Jammu and Kashmir, the Cold War and the West [1 ed.] 0415544572, 9780415544573

Table of contents :
Contents
Preface and Acknowledgements
Introduction
I — Jammu and Kashmir: Post-colonial Relations
1. Geopolitical and Strategic Position of Jammu and Kashmir and Anglo-US Involvement
2. The Accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India
3. Plebiscite
4. The Kashmir Question in the Security Council
II — Cold War Politics and India’s Relations with the West
5. Beginning of the Cold War: The United States and India
6. Britain and India: Post-colonial Relations
III — Dialogues of Hope
7. Indo-Pak Dialogue on Kashmir
Epilogue
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Jammu and Kashmir, the Cold War and the West

ii

Jammu and Kashmir, the Cold War and the West

Jammu and Kashmir, the Cold War and the West

D. N. Panigrahi

LONDON NEW YORK NEW DELHI

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Jammu and Kashmir, the Cold War and the West

First published 2009 by Routledge 912–915 Tolstoy House, 15–17 Tolstoy Marg, New Delhi 110 001

Simultaneously published in the UK by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, OX14 4RN

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2009 D. N. Panigrahi

Typeset by Star Compugraphics Private Limited D–156, Second Floor Sector 7, Noida 201 301

Printed and bound in India by Lakshmi Offset Printers FIE, 347 Patparganj Industrial Area Delhi 110092

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage and retrieval system without permission in writing from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record of this book is available from the British Library

ISBN: 978-0-415-54457-3

Contents Preface and Acknowledgements Introduction

vii 1

I — Jammu and Kashmir: Post-colonial Relations 1. Geopolitical and Strategic Position of Jammu and Kashmir and Anglo-US Involvement 2. The Accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India 3. Plebiscite 4. The Kashmir Question in the Security Council

17 48 66 92

II — Cold War Politics and India’s Relations with the West 5. Beginning of the Cold War: The United States and India 6. Britain and India: Post-colonial Relations

117 141

III — Dialogues of Hope 7. Indo-Pak Dialogue on Kashmir

169

Epilogue Bibliography Index

235 246 255

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Jammu and Kashmir, the Cold War and the West

Preface and Acknowledgements This book does not consider the Kashmir problem as merely a conflict between India and Pakistan, but views it in a larger perspective as a part of international strategic relationship being forged in the region, wherein the western powers had a major role to play. The Indian perception seems to have been somewhat simplistic in so far as it was assumed that left to themselves, unhindered and uninterfered from outside, the two neighbouring countries might have found a solution of the problem. But that was not to be. This book explains why it was so. The western powers, especially Britain, wished to be on the right side of ‘the Muslim World’, as Clement Attlee put it, for two reasons: to ‘contain’ Russian expansion and communism on the one hand, and to exploit the Middle Eastern oil on the other for their use in ‘the Air Age’, which had come into being after the Second World War. This involved creation of space for their presence and dominance, especially in the north-western Indian subcontinent. It brought the spectre of colonial dominance and power again, hence sharp differences between India and the western powers. If the debates in the United Nations were any indication, Britain and India might have ended as sworn enemies of each other, had it not been for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conferences which functioned as some kind of shock absorbers. Besides, Britain felt it was logical for the state of Jammu and Kashmir to have been incorporated into Pakistan owing to its overwhelming Muslim population. Wasn’t the Indian subcontinent divided into the two nation-states of India and Pakistan on the basis of ‘two-nation theory’, they asked. Six decades after India’s independence and partition, it might be problematic to assert its validity since most countries in the world including India, Britain, France, the USA and others are essentially plural societies with diverse religions, languages and cultures, which co-exist under the umbrella of the nation-state, guaranteeing each one of them its distinct ‘identity’ within the framework of a liberal democratic polity. Religion alone could not be a criterion for separate national

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identity. The emergence of Bangladesh as an independent state which separated from Pakistan in spite of being co-religionist is often cited as an example in this connection. The talk of ‘clash of civilisations’ based on the religious divide also does not appear to be conclusive proof of nations being apart and always in a conflictual relationship. More secular reasons seem to have operated in this relationship of love and hate. This book again sheds light on some aspects of the question, although that is not the focus of the study, without being bogged down by these formulations. National selfinterest and mutual give-and-take seem to be the guiding principles of bringing diverse societies nearer to each other. Conflict of interest among nations, at the same time, leads to conflictual relationships, as this study ultimately exemplifies. Most of the original research sources were consulted in Oxford, Cambridge and London in three spells in 2003, 2004 and 2006. When my earlier book India’s Partition: The Story of Imperialism in Retreat (Routledge, London and New York 2004) was released in July 2004 at the Nehru Centre, London, I stayed back for six weeks in London and two weeks in Cambridge to consult the private papers of distinguished British statesmen, including Clement Attlee, Creech Jones, Lord Mountbatten, Lord Wavell, George Cunningham, Francis Mudie, Ernest Bevin, Philip Noel Baker, Patrick Gordon Walker, Duncan Sandys and Selwyn Lloyd among others. The British Cabinet Papers that I consulted were housed in the Public Records Office (PRO), now known as the National Archives, London. I am deeply grateful to those who take care of these great repositories of historical information and knowledge. Their unfailing kindness and assistance is something I shall ever cherish. Another visit to England in June–July 2006 enabled me to complete the collection of materials for this book. This became possible in a most fortuitous circumstances. Dr K. N. Malik, with whom I had discussed the subject off and on and who had drawn my attention to some intricate issues, facilitated my visit by the offer of a research grant from the Ram Malhotra Foundation. But for this last minute munificence, I would not have completed this work. I thank him most warmly for both my intellectual and physical sustenance in England. Professor Peter Robb has been my intellectual mainstay in England. During the last 30 years or so, I have benefited from his insightful observations and outstanding contributions to modern Indian history.

Preface and Acknowledgements

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I have read through most of his seminal writings on nation formation, identity politics and India’s dilemma with profit, although I may have reservations on some of those formulations. More importantly, I am grateful to him for meeting me during my research forays in England at School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) and for his generous hospitality, in spite of his preoccupations as Pro-Director of SOAS. Professor Peter Caterall of the University of London and Director of Policy Research, has been most helpful in a variety of ways, not least in providing time for hours of discussions on this subject of mutual concern. He also provided me with the unpublished Harold Macmillan Diaries (1957–63) through e-mail. I thank him for his valuable leads and views. I wish also to thank my friends Robyn, Valerie and Guy Smith for making my stay in London so comfortable and memorable. Robyn, especially, not only gave me the lovely flat she owns in Russell Square at minimum conceivable rent, but also was generous with her hospitality whenever I visited London. At home, I must record my thanks to many knowledgeable friends at the India International Centre (IIC), the Centre for Contemporary Studies, the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML) and the Indian Council of Historical Research, who wish to remain incognito, and particularly to Professor Mushirul Hasan, Vice Chancellor, Jamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi. Also, the library staff of the IIC and NMML were ever willing to attend to my many demands. Especial thanks are due to some of the distinguished Indian Police Service officers of yesteryears, with whom I had discussions on the Kashmir problem and the Sheikh Abdullah affair — M. L. Chhibber, Ved Marwah and R. K. Khandelwal. I would like to thank Pallavi Narayan at Routledge, New Delhi for her meticulous editing of the book. My family has been most supportive. Pradeep gave me his office to finish writing this book. My daughter Minoo arranged for an excellent typist who could handle computer applications as well. Ashu, Samira, Sonali, Aman, Arjun and Pallavi encouraged me with their keen interest in my work and their love. My wife’s help had been tremendous during my research in England. Being a historian herself, she was always sharply critical, reminding me of the basics of the historian’s craft lest I strayed. Each statement I have made is supported by evidence. I am grateful to the NMML, New Delhi for having so kindly provided the photographs included in the book.

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Introduction

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Introduction I The Kashmir issue had its genesis in the partition of India. In a way this study is a sequel to my previous work, India’s Partition: The Story of Imperialism in Retreat (2004). Since the state of Jammu and Kashmir, especially the Kashmir valley, was inhabited by an overwhelming Muslim population, it was argued that Jammu and Kashmir should have been amalgamated ipso facto with Pakistan, following the acceptance of the two-nation theory of Mohammad Ali Jinnah as the basis of the creation of Pakistan. In fact, Lord Listowel, the Secretary of State for India, had expressed his view that Jammu and Kashmir should be a part of Pakistan. The concept of the two-nation theory was neither a historical reality nor was it a politically valid concept. But it did serve as a powerful instrument to drive a wedge between the dominant religions of India. Jinnah postulated that there were two parallel cultural streams in India with divergent religions, traditions and social orders which hardly ever interacted, and if they did they ended in conflict. It is just not a historically tenabale proposition or realistic to say that people hardly ever reacted to each other although they lived as neighbours for ages in the villages, towns and qasbas of India. This is not a place to enter into a nationalist–colonial discourse on the concept, since it is generally regarded to have been the prime mover in creating a sense of separate nationalism among Muslims in the subcontinent in the twentieth century. The fact was that electoral politics brought out the spectre of Hindu domination, which, again, was not true, as the Punjab experiment under Sikander Hayat Khan showed. However, there is no doubt that the assertion of religious identity often led to the creation of separate boundaries. In the case of Kashmiri Muslims, it has been stated by authorities of Kashmiri culture that first and foremost, Kashmir Muslims belonged to the Sufi tradition of Islam. Their devotion to Islam was second to none, but they were also influenced by devotional Sufism, Shaivism, Buddhism and Islam. India’s past history suggests profound influences of Islam and Islamic institutions on Indian society in general — on

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government, trade, industry, music, art, architecture, etc. Yet there were also fine components of indigenous cultural traits in the lives of Muslims, most of whom, in any case, had embraced Islam over the years, maintaining their respective cultural traditions and ethos. Also, there was a blend of all kinds of influences in their language, dress, habits, food, manners and overall their world view were similar to the Indian world view, where they lived and grew. Yet they maintained their distinctive identity as Muslims. Sheikh Abdullah’s grandparents were Kashmiri Pandits and so were the grandparents of celebrated poet-philosopher, Dr Mohammad Iqbal, who had given India their best national song — Sare jahan se achcha Hindustan hamara (Our India is the best in the world). Once Jinnah was assured that Pakistan would soon be realised, he pleaded with Lord Mountbatten not to partition Punjab and Bengal, since the Punjabis and Bengalis, according to him, constituted nations. Mountbatten argued India also was a nation by that definition advanced by him, and he should accept the concept of United India despite its plurality of social and cultural traditions. It must be pointed out that neither Hindus nor Muslims residing in India after partition demanded to establish a Hindu or an Islamic state, except by a microscopic minority of Hindus, the lunatic fringe, as Jawaharlal Nehru used to call them. Nehru’s vision of India was an all-inclusive, flexible, eclectic, an Indian vision of a plural society wherein everybody, men and women, without distinction of class, caste, creed, community, religion or sex, could claim a place under the sun on the Indian soil. In other words, while the leadership of the Indian National Congress, which enjoyed the overwhelming support of the Indian people, accepted partition to ensure independence of India from colonial rule, yet it had never accepted the two-nation theory as the basis of the creation of a separate state of Muslim majority areas. This did not mean that India bore ill-will towards Pakistan or that they aspired to undo partition. The accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to India, and the assurance to hold plebiscite given by India, have been the subject of enormous controversy. A lot of heat and passion had been generated between Pakistan and India, resulting in the wars of 1947–48, 1965 and 1971, but these wars would not have occurred had Pakistan not been armed to the teeth by the western powers, notably USA, ever since 1954. The massive flow of arms and ammunition, running into billions of dollars, was supposed to have been aimed at

Introduction

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combating communism. But not a single shot was fired by Pakistan in defence of Pakistan against communism during the period of the study. Neither the Soviet Union nor the newly emerged communist China invaded Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan had embarked on the path of friendly relations with China when the latter invaded India in October 1962, giving a mortal blow to Nehru’s policy of bonhomie with them; to the resultant elation of Pakistan. This book does not look at the Kashmir problem merely as a conflict between Pakistan and India, but considers it as part of a larger range of issues operating at a much wider level in the international arena. It takes a fresh look at the problem, sitting as it were in the metropolis of London, browsing through the Cabinet papers of the UK government in the post-independence period, housed in the National Archives, formerly known as the Public Records Office, or wading through the invaluable private papers available in the India Office Records and Oriental Collection, British Library, London. If you are engaged in such an exercise, your appetite for further insights and enquiry would lead you to the renowned Bodleian, Oxford, to examine the Attlee Papers, to Rhodes Library, Oxford for the Creech Jones Papers and to Churchill College, Cambridge for the papers of Philip Noel-Baker, Ernest Bevin, Patrick Gordon-Walker, Selwyn Lloyd and Duncan Sandys, including, in part, the Winston Churchill papers. That is exactly what I did and the result is breathtakingly fresh in the sense of the British role in influencing and reshaping the Kashmir issue, by both complicating it on the one hand, as also striving hard to reach a solution of it on the other, which seemed quite significant. Also importantly, Clement Attlee, in his official as well as private correspondence, categorically stated that Kashmir was an issue so germane to ‘the Muslim world’ that they must support Pakistan keeping in view British interest in the Middle East. During the Nehru years, Attlee made several attempts to resolve the Kashmir problem, but as Chester Bowles informed, the western powers including Britain, considered Pakistan ‘as a key factor in international politics by virtue of being Muslim’ and because of its proximity with the Middle East. Another view had also emerged. Lord Birdwood, an influential Indian army general of yesteryears employed in the North-West Frontier region, suggested an independent Kashmir under Commonwealth trusteeship.1 He tried his best to dispel the impression that this was not an ‘official’ view but his own personal view. Nevertheless, one can

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surmise that such a possibility would have made Britain feel elated for the simple reason that it had a chance to ‘influence’ and perhaps ‘intervene’ in the strategically important area of the northernmost part of India. In Chapter 6, I have used the metaphor ‘keep a bit of India’ as an essential aspiration of Britain to have a say in the region where they had enjoyed supreme power, dominance and rule in the none too distant past.

II Some British authors tend to think that Britain’s ‘interest in South Asia diminished quickly as did her military and economic capacity to deal decisively east of the Suez.’2 This was so, according to them, especially after the emergence of India and Pakistan as nation-states in 1947. Such a perception does not take into account the depth of involvement of Britain in creating a new Commonwealth of Nations in which the membership of India was considered to be a keystone of the arch of the Commonwealth. Second, the post-colonial British Cabinet records and the papers of various prime ministers and other central figures show that India and Pakistan were of critical importance in respect of ‘containing’ communism in these areas. Third, as Clement Attlee observed, their interest lay more and more with the ‘Muslim world’ for various reasons, which I have discussed in the book, most critical being Middle Eastern oil, so essential in the ‘Air Age’, as they described it, for reaching out to distant places for trade, communications and maintenance of their power and influence. With the increasing depth of association with USA as partners in the policy of ‘containment’ against communist expansion, the UK government had declared that ‘our security and that of the North America are interdependent’. The Chancellor of the Exchequer of Britain had announced in December 1950: ‘We stand by our association with the United States and with its aims and objectives. Our friendship is founded on a political democracy which springs from the same roots. As we have openly declared our broad economic objective is also identical — a world-wide multilateral trading community with fully convertible currencies. In addition we believe that our security and that of North America are interdependent.’3 They also identified: ‘Another area of deepest interest lies in the proper cooperative functioning of the Commonwealth.’ In this connection, ‘we wish to maintain the present daily consultation and cooperation with the other members of the British Commonwealth of

Introduction

5

Nations. The Commonwealth stretches across the earth and wherever its interest lie, our interest lies too.’4 At the same time, the enunciated policy stated: ‘We recognize that our fortunes are indissolubly linked with our neighbours and allies in Western Europe . . . thus we do not propose to stand aloof from Europe.’5 These three main principles guided the British foreign policy as pointed out by the Labour government. This meant the government did not follow a policy of splendid isolation after the conclusion of the Second World War and was part of the broader relationship of partnership with USA which was essential to maintain British influence in the world. No longer could they dominate after the end of British empire of India, but they still could hold on to a position of dominance and influence through friendly partnership. This was crucial not only for the maintenance of British influence but also for US domination in global affairs. Besides, the Kashmir dispute, as it emerged soon after the creation of Pakistan and India, became a significant plank of British foreign policy, in so far as its resolution was concerned, since both the governments were members of the Commonwealth. Also, it enabled the British to utilise the opportunity to exercise considerable ‘influence’ once the matter was referred to the United Nations by India. In fact, the US government saw, in this episode, UK’s ‘informal mediatory role’. As can be seen in our discussion on the Indo-Pak relations on the Kashmir issue, Prime Minister Attlee, Ernest Bevin and Patrick Gordon-Walker were ‘working on two Prime Ministers [Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan] and that there was more than 50–50 chance that Indian-Pakistani atmosphere could be improved’.6 The United States took the view that Pakistan could take the leadership of Muslim countries being ‘the most progressive and capable’, although ‘the UK officials were skeptical that Pakistan would ever emerge as the head of an effective political association of Muslim countries’. Yet ‘they did agree that Pakistan might set an example and its leaders exercise a useful influence’.7 It was also stated: ‘We should keep in mind the useful role of Islam might be playing with respect to the Moslem minorities in Central Asia . . . that this attachment might work to our advantage.’8 The general tilt in favour of Pakistan was obvious enough. Escott Reid, a sympathetic Canadian diplomat, who was close to Jawaharlal Nehru, tried to answer why most westerners were more comfortable with Muslims in general and Pakistanis in particular than

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Indians or Hindus. This affected their views on Kashmir also. Lester Pearson, Foreign Minister of Canada, summed up his impressions of India. Unlike Pakistan, he noted: ‘People here are morbidly sensitive about their independent position, and satisfied with, even proud about their “neutralist” stand. Indian press conferences — and I had a few — reflect both this sensitiveness and pride. At times this makes them unreasonable and self-righteous as does their occasional assumption of superior nature vis-a-vis the West.’9 Also, a significant observation of Pearson was that Indians did not consider Canada as powerful enough to be considered as ‘imperialists’, hence they were more friendly with the Canadians. Another sensitive observation was made by him which explains why they liked Pakistanis: ‘The British with few exceptions, will tell you that the “Paks” are a better people, more “our type” you know; so when you arrive here you sub-consciously seem to like the Pakistanis. Lahore was a happy but short visit, with only sight-seeing visit to the old fort and Mosque.’10 Reid further explained that Indians had fought for independence during which period the British forces used their might to control and suppress the movements launched by the Indian National Congress. Their leaders suffered long terms of imprisonment and were treated harshly. Most Indians wanted the British to leave but it was not so in Pakistan. Most of them served in the British Indian army and had the experience of a fine life in association with their officers, etc., unlike in India. There was no memory of harsh treatment meted out to the Muslim League leaders and followers. Reid further stated unlike Indian leaders ‘they were not beaten up by British-officered police’. . . . ‘Most of them bore little or no resentment to the British; indeed they usually had respect and even affection for the British who they had served under and who had trained them.’11 Second, explains Reid, ‘the culture of Islam is much closer to that of the West than is the culture of Hinduism. Hinduism is indeed farther removed from the culture of the West than any other of the great contemporary cultures of mankind. . . . India, on the other hand has almost no common intellectual or religious roots with the West and the minds of the Indian people has remained essentially speculative, and slow to adapt itself to the demands of material progress.’12

III It should be recognised that there was no sudden break or rupture in the post-colonial relations between India and Britain. Continuity,

Introduction

7

characterised no doubt with some degree of ambiguity, did exist in their relationship, although it may not have been explicit or easy to tidily locate them. Of course, in the reconstruction of those relations, ‘enlightened’ national interests of respective countries were bound to dominate, yet emotive memory of the past seems to have had a role to play. For the British, the term ‘empire’ was evocative enough, reminiscent of the bygone era of greatness, heroism and national pride. The British defined themselves in terms of the ‘empire’ even though it had long ceased to exist. The behaviour pattern of Philip Noel-Baker or Harold Macmillan as well as many other influential dignitaries, let alone the attitude of the common people, seemed somewhat tempered by what might generally be labelled as ‘imperial conceit’. The imperial vocabulary of ‘power’, ‘influence’ even ‘dominance’ sat easily on them, having an edge in their policy formulations, which Nehru did not fail to detect. Although Nehru himself was a product of British education, culture and upbringing, he was, at the same time, a foremost nationalist leader of the subject India, fighting for independence from British rule and seeking thereafter a place in the sun. He was resentful and cool in his attitude as well, despite the fact that he, along with Mahatma Gandhi, had succeeded in creating a fund of enormous goodwill and friendliness in India for the people of the country which not long ago had ruled over them with a strong hand. The loss of empire was a cause of grievance to most people, especially conservatives in Britain, who were never in favour of freedom for India. The largest political party, the Indian National Congress, was squarely blamed for destroying the imperial fabric so assiduously built by them on the Indian soil. These attitudes did influence their policy formulations to some extent, especially in respect of the Kashmir problem and their explicit support for Pakistan in relation to it. In the Cold War scenario, anti-India proclivities became more open. Several views were current among Englishmen about Indian attitudes to Pakistan. Some of them were of the opinion that Indians by and large did not accept partition, hence, they would try to undo partition if the opportunity offered itself. According to others, Indians were not only not reconciled to partition, but they would not hesitate to ‘destroy’ or ‘annex’ Pakistan. Still others like Field Marshall Sir Claude Auchinleck, who was generally believed to be ‘biased in favour of Pakistan’, feared that India might ‘invade’ Pakistan ‘if guerrilla war ensued’ anywhere in the Punjab. He also considered ‘the communal feeling and tension between the two Dominions of India and Pakistan

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is so great that there is a real risk of their becoming involved in open war with each other at short notice’.13 This might as well have happened, true; but it did not actually happen. It is true that Kashmir was embroiled in a sustained military conflict in late 1947, which is a separate story and will be taken up in the next chapter. Auchinleck’s ‘firm beliefs’ were discounted by Lord Mountbatten and the Indian Cabinet. Auchinleck’s belief was, in which according to him, ‘his own senior officers’ unanimously supported him, that ‘the present Indian Cabinet are implacably determined to do all in their power to prevent the establishment of the Dominion of Pakistan on a firm basis’.14 Lord Mountbatten’s personal reports indicated that there was no question of going to war with Pakistan on the communal issue though tempers ran high on all sides. In fact, Auchinleck’s own observations led to prove that he was too anxious and obsessed with the security of Pakistan, although he defended himself. ‘I and my officers have been continuously and virulently accused of being proPakistan and partial, whereas the truth is that we have merely tried to do our duty impartially and without fear, favour or affection.’15 As he himself said: ‘I and the Supreme Commanders HQ’ were considered to be ‘biased in favour of Pakistan’ and were closed down on 30 November 1947. The unfortunate fact was that Auchinleck’s case, as his personal secretary, Shahid Hamid, said, was one of ‘dismissal’ and the Field Marshall vanished from the scene unheard and unsung, as the story goes.16 Ian Stephens, Editor of the prestigious Calcutta newspaper, The Statesman (1942–51), wrote his magnum opus, Pakistan (1963), in which he declared that the root cause of the problem in South Asia was because of India’s ‘basically expansionist aims of her wish to unite the entire holy soil of Bharat Mata (Mother India) by force, if need be, regardless of international law or Gandhian pacifist teachings’.17 He goes on to explain, ‘. . . in the average Hindu heart even now, years after a mutually accepted partition, Pakistan as an independent state had no real right to exist; she must not devise a foreign policy of her own; her destiny was to be an Indian satellite’.18 Stephens was obviously full of anger, as most British media persons of the time were. These media persons and writers meant, though unsaid, that that is why the British and the US came forward to help Pakistan to enable it to survive and exist. Without their help — economically, militarily, morally and politically — Pakistan

Introduction

9

would have been ‘swallowed’ by India. Such notions were put forward by Pakistanis, also including President Ayub Khan. Dennis Kux (1993), an American diplomat, political analyst and author informs how Khan tried to impress President Johnson with this kind of obsession. ‘I know, you won’t believe it’, Ayub Khan implored, ‘that India are going to gobble us up.’19 President Johnson replied, ‘if the Indians tried, the United States would stop them.’ Johnson felt it was a ploy on the part of Pakistan to get more military aid from the US, but Khan was much ‘chastened’ by his talks with the President.20 While in Kashmir, Stephens lashed out at India for destroying democracy and not allowing the Kashmiri people freedom to express their voice, i.e., by not holding plebiscite, but in Pakistan, he was full of praise for Ayub Khan’s dictatorship, and supported his ‘military revolution [which] seems likely to go down to history as the most efficient and benign thing of its kind that the twentieth century had seen’.21 Khan’s ‘benign military revolution’ gave the right of vote to only 80,000 Pakistani Muslims out of more than 50 million of the inhabitants in Pakistan. Stephens goes on further with apparent glee. He said: ‘President Ayub bluntly described Hinduism as a greater threat to Pakistan than communism, an impetuous master, after professed Pakistan tasting unconditional friendship with China.’22 Jawaharlal Nehru must have assured Pakistan and the western powers, including Britain, umpteen times that India wishes well to Pakistan and that a strong and stable Pakistan was in the interest of India, but it cut no ice. Addressing the mammoth crowd gathered to listen to him during the 25th session of the Indian National Congress held at Kalyani in 1954, he made a fervent appeal for friendship and cooperation with Pakistan: Ever since Pakistan, with the establishment of Pakistan as an independent state, it has been my conviction, which I believe, is shared not only by the Congress, but by the vast number of our countrymen, that India and Pakistan should live in friendship and cooperation. We accept the independence of Pakistan, and there is no question of challenging it in anyway. Any other course would have been the height of folly. Therefore we have wished well to Pakistan and hoped its people will prosper and develop. It is true that we had disputes in a number of issues and several of them still remain unresolved. But that does not lessen in any way the basic fact that India and Pakistan have to live in friendship, or else, both suffer greatly and endanger freedom. Our disputes must be treated as matters for us to decide and not for outsiders to interfere. Indeed, I think

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Jammu and Kashmir, the Cold War and the West that several of these disputes might have been settled by this time if there had been no external interference from outside parties.23

One of the resolutions passed by the Kalyani Congress stated: ‘This Congress would welcome the peaceful development of Pakistan because the development of all countries in South Asia is important and is a guarantee of peace and stability in South Asia. In particular, the Congress considers friendly and cooperative relations between India and Pakistan, which has so much in common with each other, as essential.’24 No one in the West listened.

IV This book demonstrates why there had been paradigm shifts in relations between India and Britain. Britain was a part of the western military alliance system led by the United States. But Nehru steered clear of the alliances which were designed, as they called it, to curb Russian expansionism and imperialism. Nehru’s non-aligned policy was considered by the US leadership as ‘immoral’, ‘as sitting on the fence’ and in the age of McCarthyism, Nehru was denounced as a communist fellow traveller, which he was not. Kashmir turned out to be another burning issue. The western powers looked at the Kashmir problem as an Indian creation and wished to see that it was either amalgamated with Pakistan or made an independent state. They failed to achieve either of these aims, hence their ire against India and Jawaharlal Nehru. When the Kashmir issue was taken to the United Nations Organisation, mostly prompted by Lord Mountbatten, the western powers sharpened their attack on India for its ‘intransigence’ and for refusing to abide by the wishes of the United Nations. In respect of holding of plebiscite as well, although the Indian Cabinet approved, before agreeing with the United Nations in holding it, the Indian opinion was against both Nehru and Mountbatten for unnecessarily agreeing with such conditions. In these issues, it was felt that Britain’s position was decidedly one of opposition to the viewpoint held by India. Nevertheless, India agreed to hold plebiscite in Kashmir in 1949, but Pakistan refused, because it feared the Kashmiri people would vote for India, since the atrocities and brutalities committed by Pakistani soldiers were still fresh in their memory. Nehru believed that peace, freedom, democracy and equality of man and equality among nations were the pillars on which the new

Introduction

11

world order was based or ought to be based. According to him, a new awakening had dawned in the world, the spirit of which was at once anti-imperialist and anti-totalitarian. There had been three competing and compelling ideas in the world, he said — nationalism, imperialism and communism. He asked the western democracies to ally with the forces of nationalism in Asia, appreciating the nationalist urges and aspirations of the people. He thought the military pacts and alliances brought bipolar confrontation and tension nearer. He wanted to preserve the newly-won freedom of India and play an independent role in international politics, especially in the context of Cold War alignments. But Nehru was misunderstood. His non-aligned policy was derided. Even President Kennedy, who was sympathetic to Indian aspirations, asked Kenneth Galbraith to find out from Nehru how ‘non-alignment works — I think, I would like it’, he said.25 Simplistic minds often considered Nehru a fellow traveller who aligned with the communists, but Nehru’s ideological sensitivities as well as intellectual persuasions could not be accommodated within the framework of Marxism. Sir Isaiah Berlin, who had a long conversation with Nehru, believed he was ‘not a Marxist although there were traces of Marxist influence’. He wrote: ‘Nehru: A most fascinating man, sensitive to the finger tips — responsive to imaginative qualities, not horse sense. He made the most profound impression on me. He said that Marxism was 60% (?) about 19th century conditions, but now applied mechanically (presumably by Khruschev and Mao both) to the 20th century with cruel and inefficient results. A descriptive scheme about 19th century West turned into a prescriptive formula for the 20th century East.’26 On Krishna Menon’s influence on Nehru, often termed as ‘devious’ and ‘unwholesome’, Sir Isaiah said: ‘Nehru’s relation to Krishna Menon is T. S. Eliot’s to Ezra Pound, the same beliefs, at much lower tension, milder, more compatible with respectable life, but deriving from the same constellations of values, gently, firmly, tolerant, decently anti-western. He leads the underdogs who are going to inherit the earth — bad underdog behaviour — Chinese, Egyptians, Russians — hurtshim and he is genuinely critical of us, . . .’ ‘Every word and tone from Britain touches him on the raw, it seems to me.’27 The main theme of the book is Jammu and Kashmir, Cold War Politics and the Western Powers. The ‘West’ stands for mainly Britain and the United States of America.

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Jammu and Kashmir, the Cold War and the West

Part I of the book deals with the geopolitical and strategic position of Jammu and Kashmir; accession of J&K to India; the plebiscite issue and the Kashmir dispute in the Security Council of the United Nations. Part II is concerned with Cold War politics and India’s relations with US and Britain in the context of wider range of issues operating in the international arena. The two chapters show the diplomatic space and physical presence sought by those powers through alliances. Part III deals with Indo-Pak dialogues of 1953, 1955 and 1962–63 against the background of the MIG 21 Deal and the India–China War of 1962, which complicated the process of dialogue and peace. Nothing came out of Sheikh Abdullah’s much acclaimed negotiations with President Ayub Khan in 1965.

Notes 1. Birdwood (1956: 194). Lord Birdwood visited India in 1955 under the grant from David Davies Memorial Society of which Sir Winston Churchill was the President. 2. Hewitt (1995: 174). 3. Attlee Papers, Ms Attlee. dep. 102 f. 113, paragraph 32. 4. Ibid.: paragraph 30. 5. Ibid.: paragraph 31. 6. US Charge d’ Affairs in London to SOS (Secretary of State), 20 December 1950, FRUS 1950, vol. V: 1443. 7. Discussion on ‘US General Policies in the Near East and South Asia’, FRUS 1950, vol. V: 204. 8. Ibid.: 205. 9. Reid (1981: 92). 10. Ibid.: 93. 11. Ibid.: 94. 12. Ibid.: 95. 13. Hamid (1986: 260). 14. Ibid.: 271. 15. Ibid.: 261, 270. 16. Ibid.: 272–73. 17. Stephens (1963: 252). 18. Ibid.: 220. 19. Kux (2001: 167–68). 20. Ibid.: 168. 21. Stephens (1963: 246). 22. Ibid.: 263.

Introduction

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23. Address, Kalyani session of the Congress, 23 January 1954, SWJN, second series, vol. 24, p. 368. 24. Resolution drafted by Jawaharlal Nehru on 20 January 1954 and passed by the Congress on 24 January 1954. Ibid.: 452. 25. Galbraith (1981: 407). 26. Sir Isaiah Berlin to Paul Gore-Booth, Britain’s HC in India, 30 November 1961 (PREM 11/4865, PRO, London). 27. Ibid.

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Position of Jammu and Kashmir and Anglo-US Involvement

I Jammu and Kashmir: Post-colonial Relations

15

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1 Geopolitical and Strategic Position of Jammu and Kashmir and Anglo-US Involvement I The former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir suddenly sprang to life on the eve of India’s independence and partition owing to its geopolitical and strategic position in north and north-west India. As long as the British empire lasted, the boundaries of the state and the international frontiers remained, by and large, peaceful. They were neither violated nor were they seriously challenged by India’s neighbours, notwithstanding the fear of the shadow of the Russian bear falling on them. Geographically, the majestic mountain ranges of the eternal Himalayas were regarded as impregnable, protecting India from any invasion from the north. The northern frontiers of the Indian subcontinent were safeguarded by them from time immemorial. The official designation of the state of Jammu and Kashmir dated back to the Treaty of Amritsar signed between the British government and Maharaja Gulab Singh on 16 March 1846. This Treaty, consisting of 10 articles, was an interesting document. Article 1 of the treaty states, ‘The British government transfers and makes over forever in independent possession to Maharaja Gulab Singh and the heirs male of his body all the hilly or mountaneous country with its dependencies situated to the Eastward of the River Indus and the Westward of the Ravi including Chamba and excluding Lahul, being part of the territories ceded to the British government by the Lahore state according to the provisions of Article IV of the Treaty of Lahore, dated 9th March, 1846.’ Article 3 stipulated that Maharaja Gulab Singh ‘will pay to the British government the sum of seventy-five lakhs of Rupees (Nanukshahee) in consideration of transfer made to him and his heirs’. Article 9 assured of British government’s ‘aid in protecting the territories from external enemies’. In return, the Maharaja ‘acknolwedges the supremacy of the British Government’.

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Jawaharlal Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah Courtesy Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), New Delhi

Jawaharlal Nehru with Clement Attlee Courtesy Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), New Delhi

Position of Jammu and Kashmir and Anglo-US Involvement

Jawaharlal Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan Courtesy Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), New Delhi

19

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Article 10 sounds somewhat comical; it says that the ‘Maharaja will in token of such supremacy present annually to the British government one horse, twelve shawl goats of approved breed (six male and six female) and three pairs of Cashmere Shawls.’ No tribute of any other kind was demanded. The treaty stated in clear terms that the ruling chief and his heirs were in independent possession of the territory. Maharaja Gulab Singh was a Hindu, an ethnic Dogra Rajput, while his subjects were predominantly Muslims, especially in the Kashmir valley. Till the treaty of Amritsar was signed, the Maharaja was ruler of Jammu state only. He had served the Sikh chieftans, but during the first Sikh War of 1846, he had helped the British government by supplying men, money and materials, which pleased the British government immensely. The territories of Jammu and Kashmir, however, were no strangers to each other. Kalhana’s Rajataringini (1148–49) mentions trade routes through which extensive commercial and cultural exchanges took place. Gulab Singh was permitted to bring the chiefs of Hunza, Nagar and Gilgit to his dominion through treaty engagements in 1870. The Maharaja, however, submitted to the British government’s request for the overall supervision, direction and control of the region owing to their strategic position. It was considered essential to safeguard the British empire from the invasion of the Tsarist Russia or the hostility of Afghanistan. Pursuing these objectives, the Gilgit Agency was created in 1889 and was manned by the Gorkha and Dogra soldiers under the command of the British and administered by a political agent of the government of India. The expenditure of defence was paid by the Maharaja. In 1893, the Durand Line was established to define the frontier between Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier Provinces of British India. The state of Jammu and Kashmir was the largest of the 562 princely states of India, covering over 84,000 square miles or 222,236 square km. Situated in the northernmost and north-western region of India and passing through the Karakoram and the associated ranges of mountains, it reaches Tibet in the east and Sinkiang in the north, both provinces of China. In the north-west, it is bound by the snowcapped mountains in Gilgit and Hunza, coterminus with Afghanistan on the western side and almost touching the then USSR territory known as Soviet Tajikstan through the Pamirs. In 1947, India had common borders with Pakistan in West and East Pakistan or Bangladesh and Mynamar in the east.

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In 1941, there were three provinces in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Jammu province comprised the districts of Jammu, Kathua, Udhampur, Mirpur and Riasi along with the jagirs of Chennai and Poonch. The Kashmir province consisted of the districts of Baramula, Annantnag and Muzaffarabad. The Frontier districts consisted of Ladakh, Baltistan and the Gilgit Agency. But by August 1947, there were five administrative divisions in Jammu and Kashmir, the Kashmir division comprising mainly the valley and Muzzafarabad, the latter now in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). The Jammu division, which is largely a continuation of the undivided Punjab, consists of Mirpur, Kotli, Poonch (most of which are now in POK), Kathua, Riasi, Udhampur, etc. The Ladakh division had under its jurisdiction Baltistan, Skardu (parts of which again are occupied by Pakistan), Leh and Kargil. The Gilgit Agency and Frontier Illaqas (regions), as they were known, comprising Hunza, Nagar, Chillas, Ghizar, Yasin, etc., are under Pakistan occupation. The strategic importance of the Kashmir valley, Gilgit and Skardu cannot be overestimated. The same is the case with the Karakoram Pass and Aksai Chin (which is now under Chinese occupation). Whichever country had a foothold on them would have the power of surveillance and interference in Chinese Tibet, Sinkiang and Soviet Tajikstan. The western powers, including Britian, were therefore very keen to see that these regions did not fall under the sphere of influence of the communist powers, much less occupied and ruled by them. Most of the upper reaches of the territory in the north, north-west, that is the Gilgit agency and the Frontier Illaquas of Hunza, Nagar, etc., remain snowbound most of the year. The frozen glaciers are hardly accessible. Yet they must be defended as is being done by India in the Siachin glacier range area. The Kashmir valley, as well as Jammu, are watered by magnificent rivers — the Jhelum, the Chenab and the Ravi. The Indus river, along with its tributaries, supplies water to Ladakh and Leh. The valley of Kashmir, including Srinagar, is most important from India’s point of view, since the lifeline to Ladakh, Leh and Siachin passed through the valley and Srinagar. The Kashmir valley is the most fertile region of Jammu and Kashmir, surrounded by high mountain ranges full of perennial forests, and has in her bosom numerous lakes, meadows and sub-mountain ranges and hills; all of them gorgeous, evergreen and breathtakingly

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beautiful. The Jhelum river with its several tributaries flows in this region. Wular lake is the largest one through which the Jhelum river passes near Bandipur. ‘The Baramulla gorge through which the Jhelum flows from the valley is the only natural opening into or out of the valley.’1 Hence its immense strategic value. The major towns of the region are Srinagar, Anantnag, Baramulla and Sopore. The Jammu division is contiguous to the Punjab and Himachal Pradesh. The rivers of Chenab and Ravi rivers flow through the division before entering Pakistan. Hindus are in a majority in the region, except in Poonch and Mirpur. They speak mostly Dogri and Punjabi. The people of Poonch, Rajauri, Bhaderwah, Kishtwar speak ‘Pahari’ dialects like the Gujjars and Bakerwals. Ladakh is situated in the north-east of the great Himalayan range and Himachal Pradesh. Most of the people of Ladakh are Buddhist by religion and speak the Ladakhi language. Kargil has a substantial Muslim population but they are not Kashmiri Muslims as such. They neither speak Kashmiri nor do they follow Kashmiri social and cultural practices. They speak a dialect known as Pahari-Shina-Bhatia. These regions have their own cultural and political identity and owing to the diversities of climate, topography, language, religion and culture, the Jammu and Kashmir cannot be called a homogeneous state. There is an extraordinary mixture of races, religions, languages and social and cultural diversities in Jammu and Kashmir as is found in India. The society of Jammu and Kashmir was essentially plural and diverse. Muslims, no doubt, were in great numbers and had an overwhelming majority in the Kashmir valley proper. They constituted nearly 92 per cent according to the census of 1941, out of whom migratory Muslims like Gujjars, Bakerwals were about 9 per cent or so. Kashmiri Muslims were also followers of ‘Sufi Islam’. The Kashmiri Pandits constituted about 7–8 per cent in 1947. It has been stressed by most authorities of Kashmiri culture that both Hindus and Muslims were imbued with the common Kashmiri cultural and social ethos and practices despite there being different in religious persuasions. Their language was Kashmiri; their dress, food, social customs were more or less alike. Kashmiri cultural ethos was a blend of Shaivism, Buddhism, Islam, Sufism and Bhakti. In 1947, of the total population of Jammu and Kashmir, Muslims constituted 77 per cent and Hindus 21 per cent, but neither of the two were monolithic or homogenic entities. The political and cultural

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aspirations of the people were alike in 1947. They did not contribute to the two-nation theory of the Muslim League and its leader, Mohammad Ali Jinnah. When the defining moment in Indian history arrived with the partition and independence of India in August 1947, the state of Jammu and Kashmir was ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh, the last descendent of the Dogra ruling chiefs of Jammu. Although a man of fine presence and intellect, he had hardly been sympathetic to the new awakening sweeping across the Indian subcontinent. Feudal in temperament and upbringing, hence backward looking and dependent on the bureaucratic paraphernalia of the princely state, he introduced reforms compelled by force of circumstances in trickles, too little too late. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, the most popular leader of the National Conference as also of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, emerged as an adversary of the Dogra rule. He was educated at Aligarh Muslim University, was progressive in his outlook, and came into contact with the leaders of Indian National Congress in 1930–31, notably Jawaharlal Nehru, who groomed him for the leadership of the All-India states Peoples’ Conference and struck lifelong friendship. Like the Indian National Congress objective, Sheikh Abdullah declared his faith in secular democracy, the concept of social justice and freedom from autocratic rule, whether of the British or of the Maharaja. He also came in sharp conflict with Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who visited Kashmir in 1944, ostensibly for ‘rest’. He was accorded an enthuastic welcome both by the National Conference led by Sheikh Abdullah and the Muslim Conference, of which Ghulam Abbas was the President. Jinnah’s speech did not go well with the National Conference and its followers. He said: ‘Muslims have one platorm, one Kalma and one God. I would suggest the Muslims to come under the banner of the Muslim Conference and fight for their rights.’ Sheikh Abdullah in reply said, ‘the ills of this land can only be remedied by carrying Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs together’.2 M. K. Gandhi visited Kashmir in July 1947 and he was ‘impressed with the communal harmony that prevailed in the State’. Later, in August 1947, he declared at a prayer meeting: ‘It was very difficult for me to know whether it was predominantly Muslim or Hindu.’3 Jawaharlal Nehru, in a ‘Note on Kashmir’ submitted to the Viceroy Lord Mountbatten on 17 June 1947 observed:

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‘It is interesting and important to note that Kashmir has kept out of communal troubles during a period when the rest of India has been full of them. This is a remarkable tribute to the policy of the National Conference and Sheikh Abdullah.’4 He also declared that the National Conference was ‘the most powerful party in the state, which though predominantly Muslim, included many Hindus and Sikhs’. Sheikh Abdullah was also the darling of ‘the masses of Kashmir’, he said.5 During this momentous period of flux and movement, Maharaja Hari Singh dreamt of an independent state of Jammu and Kashmir and hence procrastinated his decision to join either Pakistan or India. Had he joined any of these two newly emerged soverign states before 15 August 1947, the Kashmir problem perhaps would not have been a sad and prolonged episode in the history of India. The Maharaja decided to join India on 26 October 1947, when Jammu and Kashmir had been invaded by hordes of Muslim tribes from North-West Frontier Province with the connivance and full support of Pakistan. The fall of Srinagar, the capital city, was imminent. He got unnerved and decided to cast his fortunes with India. Pakistan was up in arms declaring that the Muslim majority state of Jammu and Kashmir could only join India through ‘fraud and violence’ and that Pakistan was determined to wrest it from India by whatever means possible, including force. That was the beginning of the Kashmir problem which has bedevilled good relations between the neighbours; a solution has not been found in the last 50 years. What role the western powers, including the United States and Britain, play in this conflict, is an essential element of this sordid tale. How and why did they involve themselves in this problem is what the following narrative seeks to explain.

II As events unfolded themselves, it was realised by the western powers, especially Britain and the United States, that Pakistan and Kashmir were of vital strategic importance in the context of Middle East defence and being adjacent to Afghanistan. Sir Olaf Caroe, an illustrious luminary of the British Steel frame had served in the North-West Frontier Province and the adjoining tribal belt for most of his career as an ICS officer. Also, he had been Political Secretary to the government of India for a few years. He was also known for his attachment to the Pathans of the region and was considered close to

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Muslims and the Muslim League and biased in favour of Pakistan. A few months before Partition, he was asked to proceed on voluntary retirement by the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten. The recommendation was accepted by the King of England. After retirement, he wrote an article on Pakistan’s potential role for Middle East defence in the Round Table in 1949. He was asked to develop the theme more fully and the result was his influential book, Wells of Power: The Oilfields of South Western Asia, a Regional and Global Study (1951). He argued that Middle Eastern oil held the key to progress and to international relations in the world in the future. Lionel Curtis, editor of the Round Table, in his Foreword commented that the book ‘had the same kind of far-reaching effect on public policy’ as Malcolm Hailey’s ‘Survey of Colonial Policy in Africa’. (Hailey occupied positions of great influence in British imperial hierarchy in India. He served as Governor of Punjab (1924–28) and of Uttar Pradesh (1928–34) before retiring from India. Later, a series of studies on African colonial policy were initiated under his guidance. His African Survey [rev. edn 1956, published in New York in 1957] was considered a monumental study in which he coined the term ‘Africanism’ as a symbol of resurgence of African people.) The main thrust of Caroe’s argument was that the competition for oil would determine the future relationships of the powers and that ‘the danger of attack of Soviet Russia was less likely in Europe than in the Middle East’. Second, he argued that Pakistan, apart from having a strategic position in the region, was a Muslim country, and hence had a better chance of serving British interests in the Middle East than India. Therefore, the British foreign policy formulations must consider cementing better relations with Pakistan. Since, the oil of western Asia was of vital importance in the ensuing ‘Air Age’, British policy must recognise the importance of aligning with the Muslim world. Olaf Caroe’s contribution in delineating Britain’s Pakistan policy in the context of Middle East defence has been considered significant. He was consulted now and then by the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO), London. Dennis Kux, a Foreign Service career diplomat and author from the United States also observed that Caroe’s views were popular in the Pentagon, especially after Henry Byroade replaced McGhee in late 1951 as regional Assistant Secretary of State. According to Kux, Byroade had ‘a first hand experience in South Asia’ and gradually came round to appreciate Caroe’s concept of defending the oil of Persian Gulf from the northern-tier states — Turkey, Iraq,

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Iran and Pakistan — rather than Suez Canal, the conventional wisdom of the time.6 The Pakistan administration had been consistently urging the US government to provide millions worth of aircraft, tanks, anti-tank weapons and artillery. There was also talk of persuading Pakistan to join the MEDO (Middle East Defense Organisation), which created an uproar in diplomatic circles in South Asia. Chester Bowles, the US Ambassador to India, was at the end of his tenure in 1952, but shot off a strong telegram to the Department of State, USA, opposing the idea of including Pakistan in MEDO.7 A view nevertheless had emerged in the Pentagon that the Pakistanis could be of help in the Middle East defence as the Indian Ambassador in New York, G. L. Mehta, was told, although there were also others in the Pentagon who were concerned about the effects of such a move would have on India.8 Dennis Kux also informs that as early as October 1948, an American diplomat, Nathaniel Hoskott by name, from Karachi laid stress on the ‘strategic importance of Pakistan from an international point of view’. He said: ‘In a period of emergency Pakistan can form a base both for military and air operations.’9 It was argued further that India’s political leadership had been largely hostile to British rule. The memory of the onslaught of colonial nationalism was still fresh on both sides. Caroe further wrote: ‘Middle Eastern stability rested on British dominion in an undivided India; this was the power which in large measure held the region firm through the two most shattering wars in history. That anchorage is no longer ours. The emergence of a new Pakistan, and a new India — in this context Pakistan has a pride of place — presents the signal for review.’10 Recognising that ‘there are formidable dissensions between the succession states’, i.e., India and Pakistan, he argued that ‘the chain of continuity’ in defence and the conduct of the foreign affairs ‘has been snapped’.11 Under the circumstances, ‘the arc of danger ringing the Persian Gulf remains, but the central pivot of Indian ocean system has been removed, and it is necessary to construct a new one’.12 When the break came, Caroe felt somewhat grateful to Pakistan, which ‘was magnanimous in retaining the services of a number of Englishmen to cover the transition period’. This was the amenable region, he said, ‘mainly in the countries of our region, west and northwest of the old India’, that they now must look to organising their affairs. ‘A power theatre based on the Indian subcontinent can hardly

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be conceived today . . . the local conditions for a continuance of the successful partnership have for the time disappeared.’13 The partition of the subcontinent and hostility of Indians to British rule ‘has changed all that’, averred Caroe. In support of the above arguments, Lord Wavell’s view of the Middle Eastern theatre of war was cited. Lord Wavell, in his address to the Royal Central Asian Society in June 1949 observed: There are two main material factors in the revolutionary change that has come over the strategical face of Asia. One is air-power, the other is oil. . . . Oil, which is the source of air-power concerns very deeply that part of Asia with which this society deals, since the principal known oil reserves of the world lie in the Persian Gulf. The next great struggle for world power, if it takes place, may well be for the control of these oil reserves. It may centre on Western Asia, the Persian Gulf, the approaches to India both on the north-west and on the north-east. This may be the battleground both of the material struggle for oil and air-bases, and of the spiritual struggle of at least three great creeds — Christianity, Islam, Communism — and of the political theories of democracy and totalitarianism.14

The Anglo-Persian Oil Company was born in 1908. The British government, with a view to obtain security of ‘fuel-oil’ supplies to the admirality, acquired a 56 per cent share of the company by 1913. This company developed the area of nearly 100,000 square miles in south-west Persia. The name of the company was also changed to Anglo-Iranian Company and by 1947 produced 26.5 million tons of oil a year.15 Thus vast stakes lay behind British interest in the region. The government was conscious of this factor and this had a profound influence on the formulation of policy towards Pakistan, India and Jammu and Kashmir. In the Air Age, as they called it, which became a paramount feature of the post-Second World War era, Britain began looking westward from India ‘for the essentials of reinforcement and supply’. It was stressed: ‘India is no longer an obvious base for Middle Eastern defence; it stands on the fringe of the defence periphery. Pakistan on the other hand lies well within the grouping of South-Western Asia as seen from the air.’16 The second danger, according to the study, lurked ‘behind the Himalayan ramparts to the north-east and east. . . .’ With an uncanny insight into the future happenings, it was argued that ‘great forces are gathering, inimical to Southern Asia’s way of life. The danger is real, and a clear eye is needed to meet it. But that danger falls beyond

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our region; here we can only turn to mark it, and having turned look more to the outposts in the north-west. For though the shadow of Muscovite Communism falls over Southern Asia both from the north-east and from north-west, it is on the western approaches that geography opens a road and there, that the ultimate price is greater.’17 I believe, judged from the historical viewpoint, these observations should be regarded as most profound and to an extent prophetic. The emergence of communist China, however, was taken to be a part of Russian communist expansion, which turned out to be inaccurate. Both Russia and China later almost separated from each other’s embrace following different paths, yet the fact remains that both posed threats in the north-west above the Gilgit, Hunza, Pamir range and the Aksai–Karakoram regions and China trying her might against hapless India in the north-east also in 1962. Another influential writer of the time was H. V. Hodson. Hodson’s credentials were impeccable. An Oxford Don, Fellow of All Souls, formerly editor of the Round Table (1934–39), he was thereafter until 1943, Reforms Commissioner of Viceroy Lord Linlithdow. In the Great Divide he was in his eloquent best and declared that Pakistan was ‘inevitable’ since the Hindu Muslim divide dated back to the Arab invasion! A staunch supporter of Jinnah’s ‘two-nation’ theory, he commanded sufficient influence, both in New Delhi and in the corridors of power in London. He was the author of the bestseller, The Great Divide: India–Britain–Pakistan (1969). His other book, however, less known but more influential around the time was published as Twentieth Century Empire (1948) in which he pronounced that India would soon ‘disintegrate’ and be ‘reconquered’. Hence, he believed that the defence of the subcontinent was of primary importance. Both Caroe and Hodson recognised ‘the emergence of Russia as a world power of the first order is a new fact of critical importance’. At the same time, Hodson argued that the defence of the Indian subcontinent was linked up with larger strategic issues of the world. For one thing, ‘the burden of defence upon the narrow manpower resources of the British Commonwealth’ exposes the weakness of the commonwealth. The earlier theory that Britain could continue to be ‘a world power’ provided it was ‘based on a commonwealth of like-thinking and (for the most part) blood-linked nations like the self-governing members of the British Commonwealth’ could be of limited value.18 Besides, ‘Britain and Russia alike today occupy positions in relation to the rest of Europe such as Britain alone previously occupied: attached

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to it geographically, yet politically detached. Stronger than either is the United States, whose relations with Europe are now pledged to a permanent intimacy.’19 However, Hodson still entertained the hope and vision of Britain emerging as ‘a world power’, for which he said you need to have ‘command of the Atlantic, but the command of the Atlantic can never be hers alone; she can exercise only in partnership with or by the acquiescence of the United States. American friendship is the first condition of British world power.’20 Olaf Caroe refers to Hodson’s seminal ideas in parts, finally agreeing with him on the importance of searching areas of convergence in security concerns in South Asia and the Middle East. He observed that the Soviets could easily take off from Sinkiang and Tajikstan in air sorties to the North-West Frontier Province and Afghanistan as well as the plains of Punjab. Conscious of the fact that Britain had lost its power after losing its Indian empire, he also argued to work in partnership with the United States to defend the Middle East. For more than a century in this region, the task of adjustment in peace, and defence in war, was discharged by Great Britain and India in partnership, with the aid of other countries in the Commonwealth. The time has come for the United States to share the burden. In the words of Senator Vandenberg, speaking before the Congress in April 1947: ‘if the Middle East falls within the orbit of aggressive communist expansion, the repercussions will echo from the Dardanelles to the China Sea, and westward to the rims of the Atlantic. Indeed, in this fore-shortened world, the Middle East is not far enough for safety from our own New York.’21 When communist China emerged as a more powerful country in the entire Asian continent, the Americans sought to organise themselves to accept Chinese challenge to their supremacy. Yet they looked at China, as Dean Rusk seemed to do so, as observed by Kenneth Galbraith: ‘China was not a separate entity, it was he [Rusk] averred, a “Soviet Manchukuo” without any of the effective attitudes of sovereignty.’22 Hodson asserted: India’s greatest dangers are within her. They are also the greatest dangers for her external security and the peace of the world. It is true that in another world war India might become a battleground and be reconquered. If that happened, many things now unforeseen would come to pass and deny all present prophesies. But even so the conquest could hardly be accomplished until Indian resistance has been sapped from within.23

How the conquest can be achieved, he expounded this theory thus: ‘Certainly the more probable chance appears to be that the Powers

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will bring their own struggle to India by intervening in her struggle with herself. Intervention begins with ideas, proceeds to training, followed by agents who teach and support the adherents and make mischief among the rest, then to the sending of arms and equipment for violent conflict, and is finally fulfilled in puppet rule. The sequence is familiar, and in India the opportunities are markedly obvious.’24 It is a powerful exposition of either the empire building process or creation of ‘a puppet rule’ which would serve ‘the Powers’, without undertaking the unpleasantness of establishing an empire. Hodson obviously had not forgotten the lessons of British conquest of India. Harold Macmillan’s autobiographical writings seemed to support Hodson’s formulations that India’s future was bleak, as it remained under siege from within, and that the India’s break-up was imminent and not at all an impossibility. As late as 1962, after India suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Chinese, he recorded: ‘The chief risk seemed to us not the invasion and occupation of India by vast Chinese hordes. The real danger lay in the breaking up in disorder of the fragile structure which we had left behind when we retired hurriedly in 1947 — the partition of India. Subsequent events have tragically confirmed our judgement.’25 Two comments seem in order. Why did the British leave a ‘fragile structure’ even after nearly 200 years of their rule? Was Macmillan, the Conservative leader, conveniently accusing the Labour government for, as they called it, ‘scuttling and squandering of the Empire’. Why should the Indian government break up even as the Chinese invasion ended? Why did the Nehru administration not break up until then? Most of Macmillan’s comments and explanations of the Indian dilemma are replete with what may be reminiscent of ‘imperial conceit’ or ‘racial vision’, as is familiar in the colonial–nationalist discourse. Macmillan, for all his apparent goodness and diplomatic skills, was not a great friend of India or Jawaharlal Nehru. He also considered himself to be a man of sound judgement and professed to be always correct. If Hodson’s formulations, predictions and assumptions were correct, then Nehru’s criticism of military aid provided to Pakistan by the western powers should be regarded as absolutely valid. He had passionately argued that India would be threatened by foreign presence in the neighbourhood. Second, without using ‘the puppet rule’ metaphor, he did emphasise as often as he could that Pakistan would eventually lose its freedom to rule according to its own wishes and needs and that its sovereignty, to a great extent,

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would be compromised. At any rate, Hodson unwittingly offered succinctly the causes of British intervention in Kashmir.

III As soon as the Second World War ended, differences between the free democracies — as the western powers led by the US identified themselves — and the Soviet Union became apparent. Under the dominant figure of Joseph Stalin, it was alleged that ‘the revolutionary aims of Communism’ were being spread through force, intimidation and occupation in Europe, since after the defeat of Germany a political vacuum had been created, especially in eastern Europe. The USSR had actually moved into the areas reaching the warm waters of the Black Sea. Kenneth Galbraith states that American policy was dominated by ‘a paronoic fear of communism’ and a policy of massive retaliation and ‘containment’ through military alliances was initiated. That was the beginning of the Cold War. This has been discussed in depth in Part II of this book. It should suffice here to state that Pakistan joined the western bloc through military alliances, and Kashmir was willy-nilly drawn into the vortex of Cold War politics, thus becoming a pawn in the chess board of international politics. After evaluating the power situation in the world in April 1950, the US Department of State issued its policy statement in respect of South Asian countries, especially Pakistan’s orientation toward the free democracies and the USSR. It noted that although Pakistan was ‘politically independent, it remains dependent upon outside assistance for defense’. The Pakistani army, however, was a fine professional army with ‘a high degree of training and morale’, though lacking in logistic support. The US policy makers agreed that Pakistan had the potential to emerge ‘as the strongest power’ after India, ‘between Turkey and Japan on the periphery of Asia’.26 Also, it recognised that Pakistan’s political stability and assistance to the West could be of vital importance, hence Pakistan ought to be supported. Without advocating an alignment at that point of time, the US showed ample sympathy for Pakistan’s concerns which later on reached a stage of fruition in which US-Pak collaboration became a sacrosanct policy for nearly half a century. The policy statement also noted with some concern about Kashmir: ‘It is evident, however, if the government should suffer a diplomatic defeat entailing the loss of Kashmir or the tribal territory on the Afghan border, or if its various schemes for social and economic advancement should not materialise

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the present leadership would be seriously challenged.’27 Hence, the moral was that the US should support Pakistan on Kashmir without loss of face with India. Although Pakistan’s defence capability in terms of manpower was great, it lacked leadership on the eve of her independence. Fortunately, more than 500 British officers were available for employment and all of them were more or less absorbed into both civilian and military jobs. Hundreds of other lower order men, technicians and others, were also employed in Pakistan. The defence equipment needed upgradation. Pakistan had received only six armoured regiments and eight artillery and infantry regiments as compared to India’s 40 and 21, respectively.28 In 1947–50, Pakistan spent 70 per cent of its national budget on defence. In October 1947, Pakistan had asked the United States for $2 billion worth of defence equipment.29 The UK High Commissioner in Karachi Paul Grey met Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan on 20 November 1947 and reported that Pakistan was ‘in a state of bewilderment and despair’. He strongly advocated every kind of assistance to Pakistan lest they feel ‘we have not disowned her now that she has left the parental nest’.30 The matter of defence cooperation with Pakistan occupied the mind of the Labour government as well. Philip Noel-Baker initiated the move and wrote to Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan on 19 April 1949 saying that the government of the UK ‘would be glad to open defence discussions with the government of Pakistan’ and whether the ‘proposal’ was acceptable to them. Liaquat Ali Khan wanted to know whether the proposed defence talks would only be between the UK government and Pakistan or they ‘were intended to be a prelude to defence talks on a regional basis. If the latter which other countries would be invited to participate in it.’31 Also, Pakistan wanted to be apprised whether ‘the talks would be confined to defence problems relating to the World War or would they also deal with a situation in which the security of Pakistan was threatened by any country inside or outside the Commonwealth.’32 The Chiefs of Staff of the UK government were also involved in discussing the question raised by Pakistan. They felt that a guarantee asked by Pakistan for help in the event of war with other countries either from inside or outside the Commonwealth could not be given, since such a guarantee must also be offered to India, which would make the position of the UK government somewhat ‘ridiculous and impossible’, since it would mean ‘advising Pakistan on her defence

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plans against India, and advising India on her plans against Pakistan’.33 Of course, help could be extended to each country to improve their defence capabilities, the chiefs suggested. On 4 May 1949, Liaquat Ali Khan met Prime Minister Attlee and raised a number of points on defence. Essentially, the problem of defence was closely linked to the political one. It was not merely a question of arms supply, or training of officers in defence equipment, etc., it was actually a political decision of vital importance to both the UK and Pakistan. It also involved the question of the relationship with India. As Attlee, in his ‘Personal Minute’ of 4 May 1949, stated: ‘Broadly speaking, I think, that we should be well advised particularly having regard to the importance of Middle East, to do everything we can to assist Pakistan.’34 That was the crux of the matter, the Middle East oil tilted the balance in favour of Pakistan. So was ‘Islam’ involved in the decision-making of the UK government? As early as January 1948, the UK delegation from New York informed the foreign office in London that they had met the Pakistani delegation and had a talk with Zafrullah Khan on the Kashmir issue. The report said that Zafrullah Khan began on ‘a militant note’ but ‘they were in fact in accord with our own ideas’.35 Another appreciation from the US delegation to the Australian, New Zealand and South African delegations was in circulation on 12 January 1948. It stated that the two governments were not likely to come closer for negotiating the Kashmir dispute. That it was ‘not possible to settle their differences by direct negotiations’, hence an assistance of a third party was required. Most importantly, in the mutual appraisal on the Kashmir issue was the UK delegation’s considered advice to all: ‘We must be particularly careful to avoid giving Pakistan impression that we are siding with India against her. In view of Palestine situation this would carry the risk of aligning the whole of Islam against us. Also, we must be careful in handling India on account of their emotional condition.’36 In addition to the North-West Frontier Province and Afghanistan, Gilgit attracted much attention for its strategic position. Gilgit Agency, as it was called, was part of Jammu and Kashmir. In 1935, when Soviet Russia occupied part of Sinkiang, a Chinese province north of the Gilgit–Karakoram range, the government of India asked the government of Jammu and Kashmir to lease them the Gilgit Agency for a period of 60 years. The lease, however, ended with the transfer of power to India and Pakistan in 1947. The Gilgit Agency, having been legally and constitutionally part of Jammu and Kashmir, should

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have been transferred to the Maharaja of Kashmir. But instead, with the help of 400 British Scouts, as the soldiers then under the British Resident were called in Gilgit, Major Brown, who led the Scouts, declared Gilgit Agency to be part of Pakistan, hoisting the Pakistani flag on 3 or 4 November 1947. Meanwhile, the government of Jammu and Kashmir had sent Brigadier Ghansara Singh to take over administration from Major Brown. But to his utter astonishment, he was arrested by the Scouts and kept in confinement for quite some time till he was freed in exchange for a few prisoners who were under the Kashmir government.37 This little known episode epitomised the depth of interest of Britain and Pakistan in the Gilgit region. Major Brown was honoured by British Crown with an MBE and posthumously by Pakistan for his adventurous deeds. Most Indian authors — who happened to know about the episode — have dubbed it as an instance of AngloAmerican conspiracy to grab one of the most strategic regions of northern Kashmir.

IV It is indeed incredible and revealing that the British, to begin with, did not wish that the Kashmir dispute should be referred to the United Nations nor did they want it decided by the application of the so-called democratic principle of ‘plebiscite’. This is revealed by top-secret notings on the file by Philip Noel-Baker, who, later, as the leader of the British delegation in the Security Council, had upbraided India sharply for ignoring to ascertain the wishes of the people through plebiscite in Junagarh, Hyderabad and now in Jammu and Kashmir. Noel-Baker wanted the matter to be decided by British intervention and guidance and in their presence without involving other powers and without resorting to plebiscite. Second, the British official mind seem to have been engaged in devising ways and means of resolving the dispute by the quickest method of partitioning Jammu and Kashmir. Noel-Baker must have sounded Attlee on this proposal which was sent to their High Commissioner in Karachi to discuss it discreetly with Jinnah or Liaquat Ali Khan. This is revealed in Noel-Baker’s despatch of 6 November 1947, i.e., within almost a week of the armed intervention by India in Kashmir after the Maharaja had acceded to India by signing the Instrument of Accession.

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A most startling top-secret draft was sent to the High Commissioner of UK government at Karachi by Noel-Baker, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, as early as 6 November 1947, proposing the division of Jammu and Kashmir. The draft stated: ‘We have been wondering in London whether really the most hopeful course would not be to partition of Kashmir, assigning Jammu only to India and the rest to Kashmir, but it is very difficult for the United Kingdom Government to make any suggestion to this effect, especially when, wide though the differences are, both Dominion governments seem to think that reference to the people is the right method to decide the future Kashmir and Jammu as a whole.’38 The High Commissioner was instructed to discuss this discreetly with Jinnah or Liaquat Ali Khan without showing the document. The instruction was clothed in the diplomatic jargon suggesting something else, though they meant exactly the above. The instruction read: ‘It is obviously impossible for you to show the text of this to anyone, but, if you think it wise, you are authorised to speak either to Liaquat or Jinnah, as soon as opportunity offers, saying that you have in fact documentary proof from London that it is not the policy of the United Kingdom government either to wash their hands of Pakistan or India or to favour India rather than Pakistan. Indeed HMG in the UK is constantly receiving hints from the government of India that they, the British, generally are not impartial but are definitely and consistently pro-Pakistan.’39 Again, to be on the safe side, the minister pointed out that it was their government’s intention to see that both the dominions agreed on the solution of the Kashmir problem by talking to each other, etc. The draft further assured that Nehru’s intentions also were clear in so far as he had agreed to refer to the people’s wishes to be ascertained under ‘international auspices’.40 In the same draft letter, Noel-Baker referred to Attlee’s message of 6 November 1947, which suggested that Noel-Baker must have had the approval of the Prime Minister of the draft before it was sent to the UK High Commissioner in Karachi. The point to note is that within almost a week of the Indian troops landing in Kashmir and clearing the tribal invaders, the draft letter, the very first of its kind, was sent with the authorisation to speak to Jinnah or Liaquat Ali Khan about the proposal to partition Jammu and Kashmir literally on the basis of two-nation theory. Second, it should be stressed that Pakistan, ever since, had been asking for the rest of Kashmir, without the Hindu majority areas of Jammu. Third,

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with this authorisation, Pakistan was well aware of the fact that they had the support of one of the most important powers in the West and through the UK government they could finally secure the support of the USA as well. The message of 6 November 1947 referred to above explained to Liaquat Ali Khan that Nehru had undertaken that ‘the forces would be withdrawn from Kashmir as soon as order is restored’. Second, ‘he undertook that the will of the people should be ascertained, and he proposed that this should be done under the authority and the supervision of the United Nations’. Attlee added to reassure Liaquat Ali Khan: ‘I cannot believe that Mr. Nehru’s pledges have the sinister implications which you suggest, although they differ in form, are based on the same principles.’41 It is a different matter whether Noel-Baker’s proposals met with success or not but the important fact was that such a proposal was made by the British, by no less a person than Noel-Baker himself. The idea was to keep British presence in Jammu and Kashmir. As will be seen, there was a proposal also to assign the British forces to the work of maintaining peace, law and order in the Kashmir valley and to also conduct plebiscite, if at all it took place, under a British officer. The entire exercise was to return to position of power and influence in this part of the world. As we have discussed in the chaper, ‘IndiaBritain, post-colonial relations’, the philosophy of action and the basic principle behind was to ‘keep a bit of India’, if not in terms of a part of territory, at least as a part of British presence and influence. Again, the essential context in this is the assumption that India was bound to ‘collapse’ or ‘disintegrate’ and the British had a good chance of having their presence felt in the region. It is also not mere coicidence that Lord Birdwood had suggested to create an independent Jammu and Kashmir under the Commonwealth trusteeship, with India and Pakistan as coeval and co-equal powers. ‘There is much attraction for the idea of an independent Kashmir under Commonwealth trusteeship. In such a solution there might be a place for Indians and Pakistanis and Englishmen.’42 By the first week of November 1947, the Indian troops were in full control of the Kashmir valley and the district of Jammu. On 7 November 1947, Nehru, in his telegram to the Pakistan Prime Minister, asked him to call off the tribesmen from the territory of Jammu and Kashmir. Second, he offered to withdraw Indian forces as soon as law and order and peace had been restored. Third, he proposed a joint

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approach to the United Nations for a plebiscite to be held under their auspices. Nehru also said that in all cases where the ruler of a state did not belong to the community of which the majority of his subjects belonged would be decided by ascertaining the wishes of the people.43 Philip Noel-Baker, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, proposed ‘all forces should be withdrawn by 26 November, starting with 12 November’. The Pakistan Government should ‘solemnly pledge themselves to do the utmost to ensure that the tribesmen were withdrawn and that they made no further incursions’. Second, plebiscite to be held ‘under the two persons nominated by the Governments of India and Pakistan and a person nominated by Kashmir government as an Observer’. He also added ‘The plebiscite to be conducted by a British officer.’44 Two observations must be made in this connection. The British government was not keen to have the role of the United Nations in the Kashmir dispute, as is obvious by Noel-Baker’s proposal. Second, again within a week of the occupation of Kashmir by Indian troops, he was asking for the withdrawal of the tribesmen from Jammu and Kashmir, which meant he agreed with then prevalent view that tribesmen had invaded the territory and the Pakistan government had the power, as declared by Jinnah that they could be thrown out of the J & K territory if they refused to do so. Why did Noel-Baker later change his stance in this respect in the Security Council, declaring that Pakistan was not involved in the invasion of Kashmir through the tribesmen? The Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) observed that the simultaneous withdrawal of the tribesmen and the Indian forces was ‘obviously difficult’. If the Indian troops withdrew, they observed, without being replaced by a joint force of the two dominions, ‘there is a real risk of a breakdown of law and order in Kashmir’. Additionally, a plebiscite would take a long time to organise. A new register of all adults would have to be prepared. Any plebiscite while the Sheikh Abdullah government was in power and in the presence of Indian troops may not be fair. The plebiscite might go against Pakistan. The suggestion that ‘There is much to be said for keeping the UN out of it, as this would mean delay and the inclusion of a Slav bloc in any neutral Commission appointed to determine the will of the people’ was not something which was appreciated by the British. Again it was suggested, ‘one possibility is the partition of the state’, Jammu district without Muslim majority areas going to India, etc.45

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Two suggestions therefore were considered imperative. First, avoid going to the UN. In other words, let the British manage the show as Noel-Baker had suggested and that if the partition of Jammu and Kashmir was expeditiously agreed to by both parties, going to the UN could easily be avoided. This was the dominant view of British policy makers, which did not work out the way they wished. The essential and conscious British sentiment seemed to somehow remain close to the Indian territory and influence policy decisions. In addition to above, Sir A. Carter of the CRO suggested on 7 November 1947 in their internal discussion that best thing was to move the British forces to intervene in Kashmir. The fact was that unless the tribesmen withdrew, the Indian troops would not be withdrawn and the seige of Srinagar would continue to remain under Indian hands. Therefore it was suggested, ‘as soon as Srinagar is free of tribesmen’ . . . ‘British forces would move to Srinagar by air.’46 In this note, it was again repeated that ‘there is much to be said for keeping the UN out of it. They couldn’t act without a prolonged and acrimonious debate in the Security Council and any Commission it appoints would inevitably contain a representative of the Slav bloc’ — meaning the Soviet Union.47 The British recognised this implicitly as well as overtly, declaring that British stakes were high in the entire episode. The note said: ‘Considerable interest of ours are at stake.’48 And then, they again thought that Indians could not manage the whole affair. ‘If India collapsed into a welter of disorder, the economic position of the world would swing down one more spiral and eventually other great powers would begin fishing in the troubled waters . . . with a consequent danger to world peace.’49 In the Security Council, the British delegation took the position that Pakistan was not in ‘any way involved in sending the tribesmen to Kashmir’, hence it was not a case of aggression. Lord Mountbatten wrote to Clement Attlee: Everybody here is now convinced that power politics and not impartiality are governing the attitude of the Security Council. But the Indian leaders in turn counter this by saying that the Anglo-US bloc apparently attaches so high a value on the maintenance of Muslim solidarity in the Middle East that they are even prepared to pay the price of driving India out of the Commonwealth in the arms of Russia.50

Second, Lord Mountbatten gave vent to the feelings of people in general in India. ‘It is commonly being said here that British policy

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is, as perversely as anti-India and pro-Pakistan, just as it used to be pro-Muslim previously. If Noel-Baker has actually said what he is reported to have done, he has done an ill-service to his country as well as to India. You will realise that this kind of bullying tactics will have an effect reverse of that intended.’51 Dennis Kux, the US diplomat and political analyst, stated that Nehru believed that US policy towards Kashmir was ‘motivated by an interest in aligning Pakistan with an Islamic bloc, under Western tutelage against the Soviets’.52 The UK High Commissioner in India informed the India Office, London on 11 February 1948 that it was Nehru’s opinion that USA were guided in their pro-Pakistan attitude by power politics alone. Jefferson-Jones volunteered that this could only be if Nehru accepted the communist propaganda that the USA intended to use Pakistan as an anti-Russian bastion.53 But a lot of evidence has been forthcoming as will be seen in later chapters that it was the US policy ever since President Truman began his Marshall plan. Kenneth Galbraith believed that John Foster Dulles was determined to follow the policy of using Pakistan as an anti-communist bastion and hence military aid was provided to Pakistan so liberally in the post-1954 period. Patrick Gordon Walker also reported, after his talks with the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan as well as Lord Mountbatten, that India was thoroughly ‘disillusioned’ and ‘resentful’ at the failure of the Security Council to accept the Indian delegation’s case. NoelBaker’s statement to Sheikh Abdullah — ‘we had evidence that Pakistan was not helping the tribal leaders’ — was totally off the mark. There was no doubt about their involvement and Lord Mountbatten strongly protested, as can be seen in his letter to Prime Minister Attlee quoted above. Nehru was ‘angry’ for Noel-Baker seems to have cast aspersions on the integrity of India by proclaiming his views, without any basis or evidence. Gordon Walker also reported that Indian leaders have been publicly saying that ‘the Security Council was actuated by power politics’.54 Another suggestion from the foreign powers also came in December 1947 that Kashmir should be partitioned. Reuter’s gave the lead news on 16 December 1947. Nehru reacted strongly, ‘the government of India were entirely opposed to a suggestion which had appeared in the foreign press recently of a possible division of Kashmir. He did not think that this was desirable or it would solve the problem.’55 It was generally believed the partition would ultimately be on the basis

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of Hindu and Muslim majority areas in Jammu and Kashmir according to the western powers. This meant division on the basis of religion which strikes at the root of the Indian stand. Second, such a partition was only going to be helpful to Pakistan and the western powers, if at all Pakistan accepted the idea. Another highly motivated and irksome suggestion was the stationing of neutral foreign troops in Kashmir till the dispute was resolved. Nehru observed: ‘India too is hardly likely to agree readily to the employment of British troops.’56 In 1951 also at the Commonwealth Conference, the Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies had offered Commonwealth troops for service in Kashmir, which Nehru had firmly rejected.57 When India’s humiliating defeat at the hands of the Chinese took place in 1962, Menzies, with the support of Harold Macmillan, came out with their ‘shrewd appreciation that the Chinese withdrawal would probably make any attempt to reach agreement over Kashmir more difficult’. And then came their favourite suggestion, despite India’s discomfiture that ‘he [Menzies] would do everything possible to help, including sending a contingent to a Commonwealth brigade to be stationed in Kashmir, if such a plan proved generally acceptable’.58 Nehru always objected to such a suggestion and he had often said so in public speeches both in the Parliament and outside, yet the friends from the Commonwealth were bent on offending him. Actually, it was known that Menzies and Nehru had no love lost between them, hence a suggestion of this nature was bound to be painful to the latter. Nehru informed the young head of state of Jammu and Kashmir after his father was exiled, ‘The position in regard to Jammu and Kashmir, is, as you know, a very difficult one and we are up against Great Powers. This fact does not appear to be realised by many people.’59 Even Clement Attlee had been in favour of Pakistan, since as he said he could not annoy the ‘Muslim world’ owing to their Middle Eastern oil. Gordon Walker was keen to impress Prime Minister Mohammad Ali, who thought that India was favoured by the Labour government, that it was not so. Walker said in terms of arms supply, ‘we have kept a very even balance between India and Pakistan throughout’. He added, ‘you look at the arms deliveries from us to you, you will find that percentages have been even more generous’. The attempt to ‘pamper’ Pakistan had been so obvious that even Nehru, who was a great friend of the Labour leaders, felt somewhat dispirited later. Walker pronounced with considerable

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zeal to Mohammad Ali: ‘The Labour Party attaches great importance to the closest possible relations with Pakistan. It is totally untrue to say that we did not do or did not value Pakistan membership of the Commonwealth any warmly as the membership of any other country. . . . You will doubtless remember the public intervention made by Mr. Attlee in Delhi in favour of the UN proposals for Kashmir. It was due to our initiative that Truman joined in. . . . We regard Pakistan’s membership one of the greatest value. When you are in Paris, ask Habib Rahimtullah about his relations with Ernest Bevin.’60

V Another ticklish constitutional problem had to be resolved on the eve of partition and independence. It was argued that paramountcy would lapse the day transfer of power took place, and the princely states would revert back to their earlier position of independence whence they had signed their treaties with the British Crown.61 Both Lord Mountbatten and the Government of India were opposed to the principle that ‘paramountcy’ would lapse with the demise of the British Raj. According to them, the Indian dominion, as successor dominion, should have been invested with the rights and prerogatives of a paramount power. However, that was not to be. Sir Conrad Corfield, Political Adviser to the Crown Representative, had been in touch with Lord Listowel, the Secretary of State for India, privately without the knowledge of the Viceroy or the interim government headed by Nehru, who had agreed that ‘paramountcy’ which Britain held over the princely states should not ‘at any price’ be handed over to the Indian dominion.62 Both Nehru and Jinnah objected to the role played by Corfield, who had meanwhile ordered four tons of state papers, concerning the princely states, to be burnt. Nehru fumed and asked for a judicial enquiry into his conduct.63 Mountbatten remained silent, refusing to side with his political adviser, who [Corfield] later confided to Leonard Mosley in these words: ‘My job was to look after the interests of the Princely States. It was not part of my job to make things easier for India.’64 Lord Mountbatten wanted to know why this ‘impossible’ man was appointed Political Adviser. Sir Francis Wylie, who was Corfield’s predecessor and now Governor of U.P. (1945–47), told Mountbatten: ‘He was never an ideal appointment’. Under him, ‘the Princely intransigence had not decreased’, but nobody ‘suitable’ was

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available in India or at home. ‘He is a very able person indeed,’ said Wylie, ‘but his cast of mind is for these days excessively conservative. He has been all his life in Indian states and has imbibed, perhaps too successfully, the princely point of view.’65 Meanwhile, Nehru and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel created a new State Department to take care of relations with the princes, with V. P. Menon as its Secretary. Jinnah did the same for Pakistan and in spite of protestations from Corfield, his ‘job’ was taken over by Menon in India. Mountbatten kept mum and that was the end of Corfield’s services in India and Pakistan. Clement Attlee displayed great deal of statesmanship on the issue and declared in the House of Commons: ‘It is the hope of His Majesty’s Government that all states will in due course find their appropriate place within one or the other of the new Dominions within the British Commonwealth. . .’.66 Attlee was not so sanguine regarding ‘the states regaining their independence’. He said: ‘They are part of geographical India, their rulers and peoples are their fellow Indians in British India.’ Besides, he continued: ‘It would I think be unfortunate if, owing to the formal secession of their paramountcy relations with the Crown, they are to become islands cut off from the rest of India. The termination of their existing relationship with the Crown need have no such consequences. In fact, already a large numbers of states have declared their willingness to enter into relationships with the new Dominions and some have been represented in the Constituent Assembly of India.’67 He also drew attention to the protection of the states ‘against external aggression or internal subversive movement’, which must now be the responsibility of the dominions. Significantly, it was observed by him: ‘They [Princely States] have received no international recognition independent of India as a whole.’68 Ultimately, the lapse of paramountcy turned out to be ‘a blessing in disguise’, as V. P. Menon rightly observed.69 Had the ‘paramountcy’ been transferred to the Indian dominion, the Government of India would have had to honour the treaties and agreements signed between the Princes and the British Crown. The Government of India would have had to accept the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the princely states as well as accept the privileges which they enjoyed. These would have been irksome and with many princes and princelings, confrontationist relationships might have developed. In the absence of ‘paramountcy’, a new instrument of

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accession was drawn up and the Government of India although guaranteed privy purses and certain privileges, the powers and functions of the princes were curbed to the minimum. In some bigger states, they became ‘Rajpramukhs’ or the constitutional heads of the states under the framework of the Indian constitution. In all these measures, Lord Mountbatten facilitated, through his skilful diplomacy, acquiescence from most of the princely states. At the same time, it must be said to the credit of Sardar Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister of India, under whose guidance the integration of the princely states into the Indian Union took place. He was assisted ably by the Secretary of the State Department, V. P. Menon. The integration of Indian states marks a milestone in the story of unification of India and forms an exciting story as far as the details of each and every state, big and small, entering into negotiation with the Indian government led by Sardar Patel for preserving their privy purses and some of the royal privileges was concerned. It was owing to immense tact, patience and at the same time his ‘iron will’ shown by Sardar Patel that most of the 500 odd princely states opted to join the Indian Union. In the final analysis, however, only three princely states created problems in the process of smooth integration — Junagarh, Hyderabad and Jammu and Kashmir. Junagarh was a small princely state in Saurashtra on the western coast of Kathiawar, Gujarat. It was ruled by an eccentric nawab, Muslim by faith, the overwhelming majority of population being Hindu. Disregarding history, geography and culture, the Nawab of Junagarh opted for Pakistan and Mohammad Ali Jinnah as the Head of the State of Pakistan promptly accepted his request for accession to Pakistan. When the people began a mass movement against his decision, the Nawab fled to Pakistan in his private plane, carrying his 300 dogs with him. If Leonard Mosley’s story is to be believed, it seems, one of the wives discovered ‘at the last moment that her child had been left behind in the palace. She asked the Nawab to wait while she fetched her child. The moment she left the airfield, the Nawab loaded in two more dogs and took off without his wife.’70 The Nawab had carried away the family jewels with him, which was sufficient for his comfortable existence till the end of his life. Meanwhile, a plebiscite was held in Junagarh. Only 91 inhabitants opted for Pakistan, 190,779 voting for India.

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Hyderabad was a large and more powerful state. The Nizam of Hyderabad traced his descent to the Mughals and claimed his territory to have been recognised by the Mughal emperor. The Nizam aspired to make Hyderabad an independent state. Jinnah promised full support to the Nizam, declaring that Hyderabad was ‘the last vestige of the Moghul Empire’ and that millions of Muslims from India and Pakistan would rise ‘as one man’ in support of independence of Hyderabad. More than 86 per cent of the population of the Nizam’s dominion consisted of Hindus. Although Muslims constituted a powerful minority, economically the Hindus were more powerful. They also shared power substantially in the field of administration at the lower levels. Educationally, Hindus were quite advanced. The rural hinterland was dotted with Hindu villages whose traditional rights could not be ignored. In support of the Nizam, a group of Muslims known as Razakars had sprung up, who were by and large anti-social elements, and were led by one Qasim Rizvi. When actually police action took place, not a single Muslim from India and Pakistan raised his finger in support of the Nizam. However, the story of Hyderabad police action does not concern this study. It was of marginal interest, although many Englishmen felt emotionally drawn to the action. The government of the UK was quite clear that no island inside Indian Union could be created and much less sustained. The government stand was ‘that our part has been that of an impartial spectator’. It also noted that the negotiations between Hyderabad and the government of India ‘have been conducted without the assistance or intervention of the UK Government’.71 Second, India and Hyderabad entered into a Standstill Agreement on 29 November 1947 for a period of one year, i.e., till the end of November 1948. According to the Standstill Agreement, ‘Hyderabad’s relations with other countries inside or outside the Commonwealth must be conducted through and under the control of the Government of India.’ Hence, the UK government ‘cannot enter into direct communication’ with Hyderabad, and they regarded themselves ‘as estopped from offering mediation in the relations of the state with the government of India’.72 Other points which were discussed by the British Cabinet were whether a plebiscite could be resorted to in order to demand Hyderabad’s future relationship with India. It was pointed out that the Nizam had rejected the idea of plebiscite totally. In respect of

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‘arbitration’, it was the Government of India which refused to accept any arbitration on their ‘relationship with Hyderabad’.73 As for the pledges of the British Crown to the Nizam of Hyderabad, the government of the UK stood by their position that ‘paramountcy would come to an end on the establishment of a self-governing Dominion. Since HMG could not contemplate that British troops would be retained in India to enable them to carry out their obligations under paramountcy, consequently the rights of States which flow from their relationship to the Crown would no longer exist.’74 The question of appeal to the UN was ‘at present purely hypothetical’ and the government of the UK was concerned with the safety of 300 British subjects in the Nizam’s territory. Finally, Clement Attlee pointed out that ‘the destiny of Hyderabad is intimately involved with that of India.’ . . . ‘We can’t, as I have said, usefully offer to intervene.’75 Jammu and Kashmir was, however, a different cup of tea. It is to this issue, which had defied a solution during the past six decades, that we must turn our attention.

Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

For a fine-tuned description see Karim (1994: 30–35). Bamzai (1944: 742–43). Ibid.: 745. Jawaharlal Nehru to Lord Mountbatten, 17 June 1947, paragraph 25, in The Transfer of Power, (1970–83, vol. XI [229]: paragraph 25, pp. 442–48). Ibid.: paragraph 22, p. 447. Kux (2001: 45, 47n108, 376). Ibid.: 44. Ibid.: 49 (State Department to Indian Embassy, Kux’s reference, 16 January 1953, FRUS, vol. 9, pt 1, p. 343). Ibid.: 44. Caroe (1951: xix). Ibid.: 167. Ibid.: 168. Ibid.: 166–67. As quoted in Caroe (1951: 184). Ibid.: 85. Ibid.: 180. Ibid.: 185. Hodson (1948: 41, 25). Ibid.: 23–24. Ibid.: 25. As quoted in Caroe (1951: 121).

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22. Galbraith (1981: 404). John Kenneth Galbraith was an American economist turned diplomat during President Kennedy’s regime. 23. Hodson (1948: 109). 24. Ibid. 25. Macmillan (1973: 235). 26. (1950: 1490–91). 27. Ibid.: 1491. 28. Talbot (1998: 99). 29. Ibid.: 99, 118. 30. HC’s report to CRO (Commonwealth Relations Office, London), IOR: L/ P&S/13/1845b. 31. PREM 8/997, PRO, London. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 34. L/WS/1/1140, IOR, BL, London. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid. 37. Hassnain (1978: 150–58). 38. IOR: L/P&S/13/1845b, p. 186 BL, London. 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid. 41. Clement Attlee’s telegram to Liaquat Ali Khan (most immediate and secret), 6 November 1947, IOR: L/P&S/13/1845b. 42. Birdwood (1956: 194). Lord Birdwood, a former British Indian army general serving in the NWFP, had said that this was not the official view but his own. 43. CRO office note of 12 November 1947, L/P&S/13/1845b, IOR, BL, London, p. 204. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid.: 206. 46. Note of Sir P. Patrick to A. Carter, 7 November 1947. Ibid. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid. (my emphasis). 49. Ibid. (my emphasis). 50. Lord Mountbatten to Clement Attlee, 8 February 1948, L/WS/1/1140 (top secret), IOR, BL, London. 51. Ibid. 52. Kux (1993: 89). 53. L/WS/1/1140 (top secret), War Staff India Office, IOR, BL, London. 54. L/P&S/13/1845b (summary of conversation), IOR, BL, London. 55. L/P&S/13/1845b, IOR, BL, London. 56. India through HC to Pakistan (top secret), 5 January 1948. Ibid. 57. MSS. EUR. F.158/1197B, IOR, BL, London. 58. Macmillan (1973: 231). 59. Jawarharlal Nehru to Karan Singh, 15 April 1951, in Jammu and Kashmir, 1949–64: Select Correspondence between Jawaharlal Nehru and Karan Singh.

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60. Patrick Gordon Walker in conversation with Mohammad Ali at lunch at The Claridges, London, 14 June 1953 (GNWR 1/7, Churchill College, Cambridge). 61. Mosley (1961: 158–59). 62. Ibid.: 162. 63. Ibid.: 163. 64. Ibid.: 162. 65. Francis Wylie to Lord Mountbatten, 12 August 1947, paragraph 4, The Transfer of Power (1970–83, vol. XII [442]: 682). 66. Clement Attlee’s speech, 10 July 1947, in The Transfer of Power (1970–83, vol. XII [262]: 383n). 67. Ms. Attlee dep. 56 ff 66–67, the Bodleian Library, Oxford. 68. Ibid.: f. 65. 69. Mosley (1961: 169). 70. Ibid.: 186. 71. Ms. Attlee dep. 72 f. 265, 30 July 1948, the Bodleian Library, Oxford. 72. Ibid. 73. Ibid. 74. Ibid.: f.281. 75. Ibid.: 42, f. 288.

2 The Accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India Alastair Lamb believes the landing of Indian troops in Srinagar on the morning of 27 October 1947 was ‘Kashmir’s Black Day’. He did not think the tribal invasion of Jammu and Kashmir backed by Pakistan forces, which was accompanied by mass rape and murder, black enough for Jammu and Kashmir. Then he goes on to bemoan the occupation of the state by ‘at least 400,000 men who have spared no brutality to suppress all traces of popular resistance to the oppressive rule of New Delhi.’1 Obligingly, however, he acknowledged that this happened to be in the post-1990 period. Again, he knew that the Afghan Talibans and the Al-Qaeda jehadis from Pakistan had infiltrated in thousands into the Kashmir valley after 1989, letting loose a reign of terror which needed to be stopped. Most British and the western intelligentsia came to realise rather late in the day, after the Al-Qaeda terror of 9/11 had destroyed the World Trade Center in 2001 or the bombs hurled at the public transport buses or in the tubes in London, that they were not necessarily freedom fighters fighting for the independence of their countries. Incidentally, in the Pakistan occupied part of Jammu and Kashmir in the 1950s, it was known that 32 battalions of the Pakistan army were in position and it was claimed that at short notice 70,000 retired army personnel could be involved, but Lamb showed little worry about it in his Birth of a Tragedy (1994). In any case, it should be stressed that only 400 Indian soldiers landed on that fateful day, which saved Srinagar from falling into the hands of the tribal invaders. And second, the Indian soldiers then were welcomed with open arms by the people. Lamb also proceeds to ask other questions in righteous indignation: ‘What provoked the Indian arrival? Did the Indians have any right to be there at all? What was the international status of the State of Jammu & Kashmir before, during and after the Indian came? What did the Kashmiri people think about it all?’2 The only good question was the last one and it has been answered by most authors including Lamb himself that if the plebiscite had taken place any time between 1947

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and 1949, to which India was agreeable, whereas Pakistan was not, the Kashmiri people would have voted for India since the memories of tribal atrocities and brutalities were still fresh in their minds.3 Many scholars have dealt with Lamb’s controversial assertions effectively enough to render further discussion on the subject unnecessary. Yet the basic question of accession crops up again and again whenever the Kashmir dispute holds centre stage in any discussion or writings. Besides, I am acutely aware that the writings, memoirs or autobiographies of the central players in the act of accession have been either ignored or not known to them at all. For instance, the autobiographies of Sheikh Abdullah himself, Mehr Chand Mahajan, Prime Minister of J&K (October 1947 to March 1948) or Syed Mir Qasim, Prime Minister and National Conference leader, as well as the diaries of General Sir Claude Auchinleck, Supreme Commander and Chief of Staff of the Indian army which shed light on various issues of seminal importance, including accession of J&K, are hardly being referred to by authors. On the question of accession, war and diplomacy, a well-researched and extremely competent study has hit the stands recently, War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947–48 by Chandrasekhar Dasgupta (2002). He has consulted British official records as well as private papers available in the India Office Records and Oriental Collection in the British Library, London and provides a convincing argument on the question. Another equally lucid work is devoted to Lamb’s overall concerns — Prem Shankar Jha’s Kashmir 1947: Rival Versions of History (1996). The latest monograph on Kashmir, Demystifying Kashmir (Behera 2006), should help in demystifying certain notions of authors like the one of Birth of Tragedy: Kashmir 1947 (Lamb 1994) and others. Stanley Wolpert has come out with a new title, Shameful Flight: The Last Days of the British Empire in India (2006). There is a brief chapter on ‘Indo-Pak War over Kashmir October 1947–July 1948’ (pp. 183–93). Wolpert is considered to be a well-informed historian and has written on Gandhi, Gokhale, Tilak; the most outstanding being Jinnah of Pakistan (1984). In spite of howlers, the Jinnah book still holds attention. But Shameful Flight (2006) is a disappointment, if not a shame. It is the ‘Indo-Pak War’ which at present invites our attention. If interpretation and analysis is to be based on facts and evidence, this chapter ought to be revised. Old biases die hard. First, it was not Lord Mountbatten who gave the Maharaja an option to join either of the dominions. It was stipulated in the provisions of

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the Indian Independence Act to join either of the dominions, although with the lapse of paramountcy, a princely state had the option to be independent as well, but this was not advised, as Clement Attlee’s address to the House of Commons made clear. Second, the standstill agreement was signed by Pakistan only and not by both dominions. Third, it was Jawaharlal Nehru’s grandfather, Pandit Gangadhar, who migrated from Kashmir around 1819 or so, i.e., about 60 years, ‘not two centuries ago’ when Nehru was born (1889).4 Fourth, Maharaja Hari Singh was actually advised by his Prime Minister Mehr Chand Mahajan and V. P. Menon to leave Srinagar for Jammu, not that he planned to run away with the royal jewels, as implied by Wolpert. The Maharaja left for Jammu at 2 AM on the morning of 26 October 1947. Thereafter, Menon and Mahajan left for Delhi, reaching there at 8 AM on 26 October 1947. Fifth, Menon and Mahajan again flew back to Jammu with the Instrument of Accession, which was signed by the Maharaja on the night of 26 October 1947. Sixth, the Maharaja asked for military help on 24 October 1947 from India but was refused until he had signed the Instrument of Accession, which he did on 26 October 1947 as mentioned above.5 Seventh, India did not transport the Indian troops to Srinagar in 100 planes. India did not possess so many planes nor did it acquire them from other sources. In fact, only 400 soldiers landed on 27 October 1947 at Srinagar airport. Eight planes only were utilised in all. Further sorties were made later. Eight, Sheikh Abdullah was not deposed and arrested because he advocated ‘free and fair’ plebiscite and Nehru did not accept it. Sheikh Abdullah, in fact, had gone against all agreements signed between the government of Jammu and Kashmir and the government of India. Sheikh Abdullah was a signatory on behalf of the J&K government. His Cabinet was split on various issues including ‘independence’ for J&K, which was advocated by Sheikh Abdullah as against the agreement reached earlier.6 Now let us see what Sheikh Abdullah has to say in his autobiography. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, in his Flames of the Chinar: An Autobiography (1993), relates the story of the accession of India along with his dominant role in the politics of Jammu and Kashmir. The autobiography was first published as Aatish-e-Chinar (1986) in Urdu and was translated into English by the well-known author and highly acclaimed columnist Khushwant Singh in 1993.7 Singh was also a close acquaintance of Sheikh Abdullah and sympathised with

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his misfortune, especially when he was removed from the Prime Ministership of Jammu and Kashmir in August 1953. Sheikh Abdullah was an enigmatic personality with a commanding presence and charisma. He was by far the most popular political figure of Jammu and Kashmir during the Nehru era. He was also an obdurate and ambivalent politician who changed his views and sides, suiting political expediency, but he remained steadfast in certain matters regarding Kashmir’s autonomy and political destiny. He was arrested on grounds of anti-Indian activity and brought to trial for treason, but soon the government withdrew the case. He was also bitter owing to his discomfiture and disgrace, but he could not be ignored as long as he lived. His autobiography sheds considerable light and is an authentic document of his times despite shortcomings of language and expression, often displaying an exaggerated view of himself. Sheikh Abdullah says that the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir wanted independence for his kingdom, which was true, judging from all available sources. According to Sheikh Abdullah, the Maharaja had written to Lord Mountbatten that he wanted to have an independent Jammu and Kashmir state in view of its location and the composition of the population. ‘But Pakistan’s short-sighted policy of invasion of Kashmir left him no alternative. There was no choice but to accede to India and to ask for military help,’8 Sheikh Abdullah said. Another significance fact in this story, as related by him, was that Lord Mountbatten had advised the Maharaja during his visit in June 1947 to accede to Pakistan and that India would have no objection if the Maharaja did so. This part again is corroborated with what Lord Mountbatten himself has written. But he seems to have told the Maharaja also that the other option was not independence. Sheikh Abdullah says: ‘If he [the Maharaja] did not accede to Pakistan, he would have to agree to joining India. . . . The Maharaja in a bid to escape a decision, avoided Mountbatten, since he still nourished hope of an independent State of Jammu and Kashmir.’9 Mountbatten is also on record that they talked for three–four days in the presence of others. Mountbatten wanted a private talk for an hour or so with the Maharaja, but the latter avoided meeting him, feigning colic pain. Sheikh Abdullah also tells us that Pakistan had sent two envoys in the persons of Dr Mohammad Din Tasir and Sheikh Sadiq Hassan, both of whom were Kashmiris, but had gone over to Pakistan. They came to Srinagar for negotiations with him and others of the National Conference. ‘Pakistan had a strong feeling that unlike the NWFP,

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plebiscite in Kashmir would not be in their favour owing to the popularity of the National Conference. Thus they attempted to secure a back-door entry through the Maharaja, as they considered a head-on approach through the Kashmir public beneath their dignity.’10 Earlier, he recapitulated that Ram Chandra Kak, Prime Minister of J&K, assured Liaquat Ali Khan that ‘Kashmir was all for Pakistan.’ A special emissary from Pakistan had arrived in Kashmir to try to persuade the Maharaja to accede to Pakistan. But he failed in his mission. ‘Consequently, Pakistan cut off its supplies of essential commodities such as salt and petrol. It also stopped its supply of notes and small coins to the Imperial Bank, Kashmir Branch. Since the roads joining Kashmir to the rest of India ran through Pakistan, matters became more critical despite the protest lodged by the Maharaja.’11 Mehr Chand Mahajan, who was Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir from 15 October 1947 to 5 March 1948, writes in his autobiography, Looking Back The Autobiography of Mehr Chand Mahajan, Former Chief Justice of India (1963): ‘No one can possibly argue that His Highness was coerced by India to accede to her. India accepted the accession reluctantly and with great hesitation, not by coercing the state to give accession to it.’12 Mahajan goes on to tell: ‘The Governor-General of India was not keen on its accession to India. As I have said before, he thought it was expedient for His Highness to join Pakistan.’13 The circumstances, as they developed owing to the raids of tribesmen, were such that immediate action was called for. The invasion of tribesmen was possible only because of Pakistani support. Mahajan commented: ‘The tribesmen were subjects of Pakistan. This was an unprovoked act of aggression. The Maharaja had done nothing to invite it. Its objective was to take possession of the State by force. . . . No such attack was possible by tribesmen from the frontier without passage and facilities provided by Pakistan and without the staff work of their military headquarters.’ He recounts the sequence of events further: ‘When we got news of the raid, we sent our Deputy Prime Minister with a letter from His Highness to the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of India. I also sent personal letters asking help on humanitarian grounds to save us from this unprovoked act of aggression. We also sent with him a letter proposing accession. The British Prime Minister was approached by cable but no response came from him.’14 ‘. . . October 24 and 25, the two most anxious and most exciting days passed but no reply came from anywhere. The whole of Srinagar

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and the state was in danger and everyone was running for his life. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and his party had organised groups of their partymen to stop people from leaving the state, not realising that they would all be killed if raiders reached Srinagar and everything would be destroyed. Sheikh Abdullah had quietly taken a plane to Delhi on the 25th evening.’15 According to Mahajan, V. P. Menon arrived in Srinagar on the night of 26 October. Mahajan and Menon persuaded the Maharaja to leave Srinagar for Jammu. Later, both flew over to Delhi, reaching Safdarjang Airport at 8 AM on 26 October 1947. They went straight to Nehru’s house; Sardar Patel was already there. Sardar Baldev Singh, the Defence Minister, also came. After listening to Mahajan and Menon, Nehru decided to call the Defence Council meeting at 10 AM. Meanwhile, Mahajan went over to Baldev Singh’s residence and snatched some sleep, not having slept for the past three nights and days. At 12.45 PM, Baldev Singh informed Mahajan that the Indian army’s assistance would be given to the Jammu and Kashmir government and that the Cabinet would be meeting in the afternoon to confirm the decision. The Cabinet met and confirmed the decision to send military help to the government of Jammu and Kashmir to drive away the tribesmen. On 27 October 1947 the Indian troops landed at the Srinagar airport, and the army started action immediately.16 On the same date, Mahajan and Menon again flew over to Jammu to acquaint the Maharaja about the decision, and also to inform that the troops had begun landing in Srinagar. Also, some ‘supplementary papers’ on accession to be signed by the Maharaja were taken by Menon. Lord Mountbatten sent an official reply to the Maharaja in reply to his letter of agreement for accession to India, which had been sent earlier.17 Mir Qasim became Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir after the death of G. M. Sadiq in December 1971 and remained so till 13 November 1974. He was a prominent member of the National Conference and had differed with Sheikh Abdullah when the latter sought to disregard the Delhi Pact of 1952 and later had sought independence for Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah again changed his stand after his release from jail and Qasim (and others) welcomed him, leaving his own position for him. Sheikh Abdullah took over as Chief Minister on 25 February 1975. In Mir Qasim’s autobiography My Life and Times, a lucid narrative of events is available. He related the story of accession of Kashmir to India in the following

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words: ‘. . . blood-thirsty invaders swarmed the state killing and raping without discriminating between Hindus and Muslims. . . . The invasion and the humiliation his army suffered at the hands of the invaders unnerved him [the Maharaja]. . . . To confound this holocaust, communal riots started in Jammu even as Pakistan imposed a total blockade on Kashmir starving it of essential commodities — salt suddenly became luxury item.’18 ‘The Maharaja, . . . now turned to India for help, [but] India was unwilling to oblige the Maharaja by sending its army to drive out the invaders. Unless accession took place and supported by the National Conference, Nehru was unwilling to send Indian army.’19 When the Cabinet meeting was discussing the issue in New Delhi, Nehru was insistent ‘that the Government could not send its forces at the request of the Maharaja although he wanted to accede to India. Unless the accession was endorsed by the people of Kashmir, the Indian forces would not go there.’20 According to Mir Qasim, ‘Sheikh Abdullah who was listening to the debate from an anteroom scribbled a note for Nehru requesting him to send the army to save Kashmir from the invaders. Panditji read out the note to his Cabinet colleagues that Sheikh Abdullah, the sole voice of Jammu and Kashmir, was here with his working committee’s authorisation to declare accession of Kashmir to India.’ Qasim goes on: ‘A point to note here is that India agreed to send its army. . .when it was satisfied that legally and morally this action would be correct. The Maharaja by declaring Kashmir’s accession to India provided the legal justification and the people’s desire (through the National Conference) to join India provided the moral justification.’21 ‘On 26 October 1947, V. P. Menon was sent to Jammu with the Instrument of Accession to be signed by the Maharaja. This document made India responsible for defence, communications and foreign affairs and a decision was made to send the Indian army to Kashmir.’22 It must be pointed out that before reaching New Delhi, Sheikh Abdullah had a meeting of the party’s Working Committee to get its endorsement of his proposed negotiations with Congress leaders in New Delhi. On 30 October 1947, he was appointed Head of Emergency Administration in Jammu and Kashmir.23 These statements and narratives show that accession of Jammu and Kashmir was decided by the Maharaja and supported by the National Conference, which was, in fact, the most representative

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political organisation of the people of Kashmir of the time. It was brought about not as a result of ‘fraud’, ‘deceit’ or ‘conspiracy’ on the part of India or by the bete-noire of western scholars like Alastair Lamb and Jawaharlal Nehru. There was another source which can be relied on. Ajit Bhattacharjea, a respected journalist and well-informed observer and analyst of events, tells us about his experience of a visit to Srinagar at the end of October 1947 when ‘the fires and smoke still rose from the surrounding villages. . . . The Maharaja’s police had fled with him. The volunteer groups of the National Conference patrolled the roads and guarded the bridges. The people around were in full view supporting Indian soldiers in their heroic and successful endeavours to drive the tribals away. There was no question of insecurity. The people around us mostly — Muslims but with many Hindus and Sikhs — were obviously friendly.’24 ‘There was no security guards for Sheikh Abdullah’. He informed Delhi ‘that Kashmiris were unlikely to vote for Pakistan, few believed me.’25 Chester Bowles, US ambassador in the early 1950s, cabled Washington on 16 November 1951 that he had asked all the chiefs of diplomatic missions in New Delhi as to who would win a plebiscite in Kashmir. Their response: ‘Each without exception, stated India would win. . . . Many of these mission Chiefs or their staff visited recently. American press of whom many have recently visited Kashmir also agree with this analysis.’26 Jurists like Mehr Chand Mahajan have asked the following questions: 1. What is the locus standi of Pakistan to raise the question of accession before the Security Council? 2. What status has it to intervene and to say how the status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir should be determined and that too beyond the terms of the Act of Independence? 3. The dominion of Pakistan is no party, under the Act, to intervene in the matter. It has no constitutional or legal right to annex Kashmir simply because it is a Muslim majority area. 4. Pakistan tried to coerce the Maharaja into accession by denying oil and salt, including other essentials. 5. Pakistan brought about an organised and armed invasion of Kashmir.

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6. Pakistan was prepared to march two Pak army brigades into the state, though the scheme failed. An aggressor can claim no locus standi before a tribunal of nations. 7. Pakistan is wholly unfit to claim guardianship of Muslims outside Pakistan.27 According to Lord Auchinleck, the Supreme Commander of the British forces and Chief of Joint Staff forbade the British Commanderin-Chief of Pakistan to march under his command to Kashmir under ‘the Stand Down Order’. Otherwise Jinnah had issued orders to march two brigades of the Pak army into the state of Jammu and Kashmir on 27 October 1947, one from Rawalpindi and the other from Sialkot. ‘The Sialkot Brigade was to take Jammu and capture His Highness and the Rawalpindi brigade was to reach Srinagar and take the city on the excuse that the State should be saved from the tyranny of the Tribesmen.’28 Auchinleck told Jinnah that ‘in so far as Kashmir had acceded to India, the government of India had a perfect right to send its troops in response to the Maharaja’s request’. Jinnah thereafter had to reverse his orders.29 I marvel at the ingenuity of an author of repute to argue recklessly without reference to any sustainable documentary evidence. In his Birth of A Tragedy: Kashmir 1947 (1994), Alastair Lamb pronounced his judgement: ‘It is now clear beyond a shadow of doubt, on the basis of a wide range of sources including Nehru’s own correspondence and the records of British High Commission in New Delhi, that Menon, too did not go to Jammu on 26 October.’30 It seems Alexander Symon of the UK High Commission met him on that day, but, says Lamb, ‘it is curious . . . that on October 26 Menon gave Symon absolutely no hint as to quite what a massive crisis was brewing’.31 Should the top-secret decision be hinted to every Tom, Dick and Harry of the UK High Commission in New Delhi? The fact that Menon kept to himself about the affairs of the government goes in his favour, rather than disseminating information for the use of latter-day professors. Truly fantastic arguments. None of the sources claimed have been cited by the author of this great treatise. Even H. V. Hodson was kept speculating in his magnum opus, The Great Divide (1969), and there was no reason to debunk the very best evidence available. As for Ian Stephens’ writings, the less said the better. If the letter of accession was not available to India and still India wanted to help the friendly and needy state of Jammu of Kashmir, the action of India

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would not have violated any principle or provision of international law because as an ‘independent’ state, Jammu and Kashmir could have sought help given by India. Why did Stephens remain quiet when he had such a ‘scoop’ to announce to the public.? Did The Statesman publish it and has Lamb seen it? Also, ample ground for confusion existed. For instance, it was stated by Prime Minister Mehr Chand Mahajan that ’supplementary papers’ were to be signed by the as well Maharaja. But the interested parties could as well insist that it was a ‘cover’ for the Instrument of Accession to be signed by the Maharaja and that the Instrument of Accession was actually signed on 27 October 1947 and not on 26 October. Then, Lamb feels that Mountbatten may have ‘concocted’ . . . to show Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan and other Pakistani leaders when he visited Lahore on 1 November to settle the Kashmir crisis, etc. But did Mountbatten take those papers along with him for the purpose stated? His ’personal reports’ did not cite them anyway.32 Again, Lamb questions the integrity of the three British Commanderin-Chiefs of the Indian forces, who were ‘persuaded’ to issue a joint declaration before 1 November 1947. Lord Birdwood, not a great admirer of Nehru or the Indian nation-state, says, in his Two Nations and Kashmir (1956): ‘I stressed that there was no previous plot to the effect that no planning of military operations over Kashmir had been made before 25 October 1947. . . . I had his [General Sir Dudley Russell superintending the operation] firm assurance that the operation was entirely spontaneous without any previous preparation. It is most important that it should be recorded for there are few Pakistanis who for a long time did not believe that so successful an air-borne project could only have been executed without previous detailed planning.’33 Under the circumstances, and in view of suspicions from the Pakistani side, including Jinnah stating that such an operation must have been pre-planned, it does not seem to be incongruous in issuing a joint declaration. The fact was the Defence Council of India did meet on 26 October 1947, as stated by Mahajan, and a decision to send the army to Kashmir was taken, followed by confirmation by the Cabinet. The declaration reads (which seems perfectly appropriate and legitimate, since these high dignitaries of the forces may also have been present in the meetings of the Defence Council) as follows:34

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(a) It has been alleged that plans were made for sending Indian forces to Kashmir at some date before 22nd October, on which date the raid on that state from the direction of Abbotabad began. (b) The following is a true timetable of events . . . [there follows a detailed timetable covering all decisions and action taken between 25th and 27th October]. (c) No plans were made for sending these forces, nor were such plans even considered, before 25th October, three days after the tribal incursions began. (Sd.) R. M. M. Lockhart General, Commander-in-Chief, Indian Army (Sd.) T. W. Elmhirst Air-Marshal Commanding RIAF (Sd.) J. T. S. Hall Rear Admiral, F.O.C. RIN. Why did Lamb ignore this evidence which had been available for everyone to see? Lord Birdwood’s book was published in 1956 and was then regarded as an authority on the subject in the West. Alastair Lamb also quotes Auchinleck’s view as to why the ‘stand down’ regulation had to be applied after ‘Kashmir’s sudden accession’ to avoid an inter-dominion war in which British officers on both sides would have been involved. The point to note is that what has been termed ‘Kashmir’s sudden accession’ was actually ‘sudden’ in the sense it was finalised almost in the nick of time when tribal invaders from Pakistan, through their government’s connivance and support, had almost over-run Srinagar. But for the timely help from India to Jammu and Kashmir, Srinagar would have fallen to the aggressors. In this connection, it must be recorded that Auchinleck in his diary does not mention anything unusual about the accession. Auchinleck’s private secretary, Major General Shahid Hamid, reproduces the following: The will of the people was never ascertained and on 24th October Hari Singh asked for military assistance from India. The next day the Indian Defence Committee of the Cabinet met under the Chairmanship of Mountbatten. Rob Lockhart read out a signal from Gracey that the tribesmen had entered Kashmir in force. The Committee ordered the Indian Chiefs of Staff, General Lockhart, Admiral Hall and Air-Marshal

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Elmhirst, to prepare plans for the invasion of Kashmir immediately. The troops were to be moved by air and some officers were flown in advance to Srinagar to work out the details and arrange reception. The fire was lit. On 26th October, Menon arrived in Srinagar and returned to Delhi the same day. Hari Singh wrote to Mountbatten through him and ceded the State to India. The Indian Cabinet accepted the accession and the invasion was legalised.35

Thereafter, Lamb asserts that ‘the same factor continued to operate in this manner for many months before Pakistan was able to come out openly and formally in support of the Azad Kashmiri forces . . .’ and then says, perhaps, only the British officers gave ‘the benefit of their advice and experience’ in private, just as it was happening on the Indian side.36 First, Pakistan forces did not wait for months to support the Azad forces, but they did so right from the beginning of the tribal warfare. In fact, it were they who organised the tribal invasion. Second, the British officers and soldiers fought as well as actively participated not only in providing advice or preparing strategies, etc. throughout Pakistan, but also fought in Kashmir along with the Pakistanis against India. India complained to the British government about it. Also, Nehru wrote to Attlee, drawing his attention to it, as will be seen in the next chapter. General Gracey was also involved in active guidance of Pakistani forces. C. Rajagopalachari, as Governor General of India, wrote to Sir Stafford Cripps, drawing his attention to the unhappy situation in which British officers were fighting against India on behalf of Pakistan. He wrote: It can no longer be called ‘an undeclared war’. It has been admitted contrary to previous declarations that Pakistani troops are in the field, operating against Indian troops in Kashmir. Not only that, but Pakistan has publicly refused to accept a proposal to suspend operations. How can the British Commonwealth office any longer refuse to take action? As if the above were not enough, British officers are operating in the business with jest. British subjects can’t be permitted to participate in the war against one unit of the Commonwealth. British officers in Pakistan have become violent Pakistanis. I am using the language of British officers in India. General Gracey and his staff are fighting India whatever they may call themselves and wherever they may be operating.37

On the Kashmir question, the role of Philip Noel-Baker, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, government of UK, came in for profound shock and criticism in India. He had said in the Security

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Council that ‘the charges made by India against Pakistan of assistance and encouragement given to raiders and invaders are not true’ and that based on ‘his own sources of information presumably British High Commissions in India and Pakistan’ that ‘he is satisfied that Pakistan government are blameless’. Nehru reacted strongly to such a stand taken by the British leader of the delegation. He wrote to Attlee: ‘I confess these are astonishing statements to make . . . That ex-parte conclusions attributed to Mr. Noel-Baker . . . appear to us wholly inconsistent with impartiality which we have right to expect. You will forgive me if I say frankly that attitude revealed by this conversation can’t but prejudice continuance of friendly relations between India and the UK.’38 The Kashmir issue opened up scars with Great Britain, Noel-Baker setting the tone of future relations with India. Nehru, in public, however, continued to praise the UK government as he did so at the Kingsway Hall Meeting in London, which was presided over by Lord Pethick-Lawrence, one of the speakers being Professor Harold Laski, who was a doyen among scholars in Great Britain and was a highly respected political scientist apart from being a great friend of India. Nehru congratulated the government and the people of Britain ‘for the courage and vision they showed at a very critical moment in their dealings with India’ and how ‘extraordinary’ it was that ‘the generations of struggle and bitter conflict . . . has rapidly faded away’. He thought that the ‘relations of England and India were of the largest significance in history’ and that ‘I would like the closest cooperation between the people of India and the people of Britain.’39 At the same time, he felt that the Kashmir issue had been somehow responsible for destroying that goodwill. In his address to London India League on 21 October 1948, he did not fail to inform: ‘Yet there are a good many people in England who dislike the idea of a free and independent India.’40 And when George E. De Silva related to Nehru the most unfavaourable comments of the British press, the latter told him: ‘. . . they cannot easily adapt themselves to the changed conditions and they still try to sermonise as if they are our monitors. This does us little good but it does far more harm to them, for it is obvious that India is going to shape her destiny with the goodwill of others as far as possible, without it if necessary. We want their goodwill but on no account are we going to suffer patronage and superiority from others.’41 In one of the rare communications, Loy Henderson, US ambassador to India, sought from Dean Acheson, US Secretary of State, why the

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Indian stand as stated by them was considered not based on facts or unworthy of appropriate attention and action. His aim was, Henderson offered, to create a better ‘understanding’ with India without being actually in ‘agreement’ with their position, and to make himself aware of the Department of State’s opinions on the Kashmir dispute. He, therefore, sought answers to the following questions, as he had raised them:42 1. Does the department ‘disagree’ [with] India’s stand that Pakistan committed [an] aggressive act in entering Kashmir? 2. Does the department disagree that Pakistan should not be permitted to profit from its forceful entry into Kashmir by remaining in control [of] various regions during plebiscite? 3. Does the department take the view that Pakistan [sic] controlling of these regions would not be advantageous to Pakistan during plebiscite? 4. Does the department ‘disagree with the Government of India’s informal position that various regions of Jammu and Kashmir are so different that over-all plebiscite [was] . . . not the best method of finding solution or that in any event all of Jammu and Kashmir should not go to either party?’ 5. Does the department ‘continue [to] support idea over-all plebiscite with Pakistan in control of certain regions, on substantive or procedural grounds? . . . If the reason is procedural, does the department consider procedural considerations more important in the present situation than those relating to the fate [of] peoples concerned?’ No clear-cut answers to these queries were received from the Department of State. It has been argued by the US State Department officials that the Maharaja’s execution of an Instrument of Accession in October 1947 could not be regarded as having finally accomplished the accession of Kashmir to either Dominion. The reasons advanced were 1. ‘in view of the circumstances prevailing at that time’; and 2. ‘the question of the future of Kashmir remained to be settled in some orderly fashion under relatively stable conditions’. The argument further was based on their opinion as stated by them: ‘The question is an important element in the dispute.’ Why it was so was not stated. Furthermore, they opined without giving any rational explanation:

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3. ‘and in proceedings before the Security Council, neither party is entitled to assert that rights were finally determined by the Maharaja’s execution of an Instrument of Accession’.43 First and foremost, the above ‘statements’ are in the nature of opinions and are not ‘statements’ of law. Second, they displayed lack of clarity on each of the arguments advanced. As far as the last point was concerned, they pointed out that the Attorney General of UK, Sir Shawcross, and the legal advisers of the Foreign Office had said that ‘the Maharaja’s execution of the Instrument of Accession to India was inconsistent with Kashmir’s obligations to Pakistan, and for that reason perhaps invalid’.44 The legal pundits in India rejected Shawcross’s view as a ‘statement’ of opinion and not of law. It was also asserted that Shawcross ‘did not say that Indian states shall have no international status after the lapse of paramountcy’. According to the constitutional experts, the state of Jammu and Kashmir became a sovereign independent state with the lapse of His Majesty’s suzerainty over the Indian states on 15 August 1947. ‘All treaties and engagements between the Crown through treaty, grant, usage, sufferance or otherwise also came to an end. The state became independent and sovereign in the full sense of international law. The limited sovereignty of the Maharaja in relation to matters coming within the paramountcy existing before August 15, 1947 ceased to exist.’ Chief Justice Wazir observed that ‘His Highness thus became an omnipotent sovereign after the new Dominions of India and Pakistan came into existence.’45 The Supreme Court of India had also given similar judgment in Prem Nath vs Jammu and Kashmir, confirming the above view: ‘Maharaja Hari Singh continued to be an absolute monarch of the state, and in the eyes of International Law, he might conceivably have claimed the status of sovereign and independent state.’46 The Standstill Agreement concluded with the Pakistan dominion ‘had no bearing upon the new status’.47 Of course, as the statement goes, the ‘Indian states have no international life’, but that was true of the time when the Crown was the paramount power. Once the paramountcy lapsed, the states reverted back to their own independent, hence international status. ‘The Instrument of Accession for Jammu and Kashmir was signed by the Maharaja on 26 October 1947 and the same was signed by the Governor-General of India the very next day. The Instrument was signed and accepted in the same manner as was executed in case of

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other Indian states, i.e. according to the provisions of Section 6 of the government of India Act, 1935, as adopted by the Indian (Provisional Constitution) Order 1947. The contents and form of the Instrument of Accession was the same as was adopted by the Rulers of fully empowered states. The Instrument of Accession was thus executed legally and was constitutionally completed.’48 In respect of the legal and international personality of Jammu and Kashmir, it could not be doubted. The state of Jammu and Kashmir had a well-defined territory, ruled by a monarch whose ancestors ruled over the state for well over a 100 years. The monarch had a government which ruled over the people of a defined territory according to law as established in the state. The government had full control over the internal affairs of the state. Under the paramount power, the state’s external affairs was regulated through the Crown, but once that lapsed, the monarch had full power over external affairs as well. Moreover, Jammu and Kashmir had the ‘capacity to enter into relations with other states on equal footing after the lapse of paramountcy’.49 In a separate letter dated 26 October 1947, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, Hari Singh, informed Lord Mountbatten, the Governor General of India, that a grave emergency has arisen in his state and asked for ‘immediate assistance’ to save it. He further stated: ‘Naturally, they [Government of India] can’t send the help asked for by me without my state acceding to the Dominion of India. I have accordingly decided to do so and I attach the Instrument of Accession for acceptance by your Government.’50 This letter was separate from the Instrument of Accession which was duly signed. Lord Mountbatten, as Governor General of India, replied to the above letter on 27 October 1947, in which he wrote: ‘Consistently with their policy that in the case of any state where the issue of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the state, it is my government’s wish that as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader, the question of the state’s accession should be settled by a reference to the people.’51 This letter was not part of the Instrument of Accession, which was a separate document, and which was signed and duly completed. The accession, it was stated, ‘would be settled by a reference to the people’. It was optional, not conditional, to the Instrument of Accession. ‘The Instrument of Accession is complete with the offer and the acceptance.’ Lord Mountbatten’s letter went separately.52 Therefore, it was ‘an expression of a wish’, as Krishna Menon stated while arguing out the case for India in the Security Council.53

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Notes 1. Lamb (1994: 1). Alastair Lamb was considered in the 1960s by the western powers as a great authority on Kashmir affairs. His writings were popular but, as can be seen from the facts deduced, were based on misinformation and were biased. 2. Ibid. 3. See Lamb (1966a: 57) and Birdwood (1956: xix). 4. Wolpert (2006), especially p. 183. 5. Ibid.: 184. See for details of the accession in the following pages. 6. Ibid. 7. Abdullah (1993). 8. Ibid.: 91. 9. Ibid.: 89. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid.: 87. 12. Mahajan (1963: 278). 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid.: 274. 15. Ibid.: 275. 16. Ibid.: 151–52. 17. Ibid.: 154. 18. Qasim (1992: 37). 19. Ibid.: 38. 20. Ibid.: 39. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid.: 39. 23. Ibid.: 38, 39. 24. Bhattacharjea (1994: x). 25. Ibid.: xii. 26. Ibid.: xii. 27. Mahajan (1963: 284). 28. Ibid.: 276. 29. Ibid.: 277. 30. P. 96. I have seen most of the Nehru correspondence of the period and beyond and I have found nothing startling enough to suggest that the whole episode was a concoction. In the text, nowhere are the citations found of evidence from the UK High Commission in New Delhi. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid.: 98. 33. Birdwood (1956: 59). 34. Ibid.: 59n1. 35. Disastrous Twilight: A Personal Record of the Partition of India, Maj. Gen. Shahid Hamid, PS to Sir Claude Auchinleck (Leo Cooper, London 1986: 275). 36. Lamb, op. cit., p. 99.

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37. C. Rajagopalachari to Stafford Cripps, 18 September 1948, Ms. Attlee dep. 73, the Bodleian Library, Oxford. 38. Jawaharlal Nehru to Clement Attlee, 8 February 1948, SWJN, second series, vol. V, p. 211. 39. SWJN, second series, vol. VIII, pp. 361–62. 40. Ibid.: 364. 41. Jawaharlal Nehru to deSilva, 29 September 1948, in reply to his letter of 24 September, SWJN, second series, vol. VII, p. 626. 42. Henderson to Secretary of State (USA), 16 January 1950, FRUS, 1950, vol. V, pp. 1372–73. 43. Memorandum by Assstt. SOS for Near Eastern South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) and Asstt. SOS for UN affairs to USSOS, 6 February 1950, FRUS, 1950, vol. V, p. 1379. 44. Quoted in ibid. 45. Quoted in Agarwal (1979: 21–22). 46. Ibid.: 22. 47. Ibid. 48. Agarwal (1979: 35–36). 49. Ibid.: 24–29. 50. See the text of letter in Lakhanpal (1965: 55–57). 51. See Lord Mountbatten’s reply, 27 October 1947 in ibid.: 57. 52. Instrument of Accession in ibid.: 57–59, acceptance by Lord Mountbatten in ibid.: 59. 53. 8 February 1957, Official Records of the United Nations Security Council. See Menon et. al. (1992: 147).

3 Plebiscite I There was some kind of mystique about the term ‘plebiscite’ in the context of the Kashmir dispute. It influenced relations between Pakistan and India as also between India and Britain and affected international politics for more than two decades. Conceptually, plebiscite denotes certain democratic rights, values and practices. It stands for freedom of expression and choice. Simply put, it means ascertaining the wishes of people on an issue of vital import. A denial of plebiscite conjures up deep emotions and fissures, alienating people from those who deny those rights to them. In the context of the Kashmir dispute, the plebiscite idea and the denial created an atmosphere of antagonism, hostility, intrigue, suspicion, mistrust among the stake players. Also, an aura of self-righteousness, hurt and disbelief could be perceived in their relationship, judging from the acrimonious debates held in the Security Council of the United Nations and if the ill-tempered exchanges of letters and views between them are any indication. Why was it so? Did it not have an impact on the process of resolution of the Kashmir issue? First, the term ‘plebiscite’ was introduced in the discourse by Lord Mountbatten, while he was trying to convince Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Patel about its necessity, and in the assurances he gave to M. A. Jinnah and Pakistan that the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir would be ascertained before the state was integrated in any one of the two dominions. Nehru did not want to give such clear assurances to Pakistan but was persuaded to agree to Lord Mountbatten’s insistence, as the dialogue on the question reveals. Mountbatten and Jinnah, the Governor Generals of the two neighbouring dominions, met on 1 November 1947 at Lahore. Mountbatten informed Jinnah that the Indian forces would withdraw once law and order was restored in Kashmir. Second, that India was resolved to have an honest plebiscite under UN auspices to decide the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to either of the dominions. In other words,

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the accession of the state to India was provisional. These views of Mountbatten were recorded. Jinnah pointed out that the withdrawal of forces by both sides must be simultaneous. ‘When asked how the tribesmen were to be called off he made the somewhat ingenious admission that all that he had to do was to order them to withdraw and if they did not comply he would send large forces down the line of communication.’1 In other words, this was an admission that the tribes were under the control of the Pakistan government and that they must have entered the territory of Jammu and Kashmir with the connivance and support of Pakistan. Jinnah believed that ‘the whole Kashmir episode was a deep-laid plot worked out in great detail from the beginning and culminating with the despatch of troops in Srinagar. He argued that these troops could not possibly got in so quickly unless it had been prearranged.’2 The success of airlifting of troops and their successful encounters with the tribesmen was considered a great achievement, hence a big surprise. And so was the victory. In fact, according to the then military authorities of India, they were in a commanding position and could have cleared the entire Kashmir territory of the invasion, had they not been stopped by the government of India from proceeding further. Philip Noel-Baker, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, had this message conveyed to Lord Ismay before the meeting between Lord Mountbatten and Jinnah took place on 1 November 1947. Prime Minister Clement Attlee had seen the draft and approved it. On 1 November 1947 itself, Noel-Baker conveyed the following which was significant enough and the attitude of the British government appeared to have been determined for a course of action, as suggested in the contents of this despatch: I had better give you our view of the situation as it appears in London. We also are satisfied that Jinnah has been feeble or unwise in acquiescing or tolerating the activities of the tribesmen or more probably not stopping his people from pursuing such a policy but we can’t believe that Jinnah planned or designed what in fact had happened. The Kashmir situation now gravely menaces the future stability of the whole of Pakistan and we are sure that Jinnah understands this. Moreover, our experts have considerable doubts whether Jinnah could actually have stopped the movement of the tribesmen however ardently he had desired to do so.3

After having given the Pakistan government the benefit of doubt as far as their role in the tribal invasion of Kashmir was concerned, the British government took India to task, as the following paragraph suggests:

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Jammu and Kashmir, the Cold War and the West We appreciate the strength of the Indian Government’s position so far as it concerned their despatch of troops to Kashmir in the light of developments since our first message and it is no doubt true that if Srinagar was looted by the tribes the general effect on the communal situation throughout India and Pakistan might be very grave. Nevertheless the Indian Government made a dangerous and provocative mistake in our view by accepting even provisionally the accession of Kashmir to India. There was no need to do this. Military help could have been sent to Kashmir from India without accession of the State.4

By 6 November 1947, however, it became clear to India that the tribesmen definitely had the logistic support from the Pakistan government to invade Kashmir. And what was worse, Jinnah unwittingly had declared in the meeting with Lord Mountbatten that the tribal invasion could be withdrawn by the order of Jinnah and the Pakistan government. In this connection, Noel-Baker quite felt lost when he came to know about Jinnah’s statement. He recorded: ‘This makes difficult to understand what Mr. Jinnah means when he says, in his peace offer, that he has only to order the tribesmen to go home.’5 Obviously, it meant that the tribesmen had gone with the connivance and support of Pakistan officialdom and with the knowledge of Jinnah. The ire of the British arose on the question of accession, which was legally and constitutionally valid, hence the Commonwealth Relations Minister Noel-Baker declared: ‘The account of planned coup d’etat by Jinnah sounds to me like a wild exaggeration.’ After all, according to the British, Jinnah was the noblest of men and was incapable of doing anything wrong. Then Noel-Baker says: ‘If it is true that Mountbatten favoured the acceptance of accession of Kashmir to India, as Menon [V.P.] states, I think that is a matter for regret. The acceptance of Kashmir’s accession, against Nehru’s desire was to my mind an unnecessary and provocative step. I am copying this minute to the Minister of Defence.’6 Meanwhile, Prime Ministers Liaquat Ali Khan and Nehru met in New Delhi on 26 November 1947, with Lord Mountbatten presiding over it. Nehru ‘categorically’ said if the government of India had not gone ‘to the assistance of Kashmir when called upon not only by the Ruler but by Sheikh Abdullah, the leader of the popular party, he had no doubt whatever that the present government of India would have been overthrown and that it would have been replaced by an irresponsible and extremist government which in his opinion would certainly have declared war upon Pakistan.’7 During the course of

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the meeting, it was suggested that a plebiscite under UN auspices should be undertaken and minimum Indian forces should be present at vital positions in Jammu and Kashmir and as far as possible, the return of the refugees to their homes or choice of stay in other dominions should be ensured. On Mountbatten’s initiative, another meeting was convened in Lahore on 8 December 1947, which was attended by Liaquat Ali Khan and Ghulam Mohammad; Nehru, Sardar Baldev Singh and Gopalaswami Ayyangar represented India. Mountbatten declared that his main aim was to stop hostilities in Kashmir so that these did not spill over into a war between the two Commonwealth countries. Mountbatten also raised the question of plebiscite along with the cessation of hostilities. Nehru thought that the two issues were not necessarily linked up, although India had followed the path of ascertaining the wishes of the people in respect of disputes of this kind. The other point stressed by Mountbatten was that India wished to take the issue of Kashmir to UNO. Here again, Nehru showed considerable reluctance to agree with Mountbatten. It was later that he was persuaded to do so.8 Nehru told Liaquat Ali Khan that the tribesmen were ‘assisted by persons in authority in Pakistan’, and there had been ‘no attempt at an open disavowal by the Pakistan Government’. Khan disputed this, to which Nehru shot out: ‘He could produce proof that the NWFP had helped to arm the raiders and given them every sort of assistance.’9 Besides, Nehru pointed out that the question of plebiscite did not arise till there was withdrawal of the raiders. He wanted the Pakistan leaders to realise whatever may be the result of a plebiscite, whenever it took place, the fact remained that ‘Kashmir was at the present time part of the territory of India.’10 To the interjection of Gopalaswami Ayyangar whether Pakistan considered its duty as a country having an international existence, to stop these invaders, Khan expressed his helplessness in stopping them. ‘Any effort to do so would mean going to war with the tribes which he was not prepared to do.’11 Thereafter, Ghulam Mohammad offered, if a change of administration was brought about in Kashmir, ‘Pakistan would do all in their power to withdraw the raiders.’12 Nehru said that ‘India had gone out of the way to offer plebiscite, now they are told that India must change the administration.’13 Ghulam Mohammad also suggested a coalition government for Kashmir. Ayyangar pointed out that if the present government brought both communities together, there would be ‘grave risks of communal trouble in Kashmir if coalition government is brought in’.14

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During the dialogue on 8 December 1947, Mountbatten’s role was somewhat ambivalent from the Indian point of view. He chaired the meeting and brought into the discussion that plebiscite should be held under UN auspices; he drew attention ‘to the great benefits an approach to UNO would have. It was the only way to solve the impasse, and stop the fighting — and to stop the fighting was the main thing at the moment’.15 Mountbatten acted as though he was an umpire sitting on the high table to decide the dispute between the two parties. He recorded: Nearly all the rest of the time was devoted to efforts to induce Pandit Nehru to accept a reference to UNO. . . . Pandit Nehru was extremely adamant. He went to the extent of saying that he intended to clear Kashmir with the sword, whatever happened. He asked under what section of the Charter any reference to UNO could be made. He asked how Pakistan came into the picture at all. He reiterated his insistence that the first step was to drive out the raiders.16

Mountbatten suggested that ‘the UNO should be asked to send out observers or advisers in some capacity to help the two Dominions solve the impasse which had been reached’. Liaquat Ali Khan agreed. Nehru said he would entirely reject this idea. Only when hostilities had ceased he was prepared to ask UNO to send representatives for the plebiscite. The plebiscite only came into the picture when peace was restored.17 Mountbatten’s suggestion by Pakistan that a ‘joint statement’ may be issued was refused by Pakistan and his suggestion for a unilateral statement by India was refused by Nehru.18 On 12 December 1947, Nehru informed Liaquat Ali Khan that he had no desire to approach the UNO for a decision on the Kashmir ‘dispute’. ‘We have given full thought in the light of our discussion in Lahore to the question of inviting the United Nations to advise us in the matter. While we are prepared to invite UNO observers to come here and advise us as to the proposed plebiscite, it is not clear in which other capacity the United Nations’ help can be sought.’19 Another dialogue between Liaquat Ali Khan, Nehru and Mountbatten took place in New Delhi on 21 December 1947. Again Mountbatten, the diplomat, began working on Nehru, after a private meeting which he held with Khan before the start of the formal meeting. Mountbatten said that Khan was ‘in a very chastened mood, since he was obviously frightened at the situation, which appeared to me to be getting out of control’. After this introduction, he appealed

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to Nehru: ‘I thought he would accept any appeal to UNO in order to break the impasse and bring the fighting to an end, although his desire was to link the plebiscite with the appeal to cease fighting.’20 Pandit Nehru said that ‘this was out of question, that the Government of India would never agree to this and that he intended to tell Liaquat Ali Khan so. I begged him to let him explain this in a quiet and tactful manner, for I felt that I would probably get him to accept it provided it were not done in a provocative way.’21 After the meeting of 21 December 1947, Nehru had a long talk with Mountbatten. Nehru records Mountbatten made repeated appeals both on national and personal grounds. . .because he felt so much was at stake. The next day would be vital in the history of India. We were very near a settlement and the highest statesmanship and the good of India demanded that we should take advantage of it. . . . The settlement, of course, should be essentially on the lines we have repeatedly laid down, i.e. reference to the UNO to stop the fighting and when this is done and peace and order restored, a plebiscite under UNO auspices.22

Nehru said: ‘Regarding Kashmir I pointed out that the immediate issue was of aggression directly or indirectly by Pakistan on India. No other issue arose till that was settled. We propose to refer to this particular matter to the Security Council of the UNO, charging Pakistan with aggression. . .otherwise we would have to take action ourselves in such a manner as we thought fit to stop the aggression at the base.23 Lord Mountbatten said he agreed with the reference, but could we not add to it that after law and order has been restored UNO would supervise and carry out the plebiscite as we had previously declared? I said that we could not add this to our reference. It was entirely a separate matter and much would depend on developments. . . .’.24 In the final analysis, however, these subtle differences were lost in the UN debates. In any case, it was Mountbatten who finally prevailed and the matter was referred to the UNO in the manner he had suggested. However, Nehru informed him that ‘the Cabinet had considered this matter and was quite clear that it should not bring in the question of plebiscite in this reference. But how and when this should take place would depend on circumstances. We cannot have a continuation of war and the idea of plebiscite to go together.’25 Mountbatten, of course, wanted somehow to end the war and he felt concerned about the possibility of Indian forces taking possession

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of ‘bases’ or ‘nerve centres’ inside Pakistan from where they launched their operations. He wrote to Nehru that war could be ‘finished off quickly in favour of India without further complication, is to my mind a fatal illusion’.26 Later, as is well known, there was a lot of criticism of Nehru, and a hue and cry for having referred the Kashmir issue to the UNO; second, for having agreed to hold plebiscite; and third, stopping military operations halfway through when the Indian army was proceeding with full command to take over the entire region of Jammu and Kashmir. The main person behind the whole business was Mountbatten, as he himself wrote in detail to Nehru on 15 August 1948, after he had demitted the office of Governor General of India. He explained his viewpoint and claimed that most observers, including the British Cabinet, felt that taking the matter to the UNO was the right decision. He said: ‘. . .it was I who encouraged you to take the Kashmir case to UNO. . . .I know that you [and I] have been criticised in India for having gone to UNO because UNO handled the matter in a way that caused disappointment in India. But in the comparatively detached atmosphere of London it is more than ever clear that the alternatives before India were and still are open war or a decision by UNO. There are really no other alternatives except perhaps a continuation of undeclared war with all the risks that entail of eventually turning into a declared war.’27 Mountbatten also believed that ‘the last UNO resolution was not unfavourable to India, but if you will look at it again, I think you will find that if UNO were to implement it, it can provide a reasonable solution for India.’ At the same time, he stated: ‘I know that you, unfortunately, did not share my view . . .’.28 On 1 January 1948, India took the issue of Pakistan aggression in Kashmir to the UNO.

II Two aspects of the Kashmir problem have exercised the minds of knowledgeable people in the world — they are the holding of plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir and some sort of partition of the territory as a permanent solution. These had simultaneously been advocated ever since India took up the matter of aggression in Kashmir with the UN. Writing from Paris, after attending the Commonwealth Conference in London, Nehru confided in Sardar Patel: ‘So far as Kashmir is concerned, I think it is generally recognised that our case is a good one; nevertheless this business of a plebiscite and the conditions

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governing it fills people’s minds. Of course, people cannot get rid of the idea that Kashmir is predominantly Muslim and therefore likely to side with Muslim Pakistan.’29 There was also a suggestion of socalled outsiders, neutral observers. Nehru said: ‘We cannot possibly agree to any outside intervention in the government of Kashmir.’30 It is quite a different thing that during plebiscite there are outside observers, but it was not desirable to have them on day-to-day administration of the state. The other issue which had come up was partition of the Jammu and Kashmir territories. In this connection, Nehru informed Patel: ‘I might mention that the position I have taken up about Kashmir is either a full acceptance of the UN Commission’s resolution on cease-fire or a partition on the lines we have previously talked about, i.e. Western Poonch, etc., Gilgit, Chitral, most of Baltistan, etc. to go to Pakistan. Neither of these is acceptable to Liaquat Ali.’31 It was fortunate that the Hyderabad affair had been closed from the international point of view. ‘It was very fortunate that we could dispose of it rapidly’, Nehru told Patel. Hyderabad with a Muslim ruler as the head of the state with 86 per cent Hindu population and Kashmir with a Hindu Maharaja and similarly with an overwhelming Muslim population asking for a solution came to be regarded as two parallel cases. In the case of Hyderabad, it was resolved through police action, i.e., through force, which had drawn adverse comments from people in London and Europe. The Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference had brought Liaquat Ali Khan and Nehru face to face, and there was a concerted move by Clement Attlee, Ernest Bevin, Philip Noel-Baker and Stafford Cripps that the two prime ministers, should meet and discuss issues with a view to finding a solution. Nehru pointed out that unless the matter of aggression was accepted, the talks were not likely to move forward. He told them: ‘Pakistan’s aggression had been established, yet we were being asked to contribute to the solution on some vague basis of generosity.’32 Finally, he was persuaded by the four members of the British Cabinet and his own erstwhile friends to meet Liaquat Ali Khan. In his telegram, he said he met and discussed with Khan, jointly with Attlee, Bevin, Cripps and also separately and exclusively. ‘These discussions have yielded no results and have left things as they are.’33 While Gandhi had ‘approved of India’s action in sending troops to Kashmir to repel the tribal invaders, he condemned suggestions to partition of the state between India and Pakistan’.34 Instead, he

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advised India and Pakistan ‘to come to an amicable settlement with the help of impartial Indians’.35 If that failed, Gandhi asked the two governments to agree to a ‘mediation by one or two Englishmen’, and despite the fact that Noel-Baker had attacked India, Gandhi suggested his name as a mediator to ‘Horace Alexander, the British pacifist leader and friend of Gandhi’.36 Also ‘he regretted that Nehru had taken the dispute to the United Nations. At the UN, the considerations of international “power politics” rather than merit would determine the attitude of countries towards the Kashmir dispute’.37 He also ‘envisaged the possibility of a plebiscite or referendum among the inhabitants of the disputed region’.38 Pakistan wanted the entire Kashmir valley and also those areas in Jammu where Muslims were in a majority. In other words, the division, if it had to take place, must take place on the basis of religion. The Times (London) observed that Nehru’s ‘most tragic mistake was to make the retention of Kashmir the proof and guardian of secularism’.39 At the same time, it had pronounced a month before the last statement, on 14 May 1964, ‘that three essentials of any settlement were that neither country should be left with a sense of defeat; that it should not weaken the secular basis of Indian society and that it should satisfy the aspirations of the Kashmiris; it is possible and practicable to evolve a feasible solution of this problem that would answer all the requirements’.40 This pious hope, of course, came from a Times correspondent, but if the secular basis of Indian society was to be preserved, why should The Times then decry India’s insistence to follow a secular approach to resolve the Kashmir dispute, as Nehru had done. On the question of partition of Kashmir, Zafrullah Khan had made a very interesting suggestion to Noel-Baker: . . . he [Zafrullah Khan] thought the Pakistani public would swallow a limited partition if the thing was presented as an accomplished fact. His fear was that the whole thing would become public at the Security Council and then opposition would develop in Pakistan. The United Kingdom ought to take a lead in this matter and try to get the whole thing fixed up behind the scene. He hoped we would have a clear and firm line. I said in reply that it was not easy to avoid publicity when an issue was before the Security Council. We would of course do our best as always to secure a settlement of the Kashmir problem, but we must wait till we have seen Dixon’s report.41

No doubt, the Labour government led by Attlee favoured cementing better relations and a policy of understanding with the ‘Muslim world’,

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by which he meant that the British would not like to annoy them or do anything which may force them to align against them. Yet in respect of their relations with Pakistan and India, the British government tried to maintain, at least in appearance ‘a neutral’ or ‘balanced’ policy. Attlee had pulled up both Noel-Baker and the UK High Commissioner in Karachi for being too partisan, and took exception to ‘the partisan spirit’ of the High Commissioner of UK in Karachi, Sir Lawrence Grafftey-Smith. Attlee, in his minute of 22 March 1948, said: I am disturbed by the increasing lack of objectivity in the telegrams sent by our High Commission in Pakistan. It is natural and right he should inform us of the views of the government to which he is accredited, but he should not be a partisan. In no. 265, he seems to adopt completely the Pakistan attitude. It is not true that India has refused to accept any change in the administration of Kashmir or any neutral control over civil affairs notably as regard the taking of the plebiscite.’ He referred to the charge of Liaquat Ali Khan that the British Government were ‘basing their policy on acceptance of the Indian position. ... You will recall that I had asked him [Pakistan PM] to withdraw it’, and yet the High Commissioner repeated the same charge.’ Attlee literally reprimanded the High Commissioner: ‘I object to his suggestion that we are moved by expediency only especially in relation to a question when the rights and wrongs are by no means as clear as one would gather from his attitude.42

Sir Archibald Carter of the CRO was asked to convey the PM’s remarks to Grafftey-Smith. It was sometimes argued in Indian circles that Noel-Baker exceeded the Prime Minister of the Labour government’s brief in dealing with the Kashmir issue. Nehru had often thought that there were perhaps differences in approach between the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Prime Minister’s establishment and perhaps the latter’s directions were not obeyed in the spirit in which they were made. This misleading belief was cleared by Prime Minister Attlee himself, when he directed the UK High Commissioner in New Delhi to inform that it was not so. He specifically referred to Nehru’s suggestion that ‘there is any difference between the UK government and its representative at the Security Council. The question of the policy to be adopted by the British representative was fully discussed with him and the Prime Minister is entirely satisfied with the way he carried out his instruction. He is quite unable to accept the suggestion that an attitude hostile to India was adopted. Similarly the line taken on Hyderabad can’t be suggested to be hostile to India.’43 Attlee was keen to draw attention to Sir Alexander Cadogan’s remarks on the

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debate of 30 November 1948, saying: ‘You could draw Pandit Nehru’s attention to the fact that there is obviously no foundation for any suggestion that these remarks lack restraint or balance or anyway unfair.’44 It was indeed a strong affirmation of faith on Noel-Baker and his team as well as a fair condemnation of the stand taken by Krishna Menon and Nehru. There is hardly any doubt that the policy, as followed in the Security Council by Noel-Baker and the UK delegation, was discussed and approved by the Cabinet under Attlee’s initiative. His directives to Noel-Baker, the leader of the United Kingdom delegation in New York, dated 10 January 1948, make it clear that Noel-Baker was not to be blamed for his avowed tilt towards Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. Attlee’s clear-cut and comprehensive instructions45 were the following: 1. ‘We must be particularly careful to avoid giving Pakistan impression that we are siding with India against her. In view of Palestine situation this would carry the risk of aligning the whole of Islam against us.’ 2. ‘It now seems hopeless to expect India and Pakistan to settle their differences by direct negotiations without the assistance of a third party. Our best hope of a settlement therefore lies at present in action by Security Council.’ 3. Since ‘the President of the Security Council has asked governments of India and Pakistan to abstain from any measure incompatible with the Charter which might aggravate the situation’, Attlee observed, ‘It will be for consideration whether in the next Security Council meeting the action to be formally endorsed by Council in order to add weight to it. It would be of great advantage if any such endorsement could be so drafted as to omit the saving clause allowed by the President for measures compatible with the Charter which the government of India might point to as justifying them in any action they might take purporting to be covered by Article 51.’ 4. Steps should be taken by the Security Council for ‘arrangements whereby impartial administration could be set up in Kashmir and a fair procedure devised for ascertaining will of the people. It might also be charged with responsibility for negotiating settlement of such matters in dispute as Pakistan Delegation at New York brings before Security Council and processes to have detained (e.g. Junagarh).’

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5. Favours ‘Council of Administration responsible to the Security Council for maintenance of law and order in the State for ascertaining the will of the people. . . .’ 6. ‘Simultaneously with this action we consider it useful that the Security Council should also seek to draw up programme for withdrawal or reduction of forces on both sides and replacement of Muslim invaders by Pakistan troops.’ As if the above points were not clear enough, Attlee specifically drew attention to points, 4–6, saying that these ‘proposals...or similar to those made by Pakistan Prime Minister in his public statement of 16 November and this will make it more difficult to secure agreement to them by government of India. Nevertheless they seem to us the right solution.’ (Emphasis mine) 7. Attlee did not favour the idea of stationing a ‘neutral force’, saying: ‘But the more we think about proposal for neutral military force...the less we like it. ...Meanwhile, it would be well for you not to pursue this idea even informally at New York.’ (Emphasis mine). 8. As for the Gilgit situation, what the government of India had drawn attention to, Attlee said: ‘Our information is that population of Gilgit are strongly pro-Pakistan. Gilgit Scouts are in control and everything is quiet. It seems unnecessary to disturb the situation by sending any Pakistani, Indian or neutral force.’ 9. Attlee was averse to go into the past of the conflict and look to the future; in other words, he did not want to be bogged down in a discussion regarding ‘aggression’, but at the same time they argued about the ‘accession’ of Kashmir being ‘provisional’. What of the past was acceptable and what was not. His instruction to Noel-Baker reads thus: ‘We still think that we ought to avoid investigation into the past designed to allocate blame for what has happened. But as indicated in para 4 above we think that United Nations Commission would have to exhibit mediatory functions beyond the Kashmir situation itself.’ In the next paragraph, Attlee deals with the Pakistani demand that ‘the Maharaja should be forced to leave the State’ and that ‘India should be debarred from including Muslims in their nominations to Council of Administration of its staff.’ Obligingly, Attlee said,

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‘we do not respect nor favour proposals’ (as stated above). The ghost of India’s Cabinet Mission negotiations still seem to have haunted Jinnah even after Pakistan had been achieved — he wanted no Muslims other than Pakistanis to be nominated in the Security Council’s civil administration proposal. Special advice was given by Attlee to Noel-Baker — ‘to you and Cadogan’ to avoid using language which would not work for ‘conciliation’.46 On 14 January 1948, Attlee sent further instructions to Noel-Baker. First, ‘we share Chiefs of Staff views as to impracticability of neutral military force in Kashmir. No doubt their [i.e. British Chiefs of Staff] view that forces in Kashmir should be limited to troops from Dominion of India is the only one likely to be reasonably free from military difficulties. Nevertheless it would be so completely unacceptable politically to Pakistan Government that it does not afford a chance of producing a solution. Accordingly, we see no escape from the conclusion that despite all the risks we must, so far as actual forces are concerned, rely on the use of both Indian and Pakistani troops disposed in such a way as to minimise the risk of clashes.’47

III On 2 January 1948, Pakistan issued their view of the happenings in Kashmir. They prefaced it with the usual harangue against India — That India has never wholeheartedly accepted the partition of South Asia; that the Indian leaders paid ‘lip service’ in order to send the British troops out of the country; that ‘India was out to destroy the State of Pakistan which her leaders persist in regarding it as a part of India itself’; that India had followed ‘a systematic sabotage’ and had stopped supplies of petrol, coal and rail transport. ‘India has withheld Pakistan’s share of funds, arms and equipment and continues to follow the policy of wholesale massacre of Muslim population’ — ‘all designed to effect one aim namely the destruction of Pakistan’. That ‘India’s forcible occupation of Junagarh and other states of Kathiawar which had acceded to Pakistan and the fraudulent procurement of accession of Jammu and Kashmir are acts of hostility against Pakistan.’48 And of course, Pakistan appealed to the British and ‘other Powers’ to sympathise and help them out of their misery. America also received the ‘text’ from Pakistan government. The British authorities in London were in sympathy with Pakistan.49 The Commonwealth Relations office advised Sir Alexander Cadogan

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in New York on 3 January 1948 straightaway: ‘Administrations of Sheikh Abdullah and rebel governments would also have to be superceded, by some “neutralist” administration responsible for preserving law and order in Kashmir before and during the promised plebiscite which owing to climatic conditions could hardly be held earlier than May and as existing electoral roll is quite unrepresentative might be delay for several months. . . .’ Another guess was: ‘Maharaja may be reinvested with effective powers. But neither side is likely to agree to this... ’. Also they quipped: ‘Some form of temporary military authority responsible directly’ to the Security Council might be envisaged. In this connection, the British government began considering the prospect of appointing British military personnel on a ‘neutral staff under UNO’ for service in Kashmir. Officers who had already served either of the dominions were excluded from consideration, but not the supreme command staff. Yet it was felt that British officers must have had ‘Indian experience and knows the Indian mind and temperament.’ Those suitable among the rank of Major General were considered and 11 names suggested. As for appointment in the Brigadier and Colonel ranks were concerned, it was suggested that the War Office should be asked. Also, 11 personnel from the Indian army, all British, were identified. The neutral general of the UN may not be a UK national but he might come from one of the other Commonwealth countries.50 Matters relating to UK personnel to serve on the UNO civil administration, on the staff of the neutral general and as ‘neutral military’ observers were discussed. The draft was produced by Group Captain Stapleton of the Ministry of Defence, which, among other things, suggested that on no account Russians should be appointed on these bodies. ‘We do regard such a result as most objectionable and if it does occur we hope to be prepared...to avoid it.’51 The question of stationing of neutral force in Jammu and Kashmir under the control of the UN commission became somewhat controversial right from the beginning. Even the governments of the western powers, including Britain, did not feel that such a measure would at all succeed. A. V. Alexander, Minister of Defence in the Attlee Cabinet, wrote to the Prime Minister after ascertaining the views of the chiefs of staff that ‘the provision of a neutral force is out of the question. From the military point of view, the provision of forces from the Dominion of India to support the UNO Commission is the best solution but I recognise that this is not acceptable for political

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reasons. The second point I would like to make is that only Pakistani troops will secure the withdrawal of raiders now present in Kashmir.’ As far as plebiscite was concerned, he suggested that it could be properly held if Pakistan troops occupied ‘the predominantly Muslim areas’ and the troops of ‘the Dominion of India the predominantly Hindu areas’. Alexander also suggested that one battalion should be drawn from Pakistan and another from India.52 It was not only on the ‘neutral’ force that British defence personnel were being considered for appointment. There were also other positions, for instance, ‘suitable Pakistani emissary to Kashmir government’. Sir Patrick of CRO recommended to the UK High Commissioner in Karachi, P. C. Hailey, who was serving at that point of time as Financial Secretary, NWFP government. Hailey was First Assistant to the Resident in Kashmir during 1938–40 and in 1944 and acted as Secretary to the Maharaja while representing India at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference. In that capacity, Patrick says ‘Maharaja informed me that he had formed highest opinion of Hailey.’53 The Kashmir dispute has conveniently opened avenues for job-seekers. Besides, these were very attractive positions. Khizr Hayat Khan, erstwhile Prime Minister of the undivided Punjab between 1943 and 1947, met Prime Minister Clement Attlee in his personal capacity on 14 October 1949. Hayat Khan had literally been hounded out by the Muslim League and the Muslim militia under the League with the full support of Jinnah. He resigned on 3 March 1947 and vanished from the political scene of India thereafter. However, he had his own sources of information in Pakistan. Giving a gloomy account of politics in Pakistan, he ‘stressed the importance of a real Commonwealth Agreement on Defence as an antidote to the fear and uncertainty which was in men’s mind.’ Attlee recorded further in his Personal Minute: ‘He took a very reasonable and realistic line and his views are worthy of consideration . . .’54 Almost on similar lines, Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan’s Prime Minister, suggested that ‘there should be some guarantee of support against aggression and war’ by the Commonwealth. Attlee pointed out that the ‘absence of war between members of the Commonwealth and mutual support were implicit in the very existence of Commonwealth. I did not believe it would be useful to make declarations.’ As regards Liaquat Ali Khan’s fear that India might invade Pakistan or send forces into Kashmir, Attlee observed, ‘I told him that I did not believe that Nehru would take military action.’55 With regard to the question of guarantee against

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aggression by India, which Khan had been raising of late, Noel-Baker said in the House of Commons that ‘the value of the Commonwealth in the past as a bastion against aggression’ was recognised, adding at the same time that no pledges could be given in advance on ‘hypothetical situations’.56 In any case, the US looked at the Commonwealth ‘with healthy respect’ and considered it ‘as a very real source of strength and solidarity in the present times’. It was further observed, in Sir Oliver Frank’s note of 24 March 1950: And of course they often take the line that the special links between the UK and India and Pakistan are the best means of keeping these countries facing to the west rather than towards Moscow. But while the Americans recognise the special position of the Commonwealth they also think that the Commonwealth and its members have special responsibilities and that it is upto the latter to behave reasonably or at least not in a manner which risks defeating the whole objective of the western powers. And Americans look to the United Kingdom as the senior member of the Commonwealth to exercise, when necessary, a steadying and corrective influence over others.57

The Americans, in fact, wanted intervention and that the UK ‘should not be too hesitant in intervening in the India-Pakistan dispute’.58 Of course, these observations were made in the context of resolving the economic dispute between India and Pakistan, yet it also clearly implied that intervention could be extended to the Kashmir dispute. But Sir Oliver Frank cautioned, considering ‘Nehru’s present state of mind. . .may make it impolitic for us to play this Commonwealth card just at this time. . .’59 In other words, the Commonwealth position was still in the reckoning and it could be used not only to ‘influence’ but also to ‘intervene’. Towards the middle of 1950, relations between India and Pakistan had deteriorated and as has been observed, Liaquat Ali Khan feared that a war between the two countries was in the offing. The British government thought that the war clouds, which were gathering over the Indian subcontinent, were not a figment of the imagination, hence the Commonwealth Relations office issued top-secret aid memoires, one in July and the other in August 1950. It was proposed that should a war threat loomed large between India and Pakistan, a Commonwealth Conference of Prime Ministers should be convened in Colombo with the sole aim of exerting ‘moral influence in the hope of averting war’.

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Second, the prime ministers of the Commonwealth countries should watch closely the progress of Indo-Pak relations and keep in close contact with on another. Third, the responsibility of calling the conference should be left with the Prime Minister of the UK, and India and Pakistan should be invited to attend the conference when it had been decided upon.60 The other aid memoire stated: ‘It is difficult to foresee which turn the relations between India and Pakistan may take over the next few months but the situation is a disturbing one, and the possibility of further sudden deterioration leading rapidly to a state of war between the two countries cannot be excluded.’ Hence a contingency plan had been prepared, etc.61 A penultimate paragraph which the Prime Minister approved was added to the above aid memoire on 5 July 1950. It read as follows: ‘The United Kingdom government consider that it would be important, should the time come to take action on these lines that the United States government should be kept fully informed. In view of the considerations set out in the preceding paragraph, however, they suggest that nothing should be said to the United States government at the moment but that if the situation again became critical and the proposed conference were about to be summoned, they should inform the United States after action it is proposed to take and should maintain the closest consultation with them.’62 The Under Secretary of state for Commonwealth Relations, P. C. Gordon Walker’s minute of 18 October 1950 informed Attlee that he had consulted the prime ministers of Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Ceylon regarding the holding of the conference in Colombo. ‘Their views are uniformally favourable’, Gordon Walker said, though Canada had made two observations, ‘one that our action must not prejudice action of the UN; the other, that both India and Pakistan must agree to attend the proposed conference. But to my mind, neither of these reservations raises any difficulty.’63 Attlee approved. Almost a year later, after these aid memoires were considered, approved and signed by the Prime Minister, no war had taken place. The urgency of holding the conference was, however, stated by Attlee in his personal minute of 15 September 1951. He observed that a peak danger point would be reached late September or October, based on the assumption that two events which would be particularly provoking to Pakistan, namely, the failure of the Graham Mission and the resolution in the newly formed Constituent Assembly in Kashmir voting the adherence of Kashmir to India coinciding at about the same time.64

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However, the Graham report failure would come after the end of September and the Constituent Assembly would not meet until November; hence the tensions would be lowered, it was thought. Besides, in spite of election to the Constituent Assembly having taken place, in which 43 out of 76 candidates were returned unopposed, Sheikh Abdullah had ‘managed this’, Nehru ‘has been at pains to repeat that any resolution passed by them will not contravene UN resolutions, etc. had “markedly” improved matters in Karachi’. In case the tension escalates, the PM urged ‘putting into effect the very secret plan for a Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers at Colombo. ...The intention is of course to hold the conference if possible before outbreak of hostilities...and we should consider “what further political measure we should take in addition to summoning Colombo Conference and cooperating the Security Council”.’ The role of the Commonwealth in devising ways and means to avert war seemed quite significant. The most amusing feature of the British Commonwealth Security Conference scheduled to be held in 1953 under the Prime Ministership of Winston Churchill happened to be that Churchill ‘approved the holding of the conference in London if it did not cost us more than £ 200!’ It was pointed out that the earlier conferences of 1948 and 1951 had been held with good results, yet Churchill did not seem to have been impressed about the utility of such a conference. The ‘secret’ note stated: ‘One result has been the establishment of collaboration and the exchanges of security information between such incompatible bed fellows as the Union of South Africa, India and Pakistan.’ The travelling and lodging expenses of the overseas delegates would be paid by their own governments, hence ‘the cost of the conference would be negligible’.65

IV It is amazing that the Indian government, based on the advice of Lord Mountbatten, took the Kashmir dispute to the UN, hoping that this would be resolved in no time. Did he deliberately mislead India or did he do this in good faith? Nobody can vouchsafe for it. But in London, the Commonwealth Relations office was certain that the UN would prolong the affair, that political considerations would vitiate and mar the debate and finally, the Soviet bloc would eventually be introduced into the affair, which they wanted by any means to avoid. At the same time, they believed India’s ‘collapse’ was certain and not far.

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Nehru was greatly disillusioned with the UK government’s role in the Security Council in 1948. Also, most of ‘the British officers’, as Nehru observed in his letter to Attlee, ‘both civil and military, have functioned in a hostile manner towards India and have certainly helped in making a solution of the question more difficult. They have thus come in the way of the development of more cordial relations between India and the United Kingdom, which we all desire so much. It is certainly for you to consider what you should do about them. I do not propose to refer to this matter again.’66 In the end, Nehru stated, more in sorrow: ‘We confess that we are entirely unable to follow justice or logic of position taken by United Kingdom government in regard to Kashmir and employment of British officers there in those operations.’67 In the same vein, Nehru told the UK High Commissioner in New Delhi in no uncertain terms that the ‘anti-India stand taken by our representative in the Security Council was common talk at Paris, even the Argentine Representative who was notoriously anti-India commented to the leader of the Indian Delegation on the very extreme attitude taken by the British representative. He could not accept the theory of the Umpire being attacked by both sides in playing that it was quite good tactics for the side which was perfectly satisfied to enter a formal complaint. . . .I have confirmation as far away as South India that our attitude in the Security Council over the question has met with surprise and great indignation.’68 On the question of holding of plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir, the British Foreign Office sent their communication, suggesting measures to the British delegation in New York on 26 February 1948. According to these measures, if acted upon, the government of Jammu and Kashmir, for all practical purposes, would have been handed over to the Council of Administration proposed to be appointed by the UN Commission. It stipulated:69 1. The civil administration of the State shall be temporarily entrusted to the Council of Administration...consisting of three members of the Commission appointed by the Security Council by its Resolution of January 20, 1948. . . 2. The functions of the Civil Administration shall be: (i) to maintain ordered administration throughout the State; (ii) to facilitate the return to their homes of any refugees, etc.;

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(iii) to ensure protection of minorities of all areas of the State; (iv) to hold a plebiscite, under conditions permitting of complete freedom of expression, etc.; (v) and thereafter transfer to the government of the Dominion such areas the people of which after exercising the right of expression had decided to accede to a particular Dominion — and the transfer to like place on a date fixed by agreement between the Civil Administration and the Dominions etc. 3. For the performance of the functions as mentioned above the Administration shall have full authority and power over all resources and facilities of the state and over its administrative and judicial personnel . . . etc. . . . also will have powers to promulgate ordinances, amplifying, amending or replacing existing laws of the state. 4. The expenses of the entire enterprise was to be borne by India and Pakistan equally. The only comment which can be made on such an administration was nothing short of dictatorship to bring about, ironically, it would seem, democratic principles. The state of Jammu and Kashmir, according to this dispensation, was fully to be vested on the civil administration of the Commission. Could any government accept the stringent laws and steps that had been envisaged? It was nothing but despotic authority of the kind the British enjoyed over India in the nineteenth century. Most of these suggestions, coming as they did from Britain, were incorporated in the Security Council’s resolution on Kashmir, which was bound to be rejected by India and the Jammu and Kashmir government. On 24 February 1948, an informal conference was held between the State Department and British advisers on the issue of introducing Pakistani troops in Kashmir. During the discussion, the US administration expressed considerable doubt regarding the legal right of the Security Council to introduce Pakistani troops in Kashmir. The British advisers disagreed and opined that their experts had examined this question and there did not appear to be any ‘alternative to the use of Pakistan troops under a United Nations military commander for the restoration and preservation of law and order until the plebiscite’.70

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On 6 August 1949, the UK Foreign Office wrote to Washington that joint talks between India and Pakistan were ‘not likely to be productive’ and it would have been better for the Commission to ‘propose arbitration right away.71 The British concern also seemed to have been that ‘Liaquat is under great domestic pressures and unless he can show that the United States government and ourselves are taking urgent steps to prevent the situation in Kashmir drifting, his position may be further weakened.’72 Hence the UK must do something, for political reasons, to uplift Pakistani morale, of course. Besides, the British Commonwealth membership was also involved, ‘which is causing us serious concern’.73 How intense the partisanship of British officials for Pakistan was could be seen from the above. Pakistan was the real concern for them and they were sensitive to its interests, views and needs. There was no question of receiving a fair deal from them as far as India was concerned. Second, it was clearly envisaged that to establish a government in Jammu and Kashmir, superseding the government of the time, abrogating all laws in practice and issuing their own laws since the power to promulgate ordinances, amplifying, amending or repealing existing laws of the state were to be vested in the government established by the command of the Commission, the entire system had to be overhauled for the sake of holding a plebiscite. Such despotic authority was envisaged by the British. To get the new dispensation to work effectively, they also overruled their partner, USA’s view that the Security Council could not order Pakistani troops inside the territory of Jammu and Kashmir. British advice was the contrary to such advice and was that there was no ‘alternative’ to the entry of Pakistani troops. The dominant idea seems to have been to remove all traces of Indian presence and as they said, replace the Congress-led government of Sheikh Abdullah with their own despotic authority, supported by the combined British and Pakistani troops. Nobody declared how long this process would last. Certainly, there was nothing in the dispensation to show that there was any time limit to such an occupation of the territory in northern India. Such a blatant disregard of conventions, treaties or agreements could hardly have been found in the annals of recent history. Fortunately, they were not acceptable to many other powers, and of course, India refused to accept such a dictation from its erstwhile empire builders. Pakistan’s diplomatic skills were also much at hand. The Pakistan officials were determined to exploit to their own advantage the

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weaknesses of the western powers who suffered from Russo phobia. Ever since the end of the Second World War, the West’s consistent policy was to thwart what they called Russian designs in Europe, and Berlin in particular. British foreign policy throughout the nineteenth century was dominated by the Russian bogey, apart from the new entrant which challenged the British supremacy over world trade and also their command over the Atlantic and the Pacific. The German– Japanese axis had been decisively defeated during the Second World War. Now it was Russian communism which had to be fought to maintain their global position of power and dominance. Liaquat Ali Khan attempted to probe where Pakistan stood in relation to the UK, as this effort indicated. There also seemed to be considerable closeness between Pakistan and the UK with regard to their perceptions on common defence concerns. Major General Walter Cawthorn, an Australian national, but in service of Pakistan as Deputy Chief of Staff between 1948–51, claimed to be an emissary of Liaquat Ali Khan. He met the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations on 18 September 1948. On the initiative of Philip Noel-Baker, ‘purely informal and exploratory and on an entirely unofficial basis’, a meeting was arranged with senior representatives — General Scooners, PSO Commonwealth Relations Office, Lieutenant General Templer, VC, IGS, Lord Teddler and Lord Ismay — in London. Cawthorn reported that the ‘Prime Minister of Pakistan is very anxious to start defence talks with the UK Chiefs of Staff, as to the help which Pakistan could give in connection with any possible Russian threat.’74 Generals Scooner and Templers pointed out that they had informed Pakistan, as well as India, about ‘the heads’ of discussion on defence talks. The ‘heads’ in question were: 1. the strength of the armed forces in each dominion; 2. efficiency and modernisation of the armed forces; 3. the need for formulating plans for assistance by the Commonwealth forces in the event of war in which Pakistan and India became involved on the side of the rest of the Commonwealth; 4. the maintenance and availability in these circumstances of bases and communications; 5. the need for planning air facilities, both in peace and war;

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6. the question of bases in the Indian Ocean; and 7. the question of exchange of liaison staff. A reminder had been sent by the Defence Department to Pakistan on the matter but no reply had been received. Noel Baker signed the minutes on 23 September 1948 with the remark: ‘The Notes are admirable’. Later, Cawthorn met Noel Baker and a record of the conversation was sent to the Attlee, as signed and documented by Noel-Baker on 18 September 1948. The main thrust of the talk was Liaquat Ali Khan’s wish to begin defence talks with the UK government’s Chiefs of Staff. Cawthorn observed that the Pakistan government were ‘resolutely determined to play their part in any collective resistance against Russian aggression’. Cawthorn further wanted to enquire of the UK government whether they would like to have such talks ‘with a view to making definite joint defence arrangement’, etc. Noel-Baker observed: ‘I put to General Cawthorn the obvious difficulty of making such an arrangement unless India were prepared to do the same, and the further difficulties which would inevitably arise if the talks were begun before the Kashmir dispute had been settled.’75 From the point of view of India, the matter had not been discussed. The striking significance of the talks in the context of the Kashmir dispute was stressed. Although, as a measure of caution, the UK did not commit themselves, it is obvious, the talks and approach of Pakistan would no doubt be received with some warmth by Britain. Noel Baker sent the notes to the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary. In an interesting conversation with the Belgium ambassador, Prince Eugene de Ligne, Nehru was acquainted with the views of the former on the way international politics was managed. In resolving an issue at the international level, he stressed that many extraneous factors and influences were taken into account, the most important being the political nature of the dispute. Nehru informed Gopalaswami Ayyangar, member of Indian delegation to New York, the main essence of his talk with the above named ambassador. Nehru’s version was: ‘The Ambassador emphasised that the approach to Kashmir issue would be influenced less by intrinsic merits than by effect of solution on broad considerations of American world strategy in present state of tension between USA and USSR. America is pursuing a policy of

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support to Middle Eastern states from Greece to Iran in the hope that they would be providing bases and otherwise assist America in the event of hostilities with USSR. If Pakistan should be willing to cooperate suitably with the USA, it is to be expected that the USA would try to befriend Pakistan in solution of her dispute with India over Kashmir.’76 Nehru was, of course, aware of Pakistan’s geopolitical position in relation to the Middle Eastern Islamic countries and the western powers. He was not a naïve idealist who would ignore the reality of the situation, but his options seemed extremely limited, having developed a policy of non-alignment in foreign relations, to the great disappointment of the western powers. Both USA and UK had expected Nehru to align with them, being a staunch democrat and a well-known liberal with a westernised, rational outlook on many issues, but he had remained aloof and an enigma to them. He asked Ayyangar to keep this view, as expressed by an extremely perceptive diplomat, in mind and ‘energetically’ counter moves from the India baiters. He explained: ‘Pakistan has a geographic advantage of contiguity to Islamic states of the Middle East. Her religious affinity with those states is a psychological asset which America may not wish to lose by adopting a more friendly attitude towards us. Neither of these factors, however, can compensate for Pakistan’s economic and military weakness as compared to India. In event of a world war, Pakistan, even if she allows her territory to be used by USA, would be a feeble bulwark against aggression. From the military standpoint, therefore, affiliation of Kashmir to Pakistan cannot be of much value in resisting this aggression. . . .It should be obvious to the Americans that because of her manpower and economic resources, India alone can provide effective aid against aggression.’77 There is no doubt about the validity of the above views of Nehru. But the most important point to consider was whether Nehru was prepared to align with the western powers. That was the crux of the matter.

Notes 1. CRO in London, Carter to Stone, 4 November 1947, IOR: L/P&S/13/1845b, BL, London. 2. Ibid. 3. IOR: L/P&S/13/1845b, p. 374. 4. Ibid.: 427. 5. Ibid. Philip Noel-Baker’s minute (29 October 1947) was approved by Prime Minister Clement Attlee.

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6. Ibid. 7. Record of meeting, 26 November 1947, SWJN, second series, vol. IV, pp. 347–48. 8. SWJN, second series, vol. IV, pp. 361–68. 9. Ibid.: 363. 10. Ibid.: 361. 11. Ibid.: 363–64. 12. Ibid.: 365. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid.: 366. 15. Ibid.: 368. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid.: 367. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid.: 375. 20. Ibid.: 381. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid.: 382. 23. Ibid.: 383. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. Lord Mountbatten to Jawaharlal Nehru, 25 December 1947. Nehru’s reply, 26 December 1947, SWJN, second series, vol. IV, p. 401. The correspondence, pp. 399–403. 27. Lord Mountbatten’s letter of 15 August 1948 was sent by Jawaharlal Nehru to Sardar Patel for his perusal. See Das (1971: 220–22). The quote is on p. 220. 28. Ibid.: 222. 29. Jawaharlal Nehru to Sardar Patel, 27 October 1948, in Das (1971: 249). 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Jawaharlal Nehru to Sardar Patel, 19 October 1948, in Das (1971: 247). 33. 27 October 1947 in ibid.: 250. 34. Fischer (1997: 609). 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid.: 610. 37. Ibid.: 609. 38. Ibid.: 610. 39. 16 June 1964. Mss, Eur.F.158/211A. BL, London. 40. The Times, 14 May 1964, Mss Eur.F.158/211A. IOR, BL, London. 41. Record of conversation between the SOS for CR and Sir Zafrullah Khan, 7 September 1950, PREM 8/214, PRO, London. 42. PREM 8/813, 1948. PRO, London. 43. Clement Attlee’s instructions to UK HC, 23 December 1948. L/WS/1/1145 (on microfilm) (top secret), War Staff India Office), IOR, BL, London. 44. Ibid. 45. L/WS/1/1148, p. 103 ff. (top secret War Staff India Office).

Plebiscite 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75.

76. 77.

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Ibid. L/WS/1/1148, op. cit. L/WS/1/1140, p. 97. IOR, BL, London. Ibid. L/WS/1/1148, 29 January 1948 (top secret War Staff India Office). L/WS/1/1149, n.d. A.V. Alexander to Prime Minister, UK, 14 January 1948, L/WS/1/1149. IOR, BL, London. Patrick, CRO to HC Karachi, 29 October 1947. IOR: L/P&S/13/1845b, IOR, BL, London. Clement Attlee’s personal minute, 14 October 1949, PREM 8/998, PRO, London. Note of conversation between Prime Ministers Liaquat Ali Khan and Clement Attlee, 4 July 1950 (PREM 8/, PRO, London). PREM 8/216, PRO, London. PREM 8/1220, PRO, London. Ibid. Ibid. PREM 8/1457, PRO, London. Top secret aid-memoire, 6 July 1950; reply, CRO, 2 August 1950, PREM 8/1457, PRO, London. Ibid. Ibid. Clement Attlee’s personal minute, 18 September 1951, PREM 8/1457, PRO, London. Secret note, 2 September 1952, PREM 11/349, PRO, London. Jawaharlal Nehru to Clement Attlee, 4 January 1949, L/WS/1/1145 (on microfilm), IOR, BL, London. Ibid. UK HC to CRO, 31 December 1949. See ibid. IOR/L/WS/1/1150, p. 31. IOR, BL, London. L/WS/1/1150, IOR, BL, London. L/WS/1/115, Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Record of conversation, 18 September 1948. IOR, L/WS/1/1047, BL, London. Ibid. General Walter Cawthorn had served in the Indian army from 1919 to 1947. He was an Australian national and became Australia’s High Commissioner to Karachi, 1954–58. Jawaharlal Nehru’s cable, 17 January 1948, SWJN, second series, vol. V, p. 188, paragraph 1. Ibid.: 189, paragraph 2.

4 The Kashmir Question in the Security Council In this chapter, only the bare essentials of the Kashmir issue from its origins to about 1962 are dealt with. The treatment is not chronological but thematic. The din and bustle of the Security Council debates, arguments and counter arguments, allegations and disputations have been kept away from discussion since they help only marginally in understanding the problem. Besides, these have led to complicating the whole problem instead of resolving it. These endless debates may be valuable in providing alternative perspectives, but then they need necessarily to be dealt with separately and exclusively, which is not attempted here.

I On 1 January 1948, India lodged a complaint with the United Nations under Article 35 of the Charter of the United Nations, which entitles a member ‘to bring before the Security Council any matter whose continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security’ and asked the Council to take cognisance of the situation in Kashmir. The reference stated the facts of the case as follows:1 1. that the invaders are allowed transit across Pakistan territory; 2. that they are allowed to use Pakistan territory as a base of operations; 3. that they include Pakistan nationals; 4. that they draw much of their military equipment, transport and supplies (including petrol) from Pakistan; and 5. that Pakistan officers are training, guiding and otherwise helping them. The government of India, therefore, requested the Security Council to ask the government of Pakistan:2

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1. to prevent Pakistan government personnel, military and civil, from participating in or assisting the invasion of the state of Jammu and Kashmir; 2. to call upon other Pakistan nationals to desist from taking any part in the fighting in Jammu and Kashmir; and 3. to deny to the invaders (a) access to and use of its territory for operations against Kashmir; (b) military and other supplies; and (c) all other kinds of aid that might tend to prolong that struggle. On 2 January 1948, Nehru informed the audience at the press conference held in New Delhi that ‘Jammu and Kashmir had been invaded by people coming from or through Pakistan. About 50,000 raiders are inside the Jammu and Kashmir territory and another 100,000 have gathered on the border and are being trained and armed for the invasion of Kashmir. This large force is using Pakistan as a base and receiving from Pakistan modern military equipment, training and guidance.’3 The reference to the Security Council made under Article 35 to intervene and ask the Pakistan government to withdraw the tribesmen was not of a mandatory order but was essentially advisory in its content and role. On 15 January 1948, the Security Council met and began its deliberations, Gopalaswami Ayyangar presenting the India’s case before the Council. Sir Zafrullah Khan thereafter argued that India had invaded Junagarh and taken possession of it, that there had been genocide of Muslims and thousands of them were massacred in a communal holocaust on Indian territory and that the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India has been brought about through ‘fraud and violence’, etc. Between 26 October and 31 December, 1947, a series of letters, telegrams and communication had been exchanged between the governments of India and Pakistan regarding the situation in Jammu and Kashmir. These exchanges were quite often acrimonious and full of allegations, charges and counter charges against each other’s governments. On 31 December 1947, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan wrote to Prime Minister Nehru a long letter of 19 paragraphs in seven pages of print stating virtually the case of Pakistan on the Kashmir issue and also charging India of attempting to undo the partition of India and in the process systematically sabotaging normalisation of relations between the two countries.

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The case of Kashmir ‘is simple’, the Pakistan Prime Minister observed. ‘The Pakistan Government has not accepted and can’t accept the so-called accession of the Jammu and Kashmir state to India. We have said it before and repeat that “accession” was fraudulent inasmuch as it was achieved by deliberately creating conditions with the object of finding an excuse to stage the accession. It was based on violence because it furthered the plan of Kashmir Government to liquidate the Muslim population of the state. The accession was against the well-known will of an overwhelming majority of the population and could not be justified on any ground, whether moral or constitutional; geographical or economic; cultural or religious.’4 They further ‘emphatically repudiate’ the charges of ‘aid and assistance to the invaders’. In addition, India’s aggression against Junagarh, and other states of Kathiawar which had acceded to Pakistan, was cited. Their counter charges to the Security Council, which were listed by them, were as follows: 1. that India has never wholeheartedly accepted partition ‘and is since June 1947 making persistent attempts to undo it’; 2. that ‘a planned and extensive campaign of genocide against Muslims has been in progress since 1946’; 3. that ‘the religion, culture, language and the security of Muslims in India are in danger’; 4. that ‘India has forcibly and unlawfully occupied Junagarh, Manavadar, and some other states in Kathiawar, which had lawfully acceded to Pakistan’; 5. that ‘India has obtained the accession of Kashmir through fraud and violence and large-scale massacre of Muslims there has been effected by the forces and the nationals of India and the state’; 6. that ‘the Royal Indian Air Force and armed bands from India and Kashmir have made numerous attacks on Pakistan’; 7. that India has ‘blocked implementation of partition agreements and has withheld Pakistan’s share of cash balances and military stores’; 8. that ‘under pressure, direct and indirect, from India, the Reserve Bank of India is refusing to honour to the full its obligations as banker and currency authority of Pakistan and that such pressure is designed to destroy the monetary fabric of Pakistan’;

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9. that India ‘now threatens Pakistan with direct military attack’; and 10. that ‘the object of the various acts of aggression by India against Pakistan is the destruction of the state of Pakistan’. In this connection, Pakistan requested the Security Council to appoint a commission or commissions to investigate these charges and to implement a plan for the cessation of hostilities and thereafter holding of plebiscite.5 The Security Council took note of both the complaints received from India and Pakistan and proceeded to examine them urgently since the threat to peace in the region seemed to escalate to a state of war. A series of resolutions were passed between 15 January 1948–13 August 1948. They were argued by both sides but Pakistan’s complaints seemed to have been received more favourably by the western powers, notably under British guidance. The Indian government felt somewhat disillusioned and objected strongly to the ‘wild’ allegations of Pakistan with respect of India attempting systematically to destroy Pakistan. Also, it was vigorously pointed out that the only issue which needed to be looked into was the Kashmir issue which had emerged owing to the invasion of Pakistan. As has been observed, Pakistan had flatly denied that it had any role to play in aiding and assisting the tribesmen entering into Jammu and Kashmir. But to the surprise of the commission which had been appointed to look into the problem of Kashmir invasion, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Sir Zafrullah Khan, disclosed to the commission on 8 July 1948 that three brigades of the Pakistan army had been engaged in Kashmir operations since May 1948. This disclosure, to quote Josef Korbel, a member of the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) ‘came as a bombshell to the Commission’, which considered it since ‘this constituted a material change in the situation’.6 This vindicated India’s stand and Nehru told the commission, when it visited India, as stated by Josef Korbel: ‘Pakistan must be condemned. I do not require any solemn, formal verdict, but a clear declaration about the Pakistan army’s presence in Kashmir and its withdrawal.’7 Indian objections were met in the UNCIP Resolution of 13 August 1948. The Resolution has three parts. Part I deals with the ceasefire order; Part II with the truce agreement and Part III for the holding of plebiscite. The ceasefire order was designed to stop hostilities, the two governments agreeing to order all forces under their control to

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cease fighting forthwith. The first principle of the truce agreement as stated by the Resolution was: As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from the state. Pakistan was also to use best endeavours to secure the withdrawal of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally residing there. Pending its final solution, the territory evacuated by the troops would be administered by the local authorities under the close supervision of the Commission. When the Commission notified India that ‘Pakistan nationals and tribesmen have left and that Pakistan forces are being withdrawn, India was to agree to withdraw the bulk of its forces in stages to be agreed upon by the Commission.8

Pending the acceptance of conditions for final settlement, the Indian government would maintain its remaining forces considered necessary to assist in observance of law and order, within the lines existing at the moment of cease-fire.’ The commission also called upon the governments of India and Pakistan to ‘reaffirm their wish for a plebiscite, and upon acceptance of the Truce Agreement, to enter into consultations with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby free expression of people’s views would be assured’.9 India, after seeking certain clarifications, informed the commission on 20 August 1948 of its acceptance of the resolution. Pakistan, however, informed the commission that it could not accept the specific nature of the carrying out of a plebiscite. However, after series of informal conversations with the representatives of the two governments regarding the conditions and basic principles which should govern the holding of the plebiscite, the commission informed both the governments of its proposals which were later embodied in the Resolution of 5 January 1949.10 According to the Resolution, the following were agreed upon by the two parties: 1. The accession of Jammu and Kashmir would be decided through a free and impartial plebiscite. 2. A plebiscite administrator would be appointed in consultation with the two governments, but who would derive from the government of Kashmir such powers as may be considered necessary to organise and conduct the plebiscite. 3. The commission further proposed that ‘all human and political rights will be re-established and guaranteed’. 4. The return of the refugees ‘

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was to be organised. 5. That ‘The question of final disposal of the armed forces in the state of Jammu and Kashmir should be solved by the Plebiscite Administrator and the Commission in consultation with both governments and competent authorities.’ 6. The commission (UNCIP) should report to the Security Council as to whether the plebiscite had been free and impartial. US Admiral Chester W. Nimitz was nominated Plebiscite Administrator on 22 March 1949. Soon, difficulties arose regarding the disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces, which were in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and were under the control of the Pakistan government. Also, matters relating to the general withdrawal of forces on both sides needed to be sorted out along with control of the northern areas, etc. Several bottlenecks needed to be cleared before moving towards holding the plebiscite. Prime Minister Attlee and President Truman intervened and called upon both the governments to accept ‘arbitration’ to decide these issues. Again, Admiral Nimitz was named to arbitrate between the two sides. Pakistan accepted the proposal but India rejected it. The reasons for the rejection have been dealt with in brief in the latter part of this chapter. Meanwhile, several plans were proposed to bridge the divergence of views and positions taken by India and Pakistan. We shall not examine each one of them in this brief analysis. The problem was that as time passed, conditions changed imperceptibly everywhere, making matters more difficult and complicated. The POK, i.e., Azad Kashmir, became a part of Pakistan and was governed by Pakistan through a President of the Azad Kashmir government nominated by Pakistan, and functioning from the POK capital, Muzaffarabad. Similarly, the rest of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir lying on the eastern side of the ceasefire line was brought under the Sheikh Abdullah government (as the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir). Meanwhile, a series of laws as agreed to between the two governments were passed, making the Jammu and Kashmir state virtually a province of the Indian Union, with the passage of time. There was a duly elected government which was run on the lines stipulated by the Constitution of India, although the Kashmir Constituent Assembly continued to deliberate till 1956, providing a Constitution for Jammu and Kashmir within the framework of larger Constitution of India. Other significant changes took place in Pakistan and South Asia, when the government of United States of America began offering

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massive military aid to Pakistan since 1954. Pakistan joined military alliances with the western powers by becoming a member of the Baghdad Pact and SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation) in 1955. These were strategic and military alliances with the avowed object of combating communism. But as time passed, the real intention of Pakistan in joining the alliance system became clear as declared by Pakistani leaders themselves. For Pakistan, India was the enemy and the immediate purpose was to obtain Kashmir by force. The massive flow of arms and ammunition had disturbed the balance of the power situation in the Indian subcontinent. With such a scenario encompassing South Asia, the cry of plebiscite seemed so distant that even the western powers became steadily insensitive to it and by 1962, the issue of plebiscite was almost dead. The debates in the United Nations continued with fits and starts without reaching a solution of the vexing problem of Jammu and Kashmir. The McNaughton report of 3 February 1950, Sir Owen Dixon’s plan of partition of 15 September 1950, Frank Graham’s proposals of 7 September 1951 and 4 September 1952 and the Gunner Jarring report of 29 April 1957 were discussed in the Security Council in great depth. Not only the two directly affected governments of India and Pakistan, but also the Security Council members backed by their respective governments participated in the debates. Mostly they sided with the government of Pakistan, bringing in several stringent proposals, including the stationing of UN troops or Commonwealth troops in Kashmir, etc., which were resented by India. The Cold War was in full swing during these years; Pakistan being an ally of the US and UK combine, was a favourite with them. The merits of the case, the original resolutions of 1948 and 1949 were lost or forgotten in the din of clashes. It was truly left to V. K. Krishna Menon to reassert the primacy of those resolutions and then seek plebiscite in conformity with their provisions that the Security Council was constrained to look into them afresh. The role of USSR also became increasingly significant. Moscow looked at the Kashmir problem from the Cold War perspective. The USSR representative, Yakov Alexandrovich Malik, expressed their views on 17 January 1952 thus: The United States of America and the United Kingdom are continuing as before to interfere in the settlement of the Kashmir position, putting forward one plan after another. ...These plans in connection with Kashmir are of an ‘annexationist’ imperialist nature, because they are not based

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on the effort to achieve a real settlement. The purpose of these plans is interference...and conversion of Kashmir into a protectorate of the United States of America and the United Kingdom under the pretext of rendering assistance through the United Nations. Eventually the purpose of these plans in connection with Kashmir is to secure the introduction of AngloAmerican troops into the territory of Kashmir, and convert Kashmir into an Anglo-American colony and military and strategic base.11

Owing to various considerations, during the Cold War years, including power alignments and membership of regional military alliances, the Security Council passed stringent resolutions against India, asking India forcefully to comply with them. The USSR invariably vetoed such resolutions, saving the day for India. Had it not been for ‘vetoes’ from the Soviet Union, India would have been in for considerable embarrassment, if not humiliation. It was against such a background that Menon, the leader of Indian delegation to the United Nations, was called upon to plead India’s case on the Kashmir problem. He was disliked intensely by the West for his biting tongue, satire and flashes of antagonism, even for his intellectual brilliance, which he displayed in his arguments against opponents. Harold Macmillan thought him to be ‘odious’, ‘disagreeable’ and ‘the nastiest man I know’.12 He was sharp, totally focussed and argued the Indian point of view with ‘legal acumen, political vigour and debating skill’, as the President of India, K. R. Narayanan, put it. For more than a decade, during the heyday of the Cold War, he was ‘India’s voice in the United Nations’.13 He brought the Kashmir issue to the basic roots, to the fundamental questions such as the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India, Pakistan’s aggression in Kashmir, the vacation of territories occupied by the ‘invaders’ before plebiscite could be possible, and most significantly, the original resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 which seemed to have been forgotten, the overall transformation of the political scenario in Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan and South Asia, etc. His marathon speeches, one of which has been regarded as the longest ever made by any one in the United Nations — more than eight hours non-stop — running into several volumes are indicators of his mastery over details. In this brief analysis, only the fundamental issues are raised, ignoring charges and counter charges between the two governments of India and Pakistan, as also diverse allegations and disputations in which the powers participated with considerable zest. For lack of space and also because the rationale

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behind them can be found in other chapters, of this book, this treatment steers clear of those controversies. They did not solve the problem, though the speeches were full of sound and fury.

II The Commission’s resolution of 13 August 1948 and of 5 January 1949 stand together. ‘It is supplementary and subsidiary because it adds to the other.’ It enables the other to function if the occasion came. The first paragraph states: ‘The question of the accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite’. The second paragraph states: ‘A plebiscite will be held when it shall be found by the Commission [Krishna Menon interjected — “in plain English is a condition precedent. If it is not found by the Commission, then no plebiscite”] that the ceasefire and truce agreements set forth in Parts I and II have been carried out and arrangements for the plebiscite have been completed.’14 ‘We can leave aside the second part because arrangements for the plebiscite did not follow. So it is only if Parts I and II are completed, and invite the Council’s attention to the number of times mention is made, in paragraph after paragraph of this question of the condition precedent, of the sequence, something happening after something else. And then again it is an investigation, it is the applying of minds to a plan in order to find fair means of doing that. . . . As I said, neither Part I nor Part II has been completed.’15 Paragraph 3 (a) deals with the nomination and the appointment of a plebiscite administrator ‘who shall be a personality of high international standing and commanding general confidence. He will be appointed to the office by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir’ and nominated by the commission. There is no reason why the government should be displaced. Also, paragraph 3 (b) of the resolution states: ‘The Plebiscite Administrator shall derive from the State of Jammu and Kashmir the powers he considers necessary for organising and conducting the plebiscite and for ensuring the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite.’ V. K. Krishna Menon drew attention to the ‘classical definition’ under which the sovereign is the person from whom all powers flow. The government of Jammu and Kashmir could not be displaced or overthrown for the sake of holding a plebiscite.

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Paragraph 4 demands that the plebiscite should take place ‘when peaceful conditions have been restored in the State’. These peaceful conditions ‘have not been restored, because part of the country is under occupation’. Also, the above enjoins on the government of India the final disposal of Indian and state armed forces, which establishes the fact that Pakistan has no part whatsoever with regard to these matters. ‘Pakistan will not be concerned in such matters as watching, witnessing, supervising and so forth — but we have not come to that stage.’16 Paragraph 7 (a) contains the assurance that there will be no religious propaganda, although there was no restriction to legitimate political activity. Also, undue influence or any direct or indirect interference must be avoided and ensure that ‘the voter is given the free exercise of any electoral right, etc’. The commission also gave solemn assurances, which had the force of the authority of the United Nations behind them, to India, which are contained in annex. V of document S/PV 762/Add. 1.1. These assurances were given to India by the UNCIP before India’s acceptance of the resolution of 13 August 1948 (S/1100, paragraph 75) and 5 January 1949 (S/1196 paragraph 15): 1. Responsibility for the security of the State rests with India. 2. The sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir Government over the entire territory of the State shall not be brought into question. 3. Plebiscite proposals shall not be binding upon India if Pakistan does not implement parts I and II of the resolution of 13 August 1948. 4. There shall be no recognition of the so-called ‘Azad’ Kashmir government. 5. The territory occupied by Pakistan shall not be consolidated. [Now, it is a part of Pakistan according to the Constitution of Pakistan]. 6. Reversion of the administration of the evacuated areas in the north to the government of Jammu and Kashmir and its defence to the government of India, and maintenance of garrisons for preventing the incursion of tribesmen and to guard the main trade routes. 7. Azad’ Kashmir forces shall be disbanded and disarmed. 8. Exclusion of Pakistan from all affairs of Jammu and Kashmir.

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It was to these commitments that India was a party. These two resolutions and the obligations that went with them were India’s obligations.17 The most glaring was the violation of ceasefire agreements by Pakistan by arming and training 32 battalions, now 45 battalions (in 1957) of the Azad Kashmir forces by Pakistan. One of the clauses of the Resolution on Kashmir adopted by the Security Council on 21 April 1948 recommended that the Kashmir government should delegate to the plebiscite administrator all the powers considered necessary for holding a fair and impartial plebiscite. It envisaged that the plebiscite administrator would be invested with full powers over state forces and police.18 Obviously, such a stringent resolution would not be accepted by any government worth the name. During the course of discussion on the issue relating to the holding of the plebiscite, the American delegation had insisted that the plebiscite administrator should be invested with judicial powers along with powers to control the state forces and police. The UK delegation reported to their Foreign Office in London that Indian delegation not only disliked these clauses but also objected to them forcefully.19

III It was alleged that the Indian government rejected each new proposal made by the commission. In December 1949, the President of the Security Council, General McNaughton, acting as the Council’s mediator in this dispute, formulated certain proposals for the demilitarisation of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan accepted these proposals; India rejected them. First, V. K. Krishna Menon argued that General McNaughton ‘tried to place India and Pakistan on an equal level in this matter’, the complaint of India related to ‘aggression’ committed by Pakistan in the territory of Jammu and Kashmir, the responsibility of defence being that of India. This matter had to be decided first, since if Pakistan was proved to be an invader, it would have no rights. That was the fundamental issue which the Council shirked. He also equated ‘Azad’ Kashmir with the Jammu and Kashmir government, ‘despite the Commission’s definite findings against it’.20 General McNaughton’s proposals ‘did not preserve the agreements of 13 August 1948 and of 5 January 1949’, hence these could not have been accepted. Again, it was pointed out: ‘The Security Council then appointed Sir Owen Dixon and authorised in March 1950, to bring about the

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demilitarisation of the state within five months. He formulated the demilitarisation proposals in July 1950 and discussed them with Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan. Pakistan accepted these proposals, India rejected them.’21 First, the demilitarisation issue was a part of the Resolution of 5 January 1949. They were only concerned with Part II, i.e. to bring about demilitarisation. What about the Resolution of 13 August 1948? Second, Sir Owen Dixon, like General McNaughton, tried to establish ‘a parity’ between India and Pakistan. ‘What is more’, said Menon, ‘he also brought in “Azad” Kashmir as though it were a de jure government and he also tried to establish parity between the state forces and militia on the one hand, and “Azad” forces on the other.’22 Dixon, however, noted: ‘Upon a number of occasions in the course of the period beginning with the reference on 1 January 1948 of the Kashmir dispute to the Security Council, India had advanced not only the contention to which I have already referred that Pakistan was an aggressor, but the further contention that this should be declared. . . .I was prepared to adopt the view that when the frontier of the state of Jammu and Kashmir was crossed, on, I believe, 20 October 1947, by hostile elements, it was contrary to international law, and that when in May 1948, as I believe, units of the regular Pakistan forces moved into the territory of the state, that too was inconsistent with international law.’23 This was, therefore, an act of aggression, yet, since ‘the Council had not made such a declaration’ he had not been asked to make a judicial investigation on the matter, he did not declare the matter of ‘aggression’ of Pakistan as a fact of the situation. This was rather too sophisticated an argument which tended to hide the obvious conclusion that Dixon had made in terms of the violation of international law which had actually taken place as and when the Pakistan forces entered the territory of Jammu and Kashmir. As suggested by the Jarring Report of 1957, the government of India had already informed him that ‘the issues in dispute were not suitable for arbitration, because such procedure would be inconsistent with the sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir and rights and obligations of the Union of India in respect of this territory’.24 Menon quoted various authorities who thought ‘arbitration’ on issues like this very irksome, unsuitable and against the rules of law. He quoted Lord Palmerston who was on record to have said, ‘in view of the envy and jealousy of British possessions and commerce, which would

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make it very difficult to discover really disinterested and impartial arbiters’.25 Also, the USA, as recently as 1931, in the Interhandel case, put forward the view, ‘apart from the question of honour and integrity, no state, without its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes with other states to mediation, arbitration or any other kind of specific settlement’.26 It was also stated by an American authority that ‘anything concerning state’s vital interests was not subject to arbitration’. Quoting Professor Hyde, Menon pointed out that the term ‘vital interests’ was used ‘for the purpose of excluding generally from their operation controversies involving matters of grave national concern’.27 Menon interjected — ‘What can be graver than the integrity of our country and its violation by a neighbour?’ In the Pan American Aribitration Treaty of 1928, it was stipulated that ‘only a justiciable or juridical matter can be subject to arbitration’. The Hague Conventions in 1899 and 1907 were referred to by Menon as stating: ‘the method of solving international conflicts by the application of the rule of law — a veritable judicial institution between states — arbitration is a juridical instrument of peace and progress since it gives an effective sanction to the existing law and by the establishment of jurisprudence contributes to the formation of the law of the future.’28 Maintaining these arguments, Menon observed, ‘aribitration is possible only if there are rules. If it is a judiciable matter, then rules are laid down and only then one can arbitrate; otherwise it would be a gamble, it would not be arbitration. . . . It goes against the whole conception of the rule of law and all the principles of international law.’29 Menon went on to explain why India did not agree to such a kind of arbitration and ‘since there is no agreement, there can’t be arbitration’. He said: ‘What is more, it sets this question out of its context. We came here under Chapter VI of the Charter. We did not come here to ask the Security Council to decide who has the title to Kashmir. The Security Council is not competent under the Charter to judge any legal or political questions. We came here for conciliation in order to get an aggression vacated. The Security Council is not seized of this matter under any other section of the Charter, and no other section provides for the adjudication of a territory or for a decision on the legal question. Therefore, since it concerns our sovereignty, our honour, our integrity, our vital interests and our having to go beyond commitments which we have already undertaken. . . .We couldn’t accept it and we regarded the matter as closed.’30

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Although there was no agenda, as far as the Kashmir question was concerned, on the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in 1951, a private meeting was held on the initiative of Prime Minister Clement Attlee. The meeting was to be held at 10 Downing Street, but since Robert Menzies was unwell, it was held in his room at the Savoy Hotel. The Prime Ministers of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ceylon, Pakistan, United Kingdom and India were present. Three suggestions were made by Attlee and Menzies, who spoke first. 1. They referred to a plebiscite having been agreed to and only the conditions relating thereto being subject to dispute. 2. Menzies favoured a limited plebiscite. 3. As for the Indian government’s apprehension for the security of the state, Menzies offered to provide a brigade of Commonwealth troops to be placed till the plebiscite ended. Attlee also emphasised the ‘extreme desirability of the Kashmir issue being settled, more especially because of the world situation.’31 During the discussion, ‘Mr. Menzies stated that he had not been able to understand why the Government of the state should be pushed aside or suspended because of the plebiscite.’ That was exactly what Pakistan was pressing for. Menzies proceeded: ‘It could very well continue, although matters connected with the plebiscite might be handed over to the Plebiscite Administrator. Attlee agreed with this’.32 The Indian government also agreed with these propositions provided other conditions were satisfied, said Menon.33 As for the suggestion of Menzies about Commonwealth troops for Kashmir, no reference was made either by Liaquat Ali Khan or by Prime Minister Nehru,34 who of course had later rejected the idea. Nehru also referred to the ethnic and linguistic divisions of the state, pointing out ‘basic difference between our approach and Pakistan’s two-nation theory, and the insistence on religious difference coming into politics. . . .We have never accepted Pakistan’s theory...of a Muslim state and a Hindu state.’ Attlee, however, observed: ‘The division of India has largely been based on a religious basis. He did not like this religious basis at all, and he had tried to avoid it, but facts were too strong.’35 Nehru, however, stated: ‘We had never accepted that principle, and we did not propose to do so in future. Right from the beginning of the Kashmir trouble, we had laid stress on this fact and had informed the United Nations’ Commission repeatedly that this appeal to religion must be avoided. In spite of this the Pakistan Press was full of religious appeals and calls for “jehad” — that is holy war. ...If this

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kind of thing was going to take place before and during the plebiscite period, then there would be no plebiscite, but civil upheaval, not only in Kashmir but all over India and Pakistan.’36 Menzies ‘agreed that religion should be kept out of the picture and he had been much disturbed when he saw the Pakistan Press in Karachi. . .which was writing most irresponsibly on this subject’.37 Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir from 1947 to 1953 and again from 1975 till his death in 1982, had also addressed the Security Council in his first term as Prime Minister. Also, his speeches in the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir during 1951 and 1952 is of relevance to the Council’s deliberations. He made three significant observations, among others, against joining Pakistan. One, he said, ‘We have another important factor to consider, if the state decides to make this [the powerful argument that Pakistan being a Muslim state, Kashmir should join Pakistan] the predominant consideration, what will be the fate of one million non-Muslims now in our state? As things stand at present, there is no place for them in Pakistan. Any solution which will result in the displacement or the total subjugation of such a large number of people will not be just or fair.’38 According to the 1941 Census, of the 4 million population of Jammu and Kashmir, nearly one million constituted non-Muslims — Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists or Tibetans and others. A proposal to make Kashmir an independent state like Switzerland was also mooted. ‘This might seem attractive in that it would appear to pave the way out of the present deadlock. To us as a tourist country it would also have obvious advantages. But in considering independence we must not ignore practical consideration.’39‘ ‘Firstly, it is not easy to protect our sovereignty and independence in a small country which has not the sufficient strength to defend itself on our long and difficult frontiers bordering on many countries. Second, we must have the goodwill of all our neighbours. Can we find powerful guarantors among them to pull together always in assuring us freedom from aggression? I would like to remind you that from 15 August to 22 October 1947 our state was independent and the result was that our weakness was exploited by our neighbour [Pakistan] with whom we had a valid standstill agreement. The State was invaded. What is the guarantee that in future too, we may not be the victims of similar aggression.’40

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Sheikh Abdullah also said that ‘Pakistan is not an organic unity of all the Muslims in this subcontinent. It has on the contrary caused the dispersion of the Indian Muslims for whose benefit it was claimed to have been created. There are two Pakistans at least a thousand miles apart from each other. The total population of Western Pakistan, which is contiguous to our state, is hardly 25 million, while the total number of Muslims resident in India is as many as 40 million. As one Muslim is as good as another, the Kashmiri Muslims, if they are worried by such considerations, should choose the 40 millions living in India.’41 He stressed further: ‘From my experience in the last four years, it is my considered judgement that the presence of Kashmir in the Union of India has been the major factor in stabilising relations between the Hindus and Muslims.’42

IV In accordance with the Security Council’s Resolution of 31 March 1951, Dr Frank D. Graham of the US Defence Manpower Administration was appointed as an arbitrator of the Kashmir dispute. He assumed office on 30 April 1951 and submitted his first report on 7 September 1951. The governments of India and Pakistan agreed, as stated by the Graham Report 1. not to resort to force; 2. to avoid making warlike statements; 3. to maintain the ceasefire, which came into being on 1 January 1949; and 4. to reaffirm their faith in a free and impartial plebiscite with a view to decide the question of accession. Meanwhile, other agreements had also been reached in respect of 1. to carry out demilitarisation without threatening the ceasefire agreement; 2. to send representatives to draw up a programme of demilitarisation; 3. to complete demilitarisation without prejudice to the functions and responsibilities of the UN representative and plebiscite administrator regarding the final disposal of forces; and 4. to refer any differences to the UN representative, whose decision would be final.43 The main question, however, which remained to be sorted out between the two governments, which ought to have been taken up by the Security Council, was ‘India’s basic position which could not be modified’, as Prime Minister Nehru told Graham in his meeting with him in New Delhi on 5 March 1952. ‘One was that Pakistan had no right to keep any forces anywhere in Jammu and Kashmir. . . .There could be no question of India accepting the presence of any Pakistani troops in any part of Jammu and Kashmir, be it “Azad Kashmir” territory

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or any other.’44 Graham pointed out that there was no question of any ‘Pakistan regular forces to stay in the territory, but the question really was one of the “Azad Kashmir” forces. Nehru said that these forces were part and parcel of the forces of Pakistan.’45 Girja Shankar Bajpai, the Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs, government of India, who was present at the meeting, pointed out another problem which had been discussed with Graham in Paris. Sir Zafrullah Khan ‘had insisted upon parity between our forces and the “Azad Kashmir” forces and Gilgit Scouts to be maintained on the two sides of the ceasefire line. So long as the parity was sought and insisted upon by Pakistan, I did not see what suggestions we could make.’ According to the Cawthorn memorandum submitted to UNCIP in March 1949, it was ‘explicitly stated that the Azad Kashmir forces were administratively and operationally under the Pakistan High Command.’46 Walter Cawthorn was Deputy Chief of Staff, Pakistan army between 1948 and 1951. He was an Australian serving Pakistan. Later, he went to Karachi as High Commissioner from Australia in 1954–58. Before joining the Pakistan service, Major General Cawthorn served the Indian army from 1919–47. Incidentally, he had gone back in September 1948 to plead for ‘joint defensive arrangements’ with Pakistan and had met the chiefs of staff of the government of the UK as well as Philip Noel-Baker, the then Commonwealth Relations Minister, impressing on him that Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was keen for it. That was the beginning of Cold War politics and Pakistan, in conjunction with the UK, wanted to reap benefits on the Kashmir issue.47 By 1952, considerable changes in the situation in Jammu and Kashmir had taken place. After the military aid given by USA to Pakistan in 1954, phenomenal transformations in Pakistan occurred. As a result of massive military build-up, war cries were heard very often on the borders of India and the balance of the power situation had changed, disturbing the equilibrium in South Asia as a whole. The original resolutions of the Security Council pertaining to Kashmir based on 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, to which India had agreed, were still valid, yet most western powers tended to ignore them. In some quarters, there was talk of the necessity for a ‘realistic approach’ rather than on merit or the principles involved.48 Even Attlee observed that no useful purpose would be served by investigating who was to be blamed for the Kashmir problem. In other words, they

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wanted to simply ignore the Indian complaint, which had originally asked for stopping Pakistan’s aggression in Kashmir.49 There was ample ground for worry with respect to Indo-Pak relations. As General Scoones of Britain observed, ‘the two countries seemed to be more pre-occupied with the threat from each other than any from outside and there was always the danger they might go to war’.50 Graham’s proposals of 4 September 1952 were for fixing the quantum of military forces on each side of the ceasefire line with a view to bringing out the demilitarisation of the state. It was suggested that the armed forces on the ceasefire line on the Pakistan side should be between 3,000 and 6,000 and on the Indian side between 12,000 and 18,000. Graham’s suggestions were not rejected by India, but India wanted renegotiation, keeping in view its concern for security of the state and the forces suggested being insufficient for the purpose.51 But the consolidation of the occupied territory, known as Azad Kashmir, remained untouched where, according to the statement of the commission, the Azad Kashmir forces in 1949 ‘number some thirty two well-equipped battalions. . . .Units of the Pakistan army itself are present in Azad Kashmir and have operated in the closest cooperation with the local forces.’52 The government of India had stated the disbanding and disarming of these forces as a condition vital to the holding of plebiscite. The commission also agreed that large-scale reduction and disarming of the Azad forces should take place. Yet this was not done. Time after time it was said in this report ‘that there should be only local authorities — meaning de facto local authorities; there should be no consolidation of territory. Western Kashmir is practically a province of Pakistan, administered by a Central Government. It has no local government and, therefore, has become integrated in that way.’ V. K. Krishna Menon asserted: ‘The same applies to other areas, directed by Pakistan army or the Pakistan government. Therefore, the factual division of Kashmir that has been made by Pakistan occupation on the other side of the ceasefire line is a change in condition which makes the operation of Part II difficult.’53

V An American military expert, Hanson Baldwin, gave an estimate of the Pakistan army and other forces in occupied Kashmir. He said: ‘The strength of Pakistan forces is about 200,000, plus para-military forces

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organised in seven or nine divisions. Pakistan has about 125 aircraft. Pakistan’s army is the second largest army among the countries of Middle East.’54 The Prime Minister of Pakistan, in his speech on 26 February 1957, declared: ‘We have probably the finest army on this side of the Continent. We have such brave people behind us that I can with confidence say that we can challenge any army in any part of the world. We have confidence in ourselves and in our Creator, and it will make us conquer anything which stands in our way.’ V. K. Krishna Menon said, ‘heard speeches of that kind prior to 1939’55 in Europe, of course, by Hitler. And this confidence of Pakistan within three years of military aid received from the USA. Mangla Dam was constructed in Kashmir, taking the waters of the Jhelum into Pakistan. Both the dam and river are in Kashmir, in occupied territory. ‘Therefore, it is under the sovereignty of India, it is in the territory of the Indian Union where the aggressor has not only sat in occupation but has harnessed the water, changed the topography of the place and everything else.’56 It is obvious that phenomenal changes occurred on both sides of the ceasefire line. To disturb the settled conditions would have meant unsettling the populations. The danger of large-scale movement or migration of people owing to fear of their lives and dislocation was quite always there. It was suggested that these apprehensions must end. The year 1957 turned out to be the worst in Indo-British relations. It was bound to be so. India had been very critical of Britain’s invasion of Egypt in 1956 on the Suez Canal issue. The London Times acknowledged the Anglo-US resolution for stationing of UN troops in Kashmir as ‘stemming’ from India’s role in her attack on Britain during the Suez Crisis. The Hindustan Times reported that the idea was ‘to teach India a lesson’.57 Nehru blamed Britain for the resolution. The British, he said, blindly supported Pakistan. ‘By misrepresenting India’s cause and championing Pakistan’s aggression, Britain has been trying consistently and deliberately to prevent progress towards a better understanding between the two countries.’ On 15 February 1957, Nehru addressed a mammoth gathering, declaring that Britain had done ‘great injustice to India on the Kashmir issue’.58 Similarly, the Pakistan leaders attacked India in no uncertain terms. Feroz Khan Noon, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, said in the Security Council that there was ‘a reign of terror’ in existence in Kashmir and that Kashmir

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was ‘ripe for revolution’. But the Times contradicted him, reporting that 9,000 foreign tourists and 50,000 Indians had visited Kashmir during the year, and had given ‘appreciative accounts of political situation in Kashmir’.59 Prime Minister Hassan Suhrawardy of Pakistan declared that it was no use wasting more time ‘on a wild goose chase’, seeking resolution of the Kashmir issue through negotiation, and asked for troop movements to counter-balance India’s army manouevres.60 Menon, in his usual style, condemned the four power resolution as ‘a poison pill’ and asked ‘who is going to serve this poison pill to the patient’, answering himself — ‘the predominant partner in the “joint” Anglo-American “venture” against India.’61 The Hindustan Times characterised Feroz Khan Noon’s speech, who called for jehad against India, as ‘Darkness at Noon’.62 The four power resolution for the stationing of troops in Jammu and Kashmir was moved by the UK, USA, Australia and Cuba, and was vetoed by Russia. Australia’s Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, was a great friend of British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, who always appreciated his ‘shrewd appreciations’ and enjoyed his company since he was ‘witty’; there was no love lost between Nehru and Menzies. Nehru addressed a massive gathering of 8 lakh people at Nagpur, where he declared that India will not allow ‘foreign forces on Indian territory in Kashmir. . . .It is against our honour, our security and our independence. We shall never do it.’ The move was an attempt ‘to create disunity and divide our people in order to weaken us and destroy us’. Britain, he said, amongst thunderous cheers, continued to support the two-nation theory, to the discredit of India.63 During this period of tension and turmoil, Pakistan was given more military aid, with Nehru objecting to it more fiercely. Suhrawardy appreciated Britain’s enormous support to Pakistan, along with the friends of the Baghdad Pact.64 UK High Commissioner Malcolm Macdonald rushed to London ‘to ease unprecedented strain in Indo-British relations.’65 V. K. Krishna Menon finally hinted at the permanence of the ceasefire line, ‘which has remained peaceful, inspite of provocations’. Peace is vital for India ‘on which is centred the unity of India, the secular character of our state, and what is more, internal peace of the country, where there is a population of so-called minorities of nearly a hundred million, whose very large economic and social experiments — if you would like to call them that — are taking place sometimes shaking the foundations of an age-worn society.’

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He, in his last address to the UN on Kashmir, told them in plain words the utter futility of the exercise so far engaged to resolve the Kashmir dispute, disregarding the basic elements of the conflict and the changes which had taken place, which made the UN resolutions on Kashmir outdated in more respects than one, leave alone the partisanship shown in this respect. His final words rang true: ‘If it is your desire to see progress take place, it is not achieved by passing resolutions which have no meaning, which cannot apply in the present circumstances, and which would be used by Pakistan only in order to prove to their people that “we have big people outside to assist us and therefore you can do what you really want to do” — that is attack India, provoke her and be intransigent.’66 ‘The Council should not mistake our desire to examine the state of quietitude and patience in this matter as an attitude of weakness or subservience or a willingness to surrender our sovereignty under pressure. Our sovereignty we shall never negotiate, our sovereignty we shall never surrender.’67

Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

SWJN, second series, vol. 5, pp. 169–70. Ibid.: 170. SWJN, second series, vol. 5, p. 168. Lakhanpal (1965: 89). See the full text of the letter of 31 December 1947, pp. 88–95. Ibid.: 98. Ibid.: 146. Ibid.: 147. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.: 148, 158–60. Quoted in Akbar (1988: 494). Harold Macmillan, ‘HM Diaries’ 1957, Bodleian Library, Oxford. They were lent to me for consultation by Professor Peter Catterall, University of London. Foreword by K. R. Narayanan to Menon et. al. (1992: v, vi). Krishna Menon’s speech, 8 February 1957, op. cit., p. 159. Ibid.: 159–60. Ibid.: 161. Ibid.: 163–64. L/WS/1/1152, p. 73, IOR, BL, London. L/WS/1/1152, 2 April 1948, p. 87, IOR, BL, London. Krishna Menon’s speech of 23–24 January 1957, op. cit., p. 85.

Kashmir Question in Security Council 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54.

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Ibid.: 86. Ibid.: 86. Ibid.: 96. Jarring Report, paragraph 19; Krishna Menon’s speech, 9 October 1957; see ibid.: 271. Krishna Menon’s speech, ibid.: 273. Ibid. Ibid. Quoted by Krishna Menon, 9 October 1957; see ibid.: 274. Ibid. Ibid.: 275. Krishna Menon’s speech, 23–24 January 1957; see ibid.: 87. The quotes are from Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s note on the informal meeting discussions held in the Savoy Hotel during the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in 1951. Menon et. al. (1992: 88). Ibid.: 89. Ibid.: 90. Ibid.: 89. Ibid. Ibid. Krishna Menon’s speech, 23–24 January 1957; see ibid.: 73. The Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir passed the Constitution on 17 November 1956. Ibid. Quoted by Krishna Menon; extract from Sheikh Abdullah’s speech in the J & K CA, ibid. Ibid.: 72–73. Ibid.: 72. SWJN, second series, vol. 17, pp. 448–49, 3n and 4n. Ibid.: 449. Ibid. Ibid. G. S. Bajpai recorded the minutes of the talk. L/WS/1/1147, IOR, BL, London. Loy Henderson to the US Secretary of State, 16 January 1950, FRUS, 1950, vol. V, p. 1373. Record of the US–UK discussion on South Asian defence, London, 18 September 1950, FRUS, 1950, vol. V, p. 199. Menon et. al. 1992, op. cit., p. 95. Ibid.: 103. Ibid.: 102. Quoted by Krishna Menon, 9 October 1957; see ibid.: 303 (position as per April 1957). Ibid.

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55. Ibid. 56. The Times, 20 February 1957, also Hindustan Times, Mss. Eur. F.158/1197B, IOR, BL, London. 57. Mss Eur. F. 158/1197D, Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59. The Times, 18 February 1957; Mss Eur. F. 158/1197D. 60. Mss Eur. F. 158/1197D. 61. 20 February 1957; Mss Eur. F. 158/1197D. 62. Hindustan Times, 22 February 1957; Mss Eur. F. 158/1197D. 63. The Statesman, ibid. 64. The Times, 7 February 1957; Mss Eur. F. 158/1197D. 65. Mss. Eur. F. 158/1197B. 66. Krishna Menon’s speech, 22 June 1962; see Menon et. al., 1992, op. cit., p. 533. 67. Ibid.: 533–34.

Beginning of Cold War: The US and India

II Cold War Politics and India’s Relations with the West

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5 Beginning of the Cold War: The United States and India I The devastation caused by the Second World War was unprecedented. In Europe alone, more than 12.5 million fighting men had been killed. More than 21.5 million civilians were dead, including six million Jews, two-thirds of all Jews in Europe. More than seven million of both sexes had been enslaved. Hundreds of cities, towns and villages had been razed to the ground. They had to be rebuilt in good time. The Second World War ended after two atomic bombs had been dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. Significant changes had occurred after the defeat of Germany in Europe and Japan in the Far East. With the emergence of USA and the Soviet Union as great powers of the globe, the leadership had passed out of British hands. Harold Macmillan (1969) recapitulated ‘how the old imperial and colonial power must now undergo radical even revolutionary development?’. However, he commented with a certain degree of legitimate pride that in Europe, ‘the battlegrounds of the Second World War mark the heroic age of the British empire. . .great armies had gathered and fought under British Command’. Yet, ‘the prestige of Britain and ideals of all European peoples had been injured by the ease with which Japanese forces had overrun immense territories’. Also, as he said ‘unhappily’, large-scale ‘surrender’ of British troops had taken place. ‘The cataclysm was too dramatic and engulfing to be treated as an episode.’1 The British had lost their military position also facing on the economic front; they became dependent on US support for their very survival and growth after the war. The Soviet Union showed tremendous resilience and ability to recover from the wartime devastation it had suffered. It was able to forge economic reconstruction in a short time and its production of goods and services reached pre-war levels and progressed further beyond. Also, it soon filled the power vacuum created in eastern Europe after the defeat of Germany. Macmillan observed that the ‘dark

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shadows of Communism began to fall in Europe. The Russian empire grew with striking pace in all directions partly by direct annexations and partly by imposition of communist regime under the control of Moscow. With the power of Germany destroyed, our main concern must be the new Soviet threat.’2 Macmillan records, however, one outcome of the Second World War which was most reassuring to the free world — it was that the war had destroyed ‘the political and economic independence of nations . . .Isolation was dead in America as in Britain.’ A more important consequence of the flurry of outcomes in which he had ‘rejoiced’ was his faith; as he said, ‘in the fullness and genuineness of Anglo-American cooperation, whatever else might fail, this could be maintained’.3 That was the lesson of the Second World War, to which Britain solemnly adhered to in the coming decades of the history of the world. Meanwhile, the American economy grew by leaps and bounds. Quoting Simon Kuznets, Kenneth Galbraith, the US economist diplomat, tells us that between 1939–44, the total product of American goods and services had doubled. The civilian economy did not suffer, the vast claims of war notwithstanding, and civilian consumption increased. In 1939, unemployment in the USA stood at 17.2 per cent of the civilian labour force; in 1944, it was down to 1.2 per cent. ‘Not before in American history had there been so much talk of sacrifice for the national good, and overall such improved economic wellbeing.’4 Then came the Marshall Plan initiatives, the effect of which was enormous production in Europe and Britain. The Marshall Plan expenditure in Europe began with $6 billion; eventually it rose to about $13 billion, which was spent with considerable benefits to the countries. ‘It stands in memory, as it did at that time,’ says John Kenneth Galbraith ‘as the most successful of economic incentives.’5 But the benefits also accrued substantially to the USA. ‘There was a less publicised effect of the Marshall largesse. Much of the money so provided came back to the United States for the purchase of food, raw materials and capital goods. It was thus a powerful stimulant to the American economy, another of the support and favourable performance in the post-war years. In economics, as one trusts, in larger life, it is possible to do well by doing good.’6 Galbraith, however, counts another danger faced by the society. ‘But another issue had emerged — the impress of a favourable power was deepened by the dominant figure of Joseph Stalin. . . .The

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revolutionary aims of communism, indeed, its inevitability had always been sufficiently celebrated on the whole impressing conservatives more than they did the proletarian masses. . . .In the future, the American policy would be influenced by a continuing combination of compassion, idealism and paranoic fear of communism.’7 In meeting the threat of the Soviet Union and the dreaded communism, USA was fully supported by Britain. Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, who was one of the architects of policy of consolidation against the communists, tells us that the western powers began first ‘consolidating’ their power in Europe. The Marshall Plan may have been beneficial to the whole of European people in a variety of ways, but the underlying objective was also to stand up against communist aggression according to Bevin.8 The Marshall Plan was regarded as the consolidation and consummation of economic and military forces against the Soviet Union, thus heralding the Cold War in Europe. The world soon was divided into two opposing camps — one headed by the US and the other by the USSR. However, Walter Lippman, the famous American diplomatic analyst and journalist, stated that the beginning of the Cold War could be traced to the notorious Fulton speech of Winston Churchill, delivered in March 1946 at a nondescript town, Missouri, in USA. Winston Churchill attacked the Soviet Union for its ‘totalitarian, tyranny and the police state’. Roy Jenkins, in his admirable biography, Churchill (2001), tells us about that speech: ‘The substance of Churchill’s Fulton’s message embellished with many typical rhetorical flourishes, was that an “Iron Curtain” having descended across the continent of Europe. . .peace and democracy could no longer be sustained by the three Great Powers of the wartime alliance . . .’9 He did not believe that the Russians wanted war but he did think that their desire for the ‘fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines’ was a paramount consideration on their part. Churchill further added: If the population of the English-speaking communities be added to that of the United States with all that such cooperation implies in the air, or the sea all over the globe, in science and industry, and in moral force, there will be no quivering, precarious balance of war to offer its temptation to ambition or adventure. On the contrary, there will be an overwhelming assurance of security.10

Joseph Stalin, in a rare interview given to Pravda, hit out at Churchill’s appeal to the English-speaking peoples as something ‘like Hitler

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advancing the racial theory declaring that these people who speak English are full-blooded nations’, who had the right ‘to control the fate of the whole world’. Such a concept ‘unleashed the war’ as ‘inevitable’, Stalin fumed. Lippman also believed that the Fulton speech was tantamount to ‘a declaration of war’ against the Soviets.11 That, in essence, was the philosophy of the Cold War politics. Winston Churchill’s ‘Iron Curtain’ speech found an echo in Harold Macmillan’s in the House of Commons on 23 March 1949, when he, as spokesman of the Tory opposition, favoured pursuing the Cold War vigorously: ‘With communists’, he waxed eloquent, ‘we can’t say it with flowers. . . .I say be careful. Do not give away guns in order to get butter. Go elsewhere. Go to the colonies. Go to Western Europe. Make the world on our side of the Iron Curtain a demonstrably a better place to live in and then ultimately, the news of this success will filter through.’12 He concluded his speech in the following words: ‘The Cold War must be fought with as much energy and singlemindedness as the shooting war. . . .Step by step the Cold War must be won. If the way be long and weary, let us have courage and faith. For this is no ordinary journey that we must travel together. It is perhaps the last crusade.’13 Thus, the die was cast and the western nations began preparing for an eventual stand off with the Soviet Union. It is against this background that military alliance system forged with various countries including Pakistan must be viewed. President Harry Truman was no doubt supportive of ‘the Iron Curtain’ speech in so far as characterisation of Russian totalitarianism was concerned, but he was not in favour of giving an impression to Stalin ‘who already has an opinion we’re ganging upon him’.14 Truman was also worried since Churchill’s speech ‘produced a dreadful outcry from many Americans who did not want to get into a conflict with Russia’.15 To mollify Stalin, he wrote to him, offering to send his personal aircraft to bring him to the USA, promising to escort him to the University of Missouri ‘for exactly the same kind of reception, the same opportunity to speak your mind’. The answer was in the negative.16 President Truman wrote that soon after, the Russians began ‘to make trouble in the UN in 1946 and in Germany and Korea. . . .I have always been willing to talk to Russia on any subject. At Potsdam, I invited Stalin to come to Washington; he said God willing he’d come.’17 As far as the position in the Indian subcontinent was concerned, the British foreign office provided a report on 17 March 1949. Both

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India and Pakistan were evaluated in the context of how best to stem the tide of growing threat of communism. The Report stated: In all this the Indian subcontinent has a special importance. It lies at a place about halfway round the periphery. If India tends to look to the eastwards, Pakistan looks both east and west. The subcontinent should not be regarded in isolation as a separate sector. India in particular has a role to play in peripheral politics — as a great Asian power, as a possible member of the Commonwealth, as a country with whom the United Kingdom has now an opportunity to develop relations on a new basis, as a country with political, cultural and economic interests in South East Asia, which we should try to carry with us in the framing of policies and the development of action in that region. The Delhi Conference on Indonesia, Burma may be pointers to the future.18

Actually, in such a scheme of peripheral politics, Pakistan, more than India, stood at a higher plane. It was a Muslim majority state, looked to the Middle East as a symbol of Muslim brotherhood and felt emotionally bonded with the Muslims of the region. The concept of Islamic brotherhood, however vague, was a noble idea. The western powers, especially Britain, were conscious of this and planned the strategy of enlisting their support for their ultimate fight against communism. As will be seen, Pakistan had sought support from the western powers already and agreed to enter into military alliances like the Baghdad Pact readily. The era of rabid anti-communism, however, began with the ascendancy of John Foster Dulles in foreign affairs and McCarthyism at home. The USA and the UK had fought the Second World War, ‘the greatest war in history’, as partners, as comrades in arms. They had faced common dangers and had overcome the trials and tribulations of war; at the same time, they were rejoicing together in victory. Both the countries had agreed to meet the Soviet threat through joint action in Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere.

II John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State during President Eisenhower’s administration, is generally regarded as the architect of the US foreign policy, which encouraged the entering into military alliances with countries of the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia to thwart Soviet aggression and expansion. However, it was George

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Kennan who developed his classic theory of ‘containment’ against the Soviet Union’s power and influence in the world. In his article (1947), he developed the thesis that Soviet pressures could be contained by vigorous western response — economic, diplomatic, ideological and military. If the USA was successful in launching such an offensive, it would ‘force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it had to observe in recent years and thus promote tendencies which must find their outlet in either break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power’. His ideas gained wide currency and acceptance although they also received considerable criticism and opposition from several quarters. Later, Kennan contended that he intended containment to be basically a political rather than a military strategy.19 It is also asserted that the Truman doctrine was based in some respect on the ‘containment policy’. In western Europe, the Marshall Plan was initiated for economic recovery, but it was thought that Soviet pressures on eastern Europe sought to endanger the social and political fabric, hence military pacts like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) were founded. The Middle East defence also was conceived as a countermeasure against the Soviet threat. Thus, political and military content was added to the economic strategy of reconstruction of the region. President Eisenhower was sworn in in January 1953. His Secretary of State, Dulles, became a vigorous exponent of Cold War strategy and initiated what has been called ‘the policy of massive retaliation’ against communist advance. Also, efforts ‘to develop local situations of strength’ were made, ‘including drawing other nations into cooperative political and military relationships’. Dulles had been, however, quite active in the diplomatic game earlier as well. In order to seek cooperation in relation to the Japanese Peace Treaty, he met Prime Minister Clement Attlee on 8 June 1951. In effect, the discussion focussed on the question of the recognition of communist China. Attlee’s signed note states that their talk ‘turned almost entirely to the giving of absolute sovereignty to Japan. He (Dulles) was not prepared to consider any restriction on the freedom of Japan to recognise either Communist China or Nationalist China. I pointed out some of the dangers of the situation and he was inclined to think that we were suspicious of American motives.’ The British view was, in fact, ‘to put this matter of recognition into cold storage’. This question had been discussed in the British cabinet on 29 May 1951.

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The file contained an ‘appreciation’ of Dulles’s personality as well. It noted that Dulles was known for his ‘impatience’ which was ‘probably due in part to his lack of experience in diplomatic negotiations and in part to the fact that since September last he has been concentrating on Japanese Peace Treaty very intensively to the exclusion of everything else.’ The note recorded: ‘It is bad for people to specialise on one subject for too long.’ Other dominant characteristics of Dulles, were that he had ‘a sense of his own statesmanship and importance’. Behind ‘a cold and rather impersonal exterior is a man of quick reactions and considerable vanity’. The note concluded — ‘Dull, Duller, Dulles.’20 Incidentally, he visited most capitals in the world, except New Delhi, to canvass for the Japanese Peace Treaty. Jawaharlal Nehru refused to sign the US-sponsored Treaty and concluded a separate treaty with Japan later.21 Nevertheless, Nehru was appreciative of the USA and American people. The USA was a great power, he said, having emerged after the Second World War as the most prosperous and caring country. He stated that no one should forget US contribution to the regeneration of Europe. Norman Cousins, editor of The Sunday Review of Literature, New York, had a long conversation with Nehru on 3 September 1953, in which Nehru recognised the central role which USA was destined to play in future. He said to Cousins: . . .it is obvious that in the world today, the United States has an extraordinarily important task to fulfil and a tremendous responsibility. When a nation or a people are in that situation everything that they do, big or small, produces an effect that is felt all over the world. I hope and believe that the United States, or rather the people of the United States will utilise this great historic chance before them and that they will help the world to help itself, for ultimately everyone has to stand on his own feet. And it can help to create that atmosphere of lack of fear and lack of hatred that can yet bring about a certain spirit of cooperative endeavour of live and let live.22

Also, Nehru said, ‘it was of great importance for India to have good relations with America’ and ‘I would like to work for continuing good relations and I am quite convinced that in doing so I am only doing the same thing that is being done by many Americans themselves.’23 Dulles paid a visit to Delhi to hold discussions with Nehru on a variety of issues. He was in Delhi between 20 and 22 May 1953. Nehru

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recorded in his minutes: ‘1 met Mr. Dulles several times. On two occasions I had long private talks. In all I must have had these talks for about three and half hours.’24 Ideas were exchanged on India’s general approach to the USSR and China, recent developments in Russia, the Big Four Conference, Korea, Indo-China, Burma, Near East problems, Pakistan and the MEDO, situation in north, south and east Africa and Kashmir. Pakistan, Kashmir, the USSR and China featured prominently in the talks. So far, the USA had not entered into a military alliance with Pakistan nor had it decided to offer massive military aid to Pakistan, although talks had taken place from time to time, ever since the birth of Pakistan. Kashmir is the central focus of this study and therefore close attention is being paid to the dialogue on this issue between the two statesmen. Nehru pointed out that ‘the basic difference between our respective outlooks [between India and Pakistan], that is the secular outlook and the communal outlook. Kashmir did not represent just a patch of territory to us, but it was a symbol of that particular outlook of ours and on no account would we approach that question from Pakistan’s communal point of view. That would be fatal to our entire position in India. I added that I was glad to see certain attempts to change in regard to this bigotten outlook in Pakistan. The further these changes went the easier it would be for India and Pakistan to deal with each other.’25 Dulles was glad that Nehru was scheduled to meet the Pakistan Prime Minister soon. The meetings actually took place in two sets. One series of talks was held in Karachi in July 1953 and another in New Delhi in August 1953. Dulles said that the USA was ‘naturally interested in a settlement of the issue [Kashmir] but had no desire to interfere’. Nehru agreed that outside interference should not be of any help and indeed had thus far come in the way. Dulles also agreed to the suggestion that Pakistan and India should deal with the problem directly, volunteering that ‘all this talk of plebiscite’ was pointless and that it complicated the issue further. ‘Such plebiscites had failed elsewhere and only created bad blood. It was much better to settle the problem on some ad hoc basis, say partition’, he said.26 Dulles asked Nehru a most tricky question ‘about our general philosophy in regard to the USSR and China. I replied rather briefly. . . our minds were largely taken up by this building up of a new India and we were reluctant to get entangled in external matters.

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Hence our basic desire for peace, which of course arose from our whole outlook. Hence also our wish not to be tied with any other country and to retain our independence of action.’27 That was in the main the so-called non-aligned policy of India for which Nehru had all along been criticised and derided by the western powers. In this connection, Dulles, it seems, referred to the early history of the US and ‘that he could understand the desire to avoid entangling alliances’ as George Washington had done. Nehru further pointed out: ‘We had no fear whatever of any invasion of India by Russia or China. The facts of geography were against it. But we had naturally to look after our frontiers much more effectively now than that was necessary previously. . . .I told Dulles that I was pretty sure that neither Russia nor China wanted to have a major war. Also that a major was should obviously be a disaster of the worst kind and no one could predict the results. …Vaguely Dulles agreed.’28 In the end, Dulles suggested that ‘I might help in the course of my visit to London, in softening the UK Prime Minister in regard to Egypt.’29 Here the comments of Dulles relating to the Egyptian problem are quite revealing and make for fascinating reading. He was obviously greatly worried about Egypt even in 1953. As is well known, the Suez invasion of 1956 had thrown the world almost at the brink of a world war. It must be said, to the credit of Dulles and the US, that they refused to back up England and France in their 1956 ‘Suez adventure’. Dulles observed, during the course of discussion, that ‘Churchill still believed in the old colonial methods of the strong arm.’ Nehru’s minutes show that Dulles ‘appeared to indicate that both sides, that is the British and the Egyptians, were unreasonable’. On the whole he seemed to think that the British were more unreasonable or at any rate, had been too rigid. He had ‘pleaded with the British to tone down their attitude’. Dulles also observed ‘with great sorrow, at the continuing colonial tendencies of the UK and France, more especially, the latter. He said that 99 per cent of Americans were opposed to colonialism and they had been constantly pressing this upon their allies. Britain had acted well with regard to India, Burma and Ceylon, but was following a different policy in Africa, in the Middle East and he regretted it.’30 All this must have been music to Nehru’s ears. Dulles went on to stress: ‘the British had no legal justification for keeping a large army in the Suez area. Such justification as they had was for a force of 10,000 while they now had round about 80,000.’31 He hinted darkly at the possibility of the British taking possession

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of Cairo and Alexandria.32 Both Nehru and Dulles agreed that ‘that was no solution’ of the Egyptian problem.33 From New Delhi, Dulles travelled to Karachi to hold talks with the leaders of Pakistan. In spite of bonhomie in New Delhi followed by intellectual discourses with Nehru, Dulles later described Nehru as ‘an utterly impractical statesman’ and that his neutralist policy was ‘naive’, if not unprincipled.34 In 1947 as well, Dulles was hardly enamoured by ‘Hindu India’ and remained unruffled with regard to the euphoric emergence of Indian independence under the leadership of socialist-oriented Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Even before India became independent, Dulles had commented in early 1947 that ‘Soviet Communism exercises a strong influence through the interim Hindu government.’35 In Pakistan, Dulles recalled he felt ‘genuine feelings of friendship’. He told the National Security Council of US on 1 June 1953: ‘Pakistan is one country that has [the] moral courage to do its part [in] resisting communism’ and that he was tremendously impressed ‘by the martial and religious qualities of Pakistanis’.36 Dennis Kux further tells us about Dulles testifying before the Foreign Affairs Committee: ‘I believe these fellows are going to fight any communist invasion with their bare fists if they have to.’ He was lyrical about the reception he received: ‘The lancers that they have were fellows that had to be 6 feet 2 inches to be qualified and they sat there on those great big horses, and were out of the world.’37 Such sentiments, coming as they did from Dulles, must have electrified the atmosphere and the National Security Council agreed to all that he had suggested in respect of military aid to be given to Pakistan. In this context, Walter Lippman, the most influential foreign affairs commentator of the time, asked Dulles about the anticipated military alliance with Pakistan. Dulles replied: ‘ “Look Walter, I’ve got to get some real fighting men in the South of Asia. The only Asians who can fight are the Pakistanis. That’s why we need them in Alliance. We could never get along without the Gurkas [sic].” “But Foster”, Lippman contested, “the Gurkas are not Pakistanis, they’re Indians.” “Well”, responded Dulles, unperturbed by such details, “they may not be Pakistanis but the’re Moslems.” “No I am afraid they’re not Moslems either, they ’re Hindus”, Lippman stated. “No matter”, the Secretary of State retorted and proceeded to lecture Lippman for half an hour on the virtues of SEATO in stemming communism in Asia.’38

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III The US military aid to Pakistan bedevilled relations between India and the West on the one hand and India and Pakistan on the other. It marked a turning point in the relations of South Asian countries and the West. By its very nature and impact it transformed the balance of the power situation in the region. The aid and consequent alliance between USA and Pakistan changed the course of history of the region. South Asia was willy-nilly drawn into the Cold War and Kashmir, and, as will be seen in the course of our discussion, became a pawn in the game of international Cold War politics. India reacted strongly to the military aid. If Pakistan accepted American military aid, Nehru said, ‘she becomes progressively a war area and progressively her policies are controlled by others’. He also argued that the military alliances like the Baghdad Pact and the SEATO have completed ‘Western military intervention’ in South Asia. It must also be pointed out that just when Prime Ministers Mohammad Ali of Pakistan and Jawaharlal Nehru of India had concluded their talks on a positive, optimistic note (over resolving the Kashmir dispute) in July–August 1953, the New York Times of 12 November 1953 carried a story titled ‘Pakistan was willing to consider an exchange of air bases for military equipment’. It also referred to the Pakistan mission to the US department led by the Governor General of Pakistan, Ghulam Mohammad, Defence Secretary Iskander Mirza and Commanderin-Chief General Ayub Khan to seek military aid from USA. On 15 November 1953, Nehru warned that the US–Pakistan alliance would bring the Cold War to India’s ‘borders with far-reaching consequences in South Asia’.39 To the chief ministers of India, Nehru, in his fortnightly letter, explained the implications of arms aid to Pakistan. ‘This means loss of Pakistan’s freedom and their country becoming progressively a satellite of the United States. Second, the whole pattern in South Asia changes. . . .Behind Pakistan will stand a great and powerful country, the USA. In fact, the giving of military aid to Pakistan is an unfriendly act to India.’40 Nehru also wrote to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali of Bogra, on 9 December 1953, that whatever the motives behind the arms aid to Pakistan may be, ‘the mere fact that such large rearmament and military expansion takes place in Pakistan must necessarily have repercussions in India. The whole

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psychological atmosphere between the two countries will change for the worse and every question that is pending between us will be affected by it. We do not propose to enter into an armament race with Pakistan or any other country. Our ways of approach to international problems are different from those of the nations of Europe and America. But it is obvious that such expansion of war resources, with the help of the United States of America can obviously be looked upon as an unfriendly act in India and one that is fraught with danger.’41 He also pointed out ‘to interested parties’ that this would have an effect on the solution of bilateral issues. ‘The cruel logic of facts as they are developing’ would inevitably affect the Kashmir issue. The western powers had been talking of the ‘demilitarization’ of Kashmir. How could that take place, Nehru asked, when large-scale ‘militarisation’ was taking place. ‘It is in this context that we have to consider the issue of Kashmir.’42 Although President Eisenhower personally wrote to Nehru in an attempt to dispel Indian fears, and assured that the alliance was not directed against India nor would he allow US arms to be used against India in the event of war, yet the problem remained. In March and April 1956, at the meetings of the Baghdad Pact and SEATO powers, India was called upon to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Obviously, this was considered interference by India in bilateral relations between India and Pakistan and also in India’s internal affairs. India registered a strong protest.43 Nehru was not exaggerating when he said that Pakistan was sacrificing her freedom and becoming a dependent country. American aid was not merely a foreign policy exercise; it also involved in some measure compromising ‘territorial sovereignty’ of Pakistan, as Sultan Mohammad Khan, one time Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, reported about the Badaber–Peshawar air base being used by the USA. He wrote (1998) that when the final draft of the Treaty was ready in 1959, he felt that much was at stake in giving away the airport for the use of USA. He wrote: On the acquisition of Badaber by the USA for the establishment of a secret base for monitoring Soviet activities in the development of atomic weapon. . . .Given the total dependence of Pakistan on the USA, the conclusion of such an agreement was not a surprise. What was surprising was the extra-territorial right which Pakistan was conceding to the USA at Bedaber [sic]. Pakistan were totally excluded from the operations there, and could not enter the base without US approval. Since the agreement was

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still in the draft form, I took it to Mr. Manzoor Qadir [Foreign Minister] to find out if it could be revised for better terms for Pakistan. He was aware of the flaws but said . . .the President [Ayub Khan] had given approval to all the terms; there was no possibility of revising it, and I should get it finalised.44

Also, Khan wrote that in return for aid ‘the Americans expect recipients of their aid to express vociferous thanks and lend support to their policies in international foras, the Canadians to my knowledge never used the aid they gave for leverage in international diplomacy’. Most of the ‘aid’ which Pakistan received was ‘aid’ in the true sense of the term — it was free. In the case of India, as will be seen, none of the economic ‘aid’ was free but was in the form of a ‘loan’ with interest attached to it, as will be observed in the latter part of the chapter. Khan has described an interesting incident in his Memoirs and Reflections of a Pakistani Diplomat (1998). In Ottawa, where he was posted as High Commissioner of The Pakistan, he had to deal with negotiations for a nuclear power plant in Karachi. The Pakistan Foreign Office wanted it on the same terms on which India had acquired it from Canada. ‘The sticking point over inspection which applied lightly to India was more strictly applicable for Pakistan. The Canadians pointed out that India had paid for the nuclear power plant, whereas we wanted it under Canadian aid programme; if we wanted it on the same terms as India, we would have to pay for it. We could not have both — i.e. virtually a cost-free nuclear power plant as well as the terms which India had received.’45 India had always been blamed by the western powers for not having thanked them adequately. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan on many occasions accused Indians for their ‘ingratitude’ and warned the US that it should be ready for such an experience. Nehru had often felt acutely embarrassed at the US telling India that it received economic aid or food shipments from the US (of course they were all paid for) without batting an eyelid and yet was critical of the West. It is necessary to have a close look at the US arms aid to Pakistan in order to understand its implications and consequences for India and the world. Pakistan had been seen by John Foster Dulles as a great military and moral bulwark against Soviet and Chinese communism. To this end, it had been brought into the SEATO — and further bilateral alliance with US. The operative consequence of the steps was a substantial flow of weapons

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to the Pakistan Army and Air Force. . . .That Pakistan can’t stand against the Red Army was the kind of fantasy to which only minds disciplined to avoid all practical thought could rise. The Pakistanis themselves were incapable of such an imaginative flight. . . .The anti-communism crusade in Washington thus became in Asia a potentially lethal source of tension between two neighbours. The Communist Powers were left quite outside.46

This is John Kenneth Galbraith commenting on Dulles’ military alliance with Pakistan. However, Pakistan’s main objective of entering into the arms alliance with the US was to strengthen itself vis-a-vis India, which was considered by Pakistan as enemy number one. Second, it was hoped that by arming itself adequately, it would be able to snatch Kashmir from India. Senator Daniel P. Moynihan, who was US ambassador to India for a term, wrote an introduction for Dennis Kux’s book (1992). He emphasised that the American perception of threat analysis in South Asia, at the height of the Cold War, meant ‘Fearsome hegemon’ India, and ‘the beleaguered friend of yore’, Pakistan. Quoting from ‘the draft document’ of the policy planners at the Pentagon, it was ‘routinely assumed’ and agreed that the ‘Indian hegemonic aspirations’ needed to be ‘suppressed’, hence Pakistan needed to be armed, India being ‘the worst enemy and neighbour’.47 The ‘Draft Document’ stated: ‘We should discourage Indian hegemonic aspirations over the state in the South Asia and on the Indian Ocean. With regard to Pakistan, a constructive US-Pakistani military relationship will be an important element in our strategy to promote stable security conditions in South Asia and Central Asia. We should therefore endeavour to rebuild our military relationship given acceptable resolution of our nuclear concerns.’48 These assumptions were at the root of the problem which was bound to destroy any chance of creative harmonious relations between the USA and India. During the last 50 years of India’s independence, the two nations’ story is that of ‘estranged democracies’, as Dennis Kux aptly titles his book (1992). Military aid to Pakistan commenced with the signing of an arms aid alliance with the US on 8 February 1954. As envisaged in 1954, this aid amounted to about $50 million, but Eisenhower and the US administration put another $105.9 million for commodity assistance ($75.6million), technical assistance ($5.3 million) and defence support ($25 million). In the next financial year, the US committed to equip four army infantry and one and a half armoured divisions and

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modern aircraft for six air force squadrons. Also, it agreed to supply 12 vessels for the navy, the estimated cost of the programme being $171 million.49 Within the next three years, i.e., by 1957–58, $400 million aid was being given annually to Pakistan. These military aid items were specifically meant for anti-communist orientation but the US officials were also clear, Dennis Kux informs, that Pakistan remained at heart worried ‘about the threat from India rather than of any menace from the communists’. In February 1955, Pakistan was asked to join the SEATO. President Ayub Khan argued how the ‘SEATO would help Pakistan’, to which Zafrullah Khan replied that ‘the country would be better off with the Americans if it joined SEATO’.50 Similarly, Pakistan also joined the Baghdad Pact in 1955 for which Harold Macmillan claimed credit. Britain created the pact ostensibly as a way to maintain air bases in Iraq, but the more important aim was to maintain ‘our influence and voice’ in the region, as Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, pointed out.51 As for joining the Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO), which was essentially a British-led military group with its headquarters in Egypt, Pakistan refused until the Kashmir dispute was settled.52 Liaquat Ali Khan in January 1951 was obviously sending messages to the great powers that for Pakistan Kashmir was the issue, and unless they supported Pakistan to acquire it, Pakistanis would remain lukewarm towards any alliance. The US government was unable to appreciate the anxiety of India. How can a mere $50 million aid to Pakistan upset India, they argued. India with 375 million people owned enormous resources, as against Pakistan’s 35 million people with scanty resources.53 But the military aid was only a beginning of what followed. It was authentically known that between 1954 and 1960, as much as a billion dollars worth of military equipment, aircraft etc. had been supplied to Pakistan. Between 1955 and 1965, $1.5 billion worth of tanks, planes and a submarine were delivered by the US.54 These were used during the Pakistan-initiated war of 1965 against India. And what is more, the western powers, including the US and Britain, became staunch supporters of Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. The military aid to Pakistan was multidimensional — it included supply of supersonic aircrafts, transport planes and all kinds of artifacts essential for air defence, as well as other military hardware. Equally important was the creation of infrastructural facilities so essential for the effective use of weapons. Pakistan also had agreed

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to maintain, train and equip 5.5 divisions of the army to fulfil any international obligation.55 Of course, they were paid for by the US throughout the decades of their existence. And what is more striking is that they never were sent overseas to Korea, Indo-China or Vietnam etc. on the plea that they were needed at home should a Kashmir war break out.56 During the financial year 1959–60, under the MAP (Military Assistance Program), an approval of $31.1 million was agreed to in addition to $27.3 million for the army’s ammunition storage. Another agreement was reached for the construction of barracks to accommodate 10,000 soldiers at the cost of $18.1 million. This was for the Jhelum 1st Corp Cantonment construction. In the five-year period, it was planned to build barracks for 25,000 troops. In addition to these, large amounts of training aids, modern electronic communications equipment, seven F86F, two T-33A aircrafts as attrition replacement, and tank transporters were approved. Also, a proposal for 72 M47 tanks for the financial year (FY) 1959, MAP valued at $4.3 million, was recommended for approval.57 These are mere instances of warlike materials cited for the year only to exemplify the massive flow of weapons and their accessories for the use of Pakistan for its socalled fight against communism. During the period of this study as well as much later Pakistan did not raise a finger against communist Russia or China. In fact, in 1971, under Henry Kissinger’s inspiration, China was turned into an ally of the USA and a fervent supporter of Pakistan against India. How did the diplomatic community, the ambassadors of the USA, Britain and France react to the arms aid to Pakistan? Escott Reid, Canadian High Commissioner in New Delhi, gives a fascinating account of their attitude towards the problem and says how each of them was deeply concerned when the ‘ill-advised’ question of military aid to Pakistan was being ‘resurrected’. It seems in the months of December 1952 and January 1953, a proposal to induce Pakistan to join the Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO) was mooted. Archibald Nye, former India Commander-in-Chief and the British High Commissioner (1947–52) in New Delhi opposed it and had it ‘killed’ in London.58 US ambassador Chester Bowles in New Delhi also strongly opposed military aid to Pakistan and deplored inclusion of the latter in any military pact. He argued, first and foremost, that India’s non-aligned policy was ‘not incompatible with US needs in Asia’. He also stressed the fact that the already existing tension between the

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two countries, Pakistan and India, would be further exacerbated. The US arms assistance would adversely affect the balance of the power situation in South Asia and worse, would antagonise Afghanistan, thus promoting its proximity to the USSR.59 When the military aid proposal got going in November–December 1953, Alexander Clutterbuck, British High Commissioner and the French ambassador, Stanislas Ostrorog had likewise told their governments that they too thought the proposal ‘unwise’.60 Both the US ambassador in New Delhi and the British High Commissioner ‘put in strongest terms to their governments, the “deplorable” effect this would have on Indo-Pakistan relations’. The UK mission to New Delhi ‘was particularly concerned that this announcement [of military aid to Pakistan] should not be made while India and Pakistan were discussing the appointment of a plebiscite administrator for Kashmir the following April’.61 Reid also told Ottawa: ‘There is now some hope of a settlement of the Kashmir problem but this hope would, I am afraid, vanish if the United States persisted in the proposed policy.’ Reid did not succeed in convincing either Lester Pearson or St Laurent in Canada. His views were not in consonant with conventional wisdom, which was to oppose Nehru’s India for his ‘neutralist influence’.62 Robert Turnbull, the New York Times correspondent in India, sent from Karachi his despatches on 8 and 9 December 1953; these were widely read and argued. Nehru also went through them and commented to Reid that the US policy towards India was made ‘clear’ by them. Reid believed that they ‘had made clear the views of Nixon and those in the US administration who agreed with him’. Turnbull argued that the US ‘was pitched against India’, which considered Nehru as a ‘major rival for influence in South Asia’. According to this view, Nehru wanted ‘Indian dominance in Asia, the Near East and Africa’. The basic reason of Nehru’s opposition to US military aid to Pakistan was that ‘a strong Pakistan with all that implies in the Muslim world, would threaten the dominance of India in Asia, the Near East and Africa’. Second, Nehru’s neutralist influence would receive a setback if Pakistan, an Asian power openly opposed to communism, were to gain a position of greater prominence.63 Thus, the decision of military aid by the USA to Pakistan was helpful in the ultimate analysis to the dominance of the USA in Asia and the Near East instead of India. ‘India was a country often opposed to the United States in vital international dealings’ and would ‘remain merely the

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strongest individual power in an Asia-Arab-Africa bloc’, but may not be able to dominate them, they argued. Whatever may have been the US motivations, deep as they were considering their perceptions of the international conflict vis-a-vis the USSR, the fact remained that the implications of US military aid and alliances in the South Asian region were of far-reaching significance for both Pakistan and India. India had to run literally from pillar to post seeking arms to balance against Pakistan’s military might and to meet its aggressive postures which came along with military power backed by a superpower like the USA. Second, India felt mortified that the US had singled out India in some sort of a hostile combination favouring Pakistan. As for Pakistan, its territorial sovereignty was bound to be compromised, as had been in the use of the Bedaber air base near Peshawar in NWFP. Second, William Barnds stated that ‘the alliance involved the United States in the internal politics of Pakistan in several distinct but related fields. Military aid strengthened the hands of the officers vis-a-vis civilian politicians. American prestige was thus committed not just to Pakistan but primarily to a particular group, which reduced contacts with other groups.’64 In other words, the army became a prominent component of Pakistan politics. Military dictatorships followed, with the blessings and tacit support of the US. Another outcome of far-reaching significance for Pakistan was, as rightly observed by Barnds: ‘The US aid also strengthened the position of West Pakistan relative to that of East Pakistan, for most of the officers, Corps and the civil servants were from the west where the disputes with India were also centred.’ Finally, ‘by stressing military rather than economic assistance, the US program influenced the government’s priorities on defence and development. . . .By committing themselves in this way, they [the policy makers] did not realise that they were limiting their options in the subcontinent in the years to come.’65 Prime Minister Nehru also raised the question of arms aid with Prime Minister Mohammad Ali of Pakistan. ‘. . .that military aid to Pakistan has been considered by almost every country in Europe and Asia as a vital development in the world situation. This is not so much because of Pakistan or India, because a great power, namely the USA, is spreading out in Asia. This has very far-reaching consequences and we are compelled, therefore, to think of the new situation that has arisen. The situation is a direct conflict with what

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we have been striving for in Asia and in the larger context of the world.’66 He continued: ‘Because of this vital change there has been strong reaction to it all over India which may well be considered unanimous.’ After strong reaction from Nehru was received, President Eisenhower wrote to Nehru, giving ‘a guarantee that the military aid is not in any way directed against India’. Eisenhower declared: ‘I am confirming publicly that if our aid to any country including Pakistan, is misused and directed against another country in aggression, I will undertake independently, in accordance with constitutional authority, appropriate action, both within and without the United Nations to thwart such aggression.’ Also, he assured Nehru: ‘If your government should conclude that circumstances require military aid of a type contemplated by our military security legislation, please be assured that your request would receive my most sympathetic consideration.’67 He regretted ‘such a widespread and unfounded’ criticism of the aid.68 Nehru appreciated Eisenhower’s assurance given with transparent sincerity and replied: ‘I am convinced that he [President] bears no ill-will to India; he wishes well of India and that he would not take any step to injure India.’ But, as Nehru argued, it was not ‘a question of motives, but rather of certain results which inevitably follow certain action, and it has seemed to us in regard to this matter of military aid to Pakistan, that the results are bound to be unfortunate’.69 Nehru also drew attention to various statements made by Pakistan authorities, last but not the least, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, who declared that ‘this military aid will help to solve the Kashmir problem’. In December 1956, Nehru paid a second official visit to the US. The Washington despatch to the UK Foreign Office shows how close their understanding on major issues were. ‘As a result of Nehru’s visit, Mr. Eisenhower cannot fail to have realised how basically anti-communist Mr. Nehru is and the Prime Minister now sees how fully Mr. Eisenhower understands that a ‘neutralist’ India was not ipso-facto unfriendly to the West. Each found that one’s over-riding preoccupation is to build the peace. . ., their purposes are identical and their methods compatible.’70 In December 1959, Eisenhower paid a return visit to India. ‘His India visit made a deep impression on him. He said afterward that it was one of the most memorable experiences of his life. . . .By this

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time John Foster Dulles had gone, and the diplomacy of brinkmanship and massive retaliation and hostility towards “neutralism” that were associated with him had begun to give way to more flexible policies and attitudes.’71 First, the discussion between the two leaders veered round to India–Pakistan relations. The memorandum of the conversation recorded was as follows: ‘The outstanding one is that Nehru is anxious for either a joint declaration or separate simultaneous statements, by India and Pakistan, to the effect that all questions, forever, between them will be settled by peaceful negotiations, i.e. without resort to force or to war. The President asked whether this should apply to all questions in the future, after existing issues are settled. Nehru said it should apply to all questions including those now existing. If this were done — Nehru indicated without being precise about it — that he would then be less opposed to our modernising the Pakistan army.’ Nehru added that he would talk to his people ‘on the modernisation’ and he expected ‘they would simply not take note of it or make an issue of it’.72 The deep sincerity and vision with which Eisenhower addressed himself to the cause of peace, despite military alliances, earned Nehru’s respect. Also, there was a sustained effort on the part of the US administration to ‘appreciate’ Nehru’s vision of everlasting peace and the ways to achieve it. In his letter, Eisenhower referred to Nehru’s talks with Paul Hoffman, who was ‘profoundly impressed by your dedication to cause of just and lasting peace’. Hoffman was a former Head of Economic Cooperation Administration who had been assigned the task of discussing problems of disarmament and peace with Nehru in November 1958. Eisenhower also paid tribute to Nehru: ‘You are universally recognised as one of the most powerful influences for peace and conciliation in the world. I believe that because you are a world leader for peace in your own individual capacity as well as a representative of the largest of the neutral nations, your influence is particularly valuable in stemming the global drift towards cynicism, mutual suspicion, materialistic opportunism and finally disaster.’73 By the end of 1958, more and more awareness in the State Department dawned that it was in their interest to support India in building its economic strength which would eventually lead to internal political health. Ambassador Elsworth Bunker received one such letter from the Director of South Asian Affairs in Washington. It said:

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‘I am of course gratified, as you say, Washington has somehow come to believe that as a matter of cold fact it is not in the United States’ interest to see India’s economic collapse notwithstanding divergences in foreign policy and other irritants. . . .This seems to me to be a mature judgement befitting a country of the power and influence of the United States and based fundamentally on our own self-interest. More and more I am coming to feel — and I hope that I am being objective about this — that India is the key to the direction things will take in this part of the world.’ Also, they recognised that it was ‘the only large country in Asia being governed by democratic principles’. Besides, they noted, Nehru had been taking an increasing harder line toward communism, both domestic and international. This did not mean, they argued, that Nehru was changing ‘his views about the fundamental historic and traditional basis of Indian foreign policy’, yet there had been ‘a proper balancing between East and West’.74 Even the much maligned John Foster Dulles recognised that ‘India a nation of nearly 400 million people is of major political and psychological importance in Asia’, and her economic wellbeing was of concern to the US. In his telegram to the US embassy in the UK, he stated: ‘In spite of many differences between US and Indian foreign policies it is obviously in interest of free world that India remain independent and free of communism, which would flourish if economic situation deteriorates. This possibility can be lessened if India enabled make economic progress [sic] toward satisfying elemental needs of its people.’75 Dulles also stressed that India was ‘receiving only economic aid while our allies are receiving assistance in proportionally larger quantities’. Hence, ‘assistance in the form of loans. . .payable in dollars’ is being given without context of carefully formulated development program and relatively stable economic financial situation’. [sic]. He stated that to the extent ‘India remained stable and independent, security and well being of South Asia and of Baghdad Pact and SEATO will be strengthened.’76 At the end of the decade-long tortuous and fierce debate about Indo-US relations, it was recognised that much of the criticism made by India in the 1950s and 1960s of the arms aid given to Pakistan was justified. Escott Reid believed that the US policy towards India was ‘greatly influenced by wholly understandable but nevertheless irrational factors — in particular a resentment against Nehru for

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his moral lectures to mankind, his general attitude of moral superiority, his criticism of United States policy, his organisation of an opposition to the United States in the United Nations and his failure to show gratitude to the United States for the economic aid it had given India’.77 He also believed that the policy was ‘not based on a cool calculation of a long-run national interest of the United States, on a careful weighing of military, political, economic and “moral” considerations’.78 The policy makers in the US State Department also acknowledged in the 1970s that Nehru was not entirely wrong in his views. One source said: In our preoccupation with the outside threats to the area, we were, no doubt, not sufficiently conscious of the conflicting motives of the nations of the area in joining with us [in defence arrangements]. They had their local objectives, their local rivalries, which often transcended their concern over external forces. . . .The one-dimensional strategic view of the 1950s and early 1960s has been replaced by a more diverse, and more complex outlook. . . .We no longer look at the region exclusively through the prism of East-West rivalry. . . .We have no desire to return to the rhetoric and political environment of the fifties and sixties.79

Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

Macmillan (1969: xv). Ibid.: xix. Ibid.: xix. Galbraith (1994: 126). Ibid.: 159–60. Ibid.: 160. Ibid.: 161–62. Doc. 152 CAB 129/37/1 CP(49), 18 October 1949, BDEEP, The Labour Government and the Empire, pp. 340–48. Jenkins (2002: 810). Ibid. Jenkins (2002: 811). Hughes (1962: 71). Ibid.: 72. See ‘Diary of Truman’, 22 May 1945 in Ferrel (1980: 35). Ferrel (1980: 77). Ibid.: 132n2. Ibid.: 132. Doc. 150, CAB 129/32/2 CB (49) 67; BDEEP, The Labour Government and the End of the Empire, op. cit., p. 338.

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19. Barnds (1972: 84–85). See Kennan (1947: 566–82). The quotes are on pp. 375 and 382. Interestingly, George Kennan wrote this article as ‘X’. 20. PREM 8/1565, PRO, London. 21. India signed a separate treaty with Japan on 9 June 1954. 22. Conversations with Norman Cousins, first published in The Saturday Review of Literature, New York, 12 December 1953; SWJN, second series, vol. 23, p. 16. 23. Ibid. 24. Minutes of talks with John Foster Dulles, SWJN, second series, vol. 22, pp. 506–13. 25. Ibid.; the quote is on p. 506, paragraph 1. The minute consists of 25 paragraphs. 26. Ibid.: 507, paragraph 4. 27. Ibid.: 510, paragraphs 12 and 13. 28. Ibid.: 510, 512–13, paragraphs 13 and 22. 29. Ibid.: 513, paragraph 25. 30. Ibid.: 508–509, paragraphs 7 and 10. 31. Ibid.: 508–509, paragraph 7. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 34. Kux (2001: 56). 35. Barnds 1972, op. cit., p. 121. 36. Kux 2001, op. cit., pp. 55–56. 37. Ibid.: 68–69, 72. 38. Quoted in Kux (2001: 72). Story from Steel (1981: 503–504). 39. Barnds (1972: 95–97). 40. Jawaharlal Nehru to Chief Ministers, 31 December 1953, SWJN, second series, vol. 24, pp. 689–74; the quote is on p. 690. 41. Jawaharlal Nehru to Mohammad Ali, 9 December 1953, SWJN, second series, vol. 24, pp. 434–38; the quote is on p. 436, paragraph 9. 42. Ibid.: 437, paragraph 11. 43. Barnds 1972, op. cit., p. 121. 44. Khan (1998: 127). 45. Ibid.: 142. 46. Galbraith (1981: 414–15). 47. Kux (1993: Introduction, p. xvii by Daniel Moynihan). 48. Ibid. 49. Kux (2001: 68–69). 50. Ibid.: 72. 51. Ibid.: 73. 52. Reid (1981: 108). 53. FRUS, 1958–60, vol. XV, pp. 688–91. Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Rountree) to the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs (Dillon). 54. Reid 1981: 101 55. FRUS, 1958–68, vol. XV, pp. 688–91.

140 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67.

68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79.

Jammu and Kashmir, the Cold War and the West Barnds (1972: 92). FRUS, 1958–68, vol. XV, pp. 688–91. Reid 1981, op. cit., p. 101. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.: 103. Ibid. Ibid. Barnds (1972: 103). Ibid. Jawaharlal Nehru to Mohammad Ali, 18 January 1954, SWJN, second series, vol. 24, p. 452, paragraph 7. Jawaharlal Nehru’s statement in the House of the People, 1 March 1954, SWJN, second series, vol. 25, pp. 336–37. Dwight D. Eisenhower’s letter was delivered to Nehru on 24 February 1954. Ibid. Jawaharlal Nehru to Dwight D. Eisenhower; see ibid.: 339. 22 December 1956, PREM 11/1877, PRO, London. Palmer (1984: 26). Memorandum of conversation between the President and Prime Minister, New Delhi, 13 December 1959, 8:30 a.m., FRUS 1958–60, vol. XV, pp. 524–26. Dwight D. Eisenhower to Jawaharlal Nehru, 27 November 1958, FRUS 1958–60, vol. XV, p. 472. Bartlett to Bunker, 9 December 1958. FRUS, 1958–60, vol. XV, p. 473. John Foster Dulles’ telegram, 11 January 1958, FRUS, 1958–60, vol. XV, p. 200. FRUS, 1958–60, vol. XV, p. 419. Reid (1981: 113). Ibid. Reid (1981: 116).

6 Britain and India: Post-colonial Relations I Harold Macmillan, in his autobiography Winds of Change (1966), noted that the imagination of the average Briton was ‘stirred by the vision and glory of the zenith of imperial fabric. . .the hymn of ever-widening empire on whose bounds the sun never set’.1 But the winds of change were blowing across the whole world, including Britain itself. No longer did British children remember the song ‘the rich man in his castle, the poor man at his gate’, and the archbishop was inclined to observe that communism was, after all, ‘a Christian heresy’.2 Even the Conservatives realised that ‘the wind of nationalism and freedom was blowing’ as strongly in Asia as anywhere else in the world’.3 Nowhere else was it more powerful than in India, as a consequence of which the Labour government, which swept the polls in Britain after the world war, overthrowing the government of Winston Churchill despite his great contribution in winning the war, decided to transfer power to Indians in 1947. Two nation-states emerged as a result — India and Pakistan. It was a defining moment not only for these sovereign independent states but also for the history of South Asia and the world. Of course, the British defined themselves in terms of their Indian empire long after Indian independence. But the use of the vocabulary ‘imperialism’ was abhorred by them. It was a different matter, though as late as 1930s, that many pro-consuls like Governor Malcolm Hailey felt a sense of pride being ‘in the service of Imperialism’, without in the least impairing loyalty to the King/Emperor. But in the colonial–nationalist discourse, ‘imperialism’ served as a metaphor for political and cultural domination over the subject peoples by the ruling classes and nations, and economic exploitation of the colonised territory. On the eve of independence, Clement Attlee as Prime Minister of Britain asked his countrymen to ‘set aside sentimental imperialism

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and take a realistic view of policies’. He also took note of ‘the growth of colonial nationalism’ more seriously than the Conservatives. After the Second World War, he said that the days of ‘thinking in Edwardian terms of the use of military and economic power we no longer possess, were over’.4 Even before independence, especially during the difficult days of the war, he was opposed to displaying arrogance of ‘military and economic power’ as was being exhibited by Viceroy Lord Linlithgow, supported by Prime Minister Winston Churchill. In the House of Commons, while dealing with the issues of ‘war aims’ and ‘peace aims’ on 28 November 1939, Attlee observed that the war was being fought for ‘freedom and democracy’ and the peace aims must consist of ‘not the least important — the abandonment of imperialism, the extension of freedom all over the world and equal access to all nations and all peoples of the good things of the world. We believe that these things are vital to the establishment of a new world order.’5 It was in this context that Attlee joined issue with Linlithgow later in 1942 when he was Deputy Prime Minister of the War Cabinet of Britain. Attlee took exception to Linlithgow’s ‘philosophy’ of action as propounded by him in his comprehensive telegram of 21 January 19426 against the Indian National Congress which had resigned from the provincial governments, which it headed, on the issue of declaration of war aims. The Congress had referred to British war aims as the preservation of ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ as discussed in the House of Commons. The Congress felt these very ideals were being denied to them. Attlee had argued with the Conservatives both inside and outside the British Parliament in favour of the Congress demand. In 1942, Attlee joined the War Cabinet led by Churchill as the Deputy Prime Minister. In one of his dispatches, Linlithgow argued against sharing of power with Indians. He declared: ‘. . .Whatever the feeling in India, we intend to stay in this country for our own reasons. . .that we must hold on and must not relinquish power beyond a certain point.’ Linlithgow went on to say: But Cabinet will I think agree with me that India and Burma have no natural association with the Empire from which they are alien by race, history and religion, and for which as such neither of them have any natural affection and both are in the Empire, because they are conquered countries which have been brought there by force, kept there by our controls and which hitherto it suited to remain under protection. I suspect that the moment they think that we may lose the war or take a bad knock, their

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leaders will be much more concerned to make terms with the victor at our expense than to fight for the ideals to which so much lip-service is given.7

Linlithgow’s statement displayed arrogance of power associated with the imperial rule; second, there was total distrust of the ruled by the ruling race. The main theme of the Oriental–nationalist–colonial discourse, it has been argued, was that imperialism essentially was based on ‘the politics of difference.’ A certain conceptualisation of post-colonial and colonial India was perceptible when Prime Minister Winston Churchill insisted that India would relapse into ‘barbarism’ soon after the departure of the British. ‘Barbarism’, Nicholas Dirks has observed, ‘was a sign of colonial difference producing an ever-widening chasm between the subject and objects of colonial knowledge. That had been the justification of the presence of the “enlightened British Government”.’8 Indians were regarded as ‘untrustworthy’, ‘deceitful’, ‘double-faced’, ‘ungrateful’ and its leaders were considered, for instance, by Linlithgow, as ‘entirely ruthless politicians’ and by Churchill as those ‘voluble and disloyal politicians who have constituted the so-called Indian National Congress’,9 and who held now [i.e., after independence] positions of power and influence as (India’s) rulers of a sovereign democratic republic. According to Dirks, this constituted ‘the language of the historical representation of the colonised people’.10 Clement Attlee, in his ‘Memorandum on the Indian Political Situation of 2 February 1942’11 called upon the War Cabinet to consider ‘this astonishing statement’ made by the Viceroy. ‘If it were true it would form the greatest possible condemnation of our rule in India and would amply justify the action of every extremist in India.’ Attlee observed, more in sorrow than anger: I find it quite impossible to accept and act on the crude imperialism of the Viceroy, not only because I think it is wrong, but because I think it is fatally short-sighted and suicidal. I should certainly not be prepared to cover up the ugliness with the cloak of pious sentiment about liberty and democracy.12

He went on to suggest that ‘a renewed effort must be made to get the leaders of the Indian political parties to unite. It is quite obvious. . .that this Viceroy is not a man to do this. Indeed his telegram goes far to explain his past failures. His mental attitude is expressed in paragraph 8 when he talks of regaining lost ground after the war.’

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Attlee said: ‘Some person of high standing’ should be sent to India ‘with wide powers to negotiate a settlement in India’. He even asked for ‘a replacement of the present Viceroy’. Supporting the peaceful, non-violent as well as constitutional movement even as it developed into epic proportions under the leadership of Indian leaders, Attlee observed: ‘It is one of the greatest achievements of our rule in India that even if they do not entirely carry them out, educated Indians do accept British principles of justice and liberty. We are condemned by Indians not by the means of Indian ethical conceptions but by our own which we have taught them to accept.’13 He concluded: ‘Lord Durham saved Canada to the British Empire. We need a man to do in India what Durham did in Canada.’14 Not since the impeachment of Warren Hastings had such a denunciation of the Crown representative been made by any Briton. Sir Stafford Cripps was sent to India to negotiate with Indians thereafter. The fact of the matter was that colonial models of domination was a live issue and so was ‘imperialism’, which was not merely a nonexistent idea but seemed a ‘reality’ in Indian situations. Attlee, in his memorandum, attacked Linlithgow’s philosophy of action and empire as ‘crude imperialism’. Years after, Harold Macmillan, in his Tides of Fortune (1969), did not fail to remind those critics who referred to ‘empire’ as an epitome of ‘imperialism’. Empire to him was ‘service’, as he called it, following the vocabulary of the mid-nineteenth century Victorians, and not ‘exploitation’. He found: this edifice [of empire] as a world-wide commercial and industrial influence. .,. At the same time a strong instrument was forged for the preservation of peace and the spread of civilisation throughout the greater part of the globe. This imperial system which reached its apogee at the end of the nineteenth century, was threatened but not overthrown by the shock of the Boer war, which threw a livid light on the inefficiency and weakness of Britain as a military power.15

To most Conservatives like Churchill, Macmillan and host of others, the ‘empire’ was reminiscent of a heroic age. But the demand for selfgovernment and full authority and prestige to nationhood somewhat blurred the heroic elements of imperial power especially in India, where the Indian National Congress led by a formidable group of nationalists under the guidance of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and others launched a massive non-cooperation and

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civil-disobedience movements which shook the very foundations of British power. Macmillan recalls: These pressures were fortified by the somewhat naive attitude to ‘imperialism’ and ‘colonialism’ of our American allies and above all the policies of President Roosevelt himself. There was hardly a moment in the war, however grave, at which the President did not find an opportunity to drag his anti-colonial bias based on very little knowledge but much vague prejudice. . . .He like Woodrow Wilson under-estimated the age-long national problem of Europe. He altogetherly ignored the religious, racial, tribal and national tensions and complexities of Asia and Africa.16

Harold Wilson wrote: ‘He was a Diseralian, perhaps, the last Diseralian Prime Minister, Britain will see.’17 Most British academic studies on the history of India and the Indo-British connection tended to avoid categories and terms like ‘colonialism’ and ‘imperialism’ during the last several decades. However, more recently, thoughtprovoking scholars with a depth of erudition and recognised competence, like Peter Robb, for instance, stated: ‘There are many superficialities and inadequacies in colonial rule, but it had a profound influence, and that it was liberal imperialism.’ Peter Robb observes: ‘I suggest it was largely because the British tried to interpret and to improve India. By consensus, even if only in name, this was a liberal imperialism. Its hallmark, I argue, was growing intervention through description and measurement, through law — despite lasseiz faire — through commercialization and commodification. This was not a purely colonial process. It represented the modernization of states and societies. But it took particular forms and had particular consequence in India.’18

The argument, very cogent and acceptable, delineates the virtues of ‘liberalism’ rather than ‘imperialism’, although ‘imperialism’ could be a modernising process as well. It is not, however, clear whether Robb agrees with its meanings and purposes which societies in India have had to experience. Besides, the leaders and followers, both in India and Britain, whether as practitioners or opponents of ‘imperialism’, talked about it and were keen observers of its effects and consequences. This fundamental (and legitimate) question has been raised by most historians of colonised territories. Does ‘imperialism’ impinge on the economy, politics and culture of the colonised and to what extent does it damage the very roots from where these elements spring?

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The problematic of ‘imperialism’ therefore remained, however vague, biased or prejudiced its connotations might have been. Its meanings varied in terms of situational intensity and points of reference. The Labour government devoted a good part of their discussions on the shaping of policies towards colonies based on the overall concerns of the subject peoples, both political and economic, measuring them through the prism of both liberalism and imperialism and their manifold implications. Colonial models of power and dominance, it was argued by Attlee, must end. The Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, influenced as he was by western liberalism, the philosophy of democratic politics and the concepts of social and economic justice, opposed the ways of colonialism and imperialism both before and after independence, seeking to remodel post-colonial relations as conceived by the new world order. It has been argued in some quarters, however, that the colonial models of dominance did not end with the British Raj. Harold Wilson’s assessment of Clement Attlee’s contribution to the reshaping of imperial policies at the end of the Second World War and thereafter was apt. Attlee played a dominant role in founding the modern Commonwealth; in granting independence to South Asian countries; and in laying the foundation of post-war colonial relations between Britain, India and Pakistan. Wilson payed a most legitimate tribute to Attlee: In a world setting, his achievement was historic; it was he who initiated peaceful transition from Empire to Commonwealth, taking personal charge of the entire operation. Most difficult of all was the achievement of independence and self-government for India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma. This was not an inheritance from the war-time coalition; Churchill had agreed to no such proposals, and his Secretary of state for India [Leopold Amery] was totally opposed to them.19

With the end of the British Raj in the South Asian countries, the Labour government devoted itself to building an area of peace and to extend the frontiers of peace to its other colonies as well. According to the Statement of Policy regarding the colonies, it was stated in May 1950 that the central purpose of the colonial policy was ‘to guide the colonial territories to responsible self-government within the Commonwealth in conditions that ensure to them both a fair standard of living and freedom from oppression from any quarter. . .’ The second main objective was: ‘We are engaged on a world-wide experiment in

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nation building. Our aim is to create independence — independence within the Commonwealth — not to suppress it.’20 This, in fact, was an extension of the policies, with modifications, as had been adopted in South Asia. Around this period, there were 35 separate administrative units for which the Secretary of State for Colonies was answerable. These were scattered in the West Indies, West Africa, East and Central Africa, Southeast Asia, South West Pacific and the Mediterranean.21 Africa was regarded after 1945 as ‘the core of our colonial position, the only continental space for which we can still hope to draw resources for economic and military strength’. The government noted that the policy was ‘built on a most valuable goodwill between ourselves and the mass of primitive Africans. . . .Happily, for about forty years we have avoided fighting Africans.’22 In the Middle East too, it was agreed that ‘the management of nationalism in the Middle East’ should be ‘through a partnership with Arabs’, working through ‘peoples not parties’. Besides, Attlee wanted that the defence of the Suez Canal must be based on Anglo-Egyptian cooperation and ‘away from the idea of British occupation’. He proposed renegotiation with the Egyptians, ‘tempting them into some sort of equal partnership’.23 In regard to the Persian oil crisis of 1951, Attlee’s consistent policy was to deal with the nationalist challenges. He opposed Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison’s gunboat diplomacy’ and succeeded in obtaining a Cabinet decision not to use force. The Labour government’s aims were to avoid coercive methods since they were almost always ‘counter-productive’ and recognised the ‘impossibility of holding on to territories and facilities without popular goodwill and local collaboration’. Finally, it was decided to be prepared to go faster than slower, ‘avoiding giving too little, too late’, and making ‘graceful concessions for a position of control’ always ready to ‘modify ideal time-tables in response to circumstances’. It recognised the maxim that ‘military and political props could not be enduring’.24 All these were sensible ideas in dealing with African nationalism and Middle Eastern politics which India could often agree with. Creech Jones, Secretary of State for Colonies, observed that the policy was not based on ‘scuttle or squandering the empire’ but was ‘full of possibilities’ which provided an ‘excellent opportunity not only of keeping Ceylon within the British Commonwealth but of securing our vital defence interests’. It also demonstrated that ‘Commonwealth

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is not, in practice, reserved for people of European descent. . .’ only.25 It was pointed out that transfer of power was ‘not a sign of weakness or of liquidation of the Empire, but is in fact a sign and source of strength’.26 In one of the powerful statements of policy as devised in ‘Projection of Britain Overseas’, it was proclaimed: ‘Britain is free. . . .We wish to see the concept of liberty adopted throughout the world.’ Another principle highlighted was in relation to trade: ‘We are the best customer. Our exports are equal to any in quality, workmanship and design and we are even a pioneer in the development of new scientific methods and production techniques.’ And finally, ‘Britain is the centre of a world-wide community of peoples associated for mutual benefit, and not for the exploitation of one by another.’ In this connection, it was hoped that people would join the Commonwealth of nations. With the intention of impressing one and all, it was declared in the same breath: ‘Imperialism is dead in so far as it ever existed, except as a slogan used by our critics.’27 Full of idealism and faith in the new dispensation called the ‘new world order’, Attlee addressed the joint session of the American Congress on 13 November 1945. The New York Times called his speech ‘a momentous speech’. Attlee said that ‘we can’t make a heaven in our own country and leave a hell outside’. Also setting at rest the American fears that Britain was ‘going red’, he assured them: ‘I think that some people here imagine that the socialists are out to destroy freedom, freedom of the individual, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and freedom of the press. They are wrong. . . .We in the Labour Party declare that we are in line with those who fought for Magna Carta and habeas corpus, with the Pilgrim fathers, and with the signatories of the Declaration of Independence.’28

II Harold Macmillan’s first impression of ‘this remarkable man’, Jawaharlal Nehru, when he met him on 3 February 1947 during his visit to India was quite favourable. He described Nehru thus — ‘high class Brahmin of Kashmir; intellectualist philosopher, writer, nationalist socialist revolutionary; exquisite, even flowery in taste, is an admirable and charming host. Many years of prison life — or rather preventive detention — have left a mark upon him. He is, I should judge, torn between bitter hatred of the British and a desire to be fair and objective. He struck me as very nervous, jumpy and strained.

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For some months now he had some experience of power [as head of the Interim Government before Transfer of Power]. . . .I felt, however, he is not a man of storms; only a stormy petrel!’ But later, Macmillan modified his views: ‘I was wrong. For Nehru’s courage and perseverance proved to be no less than his ability.’29 Nehru was the builder of modern India. His idea of India was that of a unified, strong, self-reliant, democratic, secular country for which he created infrastructural facilities for ‘growth with equity’ on the one hand and sought to set up scientific technological institutions all over India for growth on the other, and sought to bring about integration of the entire territory of the new nation-state. Although he was impressed with the Soviet experiments in planning, he preferred the British model of mixed economy. Again, in actual practice, the British system of parliamentary representative democracy; supremacy of law and independence of judiciary; social justice; equality of opportunity to all irrespective of differences of caste, creed, sex or religion; and freedom of speech, expression, of religion and the press became the bedrock of India’s political, economic and social transformation. In the domain of scientific research, technology and medicine, most manpower assistance came from Britain in the first decades of independence. That is why Nehru was sometimes branded as ‘the last Englishman to have ruled India’. Yet, Nehru was also the product of the Indian nationalist movement. After completing his education at Harrow and Cambridge from where he earned Tripos in Science, and after being called to the Bar by the Inns of Court, he returned to India. He did not feel much enamoured by the profession of law and plunged into the political movement led by M. K. Gandhi. ‘He was like a powerful current of fresh air’, he said, ‘. . .like a beam of light that pierced the darkness, . . . like a whirlwind that upset many things. . . .He did not descend from the top; he seemed to emerge from the millions of India, speaking their language and incessantly drawing attention to them and their appalling condition. . .[of] poverty and misery.’30 Nehru wrote how millions of people in India, intellectuals and the educated middle classes included, were influenced by Gandhi in varying degrees and became part of the massive, non-violent civil disobedience movements launched against the alien rule, demanding self-government and full freedom enjoyed by the rulers themselves in their own homeland. Nehru was ‘obsessed’ with India as he recollects in his The Discovery of India (1946), which he wrote while serving imprisonment for political

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activity in the Ahmednagar Fort prison between 9 August 1942 and 28 March 1945. Many people regard the book as ‘the vision document of Nehru’. Nehru was influenced by a variety of ‘-isms’ but it was the moving experience which he had gathered by travelling in the midst of the teeming millions of poverty-stricken villages of India that made him join and lead the movement against British rule. He says often in almost all his works which he wrote during several spells of imprisonment he served in the British government’s prisons in India. In all, he spent nearly 10 years of his life in the jail; which were not by any standard mere ‘detention camps’, as Macmillan described them. They were full-blooded jails; only Gandhi was kept in Agha Khan Palace in house arrest between 1942–44. Of course, being high class political prisoners, they suffered less rigours, enjoying more freedom to mix with the inmates inside the jail and were permitted to read and write. But no newspapers or visitors were allowed, except near relatives at long intervals. The prisoners had no contact with the outside world. Just as Nehru came to discover India ‘via the West and looked at her as a friendly westerner might have done. I was eager and anxious to change her outlook and appearance and give her the garb of modernity. . .’31 but he asked at the same time: ‘Do I know India?’ And that took him across the dusty and distant corners of India on foot, on bullock carts, by motor cars, trains and planes during the next 45 years of his public life. And he had found his roots. The point is that his global worldview, his ‘internationalism’, was tempered by his Indian worldview and Indian ‘nationalism’, the pulse of which he felt and understood well. The policies he shaped for India’s progress had these elements deeply entrenched in them, as well as his foreign policy. Not many in the West appreciated Nehru’s viewpoints on Indian foreign policy, although it attracted, according to some authors, worldwide attention. For the first time, a large and democratic country was developing an independent foreign policy without supporting other democracies and the free world. In an address made at Columbia University during his visit to the US in 1949, he stated: India is a very old country with a great past. But it is a new country also with new urges and desires. . . .Inevitably, she has to consider her foreign policy in terms of enlightened self-interest, but at the same time, she brought to it a touch of her idealism. Thus she has tried to combine idealism with national interest. The main objectives of the policy are: the pursuit of

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peace, not through alignment with any major power or group of powers, but through an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue; the liberation of subject peoples; and maintenance of freedom both national and individual; the elimination of racial discrimination; and the elimination of want, disease and ignorance which affect the greater part of the world’s population.32

Also Nehru emphasised, ‘the principle of peaceful co-existence and cooperation’ through ‘the lesson of tolerance learnt through ages in India’. Peace was essential in the world; ‘without peace all our dreams [will be] vanished and reduced to ashes’, Nehru added.33 During the heyday of US arms aid to Pakistan, he used the imagery of the British conquest of India, which began imperceptibly and engulfed the entire country. The US arms aid also could eventually endanger the freedom of the people of Asia. He spoke also of the Indian Muslim League in the context of India’s fight for freedom against colonial domination and said that since the Muslim League never fought for freedom, it not very careful about it in Pakistan. As far as India was concerned, he reiterated that India would not ‘surrender or barter her freedom for any purpose or any compulsion whatsoever’. 34 Even as the Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO) was being mooted with Pakistan as a prospective member, the Subjects Committee of the All India National Congress called attention to the fact that ‘if such a thing happens the region of Cold War comes right upto our borders. . . .It affects us when something happens on our borders. . . .It is not the possibility of war between India and Pakistan but it is the possibility of the world war coming right upto our doors and it is a matter of concern to us. . . .I do not know why other people should imagine or should not like the idea of our being concerned with such a vital matter.’35 He was obviously referring to the London Times editorial of 15 January 1953, which had commented: ‘The government of India is rightly proud of its independence. It will not brook admonition — let alone pressure from any other countries on its management of its affairs. Yet it does not seem to recognise what the other countries feel and are entitled to feel the same.’36 The point of departure in his argument with others was a significant idea which he continued to reiterate but which was often lost on them. Addressing the Indian Parliament (House of the People) on 23 December 1953, he observed that he witnessed in the arms aid to Pakistan ‘a certain unfortunate reversal of the process of the

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withdrawal of colonialism. . . .it will be a matter of deep regret that attempts should be made to perpetuate or lengthen the days of colonial rule.’37 Not many in the world appreciated the point, but he felt it rather strongly. Again, while addressing the members of the Indian National Trade Union Congress on 31 December 1953, he observed: ‘The talks between Pakistan and America for military aid are contrary to the historical process for emancipation.’38 The Indian National Congress which met at Kalyani discussed the problem of the arms build-up in Pakistan as a result of the agreement between the US and Pakistan. The Kalyani Congress adopted the resolution on 24 January 1954 which was drafted by Jawaharlal Nehru on 20 January 1954. The resolution was a classic exposition of nationalist independence metaphor: In view of the history of Asia during the past few hundred years, military aid and intervention by foreign powers in Asian countries is a reversal of the process of liberation, which had led these countries after long struggle to large measure of freedom. The Congress earnestly trusts that the USA will not take any step which will lead to reverse the process of history in Asia and create doubt and apprehension in minds of Asian peoples who wish to pursue path of freedom and democracy in their own way. Because of these developments a grave situation has arisen which demands above all national solidarity.39

In the larger global context, Nehru observed: Great nations with vast power at their command are afraid of each other. We have seen the gradual withdrawal of the British power from Asia. There is still, however, colonial domination in Indo-China and Malaya. The British have sought to build up a new colonial empire in Africa. A new pattern is being set there, pattern of white dominions. We see the process in East Africa and Central Africa. There is no essential difference between the policy pursued in the Union of South Africa and the successive steps that have been taken in other parts of Africa. The language is somewhat different and more moderate. But the aim is almost identical, that is the establishment of some kind of Dominion Governments with permanent rule of a small white minority.40

It was a remarkable survey of the newly emerging colonial or post-colonial relationship over Asia and Africa. As for western Asia, Nehru said: ‘While the British colonial power is trying to consolidate itself in Africa, it has practically been driven out from Western Asia.

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This, of course, has been largely due to the growth of national movements there. But it is a worrying fact that USA are trying to take Britain’s place in that region. In spite of the grand alliance of the US, UK, France and other countries, there are many points of conflict between the parties and among them is this attempt of USA to push out and replace the UK in Western Asia. The USA are firmly established in Turkey. They are now advancing politically, financially and otherwise on other Islamic countries. They are entrenched in Saudi Arabia. So also in Tripoli, where they have large bases.’41 In the Middle East one of the great attractions, of course, is oil, and ‘it is the desire to control these oil fields that drives the American on and on’.42 Nehru questioned the theory of inevitability of the war between the two power blocs. As far as Pakistan was concerned he also believed that it had no fear of a Russian or a Chinese invasion. ‘A look at the map will convince anyone that it is almost physically impossible for such an invasion. . . .Obviously Pakistan thinks of utilising this aid against India.’43 Musing at length, Nehru informed the chief ministers that the US had been following the policy of containment of the communist world. ‘Practically all the policies of the US have been increasingly based on military consideration and the prospect of the third world war. . . .I believe, there are over 200 American military bases all over the world outside the United States. The result of this policy has led the United States to support reactionary as well as colonial regimes in various parts of the world. Some of the symbols of the “free world” for which America stands are Syngman Rhee, Chiang Kai-Shek and Bao Dai. It is not surprising that these symbolic figures do not bring visions of freedom in people’s minds.’44 Nehru’s advice to the western democracies was that they should ally themselves with the forces of nationalism in Asia and elsewhere, and that the best defence against communism was to raise living standards. He emphasised that nationalism was ‘a very great force to reckon with’, and communism came in conflict against nationalism just as imperialism before independence.45 There had been three competing ideas in the world — nationalism, imperialism and communism — but he believed that ultimately it would be nationalism that would prevail.

III Eleven years after his first visit of February 1947, Harold Macmillan visited India as Prime Minister of Britain and as a state guest in 1958.

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He recalled that had he ‘had a most moving and enthusiastic civic reception’ accorded to him at the Old Fort; ‘wonderfully illuminated’ and an audience of 12,000–15,000 awaiting his arrival, and many more jostling to get ‘squeezed into the space but were turned away’. He wrote in his diary, ‘I tore my prepared speech, and made an impromptu address which went well.’ He was so overwhelmed with the spectacle especially because ‘our welcome was not “inspired” like Khruschev’s’.46 He was also overwhelmed by Nehru’s courtesy and stayed at his house instead of the Presidential Palace, which was ‘a very unusual compliment’, drove along with him thrice, something which was equally ‘rare’ and pleasing, and was an excellent host. He found ‘the country much more sure of itself’, the government, judiciary, parliamentary democracy, the army with regimental traditions intact, as well as, so much as the ordinary way of living’. ‘The supremacy of Nehru’ was intact — ‘he is undoubtedly arrogant’ and ‘fixed in his views’. Nevertheless, Macmillan felt he was also ‘very able, full of charm, cultured and ruthless — all great qualities in a leader’.47 Another ‘feeling’ he cherished was that British businessman were ‘trusted’ and ‘liked’ and ‘socially they stood higher than under the old regime (i.e., during British rule), which was dominated by soldiers and civil servants’. In Pakistan, he met ‘the robust President of Pakistan’, Iskander Mirza and his wife — ‘charming hosts, not intellectual, good food and wine [unlike] Nehru’s food, which was uneatable. It was European but like a bad Boarding House.’ In Pakistan, the only ‘stable element’ was the army, everything else being ‘in a state of religious turmoil’, the mullahs having ‘a large uncertain power’; ‘corruption’ was practised ‘on a grand scale’. ‘The President told that Suharawardy scooped £ 4 million in his short premiership.’48 Thus, it would appear that the doors to army rule and religious fundamentalism were wide open in Pakistan. He appreciated India by and large; the country was brimming with friendliness for the British. Yet why were the Conservatives so opposed to India in practice? Was it Nehru’s policy of non-alignment that turned them off? Or had they never reconciled to India’s freedom and the way the Indian National Congress fought for it, making them virtually ‘Quit India’ and the empire they had built. Winston Churchill went on record, appreciating Nehru’s handling of the communal problem in India soon after the Partition holocaust and

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complimented him for his courage, determination and untiring effort at reconciliation. Later, he wrote in glowing terms about Nehru’s role and called him ‘the light of Asia’. Yet, he had reservations about Indian people’s culture and their contribution to make India a strong, secular and self-reliant country. India’s stand on the Suez crisis, the Hungarian revolution, Goan invasion and the tumultuous welcome accorded to Khruschev and Bulganin in 1955 might have had an adverse influence on the British and they remained somewhat antagonistic to India. The most important issue, of course, was Kashmir, which was ‘a running sore’ and they abhorred Indian ‘occupation’, as they called it. India was strongly criticised in the United Nations for its ‘intransigence’ and tremendous pressure was put on it to resolve the issue, which, according to the UN, should have been in favour of Pakistan. Only the Labour Party and its followers and the people in general were enthusiastic about independence being granted to India. Clement Attlee decided, as Prime Minister, to bring an end to British empire in India. When Attlee was asked ‘what he thought he himself would be remembered for’, he answered, ‘Don’t know. If anything India, possibly.’49 James Griffiths commended ‘Attlee’s handling of India as a great triumph’. Attlee was also the founding father of the Commonwealth as it developed into a multi-racial, multinational consultative body after 1947. In the Commonwealth, declared Britain, ‘Griffiths, carried through a transformation unprecedented in the history of civilisation’. He asserted further: ‘I think future generations may well consider our government’s handling of the Indian problem as the greatest of all its many contributions to world progress. Not least of the credit goes to our Prime Minister, Clement Attlee.’50 India joined the Commonwealth in 1949, thanks to the statesmanship of Attlee and Nehru. The Conservatives were led by Winston Churchill, who was in favour of the continuation of the British empire. In this imperial mission he was ably supported by the Conservative Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow (1936–43), and Lord Wavell (1943–47). Both favoured the Muslim League and detested the Indian National Congress. The antipathy of the Conservatives to the Indian National Congress was truly astonishing. Churchill branded Gandhi and Nehru as the ‘bitterest enemies’ of British rule. Linlithgow identified the Indian National Congress as ‘Enemy No. I’ and mobilised the entire government

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apparatus for its ‘extinction’. This was long before the Quit India Movement had been launched by the Congress. When the Quit India Movement actually occurred, Linlithgow let loose the army under the command of Lord Wavell, who was then the Commanderin-Chief of India, over north India. Linlithgow later claimed he had ‘reconquered’ north India just as the British had done in 1857, after the revolt of the people against British rule. Such open hostility was incredible. Lord Halifax (formerly Lord Irwin, Viceroy of India [1926–31]) told Sir Samuel Hoare, ‘I have no doubt at all that [Churchill] has been more responsible than anyone else for India wishing to get rid of the British.’51 Linlithgow played the crescent card and helped the Muslim League and Mohammad Ali Jinnah to consolidate their positions vis-a-vis the Indian National Congress. He advised and encouraged the Muslim League to demand partition from behind the scenes and played the role of friend, guide and philosopher to the Muslims.52 This is important in the context of the Kashmir problem which in fact became a focal point for testing the ‘two-nation theory’ so eloquently and effectively advocated by the leadership of the Muslim League, notably Jinnah. Most British army personnel as well as civil servants in India on the eve of Partition and later, after India’s independence, sympathised with the Muslim demand for Pakistan. The Indian perception was that the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Claude Auchinleck (1946–47), along with the officers of the Supreme Commander Headquarters in Delhi were ‘biased in favour of Pakistan’, and the headquarters was closed down on 30 November 1947.53 Sir Olaf Caroe, an influential member of the Indian Civil Service and Governor of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) in 1946–47, was asked by Lord Mountbatten to go on leave, thereafter to retire to England, because of his involvement in the affairs of the Muslim League and due to his being a strong sympathizer with Pakistan. Caroe resigned as desired, but asked for two months leave to go to Kashmir on a holiday before his departure to England. It seems, according to rumours, that when Nehru visited Srinagar to plead on behalf of Sheikh Abdullah, who was serving jail sentence there, it was Caroe ‘who was practically sitting beside the Maharajah the whole time telling him what to do next’.54 The Maharaja had refused permission to Nehru to enter Kashmir in 1946 and if he insisted on the same, he would be arrested.

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Sir George Cunningham and Sir Francis Mudie, the governors of NWFP and Punjab (Pakistan) in 1947, were ‘the principal sources of trouble in India’, according to Nehru and others, ‘apart from their general policy to help Pakistan’. Cunningham was regarded by Khan Saheb, the Premier of NWFP in 1945–47, as ‘the only Muslim League leader of NWFP’.55 Jayaprakash Narayan, one of the prominent socialist leaders of the time, told Sunday Statesman that ‘he did not distinguish between the Muslim League and the British’.56 Nehru had been complaining to the British authorities that most of ‘the British military officers [in Pakistan] have been concerned in the intrigue’ while the Pakistani troops were fighting in Kashmir. He apprised Krishna Menon in London about this: ‘You know the Pakistani army is full of British officers and recently several hundred British officers and technicians joined the Pak army. British Governors in Pakistan provinces have also had their share in the business. Mudie is of course the villain par excellence. The amount of mischief he has done is incredible.’57 Again, Nehru informed Menon: ‘Indian opinion is surcharged. . . . whether it is Pakistan, Hyderabad or Azad Kashmir, large numbers of Englishmen are opponents of Indian Union.’58 He identified three categories of Englishmen who provided help to Pakistan. First, ‘the British diplomats and consular representatives in various parts of the world represent Pakistan interests. As such they do propaganda for Pakistan and they come in our way sometimes. Most of them are anti-India anyhow and whether they get instructions from their government or not they gladly act in an anti-Indian manner.’59 He cited an instance: ‘Recently, the Kashmir Story film was to be shown in Indonesia. The Dutch Government permitted this. At the last moment the British Consul there objects on behalf of Pakistan and the film was not shown. In Kashgar in Central Asia, the British Consul is coming in our way.’60 Second, the ‘Pakistan Army is full of British officers and [they] can’t function without them. More and more Britishers are coming in. I have no doubt at all that many of the British officers are fully connected with Kashmir operations. . . .Bucher admitted this much.’61 The third group serving Pakistan consisted of ‘British civilian officers and technicians. Some of them are the worst type and are those who are kicked out of India.’62 Even more sensational disclosures were made by Nehru. Based on Indian intelligence reports, it was mentioned that one William

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Barton, formerly of the Indian Civil Service, went to Lisbon on behalf of the Nizam of Hyderabad to enter into a treaty with Portugal for the use of Goa as a port in case of need. ‘We are informed’, Nehru continued, ‘that the British Secret Service men have been loaned to the Hyderabad government. They are working in the London office of the Pakistan Embassy. 63 It seems that the Hyderabad government has a few squadrons of planes kept in the Middle East and East Pakistan. The air crew were mostly Poles or Czechs. However, a Halifax bomber has a British crew.’64 Escott Reid, the Canadian envoy to India, observed that many in the US were ‘bitterly critical of Nehru and of India and they deprecated the significance which Canada attached to India and to Nehru’s views’.65 The British were equally sensitive to any praiseworthy remarks ever made by Canadian politicians about Indian leaders. He cited an incident which had occurred in his presence. In October 1949, during Nehru’s visit to Canada, the Canadian Prime Minister, St Laurent, paid tributes and referred ‘to India’s struggle for Indian independence under Gandhi and Nehru’. The references so ‘irritated the British High Commissioner’, records Escott Reid, ‘that he came up to me after dinner to splutter a protest.’66 How keen were some of the British officials to display their misguided zeal in support of Pakistan on any issue would be obvious in this story. The Indian government had requested the American government through the American ambassador, Henry Grady, for a loan of 10 four-engined transport military planes to help evacuate nonMuslim refugees from Pakistan. On 12 October 1947, the US ambassador informed the Indian government of the US government’s willingness to supply planes. Nehru wrote to Philip Noel-Baker, ‘a senior officer of your ministry [Commonwealth Relations office] has raised objections to our proposals on following grounds’: (a) ‘that it might be objected to by Pakistan as favouring India’, (b) ‘that dollar expenditure involved would embarrass UK Govt.’, (c) ‘that landing facilities available in areas concerned would militate against full use being made of planes.’67 Nehru felt aghast at such interventions obviously to delay or even sabotage the proposal. He wrote to Noel-Baker, ‘I need not tell you that India is a Sovereign Dominion and, therefore, free to take decisions regarding its own affairs without interference from outside. We are still confronted with a problem of unprecedented magnitude in respect of refugees awaiting evacuation. Everyday’s delay

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in removing them from areas where . . .[sic] one of our most pressing responsibilities. We cannot but regard the objections said to have been made on behalf of your ministry as a source of grave embarrassment.’68 Noel-Baker’s reply was not a straightforward one and seemed to imply that permission from the UK was needed. On 29 October 1947, he replied saying that the US welcomed India’s request for American military planes and hoped that Pakistan would also be in agreement. The High Commissioner ‘had only expressed his country’s embarrassment regarding it to save dollars, if India had to make payment in dollar’, etc.69 Why were such clever tactics necessary for countries that were positively disposed towards each other? While the West was embroiled in the Cuban Crisis, the Chinese invasion of India took place in October 1962. Macmillan sympathised with Nehru’s discomfiture and India’s humiliation. When Nehru sought military assistance from the UK government against Chinese betrayal ‘and double-dealing’, although earlier he [Nehru] had ‘urged me to support the not too illogical claim of the Chinese communist government to a seat in the United Nations’, Macmillan wrote, ‘we are giving lots of ammunition, light arms, etc.’ He said: ‘I also sent a warm personal message to Nehru about his troubles’,70 yet despite all his goodness on his part he did not fail to enter into ‘oriental’ discourse. Macmillan commented: The vague principles of oriental mysticism, which had been supposed to lead to automatic peace between peoples had been rudely shaken. Since the independence of India, Nehru had obtained a world position by preaching peace and in support of this thesis he had scrupulously avoided ‘alignment’ in the Cold War between Communism and the free world. Now he saw Mao, pacifist in principle, imperialist in practice, demanding the reinstatement of Chinese authority over all territories where at any time in their long history they could claim some kind of ancient power or even suzerainty.71

India’s Goan invasion was another incident where Macmillan did not fail to invoke ‘Hindu double-face’ as an explanation for it. Sir Olaf Caroe was Macmillan’s correspondent, highlighting ‘Nehru’s actions’ in Goa as ‘the rankest example of hypocrisy and double standard’. He gave an example of Hindu conventional wisdom as reflected in the Bhagvad Gita, saying: ‘In the Western eyes this epic is rather tedious, like Nehru’s sermons. But it represents better than

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anything else the contradictory dualism that has at the very heart of the Hindu mind, that continual tension between the passive and the active, between creation and death. Shiva, the destroyer, is the Preserver too.’ Caroe’s outpourings can be read in this long letter to Macmillan.72 Harold Macmillan replied with an uncanny instinct to smile and enjoy as well as exercise restraint. I think it is the basic double-face of the Hindu which made him [Nehru] inexplicable and therefore at times infuriating to the Westerner. However, we must not preach (although I do not accept that Suez was more than superficially a parallel case to Goa) and we must not fall into Nehru’s error of being high-minded about other people’s affairs. I will refrain myself while retaining an unworthy satisfaction that this immortal who has flown so high and so secure for so long has been ‘tipped in the wings’.73

Another instance from the pen of Churchill’s provides valuable insights into the making of which may be called the Conservative mentality. Nehru delivered a speech at Amritsar on the occasion of the anniversary remembrance of the Jallianwala Bagh massacre of 1919. As was usual with Nehru, he often touched upon many issues affecting the country and the world. He believed his exposition in public speech was to inform, teach, educate and exhort the people with an instinct to mould public opinion. At the same time, it was also a learning experience for him, i.e., an exercise undertaken to feel the pulse of the nation. In one of his speeches he discussed Africa, where the population, according to him, was victim to racial discrimination and exploitation under different colonial regimes. This was the usual Nehru theme of nationalist discourse against colonialism. However, he also criticised the recent repression and reforms which were sought to be introduced. Lord Swinton, the Foreign Secretary, took exception to Nehru’s speech and called B. G. Kher, the Indian High Commissioner in London, to register his protest on 23 April 1953, declaring that the speech was not acceptable. ‘That was no reason why Mr. Nehru should make a public attack on British policy in Central Africa and Kenya, etc.’74 N. R. Pillai, Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs, explained that in public speeches many statements are made and Nehru might have been carried away. But the matter did not rest there. Churchill, in his Personal Minute, upheld Swinton’s views and the position he had taken. It was a revealing minute too:

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I am in entire agreement with your spirited reply which I hope will be conveyed to Nehru. I never expected anything better from a Congress Governed India. I used to try to tell this to the Baldwin-Macdonald Government. However, we have to make the best of what is left. It is less than half of nothing. In fact, it may well be that they only maintain a formal association with us because of the Sterling balance.75

This was Churchill’s stand even after six years of independence. But the new situation of independence had brought its strong positive side into light. Churchill thus noted with some satisfaction that ‘the British in India, I am told however, get on very well with the Indians now that they have put aside their racial superiority. I am glad you said what you did.’76 Once the civil servant racialism disappeared things improved and relations became smoother. Nehru of course ‘had been surprised also hurt at our reactions to his speech. Mr. Nehru felt that HM Govt. had not taken sufficient account of the changing circumstances of our relations by which he meant Indian independence within the Commonwealth. I said that even if a similar speech had been made by the Prime Minister of a foreign country I felt sure that the Foreign Secretary would have felt bound to speak to the Ambassador of that country.’77 This is what Swinton secretly noted. Nehru confided to his sister, Mrs Vijayalakshmi Pandit: ‘People in England and America are very courteous to us and friendly, but in the final analysis they treat India as a country to be humoured but not as an equal. Indeed the United States hardly treats any other country as an equal. The British Foreign office of course can’t get out of its old traditions. The world goes on changing and the UK and the USA somehow can’t catch up to it and then blame others.’78 In another of his letter to Pandit, he felt deeply hurt about the reactions of the British press to the Russian visit to India. He said: ‘As a person who has all along been rather friendly to England and the British, and who has a great deal of British background in him, I feel distressed at the way the British people are rapidly going to pieces. I thought they had some restraint in them.’79 Pandit had sent a report of the British press coverage of the visit as ‘fantastic’, that ‘the venom was sometimes beyond belief’ and that press propaganda ‘has resulted in a degree of hostility which is quite unreasoned.’80 The fact of the matter was that this was a period which witnessed dramatic events which affected India. Pakistan had begun receiving

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massive military aid both from the US and UK. It had already joined the Baghdad Pact. On 2 December 1955, John Foster Dulles and the Foreign Minister of Portugal had condemned the Soviet leaders’ statement about what they called ‘concerning the Portuguese Provinces in the Far East’. On 28 November 1955, Marshal Bulganin, the Soviet Prime Minister, called the Portuguese rule over Goa ‘a shame to civilised people’ and declared that the sympathies of the Soviet people were ‘always on the side of those fighting colonialism’. Again, writing to his sister, Mrs. Pandit, who was High Commissioner of India to London at this time, Jawaharlal Nehru said that ‘I did not approve of some of their [Bulganin’s and Khruschev’s] remarks.’81 But, as we have seen, he had been deeply opposed to the military alliances. He said: ‘the Middle East system of alliance, culminating in the Baghdad Pact, is a hit at India, which is bitterly resented here.’ Dulles’ joint statement with the Portuguese Foreign Minister produced ever stronger reactions. ‘Everything that the US might have done to India is likely to be forgotten in the anger caused by this.’82 The whole country was seething with anger against the western powers. Nehru wrote to Lady Mountbatten, complaining about the British press and other matters. ‘The visit of Bulganin and Khruschev has entirely raised the temperature of some of the British papers or their writers. Some indeed have worked themselves up into a frenzy.’ At the same time, he referred to Khruschev’s statement that ‘Kashmir is an integral part of India’ as a blessing. ‘The British press has been making out as if this visit of theirs to Kashmir is very embarrassing for me. Why they should think so, I cannot make out. I am quite pleased at it. It is true that I did not press them to go there because I did not wish to embarrass them. . .but they agreed. I welcomed this, and we have made arrangements accordingly.’ Speaking about the military alliances in which Pakistan participated as a member, Nehru informed his friend: ‘Pakistan now almost openly boasts that they are going to build their military strength with the help of aid from the West and then speak to us with strength.’ About the Americans, he added: ‘Our American friends accuse us of ingratitude. We are grateful for the help they have given us, . . .and Dulles has hurt us to the quick.’83 As far as the British were concerned, they gained diplomatic space in the Kashmir dispute in abundance. But their ambition ‘to keep a bit of India’, as Winston Churchill had desired, remained unfulfilled.84 Nevertheless, the western powers did get a strong foothold in Pakistan.

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Notes 1. Macmillan (1966: Preface, p. 1). 2. Ibid.: 4. 3. Ibid.: 318. Stanley Baldwin, Prime Minister and Conservative Leader in the House of Commons, December 1934. 4. BDEEP. The Labour Government and the End of Empire, Part I, pp. xxiii, xxvii. 5. Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Official Report, 351, 1938–39, p. 18. On 3 October 1939, Clement Attlee wanted Indians to be invited as ‘free and equal partners’ to fight ‘for democracy’. Ibid.: 1864. 6. Linlithgow to Leopold S. Amery (British Secretary of State for India), 21 January 1942. The dispatch consisted of 18 paragraphs; see The Transfer of Power 1942–47 (1970–83, vol. I [23]: 45–50). 7. Ibid.: 48–49, paragraph 14. 8. Dirks (2001: 194). 9. Linlithgow’s dispatch; see paragraph 14, The Transfer of Power 1942–47 (1970– 83, vol. I: 48). For Churchill’s views on Indians, see Barnes and Nicholson (1988: 605, 632, 838, 842, 881). There are many works by other authors as well displaying Churchill’s ill-tempered views of Indians. 10. Dirks 1992, op. cit., p. 194. Also see Cohn (1996). 11. Clement Attlee’s memorandum, 2 February 1942, was placed before the War Cabinet, W.M. (42), The Transfer of Power 1942–47 (1970–83, vol. I (60): 110–13, paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 14, 16 on pp. 11, 111–12). 12. Ibid.: 111, paragraph 10. 13. Ibid. 14. The Transfer of Power 1942–47 (1970–83, vol. I (60): 112, paragraph 14). 15. Macmillan 1969, op. cit., p. 228. 16. Ibid.: 230. 17. Wilson (1977: 305). 18. Robb (2007: 9). 19. Wilson 1977, op. cit., p. 278. 20. Doc. 72, C0537/5698, No. 69, May 1950. BDEEP, The Labour Government and the End of the Empire, 1945–1951, Part I, pp. 334ff. 21. Ibid. 22. Doc. 43, CO847/35/6, 1 November 1946. Ibid.: 117–18. 23. BDEEP Series B, (ed.) J. Ken, Egypt and the Defence of the Middle East, p. xxviii. 24. Ibid. 25. BDEEP, The Labour Government and the End of the Empire, 1945–1951, Part 1, p. xxvi; Memorandum, 25 April 1947, of Creech Jones. Also CAB/l29/l8, CP (47)] 44. 26. Ibid. 27. Doc. 68, CAB/l24/l007, No. 62, 17 August 1946. BDEEP, The Labour Government and the End of the Empire, 1945–1951, Part I, pp. 306–309. 28. Harris (1982: 281). 29. Macmillan (1969: 247).

164 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46.

47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64.

Jammu and Kashmir, the Cold War and the West Nehru (1946: 311). Ibid.: 31. Barnds (1972: 48). Ibid.: 49. Jawaharlal Nehru in the House of the People, 22 February 1954, SWJN, second series, vol. 25, p. 343. Jawaharlal Nehru, 18 January 1953 at the plenary session of AICC in Hyderabad, SWJN, second series, vol. 21, p. 493. SWJN, second series, vol. 2, p. 493n2. SWJN, second series, vol. 24, p. 569. Ibid.: 449. Ibid.: 453. Jawaharlal Nehru to Chief Ministers, I December 1953, SWJN, second series, vol. 21: 678–79, paragraphs 4–5. Ibid.: 679–80, paragraph 7. Ibid.: 681, paragraph 10. Jawaharlal Nehru to Chief Ministers, 15 March 1954, SWJN, second series, vol. 25, p. 548, paragraph 10. Ibid.: 546, paragraph 7. Reid 1981: 22; Escott Reid’s notes on the discussion with Nehru. Unpublished HM Diaries, 19 January 1958. The diaries are housed in the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford. The CD was loaned to me for research by Professor Peter Catterall of the University of London. Ibid. Ibid. Harris (1982: 553). Quoted in ibid.: 430. Roberts (1991: 299). See for details Panigrahi (2004: 336–37, Chapters III and IV). Hamid (1986: 260–93), based on Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck’s diary. Indira Gandhi to Jawaharlal Nehru, 20 May 1948; see Gandhi (1992: 556). Note of Ian Scott, 28 April 1947, Cunningham Papers, MSS. Eur. D670/21. lOR, London. December 1946, IOR/L/PO/l0124, weekly letters from the Viceroy to SOS, Januray–March 1947. lOR, London. Jawaharlal Nehru to Krishna Menon, 23 June 1948, SWJN, second series, vol. 6, p. 188. Ibid.: 190, 26 June 1948. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. General Roy Bucher was Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army from 1 January 1948–15 January 1949. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

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65. Reid (1981: 25). 66. Ibid.: 3. 67. Jawaharlal Nehru to Philip Noel-Baker, 27 October 1947, SWJN, second series, vol. 4, pp. 248–49, paragraph 5. 68. Ibid. 69. Philip Noel Baker to Jawaharlal Nehru, 29 October 1947; ibid.: 249n. 70. Macmillan (1973: 194). 71. Ibid.: 224–25. 72. Olaf Caroe to Harold Macmillan, 5 January 1962, PREM 11/3834, PRO, London. 73. Harold Macmillan to Olaf Caroe, 12 January 1996; see ibid. 74. PREM 11/460, PRO, London. 75. Prime Minister’s personal minute, 20 April 1953, PREM 11/460, PRO London. 76. Ibid. 77. Ibid. 78. Jawaharlal Nehru to Mrs Pandit, 2 December 1955, SWJN, second series, vol. 31, p. 325. 79. Ibid.: 328, 5 December 1955. 80. Ibid.: 328n2. 81. Jawaharlal Nehru to Mrs Pandit, 5 December 1955; see ibid.: 328. 82. Ibid.: 328–29. 83. Jawaharlal Nehru to Lady Mountbatten, 5 December 1955, SWJN, second series, vol. 31, pp. 331–34. 84. See Lord Wavell’s diary entry in Moon (1973: 168).

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Indo-Pak Dialogue on Kashmir

III Dialogues of Hope

167

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7 Indo-Pak Dialogue on Kashmir Was an Agreement on the Kashmir Issue Nearer in August–September 1953? Escott Reid in Envoy to Nehru (1981) expressed his conviction that Jawaharlal Nehru was prepared in August–September 1953 ‘to make a new approach to the Kashmir question in an effort to get a settlement even though this would involve departures from principles which the Indian government had considered important’.1 The theory that Nehru was not interested in a permanent settlement of the issue, that he was ‘intransigent’, that he wanted to maintain status quo and finally the verdict that ‘Nehru had never intended to make a settlement’, was incorrect, according to Reid and Walter Crocker, Australian High Commissioner to India during this period. They believed that a settlement was almost being worked out and would have been reached had it not been for the announcement of the US–Pakistan arms aid agreement in 1954. This assessment was made by Reid based on his personal discussions with a number of diplomatic community and after having had a talk with Dr S. Radhakrishnan, then Vice President of India and most important, with Raja Gaznafar Ali Khan, the Pakistan High Commissioner to New Delhi.2 Now the documents covering the talks held between the two Prime Ministers, Mohammad Ali of Pakistan and Jawaharlal Nehru of India, are available in print. The detailed minutes recorded by Nehru of their meetings held in Karachi between 25 and 27 July 1953 followed by talks in New Delhi between 17 and 20 August 1953 can be seen in the Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru (SWJN ) second series, vol. 23, 331–45, 424–39. In addition, a series of letters was exchanged between them, clarifying points of discussion and hoping to finally reach an agreement with ‘goodwill’ and ‘understanding’. Nehru reiterated that India wanted nothing but honourable peace and prosperity for both the countries. ‘The inevitable destiny of India and Pakistan must be to cooperate, as independent nations, to their

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mutual advantage and for the good of Asia and the world.’ He further assured Mohammad Ali: ‘For my part I am determined to try my utmost to seek satisfactory solutions which will lead to friendship and cooperation between the two nations, and I shall not permit myself to be diverted from this aim even by untoward occurrences.’ He explained many points of divergence and congruence in a long letter of 24 paragraphs asking him ‘to go ahead’ keeping in view the larger perspective of history.3 ‘We have to look at current events in some historical perspective. In this perspective, our huge continent of Asia appears to awaken after 300 years of quiscence.’4 An in-depth and dispassionate look at the discussions would demonstrate that there was a strong possibility of reaching a settlement on the vexed issue of Kashmir. An acceptable formula was in the process of being worked out. Nehru first visited Karachi for talks in July 1953. He was overwhelmed by the display of friendliness by the people of Pakistan. He also noticed among the people nothing but an enormous fund of goodwill and friendship for the people of India. A distinct change of atmosphere from one of ‘fear and suspicion’ of the old days to that of cooperation was noticeable. The government was also cordial. Talks were held against this background; these turned out to be essentially preliminary in nature but examined all aspects of the Kashmir dispute, and the two prime ministers agreed to meet soon for a closer and sustained dialogue. Both prime ministers de-clared that the independence and integrity of the two countries must be respected. When Prime Minister Mohammad Ali visited Delhi on 17 August 1953, the people of Delhi gave him and his delegation a tumultuous welcome. Nehru wrote, ‘the reception that Delhi gave to Mohammad Ali was really remarkable. Mohammad Ali was greatly impressed but, what is more significant, even the hard-boiled persons who accompanied him, such as Bokhari, Aziz Ahmed and others were quite bowled over. Bokhari went on saying that all this was quite incredible.’5 The fact of the matter was that there was goodwill on both sides of the border; people wanted to live in peace and sought resolution of all problems, including the Kashmir dispute. Mohammad Ali was sincere in his efforts, but it seems he was somewhat a lightweight politician. A. S. Bokhari was the first Indian to be Director General of All India Radio in the pre-Partition days. He was Director General of Broadcasting at the time of his membership

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of the delegation. Later he became Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations. Earlier, he was Principal of Government College, Lahore. Khalid Hussain, a reputed Pakistani journalist, reported that Bokhari was once asked what Pakistan’s foreign policy was. He shot back: ‘Pakistan has no foreign policy, only foreign affairs, most of them illegitimate.’ Aziz Ahmed was a competent Cabinet and Chief Secretary of Pakistan. The meetings took place in New Delhi between 17–20 August 1953. Meanwhile certain developments had taken place in Jammu and Kashmir. On 9 August 1953, Sheikh Abdullah had been dismissed as Prime Minister and had been arrested. In his place, his deputy, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, became Prime Minister. Nehru gave an account of these developments as well as of the disturbances that took place in Srinagar, and the Kashmir valley in particular, following Sheikh Abdullah’s arrest. Nehru informed that those who took part in violence, rioting and disturbances were pro-Pakistani elements. There were police firings but no ‘massacres’ of Muslims by Indian army, as reported in Pakistani press. Nehru also referred to the spontaneous welcome offered by Indian people to the Pakistan delegation, which underlined the fact that people desired peace and better relations with the neighbouring country, Pakistan. The talks indeed broke new ground. The basic preliminaries of the dispute such as the question of accession, the entry of tribals with the help and connivance of Pakistan, the atrocities committed, the formation of Azad Kashmir, the quantum of troops to be stationed on both sides, etc. were left out. They were contentious issues and the endless arguments on them earlier had not taken the talks ahead. The prime ministers, therefore, began with the fundamental question, which was ascertaining the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, by which was implied the holding of plebiscite in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Also, the question of plebiscite had been discussed for more than five years now. The Chief Justice of Australia, Owen Dixon, who was appointed by the United Nations as the mediator in the issue, had suggested earmarking of Hindu and Muslim areas and then holding plebiscite in these areas, to which India objected because it signified essentially a communal approach. It was argued that first and foremost some parts of the state which could not be absorbed either by India or Pakistan should be identified. Hence it was thought there was bound to be partition or division of the territory. This could only be decided by plebiscite.

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Second, if it was agreed that division of the territory was essential, then the question of fixation of internal boundary of the concerned areas had to be looked into and decided. The boundary question had to be decided taking into consideration factors like geography, contiguity, culture, language, etc. For this purpose, it was better to have a plebiscite administrator, the appointment of whom was formally to be decided by the Jammu and Kashmir government in consultation with the governments of Pakistan and India. Nehru also suggested that he would agree to an appointment of such an administrator from a smaller and neutral country and not the UK and the USA. Third, the two prime ministers agreed that the plebiscite administrator should be appointed within six months or so from that point. They agreed that during this period the questions relating to forces, civil administration, etc. and all related issues concerning holding of plebiscite should be settled between India and Pakistan in consultation with the government of Jammu and Kashmir. It should be kept in mind that the final decision about the state was likely to be one of division. The exact lines (boundaries) of division would depend upon the result of plebiscite.6 Mohammad Ali ‘generally’ agreed with these propositions, ‘though I can’t say that he committed himself to everything fully’.7 As far as the question of independence of Jammu and Kashmir was concerned, ‘which had gradually arisen in Sheikh Abdullah’s mind’, it was stated that at first he talked of independence of the whole state, ‘but realising that Jammu was almost a separate entity as also Ladakh’, etc. he thought of independent state of the valley with the surrounding areas which are considered the Kashmiri language speaking area. Nehru pointed out that ‘politically and economically such a state would be too small and not viable and other powers would be likely to use this area as their sphere of influence. Instead of bringing peace between Pakistan and India, an independent Kashmir would be a source of discord. Mohammad Ali agreed with this wholly.’8 Nehru also prepared a draft for a joint statement with Mohammad Ali. The latter later held a discussion with Zafrullah Khan, the Foreign Minister and Aziz Ahmed, the Cabinet Secretary of Pakistan. Some points were raised and alterations were suggested. Great stress was laid on the omission of the reference to the plebiscite administrator being selected from smaller nations. The principle was accepted but they did not want to put this into the communiqué,

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to which Nehru agreed. They also wanted to prepone the date of appointment of a plebiscite administrator to February 1954 instead of April 1954, to which Nehru did not agree, since many issues needed to be sorted out before the appointment took place. All this would need more time. Matters relating to evacuee property, etc. was drafted by Zafrullah Khan. Finally, a joint statement was issued on 21 August 1953.9 The prime ministers declared that they ‘attached greatest importance to this friendly approach and to the avoidance of words and actions which promote discord between the two countries’. It must be pointed out that Nehru was dead serious about not only the holding of the plebiscite but also on the question of the partition of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Nehru was prepared to hold the plebiscite in January 1949, but Pakistan had refused, fearing that the Kashmiri people would not vote for Pakistan. The memory of tribal atrocities, rape and murder were still fresh in the minds of the co-religionists of Jammu and Kashmir, who were the victims of the tribal invasion. Second, Nehru agreed for the first time to the idea of partition of Jammu and Kashmir after ascertaining the wishes of the people through a plebiscite. This was an advance from the stand he had taken earlier. He had all along refused to accept partition. He also discussed in-depth the methodology of undertaking partition during the dialogue with Jinnah. His sincerity to comply with the above proposition agreed upon in the discussion was obvious when he tried to convince Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. With a view to preparing him for the eventuality of partition through plebiscite, Nehru wrote to him even before the discussions started with Jinnah. ‘It is obvious that some parts of state will plump for India and other parts for Pakistan. It is no good any longer to talk of the whole state going this way or that way. If the whole state was pushed to one side or the other, that would result in an impossible situation in some parts of it leading to considerable migrations. That has to be avoided. Therefore, inevitably one has to keep partition in view, though we need not talk about it directly. If it is a question of partition, then the views of the people naturally have a greater say but not a final say about every area. Such a partition will mean the fixation of an internal boundary. . .’10

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In fact, Nehru gave a full indication of the kind of things the two prime ministers were going to discuss when Mohammad Ali arrived in Delhi on 17 August 1953. He also tried to impress on Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad: ‘In any case I rule out the idea of independence. At any time it was not practicable.’11 Then he explained about the plebiscite administrator and the timing of his appointment, and asked Bakshi to realise that ‘we have created a dynamic phase which can’t be treated in a static way. We can’t wait all the time for the events to happen or for nothing to happen. Things will happen, and it is best not only to be prepared for them but to give the lead.’12 As a follow-up of his agreement with Mohammad Ali, Nehru informed Ali to keep him abreast of the situation and asked him to continue his ‘policy of reform of the Kashmir administration for relieving the burden of the poor’. But all this would succeed if there was ‘lessening of tension between India and Pakistan’. Keeping this in view, Nehru said: ‘we have thought that we should take some slightly positive step in our talks with Mohammad Ali in regard to Kashmir. I think this step should be our agreement to select a Plebiscite Administrator by some provisional date, the end of April next. That means about eight months. Meanwhile, we should try to settle some of the preliminary prob-lems that have confronted us with the UN, etc.’13 He added: ‘It is important that whatever agreements we should arrive at with Mohammad AIi, we should have your and your government’s full approval, publicly given. That will strengthen you and help you greatly. Any other line would obviously be harmful and would encourage your opponents.’14 This sane advice, coming as it did from the senior statesman and Prime Minister of India to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad during the course of his talks with Mohammad Ali only suggests that Nehru meant to succeed in his talks and was keen and sincere to reach accord and implement it for the settlement of the Kashmir problem. Why did Pakistan let this opportunity, which promised constructive and positive results through discussions and understanding, slip? Why did it not take up the sensible offer made by India? Was it hoping to reap richer dividends later? Did the western powers influence Pakistan around this time not to enter into further discussion? There were many other factors affecting the dialogue between the two prime ministers, as the events that followed showed. Both Pakistani and the foreign press were opposed to any move, especially after the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah on 9 August 1953.

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Let us first look into the scenario in Pakistan. The then Prime Minister Mohammad Ali of Bogra was appointed by Governor General Ghulam Mohammad in April 1953. Before his appointment as Prime Minister, he was ambassador of Pakistan to USA. He did not have a strong political base. For that matter, neither did Khwaja Nazimuddin nor Feroz Khan Noon have any political following. There was a political vacuum after the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951. Nehru wrote about the extraordinary developments in Pakistan which were ‘rather Gilbertian’. On Jinnah’s death, Nazimuddin became Governor General. On Liaquat Ali’s death, Nazimuddin appointed himself Prime Minister, ‘which was rather odd constitutionally speaking, and makes Ghulam Mohammad the GovernorGeneral. And now Ghulam Mohammad dismisses Nazimuddin with little ceremony and almost at a few hours notice. After which Mohammad Ali of Bogra was called upon to form government.’15 Nehru was aware that Ghulam Mohammad, the Governor-General, ‘is probably the most important figure. The Army Chiefs count for a lot with Iskander Mirza, the Defence Secretary. Among the senior civil servants, Mohammad Ali [who became Minister of Finance 1951-55] has considerable influence, so also Aziz Ahmed, now Chief Secretary.’ Nehru also said that ‘the conflict between West Pakistan and East Pakistan is as bad as ever’.16 William Barnds informs us that Pakistan in fact was under the control of senior military officers and civil servants. These men were labelled ‘hierarchs’, the three most powerful men in this nexus being Ghulam Mohammad, Iskander Mirza and General Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the army.17 Iskander Mirza was Defence Secretary till 1954, became Minister of Interior in 1954–55, Governor General of Pakistan from 1955–56 and President from 1956–58. General Ayub Khan thereafter became President of Pakistan till 1969, overthrowing Iskander Mirza. In September 1953, the Defence Secretary Iskander Mirza and General Ayub Khan recommended stopping the retrenchment of the army, declaring at the same time that they would seek aid to maintain it. In November 1953, Ghulam Mohammad and General Ayub Khan visited Washington, seeking military aid. The Pakistani press described this mission ‘to conclude negotiations on an arms agreement’.18 The New York Times correspondent, Robert Turnbull, reported that Pakistan was ‘willing to consider an exchange of air bases for military equipment’. 19 The arms agreement between Pakistan and the US was signed on 8 February 1954, i.e., within three months of negotiation. Why

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was there such a desperate hurry to sign the agreement on the arms deal? Why did the western powers, especially the US, not wait for a year or six months on its arms aid agreement to enable the two neighbours, who were in the midst of constructive dialogue, to reach a settlement? Was the US aim to wean away Pakistan from any settlement with India deliberate? Throughout the months of August and September 1953 letters continued to be exchanged between the two prime ministers, seeking clarification and agreeing to discuss further. Did Pakistan work behind the scenes for the aid, even as the dialogue continued and letters were exchanged on various issues between the two prime ministers? The military aid agreement of 8 February 1954 no doubt killed the rapproachment between India and Pakistan. Nehru was aghast and could hardly get over the volte-face when he was informed of Robert Turnbull’s Karachi report in the New York Times about the negotiations between Pakistan and USA. He commented that the reports were a matter of ‘intense concern to us’ and later observed more in sorrow than anger that the US–Pakistan alliance would bring the Cold War to India’s borders. The arms deal elicited a strong reaction in India, which delayed the signing of the agreement. It was signed in February 1954, thus writing the epitaph to the Mohammad Ali–Nehru dialogue on the Kashmir problem. Both the Pakistan and western media were up in arms against India when Sheikh Abdullah was deposed and arrested in August 1953. This was understandable, but the cries of jehad and war started soon after the issue of the joint statement on 21 August 1953. Nehru wrote to Mohammad Ali that he was taken aback by the violence and intemperance of language that was used not only in the public press in Pakistan but by responsible ministers. The Dawn and the Times of Karachi came out with big headlines, accusing India of flouting Delhi decisions and attacked ‘Nehru’s outbursts on Nimitz’, etc. Azad Kashmir Radio reported that Nehru was an ‘adept in befooling others’ and Mohammad Ali was asked ‘whom are you going to dance with like a monkey’.20 Obviously, non-acceptance of Admiral Nimitz, who already had been Plebiscite Administrator, was likely to cause some offence to the USA, but Nehru was surprised at the agitation over Admiral Nimitz. He said he had nothing against the admiral, who was a US appointee supported by other members of the United Nations, notably Britain. In any case, his term was over long ago and as it was, he had tendered his resignation formally to the Secretary

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General of the United Nations. Both prime ministers had informally agreed to have a new incumbent from ‘some small and more or less neutral country of Asia or Europe’ and such a proposition was not an ‘affront’ to the US or any other power.21 Nehru believed that the talks with Prime Minister Mohammad Ali were extremely valuable. ‘For the first time almost, I felt that we had got out of the vicious circle which had caught us during these past years. We had not solved the problem, but it was a great thing to look at it aright and with hope and to take some definite steps in the direction of its solution. That was no small matter considering the past background of fear and suspicions and interminable and fruitless debate.’22 Mohammad Ali agreed that the press had been ‘mischievous’ and had misrepresented things. Nehru also brought to the notice of Mohammad Ali that Pakistan did not ‘side with the Commonwealth and Asian countries’ in voting for India to the Korean Political Conference which was supported by the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand; the US had opposed it. After all, India was merely ‘a symbol’, was not eager to be a member, hence the regret that Pakistan opposed it.23 Obviously, Pakistan was determined to be in the good books of the US. As a follow-up of the discussion held in New Delhi between the two prime ministers, Mohammad Ali sought several clarifications on important points. For instance, in his letter of 27 August 1953, he wanted elucidation on whether plebiscite should be held for the whole state or it should be ‘regional plebiscite’.24 Mohammad Ali said that the idea of a regional plebiscite ‘without a definition of regions was not concrete enough for expression of a definite view for or against it’.25 Nehru stressed that the discussions had emphasised that any kind of ‘migrations’ or other ‘disturbances’ within the state must be avoided at all costs. The horrors of partition must not be repeated. ‘What I had suggested was that as a result of the plebiscite over the entire state, we would be in a position to consider the matter so that the final decision should cause the least disturbance and should take into consideration geographical, economic and other important factors. Indeed any attempt at defining regions rather prejudices the result of the voting. In any event, all these matters [are] to be considered at a much later stage.’26 Another point was raised by Mohammad Ali. He suggested that ‘the administration of the state should be in the hands of an impartial authority or a Indo-Pakistan Commission’. Nehru pointed out that ‘the

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UN Commission’s Resolution is based on the recognition of the de jure authority of the state administration over even the areas occupied by Pakistan and the constitutional rights of the government of India to safeguard the security of the state.’ Because of this recognition it was for the Jammu and Kashmir government to formally appoint the Plebiscite Administrator, who was to act as an officer of the state. It was admitted, of course, that he would be chosen with the consent of the parties concerned.27 As for troops being stationed in Jammu and Kashmir plebiscite areas, Indian troops in reduced number would stay, while the Pakistani troops will have to be withdrawn as per the UN resolution. Second, there was no question of having any ‘foreign troops’ in the country. ‘We made it perfectly clear that we could never accept the introduction of foreign troops in the Kashmir state or anywhere else in Indian territory.’ Nehru pointed out ‘Such a proposal was mooted earlier but was dropped.’28 In respect of the powers and functions of the Plebiscite Administrator, Nehru pointed out that ‘we should ensure a fair and impartial plebiscite and that the Plebiscite Administrator should be in a position to organise such a plebiscite. . . .It has certainly to do with the non-interference of the government in the plebiscite. There are matters to be discussed and arranged’.29 In respect of the refugees to be permitted to vote, the matter had been taken into consideration, as the joint statement spelt out. There was the enormous problem of settling and resettling of the refugees and ‘it would result in an indefinite prolongation by years of the period preparatory to a plebiscite. It would also mean a very considerable disturbance to the life of the people of the state which we wish to avoid. Therefore, for the most practical reasons, the course does not appear to be feasible.’30 Finally, Nehru said: ‘I should like to make it clear that there is no intention on my part to exclude the UN from this question of Kashmir. The Plebiscite Administrator would function under UN supervision, but it seems to me quite obvious that while the UN can be helpful, any settlement must depend upon the consent and cooperation of India and Pakistan. Therefore, it is for us to agree and not to look to the UN to produce some settlement without our agreement.’ He further observed that ‘the entire question of Kashmir bristles with controversy’ and this question cannot be effectively handled or settled through ‘controversial or

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legalistic approach’, but ‘in a cooperative way. . . .That was the virtue of our talks and in the statement that we issued. It is easy to pick holes in that statement. . . .But the fact remains that this was the first successful attempt to get out of the morass in which we have been stuck for a long time and that it would take us some distance. These were no small gains.’31 The problem before us is how to succeed within these limitations. . . . If we aim, as we must, at closer and cooperative relationship between India and Pakistan, we must find a solution of the Kashmir problem, which is not only satisfactory to the peoples as a whole there but is also achieved without bitterness and a sense of continuing wrong to India or Pakistan. While the interest of the people of Kashmir are paramount, there are also certain national interest of India and Pakistan, which come into conflict over this Kashmir affair. It also happens that a very great deal depends not only on the solution of the problem, but perhaps even more so on the manner of doing it because the matter will have far-reaching consequences to both in India and Pakistan in the present and the future.32

These were noble words, and well said indeed, full of beautiful sentiment, but US military aid to Pakistan intervened to destroy the atmosphere of goodwill and understanding built by the two prime ministers’ dialogue. It was most unfortunate that such intervention occurred, consciously or unconsciously, to literally end the talks, which had raised hopes of success to a great extent. Never again did Nehru come forward openly for another dialogue, although these continued to be held intermittently between the two countries. The next series of talks took place at the initiative of Pakistan in May 1955, to which we should devote our attention.

India–Pakistan Dialogue on Kashmir Issue, May 1955 The context of the talks remained the same, but the text had changed. The political scenario in Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan and India had become much more complex. Almost overnight there had been paradigm shifts in the relationships between India and Pakistan. The dismissal and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah produced strong reactions in Pakistan, some parts of Jammu and Kashmir and in the United Nations. Dawn described the developments as ‘a challenge to Pakistan’ and advised the government ‘not to weaken its defences’. Pakistan Times warned against the ‘consolidation of India’s overlordship in Kashmir’. Azad Kashmir Radio was in its element, whipping up religious ‘fanaticism and inciting people of the valley to revolt against

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the new government’. Most Pakistani leaders were highly critical of the action taken in Kashmir.33 Jawaharlal Nehru had reposed full faith in Sheikh Abdullah’s credentials and accepted him as a nationalist secular leader of the people of Kashmir. He had always treated him with affection and friendship, as a comrade-in-arms, as he often said in public and private. He had never visualised that Abdullah would change after acquisition of power in Kashmir and that an extreme action of dismissal and arrest would be necessary. Although most reports which reached Nehru from various quarters suggested that Abdullah had in fact sought an escape from the earlier agreements and had begun dreaming of an independent Kashmir, Nehru tried his best to get him for personal meetings to sort out problems, but he failed. During the months of April, May and June 1953, he invited him to come to Delhi so as to personally sort out relations with India. He invited him along with Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, G. M. Sadiq, Afzal Beg, Maulana Masoodi and others for a close and comprehensive discussion. Abdullah sent all his colleagues but he himself did not go.34 Nehru also observed that ‘in his National Conference schism and factions have developed because of his attitude and changes in his views on Kashmir’. Nehru wrote: ‘Your government is far from harmonious, and in fact pulls in a number of different directions’.35 Between November 1952 and June 1953, many steps were taken in Jammu and Kashmir — sweeping land reforms to promote Muslim interests, making Urdu a compulsory subject for all, insistence on a separate flag, constitution, Head of state — there being a reluctance to implement the Delhi Agreement which had been passed by the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir on 11 August 1952 and by the Indian Parliament on 24 July 1952. These measures aroused strong doubts in the minds of his own colleagues and others who thought Abdullah was determined to repudiate the accession of Kashmir to India and seek an independent status.36 In the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir, Abdullah wanted to initiate far-reaching changes without consultation with the government of India. It was reported that he was planning to have five autonomous units of Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh, Poonch and Gilgit without consultation with the jurists and legal authorities in India. Nehru observed in his letter to him: ‘The Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir state will necessarily have to fit into the Constitution of India, if Jammu and Kashmir is a constituent unit of India and is a part of the territory of India.’37

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It was widely reported in the press that Sheikh Abdullah was hoping to have an independent state of Kashmir, supported by the US. It was rumoured that Adlai Stevenson had met Sheikh Abdullah in early May 1953 and encouraged him for an independent Kashmir. In the Working Committee of the National Conference on 18 May 1953, Abdullah put forward his views about an independent Kashmir valley, which was opposed by G. M. Sadiq, Girdhari Lal Dogra and others who were members of the Cabinet and also close to Abdullah.38 Nehru told Abdullah in no uncertain terms: ‘To me it has been a major surprise that a settlement arrived at between us be by-passed or repudiated regardless of merits. That strikes at the root of all confidence, personal or international. No treaty would be worth the paper it is written, if it was to be repudiated soon after.’39 In spite of these untoward events in Kashmir, Nehru went on to have an open-hearted dialogue with Prime Minister Mohammad Ali in July 1953 in Karachi and August 1953 in New Delhi; this has been discussed in detail in the previous section. Then came the US arms aid agreement with Pakistan in February 1954, the negotiations for which had taken place in November 1953, almost around the time when the dialogue between the two prime ministers were still going on through an exchange of letters after personal discussions in July–August 1953. According to most observers, the arms agreement between Pakistan and the US destroyed the goodwill and friendship built during the period of personal encounters between the two prime ministers. India believed that Pakistan had not been ‘acting in good faith. . .while they were pretending to be trying to reach agreement with India, they were at the same time negotiating without India’s knowledge with the United States in order to secure arms’.40 This was the view of senior members of the Ministry of External Affairs like M. J. Desai and N. Raghavan Pillai. Escott Reid says that in his meeting with them it was agreed that a peaceful solution of Kashmir would have been found had the US arms aid agreement not interrupted the process. They asked why the Americans did not wait for six months or a year for the agreement.41 Others with whom he interacted were Vishnu Sahay, Secretary, Kashmir Affairs in the government of India, Dr S. Radhakrishnan, Vice-President of India and several others of the Diplomatic Corps. George Allen, the American Ambassador, also had asked the State Department to postpone the arms agreement with Pakistan.42 Yet the arms agreement took place. Was it a deliberate move to sabotage the negotiations on the part of the State Department?

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Nehru became very suspicious after this event. As it was, he had been stressing the point of US interest in Kashmir. ‘During the last two or three years American policy has been concerned with Kashmir for two reasons. One is its geographical position from the military point of view and the possibility of having a base in the heart of Asia. The other is the possibility of rich mineral wealth in Kashmir. An important element in American policy appears to be to control the sources of mineral wealth in various parts of the world. . . .In the Kashmir conflict therefore they naturally incline towards Pakistan.’43 Nehru, in his letters to the chief ministers, highlighted John Foster Dulles’ policy of collective defence to ensure peace, security and freedom of Southeast Asia and the western Pacific. It was declared ‘that if there is any aggression on the part of the communist countries they will instantly and massively retaliate using atomic weapons and bombs’. 44 The political scenario of the world had changed dramatically after the US grant of arms aid to Pakistan. Both Pakistan and the US were keen to have an armed alliance, hence their strategic embrace did not come as a surprise to anyone, except to Nehru and India. The political developments in Jammu and Kashmir and the US–Pakistan embrace affected the talks adversely. From the correspondence now published in Selected Works of JawaharIal Nehru, second series, vol. 28, the background to the talks of May 1955 held between India and Pakistan can be pieced together. It appears that Governor General Ghulam Mohammad of Pakistan, who was a powerful figure in Pakistan politics, was keen to resolve the Kashmir issue and wanted to resume the dialogue between India and Pakistan, which had been snapped after 1953. On 18 January 1955, the Governor General was at Palam Airport in Delhi, waiting to leave for Karachi. Nehru was also there, waiting for his flight to London to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference. It is not clear whether this informal encounter between the two dignitaries was coincidental or arranged, but they seemed to have exchanged some ideas when they met at the airport. The Governor General, before leaving for Karachi, it seems, handed over an envelope to Nehru ‘containing a small piece of paper’; this contained four suggestions for the holding of plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir.45 The Governor General wanted that the plebiscite should be held in mid-October 1955 ‘without outside interference. . .casting the burden of solution to ourselves’. Nehru welcomed the latter part of the suggestion but observed that holding of plebiscite in October was

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‘wholly impractical.’ He told Ghulam Mohammad: ‘Previously we got stuck up completely in regard to prerequisites for such a plebiscite, and there we are still. The position indeed considerably worsened by developments in the foreign field.’46 Nehru pointed out that while ‘I like the approach of mutual trust. . .at the same time, the four points that your paper contained seemed to me not to be very helpful as they were and appeared removed from present facts.’47 Also, he was constrained to point out that ‘you and I have different approaches to the problem. . . .Our approach must be realistic and in accordance with the facts of the situation.’48 Besides, proper groundwork needed to be prepared before any talks took place. Nehru was not too keen to have talks as suggested by Pakistan in March 1955 and desired their postponement. In this regard, he cabled to the Indian High Commissioner, C. C. Desai, in Karachi giving instructions as to how to proceed and what to agree to, etc. His cables give an indication of what was in his mind. On 27 February 1955, he told him that ‘Ghulam Mohammad is anxious to have a settlement and is prepared to go some distance for it.’ Nehru welcomed the approach, but said nothing could be gained through ‘slogans’. ‘Personally I really see no way out except a recognition by both parties of the status quo, subject to minor modifications.’ Second, the London Times also expressed recently in an article by its correspondent ‘that the only satisfactory settlement possible now was on the basis of the status quo’.49 Nehru drew attention to the worsening international situation ‘which has a direct bearing on the Kashmir issue’. In the Far East, a war might break out. ‘Obviously if such a contingency occurs, we can’t think of anything that would upset Kashmir. Also there is not only the possibility, but something much more, of American bases in Azad Kashmir. Possibly Gilgit has already been chosen.’50 Nehru apprised the Indian ambassador of the situation, though he did not want him to speak to Ghulam Mohammad about these facts. Nehru also took him into confidence and told him that he had consulted Maulana Azad and Govind Ballabh Pant.51 Also, Nehru wrote to the Governor General on issues of common concern. These and other matters were discussed in the meetings held in New Delhi from 14–17 May 1955. Prime Minister Mohammad Ali was accompanied by General Iskander Mirza, Minister of the Interior, States and Frontier Regions. Within a few months, he took over as Governor General of Pakistan. On all four days, the mornings, until almost lunchtime, were devoted

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to discussions. This time, however, there were no grand receptions and the bonhomie of the earlier meetings and the dialogue of 1953 was absent. Maulana Azad and G. B. Pant participated in the discussions on all days. On the first day itself, Nehru gave a comprehensive resume of the Kashmir dispute from the beginning till the present and concluded: ‘Keeping all these international and national matters in view, and having given the most earnest consideration to this problem, we have come to the conclusion that the only practical and safe way of dealing with it was to accept present conditions as they were, that is, the status quo, and then proceed on that basis. Having accepted that, one could consider what rectification of the border, etc. could be made to suit both parties. But the main thing was the acceptance of the principle of the status quo.’52 That set the ball rolling. The next day was crucial. Iskander Mirza expressed ‘the difficulty of his government in accepting things as they were No government would last twenty-four hours in Pakistan on this basis.’ Nehru pointed out that ‘any major change in the status quo. . .would not only produce violent reactions on the other side but would have a gravely upsetting effect. . . .Any major change would mean our facing the problem of migrations on a large scale’.53 Mirza raised the question as to how the talks are ‘affected by American aid to Pakistan. That aid had nothing to do with Kashmir or India.’ He pointed out that American aid was asked for the defence of the Persian Gulf and for ‘self-protection’. He also suggested that India and Pakistan should have ‘common defence’.54 Nehru asked against whom was ‘common defence’ supposed to be directed. If it was the Soviet Union, he said that ‘Russia would not attack either Pakistan or India. The Persian Gulf might be threatened but the major threats of war would be Europe and the Far East.’ Second, in the atomic age, war could be ‘terribly destructive’. Nehru called attention to the statement of General Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USA, who referred to the power and strength of the western powers, which could defeat the Soviet Union, but added that ‘there would be no victor in the next war’. 55 There was no question of a war in the next generation if the world was to be saved from catastrophic disaster. This question has been often raised as to why Nehru was so adamant against any talks after American military aid to Pakistan. No doubt the balance of the power situation in South Asia underwent a profound change after this event. Second, Nehru’s fear and worry

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that somebody else’s war had reached the borders of India, resulting in upsetting things in India, was also justified. Third, Pakistan was arming itself avowedly with the object of wresting Kashmir from India and also negotiating with India from the position of strength. All these were disturbing elements which nobody could ignore, yet India was blamed for exaggerating the fears or worse still, using arms aid as a pretext to wriggle out of the pledge to hold plebiscite in Kashmir. This question has been dealt with more fully elsewhere in this book. Another point of discussion relates to one Mulraj who acted as an intermediary between Nehru and Ghulam Mohammad. Nehru gave an account of ‘the so-called negotiations’ through this intermediary, whom Nehru ‘had known him for long’ and who was ‘a good man’, but Nehru did not ‘trust his judgement’. He had been sent to Nehru by Governor General Ghulam Mohammad. The proposals which he brought from Ghulam Mohammad were: 1. a large area from Jammu province including Poonch, Riyasi, Udhampur, etc. should be transferred to Pakistan; 2. Skardu might be transferred to India; 3. Kargil should be attached to the Kashmir valley; 4. which should be governed, or have joint control by India and Pakistan, both political and military; and 5. ‘some kind of a plebiscite of the Kashmir area, from five to twenty years hence, was envisaged’.56 Nehru informed the group that he had told Mulraj that ‘I could not even consider them’. 57 He again stressed ‘that these large transfers were not at all feasible or desirable’. However, Poonch area could be considered. As far as ‘joint supervision’ was concerned, it was unimaginable, from any point of view, constitutional or other. Nehru also pointed out that negotiations through somebody was ‘bound to create misunderstandings as, in fact, it appeared to have done’, and he was not in favour ‘of doing business’ in this way which ‘was most unsatisfactory’.58 Mirza agreed. The next day, a map of Kashmir was produced by Mohammad Ali, ‘which had apparently been prepared by the UN people in Kashmir’. It indicated Hindu and Muslim areas in separate colours; Hindu marked yellow, Muslim areas were green, including the ceasefire line on the left and below the northern ceasefire line. Above the northern ceasefire line, there was no colouring; it was white. Maulana Azad observed that Pakistan demanded all these areas in the Jammu province and along the ceasefire line and still there was to be a plebiscite in Kashmir. ‘Where was the final settlement?’59 Nehru said

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that ‘the position appeared to be that we should give up all these vast areas involving a complete upsetting of the populations there and everywhere else, and still have a continuing dispute though this would be confined to a smaller area. What exactly India gain by this? All the giving up was on India’s side and the trouble still continued.’60 Maulana Azad said that on the previous two–three days there seemed to be ‘a strong desire for a settlement, now this was not so obvious.’61 Iskander Mirza agreed that for his part he did not think it either feasible to have joint control of the Kashmir valley or for a transfer of territories in the Jammu province to Pakistan, so as to prevent access from Jammu to the valley. Therefore the Ramban area ‘should for the present be attached to the valley. If the valley goes to Pakistan later, Ramban would also go.’62 However, Mirza also observed that they could not go against the Governor General’s directive and that ‘the gap between the two positions was wide and it is better to go back to the negotiations of 1953’.63 Nehru pointed out that ‘they appeared to be millions of miles away in their respective approaches. In fact they were apparently further away from each other than they had been at any time during the last seven or eight years.’ The Governor General’s proposals ‘were such as could never be agreed to by any government in India’.64 Maulana Azad also observed that ‘the Pakistan representatives had themselves pointed out that in two important matters they were not feasible, that is, joint control over the valley and the transfer of certain areas. What was the good of going back to 1953?’65 Finally, the communique as issued stated that there had been a ‘cordial and full’ discussion of all aspects of the Kashmir problem and that both sides ‘approached these subjects in a friendly spirit and with a desire to explore every avenue to reach settlements of pending problems’. The entire exercise ended as a damp squib without reaching any conclusion or solutions.

The India–China War, MIG 21 Deal and the Kashmir Talks Most authorities agree that the military assistance offered to India in the aftermath of the border war with China in 1962 proved ‘to be limited in amount, quality and time’. The total value of the arms and equipment actually delivered over a period of three years was less

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than $100 million. The material were mostly for communications, air defence systems, etc. and was first-time equipment. ‘The most modern weapons and planes were not supplied.’66 India had asked for $500 million worth of military hardware, aircraft, etc. President Kennedy was most willing to supply these, but Harold Macmillan would not agree and later, ‘negotiations for modern supersonic aircraft fell through, as did talks about refurbishing the ageing Indian Navy’.67 In fact, military assistance received from the western countries fell short of Indian expectations; it turned out to be, to use the American expression, ‘peanuts’. The Indian Defence Minister, Y. B. Chavan, informed the Indian Parliament on 17 August 1963 of the following: Canada’s contribution was Rs 27 million worth of military equipment of which Rs 11.4 million worth had been supplied till August 1963. Australia had offered arms, notably rifles, mortars, ammunition and woollen garments. New Zealand had provided butter fat. Outside the Commonwealth countries, France had promised Rs 20 million worth of spares as free gifts and West Germany had supplied winter clothing worth Rs 40 million. These details were furnished by P. I. Eldridge in his The Politics of Foreign Aid to India (1969).68 Eldridge was silent on the quantum of military assistance actually provided by Britain, which suggested that probably nothing worth mentioning was given. He was diplomatic when he wrote: ‘Information concerning British military assistance does not appear to be very extensive.’69 After the Indian debacle of October 1962 and war with China, the US President was deeply concerned about Chinese intentions on India. He readily responded to Jawaharlal Nehru’s frantic requests for military assistance to build up defence against future mountain warfare. In December 1962, Harold Macmillan and President Kennedy met at Nassau to consider arming India in the face of an attack by China. The Nassau meeting was also attended by Sir Alec DouglasHome, British Foreign Secretary, and Duncan Sandys, Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, apart from several British officers. President Kennedy was assisted in his talks by Phillips Talbot, Robert McNamara, Goerge Ball and Kenneth Galbraith. The latter noted in his Ambassador’s Journal: A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years (1969): We had a long talk on India and Chinese matters with the British being very reluctant. They do not believe the Chinese are a major threat. They are mostly concerned with holding operations to a level of cost which they can afford to share. Sandys was there and talked a great deal. Home was

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not impressive. Nor was Macmillan for that matter. I did not feel that our people recognised the full magnitude of the task or the opportunity. It was a cheeseparing operation throughout.70

Finally, with a good bit of haggling from the British side, the US agreed to give $60 million worth of military aid to be matched by the Commonwealth countries aid of $60 million. The idea was to provide air defence equipment, transport aircraft and road building equipment for India’s Border Roads Organisation. Galbraith felt ‘very disappointed’. He noted: ‘By late afternoon, all imagination had been removed from the exercise. A great opportunity to bring India into much closer working association with the western country (and to save a great deal on Independent Indian defense expenditures), an opportunity sensed only by President, Talbot and myself, had been largely dulled over.’71 Indeed, an opportunity to befriend India had been lost. An Indian ICS officer involved in the purchase of arms for Indian defence, Y. D. Gundevia, felt that the year 1962–63 was ‘a veritable watershed in this study of orbit. We have so far taken nothing from the communist East.’72 India was accused of moving into the Soviet orbit, while at the same time asking for aid from the West. First, it must be stressed that the so-called ‘aid’ was not ‘free gifts’ but was in the form of loans carrying interest and the loans given to India were due to be returned within an agreed timeframe. Second, as will be seen from the following discussion, the arms purchase from the West was not forthcoming. Behind the MIG deal with the Soviet Union, the history of arms ‘not available’ for India must be told to have a proper perspective of India’s quest for arms from other quarters than the western market. India was naturally ‘alarmed by the spectre of a hostile, unstable and militarily oriented Pakistan supported by a “superpower” ’. These were not Nehru’s words but those of an American political scientist, Norman Palmer. He also gave figures of actual aid received by Pakistan between 1954 and 1965 which amounted to more than $1.5 billion, i.e., $1500 million worth of arms, mostly free.73 By 1955, massive arms supplies to Pakistan had arrived from the US. As a consequence, India had perforce to arm itself adequately. Gundevia informs, ‘it was proposed to buy 150 Centurian tanks to match the American patton tanks and quite a large number of Canberras and Hunters in England. Other purchases were light AMX tanks and Mystere aircrafts from France. The deal was completed by the end of December 1956.’74 Later, a British aircraft carrier, Vikrant, was

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procured for the Indian navy. Also, it had been agreed to manufacture midget fighter planes, the tiny Gnats and the Orpheus engines in India.75 Gundevia tells us: We paid for all this in hard cash — very hard currency for us. This was the price for our non-alignment. Pakistan did not have to pay a penny. Their bills were met by the American taxpayer — the virtue of being a treaty ally. But the beauty of it is that, despite all these very substantial and very costly purchases by us from the West, our buying no arms whatsoever from the dreaded East, the Western world never stopped complaining that Jawaharlal Nehru’s non-alignment was leaning left.

Then came 1962–63, which changed the situation, Gundevia terming it as a ‘watershed’ in the story of arms purchases.76 India’s quest for getting military hardware from the US did not succeed. Elsworth Bunker, the US ambassador to New Delhi, strongly urged the US President to sympathetically consider the Indian request for arms. Bunker stated that India was concerned about Pakistan’s acquisition of Sidewinder missiles and F104s from the US, since these had virtually turned the Indian air force ‘obsolete vis-a-vis that of Pakistan’.77 He felt that the US should also offer ‘to sell similar equipment to India’ and surmised that India was bound to seek British Sidewinders which were much more expensive than in the US. Such purchases were bound to ‘place additional burden on the Indian budget’, which had already earmarked an expenditure of $250 million for roads and communications along the northern border. President Eisenhower ‘saw no reason why we should not offer to sell similar equipment to the Indians.’78 It is instructive to note that Eisenhower had written to Nehru on 24 February 1954, allaying any fears from the Indian mind about arms supply to Pakistan. He gave ‘a guarantee that the military aid is not in any way directed against India’. Also, he had assured Nehru that if the Indian government ‘require military aid of a type contemplated by our military security legislation, please be assured that your request would receive my most sympathetic consideration’.79 It is obvious in a fit of absentmindedness everybody, including Eisenhower, seemed to have forgotten about the earlier assurances. Yet, when the Indian government sought to purchase 25 Fairchild C-119 packets with spares and 30c-119s for support of road construction operation, one or two Lockhead Hercules C-130s and Sidewinder missiles, US Ambassador Rountree at Karachi objected:

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‘Any favourable response to the Indian request. . .would have an extremely adverse effect on our relations with Pakistan.’80 This matter came up for a high-level discussion in the Department of State. The Secretary of State, after considering the whole subject, informed the President that it was not advisable to offer to sell Sidewinders and other military hardware to India. He wrote: In view of the present delicate state of our relations with Pakistan and the damage which will be inflicted upon them should the Pakistanis learn that we have decided to sell Sidewinders to India prior to the delivery of the Sidewinders already promised to Pakistan, we hope to persuade the Indians to purchase the equivalent weapon from the United Kingdom.81

In fact, by 1963, Pakistan was equipped with several squadrons of F104 star fighters, F86 Sabrejet fighters and B57 bombers. In May 1964, Y. B. Chavan, the Defence Minister of India, went to the US again in search of arms. The US Defence Secretary, Robert McNamara, told Chavan: ‘Mr. Minister, your Airforce is like a museum. I wonder whether you are aware of the variety of aircraft in your Air Force. You are still operating with Hunters, Spitfires, Vampires, Liberators, Harvards exotic names of World War II vintage. All these are worthy of finding a place in a Museum.’82 He further suggested, ‘till India disbanded that fleet it was no use acquiring any sophisticated aircraft’.83 Nothing from the US was agreed to or offered. As far as the UK government was concerned, a lot of disagreements were rumoured, as stated by P. I. Eldridge, over the ‘incoporation of the Orpheus engines into HF 24 fighters’ which Indians wanted. The Guardian, London (26 October 1961) gave an account of these rumoured problems over the deal.84 Thus far, India’s arms capability was totally dependent on British supplies. The rationale behind not offering military assistance to India was eloquently articulated by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs to the US ambassador in India, Elsworth Bunker, on 13 July 1960. The fundamental question, as I see it, is how to build stability, progress and a community of free world purpose in a divided South Asia. The divisions remain severe and suspicions continue high, much as we hope to assist in their abatement. Between Pakistan and India it is certainly clear that the latter has virtually all the cards, and that the gap between them, in terms of national power, is bound to widen as time goes on. India has the self-assurance that comes from knowing that its achievements to

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date and its potential growth have earned for it a position of real and everincreasing importance in the world. In my opinion, now that even limited warfare required a reasonably strong financial and industrial base, India really has nothing to fear from Pakistan’s military establishment even if a momentary ‘qualitative superiority’ in some individual weapon crops up from time to time as a result of our policy of gradual modernisation of that establishment.85

Two inferences can be drawn. First, India was a powerful neighbour; its potential strength was great and it had already acquired an important position in the world because of the progress made in diverse fields. Hence, it had nothing to fear from Pakistan and its defence equipment did not need to be strengthened. Second, it accepted the position that Pakistan would have ‘qualitative superiority’ in arms and consequent warfare. This obviously meant also that the US was determined to cut India to size vis-a-vis Pakistan by raising the latter’s armed status. The second raison d’être advanced by the secretary related to Pakistan’s firm commitment to the West. ‘Pakistan has committed itself to us and the West. In becoming our wholehearted military ally Pakistan has undertaken real responsibilities and risks, making its territory available to us for a series of projects hightly important to our national security. A military alliance these days of hectic technological change can’t be a static thing, and Pakistan naturally looks to us for further complement of our alliances in the light of each new major development on the world scene.’86 Another major consideration why India was not favoured with arms assistance was argued out thus: ‘. . .if our mutual security system is to remain intact, we must show Pakistan — and many of our other allies — that substantial benefits flow from a military alignment with us against the communist bloc. We cannot therefore afford to undermine the stand by adopting a policy of automatically offering to sell to India in terms of equipment which we provide to Pakistan.’87 [Emphasis in original] Another dominant argument was that ‘an ally should certainly be given better treatment than a “neutralist” country’.88 [Emphasis in original] The inescapable conclusion which must be drawn from the above well-considered articulation from almost the highest quarters in the Department of State in Washington was that US military assistance to India was just not feasible and hence India must look elsewhere for its defence needs. Did the US want India to remain

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for ever dependent on Britain for its defence equipments? That was the crux of the situation. If not, why should the western powers complain if India desired to explore other markets for her needs? The genesis of the MIG deal must therefore be traced to the US–UK non-compliance to the Indian desire to the safeguard its national interest by adequately and suitably arming itself for the defence of its territory.

It must be stressed that Indian moves to acquire arms from the Soviet Union came after years of Jawaharlal Nehru’s prime ministership. It was also true that India’s defence policy formulations were based on the fear of Pakistan rather than of China. Pakistan became a military ally of the West not with the objective of fighting communism but to fight its enemy, India, and to acquire Kashmir. Often, the leaders of Pakistan had stated the above being their prime motive in joining the western bloc. They needed arms to equip themselves for the purpose, as stated above. These were startling but basic facts. President Kennedy’s perception of Pakistan’s military capability and its burgeoning military power was quite accurate when he said that the Pakistani leader (especially Ayub Khan) wanted ‘to use the United States to press India over Kashmir’. He also ‘doubted’ if ‘Ayub feared India militarily’.89 Nor did he believe that India would seriously consider attacking Pakistan, ‘a move that would cost them $1 billion in economic aid’.90 Kennedy was disenchanted with Pakistan: ‘We [aren’t] getting much for Pakistan either. About all their alliance [is] worth to us the intelligence facilities.’91 He saw India ‘as a potential partner in containing China’. Pakistan regarded India as a major threat to its own security. The US perceived China as its major foe in this area. Ayub saw China as a potential partner against India, as Dennis Kux’s analysis aptly shows.92 Another lingering misconception from which the western powers suffered was that Pakistan, being a small country of 40 million people with scant sources, could not be a threat to a large country like India with its enormous resources and population of over 300 million. It must be pointed out that Japan, a group of small islands, was able to triumph over Russia in spite of its vast empire extending from the Baltic Sea in the west to the Pacific Ocean in the east in 1905, when the Russo-Japanese War was fought and won by Japan. The quality of fighting personnel supported by quality war materials and

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fully trained in warfare and equipment is vital in the conduct and success of a war. Pakistan, with the support of the western powers for its arms build-up and equipment, had a distinct advantage over India. After the Chinese ran over Indian defence and the territory, it was realised how ill-prepared and ill-equipped India was to meet any challenge from its neighbours. Jawaharlal Nehru, in spite of his greatness and vision as a statesman, lived in a ‘makebelieve’ world, especially with regard to his assumptions on China. He stated that a military attack on India by China was not rational. India was defended by the Himalayas and geography was against China. In order to reach the border between Tibet and India, the Chinese had to pass over Tibet which was ‘a most inhospitable country in the world. They had put 30,000 troops into Tibet but they had found they could not support them there and already withdrew soon. . . .’93 These were rather simplistic formulations which failed to consider the nature of struggle between ‘communism’ and ‘capitalism’ as well as the ability of the Chinese to overcome difficulties posed by the inhospitable Tibet and insurmountable Himalayan frontiers. Moreover, the most important fact which Nehru seems to have underplayed was the Chinese desire to be recognised as the leader of Asia and eventually to dominate Asia. It must be said to the credit of Nehru, however, that his assumptions were also based on his talks with Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier, during his Indian visit in June 1954. In all, his private talks with Enlai lasted a total of 13 hours and the conclusion that China wanted peace in Southeast Asia was reached. But Prime Minister U Nu of Burma was not so sure of China’s peaceful intentions when he visited Burma next forewarned Nehru.94 Second, Nehru was convinced of the possibilities of China pursuing a policy independent of Russia. Third, he believed that a split would occur between the two communist giants after Stalin’s death, since Mao Tse Tung would consider himself to be ‘the leading communist in the world in the tradition of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin and that the Soviet successors to Stalin would reject this claim’.95 Nehru was also aware that China was a ‘near and powerful neighbour’ and he did not want to offend it. After four months of Zhou Enlai’s visit, Nehru paid a return visit to China. N. Raghavan Pillai, the Foreign Secretary, accompanied him. He felt that Zhou ‘considered India as a useful bridge between China and the Western world’. Also, the West considered India’s relations with China ‘beneficial in so far as it would lead China to moderation’.96

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But these hopes were somewhat belied after Nehru’s talk with Mao Tse Tung. It was generally believed that Nehru was greatly disturbed after the meeting. Sultan Mohammad Khan, Pakistani ambassador to Peking, revealed in his Memoirs and Reflections of a Pakistani Diplomat (1998): ‘Nehru was in a sombre mood and had said to senior members of his delegation that after his talks with Mao, he was pessimistic about relations with China, and foresaw a conflict in the future.’97 S. M. Khan had met Zhou Enlai several times during his tenure as ambassador and reminisced that ‘Zhou was very much his own man, and did not wish to be seen as making his debut on the world scene under Nehru’s patronage.’98 This was with reference to Nehru’s attempt to ‘introduce’ Zhou at Bandung Conference, which was ‘resented’ by him. Also, Khan writes that during the latter’s visit to Delhi, Mrs Indira Gandhi, acting as hostess for her father at a reception for Zhou, greeted him dressed in Tibetan clothes given her by the Dalai Lama. ‘Chou reflected to this in a talk I had with him in 1966, and said that he was sure Mrs. Gandhi was conveying a political message on that occasion that India had an abiding interest in Tibet.’99 Mao Tse Tung had mocked at India’s non-aligned policy right from the start. ‘It is impossible to sit on the fence’, Mao wrote in 1949; ‘there is no third road. . .neutrality is merely a camouflage’.100 Mao also rejected ‘the policy of peaceful co-existence, as of no consequence’, although he had endorsed ‘five principles’ or ‘Panch Shila’.101 In May 1955, soon after the Bandung Conference, maps were displayed in Peking ‘which showed Kashmir as Chinese territory. More than 50000 square miles of Indian territory in the Himalayan range was claimed by China.’102 On Indian protests, the Chinese lulled Nehru’s suspcions by declaring that these maps were of the British days and had been shown by mistake. Meanwhile, India continued to support China’s admission to the United Nations as vigorously as possible, hoping to mollify Chinese intransigence against India. By doing so, it came in conflict with the US as well. While Nehru was impatient with ‘the persistent obstinacy’ of the US in refusing to accept the realities of the situation in China, the US opposition to Chinese entry into the United Nations was so strong that President Eisenhower is reported to have told St Laurent, the Canadian Prime Minister, in 1956: ‘If communist China is admitted to the United Nations, the United Nations will leave the United States and the United States will leave the United Nations.’103

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By 1959, Chinese incursions in the Himalayan borders, both in the western range and the east, became more frequent and three major military clashes took place between them, but Defence Minister Krishna Menon underplayed these conflicts. On 10 January 1960, he declared at Tejpur that ‘the India–China border dispute was not of such magnitude as could precipitate war’.104 The Chinese noted that during this period India moved closer to the US. Between 1959–62 American aid to India had more than doubled than what it had received between 1947–59. The conclusion of the Chinese was that the Nehru government was serving US ‘imperialism’ and hence ‘opposed China’.105 Also, the Chinese denunciation of Nehru and India became more and more persistent and public from this time onwards. It was against this background that India’s search for weapons and air transport system which would be suitable for mountain warfare began. Most of the Indian weapons systems in the 1950s were ‘almost exclusively British in origin’.106 All ships belonging to the Indian navy were British. ‘Some of them [were] of little more than historic value.’107 The Indian air force was all British, mainly the Canberras, Hunters and Gnats. Some additions were made from France. Nehru, however, was determined to follow vigorously a policy of ‘self-reliance’ even in matters of defence production. The Gnats with their orpheus engines were being built in the Bangalore aeronautical factory. The Indian battle tank, Vijayanta, was being manufactured in India with a British gun on it. Also, the Indian government had begun assembling British aircrafts or partially manufacturing them in India.108 The US embassy in India sensed that there was a possibility of India purchasing some Soviet MI-4 helicopters. ‘One of the enticements of the Soviet deal was the apparent Soviet offer to consider licensing the MI-4 for production in India.’ The US was concerned; the purchase of a few helicopters from the Soviet Union was not very dangerous but ‘the introduction of technicians into close contact with the Indian military forces would pose very serious problems in connection with possible procurement of advanced or highly classified weapons from the United States’.109 Elsworth Bunker, US ambassador to New Delhi, in his telegram to the Department of State informed that the Indian government was contemplating purchasing eight Soviet helicopters and eight transport planes and suggested that the US could make a ‘firm offer to supply in package deal helicopters, aircrafts, roadbuilding equipment. . .for Indian border building programme’. The package ‘should be geared to surplus value and

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sufficiently attractive to offset Soviet rock-bottom prices and the fact that Soviet offer [is] on rupee payment basis’. 110 In reply, it was stated that US firms would not accept rupee pay-ment, and the Department felt after ‘exhaustive exploration’ that it could find ‘no basis on which civilian package deal as porposed therein can be authorised’.111 The US Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the sale of Soviet aircraft to India as also the manufacture of MI-4 helicopters under the licensing agreement in India. They felt that these matters ‘have relatively minor consequences in a narrow short-term sense. However, the broader and longer range aspects of the purchase or manufacture of Soviet aircraft have much greater significance.’112 The Joint Chiefs further advised the government: ‘the most productive way to counter Soviet moves in this area would be to accelerate the expansion and development of the Indian aircraft and related military equipment industries. For example, the current Indian-Lockheed negotiations. . .could probably be speedily concluded provided the United States assisted in the difficult foreign exchange problem. . . .Without such assistance Western companies cannot successfully compete with a subsidised Soviet program.’113 Second, advice as offered was: ‘While the cost to the United States of guarantees, loans, conversion of soft currencies, etc., would undoubtedly be substantial, the cost of this form of subsidisation would probably compare favourable with the cost of grant military aid and would certainly be cheaper and more productive than to counter Soviet offers through sale of US equipment at subsidised discounts.’114 Nothing transpired, meanwhile, from the US side on the matter. Kenneth Galbraith also stated that two squadrons of Supersonic F 104s, F 86 Sabrejets and B-57 bombers, along with the most modern equipments of different makes to Pakistan had been supplied by 1956–58. The Indian request to sell C-130s which were on loan from the US for use in the north-east after the Chinese war was refused. Instead of sending them home after the completion of the assignment, an Indian proposal to buy them was mooted but was refused.115 The question of procuring and manufacturing MIG 21 s was mooted to counterbalance Pakistani preparedness on the one hand and to meet the challenge posed by the Chinese in the north-east on the other after reports of border military clashes were received.

The proposal to procure MIGs from the Soviet Union became ‘the major international issue’, as Jawaharlal Nehru told the Indian

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Parliament on 26 June 1962.116 That the MIG deal evoked so much opposition in western circles was beyond the comprehension of Indians. But before we deal with the MIG deal, it is worth mentioning that the total value of negotiated military assistance with the USSR was a mere $130 million till 1964.117 On the other hand Pakistan had received, according to one estimate, $1.5 billion worth of tanks, planes and a submarine between 1955 and 1965.118 According to Krishna Menon, who resigned as India’s Defence Minister after the Sino-Indian war of 1962, the US had ‘given the Pakistanis as much as a billion dollar worth of [military] equipment which in real as distinct from money book value terms is probably about two and half billion dollars’ worth of military hardware. These were received by Pakistan according to him, between 1954 and 1960.119 As far as the USA’s military assistance to India was concerned, India had entered into a mutual defence assistance agreement in 1951 with the US government, which for all practical purposes had become obsolete. The major items provided to India under the agreement, according to Norman Palmer, were 800 Sherman tanks of World War II vintage supplied in 1956 and 55 C-119 transport planes in 1959 and 1960. They were sold at concessional rates, and were not military grant or aid.120 Of greater significance was of course the MIG deal. According to the agreement, Soviet technical and capital assistance would be available for the establishment of three MIG factories in India — at Koraput (Orissa), Nasik (Maharashtra) and Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh). Also, the entire deal was on the rupee payment basis. Nehru informed that the defence forces were ‘agitated ever since the United States gave these Sabrejets to Pakistan’. These had made the entire Indian air force almost obsolete. Given the history of India’s negotiations with the western powers (with both the US and Britain), he said, ‘we had, in fact, thought of Russia only because the British had refused us delivery’ of the aircraft needed by us.121 In his letter to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, he again reiterated that ‘the military equipment of Pakistan is much superior to what India has. We sought UK’s help but found that UK was not in a position then to supply us with suitable aircraft. Subsequently, we thought after fully examining the matter decided to buy Russian IL 28 which suited our requirements and the prices of which were relatively moderate.’122 Nehru was referring to the deal about the Russian IL28 sought some six years ago, i.e., in 1956. This matter came up for discussion with

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the UK Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, when he visited Delhi on 4 March 1956. Nehru told Selwyn Lloyd that the Gnat contract with the British ‘was on the point of being finalised’ and ‘improvements had been made in the Canberra’, but India wanted some aircraft suitable to match ‘those supplied by the United States’. Nehru said that IL28 was ‘liked by our Air people. . . .The quick delivery particularly was important. I said that I realised the desire of the British to preserve their secrets of their new devices, etc. and of Gnat. There was no reason why Russian technicians should have access to them and we would see to it that they do not.’123 India’s proposal to buy Soviet IL28 aircraft was not kept a wellguarded secret. In fact, John Foster Dulles was the next VVIP visitor to New Delhi. On 9 and 10 March, the Prime Minister of India and the US Secretary of State discussed issues affecting the world. The talks lasted for five and a half hours. During the course of conversation, Nehru informed Dulles of the background to why ‘we have thought of purchasing aircraft IL28 from Russia. . . .I told him that this was pure business transaction for us and involved no commitment or attention of Soviet technicians here. . . Mr. Dulles replied that he could not prevent us from exercising our discretion in this matter. But undoubtedly any purchase by us of Soviet aircraft would create a strong and adverse reaction in the US.’124 Earlier, Nehru had told Dulles about the US indiscretion in arming Pakistan to the hilt. Obviously, the then British Prime Minister Anthony Eden also was disturbed about the purchase of Soviet aircraft and asked from Nehru an undertaking that India would consult the British before shopping for aircraft elsewhere. Nehru drew this fact to Harold Macmillan’s attention when the MIG deal created an uproar in the western world in 1962. He told Macmillan that he had written to Eden on 23 March 1956 that the ‘GOI could not give any undertaking for the future. We would like to consult with UK Govt. and take our decisions.’125 Yet again, despite India’s strong criticism and deep concern at the US military aid given to Pakistan, the supersonic aircraft F 104s were provided to Pakistan soon after. Nehru observed: ‘We also sought American F 104s, UK’s Lightenings and French Mirage.’ None of them offered these aircraft to India. Nehru pointed out it was then that the MIG deal came to be considered and it was still at the consideration stage. Nehru also told Macmillan that the American, UK and French engines were ‘too complex and sophisticated and they couldn’t be manufactured by Indians. The MIG engines were

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found to be suitable and could be manufactured in India. India’s defence experts chose MIG 21s which was being considered for Indian defence.’126 He also observed: ‘We couldn’t risk our defence since Pakistan constantly talked of war with India.’127 In his speech to the Parliament, Nehru said that India had considered various aircraft in England, America, France and Russia. ‘They have all agreed that we can buy where we like and what we like. Nevertheless, they expressed their regret and sorrow that we should go and buy elsewhere, other than from their own markets. And behind it all is the question of aid.’128 As will be seen in the latter part of this discussion, it was Harold Macmillan who had strongly recommended to President Kennedy that economic aid being given to India should be discontinued. Meanwhile, Dean Rusk, US Secretary of State and Lord Home, the British Foreign Secretary, met on 25 June 1962; during this meeting, the MIG deal was also discussed. ‘Mr. Rusk said that both US and UK had just come under Mr. Nehru’s very heavy fire. If the Indians pursued their proposal to obtain fighter aircraft from Soviet Union, the position in the US would be very difficult indeed. The Executive would not wish to cut off US aid but Congress was in a very nasty mood. Senators Humphrey, Fulbright and Mansfield all normally sympathetic towards US aid, were most incensed at India’s attitude over the aircraft.’129 Both of them also exchanged notes on who would succeed Nehru — Desai or S. K. — Patil Lord Home volunteering that then ‘Krishna Menon’s tactics wouldn’t work’.130 Meanwhile, President Kennedy’s message was delivered to Nehru on 15 June 1962, asking the government of India to defer the decision ‘until Galbraith had had an opportunity for dicusssions’. Also, it stated that he would let the government have ‘precise details of the western offer and would also be fully aware of the conclusions that would probably flow from turning down such an offer in favour of the Russians’.131 President Kennedy also maintained a close dialogue with Prime Minister Harold Macmillan on the subject and wanted to come to terms regarding Lightenings Mark II. Besides, Kennedy suggested: ‘Perhaps you would consider an interim offer of some of the Mark I’s and I’ As. I understand you have some to be replaced later by new modern [ones].’ This might help ‘at least buy us time to dredge up other alternatives’.132 Kenneth Galbraith, US ambassador to India, has claimed a certain degree of warmth and friendship with Nehru. He argued with Nehru that the President was having ‘trouble with the Congress’ on the

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issue, and advised the ‘desirability of considering the specific British alternative’. Galbraith also felt ‘that planes were not very relevant to Indian defense anyway. He [Nehru] said no decision was imminent and the British alternative would be considered. . . .I hit especially on the theme that the word MIG has become a highly evocative term like U-boat and this especially likely to arouse emotions.’133 He felt that ‘he has managed to make some progress towards at least postponement of decision and believes Nehru is worried and would be glad to find some way out’.134 Macmillan sent his Commonwealth Secretary, Duncan Sandys, described by some as ‘the tireless hatchet man of successive governments’, to Karachi and then to New Delhi ‘to try to stop the MIG deal’.135 He trusted Sandys for his energy and strength. He had made him, it was remarked, ‘the most powerful Defence Minister’ since Winston Churchill, i.e., as long as he remained the son-in-law of Churchill. His political stars began waning after his divorce with Dianne Churchill. He made his presence felt everywhere. Macmillan’s Press Secretary, Harold Evans, tells us (1981) about the tug of war between ‘Duncan Sandys stamping around the room, jaw sticking out and saying that he won’t have any interference from Foreign Office.’136 Macmillan ‘was quite supportive to Duncan Sandys since he is very strong. He is a great help to me.’137 Duncan Sandys met President Ayub Khan of Pakistan and Mohammad Ali, the Foreign Minister. They agreed that the ‘progressive infiltration into the armed forces’ of India by the Russians was fraught with serious consequences. He worked hard to convince them that ‘the only hope of frustrating the MIG deal was for us to make the Indians an equally attractive counter offer’. After a good deal of argument, it seems, the Pakistanis agreed that the British intervention on this issue was in ‘the best interest of Pakistan’.138 From Karachi, Sandys flew over to New Delhi to meet Jawaharlal Nehru. John Kenneth Galbraith tells us that Duncan Sandys ‘is not popular with Nehru. He is exceedingly self-confident and reminds the Prime Minister, I fear, of the kind of Englishman who put him in jail.’139 Galbraith also informs that in Washington, ‘we worked out an arrangement with the British to counter the MIG offer of the Soviets. We would under write part of the British fighters and the development of the engine for the Indian supersonic fighter.’ ‘At the same time the President disliked the deal, he called to say so. “Why should we spend $40 million to save the Indians from a foolish bargain?” . . .I

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pointed out that the problem was to support our friends in the Indian government and give them an alternative. Less friendly people were hoping to throw a hooker into US–Indian relations by this action.’140 Meanwhile, Macmillan ‘went back on their Lightning offer for reasons which had mostly, I would judge to do with the cost. This came in a letter from Macmillan to Kennedy and crossed up Sandys whom we had finally persuaded to offer something definite. Sandys got off an indignant letter to Macmillan. . . .My own guess is that the Indians are settled on the MIGs in any case, but I cannot be sure.’141 There was another interesting entry in Galbraith’s Ambassador’s Journal: A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years (1969): ‘At noon I signed some $275 million worth of loan agreements. I worried a little lest they would be reported in the US immediately on top of MIG discussion with Congressional static. ‘They buy MIGs, we lend money.’142 The energetic Duncan Sandys, on the other hand, left no stone unturned to sabotage the deal. He met the President of India, Dr Rajendra Prasad, who informed him that Nehru was ‘worried about American and British reactions which have been much stronger than he foresaw and that he might well be glad to find some way out, if this did not involve too much loss of face’.143 It also transpired that Prasad and Morarji Desai had advised Nehru ‘to put into cold storage for several months this business’. This would, of course, be ‘hotly opposed by Menon. After a lapse of time there is a chance that the whole thing be quietly buried.’ On his part, Sandys promised: ‘Having pushed the Indians in the defensive, I would regard it as a great mistake to relax our pressure at this moment.’144 Sandys’ meeting with Nehru turned out to be quite revealing and disturbingly frank. According to the Commonwealth Secretary, Nehru admitted that Indian requirement for the fighters had arisen from the supply of F104 supersonic fighters to Pakistan. ‘Indian public opinion compelled him to make some counter move.’ Second, ‘MIGs were being offered at a price cheaper than any other comparable aircraft. Also, according to the Indian experts, Mirages were better suited than the Lightnings.’145 Sandys told Nehru ‘that we were concerned at the lack of fairness shown by the Indian government in the matter’. He went on to express his ‘surprise and disappointment’ at not having been consulted about the proposal and finally ended with the following remarks, as reported by himself: ‘In view of our close relationship, I felt we had a right to ask that before any decision was taken we should

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be given a full opportunity to make alternate proposals for meeting Indian requirements.’ Nehru did not reciprocate to this, however, when Sandys mentioned that ‘US aid would be affected by this move of India’. Nehru replied, as recorded by Sandys: Nehru said he was sorry if the contact between us has not been as close as we would have wished. He considered that this was a matter for the Indian government to decide for themselves and that whilst they would naturally inform the British government of any decision reached, they did not feel that they had any obligation to consult us beforehand’.146

While these confabulations were going on in New Delhi, President Kennedy was busy working out a formula with Harold Macmillan. Referring to Nehru’s press conference remarks about the MIG deal, the US President felt that ‘it is still in our mutual interest to forestall, if possible, a crucial step toward Indian acceptance of the USSR as a main source of arms supply’. He therefore declared: We emphatically support the Orpheus engine offer, and will finance seventy five percent of the three million pounds additional you estimate is required to develop it. . . .We believe it is equally important to offer some aircraft to provide an alternative comparable to the MIG offer. We share your view that reasonable comparable soft currency terms will also carry great weight with the Indians, and that we should allow payment in rupees to the extent necessary. 147

President Kennedy was so anxious to remove Russian influence and befriend India that he offered ‘to sell India a single squadron (12 aircraft) of the Lightning Mark II for rupees, at a stated price of 300,000 pounds, plus accessories which I suppose would be about 3 million pounds or little more than half of the 5 million estimate for the two squadrons. In addition, we on the US side should offer to provide nine C-130 transport planes as a sale for rupees. The latter would be left to Galbraith, but Sandys could refer to indications from us in this direction.’148 He further observed: ‘If you are prepared to do this, we would hope that you could bear one half of the real cost of the fighters which would total about 10.2 million pounds.’149 He confided in Macmillan that he had already sent a message to New Delhi. ‘We are bending every effort to bring home to Nehru how a MIG purchase might gravely prejudice Congressional approval of continued massive US aid. . . .Sandys too could certainly mention the great concern in Washington lest a MIG deal undermine our whole aid program.’150

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On 9 June 1962, President Kennedy had assured Macmillan that should they feel reluctant to offer Lightning Mark II on the ground that their own defence capability might suffer immediately, ‘we are prepared to do whatever is necessary to fill any temporary gap in your defences and to make the tough choice otherwise attractive. McNamara tells me that there are a number of possibilities to this end including a loan of F104s for your defense, and I am prepared to have him or some of his top people come over immediately to discuss this with Watkinson.’151 None of these arguments helped change Harold Macmillan’s mind. In his ‘top-secret’ message of 17 June 1962, he did not agree with the President on his offer of aircraft to India, nor was he agreeable to dilute or share the cost involved. He showed little appreciation of the US concern and seemed to believe in the efficacy of sending ‘clear warnings’, if not ‘threats’ to India to bring them to their ‘heels’. Macmillan, in fact, was an imperceptibly tough customer; his smooth mannerism was mostly a facade. He was deeply committed to Pakistan and never was a great friend of India. He never once came to argue in favour of India on any issue whatsoever and reminded one of the last of the Cold War warriors in Britain. He concluded his message to the President with the following stately advice: My conclusion therefore is that the only factor which might bring the Indians to heel would be the fear of having a substantial large aid which they receive from the United States. It seems to us therefore that the best course might be for you to send a personal message to Nehru warning him that a decision by India to buy armaments from Russia might prejudice the attitude of Congress so gravely as to endanger seriously India’s future prospect of obtaining continued aid on the present scale from the United States.152

In the ultimate analysis, nothing definite was offered from the side of the US and Britain. The ‘warnings’ and ‘threats’ did not seem to have an impact on Jawaharlal Nehru. The fact of the matter was that India was truly worried about safeguarding the integrity and sovereignty of the country. The government of India needed to be fully assured that its defence needs would be met. It were already too late in the task of defence preparedness, as the dramatic Chinese assault on Indian borders with the consequent humilitating defeat of India showed. Meanwhile, however, considering all aspects of the deal, which gave India very favourable terms like the rupee payment and the Soviet

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Union agreeing to provide the technical know-how and capital for the manufacture and assembly of MIG 21s in India. The Indo-Soviet agreement was officially announced on 17 August 1962. Within two months after the signing of the deal, the Chinese attacked India and ran over Indian defence and the territory. Also, they declared ceasefire unilaterally in November 1962 and withdrew to their former positions. Most reports say that the Chinese withdrew of their own accord after ‘teaching Indians a lesson’, but some people believe President Kennedy’s stern warning administered to China in the aftermath of the Cuban Crisis of October 1962 had the desired effect. He was reported to have warned: ‘If China advanced any further, they would be forcing the hands of the President of United States.’ Two days later, the Chinese withdrew.153 There was some truth in the above statement in the sense that Chinese withdrawal may not have been totally voluntary. John Kenneth Galbraith (1969) has this entry on the issue of withdrawal of China from the Indian soil: And the Chinese must have some impulse to caution; they can hardly be contemplating a war which might involve the Americans with their supply lines stretched over the high Himalayas. To add to this caution, I revived an idea yesterday which has been in the back of my mind for some time — that of having a carrier make a courtesy visit to Madras. This would have a calming effect on India and a deterring effect on China.154

On 29 November 1962, Galbraith wrote: ‘During the morning, I received substantial approval from Washington for the courtesy visit by one of our big carriers to the vicinity of Madras. I then went back to the Ministry of External Affairs to be assured that both the Prime Minister and M.J. Desai had fully discussed it.’155 It has not been possible to ascertain whether the ’carrier’ actually came into the Bay of Bengal, but the Chinese must have been sounded of the approaching menace, which they could hardly have ignored. The carrier was a ‘visible’ manifestation of this corrective influence, as Galbraith said.156 Almost immediately after India’s humiliating defeat in October 1962, Britain and the US put strong pressure on India to sort out the Kashmir problem with Pakistan. The US was not too keen to force the issue but Macmillan goaded it not to allow such an opportunity to slip from its hands. Macmillan’s as well as the prevailing opinion was that India would only agree under pressure for talks and not otherwise. Galbraith was of the view that ‘India must feel secure

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enough to confront China and so take their minds off Kashmir.’ The Americans wanted to push their arms help to an extent that India could gain confidence. Thereafter the Kashmir talks could be pursued. Macmillan candidly disagreed: ‘I felt very sceptical about this, and told the President frankly that in my view it would have the reverse effect: the more secure the Indians felt, the more instransigent they would be with the Pakistanis, who would then turn to the Chinese.’157 Nehru felt the pressure indeed and thought it politic to go in for talks with Pakistan. Between December 1962 and May 1963, six rounds of talks were held in Rawalpindi, Karachi, New Delhi and Calcutta (this forms the subject of the next section). Suffice to say here that the talks failed, mainly because Pakistan, being jubilant at the recent discomfiture of India, and knowing well that the full weight of the western powers was behind it, demanded 83,000 square miles from Jammu and Kashmir’s total territory of 84,000 square miles. Also, before the talks began, Pakistan reached an agreement with China in December 1962 to give away 2,000 square miles of Jammu and Kashmir to it. It was not considered necessary to consult India which claimed ‘sovereignty’ over the entire territory. Nor did Harold Macmillan question Pakistan for such a unilateral and inappropriate action. Against such a background, the talks began. The inevitable Duncan Sandys, moving to and fro, between New Delhi and Karachi to ‘assist’ and ‘advise’, was involved in the talks at some stage; so was Averell Harriman of the US. After Nehru’s death in May 1964, and thinking that India had been weakened by his departure from the scene, President Ayub Khan first began a guerrilla war in Kashmir by infiltration which soon developed into a full-scale war in 1965 between India and Pakistan. Most of the weapons supplied by the US — the F104 supersonic aircraft, the F86 Sabrejets and the formidable Patton tanks were used in the war. The US failed to stop the Pakistanis from using them against India. The Indians fought with the help of Canberras, Mysteres, Gnats and Centurian tanks, knocking out Pakistan’s 72 Sabrejets and 240 Patton tanks. India also suffered losses but Pakistan had been humbled even without MIGs, which had not been as yet operational.

Third Phase of Kashmir Talks, 1962–63 The main source of information on which our narrative and analysis of the earlier two phases of talks held between the prime ministers of India and Pakistan, rests mostly on the minutes of the talks, statements

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issued and letters exchanged between many dignitaries. The minutes of the conversations between the Prime Ministers were recorded the same day by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru himself. Therefore they are of immense value, being authentic, direct and comprehensive in details. They have now been published in the relevant volume of the Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru (SWJN ), second series. That invaluable advantage, however, did not exist in the Indo-Pak dialogue of 1962–63 since Nehru was not involved in them directly. Instead, the leader of the Indian delegation for the talks was Sardar Swaran Singh, who was ably assisted by the redoubtable Y. D. Gundevia, then Secretary of Commonwealth Relations in the Ministry of External Affairs in New Delhi. On the Pakistan side, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the Foreign Minister under President Ayub Khan, led the delegation. The official records of the time are not open for public consultation; nor are the Nehru Papers, which are an excellent source. They have been published as SWJN, but have not yet reached our milestone, i.e., 1962–63. However, this lacunae in some measure has been filled in by the delightful bits and pieces of information and anecdotes provided by Y. D. Gundevia in his memoirs (1984). Being an accomplished diplomat, he did not divulge official secrets but from the copious, candid and in part hilarious anecdotal account, it is possible to derive ample clues which enhance our understanding of the six rounds of talks held between India and Pakistan in 1962–63 in Rawalpindi, Karachi, New Delhi and Calcutta. Another fortunate coincidence was John Kenneth Galbraith, US ambassador in New Delhi, monitoring the discussions from behind the scenes. Two important dignitaries, the US Secretary of State, Averell Harriman, and Duncan Sandys, Commonwealth Secretary in the Harold Macmillan cabinet, were involved in ‘assisting’ and ‘advising’, during some stages of the dialogue, to reach an agreed solution of the vexed problem of Kashmir. Galbraith was called upon to lend a helping hand to Harriman in evolving a formula. He has left a day-to-day account of the happenings in his Ambassador’s Journal. A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years (1969) which is another valuable source of information of the talks. Sarvepalli Gopal’s biography of Jawaharlal Nehru, although based on access to Nehru’s personal papers and official records in the Ministry of External Affairs, does not break new ground. In fact, he also tends to lean on Gundevia’s account of the talks. Besides these, the media coverage, especially by some of the British dailies, viz. The Times, The Daily Telegraph and The Guardian provide information, adding spice to them.

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During the interregnum, i.e., between 1955 and 1962, talks did not take place on Kashmir; instead the parties were involved in acrimonious debates in the United Nations. Europe, however, was convulsed by political earthquakes in the shape of the Suez Canal crisis of 1956, the Hungarian revolution of October–November 1956, the ‘invasion’ of Goa by India in 1961, (as stated by Macmillan) and the Sino-India border war of October 1962. These had an important bearing on Indo-British relations to which we must devote some attention. Under the Prime Ministership of Harold Macmillan (1957–63), the Anglo-US alliance on defence was strengthened. At the same time, as a minister of defence from October 1954, he had strongly supported at home the development of the thermo-nuclear bomb programme, which, in his opinion, was essential not only ‘to win the Cold War’ but also ‘to prevent the hot war’.158 He wanted to upstage Britain in all spheres of modern weapons systems and believed in maintaining Britain’s ‘pride’ and self-respect. After the hydrogen bomb was exploded by Britain in May 1958, he declared: ‘We are not foolish enough to think we can live in this world without partners, . . .but we in Britain must not be afraid of making our point clear and defending our own interests. That’s why inspite of perverseness and agitation against me, I am determined that the country should be and remain a great nuclear power.’159 Selwyn Lloyd, the Foreign Secretary, agreed with the comments of The Economist on Britain’s relations with the US. ‘The PM is regarded as being dominated by the purpose of preserving the Anglo-US alliance and especial relationship. That has certainly been true during the Eisenhower period.’ Lloyd’s views confirmed: ‘The Foreign office have been loyal to Anglo-US relations to such an extent that I have tried from time to time to try to impress the importance of renaissant Europe.’160 One of the explosive situations which dominated the world scene in 1956 was the Anglo-French intervention on the Suez Canal issue. The Suez Crisis of 1956 was avoidable and the situation could have been controlled without undue damage. But the unilateral step taken by the Egyptian President, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, by nationalising the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956 provoked strong retaliation on the part of the British and the French. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden proclaimed he would not allow the Egyptians to press their ‘thumb on our wind pipe’. The British owned 45 per cent

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shares of the Suez Canal Company; three-fourths of oil meant for Britain passed through the canal. More than one-third of the ships passing through the canal were British. The other dominant partner of the company was France. The Suez Canal was opened in 1868 through the joint efforts, vision and finances of the two powers — the British and the French. Their combined engineering skills created an international waterway which shortened travel by half and saved the world time, money and health. It was considered a marvel of the time. The Universal Suez Company, as it was known then, held 100 years’ lease for navigation and control of the canal, which was due to expire in 1968. Nasser came to power in Egypt in 1954 and aspired to exercise control over the canal as well as the company. Meanwhile, he planned to construct a higher Aswan Dam over the Nile river for irrigation purposes and to produce electricity. The US and UK governments offered financial and technical support for this ambitious project. On 19 July 1956, however, Dulles, the US Secretary of State, withdrew the offer abruptly. Within a week, on 26 July 1956, Nasser nationalised the company, creating instantaneously a topsy-turvy world. Before the crisis deepened, Nehru had met Nasser while on his way to London to attend the Commonwealth Conference. He also met President Tito in Yugoslavia. Both of them had advised Nasser not to take any impulsive action and had asked him to negotiate with the Anglo-French authorities for a new treaty. On 31 July 1956, Eisenhower also talked with Anthony Eden to see the ‘unwisdom of contemplating use of force’ and sent Dulles to warn Eden and Macmillan not to proceed with their ‘firm and irrevocable decision’ of forcing the issue through war.161 A series of messages were exchanged between Jawaharlal Nehru and Anthony Eden, Gamal Abdel Nasser and others asking them to exercise restraint. Expressing his ‘alarm’ and ‘apprehensions’, Nehru pointed out to Eden: ‘We all are agreed that the Suez Canal should continue as an international waterway open to all’, but ‘any decision taken without the presence or agreement of Egypt will not be a settlement and many other countries might not also agree with it’.162 Similarly, he told Nasser: ‘Egypt should be agreeable to a conference to be composed of an agreed list of invitees based on the “Constantinople Convention”’ of 1888 and the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954.163 In another message of the same day he appealed to Nasser not to be provoked and hoped for ‘Your attitude

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to remain firmly conciliatory in spite of provocation.’164 Between 27 July and 10 August 1956 as many as 45 messages were sent by Nehru to several dignitaries, including President Eisenhower, warning them of ‘disastrous’ consequences if caution and restraint were not exercised.165 But ‘Anthony Eden was determined to seize the Canal and overthrow Nasser from the start’, noted Gordon Walker in his Diaries. He (Eden) ‘increasingly excluded ministers and others who did not agree. . .he removed Macmillan from Defence. Butler was excluded from the committee. . . .In the end there was a revolt in the cabinet. Macmillan changed sides. He had perhaps egged Eden on in order to get him out.’ Selwyn Lloyd said that Eden ‘took no steps to associate the opposition in his policy. . . .Gaitskell, whom he considered schoolmasterly and who, of course, had fought in neither world war.’166 ‘ “Eden dominated the Cabinet more than Churchill had ever done” — one senior member remarked. In foreign affairs his will was law, each decision on Suez was his’.167 ‘On October 31, 1956, the great British armada, with hundred and thirty warships, a hundred fighters and tank-landing craft had been set out from Malta on the long sea voyage to the Suez Canal’ — Selwyn Lloyd quoted Keith Kyle, the BBC film maker.168 Meanwhile, Israel was encouraged to attack Egypt; the latter retaliated by sinking a few ships at the mouth of the Suez Canal, making it inoperational. At the beginning of the enterprise, Harold Macmillan had said that the expenses of the war should not exceed £100 million but in November 1956, they asked for a loan of £300 million, which the US refused to provide unless they announced ceasefire in 24 hours. The British had no choice and declared ceasefire on 6 November 1956. That is how the Suez Canal fiasco ended, with Anthony Eden resigning his prime ministership and Macmillan taking over as Prime Minister soon after. Eden never forgave Dulles, ‘that terrible man’ who refused to support the British at the eleventh hour,169 but it has been said that Macmillan ‘got on well with Dulles, the only British Foreign Secretary who did’.170 The entire world condemned the Anglo-French action as ‘a last remnant of imperialism’. The Indian representative, Krishna Menon, was the last man to spare the Anglo-French and attacked them in the United Nations without mercy. Nehru also condemned them forcefully, declaring that ‘the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt was deplorable’. However, Selwyn Lloyd recognised that under Nehru’s

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influence Nasser agreed to a conference and an attempt was made ‘to make the dispute — a business dispute’. Eisenhower did not consider ‘Nasser had done anything wrong — in seizing the Suez Canal company’s property. Provided Nasser paid compensation and gave free passage through the canal under the 1888 Convention.’171 Another explosive issue was the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution by the Russians in October–November 1956. Most observers of world affairs believed that Indian criticism of Soviet action in crushing ‘the national uprising in Hungary against Soviet domination’ was somewhat muted, inadequate and came a bit too late. Mrs Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Nehru’s sister and India’s High Commissioner to London, wrote saying that ‘friends and critics are alike bewildered and unhappy at our vote in UN’ and ‘your continued silence’.172 In another communication, G. L. Mehta had pointed out that the revolt in Hungary was ‘a spontaneous mass movement against Soviet domination of Hungary and resentment against exploitation of her economy’. That the Soviet Union had carried out ‘ruthless shooting of unarmed crowds including workers and students’. Mehta also added that ‘there was considerable feeling in the US about India’s silence on the issue in contrast with her denunciation of western imperialism. . .and that the fundamental issue in Egyptian and Hungarian crisis were the same.’173 Nehru did say: ‘I have no doubt that the action of Soviet government is deplorable. But we do not yet have full information as to how and why these changes occurred. The case of Egypt is absolutely clear and there is no doubt about it. Because of this and because of our intimate contacts both with Egypt and with the Suez Canal issue, we had to express our opinion immediately and forcibly.’174 Mohan Sinha Mehta, the Indian envoy to Vienna, gathered information and wrote about the reports coming in from Budapest which had been apparently encircled by over 1,000 Soviet tanks and phosperous and incendiaries being used freely; the beseiged students wanted Nehru to use ‘his influence in Moscow for evacuating Soviet troops and saving the Hungarian lives’.175 What had happened in Hungary was something like this. On 22 October 1956, the university students at Budapest, expressing solidarity with the Polish rebellion, demanded civil liberties and improvement of the economy. On 23 October 1956, more than a lakh students joined by workers gathered at Budapest’s Bern Square and demanded a democratic government, the return of Imre Nagy (the dismissed Prime Minister of 1955) and

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withdrawal of Soviet troops. The police fired on the crowds, but the army revolted and joined the revolutionaries. On 24 October 1956, Soviet troops withdrew from Budapest. Nagy announced the end of one party rule and free elections to be held soon, as well as the withdrawal of Hungary from the Soviet-sponsored Warsaw Pact of 1955. He asked the United Nations to recognise Hungary as an independent, neutral country under its protection. On 4 November 1956, the Soviet troops, consisting of 16 divisions supported by 2,000 tanks entered Budapest and crushed the rebellion with an iron hand. Thousands of Hungarian students and workers were captured and deported to the USSR. Nagy was captured later and executed by the Russians.176 By 1 December 1956, over 100,000 Hungarian refugees had crossed over to Austria and a large number of young persons fled the country to avoid mass deportation to Russia.177 The Hungarian rebellion against Soviet occupation was an event of foremost importance. Nehru sought confirmation of reports from the Indian ambassador to Moscow, K. P. S. Menon. Nehru’s cable to him said that he has ‘received and continued to receive large numbers of telegrams from various Hungarian organisations and outside. Some messages from Hungary come through. . .Vienna. All these make earnest appeals to me to take some steps to induce Moscow to withdraw Soviet army immediately.’ At the same time Nehru urged that although reports ‘are confusing. . .it appears quite clear that there has been powerful and widespread national uprising there against Soviet forces and interference. And there has been largescale killing on both sides. We have seen reports that two thousand five hundred Russians were killed on one side and over ten thousand Hungarians on the other.’178 Nehru was strongly criticised for not coming out openly in support of the Hungarian people’s cause, as it seemed to the western observers. They also criticised India for not having voted in the United Nations on the resolution put forward by the western powers in their favour. Nehru’s stand was not fully understood; as he himself observed, ‘there appears to have been a great deal of misunderstanding of the vote we gave in the United Nations’. First, India was opposed to the proposal that elections should be held under the auspices of the UN. ‘This, according to us,’ observed Nehru, ‘was not only against the provisions of the UN Charter but also likely to come in the way of the very thing we desired, that is the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Hence, we voted against this particular provision in the UN.’179

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He also stressed the fact that India had ‘repeatedly declared that we want the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and that the Hungarian people should decide their future by themselves without interference’.180 Third, ‘we were, however, certainly of the opinion that any attempt at intervention from the Western side might well result in a major war’.181 On 5 November 1956, while inaugurating the ninth general session of the UNESCO conference in New Delhi, Nehru referred to both ‘the episodes in Egypt and Hungary where both human dignity and freedom outraged and the force of modern arms used to suppress peoples and to gain political objectives. Old colonial methods, which we had thought, in our ignorance, belonged to a more unenlightened age, are revived and practised. In other parts of the world also, movements for freedom are crushed by superior might.’182 In India, among the people, there was great sympathy for the Hungarian people’s sufferings. In the Parliament as well, Nehru had to answer about the ‘belated reaction’ of India to the happenings in Hungary. The main issue was Indian vote in the United Nations, which, as explained above, had cogent reasons behind it. Most observers, however, felt India was lukewarm in condemning Soviet action in Hungary because of the Soviet support to India on Kashmir. Also, it was argued that if elections were to be conducted in Hungary under the UN auspices, similar resolutions could be passed again in respect of Kashmir. This, of course, was an imagined fear. The UN had already passed its resolution in the 1950s for ‘plebiscite’ in Kashmir and had failed to implement it for reasons discussed elsewhere in this book. Gordon Walker’s perceptive entry in his diary is worth mentioning: ‘One reason why India attacked us more sharply over Suez than Russia over Hungary was that they knew we could take it, whereas the Russians [couldn’t and] might react.’ On the contrary, Harold Macmillan seems to have taken Indian criticism on the Suez to heart and his later stand on various issues concerning India reflected his strong displeasure, it not hostility against Indians. He records in his unpublished diary: ‘Suez has shaken them [Nehru & Indians], because they have learnt that there is a point when Britain will react. Their financial position is very bad; their moral position on Kashmir is vulnerable.’183 India could be hit hard on both fronts. In both the crisis situations, Indian involvement was deep, to the chagrin of the western powers. The fact was that Indian viewpoints were not

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in consonance with theirs; they often clashed. They differed in their perceptions, assessment, emphasis and the nature and content of the solutions offered. Another area of disagreement was Goa. There were three Portuguese enclaves of Goa, Daman and Diu in the western coast of the Indian peninsula. These were the last remnants of Portuguese rule of more than four centuries in India. When India became independent, with the end of the British empire, there was a clamour for self-rule and independence in most colonies ruled by the Portuguese and the French. In the 1950s, the French agreed to hand over their little colonies of Chandranagar in Bengal and Pondicherry in the Madras province to India. The Portuguese neither understood the aspirations of their ‘subjects’ nor were they prepared to initiate reforms commensurate with the times, which had undergone a sea change after Indian independence. In the 1950s the Portuguese Foreign Minister, supported by John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, still talked of ‘our Portuguese Provinces in the East’. Freedom movements by the people of the Portuguese colonies, supported by their Marathi and Konkani-speaking co-religionists from the west coast of India was launched; this gathered momentum as time passed. In 1959, the Indian socialists jumped into the fray, led by their firebrand leaders, Ram Manohar Lohia, George Fernandes and others. They declared that they would forcibly enter Goa and liberate the territory. In fact, groups of liberators and those who were prepared to offer satyagraha marched to Goa, only to be stopped by the Portuguese authorities, killing some of them in police firing. More and more people joined the movement. The Portuguese were adamant that they would not allow any trespasser in their territory. It became quite a problem trying to stop the liberators, as the nation slowly got enmeshed into the conflict, raising the temperature sky high in the process. The Indian government asked the Portuguese to come to terms and voluntarily shed off the burden of ruling over the unwilling Indian compatriots. But the Portuguese would not listen. Their attitude was one of complete unconcern to the political situation in the region. They talked of sending shiploads of Portuguese armies still, but 1960–61 was no longer like Vasco da Gama’s days. The Portuguese government was not prepared for negotiations. No talks or discussions with the Indian government or the ‘rebels’ in the Portuguese dominions happened and the threats of using force to decimate them continued.

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Finally, the Indian government allowed the liberators to enter these little colonies and the Portuguese government simply collapsed. Most of the Portuguese vanished without a shot being fired. Harold Macmillan was most angry at the Indians, especially Jawaharlal Nehru. Said, he preached negotiations and peace but invaded Goa in 1961. Of course, Indian troops were moved into Goa on 11 December 1961. On 13 December, Macmillan appealed to Nehru ‘to obtain his purpose through negotiations’. Almost like an imperial historian, Macmillan wrote in his memoirs: ‘On 17 December 1961, Indian troops invaded Goa. Goa surrendered two days later and the long and not ignoble story of what Portugal had brought to India by way of religion, education and commerce was brought suddenly and brutally to an end. The lesson was not lost.’184 In 1962, the MIG deal surprisingly compelled the highest dignitaries of the world, the US President and British Prime Minister, to see that it fell through. This matter has been examined in depth elsewhere in this book. It is, however, important to remember that the US had not sold or gifted through aid any military equipment to India between 1953 and 1962. US military ‘aid’ to Pakistan ever since 1954 ran into billions worth of military hardware, aircraft, ships, transport planes and equipment, submarines, etc. Not a single item was made available to India. From 1947 to 1962, the British held the monopoly of supplying World War II vintage war equipment. With much reluctance they would sell their wares to India, but not the latest warfare materials. The moment the MIG 21 planes were mooted for purchase and manufacture in India through Russian technical expertise and capital, the western powers were prepared to consider offers to India, which also ultimately fell through. Yet India was blamed for having compromised her non-aligned policy and entering into the Soviet orbit of influence, according to the US and UK governments. However, India did enter into the deal in August 1964 since it was essential to safeguard its territorial integrity. The Chinese, taking advantage of the partially equipped Himalayan defence, gave a mortal blow to the prestige of India. Then, of course, the US and UK governments sympathised with India’s humiliating defeat and were prepared to arm India to defend itself in mountain warfare. Here again, as has been seen in the earlier chapter, the assistance asked for by India was toned down considerably through the intervention of Harold Macmillan. Although he, along with the British people, felt ‘with deepest sorrow the heavy stresses to

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which the government and people of India are now subjected’, he did not fail to notice ‘the transformation of Nehru from an imitation of George Lansbury into a parody of Churchill’.185 He also noted that ‘Nehru, in quite a different spirit from his recent detached neutralism, sent an urgent appeal for help’ and ‘thinking it better to forget the immediate past and emphasise the solidarity of the Commonwealth. . . .186 Macmillan said that ‘a lot of small arms, automatic rifles and ammunition’ were being sent to India. Yet, he noted again that ‘there have been divergencies, or some divergencies of throught and policy on some of the great issues which have dominated politics in the last fifteen years’ or so.187 In other words, despite the sympathy for India, these past ‘divergencies of thought and policy’ were bound to affect the relationship between the two countries. It is against this background that one has to examine the attitudes of the western powers, especially the US and UK, in the talks on Kashmir which took place in Rawalpindi, Karachi, New Delhi and Kolkata between December 1962 and May 1963. ‘The indefatigable Commonwealth Secretary, Duncan Sandys’, as Macmillan says, ‘held several conferences with Nehru, and his Ministers, . . .[including] M.R. Desai’, the Finance Minister, who, according to Macmillan, was ‘wiser and more experienced was very sensitive about the possible repercussions of any flirtation with Russia and American aid, on which India was largely dependent’.188 Against such a background, the talks began. Duncan Sandys seemed always to be in high spirits. In the House of Commons, he proclaimed Britain’s historical mission as not only one of ‘liquidating colonialism but also assisting the transition from dependence to independence within the Commonwealth’. He also related his personal role in helping India achieve a certain degree of military competence to enable it to face any further Chinese attack. He had rushed to Delhi on 24 November 1962 to consider India’s request for military aid in cooperation with an American team headed by Averell Harriman. He met Nehru and other political leaders, and found that ‘the Indians are in no mood to surrender territory to the Chinese at the pistol point’ and ‘they are resolutely determined, with the help of their friends, to build up the bese system of defence of which they are capable’.189 He also informed the Parliament: ‘One thing is clear,. . .After the unprovoked attack by a neighbour whom they had trusted, the people of India who are today more united than ever

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before, have made up their minds never again to rely for the safety and freedom upon the good faith of communist China.’190 This was no doubt an accurate assessment of Indian opinion and the morale as prevalent in those days. In the same breath, he said: ‘In the face of Chinese threat to the whole Indian subcontinent, a new attempt would be made to settle the differences between India and Pakistan.’ He explained how he went first to Rawalpindi, came back to India with the draft, going back to Pakistan and again returning to New Delhi. ‘Finally the Pakistanis agreed but Nehru’s speech in the Indian Parliament about no change in the status quo militated against the spirit of talks to be initiated.’ Then, of course, Sandys spoke to Nehru who settled for ‘talks without preconditions.’191 He was thus engaged in exciting maneuvers, facilitating talks between the two unwilling and combative neighbours. During Sandys’ marathon Sandys — to and from Karachi, Rawalpindi, New Delhi — Galbraith pointed out that ‘much time had been spent saying that he did not say what he really did say’.192 John Kenneth Sandys was quite exuberant in his suggestions. As reported by Galbraith: ‘Among other things he [Sandys] proposed that India enter a military alliance with the West and come under the protection of a NATO nuclear deterrent. The Indians were aghast and it was fuzzed over. Gore-Booth is perturbed but defends his Minister in the finest traditions of the British Civil Service.’193 Prior to the Rawalpindi talks the main argument with Nehru was whether talks should be held under the head ‘Kashmir and Other Matters’ or ‘Kashmir and Related Matters.’ India preferred the first but agreed to the second. Meanwhile, Nehru declared in the Parliament that ‘he would not be pushed around by Mr. Sandys or anyone else’.194 It was quite a fantastic suggestion of Sandys that India should join the NATO. In the aftermath of Chinese withdrawal from India, intense pressure was brought to bear upon India for an amicable solution of the Kashmir problem. Both the US President and British Prime Minister were keen that India and Pakistan enter into a serious exchange of views and ideas to reach a final settlement of the Kashmir problem. As a result of these interventions, a series of talks did take place between December 1962 and May 1963. There were in all six rounds of talks, each taking place in different venues in Pakistan and India. Each dialogue lasted for three days. The first round of talks began in Rawalpindi, just after Christmas, from 27 December 1962. The second

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venue was New Delhi, the talks ending on 19 January 1963. The third dialogue was held in Karachi on 8, 9 and 10 February 1963; the fourth in Calcutta from 12–14 March 1963; the fifth again in Karachi from 21–25 April 1963; and finally in New Delhi, where the talks broke down on 16 May 1963. Jawaharlal Nehru was most desirous of entering into a new phase of relationship with Pakistan. Averell Harriman, US Secretary of State and John Kenneth Galbraith met Nehru on 22 November 1962 at his office. Galbraith writes: ‘Nehru told Harriman of his concern for a settlement that would make possible common defense of the subcontinent, and there was some talks of terms.’195 On 10 December 1962, he again met Nehru: ‘In the evening I had a long talk with Nehru who seemed to be searching genuinely for a solution on Kashmir.’196 Another significant paradigm shift in Nehru’s thinking could be discerned in terms of the defence arrangement of India. For one thing, India was contemplating a joint defence pact with the US in the event of a Chinese threat to India. ‘M.J. Desai raised with me the question of tacit air defense pact. The Indians would prepare airstrip and radar if the Chinese came back, they would commit their tactical aircraft and we would undertake defense of their cities. This is a very considerate proposal with very major implications. It would also completely pattern our long-term relationship with India.’197 Keeping that in view, Galbraith called a meeting of defence experts in the US embassy on 2 December 1962 to discuss the issue: ‘We had a long meeting of the staff group to discuss the possibility of a joint air defense policy with India. This is very important; it could provide the basis for a close working relationship with India. We would contribute the planes; the Indians, the fields and the ground support. The planes would come into the field in emergencies. I have completed a long telegram to the Department on the subject.’198 President Kennedy did not ‘approve of joining air defense’, yet he asked for consultation on the subject through the British and the Commonwealth. Galbraith did not agree; ‘there were only two and half cities in the world where the Commonwealth was taken seriously, namely, London, Washington and Canberra. This was the idea of Rusk.’199 How deeply was Nehru affected by the Chinese attack can be judged from this statement: ‘he had lost all confidence on their bona fides and wouldn’t trust them to reach any sort of bargain’.200 The idea of working on a better relationship with the USA continued to occupy Nehru’s mind even in 1963. ‘M.J. Desai told me India thinking on containment

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of the Chinese. They are willing to work out with the United States both politically and militarily in the rest of Asia. This is quid pro quo for our assistance, quite a remarkable advance. Nehru a week ago hinted their thoughts are moving in this direction.’201 Friendly relations with the US and Pakistan went together. Talks began in Rawalpindi after Christmas, but the Christmas spirit soon vanished since the Pakistan papers reported on 22 December 1963 that a border agreement with China in Kashmir was in the offing; this involved the transfer of nearly 2,000 square miles of Kashmir’s territory to China. Actually, the China–Pakistan border pact was signed in Beijing in February 1963, but the deal was finalised earlier. Z. A. Bhutto went over to Beijing to sign the agreement on behalf of Pakistan. The Guardian rightly felt it was ‘a blow to talks’.202 The western powers did not think the Pakistan venture indiscreet or inappropriate. Pakistan did not feel it was necessary to discuss the issue with India, which claimed sovereignty over the entire Kashmir territory by virtue of its treaty agreement with the Maharaja of Kashmir. India was on sound ground legally and constitutionally; it obviously took umbrage and protested. Galbraith began moving around the corridors of the External Affairs Ministry in New Delhi, working hard to save the talks. But he recognised the irony of the situation: ‘A staunch American ally against Communism is negotiating with the Chinese communists to the discontent of an erstwhile neutral.’203 The US ambassador in Karachi, Walter McConaughy, kept telling Y. D. Gundevia that Ayub Khan was the best bet for talks despite his dubious undertakings. The Pakistani politicians could be worse. For the last 50 years, similar arguments have been advanced by westerners that the dictators in Pakistan were more amenable to reason! But Galbraith was conscious of the Pakistani double-dealing. However, these little ‘pinpricks’ must be overlooked; Pakistan is after all ‘a treaty ally’. Everybody, including Harold Macmillan, ‘pampered’ them, as it was stated later by Nehru. ‘Let them,’ he said.204 But the disappointment and sorrow in the western camp could not lay hidden. Galbraith commented: ‘The Pakistanis continue to make up with the Chinese in a way which causes great sorrow all around.’205 Taking a broader view, he rightly observed: ‘Chinese have moved with great skill to drive a wedge between the Indians and Pakistanis’206 Meanwhile, some desultory talks continued at the officers’ level. At the second round of talks in New Delhi in January 1963, Pakistan’s ambitions became somewhat clear. The leaders of the delegations,

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Z. A. Bhutto, Pakistan’s leader and Sardar Swaran Singh on the Indian side, assisted by Gundevia had studied the problem well. The two leaders identified four important areas for discussion. First and foremost, it was proclaimed that the two countries wanted to live in peace and friendship and would hold discussions which should be ‘frank and cordial’. The dreaded word ‘plebiscite’ was not used, but it was pointed out that the international boundary drawn by the two countries should be acceptable to the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan believed that some ‘territorial division’ of the state might be necessary and the population of the region should be kept in mind. The third problem was ‘the control of rivers’ and fourth, the requirement of defence. The talks ended on 19 January 1963 and both sides agreed to meet again. The next round of talks was the most crucial. They were held in Karachi on 8, 9 and 10 February 1963. Bhutto gave a dinner, about which Gundevia relates: ‘one half of the party at least, was merry and almost boisterous by the time food was served. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, time and again, searched out Sardar Swaran Singh to apologise for the delay. . . .Only the party was too big for any Omar Khayyam.’207 A week before the talks began in Karachi, Phillips Talbot, US Assistant Secretary of State, paid a visit to New Delhi and met Prime Minister Nehru along with John Kenneth Galbraith. They also met M. J. Desai and Y. D. Gundevia. They talked to Nehru about China and arms aid and conveyed their good wishes for successful talks with Pakistan. To Desai and Gundevia, they made it more clear about the difficulty of arms aid, since the Congress was being difficult. Gundevia writes, ‘always difficult on India, and still difficult, despite the communist attack on India, yesterday’.208 And of course, there was ‘no link’ between the arms aid and Pakistan talks, but better to come to terms with Pakistan. What did they want to discuss with the MEA? It seems President Ayub Khan wanted ‘plebiscite’ within a year and that the American friends had asked: ‘What would we give Pakistan in the Vale?’ Gundevia ‘began to intensely dislike this poet’s synonym for the valley, which was gaining currency in all discussions’.209 He said that this matter had been discussed with Averell Harriman and Duncan Sandys in the presence of Galbraith ‘that we could yield nothing in the valley, for perfectly ‘sound, strategic reasons. We had to defend Ladakh in the extreme North, beyond Srinagar, against the communists and our only line of communication was through Akhnoor in the valley, very near the Pakistan border in the South.’210 He also

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explained: ‘The new international line,. . .could be a modification of the present ceasefire line almost all along in favour of Pakistan. We could give them something, but not everything, east of the valley and the south of the valley. Why not give them something also south of the valley? We could not because south of the valley was Jammu. . .a Hindu majority area and tampering with the Jammu border would mean waves of migration of population.’211 However, the crucial talks began. In addition, the question of the Chenab watershed was raised. ‘This was important for Pakistan’s requirement.’ The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 was signed after years of discussion and protracted negotiations throughout with the good offices of the World Bank and its President, Eugene Black. During the past two years, there had been no complaints from Pakistan in the working of the Treaty. Besides, if the Chenab watershed question was again opened, the Indus Waters Treaty would have had to be scrapped. India naturally refused to get into the question again. As far as the valley was concerned, it was argued again by India that the question of handing it over to Pakistan could not be considered. Bhutto pressed for more than what was offered on the new ceasefire line, which involved giving away 1,500 square miles to Pakistan. But he pressed for more and finally said that the valley which was all important might be left over as a ‘separate problem to be discussed at the next round of talks’.212 What did he mean by ‘isolating the problem of the valley’ for some separate discussion? Gundevia stated, ‘None of us could guess what he was really after.’ That is how the talks ended on 10 February 1963. The fourth round of talks was held in Calcutta on 12, 13 and 14 March 1963. About a fortnight before the scheduled meeting, Bhutto had been to Beijing to sign the China–Pak border agreement. According to the agreement, the deal for which had been started on 22 December 1962, Pakistan had agreed to gift away 2,050 square miles of Pakistan occupied border with China to the Chinese government. Interestingly, apart from India, ‘the Soviets protested to the Chinese against the signing of the China–Pakistan frontier pact.’213 This signifies that the Soviets were quite interested in the region. Galbraith paid visits to the ministry to ensure that India did not contemplate abandoning the Calcutta talks. ‘It was in the interest of two big countries, India and the USA, to somehow keep Pakistan quiet — come to terms with Pakistan, and deal effectively with China.’214 It was also rumoured that Bhutto had extended Pakistan’s invitation to Zhou Enlai and the latter

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had accepted, as well as that the Chinese ‘forces’ might pay a ‘visit’ to the Himalayan mountains. Gundevia tells us that ‘nothing useful was discussed in Calcutta’ mainly because Pakistan wanted the whole valley and was totally nonchalant about its talks with China and the transfer of territory. The Daily Telegraph noted on 13 March 1963 that the Kashmir talks resumed in Calcutta. ‘While India offered a fairly considerable adjustment of the existing ceasefire line, Pakistan offered India only a part of the state of Jammu.’215 Another issue discussed was ‘Muslim infiltration from East Pakistan in the Indian territories all along the borders in Assam, Tripura, etc. Also, there was a talk on the “internationalisation” of Kashmir, more as an off-the-record point of view. Galbraith relates it better.’216 There was also a proposal, suddenly made probably by the British High Commission in Karachi, in concert with, ‘quite possibly’ — as Galbraith put it — with the Pakistan government that ‘the valley of Kashmir should be internationalised’, whatever that meant. Galbraith commented: ‘The proposal plays immediately into the hands of the Chinese. Susceptible Asian and African powers would become involved in the administration, upon whom the Chinese could work. And, in any case, the Indians can hardly be expected to defend the valley if it is under international control. I told Harrison about this; some version will doubtless appear in the Washington Post tommorow. This will deeply dismay the State Department. But, as a common consequence of revealed truth, it will also kill the idea.’ . . . ‘I had a talk with Gore-Booth this evening and gave the idea another severe knock. . .Nothing came of it.217 Finally, Pakistan wanted to continue the talks. ‘They just barely avoided being ridiculous. Nothing was accomplished except an agreement to consider the eviction of Moslems in Tripura. . . .Yesterday afternoon, the Pakistanis came over to say they were going to make a new proposal. The offer was of a small area around Jammu now held by India. The prospective response was less generous. In the end, the Pakistanis never got around to making their offer,’218 wrote Galbraith (1969). Gundevia opined that if they wanted the talks in Karachi, ‘we said we would go to Karachi. One guess was that Bhutto wanted a time lag between his Dacca session and breaking up of the conference.’219 The Karachi talks were held between 21–24 April 1963, the longest ever sessions of talks in the series. About a week before the Karachi

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meeting Galbraith met, as usual, M. J. Desai and Gundevia, raising the same questions again. Could part of the valley be given to Pakistan? Second, Pakistan would not be content without the Chenab watershed. The same answers were given by the Indians. Both propositions were out of the question. Dean Rusk, Averell Harriman, Phillips Talbot were told same strategic reasons. The opening of the Chenab question meant throwing away the Indus Waters Treaty which was working well. The agreement had been reached after years of negotiation, under the aegis of the World Bank, etc. Yet, the British and Americans jointly prepared a paper entitled ‘Kashmir — The Elements of a Settlement’ and Bhutto was in possession of a copy as the talks began. The Indian delegation had not been supplied with one. The paper postulated that ‘neither India nor Pakistan can entirely give up its claim to the Vale. Each must have a substantial position in the Vale.’ Indians asked what the claims on the valley were that Pakistan could not ‘entirely give [it] up’.220 Pakistan, on the other hand, wanted the whole of the valley on the basis of religion of the population. The second proposal was about the ‘defence needs of both countries’. Who was invading whom? India was fighting China, not Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan was enroute to Beijing with an offer of territory and friendship. It was argued that India had no desire to ‘invade’ Pakistan. As for the role of Pakistan in containing communism, it did not fire a shot either in Korea or Indo-China, despite being a member of the SEATO.221 And again, Pakistan wanted the Chenab watershed. Same arguments advanced. Finally, the foremost important ‘element’ of the settlement declared after giving Pakistan ‘a substantial position in the vale’, arrangements were to be made for ‘local self rule’ and ‘sovereignty’ of the inhabitants. It was obviously a matter which had been discussed ‘threadbare’ in the rounds of talks with Pakistan. India had declared as many times as the questions had been raised that it would not yield on these grounds. Gundevia felt that ‘this combined Anglo-American demarche now and at this stage of the talks with Pakistan, clearly amounted to their throwing in their weight against us, full tilt on the side of Pakistan’.222 Besides, there appeared to be sort of an ‘ultimatum’ to India. Curiously, Galbraith does not mention a word about the paper on ‘Kashmir elements’ in his book (1969) but says that after the ‘fourth round of dismal talks on Kashmir’ at Calcutta, he tried to persuade everybody ‘on the idea of a concession in the valley. Then I saw Nehru

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and he turned me down flat. Then I saw him second time and he turned me down even flatter.’223 Walter McConaughy, US ambassador to Karachi was, it seems, ‘doing similar campaign’ in Rawalpindi and Karachi and ‘we succeeded in bringing the Indians and Pakistanis into a new opposition to ourselves. Nothing else was accomplished. . . .Both have joined in denouncing our proposals.’224 Finally, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to both President Kennedy and the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan about these ‘elements of settlement’ and the futility of the exercise. Kennedy wrote back about ‘the misguided elements’ and suggested ‘mediation’ through ‘a mutual friend’.225 As far as the talks were concerned, two aspects need to be stressed. Pakistan was not satisfied with the ‘substantial position’ in the valley; Bhutto told Swaran Singh that the ‘valley was indivisible’. To the question, if the valley is given to Pakistan, ‘how do we defend Ladakh?’ Bhutto answered, ‘why do you want to defend Ladakh? Don’t defend Ladakh.’ Actually he meant, ‘give Ladakh to China’ and the matter would be simply resolved.226 Sardar Swaran Singh’s recapitulation of the 1,500 square miles being offered as ‘a modification’ of the ceasefire line, in favour of Pakistan, was of no value to Pakistan. And, of course, it continued to press its claim on the Chenab watershed. Then the deadlock in the talks seemed complete. Yet, ‘one more of Bhutto’s dramatic performances’ remained to be enacted. ‘Bhutto, who had been sitting with his head buried in both hands, suddenly looked up and said, “Well, Sardar Saheb, what do you say to our having another go at it again?” The redoubtable Sardar was wide awake. . . .With his inimitable smile said,. . .when? Suppose we come to New Delhi again in May.’227 Gundevia added, ‘So mediation was now the theme-song before the Sixth Round that was programmed for 15 May.’228 He tells the story of ‘the mediation drama’.229 The dramatis personae on the British side were Lord Mountbatten, the ‘ineluctable’ Duncan Sandys, both guests at the Rashtrapati Bhavan and Lord Selkirk, Commissioner General for Southeast Asia, ‘I don’t quite know why. . .Lord Mountbatten was Britain’s finest diplomat.’230 He stayed out of the public gaze but ‘was there to soften up his friend Nehru on the mediation mouse’.231 The US was represented ‘just short of President’ by Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, Robert Manning, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and William Bundy of the Defence Department, who later became Assistant Secretary of State for Eastern Affairs. Rusk and Talbot were lodged in the Rashtrapati Bhavan as well. Nehru

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hosted dinner for Rusk on the night of 3 May. Earlier, he had a small lunch for Lord Mountbatten on 2 May, with whom both M. J. Desai and Gundevia had a quiet discussion. As for Rusk, it was reported by Galbraith that he was ‘pretty good. He was less eloquent on the great geo-political formulations. . . .He was very good in describing the anguish which conflict between Pakistan and India causes us, including the problem of fueling both sides of the dispute. Then he heard the Indian side. Towards the end, I moved out with the bureaucrats, and in private, Nehru confirmed to Rusk his willingness to accept a mediator.’232 As was well-known, India had resisted such a proposal previously. It was quite an achievement and Rusk left Delhi the next morning. Also, Mountbatten must have had a steadying influence on Nehru. Gundevia says ‘that Lord Mountbatten was Jawaharlal’s only personal friend in the western establishments. He was undoubtedly in New Delhi in this gruelling week to make one hundred percent sure that Nehru was not advised to brush aside this last chance of a common friend helping in a settlement.’233 Galbraith informs of another trouble which the American had to face; this was in the person of Duncan Sandys. He ‘was also in town, also seeing the Indians. And he had heard of the mediation proposals. He decided he should go to Rawalpindi and sell them to Pakistanis. Thus he would have another innings as peacemaker of the subcontinent. But this violated our understanding with the Indians that this idea would be developed unobtrusively.’ But ‘Sandys was adamant.’ Galbraith explained how this ‘would arouse suspicions in the minds of Pakistanis, etc.’ Finally, he agreed not to go, yet he drafted another formula and wanted to travel to Rawalpindi and Karachi. For once, Gundevia and Galbraith were in agreement that ‘Duncan Sandys for a bull in a crowded NWFP bazar was not the best choice’. The MEA had also ‘their objections to any initiative by Sandys’. Gundevia told Galbraith, ‘if between themselves, the British and the American killed the mediator idea, we might as well let them. The Prime Minister was not going to shed a tear, I repeated twice.’234 Bhutto was to arrive on 14 May 1963. No agenda for discussions had been laid. ‘We should wait and see what Mr. Bhutto wanted to discuss. As for mediation, surely they must understand that at the first mention of the topic by us, Bhutto would surely swipe the little mouse dead.’235 In any case, the idea of a ‘mediator’ was in the air. The Times observed on 8 May 1963 that the suggestion to have Elsworth Bunker as ‘a mediator’ or ‘negotiator’ was mooted.236 This report was certainly

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better received. Once Galbraith had feared that Sandys might as well have been supported by Britain to mediate which would have been as he called it, ‘disastrous’.237 Meanwhile, Bhutto arrived in New Delhi on 14 May 1963. There was some visible show of unfriendliness. On 15 May 1963 talks began. He wanted the valley to be ‘transferred’ to Pakistan after ‘some temporary arrangements in the valley’. The second option suggested by him was to let the valley be ‘internationalised’ for a limited period of time ‘to ascertain the wishes of the people’. Swaran Singh objected to the propositions, as Bhutto was going back to the talks held earlier, in January 1963. He also pointed out that a new international ceasefire line had been suggested by India and Pakistan should consider this as a realistic solution on the lines of the principles agreed upon by both sides in earlier discussions.238 Nobody talked of a ‘mediator’ at this stage and India suggested ‘no war declaration’. Bhutto declared ‘somewhat fiercely, “Oh no, we don’t want any such commitment”’239 As for withdrawal of forces from both sides of the ceasefire line, Bhutto also rejected it. Finally, he said that ‘there has been no progress’. No communique was issued; only a press conference was held. Bhutto said ‘all the nasty things expected of him against India’, as Gundevia pointed out.240 The talks thus broke down on 16 May 1963. In his Postscript on The Testament of Sheikh Abdullah: with a Monograph by Y. D. Gundevia (1974) Y. D. Gundevia, writing in 1973, i.e. 10 years after those unending talks of 1962–63, says, ‘when nearing the fifth round of talks in Karachi they [‘our American and British friends’] came out with some sort of “formula”, which they called “elements of settlement”’, thus sabotaging the whole process of discussion. Gundevia says: ‘I still maintain that if others had kept out, the talks might not have ended with the sixth round in Delhi in May 1963’.241 Within a few days, however, Pakistan agreed to ‘mediation’ under certain conditions, ‘which can never be mediated’, as Galbraith put it. Meanwhile, the media reports suggested, as The Daily Telegraph of 17 May 1963 did, that it was a failure of British and American policy and diplomacy that the mediation proposal was being derided by Pakistan while India had accepted it.242 Galbraith pointed out the conditions as put forward by Ayub Khan: ‘we should freeze long-term military aid to India while mediation is in progress; mediation should not take over three months; it should assume the validity of the United Nations resolutions providing for a plebiscite in Kashmir; and the terms of reference should confine discussion rigorously to Kashmir.’243

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Washington, according to Galbraith, ‘rejected even things that I was disposed to accept, for example, that we might live with a time limit of six months. In the present state of incompatibility, these efforts lead not to pacification but only to more combat.’244 As for the Indian attitude to Ayub Khan’s ‘law on mediation’, as it was termed in the Ministry of External Affairs, it was hardly acceptable. It was a ‘unilateral’ dictation by a dictator of ‘one-sided terms’, which could not find any favour with Nehru who returned from holiday on 28 June 1963. After listening to Gundevia, Nehru asked him to ‘tell them we won’t have it. . . .They want to pamper Ayub. Let them.’ Galbraith wrote, ‘I was officially informed that the mediation was off.’ Meanwhile, US–Pakistan relations were at a new low, President Ayub Khan attacking what he termed the ‘dual policy of the United States’. According to him, the ‘neutral’ India was also being favoured with arms aid, especially after the India–China border war.245 Harry Truman, although no longer the US President, felt aggrieved at the Pakistani attitude. His remarks, ‘but for American aid Pakistan would not have been in existence’, were resented by Pakistan. He was reminded that Pakistan did not receive any aid from US between 1947 and 1954. In August 1963 Pakistan proposed an air link with China. The US considered the move as ‘unfortunate’. Also, The Daily Telegraph declared that Pakistan had put forward ‘impossible demands’, and quoted Nehru as having said that Indian ‘concessions’ to Pakistan could ‘no longer’ remain ‘open’ since Pakistan is ‘jumping off grounds for further claims.’246 Sheikh Abdullah, who was under detention, off and on, from August 1953, was released in April 1964 and was invited by Prime Minister Nehru to stay with him. With the full support of Nehru, he went to Pakistan for a conference with President Ayub Khan in search of a solution to the Kashmir problem.

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Jawaharlal Nehru with Lord Mountbatten Courtesy Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), New Delhi

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Notes 1. Reid 1981, op. cit., p. 118. 2. Ibid.: 123. 3. Jawaharlal Nehru to Mohammad Ali, 3 September 1953, SWJN, second series, vol. 23, p. 368, paragraph 24. 4. Ibid. 5. Jawaharlal Nehru to G. S. Bajpai, Governor of Bombay and former Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs, 24 August 1953, SWJN, second series, vol. 23, pp. 349–50. 6. Conversation with Mohammad Ali as recorded by Jawaharlal Nehru, 17 August 1953, SWJN, second series, vol. 23, pp. 332–35. 7. Ibid.: 336. 8. Ibid.: 336, additional note. 9. Ibid.: 344–46. 10. Jawaharlal Nehru to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, 15 August 1953, SWJN, second series, vol. 23, pp. 327–30; the quote is on p. 329. 11. Ibid.: 329. 12. Ibid.: 330. 13. Jawaharlal Nehru to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, 18 August 1953, SWJN, second series, vol. 23, pp. 339–42; the quote is on p. 341. 14. Ibid.: 341. 15. Jawaharlal Nehru to Lord Mountbatten. 16. Jawaharlal Nehru to G. S. Bajpai, 30 July 1953, SWJN, second series, vol. 23, pp. 452–53. 17. Barnds 1972, op. cit., p. 95. 18. Ibid. 19. The New York Times, 2 November 1953; quoted in Barnds (1972: 95). 20. Jawaharlal Nehru to Mohammad Ali, 28 August 1953, SWJN, second series, vol. 23, pp. 354–58; the quote is on p. 356. 21. Ibid.: 55. In fact, before the American aid controversy broke out, Dr Radhakrishnan had told Escott Reid that a Swiss or Swede plebiscite administrator was most likely to be appointed. This was also agreed to by Pakistan (Reid 1981, op. cit., p. 123). 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid.: 358. 24. Ibid.: 363. 25. Ibid.: 363n8, 368, paragraph 23. 26. Ibid.: 364, paragraph 10. 27. Ibid.: 365, paragraph 12. 28. Ibid.: paragraphs 13, 14, 15. 29. Ibid.: 366, paragraph 16. 30. Ibid.: paragraph 17. 31. Ibid.: 367, paragraph 21. 32. Ibid.: paragraphs 22 and 23.

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33. See SWJN, second series, vol. 23, p. 317; see also footnotes. 34. Jawaharlal Nehru to Sheikh Abdullah, 28 June 1953, SWJN, second series, vol. 23, pp. 193–99. 35. Ibid.: 198. 36. Ibid.: 198–99. 37. Jawaharlal Nehru to Sheikh Abdullah, 27 April 1953, SWJN, pp. 212–14; the quote is on p. 214. 38. Ibid.: 28 June 1953, p. 197, also see footnotes 9 and 10. 39. Ibid.: 196. 40. Reid (1981) for a detailed account see pp. 118–25. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid.: 124. 43. Jawaharlal Nehru to Chief Ministers, 15 March 1954, SWJN, second series, vol. 25, p. 547, paragraphs 8 and 9. 44. Jawaharlal Nehru to Chief Ministers, 14 April 1954, SWJN, second series, vol. 25, p. 552, paragraph 8. 45. Jawaharlal Nehru to Ghulam Mohammad, G. G., 27 February 1955, paragraphs 1–2, SWJN, second series, vol. 28, p. 231. 46. Ibid.: 232–33, paragraphs 8 and 14. 47. Ibid.: 232, paragraph 8. 48. Ibid.: 234, paragraph 17. 49. Jawaharlal Nehru to C. C. Desai, 27 February 1955, pp. 234–35. 50. Ibid.: 235. 51. Ibid.: 235-36. More cables were sent to C. C. Desai on 3 March, 8 March and 13 March 1955. Ibid.: 234–39, on diplomatic issues and on holding of meetings with Pakistan. Ibid.: 241. 52. Talks with Mohammad Ali and Iskander Mirza, 14 May 1955, SWJN, second series, vol. 28, pp. 246–52, paragraph 22. 53. Minutes of talks held on 15 May 1955, as recorded the same day; see SWJN, second series, vol. 28, p. 253. 54. Ibid.: 253–54, paragraph 6. 55. Ibid.: 254, paragraphs 7–9. 56. Minutes of talk held on 16 May 1955, recorded the same day. Ibid.: 258–59, paragraphs 10 and 11. 57. Ibid.: paragraph 11. 58. Ibid.: 259, paragraphs 12, 13, 14. 59. Minutes of talks held on 17 May 1955 and recorded the same day. Ibid.: 260–61, paragraph 4. 60. Ibid.: 261, paragraph 5. 61. Ibid.: paragraph 10. 62. Ibid.: paragraph 8. 63. Ibid.: paragraph 6. 64. Ibid.: 261–62, paragraphs 11–12. 65. Ibid.: 262, paragraph 15. 66. Palmer (1984: 188).

230 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77.

78. 79.

80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85.

86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101.

Jammu and Kashmir, the Cold War and the West Ibid. Eldridge (1969: 165–67). Ibid.: 165. Galbraith (1969: 522). Ibid. Gundevia (1984: 169–70). Palmer 1984, op. cit., pp. 13, 135. Gundevia 1984, op. cit., pp. 169–70. Ibid.: 348–49. Ibid.: 349. Memorandum of conversation between the President and Elsworth Bunker, Washington, 25 April 1960, FRUS, 1958–60, vol. XV (Washington 1992) p. 536. Ibid. Jawaharlal Nehru’s statement in the Indian Parliament 1 March 1954, giving details of President Eisenhower’s letter, SWJN, second series, vol. 25, pp. 336–37. Also see chapter ‘The United States and India’, n76. Bunker telegram to the Department of State, 5 May 1960. FRUS, 1958–60, vol. XV, p. 538. Rountree’s objection, ibid.: 542. Memorandum of conversation as recorded, 7 June 1960, FRUS, 1958–50, vol. XV, p. 542. Pradhan (2007: xiii). Ibid.: xiv. Eldridge 1969, op. cit., p. 167. FRUS, 1958–60, vol. XV, p. 545. G. Lewis Jones was then Assistant Secretary of the Department of State. When Jawaharlal Nehru visited the USA in October 1960, Jones engaged Nehru as Secretary of the Department of State on 7 October 1960 in a meeting. John Foster Dulles had been dead, meanwhile. Ibid.: 546. Ibid.: 547. Ibid.: 546. Kux 2001, op. cit., p. 144. Ibid. Ibid.: 145. Ibid. Reid (1981: 55). Ibid.: 56. Ibid. Reid (1981: 59). Memoirs and Reflections of a Pakistani Diplomat (London 1998), p. 103. Ibid.: 102. Ibid.: 103. Quoted in Moraes (1964: 107). Ibid.: 106. Also see Khruschev (1971: 473–74), tr. and ed. Strobe Talbott.

Indo-Pak Dialogue on Kashmir 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123.

124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134.

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Ibid.: 107. Reid 1981, op. cit., pp. 61, 46. Dalvi (1969: 459–60). Maxwell (1970: 270–71). Memorandum of conversation, Department of State, Washington, 17 August 1960, FRUS, 1958–60, vol. XV, p. 550. Gundevia, op. cit., p. 350. Ibid.: 351. FRUS, 1958–60, vol. XV, p. 551. Telegram, 7 September 1960, FRUS, 1958–60, vol. XV, pp. 552–53. Ibid.: 553, 5 October 1960. Memorandum from Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defence, 15 November 1960, FRUS, 1958–60, vol. XV, p. 575. Ibid. Ibid. Galbraith 1969, op. cit., p. 384; also Gundevia, op. cit., p. 353. Text of Jawaharlal Nehru’s speech, 26 June 1962 is available in PREM 11/3836 PRO, London. Eldridge 1969, op. cit., p 164. Palmer1984, op. cit., p. 185. Reid 1981, op. cit., p. 108. Palmer 1984, op. cit., p. 186 and have doubts about the number of aircrafts and tanks purchased and supplied. PREM 11/3836, PRO London. 30 June 1962, PREM 11/3836, PRO London. Conversation with Selwyn Lloyd, 4 March 1956 after dinner for an hour and a quarter, SWJN, second series, vol. 32, p. 373. The conversation as recorded by Jawaharlal Nehru is on pp. 368–74. The whole day was also spent in discussions. Jawaharlal Nehru’s record of the conversation with John Foster Dulles for SGMEA, SWJN, second series, vol. 32, pp. 375–85; the quote is on p. 380. Jawaharlal Nehru to Harold Macmillan, 30 June 1962, PREM 11/3836, PRO London. Ibid. Ibid. 26 June 1962 (text of speech), PREM 11/3836, PRO London. Record of conversation between Lord Home and Dean Rusk on 25 June 1962, PREM 11/3836, PRO London. Ibid. Washington to UK Foreign Office (secret), 15 June 1962, PREM 11/3836, PRO London. President Kennedy to Harold Macmillan, 9 June 1962, PREM 11/3863, PRO London. Galbraith (1969: 186 [see 21 June 1962]). John Kenneth Galbraith met Nehru on 20 June 1962 ‘Top Secret’, PREM 11/3836, PRO London.

232 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171.

Jammu and Kashmir, the Cold War and the West Sampson (1967: 131). Ibid.: 213. Ibid.: 137. PREM 11/3836, PRO London. Galbraith (1969: 385 [19 June 1962]). Ibid.: 383 (18 June 1962). Ibid.: 385 (20 June 1962). Ibid.: 386–87 (22 June 1962). Duncan Sandys to Harold Macmillan, 19 June 1962, PREM 11/3836, PRO London. Ibid. Duncan Sandys to Washington, 18 June 1962 and 17 June 1962, PREM 11/3836, PRO London. Ibid.: 17 June 1962. President Kennedy to Harold Macmillan, 15 June 1962, PREM 11/3836, PRO London. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. President Kennedy to Harold Macmillan, 9 June 1962, PREM 11/3863, PRO London. Harold Macmillan to President Kennedy, 17 June 1962, PREM 11/3836, PRO London. Dalvi 1969, op. cit., pp. 479–80. Galbraith (1969: 497 [27 November 1962]). Ibid.: 501 (29 Nov.ember 1962]). Ibid. Macmillan (1973: 234). Sampson (1967: 102). Ibid.: 133. August 1960, Selwyn Lloyd Papers, 4/23 Churchill College, Cambridge. Selwyn Lloyd Papers, 6/208, Churchill College, Cambridge. Jawaharlal Nehru to Eden, 5 August 1956, SWJN, second series, vol. 34, p. 339. Jawaharlal Nehru to Gamal Abdel Nasser, 5 August 1956, ibid.: 337. Ibid.: 336. Jawaharlal Nehru to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 10 August 1956, ibid.: 315–16. Patrick Gordon Walker, 22 March 1957, GNWR Diaries 1/12, Churchill College, Cambridge. Selwyn Lloyd Papers, 6/208, Churchill College, Cambridge. Ibid. Selwyn Lloyd Papers, 6/208, Churchill College, Cambridge. Sampson 1967, op. cit., p. 102. Selwyn Lloyd Papers, 6/208 op. cit.

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172. See 462n3 and Jawaharlal Nehru’s cable, 15 November 1956 to G. L. Mehta, Indian ambassador to the USA and V. L. Pandit, Indian High Commissioner to London, SWJN, second series, vol. 35, p. 462. 173. See 456n2 and Jawaharlal Nehru’s cable to G. L. Mehta, 5 November 1956, ibid.: 456–57. 174. Ibid.: 457. 175. Ibid.: 457n; Jawaharlal Nehru’s cable to Mohan Sinha Mehta, 5 November 1956, SWJN, ibid.: 457. 176. SWJN, second series, vol. 35, pp. 352n2, 452–53, 463. 177. Ibid.: 352n2; also Jawaharlal Nehru’s message to Janos Kadar, 22 November 1956 on p. 476. 178. Jawaharlal Nehru to K. P. S. Menon, 2 November 1956, SWJN, ibid.: 451–52. 179. Jawaharlal Nehru to Sorenson, Labour MP, who was active in the India League, 16 November 1956, SWJN, second series, vol. 35, p. 465. 180. Ibid. 181. Ibid. 182. Jawaharlal Nehru, 5 November 1956, SWJN, ibid.: 539. 183. 4 December1957, GWNR 1/12 Diaries, Churchill College, Cambridge. Harold Macmillan, 28 June 1957, HM Diaries on CD. 184. Macmillan (1973: 226). 185. Ibid.: 228, 229. 186. Ibid.: 227. 187. Ibid.: 229. 188. Ibid.: 226–27. 189. Duncan Sandys Papers, DSND, 16/18/23 December 1962, Churchill College, Cambridge. 190. Ibid. 191. Ibid. 192. Galbraith (1969: 498 [27 November 1962]). 193. Ibid. 194. Galbraith (1969: 502 [30 November 1962]). 195. Ibid.: 499. 196. Ibid.: 517. 197. Galbraith (1969: 504 [1 December 1962]). M. J. Desai was Foreign Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi. 198. Ibid. 199. Galbraith (1969: 513 [6 December 1962]). On the President’s disapproval, see p. 513. 200. Ibid.: 517 (10 December1962). 201. Ibid.: 525–26 (5 January 1963). 202. MSS. Eur. F 158/211B, lOR, the British Library, London. 203. Galbraith (1969: 525 [ 4 January 1963]). 204. Gundevia (1984: 310). 205. Galbraith (1969: 529 [9 January 1963]).

234 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246.

Jammu and Kashmir, the Cold War and the West Ibid.: 550 (10 February 1963). Gundevia, op. cit., p. 277. Gundevia, p. 275. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.: 280. Gundevia, op. cit., p. 282. Ibid.: 286. MSS. Eur. FI58/211B, Kashmir Press Clippings, lOR, BL, London. Galbraith (1969: 557 [15 March 1963]). Ibid.: 556. Selig Harrison of the Washington Post flew with him to Calcutta. Ibid.: 556 (15 March 1963). Gundevia, op. cit., p. 286. Ibid.: 288–89. Ibid.: 289. Ibid.: 290. Galbraith (1969: 555 [12 March 1963], 564 [22 April 1963]). Ibid.: 564–65 (22 April 1963). Gundevia, op. cit., p. 295. Ibid.: 293. Ibid. Ibid.: 295. Ibid. For the story of ‘the drama’ see pp. 296–307. Ibid.: 300. Ibid.: 296. Galbraith 1969, op. cit., (5 May 1963) p. 568. Gundevia, op. cit., pp. 299–300. Gundevia, op. cit., p. 298. Ibid.: 300. MSS Eur. F. 158/211B. lOR, BL, London. Galbraith (1969: 516.) President Kennedy had suggested to Harold Macmillan in December 1962 to consider the ‘mediation’ proposal for Kashmir. Gundevia, p. 301. Ibid.: 302. Ibid.: 306. Gundevia (1974: 149). The Daily Telegraph, 16 and 17 May 1963, MSS. Eur. F. l58/211B, IOR, BL, London. Galbraith (1969: 574 [19 May 1963]). Ibid.: 575. The Guardian, 5 July 1963, MSS. Eur. F. l58/211B, lOR, BL, London. The Daily Telegraph, 14 August 1964, Ibid.

Epilogue There was considerable appreciation of India’s handling of the communal question in the West and the way the government of India had taken series of measures to restore order in the midst of chaos and violence and in rehabilitating refugees in the post-1947 period. No doubt there was criticism also for not having done enough to make Muslims more secure and comfortable. Yet, everybody realised how under Jawaharlal Nehru’s leadership even the most miserable could look to the future with some hope and optimism. Winston Churchill, in particular, complimented Nehru for the first time for his impeccable secular credentials and the courageous stand he had taken to dispel gloom from among communities without distinction of caste, creed and religion during the dark hours of communal violence and outrage. Also, the government of India’s decision to remain in the Commonwealth was welcomed ‘by all classes and groups, except perhaps the Communists’ and ‘the feeling in England. . .is overwhelmingly friendly towards India’, wrote Nehru to Indira Gandhi. ‘It is full of gratitude, as of escape from some impending disaster. . . .Winston said to me that he felt as if a friend whom he had given up for dead had suddenly come back to life. If Winston feels that way you can imagine how others feel.’1 Nehru further observed that joining the Commonwealth was ‘the right and gracious way — the Gandhian way. I am sure we have done right for India and the world. We have not given up an iota of our freedom, of anything that matters, and we have gained much. The objections can only be on sentimental grounds and that too on false sentiment and hangovers of the past.’2 In the Gandhian mode, he saw the change in Churchill, the veteran antagonist of India. Churchill ‘told me frankly’, writes Nehru, ‘that after much painful thought he had changed his opinion about India and he had been deeply moved by recent decisions and more especially by my magnanimity. He drank the toast of India and said he would stand by India. I am sure he meant it in his way.’3 But Kashmir was a different story. Sir Arthur Moore, former editor of The Statesman, observed Kashmir as ‘a test for Nehru’s statesmanship’.4 As this study shows, Nehru was genuinely interested in resolving the

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Kashmir issue. He was prepared to come to terms with Pakistan, as has been seen on the Indo-Pak dialogue of 1953, as well as in 1962–63, but Pakistan was unwilling to negotiate for anything less than the entire Kashmir valley as well as other Muslim majority areas. In these discussions, the western powers put maximum pressure on Nehru to give up the entire region to Pakistan, but he stood his ground. No other Indian politician could have withstood such sustained pressure as was built up by the US–UK combine. Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Prime Minister of the UK, opined: ‘There would be no solution of the Kashmir problem until Nehru had left the political scene!’5 Patrick Gordon Walker had similarly expressed himself to Pakistan Prime Minister Mohammad Ali: ‘I said I did not think Kashmir would be solved whilst Nehru was there.’6 Such an idea was commonly held by most British dignitaries about Gandhi as well before India’s partition took place. They believed that as long as Gandhi was alive, there would be no solution of the Indian dilemma. Neither was Gandhi responsible for the happenings of independence and Partition, nor was Nehru alone responsible for the Kashmir dilemma in the postcolonial scenario. Yet there were great admirers of Nehru among Englishmen. Sir John Dunlop, writing to Sir Frederick Millar, wanted his views to be communicated to Prime Minister Douglas-Home so that he should come to terms with India: ‘This man [Nehru] is not a tyrant, not a selfseeking hedonist, but a very devoted servant of India. Nehru will not be repeated. That fascinating personality, the product of Western education, international outlook, non-sectarian philosophy, not really a Hindu, will remain a unique phenomenon in the history of India. That at least is how it appears to me.’7 John Foster Dulles’ impression of ‘Nehru’s foreign policies’ were that ‘all hinged on Kashmir and the desire to isolate and weaken Pakistan as a member of the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact’.8 No doubt there was considerable coolness in relation between Britain and India as well as between India and the US in 1957 owing to the Suez crisis and the Indian ‘silence’, as pointed out by India’s critics on the suppression of the Hungarian people by the Russians. Harold Macmillan’s telling threat that ‘India must know that Britain would react’ was not considered friendly in India. On 4–5 May 1959, an international conference of concerned intellectuals, academicians, economists, top politicians, ambassadors, prime ministers, and ministers from the free democracies, including India, took place in the Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D. C. In all,

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88 distinguished people attended the conference. It was sponsored by the US Committee for International Economic Growth, the deliberations of which were published under the title India and the United States (Harrison 1961). They offered their comments, suggestions and solutions on India’s policies, both economic and foreign affairs, and the Kashmir question. Selig S. Harrison provided some home truths: ‘India compels consideration by virtue of its size alone.’ The Nehru government ‘commands the broad nation-wide support and confidence of the Indian people’; yet the British and American democracies sought to ignore or pressurise to alienate it from them. Third, ‘India is the right place’ for aid, ‘now is still the right time’. Fourth, ‘how risky it is to base long-term friendship on assumption that “democracy” as defined and experienced in the West will necessarily survive on India soil’.9 Our interest lies in the Kashmir solution, and it is worthwhile having Hans Morgenthau’s criticism of US policy. He was an influential intellectual of the Washington Centre of Foreign Policy Research. He was strongly critical of US policy towards India for its ‘halfheartedness’, which appeared to him to be ‘extraordinary’10 . . . ‘because of our own limitation, we have not realised how completely identical the interests of India and our interests are. The identity of interest has been obscured by our alliance with Pakistan.’11 He went on to observe: ‘I am sure, as I can be sure of anything — that future historians will look with amazement at this policy which forces the United States to engage in a kind of armament race with itself.’12 Chester Bowles, former American Ambassador to India, thought: ‘We are not going to solve the problem [Kashmir]. It is only going to be settled by a closer coming together of these two great countries, who belong in spirit even if they can’t share, and never share, I believe a common government.’13 Both Bowles and Averell Harriman believed ‘that the United States should avoid playing favourites’. These were, however, mere tokens of belief. The US had all along supported Pakistan. Michael Brecher was more forthright and offered valuable inputs for resolving the Kashmir problem. On plebiscite he had this to say: ‘My own feeling is that a plebiscite at this time would cause greater harm than the benefits which would accrue. I am not at all convinced, I might add that there is an absolute quality to self-determination. I think there are other principles which may be involved and the self-determination in the pure sense of plebiscite in the valley of

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Kashmir is not the only consideration.’14 Another important point made by him was: ‘My own feeling is that the valley of Kashmir could become internally autonomous State whose territory would be jointly guaranteed by India and Pakistan with the remaining part of Kashmir divided between the two of them — both having access to the valley for tourist and trade.’15 Whether it was Junagarh, Hyderabad or Kashmir, India was treated by the western powers as the real culprit. Throughout the last several decades, India was at the receiving end, whatever may have been its dilemma or predicament. In one of his letters to Nehru, the famed CR — Chakravarti Rajagopalachri — one of the finest minds among Indians and who succeeded Lord Mountbatten as Governor General of India in June 1948, touched upon the Indian problem thus: We are in a sad pass. If the substance is in our favour, we are up against legalities, paramountcy, lapse and all that. If the law is in our favour, then morality is brought up against us. If both are right, then they say our nonviolence is against us. Every way or some way we are wrong! We have put Bapu [Gandhi] aside — so the western democracies have taken him up. There is some compensation.16

As later events showed, India was much disillusioned by the display of partisanship at the United Nations on the issue of Kashmir by the western powers. Jammu and Kashmir unwittingly became the victim of the Cold War and a pawn on the chessboard of international politics. Pakistan was jubilant and basked under the glory, much of which was bestowed by the western allies in the form of massive flow of arms, which was nonchalantly used by Pakistan’s military dictators against India both in the 1965 and 1971 wars, with disastrous consequences to Pakistan as well as to India. In the aftermath of the Indian debacle suffered in the Himalayas, Nehru was anxious to enter into a defensive agreement with the US to thwart further Chinese attacks. Not only had India asked for a $500 million five-year plan for military preparedness, but had also wished for a long-term arrangement for defence. Both John Kenneth Galbraith and Chester Bowles are on record on the specific Indian problem. Bowles, who served his second tenure as US ambassador to India after the departure of Galbraith, reports (1971) that his was the only voice which opposed the view that the US should not do anything to disrupt relations with Pakistan held by the powerful group consisting of Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, Philip Talbot and George Bundy.

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He also had disagreed with the ‘much exaggerated assertion’ that the Peshawar base was ‘vitally important’ to the future of security of the US and the ‘modernising effort of the Indian army’ dragged on till the winter of 1963. He discussed the matter of Indian defence directly with President Kennedy, urging that the Chinese attack on India ‘was likely to open up a new relationship in Asia which though unpredictable in their directions or dimensions at that point might create favourable opportunities for an entirely new approach of Asian stability’.17 He further stated: In mid-November 1963, when I reported the President of talks with Nehru in regard to India’s request for US military assistance he was greatly pleased. He indicated, he would fully support my proposals regardless of the Pakistan situation. But before calling a meeting of the National Security Council, he wanted me to develop the broadest possible support in the Pentagon and state Department. He left no doubt in my mind that he would go through the agreement in any event, but that if I could win the support of Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara it would be that much easier for him.18

The National Security Council meeting was scheduled for 26 November 1963. Four days before that, the President was assassinated. Thus, a new anticipated phase of better Indo-American relations19 could not fructify. China was a factor in the emerging international political scenario, which the Eurocentric vision of the West, especially Britain, seemed not to have taken cognisance of, as the USA had done at that point of time. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah no doubt was the most popular and charismatic political leader of Jammu and Kashmir. Although educated in Islamia College, Lahore and Aligarh Muslim University, he had imbibed the spirit of the independence movement as advocated by the Indian National Congress ever since 1929–30. In 1931, he led the movement against the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir, demanding reforms for self-government and confirmation of rights of Muslims. In 1935 Sheikh Abdullah, in association with Prem Nath Bazaz, started a journal called Hamdard with an aim ‘to revive the tolerant spirit characteristic of Kashmiri culture and to espouse the cause of secularism and social democracy in the State’. Soon afterwards, he came into contact with Jawaharlal Nehru, who groomed him as the leader of the All India States Peoples Conference, of which he was later elected President. In October 1947, when the tribal invasion started, he appealed to Nehru for help as a leader

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of the National Conference, which was the most popular political body at that time. The Muslim Conference led by his close friend of yesteryears, Ghulam Abbas, sided with Pakistan. Meanwhile, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir state had acceded to India after signing the Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947. On 30 October 1947, he was appointed as Head of Administration of Jammu and Kashmir. In 1948, Sheikh Abdullah became Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. Prem Nath Bazaz recounts the story of five years of Sheikh Abdullah’s prime ministership till he was deposed and arrested in August 1953; how the latter had thrown thousands of political workers into jail mostly without trial merely because they held views opposed to government. Among those imprisoned were not only ‘pro-Pakistani elements’, but also ‘those who cherished faith in secularism but were critical of the working of his administration’. Many of them were ‘liquidated’, according to Bazaz.20 Sheikh Abdullah attempted to build a one party system and a monolith structure of the state, with one organisation, the National Conference; one leader, Sheikh Abdullah; and one programme, ‘Naya Kashmir’.21 His concept of autonomy applied only to the Kashmir valley. He was not prepared to concede to Jammu and Ladakh those very rights and privileges that he himself demanded from the Indian state, which were not to be interpreted as a step towards separation but as ‘a mutual accommodation of each other’s view point’. Whenever Jammu and Ladakh asked for these rights, he branded them as communal and reactionary.22 The revolutionary land reforms introduced by his government were often criticised as having been actuated by the desire of uprooting Hindu landed interests and facilitating Muslim peasant rights over land. Nearly 80,000 acres were distributed among 2,00,000 peasants without giving any compensation to the landed classes, which went against the tenets of Indian Constitution. By these moves, Sheikh Abdullah won over the Kashmiri Muslims but offended other interests, which were not necessarily communal and which had supported the secularist claims of the National Conference led by Sheikh Abdullah. In May 1949, Abdullah announced in Srinagar in the presence of Nehru: ‘No power in the world can separate us. Every Kashmiri feels that he is an Indian and that India is his homeland.’23 In September 1949, when the celebrations were held in the presence of Nehru, the Indian national flag was conspicuous by its absence, as was the

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state flag of the ruling dynasty of Jammu and Kashmir. Only the National Conference flag was raised.24 Soon after there was a demand for one flag, one constitution and one Head of State, all under the aegis of the National Conference. Every second day, there were contradictory speeches displaying ambiguities. On 14 April 1952, Sheikh Abdullah reiterated that relations between India and Kashmir were ‘irrevocable and no force under earth can rend us asunder’, and in a few days warned the Indian government that ‘the existence of Kashmir did not depend on Indian money, trade or defence forces, and he did not expect any strings to be attached to India aid’.25 Abdullah’s vituperative attacks became more pronounced especially after his meeting with Adlai Stevenson, who, according to press reports, had assured him of the US support if Kashmir became independent. He refused to go to Delhi to hold discussions with Nehru on any matter on which he had reservations. It was also reported that he was receiving messages from Pakistan for meetings with some emissaries. Although nothing was decisively proved, there were ample suspicions about his erratic behaviour patterns and ambiguous statements. His cabinet was also divided and refused to toe his line for independent Kashmir, when he proposed it at the meeting of the National Conference and also to the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir. It is said that Nehru himself was deeply upset at Abdullah’s arrest and removal, as was Indira Gandhi. On 10 August 1953, Indira Gandhi from Zurich wrote to her father: ‘It is a heartbreaking thing to happen. . . .I am filled with a terrible and deeply penetrating sadness. I suppose one has to do something for the greater good, but it is the cutting a part of oneself.26 Thereafter, Abdullah was in and out of jail for nearly two decades. His story of the rise and fall was indeed ‘a sad and sorry one’, as Josef Korbel had observed. Korbel was a member of the first UN Commission on Kashmir and came in close contact with the leaders of India, Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir. He was also sympathetic to the Indian case on Kashmir. His book, Danger in Kashmir (first published in 1954, Princeton Univ. Press, Reprint 1956, 1966) was highly rated as an authentic and fair account of the problem Speaking of Sheikh Abdullah, he wrote: ‘The story of Sheikh Abdullah is a sad and sorry one. It is the story of the patriot, once passionately devoted to his people’s welfare, but one whose patriotism was too shallow to reject the temptation of power. Once a fighter, he turned into an opportunist

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and, worse, a dictator who at the end found himself entangled in the web of his own methods and policy.’27 Korbel’s assessment may have been correct, but Abdullah was an undisputed leader of the Kashmiri people. The Kashmiri Muslims of the valley literally worshipped him. His deposition and arrest was considered by them as a great betrayal on the part of India and the government led by Nehru. The charges against him were never proved and the trial was dropped, leaving a bad taste in the mouth. People were bound to feel that Abdullah had been a victim of political intrigue and bad faith. Such a perception of the 1953 scenario still persists among those who are fighting for their just rights, as they like to call it. After Abdullah was released from jail on 8 April 1964, Nehru invited him, as an old friend, to stay with him in the Prime Minister’s House. Abdullah readily accepted Nehru’s invitation, although he had suffered nearly 10 years’ imprisonment under Nehru’s regime. Y. D. Gundevia said this was only possible and ‘very normal in Gandhi’s India’.28 Abdullah called himself an ‘old friend and colleague’, apart from being a ‘blood-brother’, since his ancestors were also Pandits like the Nehrus. On Nehru’s advice he met Jayaprakash Narayan, Vinoba Bhave and C. Rajagopalachari, all highly respectable Indians, but retired from politics and came forward with a plan of confederation between India, Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir. He thought this was essential to maintain harmonious relations with Pakistan. Nehru allowed him to visit Pakistan to meet President Ayub Khan, from whom he had also received an invitation. To the dismay of Sheikh Abdullah, Ayub Khan rejected the confederation plan outright, declaring it ‘the absurd proposal’. In his autobiography, Ayub Khan writes: ‘I told them [Sheikh Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Beg] plainly we should have nothing to do with it. It is curious that whereas we were seeking the salvation of Kashmiris, they have been forced to mention an idea, if pursued, would lead to our enslavement. It was clear that this was what Mr. Nehru had told them to us. . .’29 He went on to say: ‘How they came to such conclusion was beyond me. Only those who had neither knowledge nor appreciation of history could think on those lines. India and Pakistan could never work as a Confederation even if such an arrangement were to be brought about by force. And the reason is simple: Indian nationalism is based on Hinduism and Pakistan’s nationalism is based on Islam. The two philosophies are fundamentally different from each other. These two nationalisms cannot combine, but it should be possible

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for them to live side by side in peace and understanding. This is our foreign policy objective towards India.’30 The spectre created by Jinnah’s two-nation theory was lucidly provided by Ayub Khan. The so-called idea of joint defence, as advocated by him, should also founder on the same logic as advanced by him. Abdullah had planned to return from Pakistan after his talks with Ayub Khan, but Nehru died on 27 May 1964. Abdullah, in profound shock and sorrow, returned to New Delhi for Nehru’s funeral on 28 May 1964. In March 1965, he went to Cairo, appealing to the AfroAsian countries for support. In Algiers, he met Zhou Enlai, who invited him to visit Bejing, assuring him that China ‘always supported Kashmir peoples’ right of self-determination’. Z. A. Bhutto ‘rushed to encourage Abdullah in obvious disregard for the elementary rules of diplomacy and announced that Pakistan was prepared to give him a passport to visit China’.31 Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri took ‘a most serious view’ of Abdullah’s contact with India’s ‘enemy’, which implied that the latter ‘had condoned Chinese aggression’ against India; Abdullah was arrested again on 30 April 1965.32 Ayub Khan thought India had been much weakened after Nehru’s death. He did not take Shastri seriously; he was to him India’s ‘little leader’. He began with a gamble in the Rann of Kutch in March–April 1965, wherein he succeeded to an extent, humbling the Indian army. Emboldened by this experience, he launched ‘Operation Gibraltar’ to seize Kashmir. First, he sent 5,000 Pakistani trained men as guerrillas in order to start an uprising in Kashmir. No uprising of the people took place. On 1 September 1965, Pakistan launched a major attack across the ceasefire line in south Kashmir. India entered Pakistan on 6 September, inflicting heavy losses on Pakistan. Hundreds of Patton tanks and 72 F86 planes, all of American make, were destroyed. More than 400 square miles of Pakistan occupied territory and 200 square miles of Pakistan had been taken outside Kashmir. India ‘suffered 11,000 casualties — dead, wounded and missing. It was no consolation that Pakistan’s casualities were substantially more.33 The Tashkent Agreement was signed in January 1966, with President Kosygin intervening and asking the two countries to withdraw to the positions held by them before the war. The 1965 war was a disaster for Pakistan and Ayub Khan. Dennis Kux informs that Ayub Khan visited Washington from 14–16 December 1965. President Johnson told Ayub in no uncertain terms that the

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US would not allow Pakistan and China ‘to squeeze India’, and that ‘if Pakistan chose relations with the US “there could be no serious relations with China.” ’34 Ayub Khan was a much ‘diminished figure’ and returned ‘much chastened, subdued, pathetic and sad’;35 yet Pakistan’s relations with China was revived under Z. A. Bhutto and later under President Yahya Khan and Henry Kissinger. It must be observed that China had warned India to return to international borders during the 1965 war, but the US, USSR and UK had restrained China. The defining moment in the history of post-colonial India and Pakistan arrived in December 1971, when Pakistan attacked India in the wake of the national uprising of the East Pakistan Bengalis against what they termed the ‘Punjabi colonialism’ of western Pakistan. Pakistan lost East Pakistan and an independent Bangladesh emerged, falsifying the two-nation theory. In the war against India, Pakistan had lost 5,130 square miles of territory to India as well as 93,000 Pakistani soldiers who had surrendered before the Indian army. Under the Simla Agreement of 1972, however, India returned the territory captured during the war, and the soldiers were honourably repatriated back to Pakistan. This was done without any intervention from the western powers, not certainly under any pressure from President Nixon or the all powerful Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Both of them had visited China reversing the past policy formulations, and wanted China to enter into the fray, but India’s treaty of friendship with the USSR, signed in August 1971 between India and the USSR, cautioned China, thus safeguarding peace in the region. Nowhere in the history of the world had the defeated party (in this case Pakistan) been treated with such magnanimity, honour and dignity. India and Pakistan, it was hoped, would look to the future with better understanding, peace, hope and optimism. But after 1989, cross-border militancy and terror supported by the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and Pakistan began raising its head in Jammu and Kashmir. That, however, is a separate story beyond the scope of this book.

Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

2 May 1949, from London, in Gandhi (1992: 564). Ibid. Ibid. In Zakaria (1960: 175). 19 March 1964, PREM 11/4868, PRO, London.

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6. At Patrick Gordon Walker’s lunch at the Claridges for Mohammad Ali, 4 July 1956, Gordon-Walker Papers, GNWR 1/9 Diaries. 7. 1 March 1958, PREM 11/2363, PRO, London. 8. Sir Harold Cacacia to Selwyn Lloyd, 15 January 1957, PREM 11/1877, PRO, London. 9. Introduction, pp. 2–3. 10. Harrison 1961, op. cit., p. 58. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. Harrison (1961: 57). 14. Harrison (1961: 54). See Brecher (1953; 1959) and Brecher and Menon (1968). 15. Ibid. 16. 21 September 1968, quoted in Pandey (1976: 313). 17. Bowles 1971: 483, 439–40. 18. Ibid.: 481. 19. Ibid. 20. Bazaz (1967: 64). 21. Behera (2006: 109). 22. Ibid.: 112. 23. Quoted in Korbel (1954: 206). 24. Ibid.: 207. Josef Korbel relied on the report of The Hindu, 14 April 1952 and The Times (London) 26 April 1952. 25. Ibid. 26. Gandhi (1992). 27. Korbel 1954, op. cit., p. 207. 28. Gundevia (1984: 322). 29. Khan (1967: 128). 30. Ibid. 31. Korbel (1954: 327). 32. Ibid. 33. Gundevia (1984: 333). 34. Kux (2001: 165, 167). 35. Ibid.: 166, 168.

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Zakaria, Rafiq. 1960. A Study of Nehru. Bombay: Bennett Coleman. ———. 1989. The Struggle within Islam: The Conflict between Religion and Politics. London: Penguin Books. ———. 2001. The Man who Divided India: An Insight into Jinnah’s Leadership and Its Aftermath. Mumbai: Popular Prakashan. Ziegler, Philip. 1998. Mountbatten: The Official Biography. Glasgow: Collins.

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Index Abbas, Ghulam, President, Muslim Conference, J&K, 23 Abdullah, Sheikh Mohammad, Prime Minister of J&K 1948–53; most popular leader of Kashmir, 23; leader of National Conference, 23–24; All India States Peoples Conference, 23; opposed Jinnah’s two-nation theory, 23; supports accession of Kashmir and works for it, 68, 79, 83, 97, 106, 107; as PM sets his plan for one party system, 240; brings revolutionary land reforms, 240; seeks independent status for Kashmir, 180–81; meets Adlai Stevenson, 181; backs out on agreements with India, 180; dismissal, 179; in and out of jail, stays with Nehru, 242; suggests Confederation plan, rejected by Ayub Khan, 242–43; tryst with China, rearrested, 243; his autobiography in Urdu, translated into English by Khushwant Singh, 50; sheds light on accession of J&K to India, 51–52; says Kashmir not a Hindu–Muslim question, 106; Kashmir ravaged by Pakistan, 106–107; more Muslims in India than in Pakistan, 107; also see 2, 12, 23 Alexander, Horace, 74 Allen, George, US Ambassador in Delhi, 181 Acheson, Dean, 60, 61 Ahmed, Aziz, Chief Secretary, Pakistan, 170 American economy, 118, 119

Amritsar, anniversary of Jallianwala Bagh, 160 Anglo-American involvement in Kashmir, 24–30 Auchinleck, Sir Claude, Commanderin-Chief India, Field Marshall, 56, 156 Ayyangar, Gopalaswami, 69, 88–89, 93 Azad Kashmir (POK — Pakistan Occupied Kashmir) 157; forces in, 59; radio broadcasts, 171, 179 Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam, 184; asks Iskander Mirza, ‘where is the final settlement’, 185–86; if plebiscite even after territory transfer, 185 Attlee, Clement, British Prime Minister, supported growth of colonial nationalism, 141–42; against imperialism, 143; in the War Cabinet Memo. attacks India policy, 142–44; for Indian independence, 155; founder of multi-racial Commonwealth, 155; on Kashmir issue favours the ‘Muslim World’, 74–75; instrumental for UN resolutions, 40–41, 44–45, 67, 73, 74, 75; persuaded President Truman to agree to UN resolutions, 41; no difference of approach between Noel-Baker and himself, 75–76; issues comprehensive instructions to UK delegation, 76–78; meanwhile CRO planning Br. personnel in Kashmir under UNO, 79–80; wishes Commonwealth to serve as a bulwark against war, 81; plans Colombo Conference, 82; closeness in defence matters with Pakistan,

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87–88; CRO produce a plan to take over Kashmir administration if necessary, 85–86; in Middle East against ‘gun-boat’ diplomacy, 147–48; also favours plebiscite in Kashmir, issues instructions, 84–85; on Dulles, 122–23 Badaber (near about Peshawar in Pakistan) US secret base in, 128, 136–38 Baghdad Pact, 121, 131 Bandung Conference 1954; Zhou Enlai disliked Nehru’s introducing him to, 194; China feared India’s ‘abiding interest’ in Tibet, 194; Chinese maps showed Kashmir as Chinese territory, 194 Barnds, William, 134 Beg, Afzal, 180 Berlin, Sir Isaiah, 11 Bevin, Ernest, 73, 119 Birdwood, Lord, against conspiracy theory, 57–58 Black, Eugene, World Bank President, 220 Bhattacharjea, Ajit, 55 Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali, Pakistan Foreign Minister during Ayub Khan’s regime, 206, 218, 219; unending demands on Kashmir, 220; invites Zhou Enlai, 220–21; Pakistan wants the whole valley, 221–23; with ‘Elements of Kashmir Settlement’, 222; why defend Ladakh — give it to China, 223; mediation, 224; new ideas, 225; no to non-war declaration, 225, 244 Bodleian, 3 Bokhari, A. S., 170–71 Bowles, Chester, US Ambassador to Delhi, 3, 26, 55; opposed military aid to Pakistan, 132; argued nonaligned policy not incompatible, 132–33; not to antagonise Afghanistan,

133; President Kennedy assured lasting defence arrangement with India, 239; could not finalise owing to his assassination four days before NSC meet, 239; best policy to follow ‘avoid playing favourites’, 237 Brecher, Michael, plebiscite no longer feasible, 238; offers constructive solutions, 238 British personnel fighting in Kashmir, 157; diplomats engaged in antiIndia propaganda, 158; foreign office also involved, 160–61; press coverage often hostile, 161–62; even Noel-Baker not immune, 158–59 Canada, Pakistan’s negotiations for nuclear plant, 129 Cadogan, Sir Alexander, 75–78 Caroe, Sir Olaf, ICS, Governor NWFP 1946; Political Secretary to GOI, supporter of Pakistan and Muslim League, 24–25, 156; asked to quit, 156; friendly with Maharaja advised against India and Nehru, 156; his thesis on ‘Oil Wells of Middle East’ (1949, 1951) was considered important, 25; source of future world conflict for oil, 25; hence strategic value of Pakistan, 25–26; Pakistan potential for military bases, 26–27; to combat ‘Muscovite Communism’ in north-west and Chinese communist danger in north-east, 28–29; retired UK critical of India policy on Goa, 159– 60; opposed to Hindu India, opens up to Macmillan, 160 Carter, Sir Archibald, Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO), London, 75 Cawthorn, Walter, Maj. Gen. proposes UK common defence relations with Pakistan, 86–89, 108 China, Communist, 3, 122

Index Chinese invasion of India, 153; India’s war with China, 186–87; Chinese withdrawal following US Carrier, Nov. 1962, 204; US military aid to India, 187; Kennedy considered India potential partner to contain China; help scuttled by Macmillan, 187–88; Chinese withdrawal and Kashmir talks, 215–18 China–Pakistan border pact (Feb. 1963), 218; territory in Kashmir (POK) gifted away to China, 220; India and USSR protest, 220 Churchill, Winston, his Fulton speech (1946), 119; heralds Cold War, 119; considered declaration of war against Russia, 120; Dulles’ view of Churchill, 125; his view of India, 141, 142, 144; against independence, 155; supports Muslim League, 156; however Nehru’s statesmandhip and secular credentials hailed, 155; tells Lord Wavell ‘to keep a bit of India’, 156, 160–61 Clutterback, Alexander, British High Commissioner to India, opposed military aid to Pakistan, 133 Cripps, Sir Stafford, 144 Crocker, Walter, Australian High Commissioner in Delhi, opposed to military aid, 169 Curtis, Lionel, editor and leader of Round Table group, 25 Cunningham, Sir George, Governor NWFP 1947, friend of Muslim League, 157 Cold War, principles, 31; policy of containment, 125; ‘paranoid fear of communism’, 31; Pakistan’s importance in defence, 31–32 Cold War politics, 119, 120, 122; military alliance system, 124–25, 127; US military aid to Pakistan, 127; affects Kashmir issue, 127; Galbraith’s assessment, 129–30

257

Cold War years, 98–99, 119–22 Commonwealth of Nations, 4, 5, 145, 146, 147, 148; influence of, 79, 80, 81; role in averting war, 82–83; Commonwealth countries offer troops, 98 Commonwealth Conference and Kashmir, 105; Attlee’s suggestions, 105; so also Robert Menzies’, 106; Britain and white dominions support Pakistan, 110–11 communism, 118, 119, 121, 137 Conservatives, 7, 141–42, 144; antipathy to Indian self-rule, 155–56; mentality, 160–61; opposed to India, 155; despised Indian National Congress, 155 colonial nationalism, 142, 147, 153; arms aid a metaphor for return to colonialism, 152 Creech Jones, SOS for colonies, 3, 147–48 Cripps, Sir Stafford, 59, 73, 144 Dasgupta, C. 49 demilitarisation, 108, 109 Desai, C. C., High Commissioner in Karachi, 183 Desai, M. J., Secretary External Affairs, 181, 222, 223, 224 Desai, Morarji, 201 Dirks, Nicholas, on politics of difference, 143 Dixon, Owen, report, 171 Durham, Lord, 144 Dulles, John Foster, US Secretary of State, and Japanese Peace Treaty, 121, 122, 123; talks with Nehru, 123–26; not for plebiscite in Kashmir, 124; for partition of Kashmir, 124–25; euphoric about Pakistan, 126; prelude to alliances with Pakistan, 127; on Nehru, 126; against colonialism, 125; conversation with Walter Lippman,

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126; Galbraith on Dulles policy, 129–30; supports Portugal on Goa, 162, 213; massive retaliation policy, 182; withdraws financial support to Egypt, 208; refused loan to UK unless ceasefire in Suez crisis, 209; Eisenhower more amenable after Dulles, 135–36 Eden, Anthony, British Prime Minister 1955–57, Suez crisis, 131, 198, 207–209; resigns, 209; holds Dulles responsible ‘that terrible man’, 209 Elmhirst, T. W. Air Marshall commanding RAF, 58 Eisenhower, Dwight D., US President, 122, 128, 135; dialogue with Nehru, 135–36; assures Nehru of non-use of US arms, 189; threatens to leave UN on China’s admission, 194; on Egypt’s rights on Suez Canal, 210 Galbraith, John Kenneth, US Ambassador to India, 11, 39, 118; on Dulles’ policy, 129–30; on Kashmir related questions, 206, 218, 219, 220; on internationalisation, 221; elements of Kashmir Settlement, 222–23; mediation proposal, 224–25; on Ayub Khan’s ‘Law of mediation’, 226; military aid after China War, 187–88; opportunity to befriend India lost, 188 Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand, 7, 23, 49, 236; approved sending of troops to Kashmir, 73; favoured plebiscite, 74; opposed partition of Kashmir, 73; suggested Noel-Baker for mediation, 74, 144; called UN reference a mistake, 74, 79 Gilgit agency under Maj. Brown’s Scouts, 33–34; maintained by J&K government, 20, 34; revolted in support of Pakistan, 34; Britain’s tacit support, 34

Goan invasion, 213–14; liberation movement of, 213 Gokhale, Gopal Krishna, 49 Gore-Booth, Paul, 11 Gordon-Walker, Patrick, 3, 39, 40, 41, 82, 209 Graham report, 83, 107, 108 Gundevia, Y. D., ICS, Foreign Secretary, 188; military aid to India not gifts, 188; till 1962 no US arms supplied, 188; arms purchases mostly in UK and France, 188–89; total British dependence for arms sale, 191–92; the MIG deal, 188, 196–97; India feared Pakistan’s military strength, 192; value of arms received as free ‘aid’ phenomenal, 197; now China opens another front, 195–98; India prepared for talks with Pakistan; six rounds of talks held between December 1962 and May 1963, 206, 218, 219; in bits and pieces in his memoirs Outside the Archives, 206, 216, 219, 223, 225; elements of a settlement, 222, 225; Chenab watershed again, 220; mediation drama 223; Ayub’s law of mediation, 223–25; breakdown of talks, 225; his view in The Last Testament & Monograph, on ending of dialogue, 225 Hailey, Malcolm, ICS, Governor of Punjab 1924–28, Governor of UP 1928–34, ‘in service of imperialism’, 141; also famous for African Survey, 25 Halifax, Lord (formerly Viceroy of India 1926–31 as Lord Irwin), 156 Hall, T. S., Rear Admiral FOC RIN, 58 Harriman, Averell, USSOS, 206, 219, 237 Harrison, Selig, 221 Hastings, Warren, impeachment of, 144 Hiroshima, 117 Hodson, H. V. author of Twentieth Century Empire, forecasts ‘reconquest’ of India, 28–30

Index Hoffman, Paul, 136 Home, Sir Alec Douglas, UK Foreign Secretary, 199 Hungarian revolution against Soviet occupation, 212; Nehru’s criticism considered inadequate, 210; explains stand, 210–11; to Sorenson, 211–12; Indian stand in UN, 212; Macmillan extremely unhappy, 212 Hussain, Khalid, 171 Hyderabad, 44–45 Indian National Congress, 2, 7, 9, 23; fought for independence, 26; stood for nationalism, 152, 153; Ouit India movement, 154, 155; anti-colonial and anti-imperialist, 142, 144, 152, 155–56; Indian ingratitude, 129, 138 imperialism, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146, 148; American quest for oil and world dominance, 153 Indus Waters Treaty (of 1960), 220 Indian weapon system, British in origin, 195; self-reliance plan and manufactures, 195; production of Soviet M14 helicopters undertaken, 195; request for supersonic aircrafts sale refused, 195–96 instrument of accession, 57, 61, 62, 63; the plebiscite clause made accession provisional, 67, 68 Islam, Sufi traditions of, 1 Iqbal, Dr Mohammad, 2 Jarring report of 1957, 99, 102–103, 104, 105 Jha, Prem Shanker, 49 Jinnah, Mohammad Ali, 2, 23, 28, 49, 66, 67, 68, 80; tacit admission of help to tribals, 69; his two-nation theory and Kashmir, 156 Johnson, Lyndon, US President, 213–14 Junagarh, 43–44

259

Kashmir (J&K) founder Maharaja Gulab Singh, 19–20; Treaty of Amritsar 1846, 19–23; Maharaja Hari Singh ruled in 1947, 19–23, 25; signed Standstill Agreement, 62, 63; sought independent status, 23–24; accession to India, 62–63, 66, 67, 68, 69; Kashmir dispute, issue of aggression, 71–73, 97, 98, 99; issue of partition, 39–40, 72, 73, 74, 81–82, 83, 85–86; international politics, 88–89; religious basis of plebiscite opposed by, 10, 105–106; India determined to avoid horrors of partition, 177 Kashmir dispute in the UN; referred to by India against Pakistan aggression, 92–93; UN resolutions, 95–96, 100–101; obligations under, 102; Dixon report on demilitarisation, 74, 103; Indian argument against it, 101–102; Pakistan being militarised through US aid, 98; Jarring Report for ‘arbitration’, 102– 03; on plebiscite administrator, 100; pressure by powers, 102; on plebiscite, 66, 69, 96–97, 98, 100, 101; unsolved Kashmir problem, 226 Kashmir valley, strategic importance of, 21–22 Khan, Ayub, Pakistan President (1958– 69), 9, 12, 129, 131, 206; formerly Commander-in-Chief, 127; pressed US for US support on Kashmir, 192; demanded more, 192, 195; considered as best bet for peace, 218; puts conditions on ‘mediation proposals’, 225–26; invites Sheikh Abdullah for talks, 242–43; rejects confederation plans as absurd, 243; Rann of Kutch adventure, 243; 1965 war a disaster for Pakistan, 243–44 Khan, Raja Gaznafar Ali, Pakistan High Commissioner in Delhi, 169 Khan, Khizr Hayat, 80

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Khan, Liaquat Ali, Pakistan Prime Minister (1947–51), 5, 32, 33, 68, 69, 70, 73, 80, 86–88, 93, 131; Khan, Sikander Hayat, 1 Khan Sheb, Dr, Prime Minister NWFP (1945–47), 157 Khan, Sultan Mohammad, Pakistan Foreign Secretary, 1958–59; warns on compromising independence, 128–29; on free aid to Pakistan, 129; on Nehru’s visit to China, 193–94 Khan, Sir Zafrullah, favourite of Britain, 33, 78–79, presents Pakistan view of Kashmir dispute, 74, 78, 93; denied tribal role or Pakistan army, 92–93; accepts presence July 1948 in J&K, 95, 108 Khan, Yahya, Pakistan President, 1971 war and Pakistan humiliation, 244 Kenneth, George, classic theory of containment, 122 Kennedy, President, on non-alignment, 11; calls ‘elements of settlement’ misguided, 223; interested in India related issues including MIG deal, 202–203; suggests mediation on Kashmir, 223; Nehru agrees, 224; disenchanted with Pakistan, 192; visualises India as a partner in containing China, 192; although no for joint defence pact with India, 217–18; favoured long-term military assistance arrangement with India, 239 Kingway Hall meeting, London, 60 Korbel, Josef, member UN Commission on Kashmir (1948–51) on accession, 62, 63, 66; on two-nation theory, 95, 105; on Sheikh Abdullah, 240–41 Kosygin, Alexei, Soviet President, 243 Kux, Dennis, 39, 243–44 Lahore, 66, 69 Linlithgow, Lord, Viceroy of India (1936–43), 142–44

Lippman, Walter, 119, 120, 126 Listowel, Lord, SOS for India, 1947, 41 Lloyd, Selwyn, Foreign Secretary in Macmillan Cabinet, 207; on Eden’s gamble, 209 Lamb, Alastair, British historian, 48–49, 56–57, 58–59 Laski, Harold, 60 Lockhart, R. M. M. General, Commander-in-Chief India, 58 Macmillan, Harold, British Conservative leader and Prime Minister 1957–63, 117, 118, 120, 129; writes like an ‘imperial’ historian, 117; defines philosophy of empire, 141, 144; a Diseraelian, 145; welcomes Anglo-American cooperation, 118; supports nuclear bomb project, 207; UK hydrogen bomb May, 1958, 207–18, 223; first visit to India February 1947 — impressions of Nehru, 148, 149, 158; second memorable visit 1958, magnificent reception at Old Fort mesmerises him, 154; pleased to see British legacy intact, 154; British businessmen appreciated unlike in the olden days, 154; visits Pakistan: ‘Only the army stable’, corruption rampant and religious turmoil, 154; of course Kashmir ‘is a running sore’, 155; author of Baghdad Pact, 121, 131; highly critical of Goan ‘invasion’, 159; sympathetic to Indian discomfiture in the China War, 159–60; but seemed somewhat pleased to see ‘tipping of the wings’ of Nehru, 160; attends Nassau Conference with President Kennedy, tones down military aid to India, 187; dead-set against MIG deal of India, 197–200, 205, 206, 207, 209; asks Kennedy to discontinue economic aid to India, 199; refused Kennedy’s

Index suggestions for concessions in arms to India, 198–200; pressurises India for a Kashmir solution after India’s debacle, 205 Magna Carta, 148 Mahajan, Mehr Chand, Prime Minister of J&K 1947–48, autobiography, 57; on accession, 52–53; no locus standi of Pakistan on Kashmir, 55–56, 57 Manning, Robert, Assistant US SOS for Public Affairs, 223 Mao Tse Tung, 193–94; mocked India’s nonaligned policy, 194 Marshall plan, 118, 119 Masoodi, Maulana, 180 McCarthyism, 121 McConaughy, US Ambassador in Karachi, 218, 223 McNamara, Robert, US Defence Secretary, 190; Pakistan an ally, 191; neutralist India to suffer, –191 McNaughton report of 3 February 1950, 99, 104 Mohammad Ali, Pakistan Prime Minister 1953–55, talks with Nehru, 127–28, 169–73, 175–79 Mohammad, Bakshi Ghulam, Deputy PM of J&K, 171 Mohammad, Ghulam, Governor General of Pakistan, 127 Mosley, Leonard, 41–42 Morrison, Herbert, 147 Mountbatten, Lord, sustained efforts on Nehru for UN reference of Kashmir dispute, 63, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71; as also on holding of plebiscite, 71, 72, 83; on British role in the UN and Indian disillusionment, 38–39, 67–68; explains that war was not a solution, 72; wrote after retirement UN reference was the best option, 72; also UN resolution was ‘not-unfavourable’ to India, 72; says on these issues Nehru had not ‘shared’ his view, 72; his ‘repeated

261

appeals’ to Nehru to accept them, 71; role in ‘mediation drama’ on Kashmir issue, 223–24, 239; sat as an ‘umpire’ between Pakistan and India 63, 65, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72; plebiscite was his idea, 64, 66–67; see also 12, 23, 40, 41, 41, 49, 51 Mountbatten, Lady, correspondent of Nehru, 162 Mirza, Iskander, President of Pakistan 1955–58, 127, 154, 184; asks how American aid affects India, 184; says worried about Kashmir not communism, 185 Mir Qasim, Chief Minister J&K 1971–74; on Sheikh Abdullah, 53–54; on accession, 54 Moynihan, Daniel P., US Senator and Ambassador to India, 130 Morgenthau, Hans of the Washington Centre of Foreign Affairs, critical of US policy towards India, 237 Mudie, Sir Francis, Governor of Punjab (Pakistan), 157 Menon, Krishna, 63; detested by the West, 99; was India’s voice in the UN, 99; brought centre stage the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and January 1949, 99–100; argued against the partisan reports, 102–104; tells why arbitration unsuitable, 103–104; underplays Chinese incursions 1959–60, 195; Chinese denunciation of India, 195; issues in debates, 76, 98, 99, 100, 110–12, 157 Menon, V. P., involved in integrating states into India, 42, 43, 50, 53, 56, 68 MIG 21 deal mooted with Soviet Union, 196–97; created an uproar in the West, 197; Nehru explains, 197; purchase of IL 28 aircraft also explained, 198; Dulles also told of the purchase of Soviet IL28 by Nehru, 198; Eden asks for an

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undertaking not to buy Russian hardware, 198; Macmillan told of decision, 198, 214; President Kennedy for alternative offers, 202– 203; in return Macmillan advised discontinuance of US economic aid, 203–204; deal finalised, 204 Mulraj, 185 Muslim League, Indian, supported the British, 6, 151, 155, 156–57 Muslim world, 4, 133 Muslim infiltration from East Pakistan, 221 Nassau meeting on military aid to India, 187; aftermath of Chinese war of 1962; UK unwilling for substantial help, 187–88 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, Egyptian President since 1954; Suez Canal crisis after nationalisation (26 July 1956), 207–208; Nehru cautions against precipitate action, 208–209; advises negotiations for new treaty, 208; Suez Canal opened in 1868, leased for 100 years to UK and France, 208; since UK and US withdrew financial support to Aswan Dam project, 208 Nehru, Jawaharlal, Prime Minister of India (1947–64), 7, 10, 23, 30, 144–45, 148–49, 155, 158, 159, 160; Churchill calls him ‘Light of Asia’, 155; nation builder, 148; his idea of India, 148–49; discovery of India, 150; foreign policy formulations, 150–51, 152, 153; appreciative of US to begin with, 121; desires peace and closer cooperative relations, 169–79; statesmanship in joining Commonwealth of Nations, 235; US arms aid to Pakistan, 151–52; feels US desires oil as well as world domination, 153; asks West

to support nationalism to defeat communism, 153; talks with Dulles, 123–24; on Kashmir plebiscite and partition, 124; tells Dulles does not foresee war with Russia or China, 125; supports African nationalism, 160–61; protest by UK Foreign Minister, 161; his perception of Chinese dominance, 193; convinced of China’s peaceful intentions, 193; disillusioned later, devastated by Chinese attack, 159–60; explains MIG 21 deal to US and UK, 197–99; strong Macmillan threat to discontinue aid, 199; on Egypt Nehru appeals for moderation to Eden, 208; to Eisenhower, 209; on Hungarian revolution, criticised by West, 210– 12; Goa, 213–14; Kashmir issue the biggest headache, 66, 68, 69; reluctance of Nehru to go to UN, 70–71; not willing for plebiscite either, 71–72; disillusioned with British role, 81, 84, 85; rejects religious basis of solution, 105–107; accepts UN resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, 93, 95–96, 97, 100; vacation of aggression, 102; complains of NoelBaker’s ill-informed and unfriendly statements, 59–60; partisan attitude, 84; opens up dialogues with Pakistan for solution, 169–75; display of friendliness on both sides, 170–71; accepts partition of Kashmir as inevitable, 171–72; plebiscite administrator from small neutral country, 172–73; independence ruled out by both, 172; clarifications on points between Mohammad Ali and Nehru, 175–79; dialogue in 1955, circumstances leading to, 182–83;

Index no longer ‘partition’ but status quo with adjustment, 184–85; meeting a damp squib, 186; failure of talks 1962–63; pampering of Pakistan won’t succeed, 226; neutral force in J&K, 78–79, 80, 106 Narayan, Jayaprakash, 157 Nimitz, Chester W., plebiscite administrator, 97, 98 Nixon, Richard, 133 Noel-Baker, Philip, Commonwealth Secretary, UK; initially not for reference to UN, 34–35; desired British intervention, 35; for quick disposal under British influence, 35; suggested partition in November 1947, sought views of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, 35–36; also ‘plebiscite’ must be held under British supervision, 37; aim to avoid ‘slav bloc’ intervention, 37; having failed to achieve this end UK government supported Pakistan claim, 38; declaring Pakistan was not involved in tribal invasion, 38–39; hence no aggression committed, 39–40; British tilt towards Pakistan, 67, 68, 73, 75; absolves Jinnah and Pakistan of tribal invasion, 67–68; calls India’s acceptance of accession ‘provocative’ step, 68; advised by Attlee to use temperate language, 78; statements in Security Council, 59–60; considered unfriendly and factually wrong, 60, 61, 73; suggested Noel-Baker to mediate between Pakistan and India by M. K. Gandhi, 74 Nye, Sir Archibald, Indian Commanderin-Chief, later UK High Commissioner in Delhi (1947–52), 132 Pakistan, potential for Middle East defence, 31; British protection,

263

since ‘in a state of despair’, 32; view of Kashmir dispute, 66, 68, 69, 74, 78; Kizr Hayat Khan’s view of Pakistan, 80, 87, 89; charges against India, 93–95; agreed to UN resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, 96–97; Pakistan’s defence needs, Liaquat–NoelBaker correspondence, 32–33; Liaquat–Attlee meeting 1949, 33; Attlee favours assistance considering Middle East, 33; Pak– US military alliance compromises sovereignty, 128, 134; compromises Kashmir dispute, 131; as US ally South Asia balance disturbed, 120, 121, 130, 133, 134; massive flow of US arms, 129–32, 188, 189, 191; multi-dimensional aid, 131–32; no participation in war for US in Korea, Vietnam, China or USSR, 132; signs agreement with China gifting Kashmir territory, 218; Azad Kashmir (POK) under total command, 97, 107, 108, 109; estimate of Pak army in J&K, 109–10; military dictatorship, 134–35; Kutch adventure, 205; 1965 war faced defeat, 243; West pampering Pakistan, 224–26 Pandit, Vijayalakshmi, Indian Ambassador to US, High Commissioner to UK, 161, 210 Pant, Gobind Ballabh, 184 paramountcy, lapse of, 41–43, 62–63 Patel, Sardar (Vallabhbhai) Deputy Prime Minister of India, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 53, 66, 72–73 Patil, S. K., 199 Pearson, Lester, Canadian Foreign Minister (1953–54), 6, 133 Pethick-Lawrence, Lord, 60 plebiscite, not ‘conditional’ but ‘optional’, as expression of a wish,

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219; India agreeable to plebiscite in 1948–49 as per UN resolutions, 49; but Pakistan refused because feared people’s verdict, 49; several conditionalities for holding plebiscite which changed over time, 96–97, 107, 108, 109–10; Pakistan became an US ally, 130; military aid, 129–30; certain obligations under resolutions, 100–102; violations of conditionalities, 101–102; also see 66, 69, 71, 72, 124, 171, 178 Persian oil crisis, 147 Pillai, N. Raghavan, Secretary General, Ministry of External Affairs, on China, 181, 193 Potsdam, 120 Radhakrishnan, S., President of India, 169, 181 Rajagopalachari, C., Governor General of India, 1948–50, 59, 238 Reid, Escott, Canadian High Commissioner in Delhi, 5, 6, 132, 133, 137, 156, 158, 169, 181, 182 Roosevelt, President, 145 Robb, Peter, 145, 146 Russell, Sir Dudley, General Superintending, Kashmir operations, 58; no conspiracy, 58 Rusk, Dean, SOS, 220, 223, 224 Shastri, Lal Bahadur, Indian Prime Minister (1964–66), 243 shavism, 1 Soviet Union and Kashmir, 98; vetoed most of the anti-India resolutions, 99; Russo-phobia and Kashmir, 87–89; Khruschev and Bulganin, 2, 11, 155, 162 Stalin, Joseph, reply to Iron Curtain Speech, 119–20; attacks ‘racial theory’ as he sees it, 120 Suhrawardy, Hassan, Pakistan Prime Minister, 154

Swinton, Lord, Foreign Secretary in Winston Churchill’s cabinet; took exception to Nehru’s speech at Amritsar, 160; Churchill defends colleague, 161 Sadiq, G. M., 53 Sahai, Vishnu, Secretary, Kashmir Affairs, 181 Sandys, Duncan, Secretary for Commonwealth Relations; visits Pakistan, 201; meets Nehru on MIG deal, 201; meets President Rajendra Prasad against the deal, 201, 200–201; shows sympathy on India’s China debacle, 204–205; flurry of discussions on Kashmir, 215, 217, 224–25 St Laurent, Canadian Prime Minister, 133 Stephens, Ian, 8–9 Security Council, 63, 66, 74, 75, 76, 79; role of UK government, 84, 95; discussion on resolutions, 96, 100, 101, 102; on reports, 98; Dixon report, 74, 103; Jarring report on arbitration, 102–103 Singh, Baldev, 69 Singh, Sardar Swaran, 206, 219, 223, 225 Talbot, Phillips, US Assistant SOS, 219, 222 Tilak, Bal Gangadhar, 49 Truman, Harry, US President, 97, 120–21; comments on ‘impossible’ demands of Pakistan, 226, 227; invites Stalin, 120; Truman doctrine, 122 Turnbull, Robert, Correspondent, New York Times, 133 Washington, George, US President, 125 Wavell, Lord, Viceroy of India 1943–47,

Index favoured Muslim League, 155; on importance of oil in air age, 27 Wilson, Harold, British Prime Minister, on Macmillan, 145; on Attlee, 146

265

Wilson, Woodrow, US President, 145 Wolpert, Stanley, US historian, 49–50 Wylie, Sir Francis, Governor of UP (1945–47), 41–42