Jammu and Kashmir: Politics of identity and separatism 9781138921955, 9781315686073

Table of contents :
Cover
Title
Copyright
Contents
Foreword
Introduction
PART I Conflict in Kashmir: background factors
1 Identity politics of Kashmir
2 Background to armed militancy and separatism: failure of democratic politics in Kashmir
3 Federal logic, nationalism and Kashmir conflict
4 Political economy of Kashmiri identity politics
PART II Militancy and the politics of separatism
5 Separatist space and politics of separatism before 1989
6 Militancy and separatism
7 Democracy in the context of separatism
PART III Locating conflict in Kashmir within the larger context of Jammu and Kashmir
8 Beyond Kashmir: social diversity and political divergence in Jammu and Kashmir
9 Jammu as a factor in Kashmir conflict
10 Multiple dimensions of conflict
PART IV Conflict resolution
11 Peace process
2014 Assembly election: a postscript
References
Index

Citation preview

Jammu and Kashmir

This book provides a comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of the complex conflict situation in Kashmir. Through an internal perspective, it charts the shift in the Kashmiri response towards the Centre and offers a detailed examination of the background in which separatist politics took roots in Kashmir, and the way it changed its nature in the militancy and post-militancy period. The volume shows how separatism and armed militancy, as manifest in the Valley in the late 1980s (though augmented by external factors), have been internal responses to the changing nature of Kashmiri identity politics. It explores how the ideas central to Indian nationalist politics – especially democracy and secularism – echoed in Kashmir and were instrumental in dismantling the feudal structure and negotiating an autonomous space within the framework of asymmetrical federalism. Seamlessly blending facts and incisive analyses, this book raises new questions about the nature of conflict and contestation in the region. It will be of great interest to researchers and scholars of Indian politics, especially on Jammu and Kashmir, and sociology, as well as government bodies, think tanks and the interested general reader. Rekha Chowdhary is former Professor of Political Science at the University of Jammu, India.

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Jammu and Kashmir

Politics of identity and separatism

Rekha Chowdhary

First published 2016 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2016 Rekha Chowdhary The right of Rekha Chowdhary to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice : Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book. ISBN: 978-1-138-92195-5 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-68607-3 (ebk) Typeset in Goudy by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

Foreword by Manoranjan Mohanty Introduction

vii xii

PART I

Conflict in Kashmir: background factors 1 Identity politics of Kashmir

1 3

2 Background to armed militancy and separatism: failure of democratic politics in Kashmir

28

3 Federal logic, nationalism and Kashmir conflict

49

4 Political economy of Kashmiri identity politics

71

PART II

Militancy and the politics of separatism 5 Separatist space and politics of separatism before 1989

89 91

6 Militancy and separatism

105

7 Democracy in the context of separatism

128

vi

Contents

PART III

Locating conflict in Kashmir within the larger context of Jammu and Kashmir

159

8 Beyond Kashmir: social diversity and political divergence in Jammu and Kashmir

161

9 Jammu as a factor in Kashmir conflict

172

10 Multiple dimensions of conflict

196

PART IV

Conflict resolution

211

11 Peace process

213

2014 Assembly election: a postscript References Index

232 239 250

Foreword

In this work by one of India’s best-known scholars on Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), we get a fresh perspective that boldly shifts the focus from the much-publicised external dimensions of the Kashmir problem to the history of internal dynamics of the state. In spelling out what the author, Rekha Chowdhary, calls the ‘internal perspective’, she explains in great detail how the pluralistic and anti-feudal basis of Kashmiri nationalism was subverted from time to time and operation of democratic politics was not allowed. There lay the explanations for the rise of separatism and militancy and the alienation of people of Kashmir from India. Most commentators have presented reductionist analysis of the Kashmir situation, exclusively highlighting religious differences, developmental failure, the Pakistan dimension or international factors for explaining the outbreak of violence and crisis in J&K. In this book, we find, instead, a nuanced and multidimensional analysis of the interplay of religion and region, economic, social and political rights with people’s urge for autonomy and self-government placed at the centre. Here is a treatise on ethnic identity that breaks ranks with other identity studies that miss the links between identity and other social and political dimensions. As an explanatory account of the rise of separatism, this work draws attention to issues of democratic rights rather than only to externally sponsored networks of terrorism. The author shows how such networks found local support only when democratic rights were denied to people. The policy implications of this work are immense. They focus on finding innovative methods to enable people to exercise rights to self-governance and restore a pluralistic community, which remained at the heart of Kashmiri nationalism. They entail a framework of regional autonomy that reassured regions of their dignity without threatening the unity of the J&K state.

viii

Foreword

The author’s account of the evolution of Kashmir nationalism in the first half of the twentieth century emphasises a point that has been forgotten in the contemporary discussion of the Kashmir situation. It is how the agenda of the Muslim Conference was replaced by a progressive democratic programme by the National Conference (NC), which was founded in 1939. The NC opened its membership to all communities and affirmed its commitment to address the problems of the peasantry and artisans, thus giving not only a multidimensional ethnic orientation but also wider a socio-economic base to Kashmiri nationalism. The Naya Kashmir slogan embodied in the manifesto of NC in 1944 reflected this perspective. The critical significance of recalling this background of Kashmir nationalism is relevant today because most people have forgotten why NC under Sheikh Abdullah’s leadership preferred Accession to India rather than joining Pakistan in 1947. For the Sheikh, Pan-Islamic politics was not an attraction for India under Gandhi, and Nehru presented a democratic and multi-ethnic framework, which would allow Kashmir to protect its identity. Secondly, as Rekha Chowdhary points out, the Sheikh was afraid that Pakistan dominated by Punjabi landlords would frustrate his dream of building a Naya Kashmir that gave ‘land to the tillers’ and promoted egalitarian policies. It was the promise of autonomy for a multi-ethnic society in J&K and democratic politics with a progressive agenda of social transformation, which prompted Sheikh Abdullah to opt for India. The author points out with much evidence how the Accession to India was not merely a Hindu ruler’s decision, but was backed by the leading political party with a wide popular base. She shows how this was different from the case of Hyderabad where military force was deployed and other princely states where various kinds of pressures were resorted to. The popular backing of Kashmir’s Accession to India was based on the assurance that identity of Muslim-majority Kashmir will be adequately protected in a Hindu-majority India. That was why Article 370 was made a part of the Indian Constitution. After a series of negotiations between Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah, the Delhi Agreement was signed in July 1952, spelling out the modality of administering J&K and the nature of relationship with the Centre. Rekha Chowdhary shows how a well-worked-out framework guaranteeing autonomy and self-governance of a multi-ethnic state was broken into pieces with the arrest of the principal symbol of Kashmir nationalism, namely Sheikh Abdullah, in 1953. She demonstrates in course of her close scrutiny of the subsequent periods that it is the denial of autonomy and freedom and space for democratic politics, which ultimately gave

Foreword

ix

rise to separatism and militancy. She points out with enormous data that whenever democratic politics was allowed, forces of separatism and militancy were weakened. There is an extremely valuable discussion on separatism and militancy in this book. The author distinguishes separatism from militancy, as the latter involved armed actions while the former may or may not. Separatists included those who either believed in an independent J&K like the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) or merger with Pakistan. The interesting point that emerges from this work is that both these phenomena have to be contexualised and they referred to a wide range of meanings. This questions the oversimplified usage of these terms, which prevented understanding of the actual situation. Separatism as a trend emerged when the commitment to Kashmir’s autonomy was violated with the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah first in 1953 and the Plebiscite Front represented this sentiment. When space for democratic politics was frequently denied, the separatist phenomenon grew further as during 1953–75 and then during 1984–87. When the elections were manipulated again and again – we have detailed accounts of the very small victory margins and very large invalid votes in 1987 – the mass discontent accumulated further. That gave rise to heightened separatism, on the one hand, and armed militancy, on the other, and the latter with clear support from Pakistan. From then on the multi-ethnic and democratic foundations of Kashmiri nationalism were shaken up for which the policies of the Indian state and the manoeuvres by the ruling parties bear the major responsibility. The Central Government not only deployed security forces in large numbers but also spent huge amounts of money on building infrastructure and providing economic assistance to J&K. Instead of addressing the problems of the peasantry and the common people and expanding unemployment of the restive youth, this led to the creation of a neo-rich strata in the state. Rekha Chowdhary presents a much neglected dimension of the political economy of Kashmir nationalism by showing how this widening gulf over the decades generated mass discontent against the Indian government and created the social basis of separatism and militancy in the 1990s. Thus development projects without democracy and autonomy did not answer the challenge of separatism. In this highly informative account of identity politics and separatism in Kashmir, the author has shown how a window of opportunity has arisen for all those interested in restoring the democratic foundations of Kashmiri nationalism since the turn of the century. After a decade

x

Foreword

of violent attacks by militant groups and anti-militancy operations by security forces, common people had become victims of multiple suffering from all sides. The human rights violations were documented on killings, disappearances, torture and harassment. The presence of foreign militants was a source of much irritation. Activists as well as common people were exhausted by the continuing violence. That was when the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) was formed in 1999 voicing the issues of mass discontent, human rights violations as well as autonomy, pledging to give a ‘healing touch’ to the suffering people of Kashmir. Thus the 2002 elections were fought by two major Kashmiri parties, NC and PDP. The issues that were raised by separatists and militants were now debated in the election campaigns. Democratic politics once again got a chance in J&K. But this too did not succeed in addressing substantive issues that agitated people. Prime Minister Vajpayee’s two-pronged policy – a comprehensive peace package including dialogue with separatists in Kashmir and a composite dialogue with Pakistan – were not pursued seriously. As a result, as the author points out, democratic politics and separatist politics continued to exist and operate simultaneously even now. The resistance movements from time to time in the form of demonstrations continued even while elections took place including the successful conduct of panchayat elections in 2011. There are many insights presented in this work including the way region, religion and class interfaced, producing a harmonious society, on the one hand, and breaking into crisis situations, on the other. The chapter on Jammu shows how the long tradition of social harmony was subjected to communal mobilisation and yet the multi-ethnic base of J&K society reasserted itself from time to time. The exodus of Pundits from the Kashmir Valley has been analysed, presenting the various angles to its occurrence. How the Sufi tradition of Kashmir laid a firm ground for social harmony and was not hospitable to religious extremism, and yet was sometimes overwhelmed by political mobilisation, has been explained. This landmark treatise on Kashmir is both a major academic contribution to the study of ethnic movements in the contemporary world and a serious policy perspective on one of the world’s major regions of violence and confrontation. It argues that deepening of democracy and respect for autonomy and self-governance provide the answer to political alienation. It is a timely contribution because there are powerful forces at work, pushing the situation in the opposite direction. Rekha Chowdhary does well reminding the new NDA government led by Prime

Foreword

xi

Minister Narendra Modi that Vajpayee’s peace proposal and composite dialogue framework had turned the tables and facilitated the growth of democratic politics. Let us hope her message reaches everyone. Manoranjan Mohanty Former Professor of Political Science University of Delhi Distinguished Professor Council for Social Development, New Delhi October 2014

Introduction

The book, as the title indicates, seeks to analyse the complex conflict situation of Kashmir from the internal perspective. Without undermining the importance of the external factor, especially the competitive claims of India and Pakistan – the numerous wars and continuous tension between the two countries – it seeks to focus on the internal dimensions of conflict and seeks to provide a systematic analysis of separatism in Kashmir. The armed militancy and separatism that overtook the state in 1989– 90 is the central theme around which the book revolves. Armed militancy, though supported and sustained by the overt support of Pakistan, had its roots in the internal politics of the state. While the political developments during the period from 1984 to 1987 formed the background in which the young Kashmiris decided to shun the democratic politics for armed militancy, in the long term, it was the post-1953 politics of the state, especially the failure of democratic and federal politics, that resulted in the accumulated discontent of the mass of Kashmiris. The book has been designed in the context of a paradox. This paradox relates to Kashmiri perceptions about India in 1947 when the National Conference under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah clearly rejected the two-nation theory and endorsed the idea of association with India and the situation as it developed in the later period, particularly after 1989 when anti-India feelings were intensified and the streets of Srinagar reverberated with the slogans of azadi (freedom). The mass response that was reflected in the massive demonstrations during this period reflected not merely an accumulated feeling of alienation but anger and resentment against the Indian state. Focusing on this paradox, the book seeks to explain the shift in political responses in Kashmir over the period by referring to the internal politics of the state. Since the central focus of the book remains the ‘identity politics of Kashmir’, an attempt has been made to analyse its basic contours

Introduction

xiii

as these evolved over the period. Though rooted in a religious sense of belonging in its initial stages, Kashmir was soon to be ‘regionalised’. However, what provided a depth to this identity politics was its strong economic content, which not only expanded the outreach of this politics from the emerging middle-class leadership to the mass of peasantry, artisans and workers but also linked it with the larger nationalist politics. ‘Kinship of ideas’, as worded by Sheikh Abdullah, was the basis of the relationship between National Conference and the Indian National Congress. It was this relationship that was to become the basis of a negotiated relationship that Sheikh Abdullah envisaged with India as well as for his clear-cut rejection of ‘feudal’ Pakistan, which, in his understanding, had nothing to offer to Kashmiris except a ‘homeland’ for Muslims. That India provided sufficient democratic space to the Kashmiri identity politics to express itself was a matter of utter satisfaction to the Kashmiri leadership. The successful negotiation for a special constitutional status within the framework of federalism added to that sense of satisfaction. It is in the context of initial harmonisation of the Kashmiri identity politics within the larger ideological and institutional framework of Indian nationalist politics that the book seeks to answer the question as to ‘what went wrong’ with an internal perspective. Apart from making a detailed analysis of democratic and federal structures and processes, it delves into the background in which separatist psyche and politics evolved in Kashmir. It focuses on the 1953–75 period when there was a simultaneous de-legitimisation of power politics, on the one hand, and ‘mainstreaming’ of the resistance politics, on the other. The foundation of separatist politics as it manifested itself in 1989–90 can be located in this earlier period. The separatist politics, it is argued here, though rooted in the alienation of Kashmiris has gone through various phases and has been manifested in different manners. The separatism, as it evolved during the era of ‘plebiscite’ politics, was quite different from the era of armed militancy. The era of armed militancy that reflected a blend of external and internal dimensions of conflict was characterised by a massive mass separatist response. It was this response that led to legitimisation of militancy in the initial phase and resulted in blurring of boundaries between separatism and militancy. However, in the later period, the popular response towards armed militancy was quite changed and despite the popular separatist sentiment remaining intact, politics of violence was de-legitimised. Soon, with the decline of the armed militancy, separatism was to acquire an altogether different character. The phenomenon has come to be known as ‘post-militancy’ separatism.

xiv

Introduction

Separatism, it is argued, has been neither a static nor an internally homogenous phenomenon. Apart from analysing its changing nature, focus therefore has been placed on its internally dynamic nature. Such dynamism is a reflection of a multiplicity of ideologies, organisations, goals and leadership. An attempt therefore has been made to understand these dynamics with reference to their implications for politics, in general, and separatism, in particular. Distinction has also been made between the separatist sentiment, in general, and separatist organisations, in particular. Separatist politics captured the political space of Kashmir in the early 1990s, leading to the total collapse of mainstream politics. This was the time when armed militancy was at its peak and popular political response was fully swayed by the emotion of azadi. It was in this context that the mainstream political actors had withdrawn from the political scene and separatism emerged as the only political response. The situation was to change gradually towards the beginning of 2000. By the 2002 Assembly election, democratic space was restored to some extent and started impacting separatism in a big way. The emergence of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) as another Kashmir-based political party, along with the National Conference, was to change the character of mainstream politics in a substantial way. With PDP borrowing its agenda heavily from the separatist politics and articulating the issues raised so far within the separatist space, the mainstream politics could expand itself and find legitimacy among people. Expansion of democratic space, as the book has sought to argue, has not been at the cost of separatist politics. Even as democratic politics recovered its space, separatism continued to assert itself. The summers of 2008, 2009 and 2010 were particularly consumed by the separatist assertions in the streets of Kashmir, reminding one of the 1989–90 period when massive demonstrations had led to the collapse of political authority. It is a different matter, however, that these assertions notwithstanding, there was massive participation of people in the 2008 Assembly and 2011 panchayat elections. The parallel existence of separatist and mainstream politics in Kashmir, therefore, makes an interesting study of the way the two political spaces influence each other and how the two overlap at certain points. The Kashmiri identity politics that defines the internal dimensions of conflict operates within the larger reality of Jammu and Kashmir. This reality characterised by social diversity and political divergence introduces an element of complexity to the conflict situation. Kashmiri identity politics, due to its specificity, does not extend beyond the Kashmir Valley and therefore

Introduction

xv

the issues, concerns, ideological stances and political aspirations that are linked with this politics do not necessarily echo in the other parts of the state. Apart from the parallel political responses emanating from the distinct concerns of various politicised groups in Jammu and Ladakh region, there is the context of political divergence which compounds the nature of conflict. To explain this context of political divergence, the book seeks to extend the discussion around the conflict situation to this context of social diversity, multiple identity politics and political divergence within the state. It also seeks to focus on multiple dimensions of conflict as these are reflected beyond Kashmir. One myth that is sought to be blown in this discussion relates to the factor of religion in the identity politics of Kashmir. Though religion has been an important marker of Kashmiri identity politics in the formative stages and it continued to inform this politics even in the later period, it does not, however, have a role beyond a point. And it is for this reason that this identity politics remains confined to the ethnic boundaries of Kashmiri society and does not extend to Muslims of Jammu or Ladakh region. The regional boundaries are stronger than the religious boundaries and distinguish Kashmiri Muslims from others in the state – not merely in the socio-cultural set up but also in their political setting. It is within the context of multiplicity of identity politics that the book seeks to locate the complexity to the conflict situation from an internal perspective. An elaborate analysis of identity politics in Jammu region is, therefore, offered with a view to explain this complexity. The factor of Jammu is important not only to portray the plural nature of society and politics but also to explain the divergent directions in which the multiple identity politics tends to operate. Jammu also presents a case of other kinds of conflict-related implications, which are otherwise invisible in the literature on the conflict situation within the state. It is here that the conflict acquires a third dimension – the intra-state dimension (other than India–Pakistan and Delhi–Kashmir dimensions). Apart from analysing the context of conflict, the book also focuses on the peace process that was initiated by Atal Bihari Vajpayee and that had taken into consideration the complexity of conflict and had sought to simultaneously address the external as well as internal dimensions of conflict. As the process evolved, the complexity within the state was also recognised. This peace process, though stalled since 2007, is still relevant, if not for anything else, for the contours that it had identified and evolved.

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Part I

Conflict in Kashmir Background factors

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Chapter 1

Identity politics of Kashmir

In order to understand the conflict from the internal perspective, it is important to focus on the identity politics of Kashmir. The ethnonationalist identity, as it evolved since the period of 1930s, has been defined by a number of factors – the most important being a public perception of history. In the popular perception, Kashmir lost its independence with the annexation of the Valley by the Mughals in the last quarter of the sixteenth century. Yusuf Shah Chak, who was exiled during this time, is considered to be the last Kashmiri who exercised power. Mughal control over Kashmir was followed by that of Afghans and Sikhs before it was passed on to Dogras via the Treaty of Amritsar, in 1846. The long period of outside control is etched in the minds of Kashmiris as a memory of continued subjugation of the community and its economic oppression. This outlook has been sharpened by the political discourse that evolved during 1930s and 1940s when political consciousness took the shape of a political movement. In this discourse, the Dogra rule, against which the political movement was organised, came to be depicted as the archetype of the centuries-old outside control and domination. Despite the fact that the earlier regimes were as alien and as oppressive, it is around the Dogra rule that political responses were articulated. This rule was not only held responsible for the misery and the economic backwardness of the people but also for their degradation. The earlier subjugation forms the reference point for the identity politics of Kashmir. The urge for a local control over political power and preservation of dignity of Kashmiris are the central themes that run through it. It is around this urge that evolution of political consciousness took place in the decade of 1930s and 1940s. The manifestation of the identity politics, however, has taken various forms. The initial stage of evolution of political consciousness was

4

Conflict in Kashmir: background factors

defined by the assertion of the ‘Muslim identity’ of Kashmiris. However, the range of this identity has thereafter expanded with the assertion of ‘Kashmiri identity’ (with cultural-linguist and regional component as the defining element of the identity), ‘Kashmiri Muslim identity’ (incorporating both regional and religious markers but with emphasis on the ‘Kashmiri’ identity) or ‘Muslim Kashmiri identity’ (again incorporating both regional and religious factors but with emphasis on ‘religious’ identity) alternatively or even simultaneously. ‘Region’ and ‘religion’ form two major markers of Kashmiri identity politics, and it is around the intricate relationship between these two that the shifting nature of identity politics of Kashmir can be understood. For the people of Kashmir, it is their existence as a Kashmiri community that provides them their basic definition as a group. At the same time, their being Muslim also assumes importance. However, between these two markers of their identity, there lies a vast dynamic space, which results in the identity taking varied shapes depending on which marker of identity has assumed primacy in which context. Thus there are moments when ‘Muslim-ness’ of the identity is asserted and there are other moments when the ‘Kashmiri-ness’ of the identity is asserted. An attempt will be made in this chapter to capture the shifting nature of identity politics of Kashmir with reference to the dynamics in which different contours of this identity have been placed from time to time. The trajectory of Kashmiri identity politics can be better understood with reference to the manner in which ‘religion’ and ‘region’ as markers of Kashmiri identity have been located at a particular moment and the way these two have intersected with each other. Rather than taking a position that religion and region have formed two separate categories with one transcending the other and defining Kashmiri politics at a particular point of time, this chapter goes on to argue that the two components are much more intricately located in the identity politics of Kashmir.

The factor of religion and ‘Muslim’ identity of Kashmiris The early assertion of Kashmiri identity was a consequence of the socioeconomic situation in which the Kashmiri Muslims were placed. As the historical evidence shows, the condition of Kashmiris was quite dismal, as they were stricken by widespread poverty and faced severe hardships. Most depressing was the position of the class of peasantry and the artisans who formed the largest number of people. The peasantry did not

Identity politics of Kashmir

5

enjoy the proprietary rights on the land. While many of them provided labour to the absentee landlords in the Valley, many others were forced to leave the Valley in search of livelihood. The Dogra rule, established in 1846, had continued with the oppressive pattern of land ownership and land-tenure that was introduced since the time of the Sikh rulers. As per this pattern, though the state owned all the land, jagirdars were granted large tracts of land and other than the landless peasantry, the tilling was done by the tenants and tenants-at-will. The land revenue was exorbitant and the rent which the landholders, farmers, and jagirdars collected was heavy. The peasantry usually left the land fallow and took to less exacting vocations; and in the Kashmir province, it was usually forced to cultivate the land. The peasantry also bore the brunt of paying a large number of cesses and taxes that the State imposed upon them. The State was also entitled to Begar, which meant forced labour and compulsory appropriation of goods and services from the people. (Kaur, 1996: 6) Similar was the working condition of the artisans. They were working under the exploitative system of taxation. Citing Bazaz, Chowdhary notes: Several restrictions were placed on the manufacture of shawls and the industry was heavily taxed. Besides the fact that wool was taxed and the manufacturer was taxed for every workman he employed, there was also an enormous duty on the finished product. (Chowdhary, 1998: 8) To describe the misery of common Kashmiris, one may turn to Albion Banerjee who served the state in a ministerial position in the 1920s and resigned later on. In his observation, ‘Jammu and Kashmir is labouring under many disadvantages, with a large Muhammadan population absolutely illiterate, labouring under poverty and very low economic conditions of living in the villages and practically governed like dumb driven cattle’ (quoted in Akbar, 1991: 67). Resentment against wretched conditions of work often led to localised agitations and strikes. As early as the middle of the nineteenth century, the shawl industry witnessed a number of agitations. In 1865, a major agitation, commonly known as ‘Shawl Bauf agitation’, took place. ‘The weavers had struck work in protest against the high taxes levied upon them and about 4,000 of them had fled the valley’ (Rai, 2004: 62).

6

Conflict in Kashmir: background factors

Workers in the silk factory went on strike in 1920, demanding an increase in their wages. In 1924, they launched a bigger agitation that brought to the surface the appalling situation in which the workers were placed.1 The early politicisation that took place in the background of the widespread economic discontent, however, came to focus on the Muslim identity of Kashmiris. Due to their socio-economic backwardness, there existed among Kashmiris a deep-rooted perception that they were being discriminated because of their religious affiliations. It was the uprising in 1931 that marked the first defining moment of the Kashmiri identity politics. On 13 July that year, a number of Kashmiris were killed in the police firing during a mass protest. The protest followed the detention of Abdul Qadir, a non-Kashmiri butler serving with a European, on the grounds of making inflammatory speech and inciting people to revolt against the state. Following the killings, the protests intensified. ‘Serious communal rioting followed, for the first time in the valley. Three Hindus were killed, many more wounded and hundreds of shops looted’ (Bhattacharjea, 1994: 68). Kashmiris till date trace their political consciousness to the events that took place on 13 July. It was the first time that the people had publicly expressed their discontent against the Dogra regime. It was also from that day onwards that the authority of the Dogra regime came to be popularly and publicly contested. The agitation ‘virtually pronounced a death sentence on the absolute prerogative of autocratic political authority. The process of alienation of the masses from the existing political authority was set afoot’ (Zutshi, 1986: 6–7). It was following the 1931 uprising that more organised political response in Kashmir was initiated.2 The Muslim Conference that emerged in 1932, though it had its precursor in the Reading Room Party of Kashmir,3 was the first organisation that sought to politically mobilise people. Seeking to pursue the interest of ‘Muslims’ of the state, this organisation raised the demands related to educational and vocational opportunities for Kashmiris and their representation in the local administration and politics. Among other significant demands of the Muslim Conference was the one related to control over religious institutions. ‘At this stage, the Muslim Conference was a Kashmiri Muslim organization, whose main objective was to unite Kashmir Muslims under one political umbrella through an appeal to their sense of belonging to an Islamic community’ (Zutshi, 2004: 229). During the initial years of its inception, it was quite forthcoming in its ‘unconstrained criticism of the Hindu state and particularly its Pandit allies’ (Rai, 2004: 274).

Identity politics of Kashmir

7

In invoking the ‘Muslim’ identity of Kashmiris, the Muslim Conference presumed the common grievances and common demands of all the Muslims of the state. It was a broad-based organisation representing the interests of Muslims of the state as a whole. Its leadership comprised eminent members of the Muslim community both in Kashmir as well as in Jammu region. It was at a later stage that the regional marker of identity was to assert itself. But at this initial stage, it was the unified ‘Muslim’ identity that was emphasised.4 This stage of political mobilisation of Kashmiris has to be seen with reference to the Muslim politics of the Indian subcontinent. Many of the Kashmiris who acquired the leadership position were educated in Aligarh and were inspired by the emerging Muslim politics of India. Within this politics, a linkage was also established with Kashmir. Yusuf Samad (Samad, 1995) has referred to the linkage between Punjab and Kashmir via the Kashmiris settled in Punjab. The Kashmiri ‘Bridari’ in Punjab, according to him, was instrumental in bringing the ‘Kashmir question’ into the centre of Muslim discourse and had also started campaigning in support of Kashmiri people through an organisation named as All India Kashmir Muslim Conference. Based in Lahore, though this organisation was formed with the major purpose of helping ‘the destitute and poor Muslim students of Kashmir with money to get themselves trained in various technical and educational institutions outside the state’ (Bazaz, 1941: 109), it often raised the issues related to the rights of Kashmiris and pledged its support for them. Apart from this organisation, Ahmadiyas and Ahrars based in Punjab also sought to intervene in the politics of the state in sympathies of Muslims (Bazaz, 1941: 111–12). It was not only in Punjab but in various other parts of India and even outside that concern for Kashmiri Muslims was expressed. Ravinder Kaur has referred to a resolution passed by All India Mohammaden Educational Conference held in Rangoon in December 1909 wherein the princely ruler was asked to ‘increase the number of Muslims in the teaching and inspection staff and to institute special scholarships for the Muslims students so that their number can be increased in the schools’ (Kaur, 1996: 50). The honing of religious identity of Kashmiris, according to Mridu Rai, was inevitable given the nature of the state. Referring to the Dogra rule, Rai makes a distinction between the ‘rule by Hindu’ and the ‘Hindu state’ and notes that it was not the former but the latter, which led to ‘religious sensibility informing the political mobilization’ in Kashmir. The Hindu state, according to her, was defined first by the fact that it ‘made manifest its Hinduness’ and second, it ‘identified its subjects

8

Conflict in Kashmir: background factors

by their religious affiliations’. The Hinduness of the state was reflected in its pattern of legitimacy, which ‘allowed the Hindus of Kashmir to exclude Muslims in the context for the symbolic, political and economic resources of the state’ (Rai, 2004: 6). Identification of its subjects by religious affiliations paved way for denial of rights of the majority population. The denial of economic and religious rights placed the Muslims at a disadvantage. Religious discourse, therefore, argues Rai (274), was inseparable from discourse of rights in Kashmir. As ‘denial of rights of the majority was deeply rooted in the religious nature of the state that presided over them’, religion was an important factor in the construction of the political identity of Kashmiris. Besides Rai, various other historians and political analysts have placed the religion-oriented response of Kashmiris to the pro-Hindu bias of the Dogra regime. Prem Nath Bazaz, for instance, noted that ‘the Dogra rule has been Hindu. Muslims have not been treated fairly, by which I mean as fairly as Hindus’. In his opinion, the Muslims faced harsh treatment ‘only because they were Muslims’ (Bazaz, 1941: 250). Brecher (1953: 10) similarly argued that the communal orientation of Kashmiris clearly reflected the policies of the state, which were so blatantly favourable to Hindus. There are many others who have referred to the relative backwardness of the Kashmiri Muslims vis-à-vis the Kashmiri Hindus; bias against them in the matters of employment in the bureaucracy and armed forces and different treatment of Muslims and Hindus regarding the possession of arms (Sufi, 1949; Bamzai, 1962; Dasgupta, 1968). The initial discourse of the political leadership in Kashmir was, therefore, defined by the logic of denial of rights to Kashmiris due to the religious nature of the state. Sheikh Abdullah and other educated Muslims perceived the backwardness of Kashmiris in the background of different religious affiliation of the ruler and the Kashmiri subjects. It is this perception that Sheikh articulates in his autobiography: I started to question why Muslims were singled out for such treatment? We constituted the majority, and contributed the most towards the State’s revenues, still we were continuously oppressed. Why? How long would we put up with it? Was it because a majority of government servants were non-Muslims, or, because most of the lower grade officers who dealt with the public were Kashmiri Pandits? I concluded that the ill-treatment of Muslims was an outcome of religious prejudice. (Abdullah, 1993: 12–13)

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Religion as the basis of construction of political identity in the initial stage, however, needs a nuanced understanding. The religious manifestation of political response or emphasis on Muslim-ness of Kashmiris in defining their sense of belongingness cannot be seen in isolation of the socio-economic content of their response. The popular uprising in 1931 was a manifestation of the deep-rooted discontent of the masses vis-à-vis the policies of the Dogra rule. Besides being a Muslim response, it was also, in the words of Gias ud Din, ‘an authentic revolt of the people of the state against the political, social and economic oppression by the ruling class and their henchmen. The rebellious elements were the Muslim intelligentsia, the trading class and the mass of the peasantry who were groaning under the feudal rule’ (1997: 83). The emerging class of educated Muslims of Kashmir articulating their political demands, though speaking as Muslims, were, as Bazaz argues, asserting their ‘class rights’ (1954: 165). The class factor in understanding even the religious basis of identity assertion assumes significance due to the fact that the class divide in Kashmir also coincided with the religious divide. While the vast mass of Muslims in Kashmir were landless peasants, poor artisans and labourers and faced extremely oppressive economic conditions, the privileged sections comprised mostly of Hindus. Apart from the fact that most of the land in Kashmir was either held by Kashmiri Pundits or by the Dogra Hindus, mostly the Rajputs, most of the administrative, military and political positions were also shared by these communities. This is not to argue that prosperity was evenly spread among all the Hindus of the state since there was a vast mass of Hindu peasantry in Jammu region, which was equally oppressed. (And moreover, there was also a small class of landed Muslims in this region.) However, in Kashmir, there was almost a neat and clean class division on a religious basis. However, in demanding their class rights, Muslims were certainly making use of their religious sense of belonging. As Chitralekha Zutshi notes, much before the political space was invigorated in Kashmir, the religious space was already animated and there were competitive processes for controlling it. The mosques and shrines were the spaces for intra-religious contestations. The period of defining the Kashmiri identity was, according to her, preceded by the debates over the definition of Muslim self.5 This debate was not only initiated by the modern forces, which were challenging the traditional clergy but involved the most important religious institutions of the Valley – that of the Mirwaiz. Zutshi has elaborately dealt with the ongoing conflict between the Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah representing the more modern version of Islam

10

Conflict in Kashmir: background factors

and Mirwaiz Hamdani representing the Sufi version. So overarching was the role of the religion at that time that it was inevitable for politics to go untouched by religious overtones (Zutshi, 2003). Sheikh Abdullah entering politics at this point of time could not have stayed clear of religious symbols and idioms. Yet, he could give the discourse more modern language. Prakash Chandra argues that there was a lot of difference in the way the traditional clergy was using religion and the way ‘the vanguard of the subaltern classes – the petty bourgeoisie’, as represented by Sheikh Abdullah, were using it. While ‘the objective of the fundamentalists was to maintain status quo by giving the popular slogan of “Islam in danger” against the people themselves’, the purpose of Sheikh Abdullah was ‘to discover in the so-called “true-Islam” an instrument of social change which went against Islamic orthodoxy itself’ (Chandra, 1985: 35).6 Because of the fact that there was no public space other than that provided by religious institutions, mosques and shrines occupied the centre stage for political mobilisation. ‘Until the early 1930s, the only public activism permitted by the Dogra state was under the auspices of societies for socio-religious reform, which were allowed to function on the condition that they eschew all forms of political activity’ (Zutshi, 2003: 218–19). Thus, organisations like Arya Samaj, Dogra Sabha, Sanatan Dharma Yuvak Sabha and others worked towards the reforming the Hindu community and organisations like Taraqui-Talim-wa-Ittihad, Anjuman-i-Islamia and Anjuman-i-Nasrat-ul-Islam worked for the educational interests of Muslims (Kaur, 1996: 50). Division of the public space on the religious lines, therefore, according to Zutshi, was the logical result of the restriction of public activism to socio-religious organisations and activities. The organisations, which were allowed to operate, could work for narrow caste, community or religious interests (Zutshi, 2003: 218–19).

Redefining Kashmiri identity: formation of National Conference However, as the public space was expanded, the dependence on religious shrines was reduced. And though the mosque continued to provide the space for political mobilisation, there were other public spaces that were available for political mobilisation. More significantly, as the movement started maturing, the limitation of the religion-based politics started becoming evident. ‘Ideological framework’, as Puri argues, however, ‘was soon found wanting to cover growing Kashmiri urges.

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Outgrowing its initial demand for more government jobs for Muslims, the Kashmir movement, under its own momentum, aspired for political power through responsible government, democratic rights and freedom of expression and association’ (Puri, 1983: 186–7) Soon, the political discourse was to have a strong economic content and Sheikh Abdullah and few of his colleagues started incorporating in it the issues related to the peasantry, artisans and workers. The fact that Kashmir was simultaneously evolving a strong trade union politics helped in the process. Launching of Mazdoor Sabha in Kashmir in 1937 gave a momentum to the organisation of workers. It was around the same time that the Kissan Sabha was also organised. These developments coincided with the ingress of the leftist leadership of India into Kashmir. Some of the very influential Marxists and leaders of the Communist Party of India, including K.M. Ashraf, B.P.L. Bedi and Freda Bedi, located themselves in Kashmir. Many others who visited Kashmir included Fazl Illahi Qurban and Prof Abdullah Safdar, and both of them were trained as leftist workers in Moscow (Taseer, 2005: 24). Coming in their contact, a number of educated Kashmiri leaders got influenced by communist ideology and they started approaching their struggle against the Dogra rule in that framework. A study circle under the leadership of the leftists was started in which educated youth were given basic understanding of Marxist philosophy (Chandra, 1985: 46). Apart from that, there was also the influence of the Congress leadership, particularly of Nehru on Sheikh Abdullah. To quote Shakti Kak, The affinity between the Sheikh and Nehru as well as between the National Conference and the Indian National Congress developed as the struggle against the Maharaja drew support from the latter. At the Karachi session of the All India States People’s Conference in 1935, the Congress declared that it would support the freedom movement of the people of the princely states unlike the Muslim League, which supported the rulers of these states, including the Maharaja of Kashmir. . . . The Congress accepted the Sheikh as the true representative of the people of the princely state. (Kak, 2009) Sheikh Abdullah took the lead in shifting the goals of the movement politics away from its religious roots to more secular ones. During 1935 annual session of the Muslim Conference, he called the people ‘to rise above our petty communal differences and work for the betterment of the masses’. Specifically, he made an appeal to Hindus to join

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Conflict in Kashmir: background factors

the struggle ‘for the progress and welfare of the native land’. During the sixth annual meeting of the Muslim Conference, he talked about common sufferings of all the communities and people: It is imperative that the people who are suffering under the existing form of government be made to share in our struggle for a responsible government. Who are these people? Not only Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, untouchable, and Buddhists, but the entire populace of the state. Some Muslims believe mistakenly that all the eight hundred thousand non-Muslims are living a life of comfort. That is simply not true. . . . We are asking for a responsible government not only for the eighty per cent Muslim population of the state. To achieve this end, it is necessary that we invite participation of the remaining twenty per cent Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists and Harijans in our movement. (Abdullah, 2013: 169–70) Responding to this appeal, Prem Nath Bazaz, a progressive Kashmiri Pundit and Sardar Budh Singh from Jammu, started working with Sheikh Abdullah (Hussain, 2009: 108). They also started campaigning for secularising the movement and widening its base to include people from all religious communities. A weekly magazine jointly edited by Abdullah and Bazaz named Hamdard became the medium for such a campaign. Along with Bazaz and Budh Singh, there were other non-Muslims, including Kashyap Bandhu and Jia Lal Kilam, who joined Sheikh Abdullah in this campaign. Sheikh, therefore, started arguing for a joint movement of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. In his opinion, the common people in all the communities suffered similar indignities under the Dogra rule. In 1938, Sheikh led the Muslim Conference to raise the ‘National Demand’ for a responsible government based on the principle of universal adult franchise. While articulating a set of demands, Sheikh clearly stated that these were not being raised for the Muslims only but for all the state subjects. The underlying claim in the National Demand was that ‘this movement is not confined to any particular community or section of the public but all classes of people’ (National Demand, 1938). What formed the main content of the National Demand were the following sets of demands: (i) Substituting the ongoing system of government with a responsible government (functioning under the overall authority of the Maharaja); (ii) making cabinet responsible to a Legislative Assembly, accountability of administration to the Legislative Assembly; (iii) election of Legislative Assembly on the principle of

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adult suffrage; (iv) elections to the Legislative Council on the basis of joint electorate with a due share of seats to minorities and (v) entitlement of all the state subjects irrespective of caste, creed or religion to the army.7 It was a consequence of the efforts made by the leadership that the political struggle had started broadening itself. Soon after the presentation of National Demand, a major agitation took place in August 1938 in which a large number of Hindus and Sikhs also participated and a few of them were also jailed (Hussain, 2009: 123). It was in June 1938 that the leadership of Muslim Conference took the formal decision to change its objectives and open it up to ‘all progressive forces in the country’.8 After a marathon meeting in 1939, it was decided to convert this organisation into All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference. The membership of this party was now opened to all the people of the state ‘irrespective of caste, creed or religion’ (Bose, 2013: 238). Though it was with the overwhelming support of the party that the conversion of the Muslim Conference into the National Conference took place, however, the leaders hailing from Jammu, particularly Ghulam Abbas and Allah Rakha, were not quite supportive of the idea of changing the character of the organisation and opening it for the non-Muslims and radicalising its goals. They feared that after it was opened to the non-Muslims, it might come under the influence of Indian National Congress and lose its pro-Muslim character. When the resolution for transformation was put to vote, as many as 173 of the 176 members present there voted in its favour (Bose, 2003: 20). While Ghulam Abbas went along with the resolution, Chaudhari Hamid Ullah, his close associate, opposed it on the ground that the idea of conversion of Muslim Conference was ‘ill-conceived, anti-Muslim and premature’ (Bazaz, 1941: 314). In 1941, Ghulam Abbas and other Jammu-based leaders took the lead in reviving the Muslim Conference. Revival of Muslim Conference for all the times polarised the Muslim politics of the state on a regional basis. Though Kashmir-based leader Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah was chosen to lead it, its influence was mainly to be seen in the Jammu region. With Jammu-based Muslim Conference now standing in opposition to the Kashmir-based National Conference, regional factor became one of the most important one underlining the identity politics of Kashmir. In pursuance with the objective of opening up the National Conference to the non-Muslims, the working committee of the National Conference co-opted Sardar Budh Singh, Pandit Jial Lal Kilam, L. Girdhari Lal, Pandit Kashyap Bandhu and Prem Nath Bazaz. Meanwhile, for

14

Conflict in Kashmir: background factors

the purpose of democratising the organisation, district committees were organised and lower strata of society was encouraged to enrol as the primary members of the organisation (Bazaz, 1941: 315). In secularising the Kashmiri identity politics during this phase, the inter-linkage of the politics of the National Conference with the interest of the peasantry played a significant role. Under the influence of the leftist lobby, the party had adopted its ideological blueprint – the New Kashmir Manifesto, which had suggested revolutionary changes in the economic structure of the state, in general, and the agrarian structure, in particular, had enthused the mass of peasantry. As Ledijinsky noted in his observation later on, the slogan of ‘land to the tiller’ was the most powerful instrument for mobilising large number of Kashmiris in favour of the politics of National Conference (Ladejinsky, 1952). The New Kashmir Manifesto, adopted by the National Conference in 1944, was to become a reference point for the Kashmiri politics for all the time to come. The manifesto – with its wholesome programme for annihilation of the feudal structure, and reconstruction of the economy and politics of the state from the perspective of the peasants, artisans and working classes – was permanently etched in the imagination of Kashmiris. Rather than being seen as an ideological instrument of a particular organisation, it came to acquire the status of the political creed of the society.

Regional factor in identity politics Much before the fragmentation of the Muslim politics of the state on regional lines in 1940, regional factor was quite significant in the Kashmiri identity politics. Even though the early political mobilisation was governed by religious factors and the ‘Muslim’ reality of Kashmiris was being invoked, the ‘Kashmiri-ness’ in this identity remained important. The political discourse of the 1920s and 1930s though assumed an undifferentiated Muslim identity within the state, the regional factor was not undermined. This factor was actually sharpened as ‘Kashmir’ became the focal point for illustrating the religious divide between the ruler and the ruled. Right from the beginning when efforts were made by the Kashmiri Biradari located in Punjab to organise the Kashmiris against their oppression, it was the ‘Kashmiri’ identity that was being emphasised. Understandably, this Kashmiri identity was essentially the ‘Muslim’ identity and the oppression of Kashmiris was explained with reference to their religious sense of belonging only. However, in this whole process of politicisation, the Kashmiri factor was not rendered

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inconsequential. The fact that the religious divide between the ruler and the ruled was also complimented by the regional divide was clearly reflected in the political discourse. It was the ‘Dogra’ rule that was being fought against. As the resistance politics evolved further, Kashmiri identity vis-à-vis the Dogra rule was more clearly articulated. The way the Dogra rulers were able to gain control over Kashmir became a very important point for articulation of Kashmiri identity. In this articulation, the Amritsar Treaty of 1846 that brought Kashmir under the Dogra rulers was seen as a point of loss of ‘Kashmiri dignity’ since Kashmir along with its territory and people were exchanged in lieu of an amount of money paid by the Dogra ruler to the British. In the popular discourse, it came to be known as the ‘sale deed’. How this Treaty was represented in the speeches of Sheikh Abdullah is reflected in the following quote from his message to Cabinet Mission: One hundred years ago Kashmir was sold for 75 lakh Nanakshahi rupees to Raja Gulab Singh by a sale deed of 1846 wrongly called the Treaty of Amritsar. Less than 5 lakh pound sterling changed hands and sealed the fate of over 40 lakh men and women and their land of milk and honey, without the slightest regard to public sentiment. We challenge the political and moral status of this sale deed, this instrument of subjugation, handed by the East India Company agents to a bunch of Dogras. (Abdullah, 1993: 78) The ‘Dogra’ rule in the political discourse of Kashmir, therefore, symbolised compromised Kashmiri dignity that had to be restored through the politics of resistance. Dogra rule was seen as a continuity of the ‘alien’ rule that had befallen on Kashmir since the beginning of the Mughal rule. To quote Zutshi, ‘almost all works on the history of Kashmir consistently portray the incorporation of the Kashmir Valley into Mughal India after Chak rule as the beginning of the end of Kashmiri independence, when Kashmiriyat came under threat from outsiders’ (Zutshi, 2004: 29). After the Mughals, the control of Kashmir came under the Afghans and then the Sikhs. Though the Dogra rulers were the last in the line of the ‘outsiders’ who had exercised power over Kashmir, it was with reference to the Dogra rule that the regional sense of Kashmiri identity was articulated. It was during the decade of 1930s and 1940s that the idea of restoration of dignity of Kashmir became the central point of the Kashmiri

16

Conflict in Kashmir: background factors

political discourse. It was around this point that ‘Kashmiri nationalism’ was imagined. The Kashmiris sense of the ‘political self’ or a ‘political collective’ was defined both by the urge for regaining the political control as well as the goal for restructuring the economy and society. In 1946, the National Conference gave a call for ‘Quit Kashmir’ movement against the Dogra rule. Pursuing the larger objective of ‘freedom before accession’, this movement aimed at regaining the political control over Kashmir before deciding the question as to where the state will accede. ‘Popular control over political power’, therefore, was more important a question for Kashmiri leadership as compared to the question of Accession. This process of defining the ‘we’ sense of political collective was also reflected in the emerging cultural consciousness. In many ways, there was simultaneity in the two processes of political and cultural consciousness. To quote Prakash Chandra: The new nationalist leadership that evolved during the thirties handed down to the common people the distinct heritage of Kashmiri literary and cultural pride. The social significance of the emergent bourgeois elite lay not only in the interpretation it provided of the Kashmiri past and present or the contribution made to the literary and cultural traditions, but, above all in the fact that it made this knowledge a part of a wider popular consciousness. The spread of nationalist consciousness in this way ultimately helped in the emergence of a composite Kashmiri culture without any emphasis on Muslim sectarianism. (Chandra, 1985: 43) Among the most prominent literary figures of 1930s and 1940s in Kashmir were Ghulam Ahmed Mahjoor and Abdul Ahad Azad. Mahjoor’s poetry introduced the people to the concepts of freedom and progress. In his poems he brought in the issues of exploitation and oppression of people, especially those faced by the class of peasantry.9 Mahjoor, ‘not only mirrored the people’s aspirations against the backdrop of the New Kashmir ideal, he also widened their awareness and deepened their insight into the social implications of the new political change’ (Pushp, 1992: 191). Along with Mahjoor, Azad was another prominent literary person who had sufficient influence on the Kashmiris. To quote Gauhar: Azad’s revolutionary and thought-provoking poems made every Kashmiri feel proud of his origin, national identity and inherent

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capacities bestowed upon him by nature. . . . Thus, a sense of love and respect for the homeland was cultivated. In the patriotic song he made frequent references of the valiant soldiers, noble kings and eminent scholars of Kashmir thereby educating his fellow Kashmiri of his rich past. Love for homeland and pride in its heritage are pre-requisites which create a sense of sacrifice of one’s motherland. Azad created a thinking in the Kashmiri mind that love for the motherland should be an article of faith with the sons of the soil. (Gauhar, 1997: 4)

Intermeshing of religion and regional factors While analysing the Kashmiri identity politics, specifically with reference to the regional and religious factors, it becomes important to emphasise that Kashmiri political identity, like any other identity, is neither static nor a homogenised or singular response. As a dynamic identity, both in terms of its internal complexity as well as in terms of its ever changing nature, it takes different forms depending on the political context in which it is located. Among the various markers of this identity, religion and region are the two most important ones. The interaction between these two factors in itself creates a complexity in the way this political identity tends to reflect itself. Though generally the evolution of this identity is seen in terms of its periodisation and in terms of alternative manifestation of the factors of religion and region, yet, it is important to point out the complex pattern of relationship between the regional and religious factor. Puri refers to the inter-meshing of the religious and regional factor in Kashmiri identity and notes the ‘uniqueness of religious-regional synthesis’ of Kashmir. According to him, ‘the fact that 94 per cent of its people profess Islam has made their religious and regional identities almost synonymous’. Explaining as to how the two factors of identity reinforce each other, he argues that ‘while the strength of Islam in Kashmir lies in the fact that it is rooted in its tradition, consciousness about Kashmiri tradition is sustained by the common religious faith’ (Puri, 1983: 186). As the study of evolution of Kashmiri identity politics clearly reflects, religion has been an important component of Kashmiri nationalism. While the sense of political collective was articulated around the issue of deprivation of ‘Kashmiri Muslims’ vis-à-vis the Hindu Ruler, religious affinities continued to define the boundaries of this collective even in

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Conflict in Kashmir: background factors

the later period when the politics of Kashmir was secularised. Bose, in this context notes that: Despite the secular (and socialist) turn in the JKNC’s line, the movement’s mobilization strategy and its mass appeal among the Kashmir Valley’s people continued to be rooted in a Muslim idiom of politics, derived from and tailored to the Valley’s regional culture, six centuries old, of Sufi-inspired Islam. The charismatic Abdullah’s style personified this. His crowd-pulling prowess owed much to his ability to enthral predominantly illiterate audiences by reciting beautifully from the holy Koran. During the 1940s his political rise was built on the control his followers managed to acquire over most of the Valley’s mosques, and consequently their congregations, at the expense of religious preachers of the traditional variety. (Bose, 2013: 2013) Referring to use of religion by Abdullah, for the purposes of political mobilisation, Zutshi has noted that his ‘rhetoric’ and ‘tactics’ were similar to those of the religious leaders. ‘He continued to use Islam as the primary focus of community organization, since the parameters within which the public and political could function in the state were defined by religion’ (Zutshi, 2003: 231–2). The religious factor remained important in the movement politics also because it continued to be mainly the party of Kashmiri Muslims. The political movement, even after deliberate attempts were made to open it to all the communities across the religious divide, remained more or less confined to Muslims. Despite the presence of prominent Kashmiri Pundits, they (Pundits) did not show much enthusiasm to be a part of it. It continued, more or less, to be mainly a movement of Kashmiri Muslims. However, at the same time, regional boundaries of nationalism were very important and at times more important than the religious affiliations of Kashmiris. That is why, Kashmiris were not particularly enamoured with the idea of Pakistan. The development of 1930s (when Muslim Conference was converted into the National Conference) and 1940s (when Kashmiri leadership took a deliberated decision to demand self-government) clearly reflected the failure of the idea of pan-Islamic identity satisfying the political urges of Kashmiris. The fear that such an identity would subsume the regional identity of Kashmiris was clearly expressed during the moments of aggression by tribals with the support of Pakistan in 1947. To quote Puri:

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They had then perceived a threat to their Kashmiri identity from their co-religionist Pakistan which refused to concede their right to decide their own fate . . . A self-respecting community like the Kashmiris could not reconcile itself to that position and, therefore, sought the armed help of India to defend its right of self-determination which India had already committed to support. (Puri, 1990: 191) Thus, despite the fact that religion formed an important component of the Kashmiri identity in the initial period, one could see this identity transcending the religious factor and even overriding the Muslim political identity (Singh, 1998: 334). Rejection of the idea of Pakistan, even when it stood for Muslim homeland, was one such significant moment when religious basis of identity was rejected in favour of economic rights of people. Sheikh Abdullah particularly was very antagonistic to the idea of joining Pakistan because he was convinced that the restructuring of economy would not have been possible in feudal Pakistan. Referring to the tribal invasion and response of Sheikh at that time, Tariq Ali thus argues: If Abdullah, too, had favoured Pakistan, there wouldn’t have been much that the Indian troops could have done about it. But he regarded the Muslim League as a reactionary organisation and rightly feared that if Kashmir became part of Pakistan, the Punjabi landlords who dominated the Muslim League would stand in the way of any social or political reforms. He decided to back the Indian military presence, provided the Kashmiris were allowed to determine their own future. (Ali, 2001) A very crucial point about the factor of religion within Kashmiri identity politics is made by Chitralekha Zutshi. She argues that the religious sense of collectivity was not de-linked from the ‘discourse of rights and freedom’. This discourse, according to her, formed the core of the political movement of Kashmiris. Defining the boundaries of the community of Kashmiri Muslims, making efforts to reform it internally, and demand that ‘state recognise them as a separate entity’ – all these were part of the larger process of construction of religious identity of Kashmiris since late nineteenth century. The context of this identity construction was provided by the Dogra state, which itself asserted its religious identity. However, what was different in

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Conflict in Kashmir: background factors

the process of identity construction in the post-1930 period, according to Zutshi, was that: it more concretely linked religious affiliation with political demands by claiming rights for Kashmiri Muslims based on ideal of a just Islamic society. Furthermore, since the leadership ultimately sought to replace the autocratic rule of the Dogras with Kashmiri self-rule, the articulation of a ‘national’ ideology was imperative to its project. (Zutshi, 2004: 210) It was this emphasis on the rights of people that Sheikh Abdullah clearly rejected the option of acceding to Pakistan. As per his own statements, there was no attraction for joining Pakistan other than the fact that it was Muslim homeland. The limitation of this Muslim homeland was that it did not offer the possibility of land and other rights of people. It was only by having a negotiated relationship with India that rights of Kashmiris could be ensured (Abdullah, 1951). However, even while rejecting the idea of Pakistan, Sheikh did not agree to accept union with India in an unconditional manner. He was very firm about protecting the rights and identity of Kashmiris. As Puri argues, it was the same reason that compelled the Kashmiri leaders to distance themselves from the Muslim politics of pre-partition India, which reflected a lack of urge to merge with Indian nationalism. To quote him: The drift of Kashmiri Muslims away from the mainstream of Muslim politics of the pre-partition India due to geo-historical and political factors did not immediately culminate in their merger in the mainstream of Indian nationalism. The same powerful factors motivated them to assert their identity. The Muslim aspect of this identity was an additional factor in this assertion. (Puri, 1983: 187)

Kashmiri nationalism and response towards India The relationship of local Kashmiri nationalism with Indian nationalism, therefore, was quite complex. On the one hand, there was a sense of commonality of ideological framework and political goals, and, on the other, there was also a strong sense of the specificity of Kashmir and the need to maintain its political identity and autonomy. Sheikh Abdullah often talked of kinship of ideals between Indian and Kashmiri movement

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and also acknowledged the influence of Indian National movement on Kashmiri movement. The ideological position of Congress resonated quite well with the twin goals that the Kashmiri movement had laid before itself – those of abolition of monarchy and dismantling the feudal structure. Congress had clearly committed itself both to radical economic changes, especially in the agrarian sector as well as to the rights of people to govern themselves. It had committed itself to the struggle of people in princely state against their rulers and was instrumental in organising the All India States People’s Conference (Kak, 2009). With Sheikh Abdullah being elected as its president, not only the struggle of Kashmiris against their ruler was recognised by the Congress, but an association of Kashmiri leadership with Indian national movement was also established. Writing about the close association of National Conference with the Congress, Sheikh Abdullah notes in his autobiography: Meanwhile, common goals and aspirations were drawing us closer and closer to the Indian National Congress. The leaders of the Congress were sympathetic to our cause . . . The leaders of the Indian National Congress did not want to be directly involved in the States’ affairs but they expressed sympathy for the States’ peoples aspiration. (Abdullah, 1993: 63) As the movement against the Dogra rule was intensified, the support of the national leaders was more forthcoming. Both Nehru and Gandhi were appreciative of the spirit underlying the ‘Quit Kashmir’ movement launched by National Conference in 1946. Both agreed with the demand of National Conference that the monarch should quit so as to make way for the people to decide about their future. Taking a position that ‘the real sovereign of the state are the people of the state’, Gandhi wrote to Nehru stating that ‘the Treaty of Amritsar was a sale deed. After the termination of its term, the people of Kashmir should have their own sovereign (Abdullah, 1993: 64). However, despite the close association of Kashmiri leaders with the leaders of the Indian National Congress and despite ideological affinity between the two parties, what remained peculiar about Kashmiri nationalism was its emphasis on its autonomy. Developing as parallel to, rather than as a part of, the Indian national movement, it was governed by an inward-looking logic of assertion of ‘Kashmiri self’. To quote Chandra: from the very beginning, the movement in Kashmir was carried forward in a more or less autonomous and a relatively independent

22

Conflict in Kashmir: background factors

form This characteristic of the Kashmir movement also helped in the emergence of a specific popular consciousness in the minds of the people, which was in many ways different from the dominant form of national consciousness in India, especially in respect of the anti-feudal struggle. (Chandra, 1985: 42) What was peculiar about the political movement of Kashmir was the linkage between the two goals of ‘self rule’ and the dismantling of the feudal privileges. While freedom from ‘alien’ rulers was a very important goal, the change in the economic structure was an equally important goal. The intensity with which the Kashmiri movement pursued the goal of restructuring of economy, particularly the agrarian structure, was missing from the Indian national movement led by Congress. The trajectory of the political movement of Kashmir therefore was substantially different from that of the national movement. That is the reason that even though the two movements were quite closely linked by late 1940s, the Kashmiri movement remained quite autonomous of the national movement and continued to be governed by its own internal logic. When the British rule was coming to close, the most important question before Kashmiris was not that of ‘Accession’ but that of ‘freedom from the monarchical rule’. They were debating the questions related to feudal and princely privileges and contesting the validity of the Treaty of Amritsar. They were, therefore, vigorously questioning the right vested in the ruler to take decision about Accession and were demanding that this right be vested in them. Sheikh’s message to the Cabinet Mission clearly reflected this discourse: This is a historic moment. The future of the Indian people is being determined, while the Cabinet Mission is working out a constitutional framework of the country. The right of accession is a contentious issue between three parties, the people, the rulers and the federation. We Kashmiris have to put it in its historical perspective. A sale deed does not have the status of a treaty. Therefore after the termination of British rule Kashmir has the right to become independent. We Kashmiris want to inscribe our own destiny and we want the Cabinet Mission to reaffirm the correctness of our stand. (Abdullah, 1993: 78) It was because of this reason that the political leadership, especially Sheikh, was quite ambivalent about the issue of Accession. If there was

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any clarity in his mind, it was about Pakistan. Sheikh was very clear that Pakistan was not a choice for Kashmiris since it did not offer much to them as far as the goals of the political movement were concerned. More specifically, he was not sure that in ‘landlord-ridden Pakistan, with so many feudal privileges intact’, the kind of land reforms that the National Conference was committed to pursuing, would be possible (Abdullah, 1951). However, beyond this, there was neither clarity nor consensus within the party. In his autobiography, Sheikh talks about the difference of opinion as well as the ambivalence in his mind: I had my views. If we were to accede to India, Pakistan would never accept our choice, and we would become a battleground for the two nations. My colleagues felt differently. The Muslim League, they said, will always be dominated by feudal elements which are an anathema for enlightened and progressive views. The peoples’ vision of a ‘New Kashmir’ will never be accepted by the newly created Pakistan. Chains of slavery will keep us in their continuous stranglehold. But India was different. There were parties and individuals in India whose views were identical to ours. By acceding to India, then, wouldn’t we move closer to our goal? (Abdullah, 1993: 82) Sheikh, on his own, was more interested in the idea of independence but was not sure if it would be possible to retain its independent status, surrounded as it would be by India and Pakistan. However despite all these confusions, Sheikh was very clear that ‘the question of accession will be decided in the best interest of the people of Kashmir’. However, the first priority was ‘to get rid of the dogra domination’ (Abdullah, 1993: 86). The ambivalent position of the leadership notwithstanding, the tribal invasion led them to look towards India for military, moral and political support. Accession of the state with India as well as the military help were, therefore, seen in a positive light. Referring to the situation at that time, Sheikh thus informed the United Nations: Under those circumstances, both the Maharaja and the people of Kashmir requested the Government of India to accept of accession. The Government of India could easily have accepted the accession and could have said, ‘all right, we accept your accession and we shall render this help’. There was no necessity for the Prime Minister of India to add the provision, when accepting the accession, that

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‘India does not want to take advantage of the difficult situation in Kashmir. We will accept this accession because, without Kashmir’s acceding to the Indian dominion, we are not in a position to render any military help. But once the country is free from the raiders, marauders and looters, this accession will be subject to ratification by the people’. That was the offer made by the Prime Minister of India. (Abdullah, 1948) Once the Accession of the state with India had been legalised, its best defence was given by Sheikh Abdullah. He had the satisfaction that the political development in the post-Accession period had followed the path already chalked by the National Conference. Political power was shifted from the Dogra ruler to the National Conference; the state had retained its constitutional autonomy, which helped the party to fulfil its commitment of dismantling the feudal structure by going in for radical land reforms; and a Constituent Assembly had been constituted to draft the constitution of the state. Such satisfaction was reflected in his statements made in 1950. Thus making his speech in the Constituent Assembly of the state, he stated that: We are proud to have our bonds with India, the goodwill of those people and government is available to us in unstinted and abundant measure. The Constitution of India has provided for a federal union and in the distribution of sovereign powers has treated us differently from other constituent units. With the exception of the items grouped under Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications in the instrument of Accession, we have complete freedom to frame our Constitution in the manner we like. (Abdullah, 1951) What added to the satisfaction of Sheikh was the fact that during the initial period after Accession, the state leadership enjoyed enough autonomy to pursue its policies. Hence there was no problem for them to accept association with India. That such association was seen in quite positive light by Sheikh gets reflected from his broadcast to the people of the state in 1952: The position today, as heretofore, is that our State is a constituent unit of the Indian Union and the relationship is based on the same terms as were laid down in the Instrument of Accession. The

Identity politics of Kashmir

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State has transferred three subjects of defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications and for the residuary powers inherent in it, it has complete freedom to exercise an autonomous position. I am fully convinced that this position, consistent with the principles of democracy, could be secured for the State only through a continued association with India, where the large majority of the people are striving to democratize their mode of economic and political development. The support given to our decisions by the Indian people is an effective guarantee that we shall have the fullest opportunities of adopting progressive policies for the benefit of the masses. (Abdullah, 1952) The fact that there was sufficient space for the Kashmiri identity politics to express itself in the immediate post-Accession period led to a harmonious construction of relation between Kashmiri and Indian nationalism. It was in the later period that an acrimonious relationship between the two was started. Lack of nuanced understanding of the basis of the relationship between the two nationalism resulted in the widening gap between the two.10 Removal of Sheikh Abdullah from the power structure and his detention for a long time created a shift not only in the internal politics of the state but also in Kashmir’s relationship with India. Accumulated political discontent resulted in crisis of legitimacy of the power politics, on the one hand, and contestation of India’s claim on Kashmir, on the other. By 1989–90 one could see as to how the politics of Kashmir had taken a complete turnaround. India which was seen as an ally in 1947 was seen as an ‘alien power’ now. Along with armed militancy, the politics of Kashmir was swayed by separatist sentiments expressed through the slogans of azadi. While explanations for militancy have been provided in the external factors, it is in the internal politics of the state that one has to locate the explanations for separatist sentiments. The following few chapters deal with this.

Notes 1 The agitation, Ravinder Kaur notes, was communal in nature as the Muslim workers ‘demanded the removal of the Hindus and their replacement by Muslims’. She also notes that in the process of controlling the agitators, ten people were killed (Kaur, 1996: 113). 2 Following the 1931 riots, the Glancy Commission was appointed to look into the grievances of people and make suggestions for their amelioration.

26

3

4

5

6

7 8

Conflict in Kashmir: background factors The Commission submitted its report in March 1932. The major recommendations made by the Commission were: that places of worship taken over by the government be thrown open for the devotees; that education be broad-based and improved in quality; that Muslims be offered government jobs, especially in the education sector; academic qualifications for government jobs not to be too high; a recruitment policy be made which would entitle all communities to government service; proprietary rights to government land to be passed on to those who till it; forced labour be abolished; attention by the state be paid to promotion of arts and crafts to ensure quick end to unemployment (Abdullah, 2013: 129–30). In the context in which no political organisation was permitted to operate in the state, Reading Room Party was organised as a study club by some members of the emerging educated class of Kashmiris. Sheikh Abdullah describes the functioning of this organisation in the following manner: ‘The Reading Room, as it was called, was actually a front behind which we assembled for exchange of ideas. We discussed not only our job opportunities and other personal matters but also issues relating to the country as a whole. We especially lamented over the deplorable conditions prevailing in Kashmir’ (Abdullah, 2013: 52). According to Prem Nath Bazaz, Muslim Conference basically represented the interests of the emerging middle class among Muslims. To quote him, ‘The history of Muslim Conference is nothing but the record of the struggle of the middle and upper classes of Muslims during the period 1932–38 for the achievement of their rights. By clever manoeuvering these people had been able to achieve substantial gains in the shape of Glance recommendations. They wanted to preserve them as best as they could’ (Bazaz, 1941: 184). Zutshi, however, argues against any monolithic representation of Kashmiri Muslims. They were, in her opinion, ‘divided into Sheikhs, descendants of Hindu converts to Islam; Sayyids, who claimed a direct line of descent from prophet’s family; Mughals, with Central Asian origins; and Pathans, the descendants of Afghans’. These groups, according to her, were further divided on occupational basis – ‘with agriculture and related occupations being the single most important’ occupation, ‘Sayyids and Mughals were most likely to be landholders and administrators of shrines’. Besides these, there were various other occupational groups under the category of ‘Kashmiri Muslims’ (Zutshi, 2003: 11). To highlight the difference between Sheikh and the traditional clergy in their use of religion for political purposes, one may highlight Sheikh’s opposition of Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah whom he termed as the ‘enemy of Islam’ as he was ‘sucking the blood of poor people’ (Prakash, 1985: 35). Along with the leaders of Muslim Conference, a number of Hindu leaders, including Prem Nath Bazaz, Sardar Budh Singh, Pandit Jia Lal Kilam, Shyam Lal Saraf, were the signatories of the National Demands document. Following was the Resolution of the Working Committee of Muslim Conference in this context: ‘Whereas in the opinion of the working Committee the time has now come when all the progressive forces in the country should be rallied under one banner to fight for the achievement of responsible government, the Working Committee recommends to the General Council that

Identity politics of Kashmir

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in the forthcoming session of the Conference the name and constitution of the organisation be so altered and amended that all such people who would desire to participate in the political struggle may easily become members of the Conference irrespective of their caste, creed or religion’ (Resolution of the Working Committee Muslim Conference, 28 June 1938). 9 Mahjoor’s poem, ‘Arise O gardner’ was adopted as the national anthem of Kashmir during this period. In this poem he asks his people to organise themselves and overthrow the exploitative system. Referring to this poem of Mahjoor, Sheikh Abdullah writes in his autobiography that it ‘marvellously represented spirit of our movement. I have recited this poem many a time at my rallies igniting the hearts of the innocent, unschooled peasants and artisans’ (Abdullah, 2013: 199). 10 Referring to the role of Kashmiri identity politics in harmonising Kashmir’s relationship with India Bhattacharjea argues, ‘The key to Abdullah’s success in countering Pakistan’s religious appeal to Muslims lay in fostering the sense of a common, separate Kashmiri identity with deep roots in the past. But to maintain lasting, popular links and keep Pakistan at a distance, the sense of Kashmiriyat needed to be nurtured and respected by India a well. Any move that seeks to alter the terms on which Kashmir acceded to India was seen as impinging on this sense of identity and promoting religious fundamentalism – an explanation for later developments’ (Bhattacharjea, 1994: 14).

Chapter 2

Background to armed militancy and separatism Failure of democratic politics in Kashmir

Lack of institutionalisation of democracy in Jammu and Kashmir has been cited as one of the major reasons for the discontent and political alienation in Kashmir. The onset of armed militancy in the Kashmir Valley in 1989 has been attributed by many to a total sense of desperation with the working of democratic structures in the state, in general, and the Kashmir Valley, in particular. It is true that in sustaining the militancy and even separatist politics, the external factor played a crucial role. Without the moral, political, financial and militaristic support of Pakistan, militancy could not have perpetuated itself for around two decades. However, it is also a fact that much before the external factor came to play a role, the internal factors had generated a situation that paved the way for external intervention. It is important to note here that armed militancy was immediately preceded by electoral process and many of the first generation of militants had participated in 1987 Assembly election as candidates, election agents and sympathisers.1 It is also important to note that armed militancy had the popular support and was legitimised through the explicit response of people. The phenomenon of armed militancy was accompanied by a massive popular upsurge. Colossal demonstrations, with lakhs of people participating and chanting the slogans of azadi, characterised the political environment of Kashmir all through the period of 1989–90. These people had reposed their faith in the electoral process and had expressed satisfaction of electing governments of their choice in 1977 and 1983 Assembly elections. Though the immediate reason for the transformation of their political response (from mainstream democratic politics to separatist politics) can be traced to disillusionment with the 1987 Assembly elections, or the situation as it had evolved since 1984, yet to understand the kind of separatist mobilisation that took place in Kashmir in the period following this election, it may be important to trace the history of

Background to armed militancy and separatism

29

democratic politics since early 1950s. Tracing such history is also important from the perspective of a paradox that this state represents. This was one of the few states of India that had the sufficient initial resources on the basis of which a democratic edifice could be constructed and yet democracy was not institutionalised here.

Democratic resources The state of Jammu and Kashmir started its post-Accession experiment with democratic politics with three very crucial resources. These resources were: a highly mobilised mass that had gone through an intense phase of movement politics; a charismatic leader with a mass following and; a very well-entrenched political organisation. However, as the situation developed in the state in the post-1953 period, all these resources were frittered. Rather than helping the democratic processes to attain depth, these worked towards strengthening the resistance politics. To comprehend this process, it may be important to systematically focus on the developments in the post-Accession period, particularly the period after 1953 when Sheikh Abdullah was removed from power and was detained for a long time thereafter. His removal from power politics was to have long-term implications for the democratic politics in Kashmir. Not only a disjuncture between governance and the popular responses was developed but there also evolved and expanded a parallel separatist space.

Democratic space in the 1947–53 period It may be pointed out at the very outset that democratic situation in Kashmir from the beginning was not an ideal one. The period 1947–53 was one of transition and the democratic political structures were yet to be fully institutionalised. The National Conference government led by Sheikh Abdullah was installed in 1947 as the emergency government in the wake of the tribal invasion, political turmoil and communal violence. The tribal invasion not only led to the destruction, loot and killing, but also to the division of the state. A large part of the state had come under the occupation of Pakistan and there was influx of refugees both from West Pakistan and the areas under the control of Pakistan. Besides all these problems, there was communal violence in the Jammu division.2 The major function of the government installed in 1947 was to restore law and order and fill in the administrative vacuum. Hence, there were many lacunas in the functioning of government, in general, and the working of the ruling party, in particular. These lacunas continued even

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Conflict in Kashmir: background factors

after the first Assembly elections in 1951. Most crucially, there was the blurring of lines between the party and the government. The required distinction between the two was not maintained. In the context of the ‘virtual collapse of the administration following the tribal raids’, the government had placed the ‘trusted leaders’ in the administrative positions who continued to retain the party membership and affirmed loyalty to it. The situation was worse in smaller towns where the National Conference was almost running the whole of administration (The Statesman, 14 November 1951). The proximity of the National Conference cadre with the power structure had resulted in its political degeneration. The common refrain in 1952–53 was that the party had become complacent and its ranks were infiltrated by ‘unscrupulous people out to exploit the positions they managed to secure’ (Times of India, 4 July 1953). The situation was made further critical due to the lack of any opposition. The state was, in effect, functioning under the ‘one party system’, which neither had the internal dissent nor external opposition. Being extremely popular due to its role in anti-feudal and anti-monarchical movement, the National Conference captured the whole political space of Kashmir. Other political forces seeking to operate in the Valley worked through rather than against this party. That is the reason that the Communist Party of India and the Congress both found no reason to have a branch of their organisations in the state as both operated through the National Conference. In this situation in which the whole political space was hegemonised by the National Conference, it was important to have internal democracy within the party. Unfortunately, Sheikh Abdullah’s tall stature made it quite difficult. His complete control of the monolithic party led to authoritarian tendencies. To quote Puri: Kashmiri nationalism was monolithic. It was mobilised on the slogan ‘One leader, one party and one programme’ which referred to Sheikh Abdullah, National Conference and its manifesto New Kashmir respectively. Any deviation or dissent from this strict test of nationalism amounted almost to treason. Sheikh Abdullah, who represented entirety of Kashmir personality – its political, cultural and religious aspects – and who had led his people to freedom, assumed absolute powers in 1947 when the Maharaja’s old constitution had lost its moral and political legitimacy. Inspired by a messiah complex with unchallenged popularity and loyal party cadres, without any constitutional or political checks, he presided over a regimented set up. (Puri, 2003: 5143)

Background to armed militancy and separatism

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Though Sheikh was the most popular leader of Kashmir, yet, he was not necessarily a very democratic person. His lack of tolerance for dissent within the party and the opposition outside it has been noted by many. Mir Qasim, a close cabinet colleague of Sheikh during the early postAccession period, notes in his political biography as to how Sheikh saw Ghulam Mohiuddin Qarra, another colleague within the party, as his rival. Qarra had led the National Conference when Sheikh and other leaders of this party were jailed during the 1946–47 period. He had ‘proved himself to be an able administrator and political leader all through the Quit Kashmir Movement’ (Qasim, 1992: 42). However, notwithstanding his ability, he was not included in the cabinet that Sheikh formed in March 1948. Qarra left the party and later formed a party of his own, the Political Conference. This party, notes Puri, ‘was the first organised voice in Kashmir for a demand for the state’s accession to Pakistan’ (Puri, 2003: 5143). Sheikh Abdullah was also critiqued for manipulating the electoral process in 1951. During the first general election for the Legislative cum Constituent Assembly, all the seats were captured by the National Conference. Though the party was quite popular, yet its hundred per cent victory was made possible because of withdrawal of the Jammu-based Praja Parishad, the only opposition party in the state, from the electoral process. On trivial grounds, the nomination papers of the candidates belonging to this party were rejected in bulk. In protest, the party boycotted the election. As a result, all but two candidates in the state were returned without any electoral contest. The two constituencies that went for a poll were located in Jammu. But in Kashmir, there was no requirement for polling. All the seats here were decided without a contest.3 Assessing Sheikh Abdullah’s role vis-à-vis democratic processes, Ganguly notes thus: There is very little doubt that Abdullah’s National Conference enjoyed wide-spread support within the state. Yet Abdullah’s strategy of political mobilization, though populist, was not democratic. The organizational structure of the National Conference belied its socialist and democratic ideology. As a political party, it was constructed largely around the person of Abdullah and his close advisers. Decision-making was highly centralized and concentrated in his hands. Little internal dissent was allowed. (Ganguly, 1996: 94) However, despite all these shortfalls, the democratic space in Kashmir during the 1947–53 period was quite extensive, especially when

32

Conflict in Kashmir: background factors

compared to the situation as it evolved in post-1953 phase. The strength of power politics during the period between 1947 and 1953 lay in its linkage with the mass response. Mobilised by the National Conference during the pre-1947 period around the issues of economic reconstruction of society, mass of Kashmiris were quite satisfied with the political developments of the post-1947 period. The dismantling of the oppressive monarchical and feudal structure and the establishment of the first ‘Kashmiri’ government met with their approval. More specifically, it was the progressive land reform legislations that endeared Sheikh Abdullah personally, and National Conference as an organisation, to the people of Kashmir (Ladejinsky, 1977: 179–80). It was because of Sheikh’s vision of ‘New Kashmir’ that they became the owners of land overnight and were relieved of the burden of their debts as these were substantially scaled down by the government. The democratic space was not only defined by the linkage between the government and the popular response, but also by the negotiability that the state’s leadership enjoyed vis-à-vis the central government. Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference were fully involved in defining the future relationship of the state with India. Not merely in the incorporation of Article 370 in the Constitution of India, which guaranteed constitutional autonomy to the state, but for any further deliberation on the state’s relationship with India, the participation and active consent of the local leadership was very much required. However, all this was changed with the removal of Sheikh Abdullah from power politics and his prolonged detention. One of the reasons for removal of Sheikh Abdullah from power was his changing position on the state’s Accession with India. On 10 April 1952, he delivered a speech in R.S. Pura, Jammu in which he talked about the limitation of Accession. In his speech, he said, ‘other than the matters related to defence, foreign affairs and communications, the state was free to take decision as per its own constitution’ (Baxter, 1969: 118). Though Delhi Agreement followed, yet the differences between Sheikh and Nehru continued to be widened. Bhattacharjea argues that this change was a consequence of the strong campaign against Article 370 particularly by Bharatiya Jana Sangh, Praja Parishad and Hindu Mahasabha. He (Sheikh) began openly to doubt the permanence of accession to India without honouring the pledge of a plebiscite made when Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession, and to question whether secularism would survive Gandhi and Nehru. At the same time, he

Background to armed militancy and separatism

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began to discuss with US and other foreign diplomats the possibility of support for an independent Kashmir, as confirmed by US State Department papers of the period and diplomatic memoirs. (Bhattacharjea, 1994: 15) Besides, there were internal reasons leading to the removal of Sheikh Abdullah. Mir Qasim, in his biography, has clearly stated the conditions in which Sheikh was removed in active collaboration of his ministerial colleagues. He notes as to how otherwise stalwarts and leaders in their own rights, most of the ministers in Sheikh’s government felt dwarfed. They were also suffocated by his authoritarian attitude. This resulted in an inner division with leaders like Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, G. M. Sadiq, Girdhari Lal Dogra, Shamlal Saraf and others collaborating with the Centre in the removal of Sheikh Abdullah from the political scenario.

Post-1953 scenario As a popular leader, Sheikh Abdullah was a link between people, on the one hand, and the governments, both the local as well as the Government of India, on the other. He was not only the driving force of the National Conference, especially its mass base but also an ideologue whose vision was being translated into policies, structures and institutions. Though there were many other leaders of National Conference who contributed to the strength of the organisation, it was the charismatic persona of Sheikh Abdullah around which the popular support of the party was woven. Due to his pro-people orientation concretised in the post-Accession period, he had the full faith of people in directing Kashmir’s politics to any direction that he considered appropriate. His decision to support state’s Accession with India and negotiate a special constitutional status for it, was endorsed by people as well. His ouster therefore created a legitimacy crisis not only for the power politics but also for the Indian state on the issue of Kashmir. The legitimacy crisis that the power politics faced emanated mainly due to the disjuncture with the popular response. The popular support shifted along with Sheikh Abdullah to the parallel sphere of politics, which came into being right at the moment he was detained. This sphere comprising mainly of politics of contestation and resistance followed the direction that Sheikh Abdullah took. He raised the demand for ‘plebiscite’, which captured the popular imagination in the post-1953 period. This demand, as we will see in the next chapter, took more organised form as Plebiscite Front was formed in 1955.

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Conflict in Kashmir: background factors

Thereafter, it was the Plebiscite Front and not the National Conference that mobilised the masses and with which they identified. The National Conference, in the absence of Sheikh and other leaders like Mirza Afzal Beg who left the party in the wake of political developments in 1953, became a truncated party. Though a number of well-entrenched leaders, including Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, G.M. Sadiq and Mir Qasim, still manned it, yet it had lost its sheen – not only because the tallest leader was missing and operating through another organisation but also because these leaders were seen to have betrayed Sheikh Abdullah and his vision of ‘autonomous Kashmir’. Driven by the concerns of the Central government rather than indigenous force or logic, these leaders were seen to be unconnected and extraneous to the local politics. Meanwhile, the party they were leading was also seen as irrelevant and superfluous, much more so, because it neither had an ideological content nor was seen to be representing the genuine aspirations of masses. The legitimacy crisis, however, was not limited to the National Conference and its leadership only but in fact engulfed the whole power politics. With Sheikh Abdullah and Plebiscite Front occupying a large political space and people identifying with it rather than with the National Conference and its leaders, the power politics faced a perennial crisis. This crisis generated a circular relationship with democratic institutions – as the crisis evolved, the democratic institutions were manoeuvred and as the democratic institutions were compromised, the legitimacy crisis was further deepened.

Manoeuvred democratic politics Disconnected from its popular base, the power politics in the post-1953 period lost whatever democratic content it earlier had and meanwhile exacerbated the adverse implications of the hegemonic politics of the ruling party. The regime of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, who succeeded Sheikh, earned the infamy of being the most undemocratic and corrupt government. Most of his workers, in liaison with the bureaucracy and the administration, used corrupt practices and exploited their position for their interests. Bakshi’s dynasty, exploiting the official position to their benefits, reached the highest position of commercial class. Consequently, it turned into a big business class, forming an intermediary of the Indian bourgeoisie for exploiting the common man of Kashmir. (Fazili, 1982: 46)

Background to armed militancy and separatism

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However, what was peculiar about the Bakshi regime was the use of unscrupulous political tactics to deal with any kind of opposition or dissent against the ruling party. The National Conference, though truncated after the detention of Sheikh and Mirza Afzal Beg as well as after the withdrawal of some of his colleagues, became a very powerful organisation and its leadership developed an authoritarian streak. Since the party no more enjoyed the unstinted support of people and faced the crisis of legitimacy in the face of growing popularity of Sheikh Abdullah and Plebiscite Front, its leaders relied on various undemocratic mechanisms to sustain themselves and this party in political power. Mir Qasim refers to the use of goons by Bakshi, to keep the opponents away. He specifically mentions the ‘Peace Brigade’, a group of political workers who were mainly engaged for the job of ‘breaking up of the public meetings’ of his opponents (Qasim, 1992: 77). Peace Brigade, as Puri notes, was ‘a private army, paid from the state funds’ (Puri, 1968: 224). Puri refers to his personal experience of being a witness to the disruption of a meeting of Praja Socialist Party by the political workers of Bakshi. The meeting was being held with the purpose of establishing a branch of this party in Srinagar. Asoka Mehta, the party president, and other leaders ‘were beaten in Lal Chowk in bright day light’ (Puri, 2009). Fazili refers to the harassment of Bakshi’s opponents by declaring them as agents of Pakistan (Fazili, 1982: 46). It is because of these kinds of practices that Bakshi’s regime became symbol of ‘repression, nepotism and corruption’ (Khan, 2012: 17). Besides this, various other mechanisms were used to suppress the opposition. Of these, the most significant was the electoral machinery, which was completely controlled by the party in power. Using this machinery, Bakshi foreclosed all the possibilities of emergence of any opposition within the mainstream politics. The incidence of uncontested returns that had characterised the first general elections was extended beyond its limits in the post-1953 period. It is a fact that electoral process was manipulated during Sheikh Abdullah’s time to control the opposition in the Jammu region. However, the electoral outcome in Kashmir during Sheikh’s time was quite authentic. Due to the massive popularity of National Conference at that time, there was no competition to this party and its candidates were returned without any contest. But in the post-1953 period, the situation had changed in a drastic manner and there were visible signs of discontent against the ruling party. It was in this context of discontent that the phenomenon of ‘uncontested returns’ was almost institutionalised. As a routine, there were large-scale rejections of nomination papers of the candidates belonging

36

Conflict in Kashmir: background factors

to the opposition parties and there were large number of uncontested returns.4 The phenomenon continued till the late 1960s.5 The ruling National Conference, throughout this period, remained the hegemonic party, winning all the seats of the Valley in the elections right from 1951 to 1962 (Chowdhary et al., 2007: 13–15). The manoeuvring of the electoral process insulated the democratic politics from the mass response. Though ‘elections’ were held at regular frequency of five years, yet there was nothing that enthused the local voters. With most candidates getting elected uncontested, the whole process bypassed the people. The governments were being put in place or being changed without any involvement of people. There were numerous constituencies where voters did not have the opportunity to visit the polling booths for as many as first four Assembly elections. Election after election, candidates would be elected without any electoral campaign. For the highly mobilised community of Kashmiris, this was the most depressing experience. It is important to note that this was the time when the state underwent major transformation but without any reference to the people. Much of the logic that underlay the relationship between the Centre and the state in the pre-1953 period was reversed in this period. Soon after the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah, the Constitutional Order of 1954 was passed, which extended a substantial part of the Union List to the state. Through various other Presidential Orders, the state was constitutionally brought at par with other states. In mid-1960s, a major amendment to the Constitution of the state (the Sixth Amendment) was passed, which changed the nomenclature of the head of the state and the head of the executive and also changed the very mode of selection of the head of the state. There was no articulation of popular response to these changes within the democratic space. In fact, there was no space for democratic debate, since the mainstream political space was totally hegemonised by the National Conference with no scope for any dissent or opposition. All political parties that could potentially provide a vibrancy to the competitive politics in early 1950s had joined forces and operated through the National Conference. There was a strong presence of the leftist leaders in the state but rather than operating through the Communist Party of India, they aimed at controlling the organisational structure of the National Conference. Communists had penetrated into the National Conference in the pre1947 period and much of the ideological direction that this party took was a result of the influence that they exerted on the organisation. After

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1947, the Communists therefore preferred to conduct their politics from within the National Conference rather than from outside. Similarly, the Congress was also operating through the National Conference and did not feel the need to have a branch in the state. Till 1953 it was felt that there was no space for Congress as a parallel party due to the popularity of the National Conference and its ideological overlap with the Congress. After 1953, the Congress, being the ruling party in the Centre, could directly control the National Conference. The control of Congress on this party was so complete that National Conference virtually operated as its extended branch – a situation clearly reflected in the resignation of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad as the Premier of the state under the Kamaraj Plan of Congress in 1962. A purely internal organisational programme of the Congress Party asking for resignation of Congress Chief Ministers and Cabinet Ministers of the Union Government, the Kamaraj Plan could not have extended to the National Conference, and yet Bakshi even while remaining the leader of the National Conference not only submitted his resignation to the Congress High Command but his resignation was accepted as well. Hence, it was a mere formality that in January 1965, ‘the Indian National Congress . . . amended its party constitution, and enabled the setting up of a state unit in Jammu and Kashmir which in turn subsumed the National Conference’ (Swami, 2007: 69). Ironically, the National Conference, as stated above, was the most important resource for institutionalising the democratic politics in Kashmir. However, it not only lost its legitimacy but also its autonomy in the post-1953 period. Rather than representing the local urges and locating itself in the local support base, it became an appendage of the Congress party. In the process it lost its capacity to politically mediate and extend the democratic base. Its linkage with the Congress was not only suicidal for the organisation itself but was to have long-term implications for the identity politics of Kashmir. To quote Bhattacharjea: The National Conference was designed as a vehicle to express and safeguard the secular Kashmiri identity: it lost its raison d’être and its following when attempts were made to merge or ally it with the Congress, the representative of Central power and authority. This led to a drift towards communal organisations. (Bhattacharjea, 1994: 14) As far as the people were concerned, he notes (217) that they ‘had no alternative but to join either the Plebiscite Front, which held the

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Conflict in Kashmir: background factors

accession to India was temporary, or the Congress, seen as an agent of the Centre’. In stifling the democratic processes of the state, the Central government therefore had a direct role to play. It not only interfered with the local political processes but also disallowed any possibility of democratic opposition. In 1957, a break away group from within the National Conference had emerged, which was in a position to provide an ideological opposition to the ruling party. 6 The group named as Democratic National Conference and led by a number of left-oriented leaders was ‘encouraged’ by the Central leadership to join back the National Conference. The logic behind this move was that it was not healthy for the state to have divisive forces in the face of danger posed by external agencies. G.M. Sadiq, who led the Democratic National Conference, incorporated this logic in his statement justifying reunification of Democratic National Conference with National Conference: I agree entirely with Bakshi Sahib that the time has come when a supreme effort must be made for bringing together and welding into a common endeavour all those who stand for the unity and integrity of Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of India. Not only will such a step result in creating a favourable climate for the speedy implementation of projects intended to raise the economic standards of the people, but it will at the same time defeat all such elements who wish to sow suspicion and discord in the minds of our people in order to divert their attention from the urgent tasks of economic reconstruction and social regeneration. (J&K National Conference, 1960) Following the same logic the Working Committee of the Democratic National Conference therefore resolved to merge with the National Conference. Its resolution of merger stated the following: The Working Committee reviewed the situation both in the internal and external aspects and also the continuing difficulties and dangers confronting the country from the borders of our State. The Working Committee is of the opinion that in order to meet the new challenges to the security and integrity of our Motherland, it is the imperative need of the hour to unite all the secular and democratic forces within the State by eschewing controversies and bickering. (J&K National Conference, 1960)

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With a clear position taken by the Centre that the ruling National Conference should not be faced with any opposition within the state, the efforts by the Praja Socialist Party (PSP) to establish a branch in Kashmir were also not seen in a positive light. Despite the fact that PSP leaders were physically assaulted by the goons of National Conference, Nehru was quite critical of PSP’s efforts to establish a branch in Srinagar. He saw this as a process of ‘joining hands with the enemies of the country’ (Puri, 1968: 229). Similarly, in 1971, the Plebiscite Front was prevented from participating in the Assembly elections. The members of this organisation had earlier (in 1969) registered an impressive performance in the panchayat elections. However, prior to the Assembly elections, the Plebiscite Front was banned by the Centre under the India-wide Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act and as many as 350 of its members were detained under the local Preventive Detention Act (Bose, 2013: 265). Meanwhile, to contain the influence of Plebiscite Front, the Jamaat-e-Islami was encouraged to contest election and ‘was ensured a victory’ on five seats by the Congress (Rao, 1999: 14). The Centre’s role in restraining the democratic forces in Kashmir was not limited to discouraging the opposition or dissent within the mainstream politics, it controlled the power politics per se. Bakshi remained in power till the time he was found to be convenient for the Centre. Once he lost the pleasure of the Central leadership, he had to step aside. Ironically, like Abdullah he was also arrested after his removal from power.7 Incidentally, at the time of his arrest under Defence of India rules, he was opposing the plan of the then Prime Minister of the state, Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq, to merge the National Conference into the Congress.8 To quote Puri: Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad was arrested on September 22, 1964, just in time to prevent him from calling a motion of no confidence against the Sadiq ministry, signed by a majority of members in the state legislature. When the National Conference was convened into a branch of the Indian National Congress in January 1965, all posts were filled by nominations, thereby purging the party of Bakshi’s supporters. (Puri, 1968: 230) As Mir Qasim notes, ‘national interest’ was the ground for arresting Bakshi (Qasim, 1992: 104). Much of the distortion of the democratic processes within the state was justified in the name of protecting the

40

Conflict in Kashmir: background factors

state from the external and internal challenges. The Central government invoked the concept of ‘national interest’ to condone the undemocratic practices followed by the ruling party in the state as well as to justify its intervention in the politics of the state. In the face of external and internal contestation to the finality of Accession of the state with India, the political space within Kashmir was seen to be divided between those who were challenging the Indian position in Kashmir and the ‘nationalist forces’ (meaning thereby the ruling party and its leadership). Any challenge to the ruling party therefore was seen as an effort to weaken the nationalist forces. Therefore, dissent within the ruling party or opposition outside it was discouraged by the leadership in the Centre. Democratic politics, it was viewed, was itself in competition with the ‘plebiscite’ politics and hence could not afford any internal competition. So long as the local leadership was ready to proclaim its loyalty to India and maintain a façade of representing the people, it was allowed to sustain its power, howsoever undemocratic the means may be. Democratic processes therefore were subordinated to the national interest.

Mainstream versus resistance politics The mainstream politics, right since 1953, suffered from a crisis emanating from the parallel political space in which Plebiscite Front operated. After 1953, it was the Plebiscite Front rather than the National Conference, which represented a continuity of the tradition of Kashmiri politics as it had evolved in the decade of 1930s and 1940s. It had also captured a large part of the support base of National Conference. Popular identification with Plebiscite Front was therefore easy to come. However, what further weakened the role of the mainstream politics in Kashmir was its superfluous nature. Remotely connected with people, this politics was driven by self-perpetuating leaders who were dependent on the Central government for their survival. Hegemonised as this politics was by a single party, without any space for dissent and opposition, it did not have any vitality. In contrast, the politics offered by Sheikh Abdullah and Plebiscite Front was much more vibrant. It offered sufficient space to the highly mobilised mass of Kashmiris to represent their political aspirations and to voice their resentment against the existing political realities of the state. During the brief periods when Sheikh Abdullah was out of prison, he would attract huge crowds (Ali, 2001). Massive rallies would become the occasions of emotional outbursts of Kashmiri people.

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In the absence of any possibility of dissent or opposition within the mainstream political space, the Plebiscite Front, apart from operating as a party of resistance, also acted as a major opposition party – critiquing the policies of the government, pointing out flaws in the ongoing political developments and even responding to the debates of the Constituent Assembly of the state. It is important to note that Sheikh and Mirza Afzal Baig were the two most significant ideologues of the National Conference who were giving a particular direction to both the Centre– state relationship and the making of the state constitution. With their removal from power, there was a major shift in the very direction of the constitutional and federal relations. However, this did not evoke much of internal debate within the government or the Constituent Assembly. The only critique that was offered came directly from Sheikh Abdullah or from the Plebiscite Front. With such a situation on ground, there evolved a binary relationship between the power politics, on the one hand, and the resistance politics, on the other. As the ground for power politics started shrinking, the space for the resistance politics started increasing. More the people got disenchanted by the power politics, more intense became their identification with the resistance politics.

Return of Sheikh Abdullah to power politics Sheikh Abdullah returned to power politics in 1975. Following an accord between Mirza Afzal Beg, his close associate, and G. Parthasarthy, the emissary of Mrs Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India, he was appointed the Chief Minister of the state. Syed Mir Qasim, who was at that time heading the Congress government in the state, stepped aside to make way for Sheikh to take over the power. While Qasim and his cabinet resigned, Sheikh Abdullah formed the four-member cabinet with the outside support of the Congress. After being mobilised around the demand for plebiscite for around two decades, the people could not completely comprehend the logic of shift in Sheikh’s politics. Baffled as they were by the turn of events, they, however, went along with him, having faith in his leadership. While many felt let down, a few even stood against him and joined opposition parties or launched new organisations. There were also few young people who joined the underground movement. But on the whole, the transition in Kashmir’s politics was quite smooth. There was no apparent manifestation of popular resistance. It would be much later, when Kashmiris would be swayed by the separatist sentiments, that a re-assessment

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of Sheikh’s action would be made and disillusionment with his politics would be expressed openly. On his own part, Sheikh changed his political discourse from the demand for plebiscite to the demand for autonomy. One of the major condition that he had placed before the Central government before joining power was that the constitutional provisions and central legislations extended to the state in the period after his detention in 1953 be withdrawn. A. G. Noorani (2010) notes that on 23 August 1974, he had written to G. Parthasarthy ‘to make it plain that he could assume office only on the basis of the position as it existed on 8th August, 1953’. However as per the Accord, no direct commitment for reversal to pre-1953 position was given. Though it was reiterated that ‘in its relation with the Union’, the state would continue to be governed by Article 370 of the Constitution of India. In relation to reversal of the constitutional provisions extended after 1953, all that was agreed was that ‘where any provision of the Constitution of India had been applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir with adaptations and modifications, such modifications can be altered or repealed by an order of the President under Article 370’. However, rather than going about such alteration in totality, ‘each proposal’ was to be considered on its merit. It was also made clear that such an exercise would not cover those provisions of constitution of India, which had been applied to the state without adaptation or modification. As per the Accord, the state government could review the laws made by Parliament or extended to the state after 1954 relating to the Concurrent List and it could amend and repeal the same (Kashmir Accord, 1974). Sheikh, however, failed in the project of reversing the constitutional position, as it existed prior to 1953. He could not even succeed in reviewing or withdrawing the Central legislations extended to the state in the post-1953 period. This was despite the fact that a committee was constituted for this purpose. In the absence of internal consensus within the committee, no forward movement in this process could be made. The charisma of Sheikh Abdullah however led him to run his government smoothly, despite the paradox that he often represented. One of the problematic point of Sheikh’s post-1975 politics was the continuity of the authoritarian streak in his politics. Widmalm argues that, ‘much like Indira Gandhi, Sheikh Abdullah allowed the centralizing tendencies inherent in dynastic rule to assert themselves in his party instead of building a strong and internally democratic apparatus firmly anchored in local organisations’ (Widmalm, 1997: 1010). There were a number of situations in post-1975 phase that did not justify Sheikh’s

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democratic credentials. Of these, the first related to Sheikh’s handling of his lifelong colleague, Mirza Afzal Beg. Beg was a prominent member of National Conference who had founded the Plebiscite Front and who had provided ideological vision to the politics of National Conference in the pre-1953 period and the Plebiscite Front in the post-1953 period. In 1978 he was expelled from the National Conference. His ouster from the National Conference reflected lack of internal democracy within the party. Similarly, Sheikh could not resolve the issue of succession in a democratic manner. Despite the fact that there were senior claimants in the party, he chose his son, Farooq Abdullah, a relatively naïve political leader, to take upon the mantle of future leadership. However, one of the most astonishing undemocratic action of Sheikh was introduction and passage of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 by the state Assembly (Rao, 1999: 14). One of the most draconian legislations, it continues to stifle the civil liberty within the state. However, these constraints notwithstanding, Sheikh’s tenure certainly led to the expansion of democratic processes. When compared to the earlier period of 1953 to 1975, the power politics was much more rooted in the popular responses. The chasm that had existed earlier between people and the ‘elected governments’ was no more to be seen. As people still identified with his leadership, his government did not suffer from the crisis of legitimacy. He had, in fact, contested one of the most credible elections in the history of Kashmir and formed the government in 1977 with the massive support of people. This election became historical in the background of withdrawal of the support by the Congress to his government. In a very challenging situation in which National Conference was entangled in three-cornered contest with the Congress, on the one hand, and the Janata Party, on the other, the National Conference had succeeded in registering its massive victory in Kashmir Valley – winning as many as 39 out of the 42 seats here. For the first time, the electoral space in Kashmir was genuinely invigorated and there was massive political mobilisation. The 1977 Assembly elections generated a sense of satisfaction that the government was not imposed from above but elected by the people. With an intense level of competition and involvement of the people, the credibility not only of Sheikh’s government but also of the power politics per se was gained. This was an important feat considering the popular orientation towards the resistance politics in the post-1953 period. The same people who were cheering Sheikh Abdullah for his demand for plebiscite, were now cheering him for having defeated the Congress party. The display of popular support for Sheikh and National

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Conference on the day of results was so impressive that it was difficult to imagine that only few years earlier, electoral process suffered from credibility crisis. Making an assessment of eight years of Sheikh’s government in the post-1975 period, one can argue that though Sheikh did not succeed in restoring the constitutional autonomy, he certainly succeeded in restoring the autonomy of the politics of the state. This autonomy was compromised during the post-1953 period due to the excessive Central intrusion. Dissolving the Plebiscite Front, he resurrected the National Conference and restored its central space in the politics of Kashmir. After initial stint of alliance with the Congress, he distanced himself and the National Conference from this party. Congress, which by default had become the dominant party of Kashmir since mid-1960s, was seen by Kashmiris as an organisation that represented the interests of the Central government. In common Kashmiri perception, it had distorted the local politics and had taken away its indigenous character. Hence, distancing the National Conference from its Congress connection helped a lot in bringing it closer to people. It also helped in directing the Kashmiri identity politics through democratic channels. Sheikh ‘demonstrated his independence by ending the Central subsidy on rice even at the cost of sending up prices and giving Congress an issue to attack with’ (Bhattacharjea, 1994: 237). He also kept the religious and fundamentalist forces at bay. During the 1977 elections, strength of Jamaat within the Legislative Assembly was reduced to one. The democratic space so created was maintained even after the death of Sheikh Abdullah in 1982. Farooq Abdullah who succeeded him tried his best to maintain the autonomy of Kashmir’s politics in the initial period and sought to protect it from intrusive role of the Congress. From the very initial stages of the Accord with Sheikh Abdullah, the Congress leadership was pressuring the National Conference leaders to either merge the party with the Congress or have an alliance with it. Sheikh Abdullah was successful in keeping the Congress at a distance. Farooq Abdullah also attempted to do so initially. During the 1983 elections, he not only withheld the pressure from Indira Gandhi to ally with the Congress, but also gave her party a tough competition. In a bitterly contested election between National Conference and the Congress, the former could sweep the elections in Kashmir Valley. Due to intense competition and massive political involvement of people, the 1983 elections also attained the popular tag of being ‘credible’. Balraj Puri has argued that extension of democratic space during 1975–83 period had reversed the earlier anti-state orientation of the

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people of Kashmir. Writing in Economic and Political Weekly after the death of Sheikh Abdullah, he thus stated: As long as mass discontent was drained off by the emotional slogans of plebiscite, integration or separation, the problem in the state was one of essentially law and order. . . . Now as erstwhile emotional flood channels are closed, people feel involved in all the affairs of the state and are taking elections, administration, and development seriously. (Puri, 1983: 230) The democratic politics, left to its logic, may have continued to involve the people of Kashmir and despite the void created by the death of Sheikh Abdullah, it would have institutionalised itself. The initial period of Farooq Abdullah’s government had all the promise for such a development. The National Conference, by refusing to subjugate its politics to that of the Congress, had a very strong popular appeal. Due to its intrusive role in the politics of the state, the Congress was seen as responsible not only for the loss of constitutional and political autonomy of Kashmir, but also of the dignity of Kashmiris. Standing up to the Congress and the Centre was therefore essential not only for restoring the political autonomy of the state, but also for restoring the political dignity of Kashmiris. Kashmiri identity politics, which was characterised by the slogans of plebiscite in the 1953–75 period, was defined by a strong opposition of the Centre in the post-1975 period. The expansion of democratic space therefore was directly linked with the contestation of the Centre. So long as there was a space for such contestation from within the democratic space, this space was legitimised. It would lose legitimacy, as the future events showed, only when this space for assertion of Kashmiri identity politics was restricted. The promising scenario as it was developing in Kashmir during the early 1980s was related to Farooq Abdullah challenging the Central government. The 1983 Assembly elections, particularly, provided him the space to assert ‘Kashmiri identity’ vis-à-vis the ‘dominance of Congress’. Contesting this election, He challenged not only the Congress party in the State, but also their Central leadership. The pitch of this campaign was so high that it appeared that he would soon be on a collision course with the Centre. In this process, Farooq Abdullah was able to galvanize

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Conflict in Kashmir: background factors

Kashmiris of all hues and shades, young and old, thereby absorbing dissent and contradictions in one huge momentum. (Punjabi, 1992: 145) The popularity that Farooq enjoyed in Kashmir during the 1983 election was mainly due to the sympathy factor. People related to him because of their love for their dead leader, Sheikh Abdullah. Tavleen Singh has noted the emotional chord that people had with him during his campaign during 1983 elections: Wherever Farooq went he seemed to have a Pied Piper effect. People would come out as if to greet a conquering hero. Women would link their arms and start singing as he arrived, children would cluster round, and old ladies would reach out and touch his face with their gnarled, peasant hands. He was very much Kashmir’s most beloved son for that moment. (Singh, 1995: 29) However, what added to the support that he enjoyed was the position that he was taking vis-à-vis the Centre. The massive mobilisation and participation of people during the 1983 elections around the issue of Kashmiri identity vis-à-vis the Centre resulted in a sense of satisfaction among people that the Farooq Abdullah led National Conference was continuing to represent the Kashmiri identity in the face of great challenge coming from the Congress as the ruling party in the Centre. Failure of the Central government to honour its commitments of 1975 accord with Sheikh Abdullah was one of the major issue raised by Farooq during the 1983 electoral campaign (Koithara, 2004: 61). The fact that he had rejected alliance with the Congress, and that he had given it a tough fight in Kashmir, made him quite popular in the Valley. His popularity was reflected in the election results.9 National Conference got a massive mandate, enabling it to register its victory in 38 out of 42 seats in the Valley. Continuing with his anti-Congress politics, he joined the group of regional parties and leaders who were trying to give a united challenge to Congress at the national level. He was a prominent member of a 14-party oppositional conclave that was held in Vijayawada in May 1983. Later on, he hosted one such conclave in Srinagar as well. The then Chief Ministers of Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Pondicherry and West Bengal were also part of these conclaves. Making ‘common cause with chief ministers from the west and south of India who were

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pressing for federal devolution’, Farooq Abdullah, in the words of Radha Kumar, ‘offered a significant opportunity for India to integrate Kashmir by devolving power across the country’ but that was not to be (Kumar, 2002: 14). He had to face the consequence of joining the anti-Congress politics very soon. The first blow to the democratic space came in 1984 when Farooq Abdullah’s government was toppled by the Congress party through ‘engineered’ defections within the National Conference and formation of government by the defectors under the leadership of his brother-in-law, G.M. Shah (with the support of Congress). Notes 1 Syed Salahuddin of Hizbul Mujahideen (and also chairperson of United Jehad Council, an amalgam of militant organizations operating in Kashmir), Yasin Malik of Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front and Shabir Shah of People’s Democratic Front – the three well-known names in the separatist stream of politics of Kashmir had been actively associated with 1987 elections – Salahuddin (then known as Yousuf Shah) as a candidate from Amirakadal constituency of Srinagar, Yasin Malik and Shabir Shah as the election agents (of Salahuddin alias Yousuf Shah). See Sumantra Bose (2003: 50). 2 Although there was no communal violence in Kashmir, the Jammu region was greatly impacted by it. Both Hindus and Muslims were affected by the violence. A large number of Muslims were killed in major towns of the region including Jammu, Kathua and Reasi. Hindus in large number were killed in the areas that came under Muslim control; these included Muzaffarabad, Mirpur, Kotli, Bagh, among others. Jammu region, in fact, underwent lot of turbulence during this time. While the region came to be divided, the demography was also affected. On the Indian side, the number of Muslims was quite lowered and its status was changed from Muslim-majority region to Hindu-majority one. The Pakistan-administered Kashmir meanwhile was totally devoid of the Hindu population and came to be fully populated by Muslims. 3 Referring to the 1951 elections, Ved Bhasin notes that ‘the constituent assembly elections of 1951 were totally rigged. Personally I believe that if the elections were held in a fair manner NC would have still secured a two third majority. There was no threat to NC. May be 15 seats had gone to opposition – five to Praja Parishad in Jammu, another 10 or 15 to pro Pakistan elements in Kashmir. If that had happened, then the situation in J&K would have been different. That constituent assembly, in that case, would have been representative of the people . . .’ (‘Interview with Ved Bhasin’, Kashmir Solidarity Network, http://kashmirsolidarity.wordpress.com/2011/01/25/1000/). 4 All through this time, the number of the members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) who were elected unopposed was higher than the number of members who contested the elections. Hence 83 per cent MLAs in 1957, 71 per cent MLAs in 1962 and 50 per cent of MLAs in 1967 were elected

48

5

6

7

8 9

Conflict in Kashmir: background factors without any contest. One of the mechanisms for obtaining uncontested returns was rejection of nomination papers. Started during the time of Sheikh Abdullah himself (viz., the bulk rejection nomination of Praja Parishad candidates), the practice was further institutionalised during the later period. Analysing the 1967 Assembly elections, the Economic and Political Weekly, for instance, in its editorial, had noted that ‘the nomination papers of 118 opposition candidates in 39 of the 75 assembly constituencies were rejected so that 22 Congress candidates were able to get through without a fight’ (Economic and Political Weekly, 1971, 70). According to Bose, the communist group within the National Conference formed the DNC in protest against Bakshi since this group was not accommodated within the government after the 1957 Assembly elections. Fifteen members of Legislature joined the new party under the leadership of Ghulam Mohammed Sadiq (Bose, 2003: 77). The political detentions that remained a constant phenomenon within the state right from early 1950s were used to contain the voices of political dissent and opposition. Right from the beginning, the state had a poor record of civil liberties. Later on in 1965, corruption charges were framed against Bakshi and an inquiry commission was appointed to investigate these charges. The commission held him guilty of the charges. The election on the whole reflected a strong polarisation on regional basis. While National Conference captured most of the seats in the Valley, the Congress could win as many as 26 out of the 37 seats in the Jammu region.

Chapter 3

Federal logic, nationalism and Kashmir conflict

While analysing the conflict situation in Kashmir from internal perspective and seeking to understand the basis of political discontent, it becomes imperative to focus on the federal structures and processes. The federal logic, it may be emphasised, was the most important one in linking this state with the Indian Union. It was via this logic that the Kashmiri nationalist urges were harmonised with the larger Indian nationalist politics. The twin political goals underlying the Kashmiri identity politics – viz., the local control of political power and the reorganisation of the economic structure – could be achieved through joining the Indian Union and yet at the same time negotiating constitutional and political autonomy. The state became a part of the Indian Union under very abnormal circumstances. Maharaja Hari Singh, the princely ruler who had to take the decision to accede to one of the two dominions of India or Pakistan, failed to do so even after 15 August 1947. Toying with the idea of maintaining his sovereignty, he had asked for standstill arrangement from both the dominions and had been granted such an arrangement by Pakistan. Even when India was considering this request, there were internal disturbances within the state, especially in the Jammu region, where besides communal violence, the supporters of Muslim Conference linked with Muslim League were creating conditions of turmoil in predominantly Muslim areas like Poonch. The tribal invasion meanwhile resulted in war-like situation. After capturing Muzaffarabad and Poonch, tribesmen from the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) had reached Baramulla town, which was only 56 km away from Srinagar (Dixit, 2002: 103–4). It was under these conditions that the ruler sought assistance from India and signed the Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947. The critical

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situation in which the state acceded to India was described by Nehru in a speech in November 1947: For some weeks past we had received reports of infiltration of raiding bands into the State territory of Jammu Province. Also of a concentration of armed men near the border of Kashmir with the North-West Frontier Province. . . . It has been stated that there were raids from the Jammu side across the Pakistan border and that there was communal trouble in Jammu and Muslims were killed and driven away. . . . I have before me a detailed list of 95 villages in the Jammu province which have been destroyed by the raiders from Pakistan. Bhimbar, a considerable town, had also been sacked and destroyed. Other towns are besieged and a considerable part of Poonch and Mirpur areas is in possession of the raiders. . . . On the night of 24 October I learnt of another raid, this time from Abbottabad-Mansara Road which enters Kashmir near Muzaffarabad. We were told that armed and well-equipped persons in over one hundred lorries had broken in, had sacked Muzaffarabad and killed many persons there, including the District Magistrate, and were proceeding along the Jhelum Valley road towards Srinagar. . . . On the 25th morning we again considered this matter. The situation was even more critical then. The raiders had sacked several towns and had destroyed the great Power House at Mahoora which supplies electricity to the whole of Kashmir. They were on the point of entering the valley. The fate of Srinagar and the whole of Kashmir hung in the balance. (Pandit Nehru’s Speech, 1999; Grover: 186) Since it was in war-like conditions that the Maharaja had acceded to India, a promise was made on behalf of Indian government that the matter of Accession will be referred to people later. In a letter to the Maharaja, the Governor General of India, Lord Mountbatten had clearly stated the wish of the Government of India that ‘as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader the question of the State’s accession should be settled by reference to the people’ ((Joshi, 2008: 81). Giving the reasons for such a commitment, Nehru stated that despite the fact that urgent request for aid came not only from Maharaja but also from Sheikh Abdullah, and also the fact that both pressed the Government of India to accept the Accession, ‘we made a condition that accession would have to be considered by the people of Kashmir later when peace and order were established. We

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were anxious not to finalise anything in a moment of crisis, and without the fullest opportunity to the people of Kashmir to have their say’ (Pandit Nehru’s Speech, 1999; Grover: 186). Accession of the state with India, in this condition, was fully backed by the National Conference. As per the position taken by Sheikh Abdullah, Pakistan was an aggressor and India had proved to be a savoir in a situation of distress. Addressing the United Nations, Sheikh had clearly stated as to how Kashmiris were obliged by the help rendered by India and were quite satisfied with the way India had not taken the advantage of the situation. To quote him: While the raiders came to our land, massacred thousands of people – mostly Hindus and Sikhs, but Muslims too – abducted thousands of girls, Hindu, Sikhs and Muslims alike, looted our property and almost reached the gates of our summer capital, Srinagar . . . the civil, military and police administration failed. . . . it is the offer made by Prime Minister of India at a time when, I think, he had not the slightest need for making it, as Kashmir was in distress . . .” India does not want to take advantage of the difficult situation in Kashmir. We will accept this accession because, without Kashmir’s acceding to the Indian dominion, we are not in a position to render any military help. But once the country is free from the raiders, marauders and looters, this accession will be subject to ratification by the people. (Abdullah, 1948) In the same speech Sheikh clearly dismissed the issue related to the legality of Accession. These points are not before the Security Council. Whether Kashmir has lawfully acceded to India – complaints on that score have been brought before the Security Council on behalf of Pakistan – is not the point at issue. If this were the point at issue then we should discuss that subject. We should prove before the Security Council that Kashmir and the people of Kashmir have lawfully and constitutionally acceded to the Dominion of India, and Pakistan has no right to question that accession. However, that is not the discussion before the Security Council. (Abdullah, 1948) By signing the Instrument of Accession, the state had become part of the Indian Union and had accepted the power of the Dominion

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legislature to make laws for the state on three subjects including defence, external affairs and communications. The Schedule of the Instrument of Accession elaborated these three subjects into 16 matters. However, while other princely states, after signing the Instrument of Accession accepted the constitutional arrangement of further defining the Centre– state relations, the state of Jammu and Kashmir was kept out of this arrangement. From the very beginning there was an understanding that the state will have a constitution of its own. Like every other state, four representatives of the state did join the Constituent Assembly of India, but the leadership negotiated its own patterns of Centre–state relations via Article 370 of the constitution.

Article 370 and asymmetrical federalism As per the provision of Article 370, only two articles of the Indian Constitution, viz., Article I and Article 370, are to be directly applied to the state. Other provisions of the Constitution could be extended with the prior ‘concurrence’ of the state government. However, the Article further goes on to say that ‘if the concurrence of the Government of the State be given before the constituent assembly for the purpose of framing the Constitution of the state is convened’, it had to be placed before this Assembly. Article 370 also restricted the legislative powers of the Parliament over the state to the those matters in the Union List and Concurrent List, which correspond to the matters specified in the Instrument of Accession. With the concurrence of the government of the state, such other matters in these lists could also be extended to the state.1 The Article also empowered the President to declare that ‘that this article shall cease to be operative or shall be operative only with such exceptions and modifications and from such date as he may specify’ with the condition that a prior recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State would be required for this declaration.2 Although there have been different interpretations of the Article 370 and its temporary status, one thing is very clear. The Article was inserted in the constitution as a transitory arrangement till the final federal arrangements for the state were negotiated between the state and the Central government.3 The state was treated exceptionally and was allowed to have its own Constitution. The pattern of the Centre–state relation that was applied to other states of India, including the division of powers, was not applicable to this state. The asymmetry that was attained in the context of federal relations for Jammu and Kashmir can be attributed to the political history

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of Kashmir, particularly the political mobilisation of 1930s and 1940s and the assertion of ethno-nationalist identity. It was one the few states where the choice of joining the Union of India, though formally taken by the princely ruler, was influenced by the popular movement (Chowdhary, 1998: 17–18). As the movement led by the National Conference had evolved in the decade of 1940s, the Kashmiri leaders were debating the question of ‘accession’ from the perspective of ‘popular control over power’. They were seeking to work out a mechanism in which they would be able to gain sufficient autonomy to follow their own political goals. Federalism based upon the principles of ‘self-rule’ and ‘shared rule’ provided them such a mechanism. However, the Indian model of federalism was tilted in favour of a strong Centre. The vesting of residual powers in the Union Parliament; its power to create, alter and change the boundaries of the states; emergency provisions; the financial distribution of powers and various other provisions of the Indian Constitution created a basis for centralised federalism (Singh and Verney, 2003: 2). Only an asymmetrical federalism in which Centre–state relation was differently defined could suit this state. The requirement therefore was to work out the special constitutional status of the state. Asymmetrical federalism, as it was put in place through the incorporation of the Article 370 of Indian Constitution, provided a very solid base for a harmonious relationship between the Centre and the state. The state leadership was provided sufficient autonomy to pursue the goals that it had set before itself during the political movement of 1930s and 1940s. That the model worked quite well in the beginning was reflected in the response of leadership in the early 1950s. Sheikh Abdullah was very pleased with the post-Accession developments since the state enjoyed the full freedom to work on its economic agenda and faced minimum interference from the Centre. Incorporation of Article 370 in the Constitution in itself was a very important milestone for him. It was because of this that the state was able to incorporate the most progressive land reforms. While making his remarks to the opening session of the Constituent Assembly of the state, Sheikh reflected his satisfaction: We are also intimately concerned with the economic well-being of the people of this State. As I said before while referring to constitution-building, political ideals are often meaningless unless linked with economic plans. As a State, we are concerned mainly with agriculture and trade. As you know, and I have detailed before, we have been able to put through our ‘land to the tiller’ legislation and make of it a practical success. Land and all it means is an inestimable

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blessing to our peasants who have dragged along in servitude to the landlord and his allies for centuries without number. We have been able under present conditions to carry these reforms through. (Teng, Bhat and Kaul, 1977: 123–4) What was further the matter of satisfaction to him was the fact that the state leaders enjoyed sufficient powers to negotiate the kind of relation with the Centre that they felt comfortable with. It was in 1949 that negotiations were started about various matters regarding the future set-up of the state with regard to the framing of the constitution of the state as well as about ‘the subjects in respect of which the State should accede to the Union of India’. As per the agreement reached, it was for the Constituent Assembly of the state to take a call on these matters. Specifically on the issue of future division of powers, it was left to the Constituent Assembly of the state to deliberate and decide (Noorani, 2000). Subsequent to this, prolonged negotiations within the Constituent Assembly of India took place around the framing of Article 370. Jammu and Kashmir was represented in the Constituent Assembly by four members including Sheikh Abdullah, Afzal Beg, Maulana Masoodi and Moti Ram Bagra. It was with the concurrence of these members that the Draft Article 306A was finalised as Article 370 of Indian Constitution. It was as per the spirit of this Article that Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1950, was passed, which specified the provisions of Indian Constitution that were made applicable to the state. In October 1951, the Constituent Assembly of the State was convened, which was given the task, among other things, of devising the Constitution for the future governance of the state. Apart from that it was also to work out the nature of future relationship between the Union and this state. Before proceeding further in this direction, it was considered desirable to draw the minimum principles for working out the future relations between the Centre and the state. These principles were deliberated over a period and resulted in ‘Delhi Agreement’ of 1952.4

Delhi agreement As per Delhi agreement, consensus was built on 10 matters including those related to residuary powers, citizenship, Fundamental Rights, Supreme Court, national flag, President of India, headship of the state, financial integration, emergency provisions and conduct of election to

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the Houses of Parliament. Of these, the most important agreement was on the issue of residuary powers. As per the provisions of Indian Constitution the residuary powers are vested with the Centre. However, this principle did not apply to the state of Jammu and Kashmir and it was agreed that the residuary power would continue to remain vested with the state only. On the issue of citizenship, it was agreed that in accordance with Article 5 of the Indian Constitution, persons who have their domicile in the Jammu and Kashmir state shall be the citizens of India. It was also agreed that the state legislature shall have the power to define and regulate the rights and privileges of the permanent residents of the state. With regard to the Supreme Court, it was decided to have original jurisdiction in respect of dispute specified in Article 131. Its jurisdiction with regard to Fundamental Rights was also agreed upon.5 On the issue of state and national flags, it was agreed that the state flag would continue to be recognised. However, the Union flag will have supreme place in the state. On the powers of President, it was agreed that the power to grant reprieve and commuting of death sentence would be extended to the state. As regards the issue of headship of the state, it was decided that ‘the Head of the State shall be the person recognized by the President of the Union on the recommendation of the Legislature of the State’ and that he shall hold office during the pleasure of the President. On the issue of conduct of election to the Houses of Parliament, the application of Article 324 to the state was agreed to6 (State Autonomy Committee Report, 1999: 47–59). On the issue of Emergency powers, while it was agreed that Articles 356 and 360 would not be extended to the state, there were different opinions on the extension of Article 352. While the Government of India believed that extension of this article was necessary in the interest of the security of the state, the state representatives ‘indicated that they were averse to internal disturbance being referred to in this connection as even petty internal disorder might be considered sufficient for application of Article 352’. Hence it was decided to add a proviso to the Article 352 that application of this Article would be ‘at the request or with the concurrence of the Government of the state’. However, further discussion on application of Articles 353, 354, 358 and 359 was required7 (State Autonomy Committee Report, 1999: 47–59). There were certain issues that were still under discussion and a full agreement was not reached. For instance, on the issue of Fundamental Rights, it was agreed that these have to be defined but there was no agreement as yet as to whether these would be extended from Constitution of India to the state or whether these would be incorporated

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within the state constitution. According to Sheikh Abdullah, ‘it was agreed, however, that the Fundamental Rights, which are contained in the Constitution of India could not be conferred on the residents of J&K State in their entirety taking into account the economic, social and political character of our movement as enunciated in the New Kashmir Plan. The need for providing suitable modifications, amendments and exceptions as the case may be in the Fundamental Rights Chapter of the Indian Constitution in order to harmonize those provisions with the pattern of our principles was admitted’ (State Autonomy Committee Report, 1999: 47–59). Agreement around the issue of financial integration could also not be reached. While the need for some sort of financial arrangement between the state and the Union was recognised, however, it was felt that the matter needed further examination.

Logic of Kashmir’s relation with India and the ‘nationalist’ discourse The logic of asymmetrical federalism in the pre-1953 period was based upon three principles of autonomy, negotiability and popular consent. This logic worked towards harmonising the relationship between the Centre and the state as well as legitimising India’s claim on Kashmir in the context of contestation from neighbouring Pakistan, on the one hand, and internationalisation of Kashmir issue, on the other. It also allowed the ruling party of the state to initiate far-reaching land reforms. The logic of asymmetrical federalism was reversed in 1953 when Sheikh Abdullah, the popular leader of Kashmir, was dismissed from power and detained for long time. In the absence of Sheikh Abdullah, the element of negotiability in the Centre–state relations was lost for the Kashmiris. The political leadership that succeeded Sheikh Abdullah in power was so much burdened by the crisis of legitimacy that it became totally dependent on the support of the Centre. It was in no position to negotiate in the manner Sheikh was able to do. In the context of continuous crisis of legitimacy they faced, energies of the state leaders were spent more on surviving strategies rather than in securing autonomous status for the state. In the process, they became instrumental in the erosion of autonomy that was enjoyed by the state in the pre-1953 period. The erosion of autonomy that took place in the post-1953 period was a consequence of a ‘nationalist’ narrative that had evolved initially by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and Bharatiya Jana Sangh but which later on became the accepted position of most of the political

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parties including the Congress. In this discourse, the very concept of ‘autonomy’ was problematised and placed in opposition to ‘integration’. The uneven application of the Constitution of India as well as the provision of a separate constitution for the state were seen not merely as markers reflecting the separation of the state from rest of India but also the symbols of India’s fragility as a nation. The initiation of this discourse took place right in early 1950s. Syama Prasad Mookerjee, the founder of Bharatiya Jana Sangh, detailed the basis of his critique of Article 370 in his correspondence with Jawaharlal Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah. He vehemently opposed the special constitutional status of the state terming it ‘destructive of political unity of India’. He found this and other distinctive features of the state like its own constitution, its flag, different nomenclatures of the two executives (viz., Prime Minister and Sadar-e-Riyasat) as objectionable signs of ‘sovereignty ingrained in J&K’. Addressing the issue of uneven application of Indian Constitution and the special status of the state, Mookerjee told Abdullah: Instead of proceeding in this rational manner you have shown tendencies of creating a separate status for yourself and for your State. The provision of an elected Head and a separate flag has to be examined from this stand point. The flag is the symbol of unity. . . . But if each State starts having its own flag, according to the wishes of the party in power, then it will be a blow on India’s national and political unity. And that is what you have sought to have done. . . . You call yourself as the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. There can and should be one Prime Minister and he is the Prime Minister of India as a whole. In all other States the first executive citizen is known as Chief Minister, but you must have a separate nomenclature for yourself! The head of your State must be known as Sadar-iRiyasat (President). India can have only one President and that is the President of India. Other Heads of States may be known as Governors, Rajprakukhs or by any other name as the constitution may provide. There can not be a republic within a republic. There can be one and only one Sovereign Parliament and that is the Parliament of India. Consciously or unconsciously you are creating a new sovereignty for Jammu and Kashmir State. India has been torn into two by the two nation theory. You are now developing a three-nation theory, the third being Kashmiri Nation. There are dangerous symptoms and are not good for your State or for the whole of India. (Mookerjee to Sheikh Abdullah, 13 February, 1953, Upadhyaya, n.d.: 76–7)

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In critiquing Article 370, Mookerjee privileged the nationalist rather than federal discourse. Despite the fact that the state had joined the Indian Union by formally acceding to it and also that by virtue of Article 1 of the constitution of India, Jammu and Kashmir was now a state of the Indian Union, Article 370 was projected as compromising the Indian sovereignty. Following the principles of cultural nationalism, Mookerjee also sought to emphasise on ‘uniformities’ as the basis of ‘unity’ of the nation. Asking the question that ‘if India’s constitution is good enough for the rest of India, why should it not be acceptable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir’, he argued that ‘the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir should be governed in accordance with the same constitution that applies to the rest of India’. It is in the similar applicability of the provisions of Indian Constitution that ‘oneness’ of India could be achieved: If . . . there are some matters in respect of which our constitution should be amended in order to meet the special needs of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, let us have a full picture of it and know what are the specific provisions which should be amended. . . . There are however, certain basic matters in respect of which the oneness of India must be maintained at any cost. They relate to such subjects as Fundamental rights, rights of citizenship, jurisdiction of Supreme Court, functions and constitution of High Court, President’s power, national planning and financial integration. . . . The position of the Head of the State and adoption of one flag for the whole of India are also essential features of the oneness of India. (Syamaprasad Mookerjee to Nehru, 3 February 1953, Upadhyaya, n.d.: 24–5) The peculiarity of this discourse was that it blurred the distinction between nationalism and federalism, on the one hand, and the distinction between the ‘autonomy’ and ‘sovereignty’, on the other. Sheikh Abdullah sought to locate his argument in this distinction. He sought to assure that his demand for autonomy did not in any case go against the spirit of Indian Constitution: Whatever has been done by the Government here is strictly in conformity with the Indian Constitution. And yet you speak about this position in a manner which suggests that we have been flouting the Constitution. It is painful for me to note that even a person of your eminence should have been carried away by an emotional

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slogan like ek pradhan, ek Bidhan, ek nishan. You seem to think that we are opposed to these symbols. By virtue of the State’s accession and its constitutional relationship with India, all these symbols are supreme as much in our State as in any other. If internally there are some variations in the policies of the State Government, it is precisely because the right has been specifically conceded to the State by the Indian Constitution. (Upadhyaya, n.d.: 37) He also emphasised that rather than weakening the link with the Indian Union, Article 370 was strengthening it. To quote him: ‘so far as we are concerned, we have maintained that the special position accorded to the State can alone be the source of a growing unity and closer association between the State and India’ (Upadhayaya, n.d., 38). However, this argument was rubbished by Mookerjee by arguing that nothing less than a uniform constitutional position of the state of Jammu and Kashmir was required for the state to be fully integrated with the Indian Union. You and Mr. Nehru sometimes make strong speeches declaring that the State is already a part of the Indian Union and therefore, there need be no dispute about it. What I want is that constitutionally this question has to be settled once for all . . . It has been said that this question has to be decided according to the will of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. This treatment had not been specially offered to your state. . . . All these states had the same theoretical rights as your State to decide matters for themselves. But they came into India not only in respect of the three subjects of Foreign Relations, Defence and Communications, but also with regard to others and there thus developed one pattern of Indian constitution for the whole country. (Mookerjee to Sheikh Abdullah, 13 February 1953, Integrate Kashmir: Mookerjee – Nehru and Abdullah, Published by Dindayal Upadhyaya, n.d.: 72–3) The demand for full constitutional integration of the state with India and abolition of Article 370 was included in the agenda of Bharatiya Jana Sangh. The demand also formed the basis of Jana Sangh-supported agitation of Praja Parishad, a Jammu-based organisation in 1952 (Jafferlot 129). The Praja Parishad did not approve of the ideological position of the National Conference and right from the time of its inception

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demanded for a closer integration of the state of Jammu and Kashmir with India.8 Asking for unqualified Accession of the state with India, the Parishad leaders raised the slogan of ‘ek Vidhan, ek Pradhan, ek Nishan’ (‘one Constitution, one President, one Symbol’).9 The agitation was intensified with the active support and intervention of RSS, Bharatiya Jana Sangh, Hindu Mahasabha and other Hindu rightist organisations. The discourse of the Hindu rightist parties though condemned by Nehru as communal, however, was to influence the Centre–state relations in the later period. After Sheikh Abdullah was removed from power, sufficient emphasis was placed on ‘integrating’ the state of Jammu and Kashmir with India. Efforts were made to remove the constitutional differences between this state and other states of India. This process of ‘integration’ practically meant erosion of the basic principles of autonomy, including those agreed upon in the Delhi Agreement. The first step in the process was taken soon after the arrest of Sheikh in 1954 when the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order 1954 was passed. This was a comprehensive order, basically seeking to implement the Delhi Agreement. By this order, the jurisdiction of Parliament with regard to the Union List was extended to Jammu and Kashmir. Entries in the Union List-1 in the seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India were applied to the state. The implication of this extension was that now Parliament could make laws for the state in almost all matters specified in the Union List. This was quite a leap from the 1950 Constitutional Order, according to which only those law-making powers of the Parliament were extended that corresponded to the matters specified in the Instrument of Accession – that is Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communication. Among the constitutional provisions that were extended to the state some were those that were already agreed under the Delhi Agreement, but there were many other provisions on which agreement had not been reached as yet. For instance, Article 3 that related to the alteration of areas, boundaries and names of existing states was extended though with a proviso of requiring the consent of the state legislature of the state was not part of the Delhi Agreement. Similarly, Part III of the Indian Constitution containing the Fundamental Rights was made applicable for the state. This matter had remained unresolved during the Delhi Agreement. After agreeing in principle that the Fundamental Rights were to be made available for the citizens in the state, it was to be decided whether these would emanate from Indian Constitution or state constitution.

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It was, however, in the subsequent constitution orders that much of the spirit of autonomy was compromised. The 1954 Order merely extended the jurisdiction of Union Parliament to the matters included in the Union List. However, as the State Autonomy Committee Report suggests, the 1954 Order did not change the state’s constitutional position vis-à-vis the Concurrent and State List: These two lists were completely excluded in their application in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This left residuary Powers of legislation completely with the State Legislature and legislative power of the State was so extensive as to be capable of being available for all things not included in the Union List. . . . The cumulative reading indicates that State’s power to legislate on matters other than those ceded to the Union Parliament were quite wide and still left a great degree of autonomy with the State. (State Autonomy Committee Report, 1999: 78) But 41 Constitution Orders, which were introduced between 1956 and 1986, brought substantial change in the original scheme of the federal relations for this state. These included the extension of the Concurrent List; the provisions related to judiciary; All India Services; matters under finance, trade and commerce; emergency provisions; and jurisdiction of Election Commission of India. As the State Autonomy Committee pointed out, 260 of the 395 articles, 94 of the total 97 entries in the Union List, 26 of the 47 entries of the Concurrent List and 7 of the total 12 Schedules of the Constitution of India are now applied to the state. Of those Articles of the Constitution not applied to the state, mostly relate to the Part VI of the Constitution related to the state governments. On the whole, one can argue that the effect of these Constitution Orders has been that the state has been, over the period, brought constitutionally almost at par with other states. The constitutional parity of the state was also made effective through the changes in the constitution of the state especially through the sixth Constitutional Amendment. Among the provisions amended included those related to power of the state legislature to elect the head of the state. Instead, provision was made for Governor who was to be appointed by the President of India. The concept of ‘elected’ head of the state was replaced by the concept of Governor as the agent of the Centre in the state. Also changes were brought in the nomenclature of the head of the state (from Sadr-e-Riyasat to Governor) and head of government (from Prime Minister to Chief Minister).

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Significantly, much of this process in the direction of bringing the state at par with other states of India took place in a time when the state governments were not locally grounded. As the analysis of the democratic process has made it clear, till 1975 the people in Kashmir were distanced from the government and were mobilised by the Plebiscite Front. The changes that were taking place in the pattern of Centre– state relations did have the consent or approval of the local government but these governments did not actually have the mandate to do so. More importantly, the actions of the government were constantly questioned from within the space of resistance politics. Within the mainstream political space, the changes were not widely debated and therefore were publicly seen to be the changes not initiated by the local governments but as imposed by the Centre. As a consequence, these had the impact of alienating the mass of Kashmiris and sharpening their ethno-nationalist sentiments. However, what symbolically still distinguished this state from other states was that it still continued to be the only state of India that had a constitution of its own. The constitution of Jammu and Kashmir was adopted in November 1956 and came in force in 1957. This constitution has 13 parts and seven schedules. Other than the provisions related to governance of the state (viz., provisions related the executive including the office of Governor, the Council of Ministers, the Advocate General, conduct of government business, the State Legislature, legislative procedure, the High Court and Subordinate Courts), Public Service Commission, election and amendment procedure; it had some special features. These included the Part III of the Constitution dealing with permanent residents of the state;10 Part IV dealing with Directive Principles of State Policy;11 Section 92 dealing with the Governor’s rule;12 reservation of two seats in the Legislative Assembly for women;13 and inclusion of 24 seats14 for the area under the occupation of Pakistan.15 As per the original logic of things, the making of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir had to put a stamp of finality to the scheme of Centre–state relations. The negotiations that had started with the Delhi Agreement to delineate as to what provisions of Indian Constitution would be applicable to the state and what provisions would be required to incorporated within the constitution of the state would have culminated. However, this process of negotiation was interrupted due to the developments in 1953. Hence, the issue of Centre–state relations rather than being settled with the enforcement of the state constitution was kept open even after that. The issue kept lurking even after Indira– Sheikh Accord sought to address it.

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Post-1975 developments Sheikh Abdullah joined power after signing of an accord by G. Parthasarathy, representing Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and Mirza Mohammad Afzal Beg, representing Sheikh Abdullah. As per this accord, it was made clear that the state as the constituent unit of the Union of India would continue to be governed by Article 370 of Indian Constitution. It was also made clear that the residuary powers of legislation shall remain with the state.16 It was also agreed that only those provisions of the Constitution of India that had been applied to the state with adaptations and modifications could be altered or repealed by an Order of the President under Article 370 after considering each case on the basis of its individual merit. However, this would not apply to the provisions of the Constitution of India, which had been applied to the state without any adaptation or modification. The accord also provided for option to the state government to review and amend or repeal any the central legislation extended to the state after 1953 on any matter related to the Concurrent List. Sympathetic consideration for President’s assent to such legislation was assured. For future, the consultation of the state regarding the application of laws made by Parliament was also assured. After he took over power, Sheikh constituted D.D. Thakur Committee to review the changes that had taken place in the post-1953 period, but due to the internal differences among the members, nothing concrete could be done. Instead of one report, the committee came out with two reports reflecting the regional differences. While view from Jammu was that there was no need to review these legislations as these had proved beneficial to people, the view from Kashmir was that these needed to be withdrawn. The issue of restoration of autonomy was raised more emphatically during the mid-1990s. This was the time when the militancy had overtaken the Kashmir Valley and azadi had become the dominant slogan in Kashmir. To counter the separatist politics, the National Conference led by Farooq Abdullah raised the demand for autonomy. The party had borne the brunt of militancy in 1990 and had been forced to withdraw completely from the political scene due to the massive separatist upsurge. However, in 1994, it sought to reclaim the political space by offering ‘restoration of autonomy’. Holding the Central government responsible for alienation of people by eroding the original constitutional arrangement of the state, it called for reversal of that process. In a resolution passed by the central committee of the party, it felt that ‘the

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time has come when this state of affairs should be reviewed in order to restore autonomy to its pristine and original form’. By pristine and original form, it meant the constitutional status of the state as it was in place before the removal of Sheikh Abdullah from power in 1953. The party contested the 1996 Assembly elections on the slogan of autonomy and after it came into power, it constituted the State Autonomy Committee (SAC) to ‘examine and recommend measures for the restoration of autonomy to the state of Jammu and Kashmir consistent with the Instrument of Accession, the Constitution Application Order, 1950 and the Delhi Agreement of 1952’. The SAC came out with its report in 1999. Privileging the pre-1953 constitutional relationship between the Centre and the state, it recommended restoration of autonomy as it was available in that period. The case of restoration of autonomy was pleaded on the ground of specificity of the political movement of Kashmir and the federal asymmetry applied to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. It also emphasised on the negotiated relationship between the Centre and the state. It argued that while other states had given up their right to their separate constitution and agreed to what the Constituent Assembly of India would give to them, Jammu and Kashmir did not accept the Constitution of India as an instrument for the governance of the state (Chowdhary, 2000: 2600). It, therefore, suggested elaborate changes in the constitutional relationship between the Centre and the state. It particularly made recommendation for the deletion of a number of provisions of the Indian Constitution as these were applied to the state. It also recommended that the word ‘temporary’ be deleted from the title of Part XXI of the Constitution of India17 and that the word ‘temporary’ occurring in the heading of Article 370 be substituted by the word ‘special’. It also suggested that the chapter on Fundamental Rights should be deleted and a separate chapter on Fundamental Rights should be included in the constitution of the state. Some of the important recommendations regarding deletion of the provisions of Indian Constitution to the state included those related to the division of powers between the Centre and the state. It recommended that the matters in the Union List not connected with the three subjects of Defence, External Affairs and Communication should be excluded from their application to the state; that all modification made in Article 24618 in its application to the state subsequent to the 1950 Order should be rescinded; that Article 248, 249, 250 and 251 should be omitted in relation to the state19; State List and Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule should not be applicable to the state;

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similarly changes with reference to Articles 254, 262 and 263 should also be reversed. In relation to the provisions related to the elections, it recommended that all the changes brought about after 1954 should be reversed. It also recommended reversal in terms of application of the provisions related to Emergency. It suggested that while certain proviso should be made to the application of Article 352, Articles 355, 356, 357, 358, 358 and 36020 should be made non-applicable to the state. With regard to the provisions related to the Union as contained in Part V of the Indian Constitution, it recommended that Article 72 (1) (c), 72 (3), 133, 134, 135, 136, 138, 145 (1) (c) and 151 (2)21 should be made non-applicable to the state as per the position in the 1950 Order and Articles 149, 150 and 15122 should apply to state in the form in which they were applied in 1954. As regards the Part VI of the Indian constitution, it was recommended that Articles 218, 220, 222 and 22623 should be omitted in its application to the state. As regards the services under the Union and the states, it recommended that application of Article 312 for the state be reversed on the ground that it was not applicable even in 1954 and also that it stifles the local talent. With regard to special provisions relating to certain classes under Part XVI,24 it was recommended that powers in matters related to Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes be restored to the state. Regarding the provisions related to amendment of the Constitution, it was recommended that that clause (4) of Article 368 be deleted and clause (2) of this article should apply with the proviso as introduced by the 1954 Order.25 The committee also recommended changes in the state constitution. It recommended repeal of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir (First Amendment) Act, 1959 relating to superintendence, direction and control of election to the State Legislature and provision relating to the State High Court and the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1965 relating to the mode of appointment and nomenclature of the Head of the State and nomenclature of the Head of Executive. In its conclusions, the report made an appeal for return to ‘two solemn compacts’ as the basis of Centre–state relations – the Instrument of Accession as well as the Delhi Agreement. Arguing that Article 370 ‘had acquired a dangerously ambiguous aspect’ that is systematically destroying the autonomy, it called for another compact between the Union and the state and a new article to substitute the existing Article 370.

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Following the submission of the report, the National Conference government placed it before a special session of the Legislative Assembly of the state. In this session a resolution demanding that the Union and the state government take positive and effective steps for implementing the SAC Report was passed. The SAC Report and the ‘Autonomy Resolution’ from the beginning were shrouded in controversies. ‘While forces like the RSS and the BJP saw sinister designs of secessionism in the report, others dreaded its consequences for the national integration with similar demands pouring in from other states’ (Chowdhary, 2000: 2599). Reactions against it were expressed both within the state, especially in the Jammu region, as well as at the all-India level. The report did not succeed in attracting the attention of Kashmiris and could not make much a dent in the political discourse of Kashmir that was defined by the slogans of azadi. While the militant and the separatist leadership debunked the report as of no relevance to Kashmiris, people of the state, in general, remained apathetic to it. It, however, caught the attention of people when the Union Cabinet, without even going into the merits of the report, summarily rejected it. At a time when the National Conference was allying with the NDA government and Omar Abdullah was a minister in the Union government, rejection of the Autonomy Resolution became another reference point in the anti-Centre and anti-state discourse of Kashmir.

Notes 1 In the matter of extension of Parliament’s legislative power over the state, distinction is maintained between those provisions of the Constitution which relate to matters specified in the Instrument of Accession and other constitutional provisions. In the first case, only consultation with the state is required but in the second case prior concurrence of the state is required. 2 Quoting Ayyangar, Noorani notes the condition under which President can issue an order that the Article 370 would cease to be operative or be operative with exceptions or modifications: ‘the provision is made that when the Constituent Assembly of the State has met and taken its decision both on the Constitution for the State and on the range of federal jurisdiction over the State, the President may, on the recommendation of that Constituent Assembly, issue an Order that this Article 306 (370 in the draft) shall either cease to be operative, or shall be operative only subject to such exceptions and modifications as may be specified by him. But before he issued any order of that kind, the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly will be a condition precedent’ (Noorani, 2000). 3 According to Noorani, the power of the President to extend the Indian Constitution to Jammu and Kashmir is not to be exercised indefinitely. This power, he argues, had to be stopped once the Constituent Assembly of the

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5

6 7

8

9

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state had drafted the constitution of the state and taken a decision as to which further subjects should be acceded by the state to the Centre. To quote him: ‘It is an “interim” power. Once the Constituent Assembly met, the State government could not give its own “concurrence”. Still less, after the Assembly met and dispersed’ (Noorani, 2000). The process of making the constitution was completed in 1956 and the state constitution came into force in 1957. Among the provisions included in the constitution included a section defining the relationship of the state with the Union of India, a chapter on Directive Principles, the structure of state government, amendment procedure, among others. Article 131 refers to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in any dispute between the Government of India and one or more states; or between the Government of India and any state or states on, one side, and one or more states, on the other; or between two or more states. Article 324 provides for the Election Commission and vests with it the power of superintendence, direction and control of elections. Article 352 deals with proclamation of emergency in situation of war or external aggression. Article 353 deals with the effect of proclamation of emergency, particularly the extension of the executive power of the Union to giving direction to any state with regard to exercise of its executive power as well as the extension of the power of the Parliament ‘to make laws conferring powers and imposing duties, or authorizing the conferring of powers and the imposition of duties upon the Union or officers and authorities of the Union as respects that matter, notwithstanding that it is one which is not enumerated in the Union List’. The Praja Parishad had a close association with RSS and represented the interest of the landed, trading and various other privileged sections of society. According to Korbel, ‘Economically it represented that group of wealthy people who, as the Maharaja’s supporters, once enjoyed the privileged position of landlords but who have been dispossessed by the land reform, and of government officials and businessmen. Politically, however, it found its principal support in the great majority of the non-Muslims who were becoming increasingly worried about Abdullah’s tendency to draw the State of Jammu and Kashmir from India’ (Korbel, 1995: 222). Other than the Bharatiya Jana Sangh and RSS, there were Hindu rightist forces campaigning for full application of Indian Constitution. Among these organisations included the Hindu Mahasabha. Its president, N.C. Chatterjee, asserted that the demand of the people of Jammu for full accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to India was a ‘just demand based on democracy’. ‘Questioning Prime Minister Sri Nehru’s statement that Kashmir was as much a part of India as any other State, Sri Chatterjee said that Kashmir was not one with India in respect of application of fundamental rights under the Indian Constitution; the Supreme Court of India had no jurisdiction over that State and Kashmir was also not one with India on the question of financial integration. The Indian Parliament, Sri Chatterjee added, had no authority to impose taxes, income taxes or customs duties on Kashmir’ (Hindusthan Standard, 1 February 1953). Section 6 of the constitution of the state defines that ‘every person who is, or is deemed to be, a citizen of India under the provision of the Constitution

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Conflict in Kashmir: background factors of India shall be a permanent resident of the State, if on the fourteenth day of May, 1954 – (a) he was a State Subject of Class I or of Class II; or (b) having lawfully acquired immovable property in the State, he has been ordinarily resident in the State for not less than ten years prior to that date.’ Further that ‘any person who, before the fourteenth day of May 1954, was a State Subject of Class I or of Class II and who having migrated after the first day of March 1947, to the territory now included in Pakistan, returns to the State under a permit for resettlement in the State for permanent return issued by or under the authority of any law made by the State Legislature shall on such return be a permanent resident of the State’. The state government had been insisting from the beginning on having its own set of Directive Principles of State Policy within the constitution of the state. Most of these principles followed the spirit of the ‘New Kashmir Manifesto’ of National Conference adopted in 1944. This part provided for establishing a socialist order of society for the promotion of the welfare of the people It also provided that the economy of the state is to be developed in planned manner; ensuring speedy improvement in the standard of living of rural masses; organisation of village panchayats; promoting crafts and cottage industries; separating judiciary from executive; providing for right to work and to public assistance; right to free and compulsory education; rights of children and youth including the right to happy childhood with adequate medical care and attention and equal opportunities in education and employment, protection against exploitation and against moral or material abandonment; rights of women including right to equal pay for equal work, right to maternity benefits as well as adequate medical care in all employments; right to reasonable maintenance, extending to cases of married women who have been divorced or abandoned, right to full equality in all social, educational, political and legal matters, special protection against discourtesy, defamation, hooliganism and other forms of misconduct. It also provided for protection of educational, material and cultural interests of socially and economically backward sections; improvement of public health; fostering of equality and secularism. Section 92 of the state constitution deals with provisions in case of failure of constitutional machinery in the state. The section is parallel to the Article 356 of the Constitution of India. In application is generally invoked whenever there are cases of ‘breakdown of constitutional machinery in the state’. After a lapse of six months, the maximum period of its application, Article 356 of Indian Constitution is invoked. The principle of reservation is applied not through election but by nomination. Two women are to be nominated by the Governor. In practice, the ruling party nominates these two women from its own cadre. Section 47 provides for 111 members of the Legislative Assembly. However, as Section 48 states, 24 seats ‘shall remain vacant and shall not be taken into account for reckoning the total membership of the Assembly’ until ‘the area of the state under the occupation of Pakistan ceases to be, so occupied and the people residing in that area elect their representatives’. Also that till that time, the ‘said area shall be excluded in delimiting the territorial constituencies under section 47’.

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15 One significant feature of the state constitution was related to the nominal head of the state – the Sadar-e-Riyasat, as he was named. This nominal executive was to be elected by the state legislature. However, later after the sixth amendment of the constitution, this distinction was removed. Like every other state, the amended constitution provided for a Governor appointed by President of India. By another amendment of the constitution, the tenure of the State Assembly has been extended to six years. This amendment followed the amendment of the Indian Constitution during the times of Indira Gandhi’s premiership when the tenure of both the Parliament and State Assemblies was extended to six years. However, this was reversed later on and for both the Parliament as well as the State Assemblies, the tenure was redefined as five years. However, this reversal did not take place in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. 16 However, Parliament was to ‘continue to have power to make laws relating to the prevention of activities directed towards disclaiming, questioning or disrupting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India or bringing about secession or a part of the territory of India from the Union or causing insult to the Indian National Flag, the Indian National Anthem and Constitution’ (Puri, 2012). 17 Part XXI of the Constitution of India is titled ‘Temporary, Transition and Special Provisions’. Besides Article 370, which deals with Jammu and Kashmir, it contains special provisions for various other states, mostly in the North-East. 18 Article 246, read with Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, relates to the subject-wise distribution of powers between the Parliament and the state legislature under the Union List, the Concurrent List and the State List. 19 Article 248 refers to the residuary of legislation and vests it in the Parliament; Article 249 refers to the power of Parliament to legislate with respect to a matter in the State List in case the Council of States passes a resolution to that effect; Article 250 refers to the power of Parliament to legislate with respect to any matter in the State List if a proclamation of Emergency is in operation. Article 251 provides that in case of an inconsistency between the laws made by the Parliament under the provision of Articles 249 and 250 and the laws made by the legislatures of the state, it is the law made by the Parliament that would prevail. 20 As already mentioned, these are provisions dealing with various kinds of emergencies. Article 354 deals with application of provisions relating to distribution of revenues during the proclamation of emergency. Article 358 provided with the power the Union Government to suspend provisions of Article 19 during emergencies. Article 359 makes provisions for the suspension of enforcement of rights conferred by Part III during emergencies. Article 360 refers to the provisions related to financial emergency. 21 Article 72 (1) (c) and Article 72 (3) deals with power of the President to grant pardons and to suspend, remit or commute sentences in all cases where the sentence is a sentence of death. Articles 133 and 134 deal with the appellate jurisdiction in appeals from High Courts in regard to civil and criminal matters. Article 135 provides that jurisdiction and powers of the Federal Court under existing law is to be exercisable by the Supreme Court. Article 136 provides a provision of special leave to appeal by the

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Conflict in Kashmir: background factors Supreme Court. Article 138 deals with enlargement of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Article 145 (1) (c) refers to the power of the Parliament to make rules as to the proceedings in the court for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III. Article 151 (2) provides that ‘the reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General relating to the accounts of a State, shall be submitted to the Governor of the state who shall cause them to be laid before the Legislature of the State.’ Articles 149–151 refer to the duties and powers of the Comptroller and Auditor General and the audit reports. These articles deal with application of certain provisions relating to Supreme Court to High Court (Article 218); restriction on practice after being a permanent judge (Article 220); transfer of a judge from one High Court to another (Article 222); power of High Courts to issue certain writs (Article 226). Part XVI relates special provisions relating to certain classes, including Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Article 368 (2) provides for the procedure of amendment in case of certain articles of the Constitution including Article 54, Article 55, Article 73, Article 162 or Article 241; Chapter IV of Part V, Chapter V of Part VI or Chapter I of Part XI or any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule or; the representation of States in Parliament, or the provision of Article 368 itself. Article 368 (4) provides that ‘no amendment of this Constitution (including the provisions of Part III) made or purporting to have been made under this article (whether before or after the commencement of section 55 of the Constitution (forty-second amendment) Act, 1976, shall be called in question in any court on any ground’.

Chapter 4

Political economy of Kashmiri identity politics

The political movement of Kashmir, though initially mobilised people on the basis of their religious identity, evolved to include a strong economic content, in the later years. By the beginning of the decade of 1940, the movement had come under the leftist influence, and the economic concerns started characterising its political discourse. Under the leadership of Indian Marxists, particularly K.M. Ashraf and B.P.L. Bedi, an indigenous leftist leadership had evolved in Kashmir. This leadership was involved in giving an intellectual direction to the youth through a ‘study circle’ propagating ‘the philosophy of Marxism and communism’ (Chandra, 1985: 45–6). The leftist influence was also seen in the trade union politics, especially the Mazdoor Sabha that was launched in 1937 and was comprised of the existing organisations like the Kashmir Motor Drivers Association, the Carpet Weavers Association, the Tonga Drivers Association, among others.1 With the organisation of Mazdoor Sabha, grievances of workers were now brought into the public domain. The government-run silk factory workers, for instance, became very active and launched various activities including strikes and demonstrations. The Kissan Sabha was organised around the same time, though it was not as active as the Mazdoor Sabha. The mobilisation of the workers and the peasants through the trade union politics changed the political language of Kashmir. It became common to see red banners and flags, particularly in the city of Srinagar. With the demonstrating workers condemning their economic exploitation and demanding economic justice, a new rights-based discourse was being introduced in Kashmir, which was rapidly substituting the discourse based on religious overtones. The Left intervention helped to give a progressive direction to the movement. The entry of leftists in Kashmir in a big way coincided with the conversion of the Muslim Conference into the National

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Conference. ‘By 1943, there had emerged a big group of CPI progressives in the National Conference who were able to influence its future strategy of struggle in a decisive manner. They included chiefly the leaders of workers and peasants, intellectuals, and political workers of the National Conference’ (Chandra, 1985: 45–6). Among the prominent leaders of National Conference who came under the influence of leftist ideology and politics included leaders like Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq, D.P. Dhar, Mir Qasim and G.R. Ranzo. Most of them held a very influential position within the party. The group became active in giving a leftist direction to the political movement in Kashmir.

‘Naya Kashmir’: ideological blueprint of economic policy It was during this time that an ideological structure of the National Conference was also chalked out and a strong economic content was incorporated in the movement politics. The New Kashmir Manifesto, the blueprint of the Conference, was a document that was set in a typical communist language and not only provided a vision of the future constitution of the state but also for the socio-economic restructuring of the state. Linked with the process of broadening the political movement, this manifesto was to reflect the shift in political discourse from religious to a class-based one. Referring to the background in which this manifesto was adopted by the National Conference, Sheikh Abdullah thus notes in his autobiography: Our movement had been initially limited to the problems of Muslims only, with Islam being its central point. Now that its doors have been thrown open to all creeds and castes, we felt the need of a joint rallying point for our struggle. Obviously, this rallying point could not be based merely on religion but also on political and economic factors. Our experience had convinced us that the basic conflict among the various sections of people was not that of religion but of material interests. It was essentially a conflict between the exploiters and the exploited, between the oppressors and the oppressed. We had realized that we were confronted by a despotic regime, not by any one person. It was a quarrel between us and a feudal set-up. (Abdullah, 2013: 217) Fighting the long-standing poverty of the peasants and artisans and unmitigated helplessness of workers was the major goal of the

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New Kashmir manifesto (New Kashmir Manifesto). This was to be achieved through complete reorganisation of the agrarian structure and eliminating its parasitical and feudal components, on the one hand, and empowering the peasantry, artisans and other working classes, on the other. Hence, the manifesto was a complete plan for restructuring the economy. Among other things, it called for planned development of economy ‘with a view to ensuring a rapid rate of economic growth along with increasing social justice’. In terms of its agricultural policy, it listed it basic aim as ‘equitable distribution of land and elimination of parasites, middlemen and others who do not directly engage themselves in cultivation of land and do not contribute to its productivity’. It also talked of compulsory work for all residents of the state, right to unemployment insurance, right to rest, right to education, minimum wages and so on. Among the crucial parts of the manifesto were specific charters for peasants, workers and women. The charter of peasants rights sought to empower the peasants by seeking to dismantle the feudal basis of agriculture. As per this charter, every peasant was to have the right to possess land for tilling, and the land owned by absentee landlords was to be handed over to the peasants. It sought to abolish begar2 as well as all feudal impositions, compulsory offerings and gifts to feudal lords. It also sought to free the peasant from the burden of loans and debts. The charter of the rights of labourers meanwhile provided for right of employment, right to freedom from exploitation, right to have a standard of living much above the bare existence, and the right to equality of wage. Rights to pension, hygienic residence, free treatment and right to education were also included in the list of rights of the labourers. The charter of women’s rights included the political and cultural rights as well as the economic rights. Women were to be entitled to the same wage as men for similar work, right to follow any trade or profession, right to social insurance schemes and various other protections.

Land reforms Soon after assuming power, the National Conference government started working on the economic goals laid down in the New Kashmir Manifesto. It particularly focused on the land reforms. These reforms took place in three phases. In the first phase, that is in April 1948, the privileges enjoyed by jagirdars, muafidars and mukkarrees were abolished. This decision affected 396 jagirdars and 2,347 mukkaridars (The

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Hindustan Times, 17 July 1953). In the second phase of land reforms that took place in the month of October the same year, State Tenancy Act of 1924 was amended and relief was given to large number of tenants. Referring to the logic of these reforms, Aslam notes that: It gave priority to the reorganization of agriculture on a modern and rational basis, through the abolition of land-lordism, securing the land to the tiller and the formation of cooperative associations. These steps were taken to free the peasant from the burden of the parasitic jagirdars and kardars. Besides, waste lands were granted to the tillers for cultivation, a moratorium was declared on noncommercial debts and ejectment proceedings against tenants were stayed for a period of one year. (Aslam, 1977: 61) These measures of substantial consequences provided a sense of security to the poor tenants. They were saved from arbitrary increase in the rent. As per the observations made by Wolf Ladejinsky, one-third of the total cultivable area of Jammu and Kashmir was under tenancy. The number of landless tenants was around 300,000. Another 250,000 were part-owners–part tenants who also cultivated part of the tenanted land. Only a small part of the tenants enjoyed occupancy rights (Ladejinsky, 1952: 179). As per the new policy, ‘the share of the tenant of all-abi (irrigated) areas was fixed at ¾th and that of the owner at ¼th and in case of ‘khushki’ (dry) lands, the share of the tenant and the landowner was fixed at 2/3rd and 1/3rd respectively’. As a result of these reforms as much as ‘34,000 kanals of land were resumed’ (Puri, 1953). In 1949, the state government also passed the Jammu and Kashmir Distressed Debtors’ Relief Act and established Special Conciliatory Boards to scale down the debts of the poor.3 However, it was in 1950 in the third phase of reforms that the Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act of 1950 was passed. As per this Act, a ceiling on the holding of land was placed at 22.75 acres. (The ceiling, however, excluded the orchards, fuel and fodder reserves and uncultivable wasteland.) The Act also provided for transfer of surplus land to tillers who were cultivating on the land. The tillers were to be given the land without any payment. This was the most sweeping reform that substantially changed the pattern of land holding in the state. According to the figures made available by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir, by the end of the financial year 1952–53, around ‘200,000

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acres of land had come under the direct ownership of tillers’. As per this information: The number of tillers who have actually received land is over one and half lakh and the total number of persons benefitting as a result of it nearly six lakhs. In addition to this, over ninety-two thousand acres of land, which had come to be vested in the State under the provision of the Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, are being distributed to refugees and landless peasants. (The Hindustan Times, 17 July 1953) Also that By the end of April 12, 1953, mutations of 15,41,216 kanals of land (1,92,652 acres) had been attested in favour of 1,60,939 tillers, benefitting 5,84,821 persons. In addition to this, over 7,40,000 kanals (93,500 acres) had come to be vested in the State by the end of the first fortnight of March 1953. (The Hindustan Times, 17 July 1953) What distinguished these land reform legislations from those passed in various other states was the absence of compensation to the former landowners. While acquiring the surplus land from big land holders, the state did not pay any compensation. Similarly, the peasants were granted the land without paying any amount to the landlords. The logic given by the state for not compensating the land holders was that there was no moral, economic or social basis for compensation and also that the state did not have enough money to pay it. To quote the Land Compensation Committee headed by Minister of Revenue Mirza Afzal Beg: The tillers, to whom the excess land from which the big proprietors are expropriated is transferred in ownership right, are an indigent, impoverished and much exploited class. No question of recovering the price of the lands from them does arise. As a State with limited resources we are too poor to pay compensation from out of the State revenues. The financial liability will be of a very serious nature and the payment itself will prove incalculably mischievous. Apart from these considerations, there is no moral, economic or social basis for compensation. We therefore recommend, both on principle and policy, the payment of compensation to the expropriated

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proprietors is not desirable. The payment of compensation would perpetuate the present inequitable distribution of wealth. (Quoted in Ladejinsky, 1952: 179)4 What helped the state to go in for such far-reaching land reforms was the constitutional autonomy that the state enjoyed. The fact that the provisions of compensation as included in the Chapter of Fundamental Rights of the Indian Constitution were not extended to the state at that point of time helped the state to take such a drastic step. Hence, there was a very strong linkage between demand for autonomy and the land reforms. To quote Prakash Chandra, National Conference in Jammu and Kashmir opted for the Indian form of democracy . . . with an assurance of autonomy and special status (article 370 of the Indian constitution), so that in the implementation of bourgeois democratic reforms and especially the land reforms in Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian legal apparatus would not become an obvious structural fetter like in the rest of India. (Chandra, 1985: 37) That the land reforms formed important logic for negotiating autonomous political space for the state of Jammu and Kashmir becomes evident from Sheikh Abdullah’s speech in the Constituent Assembly of the state in the early 1950s wherein he made it very clear as to what was the basis of the choice of the National Conference for acceding to India rather than to Pakistan. He stated: As a state we are concerned mainly with agriculture and trade . . . we have been able to put through our ‘land to the tiller’ legislation and make of it a practical success who have dragged along in servitude to the landlord and his allies for centuries without number. We have been able under present condition to carry these reforms through; are we sure that in alliance with land-lord ridden Pakistan, with so many feudal privileges intact, that the economic reforms will be tolerated? (Abdullah, 1952)

Issues linked with land reforms Despite the fact that land reforms were in pursuance of the political movement led by the National Conference and that they benefitted a large number of underprivileged and oppressed peasants, these came in

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for criticism within the state. Much of this criticism was launched by the dispossessed land-owning class on the ground that they were not treated at par with their counterparts in the rest of India and were not paid any compensation for the loss of their land. It was this resentment that led them to oppose the very logic of Article 370. Apart from the large landholders, there were others who felt that in designing the land reforms, the principle of fairness was not followed. According to them, there was lack of sensitivity to the regional peculiarities of the very nature of land holdings. The fact that the land in Jammu was not as fertile in Kashmir and that a large part of the region is formed by the kandi (infertile) land led to a strong critique about the equal limit of ceiling. This matter was referred by the state government to a commission headed by Justice Janakinath Wazir, the then Chief Justice of the state. It was asked to probe whether the scale of the fixation of maximum holding at 22 acres is justified for Jammu ‘which is mountainous and with poor irrigation facilities’ (The Hindu, 3 February 1953). The committee took into consideration the fact that productivity of soil in Jammu is much lower than in Kashmir and recommended that maximum holding of land in case of kandi land should be raised to 38 acres. It also recommended that the basis of fixation of holding limits should be the land revenue and not the area. It also suggested increase in the limit of self-tilled land. Following these observations, some of the flaws in the earlier legislations were removed. Like elsewhere, there were complaints about the loopholes in the legislation as well as in the implementation of the land reforms. As regards the legislation, there was a concern that despite the declared intention to do away with the concentration of land, a window had been kept open through the exclusion of orchards, fuel and fodder reserves. This provision was used by some to bypass the ceiling legislation and declaring their land as orchards (Prakash, 2000: 2054). There were also complaints about corruption, manipulation of records and partisanship. To quote a newspaper report published at the time when these reforms were put into place: Experience has shown that what intended to be a free conferment of land on the tiller has usually involved him in great expense, and if the money has not passed into the State Treasury, the distributing agencies as well as some of the landlords have become richer, as proprietors always selected the best land for their own use, tillers had to pay the cost of land to secure its exclusion from the proprietor’s unit. (The Statesman, 28 August 1953)

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There were also allegations that lands had not been fairly distributed by the revenue authority and that only influential party men had succeeded in getting them.5 To quote Prakash: Political interference greatly undermined the egalitarian aims of the reforms, as land was distributed and redistributed according to the political affiliations of the tenants. The cooperatives through which large sums of money were extended as ‘unrecoverable loans’ developed into a highly politicised sector of Kashmir’s economy. (Prakash, 2000: 2054)

Assessment of land reforms But irrespective of these problems, the progressive nature of the land reforms has been widely acknowledged. These have been hailed as some of the most radical and most effective land reform legislations in India Korbel (1966: 212) notes that ‘the land reform laws changed drastically the agricultural and social structure of Kashmir. The feudal system was abolished, landlordism disappeared, and thousands of peasants living in virtual slavery became the landholders’. Ladejinsky compares the land reforms in Kashmir with those implemented in other states and observes: Whereas virtually all land reforms in India lay stress on the elimination of the Zamindari tenure system with compensation or rent reduction and security of tenure, the Kashmir reforms call for the distribution of land among tenants without compensation to the erstwhile proprietors; whereas land reform enforcement in most of India is not so effective, in Kashmir, enforcement is unmistakably rigorous. (Ladejinsky, 1952: 179–80) It was because of the land reforms that the political transition in Kashmir could be attained very smoothly. Although the whole question of Accession of the state was mired into controversies due to the hesitation of the princely ruler, tribal invasion, division of the state and Pakistan’s contestations, however, in Kashmir at that point of time, there was not much controversy. Sheikh Abdullah enjoyed massive popular support and his commitment to the economic reforms gave him an immense moral authority to take decisions on behalf of Kashmiris. Since his political preferences were defined by the economic logic, these made him reject the option of Pakistan. In his understanding

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it was absolutely impossible to go in for radical land reforms in that country. Even in India, he would not have been able to achieve his goals, had he not been able to negotiate autonomy for the state. Hence, his political decision, first, to endorse the Accession of the state with India and second, to negotiate constitutional autonomy was beneficial to the large number of peasants who had not only become the owners of property almost overnight, but who were also relieved of the pressure of debt. Those who observed the impact of land reforms in Kashmir during the initial phase have recorded the positive political environment in Kashmir following the land reforms. As Ladejinsky has noted in his observations, it did not matter to the mass of peasantry as to where Sheikh Abdullah was leading them, what mattered was that his political choices had benefitted them the most (Ladejinsky, 1952: 180). However, it is not only from the perspective of immediate implications, but also from the long-term perspective, the implications of land reforms for the society in Jammu and Kashmir have been widely acknowledged. Haseeb Drabu has linked the land reforms of early post-Accession period with the better human development indicators at present, especially among rural masses of the state. He argues that ‘in J&K the households living below the poverty line is just 3%, as against 26% at the all India level. The absolute level of poverty in J&K is much lower’. He further notes that there is near absence of landless labour’ in the state Compared to incidence of 23% agricultural labour at the all India level. Further that, ‘more than a quarter of the household earnings in J&K are from own cultivation. In ‘prosperous’ Punjab it is only 18%, in ‘vibrant’ Gujarat it is less than 16%. (Drabu, 2013)6 Land reforms along with other progressive policies pursued by the National Conference government in the initial stage were also to extend the middle-class base of Kashmir. The policy of free education, including higher education, a broad network of schools and colleges throughout Kashmir and opening of professional colleges provided stimulus for education to the Kashmiris (Gias-ud-Din, 1997: 80). As Ganguly (1997: 30) notes, a foundation was laid ‘for the emergence of a new generation of Kashmiris – better educated than their predecessors, more conscious of their political rights and prerogatives, and impatient with the earlier generation of the political leaders’.

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Change in substance of politics and economic distortions Removal of Sheikh Abdullah from power resulted in the substantive change in the nature of policy formation of the state. The National Conference without Sheikh and his political ideologue, Mirza Afzal Beg, became a truncated organisation. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad who took over power faced perennial crisis of legitimacy. For the next 10 years or so, when he was in power, the politics of the ruling party that he now led was more directed towards securing himself in power rather than taking positive policy and political decisions. With Sheikh still enjoying the popular support, Bakshi’s survival in power was dependent on the support of the Central government. In this situation, economy, rather than following the logic of socio-economic transformation, started becoming subservient to politics. Rather than following an ideological basis, the policies were now being ‘guided by political interest of the Chief Minister and his supporters’ (Puri, 1968: 226). To overcome the legitimacy crisis, Bakshi and his successors started creating a false sense of economic well-being with the help of the liberal Central aid. Keeping the political situation of the state in post-1953 period in view, the Central government had started pumping money in the state. Puri has noted that 90 per cent of the state’s plan till 1970 were centrally funded. Per capita financial assistance to Kashmir for the Second Plan (1956– 61) was, for instance, Rs. 50 against the average of Rs. 33 for other states. In the Third Plan beginning in 1961, the figures were Rs. 117 and Rs. 57, respectively. Again, the central grant-in-aid formed 30.7 per cent of the revenue of Kashmir whereas for other states it averaged just to 10 per cent. Indeed, the per capita statutory grant-in-aid to Kashmir of Rs. 41.7 for the five-year period from 1957–58 to 1961–62 was almost seven times the Rs. 6 average of all the states. A food subsidy, road buildings, and border development were among the other items financed by the central government. (Puri, 1968: 225–6) To wean the support of people away from Sheikh Abdullah, the Centre and the state therefore adopted the policy of, to use the words of Habibullah, ‘literally buying the Kashmiris back’7 (2004: 6). Bakshi, therefore, started an era of subsidised economy of the state.8 The food, especially the rice, the staple food of Kashmiris, was heavily subsidised.

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Referring to the use of subsidies in food items as a political tool, Fazili describes that One trakh (six seers) of rice was sold for one rupee whereas earlier under the advice of the Sheikh’s ministry for Food it was sold for seven rupees. When people had approached the Sheikh for cheaper rice he had advised them to eat potatoes, beans and pulses rather than incur any obligations from India by eating cheaper (subsidized) rice. (Fazili, 1982: 45) Power and fuel were also subsidised. People were granted liberal loans for agricultural, industrial and educational purposes. The natural resources of the state, as Habibullah notes, were exploited to help benefit a section of society. To quote him: The most important resource in the state is the forests that cover eight thousand square miles. The diversity of the region’s flora is astonishing, ranging from silver birch in the subalpine mountain ranges to the majestic chinar (a richly verdant variety of the maple), walnut, conifers, and deciduous trees in the valleys and plains. In the Bakshi tradition, several favored lessees have had access to this land, making the local government monopoly very rich. Many people have become millionaires and have set up flourishing businesses within and outside the state, and several have launched lucrative political careers. (Habibullah, 2004: 9) The state’s power to grant licenses and award contracts was used to create goodwill not only in the sector of forests, but also in the sector of ‘transport and tourist related activities and for the distribution of essential commodities’ (Habibullah, 2004: 7). Bakshi’s era of politics was also an era of infrastructure development. With the help of Central assistance, various development projects were started in the state. These included the construction of roads and hydro-electric projects. This was also the period of expansion of social infrastructure. Huge money was spent on opening of new schools and colleges and professional institutions. Scholarships and easy loans were offered to students to study in these institutions. The expansion of economic activities in the state during this period created a class of beneficiaries including the bureaucrats, traders, contractors

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and politicians. Besides the direct economic benefits, it was the availability of various other state resources that created a class of neo-rich. These were the people who were to monopolise most of the benefits of the development programmes of the state. ‘Access to the best government jobs, admissions to prestigious professional institutions, and benefits of development programs remained confined to this particular class of society’ (Punjabi 1992: 142–3). Among other sources of money, corruption was the major one. Bakshi and his family is believed to have amassed huge amount of money during the period of his tenure as the Prime Minister of the state. Rajagopala Ayyangar-led enquiry commission that was appointed to look into matter reported that his assets had increased from Rs. 10,000 in 1947 to Rs.1.25 crores in 1964 (Khan, 2012: 17). On the whole, economy in the post-1953 period was quite distorted. Neither the agrarian nor the industrial sector could strengthen itself. The failure to pursue a follow-up of the land reforms of the pre-1953 period led to the overall economic stagnation. Land reforms had certainly benefitted the peasantry and had helped them to rise above the miserable condition of poverty, but they could not rise above their subsistence level. Though most of the tillers did become the owners of the land, yet the size of the land holding was so small that it affected its overall productivity. Although the increase in the number of small holding s has created a greater sense of equality and social justice, it has also resulted in a situation of extreme land fragmentation and parcelisation, with the average size farm now being considerably below the optimum size of farms for all India. The average holding in Kashmir is extremely small, only 0.99 hectares compared to 1.82 hectares at the all India level. (Prakash, 2000: 2054) Nissar Ali has noted that over the period, the average size of landholding has substantially decreased because of which ‘almost 90 per cent of arable land constitutes marginal and sum-marginal holdings’ (Ali, 2007: 62). The industrial sector meanwhile failed to take off. The reason for this was not merely the landlocked nature of the state but also the lack of capital investment and infrastructural resources. Private sector investment could not be attracted because there were basic problems of high cost of production due to huge transportation expenses and expensive raw material. Lack of good road network and lack of availability of power also became disincentives for people to invest in the industry here. The only way the industrial investment could be attracted was through the

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incentives of subsidies. However, even after siphoning away the benefits of subsidies, the private sector did not contribute to the industrialisation of the state. The state meanwhile started industries in the public sector but most of these have been running in losses. The only positive stories in the economic development of the state have been that of tourism industry and handicraft. ‘The tourism sector played a significant role in the valley’s economy through the generation of various linkage activities like production of handicrafts and construction of hotels and restaurants’ (Aziz, 2010: 33). Meanwhile, the handicrafts also contributed to the economic development. The governmental initiatives and intervention, especially in training, marketing, subsidies and bank credits, resulted in substantial expansion in this sector. However, both these sectors were externally driven and would be adversely affected in case of poor inflow of the tourists (Aziz, 2010: 33). The economy of the state, on the whole, has remained a backward economy, which has been dependent on the loans, grants and packages from the Centre. To quote the State Development Report of the Planning Commission of India (Planning Commission of India, 2003: 43–4): The state ranks among one of the bottom-line states with respect of socio-economic development indicators. . . . Though the poverty line is only 3.48% (Planning Commission estimate), this does not reflect the progress of the state in terms of main indicators of development because majority of the people have basic requirements like nutritious food, house and cloth. It further notes that The economic infrastructure, to a large extent, is the basis on which the economic and social development rests. The power sector, roads and transport and telecommunication come under economic infrastructure. . . . Inadequate infrastructure has hampered the growth of productive sector. The report also found that the state falls behind most of the developed states in India on the indices of social infrastructure. Dependent upon subsidies and liberal Central grant, the economy failed to become self-sufficient. As Prakash notes, it was because of subsidies that ‘it failed to give the state an impetus to mobilise its own resources for economic growth’ (Prakash, 2000: 2053). Its potential resources generally remained untapped. ‘The output employment

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multipliers had remained very weak and the dependence of the state on outside markets, even for products, such as mutton, ghee, vegetable, butter, etc., in which the state enjoyed comparative advantage or where there were vast potentialities, had grown over the years’ (Aziz, 2010: 24). When the Centre reversed its early policy of liberal aid in early 1970s, the state actually started falling into the debt trap. Now the money coming to the state was in terms of 70 per cent of loans. The Central grant amounted only to 30 per cent. Following this reversal, the state’s economy was totally burdened and could not meet revenue expenses. It had no money to invest for productive purposes (Planning Commission, 2003: 359). Loans and packages, therefore, rather than helping the state have generated a perennial economic crisis for the state as it has huge debt liabilities. Prakash (2000: 320) terms this crisis as similar ‘to the debt crisis facing Africa, where resources required for productive investment are being diverted to debt repayments’. The total budget of the state meanwhile caters merely to the two liabilities that the state has – the salaries of the government employees and the expenditure related to power. With backward agriculture and poor industrial sector, the state government is the only employer. However, the state sector itself is the most overdeveloped one with almost four lakh employees. As Drabu (2011) notes, ‘the salary bill of the government of J&K must be the highest in the country – 10,000 to 11,000 crore – and then there are interest payments and pensions. If you account for that then there is nothing left’. In his opinion, the policies of the Centre have specifically contributed to this state of affairs. To quote him: For a variety of reasons, if you take a larger political economy perspective, then there is a fostered dependence, which has been created in the system over the years. So the government was not obliged to raise resources to fund itself. This is the best way to keep a government in control. (Drabu, 2011) The distortion in the economy and the politics has led to a number of inner contradictions in the society of Kashmir, which, due to the prevailing political reasons, have remained generally unaddressed. The post-1953 period has been witness not only to the emergence of a middle-class Kashmiris but also a very affluent class. Much of this class is comprised of those who benefitted from the money coming from the

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Centre including the bureaucrats, politicians, traders, contractors, engineers, among others. Commenting on the emergence of the nouveau riche class of Kashmiris and the acquisition of their fortunes through dubious means, Punjabi (1992: 142–3) notes: The acquisition of wealth and its vulgar display became the prominent feature of social life in Kashmir. Thus, a society which took pride in its value-based culture, started degenerating into an acquisitive society. At the top of this society was firmly saddled a small competitive class, for whom fierce competition for grabbing anything that came their way, became an avocation. . . . It was a small class, this axis of politicians-bureaucrats-businessmen, who set the standards and norms for the rest of Kashmiri society. Their shadows would be everywhere and would haunt everybody. Under those circumstances, it was not difficult to see that access to the best government jobs, admissions to prestigious professional institutions, and benefits of development programs remained confined to this particular class of society. This left vast segments of the population – urban and rural, educated and illiterate, men and women – engaged in a fierce struggle for social and economic survival. The wide gulf between those who monopolised the fruits of prosperity and those who remained deprived and untouched by development schemes and funds brought about slowly a creeping feeling of dissatisfaction. This feeling was further intensified by generally prevailing corruption and unscrupulousness. Meanwhile, there remained the problem of unemployment. While the number of middle-class-educated Kashmiris had increased, there were not sufficient avenues for them to be suitably employed. Noting the unemployment of the educated youth, the State Development Report thus notes: Work opportunities, however, have not kept pace with the increasing population. The problem of unemployment gains more importance because of increasing unemployment of the educated in the state. Almost 70 per cent of the population is directly or indirectly dependent on agriculture and allied activities which continue to be a subsistence sector. In the absence of industrial growth and negligible scope for absorption in the private sector, many have been rendered unemployed and have joined the ranks of job seekers. (Planning Commission, 2003: 110)

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John Ray, who served a missionary school in Kashmir during the crucial decades of 1960s to mid-1980s, has referred to a large number of Kashmiris who were ‘semi-educated, young, frustrated and vulnerable to the destructive pressures’. He observes that: The signs of riches were all around us in Srinagar in luxurious houses and living. This growth of wealth increased the frustration of the semi-educated graduates who filled Government Service and those who tried to fight their way into it after the gates were closed. Obvious wealth and corruption was a prime source of envy from beyond the charmed circle, a factor fuelling the expectation that religious radicalism would bring justice and freedom. (Ray, 2002: 202) The wide gulf between those who monopolised the fruits of prosperity and those who remained deprived brought about slowly creeping feeling of dissatisfaction. Punjabi, referring to the gulf between these two classes, notes as to how the beneficiaries of the system contributed to aggravating the crisis: It bears reminding again that this particular class thrived on uncertain political conditions. They were getting the best of both worlds. In order to escape the backlash of the discontented and disenchanted masses, they skilfully passed the blame for all of Kashmir’s ills on ‘India’ and held the ‘Centre’ responsible for everything that was going wrong in Kashmiri society. Meanwhile, they thrived on the Central government patronage. Thus, in the common Kashmiri perception, the distinction between the ‘Government at the Centre’ and the ‘the Union of India’ got very much blurred. (Punjabi, 1992: 143) Since much of the distortion in the economic structure was a result of the distortion in politics, the problems emanating from the economic sector continued to remain unaddressed. The only approach that the state government had in this regard was to ask for more aid from the Centre and the only approach that the Central government has been having towards the economic underdevelopment of the state is to offer packages of one kind or the other.

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Notes 1 The Mazdoor Sabha showed its presence through a huge procession on 4 October 1937, which was joined both by the labourers and peasants. To quote Gupta: ‘A special feature of the procession was the demonstration of red banners and flags. The banners contained new slogans and demands such as “A labourer is a human being”, “Slavery is a curse”, “Our country is rich but we are poor”, “Give bread to the hungry, Clothes to the naked”’ (Gupta, 1986: 63). 2 ‘Beggar’ was a system prevalent in Kashmir, which required poor Kashmiris to provide compulsory labour without wages. 3 As per the information provided by the government, by the end of the financial year 1952–53, debts of poor were scaled down by about 80 per cent (The Hindustan Times, 17 July 1953). 4 As Ladejinsky (1952: 184) has pointed out, withholding of compensation to the landlords whose excess land was acquired by the state places the Kashmir programme as a special case. ‘The landowners’, as he argues, ‘advanced a number of reasons for compensation. These included constitutional rights, the fundamental right of a person to own property, moral and social obligation of the state towards the citizens regardless of class, allusions to Sheikh Abdullah’s “New Kashmir” program with its stated aim that no one should be allowed to starve the historic development of landlordism, and the legality of land acquisition. They even invoked the shades of John Stuart Mull and Harold Laski to bolster up their case . . . Last, but not least, they argue that the reforms partake of religious discrimination because the landlords are mostly Hindus while the administrators of Kashmir are Muslims. But all the arguments availed them nothing’. 5 As already stated, the state suffered from the problem of not having established institutionalised governance. Being an interim government, it did not have a distinction between the party cadre and the administrative officials. Some of the administrative positions were held by the party leaders who acted in partisan way in the process of implementing the progressive policies. 6 Seen from another perspective, one can assess the impact of land reforms on the Dalits of the state. Mostly located in the Jammu region, they were the largest beneficiaries of the land reforms in that region. It is because of the reforms that one can see that this section of society has done much better in the state as compared to their counterparts in the northern India. As per the 2001 census, the literacy rate of Scheduled Castes in Jammu and Kashmir was higher than the national average. Also significantly, the number of SC workers engaged in cultivation was more than twice the national average and the number of agricultural labour was much lower than the national average. 7 It is interesting to note the observations of Aparna Rao in this context. She noted, ‘Given its small population, the Valley had a very dense structure of cross-cutting ties between trade, officialdom, artisanship, cash crop agriculture, horticulture and politics. Hence, not only those who favored independence, but even those who felt that Kashmir should be part of Pakistan, and these included many among the Muslim landed gentry and the urban mercantile class, were – as individuals and families – part of these networks.

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These opponents of the government were now co-opted into the system of economic benefits, primarily through the subsidies provided by India. The result was massive corruption, to which, however, little moral opprobrium attached, since the money that flowed in was considered “Indian money”. This policy led to the emergence of a middle class which could not afford to be openly anti-India, while participating in a sullen but peaceful opposition to Indian rule. How passive this opposition was is evident from the meager response in 1965, during the second Pakistan-India war, to Pakistan’s call to Muslims not to collaborate with Indian troops. It was this same middle class which played a key role in the late 1980s and early 1990s, first in electoral opposition and then in the armed struggle’ (Rao, 1999: 12–13). 8 Soon after taking over as the Prime Minister of the state, Bakshi made a number of promises to improve the economy of the state. Of these promises the most significant were: that the Mujawaza price of Shali to be increased by Re. 1 per Khirwar, price of Shali in Srinagar city to be reduced by Rs. 3 per Khirwar; due attention to be paid to provide rations in the deficit rural areas; cooperative movement to be purged of corrupt elements; reopening of competitive retail shops; state trading organizations to function only for the purpose of keeping prices at a competitive level, earmarking of a sum of amount for credit in rural areas and for the artisan, boatman and small shopkeepers in the town; cooperative debts to be stayed in cases of genuine distress; eviction to be stayed wherever land transgression have taken place and where lands have been distributed under ‘Grow More Food’ campaign; sum of money to be earmarked for supplying better seeds and fertilizers, encouraging the cottage industries; special welfare and security measures for the migrant labour; provide free school education; effort to be made to keep Banihal road open; to implement Wazir Committee report regarding rehabilitation of refugees and resettlement of ex-servicemen in the Jammu province; to abolish permit system; transport system to be reorganised so as to allow private sector to operate (Bakshi, 1953).

Part II

Militancy and the politics of separatism

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Chapter 5

Separatist space and politics of separatism before 1989

Separatism that characterised the politics of Kashmir in the post-1989 period was a reflection of the accumulated mass discontent since the early 1950s. The popular response towards the Indian state had started undergoing a major change after Sheikh Abdullah was ousted from power in 1953. He was instrumental in building bridges between Kashmiri and Indian nationalism. He was also successful in giving an economic orientation to the political mobilisation of Kashmiris and steering the identity politics in a direction in which the interest of native Kashmiri was seen to be secured in Kashmir’s association with India. His success in changing the lot of the impoverished peasantry through radical land reforms and other pro-people policies endeared him so much to the masses that they had totally identified with his political orientation. As long as he remained at the helm of affairs, there was no serious reservation in Kashmir about Accession with India – more so because he had succeeded in negotiating a relationship in which Kashmiri identity was maintained and the autonomy of Kashmir’s politics was recognised. This is not to argue that there was altogether no voice in favour of joining Pakistan. There were a few political leaders, backed by reasonable political constituencies, who were propagating the idea of Accession with Pakistan. Of these, Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah was the most prominent one. He headed the Muslim Conference after it was revived in 1940. He supported the idea of Accession of the state with Pakistan.1 But compared to him and many other pro-Pakistan leaders in Kashmir like G.M. Karra who organised a pro-Pakistan party in Kashmir in early 1950s, Sheikh Abdullah was much taller a leader and had a definite mass appeal. His politics formed the ‘core’ or the ‘dominant’ politics and he carried with him the weight of Kashmiri public opinion. Sheikh Abdullah was the strongest force for legitimising Indian position in Kashmir. If one has to really look for the India’s case in Kashmir,

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one can find it in two oft-quoted speeches of Sheikh Abdullah – one delivered in the General Assembly of the United Nations and the other delivered on the occasion of opening session of Constituent Assembly of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. In both the speeches, while he gives ideological reasons for the choice of Kashmiri leadership to join India, he emphasises the secular and democratic character of the Indian state and its accommodation of the Kashmiri urge for autonomy. In comparison, he underscores the feudal character of Pakistan (Sheikh Abdullah, 1948 and Sheikh Abdullah, 1951). In the immediate post-Accession period, therefore, there was lot of goodwill in Kashmir for India and if there was any sense of antipathy, it was towards Pakistan. As Sheikh convincingly argued in his UN speech, Pakistan being involved in the tribal attack was an ‘aggressor’ and India having come to the rescue of Kashmiris was a ‘saviour’. By 1989, there was clearly a reversal of this situation – India was seen as an ‘oppressor’, a colonising power and Pakistan an ‘ally’ – supporting Kashmiris morally and materially in their war for azadi against India. Kashmiris looked towards Pakistan not only for training the militants but also for internationalising the ‘Kashmir issue’.

The separatist space: Plebiscite Front How did this reversal come about? Much of it can be explained with reference to the post-1953 developments in Kashmir, especially Sheikh Abdullah’s incarceration and his demand for ‘plebiscite’ in the context of fragility of democratic structures and breach of federal contract that the state of Jammu and Kashmir had negotiated with India. Sheikh’s removal from the power politics had the implication of creating a corresponding separatist space in Kashmir. Parallel to the power politics and the formal structure of governance, a new form of politics emerged, which was popularised by the presence of Sheikh Abdullah and the Plebiscite Front. In 1955, Mirza Afzal Beg, a close associate of Sheikh Abdullah, organised the Plebiscite Front. Soon after coming in existence, it captured the political attention of people and replaced the National Conference in their imagination as the party representing ‘Kashmiri people’s movement’. For next two decades, it was this organisation, rather than the National Conference, with which people identified. It reflected the continuity of the Kashmiri politics that had evolved in 1930s and 1940s (Wani, 1996: 62). In placing Sheikh Abdullah and Plebiscite Front at the core of Kashmir’s politics, the formal power politics had much to contribute. This

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politics was so distanced from the people that it did not have much to offer to people, either by way of their involvement and participation, or by way of reflecting their political aspirations. The centrally sponsored massive development activities that were initiated by Sheikh’s successor Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed did not go a long way in placating the Kashmiris. The beneficiaries, an extended middle class rather than appreciating the local or the Central government for their changed economic conditions, became the bearers of the new resistance politics in the decade of 1970s and 1980s (Gias ud-Din, 1997: 73–80). This was mainly due to the reason that while the power politics operated at the superficial level, it was the politics of resistance that continued to involve them emotionally. The detention of Sheikh Abdullah in 1953 was a very significant moment in the political history of Kashmir. It disconcerted the people and their response towards the Indian state underwent a drastic change. Reflecting on the ground situation as it evolved after the arrest of Sheikh, Mir Qasim (who was a senior minister in Bakshi’s cabinet) notes that the new regime confronted angry crowds all over the Valley. He refers to his travel through Kulgam, Shopian and Pulwama where he found angry crowds – even ready to attack them. In Shopian they were struck up with 20,000-strong crowd and had to be rescued out of Dak Bunglow. So strong was the response of people that Bakshi felt pressurised and wanted to step down from the position of Prime Minister in favour of Sadiq but the latter declined. Referring to various measures undertaken by Bakshi to mollify people – bringing down the price of rationed food, making education free up to university level; starting a number of development projects, constructing roads and bridges, opening schools and health centres and power projects and electrification programmes – he notes that ‘the people were happy with our work, but would not forgive us for the plight of the Sheikh and therefore would not fully cooperate in our development projects’ (Qasim, 1992: 69–71). However, more than the immediate response, it was the long-term impact that the removal and detention of Sheikh had on the political psyche of Kashmiris. The moment became etched in their minds as a symbol of loss of their newly gained political autonomy. More specifically, it was seen as a moment of ‘betrayal’ by the Indian state. Since 1953, there has been re-thinking in Kashmir about India’s role within Kashmir. Instead of the earlier tagging as an ‘ally’, it was now projected as having ‘intrusive’ and ‘oppressive’ character. More specifically, the ‘externality’ of India came to be emphasised. In Kashmiri discourse, India was placed at par with the Mughals, Pathans, Sikhs and Dogras –

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as an external power seeking to subjugate and control the political destiny of Kashmiris.

Plebiscite Front It was the demand for plebiscite raised by Sheikh Abdullah that initiated the separatist politics of Kashmir in 1953. This politics, however, took a more organised form in 1955 when Plebiscite Front was formed by Mirza Afzal Beg, a senior member of National Conference and a close associate of Sheikh. Demanding that Indian government abide by its commitment to refer the matter of Accession of the state to people, it contested the representative character of Constituent Assembly of the state and also its right to take any decision about the future of the state in the wake of the UN resolutions. It defined its objective as attempting ‘by all peaceful and constitutional means, to bring about the early settlement of the question of State’s accession, in accordance with the will of people freely expressed in a fair and impartial plebiscite under the United Nations auspices’ (Bhat, 1997: 705). The organisation ‘developed in no time into a force to reckon with. Though in the beginning Sheikh was neither its founder member nor its President but later he was designated as its patron’ (Fazili, 1982: 79). Since Beg formed this organisation, virtually by splitting the National Conference much of the cadre of the National Conference also shifted to this new organisation.2 Very soon the ‘plebiscite’ demand was taken to the level of rural masses and a political psyche of contestation and resistance was generated. Raishumari (as the term ‘plebiscite’ was used in the colloquial language) became a catch phrase of Kashmir for the next two decades.3 The whole idea behind the demand for plebiscite was to contest the finality of Accession of the state with India and to demand that the matter be placed before people of the state both as per the commitment of Government of India as well as per the UN resolutions.4 However, in the absence of any other forum for expression of democratic dissent or opposition, Plebiscite Front was also involved in critiquing the local government not only on the larger issues of Kashmir’s relationship with India, but on the day-to-day issues related to policy-making. Both Sheikh Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Beg sought to engage the government on issues ranging from the constitution making to the issues related to the Centre–state relations.5 The Plebiscite Front, as Qasim notes, became ‘a symbol of people’s opposition’ (Qasim, 1992: 90). Disengagement of people from the power politics and their emotional involvement with Sheikh Abdullah had the effect of attributing

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‘legitimacy’ to this sphere of politics. Sheikh’s detention, therefore, rather than constricting his political constituency enhanced the scope of his politics. The longer he remained imprisoned, the taller he became in his political stature. His increasing popularity and endorsement of his kind of politics was reflected during the brief periods when he was released. He would receive ‘massive’ and ‘enthusiastic’ response from the people (Qasim, 1992: 90). This politics, characterised by contestation of India’s position vis-à-vis Kashmir and interrogation of intrusive politics of the Central government, was to be deeply rooted in the psyche of common Kashmiris for the times to come. That despite the façade of political normalcy there was a growing political discontent in Kashmir was reflected in early 1960s when a religious issue assumed volatile character and provided the basis for a mass stir. This was the issue of disappearance of the Holy Relic from the Hazratbal shrine. The relic, moi-e-muqadas (the sacred hair) of Prophet Muhammad, is the most revered one. After it was reported to have disappeared from the shrine, there was a popular upsurge that led to the collapse of the authority of the state. With a general impression that members of Bakshi’s family were involved in its disappearance, they were targeted and their properties were attacked (Swami, 2007: 42). The developments snowballed into a mass protest against the rule foisted on Kashmir by the Centre. For more than a week, a total hartal crippled Srinagar. Chanting crowds filled the streets. Unable to control them, the administration and police withdrew. A citizens’ ‘action committee’ decided which shops should open and when. Free Langars were organised to feed the crowds who had come in from surrounding villages. The Government’s writ did not run beyond the closely guarded offices. (Bhattacharjea, 1994: 214–15) The situation was so precarious that there it led to a crisis situation. ‘Tens of thousands gathered in Lal Chowk and Budhshah Chowk, the main commercial centres of Srinagar city, a cry grew into crescendo. So serious was the situation that Jawaharlal Nehru, then prime minister, felt that it might “seriously jeopardize India’s position in the Valley”’ (Bhat, 2001: 103). Despite the fact that it was an emotional response of people emerging from their religious sentiments, it also had become an occasion for expression of anti-government political reaction of the people. In a way, it was a protest manifesting the pent-up grievance of people against Bakshi who was seen as a self-serving politician and perceived

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to be working as a ‘stooge’ of the Centre, compromising the dignity and autonomy of Kashmir’s politics in the process. The demand for release of Sheikh Abdullah was raised in a very vociferous manner. In the volatility of circumstances religious leaders like Mirwaiz Farooq were encouraged to take a plunge in politics. Mirwaiz, in turn, giving a religious colour to the question of Kashmir, sought to internationalise it, especially in the Muslim world. As Qasim notes: Posters appeared all over Srinagar asking for the intervention of about half a dozen Muslim countries (including Pakistan) and the United Nations. It was no longer a subject for India alone, it was an international matter affecting the whole Muslim world, said the anti-Indian propagandists. A call for Jehad was given against ‘the Hindu rulers of India, who had outraged Islam’. (Qasim, 1992: 95) To give a direction to the popular response, Awami Action Committee was formed by Maulana Masoodi, and included important members like Mirwaiz Maulvi Farooq and G.M. Karra. However, the committee, rather than limiting itself to the particular episode of Holy Relic, extended its role into the political mould, demanding the resolution of Kashmir conflict. Puri notes that ‘Farooq’s Awami Action Committee was . . . the first genuine pro-Pakistani group of importance and it attracted militant sections of the population, among the youth in particular, and especially in parts of Srinagar’ (Puri, 1968: 235). The after-effects of the upsurge after the loss of Holy Relic therefore was felt on the youth politics as well. For the first time in the post-Accession period, a large number of Kashmiri youth were mobilised and they became sentimentally involved in the demand for self-determination (Mir, 2008: 35–6). Separatist space, therefore, expanded in the decade of 1960s. There was a strong anti-Centre and anti-state sentiment, which was further intensified in mid-1960s. This period was characterised by two related political developments – one, the merger of National Conference with the Congress and second, the changes in the state constitution. It was under the leadership of Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq that the National Conference was dissolved and the Congress party was formally launched in the state. Also it was under his leadership that the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution was introduced by which the nomenclature of the Prime Minister and the Sadar-e-Riyasat was changed to that of Chief Minister and Governor. The head of the state, who was till now elected

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by the state legislature, was now to be appointed by the President of India as Governor and was to represent the Centre in the state. These developments, though aimed at political and constitutional integration of the state with India, antagonised Kashmiris. Expressing his strong resentment of these developments — particularly, the merger of the National Conference with the Congress — Sheikh Abdullah gave a call for ‘social boycott’ of the Congress members. As a result of such a call, the Congress leaders were socially ostracised. The boycott was so severe that they were not allowed the use of local graveyards for the burial of their dead. People would not attend their marriages or participate in religious functions held in their houses (Swami, 2007: 69). By the early 1970s, resistance politics had started manifesting itself in another manner. Unlike Sheikh Abdullah’s over-ground politics aimed at mass mobilisation, this politics aimed at targeting the state through underground activities. The evidence of this politics came into open in 1971 when few youths associated with the Al Fatah organisation hijacked an Indian Airlines plane and took it to Lahore. There was an intensification of underground resistance politics after Sheikh Abdullah chose to join the power politics.

Sheikh’s return to power politics and separatist space Though ostensibly there was not much public opposition to Sheikh’s decision to shun the resistance politics, however, there were reservations, especially among the youth. With a strong political mind-set generated during the 1953–75 period, it was the language of resistance with which people in Kashmir identified. They were therefore not necessarily convinced by the logic offered by Sheikh for joining the power politics. It was the sheer popularity of Sheikh and his unquestioned tall stature that made them to acquiesce to the political developments. However, there were a few Kashmiris who were openly critical of Sheikh’s decision. While a few of them occupied the oppositional space within the power politics of Kashmir, others joined the underground resistance politics.6 There were still others who continued with the over-ground separatist politics. Mahaaz-e-Azaadi was one such organisation that was formed by the erstwhile associates of Sheikh Abdullah under the leadership of Sofi Mohammad Akbar (Sahni, 1999: 175). Among other organisations that were opposed to Sheikh Abdullah’s accord with the Centre included Jamat-e-Islami, People’s League and Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF).

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Notwithstanding the reservation among some people regarding Sheikh’s direction of politics in post-1975 period, his entry into power politics changed the genre of political discourse of Kashmir. From the resistance politics challenging the finality of state’s Accession with India, it took a different form of questioning the constitutional developments vis-à-vis the state in the post-1953 period. Sheikh substituted the slogan of raishumari with that of ‘autonomy’. The resistance politics, therefore, was subdued in the post-1975 period. This is, however, not to argue that it was totally missing. There were a number of political organisations operating from Kashmir, Pakistan-administered Kashmir and United Kingdom, which insisted on the demand for self-determination, but these organisations were not able to generate a mass base the way the Plebiscite Front had generated. The popular politics was still dominated by Sheikh Abdullah. In containing the separatist space during the post-1975 period, the extended democratic space contributed the most.

Rise of religion-based politics and Muslim United Front (MUF) The centrality of power politics came to be challenged soon after the 1987 Assembly elections. The reason for this could be located both in the intrusion of the Centre in power politics and the resultant loss of democratic space during the 1984–87 period. The dismissal of Farooq Abdullah’s legitimately elected government at the behest of the Central government was the first major blow to the legitimacy of power politics. In July 1984, 13 members of Farooq’s government led by G.M. Shah, the brother-inlaw of Farooq Abdullah, defected from the National Conference. Shah was a senior member of the party and had been disgruntled on the issue of succession. Instead of his seniority, Sheikh had preferred Farooq. Defections, widely perceived as engineered by the Centre, led to the dismissal of Farooq Abdullah’s government. The defectors soon formed the government with the support of the Congress party (Singh, 1995). Engineering of defections within the ruling National Conference was seen as a repeat of history and a continuity of the practice of imposing governments from the above, irrespective of the popular response (Puri, 1993: 51). The removal of Farooq Abdullah in 1984 was compared with removal of Sheikh in 1953. Since Farooq had recently won the Assembly elections with a massive mandate in Kashmir, his dismissal was seen in continuity with the policy of the Central government to have pliable governments in the state.7

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Therefore, the removal of Farooq Abdullah in 1984 was not an ordinary moment just reflecting shift of power from Farooq to his brother-in-law. It was a moment when the reversal in democratic space started taking place, which led to preparing the ground for separatist politics that emerged in the post-1989 period. What infuriated the Kashmiris was the change at the behest of the Central government with total disregard for popular mandate. For the common people who had started throwing their weight behind democratic politics, this was another moment of betrayal by the Centre. The fragile structure of democratic politics, which had just started gaining the approval of people, came under a severe strain. The G.M. Shah’s government of defectors was not accepted by the people. ‘In office, without popular mandate . . . Shah was compelled to turn to Islamists and opponents of India’ (Swami, 2007: 158). Short-lived as it was, this government remained under crisis throughout. There were massive demonstrations against the government and for long periods curfew was imposed. As Bose notes, ‘G.M. Shah’s main distinction in office was to earn the sobriquet “Curfew chief minister” – for seventy-two of the first ninety days of his administration the Valley was under curfew orders to prevent protest demonstrations’ (Bose, 2003: 92). Shah government’s brief stint also was known for the massive corruption that the ministers were involved in (Singh, 1995: 79). For the first time in the post-Accession history of Kashmir’s politics, the state witnessed communal riots. In Anantnag, the homes of Kashmiri Pundits and temples were targeted (Swami, 2007: 158). For the chaos and disorder that it created, the G.M. Shah government was dismissed in 1986. However, a bigger challenge was still to come in 1986 when Farooq Abdullah, reversing his anti-Congress political stance, took a decision to have an alliance with Congress following an accord known as the Rajiv–Farooq Accord. However, the implications of the accord were far-reaching in Kashmir. National Conference’s legitimacy was challenged and its hold on politics of Kashmir was weakened. By resisting the efforts of Congress to intrude into the politics of the state, it was till now articulating the anti-Centre sentiments. But with its joining sides with the Congress and forming the government in partnership with that party, the National Conference lost its political space. The anti-Congress and anti-Centre political space that it represented was now shifted to the Islamic forces, which had started asserting their presence for some time now. To quote Tavleen Singh: when Farooq pulled his accord with Rajiv out of a hat the ground had already been prepared for an Islamic movement to emerge on

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the right of him. There had been minor warnings in the past like the sudden emergence of Qazi Nissar in Anantnag one year when he had led a major protest against Jagmohan for ordering that meat should not be sold on the occasion of a Hindu festival. Other warnings had come in the form of pro-Pakistan demonstrations and sudden bursts of Islamic fervour. (Singh, 1995: 100) It was in this situation that the political space came to be controlled by Muslim United Front (MUF), a newly floated conglomerate of right-wing parties.8 Referring to the impact of the 1986 accord, Mohammed Ishaq Khan thus notes: As Farooq was getting alienated from his people day by day, the forces that had described the Indira–Sheikh Accord as a complete sell-out became more active and assertive. But they could not muster strength at a time when a sizable majority of Kashmiri Muslims still hoped against hope that the National Conference was capable of striking a better deal with New Delhi for their community as compared to the Jamat-i-Islami or the state Congress. The Rajiv– Farooq Accord of 1986, however, dashed their forlorn hope to the ground. Under such dismaying political circumstances, the emergence of Muslim United Front (MUF) during the 1987 assembly election, a conglomerate of several parties, was inevitable. (Khan, 2012: 29) What was particular about the MUF’s politics was that it was ‘the first party based on a religious identity’, which provided ‘the only outlet for popular discontent’ (Puri, 2006: 80). In the organisation of MUF, the Jamaat-e-Islami had taken the lead. Trying to give a religious direction to Kashmir’s politics, the Jamaat had its presence in Kashmir for long time, but it had a very limited appeal till now. It was only in 1971 that with the Congress support, the party could enter the Assembly by winning five seats. But it was again marginalised when the National Conference came back to power in 1975. With barely 3 per cent share of votes, it could win only one seat in 1977. In 1983, it failed to register its victory in any constituency. However, after forming the MUF, it could extend its political appeal by articulating the anti-Congress and anti-Centre sentiment, however, by giving a religious turn to it. The major objectives of the organisation were related to ‘issues such as promotion and protection of Islamic solidarity, adherence to the

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fundamental principles of Islam maintaining its cultural distinctiveness, precious heritage and traditions promoting co-operation among Muslims’ (Mir, 2008: 35). It was around the Islamic issues that the MUF candidates organised their campaign. ‘Threat to Islam’ was a recurring theme of their speeches: From the outset, the MUF campaign focused on Islamic issues: the proliferation of bars in Srinagar, was for example, a major target, on the grounds that this was part of a larger onslaught on Muslim religious practices and culture. For MUF’s major constituents, the acquisition of state power was a precursor to Islamist ends. (Swami, 2007: 159) With the MUF occupying the central political space, the anti-Centre feelings started being transformed into anti-Indian feelings.9 It not only introduced the factor of religion but also the factor of conflict in the arena of power politics.10 As Schofield notes, MUF’s election manifesto stressed the need for a solution to all outstanding issues according to the Shimla agreement. It also assured the voters that it would work for Islamic unity and against political interference from the centre’ (Schofield, 2003: 147). By the time the 1987 Assembly elections took place, the credibility of power politics was gravely demolished and the anti-Indian political space expanded multifold. The 1987 Assembly elections was mainly contested between National Conference–Congress alliance, on the one hand, and the MUF and few associated parties like the People’s Conference, on the other. Election campaign was quite emotive, with MUF raising a variety of issues: Targeting the simmering political discontent in Kashmir, the MUF raised the issues related to victimisation of Muslim youth and discrimination against them in matters of admission to educational institutions and recruitment to professional institutions. Extremities often marked their politics. They used rhetoric to raise the popular emotions against the National Conference, against the politics of the Central government and against the Indian state and called upon Kashmiris to assert their right of self-determination. (Chowdhary and Rao, 2003: 194) It was the politically surcharged environment that led to a very high voter turnout in the Kashmir Valley. Around three-fourths of the total

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voter population had turned up to cast their votes. On the whole, the MUF and People’s Conference together gave a very tough fight to the National Conference–Congress alliance. Registering their strong presence, these two groups scored slightly less than 40 per cent of the votes cast as compared to 45 per cent votes for the National Conference. But this high share of votes by MUF could not be translated into seats. The coalition could win only four seats in the Assembly. Narrow victories for the National Conference and very high percentage of the rejected votes reflected the manipulation in results. There were constituencies like Bijbehara where the National Conference candidate had won with merely a margin of 100 votes and here the number of rejected votes was 1,177. Similarly in Wachi and Shopian, National Conference candidates had won by as low margin as 122 and 336 votes respectively but the total number of rejected votes was 1,806 and 1,122 respectively11 (Chowdhary and Rao, 2003: 194). Referring to the manipulated elections of 1987 and its implications for Kashmir, Ganguly thus notes: In this election, voters were intimidated, ballot boxes were tampered with, and candidates threatened. Whereas previous generations of Kashmiris, whose political consciousness was low, had long tolerated all manner of electoral irregularities, the generation that had emerged in Kashmir during the long years of Sheikh Abdullah’s incarceration did not have the same regard for the Abdullah family, nor was it willing to tolerate such widespread electoral fraud. (Ganguly, 1996) The 1987 elections resulted in an impasse. Though Farooq Abdullah formed the National Conference–Congress government, it did not enjoy any legitimacy. The elections were perceived to be totally rigged and there was a general sense of disillusionment not merely with regard to the elections but also for the political processes. The situation further deteriorated as the opponents of the government, many of those who had been involved in the electoral process, were detained and ruthlessly treated while in detention. This was the time when young people feeling betrayed by the political processes started probing other possibilities. By 1988 many young people started dropping out of their professional and educational careers and going across the border to be trained as militants. Meanwhile, the disillusionment and anger of people was getting intensified with almost a lack of concern being shown by the state or the Central government. It was in this situation that the simmering

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discontent started getting manifested in the separatist mould. By 1989 Kashmir was witness to three related phenomenon – armed militancy, popular upsurge, and a complete breakdown of political order. Notes 1 The rivalry between Sheikh Abdullah and Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah was well known as the one between ‘Sher-bakra’ (lion and goat). Sheikh was popularly called ‘lion’ of Kashmir and because of his beard Mirwaiz was called ‘bakra’. After the accession of the state with India, Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah was exiled to Pakistan and he died there. In Kashmir, he was succeeded by his nephew Mirwaiz Mohammad Farooq. The political rivalry between the two groups however continued in the post-accession period. 2 In a two-day convention of the Front held in November 1955, it passed a resolution asking India to ‘honour her solemn pledges of holding free and (im)partial Plebiscite in Kashmir for the democratic settlement of the accession question’ (Singh, 1992: 87). 3 As Narinder Singh notes, besides the Plebiscite Front, there were others who pressurised the government to demand plebiscite – these included, the state wing of Praja Socialist Party, the Kashmir Political Conference (Singh, 1992, 87). 4 The Resolution 47 (1948) of the Security Council asked India and Pakistan to take steps for early restoration of peace and order in Jammu and Kashmir and to resolve the question of accession to India or Pakistan through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite. For restoration of peace and order, the Government of Pakistan was asked to ‘secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purposes of fighting’ and asked India that after the tribesmen have withdrawn and there has been effective cessation of the fighting, to ‘withdraw their own forces from Jammu and Kashmir and reducing them progressively to the minimum strength required for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order’. Regarding plebiscite, the resolution asked India to establish a Plebiscite Administration to hold a plebiscite as soon as possible on the question of the accession of the state to India or Pakistan (UNSC Resolution 5/726, 21 April 1948). Similar resolutions were passed in the later period as well. 5 Beg, in fact, continued to attend the Constituent Assembly till 1956 (Singh, 1992: 88) and influence other members of the party to demand plebiscite. 6 To quote Fayaz Ahmad Mir, ‘The 1975 Accord resulted in a setback to the separatist politics in Jammu and Kashmir but it could not mark the end of separatist sentiment in the state. There were some elements in the plebiscite front which were opposed to this accord. Mahaz-i-Azadi launched by Late Sofi Akbar, Jamat-i-Islami, People’s League and JKLF were important organizations, which questioned Kashmiri accession to India and emerged main anti-accord organizations. From 1977 to 1982 the separatist youth movement virtually died down. It was only after the death of Sheikh Abdullah that the separatist group started gaining strength and intensifying their activities’ (Mir, 2008: 35–6).

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7 Even after his removal from power, he continued to be a popular leader. In fact, as Mohammad Ishaq Khan notes, his removal ‘proved to be a blessing in disguise for him’ and he became very popular among the youth (Khan, 2012: 28). 8 Before the formation of MUF, the coalition was organized as United Muslim Front (UMF). It was comprised of Jamaat-e-Islami, Jamaat-e-Tulba, Jamaate-Ahl-e-Hadith, Anjuman Tahafiz-ul-Islam, Muslim Employees’ Front and the World Muslim Organisation. UMF was banned in September 1986. Thereafter the MUF was organized. 9 Besides Jamaat-e-Islami, there were a number of other religion-oriented parties that joined the MUF. Outside this coalition, there were other antiNational Conference forces that rallied behind the MUF. These included the Awami Action Committee led by Mirwaiz Farooq and People’s Conference led by A.G. Lone. These two organizations disassociated themselves from the MUF after the Assembly elections due to ideological differences. While the Jamaat sought to aim for reorganisation of the state on religious basis, these two organizations, especially the People’s Conference, did not necessarily support that idea. Moreover, as Schofield argues, Jamaat from the very beginning was emphasizing on the goal of ‘self-determination’; however, People’s Conference was more concerned about ‘economic justice’ and ‘better deal from India’ (Schofield, 2004: 138). 10 John Ray, who was residing in Kashmir as the Principal of a well-known missionary school in Srinagar, has noted the gradually increasing influence of religion during the late 1970s and 1980s. He thus observes, ‘Since 1979 large pictures of Ayatollah Khomeini, seen everywhere in teashops, pointed to a renewed expectation from Islam. The Afghan struggle, and final success, against the mighty Russians raised in the minds of young Kashmiris a finally false comparison for themselves. Hopes of a place of dignity within India, and of democratic solutions, slowly died through the 1980’s. Pakistan at last became an option for many . . .’ (Ray, 2002: 204). 11 A large percentage of votes in many constituencies was rejected – 6.7 per cent in Doru, 5.6 per cent in Charar-e-Sharief, 4.9 per cent in Homshalibag, 4.8 per cent in Wachi and Sangrama, 4.5 per cent in Amirakadal and 4.3 per cent in Handwara.

Chapter 6

Militancy and separatism

It was after the 1987 Assembly elections that that armed militancy started manifesting itself in Kashmir. As early as May 1987, there was an attack on Farooq Abdullah’s motorcade. The frequency of attacks increased in 1988 – besides the attacks on TV station, telegraph office and other targets, there was an attack on the Director General of Police. However, it was in 1989 that militancy manifested in its full-blown form. This was the time that a large number of young Kashmiris recruited by JKLF, who had crossed border soon after the 1987 Assembly elections, had returned to Kashmir as trained militants. ‘Two massive bomb blasts in the heart of Srinagar, the capital of the state on July 13, 1989 heralded the launching of the armed struggle’ (Sikand, 2001: 219). Attacks on governmental infrastructure including bridges, buses and offices as well as selected targets, mostly those seen as the agents of the state, became a routine after this.1 However, armed militancy did not operate in a vacuum. There was an intense mass response that manifested deep-rooted sense of alienation and anger of people. It was this mass response that legitimised the armed militancy and became the basis of separatist politics that was to acquire central political space of Kashmir in the next decade. Much before the armed militancy had asserted itself, the popular resentment was reflected through frequent protests and demonstrations. To begin with, these protests were not directly linked with the separatist politics that was to manifest itself in 1989, but reflected the growing anger in Kashmir. Gradually this anger was articulated in a more ideological form. From anti-government and anti-state stance that was usually asserted in Kashmir since 1953, it took more definite form by 1989. The spontaneous mass protests over all kinds of issues throughout the period between 1987 and 1989 provided the space for mobilisation of people. Apart from the set dates like Independence Day of India and

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Pakistan and the Indian Republic Day, which became the occasions for extensive mobilisation of anti-India sentiments, there were many other situations that turned quite volatile during this period.2 By the time, the armed militancy overtook the state, the mass response had become so coherent and expressive that it seemed that the whole valley was swayed by the sentiments of azadi3 (Schofield, 2004: 143–7). The massive processions with thousands participating reverberated with the slogan ‘hum kya chahte? Azadi’ (What do we want? Independence). These processions were visible not only in Srinagar but almost in all towns of Kashmir, including Baramulla, Sopore, Anantnag and elsewhere. Among those who participated in these procession included young people, students, shopkeepers, women and even government employees. Almost as a routine, the Kashmiris would gather in thousands, shouting slogans demanding the implementation of UN Resolutions on Kashmir march towards the office of UN Military Observers’ Group (UNMOG). Referring to a massive demonstration during the month of January 1990, Sumantra Bose (2003: 108–9) noted that ‘even the JKLF’s still relatively few underground militants were initially stunned by the spectacular scale and emotional intensity of the protests.’ Despite the fact that the state would respond to these processions by placing the major town of the Valley under curfew, the people would disregard it and join the processions in large numbers. One such procession held in the town of Charar-e-Sharief in March 1990 registered the participation of ‘over three hundred thousand people’ (Bose, 2003: 114–15). The mass response that was displayed in the initial period was to a considerable extent influenced by the global situation. Radical changes taking place in Europe through mass intervention, especially in places like erstwhile Soviet Union, Romania, Poland and Germany, were having a psychological impact on the Kashmiris. People started believing that they could also change the situation in Kashmir by agitating and joining the protest marches. The response of mass of Kashmiris towards armed militancy was quite positive. Rather than being opposed to it, they were very sympathetic and provided the moral and emotional support to it. Militancy was romanticised and militants were treated with a lot of respect. The militants in these initial years quite integrated with the society. They used to move openly in the streets and evoked both awe and inspiration.4 Seen as heroes, their death was celebrated as that of ‘martyrs’ with their funerals acquiring political significance. Referring to the funeral of Ashfaq Wani, a well-known militant of JKLF, Sumantra Bose

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notes that it was the ‘largest gathering ever seen in Kashmir, easily surpassing even Sheikh Abdullah’s funeral in 1982’ (Bose, 2003: 103). Witnessing the massive popular support for the militants, Tavleen Singh noted that, ‘even shopkeepers who have been forced to close their shops almost every day for two weeks in the midst of the tourist season talk about the exploits of the underground leaders almost with affection. Children treat them as heroes’ (Singh, 1995: 111). What was peculiar about the initial stage of resistance politics and armed militancy, women were very much part of it. The mass demonstrations had large number of women participating in it. So large was their number that they became the face of the mass politics. However, their role was not restricted to the day-to-day protest demonstrations, but they actively supported the militancy. In fact, it was the way women eulogised the militants, that militancy was legitimised in Kashmir (Prashar, 2010: 438). Owning the mujahids (militants) as ‘our own boys’, they opened their doors for them and even offered their own sons for ‘martyrdom’. It was women only who celebrated the death of a militant by singing ‘wun wun’, the traditional Kashmiri wedding songs. These wedding songs were reinvented with political meanings and political terminology (Sobharajani, 2008). To quote Sikandar: In the early 1990s the women were in the forefront of the protests demanding secession from India, helping the mujahideen morally, economically and emotionally. The women used to join the funeral processions of the dead militants chanting As-salaam As-salaam Aye Shahido As-salam, Aaj Teri Maut pe Ro raha hai yeh Aasmaan. (Felicitations and farewell to you o martyr, today even the sky cries at your martyrdom) and encouraging their men with Aye Mard e Mujahid Jaad Zara Waqt e Shahadat Hai Aaya (Wake up o warrior, the time for martyrdom has come). (Sikander, 2012: 21) The separatist space that was created in post-1987 period, therefore, was extensive. It comprised not merely the Kashmiri militants who challenged the Indian claim on Kashmir but also of the common Kashmiris who fully sympathised with the ‘cause’ undertaken by the militants. Though armed militancy formed an important part of separatist politics, it was the popular resistance that lay at the core of the separatist politics of Kashmir. It is from the popular separatist sentiment that armed militancy drew its legitimacy. The later-day separatist organisations

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and leaders also defined their politics with reference to this popular sentiment.

Collapse of mainstream politics The political situation as it evolved in the background of militancy and separatism resulted in the collapse of power politics. By early 1990s, the normal political processes had totally collapsed, and it had become almost difficult for the government to provide effective governance or even to maintain law and order. There was a total breakdown of the state machinery. With massive demonstrations in which thousands of people participated, the authority of the state was challenged almost on a daily basis. With the gap between government and people becoming wider by each day, its capacity to enforce its writ was gradually being lost. Even with the imposition of curfew, the last instrument in its hands, it could not control the mass upsurge. While defying the curfew, people would show their complete compliance to the call for ‘civil curfew’ given by any of the militant organisations. Situation on the whole was anarchic with a total collapse of law and order. This is how the situation was described by an Indian civil society organisation that visited Kashmir during that time: The deserted streets of curfew-bound Srinagar with only gun-totting para-military forces moving around make it look like a city under siege. Almost every establishment is closed – government offices, Indian Airlines office, post and telegraphs office (we were told that about 12,000 telegrams were lying undelivered), shops and markets. There is a virtual breakdown in administration throughout the entire Kashmir valley. People either do not or cannot attend office or work in the field out of fear of harassment by the security forces. All development works and projects are dormant. Contractors have abandoned sites and labour, most of which is from outside the state, has fled either to Jammu or to their home states. (Bose et al., 1990: 653) With most of the political space captured either by the militants or by the protest politics, there was no space for ‘normal’ political processes. Daunted by the intensity of separatist sentiments, the mainstream politicians themselves had withdrawn from the scene. They faced the resentment of people and were held responsible for denying people their democratic rights and also for collaborating with the state against the

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Kashmiris. Their withdrawal was also a consequence of the threat of militants. They were among the prominent targets of the militants. The killing of Mohammed Yusuf Halwai, a National Conference leader in August 1989, was the first in a series of killing of the political activists affiliated with that party. The JKLF claimed responsibility for the killing, blatantly by placing a placard on his body (Schofield, 2004: 144). The near-total erosion of the ‘mainstream’ political space as well as redundancy of the political activists and party leaders, in the wake of militancy and separatism, was reflected during the 1989 Parliamentary elections. Political parties and voters were reluctant to participate in this election. The National Conference, therefore, won the Srinagar constituency uncontested. In other two constituencies, only a few independents contested the election along with the National Conference. The voter turnout was as low as 5.03 per cent in Baramulla constituency and 5.07 per cent in Anantnag constituency. Of the total votes polled in Baramulla constituency, around 60 per cent votes were polled in two non-Kashmiri-speaking Pahari Assembly segments – Uri and Handwara. There were many segments in both the constituencies that witnessed negligible level of voting. It was in this situation that the state Assembly was dissolved in January 1990 and the state was placed under the Governor’s rule, to begin with, and later under the President’s rule, which lasted till 1996. In the kind of situation that evolved, the very nature of Kashmir’s politics changed. While there was a major shift in the way resistance was manifested, there was also an emergence of a variety of leaders and organisations. All this led to a discontinuity with the politics of identity as it was reflecting from 1930s to 1980s. Till now, what formed the basis of continuity was the presence of a single leader (Sheikh Abdullah) and a single organisation (National Conference). This continuity was maintained even when the National Conference was truncated and later on disbanded, since the Plebiscite Front led by Sheikh Abdullah represented the continuity. Now for the first time, there was not only a new set of leadership and new set of ideologies, but also there was contestation of Sheikh Abdullah. For the first time, Sheikh’s role in Kashmir’s politics was being reassessed and hugely critiqued. From having been almost a god till he died he suddenly began to be viewed as an ordinary politician who had allowed his family to benefit from power, just like politicians elsewhere in India, and who had left behind an heir who had betrayed Kashmir. (Singh, 1995: 112)

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Nature of armed militancy Militancy, to begin with, was indigenous. Except for being armed, ‘it was essentially the old NC-PF brand of politics that, radicalised under the leadership of a militant younger generation, rebelled against India’ (Bose, 2003: 117). Mostly urban, coming not only from Srinagar but also other major towns of the Valley, the first-generation militants were young people who were either students or had finished their education and a few were also qualified doctors, engineers and even policemen (Schofield, 2004: 146). While many of them had taken to militancy because of their personal frustration with the electoral process, since they had participated in 1987 Assembly elections as supporters, agents or campaigners; many others were generally resentful because of the political developments of the last few years. ‘Bulk of recruits’ according to Radha Kumar, ‘were young college graduates without jobs’, who were resentful of the lack of employment opportunities and ‘blamed their condition on Indian rule’ (Kumar, 2002: 15). Initially, the major militant organisation was the JKLF, which was led by four young men known as the HAJY group comprised of Hamid Sheikh, Ashfaq Wani, Javed Mir and Yasin Malik.5 Though formed by Maqbool Bhat in 1964 in Peshawar, the Jammu and Kashmir branch of JKLF was launched in 1988 (Santhanam et al., 2003: 168–9). Crossing over to Pakistan-administered Kashmir, the JKLF cadre got the support of Pakistan to launch militancy in Kashmir. Though as Schofield notes, Pakistan ‘seemed to be taken unawares by events in the valley’, it readily helped JKLF in providing training, arms, finances and other logistic support (Schofield, 2014: 149). One initial militant activity that brought JKLF to prominence was the kidnapping of Dr. Rubaiya Sayeed, daughter of the then Union Home Minister, Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, and successful release of five militants in 1989. Though indigenous, militancy was sustained mainly due to the support of Pakistan. Pakistan supported JKLF in the initial stages since this was the major militant group in Kashmir and its anti-India agenda was convenient to it. However, its objective of ‘independent Kashmir’ contradicted with the objective that it officially pursued – that of merger of Kashmir with Pakistan. So very soon, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the intelligence agency of Pakistan, launched its own militant organisation with the help of few breakaway JKLF cadre. The organisation was named Al-Badr. Later on, with a few more militant organisations joining it, the organisation was renamed as Hizbul Mujahideen (Swami, 2000). After creating the Hizb, Pakistan strategically started weakening

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JKLF by a variety of means, which included sponsoring breakaway JKLF cadres to organise parallel militant groups other than the Hizb (these included Al-Umar Mujahideen and Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen); eliminating the cadre of the JKLF either directly targeting them or by leading Indian security forces towards them. According to Bose, By 1992 the JKLF’s dominance of the armed struggle was under siege on three fronts: relentless pressure from the Indian security forces, the formation of splinter groups with Pakistani support, and the rapidly rising strength again with Pakistani support, of HM as a military force. (Bose, 2003: 128–9) The result was that JKLF was forced to declare unilateral ceasefire and its leader Yasin Malik vowed to adopt Gandhian method for his peaceful struggle. Since then the Hizbul Mujahideen remained the leading indigenous militant organisation. However, as Bose notes, the ideological stance of Hizb – merger of Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan could not gain popularity with the Kashmiris. He notes: Its [Hizb’s] ideology of Kashmir banega Pakistan (Kashmir will become Pakistan) remained a minority orientation, at odds with the continuing popular appeal of independence ideology in the proazaadi areas of IJK. HM’s sacrifices in the cause of azaadi were (and are) widely admired, but its political affiliate JI’s brand of orthodox Islam – preached in a network of religious schools run by the party – is regarded with distaste by most Muslims in the Valley and other Kashmiri-speaking areas. (Bose, 2003: 130) As militancy gained ground, there was mushrooming of militant organisations with different ideologies and different objectives. While India remained the common target for all these organisations, there were lot of internal differences. The difference was not merely represented by the ultimate objectives of JKLF (complete independence of erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir from both India and Pakistan) and Hizb (merger with Pakistan) but also with regard to the role of religion in the movement. A number of outfits like Allah Tigers were keen on enforcing ‘Islamic’ code on the people as well. It ‘went about smashing Srinagar’s bars, closing down cinema halls, video parlours and beauty parlours, saying that they were un-Islamic. It was

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decreed that all women would wear the burqa, and dress according to Islamic tradition’ (Sidhva, 1992: 40–2). There were others who saw armed militancy in Kashmir as part of the Pan-Islamic struggle being waged at the global level. These were jehadis who entered the scenario of militancy quite early. Lashkar-e-Toiba, according to Sikand, entered Kashmir in 1990 and intensified its activities in 1993. According to him, after the Mujahideen victory in Afghanistan in 1992, ‘numerous jihadist outfits in Pakistan began turning their attention towards Kashmir. By the late 1990s, these Pakistani jihadists were playing a key role in the fighting in Kashmir, eclipsing even local Kashmiri groups’ (Sikand, 2001: 222). Harkat-ul-Ansar, Al-Faran, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Jaish-e-Mohammed were such organisations that dominated the scenario of militancy at different points in time. The increased number of foreign militants in the period after mid-1990s gets reflected from the large percentage of the killing of these militants by Indian security forces as compared to the local militants – from 5.7 per cent foreign militants killed in 1995, the percentage was increased to 53.9 per cent in 2000 and 69.38 per cent in 2003 (Routray, 2012: 182).

Formation of Hurriyat Conference The first few years after the onset of militancy, the separatist politics of Kashmir operated on its own. There was no political organisation of significance which had the responsibility of giving it or the armed militant organisations any direction. It was only in 1993 that All Party Hurriyat Conference came into existence to take upon itself the role of giving a political face to the popular separatist sentiment and armed militancy. The circumstances in which Hurriyat came into existence were also defined by fratricide among the militant organisations. More specifically, the cadre of JKLF had come under the attack of Hizbul Mujahideen. Kul Jamaat-e-Hurriyat-e-Kashmir (All Party Hurriyat Conference of Kashmir) was formed with Maulvi Omar Farooq as its chairman. It included seven parties and 20 other groups and organisations. These included the Muslim Conference, Jamaat-e-Islami, People’s Conference, People’s League, Awami Action Committee and JKLF.6 The objectives that this organisation set before itself included struggling for exercise of right of self-determination as per the UN Charter and as per the resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council; making efforts for alternative negotiated settlement of the dispute; projecting the movement at the international level; promoting Islamic values and

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preserving the Muslim-majority character of the state. The most important decision-making body of the Hurriyat Conference was its executive council, which was comprised of seven members including Syed Ali Shah Geelani of Jamaat-e-Islami, Umar Farooq of Awami Action Committee, Sheikh Abdul Aziz of People’s League, Maulvi Abbas Ansari of Ittihad-ul-Muslimeen, Prof. Abdul Ghani Bhat of Muslim Conference, Yasin Malik of JKLF and Abdul Ghani Lone of People’s Conference. Soon after its formation, Hurriyat Conference came to occupy a central space in the separatist politics of Kashmir. It played the role of giving a political face to separatism, which was earlier reflected either through the spontaneous mass demonstrations or through the armed militancy. With the militarised response of the state, the phenomenon of mass demonstration had faded out. The armed militancy was the most dominant phenomenon, but it was bogged with internal struggles and contradictions. In the environment of violence where all political voices were suppressed, Hurriyat was able to gradually represent popular concerns. Of these concerns, the most prominent concerns were related to the increasing impact of violence on the society, in general, and the role of jehadis, in particular. Kashmiris were not very comfortable with some of the means adopted by the jehadis. For instance, Harkat-ul-Ansar had imposed ban on pilgrimage of Hindus to Amarnath. This was against the local ethos as the pilgrimage has been taking place annually with the cooperation of the local Muslims. Banning of this pilgrimage was opposed by the Hurriyat Conference. Similarly, Hurriyat also ‘condemned the kidnapping of the five foreign tourists by the Al Farhan and organised a successful bandh to protest against the killing of the Norwegian Hostage’ (Puri, 1995: 2354). Hurriyat Conference was an amalgam of different kinds of organisations. Of the 26 constituents, a few of these had political background. Such organisations included the Awami Action Committee, Jamaat-e-Islami, Jammu and Kashmir People’s Conference, Muslim Conference and People’s League. There were few socio-religious organisations like Auquaf Jama Masjid, Islamic Study Circle, Jamiat Ulam-e-Islam, Jamaat-e-Hadania, Jamiat-Ahle-Hadit and Anjuman-e-Tabligh-ul-Islam. The militant organisations like JKLF were also its components. Among other components included various associations like Kashmir Bar Council, Employees and Workers Confederation, All Jammu & Kashmir Employees’ Federation, Student Islamic League and Muslim Khwateen Markaz. With its constituents coming from different backgrounds, the Hurriyat Conference could be called a ‘loose’ organisation, replete with

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internal differences. Though it presented a unified political goal of working towards the resolution of conflict, there were sharp differences with regard to in which direction the conflict would be resolved. There were, for instance, strong differences of opinion between the ideology of JKLF and Jamat-e-Islami. The JKLF defined the movement as a struggle for ‘national liberation’. According to Yasin Malik, the goal of separatist politics was liberation of Kashmir from ‘occupational forces’. By occupation forces, he meant not only India but also Pakistan (Sahni, 1999: 55). However, Jamat-e-Islami aimed at merger of Kashmir with Pakistan and ‘establishment of an Islamic state’. Syed Ali Shah Geelani, representing the views of Jamat, looked at Kashmir struggle as a part of global jehad and not as a local political struggle. In his opinion, the idea of ‘national liberation’ is antithetical to the framework of Islam. To quote Sikand: If all Muslims form one nation and nationalism is antithetical to Islam, then, the argument that Gilani seeks to advance is that the Kashmiri nationalist project of groups such as the JKLF is itself unIslamic. From this it follows that the ‘Islamic’ solution to the Kashmir question is not the establishment of an independent Kashmiri nation but the incorporation of Kashmir into an already-existing Muslim state, Pakistan. This is seen as the first step towards the eventual unity of all Muslims. (Sikand, 2001: 221) The difference of opinion between the two therefore lay not only on the issue of the ultimate goal of the movement but also on the nature of the movement. While the JKLF saw it as an indigenous and political struggle, the Jamat saw it as a ‘religious’ struggle and a part of global or Pan-Islamic movement.

Changing popular responses towards armed militancy After the initial phase, there was a change in the popular response towards militancy. Initially the militants had come from ‘middle class intelligentsia’ and were committed to the ideology of azadi. They took to guns as they thought it to be the ‘only way to achieve their goal’ (Engineer, 1995: 2167). However, with the mushroom growth of militant organisations, indigenous as well as foreign, there was a change of the character of the militancy. Besides those who joined it because of their personal commitment, there were those who joined it because of quick

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fame, power and money. There were also criminals and anti-social people who used their newly gained power to extort money as well as for their other activities.7 Referring to the changed nature of militancy after proliferation of armed group, Bose notes that In the first heady years, with revolution in the air and the Valley awash in weapons procured from across the LOC . . . it was distinctly fashionable to become a ‘freedom fighter’. It was almost easy for the newly minted ‘commanders’ to gather a band of gunmen from their locality or extended family and float a tanzeem, a guerrilla group. (Bose, 2003: 125) The changed nature of militancy led to change in the response of Kashmiris towards it. Such a changed response was due to the implications that it was having on society. By the early 1990s, Kashmiris had started facing the maximum brunt of violence. They also started getting impacted by the criminal activities of some of the militant groups. Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights noted as early as 1992 the involvement of militants in incidents of abduction and execution of civilians suspected to be government informers or supporting the Government of India, and raping women and placing various social restrictions on them (Asia Watch Committee et al., 1993: 142–3). Also there was lack of tolerance for political dissent within the separatist politics. During the post-1990 period many people were killed by the armed militants because of their ideological position. Prominent among those killed by the militants for their political positions included Maulvi Farooq, Dr. Abdul Ahad Guru and Qazi Nissar. Bose notes as to how after the death of Qazi Nissar in 1994 there was massive protest against the Hizbul Mujahideen in Kashmir (Bose, 2003: 132). Islamic radicalisation also had its implications for the militancy. Many of those who had supported the militancy in the initial period, purely for political reasons, started getting disillusioned by it as the fundamentalist elements in the fringes started using the pro-militancy environment to invoke religious and moral codes as well as to assert the religious dimensions of the politics of azadi. Analysing the changing response of people towards militancy, Mohammad Ishaq Khan notes: Considering that the roots of embedded in the past, it was no marvel, therefore, that the militants had unstinted support of the people in the early phase of the armed insurgency. But soon turns

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and twists on the road to azadi began to appear. The movement was hijacked with the radical Islamization of the ebullient sentiment for azadi. Forced to move in the direction of a romantic or uncultivated goal in a rising tide of sullen and popular anger against India, azadi began to lose its original meaning. The militant outfits were now engaged in fighting not only the Indian forces, but more against their own people in the name of differing ideologies or on the basis of mere suspicion or vengeance. At the outset of armed insurgency in Kashmir, some Kashmiri Pundits were killed by a notorious militant of JKLF. The slogan mongering of the militants in favour of Islami Inqalab, Nizam-i-Mustafa, Kashmir Banay ga Pakistan, and so on prepared the ground for the migration of Kashmiri Pundits. . . . With the mushrooming of militant outfits, thanks to Pakistan, not only did life in the Valley became a burden, but the concept of azadi itself began to appear as a bugbear. A militant group could enter any house at its will and resort to extortion of various kinds in the name of azadi or jihad. The most contradictory strand that now began to appear in the movement for azadi was the feeling of insecurity and fear generated not only by the Indian forces, but, more than that, by gun-wielding extortionists as mujahids. (Khan, 2012: 33–4) However, more than anything else what changed the response of people towards militancy was the presence of foreign militants.8 Although in the beginning the foreign militants, popularly known as ‘guest militants’, were welcomed and their role was appreciated, but gradually their lack of sensitivities towards the local cultural values led to a sense of discomfort about their presence. Jehadis had brought in a new element in the politics of Kashmir that the people of Kashmir were unfamiliar with and as Khan argues, it provided challenge ‘of an immense magnitude to both Islam and Kashmiriyat’. Though the use of religion for political purposes was not new to Kashmiris as it was introduced by Sheikh Abdullah, but it was quite different from the way religion was used by the militants. To quote Khan: Using Islam for political ends in the 1990s, however, was not a new phenomenon in Kashmir. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah had done in from the 1930s until the sad end of his political career. But his use of Islam to further the Kashmir cause was poles apart from that of the Jamat-e-Islami and several militant outfits. For Abdullah, shrines, particularly Hazratbal, did not merely provide ready-made platforms

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for moulding the political consciousness of Kashmiri Muslims against the Dogra monarchy, Indian military and political dominance, and ultimately defending Kashmiriyat: they also served as bulwarks against New Delhi’s insidious designs against his co-religionists. (Khan, 2012: 27) However, the slogan of jehad used during the period of militancy was of different nature and it did not match with the local sensibilities, especially their Sufi orientations and traditions. The burning down of Charar-e-Sharief in an encounter between security forces and the jehadi militants in 1995, therefore, led to a negative response among people against militancy as such. This shrine symbolises the cultural and religious identity of Kashmir and represents its Sufi base. Sheikh Noorudin Noorani is known as the patron saint of Kashmir. Before it was burnt down, it was captured by a foreign jehadi, Mast Gul. Although both the security forces and the militants blamed each other for burning down the shrine, the fact that the jehadis used this sacred and revered shrine for their political purposes did not go down very well with the Kashmiris. Similarly, Kashmiris did not appreciate the act of kidnapping of two British citizens by Harkatul Ansar in 1994 (Navlakha, 1994: 2465). Balraj Puri noted in 1995 that the blurred line between Kashmir-based and Pak-based groups that existed in the initial stage of militancy started becoming sharp, and the local resentment against the foreign militants started being expressed (Puri, 1995: 2354). Yasin Malik, the JKLF militant who had left armed militancy in 1993 and joined the Hurriyat Conference, for instance, started talking of disciplining the militant organisations. He asked for ‘merger of the 70-odd militant groups into three major groups’ as well as ‘an immediate end to extortion’ (Navlakha, 1994: 2465). In understanding the changing response of people towards militancy, it is important to understand the multiple sources of violence in Kashmir since 1989. Of these, the most important were the armed militants and security forces and at somewhat later stage, the renegades or the surrendered militants who worked for the state. The renegades became prominent during the middle of 1990s due to the role they played in countering the armed militants and helping the state agencies to restore its authority in various spaces. Right from initial phase of militancy, the pressure from the security forces led to the surrender of militants. The number of such surrendered militants, however, was quite high during the years 1995–96.9 Many of these surrendered militants joined the security forces in their fight

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against active militants. They had no legal or formal authority, but they exercised immense power. Much of this power was without any accountability. To quote Balagopal, they were ‘unlawful gangs of armed Kashmiri youth, sheltered in or around the ubiquitous bunkers of the armed forces, doing their job of abduction, torture and killing, but only more efficaciously, more knowledgeably and more anonymously, and looting and raping Kashmir withal’ (Balagopal, 1996: 2920–1). Of these renegades, Kukka Parrey, Liaqat Khan, Javed Shah and Papa Kishtwari were among the most well-known names.10 In the language of the state, these were the ‘reformed militants’ (Navlakha et al., 1996: 1928). But, in actual practice, they were now working for the state in a rather informal arrangement. They were useful for the state agencies and they were the ‘insiders’ who were not only familiar the Kashmiri society very well but also understood the ways of the militants.

Withdrawal of legitimacy by women Women, as has been noted above, were the major source of legitimisation of armed militancy and violence in the initial period. However, with the change in the character of militancy, their responses also changed. This was mainly due to the fact that with the lumpenisation as well as radicalisation of militancy, women had to face the major brunt of the ‘culture of violence’. In the words of Krishna Misri, it was with reference to the ‘new identities’ that women assumed – ‘rape victims, abducted women, widows, half-widows, migrants and so on’ that one could see the impact that they had to bear. To quote her: Women bore the brunt of the suffering since, ironically, the two forces wielding power shared a patriarchal mindset that views women as symbols of individual and collective ‘honour’. As has been the case throughout history, women’s bodies in Kashmir became sites of war irrespective of their class, caste, religion, region or ethnicity. Physical violations of women became common and were used to challenge the collective honour of the community. Rape, gang-rape, abductions, kidnapping, naked corpses with amputated limbs hanging from tree-tops, were visible manifestations of the grim reality that gripped women’s lives in the Valley (Misri cited in Khan, 2010: 135). Surrounded by various kinds of guns, those of the security forces, militants and counter-insurgents, women were victimised and marginalised.

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They were not only sexually abused by the security forces but also by the militants. There have been many reports of marriages by the militants at the point of gun known as ‘command marriages’, their sexual exploitation by foreign militants as well as kidnapping (Manchanda, 1999). Meanwhile, they were also to face the impact of cultural onslaught by the fundamentalist forces. Very early in the period of militancy, women felt the pressure of these forces when in the name of religion dress codes and moral codes were suggested. Attempts were made to restrain the mobility of women and to impose sex segregation. A number of groups issued diktats to women to veil themselves. According to Parashar, women have been sprayed with colored paint or acid or even shot in the legs for wearing western dresses. Separatist militant groups, with the support of women like Asiya Andrab, have banned beauty parlours, cinema halls and wine shops and demanded that women adhere to Islamic dress code. They have also ransacked internet cafes and restaurants for allowing young couples to meet privately. (Prashar, 2010a: 179) For a liberal society like Kashmir, which allowed women sufficient freedom of mobility and space, these were alienating developments. Hence, silently, women stopped endorsing violence. In the generally muted society, they were not able to voice their concerns, but they were no more celebrating the militancy the way they used to do earlier. They were the first ones to withdraw the legitimacy to the militants, particularly the jehadi militant. With their silent opposition to these militants, there was an overall antipathy of the society as well towards the foreign militants.

Disjuncture between support for armed militancy and separatist sentiment In the culture of violence, what became the victim was the voice of the people. The repression of the security forces, on the one hand, and that of the armed militants, on the other, resulted in a culture of fear and silence. Referring to the situation as he assessed it in 1996 Balagopal thus noted: The people in whose name the gun speaks gradually withdraw into silence. It is partly due to the fear of getting caught (literally and figuratively) in the crossfire, if one draws attention to oneself

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by talking too much; more particularly, there is the fear of being branded an ‘agent’ of the other party, by either party. (Balagopal, 1996: 2917) However, despite the apparent silence, there were enough indications by the middle of 1990s that prolonged living under the abnormal conditions of violence, repression and intimidation had created a sense of exhaustion among Kashmiris. The enthusiasm that was reflected in early period for the armed militancy was gone. Also completely gone was the initial feeling of optimism that ‘azadi is round the corner’. Faced with the might of the Indian state and its capacity to restore its authority, a strong feeling was emerging that violence was no more an appropriate means to fulfil the aspirations of people and that it was rather playing a counter-productive role. By middle of 1990s, violence had affected the Kashmiri society so deeply that almost every family had been affected by it. There were thousands of people who were killed either by the security forces, militants or renegades or because they were caught up in the cross-fire; there were many people who had disappeared, imprisoned and tortured. On the whole, there had started developing a feeling that the movement in Kashmir had stagnated and there was a need to change the strategy and move forward. This did not at all mean in any case that the popular separatist sentiment had also waned. On the contrary, the intensity of separatist sentiment increased. Much of this had to do with the response of the state and security forces in combating the armed militancy. Right from the beginning, the response of the state to militancy was more or less militarised. For countering the insurgency, the security forces were given extraordinary power. Besides the local Public Safety Act (1978), the Armed Forces Special Power Act (AFSPA) and Disturbed Areas Act (DAA) gave sweeping powers to them. While empowering the security forces through these instruments was meant to control militancy, however, the ordinary people were also affected. Dealing with a complex situation the security forces were not able to draw the fine line between the armed militants and sympathetic civilian population and therefore many such situations evolved in which unarmed civilians were harassed, captured, injured and killed. Each such situation resulted in intensification of the anger against the state and the resultant intensification of the separatist sentiment.11 Repression by the state agencies, to quote Bose (2003: 116): had the effects of further radicalising public opinion and of convincing thousands of Kashmiri youths to take up arms to fight the

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Indian state. The years 1990–93 were the boom period of armed struggle in the Valley, a time of immense turmoil and suffering but also of great enthusiasm and optimism about the mass movement.12 Though the fascination with armed militancy was over in few years’ time, yet, the resentment against the Indian state and the separatist sentiments remained intact. However, there were clear signals that there was some kind of mismatch between this sentiment, on the one hand, and the armed militancy and separatist leadership and organisations on the other. By the end of 1990s, there were enough indications that the popular responses towards the separatist movement had undergone substantial change as compared to what these were in 1989–90. Unlike this earlier period, in late 1990s, there was no more blanket approval of militancy in Kashmir. Militants, especially the Kashmiri militants, who were killed were still treated as ‘martyrs’ but there was a growing weariness about the violence. More specifically, there was an increasing sense of discomfort with the presence of jehadis and their methods.13

Lone–Geelani debate However, in the overall culture of violence, it took sometime before the popular sentiment could be articulated and placed in the public realm. Since the overwhelming presence of gun had muted the voices of dissent and debate, the reflection of popular sentiment within the separatist discourse was missing. It was in late 1990s that for the first time this sentiment was reflected in the numerous statements made by two top leaders of the Hurriyat Conference – Syed Ali Shah Geelani and Abdul Ghani Lone. This public dialogue that took place between these two leaders during the years 2000–01 revolved around three major issues that confronted the separatist movement at that moment: the nature of the movement (its religious or political character), the role of the foreign militants and the relevance of armed militancy. The difference between the two leaders emanated from their very conception of the movement in Kashmir. For Geelani, the movement was a part of the Pan-Islamic movement, the international jehad. The ultimate goal of the movement, for him, was merger of the state with Pakistan. For Lone, on the contrary, the movement had nothing to do with religion. It was ‘indigenous’, ‘political’ and ‘secular’ movement and was not in any way linked with international jehad. Taking cognisance of religious, cultural and regional diversities within the state, Lone

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believed that the movement could not be defined within the parameters of religion since it had to reflect the plural realities of the state. Hence, he defined the ultimate goal in terms of uniting the two sides of Jammu and Kashmir state as it stood earlier before the partition of India. It is on the basis of their approach to the movement itself that the two differed around the issue of relevance of jehadis in Kashmir. Geelani believed that the jehadis had come from ‘Muslim countries’ for the sake of the ‘Islamic movement’ in Kashmir. Their role, therefore, for him was not only very crucial but also ‘inevitable’. Lone, on the other hand, argued that when the jehadis had come, they were welcome since they had helped internationalise the Kashmir conflict. But now, they had no role and relevance in Kashmir. Being a movement of Kashmiris, it should be controlled by them. When it comes to the settlement of disputes, in his opinion, ‘it will be the Kashmiris, their militants and their political leadership which will represent the people of Kashmir’ (Chowdhary, 2002: 2399) Asking them to leave Kashmiris alone, Lone stated that the presence of jehadis was now detrimental to the struggle of Kashmiris, because ‘they have initiated an international jehadi agenda, thus connecting the Kashmir issue with terrorism’ (Lifschultz, 2002: 3226). While objecting to the role of the foreign jehadis and asking them to quit, Lone was redefining the very nature of the movement. The movement in his understanding had come to a stage when it was important to transcend the role of armed militancy and to define it politically. A stage had come where ‘a solution is possible only through negotiations and peaceful means’ (cited in Lifschultz, 2002: 3226). Hence there was a need for diplomatic and political approaches. Lone, therefore, made a case for primacy of political strategy over violence, on the one hand, and the primacy of political activists over militants, on the other. Lone had to pay for his outspokenness through his life. He was assassinated in May 2002. However, before his death, he attended a crucial conference in Sharjah along with Mirwaiz Umer Farooq. In this conference he met Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, chairman of the Kashmiri Committee in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Here also he reiterated his assertion that violence should be substituted by the political means and Kashmiris should be allowed both by the militants as well as by Pakistan to take control of their own political movement. However, when they came back, the Hurriyat leadership under the influence of Geelani distanced itself from the stand taken by Lone. Geelani stated that till the time repression continued, jehad cannot be put to an end (Bukhari, 2002). However, Lone’s position was to prevail in the long run. Though he faced opposition within the Hurriyat, yet he ultimately succeeded in

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changing the political discourse and bringing the issue of ‘political dialogue’ on the forefront. Separatist discourse thereafter was broadened to include several issues over which silence was maintained so far.

Exodus of Kashmiri Pundits One crucial implication of armed militancy in Kashmir was the impact that it had on its mixed society. A large part of the miniscule minority of Kashmiri Pundits left the valley in 1990. It was in the situation of collapse of the political order and failure of the state to maintain its authority that the mass exodus of the minority Kashmiri Pundits took place around March 1990. Kashmiri Pundits, though a miniscule minority, formed a very vital part of Kashmiri culture and society. Despite their small number, they held a very significant influence on Kashmir holding important positions in the society as teachers, doctors, low and middle level bureaucrats, professionals, among others. Despite their religious difference with majority Muslims, they shared the cultural-linguistic ethos of Kashmir and bonded quite well with the Muslims. Traditionally associated with the state services, they were the first to take to education and were quite ahead of the Muslims in terms of their social and economic status. Despite the fact that Kashmiri Pundits were the first to raise the issue of Kashmiri identity and struggled for ‘Kashmir for Kashmiris’, they did not completely identify with Kashmiri identity politics as it evolved in the later period. Much before the Muslim Conference had emerged, Kashmiri Pundits, reacting to the influx of Punjabi officers in the state administration, demanded protection of the rights of the local residents of the state and restrict the ‘outsiders’ from holding state jobs. It was on the basis of this demand that special privileges for the ‘state subjects’ were defined in 1929. However, as the political movement evolved in the post-1931 phase, Kashmiri Pundits did not form a part of it – initially because of the religious basis of its mobilisation. However, even when the movement was secularised and the membership of the National Conference was opened to all sections of society irrespective of religious affiliations, Pundits did not join it in large numbers. This is despite the fact that Prem Nath Bazaz had a major role to play in moulding the politics of Kashmir in mid-1930s only a few prominent Kashmiri Pundits joined the National Conference. Despite the cultural bonding and a very harmonious inter-community relation with Kashmiri Muslims, the Kashmiri Pundits politically

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diverged from the dominant politics of Kashmir as it evolved in the post-Accession period. More specifically, the divergence was sharpened in the context of the post-1953 political mobilisation around the demand for plebiscite. Identifying themselves with Indian nationalism, they could not connect themselves with the politics of contestation of Indian state’s claim over the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Political divergence notwithstanding, the Kashmiri Pundit community was quite entrenched in Kashmir till the middle of 1980s. Despite the fact that the socio-economic position of the community was impacted by the post-1947 policies of the state government, particularly the land reforms and the expansion of educational and vocational opportunities for the Muslims, it continued to have a place of prominence in Kashmir. Despite their small numbers, they had great visibility. What was peculiar about the presence of Pundits in Kashmir was their being jelled within the Kashmiri society. Rather than being ghettoised in secluded areas, they were part of a mixed society. With the exception of certain localities in Srinagar city, which were mainly Pundit localities, like Habbakadal, Rainawari and Karan Nagar, Kashmiri Pundits were spread all over the Valley living as a miniscule minority within the predominant Muslim community and sharing the socio-cultural ethos of the society. Till 1986, there was no tension between the two communities. In 1986, communal tension was generated due to damage to some temples during spontaneous public protests in Anantnag. However, this exception apart, the inter-community relations till the time mass upsurge in the 1989–90 period were quite harmonious. What caused the mass exodus of the Kashmiri Pundit community from Kashmir has been mired in controversies. As per the two extreme, but contradictory, explanations floated, one relates to the ‘ethnocide’ of the Kashmiri Pundit community so as to purge Hindus from Kashmir and the other relates to the systematic policy of the state, particularly of Governor Jagmohan, to send the Pundits away so as to use ruthless militaristic means to suppress the mass of the protestors. However, an analysis of the situation as it emerged in 1989–90 points out that rather than any systematic effort, the exodus resulted due to the immediate developments. A close-knit community became conscious of its numerically minority status and felt isolated in the political upsurge for azadi. The swaying of the mass of Kashmiri Muslims by the politics of azadi and massive street demonstrations with anti-Indian slogans did not go very well with their political sensibilities. Militancy, meanwhile, created a fear psychosis, which was intensified with the killing of prominent Kashmiri Pundits including the Bharathiya Janata Party (BJP) leader

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Tika Lal Taploo and prominent judge Neel Kanth Ganjoo. There were killing of other Kashmiri Pundits also on the ground that they were seen as ‘Indian agents’ and ‘informers’. All these killings had the impact on the community and they felt ‘targeted’. It is a different matter though that there were lot of Muslims also who were killed for the same reason. What added to their perceptions was the presence of various newly founded militant organisations with their fundamentalist agenda. Apart from seeking to apply Islamic codes on Kashmiri society and imposing moral codes on Kashmiri Muslims, these organisations also sought to pressurise the Kashmiri Pundits into using symbols to identify themselves as ‘Hindus’. Some of these organisations also started a campaign using mosques and street posters to ask Kashmiri Pundits to leave Kashmir. Irrespective of the fact that mass of Kashmiri Muslims were not influenced by these fringe organisations and empathised with the Pundits and even offered to protect them in case of any untoward incident, at least in the initial phase, the factor of ‘fear’ was very strong.14 As the violence was increased and political frenzy in the streets intensified, the Pundits started leaving the valley in large numbers. In the overall chaotic situation, no effort was made to stop their exodus. With the collapse of the authority of the state, the administration was totally paralysed. It neither made any effort to instil confidence among the Pundits nor did it intervene. Most of the Pundits who left in 1990 did not plan to stay out of the Valley for a long period, but as the situation remained adverse, they could not return. Meanwhile, there were a few incidents of massacre of Kashmiri Pundits who had decided to stay back in the Valley. These massacres were pointed out as the basis of continued vulnerability of Kashmiri Pundits in the Valley still dominated by the gun. Seven Kashmiri Hindus were killed in Samgrampura village in Budgam district in 1997, 23 Kashmiri Pundits in 1998 were massacred in Wandhama town; and in 2003, 24 Kashmiri Pundits were killed in Nadimarg village in Pulwama district. By the time, violence ebbed in Kashmir after 2002–03 period, the question of return of Kashmiri Pundits had become more difficult. Notes 1 The political activists were among the first targets of the militants. Among the prominent political activists who were targeted in the initial period included Mohammed Yusuf Halwai of National Conference and Tikka Lal Taploo of BJP. Among others who were targeted during this period included Neel Kanth Ganjoo, the judge who was associated with the hanging of Maqbool Bhat. Some of the more prominent killings later included those of Lassa Koul, Director of Doordarshan, Mushir-ul-Haq, Vice-Chancellor of University of Kashmir, and H. L. Khera, the General Manager of HMT.

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2 These included agitations around the issues of ‘Darbar move’ in November 1987; killing of people in Pakistan’s ammunition dump in April 1988; rise of electricity tariff in June 1988; assassination of Pakistani President Zia-ulHaq in air crash in August 1988; anniversary of Maqbool Butt’s execution and publication of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses in February 1989. 3 The intensity of mass response increased in 1989. According to Schofield (2003: 143), one-third of the working days of that year were consumed by the hartals. 4 The open mingling of the militants with the common people in the initial stage is reflected in the following description of Schofield of procession on the occasion of release of five militants: ‘The released militants were taken out in a triumphant procession. Jubilant crowds rejoiced and danced in the streets of Srinagar’ (Schofield, 2003: 146–7). 5 JKLF came into international prominence in 1984 when it kidnapped and killed the Indian diplomat, R.H. Mhatre, in the United Kingdom. 6 Among other organisations that formed the Hurriyat Conference included All Jammu & Kashmir Employees’ Confederation, Employees and Workers Confederation, Anjaman-e-Tabligh-ul-Islam, Liberation Council, Jamiate-Ahle-Hadith, Kasmir Bazme Tawheed, Jamiat-e-Hamdania, Kashmir Bar Association, Political Conference, Tehreek-e-Huriati Kashmiri, Jamiate Ulama-E-Islam, Anjamani Auqafi Jama Masjid, Muslim Khawateen Markaz, Jammu and Kashmir Human Rights Committee, Jammu and Kashmir People’s Basic Rights (Protection) Committee, Employees & Workers Confederation (Arsari Group), Student Islamic League, Islamic Study Circle and Auqaf Jama Masjid. 7 By 1991, criminalisation of militancy started being noticed. The Economic and Political Weekly noted in July 1991 the cases of ‘kidnapping, indiscriminate killings, extortions’ (Economic and Political Weekly, 1991: 1636). 8 Alexander Evans who re-visited Kashmir in 1997 after a gap of four years had the following impression about the changed response of Kashmiris towards militancy: ‘. . . I sought out familiar faces at the University and elsewhere. Most were subdued, and even the firebrand Jamaat-supporting students I had known during 1993 were more pensive about the future. A great deal of anger at India still remained. Most echoed the Hurriyat Conference line: continuing defiance in the face of massive Indian occupation. Yet some were less convinced that the militant violence itself should continue, arguing that the militancy was increasingly corrupt and/or led by foreigners, and that it was time to consider new ways of fighting for freedom’ (Evans, 1999: 30). 9 601 militants surrendered in 1995 and 655 in 1996. The figures of the surrendered militants for other years in that decade are: 612 militants surrendered in 1991, 444 in 1992, 88 in 1993, 32 in 1994, 270 in 1997, 187 in 1998, 109 in 1999 and 104 in 2000. 10 To quote Balagopal: ‘The recruits are almost all criminalised former militants of the various groups, or victims or kith and kin of victims of the vengeful acts of violence indulged in by the militant groups. Quite a few are gangs of former militants who have turned to the Indian army for protection, having lost out to a rival group in violent battles for supremacy’ (Balagopal, 1996: 2920–1).

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11 One such situation developed during January 1990 when Jagmohan started his second term as Governor of the state. A large crowd that was demonstrating against the overnight searches of the houses and arrest of people was fired upon by the security forces in Gawkadal, resulting in loss of many lives. The incident is still etched in the consciousness of Kashmiris. Similarly etched in the minds of people is the May 1990 situation as it evolved during the funeral of Mirwaiz Farooq. Since Mirwaiz himself was killed by the militants, there was anger against the militants. But this anger against the militants was changed into anger against the state, as people were fired upon during the funeral, leading to the killing of large number of people. 12 Bose (2003: 116) notes during his field work he ‘repeatedly heard how during 1990–92 droves of young men, determined to avenge humiliations, abuse and brutality endured at the hands of the Indian state, would leave their homes in cities and villages and either undertake the hazardous LOC crossing or seek training and arms in militant camps established in the Valley’. 13 The civil society activists like Gautam Navlakha who had been taking keen interest in the political developments of Kashmir since the outbreak of militancy, had started noticing by 1996 that there was not only a change in the response of people towards militancy but also that there was a leadership crisis in the separatist movement politics (Navlakha, 1996: 2586). 14 Apart from the imposition of code of conduct by some militant organisations, some of these launched a terror campaign through letters, posters, pamphlets and newspapers asking them to leave in specified time. Some Srinagar-based newspapers also carried threats from militant organisations asking the minorities to leave. Many Pundits received threatening letters and phone calls. The religious slogans like ‘Nara-I- Taqbir Allah - o-Akbar’; ‘Yahan Kya Chalegea? Nizam-e-Mustafea’ certainly affected the morale of the minority community. Further, there were slogans that were specifically targeting the Pundits. Some of these slogans (e.g. ‘Zalimo, Kaffiro, Hamara Kashmir Choor Do’, ‘Musslamano Jago, Kaffiro Bhago, Jihad Aa Raha He’, ‘Agar Kasmir Me Rehna Hoga, Allah Allah Kehna Hoga’) made the Pundits quite insecure.

Chapter 7

Democracy in the context of separatism

The chapter is aimed at understanding the political developments in Kashmir after the mid-1990s in the context of changed political responses of people towards armed militancy and an urge for normalcy and peace. This was also the period when mainstream political processes were restored. Initially, such a process was not vibrant and continued to face the legitimacy crisis. The 2002 Assembly election, however, brought about a shift in the very nature of the mainstream politics, making it intensely competitive and grounded in local realities. While analysing the nature of this shift, the chapter goes on to argue that extension of democratic space did not take place at the cost of separatist politics. Separatist political space remained intact, and it was within the larger context of separatism that democratic space was extended. While the two kinds of politics – mainstream and separatist – operate in a parallel manner, at several points they overlap. Such overlap has implications both for the democratic as well as the separatist politics.

Restoration of political processes It was in the context of de-legitimisation of armed militancy and urge for normalcy in Kashmir that efforts were made to restore the political processes in the state. Since 1990 when the State Assembly had been dissolved, the state was being managed administratively.1 By the mid1990s, the Government of India had started toying with the idea of holding elections in the state. By this time, the situation with regard to militancy had improved relatively. Due to the pressure of the security forces, the JKLF, which had initiated militancy in Kashmir, had already beaten the retreat. Yasin Malik had declared ceasefire in 1993 and shifted his strategy to peaceful political methods. There were other militants like Baba Badr and Bilal Lodhi who had chosen to surrender

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and work for negotiated settlement of the dispute. Visiting Kashmir in 1996, Navlakha had noted that latest assessment of the government is that there are no more than 1,500 to 2,500 militants of which 300 to 500 were foreigners and that militants are finding it difficult to recruit people. It is at this moment that leadership differences have widened, the movement for ‘azadi’ appears headless, and is being pushed underground. (Navlakha, 1996: 2586) In August 1994, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao formally announced the intention of the government to initiate the political process in the state. Following this statement, some separatist leaders, including Shabir Shah, Syed Ali Shah Geelani and Abdul Ghani Lone who were kept in detention, were released (Schofield, 2003: 166). However, the restoration of the political processes was quite a daunting task for various reasons. First, there was the question of credibility of the electoral process in the background of the debacle of the 1987 Assembly elections. It was the total lack of faith in the genuineness of electoral process that had accentuated the popular separatist sentiments in the period between 1987 and 1989. But more immediate issue confronting the state authorities was almost a total absence of mainstream political space. Ever since onset of the armed militancy in Kashmir, almost all political parties and political leaders had withdrawn from the scene. Most of them had shifted base to Jammu both because of fear of life as well as because of hostile response of people. Scores of political leaders and activists, not only the high-profile ones, but even the grassroots activists, had been targeted by the militants, creating a scare within the political class. There were many others who had joined either the rank of militants or the separatists. In this situation where the separatist politics had captured the central space, restoring mainstream political processes was quite a challenging task. This being more so due to the fact that in the popular imagination, the mainstream politics was antithetical to the separatist politics. Despite an antipathy for violence and a clearly strong response against the jehadis or the foreign militants, the separatist sentiments of Kashmiris remained intact and for that reason their response to the mainstream politics remained negative. Additionally, there was also the practical problem of managing the election in the face of ascendancy of the gun. Apart from the fear of gun-wielding militants who would make every effort to scuttle the

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electoral process and threaten the security of the candidates as well as the voters, there was the apprehension that electoral process may be reduced to a farce if people did not participate in the face of a ‘boycott’ call by the separatists. The challenge of filling in the political vacuum was sought to be met by encouraging the National Conference to reclaim its political space in Kashmir. As a major mainstream political organisation of Kashmir that had played a key role in the formation and assertion of Kashmiri political identity, this was the only party that could have found some opening in the politics dominated by separatist sentiment. Its ideological plank of ‘autonomy’ was the only catchphrase which could counter the azadi slogan. In order to woo this party to come out of hibernation, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, during his visit to Burkina Faso, hinted at the intention of the government to explore the possibility of offering autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir. The possibility of holding official level dialogue with secessionists was also hinted at (Puri, 1998: 2832). However, since the mainstream politics was totally de-legitimised in Kashmir, it was not an easy task for the National Conference to capture the political space. The party also faced the issue of its own credibility. It was held responsible not merely for co-opting with the Centre in manipulating the local politics but also for compromising the dignity of Kashmiris. Apart from the resentment of people, it also faced the wrath of the militants. It had suffered huge loss of lives during the period of militancy. Among those National Conference activists who were killed by the militants included a former speaker of state legislature, few former members of Legislative Assembly and numerous district, zone, block and halqa level presidents (Chowdhary, 2004: 1527). The leadership of the party itself felt handicapped by the situation. In the context of the politics radicalised by the slogan of azadi, its ideological framework seemed to be quite limited. However, notwithstanding this limitation, Farooq Abdullah activated the National Conference initially in Jammu but later on also in Kashmir. He called the meeting of Central Working Committee of the party, which met in 1994. In this meeting a resolution demanding autonomy in its ‘pristine and original form’ was passed. What was meant by ‘pristine and original form’ of autonomy was the constitutional status of the state as it stood before the removal of Sheikh Abdullah from power in 1953. In the context in which there was an overwhelming support to the separatist politics, Farooq Abdullah wanted to enter the state politics with a definite movement forward on the issue of autonomy. He therefore demanded that Union Government issue an order for the

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restoration of autonomy as per the Delhi Agreement of 1952. However, as the Union Government did not take any action in this direction, the National Conference boycotted the 1996 Parliamentary elections, in protest. However, Farooq Abdullah was subsequently persuaded by Deve Gowda, the then Prime Minister of India representing the National Front government, to participate in the Assembly elections (State Autonomy Committee, 1999: 5).

1996 Assembly elections Despite the changed popular response towards militancy, the situation was not conducive for a normal electoral process, mainly for the reason that it was being conducted in the shadow of the gun. In the situation, as it had developed in the post-1989 phase, the political space had been overtaken by the armed militants. The security forces had certainly brought militancy to a manageable level, yet violence remained a reality in Kashmir. The ascendancy of violence vis-à-vis the politics was so complete that even in the separatist space, there was a political vacuum. Though the Hurriyat was formed for the purpose of giving a political turn to the separatist movement, however it could not do so. The role of the armed militants remained predominant compared to the role of this separatist organisations. It was, therefore, under the supervision of the security forces that the both the Parliamentary as well as Assembly elections could be organised in 1996. However, in facilitating the electoral process, the ‘renegades’ or the surrendered militants had also a very crucial role. These ex-militants had been activated by the state agencies for counter-militancy operations. Due to their local background and their internal information network, the counter-militancy operations of the security forces were quite successful. For organising elections also the surrendered militants were found to be quite handy. They could not only contain the militants during the electoral process, but could also fill in certain gaps in the path towards the political process. In a situation in which there were not many candidates coming forward to contest elections due to the fear of militants as well as overwhelming separatist sentiment, the surrendered militants fielded and supported candidates. While some of them contested election themselves, there were a few who even floated their own political parties. Among such political parties included the Awami League of Kukka Parrey and Awami Conference of Hilal Haider. The 1996 Assembly elections were quite bloody. Around 75 political activists were killed during the process of elections (Swami, 2002).

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There was a reasonable level of competition as 234 candidates contested for 46 Assembly seats of the Valley. However, despite such competition, the election was quite controversial. Such controversy also clouded the Parliamentary elections as well. A relatively high voter turnout in the Kashmir region (of around 47 per cent in the Parliamentary election and 46 per cent in the Assembly election) was recorded but it was attributed to the factor of coercion. Allegations were made that voters were forced by the security forces and the surrendered militants to cast their vote. To give some credence to this allegation, there was a very large percent of invalid votes in both the elections.2 While the state average for the invalid votes was less than 2 per cent for the Assembly election, in valley, there were certain districts where the percentage of invalid votes was as high as around 6 to 7 per cent. There were few Assembly constituencies where the percentage of invalid votes was still higher – 12.45 per cent in Handwara, 10.68 per cent in Langate, 9.46 per cent in Sopore, 9.30 per cent in Pulwama, 8.73 per cent in Homshalibug, 8.41 per cent each in Kupwara and Rafiabad and 8.02 per cent in Rajpora (Chowdhary et al., 2007: 40–1). With the completion of the electoral process, the National Conference that had captured two-thirds of the Assembly seats within the state and 87 per cent of seats within the region of Kashmir formed the government. However, despite its overwhelming majority within the Assembly, it was not very easy task for this party to govern within the overall context of separatism and militancy. It did not have the political resources to bring about change in the ground situation. Most crucially, it lacked legitimacy. It continued to be seen as party representing the interest of the Centre rather than representing the Kashmiris. It bore the burden of its association with the Congress party in the post-1984 phase and was held responsible for compromising the Kashmiri identity and making it subservient to the ruling party in the Centre. It could not, therefore, invigorate the politics of Kashmir even through its ‘autonomy’ plank. Soon after taking over the power, the National Conference government constituted the State Autonomy Committee (SAC), which was assigned the task of examining and recommending measures ‘for restoration of autonomy to the state of Jammu and Kashmir consistent with the Instrument of Accession, the Constitution Application Order, 1950 and the Delhi Agreement of 1952’. However, constitution of this committee was not taken seriously in Kashmir. Both the separatist leaders as well as militant organisations rejected it as of being no consequence. That Kashmiris on the whole were indifferent to it, was aptly reflected in

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almost a total absence of public debate on the terms of reference of this committee (Chowdhary, 2000: 2601). The position of National Conference was made further difficult in Kashmir due to its affiliation with the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government at the Centre. Soon after coming into power, Farooq Abdullah had declared the policy of his party of supporting any party that forms the government at the Centre. As per this policy, it had allied itself with the United Front Government after the 1996 Parliamentary elections and its senior member Saifuddin Soz had represented the party in the Union Cabinet. However, after the 1998 election, the BJP-led coalition formed the government in the Centre and National Conference emerged as its major partner. The partnership continued through the 1999 election. The party went in for a formal alliance with the party before the election and was rewarded with a ministry for Omar Abdullah in the NDA government formed in 1999 (Chowdhary and Rao, 2004: 1523–4). Although the BJP deferred its politics of Article 370, the National Conference was not able to gain much out of this alliance (Chowdhary, 1999: 3343). On the contrary, it faced major embarrassment in Kashmir when the NDA government trashed the whole ‘autonomy’ process initiated by it. The SAC had come out with its report in 1999 and had called for restoration of autonomy by reversing the constitutional position of the state to that of pre-1953 period. Soon after, the Legislative Assembly of the state had passed a resolution demanding the implementation of the SAC report and restoration of the autonomy of the state. This resolution was sent to the Union Government for its follow-up action. However, the Union Government dismissed the resolution and rejected the demand for restoration of autonomy on the lines of the pre-1953 constitutional status of the state.3 However, notwithstanding these problems faced by it, the sheer presence of National Conference was instrumental for recovering some political space for mainstream politics. Though politics could not become vibrant, yet some linkage was established between the political actors and the people. In the whole spectrum of political organisations of Kashmir (including both the mainstream as well as separatist organisations), National Conference continued to remain the only political organisation with a cadre that existed right down to the level of villages. Though this cadre, with time, was partially shifted to the separatist politics and even to the militancy, still it survived and formed the base upon which the mainstream politics could be re-initiated.

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Apart from this, there were some other openings for the mainstream politics. After being elected, some MLAs were able to establish linkage with the people and voice their problems. The militarised situation of Kashmir during the preceding six years had led to various kinds of sufferings of people, which had remained unexpressed for want of any political agency. These sufferings could now be articulated and verbalised by their elected representatives. There were few MLAs like Mehbooba Mufti and Mohammad Yousuf Tarigami who represented Congress and Communist Party – Marxist (CPM) respectively who were quite active after their election not only within their own constituencies but within the whole Valley. Empathising with people, they talked about the agonies of people facing violence from multiple sources and raised the issues related to the human rights violations. By establishing an emotional chord with people, they could create space not merely for themselves but for the mainstream politics per se.

Emergence of PDP What changed the course of mainstream politics in Kashmir was the emergence of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in Kashmir in 1999. Eight members of the Congress party in the Assembly headed by Mehbooba Mufti came out of the Congress to form this new party. The peculiarity of the PDP lay in its being mainly a Kashmir-based party, both in terms of its membership and support base as well as in terms of its political focus. It sought to distinguish itself from other mainstream political parties, especially the ruling National Conference by recognising the realities of the conflict situation and the implications that these had for the common people. Unlike the National Conference, which sought to underplay the harsh ground realities in the context of militarised situation, this party presented itself as a ‘people-friendly’ party that was not only aware about the suffering of people but also could intervene on their behalf. It termed its pro-people ideology as ‘healing touch policy’ that aimed at providing relief and succour to common Kashmiris adversely impacted by conflict situation. It also talked of the need to enter into dialogue with the militants, separatists and Pakistan to resolve the conflict and establish peace. The basic document that was released at the time of launching of the party in 1999 mentioning the ‘sufferings and suppression’ of people during last 10 years referred to the ‘unresolved Kashmir problem’ as the main cause of this distressing situation. The objectives that it set before itself included those relating to mobilising ‘public opinion’

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so as to persuade ‘the Government of India to adopt a policy of understanding and reconciliation’; articulating ‘the grievances of the people of the state and seek their redress through constitutional means’; waging ‘a struggle for the restoration of normalcy, democracy and rule of law in the state so that human rights of the people can be duly respected and protected’; finding ways and means for the release of innocent people languishing in jails’ and; the return and rehabilitation of migrants (J&K Peoples Democratic Party, 1999: 3). In a situation when Kashmir was going through an internal rethinking about the armed militancy and when there was a strong urge for normalcy and peace, the PDP could carve a space for itself by referring to the problems that people were faced with after almost a decade of militancy. By boldly reflecting various implications of militarisation, especially the human rights violations, the day-to-day harassment of common citizens, the disproportionate authority of the security forces and the police, the violence perpetrated by counter-insurgents, and the like, this party could make its politics relevant to people. Its political discourse was quite dynamic as compared to the one followed by National Conference. PDP’s emergence therefore helped create some sense of vibrancy within the mainstream politics of Kashmir. Challenging the hegemony of the National Conference over the regional politics of Kashmir, it provided an alternative to people within the mainstream politics. It was the absence of such an alternative so far that had delinked the politics of National Conference from the popular aspirations. Taking the voters for granted, this party had invested its energies in placating the powers-that-be in the Centre. With no challenge at the ground level, it worked on the logic that so long as it remained on the right side of the ruling party in the Centre, its survival in power politics was ensured. In the process, it compromised on its fundamentals and distanced the very power politics from the ground realities.

Politics of poll boycott Despite the restoration of political processes, the separatist constituency remained unaffected. However, the electoral process in itself was an important matter for the separatist organisations to respond. Once the election process was on, it was rejected almost by all the leaders. Most of the Hurriyat leaders including Yasin Malik, Shabir Shah, Syed Ali Shah Geelani and Abdul Ghani Lone took the position that it was a farcical exercise and was being undertaken to ease the international

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pressure on the Indian state due to the ongoing insurgency in Kashmir. Election, in their opinion, could not be a substitute to their struggle for self-determination. Therefore, they all rejected the idea of their participation in the elections. Abdul Ghani Lone, however, placed a condition for participation in election, that is, if elections are conducted to decide the future of the state (Schofield, 2004: 167). Besides rejecting electoral process, the separatist leaders responded to it by giving a call for poll boycott. The politics of poll boycott was particularly successful during Parliamentary elections held in 1998 and 1999. During these elections, the Hurriyat leaders organised very systematic and intense campaign for poll boycott. As the elections were declared, these leaders travelled throughout the Valley and organised meetings at different places. It was the result of such a campaign that during the 1998 elections the participation of people was quite low. It was only the Baramulla constituency that around 41 per cent of people voted. In Srinagar, the poll percentage was 28 per cent and in Anantnag, it was 30 per cent. The impact of Hurriyat’s campaign for poll boycott was much more effective during the 1999 Parliamentary election. During this election, the voter turnout in all the constituencies of Kashmir was much lower than in 1998 – 27.79 per cent, 14.32 per cent in Anantnag and 11.93 per cent in Srinagar Parliamentary constituency. How effective was campaign by separatist leadership was clearly reflected in detailed statistical data of Assembly segments within these constituencies. Thus it was 0.5 per cent voter turnout in Habakadal Assembly segment, 2 per cent in Idgah, 3 per cent each in Zadibal, Baramulla and Sonwar, 4 per cent in Khanyar and 5.5 per cent in Hazratbal Assembly segments. The poll boycott campaign was also quite effective during the 2001 panchayat elections. While the electoral exercise was quite effective in the Jammu region, in Kashmir, it was severely impacted both by the threat of militants and poll boycott calls by the separatists. There were many panch and sarpanch constituencies where there were no contestants ready to contest elections. Thus only 96 candidates were available for 903 panch constituencies in Badgam district, 289 candidates for 666 panch constituencies in Srinagar district, 1034 candidates for 2,082 panch constituencies in Baramulla district. In the end, there were large number of vacancies. Of the total, 63 per cent of the total panch constituencies in Srinagar district and 60 per cent in Baramulla district were declared vacant. On the whole 5,987 out of the 10,469 constituencies in Kashmir were declared vacant (Chowdhary, 2001: 1675).

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The Hurriyat Conference: differences within The effective manifestation of separatism notwithstanding, the Hurriyat Conference started coming under strain in the post-1996 period in the context of changing strategies of Indian government towards the conflict in Kashmir as well as the changing responses of people. The organisation, which had contained its ideological differences in the initial period, was finding it difficult to take a united stand on the emerging situation. Despite the fact that it continued to be the exclusive separatist organisation claiming to speak on behalf of Kashmiri people, differences within the organisation started coming out in open. Besides the well-known difference between those who were for ‘independence of Kashmir’ and those who wanted ‘merger with Pakistan’, the Hurriyat Conference, by the end of the decade of 1990s, was getting divided between two other kinds of groups – those who were known as ‘moderates’ and those known as ‘hardliners’. The moderates were those who wanted the Hurriyat Conference to respond to the shift in the popular response and change its strategy accordingly. They would emphasise on the principles of ‘flexibility’, ‘dialogue’ and ‘political means’ and hence were ready to transcend the traditional approach of the movement. However, the hardliners were averse to the change in its strategy and approach and did not feel comfortable with shifting any position either vis-à-vis armed militancy or the traditionally defined goals of the movement. According to Parveen Swami, it was as early as 1997 that G.M. Bhat, an executive member of the Hurriyat, had started talking about ending the ‘gun culture’ and that in 1999, he had ‘called for a dialogue between mainstream political parties and secessionists, a marked departure from the organisation’s constitutionally mandated demand for a three-way dialogue between itself, India and Pakistan’ (Swami, 2003). In July 2000, Hizbul Mujahideen had offered unilateral ceasefire in Kashmir, which was officially opposed by the Hurriyat on the grounds that it was not well thought out and was ‘too hasty’ (Ahmad, 2000). However, on this issue also there were internal differences. Similar differences were there on the Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s initiative for peace in 2000. He had announced a month-long unilateral ceasefire on the occasion of Ramadhan. A. G. Lone welcomed the initiative and even asked the militant groups to accept it. Abdul Ghani Bhat also approved of it, provided it was accompanied by ‘meaningful and result oriented talks’. Mirwaiz Maulvi Omar Farooq declared the ceasefire not to be a major step, but a ‘positive step’. However Syed Ali Shah Geelani argued that temporary ceasefire was not a solution to the

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Kashmir issue. It was later on, in a meeting attended by all seven executive members, that the Hurriyat welcome the Ramadan ceasefire. However, it was in the already referred to dialogue between Syed Ali Shah Geelani and A.G. Lone that serious differences within the Hurriyat were being articulated. These differences, though related to the nature of separatism and its linkage with global jehad, were also linked with the direction that the movement was to take in the future. While Lone represented a voice demanding flexibility in approach and substituting the militant means with the political ones, Geelani represented a ‘hardline’ approach of ‘no change’ from the earlier direction of the movement and its linkage with militancy.

2002 Assembly elections By the time the 2002 Assembly election was organised, the party politics of Kashmir had become sufficiently competitive. However, this in itself was not sufficient to expand the democratic space in Kashmir. Given the history of manipulation of the electoral process as well as the intrusive role of the Centre in the formation and sustenance of elected governments with a complete disregard to the voters’ choices, the scepticism towards the mainstream politics remained intact. It was to address such scepticism and to bring some sense of credibility to the power politics that Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the then Prime Minister of India, promised ‘free and fair’ Assembly elections of 2002. Such a promise was a part of his peace initiative that he offered both at the internal as well as external levels. Soon this initiative was to take the form of formal comprehensive peace process and a composite dialogue involving India and Pakistan, on the one hand, and the people of the state, on the other. Vajpayee’s promise was followed by commitment made by Chief Election Commissioner of India, J.M. Lyngdoh that no coercive measures would be used by the security forces to force voters to exercise their right to vote.4 He also ‘made clear to the officials that he did not want to see the Army operating in the State during the polls’ (Swami, 2002). The 2002 Assembly elections were held under the international glare. There was lot of media attention during this election. There was also the presence of foreign diplomats in the Valley. In order to ensure the fairness of the elections and to observe and monitor the elections, the Election Commission had appointed polling officers from Uttar Pradesh and Punjab. Unlike 1996 Assembly elections, which became controversial for the role of the security forces and could never gain legitimacy, the 2002

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elections were much more credible. There were few complaints about the security forces, especially about their calls from the mosques for the voters to come out to vote.5 But these complaints notwithstanding, the election on the whole attained legitimacy for a number of reasons: first, the voter participation was not inflated like it was in 1996. As compared to that election, the voter turnout was much lower. Further, there were different voting trends reflecting different ground realities of Kashmir. North Kashmir was most vibrant during the period of campaign and here people had shown sufficient enthusiasm for the electoral process. Within the Valley it was only in the district of Kupwara that political rallies and normal elections meetings could take place. Here the voter turnout was 53.92 per cent.6 As compared to that Srinagar district where there was no electioneering at all and where the impact of separatists boycott call was the maximum, the voter turnout was as low as 11.18 per cent. The South Kashmir, the political base of the newly formed PDP, however, recorded a moderate voter turnout around (23.68% in Pulwama and 24.06% in Anantnag).7 Moreover, it was the outcome of election that added to the credibility of electoral process. For the first time in the history of Kashmir’s power politics, a government was changed because it was refused mandate by the people. National Conference lost its hold on Kashmir’s politics. Though it emerged as the largest party in the state as well as in the Valley, it failed to obtain majority within the Assembly. Its total tally was reduced from 57 in 1996 to 28 in 2002 and its share of votes was reduced from 65.51 per cent to 28.23 per cent. In 1996, this party had secured 40 of the 46 seats of the Valley with 48.15 per cent votes in its favour but in 2002, its tally of seats was reduced to bare 18 with 35.67 per cent vote share. The fact that the National Conference’s electoral dominance was eroded and PDP could obtain almost as many seats as the National Conference (16 seats) in Kashmir, with substantial votes in its favour (24.51 per cent) added to the credibility of the elections. The credibility of the 2002 Assembly elections was also established by the fact that there were many candidates who had come from separatist or militant background. Of these the most prominent ones belonged to the People’s Conference (PC) and were known as ‘proxy candidates’. The district of Kupwara, being the traditional stronghold of the PC, there was lot of goodwill for the candidates belonging to this party. Even though the affiliation of those contesting in the name of PC was denied by Sajad Lone and Bilal Lone, the leaders of this party, the name of the party and its founding leader, A.G. Lone, who was recently assassinated, was openly used for mobilising the candidates.8 The high voter turnout

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in Kupwara district was linked with the enthusiasm that was created in the electoral politics due to the presence of proxy candidates.9 In any case, the electoral process and the outcome matched the ground level situation. For last few years preceding the 2002 election, the general mood in Kashmir was for change and for movement forward. On the whole, there was an urge to come out of the situation of violence, especially in those areas that were severely affected by armed militancy. That is the reason that voter turnout was highest in Kupwara district. This district experienced the most intensified violence during the decade of 1990s. The keenness of people to participate in the electoral process was linked with their urge for peace and normalcy. The electoral outcome also reflected the difference of political responses between the urban and rural Kashmiris. While there was a clear-cut impact of boycott politics in the urban areas, in rural areas, this impact was not to be seen. People from the rural areas, especially which were hugely impacted by violence, came out to vote in larger numbers. The contrast between the rural and urban Kashmir in terms of voter participation was linked with the level of violence. After the initial outbreak of militancy in Srinagar, it got spread to the rural areas. While Srinagar district, more or less remained free of militancy in the later years, the rural areas, especially in north and south of Kashmir experienced the most perilous phase of militancy. Apart from the fact that a large number of youth here got recruited into militancy (many of whom got killed and many others disappeared), people here lived a very pressurised life both due to the presence of security forces as well as the armed militants. Hence, while the voters in the district of Srinagar and 11 of its constituencies chose to ignore the electoral process, the people of rural Kashmir took it quite seriously. Their urge for coming out of a situation of siege in which they were placed for more than a decade led them to respond positively to the promise of bringing an end to violence, quite seriously. Anticipating the course of events, the response of the militants was quite severe. From the beginning of the electoral process, the militants became active and issued threats to the people. Through the posters, the political activists were asked to disassociate themselves from political parties and not be connected with electoral activities in any way. Those who showed their willingness to contest the elections were threatened with severe consequences. Even others including the suppliers of election material were asked not to provide any material support to those contesting elections. During the period of campaigning and through different phases of elections, lots of people were targeted and some were

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killed as well. As per the information provided by the Ministry of Home Affairs, in 2002, a total of 1,008 people were killed. This number was much higher as compared to the number of civilians killed in 2000 and 2001 (847 and 996 respectively) and 2003 (795) (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2004). As the process of election started in 2002, the level of violence also increased in the state. A number of political activists and workers were targeted. Before the actual voting started, at least 40 political activists were killed. A few candidates were also targeted. Among the most prominent target during the election was Mushtaq Lone, the law minister of the state. He was contesting the elections from Lolab constituency and was killed while addressing an election rally. Another minister in the state government, Sakina Ittoo, was also targeted a number of times; however, she survived these attacks. As compared to the militants, the response of the separatist leadership within the Hurriyat was quite ambivalent. The organisation was internally divided over the issue of call for boycott of elections. Till late 1990s, the separatists were quite aggressive in their approach to elections and issued stringent calls for boycott of elections. In their arguments, election was a frivolous exercise that was not linked to ground realities of Kashmir. Organisation of election, in their understanding, did not serve any purpose other than farcically projecting normalcy in Kashmir. The futility of election was also proclaimed in terms of its contradiction with the movement politics. In the context of complete dominance of the separatist politics, electoral activity was seen as totally redundant. This approach of the separatists was endorsed by people as well by clearly showing their reluctance to either participate in the elections or to give it a sense of credibility. The situation was quite different in 2002. Not only the mood of people was somewhat changed but within the Hurriyat also there were divergent ideas about the electoral process. As already stated, A.G. Lone was quite flexible in his political approach to the ongoing developments. Rather than following the traditional approach of the Hurriyat to boycott elections, he was ready to consider this option provided two conditions were met: first that these elections be linked with dialogue process and be followed with dialogue of Government of India with the representatives of people. And second, that the purpose of election should not merely be the formation of the government but identifying the persons who would be representing Kashmiris in the dialogue process (Chowdhary and Rao, 2003: 18). There was lot of speculation about Lone participating in the elections. However, since he was assassinated much before the 2002 elections, the authenticity of this impression cannot be validated.

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The position of Syed Ali Shah Geelani and other hardliners was very clear since they opposed the election process and supported the militants in their call for boycott of elections. However Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, known to be a moderate leader, had reservations about the threats being issued by the militants. Close to the elections, he made a statement expressing this reservation: We condemn any act of coercion which prevents the people of the state from deciding whether to participate in the elections or not though we have our objections to the process. The militants should not prevent the people from going to the polling booths and the security forces should not force the people to vote. (The Hindu, 1 September 2002) The ambivalent position of the Hurriyat about the electoral process came into open as the organisation took its time to declare poll boycott. It ultimately did give the call for boycott but the call was quite feeble and was not as seriously pursued as it was done in the earlier elections.10 Analysing retrospectively one can see that the separatists were extremely pressurised by the challenge of 2002 elections on various counts. Most significant was the pressure of the people who wanted movement forward and expected the separatists to go beyond their static approach. Also there was the pressure of the Government of India asking the separatists to join the electoral process, if for nothing else, for proving their representative character. On this ground, there was international pressure also. With the possibility of elections taking place under the international glare and people participating in these elections and choosing their elected representatives, the political domain was no more exclusive for the separatists. The parallel mainstream leadership with proven representative character therefore held the challenge before the separatists of proving their representative character. It was the reflection of this challenge only that Hurriyat Conference came up with the idea of organising its own election to determine its representative character. To frame the modalities for holding such election, the Hurriyat chairman Abdul Ghani Bhat announced the formation of a six-member election commission. To elect the ‘true representative of the people of Jammu and Kashmir’ who would be involved in talks with India and Pakistan was the declared agenda of this commission. Notwithstanding the fact that formation of this commission came to a naught due to the practical problems, on the one hand, and internal differences within the Hurriyat on the other, the very idea of parallel

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election commission and a parallel electoral process shows the pressure that the electoral process was building on the separatists.

Split in the Hurriyat The Hurriyat faced multiple splits after the 2002 elections. The differences within the organisation had started on the issue of call of poll boycott itself but these were sharpened on the issue of PC having participated in the elections through proxy candidates. Failure of the moderate leadership to expel the PC from the Hurriyat Conference led to its division into two parts – the moderate faction of the Hurriyat led by Mirwaiz and the hardline faction led by Syed Ali Shah Geelani. However, the decision of Yasin Malik to join neither of the two organisations led to the independent status of JKLF outside the Hurriyat. The split within the PC and Sajad Lone and Bilal Lone parting ways led to Sajad Lone also remaining outside the Hurriyat framework. Meanwhile, Shabir Shah has also remained outside the fold of the Hurriyat. The split of the Hurriyat, though a consequence of immediate development in the pre- and post-2002 elections, was also a reflection of the lack of ideological coherence of this organisation. As a coalition of 23 separatist and militant organisations, it was a politically divided body from inside. What kept it united during the initial period was the extremely militarised situation of Kashmir and excessive pressure of the Indian state. However, as this pressure was somewhat eased and the political space was opened, the differences within started sharpening up. As the situation started changing and political options started being explored, the ideological differences assumed prominence over the need to maintain the unity of the organisation. The Lone–Geelani dialogue was the first public display of the acute ideological differences among the separatists. That was to open up the space for other differences – not only ideological but also based on personality. The split of the Hurriyat provided a clue to the challenges that the separatist leadership and organisations was faced with in the post-2002 period. These challenges were both internal as well as external. Internally, the differences within the ranks of separatists had the effect of weakening the moral authority of the leadership. With one group seeking to de-legitimise the other group, it had the cumulative effect of lowering the stature of the leadership per se. However, this was more so in the context of the challenge that came from external sources. Externally, the extension of democratic space in the post-2002 period put immense pressure on the separatist organisations and leaders. The inclination of

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people to provide some legitimacy to the mainstream politics, also led to a crisis of relevance of the separatist leadership. This was notwithstanding the fact that the extension of democratic space did not take place at the cost of the separatist sentiments in Kashmir. The separatist sentiment throughout the post-2002 period remained intact, and in fact was more clearly asserted in the post-2008 period.

Extension of democratic space in the post-2002 period The space for democratic politics increased in Kashmir in the period following the 2002 elections. The credibility of the electoral politics significantly contributed to this. The PDP–Congress government did not suffer from the kind of negativity that was attached with the National Conference after it formed the government following the 1996 Assembly elections. Neither was it perceived to be a result of coerced or manipulated election, nor was it seen to be imposed from above. In the given situation of Kashmir that was dominated by separatist politics, relative credibility of the electoral process had the impact of creating a very small space for the mainstream politics. This space, which gradually increased itself, was generally termed as the space for ‘politics of governance’ as distinct from the separatist politics. That this space had some grounding in the emerging political situation of Kashmir was acknowledged even by the separatists during and after the 2002 Assembly elections. Anticipating voter responses in the wake of enthusiasm shown by people in certain constituencies, especially in North Kashmir, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq had linked such enthusiasm to the issues of governance such as corruption, maladministration, nepotism, misgovernance and unemployment (‘Let people decide on participation, says Mirwaiz’, The Hindu, 1 September 2002). Even after the election was over, it was emphasised by the separatists that such a turnout was not a judgement on the separatist politics. Rather than a rejection of separatism, it was a manifestation of the ‘governance’ needs of people. What led to the legitimisation of the space of ‘governance’ politics was the clear distinction that was made between this and the separatist politics. It was not only the separatists who emphasised this distinction, but even the mainstream political actors, including those in power, insisted on it. In a situation in which mainstream politics had been totally de-legitimised and participation in any mainstream political activity was seen as antithetical to the separatist movement, only this distinction could help restore it some space. With this distinction maintained,

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the pressure upon the people to choose between the two kinds of politics was eased, and they could easily participate in the mainstream politics without feeling pressurised that such a participation meant a betrayal of their separatist sentiments. Without abandoning their identification with separatism, they could also relate with democratic politics. It was the PDP which was conscious of the restricted space for its manoeuvring that it used this distinction for its own benefit. As a new entrant to the regional politics of Kashmir, it was faced with severe competition both within the mainstream politics from the National Conference as well as from outside – from the separatists. Not having historical roots like the National Conference, it had to find ways and means to make itself relevant in the context of overwhelmingly popular separatist politics, on the one hand, and the challenge posed by the legacy, cadre and ideology of National Conference, on the other. It sought to do so by acknowledging the popular basis of separatism and defining its own sphere vis-à-vis separatist politics. Rather than claiming its representative character in competition with the separatists, it sought to operate along with it. It consciously placed a limitation on its own role in Kashmir’s politics and acknowledging the long-standing conflict, acceded an autonomous role to the separatists for pursuing the politics for its ultimate resolution. From the very beginning, it provided a limited meaning to the electoral process and took the position that election should not be seen as a substitute for the separatist project of conflict. It not only considered the separatists as the stakeholders with whom a negotiated settlement was required but it also gave credence to the militants and wanted them to be included in the dialogue process. When the Vajpayee government initiated dialogue with the separatists, it demanded broadening the structure of the dialogue so as to include militants as well.11 Further, to make itself relevant and outdo the National Conference, the PDP deliberately blurred the boundaries between the separatist and mainstream discourse and identified for its political agenda the issues that were earlier in the exclusive domain of separatists. Already, to present itself as a party with difference, it had introduced its agenda of ‘healing touch’ to people adversely affected by the prolonged conflict situation. Among its demands included: restoration of rule of law, withdrawal of extra-ordinary laws, restraining the security forces, freeing jailed political prisoners, dissolving Special Operation Groups, curbing abuse of human rights and rehabilitating the militants and their families, dialogue with militants and with Pakistan.12 Much of this agenda made reference to the situation of militarisation that was prevailing in Kashmir, so far referred only by the separatists. Much of emphasis of

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PDP was on issues related to violation of human rights by the security forces. These issues formed the major content of the separatist discourse but PDP brought these to the agenda of mainstream politics. PDP’s efforts to define its politics via the issues so far dealt by the separatists had the impact of changing the very direction of political discourse of mainstream politics. Soon National Conference was also compelled to follow suit and accordingly emphasise on the issues related to conflict politics. Its leadership also started making a distinction between the politics of governance and politics of ‘ultimate resolution of conflict’. Its political leadership, which shied away from using aggressive language till now, started talking about Kashmir as a ‘dispute’ that was still unresolved. While emphasising on ‘autonomy’ within the Indian Constitution, it acknowledged that there were other political alternatives which could be offered for solution and that National Conference would be ready to accept any such solution if it was a better formula and acceptable to people. With reference to the implications of the militarisation on the common Kashmiris, Omar Abdullah started talking about the need for establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Senior leaders of this party as a matter of routine started exhorting the Governments of India and Pakistan to resolve the issue of Kashmir by involving people of the state. Much of the fillip to the discourse of the mainstream political parties came from the ongoing peace process and the overall change in the national discourse. With Vajpayee giving an offer of dialogue both to separatists and to Pakistan and formal peace process being put in place, there was sufficient dynamism in the official discourse. Following the India–Pakistan dialogue, the Kashmir-based political parties, particularly the PDP, started invoking the terms used within this dialogue. Borrowing heavily from Musharraf’s four-point peace formula, the PDP started talking about ‘demilitarisation’, ‘self-rule’ and other mechanisms of confidence-building. It also projected the decision of the Government of India to open the Uri–Muzzafarabad road for the cross-border movement of people as a success of its own agenda. With the mainstream political discourse becoming more people-sensitive, the floor of the Legislative Assembly became the forum for debating various issues that were so far restricted to the separatist forums. More specifically, the demand for removal of Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA), the critique of the abuse of power by the security forces, issue of the killing of innocent civilians in fake encounters, holding the state accountable for disappeared people were frequently raised within the Assembly.

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Mainstream and separatist politics in the ‘post-militancy’ period Militancy that had started in Kashmir in the 1989–90 period, had started losing its intensity by turn of the present century. That by 2005, it had substantially declined becomes clear by the data offered by the Ministry of Home Affairs. As per this data, in the year 1990, there were 4,158 militancy-related incidents in the state, which peaked in the years between 1993 to 1996 with 5,247 incidents in 1993, 5,829 in 1994, 5,938 in 1995 and 5,014 in 1996 (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2004: 12). The number of these incidents came down to 1,990 in 2005. Since then there has been a continuous decline with 1,667 incidents in 2006, 1,092 in 2007 and 708 in 2008 (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2012–2013: 6). By the year 2011–12, number of these incidents was still smaller – 340 in 2011 and 220 in 2012. The following table offered by the Ministry of Home Affairs reflects the trends of violence impacted by armed militancy since 2005. Trends of Terrorist Violence in J&K Year

Incidents

SF killed

Civilians killed

Terrorists killed

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

1990 1667 1092 708 499 488 340 220

189 151 110 75 79 69 33 15

557 389 158 91 71 47 31 15

917 591 472 339 239 232 100 72

Source: Annual Report 2012–2013, Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs. (Department of Internal Security, Jammu & Kashmir Affairs and Border Management), p. 6.

As is clearly reflected, there has been a substantial decline in the number of killings of security forces, civilians as well as terrorists. Compared to 557 civilians and 189 security forces killed in 2005, the number came down to 15 civilians and security forces each in 2012. Similarly, as compared to 917 terrorists killed in 2005, only 72 were killed in 2012. With the decline of armed militancy, there has been a gradual shift in the nature of politics. The centrality that militancy had acquired all through the decade of 1990 was lost and its reflection was felt in

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the overall political environment of Kashmir. Apart from the fact that mainstream politics could expand its own space, there was qualitative change in the manifestation of separatist politics. With the decline of militancy, the pressure on the mainstream political space was quite eased and gradually there was greater visibility of mainstream political activities in the public space. During the period of militancy, mainstream political leaders could not move freely and could not hold public meetings. Even during the 2002 Assembly elections, the normal electoral campaigning could not take place. However, gradually after the 2002 elections, the situation started changing. By the time the by-election to four Legislative Assembly seats (of these, three in the Kashmir Valley) took place in early 2006, electoral politics was quite animated. Apart from the fact that an unusually high voter turnout was recorded in three constituencies located in Kashmir, viz., Rafiabad, Pattan and Sangrama (75.70%, 69.23% and 63.83% respectively), there was very intense electioneering. All the three constituencies were part of highly militancy-infested areas and had not recorded such a high voter turnout in 2002 elections.13 Despite the fact that there was aggressive campaign for poll boycott by separatist leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani and some militant strikes, there was sufficient enthusiasm among voters. Both in Sangrama and Pattan constituencies, polling had to be suspended for some time following grenade attacks. But following the attacks, not merely people quickly returned to cast their vote, but also displayed their resentment against those resorting to violence (Chowdhary and Rao, 2006: 1965). The increased enthusiasm for the electoral politics could be witnessed throughout the later period. By 2007, the political scenario of Kashmir was quite lively in anticipation of the 2008 Assembly elections. More than a year before the election was due, the two major political parties of Kashmir, the National Conference and the PDP, were competing with each other in organising massive political rallies in various parts of Kashmir. By this time, it was quite clear that militants were in no position to restrain the mainstream parties and they were freely organising their meetings at quite a large scale. With high stakes of the two parties, hectic political activities were taking place all over the Valley. However, such expansion of democratic space was taking place within the larger context of separatism. The decline of armed militancy, in any case, did not mean the end of separatist politics. On the contrary, as the political developments in the post-2007 period clearly demonstrated, though the militancy stopped to be the logic of Kashmir’s politics, separatism continued to manifest itself. It is a different matter though the nature of separatist politics had been quite changed. Rather than being

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asserted through the militant or separatist organisations, it now was asserted through spontaneous popular response. The reflection of this response could be seen in Kashmir during three consecutive summers of 2008 to 2010. Each of these three years saw massive separatist upsurge in Kashmir. This upsurge clearly indicated that, notwithstanding the decline of militancy and expansion of mainstream politics, the separatist political space remained intact.

Separatist assertion: 2008–10 The separatist assertion in the period 2008–10 has to be seen in the context of the emerging political environment, which was defined by three factors: First, with the decline of violence, protests became the medium of resistance politics. A space was generated in the post-2002 period in which people could articulate demands and express their discontent. This space was not available throughout the time when there was ascendancy of militancy. The society had been muted and there was no space for people’s voices. Hence when the militancy had started declining and democratic space started getting extended, popular protests also started becoming a more frequent phenomenon. By 2007, the frequency and intensity of protest politics had increased substantially. Second, the peace process that had ushered in lot of hope about conflict resolution was stalled and resulted in popular resentment. By 2007, the peace process had lost much of momentum. Dialogue both at the internal as well as external levels was stalled and earlier optimism had been now substituted by anger and cynicism. Third, the separatist leaders were facing the crisis of relevance and looking for an opportunity to reclaim their political space. Though extension of democratic space did not affect the separatist politics since the popular separatist sentiment remained intact, there were implications for the separatist leaders and organisations. The overlap between the separatist politics and mainstream politics and the borrowing of the agenda of the separatists by the mainstream parties led to the loss of exclusivity of separatist politics. Some of the issues taken up so far by the separatists were so aggressively pursued by the PDP, that it obviously disturbed the separatists. The crisis within the separatist camp was also generated due to the stalling of peace process and disengagement of the Hurriyat leaders by the Government of India. Throughout 2007, Kashmir resonated with protest demonstrations involving a large mass of people. While some of these protests

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were around some administrative issues like demand for a new tehsil, or demand for a college, most other protests erupted over issues of human rights violations. One of the issues that evoked mass response in various parts of the Valley throughout the year 2007 was the incident of killing of five innocent civilians in a fake encounter by the security forces. It was in this background of continued unrest in Kashmir that massive upsurge took place in 2008. What triggered this response was an order of the state government to divert 800 canals of forest land to Shree Amarnath Shrine Board (SASB) for the purposes of erecting pre-fabricated temporary structures for housing the pilgrims during the period of annual Amarnath pilgrimage.14 However, the issue was used by the separatists to instil fear among Kashmiris about ‘demographic change’. People were made to believe that there was a grand design of the Indian state to influx the state with non-Muslims from outside so as to change Muslim-majority character of the state. The mass mobilisation that followed the issuance of this order turned into a massive agitation, which lasted for a number of days. So emotional was the response of people that the government was forced to withdraw the order. The agitation, however, resumed after some time when there was a massive agitation against the withdrawal of the order in the Jammu region. During both these phases of agitation, there was a very strong assertion of separatist sentiments. The whole political environment was similar to that of early 1990 when the streets of Kashmir resounded with the slogans of azadi. Ascendancy of separatist politics was complete with separatist leaders overtaking the whole political space and issuing agitation calendars for and giving calls to march to different places (like Muzaffarabad Chalo). In the popular frenzy that was reflected during the whole of summer of 2008, the mainstream politics that was quite vibrant till few months back had gone under. Though the 2008 upsurge was followed by the Assembly elections in which people participated in large numbers, the separatist assertion continued through the year 2009. Much of this assertion took place during the spontaneous protests against the incidents of human rights violations. In February 2009, there were frequent protests over killing of two youth in army firing in Bomai. In March 2009, killing of two civilians in the custody of a special operation group of the police in Alochi Bag again resulted in mass eruption. However, it was the issue of rape and murder of two women in Shopian in May 2009 that evoked massive response from people. Though there were protests around various other human rights violations – for instance over the killing of a man near the security picket in Dangiwachi camp and the killing of a teenager by

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a teargas shell in Baramulla in October 2009 – the ‘Shopian rape case’ became the rallying point for the resurgence of the separatist politics in Kashmir. However, it was in 2010 that Kashmir witnessed massive resistance politics. For five months of summer, the normal political processes came to a halt and whole of Kashmir was overtaken by separatist upsurge. The background to this upsurge was provided by the continuous eruption over the incidents of human rights violations by the security forces. Though there were other protests in the early months of 2010,15 it was the case of the killing of three civilians in Machail sector that resulted in massive protests. The killing of 17-year-old boy Tufail Mattoo during these protests led to further protests. In a cycle of protests and killing during the protests around 110 people were killed. The protests with each killing became intensified. The 2010 upsurge, though started around the issue of human rights violations, became a space for intense and aggressive form of separatist politics. Apart from the demand for self-determination, the slogans like ‘Go India Go’ and ‘Quit Kashmir’ were raised. The separatist politics, as it was manifested in 2008–10 period, though was in continuity with the separatism of post-1989 phase, it had, however, certain distinct characteristics. To begin with being a post-militancy separatism totally de-linked from the armed militancy, it was rooted in local responses of people. Till the beginning of 2000s, militancy was not only linked with separatist politics but was also its major manifestation. However, during the 2008–10 period, separatism was expressed through the popular protests. Large-scale demonstrations became the site of separatist assertion. The protest demonstrations not merely reinvigorated the separatist space in Kashmir but also inducted the youth into the separatist politics. What was peculiar about the 2008–10 separatist upsurge was the participation of large number of young people. It was during the two phases of agitation during the Amarnath land row that large number of youth joined the street protests. However, by 2010, the generational shift in the separatist politics had already been visible. The massive street demonstrations were now having large number of youths. Indulging in sloganeering and stone-pelting, these young people had overtaken the separatist politics and were now putting pressure on the separatist leadership to take it to a radical direction. Radicalisation of separatist politics, therefore, was another peculiarity of the 2008–10 period. Not merely on the streets, but on the social network sites, the expression of radicalised and aggressive

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separatist sentiment was to be seen. The moderate separatist leadership came under severe criticism for their ‘compromise’ with the goals of ‘self-determination’ during the peace process. Flexibility, which had marked the post-2000 phase of separatism in Kashmir, was now left behind. It is in this context that one can understand the rise of Syed Ali Shah Geelani as the leader of separatist politics. Despite the fact that his political agenda of merging Kashmir with Pakistan was not acceptable to large majority of Kashmiris, he became the most vocal and powerful leader of separatist politics during the 2008–10 period. What came to be appreciated was his consistent anti-India stance and his non-negotiable position on the goals of self-determination.

Electoral politics: 2008–14 Despite the assertion of separatist sentiments, the electoral politics in Kashmir has been following a trajectory of its own. The 2008 Assembly elections took place immediately after the Amarnath agitation. Enthused by the massive mass participation of people in protest politics, the separatists expected that people may shun the electoral process. Hence, they activated their boycott politics. However, defying the boycott call, people participated in election in large numbers. Right from the beginning one could see both the intensity of competition at the level of political parties and candidates as well as involvement of ordinary voters in the electoral process. Hectic campaigning and images of the long queues outside the polling booths clearly reflected that electoral process had been institutionalised despite the ongoing separatist politics. A turnout of 51.64 per cent voters in the Kashmir Valley further corroborated this fact. In 2002, the voter turnout was as low as 29.64 per cent. What was reflected from the response of Kashmiris during the 2008 electoral process was that democratic space had been substantially extended in Kashmir. However, like the 2002 elections, the voter turnout could not be translated to mean the decline of separatist space. As one could see during the Amarnath agitation, separatist sentiment was quite alive and in fact had been reinvigorated during the agitation. Hence, the participation in the democratic process was not at the cost of separatism, but despite separatism. The same people who had been participating in the massive demonstrations during the agitation also came out to vote. Making a clear-cut distinction between their right to vote and their demand for ‘freedom’, people justified their participation in election for merely governance purposes. In the words of a voter

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who had also participated in the Amarnath agitation, ‘the elections are only for local governance. We were leading the pro-azaadi protests and still stand for the freedom of Kashmir. We are only choosing a better administration. We need better drinking water, roads, electricity and education’ (Chowdhary, 2009: 14). Although the voter turnout was relatively lower during the Parliamentary elections, which followed the Assembly elections, however, as compared to the earlier Parliamentary elections, the participation was certainly higher. All the three constituencies of Kashmir recorded a higher voter turnout as compared to 2004 Parliamentary elections. In Baramulla constituency it was 41.84 per cent as against 35.65 per cent in 2004, in Srinagar constituency, it was 25.55 per cent as against 18.57 per cent, and in Anantnag constituency, 27.09 per cent as against 15.04 per cent in 2004. However, the lower voter turnout during the Parliamentary elections as compared to the Assembly elections had its own meanings. The proximity and the stakes that people felt at the level of Assembly elections was not felt at the level of national election. Moreover, by supporting the boycott call at this level, people could also assert the continuity of their separatist sentiments. During the Parliamentary election, the boycott call could become effective because people did not have similar stakes as in the Assembly elections. They could therefore easily support the boycott politics and thereby endorse the separatist stand. Not voting in these elections was a message that many Kashmiris would have wanted to give to the Central government – that their participation in the Assembly elections should not be construed as their complete rejection of the separatist politics. (Chowdhary, 2009: 14) One may emphasise that this was the phase of assertion of separatist sentiment and that throughout the 2009 and 2010 period; intensity of separatist sentiments was reflected on the streets of Kashmir. However, this intensity notwithstanding, the Parliamentary elections, by recording higher voter turnout since 2004 reflected, on the whole, an extension of democratic base in Kashmir and a more ambivalent approach towards the electoral politics. One such reflection of ambivalence towards the electoral politics could be seen in the entry of Sajad Lone, the PC leader and a leading separatist of Kashmir, jumping into the electoral fray. Lone was not the

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first separatist to contest election, since many others from the separatist camp had contested the elections in 2002 and 2008 Assembly elections. However, these separatists were either the proxy candidates or had jumped themselves from the separatist to democratic space. In case of Lone, it was a different situation. Without renouncing the separatist space, he sought to use the democratic space for his separatist politics. In his using the democratic space, there is a clear-cut indication of the enlarged democratic space in Kashmir. The authentication of the extended democratic space could be seen during the 2011 panchayat elections. These elections had taken place merely few months after the massive separatist upsurge continuing for five months in 2010. During the upsurge, the mainstream political processes had completely collapsed and governance itself had come to a halt. At that point of time the surge for separatism was so high that one could not imagine participation of people in any electoral process. However, there was massive participation of people during this election. On the whole 80 per cent people participated and neither the separatists’ call for boycott nor the militants’ threat kept the people away from the electoral process.

Conclusion On the whole, one can see ‘deepening of democracy in Kashmir, even if it is taking place within the environment of separatist politics. There is an increasing credibility of elections; increasing competitiveness, a greater participatory nature of the political space; reflections of popular concerns in the political discourse and in essence the rooting of politics within the local milieu. This process of democratisation is important since it is the minimum which is required to address the alienation of Kashmiris. It is pertinent to remember that much of the alienation in Kashmir has its roots in the absence of democratic space’ (Chowdhary, 2019: 15). However, at the same time, one has also to be cautious about one’s assessment about the democratic space in Kashmir. Separatism is a very deep-rooted phenomenon and despite the crisis faced by the separatist leadership and organisations, it tends to reproduce itself in one way or the other. An assessment of the post-2002 period clearly reflects this. As the mainstream politics recovered its space and as the people started responding to the ‘politics of governance’, there has been a simultaneous assertion of separatism. Much of such assertion interestingly takes place within the democratic space itself.

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The indications that simultaneity of democratic and separatist spaces may continue for some time to come – make a case for addressing separatism directly. Democratic expansion is important, but democracy on its own may not overcome the separatist sentiment. The kind of political engagement that was offered by Vajpayee is the minimum that may be required to deal with it. Without such an engagement, the gains made by democratic politics may also be jeopardised. Notes 1 Following the first six months of the Governor’s rule, the state was placed under the President’s rule and continued to be so till 1996. 2 During the Parliamentary elections, as many as 7.5 per cent votes were declared invalid in Srinagar constituency, 7 per cent in Baramulla and 6–8 per cent in Anantnag constituency. In some of the Assembly segments, the percentage of invalid votes was still higher – 17.5 per cent in Sopore, 12.5 per cent in Idgah, 12.2 per cent in Hazratbal, 11.8 percent in Sangrama, 11.3 per cent in Rafiabad, 11.8 in Rajpora, 11.1 in Baramulla, 10.4 percent in Homshilbug and 10 per cent in Batmaloo. Like the Parliamentary elections, the percentage of invalid votes in the Assembly elections was quite high. It was highest in the district of Pulwama (7.14) and lowest in Baramulla (4.62). 3 As per the text of the cabinet decision on Jammu and Kashmir autonomy resolution: ‘. . . the Cabinet finds the resolution passed by the State Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir endorsing the report of the State Autonomy Committee unacceptable. The Cabinet feels that the acceptance of this resolution would set the clock back and reverse the natural process of harmonising the aspirations of the people of Jammu and Kashmir with the integrity of the nation’. It was also stated that, ‘most of the recommendations contained in the report of the State Autonomy Committee seek to reverse the application of constitutional provisions to the State of Jammu and Kashmir which may not only adversely affect the interests of the people of the State but would also tantamount to removal of some of the essential safeguards enshrined in our Constitution. Besides, the issue of restoring the constitutional situation in Jammu and Kashmir to its pre-1953 position had been discussed in detail by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1974–75. It is noteworthy that the agreement signed after these negotiations had affirmed that “provisions of the Constitution of India already applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir without adaptation or modification are unalterable”. The Cabinet urges the people and the Government of Jammu and Kashmir to join hands in the endeavour to address the real problems facing the State: to root out insurgency and cross-border terrorism and to ensure accelerated development. The Centre will continue to provide all possible assistance for attaining these objectives. Hence the cabinet therefore decided, ‘not to accept the resolution passed by the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly

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on the report of the State Autonomy Committee. The Government is of the firm conviction that national integration and devolution of powers to States must go together’ (‘Text of Cabinet decision on J&K autonomy resolution’, The Hindu, 5 July 2000, http://www.hindu.com/2000/07/05/ stories/0205000e.htm) Lyngdoh stated that ‘none of you who does not wish to vote is to be forced to do so. But, there are many of you, going by the media coverage of election fest, who wish to vote, despite the needless bloodshed and tribulation, you have been through’ (Indian Express, Jammu edition, 16 September 2002). A.G. Noorani refers to a number of teams that observed the elections and came up with their own conclusions. Of these, one team comprised of academicians, civil society members and journalists led by Dr. George Mathew of Institute of Social Sciences (ISS), New Delhi, which stated that elections were ‘fair but not necessarily free’. It reported that people in Sopore had reported that announcements were made by the Border Security Force (BSF) from the mosques asking people to vote. But irrespective of this complaint, the conclusion that this team reached at was that the polls ‘endorsed the importance of the democratic process but cautioned against “taking this election as a plebiscite”.’ The CSDS team, along with University of Jammu, also mentioned the role of security forces in almost half of the constituencies in asking the people to vote. According to them that the polls were ‘substantially fair’ but were not free both due to the role of security forces as well as the militants. However they argued that the situation in 2002 was certainly much better than in 1996. Another team led by Pervez Imroz of Coalition of Civil Society reported the presence of security forces and ‘widespread coercion by the security forces on the people to cast their vote’ (Noorani, 2002). In other two northern districts of Kashmir the voting percentage was 45.92 per cent in Budgam and 39.94 per cent in Baramulla. Within the Kashmir Valley, there were 14 constituencies where voter turnout was quite high, higher than the state averages. These included Gurez (76.50%), Charar-i-Sharief (71.99%). Chadoora (69.82%), Uri (66.56%), Karnah (65.68%), Kupwara (55.29%), Langate (53.98%), Rafiabad (52.55%), Kangan (52.03%), Handwara (51.48%), Gulmarg (50.44%), Khansaahib (49.43%), Lolab (47.00%) and Sonawari (55.48%). The People’s Conference, though did not formally field its candidates for the election, however, did not do anything to dispel the perceptions that the candidates were still linked with the party. Referring to the presence of the separatists and militants among the candidates, this is what Praveen Swami noted: ‘Fifteen of the 105 candidates in north Kashmir were, for example, one-time terrorists, individuals with terrorist links or members of the Kashmir Retrieval Movement, a breakaway group of Jamaat-e-Islami figures led by Khaliq Haneef. Several constituencies also saw the emergence of rebel N.C. candidates. Significantly, Sajad Lone and Bilal Lone, sons of the assassinated P.C. leader, stayed in New Delhi through the campaign, defying orders from the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) to campaign against their quasi-official candidates. The fact that they were able to defy the APHC illustrates the intensity of grassroots pressure to restore peace, and could have profound consequences for the secessionist coalition should at least some of the P.C. candidates win.’

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Praveen Swami, ‘Vote In the Time of Terror’, Frontline, Vol. 19, Issue 20, 12–25 October 2002. The reason offered by the Hurriyat about its lacklustre approach to antielection campaign has been the detention of its prominent leaders like Syed Shah Geelani and Yasin Malik. However, the lack of enthusiasm among the Hurriyat members irked the militants and led to an open showdown between Syed Salahuddin, the UJC chairman, and the moderates within the Hurriyat. During its campaign for 2004 Parliamentary elections, Mehbooba Mufti stated that Hizbul Mujahideen ‘is the strongest and local militant organization. Its involvement is imperative for a breakthrough in the solution of Kashmir issue and restoration of the peace with honour’ (Kashmir Times, 13 April 2004). Soon after coming to power, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed started making certain symbolic moves to reflect the pursuance of government’s healing touch policy. These included release of incarcerated separatist leaders like Yasin Malik and other leaders of JKLF; disbanding of Special Operation Group (SOG) and incorporation of its members into the police; providing relief including jobs to victims of militancy etc. He also announced the commitment of his government to reduce civilian fatalities, activating State Human Rights Commission; investigation into the cases of disappearances and restraining the security forces from harassing the citizens and ensuring their accountability. Praveen Swami, ‘Terror Unabated’, Frontline, Vol. 20, Issue 8, 12–25 April 2003. During the 2002 Assembly elections, Sangrama constituency had recorded only 22.10 per cent voter turnout. It was 41.55 per cent for Pattan and 52.54 per cent for Rafiabad. More than the order, it was the assertion of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the SASB representing General S.K. Sinha, the ex-officio chairman of the SASB as the Governor of the state, that the land had been given permanently to the Board to build permanent structures. General Sinha had earlier incensed many Kashmiris through his self-proclaimed agenda of changing the ‘mindset’ of Kashmiris and seeking to redefine ‘Kashmiriyat’ essentially on the basis of Kashmir’s Hindu past. In January 2010, protest took place over the killing of a civilian from Pulwama. It was alleged by the protestors that the killed person was used as a human shield by the security forces in an encounter with the militants. In February 2010, killing of a teenage boy playing cricket who was hit by a smoke shell fired by the police again led to protests.

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Part III

Locating conflict in Kashmir within the larger context of Jammu and Kashmir

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Chapter 8

Beyond Kashmir Social diversity and political divergence in Jammu and Kashmir

This chapter and the next two chapters aim at understanding the conflict in Kashmir from the larges perspective of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Kashmir problem, as has been argued in the earlier chapters, has a context of specificity. It is located within the ethnonationalist identity politics of Kashmir. However, beyond Kashmir, there is a larger reality of the state that needs to be taken into account if one has to understand the nature of conflict in its totality and to develop an approach to resolve it. The state of Jammu and Kashmir is highly plural both in its social as well as political contexts. This plurality has the consequence of not only attributing complexity to the nature of conflict but also adding another dimension to it. Already, two dimensions are identified in the intricate ‘Kashmir issue’ – the external (India–Pakistan) dimension and the internal (Delhi–Kashmir) dimension. The complexity that prevails due to the intermeshing of external with internal dimension is well recognised. However, what is not recognised is the complexity within the state of Jammu and Kashmir, especially in the context of internal differentiations and political divergence. The focus on Kashmir is very important for understanding the nature of conflict since it has been the central point of conflict situation, the ‘theatre’ where all struggles have been taking place and where resistance politics has shaped itself during last so many decades. However, it is also important to focus on the state as a whole since the specific concerns, issues and aspirations that lie at the heart of resistance politics of Kashmir are not necessarily extended to other parts of the state. Within the larger politics of the state, there are multiple identity assertions, while some of these operate in a space parallel to Kashmiri identity politics, there are others which diverge from Kashmiri identity politics.

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These multiple identity assertions provide a third dimension to the conflict – the ‘intra-state’ dimension. To understand this third dimension of conflict, it may be important to focus on social diversity and political divergence within the state.

Social diversity Diversity is the hallmark of the state as it operates at various levels including religious, cultural, linguistic and social (Puri, 2001). Though the only Muslim-majority state of India, it has substantial minority of Hindus.1 The religious composition of the state, however, is quite complex and cannot be described in simple terms of ‘majority’ or ‘minority’. Majority, in one context, becomes minority in other. Thus the Muslims of Jammu, though part of the ‘majority’ at the state level, are ‘minority’ at the regional level. Similarly, Hindus of Jammu though forming the ‘majority’ at the regional level are minority at the state level. 2 The complexity of the religious demography becomes visible at the micro level. For instance, the Muslims of Doda-belt (comprised of three districts Doda, Kishtwar and Ramban), though part of the majority at the state level, are ‘minority’ at the regional level and are ‘majority’ at the sub-regional level. Of the three regions of the state (Kashmir, Jammu and Ladakh), it is only the region of Kashmir that is homogeneous in terms of its religious composition. Predominantly Muslim, it had a very miniscule minority of Kashmiri Pundits till 1990. However, after the exodus of this community, it has almost become a single-religion society with 97.16 per cent of its population being Muslims. Less than 3 per cent of Kashmir’s population now comprises of minorities including Sikhs, Christians and Hindus. However, the other two regions of the state are quite mixed in their religious composition. Buddhists and Muslims are almost in equal numbers in Ladakh region. Of the two districts of this region, Leh is predominantly Buddhist and Kargil is predominantly Muslim. Jammu, similarly, is Hindu-majority region but has a substantial population of Muslims. Of the 10 districts of this region, there are only the three districts of Jammu, Kathua and Samba that can be characterised as predominantly Hindu. But even here, there is a sprinkling of Muslim population. In the other three districts that are Hindu-majority districts (Ramban, Reasi and Udhampur), Muslims are in substantial numbers. In the rest of the four districts of the region, Muslims are in a majority (Poonch, Rajouri, Doda, Kishtwar). Of these four districts, while Poonch and Doda are predominantly Muslim, Rajouri and Kishtwar have a substantial number

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of Hindus. On the whole, the state provides a picture of a mixed society with Muslim and Hindu population dispersed all over the state forming different patterns. Apart from the intricate demographic structure, which makes it difficult to categorise a religious community within the simplistic ‘majority–minority’ paradigm, there are other factors that add complexity to it. To begin with, the religious identity is intersected by the factor of ‘region’. Each of the three regions that comprise the state had followed an altogether different trajectory of its social, cultural and historical evolution. It was only in 1846 under the Dogra rule that these three regions were brought together under one administrative unit. However, even after becoming part of the state, the distinct regional identity of each of these units continued to be maintained. That is the reason why region continues to be an important marker of the identity in the state and makes a dent in the religious continuity across the regions. Though sharing the same religion, the people belonging to different regions identify themselves as distinct people (Chowdhary, 1998a: 328). Diversity, however, is not only reflected at the religious and regional levels, but also at linguistic-cultural levels. The state represents a mosaic of linguistic and cultural groupings, forming a number of patterns. While Kashmir embodies one such pattern, Jammu and Ladakh follow altogether different patterns. The Kashmir Valley forms a singular cultural unit with Kashmiri language bonding people across the religious divide. Kashmiris, claiming to have 5,000 years of history, distinguish themselves from other cultural groupings of the state. To quote Puri, ‘the region’s geographical compactness and isolation, renowned beauty, cultural homogeneity, historical continuity and the political developments have created a strong sense of Kashmiri identity which is Islamised as much as Islam in Kashmir is Kashmirised’ (Puri, 2001). However, Kashmiris also boast of a composite culture that transcends the religious boundaries and includes the Muslims as well as Hindus (Sheikh, 2008). Kashmiriyat, as this composite culture is termed, stands as much for co-existence between Kashmiri Muslims and Pundits as for the continuity between the Hindu and Muslim past and a synthesis between the two (Wani, 2006). It is interesting to see as to how the Kashmiris own their shaivist past and refer to the unique Trika philosophy3 and trace their modern legacy to both Sheikh Noorudin and Laleshwari (Bhattacharjea, 1994: 28–31). The Kashmiri linguist-cultural identity does not extend beyond the Kashmir Valley. Only towards the south, there are Kashmiri-speaking people in the Doda belt of the Jammu region. These people have

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originally migrated from Kashmir and form the ethnic continuity with Kashmir (Bose, 2003: 185). The Ladakh pattern reflects a linguistic-cultural bonding of a similar kind as in Kashmir but with some basic differences. The cultural roots of people here can be traced to a shared history as well as the linkage of the region with Tibet and other adjoining areas. Ladakhis can be divided into three main groups on the basis of their ethnicity (namely, Tibetans, Monpas and Dards) and two main groups on the basis of their religious affiliations (namely Buddhists and Muslims) (Jina, 1996). However, despite these differences, the Ladakhis form a cultural unit and till very recently their religious identity, though significant, did not override their cultural identity. The tradition of intercommunity marriages that was prevalent till very recent times provided an example of their overarching cultural rather than religious identity (Mann, 2002: 102). Despite the fact that Buddhists seek to define their cultural roots via the religious linkage with Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism and thereby distinguish themselves from the Muslims, both the Shias of Kargil and Sunnis of Leh, the Ladakhi cultural identity remains overarching. Of all the regions of the state, Jammu is the most plural region and itself a mosaic of cultural and linguistic groups (Puri, 2001). Stretched in five of the 10 districts of the region (Jammu, Kathua, Samba, Reasi and Udhampur), the Dogra culture remains the predominant one here. This Dogri-speaking belt, though primarily Hindu, has a sizeable Muslim population, particularly in Reasi and Udhampur districts. Gujjar and Pahari culture predominates in the twin districts of Poonch and Rajouri. Gujjars are traditionally a nomadic tribe with a 100 per cent Muslim population. They speak Gojri and follow a distinct lifestyle. The other major cultural-linguistic group in these two districts is comprised of Pahari-speaking people. Paharis are a composite group comprised of both Muslims as well as Hindus (Maini, 2010: 4). Adjoining Kashmir region lies the Doda belt comprised of the districts of Doda, Kishtwar and Ramban. The belt as already mentioned has a large number of ethnic Kashmiri people who are mostly Muslims and are concentrated in the district of Doda and also form a substantial population of the district of Kishtwar. The Hindus of the belt concentrated in the district of Ramban and forming substantial population of Kishtwar speak a number of languages including Siraji, Bhaderwahi, Pongli, Padri, Kishtwari, among others. It is the combination of religious diversity, on the one hand, and the cultural-linguistic diversity, on the other, which provides a context of plurality to the state. This plurality, however, is more complex than reflected in various political projections of the state. Generally, there is a

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stereotypical representation of the internal diversity in which the ‘Muslim Kashmir’ is represented against the ‘Hindu Jammu’ and ‘Buddhist Ladakh’. However, in reality, this description does not validate itself due to the internal differentiations both within the category of ‘region’ as well as ‘religion’. As already stated, it is only the region of Kashmir that exhibits the homogeneous characteristics; all other regions are internally differentiated. Even for the predominant Kashmiri-speaking ‘Muslim Kashmir’, Kashmiri Pundits form an important point of reference for defining its identity (Hangloo, 2012: 38). Furthermore, it also has a conspicuous non-Kashmiri Pahari and Gujjar population at its outer fringes, for instance, in Kangan and Uri. The situation is much more complex for other two regions where it is not possible to classify people on the basis of any homogenous category, least of all, the religious one. Religious category, in any case, is intersected by the regional, cultural-linguistic and tribal identity and hence neither the Muslims, nor the Hindus of the state can be seen as internally undifferentiated. The Muslims of Kashmir, mostly Sunni (with pockets of Shia population), form a distinct group and differentiate themselves from other Muslims of the state. The Ladakhi-speaking Shia Muslims of Kargil similarly form a separate identity as do the Gujjars and Pahari Muslims. Gujjars, an all-Muslim group, rather than asserting their religious category, assert their tribal identity and even claim themselves to be the third largest group of the state after the Kashmiri Muslims and Hindus of Jammu. Pahari Muslims, mostly Rajputs, meanwhile asserting their linguistic and caste identity, differentiate themselves from Kashmiris and are placed in a very competitive relationship with the Gujjars (Puri, 2001). Like the Muslims, the Hindus are also internally differentiated on the basis of their caste, cultural and linguistic categorisation. Kashmiri Pundits feel culturally closer to Kashmiri Muslims as compared to the Dogra Hindus. A similar distinction is made between the Dogra Hindus, on the one hand, and the Hindus from the Pahari or the Doda belt. Dalits who form a substantial part of the Hindu population form a distinct category as opposed to upper caste Hindus, mostly Rajputs and Brahmins.

Multiple identity assertions It is this context of complex plurality that provides a logic to the multiple identity politics within the state. Kashmiri identity politics, though the most visible one at the international and national levels, is not the only identity politics of the state. There is a multiplicity of identity assertions that take place at varied levels. Besides the ‘ethno-nationalist’ identity

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politics (of Kashmir), there are various other manifestations of identity assertions. For instance, there is assertion of regional identity politics both in Jammu and Ladakh; the identity assertion of Gujjars and Paharis on the basis of their tribal identity; the sub-regional identity politics of marginal areas like Poonch–Rajouri or Doda belt. On the basis of these varied identity assertions, one can identify the multi-layered nature of identity politics on the one hand and its multi-dimensional nature, on the other (Chowdhary, 2010). While the ‘ethno-nationalist’ identity politics (of Kashmir) forms one layer of this politics, the inter-regional elite competition for power forms another layer. A third layer of this politics is defined by the issues of development and marginalisation. The extent and range of Kashmiri ethno-nationalist identity politics, however, is largely confined to the Kashmir Valley and does not extend to other regions of the state. Even the Doda belt of Jammu region, which inhibits a large population of Kashmiri-speaking people, does not inevitably follow the Kashmiri identity politics. Though impacted in the long run by the developments in Kashmir, its politics is defined by an altogether different logic. Confronted with extreme backwardness and marginalisation, development issues remain the priority of any politics over here (Chowdhary, 2010a). Beyond the Kashmiri identity politics, the most visible identity politics of the state is regional identity politics of Jammu and Ladakh. The parameters of this politics are defined by power politics and distribution of resources within the state. This politics is framed around the intense feelings of regionalism. This regionalism is articulated around the widely prevailing perceptions that there is an imbalance in the structure of power within the state, which has a tilt towards Kashmir region. The ‘political deprivation’ and ‘political neglect’ of these regions, therefore, remains the most vocal grievance around which most of the political issues of these two regions are formulated. Much of this politics is a manifestation of elite demands at the regional level and revolves around the issues related to distribution of state resources (educational and employment opportunities; development of infrastructure facilities, etc.) However, at the heart of the regional identity politics lies the question of ‘balance of political power’ and political parity between these regions, on the one hand, and Kashmir region, on the other. What drives the regional politics of Jammu is the feeling that despite having larger land area and having slender difference in population as compared to Kashmir, the region does not have political parity with Kashmir (Puri, 1983b: 21).

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With ‘Kashmir’ as the reference point, the range of this politics is defined by the demand for restructuring the power structure of the state. At the one end of this range lies the demand for internal devolution of power (‘regional autonomy’, for instance) and at the other, the demand for division of the state (the demand for Union Territory status for Ladakh for instance; or the demand for ‘Jammu state’). There is another layer of the identity politics in the state. This is the sub-regional identity politics that has taken shape in response to the lopsided discourse of the regional identity politics, on the one hand, and the ‘developmental lag’ of the peripheral areas within all the regions, on the other. The regional politics of Jammu remains confined to the issues concerning the privileged sections of society – the urban, middle classes of the Hindu-dominated belt of the region. The people residing in the peripheral areas – the remote border belt of Poonch–Rajouri and the underdeveloped areas of the Doda belt feel not merely excluded but alienated by the dominant discourse of the regional identity politics. Similar is the situation in Ladakh region where the Leh-centric and Buddhist-dominated discourse of Ladakhi identity politics alienates the Muslims of Kargil. In both the regions, therefore, the fractured regional identity politics provides space to the sub-regional identity politics. The politicisation of the Kargil identity within Ladakh and the demand for Hill Councils in Doda belt (Chenab Valley Hill Council) and the Poonch–Rajouri districts (Peer Panchal Hill Council) reflects the sub-regional identity politics.

Multi-dimensional identity politics On the basis of the above analysis, one can identify three broad dimensions of identity politics within Jammu and Kashmir: ideological, power and developmental dimensions. The ideological dimension is reflected in the identity politics of Kashmir as it revolves around the larger and fundamental political issues related to nationalism, self-determination and autonomy. The power dimension is reflected within the regional and sub-regional identity politics. Much of the politics of Jammu and Ladakh is based on the issues of ‘power deprivation’ of these regions. The political discourse of these regions is mainly driven by the arguments that in the absence of regional parity within the state, there is ‘concentration of political power’ within Kashmir region, which leads not only to its greater political visibility but also its greater political negotiability.

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The third dimension of identity politics within the state is defined by the issues of development and is linked with the articulation of perceptions of marginalisation. This perception not only informs the sub-regional identity politics like that of Doda belt and Poonch–Rajouri districts, but also the politics of the marginal groups like the Gujjars and Paharis. These two groups, almost similarly located in the peripheral areas of Jammu and targeting the educational and employment opportunities provided by the state, are engaged in intensely competitive identity politics. The three dimensions and three layers of identity politics, though operating in parallel, tend to intersect with each other. Hence though the Kashmiri identity politics is mainly governed by the ideological concerns, power and development issues also get to be highlighted here at times. For last one decade or so, there has often been political mobilisation around the issue of discrimination of Kashmir region vis-à-vis Jammu in terms of allocation of resources and comparative regional development. Ever since the regional power politics of Kashmir has become competitive due to the entry of PDP, the power and development related issues have often been raised by the political parties within the paradigm of ‘Kashmiri identity politics’. Similarly, though the identity politics of Jammu region has primarily been defined with reference to issues of power and development, on many occasions, the ideological issues have been raised here. The political mobilisation in Jammu during the Praja Parishad agitation of 1952 and more recently, the Amarnath agitation, for instance, had strong ideological dimensions. During these agitations, the discourse of regional deprivation in terms of power and development was combined with the ‘nationalistic’ discourse. In both these agitations, the ‘Kashmiri nationalism’ and urge for its autonomy was challenged through an assertion of ‘Indian nationalism’.

Political divergence It is in the context of the complex nature of the identity politics mapped above that one can understand the nature of political divergence within the state. The politics of the state can neither be identified as homogenous nor unidirectional. More importantly, on varied issues there are divergent political responses (Bose, 2003: 10–12). The dominant response of one region may be in complete opposition to the dominant response of the other region. It is the ideological divergence that has the most significant implications for the state, more crucially in the context of conflict situation.

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It is pertinent to note that the conflict situation in Jammu and Kashmir has both the external and internal dimensions and both need to be addressed for a long-term resolution of the conflict. However, the political divergence within the state makes the internal dimension very complex. This internal dimension is defined by contestation of the Indian state that has been ongoing since early 1950s. The basis of such contestation lies in the identity politics of Kashmir. However, this politics does not necessarily extend beyond the territorial limits of the Valley. The political concerns of people in other regions of the state are quite different. As we have seen above, the logic of the identity politics in Jammu and Ladakh (via the medium of the regional identity politics, or the sub-regional identity politics or the caste/tribe identity politics) is defined either by the power politics or by the issues of development (Chowdhary, 1998a: 331). Hence, the politics of Kashmir does not replicate itself in other parts of the state. The roots of the political divergence within the state can be traced to the very context of the early politicisation of Kashmiris and the assertion of ethno-nationalist identity politics of Kashmir, specifically since 1939. Despite its broad-based and overarching nature, and despite having a strong economic content, the political movement as it evolved in 1940s, primarily maintained its Kashmir-oriented context and failed to mobilise the masses in Jammu and Ladakh. The specificity of Kashmir politics continued during the period of Accession. The political developments that took place in the post-Accession period further added to the restrictive nature of Kashmiri identity politics. Losing its economic content, it became more ethno-centric and driven by the issues related to Kashmir’s (represented as state’s) relationship with India. Jammu and Ladakh, meanwhile, followed altogether different trajectories – mostly reflecting the issues of intra-state and inter-regional relations. Noting the ethno-centric divide between the politics of Kashmir, on the one hand, and Jammu and Ladakh, on the other, it is important to emphasise that the identity politics of Kashmir does not necessarily incorporate the Muslims of Jammu and Ladakh. This emphasis is important to do away with a myth that if there exists a political divergence within the state, it is around the religious identity of people and that there is a ‘Muslim’ political response posed in diametrically opposed ‘Hindu’ political response. As already stated above, neither the Muslims nor the Hindus form a homogenous category within the state, and more importantly, they do not necessarily share the political constituency on the basis of their religious affiliations (Choudhary, 2008: 13). The Muslims of Kargil, for instance, have altogether different political

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issues as compared to those raised within the identity politics of Kashmir (Puri, 1983a: 190). For them, the marginalisation of Ladakh vis-à-vis the state, on the one hand, and the marginalisation of Kargil vis-à-vis Leh, on the other, are the more relevant issues. Similarly, the Muslims of Rajouri–Poonch belt are more concerned with their peripheral and border-related realities and the issues emanating from these. Their politics is more oriented towards the issues related to the development of the twin border-belt and the educational and employment opportunities for people and the affirmative action by the state. The Muslims of Doda belt comprising of three districts of Doda, Kishtwar and Ramban are similarly more concerned about the issues related to development (Choudhary, 2013: 70–3). Despite sharing the ethnic identity with the people of the Valley, the political aspirations of people in this belt are not necessarily similar to those of people of Kashmir. The politics of ‘autonomy’ or ‘azadi’ that captures the imagination of Kashmiris and informs their political sentiments is not manifested in the similar intensity over here. The most dominant demand of Muslims of this belt, rather than emanating from the pro-separatist agenda of Kashmir, arise from the overall backwardness of the area – the demand for Chenab Valley Hill Council on the pattern of the Hill Councils of Ladakh. It was during the recent period of militancy that one could see a clear reflection of the political divergence within the state. The onset of militancy was accompanied by a very intense response of the people of the Kashmir. The separatist sentiment echoed through the slogan of ‘azadi’ swayed the whole of the Valley. People across the class spectrum with different professional and occupational background, both in rural as well urban areas, men and women – were emotionally involved in the azadi politics. However, such emotional involvement of people in the separatist politics was not automatically extended either in Jammu or Ladakh. While Ladakh remained totally untouched by militancy, it (militancy) certainly found roots in Doda belt of Jammu region to begin with and later in the twin districts of Poonch and Rajouri as well. But the linkage between militancy and separatism that was clearly to be seen in Kashmir was not replicated in these areas (Choudhary, 2013: 67–8). Despite the local basis of recruitment within the cadre of militants and a strong sense of sympathy with the people of Kashmir, the political response of people here, specifically the Muslims, could not be compared to that of people in the Valley. The kind of popular demonstrations and massive public display of pro-azadi sentiments that were recorded in Kashmir of early 1990 did not inform the politics of these areas at any point of time. Such differences in the popular political response between the Kashmir

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Valley, on the one hand, and the Muslim belts of Jammu region, on the other, have been recorded at various other crucial moments as well. More recently, Kashmir Valley has seen turbulence during the summers of 2008, 2009 and 2010 with massive demonstrations, bandh calls and stone-pelting, characterising the political environment. However, such turbulence remains limited to the Kashmir Valley without affecting other parts of the state.

Conclusion The political divergence that runs across the regional lines adds to the complex character to the conflict. Though Kashmir as a distinct social and political unit forms the central point of the conflict situation, its politics neither exhausts nor subsumes the politics of the rest of the state. There is a larger reality of the state that extends beyond Kashmir, which is defined by the multiplicity of political responses. There are a number of political configurations that run parallel to, and even at points, in opposition to the politics of Kashmir. These configurations impact both the context of conflict as well as the process of conflict resolution. In sum, the internal divergence adds another layer to the conflict situation, which needs to be addressed along with the other two layers of India–Pakistan dimension and Delhi–Kashmir dimension. This layer of the conflict situation demands internal dialogue and consensus building. Till the time the internal political divergence remains unaddressed, the conflict cannot be resolved. Notes 1 As per the available Census data (2001), 67 per cent of the total population of the state is comprised of Muslims. Hindus are 29.6 per cent, Sikhs 2.23 per cent, Buddhists 1.16 per cent and Christians 0.14 per cent. 2 As per the 2001 Census, Muslims form 97.16 per cent of the population of Kashmir region (1.84 per cent Hindus and 0.88 per cent Sikhs). In Jammu region 65.23 per cent of the population comprises of Hindus, while 30.69 per cent are Muslims and 3.57 per cent are Sikhs. In Ladakh region, the Buddhists form 45.87 per cent of the total population. Hindus form 6.22 per cent of the total population of Ladakh. 3 Trika philosophy had emerged as a form of Kashmiri Shaivism and represented a fusion between ancient Vedic and Buddhist philosophy.

Chapter 9

Jammu as a factor in Kashmir conflict

Balraj Puri’s famous book Jammu: A Clue to Kashmir Tangle (1966) makes an argument for Jammu as an important link in the Kashmir question. Without paying attention to this region, he argues, the conflict can neither be understood in its entirety nor can it be resolved. Referring to the ‘Jammu factor’, Varshney notes that it is ‘a factor not fully recognized, especially in international circles, but one that complicated the issues in Kashmir immeasurably’ (Varshney, 1991: 1007). It provides a third, intra-state dimension to the conflict besides the internal and external dimensions. Without addressing this dimension and without bringing it in the picture, the conflict cannot be resolved. The ‘Jammu dimension’ in conflict situation, often ignored in analysis, is quite significant from a number of angles. With its socio-cultural distinctiveness, Jammu region provides a context of plurality to the state of Jammu and Kashmir and also refers to the political reality beyond the Kashmir Valley. Through a focus on Jammu, a distinction can be made between Kashmir Valley, which is the epicentre of the conflict, on the one hand, and the Jammu and Kashmir state, on the other. Though a significant part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, Kashmir does not exhaust the whole of the state. The state extends beyond the Kashmir Valley and incorporates two more regions, which are culturally as well as politically distinct from Kashmir. The politics of Kashmir does not replicate itself in the Jammu region and in many ways can actually be seen to be divergent. This divergence generates internal tensions within the state and adds to the complexity of the conflict.

Specificities of the Jammu region Quite different from Kashmir and a more-or-less a socially, linguistically and culturally a compact unit, Jammu is culturally diverse. According to Puri:

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Jammu is, in many respects a contrast with Kashmir. It is not geographically closed and compact. Far from being a melting pot of faiths and races as Kashmir is, it is a mosaic. It did receive new faiths and ethnic communities but far from merging them into a single entity as Kashmir did, it accommodated them as distinct separate identities. Thus it is neither religiously nor ethnically homogenous. (Puri, 2010: 34) This region reflects a multi-religious, multi-cultural and multi-linguistic society. Though generally perceived to be a Hindu-majority region, it has a substantial number of Muslims. With the exception of three districts of Jammu bordering with Punjab, which have an overwhelming number of Hindus (Jammu, Samba and Kathua), Muslim population in the region is very marked. Four of the 10 districts of the state actually have a Muslim majority. Of these, two districts – Poonch and Doda – are predominantly Muslim with a very thin minority Hindu population. Rajouri and Kishtwar meanwhile have Muslims as majority but with very a substantial number of Hindus. The rest of the three districts of Reasi, Udhampur and Ramban, though having a larger number of Hindus, also have a sizeable number of Muslims. Mixed inter-community life is one of the major peculiarities of this region. Almost every part of the region has a tradition of shared socio-cultural practices that cuts across the religious boundaries. One can also find numerous examples of shared religious spaces. Shrines of Baba Chamliyal located in Jammu district, Baba Ghulam Badshah in Rajouri and Baba Fariduddin in Kishtwar are revered both by Hindus and Muslims. Though generally known for its temples, the region has numerous Sufi shrines. However, the social composition of the region cannot be understood merely with reference to religious identities because there are marked cultural-linguistic groupings cross-cutting the religious identifications. The largest of these groupings is that of Dogras who inhabit a large part of the region particularly the districts of Kathua, Samba, Jammu, Udhampur, Reasi and Ramban. These districts also have a sprinkling of Punjabi population as well. Both the Dogra and Punjabi identity is inclusive in religious terms with both Hindus and Muslims identifying themselves as Dogras or Punjabis. Gujjars, along with Bakerwals and Gaddis, form another distinct identity of this region. Originally nomadic but many of them are in the process of settling down, Gujjars are endogamous group who speak a distinct language and follow particular norms of community and tribal life. With the exception of Gaddis who are Hindus, Gujjars

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and Bakerwals are 100 per cent Muslims in this region but prefer to be identified by their tribal rather than religious identity. While located in the whole of the region, they are particularly concentrated in the two border districts of Poonch and Rajouri. Also concentrated in these two districts is another group, that of Paharis. Paharis, though not as cohesive as the Gujjars are comprised of both Muslims and Hindus. Apart from these, there are also ethnically Kashmiri-speaking people who are mostly located in the Doda belt. This belt now comprised of three districts of Doda, Kishtwar and Ramban is in itself quite plural with as many as eight languages spoken and people of different ethnic and cultural groups living together. Along with other dimensions of identity, caste forms an important dimension of identity. Among the upper castes, Rajputs and Brahmins are numerically large and competing castes. Both these caste groupings have been traditionally associated with the power structure. Though in small numbers, the other two castes that have been occupying privileged positions in society include the Mahajans and Khatris. Along with these castes, the region has a large Dalit population. As large as one-third of the Hindu population in the region is comprised of the Dalits. Caste assertion is very visible in the region both among Hindus and Muslims. Cutting across the religious lines, the Rajputs have maintained their dominance throughout the region. Extraordinarily, even among Muslims, Rajputs form an endogamous caste and assert their distinction from other Muslims. It is therefore not only among Hindus that caste forms an important identity marker but also among Muslims. Multiple and overlapping identities form a peculiar characteristic of Jammu region. As each marker of identity, whether religion, language, culture or tribe is cut across by one or the other marker of identity, it creates a complex picture of diversity. The multiple and multi-layered identities do not allow any identity to assume an exclusive form. In terms of religious markers of identities, therefore, neither Hindus nor Muslims are internally undifferentiated. The internal differentiations and multiple layers of identity notwithstanding, the regional identity of Jammu provides a larger sense of belonging to the people here. Despite the cultural and linguistic differences, there are strong regional bonds, which are a reflection of the context of cultural continuity. The major linguistic groups of the region, Dogri, Punjabi, Gojri and Pahari, though distinct, have lot of similarity and hence those speaking one can understand the other. Similarly there are cultural practices that are commonly followed. On the whole there are common regional sensibilities which link people together.

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It is because of these common sensibilities that Jammu’s regional distinctiveness from Kashmir is asserted. However, apart from the socio-cultural distinctiveness of Jammu, it is the political divergence from Kashmir’s political identity and politics that has significant implications for understanding the context of conflict.

Jammu’s political divergence from Kashmir The dominant politics of Jammu has reflected the sharp divergence from Kashmir. To understand this divergence it may be imperative to trace the trajectory of the relationship between Kashmir and Jammu. It was only in 1846 that the state was formed as one unit with Jammu and Kashmir as two major regions of the state. Prior to that there was no linkage between the two regions. Each of these regions (and for that matter even Ladakh, the third region of the state) had followed its own historical trajectory and had neither the common cultural bonds nor the common historical experiences. Unlike Kashmir, which is geographically a compact unit and traces its history to 5,000 years in continuity, ‘Jammu lacked historical continuity and permanently fixed boundaries’ (Puri, 1983: 188). Despite the administrative linkages established after 1846, there was not much interaction between the two regions and it was mainly through the Dogra ruler who exercised his powers over whole of the state that some common linkage was established.1 Among the few spaces that provided interaction among people, was the Darbar where the Dogra employees could interact with the Kashmiri employees. However, most of the Kashmiri employees were the Pundits and there were not many Kashmiri Muslims in the state services. Towards the second and third decade of the twentieth century, politics became a medium for establishing linkage between the regions of Kashmir and Jammu. This was the time when the political consciousness in Kashmir was taking shape. Though it was in Kashmir that the political response against the Dogra rule was articulated, Jammu’s Muslim elite got involved in it quite early. The 13 July 1931 upsurge, which is symbolised as the beginning of ‘freedom movement of Kashmir’, had extensive impact in Jammu. The formation of All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference was a combined response of both Jammu and Kashmir regions. The leadership of the Muslim Conference was formed from both the regions and though Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah was the towering personality in this organisation, leaders from Jammu including Chowdhary Abbas and Allah Rakha were equally influential leaders of the organisation. However, soon the political response

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of the two regions started taking different direction and by the time the Muslim Conference was converted into the National Conference in 1939, the differences between the leadership of Kashmir and Jammu was coming out in the open. The Muslim leadership of Jammu was not quite supportive of the idea of changing the character of the organisation and opening it for the non-Muslims and radicalising its goals. The withdrawal of the Jammu-based members led to a split in the National Conference. ‘The chief reason for this split’, notes Choudhary, ‘was in ideological leanings of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and Choudhary Ghulam Abbas towards Indian National Congress and Indian Muslims League and the approach of these two parties vis-à-vis Princely States’ (Choudhary, 2013: 30). The Jammu-based leaders after coming out of the National Conference revived the Muslim Conference. The split of the Muslim politics of the state on the regional basis set the pace for the regionalisation of the Kashmiri identity politics.2 The linkage that it had established with Jammu since the decade of 1930s was lost and since then the political trajectory of the two regions started following different directions. Kashmir’s politics witnessed two major changes – first, it came to incorporate strong ideological content with goals for economic and political transformation and second, it acquired mass character. Jammu’s politics meanwhile continued to remain elite-oriented with both the Muslim and Hindu leadership of the region representing the entrenched feudal classes. Due to the regionalisation of Kashmir’s politics, the mobilisation of the peasantry and the working classes in Jammu region could not take place. Despite the fact that there were similar economic reasons for discontent among masses in Jammu region as in Kashmir region, politics did not acquire mass base here. This was despite the fact that the discontent due to economic oppression of people was getting reflected at the surface in certain parts of the region. In the areas of Mirpur, Kotli, Rajouri and Seri, there were severe incidents of spontaneous violence in the period 1931–32. The peasantry in these areas was mostly Muslim and was burdened by debt and had become landless because of the usurpation of land by the money lenders stationed in the towns. The condition of these peasants was quite miserable and they came under the influence of the religious basis of politics, mainly due to the proximity with Punjab. The Punjab-based All India Kashmir Conference (AIKC) and the Majlis-e-Ahrar succeeded in turning the discontent into a communal direction. In the wake of 1931 episode, the Ahrars sent large number of volunteers in Jammu region who became active in the Jammu city and other towns of Jammu including Mirpur. But, as Copeland notes,

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the impact of Ahrar mobilisation was to be felt more in the rural areas: ‘Oppressed indebted and gridingly poor, the Muslim peasants of Jammu were ripe for mobilization, and they listened attentively to the speeches of the Ahrars and to the millenarian preaching of the Islamic clergy. They began to organize – and to hit back’ (Copeland, 1981: 243). Severe incidents of rioting, looting and killings followed in Mirpur, Rajouri and Kotli as well as other areas of the region. Among those targeted were the Dogra officials as the Hindu landowners and money lenders. With religion as the basis of mobilisation, it actually came to acquire communal character. By the time, the issue of Accession of this princely state was to be confronted, Jammu had become communally volatile. Parallel to the Muslims Conference were the Hindu organisations that had captured the dominant political voices in Hindu constituency. Of these the Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS were the most prominent ones. RSS had established itself quite early in the region and was operating in most of the towns dominated by Hindus. Both the Muslim Conference and the Hindu Mahasabha were involved in communal mobilisation of people. Almost every festival had become a moment of communal tension. Except for the Poonch town, which was free from communal tension, all the major towns of the Jammu region witnessed communal tension. It was this communal tension that erupted into communal violence in 1947. In the wake of partition of the country and the division of the state, there were large-scale communal killings. While a large number of Muslims were killed in Jammu, the Hindus and Sikhs in the areas that came under the control of Pakistan suffered casualties. This is not to argue that there was no secular politics in Jammu. Jammu, due to its proximity with Punjab, was impacted by the political developments in the Indian sub-continent quite early. Despite the fact that the state government had banned the entry of newspapers and speakers from outside the state, few students studying in Lahore colleges had started mobilising the young people in the anti-colonial struggle.3 Among the initial progressive organisations that were established in the state included the Dogra Sabha that was formed in this region in 1905. ‘It was a non-communal association and ‘provided a common platform for all communities of the state. The Executive Committee of the Sabha included both Hindus and Muslims’(Kaur, 1996: 40). Among its aims and objectives were included the those related to working for bringing about unity among the different communities living in the state, working for eradication of social evils such as Begar (unpaid forced labour demanded by the state administration) and fighting for the protection of the state subjects in government services.4 Later on, Sardar Budh Singh,

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a progressive activist, emerged as a very influential leader in the region. After resigning from his service as the district collector in the state government in 1925, he campaigned against the problems in the land revenue system and the practice of begar, corruption in the state administration as well as poverty and backwardness In mid-1920s, he became the president of the Dogra Sadar Sabha and declared it as a branch of Indian National Congress. However, as Puri argues, this move did not get the support of national leadership of Congress for the reason that they identified with the politics of Sheikh Abdullah and considered the party that he led (Muslim Conference to begin with and later National Conference) as good enough to mobilise the people (Puri, 1983: 188). Hence, Congress did not officially extend itself in the state. This response of the national leadership of Congress, which was mainly a result of its focus on Kashmir’s politics without any reference whatsoever to the political developments in Jammu region, had its long-term implication for not only communalising the politics of Jammu region but also in developing a yawning gap between the politics of Kashmir and the Jammu region. It needs to be emphasised in this regard that National Conference, even in its heyday of secular and progressive politics, could not extend its base in the Jammu region and the absence of strong secular force in Jammu left a political vacuum, which was readily filled by the Muslims and Hindu communalist organisations. The failure of National Conference to extend its project of mobilising the peasantry and working classes of the Jammu region was due to a number of reasons. First, from the very beginning of its politics, this organisation was linked to Jammu via the Muslim leadership of the region. This leadership on its part was much more oriented towards the religious basis of identity politics and therefore had joined the Kashmiri leaders in forming the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference to protect the interests of emerging middle-class Muslims of the state. Once the Muslim Conference took the route of secular politics and converted itself into National Conference, the Muslim leadership of Jammu withdrew and the National Conference was left without any link with Jammu. Meanwhile, the politics of National Conference became so regionalised that its leaders did not feel the need to extend its constituency to Jammu region.5 It was because of its process of regionalisation that it failed to take into account the sensitivities of Jammu region. It has been reported by many analysts that Sheikh Abdullah himself did not have much knowledge about the issues of Jammu and Ladakh regions and he could not develop a team of colleagues from Jammu who could guide him in this direction. Balraj Puri has often noted that

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Sheikh spoke only on behalf of Kashmiris and did not consider himself to be the leader of Jammu (Puri, 1966: 22). Similarly Bhattacharjea (1994: 169) has noted that While Abdullah was conversant with the problems and aspirations of the valley, he knew little of those of the other provinces still under the Maharaja’s dominion: Jammu and Ladakh. The Muslims of Jammu did not share the valley’s eclecticism and had mostly supported the rival Muslim Conference that favoured Pakistan, and Abdullah had a limited following among Hindus and Sikhs. In Buddhist Ladakh, he had no following at all. Nor did he show much concern for these areas, except when they affected his position in the valley; as when the eviction of Muslims from Jammu created doubts in Kashmir. One factor that created the gulf between the two regions was the very direction that Kashmiri identity politics had taken during the pre-1947 period. A strong anti-Dogra sentiment formed the basis of Kashmiri identity politics. In the political discourse that was evolving in the decade of 1930s and 1940s, no attempts were made to make distinction between the Dogra rulers and the Dogra community. While it was true that the Dogra elite, mainly those belonging to the upper castes, were the beneficiaries of the Dogra rule, there was a large part of the Dogra society that faced similar misery and impoverishment as the Kashmiris. However, in the context of strong ‘Kashmiri versus Dogra’ politics, the limits of Kashmiri politics vis-à-vis the Dogra society were defined. Hence as Puri notes, ‘many Hindu and Muslim leaders of Jammu found it difficult to sell the battle cry of Kashmir National Conference viz. Dogra Raj Murdabad to Dogra dominated Jammu region’ (Puri, 2010: 36).6 There were individuals in Jammu, mostly with middle-class background with progressive outlook who opted to be part of the National Conference, but organisationally, the party did not have much vibrant political base here. In the post-1946 period, after the launch of the Quit Kashmir Movement, a students’ group, Student Union, attracted a large number of students of Jammu city into the progressive and secular politics. However, in the absence of any secular organisational force, the discontent of Muslim peasantry was channelled in the direction of religion-based identity politics of the Muslim Conference. The Hindu peasantry, mostly Dalits and other lower castes, meanwhile remained unrepresented and invisible. Their political issues could neither be articulated nor voiced.

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Political divide between Kashmir and Jammu regions in the post-Accession period The political divide between Kashmir and Jammu regions got sharply reflected in the immediate post-Accession period. While one of the reasons for such a divide was the political polarisation that had already developed between the two regions in the pre-Accession period, it was further aggravated by the political developments in the immediate post-Accession politics and administration. With the National Conference at the helm of affairs, it was the ongoing political and economic transformation that generated much of concern and agitation in the Jammu region. The land reforms particularly became the major reason for resentment, particularly among the propertied classes. As it happened, there was a regional context to the land holdings and the landlessness. With the exception of Kashmiri Pundits and a very small class of Kashmiri Muslims who held land, most of the Kashmiris were the landless peasants. Meanwhile among those who held the land, Jammubased landholders formed the largest number. Hence, while the largest number of beneficiaries of land reforms were Kashmiris, the largest number of dispossessed after the land reforms were from the Jammu region. This is not to argue that there were no beneficiaries of land reforms in Jammu region. Land was transferred here also to the landless peasantry mostly belonging to the lower castes, who were estimated to be around two hundred and fifty thousand in the Jammu province (Brecher, 1953a: 110). Yet, there were a large number of landowners who were bitter about these reforms. As Aparna Rao notes, it was not only the Hindu landowning class that was resentful of the reforms, but also the Muslims of Jammu region. Reforms, in her words, ‘antagonized wealthy Hindus and Muslims, who found their positions of socio-economic power increasingly threatened’ (Rao, 1999: 12). What became the source of bitterness among the dispossessed class was the discrepancy in the way land was acquired in this state as compared to rest of India. In other states, it was obligatory under the Indian Constitution to provide compensation while acquiring the land beyond the ceiling limit set by each state, but in case of Jammu and Kashmir, the government of the state had taken the decision not to provide for compensation. Its ‘decision not to pay was based on the claim that Kashmir had acceded to India only in regard to defence, external relations, and communications and that she was not bound by the fundamental rights clause in the Indian constitution which provided for the payment of compensation’ (S.O., 1953: 394). Since the issue was linked with the constitutional autonomy

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of the state because of which the fundamental rights (which ensured compensation for the land acquisition) were not applied to the state, the hostility was extended to the very constitutional arrangement as well. However, such hostility was not to remain confined to the upper crust of society but was to go beyond to other sections of society. The reason was that the transformation that was taking place within the state affected the not-so-privileged people as well. To begin with, land reforms did not take into account the geographical peculiarities of the Jammu region and adversely affected people in the large part of the region. Since the ceiling limit of 22 acres was uniformly applied within the state without an fair assessment of the fertility of the land, this was considered to be unjustified in case of mountainous areas of Jammu, which, unlike fertile cultivable areas of Kashmir, comprised mostly of kandi (infertile) land not having proper irrigation facilities (The Hindu, 3 February 1953). Apart from the issue of land, there were other issues emanating from the changed political, administrative and economic structure, which generated a sense of dissatisfaction in the region. Of these one was related to the demobilisation of large number of army personnel, particularly Dogra Rajputs after the Dogra army was taken over by the Government of India. During the Dogra rule, the state army was the exclusive preserve of Dogra Rajputs. As a result of the demobilisation, around four thousand soldiers from different parts of the province were rendered unemployed. This had its implications for adding to the overall sense of unrest in Jammu. While analysing the impact of the disbanding of the local army and its getting incorporated in the national armed forces, it may be essential to highlight the importance of army for the Dogras of Jammu. Since much of the terrain of Jammu is mountainous and is comprised of kandi (infertile) area with not many sources of irrigation, agriculture did not provide a promising source of livelihood for most of the people. Joining state army therefore has been an attractive option for them. So important this option has been that it would be considered as the sole occupation for the people of many areas. With army as an occupation running through the families, the Dogra army was a very important source for employment of people of the Dogra belt.7 Added to this was the resentment generated among the trading class because of the policies adopted by the new government. Jammu’s economy was dependent upon trade and there was enough trade in cloth, grain, salt and sugar and a strong middle class dependent upon the import of goods from outside the state. However, with the ideological

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commitment of the state to control the economy in the interest of the poorer sections, this class was deeply affected. With the state assuming ‘the role of the State’s biggest importer’ and importing cloth, food, salt, sugar and kerosene, and selling it at pooled prices and establishing cooperatives for distribution, the economic status of the middlemen in Jammu was adversely affected. Similarly affected were the private transporters due to the introduction of government transport and also the policy of subsidised rates of freight (Times of India, 13 September 1952). To such a generally prevailing unrest due to the changed political and administrative dispensation, there were other issues to which the newly formed government located in Kashmir could not pay sufficient attention. Of these issues, one of the most pressing issues related to the rehabilitation of the refugees. With large influx of Hindu refugees from the area of the state, which had come under the control of Pakistan, these refugees were located mainly in Jammu and nursed the feeling that there problems were not being adequately addressed by the newly formed government. For instance, there were the grievances of Mirpur refugees that they were not registered nor the loss of the lives and property had been assessed. There were also issues related to their subsistence (The Statesman, 11 November 1952). Similarly, the Muzzafarabad refugees had the grievance that they were brought to Jammu and were not relocated in Kashmir division where they actually belonged (The Statesman, 10 September 1952). There were also issues related to their rehabilitation. Political transition, on the whole, generated tensions between the two regions, which in the absence of any unifying force, were sustained in the times to come. Already, as Puri notes, there were certain psychological factors that created anxiety in Jammu about the shift of power from its base in Jammu to that of Kashmir. Such anxiety was enhanced due to the advantage that Kashmir had in the post-Accession period – ‘its numerical superiority, internal homogeneity, established leadership and international importance’. As it acquired dominant position within the state, it generated resentment in other regions (Puri, 1983: 188–9).

Ideological divide Lack of a support base of the National Conference in the Jammu region had its reflection in the post-1947 political responses in this region. The political programme and ideology of the National Conference government met with lot of resistance and hostility in the Jammu region. Though much of this hostility can be explained in terms of the dominant politics representing the interest of entrenched classes fearing loss

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of their privileges in the wake of the radical policies being pursued by the new government, there was also the lack of understanding within the new political regime about the sensitivities of the Jammu region. Whatever little presence the Jammu leaders had within the National Conference, they could not play an effective role in generating such sensitivities. Referring to the implication of the ‘almost total absence of the National Conference from the political scene’, a national newspaper reported that ‘there were no workers who could carry the significance of Government reforms to the common man in the far-flung areas of the province, because unlike in Kashmir the National Conference did not exist in Jammu before the 1947 raids, except in few places like Chenani’ (The Hindusthan Standard, 29 January 1953). And even when it was extended to the Jammu region after 1947, it continued to remain Kashmir-oriented and could not carve enough space for Jammu-based leaders. These leaders remained discontented within the party, feeling marginalised, and the party continued to remain predominantly represented by Kashmir-based leadership. Sardar Budh Singh, who had by now joined the National Conference and could have played a role of bridging Jammu’s politics with that of Kashmir, was himself marginalised. Other Jammu-based leaders of the National Conference were also disgruntled that they were not given sufficient space within the party to play a constructive role. The regional divide within the party is reflected by Balraj Puri, himself an activist of the National Conference at that time. As he states, ‘there was never much trust between the Kashmiri leadership of the National Conference and its local leaders of Jammu. Even the group that campaigned for and contributed to the abdication of the Maharaja was expelled from the National Conference without notice or explanation’(Puri, 1983: 188–9). Apart from the National Conference, there was no other political party or organisation in the region that could have captured the secular space. The local organisations like Dogra Sabha and Mahajan Sabha operated in the social sphere and did not have any political programme. The Indian National Congress and the Communist Party of India, the two organisations that could have played crucial role in this region, had chosen to operate through the National Conference and did not have their own branches in the state. The progressive elements in the region did not therefore have many choices to operate in the region. It was in this background of almost a complete gap between the politics of Kashmir and Jammu that regional sentiment started dominating Jammu’s politics. By arguing that ‘Jammu felt sandwiched between Kashmiri nationalism and Jammu nationalism’, Puri has given a number

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of reasons for regional sentiments here. Among these reasons include ‘the dispute over Kashmir that has given rise to fears and perpetuated a sense of uncertainty’, ‘the absence of good administration which could have inculcated in them self-confidence and hope’, ‘total centralisation of powers by the National Conference in Kashmir leaving little scope for local initiative’, ‘the complex of being numerically less than Kashmiris ’, unfriendly attitude from secular-minded parties in India who are thought to be more responsive to the demands of Kashmir than that of Jammu’ (Puri, 1966: 46). In the absence of secular politics, the political vacuum in the politics of the Jammu region came to be filled in by the rightist political organisations. The political transition had led to genuine concerns in the region, which was quite shaken up by the developments in the wake of Partition violence and division of the state. While Kashmir region had remained more or less intact after the tribal invasion of the state, the Jammu region bore the maximum brunt. Apart from the communal violence that affected both the communities, there were large-scale displacements. The region had become host to refugees both from the areas of the state now under the control of Pakistan as well as from West Pakistan. The presence of a progressive or even a centrist organisation could have taken the politics of the region in a different direction. However, it was a situation of total political vacuum, in which Jammu’s politics came to be defined by the political divergence vis-à-vis the politics of Kashmir. Contestation of Kashmir’s politics, especially its emphasis on autonomy, became the hallmark of Jammu’s politics in the immediate post-Accession period. In 1952 a sustained agitation against Article 370 was launched by Praja Parishad with the demand for the abolition of Article 370 and full constitutional integration of the state with India. Praja Parishad was a Jammu-based organisation, which was established in November 1947. Though its major support base comprised of the disgruntled classes including the big and the medium landowners, the officials employed by Maharaja in various bureaucratic positions, the large trading class, the ex-army officials, it came to be supported by many others who perceived the policies of the National Conference as biased against Jammu. The very objective of its organisation was to ‘mobilise public opinion in favour of full accession to India’. As per its programme, it stood for a repeal of Article 370, application of the Indian Constitution in its entirety to the state, removal of customs barriers, integration of economic programmes and planning of Jammu and Kashmir state with the rest of India, acquisition of all fundamental rights conferred by the

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Indian Constitution, extension of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and full safeguard to civil liberties, statutory abolition of untouchability and adequate provision for the uplift of backward communities. It also stood for the retention of the ruling dynasty with the ruler as the constitutional head of the state (All Jammu and Kashmir Praja Parishad, n.d.: 1–2). Though the 1952 agitation was launched around the slogan of ‘Ek Vidhan, ek Pradhan, ek Nishan’8, the reason as to why it became popular in Jammu region was that it articulated the local resentment against the indifference of the National Conference government to the concerns of people in Jammu. Apart from demanding abolition of Article 370, The Praja Parishad had also raised the issue of bias of the state government vis-à-vis Jammu region in various matters including land reforms, custom barriers between the state and India, issue of rehabilitation of refugees and ex-servicemen and lack of employment opportunities for people of the region (S.O., 1953: 395–6). The National Conference government was accused of pursuing policies keeping in view the interest of its major constituency in Kashmir at the cost of the people of the Jammu region. In this matter, reference was made to the bulk rejection of the nomination papers of its candidates during the Legislative Assembly cum Constituent Assembly elections of 1951–52. This was the only party within the state that could have given some challenge, howsoever nominal, to the National Conference. But on trivial grounds, the nomination of a large number of its candidates seeking to contest election from Jammu was rejected. Praja Parishad agitation, in the absence of any secular force within Jammu, was in the words of Puri, ‘first though partial expression’ of regional identity of Jammu. Parishad in itself was ‘a coalition of hurt regional pride, protest against arbitrary rule, urge for share in power and democratic expression, a sense of insecurity about the future of the state, dispossessed feudal and vested interests and Hindu communal sentiments’ (Puri, 1983: 189). The political discourse created by the Praja Parishad in 1952 continued to influence the dominant politics of the Jammu region for the time to come. Despite the fact that this organisation had influence mainly in the urban pockets of the region and this also waned in the mid-1960s when it was merged with the Jana Sangh, this became the most popular discourse of the region. However, more than the opposition of Article 370 which emanated from the ideological position of the party, it was the issue of ‘regional discrimination’ and ‘regional neglect’ that became the ‘common sense’ of Jammu.

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‘Political neglect’ Over the period, the feeling of ‘political neglect’ became deeper and stronger not only in the Hindu-majority areas of the region but also in areas with larger Muslim population. These areas, like Poonch and Rajouri districts, on the one hand, and the Doda belt, on the other, however, felt doubly marginalised – both by being part of the region of Jammu as well as by being on the margins of the Jammu region itself. Though having a serious grouse that dominant discourse of Jammu region did not incorporate the concerns for the peripheral districts, yet at the same time, the people in these districts blamed the Kashmiri leaders for their utter backwardness and lack of development. It is this widespread feeling of regional neglect that has not only formed the regional discourse of Jammu but has also been reflected in various agitations that have erupted in this region after 1952. The major issues around which these agitations have been organised relate to: relative development of the region; the employment in the state services; the admission to professional and other educational institutions; the distribution of resources between the two regions; the establishment of educational or other institutions; or even the decision to shift the annual office move from Jammu. Two agitations, one in the mid-1960s and one in 1978, were so severe that these were followed by the constitution of commissions (Gajendargadkar Commission and Sikri commission respectively) to go into the reasons for regional discontent and inter-regional irritations. The Gajendargadkar Commission, taking note of the inter-regional irritations, came to the conclusion that underlying all inter-regional tensions between Jammu and Kashmir, there was political basis. It therefore noted that, even if all the matters were equitably settled, we feel that there would still be a measure of discontent. . . . In fact, we consider that the main cause of irritation and tension is the feeling of political neglect and discrimination, real or imaginary from which certain regions of the state suffer. It is for this reason that this commission had recommended that ‘a convention should be established that if the Chief Minister belongs to one region, there should be a Deputy Chief Minister belonging to other region. By another convention, the number of the cabinet ministers belonging to the regions should be equal’ (Report of the Jammu and Kashmir Commission of Inquiry, 1968: 83).

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One factor that continued to generate the feeling of ‘political neglect’ in the Jammu region has been the lack of parity within the power politics of the state. Till very recently, the tilt of power politics remained in favour of the political elite representing the Kashmir region. The political leaders of Jammu, even when representing the ruling party, had token presence in it. This was due to the peculiar nature of the party and power politics of Kashmir. The hegemonic position of the National Conference gave it an advantage in forming the government from the very beginning. Even when it was truncated after Sheikh Abdullah’s arrest in 1953, it continued to draw its numerical strength from Kashmir only. In 1965, the National Conference was merged with Congress but that did not make any change in the leadership structure. The merger was merely a formality since National Conference was already functioning as a branch of the Congress. The same Kashmir-based leadership that remained at helm of affairs before 1965 continued to control the party even after its merger with Congress. In 1975, after the re-entry of Sheikh Abdullah in power politics, the National Conference was revived and the Congress for the first time got de-linked from National Conference and operated on its own. However, its presence was limited to the Jammu region. The electoral space of Kashmir, therefore, continued to be monopolised by National Conference. Capturing most of the Assembly seats of the Valley, it barely needed support from the Jammu region. Jammu, therefore, did not seriously figure in its power politics of the state. It was in 2002 that with the emergence of another Kashmir-based political party (PDP), the power scenario of the state witnessed a major shift. Fragmentation of Kashmir’s politics between the National Conference and the PDP, on the one hand, and the emergence of the coalition politics, on the other, resulted in Jammu-based Congress having a real share of power. Both in 2002 and 2008, Congress was a major partner in the government.9 However, till 2002, the inability of Jammu’s political leadership to have a share in political power generated a sense of discontent among the Jammu-based political parties and leadership who grounded their politics around the issue of lack of political parity of Jammu with Kashmir. For mobilising the people of the region, the ‘Kashmir-dominated politics’ therefore became the most important issue. Another factor that has contributed to the perception of ‘political neglect’ of Jammu region is related to Jammu’s invisibility and lack of negotiability. Being the epicentre of conflict, Kashmir remains the focus of political attention both at the national and international level.

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Jammu, though being almost at par with Kashmir in terms of its regional status, remains almost invisible. The sensitivities that are generated because of this are heightened because of the lack of negotiability of its political elite vis-à-vis the political arrangements within the state. The fact that most of the political arrangements for this state including the application of Article 370 or various accords with the Central government, including the Delhi Accord of 1952, the Indira–Sheikh Accord of 1974 and Rajiv Gandhi–Farooq Abdullah Accord of 1986 and various other similar political decisions have followed the logic of Kashmir’s politics, has intensified this feeling. It is a different matter that the Kashmir region has its own set of grievances in all these matters; in Jammu these arrangements are seen to be imposed from above without any reference to the political sensibilities of the region. It was this acute feeling of ‘political neglect’ that came to surface in the more recent period during the Amarnath land row. Though this agitation was organised mainly around a religious issue and invoked the question of faith involving the Hindus, in many ways it reflected the politics of regional assertion. Many people were involved in it not for their religious feelings but because of their regional sentiments. The underlying feeling that sustained this agitation for more than two months was that Jammu was being taken for granted and needs to assert itself. However, what was peculiar about the agitation was that it also reflected a very strong resentment against Kashmiri separatism and Kashmiri nationalism. Assertion of regional identity, therefore, was linked with the assertion of Indian ‘nationalist’ identity of the Jammu region. The overall sentiment that was reflected during the agitation was a blend of the feelings that Jammu was being ‘discriminated’ against by the successive ‘Kashmir-based’ governments; that it was not properly represented in the political decision-making structures; that it was not taken into consideration by the successive Central governments for major decisions regarding the state; and that it carried the burden of challenging the ‘anti-nationalist’ forces and representing the ‘nationalist’ forces within the state.

Regional autonomy The political discontent of Jammu region, in the understanding of Balraj Puri, emanates from the internal political organisation of the state. According to him, although Article 370 shifts the powers from the Centre to the state, within the state there is centralised and unitary structure of power, which results in concentration of powers within

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Kashmir region, marginalising Jammu and Ladakh regions politically, in the process. For effective working of Article 370, he recommends regional autonomy within the larger structure of state autonomy (Puri, 1999). Demand for regional autonomy has been raised in Jammu by almost all political parties and organisations. Even the Jana Sangh that later became BJP, which has been focusing its politics on the demand of abolition of Article 370, has been referring to the lack of regional autonomy and since last 20 years raising the demand for regional councils for Jammu and Ladakh. The Congress and other Jammu-based political parties including the Panthers Party have also been demanding the regional autonomy. The demand became quite vocal during the period of militancy (Chowdhary, 2000a). So vocal was the political discourse around this demand in the 1990s that the National Conference, which has been ignoring the issue of regional autonomy, acknowledged it during the 1996 Assembly elections and committed itself to making a provision for regional autonomy if it comes back to power. Soon after the elections, while constituting the State Autonomy Committee (SAC), it also organised the Regional Autonomy Committee (RAC). Balraj Puri, who had been advocating the cause of regional autonomy since 1950s, was appointed its chairman. However, Puri was removed thereafter and the committee was reconstituted. The new committee while submitting its report negated the whole concept of Jammu as a region. For devolving power, it recognised ‘district’ as a unit and also recommended reorganisation of Jammu into three distinct regions. What remained the most problematic part of the report was that it suggested reorganisation of the region was communal in nature. The Hindu-dominated districts were proposed to be separated from the predominantly Muslim-inhabited Doda and Poonch–Rajouri belts10 (Chowdhary, 2000: 2603). The failure to recognise the regional identity of Jammu and its need for regional autonomy has been a major flaw of the politics of the National Conference as the leading party of the state. Its refusal to respond to the sensitivities of Jammu region aggravated inter-regional tensions right from the early post-Accession period. The opposition to Article 370, though ideologically defined, has also been a reflection of the negation of regional demands by the National Conference leadership. Refusal of this party to make regional autonomy as an integral part of the discourse of state autonomy has resulted not only in increasing the gap between the two regions but also in hardening of regional positions.

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Political divergence: a reality The above discussion makes it very clear that the state of Jammu and Kashmir is not a monolithic unit and there are serious regional differences.11 The political divergence, which is the reality of the state, has been reflected not only in the way the regions relate to each other but also in the way conflict has shaped itself. There is a context of specificity to the conflict situation – that is located in the identity politics of Kashmir. That is the reason that much of the conflict politics of Kashmir does not replicate itself in Jammu region. The politics of contestation of the Indian state that has been informing the resistance politics in Kashmir and taking varied forms in different phases has not much visibility in this region. The demand for ‘plebiscite’ that was articulated in Kashmir during the post-1953 period did not have much impact in the region. As Choudhary notes, ‘In 1955 when Sheikh’s aide Mirza Afzal Baig launched Plebiscite Front, Doda was the only area in Jammu province which gave them some foothold’ (Choudhary, 2013: 65). The Jammu mainland with its Hindu as well as mixed Hindu–Muslim population was not impacted by this politics. Poonch–Rajouri, the other Muslimdominated belt, was struck up with its own kinds of problems related to its border location. Impacted severely as it was by the division of the state between the Indian and Pakistani side, this part of the state did not have any linkage with the politics of Kashmir at that time. The political divergence that exists between Kashmir and Jammu regions became more pointed during the two and half decades of armed militancy. While in Kashmir, the mainstream politics totally collapsed in the wake of armed militancy and mass separatist upsurge, Jammu remained more or less unaffected. Throughout the six years of President’s rule, the mainstream political parties and political leaders continued to make their presence felt. Neither the legitimacy of the electoral process was contested here, nor the mainstream political parties faced any crisis. In fact, Jammu remained politically so normal that for all practical purposes, it became the working capital of the state. Not only all major governmental and non-governmental enterprises that were operating earlier from Kashmir shifted to Jammu, but a large number of people seeking refuge from continued violence in the Valley also shifted to this region. It was because of the continued normalcy of the region that when National Conference chose to come out of its self-imposed exile after the onset of militancy, it started operating in the Jammu region. Militancy did spread in large parts of the Jammu region, specifically in the Doda and Poonch–Rajouri belt with even lots of local recruits

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as armed militants. However, militancy did not involve the people in the same manner as it did in Kashmir. Separatism, as it became the dominant response of Kashmir, did not characterise the politics of these areas. While in Kashmir separatism overtook all other kinds of political responses and mainstream politics totally went under, in these areas there was no such collapse of the mainstream politics. Other than ‘sharing some concerns’, there has been ‘no evidence of any movement germinating on the ground’ (Choudhary, 2013: 9).12 On the contrary, the dominant politics of these two regions revolves around the issues of development. It is during the last two and half decades that the political class in both these areas has been quite vocal about the need for the political and economic empowerment of these areas. The demand for Chenab Valley Hill Council13 and Pir Panchal Hill Council14 has been articulated during the period of militancy only. The separatist politics, therefore, is a peculiarity of the region of Kashmir. Its historical roots lie in that region only and throughout its historical trajectory, the way it has manifested itself in Kashmir, it could not do so outside that region. At present, all the separatist organisations and leaders are located in Kashmir and the sphere of their influence is also limited to that region only. The political developments as these unfold in Kashmir therefore do not touch Jammu in any effective manner. The mass upsurge that defined the separatist politics of Kashmir during the 1989–90 period did not have any effect in the Jammu region. Similarly, the recent political unrest, during the summer months of 2008, 2009 and 2010, was not replicated in the Jammu region. The core of resistance politics of Kashmir that is defined by interrogation and contestation of relationship of the state with India does not resonate much in Jammu.

Intra-state dimension as the third layer of the conflict Jammu factor, therefore, becomes important in providing a third dimension to the complex character of the conflict, besides the two generally identified dimension, viz., the India–Pakistan and Delhi–Kashmir dimension. Right from the early post-Accession period, this dimension was in place, but it remained generally unaddressed. The conflict situation as it evolved right in the early 1950s did not have much space for tackling the intra-state political differences. This was despite the fact that Praja Parishad agitation of 1952 had clearly highlighted the need for an internal dialogue and consensus building. However, due to

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the critical context of Kashmir issue, focus on internal divergence could never be placed. The issue of intra-state differences was subsumed in the larger context of conflict. While the state government was itself caught in its crisis of legitimacy, ‘integrating’ the state with India and projecting a friction-free state of Jammu and Kashmir remained the major consideration before the Union government. The situation continued to remain likewise even during the time when Sheikh Abdullah came back to power and in the later period. The political divergence came into open at certain moments. For instance during the early 1980s when the National Conference government passed the ‘Resettlement Bill’ to allow return of those residents of the state who had crossed over to Pakistan-administered Kashmir in 1947 or later. The bill was very strongly opposed in Jammu region. Similarly in 1999 when the ‘Autonomy Resolution’ recommending the restoration of autonomy of the state in its ‘pristine form’ was passed by the state legislature, the Jammu-based political organisations termed it as against the interest of Jammu and the nation. Simplistic understanding of political divergence within the state has led many to suggest divisive conflict resolution formulas. Of these, the Chenab formula of dividing the state around the river Chenab has often been put forth. The formula is flawed since it tends to see the religious divide as the basis of political divergence. Besides others, the US-based think tank, the Kashmir Study Group, had propagated it and the Musharraf plan had also endorsed it initially.15 Within Jammu also, there was some mobilisation for reorganisation of the state and its division into three or four units. Following the submission of the State Autonomy Committee and Regional Autonomy Committee Reports in 1999, the demand for ‘trifurcation of the state’ and a separate state of Jammu was articulated. RSS and BJP, at that time, came out openly in support of this demand. Due to communal basis of its origin, the demand could not acquire a popular base and remained confined to some fringe organisations. Rejection of the divisive and communal formulas to deal with the issue of political divergence notwithstanding, the issue continues to generate political tensions within the region. There is a very strong sensitivity in Jammu that the political claims of Kashmiris, whether separatists or the mainstream politicians, are exclusive in nature and do not include the local sensibilities of the Jammu region. The dominant political response, therefore, is to negate these claims by invoking the ‘nationalist’ discourse. Not only the politics of azadi is responded in this manner, but even the politics of autonomy is similarly rejected. One of the reasons for such rejection is that the autonomy demand is made by

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privileging the Kashmiri identity politics and locating it in the historical context of Kashmir. Apart from its Kashmir-centric orientation, its failure to extend its logic to the regional and sub-regional context and incorporate the ‘regional’ autonomy in its framework tends to alienate the people in the Jammu region. In sum one can argue that dynamics of internal politics of Jammu and Kashmir has a strong bearing on the relationship of the state with Indian Union. Unless the political complexity involving the divergent political aspirations is recognised and a consensus reflecting the varied interests within different regions within the state is evolved. It may be difficult to pursue any political course in the state. Jammu provides a big challenge to the conflict resolution. Despite the fact that the roots of conflict lie in Kashmir, the solution cannot come unless an internal consensus within the state is evolved and Jammu is involved in the process. It is important to confront the political divergence, acknowledge the limits of the exclusivity of any kind of identity politics and evolve some political consensus about the future of the state. This requires a much-needed internal dialogue involving the political actors in both the regions. Notes 1 To quote Balraj Puri, ‘Kashmir had come under direct Mughal rule somewhat earlier, during Akbar’s rule. Jammu, on the other hand, is not known to have come under any outside direct rule except for brief periods. It was, for instance, directly annexed to Mughal empire by Emperor Mohammad Shah from 1733 to 1745 and to the Sikh empire by Maharaja Ranjit Singh from 1808 to 1820. During the latter period, however, due to a powerful resistance movement by legendary hero Mian Deedo, the Lahore Durbar’s writ remained ineffective till Gulab Singh was installed as Raja of Jammu by Ranjit Singh under the latter’s overall Lordship, which ended in 1846 after the defeat of his descendants by the British and Gulab Singh’s agreement with the latter under the Amritsar Treaty’ (Puri, 2010: 35). 2 Since 1940 the Muslim politics of Jammu region took an altogether a different path from that of National Conference. While National Conference during this period came closer to the nationalist politics, particularly the Congress party and the Left movement, the Muslim Conference affiliated itself with the Muslim League politics. 3 Ravinder Kaur, using the archival sources, mentions the expulsion of few students from schools and their being turned out of the state in 1907 since they had shouted Bande Materam in the streets and inscribed this slogan on their coats and on the school walls (Kaur, 1996: 38). 4 The other objectives of the Dogra Sadar Sabha included those related to social change, eradication of social evils, trafficking in women and spread of education in the state.

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5 Balraj Puri mentions the presence of two leaders of National Conference in the Muslim-dominated areas of Mirpur and Poonch. Of these one was Raja Mohammad Akbar Khan of Mirpur and Khwaja Ghulam Qadir Bandey in Poonch. The Jagir of Chenani, which was Hindu-dominated, also had some presence of National Conference (Puri, 1949). Chenani was the only place in the Jammu region where National Conference could extend its influence and intervene in the anti-feudal movement politics. This was, however, a predominantly Hindu area. ‘A popular upsurge against a Hindu jagirdar had been organised by the progressive section of the Hindu Sabha. . . In view of the socialistic and secular character of the movement, it was later annexed by the National Conference’ (Puri, 1966: 15). 6 Puri notes elsewhere that ‘as the political movement in Kashmir Valley since 1931was directed against what its leaders called the “Dogra Raj” and as its emphasis was more on the alien and Dogra character of the ruler rather than on the autocratic nature of the institution of monarchy, his identification and popularity with the Dogras of Jammu, including Muslims ‘improved’ (Puri, 1983: 188). 7 The tradition of joining army, however, was not limited to the Hindus, even among the Muslims, there was a very strong tradition of joining army. It was not only considered as a matter of pride, but as a very important source of employment. Among the Muslims, there were categories of people who were termed as martial race and included the Rajput Muslims, mainly the Chibbalis and the Sudans. 8 The agitation followed the basic ideological framework of RSS and Bharatiya Jana Sangh. These organisations saw in Article 370 a challenge to their version of cultural nationalism, which extolled the principle of ‘unity with uniformity’ and saw all differences to be dangerous. Article 370 was a constitutional exception that was seen as a symbol of ‘separatism’. Till the time the Indian Constitution was not fully applied to this state, it was not seen to be fully integrated – this was despite the fact that under Article 370, Article 1 of the Constitution applied to this state, which made it a part of the Indian Union. 9 This has certainly addressed the issue of lack of share in power politics. Apart from a larger and effective share in the state ministries, there has been a sense of satisfaction that for the first time in the history of the power politics of the state, the state had a Chief Minister who belonged to this region. For three years of Congress–PDP coalition, Ghulam Nabi Azad representing the Bhaderwah constituency led the state government. 10 Mahore tehsil, which is predominantly Muslim, was carved out of the rest of the predominantly Hindu areas to fit in the Muslim belt of Doda. 11 These regional differences are as much reflected in case of Ladakh as in case of Jammu. Though a smaller region in terms of population, Ladakh has been going through the similar trajectory of inter-regional tensions. Its dominant leadership has been blaming ‘Kashmir-dominant’ politics for its overall backwardness and underdevelopment. The demand for Union Territory status for Ladakh has actually been one of the consistent demand emanating from this region. In 1989, there was a major agitation in Ladakh, following which Ladakh Autonomous Hill Councils for Leh and Kargil have been established. However, the demand of Union Territory status of Ladakh continues.

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12 Referring to the scenario of Poonch–Rajouri during the early period of militancy, Choudhary thus notes, ‘When militants had dominated the scene in Kashmir Valley and civilians were in direct confrontation with security forces, in south of Pir Panjal in the mosques of Rajouri and Poonch people would gather in the evenings to discuss what was going on in Kashmir. People were overwhelmed with the death and destruction in Kashmir but it did not inspire and uprising’ (Choudhary, 2013, 67). 13 The larger concerns of the Doda belt are related to the backwardness, underdevelopment and marginalisation. Like the Hindu-majority areas of Jammu region, people here blame the ‘Kashmir-centric’ government for ignoring the interest of this area. It is also true that there is a feeling of discontent vis-à-vis the Jammu-based political parties and leadership for their lop-sided ‘regional’ response, which does not adequately address the issues of the Doda belt. Hence, the people here feel doubly marginalised – both by the Kashmir-based politics as well as Jammu-based regional elites. The demand, therefore, is made for Chenab Valley Hill Council on the pattern of Leh and Kargil Hill Council. As this demand clearly reflects, the people in Doda have their own issues and even while empathising with Kashmiris in their struggle and also having some common base, generally have their specific concerns. 14 People in the Poonch–Rajouri belt have been engrossed in their own specific issues emanating from their border context. The trajectory of their political problems and struggles has therefore been very different from that of Kashmiris. Here also, there remains a very strong feeling of ‘double marginalisation’ both at the hands of Kashmir-based governments as well as Jammu-based regional elite. The demand for Pir Panchal Hill Council is also a reflection of such marginalisation. 15 Kashmir Study Group, headed by America-based Kashmiri businessman, Farooq Kathwari, came out with a report titled ‘Kashmir – A Way Forward’. This report, taking the clue from the Dixon Plan, propagated the idea of reorganisation of the state and its division on the basis of religious lines. It suggested a separate Muslim State of Kashmir incorporating the Muslim areas of Jammu region like Doda, and Poonch–Rajouri. The Hinduinhabited districts of Jammu and Buddhist-inhabited district of Leh were proposed as autonomous political units.

Chapter 10

Multiple dimensions of conflict

The context of plurality and political divergence within the state leads us to go beyond a simplistic understanding of conflict. It offers a possibility to explore the intricacies of the conflict politics as it goes beyond Kashmir and engulfs the whole of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. It has already been discussed that complex character of conflict is well-recognised due to an intermeshing of external as well as internal character, however, the complexity that lies within the internal dimension of conflict is not acknowledged. Complexity within the internal dimension is defined by three distinct factors: one, that Kashmir remains the core of conflict and hence demands attention; second, though conflict is ‘Kashmir-centric’, the implications of conflict are felt beyond the Kashmir Valley, and third ‘Kashmir factor’ does not exhaust the range of issues emanating from conflict politics. To understand and analyse the conflict in its totality and to develop an approach towards conflict resolution, it is important to address the specificity of Kashmiri dimension. However, it is also important to go beyond Kashmir and understand as to in what ways the regions and people beyond Kashmir are impacted by conflict as well as to highlight as to how conflict itself gets compounded in the process. Seen from that perspective rather than a single and homogenised version of conflict, one gets to see multiple contexts of conflict as well as multiple concerns and issues. To highlight some of these concerns, this chapter focuses on the impact of conflict on people living close to borders, the divided families, the ‘PoK refugees’ and West Pakistan refugees.

Border and people In terms of its location, the state of Jammu and Kashmir is a ‘border state’.1 Of the total border that India shares with Pakistan, a very substantial part is located in this state. As per the Ministry of Home Affairs,

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‘India shares, 3,323 km (including Line of Control in Jammu & Kashmir sector) of its land border with Pakistan. This border runs along the States of Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir’ (Government of India, 2009). Of the total 3,323 km India–Pakistan border, one-third, that is 1,225 km, runs through this state.2 Apart from the relatively settled border touching a few districts of Jammu division of the state, known as International Border (IB), there is a large part of unsettled border called as Line of Control (LoC).3 To begin with, it was known as the Ceasefire Line since it reflected the position on which the Indian and Pakistani forces were located when war between India and Pakistan was suspended in January 1949. Despite the fact that it was supposed to be a temporary line, it continued to remain as the working border between the two sides of Jammu and Kashmir (Wirsing, 1998: 62).4 Yet as Samaddar notes, its status remained unresolved. It was ‘merely a line of control functioning as a border, but lacking its sanctity’ (Samaddar, 2004: 86). This line was ‘marginally altered during India-Pakistan wars in 1965 and 1971 and was renamed the Line of Control (LOC) by India–Pakistan agreement in July 1972’ (Bose, 2003: 2–3). The borderlands in Jammu and Kashmir represent a case study of the ‘alienated borderlands’. Elaborating this model, Martinez (1994: 6) notes that such borders operate in ‘extremely unfavourable conditions’ defined by various conditions including warfare, political disputes, intense nationalism, ideological animosity and so on. Such conditions lead to ‘militarization and establishment of rigid controls.’ Neither there is any possibility of routine cross-border interactions nor of normal lives of people. To say the least, such a tension-filled climate seriously interferes with the efforts of local populations to lead normal lives. International trade and substantial people-to-people contacts are very difficult if not impossible to maintain. The ever-present possibility of large-scale violence keeps these areas sparsely populated and underdeveloped. (Martinez, 1994: 6) The very process of ‘bordering’ has been violent in the state and has resulted in huge material, economic and human loss to people. Whether it was the formation of the International Boundary or the border via the Ceasefire Line or the Line of Control (LoC) it resulted in the disruption in the normal lives of people. While new boundaries were created due to the Partition of the country (as well of the partition of the state) people

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became prey to the communalised violence on both the sides of these boundaries. Many lost lives and many more were uprooted and lost their homes. With the exception of the Kashmir Valley and its adjoining areas in the Doda belt, which were spared the trauma of being ‘bordered’, all other areas of the state went through the anguishing ‘partition’ spectacle enacted in many other parts of the Indian sub-continent. It was the same story of communal frenzy, looting, killing, abduction and dislocation. However, for the rest of the subcontinent, the ‘Partition’ was soon to acquire the status of history as the people despite their anguish came to settle in India or Pakistan. However, for Jammu and Kashmir, the trauma continued. Partition was not a settled history, but a living problem that continued with unsettled and contested borders. This is specifically true due to the ambiguous position of LoC. How this ambiguity of border continues to affect a substantial part of the people of the state is reflected from the reality of large number of people living near the borders; or from the phenomenon of divided families; or from the anguish of the still-to-be rehabilitated refugees.

Volatility of border Ever since 1947, the situation in border areas of Jammu and Kashmir has been very precarious. While multiple wars (1947–48, 1965, 1971, 1999) created havoc in these areas, peace time also did not provide relief to the people here. As the history of the borders in the state shows, guns have actually never fell silent in the borders. With the onset of militancy, the border became more active. The infiltration bids by the armed militants have been accompanied by the firing and shelling. In 2003, a formal ceasefire was declared and the border people felt some relief. But this ceasefire has often been violated and the uncertainty of the borders has not ended. There have been numerous ceasefire violations in last few years – 44 cases in 2010, 51 cases in 2011, 93 in 2012 and 195 in 2013 (till 17 December) (DNA, 17 December 2013).5 The people in the border areas have to face a number of hazards, including the stray bullets and shells coming from across the border, or mine-related accidents. Almost every war or war-like situation leads to the mining of large areas. India is not a signatory of the Mine Ban Treaty (Landmine Monitor Core Group, 2003: 588). Landmines here are used as a very crucial defence strategy.6 Though the process of de-mining takes place in a systematic manner, yet lot of mine-related accidents are reported.7Apart from that, mining of the areas leads to loss of control over the cultivable land for a large number of people. In 2001 when the

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Indian security forces were mobilised, large areas near the borders were mined and it took nearly four to six years for the de-mining process to be completed. All this while, a large number of people could not cultivate their land. Besides mining, it is the process of fencing of borders that has kept large cultivable areas out of bound for the border residents. As a fallout of the armed militancy and the infiltration of large number of militants from various routes of the porous border, the project of fencing the border areas has been undertaken by the Indian government. The fence, farms a ‘wall’, which is comprised of ‘twelve-foot-high fences of barbed wire, set about twenty feet apart’ (Hagerty, 1998: 148). It is equipped with electric wire that runs throughout its length. To prevent the infiltrators from sneaking into the Indian side, there are numerous watch towers and searchlights. Fence, however, is not constructed at the zero line, but much inside the border on the Indian side – around 400 meters to one-and-half kilometres inside the Indian territory. Once fenced, access to cultivable land becomes restricted. This land is not only ‘fenced’ but also ‘gated’ – allowing people access through the gates that are opened for a restricted period during the day time, adversely affecting the cultivation process. Over a period, people living close to border have been caught up in the crossfire, their agricultural lands have been mined and they have been evacuated a number of times. Not only wartime, but even peacetime shelling forces people to evacuate. Evacuation, displacement and dislocation is an experience that is commonly shared by large number of people in the state. The division of the state in 1947–48 period resulted in vast migration of people from both the sides of the state. While a large part of the Muslim population migrated from the Jammu division towards Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, the Hindus from the Pakistan-administered Kashmir, particularly from Mirpur, Kotli, and Muzzafarabad migrated to Jammu. Displacement, however, did not stop with the 1947 ‘disturbances’, but continued in the later period. During every subsequent war, the people residing in the border had to move out for longer periods of time. In the wake of 1965 war between India and Pakistan, a large number of people had to migrate from the areas closer to borders. But larger migration took place in the twin districts of Poonch and Rajouri. Here many people, feeling the pressure from the Army, crossed the LoC. Many of them managed to come back later but many others could not. The area of Chhamb was also affected by the 1965 war and many people were forced to flee to safer areas in Jammu region. In fact, the ‘Chhamb refugees’ were relocated a number of times. Many of them

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were forced to leave in 1947–48 period, but a larger number were forced to evacuate during 1965 war. However, the largest displacement from this area took place in 1971. After the 1971 war, there was delineation of the Line of Control under which Chhamb was ceded to Pakistan. As many as 4,300 families were dislocated. Referring to their plight, Jamwal (2004) notes, ‘the displaced families had to be kept in tented camps at Manwal, about 60 km from Jammu. The government did provide them with some land and cash doles in 1976 but their demands of adequate rehabilitation are still pending.’ They were resettled around the international border. This further added to their problems. The volatility of the border made them vulnerable not only to firing, shelling and mining but it also continued their trauma of displacements. Even after settling in their new ‘homes’ after 1971, they were forced to relocate to safer places whenever tensions built up on the border. Border-related displacement continued in the later period. Although there was no war in 1986, yet the people in this belt were forced to leave their villages to safer places. This was the time when tensions had increased between the two countries and forces on both sides indulged in military exercise on the border. During the Kargil war, as many as 1.57 lakh people were displaced from various border areas (Mandal, 2009). Though the actual fight took place in Dras and Kargil area, but the mobilisation of Army took place all around the border areas and hence civilians were evacuated from these areas. Again it was the massive mobilisation of the armed forces in 2001 after the attack on Indian Parliament and again there was large evacuation and dislocation of people. As per news reports around one lakh people were displaced from the border areas of Jammu alone (Kashmir Times, 13 January 2002).

Divided families The division of the state in 1947 and the continued ambiguities of the LoC till mid-1960s resulted in a large number of divided families, mostly in the Jammu province. To quote Choudhary: As much as 75.07 per cent of entire population of what came to be known as ‘Azad Kashmir’ and 51.29 per cent of its area was drawn from the Jammu province. The division was marked by a prolonged wave of communal violence and internal displacements affecting lakhs of people. The worst sufferers in terms of deaths,

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migration, geographical division and political crumple and social and economic losses in the entire conflict o Kashmir were the Muslims of Jammu. If we look at the Indian side of the Jammu province post 1947, emerging out of violence which left hardly anyone untouched, lakhs of Muslims migrated to Pakistan leaving behind divided families. (Choudhary, 2012: 46) Within Jammu region also, the maximum number of divided families is concentrated in the twin districts of Poonch and Rajouri of the Jammu region. It was in this area that the division had the major impact. The LoC here not only divided the territory, but also villages and even individual houses’ (Himal, 2003). The erstwhile Poonch districts that comprised of Poonch and Rajouri districts before 1947 was so divided that ’59.5 per cent of its 1627 square miles area fell under Pakistani control and 40.5 per cent was secured for the Indian side’ (Choudhary, 2012: 47). The political turmoil and communal violence in 1947–48 led to movement of large number of people in and out of Poonch and Rajouri. While large number of Hindus from the areas under the control of Pakistan moved in these areas, large number of Muslims moved out to the other side. Hindu and Sikh migrations of 1947 occurred most substantially from Muzaffarabad and Mirpur Districts to Jammu City and its surrounding environments, with a sizable amount of individuals choosing to settle in the Poonch and Rajouri towns. Among the Muslim communities, the extreme border areas of Mendhar and Mandi in present-day Poonch, and the border areas of Thanna Mandi, Badal, and Manjakote in present-day Rajouri witnessed the highest amount of migration. Most of the Muslim migrants from Rajouri fled to neighboring towns of Kotli and Mirpur, which were under occupation of local Pro-Pakistani and official Pakistani forces. Most Muslim migrants from Poonch fled to Rawalkot, Bagh and Mirpur, also under control of Pakistani elements. However, many of these migrants returned in the few years after Partition, after the situation had subsided. Although local estimates vary and official data is unavailable, most individual accounts put the numbers of migrations from these areas at 20%–35% of the total population, which factors in the numbers of returned migrants. (Gupta, n.d., 9)

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Even after this period, ‘waves of migration’ continued for the next two decades. The Ceasefire Line, before it was named as the Line of Control, throughout this period remained quite porous. People would go across and sometimes even return as a matter of routine. However, it was in the wake of infiltration of Pakistani Razakars and thereafter the war between India and Pakistan that migration of very large number of inhabitants from this area took place. As Gupta reports, there were areas like tehsils of Mendhar and Mandi in the Poonch district and the tehsils of Buddhal and Thana Mandi in Rajouri district where migration figures was to the tune of 50–70 per cent (Gupta, n.d., 11). It was in this process of bordering and movement of people that families got divided and blood relations came to acquire different ‘national’ and even religious identities. Worse consequences were to follow as these ‘divided families’ across the border could not communicate with each other. Being part of two antagonistic countries, they had to bear the burden of the mutual hostility and suspicion between these countries. Poonch and Rajouri districts specifically had large number of divided families.8 Almost every family in these two districts has relatives across the LoC. Seen from the side of Pakistan-administered Kashmir, the reality of divided families assumes further critical space since ‘divided families constitute more than 60 percent of the total population’ on that side (Chari and Rizvi, 2008: 6). Mahapatra notes that, ‘before 1971 war the border was comparatively porous and there are narratives of people crossing the border by covering long distance on difficult terrain on foot. But the tightening of the border after 1971 restricted the physical movement of the people’ (Mahapatra, 2011). For generations, these relatives could not take the visa route due to stringent requirements. They would look for various other options. Those who could afford to visit a third country would meet each other there. But those down the economic ladder could not take this route and used surreptitious methods. Bhasin states that, ‘There are cases where families have been clandestinely coming, meeting each other and even there have been marriages across the border’ (Dey, 2010). This was more particularly so in Poonch district where ‘ties with the other side were never broken until militancy surfaced in the state. So high was the level of contact that even marriage parties used to go from one side to the other, a phenomenon that was rarely witnessed in other parts of the region’ (Himal, 2003). Though larger part of divided families are comprised of Muslims, there are also cross-religious divided families. In the communal frenzy and chaos, few members of the Hindu families who were migrating from

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the areas now under the control of Pakistan were left behind and eventually they got converted as Muslims. Many women who were either abducted or left behind also married Muslims. These people now are part of the divided families. However, being part of the two hostile nations, maintaining normal relations was very difficult for the divided families. Not only because the borders were made inaccessible but also because of the suspicions of intelligence agencies of their respective countries towards any such attempt to establish contact on the other side of the border. However, the situation of militancy further created difficulties for the people because the borders were almost sealed. Noting the trauma of the divided families, Gupta thus notes: Many of the families have been living in a state of suspension for the last 40 or 60 years, not knowing if their relatives are still alive. For the first several years after both 1947 and 1965, the families left in IJK kept expecting their relatives to return. They assumed that the situation would be resolved, and that their relatives would be allowed back across the border. They lived in a perpetual state of thinking ‘maybe today they will come back’. But that ‘today’ still has not come, and some families are still waiting. Many stories of lost relatives due to kidnapping, marriage and remarriage, and simple lack of communication and knowledge exist. For these families, they have been waiting for news of their loved ones for decades. Some have become resigned to their relative’s disappearance, and some continue to express hope.

Refugees The division of the state converted the status of a large section of people into ‘refugees’ or displaced people. Such large has been the number of the people who have been displaced at one point of time or the other, that the Jammu region, on the whole, can be considered to be inhabited by ‘refugees’. Over the period, there has been an increase both in the numbers as well as kinds of ‘refugees’ or ‘displaced persons’. While in 1947, there were ‘PoK refugees’ and ‘West Pakistan refugees’, in later period the ‘Chhamb refugees’ were added to this list of people who were, like the first two category of refugees, dislocated from Pakistan-administered Kashmir. To these categories were added those who were displaced because of border-related tensions. Various wars, warlike conditions and skirmishes during peace time have often forced people to leave their

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homes for shorter or longer periods. Recently, armed militancy has created its own kinds of displaced people. Large number of people have been forced to leave their homes temporarily or permanently from various militancy-infested areas. However, the largest militancy-related displacement is that of Kashmiri Pundits. Almost the whole of the community of Kashmiri Pundits was forced to leave the valley after 1990. For most of the displaced, continuity of conflict has made their rehabilitation and resettlement a difficult process. That in the absence of closure of conflict, their concerns are remaining, more or less unaddressed, gets reflected from an analysis of three more numerical groups of displaced – the ‘PoK refugees’, the ‘West Pakistan refugees’ and the ‘displaced Kashmiri Pundits’.

PoK refugees ‘PoK refugees’ (as those displaced from the undivided princely state of Jammu Kashmir in 1947 are commonly known) are the political victims of the unsettled claims over the territory now under the control of Pakistan. Though they had gone through the same experience of displacement in 1947 as a large number of ‘partition refugees’ of Punjab and Bengal had gone through; the process of their rehabilitation and resettlement has not followed on similar lines. As per the official Indian position, the territory from which they have been displaced belongs to India and hence, they cannot be treated at par with those who were displaced from Pakistan. They are the residents of the same state and hence can be considered as internally displaced people. It is for this reason that unlike other Partition refugees in India whose claims over land and property left back in Pakistan were settled, the claims of these ‘PoK refugees’ have neither been assessed nor settled. The process of their rehabilitation, therefore, has not been completed. In lieu of compensation, they were given some land to cultivate, in case they came from rural areas and some plot to build houses if they came from urban population. But their claims remain unsettled. However, what has remained problematic is the issue of land rights. Since most of the land that was given to the displaced people from Pakistan-administered areas of the state belonged to the Muslims evacuees, they could not become the owners of this land. Land was merely ‘allotted’ to them and they were not given occupancy rights. The allotted land, as per the official position, belongs to the original owners now living in the area controlled by Pakistan. Since the area is still officially claimed to be a part of the state, the original owners even if they have

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migrated to Pakistan-administered Kashmir, are still considered the citizen of the state. Hence the malikana (right to ownership) remains with these original owners. All such land that was vacated due to the migration of people across the border is categorized as ‘evacuee property’ and is under the ‘custody’ of the state. Referring to the struggle of those displaced from the rural areas, Ved Bhasin notes that, ‘As far as agricultural families were concerned, some lands (evacuated lands) was allotted to them but it took years and even now they have not got full proprietorship rights as certain laws like evacuee’s property act acts as a hindrance’ (Dey, 2010). As per the Evacuee Property Act of the state, not only the evacuee has the ownership of the property but also has the right to claim it. ‘Allotment’ of land entails its own kind of problems. Not having the ownership rights, those allotted land are always faced with insecurity that the land they are cultivating may be taken away from them. This is more so, in the context of the political position taken by the state government and the keenness shown by it to ‘resettle’ the people who have crossed border to the Pakistani side during 1947, 1965 or later. During the Chief Ministership of Sheikh Abdullah in 1982, the State Assembly passed the ‘Jammu and Kashmir Resettlement Act’. As per this Act, residents of Jammu and Kashmir who had migrated to Pakistan-administered Kashmir (as well as their descendants) were permitted to settle down in Jammu and Kashmir and claim the property which they owned before their migration. However the Act could not be implemented first because it was sent by the President of India to the Supreme Court for obtaining its opinion about the legality of the Act, and later on because its operation was stayed by the Supreme Court.9 The passage of this Act created lot of apprehensions in the mind of those people who are holding evacuee property. Despite the assurance given by the state that the Act did not affect the status of evacuee property holders, the apprehensions remain. To understand the complexity underlying the issue of compensation and claims of the displaced, one can refer to the example of those displaced from Mirpur. While the issue of rehabilitation of the Mirpuris has been hanging in the balance, Mirpur town itself has been submerged under water. Under an international arrangement, Pakistan has constructed the Mangla dam in which this town has been submerged and a new town has been constructed at a new locale. The local people owning property in old Mirpur have been provided compensation; however, this process has excluded the refugees now settled in Jammu and other parts of India.

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West Pakistan refugees If there was a situation worse than that of the ‘PoK refugees’, it is that of the West Pakistan refugees. The West Pakistan refugees, like the PoK refugees, were dislocated during the Partition time and came to settle in different parts of Jammu division during 1947–48 period. However, while the PoK refugees had migrated from that part of the state that had now come under the control of Pakistan, the West Pakistan refugees had come from outside the state, from Punjab, mostly from adjoining Sialkot area. However, this distinction has been the most crucial one since not being the permanent residents of the state; these refugees are deprived of various privileges that are attached with the status of the permanent residents. The status of the permanent residents is defined by the Section 6 of Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir and includes only those persons who were either citizens of status of Class I (born and residing within the state before the commence of reign of Maharaja Gulab Singh and those settled before the samvat year 1942) or Class II (those who permanently settled within the state and acquired immovable property here before the close of samvat year of 1968). Since the West Pakistan refugees do not fall under either of the two categories, they are not treated as the permanent residents of the state. Hence, they are denied some of the basic rights that are guaranteed to them by Indian Constitution. The Jammu and Kashmir Representation of the People Act 1955, which enables people to register in the electoral rolls; the Land Alienation Ace, 1995 that regulates the rules of transfer of land in favour of any person, the state Panchayat Act, which provides for the qualification of those who can contest elections; the Rules of Jammu & Kashmir Civil Services, which provide for the eligibility for appointment to any service – all these disqualify those who do are not permanent residents of the state. Hence these refuges cannot hold property within the state in their own name; they cannot seek state employment, and they cannot participate in the local and state level politics. Further, their children cannot claim state scholarships, and cannot get admission in the state-run professional colleges. Hence, as per the constitution and the law of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, the West Pakistan refugees are excluded from the basic privileges enjoyed by the permanent residents of the state. In a petition filed in the Supreme Court on behalf of the West Pakistan refugees in 1982 the grievances as presented by the petitioner were listed as below: notwithstanding the fact that it is almost four decades since they migrated and settled down in the State of Jammu & Kashmir, they

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are denied many basic rights which other Indian citizens have in other parts of the country, such as, the right to acquire any immovable property in the State, the right to employment under the State, the right to start an industry, the right to purchase transport vehicles, the right to higher technical education, the right to be elected to the State Assembly or a local body. (Supreme Court of India, 1987) Jamwal (2004) notes that ‘while some of these displaced from West Pakistan managed to clandestinely get the permanent residentship of Jammu and Kashmir, there are four lakh voters in the state who vote only for the parliamentary elections.’ Since they are not permanent residents of the state, they cannot vote for the local elections including the elections for the state Assembly, the municipal committees or the panchayats. Hence, they do not have the very right of representation except in the Parliament. Other than the Parliament, they are not represented in any legislative body. For the last six decades, these refugees have been struggling to enjoy the basic citizenship rights and have taken recourse to agitations, lobbying as well as adjudication but have not succeeded in getting much relief from the state. Almost ‘stateless’ citizens, their misery is aggravated due to the fact that most of them are located in the social periphery due to their poor social and economic background. A large chunk of the West Pakistan refugees comprises of the Scheduled Castes. Since they do not have the permanent resident status, they cannot make claim to the various welfare policies either of the state or the Central government. The basis on which they can do so is the Scheduled Caste certificate, which is not issued to them in the absence of the permanent resident certificate. Therefore, they face double marginalisation, both at the societal level as well at the level of the state. Interestingly most of the Jammu-based political parties raise the issue of West Pakistan refugees but it is more of an instrumental use rather than the genuine concern for their rehabilitation.

Notes 1 The undivided state of Jammu and Kashmir covers an area of 2,22,236 sq. km. Of this total area, 78,114 sq. km. area is controlled by Pakistan and around 5,180 sq. km. is under the control of China. This area was ceded by Pakistan to China after a boundary agreement between two countries (Government of India, 2003: 366).

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2 LoC forms a larger part of the border. While the International border is 210 km, around 150 km is the Actual Ground Position Line and rest (around 788 km) is the LoC. 3 The state as it was separated from West Pakistan had a recognised and settled border known as International Border (IB). However, the division of the state between the India- and Pakistan-controlled areas resulted in another unsettled border known as Line of Control. 4 To quote Wirsing, ‘It was delimited in general terms in the so-called Karachi Agreement, which was signed on 27 July 1949 by military representatives of the two countries meeting under the auspices of the Truce Sub-Committee of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). Mutual verification of this line, carried out on the ground with the aid of UN military observers, was completed on 3 November’ (1998: 62). 5 Referring to the plight of the border residents, Jamwal (2011: 75) notes that, ‘on both the sides of the dividing line, people in these border areas have borne the brunt of the hostility between the armies of India and Pakistan, during wars and the so-called peace times. These border areas are too heavily militarized for any semblance of normalcy and normal life. The levels of violence are not always visible, often not reported but felt psychologically due to the build-up of troops, excessive restrictions, fenced and mined areas. The huge military presence imposes restrictions on their movement, often ends up in harassment and keeps the civil administration away, forbidding any development to penetrate.’ 6 Referring to the frequent and widespread use of landmines, Mahapatra notes that, ‘. . . during the time of actual Indo-Pak hostilities in 1965 and 1971 mines were planted all along the border, in cultivated land and pastures, around infrastructure and even houses, to obstruct movement from across the border. In late 1980s with the rise of militant movement in the Indian state of J&K heavy mining in border areas was undertaken purportedly to check cross-border infiltration, and to stop all kinds of support and patronage from across the border’ (2011, 8). One of the largest mining operations, according to Mahapartra, was undertaken after the terror attack on Parliament in 2001. To quote him, ‘Indian army took under its control a total of 70,100 acres of land in Jammu, Kathua, Rajouri and Poonch districts after deployment of forces. . . . As per the unofficial claims, more than 25,000 acres of land in the state came under minefields by the plantation of Anti-Personal Mines (APMs) and Anti-tank Mines (ATMs) with a density of 1,000 sq. miles per square km’ (Mahapatra, 2011: 8). 7 The Indian Campaign to Ban Landmines, after a field study of the border villages in 2000, reported that ‘more than 200 people had been injured by mines’. According to this study, a number of military and police personnel along with civilian farmers were killed by the landmines (Landmine Action Campaign, 2002, 6). 8 According to K.D. Maini, 62 per cent of the population of Poonch district comprises of the divided families. Poonch district was severely affected by the division that a substantial part of including parts of Haveli and Mendhar were divided. There were some tehsils that were completely located on the other side of the LoC. These included the tehsil of Bagh and Sudhonti tehsil (Maini, 2013).

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9 The Act that was passed by the state Assembly in 1982 was returned to the state legislature by then Governor B. K. Nehru but was passed again by the Legislature. It was later on referred by the President to Supreme Court under Article 143 to seek its opinion about the competency of the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly to pass the Act and to judge its validity. The Supreme Court returned the reference in 2001 without any comment. Soon thereafter, the Act was challenged in the Supreme Court, and Supreme Court stayed operation of this Act in 2002.

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Part IV

Conflict resolution

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Chapter 11

Peace process

Conflict in and over Jammu and Kashmir right from the beginning has been quite intricate due to the blending of internal and external factors. Though these factors do have their autonomous logic yet, these are influenced by each other. Aggravation of conflict at certain moments can be attributed to either internal or external factors, but even in these moments, one can find an intermeshing of these factors in such a manner that it may be difficult to talk about one without referring to the other. In the more recent period of armed militancy, it was the internal factor that generated the situation of conflict. The internal political developments in Kashmir, particularly in the period following the death of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, resulted in intensifying the sense of alienation among the people of Kashmir. The failure of the democratic processes and the excessive intrusion of the Centre in the local political processes led to the onset of armed militancy and a massive popular support for separatist politics in 1989. The indigenous nature of the separatist movement, as already noted in earlier chapters, was reflected in the very nature of movement itself. The first generation of the armed militants were Kashmiris and it was at their initiative, rather than the external provocation, that militancy was started. The militancy did not operate in a vacuum but was grounded in the mass politics of resistance that was being displayed on the streets of Kashmir throughout the period after 1987, but particularly in 1989–90. However, despite its being based on internal factors, the separatism and militancy came to be driven by the external factors. Pakistan, which did not have much role in initiating the separatist politics, came to be very much involved in it, once the indigenous element came into play. The sustenance of militancy in the post-1989 period was mainly due to the

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material, moral and political support provided by Pakistan, particularly its Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI). Such support included the training of the militants, providing them the sophisticated weaponry, owning of the militants as ‘freedom fighters’ and taking up the Kashmir issue at the international forums. Gradually, the role of Pakistan extended even in defining the character of the militancy. The indigenous character of militancy was soon to be replaced by jehadi and Pakistan-controlled militancy. Pakistan could also intervene in the overall politics of separatism through some of the separatist organisations, which were led by pro-Pakistan- separatist leadership. It was the result of the intermeshing of the external dimensions with the internal ones that India–Pakistan relations became very tense in the post-1989 period. While India blamed Pakistan for generating terror, Pakistan raised the issue of Kashmir at international forums. In 1992, the strains between the two countries were felt at the diplomatic level when each country expelled the diplomats of the other country. Throughout this period, the two countries displayed an aggressive posture towards each other. While Pakistan publicly committed moral and diplomatic support to militants and raised the issue of right of self-determination of people of Kashmir at international forums, India questioned Pakistan’s claim on the part of the Jammu and Kashmir under its control. By a resolution of Parliament, India’s claim on whole of Jammu and Kashmir, including the Pakistan-administered Kashmir, was asserted. Throughout this period, there was no direct engagement of the two countries. Although the Prime Ministers and foreign ministers of the two countries could meet each other in the international forums, but no concrete effort was made to ease the tensions. It was in 1997 under the initiative of Prime Minister I.K. Gujral that an effort was made by India to engage Pakistan. The Gujral doctrine, which he expounded as External Affairs Minister in the Deve Gowda government, emphasised on the role and responsibility of India in dealing with its neighbours and making efforts in the direction of mutual settlement of disputes through bilateral negotiations. Soon after, it was agreed to have a composite dialogue. On 23 June 1997, in a joint statement signed by Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan, it was agreed to put in place a mechanism to discuss all outstanding issues between the two countries. Eight such issues that were identified to be discussed in joint working groups included Kashmir. Other issues included peace and security, Siachen, Wuller Barrage, Sir Creek, terrorism and drug trafficking, economic cooperation, and promotion of friendly ties. However, despite this opening, not much progress could be made during Gujral’s

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tenure. It was following the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1997 that some movement forward started being made in the peace process. International attention and sanctions on India and Pakistan led them to make some efforts for engaging each other. During a meeting between Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif on the side lines of United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) meeting in New York in September 1998, it was decided to start a dialogue on the identified eight issues. In October 1998, the foreign secretaries initiated discussion on two of the issues including ‘Kashmir’ and ‘peace and security’. Later, discussion on other six issues was also started (Koithara, 2004: 51). This process culminated in the Vajpayee’s historical visit to Lahore where Lahore Declaration and the Memorandum of Understanding between the two countries affirmed the commitment of two countries to the composite dialogue.1 The Kargil war, three months later, however, led to the collapse of this process. The tensions that prevailed between the two countries were escalated after terror attack on Indian Parliament in December 2001. The mobilisation of forces brought the two countries face to face on the border.

The comprehensive peace process It was in this background of escalating tensions between the two countries that fresh efforts were made to initiate the peace process by Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee in 2002. Though the formal process started in 2004, Vajpayee started giving indications of his new approach both to the Kashmir question as well as India–Pakistan relations in 2002–03 period. In any case, one could see a gradual shift in Government of India’s approach in dealing with the insurgency in Kashmir by the end of the decade of 1990s. By this time, there were many voices in favour of political resolution of Kashmir. It was generally felt that there was a need to go beyond the militaristic approach and explore the political one. That this feeling was shared by army as well became clear when in 2000 the retiring Army Chief, General V.P. Malik, and his successor General Padmanabhan, expressed the opinion that Kashmir issue could not be resolved through militaristic methods. Referring to the alienation of people, General Malik asked for political initiatives in Kashmir (Noorani, 2010). Apart from opening back channel links with the Kashmiri separatists, the Government of India also responded to the demand for engaging the armed militants. When Hizbul Mujahideen declared ceasefire in July 2000, it responded positively. It is a different matter though that it

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failed to take advantage of the situation and did not provide sufficient negotiating space to this organisation. However, few months later, in November 2000, it declared unilateral ceasefire, which continued for around six months (Chandran, 2005: 38). ‘Dialogue’ formed the core point of the political discourse of the time. Even while maintaining its aggressive posturing towards Pakistan and armed militants, the BJP-led NDA government that was at the helm of affairs also started referring to the need for dialogue. Even while holding Pakistan responsible for ‘cross-border terrorism’, it offered talks to militant organisations if they shunned the path of violence. During its response to Hizb ceasefire, it clearly responded that it was ready to talk to Kashmiri militants because they were its own people. It, however, rejected the idea of engaging Pakistan at that time. It was in 2002 that Vajpayee started his initiative of engaging the Kashmiris. During his Independence Day address that year, he devoted a significant part of it to Jammu and Kashmir. Acknowledging that people of this state had ‘seen and suffered violence and bloodshed’ for many years, he stated that ‘today is an opportunity when we can together heal these wounds. Together, we can participate in the creation of a happy Jammu and Kashmir’. He affirmed the support of the nation to the people: ‘I would like that no citizen of the state feels alone and helpless. The entire nation is with them’. In this address he placed lot of emphasis on process of peace and democracy and assured that the coming elections would be ‘fully free and fair’. Most significantly he referred to the ‘mistakes’ being committed in Kashmir by stating that ‘I wish to assure the people of Jammu and Kashmir that if any mistakes have occurred, we shall make amends. For this, we shall talk to the elected representatives and organizations’2 (Times of India, 15 August 2002). Although in this speech, there were strong references to terrorism as well as the resolve to defeat ‘cross-border terrorism’, especially in the context of the recent terrorist attacks on Parliament, as well as in Kaluchak and Kasim Nagar in Jammu (Human Rights Watch World Report, 2003: 242), yet there was also an indication of his changed approach vis-à-vis Pakistan. Thus he stated that, ‘We wish to have good neighbourly relations with Pakistan. The Lahore Journey and the Agra Summit are a testimony to this’. Further, ‘India wants all issues to be resolved peacefully and through negotiations. We are prepared to take some more steps in this direction’. Further he stated: I am deeply saddened when I compare South Asia with other parts of the world. When Japan, which was devastated in the Second

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World War, today stands as one of the front-ranking nations; when the whole of Europe has united, forgetting all the old enmities; why can’t we resolve all our contentious issues through talks? We can. We will. (Times of India, 15 August 2002) It was during his visit to Kashmir in April 2003 that Vajpayee laid down the basis of the comprehensive dialogue. Here he reiterated his statement that there has been denial of democracy in Kashmir and that there was a role of Indian state in it. In his convocation address in the University of Kashmir, Prime Minister Vajpayee said: Today, our sincere commitment to bring peace and normalcy to Jammu & Kashmir makes me admit that we have often faltered in our journey towards this goal. It was sometimes forgotten that democracy is too delicate a plant to be subjected to manipulation and mishandling. We must learn from these mistakes and resolve not to repeat them. We should look to the future with a constructive approach, and not remain obsessed with acrimonies and unrealistic goals of the past. (Prime Minister’s Office, 2003) He also emphasised the role of democratic institutions, rule of law and good governance: I would also like to caution that, in order to prevent the youth from being misled or driven into negative activities, we must ensure that they do not lose faith in our institutions, in the fairness of our systems and in the rule of law. Therefore, good governance and effective check on corruption and nepotism are of prime importance in the task of Nation building – and building a new Jammu & Kashmir. (Prime Minister’s address on the occasion of 16th Convocation of University of Kashmir, 2003) Identifying with the people of Kashmir and the agony that they went through during the period of militancy, he said that ‘we have come to share your pain and grief’ and hoped that ‘this new year will bring us peace, prosperity and brotherhood in this sacred land’. He clearly stated that problems could not be resolved through the barrel of the gun and that all issues whether, internal or external, could be solved only by dialogue and engagements. He hinted that Government of India could

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initiate dialogue with the Kashmiri separatist leaders.3 For this he put forth the three guiding principles of movement forward: the principles of Insaaniyat (humanity), Jamhooriyat (democracy) and Kashmiriyat (Kashmir’s age-old legacy of amity) (Prime Minister’s Statement in Lok Sabha about his Kashmir visit, 2003). Most significantly, Vajpayee extended ‘hand of friendship to Pakistan’. While stating that both countries should resolve the need to live together in peace, he expressed the hope that ‘a new beginning can take place between India and Pakistan’. Emphasising that ‘stopping cross-border infiltration and destruction of terrorist infrastructure can open the doors for talks’, he stated that ‘talks can take place on all issues, including that of Jammu and Kashmir’ (Prime Minister’s Statement in Lok Sabha about his Kashmir visit, 2003). He ended his offer of dialogue by stating that ‘we have everything which makes us to have good relations’.4 In sum, Vajpayee’s new approach to peace processes included multiple steps to be taken simultaneously. These included applying a people-oriented approach to Kashmir, acknowledging their suffering and offering them solace, taking political route of dialogue to resolve their problems and therefore offering dialogue with separatists and initiating dialogue with Pakistan and showing India’s readiness to resolve all disputes including that of Jammu and Kashmir. Following this initiative, the Central government started taking various initiatives in the directions of the agenda set by Vajpayee. Among these initiatives included the appointment of N.N. Vohra as the new interlocutor of the Centre. His mandate was to talk to cross-sections of political actors including the mainstream parties as well as the separatist leaders. The other major initiative was the announcement of ‘a series of measures promoting people to people contacts with Pakistan. The measures inter alia, included the offer to start a bus link between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad’ (Ministry of External Affairs, 2004). The ceasefire on the LoC was the major development that took place before the initiation of formal peace process. The initiative was taken following the offer of ceasefire by Prime Minster of Pakistan, Jamali. Responding to this offer India proposed its extension to Siachen as well. Finally, the two countries formally agreed to observe ceasefire on the International Border, LoC and the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) with effect from the midnight of 25 November 2003 (Ministry of External Affairs, 2004). It was on the side lines of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) meeting held in Islamabad in January 2004

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that formal peace process was launched. As per the joint press statement issued on the occasion, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and Pakistani President Musharraf, while welcoming ‘the recent steps towards normalisation of relations between the two countries’, expressed the hope ‘that the positive trends set by the CBMs [confidence building measures] would be consolidated’. While Prime Minister Vajpayee stated that ‘in order to take forward and sustain the dialogue process, violence, hostility and terrorism must be prevented’, he was assured by Musharraf that ‘he will not permit any territory under Pakistan’s control to be used to support terrorism in any manner’. He further emphasised that ‘a sustained and productive dialogue addressing all issues would lead to positive results’. Both the leaders showing the confidence that ‘the resumption of the composite dialogue will lead to peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both the sides’ agreed to start the process of composite dialogue in February 2004 (India–Pakistan Joint Press Statement, 6 January 2004). Following this development, various meetings of the foreign secretaries and foreign ministers took place in which talks were held around various matters concerning India and Pakistan.5 However, it was in September 2004 that in the meeting between Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Pakistan President Musharraf in New York, the issue of Jammu and Kashmir was addressed. Both sides agreed that ‘possible options for a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the issue should be explored in a sincere spirit and purposeful manner’ (Ministry of External Affairs, 2004a).6 It was during this time that a series of composite dialogues took place between India and Pakistan. By 2006, three such dialogues had taken place. In the third dialogue the two countries, for instance, made commitment to continue consultations on security and nuclear doctrines for conventional and nuclear CBMs and to start a bus service between Poonch and Rawlakot. The commitment for a truck service on Muzaffarabad–Srinagar road for trade in permitted goods was also reiterated.7 Meanwhile a formal dialogue with the Kashmiri separatists was started. On 22 January 2004, L.K. Advani, the then Deputy Prime Minister of India, held a meeting with leaders of the Hurriyat Conference led by Chairman Maulana Abbas Ansari. Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Abdul Ghani Bhat, Bilal Ghani Lone and Fazal-ul-Haq Qureshi were the other members of the Hurriyat who met Advani. Emphasising on “step-by-step approach that would lead to the resolution of all outstanding issues relating to Jammu and Kashmir’, the two sides agreed

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to find an ‘honourable and durable’ solution to the Kashmir problem through dialogue (Kumar, 2004). In continuation with this process, the Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani met the Hurriyat leaders in March 2004. Responding to the concerns of the separatists, Advani talked about ‘security with a human face’. He said, ‘we are ensuring that human rights violations do not take place and even while discharging their duties in relation to maintaining security and law and order, security forces must have a human face and they should see to it that ordinary citizens are not subjected to any harassment’ (Kumar, 2004a). Two rounds of dialogue with the Kashmiri separatists generated lot of expectations from the peace process. This was a path-breaking initiative, which had the implications of highlighting the centrality of Kashmir issue in the peace process between India and Pakistan. It was being accepted that Kashmir issue, while being dealt with at the external level, had also to be dealt at internal level through a dialogue with the Kashmiri people and the level of alienation in Kashmir had to be minimised through confidence-building measures. The peace process initiated by Vajpayee-led NDA continued even after its replacement by the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) following the 2004 Parliamentary elections. The UPA government led by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh took the process forward and important developments took place, especially in the direction of India– Pakistan relations. It was during this time that the historic decision to open the Uri–Muzaffarabad route (and later the Poonch–Rawlakot route) for the people living on the two sides of the Line of Control. These routes were also later opened for the cross-LoC trade purposes. At the internal level, Manmohan Singh continued with the dialogue with the separatists. Besides having formal meeting with the Hurriyat Conference leaders of Mirwaiz faction, he also met Yasin Malik, the JKLF leader, and Sajad Lone, the leader of People’s Conference.

Round table conferences and the working groups However, in 2005, the direction of the internal dialogue was changed. Instead of continuing with the one-to-one dialogue with the separatists, the Government of India decided to go in for Round Table Conferences to involve besides the separatists, various other stakeholders including the representatives of the mainstream parties, the displaced communities and other groups. The idea of round tables was not acceptable to the

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separatists. Hence they boycotted these. The Government, however, went ahead with the Round Table Conferences and organised three such conferences, each of which was presided over by the Prime Minister. The net result of these conferences was the formation of five working groups, which discussed the most crucial issues involving the state. These working groups included: the group on confidence-building measures across segments of society in the state headed by Hamid Ansari; group on strengthening relations across the Line of Control headed by former foreign secretary M. Rasgotra; group on economic development8 headed by C. Rangarajan, Chairman of Prime Minister’s Economic Advisory Council; group on ensuring good governance headed by N.C. Saxena, former Member Secretary, Planning Commission; and a group on Centre–state relations headed by Justice Sagheer Ahmed. These working groups explored various intricacies linked with conflict in Jammu and Kashmir and made substantial recommendations regarding various issues confronting the people of the state. The report of the working group on ‘confidence-building measures’ gave a slew of recommendations including those related to strengthening the role of State Human Rights Commission and providing it an investigating wing; setting up of a state Minority Commission, return of Kashmiri Pundits to their original residence; addressing problems faced by West Pakistan refugees; rehabilitation of refugees of 1965 and 1971; forming special cell for getting complete data on the conditions of widows and orphans of those killed in militancy related violence, also to extend the rehabilitation package to the orphans of killed militants. It also recommended a review of certain laws made operational during the period of militancy including the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) and the Disturbed Areas Act (DAA). It had also suggested reviewing of the cases of people under detention and giving a general amnesty to those innocent or under trial for minor offences. The working group on strengthening relations across the Line of Control suggested various measures to open up interaction of various kinds between people living on both sides of the LoC. Other than suggesting that the travel facility available so far to divided families should be extended to other people, it wanted extension of travel facility to groups visiting religious and tourist places and travel access to people for medical purposes. It also suggested opening of other routes including Kargil– Skardu, Jammu–Sialkot, Turtuk–Khapulu, Chhamb–Jorian to Mirpur, Gurez–Astoor–Gilgit, Titval–Chilhan and Jhangar (Nowshera)–Mirpur routes. It also recommended formation of a joint consultative body of both sides to exchange views periodically on social, economic, cultural

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and trade-related matters of mutual interest. It also identified various areas of mutual cooperation including horticulture, tourism promotion, environment protection and disaster management. It also suggested an exchange between students, academics and journalists. In terms of trade, it identified the ultimate aim to encourage in stages the creation of Free Trade Area comprising the both sides of LoC. The working group on economic development provided a framework for the improvement of economic infrastructure. Placing sufficient emphasis on tourism, it suggested measures for its revival, for the economic support to the tourist industry through appropriate loans from the banking sector, to accelerate renovations and new construction of houseboats, hotels and shikaras. Taking the regional peculiarities in view, it suggested religious tourism in Jammu, leisure tourism in the Kashmir Valley and adventure tourism in Ladakh. To improve the economy of the state, it suggested development of infrastructure including developing communications, rural roads, tourism and telecom. It also recommended power sector reforms, transfer of Dulhasti hydel power project and Bursar Scheme from NHPC to the state, enhancing the state’s share of free power in Central projects, simplification of procedures of clearances, acquiring stake in thermal projects and exploiting geo-thermal and micro-hydel projects with a view to reduce dependency on hydel power. It also suggested reform of social infrastructure and education with a stress on vocational and training institutions. The working group on good governance expressed a number of concerns about the state of governance in Jammu and Kashmir and suggested measures for its improvement. It asked for publication of a Citizens Charter to fix duties and explain mechanisms for redressing these. It also recommended strengthening of the State Human Rights Commission (SHRC) and creation of a high-powered committee including political representatives and civil society members for enforcing human rights. The Sagheer Committee on Centre–state relations neither recommended nor rejected autonomy but recommended that the matter of special status should be decided by the people of the state and it should be further debated. It also recommended that the ‘question of autonomy’ and its demand can be examined in the light of the Kashmir Accord or in some other manner or on the basis of some other formula as the present Prime Minister may deem fit and appropriate so as to restore the autonomy to the extent possible. Though these recommendations were of far-reaching significance, they did not lead to much enthusiasm on the ground, especially in Kashmir. With the disassociation of the separatists from this process, the very

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significance of these Round Table Conferences was undermined. Since there was no engagement with the separatists, the internal peace process seemed to have stalled. In Kashmir, however, interest was shown in the reports of various working groups, most specifically in the Sagheer Committee Report. But of all these groups, the Sagheer Committee was quite hesitant about its recommendations and it took a long time to come up with a report. While most of the other groups submitted their reports by early 2007, it submitted its report towards the end of 2009. However, the report was quite ambivalent in its content and therefore the state government referred it to a cabinet sub-committee. This sub-committee also failed to come up with concrete recommendations. The Round Table Conferences and the working groups failed to evoke much response at the ground level, more specifically in Kashmir. Here the disassociation of the separatists from the working groups was seen as a setback to the dialogue process. Since there was no engagement with the separatists, there was a gradual sense of disenchantment with the internal peace process. The fact that there was no follow-up of the working committee reports further agitated the Kashmiris. One of the factors determining the direction of peace process in the post-2005 period was the internal complexities of the state and the political divergence within. With the Government of India engaging the Kashmiri separatists, there were demands coming from various other stakeholders including those claiming to represent people of Jammu and Ladakh as well as those affected by conflict in a variety of ways – the displaced people from PoK, the border people, the Kashmiri Pundits, among others. It was with the aim to broaden the scope of dialogue that the idea of Round Table Conference was introduced. The need for broadening the dialogue was also felt by the separatists. Especially at the time when the separatists were engaged by the Government of India, they had started talking about it. Mirwaiz Omar Farooq, many times during the 2004–07 period, referred to intra-state dialogue as the third level of dialogue, besides the dialogue at levels of India–Pakistan and Delhi–Kashmir (Frontline, 2005). The intra-state dialogue was defined in two-terms – dialogue among all the stakeholders of the state across the two sides of LoC and also the dialogue among the people holding divergent opinion within the Indian side of Jammu and Kashmir. Conscious of the fact that there were divergent political perceptions, aspirations and concerns within the state, more particularly within the three regions of the state, the idea of intra-state dialogue was considered significant. It was with this purpose that Mirwaiz also visited

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the Jammu region and met various groups. He also met the Kashmiri migrants (Haleem, 2006). However, as the dialogue with the separatists was stalled, this emphasis on holding intra-state dialogue and building consensus within the state was also lost.

Stalling of the peace process Peace process, on the whole, remained quite vibrant till 2006 and started losing its momentum in 2007, to begin with, due to the internal problems within Pakistan and later on because of the tensions between India and Pakistan following Mumbai terror attack. However, unlike the earlier times, when the peace process would be reversed following any tension between India and Pakistan, this time the process was not reversed. It was slowed and later stalled to the extent that movement forward did not take place. Efforts continue to be made off and on for giving momentum to the process. This is despite the fact that frictions have continued to dominate the India–Pakistan relations during the last few years. Besides the Mumbai terror attack, there have been more recent issues between India and Pakistan. Especially during the 2012– 13 period there has been escalation of tension on the border. Besides the issue of beheading of Indian soldiers, there have been other issues that have resulted in a strain in the relationship between the two countries. Though the summer of 2012 was quite volatile in terms of ceasefire violations, however, it was the summer of 2013 that witnessed the largest number of ceasefire violations since 2003. These tensions notwithstanding, hopes about the movement forward continue to be expressed. It is, however, at the internal level that the peace process suffered a retreat. Since 2006, the separatists have not been engaged, and there has not been much movement forward in initiating the internal dialogue. The Round Table Conferences succeeded in highlighting various other issues linked to the conflict situation of the state, but with the separatists remaining outside these, the Kashmiris were alienated. There developed a feeling that broadening the basis of dialogue was aimed at diluting the Kashmir-specific context of the conflict. Since no effort was made by the Government of India to continue engaging the separatists, the optimism vis-à-vis the internal dialogue started slowly fizzling out. However, the initiative taken by Manmohan Singh government to open the Line of Control for the movement of people and for trade purposes evoked sufficient response. Opening of the road for trade and travel was seen as a big movement forward.

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However, as the time passed, the disillusionment of Kashmiris started growing and getting reflected in the public domain. Since 2007, political protests have been the hallmark of Kashmir’s politics. Most of these protests were triggered because of human rights violations. These protests became massive in the period between 2008 and 2010. Much of the involvement of people in these protests reflected their disillusionment with the peace process. It was in the wake of prolonged disturbance in Kashmir in 2010 around the issue of fake encounters and killing of 110 youth, that the Government of India made a fresh effort to engage the Kashmiris. A three-member committee of interlocutors comprising Dilip Padgaonkar, Radha Kumar and M. M. Ansari was constituted. The committee met various stakeholders and submitted a report in 2012. The report, among other things, suggested setting up of a constitutional committee to review the Central Acts and constitutional provisions extended to the state after the Delhi Agreement of 1952; proposed a ‘new compact’ with the people of Jammu and Kashmir; suggested a number confidence-building measures; amendment of Public Safety Act, review of DAA and AFSPA; resumption of dialogue with the separatists; speedy implementation of recommendations of Working groups; return of Kashmiri Pundits; creation of a regional councils for each of the three regions of the state; and reviewing the method of appointment of state Governor. Notwithstanding the wide range of recommendations by the interlocutors, the peace process continues to be stalled in Kashmir. As the committee was boycotted by the separatists, it could not gain acceptability in Kashmir. That is the reason that its recommendations did not enthuse the people. Moreover, the report was not owned by the Home Ministry. Even while placing the report on the public domain, the Home Affairs Ministry made the statement that, ‘the views expressed in the report are the views of the interlocutors. The Government still hasn’t taken any decision on the report. The Government will welcome an informed debate on the contents of the report’ (cited in Kumar, 2012).

Analysing the peace process Despite the fact that the peace process has been stalled for quite some time now, its significance cannot be undermined. Of all the efforts made to tackle the conflict situation since 1947, this process has been the most productive one. In the process of its evolution, it could not only bring into its fold all kinds of issues that needed to be addressed but could also bring on board all the stakeholders.

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One of the most crucial points that was established through the peace process was the complexity of the Kashmir issue involving both the external as well as internal dimensions, on the one hand, and the intertwining of these two dimensions, on the other. Recognising the intertwining of these two dimensions, the peace process sought to tackle both by emphasising on opening dialogue simultaneously, both at the India– Pakistan level as well as Delhi–Kashmir level. Till now, from the Indian perspective, the problem in Kashmir was sought to be perceived and resolved either from the internal perspective or from the external perspective. When the issue was sought to be resolved at the internal level, the external level was not taken into consideration and similar was the case vice versa. Thus at the internal level, Kashmir was sought to be resolved through Indira–Sheikh Accord in 1975 and through Rajiv–Farooq Accord in 1986 and at the external level through talks with Pakistan in the spirit of the Shimla Accord of 1971. Though there was an understanding that the two dimensions of the conflict were linked to each other and that such linkage contributed to the complexity and aggravation of conflict, yet no effort was made to tackle them at the same level. From Indian perspective, there were strong reservations about Kashmir being placed in the external level of dialogue with Pakistan. Officially treating the problems in Kashmir purely as an internal matter, India was wary of even the official designation of these problems in the vocabulary of ‘dispute’ or even ‘conflict’. For the first time, Kashmir was officially brought into the ambit of dialogue when Vajpayee conceded to a dialogue with Pakistan on all outstanding issues including Jammu and Kashmir. That such an offer of dialogue with Pakistan was being made simultaneously when New Delhi was also inviting the Kashmiri separatists for dialogue made the two dialogues as interlinked part of the same peace process. This in itself was an important development. The significance of the peace process initiated in the 2002–03 period lies in the fact that it evolved over the period and in the process of its evolution changed the very political discourse around the issue of Kashmir. It was Vajpayee who took the first bold step of engaging both Pakistan and Kashmiri separatists and in the process going beyond the stated position of India. Besides acknowledging the alienation of Kashmiris and offering them a ‘healing touch’, India for the first time also conceded to Kashmir being a problem to be discussed between India and Pakistan. By agreeing to talk to Pakistan on all outstanding issues including Jammu and Kashmir, it had, to that extent, gone beyond the position taken so far that Kashmir was purely an internal matter and that Pakistan had no right to raise it.

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However, responding to Indian initiative, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf was to give an altogether a new shift to Pakistan’s approach towards Kashmir. Emphasising the need to move away from the ‘maximalist’ and ‘rigid’ positions and to look for the ‘out of box’ solutions, he started making suggestions, often though through media, which sounded too far stretched in the beginning but which gradually altered the terms of the discourse. He started breaking away from the traditional position of Pakistan on Kashmir – that Kashmir be resolved as per the UN Resolutions. He started offering a proposal according to which rather than dealing with Kashmir as a single unit, it was to be seen as comprised of seven regions. Two of these regions he identified as under the control of Pakistan (‘Azad Kashmir’ and ‘Northern Areas’) and five in Kashmir under the Indian control. He suggested differential and selective treatment of one or more region – firstly to identify a region, second to demilitarise it and thirdly to change it. This proposal was criticised on the ground that it defined regions, especially on the Indian side, on religious basis, and was not formally pursued by Musharraf, and yet it had the significant impact of changing the discourse vis-à-vis Kashmir. First, this statement amounted to reversing the traditional Pakistani position that being a Muslim majority state, Kashmir was a natural part of Pakistan and therefore it had to merge with Pakistan. By referring to different regions, Musharraf was also suggesting a number of new possibilities: first, whole of Kashmir may not be merged with Pakistan. While some regions could do that, a number of regions so identified by Musharraf may not do that. Second, the Kashmir problem may be resolved through methods other than the UN Resolution, through new and innovative methods on the selective regional basis. Third, though no solution around conversion of LoC into international border could be accepted, yet the reality of the different region-based solution across the LoC could be accepted. Gradually, the ‘irrelevance’ of the UN Resolutions came to be accepted as a normal discourse on Kashmir. Meanwhile, in an interesting conversation that went on for years between Indian and Pakistani side, a way through intractable aspects of the conflict could be innovated. In the process of going beyond the rigidities and maximalist positions, the outer limits of the positions of both India and Pakistan were laid down. As Musharraf made very clear from the very beginning, Pakistan was not ready to accept the status quo as the basis of resolution of the conflict. Line of Control, in his opinion, could not be accepted as the final solution of Kashmir conflict. Manmohan Singh meanwhile clearly stated India’s position that it would not be ready for redrawing the boundaries, compromising on sovereignty or

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changing the maps. To negotiate between these two intractable positions the idea of ‘irrelevance of borders’ was put forward. The concept of ‘the irrelevance of borders’ helped overcome the intractable issue and gave a new direction, to not only the Kashmir issue but also to the future India–Pakistan relations. Rather than insisting on their stated mutually incongruous positions on border, the normal refrain on both the countries was about the ‘soft borders’, opening the traditional routes between the two parts of Kashmir, allowing free movements of people, especially the divided families on both the sides, and starting of trade through these routes. While the opening of the Uri– Muzaffarabad road was seen as a major step in making borders irrelevant, the demand to open other traditional routes came to be routinely raised by many.

Conclusion It is difficult to say as to what direction the peace process will take in the future. Since 2007, when this process came to be completely stalled, there have been political changes of substantial nature both in India as well as in Pakistan. One implication of these changes has been the crisis of ‘ownership’. This was initially more clearly reflected in Pakistan in the post-Musharraf phase of politics. There were not many takers of the ‘Musharraf formula’, which lay at the centre of the peace process, even though most of its contours were accepted. Similarly, even when Manmohan Singh continued with most of the processes started by the Vajpayee government, the missionary zeal that was reflected during the Vajpayee’s time was missing. Moreover, the problem faced by this government was the aggressive positioning of the major opposition party, the BJP vis-à-vis Pakistan and Kashmiri separatists. Failing to recognise the process as a continuity of Vajpayee’s (and NDA’s) policy, this party put so much pressure on the UPA, especially after the Mumbai terror attack that it could not take steps to restore the peace process. A fresh approach to deal with the conflict situation is expected now that the BJP-led NDA has formed the government with a decisive mandate. Like every other successive governments, this conflict provides a major challenge to this government as well. However, for Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the challenge is also to continue with the Vajpayee’s legacy. For the efforts that he made in addressing the Kashmir question in a bold but humanistic and people-oriented manner, Vajpayee holds a special place in Kashmir.9 He is seen as the only statesman who could not only change the direction of the national discourse but also one

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who could bring about changes at the ground level. What is expected of Modi is that he would not only own the process initiated by Vajpayee and take it to its logical conclusion but that with the political capital that he has acquired with his decisive mandate, he would be able to deliver results in more effective manner. However, only time will tell if these expectations are realised or not.

Notes 1 To quote Dennis Kux, ‘India and Pakistan came away with the feeling that each had gained. India received Pakistan’s reaffirmation of the Shimla Agreement calling for the two countries to address issues peacefully and bilaterally and to seek an ultimate solution of differences. Pakistan got official Indian recognition that Kashmir was an “issue” and a problem that needed to be addressed. The rest of the world was pleased by the agreement, particularly the accord to undertake nuclear confidence-building measures’ (Kux, 2006: 42). 2 Full Text of Prime Minister’s Independence Day Speech’, Times of India, 15 August 2002, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2002-08-15/india/ 27294480_1_cross-border-terrorism-jammu-and-kashmir-freedom-struggle 3 Talking in emotional language, Vajpayee thus addressed the separatists: ‘Not only our doors but also our hearts are always open for you. You (can) come to us with your grievances’ (Bukhari, 2003). 4 In his public address Vajpayee stated: ‘As Prime Minister of the country I wanted to have friendly relations with our neighbours and I went to Lahore, but it was returned with Kargil. We still continued and invited General Pervez Musharraf to Agra but again failed. We are again extending a hand of friendship but hands should be extended from both the sides. Both sides should decide to live together. We have everything which makes us to have good relations’. Shujaat Bukhari, ‘PM Extends ‘Hand of Friendship’ to Pakistan’, The Hindu, 19 April 2003. http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/2003/04/19/stories/2003041905500100.htm 5 A meeting of Foreign Secretaries of the two countries was held in Islamabad on 18 February 2004 in which modalities and time framework for composite dialogue were finalised. Other than meeting of Foreign Secretaries again in May/June 2004, it was decided to hold talks on ‘Siachen; Wuller Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project; Sir Creek; Terrorism and Drug Trafficking; Economic and Commercial Cooperation; and Promotion of Friendly Exchanges in various fields’. Another meeting of Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan took place on 27 and 28 June 2004. The outcome of the meeting was in the form of agreement and movement forward on various issues. Most significantly, India came forward with a set of Kashmir-specific proposals to Pakistan, which included those related to transport links, trade, cultural cooperation, tourism, environment and people-to-people contacts. Restoring the strength of the High Commissions of the two countries, reestablishing consulates, immediate release of all apprehended fishermen and putting in place a mechanism for the return of unintentionally transgressing

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fishermen and their boats were the other decisions taken during this meeting. With this the first round of India–Pakistan composite dialogue was initiated. To review the status of the composite dialogue, Foreign Secretary and Foreign Minister level meeting took place in September 2004. It was decided to discuss the issue of oil/gas pipeline running through Pakistan to India. It was also decided to conduct a joint survey of the boundary pillars in the Sir Creek area. Decisions were also taken to run special day bus service from Amritsar to Lahore and other religious places in Lahore on special occasions. Decision for future talk on Khokrapar Munabao rail link was also taken. 6 Like the first round of dialogue, there were additional and secretary-level talks involving the various ministries. These included the Ministry of Railways to discuss modalities for resumption of rail link between Khokhrapar and Munnabao (2–3 December 2004), Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and Highways and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss issues related to commencement of the bus services between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad (7–8 December 2004); Director General Narcotics Control Bureau to discuss bilateral cooperation in drug related matters (13–14 December 2004), Ministry External Affairs to discuss nuclear confidence-building measures (14–15 December 2004), and to discuss Conventional Confidence Building Measures (15 December 2004). These meetings were followed by Foreign Secretary level meeting on 27–28 December 2004. In this meeting various decisions were taken including the ones related to flight testing of ballistic missiles and inadvertent boundary crossers. It was decided to notify arrests of boundary crossers immediately to the respective high commission and to provide consular access within three months of arrest, to introduce mechanisms for early repatriation of inadvertent boundary crossers (Manoharan, 2005). 7 Among the other decisions taken during the Third Composite Dialogue included the agreement for operationalisation of the rail link between Zero Point Railway station near Khokhrapar and Munnabao. Decision was also taken to review the visa agreement, implementation of ‘hotline’ between the Indian and Pakistani maritime agencies, to launch a joint survey on Sir Creek and establishment of anti-terror joint mechanism between India and Pakistan. It was also agreed to release all fishermen on both the sides. 8 Working group on economic development provided a framework improvement of economic infrastructure. Placing sufficient emphasis on tourism, it suggested measures for its revival, for the economic support to the tourist industry through appropriate loans from the banking sector, to accelerate renovations and new construction of houseboats, hotels and shikaras. Taking the regional peculiarities into consideration, it suggested religious tourism in Jammu, leisure tourism in the Kashmir Valley and adventure tourism in Ladakh. To improve the economy of the state, it suggested development of infrastructure including developing communications, rural roads, tourism and telecom. It also recommended power sector reforms: transfer of Dulhasti hydel power project and Bursar Scheme from NHPC to the state; enhancing the state’s share of free power in Central projects; simplification of procedures of clearances; acquiring stake in thermal projects and exploiting geo-thermal and micro-hydel projects with a view to reduce dependency on

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hydel power. It also suggested reform of social infrastructure and education with a stress on vocational and training institutions. 9 It was in this context that expectations were built up in the wake of the possibility of Modi-led BJP winning the 2014 elections. All through the electoral process, various leaders both in the mainstream and separatist space expressed a hope that the Prime Ministerial candidate Narendra Modi would pick up the threads from where Vajpayee had left. Modi, on his part, often referred to the three principles adopted by Vajpayee to deal with Kashmir – the principles of Insaaniyat, Jamhooriyat and Kashmiriyat (humanism, democracy and Kashmiri ethos). One positive development that was quite appreciated in Kashmir after BJP’s sweeping victory in 2014 elections was the invitation that Modi extended to Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif for the oath-taking ceremony of his government. However, during his visit to the state after becoming Prime Minister, his narrative has been focused on ‘economy’ and development.

2014 Assembly election A postscript

As this study has clearly indicated, over the last few years, there has been substantial expansion of democratic space in the Kashmir Valley. Even while the separatist politics continues to prevail and takes the shape of massive upsurge at times (as in 2008 and 2010), the vitality of democratic politics can be clearly noticed. It is this vitality of democratic space that could be witnessed during the 2014 Assembly elections.

A ‘normal’ election The highlight of this election was the ‘normal’ electioneering process with no shadow of the militant violence in Kashmir. Besides the keen contest among a number of parties and candidates, there was an intense electoral campaign with the involvement of the people throughout the Valley. The interest of people in the electoral process was reflected not only in the huge rallies that were organised by the political parties but also in the long queues outside the polling booths.1 This was despite the fact that a large number of people had been affected by floods, which inundated the Valley barely few months prior to the elections. However, despite the massive impact of devastation that was felt by a very substantial population residing in and around the capital city of Srinagar, the political environment was quite charged with the electoral campaign. The boycott politics, which used to be the active response of the separatist to the electoral process, had receded to the background this time. Though the call for boycott was given by the separatists, but finding that there was no popular enthusiasm for it, they did not pursue it. There was therefore no aggressive anti-poll campaign. Popular involvement in the electoral process was reflected in the voter turnout. The trend was set during the first phase of election itself

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when more than 70 per cent voter turnout was recorded in five constituencies of northern Kashmir. Of these, the Sonawari constituency had recorded as high voter turnout at 80.10 per cent. As the polling entered into the next few phases, the enthusiasm for voting continued to be manifested. At the end of all the phases of polling in Kashmir, one could note that there were as many as 29 out of the total 46 constituencies in this region where voter turnout was more than 50 per cent, 23 constituencies where it was more than 60 per cent; 14 constituencies where it was more than 70 per cent and two constituencies where it was more than 80 per cent. There were certain constituencies in central Kashmir where the polling percentage was relatively much lower. For instance, in the constituencies of Habbakadal, Amirakadal, Khanyar, Idgah, Zadibal and Hazratbal, there was less than 30 per cent voter turnout. But these were those constituencies that are known for following the boycott politics till now. During the 2002 and the 2008 Assembly elections, the voter turnout here was quite insignificant. Compared to that elections, the voter turnout here was significantly higher this time.2 Much of what was to be seen during the 2014 Assembly elections could be stated to be a reflection of the post-militancy situation, on the one hand, and the changed party politics, on the other. As this study has already shown, it was in the situation of the declining militancy that mainstream political space started finding an opening. However, what helped invigorate this politics in the overall context of separatism was the intensely competitive party politics in post-2000 period. Much of this was related to the end of the hegemonic politics of Kashmir. With the emergence of PDP as another regional party of Kashmir, apart from the National Conference, the electoral politics of Kashmir was completely transformed.

High stakes Like the 2008 Assembly election, the 2014 election was highly competitive and keenly contested. What contributed to the intensification of the competition was the nature of the political stakes. Stakes were raised after the Parliamentary election, which was held a few months earlier. During this election, all the six Parliamentary seats of the state were captured by two parties operating in oppositional space, namely the PDP and BJP. While the PDP swept all the three seats of the Kashmir region, BJP succeeded in winning both the seats of the Jammu region and the single seat of Ladakh. The ruling National

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Conference–Congress combine that fought the election in alliance failed to win even a single seat. This kind of electoral verdict enlivened the political environment of the state. With new possibilities opening up, both the PDP and BJP became optimistic about their prospects in the Assembly elections. Meanwhile, the National Conference and Congress saw in the coming election an opportunity to recover their lost political space. With each of the four major parties trying to optimise its chance and therefore contesting election on its own, each constituency became important.

BJP’s mission 44 plus In this scenario of aggressive electioneering, what became the highlight of the 2014 Assembly elections was the redefined role of the BJP. Though this party has been occupying a significant space in the regional politics of Jammu, specifically in the Hindu heartland of the region, it never seriously ventured beyond that, not even in the Muslim pocket of the Jammu region. However, its splendid performance during the Parliamentary elections made it quite ambitious, and it entered the electoral fray with the declared ambition of crossing the halfway mark and either forming the government on its own, or being a part of the coalition government. Giving a slogan of ‘Mission 44 plus’, it therefore sought to project itself as the all-state party. It not only aimed at least two of the four seats in Ladakh region but also few victories in the Kashmir region. Its major strategy here was to mobilise the migrated Kashmiri Pundit voters in those constituencies that have been traditionally boycotting the polls. It also sought alliance with some parties and individuals in Kashmir. BJP ultimately failed to get any seat from Kashmir. So miserable was its performance there that all but one candidate here lost their deposits. The total share of votes of this party was less than 2 per cent. This was inevitable given the fact that the party did not have any base here and the projections of the party did not match with its base on the ground. Although it sought to tone down its ideological position on Kashmir and maintained silence on Article 370, its emphasis on development failed to appeal to Kashmiris. Even Modi’s attempt to use the emotional chord that Kashmiris have with Vajpayee by invoking his slogans of ‘Insaaniyat, Jamhooriyat and Kashmiriyat’ came to a naught as he maintained a total silence on conflict-related issues. However, the hype created by the BJP led to the counter mobilisation of Kashmiri voters and they turned out to vote in larger numbers, not

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only in those constituencies with significant number of Kashmiri Pundit voters but in other constituencies as well. BJP also failed to win a single seat in Ladakh. After winning the sole Parliamentary seat in May, the party was upbeat about its performance and expected to win at least the two Buddhist-dominated seats here. The party had been specifically targeting the region since the formation of its government in Delhi and had been promising funds for development of this remote area. To seek the support of the Buddhists, the party also committed itself to the Union Territory status. However, with Congress winning the three seats and the independent candidate supported by National Conference, the fourth one, the party failed to make a mark here. It was on the basis of its stunning performance in Jammu region that it was able to emerge as the largest party of the state in terms of vote share and second largest party, in terms of seats. Here it was able to record a spectacular victory winning more than two-thirds of the total seats of the region.

Fractured mandate Like the 2002 and 2008 elections, the 2014 election also threw a fractured mandate. With seats being divided among the PDP, BJP, National Conference and Congress, no political party reached near the half-way mark. PDP emerged as the largest party with 28 seats, followed by the BJP, which got 25 seats. While the National Conference got 15 seats, the Congress got 12 seats. The People’s Conference meanwhile got 2 seats. In terms of votes, BJP by obtaining 23 per cent votes emerged as the largest party of the state. It was followed by PDP (22.7%), National Conference (20.8%) and Congress (18%). The BJP was the biggest gainer with an increase of 14 seats and 11 per cent vote share. In 2008, it had obtained 11 seats with a share of 12.45 per cent votes. The PDP also gained both in terms of seats and votes. It increased the number of seats from 21 in 2008 to 28 in 2014 and its votes from 15.39 per cent in 2008 to 22.7 per cent in 2014. Interestingly, as the trends in terms of share of votes, notwithstanding the huge difference in the number of seats obtained by the four major parties, viz., the PDP, BJP, National Conference and the Congress, the votes are much more evenly divided among these parties. Though the BJP and PDP emerged as the larger parties (with a vote share of 23% and 22.7% respectively), the difference of their share of votes is not that high as compared to the votes obtained by the National Conference and

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Comparative Analysis of 2014 and 2008 Assembly Elections Party

NC CONG PDP BJP PP BSP PC IND Others

2014 Assembly Elections

2008 Assembly Election

No. of Seats

Share of Votes

Number of Seats

Share of Votes

15 12 28 25 0 0 2 3 1

20.8 18.0 22.7 23.0 2.0 1.4 1.9 6.8 3.4

28 17 21 11 3 0 – 4 3

23.07 17.71 15.39 12.45 3.33 3.67 – 16.34 8.04

the Congress (20.8% and 18%). Counted together, these four parties cornered around 85 per cent of the votes. In 2008, the share of these parties was around 69 per cent. As a peculiarity of the 2014 elections, the percentage of votes obtained by the Independents and other parties (around 15%) has been relatively much lower than that of around 31% in 2008.

Gain and loss of political parties One of the major outcome of the 2014 Assembly elections was the change in the political fortunes of the National Conference. Even while losing its hegemonic position in post-2002 period, the party was able to maintain its leading position within the state. Both in 2002 and 2008, this party had the distinction of being the largest party of the state both in terms of the share of seats as well as in terms of the share of votes. Obtaining 28 seats during both these elections, it had polled 28.23 per cent votes in 2002 and 23.07 per cent votes during 2008 elections. Moreover, this party had the unique distinction of having its presence in all the three regions of the state. However, in the 2014 elections, the party was placed at number three following PDP and BJP, and lost its leading position. Its loss was both in terms of it vote share as well as in terms of seats. Meanwhile, its overarching position as a party having

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some presence in all the three regions was also affected. While it drew its major number of 12 seats from Kashmir region, its presence in Jammu region was reduced to only 3 seats here. In Ladakh, it could not obtain any seat. For a party that dominated the politics of the state as well of Kashmir, this can be seen as a major shift in the power politics of the state. The loss of the National Conference was matched with the gain of the PDP. For the first time in the electoral history of the state, as well as of Kashmir, PDP emerged in an ascendant position. It beat the National Conference both in terms of seats as well as the share of votes. Apart from a rise in the number of seats since 2008 (from 21 to 28), there was also rise in its share of votes (from 15.39% to 22.7%). For a party that had emerged barely two elections earlier, it was a big achievement. Though it had hoped for a still higher number of seats in the Valley, after its clean sweep during the Lok Sabha election, its 25 seats here (compared to 12 of National Conference, 4 of Congress and 2 of People’s Conference) gave it a position of dominance. Though its share of votes was not much affected, the Congress lost in terms of share of seats. As against 17 seats in 2008, it could obtain only 12 seats. It emerged highly successful in Ladakh where it obtained three of the four seats. However, its loss was highest in case of Jammu region where it failed to obtain even a single seat from the Hindu-majority areas. All the five seats that it could win here were from the Muslim-majority parts of the region.

Regional variations What was unique about the 2014 elections was that in terms of performance of the parties, there was no single pattern. In many ways, rather than state-wide uniformities, this election can be better understood with reference to regional peculiarities. That is the reason that one could not point out a single party of the state after the election that could be characterised as the all-state party. As the electoral outcome clearly indicated, there were three different parties emerging as dominant in each of the regions. Thus in Kashmir, it was the PDP, which had emerged as the dominant party, in Jammu, the BJP and in Ladakh, the Congress party. There were variations in terms of the nature of competition as well. With PDP and National Conference giving each other tough fights, many constituencies in Kashmir were very closely contested. In the end, both the parties could win few seats from each other’s strongholds. Thus the National Conference could win few seats from the southern

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Kashmir, which were considered to be the stronghold of the PDP and the PDP could for the first time win a few seats from the district of Srinagar, which is known to be the bastion of National Conference. The margin of victories in many seats here both for PDP and National Conference was quite low. These electoral trends of Kashmir reflect that notwithstanding the difference in the number of seats between the PDP and the National Conference, the election was not a cake walk for the PDP. However, in the Jammu region, the nature of competition was quite different. For most of the seats, which were won by the BJP, they were victories with huge margins. In only in a few cases, there was a keen competition. Notes 1 The vibrancy of the electoral space could be felt during the Parliamentary elections, which was held few months earlier than the Assembly elections. The voter turnout was lower as compared to the Assembly elections, but the electoral space was quite charged. Apart from the fact that a distinction is maintained in Kashmir between the Assembly and the Parliamentary elections, and that generally the voter turnout during the Parliamentary elections is much lower than the Assembly elections, there was the factor of militant violence, which affected the voter turnout. Right in the initial phases, there was the killing of a few panchayat members, which had the impact of intimidating the people. Even so, the voter turnout during the Parliamentary elections was comparable to that of 2009 elections and even higher in certain constituencies and Assembly segments. 2 For instance, Zadibal recorded 23.64 per cent votes as against 17.30 per cent votes in 2008 and 4.78 per cent votes in 2002; Eidgah recorded 27.79 per cent votes as against 22.07 per cent votes in 2008 and 4.74 per cent in 2001; Khanyar recorded 26.12 per cent votes as against 17.41 per cent votes in 2008 and 4.21 per cent votes in 2001; Habbakadal constituency recorded 21.01 per cent votes as against 11.62 per cent votes in 2008 and 3.08 per cent votes in 2001; Amirakadal recorded 24.81 per cent votes as against 14.98 per cent votes in 2008 and 3.06 per cent votes in 2002.

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The Hindusthan Standard, 1953, ‘Facts behind Parishad Agitation – Steps Taken by Govt. Adequate’, 29 January. Indian Express, 2012, ‘48,226 Applications Received for Cross-LoC travel: J&K Govt’, 3 April, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/48226-applications-receivedfor-crossloc-travel-jk-govt/932063/. Mirani, Haron, 2007, ‘Line of Commerce’, Business Line, 14 September, http:// www.thehindubusinessline.com/life/2007/09/14/stories/2007091450020100. htm. Patnaik, Elisa, 2005, ‘Jammu’s Borderlanders’, Himal, November, http://www. himalmag.com/component/content/article/1680-Jammus-borderlanders. html. Puri, Balraj, 1953, ‘Land Reforms in Jammu & Kashmir’, Hindusthan Standard, 7 December. Rediff.com, 2005, ‘Kashmir Resettlement Act under Review: J&K’, 3 May, http://www.rediff.com/news/2005/may/03jk.htm. Rediff.com, 2009, ‘Trade across LoC: Problems Persist’, 16 November, http:// business.rediff.com/report/2009/nov/16/problems-persist-in-trade-across-loc.htm. S.O., 1953, ‘The Kashmir Problem: End of a Stalemate?’, The World Today, Vol. 9. No. 9, September, 393–9. Sheikh, Nida Rafiq, 2008, ‘What Is Kashmiriyat’, Greater Kashmir, 16 February. The Statesman, 1953, ‘Many Anomalies in Working of Land Reform’, 28 August. The Statesman, 1951, ‘National Conference: A Well Knit Party’, 14 November. The Times of India, 1952, ‘Jammu’s Middle Classes Critical of Government: Nationalisation Policy Hits Private Enterprise’, 13 September. Wani, Gul Mohammad, 2006, ‘Kashmir, Kashmiriyat and Shaikh Abdullah’, Kashmir Times, 13 September.

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Index

Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act of 1950 74 Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) 218 AFSPA see Armed Forces Special Power Act (AFSPA) AGPL see Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) Agra Summit 216 Ahrar mobilisation 177 Al-Badr 110 Al-Faran 112 All India Mohammaden Educational Conference 7 All India States People’s Conference 11, 21 All Jammu & Kashmir Employees’ Federation 113 All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference see Muslim Conference All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference see National Conference All Party Hurriyat Conference see Hurriyat Conference Al-Umar Mujahideen 111 Amarnath agitation 152–3, 168 Anjuman-e-Tabligh-ul-Islam 113 Anjuman-i-Islamia 10 Anjuman-i-Nasrat-ul-Islam 10 anti-feudal and anti-monarchical movement 30 Armed Forces Special Power Act (AFSPA) 120, 146, 221, 225

Article 370: Article I and Article 370 52; asymmetrical federalism 52–4; Indira-in Sheikh Accord 42–3, 63; interpretations 52–3; landowning class critique 77; link with land reforms 76; Mookerjee-Abdullah debate on 57–9; negotiation on 54; Praja Parishad agitation against 184–5; regional autonomy 188–9; RSS and Bharatiya Jana Sangh critique of 56; self-rule and shared rule, principles of 53; State Autonomy Committee on 64–6 Arya Samaj 10 asymmetrical federalism 53, 56 autonomy: ‘Autonomy Resolution’ 66, 192; arrest of Sheikh Abdullah and loss of political autonomy 9, 93; contestation of 168, 84; during early 1950s 32, 53–4; distinction from sovereignty 58; erosion of 60–2; land reforms and autonomy 76;Narasimha Rao, offer of autonomy 130; political autonomy, urge for vii, 92; problematisation of 57; PDP 146; Sagheer Committee 222; restoration of 45, 63; State Autonomy Committee, constitution of 132; State Autonomy Committee Report 64–6 Awami Action Committee 96, 112–13 Awami Conference 131

Index Awami League 131 azadi slogan 12, 25, 28, 66, 130, 150, 170 begar, abolition 73 Bharatiya Jana Sangh 56; campaign against Article 370 32; demand for full constitutional integration 59; demand for regional councils 189; merger of Praja Parishad with 185; ‘nationalist narrative’ 56; Praja Parishad agitation 60; Syamaprasad Mookerjee 57–9 Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP): aggressive positioning vis-a-vis Pakistan 228; demand for abolition of Article 370 189; politics of 370; deferring of 133; SAC Report 66; separate state of Jammu, demand for 192; Tika Lal Taploo, killing of 124; 2014 elections 233–5 Border: border and people 196–8; bordering, process of 197; borderrelated displacement 200; Chhamb refugees 199–200; evacuation, displacement and dislocation 199; fence 199; hazards 198; International Border 197, 200, 212, 227; irrelevance of 227–8; LOC 197; Mine Ban Treaty 198; partition 198; permanent residents, status of 206 Boycott politics 136, 140, 141–2, 152, 153, 232–3 Carpet Weavers Association 71 CBMs see Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) Centre–state relations 52–4, 56; Article 370 52–4; changes in 60–2; Constitution of India, application of 57; Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir 62; Constitution Orders 61; Constitution Application Order, 1950 54, 60, 64, 65; Constitutional Application Order 1954 35, 36, 60, 61, 65, 132; cultural nationalism, principles of 58; Delhi Agreement 60; demand

251

for autonomy 41, 58–9; discourse of Hindu rightist parties 60; governor, concept of 61; integration with India 59–60; 1954 Order 61; logic of 36, 56–7; Plebiscite Front, on 94; post-1975 developments 63–6; Sagheer Committee 222–3; State Autonomy Committee 66–7 charter of peasants rights 73 Chenab formula 192 Chenab Valley Hill Council, demand for 167, 170, 191 Chahamb refugees see refugees command marriages 119 Communists in National Conference 36–7 conflict: complex character 196; internal and external dimensions xv, 13, 69, 113, 161, 214; intrastate dimension 15, 162, 169, 172, 191–3, 223 Congress: alliance with National Conference 44, 99, 101, 102; Farooq Abdullah and 45–7; Government with PDP 144; Mehbooba Mufti and 134; merger of National Conference 90, 97, 187; operating through National Conference 37, 183; regional autonomy 189; role in restraining democratic forces 39; Sheikh Abdullah and xiii, 11, 21, 176; 2014 elections 234–8 Constitution Application Order of 1950 see Centre–state relations Constitution Application Order, 1954 see Centre–state relations Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) 219–21, 225 Communists 11, 37, 72 Communist Party of India 11, 183 Communist Party Marxist (CPM) 134 counter-insurgents see surrendered militants cross-border terrorism 216 cultural-linguistic diversity 164–5 cultural nationalism, principles of 58 culture of violence 118

252

Index

DAA see Disturbed Areas Act (DAA) Delhi Accord of 1952 188 Delhi Agreement 54–6; Emergency powers, issue of 55; financial integration, issue of 56; Fundamental Rights, issue of 55; of 1952 131, 132; residuary powers, issue of 55 Democratic National Conference 38 democratic politics: Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, regime of 34; Central government, roll of 38; Communists in National Conference 36–7; Constitutional Order of 1954 35; democratic resources 29; goons, use of 34; Kamaraj Plan 37; manoeuvred 34–40; national interest, concept of 40; Peace Brigade 34; Plebiscite Front 39; Preventive Detention Act 39; uncontested returns, phenomenon of 35 democratic space, 1947–53 period: anti-feudal and anti-monarchical movement 30; emergency government 29; first ‘Kashmiri’ government 32; India, relationship with 32; Jammu-based Praja Parishad, withdrawal of 31; opposition, lack of 30; power politics 32; Sheikh and Nehru, differences 32; Sheikh’s authoritarian attitude 30, 33; tribal invasion 29 diversity: complex picture of 174; plurality, and 164; regional, religious, cultural linguistic 163; social diversity 162–5 Disturbed Areas Act (DAA) 120, 221, 225 divided families: cross-religious 202–3; dislocation of 200; in Poonch and Rajouri 201–2; trauma of 203 Doda 162–8, 173–5, 186, 189–90, 198 Dogra: culture 164; identity 173 Dogra rule 3, 15, 181 discontent against 7, 9; pattern of land ownership 5; National Conference and Dogra society 179; Kashmiri identity vis-a-vis Dogra rule 15, 179

Dogra Sadar Sabha 10, 177, 178, 183 Dogra Army 181 Dogra Rajput 181 Dulhasti hydel power project, transfer of 222 ‘ek Vidhan, ek Pradhan, ek Nishan,’ slogan 60, 185 electoral politics: Amarnath agitation 152–3; 1977 Assembly elections 43; 1983 Assembly elections 28, 44–7; 1987 Assembly elections 28, 101–2, 105, 110, 129; 1996 Assembly elections 131–4; 2002 Assembly elections 138–42, 148; 2006 by-elections 148; 2008 Assembly elections 152; 2014 Assembly elections 232–8; ‘free and fair’ Assembly elections 138, 216; manoeuvring of 36; Parliamentary elections 153; proxy candidates 154; 2011 panchayat elections 154; proxy candidates 139–40, 143, 154; response of separatists 141–2; security forces, role of 138–40; The Jammu and Kashmir Representation of the People Act 206; voter participation 139–4 Employees and Workers Confederation 113 ethnocide 124 ethno-nationalist identity 53, 165–6, 169 exodus of Kashmiri Pundits see Kashmiri Pundits, exodus of free education, policy of 68, 79, 88, 93 Free Trade Area, creation of 222 Gandhian method, peaceful struggle 111 Governor, office of: Governor’s rule 62; report of interlocutors 225; Sixth Constitutional Amendment 61, 69 ‘guest militants’ 116 Gujjars 164–6, 168, 174 Gujral doctrine 214 gun culture 137

Index Harkat-ul-Ansar 112–13 Harkat-ul-Mujahideen 112 Hindu Mahasabha 32, 60, 67, 177 Hizbul Mujahideen 110–11, 137; attack on JKLF 112; ceasefire, offer of 137, 215–16; protest against 115 human rights violations 134–5, 150, 151, 220, 225 Hurriyat Conference: 2002 Assembly election, response to 141–2; formation of 112; armed militancy 113; campaign for poll boycott 135–6; dialogue with Government of India 219–20; differences within 137–8; election commission 142; executive council, role of 113; global jehad 138; militants; 117, 131; ‘gun culture’ 137; Hizbul Mujahideen 137; jehadis, role of 113; Kul Jamaat-e-Hurriyat-eKashmir 112; leadership 122–3; moderates and hardliners 137; multiple splits 143–4; national liberation, struggle for 114; religious struggle 114; socio-religious organisations and associations 113 Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen 111 India-Pakistan relations in 1992 strains 214; 1997 214; 2002–2003 214, 215, 220, 224, 228; Gujral Doctrine 214; Manmohan Singh 220; Peace Process 226–8; Shimla Accord 226; stalling of peace process 224–5; Vajpayee 215, 218–20, 226–9 Indira-Sheikh Accord in 1975 226 infiltration of Pakistani Razakars 202 Instrument of Accession 24, 32, 49–52, 60, 65, 132 Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) 110, 214 ISI see Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) Islamic radicalisation 115–16 Islamic Study Circle 113 Jaish-e-Mohammed 112 Jamaat-e-Islami 39, 44, 97, 100, 112–13

253

Jamiat-Ahle-Hadit 113 Jamiat Ulam-e-Islam 113 Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) 97, 105–7, 109, 110–14, 117, 128, 143, 220 Jammu and Kashmir Representation of the People Act 1955 206 Jammu and Kashmir Resettlement Act 205 Jammu-based Praja Parishad, withdrawal of 31 Jammu region: absence of secular politics 184; Ahrar mobilisation 7, 176–7; agitation against Article 370 184–5; caste 174; demobilisation of Armed Personnel 181; Dogra and Punjabi identity 173; Hindu-majority region 173; influx of Hindu refugees 182; land reforms 78–9; linguistic groups 174; mixed inter-community 173; militancy in 190–1; multi-religious, multi-cultural, multi-lingual society 73; Muslim Conference 7; National Conference in 182–4; political divergence from Kashmir 175–9, 184–5; political neglect of 186–8; Praja Parishad 186; regional autonomy 188–9; regional identity 174; religious factor 17; response against 129 jehad 96, 122; global 114, 138; international 121; Jehad Council 47; slogan of 117 jehadi militant 112, 113, 116, 117, 119, 121, 122, 129, 214 JKLF see Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) Kamaraj Plan 37 kandi (infertile) area 77, 181 Kashmir Bar Council 113 Kashmiri nationalism: abolition of monarchy 21; Accession of state with India 24; defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications 25; idea of independence 23; intermeshing of regional and religious factors 17–20; Kashmiri

254

Index

Pundits 125; ‘Kashmiri self,’ assertion of 21; Monolithic nature 30; post-Accession period 24; regional boundaries of 18; relation with Indian nationalism 20–5, 91; self rule, goals 22; Sheikh’s message to the Cabinet Mission 22; slogans of azadi 25 ‘Kashmiri-ness’ 3–4, 14 Kashmiriyat 15, 163, 218 Kashmir Motor Drivers Association 71 Kashmiri Pundits: communal riots 99; inter-community relations 123; Kashmiri identity politics 123, 165; Kashmiri movement 18; Kashmiriyat 163; Land Reforms 180; radical Islamisation and killing of 116 Kashmiri Pundits, exodus of 123–5, 204; collapse of political order 123; ethnocide 124; killing of Pundits 124–5; peace process 223; report of interlocutors 225; report of the working group on ‘Confidence Building Measures’ 221 Kissan Sabha 11, 71 Ladakh: Assembly election 2014 237; BJP 234–5; culture 164; demand for Union Territory status 167, 194; Buddhist 165; marginalisation of 170, 189; political divergence of xv, 169–70, 179; regional identity politics 166 Ladakhis, ethnicity division 164; identity politics 167 Lahore Declaration and the Memorandum of Understanding 215 Land Compensation Committee 75 land reforms: demand for autonomy and 76; distortion, economic structure 85–6; economic activities 81–2; impact 79; industrial sector 82–3; infrastructure development 81; issues linked with 76–8; Land Compensation Committee 75; land reform legislations 75; legislation,

loopholes 77; loans and packages 84; nouveau riche class of Kashmiris 85; phases 73–4; policy of free education 79; political transition 78; productivity 82; socioeconomic transformation 80; State Development Report, Planning Commission 83; State Tenancy Act of 1924 74; subsidies in food items 81; unemployment, educated youth 85 Lashkar-e-Toiba 112 legality of Accession 51 Line of Control (LOC) 197, 221; ambiguities of 198, 200; ceasefire on 218; divided families 201–2; migration across 199; peace process 227; trade 220, 222, 223; Working Group on Strengthening relations across the Line of Control 221 LOC see Line of Control (LOC) Lone-Geelani debate: Hurriyat leadership 122–3; Pan-Islamic movement, the international jehad 121–2; relevance of jehadis in Kashmir 122; role of armed militancy 122 Mahaaz-e-Azaadi 97 mainstream politics: collapse of 108–9; in post-militancy period 147–9; legitimacy to 144–6; mainstream versus resistance politics 40–1; restoration of 129–34; shift from mainstream to separatist politics 28; vibrancy in 135 Manmohan Singh and Musharraf, meeting 2004 219 marginalisation 166, 168, 170, 207 Marxist philosophy 11 mass upsurge 108, 124, 191 Mazdoor Sabha 11, 71 militancy: armed militancy 110–12, 113, 114–18; azadi, ideology of 114; burning of Chrar-e-Sharief 117; collapse of mainstream politics 108–9; disjuncture between support for armed militancy and

Index separatist sentiment 119–21; exodus of Kashmiri Pundits 123–5; fear and silence 119–20; first-generation militants 110; formation of Hurriyat Conference 112–14; Gandhian method, peaceful struggle 111; ‘guest militants’ 116; legitimacy by women, withdrawal of 118–19; Lone-Geelani debate 121–3; nature of 115–16, 1987 Assembly elections 105; protest marches 106; protests and demonstrations 105; resistance politics 107; violence in Kashmir, 1989 117 Mine Ban Treaty 198 Ministry of Home Affairs 141, 147, 196–7 MUF see Muslim United Front (MUF) multiple identity and politics, J&K: Amarnath agitation 168; backwardness and marginalisation 166; ‘developmental lag’ of peripheral areas 167; ‘ethnonationalist’ identity 165; issues of development 168; power dimension 167; Praja Parishad agitation of 1952 168; regionalism 166; restructuring the power structure 167 Muslim Conference 6, 91, 112, 123, 176, 175, 178; communal mobilisation 177; Muslim identity 6–10; conversion into National Conference 13, 71–2, 176; National Demand 12; revival of 91 Muslim identity and religion: artisans, condition of 5; ‘class rights’ 9; denial of rights 8–9; discontent, Dogra regime 6; intrareligious contestations 9; landtenure, Dogra rule 5; mosques and shrines, political mobilisation 10; Muslim Conference 6; political mobilisation of Kashmiris 7; Punjab and Kashmir 7; ‘Shawl Bauf agitation’ 5–6; “true-Islam” 10; uprising in 1931 6

255

Muslim Khwateen Markaz 113 Muslim United Front (MUF) 100–3; anti-Congress and anti-Centre sentiment 100; Jamaat-e-Islami 100; National ConferenceCongress government 102–3; 1987 Assembly elections 101–2; 1986 accord 100; People’s Conference 101–2; ‘Threat to Islam’ 101 National Conference 10–14, 92, 109, 130, 134, 176; All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference 13; government jobs for Muslims 11; in Jammu region 182; Marxist philosophy 11; Mazdoor Sabha 11; National Demand 12–13; New Kashmir Manifesto 14; to non-Muslims 13–14; secularising the movement 12; Sheikh Abdullah, 1935 annual session of the Muslim Conference 11–12; universal adult franchise, principle of 12 National Demand 12–13 national interest, concept of 40 nationalism and Kashmir conflict: Accession with India 51; Article 370 and asymmetrical federalism 52–4; Delhi agreement 54–6; Instrument of Accession, signing of 49–52, 51–2; Kashmir’s relation with India 56–61; legality of Accession 51; post-1975 developments 63–6 ‘Naya Kashmir’: begar, abolition 73; charter of peasants rights 73; New Kashmir Manifesto 14. 72–3; Sheikh Abdullah on 72 1975 accord 42, 46 1977 Assembly elections 43–4 North West Frontier Province (NWFP) 49 NDA: continuity of peace process 220, 228; need for dialogue 216; rejection of Autonomy Resolution 66, 133 NWFP see North West Frontier Province (NWFP)

256

Index

Pahari: identity assertion 166; in Poonch and Rajouri 166; Paharispeaking people 164; Paharispeaking segments 109 panchayat elections, 2011 14, 154 Pan-Islamic: failure of the idea of pan-Islamic identity 18; Kashmir as part of pan-Islamic struggle 112, 114; movement, the international jehad 121–2 Parliamentary elections 1989 109, 1996 131–2, 1998 and 1999 136, 2004 153 PC see People’s Conference (PC) PDP see People’s Democratic Party (PDP) ‘Peace Brigade’ 34 peace process 146, 149, 152; Agra Summit 216; BJP-led NDA 228; CBMs 219; ceasefire on LoC 217–18; complexity of Kashmir issue 226; cross-border terrorism 216; Gujral doctrine 214; IndiaPakistan relations in 2002–2003 215; Indira-Sheikh Accord in 1975 226; irrelevance of borders, concept of 227–8; Kashmiri separatists, dialogue with 219–20; Lahore Declaration and the Memorandum of Understanding 215; Manmohan Singh and Musharraf, meeting 2004 219; mistakes, committed in Kashmir 216; Rajiv-Farooq Accord in 1986 226; separatism and militancy 213; Shimla Accord of 1971 226; support of Pakistan 213; UNGA meeting 215; UN Resolutions 227; Vajpayee, comprehensive dialogue 217; Vajpayee’s visit to Kashmir 217–18 ‘people-friendly’ party 134 People’s Conference (PC) 101–2, 112, 139, 220, 235, 237 People’s Democratic Party (PDP) 134–5, 145–6; armed militancy 135; Congress government 144; National Conference 134; ‘peoplefriendly’ party 134; ‘unresolved Kashmir problem’ 134

People’s League 97, 112–13 Pir Panchal Hill Council, demand for 167, 170, 191 Plebiscite Front 39, 94–7; antigovernment political reaction 95–6; Awami Action Committee 96; detention of Sheikh Abdullah, 1953 93, 95; Holy Relic, loss of 96; Kashmir, India’s role within 93–4; Kashmiri people’s movement 92; merger of National Conference with Congress 96–7; Mirza Afzal Beg 94; plebiscite, demand for 94; political discontent in Kashmir 95; power politics 92–3; and Sheikh Abdullah 92; state constitution, changes in 96; underground resistance politics 97 ‘PoK refugees’ see refugees political processes, restoration of: Assembly elections, 1987 129; azadi slogan 130; de-legitimisation of armed militancy 128–9; Delhi Agreement of 1952 131; electoral process 129–30; National Conference 130; negative response 129; ‘pristine and original form’ of autonomy 130 politics of azadi see separatism poll boycott, politics of 135–6; electoral process 135–6; Hurriyat’s campaign 136; Parliamentary elections 136; Srinagar Parliamentary constituency 136 Poonch 49–50, 162, 164, 166–8, 170, 173–4, 177, 186, 189–90, 199, 201–2 post-Accession period 180–2 post-militancy period: armed militancy, decline of 147–9; expansion of democratic space 148–9, 155; killings of security forces 147; Ministry of Home Affairs 147; terrorist violence 147; 2008 Assembly elections 148; 2002 Assembly elections 148 post-1953 scenario 33–4; demand for plebiscite 33; legitimacy crisis 33–4; political mobilisation 124

Index post-1947 policies 124 post-1975 developments 63–6; Article 370 of Indian Constitution 63; Autonomy Resolution 66; changes, state constitution 65; deletion of provisions of Indian Constitution 64; modification, Article 246 64–5; restoration of autonomy 63; SAC 63; Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes 65 post-2002 period, democratic space in 144–6; ideology of National Conference 145; mainstream political activity 144–5; PDPCongress government 144, 145–6; peace process 146; politics of governance 144, 154; removal of AFSPA 146; Truth and Reconciliation Commission 146 power politics 32; factor of conflict 101; Indian civil society organisation 108; killing of the political activists 109; Mahaaz-eAzaadi 97; National Conference 109; 1989 Parliamentary elections 109; Plebiscite Front 92–3, 109; political organisations 98; Return of Sheikh Abdullah 41–7 Praja Parishad agitation 168, 184–5, 185 Praja Socialist Party (PSP) 35, 39 Preventive Detention Act 39 pro-azadi sentiments 170 proxy candidates 139–40, 143, 154 Public Safety Act 43, 120, 225 Pundits see Kashmiri Pundits Punjab-based All India Kashmir Conference (AIKC) 176 ‘Quit Kashmir’ movement 16, 21, 31, 151, 179 Rajiv-Farooq Accord 99–100, 188, 226 Rajouri 162, 164, 166–8, 170, 173–4, 176–7, 186, 205, 190, 199, 202 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) 56, 60, 66, 177, 192 ‘reformed militants’ 118

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refugees 203–4; allotment of land 205; Chhamb refugees 199–200, 203; Hindu refugees, influx of 182, 29; Jammu region, host to 184; Jammu and Kashmir Resettlement Act 205; land distributed 75; PoK refugees 204–5; Rehabilitation, issue of 182; Report of Working Group on ‘Confidence Building Measures’ 221; Scheduled Caste certificate 206, 207; West Pakistan refugees 206–7 regime of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad 34 regional autonomy: demand for 189; state autonomy and regional autonomy 193; Regional Autonomy Committee (RAC) 189 regional autonomy, Jammu: Article 370 188–9; RAC 189; SAC 189 regional factor in identity politics: Kashmiri identity and Dogra rule 14; ‘Kashmiri-ness’ 14; Kashmiriyat 15; literary figures of 1930s and 1940s 16–17; political self or political collective 16; ‘Quit Kashmir’ movement 16; restoration of dignity of Kashmir 15; sale deed 14 regionalisation, Kashmiri identity 176 regionalism 166 religion and regional factors: inter-meshing of 17; pattern of relationship 17; religious factor in politics 18; rights of people 20; support of Pakistan in 1947 18; tribal invasion 19 religion-based politics, rise of: antiCongress and anti-Centre political space 99; Farooq Abdullah’s government 98; G.M. Shah’s government 99; MUF 100–1; Rajiv-Farooq Accord 99–100; removal of Farooq Abdullah, 1984 98–9 renegades see surrendered militants Resettlement Bill 192 resistance politics: during Dogra rule 15–17; during 2008–10 period

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Index

149–52; mainstreaming of 13; mainstream versus resistance politics 4–47; middle class, role of 93; period of armed militancy 107–9; Plebiscite Front 94–7; strengthening of, due to frittering away of democratic resources 29; underground politics 97 RSS 56, 177; Article 370 194; Association with Praja Parishad 67; demand for ‘trifurcation of state’ 192; Praja Parishad agitation 60; SAC Report 66 round table conferences and working groups: AFSPA 221; Bursar Scheme from NHPC 222; ceasefire violations 224; confidencebuilding measures 221; creation of Free Trade Area 222; DAA 221; disillusionment of Kashmiris 225; Dulhasti hydel power project, transfer of 222; economic development 221; intra-state dialogue 223; Line of Control 221; Sagheer Committee 222–3 SAARC see South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) SAC see State Autonomy Committee (SAC) Sagheer Committee 222–3 Sanatan Dharma Yuvak Sabha 10 SASB see Shree Amarnath Shrine Board (SASB) Scheduled Caste certificate 206, 207 self-rule and shared rule, principles of 53 separatism: and militancy 13; armed militancy, relation with 105–8; contestation of Sheikh Abdullah 109; creation of separatist space 107; collapse of mainstream politics 108–9; disjuncture with armed militancy 119–21; formation of Hurriyat Conference 112–4; nature of xiv, 91; politics of azadi 192–3; spontaneous mass protests 105–7

separatism and democracy: electoral politics 2008–14 152–4; emergence of PDP 134–5; Hurriyat Conference 137–8; 1996 Assembly elections 131–4; politics of poll boycott 135–6; post-militancy period 147–9; post-2002 period 144–6; restoration of political processes 128–31; separatism before 1989: autonomy of Kashmir’s politics 91; Kashmiri leadership to join India 92; Muslim Conference, Pakistan 91; Plebiscite Front 92–7; pro-Pakistan party, Kashmir 91; rise of religion-based politics and MUF 98–102; Sheikh’s return to power politics 97–8 separatist assertion 2008–10: decline of violence 149; human rights violation 150; issue of human rights violations 151; massive resistance politics 151; peace process 149, 152; peace process, self-determination 152; protest demonstrations 149–50, 151; radicalisation of separatist politics 151–2; SASB 150; separatist leaders 149; slogans of azadi 150 Shawl Bauf agitation 5–6 Sheikh Abdullah and power politics 41–7; demand for autonomy 42; Farooq Abdullah’s government 44–5; 1983 Assembly elections 45–6; 1975 accord 42, 46; 1977 Assembly elections 43–4; Sheikh’s post-1975 politics 42–3 Shimla Accord of 1971 226 SHRC see State Human Rights Commission (SHRC) Shree Amarnath Shrine Board (SASB) 150 social diversity, J&K: culturallinguistic diversity 164–5; Dogra culture 164; Hindu-majority districts 162; Kashmiri Pundits 165; Kashmiriyat 163; Ladakhis, ethnicity division 164; languages 164; in linguistic-cultural levels 163; majority or minority 162–5;

Index Muslim-majority districts 162–3; Muslims of Kashmir 165; Paharispeaking people 164; religious composition 162 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 218 State Autonomy Committee (SAC) 55–6, 61, 64, 131–2, 189, 192 State Development Report, Planning Commission 83 State Human Rights Commission (SHRC) 222 State Tenancy Act of 1924 74 Student Islamic League 113 surrendered militants 117, 120, 131–2, 147; counter-insurgents 118, 135 Taraqui-Talim-wa-Ittihad 10 Tonga Drivers Association 71 Treaty of Amritsar 3, 21 Truth and Reconciliation Commission 146 uncontested returns, phenomenon of 35–6 UNGA see United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 215

259

United Progressive Alliance (UPA) 220, 228 UN Military Observers Group (UNMOG) 106 UNMOG see UN Military Observers Group (UNMOG) UN Resolutions 94, 106, 227 UPA see United Progressive Alliance (UPA) violence: 1996 Assembly elections 131; 2002 elections 140–1, 148; communal 29, 176 counterinsurgents 135; culture of 118–19; decline of 149; impact of 113, 115, 120, 190; Kashmiri Pundits 125; multiple sources of 117, 134; partition 184, 198, 200–1; politics of 13; trends of 147; weariness about 121 West Pakistan refugees 196, 203–4, 206–7, 221 women 118–19; abducted women, part of divided families 203; charter of women’ s rights 73; command marriages 119; culture of violence 118; jehadi militant 119; part of resistance politics 107; social restrictions by militants 115