Israeli-Arab Negotiations and Issues [1 ed.] 9781617613647, 9781617611858

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Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Israeli-Arab Negotiations and Issues, edited by Louis H. Girard, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Israeli-Arab Negotiations and Issues, edited by Louis H. Girard, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF THE M IDDLE EAST

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ISRAELI-ARAB NEGOTIATIONS AND ISSUES

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Israeli-Arab Negotiations and Issues, edited by Louis H. Girard, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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Israeli-Arab Negotiations and Issues, edited by Louis H. Girard, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF THE M IDDLE EAST

ISRAELI-ARAB NEGOTIATIONS AND ISSUES

LOUIS H. GIRARD

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EDITOR

Nova Science Publishers, Inc. New York

Israeli-Arab Negotiations and Issues, edited by Louis H. Girard, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2011 by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, electrostatic, magnetic, tape, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise without the written permission of the Publisher. For permission to use material from this book please contact us: Telephone 631-231-7269; Fax 631-231-8175 Web Site: http://www.novapublishers.com

NOTICE TO THE READER The Publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this book, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information contained in this book. The Publisher shall not be liable for any special, consequential, or exemplary damages resulting, in whole or in part, from the readers‘ use of, or reliance upon, this material. Any parts of this book based on government reports are so indicated and copyright is claimed for those parts to the extent applicable to compilations of such works.

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Independent verification should be sought for any data, advice or recommendations contained in this book. In addition, no responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property arising from any methods, products, instructions, ideas or otherwise contained in this publication. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information with regard to the subject matter covered herein. It is sold with the clear understanding that the Publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or any other professional services. If legal or any other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent person should be sought. FROM A DECLARATION OF PARTICIPANTS JOINTLY ADOPTED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND A COMMITTEE OF PUBLISHERS. Additional color graphics may be available in the e-book version of this book. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA Israeli-Arab negotiations and issues / editor, Louis H. Girard. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN:  (eBook) 1. Arab-Israeli conflict--1993---Peace. 2. Diplomatic negotiations in international disputes. I. Girard, Louis H. DS119.76.I8253 2010 956.05'4--dc22 2010037361

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. † New York

Israeli-Arab Negotiations and Issues, edited by Louis H. Girard, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

CONTENTS

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Preface

vii

Chapter 1

Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy Carol Migdalovitz

1

Chapter 2

Israel and the Palestinians: Prospects for a Two-State Solution Jim Zanotti

57

Chapter 3

Israel and Hamas: Conflict in Gaza (2008-2009) Jim Zanotti, Carol Migdalovitz, Jeremy M. Sharp, Casey L. Addis, Christopher M. Blanchard and Rhoda Margesson

97

Chapter 4

Arab League Boycott of Israel Martin A. Weiss

137

Chapter Sources

145

Index

147

Israeli-Arab Negotiations and Issues, edited by Louis H. Girard, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Israeli-Arab Negotiations and Issues, edited by Louis H. Girard, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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PREFACE It has now been 16 years since Israel and the PLO agreed to the 1993 Oslo Accord. Yet differences between the sides over core issues, such as borders, security, settlements, the status of Jerusalem, refugees, and water rights, have not been overcome, despite the thirdparty involvement of various international actors, the United States, in particular. This book explores the debate which continues over the proper U.S. approach to the peace process. Congress faces significant policy challenges both with its oversight of the Obama Administration's formulation and implementation of policy; and on matters such as foreign aid, security assistance, Israeli settlements, the role of Arab states, and others. Chapter 1- After the first Gulf war, in 1991, a new peace process consisting of bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon achieved mixed results. Milestones included the Israeli-Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Declaration of Principles (DOP) of September 13, 1993, providing for Palestinian empowerment and some territorial control, the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty of October 26, 1994, and the Interim Self-Rule in the West Bank or Oslo II accord of September 28, 1995, which led to the formation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to govern the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, Israeli-Syrian negotiations were intermittent and difficult, and postponed indefinitely in 2000. Israeli-Lebanese negotiations also were unsuccessful, leading Israel to withdraw unilaterally from south Lebanon on May 24, 2000. President Clinton held a summit with Israeli and Palestinian leaders at Camp David on final status issues that July, but they did not produce an accord. A Palestinian uprising or intifadah began in September. On February 6, 2001, Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister of Israel, and rejected steps taken at Camp David and afterwards. Chapter 2- Following leadership changes in the United States and Israel in early 2009 and the Israel-Hamas Gaza conflict in December 2008-January 2009, the inconclusive final-status peace negotiations that took place between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during the final year of the Bush Administration have not resumed. Nevertheless, President Barack Obama showed his commitment to a negotiated ―two-state solution‖ just days after his January 2009 inauguration by appointing former Senator George Mitchell as his Special Envoy for Middle East Peace. In September 2009, Obama convened a trilateral meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and PLO Chairman Mahmoud Abbas in New York and addressed the annual opening session of the United Nations General Assembly. He indicated that final-status negotiations should not be delayed further, despite the lack of resolution on preliminary issues such as the possible freeze of Israeli settlement

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building in the West Bank and East Jerusalem or the possible gradual normalization of ties between Israel and certain Arab states. Chapter 3- On December 27, 2008, Israel launched a major military campaign dubbed ―Operation Cast Lead‖ against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli offensive came in response to markedly increased Palestinian rocket fire following the expiration of a six-month cease-fire on December 19. On January 3, 2009, Israel began a ground offensive into Gaza. Despite international pressure to halt the fighting (including the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1860 on January 8), the conflict continued until January 18, when Israel unilaterally ceased fire and Hamas followed suit shortly thereafter. Israel‘s technological superiority and reliance on heavy armor and firepower contributed to a wide disparity in casualties—approximately 1,440 Palestinians have died (with some organizations estimating that at least half of the dead are civilians), compared with 13 dead (including four civilians) on the Israeli side. Chapter 4- The Arab League, an umbrella organization comprising 23 Middle Eastern and African countries and entities, has maintained an official boycott of Israeli companies and Israeli-made goods since the founding of Israel in 1948. The boycott is administered by the Damascus-based Central Boycott Office, a specialized bureau of the Arab League. The boycott has three tiers. The primary boycott prohibits citizens of an Arab League member from buying from, selling to, or entering into a business contract with either the Israeli government or an Israeli citizen. The secondary boycott extends the primary boycott to any entity world-wide that does business in Israel. A blacklist of global firms that engage in business with Israel is maintained by the Central Boycott Office, and disseminated to Arab League members. The tertiary boycott prohibits an Arab League member and its nationals from doing business with a company that deals with companies that have been blacklisted by the Arab League.

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In: Israeli-Arab Negotiations and Issues Editor: Louis H. Girard

ISBN: 978-1-61761-185-8 © 2011 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 1

ISRAELI-ARAB NEGOTIATIONS: BACKGROUND, CONFLICTS, AND U.S. POLICY Carol Migdalovitz

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SUMMARY After the first Gulf war, in 1991, a new peace process consisting of bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon achieved mixed results. Milestones included the Israeli-Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Declaration of Principles (DOP) of September 13, 1993, providing for Palestinian empowerment and some territorial control, the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty of October 26, 1994, and the Interim SelfRule in the West Bank or Oslo II accord of September 28, 1995, which led to the formation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to govern the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, IsraeliSyrian negotiations were intermittent and difficult, and postponed indefinitely in 2000. Israeli-Lebanese negotiations also were unsuccessful, leading Israel to withdraw unilaterally from south Lebanon on May 24, 2000. President Clinton held a summit with Israeli and Palestinian leaders at Camp David on final status issues that July, but they did not produce an accord. A Palestinian uprising or intifadah began in September. On February 6, 2001, Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister of Israel, and rejected steps taken at Camp David and afterwards. On April 30, 2003, the United States, the U.N., European Union, and Russia (known as the ―Quartet‖) presented a ―Road Map‖ to Palestinian statehood. It has not been implemented. Israel unilaterally disengaged (withdrew) from the Gaza Strip and four small settlements in the West Bank in August 2005. On January 9, 2005, Mahmud Abbas had become President of the PA. The victory of Hamas, which Israel and the United States consider a terrorist group, in the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections complicated prospects for peace as the United States, Israel, and the Quartet would not deal with a Hamas-led government until it disavowed violence, recognized Israel, and accepted prior Israeli-Palestinian accords. President Abbas‘s dissolution of the Hamas-led government in response to the June 2007 Hamas forcible takeover of the Gaza Strip led to resumed international contacts with the PA.

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On November 27, at an international conference in Annapolis, MD, President Bush read a Joint Understanding in which Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert agreed to simultaneously resume bilateral negotiations on core issues and implement the Road Map. On May 21, 2008, Israel, Syria, and Turkey announced that Syria and Israel had begun indirect peace talks in Istanbul via Turkish mediators. Later in the year, Israeli and U.S. elections appeared to disrupt negotiations on all tracks and the end of the Israeli-Hamas cease-fire in December and the subsequent outbreak of violence in Gaza led to the official suspension of peace talks. President Obama has affirmed U.S. support for a two-state solution to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict and named former Senator George Mitchell as his Special Envoy for Middle East Peace, but negotiations have not resumed. Congress is interested in issues related to Middle East peace because of its oversight role in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, its support for Israel, and keen constituent interest. It is especially concerned about U.S. financial and other commitments to the parties, and the 111th Congress is engaged in these matters. Congress also has endorsed Jerusalem as the undivided capital of Israel, although U.S. Administrations have consistently maintained that the fate of the city is the subject of final status negotiations.

MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

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Israel-Palestinians On November 25, 2009, to help ―launch meaningful negotiations,‖ Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proposed ―a policy of restraint regarding a suspension of new permits and new construction in Judea and Samaria (West Bank) for a period of ten months.‖ The ―freeze‖ or ―moratorium‖ does not apply to 3,000 housing units under construction, to schools, synagogues, and public buildings, to infrastructure needed for national security, or to Jerusalem. He later said that Israel would ―revert to the policies of previous governments in relation to construction‖ at the end of the ten months. Secretary Clinton said that the proposal ―helps move forward‖ the peace process and that through ―good faith negotiations the parties can mutually agree on an outcome which ends the conflict and reconciles the Palestinian goal of a independent and viable state based on the 1967 lines, with agreed swaps, and the Israeli goal of a Jewish state with secure and recognized borders that reflect subsequent developments and meet Israeli security requirements.‖1 Special Middle East Envoy George Mitchell said that the Israeli step ―falls short of a full settlement freeze, but it is more than any Israeli government has done before…‖2 He noted that ―the number of buildings under construction will decline since, as each new building is completed, there will be no new building started. So implementation of the moratorium could mean much less settlement construction than would occur if there is no moratorium.‖ He also expressed a desire to get a ―resolution of the issue of borders, so that there will no longer be any question about settlement construction, so that Israelis will be able to build what they want in Israel, and the Palestinians will be able to build what they want in Palestine.‖3 The Palestinians criticized Israel for not freezing all settlement activity or including Jerusalem. President Abbas described it as ―insufficient‖ and ―unacceptable.‖

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On December 28, Israel underscored that a ―unified‖ Jerusalem is its capital and excluded from the freeze when it announced plans to build 692 news housing units in East Jerusalem. The White House Press Secretary responded, saying

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The United States opposes new Israeli construction in East Jerusalem. The status of Jerusalem is a permanent status issue that must be resolved by the parties through negotiations…. Neither party should engage in efforts or take actions that could unilaterally preempt, or appear to preempt, negotiations. Rather, both parties should return to negotiations without preconditions as soon as possible…. We believe that through good faith negotiations the parties can mutually agree on an outcome that realizes the aspirations of both parties for Jerusalem, and safeguards its status for people around the world.4

In December, President Abbas pledged that, as long as he is in office, he ―will not allow anybody to start a new intifadah.‖ At the same time, he called on the international community and on the United States to pressure the Israeli government.5 The Obama Administration began 2010 with a renewed effort to restart negotiations. Media reports suggested that it was preparing ―letters of guarantee‖ that would assure the Palestinians that the 1967 borders would form the basis of the negotiations and the Israelis that post-1967 demographic changes (some settlements) would be taken in to account.6 Secretary Clinton said that the Administration was working ―to take the steps needed to relaunch the negotiations as soon as possible and without preconditions.‖ She again stated that a solution would reconcile ―the Palestinian goal of an independent and viable state based on the 1967 lines, with agreed swaps, and the Israeli goal of a Jewish state with secure and recognized borders.‖ Later, on January 8, she may have attempted to blur the 2009 U.S. focus on Israeli settlements, saying ―resolving borders resolves settlements, resolving Jerusalem resolves settlements….‖7 On January 6, Mitchell was interviewed on the Public Broadcasting System‘s Charlie Rose Show, and expressed hope for progress on three tracks: political negotiations, security, and Palestinian economic growth and institution building. (These tracks are identical to those suggested by Netanyahu in his March 31, 2009 address to the Knesset.8) Mitchell claimed that Netanyahu‘s 10-month moratorium is ―more significant than any action taken by any previous government of Israel for the 40 years that the settlement enterprise has existed.‖ He stated that Israeli security and the establishment of a Palestinian state are ―mutually reinforcing‖ in that ―Palestinians are not going to get a state until the people of Israel have a reasonable sense of sustainable security. The Israelis … are not going to get that reasonable sense of sustainable security until there is a Palestinian state.‖ Mitchell also said that negotiations should last no more than two years and ―it can be done within that period of time‖ or a shorter period of time. Mitchell also said that the United States is seeking a ―parallel process‖ in which ―as the Israelis and Palestinians talk in negotiations, Israel, the Palestinians, and all the surrounding countries would meet to deal with regional issues, energy, water, trade, communications, transport….‖ He seemed to discourage an Israeli-Hamas prisoner exchange because it ―will not build confidence in the Palestinian Authority because it will, in fact, be seen as a validation of Hamas‘s tactics, which is violent resistance.‖ When Rose asked if the United States had any ―sticks,‖ Mitchell responded, ―the United States can withhold support on loan guarantees to Israel.‖ Some media outlets interpreted this as a threat; so the State Department

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later clarified that he was not signaling a course of action. Mitchell himself had added, ―we think the way to approach this is to try to persuade the parties what is in their self interests.‖9 On January 8, a Palestinian newspaper summarized Palestinian ideas about peace negotiations, reportedly formulated by Saeb Erekat, head of the PLO Negotiations Department and Umar Suleiman, Egypt‘s intelligence chief. First, the goal should be a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital based on the 1967 borders. This could include exchanges of land of similar value. Second, Israeli settlement activity, including natural growth and in Jerusalem, should stop completely for six months. Third, negotiations should resume from the point reached in December 2008 with former Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and include all final status issues.10 On January 12, President Abbas said for the first time that he might restart negotiations if Israel froze settlement expansions for ―a fixed period.‖11 He also said, ―We don‘t want (U.S.) guarantees. We want (the United States) to tell Israel to fully freeze settlements for a period of time and then we will resume negotiations.‖12 Prior to Mitchell‘s arrival in Israel, on January 20, Netanyahu asserted that in order ―to effectively stop the infiltration of rockets and other weaponry … will require an Israeli presence on the eastern side of the future state,‖ i.e., in the Jordan Valley.13 An Abbas spokesman replied, ―We will not accept anything less than a completely sovereign Palestinian state on all the territories with its own borders, resources and airspace, and we will not accept any Israeli presence, either military or civilian, on our land.‖14 Mitchell made his ninth visit to the region from January 21-25. The State Department issued a statement on January 27 that he had continued a ―two-pronged approach … (1) To encourage the parties to enter negotiations to reach an agreement on all permanent status issues; and (2) to help the Palestinians build the economy and institutions that will be necessary when a Palestinian state is established. The two objectives are mutually reinforcing. Each is essential. Neither can be attained without the other.‖ Earlier, Netanyahu had said that Mitchell presented ―interesting ideas‖ on how to restart negotiations. Reportedly, the ideas included confidence-building measures such as the withdrawal of Israel forces from more territory in the West Bank, release of prisoners, preliminary talks on a low level, and/or proximity talks, with Mitchell shuttling between Jerusalem and Ramallah to convey messages on core issues of borders, Jerusalem, security, and refugees. A Palestinian official said that Abbas did not favor resuming negotiations at any level before a complete cessation of settlement activity, including in east Jerusalem. After meeting the envoy, Netanyahu visited settlements. On January 24, at Etzyon, he proclaimed, ―This place will be an inseparable part of the state of Israel for eternity,‖ and at Ma‘ale Adumim, he affirmed, ―We are here, and we will stay here and build here as part of sovereign Jerusalem.‖15 On January 29, in Ari‘el, he declared, ―Here is where our forefathers dwelled and here is where we will stay and build…. Ari‘el … will be an integral, inseparable part of the state of Israel in any future arrangement.‖16 While his statements appeared provocative, it has long been assumed that Israel would retain those large settlements in a final agreement in exchange for other land being given to the new Palestinian state. In a January interview with Time magazine, President Obama assessed the first year of his Administration‘s involvement in the Israel-Palestinian peace process. He said, ―This is as intractable problem as you get. Both sides … have found that the political environment, the nature of their coalitions or the divisions within their societies, were such that it was very hard for them to start engaging in a meaningful conversation. And I think that we overestimated our ability to persuade them to do so when their politics ran contrary to that….

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(I)f we had anticipated some of these problems … earlier, we might not have raised expectations as high.‖17 On January 28, President Abbas told Russian television that Jerusalem should not be divided and that there should be free passage for people of various faiths. He added that it must be made clear what belongs to the Palestinians and what belongs to Israel. Abbas also said that he could only recognize Israel as a Jewish state in the framework of a conclusive peace agreement that leads to the establishment of a Palestinian state. He could not resume negotiations as long as construction in West Bank settlements and East Jerusalem continues. ―If Israel says… that it will not accept the 1967 borders and that it is not prepared to discuss Jerusalem and the refugee situation, what is there to talk about?‖ Abbas reported that the United States had asked Israel to make gestures to the Palestinians, including transferring additional territories in the West Bank to Palestinian control, halting Israeli military incursions, releasing prisoners, dismantling checkpoints and allowing building materials to enter the Gaza Strip. Israel had not yet responded.18

Israel-Syria

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On November 15, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that Israel would be willing to have France serve as a mediator with Israel, even though he would prefer direct talks. He said, ―The Turkish prime minister (Recep Tayyip Erdogan) has not strengthened his image as an objective, fair mediator.‖ Erdogan repeatedly criticized Israel for launching its offensive against Hamas in Gaza in December 2008, for its conduct of that war, and for its treatment of Gazans since the conflict ended. Meanwhile, Syrian President Bashar al Asad called on France to support Turkey as mediator.19 He rejected direct talks and urged Netanyahu to join him in sending teams of experts to Turkey to resume the process. Asad also called on the United States to present an ―action plan‖ to renew negotiations.

Israel-Lebanon On November 4, Israeli naval commandos seized a cargo vessel in waters near Cyprus which Israeli authorities claimed was carrying anti-tank missiles, rockets, and other weapons from Iran to Hezbollah in violation of the U.N. embargo of Iranian arms exports and of the U.N. prohibition on arms supplies to non-state actors in Lebanon. The ship was taken to Ashdod for further inspection. Syria maintained that it was carrying commercial goods from Syria to Iran and accused Israel of ―piracy.‖20 Hezbollah denied ―any link to the weapons….‖ On November 25, Lebanon‘s new cabinet agreed to a statement on the ―right of Lebanon, its government, its people, its arm, and its resistance‖ to liberate all Lebanese territory, thereby recognizing Hezbollah‘s right to engage in armed conflict with Israel.

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BACKGROUND Before the first Gulf war in 1991, Arab-Israeli conflict marked every decade since the founding of Israel. With each clash, issues separating the parties multiplied and became more intractable. The creation of the State of Israel in 1948 provided a home for the Jewish people, but the ensuing conflict made refugees of hundreds of thousands of Arab residents of formerly British Palestine, with consequences troubling for Arabs and Israelis alike. It also led to a mass movement of Jewish citizens of Arab states to Israel. The 1967 war ended with Israel occupying territory of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Egypt and Syria fought the 1973 war, in part, to regain their lands. In 1982, Israel invaded southern Lebanon to prevent terrorist incursions; it withdrew in 1985, but retained a 9-mile ―security zone‖ that Lebanon sought to reclaim. Middle East peace has been a U.S. and international diplomatic goal throughout the years of conflict. The 1978 Camp David talks, the only previous direct Arab-Israeli negotiations, brought about the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty.21

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U.S. Role 1991-2008 At the beginning of the Gulf war in 1991, President George H.W. Bush declared solving the Arab-Israeli conflict among his postwar goals. On March 6, 1991, he outlined a framework for peace based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of ―land for peace.‖ Secretary of State James Baker organized a peace conference in Madrid in October 1991 that launched almost a decade of the ―Oslo process‖ to achieve peace. It continued under President William Clinton, who asserted that only the region‘s leaders can make peace and vowed to be their partner. With the Hebron Protocol of 1997, however, the United States seemed to become an indispensable and expected party to IsraeliPalestinian talks. Clinton mediated the 1998 Wye River Memorandum and personally led negotiations at Camp David in 2000. The George W. Bush Administration initially sought a less prominent role, and Secretary of State Colin Powell did not appoint a special Middle East envoy. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Administration focused on the peace process mainly as part of the war on terrorism. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also did not name a special envoy, asserting, ―Not every effort has to be an American effort. It is extremely important that the parties themselves are taking responsibility.‖22 She encouraged Israelis and Palestinians to act, but personally mediated a November 2005 accord to reopen the border crossing between Gaza and Egypt after Israel‘s withdrawal from Gaza. In 2007, she engaged again partly in order to elicit the support of moderate Sunni Arab governments to thwart the rise of Iranian influence. Those governments see resolution of the Palestinian issue as a key to regional stability and to denying Iran opportunities for destabilizing actions. The Joint Understanding presented at the November 2007 Annapolis Conference created a new role for the United States as ―judge‖ of the parties‘ fulfillment of their commitments under the 2003 international Road Map to a two-state solution. In January 2008, President Bush appointed (Air Force) Lt. Gen. William Fraser III, assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to monitor compliance with commitments. Gen. Fraser, who has been

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replaced by Lt. Gen. Paul J. Selva, was not to mediate or enforce compliance, but bring to their actions to the attention of the parties and encourage them to move forward on their obligations.23 Fraser was to visit the region ―from time to time,‖ but the trilateral mechanism barely functioned.

Obama Administration At her January 13, 2009, confirmation hearing, Secretary of State-designate Hillary Rodham Clinton said that the Gaza conflict of December 2008 to January 2009 ―must only increase our determination to seek a just and lasting peace agreement that brings real security to Israel—normal and positive relations with its neighbors, independence, economic progress, and security to the Palestinians in their own state. We will exert every effort to support the work of Israelis and Palestinians who seek that result....‖ She added that the United States would not negotiate with Hamas until it recognizes Israel, renounces violence, and abides by previous agreements. ―That is just an absolute for me. That is the United States‘ position and the president-elect‘s position.‖ On his first full day in office, January 21, President Obama telephoned PA President Mahmud Abbas, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and Jordanian King Abdullah II ―to communicate his commitment to active engagement in pursuit of Arab-Israeli peace from the beginning of his term.‖ The next day, the President and Secretary Clinton jointly announced the appointment of former Senator George Mitchell as their Special Envoy for Middle East Peace. The President emphasized that Mitchell was ―fully empowered‖ to speak for the White House and State Department, thereby boosting his emissary‘s clout. On January 27, President Obama gave his first television interview to Al Arabiyah television. He said, ―I think it is possible for us to see a Palestinian state ... that is contiguous, that allows freedom of movement for its people, that allows for trade with other countries, that allows the creation of businesses and commerce so that people have a better life.‖ During his first trip to the region in January, Senator Mitchell visited Israel, the West Bank, Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, but not the Gaza Strip or Syria. Among his goals was listening to the region‘s leaders‘ views on an Israeli-Palestinian settlement. In a conference call with Jewish leaders on February 19, Mitchell is said to have expressed support for Egyptian efforts to forge a Palestinian unity government with Fatah and Hamas because divisions among the Palestinians have been an obstacle to bringing peace to the region. He said that Hamas still would need to fulfill the demands that it halt violence, recognize Israel, and accept previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements, and that the chances of Hamas doing that were not good.24 In Israel on March 3, Secretary Clinton expressed understanding of Israel‘s need not ―to stand idly by while its territory and people are subjected to rocket attacks.‖ The next day, in Ramallah, she described Israel‘s plans to demolish 88 Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem as ―unhelpful and not in keeping with the obligations entered into under the Road Map,‖ and with far-reaching implications.25 Throughout her visit, perhaps due to a widespread belief that the Israeli government elected in February would not agree, Secretary Clinton emphasized the Administration‘s commitment to the two-state solution, saying that it was in Israel‘s best interests. On April 22, after meeting King Abdullah II of Jordan, President Obama expressed hope that ―over the next several months that you start seeing gestures of good faith on all sides....

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And we will be doing everything we can to encourage‖ those measures. The President described a U.S. role as helping to ―create the conditions and the atmosphere and provide the help and assistance that facilitate an agreement.‖26 On April 23, Secretary Clinton told a House committee that ―for Israel to get the kind of strong support it is looking for vis-à-vis Iran, it can‘t stay on the sidelines with respect to the Palestinians and the peace efforts. They go hand in hand.‖ She added that Arab governments ―believe that Israel‘s willingness to reenter into discussions with the Palestinian Authority strengthens them in being able to deal with Iran.‖ Israel generally rejects linkage between the peace process and Iran. In a speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) on May 5, Vice President Joe Biden called on Israel to work toward a two-state solution, not build more settlements, dismantle outposts, and allow the Palestinians freedom of movement. Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee John Kerry told the same gathering that settlements ―don‘t just fragment a future Palestinian state. They also fragment what the Israeli Defense Forces must defend, they undercut Abbas, and strengthen Hamas by convincing the Palestinians that there is no reward for moderation.‖ He warned that the ―window of opportunity is fast closing.‖ Disagreement between Israeli and U.S. officials developed over alleged informal agreements regarding a definition of ―settlement freeze‖ that Israelis claim was reached in May 2003 between then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and then U.S. National Security Council officials Elliott Abrams and Stephen Hadley. Sharon‘s (and now Netanyahu‘s) advisor Dov Weissglas says that they defined a settlement freeze as ―no new communities were to be built; no Palestinian lands were to be appropriated for settlement purposes; building will not take place beyond existing community outlines; and no ‗settlement encouraging‘ budgets (incentives) were to be allocated.‖27 Weissglas insists an oral agreement was recorded.28 Yet, he also admitted that settlements were to be allowed within a ―construction line‖ to be demarcated after a joint U.S.-Israeli survey, but the survey was never conducted nor the line demarcated.29 Abrams wrote that the guidelines were discussed, ―but never formally adopted.‖30 Secretary Clinton said, ―We have the negotiating record, that is the official record, that was turned over to the Obama Administration by the outgoing Bush Administration. There is no memorialization of any informal and oral agreements.‖ If such understandings were reached, she noted, ―they did not become part of the official position of the United States government. And there are contrary documents that suggest that they were not to be viewed as in any way contradicting the obligations that Israel undertook pursuant to the Road Map. (See ―Significant Agreements and Documents.‖) And those obligations are clear.‖31 Abrams responded that Israel had totally withdrawn from the Gaza Strip and some West Bank settlements in exchange for a U.S. agreement not to demand a total settlement freeze in the West Bank and acceptance of the principles noted above and in the a letter from Weissglas to Secretary of State Rice in April 2004.32 In his June 4, speech in Cairo, President Obama said that ―just as Israel‘s right to exist cannot be denied, neither can Palestine‘s.‖ On settlements, he stated, ―The United States does not accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements. This construction violates previous agreements and undermines efforts to achieve peace. It is time for these settlements to stop.‖ The only resolution (to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) is for the aspirations of both sides to be met through two states, where Israelis and Palestinians each live in peace and security.‖ He declared, ―(T)he situation for the Palestinian people is intolerable. America will not turn our

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backs on the legitimate Palestinian aspiration for dignity, opportunity, and a state of their own.‖ 33 In Israel on June 9, Senator Mitchell noted the controversy over settlements and said, ―These are not disagreements among adversaries. The United States and Israel will remain close allies and friends.‖ He added, ―focusing on a single issue ill serves the wider diplomatic process‖ and expressed his desire ―to create conditions for the prompt resumption and early conclusion of negotiations.‖ 34

Madrid Conference The peace conference opened on October 30, 1991. Parties were represented by 14member delegations. A combined Jordanian/Palestinian delegation had 14 representatives from each. An unofficial Palestinian advisory team coordinated with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The United States, the Soviet Union, Syria, Palestinians/Jordan, the European Community, Egypt, Israel, and Lebanon sat at the table. The U.N., the Gulf Cooperation Council,35 and the Arab Maghreb Union36 were observers.

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Israel-Palestinians 2000-2001 (Incidents of violence are noted selectively.) In November 1991, Israel and the Jordanian/Palestinian delegation agreed to separate Israeli-Jordanian and Israeli-Palestinian negotiating tracks, the latter to address a five-year period of interim Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In the third year, permanent status negotiations were to begin. On August 9, 1993, Palestinian negotiators were appointed to a PLO coordination committee, ending efforts to make it appear as though the PLO was not part of the talks. Secret talks in Oslo, Norway produced a Declaration of Principles (DOP), signed by Israel and the PLO on September 13, 1993. Through the end of the decade, incremental advances were made, including Israel‘s withdrawal from major cities and towns and Palestinian self-government as the Palestinian Authority (PA), but no final agreement was reached. (See ―Significant Agreements,‖ below, for summaries of and links to accords reached between 1993 and 2000. This narrative resumes with the Camp David summit.) President Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and PA Chairman Yasir Arafat held a summit at Camp David, from July 11 to July 24, 2000, to forge a framework accord on final status issues. They did not succeed. The parties had agreed that there would be no agreement unless all issues were resolved. Jerusalem was the major obstacle. Israel proposed that it remain united under its sovereignty, leaving the Palestinians control, not sovereignty, over East Jerusalem and Muslim holy sites. Israel was willing to cede more than 90% of the West Bank, wanted to annex settlements where about 130,000 settlers lived, and offered to admit thousands of Palestinian refugees in a family unification program. An international fund would compensate other refugees as well as Israelis from Arab countries. The

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Palestinians reportedly were willing to accept Israeli control over the Jewish quarter of Jerusalem and the Western Wall, but sought sovereignty over East Jerusalem, particularly the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount, a site holy to Jews and Muslims. On September 28, Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon, with 1,000 security forces, visited the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif. Palestinians protested, and Israel responded forcefully. The second Palestinian intifadah or uprising against the Israeli occupation began as a mob in Ramallah killed two Israeli soldiers, provoking Israeli helicopter gunship attacks on Palestinian official sites on October 12. Barak resigned on December 10, triggering an early election for Prime Minister in Israel. Further negotiations were held at Bolling Air Force Base, in Washington, D.C., December 1923. On December 23, President Clinton suggested that Israel cede sovereignty over the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif and Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem, 96% of the West Bank, all of the Gaza Strip, and annex settlement blocs in exchange for giving the Palestinians Israeli land near Gaza. Jerusalem would be the capital of two countries. The Palestinians would cede the right of refugees to return to Israel and accept a Jewish ―connection‖ to the Temple Mount and sovereignty over the Western Wall and holy sites beneath it. The agreement would declare ―an end to conflict.‖37 Barak said he would accept the plan as a basis for further talks if Arafat did so. Arafat sought clarifications on contiguity of Palestinian state territory, the division of East Jerusalem, and refugees‘ right of return, among other issues. The Israeli-Palestinian talks concluded at Taba, Egypt.

2001-2005 On February 6, 2001, Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister of Israel and vowed to retain united Jerusalem as Israel‘s capital, the Jordan Valley, and other areas for security. Sharon‘s associates asserted that the results of negotiations at and after Camp David were ―null and void.‖38 At the same time, the Bush Administration said that Clinton‘s proposals were no longer U.S. proposals.39 Sharon sought an interim agreement, not dealing with Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, or a Palestinian state and, in an interview published on April 13, said that he could accept a disarmed Palestinian state on 42% of the West Bank.40 On September 24, Sharon declared, ―Israel wants to give the Palestinians what no one else gave them before, the possibility of a state.‖ On October 2, President Bush said, for the first time, ―The idea of a Palestinian state has always been part of a vision, so long as the right of Israel to exist is respected.‖41 On November 10, he declared that the United States is ―working toward the day when two states—Israel and Palestine—live peacefully together within secure and recognized borders....‖ Secretary Powell sent General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.) to work on a cease-fire, but violence impeded his mission. Israel confined Arafat to his headquarters in Ramallah on December 3. On December 7, Sharon doubted that an accord could be reached with Arafat, ―who is a real terrorist.‖42 On December 12, Hamas ambushed an Israeli bus in the West Bank and perpetrated two simultaneous suicide bombings in Gaza. The Israeli cabinet charged that Arafat was ―directly responsible‖ for the attacks ―and therefore is no longer relevant.‖43 On January 3, 2002, Israeli forces seized the Karine A, a Palestinian-commanded freighter, carrying 50 tons of Iranian-supplied arms. Secretary Powell stated that Arafat ―cannot engage with us and others in the pursuit of peace, and at the same time permit or tolerate continued violence and terror.‖ At the White House on February 7, Sharon said that

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he believed that pressure should be put on Arafat so that an alternative Palestinian leadership could emerge. On February 17, Saudi Crown Prince (later King) Abdullah unprecedentedly called for ―full withdrawal from all occupied territories, in accord with U.N. resolutions, including Jerusalem, in exchange for full normalization of relations.‖ On March 28, the Arab League endorsed the idea with some revisions; it is known as the ―Arab Peace Initiative.‖44 Sharon said that he was willing to explore the idea, but it would be a ―mistake‖ to replace U.N. resolutions affirming Israel‘s right to ―secure and recognized borders‖ with total withdrawal to pre-1967 borders. On March 27, Hamas perpetrated a suicide bombing at a hotel in Netanya, killing 27 and wounding 130. Israel declared Arafat ―an enemy‖ and Israeli forces besieged his compound in Ramallah; they soon controlled all major Palestinian-ruled West Bank cities. On June 24, President Bush called on the Palestinians to elect new leaders ―not compromised by terror‖ and to build a practicing democracy. Then, he said, the United States will support the creation of a Palestinian state, whose borders and certain aspects of sovereignty will be provisional until a final settlement. He added, ―as we make progress toward security, Israeli forces need to withdraw fully to positions they held prior to September 28, 2000 ... and (Israeli) settlement activity must stop.‖ The President foresaw a final peace accord within three years.45 On September 17, the Quartet (U.S., European Union (EU), U.N., and Russian officials) outlined a preliminary ―Road Map‖ to peace based on the President‘s ideas. (See ―Significant Agreements,‖ below for summary and link.) On March 7, 2003, in what was seen as a gesture to appeal to the Quartet, Arafat named Mahmud Abbas (aka Abu Mazen) Prime Minister. On April 14, Prime Minister Sharon acknowledged that Israel would have to part with some places bound up in the history of the Jewish people, but insisted that the Palestinians recognize the Jewish people‘s right to its homeland and abandon their claim of a right of refugees to return to Israel.46 On April 14, Israel submitted 14 reservations on the Road Map.47 On April 30, the Quartet officially presented the Road Map. Abbas accepted it. On May 23, the Bush Administration stated that Israel had explained its concerns and that the United States shares the view ―that these are real concerns and will address them fully and seriously in the implementation of the Road Map,‖ leading Sharon and his cabinet to accept ―steps defined‖ in the Road Map ―with reservations‖ on May 25. The next day, Sharon declared, ―to keep 3.5 million people under occupation is bad for us and them,‖ using the word occupation for the first time. On June 4, President Bush met Abbas and Sharon in Aqaba, Jordan. Abbas vowed to achieve the Palestinians‘ goals by peaceful means, while Sharon expressed understanding of ―the importance of territorial contiguity‖ for a viable Palestinian state and promised to ―remove unauthorized outposts‖ in the West Bank. Abbas said that he would use dialogue, not force, to convince Palestinian groups. On June 29, Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) suspended military operations against Israel for three months, while Fatah declared a six-month truce. Israel was not a party to the accord, but began withdrawing forces from Gaza. Abbas asked Sharon to release Palestinian prisoners, remove roadblocks, withdraw from more Palestinian cities, allow Arafat free movement, and end construction of a security barrier that Israeli is building in the West Bank. Israel demanded that the Palestinians dismantle terrorist infrastructures and act against terrorists. Neither fulfilled the other‘s request.

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On August 6, Israel released 339 prisoners. On August 19, a Hamas suicide bomber exploded in Jerusalem, killing 22, including 5 Americans, and injuring more than 130. Abbas cut contacts with Hamas and the PIJ, and unsuccessfully sought Arafat‘s support to act against terrorists. Israel suspended talks with the Palestinians, halted plans to transfer cities to their control, and resumed ―targeted killings‖ of terrorist leaders, among other actions. On September 6, Abbas resigned because of what he charged was lack of support from Arafat, the United States, and Israel. On October 15, a bomb detonated under an official U.S. vehicle in Gaza, killing three U.S. security guards and wounding a fourth. Palestinian authorities arrested members of Popular Resistance Committees, who would be freed in April 2004. Sounds of discontent with government policy were heard in Israel, culminating in the signing of the Geneva Accord, a Draft Permanent Status Agreement by Israeli opposition politicians and prominent Palestinians on December 1.48 Perhaps partly to defuse these efforts, on December 18, Sharon declared that, ―to ensure a Jewish and democratic Israel,‖ he would unilaterally disengage from the Palestinians by redeploying Israeli forces and relocating settlements in the Gaza Strip and intensifying construction of the security fence in the West Bank.49 On February 13, 2004, the White House said that an Israeli pullback ―could reduce friction,‖ but that a final settlement ―must be achieved through negotiations.‖ After an upsurge in violence, Israeli missiles killed Hamas leader Shaykh Ahmed Yassin on March 22. On April 14, President Bush and Sharon met and exchanged letters.50 The President welcomed Israel‘s plan to disengage from Gaza and restated the U.S. commitment to the Road Map. He noted the need to take into account changed ―realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers,‖ (i.e., settlements), asserting ―it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949.‖ The President stated that a solution to the refugee issue will be found by settling Palestinian refugees in a Palestinian state, ―rather than in Israel,‖ thereby rejecting a ―right of return.‖ He called for a Palestinian state that is ―viable, contiguous, sovereign, and independent.‖ Sharon presented his disengagement plan as independent of but ―not inconsistent with the Road Map.‖ He said that the ―temporary‖ security fence that Israel is constructing in the West Bank would not prejudice final status issues including borders. A day before, he had identified five large West Bank settlements and an area in Hebron that Israel intends to retain and strengthen. Palestinians denounced the President‘s ―legitimization‖ of settlements and prejudgment of final status. On April 18, Sharon‘s chief of staff Dov Weissglas gave National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice a written commitment to dismantle settlement outposts that Israel itself considers illegal.51 However, other outposts later sprang up and, as of 2010, Israel has not fulfilled this commitment. On June 6, 2004, Israel‘s cabinet approved a compromise disengagement plan whereby Israel would evacuate all 21 settlements in the Gaza Strip and 4 settlements in the northern West Bank. On June 30, the Israeli High Court of Justice upheld the government‘s right to build a security fence in the West Bank, but struck down some land confiscation orders for violating Palestinian rights and ordered the route to be changed. In subsequent rulings, the Israeli Court attempted to balance Israel‘s security needs and the humanitarian claims of Palestinians and sometimes required that the barrier be rerouted. On July 9, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a non-binding, advisory opinion that the wall violates international law.52

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On October 6, Weissglas claimed that disengagement was aimed at freezing the political process in order to ―prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state and a debate regarding refugees, borders, and Jerusalem.‖53 Yasir Arafat died on November 11. Mahmud Abbas became Chairman of the PLO and, on January 9, 2005, was elected President of the PA. He called for implementing the Road Map while beginning discussion of final status issues and cautioned against interim solutions to delay reaching a comprehensive solution. Secretary Rice visited Israel and the PA on February 7. She praised the Israelis‘ ―historic‖ disengagement decision, discussed the need to carry out obligations concerning settlements and outposts, and warned them not to undermine Abbas. She appointed Lt. Gen. William Ward as Middle East Security Coordinator and emphasized the importance of IsraeliPalestinian security cooperation for the disengagement. (Lt. Gen. Keith W. Dayton succeeded Ward in November 2005 and still serves.) On February 20, Israel‘s cabinet adopted a revised route for the security fence closer to the pre-1967 border in some areas, taking about 7% to 8% of the West Bank that includes major settlement blocs. On March 20, it was reported that Israel‘s defense minister had approved the building of 3,500 new housing units between the Ma‘ale Adumim settlement and East Jerusalem, in the E-1 corridor. Critics charge that the construction would cut East Jerusalem off from Palestinian territory, impose a barrier between the northern and southern West Bank, and prevent a future contiguous Palestinian state. Secretary Rice asserted that the plan was ―at odds with American policy.‖ On April 11, President Bush conveyed to Sharon his ―concern that Israel not undertake any activity that contravenes Road Map obligations or prejudices final status negotiations.‖ Sharon responded, ―It is the position of Israel that the major Israeli population centers will remain in Israel‘s hands under any final status agreement,‖ declared that Ma‘ale Adumim is a major population center, and, therefore, Israel is interested in contiguity between it and Jerusalem. On May 26, President Bush met Abbas and said that ―changes to the 1949 armistice lines must be mutually agreed to.‖ Bush reaffirmed, ―A viable two-state solution must ensure contiguity of the West Bank, and a state of scattered territories will not work. There must also be meaningful linkages between the West Bank and Gaza. This is the position of the United States today, it will be the position of the United States at the time of final status negotiations.‖ He also said, ―The barrier being erected by Israel ... must be a security, rather than political, barrier.‖ Abbas stated that the boundaries of a future state should be those of before the 1967 war and that ―there is no justification for the wall and it is illegitimate.‖ Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in Netanya on July 12, killing 5 and injuring more than 90. Meanwhile, Hamas increased rocket and mortar fire against settlements in Gaza and towns in southern Israel in order to show that Hamas was responsible for Israel‘s withdrawal from the Strip. On August 15, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz said that Israel would keep the settlement blocs of Ma‘ale Adumim, the Etzyon Bloc, Efrat, Ari‘el, Qedumim-Qarney Shomrom, and Rehan Shaqed—all are within or expected to be on Israel‘s side of the security barrier. Mofaz added that Israel would retain the Jordan Rift Valley to guarantee Israel‘s eastern border.54 Israel evacuated all settlements in the Gaza Strip and four small settlements in the northern West Bank between August 17 and August 23. On August 29, Sharon declared that there would be no further disengagements and that the next step must be negotiations under the Road Map. He noted that while large settlement blocs would remain in Israeli hands and

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linked territorially to Israel, not all West Bank settlements would remain. This would be decided in the final stage of negotiations. On September 27, Hamas claimed responsibility for kidnapping and killing an Israeli settler in the West Bank. Israel responded with air and artillery strikes, closure of charities linked to terror groups, mass arrests including likely Hamas candidates in Palestinian parliamentary elections, and targeted killings of terrorists. On October 20, President Bush pressed Abbas to ―confront the threat armed gangs pose to a genuinely democratic Palestine,‖ but did not urge him to prevent Hamas from participating in parliamentary elections or to request that candidates renounce violence. Abbas said that they would be asked to renounce violence after election. On October 26, a PIJ suicide bomber killed 6 and wounded more than 20 in Hadera, on the Israeli coast. Sharon announced an offensive against terrorism. He ruled out talks with Abbas until Abbas takes ―serious action‖ against armed groups. On November 14-15, Secretary Rice visited Israel and the PA. Sharon told her that Israel would not interfere if Hamas participated in the January 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, but warned that if an armed terrorist organization is a partner in the Palestinian administration it could lead to the end of the Road Map. Rice asserted that it would be easier to compel Hamas to disarm after the elections because the entire international community would then exert pressure. Rice vowed not to have contacts with an armed Hamas even if it were part of the Palestinian administration.55 On November 15, she announced that Israel and the PA had reached an Agreement on Movement and Access from the Gaza Strip. After PIJ perpetrated another suicide bombing in Netanya on December 5, Israel did not hold scheduled talks with the PA about West Bank-Gaza bus convoys foreseen in the agreement, which was not implemented. After Hamas‘s victories in December 2005 Palestinian municipal elections, speculation increased about possible effects on the peace process if Hamas were similarly successful in January 25, 2006, parliamentary elections. On December 28, the Quartet stated that a future Palestinian cabinet ―should include no member who has not committed to the principles of Israel‘s right to exist in peace and security and an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism.‖56 On January 11, 2006, Secretary Rice declared, ―It remains the view of the United States that there should be no place in the political process for groups or individuals who refuse to renounce terror and violence, recognize Israel‘s right to exist, and disarm.‖

2006-2008 On January 4, 2006, Prime Minister Sharon suffered an incapacitating stroke and Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert became Acting Prime Minister. On January 12, Olmert told President Bush that peace efforts could not progress if Hamas joined the Palestinian government. Hamas won the January 25 Palestinian parliamentary elections. It is a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), claims the entire land of Palestine, including Israel, ―from the [Jordan] river to the [Mediterranean] sea‖ as an Islamic trust, rejects the Oslo agreements of the 1990s, insists on the right of Palestinian refugees to return to Israel, and on the right to ―resistance.‖57 Olmert declared that Israel would not negotiate with a Palestinian administration that included an armed terrorist organization calling for its destruction and demanded that Hamas disarm, annul its Covenant that calls for the destruction of Israel, and

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accept all prior agreements. President Bush stated that the United States would not deal with a political party ―that articulates the destruction of Israel as part of its platform.‖ On January 30, the Quartet stated that ―future assistance to any new (Palestinian) government would be reviewed by donors against the government‘s commitment to the principles of non-violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations, including the Road Map.‖58 Hamas countered that it would never recognize Israel, would consider negotiating a ―long-term truce‖ if Israel withdrew to its 1967 borders, released all prisoners, destroyed all settlements, and recognized the Palestinian refugees‘ right to return (to Israel), and would create a state on ―any inch‖ of Palestinian territory without ceding another. On February 8, Olmert said that Israel was moving toward a separation from the Palestinians and permanent borders that would include a united Jerusalem, major settlement blocs, and the Jordan Valley. Palestinian Prime Minister-designate Ismail Haniyah of Hamas declared, ―Let them withdraw. We will make the Authority stronger on every inch of liberated land....‖ Damascus-based Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Khalid Mish‘al said that his group would make no concessions and would ―practice resistance side by side with politics as long as the occupation continued.‖ After his Kadima party placed first in the March 28 Israeli parliamentary elections, Olmert said that he aspired to demarcate permanent borders for a Jewish state with a permanent Jewish majority and a democracy. He called for negotiations based on mutual recognition, agreements already signed, the principles of the Road Map, a halt to violence, and the disarming of terrorist organizations. Haniyah said that Hamas would not object to Abbas negotiating with Israel. In an op-ed in (the British newspaper) The Guardian on March 31, Haniyah appealed for no more talk about recognizing Israel‘s ―right to exist‖ or ending resistance until Israel commits to withdraw from the Palestinians‘ lands and recognizes their rights. On April 9, the Israeli security cabinet recommended severing all ties with the Hamas-led PA, which it called a ―hostile entity.‖ Because it viewed the PA as ―one authority and not as having two heads,‖ the cabinet declared that there could be personal contacts, but not negotiations, with President Abbas. On April 17, PIJ carried out a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv, killing 11 and wounding 60, including an American teenager. Abbas condemned the attack as ―despicable‖ and counter to Palestinian interests, while Hamas officials called it an act of ―self-defense.‖ On April 26, Abbas called for an immediate international peace conference with himself as the Palestinian negotiator. He claimed that the Hamas-led government was not an obstacle to negotiations because the PLO, which he heads, had the mandate to negotiate as it had all previous agreements and he was empowered as the democratically elected leader of the Palestinians. On May 4, a new Israeli government took office, with guidelines vowing to strive to shape the permanent borders of the State of Israel as a democratic state, with a Jewish majority. Prime Minister Olmert asserted that the security fence would be adapted to conform to borders. The PLO rejected the Olmert plan as aimed at undermining the Palestinian people‘s right to a state on all territories occupied in 1967, with Jerusalem as its capital. On May 10, imprisoned Fatah, Hamas, and other officials drafted a ―National Accord Document‖ calling for a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, the right of the return of refugees, and the release of all prisoners. It also called for renewing the PLO and for

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Hamas and PIJ to join it, supported the right to resist the occupation in lands occupied in 1967, and stated that the PLO is responsible for negotiations and that any agreement should be put to a vote by the Palestinian National Council or a referendum.59 Abbas accepted the document, but Hamas rejected its implied recognition of pre-1967 Israel. On May 23, at the White House, President Bush accepted that Olmert‘s ideas for removing Israeli settlements could lead to a two-state solution if a pathway to progress on the Road Map is not open in the period ahead. Olmert said that he had presented ideas for a ―realignment‖ in the West Bank to ―reduce friction between Israelis and Palestinians, ensure territorial contiguity for the Palestinians, and guarantee Israel‘s security as a Jewish state with the borders it desires.‖60 Violence increased between Gaza and Israel. The Hamas military wing and other groups repeatedly launched rockets at Sderot in southern Israel, and Israel responded with artillery fire and air strikes. On June 10, Hamas called off its 16-month truce in response to the deaths of Palestinian civilians on a Gaza beach from Israeli artillery fire on June 9. Israel denied responsibility for the deaths, but Israeli strikes caused other Palestinian civilian casualties as well. On June 13, Olmert told a group of British parliamentarians that, even with negotiations, ―Israel will never agree to withdraw from the entire West Bank because the pre-1967 borders are not defensible.‖ He asserted that Israel would withdraw from approximately 90% of the West Bank and that not all of Jerusalem‘s Arab neighborhoods would be part of the future Jewish capital.61 On June 28, Palestinian factions agreed on a revised National Accord Document. The Document stated that the PLO and the President of the PA will be responsible for negotiations to create a state on territories occupied by Israel in 1967. It changed the May draft to say that, in tandem with political action, resistance will be concentrated in (but not limited to) territories occupied in 1967. Signers vowed to work toward establishing a national unity government.62 PIJ rejected the Document, while Hamas officials insisted that it did not require them to recognize Israel or to accept two states. Israel‘s Foreign Ministry noted that the Document did not mention recognizing Israel‘s right to exist or ending the conflict with Israel and argued that the return of all refugees is a formula for the destruction of Israel, contradicting a two-state solution.63 On June 25, members of the Hamas military wing, the Popular Resistance Committees, and the previously unknown Army of Islam had attacked Israeli forces in Israel, just outside of Gaza, killing two soldiers, wounding four, and kidnapping Corporal Gilad Shalit. (He has been promoted to sergeant while in captivity.) On June 27, after unsuccessful diplomatic efforts to secure Shalit‘s release, Israel forces began a major operation to rescue him, to deter attacks, and to weaken, bring down, or change the conduct of the Hamas-led government. Israeli officials claimed that Hamas had crossed a ―red line‖ with the kidnapping and attack within pre-1967 Israel. On June 29, Israel forces arrested 64 Palestinian (Hamas) cabinet ministers, parliamentarians, and other Hamas officials in the West Bank and Jerusalem. On July 1, the kidnappers demanded 1,000 prisoners in exchange for the Israeli soldier. The next day, Israeli missiles destroyed the offices of the Palestinian prime minister. Israeli troops and tanks began sweeping northern Gaza to locate tunnels and explosives near the border and continued targeting Hamas offices in the West Bank. Hamas fired an upgraded rocket at the Israeli port

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city of Ashkelon, prompting the Israeli cabinet to approve ―prolonged‖ activities against Hamas. Diplomatic efforts were undertaken to resolve the crisis. On July 10, Hamas official Mish‘al insisted on the mutual release (―swap‖) of prisoners. Olmert rejected ―trading prisoners with a terrorist bloody organization such as Hamas,‖ adding that to negotiate with Hamas would signal that moderates such as President Abbas are not needed. The White House spokesman said that Hamas had been ―complicit in perpetrating violence‖ and that Israel had a right to defend itself. On October 31, Israeli forces began a six-day incursion into Beit Hanoun in the northern Gaza Strip to stop Palestinian rocket fire; it resulted in heavy Palestinian casualties and did not stop rockets. After it ended, on November 8, an errant Israeli artillery barrage killed 20 and wounded many more, prompting international outcries. On November 25, Olmert and Abbas agreed to a cease-fire in Gaza. Hamas said that it would respect the accord, but other groups would not. The cease-fire nonetheless produced less rocket fire and shooting along the border. On November 27, Olmert said if the Palestinians established a new government committed to carrying out the Quartet‘s principles, one that would implement the Road Map and bring about the release of the kidnapped soldier, then he would enter a dialogue with Abbas to establish an independent, viable Palestinian state with territorial contiguity and borders outlined by President Bush in his April 14, 2004, letter to Prime Minister Sharon. He listed other gestures Israel would make if the Palestinians recognized Israel‘s right to live in peace and security alongside them and renounced their demand for the right of return.‖64 Although Abbas could not meet Olmert‘s preconditions, the Israeli government and Bush Administration viewed him as the only partner for a peace process and took steps to bolster him in his contest with Hamas for control of the PA. On January 9, 2007, the Egyptian Foreign Minister asserted that there was a common Egyptian, Jordanian, Arab, and Palestinian position that an agreement on the ―end game‖ was needed before resuming the Road Map. Secretary Rice said that she would discuss ―the broad issues on the horizon, so that we can work on the Road Map‖ with Olmert and Abbas. (The Administration reportedly had promised the ―moderate‖ Arab regimes that it would become more engaged in the peace process in exchange for their support in countering Iranian influence in the region.)65 On February 8, Abbas designated Haniyah to form a new unity government and called on him to ―respect international resolutions and agreements‖ signed by the PLO, that is, prior accords reached with Israel (italics added because it is not accept). Abbas‘s letter of designation resulted from the Mecca Accord reached at a meeting of Abbas and Hamas Political Bureau Chief Mish‘al hosted by Saudi King Abdullah. The Accord aimed mainly to stop Palestinian factions‘ infighting and unite them in a new government; it did not refer to Israel or to the Quartet‘s demands.66 On February 19, Secretary Rice met Olmert and Abbas in Jerusalem to discuss the Mecca Accord. Afterwards, Olmert said Israel would continue to boycott the Palestinian government until it met the Quartet‘s demands, ended rocket attacks from Gaza, and released Shalit. It would not have contact with moderates in a government that does not meet the Quartet‘s conditions, but would with Abbas in order to limit terror and ease Palestinian daily life. Olmert rejected negotiating with Abbas because doing so, he said, would free Hamas of the requirement to recognize Israel.

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The 2002 Arab Peace Initiative was revived.67 Following his reported meeting with Saudi National Security Advisor Prince Bandar in September 2006, Olmert had noted in November 2006 that ―some parts of the Saudi Peace Initiative are positive.‖68 On March 11, Olmert again stated that the Saudi Initiative, on which the Arab Peace Initiative is based, is ―a plan that we are ready to address seriously‖ and has ―positive elements.‖ On March 15, a Palestinian unity government was formed, with a program confirming the Palestinian people‘s ―legitimate‖ right of resistance, insisting that halting resistance depends on ending the occupation, the right of refugees to return, and independence. The government asserted that it respects international resolutions and agreements signed by the PLO. At the same time, it said that it would work to consolidate the calm in Gaza, extend it to the West Bank, and transform it into a comprehensive and mutual truce. On March 17, Prime Minister Haniyah vowed to work to establish an independent Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital, along the 1967 borders.69 Hamas said that it would not recognize Israel‘s right to exist alongside that state. The government program authorized President Abbas to negotiate with Israel. However, the Israeli cabinet voted to shun the new Palestinian government until it met the Quartet‘s demands that it renounce violence, recognize Israel, and accept all prior accords, and called on the international community to maintain the aid embargo. The Bush Administration decided to deal with individuals in the PA government on a case-by-case basis, and a State Department spokesman said that the aid embargo would continue. The Arab summit in Saudi Arabia, March 28-29, reiterated adherence, without changes, to the Arab Peace Initiative and called for direct negotiations on all tracks. Abbas voted in favor, while Haniyah abstained. The Israeli Foreign Ministry stated, ―Israel is sincerely interested in pursuing dialogue with those Arab states that desire peace with Israel‖ in order to promote a process of normalization. Prime Minister Olmert welcomed the Arabs‘ ―revolutionary change in outlook‖ that represented ―a new way of thinking, the willingness to recognize Israel as an established fact and to debate the conditions of the future solution‖ and invited all Arab heads of state to meet.70 In April, an Arab League working group designated Egypt and Jordan to contact Israel. Israel expressed disappointment that League members with no formal ties to Israel would be not involved, but a spokeswoman said that Israel would be ―happy to hear the ideas.‖ In May, factional fighting in Gaza between Fatah and Hamas escalated. Later, six days of intense infighting ended with Hamas in complete control of the Gaza Strip by June 14, 2007. President Abbas declared a state of emergency, dissolved the unity government, dismissed Haniyah, and named technocrat Salam Fayyad prime minister. Hamas claimed that the decrees were illegitimate and that Haniyah was still head of government. Each side accused the other of perpetrating a coup. Secretary Rice endorsed Abbas‘s actions. On June 18, President Bush told Abbas that he was open to restarting peace talks to stabilize the situation, and Israeli officials agreed that the elimination of Hamas from the Palestinian government opened ―new possibilities for cooperation‖ and a diplomatic process. On June 25, Olmert, Abbas, Egypt‘s President Mubarak, and Jordan‘s King Abdullah II met in Sharm al Shaykh, Egypt. Abbas called on Olmert to start serious negotiations. Olmert only agreed to resume biweekly meetings with Abbas to create conditions leading to discussions on a Palestinian state and to take other actions to support the PA government in the West Bank.

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On June 27, the Quartet announced the appointment of former British Prime Minister Tony Blair as their Representative to help the Palestinians build the institutions and economy of a viable state in Gaza and the West Bank. Olmert and Abbas met in Jerusalem on July 16. On July 25, Olmert confirmed that they would work on an ―agreement on principles‖ to include the characteristics of a state, its official institutions, its economy, and customs arrangements with Israel. Olmert favored leaving ―final status‖ issues for the end. Abbas preferred putting all final status issues first. Olmert warned Abbas that a revived Fatah-Hamas unity government would end the diplomatic process. New Palestinian Prime Minister Fayyad presented his government‘s program on July 27. It stated that the government would seek to establish a state on all lands occupied by Israel in 1967, with Jerusalem as its capital and a just and agreed solution for Palestinian refugees, but did not refer to armed struggle or resistance, rather to ―popular struggle against the Israeli occupation.‖71 The Bush Administration tried to show the Palestinian people that they have a choice between chaos under Hamas in Gaza and the prospect under Abbas and Fayyad for an effective, democratic Palestinian state, according to National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley.72 On July 16, President Bush promised to support PA reforms in order to lay the foundations for serious negotiations for a Palestinian state. He called for an ―international meeting this fall of representatives from nations that support a two-state solution, reject violence, recognize Israel‘s right to exist, and commit to all previous agreements between the parties.‖ 73 Olmert and Abbas worked for several months on principles to present to a U.S.-initiated international meeting in Annapolis, MD, on November 27, 2007, but never succeeded. On September 10, they agreed to set up negotiating teams for a two-state solution and ministerial committees to work on security, communications, economic cooperation, water rights, environmental issues, and the like, and later appointed Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and former Prime Minister Ahmad Quray (aka Abu Ala) to head the teams. Secretary Rice described Annapolis as a meeting at which regional actors and the international community would rally around a bilateral vision of a two-state solution as well as help support the development of Palestinian institutions, economic development, and so forth.74 Rice excluded Hamas from the process, saying ―If you‘re going to have a two-state solution, you have to accept the right of the other party to exist ... you‘re going to have to renounce violence.‖ On September 24, Olmert described Annapolis as a ―short international meeting intended to give international encouragement to the process that we initiated with the Palestinians.‖ He said that the goal was to increase support for Abbas and deepen Israel‘s ties with moderate Arab countries. On October 15, Olmert suggested that it is legitimate to question whether Israel should retain outlying Palestinian neighborhoods in Jerusalem, seeming to prepare the Israeli public for concessions and raising the politically sensitive question of ―dividing‖ Jerusalem, which many Israelis and other Jews refer to as their ―eternal, undivided capital.‖ On November 12, Olmert told his cabinet that he did not view a freeze on all building on the West Bank to be part of the Road Map‘s requirements, but that Israel would not build new settlements or expropriate land and would raze illegal outposts.75 This appeared to conform to Israel‘s policy on so-called ―natural growth,‖ whereby settlers would be allowed to build within the borders of existing settlements. The Palestinians demand a 100% settlement freeze,

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including ending natural growth, and others in the international community agree with their stance. At the Annapolis Conference on November 27, President Bush read a ―Joint Understanding‖ that dealt with the process of negotiations, not their substance.76 In it, Olmert and Abbas expressed determination to ―immediately launch bilateral negotiations in order to conclude a peace treaty to resolve all core issues without exception, as specified in previous agreements‖ and to engage in continuous bilateral negotiations in an effort to conclude an agreement before the end of 2008. The parties also committed to immediately implement their respective obligations under the Road Map and to continue implementing the Road Map until they reach a peace treaty. Implementation of the future peace treaty would be subject to the implementation of the Road Map, as judged by the United States. The United States would monitor and judge fulfillment of Road Map commitments and lead a tripartite U.S.-IsraeliPalestinian mechanism to follow up on implementation. Both sides were able to appear successful at Annapolis. Israel succeeded in making implementation of any peace treaty dependent upon implementation of the Road Map and in avoiding a rigid timetable and deadline. It was pleased that President Bush called for Israel to be a homeland for the Jewish people, which the Palestinians have been reluctant to acknowledge because of its possible effect on the refugee issue and Israeli Arabs, and for ending settlement expansion, but not for a freeze.77 Palestinians were able to remove Road Map implementation as a precondition for final status negotiations, obtained a one-year target date, and involved United States as ―judge‖ of the parties‘ fulfillment of their commitments. General James L. Jones (Ret.) was named special envoy for Middle East security to oversee the full range of security issues for the Israelis and Palestinians and security cooperation with neighboring countries. He was tasked to design and implement a new U.S. plan for security assistance to the PA, and not to monitor compliance with the Road Map nor to replace Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton, the U.S. Middle East Security Coordinator, who had been assisting the Palestinians with improving their security forces. On December 2, Israel published tenders for the construction of 307 new housing units in the settlement of Har Homa (Jabal abu Ghneim) in East Jerusalem. Israel maintained that, unlike the West Bank, Jerusalem is not part of the Road Map‘s requirements, and that Israel would retain Har Homa in any peace accord. The PA condemned the decision and Secretary Rice criticized it.78 Because of the Har Homa controversy, formal peace talks that began on December 12 were brief. On December 30, Prime Minister Olmert directed his ministers to seek authorization from him and Defense Minister Barak for ―construction, new building, expansion, preparation of plans, publication of residency tenders, and confiscation of land stemming from settlement activities in the West Bank.‖79 The order did not apply to construction that had already been approved, to Jerusalem, or major settlement blocs. On February 12, 2008, the Israeli Housing Minister unveiled plans to build 1,120 new apartments in East Jerusalem. The Palestinians, who claim East Jerusalem as their future capital, condemned the action. On January 9-10, President Bush visited Israel and the PA. He said that any peace agreement ―will require mutually agreed adjustments to the armistice lines of 1949 to reflect current realities and to ensure that the Palestinian state is viable and contiguous.‖ He added that new international mechanisms, including compensation, are needed to resolve the refugee issue. He observed that Jerusalem is ―one of the most difficult challenges on the road to peace,‖ but did not offer a remedy.80 National Security Advisor Hadley emphasized the

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importance of a vision of a Palestinian state and moving toward it so that, at a ―moment of clarity,‖ the Palestinian people will choose whether they want to be part of an emerging state or under the rule of Hamas. Olmert emphasized that ―as long as there will be terror from Gaza it will be very, very hard to reach any peaceful understanding between us and the Palestinians.‖81 He opposed establishing two Palestinian states—a Hamas state in the Gaza Strip and a Fatah state in the West Bank.82 On January 3, 2008, militants had fired a long range Katyusha rocket from Gaza into northern Ashkelon, an Israeli coastal city. On January 15, Israeli forces killed 19 Palestinians, including three civilians, in operations in Gaza. President Abbas denounced the raid as ―a massacre,‖ and, for the first time in seven months, Hamas took credit for launching rockets into Israel. On January 17, in an effort to pressure Hamas to stop the rocket fire, Defense Minister Barak ordered the closing of border crossings from Israel into Gaza, halting supplies of fuel, leading to a major cut in electricity production from the Gaza power plant which affected water and sewage systems, hospitals, and food deliveries. Electricity deliveries from Egypt and Israel continued, and Israel said it would provide for emergency humanitarian needs. There was widespread international condemnation of Israel‘s action and Hamas vowed not to stop firing rockets. On January 23, tens of thousands of Palestinians poured out of Gaza into Egypt after Hamas militants blew holes in the border wall. Israeli officials expressed concern that more weapons would enter the Strip and called on Egypt to reestablish control over the border. The Egyptian Foreign Minister said that his country wanted to reinstate arrangements for the Rafah crossing established under a 2005 agreement among Israel, Egypt, the PA, and the European Union (EU). Abbas offered to deploy his Presidential Guards to the border, but Hamas, which is physically in control of the Palestinian side of the border, insisted on participating in a new, purely Palestinian-Egyptian arrangement without an Israeli presence.83 Abbas ruled out talks with Hamas until it gives up control of Gaza and accepts early elections. Egypt refused to cede control of the crossing to Hamas and resealed the border on February 3. It remains closed. A suicide bombing killed one and injured 23 in the Israeli town of Dimona on February 4. The Hamas military wing took credit and named perpetrators from the West Bank, intending to refute Israeli allegations that the bombers had crossed from Gaza into Egypt via the open border and then infiltrated from Egypt into Israel. It was the first suicide bombing in Israel in more than a year. Israel retaliated with air strikes that killed nine Hamas militants.84 On February 13, Olmert suggested that, in order to avoid an impasse, it might be best to begin negotiating over borders, not Jerusalem or refugees, because there are prior understandings and President Bush‘s April 14, 2004-letter to former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to offer direction. Controversially, Olmert claimed an understanding with the Palestinians to delay talks on Jerusalem until the end of negotiations.85 Palestinian official Saeb Erekat responded, ―The border issue cannot advance without addressing Jerusalem‘s borders.‖ Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Livni said that the talks were proceeding according the principle that ―until everything is agreed on—nothing is agreed on.‖86 Violence continued. On March 6, an Arab resident of East Jerusalem killed eight students and wounded nine at a rabbinical seminary in West Jerusalem. Police attributed the attack to a lone gunman. Hamas ―blessed the operation,‖ while President Abbas condemned it.

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Several Palestinian groups, including the Hamas military wing, claimed responsibility for a sniper attack near the Israel-Gaza border that wounded an aide to the Israeli Public Security Minister on April 4. On April 9, Palestinian gunmen killed two Israeli civilian employees at the Nahal Oz fuel depot, from which fuel is piped into Gaza. Israeli forces killed two of the perpetrators and an Israeli tank fired at two more, but killed three civilians and others. Israel again suspended fuel shipments to Gaza and, later, Israeli missiles struck a Hamas training site, killing two. On April 16, Hamas claimed responsibility for ambushing and killing three Israeli soldiers in the Gaza Strip as well as firing more than 20 rockets into southern Israel; Israeli retaliatory strikes, including missiles, killed 19 Palestinians. The Hamas military wing claimed responsibility for an April 19th suicide car bombing and mortar ambush at the Kerem Shalom crossing between Israel and Gaza in which 13 Israeli soldiers were injured. Israel retaliated with airstrikes, killing seven Hamas militants. Five Palestinian groups claimed responsibility for killing two Israeli security guards in Tulkarem on the West Bank on April 25. Israel suspected that PIJ was responsible. On April 28, an Israeli operation against militants resulted in the deaths of a Palestinian mother and four children and the wounding of two other children. Palestinians charged that an Israeli tank shell or missile had struck the home, but an Israeli investigation suggested that explosions caused by Palestinian ammunition were the cause, not an Israeli hit. As President Bush arrived in Israel to help celebrate its 60th anniversary on May 14, a rocket landed on a shopping mall in Ashkelon, injuring more than 30 people. PIJ and the Popular Resistance Committees claimed responsibility. Although the two sides agreed not to make public statements about the status of negotiations, their officials occasionally made remarks. On February 26, Abbas reported that committees on core issues of water, borders, settlements, refugees, Jerusalem, and security had been formed. On April 18, Olmert maintained that no great gaps exist between him and Abbas ―with the exception of the subject of Jerusalem, which from the outset and by agreement was deferred to a later stage.‖87 On May 6, however, the PLO Executive Committee (which Abbas chairs) claimed that the gap between the two sides was ―very wide‖ on all issues.88 On May 14, Olmert spoke of the need to reach an ―understanding‖ that would define the parameters of a two-state solution, mentioning only the issues of borders, refugees, and security, and again suggested that it would only include ―a framework for how to deal later with the issue of Jerusalem.‖89 The United States encouraged Egypt‘s efforts to achieve a tahdiyah (temporary truce, cease-fire, or calm) between Israel and Hamas. Egyptian General Omar Suleiman (alt: Umar Sulayman), who is in charge of intelligence services, mediated indirect talks. The issues involved were Palestinian rocket fire from the Gaza Strip into Israel, Israel‘s military operations in the Gaza Strip and West Bank and its blockade of Gaza; the border crossing at Rafah between Gaza and Egypt; Hamas‘s release of Cpl. Shalit; and Israel‘s release of Palestinian prisoners. A cease-fire to last for six months took effect on June 19. While Olmert insisted that ―Shalit‘s release is inseparable‖ from those the understandings, Hamas maintained that it was not and that separate talks on a prisoner exchange continued. Negotiations on the prisoner exchange stalled. On June 24, in the first breach of the truce, the PIJ fired three rockets from Gaza into Israel after Israeli troops killed a PIJ leader in Nablus on the West Bank; Israel responded by

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closing the commercial crossings into Gaza. That pattern continued, with smaller groups, but not Hamas, firing rockets and Israel responding with short-term closures of the crossings. On July 28, Olmert told a Knesset committee that it was impossible to reach a comprehensive agreement in 2008 due to difficulty with and lack of negotiations on Jerusalem. He added that agreement on other issues was within reach and that a clause defining a mechanism for dealing with Jerusalem in 2009 could be included. A spokesman for Abbas again responded that an agreement excluding Jerusalem was unacceptable. In a September 29 interview, Olmert admitted that Israel would have to give up ―almost all‖ of the West Bank and accept the division of Jerusalem for peace. He also said that the Palestinians must receive an equal amount of Israeli territory for any West Bank land that Israel retains. Abbas disclosed that the Israeli land swap offer is 6.8% in return for 5.5% and that he rejected ―offers that lead to discontinuous land areas and loss of control over water resources.‖90 On October 26, Foreign Minister and Olmert‘s replacement as Kadima Party leader Tzipi Livni reported that she had been unable to form a new coalition government, triggering early national elections in Israel on February 10, 2009. On November 4, Israeli troops entered Gaza to blow up a tunnel that officials said was intended for kidnapping Israeli soldiers, and killed seven Palestinian militants. Officials said that the action was to eliminate a threat to the cease-fire that had begun in June and not to end it. Hamas responded by firing dozens of rockets into Israel daily and Israel reacted by closing the borders of Gaza for extended periods of time. On December 15, Hamas leaders announced that the truce would not be extended after it expired on December 19. The expiration date was followed by a barrage of rocket fire into Israel and Israeli airstrikes. On December 27, Israel launched Operation Cast Lead with an air offensive against Hamas facilities in Gaza. The stated goal of the operation was to strike at Hamas‘s terrorist infrastructure and to improve security for residents of southern Israel. Israeli officials also said that they intended to regain deterrence that was widely perceived as weakened by the 2006 war against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel broadened the Gaza campaign rapidly to target any site considered part of the Hamas terrorism support network, including mosques, universities, schools, factories, homes of Hamas political and military leaders, and weapons caches. Tunnels under the Gaza-Egypt border used to smuggle arms, materiel, and goods were prime targets throughout the 22-day military campaign.

2009 On January 4, Prime Minister Olmert set out conditions for a cease-fire: a halt to rocket attacks and terror, international supervision of the cease-fire, and an end to Hamas‘s military build-up (via smuggling). Israel would not open its borders with Gaza unless Hamas released Gilad Shalit. On January 10, Hamas politburo chief Mish‘al stated his group‘s counterdemands: a halt to Israel‘s ―aggression,‖ the immediate withdrawal of its forces from Gaza, lifting of the siege on Gaza, and opening all the crossings, foremost that between Gaza and Egypt. The Bush Administration supported Israel. From the outset, Secretary Rice held ―Hamas responsible for breaking the cease-fire and for the renewal of violence.‖91 President Bush called the Hamas rocket attacks on Israel ―an act of terror,‖ and added that no peace deal would be acceptable without monitoring to halt the flow of smuggled weapons to the group.92

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On January 8, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1860 by a vote of 14-0, with 1 abstention—the United States. Secretary Rice said that the United States first wanted to see the outcome of Egyptian mediation for a cease-fire. The resolution called for ―an immediate, durable, and fully respected cease-fire.‖ While emphasizing the need to alleviate the humanitarian and economic situation in Gaza, it also called for intensified efforts to sustain the cease-fire, including preventing illicit trafficking in arms and ammunition and the sustained reopening of crossing points on the basis of the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access. Prime Minister Olmert said that the Gaza operation would continue despite the resolution because ―Israel has never agreed that any outside body would determine its right to defend the security of its citizens‖ and because the Palestinian groups were continuing to fire rockets into southern Israel and would not honor the resolution.93 Hamas said that that the resolution had nothing to do with it because it did not meet the Palestinian people‘s demands and Hamas was not consulted.94 On January 16, Secretary Rice and Foreign Minister Livni signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in which they agreed to work with neighbors and others in the international community to prevent the supply of arms and related materiel to terrorist organizations. The United States vowed to work with regional and NATO partners to address the supply of arms to Hamas and others in Gaza through the Mediterranean, Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, and eastern Africa.95 It also agreed to enhance security and intelligence cooperation to counter arms smuggling. Egyptian officials said they were was not bound by the MOU and would not allow foreign troops on their soil. Britain, France, Italy, and Germany jointly wrote to Olmert and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, offering to help end smuggling by all technical, military, naval, and diplomatic means, including patrols off Gaza‘s coast. On January 17, Israel unilaterally declared a cease-fire, effective January 18. Hamas soon followed with its own one-week cease-fire. According to the U.N., which used figures provided by the Palestinian Center for Human Rights, the conflict resulted in over 1,300 Palestinian deaths and 5,400 injured, and 13 Israeli deaths (including three civilians and five soldiers from friendly fire).96 Israeli and Palestinian peace negotiators had said that they would continue meeting until the new U.S. Administration took office and the February 10, 2009 Israeli elections were over. However, talks were suspended several weeks before Israel launched its operation against Hamas in December 2008, and formally by Palestinian chief negotiator Quray on December 29. Outgoing Prime Minister Olmert informed the Obama Administration‘s Special Envoy for Middle East Peace Mitchell of ―understandings‖ he claimed he had reached with Abbas. They included the uprooting of 60,000 settlers out of 250,000 and Israel‘s withdrawal to its 1967 borders, with adjustments that would allow it to retain large settlement blocs. In return for the blocs, Israel would transfer an equal amount of territory in southern Israel to a Palestinian state. Olmert agreed that Jerusalem would be divided, with eastern neighborhood transferred to Palestinian sovereignty, and holy sites administered by an international authority to include Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the PA, Israel, and the United States, while Israel would retain formal sovereignty over them.97 Israel would not absorb Palestinian refugees from 1948, but would accept a limited number in a reunification program. On January 27, Palestinian negotiator Erekat said that Olmert‘s proposal was never written down and its details were vague. Abbas declared, ―Our stance on the peace process is clear. We want back all the territories occupied in 1967, a fair solution to the refugee issue in accordance with UN

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General Assembly Resolution 194, and removal of settlements. We accept an international presence in the Palestinian territories provided the Israeli army does not participate in it.‖98 After the Israeli elections, Benjamin Netanyahu was named to form a new government. On February 28, PA President Abbas said, ―...we ask the Israeli government to adhere to previous agreements, not to restart from scratch, to be committed to the two-state vision, to stop settlement activity, to remove barriers, and to redeploy to the lines held prior to 28 September 2001, as stipulated in the Road Map.‖ 99 On March 12, Hamas issued a rare criticism of smaller groups‘ rocket attacks on Israel, saying that their timing was wrong—perhaps because ongoing truce talks with Israel via Egypt.100 (Israel acknowledges that Hamas has restrained smaller groups‘ actions.) On March 27, the New York Times reported that Israeli planes had bombed a convoy of trucks near the Egyptian border in Sudan in January that was believed to be carry arms to be smuggled into Gaza and that Iran may have sent the weapons.101 A new Israeli government took office on March 31. In his maiden address to the Knesset (parliament), Prime Minister Netanyahu vowed that his government would seek to attain peace with the Palestinian Authority on

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three parallel channels: economic, security and diplomatic. We aspire to assist the accelerated development of the Palestinian economy, as well as of its economic ties with Israel. We will support a Palestinian security apparatus that will fight terror and we will conduct continuous peace negotiations with the Palestinian Authority with the aim of reaching a permanent arrangement.... (W)e don‘t want to rule over the Palestinians. Under the permanent arrangement, the Palestinians will have all the authorities to govern themselves, except those threatening the existence and security of the State of Israel.102

Netanyahu avoided reference to a Palestinian state. New Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman raised eyebrows on April 1, when he said that the Joint Declaration presented at the Annapolis conference in 2007 is not binding because neither the Israeli government nor the Knesset ratified it. He said that Israel is bound to follow the multistage 2003 Road Map. (See Significant Agreements, below.) The Joint Declaration called for the parties to simultaneously implement the Road Map and conduct final status negotiations. Lieberman wants to return to an incremental process, in which negotiations would be conducted in a final stage, after the Palestinians confront terror, take control of Gaza, and demilitarize Hamas.103 While Lieberman often comments on the peace process often, most decisions regarding it reportedly are made by Prime Minister Netanyahu in collaboration with Defense Minister Ehud Barak. The Israeli Government Press Office said that, at a meeting in April, Prime Minister Netanyahu told envoy Mitchell that it would not be possible to advance the diplomatic process and reach a peace settlement without recognition of Israel as the national state of the Jewish People. Netanyahu did not set this as a precondition for opening negotiations with the Palestinians.104 Mitchell said that U.S. policy on a two-state solution ―would have a Palestinian state living in peace along the Jewish state of Israel.‖105 Palestinians contend that recognition of Israel as a Jewish state would negate Palestinian refugees‘ ―right of return‖ and be detrimental to the status of Israel‘s Arab citizens. On April 27, President Abbas said, ―It‘s not my job to give a description to the state. Name yourself the Hebrew Socialist Republic—it is none of my business.‖106 According to his spokesman, Abbas stressed to Mitchell the

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commitment of the Palestinians to a two-state solution and signed agreements and obligations, particularly freezing settlement activities, including natural growth, stopping house demolitions, and not building in E-1 (a corridor of land between Israel and the Ma‘ale Adumim West Bank settlement), and demanded that the same criteria be applied to Israel.107 On in a May 4 speech to AIPAC, Prime Minister Netanyahu restated his positions, which he described as a ― fresh approach‖—a triple track towards peace between Israel and the Palestinians—a political track, a security track, and an economic track. The political track means the resumption of negotiations without delay and without preconditions. The security track means continued cooperation with the U.S. program to strengthen the Palestinian security apparatus. Finally, the economic track would lead to the removal of obstacles to the advancement of the Palestinian economy. Netanyahu inserted two provisos: ―peace will not come without security,‖ and for a final peace settlement to be achieved, ―the Palestinians must recognize Israel as a Jewish state,‖—the nation-state of the Jewish people.108 President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu met at the White House on May 18, 2009. Afterwards, the President said, ―It is in the interests not only of the Palestinians but also the Israelis, the United States, and the international community to achieve a two-state solution in which Israel and the Palestinians are living side by side in peace and security.‖ He also stated, ―The Palestinians are going to have to do a better job of providing the kinds of security assurances that Israelis would need to achieve a two-state solution ... the other Arab states have to be more supportive and be bolder in seeking potential normalization with Israel.‖ The President declared, ―Settlements have to be stopped in order for us to move forward,‖ and ―the humanitarian situation in Gaza has to be addressed.‖ Netanyahu said that he wanted ―to start peace negotiations with the Palestinians immediately and to broaden the circle of peace to include others in the Arab world,‖ but that the Palestinians ―will have to recognize Israel as a Jewish state‖ and ―enable Israel to have the means to defend itself.‖ If these conditions are met, then he could envision an ―arrangement where Palestinians and Israelis live side by side....‖ He said that Israel wanted the Palestinians to govern themselves, but he did not endorse the goal of a Palestinian state. The President asserted that ―To the extent that we can make peace ...between the Palestinians and Israelis, then I actually think it strengthens our hands in dealing with a potential Iranian threat,‖ whereas the Prime Minister heard the President say ―there isn‘t a policy of linkage.‖109 On May 21, Secretary Clinton told Al-Jazeera, ―We want to see a stop to settlement construction—additions, natural growth, any kind of settlement activity—that is what the President has called for.‖ Netanyahu‘s spokesman responded, ―normal life‖ in settlements ―must be allowed to continue,‖ using a new phrase instead of natural growth.110 On May 21, on the anniversary of Israel‘s 1967 the annexation of East Jerusalem, Netanyahu vowed ―United Jerusalem is Israel‘s capital. Jerusalem was always ours and will always be ours. It will never again be partitioned and divided.‖111 The Palestinians consider East Jerusalem to be occupied Palestinian territory and, according the parameters of the 1990‘s peace process, the fate of Jerusalem is to be decided in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. On June 1, Netanyahu told a Knesset committee that halting construction in settlements would be equal to ―freezing life,‘ and therefore, ―unreasonable.‖112 President Obama restated his position regarding settlements at his May 28 White House meeting with President Abbas. On June 14, Netanyahu delivered a major address at Bar Ilan University in which he stated for the first time that Israel would accept the establishment of a Palestinian state.113

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First, however, he said that the Palestinians must publicly recognize Israel as the state of the Jewish people. This is because, he maintained, the root cause of the conflict is the refusal to recognize that right, and not Israel‘s presence in Judea and Samaria (as Israelis refer to the West Bank) and the Gaza Strip. The Prime Minister claimed that a solution would be based on the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state—without an army, without control of its air space, and with effective measures to prevent weapons from being smuggled into its territory—and he asked for international guarantees of this principle. He also declared that Jerusalem must remain undivided as the capital of Israel, and that the Palestinian refugee problem must be solved outside of Israel, thereby rejecting a ―right of return.‖ Netanyahu insisted that ―the claim that territorial withdrawals will bring peace with the Palestinians ... simply does not square with the facts.‖ He stated that he would not build new settlements or confiscate land for that purpose, but rejected a settlement freeze, insisting that settlers must be allowed to have ―normal lives.‖ At the same time, Netanyahu called for the immediate resumption of peace talks without preconditions. He later summarized five principles to provide ―clear foundations for a successful completion of peace talks,‖ but said they are not preconditions for those talks. They are recognition of the nation-state of the Jewish people, the problem of the refugees solved outside the State of Israel, effective demilitarization of the Palestinian state, the peace treaty must end the conflict, and be guaranteed by the international community led by the United States.114 President Obama welcomed Netanyahu‘s endorsement of the goal of a Palestinian state, saw ―some positive movement‖ in the speech, and said that Netanyahu‘s conditions were ―what negotiations are supposed to be about.‖ He added, ―What we are seeing is at least the possibility we can restart serious talks.115 Special Envoy Mitchell stated that since both Israel and the Palestinians are now both on the record in support of a two-state solution, ―There now is a common objective, which was not the case before the speech was made.‖ 116 However, Palestinian negotiator Erekat charged that Netanyahu ―systematically took nearly every permanent status issue off the table,‖ referring to borders, Jerusalem, settlements, refugees, and resources.117 Egyptian President Mubarak said that Israel‘s demand that Palestinians recognize Israel as the state of the Jewish people ―scuttles changes for peace.... You won‘t find anyone to answer that call in Egypt or in any other place‖ in the region.118 Later, Hamas Political Bureau Chief Mish‘al described Netanyahu‘s offer of a demilitarized state as ―a big prison, not a country fit for a great people....The minimum we accept is a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, full sovereignty, removal of settlements, and the refugees‘ right of return.‖ Mish‘al concluded that he saw no alternative to continued armed struggle. 119 President Abbas would later reiterate his demand that Israel recognize the principle of a twostate solution and halt all settlement activities before negotiations on final status issues, including Jerusalem.120 On July 1, Senator Mitchell met Israeli Defense Minister Barak in New York. Their joint statement did not restate the U.S. demand for a freeze on Israeli settlement activity or provide an Israeli response. Barak told the New York Times, ―For us, it is very important that the Palestinians commit to seeking an end to the conflict and a finality of any claims. We should not isolate this issue of settlements and make it the most important one.‖ He said that Israel was eager for a regional agreement that would lead to a state for the Palestinians and security for Israel.121 On July 6, Barak told Mitchell that Israel is committed to evacuating 23 illegal settlement outposts within weeks or months. (As of January 2010, it had not occurred.)

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Israel reportedly wants to link agreements to evacuate illegal outposts and a carefully defined, short-term settlement freeze to Arab moves toward normalization. The Obama Administration has worked to fulfill this request. On July 16, Secretary Clinton said,

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We have been working with the Israelis to deal with the issues of settlements, to ease the living conditions of Palestinians, and create circumstances that can lead to the establishment of a viable Palestinian state....(W)hile we expect action from Israel, we recognize those decisions are politically challenging.‖ She added, ―progress toward peace cannot be the responsibility of the United States or Israel alone.... The Palestinians have the responsibility to improve and extend positive actions already taken on security, to act forcefully against incitement and to refrain from any action that would make meaningful negotiations less likely. And Arab states have a responsibility to support the Palestinian Authority with words and deeds, to take steps to improve relations with Israel, and to prepare their publics to embrace peace and accept Israel‘s place in the region.122

Mitchell also reported that he is urging Arab leaders ―to take steps towards normalization as gestures of their own to demonstrate that everyone in the region shares the vision of comprehensive peace that we share.‖123 He said that Washington is not asking any Arab government to normalize ties immediately. The Arab League Secretary General responded, ―There will be no Arab steps before Israel stops its policy of settlement building.‖124 On July 31, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal stated, ―The question is not what the Arab world will offer. The question really is: what will Israel give in exchange for this comprehensive offer (referring to the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative).‖125 ―Incrementalism and the step-by-step approach have not, and we believe will not achieve peace. Temporary security, confidence-building measures, will also not bring peace.‖126 He called for a comprehensive approach that ―defines the final outcome at the outset and launches into negotiations over final status issues: borders, Jerusalem, water, refugees, and security.‖ Saudi officials maintain that normalization should follow resolution of the major issues of the conflict and Israel‘s withdrawal from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and Sheba‘a Farms in Lebanon. Further, they say that gestures or ―concessions‖ in return for a partial withdrawal would reward Israel for the return of land that does not belong to it.127 The Administration is reaching out to Arab states which previously had low-level relations with Israel and reportedly requested Oman, Qatar, Morocco, and Tunisia to reopen their commercial interest offices in Israel and the Gulf States to permit Israeli commercial airliners‘ flyovers.128 President Obama sent a letter to Moroccan King Mohammed VI, asking him to ―be a leader in bridging gaps between Israel and the Arab world.‖129 Although none has responded, the Administration continued to favor this approach. On August 10, the Deputy State Department spokesman said, ―confidence-building measures are a critical element of getting the parties to the next step, which is negotiations.‖130 On August 18, President Mubarak told President Obama that the Arabs are unwilling to make gestures until Israel does something they believe merits such reciprocity, and a temporary settlement freeze would not suffice.131 The Netanyahu government says that it is proceeding with its ―bottom up‖ approach of working to improve the living conditions for Palestinians in the West Bank as a foundation for future peace. To that end, it reports removing roadblocks, check points, and dirt barriers

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and expanding the hours that the Allenby Bridge crossing (between the West Bank and Jordan) is open for commercial goods.132 Abbas charged that Netanyahu is seeking ―to divert the world‘s attention by easing economic restrictions on the Palestinians as a substitute for political rights.‖ In a speech to the Fatah General Congress on August 4, 2009, President Abbas reaffirmed that the Palestinians‘ main aim is the establishment of an independent state and solving all issues, especially refugees and settlements. He declared, ―Although peace is our choice, we reserve the right to resistance, legitimate under international law.‖133 The Fatah Congress adopted a political program affirming ―the continuation of the negotiations without achieving real progress within a defined time frame endangers our rights and becomes futile because it enables Israel to use the negotiations as a cover for continuing its settlement activity and entrenching the occupation.‖ Its 11 principles for proceeding include: 

     

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 

Linking negotiations to real progress on the ground, specifically a complete halt to settlement activity, especially in Jerusalem. In addition, Israel must stop incursions, lift the siege of Gaza, remove barriers in the West Bank, and withdraw to the borders of September 28, 2000 (before the outbreak of the second intifadah or uprising); Negotiations based on U.N. resolutions and the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative; Setting a clear agenda and a time cap for negotiations; Rejecting postponement of negotiations on any final status issue, particularly Jerusalem and refugees; Rejecting a state with temporary borders; Refusing to recognize Israel as a ―Jewish state‖ in order to protect the rights of refugees and of Israeli Arabs; Insisting on international participation in negotiations and on a mechanism for binding arbitration of impasses; Insisting on international monitoring and peace-keeping to guarantee implementation of an agreement; Holding a referendum on a peace agreement.134

The program refers ambiguously to ―popular struggle,‖ and does not explicitly endorse armed resistance. At the first meeting of the new Fatah Central Committee on August 6, Abbas stated that negotiations would only resume if Israel halted ―all forms of settlement activity without exception in Jerusalem and the rest of the occupied territories‖ and he welcomed President Obama‘s efforts on this matter. On August 17, he told the PA cabinet, ―The main and the only path is the path of peace and negotiations. We don‘t have any other path and we do not wish to use any other path.‖135 Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad announced a Palestine Document: Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State on August 25. It calls for establishing a ―de facto state‖ to ―expedite the ending of the occupation‖ with or without a final peace agreement with Israel.136 The plan calls for building both institutions and infrastructure. On August 26, Mitchell and Netanyahu met in London. The State Department reported simply that they had ―made good progress‖ and had ―agreed on the importance of restarting negotiations.‖ The State Department signaled flexibility on Israeli settlements on August 27,

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when a spokesman said, ―We put forward our ideas ... about what it will take for negotiations to be restarted, but ultimately it‘ll be up to the parties themselves, with our help, to determine whether that threshold has been met.... Ultimately, this is not a process by which the United States will impose conditions…..‖137 On September 6, Israeli Defense Minister Barak approved the construction of 455 preplanned housing units, most to be built in major West Bank settlement blocs. Israel also plans to complete an additional 2,500 units under construction. Barak said that the action was part of a dialogue with the United States and was aimed at creating the foundation for an agreement that will include the suspension of construction in the West Bank.138 Most of the approvals were reapprovals of plans advanced during the prior Israeli government and the move was generally depicted as an attempt to placate domestic opponents in advance of a temporary freeze on settlement activity. Netanyahu later said that he was trying to balance the will to make a gesture to promote negotiations and ―the need to enable normal living for the residents of Judea and Samaria.‖ Furthermore, he declared ―Jerusalem is not a settlement and construction will go on as planned.‖139 The White House regretted Israel‘s decision, saying ―The United States does not accept the legitimacy of continued settlement expansion, and we urge that it stop. We are working to create a climate in which negotiations can take place, and such actions make it harder to create such a climate.‖ 140 President Obama, Prime Minister Netanyahu, and President Abbas met on September 22 on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly opening session, even though the two sides had not wavered in their views. The Palestinians argued that there was no point in starting negotiations without a settlement freeze and unless Israel agreed to negotiate on Jerusalem and refugees, while Netanyahu would not compromise on settlements and borders before negotiations. President Obama stated, ―Permanent negotiation must begin, and begin soon.‖ He called on the Palestinians to build on progress in halting terrorism and to do more to stop incitement. He praised Israel‘s actions to improve the Palestinians‘ freedom of movement, and called on it to move beyond discussions of restraining settlement construction to action. Palestinians noted his use of the word ―restrain‖ instead of ―freeze.‖ President Obama told the General Assembly that he would continue to seek a just and lasting peace between Israel, Palestine, and the Arab world. He said that he would continue to call on the Palestinians to end incitement against Israel and to emphasize that ―America does not accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements.‖ He declared, ―the time has come to re-launch negotiations without preconditions that address the permanent status issues: security for Israelis and Palestinians, borders, refugees, and Jerusalem. And the goal is clear: Two states living side by side in peace and security – a Jewish state of Israel … and a viable, independent Palestinian state with contiguous territory that ends the occupation that began in 1967….‖141 In late September, the PLO outlined three conditions for resuming talks: negotiations must be based on international resolutions calling for an independent Palestinian state within a two-state solution, a time limit must be established, and a complete halt to settlement activity must be in place. President Abbas has said that negotiations with Israel should resume from the agreement on ―terms of reference‖ that he says were reached with former Israeli Prime Minister Olmert, i.e., the Palestinian state would have the 1967 borders with reciprocal land adjustments. He admitted that no agreement was reached on borders or exchanging land. Abbas said that he would push for delineation of borders because it would solve, borders, settlements, water, and

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Jerusalem. He also reported that the Palestinian dialogue with Israel continues on security, economic issues, and daily life.142 In late October, Netanyahu offered to exercise restraint in construction in the West Bank, while continuing the completion of 3,000 housing units for which permits already have been given or construction begun. The ―freeze‖ or ―moratorium‖ would not apply to East Jerusalem, public buildings, or infrastructure projects. Secretary Clinton described ―what the prime minister has offered in specifics of a restraint on policy of settlements … no new starts, for example, is unprecedented (italics added) in the context of prior negotiations. It‘s also the fact that for 40 years, presidents of both parties have questioned the legitimacy of settlements….‖143 The Palestinians rejected Netanyahu‘s proposal and, after they and Arab governments expressed disappointment with her remarks, the Secretary conceded that ―it is nowhere near enough‖ and reiterated that ―the United States does not accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements‖ and wanted more from Netanyahu.144 On November 3, the State Department spokesman said, ―We recognize that things have stalled…. We‘re looking at a variety of ways to increase interaction between the parties in some form.‖ He described the proposals as ―baby steps‖ that would eventually ―create a momentum of their own….‖145 In a November 5 speech in which he repeated his known terms of reference for negotiations, President Abbas told his people that he was ―not interested‖ being a candidate in presidential elections then scheduled for January 2010.146Abbas would remain Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), in which capacity he has negotiated with Israel. On December 16, the PLO Central Council (PCC) said that Abbas would stay on as PA president after his tenure ends on January 25, 2010 and until elections are held. No date has been set for elections; the PCC called for them to be held not later than July 1. The Palestinians began to talk of asking the Security Council to recognize an independent Palestinian state in the 1967 borders. Netanyahu warned that it would provoke responding unilateral Israeli steps, while, on November 16, the State Department said that the United States supports ―a Palestinian state that arises as a result of a process between the two parties.‖147 The EU Presidency said that the move was ―premature.‖ Hamas rejected the idea as meaningless. On November 17, the White House Press Secretary expressed dismay that the city of Jerusalem Planning Committee had decided to expand -- by about 900 housing units -- the settlement of Gilo, which Israel considers to be within the borders of Jerusalem (that it enlarged after the 1967 war). He stated that neither party should unilaterally pre-empt negotiations, and that the status of Jerusalem is an issue that ―must be resolved through negotiations.‖ He added, ―The U.S. also objects to other Israeli practices in Jerusalem related to housing , including the continuing pattern of evictions and demolitions of Palestinian homes.‖148

Israel-Syria Syria seeks to regain sovereignty over the Golan Heights, 450 square miles of land along the border that Israel seized in 1967. Israel applied its law and administration to the region in December 1981, an act other governments do not recognize. Approximately 20,000 Israeli settlers reside in 33 settlements on the Golan. In 1991, Syria referred to its goal in the peace conference as an end to the state of belligerency, not a peace treaty, preferred a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace, and rejected separate agreements between Israel and Arab

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states. Israel emphasized peace, defined as open borders, diplomatic, cultural, and commercial relations, security, and access to water resources. In 1992, Israel agreed that U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 (after the 1967 war) applies to all fronts, meaning that ―land for peace‖ includes the Golan. Syria submitted a draft declaration of principles, reportedly referring to a ―peace agreement,‖ not simply an end to belligerency. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin accepted an undefined withdrawal on the Golan, pending Syria‘s definition of ―peace.‖ On September 23, 1992, the Syrian Foreign Minister promised ―total peace in exchange for total withdrawal.‖ Israel offered ―withdrawal.‖ In 1993, Syrian President Hafez al Asad announced interest in peace and suggested that bilateral tracks might progress at different speeds. In June, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher said that the United States might be willing to guarantee security arrangements in the context of a sound agreement on the Golan. On January 16, 1994, President Clinton reported that Asad had told him that Syria was ready to talk about ―normal peaceful relations‖ with Israel. The sides inched toward each other on a withdrawal and normalization timetable. Asad again told President Clinton on October 27 that he was committed to normal peaceful relations in return for full withdrawal. Asad never expressed his ideas publicly, leaving it to Clinton to convey them. On May 24, 1994, Israel and Syria announced terms of reference for military talks under U.S. auspices. Syria reportedly conceded that demilitarized and thinned-out zones may take topographical features into account and be unequal, if security arrangements were equal. Israel offered Syria an early-warning ground station in northern Israel in exchange for Israeli stations on the Golan Heights, but Syria insisted instead on aerial surveillance only and that each country monitor the other from its own territory and receive U.S. satellite photographs. It was proposed that Syria demilitarize 6 miles for every 3.6 miles Israel demilitarizes. Rabin insisted that Israeli troops stay on the Golan after its return to Syria. Syria said that this would infringe on its sovereignty, but Syrian government-controlled media accepted international or friendly forces in the stations. Talks resumed at the Wye Plantation in Maryland in December 1995, but were suspended when Israeli negotiators went home after terrorist attacks in February/March 1996. A new Israeli government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called for negotiations, but said that the Golan is essential to Israel‘s security and water needs and that retaining Israeli sovereignty over the Golan would be the basis for an arrangement with Syria. Asad would not agree to talks unless Israel honored prior understandings, claiming that Rabin had promised total withdrawal to the June 4, 1967-border, which gives Syria access to the northern shore of the Sea of Galilee (also known as Lake Tiberias or Lake Kinneret). That border differs from the international border of 1923 and the armistice line of 1949, which Damascus views as the results of colonialist or imperialist decisions.149 Israeli negotiators say that Rabin had suggested possible full withdrawal if Syria met Israel‘s security and normalization needs, which Syria did not do. An Israeli law passed on January 26, 1999, requires a 61-member majority in the Knesset (parliament) and a national referendum to approve the return of any part of the Golan Heights. However, holding a referendum would depend on a passage of a Basic Law for Public Referenda, which has not been accomplished. (In July 2009, the Knesset began considering a referendum law, with the support of Prime Minister Netanyahu. In November, it approved the bill, but additional votes are required before it becomes law.)

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In June 1999, Israeli Prime Minister-elect Ehud Barak and Asad exchanged compliments via a British writer. Israel and Syria later agreed to restart talks from ―the point where they left off,‖ with each side defining the point to its satisfaction. Barak and the Syrian Foreign Minister met in Washington on December 15-16, 1999, and in Shepherdstown, WV, from January 3-10, 2000. President Clinton intervened. On January 7, a reported U.S. summary revealed Israeli success in delaying discussion of borders and winning concessions on normal relations and an early-warning station. Reportedly because of Syrian anger over this leak, talks scheduled to resume on January 19, 2000 were ―postponed indefinitely.‖ On March 26, President Clinton met Asad in Geneva. A White House spokesman reported ―significant differences remain‖ and that it would not be productive for talks to resume. Barak indicated that disagreements centered on Israel‘s reluctance to withdraw to the June 1967 border and cede access to the Sea of Galilee, on security arrangements, and on the early-warning station. Syria agreed that the border/Sea issue had been the main obstacle. Asad died on June 10; his son, Bashar, succeeded him. Ariel Sharon became Prime Minister of Israel in February 2001 and vowed to retain the Golan. In a December 1 New York Times interview, Bashar al Asad said that he was ready to resume negotiations from where they broke off. Sharon responded that Syria first must stop supporting Hezbollah and Palestinian terror organizations.150 On August 29, 2005, Sharon said that it was not the time to begin negotiations with Syria because it is collaborating with Iran, building up Hezbollah, and maintaining Palestinian terrorist organizations‘ headquarters in Damascus from which terrorist attacks against Israel are ordered. Moreover, he observed that there was no reason for Israel to relieve the pressure that France and the United States were putting on Syria (over its alleged complicity in the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri). On June 28, 2006, Israeli warplanes caused sonic booms over President Asad‘s summer residence in Latakia to warn him to discontinue support for the Damascus-based head of the Hamas political bureau, Khalid Mish‘al, whom Israel considered responsible for a June 25 attack in Israel, and for other Palestinian terrorists. On July 3, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al Muallem denied that Mish‘al had a role in the attack and said that Syria would never force him to leave the country. In a speech on August 15 to mark the end of the war in Lebanon, President Asad declared that the peace process had failed since its inception and that he did not expect peace in the near future.151 Subsequently, he said that Shib‘a Farms (an area near where the Israeli, Syrian, and Lebanese borders meet) are Lebanese, but that the border between Lebanon and Syria there cannot be demarcated as long as it is occupied by Israel. The priority, he said, must be liberation.152 Responding to speculation about reopening peace talks with Syria, Israeli Prime Minister Olmert said on August 21 that Syria must stop supporting terrorist organizations before negotiations resume. In September, he declared, ―As long as I am prime minister, the Golan Heights will remain in our hands because it is an integral part of the State of Israel.‖153 He also indicated that he did not want to differ from the Bush Administration, which viewed Syria as a supporter of terror that should not be rewarded. On November 28, U.S. National Security Advisor Hadley concurred that as long as Syria is ―a supporter of terror, is both provisioning and supporting Hezbollah and facilitating Iran in its efforts to support Hezbollah, and is supporting Hamas,‖ then it is ―not on the agenda to bring peace and security to the region.‖ Hadley agreed that you cannot talk about negotiating with that Syria.154

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On December 6, the Iraq Study Group released a report that included recommendations for changing U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict because ―Iraq cannot be addressed effectively in isolation from other major regional issues.‖ It stated that the United States will not be able to achieve its goals in the Middle East unless it has a ―renewed and sustained commitment‖ to a comprehensive, negotiated peace on all fronts, including ―direct talks with, by, and between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept Israel‘s right to exist), and particularly Syria....‖ The report recommended that Israel return the Golan Heights, with a U.S. security guarantee that could include an international force on the border, including U.S. troops if requested by both parties, in exchange for Syria‘s taking actions regarding Lebanon and Palestinian groups.155 Olmert rejected any linkage to the situation in Iraq and believed that President Bush shared his view. In December, Asad and his Foreign Minister expressed interest in unconditional negotiations with Israel. Their statements deepened a debate in Israel over Syria‘s intentions. Olmert was skeptical of Asad‘s motives and demanded that Syria first end support for Hamas and Hezbollah and sever ties with Iran.156 On January 17, 2007, Secretary Rice asserted that ―this isn‘t the time to engage Syria,‖ blaming Damascus for allowing terrorists to cross its territory to enter Iraq, failing to support Palestinians who believe in peace with Israel, and trying to bring down the Lebanese government.157 On May 4, 2007, on the sidelines of a meeting on Iraq in Egypt, Secretary Rice met Foreign Minister Muallem. U.S. officials said that the meeting focused exclusively on Iraq. Some Israelis asked why they should not have contacts with Syrians if U.S. officials could do so. On June 8, Israeli officials confirmed that Israel had sent messages to Syria signaling willingness to engage in talks based on the principle of land for peace and attempting to discern whether Damascus might be willing to gradually end its relations with Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas in exchange. In a July 10 interview, Olmert said that he was willing to discuss peace with Asad, but complained that the Syrian only wants negotiations to be conducted via Americans, who do not want to talk to Asad.158 On July 17, Asad called on Israel to make an ―unambiguous and official announcement‖ about its desire for peace and ―offer guarantees about the return of the land in full,‖ opening ―channels via a third party, but not direct negotiations.‖ This, he said, would lead to direct talks in the presence of an ―honest broker.‖ Those talks would be on security arrangements and relations, and not land. Asad asserted that he cannot negotiate with Israel because ―we do not trust them.‖159 On July 20, Olmert called on Asad to drop preconditions which Israel cannot accept. On September 6, the Israeli Air Force carried out an air raid against a site in northeastern Syria. On September 12, a New York Times report alleged that the target may have been a nuclear weapons installation under construction with North Korean-supplied materials. Syrian and North Korean officials denied this allegation and, on October 1, President Asad claimed that an unoccupied military compound had been hit. On October 25, the International Institute for Science and International Security released satellite photos showing that a suspected reactor building had been razed and the site scraped, raising suspicions about its purpose. Syria has not retaliated for the air raid. On January 8, 2008, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohamed El Baradei initially told a pan-Arab newspaper that, ―Based on satellite photographs, experts believe it is unlikely that the targeted construction was a nuclear facility.‖160 On January 12, 2008, it was reported that new satellite photos show construction at the site resembling the former building, which would cover the

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remains of the old one and possibly conceal its past.161 Syria did not allow inspectors to visit the site until May. In November, the IAEA reported that it had features resembling a reactor and finding traces of uranium amid the ruins, but did not come to any conclusions. On February 24, 2009, a Syrian scientist told the IAEA that the site has been converted into a military installation for firing missiles. Syria has not allowed any further IAEA visits. (See ―Role of Congress‖ ―Israeli Raid on Suspected Syrian Nuclear Site,‖ below, for additional information on this issue.) On September 23, 2007, Secretary Rice had expressed hope that participants in the Annapolis meeting would include the members of the Arab League Follow Up Committee— 12 Arab governments, including Syria. On October 1, President Asad responded that his government would not attend unless the Golan Heights were discussed.162 Syria‘s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs attended the conference and explained that his presence resulted from the inclusion of the return of the Golan on the agenda. In December, Secretary Rice declared that ―Annapolis was a chance we gave Syria and its test was the (presidential) elections in Lebanon. So far, the Syrians have failed completely.‖ For months, there was speculation about a revived Israel-Syria peace track as Professor Ahmet Davutoglu, a close foreign policy advisor to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was reported to be carrying messages between Damascus and Jerusalem. Israeli officials repeatedly hinted that talks were afoot, acknowledging that the price of peace for Israeli would be the Golan Heights and hoping that it might be a way to distance Syria from Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas.163 On April 17, Prime Minister Olmert confirmed that the two sides had been in contact and, on April 24, President Asad revealed that Erdogan had informed him ―about Israel‘s readiness for a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights in return for a peace agreement.‖ Asad claimed that mediation had intensified after the Israel-Hezbollah war of 2006 and especially after Turkey became involved in April 2007. There were reports said that Olmert had first discussed the possibility of mediation with Erdogan in Turkey in February 2007. Asad also asserted that there would be no direct negotiations, only those through Turkey. He maintained that direct talks require a U.S. sponsor and that Syria might discuss them ―with the next U.S. administration because this one has no vision or a will for the peace process.‖164 U.S. State Department spokesman Tom Casey has said that neither party has formally requested the United States to become directly involved. ―If Syria and Israel came to us, we‘d certainly consider the request.‖165 On May 21, Israel, Syria, and Turkey simultaneously announced that Israel and Syria had indeed launched peace talks mediated by Turkey. On May 19-21, negotiating teams had held indirect talks in Istanbul. The aim was to reach ―common ground‖ on issues relating to withdrawal, security arrangements, water, and normal peaceful relations from which to move toward direct negotiations. This initiative appeared contrary to the Bush Administration‘s policy of isolating Syria. However, the White House said that the Administration was not surprised by the trilateral announcement and did not object to it. Secretary Rice said, ―We would welcome any steps that might lead to a comprehensive peace in the Middle East .... We are working very hard on the Palestinian track. It doesn‘t mean that the U.S. would not support other tracks.‖ White House spokeswoman Dana Perino added, ―What we hope is that this is a forum to address various concerns that we all share about Syria—the United States, Israel, and many others— in regard to Syria‘s support for Hamas and Hezbollah (and) the training and funding of

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terrorists that belong to these organizations .... We believe it could help us to further isolate Iran....‖166 On June 5, Secretary Rice thanked Turkey for sponsoring the indirect talks. Asad stated that direct talks were unlikely before 2009 and ―depend on the stability of the Israeli government....‖167 He said that eventually direct negotiations would tackle the details of water, relations, and other matters, but, when dealing with water, Syria would never compromise on the 1967 borders that stretch to Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee). Referring to Israel‘s demands concerning Syria‘s relations with Iran and Hezbollah, Asad asserted, ―We do not accept the imposition of conditions on us that are linked to countries that have nothing to do with peace....‖168 On July 7, Asad told the French newspaper Le Figaro that he would not begin direct talks with Israel while President Bush was in office.169 On September 4, President Asad disclosed that his representatives had transmitted proposals or principles for peace to serve as a basis for direct talks with Israel to Turkish mediators, but would wait for Israel‘s response before holding direct talks. He repeated that direct talks also await a new U.S. Administration and stressed that ―Syria has no interest in relinquishing its ties with Hezbollah.‖170 He added that future negotiations depend on the next Israeli prime minister‘s commitment to pursuing peace. A fifth round of indirect talks was postponed ostensibly due to the resignation of Olmert‘s chief of staff and negotiator with Syria. The Turkish government said that Israel had requested a delay due to technical and legal problems. Syria‘s Deputy Foreign Minister reported that Syria had asked Israeli to express a final opinion about the line of withdrawal and insisted that it be on the June 4, 1967 border. Israeli military intelligence reportedly had concluded that, under the next U.S. administration, Syria would be willing to sign a peace accord with Israel if a return to the 1967 border is guaranteed and if it includes generous U.S. economic aid comparable to that which Egypt has received since signing a peace agreement with Israel. The analysts also believe that Syria would be willing to ―cool down‖ its relations with Iran as the price of an accord.171 As a result of Israel‘s offensive against Hamas, Turkey officially ended its efforts to organize more Israeli-Syrian talks. They already had been suspended primarily due to Israel‘s domestic political turmoil and imminent national election on February 10, 2009. On February 2, Foreign Minster Muallem said that Syria may resume indirect talks with Israel if its elections bring forth a government willing to reach a comprehensive peace.172 While in Turkey on March 7, Secretary Clinton said the importance of the Israeli-Syrian track and peace effort ―cannot be overstated.‖173 In Damascus the same day, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman said, ―We do want to see forward momentum on the Syrian-Israeli track at the time when the parties are ready for this. We want to achieve results. I am sure that Syria will want to achieve results, but let‘s not expect that things are going to change dramatically from today until tomorrow.‖174 In an interview published on March 9, President Asad said that a peace ―agreement‖ with Israel was possible, but that the Syrian people would not accept ―peace,‖ meaning trade, normal relations, and open borders, until the Palestinian issue is resolved. He called for coordination with the Palestinians so that Israel would not use peace talks with Syria to avoid a resolution with the Palestinians.175 Two days later, Asad reiterated his long-standing view that, ―We need the United States to act as a mediator when we move from the current indirect negotiations to direct negotiations.‖176 In a speech on March 31, he called on Arabs to take a harder line with the incoming Israeli government, and stated, ―Peace cannot be achieved with

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an enemy who does not believe in peace without it begin imposed on him by resistance‖—a ―moral duty.‖ Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman said on April 2, ―there is no (Israeli) cabinet resolution regarding negotiations with Syria, and we have already said that we will not agree to withdraw from the Golan Heights. Peace will only be in exchange for peace.‖177 On May 20, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that he was willing to open peace talks with the Syrians without preconditions.178 Syria has said that Israel must commit to ceding the Golan before talks. On June 13, Senator Mitchell visited Damascus for the first time, accompanied by Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman and National Security Council Senior Director for Near East and North Africa Daniel Shapiro. Mitchell reported, ―I told President Asad that President Obama is determined to facilitate a truly comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace,‖ meaning ―peace between Palestinians and Israelis, between Syria and Israel, and between Lebanon and Israel.....We will welcome the full cooperation of the government of the Syrian Arab Republic in this historic endeavor..... Syria and the U.S. share an obligation to create conditions for negotiations to begin promptly and end successfully.‖179 Israel‘s Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon has said that Israel insists that any new negotiations with Syria be direct and has ruled out a return to mediated talks, several rounds of which were conducted via the Turks in 2007.180 On September 15, however, President Asad stressed that he wanted indirect talks with Israel to be conducted through Turkey to reach a concrete point or establish ―a healthy and proper foundation‖ before moving on to direct talks.181

Israel-Lebanon Citing Security Council Resolution 425, Lebanon sought Israel‘s unconditional withdrawal from the 9-mile ―security zone‖ in southern Lebanon, and the end of Israel‘s support for Lebanese militias in the south and its shelling of villages that Israel claimed were sites of Hezbollah activity. Israel claimed no Lebanese territory, but said that its forces would withdraw only when the Lebanese army controlled the south and prevented Hezbollah attacks on northern Israel. Lebanon sought a withdrawal schedule in exchange for addressing Israel‘s security concerns. The two sides never agreed. Syria, which then dominated Lebanon, said that Israel-Syria progress should come first. Israel‘s July 1993 assault on Hezbollah prompted 250,000 people to flee from south Lebanon. U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher arranged a cease-fire. In March/April 1996, Israel again attacked Hezbollah and Hezbollah fired into northern Israel. Hezbollah and the Israeli Defense Forces agreed to a cease-fire and to refrain from firing from or into populated areas but retained the right of self-defense. U.S., French, Syrian, Lebanese, and Israeli representatives monitored the agreement. On January 5, 1998, the Israeli Defense Minister indicated readiness to withdraw from southern Lebanon if the second part of Resolution 425, calling for the restoration of peace and security in the region, were implemented. He and Prime Minister Netanyahu proposed withdrawal in exchange for security, not peace and normalization. Lebanon and Syria called for an unconditional withdrawal. As violence in northern Israel and southern Lebanon increased later in 1998, the Israeli cabinet twice opposed unilateral withdrawal. In April 1999, however, Israel decreased its forces in Lebanon and, in June, the Israeli-allied South Lebanese Army (SLA) withdrew from Jazzin, north of the security zone. On taking office, new Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak promised to withdraw in one year, by July 7, 2000.

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On September 4, 1999, the Lebanese Prime Minister confirmed support for the ―resistance‖ against the occupation, that is, Hezbollah. He argued that Palestinian refugees residing in Lebanon have the right to return to their homeland and rejected their implantation in Lebanon (which would upset its fragile sectarian balance). He also rejected Secretary of State Madeleine Albright‘s assertion that refugees would be a subject of Israeli-Palestinian final status talks and insisted that Lebanon be a party to such talks. On March 5, 2000, the Israeli cabinet voted to withdraw from southern Lebanon by July. Lebanon warned that it would not guarantee security for northern Israel unless Israel also withdrew from the Golan and worked to resolve the refugee issue. On April 17, Israel informed the U.N. of its plan. On May 12, Lebanon told the U.N. that Israel‘s withdrawal would not be complete unless it included Shib‘a Farms. On May 23, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted that most of Shib‘a is within the area of operations of the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) overseeing the 1974 Israeli-Syrian disengagement, and recommended proceeding without prejudice to later border agreements. On May 23, the SLA collapsed, and on May 24 Israel completed its withdrawal. Hezbollah took over the former security zone. On June 18, the U.N. Security Council agreed that Israel had withdrawn. The U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) deployed only 400 troops to the border region because the Lebanese army did not back them against Hezbollah.182 On October 7, Hezbollah shelled northern Israel and captured three Israeli soldiers; then, on October 16, it captured an Israeli colonel. On November 13, the U.N. Security Council said that Lebanon was obliged to take control of the area vacated by Israel. On April 16 and July 2, 2001, after Hezbollah attacked its soldiers in Shib‘a, Israel, claiming that Syria controls Hezbollah, bombed Syrian radar sites in Lebanon. In April, the U.N. warned Lebanon that unless it deployed to the border, UNIFIL would be cut or phased out. On January 28, 2002, the Security Council voted to cut it to 2,000 by the end of 2002. In March 2003, Hezbollah shelled Israeli positions in Shib‘a and northern Israel. Israel responded with air strikes and expressed concern about a possible second front in addition to the Palestinian intifadah. At its request, the U.N. Secretary-General contacted the Syrian and Lebanese Presidents and, on April 8, Vice President Cheney telephoned President Asad and Secretary of State Powell visited northern Israel and called on Syria to curb Hezbollah. On January 30, 2004, Israel and Hezbollah exchanged 400 Palestinian and 29 Lebanese and other Arab prisoners, and the remains of 59 Lebanese for the Israeli colonel and the bodies of the three soldiers. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559, September 2, 2004, called for the withdrawal of all foreign (meaning Syrian) forces from Lebanon.183 Massive anti-Syrian demonstrations occurred in Lebanon after the February 14, 2005, assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, widely blamed on Syrian agents. On March 5, Asad announced a phased withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, which was completed on April 26. On May 28, 2006, Palestinian rockets fired from Syria hit deep inside northern Israel and Israeli planes and artillery responded by striking Popular Front for the Liberation of PalestineGeneral Command (PFLP-GC) bases near Beirut and near the Syrian border. Hezbollah joined the confrontation and was targeted by Israelis. UNIFIL brokered a cease-fire. On July 12, in the midst of massive shelling of a town in northern Israel, Hezbollah forces crossed into northwestern Israel and attacked two Israeli military vehicles, killing three soldiers and kidnapping two. Hezbollah demanded that Israel release Lebanese and other Arab prisoners in exchange for the soldiers and for a third soldier who had been kidnapped by

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the Palestinian group Hamas on June 25. (On the latter situation, see ―Israel-Palestinians,‖ above.) Hezbollah leader Shaykh Hassan Nasrallah said that the soldiers would be returned only through indirect negotiations for a prisoner exchange. He suggested that the Hezbollah operation might provide a way out of the crisis in Gaza because Israel had negotiated with Hezbollah in the past, although it refused to negotiate with Hamas now. Prime Minister Olmert declared that Hezbollah‘s attack was ―an act of war‖ and promised that Lebanon would suffer the consequences of Hezbollah‘s actions. The Lebanese government replied that it had no prior knowledge of the operation and did not take responsibility or credit for it. Israeli officials also blamed Syria and Iran, but were careful to say that they had no plans to strike either one. Immediately after the Hezbollah attack, Israeli forces launched a major military campaign against and imposed an air, sea, and ground blockade on Lebanon. In a July 17 speech, Olmert summarized Israel‘s conditions for the end of military operations: the return of the kidnapped soldiers, the end to Hezbollah rocket attacks, and the deployment of the Lebanese army along the border.184 Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora requested U.N. help in arranging a cease-fire. On August 8, the Lebanese government promised to deploy 15,000 troops to the south for the first time since 1978 if Israel withdrew its forces. Hezbollah agreed to the government proposal, while Olmert found it ―interesting.‖ On August 9, the Israeli security cabinet authorized the Prime Minister and Defense Minister to determine when to expand the ground campaign while continuing efforts to achieve a political agreement. Only after the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1701 calling for the end to hostilities on August 11 did Olmert authorize an offensive, and those two days of fighting proved costly for both sides ensued. Resolution 1701 called for the full cessation of hostilities, the extension of the Lebanese government‘s control over all Lebanese territory, and the deployment of Lebanese forces and an expanded UNIFIL, 15,000 each, in a buffer zone between the Israeli-Lebanese border and the Litani River to be free of ―any armed personnel‖ other than the Lebanese army and UNIFIL.185 The resolution authorized UNIFIL to ensure that its area of operations is not used for hostile activities and to resist by forceful means attempts to prevent it from discharging its duties. It banned the supply of arms to Lebanon, except as authorized by the government, and called for the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon. The resolution did not require the return of the abducted Israeli soldiers or the release of Lebanese prisoners. It requested the Secretary-General to develop proposals for the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, ―including by dealing with the Shib‘a Farms area.‖ The truce went into effect on August 14. In all, 44 Israel civilians and 121 military men, 1,191 Lebanese civilians, 46 Lebanese soldiers, and an estimated 600 Hezbollah militants died in the war. The Lebanese Army began to move south to the border on August 17 as Israeli forces handed over positions to the U.N. Hezbollah leader Nasrallah declared victory and said that Hezbollah would not disarm as long as Israel did not withdraw completely from Lebanon, including the Shib‘a Farms. On August 14, the Lebanese Defense Minister said that his army had no intention of disarming Hezbollah, but Hezbollah weapons would no longer be visible. On August 19, Israeli commandos raided an Hezbollah stronghold near Ba‘albek in the Bekaa Valley. Hezbollah did not respond and the cease-fire held. Olmert accepted responsibility for the war and claimed as achievements a terrorist organization no longer allowed to operate from Lebanon and a government of Lebanon

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responsible for its territory. He also claimed that a severe blow had been dealt to Hezbollah.186 After the war, Olmert expressed hope that the cease-fire could help ―build a new reality between Israel and Lebanon,‖ while Prime Minister Siniora declared that Lebanon would be the last country to sign a peace agreement with Israel. On September 7, Olmert said that if the Shib‘a Farms is determined to be Lebanese and not Syrian and if Lebanon fulfills its obligations under U.N. resolutions, including the disarming of Hezbollah, then Israel would discuss the Farms with Lebanon. On October 30, the U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon reported that there has been no breach of the 2006 cease-fire and that the parties show determination to keep it. He noted reports of suspected Hezbollah construction north of the Litani River and in the Bekaa Valley, and stated that the Israeli government contends that Hezbollah has rearmed itself to a level higher than prior to the 2006 conflict because of the transfer of weapons from Iran and Syria in violation of the arms embargo.187 On February 12, 2008, Hezbollah operative Imad Mughniyah, who was suspected of planning terrorist attacks in the 1980s against Americans in Lebanon and in the 1990s against Jews and Israelis in Argentina, was killed in a car bombing in Damascus, Syria. On May 31, Hezbollah handed over to Israel the remains of five soldiers killed in the summer war of 2006, and Israel released an Israeli of Lebanese descent who had been convicted of spying for Hezbollah. On June 29, the Israeli cabinet approved a larger prisoner exchange with Hezbollah. The remains of two Israeli soldiers whose capture by Hezbollah had triggered the 2006 war, a report on Ron Arad, an Israeli pilot missing in action since 1986, and the remains of Israeli soldiers killed in the 2006 war were given to Israel. In exchange, Israel released Samir Kuntar, a Lebanese member of a Palestinian terrorist group who had killed an Israeli man and his young daughter in 1979, four Hezbollah fighters, the bodies of eight Hezbollah members, and the bodies of other terrorists, and information on four missing Iranian diplomats to the U.N. Secretary General. At a later date, Israel released some Palestinian prisoners. During a visit to Lebanon, Secretary Rice called for U.N. action on Shib‘a Farms. Hezbollah has used that Israeli occupation to justify its ―resistance‖ and rejection of disarmament, but says that putting the Farms in U.N. custody will not end its resistance. On June 18, Israel offered to start direct peace talks on all issues with Lebanon. The Lebanese government rejected the offer, stating that occupied Lebanese territory is subject to ―U.N. resolutions that do not require any negotiations.‖188 Beirut demanded that Israel return Shib‘a and provide maps of mines and cluster bombs left during the 2006 war. On July 13, new Lebanese President Michel Suleiman said the Shib‘a Farms area should be liberated through diplomatic means, but, if diplomacy fails, military operations would be used. On August 13, he and Syrian President Asad stated that a committee would work to ―define and draw the Syrian-Lebanese borders,‖ but Shi‘ba Farms will not be demarcated until Israel withdraws.189 On September 4, Hezbollah leader Nasrallah declared that his group would not disarm even if Israel withdrew from the Shib‘a Farms and the northern Ghajar village because its weapons are needed to defend Lebanon from Israel.190 In his November 18, Report to the Security Council, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted that there had been no breaches of the cessation of hostilities. He again cited Israeli concerns that Hezbollah was rebuilding its military capacity on both sides of the Litani River, but noted that UNIFIL had not been provided with nor found evidence of new military infrastructures or smuggling arms in its

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area of operation.191 The Secretary-General also noted that Hezbollah continued to maintain a substantial military capacity distinct from the Lebanese state in contravention of 1701. In addition, he called on Israel to cease all over flights of Lebanese territory that violate Lebanese sovereignty and 1701. On March 18, 2009, President Suleiman ruled out the possibility that his country would hold direct peace talks with Israel, saying that a regional conference would be the best way to resolve differences between the two neighbors. On June 12, U.S. Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell met separately with Lebanese President Suleiman, Prime Minister Siniora, and parliamentarian (and Prime Minister-designate) Saad al Hariri in Beirut. Mitchell declared, ―There will be no solutions at the expense of Lebanon.‖192 Suleiman advised, ―any settlement in the region that is not based on the resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue is ineffective.‖193 He called for ending Israel‘s occupation of Shib‘a Farms, Kfar Shuba hills, and the northern part of the town of Al Ghajar. There was increased tension on the Israeli-Lebanese border. On July 14, an explosion occurred at a suspected Hezbollah munitions site south of the Litani River. As the Lebanese continued efforts to form a government, Israeli and Hezbollah officials exchanged threats. On August 6, Defense Minister Barak said that Israel was ―not ready to accept a situation in which a neighboring country has in its government and parliament a militia that has its own policy and 40,000 rockets aimed at Israel.‖194 He added that, Israel would use all necessary force if there were a fresh conflict on its northern border.‖ An Hezbollah official responded that if Israel ―commits an error,‖ then it would find that the 2006 conflict was ―just a bit of fun.‖195 On August 10, Prime Minister Netanyahu denied tensions were increasing, but repeated that‖ if Hezbollah joins the government, it will be clear that the Lebanese government will be held responsible for any attack coming from its territory against Israel.....It can‘t hide and say, ‗It‘s Hezbollah, we don‘t control them.‘‖196 The next day, he denied that there was any unusual tension or activity on the border, claiming ―this is a media storm, nothing else.‖197 In an August 14 speech, Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah warned that if Israel bombed Beirut, then Hezbollah would bomb Tel Aviv. ―We have the ability to hit any city or town in your entity.‖ 198 On September 11, two 122-mm rockets were fired from Lebanon into northern Israel. Israeli officials held the Lebanese government responsible for any firing done from its territory and Israeli forces responded with artillery fire against the Lebanese village from which the rockets were fired and by scrambling fighter jets across the border. There were no reports of injuries on either side. It was the first such incident since February. A group calling itself the Ziad al Jarrah division of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades later claimed responsibility on a website used by supporters of Al Qaeda. (Al Jarrah was one of the 9/11 hijackers and Azzam was close to Osama bin Laden.) The claim could not be verified. Israel reportedly believes that the perpetrators are a Palestinian-Sunni group with links to global jihadists backed by Al Qaeda.199 UNIFIL is focusing its investigation on extremist groups linked to Palestinian refugee camps. Prime Minister Fouad Siniora voiced concern that the incident was aimed at dragging Lebanon into a crisis, and he charged that Israel‘s response was ―an attack on Lebanon and its sovereignty.‖200

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Israel-Jordan Of Jordan‘s 3.4 million people, 55 to 70% are Palestinian. (The official figure is 42%.) Jordan initialed a June 1993 agenda with Israel on water, energy, environment, and economic matters on September 14, 1993. On July 25, 1994, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and King Hussein signed the Washington Declaration, a non-belligerency accord. A peace treaty was signed on October 26, 1994. (See ―Significant Agreements,‖ below). The border was demarcated and Israel withdrew from Jordanian land on February 9, 1995. More agreements followed. Although supportive of the peace process and of normalization of relations with Israel, on March 9, 1997, King Hussein charged that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was ―bent on destroying the peace process....‖ After Israeli agents bungled an attempt to assassinate Hamas official Khalid Mish‘al in Jordan on September 25, 1997, the King demanded that Israel release Hamas founder Shaykh Yassin, which it did on October 1, with 70 Jordanian and Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the detained Israeli agents. On December 5, 1998, the King called for Jordanian-Palestinian coordination, observing that many final status issues are Jordanian national interests. King Hussein died on February 7, 1999, and was succeeded by his son Abdullah. King Abdullah II said that the Palestinians should administer the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem, a traditional responsibility of his family, and proposed that Jerusalem be an Israeli and a Palestinian capital, but rejected a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. Until Israel and the Palestinians reach an accord, however, Jordan insists on its right to maintain and oversee the holy sites. On November 21, 2000, Jordan stopped accreditation of a new ambassador to Israel because of Israeli ―aggression‖ against the Palestinians. On March 18, 2004, the King met Prime Minister Sharon to discuss Israel‘s security barrier and disengagement from Gaza. In February 2005, Jordan sent an ambassador to Israel; in March, its foreign minister visited Israel for the first time in four years. In a March 14, 2007, address to a joint session of Congress, the King pleaded for U.S. leadership in the peace process, which he called the ―core issue in the Middle East.‖ He suggested that the Arab Peace Initiative is a path to achieve a collective peace treaty.

SIGNIFICANT AGREEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS Israel-PLO Mutual Recognition On September 9, 1993, PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat recognized Israel‘s right to exist, accepted U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the Middle East peace process, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. He renounced terrorism and violence and undertook to prevent them, stated that articles of the Palestinian Charter that contradict his commitments are invalid, undertook to submit Charter changes to the Palestine National Council, and called upon his people to reject violence. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and agreed to negotiate with it.201

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Declaration of Principles On August 29, 1993, Israel and the Palestinians announced that they had agreed on a Declaration of Principles on interim self-government for the West Bank and Gaza, after secret negotiations in Oslo, Norway, since January 1993. Effective October 13, it called for Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and Jericho; transfer of authority over domestic affairs in the West Bank and Gaza to Palestinians; election of a Palestinian Council with jurisdiction over the West Bank and Gaza. During the interim period, Israel is to be responsible for external security, settlements, Israelis in the territories, and foreign relations. Permanent status negotiations to begin in the third year of interim rule and may include Jerusalem.202

Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area Signed on May 4, 1994, provides for Israeli withdrawal from Gaza/Jericho, and describes the Palestinian Authority‘s (PA) responsibilities. The accord began the five-year period of interim self-rule.203

Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty Signed on October 26, 1994.

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Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, West Bank-Gaza Strip (Also called the Taba Accords or Oslo II.) Signed on September 28, 1995. Annexes deal with security arrangements, elections, civil affairs, legal matters, economic relations, IsraeliPalestinian cooperation, and the release of prisoners. Negotiations on permanent status to begin in May 1996. An 82-member Palestinian Council and Head of the Council‘s Executive Authority will be elected after the Israeli Defense Force redeploys from Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarem, Qalqilyah, Ramallah, and Bethlehem, and 450 towns and villages. Israel will redeploy in Hebron, except where necessary for security of Israelis. Israel will be responsible for external security and the security of Israelis and settlements. Palestinians will be totally responsible for Area ―A,‖ the six cities, plus Jericho. Israeli responsibility for overall security will have precedence over Palestinian responsibility for public order in Area ―B,‖ Palestinian towns and villages. Israel will retain full responsibility in Area ―C,‖ unpopulated areas. Palestinian Charter articles calling for the destruction of Israel will be revoked within two months of the Council‘s inauguration.204

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Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron Initialed by Israel and the PA on January 15, 1997. Details security arrangements. Accompanying Israeli and Palestinian Notes for the Record and letter from Secretary of State Christopher to Prime Minister Netanyahu.205

Wye River Memorandum Signed on October 23, 1998. Delineated steps to complete implementation of the Interim Agreement and of agreements accompanying the Hebron Protocol. Israel will redeploy from the West Bank in exchange for Palestinian security measures. The PA will have complete or shared responsibility for 40% of the West Bank, of which it will have complete control of 18.2%. The PLO Executive and Central Committees will reaffirm a January 22, 1998, letter from Arafat to President Clinton that specified articles of the Palestinian Charter that had been nullified in April 1996. The Palestine National Council will reaffirm these decisions. President Clinton will address this conclave.206

Sharm al Shaykh Memorandum

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(Also called Wye II.) Signed on September 4, 1999.207 Israeli Prime Minister Barak and PA Chairman Arafat agreed to resume permanent status negotiations in an accelerated manner in order to conclude a framework agreement on permanent status issues in five months and a comprehensive agreement on permanent status in one year. Other accords dealt with unresolved matters of Hebron, prisoners, etc.

A Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (More briefly referred to as the Road Map.) Presented to Israel and the Palestinian Authority on April 30, 2003, by the Quartet (i.e., the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia). To achieve a comprehensive settlement in three phases by 2005. Phase I calls for the Palestinians to unconditionally end violence, resume security cooperation, and undertake political reforms, and for Israel to withdraw from areas occupied since September 28, 2000, and to freeze all settlement activity. Phase II will produce a Palestinian state with provisional borders. Phase III will end in a permanent status agreement which will end the conflict.208

Agreement on Movement and Access From the Gaza Strip, reached on November 15, 2005, calls for reopening the Rafah border crossing to Egypt with European Union monitors on November 25, live closed circuit

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TV feeds of the crossing to Israel, Palestinian bus convoys between the West Bank and Gaza beginning December 15, exports from Gaza into Israel, and construction of the Gaza seaport.209

Joint Understanding Read by President Bush at the Annapolis Conference, November 27, 2007. Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas express their determination to immediately launch continuous, bilateral negotiations in an effort to conclude a peace treaty resolving all core issues before the end of 2008. They also commit to immediately and continuously implement their respective obligations under the Road Map until they reach a peace treaty. Implementation of the peace treaty will be subject to the implementation of the Road Map, as judged by the United States.210

ROLE OF CONGRESS

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Aid Foreign aid issues related to the peace process are covered extensively in other CRS reports. For details, please see CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti, and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel , by Jeremy M. Sharp, CRS Report RL32260, U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2010 Request, by Jeremy M. Sharp. In general, in order to ensure that Israel has a partner for peace, Congress has provide assistance for the development of Palestinian institutions, security forces, and democracy, including language that prohibits any assistance for Hamas unless it meets international conditions with respect to Israel, and requires good governance practices. It also has appropriated considerable military assistance for Israel and included language ensuring Israel‘s ―qualitative military edge‖ over its regional neighbors. Congress also has increased aid to Jordan, in part to short up its position as a voice of moderation and for peace in the region.

Jerusalem Israel annexed the city in 1967 and proclaimed it to be Israel‘s eternal, undivided capital. Palestinians seek East Jerusalem as their capital. Successive U.S. Administrations have maintained that the parties must determine the fate of Jerusalem in negotiations. H.Con.Res. 60, June 10, 1997, and S.Con.Res. 21, May 20, 1997, called on the Administration to affirm that Jerusalem must remain the undivided capital of Israel. Congress has repeatedly prohibited official U.S. government business with the Palestinian Authority (PA) in Jerusalem and the use of appropriated funds to create U.S. government offices in Israel to conduct business with the PA and allows Israel to be recorded as the place of birth of U.S. citizens

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born in Jerusalem. These provisions are again in P.L. 111-117, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, signed into law on December 16, 2009. The State Department does not recognize Jerusalem, Israel as a place of birth for passports because the U.S. government does not recognize all of Jerusalem as part of Israel. A related issue is the relocation of the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Proponents argue that Israel is the only country where a U.S. embassy is not in the capital, that Israel‘s claim to West Jerusalem, proposed site of an embassy, is unquestioned, and that Palestinians must be disabused of their hope for a capital in Jerusalem. Opponents say a move would undermine the peace process and U.S. credibility in the Islamic world and with Palestinians, and would prejudge the final status of the city. P.L. 104-45, November 8, 1995, provided for the embassy‘s relocation by May 31, 1999, but granted the President authority, in national security interest, to suspend limitations on State Department expenditures that would be imposed if the embassy did not open. Presidents Clinton and Bush each used the authority several times, and President Obama did so on June 5, 2009. The State Department Authorization Act for FY2002-FY2003, P.L. 107-228, September 30, 2002, urged the President to begin relocating the U.S. Embassy ―immediately.‖ President Bush replied that the provision would ―if construed as mandatory ... impermissibly interfere with the president‘s constitutional authority to conduct the nation‘s foreign affairs.‖ The State Department declared, ―our view of Jerusalem is unchanged. Jerusalem is a permanent status issue to be negotiated between the parties.‖ The Obama Administration, in line with its demand for an end to all settlement activity beyond the 1967 Green Line (armistice line), objected to Israeli construction of new settler housing at the former Shepherd Hotel in a predominantly Palestinian neighborhood of East Jerusalem. Israel maintains that Jerusalem is not included in the areas under discussion for a construction freeze.

Compliance/Sanctions President Bush signed the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, P.L. 108-175, on December 12, 2003, to hold Syria accountable for its conduct, including actions that undermine peace. On May 11, 2004, he cited the Act as well as the International Emergency Powers Act, P.L. 95-223, October 28, 1977, as the basis for his authority to issue Executive Order 13399 block property of certain persons and prohibit the exportation or reexportation of certain goods to Syria. In 2006 and 2008, President Bush issued additional executive orders on the subject. On May 7, 2009, President Obama declared a one-year continuance of the national emergency with respect to Syria to allow the sanctions to remain in place. In a letter to Members of Congress, he said, ―Syria poses a threat to U.S. interests‖ and accused its leadership of ―supporting terrorist organizations‖ among other actions.

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Israeli Raid on Suspected Syrian Nuclear Site

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Sec. 328 of the Conference Report (H.Rept. 110-478) for H.R. 2082, the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2008, agreed to in the House on December 13, 2007, would have limited spending of the intelligence budget to 30% until each member of the intelligence committees has been informed with respect to intelligence regarding the facility targeted on September 6. The Administration objected that this provision would circumvent the Executive‘s authority to control access to extraordinarily sensitive information.211 The Senate agreed to the Conference Report on February 13, 2008, by a vote of 51-45 and the bill was cleared for the White House, but it was not signed. On April 24, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, CIA Director Michael Hayden, and Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell presented evidence to congressional committees that the Israeli target was a nuclear reactor, designed by and being built with the assistance of North Korea. Hayden said that the reactor was within weeks or months of completion and, within a year of entering operation, it could have produced enough material for at least one weapon. These officials reportedly acknowledged lack of evidence indicating that Syria was working on nuclear weapons designs and that they had not identified a source of nuclear material for the facility. They expressed ―low confidence‖ that the site was part of a nuclear weapons program.212 They also denied U.S. involvement in planning or executing the September 6 strike. Experts suggested that the inability to identify a source of fuel raised questions about when the reactor would have been operational and agreed that the inability to identify facilities to separate plutonium from fuel raised further questions about whether the reactor was part of a weapons program.213 Damascus has allowed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) only one visit to the site and has turned down requests for follow-up visits and for access to other sites. The IAEA has said that the building had characteristics of a nuclear facility and that its inspectors had detected ―significant‖ traces of man-made uranium at the site.

Gaza Fact-Finding Mission (―Goldstone Report‖) On September 15, 2009, the U.N. Human Rights Council‘s Gaza Fact-Finding Mission, headed by South African Judge Richard Goldstone, presented its report on the December 2008-January 2009 conflict between Israel and Hamas, which Israel refers to as Operation Cast Lead.214 The report concluded that ―there is evidence indicating serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law were committed by Israel ... and that Israel committed actions amounting to war crimes, and possibly crimes against humanity. The report also found ―evidence that Palestinian armed groups committed war crimes, as well as possibly crimes against humanity in their repeated launching of rockets and mortars into Southern Israel.‖ The Mission asked the U.N. Security Council to order Israel and Hamas to conduct credible investigations into the alleged crimes. If either side fails to do so within six months, it said, then the evidence should be referred to the International Criminal Court prosecutor in the Hague. Israel is not a member of the International Criminal Court, which can only prosecute Israeli citizens if the Security Council orders an inquiry.

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Israel rejected the idea of a special investigation and denounced the report for ignoring its right to self-defense, making unsubstantiated claims about its intent, and challenging Israel‘s democratic values and rule of law. Israel further criticized the report for ignoring Hamas‘s deliberate strategy of operating within and behind the civilian population in Gaza, and charged that the Mission‘s goal is to instigate ―a political campaign against Israel.‖215 An Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman stated, ―We are speaking to members of the Security Council and countries that are conducting operations in Afghanistan. Our message is this: If this U.N. report is allowed to set a precedent, no country can feel safe in defending itself against terrorism or any other kind of threat."216 Prime Minister Netanyahu vowed not to allow Israeli officials to go to the Hague. On September 18, the U.S. State Department criticized the report‘s ―overwhelming focus‖ on and ―sweeping conclusions of fact and law‖ with respect to Israel, while making more general and tentative conclusions regarding ―Hamas‘s deplorable conduct.‖ PA President Abbas is said to have been weakened by initially trying to postpone action in the U.N. Human Rights Council on the Report until March 2010, as did the United States. Abbas‘s effort left him vulnerable to charges in the Palestinian media and from Hamas and other Arab governments of betraying the Palestinian people. He then reversed his position and supported rapid efforts to condemn Israel. The U.N. Human Rights Council and the General Assembly adopted the Report; the United States voted against the recommendation in both bodies. The Council‘s resolution condemned Israel, not Hamas, which the Report also criticized. It is believed that the Security Council is unlikely to take up the matters because all five of the permanent members oppose its involvement. The United States voted against the adoption of the Report in both U.N. bodies. On September 18, the U.S. State Department criticized the Report‘s ―overwhelming focus‖ on and ―sweeping conclusions of fact and law‖ with respect to Israel, while making more general and tentative conclusions regarding ―Hamas‘s deplorable conduct.‖ U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Susan Rice expressed concern about the Mission‘s ―unbalanced, one-sided, and unacceptable‖ mandate, which was to investigate Israel‘s ―war crimes.‖217 On September 29, at the Human Rights Council, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Michael Posner encouraged ―Israel to utilize appropriate domestic review and meaningful accountability mechanisms to investigate and follow up on credible allegations‖ and called on Hamas to launch an inquiry into the firing of rockets into Israel during the fighting in January.218 Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu suggest that ―If the report reaches the international court in Hague, it will bring the peace process to a halt because Israel won‘t take the risks necessary to achieve peace if it is not assured the right to defense itself.‖219 On November 3, the House of Representatives passed H.Res. 867, describing the Goldstone Report as ―irredeemably biased and unworthy of further consideration or legitimacy.‖

Other S.Res. 10, agreed to by unanimous consent in the Senate on January 8, 2009, and H.Res. 34, agreed to in the House on January 9, by a vote of 390-5, 22 present, recognize Israel‘s

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right to defend itself against attacks from Gaza, and reaffirm the United States‘ strong support for Israel, and support the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. H.Res. 130, introduced on February 4, 2009, expressing support for the appointment of former Senator George Mitchell as Special Envoy for Middle East Peace.

Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. Figure 1. Israel and Its Neighbors

End Notes 1

The Secretary‘s November 25, 2009 statement on Israel‘s Announcement Regarding Settlements is accessible at http://www.state.gov. 2 Richard Boudreaux, ―Israel Halts Building Permits,‖ Chicago Tribune, November 26, 2009. 3 Briefing by Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell, November 25, 2009, accessible at http://www.state.gov. 4 Statement by White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs on Construction in East Jerusalem, December 28, 2009, accessible at http://www.whitehouse.gov. 5 Charles Levinson, ―Abbas Says Palestinians Won‘t Rise Up, for Now,‖ Wall Street Journal, December 22, 2009. 6 Matthew Lee, ―US Readies New Mideast Peace Push,‖ Associated Press, January 7, 2010.

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7

Remarks with Jordanian Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh after their Meeting, January 8, 2010, http://www. state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/134972.htm. 8 Address to the Knesset by Prime Minister-designate Binyamin Netanyahu introducing Israel‘s 32nd Government, Channel 10 Television, March 31, 2009, Open Source Center Document GMP20090331738004. 9 Text at http://thepage.time.com/transcript-george-mitchell-on-charlie-rose/. 10 ―PLO Figure Urayqat Comments on Initiative to Resume Talks with Israel,‖ Al-Jazeera TV, January 8, 2010, also quoting Al-Ayyam newspaper, BBC Monitoring Middle East, January 9, 2010. 11 ―Abbas Calls for Settlement Freeze ‗For a Fixed Period,‘‖ Al-Manar TV (Beirut), January 12, 2010. 12 ―Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas Said he will Resist U.S. Pressure to resume Peace Talks,‖ Reuters, January 14, 2010. 13 ―PM Netanyahu Addresses the Foreign Press Association in Israel,‖ January 20, 2010, accessible via Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs website http://www.mfa.gov.il. 14 ―US Envoy in Israel in Bid to Relaunch Peace Process,‖ AFP, January 21, 2010. 15 Mark Lavie, ―Netanyahu‘s Claim Riles Palestinians,‖ Boston Globe, January 25, 2010, Amy Teibel, ―Parts of West Bank Israel‘s, says Premier,‖ Associated Press, January 25, 2010. 16 Barak Ravid, ―Benjamin Netanyahu: Israel to Retain Key West Bank Settlement in any Peace Deal,‖ http://www.haaretz.com 17 Transcript of interview by Joe Klein conducted January 15, 2010, accessible via http://www.time.com., excerpted in Time, January 21, 2010. 18 Reported in ―Abbas: Palestinians will Accept Only Jerusalem as Our Capital,‖ http://www.haaretz.com, January 28, 2010. 19 ―PM: We Would Accept France as a Mediator in Talks with Syria,‖ Jerusalem Post, November 15, 2009. 20 Mark Weiss, ―Israel Seizes Vessel with Cargo of Weapons Believed from Iran,‖ Irish Times, November 5, 2009. 21 For additional background, see William B. Quandt, Peace Process, American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, Revised Edition 2001; Charles Enderlin, Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace Process in the Middle East, New York, Other Press, 2003; Anton La Guardia, War Without End: Israelis Palestinians and the Struggle for a Promised Land, New York, St. Martin‘s Griffin, Revised and Updated, 2003; Alan Dowty, Israel/Palestine, Cambridge, UK, Polity Press, 2005; and Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004. 22 Anne Gearan, ―Rice Blasts Way Iran Treats Its Own People,‖ Associated Press, February 4, 2005. 23 National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley in a press Briefing, January 10, 2008, http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/01/20080110-7.html. 24 Hilary Leila Krieger, ―Mitchell could Support PA Unity Gov‘t,‖ Jerusalem Post, February 19, 2009. 25 Paul Richter, ―In West Bank, Clinton Criticizes Israel,‖ Los Angeles Times, March 5, 2009. 26 Paul Richter, ―Obama Gets Ball Rolling on Mideast,‖ Los Angeles Times, April 22, 2009. 27 Ethan Bronner, ―Bush Deal over ‗Freeze‖ Splits Israel and Obama,‖ New York Times, June 4, 2009. 28 Dov Weissglas, ―Agreements Need to be Kept,‖ Yedi’ot Aharonot, June 28, 2009. 29 Eli Lake, ―U.S., Israel at Odds over 2003 Settlement Accord,‖ Washington Times, July 22, 2009. 30 Elliott Abrams, ―The Settlement Freeze Fallacy,‖ Washington Post, April 8, 2009. 31 Glenn Kessler, ―Clinton Rejects Israeli Claims of Accord on Settlements,‖ Washington Post, June 6, 2009. 32 Elliott Abrams, ―Hillary is Wrong About the Settlements,‖ Wall Street Journal, June 25, 2009. 33 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_pre ss_office/Remarks-by-the President-at-Cairo-University-6-04-09/ 34 Barak Ravid, ―U.S. Envoy Assures Israel Policy Rift Won‘t Break Alliance,‖ http://www.haaretz.com, June 9, 2009. 35 The Gulf Cooperation Council is comprised of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. 36 The Arab Maghreb Union is comprised of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. 37 Remarks at Israeli Policy Forum, January 7, 2001, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 37, no. 2, January 15, 2001, p. 32. The Clinton proposal also is known as ―the Clinton Plan‖ or ―Clinton Parameters.‖ 38 Lee Hockstader, ―Jerusalem is ‗Indivisible,‘ Sharon Says; Camp David Concessions are Called ‗Null and Void,‘‖ Washington Post, February 8, 2001. 39 Jane Perlez, ―Bush Officials Pronounce Clinton Mideast Plan Dead,‖ New York Times, February 9, 2001. 40 Interview by Ari Shavit, Haaretz, April 13, 2001, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Document GMP200110413000070. 41 See http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov. 42 Newsweek interview, quoted by Ibrahim Barzak, ―Jewish Settlements Mortared in Gaza; Israel Leader Raps Arafat in Interview, Associated Press, December 9, 2001. 43 ―Israeli Cabinet Decision on Cutting Contacts with Arafat,‖ Government Press Office, December 13, 2001, FBIS Document GMP200111213000010. 44 For ―Arab Peace Initiative,‖ see http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/peace02.htm. 45 For text of the speech, see http://geogewbush-whtehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020624-3.html.

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51

―Sharon, ‗Certain‘ of Passing ‗Painful Concessions‘ in Knesset,‖ Ma’ariv, April 15, 2003, FBIS Document GMP20030415000091. 47 For text of Israel‘s reservations, see Israel’s Response to the Road Map, online via http://www.knesset.gov.il/ 48 For text, see the Geneva Initiative website at http://www.heskem.org.il. 49 For text, see ―Sharon Outlines Disengagement Plan from Palestinians in Herzliyya Speech,‖ Parts 1 and 2, Voice of Israel, December 18, 2003, Open Source Center Documents GMP20031218000215 and GMP200312180002167. 50 For text of letters, see Israel‘s Ministry of Foreign Affairs at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/ Reference+Documents/Exchange+of+letters+Sharon-Bush+14-Apr-2004.htm. 51 For text, see http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Letter+Weissglas-Rice+18-Apr2004.htm. 52 For text, see http://www.icj-cij.org. Note, Israel refers to the barrier as a ―fence‖ and the Palestinians and other critics refer to it as a ―wall.‖ Neutral observers often use the word ―barrier.‖ 53 Interview by Ari Shavit, ―The Big Freeze,‖ Haaretz, October 8, 2004, FBIS Document GMP20041008000026. 54 Interview by Golan Yokhpaz, IDF Radio, August 15, 2005, FBIS Document GMP20050815621002. 55 ―Israel: ‗Sharp‘ Sharon-Rice ‗Dispute‖ over Hamas Election Participation Reported,‖ Haaretz, November 14, 2005, Open Source Center Document GMP20051114614002. 56 This and subsequent Quartet statements cited may be found at http://2001-2009.state.gov. 57 For Hamas Covenant text, see http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/hamas.htm. 58 ―UN: Statement by Middle East Quartet,‖ M2 Presswire, January 31, 2006. 59 For text of a later, final version of the National Accord Document (also known as the Palestinian Prisoners‘s Agreement), see Palestine Liberation Organization Negotiations Affairs Department website http://www.nadplo.org/ inner.php?view=news-updates_pre. 60 See http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060523-9.html for text of joint news conference. 61 Gil Hoffman, ―Olmert Bids to Enlist Chirac Support for Realignment; PM tells British MPS: Israel Would Never Agree to Withdraw to Pre-1967 Borders,‖ Jerusalem Post, June 14, 2006. 62 ―Text of National Consensus Document signed by the Palestinian factions, except the Islamic Jihad Movement,‖ Al-Ayyam, Open Source Center Document GMP20060628253002. 63 For text of Foreign Ministry comments, see http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa. 64 For text Olmert‘s speech, see Israel‘s MFA at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/ Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2006/PM+Olmert+reaches+out+to+Palestinians+at+Ben-Gurion+memorial+27Nov-2006.htm. For what Olmert called the ―Saudi Peace Initiative, also called the ―Beirut Declaration‖ or ―Arab Peace Initiative,‖ see http://www.saudiembassy.net/2002News/Statements/StateDetail.asp?cIndex=142. 65 Cam Simpson, ―Dangerous Territory: With Aid, U.S. Widens Role in Palestinian Crisis; To Undercut Hamas And Iran, Bush Pushes $86 Million Plan‖ Wall Street Journal, January 12, 2007. 66 Text of the Mecca Accord was published on http://www.middle-east-online.com February 9, 2007. 67 For ―Arab Peace Initiative,‖ see http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/peace02.htm. 68 It has been widely reported that Olmert met Saudi National Security Advisor Prince Bandar in September 2006 in Jordan. Barbara Slavin, ―Arabs try Outreach to Israel, U.S. Jews....‖ USA Today, February 12, 2007, quotes former Israeli Ambassador to the United States Danny Ayalon confirming the meeting. For Olmert‘s speech referring to the Saudi peace initiative, see http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ Government/ Speeches+ by+Israeli+leaders/2006/ PM+Olmert+reaches+out+to+Palestinians+at+Ben-Gurion+memorial+27-Nov2006.htm. 69 Some commentators suggest that Hamas‘s acceptance of a state withing the 1967 borders constitutes ―implicit‖ recognition of Israel and that the demand for explicit recognition is ―unreasonable‖ due to Israel‘s continuing occupation and failure to define its borders. Daoud Kuttab, ―Obstacle or Opportunity? How the Palestinian Unity Government Offers a Path to Peace,‖ Washington Post, March 26, 2007. 70 ―Israeli PM Offers Dialogue to Arabs,‖ Associated Press, April 2, 2007. 71 Program of Fayyad‘s Government, Ma‘an News Agency, July 27, 2007, BBC Monitoring Middle East, July 28, 2007. 72 Statement on ―This Week‖ television show, July 15, 2007, quoted in Robin Wright, ―U.S. Bet on Abbas for Middle East Peace Meets Skepticism,‖ Washington Post, July 16, 2007. 73 For President‘s speech, see http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/07/ 200707167.html. 74 FM Livni‘s Press Conference with US Secretary of State Rice, (Israeli) Government Press Office, October 18, 2007, Open Source Center Document GMP20071018738002. 75 Noam Shelef, Peace Now, informed CRS on January 30, 2008, that there are 105 illegal outposts. 76 For text, see http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/11/print/20071127.html. For more on the conference, seeCRS Report RS22768, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: The Annapolis Conference, by Carol Migdalovitz.

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For text of President Bush‘s remarks, see http://georgewbush.whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/11/ 20071127-2.html. 78 ―James Blitz and Tobias Buck, ―Israelis Criticized Over Plan to Build on Occupied Land,‖ Financial Times, December 8, 2007. 79 Barak Ravid, ―PM: No West Bank Construction without my Prior Approval, http://www.haaretz.com, December 31, 2007. 80 Steven Lee Myers, ―Bush Outlines Mideast Peace Plan,‖ New York Times, January 11, 2008. 81 Remarks by President Bush and Prime Minister Olmert in Joint Press Availability, http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/01/20080110.html. 82 Shahar Ilan, ―Olmert Rules Out Gaza Ground Operation,‖ http://haaretz.com, January 15, 2008. 83 Joel Greenberg, ―Egypt Works to Restore Breached Gaza Border,‖ McClatchy-Tribune Service, January 27, 2008. 84 Isabel Kershner and Taghreed El-Khodary, ―Hamas Says Military Wing is Responsible for Bombing,‖ New York Times, February 6, 2008. 85 Barak Ravid and Shmuel Rosner, ―Olmert: Significant Progress Possible on Borders of Palestinian State,‖ http://haaretz.com, February 13, 2008. 86 Akiva Eldar, ―Israel, PA Negotiators Oppose PM‘s Bid to Delay Talks on Jerusalem,‖ http://www.haaretz.com, February 15, 2008. 87 David Landau and Yosi Verter, ―An Island of Political Stability,‖ http://www.haaretz.com, April 18, 2008. 88 ―PLO Executive Committee Denies Progress made in Negotiations with Israel,‖ WAFA, May 6, 2008, BBC Monitoring Middle East, May 7, 2008. 89 Herb Keinon, ―PM Touts Plan that Postpones J‘lem Talks,‖ Jerusalem Post, May 15, 2008. 90 Abd-al-Ra‘uf Arna‘ut, ―President Abbas says: We are Ready to Call Simultaneous Legislative and Presidential Elections,‖ Al-Ayyam, October 20, 2008, Open Source Center Document GMP20081020762002. 91 U.S. State Department, http://2001-2009.state.gov, December 29, 2008. 92 Margaret Coker, ―Israel Ground-Invasion Threat Looms in Gaza,‖ Wall Street Journal, January 3, 2009, quoting President Bush‘s weekly radio address. 93 ―Olmert Says Israeli Army to Continue Gaza Operation Despite UN Ceasefire Resolution,‖ Xinhua News Agency, January 9, 2009. 94 ―Hamas Says ‗Has Nothing to do with UN Resolution 1860,‘Says was not Consulted,‖ Palestine Information Center, January 9, 2009, Open Source Center Document GMP20090109761004. 95 Text of Memorandum of Understanding signed by US Secretary of State Rice and Israeli Foreign Minister Livni, see http://www.mfa.gov.il. 96 Palestinian figures are from U.N. Security Council, Update Report No. 3, Israel/Palestine: Gaza, January 26, 2009. The IDF reported that, according to the Research Department of the Israeli Defense Intelligence, 1,166 Palestinians were killed, of whom 709 were terror operatives, as well as 295 ―uninvolved Palestinians,‖ of whom 89 were under the age of 16 and 49 women. ―Majority of Palestinians Killed in Operation Cast Lead: Terror Operatives,‖ Official website of the IDF Spokesman‘s Office, http://dover.idf.il/IDF/English, Open Source Center Document, GMP2009032739004, March 26, 2009. 97 Shim‘on Schiffer, ―Expose: Olmert‘s Legacy,‖ Yedi’ot Aharonot, ―January 29, 2009, Open Source Center Document GMP20090129754001, Richard Boudreaux, ―Olmert‘s Peace Bid puts Livni in a Bind,‖ Los Angeles Times, February 4, 2009. 98 ―President Abbas Says: It is the Palestinian People who have Triumphed and Israel does not want Peace,‖ WAFA, January 27, 2009, Open Source Center Document GMP20090127751006. 99 ―President Abbas says: We are Moving in Steady Steps towards National Reconciliation,‖ WAFA, February 28, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East, March 1, 2009. 100 Ibrahim Barzak, ―Hamas, in Rare Move, Condemns Gaza Rocket Fire,‖ Associated Press, March 12, 2009. 101 Michael R. Gordon and Jeffrey Gettleman, ―U.S. Officials Say Israel Struck in Sudan,‖ New York Times, March 27, 2009. 102 Address to the Knesset by Prime Minister-designate Binyamin Netanyahu introducing Israel‘s 32nd Government, Channel 10 Television, March 31, 2009, Open Source Center Document GMP20090331738004. 103 Barak Ravid, ― Lieberman to Haaretz: Israel Ready for Mutual Peace Moves, http://www. haaretz.com, April 2, 2009. 104 ―Netanyahu Drops Demand for Jewish State Recognition,‖ Open Source Center Summary, April 20, 2009, Document GMP20090420738011. 105 Isabel Kershner, ―Israel: Netanyahu Demands Recognition of Israel First,‖ New York Times, April 17, 2009. 106 Isabel Kershner, ―Abbas Rejects Calling Israel a Jewish State,‖ New York Times, April 28, 2009. 107 ―PLO Negotiator Holds Joint Conference with US Envoy Mitchell in West Bank,‖ Palestinian News Agency Wafa, April 17, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East, April 18, 2009. 108 ―Prime Minister Netanyahu‘s Speech at AIPAC,‖ (Israeli) Government Press Office, May 5, 2009. 109 Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel in press availability, May 18, 2009, accessible via http://www.whitehouse.gov.

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Amy Teibel, ―Israel Rejects Demand for Halt on Settlements,‖ Associated Press, May 29, 2009. Mark Lavie, ―Netanyahu Takes Hard Line on Jerusalem,‖ Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, May 22, 2009. 112 Helene Cooper, ―Obama Talks of Being ‗Honest‘ with Israel,‖ New York Times, June 2, 2009. 113 For text of speech, see http://www.pmo.gov.il. 114 ―PM Netanyahu‘s Conference Call with Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations,‖ http://www.pmo.gov.il, July 1, 2009. 115 Howard Schneider, ―E.U. Defers Upgrade of Israel Trade Ties,‖ Washington Post, June 16, 2009. 116 Matthew Lee, ―AP Sources: Obama Envoy to Meet Israeli Leader,‖ Associated Press, June 16, 2009. 117 Michael Jansen, ―Palestinians say Israeli Speech ‗Closes Door to Permanent Status Negotiations,‘‖ Irish Times, June 16, 2009. 118 Ibid. 119 Khaled Yacoub Oweis, ―Hamas Leader Rejects ‗Freak‘ Israel Offer of State,‖ Reuters, June 25, 2009. 120 Saud Abu Ramadan, ―Abbas Challenges Netanyahu with More Hard-Line Stances,‖ Xinhua News Agency, July 12, 2009. 121 Ethan Bronner, ―As U.S Applies Pressure, Israel Willing to Freeze Settlements, Officials Say Any Offer is Contingent on Progress in Broader Peace Efforts,‖ New York Times, June 30, 2009. 122 For Clinton speech at Council on Foreign Relations, see http://www.state.gov/ secretary/rm/2009a/ july/126071.htm. 123 Jeffrey Heller, ―US Diplomats try to Revive Mideast Peace Talks,‖ Boston Globe, July 27, 2009. 124 Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, ―Obama Envoy: Peace Process will bring Arab-Israeli Normalization,‖ http://www.haaretz.com, July 27, 2009. 125 ―Saudi Arabia Rebuffs US Calls to Normalize Relations with Israel,‖ Daily Star (Beirut), August 3, 2009, Turki al-Faisal, ―Land First, then Peace,‖ New York Times, September 13, 2009. 126 Mark Lander, ―Mideast Envoy Says Misconceptions Cloud View of Peace Efforts,‖ New York Times, August 3, 2009. 127 ―Saudi Rejects Israel Recognition Without Withdrawal,‖ Arabianbusiness.com, July 30, 2009, quoting Foreign Ministry spokesman Osama Nugali. 128 Nathan Guttman, ―Obama Begins Pressuring Arab Leaders on Deal with Israel,‖ www. haaretz.com, July 29, 2009. 129 Herb Keinon, ―J‘Lem Expects Arab Gestures Soon,‖ Jerusalem Post, July 28, 2009. 130 ―US Says Mideast Peace Cannot Move Forward Without Confidence Building,‖ KUNA online, August 10, 2009, Open Source Center Document GMP20090810966033. 131 Natasha Mozgovaya, ―Mubarak: U.S. Will Unveil First Draft of Mideast Plan Next Month,‖ http://www.haaretz.com, August 19, 2009, citing Mubarak spokesman Suleiman Awad. 132 Speech to Knesset, op cit. 133 ―Palestinian President Addresses Fatah Sixth General Congress Opening Session,‖ Palestinian Satellite Channel TV, August 4, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East. 134 Abd-al-Ra‘uf Arna‘ut, ―Fatah: 11 Principles for Negotiations, Five Options for the Failure of Dialogue; Four Steps to Confront the Siege, and Seven Forms of Struggle,‖ Al-Ayyam (Ramallah), August 11, 2009, Open Source Center Document GMP20090811745009. Ali Sawafta, ―Abbas Stresses Talks, not ‗Resistance,‘‖ McClatchy-Tribune Business News, August 18, 2009, 135 Ali Sawafta, ―Abbas Stresses Talks, not ‗Resistance,‘‖ McClatchy-Tribune Business News, August 18, 2009. 136 ―‘Full Text‘ of Fayyad Gov‘t ‗Palestine Document‘ on Palestinian State by 2011,‖ WAFA (Ramallah), August 25, 2009, Open Source Center Document GMP20090827751004, also ―Fayyad Unveils Plan for De Facto State by 2011,‖ Ma‘an News Agency, August 25, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East, August 26, 2009. 137 U.S. State Department, Daily Press Briefing, August 27, 2009. 138 ―Construction Approval is Part of Dialogue with US – Israeli Defense Minister,‖ Voice of Israel, September 7, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East. 139 ―Attila Somfalvi, ―Netanyahu: Jerusalem is not a Settlement,‖ Ynetnews, September 14, 2009, quoting Netanyahu‘s discussion with the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that day. 140 Joshua Mitnick, ―Israel Says it Will Allow More Settlements – Netanyahu‘s Plan Gains Support Among Conservative Backers, but Draws Rebukes from the U.S. and Others,‖ Christian Science Monitor, September 7, 2009. 141 Remarks by the President to the United Nations General Assembly, September 23, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-to-the-United-Nations-GeneralAssembly. 142 Interview by Raghidah Dirgham, ―Abbas to Al-Hayah: Netanyahu‘s Government is a Problem and There is no Common Ground for Negotiations with it,‖ Al-Hayah, September 24, 2009, Open Source Center Document GMP200090924825001. 143 Press Conference with Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Jerusalem, on October 31, accessible at Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, http://www.mfa.gov.il. 111

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Mark Landler, ―Clinton Denies Easing Pressure on Israel,‖ and ―Short-Term Fixes Sought in Mideast,‖ New York Times, November 3 and 4, 2009, respectively. 145 Karen DeYoung and Howard Schneider, ―U.S. Hope Dims for High-Level Israeli-Palestinian Talks over State,‖ Washington Post, November 4, 2009. 146 Speech by Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas from Ramallah, Palestinian Satellite Channel TV, November 5, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East, November 6, 2009. 147 Isabel Kershner, ―Israel Moves Ahead with Plan to Expand Settlement in Disputed Part of Jerusalem,‖ New York Times, November 17, 2009. 148 Statement by White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs on Jerusalem, November 17, 2009, accessible at http://www.whitehouse.gov. 149 Shlomo Avineri, ―Only the June 4, 1967 Lines,‖ http://www.haaretz.com, August 6, 2008. 150 See also CRS Report RL33487, Syria: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp. 151 For text of speech, see ―Syria‘s Asad Addresses ‗New Middle East,‘ Arab ‗Failure‘ to Secure Peace,‖ Syrian Arab Television TV1, Open Source Center Document GMP200608156070001. 152 In interview by Hamdi Qandil on Dubai TV, August 23, 2006, Open Source Center Document GMP20060823650015. 153 ―Olmert Tells Israeli Paper: Golan ‗An Integral Part of the State of Israel‘,‖ Yedi’ot Aharonot, September 26, 2006, citing a Mishpaha newspaper interview, Open Source Center Document GMP20060926746002. 154 Shmuel Rosner, ―Chirac: France, U.S. Agree There is No Point Talking to Syria,‖ http://www.haaretz.com, November 29, 2006. 155 For text of Iraq Study Group report, see http://www.usip.org/isg/. 156 Gideon Alon, ―Olmert, Peretz Spar over Syrian Overtures,‖ http://www.haaretz.com/, December 18, 2006. 157 Interview with Andrea Mitchell of NBC News, January 17, 2007. 158 ―Israeli PM Discusses Interest in Arab Initiative, Syria Talks,‖ Al Arabiya TV, Dubai, July 10, 2007, BBC Monitoring Middle East, July 11, 2007. 159 Speech to People‘s Assembly, Syrian Arab Television, July 17, 2007, Open Source Center Document GMP20070717607001. 160 ―Report: New Satellite Photo Shows Construction at Syrian Site Bombed by Israel,‖ Associated Press, January 12, 2008. 161 William J. Broad, ―Syria Rebuilding on Site Destroyed by Israeli Bombs,‖ New York Times, January 12, 2008. 162 ―Assad Casts Doubt on Syrian Participation in Peace Summit,‖ Associated Press, October 11, 2007, citing an interview with Tunisian newspapers. 163 Herb Keinon and Yaakov Katz, ―Olmert Hints at Secret Syria Track,‖ Jerusalem Post, March 27, 2008, Mark Weiss, ―Barak: Renewing Peace Talks with Damascus is a Priority; Assad (sic) Accuses Israel of FootDragging in Negotiations,‖ Jerusalem Post, March 30, 2008. 164 ―Al-Asad Reveals Turkish Mediation with Israel,‖ Al-Watan, April 24, 2008, Open Source Center Document GMP20080424090001, also interview with Asad by editors of Al-Watan, April 27, 2008, Open Source Center Document FEA20080429651667. 165 Jay Solomon, ―Syria calls for U.S. to Play a Direct Role in Peace Talks,‖ Wall Street Journal, June 2, 2008. 166 Cam Simpson, ― Israel, Syria in Indirect Peace Talks,‖ Wall Street Journal, May 22, 2008, ―US Welcomes Syrian-Israeli Talks but Stresses Palestinian Track,‖ Yahoo! News, May 21, 2008, ―Rice: Israeli-Palestinian Track Most Likely to Produce Results,‖ Associated Press, May 22, 2008. 167 ―Syria says No Direct Talks with Israel before 2009,‖ Times of Oman, June 4, 2008, citing Al-Khaleej Emirates daily. 168 ―Syria says Israel Terms Signal not Serious on Peace,‖ Reuters, June 5, 2008. 169 Barak Ravid, ―Assad: Direct Talks with Israel Only After Bush Leaves Office,‖ http://www.haaretz.com, July 8, 2008. 170 ―Herb Keinon, ―Frustrated Israel watches Syria Break Out of Isolation,‖ Jerusalem Post, September 5, 2008. 171 Amir Rapaport, ―IB Estimate: Syria‘s Peace Intentions are Serious,‖ Ma’ariv, October 23, 2008, BBC Monitoring Middle East, October 24, 2008. 172 Mary Fitzgerald, ―Syria to Decide on Talks with Tel Aviv after Israeli Poll,‖ Irish Times, February 3, 2009. 173 Natasha Mozgovaya, ―Clinton Encourages Israel-Syria Peace Talks,‖ http://www.haaretz.com, March 7, 2009. 174 Khaled Yacoub Oweis, ―U.S. Officials Find ‗Common Ground‘ in Syria,‖ Reuters, March 7, 2009. 175 ―Peace with Israel Possible, Says Syria‘s Assad,‖ Reuters, March 9, 2009. 176 Interview quoted by Yoav Stern, ―Assad: Direct Israel Talks Possible if U.S. Mediates,‖ www. haaretz.com, March 11, 2009. 177 Ravid, April 2, 2009, op. cit. 178 Isabel Kershner, ―Netanyahu Says He‘s Willing to Talk with Syria,‖ New York Times, May 21, 2009. 179 ―US Envoy Says Syria has ‗Fundamental Role‘ in Achieving Comprehensive Peace,‖ Al-Hayat, June 14, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East, June 15, 2009. 180 ―Deputy FM: No Peace Talks with Syria Unless they are Direct,‖ Reuters, August 12, 2009. 181 ―Democratic Initiative will Affect Syria as Well, Says Assad,‖ Today’s Zaman, September 16, 2009.

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See CRS Report RL31078, The Shib'a Farms Dispute and Its Implications, by Alfred B. Prados. For text of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559, see http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions04.html. 184 For text of Olmert‘s speech, as carried on Israel Television Channel 1, see Open Source Center Document GMP20060717740013, July 17, 2006. 185 Text of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 is accessible online at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/ unsc_resolutions06.htm. 186 For text of Olmert‘s statement, see Israeli Television Channel 1, August 14, 2006, Open Source Center Document GMP20060814728001. 187 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), S/2007/641, October 30, 2007, accessible via http://www.un. org/Docs/sc/sgrep07.htm. 188 ―Beirut Reiterates Rejection of Bilateral Talks over Shebaa,‖ Daily Star, June 19, 2008. 189 Khaled Yacoub Oweis, ―Syria and Lebanon to Work on Drawing Border,‖ Reuters, August 14, 2008. 190 For background see CRS Report R40054, Lebanon: Background and U.S. Relations, by Casey L. Addis. 191 Report of the Secretary-General on Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), S/2008/715, November 18, 2008, accessible via http://www.un.gov. 192 ―Mitchell in Beirut: No Mideast Deal at Lebanon‘s Expense,‖ Al-Manar Television, June 12, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East, June 13, 2009. 193 ―Lebanese President Receives US Envoy Mitchell; Statements Issued,‖ Lebanese National News Agency, June 12, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East, June 13, 2009. 194 Amos Harel, Avi Issacharoff, et.al., ―Netanyahu: Israel Will Hold Lebanon Responsible for Any Hezbollah Attack,‖ http://www.haaretz.com, August 10, 2009. 195 ―Hezbollah Vows Tougher Reaction than 2006 if Israel attacks,‖ Xinhua New Agency, August 10, 2009. 196 Ron Bousso, ―Israel PM Warns Against Hezbollah in Lebanese Govt,‖ Agence France Presse, August 10, 2009, Ethan Bronner, ―Israel is Wary of Calm Days that May End in Turmoil,‖ New York Times, August 12, 2009. 197 ―PM: No Winds of War in North,‖ Ynetnews, August 11, 2009. 198 Speech transcript, Al-Manar Television, August 14, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East. 199 Amos Harel, ―Iran is Wasting Time in Nuclear Talks with West,‖ http://www.haaretz.com, September 13, 2009. 200 Patrick Galey, ―Israel says Lebanese Government to Blame for Rockets,‖ McClatchy-Tribune Business News, September 14, 2009. 201 For text, see http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22579.htm. 202 For text, see http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22602.htm. 203 For text, see http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22676.htm. 204 For text, see http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22678.htm. 205 For Protocol text, see http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22680.htm. 206 For text, see http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22694.htm. 207 For text, see http://2001-2009.gov/p/nea/rls/22696.htm. 208 For text, see http://2002-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm. 209 For text, see http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/ Agreed+documents+ on+ movement+and+access+from+and+to+Gaza+15-Nov-2005.htm. 210 For text, see http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/11/20071127.html. 211 See Statement of Administration Policy regarding H.R. 2082, issued December 11, 2008, http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/11/20071127-2.html. 212 Greg Miller, Paul Richter, ―U.S. Opens Dossier on Syrian Facility,‖ Los Angeles Times, April 25, 2008, ―Syrian Reactor Capacity was 1-2 Weapons/Year: CIA, Reuters, April 29, 2008. 213 Ibid., citing former weapons inspector David Albright. 214 For text, see http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/specialsession/9/doc. 215 Israel‘s Analysis and Comments on the Gaza Fact-Finding Mission Report is accessible via http:// www.mfa.gov.il. 216 Richard Boudreaux, ―Israel Lobbies to Head Off War Crimes Investigation,‖ Chicago Tribune, September 17, 2009. 217 Mark Lavie, ―Netanyahu Rejects UN Report, Says Israel‘s action in Gaza was Self-Defense,‖ Boston Globe, September 16, 2009. 218 Chris Stephen, ―US Seeks Israeli Inquiry into Army‘s Gaza Actions to Avoid War Crime Trial,‖ Irish Times, September 30, 2009. 219 Baraq Ravid, ―Netanyahu: UN Gaza Report Spells Death for Peace,‖ haaretz.com, September 30, 2009, Open Source Center Document GMP20090930739009. 183

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Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Israeli-Arab Negotiations and Issues, edited by Louis H. Girard, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

In: Israeli-Arab Negotiations and Issues Editor: Louis H. Girard

ISBN: 978-1-61761-185-8 © 2011 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 2

ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS: PROSPECTS FOR A TWO-STATE SOLUTION Jim Zanotti

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SUMMARY Following leadership changes in the United States and Israel in early 2009 and the IsraelHamas Gaza conflict in December 2008-January 2009, the inconclusive final-status peace negotiations that took place between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during the final year of the Bush Administration have not resumed. Nevertheless, President Barack Obama showed his commitment to a negotiated ―two-state solution‖ just days after his January 2009 inauguration by appointing former Senator George Mitchell as his Special Envoy for Middle East Peace. In September 2009, Obama convened a trilateral meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and PLO Chairman Mahmoud Abbas in New York and addressed the annual opening session of the United Nations General Assembly. He indicated that final-status negotiations should not be delayed further, despite the lack of resolution on preliminary issues such as the possible freeze of Israeli settlement building in the West Bank and East Jerusalem or the possible gradual normalization of ties between Israel and certain Arab states. It has now been 16 years since Israel and the PLO agreed to the 1993 Oslo Accord. Yet, differences between the sides over core issues, such as borders, security, settlements, the status of Jerusalem, refugees, and water rights, have not been overcome, despite the thirdparty involvement of various international actors—the United States, in particular. Previously when talks have faltered, the parties eventually returned to the negotiating table. Yet there are a number of key actors and observers expressing doubts that the very concept of a negotiated two-state solution can survive a process in which negotiations are put on hold and resumed an indefinite number of times without finality. These doubts have been exacerbated by geopolitical changes and by realities on the ground—including demographics, violence, Palestinian factionalism, Israeli settlements, and other impediments to Palestinian movement and territorial contiguity—that sustain tensions between Israelis and Palestinians.

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Decreased hope in the viability of a two-state solution has led to a willingness among some policymakers and analysts to consider different pathways to get there—such as Palestinian statehood prior to a final-status agreement or a ―borders first‖ deal. It also has led to openness among some Israelis and Palestinians to alternative solutions that are contrary to declared U.S. policy. These alternatives, each of which is the subject of considerable debate among and between Israelis and Palestinians, include a so-called ―one-state solution,‖ a ―Jordanian‖ or ―regional‖ option, or other, non-negotiated outcomes. Continued failure to reach a two-state solution, combined with lack of consensus on any of the alternatives, may also mean that the status quo in the West Bank and Gaza could continue indefinitely. Debate continues over the proper U.S. approach to the peace process. Congress faces significant policy challenges both with its oversight of the Obama Administration‘s formulation and implementation of policy; and on matters such as foreign aid, security assistance, Israeli settlements, the role of Arab states, and the treatment of the militant Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization). For more information on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and peace process, see CRS Report RL33530, Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy, by Carol Migdalovitz.

ISSUE OVERVIEW

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Current Diplomacy Following leadership changes in the United States and Israel in early 2009 and the IsraelHamas Gaza conflict in December 2008-January 2009, the inconclusive final-status peace negotiations that took place between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)1 during the final year of the Bush Administration have not resumed. Nevertheless, President Barack Obama showed his commitment to a negotiated ―two-state solution‖ just days after his January 2009 inauguration by appointing former Senator George Mitchell—who was successful as a mediator in the Northern Ireland conflict for the Clinton Administration in the 1990s—as his Special Envoy for Middle East Peace. Moreover, Obama‘s June 4, 2009 speech in Cairo, Egypt restated the U.S. policy goal of establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pursuant to the ―land for peace‖ principles of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338: The only resolution is for the aspirations of both sides to be met through two states, where Israelis and Palestinians each live in peace and security. That is in Israel‘s interest, Palestine‘s interest, America‘s interest, and the world‘s interest. And that is why I intend to personally pursue this outcome with all the patience and dedication the task requires.2

Since then, much discussion has centered on whether other issues—such as Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem; Palestinian factional unity and progress on reform and development in security, political, and economic sectors; and possible steps by Arab states toward gradual normalization in relations with Israel—should be addressed before or after the resumption of final-status negotiations. Thus far, the Obama Administration has

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been unable to secure an Israeli agreement to freeze settlement building or an agreement by major Arab states to take steps toward greater normalization with Israel. In September 2009, Obama convened a trilateral meeting with Netanyahu and Abbas in New York and addressed the annual opening session of the United Nations General Assembly. He indicated that negotiations should not be delayed further, despite the lack of resolution on preliminary issues:

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Simply put, it is past time to talk about starting negotiations. It is time to move forward. It is time to show the flexibility and common sense and sense of compromise that's necessary to achieve our goals.... Permanent status negotiations must begin and begin soon.... Despite all the obstacles, despite all the history, despite all the mistrust, we have to find a way forward.... We cannot continue the same pattern of taking tentative steps forward and then stepping back.3

Two major reference points for the current diplomatic discourse are: (1) the PerformanceBased Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (the ―Roadmap‖)4 rolled out during 2002-2003 by the international Quartet (the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia) and based largely on a 2001 report prepared by the Sharm al-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee chaired by former Senator Mitchell (commonly known as the ―Mitchell Report‖);5 and (2) the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative.6 A key difference between the two documents is that Israel and the PLO have both agreed to abide by the Roadmap‘s requirements,7 while most U.S. and Israeli officials view the Arab Peace Initiative as an ―opening offer‖ that is subject to further negotiation. Many observers expect the Obama Administration and/or the Quartet to present a new framework for resolving the conflict in the near future. Whether such a framework might supplant the Roadmap, establish a fixed timeline for negotiations (as did the Oslo Accord in 1993 and the Annapolis Declaration in November 2007), or set forth beginning parameters on the final-status issues themselves is unclear.

The Two-State Debate in Context It has now been 16 years since Israel and the PLO agreed to the 1993 Oslo Accord.8 Yet, differences between the sides over core issues, such as borders, security, settlements, the status of Jerusalem, refugees, and water rights, have not been overcome, despite the thirdparty involvement of various international actors—the United States, in particular. Previously when talks have faltered, the parties eventually returned to the negotiating table, and some observers are convinced that this option is likely to remain viable so long as it is supported politically.9 Yet there are a number of key actors and observers expressing doubts that the very concept of a negotiated two-state solution can survive a process in which negotiations are put on hold and resumed an indefinite number of times without finality.10 These doubts have been exacerbated by geopolitical changes and by realities on the ground— including demographics, violence, Palestinian factionalism, Israeli settlements, and other impediments to Palestinian movement and territorial contiguity—that sustain tensions between Israelis and Palestinians. The Israeli daily Ha’aretz reported a ―senior U.S. administration‖ source‘s account of what President Obama told Netanyahu and Abbas during

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the closed-door session of the September 2009 trilateral meeting in New York: ―We‘ve had enough talks. We need to end this conflict. There is a window of opportunity but it might shut.‖11 Decreased hope in the viability of a two-state solution has led to a willingness among some policymakers and analysts to consider different pathways to get there—such as Palestinian statehood prior to a final-status agreement or a ―borders first‖ deal. It also has led to openness among some Israelis and Palestinians to alternative solutions that are contrary to declared U.S. policy. These alternatives, each of which is the subject of considerable debate among and between Israelis and Palestinians, include a so-called ―one-state solution,‖ a ―Jordanian‖ or ―regional‖ option, or other, non-negotiated outcomes. Continued failure to reach a two-state solution, combined with lack of consensus on any of the alternatives, may also mean that the status quo in the West Bank and Gaza could continue indefinitely. Polls indicate that significant majorities in various Arab states believe that a collapse in prospects for a two-state solution could lead to a ―state of intense conflict for years to come.‖12 This chapter reviews the prospects of a two-state solution in the context of possible signs of progress and doubts raised in U.S., Israeli, Palestinian, and international circles. After then outlining possible alternatives to a two-state solution, the report analyzes the policy challenges facing a U.S. approach to promoting a two-state solution—including implications for Congress—on matters such as foreign aid, security assistance, Israeli settlements, and the treatment of the militant Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, or ―FTO‖).

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

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Obama’s Cairo Speech and Subsequent Diplomacy President Obama‘s June 2009 Cairo speech did not call for the immediate resumption of negotiations. Many observers believe that Obama wanted to set markers for evaluating the parties‘ readiness for negotiations before presenting a framework, and to draw from the parties‘ responses to shape the eventual U.S. approach to negotiations. That is why, some might say, his Cairo speech called for an Israeli settlement freeze while focusing on the reciprocal need for Palestinian progress on security and governance and constructive involvement by Arab states. In the speech, Obama also acknowledged that Hamas had support from some Palestinians and could potentially play a role fulfilling Palestinian national aspirations. Yet, he conditioned any Hamas involvement in the peace process on the so-called ―Quartet Principles‖—cessation and renunciation of violence, commitment to previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements, and recognition of Israel‘s right to exist.13 Some have been concerned that the Obama Administration‘s debates with Israel over a settlement freeze and with Arab states over the prospect of ―gradual normalization‖ with Israel—which could include steps such as permitting civilian aircraft over-flight rights, establishing commercial ties, and making other low-level contacts14—could overshadow the overall goal of resuming final-status negotiations and drain the Administration of political capital that it might need if negotiations resume. Specifically, some worry that Obama may have painted himself into a corner on settlements—that if he accepts anything less than a total

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and permanent freeze, two things might result. His willingness to compromise could be interpreted as a sign of weakness with the potential to undermine U.S. leverage in a larger negotiating process; and he could lose the confidence of Arabs who believe that, historically, the United States has been biased toward Israel and had hoped Obama would be an ―honest broker.‖ Others believe that Obama should explain the reasoning behind his policies directly to an Israeli audience in much the same way that he intended the Cairo speech to allay concerns about the compatibility of U.S. interests with the interests of Arabs and Muslims in the region.15

Sources: CRS, The RAND Corporation Figure 1. Map of Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip

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At the September 2009 trilateral meeting in New York, Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell said, in acknowledging that agreement had not yet been reached on halting Israeli settlement activity or securing major Arab normalization with Israel: We are not identifying any issue as being a precondition nor an impediment to negotiation.... [W]e do not believe in preconditions. We do not impose them, and we urge others not to impose preconditions.16

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Mitchell‘s statement and President Obama‘s admonition for final-status negotiations to begin soon seem intended to blunt criticism of the Administration‘s earlier efforts and to prepare the ground for potential changes of direction by the Administration and other parties on issues of concern. It is less clear whether they (1) signal that the parties are progressing to a new phase of the diplomatic approach the Administration envisioned would come regardless of the outcome of earlier phases,17 or (2) represent a conscious strategic choice by the Administration to deemphasize preliminary steps and confidence-building measures in favor of a more endgame-focused approach (see ―U.S. Policy‖ below). Subsequent efforts by the United States to prioritize the resumption of Israeli-Palestinian final-status negotiations over a full settlement freeze and over the Palestinian attempt to have various United Nations bodies scrutinize Israel‘s actions during the Gaza conflict (e.g. The Goldstone Report18) have been perceived by many Palestinians to be signs of continued proIsrael bias and a lack of sensitivity to Mahmoud Abbas‘s domestic standing, which suffered in the final months of 2009. One notable example was Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton‘s October 2009 statement that an announced Israeli moratorium on settlement construction in the West Bank, which was temporary (10 months) and excluded East Jerusalem, was nonetheless an ―unprecedented‖ step. Since then, Secretary Clinton and the Obama Administration have acknowledged that the declared Israeli moratorium falls short of the Administration‘s ultimate expectations of a more comprehensive freeze.

Netanyahu’s Speech and the PLO Reaction After Obama‘s June speech, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu gave one of his own at Bar-Ilan University in Tel Aviv. For the first time, Netanyahu publicly contemplated the possible establishment of a Palestinian state, but he insisted that it would have to be demilitarized and that Israel would retain a military presence in the West Bank and control over Palestinian airspace and its communications spectrum. Netanyahu welcomed the resumption of negotiations with the PLO without preconditions, but also insisted that in any peace agreement the PLO would need to recognize unequivocally that Israel is ―the nation state of the Jewish people‖19—a difficult demand for any Palestinian leader to accept because this would represent an implicit abandonment of the ―right of return‖ for millions of Palestinian refugees and a blow to the roughly 20% of Israel‘s population composed of Arab Muslims and Christians. Many observers assert that although Netanyahu accepted the twostate idea in principle, he did not move beyond other traditional Israeli right-wing positions on the conditions necessary for peace in his speech.20 Initially, PLO Chairman and PA President Mahmoud Abbas rejected the conditions Netanyahu placed on a two-state solution in his speech, and insisted that the PLO would only

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resume negotiations with Israel in the event of a complete settlement freeze.21 In December 2009, Abbas indicated a willingness to return to negotiations if settlements are ―halted for six months without making this public‖ and if the 1949-1967 armistice line (the ―Green Line‖) is used as the point of reference for border negotiations.22

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Fayyad’s Plan – A De Facto Palestinian State During summer 2009, PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad unveiled a plan to advance the goal of Palestinian self-determination. The plan contemplates achieving de facto statehood within two years by developing self-reliant PA security, political, and economic infrastructure.23 The PA‘s reform and development efforts have been backed by considerable donor help from the United States, the European Union, and other countries, especially since Abbas named Fayyad as prime minister of the caretaker government installed for the West Bank following Hamas‘s takeover of Gaza in June 2007. The plan does not discuss if and how Gaza can be involved absent a general opening of the border crossings and a political arrangement accommodating both Hamas and Fatah. It is unclear whether Fayyad‘s plan is intended mainly to bolster Abbas‘s prospects in negotiations with Israel or whether it articulates a genuine alternative to ending Israeli occupation and achieving Palestinian statehood in the event negotiations fail (see ―Palestinian Statehood Before a Final-Status Agreement?‖ below). It does not call for a Palestinian declaration of independence by a date certain. Because Fayyad has no significant domestic political base, doubts exist regarding his ability to leverage his main political assets—anticorruption credentials and support from Western patrons—into a sustained push to rally Palestinians around his plan. Some Palestinians fear that the plan might play too closely into the hands of Netanyahu‘s concept of an ―economic peace‖ in the West Bank—giving the PA greater responsibility for governance without a corresponding transfer in the perquisites of sovereignty or moves toward reversing factional and territorial division.

Hamas’s Political Positioning Before and after Obama‘s Cairo speech, Damascus-based Hamas politburo chief Khaled Meshaal made statements that some analysts say demonstrate his interest in showing that Hamas is not an obstacle to the peace process. In an interview published in May by the New York Times, Meshaal stated, ―I promise the American administration and the international community that we will be part of the solution, period.‖24 He proposed a ―two-state solution‖ substantially similar to a proposal he reportedly made in 2008—full Israeli withdrawal to pre1967 borders (including the dismantlement of Israeli settlements), right of return for Palestinian refugees, and a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem. In exchange, Meshaal said that Hamas would be willing to declare a 10-year hudna (―truce‖), but would not agree to a permanent peace arrangement or formal recognition of Israel and its right to exist. He urged his interviewers and audience to ignore the Hamas charter of 1988,25 which calls for the destruction of Israel.26 Later, in a July interview with the Wall Street Journal, Meshaal essentially restated his May proposal, and added that Hamas would cooperate with the United

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States in achieving a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict if Israel freezes settlement building and if the economic and military ―blockade‖ of the Gaza Strip is lifted.27 Some observers have interpreted Meshaal‘s statements as betokening a new, conciliatory Hamas approach that, while falling short of accepting the Quartet Principles, connotes implicit recognition of Israel‘s right to exist. Some who see a new approach see it as an indication that Hamas may have ―grown up‖ and that, in time, it could move toward formal recognition of Israel.28 Others who acknowledge the appearance of a new approach claim that Hamas‘s conciliatory tone may be due to the movement‘s calculation that cultivating an image of reasonableness presently serves its interests in light of (1) the diplomatic climate following Obama‘s accession, (2) Israeli deterrence of Hamas-generated violence in the aftermath of the Gaza conflict, and/or (3) geopolitical changes affecting Hamas‘s principal allies in the region—Syria, Hezbollah, and Iran.29 Those who are more skeptical of Hamas‘s intentions have countered that Meshaal‘s statements did not change anything of substance in Hamas‘s existing positions, and are best explained as a ploy to give the impression of moderation. They cite Hamas‘s continued efforts to build up its military capabilities and to plan attacks on Israelis, along with the reported rise in prominence of extremists (relative to other Hamas members) within the group‘s governing shura (or ―consultative‖) councils, as evidence to support their claims.30 These skeptics assert that ―implicit recognition‖ is no recognition at all, and that a 10-year hudna would simply allow Hamas to consolidate its position and await a more propitious moment to mount a Palestinian/Islamic takeover of Israel. For further discussion of Hamas‘s role, see the sections ―The Rise of Hamas and Divided Palestinian Rule‖ and ―The Role of Hamas‖ below.

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Evaluating Previous Negotiations: Signs of Progress or of Setbacks? During Israel-PLO negotiations in 2008, Israel‘s then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert proposed a ―shelf agreement‖ for a Palestinian state to PLO Chairman Mahmoud Abbas.31 According to Olmert‘s claims in a June 2009 Newsweek story, his proposal contemplated Palestinian sovereignty over the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem, with modified borders from the 1949-1967 armistice lines based on land swaps (Israel would have given the Palestinians territory from Israel proper, including a safe-passage corridor between Gaza and the West Bank, in exchange for its incorporation of Israeli-settled areas of the West Bank); offered the symbolic return of a ―very, very limited number‖ of Palestinian refugees as a ―humanitarian gesture‖; and contemplated putting the Holy Basin of Jerusalem under the administration of a group comprised of Israelis, Palestinians, Americans, Jordanians, and Saudis.32 Olmert‘s interview did not indicate whether his offer included or presupposed limitations on Palestinian military capacities and allowances for continuing Israeli security prerogatives in the West Bank. Abbas, in a Washington Post interview in May 2009, claimed he turned down Olmert‘s offer because ―the gaps were wide.‖33 Yet, in two December 2009 interviews, Abbas indicated that the PLO continued to negotiate, even planning a last-ditch meeting in Washington for January 2009 before the possibility was preempted by the Gaza conflict.34 The revelations on the Olmert-Abbas talks have led to debate over whether Olmert was

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dealing reasonably—particularly given that the contemplated deal was a shelf agreement, not something that would have been ―effective immediately‖—and over whether Abbas‘s was unwilling to make difficult compromises deemed necessary for peace. Some believe that the diplomatic efforts begun at Annapolis demonstrate that robust international support still exists for a two-state solution, and that Olmert‘s offer to Abbas— though not accepted—was a sign that the parties are getting closer. Other observers believe that the Annapolis process did not generate significant progress, and may even represent a step backward for chances at Israeli-Palestinian peace.35 Some assert that the parties remain stalemated on the core issues of the conflict (particularly Jerusalem, settlements, and refugees), and that the situation on the ground with regard to these disputed issues has become more entrenched.36 Several view the most recent round of talks—and the accompanying international pledges of support—as little or no different in substance from other failed negotiating cycles of the Oslo era. Another argument is that the Annapolis process may not have been primarily intended to facilitate Israeli-Palestinian peace, but to advance other U.S., Israeli, and Sunni Arab geopolitical goals—such as consolidating support for stability in Iraq37 or possibly making diplomatic overtures to Syria in order to isolate Iran.38 Still others have asserted that the signal weakness of the Annapolis negotiations was the lack of third-party mechanisms within the negotiation process to bridge differences and rectify power imbalances between the Israelis and Palestinians, and to provide incentives for both parties to accept otherwise unappealing concessions.39 These critics hope that any resumption of negotiations will replace the Annapolis model of bilateral Israeli-Palestinian talks with more direct involvement from the United States and possibly other actors such as the European Union, Arab states, and Turkey.

GOING FORWARD Proponents of the two-state idea might argue that it would be better to strengthen existing political will for a two-state solution than to spend time and resources building a new consensus for one or more alternative solutions. A quest for alternatives might more accurately reflect a ―grass is always greener‖ mentality than a qualitatively superior approach to resolving the conflict. On the other hand, opponents of the two-state idea might argue that recycling a framework that has fallen short for over a decade and a half is unwise and that something new should be tried instead of sinking more political capital into what could be an irredeemably failed idea. In an August 2009 New York Times column, former U.S. Special Assistant to the President for Arab-Israeli Affairs (under President Clinton) Robert Malley—now the director of the Middle East program at the International Crisis Group—and Hussein Agha argued that rhetorical support for a two-state solution by Binyamin Netanyahu and Khaled Meshaal, with all their caveats and qualifications, may be more a sign that the term ―two-state solution‖ has been drained of its explanatory value than that a peaceful resolution is any closer: This nearly unanimous consensus is the surest sign to date that the two-state solution has become void of meaning, a catchphrase divorced from the contentious issues it is supposed to

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Jim Zanotti resolve. Everyone can say yes because saying yes no longer says much, and saying no has become too costly. Acceptance of the two-state solution signals continuation of the IsraeliPalestinian struggle by other means....40

In the same column, Malley and Agha postulated that past attempts to resolve the conflict might have paid too little attention to the questions of identity and narrative that fuel IsraeliPalestinian disagreement on issues such as permanent security arrangements, the status of Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, and the settlements. That so many attempts to resolve the conflict have failed is reason to be wary.... It is hard today to imagine a resolution that does not entail two states. But two states may not be a true resolution if the roots of this clash are ignored. The ultimate territorial outcome almost certainly will be found within the borders of 1967. To be sustainable, it will need to grapple with matters left over since 1948....41

In the closed-door session of the September 2009 trilateral meeting in New York, President Obama reportedly laid out the following vision for negotiations to Netanyahu and Abbas:

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There‘s an historical record of the entire past negotiations and there are principles. We won't start the negotiations from scratch, we will not take the historical record and toss it aside. Nor will we wait for the perfect formula.... It‘s difficult to disentangle ourselves from history but we must do so. The only reason to hold public office is to get things done. We all must take risks for peace.42

How the logistics of a land-for-peace compromise might be resolved at the same time the conflicting worldviews of Israelis and Palestinians are addressed or transcended remains unclear. Also unclear is whether calls for new ways to conceptualize and/or resolve the conflict might increase in frequency and intensity—compelling the Israelis, Palestinians, United States, and/or other international actors to respond—if future proposals advanced under the ―two-state solution‖ heading are perceived to stretch the reasonable elasticity of the term to its breaking point.

CHANGES SINCE OSLO In addition to wavering confidence in the peace process, changes with respect to geopolitics, demographics, violence between Israelis and Palestinians, factionalism among Palestinians, Israeli settlements, and impediments to Palestinian movement and territorial contiguity may have altered the likelihood of reaching a two-state solution since the signing of the Oslo Accord in 1993.

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Middle East Geopolitics At the time of the 1993 Oslo Accord, geopolitical conditions seemed well-suited to support a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Cold War had ended, the United States had assembled a broad regional and international coalition that defeated and confined Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and many significant actors in the Middle East and worldwide had accepted U.S. influence in the region as a stabilizing factor. The PLO and Jordan were both looking for opportunities to rehabilitate their images and regain influence within the region after having supported Saddam Hussein against the U.S.-led coalition in the Gulf War. Bill Clinton and Yitzhak Rabin, elected to power, respectively, in the United States and Israel in 1992, both indicated a willingness to move forward with the Arab-Israeli peace process that was formally restarted at the 1991 Madrid Conference by their predecessors George H.W. Bush and Yitzhak Shamir. While the Oslo process with the Palestinians proceeded, albeit with delays, Israel made peace with Jordan in 1994, negotiated with Syria, and made withdrawals from Lebanon in 2000. Since then, things have changed considerably. After Oslo, Hamas has become a much more significant Palestinian actor—gradually throughout the 1990s with violence aimed at derailing the Oslo process, and then breaking to the fore during the second Palestinian intifada (―uprising‖), also known as the Al Aqsa intifada, (which began in 2000 and lasted, by most accounts, until 2006) and with its victory in Palestinian Legislative Council elections in 2006. The militant Lebanese Shia (or Shiite) group Hezbollah similarly grew in influence during the 1990s. Various developments since September 11, 2001 have challenged U.S. economic and geopolitical supremacy in the Middle East. Iran has been bolstered by the progress of its nuclear program, the U.S.-led removal of Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq, and perhaps, some might argue, by the attention it received from being so closely targeted as a member (along with Iraq and North Korea) of President George W. Bush‘s ―axis of evil.‖ Consequently, Iran‘s profile within the region—particularly with Hamas and in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon—has grown, compelling the Sunni-led Arab states (Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the smaller Gulf states) to scramble to preserve their own regional prestige by countering Iranian military, political, economic, and ideological influence. This changed Middle East environment makes the Israeli-Palestinian peace process less predictable and raises questions over whether the prospect of peace with the Sunni-led Arab world remains as powerful an incentive for Israel to engage in the peace process as it was at the time of the Madrid Conference. Some foreign policy analysts believe that the increased willingness of Sunni-led Arab states to support the two-state solution in recent years is reflective of an interest shared by these countries, the United States, and Israel in aligning to counter rising Iranian and Shia influence in the Middle East, rather than an interest in solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for its own sake. Whether these geopolitical motives can sustain the various parties‘ commitment to resolving the issues that divide Israel and the PLO remains uncertain.

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Demographic Concerns—Arabs to Outnumber Jews? Led by the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Israel agreed to the Oslo Accord in 1993 at least partly due to demographic considerations. Many projections conclude that the Arab population within the combined area of Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip will outnumber the Jewish population in coming years.43 According to September 2009 estimates from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency‘s World Factbook, Arabs (approximately 5.3 to 5.6 million) might already outnumber Jews (approximately 5.4 to 5.5 million—including Jewish settlers in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights).44 Rabin then, just as Ehud Olmert in 2008, wanted to come to an arrangement with the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza in order to avoid the situation of ruling as a numerical minority over a numerical majority, and thus the conundrum of having to choose between giving up Jewish primacy or facing accusations that Jewish rule in the combined area is undemocratic and contrary to the principle of self-determination. It is less clear to what extent these concerns drive Netanyahu.

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Violence and Palestinian Factionalism How Violence Has Complicated the Peace Process The likelihood of a negotiated two-state solution appears to have been adversely affected by the violence that has jarred both sides‘ optimistic expectations of the Oslo process and has increased, rather than resolved, tensions between and among Israelis and Palestinians. After they committed to peaceful negotiations, the onset and upsurge of attacks on both sides increased resentment. The intensity of the violence peaked during the second intifada—which featured Palestinian suicide attacks against Israeli civilians and most recently surged with the December 2008-January 2009 Gaza conflict. Security has, in the short term, been reestablished for most of Israel‘s civilian population through a combination of Israeli measures (including Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations and the partial construction of a West Bank ―separation barrier‖), a greater PA focus on internal security, and Palestinian militants‘ decisions to limit rocket attacks from Gaza and other attacks for the time being. Paradoxically, this could work against the peace process. The Israelis might not want to risk upsetting the security equilibrium they have worked to achieve by taking diplomatic risks. Even though law and order has improved in certain parts of the West Bank, many Palestinians—particularly those in Gaza—continue to be plagued by feelings of insecurity. Lingering resentment over what they view as unjustifiably oppressive Israeli security measures in the West Bank could lead to a future resumption of violence. Additionally, there are charges of factionally motivated violence in both Gaza and West Bank involving Hamas and PA authorities, respectively, and there are periodic outbreaks of violence in Gaza between Hamas and extreme jihadist movements—leading some to wonder if these movements could gain strength militarily or politically in coming years. There are also ongoing concerns over Israeli settler violence or potential settler violence against Palestinian civilians in Hebron and other places in the West Bank.45

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The Rise of Hamas and Divided Palestinian Rule During the time of Oslo in the 1990s, a vast majority of Palestinians in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip clearly accepted Yasser Arafat and the PLO as their legitimate representatives. Problems with internecine violence, divisiveness, and popular discouragement stemming from perceptions of widespread political corruption existed from the beginning of self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but, with Arafat‘s death, the failure of the peace process until now, and the rise of Hamas, these problems have worsened. Although PA President Mahmoud Abbas has taken Arafat‘s place, his legitimacy as a leader of the Palestinian people is not comparable, and the Fatah party he leads is seen by many as too divided and dysfunctional to govern successfully.46 In light of Hamas‘s rise, some wonder if the pragmatic secular nationalistic positions Fatah takes, including support for a two-state solution, have a political future.47 Hamas, despite and perhaps because of its role in perpetrating much of the violence on the Palestinian side, has greatly increased in power and influence since the 1990s. It now controls the entire Gaza Strip, maintains a majority in the currently sidelined Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC),48 commands a well-organized and well-armed fighting force— despite the losses it suffered during the Gaza conflict—that is supported by Iran,49 runs several patronage networks, and has loyalists within certain parts of the West Bank and among the Palestinian diaspora. Without some sort of political arrangement incorporating both the West Bank and Gaza that either integrates Hamas into the governing Palestinian order or that Hamas agrees not to actively oppose, Abbas may be insufficiently legitimate— both in the eyes of the Palestinians and of Israel—to conclude and implement a negotiated agreement.50 A Palestinian unity arrangement, however, could indefinitely delay the peace process because of Israeli and U.S. objections to recognizing the legitimacy of Hamas or any governing coalition including Hamas as long as Hamas withholds recognition of Israel‘s right to exist, insists on its right to perpetrate violence (what it deems resistance), and does not consider itself bound by previous Israeli-PLO agreements (see ―The Role of Hamas‖ below).

Impediments to Palestinian Territorial Contiguity and Movement Changes in realities on the ground since the signing of the 1993 Oslo Accord— particularly in terms of their effect on Palestinian territorial contiguity, movement, and access—could affect the likelihood of a negotiated two-state solution. According to the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Jerusalem, as of June 2009, there is a ―complex system of access restrictions applicable to Palestinians [in the West Bank], which include, inter alia, restrictions on the use of main roads, the [separation] Barrier and its permit regime, closed military zones and nature reserves, and Israeli settlements and adjacent ‗buffer zones.‘‖51 Speaking to this issue at a September 25, 2008 hearing on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process he chaired for the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs, Senator John Kerry said, in an exchange with then-U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, C. David Welch: The debate now is over how Swiss cheesy is this state going to look. And what sort of rights and access are going to go with it, et cetera, and what happens to the settlements and so forth.52

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Sources: U.N.-OCHA and CRS Figure 2. Map of Palestinian West Bank Enclaves Surrounded by Israeli Settlements, et al. (as of July 2007)

Israeli Settlements and Infrastructure Many observers assert that the existing division of the West Bank into separate enclaves by the presence of Israeli settlements, infrastructure, and other areas of control impedes the development of a future Palestinian state (see Figure 2 below).53 The extensive Israeli construction of settlements and infrastructure in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, which started before the 1990s but continued rapidly after Oslo,54 could be seen as an attempt to establish facts on the ground that increase Israeli bargaining leverage in negotiations with the Palestinians or as an attempt to establish an irreversible Israeli presence that could lessen Palestinian sovereign control of the West Bank under an eventual two-state solution. A major question that follows from the current realities on the ground is whether and to what extent these realities might remain a part of the West Bank following a final-status agreement. If most of the settlements and infrastructure were dismantled as a result of an agreement, then their current presence, while perhaps problematic under international law and

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for humanitarian reasons, might not necessarily harm prospects for a negotiated two-state solution.55 One might counter, however, that existing Israeli settlements and infrastructure— even if only temporary—eats away at the sense of Palestinian political, economic, and cultural identity, as well as the morale and cohesion, seen by some as important to building a state.56

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Exacerbation of the West Bank/Gaza Divide Concerns over a lack of contiguity within the West Bank are exacerbated by the fact that the Palestinians already face the challenge of governing two noncontiguous territorial entities—the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Moreover, since June 2007, these two entities have been controlled by two different regimes (Abbas and the PA in the West Bank, and Hamas and a version of the PA it represents to be legitimate in Gaza). Without reconciliation between Hamas and Abbas‘s Fatah party, the different patterns of life and administration that are being consolidated in Gaza and the West Bank, respectively, could make it difficult to bring the two territories under a single governing structure in the future, even if Israel and the PLO reach a final-status agreement that provides a strip of land or transportation access rights linking the West Bank and Gaza. Economic Effect of Movement Restrictions on Palestinians The imposition of significant restrictions on the crossing of people and goods between Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza (in addition to similar restrictions within the West Bank discussed above), is another major change from the time of Oslo. According to the World Bank, Palestinian per capita GDP in the West Bank and Gaza (calculated at real value to take inflation into account) is significantly lower than it was during the years immediately prior to the second intifada—from between $1,200 and $1,500 in 1997-2000 to just over $1,000 at the end of 2008.57 Lacking a self-sufficient private sector, Palestinians have historically depended on easy entry into and exit out of Israel for their workers and goods. Following the outbreak of the second intifada, Israel began construction of the West Bank separation barrier, increased security scrutiny at crossing points, issued permits to control access, and, in many cases, halted the flow of people and goods altogether.58 For most of the time since Hamas‘s forcible takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, most of Gaza‘s border crossings—including the Rafah border crossing with Egypt—have been closed to everything but a minimum of goods deemed necessary to meet humanitarian needs. In this environment, the formal Gazan economy has been brought to a virtual standstill, and illicit smuggling from tunnels between Gaza and Egypt‘s Sinai Peninsula has thrived. The Palestinian Federation of Industries estimated in September 2008 that 98% of Gaza‘s industrial operations are inactive.59 Even if Israel agrees to Palestinian sovereignty over Gaza and the West Bank, there are no guarantees that Israel will allow Palestinians and their goods meaningful access to Israeli jobs and markets. Although in 2009 Israel significantly reduced post-second intifada obstacles to Palestinian movement within the West Bank, many of these obstacles remain, and controls on movement between Israel and the West Bank remain largely unchanged. The alternatives for the Palestinians to economic interdependence with Israel would likely be: to attract investment and build a self-sufficient economy, which is probably years if not decades away;60 to look to neighboring Egypt and Jordan (which struggle with their own economic problems) for economic integration; or to depend indefinitely upon external assistance.

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DIFFERENT PATHWAYS TO A TWO-STATE SOLUTION Traditionally, the concept of a two-state solution has visualized a negotiated Israel-PLO final-status agreement on all core issues that, in a single stroke, ends the conflict between the parties and establishes a Palestinian state alongside Israel. In summer 2009, however, discussion of the possibility of at least two different pathways toward a two-state solution has intensified.61 Both emphasize intermediate steps that could confer certain sovereign characteristics upon the PLO/PA. Skeptics question whether such steps would represent progress toward a two-state solution, or possibly work against a full final-status agreement by removing the motivation to act from one or both sides. Each proposed pathway faces at least one major unanswered question.

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Palestinian Statehood before a Final-Status Agreement? De Facto State PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad‘s plan to develop the PA‘s political, economic, and security infrastructure into a de facto state over the next two years (see ―Fayyad‘s Plan – A De Facto Palestinian State‖ above) may appeal to those who question the likelihood of resuming serious negotiations while the West Bank and Gaza are under divided control and the right-wing Netanyahu government is in power. If Fayyad‘s pronouncements are not merely tactical devices aimed at prodding Israel to engage seriously in final-status negotiations with the PLO, his strategy appears to be to encourage a level of Palestinian compliance with the rules prescribed by the Roadmap such that Israel and the international community become compelled by justice to recognize the achievements and grant the Palestinians sovereign prerogatives. Campaigning for statehood in this fashion is a departure from the norm. Usually independence is granted an occupied people because they make the task of the occupier harder, not easier—through violence or nonviolent resistance. Trusting that a Palestinian strategy of complying with its obligations to develop and reform society and its institutions could lead Israel and the international community to validate Fayyad‘s vision of a just outcome for Palestinians may strike many as naïve. Many analysts, however, do not ascribe Fayyad‘s strategy primarily to trust of outside actors or even justice in the abstract, but rather to his conviction that the Palestinian national narrative needs to be recast. They think Fayyad perceives that neither the guerrilla nor the victimhood narrative has carried the Palestinians over the finish line of achieving statehood or is likely to do so. Therefore, he seeks to inculcate a more empowering Palestinian self-image that he hopes can create a positive dynamic of national pride and motivation carrying both internal and external rewards. One interpretation of Fayyad‘s plan for de facto statehood is that outside characterizations of Palestinians‘ achievements are far less important than Palestinians‘ own view of their progress in self-governance, self-policing, and economic self-sufficiency. Under this view, political progress is most likely if the Palestinians work toward their own goals and patiently make their case to the world. Some Palestinian and Arab observers, however, are

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uncomfortable with and skeptical of a strategy that, in their estimation, facilitates the Israelis‘ occupation by taking more of the day-today burdens out of their hands.

Declaring or Receiving Sovereign Status Even under a long-range plan such as Fayyad‘s, progress would require scaling back the indicia of Israeli occupation and control to allow the Palestinians‘ greater freedom of action, and as Palestinians demonstrate the ability to take charge of their own affairs, the ultimate question of sovereignty resurfaces. Is a non-negotiated pathway to statehood possible if the Palestinians‘ good faith in complying with their obligations is not reciprocated? At the Sixth Fatah Congress held in Bethlehem in August 2009, PLO Chairman/PA President Mahmoud Abbas made the following statement:

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While we affirm that we have opted for peace and negotiations on the basis of international legitimacy, we reserve to ourselves the right to carry out legitimate resistance that is acknowledged by international law. This right also depends on our understanding and national consensus for defining the appropriate forms of this resistance and its timing.... Through our leader and teacher Yasir Arafat who launched the declaration of Palestinian independence in 1988, we firmly rejected all forms of terrorism and we are determined to reject stigmatizing our legitimate struggle as terrorism. This will continue to be our firm and unswerving stand.62

The political program approved at the Sixth Fatah Congress explicitly cited ―declaring the state on the 1967 borders‖ as a strategic alternative ―if it is not possible to achieve progress through the current negotiations.‖63 Additionally, Javier Solana, the European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, suggested in a July 2009 speech in London that the U.N. Security Council pass a resolution establishing a Palestinian state if negotiations do not produce one by a fixed deadline,64 raising the possibility of international encouragement of or participation in a unilateral statehood strategy that some could liken to U.S. and European support for Kosovo‘s declaration of independence from Serbia in 2008. Since November 2009, head PLO negotiator Saeb Erekat has spoken of the possibility of having the Security Council vote on a resolution not to declare Palestinian independence and statehood, but to delineate the Green Line as the border of a future Palestinian state.65 The prospect of a unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood is not new. As referenced in Abbas‘s statement above, in 1988, the Palestinian National Council, the legislative body of the PLO, declared Palestinian independence and statehood at the same time it moved toward recognizing Israel‘s right to exist. The declaration had no practical effect, however, because the PLO was in exile in Tunisia and did not define the territorial scope of its state.66 After the establishment of limited Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the 1990s, Yasser Arafat periodically threatened to declare statehood unilaterally, but he never did, and his threats were widely seen as bargaining tactics. Some high-profile, mainstream Israeli analysts are now at least open to the idea. The Reut Institute, in 2008 and 2009 position papers that advocate ―upgrading the PA,‖ does not propose a Palestinian unilateral declaration of statehood, but discusses de facto statehood and suggests that the Israeli government take the lead in pushing for greater Palestinian autonomy by conferring upon the PA certain perquisites of sovereignty:

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The logic of upgrading requires rescinding the restrictions imposed on the PA in its international political status while strengthening its political-judicial status so as to bring it closer to that of a sovereign state according to international law. Examples include Israel lifting its opposition to the issuing of Palestinian currency, creating a Palestinian tax authority, establishing foreign embassies in the territory of the PA, and PA membership in international organizations.67

Israeli analysts who are open to the option of establishing a Palestinian state with ―provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty‖ before a final-status agreement cite Phase 2 of the Roadmap as support for its further discussion.68 Some assert that once the Palestinians obtain statehood, they would be able to finish final-status negotiations with the Israelis on a more equal footing. Yet, it is unclear that limited sovereignty would substantially improve the negotiating dynamic. The characteristics of sovereignty that some might argue would most likely strengthen the Palestinians in a negotiating context—such as militarization and full control over territory and borders—are likely to remain out of their reach, whether Palestinians declare statehood unilaterally or have some sovereign characteristics conferred upon them. Although withdrawal of Israeli troops and settlers from the West Bank could be envisioned as part of the arrangement on sovereignty, there is no guarantee that it would happen. It is possible that Palestinians might feel even more slighted than under the status quo, and might suspect an Israeli strategy of ―disguised unilateralism‖—retaining security control in the West Bank while shedding formal responsibility. The presentation of a proposal for immediate Palestinian sovereignty in a state with provisional borders within 60% of the West Bank by prominent Kadima Party leader Shaul Mofaz is unlikely to have improved the credibility of this idea with Palestinians and third parties.69 On the other side, some Israelis fear Palestinian statehood before a formal end to conflict through a final-status agreement because of their concern that greater Palestinian assertiveness and freedom of action could endanger Israeli security,70 regardless of paper or international guarantees against Palestinian militarization or aggression.

Main Unanswered Question: Gaza The major unanswered question in calculations of possibly creating a de facto state or something more in the West Bank is Gaza‘s political status. The PA does not govern it; Hamas does. How would those who seek changes in the PLO/PA‘s status in the West Bank link such changes to the situation in Gaza? Some recommend encouraging further FatahHamas negotiations aimed at reunifying PA control over the two territories. Others believe signs of progress in the West Bank might encourage greater opposition to Hamas among Gazans who seek opportunities similar to those of their fellow Palestinians in the West Bank. Still others advocate a ―wait-and-see‖ approach, hoping that clear options may arise as time passes. Some even speculate about a possible ―three-state solution,‖71 even though the Israeli, PLO, U.S., and even Hamas leaderships all publicly reject the idea of conferring permanent independent status upon the Gaza Strip. Most observers acknowledge that there is little consensus on the way forward politically. This is further complicated by the difficult humanitarian situation and dire economic circumstances that Gaza‘s 1.6 million residents face, and by the question of which parties are and should be responsible for addressing these matters.

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Borders First?

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In Lieu of or Following a Settlement Freeze In summer 2009, several U.S. and Israeli analysts debated the merits of taking advantage of a potential freeze in settlement activity, or bypassing the issue of a settlement freeze altogether, by expeditiously and permanently resolving the issues of settlements and borders through negotiation—commonly known as a ―borders first‖ deal. Agreement to and implementation of a borders first deal could give Israel assurances that it will keep some settled areas in the West Bank while the Palestinians are assured that they will receive territory to compensate for this and that the other settlements are permanently evacuated and/or dismantled. David Makovsky of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, in a June Wall Street Journal column, opined that the borders issue is the least divisive of the outstanding core issues, and thus is the best one for the parties to address in preparation for addressing the others.72 The Center for American Progress, while advocating that the borders first idea be seriously considered, articulated concerns that the proposal should only be pursued if the United States commits to making sure that ―borders first‖ does not become ―borders only,‖ leaving other core issues unresolved.73 Since November 2009, the Obama Administration has voiced interest in having the parties negotiate borders first as a possible way to defuse the settlement issue.74 Although PLO leaders have resisted a ―borders first‖ approach to negotiations (their traditional approach is that ―nothing is solved until everything is solved‖75), the Administration might be testing the PLO‘s readiness to accept this with the understanding that the Green Line would be the expected basis of border negotiations (a key PLO desire, and something the Administration has begun referring to more frequently).76 Main Unanswered Question: Jerusalem Assuming that implementation of a borders and settlements agreement might be possible, most analysts acknowledge that the biggest problem with a borders first approach is Jerusalem. The Israelis claim and exercise sovereignty over the whole of it, and the Palestinians seek control over its predominantly Arab eastern half. Jerusalem‘s holy sites— including the walled Old City with its Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif and Western Wall—are administered pursuant to delicate and complicated arrangements, yet remain a source of great tension (as evidenced by the September-October 2009 altercations stemming from an incident at the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif at the end of the Jewish high holiday season). The presence and expansion of Jewish settlements and other settler-developed heritage sites at the expense of Arab-inhabited areas or shared space in the ―historic basin‖ make East Jerusalem an even more confusing microcosm of the wider territorial chaos in the West Bank.77 As some analysts have pointed out, leaving Greater Jerusalem out of border negotiations would probably be a non-starter for Palestinians because existing or potential developments in Jerusalem have implications for the territorial contiguity of the West Bank and for access by Palestinians to and from East Jerusalem and between their other key population centers.78 Moreover, agreement on borders elsewhere could easily unravel if distrust over what the other side might try to take or foment in Jerusalem remains.

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ALTERNATIVES TO A TWO-STATE SOLUTION As warnings have grown more frequent and emphatic that the window of opportunity for a two-state solution might be closing, several proposals for other ways to address the future of the Palestinian territories have surfaced from both the Palestinian and the Israeli sides. Some of these proposals are not altogether new, but rather existed in some form before a two-state solution became the official Israeli and PLO line. Some analysts suggest that raising alternatives is a time-honored tactic employed to jumpstart or to galvanize negotiations. Others perceive that the advent of alternative proposals reflects a shift in fundamental realities underlying the public discourse on the peace process that makes a two-state solution less likely as time passes. Lack of Israeli-Palestinian consensus on any of these alternatives may mean that the status quo in the West Bank and Gaza could continue.

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―One-State Solution‖ The ―one-state solution‖ or ―binational state‖ is a frequently mentioned alternative when Israel and Palestinian leaders and third-party observers speculate about the possible failure of the two-state solution. The predominant discourse surrounding the one-state outcome, which would bring Israelis and Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip under a single sovereign umbrella, operates on the governing principle of ―one-person, one-vote.‖79 Polls show that Palestinian support for a one-state solution remains in the minority (around 25%),80 but leading Palestinian pollster Khalil Shikaki has stated that this support could balloon ―overnight if a credible mainstream leader were to adopt the one-state approach. ‗If [jailed Fatah leader] Marwan Barghouti or [Damascus-based Hamas leader] Khaled Mashaal was to come out in favor, the consequences could be dramatic.‘‖81 If negotiations fail or do not resume, some have raised the possibility that Palestinians could abandon their governance responsibilities within the PA and instead demand a one-state outcome. The political platform adopted by the Sixth Fatah Congress in August 2009 preserved the idea of a ―unified democratic state‖ as a strategic alternative.82 An August 2008 report produced by several current and former Palestinian leaders advocated ―smart resistance‖83 on the part of the Palestinians to block Israel from imposing a solution unilaterally,84 and potentially to shame Israel into accepting a one-state solution by threatening it with international political and economic isolation (e.g., suspension of diplomatic ties, economic sanctions and boycotts, divestment campaigns) for its supposed disregard of Palestinian rights. Additionally, during the Olmert-Abbas negotiations in August 2008, then-PLO negotiator and former PA Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei asserted that ―if Israel continues to oppose making [a Palestinian state within the 1967 pre-war borders of the West Bank and Gaza] a reality, then the Palestinian demand for the Palestinian people and its leadership [would be] one state, a binational state.‖85 In August 2009, the political platform adopted by the Sixth Fatah Congress preserved the option of posing ―the idea of the unified democratic state that rejects racism, hegemony and occupation Israeli Jews‘ strong objections to the one-state argument as a direct threat to the fundamental nature of Israel are the foundation for Israel‘s firm unwillingness to accept or even to entertain the notion of a one-state solution.86 Many believe that the Jewish character

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of the state would be extinguished by Arab domination due to the group‘s numerical superiority. This, for many Israelis, is tantamount to the end of Israel. A single democratic state for Jews and Arabs that guarantees all citizens equal rights to civil liberties and political participation could theoretically come about through a peaceful overhaul of the governing mechanisms of the existing state of Israel. This makes the idea superficially different from the ―one-state solution‖ generally advocated by Hamas, whose charter insists upon the elimination of the state of Israel and the establishment of Palestinian and Islamic primacy over all of pre-1948 historic Palestine.87 Whether the two are different in real terms is open to debate. Given that Israelis are averse to a one-state outcome, and that Western governments may not be likely to embrace the Palestinian strategy of ascribing pariah status to Israel,88 it is often unclear whether Palestinian arguments promoting this outcome are being forwarded because of a genuine strategic preference for this option, or are being used tactically—as a threat to prod Israel into agreeing to a two-state solution.89 Some proponents of a one-state solution claim that it could satisfactorily resolve all the core issues that currently divide Israel and the PLO because of their belief that problems on those issues—security, settlements, refugees, the status of Jerusalem, water rights—were created by the assumption that borders would eventually separate the two peoples.90 Take away the borders, proponents might say, and the problems vanish too. Yet, many analysts doubt that the problems surrounding the core issues are likely to vanish inside a single state. Nathan Brown, who specializes in Palestinian politics at George Washington University and the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, has said, ―The advocates of a binational state generally fall into the trap of holding out an admirable utopian solution without analyzing what such a state would be like in practice or how entrenched adversaries could ever construct such a state.‖91 In August 2009, Hussein Ibish of the American Task Force on Palestine, a Washington, DC-based nongovernmental organization generally aligned with the Abbas-led positions of the PLO, published an entire book aimed at refuting the onestate argument, entitled What’s Wrong with the One-State Agenda: Why Ending the Occupation and Peace with Israel Is Still the Palestinian National Goal.

―Jordanian‖ or ―Regional‖ Option A commonly articulated Israeli alternative to the two-state solution is the so-called ―Jordanian option,‖ sometimes also known as the regional option. The regional option is the idea that the Palestinian territories should not become an independent state, but rather should unite (or reunite, as the case may be) with Jordan and/or Egypt in some manner, for historical, cultural and geographical reasons.92 Jordan administered the West Bank and East Jerusalem from 1948-1967, annexing them in 1950 (although only the United Kingdom and Pakistan recognized the annexation) and granting Jordanian citizenship to West Bank and East Jerusalem residents in 1954 (although the annexation claims and citizenship grants were rescinded in 1988 when Jordan acknowledged the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people). Today, Arabs of Palestinian origin make up a majority of Jordan‘s population. Egypt administered the Gaza Strip from 1948-1967 but did not annex it or make Gazans Egyptian citizens.

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A major obstacle to the viability of the regional option is the stated opposition of Jordan and Egypt to assuming responsibility for the Palestinian territories, as well as the widespread aversion to this option among Palestinians who are committed to the principle of selfdetermination.93 Both Jordan and Egypt have interests in helping stabilize the situations in the West Bank and Gaza, respectively, and in forwarding the peace process. Currently, Egypt is mediating both Hamas-Fatah and Hamas-Israel talks in hopes of improving overall prospects for the peace process, while Jordan helps train recruits for PA security forces. Yet, because they are concerned that Israel might have an agenda to foist ultimate responsibility for the Palestinian territories on them,94 they are reluctant to take too direct a role or establish too direct a presence in the territories. Acknowledging this in a December 2009 article on prospects for a two-state solution in the New York Review of Books, Robert Malley and Hussein Agha nonetheless wrote that arguments favoring some kind of Jordanian–Palestinian entity comprising Jordan, the West Bank, and perhaps Gaza are worth considering. Inserting a new variable would give both parties additional flexibility in an increasingly arthritic process.... Even were Israel to remain skeptical of long-term Palestinian intentions, it might be prepared to withdraw from the West Bank if Jordan jointly held power on the other side.95

Malley‘s and Agha‘s article recognized that the concept still faces ―significant hurdles,‖ including among Palestinians who have ―spent the past several decades emphasizing separation from Jordan.‖96

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Israeli Unilateralism Another alternative to a two-state solution is unilateral Israeli imposition of a solution. The strategy of unilateral disengagement—popularized earlier this decade in the midst of the second intifada—acknowledged the futility of indefinite Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and most of the West Bank, but also held that a negotiated two-state solution was either not possible, not a priority, or not in line with Israeli interests. This stance led then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to order the complete withdrawal of all Israeli settlers and forces from the Gaza Strip in 2005. The Gaza withdrawal was a prelude to the declared aim of Sharon‘s successor Ehud Olmert—following Sharon‘s incapacitation by a stroke in January 2006—to withdraw from most of the West Bank after constructing a separation barrier to accommodate Israeli security concerns. The West Bank disengagement plans lost momentum in light of the rocket threat that emerged from Hamas and other Palestinian militants following the disengagement from Gaza, and in light of the threat that materialized during Israel‘s 2006 conflict with Hezbollah from the southern Lebanese buffer zone that Israeli forces left in 2000. Many Israelis feel that the separation barrier might be insufficient to guarantee security if an Israeli withdrawal led to a West Bank ruled by militants such as Hamas. Although unilateralism has lost favor in the past four years, it could make a comeback because it can be promoted to the Israeli public as a more efficient, less diplomatically arduous route to a twostate outcome.97

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―Status Quo‖ The default option of not adopting a proactive alternative to a two-state solution, but rather leaving the current system of Israeli occupation and limited Palestinian self-rule in place, is in itself an alternative. It may be the preferred alternative for security-minded Israelis who feel that the risks of withdrawal from the West Bank outweigh the potential consequences of continued occupation.98 Some Palestinians also might favor the status quo, at least for the time being, over idealistic options whose failure could result in renewed conflict. West Bank Palestinians may be less motivated to actively oppose continued political stalemate if they discern relative improvements in their quality of life (see ―Aid to Palestinians‖ below). Reluctance shown by Israel, the PLO/PA, and the international community to address the situation in Gaza since the 2007 Hamas takeover is one of the strongest indicators of tacit support for the status quo. The status quo could lead to a ―one-state reality‖ (neither a formal two-state nor a formal one-state outcome) with far-reaching consequences—possibly (1) solidifying the domination of an Arab majority by a Jewish minority, (2) entangling Israelis and Palestinians to such a degree that future separation of the two peoples becomes significantly more difficult to achieve, and/or (3) making the West Bank/Gaza split permanent.99 Others might say that such a scenario is less than certain, and that, in any event, it would take years or decades to materialize.

U.S. POLICY

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Debate over the U.S. Approach Because some analysts believe that prospects for a two-state solution could decrease as time wears on, some advocate vigorous U.S. engagement in pushing the peace process forward.100 They tend to believe that an urgent approach is necessary to prevent Israelis and Palestinians from turning to other options. Others, however, believe that the United States should take a more incremental approach because current conditions—particularly the division among Palestinians between Fatah and Hamas—militate against pressuring the two sides to reach and implement a final-status agreement.101 An ―incrementalist‖ U.S. posture with respect to the peace process could—by buying time—increase the chances of a propitious alignment of U.S., Israeli, and Palestinian leaders and publics willing to conclude and implement a mutually beneficial final-status agreement, or it could squander opportunities and cede the initiative to other parties. In deciding whether to play a more proactive role in the peace process, the U.S. could face concerns over possible Israeli and Palestinian resistance against outside pressure, offset by concerns that peace might not be possible without considerable third-party intervention.

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The Obama Administration’s First Steps

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It is within this context that the Obama Administration seeks to chart a policy course. Obama and many of his close advisers came into office saying that solving the IsraeliPalestinian problem is critical to U.S. national security interests because it fuels other problems America faces in the Middle East,102 and the Administration has insisted on these linkages in public disagreements with Israeli leaders. Nevertheless, some might question whether the peace process is or can remain a priority for the United States given its other pressing foreign and domestic policy problems. Proponents of the Obama Administration‘s approach counter that Obama has given the peace process a far higher profile than his predecessors in the early stages of their presidencies. The appointment of Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell during the first week of Obama‘s term could provide insight into Obama‘s intentions. Yossi Alpher, co-editor of the Israeli-Palestinian bitterlemons.org website,103 has noted that the Administration‘s major points of emphasis thus far—freezing settlements, progress on security, restoring ―pre-intifada‖ Arab-Israeli links, multilateral diplomacy—come directly from Phases 1 and 2 of the Roadmap, which was largely based on the 2001 Mitchell Report.104 A common criticism of Bush Administration-era peace process diplomacy was that it ignored or bypassed key provisions of the Roadmap, thus undermining its legitimacy. Is it possible that in appointing Mitchell as his point man, Obama is less interested in a wholly new approach to the peace process than in giving the Roadmap a genuine chance to succeed by entrusting policy to one of its antecedents? If so, does that mean that the Roadmap might also be the best indicator of future policy proposals? Some might question whether the Roadmap‘s framework—conceptualized in 2001-2002—remains relevant for 2009-2010 in light of changes that have occurred in the meantime (see ―Changes Since Oslo‖ above). At a press conference following the September 2009 trilateral meeting in New York, Mitchell provided some insight into how he might plan to approach final-status negotiations: We‘re going to meet with the parties. We‘re going to seek to determine what is necessary to bridge their differences, to close the gaps. We will, where appropriate, suggest language, suggest decisions. And there will be a genuine back and forth....105

In a January 2010 interview on PBS‘s Charlie Rose Show, Mitchell said that the Administration would tell the parties that negotiations should begin and would lay out what it thinks is a ―proper basis‖ for the negotiations. He also said, ―We think that the negotiation should last no more than two years, once begun we think it can be done within that period of time. We hope the parties agree. Personally I think it can be done in a shorter period of time.‖106

Obama Administration Personnel The Obama Administration has been staffing its peace process team to support the President, Secretary Clinton, and Special Envoy Mitchell. This support is available from several different sources. Within the State Department, in addition to Mitchell and his team, there is the Bureau for Near Eastern Affairs (including the diplomats in residence at the U.S.

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embassy in Tel Aviv and the U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem), the U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority (or USSC, based in the Jerusalem consulate), and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (commonly known as the INL bureau, it also maintains an office in the Jerusalem consulate). The National Security Council, Department of Defense, and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID, which maintains an office in Tel Aviv) also play significant roles in the region. Along with the changes in personnel owing to the change of presidential administration and to Mitchell‘s appointment as Special Envoy for Middle East Peace come a variety of questions. What lines of authority will reporting, decisionmaking, and implementation of programs follow? Will accountability be clearer or more muddled? To what extent will Mitchell and his deputies rely on officials from the Jerusalem consulate (including the USSC and the INL bureau), the embassy in Tel Aviv, and the Near East Affairs bureau? How involved will Obama, the White House/National Security Council staff, and Secretary Clinton be in diplomatic exchanges and in the day-to-day management of affairs? Who will be the primary actors in explaining Administration policy to Congress, and will those actors enjoy full access to and confidence of the key decisionmakers and implementers?

Policy Challenges for Congress

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The environment shaping prospects for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and a two-state solution can influence and be influenced by many factors. Four particularly important aspects of the current situation with possible implications for Congress are: the role of Hamas, efforts to assist Palestinians, Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and possible constructive involvement by Arab states.

The Role of Hamas The role of Hamas may pose the biggest open question: could Hamas (with which U.S. government representatives are currently prohibited from having contact because it is an FTO) be included (either directly or indirectly) in U.S.-facilitated final-status negotiations— in the event it wanted to be included? Acquiescing to the inclusion of Hamas in the peace process in some manner could involve its integration or reintegration into existing Palestinian leadership structures such as the PA and the PLO. Among current U.S. restrictions on aid aimed at Hamas and its affiliates is a prohibition on direct aid to any PA government that includes members of Hamas unless all government ministers publicly agree to recognize Israel‘s right to exist and to be bound by previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements.107 Prospects of Palestinian unity may also lead to calls for a redefinition of the mission of U.S.-assisted PA security forces in the West Bank, which target Hamas members and sympathizers for arrest under certain conditions.108 As demonstrated by Obama‘s Cairo speech, the Administration has not departed from the Bush Administration‘s stance on Hamas. It has conditioned Hamas‘s participation in the peace process on acceptance of the Quartet Principles. However, a June 2009 meeting by Thomas Pickering, a former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations and current co-chair of the International Crisis Group, with Mahmoud al Zahar—one of Hamas‘s most senior

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leaders—has led some to wonder if the Administration might be open to indirect or secret talks with Hamas.109 In August, Washington Post columnist David Ignatius speculated that the timing could be right to pursue secret talks—perhaps allowing the United States to take advantage of possible Hamas concerns occasioned by Iran‘s internal post-election turmoil:

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But Tehran's reliability as a patron is now open to question, and its friends may want to hedge their bets. It's an ideal time for the United States to explore alternatives—through a broad diplomatic opening with Syria and secret contacts (using Saudi, Egyptian and Syrian channels) with Hamas.110

Although the other Quartet members formally espouse the Quartet Principles, Russia has regular dealings with Hamas, legislators from various EU countries have met publicly with Khaled Meshaal and other Hamas leaders, and Hamas representatives claim that high-ranking European officials—including ambassadors—are talking regularly to them.111 Some analysts believe that Khaled Meshaal‘s media overtures following Obama‘s speech were largely aimed at gaining EU (if not U.S.) acceptance of a Hamas role in Palestinian affairs and the peace process without having to commit to the Quartet Principles. Some might argue that European governments could be useful as go-betweens for Hamas and the United States, while others might counter that the go-between role may have limited utility—using Bush-era European diplomacy with Iran as a case in point. Any possibility of U.S. policy shifts regarding Hamas‘s role could trigger heated debate. Those opposing policy shifts say dealing with Hamas would likely strengthen its political hand at the expense of Abbas and other more moderate Palestinians, allowing the movement to argue to Palestinians that its hardline tactics with Israel are more effective than Abbas‘s approach. They also might say that any move toward legitimizing Hamas could embolden it and other Palestinian militants to use the mechanisms of Palestinian leadership to mount attacks on Israel—either before or after the establishment of a Palestinian state.112 Those favoring policy shifts might say that Hamas is less likely to attack Israel if it is made a stakeholder that is accountable to revived Palestinian hopes of a Palestinian state.113 Leaving Hamas out of a negotiated outcome could lead the United States to pursue one of the following courses of action. One would be to trust that the Palestinian people would rally to the support of Abbas in the event he reaches a final-status agreement with Israel, ratifying the agreement in a referendum or in some other manner regardless of Hamas‘s objections. Another would be to help the PA and/or Israel prepare for containment of Hamas or for further military action against it. It is possible that a combination of both courses of action could be used. There are several risks involved with both courses of action. Entrusting the fate of a finalstatus peace agreement to a divided Palestinian public after so many years spent striving for resolution could lead to an unpredictable result (along the lines of the 2006 PLC elections that brought Hamas to power). Even if the Palestinian public backs Abbas, Hamas could seek to nullify the popular will through force. Containment of or military action against Hamas could backfire, as some believe it did for Israel during the December 2008-January 2009 conflict, leading Hamas to broaden and/or deepen its control of Gaza and possibly also giving it inroads into the West Bank. Even military success could come at great cost, given Hamas‘s entrenchment in Gaza and its attack capabilities (either with rockets or through direct attacks on Israelis). By supporting the use of force against Hamas, the United States could open itself

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up to charges that it is an aggressor, possibly eroding U.S. international credibility as an ―honest broker‖ and guarantor with regard to the peace process. If any of these risks materialize, Congress could face requests for heightened economic and security assistance— as occurred in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 Gaza conflict—at a time when discerning if potential aid recipients and their actions are hospitable to U.S. interests might become increasingly difficult.

Aid to Palestinians The Obama Administration has expanded the amount of U.S. aid given to forward Palestinian reform and development priorities. U.S. economic assistance to the Palestinians began following the establishment of limited Palestinian self-rule in the mid-1990s. U.S. assistance levels have fluctuated in past years according to the composition of Palestinian leadership and other circumstances.114 Current Palestinian priorities include the internationally and congressionally supported programs of PA security and economic reform and assistance that were relaunched in conjunction with the Annapolis process in 2007. 115 Since mid-2007, the United States has appropriated or reprogrammed nearly $2 billion in support of these programs, including $650 million for direct budgetary assistance to the PA and nearly $400 million (toward training, nonlethal equipment, facilities, strategic planning, and administration) appropriated to strengthen and reform PA security forces and criminal justice systems in the West Bank. The remainder is for USAID-administered programs implemented by non-governmental organizations in humanitarian assistance, economic development, democratic reform, improving water access and other infrastructure, health care, education, and vocational training. $500 million in total assistance was appropriated for FY2010 pursuant to the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117). Many observers point to signs of progress with PA security capacities and West Bank economic development, along with greater Israeli cooperation. It is less clear whether the progress they cite can be made self-sustaining and can be useful in promoting a broader political solution, and whether the level of Israeli cooperation is sufficient.116 The effectiveness of U.S. assistance is challenged, logistically and strategically, not only by the Israelis, the PLO, the PA, Fatah, Hamas, and their shifting and often conflicting interests, but also by the U.S. interagency process and by the need to coordinate assistance from the European Union, European states, Russia, Japan, Canada, China, Turkey, and Arab states, among others. Ensuring that all international assistance complements U.S. objectives can be difficult or even untenable depending on the circumstances. Presently, assisting Palestinian development and reform advances the stated interests of both Israel and the PA (see ―Fayyad‘s Plan – A De Facto Palestinian State‖ above). Opponents of an emphasis on Palestinian development and reform might argue, however, that efforts to bolster Palestinian moderates in the 16 years since Oslo have made Hamas stronger, not weaker. If this trend continues, their argument might go, Hamas might even attempt a takeover of the West Bank, either through the PA electoral process (according to Palestinian law, both presidential and legislative elections are scheduled to take place in early 2010) or, eventually, through force (as it took over the Gaza Strip in 2007). In such a situation, the future existence and/or posture of the PA and its security forces (on which millions of dollars and thousands of man-hours have been spent through U.S.-sponsored programs) could be thrown into doubt.117

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Another reason some might oppose an emphasis on Palestinian development and reform is that U.S. security and economic assistance to Palestinians could come to be seen as reinforcing the status quo. A peace process with no end in sight could erode momentum for a two-state solution and intensify the jockeying between and among Israelis and Palestinians for alternatives, perhaps leading ultimately to greater conflict. Also, the attention and resources devoted to reform and to strengthening anti-Hamas groups in the West Bank could widen divisions between the two Palestinian territories, given perceptions that residents of the Gaza Strip—almost totally dependent on humanitarian assistance and illicit economic activity under restrictive Hamas rule and the virtual Israeli/Egyptian shutdown of its borders—are being neglected, left behind, or perhaps even targeted. This could lead to heightened Palestinian resentment of all parties promoting the peace process.

Israeli Settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem As discussed above (see ―Israeli Settlements and Infrastructure‖), extensive construction of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem since Oslo may have complicated prospects for a two-state solution. The historical tendency for settlement construction to increase during negotiations has led to Palestinian and Arab complaints aimed not only at Israel, but also at the United States,118 as Israel‘s ally and as both parties‘ designee as ―monitor and judge‖ of the peace process‘s implementation.119 Although longstanding official U.S. policy opposes the settlements as ―obstacles to peace‖ and insists that existing settlement blocs should not prejudice final-status negotiations, Arab critics routinely charge that U.S. support of Israel indirectly supports settlement activity.120 The Obama Administration chose to make a settlement freeze (pursuant to the Roadmap) one of the cornerstones of its approach to restarting the peace process. Public U.S. and Israeli disagreement over the prospect of a settlement freeze lasted through summer 2009 and continued into the fall. Although the issue‘s centrality to the resumption of final-status negotiations was downgraded somewhat at the September 2009 trilateral meeting in New York, President Obama nevertheless reaffirmed the importance of ―real action‖ on restraining settlement activity.121 Differences have surfaced over what constitutes the type of settlement construction that would be subject to a freeze. At various points Israel has sought to exclude the following from a potential freeze: (1) construction projects already contracted, (2) construction within the bounds of existing communities (building ―up‖ but not ―out‖), (3) planning and permitting for construction that would begin following the end of a freeze, and (4) construction in East Jerusalem.122 Israel also seeks to make an exception for so-called ―natural growth,‖123 even though the Roadmap explicitly calls for including it in a freeze. Israel has claimed that during the Bush Administration, the United States and Israel reached an unwritten understanding that ―Israel could add homes in settlements it expected to keep [once a final resolution was reached], as long as the construction was dictated by market demand, not subsidies.‖124 The accounts of former Bush Administration officials diverge in their characterization of U.S.Israel talks on the subject,125 but the Obama Administration has insisted that if understandings ever existed, it is not bound by them. Some observers, particularly Arabs, assert that a settlement freeze should not be subject to negotiation. They believe that Israel is obligated to stop settlement construction because of its agreement to the terms of the Roadmap, if not on other moral and legal grounds, seeking to

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reinforce their point by asking whether Israel would countenance the Palestinians negotiating down their security obligations under the Roadmap. The willingness of the Obama Administration to accept the partial and temporary moratorium on settlement building announced by Israel in October 2009 (see ―Obama‘s Cairo Speech and Subsequent Diplomacy‖ above) may have been at least partly due to concerns in Congress that the public debate over settlements had lasted too long and could damage U.S.Israeli relations, and/or that the Administration‘s initial expectations were too drastic. In May 2009, a letter from 329 Members of Congress called on President Obama to work ―closely and privately‖ with Israel on ―areas of disagreement,‖126 and 76 Senators signed a different letter to the President urging continued close relations with Israel.127 In June, Politico quoted Democratic Congressman Robert Wexler, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, as saying that a freeze should apply ―only to settlements outside Israel‘s security fence, or wall, and should exclude territory that appears likely to ultimately remain part of Israel.‖128 In August, while leading a delegation of 29 Democratic Members of Congress in Jerusalem, the Jerusalem Post reported that House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer ―felt that there was more acceptance [in Congress] of Jewish construction in east Jerusalem than in the settlements in the West Bank.‖129 Given the structure of Israeli society and politics, it may be difficult to maintain a settlement freeze or any other external restraint on settlement activity for an indefinite period of time. Settlers affect the political and diplomatic calculus through (1) influence over key voting blocs in Israel‘s coalition-based parliamentary system (although they do not all share the same ideology or interests, settlers constitute about 6% of the Israeli population— approximately 450,000 out of 7.2 million total); (2) renegade actions to foment public protest and even violence;130 and (3) what they represent for some symbolically, emotionally, and even spiritually as guardians of the last frontier for a country whose founding and initial survival depended on pioneering spirit in the face of adversity.131 During the public debate of summer 2009, the Netanyahu government‘s announcement of new plans for construction and repeated insistence that outside actors will not dictate Israeli policy demonstrated the government‘s sensitivity to these domestic concerns, or, at least, its willingness to claim that these concerns are constraints on its ability to comply with U.S. demands for a freeze. Some analysts have suggested that the Obama Administration and Congress consider going beyond rhetoric to apply various forms of pressure on Israel in order to compel it to restrain settlement activity.132 Loan guarantees figured prominently in the last significant U.S.-Israeli diplomatic standoff over settlements—between President George H.W. Bush and Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir in 1991.133 Current legislation authorizing loan guarantees through FY2010 permits the U.S. government to make reductions in the guarantees equal in amount to Israeli expenditures on settlement activity. However, most analysts believe that any potential reductions are unlikely to have any practical financial effect on Israel.134

Arab States—Gestures toward Israel and Other Constructive Involvement? Determining the proper role of Arab states in Israeli-Palestinian affairs can be a challenge. Many observers believe that Arab states are uniquely positioned to provide key incentives to Israel and support to the Palestinians. While most Arab states want to be seen as supporting a positive solution to the Palestinian question because it is an issue of deep concern for their populations, they often differ with the international community and with one another on what they should do and how they should do it.

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As discussed above (see ―Obama‘s Cairo Speech and Subsequent Diplomacy‖), the Obama Administration has encouraged Arab states to take measures to gradually normalize their relations with Israel. Many Members of Congress support the Administration‘s efforts on this front, and believe that any Israeli efforts to reduce or halt settlement building should be met reciprocally by normalization measures from Arab states. Some small Gulf Arab and North African states that had ties with Israel in the 1990s were reportedly willing in summer 2009 to renew them in the event of an Israeli settlement freeze, but other Arab states were unwilling to consider normalization under these conditions.135 Saudi Arabia explained its position by insisting that because of past failures with incremental confidence-building measures, the ―focus must be on the final settlement and on the final peace,‖ as outlined in the Arab Peace Initiative.136 In addition to normalization with Israel, observers have proposed other ways in which Arab states could play a constructive role in the peace process, including: 



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Providing financial and political support to the Palestinian Authority and its leaders and to Palestinian refugees (through organizations such as the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, or UNRWA); Investing or encouraging investment by their companies and citizens in West Bank industry and infrastructure; Halting or reducing smuggling into Gaza; Facilitating talks aimed at ending Palestinian factional and territorial division; Encouraging the PLO to resume final-status negotiations without preconditions, and, if the negotiations resume, publicly supporting the PLO and its leaders if they decide to make difficult concessions on final-status issues (such as refugees and Jerusalem).

Many analysts believe that Arab states have played an inconsistent role thus far. Egypt has been active in brokering Palestinian unity talks, but with little concrete progress to show for its efforts. Arab states (especially Gulf states) provided large amounts of aid to the Hamas-led PA government in 2006-2007 after the United States and European Union withdrew their aid, but following the reinstitution of U.S. and EU aid in mid-2007, most of them reduced contributions.137 Routinely, they make generous pledges (including over $1.8 billion dollars in the wake of the 2008-2009 Gaza conflict) of aid to the Palestinians, but often fulfill them only in part and after significant delay.138 Their reluctance to fulfill pledges may stem from misgivings over ―picking sides‖ in Palestinian factional disputes and from concerns that without imminent prospects either for domestic political unity or for progress on the peace process, any money contributed could be a waste. On the part of the Gulf states in particular, reluctance may also stem from a feeling that they are less responsible historically for the Palestinians‘ current situation than Israel, the United States, and Europe. However, several of the West Bank investment projects—housing developments, industrial parks, superstores, entertainment complexes—that have been completed or been brought to various stages of proposal or construction in and around Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jericho and the northern West Bank in the past three years in an effort to jumpstart private sector development have been backed by Gulf states or their citizens. Also, both Palestinian mobile phone providers, Jawwal/Paltel and the newly-established Wataniya, are majorityowned by Gulf state investment companies.139

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End Notes

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1

The PLO is the internationally recognized representative of the Palestinian people, empowered to negotiate and enter into international agreements, while the Palestinian Authority (PA) is the governing organ set up to administer Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under various agreements entered into between Israel and the PLO. Mahmoud Abbas is both President of the PA (since January 2005) and the Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee (since Yasser Arafat‘s death in 2004). He is also the leader of the Fatah movement, the most prominent group with membership in the PLO. For a detailed description of these and other Palestinian groups, see CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti 2 See Transcript of remarks by Barack Obama, Cairo, Egypt, June 4, 2009, available at http://www. whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-Cairo-University-6-04-09/. 3 Transcript of remarks by Barack Obama, New York, NY, September 22, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/22/AR2009092201872.html. 4 The Roadmap contemplates the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in three distinct phases: Phase 1 includes calls for progress on security and governance in the Palestinian territories and for an Israeli freeze on settlement building (including so-called ―natural growth‖). Phase 2 contemplates the establishment of a Palestinian state with provisional borders and the continuation of progress on Phase 1 objectives. Phase 3 contemplates a comprehensive final-status peace agreement between Israel and the PLO on all issues. The text of the published version of the Roadmap, dated April 30, 2003, is available at http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/roadmap3.html. 5 The text of the Mitchell Report, dated April 30, 2001, is available at http://www.bitterlemons. org/docs/ mitchell. html. 6 The Arab Peace Initiative was proposed by then-Crown Prince (now King) Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, adopted by the 22-member League of Arab States (which includes the PLO), and later accepted by the 56-member Organization of the Islamic Conference at its 2005 Mecca summit. It offers a comprehensive Arab peace with Israel if Israel were to withdraw fully from the territories it occupied in 1967, agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state with a capital in East Jerusalem, and provide for the ―[a]chievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194.‖ It was most recently reaffirmed by the Arab League at its Doha, Qatar summit in 2009, but King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and other Arab leaders have warned that the offer will not last indefinitely. The text of the initiative is available at http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/summit.html. 7 In May 2003, Israel accepted the Roadmap but with 14 reservations. Among the reservations is an Israeli insistence that the ―first condition for progress will be the [Palestinians‘] complete cessation of terror, violence and incitement.‖ The text of the ―primary themes‖ of Israel‘s acceptance of the Roadmap with reservations is available at http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/14reservations.html. 8 The Oslo Accord of 1993 is more formally known as the ―Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements.‖ The text of the document, signed on September 30, 1993, is available at http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/dop.html. 9 Summary of remarks by Martin Indyk, ―Rethinking the Two-State Solution,‖ Washington Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch #1408: Special Forum Report, October 3, 2008, available at http://www.thewashingtoninstitute.com/templateC05.php?CID=2934; Hussein Ibish, What’s Wrong with the One-State Agenda: Why Ending the Occupation and Peace with Israel Is Still the Palestinian National Goal (Washington, DC: American Task Force on Palestine, 2009), available at http://www.americantaskforce.or g/sites/default/files/HusseinBook(SinglrPages)2.pdf; Yossi Alpher, ―A One-State Solution in Palestine Is Patently Unrealistic,‖ Daily Star (Beirut), August 20, 2008. 10 See Zbigniew Brzezinski, et al., ―A Last Chance for a Two-State Israel-Palestine Agreement,‖ U.S./Middle East Project, 2009, available at http://www.usmep.us/usmep/wp-content/uploads/official-a-last-chance-for-a-twostate-israel-palestine-agreement-11.pdf; Brian Katulis, Marc Lynch, and Robert C. Adler, Window of Opportunity for the Two-State Solution, Center for American Progress, July 2009; Scott MacLeod, ―Olmert‘s Lame-Duck Epiphany About Palestinian Peace,‖ Time, September 30, 2008. Reut Institute, ―Fundamental Early Warning: The Final Act of the Two State Solution?‖ August 2008, available at http://reutinstitute.org/data/uploads/PDFVer/20080820%20Two%20State%20Solution%20FEW%20final%20_3_.pdf. 11 Barak Ravid and Natasha Mozgovaya, ―Source: Obama Strongly Expressed His Impatience to Netanyahu and Abbas,‖ haaretz.com, September 23, 2009. 12 See 2009 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey, University of Maryland with Zogby International, April-May 2009, available at http://www.brookings. edu/~/media/Files/events/ 2009/0519_arab_opinion/ 2009_arab_public_opinion_poll.pdf. 13 See Transcript of remarks by Barack Obama, Cairo, Egypt, op. cit. 14 See Hilary Leila Krieger and Herb Keinon, ―‗US Does Not Expect Israel to Act Unilaterally,‘‖ jpost.com, July 8, 2009. Some Gulf states and North African countries (Qatar, Oman, Morocco, Tunisia) had these types of ties

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with Israel during the Oslo era, and Qatar maintained discreet commercial ties with Israel until cutting them off during the Gaza conflict in January 2009. Sometime in early/mid-2009, Obama reportedly sent letters to the heads of seven Arab states (including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco) asking for their help. There are some indications that steps toward establishing contacts with small Gulf states on the level of previous contacts might be possible, but Saudi Arabia and larger Arab states have reportedly resisted Obama‘s entreaties. See Sheikh Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa [Bahrain‘s ruler], ―Arabs Need to Talk to Israelis,‖ Washington Post, July 16, 2009; Prince Turki al-Faisal [a former Saudi intelligence chief and former ambassador to the United States], ―Land First, Then Peace,‖ September 12, 2009; Laura Rozen, ―In Letters, Obama Asked Arab States for Confidence-Building Measures Toward Israel,‖ thecable.foreignpolicy.com, July 26, 2009. 15 See Aluf Benn, ―Why Won‘t Obama Talk to Israel?‖ New York Times, July 27, 2009. 16 Michael D. Shear and Glenn Kessler, ―Obama Presses Mideast Leaders to Broaden Talks,‖ Washington Post, September 23, 2009. 17 Ben Smith and Laura Rozen, ―U.S. Officials: Middle East Talks on Track,‖ Politico, September 24, 2009. 18 The Goldstone Report, dated September 25, 2009, is available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ hrcouncil/specialsession/9/FactFindingMission.htm. 19 See Transcript of translated remarks (from Hebrew) by Binyamin Netanyahu, Tel Aviv, Israel, June 14, 2009, available at http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Communication/PMSpeaks/speechbarilan140609.htm. ―The simple truth is that the root of the conflict has been—and remains—the refusal to recognize the right of the Jewish People to its own state in its historical homeland…. Even the moderates among the Palestinians are not ready to say the most simplest things: The State of Israel is the national homeland of the Jewish People and will remain so…. I told President Obama in Washington, if we get a guarantee of demilitarization, and if the Palestinians recognize Israel as the Jewish state, we are ready to agree to a real peace agreement, a demilitarized Palestinian state side by side with the Jewish state.‖ Requiring Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state was one of Israel‘s 14 reservations to the Roadmap (see footnote 7). 20 An Israeli TV news station interviewed Netanyahu‘s 100-year-old father, historian Benzion Netanyahu, about his son‘s true convictions on the Palestinian question. Benzion indicated that his son ―does not support a Palestinian state,‖ but merely set conditions for Palestinian statehood that he knew would not be accepted. Aluf Benn, ―Does Netanyahu Back Two-State Solution or Not?‖ Ha’aretz, July 16, 2009. 21 Washington Post columnist Jackson Diehl interviewed Abbas during his May visit to Washington, DC and wrote that Abbas was content to sit back and wait for Israel to respond to U.S. pressure on settlements, perhaps even if it took months or years and led to the collapse of the Netanyahu government. Jackson Diehl, ―Abbas‘s Waiting Game,‖ The Washington Post, May 29, 2009. A representative from an American Jewish organization said that, in his meeting with Abbas during the same Washington trip, Abbas explained that he was willing ―to resume talks without pre-conditions, but added that he could not do so before the Netanyahu government agrees on the goal of such talks.‖ Nathan Guttman, ―Waiting Game: What Did Abbas Mean?‖ Jewish Daily Forward, June 12, 2009. 22 Ali al Salih and Nazir Mujalli, ―Abu-Mazin: To My Knowledge, HAMAS Leaders in Gaza Want Reconciliation Because They Are Suffering, But the Leaders in Damascus Do Not Want It,‖ Al Sharq al Awsat Online, December 20, 2009, Open Source Document GMP20091220001003 (translated from Arabic). 23 See Palestinian National Authority, Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State, Program of the Thirteenth Government, August 2009, available at http://www.mideastweb.org/palestine_state_program.htm. A key passage from the document reads: ―Out of respect for our citizens, and in recognition of their desire to live free and peaceful lives under national independence, we must answer their demand to see the fruits of the state-building project. Against this background, the Palestinian government is struggling determinedly against a hostile occupation regime, employing all of its energies and available resources, most especially the capacities of our people, to complete the process of building institutions of the independent State of Palestine in order to establish a de facto state apparatus within the next two years. It is time now for the illegal occupation to end and for the Palestinian people to enjoy security, safety, freedom and independence.‖ Some PLO and Fatah leaders have taken offense at Fayyad‘s injecting himself into diplomatic matters because the Palestinian Authority (as explained in footnote 1) has no formal authority in them. 24 Taghreed El-Khodary and Ethan Bronner, ―Addressing U.S., Hamas Says It Grounded Rockets,‖ New York Times, May 4, 2009. 25 See 1988 Hamas Charter (English translation from the original Arabic), available at http://www. thejerusalemfund. org/www.thejerusalemfund.org/carryover/documents/charter.html: ―Israel will rise and will remain erect until Islam eliminates it as it had eliminated its predecessors.... There is no solution to the Palestinian problem except by Jihad. The initiatives, proposals and International Conferences are but a waste of time, an exercise in futility.‖ 26 Although Meshaal did not offer to revoke the charter, he implied that events of the past 20 years had led Hamas to doubt the prospect of Israel‘s destruction. However, on October 2, 2009, Meshaal said the following in a speech commemorating the anniversary of the liberation of Jerusalem from the Crusaders by 12th-Century Islamic leader Saladin (Salah al Din): ―As the Crusaders' occupation of Jerusalem ended, the occupation of the

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city by the Zionists will end.... [J]ust as the Crusaders failed over many decades to falsify the facts of history and geography, so too do the Zionists today fail to falsify their claim to history, the land, and geography. Palestine and Jerusalem will remain Arab and Islamic, God willing.‖ Summary of translated remarks (from Arabic) by Khaled Meshaal, Al Aqsa Television (Gaza, Hamas-controlled), Open Source Document GMP 20091003253001, October 2, 2009. 27 Jay Solomon and Julien Barnes-Dacey, ―Hamas Chief Outlines Terms for Talks on Arab-Israeli Peace,‖ Wall Street Journal, July 31, 2009. 28 See Michael Bröning, ―Hamas 2.0,‖ foreignaffairs.com, August 5, 2009. 29 Some speculate that Syria may be encouraging Hamas, to whose exiled leadership it provides safe haven, to at least appear more reasonable while Syria pursues a possible improvement in ties with the United States. Elections in Lebanon and Iran in June 2009 may have—for the time being—turned the primary focus of both Hezbollah and the Iranian regime to jockeying for power internally. Hezbollah‘s coalition performed worse than expected in Lebanese national elections, leading to uncertainty over its influence in the new government, and Iran has experienced turmoil over allegations of fraud in its presidential elections and the repression of dissent by the regime and its allies in the election‘s aftermath. 30 See Matthew Levitt, ―Score One for ‗Hamaswood,‘‖ Middle East Strategy at Harvard, August 11, 2009, available at http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2009/08/score-one-for-hamaswood/. 31 The shelf agreement‘s effectiveness and implementation were to be contingent on (1) the parties‘ fulfillment of their Phase 1 obligations under the Roadmap and (2) the restoration of PLO/PA authority over Gaza. See Yossi Alpher, ―Revelations Regarding the Abbas-Olmert Peace Talks,‖ bitterlemons.org, June 29, 2009. 32 Kevin Peraino, ―Ehud Olmert‘s Lament,‖ Newsweek, June 22, 2009. 33 Diehl, op. cit. 34 See Avi Issacharoff, ―Abbas to Haaretz: Peace possible in 6 months if Israel freezes all settlements,‖ Ha’aretz, December 16, 2009; Al Salih and Mujalli, op. cit. 35 Despite having voiced general disdain for deadlines on the two-state solution, Israeli analyst Yossi Alpher voiced concern in June 2009 about the potential impact of failed negotiating cycles such as Annapolis: ―How many more times will Israeli and Palestinian leaders agree to risk their political careers and perhaps their lives and reinvent the very same peace wheel, only to see it fall off its axle?‖ Yossi Alpher, ―Revelations Regarding the Abbas-Olmert Peace Talks,‖ bitterlemons.org, June 29, 2009. 36 See Ashraf Khalil, ―Uncertainty Over Future of Israeli-Palestinian Talks,‖ Los Angeles Times, November 10, 2008. 37 See Recommendations 13 and 14 of The Iraq Study Group Report, December 2006, available at http://media.usip.org/reports/iraq_study_group_report.pdf. 38 See Robin Wright, ―Iran: The Uninvited Wildcard in Mideast Talks,‖ Washington Post, November 27, 2007; Herb Keinon, ―Analysis: Syria Becomes the Annapolis Prize,‖ Jerusalem Post, November 20, 2007. 39 See Brzezinski, et al., op. cit.; Yariv Oppenheimer, ―A Critical Absence of Urgency,‖ bitterlemons.org, June 29, 2009. 40 Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, ―The Two-State Solution Doesn‘t Solve Anything,‖ New York Times, August 11, 2009. 41 Ibid. 42 Ravid and Mozgovaya, op. cit. 43 See Steven A. Cook and Shibley Telhami, ―Addressing the Arab-Israeli Conflict,‖ Restoring the Balance: A Middle East Strategy for the Next President, Brookings Institution and Council on Foreign Relations, 2008. However, some projections carried out by parties associated with the right of the Israeli political spectrum have claimed that the population estimates and projections for Palestinians are vastly overstated. See Bennett Zimmerman, Roberta Seid, and Michael L. Wise, The Million-Person Gap: The Arab Population in the West Bank and Gaza, The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, February 2006, available at http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/MSPS65.pdf. This study claimed that, as of mid-2004, there were approximately 1.34 million fewer Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza than claimed by most estimates that rely on the Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics. Thus, the study estimated that there were approximately one million fewer Arabs than Jews in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. 44 See Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: ―Israel,‖ ―West Bank,‖ ―Gaza Strip,‖ available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/. According to figures provided by the Factbook as of September 2009, the Arab population breakdown is as follows: approximately 2.4 million in the West Bank, 1.6 million in Gaza, and 1.3 to 1.6 million in Israel. Israel‘s Central Bureau of Statistics reports that, as of the end of 2007, there were 5.48 million Jews and 1.45 million Arabs in Israel and that the Jewish birthrate was 1.9% and the Arab birthrate was 2.7%. Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, Israel in Figures 2008, available at http://www1.cbs.gov.il/www/publications/isr_in_n08e.pdf. 45 See Kevin Peraino, ―A Piece of the Peace,‖ Newsweek, October 13, 2008. 46 In August 2009, Fatah held its Sixth Congress in Bethlehem. It was the first party congress held since 1989—the first of the post-Oslo, post-Arafat era. Although some exiled party members lamented that Abbas would hold the congress under Israeli occupation and thus sought to marginalize him, most analysts deemed the congress a

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success simply for being held. Interviews and polls indicate that it boosted Abbas‘s image as a leader both among and outside of the party faithful. The long-term consequences of the congress for Fatah‘s future in Palestinian politics are less clear. The congress held elections for both Fatah‘s 23-seat Central Committee (its executive board) and approximately 100-seat Revolutionary Council (responsible for implementing Central Committee decisions), and observers believe that the resulting bodies are more representative of the movement‘s active membership and its power centers. Fatah loyalists hope that the party‘s leadership will remain cohesive and effectively mobilize people at the grassroots level when the next democratic test arises for Palestinians, but some observers warn not to underestimate Hamas‘s organization and political base. 47 Marwan Barghouti, age 50, is a Fatah leader who, in polls, consistently garners the strongest support of any potential Palestinian presidential candidate, including Abbas. Barghouti comes out of the ―young guard‖ of the Fatah movement (many of whose members are not PLO exiles like Arafat, Abbas, and their closest associates, but rather ―insiders‖ from the West Bank and Gaza who became prominent for their roles in the first intifada). He ostensibly supports a two-state solution, but has also advocated violent resistance in some cases (he claims to condemn violence against Israeli civilians, but in some contexts has not completely ruled it out), including as a leader of the Fatah armed group Tanzim during the second intifada. Since 2004, Barghouti has been serving multiple life sentences in an Israeli prison for involvement in various killings during the second intifada, but speculation routinely arises that he might be freed in the future, often in connection with rumors of an Israeli prisoner exchange with Hamas. Even if he were released, Barghouti‘s ability to influence political developments after several years in prison, given the current political polarization among Palestinians and assertions from some quarters that the ―young guard‖ is no longer young nor likely to generate momentum for significant change, is difficult to assess. Barghouti was elected to the Fatah Central Committee at the Sixth Fatah Congress in August 2009. 48 The PLC is currently sidelined due to its lack of a quorum caused by the West Bank/Gaza split and the imprisonment of several Hamas PLC members by Israel in 2006 in response to Hamas‘s role in the capture of Israeli soldier Corporal Gilad Shalit. (The de facto Hamas regime in Gaza passes off its version of the PLC as legitimate by ignoring the law‘s provisions and allowing the jailed members to be represented by proxy.) See ―Jailed Hamas‘ PLC Speaker Entered Prison Hospital,‖ Xinhua, November 3, 2008. 49 According to the State Department, in 2008, ―Iran remained a principal supporter of groups that are implacably opposed to the Middle East Peace Process. Iran provided weapons, training, and funding to HAMAS and other Palestinian terrorist groups, including Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). Iran‘s provision of training, weapons, and money to HAMAS since the 2006 Palestinian elections has bolstered the group‘s ability to strike Israel.‖ U.S. Department of State, ―Country Reports on Terrorism 2008,‖ Chapter 3, available at http://www.state.gov /s/ct/rls/crt/2008/122436.htm. See also David C. Isby, ―Iran Trains Hamas Rocket Producers,‖ Jane’s Missiles & Rockets, May 2, 2008. 50 See John C. Hulsman, ―Obama‘s Middle Eastern Dream on Trial,‖ Heartland: Eurasian Review of Geopolitics, July 21, 2009, available at http://temi.repubblica.it/limes-heartland/obamas-middle-eastern-dream-ontrial/1363?h=0. 51 United Nations - Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), ―West Bank Movement and Access Update,‖ June 2009, available at http://www.ochaopt.org/ documents/ocha_opt_ movement_access_2009_june_english.pdf. This system includes 613 ―closure obstacles‖ such as Israeli military checkpoints, roadblocks, earthmounds, and trenches. 52 Remarks by John Kerry, Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs, September 25, 2008. 53 See U.N.-OCHA, The Humanitarian Impact on Palestinians of Israeli Settlements and Other Infrastructure in the West Bank, July 2007, available at http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/The HumanitarianImpact OfIsraeliInfrastructureTheWestBank_full.pdf. According to the U.N.-OCHA report, as of July 2007 approximately 38% of the West Bank was off-limits or severely restricted to Palestinians because it consisted of settlements, outposts, military bases and closed military areas, Israeli-declared nature reserves, and related infrastructure. 54 See U.N.-OCHA, op. cit., which says, ―Since the beginning of the Oslo Accords period in 1993, which left the issues of settlements to final-status negotiations, the total settler population has increased by 63% (an absolute increase of more than 163,000 settlers between 1993 and 2004).‖ 55 See U.N.-OCHA, op. cit. Of the approximately 450,000 Jewish settlers in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), between two thirds and three quarters live on the ―Israeli‖ side of the current and proposed route of the separation barrier. The relatively low settler population on the ―Palestinian‖ side of the barrier could ultimately lead to Israeli acceptance of the dismantlement of most or all of the settlements on that side that are scattered throughout the West Bank (as problematic as such a dismantlement might turn out to be), thus removing many of the impediments to Palestinian contiguity and movement (such as the so-called ―bypass roads‖) in the event a final-status agreement is reached and implemented. See also Akiva Eldar, ―Let Them Stay in Palestine,‖ Ha’aretz, August 25, 2008. 56 See Leslie Susser, ―One Land: How Many States?‖ The Jerusalem Report, April 14, 2008.

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The World Bank, Palestinian Economic Prospects: Gaza Recovery and West Bank Revival—Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, June 8, 2009, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/AHLCJune09Reportfinal.pdf. 58 See U.N.-OCHA, op. cit. 59 The World Bank, Palestinian Economic Prospects: Aid, Access and Reform—Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, September 22, 2008, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org /INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/AHLCSept15,08.pdf. 60 Several high-profile projects—housing developments, industrial parks, superstores, entertainment complexes— have been completed or are in various stages of proposal or construction in and around Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jericho and the northern West Bank in an effort to jumpstart private sector development. See Lally Weymouth, ―‗Institution building‘ in Palestine,‖ Washington Post, October 23, 2009. Yet, most analysts advise against drawing the conclusion that the overall economy has turned a corner. In an October 2009 Washington Post interview, Fayyad acknowledged that the West Bank economy was growing at a rate of 8%, if not even more, but questioned whether this growth was sustainable. Many Israelis emphasize an International Monetary Fund projection of 7% growth for the West Bank in 2009 and the loosening of some Israel Defense Forces obstacles to Palestinian movement. Nonetheless, some Palestinians and international analysts assert that actual and prospective economic development should not be overstated because the Palestinian economy continues to be propped up by external aid, and uncertainty remains regarding movement and access and regarding progress in negotiations with Israel. The World Bank, Palestinian Economic Prospects: Aid, Access and Reform— Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, September 22, 2008, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/AHLCSept15,08.pdf; Zahi Khouri, ―The West Bank‘s Deceptive Growth,‖ New York Times, September 8, 2009. 61 In December 2008, Uzi Arad, now Netanyahu‘s national security advisor, urged an ―an end to ‗endism,‘ i.e., to the notion that we are within reach of resolving everything in one fell swoop, thereby ending the conflict in a quick fix.‖ Uzi Arad, ―Essay: Doing What Is Doable,‖ Jerusalem Post, December 4, 2008. 62 Translated transcript of remarks (from Arabic) by Mahmoud Abbas, Bethlehem, West Bank, August 4, 2009, Open Source Document GMP20090804745004. 63 Translated text (from Arabic) of Fatah political program, August 11, 2009, available at http://www. imra.org.il/story.php3?id=45117. 64 See Transcript of remarks by Javier Solana, London, England, July 11, 2009, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/109193.pdf. Solana‘s proposal suggested that a U.N. Security Council resolution, which has the force of international law, could end the conflict by addressing all of the core issues outstanding between Israel and the PLO. Even though Solana referred to encouraging implementation of a potential resolution through international monitoring, questions remain about the practicability of such a proposal, particularly in view of the international community‘s failure on many occasions to generate consensus between Israel and the Arabs on international proposals. 65 Tovah Lazaroff and Herb Keinon, ―Erekat denies PA unilateralism plans,‖ jpost.com, November 18, 2009. 66 The declaration included the phrase: ―The State of Palestine is the state of Palestinians wherever they may be.‖ The text is available at http://www.mideastweb.org/plc1988.htm. 67 Reut Institute, ―Upgrading the Palestinian Authority to the Status of a State with Provisional Borders,‖ September 4, 2008, available at http://reut-institute.org/Data/ Uploads/PDFVer/20080902% 20Upgrading% 20the%20PA%20to%20PSPB.pdf. See also Reut Institute, ―Reassessment of Israeli-Palestinian Political Process: Build a Palestinian State in the West Bank,‖ May 5, 2009, available at http://reutinstitute.org/Data/Uploads/PDFVer/politicalprocess.pdf. The Reut Institute has been discussing the idea of upgrading the PA at least since shortly after Abbas‘s election as PA president in 2005. 68 See Yossi Alpher, ―Obama Is Deep into Phase II,‖ bitterlemons.org, August 17, 2009. 69 See Uriel Heilman, ―The Mofaz plan—state now, ask questions later,‖ Jewish Telegraphic Agency, November 22, 2009. The plan was seen by many Israelis as a political ploy for Mofaz to attract attention as he seeks leadership of the Kadima Party. 70 Dan Diker and Pinhas Inbari, ―Prime Minister Salam Fayyad‘s Two-Year Path to Palestinian Statehood: Implications for the Palestinian Authority and Israel,‖ Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, October 2, 2009, available at http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=1&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=442 &PID=0&IID=3096&TTL=Prime_Minister_Salam_Fayyad%E2%80%99s_TwoYear_Path_to_Palestinian_Statehood. 71 See Jacob Savage, ―The Three-State Solution,‖ Los Angeles Times, June 20, 2007. 72 See David Makovsky, ―Mideast Peace Can Start with a Land Swap,‖ The Wall Street Journal, June 15, 2009. 73 See Katulis, Lynch, and Adler, op. cit. 74 The ―borders first‖ idea has inspired debate largely because its critics believe that borders cannot be drawn in any meaningful sense without resolving Israeli-Palestinian disagreement on the borders and administration of Jerusalem and its holy sites. For more information on this topic, see CRS Report R40092, Israel and the Palestinians: Prospects for a Two-State Solution, by Jim Zanotti.

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The positions of the PLO and Arab states on core issues are embodied in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API). The API was proposed by then-Crown Prince (now King) Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, adopted by the 22member League of Arab States (which includes the PLO), and later accepted by the 56-member Organization of the Islamic Conference at its 2005 Mecca summit. It offers a comprehensive Arab peace with Israel if Israel were to (1) withdraw fully from the territories it occupied in 1967, (2) agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state with a capital in East Jerusalem, and (3) provide for the ―[a]chievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194.‖ It was most recently reaffirmed by the Arab League at its Doha, Qatar summit in 2009, but King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and other Arab leaders have warned that the offer will not last indefinitely. The text of the initiative is available at http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/summit.html. Hamas has insisted on the first two API conditions, plus a right of return for Palestinian refugees, in return for a 10-year hudna (―truce‖), but refuses to openly consider a permanent peace arrangement or formal recognition of Israel and its right to exist. 76 See Daniel Levy, ―Netanyahu‘s Stubbornness on Settlements Produces American Call for 1967 Borders,‖ Huffington Post, November 25, 2009. As stated above, the PLO is considering seeking a U.N. Security Council resolution to formally demarcate the Green Line as the border of a Palestinian state. See PLO Position Paper, Fatah Media & Culture Commission, December 2009, Open Source Document GMP20091219745001 (translated from Arabic). 77 Perhaps the most comprehensive publicly available maps detailing construction are those produced by the Israeli non-governmental organization Ir Amim, which can be found at http://www.ir-amim .org.il/eng/?CategoryID=162. 78 See Marc Lynch, ―Borders First?‖ lynch.foreignpolicy.com, September 13, 2009; Gershon Baskin, ―Encountering Peace: Drawing Borders Is the First Step,‖ Jerusalem Post, September 18, 2009. 79 See Interview with Eyad Sarraj, ―Time to Change Strategy,‖ bitterlemons.org, August 18, 2008 80 See Poll by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, May-June 2009, results available at http://truman.huji.ac.il/upload/truman_site_poll_28_June2009.pdf. The poll indicated that about 60% of both Israelis and Palestinians support a two-state solution. 81 Susser, op. cit. 82 Translated text (from Arabic) of Fatah political program, op. cit. 83 See Palestine Strategy Study Group, Regaining the Initiative: Palestinian Strategic Options to End Israeli Occupation, August 2008, available at http://www.palestinestrategygroup.ps/ Regaining_the_Initiative _FINAL_ 17082008_(English).pdf. This chapter was reportedly assisted by the Oxford Research Group and financed by a European Union grant. 84 Palestinian Strategy Study Group, op. cit. Although the PSSG report does not rule out violent resistance, it implies that violence, and particularly violence against civilians, is to be avoided if at all possible. 85 ―PA Negotiator: Israel May Make Two-State Solution Impossible,‖ Reuters, August 11, 2008. Qurei‘s comment was hardly the first Palestinian reference to a possible one-state or binational outcome (nor for that matter, was it the first such public reference made by Qurei himself). In fact, the debate over partition and two- and onestate models dates back to the time of the British Mandate in Palestine. Prior to the adoption of the 1947 U.N. partition plan (General Assembly Resolution 181), the majority report for the U.N. Special Committee on Palestine supporting partition of the British Mandate into separate Jewish and Arab states was opposed by a minority report proposing a federation of Jews and Arabs. Palestinian calls for a ―one-state solution‖ never completely subsided following the PLO‘s recognition of Israel‘s right to exist (which was formally declared by then-PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat pursuant to the ―Letters of Mutual Recognition‖ of September 9, 1993, although controversy remains over whether the PLO charter has been amended to accommodate this recognition). These calls, some of which criticized the merits or the practicability of a two-state solution as well, became more frequent and less confined to Palestinians following the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada in 2000, but were made even during the initial 1993-2000 Oslo period. See, e.g. Edward Said, ―The One-State Solution,‖ New York Times, January 10, 1999. 86 See ―Endless Occupation?‖ The Nation, June 17, 2007. ―Put simply,‖ Yossi Alpher has said, ―the vast majority of Israeli Jews would not agree to live in a binational Israeli state.‖ Alpher, ―A One-State Solution in Palestine Is Patently Unrealistic,‖ op. cit. Partly because the state of Israel does not have a formal written constitution, there is no single source that authoritatively defines the fundamental principles on which the state is based. Even though over 20% of Israel‘s citizens are Arabs, the historical core of Israeli Zionist society and the Jewish diaspora overwhelmingly agrees that historical, customary, and religious reasons dictate that Israel is and should remain a democratic state that is distinctly Jewish (although the characteristics of its Jewishness are not defined with precision and consequently are subject to wide interpretation—are the national Jewish characteristics ethnic, cultural, legal, political, religious, or some combination of these?). Perhaps this consensus reflects a shared conviction that Israel fulfills an important function by providing a homeland and safe space for Jews, and that this haven can only survive if it is led by Jews and guided by Jewish principles. Needless to say, an Arab-majority democratic state organized under the principle of ―one-man, one-vote‖ would not be seen by most Israeli Jews as ―Jewish.‖ Many Jews and non-Jews struggle with the interrelated

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questions of whether Israel‘s Jewish nature can be reconciled with democratic principles in the face of demographic realities, and whether a choice might eventually need to be made between Jewishness and democracy, either on principle or in the face of outside pressure. 87 See 1988 Hamas Charter, op. cit. 88 See Naomi Shepherd, ―One State: A Solution for Israel/Palestine or a Threat?‖ guardian.co.uk, August 22, 2008. Shepherd wrote, ―Israel may be unpopular in liberal [W]estern circles, but this has little practical impact. Even in countries overtly hostile to Israel, arms and other deals continue. So if the Palestinians, backed by a substantial number of UN members, were to press for a bi-national state, the US and Europe would certainly block any such resolution.‖ 89 In the event the PLO continues discussing a one-state solution, its efforts at maintaining and gaining further international public support could backfire significantly, particularly if the PLO is seen as unreasonable, manipulative, or deceptive in the methods or tactics it uses—for example, if the timing of its abandonment of the two-state solution could be portrayed as arbitrary or as having given insufficient notice or opportunity to the Israelis; or if the PLO and its leaders say one thing to English-speaking audiences, and another to Arabicspeaking audiences. Any resort to violence against Israel in support of a one-state solution is likely to erode international support for the Palestinians very quickly. 90 See Joe DeVoir, ―The Day After Annapolis: Policy Scenario and Options Facing the Palestinian Authority,‖ Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI), September 1, 2008. 91 Nathan J. Brown, ―Sunset for the Two-State Solution?‖ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2008. 92 See Giora Eiland, Rethinking the Two-State Solution, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyFocus #88, September 2008. The idea of Jordan, instead of the PLO, ultimately having the primary governing role in the West Bank was a mainstream position in the United States and the international community until Jordan rescinded its annexation of the West Bank and acknowledged the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people in 1988. 93 See Indyk, op. cit., saying, ―In terms of the Jordanian option, ultimately no Jordanian government would be willing to take over from Israel the responsibility of policing Palestinians.‖ Some leaders and analysts believe that a Jordan-Palestine confederation, or even a Jordan-Palestine-Israel confederation, could be possible after a Palestinian state has been established. See, e.g., Susser, op. cit. 94 Ghassan Khatib, ―Forcing the Neighbors Into Play,‖ bitterlemons.org, August 18, 2008. 95 Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, ―Israel and Palestine: Can They Start Over,‖ New York Review of Books, December 3, 2009. 96 Ibid. Yet, Malley and Agha wrote that Palestinians could possibly ―gain economic and strategic strength, reduce their vulnerability and dependence on Israel, obtain valuable political space, and become part of a more consequential and self-sufficient state.‖ Ibid. 97 See Daniel Levy, ―The Alternative to Paralysis,‖ Ha’aretz, October 3, 2008. 98 See Steven J. Rosen, ―Stuck in the Middle East,‖ foreignpolicy.com, September 17, 2009. 99 See Susser, op. cit. 100 Many from this school of thought believe that the incremental confidence-building measures of the Oslo paradigm have not worked and that a new approach, in which the United States offers ―bridging proposals‖ and/or uses persuasion or diplomatic pressure to overcome differences between the two sides, is overdue. See Brzezinski, et al., op. cit.; Cook and Telhami, op. cit.; Hulsman, op. cit. 101 According to Dennis Ross—former Special Middle East Coordinator and lead peace process negotiator under President Bill Clinton—―given Hamas‘ control of Gaza and other factors, there is currently no prospect for a permanent settlement and consequently the US should focus on improving the situation on the ground through more modest measures such as security cooperation.‖ Jonathan Rynhold, ―President Obama and the Middle East Challenge,‖ Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, BESA Center Perspectives Papers No. 50, November 6, 2008, available at http://www.biu.ac.il/soc/besa/perspectives50.html. 102 See Transcript of NBC interview with Barack Obama, ―Meet the Press,‖ July 27, 2008, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25872804/. 103 Alpher is also a former special advisor to Ehud Barak (during Barak‘s tenure as Israeli prime minister) and a former director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv. 104 See Alpher, ―Obama Is Deep into Phase II,‖ op. cit. 105 Transcript of press briefing by George Mitchell, New York, NY, September 22, 2009, available at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/2009/129506.htm. 106 ―Transcript: George Mitchell on Charlie Rose,‖ available at http://thepage.time.com/transcript-george-mitchellon-charlie-rose/. 107 See CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti. 108 Hamas claims that its members are being targeted politically by PA security officials, and has used these claims repeatedly to justify its unwillingness to agree to a consensual governing arrangement with Fatah. On the other hand, PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and other PA officials insist that the security forces do not target and arrest people based on their political views or affiliation, but only to the extent that they engage in unlawful activities such as smuggling weapons or conspiring to commit violent acts against Israeli or Palestinian

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officials or civilians. See ―Officials Deny Bethlehem Sweep Will Target Hamas,‖ Agence France Presse, November 12, 2008. According to reported figures from the Independent Commission for Human Rights, an ombudsman organization for the PA, over 400 people arrested ―primarily for reasons of political affiliation‖ were in detention in the West Bank as of May 31, 2009. The Goldstone Report, op. cit. 109 Pickering was also one of the signatories to the 2009 U.S./Middle East Project report (see footnote 10) submitted to the Obama Administration that advocated taking a more ―pragmatic approach‖ toward Hamas. The report acknowledged that direct U.S. engagement with Hamas might not now be practical, but recommended that the United States ―offer [Hamas] inducements that will enable its more moderate elements to prevail, and cease discouraging third parties from engaging with Hamas in ways that might help clarify the movement‘s views and test its behavior.‖ Brzezinksi, et al., op. cit. U.S. officials claimed that they did not ask Pickering to approach Hamas and that they did not know about his meeting with Al Zahar until after it occurred. However, Bassem Naim, another Hamas official present at the meeting, conveyed Hamas‘s impression that the meeting could lead to a future dialogue, saying, ―This was a first meeting to investigate the positions in general terms of both parties without any commitment on any side.‖ Howard Schneider and Glenn Kessler, ―Ex-U.S. Diplomat Talks with Hamas,‖ Washington Post, July 16, 2009. 110 David Ignatius, ―A Waiting Game with Iran,‖ The Washington Post, August 2, 2009. 111 Andrew Rettman, ―EU Countries Practice ‗Secret‘ Diplomacy, Hamas Says,‖ euobserver.com, September 14, 2009. 112 These opponents might assert that Hamas should be dealt with only after it is marginalized. Israel did not agree to formal negotiations with Yasser Arafat of the PLO or with other historical Arab adversaries of Israel—such as former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and King Hussein of Jordan—until it had established a position of strength relative to each of them. Some might say that doing this helped lead to diplomatic breakthroughs in each case. However, at a February 2009 hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace analyst Michele Dunne provided an explanation for why the analogy may not apply to Hamas: ―Regarding Hamas, I think that our problem as the United States is we want Hamas to walk the road that the PLO walked 20 years ago. And Hamas sees very well that the PLO walked that road, and it failed.‖ See Transcript of Hearing, ―Gaza After the War: What Can Be Built on the Wreckage,‖ House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, February 12, 2009, available at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/111/47420.pdf. 113 See Joshua Mitnick, ―As Peace Talks Sputter, Israelis and Palestinians Eye Plan B,‖ Christian Science Monitor, September 15, 2008. 114 Fluctuations have been particularly significant since 2006—due mainly to the on-again, off-again role of Hamas within the Palestinian Authority (PA). 115 The overall program is articulated in the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP) for 2008-2010 introduced by PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad in December 2007. The text of the PRDP is available at http://www.mop-gov.ps/web. 116 For a more detailed discussion of the issues raised in this paragraph, see CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report R40664, U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority, by Jim Zanotti. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is currently conducting research for a report on U.S. assistance to PA security forces and the PA criminal justice system that is expected to be published in spring 2010. 117 See CRS Report R40664, U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority, by Jim Zanotti. 118 While serving as Secretary of State under President George H.W. Bush, James Baker observed, ―Every time I have gone to Israel in connection with the peace process, on each of my four trips, I have been met with the announcement of new settlement activity. This does violate United States policy. It‘s the first thing that Arabs—Arab governments, the first thing that the Palestinians in the territories—whose situation is really quite desperate—the first thing they raise when we talk to them. I don‘t think there is any bigger obstacle to peace than the settlement activity that continues not only unabated but at an enhanced pace.‖ Testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations, May 22, 1991. 119 The Annapolis Declaration of November 27, 2007, text available at http://www.bitterlemons. org/ docs/ annapolis.html. 120 Some of these charges stem from the letter President George W. Bush sent to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon dated April 14, 2004, which stated, ―In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli populations centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949.‖ The text of the letter is available at http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/bushletter.html. 121 Transcript of remarks by Barack Obama, New York, NY, op. cit. 122 Because Israel has annexed East Jerusalem, it claims that Jewish neighborhoods there are not settlements. The United States, however, along with most other countries, has not recognized the annexation, and therefore considers these neighborhoods to be settlements.

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―Natural growth‖ is a vague term that, construed narrowly, could refer to building in settlements to accommodate the rate of expansion of settler families, and, construed broadly, could refer to building to accommodate anyone interested in moving to the settlements. 124 Glenn Kessler and Howard Schneider, ―U.S. Presses Israel to End Expansion,‖ Washington Post, May 24, 2009. This article quotes former Bush Administration deputy national security advisor Elliott Abrams as saying that the United States and Israel reached ―something of an understanding.‖ 125 Ethan Bronner, ―Israelis Say Bush Agreed to West Bank Growth,‖ New York Times, June 3, 2009. 126 ―AIPAC-Backed Letter Gets 329 House Signatures,‖ Jewish Telegraphic Agency, May 28, 2009. 127 Eric Fingerhut, ―More the Three-Quarters of Senate Sign AIPAC-Backed Letter (CORRECTED),‖ Capital J blogs.jta.org, May 20, 2009. 128 Ben Smith, ―Democrats Pressure Barack Obama on Israel,‖ Politico, June 2, 2009. 129 Herb Keinon, ―Hoyer: E. J‘lem Not Same as W. Bank,‖ jpost.com, August 11, 2009. 130 See Mark Weiss, ―Settlers Destroy Trees on West Bank,‖ Irish Times, July 22, 2009: ―Militant settlers, who often act independently, in defiance of the official settler leadership, confirmed that a ‗price tag‘ policy exists under which revenge attacks will be carried out against Palestinians every time the government acts to remove outposts.‖ 131 For more information on the history of the settlements and their impact on Israeli society, see Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar, Lords of the Land: The War for Israel’s Settlements in the Occupied Territories, 1967-2007 (New York: Nation Books, 2007); Gershom Gorenberg, The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements, 1967-1977 (New York: Times Books, 2006). 132 Some of these suggestions focus on aid. See Cook and Telhami, op. cit. Others have proposed non-financial means of U.S. pressure, including possibly reducing U.S.-Israel military and intelligence cooperation and U.S.-Israel diplomatic cooperation on matters such as Iran and on United Nations resolutions related to Israel. See Pierre Razoux, ―How to Put Pressure on Netanyahu,‖ New York Times, September 15, 2009. 133 Bush refused to provide Shamir with $10 billion in requested loan guarantees to absorb immigrants from the Soviet Union without assurances that Israel would stop settlement building. Many analysts believe that the disagreement led to Shamir‘s ouster from power in 1992. Bush eventually agreed to provide the guarantees to Shamir‘s successor, Yitzhak Rabin, while reserving the option to deduct from the loan guarantees any amounts Israel spent on settlements. 134 Cliff Churgin, ―How Hard Will Obama Press Israel on Settlements?‖ McClatchy Online, June 29, 2009. 135 See footnote 14. 136 See Letter from Saudi Ambassador to the United States Adel Bin Ahmed al Jubair to selected Members of Congress, dated September 13, 2009, available at http://www.saudiembassy.net/announcement/ announcement09130901.aspx. 137 See Glenn Kessler, ―Arab Aid to Palestinians Often Doesn‘t Fulfill Pledges,‖ Washington Post, July 27, 2008; ―Falling Short,‖ Washington Post, July 27, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/graphic/2008/07/27/GR2008072700095.html?sid=ST2008072700226. 138 Following international pressure, Saudi Arabia contributed $200 million to the PA‘s budget in summer 2009. See Press Briefing by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey D. Feltman, New York, NY, September 26, 2009, available at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/2009/129669.htm. Smaller budget support contributions in 2009 have been made by the Saudis and other Arab states such as the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, and Oman. Information provided to CRS from State Department, June 2009. 139 For more information on Wataniya‘s launch and the Palestinian mobile phone marketplace, see CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.

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Chapter 3

ISRAEL AND HAMAS: CONFLICT IN GAZA (2008-2009) Jim Zanotti, Carol Migdalovitz, Jeremy M. Sharp, Casey L. Addis, Christopher M. Blanchard and Rhoda Margesson

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SUMMARY On December 27, 2008, Israel launched a major military campaign dubbed ―Operation Cast Lead‖ against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli offensive came in response to markedly increased Palestinian rocket fire following the expiration of a six-month cease-fire on December 19. On January 3, 2009, Israel began a ground offensive into Gaza. Despite international pressure to halt the fighting (including the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1860 on January 8), the conflict continued until January 18, when Israel unilaterally ceased fire and Hamas followed suit shortly thereafter. Israel‘s technological superiority and reliance on heavy armor and firepower contributed to a wide disparity in casualties—approximately 1,440 Palestinians have died (with some organizations estimating that at least half of the dead are civilians), compared with 13 dead (including four civilians) on the Israeli side. The officially stated Israeli goal of Operation Cast Lead was to diminish the security threat to residents of southern Israel by steeply reducing rocket fire from the Gaza Strip, weakening Hamas, and restoring Israel‘s deterrence. Hamas, however, has ―spun‖ the survival of most of its leaders and fighters, and their control over Gaza, as victory. Nevertheless, by temporarily disabling Hamas‘s military capacity, Israel might have decreased its vulnerability to future attacks by buying time to deploy new, more sophisticated anti-rocket defense systems. Greater U.S., European, and Egyptian openness to implementing tougher anti-smuggling measures both on land and at sea could hinder the rearmament capacity of Hamas and other Palestinian militants in Gaza. Nevertheless, the practicability of such measures, and whether they will be accompanied by an opening of Gaza border crossings to renewed commerce, remains uncertain.

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Sources: U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (including for the Bisection Line) and UNOSAT, with additional data from UNRWA; adapted by CRS. Note: All locations are approximate. Figure 1. Map of the Gaza Strip in the 2008-2009 Conflict

International attention has turned to brokering a sustainable cease-fire arrangement and to addressing the needs of the Gazan population—both in terms of continued humanitarian assistance and of reconstruction. The United States and others in the international community are concerned that, given Hamas‘s continued control of Gaza, reconstruction assistance could

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be squandered or used for undesirable means. Yet, the Palestinian Authority and the international community might lose an opportunity to regain influence in Gaza if they do not involve themselves more quickly and decisively in the reconstruction effort. The conflict has exacerbated tensions between countries in the Middle East with a relatively pro-Western orientation—like Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia—and other countries and non-state actors in the region—like Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah. The Saudis have taken the lead in seeking to mitigate intra-Arab tensions by reopening dialogue with Syrian officials and by taking a harder rhetorical line with Israel. Leadership transitions in both the United States and Israel and continued internal division among Palestinians have contributed to difficulties in analyzing prospects both for post-conflict stability and reconstruction and for the Arab-Israeli peace process. New U.S. Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell has been given broad negotiating authority by the Obama Administration. Yet, resumption of serious Israeli-Palestinian final-status negotiations might not occur unless and until stable leadership emerges from both sides.

INTRODUCTION: THE GAZA CONFLICT1

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Overview of the Conflict Israel launched ―Operation Cast Lead‖ against the Palestinian Islamist militant group Hamas (a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization) in the Gaza Strip on December 27, 2008. Initially, coordinated Israeli air strikes against pre-selected targets took Hamas by surprise. In addition to weapons caches and military facilities, Israel targeted elements of Gaza‘s infrastructure that it believed supported Hamas‘s military objectives, including a network of smugglers‘ tunnels along the border with Egypt. Some observers complained that the target list was overly broad, or that Israel did not take enough care in distinguishing between legitimate targets and civilian areas. Air strikes also killed a few senior Hamas leaders, including (on January 15) Hamas interior minister Said Siam. On January 3, 2009, Israel expanded its operations by beginning a ground offensive— sending thousands of troops over Gaza‘s northern border, along with tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery divisions. The ground operation began in the north largely to disable Palestinian rocket launch sites that took advantage of the area‘s relative proximity to targets in southern Israel. Having captured military targets in the northern sector of Gaza, the Israeli forces positioned themselves around Gaza City during the week of January 5 after taking control of Gaza‘s main north-south highway, and there was limited close-quarters fighting between Israeli forces and Hamas gunmen in various Gaza City neighborhoods and in towns in the immediate vicinity such as Jabalia. By cutting off northward access and targeting the tunnels from Egypt, Israeli forces prevented Hamas from supplying its fighters with weapons from the south of Gaza. Despite Hamas‘s use of deception (such as wearing civilian clothing and using civilian buildings for military purposes—possibly including Shifa Hospital, Gaza‘s main medical center (see Figure 1 for location)) and other guerrilla warfare tactics, Israeli ground forces did not meet formidable resistance. Many Hamas fighters remained in hiding and chose, perhaps deliberately, to avoid open confrontations with the better-equipped Israeli forces. Israel

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reportedly gained valuable intelligence from Gazans it detained, from captured maps and plans, and from subterfuge. Israel‘s decision to have its troops go in ―heavy,‖ using armored vehicles and firepower even in urban environments, is also thought to have kept Israeli casualties low, perhaps at greater cost to Gazan civilians (even though many were warned to leave targeted areas ahead of time). During the Israeli offensive, Palestinian rocket attacks on southern Israel continued (see ―Palestinian Rocket Attacks from Gaza Since 2001: Threat Assessment and Israeli Responses‖ below), although their frequency diminished as the fighting endured. Hamas and other allied Palestinian militant groups moved more rocket-launching operations into denselypopulated sectors of Gaza City and to areas further south that were less endangered by Israeli forces. The intensification of Israeli military operations led to heightened international pressure for an end to hostilities. The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1860 on January 8 by a 14-0 vote (with the United States abstaining2), which called for an ―immediate, durable and fully respected ceasefire leading to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza‖ and encouraged the reopening of border crossing points on the basis of the Israel-Palestinian Authority 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA). Both Israel and Hamas refused to halt the conflict. Members of Congress expressed support for Israel‘s operations in Gaza. S.Res. 10, passed by unanimous consent in the Senate on January 8, recognized the ―right of Israel to defend itself against attacks from Gaza and reaffirm[ed] the United States‘s strong support for Israel in its battle with Hamas, and support[ed] the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.‖ A similar resolution, H.Res. 34, passed the House on January 9 by a vote of 3 90-5, with 22 voting present. Starting on January 7, Israel instituted what it called a ―humanitarian corridor‖—a lull in violence for three hours every day—in order to allow medical assistance in conflict areas and to allow trucks to bring needed goods and supplies to Gazan civilians. Yet, some insisted that this measure did not sufficiently address humanitarian needs. After the death of at least two U.N. humanitarian workers and the injury of others, there were also complaints from international organizations (particularly the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and the International Committee of the Red Cross) that Israel‘s ―heavy‖ approach to countering Hamas and other militants made the environment for providing humanitarian assistance too dangerous, and that the organizations were not given sufficient access to injured Gazans. Additionally, there were multiple reports that Israeli fire hit U.N. buildings and/or compounds during the conflict, killing and injuring several shelter-seeking civilians. In the most deadly case, in which 43 Palestinians were killed by Israeli shelling on January 6 in response to fire from Palestinian militants, the reports turned out to be false—Israeli fire struck an area adjacent to, not inside, a U.N. compound. Getting timely and accurate reports of these and other occurrences proved challenging due to Israel‘s barring of the international media from entering the territory independently during the conflict (only a small group was permitted into Gaza, accompanied by Israeli troops). On two occasions (January 8 and January 14), volleys of Katyusha rockets were fired from southern Lebanon into northern Israel. No deaths were reported (although there were two injuries), and Israel fired back at the locations from which the rockets came (and following the second occurrence, Lebanese troops found and dismantled three additional

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rockets set to be fired), but did not retaliate further. Hezbollah appears not to have been directly responsible, but some analysts believe that Hezbollah and/or Iran may have orchestrated or at least consented to the firing to cause confusion in Israel and to portray themselves as defenders of the Palestinian cause, and that the indirect, low-level nature of the attack may have been intentionally calibrated to avoid a major Israel reprisal. Israel announced on January 11 that reserve troops were being inserted alongside regular army divisions, and another week of fighting in and around Gaza City ensued, with air strikes and ground raids also continuing in southern Gaza near the Egyptian border. Most of Hamas‘s top Gaza leadership had gone into hiding, and there were reports of disagreement among Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, and Defense Minister Ehud Barak over how to end Israel‘s involvement in the conflict. Finally, a unilateral pullout was announced on January 17—one day after a U.S.-Israel Memorandum of Understanding on halting weapons smuggling into Gaza was signed in Washington, DC—and became effective on January 18. Following one more round of rocket attacks, Hamas ceased fire on January 18 as well. The Israeli pullout was complete on January 21. Some reports speculated that the cessation of hostilities was timed to precede the U.S. presidential transition (which took place on January 20). The United Nations reports that as a result of Israel‘s three-week military offensive in the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian death toll stands at approximately 1,440 (with some organizations estimating that at least half of the dead are civilians). The estimated number of injured is 5,380. An unknown number of Palestinians have either been internally displaced or remain unaccounted for. Four Israeli civilians were killed and 183 injured by rocket and mortar fire by Palestinian militants in Gaza. Nine Israeli soldiers were killed and 340 wounded during the military operation (one additional Israeli soldier has been killed since the end of major hostilities).

Post-Conflict Developments Although the Israeli offensive has ended, sporadic fighting has continued. Israel has directed return fire at the source of rocket attacks and has engaged militants in periodic skirmishes. Despite Prime Minister Olmert‘s warning that continued attacks would be answered by ―disproportionate‖ force, no major re-escalation has occurred. Some analysts believe that absent extreme provocation, the potential for a new offensive is unlikely until a new Israeli government is assembled following the national elections that were held on February 10. President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton appointed former Senator George J. Mitchell as U.S. Special Envoy for Middle East Peace on January 22. President Obama said that Mitchell ―will be fully empowered at the negotiating table.‖ Mitchell traveled in the region from January 27 to February 3, meeting separately with Israeli and Palestinian Authority (PA) leaders in Jerusalem and Ramallah, respectively, as well as with leaders in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Europe. He has scheduled another visit to the region for late February. The Obama Administration made it clear that Mitchell will not meet with Hamas leaders. Mitchell is seeking to bolster Egyptian-brokered negotiations for a long-term cease-fire between Israel and Hamas (see a more detailed discussion of Mitchell‘s

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efforts and Obama Administration policy in ―The Conflict‘s Implications for U.S. Policy‖ below). A more formal truce would presumably include arrangements to manage the various Gaza border crossings and to prevent the smuggling of weapons into Gaza. The Israeli security cabinet decided on February 18 that any truce must include the release of Gilad Shalit, an Israeli corporal who has been in Hamas‘s captivity for more than two years.3 The international community has shown interest in helping with the reconstruction of Gaza— estimated to cost as much as $3 billion—but some countries disagree about Hamas‘s involvement in any reconstruction, and many are uneasy about implementing anything permanent without agreement on a more sustainable post-conflict order. At an Arab League summit in Kuwait on January 19 (see ―Intra-Arab Political Developments‖ below), Saudi Arabia announced plans to donate $1 billion to the reconstruction, and up to an additional $1 billion may be forthcoming from other Arab countries. PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad announced on February 4 that the PA plans to spend over $600 million on reconstruction by channeling money into Gaza through banks that are free from Hamas‘s control. An international donors‘ conference is planned to take place in Cairo on March 2. To prepare the ground for such a conference, Egypt is trying to revive hopes of Palestinian national unity, having invited Hamas to attend talks with other Palestinian factions (most notably PA President Mahmoud Abbas‘s Fatah movement). On February 19, Senator John Kerry, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and—in a separate delegation—Representatives Brian Baird and Keith Ellison visited the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. According to the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem, the congressional visits are the first since 2000, and the first visits by U.S. government officials to Gaza in over three years (since before the Hamas victory in Palestinian Legislative Council elections in 2006).4 The two congressional delegations reportedly visited sites in northern Gaza that were destroyed or damaged during the conflict and met with U.N. officials. Neither delegation met with Hamas officials.5 The visits proceeded despite the fact that sporadic fighting in and around Gaza continues.

The Conflict's Origins Prior to the start of Israel‘s campaign, experts warned that a full-scale resumption of Israeli- Palestinian violence was imminent, as Egyptian mediation failed to extend the sixmonth cease- fire (tahdiya or calm) that expired on December 19, 2008. Israel and Hamas had indirectly agreed (via Egyptian mediation) to the cease-fire in June. For the first five months, the cease-fire held relatively well. Some rockets were fired into Israel, but most were attributed to non-Hamas militant groups, and, progressively, Hamas appeared increasingly able and willing to suppress even these attacks. No Israeli deaths were reported (although there were injuries and property damage), and Israel refrained from retaliation. Nevertheless, each party felt as though the other was violating the terms of the unwritten ceasefire. Hamas demanded—unsuccessfully—that Israel lift its economic blockade of Gaza, while Israel demanded—also unsuccessfully—a full end to rocket fire and progress on the release of Israeli corporal Gilad Shalit from Hamas‘s captivity.

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Israel cited the sporadic rocket fire as justification for keeping the border crossings and Gaza‘s seaport closed to nearly everything but basic humanitarian supplies. Hamas, other Arab leaders, and some international and non-governmental organizations involved in aiding Gazan civilians complained that Israel was reneging on its promises under the unwritten cease-fire agreement. Some in Israel believed that the pressure applied through a blockade on Gaza could squeeze Hamas from power by turning Gazans against the Islamist group, while other observers asserted the exact opposite—that confining economically desperate people in Gaza would likely increase their dependence on Hamas. The nearly complete shutdown of the highly export-dependent Gazan economy6 left Israel and its supporters open to charges that they were knowingly worsening the already-precarious situation of Gaza‘s population—one of the most densely concentrated (Gaza‘s 1.5 million people live within the territory‘s 146 square miles) and poorest in the world. The United Nations estimates that at least 80% of Gazans live below the poverty line. Many believe that, all along, both sides considered the six-month cease-fire to be merely an opportunity to prepare more fully for eventual conflict. Accounts of Hamas‘s military buildup and its use of tunnels from Egypt‘s Sinai Peninsula for smuggling weapons, and reports describing how Israel devised plans for the eventual Gaza offensive, support this argument. Some commentators have said that giving up on the cease-fire was in both sides‘ interests—asserting that Hamas wanted to reclaim the mantle of ―heroic resister‖ in order to reverse erosions in its popularity among Palestinians since its takeover of Gaza, while Israeli leaders wanted to prove their ability to defend Israeli citizens on the eve of national elections.7 Violence had already resumed in the waning days of the cease-fire. After an Israeli raid on November 4 (ostensibly aimed at preventing Hamas‘s use of tunnels to abduct Israeli soldiers), rocket fire on Israel resumed with greater intensity from Gaza. Some analysts speculated that the cross-border skirmishes and rocket fire that continued into December represented jockeying by both Israel and Hamas for more favorable renegotiating positions as the cease-fire‘s December 19 expiration approached.8 On the 19th, Hamas issued a statement on its website that ―The cease-fire is over and there will not be a renewal because the Zionist enemy has not respected its conditions.‖ On December 24, approximately 88 rockets were fired into southern Israel from Gaza, followed by another 44 on December 25.9 The magnitude of this assault—although it did not cause casualties—apparently prompted the Israeli leadership‘s decision to launch the December 27 air strike and larger offensive.

Did Israel Achieve its Goals?10 The officially stated Israeli goal of Operation Cast Lead was to diminish the security threat to residents of southern Israel by steeply reducing rocket fire from the Gaza Strip, weakening Hamas, and restoring Israel‘s deterrence, which many believed had been weakened as a result of the 2006 war against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Some perceived a broadening of goals as the operation prolonged, noting that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert may have wanted to add the ouster of Hamas from power to Israel‘s immediate aims. Yet, no official statements were made to that effect, and the operation was ended well before any such ouster could be achieved. Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni specifically stated that ousting Hamas

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remained a goal for the future. Nonetheless, many in Israel were disappointed that it was not accomplished, and the government‘s political opponents sought to exploit that failure in the final two weeks of the national election campaign. It may still be too early to appraise Israel‘s achievements completely, as bombing assessments usually trail the end of a conflict for some time. Therefore, the following is only a preliminary appraisal. Rocket launches, while still occurring, have decreased markedly. Since Israel‘s unilateral ceasefire began on January 18, 2009, there have been about 40 sporadic rocket launches into southern Israel, far fewer than occurred on average per day just before Operation Cast Lead. Moreover, Israeli officials believe that smaller militant groups, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Al Aqsa Martyrs‘ Brigades, and not Hamas, have fired the rockets, as they did during the cease-fire (although it is possible that Hamas is enabling or acquiescing to these attacks while preserving deniability). The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) maintains that air strikes took out half of Hamas‘s rockets and other munitions stockpiles as well as a substantial number of rocket launchers and Hamas military commanders who had been in charge of the launches. The IDF also admits that its estimates are inconclusive. During the operation, Israel also destroyed many facilities that it regarded as part of the Hamas support network—police stations, ministries, university buildings, other schools, factories, tunnels, and homes of leaders and commanders—with the intent of weakening the institutions of Hamas rule in Gaza. However, most Hamas leaders survived and the group‘s control of the Gaza Strip is not threatened. Furthermore, Hamas retains fighters, weapons, and tunnels beneath the Gaza-Egypt border through which to smuggle more arms. Even if the IDF Gaza Coordination and Liaison Administration‘s claim that 750 Hamas fighters were killed is accepted, Hamas‘s estimated strength before the conflict was 9,000, meaning it may still have considerable manpower.11 Moreover, while Israeli airstrikes may have destroyed up to 80% of the estimated 300 tunnels under the border,12 some tunnels still are visibly in use and others are being repaired. Part of Israel‘s effort to weaken Hamas involved gaining international understanding of and aid in combating the problem presented by Hamas‘s arms smuggling. This may have been achieved. The United States and several European countries promised assistance that may prove to be effective, and the role of Egypt in this regard will be critical (see ―Efforts to Prevent Arms Smuggling into Gaza‖ below). Finally, Hamas‘s rhetoric does not bespeak weakness, as it has ―spun‖ survival as victory. To some extent, the results of the ongoing cease-fire negotiations may be telling. If Hamas compromises on its demands that all border crossings be opened and that the release of IDF corporal Gilad Shalit, whom Hamas captured in 2006, is not tied to the border issue, then its claims of victory may ring hollow. If Israel cedes control of crossings and releases ―high value‖ Palestinian prisoners in exchange for Shalit, then Hamas may have more to boast about. Israel‘s military deterrence probably has been restored. Hamas politburo chief Khaled Meshaal (alternate spelling: Khalid Mish‘al) admitted that he had been surprised by Israel‘s assault, its length, and its ferocity.13 That Hamas has not been responsible for rocket launches since the cease-fire, even though it retains the capability, and did not directly engage the IDF suggests that it may be reluctant to test Israel‘s will. Moreover, Israel‘s military achievements during the conflict were made at minimal physical cost to itself: 13 dead (four of whom were civilians and five of whom were soldiers killed by friendly fire). The Palestinian casualties, according to the United Nations, included over 1,400 dead and roughly 5,400 wounded, plus

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huge infrastructure and physical losses. The massive devastation may serve as the ultimate deterrent.

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PALESTINIAN ROCKET ATTACKS FROM GAZA SINCE 2001: THREAT ASSESSMENT AND ISRAELI RESPONSES14 Since 2001, several Palestinian terrorist groups based in the Gaza Strip have attacked communities in southern and coastal areas of Israel with thousands of indiscriminately fired rockets and mortars. During the second Palestinian intifada or uprising in 2001, Hamas militia members and others fired homemade mortars at Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip and launched the first locally produced ―Qassam‖ rockets, named after the early 20th Century militant leader Shaykh Izz al Din al Qassam. Widely-available household ingredients, such as fertilizer, sugar, alcohol, and fuel oil, serve as propellants for the low-cost Qassam rockets, which are fabricated locally from scrap metal and pipes and armed with smuggled explosives. Teams of engineers, chemists, and machinists have improved the range and payload of the Qassam series rockets over time, and several individuals and facilities associated with rocket research and production operations have been targeted in Israeli military raids. Since 2006, longer-range 122mm Grad rockets and 122mm Grad-style copies, often referred to as Katyushas, have expanded the range of Hamas and its allies beyond relatively small Israeli communities near the Gaza border, such as the town of Sderot (population est. 24,000), to the larger coastal cities of Ashqelon (population est. 120,000) and Ashdod (population est. 200,000) and to the Negev city of Beersheva (population est. 185,000). Similar mid-range rockets have been fired by Palestinian Islamic Jihad (Al Quds series) and the Popular Resistance Committees (Nasser series). A map showing the approximate range of various Gaza-based rockets and mortars appears as Figure 2 below. Press reports allege that some 122mm rockets fired against Israel have been Grad-style copies made in Iran, while others have been Eastern-bloc editions modified to expand their range and lethality. The longer range Grad rockets are believed to be smuggled into the Gaza Strip via tunnels from Egypt. The approximately 7,000 rockets and mortars fired by Palestinians since 2001 have killed at least 18 Israelis and wounded dozens, while the persistent threat of rocket fire has had a broader negative psychological effect on Israelis living in targeted communities.15 Some observers estimate that Palestinian militants in Gaza may have had as many as 10,000 rockets at their disposal at the outset of the Gaza conflict, up to a third of which may have been Grad-style rockets. In response to ongoing rocket attacks, Israel has invested millions of dollars in both passive and active defense measures, including an advance warning alert system known as ―Color Red,‖ safe room construction programs in residential areas near Gaza, and the deployment of a new counter- rocket defense system known as ―Iron Dome.‖ In December 2008, the Israeli cabinet issued final approval for a three-stage plan to build reinforced security rooms in all 8,500 housing units within 2.8 miles of the Gaza Strip. The cost of the program is estimated to be over $200 million.16 Reports suggest that Israel has budgeted $230 million for the development and procurement of the Iron Dome system; its rocket interceptor costs are estimated at $45,000 each, with a total annual system deployment cost in areas around Gaza estimated at $25 million. Some Israeli military officials and public figures

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reportedly favor the deployment of a less mobile, but potentially more cost effective directed laser system, based on the work of the joint Israeli-U.S. Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) research program that was terminated in 2004.17 For more detailed information on Israeli rocket defense measures, see ―Defense Budget Appropriations for U.S.-Israeli Missile Defense Programs‖ below.

Source: Map Resources, adapted by CRS. Data based on reporting by Jane‘s Missiles and Rockets and Israeli government statements to international media outlets. Notes: All ranges listed for weapons are approximate and may vary based on launch sites and the characteristics of individual rockets, most of which are locally produced and some of which are modified from their original foreign designs. Figure 2. Range of Selected Rockets and Mortars Fired from the Gaza Strip

IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT ON CIVILIANS18 The fighting in Gaza and southern Israel during the conflict affected both Palestinian and Israeli civilians. Questions were raised over who was a legitimate target. Rockets from

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.

Palestinian militants in Gaza were and continue to be almost exclusively fired with the aim of killing and terrorizing Israeli civilians. Israel‘s bombing campaign and ground offensive targeted Hamas, but some have charged that Israel‘s targeting of cultural, residential, and governmental sites disproportionately impacted Gaza‘s civilian population despite Israel‘s insistence that these sites are inextricably linked with Hamas‘s military operations. Israeli officials and media have alleged that Hamas has virtually or actually used Gaza civilians as ―human shields,‖ citing Hamas‘s use of homes, mosques, schools, and hospitals for military purposes and its militants‘ immersion in densely-populated areas. The toll exacted goes beyond civilians‘ immediate well-being to possible implications for regional politics and post-conflict reconstruction, including concerns over further radicalization on either or both sides. Since the cease-fire took effect on January 18, 2009, Israel and Hamas have exchanged fire on a number of occasions; the threat to civilians on both sides remains. Continued restrictions on goods flowing into and out of Gaza have slowed the arrival of humanitarian supplies to Gaza and political concerns have delayed the development of a plan to rebuild Gaza. Casualty figures for both Palestinians and Israelis are stated in ―Overview of the Conflict‖ above.

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Impact on Palestinian Civilians In spite of periodic humanitarian relief shipments allowed by Israel, the 22-day conflict further deteriorated the already dire humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip. While Palestinians began to return home after the cease-fire, an estimated 46,000 displaced persons remained in UNRWA shelters throughout the Gaza Strip.19 Access to food, potable water, and services such as electricity and sanitation was extremely limited during the fighting. Since the cease-fire, provision of health care has resumed except in clinics that were badly damaged or destroyed during the conflict. Remaining clinics are overwhelmed, but an estimated 120 foreign doctors have entered Gaza since December 27, 2008 to provide temporary assistance to understaffed facilities. On January 19, the Director of Hospital Services in Gaza stated that no more medical personnel are needed at the present time but that there is a shortage of medical supplies. The World Health Organization has warned of the risk of an outbreak of disease due to unrecovered bodies and due to the sewage flowing in Beit Hanoun and Beit Lahia in the Gaza Strip. Water, sanitation, and electricity facilities damaged in the fighting are being assessed and repaired and fuel shipments to waste disposal facilities and the Nahal Oz power plant resumed, albeit in limited quantities, on January 17. Cooking gas and diesel are still in short supply and only allowed into Gaza sporadically.20

Impact on Israeli Civilians Over 600 rockets and 200 mortars have been launched by Palestinian militants into southern Israel since the official expiration of the June-December 2008 cease-fire between Israel and Hamas.21 Hamas and other groups firing rockets and mortars target Israeli civilians

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specifically, and some observers argue that the arbitrary nature of these attacks compound the physical danger they represent with severe psychological repercussions that cannot be quantified.22 The siren alert system used to warn civilians of incoming attacks provides only momentary warning time for Israelis to head to shelters, and because the rockets are fired indiscriminately, virtually no place can be safely ruled out as a target—further contributing to Israeli anxieties. During Operation Cast Lead, Hamas rockets hit a school, open markets, homes, and other sites in Sderot, Gedera, Ashdod, Ashqelon, Beersheva, and elsewhere in southern Israel. As mentioned in ―Overview of the Conflict‖ above, northern Israel was also hit by rockets originating from Lebanon on January 8 and January 14, prompting concerns among Israelis in the north that they might have to be on indefinite alert. The government of Israel has stated that it is the right of its people to feel safe in their homes, and other analysts have alluded to the ―expectation of normal life.‖23

POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES

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Addressing the Needs of the Gazan Population Humanitarian Situation and Response24 In addition to the casualties suffered during the conflict (see ―Overview of the Conflict‖ above) and the continued displacement of approximately 46,000 Gazans, protection of civilians and safety of movement remains an urgent concern. Access is also a critical issue, both in terms of civilian access to essential services and full access by the aid community to those in need. There are outstanding requests for aid workers to enter Gaza and it is reported that many staff of international organizations have so far been denied entry. Lack of sustained provision of basic supplies through checkpoints has also presented difficulties. Initial needs assessments show that food, health assistance, and clean water are urgently required. There are severe shortages of power. Extensive damage has been done to homes and public infrastructure throughout the Gaza Strip and emergency repairs are needed for critical buildings. Other elements that would likely be included in any recovery plan include education, job creation, and emergency cash assistance. An assessment of early recovery needs projected over a 24-month period is expected later in the year. On February 9, 2009, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) lifted the suspension on movement of its humanitarian aid supplies into Gaza, following the return by Hamas of all aid supplies it had confiscated at gunpoint between February 3 and February 5. Gaza Flash Appeal The international community, led by the United Nations, is coordinating a humanitarian response. The nine-month Gaza Flash Appeal in the amount of $613 million was formally launched on February 2 (even though it had been in existence with a smaller funding request since December 31).25 This plan includes 106 non-governmental organization (NGO) projects and 82 U.N. projects in response to the humanitarian needs of the Gaza population. The U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator leads the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) with the support of

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the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA).26 The overall coordination of the humanitarian effort relies on the cluster/sector/working group approach, which includes a focus on the following sectors: education, health, logistics, protection, water/sanitation, food security and nutrition, agriculture, mental health, and shelter. There are more than 50 international NGOs working in Gaza and approximately 16 U.N. agencies.

UNRWA Quick Response Plan to Restore Critical Services to Refugees in Gaza UNRWA is mandated to provide relief and social services to registered Palestinian refugees living in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. UNRWAregistered refugees receive benefits that can include food, housing, clothing, and basic health and education. UNRWA also manages microfinance and microenterprise programs and infrastructure projects to address the living conditions of refugees. In Gaza, roughly 70% of the population are registered as refugees. UNRWA is actively involved in the current humanitarian response to refugees and working closely with the HCT as part of the overall coordinated effort. Other humanitarian aid organizations (as described above) work with nonrefugee Palestinians. UNRWA has issued a separate appeal for $345.9 million to address the needs of the Palestinian refugees in Gaza with respect to the following sectors: 

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









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Education: Mainly for school repair and equipment, psychological support for children; Food Aid: The crisis has exacerbated an already dire food security situation. Before the crisis, 56% of the population of Gaza were food insecure and UNRWA used to provide food assistance to around 650,000 refugees in Gaza and feed 200,000 children at UNRWA schools. Now UNRWA seeks to provide two rounds of general food distribution for all registered refugees in Gaza (1,000,000 persons) and two rounds for 550,000 vulnerable persons. UNRWA seeks also to expand the school feeding program due to the increase of children's vulnerability; Emergency Job Creation: Due to the level of destruction and the economic needs of the refugees, the program would include clean-up operations and light repairs/rehabilitation of conflict-affected camps, including roads and community areas, thereby contributing to longer-term post-conflict recovery; Emergency Cash Assistance: Due to further damage to homes, possessions, and livelihoods and to loss of life and the high cost of post injury care, UNRWA plans to provide cash grants to 20,000 refugee families affected by the conflict. Cash assistance to Special Hardship Case beneficiaries is also set to be expanded; Shelter: 15,000 damaged refugee shelters are to be repaired; 20,000 families whose homes have been destroyed or damage are to receive rental subsidies and non-food items to replace their belongings. Destruction of water, sewage, and waste networks, pipes and tanks inside Jabalia and Rafah camps are to be repaired; Repair and Rehabilitation of UNRWA Installations: 53 UNRWA installations have been damaged. This includes 36 school compounds, seven health centers, distribution centers, sanitation offices, warehouses, offices of the Microfinance Department, the Gaza Field Office compound, and neighboring Gaza Training Center; and Health: There has been a dramatic negative impact on the health status of the entire Gaza refugee population. Also, seven of UNRWA‘s 19 health installations are in

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Jim Zanotti, Carol Migdalovitz, Jeremy M. Sharp et al. need of reconstruction. There is a severe strain on UNRWA health clinics due to the high number of patients. Regular primary health care services have been disrupted through the loss of medical consultation days; immunization programs have been suspended. The pharmaceutical supply line has come under extreme pressure and needs to be restocked. Extraordinary levels of physical and emotional stress in the entire population are in need of treatment through psycho- social support programs.

The appeal sets forth the following conditions as important to facilitate post-conflict improvement in living conditions for Gazans: 1. Sustained provision and delivery of basic items, such as food aid, fuel, and medical supplies; 2. Unimpeded access and freedom of movement by humanitarian aid workers in and out of Gaza; 3. Protection of the provision and delivery of humanitarian emergency and recovery assistance from political interests and control; and 4. Expanded list of items to be imported, such as equipment, building materials, commercial goods and cash to help infuse the private sector and over time reduce dependency on international assistance.

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For information on U.S. humanitarian assistance to Gaza, see ―U.S. Humanitarian Aid (Including to UNRWA) and Other Economic Assistance to Palestinians‖ below.

Concerns Regarding Reconstruction27 While some see Gaza reconstruction as an humanitarian imperative, others see it as a race for influence in Gaza, recalling the role that rebuilding southern Lebanon played in bolstering the popularity of Hezbollah after the summer 2006 war. Observers fear that if Hamas is or appears to be more efficient or expeditious in delivering relief and rebuilding infrastructure, then the organization‘s popularity in Gaza could increase at the expense of Mahmoud Abbas‘s PA, widening the divide between Palestinian factions and further eroding the PA‘s legitimacy. Hamas has reportedly already handed out over $33 million to families who lost homes, business, or family members in the fighting, but has not yet been able to launch largescale reconstruction due to ongoing restrictions on the flow of goods into Gaza. 28 Concern over getting involved too late with the reconstruction may have partially motivated the PA‘s February 4 announcement of $67 million in immediate aid ($50 million ―for temporary housing and urgent needs‖ and another $17 million for infrastructure repair).29 The challenges for rebuilding Gaza center on Hamas‘s control of both political and civil institutions in Gaza. The United States and the European Union have refused to aid the Hamas ―government,‖ instead providing assistance to the PA as the recognized representative of the Palestinians despite Hamas‘s control in Gaza. Hamas controls government institutions and the police force in Gaza, raising questions about who will oversee Gaza reconstruction and how goods and services will be delivered to Gazans after the conflict. Khaled Meshaal, the Hamas leader living in exile in Damascus, has called upon the international community (and Arab states in particular) to form a committee to oversee Gaza reconstruction and warned donors not to hand over funds to the ―corrupt‖ PA.30

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Since the cessation of major hostilities on January 18, 2009, the international community has worked to find a solution to rebuilding Gaza that circumvents Hamas. Lack of consensus has slowed the process of rebuilding. Most of the international community supports the PA— despite the fact that it has virtually no presence in Gaza, nor is it able to influence events in Gaza without Hamas‘s explicit or tacit approval—as the preferred vehicle for administering international assistance and overseeing the implementation of reconstruction in Gaza. While some hope that this responsibility will improve the PA‘s popularity among Gazans, others worry that the PA‘s legitimacy could be eroded if it appears to Palestinians that Abbas‘s government was complicit in Operation Cast Lead in order to secure for itself a role in Gaza after the crisis.31 In a recent statement, Hamas Minister of Economics Ziyad al-Zaza said that ―Mahmoud Abbas couldn‘t get into Gaza on the back of an Israeli tank. So now they‘re trying to get him in through the aid he‘s offering.‖32 These statements suggest that Hamas is positioning to use any PA role in reconstruction to further erode popular support for the PA. Thus, major actors working to win support for the Palestinians have said that Palestinian reconciliation is necessary before Gaza recovery efforts can be effective. United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has said that the international community will provide for the Palestinians ―but the Palestinians must complete internal unity,‖ and Quartet envoy Tony Blair has also advocated the formation of a national unity government capable of implementing the reconstruction process effectively.33 Prospects for Palestinian unity are discussed further below in ―Efforts at Unity and the Question of Elections.‖ The willingness of Israel to open the crossings into Gaza for reconstruction supplies is another important factor in the reconstruction of Gaza. Israeli government spokesman Mark Regev said that ―What we want is to see the reconstruction of Gaza. What we don‘t want to see is the reconstruction of Hamas.‖34 In addition to a viable reconstruction plan that circumvents Hamas, Israel has said that the release of Gilad Shalit is necessary before the crossings into Gaza will be fully opened.35 Currently, Israel is reluctant to allow goods like cement and steel into Gaza for fear that such materials could be used by Hamas for military purposes.36 As the international debate over reconstruction continues, various organizations are working to provide immediate relief to Gazans. Some, such as UNRWA, have provided humanitarian assistance but are reluctant to be a responsible party or middleman with respect to long-term reconstruction efforts. As mentioned above (see ―Humanitarian Situation and Response‖), UNRWA temporarily suspended its imports of food and supplies following two Hamas thefts on February 3 and February 5. The incidents underscore concerns—shared by organizations assisting in humanitarian and reconstruction efforts and their international sponsors and donors—that supplies could be diverted away from the Gazan civilians for whom they are intended. Even if Palestinian unity is forged, any unity government would likely have to include members of Hamas, and thus may not assuage international fears that reconstruction assistance could be squandered or used for undesirable means.

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Efforts to Prevent Arms Smuggling into Gaza U.S. Efforts to Prevent Smuggling from Egypt37 The Smuggling Tunnels Though it has persisted for decades, smuggling via a network of underground tunnels beneath the eight-mile Egypt-Gaza border (known as the ―Philadelphi Route‖ or ―Philadelphi Corridor‖) has become particularly widespread due to Israel‘s total blockade of Gaza, Hamas‘s demand for weapons, and the lack of viable economic alternatives to black market activity on both sides of the border. Over the last three years, arms smuggling has increased dramatically due to intraPalestinian fighting and Israeli-Palestinian violence. At the same time, the demand for commercial items inside Gaza has skyrocketed due to the international aid boycott of the Palestinian Authority that followed the formation of a Hamas-led government in 2006 and Israel's closure of the Gaza Strip following Hamas‘s 2007 Gaza takeover. One goal of Israel‘s Operation Cast Lead was to destroy as many underground tunnels as possible. Although Israeli military officials estimate that repeated aerial bombardments destroyed hundreds of tunnels, numerous reports indicate that smuggling activity has resumed. Experts note that a number of systemic factors contribute to the ongoing smuggling trade between Egypt and Gaza, including:

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the prevalence of smuggling amongst Egyptian Bedouins in the Sinai Peninsula. The Bedouin community is largely self-governed and partially dependent on smuggling goods, people, drugs, and arms for its livelihood. Aside from the tourist industry, the Egyptian government has invested little in Bedouin areas. Furthermore, the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty limits the number of Egyptian army and police forces which can patrol parts of the Sinai, making it difficult to enforce the rule of law there. the ease of tunnel construction. According to numerous media reports, tunnels are financed by tightly knit Palestinian and Bedouin clans on both sides of the border for between $30,000 to $120,000 each, depending on a tunnel‘s length and depth.38 The equipment needed to build a successful tunnel (electric generators, cable, telephone wire, pipes, plastic containers) are widely available and labor costs are cheap. Once built, a tunnel can recoup its owner‘s investment in just a few months, and Hamas allegedly taxes proceeds from the sale of smuggled goods, giving the group a vested interest in the enterprise.39 the lack of security forces on both sides of the border with the political will to halt smuggling. On the Gaza border, there is no non-Hamas entity capable and/or willing to stop smuggling. Authorities there reportedly encourage and, as previously mentioned, even tax the trade. On the Egypt side, a 750-man Border Guard Force (BGF) was deployed along the border following Israel‘s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005.40 Over the last two years, Israel has questioned Egypt‘s political will to stop arms smuggling, though in recent months Israel has refrained from its previous public criticisms. In August 2008, Israeli defense officials acknowledged that they had received information from IDF military intelligence that Egypt was making an

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extra effort to curb the flow of weaponry and explosives into Gaza.41 Although Egypt may be more diligent in halting weapons smuggling, others allege that BGF troops look the other way when it comes to smuggling items other than guns and ammunition. According to one tunnel owner, ―There's too many people interested in keeping the tunnels open. There's too much money to be made.‖42

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Role of Congress In late 2007 and early 2008, as Israeli leaders stepped up their public criticism of alleged Egyptian complicity in Hamas weapons smuggling, Congress addressed the issue. During consideration of the House version of the FY2008 State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations bill (H.R. 2764), lawmakers inserted new language that proposed to withhold $200 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) from Egypt until the Secretary of State certifies that Egypt has taken concrete steps toward improving its human rights record, strengthening judicial independence, and curbing Palestinian smuggling along the Gaza border. Despite vociferous protests from the Egyptian government asserting that conditionality would harm bilateral relations, Congress passed legislation that temporarily suspended some aid to Egypt. P.L. 110-161, the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, contained Section 690, which withheld the obligation of $100 million in FMF or Economic Support Fund amounts until the Secretary of State certifies, among other things, that Egypt has taken concrete steps to ―adopt and implement judicial reforms that protect the independence of the judiciary; to review criminal procedures and train police leadership in modern policing to curb police abuses; and to detect and destroy the smuggling network and tunnels that lead from Egypt to Gaza.‖ In March 2008, then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated that ―I have exercised on behalf of the United States the waiver in terms of Egyptian assistance.... The Bush Administration sought to have that flexibility. We believe that this relationship with Egypt is an important one and that the waiver was the right thing to do.‖ 43 New U.S. Anti-Smuggling Support to Egypt During and after the debate on aid conditionality, the Bush Administration sought to broker a solution to the smuggling problem that was amenable to all parties. In order to allay Israeli concerns over smuggling and assist the undermanned Egyptian BGF force in Rafah, Egypt, the U.S. government in 2007 sent former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Danin and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Mark Kimmitt to Egypt to assess the smuggling problem. According to an Israeli media report, the two U.S. officials recommended that, among other things, the United States provide Egypt with sophisticated tunnel-detection and demolition equipment, such as unmanned ground vehicles and acoustic sensors, to improve Egypt's tunnel detection capability. A second team from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers also traveled to Egypt in December 2007 and offered to assist Egypt by providing technical advice and training. In late 2007, the Bush Administration and the Egyptian government agreed to set aside $23 million of Egypt's annual Foreign Military Financing (FMF) toward the procurement of more advanced detection equipment, such as censors, remote-controlled robotic devices, seismic- acoustic tunnel detection equipment, and the computers to process seismic data.44 On June 16, 2008, U.S. Embassy in Cairo Spokesman Robert Greenan said that a U.S. (Defense

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Department) team had begun training Egyptian forces in using electronic equipment, including instruments that measure ground fluctuations, to detect smuggling tunnels.45 According to the Egyptian Embassy in Washington, D.C., ―In October 2008, training sessions for Egyptian officers were held in Egypt to use the new equipment at a training site set specifically for that purpose. Pentagon officials commended the seriousness and skills of the Egyptian officers trained to use these equipment. The BGF started employing the new US equipment upon their arrival in January 2009.‖46 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers may have also assisted Egypt in installing advanced cameras and sensors, such as groundpenetrating radar. At this point, it would appear that there are no additional plans to augment existing U.S. support to Egypt in Rafah. This may be due, in part, to the sensitivities of the Egyptian government to a larger U.S. presence on Egyptian soil and the potential risk U.S. personnel may face from installing equipment designed to undermine the area‘s primary economy, tunnel smuggling. Although there have been no known threats made against U.S. personnel, retaliatory attacks are always a possibility. Recent reports indicate that U.S. assistance to the BGF in Rafah is somewhat deterring smuggling activity. According to one Gaza tunnel owner, ―The Egyptians have deployed everywhere on the other side and they have set up cameras. We haven't been able to bring anything.‖47 According to another smuggler, ―The Egyptians are closing the tunnels because the Jews and the Americans are putting pressure on them.... The situation now is dangerous.‖48 The United States also may be facilitating Israeli-Egyptian cooperation on the smuggling issue. Reportedly, Israel may be more willing to renegotiate a 2005 MOU with Egypt to expand the number of Egyptian BGF forces from 750 to between 1,500 and 2,200 men. Reports also indicate that Israeli-Egyptian intelligence sharing has increased.

U.S.-Israeli 2009 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) As Operation Cast Lead was winding down, the Bush Administration, in its final days, signed a new MOU with the Israeli government pledging additional U.S. support to counter weapons smuggling. According to the MOU, the United States, among other things, pledged to: ―accelerate its efforts to provide logistical and technical assistance and to train and equip regional security forces in counter-smuggling tactics, working towards augmenting its existing assistance programs; and the United States will consult and work with its regional partners on expanding international assistance programs to affected communities in order to provide an alternative income/employment to those formerly involved in smuggling.‖49

International Maritime Anti-Smuggling Efforts and Security Support50 Efforts to restrict the flow of weapons from Iran and other sources to the Gaza Strip in the wake of the January 2009 hostilities now extend beyond Rafah and the Egyptian Sinai to the Red Sea and Mediterranean Sea. On February 4, Denmark hosted officials and expert advisers from Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Spain, and Italy at a consultation meeting to discuss joint support for antismuggling efforts related to the Israel-Hamas cease-fire.51 Israel attended as an observer, although the Palestinian Authority and Egypt did not send representatives. The participants

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reportedly will meet in London later this month to attempt to reach a consensus and initiate a joint action plan. The United Kingdom, France, and Germany have submitted a joint letter to Israel and Egypt offering naval support for maritime anti-smuggling operations and border security assistance. European naval forces currently command the U.N.-authorized Maritime Task Force (MTF) that enforces the anti-arms trafficking provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 off the coast of Lebanon. The French frigate Germinal, which was diverted from its MTF mission and sent to help patrol the waters near Gaza after the cessation of major hostilities in late January, has since been withdrawn amid warnings and protests from Egypt. German border security experts visited Egypt in late January to assess the potential for German and EU support for Egyptian anti-smuggling efforts. Israel reportedly has sought to convince the United States, Egypt, Cyprus, and NATO countries to alter existing maritime security arrangements or to establish new maritime security initiatives to interdict suspected arms shipments bound for Hamas in Gaza (and potentially for Hezbollah in Lebanon).52 Specifically, Israel may be seeking to persuade NATO members to expand the mandate of Operation Active Endeavor, a robust maritime intelligence sharing and counterterrorism program in the Mediterranean, to include new interdiction authorizations.53 Similarly, Israel may support an expansion of the mandate of the U.S.-led multinational Combined Task Force 151 that currently patrols the Gulf of Aden in support of counterterrorism and anti-piracy missions. Recent events have illustrated the potential legal and operational challenges that new or expanded U.S. or multilateral missions might entail. On January 27, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen confirmed international press reports that a U.S. Navy vessel boarded a Cypriot-flagged ship suspected of transporting weaponry from Iran to Syria for possible reshipment to Hamas.54 The U.S. search took place in the Red Sea after the Israel-Hamas cessation of hostilities was reached, and the ship subsequently was monitored as it transited the Suez Canal before being detained in Cypriot waters for inspection. As of February 10, the ship, the M. V. Monchegorsk, was anchored off of Limassol, Cyprus and was under the control of Cypriot authorities. Cypriot government officials reportedly received confidential confirmation from the United Nations Sanctions Committee established pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1737 (Iran) that "military ordnance‖ and ―raw materials used for the assembly of munitions" found on board the ship violate Security Council Resolution 1747, which prohibits Iran from supplying, selling, or transferring arms or related materiel.55 At issue remains a lack of explicit authority for international maritime forces seeking to restrict the flow of weaponry to Hamas that would enable high seas interdiction beyond the consensual inspection rights provided to navies under current maritime law and existing United Nations sanctions. Resolution 1747 requires all member states to ―prohibit the procurement of such [prohibited] items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran.‖ Admiral Mullen emphasized this point stating that, ―The United States did as much as we could do legally... We were not authorized to seize the weapons or do anything like that.‖56 Cypriot authorities considered whether to offload the prohibited cargo in Cyprus or transfer the ship and its cargo to a third-party for further disposition. On February 13, the Cypriot government announced its decision to unload containers holding suspected contraband items from the MV Monchegorsk,

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and subsequently has transported several of the containers to facilities controlled by the Cypriot armed forces for storage.57

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Intra-Palestinian Politics — Fatah (PA/PLO) and Hamas Pre-Conflict Background Fatah, the secular nationalist movement formerly led by Yasser Arafat, has been the dominant faction in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) for decades. Fatah was supported by a vast majority of the Palestinian people in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip upon the establishment of the Palestinian Authority and limited self-rule in 1994. Since then, problems with internecine violence, divisiveness, and widespread disenchantment with corruption and poor governance, along with failure in establishing a Palestinian state, have led to popular disillusionment. The death of Arafat in 2004 removed Fatah‘s unifying symbol, further eroding the movement‘s support as Mahmoud Abbas took over its leadership. No Palestinian movement has benefitted more from, or contributed more to, Fatah‘s weakening than Hamas. Since Hamas‘s inception, it has maintained its primary base of support and particularly strong influence in the Gaza Strip (largely through a network of social and charitable organizations that has helped it extend its influence into the West Bank and the Palestinian diaspora), even though its top leadership is headquartered in exile in Damascus, Syria. Hamas‘s politicization and militarization can be traced to the intifada (―uprising‖) that began in the Gaza Strip in 1987 in resistance to the Israeli occupation. Hamas refuses to recognize the right of Israel to exist, refuses to renounce the use of violence, and refuses to consider itself bound by previous agreements reached by the PLO and PA with Israel. Due to Hamas‘s perpetration of suicide bombings against Israeli civilians and other acts of terrorism, the United States designated it as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 1997, and U.S. aid to Palestinians has been tailored to bypass Hamas and Hamas-controlled entities. Hamas‘s victory in January 2006 Palestinian legislative elections set in motion a chain of events that contributed to the Gaza conflict. The refusal of the United States, the European Union, and much of the rest of the world to have direct dealings with or to give financial assistance to a Hamas-dominated PA government helped lead to a tense Palestinian factional standoff that was only temporarily eased by a February 2007 Hamas-Fatah ―unity agreement‖ brokered by Saudi Arabia. These tensions produced fighting between Hamas and Fatah that led to Hamas‘s forcible takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007. In response to the Hamas takeover, PA President Abbas dissolved the Hamas-led cabinet and appointed a ―caretaker‖ technocratic PA government in the West Bank (led by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, a former World Bank and International Monetary Fund official), leading to renewed U.S. and international assistance for the PA in the West Bank that prompted Hamas to further tighten its grip on Gaza. Hamas's Political Maneuvering With its de facto control of Gaza intact in the conflict‘s aftermath, Hamas is working to achieve and consolidate political gains among Palestinians while the memory of the conflict is still fresh—at the expense of PA President/PLO Chairman Mahmoud Abbas and his Fatah movement. Hamas may be modeling its opportunism after Hezbollah‘s success at turning the

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wide notoriety it received across Lebanese sectarian lines for its resistance to Israel during the 2006 war into an expanded role within Lebanon‘s political system.58 The January 29 announcement by Hamas politburo chief Khaled Meshaal of a possible ―alternate PLO‖ has been seen by some analysts as a call for a new Palestinian umbrella organization defined by its opposition to Western policies, and by others as a scare tactic aimed at winning Hamas membership in the PLO itself.59 Some within the international community say that organizational fissures between Hamas‘s Gaza- based leadership and its leadership-in-exile could be exploited by promising Gazan leaders greater engagement and other incentives in return for moderating their goals and tactics. Others might say that Hamas is more united than it seems, and that it benefits from the portrayal of its leadership as divided because this perception provides Hamas with greater flexibility in dealing with both Western actors who hold out hope of its moderation and its Syrian and Iranian allies who are reminded not to take its rejectionist stance for granted. Presenting a divided front also may serve Hamas by providing it with a rationale to explain policy inconsistencies or changes of direction to the Palestinian people.

Abbas on the Defensive? Hamas‘s post-conflict maneuvering appears to have put Abbas and his political allies on the defensive. In countering Hamas‘s message, Abbas and his supporters have emphasized the PLO‘s long tradition and international recognition as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Changes in the tone of the PA‘s rhetoric at different points during the Gaza conflict may have reflected a feeling by Abbas that he was in a no-win situation.60 Support for Palestinian resistance, even if only rhetorical, would have endangered Israeli and U.S. cooperation with the reform efforts and peace negotiations—aimed at the eventual creation of a Palestinian state—that form the primary basis of his political appeal to Palestinians. On the other hand, silence would have betokened support for Israeli aims, subjecting Abbas and his allies to allegations of ―collaboration.‖ As it was, Hamas and much of the Arab and Western media alleged that the relative restraint of Abbas‘s remarks during the conflict signaled his passive acceptance of the Israeli offensive. Hamas‘s opportunity to broaden its appeal may rest on its success at convincing Palestinians that the Gaza conflict shows that the long-term Fatah/PA/PLO strategy of peaceful engagement is misguided. Hamas argues that peaceful engagement plays into the hands of an Israel that seeks to weaken the Palestinians by sowing division through the false hope of a future state.61 Abbas‘s seemingly defensive posture may also be explained by regional trends signaling the possible political ascendancy of nationalist movements featuring Islamist elements at the expense of those featuring secular and/or pan-Arab elements. Some have theorized that these trends are likely to lead to the decline of Abbas‘s secular Fatah movement—and, along with it, the official PLO position of peaceful engagement with Israel—and the continuing rise of Hamas and other Islamists. Hamas‘s survival of the Gaza conflict could bolster this trend and/or fuel further cultural and political separation between Palestinians in the West Bank and in Gaza.62

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Efforts at Unity and the Question of Elections In the aftermath of the Gaza conflict, efforts have begun to bring the West Bank and Gaza under unified Palestinian rule. The relevant Palestinian factions (particularly Hamas and Fatah) have been invited to Egypt on February 22 for a ―comprehensive national dialogue‖ whose end goal is political unity, and there are reports that the factions are already holding Egyptian-brokered discussions.63 The prospect of Palestinian unity may serve the interests of some in the international community, particularly Arab states—both by alleviating concerns over challenges posed to post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Gaza and by promoting regional stability. Yet, the failure of several efforts since the June 2007 West Bank/Gaza split to forge Hamas/Fatah unity indicates that success may be unlikely. A prominent issue in unity discussions between Hamas and Fatah is likely to be whether to hold Palestinian presidential and/or legislative elections, and, if so, when, where, and how. There is a dispute over whether Abbas‘s presidential term expired on January 9, 2009, or whether it continues until the electoral term of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC)—in which Hamas maintains a majority—ends in January 2010.64 On January 9, Hamas announced that Abbas‘s term had ended, but, despite speculation that it might name a successor PA president from the Hamas leadership of the PLC, it did not. Hamas cited the conflict (which was ongoing at the time) as the reason for its restraint.65 Before the Gaza conflict, Abbas had proposed holding presidential and legislative elections simultaneously sometime between the January 2009 and January 2010 dates, and he has renewed this proposal in the conflict‘s aftermath.66 Hamas has rejected Abbas‘s proposal, insisting that presidential elections be held and that legislative elections be held only upon the expiration of the PLC‘s term—in hopes that it might be able to win the presidency without risking the loss of its legislative majority. Forging a unity government with Hamas and reaching compromise on how to hold elections could appeal to Abbas and the PA. They would like to regain a foothold in Gaza— presumably at least through involvement in its reconstruction and by having a role in monitoring its border crossings—but do not want to look like they are, as Hamas has put it, ―returning on Israeli tanks.‖ Unity, however, would be at the expense of conceding greater legitimacy to Hamas, with unpredictable consequences. Moreover, unity could come at the expense of negotiations and security cooperation with Israel, and at the expense of aid and diplomatic ties with the United States and Europe, if the arrangement gives Hamas too prominent a role in the PA. Another reason unity might not be favored by Abbas is that Hamas has reportedly used brutal tactics of revenge and forced interrogation against Fatah members and supporters in Gaza in retaliation for their supposed collaboration with Israel during the conflict.67 It remains to be seen whether Hamas is willing to moderate its platform, decrease its militancy, or give up its monopoly on Gaza in return for greater legitimacy and participation in Palestinian institutions. The opportunity, through a unity agreement, for Hamas to reestablish an open presence in the West Bank, with the hope that it might one day gain control of the West Bank through elections or by force, could be persuasive (given that recent PA actions have focused on reducing Hamas‘s military profile and charitable activities in the West Bank), as could a possible pathway to PLO membership. If Hamas gains the release of its imprisoned members of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) as part of a truce with Israel, the reconstitution of its quorum as the majority party could boost its ability to affect political developments, and appreciably increase its leverage in unity negotiations.

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It may be too early to assess the impact of the Gaza conflict on Palestinian public opinion with accuracy. Some believe that Hamas strengthened its resistance credentials among Palestinians while Fatah looked like Israeli collaborators or appeared inconsequential, while others believe that Hamas lost support (particularly in Gaza) for its willingness to put civilians at risk during the conflict. A poll conducted by the Jerusalem Media Communication Centre at the end of January 2009 concluded that the level of support for Hamas had increased dramatically at Fatah‘s expense since a previous poll in November 2008—from a 37-20% Fatah advantage in November to a 29- 28% advantage for Hamas in January.68 Yet, these results were contradicted by another January 2009 poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion. This poll showed Fatah retaining an appreciable advantage over Hamas (in rounded figures, 39-24% in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and 43-28% in Gaza).69

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Regional and International Implications of the Gaza Conflict70 Regional and International Responses The worldwide response to the Gaza crisis was characterized by consistent calls for an end to the violence and by concern over the humanitarian situation in Gaza. Protests broke out in numerous Middle Eastern and other international capitals, and the Arab media continuously aired footage of casualties in Gaza. The crisis also exacerbated existing tensions between countries in the region with a relatively pro-Western orientation—like Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia—and other countries and non-state actors—like Iran, Qatar, Syria, and Hezbollah. The United States and other Western countries generally faulted Hamas for starting the crisis but some, including France, also criticized the Israeli response as disproportionate. Regional responses to the conflict consistently condemned the Israeli air campaign and ground invasion as ―disproportionate‖ and tantamount to a ―massacre‖ of Palestinians in Gaza. Governments as well as other regional leaders issued statements criticizing the attack. For example, Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, the prominent Iraqi Shia cleric, condemned the attacks as ―barbaric.‖ Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinej ad and Syrian President Bashar al Asad called the Israeli campaign ―outrageous aggression.‖71 Near the end of the second week of fighting, Al Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al Zawahiri said that the Israeli offensive was a ―Zionist- Crusader campaign‖ against Islam and Barack Obama‘s ―gift‖ to the Palestinian people before he takes office. Zawahiri called on Muslims around the world to respond by hitting ―Zionist and Crusader‖ targets around the world and by all available means.72 Osama bin Laden followed Zawahiri‘s statement with an unauthenticated audiotaped message—bin Laden‘s first public statement since May 2008—that circulated on Islamist websites on January 14, exhorting Muslims to wage holy war on Israel and criticizing Israel‘s ―Arab allies.‖73 There were more moderate reactions. In a joint press conference, the Egyptian and Turkish foreign ministers urged both parties to stop attacks and called for Palestinian reconciliation. They also focused attention on humanitarian needs in Gaza. Contrary to the views of its own citizenry (which is majority-Palestinian) and some of its parliament members, the Jordanian government also took a more tempered position, though King

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Abdullah II condemned the attacks and called on Israel to halt all military actions in Gaza. As the conflict continued and the humanitarian toll grew on both sides, moderate responses gave way to outrage reflected both in leaders‘ statements and in public opinion.74 In addition to condemning Israel, some regional voices have criticized certain Arab governments for not taking more active steps to end Israel‘s military campaign and blockade of the Gaza Strip. These criticisms reflect existing intra-Arab and Sunni-Shia fault-lines. As protests broke out across the region and as Arab media outlets ran footage from Gaza, Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran charged moderate Arab governments of complicity in the attacks because of their inaction. In particular, the Egyptian government faced strong criticism for its refusal to open the Rafah border crossing (which links Egypt with Gaza) for humanitarian aid.75

Intra-Arab Political Developments Criticism appeared to coalesce into action when, just a few days before the beginning of a scheduled Arab League economic summit in Kuwait on January 19, Qatar hosted an ―emergency summit‖ of its own to address the crisis. After Saudi Arabia and Egypt publicly announced that they would not attend, the Qatari meeting (January 16) failed to attract the necessary quorum of Arab states to speak for the Arab League. The list of those who did attend—including Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinej ad, and Syrian President Bashar al Asad—made the event look to some like a pro-Hamas function. Days later in Kuwait, Arab leaders made limited efforts to overcome their apparent divisions, appearing together in conversation for a symbolic photograph, but otherwise announcing no significant joint efforts or initiatives. Saudi Arabia announced its intention to donate $1 billion to reconstruction in Gaza, but no firm joint plans or delivery mechanisms were discussed. In early February, ministers from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and five other Arab states76 met in Abu Dhabi with Palestinian Authority Foreign Minister Riyad Al Malki to coordinate a response to efforts by Hamas to argue that the PA and PLO had become illegitimate representatives of the Palestinian people (also see ―Hamas‘s Political Maneuvering‖ above). According to UAE Foreign Minister Shaykh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahayyan, the meeting was meant ―to support Arab unity, rally support for the Arab peace initiative, give more support to the PA, led by President Abbas, and support the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.‖ He reportedly added that the participants hoped to ―help achieve Arab accord that will stop unwelcome and unconstructive interferences in our affairs by non-Arab parties.‖77 PA Foreign Minister Malki added that the meeting was intended to create a positive atmosphere for the next Arab summit, scheduled to take place in Qatar in late March 2009.78 The meetings in Qatar, Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi were interpreted within the region as being indicative of a potentially growing division among Arab states on the role of the PA after the conflict, and also prompted some observers to speculate about the willingness of some Arab states to deviate from the long-standing practice of following the lead of Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The willingness of Qatar to deal with Hamas alongside Iran and Syria also raised concerns about the influence of non-state actors (mainly Hamas and Hezbollah) and Iran in the region, particularly with respect to Palestinian affairs.79 The Doha communiqué from the Qatari meeting called for a suspension of the Arab Peace Initiative80 and an unconditional opening of all crossings into Gaza with EU or Turkish

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monitoring. Saudi Arabia and Egypt opposed this language in the official statement issued after the meeting in Kuwait, instead expressing support for the Egyptian proposal to end the violence that had called for the PA to manage the crossings.81 However, days later in Kuwait, Saudi King Abdullah bin Abd al Aziz, the original sponsor of the Arab Peace Initiative, characterized the Gaza conflict as ―bloody, painful and brutal scenes and genocide being carried out by a criminal, inhuman, and merciless gang as the world listened and watched,‖ and warned Israel that ―the Arab Initiative on the table today will not be on the table for ever.‖82 Since late January, Saudi Arabia has sought to build intra-Palestinian and intra-Arab unity in response to the crisis. These efforts appear to be driven by the kingdom‘s desire to further the Palestinian cause and to limit Iran‘s influence in Arab affairs. Concern about the potential emergence and intentions of a right-wing coalition government in Israel also may be influencing Saudi efforts to consolidate the positions of Palestinians and Arab governments. In Kuwait, King Abdullah lamented that political disputes among Arabs ―have led us to division and dispersion of our will. These disputes have helped and are still helping our treacherous Israeli enemy and whoever seeks to sow division of the Arab ranks and take full advantage of promoting his regional goals at the expense of our unity, dignity and aspirations.‖83 Saudi-Syrian engagement has emerged as the most important front in this regard, and Saudi leaders have reportedly taken steps in recent weeks to open channels of dialogue with Syrian President Bashar al Asad after four years of tension and distrust. King Abdullah bin Abd al Aziz reportedly held side discussions with President Asad at the Kuwait summit and sent the kingdom‘s intelligence director, Prince Muqrin bin Abd Al Aziz, to Damascus to deliver a personal message on February 15. The visit followed consultations in Riyadh among King Abdullah and Egyptian Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit and intelligence director General Omar Suleiman. At present, it appears that Saudi Arabia has taken the lead in attempting to restore a common Arab political position, while outsourcing to Egypt efforts to handle negotiations meant to reconcile Hamas and Fatah and to improve border security with Gaza.

Impact of the Conflict on Israeli Elections84 Preliminary results of the February 10, 2009 Israeli national elections are inconclusive. The centrist Kadima Party led by Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni appears to have placed first with an estimated 28 seats, but parties to the right of Kadima scored a combined majority of 65 seats out of 120 in the Knesset. Livni campaigned, in part, on a peace platform and took votes from the left—from Labor and the smaller Meretz Party. She may have been aided by her efforts to project strength and determination during the Gaza conflict, when she held her own beside an array of foreign interlocutors seeking an early end to the fighting. Livni had opposed the June cease-fire with Hamas, arguing, as it turned out correctly, that it would enable the group to arm. And she was the proponent of a policy of declaring a unilateral cease-fire at the end of the recent conflict—which the government adopted. Yet, the outcome of the Gaza conflict clearly reverberated in favor of the right in the elections. Defense Minister and Labor Party leader Ehud Barak could not sustain the boost he had received during Operation Cast Lead as the planner of a very successful military

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offensive because he was seen as seeking to end the operation ―too soon,‖ i.e., before ousting Hamas from power. Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu pounced on the failure to topple Hamas and promised to do the job if he became prime minister. His party made a comeback by winning an estimated 27 seats, up from 12 in the March 2006 election. Yisrael Beitenu (Israel Our Home), a farther right-wing party led by Avigdor Lieberman, registered gains by harping on an alleged internal threat from a ―fifth column‖ of Israeli Arabs, some of whom had carried Hamas flags during demonstrations against the Gaza operation and reawakened many Israelis‘ concerns about the estimated 1.5 million Arab citizens of Israel residing in their midst. His campaign theme ―no loyalty, no citizenship‖ appeared to resonate with many Israelis. Israeli President Shimon Peres is not required to name Livni as prime minister-designate even though it appears that Kadima won the most Knesset seats. He may select whomever he believes would be able to form a stable government. Netanyahu may fit that description more than Livni because of the right‘s majority in parliament. With 65 Members of the Knesset, including Avigdor Lieberman, voicing their support for designating Netanyahu as prime minister as of February 19, many observers believe that, over the weekend of February 20-22, President Peres is likely to formally ask the Likud leader to assemble a government.85 Both Livni and Netanyahu have said that they want a national unity government,86 and some analysts suggest that President Peres will try to get them to work together even if their goals are not compatible. Livni reportedly wants to continue negotiations toward the creation of a Palestinian state that would enable Israel to remain a democratic state with a Jewish majority. While Netanyahu said during the campaign that he would continue negotiations, he gives a priority to ―economic peace,‖ i.e. building the Palestinian economy and other institutions to serve as a basis for a later peace. It is unclear how the two can reconcile their positions for the purpose of forming a government, but, in Israeli politics, it is not impossible.

Effect on the Arab-Israeli Peace Process87 Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations The situation for both Israelis and Palestinians does not appear conducive to a revived peace process. Israeli-Palestinian peace talks resumed in 2007 and were officially welcomed at the U.S.- sponsored Annapolis Conference that November. Yet, months of negotiations did not enable the two sides to fulfill the goal of reaching an agreement by the end of 2008. Their ground rules provided that there would be no agreement until all issues were resolved, and they generally refrained from public statements about the status of the talks. The lack of public statements led some analysts to assume that no progress was made. However, anecdotal reports suggested that the negotiators had reached compromises on some issues and impasses on others. The negotiations were suspended in late 2008, mainly due to Israeli domestic political considerations, and the Palestinians halted them officially due to the Gaza conflict. Earlier, outgoing Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert had presented his ideas for peace that he said he had shared with PA President Mahmoud Abbas. They included Israel‘s withdrawal almost to its 1967 borders, with some territorial swaps or adjustments to enable it to retain large West Bank settlement blocs, giving Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem to the Palestinians, international supervision of holy sites in Jerusalem, and the return of a symbolic

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number of Palestinian refugees to Israel. Abbas, perhaps seeking to shield himself from charges that he was betraying the Palestinian people, reacted to Olmert‘s statements by saying that he would not accept anything less than 100% of the amount of pre-1967 territory or a solution that did not provide for the refugees‘ ―right of return.‖ As a result of the Gaza conflict, the situation of both negotiating parties has changed. In Israel, rightists not amenable to territorial compromise or a two-state solution appear to have won a majority of the seats in the Knesset (parliament) in the February 10 national elections. The ascendance of the right has been attributed to the fact that many Israelis believe that their unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 brought the Hezbollah threat to their northern border and that their unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 brought Hamas to power, thereby increasing the threat to residents of southern Israel—underscored by Hamas‘s rocket barrages after the expiration of the cease-fire on December 19, 2008. Moreover, they view both terrorist groups as surrogates for Iran, a perceived existential threat, now on their doorstep. This sentiment leads the right to question a peace accord with the Palestinians that would require Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank, thereby potentially creating a threat to Israel‘s heartland comparable to that from Hezbollah or Hamas. Moreover, many Israelis view President Abbas as a weak leader of a bifurcated Palestinian Authority who does not control Gaza, who would be unable to implement an accord, and who might be supplanted by radicals. The Gaza conflict also may have produced a different political dynamic on the Palestinian side (see also ―Intra-Palestinian Politics – Fatah (PA/PLO) and Hamas‖ above). Heretofore, President Abbas, as Chairman of the PLO, and his designee, former Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei, served as the primary negotiators with Israel. Abbas was sidelined during the Gaza conflict as Israel and Hamas were the combatants and focus of attention. Some viewed his relative quiet at the outset as tacit approval of Israel‘s assault on his main political rival, Hamas. As the civilian death toll mounted, Abbas condemned Israel‘s actions. The question remains, however, to what extent was Abbas weakened further by being sidelined as well as by the expiration of his term as Palestinian president on January 9, 2009, and would it affect his legitimacy as a negotiator? Others maintain that the ability of the Palestinian Authority and its security forces to successfully maintain quiet in the West Bank during the Gaza conflict may foretell future capabilities and provide some assurance about its ability to implement a peace accord. Hamas, which maintains that it triumphed simply by surviving the Israeli offensive, has long argued that ―resistance‖ is more effective than negotiations to achieve Palestinian goals. Its avowed goals include the end of the occupation of all of the former British mandate of Palestine, including Israel. Hamas officials have said that they would establish a Palestinian state on any territory from which Israel withdraws, without recognizing Israel as a second state. Hamas had accepted Abbas as a peace negotiator, provided that the product of his negotiations be put to a vote either in the Palestinian Legislative Council—in which Hamas holds a majority—or in a referendum. Hamas has long demanded that the PLO, of which it is not a member, be ―reformed.‖ Since the Gaza conflict, Hamas politburo chief Khaled Meshaal has demanded that the PLO be replaced, most likely because Hamas seeks to gain ideological and operational control over it. Because Abbas‘s legitimacy as negotiator stemmed from his chairmanship of the PLO, it appears that Hamas now may be rejecting that legitimacy.

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Israeli-Syrian Talks In May 2008, Israel and Syria began what would become four rounds of indirect peace talks via Turkish mediators in Istanbul focused on the Golan Heights. The talks were suspended before the Gaza conflict in anticipation of Israeli elections and a new U.S. administration. Syria said that Israel‘s December attack on Gaza ―closed the door on the indirect talks.‖ However, some observers suggest that the indirect talks had run their course and that the parameters of an accord are well known, but Syria requires an active U.S. role for the transition to direct talks because of its desire for U.S. security and financial guarantees. Some in Israel are amenable to a peace with Syria that would require Israel to withdraw from the Golan. They note that the Syrian border has been quiet for decades (despite what some view as Syrian surrogate warfare against Israel via Hezbollah in Lebanon) and that Syria (at least former Syrian President Hafez al Asad) has a record of keeping its word. They also believe that peace might wean Syria out of its alliance with Iran and put the Iranian threat to Israel at a greater distance. Others note that the ―cold peace‖ on Israel‘s northern border has endured thus far without territorial concessions. Israeli right-wing parties oppose ceding the Golan because it would bring Iran via its Syrian ally to yet another border of Israel and because the Golan is a major water source for Israel. It still is uncertain which position in Israel will play a decisive role in the next government. Many U.S. analysts and some in Israel believe, largely because Israeli- Palestinian peace appears unattainable at least for the near or mid-term, that the Israel-Syria track should become the main focus of current diplomatic attention.

POSSIBLE OPTIONS FOR THE 111TH CONGRESS

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Defense Budget Appropriations for U.S.-Israeli Missile Defense Programs88 Although Israel‘s Operation Cast Lead was designed to thwart Palestinian rocket fire, over the long term, Israel has recognized that it will require new missile defense systems capable of knocking out short-range projectiles. The Israeli government has sought U.S. assistance not only in countering long-range ballistic missile threats, but also in codeveloping short-range missile defense systems to thwart rockets fired by non-state groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah (see ―Palestinian Rocket Attacks from Gaza Since 2001: Threat Assessment and Israeli Responses‖ above). Congress and successive administrations have shown strong support for joint U.S.-Israeli missile defense projects. U.S.-Israeli missile defense cooperation has perennially been authorized and appropriated in the defense authorization and appropriations bills. P.L. 110329, the FY2009 Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, provides a total of $177.2 million for U.S.-Israeli missile defense programs, a $58 million increase over the President‘s FY2009 request.

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Table 1. Defense Budget Appropriations for U.S.-Israeli Short-Range Missile Defense: FY2006-FY2009 $ in millions Program David‘s Sling

FY2006 $10.0

FY2007 $20.4

FY2008 $37.0

FY2009 $72.895

Total $140.295

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Iron Dome As mentioned earlier, Israel is currently developing a short-range system, dubbed ―Iron Dome,‖ to destroy crude, Palestinian-made rockets fired by Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip.89 Iron Dome, which is expected to be deployed in 2010 at a development cost of $215 million, is designed to intercept very short-range threats up to 40 kilometers in all-weather situations. It is being developed by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems. Reportedly, the Israeli government may be seeking U.S. assistance in financing the Iron Dome system. According to one Israeli defense official, ―We're not just looking for funding assistance, although that is extremely important for us. We've offered the Americans to join as full participants and to use the system to defend their troops and assets around the world.... We're hopeful that after careful examination of the data and the system's capabilities, that they'll decide to join the program.‖90 The Associated Press has reported that data collected by Israel on the rockets launched by Palestinian militants during the Gaza conflict might assist with the finalization of the Iron Dome system.91 This chapter raises the possibility that Israel may have considered its offensive to be an opportunity to gain ground on both sides of its self-defense equation simultaneously—improving its own technological capacity to defend against rocket attacks while also depleting the arsenals of its Palestinian militant adversaries—and thus to decrease its future vulnerability to such attacks (with prospects of tougher anti-smuggling measures and reestablished deterrence as added benefits). David's Sling David‘s Sling (a.k.a. Magic Wand) is a short/medium-range system designed to counter long- range rockets and cruise missiles, such as those possessed by Hezbollah in Lebanon, fired at ranges from 40 km to 300 km. It is being jointly developed by Israel's Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and Raytheon. The system is expected to be operable by 2010. P.L. 110-329 provides $72.8 million for a short-range missile defense program. In August 2008, Israel and the United States officially signed a ―project agreement‖ to co-develop the David‘s Sling system. According to Lt. Gen. Henry Obering, director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, ―We wanted a truly co-managed program because the United States will be very interested in this for our own purposes.... The agreement we just signed allows us to work through specific cost-sharing arrangements and other program parameters.‖92

Oversight of U.S. Arms Sales to Israel93 Israel may have used weapons platforms and munitions purchased from the United States in its military operations in Gaza, reportedly including, among others, F-15 and F-16 aircraft,

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Apache helicopters, and, according to Israeli press reports, GBU-39 small diameter guided bombs approved for sale by the 110th Congress following notification in September 2008.94 The transfer by sale of U.S. defense articles or services to Israel and all other foreign countries is authorized subject to the provisions of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the regulations promulgated to implement it. Sales are made through contracts outlining the terms and conditions of the sale and the use and management of defense articles or services by the recipient country. Section 3 of the AECA stipulates that in order to remain eligible to purchase U.S. defense articles, training, and services, foreign governments must agree not to use purchased items and/or training for purposes other than those permitted by the act without the prior consent of the President. Section 4 of the AECA states that sales are authorized to friendly countries solely for specific purposes, including, but not limited to, ―internal security‖ and ―legitimate self-defense.‖ These terms are not defined in the AECA, in its predecessors, or in subsequent amendments. To date, the President and Congress have chosen to interpret the terms on a case-by-case basis. The AECA requires the President to report to Congress promptly when the President has received information that a ―substantial violation‖ of an agreement made pursuant to the AECA ―may have occurred.‖ Such a report is not required to reach a conclusion as to whether a substantial violation of an agreement has or has not occurred. If the President were to submit a written report to Congress stating that a substantial violation had occurred or in the event that Congress were to pass and have enacted a joint resolution containing such a finding, then the recipient country in question would become ineligible for purchases of U.S. defense articles or services. Such a joint resolution or any other legislation seeking to restrict or condition sales of defense articles and services to specific countries would be subject to presidential veto. Sales of U.S. defense articles and services to Israel are made subject to the terms of the July 23, 1952 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States and Israel (TIAS 2675). The 1952 agreement states: The Government of Israel assures the United States Government that such equipment, materials, or services as may be acquired from the United States ... are required for and will be used solely to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defense ... and that it will not undertake any act of aggression against any other state.

To date, Israeli leaders and officials have publicly described recent Israel Defense Forces (IDF) military operations in Gaza as defensive actions taken in response to rocket attacks on Israeli towns, cities, and civilians by Hamas, which is a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, and other Palestinians in Gaza. Some Palestinian groups and other Arab and international governments have characterized Israel‘s military operations in Gaza as acts of aggression. President Bush stated on January 5, 2009 that ―the situation now taking place in Gaza was caused by Hamas,‖ and added that ―Israel has obviously decided to protect herself and her people.‖95 As mentioned above (see ―Overview of the Conflict‖), the Senate and the House overwhelmingly passed resolutions during the week of January 5 in connection with the Gaza conflict that supported Israel‘s right to defend itself. 96 On January 6, 2009, Representative Dennis Kucinich submitted a letter to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice requesting that the Administration submit a report examining ―Israel‘s compliance with the provisions of the Arms Export Control Act‖ in relation to

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ongoing Israeli military operations in Gaza. The letter expresses support for ―Israel‘s security and its right to exist in peace, without the fear of rocket attacks from Hamas,‖ while arguing that ―Israel‘s most recent attacks neither further internal security nor do they constitute ‗legitimate‘ acts of self-defense.‖97 As mentioned above, a report issued by the Administration in response to the question of whether or not a ―substantial violation‖ of a sales agreement with Israel made pursuant to the AECA ―may have occurred‖ may, but need not, definitively determine whether a violation has occurred. Any determination that a violation has occurred must be based on definitive proof that U.S.-sold equipment has been used in specific acts that violate a sales agreement with the United States pursuant to the AECA. In the past, the Bush Administration and some of its predecessors have transmitted reports to Congress stating that ―substantial violations‖ of agreements between the United States and Israel regarding arms sales ―may have occurred.‖ The most recent report of this type was transmitted in January 2007 in relation to concerns about Israel‘s use of U.S.supplied cluster munitions during military operations in Lebanon during 2006.98 Other examples include findings issued in 1978, 1979, and 1982 with regard to Israel‘s military operations in Lebanon and Israel‘s air strike on Iraq‘s nuclear reactor complex at Osirak in 1981. The Reagan Administration suspended the delivery of cluster munitions to Israel from 1982 to 1988 based on concerns about Israel‘s use of U.S. supplied cluster munitions in Lebanon. The Reagan Administration also briefly delayed a scheduled shipment of F-15 and F-16 aircraft to Israel following Israel‘s 1981 strike on Iraq. While it appears unlikely that the Obama Administration is presently inclined to characterize Israel‘s military operations in Gaza as anything but defensive measures, heightened congressional or public concern could lead the Administration to seek renewed assurances from Israel about the nature of its use of defense articles and services purchased from the United States.

U.S. Humanitarian Aid (Including to UNRWA) and Other Economic Assistance to Palestinians99 U.S. Humanitarian Assistance Related to the Gaza Conflict As of February 13, 2009, the United States had contributed a total of just over $61.5 million in humanitarian assistance with respect to the conflict in Gaza—$38.5 million to UNRWA, $15.7 million to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (including $9.7 million for its Middle East Emergency Appeal—nearly two thirds of which is programmed in Gaza), $800,000 to the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), and just over $6.5 million in bilateral assistance through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). U.S. Contributions to UNRWA and Other International Organizations The United States is the largest single-state donor to UNRWA, which provides food, shelter, medical care, and education for many of the original refugees from the 1947-1949 Arab-Israeli war and their families—now comprising approximately one million Palestinians in the Gaza Strip (two thirds of the total Gaza population) and 3.6 million other Palestinians

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in the West Bank, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. On December 30, the Bush Administration announced an initial contribution of $85 million toward UNRWA‘s 2009 appeals—$5 million were eventually allocated to a special Gaza Flash Appeal fund first established on December 31 in relation to the conflict (see ―Gaza Flash Appeal‖ below), $20 million were allocated to the emergency appeal fund for the West Bank and Gaza, and $60 million (not counted for purposes of calculating the $61.5 million cited above) were allocated to the general UNRWA fund. The United States contributed $185 million to UNRWA in 2008. On January 27, the Obama Administration authorized another U.S. contribution of humanitarian aid for Gaza totaling $20.3 million.100 Of this aid, $13.5 million of this aid went to UNRWA ($3.5 million to the Gaza Flash Appeal and $10 million to the emergency appeal fund for the West Bank and Gaza), $6 million went to the ICRC for its Emergency Appeal for Israel, and $800,000 went to UNOCHA. Depending on the continuing humanitarian needs of the refugee-heavy Gaza population, Congress could face additional requests for FY2009 appropriations to the State Department accounts from which contributions to UNRWA and other international organizations are made. A proposal for continued or increased aid to UNRWA could meet with increased scrutiny if there is a perception that resources from UNRWA or other international organizations were used (with or without organizational complicity) to strengthen Hamas or to repel or frustrate Israeli military operations in Gaza.101 For information on the coordination of international humanitarian efforts in Gaza, see ―Humanitarian Situation and Response‖ above.

U.S. Bilateral Assistance to the Palestinians (West Bank and Gaza) Independent from its contributions to UNRWA and other international organizations, the United States provides substantial economic and development assistance to the West Bank and Gaza (approximately $239.5 million through USAID in FY2008). Authorized under a continuing resolution to provide assistance at FY2008 levels through March 6, 2009, USAID has disbursed over $6.5 million in aid to meet humanitarian needs in Gaza during the conflict and in its aftermath, and additional allocations may be forthcoming. According to USAID, $3.75 million of this $6.5 million in bilateral U.S. humanitarian assistance for Gaza were in the form of grants to approved U.S. non-governmental organizations that maintain access to Gaza (CARE International, Mercy Corps, American Near East Refugee Aid (ANERA), Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF International), Relief International, Catholic Relief Services, International Orthodox Christian Charities (IOCC)). In addition, $1.6 million were in the form of food aid through the World Food Programme (1,666 metric tons of two-month food rations distributed to over 21,000 needy families in Gaza City, Khan Yunis, and North Gaza), and the remainder (approximately $1.15 million) was in the form of direct deliveries of food items, medical supplies, blankets (40,000 count), and plastic sheeting. Additional grants in the total amount of $4 million to CHF International, Catholic Relief Services, Save the Children, World Vision, and Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED) are expected. The United States might be asked to increase this assistance and to aid post-conflict reconstruction and development in Gaza, which raises questions over which Palestinian groups might be in a position to receive and to utilize aid for reconstruction (see ―Concerns Regarding Reconstruction‖ above). Currently, economic assistance to the West Bank and Gaza is subject to prohibitions on aid to Hamas or Hamas-affiliated organizations.

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Additionally, the United States has transferred $300 million directly to the West Bankbased Palestinian Authority in the past calendar year in order to help the PA meet its budgetary obligations to pay employee salaries—the primary engine for an economy that boasts of little private sector activity or foreign investment. Current law forbids the PA to use U.S. budgetary transfers for the payment of PA salaries in Gaza. There might be calls for Congress to lift this restriction and perhaps to increase direct budgetary aid to the PA to accommodate the increased expenses the PA may incur if it becomes the party primarily responsible for reconstruction in Gaza. The PA has already been compelled to take out a bank loan (using pledges of future international assistance as collateral) in order to pay its workers‘ January 2009 salaries after beginning restitution payments to Gazans.102 Conversely, if a PA unity government is established that includes Hamas (see ―Efforts at Unity and the Question of Elections‖ below), current law may require Congress to cease direct aid to the PA, or there could be calls for cessation or for limits on other economic assistance to the West Bank and Gaza.

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U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority103 Currently, there are U.S.- and internationally-sponsored programs to help recruit, train, equip, house, manage, and reform PA security forces based in the West Bank. These forces have been deployed in major urban areas of the West Bank (including Jenin, Hebron, and Bethlehem) since May 2008, and have won praise from most observers—Israeli, Palestinian, and international—for their effectiveness in keeping public order and in countering the infrastructure of militant groups. During the Gaza conflict, they were tasked with handling demonstrations held to protest the Israeli offensive. By most accounts, the forces ―performed exceptionally,‖ in the words of a senior Western official in the region.104 Given that the PA forces appear to have acquitted themselves well during the Gaza conflict, support from the Obama Administration for significantly expanded appropriations for the U.S. security assistance program could be forthcoming. U.S. appropriations since mid2007 total $161.3 million, but those funds are expected to run out by summer 2009, if not sooner. If the PA gains a role in patrolling Gaza border crossings, it is also possible that the U.S. Security Coordinator (since November 2005, Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton) could have his mandate expanded to help coordinate security arrangements for the crossings, as was contemplated in the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access that is receiving renewed interest as part of the ongoing discussions regarding a possible long-term cease-fire. Concerns regarding security assistance may be whether U.S. involvement in Palestinian affairs is enhancing the legitimacy of Abbas and the PA or detracting from it by allowing Hamas and others to gain traction with their long-time argument that the PA is too beholden to the United States, and whether U.S. involvement in strengthening and reforming PA security forces is feeding a perception that the PA forces are more ―Israel‘s cops‖ than focused on state-building from a Palestinian perspective. This could lead to a discussion of ways to advance the U.S. interest in strengthening Palestinian moderates while at the same time reducing a U.S. ―footprint‖ that some might say is already modest.105

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Table 2. U.S. Appropriated Funds Directed to Palestinians (June 2007- December 2008) $ in millions Budgetary Aid to Palestinian Authority Other Economic & Development Assistance Security Assistance to PA Forces TOTAL

$300.0 $267.5 $161.3 $728.8

Source: U.S. Department of State. Notes: Amounts used for security assistance were appropriated or reprogrammed to the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account; all other amounts were appropriated to the Economic Support Fund account; contributions to UNRWA and other international organizations (which come from the Migration and Refugee Assistance and Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance accounts) are not included; all amounts are approximate.

Another important factor in determining the PA forces‘ success could be whether the Israelis remain open to gradually increasing the forces‘ freedoms of movement and of action that would appear to be pivotal to their continued development and assumption of responsibility over Palestinian-administered areas.106 Those supporting the loosening of deployment restrictions justify their arguments by referring to the forces‘ competence and discipline in handling demonstrations during the Gaza conflict. Nevertheless, Israeli distrust of the PA forces (above all, fears that they might turn against Israel107) could diminish expectations for what is achievable with the forces.

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THE CONFLICT'S IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY108 Thus far, the Obama Administration has voiced the same goals as the Bush Administration and some of the same policies. The new Administration desires a two-state solution in which Israel and Palestine would live together in peace and security. For example, at her January 13, 2009 Senate confirmation hearing to become Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton said that the Gaza situation was a reminder of ―the tragic humanitarian costs of conflict in the Middle East.... This must only increase our determination to seek a just and lasting peace agreement that brings real security to Israel—normal and positive relations with its neighbors, independence, economic progress, and security to the Palestinians in their own state. We will exert every effort to support the work of Israelis and Palestinians who seek that result....‖ As had officials of the Bush Administration, Clinton insisted that the United States would not negotiate with Hamas until it recognizes Israel, renounces violence, and abides by previous agreements: ―That is just an absolute for me. That is the United States‘ position and the president-elect‘s position.‖ On his first full day in office, January 21, President Barack Obama telephoned Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and Jordanian King Abdullah II reportedly ―to communicate his commitment to active engagement in pursuit of Arab-Israeli peace from the beginning of his term.‖ The next day, President Obama and Secretary Clinton jointly announced the appointment of former Senator George Mitchell as their Special Envoy for Middle East Peace. The President mainly focused on the aftermath of the Gaza conflict. He

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asserted, ―[T]he outline for a durable cease-fire is clear: Hamas must end its rocket fire; Israel will complete the withdrawal of its forces from Gaza; the United States and our partners will support a credible anti-smuggling and interdiction regime, so Hamas cannot rearm.‖ He added, ―As part of a lasting cease-fire, Gaza‘s border crossings should be open to allow the flow of aid and commerce, with an appropriate monitoring regime, with the international [community] and Palestinian Authority participating.‖109 Such a regime would be similar to or the same as the one created in 2005 following Israel‘s disengagement from Gaza under the Israel-PA Agreement on Movement and Access. Both Secretary Clinton and Senator Mitchell are planning to attend the donors‘ conference for Gaza scheduled to take place on March 2 in Cairo.110 Soon after his appointment as Special Envoy for Middle East Peace, Senator Mitchell visited the Middle East on a listening tour, during which he appeared to concentrate more on achieving a durable cease-fire and on issues related to the Gaza conflict than on the peace process per se. For example, he said that ―To be successful in preventing the illicit trade of arms into Gaza, there must be a mechanism to allow the flow of legal goods,‖ and suggested that borders be opened in coordination with the PA.111 Thus, it is not yet clear how Mitchell intends to engage in the Israeli- Palestinian peace process, which has been mainly a bilateral process since before the Annapolis Conference in 2007. Mitchell‘s tour included Israel, the West Bank, Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, but not Syria or the Gaza Strip. Obama Administration officials have not yet spoken about IsraeliSyrian peace talks. In early February, the Commerce Department released export licenses for the repair of two Syrian Airlines Boeing 747s, which had been held up during the Bush Administration. That is a relatively minor development that may or may not be a clue to the future. Perhaps a more tangible sign of U.S. interest in greater engagement with Syria is that four separate congressional delegations, including delegations headed by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry and House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Howard Berman, have reportedly either already visited Damascus in February or are scheduled to do so. Kerry, who is reportedly expected in Damascus on February 21, reportedly said in Egypt on February 15 that the United States is ―eager‖ to talk to Syria,112 and, in a February 17 interview with the United Kingdom‘s Guardian newspaper, Syrian President Bashar al Asad said that he expects the United States to send an ambassador to Damascus soon (there has been no ambassador since February 2005).113 Some believe that the appointment of an ambassador would be a clearer signal that U.S. engagement in an IsraeliSyrian peace process is in the offing.

End Notes 1

This section was prepared by Jim Zanotti, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs. In a January 12 speech in Ashqelon, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert claimed that his personal intervention with President Bush was responsible for changing the U.S. vote on Resolution 1860 from a ―yes‖ to an abstention. See ―Rice Shame-Faced by Bush Over UN Gaza Vote: Olmert,‖ Agence France Presse, January 12, 2009. The State Department denied Olmert‘s claim. 3 See ―Security Cabinet: No Truce Until Shalit Is Freed,‖ Jewish Telegraphic Agency, February 18, 2009. According to the same article, gaining the release of Shalit would probably involve a prisoner swap with Hamas. Some observers believe that this decision has complicated negotiations and might delay a truce. 4 Taghreed El-Khodary, ―Kerry and 2 U.S. Representatives Visit Gaza,‖ New York Times, February 19, 2009. 2

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Ibid. Agence France Presse reported that before crossing over into Gaza in a U.N. vehicle, Sen. Kerry told journalists in Sderot, Israel that the visit ―does not indicate any shift whatsoever with respect to Hamas.... What it indicates is our effort to listen and to learn.... What has to change is behaviour. What has to change obviously is Hamas's consistent resort to instruments of terror.‖ ―U.S. Senator John Kerry Visits Gaza,‖ Agence France Presse, February 19, 2009. The same day of the U.S. congressional visits to Gaza, the United Kingdom newspaper The Independent reported that two French senators met with Hamas politburo chief Khaled Meshaal in Damascus in early February, and that since the end of 2008, members of parliament from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, and three other Western European nations had consulted with Hamas representatives, despite the official Quartet policy against such contacts. The article quotes a senior European diplomat as saying, ―Far more people are talking to Hamas than anyone might think. It is the beginning of something new—although we are not negotiating.‖ Anne Penketh, ―Europe Opens Covert Talks with ‗Blacklisted‘ Hamas,‖ The Independent (UK), February 19, 2009. 6 The Palestinian Federation of Industries estimates that 98% of Gaza‘s industrial operations are now inactive. See The World Bank, Palestinian Economic Prospects: Aid, Access and Reform: Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, September 22, 2008. 7 Daoud Kuttab, ―Has Israel Revived Hamas?‖ Washington Post, December 30, 2008. 8 See Karin Laub, ―Analysis: Hamas, Israel Trying to Rewrite Truce,‖ Associated Press, November 17, 2008. 9 International Crisis Group, Ending the War in Gaza, Middle East Briefing No. 26, January 5, 2009. 10 This section was prepared by Carol Migdalovitz, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. 11 Tovah Lazaroff and Yaakov Katz, ―Israel Disputes Gaza Death Toll,‖ Jerusalem Post, January 23, 2009. Total Hamas strength estimate is from the U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2007. 12 Yaakov Katz, ―Hamas Takes Control of All Gaza Tunnels,‖ Jerusalem Post, January 22, 2009. 13 ―President Abbas Says: It Is the Palestinian People Who Have Triumphed and Israel Does Not Want Peace,‖ WAFA, January 27, 2009, Open Source Center Document GMP20090127751006. 14 This section was prepared by Christopher M. Blanchard, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs. 15 Toni O'Loughlin and Hazem Balousha, ―News: Air Strikes on Gaza,‖ The Observer (UK), December 28, 2008; David Isby, ―Effective anti-Qassam defence could be more than six years away,‖ Jane's Missiles and Rockets, January 1, 2007. 16 Herb Keinon and Yaakov Katz, ―Cabinet okays rocket-protection for communities within range,‖ Jerusalem Post, December 8, 2008; Yaakov Lappin and Dan Izenberg, ―Barak wants government's okay to hit Gaza residential areas,‖ Jerusalem Post, November 10, 2008. 17 See Alon Ben-David, ―Iron Dome advances to meet Qassam threat,‖ Jane's Defence Weekly, March 17, 2008. 18 This section was written by Casey L. Addis, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs. 19 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Field Update on Gaza, January 19, 2009. Available online at http://www.ochaopt.org/gazacrisis/admin/ output/files/ocha_opt_gaza_ humanitarian_ situation_ report_2009_01_19_engl ish.pdf. 20 Ibid. 21 Yanir Yagna, ―Gaza Militants Fire at Least 14 Rockets into Southern Israel,‖ Ha ’aretz, January 14, 2009. 22 Israeli Embassy Press Release, January 10, 2009. Available online at http://israelemb.org/Operation% 20 Cast%20Lead/Website4.htm. 23 Richard Cohen, ―A Conflict Hamas Caused,‖ Washington Post, January 6, 2009. 24 This section was prepared by Rhoda Margesson, Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy. 25 The Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) is the humanitarian sector‘s main tool for coordination, strategic planning and programming. This Flash Appeal revises the Gaza portion of the original 2009 Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) CAP and brings the total 2009 OPT CAP to approximately $876 million. 26 Participants include the heads of U.N. humanitarian agencies, individual NGOs, Association of International Development Agencies (AIDA), Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO), with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) as observers. 27 This section was prepared by Casey L. Addis, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs. 28 See ―Middle East: Gaza Ceasefire Faces Poor Prospects,‖ Oxford Analytica, February 6, 2009; Griff Witte, ―After Gaza War, Daunting Curbs on Rebuilding,‖ Washington Post, February 8, 2009. 29 ―Fayad: PNA to Aid Gaza with $67 Mln,‖ Xinhua News Service, February 4, 2009. 30 Griff Witte, ―After Gaza War, Daunting Curbs on Rebuilding,‖ Washington Post, February 8, 2009. 31 ―Fayad: PNA to Aid Gaza with $67 Million,‖ Reuters, February 4, 2009. 32 Griff Witte, ―After Gaza War, Daunting Curbs on Rebuilding,‖ Washington Post, February 8, 2009. 33 ―Gaza Reconstruction Likely to Take a Long Time,‖ Xinhua News Agency, January 27, 2009. 34 Mimi Dahr, ―Rebuilding Gaza a Political Minefield,‖ Associated Press, January 29, 2009. 35 Sabrina Tavernise and Sebnem Arsu, ―Abbas Seeks Greater Role for His Palestinian Authority,‖ New York Times, February 7, 2009. 36 Griff Witte, ―After Gaza War, Daunting Curbs on Rebuilding,‖ Washington Post, February 8, 2009. 37 This section was prepared by Jeremy M. Sharp, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. 38 "Gaza‘s Subterranean Resistance," The National, January 22, 2009.

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"Hamas Making $20 million a Month from Gaza Smuggling Tunnels," Ha'aretz, August 31, 2008. When Israel unilaterally dismantled its settlements and withdrew its troops from the Gaza Strip in August 2005, it negotiated a new security arrangement with Egypt to bolster efforts to secure the Egyptian side of Rafah. After extensive Israeli-Egyptian talks, Egypt deployed 750 border guards to secure the Philadelphi Route or Corridor. The memorandum of understanding between Israel and Egypt delineated the type of equipment the Egyptians may use (small arms and jeeps, no heavy armor) and the length of the patrol area (14km on the ground and 3 km into the sea). 41 "Intel Branches Split on Egypt's Role," Jerusalem Post, August 5, 2008. 42 "Gaza Smugglers Ready to Resume Work," Associated Press, February 11, 2008. 43 Department Of State, Public Notice 6139, Determination and Waiver of Section 690(a) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2008 (Div. J, Pub. L. 110-161) Relating to Assistance for Egypt, February 29, 2008. 44 "Egypt to Bolster Gaza Border," Washington Post, January 7, 2008. 45 "US Trains Egypt Forces in Gaza Tunnel Detection," Agence France Presse, June 16, 2008. 46 Embassy of Egypt Fact Sheet, February 6, 2009. 47 "Gaza Smugglers Say Egypt Tightening Tunnel Trade," Agence France Presse, February 8, 2009. 48 "Israel: Rafah Tunnel Smugglers Say Business Down 60% After IDF Operation," Jerusalem Post, February 6, 2009. 49 "Text of U.S.-Israel Agreement to End Gaza Arms Smuggling," Ha'aretz, January 17, 2009. 50 This section was prepared by Christopher M. Blanchard, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs. 51 Kim McLaughlin, ―Ways to stop Gaza arms smuggling aired at meeting,‖ Reuters, February 5, 2009. 52 Yaakov Katz and Brenda Gazzar, ―Israel seeks mandate for navies to seize arms ships,‖ Jerusalem Post, February 3, 2009. 53 An Israeli naval officer began serving in a liaison role at Operation Active Endeavor headquarters in January 2008. For more information on the Operation, see NATO‘s website at http://www.afsouth.nato.int/ JFCN_Operations/ActiveEndeavour/Endeavour.htm. 54 Anne Gearan, ―Top US military official says US could not prevent suspected Iranian arms shipment to Gaza,‖ Associated Press, January 27, 2009. 55 Enforcement of Resolution 1747 is monitored by the Sanctions Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1737 on Iran. For more information, see http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1737/ index.shtml. See also, Elias Hazou, ―Ship is carrying banned weapons, says UN panel,‖ Cyprus Mail, February 8, 2009; and, U.S. Open Source Center, ―Cypriot President Says UN Committee's Reply on Monchegorsk Ship ‗Clear, Final‘, Report EUP2009020943 0003, CNA (Nicosia), February 7, 2009. 56 Anne Gearan, ―Top US military official says US could not prevent suspected Iranian arms shipment to Gaza,‖ Associated Press, January 27, 2009. 57 Cyprus News Agency (Nicosia), ―Government To Unload and Store Monchegorsk's Cargo,‖ February 13, 2009. 58 See CRS Report R40054, Lebanon: Background and U.S. Relations, by Casey L. Addis. 59 ―Abbas Rejects Hamas Leader‘s Call for New PLO,‖ Agence France Presse, January 31, 2009. Meshaal was quoted as saying, ―At this moment, the PLO no longer represents us, and is no longer a unifying point of reference, but has become impotent and a tool for deepening the Palestinian divisions.‖ Sana Abdullah, ―Hamas Plans Alternative Authority to PLO,‖ Middle East Times, January 30, 2009. In seeking to clarify Meshaal‘s pronouncement, Gaza-based Hamas leader Mahmoud al Zahar later said on Al Jazeera that Hamas wants ―to acquire the international and Arab legitimacy and everything that the PLO has gained through elections, and to join the PLO,‖ Reuters, February 8, 2009. 60 A Washington Post column asserted that Abbas‘s adviser Nimr Hammad told the Lebanese daily Al Akhbar: ―The one responsible for the massacres is Hamas, and not the Zionist entity, which in its own view reacted to the firing of Palestinian missiles.‖ Robert J. Lieber, ―Hard Truths About the Conflict,‖ Washington Post, January 1, 2009. Abbas, however, did assertively call for an end to fighting—although some say only after being criticized as too complacent. In one statement, he said that if a cease-fire was rejected, that all parties would be to blame, but singled Israel out as being potentially responsible for ―perpetuating a waterfall of blood.‖ 61 See ―Gaza Raids Boost Hamas, Undermine Abbas on Palestinian Street,‖ Agence France Presse (with the Daily Star (Beirut)), January 1, 2009. A Hamas spokesman has even accused Abbas of ―having formed a secret cell of Fatah supporters in Gaza to collect information on the whereabouts of Hamas leaders,‖ with the intention of giving this information to the Israeli military. Griff Witte, ―Israel‘s Attacks on Gaza Deepen Palestinian Rift,‖ Washington Post, January 1, 2009. 62 This separation may be partially explained by the lack of a territorial link between the two Palestinian territories, and partially explained by geography and recent history linking the Gaza Strip with Egypt and the West Bank with Jordan. For further information on the Gaza/West Bank divide and on the territories‘ respective ties with Egypt and Jordan, see CRS Report R40092, Israel and the Palestinians: Prospects for a Two-State Solution, by Jim Zanotti. 63 See ―Fatah, Hamas Meet in Cairo to Prepare for Unity Dialogue,‖ Xinhua News Service, February 13, 2009. 64 See ―Middle East Politics: Prolonging Abu Mazen,‖ Economist Intelligence Unit, November 28, 2008. 40

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See Khaled Abu Toameh, ―Hamas: Abbas No Longer Heads PA,‖ Jerusalem Post, January 9, 2009. In a February 4 address before the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France, Abbas asked the European Union (EU) for peacekeepers and election monitors to help make elections logistically possible. The EU response indicated that there was little likelihood that peacekeepers would be sent under current circumstances. See ―Abbas Asks EU to Send Peacekeepers to Middle East,‖ Deutsche Presse-Agentur, February 4, 2009. Some believe that without outside help in planning and coordinating elections in both the West Bank and Gaza, Abbas might seek to hold elections in the West Bank only, which may compromise the elections‘ legitimacy. 67 The San Francisco Chronicle reported that as of January 22, Fatah officials said that 19 of its members had been executed and many more brutally tortured by Hamas. Matthew Kalman, ―Hamas Executes Suspected Fatah Traitors in Gaza,‖ San Francisco Chronicle, January 22, 2009. 68 Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre (JMCC) Press Releases, Polls No. 66 (November 2008) and 67 (January 2009). Accessible at http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/2008/no66-eng.pdf and http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/2009/67_jan_english.pdf. The poll results have been rounded for this chapter. The November and January polls were conducted by 60 researchers through face-to-face interviews with random samples of roughly 1,200 Palestinian adults proportionally taken from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem based on territorial population ratios. The polls have a margin of error of 3% and a confidence level of 95%. JMCC was established in 1988 by a group of Palestinian journalists and researchers and receives assistance from the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, a foundation affiliated with the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). 69 Brenda Gazzar, ―Palestinian Poll: Hamas Support Drops,‖ jpost.com, February 9, 2009. The poll was conducted through face-to-face interviews with random samples of 673 Palestinian adults, having a 4% margin of error. The Palestinian Center for Public Opinion, located in Beit Sahour in the West Bank, has done public opinion polling among Palestinians since 1994, and is directed by its founder, Dr. Nabil Kukali. 70 This section was prepared by Casey L. Addis, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, and Christopher M. Blanchard, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs. 71 U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Document—GMP20081229950075—―World Leaders Call for Calm in Gaza Conflict,‖ December 29, 2008. 72 ―Al-Qaida: Attack Western Targets to Avenge Gaza,‖ jpost.com, January 7, 2009. 73 Alan Cowell and Graham Bowley, ―Bin Laden, on Tape, Urges Holy War Over Gaza,‖ New York Times, January 14, 2009. 74 In citing the U.S. response to the conflict in Gaza as what he perceived to be another example of bias towards Israel, former Saudi ambassador to the United States Prince Turki al Faisal, at a forum on U.S.-Gulf state relations being held in Washington, DC on January 6, openly challenged then-President-elect Obama to change U.S. policy in the Middle East. Prince Turki also said, ―Enough is enough, today we are all Palestinians and we seek martyrdom for God and for Palestine, following those who died in Gaza.‖ 75 U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Document—GMP20081229869001—―Saudi Clerics Urge Support for Gazans, Egypt to Keep Rafah Crossing Open,‖ December 29, 2008. 76 Ministers from Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen, Kuwait, and Bahrain also attended. 77 U.S. Open Source Center Report GMP20090204001006, ―UAE, Palestinian Officials View Aims of Abu-Dhabi Meeting, Upcoming Doha Summit,‖ Al Watan (Abha, Saudi Arabia), February 4, 2009. 78 Ibid. The same article reported that efforts are underway among some of the same participants from the Abu Dhabi meeting to prevent another ―Qatari surprise‖ at the March summit along the lines of Qatar‘s issuing of invitations to Hamas and other militant Palestinian groups for the January 16 ―emergency summit‖ (see footnote 79). 79 Some observers have perceived Qatar to be complicit in allowing the influence of Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah to grow, given its brokering of the 2008 agreement that gave Hezbollah and its opposition partners a greater role in Lebanon‘s government, its invitation of Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal to the January 16 ―emergency summit‖ meeting (along with the leaders of Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command—two other U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations with exiled leadership based in Syria), and its willingness to play host to Meshaal‘s announcement of a possible ―alternate PLO‖ on January 29. 80 The Arab Peace Initiative is a Saudi proposal approved by the Arab League in Beirut in 2002 and re-adopted in Riyadh in 2007 that promised a comprehensive Arab peace with Israel if Israel were to withdraw fully from the territories it occupied in 1967 and agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state with a capital in East Jerusalem. 81 U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Document---GMP20090120693004—―Arab League Musa Reads Final Statement Issued by Kuwait Arab Summit,‖ January 20, 2009. 82 U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) Document— GMP20090119869001—―Saudi King: Israel 'Must Realize' Arab Peace Offer 'Will Not Be on Table Forever',‖ January 19, 2009. 83 Ibid. 84 This section was prepared by Carol Migdalovitz, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs.

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Yuval Azoulay and Mazal Mualem, et al., ―Livni to Kadima: We‘re Going to the Opposition,‖ haaretz.com, February 19, 2009. 86 However, Livni said to Kadima colleagues on February 19, ―Today the foundation was laid for an extreme rightwing government led by [Likud Chairman Benjamin] Netanyahu. This is not our way, and there is nothing for us in such a government.‖ Yuval Azoulay and Mazal Mualem, et al., ―Livni to Kadima: We‘re Going to the Opposition,‖ haaretz.com, February 19, 2009. 87 This section was prepared by Carol Migdalovitz, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. For related issues, see CRS Report R40092, Israel and the Palestinians: Prospects for a Two-State Solution, by Jim Zanotti. 88 This subsection was prepared by Jeremy M. Sharp, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. 89 Within the Israeli defense establishment, there is debate over how effective the Iron Dome system would be in protecting Israeli cities and towns from Qassam and Grad-style Katyusha rocket attacks fired from the Gaza Strip. Some Israeli defense experts assert that Iron Dome kinetic interceptors will take too long to destroy crude rockets fired from close range to Israeli towns such as Sderot. Reuven Pedazur, an Israeli expert in ballistic missiles, claims that each Tamir missile fired from the Iron Dome system will cost $100,000, while a system based on laser beam interception, would cost between $1,000 and $3,000 per strike. Nevertheless, Israeli officials argue that solid laser technology needs more time to develop. See, ―Rocket, Missile Shields in Works; Iron Dome, David's Sling eye attacks from Gaza, Lebanon, Iran,‖ Washington Times, August 8, 2008. According to one source, ―Neither the missile interceptors nor the lasers will provide 100-percent coverage, which is why they will have to both be in use.‖ See, ―Defense Officials View Laser as Future of Anti-Missile Technology,‖ Ha ’aretz, March 24, 2008. 90 ―U.S. Eyes Joint Anti-Rocket Effort With Israel; Mulls $200M Investment To Speed Iron Dome,‖ Agence France Presse, June 9, 2008. 91 See Matti Friedman, ―Israel Used Fighting to Perfect Anti-Rocket System,‖ Associated Press, February 16, 2009. The article states, ―During the Gaza offensive, which ended on Jan. 18, Israeli teams collected data on how the homemade rockets and the military-grade Katyushas fired by Gaza militants behaved in different weather conditions and how they were picked up by the interception system's radar, which is already operational.‖ 92 ―U.S.-Israel To Develop David's Sling Missile Defense,‖ DefenseNews.com, August 7, 2008. 93 This subsection was prepared by Christopher M. Blanchard, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs. For more information about oversight of the use of U.S. defense articles and services by foreign purchasers, see CRS Report RL30982, U.S. Defense Articles and Services Supplied to Foreign Recipients: Restrictions on Their Use, by Richard F. Grimmett. 94 Yaakov Katz, ―IAF uses new US-supplied bunker-buster smart bomb,‖ Jerusalem Post, December 29, 2008. See U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency Transmittal No. 08-82, September 9, 2008, available at: [http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2008/Israel. According to a memorandum accompanying the notification of the proposed sale to congressional defense committees, the GBU-39 ―is designed to destroy a wide variety of targets from ranges of 40 nautical miles, such as fuel depots and bunkers, and penetrate over 1.2 meters of steel reinforced concrete while inflicting minimum collateral damage.‖ 95 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ―Transcript: President Bush Meets with First Vice President of the Government of National Unity of the Republic of Sudan and President of the Government of Southern Sudan Salva Kiir Mayardit,‖ January 5, 2009. 96 Two other resolutions, H.Res. 37, which condemned Hamas ―for the recent attacks against Israel,‖ and S.Res. 6, which expressed ―solidarity with Israel in Israel‘s defense against terrorism in the Gaza Strip,‖ were introduced and referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, respectively, but not passed. 97 Office of Representative Dennis J. Kucinich, "Press Release: Israel May Be in Violation of Arms Export Control Act," January 6, 2009. 98 Sean McCormack, U.S. Department of State Spokesman, Daily Press Briefing, Washington, DC, January 29, 2007. 99 This subsection was prepared by Jim Zanotti, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs. For further information on U.S. assistance figures listed in this subsection (including in Table 2), see CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti. 100 See Presidential Determination 2009-15, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog_post/relief 101 See H.R. 557 (United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act of 2009), Sec. 309 (―Withholding of United States Contributions to UNRWA‖), as an example of legislation that has already been proposed in the 111th Congress to limit and place conditions on contributions to UNRWA (Referred to House Committee on Foreign Affairs, January 15, 2009). See also H.Con.Res. 29 ―Expressing the sense of Congress that the United Nations should take immediate steps to improve the transparency and accountability of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) in the Near East to ensure that it is not providing funding, employment, or other support to terrorists‖ (Referred to House Committee on Foreign Affairs, January 28, 2009); and (from the 110th Congress) H.Res. 939: ―Condemning the glorification of terrorism and the continuing anti-Israel and anti-Semitic rhetoric at the United Nations‖ (Referred to House Committee on Foreign Affairs, January 23, 2008).

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102

See ―Palestinian Authority Borrows Money to Pay Salaries,‖ Agence France Presse, February 16, 2009; ―Abbas Withholds Salaries to Pay Gazans Hit by War,‖ Reuters, February 15, 2009. 103 This subsection was prepared by Jim Zanotti, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs. For further information on U.S. assistance figures listed in this subsection (including in Table 2), see CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti. 104 CRS correspondence with senior Western official in the region, January 4, 2009. 105 The U.S. Security Coordinator‘s team has fewer than 50 people based in Jerusalem and Ramallah and does not conduct the general training of PA forces (it only helps coordinate these training activities, which are conducted by Jordanian trainers at the International Police Training Center near Amman), nor does it directly command or control PA security operations. 106 A widespread Palestinian concern is that aspects of the Israeli occupation make it nearly impossible for PA forces to demonstrate their true capacity for dismantling militant organizations. The IDF limits the effectiveness of the PA forces by restricting the scope of PA security operations—through curfews, no-go zones, checkpoints, and limitations on international arms and equipment transfers—and by refusing to make arrests requested by the PA in areas under Israeli control. Reports indicate that militants from Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other groups have been able to ―wait out‖ PA surge operations in some cases by escaping to Israeli-administered and secured areas of the West Bank (so- called Areas B and C). Moreover, the IDF‘s own effectiveness in apprehending terror suspects (particularly in areas where newly-trained PA security forces are deployed) reinforces a common Israeli belief that handing over control of anti-terror operations to the PA is not worth the risk of having such operations fail. Many Palestinian security personnel feel, however, that IDF operations undermine the Palestinian public‘s confidence in the PA forces‘ competence and legitimacy—confidence the security forces believe is important for them to enjoy in order to face down militant networks. 107 However, Gen. Dayton (the U.S. Security Coordinator) says that the transformation and professionalization of the PA security forces—marked by months of rigorous training for special ―gendarmerie-style‖ battalions and their leaders—have made the PA security forces far less likely to slip into factionally-driven conflict with Israel than their predecessors from the bygone era of Yasser Arafat. See Interview of Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton by David Horovitz, ―This Time, It Will Be Different,‖ Jerusalem Post, December 11, 2008. 108 This section was prepared by Carol Migdalovitz, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. 109 Transcript of Remarks by President Barack Obama, State Department, Washington, DC, January 22, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/22/AR2009012202550.html. 110 See U.S. Department of State Press Release, ―Secretary Clinton Will Attend the March 2 Gaza Donors‘ Conference in Cairo,‖ February 11, 2009, available at http://jerusalem.usconsulate.gov/pr110209.html; Natasha Mozgovaya, ―U.S. Mideast Envoy: Settlements Aren‘t the Only Issue,‖ haaretz.com, February 19, 2009. 111 Isabel Kershner, ―Israeli Elections and Gaza Violence Complicates New U.S. Envoy‘s Peace Mission,‖ New York Times, January 30, 2009. 112 However, speaking from Israel on February 19, Sen. Kerry said that ―Nobody takes words at face value, particularly in this part of the world. We've learned that actions are what speak, and it's going to be important for Syria to show a willingness to do a number of things,‖ including show respect for Lebanese elections, show a clearer willingness to move toward peace with Israel, and cooperate with U.S. policy in Iraq and Iran. ―U.S. Senator Says Syria Must Act to Improve Ties,‖ Reuters, February 19, 2009. Senator Benjamin Cardin, who, in his capacity as Chairman of the U.S. Helsinki Commission (formally known as the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which monitors human rights) led a delegation to Damascus on February 18, said, after meeting with Asad, ―The question we came [to] try to answer here is about whether Syria is ready to make important and significant decisions that will bring us closer together and move forward. Dialogue is important but actions speak louder than words. We will be watching Syria's actions very carefully over the next weeks and months.‖ George Baghdadi, ―In Syria, Cardin Seeks Reforms Before Renewing Relations,‖ CBS News World Watch, February 18, 2009. 113 See Ian Black, ―Assad Urges US to Rebuild Diplomatic Road to Damascus,‖ guardian, February 17, 2009. The article quotes Asad as saying, ―There is no substitute for the United States,‖ but adding, ―We are still in the period of gestures and signals. There is nothing real yet.‖ According to the Associated Press and Israeli daily Ha’aretz, U.S. Department of State spokesman Gordon Duguid said on February 18, in response to the Asad interview, that ―Syria can play a role, and a positive role, in the region by trying to help bring peace and stability to the Middle East, and I think that the Syrians understand that they can do that. That is what the U.S. would like to see all nations in the region do.‖ Natasha Mozgovaya, ―U.S. State Department: Syria Can Play Positive Role in Mideast,‖ haaretz.com (with the Associated Press), February 19, 2009.

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Chapter 4

ARAB LEAGUE BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL Martin A. Weiss

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SUMMARY The Arab League, an umbrella organization comprising 23 Middle Eastern and African countries and entities, has maintained an official boycott of Israeli companies and Israelimade goods since the founding of Israel in 1948. The boycott is administered by the Damascus-based Central Boycott Office, a specialized bureau of the Arab League. The boycott has three tiers. The primary boycott prohibits citizens of an Arab League member from buying from, selling to, or entering into a business contract with either the Israeli government or an Israeli citizen. The secondary boycott extends the primary boycott to any entity world-wide that does business in Israel. A blacklist of global firms that engage in business with Israel is maintained by the Central Boycott Office, and disseminated to Arab League members. The tertiary boycott prohibits an Arab League member and its nationals from doing business with a company that deals with companies that have been blacklisted by the Arab League. The U.S. government has often been at the forefront of international efforts to end the boycott and its enforcement. Despite U.S. efforts, however, many Arab League countries continue to support the boycott‘s enforcement. U.S. legislative action related to the boycott dates from 1959 and includes multiple statutory provisions expressing U.S. opposition to the boycott, usually in foreign assistance legislation. In 1977, Congress passed laws making it illegal for U.S. companies to cooperate with the boycott and authorizing the imposition of civil and criminal penalties against U.S. violators. U.S. companies are required to report to the Department of Commerce any requests to comply with the Arab League Boycott. In FY2007, U.S. companies submitted 1,633 reports on boycott-related requests. During the same period, penalties for violating U.S. anti- boycott legislation worth $194,500 were levied on ten companies. This is an increase from FY2006, when 1,291 reports were filed and penalties of $95,950 were assessed on nine companies.

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BACKGROUND The Arab League is an umbrella organization comprising 23 Middle Eastern and African countries and entities. Arab League members are Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Kuwait, Algeria, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Mauritania, Somalia, Palestinian Authority, Djibouti, and Comoros. In 2003, Eritrea joined the Arab League as an observer. The Arab League was founded in 1944, and in 1945 began a boycott of Zionist goods and services in the British controlled mandate territory of Palestine. In 1948, following the war establishing Israel‘s independence, the boycott was formalized against the state of Israel and broadened to include non-Israelis who maintain economic relations with Israel or who are perceived to support it. The boycott is administered by the Damascus-based Central Boycott Office, a specialized bureau of the Arab League.1 The U.S. government has often been at the forefront of international efforts to end enforcement of the boycott and to seek the Arab League‘s revocation of it. The U.S. government participates in bilateral and multilateral negotiations with Arab League members regarding the boycott. U.S. legislative action related to the boycott dates from 1959 and includes multiple statutory provisions expressing U.S. opposition to the boycott, usually in foreign assistance legislation. In 1965, Congress adopted mandatory reporting of any requests for U.S. companies to participate in the boycott. In 1977, Congress passed laws making it illegal for U.S. companies to cooperate with the boycott and authorizing the imposition of civil and criminal penalties against U.S. violators. According to the Department of Commerce, participation in the boycott includes

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    

Agreements to refuse or actual refusal to do business with or in Israel or with blacklisted companies; Agreements to discriminate or actual discrimination against other persons based on race, religion, sex, national origin or nationality; Agreements to furnish or actual furnishing of information about business relationships with or in Israel or with blacklisted companies; and/or Agreements to furnish or actual furnishing of information about the race, religion, sex, or national origin of another person.2 Lastly, U.S. taxpayers who cooperate with the boycott are subject to the loss of tax benefits that the U.S. government provides to exporters. These benefits include, among others, the foreign tax credit, the benefits for foreign sales corporation (F SC) since repealed, and the tax deferral available to U.S. shareholders of a controlled foreign corporation (CFC).

CURRENT STATUS OF THE BOYCOTT The boycott has three tiers. The primary boycott prohibits citizens of an Arab League member from buying from, selling to, or entering into a business contract with either the Israeli government or an Israeli citizen. The secondary boycott extends the primary boycott to any entity world-wide that does business with Israel. A blacklist of global firms that engage in

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business with Israel is maintained by the Central Boycott Office, and disseminated to Arab League members. The tertiary boycott prohibits an Arab League member and its nationals from doing business with a company that in turn deals with companies that have been blacklisted by the Arab League. The boycott also applies to companies that the Arab League identifies as having ―Zionist sympathizers‖ in executive positions or on the board of the company. According to one analyst, the ―nature and detail of these rules reflect the boycotting countries‘ tolerance for only the most minimal contacts with Israel.‖3 The Arab League does not enforce the boycott and boycott regulations are not binding on member states. However, the regulations have been the model for various laws implemented by member countries. The League recommends that member countries demand certificates of origin on all goods acquired from suppliers to ensure that such goods meet all aspects of the boycott. Overall enforcement of the boycott by member countries appears sporadic. Some Arab League members have limited trading relations with Israel. The Arab League does not formally or publicly state which countries enforce the boycott and which do not. Some Arab League member governments have maintained that only the Arab League, as the formal body enforcing the boycott, can revoke the boycott. However, adherence to the boycott is an individual matter for each Arab League member and enforcement varies by state. There are indications that some Arab League countries publicly support the boycott while continuing to quietly trade with Israel. According to Doron Peskin, head of research at InfoProd, a consulting firm for foreign and Israeli companies specializing in trade with Arab states, ―the Arab boycott is now just lip service.‖4 This sentiment has been echoed by Arab officials, albeit anonymously. One official commented to the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram that, ―boycotting Israel is something that we talk about and include in our official documents but it is not something that we actually carry out—at least not in most Arab states.‖5 Others assert that enforcement of the boycott waxes and wanes with the level of intensity of the Israeli-Palestinian issue and that currently interest in boycott enforcement among Arab countries may be increasing due to the ongoing Iraq conflict. However, the Arab League has acknowledged that U.S. pressure has affected its ability to maintain the boycott. At the May 2006 Arab League conference on the boycott, one conference participant reportedly said, ―The majority of Arab countries are evading the boycott, notably the Gulf states and especially Saudi Arabia.‖6 He added that a major reason for these countries bypassing the boycott is ―growing U.S. pressures in the direction of normalization with the Jewish state.‖7 Some states and entities have formally ended the boycott, or at least some aspects of it. Egypt (1979), the Palestinian Authority (1993), and Jordan (1994) signed peace treaties or agreements that ended the boycott.8 Mauritania, which never applied the boycott, established diplomatic relations with Israel in 1999. Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia do not enforce the boycott.9 In 1994, the member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—announced that they would only enforce the primary boycott. In 1996, the GCC states recognized that total elimination of the boycott is a necessary step for peace and economic development in the region. However, U.S. companies continue to receive requests to cooperate with the boycott from GCC member countries. Lebanon enforces the primary, secondary, and tertiary boycotts.10

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IMPACT OF THE BOYCOTT

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Since the boycott is sporadically applied and ambiguously enforced, its impact, measured by capital or revenue denied to Israel by companies adhering to the boycott, is difficult to measure. The effect of the primary boycott appears limited since intra-regional trade and investment are small. Nonetheless, there is some limited trade between Israel and its Arab neighbors. In 2004, according to the Manufacturers Association of Israel (IMA), Israeli exports to Arab countries and entities (mainly Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority) totaled $192 million.11 Enforcement of the secondary and tertiary boycotts have decreased over time, reducing their effect. A 1996 study by researchers at Tel Aviv University looked at the effect of the Arab boycott on the Israeli economy through the automobile market. Following a relaxation of boycott enforcement in the late 1980s through the early 1990s, Asian countries began exporting cars to Israel. The study found that if the boycott had continued to be enforced, and these cars did not enter the Israeli market, the Israeli car market would have been 12% smaller – leading to a $790 price increase per car. Total welfare loss for the study year, 1994, would have been an estimated $89 million.12 Thus, it appears that since intra-regional trade is small, and that the secondary and tertiary boycotts are not aggressively enforced, the boycott may not currently have an extensive effect on the Israeli economy. Despite the lack of economic impact on either Israeli or Arab economies, the boycott remains of strong symbolic importance to all parties. Many Arab countries want to deny normalization with Israel until there is a final resolution to the conflict in the Palestinian territories. Israel, on the other hand, asserts that it wants to be accepted in the neighborhood both in political terms and as a source of, and target for, foreign investment.13 It is expected that Israeli military activities in the Gaza Strip in early 2009 may lead to an intensification of boycott enforcement.

U.S. ACTIVITY TO END THE ARAB LEAGUE BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL The U.S. government officially opposes the boycott and works to end its enforcement on multiple levels. For many years, language has been included in successive foreign operations appropriations legislation concerning the boycott. Section 635 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161), states that it is the sense of Congress that (1) the Arab League boycott is an impediment to peace in the region and to United States investment and trade in the region; (2) the boycott should be revoked and the Central Boycott Office disbanded; (3) all Arab League states should normalize relations with Israel; and (4) the President and the Secretary of State should continue to oppose the boycott vigorously and encourage Arab states to assume normal trading relations with Israel; and (5) the President should report to Congress annually on specific steps being taken by the United States to encourage Arab League states to normalize their relations with Israel to bring about the termination of the boycott. The U.S. government also works to end the boycott through bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. During FTA negotiations with Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates, the status of the boycott was an issue of concern and these countries reaffirmed

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their position not to comply with the boycott.14 However, the credibility of their position has been questioned since all three countries outwardly continue to support the boycott. In June 2006, an Omani customs official reportedly told The Jerusalem Post, ―Products from Israel are not permitted because of the boycott ... If someone brings products from Israel, they will be confiscated.‖15 In reported remarks before Bahrain‘s Chamber of Commerce, Bahraini Foreign Minister Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa stated that ―relations would be normal with Israel when the Arab League orders the Arab countries to end the boycott, and until then the Kingdom was sticking to the boycott.‖16 The United States began negotiating an FTA with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2005 and their enforcement of the boycott has been a contentious issue during the negotiations. In February 2006, at the height of debate in the United States over whether to allow Dubai Ports World to have control over six U.S. ports, Muhammad Rashid a-Din, a staff member of the Dubai Customs Department reportedly told The Jerusalem Post, ―Yes, of course the boycott is still in place and is still enforced ... if a product contained even some components that were made in Israel, and you wanted to import it to Dubai, it would be a problem.‖17 As of July 2008, the U.S.-UAE FTA talks are on hold, and it is expected that talks will not resume during the Bush Administration.18 Multilaterally, the United States has used Saudi Arabia‘s accession to the World Trade Organization in return for its agreement in November 2005 that it would cease participation in the boycott. Despite this concession, it appears that Saudi Arabia‘s enforcement of the boycott is ongoing. The Bush Administration argues in the 2007 National Trade Estimate Report (NTE) that Saudi boycott violations ―appear to reflect out-of-date language in recycled commercial and tender documents.‖19 However, in June 2006, The Jerusalem Post said that Saudi Arabia‘s ambassador to the United States told a luncheon audience at the Brookings Institution that Saudi Arabia intends to continue enforcing the primary boycott. Reportedly, Prince Turki Al-Faisel stated that he believed ―the primary boycott is an issue of national sovereignty guaranteed within the makeup of the WTO and its rules.‖20 Table 1. FY2007 Boycott Requests Received by U.S. Companies

Country United Arab Emirates (UAE) Lebanon Qatar Syria Iraq Saudi Arabia Kuwait Libya Bahrain Egypt Jordan Other (Algeria, India, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Tunisia, and Yemen) Total

Number of Requests to Comply with the Secondary and Tertiary Boycotts 682 114 94 79 72 65 56 50 24 1 0 396

1,633

Source: Department of Commerce.

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Lastly, concerns have emerged that Iraq has increased its own enforcement of the Boycott in the past several years, due to increasing frustration with the ongoing violence and U.S. presence.21 In FY2007, the number of requests from Iraq for U.S. companies to comply with the boycott was 72, an increase from 31 in FY2006 and 8 in 2005. The Commerce Department reports that for all boycott countries, during FY2007, U.S. companies submitted 1,633 reports on boycott-related requests from Arab League members and other countries that enforced the boycott on Israel (Table 1). The United Arab Emirates remained the largest source of boycott-related requests with 682 requests.22

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U.S. ANTIBOYCOTT COMPLIANCE LEGISLATION The United States passed antiboycott legislation in the late 1970s to discourage U.S. individuals from cooperating with the secondary and tertiary boycotts. Antiboycott laws apply to ―U.S. exports and imports, financing, forwarding and shipping, and certain other transactions that may take place wholly offshore.‖23 Although U.S. legislation and practices were designed to counteract the Arab League boycott of Israel, in practice, they apply to all non-sanctioned boycotts. According to the Department of Commerce‘s Office of Antiboycott Compliance, the legislation was enacted to ―encourage, and in specified cases, require U.S. firms to refuse to participate in foreign boycotts that the United States does not sanction. They [the legislation] have the effect of preventing U.S. firms from being used to implement foreign policies of other nations which run counter to U.S. policy.‖24 U.S. regulations define cooperating with the boycott as: (1) agreeing to refuse or actually refusing to do business in Israel or with a blacklisted company; (2) agreeing to disseminate or actually discriminating against other persons based on race, religion, sex, national origin, or nationality; (3) agreeing to furnish or actually furnishing information about business relationships in Israel or with blacklisted companies; and (4) agreeing to furnish or actually furnishing information about the race, religion, sex, or national origin of another person. U.S. antiboycott laws are included in the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA) and the Ribicoff Amendment to the Tax Reform Act of 1976 (TRA).25 The export-related antiboycott provisions are administered by the Department of Commerce and prohibit U.S. persons from participating in the boycott. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) administers tax-related antiboycott regulations that deny tax benefits to U.S. taxpayers that participate in the boycott.

Export-Related Antiboycott Legislation Regulations promulgated under section 8 of the EAA prohibit any U.S. person or company from complying with an unsanctioned foreign boycott and require them to report requests they have received to comply with a boycott. Such requests must be reported quarterly to the Department of Commerce‘s Office of Antiboycott Compliance (OAC) in the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). These regulations are implemented in part 760 of the Department of Commerce‘s Export Administration Regulations (EAR).

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The EAA prescribes penalties that may be imposed for violation of the antiboycott regulations. Civil penalties for violating the antiboycott provisions are a maximum fine of $50,000 per violation and a potential loss of export privileges for a period of time. Particularly egregious cases may be referred to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution. Criminal penalties imposed for each violation can include a fine of up to $50,000 or five times the value of the exports involved, whichever is greater, or imprisonment for up to five years, or both. Willful violations, where the violator has knowledge that the items are also intended for any country to which exports are restricted for national security or foreign policy purposes, are punishable by fines up to $250,000 or imprisonment for up to ten years. In FY2007, according to the Department of Commerce, ten companies paid $194,500 to settle allegations that they violated U.S. antiboycott provisions, an increase from nine cases and $95,950 in FY2006. In July 2007, BIS amended existing penalty guidelines to introduce a voluntary disclosure program that could reduce a potential fine levied on an exporter if it voluntarily discloses its violation of U.S. antiboycott laws. For the disclosure to have a mitigating effect, notification must take place prior to BIS learning about the violation from other sources and commencing an investigation. The new guidelines also created a new supplement no. 2 to the antiboycott provisions that more clearly describes how BIS investigates violations of U.S. antiboycott laws and determines penalty rates.

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Tax-Related Antiboycott Legislation The Ribicoff Amendment to the TRA added section 999 to the Internal Revenue Code. This section denies various tax benefits normally available to exporters if they participate in the boycott. In addition, the IRS requires U.S. taxpayers to report operations in, with, or related to countries that the Treasury Department includes on its annual list of countries that may require participation in an international boycott, and with any other country from which they receive a request to participate in a boycott.26 Denying tax benefits to U.S. firms that participate in the boycott appears to be an effective antiboycott strategy. According to one study, U.S. legislation reduces overall participation in the boycott by U.S. taxpayers by between 15 and 30%.27 However, the effectiveness of U.S. antiboycott tax legislation may diminish since the U.S. government is reducing export tax benefits that are available to U.S.-based companies to comply with World Trade Organization (WTO) rulings.28

End Notes 1

Nancy Turck, ―The Middle East: The Arab Boycott of Israel,‖ Foreign Affairs, April 1977. See http://www.bis.doc.gov/complianceandenforcement/antiboycottcompliance.htm. 3 Howard N. Fenton III, ―United States Antiboycott Laws: An Assessment of Their Impact Ten Years after Adoption,‖ Hastings International & Comparative Law Review, Vol. 10 , 1987, cited in Eugene Kontorovich, ―The Arab League Boycott and WTO Accession: Can Foreign Policy Excuse Discriminatory Sanctions,‖ Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 4 No. 2, Fall 2003. 4 Orly Halpern, ―Arab Boycott Largely Reduced to ‗Lip Service,‘‖ Jerusalem Post, February 28, 2006. 5 Dina Ezzat, ―Boycott Israel? Not so simple,‖ Al-Ahram Weekly Online, April 11-17, 2002. 6 ―Arabs evading economic boycott of Israel,‖ United Press International, May 16, 2006. 7 Ibid. 2

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8

Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, March 26, 1979, Article III, paragraph 3; Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, October 26, 1994, Article 7, Section 2, paragraph A; Declaration of Principles, September 10, 1993. 9 2007 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, United States Trade Representative, March 30, 2007. 10 Ibid. 11 ―Exports from Israel Up, Up, Up!,‖ Bridges for Peace, June 27, 2005. U.S. efforts to increase trade in the region include the Qualified Industrial Zone (QIZ) program, which allows goods jointly produced by Israel and either Jordan or Egypt to enter the United States duty free. See CRS Report RS22002, Qualifying Industrial Zones in Jordan and Egypt, by Mary Jane Bolle, Alfred B. Prados, and Jeremy M. Sharp. 12 Chaim Fershtman and Neil Gandal, ―The Effect of the Arab Boycott on Israel: The Automobile Market,‖ Tel Aviv University, January 1996. 13 Anju S. Bawa, ―Israel Embarks on PR Face-lift,‖ The Washington Times, December 5, 2006. 14 2007 National Trade Estimate, op. cit. For more information, see CRS Report RS21846, U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement, by Martin A. Weiss. 15 Michael Freund, ―Boycott of Israel still in effect, Omani official tells ‗Post‘,‖ The Jerusalem Post, June 8, 2006. 16 Michael Freund, ―Bahrain‘s Israel Boycott to Continue,‖ The Jerusalem Post, May 11, 2006. 17 Michael Freund, ―Dubai Ports Firm Enforces Israel Boycott,‖ The Jerusalem Post, February 28, 2006. 18 Safura Rahimi, ―US puts UAE free trade deal on ice,‖ Emirates Business 24/7, December 23, 2007. 19 2007 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, Office of the United States Trade Representative, p. 17. 20 Michael Freund, ―Saudi Ambassador to US admits boycott of Israel still in force,‖ The Jerusalem Post, June 22, 2006. 21 ―Iraq‘s Enforcement of Arab Boycott of Israel Is Concern, ITA Official Tells Iraqis,‖ The Export Practitioner, March 2007. 22 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security Annual Report Fiscal Year 2007, Appendix E-3, p. 72. 23 Website of the Department of Commerce‘s Office of Antiboycott Compliance. http://www.bis.doc.gov/ AntiboycottCompliance/oacrequirements.html#whatscovered. 24 Website of the Office of Antiboycott Compliance. http://www.bis.doc.gov/AntiboycottCompliance/ oacrequirements.html 25 Section 8 of The Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. app. §2407) has expired but its provisions are continued under the authorization granted to the President in the National Emergencies Act (NEA) (P.L. 94-412; 50 U.S.C. §1601-1651) and the International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA) (P.L. 95-223; 50 U.S.C. app. §2407), most recently under Executive Order 13222 signed August 17, 2001 (66 F.R. 44025, August 22, 2001). Antiboycott export regulations are at 15 C.F.R. 760.1 et seq. The Ribicoff Amendment to the Tax Reform Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-455) added section 999 to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (26 U.S.C. §1 et seq). Tax regulations are at 26 C.F.R. §7.999-1. 26 The current list is Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Iraq is not included in this list, but its status with respect to future lists remains under review by the Department of the Treasury. ―List of the Countries Requiring Cooperation with an International Boycott, Department of the Treasury,‖ Department of the Treasury, 73 F.R. 50, March 13, 2008. 27 James R. Hines, Jr., ―Taxed Avoidance: American Participation in Unsanctioned International Boycotts,‖ NBER Working Paper 6116, July 1997. 28 See CRS Report RS20746, Export Tax Benefits and the WTO: The Extraterritorial Income Exclusion and Foreign Sales Corporations, by David L. Brumbaugh.

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CHAPTER SOURCES

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The following chapters have been previously published: Chapter 1 – This is an edited, excerpted and augmented edition of a United States Congressional Research Service publication, Report Order Code RL33530, dated January 29, 2010. Chapter 2 – This is an edited, excerpted and augmented edition of a United States Congressional Research Service publication, Report Order Code R40092, dated January 8, 2010. Chapter 3 – This is an edited, excerpted and augmented edition of a United States Congressional Research Service publication, Report Order Code R40101, dated Feburary 19, 2009. Chapter 4 – This is an edited, excerpted and augmented edition of a United States Congressional Research Service publication, Report Order Code RL33961, dated January 26, 2009. Chapter 5 - This is an edited, excerpted and augmented edition of a United States Congressional Research Service publication, Report Order Code RS22876, dated May 13, 2008.

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INDEX 9 9/11, 41

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A accountability, 48, 81, 135 acts of aggression, 126 affirming, 11, 29 Afghanistan, 48 Africa, 24 agencies, 109, 132 aggression, 23, 42, 74, 119, 126 agriculture, 109 Air Force, 6, 10, 34 Al Qaeda, 41, 119, 120 Algeria, 50, 95, 138, 139, 141 ambassadors, 82 anger, 33 appropriations, 124, 128, 129, 140 Arab countries, 9, 19, 102, 139, 140, 141 Arab world, 26, 28, 30, 67 arbitration, 29 Argentina, 40 armed conflict, 5 armed forces, 116 Asia, 94 Asian countries, 140 aspiration, 9 assassination, 33, 38 assault, 37, 103, 104, 123 authorities, 5, 12, 25, 68, 115 Automobile, 144 axis of evil, 67 Ayman al Zawahiri, 119

B background, 50, 55, 88 Bahrain, 50, 88, 134, 138, 139, 140, 141, 144

ballistic missiles, 135 banks, 102 bargaining, 70, 73 barriers, 25, 28, 29 bias, 62, 134 black market, 112 bombing, 11, 13, 14, 15, 21, 22, 40, 104, 107 border crossing, 6, 21, 22, 44, 63, 71, 97, 100, 102, 103, 104, 118, 120, 129, 131 border security, 115, 121 Britain, 24

C Cabinet, 50, 131, 132 calculus, 85 Camp David, vii, 1, 6, 9, 10, 50 CAP, 132 CBS, 136 ceasefire, 100, 102, 104 Central Asia, 69, 90 challenges, vii, 20, 58, 60, 110, 115, 118 charitable organizations, 116 Christians, 62 CIA, 47, 55 citizenship, 77, 122 City, 75, 99, 100, 101, 128 climate, 30, 64 closure, 14, 90, 112 cluster bomb, 40 Cold War, 67 collateral, 129, 135 collateral damage, 135 commercial ties, 60, 88 Common Foreign and Security Policy, 73 common sense, 59 community, 3, 8, 14, 18, 19, 20, 24, 26, 27, 63, 72, 79, 85, 91, 93, 98, 102, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 117, 118, 131 community support, 111

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Index

complaints, 84, 100 compliance, 6, 20, 72, 126 compounds, 100, 109 conference, 2, 6, 7, 9, 15, 25, 31, 35, 41, 51, 80, 102, 119, 131, 139 confrontation, 38 consensus, 58, 60, 65, 73, 74, 76, 91, 92, 111, 115 consent, 48, 100, 126 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 46, 83, 113, 140 contiguity, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 57, 59, 66, 69, 71, 75, 90 conviction, 72, 92 coordination, 9, 36, 42, 109, 128, 131, 132 corruption, 63, 69, 116 cost, 82, 100, 102, 104, 105, 109, 125, 135 counterterrorism, 115 coup, 18 credentials, 63, 119 criminal justice system, 83, 94 criticism, 25, 62, 80, 113, 120 critics, 51, 65, 84, 91 crossing over, 132 cruise missiles, 125 currency, 74 cycles, 65, 89 Cyprus, 5, 115, 133

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D deaths, 16, 22, 24, 100, 102 defence, 132 democracy, 11, 15, 45, 93 Democratic Party, 134 demographic change, 3 demonstrations, 38, 122, 129, 130 Denmark, 114 Department of Commerce, 137, 138, 141, 142, 143, 144 Department of Defense, 81 Department of Justice, 143 destruction, 14, 16, 43, 63, 88, 109 deterrence, 23, 64, 97, 103, 104, 125 development assistance, 128 dignity, 9, 121 diplomacy, 40, 80, 82 diplomatic efforts, 16, 65 disappointment, 18, 31 discourse, 59, 76 discrimination, 138 dismantlement, 63, 90 displaced persons, 107 displacement, 108 Doha, 87, 92, 120, 134 domestic policy, 80

donors, 15, 102, 110, 111, 131 DOP, vii, 1, 9 draft, 16, 32 duty free, 144

E economic activity, 84 economic assistance, 83, 84, 128, 129 economic cooperation, 19 economic development, 19, 83, 91, 139 economic growth, 3 economic integration, 71 economic problem, 71 economic reform, 83 economy, 4, 19, 25, 26, 71, 91, 114, 122, 129, 140 Egypt, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 18, 21, 22, 23, 25, 27, 34, 36, 44, 52, 58, 67, 71, 77, 78, 86, 87, 88, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 112, 113, 114, 115, 118, 119, 120, 121, 131, 133, 134, 138, 139, 140, 141, 144 election, 10, 14, 36, 43, 82, 89, 91, 104, 122, 134 electricity, 21, 107 embargo, 5, 18, 40 employment, 114, 135 empowerment, vii, 1 encouragement, 19, 73 enforcement, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142 England, 91 environmental issues, 19 equipment, 83, 109, 110, 112, 113, 114, 126, 127, 133, 136 Eritrea, 138 EU, 11, 21, 31, 82, 86, 94, 115, 120, 134 European Community, 9 European Parliament, 134 European Union, 1, 11, 21, 44, 59, 63, 65, 73, 83, 86, 92, 110, 116, 134 Executive Order, 46, 144 executive orders, 46 exercise, 31, 75, 88 exile, 73, 110, 116, 117 expenditures, 46, 85 experts, 5, 34, 102, 115, 135 explosives, 16, 105, 113 exports, 5, 45, 140, 142, 143

F factories, 23, 104 faith, 2, 3, 7, 73 family members, 110 FBIS, 50, 51 fears, 111, 130 flexibility, 29, 59, 78, 113, 117

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Index foreign affairs, 46 foreign aid, vii, 58, 60 foreign assistance, 137, 138 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 50 foreign investment, 129, 140 foreign policy, 2, 35, 67, 143 formula, 16, 66 foundations, 19, 27 France, 5, 24, 33, 50, 54, 55, 94, 114, 115, 119, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136 fraud, 89 free trade, 144 freedom, 7, 8, 30, 73, 74, 88, 110 freedom of movement, 7, 8, 30, 110 freezing, 2, 13, 26, 80 funding, 35, 90, 108, 125, 135

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G Gaza Strip, vii, viii, 1, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 21, 22, 27, 28, 43, 44, 58, 61, 64, 68, 69, 71, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 83, 84, 87, 89, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 112, 114, 116, 120, 125, 127, 131, 133, 134, 135, 140 genocide, 121 geography, 89, 133 George Mitchell, vii, 2, 7, 41, 49, 57, 58, 62, 80, 93, 99, 130 Germany, 24, 114, 115 gestures, 5, 7, 17, 28, 136 God, 89, 134 goods and services, 110, 138 governance, 45, 60, 63, 72, 76, 87, 116 government policy, 12 guardian, 93, 136 guidelines, 8, 15, 143 Gulf Cooperation Council, 9, 50, 139 Gulf war, vii, 1, 6

H headquarters, 10, 33, 133 health status, 109 Hezbollah, 5, 23, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 55, 64, 67, 78, 89, 99, 101, 103, 110, 115, 116, 119, 120, 123, 124, 125, 134 hostilities, 39, 40, 100, 101, 111, 114, 115 housing, 2, 3, 13, 20, 30, 31, 46, 86, 91, 105, 109, 110 human rights, 47, 113, 136 humanitarian aid, 108, 109, 110, 120, 128

149

ideology, 85 IMA, 140 image, 5, 64, 90 imbalances, 65 immunization, 110 imports, 111, 142 imprisonment, 90, 143 inclusion, 35, 81 independence, 7, 18, 63, 72, 73, 88, 113, 130, 138 India, 141 inspectors, 35, 47 institution building, 3 integration, 81 intelligence, 4, 22, 24, 36, 47, 88, 95, 100, 112, 114, 115, 121 interdependence, 71 Internal Revenue Service, 142 International Atomic Energy Agency, 34, 47 International Criminal Court, 47 international law, 12, 29, 70, 73, 74, 91 International Monetary Fund, 91, 116 intervention, 79, 131 intifada, 67, 68, 71, 78, 80, 90, 92, 105, 116 intra-regional trade, 140 Iran, 5, 6, 8, 25, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 50, 51, 55, 64, 65, 67, 69, 82, 89, 90, 94, 95, 99, 101, 105, 114, 115, 119, 120, 121, 123, 124, 133, 134, 135, 136, 141 Iraq, 34, 54, 67, 89, 127, 136, 138, 139, 141, 142, 144 Iraq Study Group, 34, 54, 89 Islam, 16, 88, 119 Islamic world, 46 isolation, 34, 76 issues, vii, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 40, 42, 44, 45, 57, 58, 59, 62, 65, 66, 67, 72, 75, 77, 86, 87, 90, 91, 92, 94, 122, 131, 135 Italy, 24, 114

J Japan, 83 Jews, 10, 19, 40, 51, 68, 76, 89, 92, 114 job creation, 108 Jordan, vii, 1, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 18, 24, 29, 42, 43, 45, 51, 67, 71, 77, 78, 88, 93, 94, 99, 101, 109, 119, 120, 128, 131, 133, 138, 139, 140, 141, 144 journalists, 132, 134 justification, 13, 103

I ideal, 82 Israeli-Arab Negotiations and Issues, edited by Louis H. Girard, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

150

Index

K kidnapping, 14, 16, 23, 38 Kosovo, 73 Kuwait, 50, 102, 120, 121, 134, 138, 139, 141, 144

L leadership, vii, 11, 42, 46, 57, 58, 76, 81, 82, 83, 89, 90, 91, 95, 99, 101, 103, 113, 116, 117, 118, 134 learning, 143 Lebanon, vii, 1, 5, 6, 9, 23, 28, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 55, 67, 89, 100, 103, 108, 109, 110, 115, 117, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128, 133, 134, 135, 138, 139, 141, 144 legislation, 85, 113, 126, 135, 137, 138, 140, 142, 143 liberation, 33, 88 living conditions, 28, 109, 110

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M majority, 15, 32, 68, 69, 77, 79, 86, 92, 116, 118, 119, 121, 122, 123, 139 Malaysia, 141 management, 81, 126 maritime security, 115 marketplace, 95 Mauritania, 50, 138, 139 media, 3, 32, 41, 48, 82, 87, 89, 100, 106, 107, 112, 113, 117, 119, 120 mediation, 24, 35, 102 medical care, 127 Mediterranean, 14, 24, 114, 115 membership, 74, 87, 90, 117, 118 mental health, 109 messages, 4, 34, 35 Middle East, vii, viii, 2, 6, 7, 13, 20, 24, 34, 35, 41, 42, 45, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 62, 65, 67, 80, 81, 85, 87, 88, 89, 90, 93, 94, 99, 101, 119, 127, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 143 militarization, 74, 116 military, viii, 4, 5, 11, 16, 21, 22, 23, 24, 32, 34, 36, 38, 39, 40, 45, 62, 64, 67, 69, 82, 90, 95, 97, 99, 100, 101, 103, 104, 105, 107, 111, 112, 115, 118, 120, 121, 125, 126, 127, 128, 133, 135, 140 militia, 41, 105 mobile phone, 86, 95 moderates, 17, 83, 88, 129 momentum, 31, 36, 78, 84, 90 moratorium, 2, 3, 31, 62, 85 Morocco, 28, 50, 87, 134, 138, 139 motivation, 72

Muslims, 10, 61, 62, 119

N national emergency, 46 national interests, 42 national origin, 138, 142 national security, 2, 46, 80, 91, 95, 143 National Security Council, 8, 37, 81 nationality, 138, 142 NATO, 24, 115, 133 needy, 128 negotiating, 8, 9, 15, 17, 19, 21, 33, 35, 57, 59, 61, 65, 74, 85, 89, 99, 101, 123, 132, 141 Netherlands, 114, 132 NGOs, 109, 132 Nigeria, 141 North Africa, 37, 86, 87 North Korea, 34, 47, 67 Northern Ireland, 58 Norway, 9, 43, 114 nuclear program, 67 nuclear weapons, 34, 47 nutrition, 109

O Obama Administration, vii, 3, 7, 8, 24, 28, 46, 58, 59, 60, 62, 75, 80, 83, 84, 85, 86, 94, 99, 101, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131 obstacles, 26, 59, 71, 84, 90, 91 occupied territories, 11, 29 Office of the United States Trade Representative, 144 open markets, 108 openness, 58, 60, 97 opportunism, 116 opportunities, 6, 67, 74, 79 oversight, vii, 2, 58, 135

P Pakistan, 77, 141 Palestinian Authority, vii, 1, 3, 8, 9, 25, 28, 43, 44, 45, 81, 86, 87, 88, 91, 93, 94, 99, 100, 101, 112, 114, 116, 120, 123, 129, 130, 132, 136, 138, 139, 140 Palestinian Islamic Jihad, 104, 105, 134, 136 Palestinian militants, 23, 68, 78, 82, 97, 100, 101, 105, 107, 125 Palestinian uprising, vii, 1 pathways, 58, 60, 72 peace accord, 11, 20, 36, 123 peace process, vii, 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 14, 17, 24, 25, 26, 33, 35, 42, 45, 46, 48, 49, 58, 60, 63, 66, 67, 68, 69,

Israeli-Arab Negotiations and Issues, edited by Louis H. Girard, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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Index 76, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 93, 94, 99, 100, 122, 131 peacekeepers, 134 penalties, 137, 138, 143 permit, 10, 28, 69 perpetration, 116 perpetrators, 21, 22, 41 photographs, 32, 34 piracy, 5, 115 platform, 15, 76, 118, 121 plutonium, 47 PNA, 132 polarization, 90 police, 104, 110, 112, 113 political participation, 77 political party, 15 politicization, 116 politics, 4, 15, 77, 85, 90, 107, 122 polling, 134 Popular Front, 38, 90, 134 popular support, 111 prejudice, 12, 38, 84 presidency, 118 President Clinton, vii, 1, 9, 10, 32, 33, 44, 65 presidential veto, 126 prestige, 67 primacy, 68, 77 prior knowledge, 39 prisoners, 4, 5, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 22, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 104 procurement, 105, 113, 115 professionalization, 136 programming, 132 project, 88, 121, 125 public discourse, 76 public opinion, 119, 120, 134 public support, 93

Q Qatar, 28, 50, 87, 92, 119, 120, 134, 138, 139, 141, 144 qualifications, 65 quality of life, 79

R race, 110, 138, 142 racism, 76 radar, 38, 114, 135 Ramadan, 53 raw materials, 115 reactions, 119 real terms, 77

151

reality, 40, 76, 79 recognition, 15, 16, 25, 27, 51, 60, 63, 64, 69, 88, 92, 117 recommendations, iv, 34 reconciliation, 71, 111, 119 reconstruction, 98, 99, 102, 107, 110, 111, 118, 120, 128, 129 recovery plan, 108 recycling, 65 reforms, 19, 44, 113 refugee camps, 41 refugees, vii, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 38, 57, 59, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 77, 86, 92, 109, 123, 127 rehabilitation, 109 relief, 107, 109, 110, 111, 135 religion, 138, 142 repair, 109, 110, 131 requirements, 2, 19, 20, 59 resentment, 68, 84 reserves, 69, 90 resistance, 3, 5, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 29, 37, 38, 40, 69, 72, 73, 76, 79, 90, 92, 99, 116, 117, 119, 123 resolution, vii, 2, 6, 8, 24, 28, 36, 37, 39, 41, 42, 48, 57, 58, 59, 64, 65, 66, 67, 73, 82, 84, 87, 91, 92, 93, 100, 126, 128, 140 resources, 4, 27, 65, 84, 88, 128 respect, 8, 17, 18, 45, 46, 47, 48, 66, 79, 88, 109, 111, 120, 127, 132, 136, 144 restitution, 129 retaliation, 102, 118 rhetoric, 85, 104, 117, 135 rights, 12, 15, 29, 60, 69, 71, 76, 77, 115 rockets, 4, 5, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 38, 41, 47, 48, 82, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 124, 125, 135 rule of law, 48, 112 Russia, 1, 44, 59, 82, 83

S sanctions, 46, 76, 115 Saudi Arabia, 7, 18, 24, 50, 53, 67, 86, 87, 88, 92, 95, 99, 101, 102, 116, 119, 120, 121, 131, 134, 138, 139, 141, 144 scaling, 73 Secretary of Defense, 113 security assistance, vii, 20, 58, 60, 83, 129, 130 security forces, 10, 20, 45, 78, 81, 83, 93, 94, 112, 114, 123, 129, 136 Senate, 8, 47, 48, 69, 90, 95, 100, 102, 126, 130, 131, 135 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 8, 102, 131 sensitivity, 62, 85

Israeli-Arab Negotiations and Issues, edited by Louis H. Girard, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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152

Index

Serbia, 73 settlements, vii, 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 16, 19, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 43, 57, 58, 59, 60, 63, 65, 66, 69, 70, 75, 77, 80, 81, 84, 85, 88, 89, 90, 94, 95, 105, 133 sewage, 21, 107, 109 sex, 138, 142 shareholders, 138 shelter, 100, 109, 127 Shia, 67, 119, 120 short supply, 107 signals, 66, 136 signs, 60, 62, 74, 83 Sinai, 71, 103, 112, 114 smuggling, 23, 24, 40, 71, 86, 93, 97, 101, 102, 103, 104, 112, 113, 114, 115, 125, 131, 133 Smuggling, 104, 112, 113, 114, 133 social services, 109 Somalia, 138 South Africa, 47 South Asia, 85, 94 sovereign state, 74 sovereignty, 9, 10, 11, 24, 27, 31, 32, 41, 63, 64, 71, 73, 74, 75, 141 Soviet Union, 9, 95 space, 27, 75, 92, 93 Spain, 114 speculation, 14, 33, 35, 90, 118 speech, 8, 26, 27, 29, 31, 33, 36, 39, 41, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 73, 81, 82, 88, 131 State Department, 3, 4, 7, 18, 28, 29, 31, 35, 46, 48, 52, 53, 80, 90, 95, 128, 131, 132, 136 state of emergency, 18 statehood, 1, 58, 60, 63, 72, 73, 74, 88 steel, 111, 135 storage, 116 strategic planning, 83, 132 strategy, 48, 72, 73, 74, 77, 78, 117, 143 stroke, 14, 72, 78 Sudan, 25, 52, 135, 138 suicide, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 21, 22, 68, 116 suicide attacks, 68 suicide bombings, 10, 116 supervision, 23, 122 survival, 85, 97, 104, 117 Syria, vii, 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 46, 47, 50, 54, 55, 64, 65, 67, 82, 89, 99, 109, 115, 116, 119, 120, 124, 128, 131, 134, 136, 138, 141, 144

T tactics, 3, 73, 82, 93, 99, 114, 117, 118 takeover, 1, 63, 64, 71, 79, 83, 103, 112, 116

tanks, 16, 99, 109, 118 technical assistance, 114 tension, 41, 75, 121 tensions, 41, 57, 59, 68, 99, 116, 119 tenure, 31, 93 territorial control, vii, 1 territory, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 13, 15, 23, 24, 26, 27, 30, 32, 34, 37, 39, 40, 41, 64, 74, 75, 85, 100, 103, 115, 123, 138 terrorism, 6, 14, 23, 30, 42, 48, 73, 116, 135 terrorist attacks, 6, 32, 33, 40 terrorist groups, 90, 105, 123 terrorist organization, 14, 15, 24, 33, 39, 46 terrorists, 11, 12, 14, 33, 34, 36, 40, 135 threats, 41, 73, 114, 124, 125 time frame, 29 tracks, 2, 3, 9, 18, 32, 35 trade agreement, 140 training, 22, 35, 83, 90, 113, 114, 126, 136 transportation, 71 trial, 90 Turkey, 2, 5, 35, 36, 37, 65, 83 Turks, 37

U U.N. resolutions, 11, 29, 40 U.N. Security Council, viii, 6, 24, 32, 38, 39, 42, 47, 52, 55, 73, 91, 92, 97, 115 U.S. policy, 25, 34, 58, 60, 82, 84, 134, 136, 142 UK, 50, 132 UN, 24, 51, 52, 55, 87, 92, 93, 131, 133 unilateralism, 74, 78, 91 United Arab Emirates, 50, 88, 95, 120, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144 United Kingdom, 77, 114, 115, 131, 132 United Nations, vii, 44, 53, 55, 57, 58, 59, 62, 81, 90, 95, 100, 101, 103, 104, 108, 111, 115, 132, 135 United States, 145 universities, 23 UNRWA, 86, 98, 100, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 127, 128, 130, 135 uranium, 35, 47 urban areas, 129 use of force, 82

V vehicles, 38, 100, 113 violence, 1, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 23, 37, 42, 44, 57, 59, 60, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 72, 85, 87, 90, 92, 93, 100, 102, 112, 116, 119, 121, 130, 142 vision, 10, 19, 21, 25, 28, 35, 66, 72 vocational training, 83

Israeli-Arab Negotiations and Issues, edited by Louis H. Girard, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Index voting, 85, 100 vulnerability, 93, 97, 109, 125

W

68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 93, 94, 95, 109, 116, 117, 118, 119, 122, 123, 128, 129, 131, 133, 134, 136 Western countries, 119 Western Europe, 132 Western orientation, 99, 119 White House, 3, 7, 10, 12, 16, 17, 26, 30, 31, 33, 35, 47, 49, 54, 81, 135 withdrawal, 4, 6, 9, 11, 13, 23, 24, 28, 32, 35, 36, 37, 38, 43, 63, 74, 78, 79, 100, 112, 122, 123, 131 workers, 71, 100, 108, 110, 129 World Bank, 71, 91, 116, 132 World Trade Organization, 141, 143 WTO, 141, 143, 144

Y Yemen, 134, 138, 141, 144

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war crimes, 47, 48 waste, 86, 88, 107, 109 waste disposal, 107 water resources, 23, 32 water rights, vii, 19, 57, 59, 77 weakness, 61, 65, 104 weapons, 5, 21, 23, 25, 27, 39, 40, 47, 55, 90, 93, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 106, 112, 113, 114, 115, 125, 133 welfare, 140 welfare loss, 140 West Bank, vii, viii, 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 43, 44, 45, 50, 52, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64,

153

Israeli-Arab Negotiations and Issues, edited by Louis H. Girard, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,