ASEAN Negotiations: Two Insights 9789814345620

Table of contents :
Contents
Foreword
Introduction
1. ASEAN Negotiating Styles: Asset or Hindrance?
2. ASEAN Postures and Performance in North-South Negotiations: Prospects for a Common Front Approach on the New International Economic Order
THE AUTHORS

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ASEAN Political Studies

ASEAN NEGOI1ATIONS TWO INSIGHTS

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies was established as an autonomous organization in May 1968. It is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia, particularly the multi-faceted problems of stability and security, economic development, and political and social change. The Institute is governed by a twenty-two-member Board of Trustees comprising nominees from the Singapore Government, the National University of Singapore, the various Chambers of Commerce, and professional and civic organizations. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is chaired by the Director, the Institute's chief academic and administrative officer. The ASEAN Economic Research Unit (AERU) is an integral part of the Institute, coming under the overall supervision of the Director who is also the Chairman of its Management Committee. The Unit was formed in 1979 in response to the need to deepen understanding of economic change and political developments in ASEAN. The day-to-day operations of the Unit are the responsibility of the Co-ordinator. A Regional Advisory Committee, consisting of a senior economist from each of the ASEAN countries, guides the work of the Unit.

ASEAN NEGOfiATIONS TWO INSIGHTS

Pushpa Thambipillai and

J. Saravanamuttu

ASEAN Economic Research Unit INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES 1985

Published by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 0511 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior consent of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

© 1985 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies ISBN 9971-902-87-7

The responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in this publication rests exctus1 vely with the authors and their interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the Institute or its supporters.

Contents

Foreword

vii

INTRODUCTION PART 1 ASEAN Negotiating Styles: Asset or Hindrance? by Pushpa Thambipillai

3

PART II ASEAN Postures and Performance in North-South Negotiations: Prospects for a Common Front Approach on the New International Economic Order by J. Saravanamuttu

29 56

About the Authors

v

Foreword

In 1981 a research project was launched by a group of political scientists, under the auspices of the Asean Economic Research Unit of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, to complement the work of economists in their investigation of the problems and obstacles that stand in the way of economic co-operation in ASEAN. It has been widely recognized that whilst ASEAN has been established since 1967 and received fresh impetus as a regional organization after 1975, very modest progress has been achieved in the area of economic co-operation, although this is one of the primary objectives laid down in the ASEAN Declaration. A team of economists, therefore, set the task for themselves to focus on specific aspects of economic co-operation in ASEAN, such as industry and trade, investments and finance, commodities, and food and energy, to investigate in depth the nature of problems and obstacles, and to discover possible areas of breakthrough in the process of economic co-operation in an effort to understand the dynamics of economic regionalism. It soon became evident that a similar enquiry directed at the political dimensions of regional economic co-operation was necessary to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of the problem. The Konrad Adenauer Foundation very generously provided the enabling funds for such a study. Thus, nine political scientists came together in two separate workshops in 1981 and 1982 in Singapore to examine the political factors affecting ASEAN economic co-operation. The results of their research efforts are seen in the six monographs in this series entitled ASEAN Political Studies. The monographs examine the institutional factors, both domestic and regional, the bilateral relations, and the decision-making processes which impinge on regional economic co-operation. vii

Hopefully, the monographs listed below will each in their own way throw light on the political dimensions of regional economic co-operation: 1. Domestic Political Structures and Regional Economic Co-operation Harold Crouch 2. Impediments to Regionalism in Southeast Asia: Bilateral Constraints among ASEAN Member States Hans H. Indorf 3. The Institutional Structure of ASEAN: Evolution and Reform Chin Kin Wah 4. Decision-making in an ASEAN Complementation Scheme: The Automotive Industry Seah Chee Meow and Estrella Solidum 5. ASEAN Negotiations: Two Insights Pushpa Thambipillai and J. Saravanamuttu 6. The World of ASEAN Decision-makers: A Study of Bureaucratic Elite Perceptions Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Withaya Sucharithianarugse These studies were completed by June 1983 and do not take into account the entry of Brunei as the sixth member of ASEAN in January 1984. Chan Heng Chee Project Co-ordinator

Introduction

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) constituting a grouping of the five states of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand in the Southeast Asian region share numerous similar as well as different characteristics in their physical, cultural, socio-economic and political aspects. The ASEAN organization itself is a testimony to the co.nflictual and co-operative forces that were at work in the mid-1960s. The original five successfully synthesized their differences to get together within a loosely structured organizational framework in 1967. This they were able to achieve because they accepted the fact that each member would retain its full sovereignty and decision-making powers. The confluence of history, religion, politics, and the level of economic development in Southeast Asia has produced a criss-cross of cultural and political heritage which inevitably is projected in each society when it interacts with its neighbours. Being an organization which encompasses different interests and policy making procedures, ASEAN could undoubtedly face constraints in those areas where it desires to pursue co-operative ventures; it thus has to overcome obstacles that might arise not only because of the different national interests but also because of the different ways and styles members make decisions. Issues of unity or division could surface during the various processes of decision-making at the regional level, during interpersonal interactions and negotiations. Therefore, some interesting questions to pursue in the study of ASEAN are: How are all the differences among the countries contained within the grouping in the name of regional co-operation? What is the operational style and behaviour that is the product of the cultural and political environment, and how do these enter into expectations and actions? What are the issues of significance to them and what determine their patterns of behaviour, firstly with each other, and secondly, with the rest of the world? The following two essays offer some insight into the behaviour of the ASEAN countries, specifically on how they negotiate intra-regionally and extra-regionally. Intra-regional negotiation occurs among the five member countries on issues that specifically affect them, for example, the Preferential Trading Arrangements, or the Industrial Complementation Projects or in I

areas where they have to confer on certain "external" issues before meeting the external partners. Extra-regional negotiations would thus involve the ASEAN members and third parties, be they a single country like Japan or a group like the EEC. The first study on "ASEAN Negotiating Styles" looks at some of the common forms of decision-making among the ASEAN leaders - Heads of Governments, Ministers or bureaucrats - in order to understand what behavioural, cultural or political traits bind them together or facilitate their interaction. The difficulties encountered as a result of conflicting perceptions, ideologies or national interests are also discussed. Any study on decision-making or the negotiation process entails not only an understanding of the socio-cultural background of the negotiators but also the national interests they represent and the issues involved. The paper tries to "look behind the scenes" to probe how ASEAN leaders negotiate by talking to involved individuals. However, due to constraints in collecting sufficient information the study is not as comprehensive as it was intended to be; decision-makers are not easily accessible nor are they communicative. They often find refuge in the argument that the issues covered are "sensitive" and might hurt regional co-operation. The second study ''ASEAN Postures and Performance in North-South Negotiations", looks at the behaviour of ASEAN as a regional grouping. It discusses some of the areas where ASEAN has taken a common stand vis-a-vis third countries, and the collective negotiation strategies it has adopted. The writer uses the New Internationa l Economic Order (NIEO) and North-South issues as the framework for analysing the common front approach. Then selecting a few specific cases, the writer looks at ASEAN's postures and strategies in negotiations with its three main partners, Japan, the United States and the European Community, and concludes that based on the strategies adopted, prospects are not too optimistic for furthering ASEAN's NIEO aspirations. ASEAN's performance on the promotion of the NIEO is dependent upon two important factors; the global economic environment and the regional trend of either one of more or less collaborative attempts at projecting common policies. The essay asserts that a great deal depends upon the willingness of ASEAN members themselves to pursue efforts in realizing the NIEO. Although ASEAN compares favourably with other southern countries in its North-South negotiations with the Northern Bloc, more could be achieved through the promotion of vigorous coordination.

2

1 ASEAN Negotiating Styles: Asset or Hindrance?

Introduction "Nations that have no conflicting interests ... have nothing to negotiate about. And nations that have no common interests have nothing to negotiate for. The interplay of common and conflicting interests determined the substance and goals of negotiation; where such a mixture is at work over the long term, it tends to shape the negotiating style. If diplomatic opponents realize that they will have important objectives in common for a long time to come, they will negotiate differently than if they are brought to the conference table by a concern shared only at that time. The expectation of recurrent negotiation engenders a stake in evolving and observing some rules of accommodation, some minimum standards of reliability and efficiencY,"

Thus observed a student of negotiations. Although written in a different context, its applicability is relevant to Southeast Asia. The ASEAN grouping which is the focus of this study on negotiations has several common as well as conflicting areas of interests in both its intra-regional and extraregional interactions, but which calls for collective negotiations. It is often a challenge and an enduring task to bring together a number of countries so that they can co-operate effectively. This is made all the more difficult if they are situated in a region marked by diversity in language, religion and ethnic identity. The current members of ASEAN had been isolated from each other politically and economically (each being linked to its western metropolis) even though geographically, and to some extent culturally, they had some common bonds. This relative isolation was evident until only about 20 to 25 years ago when in the early sixties there were indications towards sub-regional involvement by some of the states in the area. But even then, most observers tended to evaluate Southeast Asia negatively on its potential for co-operation because of the countries' political interests and economic competition rather than because of the results of efforts at actual collaboration. 3

4

ASEAN Negotiations

The grouping that immediately comes to mind when one refers to Southeast Asia is the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), established in 1961 in Bangkok. It comprised Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand; the others in the region could not be persuaded to join the organization. The Bangkok Declaration, initiated on 31 July 1961 by Tunku Abdul Rahman (Prime Minister of Malaya), Felixberto M. Serrano (Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines) and Thanat Khoman (Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand) stated that ASA was an association for economic and cultural co-operation among the countries of Southeast Asia. One of its aims was "to establish an effective machinery for friendly consultations, collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, scientific and administrative fields". The setting up of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963 comprising Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore, in a way contributed to the demise of ASA because the creation of the new political entity invited hostilities from two quarters: the Philippines which claimed Sabah, and Indonesia under President Sukarno, did not approve the larger federation and embarked on its "confrontation" policy against Malaysia. It was during this period that another attempt at regional co-operation was made, this time comprising Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia. 2 But under th_e circumstances, it did not succeed as a vehicle for consultation or compromise, perhaps because the goals and motivation were too specific and issue-oriented to end hostilities and bring the "warring" factions together while the factions themselves were not ready to compromise. The government leaders, too, were perhaps inexperienced in dealing with foreign, especially, sensitive matters, and lacked the political will to interact with each other (as opposed to later years); at the same time they had to concentrate on more pressing domestic problems of economic and political development. After 1965, with the change of events in the region, namely, the establishment of the New Order in Indonesia under President Soeharto, and after the trauma of the simultaneous separation and independence of Singapore, regional co-operation looked relatively more promising. Although an attempt to revive ASA was made in 1967, it was a newer, larger organization, including Indonesia and Singapore - the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) - that was formed later that year in Bangkok. ASEAN adopted common goals and policies projected for a longer term, directed at promoting peace and development in the region. The men behind ASEAN seem to have planned for a more slow-paced, gradual and conciliatory decision-making style (realizing that the states could not be rushed into a regional identity), thus assuring longer continuity as contrasted with short-lived issue oriented negotiations. Although ASEAN came into being amidst remnant suspicions, hostility and conflict (the five members were not yet confident nor completely at ease with each other, while the Philippines was still persisting with its claim on

Negotiating Styles

5

Sabah), over the years the political leadership has realized the merits of unstructured and informal communication as a means of overcoming sensitive issues. A slow but progressive achievement in the past 16 years has markedly contributed to ASEAN's growth and development into a workable force. Thus the decision-making process in the ASEAN context is now one of settling issues within a group of "friends and neighbours" rather than adversaries (about which most of the general literature on negotiations has dealt with). ASEAN negotiations take place in an environment of apparent cooperation rather than actual conflict and antagonism, but nevertheless within a context of conflicting and common interests. This study will look at decision-making in ASEAN, the structures and processes involved, particularly ~t the negotiating process, since negotiation is a vital aspect of decision-making. It will attempt to explain some of the basic questions related to the "who", "what" and "how" of negotiations and their influence on regional co-operation and vice versa. It provides a general overview rather than deal with specific case studies of negotiation procedures.' Due to the constraints in gathering adequate information, the study is not as comprehensive as it was intended to be. Certain senior bureaucrats in the ASEAN countries were helpful in discussing some of the issues in negotiations while others did not deem it proper to discuss such matters. Thus first-hand information was scarce, but invaluable. Some foreign personnel were willing to share their perceptions of how different ASEAN individuals negotiated. However, lacking a structured questionnaire method of collecting information, this study merely tries to understand the processes involved and the internal dynamics of ASEAN. Hopefully it gives the potential negotiators, both from within and without the region, some insight into how negotiations take place. The process itself could also be important in contributing to our understanding of the level of regional co-operation in this part of the world, and assess in what direction co-operation is moving - towards more or less co-ordination of policies - and whether the particular style of negotiation contributes to that movement. Political Decision-making: Structure and Process

The study of politics essentially evolves around decisions - who makes them and who benefits from them. As such decision-making as a process is the core of the political process of allocation, be it within a group of individuals, a state or among states. In public policy-making we are concerned only with social or collective decision-making. Within that system different modes of decision-making can be identified. One such mode may be called coalition decision-making ''the process of making a choice by numerical aggregation, involving voting majorities, rules of col-

6

ASEAN Negotiations

lective choice, and legislation". • This form of decision-making is a zerosum process since one side wins and the other loses, the successful side winning by being more numerous than the other. A significant characteristic is that neither side has any power over the other outside that specific process of choice. Another form of social decision-making is through negotiations, "a process of two (or more) parties combining their conflicting points of view into a single decision". ' It is a positive-sum process; the parties concerned are agreeable to the outcome as compared to the status quo since the process itself seeks to modify divergent views into a mutually acceptable decision. Negotiation as a basic political process also involves the exercise of certain degrees of power. But in the case of ASEAN power is not unidirectional; all parties to the negotiation have power over each other. Negotiations are utilized when other means (like a simple majority) are not desirable and when each party's stand has to be taken into consideration without simply eliminating it. Therefore each participan t has an equal input, and the outcome reflects its acceptance by all members, without being either winners or losers. In order to arrive at a mutually acceptable decision, the process may take a long time, depending on the degree of divergent stands. It also depends on the number of parties involved - whether it is two-party or multi-party, or among adversaries striving for a common outcome or among friends who are more conciliatory. In negotiations, the process becomes "personali zed" in the sense that negotiators have to propel the divergent issues into acceptable ones rather than leave it to numbers to decide (e.g. through a vote). When parties negotiate they can either adopt the more rigorous exchange system of bargaining to arrive at an agreement or pursue the more subdued and subtle process of consensus-building, or some combinati on of the two.

ASEAN Styles and Structures Decision-making in ASEAN, and ultimately the negotiating styles and processes are determined by a number of factors: for example, the structure, the cultural and political environment or the specific issues. The structural aspect refers to the institutional set-up of the association and the provisions in the various declaration and treaties. In the case of ASEAN, the Declaration of 1967 provided a basic "machine ry" to carry out the aims and purposes: (a) "Annual Meeting of Foreign Ministers, which shall be by rotation and referred to as ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Special Meetings of Foreign Ministers may be convened as required; (b) A Standing Committee, under the chairmanship of the Foreign Minister of the host country or his representative and having as its

Negotiating Styles

7

members the accredited Ambassadors of the other member countries, to carry out on the work of the Association in between Meetings of Foreign Ministers; (c) Ad-Hoc Committees and Permanent Committees of specialists and officials on specific subjects; (d) A National Secretariat in each member country to carry out the work of the Association on behalf of that country and to service the Annual or Special Meetings of Foreign Ministers, the Standing Committee and such other Committee as may hereafter be established". Source: The ASEAN Declaration, 8 August 1967. The fact that an "Association for Regional Co-operation" had been inaugurated without any clearly defined or formal structure itself is indicative of the direction the members of ASEAN, at that time, wanted to follow informal, with no specific format for decision-making and implementation. It has generally managed to follow that direction with only small degrees of modification in the proceeding years. One encouraging characteristic of ASEAN was that it was born with the least pain; it was not "bogged" down with heavy structures in its formative years but was instituted with the minimal weight necessary for the anticipated functions. In an area and period where nationalism was supreme, it avoided the creation of any supranational institution in the initial phase; the five national Secretariats were the only co-ordinating institutions for the various inter-state meetings among the members. This was crucial because the more the restrictions at the initial stage, the more the difficulties in getting an association accepted by prospective members, especially in a region crisscrossed by conflicts and mutual suspicions. The minimal structure approach was unlike the establishment of other regional organizations like the European Economic Community (EEC) with its elaborate Treaty of Rome or the Andean Grouping with its Cartegena Agreement. Another element in the structural growth of ASEAN was the slow nurturing in its development such that it allowed ten years before the first Meeting of the Heads of Government (as the highest authority) took f)lace in 1976. This meeting can be considered a mile-stone because it charted the course for the future development of ASEAN, that ASEAN would not only continue to exist (as opposed to certain pessimistic opinions expressed in the early 1970s but also take on a more definite role and structure. Three agreements resulted from the 1976 Meeting: The Declaration of ASEAN Concord, the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia; and the Agreement on the establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat. Indonesia was chosen as the host country for the Secretariat. The Preamble to the formation of the Secretariat stated that the growing activities of ASEAN since its establishment had increased the need for a

8

ASEAN Negotiations

central administrative organ to provide for greater efficiency in the coordination of ASEAN organs and for more effective implementation of ASEAN projects and activities. Although it gave ASEAN a more formal structural framework, assigning it certain functions, it also ensured that it did not override the national decision-making apparatus of each member country. Each member retains its right to make decisions while the ASEAN Secretariat only acts as a co-ordinating body, supporting the functions of the standing committees and other bodies but not entrusted with any decision-making functions for the Association. The Secretariat is also limited in its co-ordinating duties since not all issues are referred to it. For example, matters of political nature, be they intra- or extra-regional, are the prerogative of the Foreign Ministers. There is no special Bureau for Politics. The three existing Bureau Directors, under the Secretary-General, deal with Economics, Science and Technology, and Social and Cultural affairs only. Even then the Secretariat does not initiate or actively participate in negotiations within the ASEAN group or with the dialogue partners. That function is retained by the national secretariats and the various committees. The Secretary-General is a public official seconded from each of the members, in alphabetical order, and serves a two-year term. He is more of an administrative head (in fact the Secretary-General of the Secretariat) than the representative head of ASEAN; that distinction goes to the ASEAN Ministers wherever and whenever they meet third parties. Other changes to the ASEAN decision-making structure that evolved were the regular Economic Ministers Meeting and the occasional meetings of other Ministers, and the grouping of the permanent and ad hoc committees into five economic and three non-economic committees. The ninth committee, Committee on Budget and Audit, COBA, is located at the ASEAN Secretariat. The committees, with a permanent chair country, are: Committee Committee Committee Committee Committee Committee Committee Committee

on on on on on on on on

Trade and Tourism, COTT (Singapore) Industry, Minerals and Energy, COIME (Philippines) Finance and Banking, COF AB (Thailand) Food, Agriculture and Forestry, COFAF (Indonesia) Transportation and Communication, COTAC (Malaysia) Social Development, COSD (Thailand) Culture and Information, COCI (Indonesia) Science and Technology, COST (Singapore)

Below these are various sub-committees and working groups. 7 Although the Heads of Government meetings are recognized as the highest decisionmaking institution, only two have been held so far, in 1976 and 1977. The

Organizational Structure of ASEAN

l AsEAN EcoNOMIC MINISTERS

I

I

ASEAN HEADS OF GoVERNMENT

l

I

OTHER ASEAN MINISTERS

I

I A''"'" '""'"

I

I

Committee on Trade and Tourism (COTT)

Committee on Industry, Minerals and Energy (COIME)

Committ~e on Food, Agncultur e and Forestry (COFAF)

I STANDING COMMITTEE

I

:

~~--~---~

Committee on Finance and Banking (COFAB)

Committ~e on Transporta~IOn and Commumc atwn (COTAC)

I AsEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS

Committee on Social Developme nt (COSO)

Committee on Culture and Informatio n (COCI)

I Committee on Science and Technolog y (COST)

Committee on Budget and Audit (COBA)

~a

~·

5·

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VJ

Sub-Comm ittees, Working Groups, Ad-Hoc Committee s

SouRcE: ASEAN Yearbook 1980

Sub-Comm ittees, Working Groups, Ad-Hoc Meetings

~ '0

10

A SEAN Negotiation s

Declarati on of ASEAN Concord did state that such meetings would only convene "as and when necessary ". Over the last few years, with the success of ASEAN in its desire for co-opera tion, there has been a growing concern to re-evaluate the Association. The 12th ASEAN Economi c Ministers' Meeting (in January 1982) was to some extent significant in that it discussed a number of issues that were related to the restructu ring of the organiza tion and its functions. There was a suggestion to expand the number of permane nt staff at the Secretariat in Jakarta. However , there were also some discord over the move to modify the permane nt economic committees. It was agreed that the chairman ship of the committees would be reviewed every three years; and, there could be a rotation of each member country as the chairman , if the group agreed to it. The functions of each committe e might also be modified .' The ASEAN Foreign Ministers who met in June that year agreed to the setting up of a task force comprising 15 individuals from the various ASEAN members to review ASEAN' s progress. The recomme ndations were submitte d 9 to the subseque nt Foreign Ministers' Meeting in 1983. On another front, the Philippin e Foreign Minister, Carlos Romulo has indicated his displeasure over the prolifera tion of ASEAN meetings, which to some were mere "picnics ". He proposed the setting up of a permane nt planning agency, noting that "Rather than each member country designing its own short-rang e and fragmented plans and hurriedly agreeing on which one to adopt, a planning agency could have readily provided ASEAN with alternative plans based on thorough in-depth study of the numerous issues involved". 10

The next few years would probably see a re-organization of the existing ASEAN structure s and institutio ns. It may change or modify the existing methods of decision-making. But in the meantim e ASEAN has preferred to pursue its policies in the customar y manner. Decision-making: the Consensus Model

When one studies decision-making in ASEAN, one invariabl y comes across numerou s committees and meetings, with, one can correctly assume, an ascending scale of importan ce of the issues correspo nding to the ranks of the participa nts; for example, senior officials may discuss issues of lesser significance or be only involved in preparato ry meetings, while Ministers may take up more importan t issues. Given the lack of structura l and legalistic norms to regulate procedur es, coupled with the presence of numerou s levels of meetings among governm ent officials, a peculiar system of decision-making has evolved within ASEAN:

Negotiating Styles

II

(i) decision-making through small groups and committees (as we saw above), and (ii) procedurally following what is called the consensus model. Culturally, this particular model can be identified as being part of the regional social system. That part of Southeast Asia that constitutes ASEAN has one ethnic and culturally dominant group - peoples of the Malay stock. Hence a basic culture shared by the majority of the inhabitants of the region prevails, together with other features superimposed from outside the region. The consensus approach and the two basic terms of musyawarah (the process of decision-making through discussion and consultation), and mufakat (the unanimous decision that is arrived at) are associated with traditional, especially village politics in certain parts of Indonesia and to a lesser degree in Malaysia and the Philippines:' The origins, however, may not be entirely indigenous. The words are of Arabic origin and the concept, according to some literature, is similar to the custom practised in the Arabic societies during the time of Prophet Mohamed. The practice could have been introduced together with Islam via India, borrowing cultural traits and modifying them to local requirements. 12 Musyawarah and mufakat as the basis of arriving at decisions in villages have also been the focus of study of numerous scholars. One scholar who has written extensively on local socio-political processes is Koentjaraningrat. In one of his early works he stated that "The concept involves the processes that develop general agreement and consensus in village assemblies which emerge as the unanimous decision or mujakat. This unanimous decision can be reached by a process in which the majority and the minorities approach each other by making the necessary readjustments in their respective viewpoints, or by an integration of the contrasting standpoints into a new conceptual synthesis"!'

He concluded that musyawarah and mujakat excluded the possibility of the majority imposing its views on the minorities. However, one crucial factor emerged during this process. It did "... imply the existence of personalities who, by virtue of their leadership, are able to bring together the contrasting viewpoints or who have enough imagination to arrive at a synthesis integrating the contrasting viewpoints into a new conception"!'

Thus the ability to arrive at a consensus did not occur spontaneously but was catalysed by the presence of one or more individuals who consciously geared the varying viewpoints towards a common stand acceptable to all. Disagreements were not eliminated or ruled out completely; they were

12

ASEAN Negotiations

5 present at times. But only rarely were such disagreements stated openly! Consensus was carefully built so that each of the participants' ultimate views formed a line of least deviation from his original stand. Outwardly, the musyawarah may appear simplistic since power and influence are not pitted one against the other during the meeting itself. However, one has to follow the behind-the-scene activities to comprehend that mufakat is not as easily achieved as it seems! 6 There appears to be intensive informal and discreet discussion that eventually sift out the general consensus of the community. This then, during more formal meetings, acts as the starting point and around which the unanimous decision is finally accepted after further discussion. The musyawarah and mufakat processes, therefore, commence long before the actual musyawarah takes place and by then part of the mufakat has already been settled elsewhere. A few individuals, or perhaps one leader, a partriarchal figure, emerges as the most important component of this system. This was found to be the case in Javanese village politics.

"The headman often appears to determine everything in an authoritative manner, while the heads of the households serve only to approve his decisions. Those who attend seem passive, and no opposition is apparent. Careful observation, however, exposes the considerable opposition that does exist .... Efforts are made behind the scenes to reduce the differences between conflicting viewpoints, during the discussions and gossip in the guardhouses or coffee shops. The village head, who actively participates in these operations knows every development; at the official meeting his announcements are nothing but the final resolution of preliminary discussions, and as such are naturally acceptable to a majority of the assembled people. This system of conducting meetings is probably derived from a corresponding element in Javanese social behaviour in which public controversy must be avoided at all costs. This attitude is further strengthened by the patriarchal figure of the village head: like a father, he should never be directly contradicted"!'

This particular system is, however, not static; if we follow similarly oriented practices over time we can see changes. It has been found that in village assemblies headed by younger men the consensus model is not strictly followed. Those younger men do not command the fatherly respect; besides they themselves introduce changes influenced by their knowledge of and association with other urban meetings. Even so, they are usually unable to completely break away from the social environment of arriving at acceptable decisions through the consensus way. Thus there would be, it appears, elements of the musyawarah and mufakat systems in group negotiations rather than simply counting hands. Even in a smaller societal setting, "negotiations are also conducted on the basis of accommodation in order to save face and to honour the values of kinship ties and family systems of

Negotiating Styles

13

the participants, and the musyawarah style neatly provides for safeguarding these values"!' From the societal and village level analysis we could apply this particular style of decision-making to the national or internation al level. In the international context the consensus approach implies that negotiations and decision-making are also conducted in a manner to "save face" and maintain a conciliatory relationship among the participants. The nature of consensus building, the role of individuals and the changing environmental influences on decision-making will be discussed later in relation to the ASEAN case. •• ASEAN Negotiations: Who, How and With What Effect When one discusses the issue of decision-making and negotiations with ASEAN officials, one gets the impression (when one succeeds in talking to them and getting some response), that generally there is no problem as decisions are arrived at through consensus. "Consensu s" seems to be the catch-word, a mask to hide actual problems and disagreements since there is no open vote counting. The unmasking is a long and patient process, frustrating but sometimes revealing certain inner aspects of negotiations. Reluctance, on the part of officials, to discuss details could be a sign of inherent problems. What appears on the surface, or what is described by officials may not reflect actual discussions. It is only the sudden outbursts or glimpses by third parties that reveal some of the processes involved. Nevertheless, the cultural model of not revealing disagreements as well as the frank opinions of a number of respondents, have given some insight into the various aspects of negotiations. It must be made clear at the outset that there is no single ASEAN policy that emerges from any particular meeting. What we perceive as an ASEAN policy is actually some form of a synthesis or amalgam of the policies of the different members so that a common stand is projected. Thus the components of the resulting ASEAN policy maintain their identity while encompassing the general thrust, allowing each member to diverge within a certain acceptable boundary. A policy, be it economic or political, once it is decided that it should be pursued collectively, undergoes different stages of formulation and acceptance at the national as well as regional levels. Surprisingly, it is not the political but the economic or technical issues that seem to face more obstacles. For example, a political issue whether or not to support the formation of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea was of concern, it appeared, only to a core of political leaders in each country, limited perhaps to the executive and foreign offices. However, economic issues, such as the expansion of regional trade may have its supporters and opponents in various related sectors of each country, for example, trade,

14

ASEAN Negotiations

industry, or labour offices. The larger the country, the more distributed the functions and activities, and the more difficult it seems to arrive at a national policy that would be supported by the different sectors. Thus, there could be inter-departmental competition in a bid to represent national interests. For instance, one Indonesian official cited an example of sectoral interests in the debate on freer trade for a commodity versus protection for an industry in that specific commodity, to explain why some would support free trade while others would not. Smaller states like Singapore seem to have less problems in arriving at national positions since a more cohesive and relatively smaller group of people is apparently in charge of the major sectors, and priorities are clearly defined by this score. 20 National consensus-building is thus the first stage before a country stand can be adopted and introduced to the regional meeting. The input in consensus-building varies from country to country and from issue to issue. What appears at a particular regional meeting is a set of different country positions. (No country position papers on any topic were ever disclosed to a researcher.) If we were to use the algebraic example, then each country position is somewhat like x + 1, or x - 1, or x + 2 (rather than x, y, z), based on a common outlook but with variations on the shared viewpoint. The fact that the member countries arrive at a meeting with some common denominator is in itself an achievement and is partly explained by the consensus model discussed above where "sending out feelers" to the member countries is important. The consensus model holds that through some degree of manipulation and informal bargaining an acceptable formula is arrived at by adjusting each member's respective policy stand so that at a later more formal meeting a synthesis of the varying opinions can be easily adopted. The ASEAN negotiations have some similarities with this process. According to ASEAN officials a great deal of note-comparing and adjustments occur during and after the national decision-making stage before an issue is brought to the regional meeting. Through informal channels ("feelers") the likely position of a particular ASEAN country on an issue will be known in advance. If the reaction seems unfavourable and with little chance of modification, then, that particular issue or a particular position will not be pursued or would be presented in a slightly modified version. Sometimes it will be pursued more obliquely if it is important to a particular country. This is to pre-empt the emergence of confrontational issues at regional meetings, where failure to reach a common agreement could be interpreted negatively and cast doubt on the workings of the organization. In short, only issues with some degree of acceptability will be presented at the regional level. For issues relating to economic and technical matters, specific committees in each country are entrusted with the early stages of negotiation. For example, Preferential Trading Arrangements related matters are taken up by officials assigned to COTT. Depending on the significance of the issue and the

Negotiating Styles

15

prerogatives given to the negotiators, certain decisions are made. If the issues deal with important or sensitive matters, then they are left to the ministers concerned since the officials at the committee levels "do not have the mandate from the government to make major decisions affecting national interests", as one official commented. Besides, if the negotiators from a particular member country (or from all member countries) were junior in rank they would not be able to make alternative decisions if the ones they came prepared with were unacceptable. Another instance when it is referred to the ministerial level is when no decision can be arrived at during the committee stage, thus passing on the tasks to higher authority, hoping that the "delay tactics" would lead to certain settlements at the higher level. It appears, that, rather than enter a definite "No" at the end of the meeting, a postponement seems to save the day; under the consensus set-up it is important to "save face", and not to be in a confrontatio nal or directly contradictory situation. How much flexibility does a negotiator enjoy? It depends on his position in the official hierarchy. It is the senior bureaucrats in the various ministries, including the directors-general, who are in fact the main policy makers for the ministers and hence, are aware of the background of various policies. They have the capacity to decide as to how much they can alter or modify their stand during the regional meetings. But if they, too, cannot decide or do not wish to commit themselves, "there is always the excuse that they have no mandate to make decisions and thus have to consult their ministers". One conclusion we can draw from this particular procedure is that the very fact that negotiations occur at different levels is an asset towards consensus formation. From the committees to the senior officials and finally to the ministerial meetings - at each level consensus is sought. By the time the final meeting on an issue occurs, basic differences would have been ironed out and the public would only hear of the common areas of co-operation agreed upon or the policy statements on a particular issue. However, it does not seem to terminate here; the process seems to go beyond eloquently worded communiques. In fact an official suggested that one has to look at the process covering the "before-duri ng-after" of a particular decision to understand ASEAN negotiation styles, their influence and their outcome. 2 ' Factors in Negotiation The ASEAN officials responding to queries, were generally in agreement that each country's national interest was the most important factor influencing intra-ASEAN negotiations. National interest would take precedence in any conflict of interests. The nature of the specific issue like the type political, economic, and so forth, its sensitivity and utility to each member decides how the negotiation proceeds. For example, a foreign policy issue on

16

ASEAN Negotiations

Kampuchea would entail a more subtle diplomacy to iron out whatever differences there might be among the members; on the other hand, the list of economic items to be exchanged on the Preferential Trading Arrangements would need some hard bargaining. Each of the member countries is sensitive to different issues and consequently would adopt varying stands on each. This is more marked when dealing with third parties. One example was the planned introduction of cheap air flights between Australia and Britain but which had some repercussions on the ASEAN countries. Although ASEAN as a group pursued the issue through negotiations with the third parties since they were all affected, Singapore, with the support of the others, took the lead since it was the most affected. The civil aviation dispute (1978-79) was one issue mainly affecting Australia's national airline Qantas and Singapore Airlines. They were among other airlines that faced severe competition on the busy Australia-Europe route. In order to safeguard the position of Qantas and at the same time attract budget-conscious domestic travellers, the Australian Government and Qantas introduced a system which would inevitably limit other airlines' activities on that route. Simultaneously, the move would also discourage stop-overs (especially in Singapore) if high cost surcharges were imposed by Qantas. This threatened Singapore on two fronts: its national airline passenger load and the number of tourist stop-overs on the island. Australia had hoped that the dissatisfaction on the part of Singapore could be settled bilaterally. However, Singapore successfully presented its case to its ASEAN partners and managed to gather adequate support in widening the issue to make it part of the larger ASEAN-Australia dialogue. However, the other ASEAN partners were not without their own interests. Although it appeared that they were solidly behind Singapore for the sake of ASEAN solidarity, they also stood to gain, if not in the short run, at least in the long run. The group succeeded in transforming what was initially a bilateral issue into not only a regional issue, but also into a global northsouth issue where a developed country was accused of trying to restrict competition from its neighbours in the region. Culture and particular social background variables of individuals do not seem to play as important a role as perceived in negotiations, according to most ASEAN officials. According to one official, a specific cultural identity was not an important determinant in influencing the outcomes of regional meetings because the participants involved were not, for example, dealing with "traditional" Javanese or "traditional" Chinese who would perhaps portray stereotyped characteristics. On the contrary, the participants were usually, if not always, educated at tertiary institutions either at home or abroad and were generally more "westernized". Western education, as a common factor, projected two facets according to this individual's observation. Despite the western background, the officials still retained their

Negotiating Styles

17

"Asianess" and avoided rigid forms of negotiatiOn processes and formalities. At the same time, the western training helped to unite the negotiators, for example, with the use of English. After 16 years of existence, and after numerous meetings among the five rotating in each of the countries, a network of interperso nal relationships has emerged that surmount cultural categories. This enables culturally stereotyped excuses to be discarded for more relevant or rational issues when trying to explain reasons for hindrance or failures in reaching a settlement. It also enables easier negotiatio n and consultatio n when an ASEAN official has reached a stage where he is able to "pick up the phone and talk to his colleague in another country" to discuss a matter before arranging for a meeting. Better communic ation and informalit y has been an asset in the interaction among the officials. 22 It is not only at the higher levels that communic ation has eased interpersonal relationships. Younger officials, too, enjoy similar status because, as one official put it, as junior officers they have participate d in earlier sessions and thus have built up rapport over the years. Moreover, given the large number of meetings but the small pool of participan ts, the group has been able to keep in touch regularly, and has come to know each other rather well. There does not seem to be any national cultural characteristics that, by themselves, contribute to negotiatio n tactics. Personal traits rather than ethnic characteristics appear more noticeable. Certain qualities seem to be admired in a negotiator ; for example, patience. "But if one is abrasive and aggressive he would be disliked and not get any sympathy from the other negotiators". 23

There are a few "do's" and "don'ts" that emerge from talking with ASEAN negotiator s whatever their claim to Western education or their reluctance to culturally stereotype others. For example, one does not approach a topic too directly in its initial stages, but probe around with the preliminaries before "coming to the point". It has often been cited that usually Indonesian officials (and some of the others, too) project this characteristic. Certain individuals (for example, ASEAN leaders, like Foreign Ministers) are at times influential because of their likeable or charismati c personalities. 24 However, such instances are limited, and the personality factor alone may not always have positive effect on an issue. Besides, if the personality factor is a determinant at all, it is only so in those cases at the ministerial level, and not the other lower committee levels where issues rather than culture or personality seem to dominate. Another factor that emerges is that a number of officials relate issues and viewpoints to a particular ASEAN state rather than to individuals, thereby triggering different perceptions and behaviour than if it was towards certain personalities. There is a danger though, that this should not be the overriding factor since in the

18

ASEAN Negotiations

ASEAN decision-making process interpersonal access ensures an easier approach. Labelling certain countries along specific ideological stands may not always prove reliable as policy stands do vary.

Political Culture/System Although individual cultural traits are downgraded (though not entirely eliminated) there seems to be a general consensus on certain traits of country behaviour directly reflecting on the representatives but not explicitly stated. In rank order, Singapore followed by Malaysia seems to take one extreme (on points like preparation, clarity, etc.) while Indonesia and the Philippines take the other. 25 Singapore with its group of relatively young but trained personnel seems to be the most articulate with well substantiated arguments and facts to support claims (especially in economic/technical issues). Hence the negotiators are direct and forthright. It was difficult to decide if this is a cultural trait or characteristic of a country that is modern and industrializing. Singaporean negotiators, although from different ethnic groups do not seem to portray distinct cultural traits for each of the ethnic group. It is a collective "Singapore trait" that is exhibited during negotiations. It could be the level of "professionalism" that is referred to. On the other hand the participants from the Philippines (according to respondents) generally seem less specific, not too clear as to their wants and tend to dwell on much "rhetoric". Perhaps this is the only case of any "clear" indication of some trait. Malaysia, despite the fact that it has a reputation for able negotiators seems to be affected by its political culture and domestic system. This portrays the Malaysian negotiators as less "open", and more rigid. They seem to be restricted by a number of domestic priorities governed by law or policies on ethnic issues. They have a tendency to "frequently consult home". Nevertheless, Malaysians and Singaporeans are described as "tough" negotiators, implying that they will stand by their decisions, giving long explanations to back their views. Despite the differences, there is a growing realization that a web of interlinked relationships bring these countries together, either shared historical experiences (Malaysia and Singapore), dominant religious and ethnic similarities (Indonesia and Malaysia) or ideological orientations (all of them), and no one factor dominates. Thus there is no specific indication that there is a permanent or quasi-permanent coalition formation among the five during regional negotiations. Support or disagreements within the group vary according to the issues and the interests at stake.

External Negotiation When negotiating with third parties ASEAN adopts a slightly different approach. Negotiations then represent dual aspects: the national as well as

Negotiating Styles

19

the regional policy. Thus the group has to synthesize its various positions and arrive at a common stand where necessary before presenting its case to the partner. In the event of external negotiations, ASEAN has to defend its dual interests (national plus regional) in a different atmosphere; during intra-regional negotiations there are also national interests to safeguard but as one official commented it was "among friends". With the third parties, the procedures become more formal, the concept of negotiation (and bargaining) taking on a more intensive form. In certain respects though, it reflects some of the processes found in intra-ASEAN negotiations. The "feeler technique" discussed earlier also applies here, the difference being that it takes place between an external partner and ASEAN, and the "feelers" are therefore officials of the third country and ASEAN. The prelude to the negotiation process may take many months prior to a specific dialogue session. For example, consider the case of the U.S.-ASEAN meeting. The embassies of all the participating countries (that is, U.S. and A SEAN) play an effective role. It is the task of the U.S. embassy in each state to provide information as to the likely position or reaction of the ASEAN countries, before or after a certain American policy has been formulated (with inputs from the State, Commerce, Agriculture or Defence departments, depending on the issue). Similarly, the ASEAN embassies in the United States also play a role in communicating the U.S. position to their governments, so that by the time actual negotiations take place each side is already aware of the other's likely stand on the issue. This is an advantage to both sides since the negotiating parties can proceed from a more prepared position than if they were ignorant. Bilateral relations are also important in the "feeling out" process before a stand is taken with ASEAN collectively. Both sides also have their own "perimetres" or limitation within which the negotiators can act. Each of the ASEAN countries has been assigned a major dialogue partner to facilitate easier communication . 26 Each is supposed to be the co-ordinator and leader representing the five members' viewpoints and demands. However, this is only in the case of specifically "labelled" ASEAN issues or policies. Numerous other bilateral- between any member and a third party- communications in political or economic matters still occur outside the ASEAN framework. Besides, as one foreign official noted, from experience it was not highly effective to leave it to only the dialogue partner for the dissemination of information. What his country does in case of a pressing issue is to send an official notification to the co-ordinating country as well as inform the other ASEAN members. One also wonders if the system of assigning coordinator role to one particular ASEAN member really works since in the more important areas, it is the individual ASEAN country which takes the initiative for bilateral negotiations. It is apparent that there are more issues that fall in this bilateral category than in the ASEAN collective category due

20

ASEAN Negotiations

to long standing historical ties while ASEAN is a relatively more recent phenomenon. Generally, the negotiations seem to vary from one dialogue partner to another. Negotiations with the EEC take on a different posture as compared to other countries because of its structure. With the EEC, ASEAN is not dealing with one particular state but with a large machinery, intricate with formalities and institutions. Its elaborate bureaucracy has specialized functions, "full of checks and balances". It has little flexibility, since it has a rigid set of premises to adhere to, including the relations within itself as well as with other external factors. The EEC Commission in Brussels represents the ten members. 2 ' It is given the mandate to represent the ten, but it sometimes finds itself in the awkward position of being the "eleventh", "making its own decisions, with the ten acting as the watchdog.'' In such situations the ASEAN countries find the negotiations formal and limited in scope. Perhaps that is the reason the ASEAN group attends the meetings with specific issues or demands since the negotiators do not have the advantage of personal, neighbourly contacts, or adequate means to consult, deliberate or prolong an issue if no satisfactory outcome occurs in the exploratory stage. Geographical distance, as well as the organizational structure do seem to have impact on the negotiation processes and outcomes. According to EEC officials, 28 ASEAN officials appear prepared and unified in their opinion, with the leader presenting the group's position on specific economic issues. On such issues the EEC does not deal with each country's negotiator separately. Bilateral negotiations are only pursued under different circumstances, sometimes when collective negotiation is not possible or where it only concerns a specific country. Bilateral agreements seem to be adopted if there appears to be a stalemate in collective negotiations. These may upset regional unity; but if a member adopts the view that the agreement was in that country's national interest, then there is not much the others in the group can argue about. The textile case is one such example of the failure of a group approach. Thailand concluded a four-year textile agreement with the EEC, 29 leaving aside its ASEAN partners. The negotiations with the United States take on a slightly different atmosphere. Unlike the EEC, the ASEAN states are dealing with a major country rather than a regional bloc. Besides, some of the ASEAN members have special historical or political ties with the United States that have given rise to closer relationships. ASEAN complains that the United States is one of the partners that has not offered much in terms of economic support. The United States on the other hand points out the disunity in ASEAN and finds it difficult to negotiate with five different states instead of one representative. U.S. officials complain that at times ASEAN wants to be considered

Negotiating Styles

21

as a unit and on other occasions, separately, leading to confusion and uncertainty. One characteristic pointed out by a foreign official (and something quite often mentioned of developing countries in general) was the "long shopping list" that ASEAN brought with it in its meetings with U.S. representatives. Undoubtedly only some of its requests could be entertained. Another issue was that ASEAN officials invariably tried to "play on emotions" by linking the political/securi ty issues in the region with its economic demands. The United States views ASEAN as important because of its strategic location. It also supports ASEAN's policies on Kampuchea and Vietnam. Nevertheless, the United States does not outwardly appear to give much preference to ASEAN economically in contrast to its other more vital areas of economic link such as Japan or Western Europe. Therefore it considers some of the ASEAN demands as unreasonable. The U.S. negotiators are also guided by their overall economic policies and their domestic environment when they negotiate on such items as tariffs and subsidies, or the special Generalised System of Preferences that ASEAN has been pursuing. One factor that seems to have positive reaction among U.S. negotiators is the quality of some of their ASEAN colleagues. Increasingly more officials are becoming "experts" in their own areas. One example is in the case of tin and the role of ASEAN negotiators with the U.S. over its release of stockpile tin and other related issues; Malaysia has played an effective role in projecting this issue and taking the leading role on behalf of ASEAN. One disadvantage, on the part of the United States, is perhaps that it does not have a central commission to conduct negotiations like the EEC Commission and therefore negotiations are not so regularized. Thus it can be concluded that the third party itself and its characteristics contribute to certain negotiating styles, and the success or failure of the process depends on the stand adopted by both parties.

Dissent Within the Model Within the consensus model it is difficult to detect dissent because of the nature of the process: conflicting issues are not brought up for open discussion. These issues get eliminated at some preliminary stage of the process. Sometimes it is not even brought up for discussion if through informal channels (or "feelers") there is indication of disagreement. Occasionally signs of displeasure with certain policies do occur expressed in either private conversation or public statements. However, even then there is little insight into the actual negotiation process. 30 One issue that portrays some degree of disagreement is the stand over the Kampuchean issue. Indonesia was at one instance clearly displeased over the role Singapore played in the formation of the three-party Kampuchean coalition without prior consultation.

22

ASEAN Negotiations

"The substance of the Singapore proposal is in line with Son Sann's position, with which we can go along. Singapore felt therefore that they could go ahead without consultations. We nevertheless feel that internal ASEAN consultations are desirable as a matter of principle before such a proposal is put to third parties"."

Where politically sensitive issues are concerned and where ASEAN is divided in its policy stand (for example, in the supply of arms to the Kampuche an factions fighting the Heng Samrin forces), there seems to be some bilateral or trilateral negotiatio ns within the group while at times there seems to be none at all. Again, it is difficult to follow such intra-ASE AN negotiation s. As the Second Deputy Prime Minister (Foreign Affairs) of Singapore, Mr Rajaratnam has frequently insisted, "These are things which we should not discuss in public". 32 Another area over which disagreements occur is undoubted ly in the economic sector as well. One specific area has been in the ASEAN Industrial Projects (AlP). Ever since it was publicly suggested in 1977 that each country would participate in the AlP, it has undergone various phases of agreement and disagreement. Commitme nts were made before extensive feasibility studies were carried out, rendering the projects more as white elephants that each country had to accept; rejection of the programm e was seen as a "minus" for regional co-operati on. However, this did not prevent Singapore from reconsidering and ultimately pulling out of the particular project it initially agreed to, as it could not get Indonesia' s agreement to preferential access for Singapore- built diesel engines. But according to an official, Singapore has still not given up participati on in the AlP and is considerin g several suitable alternatives. The particular decision-m aking concept within the consensus model is the "five-minu s-one" model suggested by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, where even if one member disagreed with a certain policy it could still support the activities of the others and not be an obstacle. The "five-minus-one" model is not entirely contradict ory to the consensus model. This is because while voicing opposition the disagreeing country will nevertheless support the others' stand. As Lee pointed out, "When four agree and one does not object, this can still be considered as consensus and the 33 four should proceed with a new regional scheme". However, A SEAN officials have indicated that this model cannot be utilized in all decisionmaking cases. It was possible for the AlP but many feel it should not become a popular model for the ASEAN group, or it will erode the normal consensus way of arriving at decisions. Another incident that was reflective of the disagreement chord was at the 14th Economic Ministers' Meeting in Singapore in November 1982. Despite the fact that ASEAN scholars have little access to what goes on in such meetings, clues are abundant as to how it could have progressed. One such clue was the press conference after the meeting, four hours behind the

Negotiating Styles

23

scheduled time. The meeting had dealt mainly with the issue of intra- and extra-regional trade and the imminent General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) meeting in Geneva. It is apparent that most of the members did not agree with some of Singapore's stand on trade both intra- and extraregional and on the issue of market availability for AlP products. There was indication of transfering some of the responsibility - either to the Committee on Trade and Tourism, or further still to the summit level since the issue was more a case of ideology then specificity. Perhaps it was a means to set it aside until a compromise could be worked out through various channels. As has often been cited, whenever there is the political will to co-operate, there would not be much problem in collective negotiations. It is when the political will is challenged that intra-regional problems become glaring and negotiations have to tread on fragile ground. Whether political will is overriding in the ASEAN case is something ASEAN officials will not commit themselves into agreeing. After all, ASEAN is a co-operative scheme and not an integrating one and therefore national interests supercede. What seems obvious is that there is political will to let each member follow its interests if it does not outrightly jeopardise regional co-operation . Perhaps this is summarized in the following statement of Prime Minister Lee: "We have made progress in an Asian manner, not through rules and regulations, but through musyawarah (Indonesian word for consultation ) and consensus. We have developed a mutual appreciation for differences in culture, and learned to make allowances for differences in style". 34 Conclusion

The above discussion has attempted to give an overview of the negotiation styles and processes in ASEAN. While negotiations on an ASEAN issue take place at two levels, national and regional, this paper has limited itself to the latter, to the intra-regional level. Negotiations in ASEAN have their pecularities and limitations. ASEAN is not an institution in that it does not embody the strict definitions or limitations of an all encompassin g organization. It is more a gradual means towards the attainment of a peaceful and developed region. As such there are no elaborate secretariats or commissions. Decision-making and negotiations are carried out by specific committees and groups which adopt a more personalized rather than a bureaucratic approach (associated with formal organization). To support such a system, ASEAN follows the consensus model assuring that each party gets its maximum share in the input and output of a policy. A characteristic of ASEAN is that it is not gearing towards regional integration- that is, towards a network of common policies regulated and implemented by a supranationa l authority. Instead, each country's national

24

ASEAN Negotiations

interests are taken into consideration and in most cases, given full priority. Only the consensus model could generally assure this. Since sovereignty is zealously guarded by new states, any attempt to impose majority decision, or decision by a dominating country will have adverse effects in an area attempting regional co-operation. The process of ASEAN decision-making is lengthy and undergoes different stages. Subsequently, the final negotiation session may either be very short, being only an affirmation process with no actual decision-making, or it could be long with some actual bargaining to arrive at a consensus, especially if it is at the ministerial level. Since most of the countries in the group subscribe to the concept of "non-confronta tional" (face-to-face) challenges and disagreements, when such disagreements do occur, the "arbitration" process of striking a middle chord may take a long time. This is one of the drawbacks of the consensus model. The decision-making process is arduous but complicated since all parties have to reach a compromise. "Emergency" decision-making on an issue may not be feasible under this system, unless the issue is relatively and readily acceptable. However, the positive aspect is that the consensus model cannot impose a decision on its members like a majority vote usually can. ASEAN has adopted the principle to agree to disagree if a policy is against any national interest. This has been the cause of dissatisfaction among some members, since a state can opt out using that excuse. There also appears to be a dilemma at times between the bilateral and collective approaches: to what extent can a member pursue matters bilaterally and how far should the group appear collective. External partners also find the group disunited on certain matters not realizing that ASEAN cannot be represented by one spokesman but by five, further complicating and delaying the process. While giving preference to national priorities, ASEAN also has to realize that where common gains are feasible through collective negotiations it should project a stronger image, since some external parties would rather see a divided than a strong group. Within a loosely structured association representing different states at different levels of political and economic development, the separate policy emphasis will undoubtedly influence the decision-making process. But within the negotiation process itself, socio-cultural differences among the countries and the participants have been assumed to influence regional cooperation, especially in interperson.al behaviour. As acknowledged by some ASEAN officials, cultural characteristics do stand out among the various ethnic groups and thus culture is important in interpersonal relations. However, cultural factors alone do not influence the style of negotiations in most instances. Since negotiations are seen as avenues for reaching commonly acceptable solutions on particular issues, it is ultimately the national interest that plays an important role. Therefore, the issue, whether it is central to a country's interest or just peripheral, is crucial. The negotiators on the other

Negotiating Styles

25

hand are only involved as representatives of their country's position and have to project that stand within a specified boundary. One interesting area, but which this paper does not deal with in depth, is the link between national decision-mak ing in each country and its impact on regional decision-mak ing styles. For example in the case of Indonesia, it has been cited that various groups compete to exert influence over a policy while in Singapore the competition is much reduced. This link is important in determining the bargaining process intra-regiona lly since each member would have to act according to the strengths of its constituencie s, if they are important to the negotiations . It also needs to be pointed out that the consensus model is not distinctive to the ASEAN setting alone. Some other groupings, for example, the EEC at times, also practise varying forms of the consensus model and arrive at unanimous decisions through discussions. What does seem peculiar to ASEAN is the process of arriving at consensus through a rather "ritualistic" and "stylistic" manner, in a (to quote a respondent) "round-abou t, longwinded way", and at the same time avoiding conflict-pron e issues that would need direct interpersona l arguments but which would create antagonism. Since ASEAN, unlike the EEC, does not have regional parliaments or authorities to formulate and implement decisions, there is no insight into parliamentar y or public debates where violent disagreemen ts to certain policies are voiced. Most of the ASEAN meetings and negotiations are limited to a few people, rendering the others ignorant of the intricate process.

NOTES 1. F. C. Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p.xiii. 2. In 1963 Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia promoted the idea of MAPHILIND O. It was an admirable attempt to harness the common "Malay" cultural identity, in a "Confederatio n of Nations of Malay Origin" proposed by the three Foreign Ministers. (The Manila Accord, 31 July 1963.) The Manila Declaration (signed on 5 August 1963 by the three heads of governments) stated that they had "agreed to take initial step;, towards the establishment of Maphilindo by holding frequent and regular consultations at all levels to be known as Mushawarah Maphilindo". To facilitate consultations, it was agreed "that each country shall set up a national secretariat for Maphilindo affairs .. :'. (Joint Statement, Manila, 5 August 1963). 3. For examples of specific case studies elsewhere, see the studies on U.S.-Soviet negotiations, for example, Gerard Smith, Doubletalk: The Story of SALT 1 (Doubleday, 1980). Christer Jonsson, Soviet Bargaining Behaviour: The Nuclear Test Ban Case(New York: Columbia University Press, 1979). J. Michael Myers,

26

4.

5. 6.

7.

8. 9.

10. II. 12.

13.

14. 15. 16.

ASEAN Negotiations

"How Vietnam Negotiates: A Personal Glimpse" in Indochina Issues 19 (Sept 1981). U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behaviour: Emerging New Context for US Diplomacy. Study Prepared by Joseph G. Whelan, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (Washington, D.C.:U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979). For a discussion on practical negotiation and references to useful literature see, Gilbert R. Winham, "Practitioners Views of International Negotiation" in World Politics, vol. 32 (October 1979): 111-135. I. William Zartman, "Negotiation as a Joint Decision-making Process" in Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. XXI, no. 4 (December 1977): 621. Also by the same author see, "The Political Analysis of Negotiation. How Who Gets What and When", in World Politics, voi. 26 (April 1974): 385-399. Ibid, 1977, p. 622. It was the Declaration of ASEAN Concord that led to the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation and the Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat. The first two provided the scope for future ASEAN activities and laid down the groundwork for areas of co-operation. The actual organizational structure appears to be more complicated than that presented here. There is, in fact, an overlapping of committees and meetings. A modified chart of the structure is provided at the end of this section. Straits Times, 15 and 17 January 1982. For a more detailed study on ASEAN and its Reorganization see Chin Kin Wah, The ASEAN Secretariat: Prospects for Reform. Conference Paper. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982). Straits Times, 5 April 1983. Similar forms of behaviour are also reported to be prevalent in Thai social practices. The concept was publicised by President Sukarno in the 1950s and 1960s during his call for practice of guided democracy in Indonesia. See for example, his speech on "Let Us Bury the Parties" (1956), "Saving the Republic of the Proclamation" (1957), and "The National State and the Ideals of Islam" (1953) where he discussed musyawarah and its relations to Islam. See Herbert Feith and Lance Castles eds., Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965 (Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 81-89; 164-170. Koentjaraningrat, "The Village in Indonesia Today". In Villages in Indonesia, edited by Koentjaraningrat (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), pp. 386-405, p. 397. Ibid. This is also dealt with by Niels Mulder in Mysticism and Everyday Life in Contemporary Java (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1978). Similar experiences are also found in Filipino society; suggestions, if it is felt will offend the other party, are not made directly, but indirectly or through intermediaries. There is a concept pakikisama or getting along together which describes the "Filipinos' desire for smooth interpersonal relations". As one study notes, "Filipinos place a high value on good feelings and sacrifice over values such as clear communication and achievement in order to avoid stressful confrontations. The result is that they agree with what another says and keep their reservations to themselves". This was an American scholar's perceptions of

Negotiating Styles

27

Filipino society, which apparently stood out as being less frank and direct as compared to his own cultural background. See George M. Guthrie, "The Philippine Temperament". In Six Perspectives on the Philippines, edited by George M. Guthrie (Manila: The Bookmark Inc, 1968), p. 63. 17. Koentjaraningrat, "Tjelapar: A Village in South Central Java", op. cit., pp. 244-80, 274. 18. Estrella D. Solidum, Towards a Southeast Asian Community (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1974), p. 84. 19. Other studies that have discussed ASEAN decision-making and negotiating styles, elaborating on the consensus model are: Thakur Panit, "Regional Integration Attempts in Southeast Asia: A Study of ASEAN's Problems and Progress", Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1980; Peter J. Boyce, "The Machinery of Southeast Asian Regional Diplomacy", in New Directions in the

International Relations of Southeast Asia. The Great Powers and Southeast Asia, edited by Lau Teik Soon (Singapore University Press, 1973), pp. 173-185. Also, Hans H. Indorf, ASEAN: Problems and Prospects (!SEAS: Occasional Paper No. 38, 1975), and Russell H. Fifield, National and Regional Interests in ASEAN:Competition and Co-operation in International Politics (!SEAS: Occa-

sional Paper No. 57, 1979). 20. Sufficient research has yet to be done on this stage of national decision-making, the processes, the participants and the outcomes. 21. This is in fact a very interesting topic to study, but from personal experience, I would add that it would also be a frustrating one, given the lack of access to information. 22. In an interesting study on bilateral meetings between heads of states in ASEAN (Presidents, Prime Ministers), Estrella Solidum established that there was a total of 96 such meetings from 1967-81. The most number of meetings, 19 were between Malaysia and Thailand, followed by Singapore and Thailand with 14, Malaysia and Indonesia with 13, and Singapore and Malaysia with 12. The highest number of meetings were in 1976 when there were 16 in total, 8 of which concerned the coming Bali Summit. See Estrella D. Solidum, Bilateral Summitry in ASEAN (Manila: Foreign Service Institute, 1982). 23. This was a common observation of most ASEAN officials. 24. One tends to equate this with the patriarchal figure in the village setting of musyawarah and mufakat. However, it does not appear to be so. Or, again, if one carries the similie from the individual to the country level, we could imply that one out of the five members would try to lead the others towards a policy. This is not always true, as mentioned earlier, each country's interests and initiatives vary according to the issues. 25. It could be a methodological fallacy given the fact that most of my respondents to this question were Thais; perhaps there is a tendency to place oneself somewhere in the middle - a cultural trait? 26. Indonesia - Japan; Malaysia - Australia and West Asia; Philippines - U.S.; Singapore - New Zealand, and Thailand - EEC and U.N. agencies. There are also a number of ASEAN committees in third countries made up of the ASEAN ambassadors that facilitate the group's external relations through communication and contact, both with the home country and the host. Some of these are ASEAN Brussels Committee, ASEAN Canberra Committee, ASEAN Committee

28

27.

28. 29. 30.

31. 32. 33. 34.

ASEAN Negotiations

in Wellington, ASEAN Geneva Committee, ASEAN London Committee, ASEAN Ottawa Committee, ASEAN Paris Committee, ASEAN Tokyo Committee, ASEAN Washington Committee and the Bonn ASEAN Committee. The members of the EEC are: Belgium, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Two senior officials from the Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities for South-East Asia in Bangkok. For further detail see, Malcolm Subhan, "Thailand Breaks Ranks", in Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 July 1982, p. 42. The ASEAN leaders appear to be unduly concerned about "public image" - in giving a positive picture that ASEAN is working. They would rather keep matters within the "family" (that is, of the participants) and not let the public (including their population) see any disunity that might be present within their ranks. But some of the ASEAN leaders have been quick to point out that the Association is not without problems. However, as Singapore's Foreign Minister S. Dhanabalan pointed out, "What is even more important is that there is a desire to solve these problems quietly among the leaders without whipping up public emotion and rancour". Straits Times, 15 June 1982. This is perhaps quite unlike other groupings, for example, in the EEC where a member often openly accuses another on a number of common policies, be it agriculture, trade or monetary policies and where issues are more publicly debated. According to an Indonesian official, quoted by Susumu Awanohara, "Indonesia Ready for a More Prominent Role", Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 August 1982, p. 54. See for example his response in Sunday Monitor, 8 May 1983. Susumu Awanohara, "Keeping the team together", Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 May 1980, p. 53. Lee Kuan Yew, opening address, 15th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Straits Times, 15 June 1982.

2 ASEAN Postures and Performance in North-South Negotiations: Prospects for a Common Front Approach on the New International Economic Order

Introduction

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been said to have achieved its most significant results in its relations with third countries and outside political groupings. Indeed, it is often suggested that success in this area of co-operation far exceeds ASEAN's own efforts at intra-regional co-operation and integration, particularly up until the mid-1970s'. ASEAN success in pursuing common postures and strategies in political issues come quickly to mind. Its common stand and solidarity on the Kampuchean issue represents a successful common front approach on a special political issue while the joint espousal and promotion of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN)* symbolizes an effective common front on the general problem of Southeast Asian security vis-a-vis the major powers. The aspiration to follow suit on North-South, economic issues has also been voiced on numerous occasions by ASEAN statesmen. In fact, a common position on such issues is formally embodied in ASEAN's 1976 Declaration of Concord at Bali, Indonesia, under the rubric "Joint Approach to International Commodity Problems and Other World Economic Problems",' which reads: (i) The principle of ASEAN co-operation on trade shall ... be reflected on a priority basis in joint approaches to international commodity problems and other world economic problems such as the reform of international trading system, the reform of international monetary system and transfer of real resources, in the United Nations and other relevant multilateral fora, with a view to contributing to the establishment of the New International Economic Order.

* The acronym stands for the promotion of Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality adopted at the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1971.

29

30

ASEAN Negotiations

(ii) Member states shall give priority to the stabilization and increase of export earnings of those commodities produced and exported by them through commodity agreements including bufferstock schemes and other means. This paper seeks to explore ASEAN's postures and performance in its collective negotiations with third countries and blocs on North-South questions, with particular emphasis on the prospects for a common front approach on the New International Economic Order (NIEO). Despite ASEAN's aspiration to jointly pursue NIEO objectives, perhaps a thoroughgoing common front strategy on various North-South issues has yet to be seriously pursued in its negotiations with its most significant Northern economic partners, namely, Japan, the United States (U.S.) and the European Community (EC). An examination of ASEAN negotiation positions and strategies vis-a-vis these three economic blocs reveals merely ad hoc and piecemeal approaches rather than concerted strategies consonant with ASEAN's NIEO aspirations and overall world-wide Third World efforts to promote the NIEO. This is not to deny that, acting as a group, ASEAN has been able to bring to bear greater pressure on developed (Northern) countries, with which ASEAN has special relationships, to promote specific gains. On the whole, ASEAN's successes, however small, in North-South negotiations with Northern blocs compare favourably with other Southern countries in the present environment of impasse on progress toward the NIEO. Nevertheless, this paper postulates that a more concerted common front approach on NIEO issues by a significant Third World grouping such as ASEAN vis-a-vis Northern blocs such as Japan, U.S. and EC could possibly achieve marginally more significant results through the exertion of additional leverage for the South in its quest to establish the NIEO. ASEAN, mutatis mutandis, could also gain directly in its specific demands vis-a-vis those Northern economic blocs. A major structural impediment to a common front approach appears to be the accelerated integration of Southern states like those of ASEAN into the post-colonial, Northern-dominated international division of labour in world production and capital accumulation, as shall be discussed below. This development seems diametrically opposed to ASEAN's intended efforts to attain regional self-sustaining and self-reliant growth, implicit in NIEO objectives, which ASEAN espouses. The dilemma appears to be this: should ASEAN negotiate for better conditions in the short-term under the present "old" International Economic Order, constantly adjusting itself to prevailing world conditions, or should it press for some long-term restructuring of it to ameliorate the economic disadvantages of the Third World as is prescribed through the establishment of the NIEO? This paper does not aim to provide the final answer, only to examine ASEAN's actual record in promoting the NIEO in its North-South negotiations.

Postures and Performance in North-South Negotiations

31

North-South Negotiations and the Status of NIEO The origins of the call for a New International Economic Order dates from the inaugural United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, whence emerged the "Group of 75" (subsequently, "77"). 3 Thereafter, UNCTAD spawned an interminable series of NorthSouth fora and dialogues, including its own four-yearly conferences. Corresponding with the level of discussion is the rising crescendo of Southern demands for the NIEO although the concrete achievements towards it remain a pale reflection of the demands made over the years. A major impetus towards the NlEO has come not as a result of North-South negotiations but, rather, through a unilateral Southern action - that of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973 which resulted in the quadrupling of oil prices. However, this minor shift in the global status quo of North-South relations, should not be overstated. Even considering OPEC itself, under the current situation of oil glut, coupled with global economic recession, its collective power to maintain export earnings, as opposed to maintaining prices, has been drastically reduced as is demonstrated by recent events. Indonesia, an OPEC member, has been particularly vulnerable on this score.< Add to this the fact that surplus petrodollars have mostly found their way into Northern markets or are reinvested in the North, or held in U.S. and other Northern currencies, the image is definitely not one of unassailable OPEC power over helpless Northern oil consumers. Indeed, the worse victims of the oil price hike are the Southern consumers for which mounting oil bills have had the crippling impact of severely reducing purchasing power for other essential imports. (Thailand and Philippines in ASEAN, are prime examples). The fact, then, is that the overall global economic status quo has not shifted fundamentally nor significantly in favour of the South. To put it differently, there has been little change in the real economic situation even though at the political level, greater legitimacy has been accorded to Southern demands for the NIEO. Let us briefly examine what have been the actual results of NIEO demands so far. In terms of voting power in passing NIEO resolutions at such world bodies as the U.N. or UNCTAD, the South has scored numerous "successes". The original NIEO Programme of Action of 1974 was adopted by consensus and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States was passed with 120 votes for, 6 votes against, with 10 abstentions, at the U.N. 5 Thus it was in many other North-South encounters as well that the South was able to carry resolutions with substantial majorities and forge common fronts on many issues. A major common front effort emanated from a proposal of a conference on raw materials producing countries in Dakar in 1975 to create a "Solidarity Fund" with the aid of oil money to defend raw material prices. The proposal was subsequently incorporated under the UNCTAD IV (Nairobi) proposal for an Integrated Commodities Pro-

32

ASEAN Negotiations

gramme (ICP) and a Common Fund (CF) that would finance a stockpile of raw materials contributions of all countries, North and South, as well as buffer stock operations to defend prices. The ICP and CF were further pursued in UNCTAD V at Manila in 1979 but met with strong resistance from the North. Subsequently, prolonged negotiations in further dialogues on a "first window" of US$400 million, covering largely administrative operations, and a "second window" of US$300 million for buffer stock operations have hit an impasse. The proposal thus sits in limbo, waiting for a new "implementation date" of 30 September 1983, with Manila offered as its headquarters. 6 The United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) has catalogued 32 NIEO objectives under a document entitled "Progress in the Establishment of a New International Economic Order", which, following A.G. Frank,' we may subsume under the following major areas: (a) money (b) raw materials (c) manufacturing exports (d) technology and transnational corporations (e) Third World state sovereignty (f) Third World co-operation, and (g) social questions. In Frank's assessment, little or no significant progress has been made in each of these areas. In money matters, Southern debts have mounted without commensurate rises in aid or development assistance. In raw materials, the South has continued to experience deteriorating terms of trade. (From 1974-1978, the terms of trade of all developing countries declined 15 per cent, representing a foreign exchange loss of US$30 billion in 1978. ') On technology and transnationals, more concessions have been granted to transnational enterprises than has technology been transferred, promoted by the trend of Southern states competing with each other for Northern capital. On questions of Third World sovereignty, rhetoric is usually not matched by concrete achievements as Northern states and multinationals often obviate national controls via liberal Southern fiscal and other concessions offered to attract capital. As for Third World co-operation, indicative of present-day trends is the fact that, "there has been hardly any Arab investment in, let alone solidarity with, the Third World directly", while on social justice issues, the tendency has been for entrenched Southern elites to collaborate with Northern interests rather than genuinely contribute toward domestic development. 9 This cursory assessment of global progress towards NIEO objectives hardly inspires confidence in the South to achieve anything beyond empty political victories at North-South fora. Indeed, the shift in the political status quo has probably met with even stiffer Northern resistance to NIEO efforts in real terms, coupled with a trend by Northern interests to adjust

Postures and Performance in North-South Negotiations

33

the workings of the world economy to cope with the rising Southern demands. This adjustmen t has taken the form of maintaining the existing international economic order through an apparently new international division of labour in global production wherein Southern countries are increasingly being integrated into the industrialization process in a limited sort of way. Essentially, this entails the concentration of the more sophisticated and more capital-intensive production , technology and knowhow, in the North, while the Southern, peripheral countries are assigned the less technologically advanced and routinized production usually associated with the exploitation of relatively cheap southern labour! 0 Southern industrial growth occurs within this pattern of global integration which is thus superimposed upon the existing old order of core-periphery trade wherein Southern countries continue to produce their traditional raw materials and commodities (for which they are said to have a "comparat ive advantage ") largely for the Northern markets. A modified global pecking order no doubt will emerge or is emerging in this "new" international order wherein the slightly more advanced developing or semi-peripheral countries;' also called "newly industrialising countries" (NICs), are assigned the relatively more sophisticated tasks in the global division of labour. The ability of the bulk of the South achieving NIC status appears dubious, predicated as it is on extraordin ary economic performance and special external circumstances which appear out of the reach of the majority of the Southern countries under the structural constraint s to their growth imposed by the present world economy.' 2 However, we should distinguish between the emergence of this so-called new international division of labour and the original NIEO programm e of the Group of 77, which calls for a radical transforma tion of existing patterns of unequal exchange in global trade and production . ASEAN's NIEO Postures As a bloc of developing countries and members of the Group of 77, it has been natural for ASEAN to throw its support behind the Southern efforts to establish the NIEO. ASEAN countries have individually espoused NIEO objectives and continue to do so, although it was not until1976 at Bali that the group collectively endorsed the NIEO, as noted earlier. ASEAN postures on the NIEO have remained fairly steadfast, as evidenced by the support and airing of NIEO objectives received at the recent 15th Ministerial Meeting in Singapore in June 1982 which included delegations from ASEAN's dialogue partners. Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew called for joint positions against Northern protectionism and "new economic manifestations of the old colonial policy of divide-and -rule'', and unity and co-operati on on issues such as the "Common Fund, GSP,

34

ASEAN Negotiations

shipping, international civil aviation, communalities, at GATT, UNCTAD and other international economic bodies"." Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsila made a reference to joint stands on international economic issues and a united stand on "our call for a more just and equitable international economic order", even though his speech belied the fact that the Kampuchea issue remain uppermost in Thai minds. Malaysia's Ghazali Shafie talked about the faltering "free enterprise" system fashioned at Bretton Woods and the disappointment of the North-South Cancun Summit. Philippine's Carlos Romulo, while referring to the global economic crisis and the struggle to establish the NIEO, placed the problem squarely on ASEAN's need to restructure itself for "speedier growth and development". It was, however, Indonesia's Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja who, in discussing what he described as ''the most serious economic crisis since the great depression of the 1930s", enunciated the most explicit stand on the establishment of the NIEO: "It has always been our firm belief that the continuing disarray in the World economy is reflective of a deep-seated and structural malfunctioning of the system itself, thus requiring its drastic overhaul and change into a more equitable and viable economic order. The concerted efforts of the developing countries over the last decade to establish a New International Economic Order have been constantly frustrated by the industrialized countries. Efforts to launch a new round of Global negotiations at the United Nations, in order to proceed in a coherent and sustained approach towards the goal of the NIEO, are also bogged down .... It is imperative therefore that we should strengthen our solidarity and maintain a unified stance in realizing the early launching of the Global Negotiations. We must take a determined effort to further improve our co-ordination at the global level so as to enhance our countervailing bargaining power and thus ensure an equitable balance in the negotiation".

The Indonesian Foreign Minister then referred to the slowness in implementing the ICP and CF and other North-South issues, and concluded that for ASEAN, "there can be no other choice but to intensify its collective efforts in the various international fora and multilateral dialogues while continuously maintaining close consultation and co-ordination among its members on the major international economic issues. Only in this way can ASEAN increase its collective capability to contribute meaningfully to the solution of problems confronted by the world economy and at the same time cushion their possible adverse effects on the economies of the member countries".

Postures and Performance in North-South Negotiations

35

It is not at all difficult to understand why ASEAN countries have taken a strong position on the NIEO, when we examine the structure of ASEAN economies and the nature of their external linkages. As a group of predominantly primary commodity producers (with the exception of Singapore, which nevertheless still maintains some of its function as an entrep6t for ASEAN products), ASEAN's economic ties with the Northern, industrial countries take the familiar pattern of a core-periphery relationship. A brief examination of trade, investment and aid relationships of ASEAN and its most significant economic partners suffices in establishing this unmistakable pattern. This is certainly true of ASEAN's ties with Japan, now indisputably ASEAN's single most important external economic partner, cornering about 30 per cent of ASEAN exports and 20 per cent of its imports, or a total of about 25 per cent of trade. Indonesia relies on Japan for as much as 43 per cent of total trade, with exports exceeding 50 per cent! 4 Nevertheless, it is a mark of ASEAN's growing importance to Japan that it now claims about 10 per cent of Japan's total trade. It is, however, imperative to examine the actual composition of trade, which reveals that Japan generally consumes ASEAN's natural resources and semiprocessed products while ASEAN in the main buys Japanese manufactured products. From ASEAN comes most of Japan's imports of bananas (mainly from the Philippines), palm oil (Malaysia), aviation kerosene (from Singapore refineries), natural rubber (Malaysia and Indonesia) and tin (Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand). ASEAN for its part is a major market for Japanese trucks, truck assemblies, motor cycles, motor cars, cement, iron and steel!' ASEAN has also become a major Japanese investment target area. It acts as a repository for some 22 per cent, or US$9.4 billion worth of Japanese overseas capital as at the end of September 1981;• ranking only second to the U.S. in concentration of Japanese investment. Indonesia should be singled out for mention as its share comprised an inordinately large 64 per cent of the ASEAN total or a hefty 12 per cent of Japan's cumulative total as at 1979!' ASEAN is also the largest recipient of Japanese official aid, taking over 40 per cent of that given from 1966-77!' The U.S. ranks second in importance to ASEAN in terms of trade and investment with about 17 per cent of trade valued at about US$21 billion (1980), while the EC ranks third with 16 per cent of ASEAN trade and 14 per cent of ASEAN's total investment (1979). The overall composition of ASEAN trade with these two Northern blocs follows much the same pattern as that with Japan. On the whole, then, ASEAN's economic ties with the North, typified by Japan, exhibit a core-periphery pattern in which manufactured goods are by and large exchanged for natural resources. Furthermore, an asymmetric relationship obtains, as has been observed by many;• wherein ASEAN finds itself considerably more dependent on the North than the latter is on ASEAN. Indonesia's relations with Japan perhaps epitomizes such a rela-

36

ASEAN Negotiations

tionship. This structure of asymmetric dependence of ASEAN on the industrial North puts it in a particularly weak bargaining position on NIEO issues. It is indeed this structural weakness that has perhaps prompted ASEAN's staunch espousal of the NIEO itself, ironically enough. There are, therefore, definite structural limits and limitations to ASEAN's pursuit of NIEO objectives. However, before we examine its actual attempts and performance in negotiating such results, it is important also to understand ASEAN's own historical development in collaborative efforts over the years to understand the internal limits, as it were, to ASEAN's pursuit of the NIEO. ASEAN's development may be said to have undergone two broad phases:' 0 1967-1975: This period was marked inchoate and sluggish development of intra-regional co-operative ventures. There was a general cautiousness in undertaking genuine integrative measures, and most of ASEAN's success came by way of common political postures vis-a-vis third parties, particularly in the political issue-areas. ZOPFAN was perhaps the centrepiece of this period of ASEAN co-operation. Joint positions in the economic issue-areas were kept to the minimum and North-South issues were particularly absent in ASEAN's relations with third countries. Its initial emphasis, in short, was in non-controversial, cultural, social and economic co-operation as prescribed by the 1967 Bangkok Declaration. 1976-present: This period saw an acceleration of collaborative actions in the intra-regional co-operative efforts, particularly in the wake of the Bali accords and the impetus supplied by the U.N. expert group's recommendations for economic co-operation. It also witnessed a concomitant application of common approaches in dialogues with third countries and common stands on North-South issues.

It is with this second phase of ASEAN's development that we shall be most concerned so that we may better understand the perimetres imposed upon and the priority or lack of it accorded to NIEO objectives as compared with other collaborative efforts. Most of the development in the second phase has been based on the U.N. Report,' 1 commissioned as early as 1968. These recommendations of the team of 41 ECAFE experts which started work in 1970 under the direction of G. Kansu of UNCTAD, were made public in 1973." They may be summarized into three major components: selective trade liberalization, a system of industrial complementation and "package deals", and regional large-scale projects, forming the basis for the present Preferential Trade Arrangements (PTA) signed in 1977, and ASEAN Industrial Complementation (AI C), formalized in 1981 in a Basic Agreement. It would thus appear that the general thrust for U.N.-espoused positions of Third World self-reliance and self-sustaining growth has been a central pillar

Postures and Performance in North-South Negotiations

37

of ASEAN intra-regional policy since its reception of the U.N. proposals. 23 However, there were definite limits to how far ASEAN members were prepared to truly promote a thorough-going regional self-reliant system and the Kansu proposals were unlikely to account for differences in national interests, nor could it guarantee an even distribution of benefits. 24 Furthermore, the Kansu Report itself represented a limited approach in self-reliant, self-sustaining growth and seems to be geared rather towards maximizing ASEAN's gains within the existing perimetres of global capitalist development. Recently, intra-ASEAN differences over regional integration have surfaced more explicitly and there has been a trend to check over-zealousness in integration efforts which may not bring about uniform benefits for member states. As a result, a "new" emphasis to regional co-operation has been suggested, which has been variously termed, the "common denominator approach" 2 ' and the "gradualist eclectic approach". 26 The rationale for this appears to be the following: a de-emphasis on intraregional governmental integration efforts could divert more energy towards third country relations and bargaining for mutual common interest, seen as the less sensitive and hence most successful area of ASEAN co-operation. On the other hand, the more sensitive area of regional integration could most fruitfully be undertaken by collaboration among the private sectors of the ASEAN member states. The signing of the Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures (AIJV) in Singapore in November 1982 is indicative of this shift in emphasis. While there are some merits to such an approach, the slow abandoning of integration efforts for self-sustaining regional growth would probably allow for the greater penetration of Northern interests and ASEAN's integration into the international division of labour or the global economic status quo. This would not run against the trend of future private sector collaboration and integration in ASEAN since the interests of the ASEAN private sectors may be more greatly linked with Northern interests than they are with Southern (ASEAN) interests. Moreover, negotiations with third countries, concomitant with this trend, may become increasingly concerned about minor specific gains rather than with promoting long-term NIEO objectives. Already symptomatic of ASEAN's deepened links with the world economy is a drastic downward trend in its "associated-dep endent" growth in this present period of global recession. A quick rendering of a few statistics will suffice to show how the recession is taking a heavy toll. Indonesia's foreign reserves had plunged severely by about US$4 billion by March 1983. 2 ' The Philippines' external debt has topped US$13 billion with a debt service of 19 per cent (1981), reflecting mounting balance of payments deficits since 1978. 28 Malaysia and Thailand have been reeling under plummeting commodity prices (the export prices of rubber plunged by 32.5 per cent, tin by 14.1 per cent, and sawn timber and palm oil by 10.5 per cent during the first quarter of 1982). 29 Even Singapore has not been spared as

38

ASEAN Negotiations

its manufacturing industries laid off 4,300 workers during the first nine months of 1982, reflecting a decline by 7.3 per cent in the third quarter of the year and a fall of 5.2 per cent in the second quarter. 30 These figures show that the perimetres of ASEAN's growth are clearly defined by its present links with a faltering world economy and suggest that long-term development would entail a more faithful commitment to NIEO objectives, or at least some delinking with the North.

ASEAN's NIEO Negotiation Performance In this section, we will focus on ASEAN's actual collective attempts and performance in propagating and negotiating agreements pertaining to NIEO objectives vis-a-vis its three major Northern economic partners, Japan, the United States and the European Community.

Japan Even though ASEAN countries have had long-standing relationships with Japan, Japan has been reluctant to deal with ASEAN collectively until very recently. For example, it was not until the 1972 edition of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic Blue Book that ASEAN was identified as one of the main Asian regional organizations. 31 It does appear, therefore, that Japan virtually ignored ASEAN at its early stage of development. There was no mention of ASEAN in Diet policy speeches until Foreign Minister Ohira spoke in January 1973 of the group's contribution to regional co-operation which Japan "highly appreciated". 32 However, ASEAN made its presence felt when at the Sixth Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Pattaya in 1973, it attacked Japan for the effects of its synthetic rubber exports on the ASEAN natural rubber producers. The synthetic rubber issue, spearheaded by Malaysia, appears to have been the rallying point of ASEAN's first common front in negotiations with Japan and, historically, was responsible for the setting up of the dialogue relationship. The matter was first brought up at the Ministerial Conference on Economic Development of Southeast Asia (MEDSEA) under Japanese auspices, leading to the covening of the JapanASEAN Forum on Rubber in 1974. ASEAN appeared to have made significant progress on the rubber issue, demonstrating the effectiveness of the common front approach on this particular issue. Malaysian Primary Industry Ministry officials suggest that this has been one area in which ASEAN has been able to negotiate significantly in its interest. 33 The results have included Japan's agreement to restrict its synthetic rubber production or at least to ensure that its production will not adversely affect the natural rubber market. Japan also agreed in 1975 to provide technical assistance for Thai rubber production through the Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA) and has also subsequently provided assistance for tyre research and

Postures and Performance in North-South Negotiations

39

a grant of ¥600 million for this purpose to Malaysia in 1977. 34 The actual formalization of an ASEAN-Japan dialogue followed two important developments in Southeast Asia: the anti-Japanese demonstrations and riots in Indonesia and Thailand during the Tanaka visit to ASEAN in 1974, and ASEAN's Bali Summit of 1976. The Japanese were genuinely shocked by the extent of anti-Japanese sentiments and so it was not surprising that official Japanese statements on the Bali Summit were effusive by comparison with previous government reactions to ASEAN. In September 1976, Japan proposed the Japan-ASEAN Forum, the first meeting of which was held in March 1977 in Jakarta. This set the stage for the so-called Fukuda Doctrine, propounded during the Japanese Prime Minister's tour through Southeast Asia in 1977. Buttressing his rhetoric was a promise of US$1 billion to ASEAN for regional industrial projects. The Fukuda Doctrine has to date been the most positive Japanese posture towards ASEAN even though it doubled as a political ploy to redress the image of the "ugly Japanese" while simultaneously cushioning ASEAN pressure to push forward on issues of North-South trade and NIEO objectives in general. Fukuda was careful, for example, to avoid endorsing a Stabex Scheme for ASEAN," which had already been mooted in the JapanASEAN Forum. Fukuda's speech in Manila while giving full credit to ASEAN successes, evinced a reluctance to acknowledge ASEAN's existing solidarity. As noted by Alan Rix, "He preferred to view regional solidarity as something yet to be achieved, and only slowly .... Fukuda simultaneously sounded a cautionary note about the dangers of regional economic blocs and the preference for global approaches. In explaining Japan's pledge to ASEAN as the fruit of this new Japanese stance, Fukuda gave little credit to ASEAN for the presence it had steadily applied to Japan since the Bali Summit, even if the demands themselves were ill-formed:' 36

This attitude has more or less characterized all of Japan's dealings with ASEAN and explains why despite the burgeoning of numerous contacts between the two, little progress has been made in respect of promoting NIEO objectives by ASEAN. Of the 14 Japan-ASEAN projects we have listed in Table 1, only a few of them have gone into the implementation stage and even fewer have a direct bearing on NIEO issues. The most significant are the two urea projects in Indonesia and Malaysia for which Japan is presently providing capital as promised under the Fukuda Doctrine. Ironically, these joint projects have been the most troublesome for ASEAN members themselves, with the strong possibility that the first five will be the last five. 37 The only other long-term programme that has been implemented is the ASEAN-Japan Scholarship Programme which is of negligible importance. The project with which ASEAN attaches greatest importance in respect of

-t:...

c

Table 1 Status of ASEAN-Japan Projects/Activities as at 1981-82 Country

Indicative Status

Committee

~

~

~

Location Remarks

Projects/Activities A

B

Cl

C2

C3

D

E

F

G

H

I