Maiden Voyage: The Senzaimaru and the Creation of Modern Sino-Japanese Relations 9780520959170

Table of contents :
Contents
List of Illustrations
Introduction: Situating 1862 in History and Shanghai in 1862
1. The Armistice, Shanghai, and the Facilitator
2. Japanese Plans and the Scene in Nagasaki
3. Getting to Nagasaki, Loading Cargo, and the Voyage to Shanghai
4. Coming to Terms with the City of Shanghai and Its Inhabitants
5. Westerners in Shanghai: Th e Chinese Malaise
6. Opium, Christianity, and the Taipings
7. Dealings with the Chinese Authorities
8. Preparing for the Trip Home
9. Subsequent Missions to China in the Late Edo Period
10. The Senzaimaru in Fiction and Film
Conclusion: The Senzaimaru in History
Appendix: Japanese and Chinese Texts
Notes
Glossary
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

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The publisher gratefully acknowledges the generous support of the Philip E. Lilienthal Asian Studies Endowment Fund of the University of California Press Foundation, which was established by a major gift from Sally Lilienthal, and the generous support of the Humanities Endowment Fund of the University of California Press Foundation.

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Maiden Voyage

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Maiden Voyage the senzaimaru and the creation of modern sino-japanese relations

Joshua A. Fogel

university of califor nia pr ess

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University of California Press, one of the most distinguished university presses in the United States, enriches lives around the world by advancing scholarship in the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences. Its activities are supported by the UC Press Foundation and by philanthropic contributions from individuals and institutions. For more information, visit www.ucpress.edu. University of California Press Oakland, California © 2014 by The Regents of the University of California Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Fogel, Joshua A., 1950–. Maiden voyage : the Senzaimaru and the creation of modern Sino-Japanese relations / Joshua A. Fogel. p. cm.—(Philip E. Lilienthal Asian studies imprint) Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 978-0-520-28330-5 (cloth : alk. paper) isbn 978-0-520-95917-0 (ebook) 1. Japan—Foreign economic relations—China. 2. China—Foreign economic relations—Japan. 3. Japan—Foreign relations—1600–1868. 4. China—Foreign relations—1644–1912. I. Title. II. Title: Senzai Maru and the creation of modern Sino-Japanese relations. III. Title: Senzaimaru and the creation of modern Sino-Japanese relations. HF1602.15.C6F64 2014 382′.95105209034—dc23 2014006512 Manufactured in the United States of America 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

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In keeping with a commitment to support environmentally responsible and sustainable printing practices, UC Press has printed this book on Natures Natural, a fiber that contains 30% post-consumer waste and meets the minimum requirements of ansi/niso z39.48–1992 (r 1997) (Permanence of Paper).

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To Philip Kuhn and Akira Iriye

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con t en ts

List of Illustrations ix Introduction: Situating 1862 in History and Shanghai in 1862 1 1

The Armistice, Shanghai, and the Facilitator 10

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2 3

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Japanese Plans and the Scene in Nagasaki 31

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Getting to Nagasaki, Loading Cargo, and the Voyage to Shanghai 51 Coming to Terms with the City of Shanghai and Its Inhabitants 69

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Westerners in Shanghai: The Chinese Malaise 76 6

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Opium, Christianity, and the Taipings 96

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Dealings with the Chinese Authorities 118 8

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Preparing for the Trip Home 134

Subsequent Missions to China in the Late Edo Period 142 10

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The Senzaimaru in Fiction and Film 170

Conclusion: The Senzaimaru in History 187 Appendix: Japanese and Chinese Texts 195 Notes 211 Glossary 243 Bibliography 259 Index 285

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i l lust r at ions

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

Sketch of Senzaimaru with characters x T. Kroes, A. F. Bauduin, and A. J. Bauduin 23 Matsudaya Hankichi’s sketch of the Senzaimaru 39 Takasugi Shinsaku 53 Matsudaya Hankichi’s rendition of the Senzaimaru keeling 60 Hibino Teruhiro’s sketch of the Saddle Islands 61 Takasugi Shinsaku’s sketch of an Armstrong cannon with notes 84 Replica of the pistol purchased by Takasugi Shinsaku in Shanghai 92 Takasugi Shinsaku’s notebook from brush conversation with Chinese scholar 98 Nōtomi Kaijirō’s sketch of a local brave 110 Wu Xu 119 Drawing of Wang Renbo 164 Publicity poster for Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru 174 Godai Tomoatsu 176 Bandō Tsumasaburō (as Takasugi Shinsaku) and Mei Xi (as Shen Yizhou) 182

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figure 1. Sketch of Senzaimaru with characters.

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Introduction situating 1862 in history and shanghai in 1862

this book is focused primarily on the year 1862 and the events in that year leading up to the first official meeting of Chinese and Japanese in over three centuries.1 The year 1862 was much like any other year, only different, as most years are. The previous year is probably more famous now with the first inaugural of President Abraham Lincoln (1809–1865), followed soon by the commencement of the American Civil War after the South’s attack on Fort Sumter (South Carolina) on April 12, while across the globe Tsar Alexander II (1818–1881) freed the Russian serfs from centuries of servitude in early March. Nonetheless, 1862 was to be the first full year of the War Between the States, featuring the most famous naval battle in US history to that point between two ironclads, the Union’s Monitor (launched January 30) and the Confederacy’s Merrimack (launched March 8), in the Battle of Hampton Roads on March 9. Later that year, on June 19, the government of the United States (finally) outlawed slavery, though the Civil War would drag on with horrendous loss of life and destruction for another three years. The Battle of Antietam (Maryland) on September 17 resulted in some 23,000 casualties, the bloodiest single day in all US history. Five days later on September 22, Lincoln announced that on January 1 he would issue what has come to be known as the Emancipation Proclamation, freeing over three million slaves in the states then in revolt. Many other battles would be fought over the course of the year. In order to help finance the Civil War, the US government instituted the first income tax in 1861 and the following year the Internal Revenue Service came into existence. President Lincoln introduced paper currency on February 25, 1862, over a millennium after it was first issued in China during the Tang dynasty (618–907). Undoubtedly also related indirectly to the war, 1

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the first telegraphic hookup between New York and San Francisco was established on November 6. In 1862 many cultural figures of note were born (such as Gustav Klimt, d. 1918, in Austria) and many died (such as Henry David Thoreau, b. 1817). While at least the free states in the United States were celebrating Independence Day on July 4, that very day Lewis Carroll (Charles Dodgson, 1832–1898) “extemporized” the stories that would become his classic Alice in Wonderland. Late that spring and summer also witnessed what would have been an extraordinary event, had it been true, when Fyodor Dostoevsky (1821–1881) made a grand tour of Europe and “interviewed” Charles Dickens (1812–1870)—it turns out to have been an elaborate hoax.2 Dostoevsky had published Notes from the House of the Dead just eighteen months before, and Dickens had published Great Expectations in 1861. The whole tale of this meeting of master novelists ultimately was too good to be true. Meanwhile in China the Taiping Rebellion had been raging for over a decade by 1862, but the rebels, once poised to topple the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), now lacked most of their original leadership and were losing ground with each passing day. After besieging Shanghai with its large foreign community on several occasions in the first half of 1862, the Qing armed forces, with assistance from the American adventurer Frederick Townsend Ward (1831–1862) and his Ever Victorious Army, handed the Taipings a stunning defeat in the Battle of Cixi at a site some ten miles outside Ningbo. Ward was shot in the fighting on September 21, and he died the next day. As we shall see, the Taiping forces attacked in the outskirts of Shanghai a few days after the central event of this book transpired, and the Japanese visitors to China were unexpectedly close, if not quite direct, witnesses to it. The Taipings, however, soon withdrew from the city on the orders of their leader, Heavenly King Hong Xiuquan (1814–1864), to help defend their Heavenly Capital, the occupied city of Nanjing. The Xianfeng Emperor (r. 1851–1861) had died in August 1861, and he was succeeded by his five-year-old son, the Tongzhi Emperor (r. 1862–1874). Obviously the boy was too young to rule the empire, so it was at this point that his mother, the infamous Empress Dowager Cixi (1835–1908), among others took over the actual running of government (Queen Victoria [1819–1901] was coincidentally widowed in 1861 and would begin her long personal reign thereafter). China’s first modern foreign office, the Zongli Yamen was founded in March of 1861, and it would become an increasingly important institution with the passage of time; it held ultimate responsibility for handling the 2

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Japanese who showed up in 1862 in Shanghai unannounced. And, the famed Tongzhi Restoration would begin in earnest in that year of 1862.3 Among the more ignominious distinctions characterizing 1862 was the incidence of the first attempted seizure by pirates of a steamship, the Iron Prince. Pirates were, of course, nothing new, having been part of the coastal presence in China for many centuries, but they had always been limited technologically to hijacking sail ships. The year 1862 thus marks the start of a new style of corsair activity, disabusing any notion that the speed enabled by steam would make ships impervious to such predation. In Japan the bakumatsu period had already begun in 1862, although no one knew that the Tokugawa regime was slated to exit the stage of history before the decade was done. The first mission to the Western world had taken place in 1860 when a large group of Japanese traveled to the United States aboard the Kanrinmaru to ratify the Treaty of Kanagawa imposed on Japan by Townsend Harris (1804–1878). They allegedly navigated the Dutch-built vessel themselves, although accompanied by the American naval officer John Mercer Brooke (1826–1906) and effectively convoyed with the USS Powhatan. On the diplomatic front, 1862 began well with the first Japanese embassy to Europe setting sail from Shinagawa on January 21. Nonetheless, the last fi fteen years of the shogunate witnessed numerous assassinations of reformist or high-ranking samurai, and virtually anyone in government who was prepared to yield at all before the Western powers or appear even slightly to contradict an imperial command risked being mercilessly cut down. A British merchant by the name of Charles Lennox Richardson (1834–1862) was on his way home to London from his commercial base in Shanghai when he stopped over in Yokohama. On a sightseeing tour with three other Westerners on September 14, he was attacked and killed by a member of the retinue of a Satsuma domainal person of importance for failing to yield the right of way. Despite being protected under extraterritoriality, his behavior was perceived as disrespectful and deemed cause for his murder near the village of Namamugi, now part of Yokohama. The incident led to serious diplomatic and military repercussions for Japan.4 The year 1862 was, as noted, slated to be different from all other years, despite being so similar in many other ways. The alternate attendance system, a defining characteristic of the Tokugawa political settlement, came to an end in October; with the opening of several ports a few years earlier, that effectively was a resounding death knell for the Tokugawa regime, as it had constituted itself in the seventeenth century. Yet, many regimes have 1862 i n H i s t or y a n d S h a ng h a i i n 1862

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historically reformed themselves institutionally into something that would be unrecognizable to earlier figures in them. In other words, it may not have been inevitable and it certainly was not crystal clear in 1862, but the Tokugawa regime was in any event not long for this world. That the Qing dynasty would last exactly another half century, especially after surviving the Taiping Rebellion, was, indeed, something of a miracle, and it too would be overthrown by a revolution while in the process of fundamentally reforming itself. It is important neither to overstate nor underestimate the significance of the voyage of the Senzaimaru to Shanghai. Chinese and Japanese had been meeting all through the previous three centuries. Those interactions were the result primarily of Chinese merchant vessels sailing to Nagasaki and were mediated by the rigid system placed on them upon arrival in that port, the only one open to them, but the image of Japan as a “closed country” has now been shown to be greatly exaggerated when applied to the entire Tokugawa era. Many Chinese artists, painters, doctors, and other professionals sailed on those merchant ships and visited Nagasaki for shorter or longer periods of time, and there they frequently met with their Japanese counterparts.5 There were as well a relatively small number of Japanese who inadvertently ended up in China due to their fishing ships being blown off course or in some other way becoming castaways. Many of them perished at sea, and few were ever able to repatriate. There were also a small but not insignificant number of Zen monks who came to China throughout the period of otherwise interdicted travel. What made the 1862 meeting different was the official nature of the event. The Japanese aboard the Senzaimaru were largely a motley, if fascinating, crew, but there was also a team of shogunal officials aboard charged with meeting their Chinese counterparts and assessing the possibilities for opening commercial and perhaps diplomatic ties down the road. Although laden with merchandise, the Senzaimaru was not terribly successful commercially during its sojourn in Shanghai, but on the state-to-state front it did far better, and the latter was its primary mission. The Qing regime wanted to restrict diplomatic relations and turned down the Japanese request for a consulate in Shanghai; nonetheless, the 1862 meeting proved the initial first step in a process leading not only to the first modern treaty between the two countries, the Treaty of Amity of 1871, but to the first completely equal treaty in the system of international law within East Asia. And, with it would eventually come a consulate. We begin by looking at the prehistory of the Senzaimaru, the vessel that brought the Japanese to Shanghai. In the early 1860s, the Japanese had no oceangoing vessels; indeed, they had no need for any. So, where did this ship 4

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come from? We move then to examine the planning undertaken by the bakufu (shogunal government) and local officials in Nagasaki (and, to a lesser extent, Hakodate) and to assess who the Japanese on board were and how they were so privileged. We shall also describe the perilous voyage they made to Shanghai in the late spring of 1862. Once in Shanghai, the major Japanese players fan out to examine this city each in his own way, although often in small groups. The shogunal officials have several meetings with the local circuit intendant and with their intermediary, a Dutch businessman and diplomat by the name of Theodorus Kroes (1822–1889). Others search out as much information as possible on the Taiping Rebellion, while yet others (some making purchases) assess the market opportunities that Shanghai, and extrapolating to China more generally, might present Japan. From those who have left us accounts of their experiences, we know of numerous “conversations” (done by brush, as will be explained later in detail) with Chinese in their efforts to get answers to their countless questions. With a close reading of their writings and especially their interactions with Chinese, we can proceed to identify the concerns that most troubled or simply consumed the Japanese: opium use, Christianity, the Western powers, Taiping rebels, and other pressing issues. In every instance, they were actually more focused on the future of Japan as viewed through the mirror of China. All the ills witnessed in China were to become negative object lessons for the Japanese. One murky question we need to pose from the outset, though by no means at all easy to resolve, is just how they conceived of themselves. Were they present on this mission as representatives of their respective domains? Or, did they think of themselves as Japanese nationals? In clearly discernible instances, several of them acted first and foremost on behalf of their domains, and there was no love lost between many of them and the shogunal officials representing the bakufu aboard the Senzaimaru. There are, however, any number of instances—especially when finding fault with China’s apparent weaknesses and subservience to the Westerners—when they compared themselves “as Japanese” favorably to their hosts. When three of the crew members died in Shanghai, several authors of travel narratives wrote puzzlingly about how to deal with death “away from home,” a problem many generations of Japanese had not had to consider. There was no way to transport them home, and their bodies were cremated and buried far from their family and ancestors. What “Japan” meant to them is difficult to extract, but it was as much a cultural entity, a body with a history, as it was not a modern 1862 i n H i s t or y a n d S h a ng h a i i n 1862

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nation-state with a modern military, centralized government, and uniform educational system—not (as yet) by a long ways.6 The ills they perceived among the Chinese and what they took to be ineffective responses to them did not lead the Japanese—at least those who wrote about their trip—to belittle or impugn the integrity of the Chinese people or culture. They may have hated the Qing regime or even pitied the Chinese, and they certainly disagreed with many of the measures being taken by the Chinese authorities, but there is no evidence that this voyage marks the beginning of Japanese denigration of China and the Chinese. If they found fault with China and the Chinese, the metaphor of a younger, healthier sibling wanting to see an older sibling recuperate his or her strength and former prowess would be more fitting. The circuit intendant of Shanghai made it clear that the Senzaimaru would be allowed to stay in Shanghai only long enough to dispose of its cargo, and then promptly make its way back to Japan, and the Japanese were not to “rashly” attempt another unannounced entrance into any Chinese port. With their foot in the door, though, there was no denying the Japanese subsequent entrée to China. They were back less than two years later, and we shall look at the mission of the Kenjunmaru in late winter of 1864 and other early contacts. By the end of the decade the stage was set for full diplomatic ties, and all in the space of less than a decade. By then our story will be winding down. Scholarship on the voyage of the Senzaimaru was pioneered by the groundbreaking work of Okita Hajime (1905–1985). As a student in the 1920s at Kyoto Imperial University, Okita majored in English and American literature, especially the novels of Henry James (1843–1916), whose often turgid style apparently proved no impediment to Okita—he would later translate two works by and pen two studies of the Anglo-American author.7 In January 1933 he accepted a job teaching English at the Japanese Senior High School for Girls in Shanghai, a school established by the Japanese Residents Association of Shanghai (Nihon kyoryū mindan) or JRA in 1920.8 In February 1942 he moved over to the Shanghai Senior Commercial School for Girls, also established by the JRA (in 1940).9 As he became an upstanding member of the Japanese community of Shanghai, he became increasingly disappointed in the inexplicable lack of interest of his fellow Shanghai Japanese in the history of their own community and the apparent irrelevance of it to their lives. It was as if they were in a holding pattern, just waiting for the correct moment to return to Japan and start a 6

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proper life where it truly mattered, a pattern not unlike that of other expatriate communities in China and elsewhere (referred to by some as perpetually sitting on one’s suitcases or never unpacking one’s suitcases). He wrote many articles for the Japanese press in Shanghai, especially Tairiku shinpō (Mainland news) over the 1939–1945 period, and in the spring of 1941 he led the way in launching the Shanghai History and Geography Research Group (Shanhai rekishi chiri kenkyūkai). Although Okita appears to have done the lion’s share of the group’s work, one senior figure was Ashizawa Shunnosuke (1907–1985). Ashizawa, born in the city, had left to study in Japan, but then returned to Shanghai and lived there for many years, running the family printing business inherited from his father, Ashizawa Tamiji (b. 1875), who had settled in Shanghai in 1903. The objectives of Okita’s research group were to investigate sites around the city of concern to Japanese history there, collect documents, publish research in various ways, and hold periodic meetings, workshops, and exhibitions; an office was set up in the headquarters of the Japanese Youth Association with Ashizawa in charge of cultural affairs.10 Throughout the early 1940s, Okita produced a stunning quantity of highquality scholarship. To be sure, he had extraordinary access to materials and his linguistic background was perfectly suited to the topics at hand—in addition to the high level of his English, often necessary to understand the idiosyncratic prose of articles in the North-China Herald and the Chinese Repository from the nineteenth century, he was equally adept in literary Chinese and many varieties of Japanese. He first tackled the origins and history of Shanghai toponyms and changing street names, which led to a short volume, and that project soon took him into the entire history of the Japanese community of Shanghai.11 Over the summer of 1941 he traveled to his alma mater in Kyoto to visit the eminent linguist and scholar Shinmura Izuru (1876–1967); he presented Shinmura with his volume on place names, and Shinmura gave him a copy of his own recently published collections of essays entitled Ensei sōkō (Studies of the far west). Okita then traveled on to visit Mutō Chōzō (1881–1942) at Nagasaki Senior Commercial School (now Nagasaki University); Mutō had published in the 1920s several important studies on the earliest Japanese ventures to visit China during the 1860s, and he gave Okita a manuscript copy of the diary of one of the Senzaimaru travelers to China, Matsudaya Hankichi.12 The first fruits of his group’s research were collected in Shanhai kenkyū (Shanghai studies), published in February 1942 in what was to become a periodical, although no subsequent issues ever appeared. Okita’s first 1862 i n H i s t or y a n d S h a ng h a i i n 1862

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comprehensive study was published there, as was the Matsudaya diary. The publisher was the famed Uchiyama Bookstore, owned since 1917 by Uchiyama Kanzō (1885–1959), who was just as famous as the close friend of Lu Xun (1881–1936). As background reading, Okita began assiduously to read back issues of the North-China Herald at the library of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society. When the Pacific War commenced at the end of 1941, this site was closed by the Japanese army, and Okita began to use a library in the Xujiahui section of the city now under Japanese occupation. This research led him to write a short book, entitled Shanhai hōjin shi kenkyū (Studies of the history of Japanese in Shanghai), which appeared in May 1942 and was only printed in thirty copies.13 Although only thirty-seven years of age, in September 1942 Okita quit his teaching post and assumed a position as researcher for the Kachū kō-A shiryō chōsajo (The Asian development document research institute of central China), which was established by the Japanese government in November of that year. Now a full-time researcher, he published his major study, Kojō shi dan: Shanhai ni kansuru shiteki zuihitsu (Tales from the history of Shanghai: Historical notes about Shanghai), in December and Nihon to Shanhai (Japan and Shanghai) with the same publisher the following December.14 Okita continued to work for this research outfit until August 1945, and he was briefly employed as an interpreter by the Japanese military police, perhaps not by his own choice but in any event guaranteed not to stand him in the best stead in the immediate postwar era. He was repatriated to Japan in March 1946 after thirteen years spent in Shanghai. Although he would occasionally thereafter publish something concerned with the topics that had so consumed him in the first half of the 1940s, he effectively stopped doing so after the war. He wrote mostly from that point about British literature and published several textbooks for teaching the English language. His last position was at Ryūkoku University in Kyoto (1976–1981).15 He was not the first scholar to address the issue of the Senzaimaru, but over the course of his intensive research on Japanese connections to the city of Shanghai, he addressed it any number of times, and his two-part article of 1947 opened the postwar academic study of this topic.16 The fact that the story of the Senzaimaru is as well known in Japan as it is unknown elsewhere owes much to Okita’s pioneering work. The story in Japan has been treated in historical fiction and portrayed in television dramas (see Chapter 10), though outside Japan it remains to be told, with some Chinese scholars beginning in recent years to address the topic.17 8

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I have myself written several essays on the voyage of the Senzaimaru over the past two decades, and this volume is built upon their foundation and on all the Chinese and especially Japanese scholarship that has been produced since.18 I was also able to make a few discoveries of my own while using the archives of the National Maritime Museum (NMM) in Greenwich, England, and in communication with archivists in the Netherlands. The relatively recent discovery of official Chinese documents deriving from the meetings of the Japanese shogunal officials with the circuit intendant of Shanghai and their translation into Japanese have been an entirely salutary addition to the scholarly materials available. In this sense, then, the fact that the reading and writing necessary for the completion of this book have taken so long has been accompanied by beneficial by-products. Thanks are due to all the men and women in the Netherlands who answered my e-mail messages and letters, and especially to Herman Moeshart for providing me with the letters (and their translations) used in Chapter 1 and information cited elsewhere, and to Wil Furrer-Kroes, the Kroes family genealogist, who provided me with a five-generation chart ending with Theodorus and his children. Thanks as well to Michel Hockx, Hans van de Ven, and Anna Korteweg for help with individual Dutch terms. Also, special thanks are due to my old friend Peter Zarrow, who saw to it that I received a full set of the indispensable documents from the Zongli Yamen archives, used primarily in Chapter 9. Thanks are due as well to Kirk Larsen and Richard Rigby, the two readers for the University of California Press, both of whom provided helpful comments. And, thanks as well go to Robert Bickers and the University of Bristol for facilitating use of the image on the cover. A note on the appendix. In order to make the text as transparent as possible, I included at an earlier stage as much of the original texts immediately following their citations as I could; this includes the various travel writings of the Japanese aboard the Senzaimaru and the official Chinese memoranda that went up and down the food chain in the Qing bureaucracy, among other such writings. These have now been removed to an appendix, and alphabetic note references can be found in the text following the translated citations. I am dedicating this book to Philip A. Kuhn and Akira Iriye, my first teachers of East Asian history at the University of Chicago over forty years ago and consistent supporters of my work over these decades. When they left Chicago for another university, they broke the mold.

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on e

The Armistice, Shanghai, and the Facilitator

because of the tokugawa shogunate’s ban on sea travel on pain of execution for over two centuries, by the 1860s Japanese had little training available for building or sailing ocean-worthy vessels. Fishing boats along the coastal waters of the archipelago and along inland rivers were certainly present, but these boats could never sail far on the ocean and their size was restricted. Those that lost their mainsails or were for some other reason castaway from shore were lucky to be picked up at sea by foreign sailors; they, then, often found it difficult or, indeed, impossible to return to Japan because, through no fault of their own, they had violated the ban on sea travel. When the large party of Japanese sailed aboard the Kanrinmaru to the United States to ratify the United States–Japan Treaty of Amity and Commerce in 1860,1 the accords that had been signed aboard the USS Powhatan in 1858, this was the first time that any Japanese—there were a total of ninety-six Japanese nationals in the shogunal party—had purposefully crossed an ocean. It would still be several years before they would actually navigate the vessel entirely by themselves. Traveling to and from mainland Asia or to the islands in Southeast Asia was considerably less difficult, though certainly treacherous at times, and indeed Japanese had sailed for commercial, cultural, and religious reasons to China and Korea over the course of many centuries—though not always with navigational success—from at least the first century of the Common Era. They had also traveled to many places in the Philippines, Viêt Nam, Champa, and Cambodia. Those precocious seagoing efforts, however, came to an abrupt end in the middle of the seventeenth century, and by the middle of the nineteenth the Japanese had considerable catch-up to play in the field of navigation. 10

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Although they took to it like gangbusters and had in fact been keen observers of foreign ships and navigational techniques in the years leading up to the opening of ports, when the Japanese government set out on its own in the early 1860s to establish commercial and diplomatic ties with China, they were still not quite ready to go it alone. Within two years’ time, though, they would be. And, even when they eventually could sail a ship on the open seas, they remained a fair distance from being able to build one. Thus, the Japanese government’s decision to launch the first mission across a large body of water—cart before horse, one might say—preceded the ability to build or navigate a ship on such a voyage. The Western powers were forcing themselves on Japan, and the shogunate wanted at all cost to avoid the fate already visited on China. Even with limited access to information about the outside world, the principal lesson learned from China’s resistance to Western pressure and subsequent losses in fighting and sovereignty was simple: join the club before the members brand you as one of those others. One of the leaders of the Liberal Party, Sugita Teiichi (1851–1929), put it most succinctly after an 1884 visit to China: “Westerners have come [to East Asia], fighting for their interests, each wanting to assert hegemony. We lie within the contested sphere and are wondering if we should be their main course or if we should move forward and join the guests at the table. It is certainly better to sit at the table than to be served as the entrée.”a, 2

prehistory of the senzaimaru Before the Senzaimaru existed as such, there was a British vessel named the Armistice. Lloyd’s Register of British and Foreign Shipping for 1856 lists the Armistice for the first time: no. 875, owned by one J. Longton, “destined voyage: Sld. S. Amer.” (in other words, moving between Sunderland in Great Britain and South America). It had been constructed in 1855 in the shipyard of one R. Wilkinson in the major British shipbuilding center of Sunderland on the northeast coast of England.3 There is a slightly earlier record of the Armistice in the daily Lloyd’s List (now extant solely in hundreds of pages in a handwritten edition on microfiche at the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, England), a daily accounting of all British ships sighted in ports around the globe. It puts the Armistice at the port of Deal on the English Channel about eighty miles east of London, arrived on July 30, 1855, and set to sail for Montevideo (capital of the then-young country of Uruguay); its A r m i s t i c e , S h a ng h a i , a n d t h e Fac i l i tat or

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master’s name is given as “Peace” (“H. Peace” in subsequent editions of Lloyd’s Register). Over the next three years, this information remained fairly stable. It was listed as a barque (also spelled bark), a relatively small, oceangoing, squarerigged vessel with three masts. It weighed 358 tons—sometimes given as 374 tons, but this must represent additional material taken on board—was sheathed with yellow metal and marine metal, and measured 111 feet, 5 inches in length, 25 feet, 5 inches in breadth, and 16 feet in depth.4 We glean from Lloyd’s List over its first few years that the Armistice’s circumstances were slowly beginning to change. As early as 1856 it was sailing not only between Deal and Gravesend (at the mouth of the Thames River east of London) and South America, but to Colombo, capital of Ceylon (presentday Sri Lanka) off the coast of India, Table Bay (near Cape Town, South Africa), and the island of Mauritius in the Indian Ocean; in 1857 it added Cochin (along the west coast of India), and other ports as well. The ship’s captain is occasionally given as “Pearse,” though this may be a misprint.5 From mid-December 1858, when it was at Gravesend, through early November 1859, when it was spotted at Deal and departing for San Francisco, the Armistice simply disappears from the records of Lloyd’s List. It may have put in for repairs, or simply evaded notice, though the latter is less likely. In Lloyd’s Register for 1859 it was listed as belonging to the port of Liverpool. The change of principal ports from which it operated may have had to do with a change in owners—now a “J. Sullivan.” Its “destined voyage” was given as “Lon. C.G.H.” (London–Cape of Good Hope), and its master as “H. Peace.” For the first time, on November 2, 1859, Lloyd’s List gives “Richardson” as the ship’s captain, and we learn as well that the Armistice is sailing between Deal and Gravesend in Britain and various ports—San Francisco and Vancouver—on the west coast of North America. Then on November 9, 1859, it is listed in Gravesend as “put back for San Francisco (with damage).”6 Something significant, though for now lost to history, must have transpired in the commercial plans of the owner and captain of the Armistice, as from this point on, the ship made no further trips to Africa or the Indian subcontinent; through most of 1860, it sailed between London and ports along the west coast of North America: Puget Sound and Port Townsend in Washington state, San Francisco, California, and Victoria in British Columbia, and one trip to Valparaiso along the coast in central Chile. Again, a major shift with consequences that could not have been foreseen at the time took place with the New Year, 1861. At the very end of 1860, 12

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December 15, Lloyd’s List notes that the Armistice was in the port of Shanghai where it had been for over two months. This information was also reported in the North-China Herald; it is the first sighting of the ship calling at any East Asian port, but there it would remain for the rest of its life. The newspaper reported in early October that it was under the command of Captain Henry Richardson and was carrying a cargo of “Spars, &c.,” meaning material made of wood or metal used to support the sails on the vessel, and in late October it gives “Harkort and Co.” as its consignees. Lloyd’s List makes no mention of it, but the North-China Herald notes that it arrived in Shanghai again on January 9, 1861, coming from Nagasaki (the first mention of a Japanese port, opened to the British in 1859), and that its consignee was now A. R. Tilby.7 Throughout the year 1861, the Armistice sailed back and forth between Nagasaki and several Chinese ports: Wusong (five times), Shanghai (six times), and Xiamen (twice).8 On one of its trips from Nagasaki, arriving in Shanghai on March 8, 1861, the ship’s cargo is given as “sundries,” as it would be on a number of occasions later in the year. Early in 1862 it arrived again from Nagasaki with a cargo listed as “General,” though how this differs from “sundries” is not easily discernible.9 The Armistice was not the first vessel in East Asian waters transporting goods between Shanghai and Nagasaki; the North-China Herald lists a number of ships doing it from January 1859 (the very month Japanese ports opened to Western trade), such as the Thetis, the Tung Yu, and the Eastern Star.10 It was not the first British ship to do so on a regular basis, that honor falling to the 700-ton steamship Azof (occasionally reported as Azoff ) of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, which commenced this service on August 31, 1859, and required but a four-day journey each way.11 Soon thereafter two other P&O steamships began the same service: the 812-ton Aden (boasting it could make the trip in three days) and the 816-ton Cadiz.12 Captain Richardson sailed the Armistice into this mix of British and other foreign vessels, in addition to the numerous Chinese ships in mainland harbors, in late 1860. The next year, he would sail back and forth countless times, moving quantities of goods from one port to another, and the Armistice continued this hectic pace into early 1862, adding Shantou (Swatow) and Hong Kong to its numerous Chinese ports of call.13 After its first trip to Shanghai and Nagasaki, and even following its sale to the Japanese, the Armistice never left East Asia. By 1862, Lloyd’s Register gave Henry Richardson as the owner as well as the captain of the Armistice.14 There were several more sightings of this ship A r m i s t i c e , S h a ng h a i , a n d t h e Fac i l i tat or

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given in Lloyd’s List, but these must be mistaken, as the ship would be sold to the Japanese government before midyear. Further inaccuracies emerge in Lloyd’s Register, which continues to list the Armistice in all of its editions through 1870. Richardson and his crew surely had little idea how seminal his sale would be historically. Undoubtedly, their primary concern was with how they would get home from Nagasaki once the Armistice was transferred into Japanese hands. The names of the fi fteen crew members have disappeared from history—at least, for now—and of Henry Richardson only his name is known, nothing as yet having come to light of his city of birth or residence back in Great Britain. If he had a less common name, his traces might be more easily tracked. He (and his crew) would ultimately make the trip to Shanghai together with his wife aboard the Senzaimaru, as the Armistice was soon renamed, and then promptly vanish into the recesses of time. Even the usually reliable North-China Herald makes no mention of his leaving the city of Shanghai. As noted earlier, in 1862 the Japanese now had a ship but they still lacked anyone with the requisite knowledge or ability to sail an oceangoing vessel; as we shall soon see, they would thus hire Richardson and his crew back to get their party to Shanghai.

shanghai and the transformation from sail to steam While all of the above was underway, the nature of regional and interregional commercial shipping was undergoing a fundamental transformation. For centuries ships had sailed largely by wind power, but from the 1850s more and more shipbuilders were switching to steam. Steam required coal, and the longer the voyage over water, the more coal would have to be transported with its other cargo as well as passengers and crew— or acquired en route. For this reason, the transition from wind to steam took place over a protracted period of time, culminating by roughly 1890. Despite the great distance involved, Britain, which dominated transoceanic trade, found its steamship trade with China, after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, greatly enhanced by virtue of the expensive products—tea being the most highly valued of all—that it brought back to the home country.15 All of this notwithstanding, sail ships continued to exercise extraordinary staying power even after mid-century and the cutting of the Suez Canal.16 14

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Thus, despite decades of the presence of the steamship and the greater ease of sailing such a vessel, sail ships remained in full force through the end of the century. The Armistice was not only a pioneer in inter-Asian, SinoJapanese trade, but it was at the top of its class, even though steamships were gradually becoming ubiquitous everywhere. It was in the middle of this overlapping of technologies (wind and steam) that the Japanese acquired their first oceangoing vessel. Logic would seem to suggest that even the most up-to-date Japanese in the early 1860s understood little of the intricacies of such navigational matters, and there are no surviving records that the Japanese government officials sought to purchase a steamship but ultimately settled for a sail ship. Expense was, indeed, a priority, but technology does not seem to have played a role. Logic, however, is not a precise science and does not always lead to scientifically accurate conclusions. Charles Alexander Gordon (1820–1899), a surgeon attached to the British military, visited Japan in 1861 during a period of service in China. While in Nagasaki, he reported on the following trip: Before proceeding to the town, I visited the steam factory on the opposite side of the harbour. Having landed at a well-built pier close to it, from a native boat, I walked, unmolested or uninterrupted by any person, direct into the building. There steam machinery, such as we see in our dock-yards at home, but on a less considerable scale, was in full operation. Japanese workmen, under the superintendence of Dutch overseers, were busily engaged in manufacturing various pieces of mechanism suited to steam-engines and ship architecture. A small steamer, still on the stocks, was under the process of having steam-engines placed in her; and these, I was informed had been all manufactured on the spot. Great, however, as was my surprise at this, it was considerably increased, when I learnt that among the steam-vessels in harbour was one, named the ‘Scotland,’ if I mistake not, that was manned and worked by Japanese alone. Among other articles that were being made were axles, cranks, toothed wheels; and as I walked through the factory escorted by one of the overseers, who, by the way, was most civil, he pointed out to me an object which he informed me was the model of a steam boiler which they had begun to forge for a large-sized vessel.17

Thus, the Dutch were clearly mentoring the Japanese—who were obviously quick learners—in the construction of the next generation of sea vessels, and such a person would surely have understood the relative priorities of steam and sail for transporting goods across oceans as well as the ins and outs of commercial trade in a place like Shanghai. Shanghai was not only by far A r m i s t i c e , S h a ng h a i , a n d t h e Fac i l i tat or

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the biggest port in the region; it also was home to the greatest volume of trade. Already by 1760 it was the single most valuable port for trade through the Qing dynasty, and was engaging in foreign trade prior to the advent of the nineteenth century.18 As that century proceeded and ever more Westerners, especially after the Opium War (1839–1842) and resultant Treaty of Nanjing, settled in the city, Shanghai became a magnet for commercial interests domestic and foreign. When the Taipings ravaged nearby cultural centers over the course of the 1850s, many thousands of Chinese fled to the city for the security provided by the foreign powers. Central to China’s long Pacific coastline, Shanghai was thus pivotal in both China’s opening outward and Japan’s opening to export trade. It was also China’s closest port to Japan. Although boasting a long history, the Shanghai garrison (zhen) having been established in 1267 under the Southern Song dynasty, Shanghai County was first created in 1553 by the Ming, and in the mid- to late Ming it was attacked several times by marauding “Japanese” pirates.19 Trade between Ming-era China and Muromachi-period Japan was active and mutually profitable. It was largely carried aboard Japanese vessels operated by a series of Zen monks, beginning in the early fi fteenth century.20 In time Shanghai became the center of a thriving handicraft industry and trade. In 1685 the new Qing dynasty founded a Customs Office there to collect revenues, and by the early nineteenth century the office of Susong daotai (circuit intendant of Susong) was in place in Shanghai; this official was informally known as the Shanghai daotai. On the eve of our encounter, the population of Shanghai was estimated to be 200,000.21 Westerners had also long recognized the rising prominence of Shanghai as a port of trade. The adventurous missionary Karl Gützlaff (1803–1851) made a series of trips to China in the early 1830s, and already by that time, prior to the Opium War and the destruction of the Canton System which had limited all foreign trade to that port city, was profoundly impressed: “It will not be amiss here to remark that Shang-hae ranks after Canton in importance,” as many ships could be seen going there. And, shortly after the conclusion of the Treaty of Nanjing ending the Opium War, Robert Fortune (1813–1880) reported that “Shanghae is by far the most important station for foreign trade on the coast of China, and is consequently attracting a large share of public attention . . . . [T]here can be no doubt that in a few years it will not only rival Canton, but become a place of far greater importance.”22 The famous Russian novelist Ivan Aleksandrovich Goncharov (1812–1891) traveled aboard the Pallada as secretary to Admiral Yevfimii Vasil’evich 16

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Putyatin (1803–1883) on his fateful trip in 1853 to Japan. On the way back to Russia, the Pallada stopped over in Shanghai that November, and after some hesitation, Goncharov describes a vibrant scene: As we came nearer to Shanghai, the river became more lively. Constantly we met junks with their red-brown sails made of wood fiber . . . . Three miles before Shanghai we saw a whole fleet of three-masted merchant ships crowding both shores of the Soosung River. I counted twenty rows of ships, each with nine or ten boats. In various places there stood at anchor American ships, so-called “clipper ships.” . . . Over there was Shanghai. Ships and junks, magnificent European buildings, gilded temples, Protestant churches, gardens, all this was crowded together in a hazy mass, without any perspective . . . . Shanghai unquestionably occupies first place in the China trade. The rise in importance of Shanghai stems from its geographical situation.23

In short, if the Japanese were to move out into the world, rather than wait for it to come pouring into the home islands, it would have to investigate that outside realm and could not overly rely on foreigners of any stripe. Nonetheless, given all the disadvantages from which they began, they needed whatever advance information they could get their hands on. Someone with political and commercial knowledge and someone also with contacts in Japan was clearly the way to start.

nagasaki and shanghai Relations between Japan and China before the period in question were rarely carried out between Nagasaki and Shanghai. Japanese vessels often left from a port in Kyushu, but they more often sailed to Ningbo or Zhapu. Shanghai was a relative latecomer to receiving ships from Japan, in large part because Shanghai, for all its size and importance domestically, was likewise a relative latecomer to international trade. The earliest records we have linking Nagasaki with Shanghai are of Japanese castaways. The Treatise on Japan in the Song shi (History of the Song dynasty) mentions seventy-three Japanese who, unlucky victims of a storm at sea, washed up in 1183 (Chunxi 2) in Huating County, Xiuzhou (part of greater Shanghai). They were provided with food and money; then, in 1193 (Shaoxi 4) more Japanese of an unspecified number were blown by untoward winds and were lucky to reach both Taizhou and Huating again.24 A r m i s t i c e , S h a ng h a i , a n d t h e Fac i l i tat or

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It is unclear from this source, but one may assume that they were returned to Nagasaki. There were many such incidents over the centuries. Okita Hajime recounts one from 1761 of a group of fourteen Japanese sailors from the Sendai area in north-central Honshū who were shipwrecked in the Pacific and drifted ashore at the mouth of the Yangzi River. They were escorted to Suzhou for investigation. A man in Suzhou by the name of Chen Xiuwen had made the trip to Nagasaki any number of times, understood Japanese, and thus served as the group’s interpreter. They were then taken to Shanghai and held for a number of weeks where they became objects of intense curiosity among the local Chinese population. They were surrounded at every turn whenever they went out, making it impossible for them to walk freely about the city; they left no accounts of their time in Shanghai. After what ultimately amounted to a total of roughly six months, they were repatriated to Nagasaki aboard a Chinese vessel.25 Records of castaways or shipwreck victims are more numerous for the nineteenth century, and none of these stories is more famous than that of Otokichi (1818–1867). His peregrinations beginning in 1831 have been detailed elsewhere and need not be repeated here.26 He and a similarly shipwrecked sibling lived at different times in Shanghai and helped subsequent castaways from Japan. In the late Tokugawa years of the 1850s and 1860s, Chinese businessmen from Shanghai were living in the Hirobaba section of Nagasaki, some for business and some to escape the Taiping Rebellion. The three Nagasaki Commercial Hall merchants, introduced below, who accompanied the Senzaimaru mission consulted with these Chinese on many matters prior to their departure for Shanghai, and several are mentioned by name in the lone account we have from one of these merchants, Matsudaya Hankichi (1832–1880). With this increasingly proximate prehistory, the Shanghai-Nagasaki bond was solidified by the voyage of the Senzaimaru. Nagasaki had long been the one open port in Japan, and Shanghai was the most desired port in China. Even before there was movement of Japanese to Shanghai, from 1859 British and perhaps American vessels were transporting Japanese goods from Nagasaki to Shanghai, providing a niche market of sorts that was just awaiting Japanese to enter the fray. The linkage would continue into the 1870s with the slow establishment of the first Japanese expatriate community, consulate, and schools abroad.27 As steamships entered the travel and transport business in the region and ferocious competition for routes ensued, the temporal distance between the two cities continued to shorten. 18

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the elusive dutchman One of the great difficulties in tracing the history of the Senzaimaru is attempting to learn about the man who smoothed the way for the Japanese when they entered the port of Shanghai unannounced (and possibly illegally), but certainly without any of the necessary work prepared in advance. They had found a ready ally in a Dutch businessman and vice-consul in Shanghai by the name of Theodorus Kroes (1822–1889), who had extensive contacts with the Dutch community of Nagasaki. Although the details of his interactions with the Japanese prior to their arrival in Shanghai aboard the Senzaimaru in June 1862 remain largely unknown—no paper trail has as yet been discovered—we do know that he traveled between Nagasaki and Shanghai on a number of occasions prior to the ship’s inaugural voyage for the Japanese, and he had extensive contacts and undoubtedly an equally extensive correspondence with colleagues in Nagasaki. While we will analyze his intermediary role between the Japanese and the Shanghai daotai in a subsequent chapter, let us just say here that he personally vouched for the integrity and honesty of the Japanese in the first meeting with the daotai, although he had only just met them in person shortly before, and we know from recently unearthed documents that he also stood to make a significant amount of money for his services. As he told the Chinese officials: “For over two hundred years, our country has traded with Japan, and the friendship between us has grown profound. On this occasion, I could not prevent the officials here from coming to Shanghai on the merchant vessel of the pertinent country [putatively a Dutch ship] together with the merchants and their produce. They have gone through all the Customs procedures, and as soon as they sell all their goods, I guarantee that they will return home immediately without buying any Chinese goods.” b, 28 Who then is this guy Kroes, who emerges virtually out of nowhere in 1862, confirms to the Chinese authorities the Japanese half-truth (at best) that the ship on which they had sailed belonged to the Netherlands, and then plays such a fundamental role in facilitating the first face-to-face official meeting between Chinese and Japanese officials in centuries, leading ultimately to diplomatic relations less than a decade later? Apparently someone who actively sought to avoid the limelight, Kroes has not made it easy for historians to paint his image in any sort of nuanced way. Efforts to learn of him through the Nationaal Archief (National Archives) in Amsterdam and the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (Netherlands A r m i s t i c e , S h a ng h a i , a n d t h e Fac i l i tat or

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Trading Company) in The Hague proved completely unproductive. An archivist at the Ministerie van Buitenlanse Zaken (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) confirmed that Kroes did, indeed, serve in the Dutch consulate in Shanghai from 1860 through 1873, but she added: “We can assure you however that we have no archives on [what] you are looking for.”29 Perhaps all history, like all politics, as we are told, is local. Local archivists in the city of his birth (Dordrecht in the province of Zuid-Holland) and of his death (Echt in the province of Limburg) were able to supply a bit of information but basically only to confirm matters of his birth and death. An archivist from Dordrecht added one tidbit of miscellaneous but interesting information—that Kroes came from a Catholic family— but he remarked further on the dearth of data about our man: “Obviously he hasn’t made a big impression on his hometown as there is no other information about him to be found.”30 Despite these dead ends, the genealogical route proved more promising as a starting point, and the Centraal Bureau voor Genealogie (Central Genealogical Bureau) as well as the Kroes family genealogist, Wil FurrerKroes, were extremely helpful. Thus, one can now safely say that Theodorus Kroes was born in Dordrecht on May 17, 1822, to Hermanus (1795–1877) and Joanna Barbara Kroes (née Kicken or Kieken, 1801–1837). Hermanus was a baker by profession (as had been his own father, Dirk or Dirck, 1757–1827, before him) and later a distiller of alcohol. Joanna Barbara died in her midthirties, quite young even for the time, and Hermanus never remarried.31 No information has as yet been brought to light about Kroes’s youth or education. Although he served for some years as the Dutch vice-consul in Shanghai, what brought him to Shanghai does not appear to have been the diplomatic corps. It was frequently the case in the nineteenth century with distant consular postings that the men who served in such posts from Europe and North America were often businessmen living in a given area who functioned as diplomats on the side. Embassies and consulates to this day work overtime to support the commercial interests of their countrymen in the lands in which they reside abroad. In the nineteenth century, it was the same person who often wore two or more hats. Kroes was one such person, able to serve his homeland and himself with no apparent or, at least, perceived conflict of interest. As the archivist from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported, Kroes served as vice-consul for the Netherlands in Shanghai from 1860 through 1873. Some sources list him as consul, but the fact that his name is 20

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missing from a 1998 commemorative volume marking the bicentennial of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs would seem to indicate a position of lesser importance. Shanghai was the base of operations for his own “T. Kroes & Co.” In Chinese it was known as “Dianqu yanghang,” apparently meaning “T. Kroes Company.”32 He was, however, first and foremost the Shanghai representative of the Netherlands Trading Company, serving the ministry in an ancillary capacity.33 One might well wonder what tasks the consulate would have to perform in Shanghai at a time when the entire Dutch population in the city in the 1860s numbered, at most, two or three dozen (in a still tiny foreign population of 569, among them 295 British citizens [not including twenty-nine “Parsees” and thirty “Mohammedans,” both presumably part of the British empire] and 125 Americans, in December 1859), and there were as well a few other state commercial enterprises comparable to the Netherlands Trading Company. Timing was critical for Dutch–East Asian relations. The very year that the Senzaimaru made its historic voyage—in fact, on July 23, 1862, while the Japanese were in Shanghai—witnessed the transfer of responsibility from the Dutch Ministry of Colonies to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for relations between the Netherlands and Japan, China, and Siam.34 Like the Chinese and the Japan, the Dutch, too, were undergoing institutional modernization in international relations at this time, and that seemed to require the presence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, irrespective of the minuscule size of its citizens’ numbers in Shanghai. Kroes never gained anything remotely like prominence within the foreign community of Shanghai, in part because he never served on the Shanghai Municipal Council despite his lengthy stay in the city and undoubtedly in part due to his preference, as noted above, for the shadows over the limelight. Before taking up residence in the city, he seems to have made something on the order of a reconnaissance trip to East Asia in 1859. The North-China Herald carried several tiny notices to the effect that he had arrived on March 9 in Shanghai aboard the Formosa, a British steamship, that he arrived once again in Shanghai (from Nagasaki) aboard the Yang-tsze, a US steamer, on May 8, and that he departed Shanghai, again aboard the Formosa, on June 15 headed for Hong Kong and presumably on his way back to Europe.35 The nature of this first mission remains unknown—inasmuch he would not start his government work for roughly another year, it may have been both personal and official. Corroborating evidence for the reports in the North-China Herald comes from unpublished letters from Albertus Johannes A r m i s t i c e , S h a ng h a i , a n d t h e Fac i l i tat or

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Bauduin (1829–1890), agent of the Netherlands Trading Company in Nagasaki and, as was to be the case with Kroes in Shanghai, simultaneously soon (from 1863) to become Dutch consul in Nagasaki; most of these letters were addressed to Bauduin’s sister in Utrecht. In one such letter, dated April 6, 1859, soon after Bauduin had himself arrived in Nagasaki, he wrote: “Kroes plans to visit me in Japan and he will have to make a shift. He will not get truffles to eat and Burgundy to drink. Water is cheap here, that is something! Bread is quite good, there are chickens, potatoes are rare . . . . I am told that vegetables are available; the time for fruits seems to be over. I met Medical Officer [J. L. C.] Pompe van Meerdervoort [1829–1908], who is here in the service of the Japanese government and he will stay on for a few years.”36 In a letter three weeks later (April 17, 1859), he added: “Our friend Kroes came from Shanghai and returns there.” We have no knowledge of precisely when in 1860 Kroes settled in Shanghai, but from March 9, 1861, two years to the day after he first arrived there, and running every week for thirteen weeks, the North-China Herald ran the following notice on its front page (see also figure 2):37 NOTICE. I have this day established myself at Shanghai as Merchant and General Commission Agent under the style and Firm of T. KROES & CO. THEODORUS KROES Shanghai, 1st February 1861

Over the course of his thirteen years in Shanghai, Kroes had occasion to post similar announcements in the North-China Herald, and they offer us a small window into his otherwise highly subdued life on the Asian continent. For example, for some six months from December 13, 1862 through May 9, 1863, every issue of the North-China Herald ran the following advertisement: COLONIAL MARINE AND FIRE INSURANCE SOCIETY OF BATAVIA The Undersigned having been appointed Agents for the above-named Society, are prepared to grant INSURANCE on ORDINARY MARINE RISKS at the usual rates of the Local Offices. T. KROES & CO. Agents in Shanghai Shanghai, 1st February, 1862

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figure 2. T. Kroes (second from left), A. F. Bauduin (center), A. J. Bauduin (seated on right); others unidentified.

The above notification would appear to indicate that, at least for a brief period of time, Kroes was trying his hand at the insurance business, while continuing his service in the Dutch diplomatic corps and as shipping agent for the Netherlands Trading Company. A similar notice, initially dated April 19, 1862, and running weekly through July 26, announced that, as Dutch vice-consul, Kroes was handling all the affairs concerning the estate of the late H. A. Kramer, undoubtedly a Dutch national, who had passed away with debts outstanding.38 He was thus wearing at least three hats at the time.

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Regardless of what he had done prior to leaving for Asia in 1859, Kroes proved to be a successful businessman, largely as a shipping agent and consignee for a number of Dutch and foreign vessels calling at the port of Shanghai. He appears as well to have made regular trips to Nagasaki with its established Dutch community, though numbering now only some fift y or sixty members in the early 1860s, and he may have kept an office of T. Kroes and Co. there. He was also a bachelor—until early 1863 when, at age forty, he married Adeline Johanna Maria Carolina Heukensveld-Slaghek (1827–1876), five years his junior, in Macao. No hint is forthcoming from the family genealogy as to what a mid-thirties bachelorette was doing in the Portuguese colony outside Hong Kong, though epistolary evidence clarifies this part of the story. There is some suggestion, though inconclusive thus far, that Kroes converted to Protestantism in China, and perhaps this change had something to do with his new wife. She may have been connected to European missionary activity in the area, though this is little more than educated conjecture. The year before their marriage, A. J. Bauduin wrote his sister (July 10, 1862): Probably you will know that Miss Adeline Slaghek has married “with the glove” to Mr. N. C. Sieburgh, employed by the company of de Coningh Carst & Lels in Nagasaki, and she is probably at this moment close to Shanghai. This lady will receive a very unpleasant message: Mr. Sieburgh died on June 27 of nervous fever. He had asked me to take care of his estate which I have accepted, and it kept me quite busy these days. Yesterday I auctioned his furniture, etc., and the last thing I can do for him is to put a stone on his grave. The poor boy was not yet 35 years old. His wife will come to Kroes, and he shall have an unpleasant task to fulfi ll.

The expression “married ‘with the glove’” is Dutch argot (in use during the pre–World War II era) denoting a proxy wedding,39 but it remains unclear why, in the wake of her intended’s death, she would perforce approach Kroes. Perhaps, because she was apparently to learn of his death upon arrival in Shanghai, Kroes, as vice-consul, would be the one responsible for informing her of the sad news. Be that as it may, they appear to have hit it off rather well, despite the ill tidings conveyed, and this would explain how they would have met. Sieburgh, incidentally, was originally a Dutch naval officer, and his grave—whose stone Bauduin vowed to erect—can still be found in the old cemetery of the international settlement in Nagasaki (as can those of the Bauduin brothers).40

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From the letters of A. J. Bauduin and his brother, Dr. Antonius Franciscus Bauduin (1829–1885), director of the Nagasaki Hospital and professor of medicine at what would later become Nagasaki University Medical College, we come to learn much more straightforward and harshly frank evidence about this marriage. One letter (dated November 15, 1862) from Albertus Johannes, author of the majority of these unpublished (and unedited) letters, again to his sister back home, reports directly on Kroes’s impending nuptials: Kroes is planning to get married and can you guess to whom? The lady who came East for the late Mr. Sieburgh. According to Toon [their nickname for brother Antonius], she is not at all beautiful and of advanced age; our niece Nans Penn knows her well. Financially she is making a good swap, for Sieburgh did not have much money and our friend Kroes is keeping a carriage, not bad! I imagine this will cost quite a lot of money per month in that terribly expensive Shanghae. I am still walking and Toon keeps a horse.

The marriage lasted just shy of thirteen years, and from the small amount of extant evidence, it appears to have been a happy one. Mrs. Kroes’s brother actually went to work for T. Kroes and Co., although that was a less successful endeavor. We have a letter sent from Nagasaki by the Dutch scientist, naval officer, and photographer, Dr. Koenraad Wolter Gratama (1821–1888), dated April 18, 1866, reporting on a visit he made to Shanghai: “I was . . . quartered with Dutch Vice-Consul Kroes, where I stayed until the 12th. Kroes and his wife are likable, warm-hearted people . . . . Although I had never met these people before, I stayed with them for a full week.”41 The foreign community of Shanghai in these years rarely depicted their experiences in lustrous tones. At best Shanghai was harsh, and at worst—in the blunt words of Lord Oliphant (1829–1888) writing in 1859—it was seen as “the most unhealthy [port] to which are ships are sent, the sickness and mortality being greater here than even on the west coast of Africa.”42 Kroes confided to A. J. Bauduin in a letter of early 1864 that he was planning to leave soon for a trip home to see his aging father, who would not in any event die until 1877; in a letter (dated March 20, 1864), Bauduin reported, amid other local news: “Without a doubt Mrs. Kroes will accompany him to Europe, but if Mr. Kroes will get her back to China so easily is something else. Probably she will be more comfortable in Europe than in China, and Kroes is good enough to yield and leave her behind. I have not had the honor of getting to know Mrs. Kroes, only by reputation.” This may tell us more about Bauduin than either Mr. or Mrs. Kroes.

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A year later, Albertus Johannes wrote (June 10, 1865) to his sister from Nagasaki that Mrs. Kroes had given birth to a daughter and “her husband is delighted.” Her name was Dorine Herminie Eugenie Marie Kroes (d. 1932), born in Shanghai on June 4, less than a week before Bauduin’s letter.43 This would of course indicate that Mrs. Kroes had indeed returned with her husband to China when their visit to the Netherlands was completed. But, as if incapable of sustaining a positive sentiment for more than two sentences, Bauduin, who, like his brother, never married, went on to note: “Ladies from Shanghai are coming regularly to Nagasaki, but I hope that Mrs. Kroes will stay in Shanghai. I cannot lodge ladies with crying children.” This is the sort of harsh but brutally honest emotion for which personal letters are an exceptional source. Writing a year later (July 5, 1866), this time while he was visiting China himself, Bauduin noted: “As you will see, I traveled from Yokohama to Shanghai, and since yesterday I have been staying with the Kroes family . . . . Kroes’s child is charming, blond with blue eyes, a real Dutch product. Mrs. Kroes and Boss Kroes are doing very well. The brother of the Mrs. is employed by Kroes.” In the heat later that summer and just as he had feared the previous year, Bauduin wrote (September 23, 1866) his sister that Mrs. Kroes, together with her fifteen-month-old daughter and an Italian nanny, had been staying with him for eight weeks: “One of these days she will leave. The heat and unhealthy days of Shanghai will soon be over, so everyone is moving back to his own hearth. Kroes’s daughter resembles her father in every way, very blond and very light blue eyes.” A letter dated October 19, 1867, relayed a decidedly negative turn of events. Only age forty at the time, Mrs. Kroes’s health had taken a sharp turn for the worse after the birth of her second child, and the entire Kroes clan—parents, toddler, infant, and servants—was coming to Nagasaki; one can only imagine Albertus’s dismay at the news. After reporting this news to his sister, he added: “Kroes will probably return at once to Shanghai, but how long the wife and children will stay, I do not know. Probably 14 days, as it is gradually getting colder and she will long for Shanghai. I hope she will recover completely.” Were his best wishes on behalf of Mrs. Kroes’s health motivated by concerns for her well-being or his own selfish comforts? Impossible to say. Kroes officially remained resident in Shanghai until 1873, the last year for which the Staatsalmanak voor het Koningrijk der Nederlanden (State almanac for the Kingdom of the Netherlands) makes mention of him in the city.44 He seems, however, to have left Shanghai late the previous year. Bauduin mentioned in a letter sent from Yokohama (December 9, 1872) that “W. M. 26

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Van der Tak [agent of the Netherlands Trading Company in Yokohama] received a letter from Kroes from his residence near Lucca in Italy. He will have installed himself there, and I do not believe he will return” to Shanghai. This time, Bauduin was right, and from this time forward Kroes appears to have been living in Segromigno in the Lucca district of Italy.45 His wife’s deteriorating health was clearly the reason for the move, and she passed away on January 24, 1876, in Viareggio in the Lucca region near the west coast of Italy. The last letter that we have from A. J. Bauduin to his sister that mentions the Kroes family, dated March 20, 1874, gives the impression of warmth and sadness: The brother-in-law of Kroes, E. Slaghek, did not do very well at Shanghai. He could not stop drinking, and he was dismissed from the business . . . , and he has left for Europe, I suppose for Italy. He does not own anything and is too old to start something new or to recover from his drinking. He is a lost man and a problem for his family. Kroes does not seem to be doing very well on his property in Italy. I am sorry for them, for he always worked very hard and he deserved a quiet old age.

Kroes returned to Holland after his wife’s death, and on June 2, 1880, he remarried, this time to one Johanna Maria Josephina Mulder (1838–1916) in Venlo, Limburg province. He was fift y-seven at the time, she sixteen years his junior. They lived out their lives there. He died in nearby Echt on May 28, 1889, shortly after his sixty-seventh birthday. The second Mrs. Kroes also passed away in Echt on January 13, 1916.46

the arrival of the senzaimaru into the port of shanghai All the players outside Japan have now been accounted for. The Armistice is sailing regularly between Nagasaki and Shanghai, the very route our Japanese party of 1862 will be taking. The city of Shanghai is clearly the place to visit if one wants to get a glimpse of the Western world without going all the way to Europe or North America—all the important nations were represented in microcosm—and more specifically to see up close what the world of international trade and diplomacy looked like. And, certain details of the background of the Dutchman who would facilitate the Japanese entry into port (and profit from it nicely) have now been unearthed. A r m i s t i c e , S h a ng h a i , a n d t h e Fac i l i tat or

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The arrival of the Senzaimaru was something of a surprise for the residents of Shanghai, but the press and public must have gotten wind of it quickly, as the dock was teeming with curious Chinese and the press was ready to cover this extraordinary story immediately—in fact, one reporter sailed out to meet the Senzaimaru and get a scoop. We shall address all of these issues later. Here, we reprint the story carried in the North-China Herald that announced their arrival.47 The North-China Herald IMPARTIAL, NOT NEUTRAL SHANGHAI, SATURDAY, JUNE 7, 1862 Japan at the present time exhibits an interesting spectacle to the commercial world, quite in accordance with this age of progress. The arrival at the port of Shanghai, during the past few days, of a British-built vessel sailing under the Japanese flag is in itself an event worthy of notice. When we learn further that this ship has not only been purchased by the native government, but that she is laden with the produce and manufactures of the country for trading purposes abroad, it throws an entirely new light upon the exclusive national policy of that peculiar people. Hitherto we have been led to understand that the Tycoon and his Yaconins and the Damios who rule with despotic sway over the subjects of the empire, were not only averse to the encouragement of foreign commerce, but held in contempt those who pursued the vocations of merchants and ship-traders. So much was this understood to be the case that the representatives of the Treaty Powers assumed it as a fact which influenced them in drawing up local regulations for the guidance of foreign subjects in their intercourse with government officials. To this day it is a standing charge against Mr. Alcock, late British Minister at Yedo, that he endorsed this opinion—so offensive to upright British merchants—and thereby damaged our commercial status in Japan, by drawing a broad line of demarcation between the enterprising trader and the members of H. M. Legation. Like many other foregone conclusions, based upon superficial knowledge of superficial institutions by diplomatists and travellers, this is one of the most erroneous, if we may judge a government by its acts. While foreign powers have been exhausting all their diplomatic skill to open up the external trade of the Japanese isles—each nation vieing [sic] with the other for the possession of exclusive privileges—the astute members of the present administration, with the sanction of the Tycoon, have resolved on securing for the government the principal share of the benefits to be obtained by foreign commerce. They have observed the many advantages possessed by foreigners over themselves in trading freely with all parts of the world, in the manufactures and products of their country; and with the keen eyes of money-making people see their way to realizing larger profits on their wares than they now obtain. 28

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Imbued with this cosmopolitan spirit of free trade, the Japanese Government has made a first venture in purchasing and loading on their own account, the ship in question. She is a first-class British-built barque of 358 tons register, known on Lloyd’s list as the Armistice, and was the property of her late commander, Captain Richardson. Her timbers and spars are of the best material, and the cabin, fittings, and general appointments are unusually neat and uncommon for her size, while a better selection could not have been made for trading purposes, as she carries double her registered tonnage. For nearly two years this vessel has been trading between Nagasaki and Shanghai with marked success; and as Captain Richardson has made considerable acquaintance among the Japanese officials he had many visits from time to time, when they always expressed admiration of his ship. For nearly the last twelve months, overtures have been made and questions asked as to the sale of the vessel; and they have calculated the profits she made by referring to their Customs books after each voyage. Having made up their minds to purchase, they proceeded in the most cautious and business-like manner to ascertain the price. Then the governor of Nagasaki came on board, and after due consideration agreed to buy her in the name of the Japanese government for $34,000. This was agreed to before her last trip under British colours, and she was delivered over and paid for on her return voyage. When the transaction was concluded, the foreign residents at Nagasaki were all on the qui vive to know what the government were going to do with the ship. They were not kept long in suspense, for the authorities commenced loading her immediately with coals and the usual produce of the country, such as seaweed, isinglass, Japan ware, and a variety of commodities suitable for the Chinese market—about 600 tons in all. During this time several high officers of the government came down from Yedo to visit the ship and report to the Tycoon. One official of high rank was appointed to superintend the experiment, and proceed with eight others of lesser rank in the vessel to Shanghai. She was then named the Sen-zai-maroo, signifying “To last a thousand years,” and the Japanese colours were hoisted at her peak where the British ensign had previously fluttered in the breeze. On the 27th May she set sail, with fi ft y other Japanese passengers, consisting of inferior officials, followers and servants; also some native seamen and a naval officer to make nautical observations and receive instructions as to the management of the ship. When the governor of Nagasaki purchased the vessel from Captain Richardson he made it a sine qua non that he should remain in command for the first trip, and with his own crew conduct their first trading expedition to China; so that experienced ship-master was the first British subject commanding a Japanese ship and sailing under that flag. After a good passage of four days she arrived safely at the port of Shanghai where her presence, and that of her freight and passengers, has created much interest. Mr. Medhurst, H. B. M. Consul, paid an official visit to these “strangers from a strange land,” on board the Sen-zai-maroo, when they received him

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with every mark of respect. The interview was long, and the conversation which took place was most interesting. The Japanese made numerous enquiries concerning the trade of Shanghai, based upon statistical information. They asked concerning the Customs revenue of the port, and why it was that foreigners were employed in collecting the same; also the value of land in the Settlement, and wished to know if they could purchase any—to all of which Mr. Medhurst gave them the fullest information, and invited them to wait on him if they wished to make further inquiries for similar purposes. In return, he informed them that as he would have to report their arrival in Shanghai and his visit to them to the British Minister-plenipotentiary at Pekin, he wished to know whether they came with a view to ascertain the effects of a trading speculation or for political objects. They assured him that it was solely with commercial views that they had come, and it was probable that some of them might remain in Shanghai, and send the vessel back for a second cargo. Such are the chief points that have as yet reached us concerning this spontaneous mercantile venture of the Japanese government, which is so opposed to our former knowledge of that exclusive despotism and their traditional policy that the whole matter would seem a piece of romance but for the reality before us. To trace out the effects of this unexpected movement is a matter for grave consideration, and we shall return to the subject as we observe any fresh feature in the development of this new tree of commerce from Japan, which has just been planted by the Sen-zai-maroo.

Having devoted this chapter primarily to the Chinese side of the East China Sea, we now turn our attention toward Japan.

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t wo

Japanese Plans and the Scene in Nagasaki As the waters lap the shore, Never again will she sleep with closed doors. The waters at Nihonbashi [now] flow directly to the Thames of London.a h ua ng z u n x i a n (184 8 –1905) 1

we turn now to the japanese side of the planning for this seminal voyage out into the modern world of international commerce and diplomacy. Although there were certainly countervailing domestic forces inhibiting the Tokugawa shogunate’s efforts to engage the outside world, forces that were ready to lay down their own and many others’ lives in a vigorous effort to resist such a move, the shogunate through the good offices of the Nagasaki and Hakodate bugyō or Magistrates began investigating such possibilities from the late 1850s. Few Westerners have paid the Senzaimaru much attention, but in addition to the report in the North-China Herald cited at the end of the previous chapter, Samuel Mossman, editor of this newspaper at the time, offered the following assessment in a volume published a decade later: Japanese Government purchase a British merchantman.—While the Government officials at Yokohama were thus exhibiting their hostility to all foreign institutions, a most unexpected transaction occurred at Nagasaki, showing an appreciation of our shipping and commerce. At that port the British barque Armistice, 385 tons, Captain Richardson, commander and owner, traded regularly to and from Shanghai, with cargoes of native produce and foreign merchandise, which yielded highly profitable returns. She was in every way a smart craft, kept in excellent trim alow and aloft, with unusually good capacity for freight. The officials frequently boarded her, expressing their desire to know all about her traffic, which the captain unhesitatingly complied with. One day he was asked if he would sell the vessel, when he replied he had no objection to do so if he got a fair price. After some consideration, and exhibiting his traffic ledger, he asked for thirty-four thousand dollars, which they agreed to pay. The bargain was closed, the vessel handed over, and re-named the Sen-zai-maroo, signifying “to last a thousand years”— 31

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a class of vessel which is not to be found on Lloyd’s register. She was loaded with Japanese produce, and manned by Japanese sailors, having several officials on board, and made a safe trip to Shanghai. It was intended that this should be the nucleus of a merchant fleet under Government control, so as to compete with foreign merchantmen; but it did not succeed, and the project was ultimately given up.2

hakodate and nagasaki In the decade leading up to the voyage of the Senzaimaru, a number of domains wrote to Edo with ideas encouraging not only foreign trade but the development of a fleet of ships able to carry goods to ports nearby. For example, shortly after the first trip to Japan of Commodore Perry in 1853, the domains of Fukuoka and Hikone both called on the Edo government to launch a program of foreign trade. Long before such trade became a watchword of the Meiji regime, Fukui domain saw the connection between wealth and strength, and supported a plan for external trade that would lead to greater wealth and thus strength; in 1857 it actually called on the central government to send trading vessels to China and the West. Kagoshima domain also appealed to Edo to send commercial ships overseas and to acquire trade relations anywhere possible.3 These measures appear to have been motivated as much by the desire to enhance national wealth as to secure coastal defense. In 1860 a group of foreign affairs officials wrote the shogunate to urge the creation of a Products Office (Sanbutsukata) whose task it would be to assess the amounts of various goods turned out abroad: “If Japanese ships are then sent to China, as we have previously recommended, they will be able to take orders from Chinese merchants with confidence.” The preference for Chinese products was stressed, because those items would be more useful to Japanese if imported to Japan. They also noted the decline in the number of Chinese commercial ships calling at the port of Nagasaki, thus fortuitously creating an opening for Japanese traders to fill and simultaneously providing goods to China that would undoubtedly be needed. Other officials charged with foreign affairs concerns also supported this venture and made similar proposals.4 In March 1859, Hori Oribe no shō (Toshihiro, 1818–1860) was serving as the Hakodate Magistrate, a position established by the shogunate in the early nineteenth century (discontinued soon thereafter with the creation of the Matsumae Magistracy and then re-created in 1856 when the latter position was terminated) with an eye to the future management of Hokkaidō and 32

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with the opening of the first Japanese ports to foreign trade, of which Hakodate was one; he was the man in charge of relations with foreign traders and their vessels. Hori and three other officials—Muragaki Norimasa (1813– 1880), Tsuda Ōmi no kami (Masamichi, d. 1863), and Takeuchi Yasunori (Shimotsuke no kami, 1807–1867)—memorialized Edo on the need for Japan to move beyond inbound trade solely and to build or buy a modern ship (or ships) as a means of increasing profits from trade, to train their own crew(s) to sail it (them), to observe what products would be wise to import to China, and to learn what rules and regulations pertained there.5 Following the June 1858 signing of the commercial treaty forced on Japan by the United States, and soon followed by comparable treaties with Great Britain, Russia, Holland, and France, these officials had witnessed the flow of foreign vessels into this northern port from January 1859 and the detrimental economic impact it was having by depleting indigenous products and causing a spike in prices locally due to the resultant scarcities.6 The plan of the Hakodate Magistrate and his associates was for Japan proactively to send trading vessels overseas, rather than passively wait for foreign ships to enter its ports, and the cost of such a venture would be returned by commercial profits garnered. Japanese would also learn about navigation and international commerce in the process. The proposal noted that other nations regularly dispatched ships to China and even had merchant houses based in such ports as Shanghai and Hong Kong. Japan had no treaty relations with China, it was recognized, but that had not inhibited Chinese traders from calling for centuries at the port of Nagasaki, and the Chinese were unlikely to be terribly bothered by a Japanese ship sailing into Shanghai—it would be just one among many. Somehow, perhaps from Russian traders in Hakodate, they had learned that Russians had been actively settling the Amur River region especially in an area known as Nikolayevsk-on-Amur. Because these areas were so close to Hokkaidō, stressed the magistrate, they needed to be explored. Unlike with China, though, Japan did have a commercial treaty with Russia, so a vessel could be sent into the region, “putatively to engage in trade . . . [but also] to assess [local] conditions and the like.” b With this preamble, he and his colleagues requested—this entire proposal was couched as an ukagai or inquiry—the dispatching of a ship with such a mission. The shogunal officials initially balked at the idea of a Japanese ship sailing up the Amur River, but they looked with great favor on the idea of a trading ship being sent to China. Their reasons were not as hidebound as one might Ja pa n e se Pl a ns a n d t h e Sc e n e i n N ag a s a k i

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expect. Manchuria, the Amur River basin, and Kamchatka—all named in the memorial to the shogunate—were not exactly hotbeds of international trade. Thus, the profits from sending a commercial vessel there would be limited. On the other hand, Chinese ports offered far greater opportunities for trade. Other officials in Edo offered a compromise suggestion that a vessel first call at a port on Russian terrain near Hokkaidō and then sail on to Shanghai and Hong Kong. The shogunal elders ultimately accepted the proposal of the Hakodate Magistrate to dispatch a ship to the Amur region both to engage in trade and to assess local conditions there. Nonetheless, the shogunate did not apparently consider the matter sufficiently important to warrant immediate action, and two years later, the Hakodate Magistrate once again raised the same proposal, adding the idea of also visiting Shanghai and Hong Kong to investigate trading conditions there as well. By early 1861, when this proposal was received in Edo, the Tokugawa regime was in the throes of the loyalist, anti-foreign movement, but the idea of such a mission, especially the China part, was nonetheless sanctioned at the time. Hori Oribe no shō had already in 1858 had the wellknown shipwright Tsuzuki Toyoji (1798–1880) construct the Kamedamaru, 46-ton, two-masted schooner, and it was ready to sail in October 1859. The Hakodate Magistrate committed suicide in what was a sensational incident in late 1860, but Muragaki Norimasa assumed this post, and on May 26, 1861, the Kamedamaru under the command of Takeda Ayasaburō (1827–1880), and carrying Mizuno Shōdayu among other officials, their respective attendants, a crew of twenty men, a Russian interpreter, and a Hakodate resident, set out for Siberia—they were thirty men in all. They reached De Castrie’s Bay on June 4 and called at the port of Nikolayevsk-on-Amur on June 27; there they remained for nearly two months before departing for the return voyage on August 21, reaching Hakodate on September 2 without incident. The merchandise brought to Russia—silk, rice, soy produce, potatoes, and other sundries—were sold in Nikolayevsk, but the picture conveyed of trade there remained altogether vague, as no historical documents about their views on trading possibilities in the region remain extant.7 Still, the trip constituted many firsts in centuries: among others, a Western-style ship built by a Japanese, an overseas voyage, and an investigation of Russia. But the shogunal officials, while allowing for the value of such firsts, were more interested in Chinese ports where there was far greater commerce to engage in and thus the possibility of greater profits: “Should we successfully send a ship to Shanghai or Hong Kong, . . . [given] the enormity 34

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of the land, . . . huge profits for the nation”c were practically inevitable.8 They turned next to the Nagasaki Magistrate. His title may not convey it, but the Nagasaki Magistrate (a position established by the shogunate at the beginning of the seventeenth century) was the highest ranking local official concerned with foreign affairs in the Tokugawa shogunal government. He was ultimately responsible for the highly regulated trade with the Chinese and the Dutch and with the behavior of these foreign nationals while sojourning in his port of Nagasaki. All imported items, but especially the content of books, were closely scrutinized at the port, and anything smacking of Christianity was promptly banned and the ship that brought it duly punished. When Japan was compelled in 1859 to open the ports of Kanagawa (Yokohama), Hakodate in the north, and Nagasaki in the south to the five powers of Great Britain, the United States, Russia, France, and Holland, numerous foreign vessels sailed into these ports, most of them coming from Shanghai, with a number from Hong Kong or directly from the United States.9 In 1861 the Nagasaki Magistrate was Okabe Nagatsune (1823–1867), and in May of that year he and Oguri Tadamasa (1827–1868), a high-ranking foreign affairs bureaucrat, argued in a joint official communication that it was not a good idea to risk national dignity on unfamiliar terrain by rashly sailing into a major international port, especially as it was now well known that the Taiping rebels were then surrounding the city of Shanghai, and that Japan should initially commission a small quantity of domestic produce to be transported on a Dutch vessel sailing that way. Renting a Dutch ship was Okabe’s idea, as it would obviate the need for flying the Japanese flag. In that way, they could gauge commercial circumstances on the international stage of Shanghai, the primary task of such a mission, without endangering too much prestige or expending too much capital. Once the commercial scene in Shanghai was clarified, Sino-Japanese trade talks aimed at an agreement might be pursued. The shogunate, however, appears to have had its fi ll of stalling. Early that year the shogunate solicited opinions from foreign affairs officials for concrete plans to send a ship to Hong Kong with an eye toward observing the world of trade on an international stage. High-level officials thought Hong Kong was, effectively, a waste of time, because it was, to be sure, a thriving site of trade with a wide variety of ships calling there, but in the final analysis it could hardly compare with Shanghai and it had no produce of its own. Hong Kong was little more than an island, now a British colony, and the foreign vessels that called there did so largely to refuel and restock supplies. Their Ja pa n e se Pl a ns a n d t h e Sc e n e i n N ag a s a k i

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recommendation was to go directly to Shanghai instead, if Japan was to obtain results for all of its objectives. The same recommendation suggested that, because the Japanese had never themselves sailed as far as Shanghai, they would be wise, once a vessel had been acquired, to hire a Dutch crew and possibly even lease a Dutch ship to make the trip. Senior shogunal officials Andō Nobuyuki (Nobumasa, Tsushima no kami, 1819–1871) and Kuze Hirochika (Yamato no kami, 1819–1864) made inquiries of their own about export trade to China and wrote in February 1862 in support of Okabe’s idea of leasing a foreign vessel. Inasmuch as simply sailing into the port of Shanghai without prior approval on the part of the Chinese might be rash, to say the least, pretending to be a Dutch ship—something they would actually attempt to do—was, they argued, the more cautious route; it could prove disastrous if the Chinese saw right through the ruse, but this consideration does not seem to have been brought to bear on the discussions. Further consultations were held with the Dutch consul, and the more they talked, the more it seemed as though going to Hong Kong would not be a valuable option. The Dutch did firmly suggest, however, that obtaining a commercial treaty with the Chinese should precede all efforts to study and to engage in trade with the Chinese at Shanghai. Ultimately, Nagasaki Magistrate Okabe was instructed by senior shogunal officials to consult the owners and captains of foreign vessels in the harbor at Nagasaki and to find a “ship to go to Shanghai both to observe foreign business methods there and to experiment with [foreign] trade.”10 (The Hakodate Magistrate was similarly encouraged.) Okabe negotiated with the Dutch consul and with the representative of the Dutch Factory in Nagasaki, A. J. Bauduin, who explained rental costs for a ship, crew, guides, and towage once the ship reached Shanghai. Bauduin also made clear that it was acceptable to trade with China without having prearranged a treaty—Prussia, they were told, did just that. Okabe was then to hire a Dutch vessel and its crew at the port of Nagasaki to sail with whatever marine merchandise he had on hand, have it carry a group of Japanese (presumably to be determined), and have it report back on the state of commercial affairs in China. No emphasis whatsoever was placed on making a profit with the commodities carried to Shanghai on this maiden voyage there. In his travel diary, which actually begins before the Senzaimaru set sail in late May 1862, Nagasaki merchant Matsudaya Hankichi recounts a meeting on April 2, 1862, with the Japanese Dutch interpreter Iwase Yashirō at a teahouse; Iwase, who was to join the Senzaimaru mission in his official capacity, had already conferred with Mori Toranosuke of the Nagasaki Commercial Hall 36

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and two local merchants, all of whom would join him on the trip to Shanghai, and they learned that it would run the government $1300 “Mexican” per month to rent a two-masted, 270-ton ship, $3000 per month for a 600-ton vessel; other reports gave even higher costs. These prices were exorbitant in the eyes of the shogunate, and they switched gears, now looking to purchase a ship.11 The plan as it was coalescing, then, was to buy a ship, hire a foreign crew, send along translators, not worry about turning a profit on whatever cargo was transported for trade in Shanghai, and not fly the Japanese flag. This was to be a mission of observation masked as launching trade and hopefully consular relations with China. But, while China was of concern to the Japanese authorities, the principal objects of observation were the foreign powers, how they engaged in trade, how customs duties and the Customs Office worked, and other matters of international trade on a large scale in the modern world. There was also the ancillary issue of establishing just what the Taiping Rebellion was all about, but this ultimately became more important as an issue to the extent that it might disrupt Japan’s commercial experience in Shanghai and adversely influence any attempt at forging diplomatic ties.12 (Shogunal considerations aside, the individual travelers were extremely interested in the Taipings, as we shall soon see.) The inaugural year of trade at foreign Japanese ports, 1859, witnessed the first appearance of the three British ships, the Azof, Aden, and Cadiz, making a regular Shanghai–Nagasaki circuit, as noted in the previous chapter. These vessels and the Armistice (in Nagasaki harbor as the shogunate changed plans and decided to buy a ship outright) right behind them, among others, were making their foreign owners wealthy transporting Chinese and Japanese goods between the two ports. Indeed, before the Japanese were actually moving native produce on their own, there is evidence that certain Japanese items had already developed something of a niche market in the Shanghai area of China. One of the attendants to the shogunal officials and one of the youngest members of the entire entourage, Hibino Teruhiro (1838–1912), recounts going into a ceramics shop one day in Shanghai and finding for sale a Japanese wine cup with a figure of a Japanese beauty and Mount Fuji painted on it.13 Nagasaki was much more familiar with foreign trade because of the long tradition of receiving Chinese and Dutch vessels, albeit on a decidedly smaller scale than Shanghai. In April 1862 shogunal officials entered into talks with Nagasaki officials and local British residents about purchasing the Armistice from its owner and captain, Henry Richardson. A group of eight Japanese officials went to inspect the ship on April 10, and they soon reached a mutually agreeable price with the owner of $34,000 (Mexican) or 30,000 Japanese ryō. The Ja pa n e se Pl a ns a n d t h e Sc e n e i n N ag a s a k i

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principal buyer was the new Nagasaki Magistrate, as of June 1861, Takahashi Kazunuki (Mimasaka no kami). It was he who would “rechristen” the vessel the Senzaimaru and sanctioned the flying of the Hinomaru, the Japanese flag. It had taken the Japanese government a few years to decide on a plan of action, but once decided things quickly moved forward. Two days after the purchase, the Armistice set sail for what was to be its final voyage under that name, Captain Richardson promising to be back in a month. Good on his word, he reentered Nagasaki on May 9 and was visited three days later by the Nagasaki Magistrate, at which time the name was officially changed and the money changed hands.14

the senzaimaru and its passengers No expert drawings or photographs of the Senzaimaru (or the Armistice) survive. We only have a rough sketch by Matsudaya Hankichi that hardly does the vessel justice (see figure 3).15 Several of the eventual travelers aboard it during the voyage to Shanghai offer descriptions. Nagura Inata (1822–1901) claimed it was twenty bu in length, or roughly 120 feet, and three bu deep (eighteen feet). These measurements were approximations and not far off the mark. Takasugi Shinsaku (1839–1867) used the measures of the ken and shaku and claimed the Senzaimaru was twenty ken long (about 120 feet), four ken and four shaku wide (twenty-eight feet), and two ken and five shaku deep (seventeen feet)— again, measurements close to what we know from the official British records, cited in the previous chapter.16 In every mention of this initial voyage of the Senzaimaru, the number of fi ft y-one Japanese is always cited, but the actual names of the passengers who made the trip is more difficult to list with complete accuracy. There were high-level shogunal officials responsible for negotiating with their Chinese counterparts in Shanghai as well as with their Dutch intermediary, officials of the Nagasaki Commercial Hall, Nagasaki merchants (as this was after all a commercial venture), Chinese and Dutch interpreters, a Western-style doctor, an expert in Chinese medicine (serving as ship’s doctor for the Japanese)—all of the above with attendants (many of them highly educated young samurai from a host of different domains)—as well as cooks and deckhands. They broke down as follows: five shogunal officials from Edo with their eight attendants; seven local Nagasaki officials with their nine 38

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figure 3. Matsudaya Hankichi’s sketch of the Senzaimaru.

attendants; three bureaucrats from the Nagasaki Commercial Hall each with his own attendant; three Nagasaki merchants each with his own attendant; six cooks and supply men; and four deckhands. Because the Japanese were anxious for this mission to set sail, they hired back Captain Richardson and his crew, meaning that the Senzaimaru also carried fifteen British citizens, including Captain Richardson’s wife (the only woman aboard), the chief mate, the second mate, a carpenter, a steward, a cook, and various others. One final passenger was a Dutch merchant resident in Nagasaki by the name of Franciscus Petrus Tombrink (1832–1902), an employee of the Netherlands Trading Company.17 Tombrink served as supercargo as he was, in fact, an official of a country that actually had trade relations with both Japan and China. There were, thus, sixty-seven passengers in all.18 Their names, positions, and (where known) domains of origin follow: Shogunal officials Name

Position

Domain

Nedachi Sukeshichirō

Overseer of the Department of Finances (Kanjō ginmiyaku)

Hayashi Saburō

attendant

Aizu

Nōtomi Kaijirō

attendant

Saga

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Kaneko Hyōkichi

Itō Gunhachi Hibino Teruhiru Nabeta Saburōemon Nagura Inata Kimura Dennosuke Shiozawa Hikojirō

Nakamuda Kuranosuke Inuzuka Shakusaburō

Takasugi Shinsaku

Manager in the Department of Finances (Shihai kanjō) attendant attendant Secret Service Agent (Okachi metsuke) attendant attendant Assistant Secret Service Agent (Okobito metsuke) attendant Assistant Secret Service Agent (Okobito metsuke) attendant

Ōsaka Owari (Takasu)

Hamamatsu Edo

Saga

Chōshū

Nagasaki officials Name

Position

Numa Heirokurō

Investigator with the Nagasaki Magistrate (Nagasaki bugyō shihai shirabeyaku name) attendant attendant Supernumerary member attendant attendant Manager (Shihai sadameyaku) attendant Dutch interpreter (Oranda kotsūji)

Fukagawa Chōemon Matsumoto Uhee Nakayama Umonta Yamazaki Uhee Sakuragi Genzō Nakamura Ryōhei Yoshizō Iwase Yashirō

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Domain

Saga Kumamoto Edo Saga Awa

Hirado

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Sekitarō Shū Tsunejūrō Tōtarō Sai Zentarō Fukumatsu Omoto Kōdō Mine Genzō

attendant Chinese interpreter (Tō kotsūji) attendant Chinese interpreter (Tō kotsūji) attendant Doctor attendant

Ōmura Ōmura

Nagasaki Commercial Hall bureaucrats Name

Position

Mori Toranosuke

Head of the Nagasaki Commercial Hall (Shirabeyaku) attendant Medicinal Expert (Yakushu mekiki) attendant Commercial Hall Rapporteur (Kaisho hisshakaku) attendant

Chōzō Watanabe Yohachirō Denjirō Matsuda Hyōjirō

Uichi

Domain

Shimabara

Merchants Name

Position

Nagaiya Kiyosuke Sōkichi Matsudaya Hankichi Jinsaburō Kuroganeya Risuke Sakichi

Merchant attendant Merchant attendant Merchant attendant

Cooks Kaichi, Kichizō, Kakichi, Zenkichi, Seisuke, Hyōkichi Ja pa n e se Pl a ns a n d t h e Sc e n e i n N ag a s a k i

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Seamen and deckhands Saizō (Godai Saisuke, Satsuma), Chūnoshin (Satsuma sailor), Hachizō, Genjirō We shall have much to say in subsequent chapters about the passengers aboard the Senzaimaru, but I would like here to introduce a number of those members of the Japanese party who are not well known and offer some educated speculation as to why they were selected to make the voyage. There can be little doubt that many of the younger travelers who went as “attendants” had little to do with and shared little empathy for the shogunal officials—the feeling was undoubtedly mutual. Of the five shogunal officials aboard, we know surprisingly little of these men who held such high ranks. They were involved in the negotiations with Chinese officials in Shanghai, and their names appear in the extant Chinese documents, but nothing much stands out from their careers back home. The only name which crops up again in Japanese history of the period is that of Shiozawa Hikojirō (b. 1827), who had in an official capacity joined the large Japanese delegation aboard the Powhatan to the United States two years earlier in 1860, and was one of only two members of the group of officials to have been abroad. Though still young, the eight attendants were destined to become far more famous than the five shogunal officials upon whom they attended. Nedachi had two attendants, Hayashi and Nōtomi, the latter of whom went on to far greater fame than the former. Hayashi hailed from Aizu, one of the Tokugawa domains that found itself on the defeated side in the rebellion of 1867–1868 which toppled the regime; Aizu held out for a few more years before yielding to the new Meiji government. He studied for a time at the Shōheizaka gakumonjo (Shōheizaka Academy), the main Confucian center of learning in Edo, and later worked as an official in his home domain. After the Meiji Restoration, he opened the Hayashi Academy in Shizuoka, which was later renamed the Shizuoka gakumonjo. His domain a loser in the contestation for power several years after the Senzaimaru mission to China, Hayashi settled into a career in education near the former capital of the Tokugawa shogunate. He left no written record of the voyage. Nedachi’s other retainer, Nōtomi Kaijirō (1844–1918) from Saga, left an account of his experiences in Shanghai and will thus be an important source in subsequent chapters. He was the youngest member of the official party for whom we have dates, turning eighteen years of age, Western style, just two weeks before the Senzaimaru set sail. The son of a painter, he was adopted 42

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into the family of Nōtomi Rokurōzaemon in 1859, and the following year he moved to Nagasaki to study Nanga (Southern School)–style painting. Nedachi charged him with observing the art scene in Shanghai, and Takasugi Shinsaku wrote that he was on the 1862 mission “because he is an artist. He is still quite young.”d, 19 As he and others reported, Nōtomi was severely ill for much of his time in Shanghai with dysentery, and he was unable to walk around the city as much as he had wished and do what he had planned there. He was only able to acquire three paintings, two of which concerned the current military concerns in the city. And, because of the ever-present fear of Taiping attack, he did engage in any number of “brush conversations” (bitan, J. hitsudan or hitsugo) with numerous scholars who came to visit him (see the end of Chapter 4 for a discussion of the “brush conversation” itself). After the Restoration, he would return to Shanghai in 1869, and then go on to study oil painting in Yokohama. In 1878 he served as a judge at the First National Industrial Exhibition. He was a pioneer in the field of design in Japan.20 Kaneko Hyōkichi was placed in charge of budgetary matters for the voyage to China. Both his father and grandfather had served as aides to the shogunal astronomer, Shibukawa Sukezaemon (Kagesuke, 1787–1856), and he worked in the central government’s office of finances.21 Itō Gunhachi, attendant to Kaneko Hyōkichi, was a scholar living in Osaka. He had studied at the Shōheizaka gakumonjo at the same time as Takasugi Shinsaku, and was reputed to be a talented writer. He and Takasugi met on board the Senzaimaru by chance, though they had apparently known each other earlier. In Shanghai, he on occasion joined Takasugi in brush conversations with Chinese. Kaneko’s other attendant, Hibino Teruhiro, left two records of the trip to China, one of which is composed entirely of brush conversations. A fine practitioner of Chinese-language poetry (Kanshi), his talent in Chinese served him well in Shanghai. He was born in Takasu, a subdomain of Owari, and was later adopted into the Hibino family. In 1857 he studied in Nagoya with Hata Tsuguhisa, and two years later he moved to Edo where he entered the Ryokusei Academy of Sugihara San’yō. After returning from Shanghai, Hibino became a teacher in 1868 at the Meirindō in Nagoya, and the following year he accepted appointment from the new Meiji government and served in the Finance Ministry; he retired from the position in 1878, and from 1879 until his death thirty-three years later, he lived in Kyoto.22 Nagura Inata (Shindon), attendant to Nabeta Saburōemon, was one of the most intriguing members of this group of passengers and one of the besttraveled Japanese in the 1860s, though he has himself been the subject of less Ja pa n e se Pl a ns a n d t h e Sc e n e i n N ag a s a k i

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scholarship than many of the others.23 The characters of his name have also been read by estimable scholars as Nagura Anata,24 though I have followed Nagura Inata from those who have focused solely on him. He hailed from Hamamatsu domain and was a retainer of daimyo Inoue Masanao (Kawachi no kami, 1837–1904), a senior official in the Tokugawa shogunate with responsibility in the field of foreign affairs in these last years of the regime. Well educated in Chinese learning and literary Chinese, both of which served him well in Shanghai, he moved to Edo in 1861 to study what would become his specialty, military science. This last aspect of his interests, including descriptions and assessments of the military training of the Qing armies during the Xianfeng (1851–1861) and Tongzhi (1861–1874) years, features prominently in the accounts he left from the trip. Following the Meiji Restoration, like many who had excelled in traditional East Asian learning, he found himself with no outlet for his talents and personal profligacy led him into a series of dead ends. He nonetheless was a hard worker and was recognized as such by his superiors in Hamamatsu and elsewhere, and he served in a number of government posts, late in life assuming the head position at an academy of Chinese learning. Aside from two trips to Shanghai in the mid-1860s, he traveled to China and Taiwan three further times and to France with an official delegation (1863– 1864). Later, he taught at the Hamamatsu domainal academy, the Kokumeikan, and in the last year of his life, Nagura handed his manuscripts over to a disciple and wrote: “I have written several volumes. These are chronicles of my travels into which I have poured heart and soul with each of my trips abroad. It is my only estate. I now present them to you.”e, 25 The other attendant to Nabeta Saburōemon was Kimura Dennosuke (b. 1833). We have little information about him, save that he served as an attendant to Shiozawa Hikojirō on the journey of the Powhatan in 1860. As such, he and Shiozawa were the only Japanese aboard the Senzaimaru to have had any foreign experience prior to 1862, albeit more or less the same experience. Nakamuda Kuranosuke (1837–1916), who served as attendant to Shiozawa on this trip, was another one who, although only twenty-four years of age in 1862, went on to an illustrious career after returning to Japan that summer. Nakamuda was a military man to the core. He was sent in 1856 by the daimyo of his domain, Saga, to study at the Nagasaki Naval Training Center, which had only been established the previous year. Thereafter he worked strenuously on behalf of building Saga’s and later Japan’s naval strength. His lord, Nabeshima Naomasa (1815–1871), was especially interested and concerned with coastal defenses and avidly advocated the introduction of Western tech44

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niques into his domain’s planning. He was active in the fighting that brought the new Meiji government to power, and soon after he entered Keiō University to study English (of which he had acquired somewhat more than a smattering before the Senzaimaru voyage), later studying further in England. By the late 1870s he had risen to the rank of vice-admiral, and he went on to assume many high positions in the Japanese navy; in 1894, he was forthright in his opposition to Japan’s launching a war against Qing China, largely because he had a high opinion of the quality of the Beiyang Navy’s warships.26 And, he was dismissed from the Naval General Staff as a result. The last attendant to a shogunal official, Takasugi Shinsaku, all of twentytwo years old at the time of the voyage, is by far the most famous of all sixtyseven passengers. Numerous books, essays, websites, and several novels are devoted to his entire life story—all twenty-eight years of it, as he died of tuberculosis only a few years after returning from Shanghai—and his writings have been collected and reprinted several times. That he went in the capacity of an attendant to an official of the Tokugawa shogunate is ironic, to put it mildly. He came from one of the most anti-shogunal of domains, Chōshū, and he was one of the fiercest firebrands among the local samurai. In his late teen years, beginning in October 1857, he studied military science, Confucian texts, and anti-shogunal politics at the academy of Yoshida Shōin (1830–1859), the Shōka sonjuku, and earned the attention and great respect of his teacher. The next year he was ordered by his domain to continue his studies at the Shōheizaka gakumonjo in Edo. A favorite of the Chōshū authorities, especially Mōri Sadahiro (Motonori, 1839–1896, the adopted son of the daimyo and himself the last Chōshū daimyo), they managed to get him aboard the Senzaimaru by offering a “gift” to Shiozawa Hikojirō, who was able to have him listed as an attendant. This bribe consisted of five bolts of silk and a large quantity of fish, and it apparently worked. Sadahiro ordered him to carry out his own investigation of Chinese politics and topography: “I have learned that shogunal officials are going to trade in Chinese ports. You shall accompany them and quietly make your way to [those] Chinese ports where you shall investigate current conditions there and ways to control the barbarians there. You are then to report back to your domain!” f, 27 When Takasugi balked because he worried for his parents, his lord commanded him to go irrespective of any misgivings.28 Chōshū domainal leaders had tried to include Takasugi in the mission to Europe led by Takeuchi Yasunori (Shimotsuke no kami) that was set to leave in January 1862. Ultimately, only one person was allowed to go from the Ja pa n e se Pl a ns a n d t h e Sc e n e i n N ag a s a k i

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domain, Sugi Magoshichirō (1835–1920), but late in 1861 Takasugi learned that he would be granted permission to travel with the Senzaimaru. He left for Nagasaki in early 1862 and, due to shogunal concerns over the Taipings and other matters, he was stuck there for nearly three months.29 We shall have much more to say about Takasugi Shinsaku, but we turn now to the Nagasaki officials and their attendants. Numa Heirokurō was the leader of the delegation and the man in charge of all business transacted in Shanghai. We know something of his efforts in negotiating with the Chinese authorities, and we shall examine that aspect of the voyage in a subsequent chapter. Otherwise, he is best known to the world as the adoptive father of Numa Morikazu (1843–1890), the well-known journalist and political figure of the Meiji era. Nakayama Umonta (Jōji, 1839–1911) was a young diplomatic official and businessman who had already been studying English and Dutch in Nagasaki since 1857. For a time he was headmaster at an English-language training institute in Nagasaki. He would later study French and travel to France to study military science. After the Restoration he worked in the Finance Ministry of the Meiji government, and from late 1872 he served as a consulgeneral in Italy. Perhaps because he knew some Dutch, he roomed with Tombrink while aboard the Senzaimaru. Nakamura Ryōhei is now known to us primarily as an administrative official in Nagasaki. Iwase Yashirō served as the official Dutch interpreter on the trip. He would likely have translated between members of the Japanese delegation, on the one hand, and Theodorus Kroes and possibly Tombrink on the other, there being no other Dutchmen involved. He would surely also have been needed during the negotiations with the Chinese authorities, as Kroes is likely to have known little or no Chinese, and he is “quoted” in the extant Chinese documentation on the voyage. The two Chinese interpreters, Shū Tsunejūrō and Sai Zentarō, were undoubtedly men of distant Chinese heritage, given their surnames and the fact that virtually all Chinese interpreters were Chinese immigrants or their descendants.30 By 1862 Shū had already established a significant career as a figure in the training of Chinese-language interpreters in Nagasaki. Of Sai little is known. Miyanaga Takashi hypothesizes that this may have been an alternate name for Sai Zensuke, who began his career as an interpreter in training in 1831 and continued into the mid-1860s, but this is at best a conjecture.31 Somewhat better known is Dr. Omoto Kōdō (1821–1897), in part because his assistant left a narrative of the voyage. Omoto first studied Dutch 46

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medicine as a teenager with Suzuki Shunsan (1801–1846) in his native domain of Tahara. He moved to Edo in 1839 to further his medical training with Ōtsuki Shunsai (1806–1862) and Tsuboi Shindō (1795–1848). After several more stops, he ended up in Nagasaki in 1854 and there continued his medical education. He had earlier in 1848 been invited to Ōmura domain by Murata Tessai, the domainal doctor, and there he came to know the famed Nagayo Shuntatsu (1789–1855), pioneer in Japanese efforts to eradicate smallpox through vaccination. Ordinarily, one did not have the freedom to move around and resettle in the domain of one’s choice, but Omoto received permission to do so in Ōmura in 1850, and from 1852 he became officially in service to the daimyo. Less well known than many others, Ōmura domain was responsible for the city of Nagasaki, where most foreign contacts throughout the Edo period transpired and from whence the Senzaimaru sailed.32 On the whole unable to match the attendants to the shogunal officials for their perspicacity and abilities in literary Chinese, the attendants to the Nagasaki officials have stories worth telling in brief as well. Fukagawa Chōemon and Matsumoto Uhee served as attendants to Numa; neither left an account of the voyage. From Takasugi Shinsaku’s reports, we know that Fukagawa, a low-level samurai from Saga domain, spent his time in Shanghai searching out future niches for Japan to sell their goods as well as investigating possibilities for importing and selling Chinese goods back in Japan. He would later travel with Sano Tsunetami (1823–1902), founder of the organization in 1877 that would subsequently be renamed the Japanese Red Cross, and with the Japanese delegation to the Paris Exposition in March 1867 to exhibit Japanese wares.33 We know of Matsumoto Uhee that he was a samurai from Higo (Kumamoto) domain. Of Nakayama Umonta’s two attendants, we know that Yamazaki Uhee was a low-level samurai from Saga, just like Fukagawa Chōemon, and that Sakuragi Genzō was the lone voyager from Awa domain. With one further exception, we know nothing of the other attendants in this category of passengers. That exception was Mine Genzō (Kiyoshi), attendant to Dr. Omoto Kōdō, from Ōmura domain. Mine was a samurai who had studied astronomy, mathematics, and surveying techniques first at his domainal school, the Gokyōkan, and in 1850 he traveled to Edo to pursue his astronomical studies with Shibukawa Sukezaemon, one of the great figures in late-Tokugawa-era calendrical and astronomical science. Returning home in 1855 for reasons unknown, he held a number of local positions. He was learned in Dutch studies as well.34 Ja pa n e se Pl a ns a n d t h e Sc e n e i n N ag a s a k i

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The officials sent by the Nagasaki Commercial Hall also led quiet lives. The lead figure, Mori Toranosuke, seems to have come from a well-known family who worked for the Nagasaki Commercial Hall for generations. Based on a social register of the time, Miyanaga Takashi suggests that, after holding a number of important positions in Nagasaki, Mori had by 1865 worked for the Commercial Hall for some thirty-five years.35 Watanabe Yohachirō served for many years as an inspector of medicines; by the time of the Meiji Restoration a few years after the mission to Shanghai, he had clocked fift y-three years of service. Of Matsuda Hyōjirō and the three attendants to this group, no information has as yet been unearthed. The three Nagasaki merchants selected for the voyage present more questions than answers. Inasmuch as the trip was, at least on the surface, intended as a launching effort for trade with China, bringing merchants along was surely called for, but why these three from among the many in the city? A long deliberative process leading to this selection began in the early autumn of 1861—that is, before a ship had even been located. No merchants were initially interested in making the voyage, and Numa had a difficult time finding any who were willing to join him; he approached the Nagasaki Commercial Hall in October 1861, and eventually he located three men.36 Despite this, in typically traditional samurai distaste for the business class, Takasugi thought the entire trip to Shanghai was the result of a healthy bribe proffered by the Nagasaki merchants to the Nagasaki Magistrate, Takahashi Kazunuki.37 Eventually Matsudaya, Nagaiya (b. 1817), and Kuroganeya (b. 1835) agreed to join the mission, and they helped in the process of finding an appropriate and affordable vessel; this despite the fact that Kuroganeya had an arrest on his record for some sort of illicit secret commercial activity.38 Another merchant, Kasugaya Bunsuke, was supposed to have been part of the group, but he became so ill that his name had to be scrapped from the list, with Nagaiya replacing him.39 All three men (four, counting Kasugaya) interestingly bore the character ya in their surnames, indicating a “commercial house,” residue of the Tokugawa caste system. Matsudaya, as noted above, was the only one of them to leave an account of the trip, and understandably it is fi lled with information about produce, interactions with Chinese merchants, and the names and amounts of cargo items moving in both directions. He was also the only non-samurai to leave a record of this voyage. Little is understandably known about the remaining seamen, deckhands, and cooks. One of them, the samurai Godai Saisuke (later, Tomoatsu, 1836– 1885), deserves mention. His domain of Satsuma was unable to get him onto 48

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the passenger list, but he nonetheless managed to have himself hired as a deckhand. He learned of the voyage while studying navigational science in Nagasaki from Iwase Kōho (1832–1891), a Dutch interpreter based in the city. Godai rushed to the domainal residence in Osaka of his lord, Shimazu Hisamitsu (1817–1887), who had just arrived there, to get permission to join the trip, and permission came with secret orders to buy a steamship for Satsuma and to make an assessment of trading opportunities for his domain (not Japan as a whole) with Shanghai. How he managed to get himself hired as a deckhand remains something of a mystery, and his willingness to suppress any samurai indignity and assume the garb and hairstyle of a commoner (as well as relinquish his samurai swords) is extremely intriguing. He later became one of the five Japanese smuggled out of Japan to study in Great Britain in 1865, serving briefly in the Meiji government after the Restoration, but then turned to business at which he was quite successful, becoming the first president of the Osaka Chamber of Commerce, which he founded in 1878.40 As we shall see in a later chapter, many members of the Japanese delegation became extremely ill in Shanghai both from dysentery and from the measles epidemic raging in Nagasaki while they were waiting to ship out. Sadly, three members of the group died in Shanghai: Sekitarō of dysentery; Hyōkichi of cholera; and Denjirō of an unnamed cause but probably severe dysentery. Hyōkichi, one of the cooks, had earlier been shipwrecked on a vessel bound for northern Japan and spent five years, according to Matsudaya, living on an uninhabited island.41 So, who was not represented on this list? There were citizens of three countries: Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Japan. And, the ship flew three flags—covering all bases—with Tombrink serving as supercargo. It provided as well a useful cover when the Japanese would claim to the daotai in Shanghai—in what can only be called a bald-faced lie—that the Senzaimaru was a Dutch ship. Tombrink may have served as the supercargo, and Kroes may have served as their agent, but the Japanese government owned the ship and had hired the British crew sailing it. What the passenger roll failed to include was a single Chinese person. There were at least several hundred and probably more Chinese living in Nagasaki, who would have been bilingual. To be sure, two Chinese interpreters joined the delegation, but in fact the negotiations between Japanese and Chinese officials were conducted with European-language interpreters as intermediaries. This may underscore the fact that the voyage was scripted as a way to assess the future of international trade and that Shanghai was the Ja pa n e se Pl a ns a n d t h e Sc e n e i n N ag a s a k i

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most convenient port from which to do so; thus, dealing with the Chinese authorities and securing trading rights and a consulate may have been important but with a much bigger picture in mind. It remains curious why the shogunal authorities bypassed the local Chinese community altogether. One other group that was almost completely absent was women. Aside from Mrs. Richardson, the captain’s wife, this was an all-male delegation and crew—not unexpected in the least at this time. With the exception of the local officials and the cooks and deckhands, everyone else had to make his way to Nagasaki from elsewhere in the archipelago. The largest group came from nearby Saga domain, and several others were from domains in Kyushu. In the era before the coming ease of transportation and before the relative freedom to travel across domainal lines, this was no mean feat. The trip from Nagasaki to Shanghai would be hard enough for other reasons, but getting to Nagasaki was not at all straightforward.

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three

Getting to Nagasaki, Loading Cargo, and the Voyage to Shanghai If we could put each of the travel narratives of the several dozen people on this ship together into one collection, I dare say it would be extremely advantageous, though I sigh that my own strengths are not up to it.a nōt om i k a i j i rō 1

traveling to nagasaki the distance from nagasaki to Shanghai is, perhaps surprisingly, shorter than to Edo (Tokyo)—516 versus 625 miles. In addition, one can more or less travel straight across water in this instance, while traveling overland in mid-nineteenth-century Japan was a whole other story. There were mountains to traverse or avoid; there were inns and restaurants to locate and book; there were domainal borders (sekisho) to negotiate with the necessary documents; and there were additional expenses incurred due to the greater length of time overland travel entailed. The five shogunal officials would not have handled any of the day-to-day worries encountered en route. They would have underlings take care of such things, and they undoubtedly did not even walk along the road but more likely rode in sedan chairs. Nonetheless, they would not meet the attendants assigned to them until arriving in Nagasaki, meaning those attendants would have been of no help to the officials making the trip there. In the end, perhaps knowing that the ship would not be leaving without them, the shogunal officials made a leisurely trip from Edo to Nagasaki, forty-four days in all, arriving March 9. With only a few exceptions, we have scant data on how our voyagers to Shanghai first got themselves to Nagasaki, aside of course from those who lived in the city. Godai Tomoatsu, once he heard of the trip to China, was running around making every effort to join the group. We know from 51

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incidental information that it would take him twenty days to get from Osaka (where he received permission from his lord to go) to Nagasaki by fast sedan chair, a distance of roughly 520 miles. Takasugi Shinsaku left for Nagasaki shortly after meeting with his lord and benefactor in Edo on January 31, 1862, at which time he was presented with a lined hakama (formal divided skirt worn by men) and his marching orders (noted in the previous chapter). The next morning, after a send-off party with several dozen friends, he left Edo, but we have no details on his trip from there to Nagasaki. We do know from letters he would later write that he stopped en route to pay his respects at the Chōshū domainal residence in Osaka. He probably arrived in Nagasaki just prior to the shogunal officials. That means that he had over two and a half months in the Japanese port prior to the May 27 departure for Shanghai (see figure 4). What did Takasugi do with all this free time? His lord had secretly given him a substantial amount of money (500 ryō)—though far less than Godai would have been carrying—to cover his expenses. At one point during his stay, he met with two American missionaries, Channing Moore Williams (1829–1910) and Guido Verbeck (1830–1898), at the Sōfukuji, a Rinzai Zen temple, in the Kajiyamachi section of Nagasaki, where they were then living.2 Both had arrived in Nagasaki in 1859, the earliest moment possible, and were (now three years later) fluent in Japanese, according to Takasugi. They described for him the Civil War then raging in the United States with no victor in sight, a situation (he remarked) not unlike that of the Taiping Rebellion in China at the time. By the same token, neither China nor the United States was at war with a foreign land. “I surmised from this conversation that they believed civil war was more dreadful than a foreign war.” b Takasugi then asked his American interlocutors if the United States had a social system that maintained anything like the Japanese distinction between samurai and commoners. Reverend Williams explained that there was no such thing—a statement which would seem to collide with Takasugi’s reporting that both men were partisans of the American South, but here Takasugi was surely in error as Verbeck had learned from personal experience in the South how horrifying the “peculiar institution” of slavery really was. Born in the Netherlands, Verbeck came to the United States in his early twenties. He worked for a time as a civil engineer in Arkansas before turning to the cloth, but horrified by the lives of slaves on plantations throughout the American South, he came under the influence of Minister Henry Ward Beecher (1813–1887), the abolitionist brother of Harriet Beecher Stowe 52

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figure 4. Takasugi Shinsaku.

(1811–1896). After a brush with death caused by cholera, he took a vow to enter the clergy if he recovered; soon after graduating from the seminary, he was on his way to serve as a missionary in Japan. Williams, a Virginian by birth and hence a Southerner, went on to say that any American president— Takasugi used the term for “king” (kokuō) here—was a commoner like everyone else. More explicitly, his fellow Virginian, George “Washington (Washinton) was initially a commoner, then became president (daitōryō), later returned to the common people, then again became president (kokuō),” c presumably referring to his two terms in office. Takasugi next asked about B y L a n d t o N ag a s a k i , B y S e a t o S h a ng h a i

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American products. He was told that the United States turned out many different grains as well as cotton goods, but that the South produced extremely few—something is wrong here, given the great cotton fields of the Deep South, unless the point is either that relatively little cotton merchandise was made in the South or that the Civil War had sharply disrupted production. Then, just as the conversation was in full swing, the two ministers switched the topic to Christianity, something “I did not wish to hear, so I left.”d He then added: “The two men wanted to study Japanese with me. It seemed very strange to me. Delving into their intentions, they want to [learn Japanese to] spread Christianity to Japan. I would like to see that they are kept away from important people.”e, 3 At some later point during his sojourn in Nagasaki—Takasugi never dates his encounters and experiences in Nagasaki prior to the Senzaimaru’s departure, merely introducing each with “one day” (ichinichi)—he met José Loureiro (1835–1893), a Portuguese businessman then serving as consul for France and Portugal; he relinquished his French duties in November 1862 and retained those of his native Portugal until 1870, when he moved to Tokyo to become ambassador. Loureiro explained to Takasugi the relative merits and strengths of the French and British armed forces, battleships, and rivalries, with France the victor and British artillery especially powerful. But, England had proven that the way to national strength was with powerful battleships, and no one now doubted that “Britain was thus the mightiest country in the world.” f She was now building her own battleships with massive cannons. Takasugi took from this earful that a stronger state—Chōshū, not yet “Japan”—was not only desirable but that Chōshū (Japan?) also needed new and better warships. Just blaming the foreigners and empty blather about “expelling the barbarians” were a waste of time. And, Chōshū would only get stronger through trade and the development of its own military capacity.4 Thus, before he set foot on the Senzaimaru, let alone on Shanghai soil, Takasugi was already beginning to see holes in the cramped, highly ideological worldview he had brought with him to Nagasaki. On another occasion, he claims to have been strolling one evening to the port and bumped into the American consul. The likelihood of this actually having happened is not great, nor is the conversation he reports to have taken place—unless the consul had acquired fluency in Japanese or had an interpreter with him. Nonetheless, Takasugi recounts how the consul informed him of negotiations among several European ministers and Japan over the 54

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opening of the ports of Hyōgo and Osaka and the possibility of ensuing troubles. On yet another occasion, he recounts a visit to Morita Ichitarō, an official Dutch interpreter resident in Nagasaki. Morita was “infuriated by the barbarians’ violence and planning to retire,”g although his son was still in the interpreters’ business. An accomplished scholar of nativism in the school of Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801), he apparently talked Takasugi’s ear off, all the time his resentment toward the foreigners building. Russia was the most to be feared, according to Morita; although England was a great land, it could generally be trusted. Such was not the case with Russia.5 When it was time to board ship on May 25, Takasugi was feted and sent off by two fellow Chōshū natives who were in Nagasaki pursuing their studies: Kishima Kamenoshin (1838–1909) and Nakarai Shinken (d. 1919). Although he had failed to make the cut when the Japanese entourage for the 1860 voyage to the United States was scaled back, Nakamuda Kuranosuke was destined to join the Senzaimaru group. He had been advised by his domain’s doctor, Kawasaki Michitami (1831–1881), who had himself made the 1860 voyage to the United States, to call on his putative boss for the impending voyage, Shiozawa Hikojirō, and pay his respects. To that end, Nakamuda met with Shiozawa in Edo, and on January 25, 1862, he accompanied him to Nagasaki, together with several others also planning to make the voyage to Shanghai. It took a total of forty-six days to travel to Nagasaki from Edo. They arrived in mid-March, also well before the ship would sail. He took some of this time to go sightseeing with Shiozawa. He also used this free time to study mathematics with Reverend Verbeck and continued his studies of English with Mishima Suetarō, an official English interpreter and a friend since their days together at the Nagasaki Naval Training Center. Takasugi would later comment in one of his travel narratives that Nakamuda seemed to understand English well and could carry on a conversation.6

loading cargo and passengers As of May 12, 1862, the newly renamed Senzaimaru was in Japanese hands, and four days later they began loading coal and then raised the Japanese flag. The following afternoon, May 17, local officials met with the three Nagasaki merchants for a farewell drink at a well-known pavilion known as the Kagetsurō. Six days later all the cargo that had been loaded for shipment to China was ordered removed from the ship to be inspected by the Nagasaki B y L a n d t o N ag a s a k i , B y S e a t o S h a ng h a i

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officials, and the following day (May 24) it was all reloaded, some 600 tons in all, onto the Senzaimaru. Nagasaki official were notoriously circumspect about incoming cargo from China and elsewhere, but this treatment of outgoing freight seems excessive. Perhaps it had something to do with the extraordinary nature of this voyage. The next day, all passengers boarded. The actual cargo was of two sorts: items ordered by the shogunate to be transported and items prepared by the three Nagasaki merchants who were responsible for seeing that the cargo was actually brought on board and secured. With the assistance of his fellows, Matsudaya Hankichi was in charge of cargo matters, and he left an extensive list detailing the items brought.7 None of the merchants, though, had ever been to China and as such had little way of ascertaining what sorts of things might be commercially salable or desired by the Chinese. They thus made a point of observing what Chinese ships coming to Nagasaki were buying and bringing home. Matsudaya describes, for example, meeting in November 1861 with a Chinese merchant, Zhang Decheng, who may have explained what the Japanese ought to bring to Shanghai; Zhang later became a member of the Kō-A kai (Rise Asia society), one of the first pan-Asian associations that would contribute to bringing down the Qing dynasty.8 What cargo did they ultimately bring from Japan to China? A wide variety of items, as they were casting their net far and wide; in the final analysis, although a treaty to trade was desired, observation of the Western powers and how international trade was conducted were among the primary goals of the mission. Dried fish (sea cucumber, abalone, cuttlefish, bonito) and other marine produce (agar and konbu), coal, ginseng, camphor, white thread, cotton cloth, lacquerware and other industrial arts objects, cigarettes, paper, brooms, sake cups, and bottles were all items transported based on what the merchants and their staff observed Chinese loading on their ships to bring back home. The Nagasaki Commercial Hall provided the merchants with $3,000 and a money order for $27,000 Mexican to be transferred at the appropriate time to the Dutch consulate in Shanghai. In this instance, “Dutch consulate” meant Theodorus Kroes and his office because he wore the hats of both vice-consul and businessman mediating between the Chinese and the Japanese. In the end, the cargo brought in no profit, with some items being sold at a loss. As hot and humid as Kyushu and Shanghai can be in late spring and summer, by all accounts 1862 was exceptionally so. One day after the cargo was loaded, all fifty-one Japanese passengers came on board (May 25) in a highly 56

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congested scene. They took their assigned rooms—all reportedly stuff y—with the highest officials at one end of the ship (see Matsudaya’s diagram in the previous chapter). Many came on deck in an effort to escape the heat. Although the heat subsided that evening and many were able to sleep in their cabins, the ship did not depart. Rumors began flying with no basis in fact, but no one informed the passengers why they were still docked in Nagasaki. Takasugi had been suffering measles, which had hit Nagasaki, and he was not fully recovered, so he boarded at night when no one could see him. In his typically intemperate manner, Takasugi railed in his travel narrative at the Japanese: “Alas, the Japanese are so indecisive, just resigned to circumstances, so weak in resolve. This is sure to incur the scorn of foreigners. Utterly lamentable and embarrassing.”h, 9 Word finally reached the passengers that they were, indeed, going to sail the next day. They assembled before departure and Nakamura Ryōhei of the Nagasaki Commercial Hall read out to them a list of fourteen extremely strict rules for behavior on board ship. These almost read like camp regulations, but they surely reveal the nervous sensibilities of the officials and their utter inexperience with vessels of this size. 1. Be careful with fire. When smoking, do so near a place of fire [kitchen?]. Take care that fire does not spread. No smoking anywhere else.i 2. Do not use paper lanterns on board ship.j 3. Lights out after [about] 10:00 p.m., except in the cabins.k 4. . . . . Kitchen fire out at [about] 8:30 p.m.l 5. One shō [1.8 liters] of water per person per day while on ship.m 6. If you have some business to bring forth, submit it to Nakamura Ryōhei.n 7. Needless to say, arguments or disputes should not be aired loudly.o 8. Do not use fire in the cabins.p 9. Do not indiscriminately visit the rooms with business.q 10. Do not go ashore without the permission of an official.r 11. Things that might be confused with trading items must not be brought along. As for items brought for one’s personal use, however, one may make a request of an official and receive instructions.s 12. When you go out while docked in port or while waiting, report all comings and goings to an official. Do not stroll about at will.t 13. Without official permission, do not exchange letters with foreigners.u 14. Alien religions are officially prohibited. Even if someone is performing a religious service, believe none of it.v, 10

As Hibino Teruhiro, although young already an inveterate smoker, remarked: “The rules were extremely strict. Anyone who violated these rules would not be permitted to go on land.” w, 11 B y L a n d t o N ag a s a k i , B y S e a t o S h a ng h a i

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sailing out into the open ocean At long last, on May 27, the British crew did some final work on board, and roughly two or three dozen tugboats began to pull the Senzaimaru out of the port of Nagasaki. Some five smaller boats joined in to escort it further to the open sea by nearby Kanzaki. Young Hibino was given to a moment of poetic wonderment at the impending voyage: “Ah, to be separated by 10,000 li, when shall we meet again?”x Heading southwest (Nakamuda, the only Japanese on the trip with some serious training in navigational techniques, recorded “west southwest”), the tugboats took them further out into the open sea and then returned to base. In the late morning, they were moving toward Nomozaki at the southwestern tip of the Nagasaki peninsula. That night there was a bit of rain as they picked up a northeasterly wind, and they were off. Ever the observant merchant, Matsudaya noticed a three-masted British barque, the Water Witch, leaving port at the same time and slightly ahead of the Senzaimaru.12 The next day, the first full one at sea, the wind picked up, a powerful northerly (Nakamuda: “east northeast”) wind with rain and rough waves. The rain and fog were intense from that afternoon, but these conditions were felt especially strongly at night. Nakamuda compared the waves to a “galloping horse” (honba), an image to be used by Mishima Yukio (1925–1970) as the title for one of his novels roughly a century later, and noted that the ship had taken on a foot of water. Many of the passengers experienced something few Japanese had faced for centuries: seasickness. Or, as Takasugi put it in an unusually tender form: “The gentlemen on board ship were greatly distressed.”y Mine Kiyoshi: “The wind and rain did not stop at night. The boat shook, and I could not sleep that night. Many of the passengers became nauseous from the waves.”z Perhaps the modern term “seasick” ( funayoi) was not yet in currency in 1862, as the travel narratives all mention the discomfort but use different terms. Before the inclement weather set in, though, all those who kept records of the trip mentioned the sighting in the early morning hours of the dual islands of Meshima and Oshima in the East China Sea, as well as the city of Fukue in the southwestern part of Nagasaki Prefecture (now), beyond the Gotō Islands.13 Perhaps it was the ocean air, perhaps seasickness. Hibino (as he often would) took to Chinese poetry to express his feelings this day while at sea: How shall we sail over thousands of miles of dangerous sea? This great vessel pounds fiercely into the waves.

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Sailing the seas is not particularly for the magnificent scenery. Our humble hope is to carry out state policy. Witness the era when Chao Heng’s great talent was noted well. And Kibi [no Makibi’s] wide learning is recorded in the annals of history. It was back in ancient times when cultured rule prevailed, And then the times changed to great difficulties and crises. The stalwart men on this voyage have their own resolve. They would go hungry to the point of eating their own flesh. We are not boasting of the swords at our own waists [i.e., past glory], But, we are Japanese courageous and righteous.aa, 14

In this somewhat self-congratulatory manner, Hibino fi liates the voyage in a lineage going back to the much earlier missions from Japan to Tang China (ken-Tō shi) embarked on by Chao Heng (698–770), the Chinese name of the famed Abe no Nakamaro, and Kibi no Makibi (693–775), both celebrated scholars who came to China in 717 and lived there for fift y-three and seventeen years, respectively. The next morning marked the first day of the fifth lunar month of the year, May 29 on the Western calendar, and the rains continued to come down in torrents. The ship’s sails, except for one small one, were pulled in, as the Senzaimaru was whipped around at the whim of the elements. Matsudaya even drew a picture of it keeling to one side (see figure 5). Mine noted that there was no way for the ship to make any progress at sea with the ship being rocked all day and night: “Everyone and their luggage were toppled over. At one time or another, everyone became seasick.”bb Takasugi effectively repeated what he had written the previous day: “The gentlemen are extremely distressed in this hurricane and ferocious rain. Every time the ship rocks, baggage and people all come tumbling down. A seasick man is like a drunkard. We all lay there like dead men, idle and silent all day long, no one daring to try and speak.”cc Hibino described a similar scene of numerous seasick men alternately vomiting and praying to the gods for relief from the raging storm, but he also expressed great confidence in the captain and crew who were, as he described the scene, running around screaming instructions while the Japanese remained passive and silent. In addition, because of this tumultuous time at sea, the cooks could not light a fire to prepare food. Our Japanese travelers, probably not all that hungry in any case, were reduced to nibbling on bread.15 Unsurprisingly, no one mentioned any sights that day. The winds eventually died down late that night, and “everyone was overjoyed.”dd They had passed through the worst of the storm. May 30 was a

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figure 5. Matsudaya Hankichi’s rendition of the Senzaimaru keeling.

clear day, but the wind, although not overpowering, was blowing the wrong way. That afternoon it changed to a favorable direction, and Captain Richardson said that they should be able to see the hills near Shanghai the next day. They were now about 120 miles from Shanghai. Like any group that survives a great disaster, the Japanese all chatted about the previous day’s troubles, praised the Buddhas and Shinto deities to whom they had fervently prayed for helping them, and vowed to go to the appropriate temples and shrines to make offerings and offer more prayers when they returned to Japan.16 The wind was, if anything, too calm on the morning of May 31. It was a clear day, but the ship was scarcely moving. The men stared out at the horizon from the deck of the Senzaimaru, but they were unable to see anything save water; Takasugi claimed that many were becoming despondent. Captain Richardson dropped the serious hint that there might not be enough drinking water to get them all the way to Shanghai, and for that reason he was reducing rations to five gō (.9 liter) per person per day; several travelers attributed this to the fact that they, the Japanese, were unfamiliar with ocean travel, and being a fastidious people needing lots of water to keep clean, had overused the water supply. Watanabe Yohachirō, the medicine man, was put in charge of water distributions. Adverse winds blew that evening and night, and the ship slowed even more. Looking out on the water, some of the Japanese were stunned by huge sharks swimming nearby; they later saw a school of bonito, fished, and caught some. Later in the afternoon, someone observed an immense sea turtle (allegedly 1.5 meters across). On this day, Takasugi had a talk with one of the deckhands, Godai Tomoatsu, who he explained had dressed himself up as a sailor to get on board ship. This suggests that ordinarily Takasugi would not have deigned to carry on a conversation with a person of such lowly social status. Godai had 60

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figure 6. Hibino Teruhiro’s sketch of the Saddle Islands.

visited Takasugi in Nagasaki, but the latter was too ill at the time to receive guests and was unable to have an exchange. “At one glance, it was like we were old friends. We opened our hearts to our innermost thoughts and spoke grandly of our aspirations. It was marvelous.”ee As they went to bed that night, they heard that the wind would undoubtedly pick up soon. Hibino wrote a four-line Chinese-language poem about the wide-open blue sky and the (now) unmoving waves and the tiny ship moving among them.17 As promised the morning of June 1 was crystal clear, and favorable winds picked up. Water was, however, becoming a serious concern. “From early dawn,” wrote Hibino, “I kept wiping my eyes searching for an island. Something rose out of the west that morning. It looked like clouds or a mountain. I wasn’t sure what it resembled. People on board clapped their hands and said it was an island.”ff It turned out to be a three-masted Chinese merchant ship heading toward Korea, and despondency reigned once again. Undoubtedly, the fact that what they hoped to have been an island or mountain or some form of land turned out not to be any of these contributed to a general disheartening feeling that they were still far from Shanghai. Soon thereafter, though, a Western ship passed them at sea. An auspicious wind was now blowing and the Senzaimaru was making excellent time, which proved uplifting to all on board. Still staring out at sea, around 3:00 p.m., Hibino “wiped his eyes in amazement . . . and to the west he saw a row of hills. Everyone said those were islands.”gg This time it was not a mirage, as Captain Richardson confirmed that they were looking at the Saddle Islands, a group of islands that had acquired its name from its appearance. Again, Hibino found expression in a celebratory Chinese poem. He even drew a rough sketch of the islands (see figure 6). Richardson was warily eyeing passing fishing vessels that day, and he informed Hibino that those same innocuous boats could easily transform themselves into pirates come nightfall. Hibino huddled with Nakamuda, Hayashi, Takasugi, Nagura, and Itō—all of them attendants—to prepare for an emergency eventuality. “We had our Japanese swords at our side. We were invigorated with hearts full of courage and righteousness. What had we to B y L a n d t o N ag a s a k i , B y S e a t o S h a ng h a i

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fear from some trifling pirates?” hh Potentially, famous last words. They decided that their swords might not do the trick alone, and thus outfitted the cannon and roughly twenty guns on board in preparation for a possible assault.18 Takasugi, for his part, recorded on behalf of the assembled “gentlemen” the utter bliss collectively felt when islands were sighted with a telescope after such a long spell of either seeing nothing but blue sea or mistaking boats for islands. When the gentlemen were initially disappointed that one “island” turned out to be the Chinese trading vessel en route to Korea, someone happily noted that they should take that as a positive omen that China was not far off. And, then the Saddle Islands came into view, just “forty-plus miles from Shanghai. The gentlemen were dancing for joy.” ii, 19 Others expressed similar, often identical reactions to the sighting of the Saddle Islands, because they were a sign that Shanghai could not be far. Mine Kiyoshi added that he and those near him had no idea what they were looking at, and that somewhat later the Dutch interpreter Iwase Yashirō brought out an English map. Sure enough, they were looking at the Saddle Islands, northern section of the Danshan Islands and entranceway to Shanghai.20

arrival in shanghai June 2 was a cloudy day with occasional rain. In the wee morning hours, six or seven small lightboats approached the Senzaimaru. Captain Richardson called out to them asking about the depth of the water. As the morning began to light up, the passengers could see the embankment on the left side of the ship. There were literally countless fishing boats in the water as they continued up the Yangzi River. They eventually reached a treeless island known to foreigners as Blockhouse Island (Chinese, Changxingdao). That afternoon they reached the Wusong River (popularly known as Suzhou Creek) and anchored at the mouth of the Huangpu River. Seemingly overwhelmed by the size and quantities of everything, Hibino began reciting numbers: We anchored at twenty-four fathoms. The breadth of the river is over ten ri [about five kilometers]. There are boats all around us, numbering in the hundreds, perhaps a thousand of them. I asked the name of the river and was told: Ūson [Wusong]. . . . There is a row of cannon emplacements on the southern bank, emerging in an uneven form; at strategic points, one can see that they have been effectively fortified, but there are no cannons in them. The captain 62

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said that twenty years ago not only was this area outfitted with cannons, but the houses were crammed together like sardines. At that time, the British wanted to enter the port of Shanghai; because it was being defended, they could not do so. So, [the British] set fire and burned down people’s homes, and the cannons were snatched up. Now, only the emplacements remain.jj, 21

Takasugi Shinsaku assumed a somewhat more matter-of-fact style: “5th month, 5th day [June 2], clear sky. We had a favorable wind which propelled the ship like an arrow. Before we knew it, we had arrived at the Wusong River . . . . Looking north–south, the river banks were separated by only three or four ri. There are vast fields in all directions. I see no mountains. Both foreign and Chinese ships are anchored here—it is like a forest of masts. Our ship dropped anchor here as well.” kk He then added a reflection: “This is the land where Chinese and British fought a war in the past [namely, the Opium War]. Thus, the homes along here are all gone. At the mouth of the Wusong River, the northern shore is all a battery of guns . . . . This area was seized by the British, and that’s why the homes are all gone now.” ll, 22 Mine Kiyoshi also mentioned the verdant growth on shore, the cannon emplacements, polders, numerous boats, shallow water, and nearby fields. He also noticed the absence of mountainous terrain, as all the land stretching out before their eyes seemed flat. Nagura’s response was little different. He recorded seeing all the same things in his travel narrative, but then took note of some extraordinary comparisons that no one else made (see below and the following chapter). Captain Richardson explained that there had been Chinese cannons placed along either side of the river, but the British had destroyed them two decades earlier, something he could not have known from personal experience but must have acquired via hearsay.23 That afternoon an Englishman sailed up to the Senzaimaru in a one-man sampan. He was a reporter for the North-China Herald. Although his name is not recorded in any of the documents from the time, he is surely responsible for the anonymous newspaper article that would appear a few days later (quoted in full in Chapter 1). The Japanese would likely have known something of newspapers as an institution, but they would hardly have been widely familiar with the phenomenon, as news was monopolized by the shogunate and far from widely broadcast at the time in Japan. As Mine innocently put it: “This man said that he recorded information on the nations of the world, wrote it in a newspaper, and delivered it to the nations of the world.”mm, 24 If it was odd that the first person the Japanese would meet in China was an Englishman, no one commented on the fact. In a way, it betokened the B y L a n d t o N ag a s a k i , B y S e a t o S h a ng h a i

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hierarchy of power in the concession areas of the city. Later that day, the Senzaimaru was visited by a messenger from the “Dutch Consulate”—word traveled quickly in this international city—although it is unclear if it was a Dutchman or a Chinese working for the consulate. The expression Hibino used for “Dutch Consulate” was Rankan, and this was none other than the residence of Theodorus Kroes. More likely than not, it was a Dutchman, because he asked to speak with the merchant aboard, Tombrink, and they would not have had an Asian language in common; by the same token, there were by this time any number of Chinese who worked for Europeans and would have known a European language. Two smaller Chinese vessels then came alongside the Senzaimaru, one a “pilot boat to the waterways”nn and one an official Chinese vessel investigating who they were and prepared to collect customs. Hibino now surmised that, when they had entered the mouth of the river and raised a British flag on one of their masts, it effectively beckoned to tugs and a pilot boat (a tugboat run on steam).25 Richardson undoubtedly knew from considerable experience that navigating the channels his ship was now entering could be a trepidacious business. Arrival was imminent, and the Japanese shared a celebratory meal. Although already a day full of new experiences, later that afternoon several of our Japanese travelers noticed a conflagration burning in the western sky. Captain Richardson explained that it was undoubtedly the Taiping rebels burning down the homes of local people. As we shall soon see, the Taipings were in the midst of an attack on the city at precisely the time of the Japanese party’s arrival. Although news of the Taipings and all manner of rumor had been transmitted to Japan through several possible sources, this was the first time any Japanese in any sort of official capacity had witnessed the great rebellion, if only dramatic evidence of the rebels’ destructiveness rather than the rebels themselves. Considering how concerned he was with learning about the Taipings and the interest he took when in Shanghai to learning as much as he could about them, it is curious that Takasugi makes no mention of this first view of them in action.26 Everyone was profoundly impressed by the number of ships—Chinese and foreign—sailing into, out of, or docked in Shanghai harbor, and the metaphor of a forest for the sight of so many masts was widely shared. For example, Mine: “With all the foreign ships from so many countries converging [here], the Chinese government will have no way to count them all. Their masts are lined up like trees in a forest.”oo One more, from Nōtomo Kaijirō: “The barbarian vessels anchored on the Huangpu River number over one 64

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hundred . . . . They say there are also several thousand Chinese boats anchored here, but I’m not sure. The large number of masts are like thousands of acres of hemp.”ppAlmost everyone also began counting the number of warships there: Matsudaya counted sixteen, Nōtomi estimated fourteen or fi fteen, Mine claimed over twenty, and others gave vaguer figures.27 Early the next morning, June 3, under a clear sky, a pilot boat approached the Senzaimaru, cast a rope to tie the two vessels together, and pulled it southwest along the Huangpu River for several kilometers to its mooring site in the heart of the port of Shanghai—price: $200. The captain of the tug signaled to Captain Richardson what route he would be following. From that very year of 1862, a British naval officer, acting as harbormaster had been placed along the Wusong River, which was now within the jurisdiction of the Shanghai customs officials. While being towed, the Japanese aboard ship had ample time to take in the sights surrounding them. The whole trip had only taken seven full days, even if they had almost run out of water en route and faced truly challenging weather conditions. June 3 was by far the busiest to date and the first time in a week that our travelers were able to set foot on land. As the tug pulled the Senzaimaru to its docking point, the Japanese were particularly struck by the view on the right of the verdant embankment stretching over a mile. Matsudaya wrote: “At a spot only five ri along the Wusong going toward Shanghai, we saw an innumerable number of Chinese fishing boats, the most prosperous place in the world. We also saw the French consulate and the American consulate along the Wusong, and we could also vaguely make out people’s homes and the city walls.”qq Why he thought that was what he was seeing at such a distance is unknown, but the French and American consulates were not where he placed them. He was staring at a French naval warehouse and coal storage site.28 Perhaps he had seen the Tricolore flying atop a building and jumped to his conclusion, though how he would have known the French flag constitutes another conundrum. The US consulate had been in the Hongkou section of Shanghai, the so-called American Concession, since 1854. They eventually did reach the Hongkou area, probably the most recently settled quarter of the city, with its immense American commercial houses and large steamships and factories belonging to many other countries. It was about 9:30 a.m. when the Senzaimaru docked in front of the Dutch consulate—“T. Kroes and Co.”—in what was then the French Concession along the Bund at the corner of what is now Eastern Zhongshan Road and New Yongan Road, an area once known as “Quai de France” and not far from the city wall.29 B y L a n d t o N ag a s a k i , B y S e a t o S h a ng h a i

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If the Japanese had been overwhelmed by the hustle-bustle the previous day when they were watching ships of all sizes sailing by at the mouth of the Wusong River, then they were even more flabbergasted by the port of Shanghai with the grand Western mansions and businesses along the shoreline and the countless vessels nearby. It was not unlike visiting another planet, a quantum leap beyond their wildest expectations, and undoubtedly shook their previous conceptions of what might constitute an arena of international trade and commerce. Nagura’s comment was in many ways typical of their response: “Along the right bank, the commercial houses of the Western countries were of an extraordinary grandeur, lined up like the teeth of a comb. I have heard that [Shanghai] is truly the most thriving port in China.”rr He then made a seemingly unexpected statement: “Among the men on our ship, there were two who had made the trip two years ago to America [Shiozawa Hikojirō and Kimura Dennosuke]. As they recounted it, [Shanghai, where the Kanrinmaru called en route,] far surpassed for prosperity either Washington or New York in America.”ss Two days later, Nagura would add that Shanghai even surpassed Osaka for apparent prosperity. Hibino’s response fit much the same template but without the interesting comparisons: “The [Huangpu] River was completely full of boats; the homes and shops on land lined up next to one another. What great prosperity!”tt And, again, Hibino waxed poetic:30 The forest of masts stretches without limit, So many ships coming and going all day long. Look at the uninterrupted flow of men in the streets, Streaming in from the four corners of the earth everywhere. Recalling the calamity at Dagu [near Tianjin], Those vile creatures are indeed still scooping up profits in the marketplace. Pray, do not say of Shanghai that this is a flourishing place, For how much of it is being transported home on barbarian ships?uu

Again, no one is likely to accuse Hibino of being a great poet, but this particular poem nicely contrasts the thriving nature of the city (first four lines) with the deep and highly undesirable penetration of the West there ever since the Second Opium War when the Dagu forts were destroyed by foreign gunboats (second four lines). His succinct dismissal of all Westerners as less than fully human resonated with other Japanese aboard the Senzaimaru, though few were as blatant as he. His last two lines neatly summarized his attitude. 66

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After noting that Shanghai was said to have been the recent site of fighting against the Taipings, Takasugi continued: “In the morning, we eventually reached Shanghai. This is the most thriving port in China. Several thousand merchant vessels and warships from European lands are docked here. Their masts are like a forest on the verge of burying the port. On land there is a white wall one thousand feet long of commercial houses from various lands, like a citadel. Its breadth and size are beyond description.”vv Nakamuda just expressed how “truly unexpected the prosperity”ww in the port was with its thousands of boats.31 As noted in the North-China Herald article cited earlier, British Consul Walter Henry Medhurst (1822–1885) also boarded the Senzaimaru and engaged, through a translator, in a long question-and-answer session with the Japanese officials. The nature of his visit remains unclear. He had no special business to attend to, save that Captain Richardson and his crew members were under Medhurst’s jurisdiction by virtue of extraterritoriality. He asked the Japanese whether it was politics or trade or some other cause that had motivated them to come to Shanghai, and they responded in unison that trade was their objective. Before the ship docked near the Dutch consulate, a Dutch boat pulled up beside it, and the first to go on it and sail to land was F. P. Tombrink, followed by a group comprising all of the shogunal officials with Mori Toranosuke of the Nagasaki Commercial Hall, Dutch interpreter Iwase Yashirō, and Chinese interpreter Shū Tsunejūrō. They called on Theodorus Kroes and showed him their cargo manifest, while one of the officials made the appropriate arrangements regarding their living quarters in Shanghai. They were followed on land by the Nagasaki merchants, who also paid their respects at Kroes’s headquarters.32 Although many had an opportunity to alight and stretch their legs on land, they would not move to their rooms until the following day. The Japanese deckhands and cooks were not as fortunate; they spent their nights in Shanghai in their Senzaimaru quarters. Wherever any of the Japanese went, they were mobbed by curious Chinese. No Japanese had intentionally sailed to a Chinese port in centuries, and all manner of rumors among the Chinese were in the air. In addition, the samurai among the Japanese had what appeared to be utterly bizarre hairdos and clothing, and they were wearing their swords—indeed, they insisted on it. Once the arrangements were in place and the ship had docked and dropped anchor, all members of the delegation began to move in numerous directions throughout the city. The officials went to the Dutch consulate; B y L a n d t o N ag a s a k i , B y S e a t o S h a ng h a i

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Matsudaya went off with a Cantonese guide and investigated numerous commercial shops (both Chinese and Western). Unlike so many of the resident and visiting Westerners in Shanghai, the Japanese took advantage of their ability to communicate in literary Chinese to roam through the Chinese city as well. That meant negotiating passage through one of the guarded gates of the walled city which, as we shall see, could prove challenging. Adventures political, economic, social, culture, and medical would fill the next two months. Summer in Shanghai is never particularly pleasant due to intense heat and high humidity. June and July 1862 were especially so, and in this pre–air conditioning, pre–electric fan, pre–modern plumbing, pre– sterilized water era, life’s every difficulty was magnified. As we have noted, three Japanese died in Shanghai, a mortality rate of almost six percent in just two months. Those who came ashore that first day had to return to the Senzaimaru by nightfall, as hotel arrangements had yet to be finalized. Those who commented on it found the night scenery over the river with lanterns on numerous boats stunning. We turn now to the business and other concerns of the various groups once they enter the city of Shanghai.

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fou r

Coming to Terms with the City of Shanghai and Its Inhabitants

we have seen the manifold first impressions recorded by the Japanese as they approached the port of Shanghai over water. Certain motifs, such as the resemblance of the masts of so many ships to a forest, were universal; others, such as international comparisons of Shanghai’s prosperity, were unique to individuals. Thus far in the trip, however, none of our visitors had as yet actually touched soil in the city. The reflections had all been made shipside and from a fair distance. To be sure, lack of firsthand information rarely hampers many people from forming opinions or coming to conclusions—and this is certainly the case for first impressions. On this occasion, however, our voyagers were all about to have many opportunities to genuinely observe Shanghai up close and interact with Chinese personally. The Shanghai they were about to visit, though, as they all knew only too well, was not entirely a Chinese city. In addition to the fact that the Manchus had by this time ruled China for more than two centuries, non-Asians were omnipresent in the port of Shanghai. The Senzaimaru party would work through the Dutch and have occasional interactions with Americans, British, and French nationals in and around Shanghai. For all the talk of how Westerners dominated life in the city, though, when it came to the stark business of business—commerce, trade, diplomacy—the Japanese would have to meet directly with the Chinese circuit intendant of Shanghai, Wu Xu (Xiaofan, 1809–1872), the most powerful official in situ.1 Paying customs duties may have been done through the British—the Chinese Maritime Customs Service had been set up by foreign consulates in Shanghai in 1854 because the Qing was unable to collect these duties amid the chaos of the Taiping Rebellion—but that experience, if mentioned at all, is presented as little more than an annoyance. The foreigners in Shanghai certainly come 69

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into play in the accounts of the travelers to Shanghai, but it is mostly with regard to their arrogant attitudes toward the Chinese and their advanced weaponry—and what that might mean down the road for Japan as it began the process of entering the world of international (meaning Westerndominated) commerce. Japanese engagement with China and the Chinese began in earnest on the afternoon of June 3, after the Senzaimaru had docked several hours earlier that morning opposite the Dutch consulate. Various groups of Japanese and foreigners began fi ling out of the ship even before it had fully docked via smaller craft that sailed up beside the Senzaimaru. Once it had docked, all of those still on board who were coming ashore did so. One hundred and fift y years on, with a few obvious temporal breaks, this trend has shown no indication of slowing or stopping. There are now many thousands of Japanese living in Shanghai and many more thousands who visit each and every year. By June 4 all those staying on land had alighted. Up early as was his wont, Hibino stood on deck at dawn and watched Chinese ships coming and going. The Japanese rented two small vessels to take them to the wharf; they actually flew the Hinomaru on these boats. That afternoon Hibino and others went to visit the Dutch consulate. After meeting with their intermediaries and the five or six Chinese who worked there, they next went to their lodgings for the duration of the time they would be spending in Shanghai: Hongji yanghang. Th is Western-style hotel, probably located in the French Concession not far from the Dutch consulate, was run by Zhang Xuxiu. They rented four rooms of roughly seven or eight tatamis in square footage, the only way they reported it (and still the way traditional Japanese rooms are measured), plus a kitchen, for $130 per month. The hotel staff was composed of fourteen Chinese.2 But they did not tarry in their rooms long. Captain Richardson and his wife were staying at the Astor House Hotel (now known as the Pujiang fandian) to which they repaired after visiting the British consulate. The British crew disembarked the next day, thus leaving the Senzaimaru to its fledgling Japanese crew. As we shall discuss in more detail in a subsequent chapter, the Japanese officials were scheduled the next afternoon, June 5, to meet the Shanghai daotai. •

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Hibino reported that he was followed into every shop he visited in the city, making it impossible for him to linger anywhere. Although he found it irritating, he seemed to understand that the novelty was extraordinary. While he and other Japanese were standing in front of a Western-style building at one point, on June 5, “a girl six or seven years of age [East Asian style] said ‘ohayō’ [good morning] to us.”a, 3 He noted that she had probably lived in Nagasaki or, as of 1859, Yokohama. Did she recognize them as Japanese from their speech or their clothing or their topknots? If he knew, he did not explain further. One visual marker of ethnic (and class, in the case of Japan) identity was the respective sides’ hairstyles. All Chinese men, except monks, were compelled to wear theirs in the queue (they were permitted only a small area in the back of the head to grow their hair, the rest to be shaven, and then it was entwined in a long braid, figuratively known as a pigtail); Japanese men of the elite samurai class wore their hair in a topknot (chonmage, with the front part of the pate shaved and the majority grown long and tied back up on top of the head, a style carried on in modified form to this day by sumo wrestlers). Both sides found the other bizarre, which of course they were. Many Japanese were (and often were predisposed to be) taken aback by the sharp contrast between how the Chinese lived and how the foreigners lived in Shanghai. This disparity was in large part due to the fact that the Japanese were in the concession areas of the city, largely foreign enclaves but with plenty of Chinese living and working as well, and that the lion’s share of foreigners were affluent businesspeople, occasionally with members of their families. In an undated note in one of his two accounts, Nagura Inata wrote: “The foreign residential area in Shanghai is expansive with large houses and an overall structure like a sprawling forest. They say there as many as 1,100 [such] homes.” b, 4 By contrast, he had noted on June 5 that, in contrast to the Western living space in the city with its palatial residences, the walled Chinese city next to it was altogether different: “The gates into the [Chinese] city from the modern Western city are narrow and cramped, only allowing two sedan chairs to go through at the same time. Once inside, the streets run horizontally and vertically quite clearly, but the roads within the market areas are extremely cramped. Compared to it, all homes outside the walled city are magnificent . . . . The shops are also cramped, each shop roughly 5–6.6 square meters. It is bustling and disorderly, no different from our Edo.”c, 5 While other Japanese would find nothing in their realm of knowledge with which to compare what they were seeing in Shanghai, Nagura, perhaps because T h e C i t y of Sh a ng h a i a n d I t s I n h a bi ta n t s

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he was a little older, better traveled, and more experienced than most of the others who left accounts, frequently offers such comparisons. When later he noticed the Customs House of Shanghai, he remarked that its structure reminded him of a Shinto shrine from home.6 With regard to what was actually going on in the small shops within the Chinese city, he described vendors selling antiques, physiognomy specialists, fortune-tellers, singers, and storytellers, and a scene of extraordinary vivaciousness, “just like our Edo.”d, 7 Others were not as forgiving, it would seem, as the apparent assault on their senses in the Chinese walled city overwhelmed them. After a brush conversation with a Chinese about the physical layout of the walled city and questions about the population, Mine Kiyoshi contrasted the elegant, orderly broad avenues of the Western concessions with their new buildings to the stench and fi lth of the Chinese city: “Every year Shanghai experiences a major outbreak of horrific disease during the season of great heat with many deaths among the people.”e, 8 Mine clearly had a doctor’s eye, but he was not presaging the germ theory of disease. Only a few weeks before the Senzaimaru’s departure, Louis Pasteur (1822–1895) was carrying out the first experiments on the other side of the globe concerned with the deleterious impact of micro-organisms on beverages, but not in time for our passengers from Japan. Nonetheless, Mine understood that there was a relationship between squalor and poor health. Takasugi Shinsaku, with his initial penchant for blaming everything bad on the Westerners, also compared the two realms of Shanghai, albeit with a distinctive twist: “Shanghai lies in a remote place on the southern Chinese seaside which is occupied by the British barbarians. Although the harbor is all hustle-bustle, it is due entirely to the large number of foreign merchant vessels. Within and without the walled city are numerous foreign commercial houses which are thus thriving. The places where I have seen Chinese living are often poor and filthy. Some live the entire year on boats, though the rich foreigners live in their [elegant] commercial establishments.”f, 9 Nōtomi Kaijirō remarked similarly after his stroll through the Chinese markets: “There is no way to describe the fi lth of the Shanghai markets and lanes. This is especially true of the medium and smaller alleys which are everywhere fi lled with refuse and excrement. There is [thus] nowhere to walk. People do not sweep up here.”g, 10 By contrast, the Japanese appreciated the cleanliness of the concessions, although (despite mentioning the great disparities in wealth between the two communities) they do not seem to have divined that the simple difference in 72

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wealth may have been largely responsible for this discrepancy between the two parts of the city. They saw and remarked on the huge difference in population density, but did not apparently make a connection—except insofar as we see from Nagura’s comments above—between large numbers of people with little wealth in small spaces and the difficulty of removing waste, let alone hiring others to do it for you. The fi lth of the river directly before them was a source of considerable interest and investigation for the Japanese. It was like a gigantic garbage dump and graveyard from which water was drawn as drinking water—with predictably dreadful results. Hibino even got a Chinese by the name of Zhang Dixiang to join him in an examination of the water. Young Nōtomi had the most to say about this: I think the most difficult thing [for us] on this trip to Shanghai is the fi lthy water. They say that in ancient times the Yangzi and Wusong Rivers were clean, but in the Middle Ages the waters of the Yellow and Huai Rivers in the north moved south and flowed into the big river [the Yangzi] and its water became dirty . . . . People here throw all sorts of fi lthy things into the river: dead dogs, dead horses, dead pigs, and dead sheep. All of these float up to the shoreline, a lot of dead people among them . . . . Also, the feces and urine from the thousands of ships [in the harbor] make the water even dirtier. They say that there are only five or six wells in all the streets of Shanghai, though the well water is thoroughly fi lthy, so everyone drinks river water.h, 11

Add to this scene the huge influx into Shanghai of refugees and other migrants escaping Taiping depredations, the increase in production, foodstuffs eaten, and associated waste, as well as a host of other issues, and the water only got dirtier. This was far more than an academic issue for the Japanese. Many became ill with dysentery and cholera, and, as noted, three died during the stay in Shanghai. They were buried in the Pudong area of greater Shanghai, which at the time was sparsely populated. There has been so much change over the past century and a half and so much recent building in the Pudong area that efforts of late to locate the site of their graves have proven fruitless. Aside from the dead, Hibino appears to have been particularly susceptible to what the doctor diagnosed as cholera (but bears a striking resemblance to symptoms of dysentery), as he was confined to his bed with sharp abdominal pains, diarrhea, and other symptoms. “Now, so far from home,” he complained with a bit of self-pity, “I am of no use to my country (kokka) at all, but must lay here dying in bed in vain. How terribly regrettable!” i, 12 And, he T h e C i t y of Sh a ng h a i a n d I t s I n h a bi ta n t s

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vows to be steadfast in the face of whatever fate awaits him. It is interesting to speculate but impossible ultimately to say what he meant by kokka: Japan, Owari domain, or both kuni (Owari) and ie (family), the two components of kokka. On the whole, our Japanese visitors’ first impressions of Shanghai were depressing. The city was filthy and overcrowded, and the people, while not unfriendly, did not observe the rules of etiquette which the Japanese expected to be universal. They were far too in-your-face for the Japanese. Everywhere they went, they were surrounded by “several thousand” (sūsennin) gazing Chinese like a “fence”; Hibino wrote that it was both “laughable and detestable.” j As Takasugi was quick to note in his own distinctive way, it was not just the annoyance of their numbers, but the intense body odor of so many people exacerbated by the excruciating heat and perspiration: “As I was walking around the streets [with Itō Gunhachi, on June 13], the locals were tailing us. Being close to the stench of these local people was like steaming in the sweltering heat. It made me suffer terribly.” k Nagura stated it with similar clarity: “Walking around the streets and alleyways, I came to a place where the onlookers formed a fence” l (June 5); “I was wandering along the street and stopped briefly, and mobs of people gathered to look; the heat was difficult to bear”m (June 12); and “Our clothing was very strange [to them], and men and women alike struggled to get a look, forming a fence as they all gathered near”n (undated).13 After he survived the initial assault on his eyes and nostrils, Nōtomi Kaijirō recorded a different early impression of the Chinese and one that represents an important undercurrent in modern Sino-Japanese relations: The people here are altogether different from us and the Westerners who reside permanently [in Shanghai]. They [the Chinese] are extremely polite to us, the first [Japanese] to cross the sea and visit, and they seem immediately like old friends. Perhaps it is because we can exchange ideas by means of brush conversations. As soon as the ship docked and we came on land, they surrounded us like the gathering clouds. If you grab a child by the hand, you can get it to come along. One might say that this is due to the fact that the Japanese and Chinese are kindred spirits.o, 14

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the “brush conversation” in the interactions between Chinese and Japanese, especially prior to the twentieth century (and even into its early years). In the absence of a shared spoken language, all educated East Asians would have been trained from an 74

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early age in the literary Chinese language and Chinese culture. A brush, ink, and a piece of paper could facilitate a conversation, as many Japanese learned on this voyage to their surprise, or a discussion on virtually any subject from the profoundly political to the utterly prosaic. There were minor differences in the way Japanese traditionally used the literary Chinese language, but slight dissimilarities would not have impeded the exchange of ideas. Embedded in the use of the literary language was a wealth of referents rooted in Chinese cultural and literary history that would have been as familiar to well-educated Japanese as to well-educated Chinese.15

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five

Westerners in Shanghai: The Chinese Malaise The way the English treat the Chinese . . . is . . . like victors over the vanquished, cold, rough, disdainful, so much so, that it hurts to see it. They do not accept these people as humans, but as some sort of laboring animal . . . . [They] do not hide their contempt for them . . . . And there are no people more peaceful, self-effacing, and polite than the Chinese. —i va n a l e x s a n drov ic h g onc h a rov 1

one of the main objectives—if not the main objective—of the voyage of the Senzaimaru to Shanghai was to observe and assess the international community engaged in international commerce and at a port not too far away. Achieving that goal, which necessitated interactions with and examination of the Westerners in Shanghai, fell primarily to the bureaucrats and merchants, only one of whom, Matsudaya Hankichi, wrote a report. The other information we have from this trip comes from the records left by the attendants to the various officials and to the doctor. They, too, had numerous dealings with Westerners in Shanghai and countless things to say about how the Westerners were behaving in the city. We need to remember that few Japanese on board had seen or personally had more than a smattering of interactions with Westerners before this voyage. Aside from the two who had been part of the 1860 trip to the United States, the most any of our travelers would have known of real Westerners was from the handful of them in Nagasaki prior to departing for Shanghai, although the officials might have had interactions of a formal nature in treaty negotiations. Some of this we discussed in an earlier chapter. Japanese attitudes toward the Westerners in Shanghai as seen in the travel narratives produced from the voyage were always closely tied either to Westerners’ arrogance and condescension with respect to the Chinese, Chinese subservience before them, the possible implications for Japan, or a

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combination of two or more of these. In some cases, this led our Japanese visitors who reported on the voyage to be critical of the Chinese, in others they were deeply sympathetic, and in still others their animosity toward the West intensified (and it was already quite intense). But, Westerners— never a source of anything related to genuine learning or proper behavior— were nevertheless understood by some of the Japanese as repositories of knowledge about how to make a state or nation strong. While this was a lesser form of knowledge, in a world of big fish gobbling up little fish it was an increasingly necessary form of knowledge—and Japan’s long disconnection from active interaction with the outside world put it at a disadvantage.

shanghai customs Everyone on board the Senzaimaru who authored a travel report noted that the Chinese customs administration in Shanghai was operated by the British, which seemed at a minimum exceedingly odd. Nōtomi explained: Shanghai customs [collection] is in British hands. They collect levies on vessels entering the Huangpu River. I asked [Chinese for] the reason for this [and was told that], when this [port] opened twenty years ago, the merchants gathered here from many lands, traded, and prospered. But the Western merchants took advantage of the Qing’s weaknesses and at every turn did not abide by the rules, acted in an illegal manner, and the Chinese came to rely on the British to see to it that [foreign] merchants paid their customs duties. At the time of the Tianjin war [namely, the Second Opium War], however, the Qing court was attacked and defeated by the British army, and it was determined that [the former] would pay a huge amount of indemnity. Ever since, Shanghai customs monies, as indemnity, have been collected annually solely by the British.a, 2

On July 7, after about a month in the city and apparently some research on the topic, Hibino Teruhiro also took up the topic of the Shanghai customs office. As he introduced the subject in his diary account, he noted that he was just walking along the waterfront area known as the Bund in Shanghai when he came upon the customs office. Did he have the facts and figures at his fingertips as the following would lead one to believe? Did he talk (if so, in what language?) to someone there and acquire this information that way? Did events even transpire in the order and random way suggested by Hibino? W e s t e r n e r s i n S h a ng h a i : C h i n e s e M a l a i s e

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There is no way to know at present. Interestingly, what begins as a sober, balanced description of his understanding of how things worked in the customs office ends in despair tinged with anger: The new [customs] office lies at a shipping transport hub in Shanghai; it is extremely big. Qing officials and Englishmen work together, fortytwo British and ninety-nine Qing officials—141 men in all. One high official of the Qing government manages it with the British serving as department heads and running customs affairs. The annual salary of a department head is 8,000 Mexican dollars . . . . Why do the British run the customs office? After the Tianjin war, there was an indemnity of sixteen million taels, and a forty-year mortgage on customs in five ports. Alas and alack! The port of Shanghai is China’s number one port. Every day ships bring in over 600 Mexican dollars, with overall shipping enormous, but all of it is taken by the Western barbarians; it’s truly enough to make you sigh indignantly.b, 3

british (and french) arrogance Anger at the Western presence (and everything associated with it) was a consistent theme throughout the travel narratives and diaries of the Japanese visitors; some (such as Takasugi and Hibino) burned with rage, others were just highly annoyed, while still others took it more in stride as a given in a world over which they had no control. The haughtiness with which Westerners paraded around Shanghai, alternately oblivious and condescending to the Chinese, was particularly infuriating. After witnessing Chinese scurry to get out of the way when British or French persons passed by and observing the abject poverty of the great majority of Shanghai natives as compared with the splendor in which foreigners lived, Takasugi concluded  that “circumstances in Shanghai were sufficient to call it a British dependency.”c, 4 In his disgruntled view, the Chinese needed the Westerners who swaggered about the streets of the city as if they owned it. The Chinese had, for all intents and purposes, become servants of the Westerners. In theory, the Qing government had sovereignty over China, but in fact the country had become little more than a colony of Great Britain and France.5 Mine Kiyoshi was also struck by the presence of British and French troops patrolling the city. He raised the subject in a brush conversation with a Chinese scholar by the name of Guan Qingmei. 78

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[Mine] Kiyoshi: You have recently employed British and French troops. Does this not make possible a Shi-Jin disaster in the future? Are the affections of the British and French to be trusted?d [Qingmei] replied: During the crisis last year, we did not bother being concerned about this, as we were planning for the future.e, 6

Although the content of this exchange—which is the tail end of a longer brush conversation about the Taiping Rebellion—is not all that telling, it does reveal the easy manner in which educated Japanese and Chinese could communicate. What I have translated as “a Shi-Jin disaster” refers to Shi Jingtang (892–942) of the short-lived Jin dynasty (936–947, in the Five Dynasties era) employing Khitan troops, which led both to disaster for the Jin and to the subsequent founding of the alien Liao dynasty of the Khitans. The message to be conveyed to his Chinese interlocutor was clear: Can you really trust the Western (foreign) barbarians? Their minds and hearts are different from ours. Guan Qingmei effectively ignored the obvious thrust of the question. In a brush conversation of his own, Hibino did not bother with rhetorical questions but told Xu Huosheng: “Using British and French troops to fight off the Long-Haired [Bandits] is the utmost in inept planning.” f, 7 And, Takasugi Shinsaku was similarly direct in a brush chat when he and Itō Gunhachi visited with Gu Lin. They ranged back over many centuries and discussed the many “barbarians” from whom Chinese dynasties had hired troops—always culminating in a telling disaster for the dynasty in power: [Takasugi:] Ever since Yao and Shun, your country has been one of magnificent character. Lately, though, what is it with the rampant, lawless behavior of these trivial barbarians from the West?g [Gu:] Our national destiny is gradually now going into decline. It is the same old sadness since antiquity as with the Five Barbarians during the Jin, the Uighurs during the Tang, and the Liao, Jin, and Xixia during the Song.h [Takasugi:] The gradual decline of national destiny is a result of the sovereign and ministers not attaining the proper Way. If the sovereign and his ministers did so, how could there be a moral collapse? The recent decline of your country is simply a self-inflicted calamity. There is no reason to refer to it as the mandate of heaven.i [Gu:] So true, so true.j, 8

The bottom line for Takasugi (and in an effort to cut through empty rhetoric) was that China’s present problems were of her own making and due W e s t e r n e r s i n S h a ng h a i : C h i n e s e M a l a i s e

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primarily to political ineptitude, a point of view with which Gu Lin apparently agreed. Takasugi detested the way the West was treating the Chinese people and was deeply sympathetic to them. As we have seen, though, exaggeration was no stranger to Takasugi’s brush. Yet, in a fleeting moment of balance on June 10, he recorded what appears to be behavior to the credit of the British: “A bit less than one-half mile from the British consulate is a bridge known as the Xindaqiao (New Great Bridge). Seven years ago, the old bridge [there] decayed and collapsed. Inasmuch as the Chinese were unable to rebuild it, the British built this [the present] bridge. Word has it that, whenever a Chinese person passes over it, he must pay one coin to the British.” k, 9 Or, maybe this was just another, more roundabout way of criticizing the British. Hibino was even more outraged at European behavior in Shanghai and aimed his anger at the Taipings (to be discussed more fully in the next chapter) and the Westerners in Shanghai. One morning, June 7, as he came downstairs at the hotel, he was addressed by an “extremely odd-looking” (yōbō hanahada kotonari) foreigner, though he apparently had no idea who the fellow was or what he had said to him. Hibino then asked Zhang Dixiang, the Chinese proprietor of the hotel whom he had earlier befriended, and learned that the strange foreigner was a French missionary residing in the same building as Hibino. I will let Hibino (and an embedded poem he composed in Chinese) take it from here: When I heard this, I was stunned, enraged, and scowling. My emotions were rising, and I lamented all the way up to the heavens. [And, as a perfect remedy for fuming anger,] I recited this [Chinese-language] poem: The basis for the theft of resources from this land lies in this [very] building. Does everyone know this or not? I lean on the windowsill and stare out at the Huangpu. Its turbid waves line up across the horizon and flow for thousands of ri. The Qing may have banned Christianity, but there are three Christian churches in Shanghai. The Long-Haired Bandits are not like the rising of troops in a great cause at the end of the Ming. But with their heterodox religion, they have fooled the ignorant, brought about a major uprising, and caused disasters across ten provinces. Yet, can they be stopped? Even if the chaos in China becomes extreme, won’t there still be a few who remain responsible. What if the court hasn’t planned this far? Perhaps the violence of the Western barbarians without and the instigation of chaos by bandits within will together bring about disaster. Even if there are good people, what 80

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can they do? The Qing has come to this end and what more can be done? It has leased land and opened five ports. “Ah, the dangerous lesson is close at hand, only separated from us by a thin stream.” It is very frightening.l, 10

The penultimate sentence is a quotation in Japanese translation from the ancient Chinese classic Shijing (Book of poetry). And, that evening Hibino had another brush conversation with Zhang Dixiang, one of several dozen he records, in an effort to make some sense of it all. Hibino could not have been ignorant of the fact that the Harris Treaty recently imposed on Japan foisted the same indignities on the Japanese (five open ports, extraterritoriality, and freedom of missionary activity, among many such conditions). The “thin stream” either had even less water in it than he imagined, or more likely he feared that a similar set of enforced provisions would lead Japan down a path to the humiliation presently apparent in China. What remains somewhat unclear is what caused his anger. Was it the fact that he unknowingly was rooming in the same hotel with a barbarian from the West? Was it the Frenchman’s Christian faith? Was it his audacity in trying to address Hibino as if everyone was expected to understand whatever language he used? Or, was it the much larger issue which Hibino expounds about the future of the Qing empire—today one French missionary walking around like he owns the place, and tomorrow there are rebels, also Christian, knocking at the door? These are all possible explanations, but they all also fall short. Maybe, as any parent knows, the emotions of a twenty-four-year-old are not so easily explained on the basis of reason alone. The even younger Nōtomi Kaijirō had something of an altercation with a Frenchman all his own. No date is attached to the incident, but it appears to have transpired relatively early in the visit to Shanghai. Otherwise, he describes it well: I was walking one day in the walled [Chinese] city. Toward evening when I wanted to return [to his hotel in the concession area], the city gate was closed and one could not get in or out. A Frenchman saw that I was Japanese, and he opened the gate to allow me to pass through. The people there took advantage of the situation and tried to pass through, but the Frenchman would not permit them to do so. At the time, one official was riding in a palanquin from outside the city and wanted to enter. He did not obey the Frenchman’s stopping him, resolutely intent as he was on getting into [the city]. The Frenchman became angry and hit him several times in succession with a cane until he backed off. Alas, China is already so weak as to have reached this state. It’s enough to make a man sigh. (I’ve heard that there are seven gates W e s t e r n e r s i n S h a ng h a i : C h i n e s e M a l a i s e

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into the walled city, and they are guarded by barbarian soldiers either from Britain or France.)m, 11

Nakamuda Kuranosuke had a similar experience with gates closing on July 4. He found himself outside the walled city and wanting back in after closing time in the late afternoon, but the Westerner (no nationality is specified) refused. Help from an official at the Dutch consulate pried the gate open for him on this occasion. “The gates of Shanghai are guarded by Western troops, and the people of this country themselves cannot freely move in or out. This is, of course, due to the [Taiping] uprising, but how can they allow Westerners to exercise such authority? I feel pity for the Chinese. You can see how far China has declined!”12

“decline” of china and the chinese As indicated by Nakamuda’s sentiment, most Japanese regarded what they observed in the subservient Chinese attitudes toward Westerners and the Westerners’ condescension toward the Chinese as confirmation that the great fount of civilization and culture had plunged into a serious decline. There were many ways such an observation might be couched—such as “pity” in Nakamuda’s account—but all of them now had direct experience with it. None of them, however, attributed this decline to an intrinsically decadent quality of the Chinese people or their culture. As a result, our Japanese may have been saddened by what they observed or angry at the West for catalyzing this dramatic decline, but they did not think the Chinese constitutionally incapable of reviving themselves, and there is no suggestion that Japan should or would play an active role, military or otherwise, in that revival. Nōtomi, who had expressed a sense of intimacy with [China and the Chinese] just “like old friends” (kyūchi no gotoshi) soon after arriving in Shanghai, later experienced a profound shock at the behavior of his newfound “friends.” Here Nōtomi tells of this experience: One day, the Dutch consul came [to their hotel] on some matter of business. [Shi] Weinan [a Chinese acquaintance who happened to be there at the time] took one look and his complexion suddenly changed. He was quivering as he stood there bowing. I thought it strange and [later] asked him why. [He replied:] “When he [the Dutchman] walked by and stared at me, he seemed to loathe the fact that I had come to chat with a man of your country. I 82

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became all flustered and alarmed lest he become angry with me.” Then he got up and left . . . . When Shi Weinan was in school in Beijing, he was quite well known [as a scholar]. That such an eminent man would still be so fearful of Westerners shows that the fear of the West constitutes China’s [present] state of affairs. It is really enough to make one sigh.n, 13

This was a perfect example of what might be called the Chinese malaise— fear of Westerners on China’s own soil. The proud, even haughtily righteous, samurai from Japan found such behavior both confusing at first and somewhere between terribly sad and reprehensible later. They were, again, deeply concerned about it and what it might portend for Japan. As Takasugi famously noted in the margins of a page of one of his diary accounts: “How sad that Chinese labor for the foreigners. Our country has to defend against this, I pray.”o, 14 The situation in China, in particular in Shanghai, might even have been worse. Not only were the Chinese subservient on their own soil to the foreigners, but they had come to rely on them to deal with the domestic disturbance. If you detest the foreigners as no more than barbarians and have pity on the Chinese, how are you to make sense of the pitiable ones being dependent on the barbarous ones? The Japanese clearly saw the foreign powers, especially the British and French, taking advantage of this situation to strengthen their colonial stranglehold on China. Qing officials were, of course, not nearly as oblivious to the circumstances confronting their dynasty’s future as the Japanese perceived them to be. Prince Gong (1832–1898) at one point memorialized the Xianfeng Emperor about the dubious intentions of the foreigners and their willingness to fight the rebels: “This [policy of] using the barbarians to destroy the bandits is leading to ever increasing corrupt practices.”p, 15 As it turns out, the Senzaimaru arrived just as the British and French were expanding their military presence in Shanghai and elsewhere in China, and the Qing was indeed becoming increasingly dependent on them. A little over a week after its arrival in port, Takasugi noted on June 11: “Today several hundred French troops came on shore from a military vessel. I had business to attend to and thus did not see it with my own eyes. It is extremely disturbing.”q, 16 For all of his disembodied animosity toward the barbarian foreigners, when Takasugi actually saw them at work and the materiel with which they worked, he was won over. He would never concede the inner realm of culture or values, but he quickly became convinced that, whatever their failings as W e s t e r n e r s i n S h a ng h a i : C h i n e s e M a l a i s e

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figure 7. Takasugi Shinsaku’s sketch of an Armstrong cannon with notes.

human beings (legion, to be sure), the Westerners had produced the best weaponry then available anywhere.17 He made every effort to observe it and obtain what he could for Chōshū domain. For example, he remarked on July 13: “Godai [Tomoatsu] came by to chat. In the afternoon, I went with Nakamuda to the British artillery emplacements to see the Armstrong cannons. They’re twelve-pounders.”r, 18 He even drew a rough picture of one such cannon (see figure 7). The very next day, Nagura reported that he and Nakamuda (again) went to observe the British Armstrong cannons. He had nothing but praise for them. One month earlier, on June 12, he had an opportunity to watch the British army engage in defensive arrays and was impressed by what he saw.19 Nagura asked one of his Chinese acquaintances, Chen Ruqin, who had witnessed foreign troops in the field, what he thought of them. Chen replied: “The French are simple, the British arrogant, and the Russians respectful.”s Nagura remarked that “this view jibes with our own [observations].”t, 20 It is unclear if Chen’s dismissive remarks were meant discerningly or just reflected current cant, but given China’s great experience at the time with varieties of 84

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Western national groups, his comments distinguishing one Westerner from another along lines of nationality must have been novel in the eyes of Nagura, who could not have had much contact of any kind with Westerners. In one of his many brush conversations, Hibino asked Xu Huosheng how many British and French troops in total were in or around Shanghai at the time, and he was told 5,000, a figure not far from the actual one (2,800 British and 2,000 French soldiers).21 With all these foreign troops on Chinese soil, Takasugi wondered who was going to pay them for their services suppressing the rebels: “The Chinese are depending on the British and French to defend against the Long-Haired Bandits. I asked about which country was going to supply the military funds. The British said that they would, and the Chinese said that they would pay. It remains unclear.”u, 22 In the estimation of Shanghai circuit intendant Wu Xu, there was great value in hiring foreigners both to defend against the rebels and to train Qing forces, and he invested a good deal of money in them. As he put it: “Western troops will frighten the bandits. Using them to train troops is not like offering support for the barbarians.”v, 23 It is, of course, important to note that we only have these Sino-Japanese brush exchanges from the Japanese side, and they may not be verbatim reports of what was written at the time but spun to the effect of making the latter appear wiser, even if not intentionally, at the former’s expense. Nōtomi Kaijirō shared with his fellow Japanese his own utter distrust of reliance on Western military force to save China from the Taiping rebels: I asked some Chinese: “Why borrow foreign strength to protect the city [of Shanghai]?” They all fell silent. After a short while, one of them said: “A few years ago, when the Long-Haired Bandits attacked Shanghai, the new Governor Li Hongzhang had not yet arrived. At the time our troop strength was centered in Anqing, some 700 li distant from Shanghai, and we had no choice but to draw aid from British and French military might.” I asked again: “So, why did you not prevent the foreigners from behaving in an imperious and domineering manner? Is it not because the Qing dynasty is under the control of the foreigners?” No one replied.w, 24

In the brush conversation with Guan Qingmei, discussed above, Mine Kiyoshi asked about the wisdom of employing French and British forces, wondering if this might be like the fox guarding the henhouse. Earlier in that same chat, Mine was (if possible) even more insistent in eliciting information and possibly embarrassing his interlocutor (who sounds much like Nōtomi’s): W e s t e r n e r s i n S h a ng h a i : C h i n e s e M a l a i s e

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[Mine] asked: How many troops are there now in Shanghai?x Qingmei said: There are thirty-seven brigades under the command of the Songjiang brigade commander; each brigade differs in number, from over 1,000 men to 700–800. Shanghai now has two brigades. The provincial governor has over 10,000 troops at his disposal.y [Mine] Kiyoshi said: I was just asking about the circuit intendant and his underlings, and [the figures were] nothing like these numbers. What I have heard is imprecise, so let me ask again. I have recently heard the figure of over 12,000 troops. Are these the ones supplied by Britain and France?z [Qingmei] said: In the twelfth [lunar] month of last year [January 1862], the new governor had yet to arrive in Shanghai. All the troops were stationed in the Anqing area, over 700 li away. For that reason, we sought military support from British and French to defend the city.aa, 25

The assault on Shanghai by the Taipings in mid-1862 had led to great fears spreading among the Shanghai officialdom and the resultant reliance on Western military forces. It also led to some outlandish rumors, origin unknown, that Japanese had come to offer assistance. Hibino heard such fantastic tales from a merchant by the name of Chun Ling, a man with whom he exchanged many brush chats, and Nōtomi also “spoke” with him about such rumors. The one that they took pains to quash was the idea that the Japanese had come in response to a British proposal—to help support the Qing court against the rebels. Other apparently widespread rumors included two Japanese with superhuman powers—one who could fly over the clouds and kill people and the other who could traverse 1,000 li in a single day—who would be coming to China. (Neither happened.) When Hibino heard these superhero scenarios, he exclaimed (with his brush): “Such rumors are detestable. Our country strictly prohibits heterodox teachings; violate [such a ban] and you face death.”bb, 26 A switch then flipped inside Nōtomi’s head. It was because of these fantastic tales that so many people flocked to meet the Senzaimaru when it arrived in port and why the Japanese were always the source of so much attention as they tried to walk around the city.27 Of course, beings who can fly over clouds and cover great distances in a single day would hardly need to rely on such a backward mode of transportation as a ship—a sail ship no less—to reach their destination. But such details rarely intrude in the realm of the fantastic. The important point is that “news”—even if mostly implausible—may have reached Shanghai’s shores in advance of the arrival of the Senzaimaru. Nagura was also frequently asked about help coming from Japan to save China: “Rumor has it in Shanghai that ‘the Japanese will soon arrive 86

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and be a source of great joy for our dynasty. Circuit Intendant Wu is planning to attack the Long-Haired Bandits. Reinforcements from Japan can arrive by sea under cover within a few days time.’ As a result I was asked by numerous people when the Japanese forces were coming. It’s utterly laughable.”cc, 28 The foregoing observations and interactions with Chinese, witnessing of Western arrogance toward Chinese, and apparent incapacity of the Chinese to deal with their manifold problems led the Japanese to believe that the Qing dynasty was on its last legs. There was widespread doubt that the Qing would be in any position to save itself by trusting so much in assistance from the thoroughly untrustworthy West. Nagura recounts the sad tale of a visit on June 14 that he had planned with Hibino to a Confucian temple in the Chinese city. In the crowds he and Hibino became separated, and Nagura soldiered on alone. En route he met a Chinese named Wu Eshi and said that he wished to pray at the temple. Wu explained that British soldiers had temporarily taken it over for use as a barracks. He returned on June 29 and found the British troops still billeted there. They were nice enough to show him around, but the whole scene of desecration reeked of China’s declining state and fading national strength. The Chinese were all too servile to the alien Westerners.29 Takasugi had a not dissimilar experience on July 3. He was walking around the walled city and, after visiting and briefly describing a temple to the war god, Guan Yu (Guandi, d. 219), he wrote: I went on to the Confucian temple. There were two pavilions there, and plants were growing in the empty space between them. Everything seemed to be in good working order. However, ever since the bandit uprising, British [troops] have been here and turned it into a barracks. Inside one pavilion the soldiers were sleeping with their weapons close at hand. On seeing this, I truly could not endure such a deplorable [sight]. The British are defending against the bandits for the Chinese, and thus China moved the images of the sage Confucius to another place to enable the British to move in.dd, 30

Hibino did manage to visit the Confucian temple in its transformed state and offered a detailed description of it, his anger included. The anger appears to be a mixture of animosity toward the Western presence and at the despoliation of a holy site, but he concludes that the Qing dynasty’s use of Western forces to suppress the Taipings was, to say the least, misguided: “Chasing W e s t e r n e r s i n S h a ng h a i : C h i n e s e M a l a i s e

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away the fox while attracting the tiger, why are they doing something so terribly foolish!”ee, 31 When he later engaged in a brush conversation with one Wang Shiwei, Wang denied that British troops were using the temple as billet and that Hibino must have confused the Confucian temple with a Christian building, but Hibino would not let him off the hook.32 How was such a thing possible? wondered Hibino and others among the Japanese. The answer, they concluded, spoke directly to China’s current lack of courage and valor. It also meant that the Japanese—in their own selfestimation—were more faithful to Confucianism and respectful of Confucius than the Chinese. A segment of the exchange follows: Chinese: Does your country honor Confucius?ff Hibino: My country honors Confucius more than yours.gg Chinese: How so?hh Hibino: Yesterday, I went to pay my respects at the Confucian temple in the walled city, but there were no images of the sage—only British [troops].ii, 33

The conversation then shifted into the realm of what deities the Japanese venerated, a brief history of Shinto, and finally all the Confucian traditions the two people shared.

learning from the foreigners? The animosity exhibited toward foreigners by the Japanese—and their disgust at the appallingly submissive behavior of the Chinese before these intruders—did not mean that everything Western needed to be discarded, baby and bathwater style. In fact, there was grudging admiration for the West’s technical achievements, not because of the domination they were exercising over the Chinese with it but because many Japanese wanted what they saw for their own domains or even their own country. We have seen how Takasugi Shinsaku rationalized this dual perception. Aside from diplomatic officials such as Kroes and Medhurst, a few of these Westerners are mentioned by name when the Japanese interacted with them. There was a potentially systemic problem, though, with such interactions: the lack of a language in which to communicate. The official interpreters were apparently busy with bureaucratic work, as they rarely make appearances in the travel narratives. As noted earlier, though, Nakamuda Kuranosuke knew 88

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some English, and the occasional missionary knew enough literary Chinese for them to at least convey ideas across linguistic barriers. As we have seen, in additional to issues of international commerce, the main point of Japanese attention vis-à-vis the foreigners was the latter’s military presence in China (and hence close to Japan). As much as they to a man detested this phenomenon, they were all samurai, and samurai were by definition military men. They thus grudgingly admired the West’s ability to produce armaments, gunboats, and the like and to field an army in battle. One interesting case in point of a Westerner whom at least three of the Japanese approached is William Muirhead (1822–1900), a missionary from the London Missionary Society of long standing in Shanghai, author of many religious and secular works in both English and Chinese (and specifically Shanghai dialect), and operator of a hospital attached to his church. He first came to Shanghai in 1848; after a month-long trip to Nanjing in February 1861, he returned to Shanghai where he remained for decades. On June 20, Godai and Takasugi paid him a call. How they knew of him or were, presumably, introduced to him remains unknown, though he was certainly a well-known presence in the city. Takasugi confided in one of his accounts that, while Muirhead served rich and poor at his clinic, missionaries often combined their evangelical and curative activities, a cynical but undoubtedly accurate statement, and that they used their medical knowledge to spread their nefarious religion among the local populace; “honorable men of our land must be prepared to forestall this.” jj Muirhead must have given the two Japanese a tour of his facilities, because Takasugi describes it. Before leaving, Takasugi reports “asking [Muirhead] for Lianbang zhilüe (Brief account of the United States) and other such books”;kk Lianbang zhilüe was a famous treatise in Chinese by American missionary Elijah C. Bridgman (1801–1861), who had only passed away a few months earlier in Shanghai. The work would not become known in Japan for another two years, but from that point it became the launching pad for subsequent scholarship on the United States and was used by Kido Kōin (Takayoshi, 1833–1877) on the Iwakura Mission of 1871 as an entrée into study of the Constitution of the United States. In one of his own accounts of the trip, Nagura Inata also reported that one of his co-passengers obtained a copy of Lianbang zhilüe (either Takasugi or Nakamuda), “written by an American” (Kakijin arawasu), later identified as Muirhead, for a single yuan which enabled Nagura to “read” (miru) it. He may have been responsible for bringing the book back to Japan and for encouraging its republication there with Japanese reading punctuation. W e s t e r n e r s i n S h a ng h a i : C h i n e s e M a l a i s e

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Nagura was himself collecting as much information as he could about Western military technology and weaponry, especially that of Great Britain, and the history and nature of Sino-Western conflict. He does note that China was mired in the “used of antiquated weapons, including at times the bow.” ll, 34 Two days later, Takasugi went again with Godai to visit Muirhead, but the missionary-doctor was not in. On June 24, Takasugi enticed Nakamuda to join him and pay yet another visit to Muirhead. With Nakamuda in tow, presumably more or clearer communication would be possible. We have no report from Takasugi on what transpired at Muirhead’s home, except that he specifically asked to see issues of Shanghai xinbao (a Chinese newspaper reportedly carrying stories about the Taipings) and two Chinese-language works introducing modern Western science: Shuxue qimeng (Introduction to mathematics) and Daishuxue (Algebra), both prepared by Alexander Wylie (1815–1887) and Li Shanlan (1810–1882).35 Several weeks later, on July 8, Nakamuda went by himself to visit Muirhead, and Muirhead lent him a four-volume work about the Taiping Rebellion that Nakamuda spent several days replicating by hand. It included a bibliography of some eighteen works by Taiping leaders. Takasugi subsequently referred to the four-volume work as “the text copied out by Nakamuda.”36 Thus, for all their vitriol toward the Western imperialists, the Japanese visitors to China in 1862 were intensely interested in Western learning. This was for them a fairly uncomplicated division of labor inasmuch as by 1862 Japan had a long tradition of Western or Dutch learning (Rangaku) in the Edo period, a tradition that was not as a rule in conflict with the Sinological tradition of Kangaku. Both the shogunate in Edo and several domains had institutes of Western learning (Yōgaku). Nakamuda, as noted, was an avid student of Western navigational technology and had acquired some English to that end. From their travel narratives, we can also see that others among the Japanese had obtained some knowledge of techniques for making Western geographical measurements, such as Nōtomi’s placing Shanghai’s geographical coordinates in his travel account. For the Chinese, however, such a neat separation of Western and Chinese learning was for a variety of reasons much more difficult. The London Missionary Society was one of a number of missionary publishing houses that had been established in Shanghai in the 1840s and 1850s, houses that published mountains of volumes of a religious as well as secular scientific nature. They also produced the 90

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first Chinese-language journal in Shanghai, Liuhe congtan (Stories from around the world), which began publication in January 1857. As we saw in Chapter 3, Takasugi spent a fair amount of time in Nagasaki before the Senzaimaru sailed, talking with Western missionaries and diplomats in an effort to acquire as much information as he could about the outside world. He saw quickly that, for all the prattle among his local cohort about “expelling the barbarians,” the most direct way for his domain of Chōshū to become richer was through trade with the outside world and the building of a stronger military, meaning a force armed with the best weaponry available. In his Shanghai diary account, Takasugi frequently mentions activities directly related to things Western, some slightly incredible. For example, on June 9, he wrote: “In the morning, I read English books. In the afternoon, I went with all the officials to the French consulate.”mm, 37 The problem is obviously that there is no evidence that he was able to read English. Two days later, he again reports “reading an English book.”nn Such exaggerations notwithstanding, on June 14, he reported going with Nakamuda and Godai to see a British-operated “river steamship and all its apparatus.”oo, 38 It is difficult to assess when reading through Takasugi’s diary account, but it is entirely plausible that, his heroic standing aside, he was following Nakamuda and Godai around. Godai was on a private mission which was soon to leave Takasugi amazed, and Nakamuda was the only one of the attendants who could speak any English. Three days later, he went with Nakamuda to visit an American by the name of “Charles,” and this is how Takasugi tells it: In the morning, I went with Nakamuda to an American merchant establishment. The merchant’s name was Charles . . . . Charles said: “I lived in Yokohama for three or four years and understand a bit of your language. I’d love to visit there again in future, as I have a great deal of respect for your people.” . . . Nakamuda understands English and had a clear conversation . . . . I said to Charles [through Nakamuda]: “Although I have been reading a book in English of late, I cannot as yet carry on a conversation. I shall continue to study day and night, and if we meet again, I hope to be able to chat with you.” Charles replied: “When we meet again, I would like to be able to understand your language.”pp, 39

Lots of formality, but clearly Takasugi knew little or no English, and Charles had acquired a roughly equal amount of Japanese. We have already traced Takasugi’s visit, again facilitated by Nakamuda, to William Muirhead, and the Chinese-language books picked up there W e s t e r n e r s i n S h a ng h a i : C h i n e s e M a l a i s e

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figure 8. Replica of the pistol purchased by Takasugi Shinsaku in Shanghai.

indicate an interest in mathematics and science. In his own account, Nagura Inata examined in some detail the Shuxue qimeng, which he undoubtedly got his hands on from Takasugi.40 Nagura, it should be noted, did not suffer from an initially ferocious anti-Western bias in quite the way Takasugi did. Japan’s military modernization was foremost in his mind, and that required an open mind about things Western. July 12 was an especially proud day for Takasugi. He and Nakamuda went to visit an American gun dealer, and he bought a “seven-shooter” (see figure 8). There were various brands of seven-shooters available in 1862, but Takasugi says nothing more about this seemingly “macho” purchase. He later bought another pistol from a Dutchman. He brought both guns back to Japan and subsequently gave one of them, a Smith and Wesson, to Sakamoto Ryōma (1836–1867) when they met in Shimonoseki in early 1866, the year before they both passed away; the other one, it appears, he never used, and its present location remains unknown. He had earlier tried to purchase a steamship for Chōshū, but despite support from Sufu Masanosuke (1823–1864), a major figure in Chōshū politics and stalwart against opening the country, such a venture proved financially unfeasible.41 Because he did not leave an account of his experiences in Shanghai, points of confusion still cling to Godai Tomoatsu’s alleged purchase of a German steamship for his home domain of Satsuma. Godai, it must be remembered, was traveling incognito as a deckhand on the Senzaimaru. How would he have transported the more than $100,000 needed for such a purchase? Assuming he did not carry the money as cash, in what form did he transport it to Shanghai? Who would have entrusted him with such a colossal sum? To 92

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be sure, Satsuma had for some time been trading privately (meaning illegally) with foreign vessels off the coast of the Ryukyu Islands, but it had no relationship with banks in Shanghai or Hong Kong. And, even if he could have transacted such a deal, how would Godai have gotten the steamer back to Kagoshima? These questions remain to be answered satisfactorily. Rumors also spread among the Japanese that he contracted to have Satsuma purchase an additional seven steamers from Great Britain for a total price of $500,000; this part of the story is probably unadulterated hyperbole, though the purchase of the German vessel appears to be based in truth.42 Takasugi and Godai had both been charged with buying a steamship by their home domains, the two major southwestern domains of Chōshū and Satsuma, respectively, which were intent on strengthening themselves both vis-à-vis contending domains and especially at the expense of the shogunate. In the final lines of one of his accounts of the voyage, Mine Kiyoshi mentions that he heard from the two of them about these orders, and that such a task would be extremely difficult to accomplish.43 Back in Nagasaki after the Shanghai trip and various failed efforts to secure a steamship there, Takasugi learned of a Dutch ship that was available for sale, but he showed up too late to make the purchase. As Takasugi himself tells the story, Godai had on two occasions earlier in 1862, before the Senzaimaru set sail for China, sought to buy a ship for Satsuma, but was also unsuccessful: “Godai Saisuke [Tomoatsu] from Satsuma came to Shanghai as a deckhand on board the Senzaimaru . . . . He was under orders from his lord to make the trip. Slowly but surely, we became more friendly . . . . I learned that he was negotiating the purchase of a steamship . . . . The price of the steamship was $123,000, or 7,000 Japanese ryō.”qq, 44 In fact, in February he had been in contact on behalf of his domain with the famed British merchant Thomas Glover (1838–1911). In any event, the details remain murky. Midway in their sojourn in Shanghai, on July 24 Takasugi and Nakamuda visited a British “newspaper office” (shinbunshiya), unspecified though most likely the North-China Herald, where they learned some unsettling news: A British man was the manager [there]. The manager called us in and spoke candidly. The British man read out loud from a newspaper that had been sent from Yokohama in Japan. Although it was still unclear, there was a disturbance relating to a commercial matter [in Japan]. Over 1,000 foot soldiers had departed from Edo. All daimyos were moving toward Kyoto . . . . Four of the largest domains were mentioned: Satsuma, Hosokawa, my domain, and Kuroda. The British man also said that another report held that one

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daimyo had attacked the shogunate in Edo. The British man also stated that the daimyos had dispatched foreigners to Nagasaki and Hakodate and may move on Osaka and elsewhere. The shogunate had opened the port of Osaka as a site for trade, and things were fine there. In sum, the barbarians are all praising the shogunate. It’s very, very scary. We returned to our lodgings at dusk.rr, 45

In addition to not knowing what was going on back home and undoubtedly having doubts about the veracity of reports in the foreign press, Takasugi (and Nakamuda as well) would have had little experience with an open press at all. Broadsheets had been available in Edo-period Japan, but they were not legal, and as a rule the government kept a closed lid on political events and the spread of such information, especially concerning the troublesome domains of the southwest. The very idea of making public all the news available was itself entirely new, and it is no coincidence that one of the great pioneers of the press in Japan was Joseph Heco (Hamada Hikozō, 1837–1897). Shipwrecked on a fishing vessel in his early teens in 1850, he was picked up by an American steamer and brought to the United States where he lived for nearly a decade and acquired English (and American citizenship). There he saw newspapers in great numbers, and later with other enterprising Japanese launched Japan’s first such venture in the spring of 1864 (two years after the voyage of the Senzaimaru), Kaigai shinbun (Overseas news); in 1868 he helped launch another newspaper, Yokohama shinpō moshiogusa (Yokohama press miscellany).46 Takasugi also reported asking a Chinese man in a brush conversation which nation was the strongest Western power: the United States, England, Russia, and France. The Chinese man replied that Russia was the strongest of them all, though his reasoning remains unclear, as no specific grounds are laid out and the Russian presence in China was considerably less evident than that of the other three.47 •

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For all their other impressions of Shanghai, China, and the world at large, the Japanese aboard the Senzaimaru were left with an overpowering image of a formidable West. Although the conclusion that the best route would be to join the West because resistance was futile was not clearly expressed, it is not hard to see that result several steps further down the road. Many, like Takasugi Shinasaku, were alienated by the smells of the crowds that followed 94

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them everywhere in the steaming heat, the seemingly omnipresent brothels and bars, and all the “offensive” odors from the walled city—all of which he took as a sign of China’s fundamentally unhygienic nature. They were dumbfounded by the fact that Chinese lived in subservience to the Westerners in the concessions and plainly worried that such a condition could infect Japan. In typical volte-face fashion, Takasugi vowed, as a consequence of his awakening to the Western route to wealth and strength, never again to read Chinese or Japanese; the future belonged to Westerners—even if they were utterly despicable culturally—and thus one had to master their languages. He, of course, was a young hothead who never kept his vow and died of illness a few years later at the age of twenty-eight, but what he predicted may not have been so far off.48 From this point, I begin my study of Western writings, I swear not to read anything written in Japanese or Chinese. I have already forgotten everything I ever wrote myself, Henceforth, I shall distinguish superior and inferior learning.ss

In later chapters we shall look at the various interactions of the Senzaimaru travelers with the Chinese of Shanghai, but it is important to stress that the number of Westerners they met and interacted with was extensive. Nakamuda led the way here, because he knew enough English to carry on a conversation. His biographer lists at least sixteen Westerners with whom he records contacts in Nagasaki and then Shanghai, and others met with other Westerners. Some were teachers, some businessmen, some employees in branches of European firms, and some missionaries and military men.49 While the Western presence in Japan, even in Nagasaki, may still have been a curiosity or novelty in 1862, it was a harsh reality in Shanghai. From the numbers of Western vessels in the port to the number of Westerners walking the streets of the concessions, they were not only an undeniable reality but a dominating presence. And, they brought with them a dismaying array of iniquities in the eyes of the Japanese, highest on the list being opium and Christianity. The Japanese who commented on these twin evils were usually not reluctant to pair them, as we shall see presently.

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six

Opium, Christianity, and the Taipings

although opium had been present in China for centuries before the arrival of British and American traders (we would now do well to eschew euphemisms and call them what they were: drug dealers) in the nineteenth century, it had been used primarily for medicinal purposes. It was no secret then that the scourge tearing at the fabric of Chinese society in the middle of that century was caused by the British victory in the Opium War in 1842—an event which sent shock waves through elite circles in Japan1—the resultant Treaty of Nanjing, and the trade enforced in this deadly drug. That many Chinese also became involved in the larger growth, processing, and circulation of opium in their own country is a phenomenon of avarice and manipulation replicated everywhere in the world where addictive drugs find a receptive user population—irrespective of nationality. Although it may be slightly ahistorical to refer to these drug dealers as such, allowing them to call themselves defenders of free trade or some equally hypocritical weasel word is, in my estimation, far worse. With this caveat articulated, we shall refer to them henceforth in the straightforward manner that they deserve. For all intents and purposes, opium had been kept out of Japan in the late Edo period. The shogunate and all leading figures in the domains who were aware of the problem in China were adamant about keeping these predatory drug cartels at bay. If the Japanese aboard the Senzaimaru needed any further incentive on this front, the sight of traffic in and effects of opium were horrifying to all who witnessed them in or near Shanghai. And, they knew that it was these same Westerners whom they admired for their strength and military technology that were turning the Chinese nation into one large opium den.

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opium and christianity, together again The Japanese evinced a combination of curiosity, fear, and palpable loathing concerning opium. As detestable as the barbarians were—and if they needed any further proof on this front, this was surely it—Qing weakness was clearly to blame as well. The presence of opium was not simply a case of victimizers and victimized, as the Japanese quickly realized that many Chinese were now involved in opium trafficking. As of 1849, opium was said to be responsible for 71% of commerce in Shanghai alone, a figure subject to further corroboration.2 The famed chronicler of life in Shanghai, Ge Yuanxu, noted that “Shanghai opium dens are number one in all the realm”; and Huang Shiquan (1853–1924), the prominent journalist and Shenbao editor, estimated a thousand opium dens in the area of the concessions alone—the Japanese would have had ample opportunity to observe.3 News of the Opium War had been fi ltering into Japan for over two decades by 1862, and a number of important Chinese texts had already made their way to Japan in the book trade. These have been discussed elsewhere, and one need not belabor this aspect of the topic.4 In a section of his account of the voyage devoted to brush conversations, Takasugi, who was especially interested in the Opium War and its aftermath, queried an unnamed Chinese scholar as follows (see also figure 9): [Takasugi:] Are there historical materials on the subject of the British barbarians and events since the Opium War?a [Chinese scholar:] No. Opium first came to China in the Qianlong era [1736–1796] and flourished under Daoguang [r. 1821–1850]. Huang Jueci [1793–1853] of the Court of State Ceremonial memorialized to ban it, but the British barbarians continued to stir up trouble, and in Daoguang 20 [1842] with the death of Chen Huacheng [1776–1842], the ban was lifted.b [Takasugi:] Do many men from your country in recent times respect and admire the behavior of such men as [the heroes of the Opium War:] Chen Huacheng and Lin Zexu [1785–1850]?c [Chinese scholar]: The renown of these two men is not particularly respected and admired here. Foreigners are all concerned for information [about them]. They were truly famed ministers of state.d [Takasugi:] I, too, have come to admire them.e, 5

Whatever Chen and Lin may themselves have actually intended by the actions they took, Takasugi admired them as men who had courageously Opi u m , C h r i s t i a n i t y, a n d t h e Ta i pi ngs

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figure 9. Takasugi Shinsaku’s notebook from brush conversation with Chinese scholar.

fought against the British imperialists and drug dealers. Takasugi would later reject a book dealer’s effort to sell him a famed, early eighteenth-century rhyming dictionary, the Peiwen yunfu (Storehouse of rhymes for esteemed phrases), by stating instead: “I have no need for books such as the Peiwen yunfu. If you have any writings by the two great generals, Chen Huacheng or Lin Zexu, I am prepared to pay as much as 1,000 pieces of gold to obtain them.” f, 6 In this instance, he was out of luck. Knowing that opium was a dangerous drug and that it was in prevalent use in China was one thing, but observing that widespread use—far more severe a crisis than even New York City at the peak of the crack cocaine epidemic—was quite another. The latter was a staggering wake-up call to the Japanese visitors in 1862. Of them all, Hibino Teruhiro seems to have been most easily persuaded that there was a linkage with the other dangerous scourge—Christianity—infesting China at the time. In a brush conversation with a Chinese scholar by the name of Hua Yilun, Hibino was only too ready to point a finger at Christian missionaries and thus link the two issues: 98

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[Hibino:] Opium and Christianity are harmful to the state and need to be stopped. While they continue, one still sees starving people. Will you step forward to save them?g [Hua Yilun:] In my heart I would, but my strength is insufficient to the task.h, 7

Hua, it should be noted, had led troops against the Taipings rebels but nonetheless found the opium problem, by contrast, more formidable and too widespread to be able to combat. Nōtomi Kaijirō tells a poignant and extremely sad story about the pilot who towed the Senzaimaru from its Shanghai docking to the mouth of the Yangzi when the Japanese were leaving to return to Japan. According to Nōtomi, in addition to the frightful Chinese interest in Christianity with which he links the problem of opium addiction: In recent years the number of Chinese smoking opium has grown immensely, and the authorities are unable to control it. At present in Shanghai, government officials as high as [the Shanghai daotai] Wu Xu all smoke it. Thus, although they claim to have instituted a ban on it, nobody abides by it. The Chinese say that the aroma of opium smoke is extraordinarily beautiful, but it is extremely harmful to human life. One way or another, those who enjoy smoking it find their spirit out of sorts and their bodies disinclined to work; once they smoke [more], their spirit is rapidly refreshed. Thus, they ultimately cannot give it up. Smoke for one month and one cannot live without it. How will they ever bring this under control?i, 8

Although paid a good rate for his work, this pilot who also spoke English (perhaps a consequence of his work) was a down-and-out opium addict whose every cent was spent on the drug. Nōtomi described him as effectively dressed in rags and thin as a rail, roughly thirty years of age. Before we left the Huangpu, Nakamuda Kuranosuke asked him: “How many times per month do you do this kind of work?” He answered: “Sometimes two or three times and sometimes four or five times.” Nakamuda asked: “Do you have parents, a wife, children?” He answered: “No.” He asked further: “But, do you like to gamble or do you indulge in female charms? If not, since you earn this much money, how is it that your clothes are so disheveled and your body so emaciated?” He replied: “I enjoy nothing other than smoking opium. Although I earn a lot of money, it’s still not enough to smoke as much opium as I’d like.” No one could believe what they heard.j, 9

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The Japanese were not only in disbelief—they were downright angry, apparently unaware of the ferocious control the drug exercised on users’ lives and the subsequent destruction of families or complete disinterest in forming one. Even before the commencement of the voyage home, the pilot paid a visit to the lodgings of the Japanese attendants probably to arrange for his piloting work. As Nōtomi described it: On one occasion, he came to our lodgings and [promptly] removed from an exquisite box his opium paraphernalia, laid it all out to one side, and proceeded to smoke. After a few minutes, everyone had collected to observe this curious sight. The smoked fi lled the room with its malodorous smell. We thus had no choice but to stop him from smoking, but he basically ignored us, his body shaking, half drunk, half asleep. After a bit of time had passed, we were afraid of a mishap, and [Nakamuda] Kuranosuke shouted, placed his hand on the hilt of his sword, with an angry look coming over his face. Seeing this, the man was startled, hastily gathered up his smoking paraphernalia and departed.k, 10

Angry or not, none of the Japanese noted that the pilot still managed to do his piloting without which they never could have left the port of Shanghai. Nagura Inata had a less volatile interaction with a Chinese interlocutor on the issue of opium. One Wang Hufu claimed that there was no known medical remedy for opium addiction. He added, and with tongue only partly in cheek: “You need a good prescription to eliminate opium use, but the search for such a medicine is extremely difficult. If you find it, it ought to be called Zexuwan ([Lin] Zexu pills) or Huachengtang ([Chen] Huacheng soup).” l, 11 Wang found this amusing and probably shared Nagura’s hope for a heroic Chinese figure to rise up and solve the problem in one fell swoop. Had they known of Christian missionaries’ efforts to curtail opium use and help addicts overcome their addictions, would the Japanese of 1862 have been willing to concede that missionaries were not all bad? Probably not. Several of them hint strongly that missionary medical work in China was aimed at both saving lives and “saving souls.” Christianity had been banned in Japan over two centuries earlier, and only recently had the prohibition been lifted, and many of the anti-foreign Japanese in the 1862 group saw Christianity as proof positive of the evils propagated by Westerners in China. They were no less critical of Chinese converts. By 1862 there were several dozen churches in Shanghai, both in the concessions and the walled Chinese city, and the Japanese must have read or learned about the spread of this foreign infection as well. 100

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Early in their sojourn in Shanghai, several Japanese confronted proselytizers in unexpected guise. As was often the case, once literate Chinese learned that they could communicate with the Japanese, they repeatedly paid unannounced calls on the Japanese to engage in mutually informational brush conversations. Nōtomi recounts one such eventful occasion: One day, two students paid us a visit. I was sick in bed. Several of my colleagues in the same room exchanged a brush conversation with them. At one point, a student asked [me]: “Does your country believe in Catholicism or Protestantism?” I replied: “In the past, those religions were proselytized in our country and became enemies of the state. Thus, our country banned Christianity.” The student said: “Then, you gentlemen have never seen the Bible, have you? We’ve brought it along today and thought we’d present a copy to you.” A colleague of mine took it and looked it over. This was the heterodox work of Jesus. He got very irritated, threw it aside, and a huge argument involving everyone ensued. Finally, we showed them the door. The next day, though, they returned, but we didn’t allow them inside, so they just stood outside the door.m, 12

Just as the lodgings of the Japanese had played host to an opium addict, it served the same purpose for several fierce Bible enthusiasts—both were ejected in a pique of rage on the part of the Japanese. This particular misadventure might have ended here, but the same two Chinese students found an accomplice in Ma Quan, a local magistrate. They gave him the Bible to pass along to Nōtomi when they met: “My colleagues were fuming and vehemently denounced him [Ma]. Everyone left and then drove the Chinese students away. They had come a number of times before this, looking for an opportunity to exhort us, and they wanted to give us this book . . . . Apparently, they swallowed this bitter taste [of being tossed out] and never came back. Ah! Even intellectuals in China believe this [rubbish = Christianity]. How much more serious a problem is this for ordinary folk!”n, 13 If Christianity was, at least to Nōtomi and his colleagues, so obviously inane, how was it that the missionaries had been able to convert a modest number of Chinese, ordinary folk, to their faith? There had to be a good reason why people who were heirs to such a great culture as the Chinese would be willing to turn to such obvious foolishness. Some of Nōtomi’s answer is fanciful, some of it not that far off the mark: In order to get simple people to join their religion, they first gave them a lot of money, and thus there were numerous destitute people who, irrespective Opi u m , C h r i s t i a n i t y, a n d t h e Ta i pi ngs

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of the qualities of the religious beliefs, entered the faith as a way to be able to enable themselves to eke out a living. And, this religion has come to be quite prosperous throughout the realm. I have also heard that Westerners have built hospitals in Shanghai and invited many gravely ill people to come for a cure. Their medicines, they claim, are all given by order of God. Recovery from illness is also due to God’s rescue of them, not necessarily the talents of the doctors. They thus explain to people that this is God’s favor. Westerners are really quite proficient at medicine, and China’s inept doctors cannot be compared to them. Simple folk are only too happy to protect their lives, and they do indeed believe in God’s rescue and thus come to consciously devote themselves to Christianity.o, 14

As we saw in the previous chapter, Hibino shared Nōtomi’s distaste for Christian missionaries. He also registered the need for vigilance both in China and especially back home in Japan in the face of all this missionary activity, which he saw as a grave danger. That was as well one of the lessons Takasugi and his walking companions took away from meetings with William Muirhead. Why, though, would even such craft y Christian missionaries pose a threat to the Japanese? Were they as gullible as Nōtomi painted simple Chinese common folk? If their creed was so patently absurd, would thinking Japanese—the only ones who, in any event, mattered—be deluded? In short, what were they so afraid of? We never get a straight answer to this question, but the answer is fairly obvious nonetheless.

christianity and mass uprising: the taiping rebellion In the late 1840s, a charismatic native of Guangdong Province by the name of Hong Xiuquan, a member of the Hakka minority and a Christian convert, led a group of mostly fellow Hakkas in organizing the God Worshipper Society. Efforts to crush this heterodox cult, as the Qing government saw it, forced Hong and his followers into neighboring Guangxi Province. Hong had experienced repeated failures at the imperial civil service examinations, which led to a nervous breakdown. When he emerged from the lengthy illness associated with his collapse, he related several dreams which were as extraordinary as they were unintelligible to him at the time (1837). Several years later, he realized that he had been brought to Heaven by angels and God had spoken to him, in fact calling him “son.” As he interpreted this, he was 102

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God’s second son—Jesus was also in his dreams and was older—and he understood that his task on Earth would be ridding China of heathen idolatry.15 Although we have condensed the story greatly, by the early 1850s, the Qing government saw his movement as a threat and first moved to crush it in early 1851. The God Worshippers defeated the Qing forces and so was soon launched the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom (Taiping tianguo). It would last thirteen years, attract many hundreds of thousands of followers, and ultimately constitute the greatest rebellion in Chinese history to that point before meeting final cataclysmic defeat, leaving over twenty million dead. It has since been both the bane and the pride of Chinese leaders. Were the astonishing charisma and organizational talents of Hong Xiuquan and his immediate coterie something to admire, or was his narcissism and the manipulative capacity of others in his entourage something to abhor? No easy answer here. Fighting between government forces with their foreign allies and volunteers and the Taiping rebels was intense in the roughly two years prior to the arrival of the Senzaimaru. The Taiping general in charge of the efforts to make inroads into the general Lower Yangzi region was Li Xiucheng (1823– 1864), operating there from the first half of 1860. He had captured nearby Songjiang, only about twenty-five miles away, in July of that year. As he continued to press the assault on Shanghai, the Qing authorities turned to foreigners, such as Frederic Townsend Ward, to help defend the city. As noted in the Introduction, Ward lost his life successfully defending Shanghai shortly after our Japanese visitors returned to Japan, but his Ever Victorious Army (so named by the Qing government in March) did defeat the Taipings in this battle and forced them into retreat. Fighting continued in the nearby Taicang and Jiading regions. The day the Senzaimaru entered port, June 2, the Taiping army under the command of Li Xiucheng defeated British forces and occupied Guangfulin. A week later they were besieging Songjiang, and it looked as though Shanghai would become the next target for attack. Just then, government forces under the command of Zeng Guofan (1811–1872) attacked the Taiping capital at Nanjing (their “Heavenly Capital” or Tianjing), and fearing the worst, Hong Xiuquan called upon Li to withdraw and return with his armies to help defend it. We have noted in passing that news of the Taiping Rebellion had reached Japan in the decade preceding the voyage of the Senzaimaru, usually via reports made to the shogunate by Dutch and Chinese traders at Nagasaki. Opi u m , C h r i s t i a n i t y, a n d t h e Ta i pi ngs

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Nonetheless, understanding of the Taipings in Japan in 1862 was thoroughly murky. One report had it that the son of the Japanese rebel Ōshio Heihachirō (1793–1837), Ōshio Kakunosuke (d. 1837), had not in fact died with his father in 1837 but escaped to Nagasaki, made friends with local Chinese there, and then somehow sailed to China and eventually rose to lead the great Taiping Rebellion. Another contended that the leader of the movement in China was a descendant of Zhu Yuanzhang (1328–1398), founder of the Ming dynasty, and thus was leading a rebellion to topple the alien Manchu dynasty and restore China to its last legitimate ethnic Chinese ruling house.16 As news of the Taiping Rebellion continued to filter into Japan by various routes, the principal concerns that developed were what consequences it would have, if any, for Japan and whether or not it was good for Japan. When Commodore Perry visited Kanagawa in 1854, he brought along as bilingual secretary the Guangdong native Luo Sen to help interpret with the Japanese authorities. Luo had been to the Taiping capital in Nanjing, and the Japanese officials were anxious to learn as much as possible from him about that rebellion. The information he provided superseded earlier theories, and an account he left, entitled Man-Qing jishi (Chronicle of the Manchu Qing), circulated widely in Japan; Yoshida Shōin read it in Noyama Prison in 1855 and translated it into Japanese under the title Shinkoku Kanpō ranki (Account of the uprising in China in the Xianfeng era).17 As fate would have it, a branch of the Taiping army under Li Xiucheng attacked the outskirts of Shanghai only two days after the Senzaimaru docked in the port, offering our Japanese visitors front row seats to the conflict. Several of the Japanese reported hearing gunfire in the distance that day. While most were extremely curious, Takasugi actively tried to find the Taipings and see them in action—he was unsuccessful, but he did feel an instinctive sense of support for this anti-Qing movement: “5/7 [June 4]. Heard small gunfire on land early this morning. Everyone said: ‘That’s the sound of fighting between the Long-Haired Bandits [Taipings] and the Chinese.’ If these reports are accurate, I would be overjoyed to be able to witness the fighting firsthand.”p Three days later, he noted: “The Dutchman [Tombrink] came this morning and reported that the Long-Haired Bandits have reached an area only three li from Shanghai and that we should be able to hear artillery fire tomorrow morning. When the [shogunal] officials heard this, they became very wary, but I, on the contrary, was delighted.”q, 18 The very day the Senzaimaru arrived in port, June 2, Hibino Teruhiro recorded the sight of fires burning in the western sky. As we noted earlier, 104

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Captain Richardson claimed that it was probably due to fires set by the Taipings to people’s homes, but Hibino added that “it is difficult to know for sure” (kore mata shirubekarazu). The next day, he engaged a Chinese, one Wang Chengzhai, in a brush conversation and posed the same question about the fires he had seen the previous day. Wang replied (in Hibino’s Japanese translation): “I heard that there was fighting with bandits in a place called Qibaozhen.”r, 19 June 4, the same day Takasugi reported hearing gunfire in the distance, Hibino also reported “hearing the tremendous explosion of what was said to be artillery fire in the early dawn.”s That day, Hibino noted Chinese ships sailing by with white or red banners reading “Munitions, Official Business,”t which he supposed were armaments and other supplies headed for the Qing armed forces. Nōtomi made the same observation and assumption.20 On June 6, Nagura Inata visited the firm of Theodorus Kroes and there saw a copy of the newspaper Shanghai xinbao in which there was an article of just one week earlier (May 27) reporting that “Hucheng had fallen to bandits,”u the local commander had died in the fighting, and the “bandits were pressing close toward Shanghai, and thus emergency measures would be going into effect here.”v He proceeded to query Tombrink, and the latter corroborated what the newspaper reported.21 What Nagura referred to as “Hucheng” was undoubtedly Huzhou, Zhejiang Province, which was captured by Taiping general Tan Shaoguang (1835–1863) on May 30, 1862, just days before the Senzaimaru docked in Shanghai, an event that sent tremors of unease through the residents of nearby Shanghai. That same day, June 6, Mine Kiyoshi noted: “The Long-Haired Bandits from Nanjing have already arrived in the outskirts of Shanghai . . . and they now have the momentum to attack Shanghai [itself]. The British and French are thus raising defenses in Shanghai.”w Two days later, he reiterated this thought and believed that Shanghai might actually fall to the rebel forces. He reported as well that Shanghai businessmen were banking on the foreigners to protect them.22 Hibino Teruhiro also picked up information about this turn in the fighting. In an entry in his account dated June 8, he wrote: I heard that earlier this month Hucheng fell to the bandits. At the time the city had run out of food, and it was very hard to hear a mouse or sparrow’s voice [because they had all been consumed by the residents]. A catty of meat was extremely expensive, 1,000 cash, or simply impossible to buy. Soldiers and inhabitants were starving to death by the thousands. Local official Zhao Opi u m , C h r i s t i a n i t y, a n d t h e Ta i pi ngs

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[Jingxian] from the city went to his honorable death after exhausting all of his plans. Thereafter, soldiers and inhabitants fought on to the death in defense of their city. The Long-Haired Bandits issued a call to the city: “Huzhou, we only regard Lord Zhao as our enemy. He is now dead. The peasants are not our foes. Why fight to resist us as such?” They later broke through the defenses and took the city without killing or wounding anyone.x, 23

As noted, Godai Tomoatsu left no account of his extraordinary experiences in Shanghai, but Nōtomi reports that he made his way to the outskirts of the city to see the Taipings in the flesh. He failed in the attempt. In his highly scholarly, almost scientific approach to travel writing, Nōtomi, in addition to blaming the Taiping debacle on the odious presence of Christianity in Shanghai, reports on several occasions the great suffering of ordinary Chinese forced to seek protection in Shanghai, meaning the massive influx of refugees from the surrounding cities and countryside as a result of Taiping depredations. While he found the squalor in which so many lived unpleasant, he nonetheless understood the source of their travails.24 In the first weeks after their arrival, the Japanese paid calls on the American, British, and French consulates (in addition, of course, to the Dutch), and they witnessed preparations being made for the possibility of fighting, should the Taiping forces break through the perimeter of the city. Takasugi reported on June 10 that a grave atmosphere pervaded the British consulate—this was the day the shogunal officials first visited there—and took close note of the armed guards around and within the site. Nagura reported on July 6 that, “while crossing Malu Road, there were cannons emplaced here and there around the barbarian areas [the concessions],”y and he went on to specify numbers and sizes of ammunition.25 There were essentially three ways for the Japanese visitors in Shanghai to obtain information on the Taiping Rebellion: seeing and hearing it with their own eyes and ears, as we have just observed; reading about it in printed sources available in Shanghai; and gleaning it in answers to questions in brush conversations with Chinese. The first of these was the most tantalizing, but despite the fact that the rebels were only a mile outside the city and despite the efforts of several Japanese to make contact with the rebels, those forces were recalled by Hong Xiuquan to the Taiping capital of Nanjing to help defend it shortly after the attack on Shanghai. We noted earlier as well that on more than one occasion Takasugi and Nakamuda Kuranosuke visited the missionary-doctor William Muirhead, who owned a number of important Taiping texts that they were able to borrow and copy out by hand. 106

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As Nakamuda’s biographer put it: “When he visited the Englishman Muirhead on 6/12 [July 8], he borrowed a four-volume work on the LongHaired Bandits . . . and spent the entire next day copying it into his diary.”26 There were quite a few other texts as well. After failing to meet an actual Taiping soldier, Takasugi took to the streets of Shanghai in an effort to engage Chinese in brush conversations about the radical movement that was threatening to topple the Manchu regime. He was appalled that the Qing government had resorted to employing British and French mercenary forces to beat back the Taipings, not because he so fiercely identified with the rebels—he detested and reviled their devotion to Christianity—but because of the further dependency it spelled for the Qing state on the even more detested Westerners. In this he was not alone. Nakamuda envisioned the possibility of the Taipings allying with Western armies because of their shared religion, although he was unaware either of Hong Xiuquan’s putative theological (and possibly genetic) links to Jesus or of how that might play among the Westerners: “On the surface Great Britain is helping the Qing dynasty defend itself against the Long-Haired Bandits, [but] in fact it is supplying the Long-Haired Bandits with good weapons, all due to the Christianity they both practice . . . . I understand that, by means of belief in Christianity, the British have the Long Hairs under their control, and in the end they will seize control of the realm from the Qing. If they do seize the realm, the British policy will have achieved its goal.”27 Takasugi saw the West as having seduced the Taipings in this direction and precisely what it was that demanded Japan vigilance. As he put in a letter: “When the barbarians seize another people’s state, they first seize their minds, perhaps enticed by substantial profit, perhaps poisoned by evil religion. The common folk may believe all this. If they rise up to seize the state, it will be easier than breaking a rotten twig.”z, 28 Takasugi complained in a clearly strident tone that the Chinese were insufficiently attentive to the disasters affecting them. He never appears to have gotten the answers he expected in his many brush conversations with Chinese, and the answers he did get were far short of satisfactory in his overheated estimation. When he asked about current Chinese writings on the Taipings, he was told there were none. He was able to secure copies of some texts by or about the Taipings, a number of which were extremely rare, from Dr. Muirhead, but on the whole he took the Chinese claim of the absence of such texts as the truth. Drawing conclusions solely on the basis of Takasugi’s rich accounts runs aground here. Opi u m , C h r i s t i a n i t y, a n d t h e Ta i pi ngs

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Others among the Japanese must have gone with lists or asked more penetrating questions of the Chinese they met. For example, Nagura Inata reports that on July 1 he “saw [or read a copy of] the Aofei jilüe (Summary account of the Guangdong bandits) which recounts in detail the reasons the Long-Haired Bandits rose in rebellion . . . . The book is now out of print. Zhang Yun, a Chinese man in the bookshop, today asked someone on my behalf . . . and obtained a copy which he gave me.”aa, 29 The very next day, Nagura continued what he described as a month-long search for books and artwork in the Chinese shops: “I was meandering about the alleyways outside the Lesser Eastern Gate [of the walled city] in the latter part of the afternoon and passed by a bookshop where I saw a rare work entitled Jinling guishen zhige (Account of the plunder in Nanjing in 1853– 1854). This work . . . describes the contours of the Long-Haired Bandits’ violence.” bb, 30 Despite the apparent reluctance of many Chinese in Shanghai to speak openly about the Taipings to the Japanese, the latter were nonetheless able through snippets of conversation and through texts copied, purchased, or just read in situ to immeasurably enrich knowledge in Japan about the Taipings, their origins, their beliefs, and the present state of their rebellion. It was precisely because of Taiping assaults in and around Shanghai that the Japanese also saw the Qing army in action and were able to query local Chinese about the resistance capacity of government forces. While they already were well acquainted with the putative heroes of the Opium War, Lin Zexu and Chen Huacheng, little was known about the major players among the Qing armed forces. Through brush conversations, they began to “hear” the names: Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang, and Hu Linyi (1812–1861), among others. Zeng Guofan quickly rose to the top of the list as the most important figure in the eyes of the Japanese. For example, in his collection of brush chats from this trip to Shanghai, entitled Botsubi hitsugo (Brush conversations of a submerged nose), Hibino at one point in an undated conversation asked one Gu He about the leaders of the government forces fighting to suppress the Taipings; Gu remarked that Zeng Guofan was the most important such leader, adding that he was a graduate of the Hanlin Academy, the highest reaches of the civil service examination hierarchy. That is somewhat like saying William Westmoreland (1914–2005) or George S. Patton (1885–1945) was a great general but also had an Oxbridge PhD in Classics. In a later brush chat with Shu Yian, he learned of other leaders, Li Hongzhang and Hu Linyi. Later still he engaged the Qing military commander (and scholar) Hua Yilun in conversation, and his second 108

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question reveals that he had already acquired a fair amount of information about Li Hongzhang but was curious about a related matter: Hibino: At what level is Li Hongzhang?cc Hua Yilun: The Hanlin [Academy] and he is in Minister Zeng’s camp.dd Hibino: Did he [really] lead local folks in battle?ee Hua Yilun: He led soldiers under the command of Minister Zeng. These were second-class soldiers. The first-class troops remained under the command of Zeng Guoquan [1824–1890], Minister Zeng’s younger brother, when besieging the bandits at Jinling [Nanjing].ff, 31

What I translated above as “local folks” (xiangmin) is a reference to Zeng’s inventive use of the tuanlian system to recruit locals to defend their own terrain, purposefully ignoring the largely incompetent standing armies of the Qing. This innovation took the Japanese some time to wrap their heads around, accustomed as they were to hereditary military status and decidedly not to arming the peasantry, though exposure to it may have influenced Takasugi’s subsequent role in organizing Chōshū domain’s Kiheitai (irregular militia) the following year. Nōtomi remarked on this phenomenon after querying a Chinese associate: “They say the Qing army has few [regular] troops and numerous braves. Troops [here] refer to literati and above, while braves are those men locally conscripted.”gg, 32 He even included a drawing of a local brave with a rifle over his right shoulder and a short sword in his left hand (see figure 10). Nagura made an almost identical observation, dated July 13, but he offered a more detailed explication: “With the centralized institution of districts and prefectures in China, there are said to be few [regular] troops and numerous braves. Troops [here] are those ranked as literati and above, while braves are those men locally conscripted. Soldiers wear armor; braves do not, though they do wear something like shoulder guards. At the camp of Governor Li [Hongzhang], there are primarily braves drawn from Hunan and Hubei. Overall his forces number 16,000 stationed at this site.” hh, 33 Although his (unnamed) companion “greatly slandered” (ōi ni hibō suru) Li Hongzhang’s methods of troop training, Nagura was modestly enthusiastic about Li’s new army and claimed they demonstrated a strong fighting spirit.34 It is difficult to state conclusively, especially inasmuch as we do not know who was with Nagura at the time, but this man’s dismissive attitude may have been due to a condescending view of the capacity of ordinary peasants on the battlefield, something all but unthinkable in Japan at the time. Opi u m , C h r i s t i a n i t y, a n d t h e Ta i pi ngs

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figure 10. Nōtomi Kaijirō’s sketch of a local brave.

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Not content to leave it at that, Nagura “spoke” by brush conversation with the book dealer Hu Xingyi in the city. Hu told him that “there have recently been no books written about military matters. Only Chen Depei, style Zimao, an extraordinary scholar of late, a man who lives in the mountains as a hermit some 700 li removed from here, has written a work on the military, [but] he has kept it secret and dares not let it be seen . . . . I once borrowed and read it. It’s the best recent work on the military.” ii, 35 Nagura was never able to find a copy of Chen’s work on warfare. Because this visit to Shanghai came toward the end of the Taiping uprising—it would collapse two years later in 1864—the Japanese not only witnessed from a distance the assault on Shanghai but also the efforts of the foreign community to aid the Qing and defeat the rebels. The thought of possibly aiding their fellow Christians on the other side must have run through a few Western heads in Shanghai, though Hong’s theology would have made more than a few of those Westerners scratch those same heads in wonderment. The Qing may have been a nuisance, but it was at least a nuisance they knew; it was a servile nuisance, especially before the British; and ultimately it made much more sense to help crush the Taipings, who were on their last legs anyway, than to use the rebels to eliminate the Qing.36 Who knew how malleable the Taipings would be? They clearly disallowed opium and a host of other products and practices close to the hearts of Westerners. The foregoing meant that the Japanese were witness to the Qing’s reliance on the British and French to help crush the Taipings just when the latter attacked Shanghai, home to the core of the foreign presence in China at the time. It made the Manchu regime appear all the more pusillanimous in most of their eyes, even if they had grown distrustful of the Taipings with their alien religious beliefs. The contemporaneity of it all seems to have struck Nōtomi, as he noted: “Recent writings report that the bandits have reached an area only three to five li from Shanghai. Li Hongzhang has sent troops to attack them several times. Also, bandits have risen in Pudong—that is, east of the Huangpu [River]—and British troops offered assistance to the Qing forces in Shanghai to fight off and defeat them. This all took place in the fifth lunar month [roughly, June], which means while we have been in Shanghai.” jj, 37 However strong the Qing forces may have been, many of the Japanese aboard the Senzaimaru were particularly anxious to see the Taiping military in action, and they repeatedly asked Chinese about the possibility everywhere they went. On June 15, Mine Kiyoshi, Godai Tomoatsu, and Nagaiya Kiyosuke paid a call on the Chinese merchant Zhou Lan. After Zhou told Opi u m , C h r i s t i a n i t y, a n d t h e Ta i pi ngs

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his three visitors that he would provide them with some recent books the next day, Mine asked if there were any up-to-date writings on the “LongHaired Bandits.” Zhou replied that there was nothing and referred them to stories in the British press.38 Stymied again. On the basis of whatever he got from Muirhead and elicited in brush conversations, Takasugi Shinsaku offered the following, more or less accurate, theory of the Taipings: “The Long-Haired Bandits’ uprising began in Daoguang 29 [1849; should be Daoguang 31 or 1851—JAF]. The early leader of the bandits was Yang Xiuqing. When Yang Xiuqing died, he was replaced by the Heavenly King [Hong Xiuquan]. [After] Yang’s death, the bandits fought among themselves until they almost self-destructed. The bandits are believers in Christianity. General Zeng [Guofan] in Jiangnan is an illustrious man. The bandits [now] follow the Yingwang (Brave King) [Chen Yucheng, 1834–1862].” kk, 39 Hibino Teruhiro was especially interested in sorting out fact from fiction concerning the Taipings. He, too, had heard the strange rumors that they were descendants of the Ming royal house and asked his Chinese interlocutors about it. In a brush conversation with Xu Huosheng, the latter quickly disabused Hibino of this literally incredible tale. Other points of interest in their conversation: Hibino: Do the Long Hairs fear the British? Fear the French?ll Xu: Wherever the British and French troops have reached, the bandits do fear them all . . . . The bandits particularly dread [the French cannons] . . . .mm Hibino: Who is the bandits’ leader?nn Xu: The Loyal King [Li Xiucheng] and the Brave King [Chen Yucheng].oo Hibino: Who are they?pp Xu: The Loyal King has murderous intent behinds his smiles. The Brave King is as clumsy and impetuous as Xiang Yu [232–202 B.C.E., heroic military figure at the end of the Warring States era].qq, 40

Hibino was nothing if not intent on learning everything he could about the leadership of the Taiping rebels. Answers to his questions about this stratum by giving their official names within the Taiping movement—”Loyal King,” etc.—only begged the question as far as he was concerned. Sometimes he had to lead his interlocutors on, such as in the following exchange with his frequent conversation partner, Hua Yilun:

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[Hibino]: The bandit leader has established a faith and prays to Heaven, deluding the people. Is this true?rr [Hua Yilun]: Bandit leader Hong Xiuquan is a Guangxi man. He has established his faith and prays to heaven. He calls it “God,” but this is just to keep the people ignorant. This is not like the West’s Christianity.ss, 41

As noted earlier, Hua was a military man who had fought the Taipings, so his information was not extracted from the writings of others. No wonder that someone like Hibino would query him at length, though none of the other Japanese seem to have engaged him in a brush conversation. Given the military proclivity of many of the Japanese who left accounts, the following questions would be expected: [Hibino]: I have heard that you fought against the bandits a number of times.tt [Hua Yilun]: About forty or more times.uu [Hibino]: Are the bandits strong or weak in battle? What sort of field techniques do they employ?vv [Hua]: The bandits use captured prisoners among the people as soldiers and thus they have no battle techniques . . . .ww [Hibino]: How do you deploy your troops in battle?xx [Hua]: Our deployment of troops varies with time and place. We have had to make changes according to circumstances and have not been able to hold to a single method . . . .yy [Hibino]: How could one reasonably deploy troops with a single means responding to 10,000 changes? One needs to take advantage of opportunities that arise with these changes to enable victory.zz [Hua]: That’s right.aaa [Hibino]: In your fighting with the bandits of late, how many local men were under your command?bbb [Hua]: I had 70,000 men under my command.ccc [Hibino]: About how many bandits? How many dead and wounded?ddd [Hua]: The bandits were about 30,000 to 40,000 in number, with over one hundred dead or wounded.eee, 42

Chun Ling, from whom Hibino heard some of the fantastic rumors about Japan, also provided some data on the Taipings. In answer to a question about what the bandits were up to lately, Chun Ling responded: “The Long

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Hairs have now changed the name [of their capital, Nanjing] to the Heavenly Capital. Suzhou is to be renamed Sufu Province. My servant was taken captive last year by the Long Hairs. On one occasion, he saw the Heavenly King [Hong Xiuquan] in Nanjing, and he later passed through occupied Jiangxi and Hangzhou, among other places, straight through until last month when he escaped here via Suzhou.”fff, 43 Hibino asked if he could engage the servant in a brush conversation, but as Chun Ling explained, the man was illiterate. Hibino was especially interested, it seemed, in how the people in regions under Taiping occupation made a living. As he explained further: [Chun Ling]: In their lairs at present the Long Hairs are engaged in trade. There will be peace there when all their troops clear out. I am going on a trip today and will be taking two men along with me.ggg [Hibino]: What great fear you must have! How sad to hear this. Do Shanghai people still carry on trade with the bandits’ lairs?hhh [Chun Ling]: The peasants trade with the Long Hairs now . . . . In Shanghai they carry on unrestricted trade.iii, 44

Remarking in a similar vein on June 4, Hibino recounted in his travel narrative: I recently learned of an unscrupulous Ningbo merchant who was using military provisions and hardware to trade with the Long-Haired Bandits and was accruing huge profits. When the Western troops learned of this, they seized one of his ships. On board were two Westerners who were immediately taken into custody. They searched the ship and found eighty-four boxes of Western guns, 110,050 cases of ammunition, and a large number of handguns and swords. They are taking these [two fellows] to Shanghai to stand trial at the British consulate. This is altogether too much! Why can’t the Qing authorities try them? Alas and alack.jjj, 45

To be sure, Li Hongzhang was also aware of all this salaciousness and corruption—Western, Qing, and Taiping—and was angry about it, although there was little he could do to stop it. He was especially incensed by the opportunistic Westerners involved. For their part, the Taipings, as noted in the brush conversation between Hibino and Xu Huosheng, had considerable respect for the firepower of the foreign troops. Takasugi recorded a similar Taiping deference to Western might. He and Nakamuda took a walk outside the Western Gate of the city on July 10 to observe Chinese troop training. On the way back, he met Wan Song, a guard 114

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at the Great Southern Gate, and proceeded to ask him questions concerning military matters: “Wan Song said: ‘We have invited British and French troops to defend against the Long-Haired Bandits. Our troops have recently begun to study Western armaments, because the bandits fear and won’t approach them.’ I could see from this that Chinese military technology could never reach the strength of Western arms.” kkk, 46 And, it went without saying at the time that, while there were many reasons for the failure of the Taipings to take Shanghai, the one obvious difference with earlier battles was the presence of British and French troops defending the city. The Taipings would have recognized this new element, as the Japanese surely did, and few at the time would have been aware of the call from Nanjing for their troops to withdraw. Despite the fact that the Taipings were in decline, several members of the Japanese delegation were actually curious as to whether the rebels might still eke out a military victory and somehow create their own national regime. In other words, they wished to know if they were just a ragtag bandit rabble or if they had a genuine vision. Once again, it was Hibino who pursued this line in a brush conversation: Hibino: Are the Long Hairs only concerned with profit, or do they have greater ambitions?lll Chun Ling: My country uses the character guo with the element [pronounced] huo in the center. The Long Hairs draw the character guo with wang [meaning “king” in the center] to show that their land belongs to the king. All of this concerning the Long Hairs’ uprising is described in my friend Xie Bing’s [Xie Jiehe] book Jinling [guijia] zhitan.mmm, 47

Chun appears to be suggesting that the Taipings did have a somewhat grander vision than just robbing or murdering whomever they came upon, but that their vision clashed with that of the Qing dynasty in no uncertain terms. Mine Kiyoshi raised a similar question with Magistrate Ma Quan: Question: Where are the bandits most ferocious among the eighteen provinces [of China]?nnn [Ma] Quan: Nanjing.ooo Another question: Do the rebels have the capacity to destroy the realm?ppp Answer: This will be decided by Heaven.qqq [Mine] Kiyoshi: While you speak of it being in Heaven’s hands, should they [the bandits] be able to control human affairs, then they will have a means of

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redeeming their fate. Heaven protects those that obey it, not those who go against it.rrr

Mine added in his own commentary that he thought Ma Quan’s diplomatic resignation before heaven would “not stop the calamity from getting much worse.”sss, 48 Although the Japanese were intensely curious about the Taipings, only Takasugi expressed anything that might sound sympathetic to the rebel cause, which he tempered considerably when he learned about the Christian content of their views. In their writings and brush conversations with Chinese, they all used the same terms for bandits then current in China: “Changmaozei” and “Changfazei” (both meaning Long-Haired Bandits) or just “zeifei” (bandits). By the same token, they never met either a Taiping in the flesh or anyone even remotely sympathetic to the cause. Some had suffered greatly at the hands of the Taiping forces, such as we see in one man’s experience as relayed by Takasugi from a brush conversation that took place with Gu Lin on June 13: “Ever since last winter, I have been running from the Long-Haired Bandits until now. In the third lunar month of the year this spring, they burned down my home, and everything in it—books, rubbings, artwork—is now gone. It is difficult for me to describe my wretchedness. [Takasugi comments:] Hearing this was enough to make a man cry bitterly.”ttt, 49 The element of sympathy with the suffering of ordinary Chinese is a frequent refrain in Japanese writing about the impact of the Taipings, and often that human dimension far outweighed the larger geopolitical considerations involving the Qing dynasty’s future and the West. As noted, their source for information about the rebels was the government side, as none of them ever met a Taiping partisan, and thus their responses—that they were murderers, destroyers of traditional East Asian culture, unprincipled—differed from some Westerners, such as Augustus F. Lindley (1840–1873), who shared none of that traditional culture and were encouraged by the Taiping propensity toward Christianity. Lindley actually joined the Taiping forces and commanded its navy; his wife Mary served as a sniper and was killed in action.50 Whatever romantic views of the Taipings may have preceded them, when the Senzaimaru returned to Japan, its passengers brought back decidedly negative images as revealed in their writings. Takasugi exercised an especially powerful influence on radical samurai at the end of the Edo period, and his views brought about greater anti-Taiping sentiment. Kusaka Genzui (1840– 1864), a slightly younger Chōshū native and ally of Takasugi, would write

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only a few months later in September 1862: “Much of China has in recent years been overrun by a heretical religion, and as a result the way of the Duke of Zhou has fallen to such a state. This is truly a pitiful situation. I learned from a man who recently returned from Shanghai that doctors who provide medical treatment at hospitals built by the barbarians are missionaries, and they take advantage of patients who are seriously ill on the verge of death to convince them kindly to adopt their bizarre religion.”uuu, 51 Clearly, the “man who recently returned from Shanghai” was none other than Takasugi Shinsaku. And, both men were, first and foremost, concerned with the fate of their own country or domain, a fate endangered by the possibility that a Taiping victory would drive the foreigners into their Christian camp, making a joint Christian invasion of Japan virtually inevitable (in their view of things). It needs to be noted in this connection that the lesson of the Taiping Rebellion for the Japanese on this voyage was not admiration for their pluck and capacity to possibly overthrow the decadent Qing dynasty. It was that social upheaval from below was dangerous, especially when exacerbated by a contemporaneous external threat from foreign powers. The Kiheitai that Takasugi would later help organize was decidedly not based on the Taipings but much more inspired, as hinted above, by the tuanlian system into which local recruits or “braves” were enlisted by the likes of Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang, which ultimately succeeded in destroying the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom.

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seven

Dealings with the Chinese Authorities

as much as the japanese aboard the Senzaimaru who left narratives of their voyage to Shanghai bore distasteful feelings for the shogunal officials with whom they shared the trip over and back, it is considerably more difficult to characterize their feelings for the officials on the Qing side in any uniform manner. Virtually all of their meetings were with Wu Xu, the local circuit intendant (see figure 11), who allowed them a surprisingly wide berth, given the unprecedented circumstances of their sudden appearance in port. Frequently these meetings were mediated by Theodorus Kroes, and it was not until later in the journey, when the Japanese have an unmediated meeting with the Qing authorities, that we learn some candid information of their relationship with Kroes. The afternoon of June 3, the day after the arrival of the Senzaimaru, the shogunal officials and their attendants and interpreters went on land for the first time and headed right to the Dutch consulate, headquarters of Theodorus Kroes’s company. According to Takasugi Shinsaku, accompanying Inuzuka Shakusaburō: “The officials went upstairs while the attendants waited downstairs. We engaged in a brush conversation with two or three Qing officials . . . . When the meeting between the [shogunal] officials and the Dutch was over, the Chinese served as our intermediaries and walked around the streets [with us].”a, 1 He then went on to described how they were all mobbed by local people “like a wall” (doshō no gotoku), though they continued to meander. Many of the details of this meeting are unknown, but it appears to be both a formal welcome as well as perhaps preparatory for the upcoming face-toface with the daotai himself. Two days later on June 5, once again the shogunal officials with their attendants and interpreters went to meet with Kroes, 118

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figure 11. Wu Xu.

this time clearly in preparation for the meeting with Wu Xu at his office located by the Greater Eastern Gate. Again, the attendants accompanied the officials but this time only as far as the office of the circuit intendant. Joining Kroes and the Japanese was the French consul, Benoît Edan (1803–1871);2 he had arrived in Shanghai much earlier to work in the Company of Remi, and in the early summer of 1859 became consul at about the same time that Wu Xu had arrived to take up his posting in the city. Together the Dutchman, the Frenchman, and the Japanese delegation traveled by sedan chair from the concession area to the walled city through narrow cramped streets and alleyways before gaping crowds of Chinese pointing at them. When their party reached the gate of the daotai’s compound, trumpets sounded as they entered, they all dismounted, and there they met Wu Xu for the first time; one must assume that this meeting had been prearranged by Kroes. At fift y-three years of age, Wu had already had a distinguished career,

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especially in fighting against the Small Sword Society that occupied Shanghai in 1853 for the better part of a year, before taking up his present position in July 1859. Claiming he was under the weather with a cold, Takasugi stayed in his lodgings that day, but Hibino Teruhiro described the visit to the daotai’s office, and he was well aware of the historical significance of it and apparently quite moved by all the ceremonial pomp. The formalities were extensive, a banquet replete with cakes, tea, and wine, and Hibino described it all. He especially liked a sweet called yunpiangao (a kind of rice cake cut into thin rectangular pieces, traditionally from south China), which he described as: “pure white with an exceptionally fine taste . . . . It is an extremely rare cake.”b, 3 In another sense, the Japanese were like newly arrived pandas (or reverse pandas, that is), and the Chinese officials in attendance at this banquet showed no signs of being standoffish. As Hibino described it: “At this time, the [Chinese] officials surrounded us from left and right. They stared at our swords, touched our clothing, pointed to the family crests embroidered [on them], or laughed at things that struck them as odd. One man stood directly in front of me and made noises with his mouth. He appeared to be speaking. I took a writing brush and in a moment began communicating with him.”c, 4 Several more dishes were forthcoming, including one Hibino thought looked milky in consistency and so execrable he would not even taste it. When the banquet came to an end, several of the Chinese cleaned up and proceeded to stuff all the leftover sweets into the sleeves of their garments. “Alas,” notes Hibino, “how barbarous, how vile!”d Making a rather debatable leap, he took it as an appalling sign of the decline of Chinese morals.5 At this point—the party over and now time for the higher Chinese officials to meet with the shogunal officials, their intermediary Kroes, and the Frenchman Edan—the attendants departed and went their own way. Archival materials from this meeting were recently discovered, making it possible to know something of what went on behind these closed doors. Within these documents, we find the following from Wu Xu to his superior, Xue Huan (1815–1880), superintendent for trade of the Qing dynasty: On 5/9 [5/8?, June 5], the consul from Holland in the West, [Theodorus] Kroes, escorted eight officials from Japan in the East to my office for an audience: . . . [The names of the eight officials and three interpreters are listed here.] They had the following to say: “The eight of us are all officials from Japan. On orders from our superiors, we have come to Shanghai with thirteen [three?] merchants from our country, 4,000–5,000 catties each of sea cucumber, shark 120

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fin, konbu [kelp], and abalone, as well as lacquer-ware, paper fans, and other items aboard a Dutch trading ship. With the help of Dutch merchants, we have gone through customs, product inspection, payment of levies, and the like. We should now like to engage in trade and seek your permission to do so in Shanghai. This being our first such effort, our unfamiliarity leads us to seek your instructions.” [Wu Xu continued:] To this day, Chinese merchants sail every year from Zhapu [a port in Zhejiang Province] overseas and return from Japan having purchased Western copper (yangtong), but merchants from Japan have yet to come to trade in China, and following regulations, I was unable to permit them to import [goods]. However, in consideration of the fact that they have come such a great distance over the sea, I could not bear to turn them down. They have transported their goods on a Dutch vessel, and they have gone through customs with [the help of] the Dutch. I have taken into consideration the court’s pleasure in cherishing men from afar, and planning for their convenience allowed them to promptly sell the items as Dutch goods. I have not, however, allowed them to purchase Chinese commodities, and I instructed them that they must speedily return home aboard the Dutch vessel with the money [gained in transactions for their goods sold] and not rashly to come here again. They listened and replied that they would all be happy to comply. Their attitude and language at this time were exceptionally submissive. Furthermore, Dutch Consul Kroes said: “For over 200 years, the Dutch have traded with Japan, and the friendship between us has grown profound. I could not prevent the officials here from coming of the merchant vessel of the pertinent country [the Netherlands] together with the merchants and the produce. We have gone through all the customs procedures, and as soon as they have sold all of their goods, I guarantee that they will return home immediately without buying any Chinese goods.”e, 6

The document goes on at considerable length, but let us stop and consider what Wu Xu has thus far stated with respect to that initial meeting. None of the attendants or merchants were present at this meeting—only the shogunal officials and the interpreters—and inasmuch as they authored all of the travel accounts of the voyage, we would have no way of knowing what transpired without these Chinese documents. Whatever report the shogunal officials may have filed upon their return has not been brought to light. First, there are a number of confusing points in the text thus far, one that at first glance appears to be sheer falsehood. As we described it in an earlier chapter, there were only three Japanese merchants aboard the Senzaimaru, not the thirteen reported to Wu Xu. This may be no more than a clerical error, but it is compounded by a later statement which is either another, De a l i ngs w i t h t h e C h i n e s e Au t hor i t i e s

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related point of confusion or a slightly less blatant invention. When stressing to Wu Xu, as Wu reports it to Xue Huan, the hardships they suffered making the voyage to Shanghai, they claim that “three of our merchants died of illness” because of the great difficulties they were forced to overcome. As we noted earlier, three Japanese did perish, but none of them were merchants. There is no apparent or good reason to perpetuate this myth—and in casteconscious Japan at the time, there is little doubt about the social station of the three underlings who died—so this remains something of a mystery, unless he was searching for sympathy. Had Wu Xu wanted to corroborate their story, he would likely have found it difficult to do so, certainly not in any timely manner. Why would they have claimed and Wu Xu have confirmed that the Japanese sailed into the port of Shanghai aboard a Dutch merchant vessel, especially when Kroes himself went on to say that he was in no position to prevent them from doing so? If not he, who? There is no mention made that the Japanese government owned the Senzaimaru or that it was purchased from an Englishman who, with his equally British crew, sailed the ship for them. All of these facts were reported in the North-China Herald article cited earlier, an article which, although published in English two days after this meeting, would have been available to Wu Xu and his staff before he fi led his report. The Senzaimaru was flying three flags when it appeared in Shanghai: Union Jack (representing its crew), Hinomaru (representing the owners, the government of Japan), and Prinsenvlag (“Prince’s flag” of the Netherlands representing merchant and supercargo Tombrink). Th is may have been a calculated misstatement, the Japanese protecting themselves for an unauthorized entrance into port and Wu Xu protecting himself for having been incapable of preventing this illegality. Kroes backed up the Japanese claim and took responsibility for them while in Shanghai. By escorting them through the customs procedures and the like, he effectively provided them with bona fides. They promise to go nowhere but Shanghai, to follow all the rules, to buy no Chinese goods, and to return and never again just “rashly” (qing) show up unannounced. It is hard to say if anyone believed this at the time, but for form’s sake, it was essential that it be said. The ball seems to have been dropped into Wu Xu’s lap. Imagine his position at the time. The Taipings were knocking at the gates of Shanghai, and there are countless thousands of immigrants from all parts of the surrounding cities and countryside jamming into the city to escape the rebels. Rampant 122

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poverty and disease are spreading like prairie fires. And, then, out of nowhere come these Japanese and, with the representative of a once-mighty and now second-tier European agent, present him with a fait accompli. In that age Wu Xu could not simply write his superiors in Beijing and receive anything resembling a rapid response about a course of action. He had to devise one and hope that it met with their approval. One implication easily read into Wu Xu’s report is the note of fairness or reciprocity. He points out that, while the Chinese have been sailing to Japan year in and year out, Japanese traders have not—at least during the Qing dynasty—regularly sailed into Chinese ports. And, given the state of treaty regulations at the time, it was beyond his capacity to allow the Japanese to simply do as they wished. Wu, though, seems from the documents at hand to have bent over backward to accommodate the Japanese. Either he believed and was moved by their tales of treacherous travels and the desire (in so many words) to rejoin the Sinosphere (or, perhaps, a more modern version of it), thus making him predisposed to favor their requests, or perhaps he was bribed (no proof of this, it should be emphasized, remains extant). In any event, he quickly begins to conjure up scenarios in which he will be able to allow them to sell off their goods and then return home promptly.7 Indeed, using the discursive frame that he was “cherishing men from afar” after a long journey, he appears to have been just as complicit in concocting a plan to have their goods be construed as “Dutch” (as the Qing did indeed have trading relations with the Netherlands)—he even repeats the odd claim that the Senzaimaru was Dutch. Unasked is the question: Why would a Dutch vessel bear a Japanese name presumably painted on its side in large characters, though we have no extant pictures of it? So, Wu Xu found himself in a bit of a pickle, and he had to paint the best possible picture of it to his superiors and, at the same time, make it go away as quickly as humanly possible. It is thus important that he mentioned the deferential manner in which the Japanese agreed with the guidelines that he laid at their feet. As narrativized by Wu Xu, it was at this point that Vice-Consul Kroes (as noted earlier, he was much more likely vice-consul than “consul” as portrayed in the documents) stepped into the fray to support all the statements thus far made by the Japanese officials, introduced by his avowal of two centuries of Dutch-Japanese contacts. This entire scenario must have been rehearsed in the prior meeting between the Dutch and the Japanese officials. His aim here appears to be one of reassurance: You Chinese may not have had trade ties with the Japanese for quite a long time, but we Dutch certainly have and we have De a l i ngs w i t h t h e C h i n e s e Au t hor i t i e s

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come to trust one another implicitly. In fact, while there may not have been any diplomatic ties between China and Japan, and no basis in treaty or contract to engage in trade, Chinese ships “sail every year” (as Wu Xu himself noted) to Japan. Kroes’s promises to make sure the Japanese follow the ground rules set by Wu Xu covered another aspect of this tripartite negotiation, as we shall see from a subsequent meeting between the daotai and the Japanese, for he was to make a handy profit fronting for the Japanese who were chafing under this arrangement. What choice would they have had? Indeed, the Japanese may have been exaggerating their dire situation with complaints aimed at gaining Chinese sympathies and possibly bilateral trading rights down the road, concerning both of which they were more explicit in subsequent meetings. Wu Xu next describes a return visit he made to the Japanese at their hotel roughly three weeks later: “On 5/25 [June 22], I myself went to their lodgings to inspect the situation at hand. According to them, ‘Because of the chaos engendered by the Long-Haired [Bandits], the goods we brought on this voyage have not been easy to dispose of, and we have incurred losses. Because of the great distance covered in coming to this foreign land, we were unfamiliar with the local climate and topography, and three of our merchants died. As soon as we have sold the remainder of our goods, we plan to return home.’ ”f, 8 One can almost hear the violins in the background, as Wu recounts his visit to the hotel where the shogunal officials and their samurai entourages resided during their weeks in Shanghai—the lower ranking members of the party, such as the Japanese crew, slept on board ship, as we have noted, throughout the entire stay. They had made great sacrifices, several had died (this time, incidentally, the number of deceased is correct, although their occupations are not), money had been lost through no fault of their own (they conveniently blamed it on the Taiping Rebellion), and all they wanted was to finish their business and go home. The tone of fretful complaint, as conveyed by Wu, might make a cynical reader wonder. Wouldn’t the Japanese have known about the Taipings before leaving Nagasaki and perhaps have bided their time accordingly? As Ichiko Chūzō demonstrated decades ago, every educated Japanese would have known about the Taipings.9 Why didn’t they wait awhile, at least until the coast was clear, so to speak? However, we know why they came, and commerce was entirely secondary, and that leads this reader to question the tenor and verisimilitude of their remarks. They had come to Shanghai to see how the rules of the game of international trade and politics were played, and they saw it all in spades, at least as practiced in Shanghai.10 Taipings or no Taipings, time was of the essence for the future of Japan. 124

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Much of Wu’s June 22 entry cited above reiterated what he had expressed earlier in the report, and presumably he had a reason for including it again. The most obvious point is not mentioned but would have been clear to all concerned, even those in Beijing: Kroes was not present this time. The fact that this was the very day that Takasugi and Godai went to visit Muirhead and then inspected other sites in the city, and that Hibino makes no mention of anything happening, leads me to believe this meeting was arranged to be solely between the officials on both sides, Japanese and Chinese. In fact, we know from the entry for that day in Nakamuda’s travel narrative that he went with Kroes to visit Hall & Holtz, a company with many branches throughout China, and that in the afternoon or evening he again met the Dutch vice-consul, bought a sea map, and visited an American ship.11 If the June 22 entry was not unintentionally redundant, then Wu Xu—in addition to the fact of Kroes’s absence—must have included it to emphasize the difficult straits his unexpected guests were in, to reiterate the need to make a quick decision with respect to their stay in his city, and to point out how compliant they were in the face of his directives to them. He went on to iterate his own reflections on their attitude and behavior: My investigation indicates that they are [indeed] about to hurry home. When I investigated further, [I learned that] recently countries from the West have been coming to Japan to engage in commerce and that Japan brought to Shanghai all the items that it produces and put them up for sale. Of necessity, if they have numerous items, the price will go down. It is true that, with Shanghai besieged by the rebel forces, merchants could not come here and thus they [the Japanese] had no market outlets. Thus, despite their trial effort at sailing to Shanghai to trade, the Japanese officials and merchants did not realize their wishes this time. Perhaps this will militate against their coming again. When the officials set a date for their return trip [to Japan], they passed through customs, carried out the proper exit procedures, and were permitted to go, and in addition to making a further report, I now submit this for your instruction.g, 12

This is Wu Xu’s summary of the case. He conveys a sense that he has the situation completely under control, with the Japanese all but eating out of his hand. He has shown an extraordinary degree of magnanimity toward these visitors from afar. He notes that he has checked out their stories about failed business ventures, and all have proved to be true. In addition, they have done everything according to the basic rules and regulations laid at their feet back shortly after their arrival, and they have now departed. Whether the Japanese De a l i ngs w i t h t h e C h i n e s e Au t hor i t i e s

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truly grumbled to Wu or he ascribed it to them to make himself shine, we shall never know. Once he had made the decision to allow them to stay, he would likely have been responsible for any untoward consequences, and in an age of less than instant communication he was not apt to hear back from his superiors until his initial decision had been in place for a while. More importantly, if Beijing was not pleased, he would have to face the fire. It could be a career-altering choice, but that’s why someone of his stature had been given such power. Thus far we have only heard the Chinese side from Wu Xu, but that is about to change. The foregoing statements from Wu Xu were enclosed in a document dated 7/1 (July 27, 1862), and Xue Huan proceeded at this point to comment for their superiors who would read the entire fi le in Beijing: I [Xue Huan] accordingly carried out an investigation and discovered that Japan is not included among the countries with which we have trading relations (tongshang), having thus far not come to China to engage in trade directly. Furthermore, Holland is a non-treaty country (wuyueguo), and Holland accompanied the Japanese officials and merchants when they engaged in trade. On the basis of such precedents, there is the possibility of abuses of unauthorized contracting (baolan). In the future, I do not know if many nations will emulate this [practice of coming unannounced] and do not know how to stop it [if they should]. This needs to be prevented before there are abuses [of our kindness]. I pray that this will receive your scrutiny and be implemented.h, 13

Although the putative plan was to devise a means to forestall similar impromptu arrivals, Xue Huan effectively added all the important elements for actually continuing quasi-diplomatic ties over the next few years, ultimately leading to the 1871 Sino-Japanese Treaty of Amity, a treaty distinguished in its time as one based entirely on equal bilateral terms. How so? On the basis of his own investigation, Xue claims that Japan had no standing as a “trading” country with China. In 1862 and for a number of years thereafter, despite the establishment the previous year of the Zongli Yamen, the Qing government had little conception of what the Western states called diplomacy or diplomatic relations. Countries with which it had some sort of contact were arrayed in three concentric circles: trading countries with treaties (youyue tongshang), non-treaty trading countries (wuyue tongshang), and non-treaty, non-trading countries (wuyue butongshang). This system predated the Opium War and would remain in effect through much of the nineteenth century.14 According to Xue, heretofore Japan fell into the third category, but 126

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clearly wanted acceptance into the second—where the Netherlands then resided. He feared that the Japanese would milk this relationship to China’s detriment, as baolan was viewed as a morally disreputable practice excoriated by Chinese statecraft officials for centuries.15 He was also wary that, should China open its doors even a crack, there might be a flood of tiny countries like Japan rushing to jam their foot into the threshold, capture Chinese markets, and then never leave. Significant here is the fact that the Qing state, through its local officials and chain of command, had recognized categories for foreigners wishing to engage in trade, and these relations were based entirely on trade (no mention of tribute or obeisance to the emperor in Beijing or any sort of ritual acceptance of the superiority of the Chinese or Manchu court). China, thus, may not have understood as yet how modern international relations were conducted, but it appears to have been well on its way. The Chinese bureaucracy in the middle of the nineteenth century also may not have operated with the alacrity of our own age of instantaneous communication, but it was nonetheless far from inefficient or slow. On July 30, three days after Xue’s memorial to the Zongli Yamen was dated, the authorities effectively seconded his concerns in a memorandum sent to him. They briefly recapitulated the situation and then went to pains to make things crystal clear for the immediate future: “We thus firmly instruct the Su-Song daotai [Wu Xu] via the aforementioned minister [Xue Huan]: Hereafter when merchant vessels from various lands enter port, deal with the matter appropriately on the basis of a rigorous preliminary investigation. We strictly order you not to follow the case of Japan with other countries.” i, 16 On August 28 (8/4 according to the lunar calendar), several weeks after the Senzaimaru had set sail back to Japan, Xue and Jiangsu Governor Li Hongzhang wrote a joint memorial from which we can glean more of Wu Xu’s interactions with the Japanese. Within the larger memorial, we find embedded a report from Wu concerning a subsequent meeting with them and his subsequent efforts to assist them: When their [i.e., the Japanese] officials came to my office for another audience [the second of two meetings they had at the daotai‘s office], they told me: “Two months have passed since our arrival in Shanghai, but half of our goods have not been sold, and now we are putting things in order and planning to return home. As far as we have been able to investigate, there are many small countries who engage in trade in Shanghai without a treaty, and you allow them all to trade in the open port in accordance with the regulations

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pertaining to countries with treaties. You just prohibit them from entering Beijing and from calling at inland ports along the shores of the Yangzi River. “Japan is close to China. Every year your official and private merchants dealing in copper come to Japan to import goods. Japan has engaged in this business properly until this time, and not once has there been either delay or error. At present, Japan is emulating the small nations without treaties from the West and, without asking boldly to sign a treaty, if we are given permission merely to have our merchant vessels engage in trade solely at Shanghai, to install a consulate, to rent a house, and to see to our own customs procedures and levies for our ships and merchants, this would be an exceptional act of grace.” The aforementioned daotai made a list of the treaty nations and the nontreaty nations and submitted it, while ordering an investigation of related materials concerning the manner in which past non-treaty nations have acquired permission to trade at Shanghai. The aforementioned daotai [then] reported on how small, non-treaty states gained approval to trade.j, 17

What is going on here? Apparently, many things. None of the foregoing proceeds from the Japanese side; it is all recounted by Wu Xu and his superiors in their various reports. Wu’s enthusiasm for trade with Japan seems undiminished. He seems prepared to accept what the Japanese have been telling him and to understand the potential hazard of a clamorous influx of small, non-treaty states requesting the right to trade. The report indicates that the Japanese had already been in port for two months when this meeting transpired, which means it would have been at the tail end of their visit to Shanghai. The Japanese, too, had been investigating the trading scene in Shanghai and talking with the Dutch, French, American, British, and possibly other diplomatic and commercial officials within the international community. The only thing a treaty would allow, according to their research, that a non-treaty state lacks is access to Beijing, something the Qing government was loathe to permit and only did under duress. But, the Japanese appear to have assured Wu Xu that they harbored no such desire—all they wanted to do was trade and only in Shanghai, and they promised to stay away from the capital and any other inland Chinese ports along the Yangzi. When Wu Xu next began to repeat the rhetoric of Sino-Japanese geographic proximity and the implicit cultural borrowings and sharings, one wonders if he agreed or was merely acting as a go-between. The Japanese, though, clearly moved to address the point weighing on their collective mind: you’ve been coming to our port of Nagasaki for many, many years (a point they had already made at their first meeting), and we’ve always done what we’re supposed to do in a timely fashion; and now we’d really like to do 128

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the same at the port of Shanghai. In addition, there are these little Western countries who are being allowed in (implicitly: far away, not close like us, and just as culturally distant and with no lengthy history of trade with China). On top of all this, we Japanese don’t even want a treaty and aren’t interested in traveling to Beijing or anywhere else besides Shanghai. In the last portion of their appeal, as quoted by Wu, we get some further insight into this entire venture. The Japanese requested of Wu and the Chinese authorities the right to manage their own customs procedures, indicating their desire no longer to remain dependent on the Dutch from arrival to departure. Wu had insisted that, because of the unprecedented nature of their presence in Shanghai, they needed to rely on the Dutch for everything, and they and Kroes had initially agreed to those conditions. Given the fact that Wu insisted that, when they had sold off their goods, they were promptly to sail home and not make another such voyage “rashly,” it might have seemed a bit audacious on the part of the Japanese to now be asking for this right. If they were as “obedient” as Wu indicated, why had they apparently missed this part of the discussion of terms? And, even if the main point of the trip was not to turn a profit, the fact that the Dutch were taking a healthy cut as their agent did not bode well for future commercial ties with China if Holland continued to serve as a middleman. In addition, the Japanese may have been presenting themselves at this final meeting with Wu as terribly quick learners: that is, yes, they needed Kroes to serve as their agent and show them the diplomatic and customs ropes in Shanghai, to say nothing of introducing them to other foreign diplomats and to the daotai himself, but now they were ready to go it alone. When Wu stepped back in the last portion of the document cited just above and noted the research his office had conducted in search of a precedent to allow the Japanese to trade, he appears simply to have been emphasizing how assiduous his office had been in this matter. It would be as a result of this search that an important precedent would later be found. The memorial from Xue and Li, though, was not finished. They continued citing from Wu’s report to them as well as added copies of other reports from him. First, more from Wu’s own report cited within: In Xianfeng 3 [1853], the walled city of Shanghai was occupied by bandits [i.e., the Small Sword Society against whom Wu had distinguished himself], and documents in the daotai’s office were all lost, leaving us with no materials upon which to base an investigation. Although stipulated in Article Eight of the supplementary treaty with Great Britain that all foreign merchants De a l i ngs w i t h t h e C h i n e s e Au t hor i t i e s

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would be limited to trading at Guangzhou, a draft of “Regulations on Trade at Five Ports” dated Daoguang 23 [1843] enabled, as a result of negotiations in South China [lit., Jiangnan] the previous year, trade for Western merchants at the four ports of Fuzhou, Xiamen [Amoy], Ningbo, and Shanghai, if imperial permission was given. Great Britain agreed.k, 18

What this paragraph reflects is the hurried search by Wu Xu and his staff— in the midst of all their other responsibilities and bandit assaults on the city of Shanghai—since the arrival of the Japanese for a precedent to justify allowance of trade with Japan. Was he doing this as a favor to the Japanese, the Senzaimaru having departed several weeks previous with promises not to just show up and crash the party unannounced, or to cover himself in the face of potentially adverse opinion higher up the bureaucratic food chain—or both? When they turned to review Wu Xu’s report and offer their own opinion, Xue and Li could hardly conceal their suspicions: “Accordingly, this minister [Xue] and this governor [Li] understand that this memorial [from Wu Xu] conforms to the language of printed books [that is, it fits with precedent]. Officials from the land of Japan have now put forward requests to follow cases of non-treaty states, to carry on trade solely at Shanghai, to set up a consulate, to rent a house, and to see to affairs of their own merchants. This minister and this governor are unable to decide how we are to respond. We pray that these [matters] will receive your scrutiny.” l, 19 In short, Circuit Intendant Wu, you handle it, and we shall see where it takes us. Wu had promised and included as an enclosure with his report a list of countries trading in Shanghai. Trading partners with treaties included: Great Britain, France, United States, Russia, Portugal, Prussia, and Belgium (soon to sign a treaty). Those trading without a treaty included: Denmark, Sweden-Norway, Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck, Oldenberg, and Hanover.20 In Wu’s geographical imagination, then, Japan seems to have resembled small European states or even smaller German city-states. A number of questions, some large and some smaller, remain unresolved. Why in their initial meeting with Wu Xu, shortly after entering port, did the shogunal officials indicate clearly that they only wanted to trade on this one occasion, and then two months later, when their stay in Shanghai was nearing its end, did they take this new tack of requesting non-treaty trading status, a consulate, and the like—all presumably to establish the basis for fullfledged trade in future?21 Was the presence of the Dutch intermediary at the initial meeting and his absence at the later one the reason? The stress on trade 130

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is especially perplexing in light of the commercial failure of the Senzaimaru’s voyage, unless as we know the objective of the voyage was not commercial. The Japanese clearly understood the direct relationship between the Taipings storming the outskirts of the city of Shanghai and the whole region and the resultant depression of commodity prices—they even groused about it to the daotai—and yet they openly sought direct Sino-Japanese trading privileges, arguing that it would be more advantageous to both sides. Perhaps the hyperbole was flying so fast and furious that it behooves one not to read too much into it at this remove in time. More likely, I would argue, the Japanese (like Vice-Consul Kroes) were not being completely forthcoming, as true in diplomatic negotiations as it is in poker. One tidbit of this encounter, which the Japanese mentioned as a justification for their engaging in trade with the Qing empire and which Daotai Wu Xu took up in his own position pieces, was the concurrent role of Chinese merchants sailing to Nagasaki and buying up Japanese copper. They had no special treaty enabling them to engage in this activity, but some sort of hazy problem remains unresolved with two such merchants referred to in these documents. Wu told the Japanese, as he reported subsequently to his superiors, that these merchants will be dealt with just as soon as the Taiping rebels are quelled, as there were certainly bigger fish to fry at the time for this wellplaced Chinese official. While nonetheless generally sympathetic to the Japanese, Wu did have one more discourse up his sleeve to invoke to keep the Japanese at bay. As he later recounted to Xue and Li what he told the Japanese: “At the end of the Ming dynasty, Japanese pirates formed groups, came to the provinces of Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang, among others, and caused disturbances along the coastline. They were known as wokou. That was a long time ago, and I am not reproaching you for that now, but the people living in their home villages have conveyed [these stories] by word of mouth, and enmity from bygone times may still remain.”m, 22 Oh, yes, that, responded the Japanese, according to Wu Xu, but that was long ago and all the culprits were punished at the time. And, when Wu expressed incredulity—“I could not believe their words alone”n—the shogunal officials, claiming no malice toward China which they insisted they actually revered, made the assertion that their position with respect to the wokou was substantiated “in the history texts of their country which they unfortunately had not brought along with them this time and thus could not point to proofs from those works.”o, 23 Sino-Japanese controversy over the representations in textbooks of Japanese depredations of China and the Chinese, De a l i ngs w i t h t h e C h i n e s e Au t hor i t i e s

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fascinatingly, is not a solely postwar phenomenon—it goes back at least 150 years. We shall return to the role of an absent book in Chapter 9. It has become almost reflexive for scholars to dismiss official late-Edo reform efforts as doomed, much as it used to be (and in many quarters still remains the default position) equally contemptuous of late-Qing official planning toward reform. Knowing that the shogunate was to collapse in 1867–1868, only a handful of years after this mission took place, neither prefigures every bureaucratic effort to triviality nor makes irrelevant any potential post-Edo influence. We know the important impact that men like Takasugi Shinsaku would have on the Meiji Restoration, even if he died before it took place, but it does not follow that, because he and the shogunal officials were so at odds, the latter group played no appreciable historical role. The fact that trade between China and Japan began on a bilateral basis once again was a function of their perspicacity, combined with the generosity, if that is what it was, of Circuit Intendant Wu Xu. And, Takasugi Shinsaku played no role whatsoever in facilitating this development. Where did all of these negotiations leave Theodorus Kroes? While initially providing the essential intermediary role, no sooner had the Japanese arrived in port than they were complaining to Wu Xu that they wished to be liberated of the Dutchman’s oversight and to have their own agency in trade relations with China. While he may have been serving his homeland as viceconsul, Kroes was a businessman first and foremost. Like Tombrink and surely other Dutchmen in Japan and China, they must have been feeling the pinch, ever since 1859 and the opening of ports in Japan to other Western merchant vessels, of losing their monopoly as Europeans and Westerners in general of trade with Japan. The Netherlands was, of course, no longer the great power it had once been, and all that it had left in East Asia of a worldwide empire, ignoring Southeast Asia, was sole access among the Westerners to Japan via Nagasaki. By 1862, this had been coming to an end for several years. If Kroes was using this opportunity presented to him with the voyage of the Senzaimaru, it was not to inscribe his name in history. He was doing what any good businessman would have sought to do: make money. In a few more years, Holland’s pre-eminence in Japan would be a distant memory. •

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adventurous and underwent few experiences without relating them in prose or poetry. But, other than leaving us his account of the voyage and his transcripts of brush chats, he did nothing of historical importance. As an attendant, he was not privy to the official meetings with the daotai, but he never passed up an opportunity to do something new. On June 30, as he reported in detail, he bought some eel from a local fisherman and grilled it all by himself; it was, no less, the first fresh fish he had eaten since leaving Nagasaki. In fact, he so enjoyed with the whole experience that he composed what might called an “Ode to an Eel.” We might generously dub this a novelty poem.p I fi leted and cooked it myself. I ate the Songjiang eel until I was stuffed. Keeping its savory taste quiet, I felt it among my teeth. Its aroma strong, somewhat bitter to the nose. Zhang Han ate fi let of lizard fish. Why not sup on this? If I wish to know its taste, All the more reason to come to Jiangnan and sigh.24

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eight

Preparing for the Trip Home

as the weeks wore on and it became clear that the cargo transported to Shanghai by the Senzaimaru was not all going to be sold in China, the various authorities began to think about getting ready to return to Japan. Although they must have had at least an approximate date for the return voyage worked out prior to departure, none of the extant documents make mention of it. The Japanese were paying storage fees to the Dutch warehousemen, and the Dutch were skimming a 2.5 percent commission on all the goods they did sell and charging for all the necessary procedures to be followed in Shanghai. Then, there were the fees for tugboats (in both directions), the commissions to Chinese merchants who handled the produce in Shanghai for them, fees paid to Tombrink, and customs fees—to name just a few of the increasingly burdensome expenses. Being a sail ship, the Senzaimaru also had to think about the winds—even if none of the Japanese aboard would be doing any of the actual sailing. And, as noted, the timing may have been necessary from the perspective of changing Japanese policy with respect to international trade and diplomacy, especially given the proximity of the Taiping rebels to the city of Shanghai, which did not help matters. To be sure, the entire trip had not been planned with turning a profit as its principal end, but rather with seeing what would and would not sell in Shanghai and with setting the stage for future trade and possibly diplomacy with China. Nonetheless, if the shogunate did not expect for them to show a profit, profligacy was not desirable either. The voyage had been undeniably expensive. Money had additionally to be set aside for the crew that would navigate the Senzaimaru back to Nagasaki. They were now on their own, as the British 134

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captain (who received US$100 for his services) and crew that had sailed them to Shanghai went their separate ways after their arrival in China. With the assistance of the Dutch (Kroes, Tombrink, and perhaps unnamed others), they hired a Dutch crew of ten men at a cost of 460 Japanese ryō. There were expenditures related to the hotel in Shanghai, as well as costs incurred for entertaining the daotai and the European consuls. The shogunate had provided our travelers with US$30,000 for expenses; $27,000 was turned over to the Dutch to be converted into Chinese currency to engage in trade. That left the officials with precious little for their sixty days in Shanghai. When all was said and done, though, had the mission been a success? They still had no treaty or even agreement with the Chinese authorities. In fact, they had agreed to return home and not “rashly” attempt to break into the Shanghai (or any other Chinese) market any time soon. Wu Xu and his superiors had not permitted any of the items the shogunal officials had requested: consulate, agency in handling their own affairs, future trade. In terms of trade, the mission was, indeed, largely a failure. In terms of the longer term future of trade and diplomacy, the mission was both symbolically and actually a great accomplishment. The revival of SinoJapanese trade aboard Japanese ships had been dead since the late Ming, and it would slowly but surely begin to pick up as a result ultimately of this initial contact.1 It was not simply Sino-Japanese trade that stood to be reopened on an equal footing, but the Senzaimaru’s voyage also represented the first export trade for Japan since the opening of the country less than a decade previously, excluding the odd voyage up the Amur River of the Kamedamaru in 1861. There would be briefings and debriefings back in Nagasaki and Edo, much of which has been either lost to history or remains undiscovered. All the conditions and practices of trade and diplomacy on an international scale observed through the microcosm of Shanghai would prove invaluable to the Japanese as they made tentative gestures toward trying to join the family of nations. The Tokugawa shogunate would be overthrown in just a few years, but these achievements paved the way for Meiji efforts in these international domains—and thus provides an example of continuity across a divide, the Meiji Restoration, usually not crossed. Sino-Japanese trade may experience occasional bumps along the road, but currently comprises the biggest volume of bilateral trade in East Asia, now home to two of the world’s three biggest economies. On June 20, Kroes invited both Wu Xu and the shogunal officials to a meeting, and when the daotai left, he was questioned closely by the Japanese Pr e pa r i ng for t h e T r i p Hom e

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about a wide range of topics concerned with nuts and bolts. Among the many questions they raised were the following: How much were the consuls and vice-consuls serving the various countries in Shanghai paid? How much was one paid when he took up the consular duties of another country? Which countries had acquired the right to trade with China in Shanghai but did not have [Western-style] diplomatic relations? Inasmuch as the price of silver was high on the Japanese market, could the Japanese profit by sending ships abroad to trade? When renting or buying space abroad, will the office of the daotai issue identification or papers to that effect? Land along the Bund is desirable because it is easy to unload wares from ship, but that land is expensive; are there distinctions of terrestrial quality applied to land not along the Bund or perhaps elsewhere when renting? If there are agreed-upon articles regarding sales and delivery of produce, may we borrow them? Have Chinese in the concessions purchased land? How do we go about seeing to our needs as they arise regarding road and sewer repairs, night watch, and lighting? What is done to thieves when they are caught in the concessions? When hiring Chinese for labor purposes, is a guarantor necessary? Where are the graveyards of the British, French, and other foreign nationalities located? Is it permitted to have children born to prostitutes returned to the home country [presumably of the male]? How are the new, major bridges in the concessions repaired? Is opium imported into Shanghai? What Japanese produce might be needed in Shanghai? What is the handling charge for shipping a light load? The market for goods brought aboard the Senzaimaru was quite poor, with necessarily low prices; when taxes were then paid and personal expenses deducted, it inevitably led to losses sustained. Would we be well advised to sell our goods by auction? Can we hold an auction in the Dutch Consulate? We brought one monme of silver for use in the market here, but were unable to use it. Why was that? May we pay in Mexican dollars? Is the duty on dried abalone and dried bonito comparable to that on other dried fish?2

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three weeks after the meeting with the daotai when he insisted and they agreed not to make any future unexpected appearances for a while, the Japanese were being more than a little presumptuous or, put in another light, farsighted. The questions assumed that not only was there going to be trade between China and Japan down the road and not only was it due to commence soon, but that the Japanese were clearly planning to be there for the long haul—buying or renting land, worrying about the nationality of half-Japanese born to Chinese prostitutes, a concern with an older history all its own,3 and much more. The next day, June 21, they were back at Kroes’s office in the Dutch consulate with another long list of questions and requests for further information of their intermediary, these concerned more with the mechanics of engaging in trade in Shanghai. One thing that these questions indicate is how sheltered the Dutch kept the shogunal officials from the actual workings of commerce in the port. Perhaps Matsudaya Hankichi and his two colleagues were better informed, as Matsudaya’s report would seem to suggest. Information requested on the inspection of foreign vessels when they enter port. Information requested on the inspection of foreign warships when they enter port. Are there guards present every night for the merchant ships anchored in port, and are guards present when cargo is offloaded? How is cargo inspected? How is the cargo list presented? Could you provide details on acquiring permissions for loading, unloading, movement of ships, and various duties and tonnage fees? Could you provide details on the number of foreign merchant vessels in port, their cargoes, their produce, and the methods of assessing export duties and rates for tonnage fees? Please provide information on the treaties with Great Britain, the United States, France, and Russia and all the items contained within them. Until the previous year, taxes were assessed according to the amount of merchandise, but recently it had been changed to using the weight of the cargo as its basis—why? As concerns produce for which a tax is paid when entering port, must one pay it again when leaving port? Is money paid for duties on cargo that is not sold to be returned when leaving? What merchandise would be banned from import or export? Is there duty to be paid for guide boats and lamplights at the mouth of the Wusong River? Please provide details on indications of the depths of the Huangpu River. Pr e pa r i ng for t h e T r i p Hom e

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Are merchant ships in port forbidden from firing blank shots? What are the rules surrounding the necessity of vessels at anchor using Chinese tugboats? When warships from nations that have treaties with China enter port, please explain the items sent by the Qing government in recognition of their services. Please explain the inspection of loading of items for export. Are the anchorage sites for foreign ships fi xed? Please provide details on the unloading site constructed out of granite. What are the procedures involved in hiring a guide boat? Are there ways to guide a ship with small craft other than by using a guide boat? When foreign ships purchase sail rigging or steam engines, while at anchor in Shanghai, does one have to pay duty on them as on other cargo? Please provide details on showing permits and paying duties while loading cargo. Does one have to pay exit duties on cargo for which there are no taxes? When paying customs fees, are Mexican dollars acceptable currency?4

We unfortunately do not have Kroes’s responses to these questions and requests for details on countless matters of a practical nature, and if the officials did indeed report back to the shogunate on these matters and answers were provided, then those documents have not as yet surfaced. As noted, there is not even a hint that the Japanese planned to obey Wu Xu’s demand about not returning. If anything, they were already planning to settle down in Shanghai for a long time. While the many samurai we have been tracking spent their time investigating what struck them as interesting—hunting for books, observing Western and Chinese troops, exchanging views with Chinese by brush, and the like—the three Nagasaki merchants had been assigned specific tasks to carry out. They inspected Shanghai markets, especially goods available and service costs. Thus, for example, we might hear about the tugboat from one of the samurai, but Matsudaya, the only merchant to leave an account, tells us (early morning, June 6): “A steam vessel approached the right side of the Senzaimaru and tugged it onto the [Huangpu] River by twists and turns before anchoring in front of a foreign establishment in Shanghai. The rental fee was $200 Mexican, comparable to eight silver monme in Japan.”a, 5 Adding price details to observations, as we see in this citation, was not absent from others’ accounts, but it is consistently present in Matsudaya’s. In addition, Matsudaya did occasionally offer remarks unique among the writings produced by the voyage. Without his account, we would not, for 138

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instance, know that fruits and vegetables in Shanghai sold for roughly the same as they did in 1862 in Japan and that the value of gold and silver Japanese coinage on the Shanghai market was comparable to that of Japan. And, early on in the trip, he began compiling what would become a list of items and their prices purchased in Shanghai for transport back to Nagasaki, including such things as paper, white sugar, silk, and ephedra.6 The merchants were invited along to meet Kroes and later the daotai on June 5, but as Matsudaya mentions those meetings briefly, he almost immediately segues to note in his account that he will be primarily observing the ways in which Chinese and Westerners engage in business, what he several times refers to as shōhō.7 Matsudaya’s initial dealings were through the Dutch, but later he made contacts directly with Chinese merchants—Wang Chaoshan, Qian Shaohao, and Wang Xunnan, among others—who worked to see that the goods brought to Shanghai by the Japanese would be sold and to see that certain Chinese products might be exported to Japan. The ever-present threat of Taiping attack meant that the Japanese merchants could not go freely to the production sites of goods. Matsudaya simply selected what he wanted to purchase, the Chinese located and delivered same to him, and those items were repatriated with the returning Senzaimaru, in apparent violation of the promises proffered by the shogunal officials to Wu Xu that they would sell their own goods and go home. According to the groundbreaking research of Kawashima Motojirō, in all the Nagasaki merchants spent over ninety percent of what money they brought to Shanghai.8 As we have noted several times, however, the business of the Senzaimaru was not business; if it had been, the voyage would have been a resounding failure, and there would likely have been no follow-up and no resumption of Sino-Japanese trade, at least not for some time. The shogunal officials were not pleased that the voyage had not turned a profit, but they may have missed the larger picture. They certainly recognized that there was much money to be made in the wider world of international trade. As their question-andanswer sessions with Kroes and Wu Xu indicate, they were clearly planning well beyond the present trip. Without a doubt, though, the mission was an unquestionable success, even if the soon-to-collapse Tokugawa regime benefited little from it. While there had been Japanese earlier who wanted their country to open up to foreign trade and contact, their numbers were minuscule. And, the number of those who had actually been abroad was, if anything, smaller. Most of the samurai on the Senzaimaru were dead set against allowing the barbarians into Pr e pa r i ng for t h e T r i p Hom e

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Japan, but they wanted to see the outside world that was now pressing Japan to join the international community. It is hard to get a fix on the shogunal officials, but they appear to have done their job, providing the shogunate with raw data to be used in future planning. And, the merchants were sold on trade with China, or at least with Shanghai (and maybe Hong Kong). But, they all also realized that Japan, like any sovereign nation, had to be in control of its trade and diplomacy. They did not want to end up under the heel of the Western powers as China had—with concession areas, extraterritoriality, arrogant foreigners strutting around, and thousands of vessels crowding into their ports over which control might easily be lost. In a sense this is precisely how Japanese had handled its foreign relations—diplomacy and trade—throughout the Tokugawa period, only now the regime would be unable to limit the number of foreign counterparts so strictly both in number and in procedure. Thus, the voyage of the Senzaimaru would likely never have transpired had not Western pressure been brought to bear on the shogunate to open up. They set out before they even had a crew able to sail the high seas—hiring a British one to get to Shanghai and a Dutch one to return to Nagasaki— though they would solve this problem in less than two years. The samurai aboard clearly identified with the Chinese, and for all the problems witnessed in Shanghai, they felt an instinctive intimacy with China. Throughout his writings from the trip, Takasugi Shinsaku always referred to the Westerners as “barbarians” and their possessions as “barbarian” possessions. As noted in Chapter 4, Nōtomi Kaijirō’s impression was that Chinese and Japanese were “kindred spirits.” In both of these cases, and many more like them, there is an assumed cultural bridge linking China and Japan which, despite all the problems facing both peoples in the contemporary world, was certain to outlast those present exigencies. The sea voyage back to Nagasaki was largely uneventful, just what would have been most desired. There was no shortage of water or other disasters to be averted, as had been the experience coming. They left Shanghai on July 31, sailed for nine days, and arrived back home on August 9, 1862. Exactly two weeks later, Takasugi Shinsaku arrived in Kyoto to have an audience with his daimyo and submit a report on the trip. A little over two months had passed, but the world would never be the same for the Japanese.

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it back to Taishō times and even Meiji, the further back the better. Some would like to find Japanese condescension or derision or worse with respect to China at a time before there was even any contact at all between the two countries. The Senzaimaru was the first official state-to-state contact in several centuries, and the response to seeing the real, live China of those among the Japanese travelers who wrote accounts was anything but contemptuous. There was discontent, to be sure, with the ineffectiveness of the Qing military and its need to rely on “barbarians” to fight off the Taipings, but that was a sentiment shared with many Chinese at the time as well. And, there was no love lost on the rebels, especially in light of their curious adoption of the utterly alien and despised Christianity. The overriding opinion appears to be concern for the future of China, continued respect for the fount of all meaningful civilization, and (most important) anxiety about what the future held for Japan.

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nine

Subsequent Missions to China in the Late Edo Period

as we have already seen, while the shogunal officials aboard the Senzaimaru readily complied with Circuit Intendant Wu Xu’s instructions not to return hastily to Shanghai and expect to be accepted as a trading partner, the very questions put to him and to Dutch Vice-Consul Theodorus Kroes in their meetings indicate clearly that they were thinking about little else save returning to Shanghai and elsewhere where international trade might be transacted on the China coast. There were simply too many reasons weighing in favor of such a choice: money to be made, international contacts to be forged, and especially (at least the possibility of) excessive pressure from the Western powers to be forestalled. Indeed, even before the Senzaimaru set sail for Shanghai, the Hakodate Magistrate—who like the Nagasaki Magistrate had been tasked by the shogunate with investigating the possibilities of Japan entering the brave new world of international trade—purchased an oceangoing vessel of its own. Magistrate Hori Toshihiro and his colleagues had been advocating such a move in conjunction with Japan’s developing outbound trade, especially in the Russian Far East and the Chinese ports of Shanghai and Hong Kong. In March 1860 Torii Echizen no kami (Tadayoshi) and two other gaikoku bugyō (magistrates for foreign affairs) suggested they use a boat already in their possession or hire a foreign vessel to travel to Russia and from there continue to Shanghai and Hong Kong; they should bring along goods that were hard to obtain in those places and thus turn a tidy profit. They even consulted the British minister in Edo about gaining permission to enter Hong Kong, and he said they could secure permission without much difficulty. The shogunal officials authorized a voyage to the Amur River and on to Kamchatka, but they balked when it came to the plan to continue on to 142

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China. The travels of the Kamedamaru, which fulfilled this mission, were discussed in Chapter 2.

kenjunmaru, 1864 The American ship Althea was built in New Bedford, Connecticut, in 1860, and received first documentation there in June of that year. By early summer she was in New York, where she remained until January 1861 at which point she sailed for the “Amoor [Amur] River” in the Russian Far East. The Boston Shipping List notes that the Althea reached the Amur, presumably its mouth at the Straits of Tartary across from Sakhalin Island, on July 20, and she sailed into Hakodate harbor on September 12, 1861. The next month the shogunal authorities there bought the ship from the owner on board for US$22,000.1 It was wooden in structure, a barque (like the Senzaimaru), had three masts, weighed just over 378 tons (or twenty tons heavier than the Senzaimaru), and was 119 feet long, just over 29 feet wide, and slightly more than 12 feet deep, measurements similar to those of the Senzaimaru.2 It was renamed the Kenjunmaru and quickly was inaugurated into the still tiny fleet of seaworthy Japanese ships.3 The Hakodate Magistrate planned in June 1862 to send the Kenjunmaru to Hong Kong and Batavia in the Dutch East Indies, and to that end he had it loaded with a variety of marine produce (konbu, sea cucumber, abalone, and the like), silk thread, and other items. It set sail on November 27. It was captained by one Mizuno (possibly Mizuno Shōdayū, an official who had been aboard the Kamedamaru only a few months before) and held several dozen crew members. It was to be the first time Japanese had sailed a ship on the open ocean. They sailed toward Edo and reached Shinagawa the next month, but for some reason the trip was suddenly cancelled, and the ship remained docked in Edo harbor. The Hakodate Magistrate was beside himself. Nonetheless, in November of 1863, roughly fifteen months after the return of the Senzaimaru, the shogunate sent the Kenjunmaru to Nagasaki via Hyōgo to prepare for the onward trip to Shanghai. Orders to this effect went out to a number of officials, including the Hakodate Magistrate. Thus, this maiden ocean voyage would go forward, though not to Batavia or even Hong Kong, but back to Shanghai. The total number of passengers came to about fi ft y in all. The following names were the most prominent members of the voyage.4 S u b s e qu e n t M i s s ion s t o C h i n a

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Name

Position

Yamaguchi Sekijirō (Kyochoku)

Head of the delegation, under the Hakodate Magistrate, battleship commissioner

Moriyama Takichirō (Norinao)

Dutch interpreter

Fujita Shuma (Gen’ichi)

Police official, Hakodate Magistracy

Iijima Hanjūrō

Scribe, Hakodate Magistracy

Ōkuma Tetsutarō

Temporarily assigned to the Hakodate Western Studies Academy

Ōtsubo Hankichi

Manager, Hakodate Magistracy

Ishiwata Masakichi (Kōmei)

Scribe, Hakodate Magistracy

Ebiko Suejirō (Sumiyoshi)

Surveyor

Mizuno Bunsai, disciple of Takeda Ayasaburō

Teacher of surveying

Hirai Renji

Teacher of surveying

Ebiko Shihei

Hakodate elder for business affairs

Nishidaya Bunpee

Hakodate merchant

This is a motley crew, at least from a historical perspective, with few of the participants known at all well. Yamaguchi (b. 1836) had studied navigation with the Dutchman Willem Kattendyke (1816–1866) at the Nagasaki Naval Training Institute in the late 1850s and later took up a teaching post there himself, making him a natural candidate to captain the Kenjunmaru.5 He was serving the Hakodate Magistrate when the orders arrived to sail to Shanghai. After the Meiji Restoration, he worked in the telegraph business for many years. The Dutch interpreter Moriyama Takichirō (1820–1871), who also knew and taught English, was extremely well known in his day. He had served as interpreter for Admiral Yevfimii Putyatin in 1853 and Commodore Perry the next year; in 1862 he accompanied the mission to various European states led by Takeuchi Yasunori. Undoubtedly, his close association with foreigners incurred the wrath of roving masterless samurai (rōnin), and he made a special request to join this mission, according to Yamaguchi, because such a band had attacked his home, and he felt the pressing need to disappear for 144

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a while.6 Ishiwata Masakichi’s father, a scholar by training, was a friend of Yamaguchi; both had studied navigation with the Dutch in Nagasaki. The only other person of historical importance aboard ship was Ebiko Suejirō (1843–1912), a Hakodate native who had studied navigation with Takeda Ayasaburō and would go on after the Meiji Restoration to an illustrious career in navigation and surveying.7 The Kenjunmaru carried cargo of ginseng, dried sea cucumber, abalone, and other dried shellfish that they knew to be in short supply in Shanghai, as well as quantities of rice and 2,000 ryō of spending money.8 The crew members were all given uniforms with ranks, making the trip seem that much more official, though the men did not even know their destination at the time of their departure. They arrived in Hyōgo on January 25, 1864, but were unable to proceed on to Nagasaki because of highly unfavorable winds, and they thus remained in Hyōgo until March 16. They were then hit by a storm on March 20 en route to Nagasaki and blown off course—not an auspicious beginning, to say the least, but the captain then decided to proceed directly to Shanghai. The crew was largely from the Shiaku Islands in the Inland Sea near Shikoku; all were unhappy, and all wanted to turn right around and go home. They were even more unhappy when they learned that they were actually going overseas. On March 25 they spotted a three-masted vessel to their south, and they could tell from the color of the water that they were not far from the mouth of the Yangzi River. The next day they anchored in the Zhoushan Islands in the East China Sea and sought a pilot boat to guide them into Shanghai harbor. The area was rife with reefs and hence dangerous to try to navigate without an expert. Because no pilots emerged to help them, the Kenjunmaru set off on its own with an easterly wind and reached the Saddle Islands, where it dropped anchor as the wind died down. At this point, somewhat desperate, they saw a steamship in the distance, and interpreter Moriyama and two others rowed a small craft over to it. It turned out to be a Chinese naval vessel hunting down Taiping remnants. According to the Kōho shi (Chronicle of the Huangpu River), the Chinese captain, Zhang Guoying, invited Moriyama into his cabin where the latter explained: “We are officials of the Japanese (Tōyō Nihon) government. We wish to go to Shanghai. Th is morning we reached East Saddle Island but have not found a pilot boat as yet. Please indicate their position to us.”a, 9 Captain Zhang told them where to go and that they should fly a red and white banner as an indication of their desires. Later that day, a British pilot ship approached and guided the Kenjunmaru S u b s e qu e n t M i s s ion s t o C h i n a

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toward the Yangzi.10 Captain Zhang later came to visit them on May 3 at the Astor House Hotel in Shanghai. On the morning of March 28, the pilot boat took them up the Huangpu River, and along the way they all caught an eyeful of artillery emplacements amid the local scenery. The following day the pilot boat found them an appropriate docking point, and Moriyama and Iijima were immediately taken to the British Consulate where they met with Consul Harry S. Parkes (1828–1885) and his staff, followed by the same at the Dutch consulate where they met Theodorus Kroes, and once again explained their reasons for coming to Shanghai. Four days later on April 2, when the next issue of the NorthChina Herald appeared, it carried a notice in its “Shipping Arrivals” section that on March 28, the “Kand-zun-mall” (Kenjunmaru, listed as a “Jap. bk.” which would mean “Japanese bark”) had arrived from “Yeddo” (Edo) under the command of Captain “Tammaguts” (Yamaguchi). Its cargo is listed simply as “General.”11 In the May 14 issue of the British weekly, the consignee is listed for the first time as “T. Kroes and Co.” and the vessel is said to soon be leaving to return to Nagasaki. The next week, May 21, the newspaper gives a more accurate rendering of the captain’s name as “Yamagoutchi” and notes that the ship will soon depart for Nagasaki carrying a return cargo of “Sun., &c.” (meaning “sundries, etc.,” which upon reflection seems redundant). Unlike the voyage of the Senzaimaru, the passengers aboard the Kenjunmaru were (with a few exceptions already noted) undistinguished in most ways. As a result, aside from the official trip report, Kōho shi, only Captain Yamaguchi ever wrote up a narrative of the voyage, and he waited thirty-seven years before doing so. We thus know far less about virtually everything surrounding the Japanese planning and execution as well as impressions from the time in Shanghai. And, what we do know from Yamaguchi’s short essay is corrupted undoubtedly by virtue of the passage of so much time and its impact on his memory. In addition, there is little evidence that the crew of the Kenjunmaru had any concrete information on the experiences of the Senzaimaru either to learn from or build on. This sort of information, like so much else, was still kept under close scrutiny. That said, one datum that they had either learned earlier or immediately recognized upon arrival in “this forest of masts, allegedly the busiest of China’s five [open] ports,” was that the quickest way to reach any goal in Shanghai was to deal directly with the foreigners there, not the Chinese. They would rely on the British for political matters and the Dutch for things commercial. This marks an interesting change since 1862, as the Dutch played 146

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both roles at that earlier date, while the British played a less important (and exclusively political) role at that time. The Dutch were, as before, only too ready to help the Japanese handle their cargo. They took the same 2.5 percent commission as they had when dealing with the cargo of the Senzaimaru and took care of all the necessary fees to be paid in port. As the Kōho shi noted for the day after their arrival in Shanghai, “the power in this port does not really belong to the circuit intendant, for the British and French always have six huge vessels in port and stores of ammunition and supplies.” b, 12 On March 30, a British official working in the Customs Administration came aboard ship to inspect the cargo and warn against any violation of the rules and regulations of the port. Later that morning, Yamaguchi was joined by Moriyama, Ōkuma, Ōtsubo, Ishiwata, Ebiko Shihei, and Hirai to pay respects at the Dutch and British consulates. Parkes met personally with the Japanese delegation; he had only just returned to Shanghai on March 3 after a two-year leave of absence from China, where he had spent the previous two decades.13 Over the first few days of April, a group comprising the leaders among the Japanese went on to meet with the consular officials from other nations. April 1 they went to the Dutch consulate again to ask for a guide to the city. The next morning they visited the American consulate at which George F. Seward (1840–1910) was serving as consul-general; that afternoon they went with Kroes to the French consulate where the consul would have been PaulDominique Chevrey-Rameau (b. 1836), who would be leaving the post in two weeks. Later that same day they went to the Astor House Hotel where they met the new owner, one J. D. Mahon, who informed them that three days earlier three Japanese had come to Shanghai in search of firearms to buy. They were, according to Mahon, not allowed entrance into port and were summarily sent home. They later met a British merchant who had received a name card from one of the three Japanese: “Kobayashi Rokurō, [from] Geishū [Hiroshima], great Japan”;c a second Japanese was called Nagao Kōsaku, and the third was only identified as someone from Satsuma domain. No details about how these three men made their way to Shanghai—at a time when it was illegal to do so—why they wanted to buy weapons, and what happened to them afterward. Finally, on April 4, almost a week after arriving in Shanghai, Yamaguchi went with Moriyama and Ishiwata to the office of the daotai, probably at the urging of Harry Parkes, to pay their respects and undoubtedly to make sure that they were within the bounds of international legality. Wu Xu, who had met S u b s e qu e n t M i s s ion s t o C h i n a

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with the leadership aboard the Senzaimaru the day after the ship docked in port, had left the post which was now occupied by Ying Baoshi (Minzhai, 1821–1890, a Zhejiang man and a jinshi of 1844).14 They presented Ying with gifts of Japanese tea, pieces of cloth to make an obi, and a Japanese sword, and the daotai’s servants carried these away before any words of thanks had even been expressed. The one-week versus one-day lag time prior to meeting the most important local Chinese official may just be a curiosity or a consequence of that official’s busy schedule; it may also betoken a rising sense of self-confidence on the part of the Japanese, who were slowly beginning to see themselves as a part of international society rather than as mere outsiders cautiously seeking a way in. On the evening of April 29, the daotai sent a messenger to the Japanese with what appears on the surface to have been a strange but nonetheless quite formal request: Did they have a copy of a Japanese work, Kokushi ryaku (A summary of Japanese history)? The only hint about why Ying sought this work was that he noted it would be a good way to learn something about Japanese history. The work in question is a chronicle in five fascicles, written in literary Chinese and thus accessible to Ying, by the Confucian scholar Iwagaki Matsunae (1774–1849). It was first published in 1826, several decades prior to this meeting and covers the full run of Japanese history from the mythological Age of the Gods through to the year 1588, early in the reign of Emperor Goyōzei (r. 1586–1611). A generation later, Huang Zunxian would acquire much of his information of the contours of Japanese history from this work when he prepared his own Ribenguo zhi (Treatises on Japan), the first modern history of Japan by a Chinese.15 The Kenjunmaru had been laden with dried slugs, kelp, and various other creatures of the sea, but no one had bothered to bring along this particular text. Someone had, though, thought to bring a copy of a much more famous and considerably longer history of Japan, also written in literary Chinese: the Nihon gaishi (Unofficial history of Japan) by Rai San’yō (1780–1832), one of the great Kanbun stylists of the entire Edo period. If the daotai’s request was strange, this cargo must be at least as bizarre. Why were they carrying this lengthy work? Ying Baoshi expressed himself to be “very pleased” with the gift and later returned the favor by sending them some figured crepe and special paper.16 Maybe the Japanese hoped this work would circulate in China; indeed reprint editions dated 1877 and 1889 were published in Shanghai,17 but as yet no smoking gun leads to the Kenjunmaru. While enjoying tea at one point during their initial meeting, Ying asked Yamaguchi about his peerage and bureaucratic ranking and those of his 148

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fellow Japanese travelers; he also wanted to see the travel documents issued to them by the Japanese government. Ying had indicated through Parkes that, unless all of this information was crystal clear, he was not prepared to meet with the Japanese. Yamaguchi had responded that the daotai had no right, according to international law, to make such an inquiry, and if there was to be no meeting, so be it. Parkes managed to smooth things over, and indeed a meeting did take place. Yamaguchi insisted that he possessed no aristocratic rank, but that he held a bureaucratic post in his navy. He pointed out that he was wearing a garment presented to him by the shogun with a hollyhock crest, and he drew his sword to show it to the daotai, who was particularly impressed by the sharkskin used on the shaft. One wonders, as it appears many years hence, if the circuit intendant was having a bit of fun at Yamaguchi’s expense. The most difficult of the many questions posed by Ying Baoshi for Yamaguchi and his colleagues—and one that appears to have caught them off guard—concerned, of all things, the name of the Japanese emperor. As Yamaguchi later recounted it, none of them “knew” the emperor’s name. He probably meant that they did not know the emperor’s personal name. Of the various designations that are translated “emperor,” some were largely for internal and some for external consumption only. Silence ensued, and then Ying prompted them by saying: “Here, write it in Japanese characters.” Due undoubtedly to the long period of time between the experiences described in his meeting and the chronicling of those experiences, Yamaguchi’s account is rife with mistakes and characters miswritten. Did Ying mean for them to write the name in Chinese characters, which he knew educated Japanese read and used, or did he mean for the Japanese to write in kana syllabaries? One of the Japanese then came up with the idea of writing the term kinri in katakana syllabaries.18 The term kinri literally means the “forbidden interior” or inner sanctum of the Imperial Court and is a short form of one of the popular and permissible terms then in use for the Japanese emperor: kinrisama. Bullet dodged. Yamaguchi went on to explain to his host the difficulties they had encountered at sea en route to Shanghai. He also explained that the Kenjunmaru was flying two flags: the Hinomaru as a symbol of the Japanese people generally; and the Aoinohata as the insignia indicating that the ship belonged to the shogunate—another indication that Japan was not as yet unified as a modern nation-state. The division in government may have been something about which Ying was curious, even mystified, but Yamaguchi made it as S u b s e qu e n t M i s s ion s t o C h i n a

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clear as possible that the Kenjunmaru was a shogunal vessel. One thing about which Ying surprisingly did not press them was by what authority they appeared in Shanghai with expectations of being allowed to carry on commerce. That had been quite a major issue for the Senzaimaru, and considering the promises made by the officials on that vessel, one might be surprised both by the chutzpah of the Japanese and by the insouciance—at least superficially—of the daotai to this issue. Something must have been going on behind the scenes. As we now know from archival materials, the departure of the Senzaimaru did not end the matter as far as the Qing bureaucracy was concerned. The upper echelons of the officialdom knew they had not seen the last of the Japanese and wanted to plan for the eventuality of their return. On September 1, 1862, several weeks after the Senzaimaru set sail on the voyage home, the Zongli Yamen sent the following brief letter to both Xue Huan and Li Hongzhang: “We have no way to conjecture if there will be any future negative repercussions, if the Zongli Yamen authorizes Japan’s petition to engage in trade at the one port of Shanghai, to set up a one-man consulate, to rent a house, and to look after it. Thus, we instructed the aforementioned Superintendent [for Trade, Xue Huan] to investigate the present situation, take appropriate action based on these circumstances, and at the same time report to the Zongli Yamen on what actions were taken.”d, 19 Xue and Li included in their reply, dated September 26, a report received from Wu Xu on related matters of consequence, the latter having carried out the investigation with which the former two had been tasked: Japanese official Nedachi Sukeshichirō and the others have tried to return home promptly with the money they have; their merchandise did not sell well, and they followed instructions to the effect of not purchasing Chinese produce with their receipts [he was apparently ignorant of Matsudaya’s openly purchasing Chinese items]. Already on 7/10 [August 5] they set sail aboard a Dutch merchant vessel. When they departed, they were unable to wait for a response concerning return visits to engage in trade at Shanghai, as they had earlier requested. If your excellencies’ permission is forthcoming, they would very much like to have a letter to that effect sent to Dutch [Vice-] Consul Kroes informing him. If your excellencies’ permission is not forthcoming, the Dutch [vice-]consul should be informed of that as well. They will dispatch a mission of entreaty once again.e, 20

Two weeks later Wu was instructed to carry out an investigation about possible future negative ramifications of the Japanese requests left with the 150

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Chinese authorities prior to their departure. Ten days after this, on October 21, Xue and Li reported that Wu Xu had informed them with respect to their concerns that the Japanese had followed all the instructions laid before them. In addition: “They used very reverential language, and it was difficult to refuse them.”f Wu was convinced that the Japanese would be returning, and thus: This leads me to believe that the aforementioned country [Japan] wishes in all honesty to engage in trade. If we turn down their request and they do not submit another request, this would be insufficient to express the conciliatory ethos of our country. Insofar as this daotai has reflected on the matter, these [Japanese] officials came and related their request cordially. They only wish to engage in trade and only at the one port of Shanghai—other than that, they claim to have no wishes. They had no cunning ulterior motives. I believe it appropriate to grant them this request.g

But, how? On what basis could the Qing government allow the Japanese to engage in trade? Ordinarily it would have been the responsibility of the Japanese, one would think, to work out this difficulty, but they had found an ally in Wu Xu who appears ready to go to the mat for them: In concrete terms, this means that, on the basis of the example of Western countries without treaties, permit them to engage in commerce and trade at the single port of Shanghai. Duties on all merchandise will be levied by Customs. Customs and taxes will follow the example of the Western nontreaty states. Thus, we need permit them to establish a consulate, rent a house, and see to their own national trading affairs, but this shall not stand as a precedent for the other countries of the East. In addition, we need inform this [vice-]consul [namely, Kroes] that they will supervise their own merchants, prohibit them from arbitrarily traveling to another port to trade, and indicate the restrictions on them. If we do all this, there will be no future deleterious effects. I received your earlier instructions and now offer this report, jointly beseeching that the report go to the Zongli Yamen.h, 21

Xue and Li, despite Wu’s earnest reasoning, were not convinced. When they sent the daotai’s report up the chain of command, they added: “Yet, this minister and governor have met and conferred on this matter, and we find it difficult to believe that there will no deleterious effects whatsoever in future.”i They called for another investigation or a stern rejection of the Japanese request. Instructions from the Zongli Yamen sent to Xue Huan, dated October 26, seemed to buttress his and Li’s concerns, though not without a measure of consideration: S u b s e qu e n t M i s s ion s t o C h i n a

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Insofar as we at this yamen have been able to investigate the Japanese request to engage in trade at Shanghai, they claim that it is limited to the single port of Shanghai. Foreigners, however, are by nature cunning. If we respond to this request, it may lead to arousing their ambitions further and demanding trade at other ports. Furthermore, there are numerous small countries without treaties, and it is possible that they may all follow this example . . . . According to the circular letter from the aforementioned daotai now, it seems there will be no other deleterious effects, and when the aforementioned officials [from Japan] returned home, it seems they left word that, in the event that their request was turned down, another mission would be sent from Japan requesting [trade]. If they cannot achieve the request of their state, they shall come again and tiresomely make the case again. In that eventuality, we shall once again immediately request of the Superintendent [for Trade] that he thoroughly investigate the matter and consider a suitable plan for its resolution. It is more important that we not overdo our assiduousness in relying [on past cases] and be extremely generous.j, 22

On January 8, 1863, Xue and Li wrote the Zongli Yamen and included a report from the new daotai, Huang Fang, who claims to have made his own investigation, although his words replicate those of Wu Xu almost exactly. How much of the foregoing bureaucratic correspondence would have been available to Ying Baoshi is unknown, but it is likely that he would have at least known the contours of the issue prior to assuming office. The Japanese would not have had a clue and would likely have been planning solely on the basis of the kindnesses shown them by Wu Xu. In 1864 when the Kenjunmaru arrived in port, Wu Xu as well as his replacement had moved on, and a new and highly experienced man sat in his place. Ying and his staff must have been hard at work trying to deal with the apparent fait accompli of the Japanese in port. We glean this from a report he submitted to the Zongli Yamen, dated May 9, which contained details: In a letter from Thomas Dick [1837–1877], the new Commissioner of the Customs Administration, dated 2/23 [April 10] of this year, a Japanese commercial vessel laden with freight entered the port of Shanghai. British Consul Harry S. Parkes paid a call at the office, and he said that the Japanese officials wished to come for an audience at the daotai’s office. Insofar as I have been able to investigate the matter, when in the fi fth month of Tongzhi 1 [1862] the Japanese official Numa Heirokurō and others came together with merchants on an experimental trading [mission] to Shanghai, they passed through the customs procedures and paid their import fees through the Dutch. They departed from Shanghai on 7/10. At the time, Numa Heirokurō and the others sought to engage in trade solely at the port of Shanghai, also to have placed

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there a single consular official, and rent a house for him to reside in. Former Circuit Intendant Wu [Xu] reported on this to the Zongli Yamen, and on the basis of his investigation indicating no future deleterious repercussions, he received instructions to deal appropriately with the situation he faced at the time. Thereafter, judging from that which the daotai at the time, Huang [Fang], observed of the cordiality of the Japanese, it seemed they would not be coming forward any time soon with another request.k

Thus far, we are dealing with boilerplate stuff, but then Ying shifts gears and demonstrates his and his staff ’s talents under pressure: If we go back further and examine the “Regulations on Customs” ( Jiang haiguan zeli) promulgated by the Ministry of Revenue in Qianlong 46 [1781], we find mention of merchant ships from Japan exporting goods and paying duties. Furthermore, there are stipulations involving entrance into cities by foreign merchants. From this it would seem that, following these stipulations, Japanese merchants were not prohibited from coming to Shanghai to engage in trade. Japan began trading with China before the West did, and if Japan seeks to establish a consul in Shanghai, we should have proof of this in the form of a document from the Japanese ruler ( junzhu). Whether on the present occasion the Japanese officials and merchants have come to Shanghai primarily to trade or if they have some other objective, I believe that we need to question them directly. Thus, on 3/3 [April 8] the British interpreter W. F. Mayers [1832–1878] was sent by the British consul to accompany five Japanese officials to the office of the daotai. Their names are: Yamaguchi Sekijirō, Moriyama Takichirō, Fujita Shuma, Iijima Hanjūrō, and Ōtsubo Hankichi. They were extremely respectful and behaved with etiquette. As they said: “We have reported to the great Shogun of Japan that, in order that we become accustomed to navigation [lit., winds and waves], we boarded our ship and are sailing to various places. The merchants requested that we bring with us various items—such as seaweed, sea cucumber, Western silk, lacquerware, and the like. Thus, we have come to sell them in Shanghai. Should we be allowed to undergo the customs procedures and pay import duties, we would be ever so thankful. Inasmuch as we have to return home at the end of the month, we shan’t be coming on land to take up residence.” I ordered them immediately to sell their goods promptly and return home with alacrity, and they consented and returned. They had Commissioner of Customs Thomas Dick take care of the customs procedures for their goods with Japanese numbers attached to them.l, 23

Was he covering himself or doing a good deed? Either way, Ying successfully found a precedent on the basis of which Japan could legitimately engage in trade with China at Shanghai. That precedent of a 1781 regulation involving S u b s e qu e n t M i s s ion s t o C h i n a

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Japanese trade seems slightly odd inasmuch as trade in Japan in 1781 was strictly inbound. No Japanese vessels were sailing abroad, least of all into Chinese ports. There simply were no Japanese “merchant ships” at the time because of the interdiction on overseas travel—and even inbound trade was extremely tightly controlled. It is possible that Japanese goods brought aboard other foreign vessels found their way to China, but this is something of a stretch. More likely is it that Japan was fortuitously named in a listing of countries by the Ministry of Revenue in 1781. The Japanese would have to bring official documents from their ruler—this could easily have been behind Ying’s questions about the emperor, the ranks of the Kenjunmaru’s passengers, and the nature of their own travel documents. In any event, the Chinese did all the hard work, and Japan ultimately succeeded in what it sought from the start.24 Why were Consul Parkes and the British consular staff so helpful—or at least so conciliatory—to the Japanese? Parkes was the one who prodded them to meet the daotai and who escorted them to and introduced them at the daotai’s office, playing the very role that Theodorus Kroes played two years previous. It was the British consular staff and Parkes in particular whom a delegation of the Japanese (Moriyama and Iijima) went to see on March 29, the day after docking in port. Thereafter, they visited the Dutch consul who was handling their commercial affairs for them. The very next day, a somewhat larger delegation of Japanese returned to the British consulate, where it was arranged that Parkes and staff would handle their political affairs. The possibility has been suggested that the Kenjunmaru was enjoined with a secret mission to negotiate with British officials in the hope of settling the Namamugi Incident.25 On September 14, 1862, as noted in the Introduction to this volume, the Shanghai merchant and British citizen Charles Richardson was vacationing near the village of Namamugi in Japan to escape the late summer heat of Shanghai when his party was attacked by anti-foreign samurai from Satsuma domain, and he was slain. Satsuma refused to remunerate Britain for damages, leading to the Anglo-Satsuma War the following year. Ultimately, they paid the British 25,000 pounds. If this was a part of the reason for the voyage, then it was indeed kept secret, as no documents have ever come to light to substantiate such a linkage. Although one of the conditions outlined in the Chinese bureaucratic correspondence was the promise by the Japanese not to lodge on land, on the night of April 4 after meeting with the daotai, four members of the embassy (Yamaguchi, Moriyama, Fujita, and Ōtsubo) went with Kroes to the circus 154

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and spent the night at the Astor House Hotel. Two days later on April 6, the hotel proprietor’s son led them through the concession area, and en route they had a taste of what the Senzaimaru passengers had experienced with huge crowds of curious Chinese. The son, a young boy, yelled at the Chinese to make way, and to the amazement, bewilderment, and a certain degree of sadness the Japanese watched as the Chinese quickly obliged. “Ever since fighting with the British and French,” noted the Kōho shi, “foreigners look down on Chinese as if they were slaves. They [the Chinese] walk close to British homes, they are forbidden from speaking in a loud voices . . . . Chinese fear Westerners.”m, 26 By prior arrangement with the British, on April 8 the Japanese again went to visit the daotai at his office. During their meeting, his officials approached him from both sides with a matter of apparent urgency to settle, making a private discussion with the Japanese difficult in the extreme. “He seemed like someone who did not know the proper manner in which to carry on such a conversation,”n according to the Kōho shi.27 The Japanese were not amused. Nothing of substance transpired at this meeting, so far as we know, but it registered at an official level what was becoming a predominant perspective on China held by these Japanese. While impressed by the hustle-bustle of Shanghai and its clear wealth, they found the Chinese people sorely lacking, perhaps (only perhaps) a hint of the direction in which Japanese views of China and the Chinese was heading. Yamaguchi remarked in his own account of many years later that they “smelled badly close up and so I sent them away with a whip” or stick. There was no apparent consistency of practice between Chinese in different places, and the need for bribery was ubiquitous. Their immediate responses, though, led them to some rather illconceived prognostications that should compel us to view those responses with more than a grain of salt. They were convinced, for example, that the Taiping rebels would not be crushed across the nation any time soon—in fact, the rebellion ended later that very year, 1864. In the end, they attributed Shanghai’s extraordinary prosperity not to Chinese activity or industry but to the Western presence protected by British and French troops. Chinese official indolence was such that even customs at the port had to be collected by foreigners.28 Unlike the passengers aboard the Senzaimaru, there were only a small handful of brush exchanges with Chinese during those weeks that the Kenjunmaru was in the port of Shanghai. One student by the name of Ling Gao came to visit Yamaguchi and others at the Astor House Hotel. S u b s e qu e n t M i s s ion s t o C h i n a

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Yamaguchi showed him a copy of Kakka ron (On ineffectuality) by Shionoya Toin (1809–1867), a work written in literary Chinese about the Opium War, which Yamaguchi must have purposefully have brought along on the trip. No friend to China, Toin was an avid collector of information about the Opium War and had written the work as a warning that Japan not fall into the same trap of being unprepared in terms of national defense vis-à-vis the West. Yamaguchi noted that Ling Gao “blushed in embarrassment” as he read it.29 Whatever curiosity these passengers may have had was directed less at China and the Chinese and much more at the Westerners. They visited foreign battleships, troop training events, and Western consulates. But they evinced little interest in the Chinese people, even to the point of expressing a distrust of them. It should probably also be noted that Shanghai weather was much more cooperative in early April 1864 that it had been in the summer of 1862. Its business affairs complete, on May 12 the leadership aboard the Kenjunmaru was prepared to leave port in two days. Ebiko Shihei met with Kroes that day to finalize all their business affairs. The next day, Yamaguchi, Moriyama, and Ōtsubo went to the British and French consulates to thank them for their respective kindnesses while in Shanghai. At 7:00 a.m. on May 14, a pilot boat and tugboat came to fetch the Kenjunmaru, which lifted anchor and headed to the Huangpu River and on to the Yangzi River. Unlike the passengers and crew of the Senzaimaru, no one aboard the Kenjunmaru had become seriously ill or died. Six days later they reached Nagasaki. Yamaguchi, Moriyama, and Ōtsubo paid their respects on May 23 at the British and Dutch consulates in Nagasaki for all the kindnesses shown them in Shanghai. The sailors apparently celebrated their extraordinary joy at having made it home safely by all repairing immediately to the Maruyama pleasure quarters in the city. The ship was back in Shinagawa, via Hyōgo, on August 8. Three years later, the shogunate was overthrown. On the surface, Ying Baoshi seems to have behaved somewhat arrogantly in his interactions with the Japanese, though beneath that surface the waters were churning. They would not know for some time that he had solved their diplomatic-commercial problem for them, and there is no indication in the record that he was thanked for his efforts. For his part, he was left with an altogether acrid taste in his mouth. He was later deeply involved in working out the details of the 1871 treaty with Japan, but he never warmed to his neighbors: “The Japanese are cunning and dishonest. They have never kept a single promise. Recently they have followed the Western model to realize 156

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self-strengthening and in an effort to expand. These base intentions are nothing new.” That said, and especially since the developments hinted at here since the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese “are now changing to wear Western dress, and they are learning Western languages. They have burned old books and are reforming. People all over Japan want to rebel to change the current situation.” Ying may have been confused about actual events in Japan, but his answer was straightforward: The Qing should not let pass the opportunity that this apparent turmoil in Japan presented for an attack upon the island nation, for failing to do so would mean, in Ying’s estimation, that Japan would continue to self-strengthen and ultimately attack China: “Should we be attacked all of a sudden, it will be too late for regrets.” He actually counseled sailing warships to Nagasaki, landing “ten thousand soldiers” there, and proceeding on directly to Tokyo: “The Japanese will be frightened and lose their morale.” He cautioned against killing and looting. His plan was aimed at aiding the former feudal lords to regain their local footholds, revive the “old system,” and stem the tide of the centralization of power.30 Was the voyage of the Kenjunmaru a success? The answer to this question for the Senzaimaru was a qualified yes: diplomatically yes, but commercially no. The 1864 trip, though, requires no qualifications. It was positive on all fronts. It was the first time a thoroughly Japanese crew had sailed over the sea to Shanghai—not a terribly long voyage, in light of the fifteenth- and sixteencentury globe-travelers from the Iberian Peninsula, but not bad as a start for the Japanese who had so long been confined at home. Although news of the trip had been held under wraps, after the ship’s return stories and rumors began to spread from Nagasaki all the way to the Kyoto region, and the leaders of the mission were followed by anti-foreign samurai incensed by their exposure to the polluted and polluting foreigners. After coming on land, Yamaguchi and others went to pay their respects in Ise, but they were surrounded en route by a gang of angry samurai querying them sharply on their reasons for going abroad at all. One samurai from Mito domain, Mikazuki Setsukurō, came to the inn where Yamaguchi was staying. Yamaguchi invited him in, shared a drink with him, and spoke with him at length about the trip, showing him the gifts he was planning to present to the shogunate. Later that night that samurai was said to have been forced to commit ritual suicide by disembowelment, presumably for not having seized the moment to cut Yamaguchi down on the spot. Yamaguchi was advised to quietly repair to another town, as it was too dangerous to remain where he was. He agreed and eventually reached Edo.31 S u b s e qu e n t M i s s ion s t o C h i n a

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While there was pride in having successfully sailed to and from Shanghai, it came at the price of peril, though in the end nothing untoward happened to any of the Kenjunmaru crew. Second, though, the principal aim of the Kenjunmaru had been trade, and in this respect the Nagasaki authorities had learned well from the experience of the Senzaimaru. They learned what items to bring that would appeal to Chinese tastes, and they were blessed with the disappearance from Shanghai and environs of the Taiping rebels. They still had to pay the 2.5 percent commission to Kroes and a minimum 5 percent customs duty on all purchased items. Oddly, konbu, which would prove a huge big seller in years to come, did not sell well in Shanghai in 1864.32 They did arrange with a steamship to transport the konbu that they had brought from home up the Yangzi to Hankou, technically something they should not have been doing, but it did not sell there either. A British vessel had recently brought quantities of konbu from Hakodate to Shanghai, and perhaps there was a glut on the market at the time.33 The other marine produce, dried and fresh, sold extremely well. Third, on the diplomatic front and perhaps a consequence of their persistence or refusal to accept “no” as an answer, the Japanese were fortunate to have the authorities find a treaty loophole through which they would have a footing for continuing to trade without a commercial treaty. Whatever Ying may have thought about the Japanese personally, they owed him a huge favor. And, with this came the provision for a consulate and the other items that were sought at every face-to-face meeting with the daotai’s officials. In this way, Japan became, in the eyes of the Qing empire, a “trading country without a treaty” (wuyue tongshangguo).34

chōshū’s secret mission, 1865 As little known as the voyages of the Senzaimaru and Kenjunmaru remain, the 1865 trip launched by a rebellious Chōshū domain is even less well known. In the late summer of 1864, Shogun Iemochi (1846–1866) ordered his faithful feudal lords to crush Chōshū domain’s daimyo Mōri Takachika (1836–1871), though he called off the attack early the next year. Chōshū had been preparing to strike against the shogunate, its bitter enemy, and to that end had been arming itself to the teeth. In order to purchase more and better guns, the domainal authorities in April 1864 signed an agreement to sell to the American merchant Drake a 449-ton vessel named the Jinjutsumaru (origi158

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nally an armed British steamer, 300 horsepower, the Lancefield, sold in 1862 in Yokohama by the Jardine Matheson Company). Despite Chōshū domain’s ferocious xenophobia, foreigners were hired to teach local samurai what to do with it, but those foreigners were released as soon as a Japanese was found who could teach them navigational technology. Murata Zōroku (Ōmura Masujirō, 1824–1869) sailed on behalf of his domain with a crew of roughly fift y samurai and sailors to Shanghai on March 6, 1865, where they concluded the sale. With the help of a German merchant from Nagasaki, he sold the ship for US$35,000 (a fraction of what the domain had paid for it a few years earlier) and with the money bought rifles. He returned with his armaments to Shimonoseki, arriving April 26, probably aboard the Fei-peng, sailing under the radar of the North-China Herald’s shipping news.35 That Murata made this journey without the shogunate’s apparent intervention is just shy of miraculous, though it would soon learn of the voyage from the Dutch consul-general, Dirk de Graeff van Polsbroek (1833–1916), who reported what he had heard to the commissioner for foreign affairs, Hoshino Kazuyuki. Hoshino proceeded to send three of his underlings— Ishikawa Iwaji, Sugiura Aizō (Yuzuru, 1835–1877), and the Dutch interpreter Nishi Kichijūrō (1835–1891)—to Shanghai to investigate. They were given a small amount of spending money and proper attire, as well as the ship fare and hotel expenses. Ishikawa, who worked in the office of the commissioner for foreign affairs, led the group, and on April 12 the three men left Edo for Yokohama, visited the Dutch consulate, and met the consul there; the next day they boarded the Pekin, a British mail ship, slept aboard overnight, and set sail the next morning for Shanghai. After a mere five-day trip, they arrived on April 19. The following morning they came on land and went straight to the Dutch consulate to pay their respects and explain the nature of the visit. It was their job to apprehend the fift y or more Chōshū men rumored to have come to Shanghai to buy weapons. If those wayward men were still in Shanghai, the shogunal officials had to keep a low profi le, and the Dutch found them a quiet place to lodge. The rumors seemed to check out, but the men were all gone; the daotai’s office notified them that a group of some fi ft y Japanese had indeed been there but had left Shanghai some eight days earlier. One can only wonder how three men would have corralled fi ft y rebels. Vice-Consul Kroes went on April 21 to meet American Consul Seward to see what information he might elicit from that source, but we do not know what was obtained. The three Japanese met with Seward on April 25, explained their mission, and sought help. The Dutch had unearthed the fact S u b s e qu e n t M i s s ion s t o C h i n a

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that the ship in question had been sold to an American. Seward was little help, but he promised that the American minister in Japan would be more helpful, and then he produced a document, a copy of Chōshū’s transfer of power of attorney to Drake. After a series of questions and answers, they learned that this Drake was the captain and owner of a vessel, the Monitor, and by this point the Jinjutsumaru had changed its name and was then sailing to Yokohama. The Americans were being somewhat coy, as they did not want to entangle one of their own citizens in an internal Japanese squabble, but as the Japanese explained, it was illegal for him to have bought a ship privately, and Chōshū had already once rebelled against the government of Japan. That meant that Drake was party to an illegal operation. Inasmuch as Drake and the Chōshū sailors had left Shanghai by this point in time, there was little more the Americans could do, and Seward did not seem to want to go out of his way.36 In the interest of future trade and diplomatic relations, Kroes encouraged the Japanese to meet with the Shanghai daotai the next day. Circuit Intendant Ding Richang (1823–1882) received them and listened to their story, treating them to wine, sweets, and tea. They had a brush conversation with a highlevel official in Shanghai on business from Beijing. And, nothing happened. If the three Japanese acquired any hard data, it has never been published or brought to light. The shogunate did use the argument that Chōshū was arming itself for an impending attack on Edo, the launch of a preemptive assault in what was to be known as the Second Chōshū War. Data from Chōshū was just as unclear. We do not even know the port in Japan from which Murata Zōroku and his crew set sail. His chronological biography has one line: “[Genji 2, second month], ninth day, left for Shanghai to deal with the Jinjutsumaru.”o, 37 The date corresponds to March 6. The rest is educated guesswork, but one thing seems more than clear: Chōshū was engaged in secret trading on a local and transnational scale that Ishikawa and his associates were trying to track down. On May 6, 1865, the North-China Herald noted their return to Yokohama on the Pekin, though it butchered their names: “Isakawa Iwadji, Nini Kidsiusuro, Segura Aiso.”38 They had spent a total of nine days in Shanghai, April 20–29 inclusive. Ishikawa was also, apparently, charged with observing conditions in Shanghai with an eye to future Sino-Japanese trade. Soon after his return, he and his two colleagues submitted his report, entitled “Shina to gojōyaku otorimusubi kata tetsuzuki ukeritamawari tadashi sōrō shimatsu oboegaki” (Notes on the circumstances surrounding corrections of the agreed-upon 160

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procedure for concluding a treaty with China). We learn here that Theodorus Kroes was their main source of information and main intermediary for setting up the meetings with consuls in Shanghai. He had been in the city for five years and had quietly made contacts throughout the business and diplomatic community. The thrust of the report was that the Chinese authorities were loathe to hand out treaties—clearly, the Japanese had yet to learn of Ying Baoshi’s discovery of the 1781 precedent—and often refused countries pursuing one. Even if Japan were to send another embassy, the report went on, it was uncertain if it would be able to secure a treaty. The Japanese apparently had asked Kroes if there was any chance the Nagasaki Magistrate and the Shanghai circuit intendant might conclude some sort of compact, but he explained that the daotai only had authority over one county and that anything he might sign would only be effective while he was in office. This may not have been the most accurate piece of information, but it urged a measure of caution in Japan’s quest for a commercial treaty. The three Japanese concluded, oddly, that while obtaining a treaty to trade in Shanghai was at present not possible, if Japan were to dispatch a battleship to Tianjin, they might be able to secure a treaty comparable to other countries, and then they could send merchant vessels to Shanghai with officials and rent concessionary space. Needless to say, this would require considerable preparation—if it was not utterly ludicrous—and Kroes had in any event strongly suggested Chinese assistance along the way.39

ganges, 1867 The last mission dispatched to Shanghai in the Edo period was neither a shogunal initiative nor sent aboard a Japanese vessel. The Japanese who sailed on the SS Ganges in 1867—a steamship weighing 742 tons, owned by Jardine Matheson of Yokohama, and under the command of Captain Isaac Bernard—were selected by Inoue Masanao (Kawachi no kami), daimyo of Hamamatsu domain, and Hotta Masatomo (Sagami no kami, 1851–1911), daimyo of Sakura domain. Unlike the 1864 mission, the Japanese aboard were not carrying instructions regarding commerce or trade, but were (at least on the surface) interested in scholarship and the arts. It was the first such gesture in the direction of overseas study and observation. No clear reason has been suggested as to why these two daimyo would have spearheaded such a venture, save that the two men were considered “enlightened daimyo” with wider interests in the world. S u b s e qu e n t M i s s ion s t o C h i n a

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The Ganges set sail from Yokohama on February 15, 1867, and took a mere four days to reach Shanghai, indicating both how much more rapidly a steamer made the voyage and what an experienced crew could achieve, despite considerable inclement winds and rough seas (seasickness was rampant the first day at sea). As the North-China Herald (February 23, 1867) put it: “Arrived 19 Feb. per steamer ‘Ganges,’ 9 Japanese.” It left Shanghai to return home on May 4. The nine Japanese and their positions ran as follows: Name

Position

Nagura Inata

Retainer to Hamamatsu daimyo

Ōbayashi Toraji

Retainer to Hamamatsu daimyo

Itō Jinshirō

Attendant to retainers

Abe Yasutarō

Attendant to retainers, Hamamatsu elder

Yagi Saiji

Tahara domain samurai, formerly of Hamamatsu domain

Kushido Gozaemon

Retainer to Sakura daimyo

Watanabe Shōhei

Retainer to Sakura daimyo

Kaburagi Tatsumoto

Retainer to Hotta Sagami no kami

Takahashi Inosuke

Retainer to Hotta Sagami no kami

As noted in Chapter 3, Nagura was one of the best-traveled Japanese of his day, this being his third trip to Shanghai, previously once aboard the Senzaimaru and once en route to France in 1864 with a Japanese delegation under the nominal leadership of Ikeda Chōhatsu (Chikugo no kami, 1837– 1897). Given his experience, he assumed a guiding role for the neophyte Japanese travelers on board. Ōbayashi was also a Hamamatsu samurai about whom little is known. One story has it that, after his return from this trip to Shanghai, he fell afoul of his lord and committed ritual suicide. His son, Ōbayashi Yūya, later worked for the Shizuoka Tea Association and for the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce. Serving as their attendant, Abe Yasutarō was a local notable in Hamamatsu. After returning to Japan, he changed his given name and 162

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became Abe Yasuta. Several years later, after the Meiji Restoration, he left Hamamatsu and worked in the silk and tea businesses in Yokohama. He was one of the few travelers aboard the Ganges to leave an account, which remains solely in manuscript form.40 Kaburagi was a doctor in Dutch-style medicine who already had publications to his credit and was apparently a specialist in English as well. He studied medicine in Edo as well as in his home domain, and after the Restoration he became a military doctor.41 The only other modestly well-known member of the party, save one, was Kushido Gozaemon. He would rise to a significant position within his Sakura domain, but importantly he became the father-in-law of Hatano Shōgorō (1858–1929), a major figure of in Meiji-period finance associated with the Mitsui group. The most famous member of the group—by far—was Takahashi Inosuke, who would subsequently change his name to Takahashi Yuichi (1828–1894) and become the most famous painter in oils of his generation. As a youngster, Takahashi had come to the attention of his lord in Sano domain through his father, Takahashi Genjūrō, a high-ranking local official. The daimyo was sufficiently impressed with his work that he encouraged Takahashi to continue his artistic pursuits and released him from his mundane domainal duties.42 In 1862, Takahashi moved to Edo and began working in the “Art Office” of the Office of Western Books (Yōsho shirabesho, known until four months previous as the Office of Barbarian Books or Bansho shirabesho) under the tutelage of Kawakami Tōgai (1827–1881), one of the pioneering figures of Western-style painting in oils.43 The very day that the Ganges set sail, the Alphée, a French steamship carrying a large Japanese delegation led by Tokugawa Akitake (Minbu, 1854– 1910), the shogun’s younger brother, on their way to the International Exposition in Paris, also departed from Yokohama harbor.44 The two vessels arrived in Shanghai within an hour of one another, and unfortunately for our travelers on the Ganges, there were not enough rooms available at the Astor House Hotel where they had planned to lodge while in Shanghai. They had to move elsewhere to make room for the far more prestigious delegation. Takahashi and the others from the Ganges were fortunate enough, though, to be invited to relocate to the large estate of a local Shanghai businessman and art aficionado, Wang Renbo, a man who seems to have taken an interest in Japan and/or the Japanese. In 1862 he had met and exchanged brush conversations with Nagura and thus renewed their acquaintance on this occasion.45 Wang took a special interest in Takahashi and supported him for the S u b s e qu e n t M i s s ion s t o C h i n a

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figure 12. Drawing of Wang Renbo.

ten weeks he spent in Shanghai and environs. Among the drawings he executed while in Shanghai, Takahashi left one of Wang at work (see figure 12). With help from Wang and the ever-present Kishida Ginkō (1822–1905), who had been in Shanghai since the previous October, continuing work on what would become known to history as the Hepburn dictionary, Wa-Ei gorin shūsei (English title: A Japanese and English Dictionary, 1867), and who was responsible for facilitating the move to Wang’s residence, Takahashi was able to meet a wide variety of Chinese painters, including Zhang Zixiang (Xiong, 1803–1886), and other elite Chinese, attend local Chinese theater, and imbibe as much of the local atmosphere as he could.46 Although he found objects to paint and painters with whom to converse (by brush), the impact of the Shanghai School (Haipai) of painting or any other Chinese artistic trend would be difficult to identify in his work. Among the others on this trip about whom we have any information, there were businessmen, a doctor, a military specialist, and a bureaucrat. Aside from Takahashi, none were ostensibly cultural types, and Takahashi’s purported reason for visiting China—given his predominant interest in Western oils and the opportunity, even if limited, to study in the West—seems dubious at best. As it turns out, Takahashi was traveling on orders from his lord who 164

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“hoped [this trip would] afford [Takahashi] the opportunity to interact with Western-style painters living there”p in Shanghai and, on his travel documents, “to study in his field of learning” (gakka shūgyō), an expression surely as vague then as it sounds now.47 Assuming there was sincerity in these oddly cryptic views, why Shanghai? He had already spent time the previous year studying oil painting with Charles Wirgman (1832–1891) in Yokohama, and Wirgman had an extremely high opinion of his work. It would seem that there had to be another agenda for Takahashi and his colleagues to perform in Shanghai, though it remains shrouded in mysterious language. To add to the confusion, the nine Japanese were all apparently given either passports or travel documents, perhaps in response to the earlier demand placed before the men of the Kenjunmaru by Ying Baoshi. We have Abe’s, and there is frankly nothing cultural, scholarly, or even learned about its holder. In fact it reads in part: “The holder of these papers wishes to travel to Hong Kong to study gunnery. With these documents in hand, it is hoped that to this end he shall encounter no obstacles in any country passed through en route. In the event of a crisis, he should be protected accordingly” (shomen no mono kajutsu shugyō to shite Honkon e aikoshitaki mune ganni yori kono shōsho o atae sōrō tochū no aida izure no kuni ni te mo koshō naku tsūkō seshime kikyū wa sōtō no hogo kore ari). It also lists four conditions incumbent upon its bearer: he is not to go anywhere but to the countries listed on the papers; he is to keep within the timeframe of travel allowed; he may join neither a foreign household nor religion—that is, no marrying foreigners or converting to their faiths; and he is to interact with foreigners honestly and in conformity with the conditions described above.48 It would appear as though Abe, at least, was ultimately headed for Hong Kong, unless this was merely for appearance sake—and what would “gunnery” have to do with pursuing scholarship or the arts? Many years ago, the pioneer in Shanghai-Japan studies, Okita Hajime, pointed out that little related to the stated aim of the trip—study, learning—transpired, and that the real reason they were in Shanghai was to observe the outside world, get to know China and Chinese men of culture, exchange ideas with them and introduce them to Japan, and thus to expand Japan’s heretofore sharply restricted vistas.49 Beyond that, there seems no good reason to extrapolate any more nefarious motive for this mission, such as it was, certainly not with this heterogeneous crew of characters. By this point, more than a few Japanese had traveled by themselves or in small groups to Shanghai and elsewhere at a time when it was still technically S u b s e qu e n t M i s s ion s t o C h i n a

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illegal to do so except in a designated group. Several had shaved their heads and assumed the guise of itinerant Buddhist monks; others had donned fake queues, pretending to be the Chinese servants of Westerners who were often complicit in the ruse. This was all soon to change when a whole new political arrangement and relationship to the outside world took shape after the Meiji Restoration. As noted, Nagura had been to Shanghai before and sought out his acquaintances from those earlier times, Wang Renbo and Wang Xuanfu, to reconnect. While in Shanghai, he also met Yabe Kisaburō, an apparent castaway originally from Aomori who had been living in Shanghai since 1866 and was then working in some capacity for the Heard Augustine insurance company. Little is known of this man, though Wang Tao (1828–1897) met him later in Shanghai and left a brief note about it, and when Wang made his famous trip to Japan in 1879, he asked everyone about Yabe, but no one he met knew of him in his homeland.50 Yabe visited the Japanese who had sailed on the Ganges on several occasions for conversation and friendly walks, and he went with Takahashi when the latter traveled to Nanjing on March 17. Before leaving this mission, we need to see what the Chinese were thinking about this odd gang of nine who showed up at the port of Shanghai with travel documents, albeit rather strange ones. On March 26, 1868, Superintendent for Trade Zeng Guofan, the same man who had earlier built and led an antiTaiping army, submitted a document to the Zongli Yamen in which he mentioned that a report had been received from Ying Baoshi. It began, belying his true feelings about Japan: On 1/24 [February 17], a letter sent from British Consul Charles Alexander Winchester [1820?-1883] arrived. He states that he has been asked by the governor of Nagasaki in Japan to bring it to the daotai’s office. Having opened it, I found one letter in a wooden box, with one side bearing [text in] square characters and the other side in cursive script. The two sides together scarcely conveyed any meaning at all. The text of the square characters was a translation of the text of the cursive. At the head of the text it read: “Nagasaki bugyō Kawazu Izu no kami,”q but it is unclear what sort of position and name these are. The gist of the letter is a request to engage in trade.r, 51

Ying was referring to the Kawazu Sukekuni, the last man to hold this prestigious position in the shogunal government. Ying then rehearsed the now six-year history of Japanese and their ships showing up in the port of Shanghai, and he noted that in 1862 and 1864 the Japanese were instructed 166

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by the circuit intendants to sell their goods and go home. Things, though, had changed: “in addition to engaging in commerce, [Japanese] people come to China now to practice their scholarly skills.”s The term in the original Japanese letter for this last expression, gakujutsu o denshū shitari, clearly points to the reason given for Takahashi Yuichi and his colleagues aboard the Ganges to have visited Shanghai the previous year. Ying added: “this enables the Japanese to stay on for a long time in China. It differs from what we have seen heretofore of them selling their goods and then promptly returning home [in compliance with my instructions].”t, 52 This was far from all the Japanese were requesting. They had upped the ante from earlier negotiations and now were also seeking a special passport seal of some kind for all Japanese visiting Shanghai—merchants, sojourners, scholars—which was to be placed in the daotai’s office. As the Chinese understood it, the Japanese were asking for control over all their nationals when on Chinese soil, whether based on the Western notion of extraterritoriality or an older East Asian precedent. The official Japanese letter to the daotai claimed that the purpose of such a seal would be to act as a “visa” of some sort and thereby distinguish between those Japanese legally pursuing business or scholarship and those other disruptive sorts of Japanese who had illegally made their way to Shanghai, such as the Chōshū samurai who had been plotting to attack the shogunate. The letter does not elaborate upon the latter group, making it difficult to determine if this was a genuine attempt to identify and possibly repatriate Japanese who had used subterfuge to leave Japan and cause trouble or embarrassment abroad (such as prostitutes, arms merchants, rebels against the regime) or merely a ruse to get a Japanese foot in the Chinese door. Zeng Guofan was highly suspicious. For his part, he was willing to permit the Japanese to trade at the port of Shanghai, but he also felt that the Chinese translation of the Japanese letter had not sufficiently clarified just what gakujutsu o denshū shitari meant. To “engage in scholarship” or “perfect one’s scholarship” sounds as vague now as it did then, the sort of fuzzy explanation one might give for a student visa in our own century, so it’s hardly surprising that the Chinese wanted more details. “They need to clarify what sort of scholarship,” noted Zeng, “it is that they wish to pursue.”u The Zongli Yamen supported Zeng’s take on all this completely.53 The ball was now back in Ying Baoshi’s court and he asked for a further clarification, following Zeng’s request, of Japanese intentions: “Concerning scholarly endeavors, as written in your letter, the sort of scholarship in which S u b s e qu e n t M i s s ion s t o C h i n a

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they are engaged remains unclear. Please indicate whether this is something to be learned from Chinese or to be conveyed to Chinese.”v Several months would go by before an answer to Ying’s request for further information was received. The year 1868 was a busy one in Japan. In the fall of that year (October 16, 1868), a letter addressed to the Shanghai Customs Office from Sawa Nobuyoshi (1835–1873) arrived. Sawa was the official in charge of foreign affairs in the new Meiji government, and he attempted to clarify matters to the satisfaction of the Chinese authorities: “You have asked what sort of scholarship they wish to engage. By ‘scholarship’ (gakujutsu) we mean that we should like to learn anything that would be beneficial to our land . . . . In accordance with the imperial will, I should like to establish cordial relations with our neighbor. It is our intention that we show completely good faith, as you indicate. We thus respectfully offer this response from far away over the waves.”w This answer—we want to learn from the experience of the Chinese— seems to have placated Zeng Guofan. He would probably have been aware that Japanese were now traveling to many countries in the world, or at least many Western countries, to acquire foreign languages and gain practical knowledge to help implement the new institutions of the Meiji state. China as a site from which the young Meiji regime would seek to glean such data has not been as well remembered as it has for other countries, but such was the case in 1868 and even somewhat later. Zeng did add to the proviso reiterating his earlier concern: “When you compose a reply, it would be exceedingly wise to add that those who come here ought to study Chinese things. If, however, they try to instruct Chinese people, we should indicate clearly that there will be a need to investigate.”x, 54 In sum, the 1867 trip of this handful of samurai from the two domains of Sakura and Hamamatsu aimed both more and less at its stated objective. Whatever cultural engagement transpired, it would have to have been in the drawings of Takahashi Yuichi and the brush conversations with Chinese literati. They had no well-defined program of study, nor is there any indication that anyone even feigned one, other than in the official correspondence. They went and they saw Shanghai and, to a lesser extent, Nanjing, but they left no report for the shogunate or even for their domains—at least none that has ever been located. Given all the turmoil that the shogunate was experiencing, as it was not far into its last year of existence, why it would send these nine men is somewhat baffling, and assuming it was to enhance Sino-Japanese commercial ties for the good of the nation borders on the ahistorical, as it is far from clear just how many Japanese were thinking on behalf of a “nation,” 168

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although that, too, was soon to change. Also, none of the Japanese made contact with any high-level Chinese officials, something that is particularly odd given all the behind-the-scenes machinations between Chinese and Japanese officials surrounding the motives of the travelers.55 •

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The handful of smaller scale missions and simply voyages of groups of Japanese to China in the last years of the Tokugawa shogunate were considerably less momentous that that of the Senzaimaru. There were few “firsts” that posterity could claim for them, though they were not without important consequences. They opened Japan’s doors much wider to the world of international commerce—in everything from dried fish and coal to weaponry. They also paved the way for cultural exchanges that would increase in number and persons involved over time. In the first years of the Meiji regime, travel by individuals would become legal—it had been practiced furtively in the last years of Tokugawa—and the legitimate cover of group delegations would no longer be necessary to move people over water. It was still expensive to make such a trip and required a certain amount of derring-do. China was not set up for visitors from abroad, especially those who did not know the spoken language. There were foreign-owned residences in big cities such as Shanghai, but that required English (or perhaps French), and few Japanese were as yet trained in that department. More than anything else, though, missions such as that of the Kenjunmaru simply got the Japanese leg further in the Chinese door. At the official level, the leaders of the mission reiterated the list of requests for a presence in Shanghai, for trade, for continued contact—in the face of China’s continued, polite response in the negative. And, it ended several years into the Meiji years with a consulate opening in Shanghai, a small but important foothold in China, and a tiny Japanese presence. A century and a half later, tens of thousands of Japanese live in Shanghai alone, and the two countries are each other’s largest trading partners.

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ten

The Senzaimaru in Fiction and Film

japanese (and chinese) seem to have a far greater appetite for historical fiction than many other cultures. This is meant in no way to underestimate the wealth of historical fiction in the form of books or movies (or their derivatives) anywhere else in the world. As I write, two of the most esteemed movies of the previous year are both “based-on-real-events” movies—Argo and Lincoln— themselves based in part on popular histories. Nonetheless, the Japanese have a seemingly endless fascination with certain periods in their own history, presented from an expansive variety of geographic or personal angles. The story of the Senzaimaru has often been retold in fiction and occasionally on fi lm. Because Takasugi Shinsaku has, in historical hindsight, come to be the most famous of the fi ft y-one travelers aboard that vessel, the Senzaimaru voyage usually is at least in part about Takasugi confronting the degradation suffered by the Chinese and the unparalleled arrogance of the Westerners whom he has already learned to hate (and now comes to detest even more), but whom he suddenly realizes cannot be beaten unless Japan accepts the new Western-dominated rules of the game and adopts Western ways in warfare. When he dies several chapters or scenes later at the tender age of twenty-eight, younger stalwarts from Chōshū domain are ready to pick up where he left off.1 There is nothing intrinsically wrong with such an approach, as long as one remembers that historical fiction is not the same thing as history. Academic history itself is often shown by subsequent research to have been flawed for one reason or another. Indeed, the parricidal model of scholarship—taking aim at the work of someone from one’s own or an earlier generation to establish one’s name—is undoubtedly the most common tactic employed in nonscientific disciplines, at least in the Western world. 170

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Framing the story of the Senzaimaru as a chapter in the evolution of Takasugi Shinsaki’s intellectual and emotional maturation, though, has become the norm. More recently, the scholarly work of Haruna Akira has not denigrated Takasugi’s diary accounts so much as uncovered and analyzed in greater depth than anyone before him the accounts left by other travelers on that ship. The picture becomes much more complex in this light, and complexity, not simplicity, is the centerpiece of good history. The result has been a much richer understanding of what the Japanese were doing while in Shanghai during those weeks in the late spring and summer of 1862. Shiba Ryōtarō (1923–1996), arguably the most prolific historical novelist in twentieth-century Japan, retells the history of Takasugi and the Senzaimaru in his long novel—actually, all of his novels are long—Yo ni sumu hibi (Days of my life in the world). All the proper bases are touched, all the significant names are mentioned, and all the important peripheral events play their roles. It’s a real page-turner, and Shiba certainly did his homework. But, in the early 1970s, when he was doing the necessary research for Yo ni sumu hibi, there was considerably less primary and secondary material available upon which to rely. Over the course of calendar year 1977, the Japanese education television station, NHK, broadcast (as it does each year based on a given historical novel) a series in fifty-two weekly installments of another novel by Shiba, entitled Kashin (God of the blooming flower), a work that had been published five years earlier. The central figure of this novel and of the television drama was Murata Zōroku (see Chapter 9), another Chōshū samurai and Dutch Learning scholar who was responsible for creating a modern domainal military. The screenplay for this drama inserted the entire episode from Yo ni sumu hibi concerning Takasugi Shinsaku and the Senzaimaru into Kashin, the serialized television drama, although this part of the story appears nowhere in the novel Kashin. The whole presentation of Takasugi in Kashin (the TV show) up to the Shanghai trip and during it is not so much inaccurate—save a few fictional characters undoubtedly inserted for dramatic effect—as it is celebratory. Takasugi the (somewhat flawed) hero takes Shanghai by storm, comes home, founds the Kiheitai, transforms Japanese military history, and dies—all on the eve of the Meiji Restoration. Much more interesting cinematically, historically, and historiographically is a movie made during World War II about the voyage of the Senzaimaru. Paul Pickowicz has called Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru (Signal fires over Shanghai) “perhaps the most controversial Chinese movie ever made.”2 And, T h e S e n z a i m a ru i n F ic t ion a n d F i l m

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the controversy continues to this day, in part because the issues are so complex (going far beyond the tale of the Senzaimaru) and in part because the fi lm cannot easily be brushed aside as pulp collaborationist propaganda (given all the important figures involved in its production). Although well known in its day and long presumed lost, a single copy of Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru was discovered in 2001, missing the first of three reels, in an archive of the former Soviet state film industry, Gosfilmofond (lit., “state movie foundation”). The movie’s principal director, Inagaki Hiroshi (1905–1980), was one of the most famous Japanese directors of the twentieth century, and its star was the legendary Bandō Tsumasaburō (1901– 1953, known affectionately as Bantsuma, although born Tamura Denkichi) in the role of Takasugi Shinsaku. Although Inagaki eventually drank himself to death when his career began to founder, at his peak he made numerous films and won many coveted awards for them. He is probably most celebrated for his Samurai Trilogy (1954–1956), the five-hour-and-twenty-two-minute biopic concerning the semi-mythical figure of Miyamoto Musashi (1584– 1645), which starred the great Mifune Toshirō (1920–1997). Bantsuma is best known as an actor in action-packed period pieces, though he had been a seminal figure in the silent period of Japanese cinema, as well as a writer and producer in his own right.3 The two extant reels pick the story up as the Senzaimaru sails into Shanghai harbor. Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru was shot on location in Shanghai in 1944, and the actors, at least the Japanese ones, traveled by bus each day for thirty minutes before arriving at the set, all amid the dangers of war. They were staying at the Japanese-owned Tokiwa Inn, but the Japanese star Bantsuma disliked traditional Japanese inns, and the Japanese cast thus moved to the Metropole Hotel.4 Ultimately, the film appeared late that year in theaters, a time when the city of Shanghai was under Japanese military occupation. The fi lm was intended to be a complete joint venture, with Inagaki—at least in theory—sharing directorial responsibilities with Yue Feng (1909–1999), who was later replaced by Hu Xinling (1914–2000). Yue would go on to become a successful director in the Hong Kong film industry, as did Hu (who was trained in Japan) in Hong Kong and Taiwan. In China, it carried the title Chunjiang yihen (Lingering resentment over Shanghai).5 While the relationship between the Japanese and Chinese titles is unclear (to say the least), what the “signal fires” in the Japanese refers to is equally vague. The fi lm was co-produced by the Japanese Daiei eiga kabushiki gaisha (Dai’ei, for short) and the Chinese Zhonghua dianying gongsi. It opened in 172

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November 1944 in China and on December 28, 1944 in Japan, less than eight months before the war’s cataclysmic end for the Japanese and at a time when it was going badly (to put it mildly). The only extant print thus far found belonged to the Manchurian Film Company (Man’ei), created in the late 1930s under Japanese auspices on the Mainland. When Manchuria was invaded in the last week of the war, August 1945, by the Soviet army, Man’ei offices fell into Soviet hands, and this single copy of the fi lm was sent back to Moscow and placed in the Gosfilmofond archives. In 2001, this archive with 55,000 movies was discovered. Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru was certainly made under wartime conditions—military, physical, and political—and reflected the prevailing ideology of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. In Shanghai cinema, this predilection specifically called for a critique of the overpowering and decadent cultural influence of the United States and Great Britain. Having said that, it was nonetheless a great deal more than simple propaganda. Zhonghua dianying gongsi was actually created in Shanghai in 1939 at the initiative of the Japanese military as a “national policy company” (kokusaku kaisha), and the principal player in it was the chairman of the famed company Tōwa shōji (the forerunner of the present company Tōhō tōwa), Kawakita Nagamasa (1903–1981).6 For his part, Kawakita was no pawn of the imperialist Japanese state. He had been raised in China, educated in Beijing, and spoke Chinese fluently; he was also a longtime advocate of the internationalization of Japanese cinema generally. Additionally, he was drawn to the experiences of the Chinese people at the time—among his film credits are movies made in the 1930s with entirely Chinese casts—and at great risk to his own career, he wanted this new film company to be much more than a marionette of the Japanese army.7 Kawakita saw to it that this fi lm would have genuine Chinese stars, directors who could hold their own on both sides, and a storyline that did not disparage the Chinese, but would somehow also cleave to the party line (see figure 13). Inagaki was able to secure the services of Yahiro Fuji (1904–1986), with whom he had worked over a decade earlier, to write the screenplay. Yahiro later recalled that initially they were planning a film based on the life of Godai Tomoatsu, but in “researching Godai,” who left no account of the voyage to Shanghai, “I realized that I would have to examine the diaries of his fellow passenger to Shanghai, Takasugi Shinsaku . . . . I also had to research the biography of Nakamuda Kuranosuke . . . . In reading Takasugi’s diaries, I discovered that he had inadvertently confronted the Taiping Rebellion.”8 T h e S e n z a i m a ru i n F ic t ion a n d F i l m

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figure 13. Publicity poster for Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru.

The first, lost reel allegedly depicted the route by which Takasugi Shinsaku somehow found his way onto the 1862 mission to China, something still not fully understood. This involves telescoping how he became a fiery anti-foreign activist and how he and fellow disaffected samurai planned (unsuccessfully) to assassinate Nagai Uta (1819–1863), an important figure in the effort to merge the imperial court and the shogunal regime as a stopgap measure to prevent the complete destruction of the Tokugawa shogunate. Takasugi was also active in an effort to burn down the British Legation as a protest, and this involvement led his domainal lord, who clearly favored him, to whisk him out of harm’s way. As we now have it, the movie begins with the Senzaimaru sailing into the harbor in Shanghai, navigating among the hundreds of Chinese and foreign

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vessels in a port thoroughly clogged and bustling to an extent no Japanese living at the time could likely ever have imagined. Takasugi is on deck, as are the shogunal officials, and gunfire is immediately heard in the distance. What the officials assume is a welcoming shot from the harbor, Takasugi explains to his compatriots with a smirk, au contraire, is in fact signs of a war going on. He is asked what “war” and replies that the Taiping Rebellion is battling the Qing dynasty: “You didn’t know that? Oh, really?”a His voice is dripping with sarcasm (if not invective), emphasizing the depth of his animosity for the shogunal officials. The actor (Tsukigata Ryūnosuke, 1902– 1970; see figure 14) playing Godai Tomoatsu is also on deck right next to Takasugi; he is wearing the Western suit of clothes and bowtie taken from the one photo we have of him from this trip; on board the Senzaimaru, he was traveling as a deckhand and would most certainly not have been dressed in a Western suit (or chatting casually with Takasugi and the shogunal officials), but the point of the fi lm here is for viewers to know who this was without excessive introductions. We are barely two minutes into the fi lm, and already there is a problem. Takasugi never in his diary accounts called the Taipings by that name, but always referred to them as the “Long-Haired Bandits” (Chōhatsuzoku), just as they were called in official sources of the time. How Takasugi would know the source of distant and unseen gunfire at just this time is another mystery, but let us allow for a little dramatic license. The fi lm is working overtime from its inception to associate Takasugi—its central figure and a rebel back home in Japan—with the Taiping rebels whom he has high hopes of meeting. We can safely assume that Takasugi had acquired some information— though undoubtedly compromised in one way or another—about the Taipings inasmuch as his own teacher, Yoshida Shōin, had edited and translated from Chinese a recent work on that rebellion, a source as much fiction as fact.9 As noted in an earlier chapter, he would come to learn much more after meeting British missionary William Muirhead and copying out several texts Muirhead lent him. The importance of hair in the Taiping movement is stressed early and dramatically in the film. Soon after they come on shore in Shanghai, Takasugi and two colleagues are taking a stroll in the city with their stunning female Chinese guide when they witness a scene in a crowded marketplace wherein government troops shoot down a man attempting to escape their snare. The man falls to the ground dead, his hat tumbles off his head, and attached to the inside of the hat is a fake queue, the “pigtail” hairstyle required on pain T h e S e n z a i m a ru i n F ic t ion a n d F i l m

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figure 14. Godai Tomoatsu (studio shot).

of death of all Chinese men (save Buddhist monks) by the conquering Manchu dynasty in power. All Taipings cut off their queues as a sign of commitment to the movement in opposition to the dynasty, and they grew their hair long, hence the “treasonous” name (Long-Haired Bandits) imposed on them by the authorities. Yahiro, Inagaki, and their Chinese colleagues were taking a bit of artistic license here—no such incident is reported in any of the travel narratives of the 1862 voyage—but this scene does effectively set the appropriate stage for the central linkage of the film, once again, between the radical samurai and the Taiping rebels. More license taken later will trump this scene in spades. Throughout the fi lm, it is always Takasugi who unambiguously understands that the British and the Americans are the real enemies of all Asians.

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The French are more problematic; French troops fought with the Qing to defeat the Taiping assault on Shanghai, and they do appear fleetingly late in the film, but the Vichy French government in 1944 was, more or less, allied with the Japanese. Late one night, in our fi lm, Takasugi rescues and then befriends a fictional Taiping leader by the name of Shen Yizhou (played by the handsome veteran actor Mei Xi, 1911–1983, who was already by this time a star of Chinese cinema). Shen is serving under none other than Li Xiucheng (played by Yan Jun, 1917–1980), the “Loyal King” of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. Shen has been promised by the British entrance into the city of Shanghai when they plan to attack, and he is simply at a loss to understand Takasugi’s blanket antipathy for all Westerners. When Takasugi asks rhetorically if the British and Americans can be trusted, especially given the humiliating treaties that they compelled the Qing regime to sign following the Opium and Arrow Wars, Shen claims that what is past is past. Can the British and Americans even tell one Asian from another (Taiping or Qing)? asks Takasugi, given how poorly they treat them all. Takasugi then asks him if he is aware of conditions in India in the wake of the British colonization of that once great land, something there is virtually no way Takasugi himself could have known. Indeed, he continues, the foreign concessions carved out of the Shanghai landscape are but the first step in China’s descent into depravity. For China’s present decay and poverty, Shen is fully prepared to blame the alien Manchus, and the Taipings’ announced goal is the overthrow of their Qing dynasty. Takasugi actually takes umbrage at this reply, because, as a Japanese, he is not a mere bystander to this wholesale assault on Asia by the Westerners—the British and Americans, he avers, have designs on Japan, too, something about which we know Takasugi was concerned. Shen remains unmoved by this tack of his oddly persistent interlocutor—after all, the Westerners are Christians just like the Taipings. Takasugi bristles at mention of this linkage and the meeting breaks off. It is a foregone conclusion that Takasugi will be proven right—at least, in the movie. In reality, he did despise the Western presence in Shanghai and warned Chinese he met about it. He also had no truck with Christianity and with the missionaries’ sense of superiority to East Asians. Neither of these proclivities, though, blinded him to Western military superiority, something he sensed before the voyage and was able to see on a number of occasions in real time in Shanghai. He may not have liked what he saw, but he was a realist. And, while he was fascinated by the Taiping phenomenon and tried to meet a real, live Taiping soldier or commander, he never succeeded in doing T h e S e n z a i m a ru i n F ic t ion a n d F i l m

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so—the meeting with Shen Yizhou is purely for dramatic effect, albeit stretching the historical record—and there is no evidence that his wanting to meet a Taiping was related in any way to a perceived sense of sympathy for their view of the world. In the movie, Shen has actually slipped into the city of Shanghai, bearing a letter from Li Xiucheng to the British consulate. There he meets Consul Walter Henry Medhurst (the first Westerner to meet the Senzaimaru; see Chapter 3), who tells him that the Westerners are not going to like the Taipings’ full-fledged assault on opium dens and their thoroughgoing ban on opium in the areas under their control; we actually see extensive scenes of opium dens being invaded and destroyed by Taiping soldiers in Shanghai, though it never happened in Shanghai. Medhurst, playing the role of the sole sympathetic Westerner, opines that such a policy is the only humane approach to the deadly drug, though it will spell the demise of British imperialist interest in China. The actor playing the role of Medhurst (whose name is given in the credits as “Orlov”) appears roughly sixty years of age, perhaps older. There was a senior Medhurst (1796–1857), the 1862 consul’s father who had written extensively on Sinitic topics, including translations of portions of the Bible into Chinese, but he was already dead by the time of this visit, and Medhurst fils, a much less accomplished man than his father, was only forty years old at the time—and he was a strident supporter of British imperialism. “Medhurst” (Orlov) promises to have the British allow the Taiping entrance to the city, but he cannot personally guarantee weapons; for that he introduces Shen to a friend who is an arms dealer and speaks some Chinese in the film (and English with a thick Slavic accent). When the evil British later betray the idealistic Taipings in the vilest of manners, spewing (anachronistic) racialist epithets among themselves for the Chinese and Japanese and literally throwing Shen out of their consulate in Shanghai, then finally, by fi lm’s end, the message could not be clearer. Asians must stand with Asians, for Westerners are never to be trusted and will only stab them in the back to satisfy their own interests. “Untrustworthy creatures!” (meiyou xinyong de dongxi), says Shen, although his face betrays a considerably harsher assessment of the situation. United they can struggle for liberation from imperialism and colonialism; divided against themselves they will never succeed. As the only Westerner drawn with any dimensionality to his character, Medhurst tries in vain to have his fellow British recognize the agreements they have concluded with the Taipings, but the other British only scoff at him, as they have now made an alliance with the Qing government. 178

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He protests that the Taipings are, after all, Christians “just like us,” but again he is met with ridicule, for as one of his British colleagues puts it not so subtly with reference to Shen Yizhou: “I am sorry for him that his skin is not white like ours.” And, when he later meets a (completely fictional) British ship’s captain who has returned to Shanghai after narrowly escaping an attack on foreign vessels in the Straits of Shimonoseki by samurai from Takasugi’s home domain, the captain explains, invoking an anachronism for 1862 but not for 1944, that the Japanese assault (“those rascal Japs”) was just what the British were waiting for: an excuse to “harm the Japs.” The camera fades with Medhurst saying to himself with great sadnesss in his voice: “India, China, and now Japan.” A little heavy-handed, but the message is crystal clear. Another bit of dramatic license—the incident near Shimonoseki in question took place in 1863. The scenes involving Westerners are extremely difficult to take seriously. Every character who is supposed to be Anglophone or Francophone was portrayed by someone whose native language was Slavic, probably Russian, some with accents so thick and intonation so far-fetched that evidently they were doing little more than struggling to pronounce words whose meanings were unknown to them. Names for only three of them are given in the credits: Orlov, Seribanov, and Moskarenko; these men were undoubtedly not professional actors. In 1944 it would have been extremely difficult to find Caucasian faces in Shanghai who were genuinely Anglophone—to say nothing of genuine Englishmen—and willing to take part in such a movie; by the same token, there were certainly plenty of unemployed, impoverished Russophones in the city. The severe discordance to the modern (especially Anglophone) ear would not likely have been a major shortcoming at the time, and in any event there was no alternative, short of dragooning British prisoners of war who would not likely have been willing participants. Few East Asian viewers at the time would have been aware of the issue. Mei Xi, in the role of Shen Yizhou, speaks a much better English than any of his Western interlocutors. Interestingly, though, all of the English-language dialogue in the movie is grammatically flawless, and aside from a handful of anachronisms, idiomatically genuine even by nineteenth-century standards. Thus, somebody who knew English well was involved, even if no faces with “white skin” were available to deliver it in an even remotely authentic manner. One of the most interesting topics for a student of Sino-Japanese cultural ties and, in particular, personal interactions, is how the two people communicated in the absence of a shared spoken language. As we have seen T h e S e n z a i m a ru i n F ic t ion a n d F i l m

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repeatedly in previous chapters, they used the written literary Chinese language as the medium of discourse, carrying on the ancient tradition of the “brush talk” (see Chapter 4). There is only one extended brush talk in the fi lm, one that proves to be of central importance to the storyline—and Chinese characters were never written so clearly as they were on this occasion. Shen Yizhou’s literatus father, Shen Changling (played by Jiang Ming, whose fi lmography appears not to encompass more than this fi lm), observes Takasugi asking a dealer in art curios about inkstones; when he realizes after considerable surprise that Takasugi, though not Chinese, still knows enough to seek out such culturally sophisticated artifacts, he approaches and offers to sell him just what Takasugi is looking for. Incidentally, although there is no evidence of an inkstone transaction involving Takasugi at this time, Hibino Teruhiro recorded a brush conversation in his account of the voyage with an inkstone dealer, which may have inspired Yahiro in this depiction of a Sino-Japanese cultural bond taking shape.10 A friendship between the elder Shen and Takasugi ensues, and they meet again—perhaps by chance, it’s unclear—at Shen’s home. During their “conversation,” Shen describes with ink on paper having witnessed the death of Chen Huacheng, a celebrated figure who died nearby fighting the British assault during the Opium War twenty years earlier. In a consoling tone of voice, Takasugi asks if Chen was killed by a British soldier—an odd question, to be sure, considering that the British were the only enemy. Chen replies that, no, he was in fact killed by an Indian fighting in the British army—maybe not such an odd question, after all, except that we know Chen died in combat against the British, and there is no evidence at all that he fell at the hands of an Indian soldier. Shen writes out the characters for emphasis: “Yindu bing” (an Indian soldier). Shen then sighs at his telling of this story: “One Asian killed another.” b Moments later, Takasugi says to his Japanese friend and fellow passenger Nakamuda Kuranosuke, who is present but silent during the brush conversation: “Ah, Nakamuda, great chat, eh? To find another man who is thinking deeply about a new Asia!”c This is all pure fantasy. The great majority of the Japanese aboard the Senzaimaru were samurai, and that status not only entitled them to wear their long and short swords, but it necessitated it. It was one thing to walk around city and countryside of Japan with two swords attached at one’s waist, but quite another to do so in China. They were a source of intense curiosity among the Chinese in the real Shanghai of 1862. After their exchange about Chen Huacheng (and “Asia for the Asians”), Shen asks to see the swords worn ceaselessly by the Japanese 180

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now visiting him. Takasugi folds the paper on which their brush talk has thus far transpired in half, puts it in his mouth (for some unexplained reason), and then unsheathes his long sword. Shen stares at it and sighs admiringly: “Japanese swords are both weapons and works of art.” This high regard for the craftsmanship of Japanese swords is not simply propaganda, however, with the raised sword representing Japan’s willingness to lead the fight of all Asians against the West—though it is surely that as well. There is a literary tradition going back at least to the eleventh century of Chinese writing odes to Japanese swords that found their way via bilateral trade onto Chinese markets.11 As we have seen before, this was a virtually seamless folding of the past into the present, and if the Japanese can appreciate Chinese inkstones, then maybe the Chinese can appreciate the extraordinary qualities of Japanese swords and all they represent: culture and the military, respectively, wen (J. bun) and wu (J. bu). As interesting, though, as these brush chats may be for scholars, they apparently did not make for great cinema. Inagaki, Yue and/or Hu, and Yahiro thus introduced a female character by the name of Wang Ying (played by the stunningly beautiful actress Li Lihua, b. 1924, who turns all the Japanese heads when she makes her initial entrance) to act as an interpreter. Li Lihua had been trained for Peking opera as a youngster and, unsurprisingly, an opportunity arises in Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru for her to sing a piece from one such opera. After the war she became a star in Hong Kong and Hollywood, and an English-language website covering her acting and music is still maintained (http://lilihua.net/). In the fi lm her character explains that, by virtue of a short stint in the Chinese community of Nagasaki, she has acquired enough Japanese to guide the Japanese visitors as need be and serve as their interpreter. While it is conceivable that such a person may have existed in 1862 Shanghai—though it would much more likely have been a man—no person as such appears in any of the travel writings produced by the passengers aboard the Senzaimaru. More importantly, though, her presence facilitates the principal conversation, discussed immediately above, between the Taiping leader Shen Yizhou and Takasugi Shinsaku, arguably the most poignant scene in the movie. Despite these fictional additions, anachronisms, and twisting of the historical record for cinematic effect, the historical importance of Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru is in no way eviscerated.12 If there is an element of the film that undercuts its value altogether, it would be the purported relationship between Takasugi Shinsaku and the Taipings, standing in respectively for all T h e S e n z a i m a ru i n F ic t ion a n d F i l m

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figure 15. Bandō Tsumasaburō (as Takasugi Shinsaku) and Mei Xi (as Shen Yizhou).

forward-looking Japanese and the future of China. As portrayed in the movie, Takasugi forges a close bond with the Taiping leader Shen Yizhou whom he has warned against trusting Westerners (see figure 15). That such a meeting was fictional is beside the point; that Takasugi in real life had no faith in the “Long-Haired Bandits” is not. At the fi lm’s conclusion, the Taipings, now without the weaponry promised by the British and without a way to enter the city en masse, are in full retreat from the city, and Shen, fleeing as well for his life, stops off at his home to say goodbye to his sister Xiaohong (played by the breathtaking beauty Wang Danfeng, b. 1924). He mentions that he should like to see the Japanese “Gaoshan xiansheng” (Mr. Takasugi) one more time. She somehow relays the message, and Takasugi and his faithful Chinese interpreter-guide Wang Ying make their way to farmlands on the outskirts of Shanghai—even as the Senzaimaru is about to set sail back for Japan—and miraculously they meet the retreating Taiping forces. One interesting note is that the Taiping banners correctly produce the idiosyncratic manner in which they drew the final 182

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character of their name “Taiping tianguo” (Taiping heavenly kingdom). In this cavalcade of improbables, Takasugi somehow finds Shen Yizhou among hundreds of soldiers, and then each delivers a kind of soliloquy in his native tongue—of which the other cannot have understood a word and for which Wang Ying, although present, does not interpret—followed by the other replying (in his native tongue): “I understand. I understand” (C. mingbai le; J. wakaru). The thrust of this exchange is exactly the opposite, as if to say: “I actually don’t understand a single word you have just uttered, but what I now understand to be truly important is that Asians band together against the Western invader.” One further historical problem with any such exchange even being conceivable is that Li Xiucheng and his forces were not in full retreat from Shanghai until several weeks after Takasugi and his fellow travelers set off for Japan in the first week of August.13 It is accurate, however, that promises proffered earlier by French and British officials were reneged upon. The United States played little part in any of this, although it comes in for considerable vitriol in the fi lm, in large part because of the role played by American troops in the sacking of the Summer Palace, but more obviously due to the exigencies of the time in which the fi lm was made than to those of the Taiping Rebellion itself in 1862. As noted, the encounter and exchange between Takasugi and Shen are complete fantasy and beyond the range of dramatic license.14 As we have seen, despite his best efforts, Takasugi met no Taipings; if he had, they would surely have appeared in his narratives of the voyage. Any Taiping officer walking the streets of Shanghai, as Shen Yizhou does in full, bizarre Taiping regalia, would have met the fate of the one fellow wearing a fake queue for cover whom we meet early and briefly in the fi lm—that is, shot to death in the middle of a crowded marketplace. Nonetheless, Takasugi’s own biography and his account of his time in Shanghai fit with a sort of eerie precision into the framework of 1944 East Asian power politics. Anachronisms aside—and there are many more in the fi lm, beyond those mentioned above, such as the Hinomaru flying alone atop the Senzaimaru as the “national” Japanese flag when the ship arrives in and departs from Shanghai harbor15— he warned against any accommodation with Westerners, despised their presence in Shanghai and their haughtiness with respect to the Chinese, and worried more than anything else that such a fate as had befallen China might come to Japan. Although he never used the word “colony”—such a term did not exist per se in the Japanese lexicon of 1862—he did refer to Shanghai as a T h e S e n z a i m a ru i n F ic t ion a n d F i l m

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“dependency of Great Britain” (Dai-Ei zokkoku), and the colonial implications are eminently clear.16 There is thus considerable evidence to dub Takasugi an early antiimperialist icon, and perhaps he would have supported a Japanese-led, panAsian movement, had such a confederation ever come together during his short lifetime. It is, however, a huge leap from there to Takasugi as (figuratively or, in this instance, literally) supporting the Taipings in their quest to overthrow the Qing dynasty and establish a Christian kingdom on the Asian mainland (something he would have in no uncertain terms reviled). In his 1978 memoirs, Japanese director Inagaki recalled the background and storyline of the film: Bantsuma and I made the fi lm Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru, a joint SinoJapanese venture, in Shanghai, and in it Takasugi Shinsaku appears as protagonist. With the Qing defeated in the Opium War and forced to sign humiliating treaties with Great Britain, China had lost its subjectivity. Under these circumstances, revolutionaries known as the “Taipings” rose up with their Christian ideology and attacked the Qing government. Takasugi Shinsaku, Godai Tomoatsu, Nakamuda Kuranosuke, and their associates travel to Shanghai to purchase a Western-style ship, and not indifferent to what appears to be a civil war, they foresee that Japan might also be invaded by men from Great Britain and the United States. This story was not to be a saber-rattling swashbuckler starring Bantsuma, nor was I going to shoulder the burdens of the Pacific War . . . . Bantsuma and I made this fi lm over an eight-month period in Shanghai. When it was first released, both Japan and Shanghai were in the midst of air raids, and people had no time to go watch movies. But, at least for those of us who made it, we were calmly watching the rise and conclusion of the Pacific War, just as Takasugi in the drama was objectively observing the Taiping Rebellion in the Qing period.17

Later in his memoirs, Inagaki explains that he had tried to entice the extraordinarily popular actress Yamaguchi Yoshiko (b. 1920) to star as the female Chinese lead in the movie. Born in Manchuria to Japanese parents, she was all but completely bilingual and already renowned in Japanese and Chinese fi lms, known in the latter as Li Xianglan and assumed by viewers to be Chinese. In fact, after the war she was thought by many to be a Chinese who had made pro-Japanese propaganda movies; had she been, she might have suffered a much more dire fate as a traitor (Hanjian). She was only too happy to take part in Inagaki’s fi lm, but the collaboration never materialized.18 She would go on to make many more fi lms in Japan, Hong Kong, and 184

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the United States (where she was billed as Shirley Yamaguchi), and later still to serve in the Japanese Diet. There are a few, brief moments of comic relief in this otherwise serious movie, and it is a Japanese figure who ends up being the butt of one amusing mishap. One morning Godai Tomoatsu is trying to get two overly helpful and fastidious Chinese bellboys at their Shanghai hotel to make some tea for himself and Nakamuda Kuranosuke (played by Ishiguro Tatsuya, 1911–1965)19— another misstep in the fi lm as Godai did not stay at the hotel while in Shanghai, but traveling incognito as a deckhand, he slept on board the Senzaimaru. He finds himself unable to convey the simplest of words in Chinese: ocha in Japanese, cha in Chinese, but with significantly different intonation. Our hero Takasugi comes downstairs, intrudes on the confusion, and takes over, repeating the word ocha a number of times. When the Chinese starts mimicking the Japanese word, he replies: “Kore da” (That’s it). Then, the Chinese start repeating the words “kore da” until they finally believe they have discovered what these strange visitors want to drink first thing in the morning: gaoliang jiu, a particularly potent alcoholic beverage made from sorghum. Somewhat later, Nakamuda is seen taking a sip of what he assumes is tea and spitting it up all over himself. The two Chinese bellboys were played by Han Lan’gen (1909–1982) and Yin Xiucen (1911–1979), who had become famous as the “Oriental Laurel and Hardy” (respectively) in a number of movies from the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s.20 According to the Japanese playbill, Han’s name in the script was “Yaseppochi Yō” (Skinny Yang), and he was known familiarly as the “Skinny Monkey”; Yin’s was “Futotcho Rin” (Fatty Lin). Whatever one may now think of the cinematic qualities of Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru, participation in this production cannot have stood the Chinese actors and staff in good stead after the conclusion of the war and the founding of the People’s Republic of China. As noted, Chinese director Yue Feng went on to a career for some years in Hong Kong, where he made a number of movies starring several Chinese actors from this 1944 joint venture. His colleague Hu Xinling worked in the Hong Kong and Taiwan fi lm industry. The married couple Li Lihua and Yan Jun both appeared in Yue Feng’s 1952 production entitled Xin Hongloumeng (The new dream of the red chamber); Yan appeared in at least four other movies directed by Yue in the 1949–1950 period alone. Wang Danfeng worked in Hong Kong for several years before returning to China in the early 1950s, and there she was able to enjoy a lengthy career in cinema, although she may have been the exception that proved the rule.21 T h e S e n z a i m a ru i n F ic t ion a n d F i l m

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Mei Xi’s fi lmography is more difficult to ascertain in full, but with a number of lengthy lacunae, he managed to act for most of his career in the People’s Republic. Han Lan’gen also stayed on the mainland after 1949, although he suffered through a number of Communist campaigns and was never able to get his derailed career back on track. Nothing has as yet come to light about the Western actors with Slavic accents as thick as molasses, though it would not at all be surprising if they found work after the war in other professions. Their performances in this production were, from a thespian point of view, utterly execrable—to say nothing of their English. As we have seen in earlier chapters, the voyage of the Senzaimaru to Shanghai in 1862 marked the dawn of modern Sino-Japanese relations in government, commerce, and even culture (though to a lesser extent). It would have marked a historical milestone even if it had not had an impact back in Japan, when Takasugi Shinsaku found the embers of his anti-foreign hostility flaring up again. This led, in part, to the further awakening of radicalism in Chōshū domain in what eventually brought on the collapse of the Tokugawa regime a mere five years after the return of the Senzaimaru to Nagasaki, followed by the rise of a unified Meiji government. The latter part of this story continued to exercise an impact on angry young Japanese over the subsequent decades and ironically provided just the right mix for the state-sponsored fi lm of 1944, Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru. Indeed, Yahiro, Inagaki, and their production colleagues need not have tinkered with the history of the Taiping Rebellion and its links to the Japanese to have told the story they ultimately wished to tell. The truth would have sufficed just fine, though it might not have been quite as good a drama on fi lm. Binding these two seminal events—radical anti-shogunal samurai and the Taiping rebels— gave the fi lm an added punch, as we have seen. Viewing the film now, seventy years after its initial release, one is struck by a certain bizarre quality in its message. Putting aside the absurdities of the Eastern European “actors,” the anachronisms in speech and practice, and the datedness of the acting styles of the Chinese and Japanese performers, the message of the need for Chinese and Japanese to come together to ward off Western encroachment against both in the middle of the nineteenth century retains considerable poignancy. This is in no way to validate Japanese imperialism—that is a given in 1944. Nonetheless, just as Takasugi “spoke” to Inagaki and his collaborators over eighty years after he actually set sail for Shanghai, so he continues to speak to us some seventy more years after the fi lm first appeared. 186

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Conclusion The Senzaimaru in History

this volume has looked at a series of missions sent from Japan to mainland Asia over the course of the 1860s, focusing primarily on the first one, that of the Senzaimaru to Shanghai in 1862. Inasmuch as it is easy to overstate the significance of the Senzaimaru’s voyage, something that has frequently been done, it is important to adopt a less hyperbolic tone when addressing this mission’s nonetheless singular importance historically and diplomatically. So, let us start with what it was not before looking at what it decidedly was. The voyage of the Senzaimaru was not the first meeting in centuries between Chinese and Japanese. There were Japanese shipwreck victims who ended up in Shanghai and other Lower Yangzi cities over the entire course of the Edo and Qing periods. There were Chinese monks of the Huangbo (J. Ōbaku) sect of Chan (J. Zen) Buddhism who provided a flow of head teachers to the Manpuku Temple to the south of Kyoto throughout the Edo period. Chinese merchants sailed to Nagasaki throughout this era in which both countries had putatively cut themselves off, engaged in an immense volume of trade, and there was a small Chinese community present in Nagasaki throughout these years.1 It and the surrounding Japanese community of Nagasaki hosted dozens of Chinese painters and scholars over the decades for relatively short periods of time, usually no more than a year or two, though there were exceptional cases of longer residence; educated estimates list over one hundred such sojourning Chinese painters by the 1860s. In short, we exaggerate if we overplay the actual impact that interdictions on overseas travel and contact between Chinese and Japanese had. In a real sense, it was much harder for Japanese shipwreck victims who ended up in China or elsewhere and who tried to return to their native land and families than it was for Chinese calling at the port of Nagasaki. 187

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What the Senzaimaru voyage did mark, though, is the first embassy officially sent from Japan overseas to China in over three centuries. The shogunal officials on board had a mission to accomplish, one that worked under cover of a commercial venture but was actually much more ambitious. They were to meet with the local Chinese officials in Shanghai, discuss present and future trading arrangements, and even keep an eye out for the possibility of setting up a consular official of their own in Shanghai, a topic they broached during meetings with Chinese bureaucrats. Although the circuit intendant of Shanghai, Wu Xu, treated them with extraordinary generosity, he also made it crystal clear—as we now know from the recently unearthed Chinese documents—that they were to sell their goods promptly and be gone, and they were not to “rashly” venture out into this part of the world in which they had no business being. The Japanese agreed with gratitude, promised to abide by all the rules and regulations placed before them, and then another group showed up less than two years later, making similar requests of the new circuit intendant, Ying Baoshi. Neither Ying nor Wu was an inexperienced country bumpkin. The position of Shanghai daotai was an extremely important one, and one was not lightly appointed to fill it. The daotai was responsible for all the foreigners calling at the port, and all foreigners calling at the port were, at least in principle, at the mercy of the daotai. In 1862, though less so in 1864, there was the additional scare of the Taiping rebels knocking on the gates of the city. But, precisely because they had so much on their respective plates, Wu and Ying had more pressing business to attend to than the unexpected arrival of the Japanese. Both men went out of their way to accommodate the Japanese, but as we have seen, Ying certainly bore no special love for Japan whatsoever. The main purpose of the mission of the Senzaimaru was to observe the Western world in microcosm in Shanghai. In this way, Shanghai was to serve a double role as microcosm both of the West and of China. The shogunal officials and a number of their attendants met British, French, Dutch, Americans, and perhaps other foreigners while docked there; some were diplomatic officials, some merchants, and at least one a missionary. This objective was important and it was met, but perhaps even more important were the meetings between the attendants and the non-official Chinese— dozens of them over the course of the ten weeks in port, many of them reproduced in their travel accounts. There is no better avenue into the world of Sino-Japanese cultural interactions at this time than through these brush conversations. 188

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In addition to learning something about how the Western-dominated world of international relations and commerce worked, the Senzaimaru passengers were the first Japanese to observe, albeit somewhat from afar, the impact of the Taiping Rebellion on life in China’s largest city. While they were never able to actually see any real Taiping troops, they saw and remarked on the immense overcrowding in Shanghai occasioned by Taiping depredations in the entire Lower Yangzi region. They observed Chinese troops in training exercises, and they asked countless questions of their Chinese interlocutors about the Taipings and were extremely anxious to learn as much as possible. This curiosity betokened no sympathy for the Taipings, especially when the Christian element of Taiping ideology became apparent, though there was mixed sympathy at best for the Qing government. Sympathy was reserved for the Chinese people suffering as a result of both the Taipings and the flawed Qing regime. Most of the Japanese were relentlessly critical of the Qing for seeking or accepting Western military assistance to quell the rebels—again, not because of any compassion for the rebels, but out of utter disgust and fear before the motives of the Western powers. The antipathy for the Westerners was not solely because they had imported opium into China, and countless thousands of Chinese across the classes of society had become addicted to the drug. This was more a consequence than a cause of allowing Westerners into Chinese ports in the first place. There was no question that the Westerners were drug dealers and that their governments defended and supported these drug-related operations—a wholly unethical, immoral stance regardless of the fancy language in which it may have been cloaked. Unlike the modern Western response to widespread drug trafficking and use, however, an equal share of the blame in the eyes of the Japanese belonged to the Chinese users; in a word, no one was being forced to smoke opium. Wu Xu’s status in their minds was surely not enhanced when information fi ltered back to them of his opium use. The scene described earlier of the opium-addled Chinese operator of the tugboat that guided the Senzaimaru out of port at the start of the trip home speaks volumes to the revulsion the Japanese associated with opium. No other Japanese legally in China to date had ever seen or reported on opium use and its ill effects. Opium was just the tip of the iceberg, though it was a big tip. It was of a piece with Christianity and Western racist arrogance, and it was all one large impossibly ugly and fearful whole. The Westerners, although respected for their military strength, were uniformly referred to in the narrative accounts C onc lus ion: T h e S e n z a i m a ru i n H i s t or y

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of this voyage as “barbarians.” The repugnance expressed by Japanese appears to be driven by both cultural difference and the haughtiness they observed. Western arrogance runs through the travel accounts of virtually all the Senzaimaru passengers. Outside of a small island near Nagasaki, a Western presence in Japan was still a novelty in 1862. To be sure, missionaries showed up in Japan the first moment unequal treaties allowed them to in 1859, but most of the Japanese in our story had likely never seen one before. They were as relatively new in 1862 Japan, one of the reasons Takasugi Shinsaku had approached Verbeck and Williams in Nagasaki, as they were ubiquitous in China at the same time. One could learn much about the West from them— and about the Taipings in China—but that certainly did not endear the Japanese to the source of this information. Rattlesnakes can also be a source of scientific data. And, the superciliousness of all Westerners toward the Chinese and their blissful ignorance of China’s extraordinary culture deeply angered the Japanese to no end. If there was a stronger word than “barbarian” for them, the Japanese would likely have used it. Despite the fact that the Chinese officials told the Japanese not to rush back to Shanghai, and despite the fact that they did just that, there was no punishment meted out to the crew or passengers of the Kenjunmaru in 1864. When the latter made similar requests, the Zongli Yamen took them all in stride, sending them up the chain of command for instructions. Basically, they got the same response as the officials aboard the Senzaimaru. And, seven years later, Chinese-Japanese relations were placed on a whole new footing with the Treaty of Amity of 1871.2 Japan then had its first formal consulate in Shanghai, still without an embassy in Beijing, but with a signed treaty. In the interim, the same Qing emperor was on the throne, while government in Japan was on a whole new footing with the Tokugawa shogunate now overthrown and a new Meiji government in place. What role did the Senzaimaru and subsequent voyages play in the transformation of the most important bilateral relationship in East Asia? Who were these men aboard that vessel and how representative of the Japan of 1862 were they? Even excluding Tombrink, Captain Richardson, his wife, and his British crew, the Japanese passengers on the Senzaimaru were a motley crew. Excluding the kitchen staff and other non-samurai, they were composed of a handful of shogunal officials, three merchants and other officials associated with the Nagasaki Commercial Hall, and a large number of young samurai attendants whose job description was never explicitly spelled out. Their 190

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responsibilities to, in, and from Shanghai seem nebulous at best. In Shanghai they appear to have been on their own, and many of them used their time absorbing as much of the local scene as they were capable of absorbing. At specified times, they did put in ceremonial appearances, but these were exceedingly few and far between. Not every domain was represented, but some of the most important in late Edo politics were, including Satsuma (with Godai Tomoatsu serving as a deckhand), Chōshū (in the person of Takasugi Shinsaku), Kumamoto, Aizu, Saga (the best represented with four men on board), Owari, and Hamamatsu, among others. Thus, agents from pro- and anti-shogunal partisans in the coming fight at the end of the regime were present on the mission. Why such young men were sent is difficult to say, in the absence of direct testimony, but the voyage may have been viewed as potentially arduous, not something for older men; somewhat older men had been aboard the voyage to the United States two years earlier, but that mission had been more ceremonial in nature, requiring more senior representatives of the regime. (It would not have been appropriate for a gang of twenty-somethings to have shown up in Washington, DC, to sign a treaty with the United States.) More than simply arduous, the 1862 voyage to Shanghai may even have been seen as potentially dangerous, though ships from other nations had been making the trip, and the Japanese were in the experienced hands of Henry Richardson, who had made this very journey many times before—and one considerably shorter than across the Pacific Ocean. In Takasugi Shinsaku’s case, there was the added need for him to be out of harm’s way, to cool off for a time, though none of the other passengers seem to have been in a similar boat, so to speak. There does not appear to have been any coordination among the daimyos concerning necessary skill sets for the attendants to be placed on the passenger list, which means that the individual local authorities must have had common, or at least related, concerns. All apparently were extremely well versed, despite their youth, in the literary Chinese language and culture, the sine qua non requirement for interacting with and learning from Chinese in Shanghai. The shogunate was, needless to say, primarily interested in the observations and recommendations of their own officials and the merchants and officials from Nagasaki. If it was concerned with what these attendants thought about China upon their return to Japan, it hid those concerns well. Those thoughts would have likely played a greater role in local rather than national Japanese politics, unless we credit the returnees with stoking the flames of a more widespread anti-shogunal movement. C onc lus ion: T h e S e n z a i m a ru i n H i s t or y

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The main figure in such movement would again have been Takasugi Shinsaku; soon after returning to Chōshū, he helped form the Kiheitai (irregular militia) that would prove a powerful fighting force. He had learned while in Shanghai that all the anti-Western thinking in the world would not stop the Western imperialists from attempting to get what they wished, and Japan and her domains were poorly served when it came to their ability to resist such encroachments. As he wrote in a Chinese-language poem after returning home, a poem related to one cited toward the end of Chapter 5:a I once went by myself to China, Gunboats leaping over the great Eastern Sea. Having spoken with Chinese, Manchus, British, and Frenchmen, I am now going to abandon my weaknesses and study their strengths.3

Formation of the Kiheitai, as described in Chapter 6, was revolutionary in Japanese military history; the very idea of arming locals other than samurai violated the central premise upon which samurai society was founded, and upon which it relied for its continued preeminence.4 But, if Japan was to strengthen itself sufficiently to withstand assault, radical reform had to begin at the domainal level, and having only a tiny sliver of society—the samurai class—under arms was not going to be nearly enough. There is no specific evidence linking Takasugi’s work in organizing the Kiheitai and his observations upon learning about Zeng Guofan’s organizing tuanlian using “local braves,” but the dots can certainly be connected in pencil. One does not ordinarily associate nineteenth-century Chinese influences with democratizing developments in modern Japan (or anywhere else).5 Indeed, one usually jumps across the Pacific Ocean, or even farther across the Atlantic as well, to find the source of such an impulse in the Meiji period and that era’s creation of new political institutions. But, we are still in the bakumatsu era and have not yet entered the Meiji period, and many of the changes Meiji wrought would have been anathema to samurai in the late Edo years. As hotheaded as Takasugi, Hibino, and Nōtomi, among others aboard the Senzaimaru, may have been in 1862, they were also both young and somewhat realistic. Some, such as Godai, Nagura, and Nakamuda, were not even that hotheaded. In their many walks of life after returning to Nagasaki—military, government, academia, the arts—it is hard to imagine that the time in Shanghai did not register an impact, even if it may seem rather inchoate to us now. Why has Takasugi figured so prominently in the post-1862 retelling of this story? The principal reason would be his important role, outlined above, in 192

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bakumatsu politics and military affairs—namely, his role in bringing the shogunate to its knees. His untimely death in May 1867, though, precluded any role for him in the final demise of the regime or in the new Meiji government. Was it his flamboyant character, or his daredevil style, or his fierce resolution in the face of arrogant Westerners? Certainly, nostalgia for a time when men and women put their lives on the line for a cause greater than themselves must have played a role. I would argue, though, that as seemingly important as these may be as explanations for his modern popularity in fact (and fiction), they all pale beside his historical contribution in founding the Kiheitai, and the source for this points back to the Chinese militias he learned about in 1862. There is as well an utterly obvious but nonetheless utterly significant point in our story of Japanese actually seeing the world at large. The tiny armada that sailed into Uraga Bay with Commodore Perry may have scared a government with no navy or little knowledge of the science of navigation on the high seas, but it was nothing compared to what the passengers aboard the Senzaimaru would have seen upon entering the port of Shanghai. Nagasaki would have seemed like a sleepy backwater compared to the jaw-dropping sight of the many hundreds of vessels in Shanghai harbor. Had the tiniest fraction of the Western vessels themselves in Shanghai decided to make the trip to nearby Nagasaki or Shimoda or Hyōgo, would the Japanese have been in any position to respond? Thus, the experience in Shanghai served as a gigantic wake-up call, and it would likely have had the same impact irrespective of the politics of the individual Japanese present. Connected to the potentially harmful impact should the West seek to open up Japan in the violent way it was maliciously slicing up China, that might mean concession areas, extraterritoriality, Christianity, opium, arrogant Westerners, and the whole evil concatenation of misery presently being visited upon the Chinese. Different Japanese may have come up with different responses to this, but no one in 1862 is likely to have missed the need to do something to avert this dangerous possibility—and quickly. Failure to respond would likely leave Japan vulnerable to a total rupture of its social network. Opium and foreigners and Christianity had a significantly less virulent influence in Japan, and Japan was the first Asian country to have its unequal treaties revised, but it did ultimately mean that the world of Japanese society in 1862 was utterly rent. In this and in the experiences reported to the bakufu by the shogunal officials, the maiden voyage of the Senzaimaru was a major turning point in C onc lus ion: T h e S e n z a i m a ru i n H i s t or y

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modern East Asian history in the area of diplomacy as well. Chinese and Japanese government officials saw each other in the flesh, and although nothing they decided upon came to fruition immediately, just talking got the ball rolling toward bringing an end to not talking for so long. Nine years later, 1871, a completely equal treaty was signed between the two governments, consuls exchanged, and a new age was upon us in East Asia—even if it was a totally different Japanese government that had launched the Senzaimaru in 1862.

Was the world a completely different place in 1871 from what it had been in 1862? Undoubtedly, though not always for the better. The Civil War, which had just begun in the year prior to 1862, was now over in the United States, although President Lincoln had been assassinated. On April 20, President Ulysses S. Grant (1822–1885) signed the Civil Rights Act of 1871, part of a strenuous effort to enforce the reforms of Reconstruction in the American South in the face of attacks on former slaves by the newly formed Ku Klux Klan and other violent racist organizations. Slavery had ended as an institution, but the postwar had only just begun, and the horrors associated with Jim Crow were just around the corner. In France, the Paris Commune was founded on March 26. It lasted just over two months before the military shot the last 147 Communards as it mercilessly crushed the movement in late May. On other fronts, October witnessed the Great Chicago Fire, followed the next month by Stanley finding Livingstone, and on Boxing Day that year Gilbert and Sullivan’s first operetta, Thespis, opened to modest success. Some say that in early May the first major league baseball game was played, but the sports historians’ jury is still out. Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898) created the German empire in March, roughly two weeks after the birth in Poland of Rosa Luxemburg, and she would die a German citizen in Berlin, murdered by the Social Democratic government in the wake of a revolutionary uprising. In late August the young Meiji government delivered yet another hammer blow to the institutional framework of the former feudal regime by abolishing the daimyo system of semi-independent domains and establishing the more centralized prefectural system. Two weeks earlier the man who would become the Guangxu Emperor (d. 1908) in 1875 was born. His name would be associated with some of the most thoroughgoing reforms in Chinese history, many of them based on reforms undertaken in the name of Emperor Meiji.

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chapter 1 a. 西人來ツテ兹ニ利ヲ爭ヒ、霸ヲ試ント欲ス。吾輩同胞、此必爭ノ地ニ 在リ、坐シテ其ノ肉タランロ欲スルカ、將タ進ンデ、共ニ膳上ノ客タラ ント欲スル乎。 b. 伊國與日本國通商二百餘年交誼甚深今次該頭目等䔬帶商人貨物搭 坐伊國商船前來上海不便阻止情願代為報丞進出一俟物銷畢保其不 買中華貨物催其趕緊回國

chapter 2 拍枕海潮來 / 勿再閉貫眼 / 日本橋頭水 / 直接龍動天 陽に交易をと致し…陰ニ彼が動靜等探偵 追而唐國上海香港等 も出船...土地之潤澤...往往莫大之御國益 畫工之由也。未ダ年少也。 ここに數卷の著作がある。これは自分が外遊のたびに心血を注いで、 その行程及び見聞を記錄したもので、唯一の財產だ。今これを君に呈 する。 f. 幕府吏をして支那諸港に互市すと聞く。汝幕吏に隨い、ひそかに支那 諸港に渡り、彼の形勢情實と彼の諸港を御する所以を探索せよ。しょこ うして我が國に歸り報ぜよ。

a. b. c. d. e.

Notes to Chapter 2 a. 此度、御內思召これあり。公儀御役人へ隨從、外國へ差し越され候に 付いては、容易さらざる事柄、辛勞の至りに候え共、外國の事情形勢、

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なお制度器械まで、なる丈け見分の及ぶべく、歸國の上申し出候は、 一廉國家の御裨益に相成るべく候條、何によろず心を留め記憶仕り候 樣、精々心掛け肝要に候。 b. 此度上海渡海互市之根起ハ、必竟長崎商人共…高橋某ニワイ賂ヲ遣 ヒ、商人共私之利ヲ得ントナス也。又江戶來リシ官吏モ、多クハ高橋 黨ニテ、皆俗物故 c. 此船買入之後、千歲丸ト名ク。是長崎奉行高橋美作守ノ名ヅクル所ト 云フ｛聞ク、高橋ハ安藤閣老之黨ニテ、頗ル俗物也ト。其所名ノ船號、 以テ可知其為人俗。｝

chapter 3 a. 此度同船數十人ノ銘々見聞セシコトヲ皆集メテ大成セバ、頗ル益ア ルコトモ多カルベキニ、余ガ微力ノ及ブコトニアラザルハ ズベキコ トナリ b. 予其話ノ意味推察スルニ、外亂ヨリ內亂ノ方可懼キト云心持ナリ c. 華親頓ハ、始メ土民、遂ニ為大統領、後又歸土民、又再ビ為國王 d. 予聞ヲ欲セズ。因去ル e. 予、彼二人日本語ヲ學バン[ト]欲スル、何トモ怪シ。其心中推シ謀ル ニ、耶蘇教ヲ日本ヘ推シ廣メンコトヲ欲ルナラン。要路ノ人實ニ務防有 リ度キコトナリ f. 故ニ世界中以英國為強國 g. 外夷ノ猖獗ヲイキドウリ、畜髮隱逸人ト為リ h. 嗟日本人の因循 且にして、果斷に乏しき、是れ外國人の侮りを招く所以なり。 くべし、 愧づべし i. 火の用心の事、但し煙草用ひ候時は火焚所最寄へ出、飛散らざる樣 用ゆべし、其外にては無用たるべし j. 船中にて紙張提灯を用ゆべからず k. 船室の外夜四つ時燈明を消すべし l. 焚の火は夜五つ半時に消すべし。 m. 船中一日、一人水一升の外與ふべからず。 n. 諸用申立る事有之時は中村良平に可申立事 o. 喧嘩口論は勿論高聲に雜話すべからず p. 部屋內に火を免さず q. 諸用なくして船室に來るを許さず r. 役人の許を受けずして上陸いたすべからず

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s. 必要の品は格別商賣物に紛らはしき品物持越すべからず、但し自用無 據品買候節は役人に申立得差圖調可申事 t. 滯船並に 留中工他出の時は出入とも役人へ屆くべし、私に遊步すべ からず u. 役人の許なくして外國人へ音信すべからず v. 異宗の儀は堅く御制禁に付相勸め候もの有之候とも一切撮申間敷事 w. ソノ法甚ダ嚴ナリ。若有侵法者、則不許上陸 x. 嗚呼萬里ノ別レ、又何ノ時ニ會合スベキ y. 船中の諸子困窮極まれり z. ニ至テ風雨不止。船中動搖、夜寢ラレス。乘組ノ人々多ク浪ニ醉フ aa. 萬里何管海路厄 / 巨艦衝破濤波劇 / 航海不特為壯觀 / 唯期一點國 家策 / 君不知朝衡宏才鳴一時 / 吉備博學青史垂 / 元是千古文治世 / 爾今世變屬艱危 / 壯士此行自有意 / 何厭飢餓䫴股噉 / 腰間秋水 不可誇 / 只存日本勇義膽 bb. 舟中ノ人、荷物ト共ニ轉倒ス。時ニ舟中ノ人浪ニ醉ハサルナシ。 cc. 颶風狂雨、諸子甚だ窮す。船の搖動する每に、行李人と與に轉倒す。 船に醉ふの人猶ほ酒に醉ふがごとく、體を臥すこと殆ど死人の如し。終 日閑默し、敢て談を發する者なし dd. 諸子大いに喜ぶ ee. 一見して舊知の如く、肝膽を吐露し、大いに志を談ず。亦た妙なり ff. 未明ヨリ眼ヲ拭ヒ嶋ノ有無ヲ試ム。巳時西面ニ屹立タル物アリ。雲ニ似 テ又山ニ似タリ。彷彿サダカナラズ。船中ノ人手ヲウチ云フ、コレ嶋ナリ gg. 愕然眼ヲ拭ヘバ。。。一髮ノ煙严ヲ看ル。皆云フ、コレ嶋ナリ hh. 我輩腰間ノ日本刀アリ。滿心ノ勇義ヲ以テコレヲ揮フ。些々タル海賊何 ゾオソレン ii. 上海を去ること四拾余里なり。諸子大いに踴躍し jj. コノ邊水底深ク錨䷝二十四尋。江ノ廣サ十里餘。四面皆舟ナリ、ソノ 數幾百千。コノ江ノ名ヲ問フニ、ウゝソント云フ。。。。南岸砲臺連リ凸 凹ノ形ヲナス。要地ニシテ堅ナルヲ覺ユ。然ルニ砲ヲソナヘズ。船長云 フ、コノ砲臺二十年前ハ大砲ヲ備ヘ且人家モ比麟ス。當時英人上海港 ニ至ラントス。彼防イデ入レズ。故ニ火ヲ放チ人家燒燼、大砲奪却ス。 故ニ今ヤ砲臺ヲ存スルノミト云フ kk. 五月五日。天晴。風順ひ、船馳すること矢のし。忽ちにして吳淞江に至 る。。。。北南にすれば兩岸隔ること三四里計リ、四面は茫々たる草野 にして、更に山を見ず。外國船、唐船皆碇泊し、檣花林の如し。本船も 亦た此に碇泊す ll. 此の地は嘗て支那人と英人との戰爭の地なり。故に人家等しく盡く。 吳淞江の口に至れば、北岸は盡く砲臺なり。。。。此の邊は昔時英人の 奪ふ所と為る、故に人家殆ど盡くと云ふ

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mm. 此人萬國ノ風說ヲ筆記シテ新聞紙ニ載セ萬國ニ發行スルト云 nn. 水路ノ主人 oo. 各國ノ夷船輻輳シ、清國ノ艇舶數知レス。帆檣ノ連立スル恰モ林ノ 如ク pp. 黄浦中來舶スルトコロノ蠻船百餘舟。。。且唐船ノ碇泊スル幾千ト云 フ數ヲ知ラズ。帆檣ノ多キハ萬頃ノ麻ノゴトシ qq. 吳淞江より上海 五里斗之處は唐漁船誠澤山數不相知識界一番之 賑成處と相見へ吳淞へはフランス之コンシル館アメリカコンシユル館 有之尚人家或は城閣之樣成所幽に見へる rr. 右岸ニハ西洋諸國ノ商船 比シ壯觀ヲ極タリ實ニ支那諸港中第一繁 昌ナリ所ト聞シ ss. 同舟諸士ノ內ニ前年米利幹ヘ赴キシモノ兩名アリテ物語ヲ聞クモ米 利幹ワシントン・ニユーヱロク・ニモ遙ニ勝リタル繁昌ナリト云ヘリ tt. 江ハ滿抹皆船ナリ。陸ハ家屋比麟、何ゾ盛ナルヤ uu. 帆檣林立渺無邊 / 終日去來多少船 / 請看街衢人不斷 / 紅塵四合與 雲連 / 憶從曾有大沽患 / 市利網收老狒姦 / 休言上海繁華地 / 多少 蕃船䯀載桓 vv. 午前漸く上海港に到る。此は支那第一の繁津港なり。歐羅波諸邦の 商船、軍艦數千 碇泊す。檣花林森として津口を埋めんと欲す。陸上 は則ち諸邦の商館紛壁千尺殆ど城閣の如し。其の廣大嚴烈なること 筆紙を以て盡すべからざるなり ww. 誠に存外之振

chapter 4 a. 六七歲ノ女兒余輩ニ向ヒオハヨウト云フ b. 上海夷場居留地ノ甚廣袤甚タ大メ屋宇ノ結構宏麗ノ極メ其數幾千百 屋ト云フ c. 城門狹隘ニメ纔ニ肩輿ヲ并ブヘシ門ヲ入ハ街衢ノ縱橫道達セリ但街 間ノ路ハ狹ケレドモ城外ニ比スレハ每戶結構壯麗ナリ。。。店舖モ亦 狹フメ每店口二步或ハ一步半ナルモアリ其繁華雜沓ナルコト本朝江戶 ニ異ナラス d. 吾江戶ニ異ナラサルナリ e. 故ニ上海中、每年炎暑ノ時節ニ至レハ必ス惡病大ニ行レ、人民ノ死ス ルモノ甚タシト多云 f. 上海ハ支那南邊ノ海隅僻地ニシテ、嘗テ英夷ニ奪ハレシ地、津港繁盛 ト雖ドモ皆外國人商船多キ故ナリ。城外城裏モ皆外國人ノ商館多キ ガ故ニ繁盛スルナリ。支那人ノ居所ヲ見ルニ、多クハ貧者ニテ、其不潔

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g. h.

i. j. k. l. m. n. o.

ナルコト難道。或年中船ズマイニテ在リ。唯富メル者外國人ノ商館ニ 役セラレ居ル者也。 上海市坊通路ノ汚穢ナルコト云フベカラズ。就中小衢間逕ノゴトキ、 塵糞堆ク是ヲ踏ムニ處ナシ。人亦コレヲ掃フコトナシ。 此度ノ上海行、最モ艱苦ニ堪ヘザリシハ濁水ナリ。古ヘハ揚子江吳淞 江ナド皆清流ナリシ由ナレド、中比北地ノ黃河淮濟ヲ并セテ南ニ決シ 大江ニ合シタリシカバ、カクノゴトク濁流トナリシ由。ソノ上ニ土人死セ ル犬馬豕羊ノ類、ソノ外總ベテ汚穢ナルモノヲコノ江ニ投ズル故、皆岸 邊ニ漂浮セリ。且又死人ノ浮ベルコト多シ。。。尚コレニ加フルニ數萬 ノ舶船屎尿ノ不潔アリ。井ハ上海街中纔カ五六所アリト云フ。然モソノ 濁レルコト甚ダシ。故ニ皆コノ江水ヲ飲ム。 今萬里外ニアツテ涓埃モ國家ノ用ヲナサズ、空シク病狀ニ死スルハ、 豈遺憾ナラズヤ。 實ニ笑フベク厭フベシ 街市を 徊するに、土人予輩を尾して來る。土人の臭氣人を蒸すこと 猶ほ炎熱人を蒸すがごとし。予も亦た甚だ窮せり。 街坊ヲ 徊ス至ル所看ル人 ノ如シ 此日余レ街坊ヲ 徊スルニ小シク足ヲ留レハ看ル人群聚メ炎氣ニ堪ヘ 難シ 吾輩形粧ノ異ナルヲ以テノ故ニ、認メ看ントメ士女爭テ相集ルコト每ニ ノ如シ 初メテ渡リシ我輩ヲ親シムコト眞ニ舊知ノゴトシ。コレ筆語談論ノ意味 自ラ相通ズル故ナリトモ云フベケレドモ、已ニ着岸ノトキ初メテ上陸セ シニ、見ル者雲集セシ中ニモ童兒輩最モ狎親シミ手ヲ携ルバ從ッテ来 ル。謂フニコレ倭漢ノ人心自然ニ相通ズル故ナルベシ。

Notes to Chapter 4 a. 街市を 徊す。土人は土墻の如く我輩を囲む。其の形異なる故なり。

Chapter 5 a. 上海海關ノコトハ、英人コレヲ司リ、黄浦ニ入舶ノ船稅ヲ取納ムルナ リ。ソノ故ヲ尋ヌルニ、二十年以前コノ地初メテ開港ヲナシ、萬國ノ商 客ヲ集メ貿易ヲ盛ンニセシト雖トモ、洋商等清人ノ柔弱ナルヲ侮リ、ヤ ヽモスレバ制令ニ從ハズ不法ノ行ヒナセシヲ以テ、英人ヲ賴ミ海關ノ稅 ヲ納メシム。然ルニ先年天津ノ戰爭ニテ英軍ニ打負ケ、和約ノ為メ莫 大ノ償金ヲ岀スニ決定ス。コレヨリソノ後ハ上海ノ稅銀ヲモ右償金トシ テ年々英人ニ占取ラルヽ由。

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b. ソノ新館ハ上海港ノ運上所ニテ頗ル廣大ナリ。清吏英人ト雜居ス。ソ ノ人數ヲ問フニ英人四十二人、清吏九十九人、都ベテ百四十一人。清 國政府ヨリ商官ノ者一人來ツテ管理シ、英人モ司長ナルガ頭ニテ管 理ス。ソノ司長ノ給料年ニ洋銀八千。。。何ノ故ニ英人新館ヲツサド ルヤ。夫レ天津ノ戰ニ約定シテ千六百萬兩ノツグノヒ金ヲ四十箇年ニ 五港ノ運上ニテ奪却シ。甚哉、コノ事ヤ。蓋シ上海港ハ清國第一ノ港ニ テ、一日ノ舟運上ノミモ洋銀六百餘ニテ、都ベテノ運上ハ莫大ナリ。然 ルニソノ利ヲ洋夷ニ奪ハル、實ニ慨以テ ズベキカ。 c. 上海刑勢、大英屬國ト謂フテモ好キ譯也 d. 潔曰:今借英佛兵,他日貼石晉之患,其如之何.抑以英佛心情為可倚 信乎. e. 曰:此乃上年危急之秋,不暇虑及,且顧目前之計 f. 借英法之兵.防長毛.何拙謀之甚乎 g. 貴邦堯舜以來堂々正氣之國,而至近世區々西夷之所猖獗則何乎. h. 從是國運凌替,晉之五胡,唐之回訖,宋之遼金夏,千古同慨. i. 國運凌替,君臣之不得其道故也,君臣得其道,何有國運凌替,貴邦近世 之衰微,自為炎而已矣,謂之天命乎 j. 甚是々々 k. 英館を去ること五六間計り、橋あり、新大橋と づく。今を去ること七年前、古橋朽ちて崩るるも、支那人再建すること 能はず、因りて英人此の橋を建れり。支那人は通行する每に壱錢を英 人に貢ぐと云ふ。 l. 余コレヲ聞イテ愕然、怒髮サカノボリ目眥サケ、感慨勃々天ヲ仰イデ ズ。ソノ詩ニ云フ。奪國資基在此樓。滿堂諸士果知否。試憑欄檻看黃 浦。濁浪排天萬里流。蓋シ清國耶蘇ノ禁廢シテ上海ニ耶蘇堂三箇所 アリ。長毛賊ノ起リモ明末ノ者大義ヲ唱ヘテ兵ヲ起スニ非ズ。唯邪教 ヲ以テ愚民ヲ惑 シ、遂ニ大亂ヲ釀シ災十省ニ及ブ。然ルニ何ゾコレヲ 禁ゼザルヤ。タトヘ清國亂ノ極リト雖ドモ、豈一二ノソノ責ニ任ズル者 莫カランヤ。然ルニ 諾コヽニ至ラザル、何ゾヤ。蓋シ外ニハ洋夷ノ猖 獗、內ニハ賊匪ノ 亂アリテ災害並ビ至ル。善者アリトイヘドモ、如何 トモスベカラザルカ。夫レ清國ノコヽニ至ル、豈他アランヤ。地ヲカシ五 港ヲヒラクニアリ。嗟殷鑒トウカラズ。近ク一水ノ外ニアリ。オソルベキ ナリ。 m. 一日城內ヲ 徊シ日暮ニ臨ンデ歸ラントセシニ、城門旣ニ閉ヂテ往來 ヲ ス。佛人等日本人ト見テ、即チ門ヲ開ケテ通ラシム。然ルニ土人等 コレニ乘ジテ通ラントスルニ敢テ許セズ。時ニ官人ノ肩輿ニ乘リテ外ヨ リ來リ、佛人ノ制止ヲ聞カズ往カントセシ故、佛人怒リテ持チタル伺ニ テ連擊シ、遂ニコレヲ退キ回ラシメシ由。嗚呼清國ノ衰弱コヽニ至ル、 ズベキコトニアラズヤ。城門ハ七口トモ、英佛二夷コレヲ分衛シ。。。 n. 或日阿蘭ノコンシユル所用アリテ来リ過グ。渭南コレヲ見テ、愕然トシ テ顔色土ノゴトク戰栗シ立ツテコレヲ拜ス。怪シンデソノ故ヲ問ヘバ、 200

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渠レ過グルトキ吾ヲ睨ム。ソノ意我儕来リテ貴邦ノ人ト談ズルヲ惡ムナ ルベシ。尚久シクセバ、恐ラクハソノ怒リニアハント。頓ニ坐ヲ立ツ テ来リ去ル。施渭南ハ北京ノ學校ニ在テ人ニ名ヲ知るラル、程ノ者 ナル由。然レドモカクノゴトキ異人ヲ恐怖スル國勢ノ情態、 ズルニ堪 ヘタリ。 支那人の外國人の役する所と為るは、憐れむべし。我邦遂に此の如か らざるを得ず務めて是れを防がんことを祈る。 是借夷剿賊、流弊滋多 此の日佛蘭西の兵卒數百人、軍艦より上陸す。予公事ありて、遂に看る ことを得ず、甚だ以て遺憾と為す。 五代來りて談ず。午後、中牟田と英人の預かる所の砲臺に到り、アルミ ストロンク砲を觀る。砲は十二ホントなり。 佛則朴英則驕陸則恭 是意吾等所見ト相符セリ 支那人英佛人ニ賴、長毛賊ヲ防グ。其軍費何國ヨリ岀スカト訪フニ、英 人云、軍費我自岀ス、支那人云、自我贖フ。不分明也。 洋人之兵,為賊所畏.與其以餉養兵,不如餉豢夷 予清人等ニ對シ、中國如何ゾ外夷ノ力ヲ借リテ城壘ヲ守ルヤト難ゼシ ニ、皆默ス。一人暫ク有リテ云フ、コレ前年長毛賊上海ニ寇セシ時、新 撫臺李鴻章ハ未ダ到ラズ、在ルトコロノ兵勇ヒトシク安慶ト云フ七百里 ノ遠キニ在リシ故、止ムコトヲ得ズ英佛ノ兵ヲ借リシト。予又問フ、然ラ バ何ゾ洋人跋扈ノ甚シキヲ制セザル。コレ清朝ノ却テ外夷ニ制セラル ヽトコレニアラズニト。皆答フルコトナシ。 問曰,上海現兵幾人. 慶楳曰,松江提督標下所管三十七營,美營千餘或七八百不等.而上海 額設兩營.其餘撫臺所統勇士一萬餘人 潔曰,吾前問之道臺從者, 則不如此多,而其說不詳.故復問之.今聞一 萬二千餘兵.然則何為借英佛之兵哉. 曰,上年十二月時,新撫臺尚未到上海.所有兵勇均在安慶地方.離此有 七白餘里.是以請借英佛二國助守城地 傳言可惡.我國嚴禁邪教.犯之者當死 上海城ノ浮說ニ、今段東洋人來リシハ吾朝ノ大ヒナル幸ヒナリ。道臺 吳公ト熟計シテ長毛賊ヲ討伐ノ為メ、日本ヨリ援兵トメ大軍海面ヲ掩 テ來ルコト不日ニアルベシナドノ アリ。余レニ向テ援兵何レノ日ニカ 來ルナド問フモノアリ。笑フベシ 孔聖 に到る。 堂二つありて、其の間の空地に草木を種うる。結え ること宏くして頗る備ふ。然れども賊の變以來英人之に居りて、變じて 陣營と為す。 堂中、兵卒銃砲に枕して臥す。之を觀るに實に慨嘆に堪 へざるなり。英人支那のために賊を防ぐ、故に支那は聖孔子像を他處 に遷し、英人をして此に居らしむと云ふ

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ee. ソレ狐ヲ驅ツテ虎ヲヤシナフカ。何ゾ失策ノ甚ダシキヤ。 ff. 貴邦敬孔子否 gg. 我國敬孔夫子勝貴邦 hh. 何故 ii. 昨至城內拜聖 .無聖像而有英人 jj. 我邦の士君子預防あらざるべからざるなり。 kk. 聯邦志略等の書を需めて ll. 古ヘノ鎗砲ヲ用ヒ又弓ヲモ時アリテ之ヲ用ル mm. 朝讀英書、下後官吏盡至佛蘭西館 nn. 讀英書 oo. 至川蒸氣船、看諸器械 pp. 朝與中牟田至亞米利加商館,商人名チヤルス,… チヤルス曰,我掩留橫 濱三四年,少解貴邦語,明後天岀航,又欲至貴邦,甚慕貴邦人,…中牟田 解英語,談話分明,…予謂チヤルス曰,弟近日讀英書,未得與人談,日夜 勉強,他日再 ,欲得與兄能談, チヤルス又曰,弟亦與兄再 日可能欲 解貴邦語矣 qq. 摩ヨリ、五代才介ト申人千歲丸水夫ト為リ、上海エ罷越セシナリ。。 。段々君命ヲ受ケ當地罷越セシ樣子ナリ。。。蒸氣船買入之節之咄ヲ 聞クニ、蒸氣船買入之直段十二萬三千ドル、日本金ニ直シ七萬兩。 rr. 英人其の總管為り。總管、予二人を呼び、如々話あり。英人、日本橫濱 より送り來る新報紙を讀み聞かす。分明ならざれども交易の事に付、 動搖ある由。徒千餘人江戶を退く。大名皆京師え越き、。。。其の大名 の大なる者を四つ舉る。 州、細川、我藩、黑田なり。又英人云はく、 別の新報に江戶にて一大名已に幕府え打掛候由と。O英人云はく、大 名は外國人を長崎、箱館など遣し、敢て大坂などえ近づけぬと云ふな り、大君の方には大坂邊え交易場を開きても宜しと申すと。故に夷人 は皆大君の方を譽むるなり。懼るべし、懼るべし。黄昏歸館す。 ss. 從是學西方字初 / 誓心禁讀和漢書 / 忘了先後畫吾作 / 將致上知與 下知

Chapter 6 a. 英夷 片以來戰爭之事、書為史冊者有否、 b. 無,阿片通中國,始於乾隆、盛於道光,鴻臚寺黃爵滋奏禁此物、英夷遂 滋事、道光二十二年提督陳忠愍公̶化成̶死之後、遂解禁、 c. 貴邦近世之人、欽慕陳化成林則徐等之為人者多否、 d. 二公名望非特本地欽慕、四夷多想望風采、實為吾朝名臣、 e. 弟亦嘗慕其為人

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f. 佩文韻府等於我無要, 陳忠愍公林文忠公兩名將之著書,則我雖千金 要求之矣 g. 片邪教之有害於國家。不鮮少。今也公行。然而往々看飢餓之人。 兄何不獻白而救之。 h. 心有餘而足。為之一 。 i. 清國近年又阿片烟ヲ吃スルモノ甚ダ多ク、官府ヨリモ遂ニ制禁スルコ ト能ハズト云フ。コレ現ニ上海ニ於テモ、吳煦ヲ始メ官吏皆コレヲ吃 ス。故ニ下民ニ嚴禁ヲ施スト雖ドモ、亦コレヲ守ル者ナキナリ。清人云 フ、 片烟ソノ味ヒ甚ダ美ナリ。然レドモソノ害ノ甚シキハ人命ニ及ブ。 然ルヲ人々好ンデコレヲ吃スル者、ソノ故如何トナレバ、心氣遇々不爽 ナルトキ、或ハ事ヲナシ身體 勞レシトキ、コレヲ吃スレバ、精神頓ニ 明發ス。故ニ人々終ニコレヲ廢スルコト能ハザルナリ。然レドモコレヲ 吃スレバ一月ニシテ䛾必ズ生ズ。然ラバ則チ豈コレヲ嚴ノセザルコトヲ 得ンヤ。 j. 未ダ黃浦ヲ發セザル時、中牟田倉之助コレニ問フテ云フ、爾コノ業凡ソ 每月ニ幾度アルヤ。答ヘテ云フ、或ハ兩三度或ハ四五度。又問フ、父 母妻子アリヤ。答ヘテ云フ、ナシ。又問フ、然ラバ爾博奕スルカ、將タ女 色飲酒ニフケルカ。何ノ故ニハ、多ク大金ヲ得テソノ身衣服ダモ完カラ ズ、永ク貧窶ノ體ナルヤ。答フ、我他事ヲ欲セズ、嗜ムトコロハ唯阿片 煙ノミナリ。故ニ得ルトコロノ金多シト雖ドモ、コレガ為ニ不足ナリト云 フ。皆コレヲ聞イテ信ゼズ。 k. 須臾ニシテコノ者我輩ノ居所ニ來リ、美ナル箱ヨリ阿片烟ノ具ヲ シ、 平臥シテコレヲ吃スルコト凡ソ半刻。皆コレヲ奇トシ傍ニ依テ見物ス。 然ルニソノ烟座ニ滿チソノ臭モ亦惡ムベシ。因テコレヲ制止スレドモ更 ニ耳ニ通ゼズ。眸神蕩ケテ眠ルガゴトクナリケレバ、ソノ久シクシテ過 チアランコトヲ恐レ、倉之助大喝シテ刀ニ手ヲカケ怒レル顏色ヲ顯ハシ ケレバ、驚イテアハタヾシクソノ具ヲ收メ岀デサリス。 l. 烟毒需良方、今求取其藥甚難、却有、其藥名則徐丸化成湯. m. 或日二人ノ書生來リ訪フ。余病ンデ床ニアリ。同房ノ友等コレト筆語 ス。談餘書生問ヒテ允フ、貴邦天主耶蘇ノ教ヘ行ナハルヽカ。答フ、古 ヘ嘗テコノ教ヘ渡リ我朝ノ仇ヲナス。故ニ今尚コレヲ禁ズ。生云フ、先 生等未ダ聖書ヲ見ゼルベシ。我等今コレヲ帶シ來ル。則チコレヲ呈セン ト云フ。我友コレヲ取テ披キ見ルニ耶蘇ノ邪教書ナリ。因テ大イニ怒リ ソノ書ヲ拋チ、皆コレト爭論シテ遂ニ戶外ニ推出ス。然ルニ此日又來 ル。入ルコトヲ許サヾレバ、立ツテ戶外ニ在リ。 n. 我友等倍々怒リ大イニ䭃責シ皆岀テ右ノ書生ヲ逐却ス。尚コレヨリ以 前ニモ屢々來リ伱ヲ窺ヒ便ニ就テ勸メ與ヘントセシニ、。。。追歸サレ シニヤ懲リタリケン、コレヨリ後 エテ來ラズ。噫、清國書ヲ讀ム者スラ 旣ニコレヲ尊奉ス。况ヤ愚民等ニ於テヲヤ。 o. 始メ愚民等ヲソノ教ニ入ラシムルニハ、先ヅ多クノ金銀ヲ與ヘタリシ 由。故ニ窮民等ハ宗法ノ善惡ヲ論ゼズ、湖口ノ助ケナレバコレヲ尊ブ モノ多ク、ソノ教遂ニ天下ニ盛ンナリトイフ。又聞ク、洋人上海ニ於テ病 a ppe n di x

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院ヲ造營シ、數多ノ病人ヲ集メ療養ヲ施シアタヘ、藥劑等ニ於ケルモ 上帝ノ命授スルトコロトシ、ソノ病ノ治スルモ亦上帝ノ救助シ玉フト云 ヒ、必ズシモ醫師ノ功トセズ。コレヲ以テ天主ノ有難キヲサトシ、ソノ教 ヲ遵ビクトシ、洋人等ハ素ヨリ醫術ニ精シケレバ、清國ノ庸醫等ガ及バ ザル妙療ヲナス故、愚民ハソノ命ノ助カリ得シヲ悅コブ餘リ、實ニ上帝 ノ救助ナラント思ヒ、自ラコレヲ尊敬スル樣ニナリシモノナルカ。 五月七日、拂曉小銃聲轟于陸上、皆云、是長毛賊與支那人と戰ふ音な るへし、予即ち以為く、此言信なるは、實戰を見ることを得へし、心私 かに悦ふ。 黃昏、和蘭人來りて告げて曰く、長髮賊上海の三里外の地に到る、明朝 必ず砲聲を聽くべしと。官人之を聞きて大いに警むるも、予却て喜ぶ。 七保鎮ト云フ處ニテ賊ノ戰爭アリシヨシ。 未明砲發ノヲト囂スシク聞コユ。 軍需公務 賊匪湖城ヲ陷レ 賊匪上海ニ リ近クニヨリ本地ニテ戒嚴スル 南京ノ長毛賊、上海近郊ニ來リ、。。。仍テ長毛勢 盛ニシテ上海ニ 攻來ルノ注進アリ。故ニ上海ハ英佛各國守兵ヲ舉テ衛防禦ヲ為ス。 聞得タリ。當月初、胡城賊ノ為ニ陷ル。ソノ時城中食ツキ鼠雀ニ至ル マデ磬盡ス。肉一斤大錢一千文ニテナホモトムル所ナシ。兵民餓死ス ル者數萬人。城主趙公計キハマリ力ツキ遂ニ難ニ殉ズ。ソノ後兵民猶 死ヲ決シテ城ヲ守ル。賊匪城中ニツケテ云フ。胡地ニ我ノ敵タルハ趙 公一人ナリ。今趙公死ス。我百姓ヲ敵トスルニ非ズ。爾等何ノ仇アルベ キ。連カニ城門ヲヒラキ降スレバ一人ヲ傷セズト 馬路街ヲ經テ夷場ヲ巡曆ス處々砲臺アリ 夫夷狄奪人之國也、先取其心、或厚利以啗之、或妖教以蠱之、黎民 已懷之於是乎、一舉取其國,易於振枯 奧匪記略ヲ見ルニ長毛賊ノ起ル所以ン。。。詳ニ記セリ此書ハ當時直 ニ 版ニナリタル由ナリ此日舘內ノ唐人張雲余カ為ニ人托。。。取リ來 ラシメ之ヲ余ニ贈レリ 晡後小東門外諸街坊ヲ 徊シ書坊ヲ過キリ金陵癸申摭歌ト云ヘル珎 書ヲ見ル是長毛賊猖獗ノ形勢。。。記セシム書ナリ 李鴻章是何等人。 是 林.在曾相營中者。 所引率鄉民乎。 所帥即是曾相部下之兵。此尚是第二等兵。其第一等兵乃是曾國荃 所統。是曾相之弟。今圍困賊首於金陵. 清國ノ軍陣兵少ナク勇多シト云フ。兵ハ士林以上ヲ云ヒ、勇ハ 民ヲ 舉ゲ用ヒシ者ナリ。

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支那ニテハ郡縣ノ制度ナルヲ以テ兵少ナク勇多シト云兵トハ士林以 上ニ列シタルヲ云勇トハ鄉民ヲ募リテ卒ニナシタルヲ云兵ハ戎衣ヲ着 ケ勇ハ戎衣ヲ着ル㽃ナク只陣羽織樣ノモノヲ着ル李撫軍ノ營ニアル モノ大抵湖南湖北ノ鄉勇ヲ募リタルモノニシテ惣軍ハ一萬六千此ニ 駐剳スルトイフ ii. 近來兵書 述スルモノ無シ。只陳德培、字ハ子茂ト云モノアリ。近世 ノ傑士タリ。此ヲ距ル㽃七百里ノ山中ニ隱ル。其人一兵書ヲ著ス。 之レヲ秘〆不肯出。。。。曾テ借テ讀之、乃チ近代第一兵書ナリト云 ヘリ。 jj. 新文紙ニ、上海ヲ去ル三五里マデ賊匪ノ寄セシコト有リテ、李鴻章 屢人々往イテ征由、又浦東黃浦ノ東ヲ云フ賊起リ、英軍上海ニアルト コロノ清兵ヲ助ケ伐チテコレヲ破リシ由。コレ五月ノ頃ニシテ我等滯 流中ノコトナリ。 kk. 長髮賊ノ起ル始、道光二十九年。賊初將楊秀清、々々々死為天王今 王代。楊秀清死。賊擊賊致自滅。賊信耶蘇者有也。江南元帥、曾氏 英名アル由。賊徒主ヲ英王ト云 ll. 長毛畏英乎。畏法乎。 mm. 英法兵所到之地。賊皆畏。。。賊尤畏之 nn. 賊將為何人。 oo. 忠王英王。 pp. 其為人何如。 qq. 忠王乃笑裡藏刀。英王如項羽一般拙燥。 rr. 賊首設神位。祭天惑䱾。果然乎。 ss. 賊首洪秀全廣西人。其設神祭天。名稱天主。然不過借此以愚民。 非若西人之有天主教也。 tt. 聞得兄頻與賊戰。 uu. 約有四十餘次。 vv. 賊鋒強弱如何。且用何等陣法。 ww. 賊惟䇮良民為兵。並無陣法。。。 xx. 貴邦所用之軍法如何。 yy. 敝邦所用法。亦隨時隨地。各有變通.不能執一。。。 zz. 以一法應萬變之兵。焉有其理。唯應機投變。能得勝也。 hh.

aaa. bbb. ccc. ddd. eee.

然。 兄頃日與賊戰。帥鄉民若干。 帥鄉民七萬。 賊兵約若干。死傷約若干。 賊兵亦有三四萬。死傷百餘人。

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現長毛改名天京。蘇州改名蘇福省。吾從者去年被長毛䇮去。 南京天王。伊曾見過後。䇮出江西杭州等處。直至前月。方得由蘇州 逃來。 ggg. 現長毛窩內做貿易。須得法兵全去方安。故我今日動身。亦待二人 去也。 hhh. 何畏法之甚乎。弟聞之慨 。上海之人尚賊之窩內貿易乎。 iii. 現百姓與長毛亦貿易。。。在上海做貿易不妨。 jjj. 頃日奸商寧波ノ方ニテ軍需器械ヲ以テ賊ト交易シ厚利ヲエシヨシ。 然ルニ西洋ノ兵コレヲサトリ、奸商ノ船一 ヲ奪フ。ソノ中ニ西洋人フ タリアリ。速カニトラヘ船中ヲケミスルニ、洋鎗八十四箱、銅帽子十 一萬五十匣、手鎗、刀劍夥シクアリ。上海ニ來リ英人ノ領事館ニテ 究セシヨシ。コレ亦甚シト謂ツベシ。何故ニ清國ノ官吏イタリ 究セ ザルヤ。嗚呼々々 kkk. 玩松云はく、英(佛)法兵を請ひて長毛賊を防ぐ、近日又我兵卒をして 西洋の兵銃を學ばしむ、因りて賊懼れて近づくこと能はずと。此の言 に由り、支那の兵術は西洋の銃隊の強堅に及ぶこと能はざるを知る べきなり。 lll. 長毛唯貪利乎。將有大望乎。 mmm. 吾國國字中間。均寫或字。惟長毛 寫王字。係自稱為王之故。長 毛之事。吾友謝炳曾做金陵摭談書一本。上面 有。 nnn. 問曰、十八省中賊匪何處最酸烈。 ooo. 銓曰、南京。 ppp. 又問曰、逆匪有可滅之期乎。 qqq. 答曰、此天數也。 rrr. 潔曰、雖曰天數、能治人事、則有 回天運之理矣。且天之所佑在 順而不在逆也。 sss. 禍ノ至リ止ルナキ所以ナリ ttt. 弟自舊冬避長毛賊至此、今春三月家屋已被焚燒、家中書籍金石圖 畫一併而空、慘難言狀、聞之、使人潜然落淚。 uuu. 近年支那國大半邪教ニ披靡シテ周公抔ノ道ハ地チ拂フ計リ城果タ リ憐ムヘキコトナラスヤ近頃上海ヨリ歸リタル男ヨリ聞クニ夷等ノ建 タル病院ニテ治療スル醫師ハ即チ教師ニシテ病者ノ 死篤疾ニ乘 シ彼妖教ヲ懇切ニ勸諭スル由 fff.

Notes to Chapter 6 弟、舊冬より長毛賊を避けて此に至る。今春三月家室已に焚燒せら れ、家中の書籍金石圖畫は一併にして空し。慘たること言狀し難し。之 を聞くに、人をして潜然として落淚せしむ。

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Chapter 7 a. 官吏樓上に登り、從臣は樓下に待つ。予清人三兩名と筆話す。。。官吏 蘭人と應接了る。乃ち清人を以て介者と為し、街市を 徊す。 b. 純白ニテ味尤モ佳ナリ。。。至テ珍菓ノヨシ。 c. コノ時官吏左右ヲ圍ミ、余輩ノ刀ヲ看或ハ衣ヲ撫シ羽織ノ紋ヲ指點シ テ、或ハ疑ヒ或ハ笑フ。一人余ノ前ニ立チ口ニ聲アリ。語ルゴトシ。余筆 トリ暫ラク相語ル。 d. 嗚呼野ナル哉、卑ナル哉。 e. 本年五月初九日有西洋荷蘭國領事哥老司同東洋日本國頭目。。。八 人來道謁見據稱伊等八人皆日本國頭目奉本國上司派令管帶本國商 人十三名䔬有海參魚翅海帶鮑魚各四五千觔及漆器紙扇等物䯙坐荷 蘭國商船前來上海仍憑荷蘭國商人報關丞艙完稅進口意欲試做貿易 求准在滬買賣因係初次一切不諳懇請指示等語 職道當以中國商人歷年雖有由乍浦放洋前赴日本國採買洋銅之例而 日本國商人從無逕來中華貿易之實照章不准進口姑念歷涉重洋而來 不忍拒而不納且係䯙坐荷蘭國商船即憑荷蘭國商人出名報丞仰體天 朝懷柔遠人盛意暫准通融作為荷蘭商人之貨准予趕緊銷售仍不許 轉買中國貨物早日䔬資回國仍坐荷蘭國商船出口下次不可輕至該 頭目等聞知准極忻感唯唯聽命情詞頗為恭順又據荷蘭國領事哥老司 聲稱 伊國與日本國通商二百餘年交誼甚深今次該頭目等䔬帶商人貨物搭 坐伊國商船前來上海不便阻止情願代為報丞進出一俟物銷畢保其不 買中華貨物催其趕緊回國 f. 各等語旋於五月二十五日職道親至該頭目寓所察看情形據該頭目等 稟稱今次帶來各貨因上海有長毛環據不能暢銷准甚虧耗且伊等遠來 異地不服水土商人已病斃三人現侯餘貨銷完立即返棹 g. 體察該頭目等寔有亟欲 回國之意並查今日西洋各國與日本國通商凡 該國所出土產無不搬運來滬販賣貨多價減勢所必至無值上海逆氛四 商買不通銷路阻滯亦係寔在情形是以此次日本國頭目帶同商人來 滬試行貿易未遂所欲此後或可杜其再至除侯該頭目等定期返棹由海 關查丞明確准令出口再行馳報外仰祈察核訓示 h. 遵行等情到本大臣據此查日本國不在通商各國之內向不逕來中國貿 易而荷蘭亦係無約通商之國乃竟帶同日本國頭目商人前來貿易此端 一開恐唘包攬之弊將來各國紛紛效尤何所底止不可不防其漸為此咨 呈謹請查核施行 i. 貴大臣嚴飭蘇松太道嗣後於各國商船進口時務須認真訪察設法妥辦 理毋令各國准蹈日本故轍是為止要 j. 該頭目復來謁見據云抵滬兩月銷貨未及一半現欲料理返棹惟 在滬 通商之無約小國尚多准在於通商各口循照有約各國章程貿易惟不准 進京及擅入長江各內口

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k.

l.

m. n. o. p.

今日日本距中華甚近又有官民銅商頻年止日本辦銅該國內係恪遵妥 辦從無違誤此時情願仿照西洋無約各小國之式不敢請立和約祈求准 該國商船專來上海一口貿易并設一領事館賃屋而居照料本國船商完 稅等事此即格外恩典等語由 該關道開具有約無約通商各國清 轉稟請示前來又經本大臣以無約 各國上海從前如何准其通商批飭查明原案刻日抄錄稟候會該核辦理 去後慈據該關道稟尊查無約各小國從前如何准其通商 緣於咸豐三年分上海縣城被匪踞蹈職道衙門案卷全行淪失無從查考 惟檢查道光二十三年五口通商章程案內有英國善後條約第八款內載 向來各外國商人止准在廣州一港口貿易上年在江南曾經一明如蒙大 皇帝恩准西洋各國商人一體赴福州廈門甯波上海四港口貿易英國毫 無靳惜 本大臣署撫查核所稟與刊本相符今該日本國頭目據請仿照無約各國 止在上海一口貿易並設領事官賃屋照料等情其應如何辦理之處本大 臣署撫未敢擅便相應咨呈謹請查核裁奪示覆以憑飭遵施行 明季之末有日本國匪徒糾䱾至粵閩江浙等省沿海騷擾明為倭寇雖事 遠年湮既往不咎而父老相傳不無舊忿未消 職道以所辨乃無之辭何可據信 稱次載之伊國志乘惜未䔬帶將來乃無據志書簽送 自割又自炙 / 飽吃松江鰻 / 膏密齒間滑 / 香濃鼻頭酸 / 張 嗜鱸鱠 / 何不試之 / 若使知此味 / 轉向江南嘆

Chapter 8 a. 蒸氣舟走り來る千歲丸之右手に結付川筋所々曲處有之を引登る。。。 上海異館之前に碇を入候事。此賃錢洋銀二百枚日本銀八貫目に 當るなり

Chapter 9 a. 我は東洋日本政府の士官なり、上海に到らんと欲し、今曉東鞍島邊に 到り、水導船を尋るに未見、願くは我に示すに其所在を以てせよ b. 此港內の權、實は道台にあらずして英佛常に港中に大船六 を泊し、 或は兵器或は兵糧を貯と云 c. 大日本藝州小林六郎 d. 本衙門查日本國懇請專在上海一口貿易並設一領事官賃屋照料各情 其中有無流弊本衙門無從懸揣相應咨行該大臣相度時勢察看情形妥 為辦理並將如何辦理之處迅即詳細咨覆本衙門查核可也

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e. 日本國頭目根立助七郎等因各貨不能暢銷遵飭不敢轉買中國貨物亟 於䔬資回國巳於七月初十日仍搭荷蘭商船出口回國臨行嘱為轉稟以 前請此後來滬通商一事不及等候如蒙各憲准行務請諭知荷蘭國領事 哥老司專函知會設奉駮飭亦由荷蘭領事通知以便伊國另添公使前來 䳅求等情到 f. 其詞極為卑順似亦不便拒 g. 該國企慕通商意甚誠伨若必拒而不納司不足宣布聖朝懷柔之得意職 道細加察核頭目等殷殷陳乞其意但求通商且又專在上海一口別無溪 冀亦無伶詐別惜似應俯如所請 h. 援照西洋無約諸國之例准令在上海一口通商貿易所有進出貨稅統由 新關丞收其報丞完稅等事亦照西洋無約各國之例一律遵辦並准設一 領事賃屋而居管理該國通商事務其餘東洋各國 不得援以為例仍飭 該國領事申明約束不准該國商人擅赴別口貿易以示限制其中似無別 項流弊飭前因合再遵飭議詳仰祈會同咨呈總理各國事務衙門核覆遵 行等情到 i. 本大臣署撫會同籌酌若謂此後毫無流弊寔未敢遽信 j. 本衙門查日本國請在上海通商一節雖據呈稱專在上海一口但外國人 性情伶詐誠恐如其所請又或起得隴望蜀之念更思覬覦他口且無約各 小國甚多又恐紛紛效。。。玆據覆稱據該道查明似無別項流弊且稱該 頭目返櫂曾有後言如或議佀難保該國不另派公使前來䳅來等情查該 國所求不遂再來饒舌亦屬意中之事應再咨行貴大臣就近體察情形以 如何辦法為妥即行會商妥辦不必過事拘泥亦不可過存低大是為至要 k. 本年二月二十三日接新關稅司狄妥瑪來函有日本國商船一隻載貨進 口並准英領事官巴夏禮巴夏禮靣稱日本國官員欲來道拜謁等語卑府 當查同志元年五月間有日本國官沼間平六郎等帶同商人來滬試做買 賣由荷蘭國報關驗艙完稅進口於七月初十日出口當時沼間平六郎等 欲專在上海一口貿易並設一領事官賃屋居住經吳前道稟咨明總理衙 門覈覆其事有無流弊即體察情形妥辦等因又經正任黃道詳明就其殷 殷企慕似不至遽起得隴望蜀之心請准 l. 溯查乾隆四十六年戶部頒發江海關則例刊載東洋商船進口貨稅並有 洋商人市之條似東洋商船來滬貿易例所不禁其與中國通商當在西洋 之前若該國欲在上海設立領事賃屋居住自應以彼國主文書為憑此次 日本官商來滬是否專為貿易抑另有別情必須當靣詢誥旋於三月初三 日經英領事遣繙譯官梅輝立帶同日本國官五員來道相見一名山口錫 次郎一名森山多吉郎一名藤田主馬一名飯島半十郎一名大坪伴吉執 禮極恭據稱由日本國稟明大將軍乘坐板船游歷各處以習風濤因有商 人求帶貨物數種係海菜參洋綢緞漆器諸類來滬求售如准報關投稅感 激非淺三月杪必須起䰀回國並不上岸居住等語卑府令赶售貨物迅速 回國不可久留上海伊等唯唯而去除知會稅務司妥瑪准其以日本編號 m. 支那英佛トノ戰爭以後、外國ノ支那ニ スルヤ、奴隸ノ如ク 視シ、英人ノ居宅最寄通行ノ節ハ高聲ヲ禁ジ、。 。。支那人ノ西人ヲ懼ル如此 a ppe n di x

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s. t. u. v. w.

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雜談禮ヲ知ラザル者ニ似タリ [元治二年]九日先生、壬戌丸處分の為めに上海に赴く 該地居留ノ洋画伯ニ交ハリ得ルトコロアランコトヲ望ミ 長崎奉行河津伊豆守 正月二十四日由英領事溫思達函送文書一匣稱係日本國長崎總督託 帶來道職道啟閲木匣內 文書 一紙一係楷書一係草字文義均不甚 通順其楷字即係繙譯草書之文首行所具長崎奉行河津伊豆守字樣亦 不知其究竟是何官職姓名查核書中大意意在求請通商書 其來中國之人於經營商業之外添敘傳習學術 其意似欲准與該國之人久住中國不 如昔年之銷售貨物完畢即行 回國 其請傳係學術必應查明是何學術所云 今來 所云傳習學術不知所傳係何項學術是否欲就中國人傳習抑欲 傳與中國人習學請即詳悉見示以憑稟明 承問所傳習何項學術云云益其所謂學術者凡有益於我國家之事不論 何項皆欲使之學焉者也。。。欽承皇室之德意將欲以修善鄰之好其所 言推心置腹盡心盡誠者固所願也層濤漫漫肅很以報 來受中國之教似屬可行將來答復時仍宜申明如來人專習中國學術決 不吝惜如有傳授於中國者尚須查酌至查

Chapter 10 a. 御存知なかったですか？ああそうですか。 b. 同室亞細亞的人卻打死亞細亞的人 c. ア、中牟田君、いい話だな、ここにもう一人新アジアを暮れる人が当た った。

Conclusion a. 単身嘗到支那邦 / 火艦飛走大東洋 / 交語漢韃与英仏 / 欲捨我短学 彼長

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introduction 1. Yu Xingmin’s Shanghai, 1862 nian fi lls 473 pages and has only one short paragraph on the arrival of the Senzaimaru; apparently much else was going on in that city in that year. 2. Eric Naiman, “Their Mutual Friend: On the Trail of the Woman Who Introduced Dickens to Dostoevsky,” Times Literary Supplement 5741 (April 12, 2013): 16–21. An extraordinary piece of literary detective work! 3. Mary C. Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T’ung-chih Restoration, 1862–1874. 4. See Ernest Satow, A Diplomat in Japan. 5. Ōba Osamu, Books and Boats: Sino-Japanese Relations in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries; Ronald P. Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu; Marius B. Jansen, China in the Tokugawa World; Joshua A. Fogel, Articulating the Sinosphere: Sino-Japanese Relations in Space and Time. A few years later, the famed Chinese official Li Hongzhang (1823–1901), while serving as governor-general of Zhili, wrote the following in the context of Sino-Japanese trade normalization: “We have traded frequently [with Japan] from the Shunzhi era [1644–1661] to the Jia[qing, 1796–1820] and Dao[guang, 1820–1850] eras. The official merchant ships from Zhejiang and Jiangsu traveled to Japan every year to trade several million catties worth of copper.” See Chouban yiwu shimo, “Tongzhi chao,” 79:47. Two decades earlier the Chinese merchant Chen Jiren described the scene of commercial trading between Chinese and Japanese in Nagasaki (1851–1852) in his Fengli chuan riji beicha. 6. I offer some thoughts on this issue in my “Introduction: The Teleology of the Nation-State,” in The Teleology of the Modern Nation-State: Japan and China, ed. Joshua A. Fogel, pp. 3–5. 7. Okita Hajime, Henri Jeimusu kenkyū, shu to shite gikō ni tsuite; Okita Hajime, Nihon ni okeru Henrii Jeimuzu shoshi; Okita Hajime, trans., Yondo no deai, shorō.

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8. For more on the Japanese Residents Association, which took over responsibility for all matters concerning the education of Japanese schoolchildren in Shanghai, see my “ ‘Shanghai-Japan’: The Japanese Residents’ Association of Shanghai,” Journal of Asian Studies 59.4 (November 2000): 927–50. The most complete primary source to date on this subject would be the immense Shanhai kyoryū mindan sanjūgo shūnen kinen shi. More recently: Kojima Masaru, “Shanhai no Nihonjin gakkō no seikaku,” in Shanhai no Nihonjin shakai, senzen no bunka, shūkyō, kyōiku, ed. Kojima Masaru and Ma Honglin, pp. 135–38. 9. Chen Zuen, Xunfang Dongyangren, jindai Shanghai de Riben juliumin (1868–1945), pp. 133–38; Chen Zuen, “Cong zhanshi zhengyong dao zhanshi jiaoyu: Zhong-Ri zhanzheng shiqi de Shanghai Ribenren xuexiao.” 10. Nozawa Yutaka, “Senzen Nihon no Shanhai kenkyū, gengogakusha Shinmura Izuru o tegakari to shite,” Chikaki ni arite 20 (November 1991): 46–47; Takatsuna Hirofumi, “Nihon ni okeru Shanhai shi kenkyū no senkusha: Okita Hajime,” Kindai Chūgoku kenkyū ihō 17 (1995): 25–28; Chen Zuen, “Ashizawa insatsujo,” in series: “Shanhai ni ita Nihonjin,” trans. Oda Kana, Shanghai Walker Online (July 2002). 11. Okita Hajime, Shanhai chimei shi. 12. Nozawa Yutaka, “Senzen Nihon no Shanhai kenkyū, gengogakusha Shinmura Izuru o tegakari to shite,” pp. 42–43; Takatsuna Hirofumi, “Nihon ni okeru Shanhai shi kenkyū no senkusha,” pp. 29–30; Shinmura Izuru, Ensei sōkō; Matsudaya Hankichi, “Tōkoku tokai nikki,” in Shanhai kenkyū 1 (1942): 115–62, rpt. in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, vol. 11, pp. 39–86. 13. Handwritten ms. dated May 1942, copy in Kyoto University Library. 14. See bibliography for full citations. 15. Takatsuna Hirofumi, “Nihon ni okeru Shanhai shi kenkyū no senkusha,” pp. 31–32, 34–36. 16. Okita Hajime, “Bakumatsu daiichiji Shanhai haken kansen Senzaimaru no shiryō,” Tōyōshi kenkyū 10.1 (December 1947): 49–58; 10.3 (July 1948): 198–212. 17. Novelized in Shiba Ryōtarō, Yo ni sumu hibi, and televised over the course of calendar year 1977 in a production of Shiba’s novel Kashin (God of blooming flowers), though the novel itself does not mention the voyage. An excellent recent Chinese study: Feng Tianyu, “Qiansuiwan” Shanghai xing: Ribenren 1862 nian de Zhongguo guancha. 18. “A Decisive Turning Point in Sino-Japanese Relations: The Senzaimaru Voyage to Shanghai of 1862,” Late Imperial China 29.1 Supplement (June 2008): 104–24; “The Voyage of the Senzaimaru and the Road to Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Normalcy: A Micro-Historical Approach,” in Articulating the Sinosphere: SinoJapanese Relations in Space and Time, pp. 51–66; “A Wartime Cinematic Recreation of the Journey Linking China and Japan in the Modern Era,” Journeys: International Journal of Travel and Travel Writing 5.1 (May 2004): 100–18, rpt. in Traditions of East Asian Travel, pp. 125–43; “The Senzaimaru Voyage to Shanghai in 1862,” Kokusai bunka hyōgen kenkyū 1 (2005): 191–204; The Literature of Travel in the Japanese Rediscovery of China, 1862–1945, pp. 43–57.

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chapter one 1. Masao Miyoshi, As We Saw Them: The First Japanese Embassy to the United States (1860); Michael Auslin, Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy; Conrad Totman, “From Sakoku to Kaikoku: The Transformation of Foreign Policy Attitudes, 1853–1868,” Monumenta Nipponica 35.1 (Spring 1980): 1–19. 2. Sugita Teiichi, “Yū-Shin yokan,” in Sugita Junzan ō, ed. Saiga Hakuai, pp. 582, 584. 3. J. T. Oliver, River Wear Shipyards Output, 1830–1866, n.p.; e-mail communication from Alan Howard of Tyne and Wear Archives & Museums (October 24, 2012). 4. Lloyd’s Registry of British and Foreign Shipping (1856), no. 875; Lloyd’s List, July 30, 1855; Lloyd’s Registry (1864–65), no. 938 gives the ship’s dimensions. Although he gives no source, Honjō Eijirō (1888–1973) claims that the ship measured 126’ × 28’ × 17’. See his “Bakumatsu no Shanhai bōeki,” Keizai ronsō 46.5 (May 1938): 131. 5. Lloyd’s List, April 2, 1856; May 13, 1856; June 9, 1856; August 6, 1856; March 2, 1857; May 19, 1857; August 7, 1857; October 17, 1857; November 10, 1857; December 22, 1857. 6. Lloyd’s Registry (1859), no. 872; Lloyd’s List, November 2, 1859; November 10, 1859; November 25, 1959. 7. Lloyd’s List, December 15, 1860; North-China Herald, October 6, 1860, p. 160; October 27, 1860, p. 172; December 1, 1860, p. 192; December 29, 1860, p. 208; see also Okita Hajime, Nihon to Shanhai, p. 89. “A. R. Tilby” was apparently a longtime resident of Shanghai. The China Directory for 1862 (p. 72) lists him as “shipbroker, Shanghae.” 8. Lloyd’s List, various dates through 1861. M. Paske-Smith, Western Barbarians in Japan and Formosa in Tokugawa Days, 1603–1868, p. 430, notes that the Armistice called at Nagasaki on July 26, 1861, with Richardson given as captain and “Maltby & Co.” listed as “Consignees.” The Nagasaki Shipping List and Advertiser 1.4 (July 10, 1861) carries a notice from John Maltby himself (dated May 7, 1861): “I have this day established a General Commission Agency at the Port [Nagasaki] under the style of MALTBY & CO.” Lloyd’s List (September 28, 1861) has the Armistice arriving in Wusong, near Shanghai, from Nagasaki on July 21, making it highly unlikely that it had completed its business there and returned to Nagasaki six days later; this information is, however, to be found in no other source. On the basis of his reading of the North-China Herald, Okita Hajime argues that Captain Richardson made eight trips to Nagasaki aboard the Armistice, though he actually seems to have made several more, including a few that the North-China Herald did not report. See Okita Hajime, Shanhai hōjin shi kenkyū, p. 57. 9. North-China Herald, March 9, 1861, p. 38; March 16, 1861, p. 44; July 6, 1861, p. 108; October 19, 1861, p. 168; December 21, 1861, p. 204; January 18, 1862, p. 12; March 22, 1862, p. 44. When the Senzaimaru departed for Nagasaki on July 31, 1861, it was said to be carrying “sundries”: North-China Herald, August 9, 1861, p. 120. no t e s

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10. All listed in the North-China Herald, July 16, 1959, p. 200. 11. An advertisement announcing steamship runs between Shanghai and Nagasaki ran in every issue of the North-China Herald from August 13 through September 24, 1859. The ship’s name is spelled “Azoff ” here, though often as well with only one “f ”. 12. Okita Hajime, Nihon to Shanhai, p. 82; Okita Hajime, “Shanhai shiwa,” Shanhai kenkyū 1 (February 1942): 55, 58; see also entries on the Cadiz in “Tod & Macgregor Shiplist,” at www.gregormacgregor.com/Tod&Macgregor/Cadiz_87 .htm (accessed October 2012), and both ships on “The Ships List” at www .theshipslist.com/ships/lines/pando.html (accessed October 2012). The Azof made about ten roundtrips between Shanghai and Nagasaki and then disappeared from this route in early May 1860, while continuing to ply other East Asian sea routes; the Aden made its maiden Shanghai-to-Nagasaki voyage on May 19, 1860. W. C. Wetmore describes the Shanghai-to-Nagasaki trip in late 1859, as does Willem J. C. R. Huyssen van Kattendyke for early that year. See Wetmore, Recollections of Life in the Far East, p. 37; Kattendyke, Nagasaki kaigun denshūjo no hibi, trans. Mizuta Nobutoshi, pp. 146–57. See also Tō-A dōbun shoin daigaku shi, p. 9. The P&O was the first British shipping firm to open shop in Japan; see Boyd Cable, A Hundred Year History of the P & O, Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, pp. 173–74; and Paske-Smith, Western Barbarians in Japan, pp. 224–25. 13. Lloyd’s List, December 15, 1860; for 1861: February 14, February 27, March 18, March 27, April 15, May 13, May 28, June 15, June 27, July 30, August 17, August 27, September 16, September 28, October 28, December 14; for 1862: e.g., January 24, February 17, March 18, April 15. 14. Lloyd’s Registry (1862–63), no. 933. 15. Charles K. Harley, “The Shift from Sailing Ships to Steamships, 1850–1890: A Study in Technological Change and Its Diff usion,” in Essays on a Mature Economy: Britain after 1840, ed. Donald N. McCloskey, pp. 215, 217, 224. 16. This argument is made most forcefully and with all the requisite details by Gerald S. Graham, “The Ascendancy of the Sailing Ship, 1850–85,” Economic History Review n.s. 9.1 (1956): 74–88; see also Douglass North, “Ocean Freight Rates and Economic Development, 1750–1913,” Journal of Economic History 18.4 (December 1958): 537–55. For a differing view, see C. Knick Harley, “Ocean Freight Rates and Productivity, 1740–1913: The Primacy of Mechanical Invention Reaffirmed,” Journal of Economic History 48.4 (December 1988): 851–76. 17. Charles Alexander Gordon, China from a Medical Point of View in 1860 and 1861, to Which Is Added a Chapter on Nagasaki as a Sanitarium, pp. 447–48. 18. Linda C. Johnson, Shanghai: From Market Town to Treaty Port, 1074–1858, pp. 155–75; Meng Yue, Shanghai and the Edges of Empire, pp. ix, xiii, xviii–xix; Joshua A. Fogel, “The Recent Boom in Shanghai Studies,” Journal of the History of Ideas 71.2 (April 2010): 313–33; see also Hamashita Takeshi and Kawakatsu Heita, Ajia kōekiken to Nihon kōgyōka, 1500–1900. A fascinating but little known chapter in the history of Sino-Japanese ties during the Taiping era is recounted in Kojima Shinji, “Bakumatsu Nihon to Taihei tengoku: Mito han no aru shōya no ‘Kenbun-

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roku’ no kiji ni furete,” in his Taihei tengoku kakumei no rekishi to shisō, pp. 288–303. 19. Timothy Brook, “Japan in the Late Ming: The View from Shanghai,” in Sagacious Monks and Bloodthirsty Warriors: Chinese Views of Japan in the MingQing Period, ed. Joshua A. Fogel, pp. 42–62; Wang Yong, “Realistic and Fantastic Images of ‘Dwarf Pirates’: The Evolution of Ming Dynasty Perceptions of the Japanese,” trans. Laura E. Hess, in Fogel, ed., Sagacious Monks and Bloodthirsty Warriors, pp. 27–38; Tanaka Takeo, Wakō to kangō bōeki. See also John Meskill, Gentlemanly Interests and Wealth along the Yangtze River, pp. 81, 84. 20. Charlotte von Verschuer, Across the Perilous Sea: Japanese Trade with China and Korea from the Seventh to the Sixteenth Centuries (Commerce extérieur du Japon des origines au XVIe siècle), trans. Kristen Lee Hunter, pp. 113, passim; Mizuno Norihito, “China in Tokugawa Foreign Relations: The Tokugawa Bakufu’s Reception of and Attitudes toward Ming-Qing China,” Sino-Japanese Studies 15 (April 2003): 109–12; Sakuma Shigeo, Nichi-Min kankei shi no kenkyū, pp. 220–21; Tanaka Takeo, Chūsei taigai kankei shi, pp. 159–60; Fujita Motoharu, Nis-Shi kōtsū no kenkyū, chū-kinsei hen, pp. 129–74; Kimiya Yasuhiko, Nis-Shi kōtsū shi, 4:410–25. 21. Feng Tianyu, “Qiansuiwan” Shanghai xing: Ribenren 1862 nian de Zhongguo guancha, pp. 32–33, 36. 22. Charles Gutzlaff, Journal of Three Voyages along the Coast of China in 1831, 1832, & 1833, p. 303; Robert Fortune, Three Years’ Wanderings in the Northern Provinces of China, pp. 110, 112, 23. Ivan Aleksandrovich Goncharov, The Frigate Pallada, trans. Klaus Goetze, pp. 348–49, 371. Putyatin and the Pallada arrived in Nagasaki one month after Commodore Perry’s arrival in Uraga Bay; there he showed the Japanese how a steam engine worked, and one year later the Japanese were allegedly able to produce their own. Goncharov’s initial trepidation about visiting Shanghai derived from the fear that it would be more of the same British colonial scene one could find anywhere (p. 340): “Yesterday our comrades went to Shanghai by schooner. I didn’t go, hoping I might go another time because we are to be here for a whole month. They called for me, but I wasn’t ready, and I felt one should know beforehand what kind of place Shanghai is, where one could stay and what one could do. Would they let us into the Chinese quarter? If we were allowed only in the European part and could see only that, then it would not be worth the trouble to go: the same Englishmen, the same roast beef, the same ‘much obliged’ and ‘thank you.’ ” 24. Song shi, 491:12a; Tsunoda Ryusaku and L. Carrington Goodrich, trans. and annot., Japan in the Chinese Dynastic Histories, p. 73; Ishihara Michihiro, trans. and annot., Yakuchū Chūgoku seishi Nihon den, p. 75. 25. Okita Hajime, Kojō shi dan: Shanhai ni kansuru shiteki zuihitsu, p. 96. 26. Haruna Akira, Nippon Otokichi hyōryūki; Haruna Akira, Sekai o mite shimatta otokotachi: Edo no ikyō taiken; W. G. Beasley, “Japanese Castaways and British Interpreters,” Monumenta Nipponica 46.1 (Spring 1991): 92–95. 27. Joshua Fogel, Articulating the Sinosphere, pp. 67–99.

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28. “Qinming Zongli geguo shiwu yamen Qing dang, wuyue geguo an, Riben,” Zongli Yamen archives, fi le 01–21–22-(1), n.p., trans. Huang Rongguang, “Bakumatsu Senzaimaru Kenjunmaru no Shanhai haken ra ni kansuru Shinkoku gaikō monjo ni tsuite: Taiwan Chūō kenkyūin Kindaishi kenkyūjo shozō ‘Sōri kakkoku jimu gamon Shintō’ (1862–68 nen),” Tōkyō daigaku Shiryō hensanjo kenkyū kiyō 13 (March 2003): 180–81. There is an early mention of this event in a Chinese source: Yao Xiguang, Dongfang bingshi jilüe, in Jindai Zhongguo shiliao jilüe, ed. Shen Yunlong, series 5, vol. 44, p. 15. 29. E-mail communication from Rick D. H. van Velden (June 24, 2004) of the Nationaal Archief, and from Margriet van der Sluys (June 28, 2004) of the Ministerie van Buitenlanse Zaken. 30. E-mail communications from Frank Hovens (June 10, 2004) of the Rijksarchief in Limburg, and from Helen Stroosma (June 9, 2004) of the Stadsarchief Dordrecht. 31. E. M. A. H. Delhougne, Genealogieën III, pp. 214, 216; Wil Furrer-Kroes and Henk Kroes, Uit welke beker?, p. 107; personal communications from Y. M. Prins of the Centraal Bureau voor Genealogie, which included a death notice for Kroes from 1889 in his archive’s collection of “family announcements,” and from Wil FurrerKroes, which included her manuscript of the Kroes family genealogy for Theodorus going back five generations. 32. With thanks to Wilt Idema for solving the puzzle of the meaning of “Dianqu,” which has stymied scholars for many years. Kroes also used “Dianye yanghang” as a Chinese name for his operation, and Miyanaga Takashi identifies this as the Chinese name of Dimier Brothers, makers of fine watches and for whom Kroes had served as Shanghai agent; it is actually still Dimier Brothers’ Chinese name. See Miyanaga Takashi, Takasugi Shinsaku no Shanhai repotto, p. 73. 33. Hendrik P. N. Muller, Azië gespiegeld, Malakka en China: Studiën en Ervaringen, p. 166. 34. Some of this information comes from Herman J. Moeshart of Leiden University (now retired), an expert in the field of the history of Dutch–East Asian relations, in response to my questions. General population figures are from Haneda Ichiji, Shanhai no kenjō shi, pp. 159–60; North-China Herald, January 21, 1860, p. 11. By comparison, the much more well-established Dutch community of Nagasaki was reported by the North-China Herald for March 5, 1859 (p. 122) to number a total of thirty-one, with some unspecified “others.” 35. North-China Herald, March 12, 1859, p. 126; May 14, 1859, pp. 162, 164; June 18, 1859, p. 182. 36. Citations from this and subsequent letters of the Bauduin brothers are thanks to Herman Moeshart, who brought them to my attention and then translated the relevant passages. Pompe van Meerdervoort spent five years in Nagasaki, helped to build the medical college there, and taught medicine to young Japanese doctors. See Doctor on Desima: Selected Chapters from Jhr J. L. C. Pompe van Meerdervoort’s Vijf Jaren in Japan [Five Years in Japan] (1857–1863), trans. and annot. Elizabeth P. Wittermans and John Z. Bowers; L. S. A.M. von Römer, Historical Sketches: An Introduc-

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tion to the Fourth Congress of the Far Eastern Association of Tropical Medicine to be held in Batavia from 6th to 13th August 1921, trans. Duncan MacColl et al., pp. 116–35. 37. North-China Herald, March 9, 1861, p. 37; March 16, 1861, p. 41; March 23, 1861, p. 45; March 30, 1861, p. 49; April 6, 1861, p. 53; April 13, 1861, p. 57; April 20, p. 61; April 17, 1861, 65; May 4, 1861, p. 69; May 11, 1861, p. 73; May 18, 1861, p. 77; May 25, 1861, p. 81; June 1, 1861, p. 85. On each of these occasions, the following “Notice” was published directly beneath it: NOTICE. The Shanghai Branch of our Firm was closed upon the 28th February 1861. All outstanding accounts of the said Branch will be settled by Messrs. T. KROES & CO., of Shanghai. Mr. THEODORUS KROES ceases from this date to sign the name of our Firm per procuration in China. DIMIER BROTHERS & CO. China, 1st March 1861

38. North-China Herald, April 19, 1862, p. 61, through July 26, 1862, p. 117. 39. Traditionally, the man covering for the groom would wear a pair of gloves, symbolically indicating that he would not touch the bride. See Paula Kogel, The House at Ampasiet, p. 51. 40. Compiled by the Nagasaki Foreign Settlement Research Group; see www .nfs.nias.ac.jp/page042.html#NCS (accessed March 2014). 41. Koenraad Wolter Gratama, Leraar onder de Japanners: Brieven van der dr. K. W. Gratama betreffende zijn verblijf in Japan, 1866–1871, ed. H. Beukers, Léonard Blussé, and R. Eggink, as communicated to me via e-mail (February 17, 2004) by J. T. Brockmeier. 42. Laurence Oliphant, Narrative of the Earl of Elgin’s Mission to China and Japan, 1857–1859, vol. 1, p. 269. 43. See www.genealogieonline.nl/en/database-van-broekhoven/I103129.php (accessed October 2012). 44. Staatsalmanak voor het Koningrijk der Nederlanden, as communicated in an e-mail message (February 17, 2004) from J. T. Brockmeier of the Gemeentearchief Amsterdam (Amsterdam City Archives). The 1860 edition of the Staatsalmanak lists him as a vice-consul in Shanghai. 45. C. P. Mulder and P. A. Christiaans, Onderscheidingen van de KoningGroothertog: De orde van de Eikenkroon 1841–1891, p. 600, a source that also lists Kroes as vice-consul. 46. See http://genwiki.nl/limburg/index.php?title = Mulder&action = edit (accessed October 2012). 47. North-China Herald, June 7, 1862, p. 90. On p. 92 of this issue, the newspaper notes that the “Sen-Zai-Maroo,” a “Jap. bk” (Japanese barque), arrived on June 2, with Captain Richardson, and that the consignee was T. Kroes and Co.

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chapter two 1. Renjinglu shicao, fascicle 3. 2. Samuel Mossman, New Japan, the Land of the Rising Sun: Its Annals During the Past Twenty Years, Recording the Remarkable Progress of the Japanese in Western Civilization, pp. 144–45. Although a Japanese merchant fleet did not appear for quite some time, to describe it as a failure may have been a bit abrupt on Mossman’s part; also, the only real sailors on board this voyage were British. Mossman had only been named editor of the North-China Herald the previous year, and his tenure there was short-lived. See Paul French, Through the Looking Glass: China’s Foreign Journalists from Opium Wars to Mao, p. 56. 3. Honjō Eijirō, “Japan’s Overseas Trade in the Closing Days of the Tokugawa Shogunate,” Kyoto University Economic Review 14.2 (April 1939): 6–8; see also Honjō Eijirō, “The Views of Various Hans on the Opening of the Country,” Kyoto University Economic Review 11.1 (1936): 16–31. 4. Honjō Eijirō, “Japan’s Overseas Trade,” pp. 9–10. 5. “Hakodate Kamedamaru Roryō Anmurugawa e hakkō ikken,” in Bakumatsu bōeki shiryō, ed, Honjō Eijirō, pp. 3–9, rpt. in Gaimushō, ed., Zoku tsūshin zenran, ruishū no bu, vol. 29, pp. 705–35. 6. Emori Susumu, “Hakodate bugyō,” in Nihon shi dai jiten, 5:776–77; Emori Susumu, “Bakufu no Ezo chi chikkatsu to Matsumae bugyō,” Rekishi to chiri 391 (1988): 1–33; Okita Hajime, Nihon to Shanhai, pp. 262–63; Yonezawa Hideo, Shanhai shiwa, pp. 86–88; Nōshōmushō kōkōkyoku, Shanhai kaisanbutsu jijō, pp. 7, 12–14. 7. “Kaikō to Hakodate no sangyō keizai,” in Hakodate shi shi tsūsetsu hen dainikan, pp. 139–42; Honjō Eijirō, “Japan’s Overseas Trade,” pp. 12–14; Miyanaga Takashi, Takasugi Shinsaku no Shanhai repotto, pp. 15–17. The report on the voyage, entitled Kokuryū kō shi (Account of the Amur River), described a variety of things observed, including the foreign vessels docked there and doing business. Tsuzuki was to be “immortalized” on the kabuki stage as the builder of the first Western ship; see James R. Brandon, Kabuki’s Forgotten War, 1931–1945, pp. 204–5. 8. Cited in “Kaikō to Hakodate no sangyō keizai,” pp. 143–44. 9. Tō-A dōbun shoin daigaku shi, p. 9. 10. Cited in “Kaikō to Hakodate no sangyō keizai,” p. 144. 11. Matsudaya Hankichi, “Tōkoku tokai nikki,” in Shanhai kenkyū 1 (1942): 118, rpt. in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, 11:42; Kawashima Motojirō, “Kaikoku igo saigo no Shanhai bōeki,” Shōgyō to keizai 2 (1922): 34–35; Mutō Chōzō, “Bunkyū ninen no kansen daiichiji Shanhai haken to Bunkyū sannen-Genji gannen no dainiji Shanhai haken ni kansuru shiryō ni tsuite,” Shōgyō to keizai 5.2 (February 1925): 164–65; Feng Tianyu, “Qiansuiwan” Shanghai xing, pp. 47–48; Miyanaga Takashi, Takasugi Shinsaku no Shanhai repotto, pp. 20–21. 12. Ichiko Chūzō, “Bakumatsu Nihonjin no Taihei Tengoku ni kansuru chishiki,” in Kaikoku hyakunen kinen Meiji bunkashi ronshū, pp. 453–95. 218

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13. Hibino Teruhiro, Zeiyūroku, in Bunkyū ninen Shanhai nikki, p. 62, entry for 5/9 (June 5). See also Lai Yu-chih, “Tea and the Art Market in Sino-Japanese Exchanges of the Late Nineteenth Century: Sencha and the Seiwan meien zushi,” in The Role of Japan in Modern Chinese Art, ed. Joshua A. Fogel, pp. 42–68. 14. North-China Herald, April 26, 1862, p. 68; May 10, 1862, p. 76; Toyama Mikio, Nagasaki bugyō, Edo bakufu no mimi to me, p. 203; Miyanaga Takashi, Takasugi Shinsaku no Shanhai repotto, pp. 37–38. 15. Readings and explanation of the Matsudaya’s handwritten notes: a. matarosu heya iriguchi (entryway to sailors’ room) b. deiriguchi (entrance) c. koko chūdan ni makanaikata jigeyakunin komono heya (middle berth here, room for the cooks, lower-level officials, and servants) d. nimotsu deiriguchi (entrance to cargo [hold]) e. hobashira ([main?] mast) f. koko chūdan jiyakunin shōnin (middle berth here for local officials and merchants) g. koko chūdan Edo yakunin otomo (middle berth here for the servants of the Edo officials) h. matarosu (sailors) i. maru jirushi (see note): kanbanjō Ranjin hitori to Nakayama kō no heya ni koshiraesōrō (room newly built on deck here for one Dutchman and Lord Nakayama) j. senshitsu (cabin), gojūyaku shichinin (seven higher-level officials) Who these “seven” were is a bit difficult to ascertain. According to Nōtomi Kaijirō (Shanhai zakki, pp. 2–3), it included Nedachi Sukeshichirō, Numa Heirokurō, Kaneko Hyōkichi, Nakayama Umonta, Nabeta Saburōemon, Shiozawa Hikojirō, and Inuzuka Shakusaburō (see immediately below). Both Hibino Teruhiro (Zeiyūroku, p. 40) and Nagura Inata (“Kaigai nichiroku,” in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, 11:87) would have included Nakamura Ryōhei in this elite group, but he was billeted separately with the Dutchman Tombrink (see below). The relative lack of technical terminology here may be a reflection of the basic lack of local knowledge of shipbuilding and the like at this time in Japan. Thanks to Ishikawa Yoshihiro (Kyoto University) and Tao Demin (Kansai University) for their help in deciphering the handwriting. 16. Nagura Inata, “Kaigai nichiroku,” in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, 11:94; Takasugi Shinsaku, “Naijō tansoku roku” (Investigative record of internal conditions), in Yū-Shin goroku in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, ed. Hori Tetsusaburō, 2:175, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 240. 17. In Nagasaki, Tombrink lived with one Hayashi Oya, who was associated with one of the local teahouses or brothels. They had two sons together, Karel Rikitaro and Ernst Monosuke (d. 1939 in the Netherlands). Karel remained in Japan after his father returned to Holland in 1870s and sired the Hayashi family, which still lives in Hokkaidō. This information kindly provided by Herman Moeshart (personal communication, December 11, 2004).

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18. The information that follows on the names and positions of the Senzaimaru passengers comes from such primary sources as: “Nagasaki Senzaimaru Shanhai e hakkō ikken,” in Bakumatsu bōeki shiryō, ed. Honjō Eijirō, pp. 12–14; Nagura Inata, “Kaigai nichiroku,” pp. 91–94. Secondary sources include: Haruna Akira, “Sen happyaku rokujū ninen bakufu Senzaimaru no Shanhai haken,” in Nihon zenkindai no kokka to taigai kankei, ed. Tanaka Takeo, passim; Nakamura Kōya, Nakamuda Kuranosuke den, pp. 204–7; Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 485; Miyanaga Takashi, Takasugi Shinsaku no Shanhai repotto, pp. 25–27; Feng Tianyu, “Qiansuiwan” Shanghai xing, pp. 54–55. 19. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Naijō tansoku roku,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:177, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 243. 20. Fujita Haruhiko, “Notomi Kaijiro: An Industrial Art Pioneer and the First Design Educator of Modern Japan,” Design Issues 17.2 (Spring 2001): 17–31; Yamazaki Tatsubun, “Nōtomi Kaijirō no mezashita mono,” Kanazawa gakuin daigaku kiyō, bungaku bijutsu hen 1 (2003): 73–82. 21. Itō Setsuko, “Bakufu tenmonkata Shibukawa Kagesuke to Ōmura han tenmon gakusha Mine Gensuke,” Kokuritsu tenmondai hō 7.1–2 (2004): 23; Haruna Akira, “Mine Kiyoshi no Shanhai keiken: ‘Senchū nichiroku’ to ‘Shinkoku Shanhai kenbunroku’,” Chōfu Nihon bunka 8 (1998): 45. 22. Etō Shinkichi, “Nihonjin no Chūgokukan: Takasugi Shinsaku ra no baai,” in Niida Noboru hakase tsuitō ronbunshū, daisankan: Nihon hō to Ajia, ed. Fukushima Masao, pp. 53–71; Haraguchi Takaaki, “Bunkyū ninen bakufu ken-Shin shisetsudan zuikō no Bishū hanshi Hibino Teruhiro no kenbun,” Nihon shigaku shūroku 8 (March 1989): 1–10; Azuma Jūji, “Bunka kōshō to Nihon no shijuku oyobi Hakuen shoin,” Kansai daigaku bunka kōshōgaku kyōiku kenkyū kyoten 5 (2012): 35. 23. For information on Nagura, see Okita Hajime, Kojō shi dan: Shanhai ni kansuru shiteki zuihitsu, p. 47; Tanaka Masatoshi, “Nagura Inata ‘(Bunkyū ninen) Shina kenbun roku’ ni tsuite,” in Yamamoto hakase kanreki kinen Tōyō shi ronsō, ed. Yamamoto hakase kanreki kinen Tōyō shi ronsō hensan iinkai, pp. 292–94; Morita Yoshihiko, “Nagura Shindon to Nis-Shin ‘shin kankei’ no mosaku, bakumatsu ishin ki no ka-i shisōteki Nit-Chū teikei ron,” Higashi Ajia kindai shi 4 (March 2001): 63–81; Morita Yoshihiko, “Heigakusha Nagura Shindon no bakumatsu kaigai kenbun,” Teikyō daigaku bungakubu kiyō, Nihon bunkagaku 40 (2009): 45–81. 24. For example, Tanaka Akira, Nihon no kinsei, vol. 18: Kindai kokka e no shikō, p. 126. 25. Shirayanagi Shūko, “Sōsō Nagura Inata den (ge),” Shomotsu tenbō 12.4 (December 1934): 22–23, 25–27, 29, 30, citation on 30. 26. Haruna Akira, “Nakamuda Kuranosuke no Shanhai taiken: Bunkyū ninen Shanhai kō nikki o chūshin ni,” Kokugakuin daigaku kiyō 35 (March 1997): 57–59. See also Haruna Akira, “Nakamuda Kuranosuke no Shanhai keiken saikō: ‘Kōgi onyakuyaku Karakuni Shanhai omote ni te dōtai sono hoka to ōsetsusho’ o chūshin ni,” Kokugakuin daigaku kiyō 39 (March 2001): 77–109; Nakamura Kōya, Nakamuda Kuranosuke den. Was his respect for the military capacity of the Qing’s navy

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influenced in any way by his experiences in China three decades earlier? Possibly, though unlikely for many reasons. 27. Cited in Umetani Noboru, Takasugi Shinsaku, p. 89. In a personal audience with his lord just prior to his departure for Nagasaki, Takasugi was instructed: “This is something that should please you greatly. You shall be accompanying an official on a voyage overseas. This will be a difficult task, for it involves keen observance of foreign affairs and conditions, including institutions and machinery. Your report upon returning should certainly be of benefit to your domain (kokka). Remember to work hard to preserve everything in your memory”a (cited in Umetani, p. 90). See also Yokoyama Kendō, Takasugi Shinsaku, pp. 215–16, 217–20. Takasugi’s use of the word “barbarian” is virtually synonymous with “Westerner” (any Westerner), and in his case it carried a decidedly negative cultural connotation; whether or not it included the Manchus is nowhere mentioned. 28. Takasugi Shinasaku, “Yū-Shin goroku jo” (Introduction to five records of a trip to China), in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, vol. 1, p. 152, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, pp. 209–10. One story has it that Shinsaku’s style Tōkō (lit., going east) was consciously chosen to contrast with the Buddhist retirement name of Emperor Toba (r. 1107–1123): Saigyō hōshi (“Saigyō” meaning “going west”). Shinsaku’s implicit meaning was to “march” (kō) on Edo (in the east) and topple the shogunate. The story of the bribe to Shiozawa is recounted in Miyanaga Takashi, Takasugi Shinsaku no Shanhai repotto, p. 30. 29. Takasugi Shinsaku no 29 nen, pp. 46–48, 62. 30. On this fascinating topic, see Hayashi Rokurō, Nagasaki Tō tsūji, dai tsūji Hayashi Dōei to sono shūhen; and Miyata Yasushi, Tō tsūji kakei ronkō. 31. See http://ameblo.jp/honmokujack/entry-10744418990.html (accessed November 2012); Feng Tianyu, “Riben mufu shituan suojian 1862 nian zhi Shanghai,” Jindaishi yanjiu 3 (1999): 188; Xu Haihua, “Bakumatsu ni okeru Nagasaki Tōtsūhi no taisei,” Higashi Ajia bunka kōshō kenkyū 5 (February 2012): 267–80; Miyanaga Takashi, Takasugi Shinsaku no Shanhai repotto, p. 31. 32. Haruna Akira, “Mine Kiyoshi no Shanhai keiken,” pp. 28, 37–38; Ann Jannetta, The Vaccinators: Smallpox, Medical Knowledge, and the “Opening” of Japan, pp. 138, 174; Nagayo Takeo, “Ishi shiryō: Mikawa shusshin no Ranpōi Omoto Kōdō no bakumatsu,” Gendai igaku 52.2 (November 2004): 339–42. 33. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Naijō tansoku roku,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:177, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 243; 34. Haruna Akira, “Mine Kiyoshi no Shanhai keiken,” pp. 29, 39. 35. Miyanaga Takashi, Takasugi Shinsaku no Shanhai repotto, p. 31. 36. Feng Tianyu, “Qiansuiwan” Shanghai xing, pp. 235–26 37. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Naijō tansoku roku,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:175, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 240: “From the start this overseas trade to Shanghai was ultimately due to a bribe given by the Nagasaki merchants to Mr. Takahashi . . . so that the merchants gain personal profit. Also, the officials coming from Edo are mostly in the Takahashi camp, all of them philistines (zokubutsu).”b Several lines earlier in the text, Takasugi arrogantly dismissed Takahashi in similar language

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on another front: “After this ship [the Armistice] was purchased, they named it the Senzaimaru. They say that this naming was the work of the Nagasaki Magistrate, Takahashi Mimasaki no kami. (I have heard that Takahashi is in the camp of Andō Nobumasa and that he is a thorough philistine. His naming the ship [the Senzaimaru] is enough to see that this man’s very disposition is base.)”c See also Fujii Sadafumi, “Tokugawa bakufu no Shanhai bōeki to Takasugi Shinsaku,” Rekishi kyōiku 2.12 (1954): 60; Haraguchi Takaaki, “Bunkyū ninen bakufu ken-Shin shisetsudan,” p. 2. 38. Nakamura Kōya, Nakamuda Kuranosuke den, p. 211, who argues that Kuroganeya’s appearance on the passenger list marks a sea change in Japan. 39. Kawashima Motojirō, “Kaikoku igo saigo no Shanhai bōeki,” Shōgyō to keizai 2 (1922): 34–35; Kawashima Motojirō, Nankoku shiwa, pp. 120–21; Koga Jūjirō, “Rokujūichi nen mae ni okeru Shanhai e no shutsubōeki,” Nagasaki shinbun, May 10, 1923; Shirayanagi Shūko, Nihon fugō hasseigaku, batsuzoku zaiken sōdatsu no maki, pp. 211–14. 40. Takasugi Shinsaku, Yū-Shin goroku, in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:143, 154, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 212. On Godai, see Miyamoto Mataji, Godai Tomoatsu den; Okita Hajime, “Godai Tomoatsu to Shanhai,” Shanhai 1 (January 1942): 16–19; Tanaka Toyojirō, Kindai no ijin: Ko Godai Tomoatsu den; Shirayanagi Shūko, Nihon fugō hasseigaku, pp. 219–22. 41. Matsudaya Hankichi, “Tōkoku tokai nikki,” Shanhai kenkyū 1 (1942): 126, rpt. in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, 11:50. See also Okita Hajime, Nihon to Shanhai, p. 105.

chapter three 1. Nōtomi Kaijirō, Shanhai zakki, in Bunkyū ninen Shanhai nikki, p. 13, rpt. in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, 1:21. 2. On Williams, see Maria Minor, Channing Moore Williams: Pioneer Missionary in Japan. On Verbeck, see William Elliot Griffis, Verbeck of Japan: A Citizen of No Country; and Lane R. Earns, “A Miner in the Deep and Dark Places: Guido Verbeck in Nagasaki, 1859–1869,” Crossroads 5 (Autumn 1997): 87–112. 3. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Nagasaki enryū zatsuroku” 長崎淹留雜錄 (Various notes while tarrying in Nagasaki), in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:164–65, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, pp. 228–29. I have been unable to find any mention of Takasugi’s meeting with Reverends Williams and Verbeck in any of their published or manuscript writings. 4. Feng Tianyu, “Qiansuiwan” Shanghai xing, p. 215. 5. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Nagasaki enryū zatsuroku,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:165–66, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, pp. 229–31. 6. Nakamura Kōya, Nakamuda Kuranosuke den, pp. 184–96, 198–200; Haruna Akira, “Nakamuda Kuranosuke no Shanhai taiken saikō,” pp. 58–59; Umetani Noboru, Takasugi Shinsaku, pp. 91–92; Shirayanagi Shūko, Nihon fugō hasseigaku, p. 223. 222

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7. Matsudaya Hankichi, “Tōkoku tokai nikki,” Shanhai kenkyū 1 (1942): 121–26, rpt. in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, 11:45–50. 8. Kuroki Morifumi, “Kō-A kai no Ajiashugi,” Hōsei kenkyū 71.4 (2005): 624. 9. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Kōkai nichiroku” (Daily notes of the sea voyage), in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:153, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 211. 10. Cited in Okita Hajime, Nihon to Shanhai, pp. 108–10; Miyanaga Takashi, Takasugi Shinsaku no Shanhai repotto, pp. 49–50; Nakamura Kōya, Nakamuda Kuranosuke den, pp. 212–14; and probably elsewhere. 11. Hibino Teruhiro, Zeiyūroku, p. 41. 12. Hibino Teruhiro, Zeiyūroku, p. 41; Matsudaya Hankichi, “Tōkoku tokai nikki,” Shanhai kenkyū 1 (1942): 127, rpt. in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, 11:51; Takasugi Shinsaku, “Kōkai nichiroku,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:153, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 211; Nakamura Kōya, Nakamuda Kuranosuke den, p. 214; Nagura Inata, “Kaigai nichiroku,” rpt. in Tazaki Tetsurō, “Shiryō shōkai: Nagura Inata ‘Kaigai nichiroku,’ Bunkyū ninen Senzaimaru kankei shiryō,” Aichi daigaku kokusai mondai kenkyūjo kiyō 83 (December 1986): 96. Mine Kiyoshi also noticed the British vessel leaving port; see his “Senchū nichiroku bekkō,” rpt. in Haruna Akira, “Mine Kiyoshi no Shanhai keiken,” p. 79. 13. Nakamura Kōya, Nakamuda Kuranosuke den, p. 214; Takasugi Shinsaku, “Kōkai nichiroku,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:153, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 211; Mine Kiyoshi, “Shinkoku Shanhai kenbunroku,” rpt. in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, 11:24. In its entry for funayoi, the Nihon kokugo daijiten, 11:986, gives a Muromachi-era citation and an early modern citation from 1840. 14. Hibino Teruhiro, Zeiyūroku, p. 43. 15. Mine Kiyoshi, “Shinkoku Shanhai kenbunroku,” p. 24; Matsudaya Hankichi, “Tōkoku tokai nikki,” Shanhai kenkyū 1 (1942): 128, rpt. in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, 11:52; Takasugi Shinsaku, “Kōkai nichiroku,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:154, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 212; Hibino Teruhiro, Zeiyūroku, pp. 44–45. 16. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Kōkai nichiroku,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:154, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 212; Matsudaya Hankichi, “Tōkoku tokai nikki,” in Shanhai kenkyū 1 (1942): 128, rpt. in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, 11:52. 17. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Kōkai nichiroku,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:154, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 212–13; Matsudaya Hankichi, “Tōkoku tokai nikki,” in Shanhai kenkyū 1 (1942): 128, rpt. in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, 11:52; Hibino Teruhiro, Zeiyūroku, p. 47; Yokoyama Kendō, Takasugi Shinsaku, pp. 224–25. 18. Hibino Teruhiro, Zeiyūroku, pp. 48–50; Nakamura Kōya, Nakamuda Kuranosuke den, p. 217. 19. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Kōkai nichiroku,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:154–55, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 213. 20. Nagura Inata, “Kaigai nichiroku,” pp. 96–97; Mine Kiyoshi, “Shinkoku Shanhai kenbunroku,” p. 85; Umetani Noboru, Takasugi Shinsaku, p. 97.

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21. Nōtomi Kaijirō, Shanhai zakki, p. 4; Hibino Teruhiro, Zeiyūroku, pp. 51–52. 22. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Kōkai nichiroku,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:155, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 213. 23. Mine Kiyoshi, “Shinkoku Shanhai kenbunroku,” pp. 85–86; Mine Kiyoshi, “Senchū nichiroku bekkō,” p. 80; Mine Kiyoshi, “Senchū nichiroku,” p. 52; Nagura Inata, “Kaigai nichiroku,” p. 97. 24. Mine Kiyoshi, “Senchū nichiroku,” p. 52. 25. Hibino Teruhiro, Zeiyūroku, p. 52; Matsudaya Hankichi, “Tōkoku tokai nikki,” Shanhai kenkyū 1 (1942): 130, rpt. in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, 11:54. 26. In a fi lm about the voyage of the Senzaimaru made on location in Shanghai in 1944 (see Chapter 10), the first person to identify gunfire in the distance as their ship pulls into port is none other than Takasugi Shinsaku, and this becomes the central theme of the movie, Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru (Signal fires over Shanghai), directed by the great Inagaki Hiroshi (1905–1980). Despite his best efforts, Takasugi was never able to meet any of the Taiping rebels, but that does not stop Inagaki from having several extended scenes in which Takasugi exchanges thoughts with a Taiping leader. See Joshua A. Fogel, “A Wartime Cinematic Recreation of the Journey Linking China and Japan in the Modern Era,” in Traditions of East Asian Travel, ed. Fogel, pp. 129–32. 27. Matsudaya Hankichi, “Tōkoku tokai nikki,” in Shanhai kenkyū 1 (1942): 133, rpt. in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, 11:57; Nōtomi Kaijirō, Shanhai zakki, p. 13; Mine Kiyoshi, “Senchū nichiroku,” p. 53; Nagura Inata, “Kaigai nichiroku,” p. 97. 28. Matsudaya Hankichi, “Tōkoku tokai nikki,” Shanhai kenkyū 1 (1942): 130, rpt. in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, 11:54; Miyanaga Takashi, Takasugi Shinsaku no Shanhai repotto, p. 57. 29. Nakamuda Kuranosuke, “Shanhai kō nikki” (Diary of a trip to Shanghai), in Haruna Akira, “Nakamuda Kuranosuke no Shanhai taiken saikō,” p. 73; Kinouchi Makoto, Shanhai rekishi gaido mappu, p. 13. 30. Nagura Inata, “Kaigai nichiroku,” pp. 97, 98; Hibino Teruhiro, Zeiyūroku, p. 54. H. McAleavy takes a different aesthetic approach when translating the poem in his “A Japanese View of Shanghai in 1862,” Bulletin of the Japan Society of London 12 (February 1954): 14. 31. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Kōkai nichiroku,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:155, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, pp. 213–14; Nakamuda cited in Nakamura Kōya, Nakamuda Kuranosuke den, p. 219. 32. Matsudaya Hankichi, “Tōkoku tokai nikki,” Shanhai kenkyū 1 (1942): 131, rpt. in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, 11:55.

chapter four 1. For information by and about Wu Xu, see Jing Wu and Zhong Ding, eds., Wu Xu dang’an zhong de Taiping tianguo shiliao xuanji. Wu Xu was reputedly one of 224

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the wealthiest men in Shanghai at the time; see Liang Yuansheng, Wan Qing Shanghai, yige chengshi de lishi jiyi, p. 36; Banno Masataka, China and the West, 1858–1861: The Origins of the Tsungli Yamen, p. 274; D. F. Rennie, The British Arms in North China and Japan: Peking 1980; Kagosima 1862, p. 144. See also the North-China Herald of July 21, 1860, where Wu is called “that extraordinary man the Taotai, who had the purse of Fortunatus.” 2. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Naijō tansoku roku,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:175, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 240; Hibino Teruhiro, Zeiyūroku, p. 57; Nōtomi Kaijirō, Shanhai zakki, p. 7. 3. Hibino Teruhiro, Zeiyūroku, p. 58. 4. Nagura Inata, “Shina kenbun roku,” in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, 11:207. 5. Nagura Inata, “Kaigai nichiroku,” p. 99. 6. Nagura Inata, “Shina kenbun roku,” p. 207. 7. Nagura Inata, “Kaigai nichiroku,” p. 100. 8. Mine Kiyoshi, “Shinkoku Shanhai kenbunroku,” p. 28. 9. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Gaijō tansoku roku: Shanhai sōron” (Investigative record of external conditions, summary view of Shanghai), in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:178, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 244. 10. Nōtomi Kaijirō, Shanhai zakki, p. 7. 11. Nōtomi Kaijirō, Shanhai zakki, pp. 7–8. 12. Hibino Teruhiro, Zeiyūroku, pp. 67–68. 13. Hibino Teruhiro, Zeiyūroku, pp. 58, 62; Takasugi Shinsaku, “Shanhai enryū nichiroku” (Daily notes while tarrying in Shanghai), in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:158, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 217; Nagura Inata, “Kaigai nichiroku,” pp. 98, 100; Nagura Inata, “Shina kenbun roku,” p. 172 [p. 296 in Tanaka]. Earlier (June 3), Takasugi was somewhat more generous in his depiction: “I was wandering about the streets when locals surrounded me like a wall because I appeared different to them”;a see Takasugi Shinsaku, “Kōkai nichiroku,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:155, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 214. 14. Nōtomi Kaijirō, Shanhai zakki, p. 10. 15. The brush conversations that I make extensive use of in the following chapters all come from published sources, ones presumably edited based on the raw material preserved by the Japanese involved. While there is no reason to suppose that anything therein was fabricated, one may easily suspect that turns of phrases and the like may have been redacted to fit a mold, but this is entirely conjecture. I discuss the phenomenon of the “brush conversation” briefly in The Literature of Travel in the Japanese Rediscovery of China, 1862–1945, pp. 44–45.

chapter five 1. Ivan Alexsandrovich Goncharov, The Frigate Pallada, pp. 369–70. 2. Nōtomi Kaijirō, Shanhai zakki, p. 31. no t e s

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3. Hibino Teruhiro, Zeiyūroku, p. 98. 4. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Gaijō tansoku roku, Shanhai sōron,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:178, 185, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 244. 5. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Shanhai enryū nichiroku,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:159, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 218. 6. Mine Kiyoshi, “Shinkoku Shanhai kenbunroku,” in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, 11:30. 7. Hibino Teruhiro, Botsubi hitsugo, in Bunkyū ninen Shanhai nikki, p. 153. 8. Takasugu Shinsaku, “Gaijō tansoku roku, kan no er” (Record of investigation of external conditions, fascicle two), in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:198–99, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, pp. 249–50. 9. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Shanhai enryū nichiroku,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:157, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 216. 10. Hibino Teruhiro, Zeiyūroku, pp. 64–65. See also Etō Shinkichi, “Nihonjin no Chūgokukan: Takasugi Shinsaku ra no baai,” pp. 68–69. 11. Nōtomi Kaijirō, Shanhai zakki, p. 31. 12. Feng Tianyu, “Qiansuiwan” Shanghai xing, p. 115. 13. Nōtomi Kaijirō, Shanhai zakki, pp. 11–12. 14. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Kōkai nichiroku,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:156, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 214. 15. Chouban yiwu shimo, 72:2695. 16. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Shanhai enryū nichiroku,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:158, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 217. 17. Two decades later, the scholar of Chinese learning, Oka Senjin (1832–1914), arrived at similar conclusions after nearly a year (1884–1885) traveling around China, except that, in addition to acknowledging Western military supremacy and East Asian cultural superiority, he had much harsher things to say about the Chinese people’s failings. See his Kankō kiyū, kankō xuji, kankō yūcao. 18. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Shanhai enryū nichiroku,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:162, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 222. 19. Respectively: Nagura Inata, “Shina kenbun roku,” pp. 195–96; Nagura Inata, “Kaigai nichiroku,” p. 107. 20. Nagura Inata, “Shina kenbun roku,” p. 206. 21. Hibino Teruhiro, Botsubi hitsugo, p. 163; Feng Tianyu, “Qiansuiwan” Shanghai xing, p. 164. 22. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Gaijō tansoku roku: Shanhai sōron,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:178, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 245. 23. Chouban yiwu shimo, 5:33, cited in Feng Tianyu, “Qiansuiwan” Shanghai xing, p. 165. 24. Nōtomi Kaijirō, Shanhai zakki, p. 6. 25. Mine Kiyoshi, “Shinkoku Shanhai kenbunroku,” in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, 11:30. 26. Hibino Teruhiro, Botsubi hitsugo, p. 169. 27. Nōtomi Kaijirō, Shanhai zakki, p. 28.

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28. Nagura Inata, “Shina kenbun roku,” p. 197, rpt. in Tanaka Masatoshi, “Nagura Inata ‘(Bunkyū ninen) Shina kenbun roku’ ni tsuite,” p. 300. 29. Nagura Inata, “Kaigai nichiroku,” pp. 109, 120. 30. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Shanhai enryū nichiroku,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:160–61, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 220. 31. Hibino Teruhiro, Zeiyūroku, p. 90. Hibino included two elaborate sketches of the Confucian temple just before this entry, pp. 88–89. 32. Hibino Teruhiro, Botsubi hitsugo, pp. 149–50. 33. Hibino Teruhiro, Botsubi hitsugo, p. 164. 34. Nagura Inata, “Shina kenbun roku,” pp. 179, 192. 35. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Shanhai enryū nichiroku,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:159, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 219. 36. Nakamura Kōya, Nakamuda Kuranosuke den, pp. 229–30. 37. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Shanhai enryū nichiroku,” in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 270 (Japanese version, p. 216); Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:1 (Japanese version, 2:157). 38. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Shanhai enryū nichiroku,” in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 272 (Japanese version, p. 217); Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:158. 39. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Shanhai enryū nichiroku,” in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 272 (Japanese version, pp. 217–18); Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:158. 40. Nagura Inata, “Shina kenbun roku,” pp. 180–81. 41. Umetani Noboru, Takasugi Shinsaku, pp. 103, 104; Nakamura Kōya (Nakamuda Kuranosuke den, p. 245) claims the second pistol was purchased from a French merchant. 42. Shirayanagi Shūko, Nihon fugō hasseigaku, pp. 234–35, 240–43. Shirayanagi (pp. 242–43) hypothesizes as follows: Because Germany still had no diplomatic ties with Japan, the vessel could not enter Japanese waters flying the German flag. So, it sailed to Hong Kong, where it changed to a British flag, and from there it sailed to Kagoshima in the guise of a British ship. 43. Mine Kiyoshi, “Senchū nichiroku,” p. 23. 44. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Naijō tansoku roku,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:177, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 243. 45. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Shanhai enryū nichiroku,” in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, pp. 223, 274. 46. Joseph Heco, The Narrative of a Japanese; What he has seen and the people he has met in the course of the last forty years, 2:53, 59; Sugiura Tadashi, Kishida Ginkō, shiryō kara mita sono isshō, p. 160; Okita Hajime, Kojō shi dan, p. 29; Hanazono Kentei, “Kishida Ginkō to Nihon insatsu bunka,” in Kinsei insatsu bunka shikō, ed. Shimaya Masaichi, pp. 1–10; Kurokawa Kōsaburō, “Kishida Ginkō ron, shominha jaanarisuto no kiseki,” Seikei kenkyū 32.1 (July 1995): 31–56. In his efforts to return to Japan, Heco worked on a British vessel owned by Dent and Company, which called at the port of Shanghai in 1859; see his Narrative of a Japanese, 1:191. 47. Takasugi Shinsaki, “Gaijō tansoku roku kan no ni,” rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 246.

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48. Cited in Kobayashi Yoshiaki, Shimin kakumei no senkusha: Takasugi Shinsaku, p. 71. 49. Nakamura Kōya, Nakamuda Kuranosuke den, pp. 198–200.

chapter six 1. See R. H. van Gulik, “Kakkaron: A Japanese Echo of the Opium War,” Monumenta Serica 4 (1939–1940): 478–545. 2. Feng Tianyu, “Qiansuiwan” Shanghai xing, p. 197, but without a source given. 3. Ge Yuanxu, Hu you zaji; Huang Shiquan, Songnan mengying lu, rpt. in Shanghai tan yu Shanghairen; as cited in Liu Jianhui, Demon Capital Shanghai: The “Modern” Experience of Japanese Intellectuals, pp. 126–27. 4. Masuda Wataru, Japan and China: Mutual Representations in the Modern Era, trans. Joshua A. Fogel, pp. 34–52, 68–80; Haga Noboru, “Ahen sensō, Taihei tengoku, Nihon,” in Chūgoku kin-gendai shi no sho mondai: Tanaka Masayoshi sensei taikan kinen ronshū, pp. 87–123. 5. Takasugu Shinsaku, “Gaijō tansoku roku, kan no ni,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, pp. 198–99, rpt. in Japanese in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 250. If Takasugi’s interlocutor was referring to the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing as stipulating a lifting of the ban on opium, then he was in error, a common one, as the treaty makes no direct mention of opium. 6. Takasugu Shinsaku, “Gaijō tansoku roku, kan no ni,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, p. 202, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 254. 7. Hibino Teruhiro, Botsubi hitsugo, p. 161. 8. Nōtomi Kaijirō, Shanhai zakki, p. 23. 9. Nōtomi Kaijirō, Shanhai zakki, p. 24. 10. Nōtomi Kaijirō, Shanhai zakki, p. 24. 11. Nagura Inata, “Shina kenbun roku,” rpt. in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, 11:198. 12. Nōtomi Kaijirō, Shanhai zakki, pp. 19–20. 13. Nōtomi Kaijirō, Shanhai zakki, p. 20. 14. Nōtomi Kaijirō, Shanhai zakki, pp. 31–32. 15. There are many fine studies of the Taiping Rebellion. Three in English that I have found particularly helpful are: Jen Yu-wen (Jian Youwen), The Taiping Revolutionary Movement; Rudolf G. Wagner, Reenacting the Heavenly Vision: The Role of Religion in the Taiping Rebellion; Jonathan D. Spence, God’s Chinese Son: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan. 16. These and other tales are dealt with admirably by Masuda Wataru, Japan and China: Mutual Representations in the Modern Era, trans. Joshua A. Fogel, pp. 116–35. For a more specialized essay on one unusual avenue by which information on the Taipings was made known to the shogunate in Edo, see Kojima Shinji, “Bakumatsu Nihon to Taihei tengoku: Mito han no aru shōya no ‘kenbunroku’ no kiji ni furete,” in his Taihei tengoku kakumei no rekishi to shisō, pp. 288–303. 228

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17. Masuda Wataru, Japan and China, pp. 31, 104, 107. The text of Shōin’s translation can be found in volume 2 of Yoshida Shōin zenshū, ed. Yamaguchi ken kyōikukai. 18. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Shanhai enryū nichiroku,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:144–45, 156, 157, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, pp. 214–15. 19. Hibino Teruhiro, Zeiyūroku, pp. 52, 54. 20. Hibino Teruhiro, Zeiyūroku, p. 56; Nōtomi Kaijirō, Shanhai zakki, p. 27. 21. Nagura Inata, “Kaigai nichiroku,” pp. 98–99, rpt. in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, 11:103. 22. Mine Kiyoshi, “Senchū nichiroku,” pp. 16, 18. 23. Hibino Teruhiro, Zeiyūroku, p. 66. 24. Nōtomi Kaijirō, Shanhai zakki, pp. 17, 18. Nōtomi clearly read a great deal about Shanghai and Qing China before departing or after returning home, as his account is full of citations to Chinese texts, giving it more than a merely subjective travelogue quality. 25. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Shanhai enryū nichiroku,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:145–46, 157, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 216; Nagura Inata, “Kaigai nichiroku,” p. 106, rpt. in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, 11:126. 26. Nakamura Kōya, Nakamuda Kuranosuke den, p. 229. 27. Cited (in Chinese translation) in Feng Tianyu, “Qiansuiwan” Shanghai xing, p. 208. 28. Takasagu Shinsaku, “Shokan” (Letters), in Tōkō sensei ibun, p. 20. 29. Nagura Inata, “Kaigai nichiroku,” p. 105, rpt. in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, 11:121–22. 30. Nagura Inata, “Kaigai nichiroku,” p. 105, rpt. in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, 11:122. For more on the transmission of this exceedingly rare text, see Masuda Wataru, Japan and China, p. 138 and attendant footnotes. Masuda and others give a title with a different final character, tan, though the meaning remains essentially the same. 31. Hibino Teruhiro, Botsubi hitsugo, in Bunkyū ninen Shanhai nikki, pp. 134, 141, 162–63. Although he does not make extensive use of Hibino’s brush conversations, Haraguchi Takaaki sees the Taipings as central to Hibino’s concerns; see Haraguchi Takaaki, “Bunkyū ninen bakufu ken-Shin shisetsudan zuikō no Bishū hanshi Hibino Teruhiro no kenbun,” Nihon shigaku shūroku 8 (March 1989): 1–10. 32. Nōtomi Kaijirō, Shanhai zakki, p. 27. The now classic work of scholarship on the tuanlian system is Philip A. Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796–1864. 33. Nagura Inata, “Kaigai nichiroku,” p. 109, rpt. in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, 11:134. 34. Nagura Inata, “Kaigai nichiroku,” p. 110, rpt. in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, 11:136. 35. Nagura Inata, “Shina kenbun roku,” rpt. in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, 11:216.

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36. See, for example, A. Egmont Hake, Events in the Taeping Rebellion, p. 85. 37. Nōtomi Kaijirō, Shanhai zakki, p. 29. 38. Mine Kiyoshi, “Senchū nichiroku,” p. 20. 39. Takasugu Shinsaku, “Gaijō tansoku roku,” in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 245. 40. Hibino Teruhiro, Botsubi hitsugo, pp. 151–52. 41. Hibino Teruhiro, Botsubi hitsugo, p. 161. 42. Hibino Teruhiro, Botsubi hitsugo, pp. 161–62. 43. Hibino Teruhiro, Botsubi hitsugo, p. 153. 44. Hibino Teruhiro, Botsubi hitsugo, p. 155. 45. Hibino Teruhiro, Zeiyūroku, pp. 58–59. Hibino’s grumblings notwithstanding, that’s what extraterritoriality was all about, and Japan had recently been compelled to cede the same to the Western powers. 46. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Shanhai enryū nichiroku,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:162, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 221–22. In the original draft, Wan’s surname was written as Ruan. There is a fuller version of their exchange at Takasugu Shinsaku, “Gaijō tansoku roku, kan no ni,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, p. 202, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, pp. 255–56. 47. Hibino Teruhiro, Botsubi hitsugo, p. 156. 48. Mine Kiyoshi, “Shinkoku Shanhai kenbunroku,” in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, 11:33. 49. Takasugu Shinsaku, “Gaijō tansoku roku, kan no ni,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, p. 198, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 249. For the Japanese version of this vignette, see my appendix. 50. See Augustus F. Lindley, Ti-ping tien-kwoh: The History of the Ti-ping Revolution, including a narrative of the author’s personal adventures; John Newsinger, “Taiping Revolutionary, Augustus Lindley in China,” Race and Class 42 (April 2001): 57–72; Feng Tianyu, “Qiansuiwan” Shanghai xing, p. 184. 51. Kusaka Genzui, “Kaiwan chigen,” in Yashitai: Ishin shiryō sōsho, 2, ronsaku, ed. Nihon shiseki kyōkai sōsho, p. 178.

chapter seven 1. Takasugi Shinsaku, “Kōkai nichiroku,” in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:155, rpt. in Tanaka Akira, ed., Kaikoku, p. 214. 2. On Edan, see Ch. B.-Maybon and Jean Fredet, Histoire de la Concession Française de Changhai. 3. Hibino Teruhiro, Zeiyūroku, p. 61. Miyanaga Takashi (Takasugi Shinsaku no Shanhai repotto, p. 80) claims, on the basis of conversations with Chinese acquaintances, that this sweet may no longer be in existence, but a quick search on the Web will turn up hundreds of recipes and descriptions, including its own Wikipedia entry in Chinese (http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/雲片䊏), which claims it to be a specialty of the Zhuang minority of Guangxi Province. Further research a scholarly desideratum. 230

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4. Hibino Teruhiro, Zeiyūroku, p. 61. 5. Hibino Teruhiro, Zeiyūroku, pp. 61–62. 6. “Qinming Zongli geguo shiwu yamen Qing dang, wuyue geguo an, Riben,” Zongli Yamen archives, fi le 01–21–22-(1), n.p., trans. Huang Rongguang, “Bakumatsu Senzaimaru Kenjunmaru,” Tōkyō daigaku Shiryō hensanjo kenkyū kiyō 13 (March 2003), p. 180. For a long time I was under the impression that these documents from the archives of the Zongli Yamen were discovered by a group of Japanese scholars, and no doubt they independently were, but several decades earlier, Chow Ren Hwa found them himself in the course of research in the Taiwan archives. See his China and Japan: The History of Chinese Diplomatic Missions in Japan, 1877–1911. Some of the material I am about to present, including the absence of Chow’s name, appeared in my essay, “A Decisive Turning Point in Sino-Japanese Relations: The Senzaimaru Voyage to Shanghai of 1862,” Late Imperial China 29.1 Supplement (June 2008): 104–24. 7. One early Chinese source makes the case simply that the Japanese had no treaty, as the Western countries did, allowing for trade, so Wu told them to observe the law. In other words, it’s that simple. See Yao Xiguang, Dongfang bingshi jilüe, in Jindai Zhongguo shiliao jilüe, ed. Shen Yunlong, series 5, vol. 44, p. 15(2a). 8. “Qinming Zongli geguo shiwu yamen Qing dang, wuyue geguo an, Riben,” Zongli Yamen archives, fi le 01–21–22-(1), n.p., trans. Huang Rongguang, “Bakumatsu Senzaimaru Kenjunmaru,” Tōkyō daigaku Shiryō hensanjo kenkyū kiyō 13 (March 2003): 180. 9. Ichiko Chūzō, “Bakumatsu Nihonjin no Taihei Tengoku ni kansuru chishiki,” in Kaikoku hyakunen kinen Meiji bunkashi ronshū, pp. 453–95. 10. Matsumoto Tadao, “Shanhai ni okeru Nihonjin hatten no shoki,” Tōyō 42 (October 1939): 37. 11. Nakamuda Kuranosuke, Bunkyū ninen Shanhai kō nikki, in Haruna Akira, “Nakamuda Kuranosuke no Shanhai taiken: Bunkyū ninen Shanhai kō nikki o chūshin ni,” Kokugakuin daigaku kiyō 35 (March 1997): 82. 12. “Qinming Zongli geguo shiwu yamen Qing dang, wuyue geguo an, Riben,” Zongli Yamen archives, fi le 01–21–22-(1), n.p., trans. Huang Rongguang, “Bakumatsu Senzaimaru Kenjunmaru,” Tōkyō daigaku Shiryō hensanjo kenkyū kiyō 13 (March 2003): 180. 13. “Qinming Zongli geguo shiwu yamen Qing dang, wuyue geguo an, Riben,” Zongli Yamen archives, fi le 01–21–22-(1), n.p., trans. Huang Rongguang, “Bakumatsu Senzaimaru Kenjunmaru,” Tōkyō daigaku Shiryō hensanjo kenkyū kiyō 13 (March 2003): 180–81. 14. Kawashima Shin, Chūgoku kindai gaikō no keisei, p. 215; Kawashima Shin, “Jūkyū seiki chūki Higashi Ajia ni okeru kokusaihō juyō o meguru enshinryoku to kyūshinryoku, Shinchō gaikō monjo kara mita ‘Shanhai’ ‘Nagasaki’ ‘Pekin’ ‘Edo’ no shisha kankei,” Hokudai hōgaku ronshū 50.1 (1999): 188–90. 15. The term is often translated as “tax farming” or “engrossment” and was regularly attacked by officials in the Ming and Qing eras. See Philip A. Kuhn, “Local Self-Government Under the Republic: Problems of Control, Autonomy, and

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Mobilization,” in Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China, ed. Frederic Wakeman, Jr. and Carolyn Grant, pp. 268, 278; Kwang-ching Liu, “The Ch’ing Restoration,” in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 10: Late Ch’ ing, 1800–1911, Part 1, ed. John K. Fairbank, pp. 440, 445; Muramatsu Yūji, Kindai Kōnan no soen: Chūgoku jinushi seido no kenkyū, pp. 681–747; and Pierre-Étienne Will and R. Bin Wong (with James Lee), Nourish the People: The State Civilian Granary System in China, 1650–1850, pp. 228, 350, 393. The fullest treatment of the subject thus far to appear in print can be found in Nishimura Genshō, “Shinsho no hōran, shichō taisei no kakuritsu, kaikin kara ukeoi chōzeisei e,” Tōyō shi kenkyū 33.3 (December 1976): 114–74. 16. “Qinming Zongli geguo shiwu yamen Qing dang, wuyue geguo an, Riben,” Zongli Yamen archives, fi le 01–21–22-(1), n.p., trans. Huang Rongguang, “Bakumatsu Senzaimaru Kenjunmaru,” Tōkyō daigaku Shiryō hensanjo kenkyū kiyō 13 (March 2003): 181. 17. “Qinming Zongli geguo shiwu yamen Qing dang, wuyue geguo an, Riben,” Zongli Yamen archives, fi le 01–21–22-(1), n.p., trans. Huang Rongguang, “Bakumatsu Senzaimaru Kenjunmaru,” Tōkyō daigaku Shiryō hensanjo kenkyū kiyō 13 (March 2003): 181. 18. “Qinming Zongli geguo shiwu yamen Qing dang, wuyue geguo an, Riben,” Zongli Yamen archives, fi le 01–21–22-(1), n.p., trans. Huang Rongguang, “Bakumatsu Senzaimaru Kenjunmaru,” Tōkyō daigaku Shiryō hensanjo kenkyū kiyō 13 (March 2003): 181–82. 19. “Qinming Zongli geguo shiwu yamen Qing dang, wuyue geguo an, Riben,” Zongli Yamen archives, fi le 01–21–22-(1), n.p., trans. Huang Rongguang, “Bakumatsu Senzaimaru Kenjunmaru,” Tōkyō daigaku Shiryō hensanjo kenkyū kiyō 13 (March 2003): 182. See also Wang Xi, Li Hongzhang yu Zhong-Ri dingyue, 1871, pp. 6–8; Chow Jen Hwa, China and Japan, pp. 23–30. 20. “Qinming Zongli geguo shiwu yamen Qing dang, wuyue geguo an, Riben,” Zongli Yamen archives, fi le 01–21–22-(1), n.p., trans. Huang Rongguang, “Bakumatsu Senzaimaru Kenjunmaru,” Tōkyō daigaku Shiryō hensanjo kenkyū kiyō 13 (March 2003): 183–84. 21. Th is point was actually raised to them, according to Wu Xu in a secret memorial; see “Qinming Zongli geguo shiwu yamen Qing dang, wuyue geguo an, Riben,” Zongli Yamen archives, fi le 01–21–22-(1), n.p., trans. Huang Rongguang, “Bakumatsu Senzaimaru Kenjunmaru,” Tōkyō daigaku Shiryō hensanjo kenkyū kiyō 13 (March 2003): 184. 22. “Qinming Zongli geguo shiwu yamen Qing dang, wuyue geguo an, Riben,” Zongli Yamen archives, fi le 01–21–22-(1), n.p., trans. Huang Rongguang, “Bakumatsu Senzaimaru Kenjunmaru,” Tōkyō daigaku Shiryō hensanjo kenkyū kiyō 13 (March 2003): 185. These are not empty words, as demonstrated in the work of Wang Yong: “Realistic and Fantastic Images of ‘Dwarf Pirates’: The Evolution of Ming Dynasty Perceptions of the Japanese,” in Sagacious Monks and Bloodthirsty Warriors: Chinese Views of Japan in the Ming-Qing Period, ed. Joshua A. Fogel, pp. 17–41. 23. “Qinming Zongli geguo shiwu yamen Qing dang, wuyue geguo an, Riben,” Zongli Yamen archives, fi le 01–21–22-(1), n.p., trans. Huang Rongguang,

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“Bakumatsu Senzaimaru Kenjunmaru,” Tōkyō daigaku Shiryō hensanjo kenkyū kiyō 13 (March 2003): 185. 24. Hibino Teruhiro, Zeiyūroku, pp. 80–81. Zhang Han (fl. early fourth century) was an official in the Jin dynasty from Wujun.

chapter eight 1. Kawashima Motojirō, “Kaikoku igo saisho no Shanhai bōeki,” Shōgyō to keizai 2 (1922): 31–64. 2. Haruna Akira, “Nakamuda Kuranosuke no Shanhai keiken saikō: ‘Kōgi onyakuyaku Karakuni Shanhai omote ni te dōtai sono hoka to ōsetsusho’ o chūshin ni,” Kokugakuin daigaku kiyō 39 (March 2001): 96–100. Summarized in Miyanaga Takashi, Takasugi Shinsaku no Shanhai repotto, pp. 159–60; and more frankly and in greater detail in Feng Tianyu, “Qiansuiwan” Shanghai xing, pp. 242–46. 3. Koga Jūjirō’s Maruyama yūjo to Tō kōmōjin is the longest and fullest study of the phenomenon of prostitutes trained to serve the distinctive needs of the all-male Chinese resident populace of Nagasaki and the issue of unexpected offspring from such binational unions, but there have been more recent studies as well. This is, of course, the story from the other side of the East China Sea, but the Japanese were just being cautious given such a history and the problems involved. For a discussion of binational prostitution, Chinese in Nagasaki and Japanese in Shanghai, in particular, as well as the offspring produced by such unions and all the legal ramifications, see Tang Quan, Umi o koeta tsuyagoto: Nit-Chū bunka kōryū hishi. 4. Haruna Akira, “Nakamuda Kuranosuke no Shanhai keiken saikō,” Kokugakuin daigaku kiyō 39 (March 2001): 87–94; summary in Miyanaga Takashi, Takasugi Shinsaku no Shanhai repotto, pp. 160–62. 5. Matsudaya Hankichi, “Tōkoku tokai nikki,” Shanhai kenkyū 1 (1942): 130, rpt. in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, 11:54. 6. Matsudaya Hankichi, “Tōkoku tokai nikki,” Shanhai kenkyū 1 (1942): 131–32, 148–49, 152–62, rpt. in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, 11:55–56, 72–73, 76–86. 7. Matsudaya Hankichi, “Tōkoku tokai nikki,” Shanhai kenkyū 1 (1942): 132, rpt. in Bakumatsu Meiji Chūgoku kenbunroku shūsei, 11:56. 8. Kawashima Motojirō, Nankoku shiwa, p. 164; see also Kawashima Motojirō, “Kaikoku igo saisho no Shanhai bōeki,” Shōgyō to keizai 2 (1922): 31–64.

chapter nine 1. Boston Shipping List, March 27, 1861; October 23, 1861; November 6, 1861; November 20, 1861. Boston Shipping List (January 8, 1862) gives September 6, 1861, as the date of the ship’s sale to the Japanese. no t e s

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2. This information is taken from Enrollments of New Bedford, Massachusetts, 1841–1939, n.p.; Forrest R. Holdcamper, comp., List of American-Flag Merchant Vessels That Received Certificates or Registry at the Port of New York, 1789–1867, p. 35; American Lloyd’s Register of American and Foreign Shipping 1861, p. 122; “Merchants Vessels Sold from the Opening of the Th ree Ports of Yokohama, Nagasaki, and Hakodadi, 1st July, 1859,” North-China Herald and Market Report (April 27, 1867), p. 40; and a personal e-communication (dated January 24, 2005) from Wendy Schnur of the G. W. Blunt White Library, The Museum of America and the Sea, Mystic, Connecticut. Other relevant information about the Althea: master, Hattit Kelley; owners, Simpson Hart ½, John W. Howland ¼, Hattit Kelley ¼; surveyor, Alexander G. Ryder; captain, Luce. Japanese sources listed in the next note occasionally offer confl icting information, such as the date and site of the Althea’s construction. 3. Katsu Kaishū, Kaigun rekishi, p. 444; Okita Hajime, Nihon to Shanhai, pp. 173–74; Honjō Eijirō, “Japan’s Overseas Trade,” pp. 19–21. 4. Compiled from a number of sources: Okita Hajime, “Nōsuchaina Herarudo no bakumatsuji no Nihon kankei kiji,” Ryūkoku daigaku ronshū 417 (October 1980): 25; Miyanaga Takashi, Takasugi Shinsaku no Shanhai repotto, pp. 176–77; Yamaguchi Sekijirō, “Tōkoku Shanhai e makarikoshi sōrō gi mōshiage sōrō kakitsuke,” in Zoku tsūshin zenran, ruijū no bu, vol. 29, pp. 721–35. 5. Willem J. C. R. Huyssen van Kattendyke, Nagasaki kaigun denshūjo no hibi, trans. Mizuta Nobutoshi. 6. According to Katō Hiroyuki (1836–1916), the famous Meiji thinker, Moriyama was responsible for re-coining the term jiyū from its traditional Zen-inspired sense of arbitrary self-indulgence to its modern meaning of freedom or liberty. It later was introduced with this sense into China, pronounced ziyou. See Suzuki Shūji, “ ‘Shūkyō’ to ‘jiyū’,” in his Nihon Kango to Chūgoku: Kanji bunkaken no kindaika, p. 145. 7. Mutō Chōzō, “Genji gannen Shanhai haken kansen Kenjunmaru ni kanshi Ishiwata hakase teikyō no shiryō,” Shōgyō to keizai 8.1 (November 1927): 131–32; Mutō Chōzō, “Bunkyū ninen no kansen daiichiji Shanhai haken to Bunkyū sannen-Genji gannen no dainiji Shanhai haken ni kansuru shiryō ni tsuite,” Shōgyō to keizai 5.2 (February 1925): 168; www.city.hakodate.hokkaido.jp/soumu/hensan/ jimbutsu_ver1.0/b_jimbutsu/ebiko_sue.htm. 8. Much of what we know of the nuts and bolts of the actual voyage comes from two sources: Kōho shi, the report submitted to the shogunate upon their return to Edo, published in Shinmura Izuru, ed., “Genji gannen ni okeru bakuri no Shanhai shisatsu ki,” rpt. in Ensei sōkō, pp. 344–75; and the memoir of Yamaguchi Kyochoku, “Meiji izen no Shina bōeki,” Kyū bakufu 5.3 (April 1901): 20–28. 9. The Kōho shi reports Moriyama’s address to the Chinese captain to have been delivered in elegant Japanese, which is highly unlikely, and was more likely a Kanbun brush conversation or via English as an intermediary language. Okita Hajime simply states that they had an exchange by brush; see his Nihon to Shanhai, p. 181. 10. Yamaguchi Kyochoku, “Meiji izen no Shina bōeki,” pp. 20–21.

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11. North-China Herald, April 2, 1864, supplementary page. The notice also mentions that the ship departed Japan on March 18, and the consignee is listed not as Kroes but as “Order” (meaning unclear). This same notice appeared on the same supplementary page in the April 9, April 16, April 23, April 30, and May 7 issues. See also Okita Hajime, “Nōsuchaina Herarudo no bakumatsuji no Nihon kankei kiji,” Ryūkoku daigaku ronshū 417 (October 1980): 24–25; Okita Hajime, Shanhai hōjin shi kenkyū, pp. 67, 68. 12. Kōho shi, in Shinmura Izuru, ed., “Genji gannen ni okeru bakuri no Shanhai shisatsu ki,” p. 348; Yamaguchi Kyochoku, “Meiji izen no Shina bōeki,” p. 22. 13. Stanley Lane-Poole, The Life of Sir Harry Parkes, K.C.B., G.C.M.G., sometime Her Majesty’s minister to China & Japan, vol. 1, p. 469. 14. For more information on Ying Baoshi and his bureaucratic career, see Leung Yuen-sang, The Shanghai Daotai: Linkage Man in a Changing Society, 1843–1890, pp. 28, 77, 82, 103, 177; Honjō Eijirō, ed., Bakumatsu bōeki shiryō, p. 17. 15. Richard John Lynn, “Straddling the Tradition-Modernity Divide: Huang Zunxian (1848–1905) and His Poems on Miscellaneous Subjects from Japan,” in SinoJapanese Transculturation: From the Late Nineteenth Century to the End of the Pacific War, ed. Richard King, Cody Poulton, and Katsuhiko Endo, p. 26; Christian Galan, “Le paysage scolaire à la veille de la restauration de Meiji: écoles and manuels,” Ebisu 17 (1998): 32. 16. Shinmura Izuru, ed., “Genji gannen ni okeru bakuri no Shanhai shisatsu ki,” pp. 352–55; Yamaguchi Kyochoku, “Meiji izen no Shina bōeki,” p. 24. 17. Edited by Qian Yi, published by Dushitang; there is a copy of the 1877 edition in the Stanford University Library and of the 1889 edition in the HarvardYenching Library and the Guest Library at Princeton University. 18. Shinmura Izuru, ed., “Genji gannen ni okeru bakuri no Shanhai shisatsu ki,” p. 347; Yamaguchi Kyochoku, “Meiji izen no Shina bōeki,” pp. 23–24. 19. “Qinming Zongli geguo shiwu yamen Qing dang, wuyue geguo an, Riben,” Zongli Yamen archives, fi le 01–21–22-(1), n.p., trans. Huang Rongguang, “Bakumatsu Senzaimaru Kenjunmaru,” p. 186. 20. “Qinming Zongli geguo shiwu yamen Qing dang, wuyue geguo an, Riben,” Zongli Yamen archives, fi le 01–21–22-(1), n.p., trans. Huang Rongguang, “Bakumatsu Senzaimaru Kenjunmaru,” p. 186. 21. “Qinming Zongli geguo shiwu yamen Qing dang, wuyue geguo an, Riben,” Zongli Yamen archives, fi le 01–21–22-(1), n.p., trans. Huang Rongguang, “Bakumatsu Senzaimaru Kenjunmaru,” pp. 186–87. 22. “Qinming Zongli geguo shiwu yamen Qing dang, wuyue geguo an, Riben,” Zongli Yamen archives, fi le 01–21–22-(1), n.p., trans. Huang Rongguang, “Bakumatsu Senzaimaru Kenjunmaru,” p. 187. On Li Hongzhang’s attitudes and actions toward Japan, see Bai Chunyan, “Ri Kōshō no tai-Nichi kan: ‘Nis-Shin shūkō jōki’ teiketsu made no keii o chūshin ni,” Soshiosaiensu 18 (March 2012): 113–28. 23. “Qinming Zongli geguo shiwu yamen Qing dang, wuyue geguo, Riben,” Zongli Yamen archives, fi le 01–21–22-(2), n.p., trans. Huang Rongguang, “Bakumatsu Senzaimaru Kenjunmaru,” pp. 188–89.

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24. Kawashima Shin, “Jūkyū seiki chūki Higashi Ajia ni okeru kokusaihō juyō o meguru enshinryoku to kyūshinryoku, Shinchō gaikō monjo kara mita ‘Shanhai’ ‘Nagasaki’ ‘Pekin’ ‘Edo’ no shisha kankei,” Hokudai hōgaku ronshū 50.1 (1999): 189; Pär Cassell, Grounds of Judgment: Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in Nineteenth-Century China and Japan, pp. 97, 215n69. See also Kawashima Shin’s magisterial work, Chūgoku kindai gaikō no keisei. 25. Mutō Chōzō, “Genji gannen Shanhai haken kansen Kenjunmaru,” p. 133. 26. Cited in Okita Hajime, Nihon to Shanhai, pp. 180–81. 27. Kōho shi, p. 350; also cited in Miyanaga Takashi, Takasugi Shinsaku no Shanhai repotto, p. 186. 28. Yamaguchi Kyohoku, “Meiji izen no Shina bōeki,” p. 25; Shinmura Izuru, ed., “Genji gannen ni okeru bakuri no Shanhai shisatsu ki,” pp. 368–69, 372. 29. Quoted in Miyanaga Takashi, Takasugi Shinsaku no Shanhai repotto, p. 189. On the “Kakkaron,” see R. H. van Gulik, “Kakkaron: A Japanese Echo of the Opium War,” Monumenta Serica 4 (1939–1940): 478–545. 30. In Wang Xiqi, ed., Xiaofanghu zhai yudi congchao, 10: 265–66. See also Zhou Qiqian, “Chinese Intellectuals’ View of Japan in the Late Qing,” trans. Shao Dan and Joshua A. Fogel, in Sagacious Monks and Bloodthirsty Warriors: Chinese Views of Japan in the Ming-Qing Period, ed. Joshua A. Fogel, pp. 259–60. 31. Yamaguchi Kyochoku, “Meiji izen no Shina bōeki,” pp. 27–28. 32. Several years earlier, konbu had been an especially lucrative commodity in Sino-Japanese trade. See Okita Hajime, Kojō shi dan: Shanhai ni kansuru shiteki zuihitsu, pp. 99–100; Joshua Fogel, Articulating the Sinosphere, pp. 79–80; Fogel, “Japanese Travelers to Shanghai in the 1860s,” in Historiography and Japanese Consciousness of Values and Norms, ed. Fogel and James Baxter, p. 82. 33. Okita Hajime, Nihon to Shanhai, pp. 182–83. 34. Kawashima Shin, “Jūkyū seiki chūki Higashi Ajia,” pp. 189–90. 35. Ishii Takashi, Zōtei Meiji ishin no kokusaiteki kankyō bunsatsu ni, p. 468; Kimoto Itaru, Ōmura Masujirō no shōgai: Ishin no gunzō, pp. 150–51; Itoya Toshio, Ōmura Masujirō: Bakumatsu Ishin no heisei kaikaku, p. 97; Tanaka Sōgorō, Kindai gunsei no sōshisha, Ōmura Masujirō, p. 154; Kimura Kihachirō, Ōmura Masujirō den, pp. 165–69; Furukawa Kaoru, Bakumatsu Chōshū han no jōi sensō. Given the secrecy of the mission, it should not be too surprising that not a single document remains extant about this trip, save a memo by Ōmura himself. 36. “Genji ninen shigatsu tsuitachi, Seiyō sen happyaku rokujūgo daishigatsu nijūgonichi Shina Shanhai Amerika gasshūkoku konshuru zeneraaru kan ni okite, Oranda Hiise konshurute Kurūsu tsūben Ishikawa Iwaji, Nishi Kichijūrō, Sugiura Aizō, Akoku konshuru zeneraaru Shiwaruto to taiwa no oboe,” in Sugiura Yuzuru zenshū, 1: 189–91. In his otherwise fine chronicling of this event, Miyanaga Takashi (Takasugi Shinsaku no Shanhai repotto, pp. 201–5, including a picture on p. 205) confuses George Seward and William H. Seward (1801–1872). The latter was secretary of state under President Abraham Lincoln (1812–1865) and at the time of this affair in Shanghai was recuperating from the coordinated attempt on his life on April 14 that killed the president. George Seward was consul in Shanghai. I spent a

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great deal of time trying to see if this vessel was the same as the famed ironclad from the Civil War in the United States—no apparent connection. 37. Tan Kiyoshi, Ōmura Masujirō, as quoted in Miyanaga Takashi, Takasugi Shinsaku no Shanhai repotto, p. 207; Japanese slightly modernized in Uchida Shin, ed., Ōmura Masujirō monjo, p. 223. 38. Okita Hajime, “Nōsuchaina Herarudo,” p. 27. 39. “Shina to gojōyaku otorimusubi kata tetsuzuki ukeritamawari tadashi sōrō shimatsu oboegaki,” in Sugiura Yuzuru zenshū, 1:196–97. See also Matsuzawa Hiroaki, “Bakumatsu Seiyō kō to Chūgoku kenbun,” part 2, Hokudai hōgaku ronsō 43.2 (October 1992): 203–4. 40. Abe Yasuta, Shina kenbunroku, handwritten manuscript, Kyoto University Library. Many thanks to Professor Fuma Susumu for securing a copy of this exceedingly rare work for me. 41. Tanaka Masahiro, Ugata Kōan, bakumatsu no i to oshie, p. 324. 42. “Yōga no senkaku Takahashi Yuichi shi den (yon),” Bijutsu shinpō 4.9 (July 12, 1905): 68; Sakai Tetsuo, “Shin (Shin) wa saibu ni yadoritamau: Takahashi Yuichi no hito to geijutsu,” in Takahashi Yuichi ten, kindai Yōga no reimei, botsugo 100 nen, p. 7. The bibliography on Takahashi is virtually endless. 43. Kawakita Michiaki, Kindai Nihon bijutsu no kenkyū, pp. 63, 64. 44. The North-China Herald for February 23, 1867, announced the arrival: “Prince Minboutayou and 30 officers of his suite.” For a fuller discussion of this embassy to the International Exposition, see Miyanaga Takashi, Purinsu Akitake no Ōshū kikō, Keiō 3 nen Pari banpaku shisetsu. See also W. G. Beasley, Japan Encounters the Barbarian: Japanese Travelers in America and Europe, pp. 114–17; Masao Miyoshi, As We Saw Them: The First Japanese Embassy to the United States (1860), p. 175. 45. Some of his brush talks have been collected in Nagura Don and Ōbayashi Sen, Sanji jōyū roku kan no san hitsugo, manuscript held in Kyoto University Library. See also Morita Yoshihiko, “Heigakusha Nagura Shindon no bakumatsu kaigai kenbun,” Teikyō daigaku bungakubu kiyō, Nihon bunkagaku 40 (2009): 63, 78. 46. See Takahashi’s diary in Aoki Shigeru, ed., Meiji Yōga shiryō, kirokuhen, pp. 13–22. The sketch of Wang and several others are included in Tanaka Akira, Nihon no kinsei, vol. 18: Kindai kokka e no shikō, unpaginated. See also Haga Tōru, “Bakumatsu no aru Yōgaka: Takahashi Yuichi no bunkateki ichi,” Jiyū 5 (December 1963): 136–44. 47. “Takahashi Yuichi rireki,” in Meiji geijutsu bungaku ronshū, vol. 79 of Meiji bungaku zenshū, ed. Hijikata Teiichi, p. 254; Harada Hikaru, explanatory note in Takahashi Yuichi ten, p. 109. 48. Abe Yasuta, Shina kenbunroku, pp. 4–5; see also Miyanaga Takashi, Takasugi Shinsaku no Shanhai repotto, pp. 211–13. 49. Okita Hajime, Nihon to Shanhai, p. 222. 50. Wang Tao, “Ribenren Hongguang,” in Wengyou yutan, fascicle 2; Wang Liqun, “Cong Wang Tao kan shijiu shiji zhongye Zhongguo wenren de Riben guan,” Beijing keji daxue xuebao (shehui kexueban) 26.3 (September 2010): 103; Okita

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Hajime, Nihon to Shanhai, pp. 195–97; Yonezawa Hideo, Shanhai shiwa, pp. 159–60. 51. “Qinming Zongli geguo shiwu yamen Qingdang, wuyue geguo jilu, Riben” (01–21–22 [3]), trans. Huang Rongguang, “Bakumatsu Senzaimaru Kenjunmaru,” p. 190. 52. “Qinming Zongli geguo shiwu yamen Qingdang, wuyue geguo jilu, Riben,” in Huang Rongguang, “Bakumatsu Senzaimaru Kenjunmaru,” pp. 191, 192. 53. “Qinming Zongli geguo shiwu yamen Qingdang, wuyue geguo jilu, Riben,” in Huang Rongguang, “Bakumatsu Senzaimaru Kenjunmaru,” p. 192; Toyama Mikio, Nagasaki bugyō: Edo bakufu no mimi to me, pp. 178–80. 54. “Qinming Zongli geguo shiwu yamen Qingdang, wuyue geguo jilu, Riben,” in Huang Rongguang, “Bakumatsu Senzaimaru Kenjunmaru,” pp. 195, 200. 55. The one possible exception here is Zhang Xiuzhi, an official in an office concerned with coastal defense, whom Takahashi met on February 25 and several of the other Japanese met later. He is mentioned several times in Shanghai xian xuzhi, ed. Yao Wennan, p. 9a.

chapter ten 1. Several examples among many would include: Yamaoka Sōhachi, Takasugi Shinsaku; Murakami Genzō, Takasugi Shinsaku; Ikemiya Shōichirō, Takasugi Shinsaku; Shiba Ryōtarō, Yo ni sumu hibi. 2. Paul Pickowicz, China on Film: A Century of Exploration, Confrontation, and Controversy, p. 101. There is also a Chinese version of this chapter from Pickowicz’s book: Bi Kewei, “Chunjiang yihen de shishi feifei yu lunzhan shiqi de Zhongguo dianying,” Wenyi yanjiu 1 (2007): 105–13. Few others in the Western world have so much as mentioned this fi lm and fewer still have seen it. See, for example, Poshek Fu, Between Shanghai and Hong Kong: The Politics of Chinese Cinemas, pp. 126–29. 3. See Segawa Ken’ichirō, Bandō Tsumasaburō; Peter B. High, The Imperial Screen: Japanese Film Culture in the Fifteen Years’ War, 1931–1945; Inagaki Hiroshi, Nihon eiga no wakaki hibi. The rediscovery of Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru coincided with the centenary of Bantsuma’s birth and occasioned a number of fi lm retrospectives and photography exhibitions in Japan in his honor. 4. Okazaki Kōzō, Himawari to kyamera: Satsuei kantoku Okazaki Kōzō ichidaiki, p. 100. See also Mitsuyosi Mitsugi, “Metropole Club,” online at www.geocities .jp/metropoleclub/movie/ooedo/2003.html (accessed March 2013). 5. Pickowicz, China on Film (pp. 101–20), translates the Chinese title as “Remorse in Shanghai.” Whose “remorse,” Chinese or Japanese, is unclear. 6. Tsuji Shōjirō, “ ‘Tōwa shōji’ to Kawakita fusai no gyōseki,” Kumamoto daigaku sōgō kamoku kenkyūhōkoku 3 (2000): 78–86; Michael Baskett, The Attractive Empire: Transnational Film Culture in Imperial Japan, pp. 120, 142, 170, 184. 238

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7. Poshek Fu argues that Kawakita was considerably more self-concerned than my analysis suggests, that he was intent on producing entertainment and was concerned about alienating the bulk of the Shanghai fi lm world who might flee to the hinterland should the Japanese apply too restrictive a policy on fi lm-makers. He thus pushed for the creation of a single, centralized fi lm industry in Shanghai under his Zhonghua dianying gongsi that would be of, by, and for the Chinese people. See Poshek Fu, “The Ambiguity of Entertainment: Chinese Cinema in JapaneseOccupied Shanghai, 1941 to 45,” Cinema Journal 37.1 (Fall 1997): 68–69, 72–73; Poshek Fu, “Projecting Ambivalence: Chinese Cinema in Semi-Occupied Shanghai, 1937–41,” in Wartime Shanghai, pp. 86–109; Shimizu Akira, Shanhai sokai eiga watakushi shi; Tsuji Hisakazu, Chūka den’ei shiwa, ichi heisotsu no Nit-Chū eiga kaisōki 1939–1945; Yamane Sadao, “Yamane Sadao no otanoshimi zeminaaru,” liner notes to the video of Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru (distributed by Kinema Club, 2001). Fu also details Kawakita’s relationship to Zhang Shankun (1907–1957), the man in charge of the day-to-day operations of Zhonghua dianying gongsi. 8. Yahiro Fuji, Jidai eiga to gojūnen, as cited in Takase Masahiro, Wagagokoro no Inagaki Hiroshi, p. 234. 9. Masuda Wataru, Seigaku tōzen to Chūgoku jijō: “zassho” sakki, pp. 21–22, 135–39. 10. Hibino Teruhiro, Zeiyūroku, p. 65; see also Satō Saburō, “Bunkyū ninen ni okeru bakufu bōekisen Senzaimaru no Shanhai haken ni tsuite,” in his Kindai NitChū kōshō shi no kenkyū, p. 91. I translated this section of his account in The Literature of Travel in the Japanese Rediscovery of China, 1862–1945, p. 45. Inasmuch as Hibino’s account was not published until 1946, it is not clear if it was readily available in any form earlier. 11. Ishihara Michihiro, “Nihon tō shichishu: Chūgoku ni okeru Nihonkan no ichimen,” Ibaraki daigaku bunrigakubu kiyō, jinbun kagaku 11 (December 1960): 17–26. 12. In a 1997 article, Poshek Fu was much more critical of the fi lm as a propagandistic effort to rouse anti-Western sentiment, though he had at that point not as yet been able to actually view the movie. See his “The Ambiguity of Entertainment: Chinese Cinema in Japanese-Occupied Shanghai, 1941 to 1945,” Cinema Journal 37.1 (Fall 1997): 79. He was relying on interviews with surviving Chinese actors, such as Lü Yuye (in the role of Zhang Xiang), who was still smarting after four decades. The final character of Lü’s name, “ye,” is often read “kun” in essays mentioning him, but no dictionary gives this reading; the character may have been mistranscribed. 13. Jen Yu-wen, Taiping Revolutionary Movement, pp. 448–49, 458–59. 14. For an interesting critique of the movie Lincoln along similar lines, mutatis mutandis, see Maureen Dowd, “The Oscar for Best Fabrication,” New York Times, February 16, 2013 (online at www.nytimes.com/2013/02/17/opinion/sunday/dowdthe-oscar-for-best-fabrication.html?_r = 0, accessed February 2013), and the brouhaha that has ensued. Argo has been subject to a similar, though less vitriolic, critique. 15. It actually was flying three flags: the Hinomaru, the British flag because of the British crew (and because Britain did have relations with China), and the Dutch flag because of the presence of Tombrink, the supercargo on board.

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16. The earliest recorded instance of the modern word for “colony” in Japanese, shokuminchi, seems to have been 1868 in a newspaper article referring to Australia as a colony of England; shokuminchi was written in this case in an alternate form. See the entry for “Shokuminchi” in Nihon kokugo daijiten, 7:341. See also Furukawa Kaoru, Bakumatsu Chōshū han no jōi sensō, p. 80; Ikeda Satoshi, Takasugi Shinsaku to Kusaka Genzui, henkakki no shōnenzō, p. 119; Naramoto Tatsuya, Takasugi Shinsaku, ishin zenya no gunzō, pp. 106–15; Takasugi Shinsaku, Yū-Shin goroku, in Takasugi Shinsaku zenshū, 2:178, 185; Tanaka Akira, Kaikoku, p. 244. 17. Inagaki Hiroshi, Nihon eiga no wakaki hibi, pp. 281–82. 18. Inagaki Hiroshi, Nihon eiga no wakaki hibi, pp. 203–4. 19. All three Japanese leads—Bandō, Tsukigata, and Ishiguro—were wellknown period-piece actors at the time of fi lming. Only Ishiguro was remotely close in age to the character he was portraying. Bandō and Tsukigata were actually almost twice the age of their characters and it shows, particular Bandō who was forty-three to the real Takasugi’s twenty-two. 20. Wang Wenhe, Jiaoxiang le chuohao de yingxing, pp. 81–109; Paul Fonoroff, “Han Langen,” in www.gstage.com/cgi-bin/f_article.cgi?article = 2721 (no longer available). See also Zhongguo dianyingjia xiehui dianying shi yanjiubu, ed., Zhongguo dianyingjia liezhuan, p. 303; and www.chinesemirror.com/index/2011/10 /han-langen-1909–1982-the-skinny-monkey.html (accessed March 2013). 21. The information in the preceding paragraph was drawn from a number of Chinese and Japanese websites devoted to fi lm history, such as that of the “Hongse jingdian” (Red classics), which features a biographical portrait of Wang Danfeng that makes no mention whatsoever of Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru; see “Xiaozhouxuan, Wang Danfeng” (Socialite Wang Danfeng), Hongse jingdian, online at www. cctv.com/specials/hsjd/sanji/wangdanfeng.html (accessed April 2013), and a number of Japanese sites marking retrospectives for Bandō Tsumasaburō’s fi lms.

conclusion 1. See the extraordinary collection of paintings that took this community and the Chinese Compound in Nagasaki as its theme in Ōba Osamu, ed., Nagasaki Tōkan zu shūsei, kinsei Nit-Chū kōhō shiryōshū 6, and the excellent appended essays. 2. Matsumoto Tadao, “Shanhai ni okeru Nihonjin hatten no shoki,” Tōyō 42 (October 1939): 40–41. See also Pär Cassel’s excellent recent study, Grounds of Judgment: Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in Nineteenth-Century China and Japan. 3. Cited in Kobayashi Yoshiaki, Shimin kakumei no senkusha: Takasugi Shinsaku, p. 72. 4. There are many sources on the Kiheitai, but a convenient one is Tominari Hiroshi, Takasugi Shinsaku, pp. 148–68. 5. Writing in the early twentieth century as the Qing dynasty was coming to an end, the great Sinologist Naitō Konan (1866–1934) argued that the tendency over 240

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the previous millennium in Chinese history was a democratizing trend as evidenced by the elimination of aristocracy from the Song era on and the enhanced role played by commoners in culture and politics (what he referred to as heiminshugi). It was precisely the Taipings, in his view, whose impulse toward “communism” (kyōsanshugi) sought to arrest that trend by attacking the very structure of local Chinese society and was thus doomed. Zeng Guofan and his colleagues understood all this and used local society to defend against and fight off the alien Taipings. See his Shinchō suibō ron, in Naitō Konan zenshū, vol. 5, p. 429.

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glossa ry

Abe no Nakamaro 阿部仲麻呂 Abe Yasuta 安倍保太 Abe Yasutarō 安倍安太郎 Aizu 會津 Andō Nobuyuki 安藤信睦 (Nobumasa 信正, Tsushima no kami 馬守) Aofei jilüe 奧匪記略 Aoinohata 葵の旗 Ashizawa Shunnosuke 蘆澤駿之助 Ashizawa Tamiji 蘆澤多美次 Awa 阿波 Bandō Tsumasaburō 坂東妻三郎 Bansho shirabesho 蕃書調所 Bantsuma 坂妻 baolan 包攬 bitan 筆談 (J. hitsudan) Botsubi hitsugo 沒鼻筆語 bu 步 bugyō 奉行 Chan 禪 (J. Zen) “Changfazei” 長髮賊 “Changmaozei” 長毛賊 Changxingdao 長興島 Chao Heng 晁衡 Chen Depei 陳德培 (Zimao 子茂)

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Chen Huacheng 陳化成 Chen Ruqin 陳汝欽 Chen Xiuwen 陳秀文 Chen Yucheng 陳玉成 Chōhatsuzoku 長髪賊 chonmage 丁髷 Chōshū 長州 Chōzō 長藏 Chunjiang yihen 春江遺恨 Chun Ling 春舲 Chūnoshin 忠之進 Chunxi 淳熙 Cixi (battle site) 慈溪 Cixi (Empress Dowager) 慈禧 Daiei eiga kabushiki gaisha 大映映畫株式會社 Dai-Ei zokkoku 大英屬國 Daishuxue 代數學 daitōryō 大統領 Danshan Islands 丹山列島 Daoguang 道光 deiriguchi 出入口 Denjirō 傳次郎 “Dianqu yanghang” 點取洋行 “Dianye yanghang” 點耶洋行 Ding Richang 丁日昌 doshō no gotoku 土墻の如く Eastern Zhongshan Road 中山東路 Ebiko Shihei 蛯子砥平 Ebiko Suejirō 蛯子末次郎 (Sumiyoshi 純善) Fei-peng 飛鵬 Fujita Shuma 藤田主馬 (Gen’ichi 元一) Fukagawa Chōemon 深川長右衛門 Fukue 福江 Fukumatsu 福松 funayoi 船酔い

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“Futotcho Rin” 太っちょ霖 “Gaijō tansoku roku, kan no er” 外情探索錄、巻之貳 “Gaijō tansoku roku: Shanhai sōron” 外情探索錄：上海總論 gaikoku bugyō 外國奉行 gakka shūgyō 學科修業 gakujutsu 學術 gakujutsu o denshū shitari 學術を傳習したり gaoliang jiu 高粱酒 “Gaoshan xiansheng” 高杉先生 Genjirō 元次郎 Ge Yuanxu 元煦 gō 合 Godai Saisuke 五代才助 (Tomoatsu 友厚) gojūyaku shichinin 御重役七人 Gokyōkan 五教館 Gong 恭 Gotō 五島 Goyōzei 後陽成 Guan Qingmei 管慶楳 Guan Yu 關羽 (Guandi 關帝) Gu He 顧翯 Gu Lin 顧麟 guo 國 guo (Taiping character) 囯 Hachizō 八藏 Haipai 海派 hakama 袴 Hamada Hikozō 濱田彦藏 Hamamatsu 濱松 Hanjian 漢奸 Han Lan’gen 韓蘭根 Harada Hikaru 原田光 Hatano Shōgorō 波多野承五郎 Hata Tsuguhisa 秦世壽 Hayashi Saburō 林三郎

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heiminshugi 平民主義 Hibino Teruhiro 日比野輝寛 Hinomaru 日の丸 Hirado 平戶 Hirai Renji 平井錬次 Hirobaba 廣馬場 hitsugo 筆語 hobashira 帆柱 honba 奔馬 Hongji yanghang 宏記洋行 Hongkou 虹口 “Hongse jingdian” 红色经典 Hong Xiuquan 洪秀全 Hori Oribe no shō 堀織部正 (Toshihiro 利煕) Hoshino Kazuyuki 星野千之 Hotta Masatomo 堀田正倫 (Sagami no kami 相模守) Huachengtang 化成湯 Huangbo 黃檗 (J. Ōbaku) Huang Fang 黃芳 Huang Jueci 黃爵滋 Huangpu River 黃浦江 Huang Shiquan 黃式權 Huating County 華亭縣 Hua Yilun 華翼綸 Hu Linyi 胡林翼 huo 或 Hu Xingyi 胡興裔 Hu Xinling 胡心靈 Hyōkichi 兵吉 ichinichi 一日 ie 家 Iemochi 家茂 Iijima Hanjūrō 飯島半十郎 Ikeda Chōhatsu 池田長發 (Chikugo no kami 筑後守) Inagaki Hiroshi 稲垣浩

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Inoue Masanao 井上正直 (Kawachi no kami 河内守) Inuzuka Shakusaburō 犬塚鑅三郎 Ishiguro Tatsuya 石黒達也 Ishikawa Iwaji 石川岩司 Ishikawa Yoshihiro 石川禎浩 Ishiwata Masakichi 石渡政吉 (Kōmei 弘明) Itō Gunhachi 伊藤郡八 Itō Jinshirō 伊東甚四郎 Iwagaki Matsunae 巖恒松苗 Iwase Kōho 岩瀨公圃 Iwase Yashirō 岩瀨彌四郎 Jiang haiguan zeli 江海關則例 Jiang Ming 姜明 Jiaqing 嘉慶 Jinjutsumaru 壬戌丸 Jinling [guijia] zhitan 金陵癸甲摭談 Jinling guishen zhige 金陵癸申摭歌 Jinsaburō 甚三郎 jinshi 進士 junzhu 君主 Kaburagi Tatsumoto 鏑木立本 Kachū kō-A shiryō chōsajo 華中興亞資料調査所 Kagetsurō 花月樓 Kaichi 嘉市 Kaigai shinbun 海外新聞 Kaisho hisshakaku 會所筆者格 Kajiyamachi 鍛冶屋町 Kakichi 嘉吉 Kakijin arawasu 花旗人著ス Kakka ron 隔靴論 Kamedamaru 龜田丸 kanbanjō Ranjin hitori to Nakayama kō no heya arata ni koshiraesōrō カンバン上蘭 人一人と中山公之部屋新に拵候 Kanbun 漢文 Kaneko Hyōkichi 金子兵吉 Kangaku 漢學 G l os s a r y

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Kanjō ginmiyaku 勘定吟味役 Kanrinmaru 咸臨丸 Kanshi 漢詩 Kanzaki 神崎 Kashin 花神 Kasugaya Bunsuke 春日屋文助 Katō Hiroyuki 加藤弘之 Kawakami Tōgai 川上冬崖 Kawakita Nagamasa 川喜多長政 Kawasaki Michitami 川崎道民 Kawazu Sukekuni 河津祐邦 ken 間 Kenjunmaru 健順丸 ken-Tō shi 遣唐使 Kibi no Makibi 吉備真備 Kichizō 吉藏 Kido Kōin 木戸孝允 (Takayoshi) Kiheitai 奇兵隊 Kimura Dennosuke 木村傳之助 kinri キンリ (禁裏) kinrisama 禁裏様 Kishida Ginkō 岸田吟香 Kishima Kamenoshin 木島龜之進 kō 行 Kō-A kai 興亞會 Kōho shi 黃浦志 “Kōkai nichiroku” 航海日錄 kokka 國家 koko chūdan Edo yakunin otomo 此処中段江戸役人御供 koko chūdan jiyakunin shōnin 此処中段地役人商人 koko chūdan ni makanaikata jigeyakunin komono heya 此処中段賄方地下役人 小人部屋 Kokumeikan 克明館 kokuō 國王 Kokuryū kō shi 黑龍江誌 kokusaku kaisha 國策會社 248

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Kokushi ryaku 國史略 konbu 昆布 “Kore da” これだ kore mata shirubekarazu コレ又知ルベカラズ Kumamoto 熊本 kuni 國 Kuroganeya Risuke 鐵屋利助 Kusaka Genzui 久坂玄瑞 Kushido Gozaemon 串戸五左衛門 Kuze Hirochika 久世廣岡 (Yamato no kami 大和守) kyōsanshugi 共產主義 kyūchi no gotoshi 舊知ノゴトシ Lianbang zhilüe 聯邦志略 Li Hongzhang 李鴻章 Li Lihua 李麗華 Ling Gao 凌縞 Lin Zexu 林則徐 Li Shanlan 李善蘭 Liuhe congtan 六合叢談 Li Xianglan 李香蘭 Li Xiucheng 李秀成 Luo Sen 羅森 Lu Xun 魯迅 Lü Yuye 呂玉埜 Man’ei 滿影 Manpuku Temple 萬福寺 Man-Qing jishi 滿清紀事 Ma Quan 馬銓 maru jirushi ０印 matarosu マタロス matarosu heya iriguchi マタロス部屋入口 Matsuda Hyōjirō 松田兵次郎 Matsudaya Hankichi 松田屋伴吉 Matsumoto Uhee 松本卯兵衛 Meirindō 明倫堂

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Mei Xi 梅熹 meiyou xinyong de dongxi 沒有信用的東西 Meshima 女島 Mifune Toshirō 三船敏郎 Mikazuki Setsukurō 三月節句郎 Mine Genzō 峯源藏 (Kiyoshi 潔) mingbai le 明白了 miru 看ル Mishima Suetarō 三島末太郎 Mishima Yukio 三島由紀夫 Miyamoto Musashi 宮本武蔵 Mizuno Bunsai 水野文哉 Mizuno Shōdayu 水野正太夫 Mōri Sadahiro 毛利定廣 (Motonori 元德) Morita Ichitarō 森田市太郎 Mōri Takachika 毛利敬親 Mori Toranosuke 森寅之助 Moriyama Takichirō 森山多吉郎 (Norinao 憲直) Motoori Norinaga 本居宣長 Muragaki Norimasa 村垣範正 Murata Tessai 村田徹齋 Murata Zōroku 村田藏六 (Ōmura Masujirō 大村益次郎) Nabeshima Naomasa 鍋島直正 Nabeta Saburōemon 鍋田三郎右門 Nagai Uta 長井雅樂 Nagaiya Kiyosuke 永井屋喜代助 Nagao Kōsaku 長尾浩策 Nagasaki bugyō Kawazu Izu no kami 長崎奉行河津伊豆守 Nagasaki bugyō shihai shirabeyaku nami 長崎奉行支配調役並 “Nagasaki enryū zatsuroku” 長崎淹留雜錄 Nagasaki kaigun denshūjo 長崎海軍傳習所 Nagayo Shuntatsu 長俊達 Nagura Inata 名倉予何人 (Shindon 信敦) “Naijō tansoku roku” 內情探索錄 Naitō Konan 内藤湖南

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Nakamuda Kuranosuke 中牟田倉之助 Nakamura Ryōhei 中村良平 Nakarai Shinken 半井春軒 Nakayama Umonta 中山右門太 (Jōji 讓治) Namamugi 生麦 Nanga 南畫 Nedachi Sukeshichirō 根立助七郎 New Yongan Road 新永安路 Nihon gaishi 日本外史 Nihon kyoryū mindan 日本居留民團 nimotsu deiriguchi 荷物出入口 Nishidaya Bunpee 西田屋文兵衛 Nishi Kichijūrō 西吉十郎 Nomozaki 野母崎 Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru 狼火は上海に揚る Nōtomi Kaijirō 納富介次郎 Nōtomi Rokurōzaemon 納富六郎左衛門 Noyama Prison 野山獄 Numa Heirokurō 沼間平六郎 Numa Morikazu 沼間守一 Ōbayashi Toraji 大林虎次 Ōbayashi Yūya 大林雄也 Oguri Tadamasa 小栗忠順 ōi ni hibō suru 大ニ 謗スル Okabe Nagatsune 岡部長常 Okachi metsuke 御徒目付 Okobito metsuke 御小人目付 Ōkuma Tetsutarō 大熊鉄太郎 Omoto Kōdō 尾本公同 Ōmura 大村 Oranda kotsūji 阿蘭陀小通詞 Oshima 男島 Ōshio Heihachirō 大鹽平八郎 Ōshio Kakunosuke 大鹽格之助 Otokichi 音吉

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Ōtsubo Hankichi 大坪伴吉 Ōtsuki Shunsai 大槻俊齋 Owari (Takasu) 尾張(高須) Peiwen yunfu 佩文韻府 Pudong 浦東 Pujiang fandian 浦江饭店 Qian Shaohao 錢少號 qing 輕 Rai San’yō 賴山陽 Rangaku 蘭學 Rankan 蘭館 ri 里 Ribenguo zhi 日本國志 rōnin 浪人 Ruan 阮 Ryokusei 綠靜 ryō 兩 Saga 佐賀 Saigyō hōshi 西行法師 Sai Zentarō 蔡善太郎 Saizō 才藏 Sakamoto Ryōma 坂本龍馬 Sakichi 左吉 Sakuragi Genzō 櫻木源藏 Sanbutsukata 產物方 Sano Tsunetami 佐野常民 Satsuma 摩) Sawa Nobuyoshi 澤宣嘉 Seisuke 清助 sekisho 關所 Sekitarō 碩太郎 senshitsu 船室 Senzaimaru 千歲丸 shaku 尺 “Shanhai enryū nichiroku” 上海淹留日錄

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Shanhai kenkyū 上海研究 Shanhai rekishi chiri kenkyūkai 上海歷史地理研究會 Shanghai xinbao 上海新報 Shaoxi 紹熙 Shenbao 申報 Shen Changling 沈昌齡 Shen Yizhou 沈翼周 Shiaku Islands 鹽飽諸島 Shijing 詩經 Shi Jingtang 石敬䉒 Shinkoku Kanpō ranki 清國咸豐亂記 Shionoya Toin 鹽谷宕陰 Shi Weinan 施渭南 Shōheizaka gakumonjo 昌平坂學問所 shōhō 商法 Shōka sonjuku 松下村塾 shomen no mono kajutsu shugyō to shite Honkon e aikoshitaki mune ganni yori kono shōsho o atae sōrō tochū no aida izure no kuni ni te mo koshō naku tsūkō seshime kikyū wa sōtō no hogo kore ari 書面之者火術修業として香港へ相越度旨願 に因り此證書を與へ候間途中何れの國にても無故障通行せしめ危急之 節ハ相當之保護有之 Shibukawa Sukezaemon 澁川助左衛門 (Kagesuke 景佑) Shihai kanjō 支配勘定 Shihai sadameyaku 支配定役 Shi-Jin 晉石 Shimabara 島原 Shimazu Hisamitsu 島津久光 shinbunshiya 新聞紙屋 Shiozawa Hikojirō 鹽澤彦次郎 Shirabeyaku 調役 Shizuoka gakumonjo 靜岡學問所 “Shokan” 書簡 shokuminchi 植民地 shokuminchi (alternate form) 殖民地 Shunzhi 順治 Shū Tsunejūrō 周恆十郎

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Shuxue qimeng 數學啟蒙 Shu Yian 舒懌䱵 Sōfukuji 崇福寺 Sōkichi 惣吉 Sufu Masanosuke 周布政之助 Sugihara San’yō 杉原杉養 Sugi Magoshichirō 杉孫七郎 Sugiura Aizō 杉浦愛 (Yuzuru 讓) sūsennin 數千人 Susong daotai 蘇松道臺 Suzhou Creek 蘇州河 Suzuki Shunsan 鈴木春山 Tahara 田原 “Taiping tianguo” 太平天囯 Tairiku shinpō 大陸新報 Taizhou 泰州 Takahashi Genjūrō 高橋源十郎 Takahashi Inosuke 高橋怡之助 Takahashi Kazunuki 高橋和貫 (Mimasaka no kami 美作守) Takahashi Yuichi 高橋由一 Takasugi Shinsaku 高杉晉作 Takeda Ayasaburō 武田斐三郎 Takeuchi Yasunori 保徳 (Shimotsuke no kami 竹内下野守) Tamura Denkichi 田村傳吉 tan 談 Tan Shaoguang 譚紹光 Tao Demin 陶德民 Tianjing 天京 Toba 鳥羽 Tōhō tōwa 東宝東和 Tokiwa Inn 常盤旅館 Tōkō 東行 Tō kotsūji 唐小通詞 Tokugawa Akitake 徳川昭武 (Minbu 民部) tongshang 通商

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Tongzhi 同治 Torii Echizen no kami 鳥居越前守 (Tadayoshi 忠善) Tōtarō 藤太郎 Tōyō Nihon 東洋日本 Tsuboi Shindō 坪井信道 Tsuda Ōmi no kami 津田近江守 (Masamichi 正路) Tsukigata Ryūnosuke 月形龍之介 Tsuzuki Toyoji 續豐治 tuanlian 團練 Uchiyama Kanzō 内山完造 Uichi 卯市 ukagai 伺 Wa-Ei gorin shūsei 和英語林集成 wakaru 分かる wang 王 Wang Chaoshan 王朝山 Wang Chengzhai 王誠齋 Wang Danfeng 王丹鳳 Wang Hufu 王互甫 Wang Renbo 王仁伯 Wang Shiwei 汪士偉 Wang Tao 王韜 Wang Xuanfu 王亘甫 Wang Xunnan 王洵南 Wang Ying 王瑛 Wan Song 玩松 Washinton 華親頓 Watanabe Shōhei 渡邊莊平 Watanabe Yohachirō 渡邊與八郎 wen 文 (J. bun) wokou 倭寇 wu 武 (J. bu) Wu Eshi 吳峨士 Wujun 吳郡 Wusong River 吳淞江

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Wu Xu 曉帆 (Xiaofan 吳煦) wuyue butongshang 無約不通商 wuyueguo 無約國 wuyue tongshang 無約通商 wuyue tongshangguo 無約通商國 Xianfeng 咸豐 xiangmin 鄉民 Xiang Yu 項羽 Xiaohong 小紅 Xie Bing 謝炳 (Xie Jiehe 謝介鶴) Xindaqiao 新大橋 Xin Hongloumeng 新紅樓夢 Xiuzhou 秀州 Xue Huan 薛煥 Xu Huosheng 許霍生 Xujiahui 徐家匯 ya 屋 Yabe Kisaburō 八戸喜三郎 Yagi Saiji 八木財次 Yahiro Fuji 八尋不二 Yakushu mekiki 藥種目利 Yamaguchi Sekijirō 山口錫次郎 (Kyochoku 舉直) Yamaguchi Yoshiko 山口淑子 Yamazaki Uhee 山崎卯兵衛 yangtong 洋銅 Yang Xiuqing 楊秀清 Yan Jun 嚴俊 “Yaseppochi Yō” 痩せっぽち揚 “ye” 埜 Yindu bing 印度兵 Ying Baoshi 應寶時 (Minzhai 敏齋) Yingwang 英王 Yin Xiucen 殷秀岑 yōbō hanahada kotonari 容貌甚ダ異ナリ Yōgaku 洋學

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Yokohama shinpō moshiogusa 橫濱新報もしほ草 Yo ni sumu hibi 世に棲む日日 Yoshida Shōin 吉田松陰 Yoshizō 芳藏 Yōsho shirabesho 洋書調所 youyue tongshang 有約通商 Yue Feng 岳楓 yunpiangao 雲片䊏 “Yū-Shin goroku jo” 遊清五録序 “zeifei” 賊匪 Zeng Guofan 曾國藩 Zeng Guoquan 曾國荃 Zenkichi 善吉 Zexuwan 則徐丸 Zhang Dixiang 張棣香 Zhang Decheng 張德澄 Zhang Guoying 張國英 Zhang Shankun 張善琨 Zhang Xiang 丈祥 Zhang Xiuzhi 張秀芝 Zhang Xuxiu 張敘秀 Zhang Yun 張雲 Zhang Zixiang 張子祥 (Xiong 熊) Zhao Jingxian 趙景賢 zhen 鎮 Zhonghua dianying gongsi 中華電影公司 Zhou Lan 周蘭 Zhoushan 舟山 Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋 zokubutsu 俗物 Zongli Yamen 總理衙門

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Yao Xiguang ৔ᙔ٠. Dongfang bingshi jilüe ֱࣟ܎ࠃધฃ (Summary of military events in the east) (Wuchang: n.p., 1897; reprint, Taibei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1967). In Jindai Zhongguo shiliao jilüe २‫ז‬խഏ‫׾‬றហ‫( ע‬Modern Chinese historical materials reprints), ed. Shen Yunlong ާႆᚊ, series 5, vol. 44. Yao Zhenchang ৔஡࣑. “Xianxian Ying Baoshi xiansheng de zhengji” ٣凙䬗㨘 㦍٣‫س‬ऱਙ佂 (The political accomplishments of late man of distinction, Mr. Ying Baoshi). Zhejiang yuekan ௨‫ עִۂ‬12 (May 1980): 26–27. “Yōga no senkaku Takahashi Yuichi shi den (yon)” ੉྽圸٣ᤚ೏ᖯ‫ط‬ԫּႚ ʻ؄ʼ (Biography of Mr. Takahashi Yuichi, pioneer of Western-style art, part 4). Bijutsu shinpō ભᖂᄅ໴ 4.9 (July 12, 1905): 68. Yokoyama Hiroaki 䊎՞‫ີݛ‬. “Bunkyū ninen bakufu haken Senzaimaru zuiin no Chūgoku kan” ֮ՆԲ‫ڣ‬ኟࢌ੔᎞Տ䀚Մ䃘୉圸խ㧺䕋 (Views of China of those aboard the Senzaimaru sent by the shogunate [to China] in 1862). Kenritsu Nagasaki Shiiboruto daigaku kokusai jōhō gakubu kiyō ䷽‫م‬९സ坸垹垝垬垉Օ 䝤㧺Ꮎൣ໴䝤ຝધ૞ 3 (2002): 197–206. Yokoyama Kendō 䊎՞೜ഘ. Takasugi Shinsaku ೏‫ޜ‬வ‫܂‬. Tokyo: Bukyō sekaisha, 1916. Yoshida Shōin ‫࣪ضٳ‬ອ. Yoshida Shōin zenshū ‫࣪ضٳ‬ອ٤ႃ (Collected writings of Yoshida Shōin). Edited by Yamaguchi ken kyōikukai ՞Ց䷽ඒߛ 㢸.Tokyo: Daiwa shobō, 1976. Yonezawa Hideo ‫ۏ‬ᖻߐ֛. “Shanhai hōjin hatten shi (ichi)” Ղ௧߶Գ࿇୶‫׾‬ΰ ԫαʳ(A history of the development of Japanese in Shanghai, part 1). Tō-A keizai kenkyū ࣟࠅᆖᛎઔߒ 22.3 (July 1938): 50–64. . “Shanhai hōjin hatten shi (ni)” Ղ௧߶Գ࿇୶‫׾‬ΰԲα(A history of the development of Japanese in Shanghai, part 2). Tō-A keizai kenkyū ࣟࠅᆖᛎઔ ߒ 23.1 (January–February 1939): 112–26. . Shanhai shiwa Ղ௧‫׾‬ᇩ (Stories from Shanghai history). Tokyo: Bōbō shobō, 1942. Yoshimura Yasushi ‫ޘٳ‬ൈ. Takasugi Shinsaku ೏‫ޜ‬㱋‫܂‬. Tokyo: Tōhō shuppansha, 1977. “Yunpiangao“ ႆׂᗶ. http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/ႆׂᗶ. Yu Xingmin Պᙌ‫ا‬. Shanghai, 1862 nian Ղ௧Δ˄ˋˉ˅‫( ڣ‬Shanghai, 1862). Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubansha, 1991. Zhongguo dianyingjia xiehui dianying shi yanjiubu խ㧺䶣ᐙ୮㣇㢸䶣ᐙ‫׾‬ઔߒ ຝ (Research division, fi lm history of the China Film Association), ed. Zhongguo dianyingjia liezhuan խ㧺䶣ᐙ୮٨䣠 (Biographies of figures in Chinese fi lm). Beijing: Zhongguo dianying chubanshe, 1982. Zhou Qiqian ࡌඔ೓. “Chinese Intellectuals’ View of Japan in the Late Qing.” Translated by Shao Dan and Joshua A. Fogel. In Sagacious Monks and Bloodthirsty Warriors: Chinese Views of Japan in the Ming-Qing Period, ed. Joshua A. Fogel, pp. 249–66. Norwalk, CT: EastBridge, 2002.

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I n de x

ports, 13, 27, 29, 37; weight and dimensions of, 12, 213n4. See also Senzaimaru Armstrong cannons, 84, 84fig. Arrow War (Second Opium War), 66, 77, 177 art scene (Shanghai), 43, 164 Ashizawa Shunnosuke, 7 Ashizawa Tamiji, 7 Astor House Hotel, 70, 146, 147, 155, 163 attendants: to officials on Kamedamaru, 34; to passengers on Senzaimaru, 38–42, 42–45, 46–47, 51, 190–91; meetings with Chinese and Westerners, 76, 118–20, 188; records left by, 76. See also Hibino Teruhiro; Itō Gunhachi; Nagura Inata; Nakamuda Kuranosuke; Nōtomi Kaijirō; Takasugi Shinsaku Awa domain, 40, 47 Azof, 13, 37, 214n12

Abe no Nakamaro (Chao Heng), 59 Abe Yasutarō (Yasuta), 162–63, 165 Aden, 13, 37, 214n12 Aizu domain, 39, 42, 191 Alcock, Mr., 28 Alexander II (tsar), 1 Alphée, 163 alternate attendance system, 3 Althea, 143, 233n1 (chap. 9), 234n2. See also Kenjunmaru American Concession (Shanghai), 65 American consulate, 54–55, 65, 106, 147. See also Seward, George F. Amur River region, 33–34, 135, 142, 143, 218n7 Andō Nobuyuki (Nobumasa, Tsushima no kami), 36, 222n37 Anglo-Satsuma War, 154 Anqing, 85, 86 anti-shogunal movement, 45, 93–94, 186, 191–92 Aofei jilüe (Summary account of the Guangdong bandits), 108 Aoinohata, 149 Aomori, mentioned, 166 Argo (movie), 170, 239n14 Arkansas, mentioned, 52 Armistice: cargo of, 13; construction of, 11; described in North-China Herald, 29; Japanese purchase of, 13–14, 29, 31–32, 37–38; routes before 1862, 11–13; and the transformation from wind to steam, 15; travel between Nagasaki and Chinese

bakumatsu period, 3, 192–93 Bandō Tsumasaburō (Bantsuma, Tamura Denkichi), 172, 184, 238n3, 240nn19,21; as Takasugi Shinsaku, 182fig. banquets, 120 Bansho shirabesho (Office of Barbarian Books), 163 baolan (unauthorized contracting), 126, 127, 231–32n15 Batavia, 143 Battle of Antietam, 1 Battle of Cixi, 2 Battle of Hampton Roads, 1

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Bauduin, Albertus Johannes, 21–22, 24–26, 26–27, 36; photographed with Kroes, 23fig. Bauduin, Dr. Antonius Franciscus, 24 Beecher, Henry Ward, 52 Beijing, access to, 128, 129; embassy, 190. See also Zongli Yamen Beiyang Navy, 45 Belgium, 130 Bernard, Isaac, 161 Bismarck, Otto von, 194 bitan. See brush conversations Blockhouse Island (Changxingdao), 62 body odor, 74, 155 Book of Poetry (Shijing), 81 Boston Shipping List, 143, 233n1 Bremen, 130 bribes, 45, 48, 123, 155, 221n28, 221–22n37 Bridgman, Elijah C., Lianbang zhilüe (Brief account of the United States), 89 Britain: aid to Qing against Taipings, 103, 107, 111, 112, 115; built New Great Bridge, 80; Chinese views of, 84; customs service in Shanghai, 30, 69, 77–78, 147, 152, 155; in the movie Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru, 176–78, 182, 184; flag of, 49, 122, 239n15; as intermediary for Kenjunmaru passengers, 146–47; Japanese views of, 55; military might of, 54; military presence in Shanghai, 83, 85, 87–88; and the Opium War, 62–63, 96, 97, 177, 180; promises to Taipings, 183; trade with China, 14, 129–30, 137. See also British consulate; Opium War; Opium War (Second); Westerners British consulate: and the Kenjunmaru voyage, 146, 147, 154; mentioned, 80; Senzaimaru passengers’ visits to, 70, 106; and trial of unscrupulous merchants, 114. See also Medhurst, Walter Henry; Parkes, Harry S.; Winchester, Charles Alexander Brooke, John Mercer, 3 brush conversations (bitan, hitsudan): on Christianity, 101; in the movie Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru, 179–81; of Ganges passengers, 168; with inkstone dealer,

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180; and interactions between Chinese and Japanese, 74–75, 85, 132–33, 188, 225n15; of Kenjunmaru passengers, 155–56, 234n9; of Mine, 72, 78–79; of Nagura, 111, 163, 237n45; of Nōtomi, 43; source of information on Taiping Rebellion, 79, 106–9, 112–16; of Takasugi, 43, 97, 98fig., 107, 116, 180; with Wang Renbo, 163; on Westerners, 78–79, 81, 85; of Yamaguchi, 155–56. See also Hibino Teruhiro, brush conversations of Buddhist monks, 4, 16, 166, 187 Bund, the, 65, 77, 136 Cadiz, 13, 37, 214n12 Cambodia, mentioned, 10 cannons, 62–63, 84, 84fig., 106 Canton System, 16 Carroll, Lewis (Charles Dodgson), Alice in Wonderland, 2 castaways, 17–18 cemeteries, 24, 136 Centraal Bureau voor Genealogie (Central Genealogical Bureau), 20 Champa, mentioned, 10 Chan Buddhism, 187 Changfazei/Changmaozei (Long-Haired Bandits), 116. See also Long-Haired Bandits; Taiping Rebellion Changxingdao (Blockhouse Island), 62 Chao Heng (Abe no Nakamaro), 59 Charles (American merchant), 91 Chen Depei (Zimao), 111 Chen Huacheng, 97–98, 100, 108, 180 Chen Jiren, 211n5 Chen Ruqin, 84 Chen Xiuwen, 17 Chen Yucheng, 112 Chevrey-Rameau, Dominique, 147 China, decline of, 79, 82–88, 120, 226n17 Chinese, Japanese views of, 6, 74, 77, 81–82, 94–95, 155, 156, 189 Chinese city (Shanghai), 71–73, 81–82, 87 Chinese fi lm industry, 172–73, 239n7 Chinese Maritime Customs Service, 69. See also customs Chinese Repository, 7

i n de x

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Chōhatsuzoku (Long-Haired Bandits), 175. See also Long-Haired Bandits; Taiping Rebellion cholera, 53, 73 chonmage (topknot), 71 Chōshū domain: as anti-shogunal domain, 45, 186; attempt to purchase steamship, 92, 93; in fictional representations, 170, 171, 186; Kiheitai of, 109, 117; natives of, 40, 116–17, 171, 191; secret mission of 1865, 158–61, 167, 236n35; Takasugi’s investigations for, 45–46, 52, 54, 221n27, 84, 91 Chow Ren Hwa, 231n6 Chōzō (Senzaimaru passenger), 41 Christianity: banned in Japan, 35, 100, 101; Japanese antipathy toward, 81, 95, 141, 177, 189–90, 193; linked with opium, 98–99; in Shanghai, 100–102; and the Taiping Rebellion, 102–3, 106, 107, 112, 113, 116, 184, 189. See also missionaries Chun Ling, 86, 113–14, 115 Chunjiang yihen (Lingering resentment over Shanghai), 172, 238n5. See also Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru Chūnoshin (Senzaimaru crew), 42 Civil Rights Act of 1871 (US), 194 Civil War (US), 1, 52, 54, 194 Cixi, Empress Dowager, 2 Cochin, 12 Colombo (Ceylon), 12 “colony” (shokuminchi), 183–84, 240n16 Company of Remi, 119 concessions. See foreign concessions Confucian temple, 87–88 Confucius, 87–88 Coningh Carst & Lels, 24 consulates: American, 65, 106, 147; British, 70, 106, 114, 146, 147, 154; Dutch, 64, 65, 67, 70, 136, 146, 147; French, 106; Japanese, 169, 190; Japanese questions regarding, 136; Japanese request for, in Shanghai, 4, 150, 151, 153, 158 cooks, 41, 49, 59, 67 copper, 121, 128, 131, 211n5 cotton, 54 Court of State Ceremonial, 97 cultural missions, 161, 164–65, 167–68, 169

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currency, 1, 136, 138 customs: cleared by Senzaimaru, 121, 122, 125; duties, 64, 65, 69, 134, 151, 158; established by Qing in Shanghai, 16; inspection of Kenjunmaru, 147, 152; Japanese desire to manage, 129; Japanese interest in, 37, 77–78, 138; letter addressed to Customs Office regarding Ganges mission, 168; operated by British, 30, 69, 77–78, 147, 152, 155 Customs House, 72 Dagu, 66 Daiei eiga kabuhiki gaisha, 172 daimyo system, 194 Daishuxue (Algebra; Alexander Wylie and Li Shanlan), 90 Danshan Islands, 62. See also Saddle Islands Daoguang era, 228n5 Deal, port of, 11–12 De Castrie’s Bay, 34 deckhands, 38–39, 42, 48–49, 67, 92, 175, 185. See also Godai Saisuke democratization, 192, 241n5 Denjirō, 41, 49 Denmark, 130 Dent and Company, 227n46 Dianqu yanghang (T. Kroes & Co.), 21, 216n32. See also T. Kroes & Co. Dick, Thomas, 152, 153 Dickens, Charles, 2 Dimier Brothers, 216n32, 217n37 Ding Richang, 160 diplomacy: goals of Senzaimaru voyage regarding, 27, 134–35, 139–40, 194; achievements of Kenjunmaru voyage in, 158 domainal borders (sekisho), 51 Dostoevsky, Fyodor, 2 Drake (American merchant), 158, 160 dried fish, 56, 136 drinking water, 60–61, 73 drug dealers, opium traders as, 96, 98, 189 Dutch: archives, 18–19; and Chinese fear of Westerners, 82–83; consulate, 64, 65, 67, 70, 136, 146, 147; flag, 49, 122, 239n15; as intermediary for Japanese trade, 124, 129, 134, 146–47, 150–51, 158;

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Dutch (continued) Qing trade with, 123, 126, 127, 130; relations with East Asia, 21; trade with Japan, 121, 123–24, 132. See also Kroes, Theodorus; Polsbroek, Dirk de Graeff van Dutch learning (Rangaku), 90 dysentery, 49, 73 Eastern Star, 13 Ebiko Shihei, 144, 145, 147, 156 Ebiko Suejirō (Sumiyoshi), 144 Edan, Benoît, 119, 120 Edo domain, 40 Edo period. See Tokugawa regime eel, 133 Emancipation Proclamation, 1 etiquette, 74 Europe, Japanese embassy to, 3 Ever Victorious Army, 2, 103 extraterritoriality, 67, 167, 193, 230n45 Fei-peng, 159 foreign concessions (Shanghai): Japanese questions regarding, 136; preparations for fight with Taipings, 106; prosperity and cleanliness of, 65–66, 71, 72–73; subservience of Chinese in, 94. See also Westerners Formosa, mentioned, 21 Fort Sumter, 1 Fortune, Robert, 16 France: Chinese views of, 80–82, 84; consulate of, 106; in the movie Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru, 177; military presence in Shanghai, 83, 85–86; as trading partner with treaty, 130, 137; and the Taipings, 112, 115, 183 French Concession, 65 Fu, Poshek, 239n7, 239n12 Fujita Shuma (Gen’ichi), 144, 153, 154–55 Fukue, 58 Fukugawa Chōemon, 40, 47 Fukui domain, 32 Fukumatsu (attendant on Senzaimaru), 41 Fukuoka domain, 32 Furrer-Kroes, Wil, 20 Futotcho Rin (Fatty Lin), 185 Fuzhou, mentioned, 130

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Ganges, 161–69; passengers of, 162–65; purpose of voyage, 161, 164–65, 167–68 Genjirō (Senzaimaru crew), 42 geographical measurements, 90 Germany, 227n42 Ge Yuanxu, 97 Glover, Thomas, 93 Godai Saisuke (later Tomoatsu): conversations with Takasugi, 60–61, 84; and the movie Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru, 173, 175, 184, 185; interest in the Taipings, 111–12; left no account, 92, 106; life after Senzaimaru, 49, 192; represented Satsuma domain, 48–49, 93, 191; and steamship purchase for Satsuma, 49, 92–93, 227n42; studio portrait of, 175, 176fig.; traveled as deckhand, 42, 48–49, 92, 93, 175, 185; travel to Nagasaki, 51–52; visits in Shanghai, 89, 90, 91, 111, 125 God Worshipper Society, 102 Gokyōkan, 47 Goncharov, Ivan Aleksandrovich, 16–17, 215n23 Gong, Prince, 83 Gordon, Charles Alexander, 15 Gosfilmofond, 172, 173 Grant, Ulysses S., 194 Gratama, Koenraad Wolter, 24 Gravesend, port of, 12 Great Britain. See Britain Great Chicago Fire, 194 Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, 173. See also pan-Asianism Gu He, 108 Gu Lin, 79–80, 116 Guan Qingmei, 78–79, 85–86 Guan Yu, temple to, 87 Guangfulin, 103 Guangxi Province, 102 Guangxu Emperor, 194 Guangzhou, trade at, 130 guide boats, 64, 65, 137, 138, 145–46 Gützlaff, Karl, 16 Hachizō (Senzaimaru crew), 42 Haipai (Shanghai School), 164 hairstyles, 49, 71, 175–76

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Hakkas, 102 Hakodate: foreign trade at, 33, 35, 158; harbor of, 143; news regarding, 93. See also Hakodate Magistrate Hakodate Magistrate, 32–34, 36, 142, 143, 144 Hall & Holtz, 125 Hamada Hikozō (Heco, Joseph), 94, 227n46 Hamamatsu domain, 40, 44, 161, 162, 168, 191 Hamburg, 130 Han Lan’gen, 185, 186 Hangzhou, 113 Hankou, 158 Hanlin Academy, 108, 109 Hanover, 130 Haraguchi Takaaki, 229n31 Harkort and Co., 13 Harris, Townsend, 3 Harris Treaty, 81 Hart, Simpson, 233n2 Haruna Akira, 171 Hata Tsuguhisa, 43 Hatano Shōgorō, 163 Hayashi Oya, 219n17 Hayashi Saburō, 39, 42, 61 Hayashi Academy (Shizuoka), 42 Hayashi family of Hokkaidō, 219n17 Heard Augustine company, 166 Heco, Joseph (Hamada Hikozō), 94, 227n46 heiminshugi, 142n5 Heukensveld-Slaghek, Adeline (Mrs. Kroes), 24–26 Hibino Teruhiro: arrival in Shanghai, 61–63, 64, 70; as attendant to Kaneko, 40, 43; biography of, 43; Botsubi hitsugo (Brush conversations of a submerged nose) by, 108; brush conversations of, 43, 79, 81, 85, 98–99, 108–9, 112–14, 115, 132–33, 180, 229n31; dislike of Christianity, 80, 98–99, 102; dysentery episode, 73; impressions of Shanghai and the local Chinese, 66, 71, 74; mentioned, 37, 125, 192, 219n15; “Ode to an Eel,” 133; on opium, 98–99; poetry of, 43, 58–59, 61, 66, 80–81, 133; records of trip, 43, 59,

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61–62, 80–81, 114, 239n10; on the Taipings, 79–80, 104–6, 108–9, 112–14, 115, 229n31; on Senzaimaru rules, 57; on rumors, 86; on the Shanghai customs office, 77–78; views on Westerners, 79, 80–81, 85; visit to Confucian temple, 87–88; visit to daotai, 120 Higo (Kumamoto) domain, 47 Hikone domain, 32 Hinomaru, 38, 70, 122, 149, 183, 239n15 Hirado domain, 40 Hirai Renji, 144, 147 Hirobaba (Nagasaki), 18 historical fiction, 170–71, 183, 239n14 hitsudan. See brush conversations Hokkaidō, 32, 33 Holland. See Dutch Hong Xiuquan, 2, 102–3, 106, 111, 112, 113, 114 Hongji yangyang, 70 Hong Kong: fi lm industry, 172, 185; plans to send a ship to, 35–36, 142, 143; trade with, 13, 35, 140; travel documents for, 165 Hongkou, 65 Hori Oribe no shō (Toshihiro), 32–33, 34, 142 Hoshino Kazuyuki, 159 Hosokawa domain, 93 Hotta Masatomo (Sagami no kami), 161, 162 Howland, John W., 233n2 Hu Linyi, 108 Hu Xingyi, 111 Hu Xinling, 172, 181, 185 Huang Fang, 152, 153 Huang Jueci, 97 Huang Shiquan, 97 Huang Zunxian, Ribenguo zhi (Treatises on Japan), 148 Huangbo (Ōbaku) sect, 187 Huangpu River, 62, 64–65, 66, 77, 137 Hua Yilun, 98–99, 108, 112–13 Huating County, 17 Hubei, 109 “Hucheng,” 105 Hunan, 109 Huzhou (Zhejiang), 105

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Japan Residents Association of Shanghai (JRA), 6, 212n8 Jardine Matheson Company, 159, 161 Jiading, 103 Jiang Ming, 180 Jiang haiguan zeli (Regulation on customs), 153 Jiangxi, 113 Jin dynasty (936–947), 79 Jinjutsumaru, 158–59, 160 Jinling guishen zhige (Account of the plunder in Nanjing), 108, 229n30 Jinsaburō (attendant on Senzaimaru), 41 jiyū (liberty), 234n6 JRA (Japan Residents Association of Shanghai), 6, 212n8

Hyōgo, 55, 145, 156, 193 Hyōkichi (cook on Senzaimaru), 41, 49 Ichiko Chūzō, 124 Idema, Wilt, 216n32 Iemochi (shogun), 158 Iijima Hanjūrō, 144, 146, 153, 154 Inagaki Hiroshi: Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru (Signal fires over Shanghai), 172–73, 181, 184, 186, 224n26; Samurai Trilogy, 172. See also Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru India, 177, 179, 180 inkstones, 180 Inoue Masano (Kawachi no kami), 44, 161 Internal Revenue Service (US), 1 International Exposition (Paris), 163 interpreters, 41, 46, 49–50, 88, 144; in the movie Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru, 181 Inuzuka Shakusaburō, 40, 118, 219n15 Iron Prince, 3 Ishiguro Tatsuya, 185, 240n19 Ishikawa Iwaji, 159–61 Ishiwata Masakichi (Kōmei), 144, 145, 147–48 Italy, 130 Itō Gunhachi, 40, 43, 61, 74, 79 Itō Jinshirō, 162 Iwagaki Matsunae, Kokushi ryaku (A summary of Japanese history), 148 Iwakura Mission (1871), 89 Iwase Kōho, 49 Iwase Yashirō, 36, 40, 46, 67

Kaburagi Tatsumoto, 162, 163 Kachō kō-A shiryō chōsajo (Asian development document research institute of central China), 8 Kagetsurō, 55 Kagoshima domain, 32, 227n42 Kaichi (cook on Senzaimaru), 41 Kaigai shinbun (Overseas news), 94 Kakichi (cook on Senzaimaru), 41 Kamchatka, mentioned, 33 Kamedamaru, 34, 135, 143–44. See also Althea Kanagawa, 35, 104; Treaty of, 3. See also Yokohama Kaneko Hyōkichi, 40, 43, 219n15 Kangaku (Chinese learning), 90 Kanrinmaru, 3, 10 Kasugaya Bunsuke, 48 Katō Hiroyuki, 234n6 Kattendyke, Willem, 144 Kawakami Tōgai, 163 Kawakita Nagamasa, 173, 239n7 Kawasaki Michitami, 55 Kawashima Motojirō, 139 Kawazu Sukekuni, 166 Keiō University, mentioned, 45 Kelley, Hattit, 233n2 Kenjunmaru: as Althea, 143, 233n1 (chap. 9), 234n2; brush exchanges with Chinese, 155–56, 234n9; captain of, 143, 144, 146; cargo of, 143, 145, 148; delega-

James, Henry, 6 Japan as “closed country,” 4, 92, 135 Japanese people, 4, 67, 71, 86–87 Japanese consulate (Shanghai), 169, 190; request for, in Shanghai, 4, 150, 151, 153, 158 Japanese emperor, 149, 154 Japanese histories, 148 Japanese nationality, 5–6, 73–74 Japanese Red Cross, 47 Japanese Senior High School for Girls (Shanghai), 6 Japanese Youth Association (Shanghai), 7

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tion’s views of Chinese, 155, 156; failure to heed request not to return, 190; flew two flags, 149; and Japanese trade in Shanghai, 150, 152, 153; lodging on land, 154–55; meetings with consular officials, 147; mission and achievements of, 6, 154, 157–58, 169; passengers of, 143–44, 146, 154; reliance on Westerners, 146– 47; as shogunal vessel, 149–50; sources on, 146, 234n8; travel documents of, 149, 154, 165; voyage of, 143, 145, 156 Khitans, 79 Kibi no Makibi, 59 Kichizō (cook on Senzaimaru), 41 Kido Kōin (Takayoshi), 89 Kiheitai, 109, 117, 171, 192, 240n4 Kimura Dennosuke, 40, 44, 66 Kishida Ginkō, 164 Kishima Kamenoshin, 55 Kō-A kai (Rise Asia society), 56 Kobayashi Rokurō, 147 Kōho shi (Chronicle of the Huangpu River), 145, 146, 147, 155, 234n9 kokka, reference of, 73–74 Kokumeikan (Hamamatsu domainal academy), 44 Kokushi ryaku (A summary of Japanese history; Iwagaki Matsunae), 148 konbu, 158, 236n32 Kramer, H. A., 23 Kroes, Adeline, 24–26 Kroes, Dorine Herminie Eugenie, 24 Kroes, Hermanus, 20 Kroes, Joanna Barbara, 20 Kroes, Theodorus: and the arrival of Senzaimaru, 67; assisted Kenjunmaru delegation, 146, 147, 154–55; biography of, 18–27; and the Chōshū secret mission, 159–61; consular post of, 20–21, 56, 64, 123, 137, 146; as intermediary with Chinese officials, 5, 19, 118–25, 129, 130–32, 135–36, 139, 142; and Japanese trade in Shanghai, 137–38, 142, 150–51, 158; marriage of, 24–27; and the Netherlands Trading Company, 21; photographed with Bauduin and others, 23fig.; residence in Shanghai, 21–22, 26–27; translation for, 46. See also T. Kroes & Co.

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Ku Klux Klan, 194 Kumamoto domain, 40, 191 Kuroda domain, 93 Kuroganeya Risuke, 41, 48, 222n38 Kusaka Genzui, 116–17 Kushido Gozaemon, 162, 163 Kuze Hirochika (Yamato no kami), 36 Lancefield, 159. See also Jinjutsumaru Lianbang zhilüe (Brief account of the United States; Elijah Bridgman), 89 Liao dynasty, 79 Li Hongzhang: and the defense of Shanghai, 85, 111; Japanese interest in 108–9; and Sino-Japanese trade, 127–28, 129– 30, 150–52, 211n5; mentioned, 114, 117 Li Lihua, 181, 185 Li Shanlan, 90 Li Xianglan (Yamaguchi Yoshiko/Shirley Yamaguchi), 184–85 Li Xiucheng, 103, 104, 112, 183; in the movie Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru, 177, 178 Lin Zexu, 97–98, 100, 108 Lincoln (movie), 170, 239n14 Lincoln, Abraham, 1, 194, 236n36 Lindley, Augustus F., 116 Lindley, Mary, 116 Ling Gao, 155–56 literary Chinese, 7, 44, 47, 68, 75, 89, 148, 156, 180, 191 Liuhe congtan (Stores from around the world), 91 Liverpool, port of, 12 Livingstone, David, 194 Lloyd’s List, 11–13, 14 Lloyd’s Register of British and Foreign Shipping, 11–12, 13–14 lodgings, 70, 135, 154–55, 185 London Missionary Society, 89, 90 Long-Haired Bandits: in the movie, Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru, 175–76, 182; mentioned, 79, 80, 85, 87, 104–8, 112, 114–15; name for, 116, 175. See also Taiping Rebellion Longton, J., 11 Loureiro, José, 54 Lu Xun, mentioned, 8 Lübeck, 130

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Luce, Captain, 233n2 Luxemburg, Rosa, 194 Ma Quan, 101, 115–16 Mahon, J. D., 147 Maltby, John, 213n8 Maltby & Co., 213n8 Manchuria, mentioned, 34 Manchurian Film Company (Man’ei), 173 Manchu rule, 69, 104 Manpuku Temple, 187 Man-Qing jishi (Chronicle of the Manchu Qing; Luo Sen), 104 mathematics, 90, 92 Matsuda Hyōjirō, 41, 48 Matsudaya Hankichi: account of voyage, 58, 65, 138; arrival in Shanghai, 68; diary of, 7–8, 18, 36, 48, 49, 65; as merchant aboard Senzaimaru, 41, 48, 138; purchases in Shanghai, 56, 139, 150; reported on trade and business, 56, 76, 137–39; sketches of Senzaimaru, 38, 39fig., 57, 59, 60fig., 219n15 Matsumae Magistracy, 32 Matsumoto Uhee, 40, 47 Mayers, W. F., 153 measles epidemic, 49, 57 Medhurst, Walter Henry: in the movie Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru, 178–79; mentioned, 88; official visit to Senzaimaru, 29–30, 67 Mei Xi, 177, 179, 186; as Shen Yizhou, 182fig. Meiji Restoration: impact of Takasugi and Senzaimaru mission, 132, 135; mentioned, 171, 186; and travel to China, 166, 169; reforms of, 192, 194; and Westernization, 157 merchant fleet, plans for, 32–34, 218n2 merchants: Chinese, 32, 48, 134, 139, 187; purchase of copper in Japan, 121, 128, 131, 211n5; on Senzaimaru voyage, 41, 48, 120, 121–22, 138–39, 140; trading ports used by, 129–30; Western, in Shanghai, 91. See also trade Merrimack, mentioned, 1 Meshima island, 58 Metropole Hotel, 172

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Mifune Toshirō, 172 Mikazuki Setsukurō, 157 Mine Genzō (Kiyoshi): account of voyage and arrival in Shanghai, 58, 59, 62, 63, 64, 65, 223n12; biographic information on, 47; brush conversations of, 72, 78–79; comments on steamship purchases, 93; interest in Taipings, 105, 111–12, 115–16; traveled as attendant, 41, 47; on Western presence, 72, 78–79, 85–86 Ministerie van Buitenlanse Zaken (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands), 19, 20, 21 Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce (Japan), 162 Ministry of Colonies (Netherlands), 21 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Netherlands), 19, 20, 21 Ministry of Revenue (Qing), 153, 154 Mishima Suetarō, 55 Mishima Yukio, 58 missionaries: Japanese dislike of, 80, 102, 190; medical work by, 100, 102, 117; meetings with, 52–54, 89–90, 91, 106–7, 125, 190; Nōtomi’s account of, 101–2; and opium, 98, 100; publishing houses, 90–91 Mito domain, mentioned, 157 Mitsui group, 163 Miyamoto Musashi, 172 Miyanaga Takashi, 46, 48, 236n36 Mizuno Bunsai, 144 Mizuno Shōdayu, 34, 143 Moeshart, Herman J., 216n34 Monitor, 1, 160, 236–37n36. See also Jinjutsumaru Mōri Sadahiro (Motonori), 45 Mōri Takachika, 158 Mori Toranosuke, 36, 41, 48, 67 Morita Ichitarō, 55 Moriyama Takichirō (Norinao): and the arrival of Kenjunmaru in Shanghai, 145–46, 234n9; biography of, 144–45; as Dutch interpreter, 144; and the term jiyū, 234n6; visits in Shanghai, 147–48, 153, 154–55 Moskarenko (actor), 179

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Mossman, Samuel, 31–32, 218n2 Motoori Norinaga, 55 Muirhead, William, 89–90, 91, 102, 125, 175; texts on Taipings, 90, 106–7, 112, 175 Mulder, Johanna Maria Josephina, 27 Muragaki Norimasa, 33, 34 Murata Tessai, 47 Murata Zōroku (Ōmura Masujirō), 159, 160, 171, 236n35 Mutō Chōzō, 7 Nabeshima Naomasa, 44 Nabeta Saburōemon, 40, 43, 44, 219n15 Nagai Uta, 174 Nagaiya Kiyosuke, 41, 48, 111–12 Nagao Kōsaku, 147 Nagasaki: Chinese community at, 181, 187, 240n1; Chinese ships calling at, 4, 32, 33, 128, 187; Chinese visitors to, 4, 187, 211n5; compared to Shanghai, 193; links to Shanghai, 17–18, 37; loading of Senzaimaru passengers and cargo, 56–57; merchants from, aboard the Senzaimaru, 41, 48, 55–56, 67; news of Taiping Rebellion at, 103; officials and attendants from, aboard the Senzaimaru, 40–41, 46–47; and Ōmura domain, 47; opening of, 35; travel of Senzaimaru passengers to, 50, 51–57; Western presence in, 93, 95, 132, 156. See also Nagasaki Commercial Hall; Nagasaki Magistrate Nagasaki Commercial Hall, 18, 36, 38–39, 41, 48, 56, 57, 190 Nagasaki Magistrate: bribes to, 48, 221– 22n37; and purchase of Armistice, 37–38; responsibility for trade, 35, 142, 161; and the Senzaimaru voyage, 36 Nagasaki Naval Training Center, 44, 55, 144 Nagayo Shuntatsu, 47 Nagura Anata. See Nagura Inata Nagura Inata (Shindon): account of arrival and first impressions of Shanghai, 61, 63, 66, 71–72, 74; as attendant to Nabeta, 40, 43; biographical details, 43–44; brush conversations of, 111, 163,

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237n45; description of the Senzaimaru, 38; interest in Taipings, 105, 108; and the Ganges mission, 162, 166; interaction on the issue of opium, 100; interest in science and military technology, 84, 90, 92; mentioned, 192; name of, 44; observations of Westerners, 71, 84–85; observations on Qing army, 109–11; read Lianbang zhilüe, 89; on rumors about the Japanese, 86–87; search for books and artwork, 108; subsequent travel, 44, 162; travel accounts, 44, 48, 219n15; visit to Confucian temple, 87 Naitō Konan, 240–41n5 Nakamuda Kuranosuke: as attendant to Shiozawa, 40, 44; conversation with opium-addicted pilot, 99; on the “decline” of the Chinese, 82; education of, 45; and the movie Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru, 173, 180, 184, 185; first impressions of Shanghai, 67; interest in Taipings, 107; knowledge of English, 88–89, 90, 95; mentioned, 192; military career of, 44–45; observation of troops and weapons, 84, 114; opposed war against Qing China, 45, 221–22n26; travel to Nagasaki and voyage to Shanghai, 55, 58, 61; travel narrative of, 125; visits and contacts in Shanghai, 90, 91, 93, 95, 106–7, 125 Nakamura Ryōhei, 40, 46, 57, 219n15 Nakarai Shinken, 55 Nakayama Umonta (Jōji), 40, 46, 47, 219n15 Namamugi Incident, 3, 154 Nanjing, 2, 103, 106, 109, 113, 166 Nationaal Archief (National Archives, Amsterdam), 18 National Maritime Museum (Greenwich, England), 9 navigation, 10–11, 33, 58, 90, 157, 159, 193 Nedachi Sukeshichirō, 39, 150, 219n15; attendants of, 42 Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (Netherlands Trading Company), 18–19 Netherlands. See Dutch Netherlands Trading Company, 21

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newspapers, 63, 93–94. See also NorthChina Herald NHK, 171 Nihon kyoryū mindan (Japan Residents Association of Shanghai), 6, 212n8 Nikolayevsk-on-Amur, 33, 34, 218n7 Ningbo, 17, 130 Nishi Kichijūrō, 159–61 Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru (Signal fires over Shanghai), 171–85; anachronisms and missteps in, 178, 179, 181, 183, 185, 186; archival copy of, 172, 173; brush talk in, 179–81; comic relief in, 185; criticism and controversy of, 171–72, 239n12; historical importance of, 181– 82; and impact of the Senzaimaru, 186; Inagaki’s account of, 184; Peking opera selection in, 181; obscurity and rediscovery of, 172, 238n2, 238n3; production of, 172–73; publicity poster for, 174fig.; story and message of, 174–77, 186; Taiping Rebellion in, 175–79, 181–83, 186; Takasugi character in, 172, 224n2; theme of Asian unity in, 178, 180–81, 183; Westerners and English dialogue in, 176–79 North-China Herald: account of arrival of the Senzaimaru, 28–29, 63, 67, 122, 217n47; on arrival of Ganges, 162; on arrival of Kenjunmaru, 146, 235n11; on arrival of shogun’s younger brother, 237n44; Mossman as editor of, 31, 218n2; notices on Kroes, 21, 22, 217n37; reported on return of Ishikawa and associates, 160; shipping reports, 13, 159, 213n8, 214n11; as source material for Okita, 7, 8; visit to, 93 Norway, 130 Nōtomi Kaijirō: altercation with Frenchman, 81–82; on arrival in Shanghai, 64–65; biographical details, 42–43; brush chats with the merchant Chun Ling, 86; on fi lth and squalor, 72, 73, 106; illness in Shanghai, 43; impressions of the Chinese, 74, 82, 140; mentioned, 192; on missionaries and Bible enthusiasts, 101–2; observations on the Qing armed forces, 105, 109; on opium, 99, 100; reported on the Taipings, 85, 106,

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111, 229n24; sketch of local brave, 109, 110fig.; traveled as attendant, 39, 42; travel narrative of, 42, 106; view of Western military presence, 85 Nōtomi Rokurōzaemon, 43 Noyama Prison, 104 Numa Heirokurō, 40, 46, 47, 48, 152, 219n15 Numa Morikazu, 46 Ōbaku (Huangbo) sect, 187 Ōbayashi Toraji, 162 Ōbayashi Yūya, 162 Office of Barbarian Books (Bansho shirabesho), 163 Office of Western Books (Yōsho shirabesho), 163 Oguri Tadamasa, 35 oil painting, 163–65. See also Takahashi Inosuke (Yuichi) Oka Senjin, 226n17 Okabe Nagatsune, 35, 36 Okita Hajime: 6–8, 18, 165, 213n8; works of, 8 Ōkuma Tetsutarō, 144, 147 Oldenberg, 130 Oliphant, Lord, 24 Omoto Kōdō, 41, 46, 46–47 Ōmura domain, 41, 47 Ōmura Masujirō (Murata Zōroku), 159, 160, 236n35 opium: addiction, 99–100, 189; ban on, 97, 99, 228n5; dens, 97; desire to keep out of Japan, 96, 193; and Japanese antipathy toward Westerners, 95, 98, 189; Japanese questions regarding, 136; Taiping ban on, 111, 178; trade, 97; used for medicinal purposes, 96; witnessed by Senzaimaru passengers, 96, 98–100. See also Opium War; Opium War (Second) Opium War, 16, 126, 177, 180; knowledge of, in Japan, 63, 96, 97–98, 108, 156 Opium War (Second), 66, 77, 177 Orlov (actor), 178, 179 Osaka, 40, 55, 66, 93 Osaka Chamber of Commerce, 49 Oshima island, 58 Ōshio Heihachirō, 104 Ōshio Kakunosuke, 104

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Otokichi, 18 Ōtsubo Hankichi, 144, 147, 153, 154–55 Ōtsuki Shunsai, 47 Owari domain, 40, 191 painters, 163–65, 187. See also Takahashi Inosuke (Yuichi) Pallada, 16–17, 215n23 pan-Asianism, 184; in the movie Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru, 178, 180–81, 183 Paris Commune, 194 Parkes, Harry S., 146, 147, 149, 152, 154 Pasteur, Louis, 72 Patton, George S., mentioned, 108 Peace, H., 12 Peiwen yunfu (Storehouse of rhymes for esteemed phrases), 98 Pekin, 159, 161 Peking opera, 181 Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, 13, 214n12 People’s Republic of China, cinema in, 185–86 Perry, Commodore, 104, 144, 193 Philippines, mentioned, 10 Pickowicz, Paul, 171 pilot boats, 64, 65, 137, 138, 145–46 piracy, 3, 16, 61–62, 131 Polsbroek, Dirk de Graeff van, 159 Pompe van Meerdervoort, J. L. C., 22, 216n36 Portugal, 130 Powhatan, 3, 10, 42, 44 Prinsenvlag, 122 Products Office (Sanbutsukata), 32 prostitutes, 233n3; children of, 136, 137, 233n3 Prussia, 130 publishing houses, 90–91 Pudong: bandits in, 111; gravesite of three Japanese travelers, 73 Pujiang fandian, 70. See also Astor House Hotel Putyatin, Yevfi mii Vasil’evich, 16–17, 144, 215n23 Qian Shaohao, 139 Qibaozhen, 105

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Qing dynasty: armed forces, 105, 108, 109–11; decline of, 4, 56, 79, 82–88; diplomatic relations of, 126; Japanese view of government, 189; relations with Japanese, 126, 156–57; reliance on West against Taipings, 83, 85–88, 141. See also Sino-Japanese trade; Wu Xu; Xue Huan; Zeng Guofan; Zongli Yamen Quai de France, 65 queue, 71, 175–76, 183 Rai San’yō, Nihon gaishi (Unofficial history of Japan), 148 Rangaku (Dutch learning), 90 Reconstruction (US), 194 refugees, 73, 106 “Regulations on Customs” ( Jiang haiguan zeli; 1781), 153 “Regulations on Trade at Five Ports” (1843), 130 Richardson, Charles Lennox, 3, 154 Richardson, Henry: and the arrival of the Senzaimaru in Shanghai, 62–63, 64, 70, 105, 217n47; as captain and owner of Armistice, 12, 13–14, 31, 37–38, 213n8; captained Senzaimaru voyage, 39, 60, 61, 191; and Japanese purchase of Armistice, 29; residence in Shanghai, 70 Richardson, Mrs., 39, 50 Rishidaya Bunpee, 144 rōnin (masterless samurai), 144 Royal Asiatic Society, North China Branch, 8 Ruan Song (Wan Song), 114–15, 230n46 rumors, 57, 67, 86–87, 93, 112, 113, 157, 159 Russia: as Chinese trading partner with treaty, 130, 137; Chinese view of, 84, 94; Japanese view of, 55; trade with Japan, 33, 33–34, 142 Ryder, Alexander G., 233n2 Ryokusei Academy, 43 Ryūkoku University, mentioned, 8 Ryukyu Islands, 92 Saddle Islands, 61–62, 145; sketch of, 61fig. Saga domain: defenses of, 44–45; domain of origin of passengers, 39, 40, 42, 47, 50, 191

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Sai Zensuke, 46 Sai Zentarō, 41, 46 Saizō (Godai Saisuke, later Tomoatsu), 42, 48–49. See also Godai Saisuke (later Tomoatsu) Sakamoto Ryōma, 92 Sakichi (attendant on Senzaimaru), 41 Sakura domain, 162, 163, 168 Sakuragi Genzō, 40, 47 samurai: anger at Kenjunmaru leaders, 157; anti-Taiping sentiment, 116; costume and hairstyle of, 67, 71, 180–81; and the Ganges mission, 168; in historical fiction and fi lm, 171, 176; interest in Western military technology, 89; and the Kiheitai, 192; masterless, 144; and the Namamugi Incident, 154; as viewed by Chinese, 67; view of Chinese behavior toward Westerners, 82–83; view of Westerners, 139–40, 157 Sanbutsukata (Products Office), 32 San Francisco, 12 Sano Tsunetami, 47 Sano domain, mentioned, 163 Satsuma domain, 93, 147, 154; domain of origin of passengers, 42, 48–49, 191; purchase of steamship, 92–93 Sawa Noboyushi, 168 scholarship: parricidal, 170; as purpose of mission, 161, 164–65, 167–68 seamen. See deckhands seasickness, 58, 59, 162 sea travel, 10–11. See also navigation Second Chōshū War, 160 Seisuke (cook on Senzaimaru), 41 sekisho (domainal borders), 51 Sekitarō (attendant on Senzaimaru), 41, 49 Senzaimaru: accounts of, 5, 7–8, 48, 76; arrival in Shanghai, 28–30, 62–68, 86, 217n47; cargo of, 55–56, 134, 213n9; compared with other Tokugawa missions, 169; compared with the Kenjunmaru, 143; crew of, 70, 124, 134–35; dangers of the voyage, 191; deaths of passengers, 5, 73; departure of, 58–60, 99; described as a Dutch vessel, 121, 122, 123; descriptions of, 38; domains represented, 40–42, 191; expense of voyage,

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134; flew three flags, 49, 122, 183, 239n15; goals and achievements of mission, 134–35, 139, 158, 188–89, 193; instruction to sell their goods and go home, 123, 138, 142, 166–67, 188; loading of passengers, 56–57; name of, 31–32, 38, 222n37; passengers of, 38–50, 190–9, 219n151; popular portrayal of, 8, 170–72, 174–75, 186, 212n17, 238n2; prehistory of, 11–14; rendition of, keeling, 59, 60fig.; return voyage, 134, 140; rough sketch of, 38, 39fig.; rules for behavior, 57; scholarship on, 6, 8–9; significance of, 4, 187–88, 193–94; sketch of, with characters, x; sources for the study of, 7–9; towed by opium-addicted pilot, 99–100; voyage to Shanghai, 58–62. See also Armistice Seribanov (actor), 179 seven-shooters, 92, 92fig. Seward, George F., 147, 159–60, 236n36 Seward, William H., 236n36 Shanghai: city gates, 81–82; county of, 16; described by Senzaimaru party, 62–63, 65–67; disparity between foreigners and Chinese in, 71, 72; first impressions of, 65–67, 69, 71–74; as a foreign colony, 78, 83, 183–84; garrison of, 16; harsh conditions of, 24, 68, 72, 74, 94; Japanese community in, 6–7, 169; Japanese consular official in, 150, 151, 153, 158, 169, 190; Japanese plans for voyage to, 34–37; land and rentals in, 136, 137; as major port and center of trade, 15–16, 130, 137–38; as port of call for Armistice, 13; prosperity of, 66–67, 69, 155; relations with Nagasaki, 17–18; Taiping assault on, 103, 104, 105, 111, 115; trading partners in, 127–28, 130, 169; weather of, in April 1864, 156. See also Chinese city; foreign concessions; Shanghai daotai Shanghai daotai: accommodated Japanese, 188; expenses for entertaining, 135; instructed Japanese to sell goods and go home, 123, 138, 142, 153, 166–67, 188; and Japanese requests for trade and special passport, 161, 167; meetings with Japanese, 19, 133, 155, 158, 160; mentioned, 49, 70; informal name of Susong daotai,

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16. See also Ding Richang; Huang Fang; Wu Xu; Ying Baoshi Shanghai History and Geography Research Group, 7 Shanghai Municipal Council, mentioned, 21 Shanghai School (Haipai), 164 Shanghai Senior Commercial School for Girls, 6 Shanghai xinbao, 90, 105 Shanhai kenkyū, 7–8 Shantou (Swatow), 13 Shen Changling (movie character), 180–81 Shen Xiaohong (movie character), 182–83 Shen Yizhou (movie character), 177–79, 180, 181–82, 183 Shenbao, 97 Shi Jingtang, 79 Shi Weinan, 82–83 Shiba Ryōtarō: Kashin (God of the blooming flower), 171, 212n17; Yo ni sumu hibi (Days of my life in the world), 171 Shibukawa Sukezaemon (Kagesuke), 43, 47 Shijing (Book of poetry), 81 Shimabara domain, 41 Shimazu Hisamitsu, 49 Shimoda, mentioned, 193 Shimonoseki, Straits of, 179 Shinkoku Kanpō ranki (Account of the uprising in China in the Xianfeng era), 104 Shinmura Izuru, 7 Shinoya Toin, Kakka ron (On ineffectuality), 156 Shinto, 60, 72, 88 Shiozawa Hikojirō: Chōshū authorities’ bribe to, 45, 221n28; member of Powhatan delegation, 42, 44, 66; shogunal official on Senzaimaru, 40, 219n15; sightseeing in Nagasaki, 55; and Takasugi Shinsaku, 45 shipbuilding, 11, 15, 34, 218n7 shipwrecks, 17–18, 187 Shizuoka gakumonjo (Shizuoka Academy), 42 Shizuoka Tea Association, 162 shogunal officials: aboard the Senzaimaru, 39–40, 42; arrival in Shanghai, 67;

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attendants to, 38, 42–45, 51; collected data for shogunate, 140; in the movie Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru, 175; meetings with Chinese officials, 118–21, 135, 188; meetings with Westerners, 188; meetings with Wu Xu, 118–19, 124, 130–31, 135–36, 139, 188; mission in Shanghai, 188; overland travel to Nagasaki, 51; reliance on Kroes, 137 Shōheizaka gakumonjo (Shōheizaka Academy), 42, 43, 45 Shōka sonjuku, 45 shokuminchi (colony), 240n16 Shū Tsunejūrō, 41, 46, 67 Shu Yian, 108 Shuxue qimeng (Introduction to mathematics; Alexander Wylie and Li Shanlan), 90, 92 Sieburgh, J. C., 24–25 silver, 136 Sino-Japanese trade: achievements of Kenjunmaru voyage, 158; achievements of Senzaimaru mission, 135, 139–40; commodities traded, 56, 120–21, 153, 158, 236n32; before 1862, 16, 142, 211n5; and the Ganges mission, 168; and the Ishikawa mission, 160–61; Japanese request to engage in, 120–31, 137–38, 150–52, 152–53, 160–61, 231n7; precedents for, 153; purchase of Chinese goods, 139; in Qing trading system, 126–27; in the twenty-first century, 169; Wu Xu’s enthusiasm for, 127–28, 130, 132, 151, 152. See also trade Slaghek, E., 25, 27 slavery in the United States, 1, 52, 194 smallpox vaccination, 47 Small Sword Society, 120, 129 Smith and Wesson, 92 Sōfukuji (Nagasaki), 52 Sōkichi (attendant on Senzaimaru), 41 Songjiang, 103 Song shi, Treatise on Japan, 17 South America, 11–12 Spain, 130 Stanley, Henry M., 194 steam engine, 215n23 steamships, 3, 14–17, 91, 92–93

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Stowe, Harriet Beecher, 52–53 Suez Canal, 14 Sufu Masanosuke, 92 “Sufu Province,” 113 Sugi Magoshichirō, 46 Sugihara San’yo, 43 Sugita Teiichi, 11 Sugiura Aizō (Yuzuru), 159–61 Sullivan, J., 12 Summer Palace, sacking of, 183 Sunderland shipyard, 12 surveyors, 144 Susong daotai. See Shanghai daotai Suzhou, 17, 113 Suzhou Creek, 62. See also Wusong River Sweden, 130 swords: in drawing of local brave, 109, 110fig.; among military provisions of unscrupulous merchant, 114; presented as gift , 148; readied against pirates, 61–62; worn by Japanese samurai in China, 49, 59, 67, 100, 120, 149, 180–81 Table Bay, 12 Tahara domain, mentioned, 162 Taicang, 103 Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, 103, 117, 177, 183. See also Taiping Rebellion Taiping Rebellion: assault on Shanghai, 2, 103, 104, 105, 111, 115, 134, 188; and the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, 69; and Christianity, 102–3, 106, 107, 112, 113, 116; collapse of, 111, 117; compared to US Civil War, 52; consequences for Japan, 104; discussed in brush conversations, 79, 106–9, 112–16; effects on trade, 131, 139; and the Ever Victorious Army, 2, 103; and the movie Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru, 173, 175–79, 181–83, 184, 186; and the guarding of the gates, 81–82; human dimension of, 116; Japanese accounts of, 116; Japanese interest in, 5, 37, 104, 107, 111–12, 115–16, 177–78, 189; Japanese perception of, 103–4, 112, 116, 155; and Japanese plans voyage to Shanghai, 35, 46, 124; leaders of, 103, 112; lessons for the Japanese, 116–17; mentioned, 67, 99; Naitō Konan on,

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142n5; occupied regions, 114; provision of weapons to, 114, 178, 182; refugees from, 73, 106, 122; and reliance on Westerners, 83, 85, 85–88, 103, 107, 111, 114–15, 116, 141; rumors concerning, 112; sources of information on, 90, 103–4, 106–8, 116, 228n16; terms used for rebels, 116; texts from Muirhead on, 90, 106–7, 112, 175; withdrawal to Nanjing, 2, 103, 115; witnessed by Japanese aboard Senzaimaru, 2, 64, 111. See also LongHaired Bandits; Taiping Heavenly Kingdom Tairiku shinpō (Mainland news), 7 Taiwan, fi lm industry in, 172, 185 Taizhou County, mentioned, 17 Tak, W. M. Van der, 26–27 Takahashi Genjūrō, 163 Takahashi Inosuke (Yuichi), 162, 163–65, 166, 167, 238n55; drawing of Wang Renbo, 164, 164fig., 237n46 Takahashi Kazunuki (Mimasa no kami), 38, 48, 221–22n37 Takasugi Shinsaku: ability to read English, 91; admiration for Chen Huacheng and Lin Zexu, 97–98; afflicted by measles, 57; alienated by lack of hygiene, 94; attempt to purchase steamship, 92, 93; as attendant on Senzaimaru, 40, 45; biography of, 45–46, 183, 191; brought anti-Taiping sentiment back to Japan, 116–17; brush conversations of, 43, 97, 98fig., 107, 116, 180; and Chōshū domain, 45–46, 191, 221n27; death of, 170, 171, 193; description of the Senzaimaru, 38; in the movie Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru, 172, 173–76, 180–83, 184, 224n26; first impressions of Shanghai, 63, 67; on foreigners and Chinese in Shanghai, 72, 78, 83; friendship with Godai, 61–62; gun purchases, 92, 92fig.; importance of, 186, 192–93; impressions of the local Chinese, 74, 83, 170, 225n13; interest in military matters, 83–84, 114–15; interest in the Opium War, 97–98, 98fig.; interest in the Taipings, 64, 104, 107, 112, 116, 175, 177–78, 184, 224n26; interest in things Western,

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83–84, 91, 94, 95; and the Kiheitai, 109, 117, 192, 193; on meetings with Qing officials, 118, 120; meetings with Western missionaries, 52–54, 89–90, 91, 106–7, 125, 190; and the Meiji Restoration, 132; on the Nagasaki merchants, 48, 221–22n37; on Nakamuda, 55; names of, 221n28; on Nōtomi, 43; poem after returning home, 192; portrait of, 53fig.; reports on voyage, 47, 55, 57, 91, 140, 171; represented in historical fiction, 170–71, 238n1; on seasickness, 58, 59; on Shanghai as a colony, 78; sketch of Armstrong cannon, 84, 84fig.; stopover in Nagasaki, 52–55, 222n3; studied with Itō, 43; views on Westerners, 79–80, 140, 170, 177, 183–84; visits in Shanghai, 87, 91, 93 Takeda Asayaburō, 34, 144–45 Takeuchi Yasunori (Shimotsuke no kami), 33, 45–46, 144 Tan Shaoguang, 105 taxes, 136, 137, 138, 151; US income tax, 1. See also customs tea, 14 textbooks, 8, 131–32 Thespis (Gilbert and Sullivan), 194 Thetis, 13 Tianjin, 161 Tianjin war. See Opium War (Second) Tilby, A. R., 13, 213n7 T. Kroes & Co., 21, 65, 105, 146, 216n32, 217n47; notices in North-China Herald, 22–23; visit of shogunal officials to, 118. See also Kroes, Theodorus Toba, Emperor, 221n28 Tokiwa Inn (Shanghai), 172 Tokugawa Akitake (Minbu), 163, 237n44 Tokugawa regime: ban on sea travel, 10; collapse of, 3–4, 139, 156, 174, 186; and contending domains, 93–94, 191; foreign relations of, 3, 135, 140; and Japan as a “closed country,” 4; missions to China, 135, 168, 169; opening of ports, 3, 93 Tombrink, Ernst Monosuke, 219n17 Tombrink, Franciscus Petrus: and the arrival in Shanghai, 64, 67; mentioned,

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104, 105, 132, 134, 219n17; as passenger of Senzaimaru, 39, 46, 49, 239n15 Tombrink, Karel Rikitaro, 219n17 Tongzhi Restoration, 2–3 topknot, 71 Torii Echizen no kami (Tadayoshi), 142 Tōtarō, 41 Tōwa shōji, 173 trade: categories of Qing trading partners, 126–27, 128, 130, 158; customs administration, 77–78; international, observed in Shanghai, 76; Japanese questions regarding, 136–38. See also customs; Sino-Japanese trade travel, interdiction of, 4, 10, 50, 187 travel documents, 149, 154, 165, 166 travel narratives: accounts of sea voyage, 58; authors of, 48, 51; epigraph, 121; on customs administration, 77; on death away from home, 5; of Kenjunmaru voyage, 146, 155; on interactions with Chinese, 6, 188; texts used in research, 7–8, 9; mentioned, 88, 90, 141, 176, 181; theme of Western arrogance in, 76, 78, 87, 190. See also brush conversations; Hibino Teruhiro; Matsudaya Hankichi; Mine Genzō; Nagura Inata; Nakamuda Kuranosuke; Nōtomi Kaijirō; Takasugi Shinsaku Treaty of Amity (1871), 4, 126, 156, 190, 194 Treaty of Amity and Commerce (1860), 10 Treaty of Kanagawa (1860), 3 Treaty of Nanjing (1842), 16, 96, 228n5 treaty partners, 130, 137, 138. See also trade Tsuboi Shindō, 47 Tsuda Ōi no kami (Masamichi), 33 Tsukigata Ryūnosuke, 175, 240n19 Tsuzuki Toyoji, 34, 218n7 tuanlian system, 109, 117, 192, 229n32 tugboats, 134, 138, 189. See also guide boats Tung Yu, 13 Uchiyama Kanzō, 8 Uchiyama Bookstore, 8 Uichi (passenger of Senzaimaru), 41 unequal treaties, 190

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United States: Civil War, 1, 52, 54; consulate of, 54–55, 65, 106, 147; in 1861–62, 1–2; in the movie Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru, 176–77, 183, 184; Japanese voyage to, 3, 10, 191; Takasugi’s inquiries regarding, 52–54, 89; as trading partner with treaty, 130, 137 United States–Japan Treaty of Amity and Commerce (1860), 10 Uraga Bay, 193, 215n23 USS Powhatan, 3, 10, 42, 44 Vancouver, 12 Verbeck, Guido, 52, 55, 190, 222n3 Vichy government (France), 177 Victoria, Queen, mentioned, 2 Viêt Nam, 10 Wa-Ei gorin shūsei (Japanese and English Dictionary; James Hepburn), 164 Wan Song, 114–15, 230n46 Wang Chaoshan, 139 Wang Chengzhai, 105 Wang Danfeng, 182, 185, 240n21 Wang Hufu, 100 Wang Renbo, 163–64, 166 Wang Shiwei, mentioned, 88 Wang Tao, 166 Wang Xuanfu, 166 Wang Xunnan, 139 Wang Ying (movie character), 181, 182–83 Ward, Frederick Townsend, 2, 103 warehousing, 134 Washington, George, 53 Watanabe Shōhei, 162 Watanabe Yohachirō, 41, 48, 60 weapons: purchase of, in Shanghai, 92, 92fig., 147, 159; Taipings and, 114, 178, 182; Western, 70, 83–84, 84fig., 90, 115. See also swords Westerners: arrogance toward Chinese, 76, 78–82, 87, 189–90; Chinese reliance on, 83, 85–88, 141; Chinese subservience toward, 76–77, 81–83, 87, 155; Chinese views of, 84–85; in the movie Noroshi wa Shanhai ni agaru, 176–79, 182, 183, 184; Japanese interactions and discussions regarding, 66–67, 69–70, 76–77,

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94, 95, 140, 156, 189–90; military presence in Shanghai, 85–88, military technology of, 70, 89–90, 115; and the opium trade, 96–98; relations with Japan, 193; technical achievements of, 88. See also Britain; Christianity; Dutch; France; United States Western learning (Yōgaku), 88–90 Westmoreland, William, mentioned, 108 Williams, Channing Moore, 52–53, 190, 222n3 Winchester, Charles Alexander, 166 Wirgman, Charles, 165 wokou (pirates), 131. See also piracy Wu Eshi, 87 Wu Xu: career of, 119–20; as circuit intendant of Shanghai, 69, 147–48, 224–25n1; enthusiasm for trade with Japan, 127– 28, 130, 132, 151, 152; handling of Japanese delegation, 120–24, 125–30, 135, 151–53, 231n7; instructions from authorities, 127, 130, 150–51; meetings with shogunal officials, 118–19, 130, 130–31, 135–36, 139, 188; meeting with Japanese at their hotel, 124–25; mentioned, 87; portrait of, 119fig.; report of, 120–21, 125, 127–28, 129–30, 150, 151; use of opium, 99, 189; on use of Western troops, 85. See also Shanghai daotai Wusong, 13, 213n8 Wusong River, 62–63, 65, 73, 137 Wylie, Alexander, 90 Xiamen, 13, 130 Xianfeng Emperor, 2, 83 Xiang Yu, mentioned, 112 Xie Bing (Xie Jiehe), Jinling zhitan, 115 Xindaqiao (New Great Bridge), 80 Xu Huosheng, 79, 85, 112, 114 Xue Huan: communications with Zongli Yamen, 126–28, 129–30, 130, 150–52; report from Wu Xu to, 120–22 Yabe Kisaburō, 166 Yagi Saiji, 162 Yahiro Fuji, 173, 180, 181, 186 Yamaguchi Sekijirō (Kyochoku): brush conversations with Chinese, 155–56; as

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head of Kenjunmaru delegation, 144– 45, 146, 147–50; meetings and visits, 147, 153, 154–55; view of the Chinese, 155; voyage account, 146, 155 Yamaguchi Yoshiko (Shirley Yamaguchi/Li Xianglan), 184–85 Yamazaki Uhee, 40, 47 Yan Jun, 177, 185 Yang Xiuqing, 112 Yang-tse, mentioned, 21 Yaseppochi Yō (Skinny Yang), 185 Yin Xiucen, 185 Ying Baoshi (Minzhai): career of, 156, 235n14; gifts to, 148; meetings with Kenjunmaru delegation, 148–50, 155; reports to superiors, 152–54, 166; demand for travel documents, 149, 154, 165; found precedent for Japanese trade, 153–54, 156, 158; and Japanese request to engage in scholarship, 166–68; and relations with Japanese, 156–57, 188. See also Shanghai daotai Yingwang (Brave King; Chen Yucheng), 112 Yōgaku (Western learning), 90 Yokohama, 3, 91, 159, 160, 161, 162. See also Kanagawa Yokohama shinpō moshiogusa (Yokohama press miscellany), 94 Yoshida Shōin, 45, 104, 175 Yoshizō (attendant on Senzaimaru), 40 Yōsho shirabesho (Office of Western Books), 163

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Yu Xingmin, Shanghai, 1862 nian, 211n1 Yue Feng, 172, 181, 185; Xin Hongloumeng (New dream of the red chamber), 185 yunpiangao, 120, 230n3 Zen Buddhism, 187; monks, 4, 16 Zeng Guofan, 103, 108, 112, 142n5; and Japanese request to engage in scholarship, 166–68; use of tuanlian system, 109, 117, 192 Zenkichi (cook on Senzaimaru), 41 Zhang Decheng, 56 Zhang Dixiang, 73, 80, 81 Zhang Guoying, 145–46 Zhang Han, 133, 233n24 Zhang Shankun, 239n7 Zhang Xiuzhi, 238n55 Zhang Xuxiu, 70 Zhang Yun, 108 Zhang Zixiang (Xiong), 164 Zhao Jingxian, 105–6 Zhapu, 17, 121 Zhonghua dianying gongsi, 172, 173, 239n7 Zhou, Duke of, 117 Zhou Lan, 111–12 Zhoushan Islands, 145 Zhu Yuanzhang, 104 Zongli Yamen: archives of, 231n6; founded in 1861, 2–3, 126; and Japan’s request to engage in trade, 127, 150–53, 166, 190; and the Ganges voyage, 167

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