Islamic Roots and Resurgence in Turkey : Understanding and Explaining the Muslim Resurgence 9780313016332, 9780275980511

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Islamic Roots and Resurgence in Turkey

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Islamic Roots and Resurgence in Turkey Understanding and Explaining the Muslim Resurgence

STEPHEN VERTIGANS

PRAEGER

Westport,Connecticut

London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Vertigans, Stephen, 1965— Islamic roots and resurgence in Turkey : understanding and explaining the Muslim resurgence / Stephen Vertigans. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-275-98051-0 (alk. paper) 1. Islam—Turkey—20th century. 2. Islam and state—20th century. 3. Religious awakening—Turkey—20th century. 4. Turkey—Politics and government—20th century. Title. BP63T8V47 2003 306.6,97,095610904—dc21 2003051071 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2003 by Stephen Vertigans All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2003051071 ISBN: O-275-98051-0 First published in 2003 Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America

@r The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984). 10987654321

I.

For Maya and Isabel

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Contents

1.

An Introduction: Reviewing Praxisitioners

1

2.

Islam and the Rise and Fall of the Ottoman Empire

19

3.

From End of Empire to Republican Coup to Coup: The Period 1918 to 1980

39

4.

From Traditional to Postmodern Coup and Beyond: The Period 1980 to 2002

61

5.

Linking the Past and the Way Forward: Socialization Agents of the Republic

87

6.

The Incompatibility Problem and the Circle of Reinforcement

109

7.

Internalization and Change: Routes to Praxism

129

8.

Explaining the Resurgence: Concluding Beyond Exclusion and Toward Inclusion

153

Appendix: Research Questionnaire

173

Bibliography

177

Index

191

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1 An Introduction: Reviewing Praxisitioners INTRODUCTION: THE INCOMPATIBILITY PROBLEM The Turkish nation-state is built upon a range of potentially opposing elements, tradition and modernization, secularism and religion, nationalism and ethnicity, strategic location and neighborhood disputes, democracy and military political action, and Westernization and Islamification. Turkey has not been able to utilize and successfully synthesize components of those influences into a formation and system that appeal to the mass of the population in a manner that dislocates the potential for radical alternative ideologies. In these areas Turkey is not unusual. At the start of the twenty-first century and eighty years after Turkey was formed as a secular republic, Turkey's existence in the current structure is threatened by a serious challenge from one radical ideology in particular, what I shall call "praxist Islam", that is legitimized by Muslim rule over the same land during the Ottoman Empire. Islam was formally removed from power during processes of secularization that sought to relegate religion to the private sphere. Praxist Islam is irrevocably opposed to the secular modernity project on which the Turkish state is based. It is a challenge that has existed throughout the history of the republic, but until recently the state has been able to limit and suppress Islam while paradoxically seeking to use Islam for the state's own ends. Today, the challenge to the republic is stronger than it has ever been, yet the socioeconomic conditions that are often used to explain the resurgence have been in place much longer. The resurgence is happening at a time when Turkey faces other challenges from unfriendly neighboring states while being confronted with internal problems such as Kurdish separatism and extreme Turkish nationalism, deteriorating relations between Sunnis and Alevis,1 disputes over the nature of the state, in particular the roles of the military, politicians and civil society, and the appropriateness of the democratic system to address these

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challenges. Radical Islam, however, seems positioned to be the main long-term challenge to the secular state. There is considerable literature about the Islamic resurgence, but that literature has tended to concentrate on the appeal to traditionalists and reactionaries who are seen to be attempting to prevent Western-inspired modernization. Thus one can read about the appeal of Islam to peasants and bazaaris, whose lifestyles are threatened by economic and cultural transformations, or can learn about the populist political appeal of Islam to the disaffected. As Tapper noted, "much of this discussion is abstract and speculative" (1991: 1). These studies have made contributions to help understand the Islamic resurgence but cannot explain why individuals and groups are attracted by activist Islam and are not excluded according to secular criteria. To help rectify this omission I develop a schematic that aims to both understand and explain the growing appeal of Islam to a cross-section of society across the socioeconomic stratum. Individual interpretations are located within the wider socioeconomic, political, and cultural contexts to enable understanding and explanation to emerge through tracing individual and social interactions. In this approach one of the common weaknesses to be found in Islamic studies is avoided as "much of the literature...has...conceded too much to the autonomy of religious beliefs, abstracting social movements and changes in religious doctrine and interpretation from the broader social context within which they have occurred" (Halliday and Alavi 1988: 1). It is also important to move away from the emotional analysis of the phenomenon, and for this reason a number of new interrelated concepts are introduced. PRAXISITIONERS, PRAXIS, AND PRAXISIFICATION At this early stage, it is important to clarify that Islam is a multifaceted religion with believers from different schools and brotherhoods, countries and continents and involves different interpretations, beliefs, and actions. In this publication believers are analyzed who consider that Islam offers a comprehensive, rational way of life and who seek to synthesize historical tenets of faith and action with contemporary developments. They are not representative of a specific group, interpretation, location, or subcultural variation but share the belief in Islam as a way of life. These believers challenge the existing secular structures and attitudes of modernity. Other significant contributions are incorporated and extended and empirical research is included that enables the specific appeal of Islam and processes of Islamification to be illuminated, with particular attention placed upon a significant group that other studies cannot account for, postgraduate students, within a broad explanatory framework. The analysis of radical Islam is also problematic because of the language used. Many studies have tended to use the term fundamentalists to describe the followers of Islam. I consider this term to be too emotive, too closely associated with negative media images of events undertaken in the name of Islam. It is an image that has penetrated the wider society and makes any rational discussion of

Introduction: Reviewing Praxisitioners

3

the phenomena difficult. In addition, as Marty and Scott Appleby (1994: 70) have pointed out, the term fundamentalism has its roots in Protestant Christianity and is used in the West to describe movements that are considered violent or extremist. A more useful replacement is Islamist which refers to the reappropriation of Muslim identity and values. The process of Islamification that this must entail can be confusing, however. All Muslims believe in Islam and can therefore be considered to have undertaken an element of Islamification. More important for many academics and within the wider world, the two terms are used interchangeably and the significance of active Muslims can be lost in the broad analysis. For these reasons, and because I consider my term to be more reflective of the distinct beliefs and actions of the religion that is being examined, I have developed the concept praxisitioners. Praxisitioners take theological texts as guides for their social interactions and activities to provide a framework of life that Mawdudi (1986) has remarked fuses the spiritual and material or this worldly and other worldly (McDermott and Ahsan 1980) and stresses the importance of both the individual and society. A common factor that unites all praxisitioners is their stress upon what I shall refer to as Islamic Praxis. I am adapting the Marxist usage of praxis that relates theory to practice (Leonard 1984), with importance placed upon consciousness raising because as Longres and McLeod (1980: 268) state, "consciousness raising is action aimed at altering societal conditions." As the outline of the ideological doctrine in Chapter 2 shows, this applies to praxisitioners who upon gaining theological consciousness seek actively to change the social relations by which other selves are constructed, and want to replace the secular state with a theocracy. Therefore the supporters of this discourse are praxisitioners with a praxist set of beliefs and actions based upon praxism, developed through a process of praxisification within socialization. However as the following chapters establish, this process is not unilinear, inevitable, or irreversible. In the remainder of this chapter the general approaches to analyzing Islam in Turkey are summarized. The chapter concludes with a review on how the rest of the publication develops upon other studies to provide a comprehensive framework to both understand and explain the Islamic resurgence. ISLAMIC VISIBILITY IN TURKEY Many studies of religion have tended to focus on visible phenomena such as the growth in places of worship and the number of believers. The latter in particular is difficult to measure accurately, especially when assessing the number of practicing believers. In the case of Islamic praxisitioners it is not possible to ascertain the true number because there is not one homogeneous movement but a multitude of different groups, many of whom operate secretively yet practice in public with other types of believers at prayer. Individuals are also understandably reluctant to be openly identified as a threat to secularism because of the possible repercussions, particularly from the military forces, which have a constitutional duty to safeguard Atatiirk's secular reforms. However, because Islam for the praxisitioner is an all-pervasive

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ideology that does not allow for theological subjugation into the private sphere, signs of growth can be identified throughout all societal activities. Over the last twenty-five years, Islam in Turkey has gained in both prominence and diversity, and signs of devotion can be observed within both secular state structures and civil society. Conspicuous signs include the large increase in believers, and this cannot be seen as simply a reflection of population growth as Ozcan's 1993 study showed.2 There has been increased visibility through the media that can be attributed, at least in part, to a reduction in state control and censorship and the utilization of technological advances in communications by praxist groups. The groups also have considerable involvement in media productions including film and television makers, talk show hosts, publishing houses, periodicals, and novels (Gole 1996). There is now a wide range of Islamic publications covering a range of standards and interpretations. This huge expansion of Islamic media can also partly be attributed to the number of Muslim investors and businessmen supporting the ventures and the dramatic increase in the number of professionals capable of being involved in the production. The latter group has developed partly as a consequence of the expansion of education that has included dramatic increases in the numbers of both secular and religious institutions. Religious content within the national curriculum has also grown considerably. These points are explored in more detail in Chapter 5. However, visibility goes far beyond media representations and includes rising signs of believers and action. For example, the numbers undertaking the Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) have grown and Islamist modes of dress and appearance for all ages and both genders are increasingly visible, to the extent that fashion shows of Islamic clothes are now popular (Gole 1996). Fasting during Ramadan is increasingly practiced and sales of religiously orientated cassettes and compact disks continue to grow. At the state level, Islamic influences have penetrated many institutions, particularly educational and cultural and these processes were accelerated during the Ozal regime (1983— 1991) (Eralp, Tunay and Ye§ilada 1993; Sakalhoglu 1996). These growing influences within the state system and institutions have meant that while Turkey remains a secular state, supporters of a rival ideology have been allowed to penetrate central government departments. The National Security Council has clearly come to the same conclusion and has sought to purge the civil service of all Islamists and separatists.3 The emerging Islamic cultural influence, however, has tended to be dismissed as insignificant at a political level by many commentators. Sayan provides a reflective example of this evaluation, declaring that on the one hand there is a growing nostalgia for Islamic traditions and for a cultural reinvigoration along religious lines. On the other hand Islam has had only a limited impact on Turkish politics in recent years. Several factors seem to account for this. Firstly, Turkey has made considerable headway in its efforts to avoid the problem of political legitimization by institutionalizing democratic purposes. Secondly, since its inception, the Turkish party system has displayed a strong tendency towards political dualism [between right-and left-wing views]....This has undermined the electoral

Introduction: Reviewing Praxisitioners

5

chances of third parties and latecomers. Along with other types of parties, those which base their appeal primarily on religion, such as the NSP, have found it difficult to emerge as major power contenders. Thirdly, the electoral gains which can be derived from politicizing Islam are, by now, quite limited since almost all political parties, with varying degrees of commitment, support policies designed to strengthen Islam's role in Turkish society. (1984: 127) Further support for the view that state control of religion and the involvement of religio-political parties has strengthened democracy and weakened the potential for radical Islamists can be found in Heper (1997) and Sakalhoglu (1996). But events have disproved the contemporary significance of these factors because as, the following discussion highlights, both political and radical Islam has grown in popularity. The adoption of Islam by all parties has not reduced the influence of religion within society but instead has unintentionally contributed toward the resurgence that it sought to prevent. As Sakalhoglu (1996: 242) remarked "there are a range of Islamic groups and platforms expressing different interests, priorities, goals and sentiments." These include the formerly banned tarikats (religious brotherhoods) that have been able to use their networks to influence the secular right-wing political parties. For example, both the Nak§ibendi and Suleymangi tarikats and the Nurcu groups are able to exert political influence and have moved from traditional rhetoric to modern consensual discourse (Toprak 1993). This has been part of a process of accommodation that has enabled links to be established with the Motherland Party (MP), in particular (S. Ayata 1993; Sakalhoglu 1996). These tarikats have been able to run unofficial Qur'an courses and youth hostels and their members have penetrated all ranks of political society (Sakalhoglu 1996). In addition to the more overt political Islam (see the following), praxism has also become magnified, with groups covertly campaigning for the return of the Shari'ah. These groups4 have different theological influences ranging from the modernist Shariati to the more radical Qutb and Mawdudi. Also, crucially supporters of the resurgence cannot be limited to the usual suspects of the older and more vulnerable socioeconomic groups. A recent study5 found that 45 percent of people who demanded an Islamic government were between the ages of fourteen and thirty-five. As Turkey has a disportionately young population, this could contribute to longer-term Islamic influence and challenge. The role of the modern, urban, educated middle class within Islamic movements has also been identified, highlighting that the explanatory focus has to challenge the perception that Islam appeals only to the excluded.6 Religion is most tangible within politics. Since the introduction of democracy, a number of parties in government have sought to use religion for political purposes, notably the Democrat Party (DP) and more recently the MP and True Path Party (TPP). Even the Republican People's Party (RPP), which was responsible for introducing and continues to be strongly associated with secularism, implemented some amendments to attract support from the religious electorate. All the parties have to varying degrees courted religious support, but ultimately none have made fundamental concessions against secularization.

6

Islamic Roots and Resurgence in Turkey

Islam remained influential within Turkish society but was subservient to the state, irrespective of the party in power. Consequently, while some parties were considered to be more sympathetic to religion, there has been a political vacuum in which covert antisecularists could mobilize support. This has been utilized by the most visible example of political Islam, popular religious parties that have been closed down for unconstitutional use of religion, in chronological order the National Order Party (NOP 1970-1971), National Salvation Party (NSP 19721980), the Welfare Party (WP 1983-1998) and Virtue Party (VP 1998-2001). Even without taking into account the divergent support base, there have been important ideological and pragmatic differences within the parties that leaders tried to reconcile. For example, Heper (1997) identified moderates and radicals who support liberal democracy and theodemocracy, respectfully. However, the closure of the VP in June 2001 finally led to the generic party being split into two, the Felicity Party (FP) that adheres to the traditional party policies and the more reformist orientated Justice and Development Party (JDP). Until it was banned in 1998, the WP had been the most popular party in Turkey. The JDP was able to build, and indeed expand upon, this support in the general elections held in November 2002 to become the first governing party to hold a majority within the National Assembly since the MP in the 1980s. The ideology that religio-political parties promoted and campaigned on has been an interesting mix that synthesized tradition with modernity and placed particular emphasis upon rapid industrialization, development, health, and education. Social weaknesses within the secular system are also identified across the different parties' policies, for example, unemployment, the lack of social security, housing, poverty, injustice, poor social services, corruption, oppression and increasing social and economic inequality7 (Alkan 1984; Ayata 1996; Toprak 1981). There is a synthesis between religious values and modern practices that can be found within much Islamic discourse. Stress is placed upon modern industrialism and scientific and technological development allied to specific sociocultural settings to which individuals can relate. Politicized Islam in Turkey has therefore often not been reactionary or simply dismissive of Western-perceived "progress." The various religious parties have generally operated within the secular system and have not promoted a comprehensive set of praxist policies and actions. However, this is often not reflected in the analysis of both Islam in politics and Islamic praxisitioners that tends to be rooted in the secular tradition. SECULARIZATION AND ISLAM Much of the literature on the Islamic resurgence generally, and in Turkey particularly, has been heavily influenced by the modernity project and the secular methods and reasoning it promoted. The origins of the theories on secularization can be traced to the "founding fathers" of sociology, Marx, Weber, and Durkheim. Their intellectual legacy has resulted in religion being perceived as a short-term source of solace and solidarity in changing contexts. Once the situations are rationalized, the initial reasons for individuals and

Introduction: Reviewing Praxisitioners

7

groups being attracted to religion become superfluous as they become immersed in the secular modernizing process and encounter the benefits thereof. This type of forecasting has been incorporated within modern secularization theories that have been expounded by influential Western sociologists including Martin (1978), Wallace (1966), Wallis (1975), and Wilson (1975), who used the latter stages of modernity to forecast the impending all-pervasive nature of secularism and rationality which would account for the subsequent demise of religion. This secularization paradigm, rooted in the tradition of modernity, continues to have a huge impact on studies of faith, devotion, religious revivals, and resurgence. Underlying the analysis has been the assumption that Western secularism is superior, grounded in the successes of modernity while religion is the last irrational outpost for the excluded before full and willing incorporation into the modernization framework. Sayan (1984: 120) has noted how Muslim societies were expected to follow the path to modernity and "the primordial loyalties of the Middle Eastern peoples, based on kinship, religion, ethnicity and regional or tribal affiliations, would be considerably weakened, if not entirely replaced, by new ties of identity based on new forms of social differentiation and political cleavages, and therefore, that their societies would come more and more under the influence of such secular ideologies as nationalism or socialism." The global secularization paradigm that anticipated a generic route to modernization and expected homogenous responses from the affected populace, however, is clearly incommensurate with the growth in Islamic followers, thought, action, and institutions. In a variety of contexts Islam does not follow the trend of religion relegated from societal spheres into the private sphere. On the contrary, while one of the original intentions of the Turkish republic was to remove Islam from public influence, this has not been achieved. Activist religious policies that relate to social and material conditions and challenge the nature of the secular state are now being openly promoted. This potential activism within Islamic discourse has generally been ignored until wellpublicized, often sensationalized, events.8 The activism has partly been ignored because while activist interpretations of Islam remained within Turkish society and indeed globally, those interpretations were considered to be held by isolated individuals and groups that were insignificant in terms of support and influence. In this sense it was easy to apply the logic of the secular argument to Turkey and the Islamic world generally because there was no real opportunity for theological movements to mobilize widespread political opposition that extended beyond a limited minority. Consequently the seemingly restricted religious fervour enabled the secular paradigm to be extended and the lack of political transformation by religious ideologies within Western nations was transposed onto a global level. The revolutionary potential of different religions in different contexts was discarded. Even with the demise of "grand theories" in the 1980s and the onset of different examples that did not fit within the paradigm, religion continued to be viewed as a conservative impediment to state integration and modernization based on secular ideologies. Haynes adds that generally "secular ideologies9 were transplanted... into the Third World by putative

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ideologues....The crucial point is that transplanted secular ideologies did not take firm root in the societies of the Third World" (1994: 30). Consequently, in the context of failed modernization and inadequate government people are highly susceptible to radical alternatives which hold out the promise of transforming this world. Such a process is universalized because whilst many people in developing countries have become materially poorer over the last twenty years, they have acquired access to different religious ideologies and teachings. The huge increase in the numbers of Protestants in Latin America and in followers of radical versions of Islam is partly because of the increased dissemination of ideas through the media of video and audio cassettes, pamphlets and books, missionary activity, pilgrimages and visits to different societies where new ideas may be absorbed. (1994: 10) This analysis provides a counter-balance to the dominant modern interpretations of religio-political activism. Haynes notes the use of modern communications by religious groups and questions the validity of imposed Western values and practices. Although useful evidence is introduced to disprove the generic applicability of secularisation, however, Haynes has incorporated the rationale of modernity and perceives religion to be the solace of the displaced and narrows the appeal to the "materially poorer." Consequently the appeal of Islam to a cross-section of the community, including the nonmaterially motivated, cannot be understood or explained. The resurgence of Islam highlights the inapplicability of secular theories based on the legacy of classical social science. Certainly Islam can be an agent of cohesion and solace and historically the elite and masses have shared the same religion, with a common frame of reference between the cultural divide, and increasing unity, for "the bond that held the Moslem masses...and the rulers together was religious uniformity, not political consciousness" (Kazamias 1966: 40). Today, even where the elite and masses share the same beliefs, the advent and wide-scale penetration of mass communications, allied to universal education, highlight the discrepancies between leaders' rhetoric and actions across a broad social spectrum. This is compared with the idealized behavioral patterns and expectations demanded by the theologically conscious. Greater popular awareness of local, state, and global actions has meant that subsequent behavior can challenge perceptions of Islam as social cement unifying common believers, irrespective of their position in life. And the emphasis on radical change negates Marx's social opium theory because Islam is not obscurant in this context but emphasizes reality. It does not merely provide psychological solace and compensation. It provides the base for a way of life that can challenge the existing social structure. The reasons for these challenges and the wider contemporary Islamic resurgence are varied. EXPLAINING RESURGENT ISLAM A number of interrelated yet distinct reasons have been given for the Islamic resurgence generally and in Turkey in particular. Because academic focus has tended to be on the supporters of the religious political parties or areas and

Introduction: Reviewing Praxisitioners

9

professions associated with traditional religious behavior, the explanations tend to concentrate on factors that are perceived to affect these groups. These points are explored in more detail in Chapter 4. First, considerable attention has been placed upon the direct impact of the economy on beliefs, as particular socioeconomic groups were linked to the causal threats and challenges of modernization, specified by Fischer's analysis (1980) of "the revolt of the petite-bourgeoisie." Toprak (1987: 230) expands upon this, stating that Islamic forces in Turkey "draw their strength from economic groups at the margins of a rapidly growing industry" but as the economy develops "a mass political movement based on religious appeals has little chance of success in modern Turkey." Under this reasoning groups who have been threatened or dispossessed by the modernization process10 are more likely to be attracted to activist Islam. Urbanization and the relationship with migration are often identified as important factors that are providing conditions conducive to wider and deeper support. The explanation can be linked to studies of the religious parties' support that until the 1995 elections tended to be concentrated in rural areas and, it was argued, stressed the inverse relationship between support and modernization (Ak§it 1986; Alkan 1984; Roy 1994; Toprak 1981, 1984). As support has become more widespread and incorporates constituencies across Turkey in both urban and rural areas, the argument was developed to include urban migrants who had been unable to assimilate (Salt 1995). Gole (1996: 25) has used similar logic to explain the wider appeal: "upon the new actors of Islamism, both the leaders and the followers in almost all Muslim countries, such as Egypt, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, are among the recently urbanized and educated social groups. They often become 'Islamist' by following a common path: after their move from little provincial towns to cities, they encounter, during their years in high school and the university, the works of classical Islamic scholars." "Islamist movements... capitalize on the empowerment of the excluded and share [with other movements] the same critical sensitivity to the Enlightenment project, to its rationalist and universalist conceptions of modernity" (1996: 26). Richards and Waterbury (1990) have also claimed that educated Turkish militants originated from provincial towns and devout families. If migration is central in processes of praxisification, then recent relocation trends will accelerate the resurgence.11 The process of globalization, linked to both economics and culture, is also prominent in explanations of the resurgence. Within globalization analysis,12 religion is viewed as a defensive reaction to the globalizing forces of capitalism (Wallerstein 1979, 1983, 1984) or consumer culture (Robertson 1992; Waters 1998). The religio-political parties have been able to use this reasoning effectively as Kamrava (1998) observed, gathering support by using classic dependency theory arguments about the West exploiting and suppressing poorer nations and Turkey in particular. Toprak (1993: 243-44) has also argued that "the structure of the modern economy has led to a universalization of economies and cultures in areas which have integrated with the global techno-structures...in discussing Islamist intellectuals in Turkey...one should not look at their

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Islamic Roots and Resurgence in Turkey

ideology as a reaction to 'Western culture' but rather as a response to Turkey's growing integration with the modern economy." Suspicion and resentment of imported structures including secular prescriptions of imported solutions for recovery have also been a consequence of Islamic nations' involvement in the "global system" (Ayubi 1980). Processes of modernity and the subsequent development of postmodernity have been put forward as significant factors. In particular, there has been greater emphasis on associated changes, individualism and reduced solidarity, rapid social change and population mobility, materialism and widening inequality, triumphalism in a context of Muslim military defeats, noticeable corruption and injustice, and the failure of contemporary ideologies to solve the problems and provide guidance and support. These factors have arguably led to the reassessment of the perceived Muslim failures, a reevaluation of former glories and the repoliticization of Islam (Beckford 1986; Dekmejian 1980; Keddie 1988). The perceived failures and weaknesses within other ideologies have meant that Islamic "movements are seen as expressions of Third World reaction to the materialism and secularism associated with Western and Soviet civilizations" (Tapper 1991: 22). However, Ayubi (1991: 176) argues that praxisitioners are "not rebellious because they are opposed to development (or even to an extent, to modernization) but rather because they desired it so strongly and yet could not get it. Theirs is the proverbial case of 'sour grapes': they hate modernity because they cannot get it" (Ayubi 1991: 176). The demise of the communist metanarrative has also meant that Islam is one of the few remaining alternatives to global capitalism, partly because it is an international ideology and has achieved widespread success. As Rashid (2000) commented when accounting for the development of the Taliban, Mujaheddin groups' success against the Soviet Union provided further legitimacy to Islam and played a significant part in the ultimate demise of the communist empire. Muslim radicals in Afghanistan thus contributed, albeit unintentionally, to the demise of another global ideology and in the process limited the options for people dissatisfied with current systems who wanted radical changes. The end of the Soviet empire also resulted in more Muslim nation-states being formed. The new states provided believers with greater freedom to practice, promoted religion, and frequently providing support for political ends that have ultimately contributed toward an increase in radical Muslims. A number of developments can be considered within this context and Ayubi (1991: 178) puts forward one of the most significant. In apparent contradiction of his earlier point, Ayubi argues that the "financial and political self-confidence brought about by the oil boom has helped people...in the Muslim world in general to think about doing things their way." Gtilalp (1999, 2001) has developed a number of the preceding points and argues that the recent rise of Islamism can be seen as part of the post-modern condition which "allowed for questioning of the unquestionable truths of Turkey's Westernization project" (2001: 443). The Islamic critique of the Western paradigm is part of wider concern about its ability and suitability that Muslim groups have been able to utilize. Islamism itself is not postmodernist, as it is based on the Absolute Truth

Introduction: Reviewing Praxisitioners

11

and a desire to establish a society based upon a "Golden Age" of the past, but it is able to use the post-modern condition to attract support. The expansion of the postmodernity discourse into this traditionally perceived area is very interesting and highlights the contemporary nature of many Islamic movements and can help explain part of the appeal of Islam both in Turkey and globally, although in Chapter 6 I question its general applicability. A number of studies have built upon the impact of urbanization and linked the Islamic resurgence to identity formation and the demise of Gemeinschaft. Meeker (1991) has argued that before 1950, the majority of people had their identity determined by the social composition of their family and community but subsequent increases in mobility, education, urbanization, and occupational options have weakened bonds and traditional, formative identity influences leading to individuals feeling disorientated and nostalgic for idealized former times. Today, "recent migrants to the cities generally need emotional, social and material support and guidance, which religious groups provide more than any source" (Huntingdon 1996: 102). These people become vulnerable to an ideology with historical roots that emphasizes the Gemeinschaft with which they are familiar and which provides basic practical support for those in need. In these cases religion is not "the opium of the people, but the vitamin of the weak" (Debray 1994: 15). Heper believes that part of the reason for the visibility of Islam within Turkey can be attributed to the failure of Ataturkism to perform religious metaphysical functions, and, as people find their nonspiritual life dissatisfying, they need inner problems resolved. Certainly some government concessions to religion, particularly in the 1980s, would seem to indicate that there is wider support within the nation-state for this argument. For Heper "the most important dimensions of the recent visibility of Islam in Turkey are psychological and cultural. Inner need and the problems of meaning have been most significant" (1981: 363). Keddie (1988) follows a similar line of explanation when referring to the failure of secular nationalism to incorporate dissatisfied groups and classes, and states this is responsible for the emergence of Islamist movements in Turkey, Iran, and Egypt. This reasoning is expanded by Mehmet (1990) to include the previous point in his analysis of second-generation migrants whose backgrounds emphasized egalitarianism and a strong community. However, the migrants subsequently find themselves living in poverty and substandard housing conditions, with weakened community ties and the threat of anomie (Sayan 1984). In these cases, religion provided the channels to voice discontent as part of what Ayubi (1991: 217) refers to as "a reaction to alienation and a quest for authenticity." The development of the economy and corresponding expansion of education have also been put forward as important reasons. This may at first glance appear surprising, as the end result is to provide many people with opportunities within Muslim societies, but a number of commentators13 have argued that this has led to rising expectations that exceed the level of opportunities in countries with limited upward mobility. The expansion of higher educational programs was not accompanied by similar increases in facilities or available jobs on completion,

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Islamic Roots and Resurgence in Turkey

and this led to graduates becoming dissatisfied with the systems that they consider had failed them. At a wider level, Ayubi (1991: 119) has argued that "when development falters and the promised rewards are not achieved, segments of the civil society rebel against the State using 'religion' as a catalyst for mobilisation and resistance." It is "natural [my italics]...for the excluded and the disappointed to adopt a counter-ideology that is stark in its opposition to the official ideology" (1991: 225-26). State policies have also played an important part in the resurgence, particularly the concessions that have been made, often in attempts to preempt the growth of radical Islam. When religion was under strict control and not allowed a role within the political arena, mass belief remained but was generally not an oppositional force. Numerous nation-states have, however, been more willing to allow some Islamic opposition while suppressing secular parties. Many secular governments, for example the MP in Turkey during the 1980s, have expanded the role of Islam within the state infrastructure. The MP's policies included changing the national curriculum to incorporate more religious content, expanding the number of institutions that conflicted with the secular ideology, removing restrictions on media censorship, providing members of the Muslim bourgeoisie with easy credit and government contracts, and helping to establish the basis for Islamic funds to grow. These concessions were ironically introduced to gain ideological control of religion, but governments have conversely reduced the controls over Islamic structures at a time when they also created conditions14 that can be conducive to the formation and progress of opposition movements (S. Ayata 1993; Huntingdon 1996; Sakalhoglu 1996; Ye$ilada 1993). Finally, Huntingdon in his controversial "clash of civilizations" thesis considers the Muslim population growth to be significant in the rise of Islamic assertiveness. This is, he argues (1996: 117), in large measure because such increases lead to disproportionately young populations who are "the protagonists of protest, instability, reform, and revolution....The availability of large numbers of often unemployed males between the ages of fifteen and thirty is a natural [my italics] source of instability and violence both within Islam and against nonMuslims." Limited support can be found from Ayubi (1991: 218), who noted that in a number of Middle Eastern societies, political participation was closed especially to the young, and this contributed toward a generation gap. A number of these factors are drawn together by Sakalhoglu (1996: 243), who argues that the power base of the new Islam in Turkey consists of "young people, educated in second-rate secular institutions, urban rather than rural-born, upwardly mobile and desperately in need of an identity and economic security that a crisis-ridden Turkish economy can offer at only meagre levels." Certainly there is some validity in these remarks and the other factors discussed previously have important contributions to make. But in some ways, even after combining the contextual elements, the focus is still on the defensive, reactive nature of Islam to cultural and economic developments and in this sense is very much within the secular tradition. This is not to say that globalization and the interrelated modernization processes, economic systems, consumer culture,

Introduction: Reviewing Praxisitioners 13 urbanization, and migration have not played a part in the resurgence but the phenomenon has not neatly and presumably, immediately, followed wide exposure to globalization or any of the other factors. In fact, in some instances, the resurgence has occurred at least one generation after the effects of globalization, modernization and other factors became clearly noticeable. As Gulalp (1999) with reference to Islam in politics points out, migration, urban poverty and anomie are not recent phenomena, unlike the support for the WP that was growing at the time he was writing. Consequently other factors have to be involved to explain the contemporary nature of praxism within social processes. With this in mind we can review the main reasons for the specific appeal of Islam. PROFANE APPEAL OF ISLAM If we draw on the above reasoning for the Islamic resurgence, we can identify why religion appeals in those circumstances. Activist Islam seems to appeal to peasants whose traditional way of life is jeopardized, to bazaar is whose livelihoods are threatened, to urban migrants whose former behavioral patterns and cohesive units are no longer applicable, to people who live in urban poverty or who consider Islam the best mechanism to challenge limited opportunities for social mobility. Many of these Muslims are arguably attracted to traditional conservative doctrines when their cultural and economic context is being transformed at a rate and in a direction beyond their comprehension. Generally this means that these people are considered to be unable to explain rationally what was happening around them and tend to resort to identifying visible factors to which they attribute blame and support ideologies that can help explain their position. This implicit Durkheimian perspective views the appeal of religion as a support mechanism and is explicitly addressed by Heper, who suggests that "one aspect of the new visibility of Islam in Turkey is...an emergence of a Durkheimian version of religiosity. In this version, religion refers to a class of statements and actions denoting social relationships" (1981: 358-59). Geyikdagi expands upon this: Turkey is in a state of rapid change from an agricultural to an industrial economy, from a stagnant to a dynamic society where social mobility is high. All these bring about a change in the social values. This state of anomie [my italics] creates conflicts and insecurity in the human mind. Hence, many people try to find a haven in religion and become devout believers until they adapt themselves to the new circumstances. Subsequently, they regain their self-confidence and become more flexible in their ideas. (1984: 11-12) Geyikdagi then introduces the views of Dogu Ergil, who has argued that when the status quo is destroyed, religion becomes the dominant ideology of the declining social classes. For Ergil this is the first stage of the struggle toward modernization that is succeeded by "the adoption of more progressive ideologies as their economic decline speeds up" (Geyikdagi 1984: 12). In a review of M.

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Islamic Roots and Resurgence in Turkey

E. Yapp, Geyikdagi (1984: 12) concludes that "when Turkey becomes an industrialized state that can provide a decent job and future to all its citizens, religion is likely to become a private matter between man and God and to lose much of its political importance. Turkey is now in the midst of this painful process which is a necessary phase of modernization." Again the reliance upon secular terminology and reasoning can be noted, in particular the belief that Islam is a short-term response to modernization. This can be noticed among studies that have focused on the impact of urbanization and urban migration. These factors have long been identified with the growth and appeal of various religious denominations,15 and many studies have focused on the supportive appeal of religion, compensating "for the sense of 'homelessness' following the disintegration of communal solidarities" (Sayan 1984: 125). Mardin (1989: 232) supports this tradition, arguing "that there still is much support for Durkheimian theories of 'collective representations'...we detect an aspect of Islam as communal cement and bond for solidarity."16 Picking up on the widespread patterns of urbanization in the Middle East led Sayan (1984: 123) to declare that "the attempts to reconstruct new ties of solidarity and identity through the symbols, artefacts or organizations of traditional solidarities appears to be one way of dealing with the psychological strains of modernization. This explains the popularity of Islamic revivalist movements, religious orders, traditional qur'anic principles and fundamentalist political movements." Studies have also included examples of the more pragmatic approach that Islamic groups can provide and in the process attract support, providing assistance through impressive organizational arrangements to those who need it at what Kamrava (1998: 287) refers to as the grassroots level. This is possible in many Muslim societies because they do not possess developed welfare states and there is considerable scope for groups to provide food, shelter, fuel, and medicine to poorer sectors of the community that have been most adversely affected by structural change or simply have failed to be involved in the benefits. Similar support can also be found within education (discussed in detail in Chapter 5), particularly further and higher education where the lack of state financial assistance generally means that students from poorer families are unable to progress with learning. In many situations Islamic groups will provide individuals with financial assistance and dormitories for students and thus enable them to attain higher qualifications than would otherwise have been possible. The above examples highlight the secular orientation of Islamic support studies and the reasoning behind it provided earlier. These studies can provide useful insights into the appeal of Islam, giving cultural and psychological solace and economic protection for individuals against modernity and modernization. Conversely it can also attract individuals who consider their social mobility is unjustly limited by restricted opportunities and are attracted by the potential inclusivity of Islam. Clearly these studies can, at least partly, explain praxisification among excluded groups or those who effectively feel themselves to be prevented from achieving their potential. The importance of culture and economics in both Turkey and the wider global framework are rightly

Introduction: Reviewing Praxisitioners 15 emphasized. They are grounded in the secular paradigm, however, and there is little or no attempt to examine Islam beyond those parameters or to address the interrelated complexities. Consequently the existence of Islamic praxisitioners who are educated and anticipate or have successful careers, are members of the bourgeoisie and are not displaced, materially disadvantaged, threatened, or frustrated cannot be adequately explained. These groups of praxisitioners are not necessarily attracted to religion for the defensive, pragmatic, or protectionist purposes that are usually associated with the phenomena. In this sense, these Muslims are a paradox because they conflict with common sense and challenge the legitimacy of the nation-state based on the history of knowledge that successful citizens should accept. It is important to bring the analysis out of the secular framework and view it not as a retrograde reaction to processes of modernization, because it can have a positive appeal in circumstances that are not negative and accommodate modernity, as Gellner observed: on the evidence available so far, the world of Islam demonstrates that it is possible to run a modern, or at any rate modernizing, economy, reasonably permeated by the appropriate technological, educational, organization principles and combine it with a strong, pervasive, powerfully internalized Muslim conviction and identification. A puritan and scriptualist world religion does not seem necessarily doomed to erosion by modern conditions. It may on the contrary be favoured by them. (1992: 22) Thus there is a need to change the focus for studies of praxisification. In particular the emphasis has to evolve from tautology to acknowledging that Islam offers different possibilities for believers and accepting that Muslims can be successfully incorporated within processes of modernization and yet still want to change the system in which they are achieving secular criteria. Certainly Islam can offer solutions to people who are disenfranchised from modernity, but the religion can offer much more that the secular paradigm cannot explain. Conversely neither can the paradigm explain why some people who are excluded from the processes of modernization, whose livelihoods are threatened by global capitalism, or who experience anomie as a consequence of urban migration do not become praxisitioners. I believe that this is only possible by extending the framework beyond contemporary contextual analysis to include ideology, historical context, processes of socialization, and motivation. If we use a simple example to highlight this, person Y may be in a state of normlessness, may have lost social contact with family and friends, and may be poor, homeless, and unemployed. However, if Y has not been exposed to radical Islamic ideology, the socializing agents to transmit the messages and the motivation required to undergo dramatic individual and social changes, then she or he will not become a praxis itioner. Other studies may show prevalent features, but they do not elucidate the reasoning behind the process because there is inadequate attention to both understand and explain the phenomenon. This is partly because there is a distinct lack of empirical research that addresses the multifaceted nature of Islam and the processes by which people become praxisitioners. In other words, not enough testing of theories has been undertaken. To help

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Islamic Roots and Resurgence in Turkey

address this omission I use empirical research17 that I undertook into praxisitioners and secularists that helps develop a more accurate, holistic account of the process involved in the acceptance of Islamic praxis by different groups of believers and conversely its rejection by others. BOOK OUTLINE The remainder of the publication incorporates the central dimensions of ideology, context, socializing agents, and motivation that are interconnected by processes of socialization. It is this combination that I argue has led to the contemporary nature of praxism. Chapter 2 focuses on Islamic ideology and its origins and relationship with the Ottoman Empire. A number of aspects are raised that are crucial for both understanding and explaining the recent resurgence. The chapter is designed to trace the source of praxist argument and establish what it is about Islam that can lead to the acceptance of theological beliefs and subsequent questioning of the secular state's legitimacy. This is answered by examining both the scriptural and doctrinal base of Islam, individual practices and beliefs. The significance of these beliefs is later tested in Chapter 6 with the research group of praxisitioners. Of course considerable publications concentrate upon the scriptural and doctrinal, but these publications are inadequate if studied in isolation because clearly religion exists in the material world and is part of a wider social, economic, political, and cultural context. Both practices and beliefs must be explored if we are to understand and explain the nature of the ideology and its appeal. The second part of the chapter examines the period of Muslim expansion and the role of Islam in the Ottoman Empire. This is because the contemporary nature of the Islamic resurgence can partly be explained by the early period of Islamic success and Ottoman expansionism. This period provides the legitimacy for praxist Islam today and is the basis for the incompatibility problem, discussed in detail in Chapter 6. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 examine the Turkish context, the periods 1918 to 1980 and 1980 to 2002, respectively. They build upon the preceding chapter and locate the processes of modernization and modernity within the historical and contemporary socioeconomic, political and cultural contexts. Chapter 3 outlines the ongoing decline of religious influence as part of a gradual period of secularization associated with modernization. This process was accelerated and formalized shortly after the formation of the Turkish republic. Modernization continued throughout the twentieth century and society has been in constant flux since, yet the praxist resurgence is recent. The historical and social context is fundamental to the process of praxisification, but it cannot simply be a generic reaction to modernity or globalization, because these factors were elements of Turkish society prior to the resurgence. Therefore the historical and contemporary contexts are examined and compared to establish the webs of social relations and activities that help explain why people are internalizing praxist beliefs now.

Introduction: Reviewing Praxisitioners 17 Chapter 5 focuses on socializing agents that are involved in socializing praxisitioners because clearly people must be told about Islam. Changes in socializing processes, and the role of agents in particular, are central elements in the recent resurgence and can help explain why some individuals become praxisitioners while others from the same socioeconomic group are secularists. Therefore this chapter focuses on the people, institutions, and mechanisms that are influential in transmitting norms and values. Particular attention is on the family, education, peers, and the media. Illustrative empirical evidence is used and comparative analysis is undertaken to help identify the crucial agential influences in praxisification and secularization. Chapter 6 builds upon the previous ideological and contextual analysis to identify the central components of the incompatibility problem and the interconnected circle of reinforcement in Turkey and global relations that provides the framework for comparison and challenge. The validity of this analysis is tested and supplemented by empirical research about the significance of the ideology and context divide for praxisitioners. Comparative analysis of these views is undertaken with secularists' perceptions to address significant differences. The penultimate chapter outlines processes of internalization through socialization and assesses the motivation behind the need to implement ideological beliefs. Particular attention is placed upon educated praxisitioners whom other studies cannot adequately explain, especially why they challenge the system in which they are succeeding. This dimension builds upon the agent and ideological components and incorporates research into both the reasoning and internalization processes of comparable praxisitioners and secularists. Again I am interested in addressing why the resurgence is happening now. Finally, the conclusion brings together the different dimensions under a composite framework. This enables the contemporary nature of the growth in numbers, range of praxisitioners, and intensity of beliefs to be both understood and explained. The conclusion draws together praxist ideology and interrelated demands, with the socialization processes by which individuals' beliefs were internalized, the contexts responsible for the conditions that both contribute to internalization and legitimize belief and actions and ultimately the motivational forces to want to change the system. These combined processes have led to the contemporary resurgence of praxisitioners challenging the Turkish nation-state. NOTES 1. Alevis are Shi'ite Muslims, although they are significantly different from the much better known Shi'ites of Iran. For example, they do not worship in mosques, are much less dogmatic, and incorporate a number of pre-Isiamic practices in their ceremonies. Within Turkey they are a minority and believe that they have been victims of Sunni oppression since the Ottoman Empire. This was part of the undercurrent within the extreme violence of the late 1970s, discussed in Chapter 3 and subsequent disturbances in the 1990s, discussed in Chapter 4. 2. Ozcan's study (1993) showed that between 1981 and 1988 the population increased by 20 percent while the number of mosques rose 47 percent during the same period.

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Islamic Roots and Resurgence in Turkey

3. At the time of writing the recent attempts have been unsuccessful, not least due to opposition from President Sezer, who declared the proposals to be unconstitutional. 4. The groups include Btiyuk Dogu, Hizbollah, Hizb-ut-Tehrir, Rabit'at al-Alam alIslamic, and Vardet. 5. Reported in Gulalp (1999). 6. Esposito (1992), Gole (1996), Gulalp (1999) and Meeker (1991) have all identified the role of the modern, urban, educated middle class within Islamic movements. 7. Ayata (1996: 54) has commented that "Turkey now has one of the most skewed income distributions in the world." 8. The two events that have attracted most attention globally have been the Iranian Revolution and the terrorist attacks upon America in September 2001. 9. Arjomand (1986), Ayubi (1980), Gellner (1992) and Sayan (1984) have also commented on the unsuccessful imported ideologies (whether nationalist, capitalist, or socialist/communist) and problems that have been associated with them. 10. For example, bazaaris, petite bourgeoisie, urban migrants, rural peasants, and the unemployed are seen to provide the main base of support, located in traditional or briskly changing urban areas (Alkan 1984; Gole 1996; Heper 1981; Huntingdon 1996; Salt 1995; Sunar and Toprak 1983). 11. Hiro (1997: 18) estimated that rural immigrants to urban areas accounted for 25 percent of the total population of 65 million. 12. A summary of this analysis can be found in Vertigans and Sutton (2002a). 13. Fischer (1980), Gole (1996), Heper (1981), Huntingdon (1996), Mehmet (1990), Sayan (1984), Sakalhoglu (1996) Toprak (1981) and Williamson (1987) have all addressed these points. 14. These conditions include political and economic instability, cultural changes, social restructuring, and mobility and are examined in detail in Chapter 4. 15. For example, as Arjomand (1986) noted, Methodism, Catholicism and Pentecostalism have witnessed revivals during industrialization and urbanization in England, Mexico, and Brazil, respectively. 16. It should be noted that Mardin (1989: 232) does add that studying these variables in detail requires the use of the Weberian concepts of authority relations, domination, and legitimacy within methodological individualism. 17. The research was undertaken between 1993 and 1998 as part of my Ph.D. (Vertigans 1999). It was developed as a case study of Turkish postgraduate students living in the United Kingdom and for comparative analysis included both praxisitioners and secularists. The focus was on acquiring detailed information through interviews, and this meant that only a relatively small sample (25 interviewees) was included. The results in themselves were therefore not representative but were used to test the generic applicability of other theories and studies and subsequently to develop a more inclusive explanatory framework.

2

Islam and the Rise and Fall of the Ottoman Empire INTRODUCTION In the introductory chapter I argued that history and the direct involvement of Islam in the Ottoman Empire are central to understanding contemporary Islam in Turkey. This may seem surprising given that I also state that the Islamic resurgence is a recent phenomenon in terms of both time and the historical and contemporary blend of interpretations. But I shall argue that understanding the nature of praxisitioners' beliefs requires an examination of the origins of the faith and the period when the religion gained legitimacy. 1 do not intend to provide a comprehensive review of Islam but rather to highlight the central elements for the purposes of this research. The chapter begins by focusing on core beliefs and practices that praxisitioners hold and follow. This information is then used to clarify, in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, the impact upon individual and social consciousness and why they differ from, and lead to challenge against, the contextual secular state. These chapters focus on what is actually happening and what people think about radical Islam. The roles and impact of Islam within the Ottoman Empire are then discussed. There is considerable disagreement about the extent to which Islam was practiced according to the Shari'ah during this period. Islam was the main ideology of the empire, however, and I want to describe Islam as an ideology because it provides a framework for all activities and not just those directly associated with the sacred realm. This will emphasize Islam as praxis, the synthesis of belief and action into everyday activities. ISLAM AS IDEOLOGY For a body of ideas to be deemed ideological it must be established that 1. those ideas are indeed shared by a significant number of people;

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Islamic Roots and Resurgence in Turkey

2. they form some kind of coherently related system; and 3. they connect in some way to the nature of power within society (McLennan 1995: 123).

This definition fits Islamic praxis which both affects and represents the social context. By comparison, Eurocentric religious doctrines tend to emphasize as McLennan notes, gods, spirituality, and salvation but do not refer to society and so consequently are not ideological but theological, based on individual faith. However, "most religions also involve definite notions of rightful authority, moral conduct, of the good society, of heaven on earth, and so on. Religions often carry implications about whether a particular type of hierarchy of social power is legitimate or not. Put that way, religion can be regarded as ideological in some respects" (McLennan 1995: 123). In this sense the same religion can be both social cement and agency for change. McLennan develops this point, discussing the historical legitimizing role of Catholicism in supporting the dominant ideologies, yet conversely the same doctrine can be used as a counter-ideology. For example, in some South American countries Catholic liberation theology has united priests and peasants against the landed classes. Using the same criteria, Islam can offer a complex, all-encompassing ideology that can be used for many functions. Globally, these range from the social cement role of legitimizing and solidifying a social order, in for example Iran during Khomeini's leadership, to a revolutionary challenging force providing a counter-ideology to those disenchanted with present structures, currently witnessed in many countries including Turkey and used to unite disparate groups during the Iranian revolution. As Halliday (1996: 2) has noted there is no unitary Islam. Consequently, Islam "as an object of study must first be dissolved in order to be made concrete in the study of particular events, times and places." Islam is a fluid, dynamic religion, yet as Halliday has commented both orientalist and Islamist accounts exist which perceive the religion to be static and homogeneous. There are reasonable grounds to level at least some of these criticisms against Huntingdon's (1996) influential study of the "clash of civilizations." In this study Huntingdon rightly acknowledges that many distinct cultures and subcivilizations exist within Islam (p. 45) but then contradicts this when describing "the underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power" (p. 217). This claim is not supported by any substantive evidence and adds to the misperception about a generic Islam, united in common cultural and sociopolitical analysis. The massive number of different Islamic groups within regions, nations, continents, and globally with very different beliefs, practices, visions, and strategies for action make such generations inherently flawed. I do agree with Huntingdon, although again not his diagnosis, about the focus on change that in the case of Islam in Turkey means focusing on the evolving nature of the religion and relationships within both historical and contemporary developments and experiences.

The Rise and Fall of the Ottoman Empire

21

The role of Islam throughout Turkish history has changed considerably. The Ottoman period saw Islam as a mechanism for social control, in the War of Independence it was used as a unitary force, the emergence of Republicanism led to the use of religion as a means of protest, and the introduction of democracy saw Islam as a source of mass political mobilization. The societal position of Islam has changed again because religion has regained a central role, increasingly ensconced within state structures leading to the paradoxical development of elements of institutionalized Islam seeking to destroy the secular institutional framework. Recently the government has used Islam as a source for social cement, and this usage has conversely increased the potential of Islam as a counter-ideology. The origins of this contemporary discourse can be traced to the lifetime of the prophet Muhammed. DEVELOPMENT AND LEGITIMIZATION OF ISLAM Muhammed ibn Abdullah was born in Mecca (now in Saudi Arabia) around 570 A.D. and was to become the last and most revered prophet for Muslims. In chronological terms Muhammed followed Moses and Jesus, and is considered to have delivered the final message from God, complementing the messages carried by his predecessors. He was born in a period of transition with reduced group solidarity and tribal disunity, increased private property and cultural decay, and usury and profiteering (Mehmet 1990). It was a period of tremendous change as social, economic, cultural, and political structures altered rapidly with a shift from agrarian to commercial and nomadic to settled lifestyles (Watt 1968). In this environment, Muslims believe that Muhammed received revelations from God that were to provide guidance for all spheres of life. These are recorded in the Qur'an. After receiving the messages, Muhammed preached for the establishment of an alternative moral law to solidify the emerging society, offering a new religious ideology based on ethics and justice throughout life. This led to Muhammed being perceived as a threat by the ruling elite, and he was forced to leave Mecca and went to Medina. In Medina Muhammed's fortunes improved and he was installed as the political and religious leader. He created a new solidarity around the ummah, a universal community, based on religion. All other allegiances were deemed secondary and were encouraged to "wither away" because loyalty to Allah was all-consuming. This new ideology was to smooth the transition to different societal structures. Therefore, "the injunctions of the Qur'an were translated into practice by the Prophet Muhammed (peace be upon him) thus providing a living model for all" (Ahsan 1991: 21). Belief and action are intertwined in these Islamic origins and became embedded in Muslim culture. As Gellner commented, Muslims have the "view that the Message received by the Prophet is.. .terminal, and.. .it contains both faith and morals—or, in other words, it is both doctrine and law, and that no further augmentation is to be countenanced" (1992: 6). Believers had and many continue to have "submerged their entire personality to the will of Allah, to the extent that they liked what Allah liked and they disliked what Allah disliked. They gave away not only their lives and their properties for the sake of Allah, but their whole personalities" (Murad 1985b:

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19). Consequently identity formation was, and again remains for many believers, based upon Islamic tenets. It can be argued that one of the main reasons why Islam became so popular and crucially has experienced a massive resurgence relates to what happened following the revelations to Muhammed and the ideology was legitimized. This period began during the lifetime of Muhammed and continued long after he had died. It started with successful conversions in Medina, and developed through military expeditions and new alliances. The Muslim alliance gained geographical dominance in power and economic and cultural relations and the rapid successes provided both immediate and long-standing ideological legitimacy. This stage of development culminated in Muhammed coming to an agreement with his former enemies at Mecca, and Islamic dominance was solidified. Crucially this period was based on intertwined belief and action, with social and political issues incorporated within a political-religious framework. The central tenets of the Islamic faith are found within these origins, although synthesized to varying degrees with contemporary concepts and thoughts. If we are to understand why the Islamic challenge is currently gaining momentum, then the scriptural and doctrinal criteria have to be outlined as they provide the base for today's Islamic alternatives. ISLAMIC PRINCIPLES Muslims share common cultural references of social justice and communal solidarity based upon the Shari'ah that "prescribes directives for the regulation of... individual as well as collective lives. These directives affect such varied subjects as religious rituals, personal character, morals, habits, family relationships, social and economic affairs, administration, the rights and duties of citizens, the judicial system, the laws of war and peace and international relations." In this description by one of the most influential Islamic scholars, Abu al-Ala Mawdudi (1986: 19), the totality of Islam as the way of life is stressed, which crosscuts social relations and activities and is emphasized by the public and private nature of worship, belief, and actions. Muslims across and within different sects, ethnic groups, and nations differ in their interpretations of the Shari'ah, the need to practice within social activities, and the contemporary relevance of Islamic law.1 But for Mawdudi and praxisitioners generally, religion cannot be confined to the narrow personal milieu because as the following analogy outlines, with a striking resemblance to Durkheimian functionalism, Islam can be an organic whole: the entire way of life propounded by Islam is animated by the same spirit and hence any arbitrary division of the scheme is bound to affect the spirit as well as the structure of the Islamic order. In this respect it might be compared to the human body...Islam signifies a complete way of life which cannot be split into separate parts. Consequently, it is neither appropriate to consider the different parts of the Shari'ah in isolation, nor to take any particular part and bracket it with any other "ism". The Shari'ah can function smoothly only if one's whole life is lived in accordance with it. (Mawdudi 1986: 19-20)

The Rise and Fall of the Ottoman Empire

23

For all Muslims the Shari'ah is central to their faith and is derived from the Qur'an, the eternal word of God, and hadiths that are traditions based on "the authoritative word of Muhammed or his companions" (Campo 1991: 28). Hadiths generally possess greater depth and complexity than the Qur'anic statements, upon which they build, but can lack the latter's divine authenticity. Because the Qur'an was definitively established within a generation of Muhammed's death, its authority is unquestioned by Muslims. The hadiths were compiled in the ninth century A.D. and lack the Qur'an's mandate (Mortimer 1982). Both are open to different interpretations today, not least because as Mortimer explains, Muhammed passed messages to a very different society with different structures and semantics. And as Ahmed (1992) noted, Islamic concepts and social practices were heavily influenced by the conceptions, assumptions, and social customs of the places that the Muslims conquered. Since societies, culture, and language have evolved, creating problems of definition, understanding, and explanation, there appear to be "not one Islam but many Islams, because one finds such an enormous variety of Islamic thought and practice" (Mortimer 1982: 398). The praxisitioner is distinct from less radical Muslims because of the emphasis placed upon both the need to believe in the central tenets of the faith and the need to act according to these interpretations. Many nonpraxist Muslims will be content for their faith to be a matter of private, passive belief and limited actions that do not threaten the secular status quo. These Muslims are believers but not praxisitioners. For praxisitioners, the ethnic, linguistic, national, political, and contextual differences will prove difficult barriers that need to be surmounted. Objections about the theological legitimacy are irrelevant for this study because it is the confidence with which praxisitioners believe in the all-encompassing nature of Islam and the subsequent consequences that are under investigation. As part of this general process praxisitioners are not intended to be examples of particular groups within Islamic movements. They are the focus of attention because of the generic values and beliefs that they hold and the actions that they practice and actively promote. Like praxisitioners across the Muslim world, they come from a variety of backgrounds and their ideology is heavily influenced by a multinational list of authors that includes the Pakistani Mawdudi, the Eqyptians Qutb and al-Banna, the Iranians Khomeini and Shariati, and the Turks Bulac and Ozel. And to highlight the limited integration within wider Islamic groups, for Sunni praxisitioners there is a lack of involvement of the ulema, who are widely considered to be too traditional and bound to the secular state. However, while theocratic vicissitudes are common, the general principles of belief are agreed upon. Within the Islamic world there are globally standardized precepts (e.g., the "five pillars"; see the following text) and acceptance of the ummah concept or Islamic community, although not its meaning or implementation. A degree of standardization occurs within groups of believers because behavior can be guided in all spheres, including economics. For example, the Shari'ah can be seen to promote free trade and individual ownership but is against excessive individualism and the pursuit of wealth for its own sake. Again, this belief and practice are often misunderstood and mean that

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contrary to Weber's orientalism, the spirit of Islam did not and does not prevent capitalism. It does, however, stop the excessive deregulation and individualist consequences. Mawdudi states that Muslims should believe that "everything in this world belongs to Allah. As such, man's life and wealth, which are part of this world, also belong to Him, because He has created them and has entrusted them to every man for his use. Looked at from this angle, the question of 'selling' or 'buying' may not seem to arise at all; God does not need to buy what is already His and man cannot sell what is not really his" (1986: 12). Under this reasoning humans cannot use materialism as the basis to barter their way into the Hereafter, but as I shall show in the Turkish examples, they can use their wealth toward expanding the influence of Islam and in the process help Islam and please Allah. The Shari'ah provides Muslims with a "massive body of regulations based upon precepts found in the Qur'an and other Islamic writings and crucially is still perceived to have potential relevance. It covers both the most intimate aspects of life (such as personal hygiene and sexual relations) and the most public (such as taxation and warfare)" (Pipes 1989: 123). Considerable emphasis is placed upon "the collective enforcement of public morals" (Ayubi 1991: 35). In much of the Islamic literature there is focus on both the public and private, and this is often overlooked within academic analysis. Followers of the implementation of the Shari'ah adhere to the principle of Allah's absolute rulership. They are actively opposed to what they perceive to be a movement away from its origins with the artificial segregation of Islam into sacred and profane spheres that are subdivided into different life worlds, even though their invocations are likely to be at best only loosely based on the original prescriptions. The basis for contemporary praxisitioners to resist imposed, seemingly artificial, divides can be found in the interweaving of belief and action as, "Islamic life is based on two solid foundations: (a) belief and (b) action. Belief without action is of no use, nor is action without belief of any value. Both must go together and remain together" (Ahsan 1977: 8). "There are three fundamental beliefs [with another two for Shi'ites] which form the basis of Islamic faith: the Oneness of God...Prophethood...and Life after Death" (Ahsan 1977:8). 1. Oneness of God emphasizes the monotheism of Islam. Allah is the All-powerful, Ruler and Master, an all-seeing, all-knowing omnipresence. This "is the foundation of Islam, the bedrock of the Muslims' creed" and this belief "finds expression in every cultural or social practice, whether it be the etiquette of everyday life, the norms of human interrelationships, the modes of eating and dressing or even the slaughtering of animals" (McDermott and Ahsan 1980: 16-17). Human weaknesses and Allah's incomparable superiority ensure that "guidance received by God can be the only criterion for right and wrong" (Ahsan 1977: 9). 2. The belief in prophethood emphasizes the role of a range of messengers, commencing with Adam, who had communication with Allah and who in turn communicated his message to the people, to (re-)direct them onto the righteous path. "Every Muslim is required, as an integral part of his faith, to believe and respect all the Prophets of God. Denial of one is the denial of all, and is enough to take one outside the fold of Islam" (McDermott and Ahsan 1980: 17).

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3. The third fundamental belief is in life after death as "Muslims...believe in the Hereafter and the Day of Judgement where each individual will be called to account for his or her conduct and rewarded accordingly. Those who were good in this life will be given Paradise as a reward, whereas those who did not follow God's commands and lived unjustly will be punished in Hell" (Ahsan 1991: 11-12). This belief is crucial to praxisitioners and distinguishes their patterns of behavior from those of other Muslims who have no firm conviction in this regard, and are prone to modify their conduct in relation to immediate or foreseeable consequences according to their perceptions of society (McDermott and Ahsan 1980). The importance of salvation is explored in Chapter 7 because the concept is central to understanding what motivates praxisitioners to demand change. For proof of individual faith, Muslims are expected to combine the preceding beliefs with the following actions, the "five pillars" that are the common basis for popular Islamic behavior. 1. The profession of faith (shahada)—Muslims profess their allegiance to Allah, a belief in one God and his messenger; 2. Prayer (salat)—to be performed five times per day, with children encouraged to start as soon as they can, but by the age of twelve they are obliged to have commenced; 3. Almsgiving (zakat)—obligatory payments, toward weaker elements of the community; 4. Annual fast of Ramadan (Sawn)—all food, drink, and sexual behavior are banned for one month between dawn and dusk; 5. Pilgrimage to Mecca (Hajj)—an obligation all Muslims must perform at least once during their lifetime unless they do not possess the resources. Of these five pillars, "the first two are daily duties, the second two are annual obligations" and "a pilgrimage to Makka is a once in a lifetime event of great magnitude and significance in the heart of every Muslim" (McDermott and Ahsan 1980: 28). An individual who denies the existence of a pillar is not a Muslim. If the pillar is simply not practiced, the person remains a Muslim but one who has sinned. Devout Muslims will adhere to the five pillars and other key tenets of the faith to be found in the Shari'ah's regulations, norms, and values for the public and private spheres and will believe in the three obligatory principles of one God, the existence of Muhammed and the Prophets, and salvation. Again, anyone who does not believe in the principles cannot be a Muslim. However, people differ in the nature of their devotion, in the depth and intensity of their belief and the actions they undertake. The model for praxisitioners developed in the following section expands the range of beliefs and actions to encompass Islam as a way of life. BELIEF AND ACTION AS A WAY OF LIFE: PRAXISM A wide variety of Muslim beliefs and actions can be discovered that claim legitimacy based on the Shari'ah. Halliday (1996: 31) has remarked that these specifications are "partial" and "tell us very little about how Muslims will or do

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act in any society or political situation." Islamic groups have not provided a universally agreed upon comprehensive guide, based on a static unchanging system. But crucially they believe it is possible, as McDermott and Ahsan (1980: 17) stated, that Islam can provide a universal base as "the belief in God permeates every walk of a Muslim's life and finds expression in every cultural or social practice, whether it be the etiquette of everyday life, the norms of human inter-relationships, the modes of eating and dressing, or even the slaughtering of animals." Qutb (1964: 9) has outlined this ideological totality, stating, "Islam is not a mere creed, nor does it represent simply an edification of souls, or a refinement and training of human virtues but is rather a harmonious whole that also includes a just economic system, a well balanced social organization, codes of civil, criminal as well as international law, a philosophical outlook upon life along with a system of physical instruction." These interpretations portray Islam as a totality that does not acknowledge any dichotomies between the self/social and spiritual/material. This enables praxist Islam to be able to provide both metaphysical and social guidance, ranging from assisting the individual in understanding life to a comprehensive behavioral frame of reference. To develop an earlier point, praxisitioners are involved in reciprocal relations with Allah; they must practice at both individual and social levels while the deity will assist individuals in changing themselves and the social environment. The appeal of contemporary praxis is based on these historical precepts and adapted within modern conditions and politicized concepts. It is maintained that "an Absolute Authority, severely external to this world and its various cultures, dictates Its Will to Its Creation: and that transcendent Will derives its legitimacy precisely from its unsullied, extraneous and absolute origin" (Gellner 1992: 73). This practice of beliefs and actions during periods of success and relative lack of involvement when Islam lost influence provides praxisitioners with a double legitimacy that forms a central part of a circle of reinforcement. The significance of Islam as a way of life has often been overlooked and cannot be closeted within culture, because it also crosscuts social, political, economic, and legal spheres. In this sense, Huntingdon's (1996) overconcentration on cultural identity reflects much recent analysis. The history of Islam highlights the comparative demise between the past and present. But again, this is often overlooked. For example, Halliday argues that Islamists "feel themselves to be under threat: it is the fear of loss of social control that animates the activities of their leaders, traditional and new.... Aggressive and aggrieved as they may sound, theirs is a defensive cry" (1996: 125-26). But many Muslims do not fear the loss of social control; it has already been lost. Consequently rather than defending what Halliday implies is the indefensible traditional culture, praxisitioners are offensively seeking to bring about what they perceive to be positive change in accordance with the tenets of their faith and restore Islamic social control. Halliday's explanation can partly account for behavior in conservative Middle Eastern countries, but it is not applicable in Western nations, as Halliday claims, because many of the Islamists he describes are young radicals whose experiences of social control will be based on secular domination. And crucially for this research, Halliday cannot explain the

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emergence of praxisitioners in Turkey where social control at state level has been lost for at least eighty years. At an individual level many of the praxisitioners have never possessed real control. Halliday also states that "Islam is 'in danger,' and it is seen to be under threat not so much from without, something that has always been the case, as from the loss of belief and of submission emerging within" (1996: 127). This claim is not valid for the Islamic followers that are the focus of this study because rather than "submission occurring within," they are increasing in assertiveness and aggression, "within" and "beyond." The basis for behavior of these Muslims can be located within Islamic precepts. As it says in the Qur'an, "And there are some men who sell their selves, seeking God's pleasure; and God is most compassionate towards His servants. O Believers, surrender yourselves wholly unto God" (Surah 2, 207208) for "you cannot bring your own self wholly under Allah unless His claim upon your life, love and loyalty becomes the most urgent and important" (Murad 1985a: 21). Praxisitioners will strictly adhere to the five pillars but as Ibrahim's study (1980) of Egyptian Islamic militants highlighted for them, a good Muslim "must do more"; to be a good Muslim one must see "that the will of God...is truly fulfilled at the collective level as well...the righteous Muslim cannot exist individually; he must strive to build and maintain a righteous community of the faithful. Struggling to bring that about is the duty of every true Muslim" (1980: 430). Ahsan (1991: 21) has remarked that "Islam does not divide life into what is sacred and what is secular. Every aspect of life has been taken into consideration and guidance has been provided in all fields. Hence every action of a Muslim can be regarded as worship...if it is done with the intention of fulfilling God's commands." Therefore it is argued that praxist Islam does not adhere to Durkheim's sacred and profane dichotomy. Inevitably this will lead to confrontation with competing state and other theological ideologies and interpretations. The emphasis is on social restructuring, not simply individual spiritual rejuvenation, because the private faith of the individual is interlinked with public behavior. This attitude is well conveyed by Murad, who argues from the praxist perspective, "what purpose in life could be more valuable, more compelling, more important, more urgent, than that of bringing the whole man [sic]—his inner personality, his environment, his society, the entire world—to the path of Allah" (1985a: 8). To reiterate an earlier point because it is central, these beliefs and actions originated during the time of Muhammed and remain fundamental within Islamic revisionism today. It is equally important, however, to understand what has happened since that period because it has both legitimized Islam and delegitimized alternative ideologies for praxisitioners as the popularist base for assessment of contemporary society. RISE AND FALL OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE Following the death of Muhammed (632 A.D.), Islam continued to spread across the Arabian peninsula into Africa, Asia, and Europe during the time of the three great Muslim dynasties, Umayyads of Damascus (661-750), Abbasids of Baghdad

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(750-1517), and the Ottoman Empire (1342-1918). For three centuries (until the tenth) Islam continued to expand both militarily and in a domain that is often neglected, intellectually. Throughout the different empires Islam as an ideology adapted to local conditions and was used by rulers to legitimize policies, for example, charging rent-cum-tax and to secure and reinforce power, and ultimately transforming the concept of tawhid (one-ness, unification, monothesism) "into unique, supreme, and absolute power for the ruler" (Ayubi 1991: 15). "Islamic scholars, ulema, pushed the frontiers of ancient Greek rationalism to new heights. Then, in the tenth century...the ulema declared the 'Gate of Knowledge' closed, believing all possible human problems had been answered, and decreed that henceforth only education by imitation would be possible. Theology replaced rationalism and Islamic scholarship and creativity entered a long period of decline" (Mehmet 1990: 11). From this period the focus on intellectual progress diminished. Muslim dynasties continued to dominate militarily, however, and none more so than the Ottomans. The dramatic rise and fall of the Ottoman Empire has had lasting implications for the contemporary Turkish state. One needs to understand the importance of the successes and to examine the fundamental failures that led to the demise of an empire that once dominated most of the Middle East, Asia Minor, North Africa, and substantial parts of southern Europe. The perceptions of Islamic influence within periods of both success and failure have had a crucial impact upon the reemergence of praxist interpretations within Turkey. Today Turkish children are taught about the history of Turks and are encouraged to feel nationalistic pride in their ancestors' warrior exploits and ancient civilization. However, a lot of the curriculum is historically debatable. Even the ethnic origins of the Turks are difficult to establish. Generally Turks, or more likely an ethnic mix that became known as "Turk," are believed to have originated from Central Asia. It was here that they are thought to have first experienced Islam, through military contact and trade, and began to accept the recently emerged, rapidly expanding religion. Gradually many Turks started to leave the region due to drought and moved westward toward the surrounding Byzantine Empire. They were initially employed as slave fighters and guards for the Baghdad rulers. In the eleventh century, some Turks formed their own warrior groups and successfully gained control of Baghdad and penetrated large parts of Anatolia in 1071, which provides a substantial part of Turkey today. Turkification and the increasing dominance of Islam continued until the thirteenth century when the Mongols invaded and defeated the ruling Seljuk Sultanate, leaving the peninsula fragmented into numerous emirates.2 The Turcoman revival occurred with the emergence of Osman (1299-1324) and the Osmanli (Ottoman) dynasty he established. Osman quickly gained control of neighboring land and began a long period of expansion. This sequence continued until the beginning of the fifteenth century when the Mongols again defeated the Anatolian army. However, the Mongols quickly left the territory and after an internal power struggle the Ottomans resumed control. In 1453 the Ottomans were led by the much-revered Mehmet II and finally defeated their Byzantine adversaries and took possession of Constantinople

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(later renamed Istanbul). The victory was quickly followed by military conquest of the surrounding areas of Greece, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and part of Albania. At this time orthodox Sunni Islam was becoming increasingly dominant. The connection between the empire and religion was formally legitimized and closely entwined by 1516 when Sultan Selim I added Egypt, Syria, and Mesopotamia to the empire. This meant that Ottomans now possessed many of the important Islamic cities and the caliphate title (successor to the prophet Muhammed) from the Egyptian Mamluks. The titles of caliph and sultan quickly became synonymous and the Ottomans were now considered the legitimate defenders of Muslims, in particular the Sunni faith, and protectors of the holy cities and shrines. The period of expansion continued during the reign of Siileyman the Magnificent (1520-1566), and Rhodes, Belgrade, and much of Hungary became part of the empire. While the Ottomans did lose some battles, notably Malta, they were without rival the leading global power of the period and were achieving that power under the rubric of Islam. The expansionism continued under Selim II (1566-1574) and Murad III (1574-1595) as Cyprus, Georgia, and some Iranian provinces became part of the empire. Estimates of the total population within the empire during this period range from twenty to fifty million and included a bewildering mix of ethnic, national, cultural, and religious groups. Overall, the Muslims were the most populous religious group and included Turks, Kurds, Arabs, and Berbers and Bosnian, Albanian, and Bulgarian converts. This mix of crosscutting unities and equally important conflicts played a fundamental part in the empire's final collapse and in the cases of Muslim Kurds and Alevis the ethnic disputes within contemporary Turkey. Initially the Ottomans were able to govern the heterogeneous population by establishing that each significant religious community was subject to the religious laws of that community. Thus Muslims were subjected to the Shari'ah and non-Muslims were subject to the civil laws of their millets (religious communities) and own courts for personal status issues. Millets had their own leaders, and these arrangements enabled the different communities to be part of the empire while retaining some autonomy and control over their own lifestyles. The rule of the sultan over the empire was in theory absolute, and he was held accountable only to God and restricted by the Shari'ah. This meant that the ulema who interpreted religious law had considerable power and were able to advise and restrict sultans' policies and actions.3 The theocratic nature of the empire is much contested.4 Toprak (1988) has pointed out that as early as the Classical Period (fourteenth to sixteenth centuries) the ulema were incorporated within the state bureaucracy. It is probably least contentious to state that Islam had a heavy influence on the empire in political, economic, social, and legal spheres until the nineteenthcentury reforms, described in the following paragraphs. However, at no point was the empire based exclusively upon the Shari'ah; indeed, there is little guidance within the Qur'an about establishing or working within an Islamic state. Pragmatically it can also be argued that the Islamic content needed to be

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balanced to ensure that the empire's multiethnic and religious fabric retained intact. Within the empire, orthodox Sunni Islam was taught by the ulema who were the judges, theologians, preachers, and teachers. This Islamic interpretation was, however, by no means universal, because it tended to be practiced alongside popular Islam, Sufism, that was and remains more personal and mystical in belief and practice. Sufism appealed to a wide range of believers with its more eclectic approach compared with the more regimented and austere orthodoxy.5 The empire was probably at its most influential and powerful during the latter part of the sixteenth century. Crete and southern Poland were added in the seventeenth century, but this was not a successful period to compare with the previous century. It is difficult to precisely identify when the decline began, but a period of slow retraction occurred during the seventeenth century. Probably the greatest symbol of changing fortunes was the eventual failure and decimation of the army during the siege of Vienna. From a position of apparent invincibility the Ottomans had to make concessionary treaties, for example, Kucuk Kaynarca (1774) and Jassy (1792) that were made with the expanding Russian empire. Over a period of three centuries, large territories were lost, starting with Hungary in the seventeenth century, Greece, Algeria, Bulgaria, and BosniaHerzegovina in the nineteenth century and Crete, Libya, and Albania early in the twentieth century. The remaining Arab land was lost as a consequence of the Ottomans' participation and subsequent defeat in the First World War. This gradual period of decline was paralleled by increasing Western influence that first became noticeable during the sixteenth century with the introduction of the system that was to become the capitulations. This system was introduced because the sultan was eager to encourage trade within and beyond the empire. To encourage the process he allowed privileges, initially to French traders and later expanded to other nationalities. These privileges included exemption from taxes and in case of dispute or criminal activity, the right to be judged according to the traders' consular foreign law. The treaty was a reciprocal arrangement but one which the Ottomans rarely used. This meant Europeans came to dominate both imports and exports. As Western power expanded, the capitulations were utilized by Europeans to improve their trading prospects, subsequently reducing Ottoman sovereignty to varying degrees across the empire.6 The challenge by Euro-Christian nations also heavily influenced the growth of nationalism within the millets creating another internal challenge for the Ottomans. Gradually the empire dropped to a lowly position in international relations and was perceived as the "sick man of Europe" by the increasingly dominant Western nations. But unlike many other older empires it was not formally colonized because the competition among rival nations for the territory and markets conversely helped maintain its existence. The competing Europeans, fearing the ascendancy of their rivals, allowed the empire to survive, thereby guaranteeing a share of the spoils.7 Many additional, often crosscutting, reasons were responsible for the decline. For example, there were too many vested interests in preventing innovation so that the empire failed to build upon developments. Dunn (1989) has identified a

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number of influential groups whose economic and political interests were considered best represented by stopping secularization and the modernization of the military. Indeed this could also be applied to the sultans and ruling elite, whose power had been interwoven with religion since the capture of the caliphate. Consequently any movement toward secularization could lead to serious problems of legitimacy, because the Ottoman rulers would be of less relevance in the power relations of a secular society. In addition, the administration system in place had been established during the period of expansion and was much less suited to the period of entrenchment.8 If we develop these points it can be argued the Ottomans also found it difficult to respond to the new challenges because a culture permeated the empire that had been based on longstanding success and they became complacent. Also, it took generations to realize that they did not have a divine right to prosper and the ways of the past were not necessarily the most appropriate. Other factors to take into account are the discovery of, and opportunities within, the Americas that led to the influx of cheap silver into the empire in the late sixteenth century and contributed to massive inflation. The Ottoman government was used to stable currency and prices and proved unable to adequately deal with the crisis. Prices of goods and raw materials were seriously affected, and European merchants increasingly imported cheaper goods from India and the Persian Gulf. The traditional silk routes through the Middle East and Central Asia were circumvented by the growing use of sea trading around Africa that developments in navigation and shipping enabled. As the Ottomans confronted major economic problems, they were simultaneously confronted by changes in military warfare that required greater financial commitment for weapons and maintenance. The modernization of warfare meant that toward the end of the empire, the military apparatus used by industrial nations could no longer be imitated by nonindustrial societies. This was because as Dunn identified (1989) modern weaponry now required modern armies. These armies could function only within societies that provided secular educated personnel for the forces. Greater financial resources were also required to meet the ongoing costly developments in industrial techniques and processes to mass-produce weapons. European nation-states were able to meet these increasing costs through expanding tax revenues that were beyond the Ottomans. It was impossible for the Ottomans to compete over the long term without these interrelated resources. In addition, the Ottomans' fighting units were not as efficient or effective as previously. Changes to the fief arrangements resulted in fewer experienced cavalrymen being available, and the local order that had been maintained for generations began to disintegrate as peasants lost land and started the process of urban migration. Key corps and government posts became nebulous and increasingly open to corruption. Finally, the quality of the sultans' leadership deteriorated. Davison (1990) has attributed this to two main changes. Firstly, newly enthroned sultans had previously arranged for all their brothers to be killed to avoid any subsequent challenges and possible splitting of support and the empire. This practice continued until the beginning of the seventeenth

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century when the new sultan allowed his brothers to live in apartments or "cages."9 From this point onward, the successor was the oldest surviving male, be he son, brother, or uncle. Secondly, the sultans' sons had previously been sent to different provinces to gain administrative and military experience. This practice changed in the early seventeenth century with the introduction of the cages and meant princes gained no practical experience that had previously helped them to govern. Consequently the sultans were often ill equipped and ill suited for the role and gradually lost power and influence to self-centered court officials. The decline of the empire was thus a complex process that involved "economic, military, social, administrative and psychological problems" (Davison 1990: 16). This period remains much disputed within contemporary Turkey, and its significance for praxisitioners is crucial today. It is also important to acknowledge that a number of attempts were made to reverse the decline. OTTOMAN REFORM PERIOD As we have seen, the decline of the Ottoman Empire from leading global power to "sick man" occurred over centuries. However, it was not a unilinear process, because the Ottomans made a number of significant attempts to stem the flow of lost land, prestige, and revenue during a period of reforms. The final event that directly led to the reform process was a shattering defeat by the Russians in 1774. After this defeat the Ottomans sought to reform and a number of changes were introduced to try to prevent the increasing dominance of European nations. Because the Europeans had made rapid progress, often at the expense of the Ottomans, the Ottomans crudely adopted a number of the Europeans' practices that were considered to be the basis for Western success. For example, because the West had recently proved militarily superior in combat, the Ottomans copied their techniques, tactics, and tools, Prussian military advisors arrived in the 1830s, and a military academy was established. A medical school and civil service were created and Western dress became mandatory, with the turban being replaced by the fez. There was thus pressure, as Saffet Pa§a (1814-1883), statesman and minister, remarked to accept the "civilization of Europe in its entirety: in short to prove itself a 'civilized state."10 It was generally considered that there was no need for major social reforms, and the majority of the empire's subjects remained unaffected (Davison 1990; Peretz 1988). The family, elders, and village continued to be the major socializing agents with the often-unconscious objective of maintaining the equilibrium. These communities were self-sufficient and often isolated, certainly from the urban elite, and loyalties did not exceed the community boundaries. The wider unity that did exist was achieved through "the bond that held the Moslem masses...and the rulers together was religious uniformity, not political consciousness" (Kazamias 1966: 40). n Generally the reforms that were introduced had more impact on urban areas but tended to be adopted on a piecemeal basis and were isolated to particular spheres. While the empire was

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reluctant to confront underlying structural problems, it was becoming heavily indebted to foreign capital, leading to the capitulations' being extended. Resident foreigners generally undertook all foreign and most internal trade. "Perpetual indebtedness provided a leverage European governments felt free to exploit....In time bureaucrats found themselves at the mercy of the lenders" (Keyder 1987: 38). Europeans were providing the funds as loans that the Ottomans used to buy Western products and were increasingly taking control over transport and amenities in the key locations, such as Istanbul, Izmir, and Salonika. These restrictions and external pressures led to the introduction of more short-term measures that sought to address the growing problems. For the Ottomans, the strategic options were limited because the growth in debt was accompanied by a consummate increase in European control over repayments and economic policies (Dunn 1989). As the above pressures grew, the reform process accelerated with the introduction of the Tanzimat period in 1839. This was a period of the most dramatic changes thus far, seeking to bring about major reorganization of provincial administration, education, and the judiciary. Its results were that some of the sultan's powers were delegated, Islamic law was replaced by Western legal codes, civil society became more prominent, newspapers were permitted, and secular education was introduced. This meant that administration became more bureaucratic as the center became more modernized with the intention it would develop outward. Social communication developed as part of emerging global networks. And in Istanbul, Western cultural behavior became increasingly noticeable as cafes, dance halls, European clothes, and music were introduced. As part of the 1876 Constitution it was intended to introduce compulsory education, but this was never implemented during the duration of the empire.12 It was felt that if the Ottoman empire was to modernize then the education system had to be removed from the religious institutions, which sought "to induct the masses of the people into the Ottoman Islamic culture" (Kazamias 1966: 31-32) and be replaced by a Westernized curriculum. However, Islamic learning institutions were not abolished, and so when the secular educational institutions were opened a learning dualism was created with two systems13 in operation that were both seeking to be the dominant influence (Geyikdagi 1984). The reform process did, however, create opportunities for discontent to be voiced, and these opportunities led to criticism of the rulers growing and pressure increasing for the adoption of a constitutional monarch. In the face of this opposition Sultan Abdulhamid dissolved parliament in 1878 and ruled dictatorially. During the earlier reforms, Islam had diminished in influence over social, political, and economic spheres because it did not accord with established European secular patterns. The substantial influence of the ulema, which provided legitimacy for the ruler's claim to be the temporal and spiritual representative of the people, was gradually reduced because sultans increasingly emphasized their own temporal roles. The previous division of power that had left the socialization of believers to the ulema in family, education, and legal matters was gradually being transferred to the state (Toprak 1981). It could be

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considered surprising that the higher ulema continued to support the sultans even though modernizing had undermined their own positions. This support can be explained by the relationship between the ulema and sultans. Generally the ulema were dependent on the rulers for whatever power and prestige they had left. Consequently the higher ulema throughout the empire rarely provided leadership in resistance struggles. The religious figures that did become involved in revolutionary movements tended to be at a lower level and were removed from social and economic contact with the elite and were in close contact with rural or urban masses. Gradually the dual role that Islam had been able to perform for centuries as both a mechanism of control and cohesion (Toprak 1981) was changing because secularization was widening the gap between the Muslim masses and elite. It was partly to reinforce the Muslim bond and develop Pan-Islamism in a period of rising nationalism14 that the sultan reintroduced the caliph term which had become disused in the hope that this would help unite the remaining groups.15 In this sense Islam continued to be utilized by the empire for its own ends. Pan-Islamism was not able to stem the tide of disenchantment because it did not provide sufficient support, encouragement, and scope to address the challenges that the empire faced. Not surprisingly this approach also disenfranchised non-Muslims. By 1908 opposition had grown and was sufficiently strong to reduce the sultan's authority. A new government was installed that consisted of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), better known as the Young Turks. The new government was immediately faced with growing nationalist opposition that had besieged other administrations. After reviewing the failure of both pan-Islam and the earlier reformers' Ottomanism that had aimed to provide equality to all subjects irrespective of religion or nationality and which the CUP initially supported, a policy of pan-Turkism was introduced. This policy was intended to unite the Turkish ethnic groups that were dispersed throughout the empire who "constituted...the largest ethnic group" and were also "by default, the most loyal" (Keyder 1988: 197). As Icduygu et al. (1999: 193) remarked, this was "the first attempt to search for a Turkish identity... and... to transform the Empire into a model of a homogeneous state based on the premise of one state, one nation." While this was partially successful as a unitary policy for Turks, it simply enhanced the secessionist demands of the remaining ethnic groups, for example, Albanians, Arabs, Armenians, Jews, and Kurds. Thus the CUP had changed the emphasis from religion, as the source of unity that had isolated a significant number of nonMuslims, to nationalism that isolated other nationalities. During their time in power the CUP sought to bring about many other changes, including accelerating the secularization process by introducing more nonreligious education, courts, and military institutions. The marriage contract was removed from religious control to become part of secular law, although arranged marriages remained. There was a return to the 1876 Constitution and the objective of compulsory, free public elementary education was restated. Secondary and university education was also restructured under the influence of the French system. Teacher training was improved, particularly in rural areas,

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and good teachers were rewarded financially. There was also a belief that religious schools needed to be reformed in accordance with the perceived demands of modernization. Female education and employment were encouraged and opportunities improved, especially during the First World War when there was a labor shortage of male workers. Undoubtedly the CUP's reforms were more progressive than previous attempts and created opposition, particularly from some members of the popular ulema who wanted to return to the Shari'ah. An unofficial political party of opposition was formed called the Society of Muhammed, and with support, notably from some army members, they overpowered Parliament in 1909 and gained control for two weeks until defeated by army supporters of the Young Turks. The CUP was then reinstalled and continued the reform process. These reforms were also ultimately doomed to failure. The rulers believed progress could be achieved only by imitating the West, but they felt unable to confront their Islamic past and totally remove religion from state influence. Consequently there was confusion and conflict over the direction and policies that the state should take, as witnessed to a lesser degree within education. As Toprak (1981) observed, this dilemma led to Western secular institutions without secular systems. This attempt at secularization was defensive and reactive in nature and was not able to gradually evolve, and large sections of the population remained outside the process. The highly influential social commentator Ziya Gokalp stated at the time, "one portion of our nation is living in an ancient, another in a medieval, and another in a modern age. How can the life of a nation be normal with such a threefold life."16 Overall the reforms were only superficially successful and the Ottomans continued to lose land. During the nineteenth century, Russia gained territory, France obtained Algeria and Tunis, Britain occupied Cyprus and Egypt and Austria claimed Bosnia. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Italy took Tripoli in Libya and a coalition of Balkan states seized the remaining European land, with the exception of Istanbul and the surrounding area. The reforms had been introduced principally to preserve the social order and involved a "partial abandonment of identity in the effort to preserve any identity at all" (Dunn 1989: 179). Ultimately they failed in this primary aim because the remnants of empire and the social order were dismembered in the aftermath of the First World War. The competition between the German, French, and British countries for markets had probably prolonged the duration of the empire that had long ceased to possess anything like the power and influence that it had at its zenith. The First World War clearly divided the competing parties, and the empire's still considerable territory was fought over. The desire to protect the empire ultimately led the Ottomans to join forces with Germany. This was because Germany wanted to help prevent secessionism that it felt would strengthen the strategic position of France and Britain, in particular their designs on the Arab provinces and Russia's intention to establish an Armenian protectorate in Eastern Anatolia. Thus the desire to prevent the dismemberment of the Ottoman empire to the advantage of first Russia and then Britain and France led to the alliance (Keyder 1987). Defeat meant the end of the Ottoman empire and the division of its remaining territories.

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CONCLUSION In this chapter a framework of praxist beliefs and practices has been developed to incorporate the history of Islam as a world religion and in particular involvement within the Ottoman Empire and the significance of this period in legitimizing the ideology. If the Islamic resurgence is to be explained then the appeal of Islam needs to be understood as providing a framework for life. The significance of the historical success of Islam in political, economic, and sociocultural spheres is developed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, because I believe that the period has provided praxisitioners with an alternative to other metanarratives, based on, and legitimized by, past experiences. This period ended for a number of reasons that included the development of Western influence and a reduction in Islamic power. The latter has been identified as fundamental to the decline by praxisitioners and crucially provides guidance on what is needed for the way forward. In this instance, Islam has been legitimized by the decrease in practice as the empire became weaker. The events since the end of empire now become the focus because the movement toward a secular society has clearly been instrumental in the demand for the Shari'ah. However, because this change formally occurred eighty years ago, the different system alone cannot explain the contemporary nature of the Muslim resurgence. To begin to understand and explain why this is occurring now we must compare the different contexts and time periods in order to identify the responsible underlying mechanisms. This process starts by focusing on the history of the Turkish republic from 1918 to 1980.

NOTES 1. The Qur'an emphasizes unity of faith and behavior with allegiance primarily to God. "There is no distinction or discrimination on the basis of colour, race, nationality or ethnic background. In fact, Islam unites all men and makes them abandon their old prejudices and superstitions, making them a single community" (Ahsan 1991: 9). However, following the death of Muhammed, different interpretations have evolved and the idealism/pragmatism chasm that first surfaced during the time of concession over Mecca reopened. Many followers wanted a successor in the same pragmatic vein (which ensured the influential elite remained) while other Muslims argued for a direct descendant of Muhammed. This divide resulted in two different forms: Sunni, to which 85 percent of Muslims belong today, and; Shi'ite, which is dominant in Iran and numerically (but not politically under the Baathist regime) popular in Iraq. Even within the Sunni form, four main schools of Islamic thought and interpretation existed, which crystallized during the tenth Century A.D. (before the Gate of Knowledge closed; see the preceding text). The four are: Hanafite, to which nearly half of Sunnis belong including Turks; Shafi'ites; Malikites; and Hanabalites. Sufism is another strain of Islam and is generally a mystical form with emphasis upon less conventional spiritualism. 2. Further details can be found in Davison (1990), Heper (1985), Pope and Pope (1997), and Weiker (1991). 3. Davison (1990) discusses these points in some detail. 4. See for example, Inalcik (1973), Kadioglu (1998), Kazamias (1966), Khalidi (1997), Toprak (1988), and Turan (1991).

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5. Popular Islam has remained popular in varying forms throughout Turkish history, exemplified by probably the most famous followers, the Whirling Dervishes (the Mevlevi). 6. Ahmed (1992) points out that the area that is today Turkey was part of a vanguard for the new markets while the Arabian peninsula was less directly affected until the twentieth century. 7. These points are discussed in greater detail in Dunn (1989); Peretz (1988). 8. Davison (1990), Dunn (1989), Lewis (1974), and Rustow (1965), all discuss this in some detail. 9. Fratricide was generally supported until nineteen brothers were killed on the accession of Mehmed, and this act changed perceptions and partly led to ending the practice. 10. Quoted in Mardin (1989: 113). 11. Again, this is not to state that there was only one Islam. Mardin (1989) has also commented on two divergent types, a state-supported orthodox religion and a folk religion, operating at the grassroots level. As secularism developed, this gap broadened. 12. Further details can be found Berkes (1964), Davison (1990), Kadioglu (1998), Mardin (1989), Peretz (1988), and Rustow (1965). 13. Mardin (1989), refers to three divergent streams, dividing the religious schools between the medrese (religious school) and the tekke (the lodge of Sufi orders) and the secular institutions. 14. This was particularly noticeable in the generally non-Muslim Balkans. 15. This period is discussed in some detail by Baier (1984), Geyikdagi (1984), Kazamias (1966), and Rustow (1965). 16. Quoted in Berkes (1959: 278).

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From End of Empire to Republican Coup to Coup: The Period 1918 to 1980 INTRODUCTION The period after the First World War is probably as heavily contested as the preceding Ottoman years but for very different reasons. In this era the introduction of the republic and the subsequent nature, influence, and impact of secularism are disputed. It is clear that irrespective of how republican history is considered, Turkey, like the Ottoman Empire before, has experienced traumatic periods of change. As the Introduction highlighted, explanations have tended to link the Islamic resurgence to change. If change has been omnipresent during the republic, however, then the analysis has to be more distinct. To help understand why the resurgence of praxism is a contemporary phenomenon, conversely greater attention needs to be placed on the earlier historical analysis. This chapter examines the development of the republic until 1980 and is designed to enable comparison with the most recent era in order to identify fundamental differences that can help explain the contemporary nature of praxist discourse. END OF EMPIRE AND START OF THE REPUBLIC The contest for the remaining parts of the Ottoman Empire that had begun within economic and political spheres during the seventeenth century was concluded when the First World War ended. The unity established among the successful nations during the war, the total amount of land gained in warfare, and crucially the removal of both Germany and Russia, for very different reasons, from the influential nations seeking control within Ottoman territories led to the Treaty of Sevres. This treaty effectively meant the end of the Ottoman Empire as the land was divided among existing and proposed new nation-states. Large parts of what is today recognized as Turkish territory were divided among Greece, Italy, and

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France. Armenians were granted independence and the Kurds were offered autonomy with the prospect of eventual independence. Foreign intervention and invasions left the predominantly Turkish population with only minimal land around the suburbs of Istanbul, parts of Central Anatolia, and the Western Black Sea region. Despite this, the Ottoman delegates of the sultan's government signed the treaty. As in the decision made over post war Germany, the delegates to the Treaty of Sevres felt they had little option but to sign a treaty that was instrumental in an upsurge of huge social unrest and upheaval. In the case of the empire, the reaction was almost immediate and quickly developed into the War of Independence. It can be argued that one of the reasons that the Ottomans signed the treaty was because it enabled their continuation, albeit with minimal power and land. For nationalists, though the treaty1 was totally unacceptable and by implication so was the sultan's involvement in both the decline and formal division of the empire. This led to the beginning of the nationalists' military campaign to liberate what is now Turkey from foreign invaders. They were led by Mustafa Kemal (later named Atatiirk, "father-Turk") and were able to create a sense of nationalism among the Turkish population, who were now no longer part of a multiethnic, multireligious empire. Consequently the development of Turkish nationalism arose almost by default and as a consequence of the divisive treaty that had granted varying degrees of autonomy to other major ethnic groups. The Turks had been the most influential group within the empire and were suddenly dispossessed of the land that historical memory determined was theirs, often living in land that was now ruled by previous subjects, in particular Kurds, Armenians, and Greeks.2 In these circumstances it was not difficult for the Turks to develop a sense of nationalism and a willingness to fight for what was considered rightfully theirs. The nationalists won the War of Independence principally by gaining the widespread support of the Turkish population. This was achieved by using traditional channels of authority to encourage peasants, who were predominantly isolated from central jurisdiction, to fight for a national state free from foreign domination. Atatiirk realized that neither the formal government nor the alternative government established by the nationalists in Ankara had sufficient contact with the majority of rural and town dwellers. Only the lower ulema possessed the necessary influence and contact with the population, and they became a prominent part of the nationalist campaign, providing invaluable networks and communication channels. Significant elements within the ulema therefore played a crucial role in the War of Independence, and in 1920 provided 20 percent of delegates of the liberation leaders' congresses.3 This use of religion was part of the pragmatic approach that the nationalists adopted for attracting support, often utilizing important symbols that as Mardin (1989: 129) noted "could compete with the national symbols of the Greeks or Serbs." For example, the double symbol of the sultanate and caliphate was a rallying call to the masses during the war even though the sultan and many of the higher ulema supported the foreign rulers, were openly hostile toward the nationalists and even issued a fatwa (edict issued by religious authority) for jihad or holy war against the resistance. Atatiirk and other leaders were sentenced to death in their absence (Pope and Pope 1997). The nationalists used this hostility to highlight the strength of the foreign powers and

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the restraints on the sultan whom they argued was being dictated to (Toprak 1981). Ulema, sympathetic to the resistance, also portrayed the war as jihad but against the occupying foreign forces. Religion was used carefully, however, and nationalists sought to avoid doctrine and slogans that would deepen sectarian divides. Instead, the generic appeal of Islam was promoted as part of an emphasis on cultural homogeneity that would appeal to Anatolian notables and peasants, Turks and Kurds, and Sunnis and Alevis (Sakalhoglu 1996). With this strategic approach the nationalists were able to attract broad support from different groups that the government underestimated. It has been estimated that 32,000 Turks died during this period from war and disease and 100,000 Greeks died or were wounded (Pope and Pope 1997). In October 1922 an armistice was signed and the Western Allies were obliged to accept the Ankara government, and in 1923 the different parties agreed to sign the Treaty of Lausanne that officially recognized the new Turkish nation-state. The end of the war brought to a close a period of intense fighting that had lasted over eight years and two conflicts. During this time significant areas of land and urban areas had been decimated, the population had experienced considerable turmoil, and there were hundreds of thousands of refugees from war-torn areas of the country and former parts of the empire, in particular Greece. Although a Turkish bourgeoisie had started to develop during the war years, Armenians and Greeks who had equated to approximately 20 percent of the pre-war population and 90 percent of bourgeoisie within the new boundaries, dominated the majority of trade and commerce. Most of the Armenian and Greek bourgeoisie either died in the war or left the country after the war ended, leaving the new Turkish nation-state with an underrepresented and inadequate economic infrastructure. ATATURK'S REFORMS The victory over the foreign invaders provided the new nation-state with a sense of achievement that the new government was able to utilize to strengthen pride and enhance feelings of nationalism. In the process the new nation-state reversed centuries of decline and land loss and attained sovereignty. The nature of power had changed considerably, however, since the halcyon days of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey was now part of an evolving, increasingly complex global system that influenced and restrained national governments. Of course the financial integration of Turkey into, and dependence on, the global economic system had commenced during the empire. From the nineteenth century in particular, the Ottomans had tried to develop an economic strategy but were "constrained by the wider international order of which they are a part" (Williamson 1987: 4). This was witnessed during the empire, with the concessions given to, and removal of import controls gained by, the major European nations. Added to the "historic backdrop of underdeveloped industry and subsistence agriculture, these were conditions which severely restricted the economic resources of the new government" (Williamson 1987: 90). For example, a number of economic concessions that had been agreed before 1914

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remained binding and had to be paid (Hale 1981). Import tariffs were also constrained by previous arrangements that had reduced potential government revenues and threatened fledgling Turkish industries. And although Turkey avoided paying any war reparation payments, it was held to be responsible for a significant amount of the overseas Ottoman debt. Thus while Turkey gained independence on relatively reasonable terms, its historical heritage, allied to European persistence and global relations, ensured a number of restraints were imposed on the development of a modern nation-state. All these factors combined meant that the new government was immediately confronted with massive problems that had been inherited from the empire and which were exacerbated during the war years. When independence had been formally attained in October 1923, Atatiirk was elected president and head of the new Republican Peoples Party (RPP). He immediately sought to radically restructure Turkey. After assessing the failures of the empire, Atatiirk believed that the decline could be attributed, in part, to the inability to compete with the West. The reforms that had been implemented over centuries were reviewed and considered to have been too concessionary as the Ottomans had sought to appease both traditionalists and modernists. Atatiirk believed that the future of the republic depended on how it was able to compete with Western nations and avoid the mistakes of the past. The analysis of Western success and Ottoman failure led Atatiirk to propose that Turkey adopt the standards and practices of European nations. Practices that were considered to inhibit progress were to be eliminated. One of the first decisions was to abolish the sultanate, and the sultan immediately went into exile. In 1923 Turkey was declared a republic, with little popular opposition. The role of caliphate remained but with no temporal powers and was adopted by one of the last sultan's cousins. However, Atatiirk's awareness of Islam's historical role and the ulemas potential communication channels for dissident messages led him to conclude that religion could be an important obstacle in the route to modernization. The absence of Islam, and indeed religion generally, in recent Western achievements and its perceived role in the Ottoman decline was confirmation for Atatiirk that it should not be influential within a modern Turkish republic. Consequently, in 1924 a number of important theological institutions were abolished including the Caliphate.4 This was part of a trend of secularization interwoven with nationalism that was unique to Turkey. Unlike Western processes of secularization, state and religion were not divided into separate spheres, because Islam was subjected to state control (laicism). This attempt to bring Islam under formal state control was, Ye§ilada (1990) argued, seen as an attempt to introduce Reformationesque changes to Turkey. The decision that both removed religion from state power and subjected it to state control came to be seen as a "doubleheresy" (Toprak 1981) by praxisitioners. Gradually Muslim institutions were replaced by secular Western-influenced alternatives and the state increasingly sought to control religion, principally through the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA). The DRA was officially responsible for the administration of mosques, training new religious leaders, and repressing privately organized religious activity. Under its control considerable

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emphasis was placed on displacing beliefs and practices that were considered backward and inappropriate for modernization. A law on the Unification of Education was passed in 1924, which introduced free compulsory elementary education but only permitted secular teaching. As part of the new education, the ulema were "impugned... for the decline of the Ottoman Empire" and were "described as ignorant and reactionary fanatics who had exploited the Turkish people" (Mardin 1989: 155). Religious education and teaching stagnated and were left to the family and religious men (hocas) (Ayata 1996). These laws reflected the importance of education to Atatiirk in the path to modernization as Islamic influences on learning were purged and secular systems and institutions introduced. Similar changes were happening across the state structure. Swiss codes of law were adopted (1926) and commercial law was developed based on Swiss, Italian, and German codes. The interpretation of religious law to control women was also eradicated, and as part of this process women were given rights to inheritance and divorce. Polygamy was banned. In 1934, women obtained the right to stand for election. The consumption of alcohol and spirits by Muslims was made legal (1926). In 1928 the Arabic alphabet was replaced by a Latin version, a process of "purification" occurred with many Arabic and Persian words removed from use, the Gregorian calendar was adopted (1926), Turkish names were adopted for cities (1930), and surnames were made compulsory (1934). These changes meant that Turkish-speaking students ultimately could not study Ottoman history because of its Arabic text but in the short term led to almost the entire nation being made illiterate. Other reforms included changing the day of rest from the Muslim Friday to Sunday (1935) and forbidding the wearing of the fez and turban (1925). In 1932 the ezan (call to prayer) was changed from Arabic to Turkish. Finally, although the 1924 Constitution declared that Islam was the official religion of Turkey, an amendment in 1937 declared the republic to be secular. Reference to Islam as the official religion was removed in 1928.5 Generally the republicans sought to undermine traditional religious institutions because of their perceived double-edged threat to both the republic and modernization route. However, less orthodox religious groups, the tarikats,6 were granted autonomy because of their active opposition to the Ottomans. Toprak (1981) makes an interesting comparison between the treatment of religious groups in Russia and Turkey after their respective revolutions. Both sought to subordinate orthodox groups while permitting the activities of sects and later changed their policies. The emphasis changed in Turkey when it became clear that generally the ulema had cooperated with the secular state, while the tarikats continued their oppositional stance through existing networks. In 1925, the state introduced a repressive strategy and abolished the brotherhoods and prohibited any further activity. The RPP also placed considerable emphasis on, and resources toward, industrialization that was perceived as the cornerstone of a modern state. Historically, the empire had been dependent on the West for industrial equipment and products since the onset of the European industrial revolution. As part of the wider attempt for real autonomy, the government decided that a self-sufficient

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Islamic Roots and Resurgence in Turkey

industrial base needed to be developed. To achieve this an infrastructure was built, including new and improved transportation networks, and a number of state monopolies were established to produce essential raw materials such as metals, textiles, and sugar. Both internal and external competition was limited and high protective import tariffs were set within a series of "Five Year Plans." The implementation of the plans during the 1930s caused concern within the West about the extent of Soviet influence over the fledgling state. However, the RPP had simply been impressed by the pragmatic possibilities and practice of state planning and was not attracted to the associated ideological baggage. Indeed, the geographic proximity that led many within the West to consider that the Soviet Union would be able to have a significant influence over Turkey was a major source of concern linked to border disputes, inherited animosity, and the Soviet policy of expansionism. The pragmatic nature of the regime can best be witnessed by the willingness of the state to adopt the approach during the 1930s when it perceived that this was the best mechanism for development and the speed with which the economic direction changed during the Second World War and the aftermath, when global opportunities expanded. But during the early years of the republic the concentration of limited resources on industrial development meant that the RPP was not able to develop other aspects of the business and commercial infrastructure. Therefore, although agriculture remained the largest occupational sector in the republic, it was relatively neglected in comparison with the industrial sector and retained the same traditional techniques and structures. Consequently agricultural output remained static. The reforms directed at state institutions and industry could be implemented relatively easily, but the success of the new institutions depended heavily on whether the republicans were able to change the culture and socialization processes to help with the development of national and cultural citizens. The new nation-state wanted people who had modern outlooks based on citizenship and universal rights, aware of the potential of new ideas and practices and not restricted by the traditional ways of thinking and behaving. Culture and the role of socialization were interrelated cornerstones in the development of the republic because it was intended that citizens were civilized according to Western definitions replacing Ottoman ways of behaving, even to the level of dress. The abolition of religious institutes and the transfer of other agencies to the state's control were intended to seriously weaken the impact of Islam and its cultural links as a potential political threat to the republic. Crucially the state sought to revise socializing processes because Islamic institutions were considered to be too influential and deemed inappropriate for a developing nation-state. In place of Islamic heritage a disputed history of the Turks was introduced that incorporated a monolithic culture and excluded Muslim symbols of the Ottoman period. This was part of a wider process that promoted equality irrespective of class, gender, religion, or ethnicity while conversely seeking control over both the nation's institutions and ultimately the minds of the populace as part of the process of socializing a population into an "imagined community" based on nationalism. However, Atatiirk not only distinguished between the orthodox type of Islam associated with the ulema but also added another type, that "does not oppose

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consciousness or preclude progress"7 and was portrayed as mild and rationalist. In the early years of the republic, Atatiirk used this type of religion and indeed, as Ayata notes (1996), reformed it within secular parameters to support and promote the reforms from a mildly Islamic perspective to strengthen the new national unity and help with social welfare.8 This meant that Islamic teaching needed to "be rendered compatible with Western values and institutions to assist the government to develop intelligent, cooperative, patriotic, and moral citizens. The state's ideal was an ideal confined to the realm of individual conscience" (Ayata 1996: 42). After 1930 the republicans felt more secure and confident and tended to implement the ongoing secularization process with less recourse to Islamic tenets because they considered that religious legitimacy was no longer required for secular goals. Opposition to the Reforms The secular reforms sought to move Turkey toward Western ways of behaving and away from the Ottoman heritage. Because of this "double-heresy," it could be reasonably expected that the reforms would lead to mass protests from Muslims, who composed 97 percent of the population within the new national boundaries. Indeed there was some opposition to a number of the reforms which, when denied democratic outlets, often became visible street confrontations between opponents and guardians of the republic, namely, the armed forces. Surprisingly, the largest demonstrations did not occur as a consequence of the abolition of the caliphate9 but with the introduction of dress changes. For example, the fez, which had been introduced only during the previous century, was banned, and this caused widespread disturbances that led to military intervention in some places, and in Rize members of the local ulema were hanged for preaching against the law (Peretz 1988). The process of Western influenced civilizing processes was not accepted unequivocally, and there was much resistance to the attempt to change the symbols of identity, irrespective of religious significance. It could be anticipated that within these demonstrations the ulema would have a central role. But although there was considerable disenchantment among the ulema about the secular nature of the republic, few popular religious uprisings occurred. A major rebellion broke out in 1925 with the explicit aim of restoring the caliphate, but the implicit, overriding objective was establishing a Kurdish state (Lewis 1974; Toprak 1981). The RPP emphasized the reactionary religious nature of the rebellion and used this to justify the suppression of all tarikats. By underplaying the issue of separatism the RPP exacerbated the problem that continues to hamper Turkish plans to establish a homogeneous state. In 1926 a plot to assassinate Atatiirk was uncovered and brutally suppressed. The plot was then used by Atatiirk to justify the eradication of potential dissidents.10 A notorious case of religious reaction to the reforms occurred in 1930 when a group of dervishes at Menemen, near Izmir, decapitated a lieutenant. This led to even tighter RPP control over the country. Generally with the exception of these incidents, active opposition was relatively small-scale and did not challenge the secular state to the extent one would expect using the excluded criteria that some studies have used to explain the Islamic

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Islamic Roots and Resurgence in Turkey

resurgence. Islam was formally removed from power, the central institutions were dissolved or forced under the control of the state, and religious symbols were increasingly replaced by secular icons at a time when large numbers of the population were dislocated, culturally displaced, and facing massive change within a war-torn state. Yet there was not an Islamic resurgence. There are a number of reasons for this, developed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, including the nature of the type of Islam that the Muslims followed, and while many people were adversely affected by the reforms the majority of the population were isolated from the political process and had not yet been affected.11 As Sunar and Toprak (1983: 427) stated, "exclusion meant that social groups were largely left to their own traditional devices, politically untouched, ideologically inactivated, and organizationally disjointed." For the first period of the republic it seemed that the plan was to educate and modernize the center, leaving the periphery relatively unchanged. Context for Reform Atatiirk implemented the reform program to change both the structure of Turkish society and individual identity formation. As a consequence he is often perceived as the Great Reformer, but one can legitimately argue that he was following the route that had tentatively been established during the Tanzimat and Young Turk periods. Additionally, while it is difficult to imagine Atatiirk succeeding in the creation of a nation-state without being able to build on the developments initiated by some of the earlier reformers, the past also provided him with the crucial experiences of failures. The failures led him to conclude that the state and civil society required complete restructuring. Indeed, it was the reformers' perceived mistakes that generally contributed to, or did not prevent, failures to modernize that shaped the republican secular direction and subsequently caused Islam's subjugation. In evaluating the effectiveness of the reforms, one must also consider the context within which they occurred: the foreign restrictions, the war-weary people and structures, and the loss of the majority12 of the Ottoman bourgeoisie through emigration or death. The Turkish economy was dominated by agriculture, and 76 percent of the total population of 13.6 million lived in rural areas (Toprak 1996). Industry accounted for only 13 percent of GNP. Consequently even for the newly formed nation-state to achieve the pre-war standards would have required extensive rebuilding of the infrastructure and the development of a national consciousness. The republicans' plans demanded radical restructuring of both the infrastructure and ideological consciousness. In Turkey, this meant that Western ideologies were transplanted but did not adequately take into account unique internal characteristics or the external factors, in particular the intense competition within the evolving global system that the first industrial nations did not confront. Therefore systems were introduced within Turkey that had developed within European nations at a different time period and with very different contextual conditions both within and beyond state boundaries. These systems not only included the infrastructural basis but also were part of a package that included

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secular values transposed from abroad and imposed from above. The urgency that Atatiirk attributed to modernization meant that it was not possible to develop and incorporate the population gradually as part of economic, political, and social development as had occurred in Western Europe. The modernization process was partial and concentrated within industrial and urban centers. As Karpat remarked, "villages and small towns...continued to preserve their basic Islamic customs and traditions, and the cultural goals of secularism were only partly fulfilled" (1959: 271). Consequently the impact of the reforms differed and the proposed movement toward modern national consciousness varied according to the different groups, geographical areas, subcultures, and crucially the other forms of identification that individuals were exposed to. This partly explains why the implementation of secularism, with some notable exceptions, was not actively contested. The contemporary analysis of Atatiirk's role and achievements is split. Millions of people have revered him, and continue to do so. Atatiirk's focus upon the development of the modern nation-state at the expense of the ummah concept has resulted in his words and deeds being ingrained within the central aspects of the Turkish state and society, including the education curriculum. However, despite the huge presence of Atatiirkian philosophy, symbols, and images, many people revile him and object to his legacy. This continuing, indeed broadening, secular/religious dichotomy highlights the ultimate failure of Atatiirk's "civilizing process" that was partly aimed at relegating religion into the personal consciousness and the development of the broad church of Turkish nationalism. This was not possible to achieve during Atatiirk's period in power and has proved elusive to his successors. REPUBLIC AFTER ATATURK UP TO 1950 When Atatiirk died in 1938, Ismet Inonii, the prime minister, assumed the presidency. Inonii had been a close colleague of Atatiirk and had been credited with a crucial role in the War of Independence. He was a firm upholder of the republican state and guarded Atatiirk's secular legacy. Taking over the leadership on the eve of the Second World War was going to prove difficult, but Inonii quickly adopted a pragmatic approach for the circumstances. Because of Turkey's strategic position he was placed under considerable pressure from both sides to express support but was instrumental in the country's remaining neutral until early in 1945 when allegiance was expressed for the Allies in order to gain entry into the United Nations Organization (UN). The involvement with the UN marked the beginning of the end of Turkey's self-imposed period of relative isolation. The cessation of war was followed shortly afterward by the Soviet Union's resuming longstanding demands for the disputed areas of Kars and Ardahan and for revision of the Montreux Convention.13 After becoming concerned by the close proximity of its neighbor and its aggressive postwar stance, Turkey decided that its survival as a nation-state was threatened and protection was required. Like most nations involved within the global system at that time, Turkey had experienced severe financial difficulties during the war and had to introduce rationing and additional taxation. The state was still confronted with the aftermath of these problems and

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was not in a position to undertake costly military expenditure (Ayata 1996). Therefore the Turkish state chose to begin a long reciprocal relationship with the United States, who it was felt provided the best opportunities for both development and protection. The change in Turkey's global strategic position coincided with growing disenchantment with the RPP. After decades of one-party rule an alternative party, the Democrat Party (DP), was allowed to participate in limited elections in 1946. The transition to democracy could be partly attributed to increasing American influence. Turkey was provided with considerable economic aid that in 1948 amounted to $100 million. In return America was able to utilize Turkey's strategic position, as part of the wider postwar stance toward the Soviet Union, as a buffer against Soviet expansion into the Middle East, and influence the adaptation of more Western principles and practices, including democracy. The first elections were at best limited and seriously flawed. However, the process continued and was expanded in 1950 when another national election was held. In this election the DP won 55 percent of the vote. Bayar replaced Inonii as president and Menderes became prime minister. There are a number of reasons why the DP won and the RPP lost power. The RPP had brought considerable changes to both the image and urban cores of Turkey as part of the modernization process that it had initiated. However, during the time in power, the RPP never managed to widely build on the populist appeal that was utilized during the War of Independence. Throughout the period in government it remained an elitist organization and could not compete with the populism of the DP. The RPP had tended to appeal to bureaucrats and intellectuals with policies rooted in Western ideology. By contrast the DP developed policies that were more attractive to peasants, whom the RPP tended to dismiss for their traditionalism while ignoring their electoral power, and to the bourgeoisie, who had grown dramatically during the trading opportunities generated by the Second World War. The DP was able to appeal to this range of supporters with promises of agricultural improvements for the peasants and the bourgeoisie were attracted by the offer of removing restrictions on business activities that remained from the state planning and protectionism of the 1930s (Ceyhun 1989; Keyder 1988). In addition, the DP was able to utilize religious feelings that many people still possessed who had generally not been immersed within secular establishments and disliked the dismissal of traditional institutions. The RPP realized before the elections that there was a need to broaden its support base and made a number of concessions to Islamic groups during the late 1940s. For example, Imam-Hatip schools were introduced in 1948 to provide basic vocational training to imams and preachers, sacred tombs were reopened, optional Islamic lessons were allowed for 10 to 12-year-olds, and a faculty of theology was permitted (1949). However the concessions were considered within the context of the RPP's secular heritage and meant that the electorate recalled the previous restrictions on Islamic institutions and symbols (Geyikdagi 1984). Consequently the party lacked the legitimacy of the DP's wider involvement in, and use of, Islamic traditions and integrated culture and the implicit offer of religious freedom.

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These factors meant that the DP had a more widespread popular appeal than the RPP, but the DP did not promote praxist policies or actions and voters were clearly voting for a secular party, albeit one that was likely to be more sympathetic to religion just as it was to agricultural and commercial interests. THE TURBULENT YEARS (1950-1980) When the DP gained power the policy of etatism was quickly replaced by laissezfaire capitalism based on an open-door policy rather than the intended isolationism of the RPP. The change in approach was devised to encourage private commercial activities, foreign investment, and imports, and initially this happened (Ceyhun 1989). However, the movement away from isolationism brought Turkey closer to other countries and led to greater external influence over state policies. The country that had, and continues to have, the greatest impact was America. This was partly developing on the links that the RPP had sought to introduce, principally for pragmatic strategic purposes, and happened when America was developing its self-perceived "world policeman role" in the void left by the previously dominant European nations. Part of this role often meant that considerable financial aid was provided to amenable nations and Turkey was no exception.14 The aid was usually linked to economic opportunities and important strategic position. In these respects Turkey was able to take advantage of being located next to the Soviet Union but had to open up import and export markets to secure funding. In 1952 Turkey cemented the alliance by joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and then provided soldiers for the UN Korean campaign.15 Consequently after a period of relative isolation Turkey quickly became more ensconced within the world system, partly trading financial gains and sovereign security with greater economic and political dependence within the web of global relations. This led to the debt process that had been initiated during the Ottoman decline accelerating after the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and opened the doors for American involvement at all levels of the Turkish state. The introduction of American aid and its subsequent growth has led to an ongoing debate about the impact of the relationship on foreign policy, for example, the U.S. Congress's linking aid to the Cyprus situation and a memorial for the "Armenian genocide" (Gruen 1991) and the impact of America in the introduction of democracy (Karpat 1959) and most recently the unsuccessful request by America to attack Iraq from Turkish territory in 2003. The request was linked with financial grants that would have been made available if Turkish permission had been given. These factors have led to considerable discontent based around the view that "in effect, the Turkish economy had become an appendage of the US-controlled world economy" (Berberoglu 1981: 279). The aid provided the DP with opportunities to modernize the infrastructure that were not available to the RPP. This was partly due to the state of the world economy during most of the time the latter was in power and the interrelated policy of isolationism. Some of the aid was used practically to finance infrastructural innovations and industrial and commercial products and import agricultural machinery.16 These imports stimulated rapid agricultural expansion, and this

50

Islamic Roots and Resurgence in Turkey

temporarily developed into a lucrative export market and industrial growth. The policies were creating conditions that enabled both large and small businesses to prosper (Geyikdagi 1984). Irrigation was improved, communication channels developed, roads and electrical networks were built often with American assistance. The traditional "centre and periphery" divide that had existed during the empire and had been retained by the RPP policies was diminishing as a consequence of the wide appeal and nature of the DP's populist reforms, including improved communications and political participation. These led to increased levels of social interactions between formerly isolated rural areas, towns, and cities (Sunar and Toprak 1983). At the 1954 general election the DP was re-elected with an increased majority. However, shortly afterward the boom abruptly ended when bad weather severely damaged the crops and the state experienced economic difficulties, which would beset it for the remainder of the DP's reign. The agricultural crisis quickly led to foreign exchange shortages, industry and agriculture stagnated with no expenditure for further modernization, inflation rose drastically, and trade deficits increased. At the next election, held in 1957, the DP failed to gain a majority of electoral support but because of the voting system still obtained a dominant number of seats. However, it no longer had widespread popular support and was forced to respond to the lack of funds to pay for imports and debts, and the open-door policy was changed under International Monetary Fund (IMF) austerity measures (Ahmad 1977; Ceyhun 1989). Islam in Democracy During this period Islam within Turkey became more noticeable. After the 1950 election there was a widespread belief that the rigid secularism of the RPP would be overturned. This belief seemed likely to be confirmed as a number of restrictions on Islamic practices were lifted. For example, the prohibition of singing the ezan in Arabic was lifted, Islamic radio programs were allowed, thousands of new mosques were built, partly with private funds, and Islamic organizations increased dramatically.17 There was an increase in visibility of Islamic documents, buildings, and symbols. The numbers of pilgrimages, newspapers and magazines, and education courses all increased. Religious education in schools was extended and students were now obliged to attend these sessions unless parents forbade it in writing.18 While these changes maintained the DP's image as being sympathetic toward Islam, religious education was generally perceived as being ineffective (Scott 1965), remaining under the control of the state and delivered by state-trained employers. This led to some Muslims utilizing the new democratic channels to state that more fundamental changes were required. These included the demand for the Arabic script and the return of the fez and veil (Ahmad 1977) but did not include demands to reverse the secular process or the implementation of the Shari'ah. Gradually Islamists became more confident and, based on the DP's use of religion, considered the government to be at least implicitly supportive, issued religious statements, and undertook actions that began to exceed the limits of the secular law. For example, statues of Atatiirk were attacked and destroyed and

The Period 1918 to 1980

51

Western events and organizations faced aggressive onslaughts. Eventually the DP responded and implemented a law protecting busts of Atatiirk and clamped down on extremist religious activities. However, particular religious movements (e.g., Nurcus) that were believed to have close links with the DP were granted greater autonomy (Geyikdagi 1984; Sakalhoglu 1996) particularly during the latter part of the decade when wider political support was waning. A religious party that had been established in 1948, the Nation Party (NP), also became more ambitious in its slogans and began to support a return to the caliphate and Arabic alphabet. This led to the party being banned in 1953 although the closure could also have been because of the party's potential for obtaining some of the DP's support (Lewis 1974). However, this statement has to be balanced by the NP's limited appeal to the electorate, gaining only 3.1 percent of the vote in the 1950 election, and the fact that the ban occurred when the DP had increased in popularity. As Toprak remarked, "religion was not a crucial factor in determining voter alignments and...Turkish voters proved reluctant to cast their votes to obscure parties which offered nothing else than the promise to create a more relaxed religious atmosphere" (1981: 76). Generally while the DP was more supportive of traditional culture, the changes it implemented did not weaken, at that time, the state's control over religion. However, the introduction and expansion of Imam-Hatip schools and Islam within the education curriculum were the start of the process that, it is argued in Chapter 5 and Chapter 7, was fundamental in the subsequent emergence of praxisitioners. Coup One (1960) The DP had based its appeal partly on promises of prosperity. Consequently, when many citizens began to endure hardship and shortages during the late 1950s, resentment against the government became widespread and threatened to divide the nation between the supporters and detractors of the DP (Ahmad 1977, Ceyhun 1989). As dissent grew, levels of censorship increased, the DP moved toward the establishment of a totalitarian regime, oppositional powers and activities were reduced, and media reporting was severely restricted (Geyikdagi 1984; Pope and Pope 1997). The problem was exacerbated by the differing effects that the political and economic crises had on the population. Those most adversely affected tended to be the traditional supporters of the RPP, in particular the bureaucracy, intelligentsia, and army who had witnessed gradual erosion of Atatiirk's principles, high inflation, and consequent reduction in their fixed salaries. The DP's policies had led to economic, political, and social crises that alienated the majority of the population to such an extent that civil war was becoming a possibility. In this context the army intervened and undertook a coup to establish order and resolve the crises that were considered beyond the elected politicians. Therefore secular forces, on behalf of a significant section of the population, overthrew the DP government that had generally remained bound to laicism. And while the conditions were conducive to the development of counterrevolutionary movements, no such movement played a significant role in either the preceding period or the aftermath. In particular one could have expected

52

Islamic Roots and Resurgence in Turkey

Islamic praxisitioners to challenge the weakened state and use the divided civil society to gain support. However, at a time when the Ottoman period and Islamic symbols could still be recalled by a significant number of the population and the decade was marked by the characteristics that other theorists have linked to the Islamic resurgence, for example, economic downturn and political problems of legitimacy, praxisitioners did not play a significant role in the period, either as agitators or defenders. The reasons why this did not occur are explored in the remaining chapters when social interactions and activities are compared between this period and post-1980 when praxisitioners became more visible. Immediately after the coup occurred in May 1960, the National Unity Committee (NUC) was established to govern the country and the DP was disbanded. Three leading members, including Menderes, were arrested and later hanged. The return of Atatiirkian supporters to power led many to believe that Turkey would return to its previous form of more rigid secularism. The new government surprised expectations, however, and did not reverse many of the DP's perceived concessions to Islamic groups and believers. The new government did seek to prevent the exploitation of religion for political purposes, for "it is the greatest aim of the NUC to keep our sacred religion, which is the treasure of freedom and conscience, pure and unblemished, and to save it from being made a tool of reactionary and political movements."19 In reality this meant reinforcing the removal of religion from power but generally allowing the greater emphasis on religion to remain. The government considered that retaining control of and utilizing religion provided an opportunity to mobilize the masses while reducing the potential influence of Islamic radicals. Consequently, the government acted in some respects against their secular heritage and were actively seen to support Islamic institutions, repairing and restoring mosques, expanding Imam-Hatip syllabuses to include contemporary subjects, and translating the Qur'an into Turkish so the populace could read it if they wished (Ahmad 1977). The use of Islam by the military government has to be seen pragmatically, however, especially the way in which religion was used to support civil society and provide moral and political legitimacy for the secular state. This change in approach did not alter the institutional dominance of the state over religion, but it did highlight a change in perception, in particular how religion could be used to help while simultaneously weakening its potential opposition. Later chapters show that this approach worked in the short term but in the longer term was part of a process that has unintentionally helped to develop the power and influence of Islam. There was also concern both within Turkey and globally that the military would abandon the country's commitment to democracy and strengthen its own position. Again the government acted against expectations and in May 1961 published a new constitution that sought to prevent the tyranny of the majority and guarantee free speech and association that had been diminished by the democratically elected DP government. This was perhaps not surprising because as Toprak (1996) commented this had been the proclaimed aim of the coup. A general election followed and power was relinquished to a coalition of the RPP/Justice Party (JP, the successor to the DP) because neither party had managed to obtain a majority. The military government did, however, require that if political parties were to

The Period 1918 to 1980

53

participate in the elections then they had to declare that Islam would not be used for political ends before and after voting. This declaration did not create any significant discontent at the time. Coup to Coup (1961 to 1973) During the period after the coup, capitalist industrialization fully emerged. As with similar processes elsewhere, industrialization created for the first time a working class (Berberoglu 1989; Keyder 1988), in the Marxist sense, and largescale organizations. The emergence of the latter in turn led to an embittered petite bourgeoisie who were finding it increasingly difficult to compete with large-scale economies of scale (Ahmad 1977). Political divisions also became more defined, linked to the industrial process. Class allegiances arose and the main parties began to be differentiated on class-related policies. The RPP, now under the enduring Ecevit,20 changed its more elitist approach and began to appeal to a wide electorate, in particular the working class. The 1960s were marked by fluctuating political and economic fortunes with no party obtaining a strong mandate. Following the reintroduction of a democratic government in 1961, there was a change in economic policy. The open-door approach of the DP was replaced by import-substitution industrialization (ISI) which aimed to manufacture products domestically and thereby avoid the problems related to excessive importing that had occurred during the latter part of the 1950s (Ceyhun 1989). When the JP, led by the equally enduring Demirel,21 gained a majority in the 1965 election, it faced a dilemma because its supporters consisted of modernizing industrialists and the traditional support base of the DP that it had inherited and included peasants, shopkeepers, and tradesmen. Ideologically the JP presented itself as a center-right party that unified modernity and tradition. This balance became increasingly difficult to maintain as policies were implemented to help industrialize the country, and as a consequence a number of groups were unable to compete within industrial, manufacturing, and agricultural spheres. There was a growth in agricultural mechanization that meant fewer peasants were required to work the land, and the process of peasant migration to towns and cities that had begun during the 1950s accelerated as they sought employment in the expanding industrial areas.22 Consequently the JP alienated some of its supporters who were the most vulnerable to change. Between 1965 and 1969, a 7 to 8 percent growth rate was achieved, but this was heavily supported by the increasing foreign remittances from migrant workers in European countries23 and the benefits were usually accrued by industrial capitalists who enjoyed high protective tariffs. Generally, though, the ISI policy seemed to be working, consumer demand for the indigenous goods continued to rise, and the economy continued to grow. The JP was able to utilize these conditions and in 1969 was re-elected. During the 1960s political Islam was not prominent with the left/right schism taking central stage. But this did not mean that religion disappeared from politics because throughout this period, Islam was used for political means, principally by the JP. For example, Islam was promoted as a defense mechanism against communism and relations with certain tarikats and the Nurcus were cultivated for

54

Islamic Roots and Resurgence in Turkey .

electoral support.24 To reduce the perceived cultural divide between the JP urban elite and the rural provincial support, a number of provincial technocrats were appointed within the bureaucracy and political posts (Ayata 1996; Sakalhoglu 1996). These policies were within secular parameters as religion remained outside the public sphere and in many ways were implemented to protect both the JP and secular state. The policy of patronage has continued to be practiced by political parties in power and I shall argue in Chapter 6 that this has had fundamental consequences for the rise of praxism. The growing economy and political support did disguise growing discontent among significant elements of the population. These included members of the rightwing, Islamists, the working class and students who formed an alliance of disenchantment caused by different elements of the JP's policies, the worsening position of the petite bourgeoisie, peasants who had been forced off land, and the working class, employed in difficult, often hazardous, conditions helping to create wealth for which they felt inadequately rewarded. The fragmentation of the JP's diverse support base inevitably began to occur and a number of JP members broke away to form two separate parties. The more interesting was the Islamic National Order Party (NOP) led by Necmettin Erbakan,25 which was dissolved in 1971 for ignoring the constitutional demand that religion not be used in politics. This was also a time when peaceful industrial and violent urban conflicts began to escalate. This combination of events caused the army to intervene again in 1971, when it issued the "coup by memorandum"26 and Demirel resigned from power. A civilian government was put in place consisting of technocrats and selected representatives from political parties. The new government was strongly influenced by the military that had appointed it and lacked any popular mandate. Support for the coup had not been as widespread as previously, and students in particular continued with often violent demonstrations. In response the army immediately imposed martial law in several provinces with little recourse to the formal government, and many political organizations and newspapers were closed down and reporters arrested. The government also made some significant amendments to the 1961 constitution that strengthened state security partly by reducing the actions and freedom of trade unions and university campuses. The constitutional changes were not comprehensive, however, and the period of military-led government did not substantively address the contextual problems that had led to the coup. Consequently when the democratic process was again restored in 1973, similar problems remained to the pre-coup era. In summary, the period 1961 to 1973 was one of considerable change and led to the development of the working class and the creation of dislocated peasants and threatened petite bourgeoisie. These are the same groups and processes that other studies have argued are responsible for the development of resurgent Islam. But as with the 1960 coup, the main instigators were the military, and they sought to resolve unrest between different political groups and did not include any significant contributions by praxisitioners. On the contrary, "Islam virtually lost its importance in determining political positions" (Toprak 1993: 241) as the focus became increasingly based on secular political ideologies. Therefore we must again conclude that while the conditions appeared conducive for praxisitioners to

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55

become influential, Islamic groups did not play a major role in either the unrest or the resulting coup. The reasons for the limited involvement are established when the conditions in which the resurgence did occur are explored in subsequent chapters. Coup to Coup II (1973 to 1980) In the elections following the "coup by memorandum" the RPP regained power. Neither it nor the opposition could gain a majority, however, and the remainder of the 1970s were characterized politically by a number of ineffective alliances27 involving the RPP or JP and the National Salvation Party (NSP), the successor to the NOP, and the fascistic Nationalist Action Party (NAP). These ineffective coalitions meant that economically the state appeared rudderless because it lacked political direction and strong leadership. At the time the economy was helped considerably by the foreign workers' remittances28 and appeared, perhaps surprisingly in view of the problems it was facing, to be prospering with the coalition governments' ISI policy even after the 1973 oil price increase. The extensive restructuring that symbolized the 1960s continued and by 1980 forty percent of the working population was employed in nonagricultural activities. But from the mid 1970s, the economic position changed, partly linked to the global economy and growing trade deficits.29 Increasingly the Turkish economy was becoming dependent on foreign loans. Underemployment and unemployment rose and demand for foreign workers began to contract (Rustow and Penrose 1981). These factors meant that finance for imports became restricted and led to industrial and manufacturing output dropping because of shortages of supplies, fuel, and parts. Eventually demand exceeded supply and inevitably prices rose and inflation increased dramatically. By the late 1970s, Turkey was again faced with massive debt burdens30 and had to undertake IMF austerity measures, which included wage freezes,31 spending cuts, and the reduction of barriers to imports and foreign investments (Ceyhun 1989). Under these conditions, the Demirel-led government policy changed to an export-led economy that aimed toward overseas markets and foreign capital for their goods and services. It also meant that it was easier for imports to enter Turkey, and the policy change caused much resentment among the vast numbers of small businesses that were unable to compete internally with foreign imports or internationally in the export market. Many of these businesses faced bankruptcy or became bankrupt (Ceyhun 1989). The economic and political problems were compounded by the "Cyprus problem." This began in 1974, when in response to the coup staged by Nicos Sampson against President Makarios, the Turkish army occupied the north of the island and established a safe haven for Turkish Cypriots. However, military success was not translated into a popular political mandate for the leading party at the time, the RPP, and the coalition it led was brought down only two months after the invasion (Pope and Pope 1997). This was partly due to the internal problems that Turkey already faced but had now been exacerbated by the actions in Cyprus. Massive financial costs involved in the operation had to be borne by the state. While devout nationalism is embedded within Turkish culture and the population

56

Islamic Roots and Resurgence in Turkey

generally supported the Cyprus policy, the electorate was less supportive of the consequences. These problems were compounded when the Americans imposed an arms embargo and withdrew aid in response to the invasion and the IMF intervened. As the decade drew to a close Turkey's position within the global system had changed and it was increasingly isolated over its stance on Cyprus. Turkey was beset with massive economic and political problems and was facing shortages of essentials. Heating was limited, power shortages were frequent, and travelling was limited by fuel restrictions. The American position eventually changed, arguably influenced by the imminent Iranian revolution that strengthened Turkey's strategic position as neighbor of both the Soviet Union and Iran. In 1979 the Organization for Economic Development (OECD) rescheduled the debt and military arrangements with the United States resumed. By this stage, however, the Turkish state faced massive internal problems. As the above analysis established, during the 1970s politicized Islam became significantly visible, noticeably as part of different coalitions. The 1973 election saw the NSP combine religion, nationalism, conservatism, and modernity. It was a mixture that helped gain 11.3 percent of the vote. The share of the vote can, at least partly, be attributed to the JP's failure to reconcile the conflicting interests of large and small businesses. Increasingly the small-scale shopkeepers, merchants, and artisans, many of whom were traditionally Islamically orientated (Toprak 1981), were threatened by large-scale production processes and food chains, and attracted by the economic protectionism, allied to social justice, that the NSP offered.32 As Sunar and Toprak (1983) noted, this list could be expanded to include people living in the most rapidly developing areas whose education and exposure to modernization led to rising expectations that were unfulfilled by the other political parties. In 1974 the NSP provided seven out of the twenty-five members as the junior partner in the government coalition (with the RPP). During the periods in government, the NSP was able to install many of their own supporters in the bureaucratic structure (as did their rivals) where they possessed covert influence in policy determination (Heper 1985; Pope and Pope 1997). This has had long-term implications that are explored in subsequent chapters as almost thirty years later many of these "bureaucrats" have gained positions of considerable authority. The growth of Islam in politics has to be analyzed with caution, however. The NSP was not advocating a return to the Shari'ah but campaigned with policies that in many ways were not dissimilar to social democrats in other countries albeit under an implicit religious umbrella. This is highlighted by the initial strong links that were developed with tarikats, particularly the Nak§ibendis. Support was generally withdrawn, however, because the tarikats argued that the NSP had become incorporated within the secular system and had deviated from Islamic norms and values (Sakalhoglu 1996). Because of the position within the coalition the NSP was influential, but this was because of that position and not because of widespread popular support, which in 1977 dropped to 8.6 percent. Islam was more prominent within Turkish state and society, but it was not praxist in nature and praxisitioners remained isolated. Although praxisitioners were involved in the late 1970s conflict

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57

(discussed in the following text), they were not one of the more significant or active groups. Because all the major political groups were incorporated into the different coalitions, disenchantment over economic strategy had no political safety valve as no party was considered to be capable of developing and implementing policies to ease the heterogeneous, widespread dismay. The political process had led to insecure short-term coalitions with no political party or ideology able to attract a popular mandate. Ironically, since the 1960s civil society had been strengthened and a plethora of groups and organizations existed representing occupational groups, students, women, peace, and other groups, often with crosscutting issues. Many of these groups were firmly committed to ideologies and functioned within the highly politicized Turkish society of this period (Toprak 1993). At the end of the decade there was widespread disillusionment with mainstream economic and/or political instability and stagnation and some groups sought violent solutions, fighting with and killing rival groups and scapegoats. Fatal rivalries broke out among, and in many instances within, the crosscutting groups of the right and left, secularists and Islamists, Sunnis and Alevis, and Turks and Kurds. A number of fights involved the police, who were often seen to protect the rightists who in turn were thought to be protecting the state against leftist extremists. Even here there was no conformity as some members of the police supported the leftists. A fragmented civil war seemed imminent with an average of twenty people killed per day and over 5,240 people dead in political incidents during the decade.33 In these conditions and in view of earlier precedents it was perhaps not surprising that in 1980 the army staged a third coup. The coup was to be the start of the next major development stage in Turkish history. CONCLUSION During the period 1918 to 1980 the area that is now Turkey underwent a dramatic transformation. The republic emerged out of the debris that remained after the end of the First World War and the subsequent division of the "sick man of Europe." The relationship with religion quickly changed, as Islam was used selectively to support and protect the secular state against internal and external forces. However, Islam was made subservient to the state and this power relationship remained throughout the period. Religion was forced under state control as part of the process of modernization that it was felt would be hindered by Islamic influence. Republicans sought to limit religion to the private sphere as personal belief. The modernization process brought about considerable change in Turkish society as first urban areas and later rural regions were exposed to different ways of working and lifestyles. Demographics altered dramatically and the urban pull and rural push became more noticeable as peasants began to move to towns and cities. The modernization process created considerable wealth alongside deprivation, enfranchisement and dislocation, rapture and disenchantment. Millions of citizens moved, changed or lost their livelihoods, experienced the removal of Islamic symbols and traditions, and witnessed the increased involvement of Western states in the policy making of

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economic and political processes, behavioral patterns, and identity formations within Turkish society. Levels of national indebtedness constantly grew during this period. Despite all these factors that contributed toward a society in flux, with people's economic, social, and cultural way of life destroyed or threatened, Islam as a praxist ideology was not a significant feature. In order to understand why the resurgence is a contemporary phenomenon we must examine conditions of the post-1980 period before later comparing the two eras to identify the responsible underlying mechanisms.

NOTES 1. The treaty was never ratified or implemented, but the intent to isolate the Turkish population to small, relatively poor land was sufficient to arouse popular anger (Pope and Pope 1997). 2. It can be argued that the present disputes between Turkey and these ethnic groups and nation-states have strong links to the empire and Treaty of Sevres. 3. This figure is interesting given the general contemporary perception of Atatiirk as an agnostic. The role and number of ulema quickly diminished, however, highlighted by the drop in attendance at later congresses to seven in 1923 and two in 1939. 4. Other institutions that were abolished included the Ministry of Sacred Law and Pious Foundations, religious courts of law and religious colleges (Lewis 1974). 5. Further details about the reforms can be found in Berkes (1964), Geyikdagi (1984), Gole (1997), Lewis (1974), Mango (1999a and b), Toprak (1981), and Weiker (1991). 6. Tarikats are based on networks of contacts and traditions that were established during the Ottoman Empire. They highlight the diverse nature of Islam in Turkey, often based on Sufism, a more mystical form that stresses closeness to Allah and renewal of faith as a process of self-purification. 7. This is reported in Sakalhoglu (1996: 236). 8. In the process Atatiirk established a precedent for the use of religion by secularists within Turkish politics. 9. This was because the institution was considered too remote for the peasantry to feel outraged (Lewis 1974). 10. Pope and Pope (1997) stated that following the 1925 rebellion, dozens of leaders were hanged and thousands deported. In the aftermath of the 1926 assassination attempt it has been estimated that hundreds were summarily tried and executed. 11. Berkes (1964), Kadioglu (1996 and 1998), Salt (1995), Sunar and Toprak (1983), and Toprak (1981) all discuss these points in detail. 12. Keyder (1988) has estimated that this equated to approximately three million Greeks and Armenians. 13. Seydi (2001) discusses this point in detail. 14. Between 1948 and 1952 the United States provided Turkey with over $1 billion in aid with $687 million invested in 1952 alone. 15. Turkey deployed 25,000 troops to Korea as part of the UN (Berberoglu 1981). 16. For example, the numbers of tractors increased from 3,000 in 1947 to over 40,000 in 1955. 17. There were 95 organizations in 1949 compared with 5,104 in 1960. 18. These points are discussed in some detail by Ahmad (1977), Geyikdagi (1984), Keyder (1988), and Toprak (1981).

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19. NUC proclamation quoted in Ahmad (1977: 374). 20. Ecevit later returned to power as prime minister between 1997 and 2002. 21. Demirel was to become prime minister numerous times over the next thirty years and was president between 1993 and 2000. 22. The urban migration, which began in the 1950s, rapidly grew, causing the expanding formation of gegekondus (shanty towns). This increased mobility was emphasized by a 1970 study which found over 60 percent of city-dwellers had been born in other districts, which when allied to the huge population growth (the population was 20.9 million in 1950 compared with 40.2 million in 1975, (Hale 1981) created massive infrastructural problems in health, housing, transport, food, and employment. 23. In 1965 the migrants numbered 112,000 (Geyikdagi 1984; Keyder 1988). 24. Ayata (1996) has argued that in return for votes the tarikats were allowed access to public resources and protection against secular forces and threats. 25. Like Ecevit and Demirel, Erbakan has remained a prominent figure within Turkish politics, especially during the 1990s, including a spell as prime minister between 1996 and 1997. The enduring nature of these three and the late leader of the NAP, Alparslan Tiirke§, highlights the political culture for leaders, and not necessarily parties, that Pope and Pope (1997) have linked to the advent of the cult of leaders, originating with Atatiirk. 26. On 12 March 1971 the military sent Demirel a letter asking him to step down from power and he duly resigned. 27. There were thirteen coalition governments during this time (Pope and Pope 1997). 28. In 1974 the amount was $1.5 billion. 29. Total exports were exceeded by oil imports alone in 1980 (Geyikdagi 1984). 30. In 1980 the trade deficit was $4,010 million (Ceyhun 1989). 31. Real minimum wages dropped from 20.32TL in 1977 to 12.56TL in 1979 (Ceyhun 1989). 32. This is confirmed by studies of bazaari political behavior, Alkan (1984); Sunar and Toprak (1983). 33. For further detail see Heper (1985), Keyder (1988), and Pope and Pope (1997).

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4

From Traditional to Postmodern Coup and Beyond: The Period 1980 to 2002 INTRODUCTION After fifty seven years as a republic, Turkey entered the 1980s with serious internal conflict that threatened the social fabric. The conflict centered on a number of dichotomies, based around a mixture of differing political, religious, and ethnic interpretations. Turkey seemed to be heading toward civil war and possible disintegration. Society had become ridden with violence as the conflict extended to involve distinct and crosscutting groups, for example, extreme nationalists, socialists, and communists, Kurds and Turks, Sunnis and Alevis, secularists and Islamists. The principles of Kemalism were increasingly being threatened as different groups sought to resolve local, historical, and contemporary societal problems in the vacuum created by the malfunctioning democratic process. None of the political parties could secure a popular mandate or develop a strong working coalition. This resulted in the Turkish state being unable either to address the central problems or provide effective democratic channels through which the populace could feel involved. A disenfranchised stalemate prevailed. The conflictual types of political action quickly degenerated into reciprocal actions and led to expanding cycles of violence between opposing forces. And while the extent of the violence was wider and more brutal than at other periods of social dispute, the underlying problems were similar to previous episodes that led to military involvement, namely economic problems, social unrest, and political malaise. Therefore it was of little surprise when another military coup occurred. COUP III (1980) The 1980 army coup was principally instigated to prevent civil war and in the process ensure that Atatiirk's secular heritage was preserved. This is highlighted

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by the coup leader General Evren's statement1, that the "straw that broke the camel's back" was a provocative NSP rally on a Jerusalem Liberation (from Zionism) Day. At the rally speakers abused Atatiirk and demanded the restoration of the caliphate and the audience remained seated during the national anthem. It should be pointed out, however, that while these claims were made at the rally, they were not widely supported and praxist Islam was not a prominent component of the widespread conflict, despite the fears of the military. Five days after the rally, the armed forces in their constitutional role as guardians of Atatiirk's reforms staged the coup that was generally well supported by the public, as relief from the anarchy of the 1970s (Geyikdagi 1984; Gruen 1991). After securing power, the junta dissolved all political parties and instigated a number of purges against extremists, dissident intellectuals, and labor groups (Ceyhun 1989). The leaders of the NAP and NSP were arrested, the former for suspected terrorist links and the latter for violating secular principles. Both leaders faced imprisonment. Erbakan was sentenced in 1983 to four years' imprisonment but was formally acquitted in 1985, and he quickly returned to the political arena (see the following text). As a consequence of these measures, political activism was quashed and civil society restrained. This meant that in the short term, order and stability were restored and an export-led strategy was introduced. These factors helped the economy to grow. Although unemployment remained high, inflation was reduced from 100 percent to 30 percent, and as the export-led approach gained momentum, GNP grew in real terms and exports increased significantly (Geyikdagi 1984; Richards and Waterbury 1990). These factors created greater trust in government and led the army to again assess the possibility of reintroducing democracy. The turbulence of recent years, however, highlighted the need for major changes if long-term stability was to be achieved. Consequently a new constitution was drafted and accepted by a referendum in 1982 that re-established secular principles, emphasizing equality, freedom, and justice. New boundaries for power were established that enabled basic rights and liberties to be curtailed in many instances, and the activities of civil associations were limited. As part of this process, a significant number of individuals across the political spectrum were imprisoned (leduygu et al. 1999; Toprak 1996). Other important legislation was introduced, in particular the 1983 Law on Political Parties that reinforced the outlawing of extremism and demanded loyalty to Atatiirk's principles. This law also sought to reduce the fragmentation of votes that had led to larger parties' having to share power with smaller groups who had been able to obtain greater concessions than their electoral support justified (Geyikdagi 1984; Gruen 1991). The electoral system was therefore changed to eliminate minority parties, particularly extremists, from power because now only parties that were supported by at least 10 percent of the total vote could enter Parliament. To try to achieve majority government a rather complex division of seats was devised. This did, however, mean that a dominant party could emerge that secured considerably less than 50 percent of the popular vote. During this period the junta remained firmly secular but had come to accept that religion remained prominent for millions of citizens. As such, rather than leaving

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Islam as a mechanism for opposition, the armed forces believed that it could be used both as a solidifying agent and to prevent right and left extremism. In the process groups could be weakened that sought to use religion as a means of mobilization against the secular state. Heper observed that "although absolutely opposed to the utilization of religion for political purposes, the military proved itself to be more congenial on the issue of the role of religion in society than the post-Atatiirk bureaucratic intelligentsia had ever been" (1985: 134). As part of this policy, the 1982 constitution stressed that religious instruction at schools should be compulsory at both primary and secondary schools, which could be seen as supporting the role of Islam within the nation-state. The real intention is made clearer within the constitution, however, which declared that education in religion and ethics "shall be conducted under state supervision and control."2 The constitution also prohibited the exploitation or abuse of religion or religious feelings for personal or political means. In other words, the junta decided that Islam had a functional role to play within the state and civil society but also had the potential to be an agent for change and therefore needed to be closely regulated. As we shall see, supporting Islam while simultaneously seeking to control it has proved a very difficult balancing act to perform. Overall, though, as Sakalhoglu (1996: 247) remarked, the state-Islam relationship "has not changed in its basic secular orientation or in the primacy of the role of the state." After three years of military rule, the junta arranged a return to democratic power through general elections although severe restrictions were placed on the candidates and parties. DEMOCRATIC ROAD PART THREE (1983-1997) None of the main precoup parties were able to participate in the 1983 elections. This meant that new parties were competing to take over political affiliations that citizens often previously had for one party. Because the old parties were banned the electorate had to choose another party and in some ways the long-term loyalty to politicians and parties by sectors of the electorate has still not been recovered.3 This was further fragmented when the banned leaders were allowed to return to politics in the late 1980s and immediately established new parties. The party that was able to secure the most support in 1983 was Turgut Ozal's Motherland Party (MP), which represented a laissez-faire rightwing perspective. Ozal had previously achieved political fame as the chief architect of economic policy in the government established after the 1980 coup. The MP won the election despite, or perhaps because of, the armed forces' preferring the other two parties and making it widely known that they did not want the MP to win. In some ways this declaration established Ozal as a political outsider, a challenger to the inertia that had dominated recent democratic periods and yet who had the legitimacy of being heavily involved in the resurgent economic policies of the post-coup government. The MP was also able to gain power because it was the only party that was able to appeal to a diverse range of supporters from large and small businesses and traditional and modern backgrounds. This breadth was represented within the

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MP's deputies whom Ozal selected to ensure that diverse ideological persuasions would be incorporated within the same party. As part of this broad coalition, a significant number of Islamists became deputies for the MP and formed a major wing of the party.4 In some respects the MP had inherited the contradictory support base from the JP and shared the dilemma of how to appease supporters with opposing interests, for example, to safeguard small businesses and to allow larger organizations to expand, inevitably at the expense of the smaller ones. The MP was also able to imply that it was sympathetic to Islam without breaching the new constitutional ban on the use of religion for political purposes. This was aided by Ozal's well-publicized piety and unsuccessful political candidature for the NSP in 1977. The MP's image was enhanced by loyalty to Muslim conservatism, the stress placed on religious values within Turkish nationalism, a significant increase in the budget of the Department of Religious Affairs, and the expansion of Islamic teaching in schools. Additionally the close ties between the MP and Islamic brotherhoods, who openly backed the MP, particularly the Naksibendi tarikat which had members in the MP cabinets,5 led some secularists to claim that "the most broad-based serious attack on secularism since we made the transition to a democratic regime in Turkey in 1946 has occurred and been implemented during the Motherland Party government" (Oktay Ek§i, quoted in Reed 1988: 5). During the Ozal regime, the Turkish economy was restructured and fuller integration occurred into the global capitalist market (Eralp et al. 1993), aided by the investment of foreign Muslim companies, most noticeably from Saudi Arabia (Ye§ilada 1993). The time period and Turkey's strategic location were important factors in the integration. As Eralp et al. (1993: 3) state, economic restructuring in Turkey also benefited from changes in the international climate at the end of the 1970s. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Iranian Revolution, and the conflict in Lebanon undermined the process of detente, and both the United States and Turkey became extremely suspicious of Soviet expansionist intentions. Under these circumstances, Turkey's position became very important for the American administration. Thus, in a repeat of Turkish-American relations of the 1950s, the strategic location of Turkey helped in the Turkish-American rapprochement during the 1980s. This rapprochement affected international lending agencies, resulting in funds beginning to flow to Turkey from the World Bank, the IMF, and the OECD. Economic liberal reforms, including privatization and the removal of subsidies, were introduced, allied to the new export orientated industry, and initially exports6 and economic performance rose dramatically as Turkey became increasingly incorporated into world markets. Levels of individual freedom rose and with it the strength and vitality of civil society. Massive investment in the infrastructure took place, with large-scale spending on roads, bridges, airports, ports, dams, telephone exchanges,7 and electricity pylons. As a consequence the overwhelming majority of the population were being incorporated within the modern infrastructure. Foreign visitors increased8 and levels of familiarity with Western culture grew at different levels throughout society. But the reforms were accompanied by inflation, growing foreign debts,9 and old and new social tensions and cultural discontinuities. For example, tension remained between Alevi-Sunni and

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secularist-Islamist. Social inequalities increased in visibility during the 1980s (Gole 1996; Hershlag 1988) as industrial workers received greater rewards than their agricultural counterparts. Regional divides grew as the major cities and western coastal districts gained more resources than the east and southeastern regions (Williamson 1987). Tunay (1993: 23), after interpreting MP manifestos and comments by Ozal, stated that "the productivist ideology as a lever for industrialization meant to reward productive sectors, services, and persons while penalizing the unemployed, pensioners, unskilled and semiskilled workers, and a large section of government employees." In this respect the MP can be seen to have consciously accepted that inequalities were an inevitable consequence of its attempts to restructure the economy and incorporate it within a global context. Support for the MP dropped during the four years between elections as a gradual growth in divisions and disenchantment occurred. The discontent was relatively peaceful, however, and generally was contained within the democratic process. The dissatisfaction meant that the MP attained only 36 percent of the vote in the 1987 election, compared with 45 percent in 1983. However the MP retained power because the nonproportional seat allocation meant that despite receiving considerably fewer than half of the votes, the party retained a majority in the assembly. Following the 1987 election, the MP continued to liberalize the economy and remained heavily influenced by international bodies. Ye§ilada (1993: 183) argued that the economic austerity programs of the 1980s liberalized the laws for foreign investment and "gave foreign capital the same rights and obligations as domestic capital, with guarantees in transferring profits, fees and royalties." Indeed one can argue that, during the 1980s, with the country heavily indebted to international financiers, Turkey's bargaining power was seriously reduced and it became less able to resist the stringent conditions attached to loans. Thus "in return for the loans received (between 1980 and 1984 Turkey the loans totalled 1,556.3 million US dollars) Turkey agreed to implement a large number of policies which affected almost every sphere of economic life" (Aydin 1993: 11617). In the process considerable financial control was passed to external forces. The policies that were introduced, at least partly as a consequence of international pressures, included privatization, credit restrictions, decreasing subsidies and wages,10 reducing tariffs, and exchange controls. In 1989, the then President Evren reached the end of his term in office and was replaced by Ozal. Ozal remained president until he died in 1993 and for the first part of his tenure remained in control of the party. The newly installed prime minister, Yildirim Akbulut, was considered to be responsible to Ozal and there were concerns that the non-partisan nature of the presidential office was being abused. The MP's popularity had gradually reduced since the halcyon days of the mid-1980s and the formal change in leadership accelerated the process. In addition the general perception of the MP as the most Islamic of the center-right parties changed during the late 1980s as the True Path Party's (TPP led by the former JP leader, Demirel) use of secular conservatism shifted to one of greater religious orientation.11 This happened when the MP, especially when subsequently led by Me§ut Yilmaz,12 was moving to a more secular perspective and image.

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With the MP appearing ineffective in power, the TPP obtained the most votes at the 1991 elections, but gained only 178 seats out of 450. Subsequently they had to form a coalition and rather surprisingly chose the left-of-center Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP, led by Erdal Inonii, son of Ismet) as their main partner rather than the MP. This seemingly illogical forming of coalitions can at least partly be explained by the personalities involved in the different parties. These would appear to provide more serious obstacles to forming ideologically similar coalitions than forming a coalition with ideologically dissimilar, often opposing, partners. This pattern became particularly noticeable during the coalitions of the 1990s. All the governments had to face serious economic problems during this period as inflation and unemployment remained high, investment and growth did not reach anticipated levels, the state system remained in a condition of apparent inertia, and the 1991 Gulf War continued to have a seriously adverse effect on trade.13 The 1991 election was also noticeable for the return to the Assembly of an Islamically orientated party, the Welfare Party (WP),14 with policies that went beyond the more pragmatic use of religion by the MP and TPP. In many respects the WP were very much part of the historical lineage of the NOP/NSP, were still led by Erbakan, and continued to entwine religion and social inclusion, adopting social democratic rhetoric, tone, and often images. The new party was able to mobilize support around popular issues, often civil, and included corruption, waste, local concerns, education, environment, and exclusion and, as part of its claim to be the party for the whole family, gender concerns. These policies were linked to vague religious themes that it was hoped would not lead to the closure of the party for the unconstitutional use of religion in politics. But the party had to balance concern about being closed down with being sufficiently religious to retain the support of a cross-section of Muslims.15 The campaign was successful and helped the WP achieve sixty-two seats but as Gole (1996: 30) commented, the party "remained at the margins of the system." The support gained in 1991 by the WP was gradually built on and after success in the 1994 local elections16 the party gained the largest number of seats (158) and 21.4 percent of the vote in the 1995 general elections. However, the electoral support achieved at the general elections was initially insufficient for the WP to gain power because no other major party was willing to enter into a coalition, partly due to intense military pressure. As a consequence the first coalition government included the TPP and MP. This was disbanded in June 1996, primarily due to irreconcilable differences between the leaders, (filler17 and Yilmaz. The differences were not based on ideological chasms, as both parties shared similar philosophies and could have united under a right-wing banner that would have gained a populist mandate. Instead, as has often happened in Turkish politics, the problem was principally based on personal enmity and the personal overrode the political. In this instance, the coalition finally ended when Erbakan presented a file that Yilmaz supported, charging filler with corruption, (filler then made a similar claim against Erbakan. Ironically after the failure of the first TPP/MP coalition, Erbakan was asked to form a government, which he did in alliance with the TPP.

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The WP/TPP alliance provided a parliamentary majority and ensured that neither of the two leaders would lose political immunity and have to face the charges that each had leveled against the other shortly before, filler had been one of the staunchest defenders of secularism and severe critic of the WP, accusing the party of wanting to divide Turkey, yet had decided to enter into the coalition. Not surprisingly the alliance was ill conceived and short lived and leads one to wonder why it was formed. The TPP, and (filler in particular, perhaps had more pragmatic grounds for joining, but the MP would have seemed more logical partners for the WP, especially when one considers Ozal's legacy. Cornell (1999) argues convincingly that the coalition was formed mainly because the military preferred the TPP's involvement because of closer ties between them and while Yilmaz was acknowledged as being a committed secularist, a powerful Islamic conservative wing remained within the MP. Consequently it was felt that the MP might be more sympathetic or at least less opposed than the TPP to the religious direction of the WP. In addition, the military had little option by this stage but to invite the WP to form a government. They had insisted on the previous coalition that had failed, the left-wing parties were refusing to be involved in any coalitions, and realistically, if democracy was to retain credibility, then the most popular party had to be given the opportunity. Cornell adds the interesting point that the military finally agreed to the coalition because the WP had proved a popular party in opposition, untarnished by power and scandal. It was felt that by allowing the WP to form a government the party's support base could be seriously weakened if as expected pre-election promises were not met. The WP would then prove that it was prone to mistakes and was fallible. In other words it was easy to criticize the state but much harder to govern it. And the armed forces had the security of knowing that the TPP would be able to exert some influence and had direct control over the key ministries, from the military's perspective, of Defence, Interior, and Foreign Affairs. When the WP entered government in June 1996 there was considerable concern among secularists and hope among conservative Muslims that the secular process would, at least partly, be reversed. In many ways, the brief spell in power probably dissatisfied both sides of the spectrum. Initially the WP sought to placate concerns by appealing to the center right, highlighted by Erbakan's references to Ozal's links to the NSP and stating that the WP were the rightful heirs to his legacy. This was part of a rapid transformation from the rhetoric of opposition to main governing party within a secular constitution. The new approach was most noticeable within international relations. For example, after inheriting a series of international relations that included closer economic and military ties with Israel, the WP-led coalition signed a new military agreement, under suspected intense pressure from the Turkish armed forces.18 And after years as a party of antiWestern, anti-imperialism policies, the WP developed close ties with international financial organizations. This was part of a wider change in economic approach as the WP moved from supporting a strong welfare state and public controlled industrialization to policies that included privatization and economic liberalization. The government also had to dismiss a large number of military officers for "antisecular" activities. These policies caused concern among their own supporters which the WP sought to alleviate by addressing cultural matters, for example,

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promoting Muslim symbols, organizing the planned construction of a large mosque in Taksim, the business center of Istanbul, and seeking to liberalize regulations about wearing headscarves (Aydrnta§ba§ 1998; Gulalp 1999). State agencies were closed early during Ramadan to enable employees to be home in time for sundown (Aydinta§ba§ 1998). Erbakan also used foreign relations to stress the links with Islam, undertaking a number of high-profile visits to Muslim countries and coming to a $23 billion trade agreement with Iran. Other commentators have argued, however, that the impact of the WP-led government on Turkish society went beyond the cultural sphere. Akinci (1999) and Cornell (1999) suggest that secularists' concerns about the WP were justified as Islam was strengthened within the state apparatus and a system of patronage was reintroduced within local and national government, often at the expense of secularists,19 even though a significant number of appointees were unsuitable for the job.20 Certainly Islamic visibility increased in local government offices, with a noticeable rise in the number of beards and headscarves in particular. This was also a period when there was a dramatic increase in the number of Muslim students at social science faculties. While this happened outside the WP's control, it led to a subsequent increase in Islamist graduates seeking employment and often finding it within higher levels of administration. The WP-controlled municipalities also wanted to establish Islamic cultural principles, for example banning alcohol; terminating television and cable broadcasts; looking at banning prostitution, lottery sales, and the retail sale of pants and bras; encouraging segregation of recreational facilities by gender; and in some instances destroying "immoral works of art."21 The policies of municipalities were by no means nationwide, however, and were often based on pragmatism. As Pope and Pope (1997) note, the main cycle of Istanbul's music, theatre, film, and art festivals were not interfered with, even though much of the content would be against the WP's interpretations for appropriate behavior. Of much greater significance for Cornell (1999) was the public debate regarding the introduction of the Shari'ah at the beginning of 1997. As the debate raged within Turkish society, Erbakan defended the proponents of the Shari'ah, and Ciller ambivalently stated that every Muslim should follow the Shari'ah while Yilmaz as the leader of the main party in opposition, the MP, refused to support protestors who were against the Shari'ah. In other words, none of the leading right-wing politicians, with a combined support of 60 percent of the vote, were willing to defend the constitution. The level of concern that these unconstitutional statements gave the armed forces and secularists rose still further when a large demonstration in favor of the Shari'ah took place and was firmly supported by the local WP mayor, who was subsequently imprisoned.22 The balance between on the one hand secular politics, global economics, and appeasing the principal secular forces and on the other, Muslim culture and satisfying their wide range of supporters proved impossible for the WP to maintain. This was partly as the military was scrutinizing all actions and policies for evidence of unconstitutional behavior and thus the justification for removing the WP from power. In February 1997, the National Security Council proposed a number of measures that the government was advised to follow. The measures

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ranged from educational reform to dress code, and all of the measures had the underlying intention of restricting Islamic activism. During the following months, senior military officials issued briefings referring to the internal number-one enemy of "reactionary anti-secularism" (Gulalp 1999). POSTMODERN COUP (1997) In June 1997 the coalition ended when Erbakan resigned, in a process described by the media as Turkey's first "post-modern coup."23 This was because the coalition was forced out of power without the army directly intervening on the streets. Instead the intervention of the armed forces was more covert. Gulalp (1999: 39) argues that "under intense pressure, the government was finally forced to resign," and Kamrava (1998: 275) believed that the "military pushed the Refah [WP] out of office." However, Cornell (1999) points to the rapid defections of TPP deputies prior to the coup, partly in protest over the policies being implemented, and argues this led Erbakan to resign before the coalition lost its majority. It was felt that behind the resignation was the belief within the WP that the other main party, the MP, would not be able to gain sufficient support for a feasible coalition and the WP/TPP would be asked to form another government with reinforced legitimacy. This did not prove to be the case. Another interesting question is raised by Cornell, namely why did the military wait so long before acting? Cornell argues that simply not allowing the WP, or forcing the WP out of power sooner and then closing down the party would have been inadequate. This approach might have slowed down the momentum, but as the organizational abilities and finances were much deeper and broader than the party, these also had to be identified so that the movement's roots could be destroyed. Cornell draws on an analogy with the 1980 coup when the army waited for over a year before intervening, using the time to identify groups and individuals. Consequently when action was undertaken, the 1980 coup was well planned and relatively bloodless and immediately led to 138,000 arrests. In 19961997 the military also used the period when the WP were in government to track the various Islamist movements, identify their organizational networks that could be subsequently broken down, and stop their financial sources. Within forty-eight hours of the Yilmaz coalition's introduction, many arrests were made and the finances of radical Islamist movements claimed. The military had been aided in the process of identification by the increased visibility of these groups during the WP-led government. But it seems surprising in view of the military's constant suspicion that it had not already collated this information when the WP were in opposition. It could also be that to adapt Cornell's earlier argument, the WP were left in government for so long in the hope that the party would prove to the electorate that it was unsuitable to govern. The military also wanted to preserve the image of democracy as much as possible, both internally and externally. After the WP-led government resigned, Yilmaz formed a coalition of deputies24 from the opposition to the previous administration. Athough the coalition included four main parties and represented two different ideologies, it provided some stability and was involved in economic growth and the reduction of inflation. In

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view of the different parties and most particularly the different agendas, however, it was probably inevitable that major fractures would develop and toward the end of 1998 the coalition was reduced to three parties and became a minority caretaker government. Early elections were arranged for 25 April 1999. This coalition governed for five months and continued with similar policies to its predecessor. Ecevit, yet another survivor from the 1960s power struggles, became prime minister and in the run up to the general election both he and his party, the Democratic Left Party (DLP), experienced a boost in popularity. There were a number of reasons for this. First Ecevit presided and negotiated over the capture of the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan, that caused great pride within Turkey. This was part of a wider perception that Turkey was becoming a leader in the region. In addition, Ecevit became a main attraction for voters because in spite of being involved in state politics for over thirty years he had retained his charisma and corruption-free reputation.25 At the time these were important factors for voters. The elections were contested by numerous parties and included the Virtue Party (VP) that had been formed to succeed the WP.26 Following the closure of the WP, all its deputies joined the VP, led by Kutan, a long-standing colleague of Erbakan who was still considered to be in control of the party. The VP had clearly learned from previous closures and changed their primary goals of the "just order" to include the promotion of democracy, human rights, political liberties, and freedom.27 In some respects the military's double-edged gamble, in allowing the WP to form a government and subsequently allowing it to remain in power despite evidence of unconstitutional behavior at the levels of municipal and national administration, seemed to have paid off, at least in the short term. As Akinci (1999: 75) commented before the 1999 elections, it would be harder to attract "reaction" votes since the party was no longer an unknown quantity. The widespread appeal became more difficult to retain when taking into account the disappointment of many previous voters, for example, the ethnic-Kurdish voters and other supporters who felt betrayed by broken promises, for example, to solve the Kurdish problem and annulling the military agreement between Israel and Turkey. In addition the financial reputation for the party was questioned because, as Akinci identified, former WP-controlled municipalities were associated with mounting debt, rising prices and most importantly corruption and patronage after heavily promoting a crusade while in opposition against these elements. It is also likely that some of the WP's moderate supporters will have changed allegiance to other parties, partly over concern about the proposed and implemented lifestyle changes. Finally the VP also lost support over a complex attempt to postpone the elections that caused considerable confusion for a couple of weeks and highlighted to many voters the pragmatic, possibly obstructive, nature of the party.28 The elections were won by the DLP with 22.1 percent and 136 seats. In second place was the nationalist Nationalist Action Party (NAP), led by Devlet Bahceli, attracting 18.1 percent and 129 seats and the VP came third with 15.2 percent and 110 seats. It has been argued that the VP's performance was poor29 and highlighted that its previous popularity could have been at least in part due to it being an untried alternative. But I am inclined to believe that in view of the problems it had encountered since 1996, the percentage achieved was actually

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creditable and only six points lower than 1995. Despite a drop in democratic support it was premature to state "that the utilisation of religion in Turkish politics belongs in the past" (Cornell 1999: 230). On the contrary, political Islam, as support for the Justice Development Party (JDP) has since shown (see following discussion) is more deeply rooted and widespread and enables light to be shed on different elements of the resurgence. The VP was basically encountering problems as a new party, for example, logistical and organizational, but had considerable baggage carried over from its predecessor. In addition the party was less attractive for the reasons previously identified and it was becoming faction driven, splitting into the old guard around Erbakan and the reformist younger movement led by Recep Erdogan, the former mayor of Istanbul who was also banned at that time, and fronted by Abdullah Gul. The ominous messages from the military about the implications of a VP victory, the legal moves to ban the party, and the unlikelihood of its being allowed to take power may have all contributed to the drop in votes. To highlight the VP's relative success, the dominant parties of the 1980s and first half of the 1990s, the MP and TPP trailed in fourth and fifth with 13.2 percent and 12.2 percent respectively. Overall the results highlighted the dichotomous nature of Turkish society, but unlike the right/left schism, the electorate was divided three ways, with approximately 30 percent for the left center, 25 percent for center right, and 33 percent for the right, including the VP. This spread, allied to the multifarious nature of the political parties, meant that again no dominant party emerged and another coalition had to be established, incorporating the DLP, NAP, and MP. This alliance appeared strong numerically, holding 351 out of the 550 seats, but the divergent ideological positions required skillful negotiations and made substantive change difficult. Ecevit retained his position as prime minister. The political arena did, however, change as Ahmet Sezer replaced Demirel as president in May 2000 for a seven-year tenure.30 Sezer made an immediate impression, notably annoying secular politicians and the military over his refusal to accept a decree that sought to make it easier to dismiss civil servants who were considered to have Islamist or separatist sympathies. He then further irritated the ruling coalition by refusing to sign another decree for the privatization of three banks. The apparent independence of the president and his modest lifestyle made a favorable impression on the public.31 The generic religious party finally split into two after the closure of the VP in June 2001: the Felicity Party (FP), which adheres to the traditional party policies, and a more reformist party, the JDP. In the November 2002 national elections it was the JDP that would emerge victorious. ISLAM IN CONTEMPORARY TURKEY Increasingly studies are acknowledging that praxisitioners incorporate not only those believers easily explained under modernization criteria, for example, migrants and small traders, but also representatives from across the socioeconomic spectrum32 including intellectuals, government officials,

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engineers, scientists, members of the bourgeoisie, and even in some instances officers in the armed forces.33 There are data available concerning the support for religious political parties34 and background of party membership. The more recent studies of party representatives provide some extremely useful information, highlighting the widespread appeal of political Islam. For example, the ages of JDP candidates in the November 2002 national election were split across age groups35. Sixty-three percent of the candidates were university graduates. A significant number had been involved with other parties in the past, including the WP, FP, MP, NAP, and even the DLP and reformed RPP. Kamrava's report (1998) also provides useful background information about the different level of officials within the WP and again emphasizes widespread demographic representation. At the top, he places the old guard of primary administrators with successful backgrounds in engineering and academia. The second level consisted of predominantly men aged between thirty and fifty who were often serving as administrators in provincial organizations and local authorities. The majority came from middleclass backgrounds, ranging from government employees to teachers and lecturers. The third level was composed of grassroots activists and supporters aged from late teens to early thirties. This group included young men and women attracted as part of the Islamic wave that swept the Middle East in the 1980s (although Kamrava fails to explain why) and current or former students whose education had not led to anticipated jobs. The detailed extent of support for praxist Islam is limited, partly due to the covert nature of many praxisitioners. Estimates of the percentage of praxist supporters of the politico-religious parties and within society vary, reflecting the uncertainty of the extent of the phenomenon. Akinci (1999) refers to an estimate36 of seven percent of "hard core" Islamists while Cornell (1999) has estimated that there are between 10 and 15 percent. An earlier survey in 1986,37 before the praxist resurgence fully developed, stated that 7 percent of a national sample agreed that Turkey should be ruled by the Shari'ah. Heper (1997: 35) interpreted this as "only seven percent." To put this figure into perspective, however, the WP received 4.4 percent of the vote in municipal elections in 1984 and 10 percent in 1989. Consequently this was a period in which political Islam was growing in popularity from a low support base. And while 7 percent of the electorate might be a significant figure if they want to radically change the state system, the increase of the figure to possibly 15 percent has, Cornell (1999) suggests, highlighted the extent of the resurgence. This figure becomes even more interesting when other praxisitioners are taken into account. These praxisitioners are reluctant to provide open answers because of perceived repercussions, and they would not vote for any politico-religious party because it is not radical enough or they believe that the democratic system is, for them, unIslamic. They believe change can be achieved only by working outside the state system.38 Interestingly Gulalp (1999) has noted that there were more absentee nonvotes or votes that were cast and considered spoiled and thus invalid than the WP received. High numbers of nonvoters and spoiled votes were also a feature

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of the 2002 elections. Obviously all these people will not have been praxisitioners, but it seems feasible that a significant number could be included. Trying to establish a clear picture of Islam in Turkey becomes even more difficult when the role of tarikats, like the Bekta§is and Nak§ibendis and newer Islamic movements, such as the Suleymanci§ and Nurcus, are examined. The movements vary in beliefs and practices.39 They range from the widespread movement of Fethullah Gtilen (see the following discussion), the Fethullahcis belonging to the Nurcus, who stress consensus and compromise and openly praise Atatiirk to the Aczimendiler who are radical Muslims in both practice and appearance, with black turbans, long hair, beards, and robes. Perhaps not surprisingly in view of Turkey's staunch formal secularism, the brotherhoods have attracted political attention throughout the history of the republic, not least when they were formally banned by Atatiirk and went underground. Over recent decades they have become more visible, lobbying initially over economic issues and then developing closer links with political parties, usually from the right wing. Politically the most notable brotherhood has been the Nak§ibendi,40 particularly through its involvement with the MP government of the 1980s. The involvement of religious brotherhoods within some main political parties has bestowed them with semilegal status and boosted their levels of influence. During the 1980s, the movements grew in membership as they successfully spread their ideas through both traditional and modern methods of communication as part of a wider attempt to educate Muslims. This has been achieved through a proliferation of publications, including journals and books and formal institutions such as schools and universities, where students are helped with accommodation in dormitories. The role of the media and education is discussed in more detail in the following chapter. Support for the tarikats and other newer movements has also grown, because like the WP/VP and subsequently the FP and JDP, they have been in positions to provide assistance for the poor that the state does not provide. And movements like the Nur have spread rapidly from being predominantly rural to being enmeshed within urban areas as migration has continued unabated. The growing political and social commitments are met by increasingly diverse financial sources from within Turkey and international organizations, especially in the Gulf countries. This growth is part of the wider expansion of the Islamist economic sector and includes banks, insurance companies, large commercial operations, and holding companies. Influence has also been extended to incorporate the institutional framework, and there are now Islamist employers' organizations, consulting agencies, and trade unions. Again, as with the religious parties, tarikat and newer movement members are able to find employment in important positions within the public sector. However, as Ayata (1996) has remarked, the success of these groups is ultimately likely to mean that the increased membership will weaken the grassroots support and the social cohesion that was the bedrock. This is because relations will change between the leaders and members and the former will become more distant as a consequence of the organizations' becoming more diverse, complex, and formal. And while the seemingly simultaneous rise of tarikats, newer movements, and

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the religious parties led to the description of a generic movement, they are distinctly separate and are all vying for leadership of Muslim communities. For this reason groups such as the Nak§ibendis are seeking to influence the secular center right parties that initially sought to incorporate them to enhance widespread political appeal, to move toward a more Islamic direction. At the same time, the politico-religious parties and Islamic intellectuals outside the mainstream are trying to weaken the links between the tarikats and grassroots supporters as they try take advantage of the changing relations. In the case of Islamic intellectuals, they are able to utilize their knowledge and communicative and analytical skills to translate what Toprak (1993: 244) refers to as the tarikats' "religious and political differences...into a consensual language" with "relative clarity of vision based on a rational discourse" that the relatively uneducated traditional tarikat leaders are unable to provide. It is therefore likely that the intellectuals are proving extremely important in influencing some educated people to become praxisitioners, partly as they are able to apply academic reasoning to Islamic discourse and contemporary contexts. There are signs that the military are becoming suspicious of different tarikats and newer movements, particularly those without strong links to the governing parties. Even Gulen has been linked to the threat of Islamic fundamentalism and indicted on charges of plotting to overthrow the secular regime.41 In view of the expanding and diverse range of Islamist influences, the perceived threat from radical Islam, and the traditional suspicion of tarikats, the military's policies are not surprising. It is perhaps surprising, however, that Gtilen has been questioned. This may partly be because of his popularity, influence, and potential longer term impact rather than simply the movement's relatively moderate religious ideology and emphasis on Turco-Ottoman nationalism. Until the attack, the Fethullahcis had been considered against the instrumentalization of Islam in politics and therefore were opposed to the use of religion by the parties. As such, both president Demirel and prime minister Ecevit defended the movement as a bulwark against political Islam. Yavuz (1999: 602) pointed out that "Islam, for Gulen, is not a political project to be implemented but rather a repository of knowledge and practices for the evolution of a just and ethical society." It could be that despite his attempts to work with the secular establishment Gulen is considered more of a threat because of his extensive external connections and socializing networks. For example, the Fethullahcis have established hundreds of schools throughout Turkey, Central Asia, and the Balkans and hold considerable economic and media interests. With Gtilen's power, influence, and contacts, the military now seem to view his moderate Islam as a Trojan horse within the secular castle that is almost imperceptibly seeking to bring about greater Islamification. The expansion of both political Islam within the democratic process and religious brotherhoods are two clear examples of the Islamic resurgence in Turkey. Linked to these developments are the widespread introduction of religious schools and increasing media penetration, discussed in the following chapter. There are also a vast number of economic and employee organizations covering a multifarious range of services, products, activities, and groups within

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regions, nations, and continents. Conspicuous signs of the Islamic resurgence can be noticed within society, most easily the growth of men in Muslim garbs and facial hair and more contentiously the number of women wearing the veil. As Gole (1997) noted in many instances the veil has moved from being a symbol of the uneducated, passive, and family orientated to politically active, educated women. These women consciously chose to wear the veil as part of their multifaceted lifestyles that incorporate higher education and professions but are centered around Islamic identity. Waxman (1998) develops this point, arguing that secularist opposition to the veil is not because they want everyone to look Western but due to the veil's becoming politicized, and consequently it has become part of a political uniform, a visible challenge against secularism, what Ahmed (1992: 235) refers to as "the symbol of resistance" within geopolitical discourses. It is therefore as political symbols that the security forces want universities to enforce the ban on headscarves.42 This symbolic meaning helps to explain the outrage and actions by secular politicians who forced a VP deputy wearing a headscarf43 to leave the National Assembly. Interestingly, however, the armed forces may be going against the wishes of the majority of the population, as in a recent survey 70 percent of people stated in response to a question about headscarves that women should be able to wear what they like.44 The growth of Islamic behavior in Turkish society is generally accepted by social commentators, even allowing for political analysts who were premature to identify a decline of religion in politics. However, the meaning of increased Islamification for the Turkish state, in particular the democratic system, is much debated. Both Heper (1997) and Sakalhoglu (1996) have argued that state control of religion and the inclusion and accommodation of the religiously oriented within mainstream politics have consolidated Turkish democracy and weakened support for a radical religious revival compared with a situation where the movement and parties had been banned. Certainly Islamic orders, movements, and sects have been incorporated within the political process and the state appears to have greater control, even with the JDP in power. However, these processes have allowed religious groups to have a disproportionate impact on state policies and institutions. As I shall argue in the next chapter, this has increased awareness of Islamic discourse, history, and symbols and ultimately contributes to many Muslims becoming praxisitioners. And while two religiopolitical parties are operating within democracy, one of which, the JDP, is heading the government, the constitutional action undertaken against their predecessors and leading officials means that they have to be very careful about how they portray Islam and secularism if they are to avoid being banned. In this likelihood, as Gulalp (1999: 37) expressed with reference to the WP, excluding the generic religious party "from mainstream parliamentary politics could lead to further radicalisation of political Islam in Turkey." Similarly the frequent closure of religio-political parties has raised significant questions about the Turkish democratic process. Yet this is always a possibility if the group that Heper (1997: 45) refers to as "radical secularists" remain instrumental to the state's decision-making and whose conception of democracy has excluded both radical and moderate Muslims. Culturally, the dichotomy is widening between

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two opposing groups because as Kadioglu (1996) argues, each group seeks to exclude the other and dialogue and understanding diminish. Radical secularists become increasingly hostile to religious images and Islamists increase their attacks on Western culture. For Toprak (1996) this polarization can be at least partly attributable to the rigidity of state secularism that is preventing the formation of a civil consensus to incorporate different beliefs. The development of a consensus that included Islam would, Toprak argues, weaken the potential for radical Islam and prevent an uprising. Cornell (1999) has stated that the Islamic resurgence in politics belongs to the past as the WP failed to prove that it was substantively different from its predecessors and disappointed the electorate, who subsequently turned to the nationalist NAP in the 1999 election as the last untried alternative. While I am inclined to disagree that an 18 percent share of the vote for the NAP is proof of the theory (what, for example, of the remaining 82 percent?), I believe that the dismissal of religion in politics is premature for reasons explained earlier. Similarly the confidence that Toprak (1987: 230) placed on the development of the Turkish economy that would mean "that a mass political movement based on religious appeals has little chance of success in modern Turkey" in hindsight probably fails to take into account the economic instability of post-Second World War Turkey. If Cornell is correct in attributing at least some of the vote for the WP and NAP as protest votes45 then following the recent history of Turkish politics it was extremely unlikely that either religious party would make a significant difference to Turkish political life. But after the WP's ill-fated spell in government and subsequent closure of the VP, both the FP and JDP have had the opportunity to try to reclaim past popularity. The JDP sought to position itself as a center right party, denying links with the heritage of the WP and VP, and has been associated less with previous mistakes46 than the FP. This is partly because the FP has inherited the image of the latter stages of the WP and VP, not least as the old guard are still seen to remain in control. The JDP has proved to be more innovative at public relations, utilizing Erdogan's charismatic leadership, and has emphasized distinct characteristics compared with its predecessors, including being more supportive of relations with the European Union (EU). The widening of the JDP's appeal proved to be successful at the November 2002 elections, which the party won with a parliamentary majority. This was partly achieved through its broad appeal that went beyond religion, highlighted by a survey undertaken just prior to the elections that found only 28 percent of the people who said they would vote for the JDP had previously voted for a religious party.47 The JDP was the clear winner at the election, securing 363 seats out of 550 and has formed a single party government. However the size of the majority is misleading due to the system of proportionate representation as the JDP only secured 34.2 percent of the votes cast and when the number of voters, who did not vote or cast invalid votes are taken into account, the JDP could be seen to only represent twenty-five percent of the electorate. The RPP, the only other party to pass the ten percent of votes received threshold, obtained

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a total of fifteen percent of possible votes. Consequently sixty percent of the electorate are not represented within parliament. Against this background and three military coups (or four, if the postmodern coup is included), the democratic process is questioned across the political spectrum. The JDP's electoral success created a tremendous dilemma for the military. This has since been exacerbated by the JDP's policies although not for reasons that the military may have anticipated. The national assembly has recently passed a sixth package of democratic reforms that were instigated by the JDP as part of the process for EU membership. The reforms were passed despite the army's concerns and unusually were not submitted in advance to the National Security Council (NSC). Within the forthcoming seventh package, it is proposed to curb the influence of the NSC, with its role changing from formulating policy to becoming an advisory body that would be headed by a civilian (Pope 2003c). Military expenditure is being reduced, partly by reducing the length of compulsory military service and there are plans to restructure the institution (Pope 2003a). The proposed reduction of the military's role within politics and possible downsizing is causing considerable concern within the army, and which remains suspicious about the JDP and links with Islamic groups. However, the JDP's parliamentary majority, its frequent praise for the military and the meticulous attention placed on ensuring policies do not contravene the secular constitution has meant that at present the military has only limited scope to resist the proposals. There are currently no grounds on which to legitimately abolish the JDP, not least as it would seriously undermine Turkish democracy and would lead to widespread condemnation. It is therefore, ironically, the pursuit within secular institutions for greater union with Europe that could lead to the military's power being reduced by the JDP. At the time of writing, the military seems to be adopting a similar approach to that used for the 1996 WP led coalition. The JDP is being very closely scrutinised and whilst the military had little option other than to allow the party to form a government, it must hope that the party will be discredited through its use of power. At the time of writing, however, the JDP is probably exceeding expectations and a recent survey48 showed that support for the party in the seven months since it formed the government had increased by 5.7 percent. It is still too early to accurately predict the likelihood that the JDP will prove to be a long-term success. In the event that it is unable to maintain the broad coalition of supporters, who have very different, and often conflicting, requirements and expectations, or, based upon previous episodes is subsequently declared to be unconstitutional then there would be tremendous concern about where many of the JDP's supporters will go if all the democratic options are discredited. This could also apply if the JDP's more Islamically orientated supporters became disillusioned with the party's center-right stance and firm adherence to the secular constitution. In this eventuality, people who have already supported right wing parties, with at least strong Islamic undertones, might not have to make quantum leaps of faith to support praxist groups that offer solutions outside democracy. Alternatively the increasing levels of abstention that Gulalp (1999) discussed and which were noted in the 2002

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elections may incorporate praxisitioners refusing to participate in democracy or growing levels of apathy that may enable populist movements to prosper with less popular opposition. Despite the post-modern coup and subsequent actions taken against Islamists, the patronage system has ensured that praxism had become more deeply ingrained within secularism. The military still considers it to be the main threat against the secular state, with the Chief of Staff General Kivrikoglu stating that "there are thousands of public servants at every level who want to undermine the state. They have even reached positions such as governor and other key posts, and are destroying the foundations of the state."49 Consequently there have been attempts to provide the state with power to dismiss "suspicious" employees from state positions that have so far been prevented by the president due to the unconstitutional methods used to introduce the decree. In the short term it does seem that the inclusion of religion within democracy is likely to reduce the resurgence of praxist Islam. This is providing as Gole (1996: 19) has argued "the inclusionary context provided by political pluralism, upward social mobility and autonomous civil society increases not exclusion and confrontation, but the chances for an interplay between modernist and Islamist actors and discourses." In other words, providing the modernization process incorporates these interactions and activities, Islam can be retained within the democratic system. However, in the long term concessions made to incorporate religious groups will accelerate the praxisification process. Conversely frequently closing down moderate Islamic parties is also likely to increase levels of praxism for the reasons discussed earlier. At this stage it is important to build on the general factors in the Introduction for the Islamic resurgence and summarize the specific reasoning provided by other studies within Turkey. This will help develop the underlying mechanisms that are responsible for the religious parties' political support and the wider societal Islamic resurgence that occurred since 1980. I reiterate that within this apparently general process there are considerable variations in the nature of supporters' beliefs, interpretations, policies, and actions, and the multitude of different parties, tarikats, sects, and groups ensure that there are no generic movements and no universally recognized leader. FACTORS FOR GROWTH IN WIDESPREAD ISLAM Studies of Islamic resurgences within different countries tend to put forward similar reasoning that stress a variety of factors that are linked to modernization and globalization and which reflect the religion's wide appeal. A general list is included in the Introduction. More specifically, within Turkish analysis there is a concentration on: Economy. Developing on the logic established in the Introduction, many Muslims are attracted to Islamic groups, particularly within politics, that offer highly populist solutions to economic problems, and possibly seek more radical solutions to considerable problems. Within Turkey, the development of international capitalism and interrelated consequences have led to protests from the economically excluded based on classic

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dependency theories that the WP, in particular, frequently utilized. Even though the Turkish economy is the sixth largest in Europe (Mango 1999b), since 1983 economic instability has been increasingly noticeable with the end of greater protectionism and the introduction of free market policies and wider involvement in globalization that have resulted in higher inflation, a drop in public salaries, and a widening of the gap between rich and poor.50 Both the fascist NAP and pre JDP religious parties have been able to take advantage of these problems and mobilize fears over possible EU membership. This can be seen in the popularity of these parties in poor, often depressed areas. By identifying the concerns of many, which the Western-facing mainstream parties are unable to address, previous Islamic parties and groups operating outside the democratic system have been able to connect economic concerns with European and American intervention, often allied to anti-Semitic sentiments.51 These concerns about the country's economic direction are shared by large segments of the population, but they are divided in their approach, action, and ideological policies (Akinci 1999; Eralp et al. 1993). Urbanization. The process of urbanization has brought millions of rural inhabitants to cities, leading to the dramatic growth of urban areas. For example, the population of Istanbul increased from 5 million in 1990 to 10 million in 2000 and the share of urban residents in Turkey climbed from 44 percent in 1980 to 65 percent in 2000.52 Many of the migrants experience economic marginalization and alienation that Ayata (1996) and Salt (1995) argue are strongly connected to the rise in Muslim consciousness. Migrants "begin to wear Islam as a 'badge' and become dependent on religion for a definition of their identity" (Mardin 1989: 179). Bianchi (1984: 291) has claimed that "there is a clear curvilinear relationship between religiosity and urbanization; those who were raised in provincial capitals or small towns score significantly higher on our index of religiosity than those who were raised either in villages or in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. Religiosity is positively related to age and negatively related to education." Age. However, with respect to the age factor the above point goes against claims that the majority of radical Muslims are young and the prominence of praxist students and graduates certainly discounts age as a factor in this sense while highlighting that there is no longer, if there ever was, an inverse relationship between Islam and education. As Richards and Waterbury noted, commentators in Turkey and other Middle Eastern countries have observed that religiosity now attracts the "better educated and younger members of the petite bourgeoisie" (1990: 414). And in a study reported by Gulalp (1999) it was found that 45 percent of those who demanded an Islamic government were aged between fourteen and thirty-four. These points reflect Huntingdon's (1996: 117) view that "young people are the protagonists of protest, instability, reform and revolution." Social mobility. Following on from the preceding points, there is evidence that where the circulation of elites takes place through social mobility and opportunities within education then Islamist movements are likely to be more participatory in approach (Gole 1996). However, if social mobility is blocked, then Islamist groups are likely to attract more support and use more extreme methods to work toward more radical outcomes. Democracy and fragmented politics. Generally there is widespread disillusionment with the main secular political parties and the same rotating leaders, although possibly renamed parties, that have tended to monopolize power. These leaders have been unable to control the high rates of inflation, solve the Kurdish problem, prevent corruption or nepotism, attract a popular mandate, provide strong leadership, or avoid personal vendettas. In this respect votes for the religious parties and in 1999 the NAP have been seen as protest votes against the establishment and not as proactive support for these parties (Cornell 1999; Kamrava 1998). The secular political parties have tended to be divided by ideology and then subdivided by personality. This has meant that the popular vote has been fragmented and strong government has been prevented from forming. The

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process enables rival political ideologies to be legitimized through opposition as they are able to use the seat allocation system to be disproportionately influential. Throughout its history Turkey has not achieved political, economic, or social stability leading people to look for alternatives (Kamrava 1998; Toprak 1996). As Kadioglu (1996: 192) has remarked, "the political climate that prevailed in the 1980s and the early 1990s has opened the Kemalist Pandora's box out of which have emerged multiple identities making references to the different sects of Islam and Kurds." It is not universally accepted, however, that this has been the case as both Heper (1997) and Sakalhoglu (1996) have argued that the accommodation of Islam within secular politics has "secured political stability." Freedom of expression. It is argued that amending Article 163 of the Turkish Criminal Code, lifting restrictions on free speech (Kamrava 1998; Sakalhoglu 1996; Toprak 1996), has enabled praxist groups to use modern media, including Islamic radio, television, and press, to communicate to people with messages that they previously had not been allowed (more details are included in the following chapter). State support. Ironically the state has promoted Islam at important stages of its history as a bulwark principally against the political left53 and with double irony to prevent religious radicalization (Sakalhoglu 1996, Toprak 1996). As Ayata (1996: 41) has commented "the policies put forward by political parties on the center right and the religious activities of various government institutions have tended to heighten religious consciousness, increase levels of religious observance, and reinforce religious identity among the masses." These aspects are discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. Patronage. During the periods in power sharing by the NSP/WP and the Islamist wing of the MP, they installed their supporters into important positions where they have continued to have an influence (Akinci 1999; Cornell 1999; Toprak 1996). The significance of this trend is explored in the next chapter. Social welfare. As a consequence of economic instability, urbanization, and the lack of adequate state welfare, there has been a demand for help and assistance that the religious groups have been able to provide (Akinci 1999; Cornell 1999; Kamrava 1998). For example, in poorer areas, tarikats and political parties have used their considerable local networks to provide fuel, food,54 shelter, and even jobs, arguably to help gain support.55 The parties and other Islamic groups have utilized large resources for welfare programs, with much funding allegedly from abroad, notably Iran and Saudi Arabia. Populist appeal. In view of the preceding problems, praxist groups can attract support by offering popular, often clear and simple solutions for social actions such as reducing unemployment, enabling indigenous trading opportunities, improving housing, and providing communual identities (Ayata 1996). These solutions appear feasible because of the pragmatic assistance that Islamic groups already provide and have not been tarnished by involvement in state problems.56 Gulalp (2001: 442) argues that the WP was "filling the void created by the collapse of statism and the ensuing crisis of modernist identities that were based on it, such as nationalism and socialism." Psychological issues. Arguably as a consequence of the preceding factors, radical Islam attracts people who are alienated, lack required metaphysical functions (Heper 1981; Keddie 1988), and face anomie (Mehmet 1990; Sayan 1984). After analyzing the different factors, three main categories become apparent: 1.

The first, and overwhelmingly dominant, perspective identifies the problems with the state and to a lesser extent the global system, for example, weakness in democratic parties, patronage, unemployment, urbanization, and restricted social

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3.

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mobility. Gulalp's (1999; 2001) use of the post-modern condition can be included within this category. The second type of explanation refers to state concessions and the way that praxisitioners have been able to take advantage, for example, of freedom of information, democratic process (although contested), and state sponsorship to counteract other ideologies that were considered more of a threat at the time. The final category is derived from the previous two, namely, solutions that Islamic groups are able to offer in terms of populist policies and practical assistance within the void caused by the lack of localized state welfare that can be implemented through widespread and effective organization.

There is evidence to support the composite involvement of these interrelated yet distinct elements within the three categories. However, there is still an overemphasis on exclusion linked to migration and poverty, and radical Islam is by implication still the preserve of the poorer classes. I am not disagreeing that these groups are likely to provide praxist movements with most of their supporters, but there are two major problems with this classification of different causal factors: 1.

2.

As Gulalp (1999: 34) commented on the failure of many studies "to note that while neither immigration nor urban poverty and anomie are new phenomena, the growth of Islamism...is. Working classes or other urban poor elements were always primarily composed of recent immigrants yet they did not use to subscribe to Islamism until the 1980s." Thus, the conditions that many argue are responsible for praxism today were, as the previous chapter explained, generally present throughout the republic's earlier history; Even the synthesis of views cannot adequately explain why educated and successful people become praxisitioners.

Further support can be found when examining the appeal of Islam by investigating the socioeconomic background of the WP, VP and JDP supporters. Certainly there are the marginalized and dispossessed from large urban areas, the provincial petite bourgeoisie and urban traders that could be anticipated under secular reasoning.57 But as Gulalp has noted, the electorate also includes members of the young professional middle class and students. And while an argument can be put forward for the latter's being subsequently unemployed and thus attracted by the politico-religious parties' employment promises, it is less easy to explain the support of the young, professional middle class. Crucially Gulalp adds that the appeal can no longer be considered to be a rural phenomenon because it is overwhelmingly urban in support nor can it be rural by migration, that is, a reaction by migrants facing anomie as Heper (1997) has argued. As the existence of other working class and non working class groups highlights, other factors have to be involved. Consequently while all the preceding factors are to varying degrees relevant in helping to understand and explain the Islamic resurgence they need to be incorporated into a wider, more comprehensive schematic. The schematic needs to include the appeal of praxism to different socioeconomic groups and account for the contemporary nature of the resurgence that neither snapshot sociology nor the

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comparative social analysis undertaken in the last two chapters can fully understand or explain. The remainder of this publication seeks to fill in the missing gaps, starting with the role of a dimension that is often overlooked or understated: the socializing agents. NOTES 1. Quoted in Geyikdagi (1984: 136). 2. This part of the constitution is quoted in Salt (1995: 16). 3. Gole (1996) has noted that affiliation is no longer a lifetime commitment but is defined on a shorter-term issue-based relationship. Voter support is also linked to the "cult of the leader" (Pope and Pope 1997). 4. For further details see S. Ayata, (1996). 5. S. Ayata, (1993, 1996), Toprak (1996), and Yesilada (1990) all discuss these factors in some detail. 6. Turkey's share in international exports rose from 0.18 percent ($2.3 billion) in 1975 to 0.43 percent ($8.3 billion) in 1985 (Hershlag 1988). 7. Toprak (1993) notes that the number of telephone subscribers in 1979 was 1.1 million and by 1989 had increased to 5.9 million. The number then doubled between 1989 and 1995 (Pope and Pope 1997). During the 1980s the number of villages with telephone lines rose from 6.3 thousand to 37.6 thousand (Toprak 1993). 8. The number of tourists rose from 1.1 million in 1979 to 5.4 million in 1990 and 7.7 million in 1995. During the same period, Turkish citizens traveling abroad increased from 1.3 million to 2.9 million (Pope and Pope 1997; Toprak 1993). 9. Debts totaled $26,303 million in April 1986. Imports more than doubled between 1979 ($5.1 billion) and 1984-1985 ($11.2 billion). 10. "During the same period (1980-1988), the share of wages and salaries fell from 23.9 to 15.8 percent of national income. On the other hand, the share of rents, profits, and interest income increased from 49.5 percent in 1980 to 71 percent in 1988" (Yesilada and Fisunoglu quoted in Eralp et al. 1993: 233). 11. For example, Demirel, hitherto a staunch secularist, declared to a religious magazine that "since the Law for the Unity of Education is not a holy book, if Qur'an courses or religious education are against this law then it is not religious education that is wrong but the law itself (quoted in Acar 1991: 197). 12. Yilmaz replaced Akbulut as leader of the MP after the 1991 election. 13. While the West, notably America, initially gave Turkey some compensation for the loss of trade, this was generally short lived. Indeed there has been a general decline in the aid allocated as Turkey's strategic importance weakened and Armenian, Kurd, Greek, and Cypriot groups proved adversely effective in preventing financial assistance from being allotted (Pope and Pope 1997). 14. The WP had participated in the 1987 election but attained only 7.1 percent of the vote and consequently was below the 10 percent threshold for representation. In 1991 the WP gained 16.8 percent as part of an alliance with two other smaller parties. It has been estimated that the WP's total share of the national vote was 13 percent (Salt 1995). 15. Pope and Pope (1997: 336) add that "the vagueness of its programme reflects the fact that it cannot claim to represent a universally approved form of Islam, since Alevis and the tarikat brotherhoods all have very different views." 16. In the 1994 local elections, the WP gained control of 327 municipalities, including Ankara and Istanbul.

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17. Tansu (filler was elected as Turkey's first female prime minister by the TPP after Demirel became president on the death of Ozal in 1993. 18. This strategic partnership at the expense of neighboring Muslim states provides further evidence that what Huntingdon (1996: 28) referred to as "cultural kinship" is not central, if indeed it exists at all in the generic sense he claims, within the Islamic world but simply an element taken into account, and often overridden, when governments are making pragmatic decisions. 19. For example, Kara (1996) reports on 200 municipal workers who were made redundant by the WP mayor allegedly due to insufficient funds in Istanbul's Eminonu district. An equal number of pro-WP staff were immediately recruited after the redundancies were implemented. 20. This was highlighted by the appointment of the WP-supporting director of the Municipal Firefighting Department in Corum who had no prior experience of firefighting, reported in Akinci (1999). 21. Further details can be found in Akinci (1999). 22. The demonstration was also supported by an Iranian ambassador then based in Turkey. He returned to Iran shortly afterward. 23. The coup is discussed in greater detail in Aydintasbas (1998), Cornell (1999), Gulalp (1999), Kamrava (1998) and Pope and Pope (1997). 24. The coalition was secured only when a sufficient number of TPP deputies joined who had been against the WP/TPP government (Cornell 1999). 25. Cornell (1999) discusses this in more detail. 26. The WP had been banned in January 1998 after the Constitutional Court declared that the religious platform contradicted the secular constitution. Erbakan and several other significant members were banned from politics for five years. 27. Further details can be found in Gulalp (1999). 28. Cornell (1999) and Pope (1999a) discuss this in more detail. 29. Further details can be found in Cornell (1999) and Pope (1999b). 30. The change occurred after a proposal to amend the constitution to allow Demirel's term to be extended was rejected. 31. In a number of surveys into the most popular Turkish public figure, Sezer came out top, obtaining positive responses from 91 percent (reported in Turkish Daily News, 8 October 2001). Since then his popularity has gradually decreased although he remains more popular than the previous president, Demirel (reported in Turkish Daily News, 8 July 2003). 32. Further details can be found in Ayata (1991, 1996), Gole (1996, 1997), Heper (1997), Meeker (1991), Pope and Pope (1997), and Toprak (1981, 1993). 33. According to Ayata (1996), even the armed forces, the recognized defenders of Atatiirk's legacy, have a significant number of Islamists in their ranks, and he points to an episode in 1990 when 813 officers and students were dismissed for having ties with fundamentalist organizations. Kamrava (1998) has reported on the attempts by the WP to develop closer ties with the armed forces after its success in the 1994 municipal elections. 34. For example, Aksit (1986), Alkan (1984), Roy (1994), and Toprak (1981, 1984) have drawn correlations when the support was predominantly rural. However, as S. Ayata (1993) and the recent general elections have shown, support has become spread across urban and rural areas. 35. The figures were 30-35 years, 12.8 percent; 36-40 years, 16.7 percent; 41-45 years, 16.6 percent; 46-50 years, 24.2 percent; 51-55 years, 15.4 percent; 56-60 years,

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8.4 percent; and over 60 years, 5.6 percent (reported in the Turkish Daily News 4 September 2002). 36. Estimated in Nokta, 26 June-2 July 1994. 37. Reported in Turan (1991). 38. A number of praxisitioners belong to radical groups such as Buyuk Dogu, Girisim, Hizbullah, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, IBDA-C, and Vardet. The dispersal of praxisitioners across a range of groups that operate covertly due to the nature of their objectives makes accurately estimating the total almost impossible. Currently the most interesting and visible group is Hizbollah which was implicated in a number of political murders. The group had reputed strong links in development and initial operations against Kurds with the armed forces. IBDA-C have also been influential and its leader, Salih Mirzabeyoglu, has been sentenced to death. Between June 2001 and July 2002 the Interior Ministry detained 1,348 alleged Hizbollah militants, reported in Turkish Daily News, 2 August 2002. 39. For example, the Suleymancis and Nurcus are not based on Sufism. Further details about the brotherhoods can be found in Atacan (2001), Ayata (1991, 1996), Cornell (2001), Heper (1997), Kadioglu (1998), Pope and Pope (1997), Sakalhoglu (1996), Toprak (1993), and Yavuz (1999). 40. Ayata (1996: 48) comments that "the numerous branches and lodges of the Naksibendi tarikat were able to develop powerful and active networks in business, politics, the mass media, and social and welfare services." Membership of the Naksibendi has been estimated at 2.5 million and is believed to consist of five subgroups (Cornell 2001). 41. It should be noted that on this occasion the Court ruled that there was insufficient evidence to arrest Gtilen. 42. In 2001-2002, 1,650 Imam-Hatip students could not attend high school classes because they did not adhere to the dress code, in particular the headscarf ban, and subsequently failed their courses (reported in Turkish Daily News, 2 August 2002). 43. The deputy, Merve Kavakci, argued in response that she had been elected with her headscarf and represents 70 percent of Turkish women who also cover their heads (Pope, 1999c). 44. Reported in the Turkish Daily News, 8 October 2001. 45. Further support for this can be found in the ANAR survey reported in Gulalp (1999). 46. The distance between the JDP and its predecessors has been strengthened by Erbakan's subtle criticism of Erdogan and the latter distancing himself from the critical politics of the past (reported in the Turkish Daily News, 23 August 2002). 47. Survey reported in the Turkish Daily News, 2 August 2002. 48. The survey was reported in the Turkish Daily News, 8 July 2003. 49. Reported in Pope (2000b). 50. Ayata (1996) points out that Turkey has one of the most skewed income distributions in the world. Further information about these points can also be found in Sakalhoglu (1996), Salt (1995), and Tunay (1993). 51. The WP's stance against Israel, although subsequently broken, was particularly important at a time when the Turkey was developing closer ties with Israel and some Muslims, as part of the wider trend in the Middle East, became increasingly dissatisfied with Israel and the perceived preferential treatment it was given by the West in the conflict with Palestinians.

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52. Reported in the Turkish Daily News, 27 August 2002. A previous report in the same newspaper (9 October 2000) estimated that the urban/rural split was 74:26. 53. The decline of the left as a major force subsequently provided greater space and support for praxist groups to develop. 54. For example, during Ramadan, one WP mayor of a suburb of Istanbul provided 3,500 families with 250 kg packages of groceries (Akinci 1999). 55. For opposing views about the effectiveness of the WP-controlled municipalities see Akinci (1999), Cornell (1999), and Kamrava (1998). 56. This was at least partially true until the WP formed the government in 1996, and to a lesser extent the JDP in 2002, as the party had the attraction of novelty, free of corruption and scandal and its difference promoted without being untested (Cornell 1999, Kamrava 1998). The NSP's participation in coalitions during the 1970s was not considered within this analysis due to its junior status and the significant lapse of time and the much wider range of officials and popular appeal of the WP/VP/JDP. To a certain extent the JDP has been able to claim an element of novelty, partly as a consequence of publicly distancing itself from the WP/VP. 57. Gulalp (2001) provides an interesting development, arguing that the global organization of production has led to growth of subcontracted, decentralized and smallscale enterprises within developing countries. These firms tend to be based on the "sweatshop" mentality and have contributed to a decline in working-class politics and the rise of petite bourgeoisie entrepreneurship. This provides political Islam with "particularly fertile ground." However Gulalp fails to adequately explain his claim and it is not clearly established why these firms provide such fertile ground.

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5

Linking the Past and the Way Forward: Socialization Agents of the Republic INTRODUCING SOCIALIZATION AGENTS Socializing processes have changed considerably since the formation of the Turkish republic. Previous processes of socialization within the Ottoman Empire tended to be localized. Moral, legal, commercial, and learning spheres were the responsibility of the family, community, and ulema. These roles have altered dramatically during the history of the republic as socialization processes1 have become more complex, linking individual identity formation within widening global relations. These changes have been instrumental in the Islamic resurgence. Clearly within any social contexts there are agents that are directly involved with socializing individuals intentionally or unintentionally. In this chapter the impact of the four most influential agents on religious orientation are evaluated: family, peer group, education, and the mass media. None of the agents are examined in isolation, because as Goudsblom (1977) commented in reference to the family, each has to be seen in the context of other groups and I would add within the wider spatiality. The earlier chapters established that Islamic beliefs and actions are held and practiced by praxisitioners. Obviously praxitioners are being informed about Islam as part of their socializing processes; otherwise, they would not be aware of the beliefs or the need to practice what they believe. We need to establish why similar contexts or agents have different impacts. As a start in this process, some empirical evidence is used to help illuminate the responsible socializing agents and explain the contemporary nature of the Islamic resurgence. Particular attention is placed on the group that other studies have found most difficult to explain, educated praxisitioners.

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THE DIMINISHING FAMILIAL ROLE The role of the Muslim family has been central within Islamic tenets, echoed in Mawdudi's (1986: 39) statement that the family is an instrument of continuity which prepares the succeeding generation to serve human civilization and to discharge its social obligations with devotion, sincerity and enthusiasm. This institution does not merely recruit cadets for the maintenance of human culture, but positively desires that those who are to come will be better members of society. In this respect, the family can be truly called the source of progress, development, prosperity and strength of human civilization. Recent developments have meant, however, that this monopoly is continually being broken down in most parts of the interdependent world during the latter stages of the twentieth and early part of the twenty-first centuries. For example, as the following sections indicate, education and the mass media have penetrated individual lives as the nature of global relations changes. Giddens has noted "the more tradition loses its hold, and the more daily life is reconstituted in terms of the dialectical interplay of the local and global, the more individuals are forced to negotiate lifestyle choices among a diversity of options" (1991: 5). These changes do not necessarily mean that the family is no longer of central importance in social relations, but it has lost its dominant position and in some instances monopoly. McDermott and Ahsan (1980) noted that as the child matures it encounters a wider range of agents, many of whom will disagree with parental messages. These other agents in the process of praxisification need to be established. But within these changes Muslim parents are still expected to "preserve and develop the religion of Islam and transmit this faith to their children" (McDermott and Ahsan 1980: 14). This is against a background of changes both within and outside family life; for example, perceptions of women are altering to become, in many instances, more progressive and strongly influenced by increases in female employment. These changes are having a major impact. In the case of gender relations, rather than hiding or secluding women or their bodies more emphasis is placed on socializing behavior as woman increasingly find employment outside the home and the perception of them and their roles needs to change accordingly. Changes in employment patterns have also affected the role and structure of families. The previous methods of employment during the Ottoman and first part of the republican eras tended to result in individuals following the family's traditional occupation which was, to a large extent, determined by the community's needs. The family and community were crucial agents interwoven within socializing processes, although as Mardin noted (1989: 12), changes were introduced during the Ottoman Tanzimat period and continued by republicans that de-personalized the traditional systems. The role of the father as patriarch "was gradually eroded and bonds of personal allegiance were replaced by Western-type contractual ties or by the types of affiliation that prevailed in a society of blocks." As the state altered economic direction and urban migration became a consequence of the move from an agricultural to an industrial base, many family ties and levels

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of influences became weaker following the widespread dispersal of members. Even when migrant families remained together, the traditional authority of the father has been undermined by his lack of knowledge and experience in urban areas. Increasingly the wife and mother has to go out to work (Ayubi 1991). This has been helped ironically by the increase in veiled women. In light of the perception of the veil as traditional and restrictive to female rights this may seem surprising, but as Zubaida (2000: 76) noted, "the veil has facilitated rather than inhibited...much wider social and economic participation by women, in bestowing respectability and modesty on female public appearance." Clearly the overall impact of these changes on the Turkish family has been profound and the process of role reduction identified by Stirling (1976) has continued. The traditional extended family is gradually being replaced by the nuclear version. Consequently there has been a decline in the cultural consensus because children are now faced with greater choice than previous generations and are not restricted to behavioral parameters similar to those of their parents or grandparents. The state has also been directly and intentionally involved in the changing nature of the familial role through its expanding incursion into personal life. This has occurred throughout the history of the republic and can be traced to the acknowledgment by the early governments that the family was transmitting dominant cultural values. The republicans were trying to establish a broad culture based on nationalism and needed to ensure that families were not communicating incommensurate values to their children. As most families held the traditional values that the republicans were trying to change it was decided that the state needed to take a more dominant socializing role and weaken the power of the family that was considered detrimental to progress. The process was started with Atatiirk's civil code that provided women with the same rights of inheritance, family law, and property. As the state increasingly sought to modernize, particularly during the 1960s, intervention became more noticeable and influential, for example, introducing compulsory education and passing the 1965 Family Planning Law. If we start to look at why changes in the family may have been instrumental in the rising Islamic consciousness it is possible to link the numerical increase of Muslims with the growth in the Turkish population, 99 percent of whom are Muslims. Islamic families produce Islamic children and the apparent religiosity is simply a consequence of Muslims reproducing and socializing more Muslims as the birth rate exceeds the death rate. However, Ozcan's (1993) study of the growth in population and faith showed that the latter has increased at a greater rate than the former. Consequently the growth in Islamic behavior, in particular that of praxisitioners, cannot be adequately explained by children imitating the devotion of their parents, nor can it explain why praxism is a recent phenomenon. If the identity formation of children was simply the consequence of socialization by their parents, then praxism would have been prominent for at least two generations and realistically over a longer period. Within this reasoning, parents would need to internalize praxist values that, under this explanation, would in turn be from their own parents. The contemporary nature of rising Islamic consciousness, however, means that offspring must be more

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devout than their parents. This is supported by my empirical research into processes of socialization that examined the role of agents. In particular, a statement was developed that asked if other family members held similar beliefs,2 and this provided helpful information.3 Generally, praxisitioners who expanded on their answer considered the question to be about religious beliefs as did secularists who had subsequently changed their views. It would appear that the praxisitioners exposed to religion in the family considered religious beliefs to be the prominent belief. Family members would therefore seem important in processes of secularization and praxisification because a significant number of secularists and praxisitioners shared similar beliefs to their parents. Can we therefore suggest that the interviewees had simply internalized the ideology of their families? I conclude that this was incorrect for two reasons: 1.

2.

Not all respondents agreed that they shared similar beliefs with family members. Therefore a generalization about internalization would have to be treated with extreme caution, particularly in the case of secularists who subsequently discarded their parents' religious views. While the remaining interviewees may share similar beliefs, the comments provided by praxisitioners in particular showed that the levels of practice are not the same. Generally they would appear to be more active in their faith than other family members.

As Ozcan's study implied, the process of becoming a praxisitioner does not therefore appear to be linked inevitably to internalizing familial precepts. Sons were not replicas of their parents and interestingly the process of Islamification is not necessarily unilinear; internalizing Islamic values during childhood does not necessarily mean that the child becomes a praxist adult. Consequently we have to conclude that differences in behavior for both secularists and praxisitioners from their parents must at least be partly explained by the involvement of other agents. Following the theories that link the Islamic resurgence with economic deprivation, it could be argued that praxisitioners would be more likely to come from families living in poor conditions or threatened by them. Witnessing the familial conditions had led them, and not necessarily their parents, to become praxisitioners after other agents exposed them to theological explanations. The interviewees' economic position is explored in the following education section. In the study I undertook of parents' occupations, some support was discovered for the modernization argument as the praxisitioners generally originated from lower socioeconomic groups4. However, the occupations, with the notable exceptions of the bazaaris and imam, would not necessarily be associated with economic breeding grounds for Islam. Neither did the secularists match any preconceived stereotypes because some fathers were employed in similar labor-intensive industries to the praxisitioners' fathers and would be vulnerable to the same economic opportunities and threats that modernization arguments use to explain the appeal of Islam. Consequently if these patterns are generalized the economic position of families is a factor in the internalization process of both praxisitioners and secularists, but parental, principally fathers', occupation alone is not decisive. This is partly supported by Meeker (1991), who argues that the new Muslim

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intellectuals are modern products of various backgrounds who operate within the secularist environment. From the above information it can be tentatively argued that praxisitioners' parents generally tended to display some characteristics that modernization theories might expect. But these characteristics are not as widespread or universal as such studies would claim, nor do parents appear to possess the depth and intensity of belief that their sons hold. The shift to a broader range of agents is one of the main factors behind the contemporary nature of the Islamic resurgence. Hence within contemporary Turkey, the individual can now become aware of ideologies from different sources, including education. THE EXPANDING ROLES OF STATE EDUCATION: DEVELOPING THE STATE AND UNINTENTIONAL CONSEQUENCES The role of education in the socialization process is of immense importance within modern societies. Hess and Torney (1965) stress this point in their study of the political orientation of American students and teachers that led them to declare that schooling was the most important instrument of political socialization. Educational institutions have no competition in delivering particular messages that children must internalize if they are to be socially and academically successful. There is increasing evidence, however, that education can both intentionally support and strengthen the nation-state and conversely often unintentionally promote radical challenges to its legitimacy. This can be seen across many Muslim nations that have emphasized the need for cognitive skills to assist in the quest for development within the global system. Clearly education can benefit individuals who meet secular assessment criteria and are able to leave universities highly qualified with modern skills and knowledge that can help the state modernize. Probably for this reason, studies have tended to ignore graduate praxisitioners because they do not meet the exclusion criteria unless it is argued that despite their education these praxisitioners will not be able to find suitable employment. Bianchi's (1984) findings that Turkish religiosity is negatively related to education are generally not applicable. On the contrary, as Arjomand remarked (1986: 88), throughout the Muslim world, "the spread of literacy and expansion of higher education...have been accompanied by an increase, rather than a lowering of religious propensity on the part of the majority of the population. In other words, with the development of media, of communication, urbanization and the spread of literacy and higher education, religion has flourished: it has not declined." This is supported by correlations between higher education and Islamic activism that have been noted in Malaysia (van der Mehden 1987; Tasker 1979); Nigeria (Muhammed 1980); Saudi Arabia (Mortimer 1982; Dessouki 1982); Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco (Clement 1983); and across the Middle East generally (Ayubi 1991; Huntingdon 1996). Ibrahim undertook a classic study that explored the links between higher education and Islamists and he describes "the typical member of the militant Islamic groups could...be described as young (early twenties), of rural or small-town background, from the middle or lower working class, with high achievement and motivation,

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upwardly mobile, with science or engineering education, and from a normally cohesive family" (1980: 440). In this section the nature of Turkish education is investigated to enable greater understanding of learning experiences and in particular the impact on processes of praxisification. Because I shall be arguing that changes to the system of state education have been instrumental in the rise of Islamic behavior, a detailed picture of Turkish education is established to help identify significant changes. This is followed by a further discussion of theories that explain the importance of education as a socializing agent and their significance for praxisitioners. It should be noted that children attending schools have already experienced other socialization agents, particularly the family, and tend to have internalized their sociocultural values and norms. As Massialas (1969: 9) observed, "the process of education does not take place in only one social institution, i.e. the school, but practically all social institutions—the church, the family, the peer group, the work group, the political party, etc. Education is provided in a formal way in schools, but informally it takes place in all phases of social life, in one way or another." Turkish Education System In the twentieth century institutional education grew considerably within Turkey. This process started with the Young Turks' (CUP) initiatives and was developed and expanded by Atatiirk. As we discussed in Chapter 3, Atatiirk used the lessons of history to determine policies for the future and considered that education could play a central role in the development of a modern secular state. In this regard he sought to avoid the parallel approach of the Ottoman reformers who introduced secular education but alongside Islamic institutions. Atatiirk applied a Western approach to reform and quickly sought to replace religious influence with modern secular values and ideas. For example, the role of trained teachers in disseminating secular nationalism (as part of the "hidden curriculum") was a key part of the modernization scheme because "the revolutionary plan to 'Tiirkicize' the people, their language, and their culture was most saliently echoed in changes in the curriculum" (Kazamias 1966: 148). The central role of education on behalf of the state has since accelerated and "has been regarded...as a vehicle for national integration, economic regeneration and modernization" (Williamson 1987: 11). Education within Turkey, like other nation-states, is therefore much more than academic and vocational learning. As Toprak noted, "educational institutions are the most important agencies of political socialization at the disposal of the state. During a period of transition when traditional bases of group identity are being deliberately destroyed, educational institutions can function as channels of mass communication to disseminate the ideology of a nationalist or a revolutionary movement" (1981: 50). The education structure has continued to expand, in accord with the perceived demands of contemporary society. But the levels of success attained by the educational system have long been disputed. In particular attention has focused on inadequate funding, longstanding high drop-out rates, overcrowding, underrepresentation of women, who have disproportionately high rates of illiteracy, the proportion of poor and rural inhabitants in higher education, and the

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effectiveness of uniform curricula irrespective of individual and regional need.5 The success of the state as central socializing agent is also disputed because there are a number of groups who contest its hegemony, pressure to assimilate, and ultimately legitimacy, for example, Kurds and Alevis. And while secular views have been transmitted and accepted by generations, acceptance has not been universal and indeed in some instances schooling within the education system has encouraged the growth of Islamic praxisitioners opposed to laicism. At all levels6 and types of education the state plays an active controlling role, determining the modules7 and textbooks, and following the 1981 Law on Higher Education all teachers and students have been banned from belonging to political parties (Landau 1997). The state introduced compulsory religious education into primary and secondary schools as part of the attempt to promote "enlightened" religious teaching. Crucially it was also designed as President Evren declared to ensure that "religious education cannot be given to children by every family. In fact, even if the family decided to do so, this would be improper since it may be taught wrong, incompletely or through the family's own point of view."8 But this emphasis on education as the main socializing agent at the expense of the family has ironically partly contributed to the process it was designed to prevent; in other words, the power of political Islam has increased both on campuses and within the wider society. Gole (1996: 39) observed that the "formation of an educated modern Islamist elite aspiring for greater control of modernity countered the prevalent republican image of the Muslim as 'passive, illiterate, traditional, and retrograde." Students are graduating with rational and critical thinking that they are able to use both in secular employment and to the perceived benefit of Islam. In other words, the process of secularization that praxisitioners undertake is being utilized for success in employment and to challenge secularism. The rapid expansion of education institutions has been met by a more dramatic growth in demand for further and higher education. Competitive examinations for admission were introduced as the principal method for deciding admissions, and as demand far exceeds supply there is considerable disappointment and often frustration and anger from the unsuccessful applicants. Demand remains high even though as Landau (1997) and Mehmet (1990) have pointed out, graduate unemployment is relatively high.9 Mehmet discusses the postwar elitist policy that expanded the classical-type higher education but failed to vocationalize education and underfunded primary and secondary institutions. This disproportionate spending on higher education eventually led to huge increases in graduates who could not be accommodated within the economy and led to graduate unemployment occurring alongside a national shortage of sufficient people with vocational skills. The massive growth of university enrollments was not accompanied by "commensurate investments in educational quality. Overcrowding and declining standards fuelled protest and campus violence" (1990: 46). Landau has also commented on the lack of suitable employment opportunities leading to political radicalism. In many respects this argument develops the logic of modernization theories because in this case the excluded graduates are the main source of radical protest among the educated. I shall argue later that while this can explain the appeal of Islam to many Muslims, it cannot

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explain those students who expect to find rewarding careers or those who are already succeeding within employment spheres. Another important development has been the establishment of religion as a prominent feature within the national syllabus. At first glance this seems to be at odds with the secular nature of the state and Atatiirk's legacy, but since optional Islamic courses were first introduced in 1949, religion has increased significantly in terms of curriculum content and institutions. The junta-assigned 1982 Constitution declared that "instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools" (Article 24) and particular types of Islamic schools were also emphasized, Imam-Hatips. In 1949 these schools were introduced to improve the standards of imams (prayerleaders) and hatips (preachers) and have since grown in popularity at both secondary and high school levels. The schools do not concentrate solely on theology but include contemporary modules, for example, economics, astronomy, civil law, and sociology. In some respects Imam-Hatip schools can be seen as the reintroduction of the medreses system10 and provide free education and support (e.g., food, lodgings). For poorer families whose children would not otherwise be able to attend university this is obviously very important. Initially ten Imam-Hatip schools were introduced, and in 1958 were increased to eighteen (including both middle school and higher levels). In the 1969-1970 academic year there were 101 institutions. This period of rapid growth coincided with DP/JP governments and the rise accelerated during the 1970s NSP coalitions; in 1977-1978 there were 134,517 pupils at 437 schools. By 1987-1988, student numbers had grown to approximately 240,000 belonging to 717 schools.11 Ak§it (1991) calculated that the ratio of Imam-Hatip schools to general secondary school students was 1:10 and in 1997 "12 percent of parents enrol their children in Islamic secondary schools...after they finish their compulsory primary education....That amounts to half a million pupils. And three times as many annually pass Qur'anic courses12 [that are also supervised by the state], taught in private institutions, for example those linked with Islamic movements, such as the Nurcus. Many of them have been swelling the ranks of the Refah Party [WP]" (Hiro 1997: 17-18). The dramatic growth of religious institutions has exceeded the wider expansion of the education system because between 1963-1964 and 1971-1972, religious schools grew by 611 percent compared with 127 percent for the other types of institutions. A 500 percent increase followed during 1976-1984, while other types of schools expanded by 35 percent (Reed 1988). It is also interesting to note that during this period middle-school religious culture and ethics teachers were disproportionately appointed and composed 20 percent of all teachers at this level. In 1966 graduates of Imam-Hatip schools were given the opportunity to attend university, partly, Ahmad has argued, to "strengthen the conservative element in the universities in order to counteract the growing radicalism" (1977: 387), a claim supported by Ak§it (1991) and Geyikdagi (1984). Interestingly, after gaining entry, Imam-Hatip graduates do not formally study within the academic subjects that modernization theories might expect. For example, at Ankara University in 1992, 60 percent of political science students were Imam-Hatip graduates. This could at least partly be because the overwhelming majority of Imam-Hatip

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graduates cannot be accommodated within the vocation that the schools were established to provide,13 even if they wanted to be. These graduates are now providing recruits to the civil service, politics, education, business, journalism, and other fields where they possess considerable influence (Ak§it 1991; Ayata 1996). The wider significance of Imam-Hatip schools is a source of contention, however. Disagreements exist within both secularist and Islamist camps. Secular views range from considering the schools as places that encourage enlightened men of religion to viewing them as "problem ridden institutions" (Ak§it 1986: 38) which are breeding grounds for radicals. Islamists also disagree over the value of the schools, with some considering the schools to be effective sources of recruitment to Islamic courses while others believe them to be agents under state control. Even allowing for these disputed claims it is perhaps surprising that the state has permitted and in some respects even encouraged such a huge increase of these schools. There appear to be five main reasons for this and the wider expansion of Islam within the national curriculum: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Political gain—the DP and MP, in particular, tended to promote growth for its vote winning potential (Ahmad 1977: 366; Ak§it 1991: 147) Internal counterbalance—growing radicalism in universities could be, it was believed, offset by Islamic students (Ahmad 1977: 387) External counterbalance—Islam was considered to be an effective deterrent against neighbouring Soviet influence (Eralp et al. 1993: 4) Psychological and cultural needs—it was perceived that secularism was not providing the necessary moral values and uniting beliefs (Heper 1985: 134) The incorporation of Islam within official parameters would restrict the opportunities for political Islam. (Sakalhoglu 1996: 246)

Because of the growth of Imam-Hatip and Islamic movement schools in terms of both numbers and influence and relatively recent widespread Islamic resurgence, it can be argued that they have played a significant role in processes of praxisification (Ak§it 1991; Ayata 1996; Yavuz 1999). We need to avoid over simplification, however, because many praxisitioners either have attended other types of institutions14 or have not been educated. Simply attending Imam-Hatip schools would not invariably result in a process of praxisification, as the following chapter will establish. One possibility is that other types of pedagogic institutions have employed praxisitioners as teachers. In my research praxist and secular students from the three main types of institution were asked if their schoolteachers had similar beliefs. Praxisitioners tended to agree that they did share similar beliefs, irrespective of the type of education they experienced, while secularists disagreed, stating, for example, "many of the teachers were big Muslims and I am not." The responses, admittedly limited in scope, support claims that secular institutions have employed praxist teachers. Consequently we could argue tentatively that praxisitioners shared cultural capital with their teachers but not with the state, while secularists shared cultural capital with the state but not with their teachers. Although this may at first glance assist in explaining praxisification, some praxisitioners did not agree with their teachers, so the teachers' beliefs alone cannot explain their internalization process. Clearly, simply sharing beliefs with

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teachers is inadequate evidence of a central socializing role. But the fact that praxisitioners did not share the same beliefs as their family and cannot recall their childhood friends' beliefs (see following section) implies that the teachers must have had a significant impact for a considerable number of the children to gain the beliefs that they now hold. The process of internalization is explored in more detail in Chapter 7. Additionally, this view cannot explain why secularists apparently in the same contexts do not accept the teachers' Islamic views and become praxisitioners. Therefore other elements within socializing processes need to be identified. Before exploring the impact of other socializing agents the possible role of teaching methods is examined because it has been argued that teaching methods are important in determining the nature of values individual's internalize. A number of studies15 have supported the claim that the duration of an individual's education is inversely related to levels of nonliberalism. These studies would perceive praxism to be a type of nonliberalism, but obviously the identified relationship cannot be applied to well-educated Muslims. Simpson (1972) and Duckitt (1992) extended the analysis to incorporate the impact of teaching experiences and found that the existence and scale of (non)liberalism was linked to the style of learning experienced by students. The chance that an individual was a nonliberal was higher if the individual had been taught by rote learning, compared with students who learned through emphasis on cognition. This conclusion cannot be supported in Turkey, however, because teaching styles across the different institutions appear limited. "In general, the universities, like the state schools, suffer from a severe shortage of facilities, with over large classes and teaching methods which encourage rote-learning rather than personal investigation" (Hale 1981: 229). This situation seems to reinforce teachers' authority, status, and the power divide from students. There is little evidence that the teaching methods have changed as Tapper and Tapper noted that "there is still, in school, a major stress on memorization of texts... and on ritual and unison repetition of slogans and formulae, especially the sayings of Atatiirk. There is a reduced, but still significant emphasis on physical discipline (backed up in some schools...with physical punishment)" (1991: 73). Landau (1997) has since commented that competition for places remains fierce for overcrowded classes and this has meant that rote learning and lecturing, at higher-level institutions, remain the pedagogic methods rather than discussion and analysis. My own research16 supports this, highlighting the direct imposition of knowledge, memorization, recitation, discipline, and punishment. This is not of course to say that these methods are effective in processes of praxisification, because as one secularist stated, "most of teachers were Islamic and I disagreed with them...so keep quiet." Consequently simply being taught through the rote method by teachers, whom the individual may not agree with, does not necessarily lead to the internalization of their beliefs; it may simply require the temporary suppression of the individual's own. As the earlier comments made by Landau showed, education could also play a part in the process of praxisification, again unintentionally helping students who have made considerable sacrifices to gain qualifications which they are unable to translate into meaningful careers because of job shortages. These students

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become disillusioned with the system that apparently trained them unnecessarily and are attracted by the radical alternative promoted by Islamic groups that proclaims a fairer economic system based on justice and reward. Fischer (1980) and Williamson (1987) have both identified this as happening in Egypt and Turkey. Mehmet (1990) developed the theory in his study of both Turkey and Malaysia where "neither education nor wage-employment offers opportunities for upward mobility....In this study Islamic resurgence is regarded as primarily a response of the masses to unfilled expectations" (1990: 42). Huntingdon (2001) has used similar logic to explain the involvement of the educated within Islamic "fundamentalist" movements generally. In this sense the group of praxisitioners are attracted to Islam for reasons similar to those of other threatened or excluded groups; it is more a pragmatic attachment than spiritual. This fails to take into account, however, the nature of the beliefs or the considerable number of students who have progressed to successful careers and yet remain, or have become, praxisitioners even though their beliefs and activities could result in losing their jobs. Within Turkey, at least two generations have progressed through Imam-Hatip schools and, to a lesser extent, institutions linked to Islamic movements.17 Hundreds of thousands of these pupils have subsequently gained qualifications that have enabled many graduates to achieve important employment positions, often with considerable influence and power with which they could spread Islamic interpretations. These opportunities rose considerably following the election of the MP in 1983 when there was an "unprecedented level of penetration of state institutions by neo-traditionalist Islamic groups" (Ayata 1993: 64). Ayata has identified that many official departments are used to promote Islamist ideas and interests and the penetration of personnel departments by Islamists has enabled graduates of Imam-Hatip schools and students with connections to the religious "dormitories" to be recruited into state institutions. On a broader level this is supported by my research because all the praxisitioners expected to be employed in their chosen careers, predominantly as lecturers, on completion of their postgraduate degrees. Interestingly, the overwhelming majority of these students had obtained a higher level of education and subsequently status than their parents. For this particular group and those identified by others18 one cannot legitimately argue that praxisitioners generally turn to opposing ideologies because of a lack of academic and subsequent employment opportunities. It thereby discounts a generic explanation that a lack of opportunity explains a demand for fundamental structural change although it clearly is a factor for both uneducated and some educated people who cannot find appropriate employment. Summary. Changes in the Turkish education system, notably the expansion of the curriculum and further education, have created opportunities for individuals to progress within the Turkish state and be exposed to different ideas and values than they would otherwise have experienced. However, politically and culturally, messages are being transmitted that are diametrically opposed to the nation-state, neither universally stressing the value of national unity under laicism nor creating a modern secular consciousness. Students are learning

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within and beyond the curriculum in these institutions, and as Ahmed (1992: 235) has commented, "the discourses of resistance and rejection are inextricably informed by the language and ideas developed and disseminated by the West." The education system has been used for political ends and/or would appear to be continually expanding at a rate that has prevented the state from gaining ideological control and ensuring its messages are being transmitted. There is evidence to suggest that the state has played a part in the process by allowing, indeed covertly supporting, Islam as an opposing ideology. The unintended consequence of this has been to contribute toward the creation of Muslims who challenge the secular state. Clearly, relatively uneducated praxisitioners are much less likely to gain similar socioeconomic positions and therefore may have greater pragmatic cause for resentment against the Turkish state according to the modernization criteria for religious revivals. But again I am drawn to conclude that simply being frustrated by limited occupational opportunities will not inevitably result in internalizing praxist values. Otherwise the process would be much more widespread in both Turkey and other parts of the world. And of course it is not inevitable that uneducated individuals will have the desire or ambition to succeed materially as modernization theorists would expect and so would not necessarily resent the lack of opportunities. This all means that being uneducated and unskilled are not the only possible criteria that need to be experienced to become a praxisitioner nor, will these individuals invariably become praxisitioners. It seems likely that both university and primary school graduates will be exposed to praxist teachers as a consequence of radical Islamic penetration of state institutions including, most notably, schools. The challenge by the educated also goes against modernization theories because praxisitioners possess socially recognizable positions and skills and yet seek to change the boundaries within which they appear so successfully established. Thus by allowing and indeed encouraging Islamic world images to be perpetuated and enhanced, the Turkish state appears to be assisting in developing individuals, through socialization, who are able to progress through modern structures holding conflicting views which many seek to disseminate. These apparent double paradoxes cannot fit within the dominant secular discourse, but neither can they explain when examined in isolation why some individuals become praxisitioners while others with similar exposure to education and Islamic elements within do not. To partly address this we need to focus on the remaining socializing agents. INTRAGENERATIONAL INFLUENCE AND THE EXPANDING ROLE OF PEERS Peers are those individuals who are in groups of the same age, with what Mannheim refers to as "a common location in the historical dimension of the social process" (1952: 291). It is likely to be a group exposed to similar public contexts, although the unique experiences ensure the same events will be interpreted and remembered differently. The word implies equals, and this is reflected in the relatively egalitarian relations that exist between members. Piaget (1932) stressed

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the importance of peer groups that are more democratic than other experienced relations, for example, with parents. Generally the significance of peers within formative years has not been extensively examined, particularly in Turkey. As Neyzi (2001: 414) commented, "there are few studies that relate age as a cultural construct to generational identity and to the emergence of youth subcultures in Turkey." Consequently I have supplemented important Turkish studies with some significant theories from other countries to enable the role of peers in the socialization process to be evaluated. Some of the research undertaken has shown that peer groups enable individuals to develop interpersonal skills and relations on an equal basis, discuss shared experiences, gain greater independence, and acquire multifarious precepts that are deemed of greater personal relevance to their situation than those espoused by parents. It could be argued that this is particularly applicable where families are experiencing radical change, which of course applies to the experience of many within Turkey. In these situations peers are often models for behavior when entering unfamiliar environments that their parents cannot expand on and can be interlinked to the changing socializing role of the family. With generational disparities and evolving social contexts, "children must...rely to some extent on older siblings and peers as models for specific modes of behavior that parents do not ordinarily provide" (Bandura 1969: 248). This process would seem to accelerate as the child matures because increased intimacy with peers tended to correspond with a decrease in parental intimacy (Kroger 1985). Support for this view can found in Hortacsu et al. (1991), who noted how Turkish adolescents' relations with their families became less intimate as they matured while peers grew in prominence during this time. In support of their research, Hortacsu et al. refer to a study by Armsden and Greenberg (1987) in which Turkish university students declared they were closer to their friends than to their parents. However, as Bandura (1969) noted, children choosing peers are strongly influenced by familial values and tend to select friends who share the same conduct. This is echoed by Hetherington's (1970) study that found children accept peers as leaders if the followers recognize attributes that can be found in their parents. If these conclusions are expanded to religious beliefs similar patterns can be found. De Vaus (1983) found parental influence much stronger than peers for students' beliefs, although peers were almost as important in deciding religious behavior. Weiss Ozorak (1989) has also reported that individuals who either strongly believe or disbelieve in a religion are likely to seek contact with like-minded peers rather than change to fit into other groups. Further support can be found in Eickelman's study (1978) of Moroccan Islamic education and the importance of peer groups in informal theological discussions. Eickelman identifies that peer groups are important in the formation and reinforcement of Muslim identities but only after contact with praxist parents or teachers. In my research I found perhaps not surprisingly that praxisitioners and secularists shared the same beliefs as their friends. If these findings are used to analyze societal changes identified in the previous two chapters, then it appears logical to assume that the role of peers has changed in

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nature and importance. Certainly, traditional similarities based on family, community, and occupation will have changed and individuals will now be exposed to an intergenerational range of people who have experienced different social contexts. Because of the evolving nature of Turkish contexts and the potentially dislocating consequences, peer groups will grow in importance as a resource based on similarity of experience and opportunities. The role of peers appears to become particularly noticeable in influencing behavior based on beliefs and values that are acquired from older generations, noticeably parents and teachers, which fits in with the preceding analysis of these agents. This analysis supports Neyzi's (2001: 413) argument that "the concept of generation, defined as an age cohort with a shared historical experience, is particularly useful in studying young people in societies characterized by rapid social change, a powerful intelligentsia [and] the centrality of collective identity." Chapter 7 develops on these aspects within processes of internalization. THE MEDIA: WORKING FOR AND AGAINST THE STATE The global expansion of the mass media19 has been perhaps the most visible change among socializing agents. This dramatic increase is highlighted by the penetration into areas and markets previously considered impenetrable. It has been accompanied by developments in electronic communications that have enabled different forms of media to relay messages worldwide, affecting timespace perceptions (Giddens 1991). And as Huff (2001: 440) has commented, "the advent of fax, E-mail, and other forms of electronic communication have captured the imagination because such communication can now be accomplished within seconds anywhere around the world for a tiny fraction of a worker's daily wages. Such possibilities were hardly imaginable just a few decades ago." Previously unexposed parts of the world are now increasingly aware of events in their nation-state, and global interconnections among even more unfamiliar parts of the world, which may not have previously known about each other, have increased. These changes can bring both threats and opportunities. Books and newspapers are available on a wide scale, although obviously this becomes particularly relevant only if accompanied by universal education and the ability to read. Television and radio can inform the nation of developments, expanding knowledge, awareness, and interests, and can instil greater national cohesion. Lerner's (1964) study of Turkish peasants highlighted how levels of understanding about state functions rose when exposed to modern media. McLuhan (1967) and Meyrowitz (1985) have both observed how particular types of media are able to portray images of events and people about whom the viewers have no other knowledge; unknown "spaces" become known and the viewer becomes familiar with alternative ideologies. This point is developed by Haynes (1994: 148), who argues that "one reason for the contemporary explosion of religio-political ideas and movements is that ideologues and activists read in newspapers, magazines and journals, see on television screens and video-cassettes, and hear from radios and audio-cassettes the proclamations

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and stated aspirations, as well as the practical successes and failures, of politicized religious groups and movements around the world." Generally it had been considered that religion would not prosper within the new media. Indeed it was widely felt that the spread of literacy, transport, and communication, as mechanisms of support for modernization, would reduce the impact of religion. But, as Arjomand (1986: 88) points out, this is not necessarily true, as "the creation and enlargement of the public sphere provides the conditions for the rise of socio-political movements has long been taken for granted. However, it is just as possible for the arrival of the media of communication to give rise to and sustain a religious movement." The products and interrelated processes of modernization are able to ironically help rivalling ideologies. Until the 11 September 2001 attacks on America, many secular analysts had ignored this fact presumably because praxisitioners in particular were dismissed as short-term reactionaries who therefore would not be using progressive technology. However, praxisitioners are now spreading messages visually, phonetically, and personally more effectively and quicker due to developments in the communication media and transportation. As a consequence they are able to reach audiences that were previously beyond their scope. Certainly, in many Islamic countries, modern technology has been used to produce theological messages via books, periodicals, newspapers, television, cassettes, cds, videos, and websites. These different forms of communication have both enhanced religious knowledge and heightened awareness of perceived inadequacies of the secular system, highlighting what I refer to as the incompatibility problem. This was witnessed most effectively during the Iranian revolution when "traditional" Islamists utilized modern technology both to disseminate revolutionary messages and to be kept informed about events. In this example, and to a lesser extent by Hamas in the Palestinian uprising, media have been used to communicate quickly and effectively as the basis for information, organization and mobilization.20 Most recently, al-Qa'ida and organisations that operate under its umbrella have proved to be extremely proficient at communicating quickly and effectively often from isolated areas through the use of mobile phones and the Internet both within the group and by promoting links with outside organizations. Consequently the role of the media needs to be carefully considered and, rather than providing a generic claim about the effects, differences need to be taken into account. For example, the media can support a nation-state such as Saudi Arabia, where they highlight the religious nature of the governing regime, or Morocco, where reporting of the king is used to emphasize loyalty to the "commander of the faithful" at the expense of ethnic and tribal divisions (Ayubi 1991). The media can also be perceived as an underlying threat to national or ethnic identities through the spread of cultural imperialism and the pervasive expansion of Western messages with their economic and political undertones. Alternatively the threat could come from more indigenous ideologies, for example, Islam. Success in supporting or supplanting the existing precepts would seem to depend on the content of other socialization agents' messages and the social contexts. Consequently there is a need to explore the media as a source of information and as a channel of dis/content and then analyze the subsequent impact on beliefs. For the remainder

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of this chapter, and part of the following chapter, I tentatively start this process for the growth of praxisitioners in Turkey. In Turkey the expansion of the media has been allied to improvements in electrification, technology, growing literacy, communications, liberalisation of the press, and deregulation of broadcasting.21 These factors have combined to enhance the role of the media, as a generic entity, within socializing processes in Turkey. Road and air transport have greatly reduced travel times and when combined with the development of electronic communications has enabled the widespread distribution of written and pictorial media. A multitude of books, periodicals, and newspapers are now widely available, aided by the ready-made markets created through literacy programs. Television and radio are available in even the most remote places. This has had a huge impact on social life, both informing and providing alternatives to previous modes of behavior. It is in terms of the informing role that the expansion of Turkish media has been most influential because the media inform observers of local, societal, and global events that they would not previously have been aware of. For example, social inequality has always existed, but now many more citizens are aware of it. The diverse, pervasive nature of contemporary forms of media, representing different power, economic, and sociocultural interests, has created information channels that are more accessible and which even the most sophisticated propaganda machines have difficulty negating. Mango remarks (1997: 152) that "never before have the problems facing the country been discussed as widely as today in the press, in the multiplicity of commercial television channels, in academic institutions and professional organisations." This of course means that popular awareness of perceived problems is much higher than previously and continues to grow as access to the Internet increases. This makes attempts at censorship, which as Zubaida (2000) has noted with reference to Saudi Arabia and Iran was not possible to fully implement for television and radio, even more difficult to accomplish. Additionally, the international nature of the media means that the receiver will also be aware of global relations and perceived problems that, although not necessarily the responsibility of Turkey, highlight wider systemic issues. For example, the regular visual images of Muslims seemingly being persecuted in places such as Palestine, Bosnia, Chechnya, Iraq, and Afghanistan are likely to have an impact on views of the global system. More generally, national and international reporting can lead to discontent with the current nationstate and encourage people to seek alternative systems. The explosion of the media has also incorporated Islamic literature and audiovisual mechanisms. Islamic groups are one of the most effective oppositional forces to use the new opportunities brought about by media developments. Today Islamic ideology is communicated by television, including satellite transmissions, radio, magazines, newspapers, books, telephone, bleepers, fax, and the Internet by a number of sympathetic broadcasters, publishers, and distributors that are staffed by Islamists (Ayata 1993, Gole 1996). Toprak (1996: 109) has commented that Islamists "control a major portion of the media," and this is supported by Heper's study (1997) that identified a complex network of Islamic economic ventures that included forty-five radio stations,

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nineteen television channels, and hundreds of video and cassette producers. In addition, Toprak (1996) has identified approximately 100 journals that are all advocating the Shari'ah for Turkey. As she comments, this has been possible only since Article 163 of the Turkish Criminal Code was amended to lift restrictions on free speech. The media can therefore be used as a means of criticizing the current system and providing alternative images and ways of behaving. Channels of communication are directed across demographics, starting with the young. As Saktanber's (1991: 173) analysis of the impact of Islamic children's books shows, they "are among the basic socializing agents which transmit social values, norms and behavior, and Islamic values constitute no exception to this." The growth of Islamic media outlets has to be seen in the wider context of greater media penetration and choice made possible by advanced technology and communications at a time when the population is better educated with more financial resources that enable the new products to find markets. The impact of Islamic media, and indeed the media generally, can be disputed, but clearly the new range of products and expansion of existing media are providing mechanisms for communicating Islamic ideology that are proving popular with a wide section of the population. These opportunities were not previously available, so the recipients are being exposed to theological messages and contextual images often through secular media that highlight problems within the Turkish nation-state and the wider global system. In the research I have undertaken, secularists and praxisitioners tended to use different media sources, not surprisingly representing their ideologies.22 Interestingly both groups showed closer taste allegiance to friends than to family. Although a significant number of devout Muslims also shared tastes with their families, there would appear to be a divide between generations, and this was slightly more prominent for secularists. The similarities with friends would appear to support studies23 that have commented on the increasing importance of peers as individuals move beyond their families into wider sociocultural spheres. Generally tastes in types of media were similar to friends' in a manner that is comparable to the way that the individual's beliefs were ideologically closer to their friends than families. Both groups commented on the use of the media to obtain information that legitimized and strengthened their respective beliefs. The groups were also aware about the presence of propaganda within the media. Indeed witnessed events could create stronger opposition to the perceived causes. As one praxisitioner commented when asked to explain the reasons for the contemporary visibility of Islam, "many reasons for this. Peoples see many bad things. For example many Muslims killed. West sees this but this is okay as no oil. Peoples see this. Cannot rely on West." The media are the only mechanism through which many praxisitioners can become familiar with events in the rest of the Middle East and it is these experiences, witnessed second hand, that praxisitioners partly use to explain the decline in support for the West and the growth in opposition forces. Consequently the development and expansion of the different media, while not necessarily effectively used as tools of propaganda, are providing information that legitimize and strengthen beliefs.

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While as Halliday (2002) points out communications have existed for thousands of years, I believe that breadth, depth, speed, and vivid imagery of contemporary technology has significantly enhanced the impact. The significance of these developments is explored further in the internalization process of praxisitioners' beliefs in Chapter 7. CONCLUSION The impact of the four main socialization agents in the transmission of religiosity has been much debated. Clear evidence could not be found for an overwhelmingly dominant socializing agent as other theories have identified. Consequently Islamification for praxisitioners cannot be explained simply through reference to parental beliefs, methods of teaching experienced, teachers' values, friends' beliefs, or media manipulation, because none of these factors generally apply. However, this chapter has highlighted that all four agents are important, echoing McDermott and Ahsan's examination (1980: 44) of the often-conflicting position of Muslim children in modern societies who pass "through various socializing agencies, each communicating a different message. The parents, with their Islamic, ethnic and village background; the family, the peer group within and outside the home; the mass media; the school environment; the teacher; the text book; and society in general." These demands take place within a constantly changing context in which Turkish socialization agents are enmeshed and in turn altered. The comparatively more diverse socializing processes have contributed to different individual identity formations. Changes in the availability of information to people in different places, events, opportunities, and discourses have created greater ideological awareness among significant elements of the population. In the case of the family, information has always been transmitted, but the changes have challenged the monopoly previously shared with the community. Although still influential, as an institution the family has experienced a reduction in authority as the state has taken formal responsibility for education and the changing nature of contemporary Turkish society means that parents may not be familiar with many of the issues and concerns that affect their children. Consequently, the socializing role of peers has grown in significance because peers are able to share the same experiences and provide explanations for phenomena that may be beyond families. Education and media have grown in importance relatively recently and together have enabled more people to possess information, resources, and interpretative skills. The widespread penetration by the media has provided praxisitioners, many of whom now possess greater interpretative and analytical skills acquired through education, with easy access to local and global events that can be used to legitimize or threaten ideologies. These changes in the role and impact of socializing agents are altering the content of socializing processes and are informing more people about local, societal, and international problems and possible solutions. This notification is part of a process of praxisification that will differ according to the individual interpreting the message, the agent sending it, and the context in which it is received. It is not enough to be a bazaari whose business is threatened by large

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superstores or peasants dislocated by change, because otherwise there would be a generic reaction among socioeconomic groups. But this is not happening. In the case of the bazaari she or he would have to be aware of the challenging ideological interpretation of Islam and must experience agents who have transmitted the messages about protectionism, immorality of usury, and so on and then be motivated to seek change. Despite eighty years of Turkey's existence as a laicist republic and numerous attempts to subjugate religion to state control, with intentional promotion limited to the national interest, Islam has remained part of the popular culture and within some institutions. Popular Islam has been transformed into praxist interpretations for many believers partly through the unintentional radicalization of state functions and officials and the onset of modern means of communication. Socializing agents such as secular education and the media have not as expected meant the end of religion but conversely in the case of praxist Islam have contributed to its development when social conditions are conducive. So while agents cannot provide an explanation for Islamification when examined in isolation, they have a part to play in the beliefs being internalized. Changes in socializing agents can help us to understand the contemporary nature of praxism, but this awareness does not explain why believers are motivated to pursue activist challenges to the secular state or the contextual factors involved in the processes. Internalization processes that lead to motivation are detailed in Chapter 7. In the conclusion we will return to the role of the agents and establish their significance within the wider context. As Hammersley has commented, to understand the meaning of communication we need to take "account of the wider society in which the communication occurs and even the history of that society" (1990: IX).

NOTES 1. Within the social sciences there is considerable debate about the impact of socialization and the structure/agency dichotomy. I have defined socialization as a constant process in which individual identity develops according to the social interactions to which individuals are exposed and the spatiality in which they reside. Socialization is the link between identity and social relations and activities and consequently brings together both the individual's agential ability and structural involvement. This leads to the individual's being enmeshed in wide interlinked social webs within which the individual has freedom of thought and movement within the boundaries established by the relevant contexts and agents. Through this process of socialization and its responsible agents, for example, the family, education, peers, and the media, humans are taught to conform to the ways of society, the conscience collective, the common norms and values, and identity formation takes place. 2. I did not specify what type of beliefs I was referring to. This was because I wanted the interviewees to decide which beliefs they considered fundamental and thus the ones they would be most likely to use as the basis for comparison. 3. Praxisitioners that expanded on their initial replies added: "No they do not pray."

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"Parents say respect your religion and peoples." "My mother and father had same beliefs, but my father did not always practise 'five pillars' because he was working in Germany." "Yes, all my family are strong Muslims but my brother is also strong nationalist." "Parents or family members say respect every peoples and every religion but you are a Muslim. Do not forget this." "My family do not practise belief." "Some are same but they do not practise." These responses compare with secularists who elaborated on their fixed answer and stated that: "Other family members were religious and have right views [this interviewee now held left-wing views]." "Parents allowed own thoughts even if they did not agree." "Of course. For example, parents always left-view. I too think this." "I do not agree. My family were religious. My father is right view. I taught to be Muslim but now I do not like [this interviewee now held left-wing views]." "I suppose. My father is left view. I too left view." 4. The actual findings were as follows: Praxisitioners—factory guard (retired), German construction worker (deceased), Turkish construction workers (2), bazaari (2), electrician, clerical officer, imam, farmer (after jobs in Germany and as a self-employed lorry driver), teacher (2), metalworker (deceased), and technician. One mother worked in an office and the rest were housewives. Secularists—Occupations are state official (2 including one deceased), businessman, foreman (retired), teacher (2), carpenter, waiter (in Germany), bus driver, engineer, and builder. Eight mothers were housewives (including one deceased) and the remaining three were a nurse, a teacher, and a bank clerk. 5. Kazamias (1966), Pope (2001c), Turkish Daily News (12 September 2002), and Williamson (1987) discuss these points in greater detail. 6. The Turkish education system has four stages under the control of the Ministry of Education and Higher Education Council. The first level, primary, commences when the child is age seven. This stage has recently been expanded to eight years and is compulsory, although attendance is not always enforced. The next secondary stage lasts for three years and prepares students for high schools. Finally, there are the universities. 7. For example, in 1981 it became compulsory to teach "Atatiirk's principles" and "The History of the Turkish Reform." 8. President Evren quoted in Sakalhoglu (1996: 246). 9. Data from the Education Trade Union showed that unemployment among the educated was 29.2 percent (reported in the Turkish Daily News, 12 September 2002). 10. The medreses were abolished by the republicans in 1924. 11. This was broken down into 376 middle schools and 341 higher institutions. 12. The number of Qur'an schools rose from 2,610 in 1979-1980 to 4,715 in 1988-1989 (Salt 1995). 13. Ayata (1996) states that the Directorate of Religious Affairs employs only 10 percent of the graduates. 14. For example, the majority of the praxisitioners I interviewed were educated at lycee or technical schools. 15. For example, Adomo et al. (1950), Brown (1965), Kirscht and Dillehay (1967), and Ray (1983).

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16. In response to a question asking whether or not teachers proved the answers during lessons, the following responses elaborated on their answers: Praxisitioners—All but one claimed to have been told the answers, at all levels of the Turkish education system. I include some examples of the answers given. "In technical school had to do as told as else could hurt myself." [How could you hurt yourself?] "As teacher banged head on board." Another student, who had been taught at an Imam-Hatip school, said, "Many teachers are autocrat. Do not allow students query." Students stated that at lycees "strictly told what was so. Accept that is correct. Teachers had to teach what textbooks say. Political pressure even if you do not believe it." "Teachers tell answer. Sometimes they ask question. When student gets wrong answer then sometimes teacher hit him." Secularists—All stated they had been told the answers, and were not encouraged to question the teacher. I also include some examples of their statements: "Most of teachers were Islamic and I disagreed with them... so keep quiet." "Tell us right answer. Sometimes ask.. .expect right answer from us if not they explain if had time." 17. The most well known examples are the schools and community colleges established by the neo-Nurcu movement of Fethullah Gtilen that tend to have impressive results in examinations and places are much sought after. 18. For example, Ayata (1993), Gole (1997), Meeker (1991), and Toprak (1996). 19. When I refer to the media I include television, radio, newspapers, magazines, advertisements and the Internet. 20. Afshar (1985), Enayat (1982), Irfani (1983), and Keddie (1983) provide further details about the use in Iran, and Khalidi (1997) provides a useful discussion of Hamas' use of the media. 21. This process started in the Ozal era and acclerated during the filler tenure in government that in 1993 lifted the ban on private radio stations (Pope and Pope 1997). 22. When comparing the two categories, the most obvious difference is found in newspaper choice. Praxisitioners expressed loyalty to right-wing and religious newspapers, while secularists chose a left-wing daily. Some of the praxisitioners showed a greater willingness to obtain information from other political viewpoints in order to "find their opinion," presumably with the intention of developing a fuller perspective. This compared with secularists who tended to focus on channels of information that represented their views. These differences in attitudes could be seen to represent the differing interpretations of the rival ideology. Some praxisitioners willingly conceded that alternative perspectives have some valid points to make and also believed that they must be aware of the logic of secular arguments if they are to be able critically to dismiss them, a point that reflects the praxist synthesis of the traditional and modern. Secularists, on the other hand, tended to dismiss Islamist thought outright and had little interest in gaining in-depth information on which to base this rejection. 23. Armsden and Greenberg (1987) and Hortacsu et al. (1991) put these points across and are discussed earlier in the text.

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6 The Incompatibility Problem and the Circle of Reinforcement INTRODUCTION Since the formation of the Turkish nation-state there have been continual processes to modernize and change. The economy has grown rapidly, sectoral changes in GNP (gross national product) have occurred, life expectancy has increased, infant mortality has reduced,1 education places have grown, communication and transportation are integral parts of a rapidly expanding national infrastructure, utilities are widely available, and facilities generally have improved. Yet as the contextual chapters showed, the state continues to face massive economic and political problems. For example, despite an average GNP growth of 5 percent over recent years, Turkey remains massively in debt to Western and global institutions, partly because while exports have risen impressively they have been exceeded by imports.2 Turkey is heavily indebted to the IMF, who will be providing a further $16 billion in addition to $19 billion pledged under earlier agreements to help Turkey meet projected financial deficit. This will mean greater involvement of the IMF and World Bank over Turkey's economic program because "the provision of additional funds [the $16 billion] will be conditional to strong fiscal policies and continued structural reform."3 Within Turkey it was widely believed that the additional loan is a reward for support given to America in the war against terrorism. In the longer term, however, the funds will add to the growing debt and increasing control that external agencies possess over economic and political strategies and cultural products and services. Corruption is increasingly seen to be hindering development.4 The limited provision of state welfare and ineffective political parties has contributed to civil associations providing services privately. More people are becoming empowered to take action as civil society is strengthened albeit within parameters set by the state that are intended to exclude ethnicity, radical Islam, or socialism. Praxisitioners can, however, be categorized within this wider movement, linked to agencies providing education, health service, and social welfare that the state is not

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providing adequately. In the process, these groups gain widespread ideological legitimacy as a consequence of the implementation of services. This chapter is designed to develop the incompatibilities between the above problems and those identified in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 against the ideological dimensions established in Chapter 2. In particular I want to reiterate and refine the contextual analysis and show that the incompatibility problem does indeed exist and is incorporated as part of the process of praxisification. The views5 of praxisitioners about Turkey and the wider context that appear to contradict religious ideological foundations are introduced to illuminate the significance of the incompatibility problem. Comments from secularists are also included for comparative analysis. IDEOLOGY AGAINST CONTEXT: THE INCOMPATIBILITY PROBLEM In Chapter 2 it was established that Islamic interpretations exist that consider the Shari'ah to provide guidance and a complete framework for life. Believers who hold these interpretations want the ideological tenets to be implemented in the context. It is clear that Turkey has moved away from this ideal for at least the last two centuries. Yet despite the gradual reduction of religious influence, culminating in the "double-heresy" and the continuing belief in Islam, religious protests against secularization tended to be isolated and small scale. The overwhelming majority of the population were obviously not praxisitioners, and religion was subjugated to state control and relegated into the private sphere. This caused little widespread protest. Crucially, the recent widespread emergence of praxisitioners is linked to subsequent problems identified within governing secular ideologies,6 which are compared with the legitimacy that praxist Islam is seen to possess through association with success and nonassociation with contemporary difficulties. The reasons behind the Islamic resurgence occurring at this time and not other equally turbulent periods are drawn together in the Conclusion. The remainder of this chapter is intended to establish the significance of the incompatibility problem, using the case study to help understand and explain why Islam is becoming increasingly popular, what the role of the cycle of reinforcement is, and whether praxisitioners do indeed want to remove secularism. Contextual Incompatibilities The first part of the empirical research explores the levels of cultural, political, and economic incompatibilities as examples of the wider incompatibility problem between secular and Islamic ideologies before examining how these different spheres are central to the circle of reinforcement. When we examine interpretations of Turkish culture, it is important that we recall that social and cultural relations within Islamic doctrine can be interpreted to mean that It [Islam] aims at changing life and producing a new man [sic] and a new society, both committed to God and to the welfare, of mankind. That is why religion is not a religion in the limited sense of the word; rather it is a complete code of life and a culture

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producing factor. Muslim culture profits from all available sources, local and international, but its unique characteristic is that it is grown from the foundation of the Qur'an and Sunnah. (Azzam 1977:8)

Praxisitioners follow social and cultural precepts with a strong emphasis placed on public ethics and collective morals that they interpret within the Shari'ah. Clearly this has not happened within contemporary Turkey where Western cultural practices are prominent; pop music can be heard on radio and TV stations, in shopping malls, and in other areas of social activity; European and American television and films are popular; there is widespread demand for the relatively expensive Pepsi and Coca-Cola; burgers are widely available in a country renowned for its cuisine; European fashions are imitated that contravene praxist interpretations of dress restrictions; and Western-style more open relations between males and females are becoming increasingly apparent. Tourism7 has grown persistently and many Turkish people have come into contact with different cultural behavior of Western visitors. The pervasive influence of endogenous cultures presents a problem that appears for people like cultural schizophrenia, reflective of Turkey's geographical location. People became uncertain whether to follow Western or Islamic behavior or if, and how, to balance and incorporate the two within indigenous behavior. Gradually and across generations, Western-styled cultural practices became more prominent, but there are significant numbers who are retaining or turning to more indigenous lifestyles or to Islamic ideology and revising ways of thinking and behaving. Bulac has commented with specific reference to intellectuals that two groups have emerged, "the first with a radical attitude towards the West in the name of Islam, and the second with a radical attitude towards Islam in the name of the West."8 For the first group, one would expect the incompatibility between religious and Western cultural practices to be a central issue. This point was drawn out in response to the following statement and subsequent discussion with interviewees, who agreed with it, during the case study. To help distinguish the important characteristics, I discussed a number of related statements with praxisitioners and undertook some comparative analysis9 with Bulac's second group, the secularists. Turkish Identity Is Currently Being Threatened by Alien Western Cultures The responses from secularists were limited because the majority disagreed that Western culture was a threat, although this did not mean that there was a lack of awareness about the effect of other cultures on Turkey. But generally the effects of Western influence were perceived as opportunities and choice, as examples of music and clothes indicated, while conversely "traditional culture slows down secularism." By comparison, while praxisitioners also observed cultural changes, they were interpreted as a threat to the Turkish and Islamic way of life. Thus one noted concern about the implications for females, Turkish youth, incomprehensible imitation, general ways of behaving, and "Third World" countries generally. With these examples, social relations and activities have been identified that are culturally irreconcilable with the Islamic

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alternatives that were established in Chapter 2 and are the basis for comparative analysis by praxisitioners. For praxisitioners, the same sources that help identify these cultural concerns are also the basis for solutions. Similar reasoning can be found within interpretations of political and economic power. Turkey's economic condition highlights that considerable Western penetration and influence in financial matters have taken place that are against the economic principles of praxist Islam. For example, Turkey has regularly sought integration into the European Union (EU) and entry has been linked to significant changes to civil liberties and loosening economic restraints.10 This process has been long and drawn out, symbolized by regular rejections and apparent queue-jumping by other nations. Relations with the EU have provided opportunities for opposing ideologies to highlight the exclusive nature of the West that will deal with other nation-states only on its own terms. Reforms have been introduced during 2002 and 2003 that are intended to bring Turkey closer to the criteria set by the EU for membership. However, while the reform process has been applauded, the EU will ultimately make the decision based on implementation. Any subsequent perceived rejection of Turkey by the EU would certainly influence the attitudes of many people,11 and although an accession process has now been established it is far from certain that the Turkish state can or would ultimately want to meet the criteria for entry. In a certain sense, this part of the analysis is incorporating the materialism that other studies have used to explain the Islamic resurgence, as I am not disputing that the process is linked to the performance of the Turkish economy. However, it is only part of the explanation, because the decision to become a praxisitioner is not simply or invariably related to material deprivation. In many instances, particularly among praxisitioners who are not deprived in this sense, the central dispute is over the type of society that Turkey is and the relative lack of Islamic practices that include economic behavior as part of the general incompatibility problem. Both the preceding and following statements were designed to test the validity of this theory as part of the wider framework for understanding praxist interpretations of politico-economic global structures with particular emphasis placed on the relations between Turkey and the West. Again comparative analysis is undertaken between the comments of praxisitioners and secularists, who agreed with the statement, to help identify different characteristics in beliefs.12 At Present Global Economic Power Is Unfairly Concentrated in the Hands of the West In response to the statement, praxisitioners provided a critique of the global economy and the controlling Western nations. America and Europe were perceived to be divisive, manipulative, protectionist, and monopolistic. Interestingly, the imbalance is implicitly attacked on criteria perceived to be inherent features of modern nations since the Enlightenment: equality, democracy, and justice. The reasoning provided by praxisitioners would seem to reflect their exposure to the education curriculum and learning secular values and principles. Ironically this knowledge and cognitive skills acquired during the state

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education program have been used to severely criticize the state and indeed seriously question its existence. As Ahmed (1992: 236) has commented with reference to the Arab world, "the rejection of and often-legitimate anger at the West that they [praxisitioners] give voice to are formulated in terms of the dominant discourse—Western in origin—of our global society." The Turkish praxisitioners have interpreted that Western countries "do not want all countries to have same rights, same powers" and while Turkey "should always be peace but these countries do not want this...they get peoples versus one another," "West say 'we want democracy' but change their minds when there is oil" and "blockade equal rights of small countries." Recent reporting on Cyprus, pressure, prior to the removal of Saddam, both to curtail trade with Iraq and to allow America Turkish air space, linked to financial concessions, in the build up to the Western attack on Iraq, and political references by both America and France to the Armenian genocide add to the perceived imbalance in global relations. The comments generally suggest that global economic power is unfairly weighted in favor of the West and is used in a manner that disproves the validity of the central concepts of modernity. By comparison, the majority of secularists also agreed with the statement but analysis of the open responses indicates different sentiments within the critique. Certainly, they agreed that power was unfairly concentrated in the hands of the West and provided examples of control and limitations on both economic and political internal matters. Multinational organizations and nation-states are included in the examples. The "UN, NATO, America and Europe all for West."13 However, linguistically the terms used lack the depth and intensity of their praxist peers and are tempered with implicit praise such as the "West is well developed," "they are leading world. It is very difficult to change this" and provides monies and credit for Turkey. The secularists are therefore critical of Western concentrated power; they do not possess an idealized impression of encroachment and appear to dislike certain facets. But unlike the praxisitioners and committed left-wing secularists, they are content to focus on specific instances and do not provide an overriding critique of the whole system. Therefore while both groups agree that the West has an unfair concentration of economic power, they differ in the breadth of their evaluations. The praxisitioners vehemently oppose the system while secularists' sentiments appear to be pragmatically accepting the situation "for we have to copying American ways. If we do not we cannot survive." Secularists tended to agree with the modernization process, albeit with serious reservations because the system is compatible with their ideologies, again with the exception of the socialists. The global economic system and Turkey's incorporation are incompatible, however, with Islamic principles and practices and thus present huge problems for praxisitioners that need resolving. This logic is developed with the following statement as deeper knowledge and understanding about perceptions of the context were sought.

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There Are a Number of Global Problems Associated with Western Capitalism As with the previous responses, the majority of all respondents agreed with the statement, highlighting consistency in responses. During the subsequent discussion,14 however, the significant differences identified earlier between the secularists and praxisitioners become less noticeable. Generally, praxisitioners continued in the spirit of their earlier responses, again referring to the exploitative, divisive, unequal nature of capitalism. This leads to problems for Turkey with the PKK and Greece, who are "helped by Western capitalism," which restricts trade. European nations and America impose external control. Poverty exists, culture is threatened, the supportive Islamic mechanisms are being displaced, and identities are threatened by the overemphasis on selfishness and materialism. There are also examples of what Halliday (2002: 88) refers to as perceived "anti-Muslimism" and the continuing hostility of the non-Muslim world that can be traced to the Crusades. The problems are therefore all encompassing, again reflecting Islam as a totality, ranging from the private sphere to the public arena. By comparison, the secularists who provided explanations also linked the problems to both the individual and the social, identifying materialism, laissez faire economics,15 and foreign intervention. Both categories highlight the perceived wide-ranging negative elements of capitalism including reference to environmental problems. Crucially, though, all praxisitioners expounded problems while less than half of the secularists provided examples. It therefore has to be acknowledged that the secularist comments do not necessarily reflect the sentiments of the whole group and certainly are not universally held. The secularists' responses do, however, support the view that with the "global crisis of modernism and the rising challenges against the universal myths of Western civilization, the promises of the Kemalist project have begun to be questioned" (Gulalp 1999: 23). GUlalp argues that there is a renewed attempt to promote Islamic ideology as the alternative because Kemalism has become seriously questioned as part of the wider postmodern condition discussed briefly in the Introduction. This theory suggests that the Western paradigm cannot solve all problems as was widely believed, and this leads to truth becoming relativized. In this scenario one can no longer state which system, way of behaving, or even object is the best because there are no absolutes for measuring. However, while GUlalp is partly correct in identifying the increasing and widespread questioning of the Western paradigm, and this is borne out by the above comments, there are two central problems with his views. First, and most important, as GUlalp himself acknowledges Islamism is not necessarily postmodernist, and praxist Islam is most definitely not. This is because Islam is based on absolute truth which is an impossible concept under the postmodern condition. The growth of praxist Islam cannot be part of this process because it is based on the very principles that postmodernity opposes. Thus the relativism of the postmodern age cannot provide "the defense of authenticity" as GUlalp seems to be claiming (2001) because the very essence of the philosophy is that cultural sources cannot possess authenticity. Praxisitioners are analyzing the Western paradigm but they are against the system because it does indeed create many problems. This analysis is part of the circle of reinforcement, however, and the belief that they have an alternative way of life that can resolve the problems. In

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some respects similarities can be drawn with Western communists of the 1960s who opposed the nature of capitalism and suggested an alternative totality but could never be described as part of the postmodern condition. Both groups oppose the Western-styled nation-state on the grounds of economic, political, and cultural incompatibility and not relativism. Second, as the above examples show, non-leftwing secularists are critical of the Western paradigm but are without an alternative discourse to explain the discrepancies. Consequently, the secularists are most likely to experience the postmodern condition because they refuse to accept the absolutism of any ideology and will make preferences according to issue, relativism, and elements that they dislike the least. The points raised during the discussions support the view that social processes and structures within Turkey are opposed by praxisitioners. They are also opposed by a number of secularists, so the critical analysis could simply reflect widespread discontent. It is therefore important to assess whether the problems identified within the wider contexts and the ideological and practical support discussed in Chapter 2 are linked by praxisitioners to the Islamic resurgence. This is consistent with my intention to be able to both understand and explain the phenomena. Where relevant, secularists are included for comparative analysis. This section starts by looking specifically at praxisitioners' explanations for the help that Islam provides, partly to highlight the need to focus beyond the economic element of the incompatibility problem to the broader appeal. At What Periods in Your Life Has Islam Been Most Helpful? At first glance the responses16 were rather ambiguous. All responses, however, either explicitly or implicitly refer to continuous help with common meanings reappearing, for example, "all life," "all the time," "always helping," and "throughout my life." They can be seen to reflect Islam as a totality, and this focus became more prominent during responses17 to the follow-up statement. Why Is It [Islam] So Helpful? Summarizing the responses Islam, for these praxisitioners, can provide six categories of assistance: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

As a restraining force that prevents immoral behavior because "if people believe in Islam, do not do bad things." In providing positive feelings because "when I prayed to God, I very happy, really happy." Explanatory guide which "helps me think, understand things in life," a point which echoes the earlier comments by another praxisitioner who said "I had some questions and the Qur'an, it answered the questions." Assisting in specific events, for example, "in any examination...special prayer to seek God's help" and from the previous statement "when I was young my father dies. This was very bad for my family. Only Islam help us." In the process of maturation and at points of transition, such as, "after I started university education when I was 18 years."

116 6.

Islamic Roots and Resurgence in Turkey As a total framework for life, "because it is shaping my behavior, everyday life, the whole of my life."

Islam for these praxisitioners provides both metaphysical and social guidance with no dichotomies between the self/social and spiritual/material. The interrelationship between the individual and social can be noted further in responses18 to the broader question about why Islam has become popular. Islam Has Recently Visibly Grown in Popularity (Respondents Who Agreed Were Subsequently Asked to Explain Why They Thought This Had Happened) Both groups provided sophisticated responses to the statement. The secularists focused on the secular rationale, believing that the West and Turkey's "many economic problems" have created fertile ground for a rival ideology that is "increasing day by day because of the economic situation." Economic problems within Turkey were of course also identified in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. This is allied to the ideological freedom given to religion by the state for "even though we have a secular Government they act on the contrary" and the pragmatic approach that the religious party used to provide basic support to a "lot of poor people [in order] to gain votes." The comments of the praxisitioners can be divided into three levels of awareness: 1. 2.

3.

Problems with the Turkish economy and Western interference in the process. Considerable suffering in Muslim countries with no Western interference; in other words, the UN and NATO will stand by and allow catastrophes to occur unless they have any valuable interests to defend. Additionally the actions of Western forces against Iraqi citizens following the 1991 Gulf War have also been influential and actions within Afghanistan and the 2003 American led war against Iraq will be considered in similar ways. Islam as a rival ideology and pragmatic provider of an alternative morality for individuals and society.

Many praxisitioners are thus "now more aware of need to get rid of West," and "are more aware of need to follow Muslim way of life." Their Islamic frame of reference would appear to be providing both the basis for discovering weaknesses in the current system and for determining solutions at individual and social levels. This interwoven process develops into a circle of reinforcement because Islam can provide explanations for the negative reality, proposes solutions and finds support within contemporary conditions. If we hypothesize at this stage why the Islamic resurgence is occurring now, we can argue that the crucial word used is awareness. As the previous chapter established, more people are being introduced to praxist Islam, societal, and global problems. This fails to explain, however, why some people practice radical Islam and others do not. Problems in the public context, identified by both praxisitioners and secularists, have played a significant part in the process but are not causing the latter to think beyond alternative secular ideologies, for example, left-wing perspectives. The contextual problems, which are described in similar rhetoric by praxisitioners to that used by other radical

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perspectives, legitimize the theological ideology. This enables common characteristics to be identified but in isolation cannot explain the phenomenon without more information and without being established within a comprehensive framework. RELIGIOUS PARTICIPATION AT STATE LEVEL The previous section demonstrated that there is considerable criticism about Turkey by both praxisitioners and secularists. The analysis by praxisitioners tended to reinforce their beliefs, and this would strengthen their resolve to want, at the very least, greater theological penetration within the state and society. Consequently I am challenging Sayan's observation that "Turkey has made considerable headway in its efforts to avoid the problem of political legitimization by institutionalizing democratic processes" (1984: 127). On the contrary, political Islam is challenging the democratic process that has partly allowed aspects of religion to mobilize support and contributed to its legitimacy. The final part of the incompatibility problem starts with a summary of responses19 to the initial loss of Islamic power. During the Last Few Centuries Islam Lost Political Influence Because It Could Not Compete with Western Developments Generally, the praxisitioners believed that the statement is, at best, only partly correct. The main explanations for the reduction of Islam and the interlinked demise of the empire can be perceived to be linked to nonpractice allied to foreign intervention and imitation and not the practice of religion, best summed up by Kidwai's (1959: 8) view that "the decline of Muslims is not due to any shortcomings in Islam but to their failure to live up to it." It is not the decay of Islam that is being witnessed but the "decay and bankruptcy of the hearts of the Muslims too lazy to respond to the Divine call." Thus for the praxisitioners the demise of the empire and weakening of Islamic power were a consequence of the neglect of religious tenets and the intrusive Western impact. This ties in with the interweaving of belief and action and highlights that if the latter part is missing then Islam is not praxist. It also provides one of the key elements for the circle of reinforcement because history appears to have shown praxisitioners that when Islam is practiced Muslims are successful, while limited or nonpractice leads to decline and fundamental problems that subsequently can be resolved only by praxism. Further support can be found for this within praxist responses20 about altering the Turkish structure. Should the Turkish State Structures Be Altered to Include Greater Religious Participation? If So How Can This Be Achieved? This question was developed in support of an earlier statement, "Islamic law should be the basis for Turkish society." Secularists answered whether they agreed that praxisitioners did want to change the system.21 Within the responses

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there were implied differences in emphasis on levels of change ranging from Islamic rule to the need for more theocracy. There was, however, general agreement that state structures needed altering. This was not unexpected, because, as explained earlier, Muslim activists should want the freedom to practice, the elimination of behavior deemed immoral, and the reduction, at the very least, of laicism. These views are not, as Halliday (1996) remarked, animated to activism by a fear of losing social control, because under praxist interpretations of Islam, that control was lost a long time ago. Their activity is directed toward recapturing it. And the recent experiences of the WP in government, and possibly the JDP in the near future, are likely to highlight to many Muslims the need for radical politics to operate outside the secular system due to the lack of any significant structural change or even the address of cultural aspects of civil society that conflict with interpretations of the Shari'ah, discussed in Chapter 4. When praxisitioners were asked how the state was to be transformed the responses were limited, partly as a consequence of my lack of persistence on this point.22 Those who did provide an answer beyond "it will be very hard," offered some information about their line of reasoning which related to freedom, awareness, and setting examples. This was particularly noticeable when I asked the praxisitioners about their own contributions. One could argue that the praxisitioners, in attempting to increase the role of Islam, are actively setting examples as part of their interpreted obligations and to increase the awareness of others. A number of respondents also stated that they were attempting to encourage others to adopt the praxist interpretation through discussions. All these activities were intended to lead to the demand for structural change becoming overwhelming. Some praxisitioners argued that Turkey would need to become self-sufficient because they did not believe that the West would allow their ally to "become Muslim." The only way they believed that self-sufficiency could be achieved was through alliances with other Muslim countries, perhaps leading to the removal of nation-states and the emergence of the ummah. It is clear that all the praxisitioners who expanded their answers were actively trying to increase the influence of Islam in both Turkey and Britain, raising consciousness as a form of action aimed at changing society.23 In this sense praxisitioners shared Bulac's (1983) view that the first step toward any radical transformation of society was through developing Islamic consciousness. The strategic direction for what happens, however, subsequently varies between different groups of praxisitioners and is often vague. It could be anticipated that political struggle would be a necessary action when consciousness was at a level to make this feasible. Toprak (1993) has commented that while there is talk about political struggle, how this is to be achieved is unclear. Indeed in the event of successful political action, the proposed alternative totality that would replace the complex secular structures, systems, processes, and interactions has usually focused on generic factors interpreted within the Shari'ah. There is a general lack of the extensive detail required to suggest how the proposed radical changes would be implemented and maintained. Unless comprehensive and

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popular strategies are developed to achieve this, it is difficult to foresee the resurgence becoming revolution. CONCLUSION This chapter has focused on beliefs and practices that for praxisitioners are incompatible with the secular state and need implementing. Secularists have stressed the need for reform to rectify the problems that have been identified, while praxisitioners supported radical change of both public and private space as the solution. One of the main reasons for this difference would appear to be that secularists not surprisingly considered secularism to be the only way forward, although they often disagreed with the overwhelming capitalist direction. Praxisitioners by comparison were unanimously opposed to secularism and considered adopting Islamic values and practices to be the only alternative. One can therefore tentatively state that unless capitalism is able to produce a world of equality, justice, and peace, anyone who believes in Islam as a totality will have their beliefs sanctioned within the circle of reinforcement. This reinforces the incompatibility problem of the present reality with the idealized past and anticipated future. Similarly one could argue that individuals who are discontented, disillusioned, or dissatisfied with the present can find a viable explanation for contemporary life that is legitimized by past successes. The process of praxisification is therefore not necessarily linked to individual materialism. And although I argue in the following chapter the process is associated with individualism, it is not necessarily linked to social mobility or political participation as Gole (1996) has argued because for many praxisitioners both elements can be, or are being, achieved. If these patterns are replicated across Turkey then the resurgence of praxist Islam is likely to be a long-term phenomenon. The incompatibility problem can be resolved only by Islamic values becoming discredited, either by practice or through secular success that breaks the circle of reinforcement or alternatively through actual implementation. Unless any of these events occur, which seems very unlikely at this time, then praxisitioners will not, as Gole (1997) argued, in the case of Islamist counter-elites become part of processes of secularization that ultimately separate the sacred and profane but will remain firmly opposed, irrespective of their academic skills or occupation. In the unlikely event that Turkey was to become a praxist state in the near future, this creates the reverse incompatibility problem for secularists. The Turkish armed forces, probably supported by Western allies, would not allow praxism to become dominant because it would mean that the secularization they support would have to be eliminated to accommodate the radically opposed religious policies. Thus their beliefs and actions would be incompatible with theocracy. Consequently the military view Islamic movements as threats to the two central pillars of nationalism and secularism. The analysis of the context in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 showed that Turkey has changed dramatically over recent centuries and this process has accelerated since the republic was formed, particularly after the Second World War. The recent changes have been identified as fundamental factors in the Islamic revival by other

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studies but, as I have pointed out, this ignores the long-term roots of the changes and the significance of the historical legacy that republicanism was seen to replace and which are an integral part of the circle of reinforcement. Change is indeed instrumental in the process as other studies have outlined, but it is not change per se that is the cause of praxism, although this is a contributing factor. It is the nature of the changes, their effects, and what they are perceived to have changed from (i.e., the idealized past). These points are incorporated into a wider explanatory schematic in the Conclusion. Nor can change explain differential responses or the motivation to demand an alternative system. This dimension is addressed in the following chapter. NOTES 1. The average life expectancy, which was 62 for men and 68 for women in 1990, had risen to an average of 68 in 1995, and was expected to rise to 69.1 by the end of 2000 and to 70.3 in 2005. This increase is accompanied by a considerable reduction in the rate of infant mortality, from 4.31 percent in 1995 to an estimated 3.53 percent in 2000 and 2.88 percent in 2005. These factors and the relatively high birth rate have contributed to the population increasing. In 1990 the population was estimated at 56 million compared to officially 67.8 million in 2000. The extent of the increase will obviously have a huge impact on the state in terms of demand for its services, employment trends, health, education, housing requirements, and other social necessities. It has been estimated that the population will exceed 100 million by 2050 (reported in the Turkish Daily News 27 August 2002). 2. In December 2001 the value of imports exceeded exports by 947 trillion lira (reported in State Institute of Statistics 2002). 3. Statement by the Economy Minister, Kemal Dervis (reported in the Turkish Daily News 4 December 2001). 4. In response to a number of high-profile cases within banking, the Interior Minister Saadattin Tantan stated that "the corruption economy is the number one threat to Turkey's economic and political stability. It lies at the root of many of our country's problems and poses a future threat to our society and constitutional regime" (quoted in Pope, N. 24 November 2000). As a recent survey published in the Turkish Daily News, 8 October 2001, showed, it would seem that the public are also generally aware of the widespread nature of corruption. 5. Questions and comments from Vertigans (1999). 6. This is not to state that all secular ideologies have been totally dismissed as alternatives to the current system. For example, the radical left organization, the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), continues to operate and has escalated its campaign against the state by targeting security forces and using suicide bombers and hunger strikes to raise the profile and as a means of protest. The group was also prominent in prison riots at the end of 2000 and the beginning of 2001. The brutal events of the 1980s and the history and subsequent demise of the Soviet Union have limited its appeal, however, to a small minority. 7. Between 1990 and 1995 the number of tourists rose from 5.4 million to 7.7 million (Pope and Pope 1997). 8. Quoted in Toprak (1993: 248-49). 9. Responses to the statement "Turkish identity is currently being threatened by alien Western cultures" were:

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Praxisitioners "For example, Turkish culture and also Islamic culture. For example woman wears long clothes but your mother and sisters do not like Turkey. For example, Western clothes, fashion aspects are very different from Turkey. They are not suitable but are being taken. For example, TV and lifestyles being affected." "Of course. Many things. Many peoples in Turkey smoke. Even though this is bad. Now must smoke American and others' cigarettes. Many things like this." "Yes, Turkish youth change with foreign cultures. For example, smoking, watching TV, movies, go to pop concerts, see advertisements. This not like this, for other Turks who do not understand (what is happening) cannot understand young people." "In the world development, countries affect Third World countries because they have enough power, army and economic and knowledge power and affect other cultures." "For example. Many Turkish people buy American and English music. Peoples like Michael Jackson. But he is not good for Turkish people. They buy music and other things, for example clothes like West but they do not have any monies." "For example, many people must smoke European cigarettes, and wear their clothes. Also, for example, eat foreign food, but Turkish food is very good, one of best." "Examples, absolutely. Can be seen in Turkey. For example, before woman wearing Islamic clothes but now everyone free wearing whatever they like but not good. For example, everywhere there is advertisements, in TV, newspapers, in front of shop, in front of restaurant. Also at school we take English but most people do not need it so why do it? Also fashion like Western Europe. For example, if someone has Western car, Western clothes, even if bad, or not quality, everyone looks at that car or that clothes as if very strong. For example, in Germany two million Turkish people working. They come to Turkey during summer holiday, they bring some summer clothes, bicycle, car or maybe second-hand but in Turkey everyone says very good." "There is a lot of cultural changes in any country. Especially in city, capital is important thing. Society structure changed by West, in time. For example, living manner, for example what wearing, it is different now." "This is a problem. For example, West is not good for Turkey. I see many peoples who come to my city [Antalya] but they do not behave. They are not nice peoples. But many Turkish youths see clothes and more and think T want to be like them.' Why? They are not nice peoples so why copy them?" "In Turkey, long time of culture. Now say we must change. Must stop past...behave like West." Secularists Only a limited number of secularists considered Western culture to be a threat to Turkish identity and some of these responses indicated that it was a threat without menace. The last two responses included below were not from interviewees who agreed with the statement but chose to add their comments anyway. "This is true. Too much West is not good for Turkey. We are not the same so it does not mean it will be good." "For example, many young people like American food. They go to McDonalds. They do not like Turkish food but it is very good." "In Turkey, much traditional culture slows down secularism...it is not good, it stops." "For example, usually young people like Western music...Western things." "People like Western clothes...things. Why should they not have them? They look good." 10. The EU Accession Partnership document was published in November 2000 and lists political and economic reforms that need to be implemented before Turkey meets the required criteria. The reforms include guaranteeing freedom of expression and

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association and implementing anti-inflation and structural changes. These elements caused no surprise, but much more unexpected and contentious was the requirement to bring about a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. Accession talks have to be started by 2004. As part of this accession process the Turkish Constitution adopted by the military regime in 1982 was amended in October 2001 to place more emphasis on greater democratization and freedom of expression. The JDP has subsequently introduced a number of reform packages that include granting cultural rights to Kurds and removing an infamous article within the anti-terror law, that is used to jail dissidents for spreading "separatist propaganda." Despite the concerns of the military the National Assembly has adopted the reforms. 11. A point developed by the then Prime Minister Tansu (filler who stated in Washington that "if Turkey is separated from Europe or rejected from Europe then the Turkish people will reject Europe as well....Fundamentalism is only going to be a threat if Turkey is left out of Europe. Turkey is not in need of Europe, I think Europe is more in need of Turkey as well, if they do not want the forces of fundamentalism to move up to their borders" (quoted in the New Straits Times, Malaysia, 20 April 1995). 12. The responses to the statement "At present global economic power is unfairly concentrated in the hands of the West" were: Praxisitioners "For example, during history England did not like Ottoman Empire, and now Turkish people especially Muslim peoples. West, they do not want all countries to have same rights, same power, same level. They want to gain all supply themselves. For example, they cause a lot of trouble amongst other Islamic countries as they have power, colonist countries. I do not like them, all of them as I want all countries to have same rights. They stop peoples being happy, should always be peace but these kinds of countries do not want this. For example, they get people to want their things, not Turkey's, always make money. They get people versus one another." "It is like I just say. Other countries tell peoples must buy their goods and Government does not tell peoples not to." [Which other countries?] "Countries in EU and also America." "There is discriminatory policy and practice so big countries blockade equal rights of small countries. Small countries do not have words in international affairs." "America and Europe sets tariffs so Turkish goods cannot be sold yet tell us we must get rid of tariffs." "Everything is done for West. Turkey is told must follow this way." "This has always been so since end of Ottomans. West wants to stop Muslims." "Of course. This is everywhere. Demirel says we must be like West but they do not want Muslims. West tell Government to sell their products but will not let Turkey get better." "In the world, things are devised to Western standards. For example, EU and IMF influence Turkish Government who follows their recommendations. For example, privatization, idea and practice influenced by Western economic institutes." "You can see America is against Islamic economic unity. It prevents it." "Some countries, especially United States, have more power, more control, more land and more natural resources." "Of course. Turkey and other countries told by America and EEC [European Economic Community] what to do. Say we must buy this, we must have American army." "In Turkey economics are controlled by West. Turkey does not have control." "For example, in Middle East, peoples told by oil companies. West say wwe want democracy' but change their minds when there is oil. In these countries peoples cannot have say...as long as America has oil they do not care. Only when this is threatened do

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West take action. For example they do not care what happens to peoples of Kuwait but when Iraq invasion threatens oil they use army." Secularists "Big countries always affect economy of Third World countries. If something happens with Turkey and United States or EEC then Turkey's money goes down. These countries control money rate. For example, they control over export price, also give credit for example, EEC and IMF, World Bank and get control." "Because West is well developed, have control, strong and so control the rest. For example, EEC and United States put limitations on Turkish textiles." "For example, United States holds economic power. Whatever they say we have to do it otherwise they will cut the monies. We have to copying American ways. If we do not we cannot survive." "I believe that European countries are powerful and use their power for their benefit and others are dependent on them. For example, if something happens in Turkey, they say you cannot do it for example, the Kurds are attacked in Iraq. They say you cannot attack Kurds." "Of course. In Turkey there is big military but still told what can do by West. For example they say 'do not go to Iraq' but they have PKK." "This is true but they are leading world. It is very difficult to change this." "West has more power. I do not know if this can be good...sometimes stop others from getting bigger. They want to keep riches." "Of course. UN, NATO, America and Europe all for West. Who is there to stop them?" 13. Pope and Pope (1997: 184) have commented on the shared rejection of Europe by radical Islamists and Kemalists, particularly during times of European and also American criticism and rejection. 14. The responses to the statement "There are a number of global problems associated with Western capitalism" were: Praxisitioners "For example, in Islamic culture, we help people but after capitalist system we not get enough money, we a poor country and we had to leave our customs and we could not help other peoples. Capitalism is very hard for Turkey and other countries." "Capitalism people create problems and still continue. Greek and Turkey's peoples do not like each other. Why, because of Western countries, they do not want Turkey to be a strong country, so want others to fight it. So we fight them and do not get strong and others do not get strong either. Ottoman Empire prevented them from doing what they wanted and they did not like it. Now can get what they want." "Environmental issues, big companies using cheap labour and sell goods at expensive price, United Nations only helping West." "It is not too bad but produces small number of rich peoples. Other peoples poor. Rich peoples pressure Government to get own way. Way of rich people is not good, it is unfair." "For example, it is about making money not what peoples want." "For example, PKK and Greece helped by Western capitalism. Turkey is located in very important part of world, between Asia and Europe so I think every country does not want Turkey's free behavior. For example, Russia, British, Germany, France as every country benefits from control of Turkey. For example, need Turkey's sea for goods." "Money affects the people everywhere. In my opinion, it is a bad thing because people can be lost, lost his personality, money, money, money." "Of course, it is all greed. Get more money, more cars and houses. But this is...only good for West. Other peoples poor. In my country many poor peoples cannot buy things." "In West, peoples are very selfish. They do not help anyone. They only help themselves. But what will they do when they cannot help themselves?"

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"For example, Turkey is Muslim peoples. But capital does not want Muslims strong. Must stop this." [How is this achieved?] "They give monies to Greece and also to PKK." "It makes many people many money. But does not help many poor Turkish people." "Of course. Many problems. West says peoples must buy many things. But this is not good. Peoples do not need many things. Do not buy Turkey things. Already have own things." "In Turkey many poor peoples and some peoples have many monies. In Turkey, there is also lot of terrorism. For example, PKK kill peoples." [How is this linked to capitalism?] "This is good for West. It makes Muslims fight themselves. Stops Turkey from getting bigger." A praxisitioner disagreed with the statement and explained that: "My belief is do not put blame on others for our misgivings, our poverty, lack of power even though the facts are there. If our belief is hard and strong, work hard, we can overcome that." Secularists "I think there is too much materialism. Peoples are losing face. More and more money, more individualism but bad culture. World capitalism is big but it is not good." "You can see some problems. For example, environmental problems and CFC gases." "For example, many countries are influenced by others. For example, Russia influencing some countries before it was influencing East Germany. In my opinion, these countries stopping others from doing what they want." "For example, in Turkey trade unions are blamed for problems. But this is fault of EEC. They tell Turkey must buy this, must sell this. Tell Ozal to be like British. Many peoples lose job. This is fault of Ozal policies not trade unions." "Of course, there are many. For example, environment, terrorism, war with Greece and Kurds. These problems all for West. In Turkey, always seeing at these problems. Peoples do not see any problems with West." A secularist who had answered "Undecided" stated: "Of course problems exist. But also many good things. If was bad it would not be very long here." 15. This process is associated with Ozal's tenure as prime minister as a way of liberalizing the economy, attracting investors, and meeting EU criteria. It has been continued by subsequent governments. 16. The praxisitioners' responses to the question "At what periods in your life has Islam been most helpful?" were: "Especially between 6-10 and after 24." "After I started university education when I was 18 years." "I cannot split them, it is not seasonal. Throughout my life, Islam has been very helpful." "No certain period." "Generally feel it all the time. People in strong position pray to Allah as well as weak. Pray more than when weak to give thanks." "All life, Allah helps me." "Every event reinforces belief. Allah is helpful in everything." "Every time." "Islam helps all the time." "After I need help. When I could not explain what is happening. Islam always here." "Islam good all the time. For example, helps me. Stops me doing bad things." "Now helps me all the time. I really cannot divide." "When I was young my father dies. This was very bad for my family. Only Islam help us. We pray and Allah help us. When I go to university Islam also helpful. I meet friends who help me...show me many books."

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"What cannot be seen, cannot be explained. For example, if you took medicine when you are ill. You get better, improving your illness, but everyone thinks that I got better, but this is wrong because Allah keeps improving the medicine. Allah always helping. Every Muslim should think like this." Part of this quote was provided in response to a follow up question. 17. The praxisitioners' responses to the question "Why is it [Islam] so helpful?" were: "For example, I just graduate in 1993 and not practise but now two years my beliefs are active and practising. I feel good." "Most important thing for me is belief. Daily life is important. There are a lot of bad things, for example, alcohol, drugs, smoking, immoral things between people. When I started university I saw those things and hated it. I wondered why they did these things. I decided they do not have enough belief, lost their Islam. Islam is very helpful as people do not do such things if they believe. Otherwise they will go to Hell, which is very bad. If people believe in Islam, do not do bad things, for example kill people, steal, take drugs as very bad for their bodies. Do not eat bacon as contain very small bad things." "Because it is shaping my behavior, everyday life, the whole of my life." "In many ways. For example, in any examination at any level, special prayer to seek God's help. If ask God, he will give us. Most things asked for, God gave it. Sometimes God did not give, but because of me, I did not do something." [So if you pass an exam it is down to God and if you fail it is down to you?] "Yes." "Everyday helps life." "Stops me doing bad things. Think sometime bad, then think of Allah and it stops you doing bad things." "Helps me think, understand things in life." "When I prayed to God, I very happy, really happy. I felt peace of mind and I got something." "Because Allah tells us how to behave." "Because Islam gives you help in life, and when you see bad things you know they are bad and not for Muslims." "It stops me doing bad things." "Because Islam provides many answers. If you have problem, Islam can answer." "Islam explains many things in my life." 18. Responses to the statement "Islam has recently visibly grown in popularity" were: Praxisitioners "Islam has grown in Turkey because of capitalism, because living conditions are going worst, as everything is going more expensive, so people are expecting some things from religion." [Which capitalism cannot provide?] "Yes, of course." "Many peoples need to be Muslims. For example, Michael Jackson, no moral things, people think they can do anything. People need moral things. European peoples do not have such beliefs, have money but not happy so there are lots of English turning to Islam. People need morals which West and Atatiirk did not have. Atatiirk stopped Arabic writing. People could not read Qur'an and lost morals." "People are more aware of need to follow Muslim way of life." "For example, there has been an increase in 1990s as reaction to Western powers, always interfering for their own good but not good for Muslims. Peoples now more aware of need to get rid of West." "Even here, more Westerners are going to Islam. They see Christianity fail so they turn to Islam. For Muslims, events like Bosnia, Iraq war, Grosny show we are weak. So we must strengthen Islam."

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"For example, there has been an increase in 1990s as reaction to Western powers, always interfering for their own good but not good for Muslims. Peoples now more aware of need to get rid of West." "There are several reason for this, I think, not one reason: 1. According to the Turkish condition, after Republican era, there was strict laicism, no religious education. This affected people and always discussing Islam against laicism. But many people do not respect Islam and this upset believers; 2. Right wing or left wing Government do not improve economic development in Turkey. This party or this party or this party are not successful so now some are trying Refah [WP]; 3. Collapse of communism in Soviet Union so less option for change; 4. Ozal was good. People respect his ideas in society. Economic development was good in his period. Need respect, not there today. People miss respect; 5. We cannot imitate West ideas and values as not true, cannot reach good solution as does not suit us. Should not copy others, be a copy is not good. We should keep previous Islamic identity and we will be successful; 6. Religious groups have power, even if illegal in Turkey. They control education. Ciller knows have power and meets them two months ago." "Only Islam can unify groups with problems." "I think peoples knew problems?" [Which problems?] "For example, in Turkey many peoples very poor, peoples bad. In world many Muslims killed. Peoples know this." "For example, Bosnia, Palestine, Azerbeijan, Kashmir. In my opinion, these wars, these countries Muslims were destroyed by non-Muslims and non-Muslim countries do nothing for them. Muslims saw them save Muslim country suffering, Kuwait. America rescued Kuwait from Iraq because of lot of oil reserve. But Bosnia, since 1991, no country could help because there is no oil reserve, no nuclear energy, precious stones. Nothing valuable so that can be done to Muslims. Now Muslims know must fight on own." "Because a lot of people becoming Muslim as, in my country, people more aware of Islam." "Many reasons for this. Peoples see many bad things. For example many Muslims killed. West sees this but this is okay as no oil. Peoples see this. Cannot rely on West." "More peoples are becoming Muslims. In West also. They realize many problems with West. Also see that many Muslims are good. Help others. For example in Istanbul, Islamic groups help people with problems. For example, in Istanbul, Refah [WP] very good for peoples. Much cleaner." "In Turkey, peoples see many problems. Only Islam can help." "We have many problems. Many parties [political] but do not do anything. Say 'Must do as West' Muslims say follow Muslims. This is answer." Secularists "This is effect of Turkish situation, in my opinion. Increasing day by day because of the economic situation. For example, Refah Party [WP], Turkish people tried other parties before and they do not do anything. Refah offer supposedly new things." "For example, economic situation is bad, people suffering and want change. Also coming from past. Islam was very small until other parties did not do well. Refah [WP] use always peoples beliefs. Local election victories were a warning to other parties by people, if do not improve we will elect these people. Refah spend a lot on poor people to gain votes." "Government intangibly allowed acts. For example, allowed Sivas fire. Increasing Islam gaining support, people see corruption, behaviors and go to Refah as an alternative to suffering for social democracy. Even though we have a secular Government they act on contrary. Give power to Islamic forces. In high schools principals force pupils into

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mosques and fasting during Ramadan. Government encouraged this with Ministry of Education run by fundamentalists." "In Turkey, there are many economic problems. Many peoples have no jobs. They think Refah can help them. Refah says 'we will give you job.' Refah offers many peoples help." "Of course, many peoples not happy with West. See many problems. They are told 'left wing is bad.' Scared of left wing so turn to Erbakan." "For example, many people are poor. Peoples think Islam help but it can't. It is too old." "This is Government. Must stop fundamentalists telling people things. People believe this. Say we must be Muslims." 19. The praxisitioners' responses to the statement "During the last few centuries Islam lost political influence because it could not compete with Western developments" were: "It is part of the reason. It is also due to people trying to show Islam is very bad. For example, they do not want people to be Muslims...try stop people being Muslims practising...say must be like West not like Muslims." "This is only partly true. The more reason is Muslim people ignored their way of life. For example, they did not practise as Muslim." "It was because Muslims must satisfy Western needs, not Islamic ones. This is not practical for Muslims." "Problems are from copying West and forgetting Islamic ways." "Because Muslims distanced themselves from practising Islam." "Islam lost power, not due to West being good but as Muslims became bad Muslims." "It is because Islam became bad. Peoples were bad at practise. Not because West good." "This is not true. Islam not practised. This is reason." 20. Praxisitioners stated in response to the statement "Should the Turkish state structures be altered to include greater religious participation? If so how can this be achieved?" that: "I think so. Some rules are more useful and we can apply. We practise in normal life, respect yourself and improve state." "I believe that Islamic rule should come to Turkey. In Turkey there are a lot of pubs. Different parts have different customs. Relations between people in North East and West is bad, have different customs. I do not know how this happen. Turkey has been changed by Western countries, use their technological advantage. They take money. IMF give money to Turkey, say must use for education so they can take money back for this purpose to England. Cannot use for factories. We come here and are studying here and have to pay money for education. It costs £8000 for MSc per year." This student referred to this question, during the final question when he said "first thing you have to do [to bring about change] during education, the lesson about religion has to be given by Ministry of Education officials. Children must take such lessons to avoid doing bad things. I tells people that do bad things about being Muslim. For example, as people do not do bad things." [Is this in Turkey?]. "Of course but in this country also." [Where in this country?] "At this university, there are many bad things. For example, smoking, drinking, drugs, homeless people." "I think so. Peoples must be more Muslim. Must have freedom to practise so must change state power." [How can you achieve this?] "For example, I think must respect yourself and Islam. Other peoples will see this." "I think so, so must implement laws to be used by Muslims.' [How?] "For example, I practise....If people do not practise then Muslims should teach them." "It depends on the state structures. In Turkey, no freedom or respect to believers but must respect believers and ideas. Need more freedom and respect and ideas." [How can this be achieved?] "It is very difficult as state does not like Islam."

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"I think so. Need to increase religion in Turkey. This can be achieved through telling peoples more about Islam, I think. Also by setting examples for others to follow. For example, my friend was not a Muslim but he saw how we practise, no drinking, bad behavior, our levels of tolerance and he followed us, he became a Muslim." "Of course. For example, use education, tell children about Allah's will." "Yes. We cannot say exactly what must be done, depends on part of Government." "Yes, but it will be very hard." [What can you do to help?] "For example, you do good things so people can see that Islam is not for bad things." "I believe Turkey needs more Islam. Many people do not practise and believe. Peoples should be better Muslims." [How will this be achieved?] "I think peoples need to be told more about Islam. Also must look at bad things in Turkey. For example, alcohol, prostitution, drugs. Also must devote yourself fully to Islam in everyday life." "Islam has to be followed more in Turkey. Must look at traditions and values and customs and get people to follow. People need more freedom from state to practise Islam." [What are you doing to achieve this?] "People must learn to share things. You do not lose anything to give. You learn a lot of things. I try tell people this." "Peoples need to know more about Islam. They will see Islam is good. It will be very hard because people in power do not like Islam....I talk to peoples about good of Islam." "I think so. In Turkey, there are many problems. Atatiirk has not helped Turkey. Must turn to Islam. Only Islam can help." 21. Secularists' responses to the question "Do you think that radical Muslims want to change the Turkish secular system?" were: "Yes, I think democrat system is very nice. I think nobody can't change this system. They want to change admin, but they will never be successful. Islamic system will never come to Turkey. Democracy need improvement like European administration. For example, England and Germany, Turkey needs this kind of admin." "Of course, instead of laicism they want Shari'ah." "They want Muslim state in Turkey." "Yes I think. Government now supports them. For example, the Ministry of Education." "Yes, of course." "I believe this." "I think so." "Of course. They say 'Turkey must become Muslim state like Iran.' " "I think this is so." "Yes." "Of course. They want Shari'ah in Turkey. They do not like democracy." All the secularists agreed with the statement, and it is interesting to note the perception of one respondent who associated the Government, and in particular the Ministry of Education, with the demands. These remarks reflect some of the earlier sentiments that refer to the penetration and influence of praxisitioners within state institutions. 22. The lack of persistence was due to the confidential nature of the subject and possible suspicion that consequently might have arisen if the matter was pursued. 23. There was no expression made or willingness shown to achieve greater religious participation through violence, although I did not discount the reluctance to divulge this material for fear of possible repercussions.

7

Internalization and Change: Routes to Praxism INTRODUCTION In the previous chapters it was established that modernization processes have been intrinsic components of what is now the Turkish state since the latter stages of the Ottoman Empire. These processes have varied considerably in impact on structures, processes, and the populace. Within Turkey people are aware of the evolving nature of society partly, as Chapter 5 highlighted, as a consequence of the development of the media and communications generally. I believe, however, that modernization processes and interrelated changes do not necessarily lead to generic groups of individuals internalizing secular or Islamic values as other studies have claimed. I suggest that what also matters is how these processes and changes are translated, and this will depend on individual socialization processes, the influential agents and contexts in which the interactions take place. Thus the gradual movement toward urbanization, cultural pluralism, industrial capitalism, and globalization will create either opportunities or problems depending on individual interpretation. For example, Turkey could be the poorest, most brutal, and most unjust nation in the world, but these factors would be insignificant in the development of beliefs if they were not perceived as such by the individual. While it is essential that structural factors are established to help explain the contemporary nature of praxisification, they need to be integrated with individual processes of internalization. A series of questions need to be raised. For example, who was influential in passing on the beliefs, what were the critical stages, why do individuals retain beliefs, which local interactions and activities were influential, and what impact have experiences and perceptions of the wider framework had on belief retention and reinforcement? The responses will allow a more composite picture to emerge that can explain the different attitudes to religion between and within different groups as a response to individual experiences and societal and global factors. Because I am particularly interested in the group that modernization theorists have been least able to explain, educated praxisitioners, it

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is important to know why, when by secular criteria they are succeeding and therefore have no apparent need to support and promote radical change, they want to replace the system on which their success is based; in other words, what motivates them to confront this apparent paradox. PROCESSES OF SECULARIZATION AND PRAXISIFICATION This chapter starts with a look at processes of internalization, beginning with the stages at which beliefs were first held and practice started. An examination of changing levels of devotion follows before the impact of wider events and experiences is established. To help illuminate why some people become praxisitioners and other individuals are secularists, some comparative analysis is undertaken, where appropriate, between the two groups. Analysis starts with the points raised by praxisitioners.1 The questions that the respondents were asked are included. From the Comments You Have Made So Far, You Appear to Be a Practising Muslim [Check the Interviewee Agrees]. When Did You Start to Believe in Islam? Why and Who Was Influential in the Process? At What Age Did You Start to Pray Five Times per Day? The first question focuses on earlier devotion and then, where appropriate, I analyze later influences. The second question was included as an example of an essential Muslim principle in practicing the faith, praying five times per day, and provided an indication of the individual's commitment to Islam, to help me establish when the process commenced. It will be recalled that a praxisitioner has been defined as both believing in Islamic tenets and practicing them. Within the responses from praxisitioners, there is a range of answers between six and nineteen with the most popular ages between twelve and fourteen. An interviewee answered nineteen, but he had practiced before and this was the age at which he properly commenced devotional behavior. There was no general stage, and the responses also showed that the process is not necessarily unilinear, because some respondents started praying in childhood and some started aged thirteen to fourteen, but stopped practicing until they attended university. Consequently simply internalizing Muslim norms and values did not inevitably result in dedicated devotion. The decision to become a praxisitioner was not simply determined by socializing agents providing these individuals with the appropriate knowledge. These fluctuations in belief show that the praxisitioners did not develop their beliefs due to brainwashing during childhood, nor was the outcome the result of an irreversible process. The majority of respondents started to believe in Islam from "birth"; they were "born Muslims"; in other words, they were born into Muslim families. For another respondent, the process started as a child, one praxisitioner was between thirteen and fourteen, while another started to believe when he left home for boarding school at age seven. As I explained in Chapter 5, people are more likely to become Muslims as a consequence of living in a society where,

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"everyone is a Muslim" with "most people...born into Islamic family." For this study the crucial feature of theology is the nature of the interpretation, because Muslims will differ in what they think are the requirements and expectations of Islam. This information generally supports the results collected in Chapter 5 about members of families sharing similar beliefs. Certainly families are successful in transmitting Muslim values to the majority of praxisitioners, but as some of the above responses and Chapter 5 identified, family members may have transmitted the values though they were not necessarily praxisitioners. And as a later section shows, many praxisitioners have intensified their levels of devotion beyond those established by their families. In one instance where the respondent started practicing when he went to boarding school, he left behind secular parents. It is clearly possible, as Abu-Amr (1994) has noted in his study of Islamic Jihad and the high-profile involvement of the American John Walker Lindh fighting with the Taliban against forces belonging to his own nationality, for individuals from secular backgrounds to subsequently become radical praxisitioners. As Ispahani (1989) showed, these patterns are by no means restricted to men, as younger women can become more Islamically orientated than their secular mothers. In these situations another agent(s) could have a greater impact on behavior. This would appear tentatively to support de Vaus' (1983) observation that the family may be responsible for transmitting beliefs, but it could be that the peer group has a significant impact on practices. The validity of these comments will be further explored later in the chapter. To help explain the processes of internalization and in particular why some people become praxisitioners while others become secularists, the stages of internalization for some comparable secularists are examined.2 I had already established that the secularists were indeed secularists based on their responses to the questions and by asking them if my interpretation was correct. When Did You First Hold These [Secular] Beliefs? Influential in the Process?

Why and Who Was

In comparison with their praxist peers, secularists seemed to hold their beliefs generally later, noticeably post-school days. Universities appeared particularly important, supporting the point made about the role of university teachers in Chapter 5, but the significance of parents was mentioned infrequently. This finding is a major difference from the praxisitioners, for whom the family had a central role in transmitting ideological information. Secularists tended to stress the effect of other socializing agents including friends, books, and education. Ironically one of the few secularists who commented on being taught values by his parents later discarded the views because they were Islamic, which he came to consider inappropriate. This example and that of the first comment included in the footnote conversely highlight the complexity of praxisification and support part of the conclusion for praxisitioners, namely that simply being told about Islam and even internalizing faith do not necessarily lead to the retention of those beliefs or intensification of practices. Becoming a praxisitioner appears to require legitimization. People whose faith is not supported by physical or

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spiritual experiences can lose that faith either temporarily, as a number of praxisitioners experienced, or seemingly permanently, as the secular example showed. As an interesting aside it is illuminating to observe that some comments by secularists about Atatiirk indicate a process of deification towards "Father Turk." Values that are associated with religion have become incorporated into the secular respondents' discourses. The adoption of this "civic religion" is perhaps not surprising when one recalls that Atatiirk initiated socializing processes through civic institutions that incorporated Western norms and values developed during the Enlightenment. In a manner similar to that identified by Robert Bellah's study (1970) of American presidents, Atatiirk's position as head of state allowed him symbolically to represent the nation-state. The secularists appear to have been socialized into these civic rituals and values. In the case study, the family did not appear to have been as significant for secularists in the development of their beliefs. It will be recalled, however, that in Chapter 5 the overwhelming majority of secularists stated they shared similar beliefs with their parents. Two conclusions can be drawn from this: 1. 2.

Most interviewees were introduced to their ideological beliefs by their parents but were generally not aware of this. Parents had only a negligible effect on beliefs and the significant interaction occurred later.

When the stages are compared at which the respective beliefs were first held, the process of internalization had generally occurred later for secularists than praxisitioners and they were often able to support their claims with reference to specific events such as economic problems and foreign students, to awareness of the achievements of Atatiirk and the role of teachers and friends. There is no reason to doubt the validity of these comments, because the apparent discrepancy about the role and beliefs of parents can be explained through a discussion of the ideologies they support. For example, if parents introduced a praxisitioner to Islam, the individual would remain aware of this because it provided the base on which to develop a subsequent way of life. Later events and interactions can be seen as legitimizing this. Secularists may also have been told about secular values, but they cannot provide the same broad frame of reference. Consequently, later interactions are less likely to draw on childhood information which lacks the comprehensive outline of Muslim tenets. This position could be influenced by ideologies, including liberalism that the secularists adhere to and stress the importance of individual choice when developing beliefs. The individual may then consciously decide on beliefs, but this would be a decision that was also, perhaps unconsciously, affected by childhood experiences. There are too many secular respondents holding the same beliefs as their parents for the results simply to be coincidental. Therefore it seems reasonable to attribute families with an important communicative role for contemporary secularists' values. However, this view must be taken with some caution, because not all respondents shared their families' beliefs, and even when the beliefs are similar the interviewees' levels of interpretation and in some instances practice differ.

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It is important to build on this information and examine the impact of events and experiences in the process of praxisification and changes in secularists' views on religion. Identifying reasons for the decrease in levels of devotion should conversely help explain, through comparative analysis, why devotion levels for others increase. In other words, by comparing the different experiences between secularists and praxisitioners, significant differences between the growth and drop in levels of devotion can be noted. Changes in Levels of Devotion Have the Levels of Your Devotion Change? Why? (Praxisitioners Only) Generally the responses3 reinforced the conclusion from the previous section, namely, processes of praxisification cannot be explained simply through reference to central tenets being transmitted by influential socialization agents. The responses to the above question showed that the intensity of belief fluctuates for the overwhelming majority of praxisitioners for whom levels of devotion had changed positively. Five interrelated yet distinct reasons were provided: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Greater freedom to practice Increased contact with other Muslims Expanding Islamic awareness Responding to the challenge to prove faith Witnessing "bad things" and "good things"

A significant proportion of interviewees identified contact with other believers, especially friends and other foreign students, and greater reading of relevant materials as factors in changing devotion. The importance of friends was also stressed by a number of praxisitioners whose devotion had waned but returned through support and encouragement "from a friend, who influenced me.. .he help me to practise." For another interviewee "friends were practising and influenced me. Also they reading materials so I increased my reading and followed their example." Here we have examples of the importance of both friends and forms of media in developing the depth and breadth of belief, emphasized by the following quote; "a friend of mine had evidence of proof [of existence of Allah], and I asked for strong Islamic book to prove Allah." Beliefs and practices for these Muslims were becoming more praxist partly through using the analytical, cognitive skills obtained through education to obtain evidence about the need for deeper faith. Devotion could increase by contact with peers and different types of media, and this could happen irrespective of social status and future prospects. To summarize this section, the family in early socialization is clearly important in transmitting Islamic values. However, while the child may internalize these values, it does not automatically follow that the individual becomes a praxisitioner; indeed, it would appear offsprings' piety can fluctuate and often exceed their parents'. Otherwise praxism would remain static and the numbers of practicing Muslims would be equal to or less than the population increase.

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Consequently, for most of the praxisitioners, other agents were involved, in particular friends, other Muslims, and theological materials that became important in creating or reinforcing Islamic devotion. From this we can tentatively argue that generally families are instrumental in introducing the child to Islam but this alone is insufficient for the offspring to become a praxisitioner. They need further reinforcement that peers and books and other types of media provide. This appears to go beyond de Vaus' (1983) observation that peers may be almost as significant as the family in determining religious behavior because the praxisitioners' friends are at least as important, if not more so, in the formation of specifically praxist values and practices. Support can also be found for Weiss Ozorak's (1989) comment, however, that believers would change their peers rather than change their beliefs because interviewees appeared to choose friends with similar values even if the levels of practice may initially differ. Following the discussion in Chapter 5, the role of teachers in transmitting beliefs also needs to be taken into account. Peers were not therefore changing general beliefs but were assisting in the development of more intensive, devout faith that was allied to the practice required of a praxisitioner. What appears at first glance to be a unilinear process, dictated at birth for many, becomes a complex interaction between various agents and, as I shall highlight shortly, contextual events. Consequently the evolution of socialization processes within Turkey and changes in the roles of agents in particular, discussed in preceding chapters, have had a dramatic effect on praxisification. For comparative purposes, secularists' responses to questions about changes in faith are now examined. Have Your Beliefs about Religion Changed? (If the Interviewee Answers Yes, Then) When and Why Did Your Beliefs Change? A limited number4 of secularists considered that their originally devout religious beliefs had significantly changed to the extent they became agnostic. These examples of secularization processes are limited but support the relevance of the points raised earlier. In particular, processes of praxisification do not simply entail introduction to Muslim tenets but require legitimization and support that were not present in these examples. On the contrary, these interviewees had a number of negative experiences that had been attributed to weaknesses in Islam and which the new ideologies, Marxism and Western-styled secular democracy, promised to resolve. Clearly praxisification, especially for educated people, cannot just be the result of being introduced to Islamic tenets, because these respondents would have been much more likely to become praxisitioners than secularists because of their religious upbringing. There must be more to the process than just being informed about the ideology. The following section starts to identify what else is required, namely, evidence and the incompatibility problem.

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Belief Reinforcement Other studies have rightly argued that structural factors are an integral part in the contemporary praxist resurgence. Support for these factors can be found in the reasoning provided by praxisitioners for the rise in Islam. The following questions were developed to explore these factors further, particularly in light of the incompatibility problem identified in the previous chapter and to provide information about the importance of events and experiences in processes of reinforcement. Certain Events and Experiences in England, Turkey or Elsewhere in the World Have Reinforced Your Beliefs? In the responses,5 the praxisitioners all stated that their beliefs had been reinforced by particular events and experiences. One interviewee referred to the helpfulness of Islam in providing support (for homesickness) and also pointed to the strengthening of his faith through increased activism. This is developed by another praxisitioner who identified the ability to be allowed to pray freely. Nature and its association with Allah were also identified as factors in the strengthening of belief. If the comments are examined more generally, two categories emerge. The first group had their beliefs reinforced through comparing their values and lifestyles with those of the indigenous British population. They decided that while the British may be wealthy "they are not happy" and while there are "some good things...bad things are more." The second and most popular response mentions international affairs where "there are many bad things done to Muslims." "Bosnia, Palestine, Azerbeijan, Kashmir....These countries Muslims were destroyed by non-Muslims and non-Muslim countries do nothing for them." They "watch news and see Muslims dead. West do not care unless have oil." Within this response, the significance of modern media communications, discussed in Chapter 5, is further confirmed, helping "shrink" the world, creating a "globalization of issues," and able to inform peoples throughout the world about current affairs. As Haynes (1994: 2-3) remarked when discussing the 1990-1991 Gulf War, "because of Iraq's status as a country with a large number of Muslims...and because of the ability of television, radio and newspapers to penetrate and spread information and ideas to every area of the globe very quickly, there were spontaneous demonstrations of support for Saddam Hussein in virtually every country with a substantial Muslim population." The responses highlighted the importance of unique experiences that reinforce belief (e.g., freedom to pray and comparative analysis with the British) being allied to the public events that have influenced many Muslims' interpretative contexts (e.g., the perceived destruction of Muslims on a global scale). The interplay between individual actions and public arena reflects again the totality of Islam, while emphasizing the importance of both the individual and public context in belief formation and retention. Praxisitioners were therefore able to draw on their comprehensive frame of reference to interpret individual and social events and in the process strengthen their faith. It is within this frame of

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reference that attacks against al-Qa'ida, the Taliban and "global terrorism" need to be examined. In the short term the attacks have successfully achieved some objectives. However, the acts have also provided further legitimization for praxisitioners and many less radical Muslims who witness the contradictions between American actions against Muslims, including the 2003 war against Iraq and apparently unconditional support for Israeli attacks. Important differences can be noted with secularists' experiences and subsequent interpretations. By comparison with praxisitioners, the secularists were split in responding to the question. Less than half of the respondents decisively agreed that events and experiences had reinforced their beliefs. One critical response was from a socialist who used his knowledge of foreign events, learned through the media, to strengthen his ideological views. A number of the comments raised were, however, very similar to the praxist remarks on the role of public events. The other affirmative answers are split between opinions expressing: 1. The comparable superiority of England, and thus one presumes Western secularisation. 2. Sentiments that echo the adage "absence makes the heart grow fonder." The views of some secularists about Turkey have been strengthened through absence. The relative lack of events and experiences in reinforcing secular views perhaps develop on the point raised earlier about the internalization of beliefs. It emphasizes the conscious attention that praxisitioners pay to daily life and selfanalysis which they are able to use to legitimize their religion. This compares with the limited explanatory relevance of secular ideologies to contemporary life. These points are explored further in the following analysis about the respondents' beliefs6 while they had been living in England. While Studying in England, the Intensity of Your Beliefs Has Grown? The praxisitioners' responses could be split into two categories: First, those for whom the experience of living in England has not strengthened the intensity of their belief and second, praxisitioners who have found their faith has deepened. This group can be subdivided again into two: 1.

2.

The first subcategory stressed the positive experiences of freedom to pray, uniting Muslims from different nationalities, and witnessing examples of God's greatness. This social bonding would seem to discount the general relevance of anomie in the process of praxisification, when in England, because the praxisitioners' experienced support mechanisms from social contact with other believers. The other subcategory focused on the comparative deficiencies of British society, the lack of morals, and city deprivations in a manner similar to the previous question about events and experiences.

The secularist responses were not dissimilar to their praxist peers because most secularists identified weaknesses within England and some attributes within

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Turkey. Focus has also been placed by some secularists on how they can assist in the development of Turkey. A number of interviewees expressed an initial belief that Turkey's problems were self-inflicted, but there is perhaps a growing awareness that many problems are within the global system. The secular analysis has not, however, generally changed their faith in secularization or modernity. It seems feasible when we recall the apparent "deification" of Atatiirk, to find support in civic religion. This civic religion changes according to the sociohistorical context, but its roots can be found in the philosophical traditions of the Enlightenment and it lacks the rigidity and certainty of praxism. In concluding the responses to these two questions, it can be seen that the praxisitioners' beliefs had been supported and reinforced by their interpretations of local and global affairs and the existence of the incompatibility problem. This is because, as I argued earlier, Islam can provide explanations for much of contemporary life and if people are introduced to these interpretations, they can both delegitimize and legitimize systems at global and individual levels. The interweaving of legitimization and delegitimization leads to a circle of reinforcement based around the incompatibility problem. By contrast, secularists retained their beliefs but their experiences of England have ensured they do not uncritically accept Western ideologies and behavior. And in the case of left-wing secularists, experiences in England strengthened their ideological attacks on global capitalism. If these findings are linked to the previous analysis, then the resurgence of praxisitioners can be seen as partly the result of historical developments and continuous contemporary interactions; it is a social creation that reflects the time period, spatiality, and social relations and activities. Islamic precepts are socially learned and Muslims become conscious of historical representations through socialization. The incompatibility problem between Islamic and secular processes can be resolved only by replacing the secular with the Islamic at both local and global levels. The underlying motivational factor that leads praxisitioners to want to change the system is unclear, however, particularly in the case of interviewees who were succeeding under the secular system that they want to replace. To develop an earlier point, simply being aware of the incompatibility problem does not explain why people want to address it. MOTIVATION BEHIND PRAXISM In this section I argue that the concept of salvation is of central importance to help understand and explain the processes of motivation that led people to decide to confront the incompatibility problem and challenge the secular state. Routes to Salvation Since the establishment of the ummah during Muhammed's lifetime, the central problem for Muslims has been the attempts to translate the ideals of religious writings into reality.7 Indeed the roots of this dilemma can be traced to Muhammed's pragmatic relationship with his former detractors from Mecca and

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the willingness to accommodate the existing indigenous cultural norms within the emerging Islamic framework.8 Since then the implementation of the Shari'ah has become progressively more difficult as different schools of thought emerged, interpreting theological language that constantly evolved, within different cultural contexts and confronted by conditions and experiences that were not taken into account during the development of the religious tenets. Consequently within the Muslim world there have been considerable variations in beliefs and practices and invariably compromise between the comprehensive implementation of the Shari'ah and processes of accommodation between and within different groups and societies. These differences can be found within praxisitioners as shown by the multitude of Islamic groups found within Turkey and the world. These groups base their views on the earlier spiritual, economic, and political expansionism and develop ways to implement them within modern settings. They disagree about the extent of implementation, the balance between the traditional and modern, the reliance on Islamic methods and practices and those associated with the West, and how to transfer what is at present a private praxism into societal norms and values. Praxisitioners, however, agree that the contradictions between the theological ideal and the imperfect reality must be addressed. This means that practical ethics must be introduced that have implications for belief, for conduct in daily life, and for societal practices. I believe that the need to implement these changes and confront the incompatibility problem is the primary motivation for praxisitioners because they consider it the basis for salvation. The majority of contemporary Christians and more moderate Muslims are able to avoid this confrontation because they interpret theological doctrines to place greater emphasis on private morality and salvation in the "other world" and not economic and social regulations. Christianity generally is not a confrontational religion based on historical dominance, nor does it provide precepts for all activities. As a consequence, Christianity has generally been reduced to the private sphere, with limited public acts of worship and moral behavior required for access to the hereafter. In other words, because Christianity has only limited tenets it is much easier for the majority of believers to be aware of them and what is required to help toward gaining a place in heaven. Islam also stresses salvation, but departing (at death) from a good society can be a requirement for redemption according to some interpretations. The Qur'an (Surah 47, verse 7) states, "if you help [the cause] of Allah, He will help you and make firm your feet" and "Allah will make those who believe and do good enter gardens beneath which rivers flow; and those who disbelieve, enjoy themselves and eat as the beasts eat, and the fire is their abode" (Shakir 1988, 47: 12). A "parable of the garden" (heaven) is promised for "those guarding against evil" (Shakir 1988, 47:15). As the discussion about different Islamic interpretations indicated, however, there are also no universal rules for gaining salvation. The believer examining the Qur'an for guidance would need to ask, "How does one help Allah, guard against evil and do good?" The decision concerning what is required will depend on individual views about how far Islamic practices should be implemented within society. For the moderate Muslim this could mean practicing the five pillars

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because that is the extent of their faith and which she or he believes is appropriate. But for the praxisitioner with a much wider set of beliefs and practices, within an image of an Islamic totality, these statements will be interpreted as implementing Allah's word, in other words, introducing the Shari'ah and thus removing the secular regimes. Hence, praxisitioners who adhere to these tenets are under pressure to attain the moral and ethical standards interpreted within the Qur'an yet ignored by Western-influenced governments. Consequently praxisitioners may not depart from "a good society." But in these instances religious texts are interpreted to mean that individuals must strive to contribute toward improving society as part of the route toward salvation. As Murad has remarked from a praxist perspective, because Islam places considerable emphasis on salvation, one must motivate oneself to sacrifice on behalf of Allah and prove oneself through a "ceaseless striving to reshape self and society so as to attest to your witnessing" (Murad 1985a: 5). Therefore if salvation is to be achieved, practice must occur at individual and collective levels because it is an inner-worldly pursuit and cannot be achieved simply by individual contemplation or monastic withdrawal. Du Pasquier (1992) has also noted the centrality of salvation for Muslims, who address Allah in their ritual prayers as the "King of Judgement-day." This is part of the general Islamic stress on the temporary condition of humans in this world and the subsequent need to plan for everlasting life. As Mehmet (1990: 10) observed, "identity in this life is tentative; one fulfils one's real identity on the Final Day." Praxisitioners will use an Islamic totality as their frame of reference when assessing what is required. In this sense working toward the implementation of Islamic rule, at the expense of secular governments, can help secure both a decent society and personal salvation. This means that praxisitioners will assist in enhancing Islamic power within society. Many social actions can be interpreted as helping toward this spiritual goal, although they can be divided into two interdependent categories: 1. 2.

Behavior aimed at increasing the numbers of devout Muslims, through actions ranging from handing out leaflets to conversions, to jihad (struggle or effort to become a good Muslim or holy war), Behavior directed at bringing about social change. A multitude of actions can seek to achieve this, again reflecting the interpretation of Islam as a totality. They include all life activities that intend to enhance the position of Islam, ranging from leading by pious example to demanding that gender relations adhere to interpretations of the Qur'an to abolishing interest rates and overthrowing the secular state.

Obviously, even though praxist Islam can provide a guide to life, followers are not expected to partake in all activities directed toward achieving the implementation of the Shari'ah, because they are too extensive for one individual to undertake and it is impossible if living in a secular society. As Ibrahim (1980: 430) discovered during his study of Egyptian Islamic militants, however, to be a good Muslim (and thus improve the chances of salvation) one must see "that the will of God... is truly fulfilled at the collective level as well [it is not simply about individual spirituality] ...the righteous Muslim cannot exist individually; he must strive to build and maintain a righteous community of the faithful. Struggling to

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bring that about is the duty of every Muslim." And the Islamic scholar Murad (1985a: 14) picked on a similar theme, remarking that "time is our most precious commodity.. .is the first thing Allah demands of us. Every moment should be spent in seeking His pleasure, in fulfilling our commitment to Him....Remain everconscious that every moment in time, depending on how you choose to spend it, will turn into either eternal bliss or an endless misery. Remembering this will strengthen you most in sacrificing your time." The praxisitioner must use his or her time productively on behalf of Allah, for example, in the private contextuality of thoughts and the public arena to enhance the public presence of Islamic ideology. Looked at from this angle, the praxisitioner's time in this world is to be used primarily for the purpose of Allah, doing one's utmost to change the context to one governed by Muslim precepts, and in the process individual prospects for the other world are enhanced. Within this interpretation, the role of the ulema is limited because like Weber's Calvinists, Muslims do not have a mediator between themselves and God. The ulema "cannot promise or refuse salvation or grace, and the keys to hell or paradise are not in their hands" (Gilsenan 1992: 30). Historically, as Gellner (1981) pointed out, the tribal illiterate practitioners, of what he termed "folk religion," relied on the ulema to interpret and intervene on their behalf. But as tribalism as a way of life is increasingly broken down by modernization and more Muslims become increasingly educated, the role of the ulema is being reduced. This certainly applies to praxisitioners, especially from the Sunni branch of Islam, who as Ayubi (1991) noted are increasingly anticlerical because the ulema are seen to be too traditional in approach and too close to the secular regimes. Praxisitioners also differ from Calvinists because they do not need to look for signs of redemption; they believe they know what needs to be attained. They know "paradise is not the reward for the mere profession of the bargain [with Allah], it is the reward for the faithful execution of it" (Mawdudi 1986: 15). Praxism does, however, share with Calvinism the need to assess the social consequences of the quest to solve "salvational anxiety." Weber noted that "the moral conduct of the average man was...deprived of its planless and unsystematic character and subjected to a consistent method for conduct as a whole" (Weber 1992: 117), and attempts "to bring his actions under constant self-control with a careful consideration of their ethical consequences" (p. 119). Both theologies stress the "necessity of proving one's faith in worldly activity" (p. 121). Praxisitioners possess greater control over their perceived destiny, however. Although Allah knows everything, including people's behavior, individuals affect the decision to be made on the Day of Judgment. This decision has already been predetermined for Calvinists, who subsequently had no impact on the decision and experienced greater psychological insecurity. Weber's "elective affinity" is also relevant to the analysis, because it provides a further example of the influential secularization paradigm discussed in the Introduction. By using this concept, Weber described the relationships between social groups and the set of beliefs they held and stated that "other things being equal, classes with high social and economic privilege will scarcely be prone to evolve the idea of salvation" (1985: 27). In this respect, the roots of some

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contemporary secular analysis can be traced that argue poorer groups are attracted to religion and the prospect of an eternal life leads the suppressed to accept their lives on earth. This study finds clear evidence that Islam appeals to a wide cross section, including the specific case study of educated students who are relatively privileged. Rather than using religion primarily to legitimize their good fortune, as Weber would expect, the members of this group have interpreted Islam to be the route to salvation, possibly at the expense of their "good fortune" which is rooted within the system that they want to change. Consequently a "theodicy of disprivilege" cannot generally apply to praxisitioners. The seemingly paradoxical stance of relatively successful people challenging the system in which their success is based is motivated by the activist belief in salvation. It must also be significant for other groups that appear under modernization arguments to be motivated solely through self-preservation or pragmatic reasoning. I do not discount these factors, but we need to acknowledge that the appeal of religion, particularly an all-embracing interpretation of Islam, is not limited to the material world. There are people who genuinely believe in the existence of deities and an afterlife, and their actions need to be considered alongside their perceptions. This is not to say that the contemporary context is irrelevant in the process. On the contrary, the preceding chapters have been designed to develop the interplay between the historical development of Islam and the contemporary experiences of Muslim societies and individuals who have combined to play such a crucial part in the motivation of praxisitioners. This interplay revolves around a circle of reinforcement that serves both to represent the superiority of Islam and the moral and ideological bankruptcy of the West. The need to change this is one of the fundamental aspects of praxism within secular societies. It should be stressed that this is not change for the sake of change per se or simply to improve individual economic prospects or cultural behavior but as part of a wider process translating beliefs into societal practices that help improve chances for salvation. Believers must seek to affect both private and public agendas, and providing they do their utmost to bring about the ummah, their chances of immediate acceptance into heaven will be enhanced, even if their attempts at structural change are ultimately unsuccessful. The Paradox: Academic Success and the Demand for Change In this section, the relevance of salvation as a motivational force is established and interviewee interpretations and experiences of the praxisification process are developed further in response to a number of questions. The set of questions begin by addressing the apparent paradox of successful praxisitioners wanting to change the system.

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One of Your Earlier Comments Referred to You Succeeding in the Turkish System [Included in Chapter 6]. Do You See Any Contradiction between Your Success and the Need to Change the System? All the interviewees9 denied any contradiction leading to the follow-up question. Why Do You Want to Change the System When You Are Obviously Doing Well in It? Two different points emerge from the praxisitioners' responses.10 First, the apparent paradox is confronted as praxisitioners state, "I successive in nonIslamic system but successive not because of anything to do with non-Islamic way but due to Islamic way followed." Under this interpretation, the success is due to Islamic practice and despite, not because of, the secular system. Using Bourdieu's (1977) concept of "cultural capital," it can be argued that individuals' Islamic culture provided the support, targets, and resources that were translated into academic success in an arena that would appear conducive to failure. In these examples, holding ideological beliefs that contradict the dominant state values has obviously not prevented academic success. Following the discussion of teachers' beliefs we can tentatively argue that the praxisitioners' success is not totally surprising, because while they may hold cultural values at odds with the wider state, they share similar values with many of the state officials disseminating the messages. The second type of response addresses the need to change the system and highlights the contradictions between internalized ideology and reality: the incompatibility problem. This common theme is represented as "we must change system...not living as we believe." Examples where reality does not meet ideological expectations include economics, morality, social behavior, cultural appearance, crime, sexual relations, "self and community and Government," and the global challenge. For praxisitioners, Turkey is failing in these areas according to interpretations of Islamic discourse, and this can be rectified only by a change in system. Academic and professional success is therefore irrelevant to the demand for change, because the demand would continue to exist irrespective of individuals' economic performance and status. This means that rather than the demand for change being limited to the socially and economically excluded, and then only for as long as the period of exclusion lasts, it will ultimately be dropped only if the circle of reinforcement is broken or if the system is transformed into an Islamic state. For the praxisitioner this extreme option would, providing the alternative was based on their interpretations of the Shari'ah, resolve the problems they consider currently exist within Turkey and ultimately beyond. The final question develops the linkage between the need to address the incompatibility problem and salvation.

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By Helping to Change the System You Are Improving Your Chances of Salvation. Is This Correct? In this final set of responses11 the praxisitioners are united by the underlying motivation behind their activism. Salvation provides the motivation to want to bring about change. A number of common sentiments emerge from the interviews: change, love, practice, belief, and the existence of role models for behavior that are all leading to the decision on the Day of Judgment. By assisting in bringing the word of Allah to reality, to "help with change and you help Allah," the individual is "building up savings for Day of Judgment." When the Day of Judgment arrives, and the life of the deceased is analyzed to determine the next destination, the chances of immediately going to heaven will be increased by this kind of activism. However, "changing state is not enough on own, must also practise." Religion is the basis for the praxisitioners' daily conduct and provides the practical ethics on which to base behavior. Therefore, through interweaving faith and activities, the praxisitioners, according to the interpreted demands of Islamic doctrine, are enhancing their chances in the afterlife. Consequently I am inclined to disagree with GbTe's (1997: 58) claim that the more Islamists acquire a professional identity "the more the realms of the sacred and profane will be separated." I conclude that the more exposure praxisitioners have to profane realms the greater the evidence of the incompatibility problem and the stronger the circle of reinforcement becomes. The need to ensure that religion and society are inherently interwoven is part of the route to salvation. This central belief in salvation is the underlying motivation for all Islamic praxisitioners, and this leads to many confronting the system in which they are succeeding at both a public and private level. Turkey is a secular state, so praxisitioners "cannot practise as it says in Qur'an. How can I practise like this in this country? It is impossible." If praxisitioners were unable to help resolve this problem, then their chances of salvation would be seriously diminished and Weber's "salvation anxiety" would be of immense relevance. In this instance, they would know what is expected, but it would be beyond them and they would have no theological intermediaries to negotiate on their behalf. Because they interpret the Shari'ah to offer guidance about how to behave in such circumstances, however, salvational anxiety is not the problem it was for Weber's Calvinists. This is because praxisitioners believe that there is an onus on them to be proactive but if they are born into a secular society, then they cannot be blamed. Similarly a place in heaven is not dependent on leaving an Islamic state, because to introduce such a society may not be possible at that time and, again, this would unfairly penalize the individual. Salvation is, however, partly dependent on contributing toward bringing about such a society, to "help with change," to "do good for Allah," and by "leading other people by showing good example." The individual must practice wherever possible and where it is not possible must assist in making it possible. To paraphrase Weber, "the spirit of praxism... has to fight its way to supremacy against a whole world of hostile forces" (1992: 56) and in the process alleviate "salvational anxiety." It can therefore be concluded that the apparent paradox of successful individuals

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wanting to change the system, in which they are being successful, is an attempt to introduce Islamic structures as part of one's duties toward gaining salvation. And while it can be argued that other, less well educated praxisitioners are not potentially making the same profane sacrifices, there is no evidence to suggest that salvation and not personal gain is the ultimate motivation for their faith. CONCLUSION For praxisitioners the demand to change the system is not irrational, paradoxical, or short term as modernization theorists may argue. The resurgence is likely to be a long-term phenomenon, linked to the length of time that societal and global systems and processes are considered to be conflictual. Neither are individual circumstances an isolated yet universal factor behind the resurgence. Underlying the confrontation is the motivational force of salvation that is inspiring challenges against perceived inappropriate structures, activities, and relations to help improve praxisitioners' chances in the afterlife. In this sense the sacred and profane are integrated. And while this was found to be the case for educated praxisitioners, it is expected that similar levels of motivation will be found for different groups of praxisitioners. Other groups may have more pragmatic reasons for supporting praxism, but they all, by the very nature of their beliefs, must be motivated to act by salvation. It will be recalled from Chapter 2 when the origins of Islam were discussed that the main doctrines and scriptures have existed for centuries. The Shari'ah was implemented 1,400 years ago, yet only now has the praxist resurgence become noticeable. It is clear why people are confronting the secular state, but we cannot explain why they are doing so now. This can be achieved only by synthesizing the dimensions that have been discussed throughout the different chapters into a coherent framework. The framework established in the concluding chapter will enable us to understand and explain the contemporary nature and crosscutting appeal of praxism. NOTES 1. The praxist responses to the questions, "From the comments you have made so far, you appear to be a practising Muslim [check the interviewee agrees]. When did you start to believe in Islam? Why and who was influential in the process? At what age did you start to pray five times per day?" were: "Of course, our parents say we pray together, born into Islam. Especially my grandfather and also grand-grandmother want us to follow Islam. They believe God. They took me to prayer ceremonies, mosques and told us we have to learn some sentences for some parts of the Qur'an." He started to pray between the ages of 6 and 8 when he also began to learn the Qur'an. "Yes of course. When I was a child. My mother and grandfather influential because they sent me to religious school when I was a child. Attached to mosque. Before starting primary school and aged five and ten I always go to such places especially at weekends and go after school...sent to religious school and in my environment a lot of people with strong relationship in religion. They influence me. And I read Qur'an,

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loved religious songs, when I angry or unhappy they help me. My mother did not give me information about religion but everyday she prayed. Mother did not have much information about Qur'an but my grandfather did have. Grandfather did not say 'you have to go there or there' but he advised me and gave me information about my religion." He started to pray aged fourteen. "The whole of my family are Muslims, so I born a Muslim, living in Muslim society, all my family important." He started to pray aged twelve. "Yes, born Islam, born a Muslim, all family we Muslim." In response to the question about praying he replied, "I started in childhood but only seriously pray during my first degree." "Yes, of course. I born Muslim, my family are Muslim." He started to pray aged about 12. "I am a Muslim....At birth, all around me are Muslims. Parents are Muslims." In response to the pray question the interviewee replied, "start training at seven years. By ten pray independently." "I was born Muslim...all family are Muslim." He started to pray aged 12. After initially querying the feasibility of practicing in a secular society, the respondent agreed he practiced within the structural constraints and said "in Turkey, most people was born into Islamic family. It is learnt, Islamic belief. After that if people do not read Islamic books to improve knowledge, maybe displaced or misled. Also I reading books." [Did anyone recommend these books?] "Friends and teachers." When asked when he started to pray he replied "properly, nineteen." The respondent queried the idea of practicing in a secular society, for "if you believe you must do what it said." After explaining that I meant practicing within the structural restraints, the student agreed he did practice. "Especially when I think when 13, 14. I read about different religions these situations [everyday life] effect me. I believe God more and more after this thinking. Everything is useful, everything is designed for people." Replying to the question about praying the interviewee replied "13, 14 then I stop until 22-23 when I believe I should pray." "Yes, I born a Muslim, everyone in my family a Muslim." Interviewee began praying aged 12. Another respondent questioned his ability to fully achieve this in a secular society but when I clarified this, he referred to practicing within the structural constraints he agreed and stated, "when I leave home to boarding school. I learn more about Islam. I learn to practice." The people influential in the process were identified earlier in the interview when he identified older friends at boarding school as people he respected, for "they care about me at that time. They able to solve my problems, teach me how to behave. For example, they teached me how to pray." This answer was also provided for the question concerning changes in devotion. The student began praying five times, aged 14. "I born a Muslim. My family are Muslims. They teach me. They tell me about Islam but they do not practise this." He started to pray five times per day aged 15. "I always been a Muslim. In Turkey everyone is a Muslim. We taught this by our parents. My grandparents also tell me this." The interviewee commenced praying aged 12.

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"I born a Muslim. My family Muslim. They tell me. Show me books." The interviewee commenced praying five times per day aged between seven and eight. 2. The secularist responses to "When did you first hold these [secular] beliefs? Why and who was influential in the process?" were: "I started to think, read a lot of books. At university, some economic problems, not enough money to study, difficulties with money. I believed in religion, but there is a limitation of religion. If we worked in factory, or some other place, some earn money, some less money. This not equal. When family earned less money, there was not enough to survive. I think that I changed my mind. I had to gain or make some money. So I changed my relationship with religion it is too limited, it is less. Also there is some disagreement in Qur'an, from some views." "I always hold these beliefs I think....Atattirk, he change many things to make Turkey modern. He finished Ottoman Empire and caliphate. Separated Government and religion. He could have said T be King or sultan' but he said 'no.' I think this way is logical for me. It is like 2 + 2 for me." "During my university education. We had foreign students in communications who impressed me. Also Kemal Atatiirk, main reason him. He was first architect of modern Turkey. Before went to university, want to create and apply same ideas so he first for me. It is logical and also I saw different people, with different beliefs from me. According to my mind, mine is best after comparison." "At university, my beliefs became stronger. My father influential in this." "When I was at university, I suppose." "After High School, and maybe before....Maybe parents affected me, as my parents feel same as me. University teachers also good. They see two ways." "I read each sides. When I finished BA, I said middle as exactly right is not good, exactly left is not good." "When I was aged 19 I went to university. Before this I was a Muslim. I taught this by my family. At university I think about things. Islam could not help. For example, when I aged five, my mother died and my life very hard. I think Islam help but it did not. I learn at university to think for myself." [Did anyone help you?] "My friends show me how to enjoy. Also they show me modern books." "I have always thought this." [Was anyone influential in the process?] "Of course, my parents teached me many things." "Fourteen/fifteen. When I young I not think about life. But when I older Ozal in power and peoples say 'he is very good' but this was not. He make some peoples very rich but many peoples very poor." "I think when I go to lycee. For example, I learn much about Turkey and also world." 3. The praxisitioners comments to the statement "Have the levels of your devotion changed. Why?" were: "Yes, because we could not be in a religious environment, after leaving my family. But in university, we had a group, friends which are following rules. I followed some rules, but not others. But in England, I always want to follow rules, it is not possible to follow all, but in England I follow as many as possible, as I can." "No I do not think so." "Yes, as I grow older, I think devotion levels changed. Devotion it is more committed to Islam and to doing what is commanded by Allah. It is natural as you grow older, seek something, mix more with other Muslims." "I think so. Started praying five times when exposed to more Islam. Friends were practising and influenced me. Also they reading materials so I increased my reading and followed their example."

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"I believe. Reading and listening and observing has grown my belief. Also comparing other religions." "Yes. As I get older, I get more aware of my responsibilities to Allah." "I think so. For example, as get older start to think about afterlife and to prepare." "At High school, beliefs stronger, compared with before. When I was at high school, in last year, I have six friends in my group. Always we together. Go to coffee house play poker. We very close. Of course, we weren't praying, at that time. Just fasting and of course I believed in Allah. We had weakness. After sometime, end of 1988, we were debating about Islam, they said 'there is no Allah.' I said there was, they said 'where is your proof I was amazed. I tried to explain, tried to convince but I couldn't. This conversation lasted one week. After this conversation I called to them, I amazed about their ideas but I do not know what to do. On the last day, if I can prove that there is Allah and there will be life after death, and Muhammed is real prophet, and Qur'an is Allah's book, not Muhammed's and Angel is real not false. If I can prove do you believe. They say we will believe, and they say if you cannot will you believe our ideas. After thinking I said to them 'give me one month and I will search library, and ask my friends and teachers and learn exactly.' I left them after that, I could not speak to them. I were not doing anything for 15 to 20 days. How could I do it? I do not know. Although I studied at Imam-Hatip I do not know anything. At Imam-Hatip it is given, taught how to pray, read Qur'an, memorize knowledge of Islam not evidence. Later, a friend of mine had evidence of proof, and I asked for strong Islamic book to prove Allah. He gave me that book and showed me paragraph. I read but did not understand anything. I was very hopeless and I was sad. My friend said there was a conversation of Islam but I was very weak and ignored his offer. Staying at dorm at this time, there was heating system for bath once per week. That week heating system was broken and we went to public bathroom. I wash and see believers praying. I impressed by their strength and after bath came back to dorm and I wanted to pray. I found him and wanted to go to Islam conversation with friends. I liked them very well, only about Islam, not political, not against humanity. Just Allah. About proving this, I went regularly after this, once per week. After that I started to pray. But after three months I could prove Allah, that Muhammed did not write Qur'an and there is life after death. And I was proud to prove. I went next to them and I said I could prove you now but they said 'we don't need your voice, please do not speak about that topic, we do not want to listen, we do not want to learn.' After that time, I read about 60 books about proving there is Islam. There is Allah, you must believe, but logical evidence there is Allah but must explain why must be Allah. There is life after death, must explain why must be life after death. I do not read much now, I cannot unfortunately now but I want to read. I can improve now." [This story is surprising considering your father is an Imam.] "I lived separately from my family for ten year, since 1985. My father does not explain, or my father does not teach. He is praying, my mother is praying also but not like a teacher to us." "I think so. For example...I had some questions and the Qur'an, it answered the questions. For example, there is a tree, why, there is a cow why? Qur'an answers." "It has grown, more I know more I have to practise." "Of course, as I just say. Friends help me, show me how Muslim behaves. After this.. .1 practise more. Now I know much about Islam so must practise." "Of course, I see many things. This make devotion stronger." [What kind of things?] "For example, I see bad things. I think about Islam and good things. Shows me which is best. Must follow Islam for good."

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"Yeah. For example, I have always been a Muslim but sometimes I not practice. Since I go to university I always practise." [Why did you change] "I read more, I understand more about Islam. My friends also help me. Some know very much and explain to me 'you must practise.' They also show me important books. They [Books] help me understand....They [friends] were right. I must practise." "When I go to university I at first stop. For example, I have new friends who do not pray. We do not practise but I do not like this. My friends could not explain bad things. They only see good things and say this means laicism is very good. I meet other friends. I start to pray again." [When was this?] "When I was twenty. I pray and Islam can explain bad things. I think 'why is it raining...why am I in England?' Only Islam can explain this." 4. The affirmative answers by secularists to the question, "Have your beliefs about religion changed? When and why did your beliefs change?" were: "Up to university I went to mosque. Then after thinking, changed my mind." For this question, two interviewees referred to comments made in the previous section that are also repeated here. "I started to think, read a lot of books. At university, some economic problems, not enough money to study, difficulties with money (after father died). I believed in religion, but there is a limitation of religion. If we worked in factory, or some other place, some earn money, some less money. This not equal. When family earned less money, there was not enough to survive. I think that I changed my mind. I had to gain or make some money. So I changed my relationship with religion it is too limited, it is less. Also there is some disagreement in Qur'an, from some views." "When I was aged 19 I went to university. Before this I was a Muslim. I taught this by my family. At university I think about things. Islam could not help. For example, when I aged five, my mother died and my life very hard. I think Islam help but it did not. I learn at university to think for myself." [Did anyone help you?] "My friends show me how to enjoy. Also they show me modern books." 5. Responses to the statement, "Certain events and experiences in England, Turkey or elsewhere in the world have reinforced your (ideological) beliefs?": Praxisitioners Agreed. "For example, religious beliefs and practices are better. Homesick for friends and parents, need Islam." Strongly agreed. "For example, daily life. I went two days ago to pub and saw that lot of young people always drink alcohol. Some people take drugs. Why? As do not have any release. In my opinion such people have to believe in some rules. They do not, they worry and so take drinks, drugs for example...some good things but bad things are more. Homeless people T am hungry' it is very bad, many people like this. Many people need help." Agreed. "Events show how now can learn from past. Daily events show this. For example, Middle East conflict shows Western powers do not respect other peoples." Agreed. "For example, Grozny and Bosnia. Also when meeting other Muslims to discuss Islam and events to maintain beliefs." Agreed. "I here can pray at university. It is no problem but it is in Turkey. Sometimes allowed at university, others not." Strongly agreed. "Compared with non-Muslims here, even though wealthy they are not happy." Strongly agreed. "Watch news and see Muslims dead. West do not care about this unless have oil."

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Agreed. "Bosnia, Palestine, Azerbeijan, Kashmir. These wars, these countries Muslims were destroyed by non-Muslims and non-Muslim countries do nothing for them. Saw some Muslim countries suffering. Kuwait, America rescued Kuwait from Iraq because of lot of oil reserve. But Bosnia since 1991, no country could help because there is no oil reserve, no nuclear energy, precious stones. Nothing valuable. So that this is being done to Muslims." Agreed. "In Turkey, for example, I think why is the world created. I saw a cow, they give us milk, cow does not protest. Everything do not protest, only humans use everything. Shows Allah's world." Agreed. "For example, Bosnia, how can this happen? West watches, this should not happen I think. Shows Muslims must do more...cannot rely on West." Agreed. "There are many bad things done to Muslims. For example, in Bosnia, peoples need help but West do nothing. Muslims should do more I think, cannot rely on West I believe." Strongly agreed. "When I see other peoples. I compare with Muslims. They not happy. Islam is much better." Agreed. "When I read about Islam I can explain what is happening....Ottoman Empire shows what Islam can do." Strongly agreed. "Of course. Everywhere shows the glory of God. For example, in England I meet other Muslims from many parts of the world. This is good. I see snow and sun. I see new places. Only Islam can explain this." Secularists: Strongly disagreed. Undecided. Undecided. Strongly agreed. "Before came here, strongly believed in living abroad. Hated people in Turkey. Cultural levels very low in comparison with England, where give value to thoughts. After came here, want to work in Turkey not abroad. Also went to Pakistan for training for scholarship. They very hospitable, changed my opinion....Also I am homesick, I miss my home." Undecided/Agreed. "For example, many things here I like but my fondest for Turkey has grown. There are good values in Turkey as well. Good values for each." Undecided. Agreed. "When I live here and saw English people living and can compare between two. In Turkey, people living like this and here like this. In England, seems living better." Agreed. "Since I came to England I see many things that is better than Turkey." Undecided. Strongly agreed. "Many unfair experiences. For example, I see poor peoples killed in Bosnia and Grozny. If rich peoples killed West helps them. For example in Kuwait but these peoples have no oil so West does not care." Agreed. "Until now I never leave Turkey. Now I see other countries have problems. I want to help Turkey with problem. Also in England I see many good things. In Turkey we need these things." 6. Responses to "While studying in England, the intensity of your beliefs has grown?" Praxisitioners: Agreed. "For example, when we came here the month was Ramadan so religious belief was reinforced because of Ramadan. We are in like this Christian country and we are Muslims and I have prayer. Living here it is affecting me."

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Strongly agreed. "I saw behaviour of English daily, reinforces belief as they have no moral belief." Strongly disagreed as beliefs remain the same. Disagreed as beliefs remain the same. Strongly agreed. "My other Turkish friends also more religious than before. In Turkey, we have family, friends, for example, do not think clearly. Here people are alone. No pressure, no anti-religious propaganda. If say I am a Muslim, I must behave as Muslim with God's help." Strongly agreed. "Experiences of praying with others and seeing all seasons shows God's greatness." Strongly agreed. "If love God, makes us believe. Prayers with other nationalities. These experiences shows God's greatness. Allah decided we meet. All decided by God." Disagreed as belief intensity remains the same. Undecided. Agreed. "I go to city and see much goods and also see much poor peoples. They are together. Also other many things are bad. For example, drugs, unmarried mothers, crime and much alcohol." Undecided. Agreed. "I suppose. Here we can pray, always together with other Muslims. Meet other Muslims." Agreed. "I like chance to meet other Muslims. All meet in prayer. Discuss Islam. I stronger in knowledge now." Disagreed. Secularists Strongly disagreed. Undecided. Undecided. Agree. "People working towards specific goal, make Britain higher level. In Turkey, everyone thinks about own welfare. This is the reason Turkey is very low. For example, MPs think about themselves. Our country needs talents like me, to be more useful for my country. There is an increased awareness of what can be achieved." Undecided. Strongly agreed. "Before I came to England, I had not been to another country. Just see on TV. After I came here, maybe two/three months. First miss family and friends. In English class, meet other nationalities and my mind is opened, good to know their culture, their politics. I like here. It is interesting." Agreed. "In some cases I like life in England, everyone is free and living better. But some problems. For example, I do not like children are guilty under 15. They are not law." Agreed. "For example, I look at peoples here and they look good. Have good time. In Turkey peoples are scared to do this." Undecided. Agreed. "In England many peoples are rich. But I walk in streets and see many peoples sleeping in streets." Agreed. The interviewee repeated his comments to the previous statement. "Until now I never leave Turkey. Now I see other countries have problems. I want to help Turkey with problem. Also in England I see many good things. In Turkey we need these things." 7. Ruthven (1984) explores this point in some detail.

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8. These points are developed by Ahmed (1992). 9. The two most expansive answers to "Do you see any contradiction between your success and the need to change the system?" were: "No, my family worked very hard, good Muslims paid for me to go through school [nonreligious] but I succeeded due to Muslim influence." "No, why should I not want change if I am not happy with system?" 10. The responses to "Why do you want to change the system when you are obviously doing well in it?" were: "Normal people like me, my father, my mother, believe their beliefs, we are always doing rules, we do this, this is our destiny. But some of us want more change because we have very, very strong beliefs and must get things done." "The people of Turkey have different level of belief. Demirel says always live by Islam but he does not. He is a bad man. Bad things for Turkey. He is still there. He supported by Western countries, USA and England. These people sometimes go to mosque to pray, but not enthusiastic, just to promote party. If these people have real belief they do not do bad things. In Turkey, if you are intelligent person, can earn a lot of money but other people do not earn a lot of money. For example, 15 percent to 20 percent high standard and other part live low standard. Such people do not do bad things. Other people do anything, whatever they want for money. If Islam come to Turkey, this would be stopped, standard of living would be very high. Now very low. More Islam needed to improve standard of living." [But presumably when you are a lecturer, you will have a high standard of living anyway?] "Of course, but Islam not for just one people, all peoples should have share." "I think need to change thinking and values. I do not mean change science and technology but mix with religion. Need religious morality, to be complete person, in your self and also community at large." "I successive in non-Islamic system but successive not because of anything to do with non-Islamic way but due to Islamic way followed. This is the way to follow." "Because every man who has a belief wants to apply the belief. It is a man's main belief. If I want pray I pray. If woman wants to cover hair then should be let to do. Society not improved. Need to improve attitudes for self, and community and Government." "Need to change to be able to compete with rest of world." "We must change system. For example, Turkey now laicist, not Muslim. Not living as we believe." "For example, more people drinking. Alcohol affects people's minds, many bad things. In England, girlfriend like wife. This also happening in Turkey. These are bad things, must be stopped. Also my family, very poor, many people are very poor, every poor children desires good job but not much chance. Need to change for them." "In my opinion, lately money is very important material for peoples. In my opinion, money is mediator, but money is not important. All of the world under money effects. People, humans should share things. People must learn to share things. You do not lose anything to give, you learn a lot of things." "I see need for change. Turkey is copying bad ways of West. We do not need to change technology but bad things. For example, morality." "Because when you look at Islam, have to look at whole, have whole. For example, economics, must be free and arrange according to its fair economic rules. For example, Islam offers a way of social fairness. For example, Zakat, when rich give 2.5 percent income. Also something's certainly harmful now for people, for example, alcohol, gambling, killing other people, theft."

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"I do well but many peoples do badly. Many peoples need help." [Where will the help come from?] "Islam helps all peoples. This is good. For example, we must change bad things. Help peoples." "I successful. But the system is not good. This is Western. In Turkey we have always been Muslim. Atatiirk changes this says 'we must be Western.' But Turkey can only be successful if Muslim. I successful because I am Muslim not because of system." "Why should I not. I do well because I am a Muslim. When I stop praying I do not do well. Everyone do well when more Muslim." 11. The responses to "By helping to change the system you are improving your chances of salvation. Is this correct?" were: "Yes, if you die you will go to heaven if you do this. But changing state is not enough on own, must also practice." "It is correct." "Yes, definite. Because you are talking about our next life, permanent life. In order to gain this, must work hard, meet yourself. Your whole life includes prayer, conduct with people, conduct in governing the country do everything of what Islam asks us to do. If you meet yourself totally in the word of Allah, you are assured of your place in paradise." "Yes, definitely yes. Only difference is the intensity of the yes. For many, main purpose is salvation. I want to do it. I would like to be fundamentalist but because of my education and family for example, could not leave to go to Bosnia, although if I die I believe I will go to heaven....All Muslims who go to Bosnia will go to heaven, if they die and families will be taken care of." "Yes, I think peoples free to make choice. Some peoples do not understand Qur'an. Follow wrong way. But must improve attitudes in self, and community and Government. Do not imitate other identities...good to take some ideas but not exactly imitate, leave bad." "Yes, I think so. Building up savings for Day of Judgement. If you love God, need something to present to him to show love. Also through prayers and belief and practice we are preparing for death, leading other people by showing good example." "By seeking to change system, am showing love for Allah, doing as he asked and if we do good for Allah, it will help us on the Day of Judgement." "I hope so." "Yes, help with change and you help Allah." "Definitely, you are responsible for what you do. Also responsible for community at large. Everything you do will be shown on Day of Judgement. For example, you must do the word of Allah." "I believe this. Must show love of Allah. Believe and practise to show love ready for Day of Judgement." "Yes I think. Must help Allah in many things. These will be shown on Day of Judgement." "Of course. Muslims must try increase influence of Islam....Also we must practise word of Allah." "Only Allah knows this. No guarantee. But it is true. If you are good Muslim it is more likely."

8

Explaining the Resurgence: Concluding Beyond Exclusion and Toward Inclusion INTRODUCTION In this final chapter I want to provide a new explanation for the contemporary Islamic resurgence within a broad framework that enables the appeal of Islam across socioeconomic groups and aspirations to be understood. It is intended to extend the focus beyond explanations that are grounded in secular and modernization rationale. There has been too much attention on the significance of modernization or more explicitly its interrelated consequences. There is no dispute that modernization does create considerable problems for many people in terms of economic livelihood, prospects, and cultural ways of behaving and is linked to a subsequent increase in religiosity. However, these behavioral patterns were expected to follow experiences of the West, be short term, and be limited to extremes as part of the overwhelming process of secularization that is interwoven within the Western-inspired route to modernization. Studies of radical Islam have tended to portray praxisitioners according to this criterion. Consequently analysis has concentrated on the materially vulnerable, peasants and bazaaris in regions that are opening up to modernization and displaced migrants who experience poverty and anomie in unfamiliar cities. As Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 outlined, however, Turkey has been gradually following the modernization route throughout its history. Yet it has generally been agreed that the process of praxisification is a more recent development. Consequently the relationship between modernization and praxisification has to be more complex; it is not simply about cause and effect. It is also important, as I mentioned previously, that the general focus of the resurgence and appeal of praxist Islam is extended to incorporate not only the wider sociohistorical context but also the groups that have not been excluded under secular criteria. To this end, educated

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praxisitioners have been used as a case study to illuminate the need for and to help develop a wider explanatory framework. The approach outlined here is based on the inherent link between religion, meaning, and the wider socioeconomic relations and activities and in particular the related dimensions of ideology, historical and contemporary contexts, socializing agents, and motivation. All these different elements are brought together by socialization and these processes are central to the identity formation of praxisitioners and of course secularists. More specifically there are crucial similarities and differences within socialization processes that are responsible for different types of identity formation. I conclude by proposing that this research helps to understand and explain the contemporary nature of praxism within a broader, inclusive framework. The chapter ends with a tentative attempt to extend the findings to Islam globally. IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION It has been argued that Islam can be an ideology that involves "definite notions of rightful authority, moral conduct, of the good society, of heaven on earth" (McLennan 1995: 123). This role has been legimitized for believers by historical evolution and involvement as the guide for a way of life. As the historical role also highlights, the religious multifunctional nature can both legitimize and threaten the social order. Ahmed (1992), Gole (1996), and Waxman (1998) have all commented that this perceived threat extends to cultural representations, most notably the veil, which is increasingly accorded political status as a symbol of resistance by both praxisitioners and secularists. This is not to claim that there is a generic Islam, partly because the religion is multifunctional and is subdivided into different schools, sects, and tribal, ethnic, and national interpretations. Praxisitioners possess common principles of faith and action, however, that have been revitalized and developed within different social contexts and in contact with a range of discourses that can be drawn on to threaten the secular fabric. These Muslims have been called praxisitioners because they combine theory and practice and want the secular state to be replaced with a theocracy. While the Islamic discourse is based on historical tenets and achievements, it would be a mistake to consider interpretations as necessarily a traditional challenge against modernity. As Waxman (1998: 13) has argued, "the clash between secularism and Islamism in Turkey...is not between modernity and tradition, but between two contrasting visions of modernity." As such, the Islamic resurgence is very much a product of its time, synthesizing the past and present into a view of the nature. Islamic meanings and systems are transmitted within socializing processes, and many individuals are now forming identities that revolve around these tenets to the exclusion of secular alternatives. Within these processes the metaphysical and material divide becomes blurred and even interwoven, leading to praxisitioners seeking to operationalize religious doctrines into societal structures. My findings draw me to conclude that for praxisitioners, irrespective of socioeconomic status, the nature of faith ensures that activities in the profane

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sphere are undertaken as part of interrelated duties for the sacred. Clearly there is a separation within secular societies, but for praxisitioners this has been artificially imposed and should be reversed so that as Arjomand (1989) has commented the political is subjected to religion. Simply, Muslims who accept the sacred and profane divide that Gole (1997) referred to cannot be praxisitioners. CONTEXT AND IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION: THE INCOMPATIBILITY PROBLEM AND THE CIRCLE OF REINFORCEMENT The ideological foundation is the base for the incompatibility problem. Praxisitioners internalize ideological representations that provide frames of reference. These frames are compared with interpretations of the contextual reality. In Turkey, and indeed other Muslim countries, a clear divide exists between reality and these interpretations. There are numerous reasons for the Turkish incompatibility and its role in the circle of reinforcement, developed in Chapter 3 through to Chapter 6. For example, Islam can be legitimized by both involvement within periods of success and conversely the relative lack of input during the decline of the Ottoman Empire and subsequent introduction of the republic, "Western civilization," and associated problems. The recent resurgence is therefore not a consequence of what Halliday referred to as the "fear of the loss of social control" (1996: 125), because in Turkey that control was lost generations ago. Since the emergence of the republic, the state has not obtained economic or political autonomy, has been perpetually in debt, and reliant on foreign financial institutions and governments. These external organizations are able to influence state policies in return for economic support and more penetration from Western cultural products and activities. The adopted liberal economic policies are against praxisitioners' interpretations of economic principles, which consider contemporary capitalism to promote excessive individualism and inadequate regulation. These factors support other studies that have identified economics as a factor in the growth of Islam. Certainly in many situations, individual financial positions are a primary factor in the protest against the nation-state. However, there are two central problems with over reliance on economic determinism namely, adverse economic conditions do not apply to influential groups of praxisitioners who are not excluded according to this rationale, and at a broader level, economic problems and associated immersion within globalization occurred before the recent resurgence. Consequently while economics are central to the incompatibility problem and related circle of reinforcement, economics cannot be examined in isolation, because other factors are involved. These wider economic relations have increasingly led to power being granted to foreign multinational companies, states, and international bodies within the global context. The relations are interwoven with cultural influences and ongoing processes of secularization that are fundamentally different from praxism. These changes have been associated with many problems. Conversely

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the lack of praxist involvement is an integral part of the circle of reinforcement and enables the radical discourse to provide both strong opposition to the state and solutions to problems. This legitimacy is helping strengthen and broaden the appeal of praxist Islam. As a consequence the praxist opposition is increasingly being seen as a threat to the secular nation-state, challenging the two central pillars of nationalism and secularism, and has resulted in Islamic groups and institutions being monitored and their activities being restricted. THE ROLE OF AGENTS IN SOCIAL CONTEXTS The growing awareness of the historical role of Islam and perceived contextual problems associated with other discourses are prominent elements behind the evolution of circles of reinforcement. For example, in the case study praxisitioners' beliefs were reinforced through analysis of life in the United Kingdom and familiarity with problems associated with both the Turkish and global economy, including the double-edged Western processes of intervention in Turkish economics, culture, and power and conversely nonintervention in other Muslim areas.1 Crucially, at a time when more people are knowledgeable about problems, the circle of reinforcement is strengthened, "because a lot of people becoming Muslim...people more aware of Islam." Many people with access to this information are thus "more aware of need to follow Muslim way of life" and "more aware of need to get rid of West." Consequently the Islamic resurgence is due at least in part to the increase in, and awareness of, economic, cultural, and political problems and crucially, an awareness of Islamic alternative solutions. Developing this point, it can be concluded that changes in the wider context have created greater visible disparities that people are able to witness through improvements in communication and technological systems, while internalizing opposing values at an individual level, which ironically in the case of education are often disseminated within the Turkish state system. This point can partly address why the resurgence is recent and did not occur during previous traumatic periods. More praxisitioners are emerging in contemporary Turkey that have been taught about the activist elements within Islam and have perceived the injustices and inequalities in contexts that have legitimized the ideology. This information is combined with knowledge of the historical and contemporary failures of other ideologies that have been tried both in Turkey and in other developing countries. Clearly this growing awareness of both problems and solutions has to be transmitted before people can hold the values. Consequently, socializing agents have a central role in the contemporary resurgence by transmitting information about the incompatibility problem and the circle of reinforcement. There is nothing new about agents having a central role within processes of belief internalization within Turkey, however. The new elements are changes in the roles of agents and the development and expansion of forms of communication. Throughout the history of the republic, the family and state have, to varying degrees, had roles teaching people about religion. The secular nature of the state led to numerous attempts to become the official transmitter of Islam. This was

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partly due to the early republicans' concern about the threat of religion to modernization and the requirement that Islam be subservient to the state. Religion has consistently been acknowledged as an important source of national unity, however, and has been promoted, particularly during times of crises. The overt promotion recently ended when Islam was again perceived to be a threat to the secular state in the late 1990s.2 Implicit and even explicit support for the role of religion had also increased during the period in power of center-right parties during the 1980s and 1990s. As Ayata noted (1996: 41), this led to "heightenfed] religious consciousness, increase[d] levels of religious observance, and reinforce[d] religious identity among the masses." The case study provided some useful support for the role of agents and in particular the significance of changes within social relations. Generally families introduced praxisitioners to religion, but belief was strengthened and deepened by later exposure to peers and teachers. The media provided information about local, national, and international affairs that have justified and legitimized the praxist ideology. Secularists differed because they faced greater conflict between the beliefs of their parents and the religious values of teachers, and this seems to highlight the penetration of Islamic influences within education. Generally the influence of parents appeared to exceed that of teachers. These patterns reinforce the argument that simply being informed about Islam is insufficient because this cannot explain why beliefs differ, fluctuate, deepen, or are replaced. While socializing agents have been present within Turkish society for generations, they have had a major impact on the contemporary praxist resurgence. To reiterate my earlier point, the categories of agents have remained constant but their roles have changed. In particular when examining praxism today we must refer to the development of the significant role of peers, the expansion of religion in the school curriculum, supported by the state, private Islamic teachings, and the growth of national and international media networks transmitting information to a more literate and analytical readership, viewers, and listeners. The secular state has sponsored Islamic agents and in the process unintentionally contributed toward the threat to its own survival. This means that the growth in literacy, education, and communications are factors as Arjomand (1986) identified that affect the contextual reality of individuals' private contexts and the perceived public environment. In turn these images and messages are subsequently transmitted by praxisitioners, who have already used them to reinforce their own beliefs, as part of consciousness-raising "action aimed at altering societal conditions" (Longres and McLeod 1980: 268). To conclude this section, if we are to both understand and explain the contemporary nature of praxism, based on a discourse that has been available for centuries, we must pay attention to the changing role and variety of socializing agents allied to an evolving context which creates a circle of reinforcement for agents' ideological messages. As a consequence, the identity formation of praxisitioners is significantly different from that of previous generations. Individuals are becoming praxisitioners because they internalize ideologies that are legitimized by their experiences in the private context and their exposure to

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the public context. If they do not internalize the ideology or it is not legitimized by contextual perceptions, then they will not become praxisitioners, irrespective of socioeconomic group. INTERNALIZING THE NEED FOR CHANGE The ideological, contextual, and agential factors are, as we have already discussed, central to the development and reinforcement of the contemporary incompatibility problem. But it is unclear what motivates people to challenge the state, particularly in cases of apparently successful Muslims who oppose the system on which individual success seems to be based. The reasons I suggest can be found in processes of internalization and ultimately one central belief and all it entails: salvation. As Chapter 2 established, Islam can offer a wide range of beliefs and practices. There are, however, three fundamental principles that all Muslims must hold, including salvation. This principle becomes clouded by the different interpretations of how this is going to be achieved. For many Muslims this may simply entail limited practice, but for praxisitioners, because of the strength, depth, and intensity of their faith, demands for the level of practice within thisworldly activities are much greater than other Islamic interpretations. The praxisitioners' conduct in daily life is based on practical ethics that they interpret within theological teachings and are partly directed at raising the level of Islamic influence which in turn contributes toward the impact of religious socializing agents and processes of internalization. This encompassing framework, based on what religious behavior means in terms of daily life, provides praxisitioners with the benchmark for achieving salvation.3 This is the ultimate motivation that explains the intensity, piety, and inherent opposition to secularism within praxism. In other words, people are practicing what they believe in to help achieve salvation, irrespective of personal situation. Personal profane gain is considered irrelevant to salvation and all praxisitioners are under the same pressure to practice and work toward increasing the impact of Islam in society, irrespective of social status. While salvation is the underlying motivation to change the system, however, the concept has of course existed throughout republican history. Again it is necessary to broaden the focus. At this point, ironically in view of the preceding comments, the impact of modernization needs to be considered. This is because modernization has brought considerable changes to Turkish society as other studies have identified. But these need to be allied to other factors including state policies, which have combined to have a major impact on socialization processes. It is thus not necessarily the negative consequences of modernization at an individual level that are inevitably instrumental in enabling praxist values to develop, be communicated, and be legitimated, although clearly these are crucial. Focus must also be placed on interrelated processes, mechanisms, and opportunities that are leading to changes in beliefs being internalized. Of particular relevance are the changes within and between agents that have meant that different mechanisms are being used to transmit different messages across

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different wider contexts. As a consequence of these different social interactions and activities, processes of identity formation have changed and the internalization of beliefs therein. If the research from the case study is used to help illuminate processes of internalization, then perhaps not surprisingly in a Muslim country, praxisitioners generally learned Islamic norms and values during childhood.4 But as Ozcan's (1993) study highlighted, the praxist resurgence is not simply the consequence of familial transmission, because the rate of increase in practicing Muslims exceeds that of the population growth. This means, and is supported by the case findings, that people become Muslims, but not necessarily praxisitioners, during childhood. The process to become a praxisitioner is often lengthy because piety can deepen, people continue to learn, and crucially, as part of the circle of reinforcement, the more they learn, the more their piety is strengthened and beliefs legitimized. As one believer observed, "more I know, more I have to practice." It is also important to establish that processes of internalization are neither universal nor irreversible. Muslims do not become praxisitioners by certain ages or socioeconomic group, levels of practice can fluctuate, and it is possible for Muslims to replace their faith with secular ideologies. To become a praxisitioner there are three distinct stages experienced within internalization processes. It should be noted that the first two stages are not necessarily in chronological order. 1.

2.

3.

During socialization processes people internalize radical Islamic beliefs and values that provide the basis for individuals' perceptions of their selves. These beliefs have been transmitted by a range of family members, friends, teachers, and different forms of media and are a synthesis of traditional tenets that remained within intergenerational socialization processes and modern values, concepts, and methods; Experiences at an individual level (e.g., poverty, dislocation) and/or public level5 (e.g., societal injustice, global inequality, and specific incidents in other nations, for example, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Grozny, and Iraq) justify and reinforce religious messages (or alternatively experiences may lead to existing secular principles' being considered inadequate or inappropriate and being replaced by Islamic reasoning). Thus the context provides a double legitimacy for the ideology based on historical success and contemporary analysis. This legitimacy strengthens the self-identity based around religion and continues to be reinforced by greater knowledge of Islamic principles, actions, and history and comparisons with secular societies and systems; These reinforcing stages result in the individual's adhering to Islam "as a way of life." The contradictions between the ideal world and the imperfect reality must be confronted if salvation is to be attained. Consequently the decision to be a praxist Muslim is due at least in part to societal and global cultural, economic, and political failures and not necessarily simply based on living in poverty, in cultural dislocation, or under economic threat.

The praxisitioner will develop only if all three criteria are satisfied. In other words, praxisitioners must have a level of ideological awareness and exposure to social contexts that are interpreted according to their internalized beliefs, and in

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the process their perceptions are reinforced. If people are aware of the ideology through contact with agents that subsequently helps to understand and explain the context, then a circle of reinforcement develops. Once Muslims accept the Islamic tenets, then those values can be strengthened by events and experiences and the individual is motivated to retain and develop belief because it is interpreted as being legitimized by reality. It seems highly probable that Turkish and global contexts will continue to legitimize Islamic ideology for a cross section of people and not just those excluded under secular criteria. Therefore, to gain greater understanding of praxism more focus needs to be extended beyond the exclusionary factors to incorporate the inclusive elements of praxism that provide crosscutting appeal. FUTURE FOR PRAXISM In this book I have sought to develop a framework of understanding and explanation for the praxist resurgence in Turkey but inevitably am left with unanswered questions. For example, how established has praxism become within Turkish society and what are the implications for the Turkish nation-state and global relations? What will be the reaction of the secular state and in particular the armed forces to increased praxist numbers and influence? What does the future hold for Turkey? How far can we generalize the results and expand the findings to other countries? What if any relevance has the emergence of al-Qa'ida had as a international force and to what extent would global changes increase or decrease praxism? These questions require considerably more investigation if we are to develop a deeper understanding and more sophisticated explanation of praxism and the conditions in which it develops. I tentatively offer some suggestions based on my findings. If we start by reassessing the contextual dimension, it is clear that contemporary Turkey is faced with considerable difficulties as it confronts the incompatible legacies of Atattirkism and Ottomanism and the balancing of Western and Islamic influences and seeks to develop a significant role in the global economy. Despite numerous economic policies the nation-state remains heavily in debt and continues to face periodic crises. Indeed it could be argued that the most recent economic crisis, along with the reluctance of other nations to provide investment, has been one of the most severe crises that Turkey has faced6 at a time when it was intended to grow to meet accession criteria for EU membership. This is happening when the political mechanisms for resolving problems have been seriously weak (discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs), facing a legitimation crisis with both public and international bodies. As the Turkish state has been working within an anti-inflation program agreed with the IMF to secure funds and is aiming toward meeting EU criteria, any subsequent foreign investment will be tied to conditions. In particular, foreign investment has been linked to the political and economic reforms demanded by both the EU and IMF. Consequently Turkish options are likely to be severely restricted by external constraints.7

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In addition to exogenous demands, the Turkish economy is also facing considerable internal pressure. Large parts of the public sector are expensive and relatively unproductive, bureaucracy is massive and cumbersome, subsidies remain high, corruption seems endemic, and urban migration and the population continue to increase, with considerable complications for the infrastructure. The economy must grow impressively just to maintain today's levels, repay the rapidly increasing international debt, and incorporate the disproportionately young population.8 The funds provided by the IMF are conditional on structural reform across the economic and public sectors with significant unemployment a likely consequence, certainly in the short term and at a time when hundreds of thousands of jobs have already been lost within manufacturing. To achieve even the modest aim of maintaining the status quo within these functions and services, which are partly responsible for widespread discontent,9 places Turkey in a dilemma or vicious circle faced by many developing countries. If the state provides infrastructure and service requirements, then it will not be able to repay foreign debts and the necessary funding and guidance needed for development would be withdrawn due to insufficient repayments. Alternatively, if Turkey repaid foreign creditors, which it is not in a prudent position to undertake anyway, then the state would not then be able to build an infrastructure that would enable it to compete in the global market. Consequently, the limited exports would quickly be exceeded by the growing number of imports made possible by opening up internal markets to competition as part of agreements with the EU and IMF. This situation would lead to Turkey remaining massively in debt that cannot be repaid, and development would stagnate, unemployment would rise, and the standards of living would drop. Like many developing countries, Turkey is caught between the irreconcilable demands of internal and external forces. This is reflected in the common outcomes uniting all of Turkey's various economic strategies. These have been the growth of debt and the general failure to establish the country as a major competitor in the global market. I would argue that the long-term nature of these problems and ineffectiveness of different economic approaches to overcome them have provided fertile ground for radical ideologies which have not been discredited through association with recent failures. Within this national context Islam has continued to grow in strength and importance. There is no evidence either in Turkey or globally to suggest that economic conditions will improve significantly to change these patterns. Indeed it could be argued that conditions will become more conducive to the growth of Islamic support. If we follow the likely outcome of current IMF and EU programs, then as Turkey adopts a more flexible approach to the labor market, privatization will reduce job security and increase levels of unemployment, and further liberalization will lead to a greater in flux of imports and wider balance of payments deficits. In these respects I am in agreement with other studies that have attributed the economy with such importance. But to reiterate my methodological stance throughout, economic factors examined in isolation can account for neither the current nature of the Islamic resurgence nor its broad appeal.

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Clearly Turkish politics has also played a fundamental role in the development of praxism and will continue to do so. The political situation in Turkey is interwoven with economics, history, and geography that have left the nationstate facing severe challenges from external and internal forces10. At present, Turkey continues to be in dispute with Greece, Armenia, Iraq, Syria, and Iran, the future of Cyprus remains a contentious issue, and the ongoing military strategy with Israel has caused considerable resentment among many Middle Eastern countries. These disputes tend to be over land, air space, territorial waters, water supply, nationalism, ethnicity, historical battles, massacres, terrorism, and perceived slights. Internally and across the borders, the Turkish state has continued to suppress Kurdish opposition and was reluctant to grant freedom of expression and cultural rights to ethnic minorities, despite the current KADEK, formerly the PKK, cessation of violence. However, the laws passed in August 2002 that are linked to accession to the EU include concessions to Kurdish rights. It remains to be seen how far the military will allow the rights to be expressed. Ironically the suppression of Kurdish rights, restrictions upon activities, and destruction of properties, communities, and livelihoods have resulted in a massive migration that has effectively spread the potential challenge from Kurds across the nation-state. The international focus has tended to be on the Kurdish issue, but there are other important ethnic groups. The Alevis in particular have, as Chapter 3 outlined, been prominent in disputes over religious interpretation, ethnicity, and their association with left-wing secularism. This has contributed to associated sectarian resentment, hatred, and suspicion between them and the Sunnis that remain and often lead to violence.11 As the previous chapters have identified there has been a growth in actions by radical Sunni groups that included the assassination of leading secular figures. These different challenges to the Turkish state mean that vast resources and strategic cover must be spread over a wide range of issues and geographical areas with immense economic costs. Turkish democracy operates within these economic constraints, endogenous problems, and internal challenges. Recently the state seems to have greater control over religion. This is likely to be only short term because the roots of the resurgence have become embedded in both the Turkish state and civil society and there are increasing signs that the system providing the "solution" to activist Islam is part of the problem. The electoral system, political fragmentation, and personal animosity that override ideological similarities had, until the November 2002 election, prevented any party from securing a popular mandate. Since the MP majority governments of the 1980s, the governing body had been based on insecure, ideologically riven coalitions that were unable to find clear agreement and direction to meet the considerable political and economic challenges. Consequently the JDP's success at the 2002 general elections in achieving a majority within the national assembly should not be underestimated. But neither should it be overstated. The Turkish system of proportionate representation, designed to keep minor parties out of the assembly, and the multitude of political parties and lack of voter loyalty meant that in 2002 only the JDP and RPP reached the 10 percent threshold. As a consequence, with the exception of a few

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independent MPs, the 550 seats were split between the two parties and, including absent voters, approximately 60 percent of voters are not represented within the national assembly. This creates serious problems of legitimacy for Turkish democracy, when only 40 percent of the electorate is represented. The armed forces continue to have considerable power as the coups have indicated and the National Security Council (NSC) in particular has had massive influence over the direction of the Turkish state, arguably at the expense of the elected government. This has to be considered alongside the wide regard felt by large sections of the population towards the armed forces,12 the mistrust of political representatives, the lack of representation within parliament and apathy towards the democratic process.13 As a concept, democracy has lost popular support. Ironically, in light of secular concerns about religion in politics, the JDP is currently best placed to allay at least some of the concerns about democracy. It is the JDP that is introducing reforms designed to strengthen democracy and meet the criteria for EU membership. However this process is likely to threaten the JDP's support across divergent groups because the reforms will lead to significant economic changes that are likely to cause many redundancies. While some JDP's followers may benefit from the changes there will be many across the socioeconomic spectrum who will be threatened by the reforms and who switch their allegiance to another party as a consequence. In light of the history of Turkish democracy and forthcoming problems it is difficult to support Fukuyama's (2001) description of Turkey uas a successful model of a secular and liberal democratic country" as part of an article that stressed the leadership role that Turkey could play internationally in liberalizing Islam. The extent that Islam has been successfully incorporated within democracy is questionable and the concerns are highlighted by the abolition of the WP and VP. And while the FP and JDP have formed from the previously single party, their policies, actions, and representatives are closely monitored and restricted. The parties will also be subjected to closure if either are considered to have illegally used religion for political purposes.14 The closure of the WP and the VP, the ban on the use of religion within politics, and increasing restrictions on Islamic businesses and educational institutions could strengthen more forceful approaches to the state which some praxisitioners, who refuse to participate in the democratic system, have already advocated. It could be argued that the political and economic factors would lead to overwhelming political support for the religious political party. Until recently this had not materialized. There were a number of reasons for this, discussed in Chapter 4, including the banning of the WP and VP, political strategies that proved unpopular, and some legitimacy at least being lost through involvement in recent periods of political crisis. There are also issues that Islamic groups generally face, of attracting wider support in a predominantly secular society, and how their vision, policies, positions and tangible gains can undermine secular institutions. The recent success of the JDP has, however, highlighted that political Islam remains a force within Turkish politics. It does though need to be stressed that of all the religio-political parties, the JDP is the least Islamically orientated. This is highlighted by the JDP's enthusiasm for gaining

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membership to the EU and commitment to pushing through a series of significant reforms to help achieve this. In many ways the JDP policies can be located within the centre-right of Turkish politics, and its success has been partly at the expense of the TPP and MP, who had become closely associated with the problems within Turkish politics. The JDP is not an Islamic party and despite huge concerns among secularists, including the military, it has yet to make any significant concessions to religion. If both the JDP and FP are allowed to operate within the democratic system albeit under rigid restrictions then in this sense Islam can continue to be incorporated within secular politics. But if the parties were closed down for being unconstitutional without sufficient evidence or popular support then Islam in politics will become marginalized. In the short term therefore the JDP's policies and performance in retaining popular support and power, without contravening the constitution, and the response of the military will be of tremendous significance. In the longer term, if moderate forms of Islam are marginalized within Turkish politics, or the movement of the JDP to the centre-right is at the expense of Islamic support then support for more radical groups will be strengthened as confidence in the democratic process continues to weaken. As in the late 1970s, it is not inconceivable that the disenfranchised take violent action in a developing political vacuum to address problems that they consider the system cannot resolve. Growing evidence that the Turkish state, irrespective of the political make-up, could not address major problems would lead to many more moderate Muslims reassessing their approach and looking toward more radical options that would make state control and constraint of religion considerably harder. This is given further momentum for many Muslims by the perceived democratic and civil bias against Islam and the state's involvement in the attacks against al-Qa'ida and Afghanistan. The national assembly's unexpected rejection of the American request to open a northern front from Turkish territory into Iraq during the 2003 war, despite the financial grants linked to accepting the request, has, however, been widely supported within Turkey, amongst secularists and Islamists alike. In view of the likely direction of the political and economic contexts, it seems that socializing agents will continue to develop in conditions that will not legitimize the dominant secular ideology. Many families will transmit religious messages, peers and the secular education system with religion prominent in the national curriculum will strengthen those beliefs, and the media15 will continue to grow and inform people of local and global events that complete the circle of reinforcement between ideology, context, and agents. Indeed, one could argue that as the circle evolves, many of the younger praxisitioners will become parents transmitting praxist values to their children who are likely to undergo the experiences to support those beliefs. The pre-JDP government belatedly realized the long-term threat to secularism of Islamic education, but even if Imam-Hatip schools are reduced or disbanded altogether as has been suggested, this study has shown that the ideology has already penetrated secular institutions. In addition to the institutional religious education, private Islamic teachings have been increasing in popularity and will be difficult to ban without adding to the religious cause through the sense of persecution. In terms of employment, many

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praxisitioners have gained, and will continue to gain, influential positions where they can utilize their positions to transmit views. These views are of course the basis for the resurgence and because they place so much emphasis on working toward enhancing the impact of Islam, considerable time is spent communicating with people, informing them about praxist Islam, and leading by example to attract support. In other words, praxisitioners at all levels across society, and not just those in influential positions, have a role to play in maintaining and developing the resurgence. Their legacy will depend heavily on how successful the current praxisitioners are in explaining the local and global problems and equally important, the extent to which the ideology may be compromised by failure and the groups' activities become "routinized" through participation within secular arrangements. Islam will continue to grow in popularity among a range of social groups who are informed through socialization processes and confront the incompatibility problem as a consequence of the circle of reinforcement. The state may be able to suppress temporarily the growth of praxism, although it is certainly possible that the armed forces have already been penetrated by radical Islamists, as Ayata (1996) noted and an influential figure in Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation) informed me. But unless the circle of reinforcement can be broken, Turkey is facing serious civil unrest. There is no evidence to suggest that the circle will be broken. Equally the extent of the praxist resurgence seems limited by the restraints that are faced: the Kemalist legacy that is engrained within significant state institutions; the lack of coherent long-term strategies for attracting support and ultimately gaining power; and the disparate nature of Islamic groups, ideologies, and supporters. Unless these issues can be resolved, it seems that the stalemate between the incompatible secularists and praxisitioners will remain and in the process the division will become more firmly entrenched within Turkish society. When transferring these conclusions to other contexts, any generalizations become even more speculative because, of course, Turkey has a unique history and faces different problems from earlier generations and other nation-states. However, I am convinced that secular nations, across the Middle East, North Africa, and the old Soviet bloc with a significant Muslim tradition, experiencing significant economic, political, and sociocultural problems, will observe an increase in the number of praxisitioners, which will threaten the nature of the state and, as the actions of the al-Qa'ida group appear to show, global relations. This is because similar circles of reinforcement can be discovered where the ideology, supporting context, appropriate agents, and motivation for change are present to challenge secularization which has failed to become firmly entrenched beneath institutional levels. It therefore seems likely that praxist beliefs will continue to be legitimized by representations of the past and the contextual imperfections of reality and will increasingly pose serious challenges to secular states. This is happening when other possible alternative ideologies, particularly socialism and communism, have to a large extent been discredited16 or political expression is denied. In these countries, Islamic networks are too embedded within societal cultures to be totally suppressed and provide one of the few

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communal mechanisms for expressing grievances. And contrary to Fukuyama's (1989) declaration in his prominent analysis, the end of the Cold War has not led to the end of history. In reality the decline of the Soviet Union has meant American policies and actions are now highly prominent with no equivalent rival. Crucially for many developing countries there is now no counterbalancing support and intervention that the Soviet Union offered and the implicit restraint it placed on American global actions and counter-actions. In addition, the demise of the Cold War has not led to inevitable support for American actions but contributed to a reawakening of Muslim consciousness.17 This is not, however, to follow the arguments along the lines of Huntingdon (1996), because there is no inherent clash between the West and Islam. Many of the reasons for the resurgence apply to other challenges from non-Muslim groups against Western systems, and while Islamic history is a key part of the ideological legitimation, conflicts with Christians were only a part of the relations during that period. The impact of Western actions will become increasingly apparent in the aftermath of the war against terrorism but not on a basis that can be simplistically derived from culture. Attacks against al-Qa'ida and the Taliban may have had general consent, but there remains considerable resentment against the inconsistent American approach and seemingly unconditional support for Israel. Despite the 2003 diplomatic push for the "road map" for peace there are serious doubts within the Middle East that the Sharon government can, or has the desire to, deliver what is required or that the Americans are sufficiently committed to the process to ultimately pressurize Israel to make concessions, if required. Indeed, views about America since 11 September 2001, from an initial widespread reaction of sympathy and support have quickly deteriorated following the Bush administration's subsequent unilaterist approach to global affairs. Muslims who supported Western action when it was considered part of a general process to rectify wrongs in the aftermath of 11 September are now much more cautious about offering such support again. This was highlighted by the limited membership of "coalition of the willing" involved in the 2003 war against Iraq. The suspicions of Muslims, who were already skeptical about the broad consensus, are likely to consider their concerns to be justified when, despite widespread condemnation, the war against terrorism was rolled out to Iraq, on the basis of what is increasingly looking like flawed intelligence. There are reasonable grounds to suggest that the war against terrorism has conversely led to more Muslims being more supportive of movements that challenge Western actions. The economic and political attempts by the West and America in particular to ensure the broad coalition, exemplified by sudden extended loan arrangements to Turkey after 11 September, are also likely to ultimately create more resentment. Certainly the money could be very useful, but generally it is contributing to growing debt problems and given to regimes that are not renowned for the effective management of the state economy or political liberalism. Thus the West has made supportive arrangements with nation-states such as Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan that would otherwise have been

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politically impossible because of the very different practices within those countries that are counter to American ideals. This political expediency means that the West will find it very difficult to subsequently withdraw support for "moral" reasons that were overlooked during the war against terrorism and thus of secondary importance to American priorities without losing the last vestiges of credibility in many countries. There must also be pragmatic concerns about how the wide-ranging promises, particularly rebuilding Afghanistan and Iraq, will ultimately be paid as America may be trying to spread financial and military resources too thinly. And the extension of the war against terrorism beyond Afghanistan to Iraq and possibly to other nation-states, for example, Syria and Iran, makes it becomes increasingly difficult to defend actions against accusations that it is not a war against Muslims. The actions in Afghanistan and Iraq and rhetoric between America and Syria and Iran provide support for those eager on the extremes of both sides to adapt inappropriate Cold War terminology.18 The seemingly arbitrary manner in which America makes decisions based on criteria that could be applied to Israel by many observers can only create further resentment. Again it is important to acknowledge within any forecast that radical Islam is not simply a negative reaction but is built on positive images both historical and contemporary. For example, Rashid (2000) has pointed out that international Muslim forces within Afghanistan were instrumental in the defeat of the Soviet Union and this defeat played a crucial part in the Soviet Union's subsequent break-up. This contributed to the international Islamic resurgence at a number of different levels. The outcome helped invoke feelings of pride and awareness of what could be achieved under Islamic interpretations to Muslims across the world. Participation brought together thousands of Muslims from different nationalities, uniting and developing strong bonds that would extend beyond the war and crucially provided learning opportunities for military, ideological, and strategic purposes. As is well documented, Osama bin Laden played a leading role within the Afghan war, and the credibility and links he gained and developed during this period were instrumental in the subsequent actions of al-Qa'ida. At the time of writing, bin Laden seems to have disappeared despite massive military operations and technological surveillance. Since the capture or death of bin Laden was one of the primary aims of the attacks on Afghanistan, his international standing, and al-Qa'ida's generally, will have been further enhanced within significant sections of the world's population.19 There has been considerable analysis about why the events of 11 September occurred, but the underlying motives remain unclear. Following the framework developed for praxisitioners, I would argue that salvation was instrumental and crucially the need to raise awareness of both Islamic potential and Western actions. If the latter was a strategic aim, then this has been achieved; American actions in particular are very much under the microscope within Muslim societies. And unless America is able to recognize that its policies and actions have been instrumental in creating the global terrorism it seeks to destroy, it will not eradicate the problem. Targeted physical, infrastructural, financial, and legal

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attacks cannot ultimately be effective without a comprehensive framework for peace and incorporation. Instead, American actions seem to be providing longer term legitimacy to the praxist cause and have increased harassment and led to human rights being restricted, more Muslims becoming radicalized, and more movements formerly operating within secular environments being forced underground without any democratic political outlets. With limited peaceful options, many groups are likely to adopt more aggressive approaches. These factors lead me to conclude that while the war against terrorism may be successful in the short term, and that is debatable without the capture of bin Laden and other senior al-Qa'ida and Taliban personnel, in the longer term the war against terrorism is contributing toward further legitimacy of praxism and more widespread opposition. On the other hand, the eventual outcome of the challenge by praxisitioners is unlikely to achieve wider objectives unless their movements are able to provide comprehensive policies and have opportunities to operate and strategies to mobilize widespread popular support that override existing divides and tensions, for example, ethnic and tribal. It seems likely that the best option for taking control would be initially as part of a broad coalition within a nation-state, as in for example the Iranian revolution that included Muslim opposition of varying interpretations and Marxists and civil groups. The global fragmentation means that any comprehensive international challenge is not feasible for the foreseeable future. There are a number of international movements, but these have had limited global impact and are further weakened by significant differences in language, nationalism, culture, and challenges confronted or confronting and to confront. Clearly the al-Qa'ida group has made some progress toward a global movement and includes representatives across the Muslim world. However, alQa'ida is not, contrary to popular representations, a homogeneous movement. It consists of different Islamic groups in a loose association united by high-profile actions and a hatred for America and Israel but which possess very different characteristics and ultimate aims that will prove very difficult to reconcile over the longer term. CONCLUSION There are many studies of the Islamic resurgence in both Turkey and the Middle East. These studies have provided invaluable insights into the appeal of Islam to excluded groups. However, using this category of explanation for the Islamic resurgence per se raises serious questions because it cannot incorporate the influential supporters of praxism who are educated and/or professionally successful. Many other studies have made major contributions to help understand and explain the phenomena through their analysis of structural factors, principally modernization, globalization, and interrelated consequences, but these elements generally predate the resurgence. Certainly they have had a huge impact but cannot, when used in isolation, explain the contemporary nature of the resurgence. This has led me to suggest that analysis of the Islamic resurgence needs to be more expansive and inclusive. In other words, a

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framework of understanding and explanation is required that can incorporate the diverse support base and appeal of praxist Islam and can address why this is happening now and not during other periods that, using the exclusion criteria, have been equally traumatic. The framework that I have proposed incorporates: 1. 2. 3.

4.

Ideology, as we need to know what praxisitioners believe in to help understand the appeal and explain the contemporary popularity, Context, because it is essential that we know the contextual conditions that are incompatible with and provide legitimacy for the opposing ideology in a circle of reinforcement, Socializing agents that are transmitting the ideological beliefs to be internalized that form an essential element within praxisitioners' identities. Generally the process begins in the family, but individuals develop into praxisitioners only if they acquire an in-depth knowledge and understanding of praxist Islam. This was usually gained from peers, education, and the media. The agents, in particular the media, provide contextual representations that again legitimize ideology, Motivation, which is central to understanding why people want to be praxisitioners and challenge secularism. Praxisitioners are motivated by a number of factors that are linked to addressing the incompatibility between ideology and context. There is, however, one underlying incentive which, when added to the other elements of the framework, explains the cross-societal appeal of Islam: salvation. Praxisitioners want to increase the impact of Islamic praxism, irrespective of personal status, to enhance their chances of salvation.

The recent resurgence is very much a product of the time, synthesizing the historical tenets with contemporary discourse, technology, strategies, and methods. In this sense there are distinctly unique elements within praxism that are often overlooked. The ideology has developed within modern environments and contrasts sharply with the local and global contexts that it seeks to explain, and as such it is quickly dismissed as being antimodern. This contrast has been obvious for centuries, yet the resurgence is recent. The contemporary nature of the resurgence is because more people are becoming aware of both praxist Islam and the failure of other ideologies to resolve perceived problems. The process of raising awareness has occurred through developments and expansion within education and media, and these changes have also contributed toward peers' having more influence within socialization processes. Changes within the socialization contexts and the nature and effects of the socializing agents have meant that increasing numbers of people are aware of praxism. Awareness is legitimized by familiarity with local and global contexts that highlight considerable flaws in secular ideologies and global systems. This circle of reinforcement provides the support for radical change. Unless the circle can be broken either by resolving some of the fundamental problems that many Muslims consider to exist within secularization or by discrediting praxist Islam as an ideology, this type of Islam will remain and in all likelihood the challenge to the West will increase.

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NOTES 1. Examples of internal problems included economic dislocation, failures of democracy, and imposition of other cultural ways of behaving. External problems included events in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Kuwait that are perceived as showing that Western-controlled global intervention is a selective process dictated by the available material resources. Recent events in Afghanistan and Iraq would fit easily within this analysis. 2. Pope and Pope (1997) provide examples of the state using religion for other purposes. In the most notable recent case, the state helped establish Hizbollah as a threat to the PKK but the Islamic group developed beyond the intended remit and subsequently became a threat to the state. 3. It is important to reiterate that as the vast number of praxist groups testifies, the strategies for action are open to different interpretations. 4. Praxisitioners can also originate from secular families. In these instances the influential factors are likely to be contextual experiences that cannot be explained by the familial ideology, if held, and contact with Islamic agents, most noticeably peers and teachers. An example of this process was discussed in the case study. Other examples include Ispahani's (1989) study of a clear demarcation between older secular women and their Islamist children. And as the West is gradually becoming aware, it is possible for people to become Muslims from Christian backgrounds. High profile conversions include Muhammed Ali, alongside other members of the Nation of Islam, including Malcolm X, and the most recent newsworthy example is John Walker Lindh, the "American Taliban." 5. These types of conditions can be seen to have created revolutionary opportunities for other ideologies in developing countries. 6. In 2001, the Turkish lira and stock market lost considerable value and foreign investors, institutions, and nations were cautious about investing at a time of possible global economic downturn and concern about the apparent inertia of the Turkish state to proceed with an agreed IMF-backed stabilization program. More recently the economy has started to recover and the JDP government is expected to introduce the long delayed economic measures. However, the extent that the reforms will be effectively implemented remains, at this stage, open to question (reported in Pope 2003a; 2003c). 7. The imposed conditions by foreign nation-states and institutions, including the severe reductions in oil trade with Iraq following the first Gulf War and ultimately the ending of the illegal oil trade with Iraq following the 2003 war has resulted in Turkey losing billions of dollars in potential income. 8. I am not arguing, however, that the population growth and subsequent disproportionately young population lead to "Muslim assertiveness" as Huntingdon (1996) claimed, but that they have added to the massive problems that nation-states including Turkey face and may not be able to address. Consequently it is these problems that are likely to contribute to the attraction of opposing ideologies that include Islamic interpretations. 9. It is partly the dissatisfaction with services and lack of welfare that gave rise to the growing popularity of civil groups, including Islamic movements. The limited availability and standards of employment, health, education, housing, fuel, and sanitation have all been the source of protests. 10. The extent of Turkey's involvement in action against Afghanistan has also had implications for relations with other Middle Eastern countries. While there is a general consensus that some action needed to be taken, there is considerable disagreement about what those actions should have been and who should be involved. Extending the war

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against terrorism to other nations has placed Turkey in a difficult position. For example, the U.S. led war against Iraq meant the end of the illegal oil trade and loss of considerable resources, caused widespread alarm at seemingly unprovoked American actions against Muslims, and raised concerns about a post-Saddam Iraq, most particularly the position of Kurds and possible implications for Kurdish nationalism within Turkey. 11. Acts of violence tend to be periodic. The act that probably caused the most revulsion and global attention in recent years was the Sivas massacre, when Sunni Muslims set fire to a hotel in which prominent Alevis were staying and thirty-seven people were killed. 12. Pope (2003a: 19) has reported that whilst Turks still respect the military, there is increasing awareness "of the need for serious reform." 13. Levels of apathy are highlighted by twenty-four percent of eligible voters not voting at the November 2002 election. 14. At present, the stance towards leading religio-political parties figures seems less rigid than previously. For example, Erdogan, the leader of the JDP, successfully overturned a ban on his involvement in politics and following a by-election he was able to become prime minister. 15. Following a report to the NSC, there are signs that the state will be monitoring private radio and television stations more closely for Islamic content, and presumably books and other types of media will be added to the list. The NSC has since decided to appoint special prosecutors in five provinces to closely monitor Islamic publications. 16. This is not to overlook the ongoing struggle by armed Marxist organizations, such as the DHKP/C in Turkey, but their appeal and impact are limited. 17. These points are developed in greater detail by Vertigans and Sutton (2001) with respect to the emergence of al-Qa'ida. 18. A discussion on the development and use of concepts following the attacks on America can be found in Vertigans and Sutton (2002b). 19. Discussed further in Vertigans and Sutton (2001).

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Appendix Research Questionnaire

The questionnaire will ask you some questions based upon the periods and events in your life and their impact on you. To begin with, I shall ask you some questions about your childhood (0-16) and family life if I may. 1.

How old are you?

2.

I am interested to know about the places that you have lived before you came to England (e.g., were they rural or urban, small or large?)

3.

What was/were your father's (and mother's) occupation(s)?

4.

What educational level did your father achieve? Primary Secondary Secondary High University

5.

In your household, which members of your family lived with you?

6.

Do your parents hold strong political views? What are they? How strong are they?

7.

Who was responsible for disciplining your childhood?

Now some questions about other influences on your childhood. 8.

Which people did you respect during your childhood? (Why?)

9.

Were there any people you did not particularly respect? (Examples and why)

10.

What types of school did you attend? Lycees—English or Turkish speaking Technical/Vocational

Imam-hatips

174 11.

Appendix During your lessons at school did your teachers generally tell you the correct academic answer or were you expected to find the answer yourself?

I will now refer to your recent education experiences and your future plans if that is okay. 12.

Who has supported you financially while you have been in higher education?

13.

Why did you continue in higher education?

14.

It would seem that given this academic record you could be considered successful. Is this correct?

15.

What are your employment plans after you have graduated?

16.

Will your employment plans be successfully achieved? If not why not?

Next I shall ask you some questions about the mass media. 17.

How do you obtain information about Turkey and the world (for example from TV, radio, friends, Internet, public notices)?

18.

Which newspapers do you read in Turkey?

19.

Do your family and friends in Turkey enjoy the same: TV radio newspapers

20.

Does any individual or group control the media (if so, who and what kind of messages do they put across)?

For the questions below please circle the responses closest to your opinion. It can be very difficult to follow my line of thinking so you will given opportunities to explain any of the answers. SA = Strongly Agree A = Agree

UD = Undecided/Don't know D = Disagree

SD = Strongly Disagree

21.

Turkish identity is currently being threatened by alien Western cultures.

22.

At present global economic power is unfairly concentrated in the hands of the West.

23.

There are a number of global problems associated with Western capitalism.

24.

During the last few centuries Islam lost political influence because it could not compete with Western developments.

25.

Islam has recently visibly grown in popularity.

26.

The "five pillars" should be followed by Muslims.

Appendix

175

27.

Charging interest for loaning money is a form of exploitation.

28.

Turks should follow the teachings of the prophet Muhammed and, where possible, apply them to contemporary society.

29.

Islamic law should be the basis for Turkish society.

30.

Life after death (a place in heaven) is guaranteed for practicing Muslims who contribute towards increasing the influence of Islam in Turkey.

31.

Certain events and experiences in England, Turkey, or elsewhere in the world reinforced your beliefs.

32.

While studying in England, the intensity of your beliefs has grown.

33.

Members of your family hold similar beliefs to you.

34.

Some of your school teachers held similar beliefs to those you now hold.

35.

Some of your Turkish university teachers held similar beliefs to you.

36.

Your childhood friends (up to the age of 16) held similar beliefs to you.

37.

Your present friends hold predominantly similar beliefs to you.

38.

You are a practising Muslim

The following questions are for practising Muslims. 39.

When did you start to believe in Islam? Why and who was influential in the process? (check interviewee agrees)

40.

At what age did you start to pray five times per day?

41.

Have the levels of your devotion changed? Why?

42.

At what periods in your life has Islam been most helpful?

43.

Why is it so helpful?

44.

Should the Turkish state structures be altered to include greater religious participation? If so how can this be achieved?

45.

One of your earlier comments referred to you succeeding in the Turkish system. Do you see any contradiction between your success and the need to change the system?

46.

Why do you want to change the system when you are obviously doing well in it?

47.

By helping to change the system you are improving your chances of salvation. Is this correct?

176

Appendix

The following questions were for people who were not practitioners. 48.

It would seem that given your earlier comments your beliefs could be considered (to complete). Would you agree with this?

49.

When did you first hold these beliefs? Why and who was influential in the process?

50.

Have your beliefs about religion changed? Yes—Q51, No—Q52

51.

When and why did your beliefs change?

52.

Do you think that radical Muslims want to change the Turkish secular system?

53.

Following your earlier comments, you seem to be succeeding in the Turkish system. Do you think that radical Islamic students are also successful?

54.

If the Islamic students are succeeding, why should they want to change the system?

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Index

Afghanistan, 10, 64, 102, 116, 159, 164, 166-67, 169, 170 Ahmed, Leila, 23, 36, 75, 97, 113, 150, 154 Ahsan, Manazir, 21, 24, 27, 36 Ak§it, Bahattin, 94-95 Alevis, the, 1, 29, 41, 56, 61, 64, 82, 92, 162, 171 America, 47, 49, 55, 64, 79, 82, 101, 109, 111-14, 116, 120-23, 126, 130, 136, 148, 164-68, 170-71 Arabs, the, 29-30, 34-36, 113 Arjomand, Said Amir, 91, 100, 155, 157 Armenians, the, 34, 39, 40-41, 49, 58, 61, 113 Army, the, 51, 54-55, 57, 61-62, 69, 7677; Interviews, 120, 122; Ottoman, 28, 30, 34. See also military Atatiirk, Mustafa Kemal, 40, 41^t2, 47, 50,57-58,73,89,96, 132, 137; Atattirkism, 11,47,53,61, 160; interviews, 125, 128, 145-46, 151; reforms, 3, 62, 92-93 Ayata, Sender, 5-6, 12, 43-45, 47, 53, 58, 73, 79-80, 82-84, 94-95, 97, 102, 157, 165 Ayubi, Nazih, 10-12, 18, 24, 27, 89, 91, 101, 140

Bahceli, Devlet, 70 Bandura, Albert, 99 Berkes, Niyazi, 36-37, 58 bin Laden, Osama, 167-68. See also alQa'ida Bosnia, 28-30, 35, 102, 125-26, 135, 148-49,152,159,169 Britain, 35, 118, 150. See also Europe, West Brotherhoods. See Tarikat Bush, George W., 166 Caliphate, 28, 30, 40, 42, 45, 50, 62, 145 Calvinism, 140 Capitalism, 9-10, 15, 23, 48, 78, 113-14, 119, 123-25, 155 Catholicism, 18,20 Chechnya, 102, 169 Christianity, 3, 30, 125, 138, 149, 170 Ciller, Tansu, 66-68, 82, 107, 122, 126 Circle of reinforcement, 17,26, 109-10, 114, 116-17, 119, 137, 141-143, 155-57, 159-60, 164-65, 169 Civic religion, 33, 132, 137 Civil society, 1, 4, 12, 46, 51-52, 56, 6264,78, 109, 118, 162 Clash of civilizations, 12, 20. See also Huntingdon, S.

192

Index

Class, social, 11, 14, 18, 52-54, 72, 81, 85,91, 140 Cold War, 165-67 Cornell, Svante, 67-70, 72, 76, 79-80, 83-85 Coups, 162; 1960, 51-52; 1973, 52-54; 1980, 57, 61-62; 1997 Postmodern coup, 69 Cultural capital, 95, 142 Culture, 9-10, 13, 15, 20-21, 23, 26, 30, 33,44,48,51,55,68,75, 104, 111, 114, 120-21., 123-24, 142, 150, 156, 165-66, 168 Cyprus, 29, 35, 49, 55, 113, 121, 161 Demirel, Suleyman, 53-55, 58-59, 65, 71, 74,82-83, 122, 150 Democracy, 1, 5-6, 21, 62, 67, 69-70, 75, 77-79, 112-13, 122, 126-128, 134, 162-63, 169 DP (Democrat Party), 5, 47-53, 94-95 Dunn, John, 30-32, 35-36 Durkheim, Emile, 6, 13-14, 22, 27 Ecevit, Bulent, 52, 58, 69-71, 74 Education, 87-89, 91-98, 131, 133, 152, 156, 163-64., 169; expansion, 4, 1112, 42-43, 50, 92-3, 157; further education, 6, 50; higher education, 50, 63, 91; illiteracy, 92-93; Islam in education, 4, 43, 50, 63-64, 82; 9495, 126-28, 156-57, 163-^64, 169-70; interviews, 106-7; national curriculum, 43, 47, 51, 63, 92, 112; Ottoman education, 32-34; overcrowding, 92-93; secondary education, 94; universities, 94, 115, 124, 146. See also Imam-hatip schools and socializing agents Egypt, 9, 11, 27-28, 35, 91, 96, 139 Elections, 1946, 47-48; 1950, 48; 1954, 49; 1957, 50-51; 1961, 52; 1965, 53; 1973,54-55; 1983,63; 1987,65; 1991,65; 1995,66; 1999,69-70; 2002,6,71-72,76, 161, 171 Elective affinity, 140 Erbakan, Necmettin, 54, 58, 62, 66-71, 83-84, 126 Erdogan, Recep, 71, 76, 84, 171 Europe, competition, 30, 123; culture, 33, 111, 121, 123; domination, 32, 42, 46, 79, 114, 123; relations with

Turkey, 27-28, 32, 42; trade, 30-31, A\,19.

See also ^NQSX,

Westernization EU (European Union), 76-78, 112, 122, 160-63 Family, 11, 88-93, 95, 99, 103-105, 115, 124, 131-34, 159; interviews, 10506; 144-52; role of, 15, 17, 43, 156, 169. See also socializing agents FP (Felicity Party), 6, 71-73, 76, 163-64 France, 35, 39, 113, 123. See also Europe, West Fukuyama, Francis, 163, 165 Fundamentalism. See Islam, praxisitioners, praxism and praxist Gellner, Ernest, 15, 18, 21, 26, 140 Germany, 35, 39-40, 105-6, 121, 123-24, 128. See also Europe, West Geyikdagi, Mehmet, 13-14, 33, 37, 4851,58-59,62,81,94 Globalization, 9, 13, 17, 49-50, 78, 129, 135, 137, 143, 155-56, 160-61, 16869 Gole, Nilufer, 4, 9, 65-^66, 74, 78-79, 93, 102, 119, 143, 154-55 Greece, 28, 30, 39,41, 114, 123-24, 161. See also Europe, West Gulalp, Haldun, 13, 18, 67-69, 72, 75, 77, 79-81,83-85 Gulen, Fethullah, 72, 74, 84 Gulf War, 66, 116, 135, 170. See also Iraq Halliday, Fred, 20, 25-26, 103, 114, 117, 155 Haynes, Jeff, 7, 8, 135 Hizbollah, 4, 18,83-84, 170 Hizb-iit-Tahrir, 18,83, 165 Huntingdon, Samuel, 12, 18, 20, 26, 79, 82, 91, 96, 166, 170. See also clash of civilizations Ibrahim, Saad, 27,91, 139 Imam-Hatip schools, 48, 51-52, 84, 9495,97, 106, 147, 164 IMF (International Monetary Fund), 50, 55,64, 109, 122, 127, 160-61, 170 Incompatibility problem, 1, 16-17, 101, 109-12, 114-15, 117, 119, 155-56, 158, 165

Index Industrialization, 6, 18, 31, 43, 52-53, 65, 67 Inonii, Ismet, 47-48 Internalization, processes of, 17, 90, 9596, 100, 103, 105, 129-132, 155-59, 169 Iran, 9, 11, 20, 23, 36, 68, 80, 83, 102, 107, 128, 161, 167-68 Iranian revolution, 18, 55, 64, 101 Iraq, 36, 49, 102, 113, 116, 122-23, 12526, 148, 159, 161, 164, 166--67, 16970 Islam: appeal, 2, 5, 8, 11, 13-14, 41-42, 93, 114-115, 132-33, 137, 153, 16869; behavior, 16, 21, 23-25, 27, 87, 92, 113, 130-31, 134, 139, 142; challenge, 2, 5, 22, 51, 117-19, 157, 166; decline, 26,28, 34-35, 117; diversity, 2, 13, 15-16, 20-22, 24, 26,36,58,74-75, 115, 133, 138, 140, 154, 158; expansion of empire and domination, 21-23, 27-29, 35; education, 33, 44, 48, 51, 95, see also education above; family relations, 22, 32-33, 44, 88-89, see also family; folk religion, 36, 140; fundamentalism, 2, 20, 74, 122; groups and movements, 5, 9-11,14, 18, 20, 23, 25, 27, 52, 54, 69, 75, 7778, 91, 94-95, 97, 102, 119, 138-39, 156, 163, 165, 168; hadith, 22-23; ideology, 10, 16, 19-20, 22-23, 27, 57, 110-11, 114, 140, 142, 154, 160, 166; see also media; origins, 16, 18, 21-23, 26, 141-42, 144; Ottoman empire, in, 1, 16, 19-21, 27, 28-34; peers, 99, see also peers below; politics, in, 4-6, 11, 13, 50-56, 6 3 68, 70-72, 74, 78-79, 81, 85, 93, 117, 162-64; principles, 2, 3, 21-24, 27,36,87, 110,113-14, 129, 134, 137-38, 143, 158-60; radical, 3-5, 8-9, 11,15, 19,52,72,74,81,104, 109, 116, 167; resurgence, 2, 3, 6, 89, 11, 13, 16, 19,26,35,39,45,51, 54, 73-76, 78-81, 87, 90-91, 96, 110, 112, 115-16, 119,135,153156, 160-61, 165-68; role, of, 1, 8, 11, 14-15,20,22,33,42, 132-33, 135, 137; salvation, 20, 25, 137-44, 152, 158-59, 167, 169; secularization, 6, 7, 11, 42-46;

193

shari'ah, 19, 21-22, 29, 33; state, use of, 1,8, 11, 14,34,42,44-45,48, 52-53, 57-58, 63, 68, 79, 98, 157; study, of, 3, 14, 19-20, 91, 153-4, 159; tradition, 4, 45-46, 48, 56-57; visibility, 3, 50, 68, 75, 115-16; way of life, 2, 3, 20, 22, 24-27, 35, 11011, 114-15, 132-33, 138, 159. See also praxisitioners, praxism, praxist Islamification, 1-4. See also praxisification Islamism, 9-11, 81, 154, 165. See also praxisitioners, praxism and praxist Islamist, 3-4, 9, 20, 26, 53, 56, 61, 77-78, 83,97, 114, 143. See also praxisitioners Israel, 67, 70, 84, 136, 162, 166-68 Italy, 35, 39. See also Europe, West Jihad, 40-41, 139 JDP (Justice and Development Party), 6, 70-71, 73, 75-78, 81, 84-85, 118, 121, 162-64, 170 JP (Justice Party), 52-54, 56, 94 Kamrava, Mehran, 9, 14, 69, 72, 79-80, 83-85 Kazamias, Andreas, 8, 32-33, 36-37, 92, 106 Keddie, Nikki, 10-11,80, 107 Keyder, gaglar, 32, 34-35, 48, 52, 58-59 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah, 20, 23 Kurds, the, 29, 34, 39-41, 56, 61, 70, 79, 82, 84, 92, 121, 123-24, 162, 170; separatism, 1, 45, 70, 79, 84, 124, 162. See also PKK Laicism, 42, 51, 93, 97, 117, 125, 128, 147, 151 Liberalism, 124, 132, 155, 161, 163, 166 Mardin, §erif, 14, 18, 36-37, 40, 43, 79, 88 Martin, David, 7 Mass media, 2, 4, 12, 17, 74, 80, 87-88, 91, 101-3, 107, 129, 131, 133-36, 157, 159, 164, 169, 171. See also socializing agents Marx, Karl, 3, 6, 8, 52, 134, 168, 171 al-Mawdudi, Abu al-Ala, 3, 5, 88, 140 McDermott, Mustafa, and Ahsan, Muhammad, 3, 24-25, 88, 104

194

Index

Medrese, 37,94, 106 Meeker, Michael, 11, 18, 83, 90, 107 Mehmet, Ozay, 11, 18, 21, 28, 80, 93, 96, 139 Menderes, Adnan, 48, 51 Middle East, 7, 12, 14, 26, 28, 31, 48, 72, 79,84,91, 103, 122, 148, 162, 16568, 170 Migration, 9, 13-15, 31, 53, 58, 73, 81, 88, 161-62. See also urbanization Military, Islamic, 22; Ottoman, 28, 30-34, 154; republican, 45, 47, 52, 54-55, 59, 61-63, 66-71, 74, 76-77, 119, 121, 123; wair of independence, 40. See also the army Millet, 29-30 Modernity, 1-2, 6-10, 14-17, 53, 55, 113, 137, 154; Ottoman empire, in, 30-31, 34, 154 Modernization, 2, 7-10, 13-16, 42-43, 46, 48, 50, 56-57, 71, 78, 90, 92-94, 98, 100, 113, 129, 140-41, 143, 153, 157-58, 168 Mosques, 18, 42, 50, 52, 126, 144, 147, 150 MP (Motherland Party), 5, 63-73, 80, 82, 95, 97, 163 Muhammed, the Prophet, 21-23, 25, 2728,36, 137,146-47 Murad, Khurram, 21, 27 Naksibendi, 5, 56, 64, 72-73, 84 Nationalism, 1, 7, 11, 30, 33-34, 40-42, 44,47,55,64,74,80,89,92, 119, 156, 162, 168, 170 NAP (Nationalist Action Party), 54, 58, 62, 70-72, 76, 78-79 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 49, 113, 116, 123 NSP (National Salvation Party), 5-6, 5456, 58, 62, 64, 66-67, 80, 85, 94 Nurcu, 5, 50, 53, 72, 84, 94, 107 Oil, 10, 55, 59, 103, 113, 122, 126, 135, 148-49, 170 Ottoman Empire, decline, 29-35, 39-41, 43, 145, 155; development and expansion, 16, 27-29; ideology, 16, 160; Islam, role of, 1, 16, 19-20; reforms, 32-35, 41-42, 122-23, 129. See also Tanzimat

Ozal, Turget, 63-65, 67, 82, 107, 124, 126, 146, 159 Ozcan, Yusuf, 18,89-90 Palestine, 102 Peers, 17, 98-99, 103-5, 113, 131, 13334,136,157, 164,169-70 PKK (Kurdish Workers' Party), 70, 114, 123, 162, 170 Pope, Nicole and Hugh, 36, 40-41, 51, 55-59, 68, 82-84, 107, 120, 123, 170 Pope, Nicole, 77, 83-84, 106, 120, 17071 Postmodernity, 10-11, 114 Praxis, 2, 3, 19-20 Praxisification, 2, 3, 9, 15, 17, 78, 88-92, 95,104, 110,129-33, 153 Praxisitioners, 3, 6, 10, 15-19, 22-27, 31, 35, 42, 51, 54, 56, 71-72, 74-75, 77, 80-81, 83, 87, 89, 90-93, 95-99, 101, 103-7, 109-14, 120, 122-28, 129-44,153-65, 167-70 Praxism, 3, 25-26, 39, 53, 77-78, 81, 89, 96, 105, 117, 119, 129, 133-34, 13738, 140-44, 154-55, 157-58, 160-61 Praxist Islam, 1, 26-28, 35, 39, 48, 56-57, 62, 72, 77-81, 84, 89-90, 104, 107, 110-12,114,116-17,119, 139,153, 156-160, 164-69 Privatisation, 64-65, 67, 71, 122, 161 al-Qa'ida, 101, 136, 160, 164-68, 171 Qutb, Sayyid, 5, 23, 26 Rashid, Ahmed, 10, 167 Reforms, 1920-39, 41-46; 1940-50s, 4549, 58; 1980s, 64; 2002-03, 76, 160, 163, 170 Republic, formation of, 40, 42 RPP (Republican Peoples' Party), 42-45, 47-52, 54, 56, 72, 76, 162 Russia, 30, 32, 35, 39, 43, 123-24. See also Soviet Union Sakalhoglu, Omit, 4-5, 12, 18, 41, 50, 53, 56, 58, 63, 95, 106 Salt, Jeremy, 9, 18, 58, 79, 82, 84, 106 Saudi Arabia, 21, 64, 80, 91, 101-2 Sayan, Sabri, 4, 7, 11, 14, 18, 80, 117 Secularists, 16-18, 90, 94-96, 99, 103, 105-7, 110-19, 121-22, 124, 126, 128

Index Secularization, 1, 5, 6-7, 30, 33-34, 42, 44-47, 61, 64, 67-68, 75, 82, 90, 93, 110, 119, 130, 134, 137, 140, 153, 155, 165, 169 Shari'ah, 5, 19, 22-25, 29, 34, 36, 50, 56, 68,72, 102, 110-11, 118, 128, 13839, 142-44 Shi'ism, 24, 36 Socialism, 7, 80, 109, 165. See also Soviet Union Socialization, 3, 15-17, 33, 44, 74, 87, 89, 91-92, 98, 104-5, 129, 130-34, 137, 154, 158-65, 169. See also socializing agents Socializing agents, 15-17, 101, 103-104, 130-32, 154, 156-58, 164, 169. See also education, family, mass media, peers, socialization Socio-economic factors, 10, 13-15, 18, 47-48, 55, 58, 61, 64-65, 78, 82, 84, 109-116, 120-123, 125-26, 129, 136, 138, 145-51, 153-56, 160-61, 165-66, 170 Soviet Union, 10, 44, 47-49, 55, 120, 126, 165, 167 Sufism, 29, 36-37, 58, 84 Suleymanci§, the, 5, 72 Sultanate, the, 28-31, 33-34, 40, 42, 146 Sunar, ilkay and Toprak, Binnaz, 18, 46, 49, 58-59 Sunni Muslims, 1, 18, 23, 28-29, 36, 61, 64, 140, 162, 171 Taliban, 10, 131, 136, 166, 168, 170 Tapper, Richard, 2, 10 Tanzimat, 32-35, 88. See also Ottoman, reforms Tarikat, 5, 43, 45, 53, 56, 58, 64, 72-74, 78, 80, 82, 84 Toprak, Binnaz, 6, 9, 18, 29, 33-34, 36, 40, 42-43, 45-46, 51-52, 54, 56, 58, 62, 74-76, 79-80, 82-4, 92, 102, 107, 118, 120 TPP (True Path Party), 5, 65-67, 69, 71, 82-83, 163 Treaty of Lausanne, 41 Treaty of Sevres, 39-10, 57 Turkey, Alparslan, 58 Turkish nation-state, 39, 41-42, 44, 4647,49,55,61, 109 Turks, the, 28-29, 34, 36, 40-41, 44, 56, 61, 120, 171

195

Ulema, 23, 27, 29, 33-34, 40, 42 Ummah, 21,23,47, 118, 137, 141 UK (United Kingdom). See Britain, Europe USA (United States of America). See America Urbanization, 9, 11, 13-14, 18, 79-80, 91, 129. See also migration Veiling, 50, 74-75, 89, 154 Vertigans, Stephen, 18, 120 Vertigans, Stephen and Sutton, Philip, 18, 171 VP (Virtue Party), 6, 70-71, 73, 75-76, 81,85, 163 Wallerstein, Immanuel, 9 War against terrorism, 109, 166-168, 170 War of independence, 40, 47-48 Weber, Max, 6, 23, 140, 143 Weiss Ozorak, Elizabeth, 99, 134 West, the, 3, 9, 42, 82, 84, 109, 111-28, 135, 138, 141, 148-51, 153, 156, 166, 169-70. See also America, Europe Westernization, 1-2, 6-8, 10-11, 30, 3 3 35, 42-43, 45-46, 48, 57, 64, 75, 92, 97,101,111-28, 132, 137, 139, 151, 153, 155-56. See also America, Europe Williamson, Bill, 41, 65, 92, 96, 106 Wilson, Bryan, 7 World War I, 30, 34-35, 39, 57 World War II, 47-48 WP (Welfare Party), 6, 66-70, 72-73, 7578,80-85,94, 118, 125-26,163 Ye$ilada, Birol, 4, 12, 42, 64-65, 82 Yilmaz, Me§ut, 65-69 Young Turks, the, 34 Zubaida, Sami, 89, 102

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About the Author STEPHEN VERTIGANS is Lecturer in Sociology, Applied Social Studies at the Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen, Scotland.