Isolationism in America, 1935-1941 0801490782, 9780801490781

Table of contents :
Preface
Contents
I The Isolationism of the Thirties
II Varieties of Isolationism
III The Left and the Right
III The Left and the Right
IV Bases of Isolationism
V The Devil Theory of War
VI The Isolationist Dilemma
VII Challenge and Response
VIII The Persistence of Isolationism
IX Retrospect and Prospect
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

ISOLATIONISM IN AMERICA 1935-1941

ISOLATIONISM IN AMERICA 1935-1941 By Manfred Jonas

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS Ithaca, New York

Copyright © 1966 by Cornell University All rights reserved CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS First published 1966

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 66-16289

PRINTED IN TH E UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY W . F. HUM PHREY PRESS BOUND BY VAIL-BALLOU PRESS, INC.

To Nancy

PREFACE

AMERICAN isolationism before the Second World War has deservedly been the subject of careful scrutiny in recent years. The anomaly of a great nation in the twentieth cen­ tury intently avoiding responsibility for world events, and striving to insulate itself by domestic legislation against dis­ asters it was unwilling to help prevent, has been treated from complementary viewpoints in Robert E. Osgood’s Ideas and Self-Interest in American Foreign Relations (1953) and Selig Adler’s The Isolationist Impulse (1957). It also received con­ siderable attention in Isolation and Security (1957), edited by Alexander De Conde. The “battle against isolation” is described in great detail both in The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940 (1952) by William L. Langer and S. E. Gleason, and in Donald F. Drummond’s The Passing of American Neutrality, 1937-1941 (1955). The controversy over neutrali­ ty legislation is examined by Robert A. Divine in The Illu­ sion of Neutrality (1962). Wayne S. Cole has treated one of the principal isolationist organizations in America First (1953) and one of the leading isolationist spokesmen in Senator Gerald P. Nye and American Foreign Relations (1962). No attempt has been made here to go over in detail the V ll

viii

Preface

ground covered in these studies. Nor is it the purpose of this work to utilize the conclusions they offer for a synthesis that might try to be the definitive historical treatment of iso­ lationism in the thirties. Instead, this analysis seeks to define an aspect of isolationism previously glossed over or com­ pletely ignored. Nowhere in the works cited, nor in any others dealing with this subject, is the nature and content of isolationist thought adequately described, nor are its basic assumptions carefully examined. This is an effort to remedy the lack. The isolationist viewpoint, as expressed from 1935 to 1941, cannot be elevated to the level of political philosophy, yet it cannot be dismissed as simple obstructionism based on ignorance and folly. Isolationism was the considered response to foreign and domestic developments of a large, responsible, and respectable segment of the American people. This re­ sponse can be understood and evaluated only by examining the validity of the assumptions on which it was based. By extracting these basic premises from the mass of iso­ lationist letters, speeches, and writings and examining them in the light of the events to which they were applied, one can go far in explaining not only the survival of isolationism until the attack on Pearl Harbor, but also its subsequent disappearance. Because so many persons, knowingly or not, have helped to make this book possible, I can specifically acknowledge only my major indebtednesses. The task of collecting the necessary material was made less arduous through the generous assis­ tance provided by the staffs of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, the Yale University Library, the library of the John F. Kennedy-Institut at the Free University of Berlin, the Peace Collection of the Swarthmore College Library, the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, the Legis-

Preface

ix

lative Records Division of the National Archives, and, above all, the Harvard University Library. I am indebted to the Honorable Ralph R. Roberts, Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives, for permission to examine the records of various House committees and to the Honorable Leo W. O’Brien, M.C., for securing this permission for me. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., encouraged me to undertake this project and throughout its earlier stages contributed suggestions and advice that have proved invaluable. Frank Freidel and Ernest R. May of Harvard University, and my colleague in Berlin, Ursula Brumm, read the original manu­ script and offered much-needed criticism. The perceptive judgment of Donald Fleming of Harvard University aided me in eliminating various errors and inconsistencies, though he is in no way responsible for those that may remain. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Bernard Roshco, who graciously gave of his time and talent. The nimble fingers and cheerful goodwill of Nancy Petersen Gibbons were essential to the final preparation of the manuscript. Grants from the Penrose Fund of the American Philo­ sophical Society and from the Union College Faculty Re­ search Fund made the completion of this book possible. My heaviest obligation is to my wife, Nancy Greene Jonas, whose contributions are too varied to permit enumeration here, and who bore the strains involved in the preparation of this book with fortitude, if not always with patience. M. J. Schenectady, New York August, 1965

CONTENTS » » » » » »»»»►»»»»» « « « « « « « «
4 The geographic position of the United States and the distribution of power among the nations of the world during the nineteenth century made it possible for this country to pursue what it considered its best interests without directly aligning itself with any nation or bloc. In a limited sense, such a course may be regarded as one of isolation. But it can be more accurately defined as the achievement, to an enviable degree, of the ability to act independently in foreign affairs. “It is,” as President Grover Cleveland explained in 1885, “the policy of independence, favored by our position and defended by our known love of justice and by our power. It is the policy of peace suitable to our interests. It is the policy of neutrality, rejecting any share in foreign broils and ambi­ tions upon other continents and rejecting their intrusion here. It is the policy of Monroe and of Washington and Jefferson—‘Peace, commerce and honest friendship with all nations; entangling alliances with none.’ ”18 The isolationists of the 1930’s believed that the conditions of their time were still suitable for such a policy. They realized that some things had changed. The United States had developed into a major power and acquired overseas possessions. Rapid means of transportation and communi­ cation posed problems that had not existed in the nineteenth century, and military technology had made frightening prog­ ress. But they were convinced that the possible effects of these changed conditions could be neutralized by adopting precautionary domestic legislation and cultivating proper attitudes in the American people. In the course of adapting their concept of foreign policy to the requirements of the twentieth century, they were com­ pelled to espouse schemes tending to abridge the commercial ties which Washington and Jefferson had deemed essential “ Richardson, op. cit., VIII, 301.

The Isolationism of the Thirties

15

and to surrender rights the United States had vigorously defended since its founding. Nonetheless they held fest in principle to the traditional American concept of unilateral­ ism. At the same time, the isolationists of the thirties modified their determination to retain full freedom of choice in foreign policy decisions by their conviction that the domestic crisis and the course of world events made the primary foreign policy interest of the United States the avoidance of war. These two principles—unilateralism in foreign affairs and the avoidance of war as the sine qua non of a beneficial foreign policy—are not necessarily interconnected. It is quite possible to regard preservation of peace as the ultimate pur­ pose of foreign policy and favor, at the same time, a system of collective security or the establishment of supranational organizations. On the other hand, a belief in unilateralism is perfectly consistent with an aggressive foreign policy that accepts war as one of its chief instruments. It is easier, in fact, to argue that the two principles are in­ compatible. One insists on freedom of choice while the other predetermines the choice on the most important issue of all, peace or war. One establishes the primacy of a goal while the other limits the steps that can be taken toward that goal to those which can be taken unilaterally. This incom­ patibility became apparent in the years after 1935, as the isolationists sought to apply both principles to specific situa­ tions. Ultimately, it was a major factor in the decline of isola­ tionism. In 1935, however, the combination of unilateralism and ad hoc pacifism seemed logical. Washington had expressed the hope that, if the advice contained in the Farewell Address was followed, the time would not be far distant “when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice,

i6

Isolationism in America

shall counsel.”19 The isolationists believed the thirties to be such a time and they chose peace. They did so partly from pacifist principle, but more generally because they foresaw that participation in the coming war would lead to perma­ nent entanglement in world affairs. They were afraid that the progress of technology would subject the United States to the horrors of modem warfare which some of them had experienced in the trenches of France twenty years earlier. They feared that American institutions, already weakened by the economic crisis, could not withstand the shock of total mobilization. They believed that the United States could best fulfill its historic mission by becoming an unscarred island of sanity in the shell-shocked postwar world. Washington had never ruled out war as an instrument of American foreign policy and Jefferson had favored joining Great Britain in a war against the Holy Alliance. The United States had fought France in 1798, Great Britain in 1812, Mexico in 1846, and Spain in 1898. A man so clearly within the isolationist tradition as Grover Cleveland had threatened Great Britain with war over the Venezuela boundary as late as 1895. But the isolationists of the thirties regarded war and entanglement as virtually synonymous terms. By opposidg both, they were able to appeal simultaneously to national egotism and humanitarian sentiments. They could attract support from genuine pacifists, from the politically apathetic who accepted isolationism as a way to remain uninvolved in world affairs without sacrificing either their sense of virtue or their security, and from those who, though primarily con­ cerned with maintaining America’s freedom of action and thus adhering to the unilateralist tradition of Washington and Jefferson, were happy to accept noninvolvement in war as an unexpected bonus. "Ibid., I, 222.

The Isolationism of the Thirties

17

American isolationism during the thirties was basically “the nation’s insistence upon the sole authorship of its legal acts” and thus “the non-judicial counterpart of sovereignty,”20 combined with a policy of subordinating virtually all other interests to that of avoiding war. It was a general American sentiment; not, as sometimes pictured, simply a Midwestern phenomenon born of the insularity of the American interior. Nor was it merely a partisan movement aimed at undermin­ ing the popularity and prestige of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Isolationist leaders had diverse backgrounds, advo­ cated varied courses of action, and shared few domestic interests. But men from New York and California, from Idaho and Texas, men whose political creeds ranged from the socialism of Norman Thomas to the conservative Repub­ licanism of Herbert Hoover, made common cause in the field of foreign policy because they believed in unilateralism and feared the effects of war on the United States. Geographic insularity and political partisanship help to explain why anti-interventionist sentiment was more preva­ lent in the Republican Middle West than in any other section of the country, and why a disproportionate number of spokes­ men for isolationism came from that region. At the same time, the affinity between the tenets of isolationism and the presuppositions underlying various forms of agrarian radical­ ism colored the Midwestern response to the wars in Europe and Asia.21 In the final analysis, however, the basic assump“Albert K. Weinberg, “T he Historical Meaning of the American Doctrine of Isolation,” American Political Science Review, XXXIV (June, 1940), 540. “Ray Allen Billington, “The Origins of Middle Western Isolation­ ism,” Political Science Quarterly, LX (March, 1945), 63-64; the data compiled by Billington also indicate that while the Congressional dele­ gations from the Midwest were markedly more isolationist than those from other sections, the sectional differences in public opinion, while present, were less pronounced. Wayne S. Cole, while recognizing the

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Isolationism in America

tions of those who opposed greater American participation in world affairs were more comprehensive and more complex, transcending both regional and partisan interests. Isolationist legislators were elected in all sections of the country and represented both major parties. Democratic Senators Bone of Washington and Bennett C. Clark of Missouri were among the most ardent champions of neu­ trality legislation designed to make involvement in war im­ possible. Their Democratic colleague. Representative Louis Ludlow of Indiana, was the chief sponsor and most persistent advocate of a constitutional amendment that, in his view, would have prevented the United States from ever engaging in a foreign conflict. Democratic Congressman Maury Maverick of Texas was also for some years an isolationist spokesman of note. Although many Republicans holding iso­ lationist views came from the Midwest, Senator Hiram W. Johnson of California and Representatives Hamilton Fish, Jr., of New York and George Holden Tinkham of Massa­ chusetts spoke for areas far removed from the American interior. And the largely pro-Roosevelt New Republic, as much as the bitterly anti-Roosevelt Saturday Evening Post, can be classified as an isolationist publication.22 importance of other elements, places great stress on the agrarian bias in isolationism. See his Senator Gerald P. Nye and American Foreign Relations (Minneapolis, 1962), 6-13, 227-235. T h e predisposition to isolationism of an agricultural area threatened with rapid industrializa­ tion is suggested in Charles O. Lerche, Jr., The Uncertain South (Chi­ cago, 1964), 288-290. “A Gallup Poll released on April 14, 1939, showed that 57 per cent of those asked “Do you think the law should be changed so that we could sell war materials to England and France in case of war?” answered in the affirmative. Results were very nearly the same in all sections of the country, and Republicans responded much like Demo­ crats. A copy of the results was sent to Senator Key Pittman by the editor of the Daily Republic of Mitchell, S.D. See Ronald to Pittman, dtd April 14, 1939, in Senate Records (Committee on Foreign Relations),

The Isolationism of the Thirties

19

The impossibility of explaining isolationism fully in terms of geography or political partisanship has led to an effort to account for it on the basis of ethnic considerations. The researches of Samuel Lubell into the statistics of the presi­ dential elections of 1920, 1940, and 1948 led him to the con­ clusion that the factors primarily responsible for American isolationism were “the existence of pro-German and antiBritish ethnic prejudices” and the exploitation of these prejudices by an opposition political party.*8 If applied to the entire isolationist tradition, this explanation is clearly in­ adequate. Washington’s Farewell Address shows a strong antiFrench bias and must therefore be regarded, at least by impli­ cation, as pro-British. Moreover, isolationism antedates both the arrival of the majority of the German settlers in America and the formation of the German Empire. Even when applied only to the period which Lubell has investigated, his thesis is more useful for explaining the support given isolationist candidates by many German-Americans and Irish-Americans than for revealing the bases of the movement itself. After 1933, it was apparent that if the United States joined in a future European war, it would inevitably be on the side of Great Britain and France against Germany. This fact greatly concerned German diplomats in America and they constantly reflected it in their reports to Berlin.24 Many Americans of German descent, regardless of their views File 76A-F 9. Editorials from 42 newspapers in 20 states and all sections of the country taking the same view are collected in House Foreign Affairs Committee, American Neutrality Policy; Editorials, 76th Cong., 1st sess. (1939). "Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics, 2nd ed., rev. (New York, 1956), 141. “See, for example, Dieckhoff to Foreign Office, dtd December 7, 1937, or Thomsen to Foreign Office, dtd September 12, 1938 in Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik, 1918-1945, Series D, I (Von Neurath zu Ribbentrop, Baden Baden, 1951), 593-594.

20

Isolationism, in America

concerning Hitler's Third Reich, retained family ties and sentimental attachments that made such a course seem un­ desirable. Similarly, a large percentage of Irish-Americans preferred nonentanglement to war on the side of England. However, such persons did not constitute a large part of the majority holding isolationist views in 1935 and the years immediately thereafter. A poll conducted by the American Institute of Public Opinion in October, 1937, found 69 per cent of the population in favor of stricter neutrality legisla­ tion giving less discretion to the President. They were, there­ fore, at least implicit supporters of the isolationist position. Yet, six months later, 55 per cent chose England as the Euro­ pean country they liked best and another 11 per cent chose France. Only 8 per cent expressed a preference for Germany and 4 per cent for Ireland.25 Lubell himself has cited economic and educational factors that influenced votes and perhaps helped to produce an iso­ lationist response.2®It is likely that these were more impor­ tant than ethnic considerations, and that emotional judg­ ments unrelated to ethnic background also played a promi­ nent role.27 Moreover, none of the elections examined by Lubell turned solely, or even largely, on the issue of isolation­ ism. In 1920, the “solemn referendum” that Wilson had called for did not materialize. In 1948, both candidates were confirmed internationalists. In the most relevant election, that of 1940, many German-American voters probably pre­ ferred the Republican candidate Wendell Willkie not for his views on foreign policy, which differed little from those of “ Gallup and Robinson, op. cit., 388, 389. “Lubell, op. cit., 145-146, 155-161. “Emotional and psychological bases for isolationism are examined in Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., “The Anatomy of American ‘Isolationism’ and Expansionism. II,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, II (December, 1958), 280-307.

The Isolationism of the Thirties

21

President Roosevelt, but rather for his German-American background. An examination of isolationist policies and the statements of the movement’s leading spokesmen confirms that isola­ tionism during the period just before the Second World War^ was not essentially an ethnic matter. The two-year cash-andcarry provisions of the Neutrality Act of 1937, as well as other measures accepted willingly by the isolationists, were favorable to Great Britain. The attitude of Senator Nye and some of his isolationist colleagues toward the Spanish Civil War was significantly more anti-German and anti-Italian than the official policy of the United States Government.28 Although the isolationist movement was supported by the German government and its agents in this country, and even though some American isolationists, notably Charles A. LinçUbergh, had a distinct pro-German bias, most anti-interven­ tionists were friendly to Great Britain. They favored helping her as much as possible, so long as the risk of involvement in war could be avoided. “We wish to aid Britain,” wrote Herbert Hoover in an article strongly urging the United States to remain out of the war and painting a dire picture of the domestic results of American intervention. “I am for aid to Britain. I am against naval or military intervention in this war,” added Robert Maynard Hutchins, then Chancellor of the University of Chi­ cago and prominent member of the America First Commit­ tee. And Senator Burton K. Wheeler, Democrat of Montana who has often been charged with harboring pro-German senti­ ments, stated at the same time: “No blood but English flows through my veins or any of my family. And next to being proAmerican I am pro-English.”29 “See below, Chapter VI. “Herbert C. Hoover, “The Immediate Relation of the United States to this W ar,” Robert Maynard Hutchins, "W ar and the Four Freedoms,”

2 2

Isolationism in America

American isolationism was obviously not limited to a single geographic area or one major political party and can­ not be considered merely the product of the prejudices of large ethnic groups. Any attempt to define it in socioeconomic terms must also prove futile. It is possible that isolationist organizations derived much of their support from certain segments of the business community and that most of the votes received by isolationist candidates were cast by farmers and owners of small businesses. Attempts to document such a thesis would require an organization by organization and county by county investigation. Were it undertaken, it would only show the socioeconomic groups to which isolationism had the greatest appeal, without necessarily yielding an expla­ nation for the sentiment itself.30 Isolationism transcended socioeconomic divisions and was supported by Americans of widely divergent status. On the subject of America’s relationship to the conflicts in Europe and Burton K. Wheeler, “W hat If Germany Seizes the British Fleet?” in Nancy Schoonmaker and Doris Fielding Reid, eds., We Testify (New York, 1941), 10, 37, 187-188. The question of W heeler’s bias is discussed at some length in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics of Upheaval, The Age of Roosevelt, III (Boston, 1960), 141-142. Although it is implied there that Wheeler was pro-German, the evidence presented is of the “hearsay” variety. In an open letter addressed "Dear Friend” and written during the Lend-Lease debate in 1941, Wheeler stated “I am perfectly willing to aid Great Britain.” A copy of this letter is in the Amos Pinchot Papers, Box 69. Representative Hamilton Fish and Senator Robert A. T aft expressed the same sentiment in speeches delivered on January 21, and January 25, 1941. Copies in Amos Pinchot Papers, Box 69, and Charles L. McNary Papers, Box 14. “The only thorough study of an isolationist organization is Wayne S. Cole, America First (Madison, Wisconsin, 1953). Cole has investigated the leadership of the Committee, the sources of its financial support and the geographical distribution of its membership. He points out, however, that other isolationist organizations had different bases of support and, in any case, makes no attempt to analyze the socioeconomic status of the rank and file. See especially 30-33 and 69-74.

The Isolationism of the Thirties

23 and Asia, Socialist intellectuals shared the views of the American Legion. The Chicago Federation of Labor agreed with Henry Ford. Midwestern Progressives who had spent their lives fighting against Eastern banking interests espoused ideas on neutrality legislation first expounded by Bernard Baruch. Herbert Hoover’s arguments were supported in the pages of the New Republic. Isolationism owed whatever unity it had during the thirties not to geography, nor politics, nor class structure, nor ethnic background, but to faith in unilateralism and fear of war. On the one hand, isolationism was a symptom of national ego­ tism and the universal aspiration for complete freedom of action, buttressed by the unique experience of the United States during the nineteenth century. On the other hand, it was a fearful response to a modem technology that made involvement in a new world conflict appear hopelessly en­ tangling and fatal to American institutions. The isolationists’ basic unilateralism is clearly shown by the difference in their attitudes toward the crises in Europe and in Asia. They opposed American involvement in both areas, but their major fears arose out of the European situa­ tion. In part this was undoubtedly due to their assumption that a Far Eastern war could never be a land war for the United States and would thus not require a degree of mobili­ zation which might threaten American democracy. More sig­ nificantly, however, a war in Asia was only conceivable against Japan, the single major power in the area. In such a war the United States could function quite independently and ran no risk of having its wartime or postwar policies “dictated” by powerful allies. In Europe, on the other hand, war would mean a de facto alliance with Great Britain and France, and thus raise the specter of substantial and perhaps permanent entanglement in European affairs. Most isolation­ ists, therefore, agreed with Senator Taft that “it is not nearly

24

Isolationism in America

so dangerous to become involved in a war in the Pacific as in the European war,” though they sought to avoid even the former out of fear that a war in the Pacific might soon become part of a more general conflict.31 The great resurgence of overt isolationism in the thirties resulted from an unusual combination of political, military, economic, and ideological factors. Foremost was the wide­ spread realization that the activities of Germany, Italy, and Japan would probably lead to a major war in the near future and that, unless appropriate measures were taken, the United States would ultimately be involved. Japan’s advance into China and the appointment, in October, 1931, of an Ameri­ can representative to join the Council of the League ..pf Na­ tions in its consideration of the Manchurian crisis seemed to presage such a development. Isolationist newspapers immedi­ ately raised the alarm and voiced strong objections to the State Department's action. The steps Germany took toward rearmament in 1933 and 1934 indicated that future trouble would not be limited to the Far East. In August of the following year, Senator Nye found the world “topsy-turvy and quite definitely headed for more war.”32 The second important factor was the Great Depression. A relationship between isolationism and economic difficulties was observed by Lubell, and Ray Allen Billington has pointed out that it was during the last, crisis-ridden decade of the nineteenth century that isolationism came to the Mid­ west along with Populism and the demand for the free coin­ age of silver.33 “ Robert A. Taft, "O ur Foreign Policy,” Vital Speeches of the Day, VI (March, 1940), 348. See also Borchard to Senator George W. Norris, dtd January 7, 1938, Norris Papers, Tray 104, Box 4. “ Bailey, op. cit., 724-725; Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st sess., 14535 (August 24, 1935). "Lubell, op. cit., 145-146; Billington, op. cit., 50-53.

The Isolationism of the Thirties

25 The links between depression and isolationism are not difficult to find. People confronted by widespread unemploy­ ment, lengthening breadlines, and increasing poverty under­ standably pay little attention to questions of foreign policy, but tend to demand that the nation’s entire energy be devoted to the solution of domestic problems. Faced with an im­ mediate crisis at home, few persons consider carefully the future dangers being generated in distant places. A poll conducted in December, 1936, to determine “the most vital issue before the American people today” ranked unemployment first and economy in government second. When Republican voters were asked in December, 1937, on what issue they would appeal for support if they were candi­ dates for public office, economy in government spending, restoration of business prosperity, and reduction of taxes were the most frequently mentioned. Not until May, 1939, was the problem of keeping out of war, let alone any other issue involving foreign policy, listed as the most serious American problem. By that time, the worst of the Depression had passed.34 Foreign policy problems were not a primary interest of the American people when isolationist sentiment was strongest. Even when the activities of other nations posed a potential threat to the security of the United States, they were regarded by many as distractions diverting the Administration from the country’s “real” problems. In view of the existing''econ » > » » » > » « « « « « « « »> » » » »>» » « « « « * « « « «

Adams, John, 8 Adams, John Quincy, 12, 102 Adler, Selig, 30 n. agrarian radicalism, 17 and note, 59, 60 Aiken, Sen. George, 284 Aldrich, Nelson W., 46 Allen, Rep. A. Leonard, 66 Allstrom, Oliver, 237 America, 67, 106, 113, 148 America First, 22 n. America First Committee, 21, 22 n., 32, 92, 94, 97, 109, 221, 233, 237, 252, 274 anti-Semitism in, 253, 256 America Goes to War, 116 n. America Is Worth Saving, 231-232 American Civil Liberties Union, 58, 79 American Commonwealth Political Federation, 80 American Fellowship Forum, 39 American Forum of the Air, 87, 229 American Historical Review, 27 American Institute of Public Opinion, 1, 20, 212, 213, 215, 216 American Legion, 34, 53, 67, 123, 143, 155, 157 reverses position, 218 307

American Liberty League, 48, 53, 86 American Mercury, 127, 236 American Nationalist Confederation, 39 American Peace Mobilization, 32 Amlie, Rep. Thomas R., 190 antiprofiteering legislation, 155-158 anti-Semitism, 253-254 as ingredient of isolationist posi­ tion, 255-256 appeasement, policy of, 109 Army Ordnance, 249 Asia Answers, 37 Baldwin, Hanson, 126, 127, 130 Baldwin, Roger, 79 Balkan Pivot-Yugoslavia, The, 75 Bankhead, Rep. William B., 161, 162 banking and bankers, 38, 116, 167 and note distrust of, 26, 29, 149 and First World War, 140, 146, 149, 153, 154 want U.S. to enter war, 250, 252 Barnes, Harry Elmer, 28, 72, 126, 147, 218, 231, 246, 270 Baruch, Bernard, 23, 108, 120, 127, 135, 180, 197 Bausman, Frederick, 28

3°8 Beard, Charles A., 4, 33-34, 40, 62, 105, 140 background of, 72-77 on devil theory of war, 152-154 Beckman, Archbishop Francis J., 92 Bell, Edward Price, 109 Bemis, Samuel Flagg, 10 Bender, Rep. George H., 257 Bernard, Rep. John T., 190 big business, 26, 60 See also Wall Street Bigelow, Rep. H erbert S., 63, 81 Billington, Ray Allen, 17 n., 24 Bingham, Alfred M., 80-81, 82, 236, 268-269 advocates British victory, 219 Bliven, Bruce, 62, 111, 218 Boeckel, Florence Brewer, 166, 195 Boileau, Rep. Gerald J., 190 Bone, Sen. Homer T., 6, 18, 64, 67, 70, 105, 181, 263 Borah, Sen. William E., 4, 6, 42, 65, 70, 126, 135, 165, 227, 253, 263 defines unilateralism, 5, 7 background of, 45-48, 49-50 and belligerent isolationism, 51, 181 raises war-debt issue, 110 oppose Axis Powers, 191, 193, 201 Borchard, Edwin M., 55, 56-57 and note, 68, 72, 110, 117, 119, 177, 190, 191 Boren, Rep. Lyle H., 157 Bowers, Claude G., 187 Bowles, Chester, 32 Bradley, Phillips, 72, 104, 108, 112, 124-125 Browder, Earl, 39-40 Brown, Philip M., 152 Bryan, William Jennings, 64 Bulow, Sen. William J., 245, 248 Burdick, Rep. Usher L., 154 Burgess, John W., 74 Burns, Josephine Joan, 146 Burt, Roy E., 188 Butler, Nicholas Murray, 75, 111

Index Butler, Maj. Gen. Smedley D., 160 Cantril, Hadley, 214 capitalism, 71, 98, 270 Capper, Sen. Arthur, 165, 166, 230, 247 Carroll, C. P., 108 Carter, Boake, 127-128, 225 cash-and-carry principle, 180-181, 195-202 Castle, William R., 224 Celler, Rep. Emanuel, 110 Chamberlin, William Henry, 236 Chase, Stuart, 73, 83, 128, 166, 268 Chicago Tribune, 71, 256 China, 5, 104, 201 Christian Century, 1, 29 Church, Rep. Denver S., 159 Church, Sen. Frank, 284 Clark, Sen. Bennett C., 18, 69, 70, 150, 164, 181, 189, 267 background of, 64 on preparedness, 129 opposes arms embargo repeal, 216 on American impregnability, 245, 247-248 Clark, Sen. D. W orth, 164, 228 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 13 Cless, George, 119, 198 Cleveland, Grover, 14, 16 Cobb, Frank, 262 Coffee, Rep. John, 63 Colby, Bainbridge, 92, 120 Cole, Wayne S., 22 n. collective security, principle of, 277 Colmery, Harry W., 34 Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, 214, 251 Common Sense, 80, 81, 125, 217 reverses position, 218 communism, 113, 232, 283 feared by isolationists, 54, 64, 87, 265 Communist Party of the United States, 39-41 Congressional Record, 56, 62, 108, 229, 230, 257

Index Connally, Sen. Tom, 139, 181 continentalism, 75-76, 235 Coughlin, Fr. Charles E., 37-39, 39 n., 42, 252 Council on Foreign Relations, 5, 87 Cox, Ignatius W., 193 Cox, James M., 44 Cross Currents in Europe Today, 75 Crowe, Rep. Eugene B., 123 Current History, 29, 88 Daily Republic (Mitchell, S.D.), 18 n. Dallas, Alexander J., 102 Daugherty, Harry M., 47 Dawes, Charles G., 89 Dennis, Lawrence, 152 Dennis, William C., 226, 239 Des Moines Register and Tribune, 34, 59 Detzer, Dorothy, 107, 110, 144, 161, 166, 179, 224 and munitions investigation, 142143 Development of Modern Europe, T he, 75 Devil Theory of War, The, 152-153 Dewey, John, 80 Dieckhoff, Dr. Hans Heinrich, 199, 207-209, 210 Dies, Rep. Martin, 124 Dill, Rep. C. C., 158 Dirksen, Rep. Everett, 71, 138 disarmament, 3 Douglas, Paul H., 80 Dreiser, Theodore, 231, 252 Dulles, John Foster, 225 Dunne, Rep. Matthew A., 160, 164 Earle, Gov. George H., 113 Economic Interpretation of the Constitution, An, 73 Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy, The, 74 economic sanctions, 167, 173, 183 economic self-sufficiency, 5 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 280

309 Eliot, Maj. George Fielding, 119, 125 Ellenbogen, Rep. Henry, 124 ethnic prejudices, 19-21 Europe since 1815, 28 Europe since 1870, 28 European war, 19, 31, 33, 85, 91, 235 U.S. attitude toward, 1, 8, 100104 threat of as a base of isolationism, 24 Catholic view of, 113-114 Evans, Rep. John M., 158 Evjue, William T., 217 Far East, 3, 24, 104 fascism, 71, 80, 82 n., 87, 113, 232, 265, 270, 283 Fay, Sidney B., 27 Fellowship of Reconciliation, 79 First World War, 27, 74, 78, 104, 153 U.S. role in, 28-30 lessons of, 101, 115, 118, 169 ethics of, 116 and note, 117 reasons for U.S. entry, 136-140, 167 costs of, 263 Fish, Rep. Hamilton, 18, 41, 71, 105, 108, 151, 158, 165, 190, 200, 226, 247, 274 background of, 52-54 and belligerent isolationism, 178179 favors loan to Britain, 242 fears dictatorship, 269 Fish, Mrs. Stuyvesant, 52 Flynn, Elizabeth Gurley, 41 Flynn, John T., 32, 217, 233, 238, 249, 270 Ford, Henry, 23, 251, 274 Foreign Affairs, 126 Foreign Policy Association, 33 Foreign Policy for Americans, A, 279 Foreign Policy Reports, 141 foreign trade, 3, 5, 68

Index

3io Fortune, 141, 142, 144, 212, 214 Forum, 33 Foster, William Z., 40 France, 3, 8, 19, 20, 28, 169-202 passim, 227 as business competitor, 112-113 and note Frank, Jerome, 82, 119 Frear, Rep. James A., 158, 159 Freeman, 28 From Cornfield to Press Gallery, 160 Fulbright, Sen. William J., 284 Gannett, Frank E., 34 Garner, John Nance, 144 Gehrman, Rep. Bernard J., 201 Genesis of the World War, The, 29 George, Sen. W alter F., 216 German-American Bund, 39, 209 Germany, 1, 19, 20, 24, 97, 106, 129, 232, 247-249 annexes Austria, 210 annexes Czechoslovakia, 210, 212, 227 racial and religious persecution in, 211

Gilbert, Prentiss, 89 Gillette, Sen. Guy M., 216 Glass, Sen. Carter, 139 Godshall, Wilson L., 219 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph Paul, 38 Goldwater, Barry, 285 Goodwin, William J., 91 Gore, Sen. Thomas P., 158 Grace, William J., 269 Graff, Henry R., 284 n. Grand Rapids Herald, 65 Grattan, C. Hartley, 29 Great Britain, 3, 8, 12, 16, 19, 20, 169-202, passim, 227, 244 as business competitor, 112-113 and note Great Depression, 283 as a base of isolationism, 24-26 Green, William, 62 Greenwood, Rep. Arthur H., 66

Gruening, Sen. Ernest, 284 Hagood, Maj. Gen. Johnson, 124, 152, 265 Hamilton, Alexander, 9, 117, 121— 122, 222

Harper's 73, 122 Haywood, William, 46 Hazen, Charles D., 28 Healy, Rep. A rthur D., 178 Heffernan, John A., 126 Hell or Heaven, 165, 265-266 Hell-Bent for War, 232 Hemingway, Ernest, 115 Higgins, Rep. John P., 108 Hildebrandt, Rep. Fred H., 63 Hill, Rep. Knute, 63, 247 Hill, Rep. Lister, 157 Hillenbrand, M. J., 113, 125, 137 Hillyer, Mary W., 258 Hitler, Adolf, 83, 104, 106, 129, 134, 221, 245, 246, 250 Holmes, John Haynes, 256 Holt, Sen. Rush D., 181, 229 Hoover, Herbert, 17, 21, 47, 86, 233, 238, 249 background of, 88-89 and “new isolationism,” 278-279 House, Col. Edward, 116, 138 House Foreign Affairs Committee, 120, 149, 188, 266, 269 Howe, Quincy, 112, 265 Hughes, Charles Evans, 43, 44 Hull, Cordell, 134, 138, 144, 163 n., 187 Hutchins, Robert Maynard, 21, 72, 231, 249, 270 I Didn’t Raise My Bay to Be a Soldier—for Wall Street, 41 Insurgent America, 80 international law, 68 Ireland, 20 Iron, Blood and Profits, 142 Italo-Ethiopian War, 172, 178, 182, 184 U.S. reaction to, 173-175, 179

Index Italy, 1, 106, 110, 172 Jacob, Philip E., 212 n. Japan, 1, 5, 13, 23, 24, 104, 129, 198, 250 disliked by isolationists, 200 aggression in China, 201 Japanese Committee on Trade and Information, 37 Jefferson, Thomas, 8, 11-12, 14, 101102 Jewish W ar Veterans, 157 Johnson, Sen. Hiram W., 18, 47, 5051, 57, 70, 181, 245, 257, 271 background of, 42-45, 48-49 Johnson, Brig. Gen. Hugh S., 120, 127, 200, 227, 231, 232 Johnson, Lyndon B., 63 Jonkman, Rep. Bartel J., 247 Kaiser on Trial, The, 36 Keep America O ut of W ar Congress, 32, 256 Kellogg-Briand Pact, 4, 56 Kennedy, Joseph P., 278 Kirchwey, Freda, 218 Kloeb, Rep. Frank L., 58, 147, 152, 155 n., 180, 195, 263 Knutson, Rep. Harold, 137, 160, 247, 250 Koppleman, Rep. Herman P., 220 Kossuth, Louis, 13 Kvale, Rep. Paul J., 137, 158 Ladd, Sen. Edwin F., 158 La Follette, Philip, 270 La Follette, Sen. Robert M., 43, 47, 59, 182, 217, 228, 233, 248, 267 Lage, William Potter, 56 Lamont, Thomas W., 146, 251 Landon, Alfred M., 47 Lansing, Robert, 28, 116, 138, 148 League for Independent Political Action, 80 League for Industrial Democracy, 79 League of Nations, 3, 6, 24, 30, 49, 59, 89, 90, 107, 111, 167, 183

3»» Lemke, William, 42, 250 Lend-Lease Bill, 241-243, 246, 247, 269 Leverone, Frank, 118 Lewis, Fulton, 97 Lewis, Kathryn, 274 Lincoln, Abraham, 122 Lindbergh, Charles A., 21, 32, 94, 160, 230, 236, 238, 240-241, 247, 249 background of, 95-98 anti-Semitic remarks of, 254-255 Lippmann, Walter, 284 Literary Digest, 109 Limng Age, The, 33 Lodge, Sen. Henry Cabot, 245 Longworth, Alice Roosevelt, 32 Lovell, Arthur J., 161 Lubell, Samuel; 19, 20, 24 Luckey, Henry C., 224 Ludlow, Rep. Louis, 18, 66, 162, 164, 165, 179-180 background of, 159-160 Ludlow Amendment, 18, 33,159, 160163, 165-166, 167 n., 251 See also war referendum Luecke, Rep. John, 63 Lundeen, Sen. Ernest, 41, 229 McClellan, Rep. John B., 118, 123 McCormick, Col. Robert R., 71, 270 McCormick, R uth Hanna, 61 MacCracken, Henry Noble, 73 McGovern, Sen. George, 284 McIntyre, Marvin H., 58 MacNider, Col. Hanford, 237 McSwain, Rep. John J., 155 Manning, Helen Taft, 233 Marcantonio. Rep. Vito, 132 Marsh, Benjamin C., 227 Marshall Plan, 277, 279 Martin, Rep. John A., 63 Martin, Rep. Joseph W., 54, 111 Maverick, Rep. Maury, 18, 58, 70, 111, 118, 158, 163, 190, 264 background of, 62-63

Index

312 Maverick American, A, 62 May, Rep. Andrew J„ 157 Mencken, H. L., 228 Merchants of Death, 142, 147 Michener, Rep. Earl C., 198 Miller, Clyde, 191 Milliken, Alida K. L., 165 Millis, Walter, 115 Moley, Raymond, 134 Molotov, Vyacheslav, 40 Monroe, James, 12 Monroe Doctrine, 13 Monsman, Gerald, 166 Moore, John Bassett, 4, 55-56, 72, 151, 177 Morgan, J. P., 146, 148, 251 Morse, Sen. Wayne, 284 Münchener Neueste Nachrichten, 36 Mundt, Rep. Karl, 241, 251 munitions makers, 141, 145, 148, 149, 152, 165, 167 and note, 250 See also Nye Committee Murphy, Ray, 118 Mussolini, Benito, 104, 106, 110, 172 My First 2000 Years, 36 Myth of a Guilty Nation, The, 28 Nation, 34, 79, 84-85, 107, 110, 148, 274 National Civil Liberties Bureau, 79 National Committee on the W ar Referendum, 162 National Council for the Prevention of War, 32, 57, 58, 112, 161, 195 National Council of Jewish Women, 58 National Industrial Recovery Act, 48, 62, 76 National Union for Social Justice, 38 nationalism, 68, 102 Naval Construction Bill of 1939, 133 Neuberger, Richard L., 135 neutrality, 33, 68, 70 n., 109, 167, 203 Neutrality for the United States, 56

neutrality, legislation, 25, 50, 58, 63, 130, 150-151, 154-155, 171, 176183, 189, 199, 203, 206, 215-216, 242 Act of 1935, 171, 175, 180 Act of 1936, 150, 180, 181, 182 Act of 1937, 21, 54-55, 66, 195-196, 198 Pittman Bill, 176-180 New Deal, 71, 76, 85, 138 new isolationism, 281 and note New Republic, 18, 28, 72, 81, 111, 117, 152, 274 reverses course, 217 new unilateralism, 285-286 See also unilateralism New Western Front, The, 128 New World, The, 79 Nock, Albert J., 28 Non-Intervention Committee, 185 Nonpartisan League, 60 Norris, Sen. George W., 47, 61, 119, 202, 274 takes interventionist position, 219-

220 Nye, Sen. Gerald P., 4, 21, 24, 70, 107, 139, 189, 192, 204, 222, 248 background of, 58-62 and munitions investigation, 143148 denounces England, 230 and anti-Semitism, 256 Nye Committee, 6, 144-148, 156, 157 See also munitions makers obstructionism, 3 O'Connor, Rep. James F., 166, 240 O’Day, Rep. Caroline, 166 Oliver, Rep. James C., 250 Olson, Floyd, 80 O ’Malley, Rep. Thomas, 190, 201 Open Door at Home, The, 76 Origins of the World War, The, 27 Our Military Chaos, 128 pacifism, 15, 169, 170, 204, 260 Page, W alter Hines, 138

Index Palmer, Albert, 271 Panay, 162 Pastorius, Francis, 7 Patterson, Fr. Laurence K., 106 Peace Federation, 40 Pearl Harbor, 1-2, 257 Peek, George N., 257-258 People’s Lobby, 58 Pepper, George Wharton, 105 Perkins, Dexter, 163 n. Philadelphia Record, 137, 147 Phillips, Lt. Col. T . R., 249 Pinchot, Amos, 91-92, 94, 236, 239, 246, 255, 257 Pittman, Sen. Key, 18 n., 70, 143, 211 polls, public opinion, 1, 18 n., 20, 25, 33, 211, 212. 214, 215, 216, 252 Pope, Sen. James P., 157 preparedness, military, 129-133 Progressive, The, 217 Railway Labor Executives’ Associa­ tion, 149 Rainey, Homer T., 160 Ramparts We Watch, The, 125 Randolph, John, 222 Rankin, Rep. Jeanette, 83, 125 n., 202, 204 Rathbone, Rep. Henry R., 158 Raushenbush, Stephen, 161, 193 n., 265 Reed, David A., 249, 271 Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 40 Rise of American Civilization, The, 72, 75 Rivers, Maj. Gen. William C., 165 Road to War, 115-116 Robsion, Rep. John M., 52 Rogers, Rep. Edith Nourse, 51-52, 163 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 17, 34, 38, 45, 47, 53, 76, 85, 134, 172 and Spanish Civil War, 187 attacked by isolationists, 257-259 Rosenwald, Lessing J., 253

Saturday Evening Post, 18, 91, 106, 124 Sauthoff, Harry, 264 Save America First, 82 Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., 22 n., 281 and note Schneider, Rep. George J., 63 Schulte, Rep. William T., 137 Schurz, Carl, 122, 261 Scott, Rep. Byron N., 185 Scribner’s Commentator, 37, 230, 246, 270 Scribner’s Magazine, 76 Senate Committee on Foreign Rela­ tions, 4, 49, 65, 70, 120, 127, 199, 215, 216, 239, 266, 271 Senate Military Affairs Committee, 143 Senator Solomon Spiffledink, 160 Seward, William H., 223 Shaw, Albert, 86 Sikorski, Igor, 233 Simonds, Frank H., 106, 177-178 Sims, Adm. William S., 57-58 Sisson, Rep. Fred J., 130, 224 Smyth, Alexander, 261 Social Justice, 37, 97 socialism, 80, 258 Socialist party, 77, 78, 229, 251, 256, 267, 274 Southern Review, 56 Soviet Union, 41, 54, 233, 277, 281 as factor in U.S. neutrality, 114 Spanish Civil War, 184, 185 U.S. reaction to, 185 Stern, William, 256 Stevenson, Adlai E., 280 Stewart, Donald W., 67, 105, 113 Stillwell, L. D., 127, 227 Stimson, Henry L., 89, 138 Stone, William T., 141 Stuart, R. Douglas, 94 Taft, Sen. Robert A., 126, 236, 246 and war in Pacific, 23-24

3*4 Taft, Sen. Robert A. (cant.) fears dictatorship, 87-88, 266-267 background of, 89-91 favors arms embargo repeal, 200 favors loan to Britain, 242 and “new isolationism,** 278 Tansill, Charles C., 116 n., 120 Terrell, Rep. George B., 159 Thomas, Norman, 4, 6, 17, 73, 8283, 85-86, 110, 120, 150, 192, 229, 237, 256 background of, 77-80 fears dictatorship, 119, 232, 267 opposes embargo on Spain, 186187, 188 Thompson, Dorothy, 15/ L< Thorkelson, Rep. Jacob, 253 Tinkham, Rep. George H„ 18, 111, 138, 147, 163, 178, 257, 269 Today, 177 totalitarianism, 85, 268 Townsend, Ralph, 36-37 Trail of a Tradition, The, 65 Trum an Doctrine, 277 Turner, E. R., 28 Turner, John K., 28 Uncensored, 230, 245, 246, 251, 268, 274 unilateralism, 5, 10-11, 15, 17, 31, 68, 170, 241, 273, 275, 282 as a base of isolationism, 23, 169, 204 See also new unilateralism Union party, 38, 42 United States, 1, 15, 68 traditional view of relationship to foreign wars, 100-104 impotence of, as factor in isolationism, 117-121 impregnability of, as factor in isolationism, 121-129, 244-249, 276 attitude toward Germany, 209, 239 fear of German attack, 214

Index fear of war as a base of isolationism, 23, 260-272 U.S. Congress, 216, 234, 267 voting record on military appro­ priation bills, 130-133 debate on Lend-Lease Bill, 238 Vandenberg, Sen. A rthur H., 64, 70, 143, 189, 236, 267 background of, 65 converted to internationalism, 219 on isolationism, 273 Versailles Treaty, 29, 49, 84, 107, 111, 145, 212, 224 Veterans of Foreign Wars, 219 Viereck, George Sylvester, 35-36, 54 Villard, Oswald Garrison, 34, 62, 73, 83, 106, 116, 148, 217-218, 221, 228, 235, 236, 253, 263-264 background of, 83-85 on American impregnability, 128— 129, 247 favors Ludlow Amendment, 160 attacks Roosevelt, 258 fears dictatorship, 268 Vinson Naval Expansion Bill of 1938, 132-133 Virginia Quarterly Review, 246 Voigt, Rep. Edward, 158 Voorhis, Rep. Jerry, 63, 73, 113, 190, 195 background of, 66 changes views, 220 Vorys, Rep. John M., 215 Vorys Amendment, 215, 216 Wall Street, 28, 41, 60, 84 See also big business Walsh, Sen. Thomas J., 61, 236 War, Peace and Change, 225 war debts, 3, 110-111 war referendum, 169-166, 251 See also Ludlow Amendment Warner, Milo J., 233 Washington, George, 8, 14 Farewell Address, 8-10, 15, 101

Index Washington Foreign Policy Commit­ tee, 58 Waymack, W. W., 34 We Can Defend America, 124 We Have a Future, 232 Weizsäcker, Em st Freiherr von, 208 Wheeler, Sen. Burton K., 21 and note, 22 n., 112, 245, 248, 254 Whelchel, Rep. B. Frank, 105 Why Meddle in Europe?, 128 Why We Fought, 29 Wiley, Sen. Alexander, 164 Wilhelm II, Kaiser, 36 Willkie, Wendell, 20, 97 Wilson, Hugh, 211

3*5 Wilson, Woodrow, 2 and note, 29, 43, 44, 64, 103, 138-139, 262 Wolfe, Bertram D., 82 Women’s Christian Temperance Union, 58 Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 32, 58, 107, 142, 157, 161, 202, 239 Wood, Gen. Robert E., 92, 98, 240, 246, 247, 249 background of, 93-94 Woodruff, Rep. Roy C., 92 Zaharoff, Sir Basil, 145