Democratic Decay and Authoritarian Resurgence 9781529210408

Table of contents :
Front cover
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
List of Tables
List of Boxes
List of Snapshots
List of Case Studies
Glossary
Introduction
Part I: The Current Landscape
1. An Era of Autocratization? Are We Experiencing an Era of Democratic Backsliding?
2. Entering the Grey Zone
Part II: Public Opinion and Norms
3. Measuring and Defining Public Support for Democracy and Autocracy
4. What Shapes Public Support for Autocratization? Political Culture, Education, Religion, Personality and Authoritarian Legacies
5. International and Informational Sources of Authoritarian Norms
Part III: Causes and Context
6. Globalization
7. Corruption
8. Authoritarian Populism
Part IV: Symptoms and Processes
9. Assaults on the Media and Civil Society
10. Assaults on Institutions
11. Assaults on Electoral Processes
12. Protests and Reforms
Conclusion
Notes
References
Index
Back cover

Citation preview

DEMOCRATIC DECAY AND AUTHORITARIAN RESURGENCE Natasha Lindstaedt

First published in Great Britain in 2021 by Bristol University Press University of Bristol 1-9 Old Park Hill Bristol BS2 8BB UK t: +44 (0)117 954 5940 e: [email protected] Details of international sales and distribution partners are available at bristoluniversitypress.co.uk © Bristol University Press 2021 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-1-5292-1038-5 hardcover ISBN 978-1-5292-1039-2 paperback ISBN 978-1-5292-1041-5 ePub ISBN 978-1-5292-1040-8 ePdf The right of Natasha Lindstaedt to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Bristol University Press. Every reasonable effort has been made to obtain permission to reproduce copyrighted material. If, however, anyone knows of an oversight, please contact the publisher. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the author and not of the University of Bristol or Bristol University Press. The University of Bristol and Bristol University Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. Bristol University Press works to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design: blu inc Front cover image: Unsplash/jr korpa Bristol University Press uses environmentally responsible print partners. Printed in Great Britain by CMP, Poole

Contents List of Tables List of Boxes List of Snapshots List of Case Studies Glossary

v vi vii viii ix

Introduction 1 PART I The Current Landscape

1 2

An Era of Autocratization? Are We Experiencing an Era of Democratic Backsliding? Entering the Grey Zone

17 43

PART II Public Opinion and Norms

3 4 5

Measuring and Defining Public Support for Democracy and Autocracy What Shapes Public Support for Autocratization? Political Culture, Education, Religion, Personality and Authoritarian Legacies International and Informational Sources of Authoritarian Norms

65 85 103

PART III Causes and Context

6 Globalization 7 Corruption 8 Authoritarian Populism

127 151 169

PART IV Symptoms and Processes

9 10 11 12

Assaults on the Media and Civil Society Assaults on Institutions Assaults on Electoral Processes Protests and Reforms

iii

193 217 241 263

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Conclusion 293 Notes 301 References 303 Index 397

iv

List of Tables 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 2.1 2.2 3.1 6.1 9.1

Countries with biggest jumps in liberal democracy scores (2008–2018) Waves of democracy How democracies fall Examples of personalist and populist leadership Regimes and dimensions of democracy Competitive authoritarian regimes Trust in parliament Trust in media Common civil liberties in democracies

v

20 21 32 39 51 56 74 144 199

List of Boxes 1.1 Democracy and autocracy in waves 1.2 Poverty and democratic breakdown 2.1 Delegative democracies 2.2 Reserved domains, military power 3.1 Political sophistication: how much do people know? 4.1 Personality cults and charismatic leadership 5.1 Russian election interference 5.2 Ethnic fragmentation and democracy 5.3 Artificial intelligence and democracy 5.4 What is fake news? 6.1 Inequality and globalization 6.2 Banks and the global financial crisis of 2008 6.3 Inequality and democratization 6.4 The ‘immigration’ issue 7.1 Kleptocracy 8.1 Donald Trump 8.2 Who is the populist voter? 8.3 What is Brexit? 9.1 Uncivil society 10.1 Electoral commissions 11.1 Gerrymandering in the US 11.2 Dark money 11.3 Elections in autocracies 12.1 Strategies to strengthen judiciaries C.1 COVID-19 and democracy

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20 30 47 49 76 99 109 114 118 120 129 132 141 146 155 174 181 185 198 233 245 254 256 286 293

List of Snapshots Chapter 3 Chapter 6 Chapter 10 Chapter 10

Brazil and democratic satisfaction What caused the crisis? How popular are referenda? The Trump administration and independent adjudication agencies Chapter 11 Rising campaign costs Chapter 12 Campaign finance around the world

vii

83 132 224 231 255 282

List of Case Studies Chapter 1 Chapter 1 Chapter 7 Chapter 8 Chapter 10 Chapter 12 Chapter 12

Turkey: democratic backsliding to breakdown Return from democratic decay in Ecuador Nigeria and corruption Populism in Latin American and Africa The perils of presidentialism? Protests and decay in India Women and democracy

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28 34 166 187 237 271 290

Glossary Aborted democratization attempt: when a country attempts to democratize but fails to become consolidated. Administrative corruption: abuses of power committed by civil servants and other members of the administrative institutions for personal gain; this usually includes bribe taking, nepotism (or the hiring of family members regardless of merit), cronyism (or the hiring of friends regardless of merit). Anti-party candidates: candidates that reject belonging to a political party; rather than campaigning on a political platform that is based on ideology or specific policies, they focus on their personal characteristics and appeal. Arab spring: a series of anti-government protests, uprisings and revolutions that took place in North Africa and the Middle East from December 2010 until December 2012 in response to decades of corruption and authoritarian rule. Tunisia was the only country that democratized while Jordan and Morocco implemented some moderate reforms. Armed conflict broke out in Syria, Yemen and Libya. Authoritarian breakdown or replacement: the fall of an authoritarian regime; replacement refers to when one authoritarian regime falls and is replaced by another authoritarian regime. Authoritarian collaboration: when authoritarian regimes offer financial and military support and/or share information with one another to help prop up fellow autocrats in maintaining themselves in power. Authoritarian deepening or resurgence: when an authoritarian regime becomes more authoritarian; a resurgence refers to the global rise of authoritarianism. Authoritarian learning: when autocrats learn from other autocrats about how to maintain and tighten their grip on power; this can take place by seeking out examples of other authoritarian successes or failures and applying those lessons appropriately. Authoritarian legacy: the psychological imprint left from authoritarian regimes, which may include a political culture that remains nostalgic about autocracy. Authoritarian personality: a personality type that is characterized by a rigid cognitive style that struggles to deal with ambivalence; authoritarians are also

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blindly obedient to authority and intolerant of those who are perceived to be part of an out-group. Authoritarian promotion: when authoritarian regimes actively promote democratic breakdown and authoritarian norms. Autocratization: the process of a regime becoming increasingly authoritarian, such as reducing civil liberties and eliminating term limits. In contrast to democratic backsliding which refers to a democracy becoming less democratic, autocratization can be applied to any type of regime. Bureaucratic corruption: see administrative corruption. Campaign finance rules: the rules that govern and regulate the use of money in elections. Checks and balances: the overlapping powers of different branches of government to check the power of one another in order to prevent one branch from becoming too powerful. A common example is the US system of government. Civic culture: a political culture in which citizens of a state have high levels of interest in politics, respect for the rule of law and are most interested in being individually and collectively engaged in political processes. The term was coined by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, who argued that a civic culture is an important building block to sustaining democracy. Civic nationalism: a form of nationalism that focuses on the value of citizenship, equality and tolerance. Civil liberties: individual rights such as freedoms of speech, press, association, religion and conscience. Civil society: associational life that is outside the government, where groups of people come together to achieve collective political and social objectives. Cognitive effect: the impact on education and democracy; more educated and informed citizens will be effective democratic citizens because they are better able to process complex information and distinguish between good and bad information. Colour revolutions: a series of uprisings and revolutions that took place in the former Soviet Union and the Balkans in the 2000s. Competitive authoritarian regimes: a term used to describe a hybrid regime (and non-democratic regime) that holds elections but where the incumbent has an enormous advantage. Though the elections are free of massive fraud, the regime represses civil liberties and the executive does not face checks and balances from other branches of government. The term has been most notably used by Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. Confirmation bias: the tendency that individuals have to confirm information they consume that supports their beliefs. Constitutional capture: where a democratic constitutional system is reshaped to benefit an incumbent regime. The rules are changed to help the incumbent hold onto power longer.

x

Glossary

Constitutional hardball: when a leader or party refuses to abide by the rules and laws of the constitution. Critical citizens: citizens who are critical of government policies, and active in government but are not necessarily dissatisfied with democracy. The term has been popularized by Pippa Norris. Cronyism: the practice of giving favours or jobs to friends without consideration of their qualifications. Dark advertising: a type of online political advertising that are not subject to normal regulatory guidelines. Dark money: undisclosed donations or money that goes towards a political campaign. Defective democracies: democracies that meet the minimum standard of democracy but not much else; they hold elections that are free and fair but have very weak democratic institutions and norms. Delegative democracies: democracies that hold relatively free and fair elections but have low levels of horizontal accountability, or ways of checking the power of the executive. Deliberative democracy: a model of democracy where significant deliberation and discussion takes place in order to inform policymaking. Democratic backsliding: the process of a democracy becoming increasingly less democratic, such as through the politicization of the judiciary or through greater restrictions on civil liberties. Democratic breakdown: the process of a democratic regime breaking down usually through a fraudulent election or a military coup. Democratic deconsolidation: the process of a consolidated democracy seeing an erosion of democratic norms, where a greater number of citizens are open to non-democratic forms of rule. Democratic decay/erosion/rot: see democratic backsliding. Democratic swerving: the back-and-forth process of a democratic regime becoming less democratic and then more democratic, such as what happened in the case of Ecuador after Rafael Correa left office and constitutional term limits were restored. Diagonal accountability: where citizen groups engage with institutions of horizontal accountability such as the legislature and the courts to ensure that there is better oversight of the executive and the state. Diffuse support for democracy: when citizens believe that democracy is superior to all alternative forms of government. Discriminatory legalism: laws that target groups that may be critical of the incumbent. Discursive accountability: where the media, civil society and NGOs ensure that elected leaders must justify their actions in the public discourse.

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Electoral democracies: democracies that hold elections that are free and fair but otherwise do not uphold all of liberal democracy’s essential features, such as full civil liberties and the rule of law. Electoral malpractice: the process of manipulating the rules governing elections and voting, the choices before voters and the administration of voting. This does not include fraud or tampering with the votes. Electoral mis-practice: when a state is too weak or incompetent to properly hold free and fair elections. Electoral fraud: the process of illegally interfering in the outcome of an election. This includes activities such as buying votes, stuffing ballot boxes, improperly recording votes and destroying ballots. Ethical effect: the impact on education and democracy; the idea that more educated citizens are able to take on more moderate political positions, and have more positive attitudes about human rights, civil liberties and democratic values. Exclusionary nationalism: a form of nationalism that emphasizes a pride in common ancestors, language and culture and glorifying one’s history and traditions. Executive aggrandizement: a type of democratic backsliding/autocratization where the executive becomes increasingly powerful vis-à-vis other branches of government. Flawed democracies: democracies that hold free and fair elections, but are flawed in other ways; they are sometimes referred to as electoral democracies. Flooding: the process of inundating citizens with so much information that they are confused about the facts; this is especially important for regimes that want to drown out any criticism. Gerrymandering: the process of drawing up electoral maps in ways that disadvantage a particular political party or candidate. This has been used in the US to the disadvantage of racial minority candidates (known as racial gerrymandering). Grand corruption: when those in power (not those working as civil servants) abuse power for their own personal gain; examples include embezzling funds or giving out lucrative government contracts in exchange for kickbacks. Grand corruption involves significant subversion of the political, legal and economic system. Grey zone regimes: regimes that are neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic (such as flawed democracies, semi-authoritarian regimes); since the end of the Cold War, there has been a rise in these types of regimes. Hegemonic elections: elections that are free of massive fraud but where the incumbent party has a huge advantage; there is little uncertainty about election results.

xii

Glossary

Hollowing: the process of weakening the state institutions by removing or forcing out knowledgeable and unpartisan experts or refusing to follow the rules and regulations of the institutions. Horizontal accountability: the scrutiny of state officials (such as the legislature, the judiciary, anti-corruption agencies, general auditing commissions, ombudsmen and watchdogs) holding the leadership of the executive accountable for their actions. Hyper-nationalism: a form of nationalism that is destructive to democracy; it over-glorifies a common history, ancestry, language and culture and rejects diversity and tolerance of others. Illiberal civil society: a form of civil society that is anti-democratic and intolerant of others. Information bubbles: a state of intellectual isolation where individuals only hear one point of view reinforced over and over. Institutional decay: the process of institutions such as the administrative, security, legislative and political institutions becoming more personalized and less professionalized. Inter-personal trust: the belief in the integrity and honesty of others; the ability of individuals to trust those who are outside their close network of friends and family. Judicial corruption: corrupt activities of those who are closely tied to the judicial system such as judges, prosecutors and court officials. Examples include when judges take bribes in exchange for specific judicial decisions or make politically motivated court rulings. Kleptocracy: a form of grand corruption where the leader or regime abuses power to steal public funds and resources. Examples include Joseph Mobutu’s theft of billions of funds in what was previously known as Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). Liberal democracies: democracies that hold free and fair elections, while also maintaining respect for civil liberties, political rights and the rule of law. Media capture: where the media is controlled directly or indirectly by the government or by large conglomerates with strong political interests. Media malaise: where the media neglects informing citizens and mostly focuses on horserace journalism or sensationalistic reporting; the result is a growing political disaffection and low levels of political efficacy. Mediatization of politics: the changing role of the media in framing political discourse. As a result of this, scholars have noted that citizens have become more aware of scandals and corruption. Military coup: a sudden and quick seizure of power to oust a leader or regime through extra-legal means. It is usually staged by the security forces, though the security forces can be working on behalf of civilian leadership. Movement society: the idea that protests are a normal feature of democratic politics.

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Nativism: an ideology which argues that states should comprise of members of the native group. Nepotism: the practice of giving favours or jobs to family members without consideration of their qualifications. Nostalgic deprivation: the feeling of romanticizing the past and believing that one is being left behind economically; this happens in the context of rising inequalities. Patriotism: devotion to one’s country; this is not to be confused with nationalism which may mean devotion to one’s nation (or group of people). Patronage: government appointments or hiring of citizens by those in power in exchange for or as a reward for their loyalty, rather than on basis of merit or qualifications. Patron-clientelism: a system based on hierarchical relationships between a more powerful patron, who may provide particularized benefits (such as jobs, money and other gifts) to a weaker client in exchange for their political loyalty. Personalist leadership/personalism: a style of leadership that is based on a leader’s appeal and characteristics over policy; power lies with the leader and not with the rules or institutions. Petty corruption: consists of the everyday abuse of power by public officials in their interactions with ordinary citizens; see also administrative corruption. Political corruption: the abuse of power of public office for personal gain, at the public’s expense. Political culture: the set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments towards a political system; though difficult to measure, the concept is still important to democratic consolidation. Political cynicism: an absence of trust in institutions of government; this is not necessarily indicative of low levels of diffuse support for democracy. Political trust: the confidence of citizens in institutions, such as the legislature, judiciary and the administration. Pork barrel policies: a form of spending that is intended to benefit a small constituency in return for their political support; these types of policies usually come at the expense of other public goods that are more far-reaching in their impact. Presidential hegemony: where the executive branch has neutralized the power of the legislature, judiciary and other independent agencies. Racial gerrymandering: the process of drawing up electoral maps in ways that disadvantage a particular race. This has been used most notably in the US to disenfranchize African American voters. Rentier populism: where oil rents are used to buy off citizen loyalty; these government handouts are often ‘popular’ but usually not conducive to long term development. Rule of law backsliding: a process where the courts, laws and rules are increasingly not adhered to or respected.

xiv

Glossary

Semi-authoritarian regimes: a type of grey zone regime that has both democratic and authoritarian characteristics. Elections are held regularly but they are not always free and fair; there is some turnover in power from time to time; civil liberties and other freedoms exist but there is also repression. There are some checks and balances but little horizontal accountability. Sharp power: an approach to international affairs that seeks to pierce, penetrate and perforate the political and information environments of targeted countries; it contrasts with soft power which is based on the positive promotion of a state’s identity to gain influence in the world. Silent counter revolution: the backlash to post-materialist values (which emerged in the 1960s and 1970s), that emphasizes security and hostility to outsiders. Social media: an instant form of electronic communication where users share information that is not vetted by an editor. Social trust: see inter-personal trust. Socio-tropic voting: a type of economic voting when citizens vote based on how they believe the economy is doing, rather than their own individual concerns. Soft power: the ability of a state to attract support and persuade other states to do what it wants without having to resort to using force or coercion. The term was coined by Joseph Nye. Specific support for democracy: when citizens are satisfied with the way that democracy is working. Telephone justice: a type of system where the executive interferes with judicial decisions by clearly directing the judiciary of what rulings to make, undermining judicial independence. Term limits: specific limits imposed on elected leaders, which can be applied to the judicial institutions, the legislature and the executive. Third wave: the wave of democratization that took place in the beginning in the 1970s in Southern Europe, Latin America and Asia. The term was popularized by Samuel Huntington. Vertical accountability: accountability that derives from citizen support of its leaders, and is demonstrated through elections. Vote buying: the process of buying off citizens in exchange for their vote; this can include offering small financial support, gifts and/or the promise of jobs. Voter suppression: a strategy to prevent certain groups from voting; an example tactic is using complicated voter registration laws to move citizens off of voting rolls. Welfare state: a state that provides generous benefits to its citizens, in the areas of healthcare, pensions, etc. in order to protect and promote their economic and social well-being.

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Introduction After decades of progress, democracy around the world has hit a snag. From Hungary to India, Venezuela to Turkey, Brazil to the Czech Republic, the quality of democracy is faltering. In 2020, for the first time since 2001, the majority of governments in the world are autocracies. Although pro-democracy protests reached an all-time high in 2019, key trends developing beneath the surface have slowed democracy’s forward momentum and are threatening to reverse the progress of the last several decades (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2020). For many years, this was not the case. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the success of the liberal democratic order set in motion changes to the international environment that put authoritarian regimes on the defensive. Autocracies struggled to adapt to the post-Cold War reality, and their numbers rapidly declined. Democracy, it seemed, had triumphed and secured its status as the world’s preferred form of governance. Francis Fukuyama (1989) proclaimed that we had reached the end of history – the point where liberal capitalist democracies would be the norm. Counter to the hopes that democracy would take hold in places like China after the Tiananmen Square protests and in Russia after the Soviet Union broke down, the end of history had been prematurely declared (see Diamond, 2008, 2015). The staunchest authoritarian regimes did not buckle in countries such as North Korea, China, Singapore and Vietnam. Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Armenia were also just as authoritarian as ever.1 The end of the Cold War also did little to change the democratic landscape in the Middle East – and though there were some positive developments in Africa, much of the continent had not democratized. The robustness of authoritarian regimes led to a renewed effort by comparativists to study authoritarianism and the variations that existed in these regimes. Along with earlier studies that looked at the impact of military coups (which were very common), most of these works investigated how authoritarian regimes maintain stability and how they fall apart. In particular, autocratic and democratic breakdown became two important areas of interest for comparativists (after decades of focusing on democratization). Both developments involved discrete events that were easy to identify and quantify. What was harder to measure was the rise of new democracies that never became fully democratic. All over the world, weak and new democracies stalled

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in their efforts to consolidate. Though elections were being held, these regimes were unable to offer much else. States that were poor and governed by patron– clientelism struggled to build democratic institutions and civil societies that could completely contain authoritarian abuse and corruption (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018). Meanwhile the lack of a global consensus on democratic norms and the absence of a democratic hegemon diminished democracy’s soft power. Many countries questioned whether democracy was the best form of government. Some were defiant in asserting that democracy is a Western construct that is not appropriate in other contexts. Other countries continued to pay democracy lip service, but had no genuine interest in democratizing. While the number of weak and failing states was increasing, there was also a rise of new forms of authoritarian rule. Many studies focused on how authoritarian regimes were adopting democratic institutions, such as building parties, legislatures and holding elections (Schedler, 2006; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Rivera, 2017). Though this initially looked like a democratic opening, it masked the reality that these democratic institutions were being used to keep autocrats in power. The prospect of a democratic opening came to fore once again when the Arab Spring broke out in 2010–2011. Though initially there was hope that democracy would spread across the Middle East, the region struggled to regain stability and some countries dissolved into state failure and conflict. In some ways, this is not surprising given the historical context. Not only had the region endured decades of authoritarianism, but the 2001 and 2003 US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, had resulted in prolonged violent conflicts that undermined the West’s efforts to promote democracy (Diamond, 2020). Attempts by the West to get involved in the Middle East in the aftermath of the Arab Spring resulted in more protracted conflicts in Yemen, Syria and Libya. Of the countries that saw uprisings, only Tunisia managed to transition to democracy, while Egypt returned to de facto military rule under General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. In light of these issues facing democratizing countries, many authoritarian regimes became increasingly authoritarian and more aggressive in asserting their values, filling the void left by the delegitimized West. This authoritarian resurgence led to concerns about the state of democracy, though some scholars had started using terms such as democratic slump, rollback and decline as early as 2008 (see Diamond, 2008; Plattner, 2015). Additionally, in contrast to clean breaks with democracy, another alarming trend was taking place in regimes across the spectrum. They were slowly becoming more autocratic. Referring to it by a number of names, including democratic backsliding and autocratization (see Chapter 1), scholars identified a new concept that had not previously been theorized in depth. As the field of democratic backsliding/ autocratization studies is still relatively new, much of the literature does not examine the direct causes of backsliding; instead past studies have mostly looked at the drivers of democratic and authoritarian stability.

2

Introduction

Drawing connections from this past scholarship, David Waldner and Ellen Lust (2018) highlighted different theory families for why democratic backsliding takes place. Theories of political economy argue that democratic backsliding is driven by structural economic variables, such as levels of income, distribution of income, sources of income and macro-economic performance (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2011; Mazzuca, 2013). Higher levels of inequality, rising unemployment and rentierism were cited as potential reasons for democratic decay and autocratic stability. Agency-based theories argue that political elites are responsible for democracy’s demise; political leaders who lack a normative commitment to democracy do not foster democratic institutions and instead engage in executive takeovers (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018). Theories that look at political institutions argue that specific political institutional arrangements are more conducive to backsliding than others. Presidential systems face criticism, as do electoral systems that encourage weak parties (Linz, 1990; Cheibub, 2007; Lijphart, 2012). Scholars also noted that international factors are important, mostly due to rising authoritarian norms and assaults on civil society by foreign actors (Cooley, 2015; Rutzen, 2015). Theories of political culture argue that norms, beliefs and attitudes are critical to sustaining democracy, but these studies took place prior to the onset of the big wave of autocratization in the twenty-first century (Almond and Verba, 1963; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). We incorporate these arguments and also explain the role of recent factors – such as globalization, rising levels of corruption and populist forms of leadership – that have been highlighted as important to understanding the causes of autocratization. In addition to the context that drives autocratization, we also look at indications that there were issues with how democracies were performing. One of the notable trends that predated the most recent autocratic surge is increased public dissatisfaction with democracy. Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner were aware of the problem, reflected in an anthology that they edited on public opinion about democracy in 2008, titled How People View Democracy. Although, at the time, democracy was the preferred form of government for the European public, surveys revealed that a large percentage of countries that had been part of the Soviet Union still admired strong leadership. Surveys also demonstrated an erosion of support for democracy in Latin America from 1995 to 2007. Similar drops in support for democracy took place in South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and the Philippines. In South Asia, though support for democracy was strong, so too was support for scrapping parliaments to allow for a strong leader. In many of these countries today, over a decade after these surveys were taken, democracy is struggling. In some policy circles, it was assumed that citizens would love democracy – but as public opinion surveys were uncovering, that is not always the case. By 2013, it became clear that democracies were struggling. Unlike in the past, democracies were not falling apart due to military coups. Though coups still take place, democracies were no longer having ‘official deaths’. Instead, they were decaying slowly through a series of power grabs that had

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some public support. This process became known as democratic backsliding or autocratization (see Chapter 1). Only since 2010 has there been more scholarly attention on this small but growing field. Would-be autocrats (and their ruling parties) were not being launched to power by the military; instead, they were seizing power through a series of incremental, informal and legal changes that had low transaction costs but that undermined mechanisms of accountability. As this book will explain, these systemic micro-assaults are launched on multiple fronts. It is only when the leader and the ruling party amass vast amounts of political power that they can overrun the constitution. In Turkey, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) relied on incremental assaults on the Constitution and on democratic norms for five years before the referendum in 2007, which increased executive power (Dinçşahin, 2012). In other cases, there was no need to change the constitution. De facto changes to the Polish Constitution enabled executive aggrandizement by the ruling Law and Justice Party (Sadurski, 2018). In sum, scholars noted two interesting trends. One, democracies were being killed by a thousand cuts, and two, these mortal cuts were being inflicted by democrats themselves (Ginsburg and Huq, 2018).2 But the early seeds of democratic decay may be sowed years before backsliding can be accurately captured. Countries that suffer from weak rule of law, poorly institutionalized parties that fail to represent the people, or a media that polarizes more than informs are already starting to erode. When this is accompanied by growing inequalities, demographic shifts and corruption, the propensity for autocratization rises. All of these factors are important because they shape citizens’ commitment to democracy, and to the belief that democratic processes are best suited to resolving disputes. Political entrepreneurs seize upon these conditions to engage in detrimental power grabs. In cases where political actors have not yet tried to expand their power, countries may remain vulnerable but may not actually experience identifiable rollbacks of democracy. As the book will show, assuming these preconditions described are present, the incumbent (leader and ruling party) can weaken democracy by capturing accountability mechanisms, while maintaining the bare minimum commitment to electoral democracy to legitimize the regime. The use of multi-micro-assaults is particularly effective because it makes it difficult for the judiciary and legislature to check. For example, judges are able to curb isolated egregious violations, but are less effective at preventing systemic challenges that, when presented in isolation, do not look especially damaging but accumulate over time (Khaitan, 2019). Some of these assaults have had a lasting impact, by eroding the separation of party and state, and creating precedents for future leaders and parties, even if the incumbent gets ousted from power. Democratic institutions take a long time to build and rebuild, but are easy to dismantle when there is some public support. Naturally there is a cyclical ebb and flow of democratization and dedemocratization (or backsliding), but this recent cycle has garnered significant attention because of the extent to which it has affected consolidated democracies.

4

Introduction

In consolidated democracies, we are not seeing vast changes taking place to constitutions and laws, but we are witnessing a complete erosion of democratic norms. This is in part due to the rise in populist authoritarian (and personalist) styles of leadership in democracies that are playing constitutional hardball and are simply refusing to abide by the laws and the constitution. This ebb is also due to changing norms in the public, which have grown weary of their governments, the pressures from globalization and mounting corruption. This has led to two important developments in public opinion: apathy and polarization. Key actors have taken advantage of these developments and stoked fires further. Neither trend bodes well for democracy (Hetherington and Weiler, 2009; Luttig, 2017; Svolik, 2019; Nugent, 2020). In more extreme cases, it is not just apathy and polarization that are the problem, but also a shift in norms that are anti-democratic, or at least, not conducive to democracy. But what may explain these shifting norms? Though these executive power grabs took place most notably since 2000, some less noticeable undemocratic developments took place beforehand. Take the case of the US. Though Donald Trump has been identified by scholars as a threat to US democracy (Bugaric and Kuhelj, 2018; Ginsburg, 2018; Antonio and Bonanno, 2019; Kaufman and Haggard, 2019; Pulido et al, 2019; Smith, 2019), detrimental changes to campaign finance rules and gerrymandering predated his electoral victory. In most of the countries that are backsliding the most severely, precursors were in place that facilitated this process. Parties were failing to represent, the rule of law had already been breaking down and the media was not always helping to promote democratic values or informing. Thus, there is not just a context, but a pre-context that is important to understand. The book aims to understand the pre-context and context of autocratization. The book also strives to understand the exact processes of how democratic regimes backslide. We know generally how democracies break down, but what are the cuts that dismantle democracies? In doing so, the book does not just examine the process of democratic de-consolidation in established democracies, but also how weaker and newer democracies backslide. In other words, why is this happening? Though the scope of this book does not focus in depth on authoritarian regimes, their growing presence makes it impossible to not address the strategies they are currently using to prop up themselves up and undermine democratic values. With its final chapter focusing on protests and reforms, the book acknowledges that this democratic slump could be followed by a democratic resurgence. Democracies may be faltering but they are not completely breaking down. Additionally, while autocratization is a major trend, so are democratic protests. In 2009, 27 per cent of the countries around the world had substantial prodemocracy protests. In 2019, as many as 44 per cent did (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2020). The final chapter examines the role of these protests, as well as what types of policies can help citizens understand democracy better.

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That brings us to the question of whether or not democracy is the best form of government. The book – in addressing the issue of democratic decline, how to identify it and how to tackle it – is arguing that democracy offers intrinsic value. Although regimes that lie between democracy and autocracy often struggle the most, the empirical record shows that democratic governance performs better on average than autocratic governance on a number of indicators. Human rights are more likely to be protected and corruption is likely to be lower. There are also higher life expectancy rates, lower maternal death rates and lower infant and child mortality rates. Moreover, a famine has never taken place in a democracy (D’Souza, 1994; Sen, 1999). When something goes wrong, democratic leaders hear about it, and have incentives to take action. Take the 2020 outbreak of the COVID-19 in China for example. During the early stages of the outbreak, which are critical to containment, there was little information shared about the virus and no precautionary warning given to the Chinese public. China’s efforts to hide the outbreak, its lack of transparency and the role of censorship only made things worse. Chinese President Xi Jinping uncharacteristically admitted that the government had made some mistakes, but critics charge that this has caused millions of lives. Additionally, as China is not forthright with official figures, the number that have died could be much higher. Though authoritarianism has fared better in countries like Qatar and Singapore, these are the exceptions, not the rule. Another question is how exactly do we measure democratic backsliding? Chapters 4–7 look at how authoritarian norms might form, while Chapters 9, 10 and 11 examine examples of power grabs and cuts to democracy that are taking place. These examples are not quantified in the book with a specific measure, but we try to provide a sequence of how these power grabs take place over time, and a sense of what a power grab entails, using examples from backsliding countries to demonstrate. This is why we focus on the media first: controlling information is important to shaping the hearts and minds of citizens. Controlling the narratives enables would-be autocrats to conduct other assaults on institutions of horizontal accountability, and ultimately on elections. Though this is not always the sequence in backsliding regimes, the chapters are ordered in this way in acknowledgement of the fact that it is the one that materializes most often. Additionally, as the focus of the book is on democratic backsliding, the countries that are discussed are primarily those that are backsliding (such as India) or have done so in the past (such as Ecuador). That limits the choice of countries that can be discussed, because not all countries are autocratizing. Some are staying the same (according to Lührmann and Lindberg, 2020, about 20 per cent of the countries around the world have not become more or less democratic in the past ten years). Some countries are making democratic progress. Africa, as a region, has seen more improvement than decline. Only seven democracies in Africa are declining, none severely. The most dramatic declines are taking place in semiauthoritarian regimes such as Mali and Zambia. Africa also differs from many of the cases in this book because of the increasing levels of diffuse support for

6

Introduction

democracy.3 Take the case of Zambia. Though two-thirds of Zambians surveyed in 2017 believed that the country is moving in the wrong direction (up from only 29 per cent in 2012), 81 per cent prefer democracy to any other form of government. Additionally, 64 per cent believe that the parliament should monitor the president and 71 per cent believe that the president should always obey the courts. Another 84 per cent favour term limits (Bratton and Dulani, 2017). Thus, the overall picture is more positive in Africa than in other regions (Lührmann et al, 2019). As a result, there are fewer examples from the region to draw from. Some exceptions to this are Senegal, Botswana, South Africa and Ghana, but most of these dips are small. Another point of clarification is with regard to populism. The rise of populist leadership figures heavily in this book, and is an issue that is woven throughout. Populism is defined in detail in Chapter  8, but there are some disagreements about how to define right-wing populism. Though we look at left-wing populism as well, the rise of right-wing populist parties has demanded considerable attention of late. Sometimes right-wing populist parties are referred to as such. It is also common to see the label ‘radical right-wing populism’ used. For the most part, these terms are used interchangeably. These parties are radical because they reject social integration of marginalized groups and are xenophobic. They are right wing in their position on supporting tax cuts (but not right wing in their support of protectionism and welfare). They are populist when they also seize upon sentiments of anxiety and disenchantment to appeal to the common man against ‘corrupt elites’ (Betz, 1993). According to Cas Mudde (2010), radical right-wing populism consists of nativism, authoritarianism (or the belief in a strictly ordered society) and populism (or the need to fulfil the will of the people). We incorporate Mudde’s conceptualization into how we define populism. We see populism as compatible with authoritarianism, and therefore refer to populism as authoritarian populism. We explain why in Chapter 8. We argue that today’s executive power grabs are being spearheaded largely by populist-style leaders. Two other labels that enter the mix are radical right-wing parties and extreme right-wing parties. Radical right-wing parties are often conflated with radical right-wing populist parties. In this book too, we assume that the two are synonymous. Extreme right-wing parties, however, are distinct. This is because they are openly racist, have clear ties to fascism and may resort to violence (Ellinas, 2015). Take for example the British National Party (BNP) and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the UK. The BNP is a neoNazi party that focused on creating paramilitaries, conducting marches and rallies in the 1980s and 1990s, and promoting white nationalism. It called for non-white British citizens to be stripped of their citizenship and believed in racial separatism. The group found some electoral success in the 2000s, before splintering in the 2010s. Its open embrace of Hitler made it impossible for it to reach the mainstream, and its membership as of 2019 was estimated to be only about 500

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DEMOCRATIC DECAY AND AUTHORITARIAN RESURGENCE

people. UKIP however, is a radical right-wing populist party. Its main agenda was to call for the UK to leave the European Union (EU) and to promote a British nationalist agenda. It aimed to limit immigration, reject multi-culturalism, return to traditional values regarding LGBT rights and be tough on crime. It has denied charges that it is racist, fascist or xenophobic. Its membership stands at 29,000 as of 2019 (Audickas et al, 2019). This book looks at radical right-wing populist leaders and the movements they lead, and not extreme right-wing movements.

Organization of the book The book focuses on two questions: how autocratization takes place, and why. The book is loosely organized into four parts. The first explains what we mean by autocratization and the different types of regimes that have emerged with varying levels of democracy. Because public support for democracy is so important to democratic stability, we also explain what public opinion is, how it is usually measured and how norms and beliefs develop at the individual and national levels. The book then looks at the context that shapes public opinion, both globally and domestically. Following this, the focus turns to populist authoritarianism in particular. Though power grabs are also being made by other types of actors and for other reasons, it is populist authoritarians who are doing the most damage to democracy. Next, the book demonstrates how power grabs take place, looking mainly at assaults on the media, legislature, judiciary and bureaucracy, and on electoral processes. We close with a look at the different ways that the public channels its frustration and the steps countries can take to prevent backsliding. We emphasize strategies that help foster norms that are supportive of democracy, and increase political knowledge and participation. The following sections provide a more in-depth overview of each chapter.

Chapter 1: An Era of Autocratization? This chapter explains how democracy in the twenty-first century is experiencing a slight decline. The chapter begins with an overview of the trends of democratic decay around the world. It then explains what is meant by democratic backsliding, and how it takes place. Though since about the 2010s, scholars have been writing about this concept, more needs to be done to understand the process fully. While previous research on democratic failure aggregated democratic breakdown into a single category of events, democratic backsliding today is more gradual and the public plays an important role in enabling it to happen.

Chapter 2: Entering the Grey Zone This chapter conceptualizes the ‘messy middle’, or those ambiguous regimes that mix democratic characteristics with authoritarian tendencies. It lays out how these

8

Introduction

regimes operate, differentiating between liberal democracies, flawed democracies, defective democracies, semi-authoritarian regimes and authoritarian regimes. Many regimes have become stuck somewhere short of full democracy. In this chapter, we briefly explain why there appears to be more grey-zone regimes since the Cold War ended (Levitsky and Way, 2010). Some scholars contend that grey-zone regimes have proliferated to such an extent that they are now ‘the modal type of political regime in the developing world’ (Schedler, 2006, 3; see also Brownlee, 2009; Coppedge, 2017). This depends, of course, on how you classify what should fall in the grey zone and, as the chapter explains, this varies considerably. Regardless, in order to understand how backsliding takes place, it is critical to know what a regime is backsliding towards. In other words, if a liberal democracy is backsliding, what has it become?

Chapter 3: Measuring and Defining Public Support for Democracy and Autocracy More and more frequently, contemporary democratic recessions are characterized by bottom-up processes with authoritarian leaders taking power through popular elections rather than elite-driven coups d’état (Bermeo, 2016). Though the public is not necessarily voting for autocracy, dissatisfied democratic voters may be willing to look the other way when power grabs take place. This development challenges the common perception that ordinary citizens universally perceive democracy as the best political system. This chapter explains how public opinion is measured and then maps patterns of democratic and authoritarian values in advanced democracies. It lays the foundation for greater insights on how authoritarian values develop in democracies, and why this is an important trend for autocratization. The chapter lays out the key values to examine, such as diffuse support for democracy, specific support for democracy, political trust and interpersonal trust. The chapter also focuses on polarization and apathy, and their implications for democracy.

Chapter 4: What Shapes Public Support for Autocratization? This chapter discusses how values are formed at both the national and individual levels. It starts by surveying the literature on political culture and the role of culture in shaping collective values about democracy. The chapter argues that though political culture is hard to measure and predict, there is value to understanding how political cultures are shaped by history and context. Education and its impact on democracy is also considered. While education and democracy are usually positively linked, not all education is meant to encourage democracy. The chapter looks at the role of authoritarian regimes in inculcating beliefs that have had a lasting legacy. The chapter also considers personality and what role, if any, it plays in forming political beliefs and in explaining receptiveness to authoritarianism, fascism and extremism (see Adorno et al, 1950; McFarland et al, 1992; Martin, 2001).

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DEMOCRATIC DECAY AND AUTHORITARIAN RESURGENCE

Chapter 5: International and Informational Sources of Authoritarian Norms Chapter 5 examines the resurgence of authoritarian regimes, and how these regimes have become more aggressive in promoting authoritarian norms around the world, such as fears about immigration, crime, instability and terrorism (Ambrosio, 2010; Cooley, 2015; Walker, 2016). The chapter argues that introducing these norms into the global discourse risks distorting interpretations of existing human rights norms and undermining their universality. It then turns to how technology, in particular, is exploited to challenge liberal democratic norms, create confusion and instil fear and anxiety in the public. Owing to the availability of data about individuals from social media, campaigns can microtarget specific categories of voters and develop messaging that will resonate with them. Thus, it is now possible to use machine learning to manipulate citizens’ opinions in major elections and referenda (Helbing et al, 2017; West, 2018). The chapter explains in detail how this is happening and how norms and values are shaped that are harmful to democracy.

Chapter 6: Globalization Democratic backsliding cannot be understood without looking at globalization, or the rapid improvements to technology and transport, the wide reach of mass media, the free movement of people and the unprecedented economic interdependence of the global economy. Chapter  6 defines globalization and explains how different aspects of globalization – free trade, inequality, immigration and the evolution of the media – impact support for democracy. The chapter pays significant attention to the relationship between inequality and democratic decay, as the former is considered a by-product of globalization. Some studies have argued that inequality is a bigger driver of authoritarian reversals (Gasiorowski, 1995; Slater et al, 2014), but does it also drive democratic backsliding? The chapter examines the ways in which inequality impacts support for democracy and why this is the case. It also looks at how perceptions of immigration affect democratic support and trust, and at the impact of the globalized media. International economic factors create a ripe environment for political entrepreneurs from authoritarian regimes to exploit. Free trade and the rise of corporate power has left many feeling excluded and socially dislocated, and has led to rising inequalities (Munck, 2006; Bourguignon, 2017; Lax et al, 2017). This chapter explains how these factors have shaped public opinion to favour non-democratic alternatives.

Chapter 7: Corruption This chapter examines the connection between corruption and democracy. Many studies argue that high levels of corruption are a sign of democratic decay,

10

Introduction

but does it also drive backsliding? Studies have demonstrated that high levels of corruption are harmful to democratic consolidation because of the impact on political legitimacy (Seligson, 2002a; Warren, 2004). Corruption affects a country’s political culture, leading to low levels of trust in public institutions, which has a severe impact on the commitment to civic activity and collective projects (Doig and Theobald, 2000). For example, political corruption has affected Nigeria’s political culture substantially, with declining confidence and trust in the state’s ability to organize free and fair elections and to be accountable to its citizens (Ogundiya, 2010). Rising corruption also creates fertile ground for the emergence of messianic-style of leadership that claim to ‘save’ the public from corrupt elites of the past. It creates a sense of urgency that allows authoritarians to cut corners in order to rid the country of the corrupt establishment. The chapter explains the relationship between corruption and democratic decay, and how pervasive corruption increases citizens’ receptiveness to non-democratic forms of rule.

Chapter 8: Authoritarian Populism Chapter 8 explains what is meant by authoritarian populism (both left- and rightwing). Since the mid-2000s, populist parties have gained a sizable vote share in Western Europe and the Americas. This chapter explores why populist leaders have become more significant, and explains the possible threats posed by the rise of populist movements in democracies and transitioning democracies (see Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012; Wodak, 2013). It primarily focuses on the role of populist leaders in shaping authoritarian narratives and fostering polarizing environments on which they can capitalize. The chapter looks at how populist leaders drive autocratization through power grabs that have some public support, and why some of the public is attracted to this leadership style and the narratives authoritarian leaders create.

Chapter 9: Assaults on the Media and Civil Society Switching gears from focusing on potential drivers of authoritarian norms, this chapter turns to the processes of democratic decay, or more specifically how would-be autocrats undermine diagonal and discursive forms of accountability, and what important preconditions facilitate these processes. The chapter explains how regimes looking to expand executive control seek to undermine media freedom and civil society. Incumbent regimes do so in order to minimize these actors’ ability to expose anti-democratic behaviour and amplify narratives that support their efforts to consolidate control. The media is of particular interest to would-be autocrats. Although attacking the media and encouraging selfcensorship is common in autocracies, this practice has become more prevalent in democracies. The pervasiveness of declining media freedom in democratic settings is highlighted by Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press Report 2017,

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DEMOCRATIC DECAY AND AUTHORITARIAN RESURGENCE

which found that ‘press freedom worldwide deteriorated to its lowest point in 13 years in 2016, driven by unprecedented threats to journalists and media outlets in major democracies…’ (Dunham, 2017, 3). This process degrades citizens’ rights and engagement with the state, which makes it more difficult for citizens to access accurate information about their governments (Bermeo, 2016). The chapter also explains the conditions that allow authoritarians to delegitimize media – primarily the media’s own failure to inform the public properly. The failure of some of the media to accurately report the facts has not only divided public sentiment, but made it easier for political entrepreneurs to delegitimize the press.

Chapter 10: Assaults on Institutions This chapter explains how regimes make discrete changes in the rules and informal procedures in order to expand their power. In doing so, a number of domains are targeted, including administrative, judicial and legislative institutions. The chapter first explains why these institutions are important for democracy and how they should function. The chapter then clarifies how these institutions are weakened or disabled, and why that is critical for a would-be autocrat to gain more power. This chapter goes into detail of these assaults on institutions, which undermine the rule of law and horizontal accountability (Lust and Waldner, 2015). It also explains the precondition that makes it easier for incumbents to expand power: a weak rule of law that fails to ensure that everyone is treated equally under the law. The erosion of the rule of law often happens years before direct assaults on it can be identified.

Chapter 11: Assaults on Electoral Processes Elections are fundamental to any democracy and undermining them affects the power of citizens to exercise vertical accountability. Chapter 11 examines different forms of electoral malpractice, which include manipulating the rules governing elections and voting, the choices before voters and the administration of voting (Schedler, 2002; Birch, 2011; Van  Ham and Lindberg, 2016). The chapter highlights the subtle changes taking place that enable incumbents to gain a huge advantage. The chapter especially focuses on developments in democracies that, though they may be legal, have made the playing field uneven, such as campaign finance laws, electoral systems, voter suppression efforts and gerrymandering (Braconnier et al, 2017b). The chapter also explains the preconditions for this process, particularly weak parties that fail to represent the public.

Chapter 12: Protests and Reforms This chapter contemplates various responses to democratic decay. We start by looking at the uptick in protests that have taken place around the world,

12

Introduction

examining the drivers that have moved citizens to take to the streets and whether these drivers are similar to those that cause other citizens to look towards authoritarian alternatives to remedy bad governance. We investigate which laws have proven most effective in ensuring high voter turnout (Gerber and Green, 2017). We also look at institutions that suppress minority voting (see Burden and Wichowsky, 2014; Citrin et al, 2014; Hicks et al, 2015; Hajnal et al, 2017; Highton, 2017). We highlight the importance of reforms that can lead to higher levels of support for democracy (see Buscaglia and Dakolias, 1999; Rauch and Evans, 2000; Sieder et al, 2016). The chapter also looks at reforms to the media. Corruption, high concentration of media ownership and blurring of lines between the media and the state all impede the public’s ability to access accurate information (see Jenkins et al, 2004; Curran, 2011; McChesney, 2016). What types of media reforms can improve the quality of information that citizens receive? The chapter investigates how media reforms can make a difference. Finally, the chapter looks at the role of civic programmes around the world in teaching democratic values and fostering an understanding of how democracy works. Studies have shown that democracy can increase political participation and lead to higher levels of public efficacy for democracy (see Naval et al, 2002; Finkel and Smith, 2011; Hess and McAvoy, 2014; Farnen, 2015; Fesnic, 2016; Crick, 2017). The chapter explores how civic programmes are able to make a positive impact. The roles of gender equality and increased levels of women in government are also explored.

Conclusion The book closes with a brief overview of the key themes discussed and what the future for democracy holds.

Key themes of the book • Democratic decay starts well before democratic indices may observe problems. • There are fewer clear breaks from democracy than in the past, instead there is a steady erosion consisting of small assaults on institutions and norms. • Early signs of decay include the erosion of the rule of law, political party institutionalization and a polarizing media. • Rising levels of corruption, growing inequalities and injustices (both perceived and real) can create growing discontent with democracy, polarization and apathy, enabling the erosion of democratic norms. • Democratic norms have to compete with authoritarian norms, with authoritarian actors effectively selling narratives that challenge democracy and new forms of technology facilitating this process. • Political entrepreneurs (and populist-style leaders in particular) have taken advantage of this context. Though these leaders have risen to power through

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DEMOCRATIC DECAY AND AUTHORITARIAN RESURGENCE

democratic elections, they have systematically sought to consolidate power vis-à-vis other institutions through a series of executive power grabs. This has taken place, to some extent, with public support. • These executive power grabs have led to even more polarization – manifested as outrage, protests and unrest – and further hardening of support for the incumbent.

14

PART I

The Current Landscape

1

An Era of Autocratization? Are We Experiencing an Era of Democratic Backsliding?

Introduction The Brazilian presidential election in late October 2018 saw a run-off between right-wing authoritarian candidate Jair Bolsonaro and former São Paulo mayor Fernando Haddad. Bolsonaro’s campaign rhetoric targeted minorities, gay people and women, and exposed his nostalgia for a return to military rule. Bolsonaro had gained attention in a radio interview in 2016, in which he said that the Brazilian military dictatorship’s one mistake was torturing but not killing. In spite of this, Bolsonaro managed to win the second round handily, with 55.1 per cent of the votes (Bloomberg News, 2018; Phillips, 2018). After his inauguration on 1 January 2019, Bolsonaro appointed members of the armed forces to key government posts, including vice president and the ministers of defence, science and technology, and mines and energy, as well as to the government secretariat, which handles relations with parliament. Seven out of twenty two ministers in his administration came from the armed forces (including reservists), more even than in some governments during the military dictatorship of 1964–1985. The press referred to Bolsonaro as ‘Tropical Trump’, a moniker that alluded not only to Bolsonaro’s right-wing agenda but also to the two leaders’ shared disdain for democratic institutions and human rights. Both leaders also made false claims about the fairness of their countries’ elections just prior to their victories. Just two years before Bolsonaro’s big win, the election of Trump brought to the fore the populist challenge facing Western democracy. But Trump’s win was preceded by other alarming developments for democracy. One of the earliest challenges came from Viktor Orbán in Hungary. Hungary’s status as a liberal

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DEMOCRATIC DECAY AND AUTHORITARIAN RESURGENCE

democracy has plummeted since Orbán took power in 2007. Orbán has stopped using rhetoric to cloak his anti-democratic impulses. In 2014, in a speech given to a Hungarian audience, he proudly declared that Hungary was an ‘illiberal democracy’ (Bíró-Nagy, 2017). Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the Law and Justice Party in Poland gained a majority in late 2015 and quickly took steps to weaken the independence of the judiciary. Populist leaders such as President Miloš Zeman and Prime Minister Andrej Babiš of the Czech Republic have strained Czech democracy. In one of Africa’s strongest democracies, former South African President Jacob Zuma attacked democratic structures such as the Constitutional Court and anticorruption investigators (Daly, 2018).

Is global democracy under threat? Many scholars and policy makers are concerned about the state of democracy in the world today and have been for some time now. In 2008, Larry Diamond warned of a democratic recession and described the preceding ten years as a protracted democratic recession (2015, 144). In 2016, Freedom House documented ten years in a row of declining Global Freedom. When population is taken into account, the level of democracy has receded to where it was in 1990. The most significant cases of regression are in Eastern Europe, which as a region has seen the biggest drop in the quality of democracy since the 2000s. In addition to Hungary and Poland, Serbia and Ukraine have also made headlines because of democratic decline. In the West, there has also been a notable decline in the quality of democracy in the United States, thanks to attacks on the judiciary and barriers to free and fair elections. However, although there are pessimistic arguments that we have entered a democratic downturn, others claim that not many democracies have broken down since the 2000s, and there also are plenty of countries that are advancing their democracies. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way (2015), for instance, point out that four democracy indices have recorded stable average democracy scores over the 2010s, while the number of democracies in the world has moved little in either absolute or relative terms. A recent study has demonstrated that on average, the countries that democratized during the third wave of democratization are still much more democratic today than they were before they transitioned to democracy (Mainwaring and Bizzarro, 2019). According to Varieties of Democracy data, there is some truth to both views (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2020).1 From 1978 to 2013, there were more democratic advances than reversals. In particular, the period after the Cold War saw a significant boost to democracy. From 1993 to 1994, over sixty countries made important advances, with only four countries sliding backwards. But this trend of democratic advancement was finally reversed in 2013, when more countries

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An Era of Autocratization?

were backsliding than were progressing, and there were more cases of democratic breakdown. According to Scott Mainwaring and Fernando Bizzarro (2019), the rate of breakdown of democracies between 1993 and 2012 was nearly three times higher than between 1974 and 1992. Additionally, since the mid-1990s, Varieties of Democracy reports that twenty-two countries that were electoral democracies have broken down to become electoral autocracies (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2020). In 2020, Varieties of Democracy reported that there were more autocracies around the world than democracies (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2020). Most scholars agree that the era of democratic transitions is over (Plattner, 2014; Diamond, 2015; Mechkova et al, 2017). Additionally, if we look closely at what has transpired over the 2010s, it does not look particularly promising. According to the Varieties of Democracy database, which measured how well countries score on the liberal democracy index over the decade, out of 175 countries, 45.7 per cent saw their democracies decline in quality, while 33.1 per cent improved and 21.1 per cent stayed the same. Of those that made improvements, about half were semi-authoritarian or authoritarian (Lührmann et al, 2019). Of those that declined, 62.5 per cent were democratic, meaning the bulk of autocratization is taking place in democracies (Lührmann et al, 2019) In spite of this, many countries are still advancing. For example, there have been some positive changes in Asia. Though Thailand has made a steep decline, overall Myanmar, Nepal, Bhutan, Vietnam and Sri Lanka have all liberalized in the 2010s (see Table 1.1). In North Africa, Tunisia has been a star advancer, democratizing after several decades of authoritarian rule. There are also other success stories in sub-Saharan Africa. African countries have seen a rise in the number of multi-party elections (Gyimah-Boadi, 2019). From 1960 to 1989 there was one election per year on average, compared to around seven a year from 1990 to 2012. Roughly 20 per cent of these elections have led to transfers of power (Gyimah-Boadi, 2019). There has also been a decline in election-day voter fraud (Lindberg, 2006). More election monitoring has served as a deterrent to counter falsification, ballot stuffing and ballot box fraud. Sierra Leone, Nigeria, the Gambia and the Ivory Coast have improved the quality of their elections, while Burkina Faso held fair elections for the first time in decades in 2015 (Gyimah-Boadi, 2019). Constitutions in Africa have also become more common, many of which mandate separation of powers and presidential term limits, and include bills of rights (Fombad, 2014; Hessebon, 2014). Anti-corruption commissions and election management bodies have also been formed. Information communication technologies (ICTs) are being used to promote government accountability and responsiveness. Civil society organizations are promoting more political inclusion, human rights and fair elections (Kew and Oshikoya, 2014). These groups are better organized and able to mobilize because of the availability of social media and mobile phones (Obadare and Willems, 2014).

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DEMOCRATIC DECAY AND AUTHORITARIAN RESURGENCE

Table 1.1: Countries with the biggest jumps in liberal democracy scores (2008–2018) Decline

Improvement

• US • Czech Republic • Brazil • Poland • Bulgaria • Hungary • India • Serbia • Mali • Zambia • Honduras • Ukraine • Comoros • Zanzibar • Mauritania • Turkey • Nicaragua • Burundi • Palestine • Gaza • Yemen • Bahrain

• Tunisia • Georgia • Burkina Faso • Sri Lanka • El Salvador • Ivory Coast • The Gambia • Nigeria • Sierra Leone • Fiji • Kyrgyzstan • Armenia • Myanmar • Central African Republic • Zimbabwe • Guinea • Libya • Swaziland

Source: Varieties of Democracy Annual Report 2019 (Lührmann et al, 2019)

Nevertheless, there are multiple challenges facing liberal democracies. As subsequent chapters will explain, while populist leaders have chipped away at horizontal forms of accountability, publics have become increasingly disillusioned with democracy. Thus while there is a significant role played by political elites who want to manipulate the masses, the erosion of democracy would not be possible without popular support. We see the emergence of uncivil society groups that enthusiastically endorse illiberalism, as well as growing apathy, alienation and polarization influencing citizen engagement with politics and political civility. Scholars are working to understand the nature of these evolving threats to democratic systems and come up with potential solutions.

Box 1.1: Democracy and autocracy in waves Since the publication of Samuel Huntington’s 1991 study of democratization, many scholars have concurred that there are distinct waves of democratization (see Table 1.2). A wave of democratization is defined as a group of transitions from non-democratic regimes that

20

An Era of Autocratization?

occurs within a specific period of time in which such transitions significantly outnumber the number of transitions in the other direction. A wave can also involve partial liberalization or democratization of political systems. The more democratic powerful states in the system are, the greater the number of democracies. On the flipside, just as the number of democracies rises when democratic countries dominate the system, the number of democracies decreases when there is an autocratic hegemon. Today we are currently experiencing a wave of autocratization. Huntington referred to these waves as reverse waves of democracy, but more recently, they have been referred to as waves of autocratization. The first wave of autocratization took place from 1926 to 1942. After the First World War, the rise of fascist Germany and the weakening of France and Britain led to a decline in the number of democracies in the inter-war period. In this democratic vacuum, fascists in Germany and Italy sought to portray their regimes as more capable of providing security and stability (Berman, 2016). The second wave occurred from 1961 to 1977, during the height of the Cold War. The exact time of onset of the third wave of autocratization is still under debate. Anna Lührmann and Staffan Lindberg (2019) argue that it may have started as early as 1994, while Larry Diamond (2015) suggests that it started after the global financial crisis of 2008. After the Cold War ended, the US and the European Union played an important role in advancing democracy during the third wave of democratization, using a variety of tools including foreign aid. International activism and the lack of an assertive authoritarian regime to counter this helped to construct a broad consensus that was favourable to democratic forms of government.

Table 1.2: Waves of democracy First wave

1826–1926

Reverse wave

1922–1942

Second wave

1942–1962

Reverse wave

1960s and 1970s

Third wave

1974 to end of 1990s

Third reverse wave

1994(?)–

What do we know about autocratization? Given the challenges facing democracies today, there has been an increasing interest in the study of democratic backsliding. Before we begin, it is important to note that there are many different terms to describe this process, including democratic decline, democratic backsliding, democratic erosion and autocratization. There

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are small differences between autocratization and democratic backsliding, but the objective of studying them is the same: to better understand the causes, patterns, trends and extents to which countries are becoming less democratic and therefore more authoritarian. We will highlight the small difference later in Chapter 2, but for the purposes of this book, we use the terms interchangeably. There are also different types of democratic recessions. Larry Diamond (2016) highlights four: an acceleration of breakdown in a democratic regime; a deepening of authority in non-democratic states; a decline in stability or quality of democracy in a democracy, known as ‘democratic backsliding’; and finally, a decline in the vigour of long-established democracies, known as ‘democratic de-consolidation’ (which also constitutes a type of backsliding). However, several decades ago, much of the scholarly interest focused on studying the reverse process: democratization. In the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s a wave of democratization took place in Latin America, parts of Asia, Eastern Europe and subSaharan Africa. This was known as the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991). As a result, scholars studied the causes of the democratic transitions (Diamond et al, 1989) and the types of transitions taking place (Huntington, 1991). However, as these democratizing regimes struggled to consolidate, scholarly attention turned to the challenges to consolidation (Haggard and Kaufman, 1994; Linz and Stepan, 1996), the problems relating to the quality of democracy in some of the newer democracies and the emergence of so-called hybrid regimes, which we refer to in this book as ‘grey-zone regimes’ (Diamond, 2002). In the mid-2000s, scholars started to see worrying signs of a democratic rollback. While the Freedom House Index has been measuring political rights and civil liberties since 1972, and the POLITY series has been doing so since the 1960s, datasets have been increasingly engaging in democratic assessments over a wider period of time and space, with more accuracy, reliability and specificity. In addition to these reports, the Economist Index of Democracy, Varieties of Democracy and IDEA International have also produced valuable reports and indices on the state of democracy. While some scholars could draw on historical cases to better understand democratic rollbacks (Berg-Schlosser and Mitchell, 2002; Bermeo, 2003; Capoccia, 2005), scholars are now able to use large data sets to build large-N studies that help identify patterns of not only breakdown, but also backsliding.

Key concepts: autocratization Autocratization, democratic backsliding, decline, erosion, decay and the like refer to the deterioration in quality of democracy and encapsulate a wide range of processes. Autocratization is the undermining of democratic institutions, governance and transparency. Autocratization takes place through a series of discrete changes in the rules and informal procedures that shape not only elections, but also civil liberties, political rights and various mechanisms of accountability.

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With autocratization, there is an also increasing power of actors that do not have electoral accountability, such as shadow leaders and multi-national corporations (Ercan and Gagnon, 2014). In contrast to democratic breakdown, autocratization is the gradual degradation of a democratic system. Some of the changes are subtle and not easy to notice right away. This could mean that elections become less competitive and power becomes more arbitrary, but electoral mechanisms have not been undermined entirely. Political participation may be restricted and access to resources narrowed, without explicitly abolishing the rules of universal franchise (Tilly, 2003). Media freedoms, civil society and freedoms of speech and association may be under attack and face intimidation, but remain legally protected. It also means that legislative and judicial checks on executive power exist in theory, but become less effective in practice. Some changes have a direct impact on the quality of democracy, such as laws that limit freedom of speech. But many changes have more of an indirect impact, such as violations of campaign finance laws that might marginalize smaller parties. One of the reasons why the field of democratic erosion has gained so much attention is because of concerns that there is a specific type of backsliding taking place in consolidated democracies, known as democratic de-consolidation (Diamond, 2016). While democratic backsliding typically takes place in new democracies that have weak institutions, democratic de-consolidation refers to the erosion of democratic norms that take place in consolidated democracies that have built up strong democratic institutions over time. The erosion of norms is important because in consolidated democracies, constitutions and laws may not be as easy to change. The US Constitution, for example, is near impossible to change without supermajorities in Congress and state legislatures. But in consolidated democracies there has been a slow erosion of how the public and elites feel about democratic procedures and norms, along with changes to informal rules that govern executive and legislative power. In this book, we refer to cultural shifts in consolidated democracies as democratic de-consolidation (Foa and Mounk, 2017). Survey data helps reveal whether or not there are lower levels of trust in the system and growing dissatisfaction with democracy; a greater willingness of political actors to violate the rules of the system; low levels of political literacy; and a belief that democracy might not be the only game in town. Declines in voter turnout and civic engagement in politics, greater support for anti-system political parties and a decline in membership of political parties are also signs of democratic de-consolidation (Foa and Mounk, 2016). In Latin America, public disillusionment over the benefits of democracy and its capacity to bring opportunities and prosperity to the many has raised concerns over the continued legitimacy of democracy as the best form of government. Brazil has seen a declining public faith in democracy and greater willingness of political actors to breach its fundamental rules (Foa and Mounk, 2016; Sunstein, 2018a).

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Some scholars refer to this process as ‘hollowing’, wherein there is a decline in interest of citizens in participating and a change in democratic values rather than just a change in the institutions and processes (Greskovits, 2015). According to this view, some civic engagement may continue, but there is an overall decline in citizens’ interest in participation and support for democratic processes, even while democratic institutions appear to be intact. For example though the US  Constitution has remained unchanged, there are increasing concerns that US citizens are no longer willing to sustain the Constitution due to a lack of civic education and faltering commitment to essential democratic values. One reason why a hollowing of democratic norms can take place while democratic procedures are still in working order is that political cultural norms change so slowly. Therefore, cultural erosion unfolds over a long time in comparison to the relatively swift changes that can be made to weaken institutions. Pippa Norris uses the analogy that old floorboards can creak for years without the foundations collapsing (2017b). Chapter 3 provides more insight on how much support there is for democracy around the globe and which countries may already be facing democratic decline. In addition to democratic de-consolidation and hollowing, confusingly, there are a host of different terms used to describe the process of becoming less democratic: ‘democratic backsliding’ (Bermeo, 2016; Waldner and Lust, 2018); ‘democratic regression’ (Erdmann, 2011); ‘democratic recession’ (Diamond, 2015); ‘democratic decay’ (Daly, 2019); ‘democratic deterioration’ (The Economist, 2019b); ‘democratic erosion’ (Plattner, 2014; Coppedge, 2017); ‘de-democratization’ (Tilly, 2003; Ágh, 2015); ‘performance deficit’ (Fukuyama, 2015); and ‘democratic de-consolidation’ (Foa and Mounk, 2016). There is a slight distinction to made between democratic ‘rot/erosion/decay’ and ‘autocratization’ because the latter can be viewed as intentional while the former can be seen as unintentional. Decay and erosion are terms used to describe a gradual process that may happen over time and may not be premeditated. The process is involuntary and may be occurring out of the control of anyone specific. For example, later chapters will explain how parties may erode over time and become less representative. Corruption, more generally, may cause democracy to erode over time, though this may be an unintentional consequence of institutional weakness. However, we see terms such as democratic decline, democratic decay, democratic rollback and democratic backsliding as neutral terms used to describe the process of a regime becoming less democratic, regardless of the role agency, and we use them interchangeably.2 We see the process of becoming less democratic as one that could involve both intentional and unintentional processes. In addition to these terms, there are also specific types of backsliding that have attracted the attention of other disciplines. Legal scholars have more specifically focused on ‘rule of law backsliding’, where the courts, law and rights are

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An Era of Autocratization?

undermined (Pech and Scheppele, 2017). The Philippines represents a perfect case of this. Since the 2016 election of Rodrigo Duterte, rule of law has been ignored in favour of vigilante justice against alleged drug dealers and users. Other scholars refer to judicial capture and ‘constitutional capture’, wherein a democratic constitutional system is reshaped to benefit an incumbent regime. The courts, laws and rights are sidelined. This is what happened in the case of Hungary: a supermajority was used to push through an entirely new constitution to suit leader Viktor Orbán and the Fidesz party. This is unlikely to happen in most consolidated democracies that have experienced decades of judicial independence. In consolidated democracies, a more likely scenario is instances of the executive playing ‘constitutional hardball’ – or engaging in practices that are technically permissible under the constitution but which violate existing constitutional understandings (Tushnet, 2004). This could include the executive simply ignoring the constitution (and other laws) without actually changing them. In addition to democracies becoming less democratic, there are also more authoritarian regimes becoming more authoritarian. This phenomenon is known by a number of terms, such as ‘authoritarian deepening or resurgence’ (Walker, 2015, 2016); ‘re-consolidation or re-solidification of autocracies’ (Carothers, 2002; Levitsky and Way, 2015); and ‘authoritarian backsliding’ (Waldner and Lust, 2018). There is some disagreement over whether or not the process of authoritarian regimes becoming increasingly authoritarian constitutes a form of backsliding. For this reason, Anna Lührmann and colleagues (2018b) at Varieties of Democracy use the term ‘autocratization’. This denotes that the process can take place in a democracy or an autocracy, because it constitutes a deliberate process of regime change that shares a direction towards autocracy regardless of the point of departure. For example, China has become increasingly authoritarian under Xi Jinping, but while this is a case of autocratization, it is not democratic backsliding because China is not a democracy. Thus, terms that use the word ‘democratic’ can only be applied to regimes that are democratic or at least have democratic features. This is important to note because the process of autocratization is more likely to take place in a regime that is not fully democratic, as authoritarian regimes around the world are becoming more authoritarian. In a 2019 report, two-thirds of the cases of autocratization around the world took place in countries that were already autocratic, and only one-third took place in democracies (Luhrmann et al, 2019). For greater clarity, it is important to highlight what autocratization and democratic backsliding are not. Autocratization is not the replacement of one authoritarian regime by another, such as when Ugandan dictator Idi Amin was ousted from power only to be replaced by another dictator, Milton Obote (Levitsky and Way, 2015). With backsliding there is as worsening of democratic conditions, not maintenance of the status quo (Cassani and

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DEMOCRATIC DECAY AND AUTHORITARIAN RESURGENCE

Tomini, 2018). Authoritarian regimes often break down and are replaced by another authoritarian regime, but this is simply ‘authoritarian breakdown’ and ‘replacement’. Failed democratization attempts and state failures are also beyond the scope of democratic backsliding. These are known as ‘aborted democratization attempts’. Cases where elections are held shortly after authoritarian breakdown takes place, but the autocracy is reinstalled soon after are considered reversals or ‘aborted openings’ (Diamond, 2000). For example, after Hosni Mubarak was ousted from power in 2011, Egypt briefly attempted to democratize, but within a few years General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi was installed in power indefinitely. This may also include cases where the autocratic breakdown was followed by a few democratic elections cycles, but democracy never really gained traction. In the case of Iraq, after years of dictatorship under Saddam Hussein, the US ousted him and his Ba’athist regime in 2003. Elections were held in 2005, 2010 and 2018. Nouri al-Maliki became the prime minister of Iraq from 2006 to 2014, and then served as vice president from 2016 to 2018. During al-Maliki’s tenure, he drove Iraq into state failure and tightened his grip on power (Al-Ali, 2014). However, Iraq was never truly democratic and has faced numerous challenges to democratizing. Backsliding also does not include attempts of authoritarian regimes to consolidate control and counter democratic narratives around the globe. These efforts to fight against pro-democratic movements and external democracy promotion are about sustaining the status quo and ensuring authoritarian resilience (Heydemann and Leenders, 2011). True, there is an authoritarian resurgence taking place – in that authoritarian regimes are consolidating power and promoting authoritarian values (see Chapter  5), but this authoritarian deepening is taking place in regimes that are already autocratic. Backsliding can also be distinguished from ‘democratic breakdown’. While democratic decay is a gradual and continuous process, democratic breakdown is the endpoint of the process when a democracy has failed or where a regime ceases to be democratic (Kapstein and Converse, 2008a; Denk and Anckar, 2014; Svolik, 2015). In democratic breakdown, there is a clear rupture or break with democracy that is easy to pinpoint. In contrast, democratic erosion may eventually lead to a democratic breakdown, but the process could take years and it may not be as easy to discern exactly when it has happened.

Types of democratic breakdown There are two types of democratic breakdown – an exogenous and an endogenous termination of democracy (Maeda, 2010). An exogenous termination is a democratic breakdown engineered by forces outside the government, such as a military coup, where the elected executive loses power. On the other hand, an endogenous breakdown is where the chief executive initiates the breakdown

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An Era of Autocratization?

and remains in power afterwards. A common type of endogenous breakdown has been a self-coup. ‘Military coups’ or exogenous terminations are another way in which democracies end. A military coup is the illegal removal of a leader from power, usually planned and executed by the military or security services. Given that the use or threat of force is necessary to take power, the military or security services are always involved. However, the extent of their involvement varies widely. Palace coups, for example, are driven primarily by civilian elites, although they have the backing of either the military or security services, and are executed by the military. Self-coups are events where the executive renders the national legislature powerless, or assumes extraordinary powers unlawfully in a swift seizure of power. Self-coups can also involve annulling the constitution, declaring martial law or suspending the courts. The result is that the executive is ruling by decree and assuming dictatorial powers. Self-coups are relatively rare compared to military coups, but there are several modern examples. In Peru, Alberto Fujimori shut down the legislature in April 1992 and ruled by decree. In Pakistan, President Pervez Musharraf suspended the Constitution in November 2007. In Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro enabled the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, which he controlled, to take over the legislative powers of the National Assembly in March 2017. In the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in September 1972. In South Korea, Park Chung Hee assumed dictatorial powers in October 1972. Other types of endogenous breakdowns include electoral fraud to keep the incumbent in power and, possibly, the elimination of term limits (see Chapter 11). All of these examples are of events where a democracy broke down quickly and at a clear point at the hands of the incumbent. These self-coups or endogenous terminations are also examples of a type of executive takeover, but it is important to note that most executive takeovers today take place over several elections cycles through a process that is led by the elite and supported by the public. Self-coups, on the other hand, indicate that a discrete action took place that constituted an endpoint to democracy. Democratic backsliding through executive aggrandizement (this is the process of the executive gaining more power visà-vis other actors that are supposed to hold the executive to account) can also eventually lead to a democratic breakdown, but this happens after a series of gradual power grabs over a longer period of time. The case of Turkey illustrates this process of backsliding or ‘executive aggrandizement’ (see Chapter 10) ending in democratic breakdown. This was an endogenous process like a self-coup, but played out over time. Turkey was backsliding for years, but at the time of writing is considered authoritarian, even though it may continue to backslide further. However, because a clear rupture did not take place (such as a coup or self-coup), scholars are not in agreement as to which power grab was the one that served as the death knell to Turkey’s democracy.

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DEMOCRATIC DECAY AND AUTHORITARIAN RESURGENCE

Case study: Turkey: democratic backsliding to breakdown Few countries have had such a colossal fall from democracy as Turkey. In the early 2000s, Turkey appeared to be well on its way to becoming democratic. Today, under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Development and Justice Party (AKP), Turkey has descended into autocracy yet again. Erdoğan and the AKP came to power in 2002, boasting impressive electoral victories. Erdoğan initially set himself apart from his predecessors as a reformer wholly focused on democracy and prosperity. Hoping to eventually joining the European Union, the regime emphasized political liberalization and economic modernization, and attempted to implement a structural reform programme. Restrictions on wearing headscarves were removed in the name of freedom of expression. Erdoğan also spoke about national unity and increasing rights for the Kurds. He became the first Turkish prime minister to sit down with the Kurdistan Workers Party. Given its early success in delivering economic growth and investment, the AKP enjoyed strong public support. As a result, both domestic and international observers tended to downplay some of Erdoğan’s early moves to consolidate power. For example, there was little public outcry when, during Erdoğan’s first two years in power, the AKP government passed more than 500 laws without deliberation (Dalacoura and Seckinelgin, 2015). There was also public support for a 2007 referendum to elect the president by popular vote instead of through the parliament. Erdoğan went on to win the presidential elections in 2014 and 2018 with over 50 per cent of the popular vote. Erdoğan’s reformist agenda also helped reduce the military’s political influence. However, what appeared to be a genuine effort to increase civilian influence masked an effort to reduce the power of the biggest threat to Erdoğan’s power: the military and the wider secular establishment. In 2007, Erdoğan reduced the military’s influence in the National Security Council and removed seats reserved for military officers on the Higher Education and the Radio and Television Supreme Council. Two court cases accused hundreds of military personnel of planning a military takeover and detained them. Many observed that the purpose of these moves was to suppress political opponents of the AKP government. The trials against members of the military were criticized for using undemocratic procedures, with little attention to the rule of law or human rights. The judiciary has also suffered. In 2010, Erdoğan passed two dozen constitutional changes via national referendum (Baser and Öztürk, 2017). Some of the reforms appeared as though they were designed to enhance democracy in Turkey by making posts elected rather than appointed. Ultimately, however, Erdoğan used the reforms to enhance his power vis-à-vis the judiciary. The president received power to name fourteen of the seventeen Constitutional Court judges. Instead of the courts, the AKP-controlled legislature can effectively decide

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An Era of Autocratization?

which parties can legally contest elections (Yilmaz and Bashirov, 2018). As a result, more than 3,000 sitting judges were removed in 2014. In 2015, the National Intelligence Organization (headed by a presidential appointee) was given the power to collect ‘all information, documents or data from any entity in Turkey’ without having to seek judicial permission or submit to judicial review (Bermeo, 2016). Erdoğan had initially gained the support of progressives by talking about tolerance and unity. A decade later, his tone had become firmly undemocratic and assertive. In multiple instances, Erdoğan used real or manufactured threats to justify repressive measures. Following the 2013 protests against the demolition of Gezi Park in Istanbul, twenty-two people were killed, over 8,000 were injured and almost 5,000 were arrested (Demirel-Pegg, 2020). Attacks on the media also increased. According to Human Rights Watch (2020), Turkey is also the world leader in jailing journalists (for more on repression of the media, see Chapter 9). Though the Gezi protests were the most significant challenge to his rule, they did little to stop Erdoğan from accelerating efforts to consolidate his control further. His next move was to use the July 2016 coup attempt to declare a state of emergency and purge dissidents from the military, the media, the judiciary and even his own party (Whiting and Kaya, 2016). This laid the groundwork for the passage of an April 2017 referendum that expanded his presidential powers, enabling him to stay in office potentially until 2029. By the time the two-year state of emergency expired, it had been replaced by counter-terrorism legislation that gave the government extraordinary power to increase police power and to dismiss public officials. Over 130,000 public officials have been dismissed over alleged association with terrorist groups (The Guardian, 2018a). Though Turkey was never fully democratic, in the early 2000s it was on the path to liberalization. Since then, through a series of discrete manoeuvres sanctioned by the public, Turkey has become fully authoritarian (Özbudun, 2015; Azgın, 2020; Esen and Gumuscu, 2020). Erdoğan has been a master at using ‘democracy’ to keep himself in power indefinitely.

Causes of democratic breakdown Though the main focus of this book is to examine the drivers of democratic decay and not necessarily democratic breakdown, it is important to recap the vast literature on the causes of democratic breakdown. We focus here specifically on the causes of military coups. A commonly cited cause of military coups is corruption and government mismanagement. In some cases, government misrule is more a pretext than a central driver for military action. Nevertheless, whatever the underlying motivation, the military deems itself more capable of running the government and the economy, and views its intervention as necessary for the well-being of

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the state. Poor governance can also strengthen the resolve of coup plotters and ease the decision of the rest of the military to cooperate with the coup. Poor governance also affects public perception of the desirability of coups. Though coups are orchestrated by the military, public sentiment plays an important role in their decision-making. The military is more likely to attempt a coup if it perceives that the public will accept or even welcome the intervention. In Pakistan, for example, strong public dissatisfaction with civilian politicians who were viewed as corrupt and incompetent were critical factors fuelling the country’s three military coups. Coups in Thailand (nineteen coups in total) have happened regularly due to the military’s disdain for the civilian leadership. The most recent coup took place in 2014, amid growing political unrest. Once a country has experienced a coup, it has a much higher likelihood of experiencing another coup, relative to a country that has not had a coup in its recent history (Londregan and Poole, 1990). It is not just that the military knows it is possible; the public may be more willing to accept coups. Thus, a democratic political culture and a robust civil society are critical to preventing coups (Belkin and Schofer, 2003). Democracies can also break down when there has been instability, chaos or state failure. This is fairly common in democratizing countries that lack the institutional strength to manage democratic transitions. Typically democratic transitions are difficult periods for any regime, as expectations are high while rules and institutions are relatively weak. In many cases these rules are not agreed upon and elites engage in a power struggle, carving out territory and riling up factions in order to gain support. This rarely takes place in a consolidated democracy. However in countries like Pakistan, where periods of elections and civilian rule have alternated with periods of military dictatorship, instability and insecurity are often used as an excuse for the military to seize power. Instability due to guerrilla groups in Argentina was used as a reason for the military to take over in 1976.

Box 1.2: Poverty and democratic breakdown Theories linking economic variables to regime outcomes are a central pillar of studies of democratic transitions and breakdowns. Bucking the trend argued by modernization theories, there are poor countries increasingly transitioning to democracy. In the last decades of the twentieth century, more impoverished countries transitioned to democracy, up from 25 per cent to 37 per cent from the previous period (Kendall-Taylor et al, 2019). However, countries experiencing higher levels of poverty are more likely to also experience democratic breakdowns (Londregan and Poole, 1990; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997; Slater et al, 2014). Early studies had noted that democratic breakdowns are more likely in countries with GNP per capita of less than $1,000, where democracy had an expected lifetime of only eight years (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997).

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Studies show that poor economic conditions dramatically increase the likelihood of coups (Londregan and Poole, 1990; Luttwak, 2016). There are a number of reasons for this. An economic downturn may provoke social unrest, strikes and protest, which can lead the military to stage a coup to restore order (Welch and Smith, 1974). States with low revenues are also unable to pay military salaries, which may lead to dissatisfaction within the military. Less developed countries are also associated with lower quality governance, which creates conditions conducive to coups. Poor economic performance also makes democracies more vulnerable to breakdown, as do high rates of inflation (Mainwaring and Bizzarro, 2019; Kapstein and Converse, 2008b). On the flip side, countries are more likely to make democratic advances when they have higher GDP per capita and stronger economic growth (Burke and Leigh, 2010; Mainwaring and Bizzarro, 2019). Some countries, such as Mongolia, Benin, Senegal and Ghana, have been able to defy expectations and advance their democracies with relatively low GDP per capita rates. However for the most part, advances have been elusive for democracies facing poor economic conditions. Democracies can deteriorate for several reasons when countries are poor. Poverty makes it difficult for the state to supply public goods, which can lead citizens to push for authoritarian decision-making and desperate political measures. Poverty will also raise the stakes of socioeconomic conflict and raise levels of discontent, making extra-systemic solutions appear more attractive (Seligson and Muller, 1987; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995). Poorer states offer very few opportunities outside of the public sector for gaining wealth and influence, which makes control of the state important. This drives clientelistic politics, which can erode democratic institutions. Poor people are susceptible to vote buying and being co-opted through political patronage, making elections merely an economic exchange. For example in Zambia, reports emerged that electoral authorities in strongholds of the ruling Patriotic Front were permitting voters to register more than once (Freedom House, 2016).

Economic arguments of democratic breakdown also highlight the importance of high levels of inequality. Inequality can lead to demands from the wealthy to protect their wealth at any cost, even if this includes supporting authoritarian styles of leadership (Boix, 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). During the Cold War, many Latin American countries reverted to authoritarianism in order to avoid the demands of the poor from being met. Oil and gas rents may also lead to backsliding and breakdown. Rising oil rents can lead to ‘rentier populism’ where elected officials use oil revenues to pay off citizens who will then support mechanisms that undermine democracy and vertical accountability. They may support more power for the president as they feel dependent on this leadership due to the distributional and clientelistic nature of the state (Mazzuca, 2013). In Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela,

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rising oil rents led to leftist rentier populism where informal economic sectors were convinced to support new direct democracy mechanisms that diminished horizontal accountability (Mazzuca, 2013). Oil rents were also used to buy off citizens’ loyalty, allowing governments to tighten up press restrictions, impede the power of the legislature and weaken the judiciary (Karl, 2007; Levitsky and Loxton, 2013).

Trends in autocratization In the early 1990s, Guillermo O’Donnell made the distinction that there were two different types of deaths to democracy: ‘rapid deaths’ and ‘slow deaths’ (1992, 19). Military coups, or ‘rapid deaths’, were once the most frequent form of democratic breakdown. However, these are becoming less likely (see Table 1.3). The probability that any kind of coup would occur (successful or unsuccessful) reached a thirty-year low in 1995 (Bermeo, 2016). Although that probability rose slightly by 2010, it is still significantly lower than in the 1960s. From 1946 to 1999, 64 per cent of democracies failed because of coups (Kendall-Taylor and Frantz, 2016). Their frequency peaked in the 1960s, when coups accounted for 15 of the 19 democratic failures. Today, the likelihood that a democracy will be the target of a successful coup has declined markedly. From 1945 to 2017, there were 225 successful coups (in countries with populations greater than 500,000 people) according to the Centre for Systemic Peace, with most coups taking place from the 1960s to the 1980s. From 2010 to 2017, however, there were only seven coups. Though this likelihood too has risen slightly since then following coups that ousted democratically elected leaders in Mali in 2012 and Egypt in 2013, the drop in the success rate of coups in democracies that began during the Cold War has not been reversed (Bermeo, 2016). The decline in coups is in part due to shifting public norms about the acceptability of coups. Political cultural norms have changed over time in most countries that have been coup prone, as the public has become increasingly concerned about the implications of a military coup (Cassell et al, 2018). As democratic elections have spread, it has become difficult to garner public support Table 1.3: How democracies fall Kind of seizure

1946–1989 (%)

1990–2010 (%)

Coup

64

36

Autocratization

25

50

Insurgency

 4

 9

Foreign imposed

 7

 0

Popular uprising

 0

 5

Source: Geddes et al, 2018

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for military coups (Clark, 2007). This is why, when militaries take over, they are often careful to announce that the seizure was not a coup, such as when the Zimbabwean military staged a coup to oust Robert Mugabe in 2017, but denied that a coup had taken place. The international community is also likely to punish countries after they have a military coup, which has proven effective in cases involving the Organization for American States and the African Union. For O’Donnell, however, it was important to draw attention to ‘slow deaths’ – or the progressive deterioration of existing space to exercise civilian power and guarantee liberal constitutionalism – because these are not so obvious to the public (1992, 19). O’Donnell argued that the opaque process of authoritarian advances would eventually lead to a façade democracy, often without any public outcry (1992, 33). In light of the declining risk of military coups in new democracies, there has been renewed scholarly attention on ‘slow deaths’ (Svolik, 2019). As O’Donnell predicted, democracies are increasingly breaking down as a result of changes that take place over time through a series of distinct changes to the rules and procedures regarding elections, checks and balances, and respect for political and civil liberties (Lust and Waldner, 2015). Leaders have become more adept at using the confines of democracy to prolong their rule, with the public’s full support. Leaders also do not have to officially announce that democracy has ended. The degrees of change are more nuanced (Erdmann, 2011, 39). This makes it harder to detect when a break in the democratic process has taken place because the process is not abrupt. Though there are still cases of military coups, self-coups (autogolpes) and election day fraud that cause democracies to fail. Between 2000 and 2010, democratic backsliding accounted for 40 per cent of all democratic failures, matching coups in frequency (Bermeo, 2016). If current trends persist, backsliding will soon become the most common way that democracies fail.

Trajectory of democratic autocratization In contrast to coups, which usually signal the end of a democracy, autocratization can occur with or without a complete return to authoritarian rule. Some cases of backsliding do not lead to the breakdown of democracy (or the eradication of transfer of executive power through free and fair elections), but instead see citizens’ rights degraded and executive power enhanced. Other cases of backsliding eventually lead to the total breakdown of democracy and the emergence of authoritarian rule (see the case study on Turkey in this chapter). However, there are also cases where a deteriorating democracy is able to reverse course and break its trajectory. South Korea recovered after the crisis sparked by President Park Geun-hye, who was impeached in 2016. Peru was able to re-democratize in 2002 after Alberto Fujimori imposed a self-coup and abolished democratic procedures ten years prior. Charles Tilly (2000) noted that democratization is not always a linear process, and may have periods of

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backsliding as well as periods of progress. Thus, democratic backsliding may be more aptly described as ‘democratic swerving’. Swerving recognizes that volatility and uncertainty are parts of the democratic process, and that this may not necessarily lead to democratic breakdown. The trajectory of swerving depends on previous episodes and is often a reaction to a past period of liberal expansion (Bustikova, 2014). There are many examples of countries that have zigzagged back and forth on the democratic continuum. In the early 2000s, Poland was considered the capital of illiberalism in Eastern Europe (Krastev, 2007). However, in 2007 the illiberal coalition fell and was replaced by a liberal government, only to see the illiberal coalition come back to power in 2015. Since then erosion has set in again. The ruling Law and Justice Party has tightened control over the judiciary, civil society and the press (Mainwaring and Bizzarro, 2019). Nicaragua is another case that has swerved considerably. The Sandinista regime led by Daniel Ortega took power in 1979 after ousting the Somoza regime, a brutal personalist dictatorship that had ruled the country for decades. By 1990, mismanagement and pressures from paramilitaries made the Sandinista regime ineffective and unpopular, ushering in the democratic election of the centrist Violeta Charmorro. The years that followed were difficult and unstable, with her successor being charged with large-scale corruption. In the 2006 presidential and legislative elections, the Sandinistas and Ortega took power again. This time however, Ortega has refused to let go, and has given little indication that he will step down in the near future. Media freedoms have been severely limited, and legislative and judicial powers have also been reduced. Ortega managed to eliminate term limits for the president and can now rule by decree. Elections are severely manipulated and the main opposition coalition was excluded in the most recent election, in November 2016 (Thaler, 2017). In spite of some window dressing to convey the contrary, Nicaragua is an authoritarian regime. Elections have little meaning and Ortega remains firmly in control.

Case study: Return from democratic decay in Ecuador Ecuador is one of the more notable cases of a country that deteriorated under the autocratic rule of its president only to bounce back. Rafael Correa’s rise to power was similar to other autocratic populists. He rode a wave of popularity, only to use that popularity to undermine democratic processes and neutralize checks and balances. By the time he left office in 2017, Freedom House (2016) ranked Ecuador as one of twenty countries where civil liberties and political rights had declined the most in the past ten years. There were concerns that nondemocratic governance was firmly entrenched in Ecuadorian politics. Surprisingly however, Correa’s successor has taken steps to return Ecuador to democracy. Let us examine how far Correa went in dismantling democracy in Ecuador and what his successor, Lenín Moreno, did to reverse it.

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Correa came to power in 2007 at a time when Ecuador was in deep crisis. He presented himself as a political outsider willing to confront traditional elites and institutions that were serving as an impediment to progress. To demonstrate his commitment to eradicating the power of corrupt politicians and traditional elites, Correa abstained from running candidates for Congress, and instead promised to shut it down and convene a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution. Correa found support from the Electoral Tribunal Board and the Constitutional Tribunal, disqualifying the fifty-seven legislators that were opposed to the process. The government secretly gathered and co-opted fifty-seven substitute lawmakers to take their place (Conaghan, 2016). Legislators who opposed him had to deal with pro-Correa mobs that surrounded the parliament and Supreme Court. Correa convened a referendum, which passed with 82 per cent of the vote, authorizing the Constituent Assembly with full powers over all existing judicial norms (De la Torre and Ortiz Lemos, 2016). Within a year of Correa taking office, all mainstream political parties had lost their power in Congress, enabling Correa to rule virtually unopposed. The National Assembly then set out to write a new constitution. Though it organized ten roundtables and consulted with delegations of civil society, proposals from civil society organizations that supported Correa received priority over more critical organizations. The new hyper-presidential constitution was approved in a referendum, winning 64 per cent of the vote. The new Constitution expanded rights on the one hand, but strengthening the powers of the executive branch on the other. It allowed for another term for Correa (first in 2009 and then again in 2013) and placed restrictions on the legislative branch’s powers of oversight over the executive. The president could call national referenda, partially veto or amend laws passed by the National Assembly and even dissolve the National Assembly and call fresh elections. Since the 2008 Constitution came into force, Correa oversaw significant legal restructuring with the implementation of a flood of new laws, decrees and rules (Conaghan, 2016). Correa proposed the creation of a Council of Magistrates, a body that had the power to enact reforms throughout the judicial system with almost no limits. It could appoint, sanction and replace judges at all levels, under the guise of ridding the judiciary of influences from past political parties. The Council of Magistrates was staffed with representatives of the presidency, the National Assembly and the Council of Citizens Participation and Social Control (CPCCS), which were all in the hands of the ruling party. The President also had the power to appoint Supreme Court justices, so it was packed with Correa loyalists. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court ruled in Correa’s favour numerous times. The courts ruled in support of holding the May 2011 popular referendum, in support of granting the president veto power over the legislative branch and in support of offering the government an ambiguous interpretation of freedom of speech that allowed it to quell opposition (De la Torre and Ortiz Lemos, 2016). As a result, Correa was able to use the law to destroy both horizontal and vertical forms of accountability. Electoral laws were altered to benefit the ruling party, the legislature became a rubber stamp and freedoms of expression and association were undermined by government

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regulations. Legislation was passed that required all civil society organizations to register with the state, and gave the government broad authority to sanction organizations for interfering with its policies in ways that disturbed the peace (De la Torre and Ortiz Lemos, 2016). Ecuador was able to return to its pre-Correa level of democracy, however, with the election of Correa’s successor Lenín Moreno in 2017. Moreno was once a Correa protégé, but had a falling out with Correa that may have influenced his decisions to try to prevent Correa from seeking power again. Moreno reinstated term limits in 2018. He also created a body that has supra-constitutional powers, and the ability to evaluate and control authorities and judges, in an effort to remove Correa’s influence. Officials convicted of corruption were barred from seeking office (De la Torre, 2018a).

The process of democratic decay Subsequent chapters will go more in depth into the global and domestic context enabling backsliding, but first, it is important to look at the process of democratic backsliding. We start with the premise that once a country has democratized, the public’s normative commitment to democracy is important to democracy’s survival and to explaining backsliding (Pérez-Liñán et al, 2019). In contrast to coups, over which the public may not have any control, backsliding and de-consolidation necessitate shifts in citizens’ values that allow the executive to grab power. What factors chip away at the public’s commitment to democracy? As this book argues, countries that have a weak rule of law, poorly institutionalized parties that do not provide adequate representation and a polarizing media may have already started to backslide, though this erosion may not be easy to identify. It is also true that countries facing growing inequalities, demographic shifts and rising levels of corruption are also more predisposed to autocratization. These factors shape citizens’ commitments to democratic processes as the best way to resolve issues. Even when these preconditions are present, political entrepreneurs are necessary to this process. Without a would-be autocratic leader to initiate backsliding and take advantage of public frustration and apathy, countries remain vulnerable but may not actually experience identifiable democratic rollback. Jamaica is a good example of this. The country suffers from high levels of corruption, inequality and crime, and almost 15 per cent of the population lives in poverty (Thompson, 2017). In spite of this, Jamaica’s democracy has steadily improved since the 1990s and it holds regular, free and fair elections that have led to transfers of executive power. At the same time, it has not suffered from executive aggrandizement or electoral misconduct. In contrast, the case of Zambia illustrates the importance of leadership in the process of backsliding. Zambia also suffers from poverty and corruption, but when long-time leader Kenneth Kaunda stepped down from office after he lost

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multi‑party elections in 1991, there was hope that Zambia might democratize. Since then, Zambia regularly held elections that led to transfers of power. Civil liberties and political rights also improved. However, the rise of populist leader Michael Sata changed Zambia’s trajectory. Sata used divisive language and antielitist rhetoric in fiery speeches to galvanize support. He also railed against corrupt civil servants, while touting the benefits of a one-party state (Fraser, 2017). When Sata died in 2014, Zambia’s democracy had already started to decline. His Patriotic Front party was poorly institutionalized and its leadership was not socialized to democratic norms. Sata’s Vice President Edgar Lungu took over, starting a full term after a hotly contested election in 2016. Lungu went on to intimidate opposition parties, neutralize civil society groups and briefly imprison his main political rival. In 2019, Lungu tried to push through a bill that would remove constitutional provisions on the number of judges that can be appointed to the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, giving this power to his pliant Parliament instead. This would have ensured that the courts would always rule in Lungu’s favour. The bill would have also made it easier for the president to dismiss judges. In 2020, the bill failed, but Lungu was granted the power to run for president in 2021, breaching the two-term limit. Though power grabs and executive aggrandizement are nothing new, there are several new developments that are important to highlight. First, the speed of executive aggrandizement has become more gradual and piecemeal than in the past. This theme is woven throughout the book; the process of democracies deteriorating is not taking place overnight anymore. It starts with the executive slowly delegitimizing the media, pushing the boundaries of the laws and playing constitutional hardball. Second, when power grabs take place, they are transpiring mostly through legal manoeuvres. Would-be autocrats try to cloak their objectives in the legitimacy of the law, pretending to support many of the same values as their critics (Scheppele, 2018). Leaders use electoral mandates such as referenda to justify undemocratic moves and disguise their true intentions. Public support empowers opportunistic leaders to accumulate more power using legal channels. We talk more about public support in Chapter 3. Third, citizens are not usually openly in favour of or calling for autocracy, but they are supporting values and power grabs that contribute to democratic backsliding. The process of democratic backsliding and de-consolidation is intentional, and is initiated and triggered by the executive. In more established democracies, this often requires populist leadership to foster and expedite polarization, and to offer the façade of a commitment to democracy. De-consolidation of a liberal democracy involves the gradual erosion of democratic norms of the public and elites. The build-up to backsliding takes place over years as the public grows increasingly frustrated, polarized and apathetic because of international and domestic conditions. This may be accompanied by the ossification of political parties and failures of representation. As Chapters 3, 4 and 5 will explain, norms and public opinion are an important piece of the puzzle. They change and evolve

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over time, and are affected by numerous factors. Additionally, would-be autocrats are often both a symptom and a cause of democratic backsliding. They cannot just appear and dismantle a democracy at will; certain preconditions are necessary. But, as Chapter 8 will explore, real damage to democracy requires an executive that wants more power.

Personalism and populism Cases from the 1990s onwards show that this process in democracies is often being initiated by populist authoritarian leadership. Populist leaders exacerbate divisions and play on fears, shifting norms in directions that are unconducive to democracy. Thus they can ensure that power grabs (which would have been unheard of in the past) receive public support. The prominence of competing authoritarian norms does not help matters; these are disseminated widely through new forms of communication. All of these developments have intensified concerns of a democratic recession facing consolidated democracies. In relatively new democracies and grey-zone regimes (see Chapter  2), personalist leadership can drive autocratization as well (see Table 1.4). Personalist rule is a form of political behaviour that can overwhelm democracies as well as authoritarian regimes (Colburn and Cruz, 2012). Personalization of power is when leaders expand on executive power at the expense of other institutions, something that is made easier if their inner circles pose no risk to them (Svolik, 2012). Such leaders then pursue other power grabs, eventually personalizing power into their hands. In an autocracy, this means that there is absence of a powerful military or institutionalized ruling party. In a democracy, this means that the legislature, political parties, courts and laws are increasingly taking a backseat to the leader. With personalist styles of rule, leaders are heavily involved in all decisions and they try to circumvent checks on their power. As the leaders become more powerful, there is greater demand for total devotion. As such, career advancement in the state and security apparatuses are determined by personal loyalty to the leaders over rules and guidelines. The antithesis of personalism is a regime governed by rule-bound institutions. Though personalist regimes are adept at staving off collapse, personalism impedes broad-based discussions on national development. Personalism is profoundly undemocratic even when practiced in the framework of what appears to be a constitutional democracy. Not surprisingly, it usually paves the way for transitions to authoritarianism. Personalist dictators share much in common with populists, but personalist rulers do not always use anti-elitist rhetoric and do not pretend to be democrats. Personalist dictators may also not care about constantly engaging with the public and the media directly. They may not want to be perpetually on the campaign trail. Their main aim is to exercise total power, and marginalize other power centres such as the military, political parties and/or a ruling family. Populist

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Table 1.4: Examples of personalist and populist leadership Populist leaders elected since 1990

Years in office

Countries

Carlos Menem

1989–1999

Argentina

Christina Fernández de Kirchner

2007–2015

Argentina

Evo Morales

2006–2019

Bolivia

Fernando Collor de Mello

1990–1992

Brazil

Jair Bolsonaro

2018–

Brazil

Boyko Borisov

2009–2013, 2014–

Bulgaria

Miloš Zeman

1998–2002

Czech Republic

Andrej Babiš

2017–

Czech Republic

Abdalá Bucaram

1996–1997

Ecuador

Lucio Gutiérrez

2003–2005

Ecuador

Rafael Correa

2007–2017

Ecuador

Syriza leadership

2015–

Greece

Viktor Orbán

1998–2002, 2010–

Hungary

Narendra Modi

2014–

India

Joko Widodo

2014–

Indonesia

Benjamin Netanyahu

1996–1999, 2009–

Israel

Silvio Berlusconi

1994–1995, 2001–2006, 2008–2011, 2013

Italy

Nikola Gruevski

2006–2016

Macedonia

Daniel Ortega

2007–

Nicaragua

Fernando Lugo

2008–2012

Paraguay

Alberto Fujimori

1990–2000

Peru

Joseph Estrada

1998–2001

Philippines

Rodrigo Duterte

2016–

Philippines

Lech Wałęsa

1990–1995

Poland

Law and Justice Party leadership

2015–2010, 2015–

Poland

Traian Băsescu

2004–2014

Romania

Vladimir Putin

2000–

Russia

Aleksandar Vučić

2014–

Serbia

Vladimír Meciar

2006–2010, 2012–2018

Slovakia

Robert Fico

2006–2010, 2012–2018

Slovakia

Jacob Zuma

2009–2018

South Africa

Mahinda Rajapaksa

2005–2015, 2018

Sri Lanka

Chen Shui-bian

2000–2008

Taiwan

Thaksin Shinawatra

2001–2006

Thailand

Yingluck Shinawatra

2011–2014

Thailand (continued)

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Table 1.4: Examples of personalist and populist leadership (continued) Populist leaders elected since 1990

Years in office

Countries

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

2003–

Turkey

Donald Trump

2017–2021

US

Rafael Caldera

1994–1990

Venezuela

Hugo Chávez

1999–2013

Venezuela

Michael Sata

2011–2014

Zambia

Personalist leaders who were elected to power since 1990 Alexander Lukashenko

1994–

Belarus

Vladimir Putin

2000–

Russia

Nouri al-Maliki

2006–2014

Iraq

Nicolás Maduro

2013–

Venezuela

Sheikh Hasina

1996–2001, 2009–

Bangladesh

Edgar Lungu

2015–

Zambia

Alpha Condé

2010–

Guinea

Hamid Karzai

2001–2014

Afghanistan

Nursultan Nazarbayev

1991–2019

Kazakhstan

Heydar Aliyev

1993–2003

Azerbaijan

Joseph Kabila

2001–2019

Democratic Republic of Congo

Pierre Nkurunziza

2005–

Burundi

Paul Kagame

2000–

Rwanda

Serzh Sargsyan

2008–2018

Armenia

Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta

2013–

Mali

leaders (see Chapter 8) have for the most part, been less interested in using hard forms of repression to keep themselves in power. Though personalist dictators are less brutal than in the past, repression is always an option. Personalist leaders can rise to power in weaker democracies and grey-zone regimes because their political institutions are considerably weaker, and democratic institutions and processes are not solidly sustained by a robust democratic political culture. In some countries, authoritarian power grabs may be seen as business as usual. In countries that experienced years of authoritarian rule, the public may even be nostalgic about authoritarian rule and prefer to be led by a strong hand (see Chapter 4). Thus, in new, fledgling democracies and grey-zone regimes with more authoritarian political cultures, autocratization can take place via leadership that does not have hide behind a democratic veneer. Autocratization has coincided with an uptick in personalist dictatorships. Data shows that the number of personalist dictatorships or regimes where power is highly concentrated in the hands of a single individual has increased since the

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Cold War ended (Kendall-Taylor et al, 2019). Personalist rule, which accounted for 23 per cent of all authoritarian regimes in the 1990s, now accounts for 40 per cent of authoritarian regimes. Much of this is due to changes in the way dictators emerge. In the 1970s and 1980s, 75 per cent of dictators emerged after a coup or an insurgency (Kendall-Taylor et al, 2019). Today it is increasingly common that dictators emerge due to autocratization. The strength and structure of the group that supports a leader’s rise to power affects the institutional constraints that a leader faces and whether or not they can consolidate control. Personalization takes place when leaders emerge who want to expand executive power at the expense of their allies, and when there are no massive organizations such as the military or insurgent groups to deal with. Though dictatorships are launched by political parties (such as China), these launching organizations are increasingly weak, fragmented and created hastily by the leader. When personalities overshadow institutions, the regime or ruling party is weakened. Personalism entails loyalty to an individual, not to ideologies or policies. As a result, party positions are doled out in accordance with the leader’s wishes instead of merit. Typically, party members with lower levels of devotion to the leader are relegated to the lower ranks. Thus, another trend is that democratically elected leaders who are dismantling democracy are likely to transition into personalized forms of authoritarian rule (Kendall-Taylor et al, 2019). Data demonstrates that from 2000 to 2010, 75 per cent of the instances of autocratization led to personalist rule (Kendall-Taylor et al, 2019). Chávez and Erdoğan are examples of populists who eventually became increasingly personalist and authoritarian (Kendall-Taylor et al, 2019). Elections also helped usher in the rule of Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus and Vladimir Putin in Russia, neither of whom are classic populists. Semi-authoritarian and authoritarian regimes may also become increasingly personalized, as exemplified by the authoritarian deepening taking place in countries such as China under Xi Jinping and Saudi Arabia under Mohammad bin Salman. In the case of China, Deng Xiaoping spent over a decade trying to foster collective and consensual leadership in order to limit personality cults and personal power. Xi has reversed this process.

Conclusion Though democracy is still the most popular style of government in the world, we are likely in a democratic slump. Democratic rollback is one of several trends in politics that are a break from the past. Personalism in politics is also on the rise, not just affecting autocratic regimes but democracies as well. Personalist leaders are destabilizing democratic institutions through a series of power grabs known as autocratization. In contrast to the past, we also have fewer instances of democratic breakdown and more cases of regimes slipping into the grey zone. There are semi‑authoritarian

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regimes that have consolidated their rule and become increasingly authoritarian (like Russia); flawed and defective democracies becoming more flawed and autocratic (like Serbia and Hungary); and liberal democracies that are deconsolidating (like the US). There are also cases of regimes becoming more democratic (like Tunisia) and swerving back and forth (like Poland). This dynamic trajectory differs from the past, when coups and self-coups immediately signalled the death of a democracy. We explored what differentiates democratic breakdown from backsliding, and the role of political agents in the process. Because so many regimes have been backsliding, there is also more interest in how we classify regimes that fall in the middle. In the next chapter, we clarify how we can define regimes that sit on the continuum between being fully democratic and autocratic. We clarify what we mean by liberal democracies, flawed democracies, defective democracies, semi-authoritarian regimes, competitive authoritarian regimes and authoritarian regimes. Finally, we examine why there appear to be many more grey-zone regimes today. KEY QUESTIONS 1. Do you believe we are in a democratic slump? Do you think there has been an exaggeration about this slump, or is there real evidence of the recession? 2. What is the difference between democratic backsliding, democratic decay and autocratization? Are they basically the same terms? If not, what is the advantage of using the term autocratization over democratic backsliding and decay? 3. Why are there fewer coups and self-coups these days? Do you think this is a permanent shift? 4. Why do you think democracy comes in waves? What are the benefits of using this type of framework to understand democratization and breakdown? 5. What could explain the rise in personalist leadership? In what ways is this bad for democracy?

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2

Entering the Grey Zone Introduction The most recent wave of democratization has resulted in a proliferation of regimes that are neither fully democratic nor classically authoritarian. While there are fewer and fewer traditional authoritarian regimes, there are also fewer consolidated democracies. Most regimes are defying these binary categories and exhibiting a wide range of democratic and autocratic characteristics. Generally speaking, regimes that fall in the grey zone can be grouped into two categories: authoritarian regimes with democratic attributes, and democratic regimes with defective institutions and practices (Kendall-Taylor et al, 2019). In contrast to past scholarship, it is now accepted that grey-zone regimes are not regimes in transit, but are a distinct type of political system (Bogaards, 2009; Levitsky and Way, 2010; Kendall-Taylor et al, 2019). After the Cold War ended, it was assumed that countries that experienced authoritarian breakdown would eventually become consolidated liberal democracies. But many countries failed to meet this expectation, and instead became stuck in the middle. Rather than leading to democracy, authoritarian collapse led to different forms of nondemocratic rule that have been surprisingly durable. This chapter first provides an overview of the different types of regimes that dot the landscape. We explain how these regimes in the grey zone operate and what differentiates them from democratic and authoritarian regimes. We also clarify that while most regimes around the world hold elections, this has led to new forms of authoritarianism, rather than efforts by authoritarian regimes to liberalize. We explain why that is the case, and how these regimes use democratic institutions to prolong their rule. We then explain why there are so many more grey zone regimes than in the past, looking at stalled processes of democratization and the most recent trend of democratic backsliding. We noted in Chapter 1 that there has been a pattern of previously consolidated democracies becoming increasingly flawed, like the United States, and flawed democracies decaying significantly, like Hungary. We

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provide an overview of the different patterns of entering the grey zone since the Cold War ended, and explain why these patterns persist. Understanding how regimes differ in terms of their level of democracy helps clarify what democracies are backsliding towards.

Key concepts: grey zone regimes As previously stated, most regimes are neither fully consolidated democracies nor authoritarian regimes. Confusingly, scholars have not come up with a set of unified categorizations, and have instead offered a number of different labels for regimes that fall in the middle. These regimes that fall in the grey zone have remained strikingly dynamic, experiencing periods of democratization and of backsliding (Carment et  al, 2019). Countries that have highly functional democratic institutions tend to be more stable, but so too are deeply repressive authoritarian regimes. Among grey-zone regimes that lean democratic, there are defective democracies, semi-democracies, illiberal democracies, weak democracies, partial democracies, partly free regimes and delegative democracies (O’Donnell, 1994; Zakaria, 1997; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 2013; Freedom House, 2020). Grey-zone regimes that lean autocratic have been called hybrid regimes and semi-authoritarian regimes (Bogaards, 2009; Ottaway, 2013). These are not to be confused with authoritarian regimes that hold elections, which have been referred to as electoral authoritarian regimes or competitive authoritarian regimes (Levitsky and Way, 2010; Schedler, 2015). These authoritarian regimes that are pretending to be democratic but are actually fully authoritarian have also been labelled virtual democracies, façade democracies and pseudo-democracies (Berntzen, 1993; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Van de Walle and Butler, 1999; Barkan, 2000). There are disagreements about how to classify these regimes that do not live up to the standard definitions of either democracy or autocracy, and about how to empirically measure their various defects. Scholars and policy-makers are not in full agreement about whether or not a regime is authoritarian if elections are its main flaw. For example, the Economist Democracy Index (The Economist, 2019b) categorized Singapore as a flawed democracy because it performs adequately on other democratic dimensions, even though its elections are not deemed free and fair, and has never experienced a transfer of power. Others see Singapore as an authoritarian regime (Ortmann, 2011; Geddes et al, 2014). For the purpose of this book, the most commonly used indicator to differentiate regimes is the role of elections: how competitive elections are, whether there are transfers of executive power, and whether a regime offers much else in terms of civil liberties. Thus, grey-zone regimes are most frequently differentiated based on the degree of competitiveness and participation (Carothers, 2002; see also Diamond, 2002; Dahl, 2008b). However, many questions remain and much work needs to be done to assess the nature of grey-zone politics.

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Entering the Grey Zone

‘Liberal democracies’ are regimes that go beyond the minimum democratic requirements of holding free and fair elections. Liberal democracies not only have free and fair elections for all the key positions of powers, but also uphold the rule of law, and offer government accountability and full civil liberties for their citizens. Citizens participate often in politics, have high levels of political trust and positive feelings about democracy. Thus, the political culture is fully committed to democracy. Liberal democracies therefore do not fall within the grey zone. They are fully consolidated democracies, which indicates that they have not decayed much over time. There are roughly twenty countries that have consistently registered as liberal and consolidated democracies in the past three decades, including Norway, New Zealand, Canada, Sweden, Denmark, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Mauritius and Iceland (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2020). There are a handful of liberal democracies that have free and fair elections, but have one party that is particularly dominant. In Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party has been in power for decades, with the exception of 1993–1994 and 2009– 2012. Though Botswana is a democracy, the Botswana Democratic Party has been in power ever since the country gained independence in 1966 (Leith, 2005). There are also many regimes around the world that hold free and fair elections, but are flawed in a variety of different ways. These regimes do not fall in the grey zone, but compared to full democracies, suffer from a host of different issues, such as higher levels of inequality, lower levels of political trust and efficacy, higher levels of corruption, poorer implementation of policies and/or lower levels of political participation. Some flawed democracies only suffer from minor issues. For example, Chile is a liberal democracy but suffers from low political participation rates. France is a stable democracy, but the public’s attitudes towards democracy have deteriorated somewhat (Foa and Mounk, 2017). Democratic assessment organizations have noted that there has been an upsurge in the number of flawed democracies (sometimes referred to as ‘electoral democracies’), a central topic of this book. In some cases, this is due to positive reform, such as in Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia and Mauritius. However, in many cases, this has been the result of democratic backsliding. The US, Austria and the Czech Republic have suffered from democratic backsliding and are now considered flawed democracies. According to Varieties of Democracy’s (V-Dem) 2019 Annual Report (Lührmann et al, 2019), there has been a slight drop in the number of liberal democracies. The number of liberal democracies in the world peaked in 2014, reaching forty-four. This number declined to thirty-nine by 2018. Additionally, the share of the world population living in a liberal democracy peaked in 1996 at 18 per cent. Today it has dropped to 13 per cent. This is because of the increase in the number of flawed democracies. The Varieties of Democracy 2019 report (Lührmann et al, 2019) notes that in 1972 there were only seventeen electoral democracies (or flawed democracies) with 10 per cent of the world’s citizens living in electoral democracies. Today 39 per cent of the population lives in one of the sixty electoral democracies in the

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world. According to the 2019 and 2020 V-Dem reports, countries like Greece, the Czech Republic and Poland have become electoral democracies (Lührmann et al, 2019; Lührmann and Lindberg, 2020). Falling within the grey zone are regimes that are technically democratic (because they hold relatively free and fair elections), but do not adequately institutionalize other vital dimensions of democracy. This can be due to either democratic decay or stalled democratization. These are not merely flawed democracies, but suffer from significant defects that impact outcomes for their citizens. These regimes are referred to in this book as ‘defective democracies’. These regimes barely meet the minimum requirements of democracy. For these reasons, they fall in the grey zone. There is no scholarly consensus about how to distinguish democracies that fall into the grey zone. Most of the time, flawed democracies are lumped together in one large category, along with democracies with more serious issues. However, flawed democracies have stronger political institutions than defective democracies. Flawed democracies still have strong parties, well-institutionalized party systems, and generally offer more checks on the executive from the judiciary and the legislature, while defective democracies generally do not. Flawed democracies also enjoy higher levels of public support for democracy than defective democracies, which have political cultures that may be incompatible with democracy. In addition to defective democracies, there are regimes that are neither democratic nor autocratic. We refer to these as ‘semi-authoritarian regimes’, though they are sometimes referred to as anocracies or hybrid regimes (Ottaway, 2013). Semi-authoritarian regimes possess both democratic and autocratic characteristics. These regimes may have transfers of power from time to time, but unlike in defective democracies, their elections suffer from irregularities. They have democratic institutions in place but these barely serve their purpose. The number of semi-authoritarian regimes varies from study to study. Regimes such as Malaysia, Serbia, Bangladesh, Ukraine, Honduras, Haiti and Pakistan are semi-authoritarian by these standards. Further down the spectrum are authoritarian regimes that hold elections. Though there is a degree of competition in the electoral arena, these regimes are authoritarian and do not fall into the grey zone. Their elections are manipulated to such a degree that there is little doubt about the results. The incumbent always wins and there are no transfers of power. These types of authoritarian regimes are referred to as competitive authoritarian regimes or electoral authoritarian regimes. For many scholars, these are not authoritarian regimes that are in the process of democratizing; rather they represent new forms of authoritarianism that hide behind electoral façades (Schedler, 2002). At the end of the scale are authoritarian regimes (which are not part of the grey zone), but even within this category there is some variation. Most authoritarian regimes do hold elections, but the outcomes are predetermined and the incumbent typically wins by large margins. Some authoritarian regimes have a small degree

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Entering the Grey Zone

of pluralism, such as in Azerbaijan, where a handful of seats go to candidates from other parties. In other cases, elections are held though there is absolutely no competition, such as in North Korea, where 100 per cent of the votes go to the Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland (DFRF), Kim Jong-un’s coalition. In another extreme, Eritrea has not held a national election since it gained independence in 1993 (Kendall-Taylor et al, 2019). To get a better a grasp on the various subtypes, we focus on only two categories: defective democracies and semi-authoritarian regimes. We then explain why competitive authoritarian regimes represent a new form of authoritarianism, and do not fall into the grey zone.

Defective democracies Democracies have many different dimensions that are important to their functioning. Defective democracies usually offer frequent and relatively free and fair elections, transitions of power, civil liberties, and political freedoms. For these reasons, they are democracies. Nevertheless, participation rates are often low outside of elections. Any political participation that does takes place happens outside formal institutional channels, which leads to further de-institutionalization of already fragile democratic structures. The public perceives political elites as dishonest and corrupt. The rule of law exists in theory, but is not evenly applied. Citizens enjoy civil liberties, but more extreme cases may have some restrictions in place. The state remains weak and there are persistent issues of the functioning of governance. As a result, the political culture is underdeveloped and people have a poor perception of politics. There may also be high levels of dissatisfaction with democracy and civil society remains weak.

Box 2.1: Delegative democracies One of the more well-known labels for defective democracies – ‘delegative democracies’ – was coined by Guillermo O’Donnell (1994) in a seminal article of the same name. Delegative democracies meet the minimum standards for democracies but have low levels of horizontal accountability. These regimes have weak institutions, but strong presidents. The president is able to make quick decisions, which can lead to erratic policy-making and grave errors. The courts exist and sometimes block unconstitutional policies, but are not well institutionalized. Parties, interest groups and the masses can challenge the regime and are free to voice criticism of the government, but mostly take action only during elections. Elections are emotional, high-stakes affairs. There are few campaign promises and no accountability. These weak democracies are prone to breakdowns and function poorly. Much of O’Donnell’s work focused on regimes in Latin America that had high levels of presidential power, but were prone to instability and breakdown, such as Brazil after military

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rule, Ecuador and Peru. Thailand under the leadership of the Thai Rak Thai government led by Thaksin was also a delegative democracy. In all of these cases, the president was very powerful and interfered with the institutional strength of the legislature and bureaucratic agencies (Case, 2007).

One of the hallmarks of defective democracies is that (outside of elections) their political institutions are relatively weak. In particular, legislatures and political parties are not strong enough to provide an effective check on the executive. Countries with weak political parties are also unable to connect with ordinary citizens. There are no organizations that reflect a coherent political platform or articulate policies. Parties are too weak to build bridges to the wider society, and are short-lived. Most people recruited are not representative of society. Parties form to satisfy the electoral ambitions of their leaders and are devoid of ideology. The parties mostly draw support from their leaders’ charisma, with little reference to policy positions. As a result, bizarre coalitions form based on personal favours. A defective democracy may also have a weak legislature that is not able to serve as a forum for political discussion. Because the legislature is weak, there is little effective check on the executive. The legislature might also not be in session regularly. When the legislature is in session, it may have limited experience and expertise in policy-making. The executive may be able to find loopholes to circumvent the power of the legislature, often allowing it to rule by decree. There are also a handful of cases of defective democracies that have overly strong executives and ruling parties. Here, the ruling party becomes overly dominant and fuses with the state. Partisan considerations corrode the institutional autonomy of administrative institutions. Hungary is the best example of this. Once considered a liberal democracy, the rise of Viktor Orbán and the Fidesz party led to severe backsliding. The ruling coalition mobilized state resources and used its control over the media to undermine the opposition and rapidly ram through a new constitution reflecting the ruling party’s values (Ágh, 2016). Many defective democracies remain flawed because of weak civil societies. Civil society is important to help socialize individuals in the norms of communication, reciprocity and trust. It is supposed to provide networks of civic engagement to enable collective action. Civil society provides important horizontal networks, as opposed to vertical networks of the patron–client variety (Foley and Edwards, 1996). Countries that have weak civil societies may have political participation, but this takes the form of ineffective, fragmented and ad hoc protests. Countries with a weak civil society may also see a hyperactive and confrontational public, with little concern for the overall welfare of society, which can overwhelm a weak state. Civil society often remains weak in polities that suffer from low levels of trust in institutions and politicians. Civil society is also weaker in countries where

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very exclusive friendship networks persist. People in new democracies may have low levels of the interpersonal trust necessary to build civil society, and instead rely on a close circle of friends and family to survive. A final issue is that civil society may be weaker in countries that feel perpetually disappointed by what power and efficacy they may have. Early years of disappointment with democracy may mean that participation in civil society is limited due to apathy. The lack of political engagement by citizens is indicative of a form of democracy that is somewhat hollow, making it vulnerable to being taken over by non-democratic forces (Howard, 2002). The collapse of communism led to the formation of many new democracies, most of which had very weak civil societies. Defective democracies also tend to have political cultures that express mixed feelings about democracy, and thus have low political participation rates. Many defective democracies begin with incredibly high expectations of what democracy can achieve, followed by disappointment and then apathy. A 2010 Latinobarómetro survey of Mexican citizens revealed that only 27 per cent of respondents felt satisfied with the way democracy was functioning in Mexico, and 73 per cent were convinced that the country’s situation would not change or improve, regardless of who wins the elections (Cámara, 2016). With no enthusiasm for democracy or political processes, citizens are left with very limited ability to hold their governments to account. Defective democracies also suffer from weak rule of law. Countries may have constitutions or clear laws to govern behaviour, but without strong judicial and courts systems that can adjudicate and lay out punishments effectively, the rule of law can be abused and undermined. As a result, defective democracies may also have high levels of corruption and clientelism, which disrupts democratic representation. Judiciaries may also be restrained in checking the power of the executives, or have been politicized, not offering impartial rulings. In Mongolia for example, corruption continues to be a major problem in spite of the fact that elections have been relatively free and fair, and civil society organizations have mostly been free to organize. The public servants that work for the judiciary are poorly paid and appointments are politicized (Fritz, 2007). Accepting bribes is commonplace and judicial decisions are sold to the highest bidder. Defective democracies may also have reserved domains of power, or authoritarian enclaves. This most often takes the form of unelected officials, such as the military, maintaining too much power in decision-making and oversight (Croissant and Kuehn, 2017). For more on reserved domains, see Box 2.2.

Box 2.2: Reserved domains, military power Once an authoritarian regime has fallen, it is common for the democratic transition to be stalled by the persistent power of the military. In the case of many post-transitional regimes, the military may demand that it retain certain rights and powers.

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• The military may impose various limits on executive control of the military. • There may be a constitutional directive to preserve the military’s autonomy in terms of being in charge of domestic security. • The military may participate in the cabinet. • The military may be allowed to own public enterprises. • There may be laws protecting the military from being prosecuted in civilian courts and the establishment of military courts. • The police infrastructure may be subordinated to the military as an institution. • The military may retain autonomy over the promotion and termination of officers. • Blanket amnesty may be given to former military officials who have committed human rights violations in the past.

In defective democracies, another common issue is that policies are not properly implemented. Though citizens may be able to vote in elections in support of specific policies, guaranteeing that these policy promises are put into action is another matter. Policies may be passed, but in defective democracies, implementing new policies may be difficult due to state weakness. Some countries that have consistently fallen into this category are the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Mexico. It is actually rare for a country that has experienced years of liberal democracy to become defective. Typically, defective democracies are countries that stalled and swerved while attempting to democratize. As mentioned previously, Hungary is the exception. On the flip side, Ecuador was defective, but new leadership has moved the country in an increasingly democratic direction (Stuenkel, 2019).

Semi-authoritarian regimes Semi-authoritarian regimes are regimes that mix democratic and autocratic features. Semi-authoritarian regimes do not develop institutions that preserve the allocation of power because they do not want their democratic façade to fall apart. However, they also cannot allow democratic institutions to properly function without putting their control in jeopardy. To deal with this dilemma, semiauthoritarian regimes have to undermine their own institutions, by producing more power outside the institutions themselves (Ottaway, 2013). For this reason, personal relationships are much more important than institutions in semi-authoritarian regimes. A leader or small group of elites hold power; power is not held through institutions. Political parties are based on personalities. Bureaucratic outcomes are the result of patron–client relationships. The incumbent has control over the distribution of patronage and the state is seen as a source of jobs and handouts. Judicial decisions are affected by personal connections. The importance of personalities and personal relationships adds uncertainty and helps explain why processes are more opaque. In contrast to well-institutionalized

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Liberal democracy

Flawed democracy

Defective democracy

Semiauthoritarian

Competitive authoritarian

Full authoritarian

Table 2.1: Regimes and dimensions of democracy

Frequent elections with no predetermined outcomes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Free and fair elections

Yes

Yes

Yes

Sometimes

No

No

Transfers of power

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Civil liberties

Yes

Yes

Yes

**

No

No

Legislative and judicial checks on the executive

Yes

Yes

**

No

No

No

Political party institutionalization

Yes

**

No

No

No

No

Political party system institutionalization

Yes

**

No

No

No

No

Political participation

Yes

**

No

No

No

No

Democratic political culture

Yes

**

No

No

No

No

Civil society group participation

Yes

**

No

No

No

No

Rule of law and low levels of corruption

Yes

**

No

No

No

No

State functions and can implement policies

Yes

**

No

No

No

No

No reserved domains of power for the military

Yes

Yes

**

No

No

No

Outcome: Low levels of socio-economic and gender inequality

Yes

**

No

No

No

No

Notes: The chart represents the minimum criteria for each category. ** denotes that this feature could exist but may be faltering.

single-party authoritarian regimes, power is not allocated in an orderly or predictable fashion. In semi-authoritarian regimes, stability is based on the leadership of an individual or small elite. Semi-authoritarian regimes regularly hold elections, which periodically lead to transfers of power. For this reason, they are not fully authoritarian. Although these elections are not massively fraudulent, the playing field is not fair and there may be irregularities from time to time. To illustrate the contrast, Russia (an authoritarian regime) regularly holds elections, but Vladimir Putin has been in power effectively since 2000, while Pakistan (a semi-authoritarian regime) also holds elections but has regularly seen transfers of power of the executive, with the exception of several periods of military rule. The Philippines, in contrast, is a defective democracy because it holds regular elections with fewer concerns

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about the integrity of the elections compared to Pakistan, but suffers from major challenges to the rule of law (Lührmann et al, 2019). Semi-authoritarian regimes also have legislatures and judiciaries that are more than just cosmetic institutions. Though the judiciary is subject to subtle methods of coercion like bribery and extortion, from time to time it can exercise some authority. For example, Malaysia’s Federal Court overthrew the conviction of opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim in 2004 on the grounds that it violated due process. Pakistan’s Supreme Court remained active and assertive under Pervez Musharraf ’s 1999–2008 military government, challenging his attempt to order the judges to take an oath of allegiance to him (Gilley, 2010). Although the regime may punish judges that act independently, in semi-authoritarian regimes there are costs of doing so. Musharraf ’s attempt to suspend Chief Justice Chaudhry when he disagreed with him led to a huge backlash from the public (Ghias, 2010). Semi-authoritarian regimes may allow some civil liberties, and even some local and regional government. The media may also be allowed to criticize the incumbent from time to time. At the same time, there are very low levels of transparency, and processes and outcomes are not entirely clear. Corruption levels are usually extremely high due the highly personalized nature of the institutions. Civil society organizations in semi-authoritarian regimes are usually unable to make a significant contribution to democracy. They face obstacles such as laws that restrict registration and pressure to limit activities to politically noncontroversial issues. However, unlike in authoritarian regimes, civil society organizations are allowed to operate. Semi-authoritarian regimes also allow some political participation, using it as a safety valve for social discontent, but participation is more restricted than in defective democracies and elections are not as clean and fair (Ottaway, 2013). Political participation tends to be low, while the public may be either completely dissatisfied with democracy or content with leaders that rule with a strong hand. Yet semi-authoritarian regimes fall short of authoritarianism, because the incumbent does not have the ability to stay in power indefinitely. Think about Iraq today. The country has experienced transfers of power (with the most recent prime minister stepping down after protests), possesses a constitution that in theory guarantees some civil liberties and has a parliament and judiciary. However, it has incredibly high levels corruption, the judiciary is politically influenced and the citizens are allotted very few freedoms in practice. As a result, some assessment organizations classify Iraq as authoritarian or not free, while others label it a hybrid regime. Some may argue that semi-authoritarian regimes are actually poorly institutionalized authoritarian regimes – or regimes that want to be democratic or authoritarian but do not have the capacity to control the public or channel political representation. The reason for why a state becomes semi-authoritarian varies considerably. Some have become anocracies due to democratic backsliding, like Serbia. Other countries, like Bangladesh, have reformed but decayed

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considerably over time. Finally, there are also countries like Myanmar, which attempted to reform after decades of authoritarian rule, only to stall after holding its first free and fair elections. No consolidated liberal democracies have become semi-authoritarian regimes in recent years. Coups took out democratic regimes in Chile, Uruguay and Argentina, but those military coups plunged their countries into deep authoritarianism. The closest counter-example may be of Venezuela under Chávez, before it became fully authoritarian. But Venezuela’s democratic period was highly flawed, making its spectacular fall more likely (Corrales and Penfold-Becerra, 2011).

New forms of authoritarian rule More recently, scholars have come to view post-transition regimes that hold elections not as defective democracies or semi-authoritarian regimes, but as new forms of authoritarianism. As more scholars are looking at regimes that fall short of traditional forms of authoritarianism, there is a proliferation of terms to describe these new forms of authoritarianism. Some of the more prominent examples are ‘competitive authoritarianism’, ‘liberalized autocracy’ and ‘electoral autocracy’. These new forms of authoritarianism use formally democratic institutions that mask ‘the reality of authoritarian domination’ (Diamond, 2002, 24). Whereas defective democracies and semi-authoritarian regimes have institutions that lead to transitions of power, new forms of authoritarianism have electoral institutions that perpetuate regime survival. Thus, these new types of authoritarian regimes are not in the process of transitioning to democracy; they are actually fairly resilient in their position. In contrast to traditional forms of authoritarian rule, such regimes tolerate a limited opposition. Elections take place and may even be free from massive outright fraud. In spite of this, there is usually transfer of power, and elections often require international observation and intervention (Diamond, 2002, 24). New authoritarian regimes also have very restricted levels of political party competition, which compromises the freedom and fairness of elections. During elections, authoritarian regimes may even create fake opposition parties to capture the votes of those who are discontented (Kendall-Taylor et al, 2019). Steve Levitsky and Lucan Way have coined one of the more notable labels for this new form of authoritarian rule: ‘competitive authoritarianism’. For the purpose of this book we use the term ‘competitive authoritarian regime’ interchangeably with ‘new forms of authoritarian rule’. In competitive authoritarian regimes, democratic institutions are used to exercise political authority, but incumbents violate the rules often enough that the ‘regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy’ (Levitsky and Way, 2002, 52). Though competitive authoritarian regimes hold elections in which the opposition is able to challenge incumbents, the electoral playing field is not

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even as in democracies or even semi-authoritarian regimes. Instead, incumbents have access to a variety of state resources that can help them steer the election’s outcome in their favour. They can deny the opposition adequate media coverage, harass and threaten opposition candidates and/or supporters, and manipulate the electoral rules and results in ways that disadvantage opposition candidates (2002, 53). Elections may also not be perfectly transparent. Most importantly, though elections are not massively fraudulent, the incumbent always wins. The key difference from traditional authoritarian regimes, however, is that the exact results of elections are not entirely predetermined. The incumbent may win by smaller margins. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the 2018 parliamentary elections with 49.50 per cent of the votes. In comparison, in Kazakhstan, President Nursultan Nazarbayev has been regularly elected with over 80 per cent of the votes (Kucera, 2011). Competitive authoritarian regimes differ from traditional authoritarian regimes in other ways, as well. In competitive authoritarian regimes, though legislatures are weak, ‘they occasionally become focal points of opposition activity’ (Levitsky and Way, 2002, 56). The opposition can also use the legislature to meet and organize, which serves as a safety valve to deal with discontent. The judiciary in competitive authoritarian regimes occasionally tries to challenge the executive, but it usually has little leeway to do so. The Supreme Court in Zimbabwe defied Robert Mugabe’s government when it ruled that Mugabe’s land redistribution programme was illegal. In response, progovernment militants threatened the judges who made this decision (Hemel and Schalkwyk, 2010). In contrast to a fully authoritarian regime where no civil liberties exist (such as Saudi Arabia), there are some small avenues for expression in competitive authoritarian regimes (such as Mali). These liberties are fairly limited, making it difficult for different political interests and orientations to organize effectively (Diamond et al, 1989). To illustrate the difference, in Tunisia under the leadership of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, civil and political liberties were severely restricted to the extent that a journalist that wrote a marginally critical article of the regime was placed under house arrest with his passport confiscated (Sadiki, 2002). In contrast, in new forms of authoritarian rule, the media is not completely state owned and controlled. But compared with democracies and semiauthoritarian regimes, competitive authoritarian regimes face restrictions on what they can cover. In Venezuela, the media was able to criticize former President Hugo Chávez, but it was also regularly harassed, intimidated and subject to fines and censorship. The government controlled the content of the news media by passing laws that toughened penalties for speech that was deemed offensive by the government. It also expanded the number of government-run TV channels, while denying licence renewals for stations critical of Chávez. Venezuela and Russia both have much higher levels of media censorship and media bias compared to semi-authoritarian regimes such as Bangladesh or Pakistan. Flawed democracies,

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such as Jamaica and South Korea, have almost no government censorship of the media and relatively low media bias (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2020). New forms of authoritarian rulers do not stay in power through manipulation and repression alone. The leaders in semi-authoritarian regimes enjoy some levels of genuine support, but as in traditional authoritarian regimes, economic and political power are fused. In Russia under Putin, state power is extensive. Putin ensures that the regime had a close relationship with big business (keeping big business subservient to him). Attacks on oligarchs have led most business leaders to consult with the Kremlin before supporting anyone from the opposition. Business leaders are instructed which pro-Kremlin candidates to back in the elections, which helps create majorities for Putin’s United Russia party (Hale, 2010). Putin may be generally popular enough to win a free and fair election, but he appears to be unwilling to take any risks. Another contrast with traditional authoritarian regimes is that because new forms of authoritarian rule hold elections, this can lead to liberalizing outcomes from time to time. In a traditional authoritarian regime, only the ruling party is effectively the sole competitor. The opposition is shut out completely from access to state-owned media coverage and banned from holding political rallies. In more serious cases, the opposition is forced to live in exile or put in jail. The dominant candidate or party wins by large margins. In new forms of authoritarian rule, however, elections have a small chance of leading to a win for the opposition (Howard and Roessler, 2006). Mexico for many years was a competitive authoritarian regime. It held elections that were mostly free of massive election-day fraud, but there was only one winner. The ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) regime monopolized the political arena and used a combination of patronage, coercion, media control and other tactics to deny the opposition a chance of winning office. The PRI government was not particularly effective at spurring economic growth and reducing poverty, but it was incredibly powerful when it came to mobilizing voters and it knew how to ensure electoral victories. Nevertheless, in the presidential elections in 2000, there was finally a victory for the opposition, the National Action Party (PAN). Since then, elections in Mexico have become more free and fair, but other dimensions of democracy have not improved much and serious challenges remain (Camargo and Rivera, 2016). Armenia, under the Republican Party, is another good example of the role of elections in competitive authoritarian regimes. Elections were meant to give the regime a stamp of legitimacy, not to lead to real policy alternatives. As such, the 2008 election of new leader Serzh Sarkisian was not an example of transfer of power, because Sarkisian was hand-picked by his predecessor, Robert Kocharian. Though elections were free of massive fraud, the regime resorted to clever tactics to ensure its victory. Prior to elections, various goods were distributed to the public, and the regime ensured that it had favourable media coverage, with uncooperative media outlets threatened and eliminated. In 2002, the A1 Plus

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TV station, the most important independent media outlet, was forced off the air after it was too critical of the regime (Danielyan, 2002). Nevertheless, the practice of holding elections that had some level uncertainty eventually led to reform. Armenia had a revolution in 2018 that ousted Sarkisian, which may not have been possible without the opening created by regular elections and participation. Notable examples of competitive authoritarian regimes from the past include Peru under Alberto Fujimori and Ukraine under Leonid Kuchma. Contemporary examples include Venezuela under Nicolás Maduro, Mozambique under the FRELIMO Party and Nicaragua under Daniel Ortega (See Varieties of Democracy Report 2020 by Lührmann and Lindberg, 2020; Kendall-Taylor et al, 2019). Table 2.2: Competitive authoritarian regimes • Elections are held and outcomes are not predetermined, though incumbents have huge advantages and manipulate the formal democratic rules. • Legislatures and the judiciary exist, but both are very weak and there are no institutional checks on power. • Opposition political parties are legal and the media is free to operate, but both are heavily restricted, harassed, threatened, arrested, bribed and extorted. • Civil liberties exist, but are limited.

What explains the rise of grey-zone regimes? Grey-zone regimes are not a new phenomenon, but more regimes today do not fit the binary categories of being fully democratic or fully authoritarian. This may be in part because of the prevalence of indices that measure democracy around the world, which have been able to differentiate regimes based on a number of dimensions. As a result, any regime that does not perfectly measure up to the standards of democracy or autocracy gets lumped together in one large greyzone category. Grey-zone regimes actually first emerged in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Europe and Latin America. Many of these countries followed a path to democracy where political institutions preceded the expansion of participation. This allowed the elite to form a democratic political culture that gradually diffused to the larger population. Elections were then implemented gradually. In many younger countries, however, elections preceded the formation of political institutions. These regimes with weak state institutions have struggled to maintain democracy. This helps explain why there are so many more ‘democracies’ that fall in the grey zone. Much of the twentieth century also saw more full autocracies that did little to hide their nature from the world. Some of these regimes broke down and fully democratized, such as in Eastern Europe, but many others reformed only superficially in order to cater to international expectations. In the

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sections that follow, we explain in more depth the various pathways to entering the grey zone.

Pathway 1: authoritarian breakdown Towards the end of the third wave of democratization, the proportion of democracies in the world more than doubled (Diamond, 2002). Democracy was advancing on a global level, but many of these states were incredibly weak and not prepared to fully democratize. As a result, many of the regimes that democratized did not have enough time to fully develop democratic norms and democratic institutions. Globalization (see Chapter 6) led to the diffusion of the idea that democracy was the best form of government, but did not necessarily lead to strong institutions or the establishment of robust democratic political cultures. This helps explain why so many regimes stalled and never became fully democratic. After the Cold War ended, many scholars noted the emergence of weak and failing states (Zartman, 1995). During the Cold War, many weak states were propped up by foreign aid that enabled them to survive. When the Cold War ended, economic and military aid stopped completely. Leaders at the helms of weak states no longer had resources to distribute to their followers or to maintain their militaries. The end of the Cold War led to an environment that overall was hostile to institution building (Moss et al, 2006). The end of the Cold War also coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of multiple new states in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus. Many of these states only had ‘marginal capacities to function politically and economically,’ (Dorff, 1996, 18). The Central Asian republics and the states in the Caucasus were particularly weak. Scholarly work has also shown regional trends with democracies, with recurring combinations of flaws that suggest a contagion effect (Bogaards, 2009). With a backdrop of state weakness, the end of the Cold War also ushered in a wave of regime change, with many authoritarian states trying to make the transition to democracy. While in some cases, such as East Germany, this led to democracy, in other cases, authoritarian regimes collapsed and were replaced by a watered-down version of the previous regime, one of the most common pathways to semi-authoritarianism (Carothers, 2002). States that suffered from poverty, inequality, low literacy rates and weak civil societies attempted to democratize. Countries that attempted to democratize also had to deal with contested borders and other sources of instability. Some of these countries attempted to democratize after long wars that left grievances and weak institutions. New democracies are often able to hold elections, but are unable to build other effective political and judicial institutions, or create an active, democratic political culture overnight. The political institutions are too weak to effectively mediate between the public and the government.

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Additionally, building a strong political culture that is favourable to democracy is one of the biggest challenges facing new democracies. New democracies lack years of diffuse and specific support from citizens for new democratic regimes. In the aftermath of authoritarian rule, the political culture and power structures of the previous regimes can persist in new democracies; their politics constitutes an exchange of favours rather than an exchange of political ideas. High levels of patron–clientelism and corruption are pervasive (see Chapter 7). Years of authoritarian rule means that civil society and political parties are too weak to help a new regime transition to democracy, and there are no democratic traditions from which to draw. The new regime holds elections but the elections suffer from irregularities. If the state has control over a major source of revenue, this facilitates the perpetuation of its power and can lead to a relapse to authoritarianism. Mauritania illustrates this seesawing between authoritarianism and semiauthoritarianism. Mauritania’s long-standing dictatorship led by Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya was ousted in a coup in 2005. Elections were eventually held two years later in which Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi came to power. But by 2008 Abdallahi was ousted in another coup led by General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, who had recently been fired. Abdel Aziz eventually resigned from his military post and held elections in July 2009, in which he won the presidency with 52 per cent of the vote. Mauritania has since again decayed into authoritarian rule, with Abdel Aziz holding power indefinitely (Human Rights Watch, 2019). The combination of institutional weakness and instability has not lead to democratic consolidation, but to semi-authoritarian regimes or, at best, to shaky and vulnerable defective democracies (Dorff, 1996). Transitions from authoritarian rule were never completed, and in many cases personalist leadership styles emerged.

Pathway 2: authoritarian survival As the previous section explained, most democracies that emerged after the third wave suffered from numerous flaws. In spite of this, there has been increasing scrutiny of individual countries’ democratic practices. Donors, international organizations and other powerful states also became more active in supporting democracy. This led to increased pressure for authoritarian regimes to hold elections and more intense monitoring of them. In 1972, there were thirty-three autocracies that regularly held elections. Today there are fifty-five – including Bangladesh, Montenegro, Nicaragua, Russia and Serbia (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2020). Thus, international observers were in some cases able to limit the ability of regimes holding elections to engage in massive fraud. In particular, established authoritarian regimes were compelled by the international community to adopt more formal democratic institutions. Economic crises and the loss of aid after the Cold War ended left many authoritarian regimes financially strapped and vulnerable. Holding elections

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was a way of gaining international legitimacy and foreign financial support. However with weak oppositions, holding elections did not automatically lead to a transition to democracy. Incumbents became adept at manipulating the rules to suit themselves. What emerged were new forms of authoritarian rule and, in some cases, semi-authoritarian rule (for more on authoritarian cooperation, see Chapter 5). New forms authoritarianism have given us the perception that there are more regimes in the grey zone, but in many cases this because of authoritarian survival mechanisms rather than efforts to actually reform. For example, after much pressure from donors, Tanzania liberalized in a limited way when long-time leader Julius Nyerere stepped down from power. But the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) Party, which had been in power since 1954, remained in control. Thus many authoritarian regimes responded to new pressures to democratize after the Cold War ended by not really democratizing at all, but using democratic institutions to prolong their rule and gain legitimacy in the eyes of the public and the international community (Kendall-Taylor et al, 2019). Though pressure has been applied by the international community for regimes to democratize, there is also considerable leeway for friendly authoritarian regimes to maintain stability in any way they see fit. Economic and security issues can trump the importance of human rights and democracy, which contributes to stalled democratic development.

Pathway 3: democratic backsliding Another pathway to entering the grey zone is when a democratic regime starts to backslide significantly. As Chapter 1 briefly explained, this is most likely to be initiated by the rise of a would-be autocratic leader, either personalist or populist, but there are other important bottom-up drivers that enable this, which will be detailed in subsequent chapters. There is no consensus as to how many regimes are now in the grey zone and how many of these got there due to backsliding. This book argues that democratic de-consolidation has not increased the size of the grey zone, because most consolidated democracies have simply become flawed democracies. Additionally, most cases of autocratization have involved regimes that were already leaning autocratic becoming increasingly authoritarian. As mentioned in Chapter 1, two-thirds of the cases of autocratization around the world took place in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes, and only one-third were in democracies. Other cases of autocratization have affected regimes that already had weak institutions and rule of law. The more pre-existing institutional vulnerabilities, the easier it is for a leader to exploit them. However, plenty of flawed and defective democracies have become increasingly authoritarian, such as Hungary, Bulgaria, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Senegal, Bolivia, Serbia, Zambia, the Philippines and the Dominican Republic (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2020).

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Conclusion Most democracies around the world are imperfect. They possess many features that are democratic, such as elections, and still fail to satisfy criteria of fully consolidated democracies. This chapter explored the different labels for these regimes that fall in the middle, and how and why they have been categorized in this manner. In general, there is greater reason to pay attention to such regimes. After the Cold War ended, many new, weak democratic regimes emerged that did not have fully developed institutions that could meet the citizens’ needs. This contrasted with consolidated Western democracies that democratized in a more gradual manner and had more developed institutions. But newer democracies do not have the luxury of time. They are often expected to democratize as quickly as possible, though their institutions are weak. As a result, many of these regimes have reverted to authoritarianism or semi-authoritarianism, or remain deeply flawed or defective. They possess many traits that make it difficult to overcome their flaws, such as persistent patron–clientelism and corruption. Meanwhile, many authoritarian regimes want to appear to be more democratic in order to ensure the regime’s survival. These post-Cold War changes have led to an emergence of a range of different institutions in authoritarian regimes, some of which appear to be democratic. Whether a regime started out as authoritarian and reformed, or started out as democratic and decayed, there is a huge variation in political regimes. This chapter delved into the key flaws that these regimes in the middle possess and highlighted how they differ from consolidated democracies and autocracies. By doing so, it has provided a useful starting point to understand the spectrum of authoritarianism and democracy, and the different points on this continuum that regimes can regress to. This chapter did not devote much time to explaining the role of public opinion in democratic, grey-zone and authoritarian regimes. Public opinion is critical to the health and stability of a democracy. Positive attitudes towards democracy, and high levels of political and social trust help democratic institutions function. Thus, variations in the public’s attitudes towards democracy are a factor that explains why some regimes are more democratic than others. Citizens often embrace democratic and authoritarian political systems simultaneously (Shin and Tusalem, 2007). Therefore, it is important that citizens not only embrace democracy, but reject authoritarian alternatives. The next chapter tackles this subject in depth, looking at how public opinion is measured and which questions are critical to measuring the health of a democracy.

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KEY QUESTIONS 1. Choose any country that falls into the category of a competitive authoritarian regime. Why is this country a competitive authoritarian regime and not a traditional authoritarian regime? 2. What factor is most convincing in explaining why there are so many grey-zone regimes today? 3. How do you differentiate between a flawed democracy and a defective democracy? Is it useful to make this distinction? What are the benefits of having democracy with adjectives? What current examples can you give of these types of democracy? 4. Can a country be considered a full democracy if it does not have transfers of power? In light of this, why is Japan considered a democracy? 5. Why is patron–clientelism so detrimental to the consolidation of democracy? Can a country be corrupt and still be considered democratic? Why or why not?

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PART II

Public Opinion and Norms

3

Measuring and Defining Public Support for Democracy and Autocracy

Introduction According to Russell Dalton, the most pressing challenge to contemporary democracies comes from their own citizens. They have grown ‘distrustful of politicians, sceptical about democratic institutions and disillusioned about how the democratic process functions’ (Dalton, 2004, 1). Democratic backsliding does not happen without some citizen support of it (Luo and Przeworski, 2019). One of the themes of this book is the argument that citizens are increasingly willing to support authoritarian leadership. This is not to say that democracy is not the most popular type of regime around the world; it still is. However, there are trends in public opinion that are concerning for democracy (Foa and Mounk, 2017; Kendall-Taylor et al, 2019). To help understand what these trends are, this chapter first lays out what we mean by public opinion and how public opinion is measured. We then use surveys from around the world to map the patterns of democratic and authoritarian values in democracies. Is democracy really in danger or just facing a predictable dip in support? We then examine one of the key trends measured by public opinion surveys: polarization. We explain how polarization is problematic for democracy. With rising polarization, some individuals in democracies are increasingly inclined to support leadership that represents their point of view, even if it means that democracy might suffer. While Chapter 4 will explain other factors that drive support for authoritarianism, rising polarization helps explain how backsliding can happen in advanced democracies. Finally, we look at political participation rates and explore the counter-intuitive trend of high levels of polarization coinciding with high levels of apathy. Like polarization, high rates of apathy are symptoms of larger issues that most democracies are contending with today.

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Key concepts: public opinion Public opinion is the composite of individual citizens’ opinions, attitudes and beliefs. Scholars of public opinion investigate a wide range of subjects including citizens’ ideological beliefs; policy, candidate and party preferences; assessments of self-interest in politics; sense of political efficacy; and attitudes towards social groups and political institutions (Kinder, 1998). The study of public opinion overlaps with political psychology but focuses on collective preferences and beliefs rather than how individuals mentally process information. Public opinion studies at the aggregate level largely assume that public opinion is shaped by large-scale social forces, family socialization and education, and is mostly stable and consistent over time. Chapter 4 explores some of these large-scale forces, while also looking at psychological factors that explain how individuals form their points of view. The concept of public opinion arose with the rise of democracy and the idea that government should rule with the consent of the governed. Early studies of political support differentiated between ‘diffuse support’ – citizen support of a political regime as an ideal – and ‘specific support’ – citizen satisfaction with general government performance (Easton, 1965). Specific support refers to citizens’ perceptions of the decisions, policies and actions of authorities. It is shaped by how effective the regime is (Easton, 1975, 437). Diffuse support has to do with evaluations of what democracy represents, and the legitimacy of the regime (Easton, 1975; Klingemann, 1999). Where there is diffuse support, citizens believe that democracy is superior to all alternative forms of government. It is important to note that citizens can be supportive of democratic principles, yet still dissatisfied with the way democracy is working in their country (Klingemann, 1999; Norris, 1999; Linde and Ekman, 2003; Qi and Shin, 2011; Doorenspleet, 2012). Thus believing in the principles of democracy is distinct from specific levels of support for a political regime (Norris, 1999; Ferland, 2015). These concepts are referred to in the public opinion literature as ‘democratic satisfaction’ (specific support) and ‘support for democracy’ (diffuse support). Diffuse support is the final step towards democratic consolidation. Democratic consolidation is contingent upon citizens believing that democracy is the only game in town (Linz and Stepan, 1996). Without the public’s support, democratic institutions have no meaning. Diffuse support for democracy tends to be a stable cognitive value or attachment formed through socialization. Through the socialization process (attending school, interacting with peers and family, and media exposure), citizens learn to value the benefits of democracy and political participation. Any changes in diffuse support take place slowly over time. In contrast, democratic satisfaction is more susceptible to fluctuations based on government performance (Huang et al, 2008). Though diffuse support is stable, experience with democracy can impact citizens’ support for it. A long period of poor government performance, for

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example, may impact diffuse support. Citizens could come to believe that democracy is not the most appropriate form of government for their society based on their experience with it (Lipset, 1959). In contrast, governments that are considered effective are likely to be deemed more legitimate (Dahl, 2008a). Poor regime performance can weaken legitimacy over time even in cases where citizens have been socialized to believe in the benefits of democracy (Linz and Stepan, 1978). Surveys have revealed that those that are dissatisfied with democracy are also more open to non-democratic alternatives. For this reason, Larry Diamond (2008) argues that the biggest threat to democracy is bad governance, or failing to improve people’s lives and only serving the interests of a narrow elite. Citizens base their evaluations of the government based on its delivery of economic and political goods. The public’s perception of personal and national economic conditions are the most important economic factors (Hofferbert and Klingemann, 1999; Criado and Herreros, 2007). While scholars acknowledge that there is political discontent among citizens, they disagree about the dangers. Surveys seem to point to a contradictory situation. While voters are disappointed with the performance of democracies, many continue to profess a strong allegiance to the principles of democracy (see Klingemann, 1999; Norris, 1999, 2011; Booth and Seligson, 2009; Schmitter, 2015). It may be that dissatisfied democrats are actually politically active and are strengthening participatory elements of democratic political culture, something that could be viewed as a positive development (Klingemann, 2014, 141). Since dissatisfied democrats are assumed to be highly educated, well-informed, politically interested and active, they should serve as a potential driving force in strengthening democracy and thus as drivers of democratization (Klingemann, 1999; Norris, 1999; Qi and Shin, 2011). On the other hand, it may be that increasing democratic discontent and scepticism towards political institutions constitutes a threat to the legitimacy of representative democracy (Pharr et al, 2000; Stoker, 2006; Doorenspleet, 2012). On this note, some studies have claimed that being content or discontent with democratic performance is less critical than levels of apathy (Geissel, 2008). In other words, as long as participation levels are high, the level of satisfaction is a less important indicator of the state of democracy. Political trust is another important element of public opinion. It is an indicator of political legitimacy (Easton, 1975). Political trust is defined as citizens’ confidence in political institutions. It is also an evaluation of a relationship between one who trusts and one who is trusted, but it is not clear the degree to which trust is based on evaluating past performance (specific support) or democratic procedures (diffuse support). Low levels of trust would indicate that the relationship between citizens and the state is deteriorating (Hardin, 2000). Some scholars argue that low levels of political trust translate to lower levels of diffuse support for democracy, because when trust has been broken citizens may be concerned that the problem is the system (Berelson, 1952; Iyengar, 1980).

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Others argue that political trust is related to specific forms of support because trust reflects how citizens evaluate the performance of political institutions against their normative expectations (Miller and Listhaug, 1990). Studies have demonstrated that systems that perform well economically have higher levels of trust (Miller and Listhaug, 1999; Anderson, 2009; Van der Meer, 2018). High levels of political trust and a widespread belief in the legitimacy of the institutions is a strong marker of democratic stability (Levi and Stoker, 2000). Political trust is also rooted in the quality of democratic procedures. The perceptions that institutions and procedures are impartial, fair, efficient, honest, equitable and responsive to society’s needs are important factors in the development of political trust (Miller and Listhaug, 1990). Citizens also expect that there are adequate opportunities for input into the democratic process (Linde, 2012; Dahlberg and Holmberg, 2014). These factors are important to fostering both specific support and diffuse support for democracy. Declining levels of political trust in consolidated democracies around the world has attracted a large body of research into the likely causes and consequences (Klingemann, 1999; Dalton, 2004). Numerous empirical studies have found that citizens with lower levels of trust engage less in institutionalized forms of political participation (such as voting), and are more likely to not comply with laws (Hooghe and Marien, 2013). Political trust also makes citizens more likely to comply with voluntary programmes that require public cooperation. Higher rates of trust are also associated with support for political compromises and coalitions, which checks extremism and polarization. Political trust is also associated with higher levels of support for government programmes that offer public goods. Additionally, high levels of trust can help democracies weather downturns in regime performance. Other scholars counter that low levels of trust do not necessarily undermine support for democracy. The functioning of democracy may benefit from a degree of healthy scepticism in its citizens (Cook and Gronke, 2005). Low levels of trust may be an indication of a higher number of critical citizens, who feel that existing channels of participation fall short of democratic ideals (Norris, 2011, 134). This may not necessarily mean that there is disengagement, but rather an aspiration to improve democracy. Here a slight distinction can be made between critical citizens and political cynics. Political cynicism is when citizens believe that political actors are primarily self-interested. It is characterized by limited faith in the sincerity of political actors and little belief in the reliability of political authorities (Brants, 2013). High levels of political cynicism could be correlated with low levels of political trust, for example in the legislature, but political cynicism does not mean that individuals do not support democratic practices. Interpersonal trust, sometimes referred to as social trust, is another important element of democracy and a key contributor to sustaining a host of positive outcomes, such as development and good governance. Almond and Verba (1963) showed that social trust and social participation are at the heart of a democratic culture. Social trust strengthens pro-social behaviour at the micro-level, and also

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Measuring and Defining Public Support

generates support for democratic institutions and a willingness to participate in politics (Inglehart, 1990). Social trust refers to how much individuals trust other individuals in society, beyond their families. Social trust is the touchstone of social capital. It helps to cultivate face-to-face interactions and facilitates social integration. Social trust supports the establishment of strong community bonds and helps societal institutions function. Individuals in societies with low levels of trust have to keep an eye on others, cannot take people at their word and are more likely to hire an inexperienced family member than a qualified stranger. Interpersonal trust is highly correlated with effective democratic governance and lower corruption, because it creates a virtuous circle of social attitudes that foster and sustain cooperation (Inglehart, 1990; Muller and Seligson, 1994; Almond and Verba, 2015). Social trust is necessary for cooperation and resolving collective action problems. Social trust reinforces voluntary participation, making it easier and more rewarding for citizens to participate in civil society. Trust also helps to moderate conflicts and encourages citizens to take an interest in the public good (Newton et al, 2018). In contrast, low levels of interpersonal trust can make it easier for elites to unify supporters in zero-sum games, which helps leaders gain support for anti-democratic behaviour and actions to defend against other segments of the population that they feel cannot be trusted. Social trust is believed to be strongly associated with civic engagement. Societies that have high levels of social trust are more likely to have a vibrant civil society. Robert Putnam writes: People who trust their fellow citizens volunteer more often, contribute more to charity, participate more often in politics and community organizations, serve more readily on juries, give blood more frequently, comply more fully with their tax obligations, are more tolerant of minority views, and display many other forms of civic virtue. People who trust others are all-round good citizens, and those more engaged in community life are both more trusting and more trustworthy. (Putnam, 2000, 136–7) One of the ways social trust is measured is by civil society membership. Societies where citizens are highly involved in civil society are considered to have higher levels of social trust and political participation. Early studies had noted that a major feature of American society was the wide array of voluntary associations. It was argued that membership in any type of association, even if it is non-political and does not involve active participation, leads to a more competent citizenry. In spite of the theoretical benefits of social trust, some argue that joining small and homogenous civil society groups does not mean that individuals will be more supportive of acting on behalf of the common good or be politically engaged. In spite of this scepticism, studies of the US and Europe have found that social trust

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and political trust are highly correlated (Mishler and Rose, 2005; Newton et al, 2018). Thus societies that exhibit high levels of social trust are also more likely to have high levels of political trust, which is a critical building block of civil society and democracy. But globally, social trust varies considerably from country to country and longitudinal data suggests that people trust each other less today than they did forty years ago (Newton et al, 2018; Pharr and Putnam, 2018). In spite of this, democracy remains the most popular form of government, but as laid out in earlier chapters, the quality of democracy is faltering and many regimes are backsliding. Most people still see democracy as the best form of government, but there are declining levels of specific support for democracy, of public trust in political institutions and actors, as well as of interpersonal trust (Greskovits, 2015; Luhrmann et al, 2019).

Measuring public opinion The spread of democracy following the Second World War coincided with greater interest in developing a clear understanding of what public opinion is and how it can be measured. By the 1950s, the study and measurement of public opinion through commercial polling and mass surveys had become more common. Social scientists perfected large sample surveys and probability sampling. Public opinion surveys used randomly selected respondents to provide a reasonably accurate representation of the preferences and beliefs of citizens. Professional and scholarly organizations and journals began to publish and publicize the results of these polls and surveys. Today mass survey research is a big business with polling being critical to democratic campaigns. Surveys are also important to gauging the health of a democracy. Social scientists can gain access to public opinion data from most countries around the world. Pew Research and World Values Survey regularly crank out research based on surveys around the world measuring public opinion. The Asian Barometer, Eurobarometer, Latinobarómetro, Afrobarometer, Arab Barometer and Eurasia Barometer also offer insights into public opinion in specific regions. All of these global research projects explore people’s values and beliefs, and demonstrate how they change over time. Surveys that try to assess how democratic a political culture is generally focus on a few specific questions. One group of questions tries to ascertain levels of diffuse support for democracy. These questions are meant to gauge support for democratic principles and values, as well as the sense of importance of having a democratic system. For example, individuals are often asked what their proclivity is towards a strong leader who might circumvent legislatures and elections. This question is similar to questions that ask individuals whether they would be supportive of alternatives to democracy. Studies of Europe have found that Eastern Europe is generally more sceptical about the centrality of democracy than is Western Europe. A 2015 study using

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data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems found that in Western European countries, only 6 per cent of citizens doubted that democracy was the best form of government, but in Eastern Europe this was 18 per cent (Karp and Milazzo, 2015). Italy was the only Western European country in which the level exceeded 11 per cent, while Albania was the only country in Eastern Europe in which it was below 11 per cent (Karp and Milazzo, 2015). On average, 59 per cent of citizens in the ten countries studied rejected all non-democratic alternatives. Only in two countries (Bulgaria and Poland) were those rejecting authoritarian alternatives in the minority. A 2016 study by Foa and Mounk, using a World Values Survey, found that in 1995, 24 per cent of Americans answered positively to the question of whether they preferred a strong leader. By 2011, this number had climbed to 32 per cent. Another question used to measure diffuse support for democracy is about support for military rule. Some democracies have pockets of public support for military rule. Pew Research Global Attitudes Data (2017) found that support for military rule is relatively high in countries like Indonesia (68 per cent), South Africa (52 per cent), Nigeria (48 per cent), Ghana (46 per cent), Kenya (45 per cent), Mexico (42 per cent), the Philippines (41 per cent), Peru (40 per cent), Brazil (38 per cent) and Colombia (31 per cent). There is very little support for military rule in Europe; it is the highest in Italy and France at 17 per cent. The US also is at 17 per cent, while 15 per cent of the British public supports military rule in the UK. However, the World Values Survey Wave 6 (2014) revealed an alarming trend in the US regarding support for military rule. While only 6 per cent of Americans supported it in 1995, by 2011, this had risen to 16 per cent (Foa and Mounk, 2017). Others argue that individuals calling for more technocratic rule and strong leaders, while also calling for more direct forms of democracy, is not necessarily a bad sign for democracy. It may mean that citizens support a democratic model that allows for strong leadership that will act in the public interest, but can be overruled by the public when need be (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002). An additional question on diffuse support for democracy is of how essential it is to protect democracy and civil liberties. Individuals born in the interwar period or early post-war periods were more likely (41  per cent) to say that protecting people’s civil liberties was absolutely essential in a democracy than were those born since 1980 (32 per cent). Millennials were also not as convinced that it is essential to live in democracy. Compared to 72 per cent of older respondents only 30 per cent of younger respondents believed this. Foa and Mounk (2016, 2017) see these findings as evidence of democratic deconsolidation in the US. The second group of questions seeks to determine specific support for democracy, support for regime performance or ‘democratic satisfaction’ (Norris, 2001; Booth and Seligson, 2009). These questions may ask about confidence levels and trust in specific institutions such as political parties, legislatures, the

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courts and government overall. These types of questions concern citizens’ confidence and satisfaction with the way democracy is working in their country. There is a huge divide between Eastern and Western Europeans in terms of satisfaction with democracy, according to a 2015 study using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (Karp and Milazzo, 2015). Nearly twothirds of people Eastern Europe are dissatisfied, compared with 33  per cent in Western Europe. Only 7  per cent of Danes are dissatisfied with the way democracy works compared to 79 per cent of Bulgarians (Karp and Milazzo, 2015). Additionally, a Global Attitudes Survey from 2018 revealed that people in many countries around the world were not satisfied with the way democracy is working, including 84  per cent in Greece, 83  per cent in Brazil, 81  per cent in Spain, 70 per cent in Tunisia and 70 per cent in Italy. In all five cases, dissatisfaction rates have increased since the previous year (Pew Research Global Attitudes Data, 2019). Democratic satisfaction varies depending on the age of the democracy. Citizens of newer democracies are evaluating whether or not the government can deliver economic development and basic welfare (Dahlberg et  al, 2015). There is often a big discrepancy between the democratic aspirations of citizens in new democracies and their evaluations of democracy in practice. New democracies tend to have weak institutions that are not able to deliver what citizens expect. Studies show that satisfaction in new democracies is not based on attitudes towards democratic institutions but on short-term evaluations of the outputs of the democratic system. The failure of new democracies to deliver what citizens were expecting led to high levels of dissatisfaction (Waldron-Moore, 1999). In the mid-1990s, levels of dissatisfaction exceeded 95 per cent in Bulgaria, the highest recorded by the Eurobarometer surveys, since they began in the early 1970s. Many Eastern European democracies also suffered from high dissatisfaction levels (Anderson, 1998). As of 2021 the level of political support in post-communist countries is still worrisome. The 2008 financial crisis caused a jump in dissatisfaction levels in eight out of eleven Eastern European countries. Recent studies of Western European democracies have argued that drops in satisfaction with democracy can be caused by economic factors as well. Eurobarometer data showed dissatisfaction spiking in countries like Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Ireland and Portugal, in some cases reaching as high as 80 per cent. Most of the drops in South European countries coincided with the financial crisis. For more on the role of financial issues affecting democracy, see Chapter 6. Financial issues, poor governance and high levels of corruption have caused support for democracy to erode in Brazil, after several decades of democracy. The first hints of a problem emerged in 2013 when São Paulo saw protests against a modest increase in bus fares. The public’s dissatisfaction with public transport, policing, healthcare and education continued to intensify over time. Millions took to the streets in an outpouring of frustration against corrupt politicians

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in 2013.1 A September 2016 Latinobarómetro poll indicated some alarming trends. First, only 9 per cent of the public believed that the country was being governed for the benefit of the people. Then-President Michel Temer, who took office after President Dilma Rousseff was impeached, had an approval rating of 14 per cent (Folha de S. Paulo, 2018). Second, diffuse support for democratic governance dropped to 32 per cent, from a high of 55 per cent in 2009 (Riethof, 2016). Not surprisingly, specific support for democracy also dropped; 83 per cent of Brazilians were not satisfied with the way democracy was working in their country according to a 2018 Pew Research poll (Kent, 2019). A third category of questions tries to determine levels of political trust. Individuals may be asked how much they trust a particular institution or politicians in general. There is no scholarly consensus about whether or not political trust can be used to measure diffuse and/or specific support, but it is often used as proxy for both. In addition to drops in satisfaction, citizens have become increasingly distrustful of politicians and institutions for some time now, but this has varied in severity by region. Political trust tends to be low in the postcommunist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and high in Scandinavian countries. In the US, Gallup polls have shown that levels of confidence in Congress, political parties and the government have waned over time (Gallup, 2020).2 Political trust in the US government declined between 1958 and 1980, then boomed from 1980 to 1988. It rose again from 1992 to 2000 – and after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Political trust plunged following the Great Recession in 2007–2008 in the US and Europe. Ironically, it is not the stronger economic performers that have the highest levels of political trust. Cross-national studies show that what matters is how well a country is performing relative to the past, rather than any cross-national comparison (Van Erkel and Van der Meer, 2016; Bargsted et al, 2017). The erosion of legislative, judicial and bureaucratic institutions leads to declining levels of trust in democratic institutions. While we have clear evidence that corruption undermines confidence in institutions, there is a dearth of studies that have looked at the relationship between executive aggrandizement vis-à-vis the legislature and trust in parliament. Levels of trust in parliaments tends to be incredibly low due to the perception that partisanship and self-interest guide decision-making. Trust in parliaments around the world tends to be fairly low, relatively speaking. In Europe, a 2010 and 2012 European Social Survey showed that trust in parliaments was lower in Southern Europe than in Northern Europe, with Ireland, Spain, Cyprus, Portugal and Greece facing the biggest declines (Zmerli and Van der Meer, 2017). In the US, Gallup polls have found that the public’s confidence in Congress fell from 42 per cent in 1973 to 11 per cent in 2019 (Gallup, 2020). Interestingly trust in parliament is higher in authoritarian regimes, followed by some consolidated democracies and newer democracies. Flawed democracies and other grey-zone regimes have the lowest levels of trust in the parliament. The

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countries with the lowest trust in the parliament of the seventy-seven countries polled by World Values Survey 5 and 6 are shown in Table 3.1 (World Values Survey Wave 5; Wave 6). According to a 2013 global Gallup poll of 123 countries, about 50 per cent of individuals expressed confidence in their judiciaries (Roshelle and Loschky, 2014). Regionally, confidence in the courts was highest in Asia, with 65 per cent support, compared to 49 per cent in Europe, 48 per cent in Africa, 47 per cent in the Middle East, 47 per cent in North America, 35 per cent in Latin America and 28 per cent in the former Soviet Union. There is some variation within regions as well, with 95 per cent support in Bhutan but only 23 per cent in Taiwan. In Latin America, confidence in the courts ranges from 17 per cent in Peru to 52 per cent in Uruguay (Gallup, 2020). A 2019 Gallup poll shows that trust in the judiciary in the US has also decreased over time (Gallup, 2020). In 1985, confidence in the judiciary was at 56 per cent. By 2019, it was 38 per cent, although that is up from 30 per cent in 2014. Brazilians have been losing trust in democracy and the way the country is governed in general, but the courts (and the Supreme Court) are considered particularly biased, corrupt and inefficient, with low levels of trust of the country’s judicial institutions (Riethof, 2016). In Brazil there continues to be declining confidence in the courts and the rule of law, while there is an increase in support for vigilante justice (Daly, 2019). Most citizens rarely meet an elected representative or member of the judiciary, but are likely to have encountered a member of the public bureaucracy. These encounters can help legitimize or delegitimize the public’s perception of the state (Yackee and Lowery, 2005). These state–society relations are incredibly important to securing trust in the public sector (Christensen and Lægreid, 2005). As David Easton (1965) writes, if specific support for the ability of the state to deliver goods develops over a long period of time, this turns into diffuse support that is critical to sustaining democracy. Table 3.1: Trust in parliament % Slovenia

%

 6

Serbia

21

Tunisia

 7

Colombia

21

Guatemala

11

Bulgaria

21

Peru

12

Japan

23

Poland

13

Chile

25

Romania

16

Mexico

25

Hungary

17

Brazil

25

United States

19

Argentina

26

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Measuring and Defining Public Support

In many new democracies, like Kosovo, it is a common belief that public administration is inefficient, corrupt and only loyal to particular interests (Skendaj, 2014). As a result of strong patronage systems, these institutions have a very poor reputation among citizens for failing to be independent. As Chapter 7 explains, in countries with high levels of corruption, citizens have negative attitudes towards civil servants and lower levels of trust in the state in general (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003). Numerous studies have looked at trust in elections. Various factors explain why there is fluctuation in the levels of trust in the electoral process. Individuals tend to have more faith in the paper ballot system than in electronic systems where there could be technical glitches, because it is seen as more transparent (see snapshot case on Brazil, p 83). The paper ballot can also be verified by outside observers – another source of trust, especially in emerging democracies (Brancati, 2014). Additionally, fair party competition is important for fostering trust in elections. When parties are banned, or candidates or opposition parties are harassed, it lowers turnout and trust (Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998; Donno and Roussias, 2012). Harassment changes the perception of competition and makes citizens feel that elections are futile or pointless. Another aspect of the rules that affects perceptions is the level of public funding of parties. High levels of public funding for parties generates perceptions that the playing field is level (for reforms in this regard, see Chapter 12). Additionally, when the electoral administration appears to be well organized and independent (see Chapter 10), it generates high levels of public confidence in the electoral process (Mozaffar, 2002; McCoy et al, 2018). A fourth group of questions seeks to measure levels of interpersonal trust. Individuals are asked whether or not people can be trusted, or whether it is important to be careful in dealing with people. World Values Survey Data Wave 5 (2009) and 6 (2014) from 2005 to 2014 indicates that there are high levels of trust in the Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Switzerland. There are also increasing levels of trust in Australia, Germany and Estonia. However, the US, the UK, Russia, India, South Africa, Spain, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Mexico all have declining levels of trust. In Turkey and Brazil, trust is not declining but they have the two lowest trust levels of all of the countries surveyed. As a region, interpersonal trust is particularly low in Latin America. World Values Survey Wave 7 (2019) have reported that trust levels in Brazil, Ecuador, Peru and Colombia are less than 10 per cent. In 2016, the Latinobarómetro survey reported that the average level of trust in Latin America was 16 per cent. Connected to interpersonal trust is civic, political and social participation. Citizens may be asked how often, if at all, they have taken part in civic, political and/or social organizations in the past twelve months. Many scholars believe that civic participation is a key marker of the health of a democracy.

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Box 3.1: Political sophistication: how much do people know? Studies have argued that democracy requires educated voters that can make meaningful decisions that hold office holders accountable. Robert Putnam notes that for democracy to work, citizens need to be involved in a civic community and ‘regard the public domain as more than a battle-ground for pursuing personal interest’ (1993, 88). But early studies of voter sophistication argued that citizens were not politically interested and had little desire to become more involved in politics beyond voting in national elections. These early studies argued that voting decisions were not necessarily based on rational evaluations of candidates, parties and issues (Butler and Stokes, 1969; Converse, 2000). The predominant view was that people do not understand or care about politics. Attitudes about politics can be inconsistent, and many citizens do not have an overarching ideological point of view. Studies of public opinion in the US found that very few people based their political opinions on a coherent belief system. People often switched their opinion when asked the same question at different points in time. Given these low levels of sophistication, some experts argued that it was better for democracy if citizens did not participate too much. Samuel Huntington (2006) argued that too much mobilization and participation, taking place before institutions have had time to develop, would lead to instability. Although most researchers agree that sophistication among citizens tends to be low, many issues in this field are deeply contested. The common view is that most citizens lack political information (Carpini and Keeter, 1996), are disengaged from politics and disinterested in the responsibilities involved in being an informed democratic citizen (Putnam, 2000; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002). In spite of this gloomy picture about political sophistication, more studies suggests that many citizens are knowledgeable about certain aspects of politics, but are not interested in all aspects (Sides and Karch, 2008; Rapeli, 2018). For example, studies have shown that though men are more knowledgeable than women about politics in general, the gender gap disappears when looking at political issues that women care about or relate to their life experiences (Stolle and Gidengil, 2010; Dolan, 2011). Thus, conclusions made about political sophistication need to take into account that various types of issue-publics exist, which impacts what people pay attention to. Others caution that using surveys to measure political sophistication is in itself problematic because it measures respondents’ ability to answer questions in sub-optimal conditions rather than finding out what they really know about politics. As a result, some have argued that the public is better informed than previously thought and able to make proper decisions (Lupia et al, 1998; Lau and Redlawsk, 2006). 3 Political sophistication is also unevenly spread among individuals in any democracy, making it difficult to make sweeping generalizations. In any event, if political sophistication were a problem, the way forward would be focus on improving citizens’ access to political information rather than excluding them from participating.

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Trends in public opinion: polarization In addition to measuring the public’s opinion about diffuse and specific support for democracy, some studies also measure the ideological placement of voters across democracies. For several decades, scholars have analysed voters’ issue positions to determine partisanship and the ideological distance among citizens (Fiorina, 2017). One of the trends noted is of growing levels of polarization, not just among political elites and parties but among the general public as well (Draca and Schwarz, 2018). Polarization is a process where the normal differences in a society increasingly align along a single dimension. Polarization used to be defined by how far voters or political parties were from each other on a left–right spectrum. Today surveys ask citizens how warm or cold they feel towards the opposing party; how honest, generous, patriotic, open-minded and intelligent they feel the opposing party is; and how much they trust the opposing party (Levendusky and Malhotra, 2013; Lelkes and Westwood, 2017; Druckman and Levendusky, 2019; Iyengar et al, 2019). Thus polarization today extends well beyond ideology, and represents a different way of life. Polarization divides people into clear blocks, which destroys a sense of overarching interests that are so critical to civil society and civility in a democracy. Polarization facilitates the development of rigid political identities and undermines cultural and psychological factors that help sustain democracy (McCoy et al, 2018). This makes de-polarization a much more problematic process. The lack of social interaction between groups furthers polarization, creating a vicious cycle (McCoy et al, 2018). Democracy requires not only institutional endurance, but mutual toleration, something that becomes more difficult in societies that have become increasingly polarized (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018). While some amount of polarization is good for providing cues to differentiate between candidates, it becomes problematic when it creates two camps with mutually exclusive identities and interests (Lozada, 2014). The more salient identity becomes, the stronger the loyalty towards in-group members, and antipathy and distrust toward out-group members tend to be (Gaertner et al, 1993). When opinions align under a single identity, it can threaten social cohesion and political stability (Kriesi, 2010). Polarization also means people have different views on what democratic rules and principles should be. Some may be loyal to the principles of democracy, while others may be cynical or nostalgic about authoritarian rule. Ironically, in some cases people may feel it is necessary to take undemocratic steps in order to defend democracy. In the case of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez constructed a polarized society that moved beyond class-based cleavages to competing views of democracy; you were either in favour of the Bolivarian Revolution or you were against it. With polarization, people increasingly perceive politics and society to be in terms of us versus them or as a zero-sum game (Somer and McCoy, 2018).

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Polarization emphasizes in-groups and out-groups, and creates growing resentment of out-groups that tend to be depicted by stereotypes (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006, 2008). As a result of polarization, citizens believe their efforts to shape policy is being blocked by others. In polarized societies, people may also be less willing to cooperate and collaborate with others. Worse yet, polarization fuels a disdain for those who want to compromise (Kreps et al, 2017). As people are less willing to compromise and work collectively, the chances for political violence may increase. In Kenya, strong political identities driven by certain groups being excluded and marginalized has turned elections into high-stakes affairs, causing large-scale electoral violence. In polarized societies that are able to compromise, it can lead to government paralysis, gridlock and less public goods provisions, which negatively effects the economy (Alesina et al, 1999). In other cases, polarization can lead to imposition by the majority of policies that are unpopular with the rest of the public. Polarization also affects the way citizens discuss ideas. Society is grouped into two camps as people cluster around like-minded individuals. Homogenous communities and groups become more extreme in their thinking over time (Bishop, 2009). Neither camp is willing to discuss issues with groups of a different opinion, so public discussion becomes less constructive (Gentzkow, 2016). Societies can become divided not just socially, but spatially as well. They may come to believe that they cannot coexist in the same nation with the other side. Physical segregation feeds on existing antagonistic feelings. The danger of toxic polarization is that once political elites and their supporters no longer believe that their political opponents are legitimate, they become less willing to adhere to democratic rules and processes (Lührmann et al, 2019). Polarization also erodes at partisan restraint and presidential restraint (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2016). Voters may profess a commitment to democracy while simultaneously supporting leaders who subvert it. Perceptions of existential threats gives political elites incentives to consider undemocratic actions and seek a permanent advantage. Meanwhile, supporters of the incumbent regime are willing to ignore democratic norms and threats to democracy, because the opposition represents an even greater threat that must be defended against at all costs (Svolik, 2019). The deeper the political divisions, the easier it is for a political entrepreneurs to take advantage of this, since citizens may be more interested in punishing political opponents whom they view as morally unfit (Svolik, 2019). In the US, voters with strong partisan preferences were more lenient towards undemocratic candidates who matched their political views. In Venezuela, autocrat Nicolás Maduro’s supporters were more willing to tolerate illiberalism and authoritarianism, giving him an 88 per cent approval rating in 2017, while the opposition and independents surveyed disapproved with 98 per cent and 94  per cent respectively (McCoy et  al, 2018). This contrasts with Venezuela when it was a democracy. At its peak, 90% of all Venezuelans agreed that democracy was the best system of government (Svolik, 2019).

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Robert Dahl (2008c) used a Gallup survey of Argentina from March 1966 to illustrate how polarization erodes the electorate’s ability to resist authoritarianism, even among its most educated citizens (excerpt from Svolik, 2019). Citizens were asked if they would support a ban on the leftist populist Peronist party in future elections. Of those with a university degree, 35 per cent supported a ban, compared with only 16 per cent of those who had a primary school education or lower. That June, the military staged a coup, led by Juan Carlos Onganía, aimed at suppressing the left. Thus, though autocratization is orchestrated by elites, democracy is eroded with the consent of a significant portion of the public (Kendall-Taylor et al, 2019; Lührmann et al, 2019). Polarized electorates are not able to agree to disagree, because there is the belief that those on the other side are trying to destroy the country and are threatening to their way of life (Gentzkow, 2016; García-Guadilla and Mallen, 2019). This can set up a vicious cycle of mistrust and antipathy that is difficult to stop. Opinion polls in the US and Turkey show that citizens are less likely to accept someone who supports another political party as a spouse, a friend of their child or a neighbour (Somer and McCoy, 2019). Deep social cleavages can be dangerous according to Seymour Martin Lipset (2000). Dahl and Edward Tufte warned that democracy is in danger when it becomes characterized by deep divisions, limited consensus and mutual suspicion (1973). Polarization is measured by looking at mass surveys of citizens, such as those identifying where they place themselves on a left–right ideological spectrum. Another way to measure polarization is to directly ask citizens about their willingness to speak to those with political differences. An Ipsos MORI (2019) survey asked citizens, ‘now thinking about people in your country with opposing political views to you, to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following?: They are not worth trying to have a conversation with.’ Some countries polled revealed high percentages of the public felt that those with opposing views were not worth talking to. In India, South Africa, Brazil, Chile, Turkey and Argentina around one third of the public could not see themselves having a conversation with someone with an opposing viewpoint. In contrast, in Japan, where polarization levels are lower because it has been led by a centrist catch-all party for decades, this number is only 11 per cent. In Hungary, France, Mexico, Italy, Spain and the US it is around 25 per cent. These statistics do not take into account where citizens place themselves on a left–right spectrum; they only measure their willingness to speak to the opposition. Yet, as previously explained, there is a decline in the number of centrists globally. Polarization also means that those in power will cater only to the narrow interests of their base, making it harder for democratic governments to be responsive to the needs of the citizenry overall. This may explain why polarization leads to lower levels of democratic satisfaction. Studies have shown that increases in party policy extremism is also related to lower levels of satisfaction with how democracy works (Ezrow and Xezonakis, 2011). The closer that parties

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are centred in relation to the median voter position, the higher the level of citizens’ satisfaction with the workings of democracy. In spite of this, observations from elections in Europe have shown that centrist parties are losing ground to ideologically extreme parties, creating more polarized electorates. In particular, the major trend is the fall of centre-left movements and the rise of far-right movements (Caramani and Manucci, 2019). In Brazil, the Workers Party failed to recover from the scandals that hit its former presidents and the party. In Eastern Europe, far-right parties have gained considerable ground. Alarmingly, the proportion of votes for far-right parties in Europe is similar to the levels in the early 1930s (Benedetto et al, 2020). In some countries, mainstream conservative parties have been hijacked by extremists and alt-right groups. Though not all polarization is driven by the rise of far-right movements (such as in Turkey, Venezuela, Colombia, Thailand, Egypt and the Philippines), these movements have driven polarization in countries like Poland, the US, the UK, France, Hungary and Austria (Carothers and O’Donohue, 2019). The fault lines are no longer as predictable or based on the left–right spectrum, but are based on a complex range of issues. In the case of the US, polarization doubled among non-activist Democrats and Republicans from 1972 to 2004 (Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008), with other studies finding that the number of moderates had been decreasing (Campbell, 2018). In Hungary, Fidesz gains its support from those who emphasize Christianity, nationalism, greater government control over citizens’ lives, and order and stability, while the opposition supports the European Union, multi-culturalism, secularism, individualism and civil liberties. In Turkey, a similar division exists between the pro-AKP group that supports stability, Islam and defending Turkey against groups that they perceive to be corrupt and elitist, while the opposition supports secularism, freedom and cosmopolitanism. In Venezuela, the Chavistas are pitted against the anti-Chavistas, with the former supporting a leftist agenda at any cost and the latter being mostly fragmented but committed to democracy (McCoy et al, 2018). As Chapter 8 will explain, one of the drivers of polarization is populism. Populist leaders tap into identities that are already hardening and present themselves as messianic figures that save people from the ‘enemy’. Populist leaders advance programmatic agendas that are greatly at odds with their opponents. Populist figures also politicize the pro-system and anti-system dimensions of politics, making the case to shake up the system by using democratic processes to validate destroying democratic institutions. In the UK, politics became increasingly polarized after 51.9 per cent of the public voted to leave the European Union in 2016. The need to ensure that the country would leave the EU led to a parliamentary crisis, with Prime Minister Boris Johnson suspending Parliament in 2019. New forms of direct external interference in elections are also playing an important role in fostering polarization (Ohlin, 2018). Authoritarian regimes have become more adept at shaping hearts and minds in ways that increase polarization

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and influence publics to vote for anti-democratic candidates (see Chapter 4). Negatives advertisements may also increase negative partisanship (Abramowitz and Webster, 2016; Iyengar et al, 2019). The media also plays an important role in influencing polarization by creating information bubbles, wherein individuals only hear one point of view (Duca and Saving, 2012; Levendusky and Malhotra, 2013; Kleinberg and Lau, 2016).

Trends in political participation: apathy and alienation Ironically, despite the rising levels of polarization, the biggest trend in political participation is low voter turnout. In fact, non-voters make up the single largest bloc, in contrast to the past. Scholars have argued that low voter turnout decreases the legitimacy of democracy (Powell, 1986; Birch, 2010). In Europe, voter turnout is steadily falling (Benedetto et al, 2020). Voter turnout is the lowest since suffrage was extended to all. From the Second World War to the early 1980s, voter turnout stood at around 80–85 per cent. Today it has fallen to under 65 per cent, with a significant drop since the 1990s. Turnout among young people has fallen, though older generations still remain engaged. The UK has the biggest gap between older and younger voters, with a gap of 35 points separating those over 55 and those under 35 years of age. Younger people today have been socialized during a time of higher levels of distrust for political parties and politicians (Caramani and Manucci, 2019). The region that has seen the highest drops in voter turnout is Eastern Europe. Electoral turnout has declined or stagnated at low levels in Eastern Europe and it is about 15 per cent lower than in Western Europe (Karp and Milazzo, 2015). In the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia, turnout fell by 15–25 percentage points in the five national legislative elections between 1998 and 2013; Croatia saw a decline of 22 percentage points in the four elections between 2000 and 2011; and Hungary’s turnout declined by 9 percentage points in the four elections between 2002 and 2014 (Armingeon and Schädel, 2015). Most countries have seen declines in voter turnout since their first elections to today. The biggest drop is Albania, which has decreased by 46 per cent, followed by Slovakia (37 per cent), the Czech Republic (37 per cent), Romania (35 per cent), Slovenia (34 per cent), Bulgaria (33 per cent), Croatia (24 per cent), Moldova (24 per cent), Ukraine (23 per cent), Latvia (22 per cent), Lithuania (19 per cent), Macedonia (18 per cent), Estonia (14 per cent) and Poland (11 per cent). These declines in turnout may be a reflection of the failing authenticity of democracy in the eyes of these voters. Eastern European voters are also less aligned to particular parties than in Western Europe, with declining levels of party membership (Brusis, 2016). Turnout has declined not just in Europe, but also in the US, Asia, Latin America and Africa (World Bank, 2017). There are more elections than ever before, yet voter turnout around the world has fallen. Global voter turnout was as high as 78 per cent in 1945, and remained high until 1985. By 2015, voter

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turnout has dipped to 63–66 per cent. In South Africa, a country with relatively high turnout rates, we have seen voter turnout steadily decrease since apartheid ended in 1994 (Runciman, 2016). The drivers of low voter turnout are political apathy and political alienation (Southwell, 2008; Dahl et al, 2018). Political apathy is the attitudinal orientation of a lack of interest in political participation. Political apathy is more widespread among younger generations, who are more apathetic than young people were in the past (Dahl et al, 2018). Political alienation refers to a person’s sense of estrangement from politics and the government. Politically alienated individuals feel powerless and isolated. They feel that norms have broken down and they have low levels of political efficacy (Fox, 2015). One difference between apathy and alienation is that alienated individuals are cognitively aware of what they are alienated from. In contrast, apathetic individuals may not know enough about politics to identify why they are not interested (Dahl et al, 2018). Apathetic individuals have little motivation to act or participate (Fox, 2015). In contrast, while alienated voters may refuse to vote, they may also try to take action in other ways, voicing their discontent through unconventional political means such as protests (see Chapter 12). In Eastern Europe, non-voting may be due to disillusionment with old elites, feelings of distance from the elites, and other economic problems. In an analysis of 137 national elections in nineteen post-communist countries, Pacek and colleagues (2009) found that high unemployment and inflation were associated with lower turnout. Hopelessness and despair may also discourage the poorest sections from participating, which lowers overall turnout (Solt, 2008; Brusis, 2016). Growing levels of electoral malpractice (see Chapter 11) and strategic manipulation of the rules are also correlated with increased levels of voter apathy (McAllister and White, 2015; Fortin-Rittberger et al, 2017; Norris et al, 2018; Wellman et al, 2018). In studies of advanced industrial democracies, there is a strong relationship between low voter turnout and trust in the fairness of elections (Cox, 2003; Dalton, 2004; Grönlund and Setälä, 2007). Where electoral contests are seen to be fair and legitimate, there is greater civic activism and participation. In contrast, citizens who believe that elections are unfair are less likely to vote (Norris, 2012; Carreras and İrepoğlu, 2013). At the same time, while abstention rates may be high, many of these same countries have seen protests break out (see Chapter 12). Nevertheless, political apathy and alienation are usually symptomatic of larger problems. Apathy often signals that citizens do not care about which type of political regime they live in. It may also be a sign that rules and procedures have lost their meaning, and there is little to be gained from engaging with the state. In the US, results from World Values Survey Wave 6 (2014) found that 57 per cent of those who think taking bribes and evading taxes are justifiable are also not interested in politics, while only 35 per cent are interested in politics. Almost 70 per cent of those who feel that living in a democracy is not that important are also not interested in politics (World Values Survey, n.d.).

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SNAPSHOT: BRAZIL AND DEMOCRATIC SATISFACTION In 2018, Pew survey data revealed that 83 per cent of Brazilians were not satisfied with the way that democracy was working in their country (Castillo et al, 2019) and only 14 per cent of Brazilians believed that their elections were honest – a historic low (The Economist, 2018). This is in spite of the fact that Brazil uses electronic voting, which has not yielded a solid case of tampering thus far, according to representatives from the Organization of American States (OAS). Mistrust is especially high among supporters of the eventual winner, Jair Bolsonaro. His support base believed the false rumour that the voting machines were made in Venezuela and therefore were biased against the right. In actuality, the machines were used because they made it easier for the poor to vote and allowed immediate counting, but Bolsonaro supporters were not convinced. Supporters of the Workers Party also felt frustrated by what was taking place in Brazilian politics. Popular former President Lula was barred from running for office in 2018 after he was convicted on corruption and money laundering charges. While the right was outraged by the corruption, the left felt the judicial process was biased and had been fast-tracked for political reasons. By November 2019, he was released from prison. In spite of a media attempt to tarnish his and the Worker’s Party’s image, Lula remained the most popular candidate in the 2018 election. For Brazilians on the left, the integrity of the elections was tainted by his candidacy being barred. The right, feeling convinced that corruption at the highest levels was a huge betrayal of public trust, disagreed (Phillips, 2017).

Conclusion Public support for democracy is critical for the success of a democratic system. As previously stated, democratic survival relies on the significant actors (elites and the public) believing that democracy is the best form of government. This support is especially important when it comes to societies that may disagree over policy or leadership. Democracies require citizens who are committed to democratic governance (diffuse support), who are relatively satisfied with democracy (specific support) and who can place their trust in the institutions and in one another. For the most part, public support for democracy tends to be stable in consolidated democracies. However, as the chapter revealed, there are cracks in this support because democracy has underperformed. These cracks in support in consolidated democracies as well as newer and/or flawed democracies have been seized upon by would-be autocratic leaders who convince the public that democratic rules should be broken in order to resolve crises of governance. These leaders also take advantage of other trends in public opinion, particularly polarization and apathy. Polarization is problematic in democracies because it

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chips away at trust. Citizens also become more willing to give up democratic practices if it means the opposition is thwarted, and they may be more willing to support power grabs by the executive. Apathy leads to citizens turning the other way while this happens. In the next chapter we try to understand what shapes public opinion by looking at culture, socialization, education, personality and history. It explains how these factors influence the way citizens feel about democracy and about authoritarian styles of leadership. Later chapters will delve deeper into what drives polarization and apathy. KEY QUESTIONS 1. What is the difference between diffuse and specific support? Are they driven by the same factors? 2. What is the difference between political cynicism and political apathy? What types of questions would you ask in order to measure them? 3. Why is social trust so important in a democracy? Can you have a democracy with low levels of social trust? Why or why not? 4. What is worse for democracy, polarization or apathy? Explain why you believe this to be the case. 5. Is there such a thing as a critical citizen? Do you agree that low levels of specific support for democracy are not problematic?

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4

What Shapes Public Support for Autocratization? Political Culture, Education, Religion, Personality and Authoritarian Legacies Introduction As previous chapters have explained, more and more frequently, contemporary democratic recessions are initiated by authoritarian-style leaders taking power through popular elections rather than through elite-driven coups d’état and slowly dismantling democracy with some public consent (Bermeo, 2016). This development challenges the common perception that ordinary citizens universally consider democracy the best political system. This chapter lays the foundation for greater insight into how authoritarian values develop in consolidated democracies. There is rich literature that distinguishes between democratic and less democratic political cultures. We explore the differences, and look at how and why different cultures are more conducive to stable democracy. We then turn to how collective values are formed at the national level by looking at historical legacies. This may help explain how authoritarian values persist in countries that are democratic but have authoritarian pasts. Studies have shown that political indoctrination that takes place during the impressionable years has an important impact on the values of citizens who lived in authoritarian regimes. Next, we incorporate studies in political psychology to investigate what causes individuals to embrace non-democratic values. Bringing in studies that look at the individual level helps explain the nostalgia or support for authoritarianism that exists in formerly and currently authoritarian regimes, while also explaining why there are pockets of citizen support for authoritarian styles of leadership from citizens living in consolidated democracies that have never experienced authoritarianism and have no authoritarian political culture to draw from.

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Key concepts: political culture A large body of research has focused on whether and how a country’s cultural experiences shape its potential to democratize and to consolidate its democracy. According to political culture theorists, the presence or absence of a democratic political culture has important implications for democratic consolidation. By political culture, we are referring to the attitudes, beliefs, norms, practices and rituals related to government and politics that are widely shared by a society. To have a democratic political culture, citizens and political elites need to accept and support democratic institutions, the principles of civil liberties, the rule of law and human rights (Diamond, 1999). A democratic political culture also includes tolerance of political opponents and high levels of political trust. High levels of trust and tolerance help to ensure involvement in civic associations that can counteract any potential excesses of the state. Ronald Inglehart (1988) concluded that political culture also plays an important role in explaining the persistence of democratic institutions. As the previous chapters explained, a democracy is not consolidated until its citizens believe that democratic institutions are legitimate. While a democratic political culture at the national level helps to ensure institutional and organizational coherence, at the individual level political cultures help to explain other aspects of political behaviour (Pye, 1965). Individuals learn political values during the course of their lives through the educational system, from their families and from repeated interactions with other members of society. These norms that are passed across generations through early socialization shape and constrain behaviour (see Pye and Verba, 1965; Moore, 1966). In addition to the socialization process, political cultures form through the process of citizens interacting with the political system, or the process of society’s demands (inputs) being translated into policies (outputs) (Almond and Verba, 1963).

Civic culture and democracy By the 1950s, it was widely recognized that political systems were embedded with different political cultures. The rise of survey methods in the 1950s and 1960s offered evidence of variation in attitudes among countries, as well as the impact of social class and education. Newer democracies around the world faced challenges due to having fewer years of exposure to democratic values and underperformance of democratic governments. Theories of political culture gained traction with the seminal work, The Civic Culture by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba. Almond and Verba (1963, 2015) used the concept of ‘culture’ as a psychological orientation towards social objects. As they explained, a political culture encompasses three different types of orientations: cognitive (related to how much a citizen knows); affective (related to how a citizen feels); and evaluative (related to what a citizen values) (Almond and Verba, 1963). Using

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survey data from five countries (Germany, Mexico, Italy, the US and the UK), Almond and Verba explored the different political cultures that emerged from the surveys, and used this information to make predictions about the relationship between culture and stability. Almond and Verba noted the contrast between participant and subject cultures. Participant cultures were oriented towards the political system, interested in politics, involved in elections, parties and civic associations, tolerant of opposition, capable of critical thinking, confident in their abilities to participate and exhibited high levels of interpersonal trust (Almond and Verba, 1963). Almond and Verba argued that where participatory cultures were widespread, democracy was more likely to flourish. Participatory cultures are open to independent political knowledge and experience, and are capable of coexisting with a multicultural society. In contrast, political cultures that are more passive and traditional are more susceptible to authoritarianism. Around the same time, work by other scholars made similar distinctions between traditional and modern cultures. David McClelland (1961, 2019) suggested that values that emphasized achievement and individualism were also critical to creating modern democratic societies. Edward Banfield (1958) contributed the argument that traditional cultures overemphasize the extended family, while not sufficiently emphasizing upward mobility and participating in politics. Almond and Verba (1963) indicated that political cultures in Mexico and Italy were more traditional and parochial, and were thus more disposed to authoritarian styles of leadership. However, a political culture characterized by a general belief in the importance of participation and an acceptance of the state as the legitimate authority constitutes the perfect mix to sustain a stable democratic government. According to Almond and Verba (1963), this combination of passivity, trust, activism and support for the state constituted a ‘civic culture’. As they argued, for democracy to flourish, citizens need to be interested and confident in their abilities to influence political elites. Citizens need to have some level of knowledge of public affairs and the capacity to understand how they can have an impact. Countries whose citizens have low levels of political efficacy and interest in participating in politics tend to struggle to maintain their democracy. Later studies have disputed the conclusions that political cultures in the developing world were poorly disposed to supporting democracy (Booth and Seligson, 2009). The Civic Culture was also accused of having an Anglo-American bias and being ethnocentric. The characterization of political cultures in Germany, Mexico and Italy were more prescriptive than objective. Further research also revealed that political cultures are not homogenous, as there is a great deal of variation not just between countries or regions but within them as well. For example, early studies of political culture argued that Latin America had a singular political culture, originating from its Iberian heritage, that was not conducive to democracy. But increasing availability of survey data demonstrated that there

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was considerable variation within the region, casting doubt on the existence of a singular cultural identity. Studies of Costa Rica, for example, showed that Costa Ricans have high civic orientations compared to Mexican citizens (Power and Clark, 2001). Additionally, studies in several Latin American countries such as Argentina and Chile have demonstrated that political cultures in those countries are also not uniform (Tiano, 1986). Contemporary studies have also moved away from identifying countries that are culturally ‘backwards’. Instead, recent studies have examined how values change in modern democracies, placing less emphasis on which countries have political cultures that are less amendable to democratization (Inglehart, 1977; Abramson and Inglehart, 1994; Inglehart and Welzel, 2009; Dalton and Welzel, 2014). While these lines of research have generated useful insights, there is still some disagreement about how much weight can be placed on cultural explanations for democratic stability. Though political culture is not static, it tends to move slowly over time. As a result, some political scientists find cultural explanations too tricky to explain political change, or democratization prospects more specifically (Conroy-Krutz and Frantz, 2017). Others claim that political culture helps us to understand how individuals adapt to changes in incentives structures from institutional arrangements (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Nevertheless, in spite of the wide range of views on the role that culture, religion and education play, most scholars concur that a democratic political culture is important for a democracy to endure (Almond and Verba, 1963; Diamond, 1999; Inglehart, 2000). As Ronald Inglehart concluded, the survival of democracy ‘depends on the values and beliefs of ordinary citizens’ (2000, 96).

Religion and democracy Due to links between authoritarian regimes and religion, some scholars have contended that religion promotes values that are incompatible with democracy, such as intolerance, and obedience and deference to authority (Lipset and Raab 1981; Stark, 2001). Cultural arguments have focused on the importance of secular values over traditional religious values as critical to establishing a culture that is conducive to democracy and resilient to democratic backsliding. Two religions that have faced particular scrutiny when it comes to democratic compatibility are Catholicism and Islam. Studies of religion and democracy examine the actions and words of the clergy, how the religion affects the national political culture and finally how religious devotion at the individual level may affect the extent to which an individual values democratic principles. Critics of Catholicism have pointed to the role of the Catholic Church in supporting authoritarian regimes. However, while the Catholic Church was complicit in supporting the authoritarian regimes in Argentina and to a lesser extent those in Brazil and Uruguay, the Chilean Catholic Church played an important role in supporting civil society and fighting for human rights under

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Augusto Pinochet’s military regime. There are other examples of the Church being proactive in its support for human rights. In El Salvador, Archbishop Óscar Romero was a human rights activist, speaking out against social injustice and violence during El Salvador’s civil war. Romero’s activism led to his assassination by a right-wing death squad in March 1980 (UN Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, 1993). In Colombia, Guatemala and Mexico, the church has applied pressure to end political violence and support human rights (Hagopian, 2009). Outside Latin America, the Catholic Church applied similar pressure in the Philippines and Poland. In spite of these efforts, early works focused on how Catholic political cultures were incompatible with democracy. Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) claimed that Catholicism in particular was problematic for democracy because democracy emphasizes pluralism and equality, while Catholicism claims that there is a singular truth and emphasizes hierarchy. According to Lipset, the Catholic focus on one truth makes it difficult for Catholicism to accept religious tolerance, which creates a dilemma for democratic processes. Lipset also argued that most long-enduring democracies were Protestant, while at the time of his early study, most of Latin America was authoritarian. Samuel Huntington (1991) also claimed that Catholic cultures seemed vulnerable to more traditional styles of leadership. Lipset’s later writings (1994), however, acknowledged that the Catholic Church had evolved in ways that were better suited to democracy due to a change in the church’s political theology, incorporating human rights into its teachings. Additionally, Huntington observed that the third wave of democracy took place predominantly in Catholic countries, prompting questions about how incompatible Catholicism was with democracy in the first place. Islam has faced similar critiques to Catholicism. Elie Kedourie wrote ‘[T]he ideas of the secularity of the state, of society being composed of a multitude of self-activating, autonomous groups and associations – all these are profoundly alien to the Muslim political tradition’ (1992, 6). Yet there are several Muslim majority countries, such as Indonesia, Tunisia and Senegal, that have democratized. Additionally, several larger-N studies have shown that Islam is not an obstacle to democratization, as some Western scholars have alleged (Rose, 2002; Tessler, 2002, 2015). The impact of religion on individuals’ beliefs is also not straightforward. In a study that drew data from fifty-four countries using World Values Surveys, the results showed that religious beliefs and religious participation have different effects on democracy (Bloom and Arikan, 2013). On the one hand, people who participate in religious organizations have a heightened interest in politics and are more likely to support democracy (Verba et al, 1995). Deep religious convictions however, are not always compatible with democracy. Holding strong convictions can undermine educational efforts to politically socialize citizens in support of democratic values (Lipset and Raab, 1981; Stark, 2001). Furthermore, survey research has determined that religious orthodoxy can be used to predict

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intolerance and support for non-democratic practices. Atheists, in contrast, are more tolerant of political dissent (Hunsberger, 1995; Schwartz and Huismans, 1995; Sullivan and Transue, 1999; Duriez et al, 2002; Arian et al, 2003). Other studies have suggested that the effects of religiosity are mitigated by personality. Scholars say that authoritarian personalities are more likely to be religious (Weller et al, 1975; Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 1992; Hunsberger, 1995; Laythe et  al, 2002).1 Not surprisingly, in studies that looked at the relationship between religion and support for democracy, when controlling for the authoritarian personality, the correlation was reduced to non-significant levels (Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 1992). Furthermore, other studies have shown that an authoritarian personality is more important to explaining racism and homophobia, not fundamentalism (Wylie and Forest, 1992). Thus, according to this view, it is the authoritarian element of an individual’s personality that fosters the association between religiosity and non-democratic values (Laythe et al, 2001).

Education and democracy While the relationship between religion and democracy is complicated, across the world, there is a correlation between education and democracy. The countries with the most educated citizens are also the most democratic. Primary education is especially important to democracy. As primary education rates increase, democratization is more likely. Though this takes time to bear fruit, improving access to education improves the chances of democracy surviving. This is especially true if access to female education is expanded. Increases in higher education have also been linked with democratic values (Dahl, 2008c). But, how does the relationship between education and democracy work? Most studies have shown that democracy does not lead to higher levels of education, but evidence suggests that the reverse may be true. Education is a strong indicator that a country will transition to democracy (Glaeser et al, 2007; Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008).2 One reason why schools are important to democracy is that they help to create good citizens (Dewey, 1998). According to Lipset (1959), education enables citizens to understand the norms of tolerance. This is known as the ‘ethical effect’. Educated citizens are able to take on more moderate political positions and have more positive attitudes about human rights, civil liberties and democratic values. Education socializes individuals to express their differences using information and evidence rather than resorting to having heated arguments (Bowles and Gintis, 2003). Students can learn that disagreements can be resolved through debate instead of threats of violence. Students may come into contact with individuals from different backgrounds and cultures. Education enhances social intelligence, and teaches citizens to regulate their behaviour in order to participate and work with others (Gordon and Browne, 2004).

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To examine this effect, we can look at Tunisia, the only country from the Arab Spring to successfully democratize. Some of Tunisia’s success may be due to the role of its educational system, which is very different to those elsewhere in the Arab world. Tunisian textbooks championed freedom, cooperation, equality, social justice, respect and tolerance. In fact tolerance is one of the most important themes in Tunisian textbooks. Most importantly, the education minister implemented reforms that eliminated intolerance towards different religions, while keeping the liberal aspect of Islam intact. The curriculum highlighted the unity of mankind and peaceful coexistence between different races and religions. There was also an emphasis on dialogue, flexibility, moderation and an openness to universal values in the curriculum (Faour, 2013). Education also increases citizens’ ability to make rational decisions; this is known as the ‘cognitive effect’. Education ensures that citizens are better informed and can process complex information (Pressley et al, 1989). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) echoed this, claiming that ‘people with more schooling are likely to make more informed choices when voting and to participate more actively in their communities’ (Campbell, 2006, 81). Educated citizens will be able to distinguish between good information and misinformation, to detect deception and to avoid being easily manipulated by elites. According to Tatu Vanhanen, ‘It is easier to maintain autocratic political systems in countries in which the number of literate and educated people is low than it is in countries in which it is high’ (2004, 125). Educated citizens are also more knowledgeable about how the political system works and can better understand how to influence their representatives. Evidence from the US and the UK has shown that education also spurs on more people to get involved in politics and ensures that they are better informed when they do (Milligan et al, 2004). Educated people are more likely to read newspapers and to vote. Low interest in politics usually goes together with low levels of political knowledge. Education ensures that citizens can engage in critical and flexible thinking to challenge authority (Meisenberg, 2004). Better educated nations are more likely to preserve democracy and to protect it from coups. Education is an important socializing agency for political trust (Hakhverdian and Mayne, 2012). People with higher education levels are more likely to trust politics assuming that corruption levels are low. At the same time, when corruption levels are high, educated people are less likely to trust government and more likely to pose a challenge. In Eastern Europe, citizens became more critical after democratization and judged the reality of their experiences with democracy (and corruption) against their expectations (Klingemann and Fuchs, 1995). People with higher levels of education are more supportive of democratic processes, but are not blindly obedient to authority. Ronald Inglehart (1997) argued that post-materialist values can explain why trust and faith in governments declined while democratic processes improved. As citizens became wealthier,

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they were freer to focus on other issues, one of which was challenging how well political institutions were working. Education levels are also important to social trust, or trust of other citizens. According to Robert Putnam (2004), individuals whose parents had a high school education or less were less likely to have social trust. These studies may all be assuming that education is being used to socialize citizens to support democracy, to think critically and to be tolerant. Here is where the type of education may matter. All the communist regimes had literate citizens, but the educational process was used to socialize citizens to fervently believe in the merits of the communist system and the perils of capitalism. Citizens who were socialized under communism were indoctrinated not to challenge authority (for more on this see the ‘Authoritarian legacies’ section in this chapter). Learning methods included memorization rather than challenging students to engage in reflective thinking. For citizens who were indoctrinated with communist authoritarian ideals during their impressionable years, these values have been somewhat durable (Norris, 2011). Cohort analysis has demonstrated that generations that were indoctrinated during their impressionable years about the necessity of authoritarian rule have attitudes that are difficult to change (Neundorf et al, 2017). The level of education also matters in terms of support for populist parties (see Chapter 8). More educated voters are less likely to vote for populist right-wing parties (Lubbers et al, 2002). However, other studies argue that the relationship is curvilinear, in that populist right parties receive most of their support from the mid-education stratum (Evans, 2005; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006). Some authors claim that this may be due to a ‘cognitive mobilization’ of citizens with some education that no longer want to blindly swallow what the established elites tell them (Mudde, 2004). In the case of left-wing populist voters, educations levels vary. In Spain, the supporters of left-wing populist party PODEMOS were a mix, but included highly skilled supporters with unfulfilled expectations (Ramiro and Gomez, 2017).

Authoritarian legacies Historical legacies can also have an impact on how values are formed. Studies have examined how exposure to autocratic institutions, values and practices shape people’s political beliefs and behaviour. This has important implications for backsliding because many democracies have had an authoritarian past that citizens can remember. A small, but growing literature has shown that people who lived through autocracy during their impressionable years tend to become nostalgic for these regimes. Some authoritarian regimes were better able to socialize their citizens in ways that legitimated authoritarian rule and left an indelible imprint. Though these authoritarian regimes eventually broke down during the third wave of democratization, the socialization left a lasting impression that weakened

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citizens’ support for democracy and made these countries more susceptible to the democratic recession. In contrast to much of the literature on authoritarian regimes, which argues that their survival strategy is based on catering to regime insiders and using repression against the public, more recent studies have revealed that authoritarian regimes (not just totalitarian ones) want legitimacy (see Geddes, 2005; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006; Møller and Skaaning, 2013). Many authoritarian regimes aimed to achieve a high level of public conviction in their legitimacy through indoctrination. By indoctrination, we are referring to the inculcation of a doctrine, ideology and political values that goes beyond merely fostering a mentality of obedience (Brandenberger, 2012). Indoctrination is a process by which a subject irreversibly learns an attachment, absorbing information as if it were universally accepted and true regardless of evidence (Eibl-Eibesfeldt and Salter, 1998). Thus, indoctrination closes down alternatives through the promotion of a single view that provides citizens with a narrative of why the incumbent should be seen as legitimate (Sears and Hughes, 2006). Authoritarian regimes used the educational system, the media and other organizations to successfully shape the values of citizens from an early age. Ritual praise and expressions of love are directed by teachers, fellow students and textbooks towards the leaders of the regime (Eibl-Eibesfeldt and Salter, 1998, 432; Lott, 1999). Education can have policy-prescribed, ideologically correct curricula. Subjects are infused with ideological messages through schools, universities, the media and the arts. Educational systems are also designed to discourage critical thinking and questioning of authority. The educational systems in right-wing military regimes in Latin America during the Cold War emphasized nationalism, Christianity and discipline. As such, the educational climate that people aspired to was one of respect, order and silence. Additionally, a military model of management was superimposed on the educational institution (Hanson, 1996). Textbooks were destroyed and new curricula were introduced that supported military rule and were purged of left ideologies (Davis, 1995). In Eastern Europe, the curriculum was updated to focus on nationalism and the communist ideology. The goal was to cultivate the principle that communism is morally right and everything that opposes it is morally wrong (Glenn, 1995). In Turkey, the textbooks focused on Turkish nationalism, while also creating a phobia about the enemy. No critical thinking was encouraged; instead, rote memorization of the state ideology was emphasized along with deference to authority (İnce, 2012). The media was also used to disseminate propaganda in favour of the regime. For example, in Argentina under military rule (1976–1983) there was a mass media campaign that stressed moral conduct and authoritative discipline. Argentines who watched more television were significantly more likely to agree that people should obey authority, to approve limits on freedom of speech and to think it is someone’s own fault if they are poor (Morgan and Shanahan, 1991).

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In Eastern Europe, television and radio programmes were heavily loaded with indoctrination regarding the triumphs of the Communist Party (Taborsky, 2015). In tandem with this approach, authoritarian regimes also ensured that citizens had little access to alternative information that may carry alternative values (Geddes and Zaller, 1989). The result of this strategy was that citizens developed strong convictions about the benefits of the authoritarian systems that they grew up in. Nostalgia about authoritarian pasts have been become a major obstacle for consolidation of democracy. Citizens’ formative experiences in authoritarian regimes impact their political preferences after the regime democratizes. People that grew up under authoritarian rule during their formative years are more critical and less satisfied with democracy, compared to people that grew up during democratic periods. Thus, authoritarian regimes cast a long shadow on citizens even after their downfall. These legacies have important implications for the development of a democratic political culture in transitioning societies. Many of the regimes in Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet sphere have struggled to democratize or have seen their democracies erode over time. The lingering authoritarian political culture has meant that citizens who have faced social dislocation have become nostalgic about the authoritarian eras. Survey data has revealed high levels of authoritarian nostalgia in Russia, Chile, Turkey, Brazil and many countries in Eastern Europe (Masci, 2017). One of the reasons Eastern European democracy is eroding is the powerful indoctrination efforts of communist regimes. These have proven to be adept at political socialization. Older respondents who had been socialized for decades in paternalistic and authoritarian societies are more nostalgic for communism than younger cohorts and older cohorts that were not indoctrinated during their impressionable years (Neundorf et al, 2017). Communist parties provided a more coherent ideology than some right-wing dictatorships, with some exceptions, and that has had a lasting resonance within these societies. Communism has also had a more indoctrinating effect than a resistance effect. A recent study demonstrated that the longer the period of exposure to communism, the higher levels of opposition to democracy are (Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2014).

Personality and democracy Where past studies have examined the role of culture and historical legacies in understanding democracy, contemporaneous studies in political psychology look at the role of personality in explaining support for authoritarianism. Psychological approaches focus on how individuals understand and evaluate experiences and information. In particular, this research aimed to understand popular support for fascist and totalitarian regimes in Europe and the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of the First World War, when there was a growing interest in democracy and democratic ideals, the harsh authoritarian resurgence in the inter-war period prompted important questions about individuals. What

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types of citizens would willingly support repressive regimes? What types of individuals were more susceptible to charismatic leadership styles (see Box 4.1)? What types of individuals were mostly likely to be intolerant towards minorities? Today there is renewed interest in the authoritarian personality because of the emergence of authoritarian support in countries with no political culture or legacy of authoritarian rule. It may also help to explain some of the variation in support for authoritarianism in post-authoritarian democracies. Initially, questions about why brutally repressive regimes garnered citizen support led to the development of the concept of an authoritarian personality (Adorno et al, 1950). The original tool used to measure authoritarianism was the California F-scale that emphasized characteristics present in individuals that would make them more predisposed to anti-democratic propaganda. These early studies were criticized on a number of methodological grounds, but the topic remains influential in the field of political psychology (Altemeyer and Altemeyer, 1981; Altemeyer, 1996; Oesterreich, 2005; Stenner, 2005; Hetherington and Weiler, 2009). Work by Robert Altemeyer (1988, 1996) has given researchers more empirical evidence of what the authoritarian personality is. Though there is still no consensus on how to measure authoritarianism or its origins, rising levels of authoritarianism have sparked renewed interest in authoritarian personalities. In spite of this lack of conceptual clarity, we lay out the most commonly listed traits of individuals who have authoritarian personalities based on the literature. Authoritarians are defined as individuals who have a higher willingness to submit to authority whether that be political and/or religious leaders. They tend to hold an uncritical attitude towards authorities of the in-group and identify with leaders that project toughness and strength. Seminal work by Theodor Adorno claimed that there is a preoccupation with dominance and submission. The authoritarian loves authority and wants to subject him or herself to it (Adorno et al, 1950). The proclivity towards strong leadership may originate from the issues that authoritarians face in managing uncertainty and ambiguity. Authoritarians are also characterized by a very rigid cognitive style, and struggle to deal with subjectivity. This leads to boxing people into rigid stereotypes, and creating in-groups and out-groups (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1954). For this reason, to combat fascism, research in education has focused on stressing flexible and non-dogmatic thinking in children during the formative years of their education. Authoritarians also hold conventional and traditional values, and are more likely to prioritize social order and reject non-conformist behaviour (Feldman and Stenner, 1997; Hetherington and Weiler, 2009). Authoritarians are habitually intolerant, but this is connected to social norms and values that are perceived to be legitimate and traditional (Altemeyer, 1996). Authoritarians are predisposed to intolerance towards out-groups that they perceive to be a challenge to the status quo, and that deviate from the norms in a crucial way, or differ in ethnicity or religion (Adorno et al, 1950, Altemeyer and Altemeyer, 1981; Altemeyer, 1996;

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Feldman, 2003; Hethering and Weiler, 2009). They are also more likely to be aggressive towards individuals or groups that they perceive to be exhibiting deviant behaviour. Generally, they are threatened by non-conformity and are hostile towards out-groups. In contrast, low authoritarians support individual autonomy, and have higher tolerance of out-groups, dissent and hostility to authority. Consensus information about predominant social norms can be a powerful influence on the attitudes that individuals will express. Because they have a greater need for order and preference for conformity, authoritarians are likely to be especially responsive to normative cues (Altemeyer, 1996; Hetherington and Weiler, 2009). A seminal study by Sherif and Sherif (1953) argues that attitudes are formed by adopting the attitudes of the valued in-group – this is known as group norm theory. Prejudice against an out-group is sometimes the result of conforming to an in-group’s perceived consensus attitude (Pettigrew, 1991; Crandall et al, 2002). When people identify with an in-group, they consciously or unconsciously adjust their attitudes to match the group’s attitudes. In the US, for example, a study during the early 2000s found that authoritarians had negative attitudes towards homosexuals because social norms were negative at the time. But when social consensus changed this was blunted (Altemeyer, 2002). Political attitudes are a result of a pre-political predisposition for a need for order. Authoritarians tend to believe that the world is a dangerous place. There is a tendency to rely on established authorities – such as religion, political leaders or predominant social and cultural norms – to provide that order, with conformity being the goal (Hetherington and Weiler, 2009). This helps to reduce the anxiety associated with ambiguity. Early studies of political psychology took a Freudian perspective and argued that personality is shaped by events that happened in childhood, most notably a childhood of repression (Adorno et al, 1950; Fromm, 2014). More recent perspectives argue that authoritarians are affected by interactions with their environment (Altemeyer, 1996) and more specifically perceived social threats (Feldman and Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005, 2009). Karen Stenner (2005) argues that the origin of authoritarian behaviour stems from a cognitive and psychological incapacity to cope with diversity and stress. The failure to cope causes authoritarians to default to strategies that require the least amount of cognitive resources, such as relying on authoritarian leadership (Lavine et al, 2002, 2005). Because authoritarians cannot develop more socially adaptive responses to threatening situations, they reject what they find threatening and are likely to be drawn to a dominant authority figure that will maintain a strong stance against these threats (Altemeyer, 2004; Oesterreich, 2005). Thus authoritarianism, according to some authors, is a coping strategy that has to be triggered when there is a perception of a threat, which causes higher levels of anxiety relative to low authoritarians (Stenner, 2005). Authoritarians are less capable of adapting to new stimuli and social situations, which is why they may struggle with threats from immigrants (Mather and Jefferson, 2016).

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Many political psychologists argue that normative threats trigger authoritarian behaviour, which sets authoritarians apart from the general public. In certain cases of extreme physical threat (such as in the aftermath of a terror attack), the attitudes of low authoritarians may converge with those of high authoritarians (Hetherington and Suhay, 2011). While the public may respond similarly to a security threat, it is only authoritarians that are likely to respond after a normative threat, such as threats to unity and uniformity of society (Stenner, 2005). Authoritarians are also more responsive to threatening messages, which can originate from discourse on normative threats (Lavine et al, 1999). Given that authoritarians can be triggered by social threats or by perceived threats to the normative order, leaders and parties can resonate with these voters if they take policy stances that deliberately address their psychological motivations and cognitions, such as amplifying the threat from immigrants (Brader et al, 2008; Hetherington and Weiler, 2009). Other research has confirmed that perceived normative threats matter the most for radical right-wing support – even more than economic threats (Oesch, 2008; Lucassen and Lubbers, 2012). Studies that investigated the relationship between economic inequality and personality found that economic inequality could also serve as a trigger for authoritarianism (see Chapter 6). Failure to address inequalities could yield higher levels of intolerance. A study of 15 advanced democracies found that people that live in countries with welfare policies that reduced inequalities were less likely to believe that immigrants reduced wages, stole jobs and drained public services (Crepaz and Damron, 2009). In contrast, countries with higher levels of inequality with limited welfare spending were more likely to exhibit authoritarian attitudes and less acceptance of immigration. By this account, there is an interaction with personality and the context (McCourt et al, 1999). Studies have argued that authoritarian personalities are more likely to support authoritarian forms of rule and authoritarian movements, as the name suggests (Altemeyer, 1996). Notably it is authoritarians’ tendency to submit to authority that causes them to blindly follow strong leaders (Adorno et al, 1950; Feldman, 2003). Authoritarians also value social conformity, which motivates their desire to limit the liberties and rights of segments of society that fail to conform to their values (Feldman, 2003). Studies show that authoritarians have displayed negative attitudes towards human rights and are prejudiced towards out-groups (Adorno et al, 1950; Altemeyer, 1988; Moghaddam and Vuksanovic, 1990; Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 1992; Wylie and Forest, 1992; Hunsberger, 1995). In South Africa, for example, studies of white authoritarians demonstrated that they were more likely to champion apartheid, and support detention without trials and persecution of out-groups than other members of the public (Duckitt, 1993; Duckitt and Farre, 1994). Additionally, other studies have demonstrated that authoritarians from formerly communist countries have opposed the democratization process due to fears of the uncertainty that democracy brings (McFarland et al, 1992; Reisinger et al, 1994).

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Personality and ideology Political psychologists have also investigated the relationship between personality and ideology. Recent work in this field has conceptualized support for various ideologies and parties as a form of motivated social cognition that is linked to the need to manage uncertainty and insecurity (Jost et  al, 2003, 2009). Though studies lack direct evidence of whether or not the relationship is causal, authoritarianism has generally been associated with extreme right-wing attitudes and identifications (Stone and Smith, 1993; Stenner, 2005; Hetherington and Weiler, 2009).3 This is due to the fact that authoritarians fear risk and social instability. They have a strong need for law and order – which is associated with supporting right-leaning ideologies that support traditional power arrangements. Authoritarians are also more likely to advocate the use of military force rather than diplomacy (Kam and Kinder, 2007; Barker et  al, 2008; Hetherington and Weiler, 2009). Studies examining the psychological traits of individuals who support the extreme right have found that they show relatively stronger psychological and physiological responses to negative or threatening stimuli (Hibbing et al, 2014). Authoritarians may also be drawn to radical right-wing populist parties due to their views on socio-cultural policies, such as being tough on immigration and crime for example, and not due to their views on socio-economic policies (Rydgren, 2005). Right-wing parties are not as appealing to authoritarians as radical right-wing populist parties, because laissez-faire economic policies provide more uncertainty (Lipset, 1959; Houtman, 2003; Oesch, 2008; de Regt et al, 2012). Authoritarians are also drawn to parties that focus on the exclusion of outgroups as the solution for all of their social and economic problems (Klusmeyer, 1993). Supporters of left-leaning ideologies who promote massive change are also typically are more open to experience, have more cognitive complexity and are able to tolerate uncertainty and ambiguity better (Jost et al, 2003, 2009; Duckitt and Sibley, 2009). However, researchers have suggested that authoritarians can also be found on the far left. In particular, the brutal left-wing regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union led scholars to believe that the left can also attract authoritarians (Shils, 1954; Rokeach, 1960). For example, authoritarians may seek the security that a regulatory state provides, such as housing and employment (Malka et al, 2014). The issue, however, is that the far left in many countries often represents groups that are traditionally not part of the mainstream and do not represent the status quo. That authoritarians are less comfortable with pushing for massive social change and destabilizing challenges to the existing order, explains why authoritarians have been less likely to gravitate towards the left (Jost et al, 2003, 2009; de Regt et al, 2011). That said, when a left-wing party is in the mainstream and when left-wing politics constitutes the norm, such as it had in Eastern Europe, authoritarians face little internal conflict about aligning themselves to

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the left. Authoritarians who grew up in left-wing despotic regimes become nostalgic about left-wing panaceas for the issues facing their countries after democratization. Assuming the left does not constitute the norm, it is more likely that left-wing authoritarians will disengage from politics. Thus in countries where left-wing politics is not mainstream, if authoritarians identified with the left became less interested in politics, it lowers the chances that elites will adopt policies to appeal to them (Adams and Ezrow, 2009). The same cycle can take place on the right as well. If a radical right-wing populist party emerges that is not mainstream enough, it may not gain support from authoritarians at first. Authoritarians are highly conventional, prone to conform to in-group norms and rules of conduct, and will adjust their attitudes to conform to group norms (Duckitt, 1989; Altemeyer, 1996; Stenner, 2005; Oyamot Jr et al, 2006, 2012). As a result, authoritarians may be late to join radical-right parties, deciding to offer their support once they believe that the party has become mainstream enough.

Box 4.1: Personality cults and charismatic leadership As Chapter 1 laid out, politics is becoming increasingly personalized (McAllister, 2007). Charismatic leadership and personality are receiving attention in research seeking to explain electoral performance in democracies as well as in grey-zone regimes (Caprara et al, 2008). Polling data indicates that perceptions of leadership and character are growing increasingly important to voters. Candidates who are perceived to be strong leaders, caring, compassionate, moral, determined, reliable and trustworthy have a strong influence on voters (Bartels, 2002). Studies have shown how something as simple as a candidate’s appearance can affect a candidate’s chances (Todorov et al, 2005). In addition to personality traits, there is increasing scholarly attention being given to charismatic styles of leadership and personality cults (Lancaster, 2014; Leese, 2014; Marquez, 2016; Sperling, 2016). Personality cults emerge when leaders create a heroic image of themselves as superhuman, and a powerful psychological and emotional identification develops between the leader and their followers (Kinne, 2005). In non-democratic regimes, personality cults are created through widespread displays of objects that glorify the leader, such as statues or portraits. Leaders immortalize themselves using ostentatious architecture, cult imagery and objects, and written, visual and performance arts. As citizens are confronted with images of the leader everywhere in everyday life, they may become mesmerized by the leader’s power and mystique. The media also plays a role in fostering personality cults. Total control over mass communication allows a regime to engage in a nationwide process of brainwashing to achieve total ideological integration of its people. Modern communications can help project the image of a charismatic leader to a far greater number of people by repeatedly disseminating images and information portraying the leader as a messianic figure (Tucker, 1968).

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In democracies, personality cults tend to develop in times of crisis. Perceptions of charisma are heightened when contextual circumstances cause followers to look to political leaders for a solution. A crisis evokes an emotional response to leaders that enables them to exert strong influence over followers (Madsen and Snow, 1991). Whoever is able to take the lead and bring ‘order’ will naturally generate a response of awe and reverence (Geertz, 1977). Studies have demonstrated how in US politics, the 9/11 terrorist attacks affected public perception of George W. Bush and his level of charisma. The administration used the fear of future terror attacks to maintain an atmosphere of looming crisis and to portray Bush as the best candidate to handle crises (Riggio, 2005). Studies have shown that during stressful times, more charismatic candidates are more likely to be elected (Halverson et al, 2004). Hugo Chávez rose to power in the 1990s, when Venezuela was facing an economic and political crisis. Rising corruption levels, growing frustration with rent seeking and poor leadership of traditional elites led to public desperation for someone to come in and deliver on past unfulfilled promises. In this atmosphere, Chávez was able to convince much of the Venezuelan public that he alone had the strength, vision and integrity to put Venezuela on the right path. Surveys following Chávez’s first election to office demonstrated a belief in the president’s capacity that were divorced from reality (Weyland, 2003). Chávez won 56 per cent of the vote but started his first term in office, in February 1999, with an approval rating of 91.9 per cent (Yepes and Antonio, 2004, 253). It was the force of Chávez’s sheer charisma that helped him maintain a strong base of undyingly loyal supporters, even as the economy started to run into problems. Earlier research claimed that the public has a strong need for a charismatic leader due to the challenges of everyday life and the universal need for order (Shils, 1982). The power of charisma is that it links the individual’s own sense of hope and security to the leader. For these reasons, charismatic leaders obtain unusually high levels of intense support. Followers of a personality cult are motivated by an allegiance to the leader above party or policies (Madsen and Snow, 1991). At an extreme, followers are willing to blindly obey and defend the leader unconditionally (Post, 1986). The support the charismatic leader receives is stable and easy to mobilize, as subordinates have a fairly durable emotional identification with the leader (Bass, 1999; Edwards, 2002).

Conclusion This chapter highlighted the factors that help shape citizens’ attitudes and values towards democracy and authoritarianism. We started with a brief overview of what constitutes a democratic political culture, and how a democratic political culture may compare with non-democratic political cultures. Though studies

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of political culture have been controversial, there is consensus that a democratic political culture is essential to the sustenance of a democracy. Support for democracy helps maintain democratic institutions and prevent regimes from backsliding. However, not all citizens hold values that are supportive of democracy. In some cases, this is because citizens grew up under authoritarian rule and were indoctrinated to believe in values that support authoritarianism. In other cases, citizens with no history of living under authoritarianism might have proclivities towards authoritarian leadership styles due to their personalities and contextual factors that trigger this type of response. The relative importance that scholars allot to personality, education, culture and socialization may vary, but there is reason to believe that some combination of these factors plays a role in shaping people’s attitudes towards democracy and authoritarian leadership styles. While we may never fully understand what shapes support for authoritarianism, interest has been renewed in this topic is due to the current democratic recession and the role that citizens are playing in allowing democracies to backslide. In the next chapter, we will examine other factors that shape authoritarian norms, such as shifts in the international order and the growing importance of social media. These external factors do not exclusively shape the formation of authoritarian norms, but their growing significance is another factor that helps us to understand the current democratic slump. KEY QUESTIONS 1. Why is political culture important to democracy? What were the criticisms of studies that looked at political culture in order to determine democratic stability? 2. Do authoritarian personalities always support populism? Why or why not? What types of populism are they more likely to support? 3. What are the ways in which education helps sustain democracy? Can you think of examples where this is not the case? 4. Do you agree that citizens that experienced authoritarian rule are more likely to be nostalgic about it today? What are the reasons for why this could be the case? In what countries are citizens experiencing authoritarian nostalgia? 5. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the concept of the authoritarian personality? What can it help us understand about the current democratic rollback? What are the concerns with using this concept?

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5

International and Informational Sources of Authoritarian Norms

Introduction As previous chapters have explained, democratic backsliding is largely the result of a change in norms and values among elites and the public. This chapter sets out to explore the key factors that drive this trend – the changing international order and new mechanisms to spread authoritarian norms – which is causing some citizens to reject the liberal democratic model. The role of changing norms has been facilitated by different models of authoritarian learning and authoritarian cooperation. In contrast to the past, where authoritarian regimes were more content to focus on their own stability, a handful of authoritarian regimes have become more proactive in authoritarian promotion and the use of sharp power. These regimes have worked to foster norms that are incompatible with democracy, and have stoked hyper-nationalist sentiment in an effort to vitiate civic forms of nationalism. The chapter then explains how authoritarian regimes use social media to promote anti-democratic values in democracies and beyond. Finally, the chapter explores how authoritarian regimes are able to maintain authoritarian rules in the age of the internet. The tactics used by authoritarian regimes to control digital freedom, which have served as a model for backsliding regimes, are also explained.

Authoritarian resurgence Historically, the institutions of the global order have mirrored the domestic political cultures of the most powerful countries in the world. International institutions have been a projection of domestic liberalism on a global scale (Ikenberry, 2009). The dominance of Western democracies has meant that the norms of liberal democracy were endorsed around the world. After the fall of the Soviet Union, there appeared to be a consensus that constitutionalism, the rule of law and the protection of individual rights were desirable. After the Cold

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War ended, Western democracies used democratic performance as a condition for receiving foreign aid, and withdrew external assistance to autocrats who did not make progress in holding elections. This conditionality was supported by the widespread monitoring of elections by Western governments and international NGOs (Kelley, 2012). There was increased scrutiny of governments’ treatment of independent media, basic human rights and the opposition, though the rich Gulf monarchies were largely unpressured. Today, however, the foundations of the international order are under attack from illiberal regimes hoping to advance non-democratic values. The effort to resist democracy began in the 2000s in reaction to the colour revolutions, where citizen uprisings pushed out autocrats in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005). The backlash targeted about 25 per cent of the 80 countries where democratic assistance was being offered (National Endowment for Democracy, 2006). Then the Great Recession of 2008 and 2009 caused Western democracies to shift their focus from democracy promotion abroad to dealing with problems at home. At the same time, authoritarian regimes regained their strength and became more assertive in promoting authoritarian norms and contesting democratic ones on a global scale (Diamond, 2008, 2015). Yet in the current contest, democracies have given up (Walker, 2018). The global context to support democracy has changed; an authoritarian resurgence is coinciding with a democratic recession. A notable reason for this is the rise of China and Russia. As China and Russia assume a stronger position on the international stage, authoritarianism is becoming more prominent and quite possibly more normatively acceptable. Democracy can no longer claim to be the only game in town. There is an inventory of soft power tools authoritarian regimes are using to reshape the international system. Authoritarian regimes have learned to project influence beyond their borders and are trying to reassert control over ideas and values. Both countries are also increasingly intertwined economically with many countries around the world and have increasing soft power. Authoritarian regimes have more economic leverage than ever before. Russia exerts influence through its control over natural resources. The gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine in January 2009 demonstrated how vulnerable Eastern European countries are to interruptions of energy transit. Hungarian energy interests in part explain its friendly relationship with Russia (Buzogány, 2017). Countries that have intense trade links with Russia are also more likely to score lower on democracy (Libman and Obydenkova, 2014). Countries are also dependent upon Russia because they suffer from political and social instability. Russia has kept its neighbours on the edge of fragility by supporting unresolved conflicts, and being directly involved in the case of Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea. Russia benefits from instability because it makes democratization a secondary issue for domestic political elites. As a result, Western actors are also forced to focus more on achieving stability than on democratization.

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With China’s impressive economic growth, it has also emerged as a model for authoritarianism. China has actively worked to increase its economic and soft power, especially in Africa and Latin America (Kurlantzick, 2007). Some of China’s soft power appeal comes from its investment and infrastructure around the globe. China has focused on forging economic deals with other countries and investing in development projects in the developing world (whether they are democracies or not), using a no-interference policy (Melnykovska et  al, 2012). There are none of the demands for good governance or democracy that come with Western aid. Rather than directly interfering in Central Asia, it has purchased oil and gas concessions and financed energy infrastructure in the region (Koldunova, 2010). China has invested significant amounts in Africa, but has rejected the claim that aid, loans, trade and FDI to Africa are efforts to counteract Western democracy promotion in the region. China has also trained African journalists on how to cover news stories on Beijing to ensure that China is shown in a positive light. In Venezuela, Hugo Chávez argued that his populist competitive authoritarian regime was an improvement over liberal models of democracy. By using a constituent assembly to help him concentrate power in his own hands, he was able to dismantle checks and balances. This model of rule attracted the attention of other leftist populist leaders such as Evo Morales of Bolivia, Rafael Correa of Ecuador and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua (Weyland, 2017). Russia’s legal framework has been modelled by other regimes. Approximately five amendments to the Kazakh election law were borrowed directly from the Russian 2002 election law (Bader, 2014). Russia sees its soft power agenda as equally important as its military agenda (Van Herpen, 2015). Economic interdependence and growing soft power are just some of the ways in which authoritarian regimes like China and Russia are having a bigger impact. Authoritarian regimes are also learning from one another indirectly and more directly through active collaboration. In contrast to the past, both China and Russia have become more involved in authoritarian promotion as well. Before explaining this process, we explain authoritarian learning and collaboration.

Key concepts ‘Authoritarian learning’ is the process of learning from other authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian learning is unintentional; authoritarian regimes learn from each other’s actions and responses to specific events. After the Arab Spring, Morocco and Jordan learned from the mistakes of their neighbours and offered more significant reforms to appease their citizens (Saideman, 2012). Belarus studied the protests of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine to learn how to prevent a revolution from taking place at home (Korosteleva, 2012). The uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have also led Russia and China to launch serious campaigns to protect their own regimes. The Chinese are active on the

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internet, with an army of state-sponsored bloggers and online police monitoring and filtering websites. The Chinese government ensured that information about the revolutions of the Arab Spring was blocked from Google searches. Authoritarian regimes can also learn from one another through a more direct and formal process known as ‘authoritarian collaboration’. Authoritarian collaboration assumes that the actors involved are all authoritarian. Strategies to resist change and prepare for domestic threats are taught rather than diffused (Ademmer and Börzel, 2013; Koesel and Bunce, 2013). Repressive governments have learned how to use democratic institutions to sustain their regimes and use legal frameworks to undermine the opposition. Elites share successful strategies of authoritarian survival with each other, such as how to win elections (Bader et al, 2010; Vanderhill, 2013; Hall and Ambrosio, 2017). By the mid-1990s many regimes discovered how to control the process of competitive elections while still gaining legitimacy from the international community (Bratton, 1998). For example, in Africa after the defeat of Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia in 1991, African leaders began to advise each other of how to hold democratic elections without being voted out of office. Autocratic regimes have also advised other regimes about how to deal with election monitors. Alternative election observations missions have been offered to sow confusion and help cover up electoral abuse. Authoritarian governments have been more adept at stopping dissent, as the tools of repression have been refined. Authoritarian elites have advised each other on how to deal with civil society, the opposition, protesters and NGOs (Gunitsky, 2014). In the aftermath of the colour revolutions, Russia introduced new laws to manage and monitor NGOs and associational activity, making it mandatory to re-register an NGO if it had received Western funding. After re-registering, the conditions under which NGOs could operate became much more stringent. Government officials could sit in on meetings and request audits, and foreign staff could be deported. Russia then created pro-government civil society groups to counteract the effects of pro-democracy NGOs. Leaders in countries such as China, Venezuela, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Belarus, Egypt and Zimbabwe learned from Russia’s tactics and mimicked them. Authoritarian regimes also learn from one another how to block information. After the colour revolutions, the Chinese and the Russians began to share technology with each other and with other authoritarian states such as Kazakhstan, Belarus and Venezuela that block the free flow of information and enhance the ability of the regime to monitor the exchange of information. Another form of authoritarian collaboration, which goes beyond just offering advice and sharing information, is direct financial and military support for one another. This entails actively supporting illiberal elites with steps such as offering financial and military support, as was the case with Russia’s support of Emomali Rahmon in Tajikistan and Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine. Authoritarian collaboration was also important in stopping the Arab Spring in the Gulf

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region (Odinius and Kuntz, 2015). The Gulf Cooperation Council supported monarchies under stress to prevent similar backlashes in proximate regimes to promote the status quo (Von Soest, 2015). During the Arab Spring, Bahrain was offered critical financial and coercive support from Saudi Arabia to protect the monarchy against protesters. With the support of the GCC, Saudi Arabia sent in 1,000 troops into Bahrain in March 2011 to prevent the toppling of the monarchy (Gunitsky, 2014). Hugo Chávez provided Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega with financial support in the form of low interest loans on oil payments. With this extra support, Ortega was able to fund social programmes, keep energy prices incredibly low and eliminate opposition TV stations. China has also been eager to provide diplomatic support for authoritarian regimes, such as Cambodia. The Chinese have also offered training programmes for foreign officials and government workers. Authoritarian regimes also protect each other at the international levels by providing statements in support of each other’s elections and through vetoes in the UN Security Council (Erdmann et al, 2013). In addition to supporting Ortega financially, Chávez openly backed him in his 2011 election. He offered similar support to Correa in Ecuador and Evo Morales in Bolivia, who have united under the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of America (ALBA) union (Ellner, 2012).

Authoritarian promotion and sharp power Authoritarian promotion can be distinguished from authoritarian learning and collaboration because its target is not established authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian promotion consists of deliberate attempts to influence regimes, usually vulnerable democracies and grey zone-regimes, in an anti-democratic direction. It may also include offering a counter-pressure to authoritarian regimes that are trying to democratize. It is a more recent phenomenon that authoritarian regimes have tried to derail established democracies. Here it may be important to distinguish between ‘soft power’ and ‘sharp power’. While soft power is something states pursue in order to build a positive public image and win over hearts and minds, sharp power is an approach to international affairs that seeks to pierce, penetrate and perforate the political and information environments of targeted countries (Walker et al, 2017). Authoritarian regimes are unlikely to change the hearts and minds of the public in democracies through soft power tactics, because the appeal of authoritarianism is a tough sell to citizens in democracies. Therefore, a more incisive method is needed to impact democratic regimes. For example, Russia attempted to undermine newly elected President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia after the Rose Revolution by boycotting some Georgian products, cutting off gas supplies and restricting travel by tightening the visa regime (Way, 2016). Thus, authoritarian promotion is a form of sharp power that has nefarious aims, going beyond serving as a model that inspires other countries.

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Authoritarian promotion does not mirror democracy promotion. Not all authoritarian regimes have the same missionary zeal as some democracies do for promoting democracy. The biggest concern is curbing democracy promotion, and not necessarily fostering an international authoritarian movement (Ambrosio, 2007; Silitski, 2010). Authoritarian promotion may be more likely if authoritarian regimes see democratization elsewhere as a threat to them at home, as autocracies are primarily concerned with democratic revolutions spilling over (Von Soest, 2015). Geopolitical interests in securing spheres of influence and supporting compliant partners may also drive authoritarian promotion. Overall, authoritarian regimes are less concerned with regime type and more concerned with the specific policies that their countries might benefit from (Brownlee, 2017). Though most authoritarian regimes have preferred to support and stabilize existing autocratic regimes, Russia (see Box 5.1) and China have become more aggressive in creating global conditions under which democracy promotion is blunted and democracies are weakened (Bader et  al, 2010; Burnell and Schlumberger, 2010; Bader, 2014; Risse and Babayan, 2015). After the Cold War ended, Russia became more neutral towards the European Union and NATO. However, in its quest to reassert itself as a global superpower, Russia has started to go beyond strengthening autocracies and is working to destabilize democracies. Today Russia uses inter-governmental organizations such as the Commonwealth of Independent states (CIS) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to further its objectives (Chou, 2017). Russia has also allocated vast amounts of funds to NGOs, media outlets and religious groups in post-Soviet states to promote its agenda of authoritarian stability (Lankina et al, 2016). Authoritarian regimes are selling the idea that authoritarianism is better for stability and economic prosperity (Vanderhill, 2013). Authoritarian regimes aim to achieve information sovereignty. To promote these ideas, several autocratic governments now fund major international television networks – Iran’s Press TV, China’s CCTV, Russia’s RT, Turkey’s TRT World and Venezuela’s Telesur – to challenge Western interpretations of major world events. Iran’s staterun Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) operates a host of international networks and has programming in twenty-five different languages (Walker, 2018). China’s television, radio and online ventures are growing everywhere, from Africa, to Europe to North and South America. China has embarked on a campaign to discredit revolutionaries, arguing that democratizing countries have not improved people’s lives. The Chinese media portray the colour revolutions as disappointments that only lead to inflation, corruption and unemployment (Chen, 2010). China has vilified the protests taking place in Hong Kong as being led by terrorists (The Guardian, 2019). China and Russia have become involved in democracies using media outlets, education, cultural initiatives and think tanks to influence public discourse in ways that benefit them, disguising these entities as commercial ventures or civil society groups. China has used these actors to paint itself as a benign force in the

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world, while Russia has manipulated the public conversation to sharpen tensions within and among democracies (Walker, 2018). Some studies have countered the notion that authoritarian powers are able to promote autocracy successfully. Lucan Way (2016) argues that the influence of autocracy promotion is limited because authoritarian power are more concerned with their narrow economic and geopolitical interests than promoting authoritarianism. Jason Brownlee (2017) claims that evidence shows that the number of electoral democracies is growing and democratic breakdowns have been due to unfavourable conditions and not external actors. While we can agree that democratic breakdown is not being driven by external autocracy promotion, what is concerning is the impact of authoritarian regimes on the quality of democracy.

Box 5.1: Russian election interference In the 2010s, Russia shifted its survival strategy from coexisting in a liberal order to extending its sphere of influence and containing the West. In what is referred to as a ‘forward to the past’, Russia uses various methods to affect outcomes in neighbouring states, spreading anti-democratic norms and in some cases using force (Shevtsova, 2015). Russia has also directly manipulated elections and the electoral processes. Electoral interference is not a new phenomenon. Both the US and the former Soviet Union regularly relied on information warfare to further their interests. With Russia severely weakened, the end of the Cold War seemed to indicate that Russian interference was a thing of the past. But Russia been incredibly adept at using technology to undermine democracies from within. By promoting media outlets that spread fake news, supporting groups sympathetic to Russian interests and riling up factions within Western democracies, Russia has been able to undermine unity in the West (Morgan, 2018). Russia honed its experience in undermining democracy by initially focusing on post-Soviet regimes. The Russian playbook on electoral interference in grey-zone regimes involves focusing on friendly autocrats and providing unconditional support for them during elections, such as by offering funds to buy off voters directly or strategically disburse before elections (Tolstrup, 2015). Russia also weakens opposition parties by harassing them, raiding their offices, disbanding their organizations and impairing their ability to participate in elections or conduct credible campaigns. To undercut the work of election monitors, Russia provides its own monitoring to friendly regimes to delegitimize Western monitors and sow confusion. When flawed elections lead to protests, Russia helps discredit and, if necessary, repress these protests. Russia also provides security personnel and equipment to deal with protesters and disperse crowds (Tolstrup, 2015). Russia has paid particular interest in Ukraine. Prior to the colour revolutions in 2004, Ukraine was in the midst of a political crisis, with incumbent President Leonid Kuchma trying to

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engineer the succession of his chosen candidate, Viktor Yanukovych. Putin also praised the Russia-friendly Yanukovych and helped organize and finance a smear campaign in his favour and bribe officials (Kuzio, 2005). Russian officials also met with Yanukovych to discuss the smartest ways to rig the elections, such as by inflating turnout in trusted regions rather than by falsifying the vote count. The Kremlin also repeatedly criticized the opposition. Russia also made concessions to Ukraine’s government to show the benefits of cooperation. Putin declared that a VAT on oil exports to Ukraine would be removed if Yanukovych won and promised that gas prices would remain stable. To make matters worse for the opposition, one of its most popular opposition leaders, Yulia Tymoshenko, was unexpectedly charged with embezzlement. Russia was also accused of being involved in several assassination attempts against the opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko (including one where he was poisoned) (Wilson, 2005). In Belarus, Russian strategists were heavily involved in planning a campaign to support autocratic President Alexander Lukashenko (Silitski, 2007). During election season, the Russian government and the Russian media, which is widely watched in Belarus, openly praised Lukashenko. The Belarusian press, which could have potentially offered a critical view, was shut down. Opposition activists were targeted, harassed and discredited. In the 2006 Belarusian presidential election, Putin once again promised that gas prices would remain stable under Lukashenko. Russia also gave him financial support, which was used to increase wages for public servants just prior to the election. These Russian tactics made voters believe that Lukashenko was the only candidate who could guarantee economic stability. After Lukashenko won with 82.6 per cent support, protests broke out in the capital, Minsk. Russian media was quick to characterize the demonstrators as bullies sponsored by the West. This campaign ended up being very effective – only 20 per cent of the public approved of the protests (Silitski, 2006). Russia’s desire to undermine democratic processes in established democracies has accelerated in the 2010s. Russia’s involvement in the 2016 US presidential election is an example of this, and it also allegedly targeted Mexico’s 2018 presidential election. But while the US may be one of the most well-known cases, Russia has extended its influence well beyond North America. In Europe, Russian bots were responsible for 15 per cent of the Twitter activity promoting far-right candidates just prior to the Italian election in March 2018 (Chertoff and Rasmussen, 2019). Similar spikes in Russian bot activity were noted in recent elections in Sweden and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia was also involved in influencing the elections in France (in support of Marine Le Pen) and in the UK (in support of Brexit) (for more on the role of bots, see Box 5.3). In response, significant pressure has been placed on Facebook, Google and Twitter to monitor their platforms better, but no laws have been passed to manage this officially. Recent studies have used machine learning to demonstrate that Russian troll accounts are still very active (Im et al, 2019; Kim et al, 2019). Without much action to counter these efforts, democracy will continue to be hacked.

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Norms that are incompatible with democracy Beyond cultivating favourable images of their regimes and the benefits of authoritarian stability, authoritarian regimes have also supported the spread of authoritarian norms. We are not referring here to citizens’ preferences for living under authoritarian rule. Rather, authoritarian regimes propagate norms that are detrimental for democracy, particularly in diverse countries. The formation of authoritarian norms in democracies does not happen overnight and authoritarian regimes are not the key reason why these norms materialize. However, as authoritarian norms emerge in some Western democracies, authoritarian regimes exploit these norms to drive a wedge between citizens. To be fair, most democratic countries see a sizable support for multi-culturalism, immigration and other human rights. At the same time, a portion of the voting public in democracies holds an opposing view on these issues. Pippa Norris (2011) believes that this is due to a post-materialist backlash. If we rewind to the look at Western democracies in the 1960s and 1970s, when class voting started to disappear, it led to the emergence of post-materialist values that attracted a younger generation of educated, middle-class voters (Inglehart, 1977). New parties emerged that were not class-based and that wanted progressive social change, such as the Greens and Libertarians. These parties did not emphasize social class or economic redistribution, but focused on cultural issues that were polarizing for the older labour classes. Post-materialist values focused on tolerance of multi-culturalism, protection of minority rights freedom of expression, secularism, gender equality, flexible and fluid gender roles, and environmental protection. These are the values that the European Union supports, values that, as the Brexit vote revealed, are not appealing to everyone. Inevitably, however, there was a backlash to post-materialist values, known as the ‘silent counter-revolution’. This was especially salient for those who lived in countries that were also experiencing a huge rise in the numbers of foreign workers, tourists, foreign students, migrants and refugees, or at least who perceived this to be the case. Large immigration flows from low-income countries with different cultures and religions sparked a reaction in which much of the working class moved to the right, in defence of traditional values. As a result of these changes, for the last two decades, non-economic issues have dominated party platforms. Right-wing populists have seized upon this and argued that those who oppose multi-culturalism and progressive values have been disrespected and poorly treated. Populists have warned that the true citizens are in danger of losing out demographically and ideologically. We see that there has been a rise in neo-Nazi parties in Greece, Switzerland, Sweden, Austria and Germany. For example, in 2015 the Law and Justice Party promised to clean Poland of the ‘disease’ of 25 years of liberal indoctrination. As authoritarian regimes gained a footing, some of them promoted authoritarian norms to create fissures in democracies.

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The silent counter-revolution embraced values that placed an emphasis on security and tribal protection against perceived risks of instability and disorder. There is also a proclivity towards conventionalism and a deep hostility to outsiders (such as those of a different race, ethnic group, religion or sexual orientation) and threats to group norms. At the very minimum, there is a rejection of tolerance for minorities and multi-culturalism. The necessity of defending these values has affected people living in democracies. Strong leaders that are willing to protect the tribe are glorified. Supporters are willing to be subservient and uncritical of these leaders in the name of supporting their in-group at any cost. Along with the silent counter-revolution, another development that has influenced the public’s willingness to defend democratic principles is the war on terrorism. In the name of fighting terrorism, laws have been passed that threaten civil liberties, often supported by citizens. Studies of the effects of terrorism on public opinion in Israel reveal that terrorism lowers citizens’ political tolerance and willingness to extend civil liberties (Peffley et al, 2015). In the case of the US, immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, nearly 70 per cent of Americans agreed that some sacrifice of civil liberties and personal freedoms was needed in order to fight terrorism (Huddy et al, 2002). In 2006, 52 per cent of Americans approved of the government engaging in wiretapping without warrants (Mondak and Hurwitz, 2012). Governments may decide they no longer require judicial authorization for surveillance activity, resulting in constant intrusion of privacy. Terrorism provides a trigger for governments to exercise emergency powers that may constrain political competition (Huq, 2017). Parties may be more easily deemed terrorist organization by the government. Governments may also respond by detaining suspect communities, and generally limiting rights of free speech and association in the name of keeping citizens safe. Governments may also justify restricting media freedom. Turkey has imprisoned a large number of journalists using overly broad anti-terrorism laws, such as Article 314 of the Turkish Criminal Code and the Turkish Anti-Terror Law, which make it a crime to ‘print or publish declarations or announcements of terrorist organizations’ (Corke et al, 2014). Governments can also restrict the power of federal units. A 2004 Chechen terrorist attack and hostage crisis in Beslan, Russia, allowed Putin to strip Russian provinces of power while strengthening central institutions under his direct control. There are other norms that are not necessarily always associated with authoritarianism, but in extreme forms are problematic for democracy. One such belief system is nationalism. The rise of ‘hyper-nationalism’ in many countries around the world is causing concern. In Western countries, fears of immigration has led to policies that have tightened borders and increased tensions between communities. Nationalistic sentiment in Hungary has led to human rights violations and attempts to undermine NGOs and civil society. In 2018, Hungary’s nationalist government led by Viktor Orbán passed a bill that would impose a 25 per cent tax on foreign donations to NGOs that back migration in

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Hungary. Such incidents are why many scholars assert that hyper-nationalism is mostly hostile to democracy (Fukuyama, 1992; Diamond and Plattner, 1994; Gagnon, 1994). Hyper-nationalism is often seen as racist, chauvinistic, irrational and backwards, while liberal democracy is seen as progressive and inclusive (Nodia, 1992). Hyper-nationalism has also caused conflict and instability. In the case of Eastern Europe, nationalism initially unleashed the forces of democratization after decades of repressive authoritarian rule. However, it was not long before the democratization process exploded into ethnic conflict as nationalism became more politicized (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995). In the case of the Caucasus and the Balkans, political entrepreneurs manipulated ethnicity in order to amplify their own power, arguing for the need to create an ethnically pure state. Many of these states had weak institutions and were experiencing severe economic declines. Fragmented political forces that radicalized around ethnic cleavages filled the power vacuum (Pamir, 1997). All of the instances listed above are examples of exclusionary forms of nationalism, which entail a pride in common ancestors, language and culture, and glorifying one’s history and traditions (Kohli, 1997). It excludes minority groups that do not share the same history, language, race, ethnicity, religion or culture (see Box 5.2). Ethnic concepts of nationalism are similar to what Cas Mudde (2010) refers to as nativism or an ideology which argues that states should comprise of members of the native group. Non-native persons and ideas are threatening to the homogenous nation-state. Ethnic concepts of nationalism follow a primordial belief that nations have existed forever and are not social constructs. Nationalism provides powerful discourses about a direct primordial relationship to a certain territory, which provides security (Kinnvall, 2004, 742, 763). This sense of nationalism is narrow, traditional and unchanging. However, nationalism is not always exclusionary and polarizing. Civic nationalism is a form of nationalism that is more inclusive, based on common citizenship and a shared set of political practices and beliefs rather than a common ethnicity (Calhoun, 1993). Civic nationalism is the idea of a collective sovereignty and common principles of political participation. It is more modern and adaptive. Civic nationalism does not have to threaten democracy or outgroups. With civic nationalism, citizens are taught that the nation is a community of citizens with equal rights (Smith, 2005). Customs that emphasize tolerance and inclusiveness can be integrated into the national identity and be a source of pride (Brubaker, 1999). Often confused with nationalism, ‘patriotism’ is distinct from exclusionary forms of nationalism (Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989). Patriotism is love of one’s country and not to a particular nation. Civic nationalism is a sense of pride and belonging through citizenship and norms of liberalism and political equality. Nationalism supports homogeneity within society, blind obedience and an idealized value of one’s own nation (Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989;

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Blank and Schmidt, 2003; Poole, 2007). Patriotism can support heterogeneous structures within society and entails loyalty to one’s country (or independent sovereign state), not a particular nation (or community of people that share the same language, culture and heritage).1 A nation is a group of people that share a common heritage, while a country is the government that occupies a particular territory. Nationalism can lead to denigration of out-groups, while patriotism can strengthen tolerance. Nationalist thought may appeal to more people than just authoritarians. While authoritarians are attracted to nationalism because they lack the coping strategies to deal with a pluralized society, others may be attracted to nationalism if they suffer from an insecurity over their own identity in an increasingly complex world (Dekker et al, 2003). These insecurities may lead individuals to be attracted to ideologies that fight ethnic and cultural pluralism, and enforce security of the in-group. Exclusive national myths provide a sense of stability and identity as they affirm in-groups and denigrate out-groups (Blank and Schmidt, 2003; Coenders and Scheepers, 2003; Davies, 2008). Thus, a wider range of individuals than just authoritarians could be interested in restrictions on immigration, and bear hostility towards multi-culturalism and multi-ethnic society. Radical rightwing parties have programmes that promote intolerance and exclusive forms of nationalism that can appeal to a wider net of individuals beyond authoritarians (Betz and Johnson, 2004; Blee, 2007). Unfortunately, the surge of nationalism we see today is predominately exclusionary. In Europe, for example, nationalism is deeply intertwined with populism as ethnic nationalists push to sacrifice individual liberties to create homogenous societies. These nationalist waves are creating strong challenges for democracy today. In countries that lack strong political or institutional achievements, exclusive forms of nationalism are more likely to be fomented (Snyder, 1993).

Box 5.2: Ethnic fragmentation and democracy Is ethnic diversity good for democracy? According to many analysts, diversity can pose a problem, especially in fledgling democracies. Sustaining democratic institutions in ethnically divided societies can be a difficult task (Welsh, 1993). Donald Horowitz (2000) found that democracy has progressed furthest in countries that have the fewest serious ethnic cleavages. Countries that are more homogenous are more likely to be resistant to democratic backsliding. Ethnic fragmentation was significantly higher in cases where democracy was reversed than where democratic governments persisted– 51 per cent compared to 38 per cent (Kapstein and Converse, 2008a, 61). Diverse societies that have strong ethnic identities will have a loyalty to these groups and may put pressure on politicians to appeal to their community even if this undermines democracy. There will be ethnic outbidding(s) as well as assaults on democracy and institutions, and could possibly lead to violent conflict (Horowitz, 2000).

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In some countries with ethnic diversity, elections are high-stakes affairs that are plagued by violence and abuse. Ruling presidents and parties may play up ethnic identities and may resort to abuse of power and electoral manipulation, leading to violence. The 2010 presidential election in Cote d’Ivoire was so bitter that it turned into a civil war that lasted over a year. The elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2011 were also plagued by violence, as were the elections in Kenya in 2007. Nigeria also saw electoral violence during electoral contests in 2003, 2007 and 2011 (Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero, 2012). Kenya, which had experienced free and fair democratic elections in 2002, saw political violence erupt after a disputed presidential election in December 2007 that left more than 1,000 people dead and over 350,000 forced to flee their homes. Machete-wielding gangs roamed the streets until a coalition government was agreed upon, three months after the elections had taken place. Trust levels deteriorated among local communities. Such violence is not surprising given that politicians have pursued sectarian agendas and accused each other of using ethnicity for political purposes. After becoming the first Kenyan opposition candidate to win an election, Mwai Kibaki (2002–2013) compounded the ethnic divide by appointing members of his own community to public service (Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero, 2012). Given the high stakes of elections, politicians are more willing to resort to electoral manipulation in order to win in societies with strong ethnic identities (Bratton and Kimenyi, 2008). In Kenya, the ordeal of the disputed election reduced trust among ethnic groups and reduced communities’ social capital. In spite of this somewhat pessimistic picture, there are case studies and regional studies that argue the opposite – that ethnic diversity can be good for democracy (Hardgrave, 1993; Reilly, 2001; Fish and Kroenig, 2006). Backsliding has also taken place in more homogeneous countries like Hungary. Furthermore, much empirical evidence has shown that ethnic diversity has no impact on democratization. Therefore, more work needs to be done to study the relationship between diversity and democratic consolidation to better understand how ethnicity is weaponized to undermine democracy, and what can be done to prevent this.

Spreading authoritarian norms: social media The role of social media in promoting democracy has been hotly debated. While optimists initially thought that social media would be beneficial to democracy, the gains may have been over-hyped. The initial optimism came from the role that social media played in the Arab Spring. Twitter, Facebook and other social media platforms were lauded as being critical to the success of the uprisings. Young people are often at the heart of revolutions, and Arab youth took to social media to communicate with one another and coordinate their actions during the protests. Without social media, information regarding where protests were

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taking place would have been very difficult to share. Social media also played an important role in connecting leaders and activists to ordinary citizens, and expanding the network of individuals who were willing to take action. The density of connections helped ideas spread more rapidly. Thus, social media has been used by citizens living in autocracies to exercise freedom of speech. But research later emerged that showed that while social media was important in communicating to the rest of the world what was happening on the ground, with the exception of Tunisia, it was not actually able to galvanize the public into cohesive political parties that could build consensus. In Egypt, undemocratic forces usurped the democratization process, and the political struggle became intensely polarized. Social media then became a battleground for misinformation and fake news. Tools that were used to oust dictatorships were being used to tear people apart (Hellmeier, 2016). Social media has also played a sinister role in confusing consumers of information in democracies as well, impacting electoral outcomes, shaping public opinion and pushing the boundaries of free will through the use of artificial intelligence (see Box 5.3). With social media facing an onslaught of criticism for supporting fake news and being hijacked by authoritarian regimes to propagate misinformation, what is the future of social media and democracy? In what ways can it be helpful to citizens living in authoritarian regimes, and in what ways does it pose a major threat to democracy? Proponents of social media have argued that without it, coordination in protests (see Chapter 12) would not be possible. Social media networks resolve collective action problems and help organize core activists. Social media gives a voice to those who normally would be excluded and cut off from mainstream politics. Social media also helps to diffuse messages from highly committed activists across networks. It creates a community of digital activists that can help spread valuable information. Additionally, social media helps to communicate to the rest of the world what is taking place. In 2009, Iranians took to the street to protest a rigged election and used video clips of the protest to spread their message around the world. Political discussions took place on blogs evaluating the problems with the government. In Egypt, social media platforms were used to create an online community and help coordinate the protests (Kharroub and Bas, 2016). But others have argued that while social media can be used to facilitate social interactions and collective action, it cannot maintain democracy (Norris, 2001). In fact, there have been many critics of social media as a driver of democracy. Here it is important to distinguish between social media and new media. ‘New media’ refers to the transfer of traditional media information via the internet or websites linked to traditional mass media outlets. This information is edited and fact-checked but may be influenced by the interests of editors or political elites. For the most part, studies on the role of new media and democracy have argued that the internet has enhanced communication, information retrieval and information dispersion (Bailard, 2012; Ceron et al, 2013). It is easier for citizens

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to access the news when they want to, while the internet may also expose citizens to alternative viewpoints that might not be broadcast on traditional media. It is important to make the distinction between new media and social media, because studies demonstrate that social media does not have a positive impact on democratic satisfaction or democracy (Ceron and Memoli, 2016; Tucker et al, 2017). One of the issues is that social media has been used to facilitate hate speech, public humiliation of marginalized groups and violence (Barberá, 2020). Violent groups use social media to propagandize their ideology and recruit potential members. It has also attracted the attention of extremist groups, including white nationalists, that use social media to spread their messages of hate and exclusion. Online chat rooms help like-minded individuals find online communities and form much larger communities to share messages of hate. These anti-system forces may hold views that are hostile to liberal democracy. Social media has seen the rise of online abuse of women and minorities. In some countries, this may lead minorities to self-censor or opt out of participating in public life. Populists (see Chapter 8) have found social media particularly helpful to their success. They can use social media to directly communicate with their supporters. By doing so, they are able to subvert established protocols and project soft power, sometimes even across borders. Armies of trolls and automated bots can create the false impression of momentum in favour of a populist candidate or issue. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi uses Twitter to make policy announcements, circumventing conventional routes of presenting them first to Parliament, to help him gain political support for them (Pal et al, 2016). Populists can also use social media to distract from real issues with provocative statements, where they never have to engage in debate or listen to the other side. Social media can be used to stoke social divisions and demonize out-groups. They can marginalize minority voices, while normalizing hateful views. In the Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte uses social media to control the narratives on his war on drugs. Though thousands of extra-judicial deaths have taken place, he silences critics on social media who try to question his tactics. Disadvantaged minority groups face demeaning hashtag labels (Lees, 2018). In Myanmar, the government’s official Facebook account disseminates hate messages about Muslim minorities. Major portions of the content on Facebook is also divisive and hateful (Stecklow, 2018). Social media is also not conducive to deliberative democracy, as social media platforms have character limits that are not conducive to fostering nuanced discussions. In addition to not facilitating meaningful discussion, social media does not foster strong ties, unlike civil society groups that collectively work together in person. Another concern is the ease with which rumours and false information can be spread on social media. Journalists are no longer the gatekeepers of information. Facts are spread without being fact-checked with any rigour and there is a blurring of lines of specialists and lay people. Social network platforms usually

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face no consequences if they distribute fake news. The exception so far is in Germany, where lawmakers passed the Network Enforcement Act that fines social media companies that do not remove illegal content on their sites within 24 hours (Wischmeyer, 2017). Without much enforcement elsewhere, rumours have shaped the narratives of key elections. WhatsApp played an important role in the election of Brazil’s far-right leader Jair Bolsonaro. False information about Bolsonaro’s opponent was spread on the platform, which created competing realities (Tucker et al, 2017).2 The false campaign was difficult for Brazil’s independent press to expose or discredit. During the 2016 election in the US, the Macedonian town of Veles, population 55,000, was the home to 100 pro-Trump websites that disseminated fake and sensationalistic stories about Hillary Clinton and Trump (Howard et al, 2018). Many studies have demonstrated that social media is used to manipulate and deceive the voting public using fake news that conveys emotional messages (Gunitsky, 2015; Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017).

Box 5.3: Artificial intelligence and democracy Artificial intelligence is posing a big challenge to liberal democracies. Some argue that artificial intelligence is pushing the boundaries of free will. Though it may sound far-fetched, scholars are noting that machine learning is being used to shape public opinion and affect electoral outcomes (Helbing, 2017; West, 2018). Campaigns use machine learning and technology to search through large swaths of data on voters to identify patterns of behaviour that can be used to manipulate citizens’ opinions in major elections and referenda. Bots (autonomous accounts that are programmed) can aggressively spread propaganda and misinformation on social media that shape public discourse and manufacture the illusion of public support for certain policies and/or candidates. Researchers at USC have estimated that ‘between 9% and 15% of active Twitter accounts are bots’ – which means that there are up to 50 million bot accounts (Shao et al, 2017, 280). Bots can spread misinformation about a candidate that dissuades voters from turning out for them on election day. Bots can also be used to conjure emotional responses (Polonski, 2017). For example, Cambridge Analytica had a major advertising campaign to target persuadable voters, sending them a message that was tailored to trigger the right emotions. The paranoid voter receives fear-based ads. Artificial intelligence can also be used to confirm pre-existing views. A voter that does not believe in global warming could be flooded with articles that question the validity of science (Vishwanath, 2018). Owing to the availability of data about individuals from social media, campaigns can micro-target specific categories of voters and develop messaging that will resonate with them. When citizens surf the internet, each click provides information that helps to create a psychological profile of the user. Artificial intelligence can then be used to prey on their

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psychological vulnerabilities. This took place initially in the 2008 US presidential campaign but was perfected in 2012 and 2016. Bots were responsible for a flood of pro-Trump traffic in the 2016 election as well as for the efforts against Emmanuel Macron on social media two days before the French presidential election. Though this did not affect the outcome in the French election, it arguably played a significant role in the US election (Segal, 2017). US intelligence agencies have claimed that Russian bots are trying to interfere in the 2020 US presidential election as well (Los Angeles Times, 2020). The threat to democracy is that whoever has access to the data is able to manipulate electoral outcomes. This would give a big advantage to the incumbent government that is more likely to have control of data about voters and to be able to use it to help win elections. These manipulative technologies pose a direct threat to freedom of choice. Judgements and decisions are predetermined by algorithms, brainwashing the public. Society is being controlled in a top-down fashion. Democracy depends on elections being free and fair. Citizens need to be able to vote without manipulation. Artificial intelligence and related technologies threaten to undermine fair elections by covertly manipulating voters’ decisionmaking (Segal, 2017). A more ethical approach to artificial intelligence would be to use it to inform the electorate on specific issues or to debunk myths to help better educate voters. Additionally, artificial intelligence can be used to listen to an electorate to ensure their elected representatives can hear them (Polonski, 2017). The advancement of artificial intelligence illustrates the importance of citizens rejecting slacktivism. Individuals need to be more proactive in finding their news and to rely on a host of different sources for news and opinions.

Another danger of social media is that when personal data is captured by these platforms to engage in micro-targeting, political ads can be used that are not subject to any traditional regulatory guidelines, known as dark advertising (see Chapter 11). Online political messages that appear to be news reports do not have to disclose that they are actually political ads. The New York Times has reported that $100,000 worth of divisive ads were bought by Russian companies and were linked to 470 fake accounts (Shane and Goel, 2017). In spite of this, social media is used by almost 3 billion people around the world (London School of Economics and Political Science, 2017). According to a 2017 study from the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, of twenty-six countries surveyed, 44 per cent of people said that they use Facebook for news (Newman et al, 2017). There are also concerns that social media and the proliferation of fake news increases political polarization (Hong and Kim, 2016; Bail et al, 2018; Sunstein, 2018b). According to this view, social media serves as an echo chamber that insulates individuals from opposing views, while highlighting more extreme views than their own. Social media tends to expose people to networks ties

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that are similar to their own views, which may reinforce their prior convictions even further. Studies have demonstrated that it is difficult to persuade people with facts once they have adopted a belief, a phenomenon known as a ‘confirmation bias’. Individuals are able to access information (whether factual or not) that confirms their existing beliefs and interpret evidence in ways that are partial to those beliefs (Frey, 1986; Nickerson, 1998). There are now algorithms that can customize and personalize users’ online experience and place them in a bubble where they are only presented with information that matches their interests (Pariser, 2011). Thus social media platforms increase the possibility of filtering information that is consistent with people’s beliefs regardless of whether the information is true. Further, individuals who read fake news that confirms their point of view are more likely to believe it (Gil de Zúñiga et al, 2017). Users tend to focus on narratives that are confirming while ignoring facts that do not confirm their prior beliefs (Spohr, 2017). However, a recent study counters that social media is driving polarization, but this is only the case for older generations or those that have had little exposure to the internet and social media (Boxell et al, 2017). Why this is the case still needs to be explored in more detail. At the moment, there are still gaps in the research into social media’s role in weakening or strengthening democracy and causing polarization.

Box 5.4: What is fake news? Fake news is defined as news articles that are verifiably false, and are intended to mislead readers (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017). In the infamous case of the US 2016 election, the top-performing fake election news stories on Facebook had more engagement than the top stories from major news outlets in the three months leading up to the election in November (Silverman and Singer-Vine, 2016). Most of the stories favoured Donald Trump, by a wide margin of 115 to 41 (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017). Fake news is mostly spread through social media but there are instances where fake news stories are shared from what appear to be traditional new media websites. Fake news and types of misinformation3 • Satire or parody – has no intention to cause harm but has the potential to fool • Misleading content – misleading use of information to frame an issue or individual in a particular way • Imposter content – when genuine sources are impersonated • Fabricated content – content that is entirely false and designed to deceive and harm • False connection – when the headlines, visuals or captions do not support the content • False context – when genuine content is shared with false contextual information • Manipulated content – when genuine information or imagery is manipulated to deceive

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Digital authoritarianism With the power of the internet, authoritarian regimes were initially concerned that the digital revolution would unleash the forces of democratization and lead to authoritarian breakdown. Many authoritarian regimes have been unable to completely control what their citizens are able to access. However, Freedom on the Net, a comprehensive study of internet freedom in sixty-five countries, has demonstrated that internet freedom is deteriorating (Shahbaz, 2018). More countries are following the Chinese model of censorship, surveillance, disinformation campaigns, arrests of government critics, and technical breakdowns and attacks. It is not only autocracies like Egypt, Cambodia and Venezuela that are embracing these tactics but also grey-zone democracies like Sri  Lanka, Nigeria, Kenya and the Philippines. The incorporation of these tactics of digital authoritarianism is an example of how flawed democracies are backsliding. China has led the charge by hosting a two-week seminar on cyberspace management for officials of countries along the Belt and Road Initiative. Chinese companies are also playing a big role in installing internet and mobile network equipment in countries around the world, offering high-tech tools to assist governments with surveillance as well. China has offered support to help countries monitor and filter online content. Tanzania and Nigeria, for example, have used this additional support to crack down on internet content. In response to the Arab Spring, some authoritarian leaders began to share information-blocking technology. Other countries have passed strict laws restricting journalists. Russia passed a law in 2014 which required blogs with over 3,000 monthly visitors to register. Bloggers are liable for the accuracy of what they write, with anything too critical of the government likely to be deemed false. Egypt, which has the third-highest number of journalists in jail, passed legislation that requires social media users with more than 5,000 followers to obtain a license from the Higher Council for Media Regulation. Similar laws face social media users in Iran that have 5,000 followers or more. China has banned social media accounts from posting without a permit since 2017. Cambodia requires all websites to register with the Ministry of Information, and hands out jail sentences for spreading fake news online – a pretext used to shut down critical media (Shahbaz, 2018). In addition to lawsuits and jail sentences, authoritarian regimes can also make it more difficult for information to flow. This strategy is known as ‘friction’ (see Roberts, 2018). Regimes can cause internet shutdowns or slowdowns. They can remove social media posts. They can make it more difficult to access government information that is important for publicizing government failures. They can create fees for accessing information that should be available for free. Friction causes delays, and journalists may not even realize that they are being affected. Regimes can also flood social media with information that is supportive of the regime or demonizes the opposition (Roberts, 2018). Regimes can use automated bots to promote government propaganda or flood the country with

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anti-regime protests (for more on fake news, see Box 5.4). Human or online armies can use propaganda to either influence or at the very least disrupt the opposition by creating distractions. For example, the Chinese government uses social media to pay government employees to generate about 448 million comments every year (Tucker et al, 2017). By flooding the citizens with so much misinformation, regimes can ultimately confuse people. If there is an onslaught of propaganda to convince the public of something, it makes it even harder for citizens to discern what is false and what is the truth. Censorship and instilling fear in those using online platforms (either social or new media) to criticize the government is still a common tactic. The digital tracking power of the internet has made it easier to identify bloggers that the government deems offensive and as a result, thousands of bloggers have been arrested. Nevertheless, authoritarian governments have found that intimidating everyone is difficult and therefore other strategies need to be employed. These strategies have changed the landscape for how information is disseminated, and have given a huge advantage to incumbent regimes that can harness social media to control narratives (Kendall-Taylor et al, 2019).

Conclusion There is no question that there is an authoritarian surge taking place. After decades of democratic progress, political development has changed direction. One reason for that has been the rise of authoritarian norms. Authoritarian regimes are no longer content to maintain the status quo and have played a bigger role in influencing global values. The norms that authoritarian regimes support are incompatible with tolerance, diversity, freedom and pluralism. As these regimes have gained more attention, they have also become more adept at spreading these norms through technological innovations. By flooding the airways with fake news, regimes are able to drown out any domestic criticism while also shaping the fears and concerns of people in other parts of the world. Authoritarian regimes are also learning from one another and are becoming savvier at using ‘democratic’ institutions to their advantage. Autocracies learn from one another in different ways, either by directly communicating with one another or by serving as models for other regimes to emulate. In spite of these efforts, this authoritarian resurgence would not be possible without a void of democratic soft power. The democratic slump is in large part due to the failure of democracies to promote a compelling alternative to autocratic values. However, as Chapter 6 explains, this may also be driven by the failure of democracies to perform well in an increasingly globalized world. The next chapter explains the contextual factors that are driving this democratic recession. Globalization, in particular, has been a double-edged sword for democracy. It has facilitated communication and the spread of democratic ideas while also creating economic and social conditions that make it more difficult for democracy to flourish.

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KEY QUESTIONS 1. How do authoritarian norms contrast with liberal democratic norms? 2. In what ways do China and Russia promote sharp power? How is this different than soft power? 3. What is the appeal of authoritarian norms? Why would these norms be embraced in a democracy? 4. Is social media good for democracy? Explain why or why not? 5. What are the tools of digital authoritarianism? Are there are any democracies that have used these tools as well?

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PART III

Causes and Context

6

Globalization Introduction Our understanding of democratic backsliding would be incomplete without an exploration of the global context propelling discontent. Globalization was supposed to benefit developed and developing countries around the world. Instead globalization has been reviled (and loved) almost everywhere. In 2002, Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz (2002) sought to explain in his book Globalization and Its Discontents why there was so much dissatisfaction with globalization in developing countries. Today globalization is facing a political, economic and cultural backlash even in developed countries. With globalization, voters in developed countries face more uncertainty, social dislocation and economic duress, such as the loss of jobs and industries. The response to economic anxiety brought about by globalization is channelled in different ways (Voorheis et al, 2015; Duca and Saving, 2016; Grechyna, 2016). More importantly, these anxieties and the different responses to them has fostered polarization. Neither the left nor the right believes that globalization is being managed properly, but there is little common ground in terms of how to tackle this problem. Globalization generates a highly emotional response from voters, who have become more willing to vote for extreme candidates and parties that polarize the electorate. In consolidated Western democracies, globalization has fuelled waves of authoritarian populism. Indeed, international economic factors create a ripe environment on which political entrepreneurs in authoritarian regimes can capitalize. The goal of this chapter is not to explain how globalization has caused autocratization in Western democracies. Instead, the chapter lays out how globalization has impacted polarization and apathy, creating a context that would-be autocrats can seize upon. Free movement of goods and services, and the rise of corporate power, has left many feeling excluded and socially dislocated, and has led to rising inequalities (Munck, 2005; Bourguignon, 2017). This chapter explains the role of these factors in shaping public opinion to favour non-democratic alternatives.

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The chapter will first explain what globalization is, how it might create economic insecurity and how this may drive polarization. Then the chapter focuses more specifically on three aspects of globalization and the relationship with polarization: free trade, free movement of people and mass communications. The chapter then turns to look at a by-product of globalization, inequality. What is the relationship between inequality and democratic backsliding? Does it harm the quality of democracy? Does it lead to backsliding? Does it drive polarization? The chapter also looks at why identity-based politics has become more significant, explaining the possible threats posed by the rise of identity-based politics in consolidated and transitioning democracies (see Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012; Wodak, 2013). Several studies have found that as immigration levels increase, so does support for radical right-wing parties (Lubbers et al, 2002; Van der Brug et al, 2005). More recent studies corroborate this: cultural factors, such as the perception that immigration is threatening one’s identity, are the strongest predictors of support for populist right-wing parties (Norris and Inglehart, 2016).

Key concepts: globalization – the big picture Former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan once said that arguing against globalization is like arguing against the laws of gravity (UN SecretaryGeneral, 2002). It is nearly impossible to ignore. However, globalization is a double-edged sword. Proponents claim that it has spurred on unprecedented economic growth and interdependence, while critics charge that it has created massive gaps between rich and poor, economic insecurity and anxiety. Globalization has fostered progressive social and cultural values, such as multiculturalism, but also hyper-nationalism and ethno-centrism. Some aspects of globalization have helped to open up authoritarian regimes and foster popular uprisings, but others have been used to spread authoritarian norms. Globalization has helped to diffuse technology and improved transportation but has also intensified transnational threats such as international crime, terrorism, immigration and environmental degradation. Globalization has created more demands for good governance, but has facilitated different forms of corruption. Globalization has helped people connect, bringing people from diverse cultures together, but has also created social tensions by challenging domestic norms and social arrangements (Rodrik, 1997). Globalization creates divisions between skilled and low-skilled, international and local, cities and countryside. Mainstream economists and politicians touted the benefits of globalization, with little concern of the economic, political and social consequences. Globalization has made the world more polarized, and polarization is not good for democracy. Globalization is defined by enormous increases in trade, goods and investment, and unprecedented levels of economic interdependence.1 Globalization refers to unrestricted economic relationships across most of the world. Globalization

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is driven by massive improvements to technology and transportation, and a proliferation of communication networks, facilitating the free movement of people, services and capital, leading to an increasingly interdependent global society (Held, 2006). Globalization also represents the weakening of state sovereignty and the strengthening of multi-national corporations and multi-lateral institutions. As multi-lateral institutions and corporations are rarely accountable and transparent to the public, their growing influence undermines democratic legitimacy. The impact of globalization is said to be both economic and cultural (Kriesi et al, 2012; Fuchs and Klingemann, 2019). Globalization has certainly widened gaps between the rich and poor, not just among countries, but also within them (see Box 6.1). Some countries have been able to harness the energy of globalization and lift millions out of poverty. China created a new middle class after bringing half a billion people out of poverty. But many countries (China included) have seen their economic gaps widen, as the richest have amassed unprecedented levels of wealth, while the middle and lower classes have failed to see the same benefits.

Box 6.1: Inequality and globalization Rising levels of inequality have often been blamed on globalization (Mazur, 2000; Wei and Wu, 2001; Wade, 2004). Thus far there is no consensus on whether or not globalization causes inequality to rise, but an increasingly globalized world has coincided with higher levels of inequality. Case in point: for most of the twentieth century, inequality levels were declining, but this trend reversed after 1970 (Piketty and Saez, 2014). At the moment, the world’s eight richest billionaires combined control the same amount of wealth as the poorest half of the globe. Between 1988 and 2011, the incomes of the poorest 10 per cent increased by $65, while the incomes of the richest 1 per cent grew 182 times as much (Elliott, 2017). Nevertheless, some countries have seen inequality decrease (such as Algeria, Kenya and Russia). Latin American and Caribbean countries have typically had higher levels of inequality, but these have declined slightly from 1990 to 2015. Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia have had a mix of rises and falls in inequality, while the Middle East and North Africa have mostly seen a decrease. However, inequalities have been significant in Indonesia, India, China and Western industrialized countries, such as the UK and US. Though advanced industrial economies still show lower levels of inequality than Latin America and parts of Africa, most of these industrialized countries have seen a rise. Moreover, because rising inequalities have hit some of the most populous countries in the world, the majority of people are living in a country that saw rising inequality (Alvaredo et al, 2018). For example in China, the wealth share of the top 10 per cent increased from 26 per cent in 1980 to 41.7 per cent in 2008. Since 2008, there has been a modest decline in the share of the top 20 per cent and some gains for the middle class, but the bottom deciles have not benefited much (Jain-Chandra et al, 2018).

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The US is another example of globalization coinciding with higher levels of inequality. Wage growth, in particular, has been very uneven, with growth only at the top, while the wages for most workers have not matched the rise in productivity. From 1980 to 2015, the top 1 per cent saw their incomes grow five times as fast as the bottom 90 per cent (Monaghan, 2014). In 1965, CEO pay at the 350 largest US companies was twenty times that of the average worker. By 1989, it was fifty-eight times as high and by 2012, CEOs earned 354 times as much as the average worker even though there was little evidence that CEO performance had improved (Mishel and Schieder, 2018). Inequalities also rose in terms of share in total income. In 1980, the top 10 per cent had a share of 32.9 per cent of the total income; in 2015, this has risen to 47.8 per cent. The top 1 per cent control 40 per cent of the country’s wealth (Ingraham, 2017). Tax cuts for the wealthy have not helped matters. Studies have noted that US taxes for the rich have been cut from 75 per cent in 1970 to less than 35 per cent in 2004 (Piketty and Saez, 2007). In the UK, the richest 1 per cent have seen their share of household income almost triple since the 1980s (Partington, 2019). Wages and salaries are widely varied. The average pay for a chief executive at a Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 firm has risen to 145 times that of the average worker, up from forty-seven times in 1998 (House of Commons Debates, 2019). Meanwhile, the average British worker has experienced a 10 per cent decrease in real wages since 2007 (OECD, 2016). Similar trends are observed in developed countries. All but one of the OECD countries for which data is available experienced rising income inequality from 1980 to 2009.

Globalization introduced competition from low-wage manufacturing in the developing world, which helped drive down wages in the developed world. As import competition increased, factories closed down or moved abroad to take advantage of cheap labour in developing countries. Again and again, workers were held hostage to the possibility that the businesses that they worked for would leave in order to find cheap labour in other parts of the world. Workers faced growing unemployment and greater volatility in the hours they were expected to work, and had to accept restraints on their salaries and wages. Along the way, manufacturing jobs have become increasingly scarce and many industrial towns have been hollowed out (Bennett, 2012). In the US, one in three jobs used to be in agriculture and manufacturing sixty years ago. Today it is one in eight. Countries are gaining from trade, but these gains are not evenly distributed. Governments around the world have sharply reduced regulation of the economy and financial markets, but have done little to soften the impact of globalization and help compensate citizens for trade-induced losses. For example, the government could fund subsidies for domestic producers to offset the competition from imports (Rickard, 2012). Middle-class and working-class wages in democracies became stagnant, leading to a decline in living standards for the lower and middle classes. Since the 1970s,

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lower-skilled European and American workers have endured a drop in the real value of their wages, which have fallen by more than 20 per cent (Saval, 2017). In the US in 2017, median household wealth was 34 per cent below what it was in 2007 (Wolff, 2017). However, states in the US are able to improve wage growth for the bottom 10 per cent when they pass policies that tackle these issues directly. Wage growth at the bottom 10 per cent was strongest in states with minimum wage increases between 2013 and 2018, unlike those that passed policies that lowered taxes for businesses in the hopes that this would trickle down to positively affect the average worker (Gould, 2018). In most cases, the middle and working classes have been left behind, while bankers, corporate executives and other economic elites have taken advantage of global ties. In particular, globalization has facilitated the rise of companies that earn great sums of wealth but do not employ that many workers. Take the case of General Motors and Facebook. General Motors is valued at $35 billion, and has 77,000 employees in the US and over 200,000 worldwide. By contrast, Facebook is valued at $70 billion, but only employs 2,000 workers (Moller, 2016). The wealth of these successful tech companies is not reaching the lower and middle classes (Kupchan, 2012). Globalization has not only led to greater uncertainty for workers, but also economic crises (see Box 6.2). Increasing levels of economic interdependence have made countries more vulnerable and sensitive to booms and busts. These booms and busts usually affect those who are rich and highly skilled quite differently than those who are poor and low skilled. While financial elites are often bailed out, low-income citizens are left to fend for themselves. The austerity packages deployed after the Eurozone crisis made matters worse. As a result of austerity packages in many European countries, homelessness increased, food insecurity worsened and mortality rates increased (Stuckler et al, 2017). For some countries, cuts in public sector employment led to higher levels of unemployment. In Spain, unemployment was as high as 20 per cent, rising 12 percentage points from 2007 to 2010 (Stuckler et al, 2017). The collapse of confidence in the EU and European governments began with the onset of the European debt crisis. Thus, globalization has led to lowering levels of trust in the government. Many individuals in Western democracies have felt forced to navigate the choppy waters of globalization on their own. Globalization has also mostly helped to facilitate corruption instead of stemming it. Globalization and the growing openness among countries creates relationships that may encourage players to engage in corruption in order to have a competitive edge. Globalization also may help to spread corrupt practices as countries learn from one another (Warner, 2007). It has also made the detection of corruption more difficult (Leiken, 1997). Corrupt leaders can channel money more easily to offshore accounts. It is estimated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that 8 per cent of global GDP is kept offshore, with some $12 trillion worldwide constituting phantom corporate investment (Damgaard et al, 2018).

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However, other authors disagree, claiming that greater integration of trade and investment necessitates more transparency, which reduces opportunity for corruption (Akhter, 2004). Participation in the global economy also requires that countries improve transparency standards as supra-national institutions act as oversight agencies (Savin, 2003). More recent research has noted that while those that already have strong institutions are able to harness globalization positively and reduce corruption levels, countries that open themselves up to the global economy without strong democratic institutions may see corruption levels rise.

Box 6.2: Banks and the global financial crisis of 2008 The 2008 global financial crisis had far-reaching consequences for advanced democracies in Europe and the US (see Snapshot). For many scholars, financial crises have negative effects on democracy due to the rising levels of inequality and decreasing levels of public trust. But studies have also noted that crises are problematic for democracy because they lead to a rise in far-right party candidates (De Bromhead et al, 2012; Funke et al, 2016). On average, far-right parties have increased their vote share by 30 per cent after a financial crisis, as voters are lured by the political rhetoric of nationalism and xenophobia (Funke et al, 2016). Though there are some exceptions, the left in Europe and the US does not profit as equally from financial instability. This is all the more surprising given that much of the blame for the 2008 global financial crisis was placed on the financial sector or the banking industry, which the left usually targets.

SNAPSHOT: WHAT CAUSED THE CRISIS? Prior to the crisis, macro-economic imbalances created a glut of savings that made it difficult for banks to profit from lending, as huge supplies of credit drove down interest rates. In the US, banks needed to find other ways to make money, so many of them started to create a large volume of loans that they could repackage in order to stimulate housing market growth. The problem was when house prices started to stagnate, there were more and more defaults, which dried up liquidity, which drove down consumer spending. Banks stopped lending, making it more difficult for businesses to obtain financing, which was in turn compounded by the falling housing prices and low consumer spending. Meanwhile in Europe, banks had built up huge dollar liabilities and assets, mostly consisting of short-term market borrowing. However, when lending froze, foreign banks were in trouble and faced huge debt repayments (Schoen, 2017).

Though the banks were reckless in causing the 2008 crisis, they faced little punishment. While millions were losing their jobs and homes, bankers were rewarded with bonuses. When the US government bailed out AIG, the company’s creditors did not lose a penny. This contrasts

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with the bailout of the US car industry (Mukunda, 2018). Not only were some CEOs fired, but unionized workers had to accept huge pay cuts even though they had nothing to do with causing the crisis. When it came to the banks, however, the US government gave the public the impression that it was willing to spare no expense to save them from the consequences of their own mistakes (Thirkell-White, 2009). Though a few institutions faced fines and penalties, there were very few new regulations targeting banks. For the most part, the public (taxpayers) bore the brunt of the crisis. The bailouts were considered an injustice to the public, and corroded the bonds of trust in the governing elite (Goodhart and Lastra, 2018). Trust eroded because the crisis left the average person much worse off than before. According to a study by the Federal Reserve Board, the crisis cost the average American $70,000 (Barnichon et al, 2018). This is on top of the fact that median wages for blue-collar workers had been stagnant since the 2000s, while bankers’ salaries and bonuses had kept growing. The average pay for bankers was $264,357 in 2014, rising by 117 per cent from 1990 to 2014, compared to 21 per cent for the rest of the private sector (Wolff-Mann, 2016). The UK faced a similar scenario with how banks and the public fared. In the UK, 60 per cent of the rise in income share of the top decile since the 2000s accrued to finance workers (Bell and Van Reenen, 2010). The reaction to the crisis led to toxic rhetoric from mostly right-wing ideologues about how to resolve the injustices. However, instead of focusing on the banks, the crisis shifted political energy towards criticizing the EU, the welfare state that benefited immigrants and globalization in general. The average worker came to feel that ethnic minorities were prioritized over them by a careless and corrupt elite. Right-wing populists such as Donald Trump made promises to aggressively pursue these elites and ‘drain the swamp’. However, the record of right-wing populists once they take office shows them doing the opposite. Trump cut taxes on the wealthy, rewarded financial elites, limited the power of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and rolled back the tightening of US banking regulations (Rushe, 2019; O’Donnell, 2020). Alarmingly, since the crisis took place, little has been done to prevent another collapse.

One reason citizens have lost trust in their government is that globalization has made many traditional policy tools of the state much less effective. Important economic and social policy decisions are made by international institutions with low levels of transparency. In Latin America, there has been a significant backlash against the World Bank and the IMF, which have advocated neo-liberal policies such as privatizing public enterprises, reducing public employment, weakening protections for workers and opening up countries to international trade and investment. The grievances against these international institutions have been channelled into a backlash against globalization. Similar grievances also radiated from European countries. In the UK, 69 per cent of the British public who disliked globalization in general also voted to leave the EU (Sampson, 2017).

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As countries have competed to become more hospitable to business in order to attract capital investments, governments have been less able to address the needs of their publics. As a result of globalization, many individuals are slipping through the cracks and seeing the social safety nets beneath them fraying. In many Western democracies, weakened state capacity has led to a retrenchment of the welfare state, a process that has been going on since the 1980s. Austerity programmes that were set up in order to facilitate economic integration led to social backlashes from the groups affected. In 1995, France adopted a programme of spending cuts in order to prepare to enter the Eurozone, but was met by the largest wave of strikes since 1968. Under the leadership of Emmanuel Macron, the country has faced a constant stream of strikes from public transport workers who balk against cuts to their pensions. Many communities have faced the adverse effects of economic integration without satisfactory compensatory mechanisms (Niblett, 2017; Bailey et al, 2021). Compensating those hit by trade agreements is critical for mitigating globalization backlashes more generally (Frieden, 2018). Compensation works best when it is embedded within the general social policies of the nation, and not targeted specifically at those who have been impacted by trade. In this way, compensation in the form of generous social safety nets can help individuals who have been displaced, lost their jobs or need to access retraining. In Europe compensation has mostly been institutionalized in the form of a welfare state, as European employers have been willing to consent to the high costs of safety nets. For many years, this enabled European countries to achieve high levels of openness and exposure to competition. Thus, policies of individual countries are important to making a difference in managing globalization. By contrast, US trade agreements such as NAFTA and its deals with the World Trade Organization were established without ensuring that more robust social insurance programmes were in place. Bill Clinton passed NAFTA in 1994, but failed to expand safety nets. Economist Dani Rodrik says that this had farreaching consequences, even impacting the 2016 presidential election: ‘One reason that Hillary Clinton didn’t get any traction with those people is that she didn’t have any credibility’ (quoted in Saval, 2017). Voters have punished politicians that have not adequately addressed trade related job loss concerns (Margalit, 2011). Many citizens believe that elites have not properly managed globalization and have mostly benefited from it. General dissatisfaction in communities hard hit by these globalization-induced losses has soared, mostly in a ‘socio-tropic’ fashion (Mansfield et al, 2019). This means that inequalities that are perceived to be driven by globalization do not just affect those who were made redundant, but impact entire communities. Individuals residing in hard-hit communities will exhibit anti-globalization sentiment, regardless of their personal finances. Both left- and right-wing populists blame elites for their failure to respond to the stresses caused by globalization. Elements of the left and the right that

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do not benefit from globalization have a nostalgia for the past and a need for sovereignty. If the past was a state that was less internationally integrated or had a more homogenous community, this is what populist elites and their supporters tend see as the panacea to their problems (Crouch, 2019). The left and the right also have different scapegoats. Left-wing populists target big corporations and foreign exploitation, while right-wing populists target international institutions and immigrants. Latin America and Southern Europe are two regions where globalization has brought with it numerous challenges. Latin America has experienced globalization through shock trade openings, financial crises, IMF austerity programmes and infiltration by foreign multi-national corporations. As a result, left-wing populist movements have resonated more in Latin America. Spain and Greece experienced similar challenges, with rapid European integration, austerity policies and rising unemployment (Rodrik, 2018). In Greece, globalization fuelled the strength of left-wing populist parties. In Spain, populists of the left and the right have emerged. The US and Europe have experienced globalization through a perceived rise in immigration, combined with trade shocks and rapid economic integration. Right-wing populist movements have tapped into people’s anxieties by providing a narrative of immigrants competing for jobs and draining public services and resources (Cavaille and Ferwerda, 2017). Instead of increasing social safety nets and welfare (which could benefit immigrants supposedly draining state resources), far-right populism believes that workers are better compensated by broadening protectionism. To far-right populist movements, the state is no longer the solution to the issues facing communities, instead it represents the problem. The nostalgic notion of making countries great again is resolved by protectionist policies, low taxes and restrictions on immigration (Milner, 2019). In order to make gains on the international stage, far right populist supporters yearn for strong leadership that can make good deals with other countries, and put the national interest over diplomatic and multi-lateral cooperative objectives.

Free trade, free movement of people and mass communications Globalization is a broad term that encompasses many different processes. We summarize the studies that have examined three important aspects of globalization: free trade; free movement of people (or immigration); and the mass the media. Studies have tried to identify whether one particular aspect of globalization is more impactful in generating economic, cultural or political backlashes to globalization. We synthesize the literature that has examined these relationships and argue that these forces of globalization work together to foster several significant developments, most importantly general dissatisfaction with the government and polarization. Chapter 8 examines how countries dealing with citizen dissatisfaction with the government and high levels of polarization

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are more vulnerable to authoritarian populist takeovers. Marine Le Pen warned after she qualified for the second stage of the presidential election that ‘the main thing at stake in this election is the rampant globalisation that is endangering our civilisation’ (Chrisafis, 2017).

Free trade Free trade is only one of many forms of economic integration, but history seems to suggest that it might be the most destabilizing one.2 Several decades ago, economist Dani Rodrik pointed out some of his prescient concerns that free trade would not be peacefully accepted, as many other economists had suggested. Still, the past two centuries has seen massive increases in free trade, completely transforming the global economy. Facilitated by drops in transport and communication costs, trade became a huge share of countries’ GDPs. The global average of the value of exports as a percentage of GDP increased from 5.7 per cent in 1945 to 24.24 per cent in 2014 (Ortiz-Ospina and Beltekian, 2018). Until the Second World War ended, most transactions involved trade between a small group of rich countries. Today trade between developed and developing countries is just as important. China has been one of the key drivers of this dynamic. Proponents of free trade have pointed to the correlation between rising levels of global trade as a share of GDP (rising from 7.7 per cent to 19.5 per cent from 1975 to 2002) and rising number of democracies (quadrupling over the same period). The argument goes that as financial liberalization diversifies economic power, which creates greater demand for transparency (Maxfield, 2000). Furthermore, the exchange of goods and services may also serve as a conduit for the exchange of ideas (Eichengreen and Leblang, 2008). However, studies that have tested the impact of free trade on democracy see no relationship (Li and Reuveny, 2003; Rigobon and Rodrik, 2005), or find a negative impact because of the effect of free trade on income levels (Eichengreen and Leblang, 2008). Another issue with globalization is that discontent with globalization, and more specifically free trade, has aggravated polarization. Though citizens may not be acutely aware of it, the biggest driver of discontent with globalization is the impact of free trade, most specifically with China. Studies that analysed electoral results across the US have found that Chinese trade shocks moved districts more to the right or to the left, depending on where they were leaning in the first place (Autor et al, 2016). Elected Republicans became more conservative, while elected Democrats became more liberal. In the UK, regions that faced larger import penetration from China moved more to the right, and had voted more strongly in favour of leaving the EU, conditional on education levels (Colantone and Stanig, 2016, 2018). Studies have also found that China trade shocks played a statistically significant role in increasing support for nationalist right-wing populist parties in several European countries (Dippel et al, 2015; Guiso et al, 2017; Malgouyres, 2017; Rodrik, 2018; Colantone and Stanig, 2019).

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Though there are no studies in Latin America that test this relationship directly, we see that growing levels of polarization in the region have coincided with growing trade. World Values Survey Wave  6 has found that polarization in the region was 52.5 per cent compared to 44.8 per cent for other advanced economies, a trend that is getting worse in the region (Vlaicu, 2017; The Economist, 2019a). Nevertheless, in Latin America, where populist leadership has resonated since the 1930s, the booms of busts of financial crises have been the most polarizing force. The austerity measures that have followed economic crises have been found to be the biggest driver of polarization (Canak, 2019). Not surprisingly, skilled workers in the region are more supportive of free trade than non-skilled workers. In general, individuals with higher levels of education in developed economies are more likely to support free trade because it tends to push up the wages of highly educated workers while lowering the costs of consumer goods (O’Rourke et al, 2001; Scheve et al, 2001; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006). These individuals, particularly if they do not originate from communities that have been hard hit by globalization, are more likely to support a pro-globalist agenda. Individuals who are poorer and have lower levels of education tend to benefit less from free trade and are more likely to be dissatisfied. Globalization’s sharply different impacts on communities and individuals helps to explain why it has led to greater polarity of electorates. In spite of some of the negative repercussions on lower-skilled workers of trade specifically, right-wing populism is not necessarily always been anti-free trade, although it is anti-globalization. In Europe, right-wing populists blame the EU and its intrusion into domestic policy rather than free trade per se. Brexit advocates claimed that one of the advantages of leaving the EU would be Britain’s ability to pursue free trade agreements on its own. This illustrates that working-class groups hard hit by free trade were blaming their economic hardships on immigration instead. In the UK, a study using data from the British Election Survey found that trade shocks caused by globalization have been found to impact attitudes and perceptions about immigration (Colantone and Stanig, 2018). Ironically, exposure to Chinese imports is a stronger predictor of antiimmigrant attitudes than exposure to actual immigration (Colantone and Stanig, 2018). A study looking at voters in the US found that China import shocks also increased hostility towards immigrants, most notably from Latin America and Asia (Cerrato et al, 2018). Studies of European countries have also found that regions impacted by import shocks from China channel this anxiety elsewhere and become more concerned with immigration (Colantone and Stanig, 2018). Free trade serves as a trigger not just for polarization, but also for stances that are more authoritarian. Regions in the US and Europe that are more exposed to Chinese import shock do not just become more polarized; they also become less supportive of democratic norms and liberal values, and more likely to support strong, unconstrained leaders (Napier and Jost, 2008; Hetherington and Suhay,

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2011; Ballard-Rosa et al, 2017). Previous chapters have explored this relationship between economic anxiety, polarization and authoritarianism.

Immigration Another significant impact of globalization is increasing levels of mobility, not just of goods and services, but also of people. As a result, levels of immigrants and of refugees and asylum seekers have been rising since the 1990s.3 The number of immigrants worldwide reached 258 million in 2017, up from 173 million in 2000. Most immigrants live in Asia (80 million), Europe (78 million) and North America (58 million), but overall immigration to OECD countries has risen since the 1960s. The US hosts the most immigrants, followed by Saudi Arabia, Germany, Russia and the UK. Most migrants come from India (17 million), followed by Mexico (13 million), Russia (11 million), China (10 million) and Bangladesh (7 million). Positive net migration to North America from 2000 to 2015 has contributed to 42 per cent of the continent’s population growth. Europe has seen a 2 per cent rise in population growth, but would have seen a 1 per cent drop without the net inflow of immigrants in the same period. The increase in migration (both perceived and actual) over a short period of time has been embraced by some citizens, but has given others the perception that their cultural identities and communities are under threat. This has generated feelings of loss of control of borders and sovereignty. In the US, the rising levels of immigration (mostly from Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala) and the perceived threat of radical Islamic terrorism have led to backlashes (Rodrik, 2018). Some European countries have seen a rapid increase in the share of immigrants from 2002 to 2014, which has coincided with a rise in the vote share of far-right parties, challenging the centre-left consensus. Though a significant body of scholarship has investigated the impact of immigration on the success of far-right parties, there still is no consensus from empirical research that rising immigration on its own leads to support for far-right parties (Knigge, 1998; Swank and Betz, 2003; Dülmer and Klein, 2005; Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Proaño Acosta et al, 2019). In fact, some studies have noted that cities that have hosted refugees and that have a greater number of immigrants are less likely to support far-right parties (Steinmayr, 2016; Vertier and Viskanic, 2017). Instead, it is rising immigration levels coupled with growing economic insecurity that have created tensions in Western democracies. Several studies have found that as immigration levels increase, so does support for right-wing populist parties (Lubbers et al, 2002; Van der Brug et al, 2005). The perception that immigration is threatening one’s identity is a strong predictor of support for populist right-wing parties (Norris and Inglehart, 2016). Right-wing populists find it easier to mobilize along ethno-nationalistic lines when countries are experiencing an influx of immigrants and growing inequalities (Rodrik and Mukand, 2020).

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In this context, individuals with low skills experiencing economic insecurity are more likely to oppose immigration (Guiso et al, 2017). Thus, what manifests as cultural and xenophobic backlashes are driven fundamentally by economic anxieties and dislocations. In other words, it is cultural factors interacting with economic factors that determine support for radical right-wing populist parties (Gidron and Hall, 2017, 2018). Economic and cultural backlashes are part of same process, are tightly related to each other and do not constitute alternatives to each other (Colantone and Stanig, 2018). Education levels also have an influence on attitudes towards immigration. Highly educated individuals are more acceptant of diversity, and are willing to accept immigrants of all skill levels, unlike lesser-educated individuals (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). Interestingly both highly educated and lessereducated respondents are more willing to accept highly skilled immigrants than lower-skilled immigrants (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010).

Mass media Due to mass media’s extended reach, globalization has also facilitated the diffusion of ideas. Technological innovations in communication have made it more difficult to withhold information from the masses. Powerful ideas that champion civil liberties, social justice and suffrage have spread around the world through networks of communications and transportation. At the time that the Cold War was ending, the international climate favoured democracy rather than non-democratic alternatives, with elites and citizens sharing the same views on the subject. These ideas were transmitted all over the world. For example, Solidarity strikes in Poland in 1980 were broadcast into Poland and elsewhere via Radio Free Europe and the BBC (Webb, 2013). News of these events was disseminated, ushering in a series of authoritarian breakdowns and democratization not just in Eastern Europe, but in parts of Africa and Latin America as well. Today, the impact of the mass media on democracy is more complex. While the informational revolution was once used to share stories of human protest and defiance, new political media is fuelling ideological polarization instead of cultivating deliberative debate. In particular, new media has altered the way that citizens engage in politics (for the role of social media, see Chapter 5). New forms of media can relay information directly to individuals without the mediation of editors and fact checkers. New media has introduced more instability and unpredictability into the political communications process. As a result, the media environment provokes more than it informs. Some elements of the media openly support exclusive forms of nationalism, offering propaganda that denigrates and vilifies immigrants and other minorities (Crouch, 2019). In addition to the polarizing effect of social media, the mainstream media is also fostering schisms. In many democracies, the media has been captured

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by corporations, which primarily seek profit. This has changed the way that the news is reported, with a greater focus on what type of news will increase advertising revenues, rather than to a commitment to disseminating relevant information. Often, divisive and outrageous news stories are what fits the bill. Chapter 9 goes into this issue more in depth. Additionally, today authoritarian regimes have become more aggressive in pushing anti-democratic messages. These norms are disseminated using the latest technology, which was supposed to help spread democracy (see Chapter 5).

Globalization and democratic decay Globalization and support for democracy The connection between globalization and democratic decay is not straightforward. Studies have demonstrated that globalization has caused a growing gap in satisfaction with more educated and wealthy individuals being more satisfied with democracy than are lower-educated and less-wealthy individuals (Bratton et al, 2005; Aarts et al, 2017). As a proxy for globalization, other survey and areas studies literature has looked at the relationship between inequality and democratic backsliding. Though this relationship is also not very clear-cut, globalization has led to an increase in the perception of inequality. Studies that have examined this relationship have found that democratic backsliding and breakdown are more probable in countries that have higher rates of inequality (Kapstein and Converse, 2008b; Houle, 2009). Democracies that have shrinking inequality levels survive for eighty-four years, while those that have rising inequality last only twenty-two years (Houle, 2009). Additionally, poorer countries may be more likely to backslide (Cheibub et al, 1996; Przeworski et al, 2000; Boix, 2003; Slater et al, 2014). For the most part, there is ample support for the argument that economic inequality generates low levels of specific and diffuse support for democracy (Krieckhaus et al, 2014). Various studies have shown that richer countries are not the only ones to have more satisfied citizens; the most egalitarian societies also have the highest levels of satisfaction with democracy (Han and Chang, 2016). In a study of West European democracies, income inequality was the most found to be important variable in explaining variations in democratic satisfaction (Linde and Ekman, 2003). Other studies looking at this relationship in Latin America and Asia reported similar results (Wu and Chang, 2019). Additionally, a study of welfare states in Europe has found that social policies which citizens see as reducing poverty are positively correlated with satisfaction with democracy (Sirovátka et al, 2019). Though democracy can persist in countries with high levels of inequality, the quality is likely to suffer (Piven, 2006; Dahl, 2008b). Inequality tends to warp representational outcomes because the rich have more influence on politicians

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through bribes, campaign finance or lobbying. Research done in the US has shown that elected officials are more responsive to affluent citizens (Bartels, 2018). Elites can encourage the de-funding of oversight authorities, lobby politicians to enact policies that benefit the rich, work to eliminate minority protections, control media conglomerates that shape the narratives and impact elections, and award lucrative government contracts to others within the elite circles, undermining transparency (Glaeser et al, 2003). Inequality also means that it may be more difficult for someone from an impoverished background to rise to a position of power. Though India has defied logic for remaining democratic amid high levels of poverty, it still retains relatively low levels of inequality, which may explain why democracy has not broken down (though increasing levels of inequality have coincided with backsliding). In contrast, democratic backsliding has taken place in Latin American countries that have high levels of inequality. The relative stability of democracy in Costa Rica and Uruguay may also be due to the fact that they are two of the most equal countries in Latin America. Peru has had more difficulty making democracy stick, experiencing four breakdowns since it became democratic. In comparison, the Baltic countries have low levels of inequality and are democratically stable, in spite of having endured decades of authoritarian rule and bordering Russia. In general, most scholars agree that democracies with sufficiently low levels of inequality are more immune to backsliding and breakdowns. Higher levels of economic inequality tends to reduce support for democracy among all social classes (Krieckhaus et al, 2014). In addition to looking at the role of inequality, there are also studies that have looked into the relationship between immigration and democratic satisfaction. Though there is little evidence that immigration affects diffuse support for democracy, studies have shown that immigration does impact specific support for democracy and/or democratic satisfaction (McLaren, 2015; Pennings, 2017). Other studies highlight that what matters is not the level of immigration, but the perception of immigration and whether or not citizens feel threatened by it (Parsons and Smeeding, 2006). Pew research has demonstrated that concerns about immigration are tied to dissatisfaction in European democracies. Similar results are demonstrated in the relationship between dislike of the EU and democratic dissatisfaction (Wike et al, 2019).

Box 6.3: Inequality and democratization If inequality is so harmful to democracy, why are there so many democracies around the world with high levels of inequality? Though this is a more recent phenomenon, democratic transitions have taken place amid high levels of inequality (Bermeo, 2009; Haggard and Kaufman, 2012; Slater et al, 2014). Past studies have argued that inequality could undermine the chances of democratization because the rich will be less likely to support it, fearing that

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the poor will demand redistributive polities (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). However, this no longer appears to be the case. Studies have argued that the reason these unequal democracies are able to democratize is due to pacts preserving the status quo between key groups (Ansell and Samuels, 2014; Ziblatt, 2017; Albertus and Menaldo, 2018). As long as the elites feel that their interests are secure, democracy can survive. When elites come from a position of strength, they are able to set up institutional roadblocks to prevent redistribution. This gives them little reason to support military coups (Ziblatt, 2017). Another key area that may be important to elites is the existence of strong property rights protections (Winters, 2011). Strong property rights protections explain how countries with high levels of land inequality have been able to democratize. Land inequality, in particular, has prevented democratization in the past, but this is dependent on whether or not the landed elite depends on exploitative labour (Rueschemeyer et al, 1992; Wood, 2000). Land inequality therefore only matters when there are a large proportion of workers in agriculture (Thomson, 2016; Albertus, 2017). When there are not many landless migrants, democracy should pose little threat to agrarian elites, since their wealth is not dependent on controlling rural labour.

Globalization and trust In addition to looking at how inequality impacts democratic satisfaction, research has also investigated the relationship between inequality and political trust (Zmerli and Castillo, 2015). In case studies, in Europe, Latin America and Asia, it has been demonstrated that inequality and perceived inequality are negatively associated with political trust. In addition to affecting democratic satisfaction and levels of diffuse support for democracy, inequality also impacts social trust. Numerous studies have examined this relationship and have underscored how inequality undermines people’s willingness to place their trust in others (Bjørnskov, 2008; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009; Cozzolino, 2011). In addition to studies on inequality and trust, as the chapter previously mentioned, there is also a correlation between financial crises and trust. In Latin America, Latinobarómetro scores revealed eroding levels of political trust ahead of the 2008 economic crisis (Córdova and Seligson, 2009). Similar results were recorded in European democracies after the financial crisis hit that region as well (Kroknes et al, 2015). Studies have also investigated the link between immigration and political trust, mostly looking at this relationship in case studies of the US and Europe (Pennings, 2017). Some studies have highlighted that the relationship is more nuanced. Government policies that emphasize an inclusionary approach to immigration affect political trust among those that have exclusive conceptions of national identity, but do not affect political trust of those who have inclusive conceptions of national identity (McLaren, 2017).

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There is also work that has investigated the relationship between immigration and social trust. Recent studies suggest that the relationship between immigration and social trust depends on a number of economic, political and cultural factors (Kesler and Bloemraad, 2010; Reeskens and Wright, 2013; Ziller and Schübel, 2015). Conflict theory approaches suggest that immigrants increase the salience of in-group and out-groups (Newman, 2013). In contrast, contact theory posits that immigration provides opportunity structures for members of different groups to interact and connect, fostering social trust (Pettigrew et al, 2011). Case studies in Denmark and Germany find no relationship between social trust and immigration (Gundelach and Traunmüller, 2014; Dinesen and Sønderskov, 2015; Ziller and Schübel, 2015). Additionally, studies in the Netherlands and the UK found no results of significance (Hooghe et al, 2009; Tolsma et al, 2009; Sturgis et al, 2011).

Globalized media and political trust With globalization, there have been some important changes to the media. Before, citizens received their information from a few trusted television networks and newspapers. TV news was only accessible at certain times of day, tended to reach a mass audience and was generated and consumed domestically. Today there is a glut of information that citizens can consume. News is available 24/7 and citizens can consume news produced from anywhere and by anyone. There are no studies that determine the impact of globalized media on democratic satisfaction and support for democracy. However, there are many studies that have observed declining levels of trust in the media, and the role of the media in fostering cynicism and distrust. Some of this has to do with ‘mediatization of politics’, or the changing role of the media in framing the political discourse. Technological changes in communications have evolved in ways that have increased the visibility of political scandals and abuses of power. Thus the changing role of the media has made citizens more aware of corruption, increasing feelings of distrust towards the government (Inglehart, 2004; Castells, 2010). According to data from the 2019 Ipsos survey on the media, levels of trust in the media have declined at varying rates across countries over the last five years (Ipsos, 2019). Trust in traditional media has declined due to perceptions that the media is partisan and to the prevalence of fake news (both genuine fake news and news that is labelled fake for political purposes). Countries with the highest percentage of those surveyed claiming that they are less trusting of print and of broadcast news include: Hungary with 43 per cent and 43 per cent; Serbia with 52 per cent and 46 per cent; Turkey with 45 per cent and 42 per cent; Poland with 35 per cent and 39 per cent; the US with 26 per cent and 29 per cent; France with 21 per cent and 28 per cent; Argentina with 27 per cent and 27 per cent; and Spain with 20 per cent and 23 per cent. Table 6.1 shows levels of trust in the media in a select group of countries.

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Table 6.1: Trust in media Trust in the media

Newspapers and magazines (%)

Television and radio (%)

India

77

71

Brazil

65

65

Germany

65

66

South Africa

64

68

Malaysia

62

68

Canada

62

66

Australia

54

57

US

52

51

Belgium

51

53

Italy

48

50

Japan

47

45

UK

46

62

Turkey

43

46

Mexico

42

36

South Korea

42

45

Peru

40

46

Spain

39

41

France

36

37

Argentina

33

37

Chile

30

37

Poland

29

27

Hungary

19

10

Serbia

11

17

Source: Select countries from 2019 Ipsos Survey (Ipsos, 2019)

Globalization and polarization Inequality and polarization Countries suffering from growing rates of inequality face numerous consequences that may foster political polarization. Less equal societies suffer from social problems such as higher illiteracy rates, crime and poorer health outcomes (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). Studies have also shown that individuals are less content when they live in unequal societies (Morawetz et al, 1977; Alesina et al, 2004; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Dawes et al, 2007; Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Ramos, 2014).

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A result of this discontent is the search for more extreme solutions, generating different responses from the right and the left and polarizing the electorate (Brady, 2004; Oliver and Ha, 2007). Growing economic insecurity experienced by certain segments of the population made citizens reject outsiders and cling to forceful leaders that claim to be able to protect them (Piketty and Saez, 2003, 2014). Case studies have pointed to growing inequalities leading to support for the far right in the case of the US and Western Europe, and the far left in the case of Latin America. Both left- and right-wing populist voters see themselves as have been hurt by modernization (Minkenberg and Perrineau, 2007). When the Cold War ended, Eastern Europe experienced higher levels of income equality. Since then, free markets and rising corruption have accelerated this trend, casting a shadow over the meaning of democracy and how these problems can be fixed (Grzymala-Busse, 2007). Income inequality, when taking place among the ‘losers’ of globalization, can help mobilize anti-democratic farright parties (Kriesi et al, 2012). Not surprisingly, there has been a rise in populist parties in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, as well as in the former East Germany (Pirro, 2014; Kriesi and Pappas, 2015; Hanley and Sikk, 2016). Political psychologists have noted that polarization is more likely when individuals perceive that inequalities are being driven by injustices, or by the appearance that some groups are making unfair gains at the expense of others (Starmans et al, 2017). Thus, polarization may be due to perceptions of economic unfairness, rather than to actual economic inequality. This may explain why there has been a rise of far-right populism in countries like Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark (Widfeldt, 2014). Inequalities are not high, but they are increasing, and there is a perception that this is happening exponentially and that governments are not responding appropriately to these issues. Studies of Western democracies have also demonstrated that countries with high income inequality, as well as high levels of financial development and trade deficits are prone to far-right populism. Higher levels of income inequality may diminish social tolerance towards out-groups (Andersen and Fetner, 2008). Rising levels of inequality, coupled with white, working-class individuals feeling that they are the losers, may fosters sentiments of ‘nostalgic deprivation’ (Williamson et al, 2011; Gest et al, 2018). Because inequality levels can rise in spite of many years of economic growth, mainstream parties are often punished for not taking into account the concerns of those left behind (Proaño Acosta et al, 2019). These increasing levels of income and wealth inequality have led to increases in political polarization (Atkinson et al, 2011; Stiglitz, 2012; Piketty and Saez, 2014).

Immigration and polarization It should come as no surprise that growing immigration and the perception of immigration are hotly contested issues that drive polarization. For more on this see Box 6.4.

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Box 6.4: The ‘immigration’ issue The exit polls from the 2016 US presidential election revealed that those who were most concerned with economic problems disproportionately voted for Hillary Clinton, while those who considered immigration the most crucial problem voted for Donald Trump. Low-income Americans who voted for Trump voted against their economic interests, but as Arlie Hochschild (2016) argues, this paradoxical support for Trump reflects a powerful emotional reaction. Immigration has become one of the most important issues in European elections as well. More and more voters are concerned that they have become strangers in their own land. They see themselves as victims of affirmative action, which has benefited specific groups. The reaction against rapid cultural change and immigration has brought a surge of support for xenophobic populist parties among the less-secure strata. Trump provides emotional support to anti-immigration voters when he openly expresses racist and xenophobic feelings (Norris and Inglehart, 2019). The perception of an ethnic threat also helps explain why voters are likely to back the radical right in Europe (Werts et al, 2013). Several other studies argue that the number of immigrants in a country positively corresponds with support for radical right-wing parties (Knigge, 1998; Lubbers et al, 2002; Van der Brug et al, 2005). Another study claimed that this positive relationship between the number of immigrants and electoral turnout for the radical right only matters where unemployment rates exceed 1.3 per cent (Golder, 2003). Still another study, however, has claimed that ethnic diversity does not have an effect on support for radical right-wing parties (Norris, 2005). In spite of this, the main issue may not be how diverse a country actually is, but rather the perceptions of the effects of diversity and how it may shape identities. Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Kaltwasser (2012, 167) argue that ‘the European populist radical right is in essence […] a post-material phenomenon, based first and foremost on identity rather than (material) interest’ (see also Mudde, 2010). Studies corroborate this: cultural factors are the strongest predictors of support for populist right-wing parties (Norris and Inglehart, 2016). In Denmark, the success of the anti-Muslim Danish People’s Party is not due to growing economic deprivation, but due to the perceived cultural threat of immigration (Karpantschof and Mikkelsen, 2017). Rising immigration may generate the perception that their countries are losing their sovereignty. Though these fears may be driven by cultural differences with new (and old) immigrants, they may also fear that economic systems will be put in place that will undermine their incomes and benefits, if that has not already happened. Thus, the relationship between immigration and cultural issues and economic issues may be related.

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Globalized media and polarization As the media has become more international, cable and internet outlets have entered crowded national markets with weaker incentives to aim for politically moderate, median users. Theoretically speaking, globalization of the media has led to more choice and the opportunity for citizens to consume information from a wide variety of viewpoints. However, in comparison to network news of the past, cable news, talk radio, and internet news and blogs mostly choose ideological opinion formats that target a specific audience, providing that audience with more a one-sided coverage (Baum and Groeling, 2008). Though some studies argue that the consumption of television news has no direct effect on polarization, talk radio, internet news, blogs and fake news have further fed into political polarization (Tucker et al, 2018). Studies have found that trust in the mass media in the US has diverged between the two main parties. Gallup polling illustrates this growing polarization of trust. In 1998, 55 per cent of Republicans trusted the media, compared with 59 per cent of Democrats. Fast forward to 2019, and we see that 69 per cent of Democrats trust the media, compared to just 15 per cent of Republicans (Jones, 2018). Pew Research showed that 40 per cent of those that strongly support Trump believe that journalists have no ethics, compared to only 4 per cent of Democrats (Gottfried et al, 2019). These vast differences in trust levels in the mass media illustrates how unlikely it is that citizens from both parties have access to the same information.

Globalization and participation Inequality and participation Though globalization might facilitate many different forms of political involvement, studies that have investigated the effects of inequality have found that it depresses participation and can lead to apathy (Schattschneider, 1960; Goodin and Dryzek, 1980, Dahl, 2008b; Solt, 2008). There are several reasons for this relationship. Democracies need equal participation and economic inequality may encourage the rich to subvert democracy in ways that benefit them (Tilly, 2003). Greater levels of inequality concentrate more power in the hands of the rich, and generate greater levels of frustration and apathy among the poor. Robert Dahl (2008c) theorized that the frustration and resentment of poorer citizens does not lead to pressuring for more political and economic equality, but instead makes them feel hopeless and apolitical. Studies that have examined this relationship have argued that because Western democracies have been unresponsive to the poor, voter apathy sets in, along with low levels of political efficacy (Schlozman et al, 1999; Beramendi and Anderson, 2008; Hacker and Pierson, 2010; Giger et al, 2012; Gilens, 2012; Rosset et al, 2013; Krieckhaus et al, 2014; Bartels, 2018). Economic inequality can lead to political inequality; while the poor are

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demotivated, the rich become more activated (Goodin and Dryzek, 1980). In unequal societies, affluent citizens are more likely to donate, contact government officials and work for campaigns (Schlozman et al, 1999). Most of the studies that have examined this relationship have looked only at Western democracies. A study of twelve wealthy democracies that looked at the relationship between inequality and voter turnout demonstrated that in subnational regions, voter turnout was the lowest in the most unequal sub-regions (Mahler, 2002). Case studies of the US and Italy demonstrate that inequality suppresses turnout in sub-regions (Boix, 2003; Solt, 2004). A polled time series analysis of fifteen wealthy countries also found evidence that inequality suppresses turnout (Lister, 2007). Additionally, survey research in Western democracies (including Eastern Europe) has confirmed that individuals living in more unequal societies are less likely to vote (Beramendi and Anderson, 2008; Solt, 2008). In non-Western democracies, it is not clear if there is a relationship between turnout and inequality.4 There are many cases of high inequality and low voter turnout, but also cases of low inequality and low voter turnout. There are only a handful of non-Western democracies that have relatively high rates of voter turnout (and do not impose compulsory voting), despite having high rates of inequality. Botswana, Kenya and Namibia are exceptions, with turnout rates of over 70 per cent. In spite of this, studies have not demonstrated that growing inequalities causes turnout to decline in non-Western countries.

Conclusion This chapter provided an overview of the economic factors that explain why countries are backsliding and de-consolidating. As it explained, these processes need to be understood in the context of globalization and rapid improvements to technology. Though globalization creates many opportunities for the spread of democratic norms and ideals, some of its side effects pose challenges to democracy. While it is not clear that globalization causes inequality, there is certainly a correlation, and inequality is not helpful to democratic stability. Globalization has also led to an increase in movement of people. While this has made some citizens more tolerant, others have become more concerned and fearful. The globalized media has not always helped allay concerns, focusing more on gaining ratings than educating the public. Thus, growing inequalities, coupled with the perception of an immigration crisis and a provocative media, is a toxic mix for democracy. Globalization has caused citizens to question whether democracy is really working for them. Growing frustration with issues that appear to be exponentially larger than before has created a ripe environment for political entrepreneurship and manipulation. While some believe that citizens feel more than capable of taking advantage of all that globalization has to offer, other citizens feel abandoned by their governments and let down by democracy. Ultimately, citizens’ support for

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democracy has dissipated a bit over time, and global processes are driving much of this erosion of support for democracy. The chapter that follows examines a domestic driver of eroding support for democracy: corruption. KEY QUESTIONS 1. Is globalization good for democracy? How has it helped spread democracy around the world? 2. Can a society be democratic and have high levels of inequality? Why or why not? Why has inequality not impacted democratization? 3. How does immigration affect democracy? Do countries that have high levels of immigration and migration enjoy democratic stability? 4. Do you believe the mass media is contributing to polarization? Why or why not? 5. Which is driving low levels of political and social trust: the media or inequality?

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Corruption Introduction Transparency International (2018), a noted non-governmental organization focused on rooting out corruption, states that the failure to curb corruption is contributing to the worldwide crisis of democracy. Only twenty countries have improved their corruption levels, while the rest have either stagnated or worsened since 2012. According to managing director Patricia Moreira ‘With many democratic institutions under threat across the globe – often by leaders with authoritarian or populist tendencies – we need to do more to strengthen checks and balances and protect citizens’ rights’. This chapter examines how corruption undermines democracy. Many studies argue that high levels of corruption are a sign of democratic decay, but what are the ways in which corruption drives democratic erosion? Corruption is an oft cited reason for coups (Hiroi and Omori, 2013) and revolutions (Tucker, 2007), but there is less scholarship that has explored the relationship between corruption and democratic decay (Hiroi and Omori, 2013). A few studies have demonstrated that high levels of corruption are harmful to democratic consolidation, because corruption affects political legitimacy (Seligson, 2002a; Warren, 2004). Corruption affects a country’s political culture, leading to low levels of trust in public institutions, which has a severe impact on the commitment to civic activity and collective projects (Doig and Theobald, 2000). For example, the level of political corruption in Nigeria has affected its political culture substantially. There is decreasing confidence and trust in the state’s ability to organize free and fair elections and be accountable to its citizens (Ogundiya, 2010; Basiru, 2018). Rising corruption also creates fertile ground for the emergence of messianic styles of leadership that can ‘save’ the public from corrupt elites of the past. It creates an urgency to cut corners in order to rid the country of the corrupt establishment. This chapter explains the relationship between corruption and democratic decay, and how pervasive corruption increases citizens’ receptiveness to non-democratic forms of government.

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Transparency International (2018) argues that there is a direct link between corruption and level of democracy, because corruption chips away at democracy, creating a vicious cycle. The countries that had the biggest rise in corruption levels also have the greatest declines of democratic freedoms. For example, rising corruption levels in Turkey have coincided with democratic decline. Civil liberties have declined, as have political rights and checks and balances. Rising corruption is certainly a sign that institutions are eroding. It is also true that the most corrupt regimes in the world are some of the most undemocratic – such as Somalia, Syria, South Sudan, Yemen, North Korea, Sudan, Guinea Bissau, Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq. Transparency International (2018) also reports that corruption increases support for populist candidates – with 40 per cent of populist leaders worldwide also indicated on charges of corruption (Kyle and Mounk, 2018). In spite of these correlations, more scholarly work needs to be done to investigate this relationship.

Key concepts: corruption Former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo once remarked that corruption was the greatest single bane of their society. It hinders economic and social development, while also impacting people’s freedoms. It was estimated that Nigeria lost over $400 billion to corruption between 1960 and 1999 (UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007). Corruption is also a major obstacle to democracy and democratic legitimacy. This creates a vicious cycle for new democracies, since democratizing regimes tend to see corruption levels increase (Mohtadi and Roe, 2003). Weak institutions go hand in hand with abuses of power. There are many different forms of corruption, including political, administrative, judicial and police corruption. Political corruption is a form of ‘grand corruption’ or corruption at the highest levels. This contrasts with ‘petty corruption’ or administrative corruption (also known as bureaucratic corruption) and police corruption, which consists of the everyday abuse of power by public officials in their interactions with ordinary citizens. In its worst form, the expectation of constant bribes leads to administrative inaction and the refusal to provide vital services unless a bribe is paid. When bureaucrats assume that bribes are a systematic part of their remuneration, the entire output of the administrative institutions is in jeopardy. Law enforcement agencies can use their positions of power to exact bribes, which creates greater insecurity and fear of the police. Petty corruption takes place on a small scale, involves low-level members of the state, and is often rampant in newer democracies and authoritarian regimes. Most mature, wealthy democracies do not exhibit high levels of petty corruption.

Judicial corruption Judicial corruption can represent both petty and grand corruption. Judicial corruption ‘includes corrupt acts by judges, prosecutors, public defenders, court

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officials, and lawyers who are intimately involved in the operation of the judicial system’ (USAID, 2009, quoted in Ezrow and Frantz, 2013, 263). Petty forms of judicial corruption include when court users must pay bribes to employees of the courts in order to alter the legally determined treatment of files and discovery material, or to accelerate or delay a case by illegally altering the order in which the case is to be attended by the judge. These cases of corruption are referred to as procedural and administrative irregularities. Operational corruption consists of judges not basing their rulings on evidence or legal considerations, but based on bribes, making it difficult for the poor to get a fair trial. Other types of operational judicial corruption also constitute forms of grand corruption. These include schemes where political and/or considerable economic interests are at stake, such as politically motivated court rulings or changes of venue. In these cases, pliant judges are either induced or threatened to rule in ways that benefit the political and economic elites. These cases involve substantive irregularities affecting judicial decision-making where the politically and economically powerful are immune from punishment.

Political corruption No democracy has completely escaped from political corruption. It exists even in the most mature democracies. Political corruption is defined as the abuse of power of public office for personal gain, at the public’s expense (Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Warren, 2004). Political corruption involves accepting or soliciting something of value in exchange for political favours (Heidenheimer et al, 1989). Political corruption also implies an element of duplicity, as corrupt activities usually take place in a non-transparent manner (Warren, 2004). In South Africa, Jacob Zuma (2009–2018) was forced to resign after being charged with corruption and money laundering. Zuma allegedly allowed the wealthy Gupta family to influence his administration’s appointments so that they could flout government rules to further their business interests. Former Deputy Finance Minister Mcebisi Jonas testified that Zuma offered him the top ministry post and a 600 millionrand ($43 million) bribe if he agreed to fire top Treasury officials blocking the Guptas’ business interests (Reuters, 2018). Jonas declined the offer. Several other important officials also testified that they were under pressure to heed to the Guptas’ wishes, with bribes offered as inducement. Political corruption can also involve politicians embezzling public funds and assets for personal advancement or gain. In extreme cases, the executive or other political elites engage in stealing from the state, known as ‘kleptocracy’ (see Box 7.1). ‘Nepotism’ and ‘cronyism’ are two more specific types of political corruption (or administrative corruption when they happen in the bureaucracy). Nepotism is the bestowal of patronage (jobs, economic opportunities, favours) based on familial ties instead of merit. Cronyism is the same process, except the benefits

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are passed along to friends and loyal lackeys. Friends and family are given access to favours, funds and opportunities that they would otherwise not benefit from, including access to lucrative government contracts or, in extreme cases, granting friends and family control over key sectors of the economy. In the case of Bangladesh, formal institutions only play a minor role, while decisions are made by a small group of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s relatives and personal advisors, side-lining experienced individuals that she considers disloyal (Rahman, 2019). In Sri Lanka, the regime of Mahinda Rajapaksa involved his brothers in highlevel political positions, collectively controlling between 60 and 70 per cent of the country’s budget. While Rajapaksa was president, he also served as the minister for defence, urban development, finance and planning, and law and order. His younger brother Basil served as the minister of economic development. Another brother, Chamal, is speaker of the parliament. A fourth brother, Gotabaya, is now the country’s defence secretary and oversees immigration and emigration, the Land Reclamation and Development Corporation and the Urban Development Authority (DeVotta, 2014). Gotabaya Rajapaksa has also been the president of Sri Lanka since 2019, indicating that the Rajapaksa brothers are creating a dynasty. In Venezuela, Hugo Chávez placed his Chavistas in key positions of power across administrative institutions, the judiciary and the state-owned oil industry (Kendall-Taylor et  al, 2019). In Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych fired cabinet members who were not loyal and replaced them with cronies (Bermeo, 2016). In Nicaragua, Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega’s wife Rosario has tremendous power in Nicaraguan politics and serves as vice president. In Liberia, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf ’s three sons were given top state positions (head of the national security agency, deputy governor of the central bank and chairman of the national oil company), with no evidence that they were qualified to fill these positions. In South Africa, Jacob Zuma’s 25-year-old daughter was appointed chief of staff of the department of telecommunications and postal services. After winning re-election in 2018 in Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan fired the head of the central bank and placed his son-in-law in charge of economic policy, though he has since resigned (DW, 2020). Another form of political corruption is ‘electoral fraud’, which is illegal interference during elections (see Chapter 11). Elections can be interfered with primarily through vote buying, ballot stuffing and vote miscounting. Vote buying involves paying voters to vote a specific way, regardless of their political affiliation. Politics in this instance is merely an economic transaction. In ballot stuffing, the voters are usually left out of the process and the ballot results are manipulated by creating phantom voters or by destroying ballots. In some cases, voters are allowed to vote multiple times. Ballots of opposition candidates might also be destroyed. When votes are miscounted, the results are hidden from the public, and pliable individuals from ‘electoral commissions’ are used to ratify the fake results.

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If these forms of electoral fraud take place, a country is no longer democratic (see Chapter 2). Electoral fraud can be broken down into two types. Minor electoral fraud is where the results are tampered with, but the perception is that this tampering had little effect on the outcome. Major electoral fraud, however, is where the fraud is believed to have impacted the election results (Tucker, 2007).

Box 7.1: Kleptocracy Kleptocracy is a system where ruling elites steal public funds for their own private gains. This is more likely to take place when there are few checks on executive power, so the political and economic system can be structured in ways that maximize the economic interests of the ruler and other elites (Lundahl, 1997). This enables the ruler and their entourage to accept huge bribes and kickbacks in exchange for authorizing certain political decisions. The ruler might also embezzle foreign aid or steal directly from state coffers. The global financial system is then used to launder and protect the stolen wealth. For example, in Zaire (today the Democratic Republic of Congo), Joseph Mobutu acquired over $8 billion by stealing 15–20 per cent of the country’s operating budget (Ezrow and Frantz, 2013). Suharto in Indonesia and his family were worth more than $15 billion by stealing from a scholarship fund and other charitable foundations (Quah, 1999). Malawi’s President Hastings Banda managed much of the country’s commercial activity through family trusts (Reno, 2002). After a decade in power, Liberia’s President Samuel Doe accumulated a fortune equivalent to half of Liberia’s annual domestic income (Reno, 2002). Sani Abacha (1993–1998) of Nigeria stole $4 billion in less than five years by awarding contracts to front companies, accepting huge bribes and stealing money directly from the treasury. Family members and friends were used to transfer the money abroad (Goldsmith, 2004). There are also plenty of examples of kleptocratic behaviour in Latin America. In Ecuador, former Abdalá Bucaram stole money that had been raised in a Christmas telethon to help the poor. In Nicaragua, former dictator Antonio Somoza stole earthquake relief funds. In Venezuela, Carlos Andrés Pérez misappropriated public funds. Today while Venezuelans starve, the political elite under Nicolás Maduro have stolen funds to subsidize their lavish lifestyles (Margolis, 2020). When kleptocratic behaviour takes place in weak democracies, politicians who are enriching themselves become even less likely to leave power, both because they want to continue benefiting from their positions of power and because they want to avoid prosecution. These leaders in turn may attack democratic institutions by engaging in electoral fraud and by weakening agencies that may pose a threat to them.

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How is corruption measured? The most common way of measuring corruption is using polls and surveys that measure the perceptions of corruption by business elites and experts. The two most well-known indices are Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index (CC). Both CPI and the CC capture bureaucratic, judicial, police and political corruption using expert surveys, but they do not disaggregate these categories. They also do not take into account citizens’ perceptions or experiences with corruption. In addition to these indices, there are studies that have captured citizens’ experiences with petty corruption, or interactions with low-level public officials. Surveys meant to capture perceptions of corruption usually ask questions about grand corruption or corruption that infects the highest levels of government (Mishler and Rose, 2008). Though citizens are unlikely to have encountered grand corruption, it is more influential in affecting their perceptions (Pellegata and Memoli, 2018). Most citizens in mature democracies view corruption as fairly widespread, though they may have no direct experience with petty forms of corruption. For example, a 2014 anti-corruption report published by the European Union Commission found that 76 per cent of respondents perceive political corruption to be widespread, yet only 8  per cent have had direct experience with corruption. Citizens may assume that corruption is extensive, regardless of whether all public servants are guilty or not (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003). According to a 2018 Latinobarómetro survey, seven countries in Latin America believed that corruption was the biggest or second biggest problem facing their country (Latinobarómetro, 2018). It is important to note that studies that look at citizens’ perceptions compared to expert surveys have found that there is a mismatch between what citizens perceive and what experts say. For example in Cyprus, Ireland and Portugal, citizens tend to overestimate the level of corruption, while in Estonia, Poland, Slovakia and Italy, they underestimate it (Pellegata and Memoli, 2016).

Corruption and democracy Scholarship from the post-Second World War period had a more benign view of corruption – the idea being that corruption was important for greasing the wheels for a developing economy and facilitating social modernization in countries with slow or inefficient bureaucracies (Leff, 1964; Nye, 1967; Huntington, 2006). Studies of corruption eventually took the opposite view – that corruption was terrible for economic growth, investment, state capacity and wealth distribution, and that it led to brain drain (Goldsmith, 1999; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015; Dimant and Tosato, 2018). Most studies of corruption focused on its relationship with economic development. Far fewer studies have examined the relationship between

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corruption and political development. Studies that have looked at corruption and democratic consolidation have found that corruption is a major obstacle (Schedler, 1999). There is not a consensus in the literature however, that corruption causes democratic breakdown. Here, however, we lay out arguments for how corruption can cause democratic backsliding by exploring several potential issues. Corruption is both a symptom and a cause of democratic decay. It is symptomatic of weak oversight institutions and non-transparent decision-making (Power and Taylor, 2011). Corruption undermines the principles of democratic equality, openness and accountability (Dahl, 2008c). The effect of these weak regulatory institutions is that laws are implemented arbitrarily (Warren, 2004). Some groups benefit from corruption while others are negatively impacted. For this reason, all forms of corruption can also drive democratic erosion. As corruption undermines justice, fairness and equality, it affects the quality of democracy. Politicians adopt policies that only assist certain segments of society, such as special interests, elites and the politicians themselves (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 1995; Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Zyglidopoulos, 2016). Informal power networks benefit the privileged, while resources diverted from the public interest undermine the principles of fairness (Della Porta, 2000; Rothstein and Teorell, 2008). Political corruption dissipates resources that could have been used more productively, and were not up for sale. Corruption means that the resources needed to provide vital services that citizens are entitled to are siphoned off for personal gain (Podobnik et al, 2008). As a result, all forms of corruption exacerbate social inequality (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005). Studies have demonstrated that political corruption can limit female empowerment and female representation. Countries with high levels of political corruption have fewer female legislatures and lower female voter turnout (Alexander and Bågenholm, 2018). If policies are for sale, those that have less economic and social power will also suffer (Sundström and Wängnerud, 2016). Furthermore, as political corruption only benefits the few, those that are excluded will tend to abstain from taking part in democracy (Bauhr and Charron, 2018). Countries that have high levels of bureaucratic corruption (a form of petty corruption) are also more likely to deliver public services inefficiently (Cingolani et  al, 2015; Della  Porta et  al, 2015; Chayes, 2016). Routine government transactions have a price, violating citizens’ rights (Warren, 2004). When a bribe is needed to ensure a service is offered, it increases the costs of public services, creating an additional tax on citizens. These types of ‘taxes’ exponentially hurt the poor, who cannot afford them. Bureaucratic corruption also reduces productivity, and delays access to public administration and the completion of public works (Della Porta, 2000). Not only are public projects delayed, but quality also suffers (Podobnik et al, 2008). Government jobs go to the highest bidder instead of the best quality provider. These inefficiencies are costly. In Brazil, for example, corruption has

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been estimated to be eating up as much as 5 per cent of its GDP (Power and Taylor, 2011). Countries that have high levels of police and judicial corruption are more likely to violate human rights and are more likely to overstep the reach of the state vis-à-vis their citizens. Institutionalized rights of citizens and protections are turned into favours that must be repaid in kind (Warren, 2004). Highly corrupt countries are also more likely to discriminate and not offer access to fair trials, as fast and favourable judicial outcomes are only available to the rich and powerful (Andersen, 2018). Once corruption is commonplace, it incentivizes executives to cling to power in order to avoid prosecution and to continue to enrich themselves. Corrupt leaders may seek to weaken further checks on power bypassing formal institutions that are supposed to ensure transparency. In Guatemala, President Jimmy Morales, a former comedian, reneged on an agreement with the United Nations to allow the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) to operate. The CICIG had been investigating allegations of corruption against Morales and his party, his brother and son. The Guatemalan Constitutional Court attempted to block Morales’s decision, but Morales responded by depriving three Constitutional Court judges of immunity from prosecution (Goldman, 2019).

Corruption and democratic decay Corruption and support for democracy Previous research has demonstrated that corruption undermines democratic institutions because it institutionalizes the abuse of power of the state (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Corruption leads to greater acceptance of rule-breaking behaviour. But the causal relationships between government corruption, legitimacy and democratic satisfaction is reciprocal, complex and constantly evolving. As explained in Chapter 3, democratic satisfaction is often a function of actual policy performance of the political system, which can fluctuate over time (Easton, 1965). This can go beyond economic outcomes such as creating jobs and distributing welfare, to include respect for the rule of law, and provisions of political and civil rights (Mishler and Rose, 2001; Seligson, 2002a; Rothstein, 2007; Norris, 2012; Dahlberg and Holmberg, 2014; Magalhães, 2016; Newton et al, 2018). On the individual level it has been shown that citizens’ perceptions of the impartiality of government and procedural fairness strongly influence whether or not people are satisfied with the working of democracy and its institutions, in both new and old democracies (Seligson, 2002a; Wagner et al, 2009; Holmberg and Rothstein, 2012; Linde, 2012; Linde and Erlingsson, 2013; Rothstein, 2013; Dahlberg and Holmberg, 2014). Thus it is not surprising that citizens who perceive corruption to be widespread are more likely to be dissatisfied with the way democracy works (Pharr et al, 2000;

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Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Merkel, 2004; Wagner et al, 2009; Dahlberg and Holmberg, 2014; Pellegata and Memoli, 2018). More specifically, studies that have examined citizens’ perceptions of corruption of politicians and government officials in Europe have found that these perceptions are negatively correlated to satisfaction with democracy (Wagner et al, 2009). For example, according to a Pew Research survey in 2019, 84 per cent of Greeks are not satisfied with the way democracy is working and 76 per cent believe that the court system does not treat everyone fairly. In Spain, the same factors are at 81 per cent and 77 per cent respectively. The results are similar in Brazil – 83 per cent are dissatisfied and 72 per cent believe the courts are unfair (Kent, 2019). Other studies of Latin America have shown that perceptions of procedural injustice and partiality, in the form of corruption, have a negative effect on support for the political system (Seligson, 2002a; Booth and Seligson, 2009). In particular, citizens who have been subjected to corruption view government performance and political institutions more negatively. Another study of Western Europe used survey data to demonstrate that controlling corruption and applying of the rule of law has a positive effect on democratic satisfaction levels of citizens (Wagner et al, 2009). Past survey research on Poland shows that citizens’ perceptions of corruption is correlated with low levels of trust in politicians and elections (McManusCzubińska et al, 2004). Nevertheless, high levels of citizen dissatisfaction with democracy does not necessarily mean that citizens prefer non-democratic alternatives. As Chapter 3 explained, there is a distinction to be made between citizens’ satisfaction with how democracy works and diffuse support for democracy in principle, usually captured by asking individuals whether or not democracy is their favourite form of government, compared with the alternatives. Most mature democracies enjoy high levels of diffuse support for democracy, even when there is a perception of political corruption. However, diffuse support for democracy is more likely to suffer in new democracies with high levels of corruption. Where democracy is younger and more fragile, citizens may be more likely to question the institutions of democracy when political corruption is rampant (Mishler and Rose, 2001; Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Chang and Chu, 2006; Dahlberg et al, 2015). Diffuse support for the political system is a product of citizens’ sense of procedural fairness (Tyler et al, 1989). Citizens may believe that the issue is the democratic system and not corrupt politicians. Citizens in new democracies may also have more direct experience with administrative and judicial corruption than do citizens in consolidated democracies. Some studies have investigated the relationship between citizens’ direct experience with corruption and diffuse support for democracy. A study in Bolivia, Nicaragua, Paraguay and El Salvador demonstrated that citizens’ experiences in dealing with corruption are negatively correlated with diffuse regime support for democracy (Seligson, 2002a). Studies in Sub-Saharan Africa have also come

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to the same conclusion (Cho and Kirwin, 2007). A cross-national study of nine Central and Eastern European countries found that higher levels of corruption were also associated with a lower likelihood that undemocratic alternatives would be rejected (Rose et al, 1998). When citizens feel that ignoring the rules of democracy leads to preferred outcomes, support for democracy is undermined (Voigt and Gutmann, 2015). In comparison to other types of corruption, electoral fraud is more likely to attract the attention of even politically naïve citizens. Citizens tend to feel that electoral malpractice is a sign that other forms of misdeeds are taking place in the government, and that there are low levels of accountability. Electoral fraud serves as another screen that undermines citizens’ ability to shape outcomes, and contributes to the perception that elections are not reliable expressions of the general will (Schedler, 2006; Fortin-Rittberger et al, 2017). Electoral malpractice also lowers democratic satisfaction, and diffuse support for democratic ideals (Birch, 2008, 2010; Kalandadze and Orenstein, 2009; Rose and Mishler, 2009; McAllister and White, 2011). In countries that do not have strong levels of diffuse support for democracy to begin with, election irregularities can be incredibly destabilizing (Robbins and Tessler, 2012).

Corruption and trust Impartial government institutions are important to generating political support and legitimacy. Evaluations of government fairness is critical to building trust in the government (Miller and Listhaug, 1999). When government institutions are perceived to be benefiting certain groups at the expense of others, this can also cause confidence and trust in these institutions to erode (Mishler and Rose, 2001; Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Merkel, 2004; Kostadinova, 2012). Citizens who experience electoral fraud are especially likely to express low levels of confidence in the political system, and low levels of political trust and legitimacy (Rose and Mishler, 2009; Norris, 2014). Democratic legitimacy is also questioned when corruption is high because it undermines procedural and distributive fairness (Gibson and Caldeira, 1995). Additionally, because corruption leads to poor government performance, citizens’ trust in institutions can also decline (Pharr et al, 2000). Thus, government corruption is a potential cause of distrust and declining legitimacy of political institutions, including the legislature, political parties, and the incumbent government and administration (Bowler and Karp, 2004; Sung, 2004; Seligson, 2006; Rock, 2009; Kostadinova, 2012). Scholarly work on this relationship has confirmed that there is a link. A study using survey data and based on fifteen democracies (including Japan, New Zealand, the US and several countries in Western and Eastern Europe) found that all forms of corruption undermine citizens’ faith in their governments (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003). Other studies in Eastern and Central Europe (Mishler and Rose, 2001; Wallace and Latcheva, 2006), among EU member states

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(Pellegata and Memoli, 2016), African countries (Cho and Kirwin, 2007) and Asian democracies (Chang and Chu, 2006) have confirmed that perceptions of public sector corruption erode trust. In Japan, a study using newspaper articles to identify the frequency of political scandals found that political corruption by public officials lowered public confidence in democracy (Pharr, 2000). In Latin American democracies, a study using surveys revealed that citizens’ experiences with bureaucratic, judicial and police corruption negatively impacted their diffuse support for democracy as well as their confidence in their political systems (Seligson, 2002a). For example, a study in Mexico demonstrated the link between political corruption and widespread distrust of the police and politicians (Morris, 1999). Rising corruption in Venezuela was also associated with low levels of trust in political parties prior to Hugo Chávez taking power (Canache and Kulisheck, 1998; Canache, 2002). In Eastern Europe, low levels of political trust and corruption go hand in hand. Surveys of procedural impartiality in Eastern Europe have shown that in Slovenia and Czech Republic about 50 per cent of citizens perceive public authorities as impartial and likely to treat citizens equally, while only 20 per cent of citizens in Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary feel the same way (Linde, 2012). In addition to affecting political trust, corruption is also connected to lower levels of interpersonal trust (or social trust) (Seligson, 2006). When citizens believe that public officials are corrupt or untrustworthy, they will make an inference that most other people cannot be trusted either (Rothstein, 2011). This has knock-on effects on democracy because low levels of social trust leads to citizens being less involved in civil society and being less civic-minded (Putnam, 1993). Social trust is critical to fostering an environment where civil society groups can form to check and influence the government. Corruption also affects the strength and ability of civil society to participate in the decision-making process (Johnston, 2005; Guiso et al, 2010; Grimes, 2013). In this way, corruption reduces the effective domains of public action (Warren, 2004). A large-N study of more than 100 countries has demonstrated empirically that both individual perceptions of corruption and experience with corruption impact interpersonal trust, contributing to lower citizen involvement in the political process (Pellegata and Memoli, 2016). In turn, countries with higher levels of particularized trust of family and friends, and lower levels of social trust have more corruption (Uslaner, 2004).

Corruption and polarization While the relationship between corruption and trust is more straightforward, the relationship between corruption and polarization is more indirect. There are no studies that directly link corruption as a cause of polarization, but case studies have shown that corruption can exacerbate polarization. As the loss of

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trust leads actors to drop electoral support for traditional parties, studies have shown a rise in anti-system parties and populist parties (Bågenholm, 2013; Hanley and Sikk, 2016; Vampa, 2020). Corruption and social exclusion have also led to popular dissatisfaction with traditional institutions. Because of corruption, citizens feel the system is not working for them and is failing to address their socioeconomic concerns. Populist leaders (see Chapter 8) often use dissatisfaction with corruption to mobilize public support, promising that they will break the vicious cycle of corruption. Corruption scandals involving the Workers’ Party are said to have contributed to the electoral victory of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil (Mounk and Kyle, 2018). After it was discovered that seventy-two members of Congress accepted bribes in 2006 in exchange for legislative support for President Lula’s Worker Party, members of his inner circle resigned and thirteen members of Congress were indicted (BBC News, 2018). This was followed by another scandal where the Worker’s Party took back control of Petrobas, Brazil’s national oil company, and then ensured that the company was the sole operator of the pre-salt discovery oil fields and refineries. Billions of dollars were secretly diverted to the Worker’s Party and its coalition partner (Watts, 2017). In the aftermath, a study that tracked online polarization on social media found that those interested in fighting corruption and crime became indistinguishable from those interested in rightwing politicians and parties, while those interested in human rights merged with left-wing parties (Ortellado and Ribeiro, 2018). High levels of corruption in Venezuela and a crooked spoils system led to growing frustration with the government. Chávez seized upon this discontent to mobilize the left in the late 1990s. Since Chávez took power, scholars have noted that Venezuela has become increasingly polarized and corrupt (Roberts, 2012; Corrales and Penfold, 2015). Other studies claim the reverse – that polarization is good for curbing corruption because it increases incentives for politicians to expose corrupt practices by the opposition (Tsebelis, 2002; Brown et al, 2011; Testa, 2012). A study in the US used panel data from US states to demonstrate that politicians are more likely to police one another when polarization is high (Melki and Pickering, 2016). Nevertheless, it is not clear that polarization has had the same effect on any other countries, with growing polarization coinciding with growing levels of corruption.

Corruption and participation Because corruption leads to a declining trust in elites, political parties, the state and declining levels of interpersonal trust, the result is declining levels of political participation. There is growing cynicism in the ability to influence elites through collective action and the purpose of public speech and deliberation. Many citizens are likely to feel disempowered with little incentive to interact with elected officials (Wagner et  al, 2009). As the press makes the public more aware of

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corruption, pessimism sets in, as does tolerance of illegal practices (Villoria et al, 2013). Once trust has eroded, citizens are likely to withdraw from politics and attend to narrow self-interests. Thus, corruption makes it impossible for citizens to influence people’s decisions through votes and participation; high voter apathy signals that citizens feel a low sense of efficacy (Warren, 2004). Politicians may become emboldened once citizens disengage, taking advantage of public apathy to engage in even more corrupt activities (Holbrook and Meier, 1993). There have been a small group of studies, however, that argue that corruption can motivate citizens to vote. A few studies in the US have found that citizens’ trust in politicians did not affect turnout for congressional and presidential elections during the 1960s and 1970s (Peters and Welch, 1980; Shaffer, 1981). A more recent study in Senegal found that corruption mobilized Senegalese voters (Inman and Andrews, 2015). A study of post-communist countries found no link between corruption levels and citizen engagement (Pacek et al, 2009). Another study claims that corruption only motivates citizens to vote if they are benefiting from corruption (Bauhr and Charron, 2019). Nevertheless, these findings are not the norm. Most of the literature points to corruption as a demobilizing agent for voting (Stockemer et  al, 2013; Stockhammer, 2017; Carreras and Vera, 2018). Though it may initially fire up voters and move them to the polls in the early years, apathy sets in over time as citizens discover that little can be done about high levels of corruption (Kostadinova, 2009). This disappointment with the political process pushes voters to withdraw (Dahlberg and Solevid, 2016). In particular, educated citizens are more likely to feel resigned rather than motivated (Agerberg, 2019). Regional and case studies have found similar results. In Latin America, endemic corruption demobilizes citizens, breeds resignation and leads to low voter turnout (Bauhr and Grimes, 2014). In particular, perceptions of fairness of elections can effect turnout rates. Mexican citizens who believed that elections were fraudulent were also more likely to stay home on election day (McCann and Domínguez, 1998; Simpser, 2012). A US study found that when using the number of state officials convicted of a crime as a measure of corruption – voter turnout was correspondingly lower (Meier and Holbrook, 1992). In Russia, perceptions of corruption also had a weak effect on willingness to vote (Mishler and Rose, 2005). Nevertheless, while corruption depresses voter turnout, it does not have the same effect on other forms of participation. In a study using survey data from thirty-four countries, corruption levels led to non-electoral forms of mobilization such as demonstrating, petitioning, boycotting or donating money to a political cause (Bazurli and Portos, 2019). There are also cases where electoral fraud has triggered political participation (Tucker, 2007; Magaloni, 2010). Citizen perceptions of fraud can galvanize anti-incumbent sentiment and serve as a focal point around which the opposition can more easily mobilize mass dissent and coordinate their activities (Donno, 2013; Shirah, 2016). In these ways, a

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fraudulent election can enable citizens to overcome collective action problems associated with protesting against an unpopular regime. Perceptions of electoral fraud were the trigger for each of the colour revolution protests, which ultimately unseated incumbent authoritarian leaders in Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004 and Kyrgyzstan in 2005 (for more on protests, see Chapter 12).

Corruption in new democracies For many new democracies, there was little time to implement new mechanisms to prevent corruption after years of authoritarian rule. They faced intense competition to take over the state. This led to higher rates of corruption as parties and elites competed for lucrative state jobs and contracts. The dispersion of power in the hands of the many widened the opportunity for bribery. In many cases, democratizing countries were more corrupt than their authoritarian predecessors. Democratization only suppresses corruption once a democracy has reached a certain threshold. Thus, regimes that are in the process of democratizing face the double problem of not having the institutional strength to stave off corruption, while that corruption in turn depresses participation so citizens become increasingly disengaged. Democratizing regimes also get stuck in a cycle of corrupt activities leading to the rise of authoritarian populist leaders who claim they can end corruption, who in turn systematically weaken the very mechanisms that are in place to curb it. These authoritarian populist leaders also resort to corrupt practices themselves in order to collect the funds needed to pay for TV time and being perpetually on the campaign trail (Norris, 2017a).

Clientelism One of the most common forms of corruption in new democracies is clientelism, which is often a holdover from the previous authoritarian regime. Clientelism (or patron–clientelism) is a political system based on conditional loyalties and involving mutual benefits, in which individuals of unequal power are linked together through the exchange of favours. Favours include financial compensation, jobs, loans, scholarship and other forms of preferential treatment. Clientelism leads to an uneven and unfair distribution of economic goods, which leads to inefficiencies. This can result in large public deficits as parties and politicians divert public resources to invest in big patronage networks (Hicken and Simmons, 2008). This process is also often referred to as ‘patronage’ or the distribution of government jobs and other favours to political allies, irrespective of their qualifications. Rather than relying on rational, legitimate forms of governance based on the formation of sound policies, patron–clientelistic systems sustain loyalty through the selective and particular distribution of favours to loyal clients. This differs from ‘pork barrel policies’, which have been commonplace in developed democracies. With pork barrel legislation, an entire geographical constituency may benefit, and

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the relationship between the legislator and the constituents is less personalized. With patron–clientelism there are fewer recipients and the relationship is much more individualized and particular. Clientelism is often linked with countries that have weak administrative and political institutions. In these instances, new regimes that have low levels of nationalism, poor economic performance and weak leadership will rely on clientelistic practices in order to cultivate loyalty (Lemarchand, 1972). Without any legitimacy and weak institutions, leaders can build small winning coalitions based on steering benefits towards people of a similar ethnic group (when patron–clientelism takes place along ethnic lines it is referred to as pre-bendalism) (Van de Walle, 2003). The distribution of the spoils takes precedence over the formal functions of the state, which limits the ability of elected officials to make policies that serve the general interest (Rocha Menocal et al, 2008). The state in turn is often overwhelmed by constant demands and democratic pressures to which it cannot respond adequately. It lacks the institutional and administrative capacity, as well as the legitimacy and credibility needed to achieve important tasks. This leads to a growing dissatisfaction with democracy among the population, while perpetuating patron–client ties. In clientelistic societies, individuals who appear to be wealthy and generous win elections. Politicians use their office as a source of particularized benefits for constituents. Programmes that were supposed to resemble development projects actually deliver particularized benefits that go directly to partisan supporters. Supporters of a particular leader are more likely to receive land during land reforms, small loans from state banks, vouchers for free lunches or milk, scholarships, material to build houses, jobs and other opportunities to gain income, help with local problems and other handouts (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). Poverty feeds into clientelistic party machines, creating a cycle that is harmful for democratic consolidation and good governance. More impoverished people depend on handouts that are controlled and dispensed by the clientelistic networks of that party, reinforcing their election victories. Clientelism also undermines democratic principles of equality because some individuals in clientelistic systems benefit more than others (Keefer, 2007). Some citizens have access to political processes and resources, while others are excluded. When votes are secured through clientelistic practices, it is hard to discern political performance (Stokes et al, 2013). Instead of relying on political platforms, candidates are evaluated based on their character and their personal contacts. Political transactions are not about making campaign promises based on a platform of coherent policies, but about a concrete promise to provide private benefits to specific individuals. Elections are therefore not about voting for a party and its platform but about an exchange of favours that benefit the few. Additionally, voters’ ability to hold politicians accountable is undermined if some voters are dependent on the same politicians for their livelihoods.

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When citizens are aware that politics is completely transactional, it creates popular discontent and alienates citizens from the system (Booth and Seligson, 2009). Studies have shown that citizens actually favour policy-oriented politics to politics based on patron–clientelism (Manzetti and Wilson, 2007). Clientelism weakens the public’s interest in elections because citizens know that it is not a tool for political input or representation. As a result, clientelism can affect citizens’ evaluations of democracy and satisfaction with democracy (Fox, 1994; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Morris and Klesner, 2010; Hicken, 2011; Linde and Erlingsson, 2013). In contrast, the winners of clientelism will have relatively higher levels of satisfaction, though they are still less satisfied than voters in systems where citizens are treated equally (Karahan et al, 2006; Wang, 2018).

Case study: Nigeria and corruption After years of military rule, Nigeria moved to democratize in 1999 under the leadership of Olusegun Obasanjo. The first elections held were rife with fraud, but the 2011 and 2015 elections were deemed by international observers to be free and fair. But democracy in Nigeria is still incredibly flawed, weakened by persistent corruption and patron–clientelism. Corruption has been particularly bad in Nigeria, with possibly as much as $400 billion squandered since independence. During military rule, funds were diverted to private accounts and questionable contracts were awarded to companies owned by cronies of the regime. The military elites circumvented all the mechanisms that promoted accountability and focused on accumulating wealth (Agbiboa, 2012). While revenues went unaccounted for, 70 per cent of Nigerians continued to live in poverty. Holding the leadership accountable for its actions has been difficult in Nigeria. Politics is excessively personalized and not based on competing platforms. Instead, political elites in Nigeria vie for power in order to control the spoils of office. To win office, politicians rely on powerful ‘godfathers’ or ‘big men’ who sit atop vast patronage networks (Olarinmoye, 2008). The godfathers in Nigerian politics are power-brokers who work between the political parties and the voting public for a profit. Having no political interests of their own, they are entirely focused on self-enrichment. To help ensure electoral victories for their favoured candidates, they interfere in electoral processes. Every level of Nigerian politics has its own ‘big men’ and their supporters (Fagbadebo, 2007). Corruption and patron–clientelism have not allowed a vibrant political culture to develop. Political participation remains low since citizens do not have much efficacy or see how it is relevant in their lives. Because national policy is driven by elite relationships rather than the needs of the public, there are also high levels of disgust with the political system, yet little hope that it can be transformed or effort to do so.

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To address these problems, Obasanjo embarked on a fight against corruption, implementing civil service reforms and promoting more technocrats within the government. President Muhammadu Buhari (2015–) campaigned for office on the promise that he would tackle corruption. In spite of these efforts, Nigeria’s democracy remains vulnerable. Patron– clientelism is still more important than the rule of law and functioning political institutions (Fagbadebo, 2020).

Conclusion Corruption is detrimental to society in a number of ways. It disproportionately benefits the rich at the expense of the poor and middle classes. It misallocates valuable resources and leads to waste and inefficiencies. It is also profoundly unfair and violates citizens’ sense of justice. This chapter described the various types of corruption that affect countries, but highlighted that the abuse of power for personal gain by the executive has an especially negative impact on democracies. Abuse of power indicates that the executive is above the law and that mechanisms of accountability are broken. Political corruption often goes hand in hand with judicial corruption (which is where judicial decisions are arbitrary, up for sale or susceptible to influence). With a pliant judiciary, the executive is free to carry out abuses of power with impunity. In many cases this means executives make decisions that enrich themselves, their cronies and their family, to the detriment of the public; this is called grand corruption. However, petty corruption, or administrative corruption, also impacts citizens. Though grand corruption is much more damaging, it is less likely that citizens will be directly affected by it. Citizens are more likely to encounter petty corruption, which as this chapter explained, has a negative effect on individuals’ support for democracy, and levels of political trust and social trust. In addition to depressing support for democracy and trust, corruption also can lead to apathy and low voter turnout. Corruption also breeds frustration, disillusionment and cynicism. In some cases, it can lead to alternative forms of participation, such as protests, which an outraged public may consider more effective to voting. However, not all citizens have the energy or are willing to take on the risks involved in engaging in alternative forms of participation. More often than not, citizens deal with corruption with resignation and disengagement. Other times corruption has drawn citizens to support radical alternatives or populist leaders. This brings us to the next chapter, which discusses the role of populist leadership. The previous two chapters laid out the context in which democratic decay can happen, or the conditions that cause a shift in support for alternatives to democratic rule. Some of these conditions have an indirect effect on democratic backsliding and others have a more direct impact. The dynamics and pressures

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from globalization along with the perception of rising corruption levels is the perfect situation for a political entrepreneur to exploit. Both breed discontent, frustration, mistrust, polarization and apathy. The public is in a vulnerable state and more likely to question whether or not democratic governance is the solution. However, citizens cannot change the constitution or undermine institutions on their own. It is critical that the leadership (both a populist authoritarian and compliant political elites) takes advantage of these vulnerabilities in the public’s psyche to engineer power grabs that either go unnoticed or have the public’s consent. The following chapter explains what we mean by populist authoritarian leadership and how this style of leadership is best suited to erode democracy. KEY QUESTIONS 1. Is grand corruption more problematic for democracy than petty corruption? Why or why not? 2. Why are new democracies more prone to corruption? What is it about the democratization process that is so destabilizing? 3. Can a country be democratic and be also highly corrupt? Are there any examples that defy expectations? 4. Why does patron–clientelism constitute a form of corruption? How does patron– clientelism undermine democracy in Nigeria? 5. Does corruption activate citizens or make them apathetic? What are the reasons for this?

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Authoritarian Populism Introduction Since the 2010s we have seen a rise in authoritarian populism, a style of political leadership and political force that has generated new challenges for democracy (Norris and Inglehart, 2019). Previous chapters explained how the perception of rising levels of corruption, unemployment, inequality and migration have caused citizens in democracies to be concerned that the world is in crisis. This is where populist authoritarianism comes in. The rhetoric of populist authoritarian leadership claims that democratic institutions and freedoms are what is standing in the way of resolving crises. Though populist leaders do not usually directly attack democracy, they delegitimize the institutions of accountability (see Chapters 9, 10 and 11). This chapter explains the concept of authoritarian populism (both left- and right-wing) and explores the role of populist leaders in shaping authoritarian narratives and fostering polarizing environments on which they can capitalize. This chapter begins by outlining the strength of populism around the world. Since the 1980s, populist parties have gained a sizable vote share in Western Europe and the Americas by tapping into fears of immigration, xenophobia and corruption. We then define what populism is and explain how populist leaders activate populist attitudes. After doing so, the chapter lays out the arguments for why populism is at odds with liberal democracy. We conclude by looking at populism in Latin America and Africa – exploring the prevalence of populist styles of leadership in Latin America and their relative absence in Africa.

Strength of populism around the world In 2012, José Manuel Barroso head of the European Commission (2004–2014) claimed his biggest concern was the rise of populist movements in Europe (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014). Populism has attracted more global attention than ever due to the rise of the likes of Donald Trump in the US and Marine

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Le Pen in France. Though the latter failed to win the presidency, her popularity catapulted her to the final stage of the French presidential election in 2017. Populist parties and their leaders have been gaining traction in Europe and the United States for some time now. In fact, the average vote share of populist parties in national and European parliamentary elections has more than doubled since the 1960s, from around 5.1 per cent to 13.2 per cent, while their share of seats has tripled from 3.8 per cent to 12.8 per cent. The mean share of the vote for populist left parties rose from 2.4 per cent in the 1960s to 12.7 per cent in 2010s, while their share of seats increased from 0.12 per cent to 11.5 per cent during the same time period. Between 1990 and 2018, the number of populists in power around the world increased fivefold, from four to twenty (Inglehart and Norris, 2016). Populism in Europe is often equated with ‘nativism’, or opposition to immigration, with seventy-four out of 102 populist parties being recorded as nativist. In Europe, one of the first parties to establish a doctrine of differentialist racism was the National Front in France, formed in 1972 under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen. The party espoused a version of French nationalism that played on people’s fears that Europeans faced extinction due to migration and low population growth rates. The party would gain national attention by 1984 and in 2002, Le Pen was the first National Front candidate to compete in the second round of a national presidential election. Though the National Front has never won a majority in the legislature, it received 13 per cent of the votes in the 2017 parliamentary election. The Swiss People’s Party (SVP) also gained attention in the 1990s when it started to make impressive electoral gains in local and national elections. Its popularity was also rooted in cultural intolerance, with it claiming that Islam was an obstacle to integration and that multi-culturalism could not work. The party originally catered to farmers in rural areas, but under the leadership of Christoph Blocher it changed its strategy to focus on the defence of Swiss values and on attacking European integration. It has been a dominant party in Swiss politics, and won a plurality of the votes in the 2015 elections. Austria has also seen the right-wing populist Freedom Party of Austria gain popularity, winning 20 per cent of the vote in the 2013 election. In Eastern Europe, right wing and right-wing populist parties have emerged and gained popularity. In the post-communist era in Hungary, Fidesz gained popularity by amplifying anti-elitist, anti-immigration sentiments and stressing the importance of being an ethnic Hungarian. The Hungarian right has been outspoken in the defence of national values while portraying the left as socialist, internationalist and cosmopolitan. Elections became increasingly polarizing, campaigns became much dirtier and more negative, and ordinary citizens felt the need to take sides in every realm of life (Palonen, 2009). More worrisome is the success of neo-fascist party Jobbik (an anti-Semitic and anti-Roma party) which pushes the ruling Fidesz party even further to the right, leading to antimigration policies. Fidesz leader Viktor Orbán has also courted the governments

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of the authoritarian states such as Russia, Azerbaijan and China, much to the consternation of other European states (Ostrow, 2014). There are similar concerns about the direction of Poland under the Law and Justice Party. Surprisingly, Scandinavia has also seen the rise of far-right populist parties. The Progressive Party of Norway has formed a coalition with the Conservative Party, and holds twenty-nine of 169 seats. The Swedish Democrats in Sweden hold forty-nine out of 349 seats. The Finns Party or True Finns Party in Finland was part of the ruling coalition until members defected from the coalition in 2017. The Danish People’s Party in Denmark gained 20 per cent of the vote in the 2015 election, its best showing to date. Many of these parties have gained popularity for focusing on issues of immigration, particularly from Muslim countries. In the 1980s, the Danish People’s Party gained attention for wanting to make Denmark a Muslim-free zone (Rydgren, 2004). Similar calls have come from the Lega Nord and the Five Star Movement in Italy, the PVV in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom Independent Party (UKIP) and, until 2004, the Vlaams Blok in Belgium (Kendall-Taylor et al, 2019). Even in countries without a substantial amount of populist representation, populist parties exert influence on mainstream parties, applying pressure on them, changing the public discourse and polarizing the political sphere more and more. The UKIP played a pivotal role in catalysing the UK’s exit from the European Union (Norris and Inglehart, 2016). Led by Nigel Farage, the party exerted influence on the governing Conservative Party to hold a referendum on remaining in the EU. Seizing on people’s fears and lack of understanding of the EU, UKIP pushed Conservative Party leader David Cameron to make the fateful decision to allow a referendum, with disastrous consequences for Cameron (he resigned) and those who wished to remain. For the most part, populist candidates in Western Europe have struggled to gain as much power as populists elsewhere. This may be in part because most European countries still use parliamentary systems, which, unlike presidential systems in which the leader is directly elected by the people, do not facilitate the rise of outsiders and where the direct election helps to justify popular mandates. Additionally, having to form a coalition government makes it more difficult for populists to undermine traditional institutional channels of governance. Presidential systems tend to give leaders more unconstrained political power (Fish, 2001; Van de Walle, 2003). In spite of this, Western European populists have wielded influence by fostering polarization. Populism in Latin America appeared to be waning, but with the election of Jair Bolsonaro, it is making a comeback (see case study at the end of this chapter). In Venezuela, Hugo Chávez handed over power to Nicolás Maduro, who is now a full-blown authoritarian. Other Latin American populists include Evo Morales, who only recently fell from power in Bolivia, and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. In Asia, populist leaders have taken over in India (Narendra Modi), Pakistan (Imran Khan), Sri  Lanka (the Rajapaksa brothers), Indonesia (Joko

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Widodo) and the Philippines (Rodrigo Duterte). Though the military now controls Thailand, populist President Thaksin Shinawatra (2001–2006) and his sister Yingluck Shinawatra (2011–2014) were also noted populists. In the Middle East, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey and Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel are considered populists, while in the US Donald Trump embraced his populist appeal. This trend has not emerged thus far in Africa, where the few countries where populism has gained traction have embraced the left-wing variety. We explain later in the chapter why populism has not worked in Africa (with a few exceptions). In fact, Africa is one of the few regions where populist power grabs are not the main driver of democratic backsliding (and breakdown).1

Key concepts: what is populism? Populism is a slippery concept that has been mostly used pejoratively to describe politics that is anti-establishment and anti-elite. Though the concept encompasses many different things, at its core is the belief that the institutions of classical liberal democracy cannot express the true will of the people (Seligson, 2007). Populism aims to tap into the will of the people by advocating an ideology that may include an eclectic mix of right- and left-wing discourse (Mudde, 2004). The term populism comes from the Latin ‘populus’ (or the people), but it came into broader use in the 1950s when Latin American scholars adopted the concept of populism to describe a style of leadership that characterized many Latin American leaders, such as Juan Perón in Argentina and Getúlio Vargas in Brazil. Even earlier examples of populism include the US agrarian movement that founded the People’s Party, and later supported the 1896 candidacy of William Jennings Bryan; and the Narodnik movement in Russia to overthrow the Tsar in the nineteenth century. Thus, populism is nothing new and may come in waves (Akkerman, 2003; Varentsova, 2014). In Latin America, waves of left-wing populist movements have been followed by waves of right-wing military dictatorships. Populism has since attracted plenty of scholarly attention. Some studies have looked how populism has had a mostly negative impact on economic development (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1991). Other studies have focused on the common characteristics of populist leaders (Van der Brug and Mughan, 2007) and the ideology they tend to promote (Stanley, 2008). But more recent studies have investigated the negative impact of populism on democracy (Canovan, 1999; Panizza, 2005; Abts and Rummens, 2007; Kriesi, 2014). While this is contested, we take the view that populism is detrimental to democracy. We justify this in more detail later on in the chapter.

Populist leaders As the chapter argues, populism without a leader is a social movement. We therefore see populism as a mobilization of people around a personality-centred

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movement that is often, though not always, led by a charismatic leader who inflates societal demands for their own personal gain. The parties of these movements are often hierarchical in structure and built around one person, who is usually male (some counter examples are Eva Perón of Argentina and Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan). Though having a charismatic leader at the helm is not necessary, populist parties with charismatic leaders tend to be more successful (Pappas, 2016). Populist leaders build themselves up as an embodiment of the true people. For example, Chávez used ‘¡Chávez es Pueblo!’ (Chávez is the people!) as a slogan. Alberto Fujimori of Peru used the slogan, ‘Fujimori, presidente como usted’ (Fujimori, a president like you). Populist leaders oscillate between presenting themselves as a saviour to the masses and the embodiment of the common man – someone who would be willing to meet supporters in beer halls and pubs. To connect with people, populist leaders use a simplistic communication style with direct language that appeals to common sense (Taggart, 2002; Tarchi, 2002). The populist leader offers incredibly simple solutions to complex problems while also denouncing intellectuals and elitism. They do so while decrying political correctness and expert knowledge, which is associated with elites. Populist leaders try to connect with the culture of ordinariness and promote their lack of political knowledge and expertise as an asset, not a weakness. Populist leaders may also engage in style switching, or using inappropriate, vulgar and informal language in public situations in order to connect with voters (Labov, 1973). In the Philippines, Duterte’s use of colourful language while on the campaign trail was taken as a sign of his authenticity to voters. The more he cursed, the more the crowd was entertained (Ranada, 2016). Jair Bolsonaro is also known for his plain talking style. His alarming statements in support of military rule and denigration of minorities has attracted the conservative elements of Brazilian society that laud his honesty (Financial Times, 2020). Populists break onto the scene by pointing to the flaws in the established system. The elites are painted as a self-serving cartel that controls the apparatus of the state and has neglected the common man. Populists argue that the nation’s former politicians are part of a corrupt elite that has been condescending and unrepresentative of the true people. The populist leader, on the other hand, has no links to the establishment. Populists advocate overturning the political establishment but have no answer about what should replace it. They promise fantasies and vague policy initiatives, that in many cases are impossible to carry out. The rise of Fujimori of Peru in 1990 illustrates this. Fujimori emerged at a time when the alternative seemed unattractive. He made few concrete promises and presented himself as an outsider with no links to the corrupt elite (Crabtree, 2000). In the US, the appeal of Donald Trump (see Box 8.1), and Ross Perot before him, was grounded in the idea that neither candidate had any political experience. Their appeal is in their ability to skilfully spout out rhetoric that attacks the establishment.

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Box 8.1: Donald Trump The rise of Donald Trump seemed impossible. Mostly known as a flashy billionaire and the host of the reality TV show The Apprentice, Trump had no political experience and seemed to have too many skeletons in his closet to run for president. Married three times, caught on tape bragging about sexual assault, referring to (some) Mexicans as rapists and criminals and calling for a ban on Muslims, Trump was far from being politically correct or the ideal candidate for the Republican Party, a party that championed ‘family values’. As the personal character of a US presidential candidate has become increasingly important, Trump had many vulnerabilities that neither his Republican primary competitors, nor his Democratic rival Hillary Clinton were able to exploit (Campbell and Cowley, 2014). Though Trump lost the popular vote, with 62.9 million votes (46.1 per cent) compared to Clinton’s 65.8 million votes (48.2 per cent), he won the Electoral College with 304 electors to 227 and was inaugurated as the 45th president of the United States in 2017. How did an outsider win? Though unthinkable for most candidates, Trump’s political incorrectness played into the public’s xenophobic fears of Muslims and Mexicans. He championed the fact that he was a Washington outsider, demonizing the corrupt establishment and promoting theories that the whole system was ‘rigged’ against him. He catered to the heartland, voters who felt they had been neglected by the previous administration and were deeply concerned about the US’s changing demographics. Trump also benefited from the strength of pre-existing organizations that demonized immigrants (Skocpol and Williamson, 2012). Education also played an important role in Trump’s win. The counties with the least educated voters went for Trump while the counties with the most educated voters backed Clinton. According to Pew Research (Tyson and Maniam, 2016), 67 per cent of those without a college degree voted for Trump, while 28 per cent of them voted for Clinton – the largest gap in this demographic since 1980. Trump also resonated with older white people. His greatest support group were white males aged 45–64, but overall he had support from both white males and white females. In fact, 53 per cent of white women voted for Trump, which was similar to the support level for Republican candidate Mitt Romney in the 2012 election. Trump also benefited from the media’s constant focus on him during the campaign. Trump’s rhetoric gained mass attention from all media outlets (Azari, 2016). The media was fascinated by his antics, giving him nearly $5 billion in free airtime (Stewart, 2016). But it was the Fox News morning show Fox and Friends that served as a promotional platform for Trump since as far back as 2011, when he started regularly calling in to the show. He used the show to reach a mass audience of sympathetic Fox viewers and test out his talking points, with no pushback from the hosts (Wemple, 2017).

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Though Trump’s rhetoric echoed the likes of Nigel Farage in Britain and Marine Le Pen in France, his relationship with the media was more like that of Hugo Chávez of Venezuela. Like Chávez, Trump loves media attention. But after Trump was elected, like Chávez, he attacked the media if they dared to criticize him. He has regularly referred to the media as corrupt and dishonest. The global cable news organization CNN was dismissed as ‘fake news’ (Kurtzleben, 2017). In July 2017, he posted a doctored video clip showing him mashing the head of a figure, representing CNN (Nakamura et al, 2017). He referred to MSNBC media personalities as ‘low IQ’ and ‘crazy’ on Twitter (ABC News, 2017). Trump forged links with the public through his constant activity on Twitter, which provided him with a platform to directly connect with his supporters. Trump has about 30 million followers on the platform, though about half are reportedly fake (Bort, 2017). Regardless, Trump thrives on the charismatic leader–follower relationship he has formed with his supporters. While in office, Trump tried to fulfil some of the promises he made to his support group during the campaign, but he was mostly interested in campaigning for the 2020 election (Kendall-Taylor et al, 2019). Trump’s addiction to campaigning is one of the few ways he interacted with the democratic process. For the most part, his win has been disastrous for democracy. In addition to attacking the media, Trump has attempted to install lackeys in the judiciary, surrounded himself with loyalists and blatantly disregarded the rule of law. Attempts made by Congress to check the executive were met by stonewall tactics, such as refusing to comply with subpoenas during his impeachment investigation. He appears to have little interest in or respect for democratic political traditions (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2016; Highton, 2017; Mickey et al, 2017; Superville and Swanson, 2017). For example, Trump has refused to divest from his holdings and place his assets in a blind trust, and to release his tax returns to the public. Foreign governments and entities stayed at Trump hotels, lining Trump’s pockets and attempting to curry favour with him. Trump attempted to obstruct justice by smearing and trying to stop Robert Mueller’s investigation into Russian collusion with the Trump campaign in the 2016 election. Trump also attempted to extort Ukraine – withholding congressionally authorized military assistance – to get the country to smear his domestic political rival. Trump accused Congress of attempting a coup for exercising its constitutional obligation to pursue an impeachment inquiry, and worked with a pliant Senate to ensure a cooked impeachment trial (Sharman and Buncombe, 2019). For Trump, anyone who opposes him is an enemy of America, because he thinks of himself as synonymous with the state (Kendall‑Taylor et al, 2019).

Populist leaders also depend on the modern use of the media (Krämer, 2014; Rooduijn et al, 2014; Reinemann et al, 2019). Populist politicians are usually well-trained as media personalities, know how to use spin and have a certain image that is appealing to their supporters. Television provides the perfect stage

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for populist actors to vocalize their viewpoints (Mudde, 2004). By doing so, the media legitimizes the issues raised by the populist leaders and helps diffuse populist ideas. Populist leaders have also been adept at using communication strategies that ensure media coverage. Some of these include playing the role of the underdog, holding huge rallies, staging massive events and even tactically attacking the media to get a reaction. Populists emphasize direct and unmediated communication with their supporters (see Chapter 9). For example, Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán is interviewed on the radio every Friday to maintain a direction connection to the people. Similarly, Chávez hosted Aló Presidente, a television show where ordinary citizens could call in to raise their concerns with him directly. Populist leaders also feed off the changed role of the media in democracies around the world. The rise in the importance of social media (see Chapter 5) has helped explain the growing role of populism. Social media is another powerful tool populists use to make a direct connection with their supporters. As populists aim to create a close connection to the public, social media provides a shortcut that populist leaders can use, helping them bypass traditional media that may have to adhere to professional norms (Kriesi, 2014). For example, in the Philippines, Duterte has used social media to rail against a corrupt elite, drug dealers and drug addicts. Populist leaders can pursue a hybrid communication strategy of using both the mass media and social media. The simple populist message works well in both mediums, but is especially effective on social media (Engesser et al, 2017). Populist leaders also win support from individuals who are hostile to mainstream media (Müller et al, 2017).

Populist ideology Populism is generally thin on ideology and attaches itself to other ideologies, such as nationalism, socialism or conservatism (Pauwels, 2011). Policies tend to be opportunistic and popular, such as lowering taxes or giving handouts. Populist leaders may initially try to appeal to a multi-class coalition of voters or to a group that has been neglected by political elites. Populism also has the potential to cut across traditional left–right cleavages, sometimes creating new cleavages. Populist leaders home in on pre-existing societal needs and demands but inflate them to create a crisis (Roberts, 1995). They use highly emotional discourse, based on gut feelings. Populism revolves around promoting narratives that are polarizing. Chapter 3 described how polarization is potentially damaging to democracy. Populist leaders rarely create social cleavages from scratch, but they are able to exploit and stoke divisions that have been simmering under the surface. Populists dramatize these divisions and elevate them to a matter of national urgency. Opponents are not adversaries but profound threats and enemies of the people. This eliminates the possibility of compromise – opponents cannot be worked with because they

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are ‘evil’ in the populist’s eyes. This also undermines the politics of pluralism, because it becomes a battle of us versus them. As previously explained, one of the most common antagonistic relationships created is of the people versus the elites (Canovan, 2002; Taggart, 2002; Mudde, 2004). Elites are alienated from the general public and its values. Populist groups gain support using antiestablishment movements directed against elites (Butterwegge, 1996). The other antagonistic relationship is between natives and ‘foreigners’. Populist ideology, whether left- or right-wing, has often used nativist rhetoric and xenophobic discourse. Both left- and right-wing populists focus on a crisis that needs to be urgently resolved. They only differ in whom they blame. While leftwing populists rally against Western imperialism and foreign business interests, right-wing populists focus on demonizing immigrants and foreigners, ethnic and religious minorities and/or other ‘undesirables’. Cosmopolitan elites who have enabled too much multi-culturalism are also a target. Right-wing populists aim to purge the country of these groups and believe in strong and tough leadership that does not shy away from political incorrectness. Right-wing populists also tap into anger and resentment to activate citizens’ fears about losing their status in society to immigrants, refugees and other minorities. Right-wing populists play into citizens’ anxieties about safety and the need for punitive politics. They want to promote short-term solutions to complicated problems, even at the expense of human rights. They also want limit who can legitimately participate in politics and change the distribution of power in society. The radical right in Eastern and Western Europe has emphasized mobilization against minorities – until 2015 the targets were mostly minorities with electoral rights who had been settled in Eastern Europe for many years. However, the millions of refugees entering Europe since 2015 have led to a backlash against those with non-European backgrounds, particularly Muslims. European populists are upset about the perceived increases in migration and refugee inflows, and about attacks on sovereignty. Right-wing populist parties in Europe propose a model of democracy that excludes other ethnic groups (Mudde, 2010). Rightwing populists in Europe oppose the EU, equal rights for ethnic, social and sexual minorities and any form of liberal democracy that they feel supports diversity. Some right-wing populist parties want to protect the market from volatility, increase social spending and reduce foreign involvement and ownership, but they do not always have a clear ideology (Bustikova and Kitschelt, 2009). Left-wing populists focus on poverty and inequality, and attack the established political classes as self-serving and privileged. They try to identify with ordinary people and groups that have been previously marginalized. Latin American populist leaders such as Chávez and Morales emphasized their indigenous heritage. Though left-wing populism proposes an agenda that is supposedly pro-poor, it does not have a track record of lifting the masses out of poverty. Left-wing populists advocate on behalf of the poor, but then find scapegoats for

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why poverty has not been alleviated and use this to justify remaining in power indefinitely (Weyland, 2013). In Thailand, Thaksin valorized the poor with policies that were aimed at helping them, but he also enriched himself and made the middle class feel excluded (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2008). In the Philippines, former movie star Joseph Estrada won the presidential election by campaigning as a pro-poor, approachable candidate. He claimed to be the champion of the poor, but lacked the know-how and experience to actually help them. A programme to provide extra services to the poorest towns fell apart because it was put together too quickly. The middle class were resentful and Estrada was forced from office (Case, 2017). The case of Venezuela also illustrates this. Chávez gained attention in part for being an advocate for the poor. He created social missions that targeted the poor, bypassing the traditional institutions of the state and financing them from the presidential office directly. Some of these missions dealt with important areas, such as healthcare programmes, expanding primary school, distributing subsidized food and providing housing services. World Bank figures indicated that Venezuela’s poverty rate fell from 55.4 per cent of the population in 2002 to 28.5 per cent in 2009. Indeed, poverty was reduced when oil prices were high, but the dependency on oil and minerals became much worse, which meant that poverty levels would increase if oil prices dropped. Between 1998 and 2019 the percentage of Venezuela’s export earnings derived from oil increased from 68.7 per cent to 96 per cent (Hetland, 2016, 9). When oil prices started to fall, poverty in Venezuela jumped from 24 per cent in 2012 to 32 per cent in 2013. By 2019, another study concluded that 64.8 per cent of Venezuelans were poor, going by their incomes, access to education and access to public services (Reuters, 2020). As of 2020, Venezuela is in a dire situation with some citizens facing starvation. Both left- and right-wing populists are adept at linking failures in one policy area to failures in another, making them appear part of a broad and systematic chain of unfulfilled demands. For example, populists may couple elites’ failure to address public concerns about immigration with their failure to address people’s worries about crime and/or welfare spending. Yet populist regimes offer few concrete solutions. They eschew developmental planning or longterm investment because it requires too much technocratic know-how and involvement of the state. Almost all of their promises are short-term fixes that include handouts and the creation of jobs that serve little function to the state or development. Though this appeals to the interests of the general public, there are few winners under populist leadership in the long term.

Activating populist attitudes It’s difficult to determine the exact cause of populist movements. Scholars have posited that populist attitudes could be widespread but vary within populations,

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but it is not entirely clear what causes the variation (for more on the populist voter, see Box 8.2). Thus, there is little academic consensus on whether or not populism is driven by the demand for populism or the supply provided by populist leadership (Beauzamy, 2013). Demand side models claim that populist support is due to rising inequality, unemployment and marginalization (O’Connor, 2017; Pastor and Veronesi, 2018). Other demand side models claim that populism is due to anti-immigration feelings, racial prejudices (Veugelers and Magnan, 2005; Kaufmann, 2018; Norris and Inglehart, 2019) and authoritarian personalities (Herbert and McGann, 1995). These issues were addressed in detail in Chapters 5 and 6. Additional factors that may drive populist support are institutional crises. As Chapter 11 explains, populism is to some extent a result of the failure of political parties to accurately represent the public. For example, in Venezuela, Chávez (2000–2013) emerged at a time when the political parties had ossified and the Punto Fijo Pact, a consensual power sharing deal between the two main parties, had crumbled. Populist leadership seizes upon openings created by an institutional vacuum in order to make direct connections with supporters. In Europe, one of the biggest shifts that explains populist support is the decline in class voting, class-based parties and mass membership in traditional organizations (Bornschier and Kriesi, 2013). The development towards a postindustrial society has de-aligned many voters, increased the importance of divisions and thereby created space for new, less ideological parties. Organized labour groups used to be better organized than middle-class groups and almost always supported left-based parties. Left-wing parties supported the redistribution of wealth to decrease income inequality. But class voting has dissipated, becoming half as strong as it was in the 1950s. As a result, social safety nets have also been dismantled. Additionally, in response to large immigration flows from lowincome countries with different cultures and religions, many of the working class moved to the right in defence of traditional values. As a result of these changes, non-economic issues have dominated party platforms since the 2000s. Populism in Latin America emerged not due to a decline in class-based parties, but because class-based parties never truly materialized (for more on populism in Latin America, see the case study ‘Populism in Latin America and Africa’ in this chapter). In the post-1930s transition from oligarchic rule to mass politics, oligarchic parties were not able to represent the masses. The absence of any party to represent the masses was taken advantage of by populist leaders and parties. These populist parties tried to incorporate the working and lower classes, who had been neglected by the oligarchy. Populism is also more likely to emerge when the state is in crisis not just politically, but economically as well. Populism gained popularity again after the 1982 debt crisis. This presented another opening for political outsiders who tapped into frustrations and connected directly to unorganized mass constituencies. Renewed populist mobilization occurred again after the failure

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of the Washington Consensus (Seligson, 2007). More recently, Evo Morales in Bolivia and Rafael Correa of Correa both came to power amid a major crisis and backlash against neo-liberal policies. Additional factors such as the perception of crises and corruption scandals are an important backdrop to the rise of populist movements, as are the long-term forces of socialization and personality (Bakker et al, 2015). Yet these factors on their own are not sufficient to explain the rise of populist movements. Supply-side explanations argue that populist leaders are to blame for the rise in populism. Populist movements are consolidated by populist leaders who focus on a crisis. This provides a pretext for unconstrained leadership as the public is reminded that it is only strong leadership that can extract the nation from crisis. The populist leader seizes upon public anxieties and discontent, intentionally fosters polarization and takes advantage of citizen apathy. In a polarized society (see Chapter 3), views are so vastly different that individuals are willing to support non-democratic alternatives if it prevents the opposition from gaining power, while apathetic citizens are willing to turn the other way to this. The populist leader then takes advantage of this volatile context to justify a power grab, usually with public support. In the Philippines, Duterte has manufactured a growing and urgent drug crisis. Though there is a drug problem in the Philippines, it is not severe and statistics showed that both drug abuse and crime had been falling (Baldwin and Marshall, 2016). Duterte has exaggerated the number of drug users and drug dealers to almost double the government estimate (Thompson, 2016). He warned the public that eradicating the problem properly would come at the price of civil rights (Curato, 2016). Despite threatening martial law, Duterte’s popularity soared to 90 per cent. The first power grab may break with democratic precedent, but take place through legal channels such as referenda. Legislative majorities and politicized courts lean in the leader’s direction, facilitating this process. Once enough power has accumulated both informally and formally, the threat from the leader to any non-compliant elites becomes more credible (Svolik, 2012). Populist leaders then attempt to skew the electoral playing field, controlling the electoral commissions and using state media to their advantage (Levitsky and Loxton, 2013). Ultimately, the populist leader wants to fragment civil society and erode collective identities in order to establish vertical and unmediated relationships with the masses (Weyland, 2001; Mudde, 2004; Hawkins, 2009). The populist leader then continues to foster norms and values that are hostile to democracy, mobilizing in a top-down fashion. There are many examples of crises that have taken place without populist movements emerging, because there was no mobilizing resource to lead a movement. Populist movements depend on leaders who can articulate the populist message, frame the crisis, assign blame and offer themselves as a panacea (Bakker et al, 2016). For example, as Chapter 4 explained, there are many personality traits, which exist as latent dispositions that are only activated by context and by

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leadership (Feldman and Stenner, 1997; Hetherington and Weiler, 2009; Mondak et al, 2010). Populist leaders may for example, reinforce pre-existing xenophobic sentiments for political gain (Betz, 2018).

Box 8.2: Who is the populist voter? People who identify with a group that has the perception of being neglected by the establishment find a safe haven in populism. While right-wing populism attracts groups that feel that their ethnicity or nation have been ignored, left-wing populism attracts a class of individuals who have been left behind (Kriesi, 2014). Thus, left-wing populism has tended to attract the poor and low-income workers, though historically it has attempted to appeal to a multi-class coalition (Roberts, 2003). Right-wing populism tends to attract older voters as well, though left-wing forms of populism have attracted both younger and older people. Right-wing populist groups do not tend to attract younger voters, even though unemployment levels are higher among young people. Empirical research clearly shows that workers and the ‘old’ middle classes are more likely to support right-wing populist parties (Lubbers et al, 2002; Ivarsflaten, 2005; Norris, 2005). Income is not an important indicator of who supports populism. While left-wing populism typically targets the poor, right-wing populism usually aims to win the support of multiple classes. Venezuela’s urban poor constituted Chávez’s initial base of support (Canache, 2004). However, he had a multi-class base, like other populist leaders in the region did. His rhetoric was aimed at the lower classes, but he also attracted support from the middle classes by pursuing distribution policies, such as lowering utility prices, that benefited them (Lupu, 2010). In the Philippines, unlike previous populist President Joseph Estrada (1998–2001), Duterte mostly draws his support from the elite and middle classes, not the poor (Teehankee and Thompson, 2016). Right-wing populism does not attract the wealthy, but it also does not necessarily attract the poorest people (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013). Right-wing populism has more support from owners of small businesses than from poorly paid manual workers (Inglehart and Norris, 2017). Moreover, though women are poorer than men, they are less likely to vote for populists. While left-wing populism can attract both sexes, right-wing populism is more likely to resonate with men (Givens, 2004). Among economic indicators, unemployment is more of a factor than income. Though the countries that have the highest levels of unemployment do not have the highest percentage of populist voters, unemployment levels do matter. Whether or not someone is employed impacts whether they will vote for a right-wing populist party. Socially disadvantaged groups are most likely to blame ethnic minorities and immigrants for their deteriorating incomes, loss of jobs and dwindling welfare services (Betz, 2018). Right-wing populist parties may attack governments for failing to provide the prosperity that was once enjoyed by post-

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war societies. Many centre-left parties have failed to adequately address these issues, and right-wing populist parties have capitalized on this. In sum, populist messages try to trigger emotions and these messages tend to resonate with individuals who are more politically cynical and frustrated (Bos et al, 2013; Hameleers et al, 2017). Furthermore, individuals who identify with being wrongfully oppressed (this includes the far right responding to political correctness), find populist messages to be particularly appealing.

Populist leadership and assaults on democracy Populism by definition is at odds with liberal democracy. Scholars are in disagreement regarding the extent to which populism is bad for democracy, but the form of populism that has emerged in the last century has mostly had negative consequences. Some scholars have even referred to populism as a democratic malformation, a disease or a dangerous force (Betz, 1994; Rosanvallon, 2011). Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Erica Frantz write that populism opposes the ‘representative nature of modern democracies, the protection of the rights of minorities, and the constraints to the sovereignty of the people, a distinctive feature of globalization’. By their accounting, populist movements have caused 40 per cent of the failures of democracy from 2000 to 2010 (Kendall-Taylor and Frantz, 2016). Compromise, negotiation and accommodation are eschewed in favour of the need for charismatic leadership that can speak out and act on the behalf of people. Populists may be justified in criticizing the gaps between the government and the governed, but they propose an authoritarian solution to overcome this. Populists create a façade of more democracy, while simultaneously destroying independent and objective institutions that are essential to democracy. Populist leaders want to create direct linkages with supporters, unmediated by a political party, civil society groups or the media. They see democratic institutions as an obstacle to creating these personal connections. Populist parties promote the idea that ordinary people can challenge the current political establishment that has neglected them, and that nothing should constrain the will of the people. But under populist leadership, people do not drive decisions, they are the object of strategies. In reality, the vague policy goals of the populist are not up for debate. Participatory and majoritarian concepts of democracy are emphasized at the expense of deliberative, liberal and egalitarian models of democracy and constitutionalism. The notions of popular sovereignty and majority rule are invoked in order to attack the institutions and practices of political representation (Rosanvallon and Goldhammer, 2008). Thus, populists promote the notion that

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whoever has the majority should be able to rule unfettered by institutions, checks and balances. Because of the urgency of the manufactured crisis, there is no patience for procedures, rules and the protection of individual rights. Populist leaders believe that there is no room for debate about policy ideas because there is only one solution. The opposition is delegitimized as wanting to constrain the true will of the people. When the majority takes on an ethnic dimension, this provides justification for ethnic majority groups to rule over minority groups. In Hungary in 2010, Orbán’s Fidesz party won two-thirds of the seats in parliament, which he has referred to as his ‘two-thirds revolution’. Orbán interpreted this outcome as a mandate to give him increased executive power (Krekó and Enyedi, 2018). There is also little rhetoric about equality and civil liberties because the populist leader believes that anyone who dares to disagree with them is disloyal. Populist leaders also go after NGOs and civil society if these groups are not supportive of their agendas. When it comes to the media, populist leaders have a love–hate relationship. They adore the attention, but will lash out at the media when criticized. Many Latin American left-wing populist regimes were particularly tough on the media after initially embracing the attention (see Chapter 9). Populist leaders may also try to weaken judicial institutions by packing the courts with politically pliable judges. The courts may also be a source of patronage for the populist leader to deliver goods to supporters. In Argentina under President Carlos Menem, the courts were undermined by his deliberate selection of politically loyal judges. This ensured that court rulings were always friendly towards his regime. Under Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952–1970), Egyptian courts were stymied by his deliberate selection of politically loyal judges. As a result, the rule of law was weakened and a host of government abuses took place with impunity (Ezrow and Frantz, 2013). Populist leaders may also try to hollow out the administrative institutions, which has direct consequences on the functioning of the economy and the types of economic policies favoured. The economic policies of a populist regime are focused primarily on distributing patronage (Roberts, 1995, 88). From this perspective, populist leaders are not focused on economic growth through stimulating entrepreneurship, instead favouring nationalization of industries in order to keep employment levels high (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1990). Because the policies are distributional, there is no urgent need for an effective bureaucracy. The bureaucracy becomes a large resource that the populist leader can use to distribute patronage to his or her constituents and main support groups. For example, Zulfikar Bhutto (1971–1977) weakened the Pakistani state by appointing a large number of loyal cronies to top government and party positions (Ellner, 2003, 149). The populist leader also tries to circumvent administrative institutions in order to deliver goods directly to people, thereby cementing linkages between the leader and constituents. For example, Chávez skirted state institutions in

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order to create more direct linkages with the population (Corrales and PenfoldBecerra, 2011). Fujimori in Peru eliminated the state’s role in distribution as well, preferring to make more direct transactions with his constituents (Roberts, 1995). All of the strategies of the populist leader have the temporary effect of elevating the popularity of the populist leader at the expense of the state’s institutions. In spite of these efforts to undermine democracy, populist leaders do not want to do away with elections. Chávez relished claiming that Venezuela was the most democratic country in the world because he was constantly winning elections (Corrales and Penfold-Becerra, 2011). Populist leaders gain legitimacy by holding elections and referenda to validate their rule. Populist candidates are also in their element when campaigning. They use populist discourse to convert rivals into enemies of the state, and transform elections into personabased popularity contests. Elections are framed as battles to recover from past oppression and to support the leader of the people, the only person who can help save them. Nevertheless, though populists love campaigning, they also want to tilt the playing field in their favour to ensure perpetual victory.

More democracy? In the name of democracy, populist leaders often argue that popular sovereignty is best served by more direct forms of representation. This may take the form of referenda or replacing intermediary institutions, which would normally check executive power, with undyingly loyal popular councils (see Chapters 10 and 11). In Venezuela, Chávez promoted participatory democracy based on Bolivarian circles or groups of eight to ten people who engage in raising consciousness and work on community projects (Hawkins, 2010). Political participation could be exercised through direct democratic channels such as constituent assemblies, referenda and town meetings (Molina, 2010). But this comes at the expense of other institutions, with the new constitution increasing executive power and undermining the right of the opposition to challenge the government. Morales in Bolivia relied on the people to undertake constitutional reforms that came at the expense of checks and balances (Cameron and Sharpe, 2010). In Uganda, Yoweri Museveni set up a series of five-tiered ‘resistance councils’ to encourage popular participation at the grassroots level, which in practice helped to further entrench the National Resistance Movement’s reach at the local level (Tripp, 2010). The other manoeuvre that populist leaders may attempt is to eliminate term limits (see Chapter 11) in the name of democracy. Populists claim that term limits block the will of the people. However, by refusing to step down from power, populists can set off a chain of events that further erode democracy. Opposing classes might resort to supporting non-democratic means to get rid of populist leaders. In Thailand, Thaksin was a populist leader who gained support from rural voters and won elections fairly by giving out handouts at the right

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times. The middle class realized he could not be beaten in an election and they abandoned their democratic commitments, replacing democratic rule with military appointments. Thaksin was ousted in a coup in 2006 and his sister Yingluck in another coup in 2014. Once in power, populist leadership has had a poor record of governing and has damaged democratic institutions and norms. A recent study demonstrated that among populist leaders who entered office between 1990 and 2015, only about one third left office after they either lost free and fair elections (17 per cent) or reached their term limits (17 per cent). The rest were forced to resign, were impeached or are still in power. While in power, populists have initiated democratic backsliding, with half of all populists succeeding in rewriting or amending the constitution to eliminate term limits and reducing checks and balances. In fact, populist governments are four times more likely than non‑populist ones to damage democratic institutions (Mounk and Kyle, 2018). In spite of what they claim – that they will clean up corruption, populists leaders are also much more corrupt. They do not drain any swamps. As many as 40 per cent of populist leaders were indicted for corruption (from 1990 to 2015), and this does not take into account the number of cases where independent investigations were shut down before charges were made (Mounk and Kyle, 2018). Populist governments have led their countries to drop by an average of five places on the Corruption Perceptions Index. Venezuela dropped eighty-three places under Chávez (Mounk and Kyle, 2018). This makes it all the more ironic that populists often rise to power on the heels of corruption scandals. Advocates of populism refer to it as a form of protest and resistance to modernization projects. Proponents of populism claim that the concept has been poorly defined. Populists argue that it is fundamentally democratic, because political representation rests with the people. Populism, particularly in Latin America has been noted for incorporating those who had been previously excluded (see the case study later in this chapter). However, the form of populism that has characterized the twenty-first century has abandoned some of the principles that drove these movements to form in the first place. In a best-case scenario, populism can serve as a wake-up call to elites to listen to their constituents more. More often than not, populist leadership has been very dangerous for democracy.

Box 8.3: What is Brexit? On the morning of 24 June 2016 it was announced that 51.9 per cent of the British public had voted in favour of leaving the EU, while 48.1 per cent were in favour of remaining, with a turnout of 72.2 per cent. The result sent shockwaves throughout Europe and the world. A petition calling for a second referendum attracted more than 4 million signatures, but was rejected by the government.

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While remain campaigners had focused on the economic benefits of staying in the EU, the number one issue driving the leave vote was the fear of uncontrolled immigration. More than two-thirds of voters believed that if the UK left the EU, it would have better control over immigration (Ipsos MORI, 2016). Membership in the EU represented a cultural threat. Like the Trump campaign, which was successful in playing into people’s fears of uncontrolled immigration and changing demographics, the leave campaign was able to tap into insecurities about a sovereign supra-national body dictating immigration policies. A YouGov (2016) poll revealed that immigration was the most important issue in the Brexit vote, with 75 per cent of Britons wanting to reduce immigration, about half having strongly anti-immigrant views and 37 per cent saying that where they live does not feel like home due to immigration. There were also general concerns that the EU was too powerful and had too much control over the UK’s laws and policies. A 2015 Eurobarometer survey (Hix, 2015) revealed that among the citizens of EU member states, Britons were some of the least knowledgeable regarding the EU. Though they knew little about the EU, over half of voters felt they had to leave. So what is the EU? It is a political and economic union consisting of twenty-eight member states, with a population of over 510 million. Through a standardized system of laws that applies to all member states, the EU has developed an internal single market. The goals of the EU are to ensure the free movement of people, goods, services and capital within one internal market. Other objectives include enacting legislation on justice and home affairs, and maintaining a common set of policies on trade. A common currency, the euro, came into effect in 2002, with nineteen member states adopting it. The UK opted to maintain its own currency. Britain had been a member of the EU, then known as the European Economic Community, since 1973. From the beginning, it was a tense relationship and the UK always sought to avoid submitting itself to the EU completely. In 1985, the UK negotiated a rebate to ensure that it contributed less to the EU, arguing that it did not benefit as much from agricultural subsidies. The rebates were substantial – in 2015 it was over £5 billion (HM Treasury, 2015). Euroscepticism worsened after the Treaty of Maastricht was signed in 1992, challenging Britain’s sovereignty. Many British citizens began to worry that the EU was dictating internal politics in ways that were having a negative effect on the UK. The concerns included fear of losing jobs to foreigners and worries about too much migration to the UK. However, these fears were unfounded and puzzling, given that the UK was not a member of the Schengen Agreement, the treaty that regulates borders. As Edward Alden from the Council on Foreign Relations remarked, ‘The irony is that the country that was least affected by the migration crisis is the one where we’ve seen the most consequential political backlash’ (Alden, 2016). Still, the UK has left the EU, hoping for a brighter future on its own.

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Case study: Populism in Latin American and Africa Populism has refused to disappear from Latin American politics. For over a century, Latin American populist leaders have been able to gain power and maintain a passionate following. Populism in Latin America emerged in the 1930s and 1940s as a reaction against the political, socio-economic and cultural exclusions of the oligarchic order. Latin American governments had been trying to combine liberal-inspired constitutions and elections with patrimonial practices and values, but years of rapid urbanization and industrialization led to a crisis of paternal authority. Populist leaders such as Juan Perón in Argentina and Getúlio Vargas in Brazil tapped into the frustrations of citizens who had grown tired of electoral fraud and failed promises. However charismatic populist leaders envisioned mass participation not through the institutionalization of popular participation and the rule of law, but through mass rallies. Later populists would re-emerge as a reaction to neo-liberalism and rising corruption. Populist leaders such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia and Rafael Correa in Ecuador appealed to citizens using a dualistic and antagonistic discourse, of the people against the elites, the West and globalization. Unlike their predecessors, they were able to drive citizen revolutions through elections, rather than through mass rallies or violence. All three leaders enjoyed relatively high levels of support at various times during their presidencies and remained in power by winning elections, but all three also tried to roll back democratic freedoms during their tenures. As soon as Chávez was elected president, he set out to revamp Venezuela’s institutional framework. First, he called a constituent assembly and then closed the recently elected bicameral Congress in which his party only controlled a third of the seats. He then re-engineered the electoral system, which enabled him to dominate the constituent assembly. He took control of the new unicameral national legislature and ended the ban on consecutive terms. He took control of the courts and other independent institutions, including Venezuela’s electoral commission. Chávez made every important decision himself, with little consultation with anyone else. Even right before his death, his successor Nicolás Maduro was hand-picked in a topdown fashion. Chávez never relied on a strong organization with a transparent decisionmaking process. If his adversaries did win against all odds, he used various ploys to limit the effects. After the opposition managed to win the mayoralty of Caracas in 2008, for instance, Chávez folded much of the city into a new Capital District under a hand-picked commissioner who was given most of the power and funding that had previously been under the mayor’s control. The same attacks on democratic institutions also took place in Bolivia and Ecuador. In Bolivia, the Morales government shut the opposition out of decisive stages of the constitutiondrafting process by charging them with terrorism and corruption. The opposition was either

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intimidated, imprisoned or driven out of the country. Morales then agreed to a referendum, promising not to run in 2014. He later reneged on this. In Ecuador, Rafael Correa pursued a constituent assembly election by engineering the irregular removal of more than half the members of Congress (Sánchez-Sibony, 2018). As this chapter has explained, populism has led to a weakening of democracy and the growth of authoritarianism (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012; Levitsky and Loxton, 2013; Weyland, 2013). But not all scholars of Latin American politics agree with this assessment. Ernesto Laclau (2015) argued that populism is a process of political discourse that leads to the construction of popular political identities. Though society is split into two camps, populism is important for citizens wanting to challenge the old order. Other scholars have noted that left-wing populism, or progressive populism is vital to challenging more exclusive and inequitable forms of rule (Stavrakakis, 2017). On the extreme end, some scholars refer to populism as the purest form of democracy (Tännsjö, 1992). Others argue that left-wing populism can only be helpful to democracy when its leaders are not in power. When populist movements are the challengers, populism has had a democratizing effect on Latin American politics. Populist supporters would take to the streets and protest growing exclusion and corruption (De la Torre, 2016). However, when populist leaders take power, there are numerous examples of democratic institutions being challenged. Argentina’s courts were undermined by Menem’s deliberate selection of politically loyal judges. Under Fujimori in Peru, the party system deteriorated as programmatic differences were overshadowed by personalities. By the time Chávez died, checks and balances in Venezuela had largely eroded (Corrales and Penfold, 2015). In spite of this, in many polls, Chávez remains Venezuela’s most popular former president (Matamoros, 2018). Populism is alive in well in Brazil as well, with the 2018 election of Bolsonaro. Unlike in Latin America, populism has not become prevalent in Africa. One reason for this is that the development of class consciousness in Africa has been damped by patron–client networks based on local and ethnic identities. Ethnic identities are often too strong for any one leader to overcome and unite a cross-section of people under a single populist banner (Kendall-Taylor et al, 2019). There are, however, several countries where populist leaders have emerged (de la Torre, 2018b). Under Jacob Zuma (2009–2018), South Africa experienced left-leaning populiststyle leadership. Zuma tried to circumvent long-standing institutions, strengthen his own power vis-à-vis supporters of former President Thabo Mbeki and fired his minister of finance. Zuma’s poor background and charismatic leadership style earned him the title of ‘people’s president’. But Zuma was not popular with everyone. As leader of the ruling African National Congress Party (ANC), Zuma was quick to create a world full of friends and foes. Anyone that opposed him was labelled the ‘enemy’, rather than the opposition (Vincent, 2011). Party members that voted against him were called ‘people who have double hearts’ (Reuters, 2017). Fortunately, the ANC is a fairly well-institutionalized party and was able

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to withstand Zuma’s attempts to take total control. Though he worked hard to hand-pick his successor, he failed and South Africa is now led by Cyril Ramaphosa. Michael Sata (2011–2014) of Zambia was also populist. The platform of his political party, the Patriotic Front, was devoid of any clear programme, and was mostly inconsistent and incoherent (Larmer and Fraser, 2007). Sata mainly focused on making promises to multiple sections of the population while taking different sides on any given issue depending on his audience. Sata rose to power on the basis of his charismatic and fiery campaign speeches. Sata claimed the government was out of touch, and was colluding with China and other foreign powers (Larmer and Fraser, 2007, 627–9). He also grew his support through ethnic appeal to the rural Bemba community with which he identified (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar, 2009). Most importantly, however, Sata articulated a set of grievances that resonated in both urban and rural areas. He was able to appeal to a wide range of voters, not just one ethnic group. But the Zambian experience is an exception. Zambia is highly urbanized and has mostly taken ethnicity out of politics. This allowed Sata to run a more inclusive campaign to attract voters from a range of ethnic groups, transcending the country’s ethno-linguistic divisions. In most African countries, however, ethnicity is more salient and levels of urbanization are lower. Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has been accused of embracing a populist style of leadership. In March 2018, Abiy was elected chairman of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), but critics claim he has sidelined the party in order to directly appeal to the masses. Others charge that he has monopolized power and decision-making, with little consultation. Though he has promised democratic elections in 2020, he has been accused of using elections to jockey for more power. Critics claim that he has cultivated a personality cult that is propelled by the state-owned media (Pilling and Barber, 2019). In spite of this, he has become enormously popular across Ethiopia. Despite these critiques, Abiy has departed from the authoritarian populist agenda by avoiding anti-elitist rhetoric and divisive narratives. He has focused on unity and reconciliation, and has rejected identity politics (Fisher and Gebrewahd, 2018). He has also warned against treating his opponents as moral enemies. He also does not use social media to communicate with the masses, and does not have a personal Twitter account (Gardner, 2018).

Conclusion Populism is a top-down mobilization strategy that attempts to circumvent institutional gatekeepers and increase the authority of a leader through the ‘will of the people’ (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018). Populists manufacture threats and stoke extremism. In return for solving urgent problems, populists ask for greater power and authority over other institutional checks in the government (Mounk, 2018).

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Once they have greater power, they begin a series of manoeuvres to undermine democracy. Chapters 9, 10 and 11 look at how democratic backsliding takes place through a combination of power grabs at the expense of other institutions, organizations, rights and liberties. Most of the time, these changes are engineered by a populist or personalist leader who has transcended the party, such as Chávez. There are also other instances where autocratization is at the hands of a ruling party, such as the Law and Justice Party in Poland. Finally, there are cases where the ruling party and the leader are working concurrently to autocratize the regime, such as in Hungary with Orbán and the Fidesz Party. As the next three chapters will explain, there are three primary mechanisms of autocratization. Chapter 9 will examine how leaders or ruling parties thwart discursive and diagonal accountability by degrading civil liberties and media independence. Chapter  10 looks at how leaders or ruling parties undercut horizontal accountability by weakening legislatures, judiciaries and the state. Finally, Chapter 11 lays out the ways in which the executive and ruling party weaken vertical accountability by undermining the legitimacy of elections. These assaults by the executive do not happen in a vacuum. There are important precursors present that facilitate this process, such as a ratings-obsessed media, weak rule of law and poorly performing and institutionalized political parties. The next three chapters explain how we can observe democratic backsliding by pinpointing discrete actions, usually performed by the executive, with the primary objective of prolonging and expanding power, and the important preconditions present that facilitate this process. KEY QUESTIONS 1. Populist leaders often claim that populism is democratic. What is democratic about populism? 2. What are the conditions under which populism movements usually emerge? Why are populist movements gaining in Europe? Why have they not been that popular in Africa? 3. What is the difference between left- and right-wing populism? What factors explain their success? Are the drivers of right-wing populism any different than the drivers of left-wing populism? 4. What is the difference between populist and personalist leadership (see Chapter 1)? Can a leader be both? 5. This book argues that populism and autocratization go hand in hand. Do you agree with that? Why or why not?

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PART IV

Symptoms and Processes

9

Assaults on the Media and Civil Society

Introduction Although it is common for media freedoms and civil liberties to come under attack in autocracies, these practice have become more prevalent in democracies as well. Many countries around the globe have seen freedom of expression and of the media deteriorate. The pervasiveness of declining media freedom in democratic settings is highlighted by Freedom House’s 2017 Freedom of the Press report (Dunham, 2017, 3), which found that ‘press freedom worldwide deteriorated to its lowest point in 13 years in 2016, driven by unprecedented threats to journalists and media outlets in major democracies’. Studies have also pointed to civil society coming under particular attack from 2006 to 2016 (Mechkova et al, 2017). This chapter explains how regimes looking to expand executive control seek to undermine media freedom and civil society. Incumbent regimes do so in order to minimize these institutions’ ability to expose antidemocratic behaviour and to amplify narratives that support their own efforts to consolidate control. This chapter explains how regimes looking to expand executive control are vilifying civil society and the media, and provides examples of this. It argues that this process degrades citizens’ rights and engagement with the state, which makes it more difficult for citizens to access accurate information about their governments (Bermeo, 2016). Unfortunately, it has been easier to delegitimize the media because of its self-inflicted wounds. The media in many democracies has become increasingly sensationalist and polarizing, and thus less trustworthy (Newton, 2017). Before doing so, we look at what how the media and civil society can provide discursive and diagonal accountability.

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Key concepts ‘Discursive accountability’ is a type of accountability that ensures that the executive (along with other state institutions) has to justify its actions in the public discourse. Holding the state to account involves a number of actors, including the media, civil society, NGOs, trade unions, universities, religious organizations, charities, etc. This type of accountability is threatened when there are violations of civil liberties and freedoms or when these groups have been coopted, captured or drowned out by state propaganda. Executive aggrandizement takes place when the executive is able to silence or pay off critics to ensure that the discourse is always in support of the executive and the ruling party. In authoritarian regimes, there are varying levels of discursive accountability, but democracy requires complete freedom of information and association. Discursive accountability is key to ensuring that there are other forms of accountability as well. Guillermo O’Donnell’s (1998) work has echoed the importance of a robust civil society and media in promoting thicker forms of accountability. For there to be any sort of electoral accountability or vertical accountability (see Chapter 11), there needs to be freedom to provide information to voters. Executive control over political communication or capture of civil society institutions is an important step to executive aggrandizement. Without clear information about the actions of the government, voters are in the dark about any potential abuses of power. The most frequent violations to discursive accountability involve lowlevel threats to actors that might challenge the discourse. In countries that have experienced significant democratic backsliding, however, civil society organizations and independent media are often shut down or totally captured. For the worst-case scenario to play out, other forms of accountability will also have to break down. In a liberal democracy, discursive accountability is often protected by the constitution, constitutional courts, human rights commissions and other watchdog organizations. When there are attempts to curb civil liberties by the executive, the aforementioned actors, if robust, can serve as a protective layer to defend these freedoms and ensure discursive accountability. As Chapter 10 will explain, executive assaults on accountability do not happen in a vacuum and are not possible without pre-existing institutional weaknesses and assaults on other institutions. Nevertheless, challenging the prevailing discourse of what citizens know and think about democracy is key to initiating the process of undermining other forms of accountability. ‘Diagonal accountability’ is a form of accountability that may overlap with discursive accountability. It operates in the domain between horizontal and vertical forms of accountability, which will be explained in more detail in chapters 10 and 11, respectively. Diagonal accountability entails citizen groups engaging with institutions of horizontal accountability such as the legislature and the courts to ensure that there is better oversight of the executive and the state (Goetz and

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Jenkins, 2005). When citizens and civil society groups are directly lobbying governments, demanding explanations and threatening negative publicity, it is sometimes referred to as a form of vertical accountability. Nevertheless, we see these as examples of discursive accountability (in threatening negative publicity) and diagonal accountability (in lobbying the legislature). Civil society groups in particular are important to ensuring that the government is held accountable for its actions (Grahn and Lührmann, 2020).

Civil society and democracy ‘Civil society’ remains an ambiguous term that may be subject to diverse interpretations. Alexis de Tocqueville (2003) coined this term in 1835, in his analysis of American democracy. For de Tocqueville, civil society consisted of the sphere of intermediary voluntary, non-political and social organizations that stood between the individual and the state. Civil society is human activity that takes place outside of both the market and the government, and constitutes the public sphere in which debate and deliberation can take place. Civil society is also conceived of as a set of values that aim for social, economic and political progress, bringing people together and helping them develop key skills and civic values (Warren, 2011). Civil society also includes various non-governmental and non-profit organizations. Civil society may include people’s organizations, trade unions, cooperatives, consumer organizations, professional organizations, human rights groups, consumer rights groups, women’s associations, youth clubs, the media, community organizations, religious groups and grassroots movements and organizations (GROs) (Brysk, 2000). In contrast to the vertical networks of patron–client arrangements or traditional hierarchical organizations, civil associations are horizontal networks that are voluntary and autonomous. They provide a critical space for opposition activity to occur. The impact of civil society depends on how independent it is from the state and the market. Starting with de Tocqueville, scholars have long argued that civil society can help consolidate and deepen democracies. De  Tocqueville asserted that civil society organizations were critical to strengthening democracy and preventing governmental tyranny. These organizations were important to preventing the fragmentation of society and the isolation of individuals from the community. Civil society fostered social norms that helped people work with one another to check the state’s power. In de Tocqueville’s analysis, civil society and democracy are assumed to complement each other. Larry Diamond echoes this, arguing that a ‘vibrant civil society is probably more essential for consolidating and maintaining democracy than for initiating it’ (1994, 7). Civil society also gives legitimacy to the state and helps enforce the rule of law and monitor elections (Diamond, 1994). Civil society and civic engagement have been critical to democratic consolidation, proper functioning of government and prevention democratic

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decay. Robert Putnam, in his book Making Democracy Work, argues that civil society enables participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives (Putnam, 1993). Participating in civil society helps citizens build trust and leadership skills, which are important in representative government. Putnam’s seminal work argues that higher levels of associational activity in Northern Italy compared to Southern Italy help explain why democracy in Northern Italy has performed better. Putnam asserts that any type of group membership creates social capital, which builds norms of social trust that facilitate mutually beneficial coordination and cooperation (1993). Densely segregated horizontal networks sustain cooperation, especially if they cut across social cleavages. Membership in horizontally ordered groups (such as sports clubs, cooperatives, mutual aid societies, cultural associations and voluntary unions) should be positively associated with good government. Putnam (1995) also argued that the decrease in associational activity (or ‘bowling alone’) in the US was eroding social capital and undermining democracy. Civil society serves a number of important functions in a democracy. Civil society groups are intermediaries between states and the citizens, channelling the demands and concerns of different interest groups to the state and applying pressure on the state. Civil society engages in dialogue with the state and in doing so, ensures that the state is transparent about its actions. Civil society also promotes democratic political participation by encouraging political action and providing information about public issues. In particular, civil society can provide education on democracy and help cultivate democratic values. Civil society is also important in preventing democratic backsliding, the excesses of state power and the resumption of power by an authoritarian leader or government. It encourages greater scrutiny of the state at the local and national levels, and can serve as a watchdog.

Assault on civil society When democracies backslide, civil society is systematically weakened or restricted to hinder the capacity of these groups to hold the government accountable or mobilize opposition to government efforts to expand control. Leaders often use national security arguments, including the threat of terrorism and instability, to justify such actions. Not only do these threats provide leaders with justifications for their actions, but they also make citizens more willing to accept political and civil liberties restrictions in exchange for the promise of stability. Moreover, the trends fuelling populism – the growing swath of citizens who view cultural change as a threat to their livelihoods and well-being – also create an environment that is more permissive for opportunistic leaders to restrict civil society. Research suggests that as fears of societal change and external threats grow, so too does the public’s preference for strong, decisive leaders who are willing to use force to maintain order (Feldman and Stenner, 1997; see also Mather and Jefferson, 2016).

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Many countries have seen the executive attack civil society. In the Philippines, for example, the government of Rodrigo Duterte (2016–) has been taking an aggressive stance against civil society, and activists have faced many threats. Though Varieties of Democracy’s Civil Society Index (see Lührmann et al, 2017) improved in eighteen countries, including Bhutan, Tunisia and Sri Lanka, the CSO environment worsened in seven countries, including Burundi, Ethiopia, Turkey and Albania. The environment for civil society is also deteriorating in Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Niger, with burdensome registration requirements for these organizations (Civicus, 2015). That being said, only 0.07 per cent of people live in countries where most organizations are statesponsored – Cuba, Eritrea, North Korea, Qatar, Syria, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Most people live in countries with a large number of CSOs and are either minimally (41.8 per cent) or at least occasionally active in them (32.6 per cent) (Lührmann et al, 2017). Democratic leaders seeking to reduce constraints on their control rely predominately on legal means to selectively target those groups and individuals they view as threatening. Populist leaders in particular may also go after NGOs and social movements that do not support the populist leadership (see Chapter 8). In Hungary, Viktor Orbán pioneered attacks on civil society by tightening rules on civil society groups and NGOs. The government passed new legislation in 2017 requiring certain NGOs, including prominent US-funded NGOs, to register as foreign-funded groups and indicate their foreign status on all media materials. Orbán argued that the new law will improve transparency and help fight money laundering and terrorism. The country also has a new law that imposes criminal penalties on NGO staff found to be supporting ineligible asylum seekers. A special tax of 25 per cent is imposed on groups supporting immigration. Orbán has also launched a campaign against Central European University and its founder, George Soros (The Guardian, 2018b). In Bangladesh, where Sheikh Hasina and her ruling Awami League have been gradually consolidating power, the government passed The Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities) Regulation Act in 2016, which made it more difficult for NGOs to obtain foreign funds and gave officials broad authority to deregister NGOs that make ‘derogatory’ comments about government bodies or the Constitution. In Poland, a 2017 law has empowered a government board to indicate whether an NGO receives any public funds. According to Amnesty International, a series of new laws in more consolidated democracies have also affected civil society and NGOs (Amnesty International, 2019). A 2018 law imposes reporting and financial obligations on all NGOs working with foreigners in Australia. A new Austrian law on Islam has been amended to restrict access to foreign funding for mosques and Muslim organizations. In India, a 2010 law requires all NGOs that accept foreign contributions to register with the government and use designated banks. Their

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funds can be blocked if the government decides that the NGOs does not work in the national interest. In Israel, a 2016 law requires all NGOs that get more than half their funding from abroad to declare their reliance on foreign funding. In Ecuador, Rafael Correa’s government was confrontational with civil society, including teachers, students and indigenous organizations. Correa clashed with these groups and tried to reduce their influence. Many of these groups were subjected to an elaborate legal registration system imposed by executive decree. NGOs could also be sanctioned for engaging in politics and interfering in public policy (De la Torre and Ortiz Lemos, 2016, 229–30). A decree issued in June 2013 required all civil society groups to follow a complex set of rules for reporting their activities or lose their legal status. The degree also said that civil society groups must avoid partisan activity or interfering with public policy, or risk losing their legal status. With other civil society groups Correa resorted to more carefully tailored divide-and-conquer tactics. Correa isolated the leadership of the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) by offering clientelistic support to their indigenous base. As a result, indigenous people working for the state became more willing to support Correa’s government unconditionally (De la Torre and Ortiz Lemos, 2016). In Venezuela under Hugo Chávez, NGOs that defended political rights were barred by the 2010 Law for the Defence of Political Sovereignty and National Self‑determination. Under Evo Morales, Bolivian NGOs that carried out activities he deemed threatening to ‘public order’ were banned. Daniel Ortega has issued many paralegal decrees regarding Nicaragua’s weakly institutionalized polity and has put persistent pressure on independent NGOs. Social movements were then created in a top-down fashion to counter NGOs and democratic movements such as unions, student groups and indigenous groups. Additionally, Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia banned organizations that received international assistance, and the former two countries also criminalized protests (Corrales, 2015).

Box 9.1: Uncivil society Though civil society is important to the functioning of democracy, not all civil society groups are supportive of democratic norms. The rise of populist nativist and/or extremist movements has led to increasing concerns about uncivil society (Rosenblum and Post, 2002). Uncivil society refers to organized groups and networks that engage in unconstitutional or violent social and political behaviour. This term has been used of late to refer to the escalation of organized right-wing and racially motivated violence which has infiltrated the mainstream political discourse in many democracies. Racists, nationalists and ethno‑populists articulate exclusionist narratives to justify forms of political violence against ethnic minorities, refugees and other vulnerable groups. These groups engage in extremist propaganda and have effectively used social media and the internet to mobilize.

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In Poland, the strength of illiberal civil society was manifest on 11 October 2017, when 60,000 individuals marched in the capital to celebrate the Day of Independence, but called for a ‘white Europe’ and a ‘Poland without Jews and Muslims’. Far-right organizations such as the National Radical Camp (ONR) and the All-Polish Youth group also promote views of extreme nationalism and exclusion (Narkowic and Balogun, 2017). In Slovakia uncivil society has focused on gays and lesbians, including pushing a 2015 referendum to ban gay marriage that failed to pass (The Economist, 2015). In the Czech Republic, uncivil society has mobilized against Islam (Čada and Frantová, 2019).

Table 9.1: Common civil liberties in democracies • Freedom of speech and expression • Freedom of the press • Freedom of religion • Freedom of assembly • Freedom of conscience • Freedom of movement • Freedom from torture • Freedom from slavery • Right to life • Right to privacy • Equal treatment under the law; freedom from arbitrary arrest • Right to own property; right to work • Right to a fair trial, right to due process • Right to defend oneself • Right to bodily integrity • Right to marry • Right to vote and participate in government

Democracy and the media For the bulk of the chapter, we will focus on the role of the media in democratic decay, as it has been both a victim and, to a lesser extent, a driver of democratic decay. In backsliding democracies, media freedom is one of the key areas facing the greatest decline. The media has become more politicized, more sensationalized and more restricted. There are both soft and hard restrictions being imposed on the media around the world. Not surprisingly, autocracies continue to exercise greater control over the media. Grey-zone regimes are also engaging in harsher forms of media control. Alarmingly, even democracies are seeing their freedom of media scores plummet due to softer forms of censorship and restrictions.

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For democracies to flourish, a free and independent media is essential, because it is related to freedom of speech and information. The media should be free to collect and publicly disseminate political and official information without government interference and independent of government control. This should take place without competing constructions of what the political realities are (Schedler, 2013). Media freedom is essential to the deepening of democracy and preventing democratic reversals and decay (Besley and Prat, 2006). The media is often referred to as the Fourth Estate – serving as a watchdog. Multiple studies have found that a free press has a positive effect on the fight against corruption and other forms of abuse of power (Stapenhurst, 2000; Brunetti and Weder, 2003; Freille et  al, 2007). A related study found that trade openness only reduces corruption in countries that also have a free media (Charron, 2009). Media freedom is also important to electoral integrity because it increases the costs of electoral manipulation. Journalists can investigate and expose electoral fraud while also giving the opposition a chance to propagate its views. An independent media raises the costs of manipulations and helps citizens monitor and expose aspects of the electoral process (Birch, 2011). When the media is being restricted or manipulated, it affects the quality of information that citizens have (Schedler, 2013). The media is critical to keeping the population informed, holding democratic leaders to account and checking abuse of power. Media freedom also entails media pluralism, access to media by minorities and media independence (McConnell and Becker, 2002). A democratic media may be served best by both a market and non-market sector. The market sector allows programmers to provide the content that they want, free of government interference, using advertising revenues to do so. A non-market sector provides a balance to ensure that information that is important to the public discourse is provided. To ensure these values, the educational system should encourage values of pluralism and tolerance, while defamation laws, anti-trust legislation (see Chapter 12), laws limiting concentration of media ownership, along with some rules on harmful content and advertising, are helpful to ensure that there is a pluralistic, free media. An independent media can help foster public discussion and ensure that political participation is based on well-informed opinions. The media should help increase interest in politics, political participation and voter turnout, while also communicating the views of citizens (Voltmer, 2004; Leeson, 2008). When countries democratize, independent media is one of the areas that grow. Reformist leadership is usually open to accepting criticism from the free press. For example in Sudan, since the revolution, television channels that initially avoided covering mass demonstrations started to provide more in-depth reporting. The information flowing from this coverage helped popular movements gain momentum and keep the pressure on the government, and legitimized the new leadership. The burgeoning independent media that emerged also helped to counter efforts by the former regime to spread disinformation.

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While there are still many countries, such as Tunisia, where media freedom is improving, it is declining in many others. The section that follows explains how media freedoms erode in a democracy.

Signs of autocratization: media capture and control It is not surprising that the breakdown in global freedoms has coincided with the decline of democracy. The repression of the media is a strong indication that other political rights and civil liberties are in danger. A 2019 Varieties of Democracy report found that global media freedom is at its lowest since the start of the century (Maerz et al, 2020). Freedom House and Reporters without Borders have reported similar declines. According to a 2019 Freedom House Report (Repucci, 2019), media freedom has declined in Sub-Saharan Africa (by 3 per cent); Eurasia (by 9 per cent); the Middle East and North Africa (by 11 per cent); and Europe (by 8 per cent). There are also some countries that have seen media freedom deteriorate very sharply. Turkey had the biggest decline in freedom of speech and media over the 2010s, but Brazil, Burundi, Egypt, Poland, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Hungary and Bangladesh also had disturbing falls in the diversity and independence of the media. Democratically elected leaders now have a toolkit at their disposal to muzzle the press and control the narratives. Incumbents are able to discourage and obscure independent reporting while also channelling unlimited resources into creating a loyal media powerhouse. In some countries, the executive goes beyond just questioning the media’s veracity to actively make it harder for the media to operate. In more extreme cases, the media is physically attacked, threatened, jailed, closed down, fired or even killed. It was reported that 274 journalists were imprisoned and thirty-two were killed in 2020 (CPJ, 2020).1 Particularly vulnerable are journalists who report from the Philippines, Mexico and Honduras. In the following sections, we examine the various ways in which media freedoms are assaulted.

Verbal attacks on the media One of the first steps of autocratization is the executive delegitimizing the media and engaging in a smear campaign. While this is all perfectly legal, leaders attacking the credibility of the independent and mainstream media has limited the public’s access to accurate information and undermined the quality of elections. By delegitimizing the media, paranoid publics might reject factual information from the mainstream media and be susceptible to false narratives perpetuated by the executive. These verbal attacks also worsen political polarization, with supporters disbelieving everything the mainstream media says, and opponents doing the opposite. For example, Pew Research revealed that among US citizens

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who consider themselves politically aware, 91 per cent of Democrats have high levels of confidence in journalists, compared with only 16 per cent of Republicans (Gottfried et al, 2019). Populists, in particular, seek to portray the media as part of the ‘old’ and ‘corrupt’ political establishment and seek to discredit critical outlets (see Chapter 8). Although media outlets play an important role in delivering populist messages, they are also the victims of populist governments (Boas, 2005; Manucci, 2017; Waisbord, 2018). The tension between populist leaders and the media is that populists reject pluralism and any criticism of their worldview, and so they make the media a primary target (Kaltwasser, 2017). In the run-up to President Donald Trump’s election and since he took office in 2017, he has labelled several media outlets ‘dishonest’, ‘fake news’, ‘the enemy of the state’ and ‘enemies of the American people’, in an effort to delegitimize information that is critical of his presidency (see Chapter 5). These types of actions can, over time, erode press freedom, remove an important constraint on executive power and reduce trust in the media. In Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu repeatedly denounces reporters who have covered the corruption scandals in which he and his family have been embroiled. In Hungary, Orbán has also jumped on the bandwagon, regularly attacking journalists’ credibility and referring to critical media outlets as ‘fake news’. Journalists that work for foreign outlets were called ‘despicable’ on Twitter. Macedonia has also seen a campaign against critical media outlets that have accused the government of corruption, nepotism and authoritarian behaviour (Keil, 2018). In Serbia, the media are often referred to as ‘traitors’ and ‘foreign mercenaries’, and there is open hostility towards outlets that have been critical of the government (Keil, 2018). Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić campaigned against the Balkans Investigative Reporters’ Network due to its reporting on corruption in awarding state contracts (Vladisavljević, 2019). Slovakia’s former prime minister described journalists as ‘filthy anti-Slovak prostitutes’ and accused them of trying to damage Slovakia’s EU presidency in November 2016 (Council of Europe, 2016).2 Similar rhetoric came from the president of the Czech Republic, who expressed regret that journalists are not an ‘extinct species’ (Council of Europe, 2018). In Italy, the deputy prime minister regularly uses rhetoric that is hostile to journalists on social media, threatening to remove police protection for those who have faced threats from organized crime. Hostile rhetoric from members of the government has put Italian journalists at risk. In Austria, reporting that is not to the liking of the Freedom Party was subject to systematic verbal attacks, with independent journalists who covered government scandals branded as leftwing extremists. In Latin America, it is commonplace for leaders to criticize the media as a tactic to win elections and referenda (Conaghan and De la Torre, 2008). In fact, observers of Latin American politics have raised concerns about populists

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attacking the media for their own gain for some time now (Levitsky and Way, 2002; Corrales and Penfold-Becerra, 2007; Conaghan and De la Torre, 2008; Corrales and Penfold-Becerra, 2011; Kitzberger, 2016). The governments of Nicaragua under Ortega, Venezuela under Chávez and Maduro, and Ecuador under Correa were all incredibly confrontational with journalists. These regimes have stigmatized journalism as a profession. Chávez’s war with the media began after the failed effort to oust him from power in 2002. The private media was accused of supporting the organizers of the coup by providing ample coverage of the anti-Chávez protests. When Chávez returned to power, he banned certain journalists from participating in official events and launched a campaign to undermine the credibility of any media outlets that were critical of him. Press freedom has also been under strain for some time now in Senegal, in spite of it having been a democracy for years. Senegal was one of the first countries in Africa to successfully transition to democracy in 2000. As such, the country has enjoyed high levels of press freedom. However under the leadership of President Abdoulaye Wade (2000–2012), attacks on the press started to increase. Once an ally of the press, Wade began routinely criticize the press, and even ordered newsrooms to be raided (Mbow, 2008).

Firings, threats and arrests Once the media’s legitimacy has eroded, the leadership in an autocratizing regime can start to directly target journalists. Though these tactics are more common in authoritarian and grey-zone regimes, democracies have faced these issues as well. In Turkey, which once had a free press, mass firings have greatly undermined it (Weise, 2018). As many as 2,500 journalists have been fired for publishing information that was deemed to be unflattering to the government. The firing of more critical columnists has led the media to support the government’s narratives. Media owners were told to fire specific reporters who were overly critical of the government. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also regularly attacks by name journalists who have been critical of the government. There have been several prominent cases of journalists losing their jobs after such public attacks (Hansen, 2019). In Poland, there have been instances of journalists who were too critical of the Law and Justice Party’s agenda being fired. Journalists have also been imprisoned. In Myanmar, journalists have been sentenced to prison for reporting on the Rohingya. Some have been pardoned, but only after facing long pre-trial detentions. Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s former de facto leader, has voiced support for the pre-trial detentions. In 2018 Turkey had the dubious distinction of being the country that has imprisoned the most journalists, with hundreds facing arrest and there were more journalists in jail in Turkey than in Russia, Iran or China. By 2019 Turkey was eclipsed by China (CPJ, 2019b). Most of those jailed in Turkey are Kurds facing terrorismrelated charges allowed by a state of emergency. Turkey uses solitary confinement

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against detained journalists and has handed down lengthy prison sentences. Journalists also lack access to defence lawyers during their pre-trial detentions and trials. Kurdish journalists are arrested and used as bargaining chips (Corke et al, 2014). In Ghana, which recently democratized, journalists were detained in 2019 for reporting on the national security minister (CPJ, 2019a). In Nicaragua, journalists were subjected to arbitrary arrest. Many journalists have had to flee abroad, while others have been jailed on terrorism charges (Llorente, 2019). Journalists also face constant harassment and threats. This often takes place through proxies, and with political leaders signalling that the hostility towards journalists is permissible. This cultivates an atmosphere of fear for journalists that seek to publish the truth. India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party has supported campaigns that connect free speech to being anti-national. Thugs aligned with the government have raided the homes and offices of journalists who were deemed to be too critical. Journalists are also advised about how to cover events and government activities. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has been accused of issuing directives to the press about how to report on him. As a result, reporters have mostly stuck to flattering him (Ganguly, 2018). In Pakistan, journalists are warned not to cover abuses by the military, and face threats and harassment if they choose to ignore these warnings (Ellis-Petersen and Baloch, 2019). Thaksin, the former populist leader of Thailand, used state institutions to repress or harass media that was critical of his regime (Hewison, 2010). Bangladesh continues to backslide with more restrictive policies against journalists (Hasan and Wadud, 2020). Many journalists have arrested while others have been threatened and beaten. In Nicaragua, journalists are frequently threatened with their radio frequencies being cut off and their properties trashed. They are also hounded by the police and Ortega’s personal bodyguards (Freedom House, 2019). In Montenegro and Kosovo, there have been a series of verbal and violent attacks on journalists that report controversial information. Journalists mostly self-censor to protect themselves. Serbia has become a place where practicing journalism is neither safe nor supported by the state. The number of attacks, including death threats, on media is on the rise and inflammatory rhetoric targeting journalists is increasingly coming from the governing officials. Journalists have had their doors plastered with flyers that read, ‘Miserable Association of Enemies of Serbia’ (Csaky, 2019a). In late 2018, the home of an investigative journalist was torched. Other journalists claim that they are under constant surveillance (CPJ, 2018). Journalists in Turkey also are under surveillance. The National Security Organization has ordered wiretaps of several journalists who had covered stories that the government considered a threat to national security. Constant harassment has silenced journalists from reporting about sensitive issues. Editors and reporters regularly receive phone calls from the government instructing them about which stories to cover.

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According to Freedom House violence against journalists coincides with democratic erosion. Journalists have suffered violence and harassment in 63 per cent of countries where press freedom has declined since 2015 (Freedom House, 2019). In extreme cases, journalists have been murdered. A notable case is that of Jamal Khashoggi, the Saudi journalist who was murdered in the Istanbul Saudi consulate in 2018. African journalists in Mali and Tanzania who were investigating corruption and crime were killed or disappeared. There have also been cases of journalists who have been murdered in democracies, such as Slovak journalist Ján Kuciak, who was killed along with his fiancée, Martina Kušnírová, fifty kilometres from Bratislava. Kuciak had been investigating tax fraud and corruption in Slovakia. In Bulgaria, journalist Viktoria Marinova was murdered in 2018, with authorities botching the investigation and attempting to cover it up. In 2017 investigative journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia was murdered in Malta. The government continues to refuse calls for an independent public inquiry into whether her death could have been prevented. Malta has become an increasingly hostile environment for independent journalists, with many receiving threats when they report on corruption. Caruana Galizia herself had been receiving daily death threats for decades. Reporters without Borders (2020) ranks the Philippines as one of the most dangerous countries in the world to be a journalist. Over 90 per cent of murders of journalists go unsolved in the Philippines. In countries where journalists receive death threats, they also lack proper police and judicial follow up to prevent violence and harassment (Reporters without Borders, 2020).

More restrictive media laws Another method of muzzling a critical media in democracies is to pass a series of laws restricting what the media can say. Usually these laws are passed in the name of preserving national security and privacy. They are more easily put implemented once independent media boards are placed in government-friendly hands. For the most part, these types of restrictions have not taken place in liberal democracies. However, Hungary and Poland are two exceptions (Freedom House, 2019). In Poland, the Law and Justice Party has limited media freedom by passing laws in 2016 that transferred authority over public media to government-appointed officials. All broadcasters must have a board controlled by the government. The president of public television was also appointed by the Law and Justice Party. Laws were also passed to limit media access to the parliament (Freedom House, 2017). Hungary has created a media control body appointed by the ruling Fidesz party, with the head appointed by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. All media outlets have to register with the Media Council to operate. One of the first decisions of the new media control body was to close down opposition radio channels and influential newspapers. Media laws were passed that could impose massive

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fines on outlets for providing imbalanced news coverage, insulting the majority or violating public morality. The law also removes legal protections against the disclosure of journalists’ sources (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Most regimes that are able to legally muzzle the media have had experience with authoritarianism and their democracies were weaker to begin with. Nepal’s new privacy law restricts collecting personal information on public officials, suppressing the media’s ability to scrutinize politicians and investigate abuses of power. In Turkey, broad anti-terrorism and criminal defamation laws make it easier to prosecute, investigate and sentence individuals who have been accused of being involved in terrorism. The law has been repeatedly used to prosecute journalists, especially those who are Kurdish. There are also still laws in place that make it a crime to insult the Turkish nation, which sets up a minefield for the media if it criticises the government. In Myanmar, all of the gains of the short democratic period are starting to fizzle out. When the NLD came to power in January 2016, there was an increased usage of the 2013 Telecommunications Law, which stipulates that people can be jailed for up to three years for defamation or disturbing the peace using a telecommunications network. The law is intentionally vague which allows the police to enforce it selectively, and forces the media to engage in self-censorship to avoid being sued or jailed (Human Rights Watch, 2017). The biggest problems for reporters in Myanmar is that they are flatly restricted from entering parts of the country that the Rohingya Muslims have fled to after a brutal crackdown by the Burmese military. Journalists are only able to visit the region through state-run trips curated by the government and military, and are regularly denied visas to enter the country (Ratcliffe, 2020). In Sri Lanka, anti-terror laws make it more difficult for the media to report sensitive information (Natarajan, 2012). Some Latin American presidents have also signed new laws that allow them to regulate and monitor media content more freely. In Venezuela, Hugo Chávez enacted the Organic Law of Telecommunication that gave the government greater power to suspend or revoke broadcast licences (Corrales, 2015). In 2004, the Law of Social Responsibility was passed, barring the transmission of material that could foment anxiety in the public or disturb public order (Ginsburg and Huq, 2018). Ecuador’s National Assembly approved a law in 2013 that gave the government-controlled Council of Communications the power to penalize the media for publishing material that could damage a person’s credibility. Reports that publicized corruption scandals in particular were investigated and fined (Southwick and Otis, 2018). When Russia was still a semi-authoritarian regime, Putin used institutional reforms to gradually roll back democratic freedoms, which included new media laws passed in 2005 that restricted freedom of speech. In 2006, anti-terrorism legislation allowed the government to crack down on political opponents. More sanctions on public assemblies and the internet were introduced and a treason law was also amended, criminalizing a wide array of activities (Lipman, 2016).

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Media freedom has also declined dramatically in Mauritania since 2014, after several years of great progress. Under a law passed in November 2017, apostasy and blasphemy were made punishable by death, even if the offender repents.3 The law was prompted by the case of Mohamed Cheikh Ould Mohamed Mkhaitir, a blogger arrested in January 2014 (Human Rights Watch, 2017). His initial death sentence for apostasy was finally commuted to two years in prison. He should have been freed in November 2017, but was only released in July 2019 (Human Rights Watch, 2019).

Control over public and private broadcasters Democratically elected leaders have also undermined the media’s ability to act as a check on their power by increasing government control over public broadcasters and ensuring that media ownership is consolidated in government-friendly hands. Government control over the media is crucial to facilitating coordination among supporters and to preventing the counter-mobilization of political opponents. Another consequence of having increased control over information is that it allows incumbents to shape the narrative in ways that benefit them. As symbolic capital in the form of political reputations becomes more important to winning campaigns, the power to improve one’s own image and discredit a rival has become more important. The process of government taking greater control over the media plays out in several different ways. In some cases, the government itself slowly takes control over the media, such as in Malta, where the state broadcaster’s bias towards the government has meant that major corruption stories go unreported. In other cases, media ownership falls into the hands of government cronies, such as in Serbia under Vučić and in Hungary under Orbán. Government allies own nearly 80 per cent of the media in Hungary, a process that accelerated in 2016 (Repucci, 2019). That same year, the leading daily newspaper Népszabadság was shut down overnight in a hostile takeover, and was sold to Lőrinc Mészáros, an oligarch and childhood friend of Orbán. Mészáros then acquired more television channels, newspapers and online media, becoming the country’s second richest man. In November 2018, Mészáros along with other pro-government media outlets decided to give up their holdings to a pro-government media conglomerate, KESMA, which unified more than 400 media outlets friendly to the Fidesz government. Government agencies and private firms that wished to maintain good relations with the government also began to refrain from advertising on independent media, making it difficult for these outlets to sustain their operations (Kornai, 2015). As a result, media freedom and access in Hungary are more reminiscent of an authoritarian regime than a democracy (Ostrow, 2014). In Serbia, privatization has been concentrated in the hands of several outlets that are friendly with the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). In late 2018, the brother of a top SNS official was able to buy two national television channels, in

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addition to the three online portals, a radio station and the nine cable channels that he already owned (Keil, 2018). In Slovakia, media outlets previously owned by leading international media companies have been acquired by local oligarchs whose main business interests are aligned to the state. In Turkey, there has been an alarming series of forced sales of media outlets to pro-government business groups. The end of independent media in Turkey was sealed with the sale of Doğan Media Group to Demirören Holding in March 2018, months ahead of the presidential and parliamentary elections. Demirören Media Group (DMG) controls two-thirds of the nation’s top forty media outlets and is also involved in other sectors such as construction, energy and mining. After the July 2016 coup attempt, efforts to take over the media accelerated. In the name of national security, 115 media outlets, including fifty-four newspapers, six news agencies, twenty-four radio stations, seventeen television networks and twenty magazines, were shut down. Pro-AKP managers and journalists were then appointed to major TV stations and newspapers (Esen and Gumuscu, 2016). In Latin America, media ownership has traditionally been private and concentrated in the hands of wealthy families, politicians, oligarchs and the financial sector. This concentration of ownership has led to a dominance of conservative reporting in the media and fostered intense polarization between the media and the left in Latin America. This was reversed, however, as leftwing authoritarian populists gained power in the late 1990s. Under Correa, Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution prohibited bankers from owning media outlets, and a 2011 referendum banned media owners from holding stocks in any other types of enterprise. This ensured that the state could retain control over newspapers, television and radio stations. Additionally, a public television station and newspapers were created to target his supporters (De la Torre and Ortiz Lemos, 2016). Chávez also dramatically increased state ownership of media by purchasing outlets under duress. He then invested more than $40 million in improving the state-owned television and news agency, and in establishing three new television stations. His government also acquired over 145 local radio stations and seventyfive newspapers, along with dozens of government-friendly websites (Corrales and Penfold-Becerra, 2007). Chávez also closed a number of independent television stations that were critical of him, and threatened the remaining ones. The state became the main communicator, controlling 64 per cent of television channels (Corrales, 2015). In Argentina, the government passed legislation in 2011 that increased government control over the country’s only newsprint manufacturer, giving Cristina Fernández de  Kirchner’s government greater control over narratives. In Peru under Alberto Fujimori, by the late 1990s four of five private television networks and more than a dozen tabloid newspapers were on the state payroll (Levitsky and Loxton, 2013). Another common trend involves controlling the media through financial pressure and incentives. An autocratizing government may direct advertising to

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friendly outlets and encourage business allies to only buy ads on governmentfriendly media. Taking advantage of a tougher financial environment for the media, the government can award state advertising contracts, provide special financing schemes and preferential treatment by tax authorities. Governments can then deny responsibility for crippling the media via financial measures. In Hungary, state advertising in 2018 grew to five times what it was under previous administrations, with 85  per cent of contracts awarded to media companies friendly to the government (Csaky, 2019b). New pro-government outlets have emerged that have quadrupled their profits through preferential treatment by the government, without increasing their audience numbers. Hungarian independent media outlets face obstacles to competing, such as securing broadcast frequencies and selling advertising (Polyák, 2019). In Malta, independent media is increasingly dependent on massive expenditure by the government on advertising, which leads to control of information and the push of pro-government agendas (Reporters without Borders, 2019). In Italy, Deputy Prime Minister Di Maio has started to abolish public subsidies for the press (AFP, 2018). In Serbia, state advertising is important to keeping the media afloat which compromises the independence of the media. Pro-government outlets that embarked on media projects that the government supported were co-financed, a process that was completely lacking in transparency. Friendly media outlets have benefited from selective tax enforcement, while critical media outlets have faced harsh penalties. Regular visits by the tax authorities in Serbia led to the closure of the popular weekly Vrjanske novine. News site Juzne Vesti, known for critical reporting about the government, has also been subjected to constant tax investigations (Freedom House, 2019). In Turkey, the holding companies of media outlets that are sympathetic to the government receive billions in government contracts. In contrast, media outlets critical of the government have been targets of tax investigations, forced to pay large fines and put at a disadvantage when seeking public tenders. The once-powerful Doğan Media Group was fined and forced to sell off several media properties, including one of the country’s leading papers, Milliyet, after its reporting on AKP corruption infuriated the government (Corke et al, 2014). In Ecuador, strategies suffocated privately owned media, which were already vulnerable due to small profit margins and a financial crisis that had taken many media outlets to the brink of bankruptcy. The state raised the price of paper and stopped advertising in newspapers or radio stations that were critical of its policies. For mass media outlets with less financial power, the prospect of losing government advertisement revenue was enough to incentivize a change in editorial policy. Businesses were pressured to reduce support for critical media outlets as well (De la Torre and Ortiz Lemos, 2016). This meant that many media outlets no longer had financial support and came under economic strain. This additional financial pressure led to the sale of

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independent television stations such as Teleamazonas, through an opaque process filled with irregularities. Thus, the state controlled some of the most popular television stations, radio stations and newspapers. By 2008, the government had captured over 40 per cent of the total television audience (Sánchez-Sibony, 2009). Governments can also control the media by being selective about licenses and excluding unfriendly outlets. This can happen in democracies as well as grey-zone regimes (and autocracies, of course). Modi has exercised this power in India, as did Kirchner in Argentina. Kirchner’s government approved a media reform bill in 2009 that limited the number of media licences a single company could hold. In 2011, Hungary selectively refused licenses to outlets that were not supportive enough of the government. The license of the most popular radio station in the country was not renewed in 2016 because it was not sympathetic enough to the government, leaving Hungary’s radio market filled with nothing but government-affiliated national stations (Csaky, 2019a). Trump has threatened to strengthen US libel laws and revoke the licences of certain broadcasters as punishment for unflattering reportage. In addition to selective licensing, another method of controlling the media is through lawsuits and the threat of litigation. In Serbia, politicians have filed costly defamation suits against media outlets that have published critical content. In early 2018, Nenad Popović, a minister without a portfolio, filed four separate lawsuits against the investigative portal KRIK. In Turkey, there are thousands of defamation lawsuits pending against journalists. Many in Turkey engage in self-censorship, considering it is not worth the risk to criticize the government (Freedom House, 2019). Correa also used discriminatory legalism to sue Ecuadoran journalists and media outlets. The most notable case was when the largest privately owned newspaper, El Universo, published an editorial titled ‘No to lies’, for which it was sued and had to pay a fine of $40 million. Other journalists who have published allegations of corruption and nepotism by Correa’s brother Fabricio have also been sued for libel (Caselli, 2012). Major television network Teleamazonas reported that several lawsuits were being filed against it each month. In the first half of 2011 alone, at least twenty television and radio stations were closed on legal and technical grounds (De la Torre and Ortiz Lemos, 2016).

Direct communication with the public Once the incumbent has taken some amount of control over the media either directly or indirectly, the regime can build a parallel reality and flood the media landscape (see Chapter 5) with their own political messaging to drown out any critical accounts. Government-supported media outlets focus on the government’s achievements, while also offering disinformation to cause confusion and doubt (Cruz et al, 2016). Positive narrative-building through direct communication is used not only to broadcast the accomplishments of the administration but also

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to give the leader an opportunity to criticize the opposition. Additionally, by directly communicating with the public, any information that is critical of the leader can be discredited as ‘fake news’. Much of this direct connection between leaders and the public happens over social media today, but leaders still try to also engage with people through their television sets. Under Correa, a weekly radio and television programme called Enlace Ciudadano, or Citizens’ Connection, was broadcast for two hours every Saturday morning in Ecuador. The time was used to boast about Correa’s achievements and rail against his detractors. The show was hard to miss, airing concurrently on two television channels and forty radio stations. Private media were forced to broadcast advertisements that further reinforced the party line. Correa also connected with his supporters through the use of ‘cadenas nacionales’, or mandatory interruptions on all channels to show government broadcasts. From 2007 to 2012, the government aired 1,365 mandatory broadcasts that lasted a total of 11,793 minutes (De la Torre and Ortiz Lemos, 2016). Chávez also had a weekly chat show, called Aló Presidente!, which sometimes aired for as long as eight hours on state television. During the show, Chávez would engage with the masses, announce new policies, fire or reprimand ministers whom he deemed ineffective and tout his socialist revolution. Chávez also aggressively targeted the public with speeches, a total of over 3,500 hours by 2012, that were mandatory national broadcasts (Folha de S. Paulo, 2013). In Italy, former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s media empire enabled him to make frequent television appearances to hone and polish his image as a man of the people. He is currently using television appearances and Instagram to make a political comeback (Poggioli, 2015). Serbian Prime Minister Vučić has no limits when it comes to talking to friendly media – ahead of the 2018 local elections, reporting on the president, his party and the government received four times more airtime than did the remaining twenty-three electoral party lists combined (Csaky, 2019a).

Precursors: media in crisis The previous sections illustrated how the executive takes greater control over the media and civil society. The question that remains, however, is of how the public allows this to happen. Though it is impossible to pinpoint the exact sequence of democratic backsliding, as earlier chapters have highlighted, the process of autocratization requires some portion of the public to consent or at least be willing to turn the other way. For would-be autocrats attempting to diminish the ability of other actors to hold them to account, it is critical that the public already be sceptical of the media (Jones, 2004; Lee, 2010). Confidence and trust in the media has been replaced by a deep suspicion of its credibility. This has been compounded by the emergence of social media, which has a chequered record when it comes to facts (Fisher, 2016; Sterrett et al, 2019).

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As the next section highlights, when the media fails to perform its function, efforts to undercut its influence become more effective. We next explore the role of the media in weakening democratic norms.

Media malaise Not surprisingly, the erosion of discursive accountability takes place well before the democratic recession. In many countries, the media, which is tasked with educating the public about democracy and keeping the citizenry informed, has instead added to the political cynicism and personalism in politics. Early studies argued that the media’s focus on sensationalistic horse race and attack journalism was responsible for ‘media malaise’, or political disaffection and a lack of political efficacy (Lang and Lang, 1968; Weaver, 1972). In particular, the role of television (known as ‘video malaise’) was singled out as problematic as instead of engaging the public, it lead to a greater estrangement from government (Robinson, 1976). Television has also played a role encouraging voters to evaluate candidates based on personality and appearance rather than the issues (Hart, 1999). According to these studies, the focus on candidates and not the issues has led to a crisis of civic communication. Other factors that have contributed to media malaise include the commercialization of the media and its search for more advertising revenue, the growing size of the television news audience, and the higher viewership associated with negative, sensationalistic and scandalous stories (Robinson, 1976; Edelman, 1988). Other scholarship has argued that the media encourages campaigns to go negative (Jamieson, 1993). Strategic news frames during elections campaigns have been found to be influential in growing political disaffection. The focus on bad news, winning and losing, and tactics and polls has contributed to growing levels of cynicism (Robinson, 1975; Cappella and Jamieson, 1997; Hallin, 1997; Negrine, 2003). The race to cover new stories first also means that the news is delivered in a quick and superficial fashion. Presenting the public with a constant flow of events that are barely explained creates political fatigue, confusion, distrust and alienation (Putnam, 1995; Tumber and Waisbord, 2004). While most of the research was US-focused, there are also some findings that suggest that European countries also face similar challenges (Putnam, 1995; Blumler, 1997; Cappella and Jamieson, 1997; Kaase, 2000). Still others have countered that the media malaise in democracies is exaggerated and that the studies on it are methodologically flawed. In a study of twenty-eight Western democracies, it was demonstrated that citizens who consume more news are more knowledgeable about political affairs, have a more positive orientation towards the political systems and have higher levels of political participation (Norris, 2000; see also Strömbäck and Shehata, 2010). Echoing this view, other studies agreed that the media has the potential to create a virtuous circle of more politically active citizens (Newton, 1999; De Vreese and Boomgaarden,

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2006). Further research has confirmed that the media can foster political trust, knowledge and activism (Aarts and Semetko, 2003; Strömbäck et al, 2016). Other studies argued that the media may lead to more cynical citizens, but that this cynicism could create critical citizens who do not turn away from politics and remain committed to democracy (Elenbaas and De Vreese, 2008). In spite of the mixed picture from the literature on political sophistication and cynicism of voters, the fact remains that a large body of research has found that the media has stoked polarization (Iyengar and Hahn, 2009; Arceneaux et al, 2012). Early works concluded that horse race journalism did not bring voters together but drove ‘a wedge between them’ (Patterson, 1993, 52). Studies have demonstrated that as the more the US media was perceived as becoming partisan, the more polarization grew in US politics. There is no consensus as to the degree, however. Others claim that the ideological views of citizens tends to match the media outlets from which they consume information (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010). Other studies have demonstrated that any polarization driven by the media is dependent on the issues and on the prior opinions of citizens. For example, when individuals are exposed to hard issues by the media that are contentious and that touch upon their identities, it can polarize attitudes. Individuals may want to think of themselves as impartial but they have pre-existing beliefs that motivate the way that they arrive at conclusions (Lodge and Taber, 2005). When individuals are exposed to a contentious issue, it triggers an automatic, emotional reaction that either confirms or rejects the information provided (Morris, 2007; Taber and Lodge, 2012). Individuals’ reactions to being exposed to issues vary depending on how strong their prior opinions are (Leeper and Slothuus, 2014). A study that looked at people’s reactions to the EU showed that exposure to media coverage of the issue polarized individuals who had already held strong partisan opinions (Wojcieszak et al, 2017). The diversification of the media (more cable news and online sources) may also drive polarization of the public. In contrast to the past, there is no shared base of information that informs all the different political groups in a democracy due to the plethora of online sources. Research done in the US has found that conservatives and liberals do not consume information from the same sources. There is absolutely no overlap in the news sources they turn to, unlike in the past (Mitchell et al, 2014). Similar patterns can be observed in other Western democracies as well. This has led to citizens becoming increasingly polarized on political issues (Stroud, 2008). The media may also contribute to polarization through its symbiotic relationship with populism. The media may not intend to promote a populism or evoke a populist form of government, but it directly contributes to it by providing populist actors ample opportunities to communicate their messages (Mazzoleni, 2008; Krämer, 2014; Rooduijn et al, 2014). The media provides populist leaders with disproportional attention because of its focus on negativity, conflict and dramatics.

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Populist actors tend to be over-represented in the media both negatively and positively. The media is threatened by what populist leadership represents for media freedoms, but it (in particular the mass media) is also captivated by populist actors due to the preference for sensationalism, scandals and conflicts. The media may legitimize populist issues and fuel anti-elitist and anti-out-group sentiments, while simultaneously trying to tear down populist actors. Though there is not much empirical work on the media’s role in spreading populist ideas directly, a content analysis study of newspapers in the Netherlands over a twenty-eight-year period (1990–2017) found that there is clear evidence of the increasing presence of people-centric, anti-elitist stories and increasing coverage of populist actors (Hameleers and Vliegenthart, 2020). The media’s constant focus on populist messages and actors has a differential effect on citizens, which contributes to polarization (Bos et al, 2013; Hameleers et al, 2017). Repeated exposure to populism may irritate those who do not identify with that worldview, while resonating strongly with and priming those who do, and thus driving polarization (Krämer, 2014). This is similar to the argument that greater exposure to issues can have a polarizing effect. As Chapter 3 explained, ideological polarization has a negative impact on society and democracy, diminishing the norms of tolerance, acceptance and political and interpersonal trust.

Conclusion Theoretically, the media has an important role in a democracy as a source of unbiased information that educates the public and holds the government to account. Because of the valuable role that the media plays in exposing abuses of power, it is likely to be the first target of any would-be autocrat. Aspiring autocratic leaders today have become more adept at discrediting and impairing the media, while also flooding the public with counter-narratives. Controlling information and narratives is critical to convincing the public that democratic norms – once deeply engrained – should be abandoned. The changes to the media that have prioritized sensationalism over educating and informing aid this process. This chapter laid out the steps that would-be autocrats take to undermine various forms of discursive and diagonal accountability. The toolkit that leaders use starts with a smear campaign to create a post-truth environment, where anything that the mainstream media reports is delegitimized. This is then followed by a host of different tactics to hollow out the media such as firing, threatening and arresting journalists, enacting more restrictive laws on press freedom, exercising greater control over broadcasters both private and public and, finally, directly communicating with the public. Similar restrictive laws can also be used to limit the space for civil society. Once this has happened, the ground is prepared for a would-be autocrat to engage in power grabs without any pushback.

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In the next chapter, we detail the various power grabs that the executive engages in – in order to limit horizontal challenges to their power. This entails undermining the legislature and the judiciary, politicizing the administrative institutions and undercutting the watchdog agencies tasked with monitoring abuses of power. Though these processes sometimes take place simultaneously, power grabs are nearly impossible to execute without controlling information. KEY QUESTIONS 1. What is the difference between discursive and diagonal accountability? Why are they important in a democracy? 2. Should uncivil society be banned in a democracy? Why or why not? 3. Why does the public often believe a would-be autocrat over the mainstream media when the latter is critical of the former? 4. What tool in an incumbent’s toolkit is most effective in muzzling the media? Why is this strategy more effective than other methods? 5. Do you believe the media has accelerated democratic decay? Why or why not? Should any blame be assigned to the public’s interest in sensationalistic journalism?

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Assaults on Institutions Introduction More recent literature on democratic backsliding has shown increasing concern over executive aggrandizement. In the past, the process of undermining institutional checks and balances took place rapidly as the result of military coups.1 Since the Cold War ended, the risk of coups has decreased, while the accumulation of too much power in the hands of the executive is the biggest threat to democratic stability (Svolik, 2015). As this chapter will explain, democratic backsliding takes place because of the executive’s strategic manipulation of laws that weaken checks on executive power. This occurs in a piecemeal fashion, through a series of changes that usually happen within the confines of the law and which may seem innocuous in isolation. The leadership then gradually modifies governing institutions in ways that insulate them from any challenges. The chapter begins by explaining what horizontal accountability is and how legislative, judicial and administrative institutions are important in a democracy. It then clarifies how these institutions are weakened, both at the direction of the executive and because of their own inherent vulnerability. Eliminating checks on executive power is a clear marker of democratic backsliding (Huq and Ginsberg, 2017). The chapter details the discrete changes to formal and informal institutions and procedures that undermine the rule of law and accountability (Lust and Waldner, 2015). It also explains one of the key preconditions for autocratization – weak rule of law. Newer democracies often lack strong rule of law as a foundation, but we are also seeing rule of law erode in more consolidated democracies, well before autocratic power grabs have taken place.

Key concepts ‘Horizontal accountability’ involves state officials holding one another accountable for their actions (O’Donnell, 1998; Kenney, 2003; Mulgan, 2003; Bovens et al, 2014). The executive is scrutinized by state institutions, such as the legislature, the

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judiciary, anti-corruption agencies, general auditing commissions, ombudsmen and watchdogs. These state institutions are legally empowered to take action to engage in oversight, sanctions and/or impeachment when unlawful activity takes place (O’Donnell, 1999, 38).2 The executive must in turn explain its decisions to agencies, legislatures and courts, and in some cases can be overruled or sanctioned if it violates procedures. It is important to note that though horizontal accountability and ‘checks and balances’ are both designed to constrain the exercise of power, the two concepts are not the same. Checks and balances protect against total encroachment on institutional autonomy, while also constraining government institutions in setting and enacting policy. Furthermore, in contrast to horizontal accountability, checks and balances may also involve power-sharing (Madison, 1961). Horizontal accountability is the liability of governmental institutions to be sanctioned by other actors when they engage in illegal or improper activity. When the US Congress overrides a presidential veto, it is an example not of horizontal accountability, but of checks and balances. However, when the US Congress impeaches a president for criminal activity, it is an example of one branch holding the other branch to account for an abuse of power. Horizontal accountability depends on a legal system that provides for the exertion of checks and balances by other public entities. These state institutions will vary in terms of their legal ability to carry out executive oversight. Laws should empower agencies of accountability to carry out their functions as checks and balances, and be given the power or ability to impose sanctions for transgressions of the law (Schedler, 1999; Kenney, 2003). Horizontal accountability also depends on the strength and independence, relative to the executive, of these unelected institutions and agencies, such as the bureaucracy and the judiciary. Unlike legislatures, which are elected, bureaucratic institutions and courts are in theory not linked to the executive via the ruling political party. Elected institutions are more likely to be controlled or influenced by the executive, which puts pressure on the political opposition to ensure accountability (if the ruling party is united behind the executive). Agencies of horizontal accountability are only effective in monitoring the executive if these non-elected institutions are independent and politically neutral; they also should not be competing as an alternative to the government (Diamond, 2015). In some cases, the very agencies charged with holding the executive accountable are themselves appointed, removed and funded by the executive (Van Cranenburgh, 2009). For example, the Liberian Anti-Corruption Commission (LACC) was established in 2008, but its budget is determined by the executive branch that it is tasked with overseeing. Another challenge to horizontal accountability is when there is a fusion of the ruling party and the state, or when the unelected institutions are stacked with partisans. Finally an additional critical factor is how much information independent agencies are able to access to in order to properly hold other institutions to account.

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Executive aggrandizement In democracy, there is always a concern that the executive may become too powerful. This process is known as ‘executive aggrandizement’ or ‘executive degradation’. It involves a series of formal and informal institutional changes or power grabs by the executive that weaken or capture accountability mechanisms and undermine the power of the opposition to challenge the executive (Bermeo, 2016). Javier Corrales (2011, 70) writes that a power grab consists of an ‘expansion of control over crucial political institutions’. The outcome of these power grabs engineered by the executive is democratic backsliding. Unlike in the past, autocratization today is brought about not by immediately and dramatically invoking emergency powers, but by defying conventions or unspoken rules that were not legally required (Balkin, 2017). This is sometimes referred to as ‘constitutional hardball’. In the US, Donald Trump stretched the boundaries of executive power by simply ignoring legislative requests and refusing to accept legislative oversight in the face of impeachment. Executive aggrandizement also entails using the rules to make incremental changes that may go unnoticed for years, but that can lay the groundwork for more serious changes later. During the AKP’s first five years in power, it made a series of incremental assaults on the Turkish Constitution before the historic referendum in 2007. Significant incremental assaults on mechanisms that ensure executive accountability have also occurred in the US, South Africa, India, Israel and, to a much greater degree, Poland. While making these small incremental changes to formal and informal rules, elected would-be autocrats delegitimize and/or politicize accountability mechanisms. In addition to dismantling sources of discursive accountability such as the media or civil society (see Chapter 9), agents of horizontal accountability are attacked for being corrupt, partisan, elitist, treasonous or part of the ‘deep state’ (Halmai, 2018; Sadurski, 2018). The end result is something known as ‘presidential or executive hegemony’, wherein the executive branch has neutralized the power of the legislature, judiciary and other independent agencies. It is not necessarily important for the executive’s formal constitutional powers to have changed; if the executive has de facto control over the other two branches of government and over independent agencies, it can do a lot of damage to democracy. These changes are often supported by newly elected constitutional assemblies or referenda to demonstrate that it was accomplished through a democratic mandate. As Milan Svolik (2015, 735) writes, ‘the accumulation of too much power in the hands of an incumbent seems to be a persistent threat to democratic stability’. Once checks and balances are weakened, the executive can adopt policies that further undermine the rights of the opposition and make more changes to the law. In Hungary, the legislative branch, which used to be separate from the executive branch, is now controlled by Viktor Orbán himself. From 2010 to

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2014, eighty-eight bills were introduced and voted on, and from 2011 and 2013, thirty-two cardinal laws that cover the most crucial aspects of Hungarian life were passed by the weak parliament. Any future parliament that might want to change these laws would require a two-thirds majority (Kornai, 2015). Changes to the constitution can also be permanent. Constitutions in consolidated democracies are usually fairly difficult to amend or suspend, but in democracies with ambiguous constitutions not propped up by a long history of democratic norms, a revamp, or at least authoritarian abuse by the executive, is more likely (Huq and Ginsberg, 2017). A change made to the Peruvian Constitution in 1993 created a unicameral national legislature that was easier for the executive (led at the time by Alberto Fujimori) to control. In Ecuador in 2008, Rafael Correa was able to engineer a new Constitution with 69 per cent support (Corrales, 2018). The earlier Constitution had already been fairly generous to the executive, and the new Constitution gave him additional powers. Correa was able to take advantage of the expansive powers of the old Constitution, which allowed him to call national referenda and partially veto or amend laws passed by the National Assembly, with a two-thirds majority needed to overrule him.

Legislative, judicial and administrative power and democracy In a healthy democracy, while the executive is charged with executing laws, ensuring order, enforcing rules and maintaining peace and good governance, the legislature is tasked with oversight of those functions and enacting legislation. Along with gathering information to develop new legislative proposals or amend existing statutes, the legislature also detects waste and evaluates programmes’ performance to ensure that policies reflect the public interest and that the administration is complying with legislative intent (Fish and Kroenig, 2009). The legislature also must ensure that the executive does not encroach on legislative authority and its ability to exercise oversight functions (Fish and Kroenig, 2009). Oversight involves scrutinizing the executive and its agencies to ensure that they are not abusing their power. The legislature should also have the power of summons over the executive branch and its officials, and the power of oversight over agencies of coercion such as the military, law enforcement and intelligence. The legislature should have the power to remove a president or prime minister, if necessary. Legislative confirmation should be required for the appointment of judges, ministers and other key officials, as well as to declare war and to ratify treaties with foreign countries. Legislatures are weakened when they lack the institutional capability to effectively scrutinize the executive. The legislature should also hold operational and institutional autonomy in order to resist executive encroachment. The legislature should be able to control the

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resources that finance its own internal operations (Fish et al, 2015). The executive should not have the power to impound funds that have been appropriated by the legislature. Additionally, the legislature should have the opportunity to legislate and make budgetary decisions and should be regularly in session. The legislature should have the power to initiate bills in all policy jurisdictions, and laws passed by the legislature should be wither veto-proof or subject to veto overrides. The legislature should also have the power to approve or abandon a proposal before it reaches the floor. The legislature alone, without the involvement of any other agencies, should be able to change the constitution, and the executive should not have the power to rule by decree. Legislative members should be elected, not appointed by the executive, and should be immune from dismissal by the executive (Chernykh et al, 2017). The legislature’s capacity is often measured in terms of the number of active standing committees, how much power these committees have and the quality of expert advice that they are afforded. Legislative capacity is also measured by the average experience of legislators and the percentage of legislators with a university education. The legislature should contain individuals who are highly experienced in policy-making, with no restrictions on re-election. A more capable legislature indicates better oversight capacity over the executive as well as more effective law-making. The re-election of incumbent legislators should be common enough that, at any given time, the legislature contains a significant number of highly experienced members (Fish and Kroenig, 2006). For example, Liberia is a country that attempted to democratize after many years of dictatorship, and one of the obstacles it faced to building a strong legislature is that the members had low levels of educational attainment. A study of the Liberian House of Representatives in 2006 found that half of the members lacked a college degree (Signé and Korha, 2016). This made it difficult for the representatives to impose horizontal accountability on the executive (and to provide vertical accountability by being able to communicate effectively with their constituencies). Additionally, low education rates also made it more difficult for the legislators to assert themselves and enact sound legislation. The Liberian legislature also had high turnover rates, which meant that most incumbents did not retain their seats. The legislature, therefore, was constantly filled with new and inexperienced members that did not have the skills necessary to exercise oversight over the executive. A strong, independent and institutionalized judiciary is another vital pillar of democracy. The courts are needed to interpret the constitution, maintain the rule of law, protect minority rights and check the executive. A strong judiciary needs to have the capacity to deliver high-quality, consistent decisions that help safeguard individual rights. Additionally the judiciary needs to be composed of quality judges who have been appointed by a meritocratic process and are independent from the executive. The judicial process should be efficient and accessible to all. Judicial independence is typically measured by how robust the

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appointment process is, the educational background and experience of the judges, their level of ethical training and the length and terms of their tenure. Independent, neutral bureaucratic agencies are also critical to sustaining democracy and keeping the executive in check. In a healthy democracy, administrative institutions are charged with administering the policies of the state, carrying out laws and enforcing government regulations. The bureaucracy is also an important check on power; it establishes the boundaries between private and public resources. Administrative institutions can be divided into two groups: those that deliver goods to citizens as mandated by government laws and policies, and those that are charged with overseeing the government, guarding citizens’ rights and preventing abuses of power. Thus, it is only the latter group that is tasked with horizontal accountability, while the former is focused on service delivery. Both, however, are supposed to be honest, transparent, objective, impartial and able to put the obligations of public service above personal or partisan interests. Administrative institutions meant for service delivery are essential to ensuring that government policies are translated into action. As a result, they affect the legitimacy of the regime and policy outcomes (Hyden et al, 2003). As they are also responsible for providing basic goods and services to citizens, poor service delivery can lead to lower levels of citizen satisfaction. Ideally, the civil service is staffed with professionals who are hired through a formal process, with lifelong employment and special laws covering the terms of their employment. They are also supposed to be impartial and not politically biased. Their employment should be affected only by their expertise and competence, not their political affiliations and connections. They should follow directions and procedures to carry out the mandates of the state to meet the needs of citizens. Civil servants are not elected, but gain their positions through an appointment process that should entail a rigorous, merit-based recruitment and training process (that may include a competitive exam). They should be properly paid and their promotion and demotions should be based on clear, transparent criteria and not subject to political interference (Ezrow and Frantz, 2013). Attempts to violate these appointment processes are signs of democratic decay. For example, one of the first decisions the Fidesz government made in Hungary was to annul a law in 2010 that required justification for the sacking of government employees (Enyedi, 2016). This ensured that the civil service was fully under the government’s control.

Signs of autocratization Assaults on the legislature The executive has many different methods by which it can chip away at legislative power, though this is affected by the strength of the ruling party. If the ruling party

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has a strong legislative majority (and is united), the executive has tremendous latitude. Would-be autocrats can take advantage of legislative majorities to push through a series of laws and actions that are difficult to undo. This has taken place in some Eastern European countries. In Hungary, a legislative majority enabled Viktor Orbán and the Fidesz party to exercise a great deal of power. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also used the AKP’s legislative majority in Turkey to enact laws with little pushback. During Erdoğan’s first two years in office, the government passed more than 500 laws (Lindstaedt, 2016). When it does not have a strong majority in the legislature, the executive may be skilled at co-opting the legislature. This give-and-take is fairly common in democracies, but more dangerously, it entails financial incentives to legislators in return for votes and submission to the executive will. This is particularly problematic if the executive is able to co-opt the opposition, since they are the most responsible for holding the executive to account. In newer democracies, where ideological commitment to party platforms is weaker, politicians can be co-opted or bribed more easily to create a pliant legislature. In Bangladesh, Prime Ministers Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina co-opted members of the legislature by allowing lawmakers to import cars tax-free. Hundreds of luxury cars were imported, depriving the National Board of Revenue of millions in tax revenues. In Nicaragua, former President Arnoldo Alemán (1997–2002) used illegal financial inducements to purchase the support of the legislature and push through a constitutional reform allowing him to make line-item changes to the 1995 Constitution without congressional oversight. When Daniel Ortega took back power in 2007, democratic decay accelerated as pressure was applied on his party as well as the opposition to toe the line (Thaler, 2017). Once the opposition has been co-opted, the legislature no longer has any power to check in the executive. In Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, the executive dominates the legislature, there is little legislative scrutiny over the executive and bills are passed without much debate (Emerson and Šedo, 2010). If the legislature is not pliant enough, a would-be autocrat can circumvent it and use referenda to enshrine their objectives. As long as leaders possess the communication skills needed to control the narrative, they can often convince the public to vote in support of their referenda, which would not normally pass the legislature. In Turkey, Erdoğan passed two dozen constitutional changes via national referendum in 2010. A series of other referenda altered the election rules and laws governing how political parties are recognized. In Venezuela, referenda were used to legitimize Chávez’s agenda. He submitted his agenda to fourteen national votes and won thirteen of them by large margins. These included rewriting the Constitution in 1999 and removing presidential term limits in 2009.

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SNAPSHOT: HOW POPULAR ARE REFERENDA? Some populist leaders have used referenda to legitimize power grabs and give the appearance that these moves are mandated by the people. Countries like Ecuador, Hungary, Turkey and Venezuela have been notably successful in doing so. Notwithstanding these exceptions, the use of referenda as a means of autocratization is rare are outside of Africa. Africa is the one region where referenda have played an important role in democratic backsliding, often by extending or eliminating term limits. This has predominantly been used in regimes that are already authoritarian, such as Guinea (2001), Chad (2005), Uganda (2005), the Republic of Congo (2015), Rwanda (2015), Burundi (2018) and Comoros (2018) (Collin, 2019). Though Brexit was one of the most notable referenda in Europe, for the most part, referenda have not been an effective tool for European populists to advance their policies or enact systemic change. Referenda have been more successful in semi-authoritarian and authoritarian regimes, such as when Putin submitted the annexation of Crimea to a popular vote in the territory weeks after he seized it from Ukraine. Not surprisingly, as many as 96 per cent of the voters supported this move (Qvortrup, 2016).

Would-be autocrats can also try to sidestep the legislature by manufacturing or inflating a threat to justify the use of emergency powers that would let them rule by decree. Emergency powers are legal acts that expand the power of the executive during times of crisis. Emergency provisions are common in democracies, in order to deal more effectively with national security threats that may require quick action (Ferejohn and Pasquino, 2004). However, recent scholarly work has noted that states of emergency are both a symptom and an accelerator of democratic decline (Lührmann and Rooney, 2019). The executive creates or exaggerates a threat, then uses it not only to justify more authoritarian decisionmaking but also to label any opposition as unpatriotic. For this reason, invoking emergency powers has been a common ploy of would-be autocrats. After a state of emergency is declared, it can continue well past the original duration of the declaration. Even if the opposition is ever able to take back power, it has little incentive to return to the old rules of democracy. In Peru, Fujimori ruled by decree in 1992 using the conflict with Shining Path as a pretext to make decisions unencumbered by the legislature. In Madagascar, President Didier Ratsiraka declared a state of emergency following protests against the 2001 election results. In Venezuela, amendments to the 1999 Constitution enabled Chávez to expand the emergency powers of the executive, which allowed him to rule by decree. Erdoğan declared a state of emergency in Turkey on 22 July 2016 due to the failed coup attempt. This gave him the power to rule by decree, helping him transform Turkey into a dictatorship (Esen and Gumuscu, 2017). Former President Nestor Kirchner (2003–2007) used the Necessity and

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Urgency Decrees in Argentina an average of sixty times per year (Capriata, 2008). In the Philippines, the ‘urgent’ threats from drug dealers and users has led President Rodrigo Duterte to threaten to rule by decree if necessary. Another way to counter the power of the legislature is to create a constituent assembly or a new parallel body to the legislature. Though this has never happened in a consolidated democracy, it has taken place in several developing democracies. In Ecuador, Correa used an April referendum, only about three months after his inauguration, to back a new constituent assembly, which passed with 82 per cent approval. By doing so, he was able to engineer the irregular removal of more than half of the legislature (Conaghan, 2008). In Senegal, President Abdoulaye Wade increased his powers by creating a new upper house that was dominated by his own appointees (Ottaway, 2013). Chávez eliminated Venezuela’s senate (where only about one third of the members supported him) and created an unelected twenty-one-person council that was loyal to him. Apart from the council, Venezuela was left with a unicameral national legislature that was easier for Chávez to control (Corrales, 2015). Once the executive has gained significant power, it can formally (or informally) dissolve the legislature. While dissolutions through a vote of no confidence and the call for new elections are commonplace in a parliamentary system, they are rare in presidential regimes, which typically have few constitutional procedures for dissolution. In Latin America, a region with mostly presidential systems, there have been many cases of the executive ordering the dissolution of the legislature even after the country transitioned to democracy, such as in Colombia (1991), Peru (1992) and Venezuela (1999). Though only a few Latin American constitutions empower the president to dissolve the legislature, some countries have made changes to permit it. For example, Ecuador’s 2009 constitution increased the executive’s power to dissolve the legislature and call new elections (Breuer, 2009). In addition to dissolving the legislature, would-be autocrats can also dismiss or strip legislative bodies of their original powers. In 2016, Ortega was able to dismiss twenty-eight opposition lawmakers from the Nicaraguan National Assembly, the only space in which the opposition could contest policy. In Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro used a newly created assembly to strip the opposition-controlled parliament of its legislative powers in 2017, setting off a constitutional crisis. In addition to these common assaults, any changes to the formal or informal power of the legislature are examples of democratic backsliding. These include: • • • • •

removing or ignoring the legislature’s power to appoint ministers and judges removing or ignoring the legislature’s power to declare war removing or ignoring the legislature’s control over its own resources removing the legislature’s power to pass laws and set the budget removing or ignoring the legislature’s power to investigate and summon the executive • removing legislative veto power

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• removing or disregarding the legislature’s power of oversight over the agencies of coercion. In some cases, the constitution is already set up in ways that afford the executive much greater power over the legislature. In developing countries, executives can enjoy a large advantage, particularly in presidential systems. Most agencies of the state fall under their control, and executives may have influence over the judiciaries as well. Additionally, many grey-zone regimes have legislatures that are more subservient than active. In some cases, the executive makes legal or de facto changes to amplify its power. Before Duterte took over as the president of the Philippines, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo asserted her power in questionable ways. For example, she issued executive orders without prior legislative approval and manoeuvred to control appointments to key public offices intended to counterbalance her authority (Rose-Ackerman and Desierto, 2011).

Assaults on the judiciary The judiciary is another prime target for would-be autocrats (Gibler and Randazzo, 2011; Bermeo, 2016). With greater influence over the judiciary, leaders can use the courts and the semblance of the rule of law to remove barriers to their power and opportunistically target their opponents (Levitsky and Loxton, 2013). For the most part, judiciaries in democracies around the world have been able to check isolated and egregious acts of abuses of power of the executive. However, judiciaries are less effective in preventing systemic challenges from a constant stream of micro-assaults, none of which look particularly detrimental when examined in isolation. One way of influencing the judiciary is to find ways to change the composition of the judiciary. Executives can force out individuals who are not pliant to the executive so that the courts can be stacked with more loyal individuals. This can be accomplished by reducing the retirement age of judges, inducing judges to retire or leave, threatening them so that they retire and/or making changes to how judges are hired and promoted. If that does not work, the executive can try to appoint more high-level judges to increase the size of the courts or can create an entirely new body composed of loyal supporters. Carlos Menem wanted to change the composition of Argentina’s courts, and tried to coax unfriendly judges with lifetime tenure to leave, luring them with promises of more prestigious posts (Verbitsky and Zaffaroni, 1993). When this tactic only worked with one judge, he then changed the number of Supreme Court judges from five to nine, packing the courts with friendly judges. In Poland, the Law and Justice Party appointed five new members to the Constitutional Court while refusing to swear in three other judges who had been appointed by the previous government (Sadurski, 2019).

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Judges may also be forced to take loyalty oaths. If they do not comply they are either sacked or pressured to step down, as was the case with Bangladesh’s Chief Justice, who retired in 2017. Other judges were purged and replaced by Awami League loyalists. In Peru, Fujimori sacked the Constitutional Court’s justices when they challenged him and replaced them with loyalists. In Nicaragua, Ortega packed the courts and then had his appointees on the bench exempt him from the Constitution’s ban on immediate re-election (Weyland, 2013). Leaders may also drive out unsupportive judges by accusing them of corruption. In the Philippines, Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno was impeached in May 2018 after Duterte declared that she had not declared her assets and liabilities. In her place, he installed a loyalist (Villamor, 2018). Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa appointed Shirani Bandaranayake Chief Justice in May 2011, and she initially contributed to rulings that strengthened executive power. However, she ruled against the executive’s desire to create a new development department that would allow for $600 million to be overseen by Rajapaksa’s brother Basil. In response, Rajapaksa set up a committee comprised of politicians from his party that found her guilty of financial misconduct, circumventing the normal impeachment process. Though civil society groups objected, Rajapaksa quickly signed an order removing her (DeVotta, 2013). Making changes to the appointment process makes the damage more permanent. Sri Lanka had a Constitutional Council to appoint Supreme Court judges and other key members of the justice department. Rajapaksa’s party passed the 18th  amendment to the Constitution, empowering the president to make these appointments instead (Karunatilake, 2020). Bolivia too changed its Constitution in 2009 to remove congressional obstacles to presidential appointments. President Evo Morales used this to politicize the justice system by appointing loyal supporters as judges and prosecutors. He then engineered the direct election of judges in 2011, which created greater executive dominance over the judicial branch (Driscoll and Nelson, 2012). The Turkish government passed legislation in 2014 giving the justice minister the power to directly appoint members to the High Council of Judges and to control the inspection board that disciplines judges. Within six months, more than 3,000 sitting judges had been removed. In 2010, the ruling AKP undertook its most notable change on this front, with a referendum increasing the number of Constitutional Court judges from eleven to seventeen, then packing the court with AKP loyalists in an attempt to control threats from secular establishments. Chávez added twelve seats to the Venezuelan Supreme Court in 2004 to ensure that the now thirty-two-seat tribunal was filled with government supporters. The justices all pledged a commitment to Chávez’s agenda (Corrales and PenfoldBecerra, 2011). In Hungary, the ruling coalition dismissed the president of the Supreme Court before his mandate expired and created a new institution in its place. To ensure that this new court was much less likely to challenge the regime, Hungary lowered

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the judicial retirement age from seventy to sixty-two, which forced hundreds of judges out of the courts (Kornai, 2015).3 A former member of Orbán’s party was appointed to be chief prosecutor and Orbán filled the Constitutional Court with his supporters. In addition to changing the composition of the courts, the executive may try to limit the power of the courts and give itself greater authority over the judiciary. Some of the most notable changes of this type have taken place in Hungary, where a new Constitution has made the Constitutional Court in Hungary less effective, giving the government carte blanche to pass laws without restrictions. In the case of Poland, the Law and Justice Party enacted an amendment to the Constitutional Tribunal Act, which required a two-thirds majority in the courts for its decisions to be binding. Other ways of limiting the power of the courts is to restrict the jurisdiction of judges. Executives can also reduce the salary of judges or withhold resources that courts badly need in exchange for political support. In weaker democracies, executives may not need to make any official changes to the rules or composition of the courts, but can regularly interfere in judicial decisions due to weak judicial norms. In the Philippines, politicians have called applicants for judgeships to ask what judges would do in return if their nomination was supported. In Sri Lanka too, the judiciary has had to grapple with ‘telephone justice’, where someone from the office of the president or the attorney general calls judges and tells them how to rule on specific cases. Latin American legal systems have historically seen considerable executive interference with the courts and judicial nominations. For example, the executive has played a significant role controlling the court system in Colombia, as the president has discretion to veto decisions by the Supreme Court on whether criminals can be extradited or not.

Assault on administrative institutions and agencies One of the primary pathways of democratic decline is the decreasing separation of powers between the administrative services and the executive (Huq and Ginsberg, 2017). Thus, another marker of democratic backsliding is when the executive gets involved in staffing decisions that punish the competent in order to politicize the civil service. When the promotion and hiring of civil servants is driven by loyalty, or by political affiliations or connections, there is no separation between the private sphere and the official sphere. Fidesz in Hungary has taken the patronage system to an extreme – only companies and individuals with connections to the party can obtain contracts or support from the state (Ágh, 2016). The state becomes not only politicized, but personalized for the executive in order to allow it to exploit its political power. Additionally, when personal and political connections drive hiring and promotion decisions, there is little incentive for civil servants to be well-trained (Evans, 1992). The civil service thus loses competence and fails to deliver

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services effectively. Greater political interference in administrative institutions also makes the civil service more bloated and inefficient. A vicious cycle can emerge, wherein every time a new regime comes to power, civil servants that are not viewed as politically loyal to it are removed to make way for those that are, increasing inefficiencies in service delivery (Farazmand, 2002). Weakening civil service tenure protections is another way for an executive to expand its power vis-à-vis administrative institutions. By doing so, it sends a clear message that the best way to keep one’s job is to remain loyal. In more extreme cases, civil servants are immediately dismissed due to their lack of political loyalty. In Turkey, Erdoğan undermined the state with a series of purges, the scale of which was unprecedented. After the 2016 coup attempt, Erdoğan purged the government of tens of thousands of civil servants, teachers and judges suspected of being disloyal (Kirby, 2016). When government workers hired on the basis of merit are replaced by partisans, a potential check on executive power is removed. The executive can also use the bureaucracy as a means of ensuring loyalty, utilizing the state to supply jobs and dole out patronage to supporters. If significant state resources are used to buy citizens’ support, it may make electoral rotation nearly impossible. In Brazil, the president has the power to appoint thousands of officials, whereas the Japanese prime minister can only make a few dozen such appointments. For this reason, the Brazilian state is referred to as the cabide de emprego (source of jobs) (Ezrow and Frantz, 2013). In the late nineteenth century, the US federal government was characterized by a high degree of party-managed clientelism, creating the risk of devolving into corruption. Patronage-based state structures can be used to buy support from political elites and citizens in ways that undermines electoral mechanisms. In many new democracies, the administrative institutions never become fully institutionalized and professionalized. In Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia, the civil services are filled with party associates (Džankić and Keil, 2017). The state remains the biggest employer, and hiring is linked to party affiliation and leads to an extension of executive power. In Lebanon, political affiliations, often based on sectarian identities, have always dominated the appointment of civil servants. Those that are loyal to their patron and who enjoy the support of an influential political figure cannot be controlled by their superiors. Salaries are also based not on performance, but on political loyalties (Leenders, 2012). Historically, sectarianbased recruitment, known as wasta, has driven administrative appointments to the Lebanese bureaucracy. The practice of baksheesh, meaning fees or bribes for government services, is also important (Jabbra, 1976; Parle and Kisirwani, 1987). Rampant corruption has led to poor delivery of basic services, resulting in high public resentment. Protests erupted in 2019 over perceived chronic government mismanagement over decades. In India and Pakistan, we see evidence of ‘institutional decay’, meaning administrative institutions have become more clientelistic over time. When India became independent, the state was noted for having a ‘venerable bureaucracy’

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(Evans, 1992, 172). Entry into the civil service was a competitive process based on merit. Since independence, however, administrative institutions slowly eroded due to constant interference by politicians. The bureaucracy was used to create jobs and revenue for friends (Sondhi, 2000). Because jobs were based on political connections, there was little incentive to acquire skills and expertise to deliver services. There was also little disciplinary action for misconduct (Dwivedi and Jain, 1988). The Pakistani bureaucracy was also once a prestigious institution, retaining control over selection and training of its members. Today, the recruitment process is no longer transparent and jobs are given out based on loyalty rather than merit. Political interference became commonplace under civilian leader Zulfikar Bhutto (1971–1977). When he came to power over 1,300 civil servants were purged, including some of the most experienced and competent personnel. In their place, his Pakistan People’s Party created a ‘lateral entry’ programme to staff the administration with party loyalists. Additionally, close associates and relatives of Bhutto filled the high-level administrative positions that had opened up (Khan, 2007). These practices continued after Bhutto, making it nearly impossible to gain a civil service post without the support of a political patron. Subsequent military leaders such as General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (1978–1988) and General Pervez Musharraf (2001–2008) ordered that at least 20 per cent of the administrative institutions must be filled by members of the armed forces. Members of the military were given senior positions regardless of their administrative qualifications or experience (Wilder, 2009). This led to a deterioration in the work ethic of the civil service and seriously undermined the welfare of Pakistani citizens. In Venezuela, although the bureaucracy had already been suffering from high levels of corruption, it reached new heights of politicization during the Chávez years. He deliberately weakened the state’s institutions and filled the bureaucracy and high-level government positions with his associates. Merit, expertise and experience were not used as criteria for promotion or appointment to administrative positions (Corrales and Penfold, 2015). The military was used instead of administrative institutions to deliver goods and services. These programmes were now operating independently of their related government ministries. By doing so, previously privileged groups lost their influence, access and patronage, but institutional capacity was also weakened even further. In many countries, bureaucratic autonomy is not constitutionally protected. There may be laws meant to prevent the politicization of the bureaucracy but there are tools for the executive to undermine them. For example, presidents can appoint people to head agencies although they are opposed to the missions of those agencies. This means that the new head would be able to resist staff initiatives. The US Constitution does not provide for a public service or civil service commission to govern public employment. However, some reforms took place as a reaction to the Jacksonian spoils system where presidents used their position of power to distribute government jobs. The Pendleton Act of 1883

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stipulated that Congress must use a merit-based recruitment and promotion process. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 prohibited agencies from taking personnel actions that undermine merit. There is also a Merit Systems Protection Board, to hear appeals of personnel decisions (Theriault, 2003). For example, when President George W. Bush’s administration sought to hire career staff on the basis of political affiliation, the Office of the Inspector General released a critical report and referred its findings to the US Attorney’s office (Conyers, 2009; CREW, 2020).4

SNAPSHOT: THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION AND INDEPENDENT ADJUDICATION AGENCIES The executive branch in the US includes independent agencies that conduct highprofile adjudications, or trial-like disputes such as granting asylum or deciding on benefits for veterans. There are about 12,000 agency adjudicators across the federal bureaucracy, compared to 870 permanently authorized federal court judges. These independent adjudicators decide more than 750,000 cases each year (Shane, 2020). They are independent because the president cannot dismiss them at will – they can only be removed if involved in wrongdoing, such as neglect of office or malfeasance. Trump and the Department of Justice have been prodding the Supreme Court to decide that the president’s lack of authority to remove independent adjudicators from office is unconstitutional and that instead, any failure to follow a presidential directive would be grounds for dismissal. In addition to affecting many cases facing asylum seekers, this change would also effectively end the independence of the Federal Reserve system, which had been a thorn in Trump’s side (Shane, 2020).

When public employment is not transparent or merit-based, the executive can assume greater control over it. This may ensure that policies that the executive prefers are always executed. Some agencies tasked with service delivery can be weaponized against political opponents, such as using tax agencies to audit media outlets that are critical of the executive, as was the done in Argentina under Christina Fernández de Kirchner (Weyland, 2013). In other cases, the main impact is rampant corruption, which weakens institutional bonds between the public and the state. Poorly trained and inexperienced, but politically loyal civil servants are unable to properly carry out their duties, which essentially means that citizens are not being properly represented. These agencies may also be incapacitated by resource shortages (Kuris, 2015). Agencies that try to resist political pressure by leaking information or refusing to cooperate with orders may see their powers stripped. This can take place not only by reducing resources and restructuring them, but also by challenging them in the courts. Trump has stripped the US Environmental Protection Agency of

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31 per cent of its funding because it was at odds with his pro-coal agenda (Office of Management and Budget, 2017).

Assault on bureaucratic watchdog agencies To successfully augment executive power, would-be autocrats need to ensure that internal monitors or auditors of governmental illegality are disabled, politicized or controlled. This enables them to direct formidable prosecutorial and investigative apparatuses against political foes. Democracies should have institutions and measures in place that ensure that auditors or ombudsman agencies have sufficient independence to effectively check and exercise oversight over the government. However, by politicizing or controlling watchdog agencies, the executive can ensure that it is never investigated, prosecuted or punished for misconduct. The executive may also use these agencies to investigate political opponents. For example, former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra used a pliant watchdog agency to carry out witch-hunts on his opponents, mainly targeting journalists (Mutebi, 2003). Would-be autocrats make anti-corruption agencies, watchdog agencies and auditors general their primary targets. In South Africa, former President Jacob Zuma was able to take control of the National Prosecuting Authority. Controlling this agency enabled him to fend off corruption charges against himself. After dealing with an auditor general who was critical of the levels of corruption in her administration, Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf used her power to appoint one who was more loyal in 2011. In Bangladesh, politicized watchdog agencies have nullified corruption cases against members of the ruling Awami League, while those against opposition figures have proceeded at great speed (Islam, 2013). In Hungary, Orbán moved quickly to take control over supervisory bodies, such as the Budget Commission, the Media Board and the Ombudsman offices. Officials were removed to make way for Fidesz loyalists. Orbán also created his own court of public administration to oversee cases related to corruption, electoral laws and the right to protest (Novak and Kingsley, 2018). In Venezuela, after Chávez rewrote the Constitution to give the president sweeping powers in 1999, he used his appointment power to fill independent watchdog organizations with those loyal to him (Corrales and Penfold-Becerra, 2011). In Ecuador, Correa filled the Ombudsman office with individuals aligned with him. Politicization of watchdog agencies in Poland has led to accusations of favourable treatment of the ruling party (Kuris, 2015). In the Philippines, the executive appoints members of the oversight agencies, which enables the president to control their activities. Oversight agencies have suffered from financial and administrative constraints. At other times, their work has been undermined by political interference. As a result, they have been highly ineffective. For instance, the Office of the Ombudsman has failed to catch any

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‘large fish’ for twenty years and has a conviction rate of under 15 per cent (Dressel, 2011). Thaksin captured key state regulatory institutions by staffing them with individuals aligned with him. With a politically loyal upper house, Thaksin then appointed loyalists, relatives and friends to independent agencies that were created by the Constitution to oversee corruption and abuses of power, thus ensuring that there was no independent body to check his behaviour (Mutebi, 2008).

Box 10.1: Electoral commissions If elections are the cornerstones of democracies, then it is of paramount importance to ensure that there are free and fair. Electoral commissions or watchdogs protect democracy directly. Significant organization, training and oversight is required to conduct fair elections. In many advanced democracies, elections are administered by local institutions that work within government offices, or are in some cases are supervised by a judiciary body (Pastor, 1999). The elections are essentially run by the executive branch and then certified by the legislature. In newer democracies however, the administration of elections is managed by an independent electoral commission, in order to avoid any possible electoral manipulation. This may consist of an independent election commission that is managed by experts, judges or bureaucrats but directly accountable to the legislature, or a commission that is composed of all the political parties. Sometimes the electoral commission is comprised of a list of nonpartisan, distinguished individuals from a list proposed by the president and legislature, and selected by a group of judges for a specific term. In spite of the way elections are run in advanced democracies, the trend for newer democracies during the third wave of democratization was to place more responsibility for conducting elections in the hands of independent electoral commissions. Almost all new democracies in Eastern Europe used independent commissions, as did many in Africa. In Latin America, there is more diversity. Mexico’s electoral commission has gradually become more independent. For decades, it was simply an instrument of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) government and there was widespread distrust of the electoral process. Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay have independent election commissions, but they operate within the judicial branch (Lehoucq, 2002). Several new democracies, such as Costa Rica and India, established electoral commissions right after the Second World War. India’s chief election officer was a career civil servant appointed by the president but insulated from parliament. The first chairperson, Sukumar Sen, was able to set a tone of impartiality and established a reputation for fairness in the 1950s and 1960s (Pastor, 1999). Electoral commissions are not as important in consolidated democracies where people have confidence in the fairness of elections, and citizens often take for granted that elections are fairly conducted. However, they play an important role in countries where voters assume that the conduct of elections is manipulated to serve the incumbent. Electoral commissions take the decisions away from the direct influence of partisans and ensure that the electoral

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process is transparent and fair (Lehoucq, 2002). Their decisions have to be justified by strict guidelines that have had to be accepted by those on all sides of politics, and if they fail to do so, there may be a public outcry (Pettit, 2004). In countries where elections are highstakes affairs, it is more challenging a peaceful election. By having a neutral actor endorse the winner of the election, post-election disputes, particularly in presidential systems, can be avoided (Svolik and Chernykh, 2015). If the elections are deemed unfair, not only is there public objection, but it also raises the chance of later election boycotts and disengagement from politics. According to Robert Pastor (1999), for electoral commissions to be effective they have to perform many tasks ahead of the election, on election day and after the election. Pre-election tasks include designing a system to appoint and train registration and election officials; delineating the boundaries of voting areas; designing a voter registration system; establishing voting sites and notifying voters of them; registering voters; collecting information on voters; processing this information into voter identification cards; finalizing the registration list and sending copies to voting sites; registering and qualifying political parties and candidates; establishing and enforcing rules regarding campaigning, access to the media and financing; ensuring voter security at polling stations; developing rules for election observation by domestic and international monitors; and producing election materials and delivering them to designated voting sites. On election day, polling officials need to certify that voters are on the registration list and are able to vote privately; monitor all voting sites on the day; ensure ballots are counted carefully and in the presence of monitors from all political parties; and deliver results to sub-regional offices and the national election commission as soon as possible. Post-election, any complaints should be investigated and the final count certified. In new democracies, officials are often poorly trained and ill-equipped to carry out these tasks. For example, voter registration lists are often a point of contention. Opposition parties might complain that the incumbent government is preventing their supporters from registering to vote or listing their names at the wrong polling station. When this happens due to state weakness or incompetence, it is referred to as electoral mispractice; when it happens intentionally, at the behest of the executive, it constitutes electoral malpractice or strategic manipulation of elections (the next chapter goes into these tactics in greater depth). Gaining control over the electoral commission could be considered the last step in ensuring that the executive is able to retain power indefinitely where elections are close. In Liberia, Sirleaf appointed James Kokoya, a loyal partisan, to be chair of the National Election Commission after he lost his seat in the House of Representatives (Signé and Korha, 2016). In Peru, Fujimori broke down the electoral commission into three agencies that he could better control (Lehoucq, 2002). Venezuela’s National Electoral Commission was also placed under Chávez’s control and was filled with regime loyalists (Corrales and Penfold-Becerra, 2011). Members of Hungary’s National Election Commission are appointed for nine-year

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terms by the parliament, but since the ruling Fidesz party has a two-thirds majority in parliament, observers say that all its current members, including the chairman, are Fidesz loyalists (Bánkuti et al, 2012). There was also no formal parliamentary debate or public consultation process in the selection of its members. All tough decisions have gone in Fidesz’s favour (Kornai, 2015).

Precursors: rule of law decay Just as a strong media is important to ensuring discursive accountability, the rule of law is critical to ensuring horizontal accountability. For that reason, the rule of law is considered inextricably linked to democracy. The rule of law can exist in theory, but its practical application is more important for deterring corruption and abuses of power. Where the rule of law is already shaky, it becomes that much easier for would-be autocrats to engage in executive aggrandizement. When the rule of law is weak and corruption is rampant, further power grabs may go unnoticed by the public. For example, Hungary’s rule of law score was already on a downward trend before 2006, a full election cycle before Viktor Orbán came to power. In the next section, we explain how weak rule of law may facilitate executive aggrandizement.

Weak rule of law The rule of law involves equal enforcement of the law for everyone, including officials that work for the state. No one – including private and public institutions, persons and entities – should be above the law. Administrative, judicial and security institutions should be working to ensure that laws are applied fairly and enforced properly, and should assume responsibility for errors. The laws of the state should be supreme and not overshadowed by informal laws enforced by local power centres, such as organized criminal groups. The laws also need to be evenly applied to protect fundamental rights, including security, property and core human rights. Laws need to be clear, publicly available and accessible in all languages. Changes to the laws should take place using established procedures, and should not be based on short-term whims or self-interest (Gibson, 2006). Laws also cannot be used to punish individuals retroactively for past transgressions. Finally, there needs to be equal access to justice delivered in a timely fashion by competent, independent and ethical personnel. Chronic inefficiencies, deteriorating court facilities and outdated filing systems create backlogs that undermine the rule of law. Individuals need to be able to access justice without unaffordable fees or unreasonable procedural hurdles. The rule of law of law is a critical factor in the advancement of democracy because it is rooted in equal rights, and ensures that various types of accountability

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are enforced. It helps to defend political and civil rights, and the procedures of democracy. It also supports inclusiveness. The rule of law also limits the arbitrary exercise of power. Weak rule of law, which permits lawlessness and abuse of power, leads to less political participation, less protection of individual rights, elections that are less competitive and more rampant corruption (Diamond and Morlino, 2004). The efficient application of the law should be distinguished from the rule of law, as the former does not stress the requirement that the government be subordinated to the law (Carothers, 1998). In non-democratic regimes, the law exists not to limit state power but to help enforce it. In democracies, the rule of law is in place to ensure that no one is above the law, and that political and civil liberties are protected. It constrains both citizens and leaders – and is universal (Gibson, 2006). In weaker democracies, the rule of law is challenged frequently. The constitution may have little meaning in practice. Individuals may not have access to fair trials. Officials may not accept that the laws that apply to citizens also apply to themselves. Judges may be partial, and subject to manipulation or influence. Brazil’s Supreme Court judges, for example, have faced accusations of being partisan for years now (Prillaman, 2000). Critics charge that the court has offered judgements that, while cloaked in the impartial language of justice, are based on its personal and political views. As a result, the Brazilian justice system has been accused of increasing political polarization and democratic decay (Daly, 2018). Things worsened after the death of Justice Teori Zavascki in January 2017. This allowed then President Michel Temer to appoint a political ally, Justice Alexandre de Moraes, a man who lacked the credentials and objectivity for the position. Another justice, Gilmar Mendes, was also viewed as a Temer ally. These appointments led to declining confidence in the courts. When the judicial institutions are politicized and are in harmony with the incumbent, the executive can become above the law. Without a judiciary to exercise horizontal accountability, there may be little to stop the executive from abusing its power. Additionally, the rule of law is not evenly applied in many countries, a phenomenon sometimes referred to as ‘discriminatory legalism’. In Latin America, there is a tradition of ignoring the law in order to favour the strong and the privileged, while repressing the weak and giving the powerful legal impunity. Brazil’s former President Getúlio Vargas (1930–1945, 1950–1954) claimed, ‘For my friends, everything; for my enemies, the law’ (Plummer, 2005). National traditions of some individuals being above the law undermine democracy. In Brazil, a 2017 law assures that members of the armed forces and the police will be tried in military courts, where they might receive preferential treatment, rather than in civilian courts. By contrast, Venezuela is increasingly using military courts to try citizens (D’Araujo, 2019). In Egypt, a 2014 law stipulates that military courts have jurisdiction over alleged crimes taking place on public lands, which has led to thousands of civilians being tried in military courts (Human Rights Watch, 2016).5 In some countries, access to justice is also uneven. The poor often have far less access to the justice system than those who are wealthy and well connected. The

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system should behave uniformly towards all classes and groups. For example, the judiciary should ensure that the poor, the illiterate and other deprived individuals and groups have equal access to the courts and to competent legal counsel. In Brazil, access to justice varies due to high levels of income inequality. The state does not adequately provide legal counsel for impoverished defendants. The courts are also overburdened and severely backlogged with cases. In South Africa, there is a shortage of judicial staff and little support for poor defendants. Due to backlogs, many defendants wait months for their trials to begin, and some are held for years (Kreis et al, 2016). Latinobarómetro surveys have shown that confidence in the rule of law and the justice system is low, which has affected confidence in other government institutions (LAPOP, 2016). Countries with pre-existing weak rule of law are more susceptible to backsliding, because the public is more accustomed to breaches of the law. Societies differ in terms of how much they value the law and believe that laws should matter. When the rule of law is not consistently applied, society may be more likely to reject the need to adhere to laws; strong social norms are critical to effective implementation. Surveys that measure the public’s commitment to the rule of law ask a series of questions about how necessary it is to obey an unjust law, whether it is better to ignore the law to solve problems, and whether the government should be allowed to bend the law in some cases. Societies that do not believe as strongly in the rule of law are more likely to support elites when they breach it (Gibson, 2006). Lower levels of support for the rule of law enable a would-be autocrat to circumvent, avoid or violate the rule of law more easily. Citizens and elites may be more predisposed to looking the other way or even consenting to infringements. Since 9/11 there has been greater support among US citizens for deviations from the strict application of the law. This has been legitimized by US elites, laying the groundwork for the rule of law to be further undermined. Where the rule of law has already been challenged, it becomes easier for populist demagogues to convince the public that sacrifices of the rule of law are necessary to further their goals (Mounk, 2018).

Case study: The perils of presidentialism? Presidential systems have been singled out as being more prone to backsliding (Linz, 1990). Presidential systems are more prone to crisis – they divide legitimacy between the executive and the legislature; have fixed terms and can lead to political stalemates; have winner-takesall rules that can cultivate an authoritarian presidential style. M. Steven Fish (1997) asserts that, going by post-communist cases, presidents prefer to have more power and will take opportunities to expand their powers. In many new democracies, presidents are largely above the law and have a small elite group that

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becomes narrower with time. Policies are pursued to weaken the opposition, legislature and judiciary. Many studies argue that parliamentary systems are better for ensuring democratic consolidation and the survival of democratic governance (Linz, 1990; Linz and Valenzuela, 1994; Linz and Stepan, 1996; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 2013). Further quantitative analyses have also supported parliamentarianism (Hadenius, 1994; Cheibub et al, 1996) or found no evidence to support one regime type (Power and Gasiorowski, 1997). Nevertheless, other scholars have defended presidentialism (Horowitz, 1990; Shugart and Carey, 1992; Mainwaring, 1993). We next explain the key criticisms and benefits of both presidential and parliamentary systems. Presidential systems and parliamentary systems Presidents are directly elected by the public and serve as both the chief executive and the head of state. The job of running the country is usually listed in the Constitution, and in presidential systems there is supposed to be a separation of powers between the executive and the legislative branch. A presidential system usually has a fixed term of office with elections held at scheduled times that cannot be triggered by a vote of confidence. The president usually cannot introduce bills and is not a voting member of the legislative branch. In parliamentary systems, the legislative and the executive branches are combined, and there is no separation of powers. The legislative branch can elect and dismiss the prime minister and the executive is constitutionally responsible to the legislative branch. Presidential systems have been critiqued for being rigid and prone to instability. Presidential systems are prone to democratic breakdown in new democracies because getting rid of presidents is nearly impossible unless they have committed a crime (Linz and Valenzuela, 1994). A fixed term in office also means that there is little flexibility if there is a problem. This rigidity may lead to new democracies resorting to military coups to get rid of a president. Milan Svolik (2008, 2015) finds that presidential executives have a large, negative and independent effect on the chances of democratic consolidation. Svolik explains that this is because executive power can more easily be abused in presidential systems.6 The case of Turkey illustrates how presidential systems can be easily exploited. Turkey had a parliamentary system (with a prime minister and a president), but it changed to a hyperpresidential system in April 2017. It gave the president the power to issue decrees, declare emergency rule, appoint ministers and dissolve the parliament. While serving as prime minister, Erdoğan ensured that the president would be directly elected, and handily won the presidency in August 2014. Within three years, Erdoğan was able to plan a referendum to give the largely ceremonial position extensive powers. According to these critiques, presidential systems may be more prone to personalism (see Chapter 1). Guillermo O’Donnell (1994) holds that presidential systems are more likely to become ‘delegative democracies’, or democracies with low levels of horizontal accountability.

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The reason may be that presidentialism can be a partial legacy of military rule. Legislatures and parties are very weak in relation to the president. On the other hand, gridlock between the president and the legislature can lead to policy paralysis. Because the legislature and president in presidential systems have fixed and separate mandates, gridlock may lead the president to bypass the legislature and rule by decree. Moreover, because the president is directly elected, presidential systems may lead to the election of unqualified individuals who are not knowledgeable or experienced but happen to be charismatic and popular with voters. Presidential elections are high-stakes affairs since there is only one winner (Linz, 1990). In parliamentary systems, a defeated candidate can continue to be a member of the legislature. Nevertheless, empirical research is not unanimous on the effects of presidentialism on democratic survival (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997; Przeworski et al, 2000). Proponents of presidential systems argue that the separation of powers places a greater check on decisionmaking (Shugart and Carey, 1992). Another argument is that presidential systems can be more decisive and stable (Mainwaring, 1993). Presidential systems give votes a wider range of choices, and potentially more accountability and ability to identify whom to reward or punish. In a weak democracy with weak parties, the president might be the only elected official with a national constituency. As a result, the president may have stronger incentives to promote broad-based public goods. Other studies find that the effects of presidentialism are dependent upon other factors. Carles Boix (2003), for instance, finds that the effect of presidentialism on democratic survival depends on whether or not there is an unfavourable distribution of assets, with no independent negative effect of presidentialism. Other scholars caution that presidentialism is not the problem, pointing to electoral systems instead (Shugart and Carey, 1992). Electoral systems (see Chapter 11) that increase the chances of a two-party system are more likely to also have stable presidential systems (Mainwaring, 1993). Proponents of presidential systems claim that when combined with the right institutional combination, they can also be just as effective as parliamentary systems.

Conclusion In democracies, leaders and ruling parties face multiple checks on their power, and should be held to account in cases of abuse. As the chapter explained, executives aiming to autocratize their regimes target various institutions in order to dismantle mechanisms of accountability, such as the legislature, judiciary, bureaucracy and watchdog agencies. The process of dismantling these institutions is slow and may go unnoticed at first, but in doing so, the executive is able to circumvent laws without needing to change them. The chapter then explored how weak the rule of law facilitates executive aggrandizement. As the book has argued, citizen support or acquiescence is critical to democratic backsliding. When norms about the importance of the

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rule of law dissipate, it provides the perfect conditions for autocratic power grabs. This chapter also examined the debate over which system, presidential or parliamentary, is better suited to democracy. Surprisingly, while the literature leans slightly in favour of parliamentary systems, the democracies that have experienced the biggest democratic declines have been Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, India and Serbia – all parliamentary systems. However, the strongest democracies around the world are also parliamentary. Scholars claim that this may mean that there is a bigger role played by electoral systems. Chapter 12 looks more in depth at the role of electoral system, while Chapter 11 examines how elections are manipulated to further cement the incumbent’s control. KEY QUESTIONS 1. What legislative function is most important to ensuring horizontal accountability? 2. What is meant by judicial independence? Why is it important to democracy? 3. What is administrative or institutional decay? Is the executive always to blame for this? 4. Why is the rule of law important to democracy? Can you have a democracy without the rule of law? 5. In spite of the merits of parliamentary systems, many have experienced backsliding. What could explain this?

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Assaults on Electoral Processes Introduction As previous chapters have laid out, the primary threats to democracy are deteriorations in the rule of law, and greater executive control over the media, civil society and institutions that can check executive power. For the most part, electoral manipulation has been less common in advanced democracies. Nevertheless, for the first time in decades, there is evidence that the number of countries in which freedom and fairness of elections are declining is more than the number in which they are improving (Lührmann et al, 2019). In grey-zone regimes in particular, electoral manipulation is becoming more sophisticated and prevalent. At the same time, there are increasing challenges to the fairness and legitimacy of elections in advanced democracies. Thus, it is not just authoritarian regimes that are engaging in electoral malpractice, but also regimes that once held free and fair elections. The chapter begins by looking at the type of accountability that is undermined by electoral malpractice – vertical accountability. We explain what vertical accountability is, how elections provide it, and the importance of elections and electoral systems in a democracy. The chapter then examines how executives (and the ruling party) weaken vertical accountability by engaging in different types of electoral malpractice, such as manipulating the rules governing elections and voting, the ease of voting, the choices voters have, how people vote and the administration of voting (Schedler, 2002; Birch, 2008; Van  Ham and Lindberg, 2016). Generally speaking, electoral manipulation is more common in grey-zone regimes that have weaker accountability mechanisms in other areas as well. Nevertheless, certain forms of electoral manipulation, such as voter suppression, gerrymandering and dark money, are becoming increasingly observable in advanced democracies. The chapter also explains one of the key precursors to democratic backsliding: erosion of political parties. Without strong, institutionalized parties that can represent the public’s interests, a would-be autocrat can create direct links with the public that circumvent and delegitimize the other institutions of accountability.

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Key concepts ‘Vertical accountability’ is the process by which citizens play a direct role in holding the powerful to account. In contrast to horizontal accountability, vertical accountability runs upward from citizens to leaders, or from the governed to the governors (Diamond and Morlino, 2004). Voters hold elected officials responsible for their actions usually through elections, the main institutional channel of vertical accountability. The voter is given the choice to reward the incumbent candidate or party, vote for another candidate or party, or abstain. Nevertheless, this type of accountability is periodic in nature, as elections do not take place all the time. It is important to note that in this book, non-electoral societal mechanisms that expose wrongdoings and provide information (such as public use of freedom of information legislation) are categorized as discursive and diagonal forms of accountability (see Chapter 9). We define vertical accountability as the mechanisms voters have to hold elected officials accountable, such as elections. Vertical accountability is often measured by examining political competitiveness, voter turnout and the fairness of elections, but it is reliant upon other forms of accountability as well. As Chapter 9 explained, for voters to be able to exercise vertical accountability, they must have access to accurate information (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti, 2000). When parties are poorly institutionalized, civil liberties are not safeguarded and the courts are politicized, vertical accountability becomes thinner. Gerrymandering, the undue influence of wealth in politics, corruption, vote rigging, voter suppression or other mechanisms that hurt political competition and participation also undermine vertical accountability. Grey-zone regimes where transfers of power are taking place are technically able to exert vertical forms of accountability. For example, the ruling UMNO party in Malaysia was voted out of power in the 2018 general election after a corruption scandal involving Prime Minister Najib Razak. Though civil society is hampered, the media is sometimes muzzled and the courts have been accused of being politicized, Malaysian citizens were able to oust the incumbent. By contrast, Colombian President Álvaro Uribe tried to amend the Constitution in 2009 to enable him to remain in office for a third term, but this was struck down by the Constitutional Court in 2010. This is an example of horizontal accountability, wherein the judiciary held the executive to account to prevent executive aggrandizement.

Elections and democracy The most common distinction between a democracy and a dictatorship is that the former has elections that lead to transfers of executive power. Article 25 of the UN International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights specifies the need for regular and genuine elections with universal suffrage through a secret ballot process. By this standard, a country cannot be truly democratic unless its citizens have

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the opportunity to vote. At its core, a democratic government must have regular elections that are fairly conducted and honestly counted (Schmitter and Karl, 1991). Such a system usually will see regular turnover in executive power, with some exceptions. The opposition should have a chance of actually winning the election, and parties and candidates should not be excluded from running. Everyone should have the right to stand for public office. Free and fair elections also have no registration fraud. Voters are not intimidated, bought off or unduly influenced to vote a specific way, and votes are counted fairly. The elections should reflect the will of the people. Elections are not the only way that citizens can further their interests – they can participate in special interest groups, social movements and so on. However, elections are critical to democracy for several reasons. First, elections supply legitimacy, or the acceptance of the right of public officials to hold office and legislate. In a democracy, the authority of the government is supposed to derive from the consent of the governed. Elections are the mechanism to express consent. Second, elections are an important way to ensure that there is vertical accountability, meaning citizens can keep elected representatives in check. Frequent, fair and competitive elections where information is generally available helps citizens vote out representatives who are not meeting expectations. Third, elections are important for ensuring governmental responsiveness. Elections should cause democratic governments to translate citizens’ preferences into policy.

Signs of autocratization As a previous section explained, electoral procedures need to meet normative standards of fairness, inclusiveness and transparency in order to be considered democratic, legitimate and in line with international norms and standards (Birch, 2011). Electoral malpractice or manipulation (we use the terms interchangeably) constitutes a violation of these global norms and represents an intentional restriction of democratic human rights. It is important to distinguish between ‘mispractice’ and ‘malpractice’. Mispractice, sometimes also referred to as maladministration, involves unintended errors by election officials or routine flaws. Mispractice may take place when electoral officials are poorly trained or have inadequate resources (Birch, 2008). Lack of resources causes low levels of bureaucratic capacity. This results in managerial failures, inefficiencies and incompetence. This can lead to long lines at polling stations, inaccurate or dated electoral registers, lack of ballot papers, misplacement of ballot boxes, errors during the vote count or technical problems with electronic voting machines (Norris, 2014). The 2000 US presidential election involved serious cases of mispractice. The poor and confusing ballot design in Florida created all kinds of problems for voters, especially in Broward County. These problems were not due to an intentional effort to defraud voters, but the result of human error by local officials (Alvarez and Hall, 2006; Alvarez et al, 2013).

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It is also important to differentiate between ‘electoral fraud’ and electoral malpractice. Electoral fraud can be defined as illegal acts meant to interfere with electoral outcomes. Examples include voter intimidation, vote buying, bribery, ballot stuffing and falsifying vote counts (Birch, 2011). In many countries, this kind of ‘crude fraud’ was commonplace until the end of the 1990s, but it has been virtually eliminated, although electoral manipulation as such persists (Hartlyn and McCoy, 2001). More monitoring has forced leaders to be more creative about how to win elections (Bermeo, 2016). Electoral malpractice is more subtle and the result of strategic actions by incumbents to create uneven play fields without engaging in massive election-day fraud or violating the laws. Electoral malpractice is the strategic manipulation of the legal framework governing elections (Birch, 2011). It can take place at different stages of the electoral cycle, but most strategic manipulation takes place well in advance of polling day and is engineered by the incumbent and the ruling party. As it is not blatant, it is generally more difficult to catch or observe. These types of legal strategies are also less likely to draw critical media headlines, international condemnation or domestic protests than are more overt forms of intimidation and corruption. However, because the rules of the game are critical to the fairness of elections, changes to the rules can have a big impact on electoral outcomes.

Assault on electoral processes The electoral integrity project (Birch, 2011) offers a useful starting point to look at the strategic manipulation of elections. In the following sections, we go over the different aspects of strategic manipulation and differentiate it from electoral fraud.

Factors influencing the fairness of the rules Electoral rules in a democracy mostly differ in terms of proportionality of the system. Proportional representation (PR) is where the percentage of votes received roughly translates into the percentage of seats won. PR systems usually encourage proliferation of parties, but strategic manipulation can take place by designing a threshold (or a set limit that must be reached) that marginalizes the competition. If regimes use a threshold that is too high, they can prevent small parties from having a chance to compete. For example in Turkey, to prevent the Kurds from gaining too much power a 10 per cent threshold must be surpassed, which has limited their power (Alkin, 2011). Countries that change the threshold may be causing democratic backsliding if it prevents or reduces real competition. In single member district systems (SMD), candidates compete in districts where the top vote-getter wins the seat, and those who finish second or lower get nothing. In SMD systems, the changes to how the boundaries of the districts are drawn can lead to democratic decay. Are the boundaries drawn up by an impartial

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commission? Are they drawn in ways that discriminate against some parties or groups, or favour the incumbent? Countries with majoritarian institutions have resorted to gerrymandering and malapportionment of regions where the incumbents receive the most support to ensure that they remain in power. For more on gerrymandering see Box 11.1.

Box 11.1: Gerrymandering in the US The US has had a long history of electoral dysfunction. Initially, it was the Democratic Party in the states that made up the Confederacy that deprived African Americans of the right to vote. Even though the Republican Party passed the 13th, 14th and 15th amendments to the Constitution to provide voting rights to the emancipated slaves, the Democratic Party, at the time dominated by the planter class, gained control of most of the governorships and legislatures in the South. They used poll taxes and other redistributive procedures to diminish the Republican electoral base. Both fraud and violence were used to regain control of the South (Kousser, 1974; Perman, 2003). Though the US has made improvements to voter suffrage, a persistent issue still affecting the quality of democratic elections in the US is ‘gerrymandering’. Gerrymandering is the practice of drawing up electoral maps in ways that disadvantage a particular political party or candidate. The way districts are drawn up for congressional elections in the US has drawn accusations of gerrymandering that have received substantial attention. Using geographical information, census data and insights on voter preferences, mapmakers can use technology to generate sophisticated configurations that will help them achieve their desired results. Gerrymandering is of two types. First, a district can be ‘packed’ with a certain voting bloc, which concentrates the opposition party’s congressional support in one district, leaving the party in charge of redistricting with substantial majorities in the remaining districts. Second, districts can be ‘cracked’ to dilute the voting power of a certain group, typically used to reduce the percentages of minorities. Both techniques lead to wasted votes, or votes that go above the threshold needed to win a seat. Wasted votes do not supply a party with the number of seats that their level political support ought to generate. In some US states, state legislatures (rather independent redistricting commissions) are responsible for drawing up congressional districts. In such cases, when the legislature and governorship are been dominated by a particular party, they can draw up districts in ways that greatly advantage themselves. State legislatures have often used gerrymandering to weaken the political power of minorities. When gerrymandering thus takes on a racial dimension, it is called ‘racial gerrymandering’. Gerrymandering has been so egregious in the US that during the 2004 election, international election observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights were deeply concerned about the congressional

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redistricting process and made recommendations that the procedures be reviewed. For example, in areas of Texas that were competitive between Republicans and Democrats, districts were drawn up in such a way that Democratic strength was diluted, allowing Republicans to win comfortably. However, no such review took place, and instead, in 2010, the Republican party initiated a program called REDMAP, which recognized that the party in control of state legislatures could use the 2010 census to ensure it could stay control for the next ten years (Newkirk II, 2017). Not surprisingly, this redistricting effort helped the Republicans make substantial gains in the 2010 elections. Legal challenges to these moves went as far as the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court had previously ruled in Davis v. Bandemer (1986) that gerrymandering violated the Equal Protection Clause, but the court could not agree upon an appropriate standard for what constitutes partisan gerrymandering. The standard of what constitutes gerrymandering can be better understood by looking at the efficiency gap, or the difference between the parties’ respective wasted votes in the election, divided by the total number of votes cast. Wasted votes are ballots that do not contribute to a win for candidates because they are lost to a candidate who was defeated or were part of a huge surplus for a winning candidate. In a state that has perfect partisan symmetry, there would be an equal number of wasted votes for both parties. For example, in the 2012 election, the state of Wisconsin, a gerrymandered state, saw Republicans winning sixty out of ninety-nine legislative assembly seats even though the Democrats had a majority in the state-wide vote (Gilbert, 2018). Another method of checking for gerrymandering is to examine whether the map is drawn up in a compact manner (Stephanopoulos, 2014). Early on in US politics, it was the Democratic Party that was guilty of gerrymandering to marginalize African American voters in the South. This affected minority groups until 1965, when the Voting Rights Act was passed, prohibiting redistricting that would reduce the voting impact of minorities. The Supreme Court dealt a setback for African Americans in its ruling in Hunt vs. Cromartie (1999), deciding that North Carolina had drawn its new districts for political reasons and not racial ones, making it constitutional. Subsequent Supreme Court rulings in 2004 and 2006 held that political gerrymandering did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, even if the legislature’s primary purpose was to improve their own party’s chances of victory. However, federal judges ruled in 2018 that North Carolina would have to redraw its thirteen districts because the map was too partisan and therefore unconstitutional (Graham, 2018). The judges said that the map violated the Equal Protection Clause, making it the first time that the courts struck down a congressional map because of partisan gerrymandering.

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Gerrymandering is a major problem in US politics, but it is not confined to the US. In Australia, during the 1970s, rural areas were given twice as much weight as urban districts through gerrymandering, which enabled Joh Bjelke-Petersen and his National Party to control Queensland. In Hungary, redistricting disadvantaged pro-opposition districts, which explains how Fidesz’s vote share declined from 52.7 per cent in 2010 to 44.9 per cent in 2014, yet its majority in parliament increased. This was largely because the government established an electoral system that favours the winning party and gerrymanders electoral districts. In Poland too, gerrymandering has ensured victories for the ruling Law and Justice Party. The UMNO in Malaysia has also been accused to gerrymandering districts to give more importance to its rural strongholds. Canada had a serious gerrymandering problem in the 1960s. Today, however, it has an independent commission that has drawn up districts in a simple and uncontroversial fashion that conforms to borders that are familiar to local residents. An independent redistricting commission is important to preventing gerrymandering, but these commissions are naturally likely to be biased when politicians can appoint members. Thus far, there is no conclusive evidence that gerrymandering causes polarization of the public. However, studies have shown that these large efficiency gaps lead to large changes in the ideology of the median voter in the legislature, and thus influence state policy (Caughey et al, 2017). Gerrymandering of any variety leads to malapportionment, or districts that have a divergent ratio of representatives to voters. When this happens, not only do people feel they are not being represented, but it also enables more extreme candidates to gain power (Bermeo, 2016). Elections become less competitive and therefore more radical candidates are often chosen because more moderate voters are no longer needed to win majorities.

There are also changes that can be made to the number of seats per district and the type of system used. This can be engineered in single-district systems, multimember district systems and proportional systems that have a district magnitude. In Bolivia for example, the number of multi-member districts was reduced to include indigenous single-member districts that were more likely to support Morales (Ruth, 2018). Ecuador did away with a PR system to use a mixedmember district system with a high number of single-member districts in order to amplify Correa’s supporters (Sánchez-Sibony, 2017). In Hungary, a new electoral law was introduced in 2011 without discussion in parliament, consultation or support of the opposition. The new rules helped Fidesz win 67 per cent of the seats with 45 per cent of the vote, 8 per cent more seats than they had won in 2010. More single-member districts were added, and these were redrawn to benefit Fidesz. Additionally, a party used to only need fourteen single-member district candidates backed by 10,500 signatures spread across seven regions to run a national party list; now parties need at least twentyseven single-member district candidates with at least 27,000 signatures across nine regions (Renwick, 2011; Kovács and Vida, 2015).

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In addition to the rules for how votes translate into seats, there are also rules regarding how long elected officials can stay in office, which can be amended to favour the incumbent. Term limits are important to democracy because they help ensure that there are power turnovers in cases where the electorate cannot exercise vertical accountability through elections. Term limits are a necessary safeguard against abuse of power, especially when electoral systems advantage the incumbent. Though incumbent leaders can hand-pick their successors, these successors are more likely to lose, since presidential succession can lead to elite splits. A study demonstrated that in Latin America, all else being equal, incumbency has increased presidents’ chances of winning re-election by 62.8 per cent (Corrales and Penfold, 2014). Therefore, eliminating term limits offers a chance for an incumbent to stay in power indefinitely. For this reason, term-limit extensions have become increasingly common with the average annual incidence of term-limit extensions quadrupling in the post-Cold War period (Kendall-Taylor et al, 2019). Eradicating term limits is a common tool in authoritarian regimes, but term-limit extensions in democratic countries (rather than those in countries that are already dictatorships) are also rising. Today, 33 per cent of term limit extensions occur in democracies, up from just 8 per cent prior to 1989 (Kendall-Taylor et al, 2019). In other words, changes to electoral laws and term-limit extensions have become an increasingly common tactic to solidify the power that leaders gain through autocratization. Leaders who enjoy enough public support may be able to convince the legislature to support this, or may use referenda to get around objections. For example in Rwanda, Paul Kagame used a national referendum in 2015 to enable him to stay in office until 2034. In Venezuela, Chávez used a referendum to abolish term limits in 2009, and stated that he wanted to rule indefinitely. In Nicaragua, the National Assembly approved constitutional amendments in 2014 that paved the way for Ortega to win a third consecutive term in 2016. In Ecuador, Correa was originally limited to one four-year term, which he overturned in 2009 and then again in 2013. He was unable to engineer the removal of term limits however, and was forced to step down at the end of his third presidential term in 2017. In Sri Lanka, the 18th Amendment to the Constitution, passed in 2010, allows the president to run for more than two terms. Namibia’s former President Sam Nujoma managed to remove term limits, but only for the first president, himself (Tull and Simons, 2017). Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe declared that only God could make him step down from office (Louw-Vaudran, 2016).

Factors influencing ease of voting Electoral manipulation also deals with how accessible and fair voting is for citizens. If the rules regulating voter registration and voting are too complicated, cumbersome and difficult, large sections of the population gets excluded

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from voting, which can be considered an example of ‘voter suppression’ (see Chapter 12). In cases of democratic backsliding, voters are unable to register with ease or at all. This has been a persistent criticism of US democracy. Voters in North Carolina have been threatened with strict voter identification provisions that would reduce the early voting period by one week, bar local elections boards from keeping polls open on the final Saturday before the election beyond 1 pm and eliminate same-day voter registration (Olgin, 2018). It also prevents high schools from pre-registering sixteen- and seventeen-year-old students (Hasen, 2013, 61). Courts struck down this law in 2016 and again in 2020, but the Republicans who crafted the law have vowed to fight it. Voter-matching laws in Georgia, where the name on the register must match the name of the voter exactly, disqualify those that do not have a 100  per cent match. Restrictive voter registration laws and identification requirements are examples of electoral backsliding (Overton, 2006; Minnite, 2012; Hasen and Litman, 2020). Though not always intentional, cases of information about voting procedures not being clear and widely available is another form of voter suppression. Electoral manipulation may also entail making changes to the electoral calendar to serve the incumbent’s interests. For example, in Senegal, President Abdoulaye Wade used his power to tamper with the electoral timetable repeatedly. Two months before the February 2007 presidential election, a polling date had not been set. This benefited Wade because it left the opposition in the dark as to how and when to prepare (Mbow, 2008, 158). The incumbent could also hold a snap election that leaves the opposition with little time to prepare. Erdoğan called for early parliamentary and presidential elections to be held in June 2018 instead of November 2019, which left the opposition with little time to organize. In Bangladesh, though the date was not changed, unilateral changes to the rules eliminated the practice of a caretaker government taking charge ahead of the election, which gave the incumbent regime a huge edge and triggered an opposition boycott just before the 2014 parliamentary election (Diamond, 2015). Voter suppression also includes obstruction of voting on election day. This can involve citizens not being listed on the voting rolls and inaccuracies in the ledger or, in more extreme cases, ballot boxes being removed either unintentionally or at gunpoint, as happened in Georgia in 2003 (Tucker, 2007). The former is a matter of under-provision of voting facilities. When this is done intentionally in opposition strongholds it becomes a more serious case of electoral manipulation. Sometimes, it is only certain groups that face obstacles to voting, such as lack of facilities for people with disabilities, demands that voters cast their ballots in their hometowns or restrictions on absentee voting. In the past, some countries such as the US and Brazil had literacy tests and poll taxes as obstacles to voting. Even today, voters in many countries around the world put themselves at risk when they vote. This goes beyond ensuring ballot secrecy to where simply showing up to vote is a dangerous endeavour.

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Zimbabwe is an authoritarian regime, but it avoided engaging in electoral fraud by using more subtle forms of manipulation to suppress votes. In its 2002 election, there were numerous attempts by the ruling ZANU-PF party, led by Robert Mugabe, to make it difficult for citizens to vote for the opposition. Changes to electoral laws limited absentee ballots to civil servants, diplomats, and military and security forces. This was to prevent expats, who would likely vote for the opposition, from voting. The laws also prevented anyone with foreign-born parents from voting. In addition, over 400,000 people were arrested on accusations of trying to vote for a second time, the majority of whom, the opposition MDC believed, constituted its supporters. Election officials were told to process voters as slowly as possible in urban areas, so that voters were stuck in queues for ten to twelve hours. The names of deceased people and children appeared on voter rolls and 400,000 residents of ZANU-PF strongholds were registered after the official registration deadline. ZANU-PF also physically intimidated and prevented citizens from voting, violently harassing voters who supported the opposition (Chigora and Nciizah, 2007; Chigora and Chilunjika, 2016).

Factors influencing voter choice An important way to influence voter choice is to craft laws that may prevent opposition candidates and parties from running. In a democracy, everyone should have an equal opportunity to run, regardless of sex, race, ethnicity or religion. However, in some grey-zone regimes and autocracies, the nomination requirements are so restrictive or cumbersome that it is near impossible to gain ballot access. Religious and regional parties and independent candidates had been barred from running in Mexico due to restrictive laws. Nationality clauses were used in Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya and Zambia in order to prevent opponents from running for election (Schedler, 2002). In Senegal, President Macky Sall jailed his most popular challengers to ensure his re-election in 2019 (Diamond, 2020). In Nicaragua, centre-right parties were banned in local and national elections in 2006 and 2008 on technical grounds (Anderson and Dodd, 2009). More recently, the Nicaraguan court ousted the leader of the main opposition party and the National Assembly expelled sixteen opposition lawmakers in the run-up to 2016 elections because the main opposition party, the National Coalition for Democracy, had its legal status removed. In Tajikistan, the government revoked the registration of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRTP) in 2015 and detained its leaders (Human Rights Watch, 2015). Opposition members are often banned in Russia. In the 2016 election, Vladimir Putin disqualified several opposition candidates, including Alexei Navalny and the Progress Party. Russia’s Freedom Party was weakened by the murder of its leader Boris Nemtsov. Coalitions of opposition parties were not recognized and were prevented from running (Zavadskaya et al, 2017). In Venezuela, opposition leader Leopoldo López was imprisoned on charges of inciting violence against Maduro in 2014, and was not released until April 2019.

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Laws banning parties have been enacted in advanced democracies as well, though this is mostly to prevent extremism. In Israel, the court banned the Kach party from competing in 1988 on the grounds that it was racist and undemocratic (Pedahzur and Perliger, 2004). In Spain, the Political Parties Organic Law led to the banning of Batasuna (formerly Euskal Herritarrok and Herri Batasuna) from competing in the general elections of 2004 due of its ties with the terrorist group. In grey-zone regimes and autocracies, the opposition can also be undermined by creating laws that restrict the right to assemble peacefully. In Zambia, political rallies were banned by the Public Order Act. In Zimbabwe, laws prohibited the opposition MDC from holding more than eight rallies, while Mugabe held fiftytwo rallies in two weeks (Makumbe, 2002). Police permission was also required before any public meeting could take place (Makumbe, 2002). In Russia, antiextremism laws prevent demonstrations and internet campaigns, which mean that supporters of opposition candidates can face fines, jail or job losses (Dresen, 2013).

Factors influencing how people vote During the election period, electoral malpractice can take place when voters are manipulated by distorting or swaying their preferences. This can happen through illicit campaign tactics such as violating campaign finance laws, failing to ensure fair media coverage of the election, vote buying or intimidation. Violating campaign finance laws is more common in advanced democracies while vote buying is more common in grey-zone and authoritarian regimes. Changes to and violations of campaign finance rules is a subtle form of electoral manipulation that can affect outcomes in democracies (Tumber and Waisbord, 2004). Campaign finance rules are the laws that regulate the amount of money that political candidates and parties can receive; who is eligible to contribute; and what types of activities constitute in-kind contributions (or non-monetary contributions). Changes to electoral laws just prior to an election can make it difficult for the opposition to contest. Under Sall in Senegal, a new elections law was passed that required every presidential candidate to gather at least 52,000 unique registered voter signatures, with at least 2,000 signatures each in no fewer than half of the country’s fourteen regions. In the past, candidates could run by paying a small fee. This new law narrowed the field to the smallest it had been in three decades (Riedl and Sylla, 2019). Campaign finance rules also deal with how much candidates and parties can spend. In spite of the campaign finance rules, violations are common in democracies because they are hard to detect, or because loopholes are used. Nevertheless, there have been many scandals involving campaign finance violations in democracies that have been brought to light. In Brazil, the discovery of influence peddling schemes led to the resignation of President Fernando Collor de Mello in 1992. In Spain, fraudulent companies channelled support to

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political parties in exchange for lucrative government contracts in 1993. Similar scandals have engulfed Japan, Germany, Italy, India, South Korea, the US and the Czech Republic, to name just a few. In the US, several campaign finance violations took place in support of the candidacy of Donald Trump (CNBC, 2020). Venezuela under Chávez suffered from uneven campaign financing as he banned public financing of political parties, though there was no way to monitor his own campaigns (Corrales and Penfold-Becerra, 2007). Campaign finance rules are also supposed to be in place in democracies in order to limit the impact of individuals or organizations using their financial power to retain influence on elected officials. It is problematic if the rich can ‘buy’ elections, because it warps representation disproportionately towards the wealthy (Issacharoff, 2010). Parties and candidates should have equal access to public subsidies and political donations. Additionally, the incumbent should not be able to use state resources for campaigning. Financial accounts should be published and transparent. At present, the wealthiest .01 per cent of the US population is responsible for over 40 per cent of campaign contributions (Bonica et al, 2013), but it is not clear where all of this money is going. Therefore, the role of ‘dark money’ in developed countries needs to be further investigated (see Box 11.2). In some cases, countries suffer from imbalanced media coverage of parties and candidates. Some of this may be due to the media’s need to earn advertising money, which encourages coverage of candidates who are more controversial, media friendly or appealing to advertisers. This skews the balance in favour of charismatic, populist-style candidates. In some countries, the advantage may go to incumbents simply because they have much better access to the media to promote their agenda as compared to other parties and candidates. In grey-zone regimes and autocracies, this may be because the opposition is barred from disseminating their campaign messages through the media. In Zambia, the opposition was restricted by not having access to the media. The same was the case in Zimbabwe, where most of the media is state-owned. In Zimbabwe, the state-run media offered laudatory coverage of Mugabe, while heavily criticizing his opponent. Privately owned print media was referred to as the ‘opposition media’. Meanwhile ZANU-PF campaign information was publicized as the news. The opposition party, was not allowed to air its ads on national airwaves. Media access was also uneven in Venezuela under Chávez, who enjoyed the benefits of state-owned television stations and acquired more than 145 local radio stations, seventy-five newspapers and dozens of pro-Chávez websites (Corrales and Penfold-Becerra, 2007). He was able to take advantage of the state’s oil money to campaign, while institutional constraints on campaign finance eroded (Corrales and Penfold-Becerra, 2007). Social media campaigns from domestic and foreign actors have also started to play a role in how people vote. In the 2010s, social media campaigns using bots and trolls have shaped public opinion in established democracies, which has affected election results in some cases (see Chapter 5).

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These efforts to sway voters with unbalanced and opaque media coverage and manipulation is not always as obvious as other forms of manipulation, such as vote buying. Incumbents in grey-zone regimes and autocracies that have state resources at their disposal can simply buy off voters to vote the way they want. Political machines can make direct payments to voters (Stokes, 2005; Nichter, 2008), or pressure employers to ensure their employees vote for the ruling party (Frye et al, 2014). Incumbent regimes may offer clientelistic favours to voters – especially the poor, who may be dependent upon financial support, jobs or badly needed investment to their regions – in exchange for votes. It’s still common for politicians in Kenya to give the poor cash rewards in exchange for votes (Kramon, 2016). In Venezuela under Chávez, cash transfers were distributed to the poor in certain areas, but spending considerations were totally based on the degree of loyalty of governors and mayors, and on the number of voters, but not on poverty variables. Moreover, in the 2005 legislative elections, officials could use fingerprint identification machines to figure out how individuals voted (Corrales and Penfold-Becerra, 2007). In all of these cases, the line between a government programme and a bribe was blurry, making it harder to detect any illegal activity. The voters may see these rewards as part of the normal political process of parties implementing their campaign promises. There are other examples of vote buying, however, that are more obvious violations of democratic procedures (though they may not be technically illegal). In Macedonia in 1998, people were paid to collect the voting cards of those who had not voted yet, and voted on their behalf. Claims of vote buying in the country have persisted up into the 2014 elections (Mikucka-Wójtowicz, 2015). In Taiwan before it democratized, as many as two-thirds of voters and politicians believed that cash was offered to voters on election-day to sway the vote in favour of the incumbent Kuomintang party (KMT) (Rigger, 2000). The incumbent regime may also go to the extreme of paying voters to travel to areas where more support is needed. Red envelopes filled with cash were given to voters to reward them for their support. It was culturally acceptable and not considered illegal at the time (Rigger, 2000). In Mexico, a busload of illegitimate votes was intercepted on the way to Yucatan during the 2013 election. The voters claimed that they were paid 1,000 pesos ($75) for their efforts. During the 2013 election in the Philippines, citizens were brought in to vote and paid 500 pesos ($11) (Hidalgo and Nichter, 2016). By buying off voters, the incumbent is engaging in undemocratic forms of mobilization to ensure victory. These networks can also be tapped into to organize counter-protests if opposition protests break out. In this way, these mobilization networks serve as an insurance policy against opposition action in the streets. Though these mobilization efforts are not easy, they send a clear message to the opposition regarding the resources and capacity of the incumbent, which may have the effect of convincing opposition leaders to cooperate with the incumbent.

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Box 11.2: Dark money In democracies around the world, social media users are regularly targeted by political ads without knowing the source (Smith and Powell, 2014; Johnson, 2016; Mayer, 2017). In most democratic campaigns, disclaimers are usually required to appear alongside political messages to identify who paid for the ad (Dawood, 2015). However, in some democracies there are loopholes around these disclaimers for ads that are paid for by anonymous groups. This anonymous money constitutes dark money, or undisclosed money that goes towards a political campaign. In the US, dark money groups are supposed to be social welfare organizations that can advocate for issues and support candidates that they care about as long as they are not coordinating directly with the campaign. Unlike other funds that a candidate or party may receive, these funds do not need to be reported, helping donors to evade disclosure requirements (Gerken, 2014; Tokaji and Strause, 2014). In the US, conservative groups make up the lion’s share of dark money spending (76 per cent, as against 17 per cent for liberal groups in 2016) (Maguire, 2016). Hundreds of millions of dollars in dark money have paid for ads in hundreds of political and judicial races in the US (Garrett and Smith, 2005). In 2016, some of these ads came from foreign adversaries engaging in election meddling (Wood, 2020). Dark money no longer just affects the US, it also affects elections in European democracies. In many European countries, campaign finance laws cap political spending during campaign seasons. Campaign groups are also supposed to be transparent and have limited coordination. To get around that, dark money group pump unlimited funds from proxy groups into domestic political races. The NGO Open Democracy reported that US right-wing Christian groups spent at least $50 million in dark money campaigns to advocate for causes and candidates they support in Europe over the past ten years (Fitzgerald and Provost, 2019). For example, when Ireland had a historic abortion referendum in 2018, US alt-right activists targeted Irish voters with a social media campaign. There were also irregularities in the financing of the Leave campaign to take the UK out of the EU, which led to concerns that some of the financing may have come from dark money groups (Geoghegan, 2020). The prevalence of dark money affects voters because when campaign finance is drawn from secret sources, voters do not have the full picture of where a candidate is receiving their support from. In the US, dark money has created a misalignment between the views of the majority of the public and those of the members of Congress being secretly supported by groups with increasingly partisan agendas (Stephanopoulos, 2014). Voters are left in the dark about this, making it more difficult to hold politicians accountable for corruption and quid pro quos.

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SNAPSHOT: RISING CAMPAIGN COSTS Because of the lack of transparency in campaigns, campaign finance regulation has emerged as a contentious issue in politics. Complaints of money politics, or the dramatic increase in money spent on elections, have fuelled concerns that the principles of political equality are being violated (Ward et al, 2003; Kuhner, 2014). However, the trend is that campaigns have become increasingly expensive, not less. The rising expenses involved in campaigns excludes most members of the public from taking part in politics, thus limiting the choices available to voters. In the US, $5.2 billion was spent on the 2008 presidential campaign. In 2012, over $6 billion was spent (Tokaji and Strause, 2014). It was estimated that the 2006 Brazilian national election cost $2.5 billion. In the Mexican national elections of 2006, $301 million was spent. In Guatemala, $84 million was spent on the 2007 general election. Elections in the Philippines are so expensive that millionaires tend to dominate the races. In the 2010 election, almost all of the eighteen presidential and vice presidential candidates were millionaires, and most politicians come from wealthy dynasties or show business (Dressel, 2011). By contrast, in Canada, where limits are imposed, the 2011 general election allocated $21 million each to the three major parties. Limits also exist in Chile and Costa Rica where $22 and $27 million were spent in 2009 and 2010 respectively (Casas-Zamora and Zovatto, 2016). The effects of rising campaign costs is that elected officials are perpetually campaigning or fundraising instead of legislating and governing.

Factors influencing voting procedures, vote counting and election administration Actions that take place after an election are more commonly associated with deliberate ‘electoral fraud’. This is distinct from strategic manipulation of elections, because it goes well beyond making the playing field uneven and enters the realm of illegality. Fraudulent elections are usually where scholars draw the line in deciding that a country is no longer democratic. The incumbent regime can deliberately refuse to count the ballots in areas where the opposition is strong, the results can be doctored, ballot boxes can be stolen or stuffed (using phantom voting or multiple voting) or the results can simply be declared before all the ballots have come in. In extreme cases, elections are cancelled or the result is engineered down to the last vote by the incumbent. The type of fraud that is hardest to detect is when the incumbent engages in small amounts of ballot stuffing, just enough to ensure victory. This is a less risky strategy than outright falsification, since the results are tied to actual ballots, but not actual voters. An election commissioner might even be willing to look the other way if an agent drops in some ballots, as the commissioner would not risk being implicated. However, this strategy is less efficient and offers less certainty for autocratic incumbents than does in outright falsification. Falsification involves

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election officials reporting false results on election protocols, which imposes a greater responsibility on election commissioners. In Zimbabwe, the electoral commissions were packed with regime loyalists, which could guarantee that no matter what the outcome, Mugabe’s party would win (Makumbe, 2002). The commissioner has to be ‘bought’ in order to facilitate this type of fraud, while election agents have to be ‘bought’ when it comes to ballot stuffing. Both these choices involve paying off small networks, whereas vote buying and patron–clientelistic mobilization relies on massive networks that can reach a large number of people. In the mid-1990s Russia was still democratic, although just barely. It regularly held elections that offered some uncertainty. Today there is little doubt about what the outcomes will be, because Putin has control over who counts the votes. Election commissions at the national, regional, sub-regional and precinct levels are responsible for counting, tabulating and releasing election results (Ross, 2014). Regional governors allegedly receive targets for turnout and support for United Russia, which they in turn demand of their subordinates in the electoral bureaucracy (White, 2011). This ensures that the results are never up in the air for Putin and his United Russia Party. Similar linkages between the ruling party and the electoral administration have been noted by observers in other post-communist countries (Bader, 2012). If elections are at the heart of what distinguishes autocracies from democracies, than electoral fraud is the final step in the path to autocracy.

Box 11.3: Elections in autocracies In authoritarian regimes, elections have become routine. In 1970, only 59 per cent of autocracies regularly held elections (one at least every six years). As of 2019, that number had increased dramatically to 96 per cent, when excluding territories. Just a handful of countries do not hold elections, such as China, North Korea, Eritrea, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Eritrea, Cuba and Brunei (Kendall-Taylor and Frantz, 2014). Although elections occasionally spark regime-ending protests, for the most part authoritarian regimes hold elections because they are more durable when they do (Geddes, 2005). Authoritarian elections usually never lead to transfers of power, but they enable incumbent regimes to solidify support. They also enable authoritarian regimes to deter potential rivals by signalling to the opposition how dominant they are (Geddes, 2005; Magaloni, 2006). Authoritarian regimes have the resources to spend on campaigns to ensure that they win by wide margins. They often are able to win elections without resorting to massive fraud. Distinctive about these ‘hegemonic elections’ is that, unlike competitive elections, there is no serious doubt about the outcome beforehand: the regime, the opposition and the public all anticipate a large victory for the incumbent. Authoritarian elections also help to maintain elite cohesion (Geddes, 2005; Blaydes, 2008). Autocrats can use the results from the elections to reward or punish individuals who are

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competing for state resources in a way that is perceived by elites to be more fair (Blaydes, 2010). Authoritarian regimes use elections to motivate the elite to support the regime’s objective of winning elections. This also helps to ensure that the most competent and committed individuals are associated with the regime. Elections in authoritarian regimes also weaken the opposition because they often split themselves up into different parties and compete among each other. By allowing the opposition to compete, dictators pursue a divide-and-conquer strategy. Authoritarian regimes may be able to co-opt the opposition if they bar the opposition’s closest competition from competing from time to time (Lust-Okar, 2004). Finally, elections in authoritarian regimes provide information to the incumbent regime about how it is performing. This is a source of objective information about how popular the opposition is and where the opposition’s support is located. The PRI in Mexico was able to target areas where they had less support with greater resources to ensure that they had enough votes to stay in power (Magaloni, 2008).

Precursors: political party decay The erosion of political parties begins to facilitate democratic backsliding well before a would-be autocrat engages in electoral malpractice and other forms of autocratization. In particular, the decline of class consciousness and the failure of representation has provided fertile grounds for populist charismatic leadership to fill the void left by weak parties, and is one of the reasons why public opinion is shifting against democracy. This crisis of representation has also led to a crisis of governance. Furthermore, weak opposition parties have been unable to stave off power grabs by would-be autocrats, allowing them to chip away at democracy further (Scheppele, 2018). Though it is generally the opposition parties that are tasked with checking the authoritarian manoeuvres of the executive, a more institutionalized ruling party also has the potential to check authoritarian personalities.

Party weakness Political parties are critical to democracy and democratic maintenance. Studies have shown that countries that have institutionalized parties are more likely to consolidate democracy than those that do not (Weiner and LaPalombara, 1966; Diamond, 1994; Lipset, 2000). When functioning properly, parties represent society in electoral competitions and in the legislative arena. Parties articulate and aggregate interests, draft platforms at national conventions and create coherent public policy. Parties serve a number of other functions as well.

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Parties also help mediate and resolve conflicts between groups (Randall and Svåsand, 2002). Parties frame policy alternatives and structure electoral choice in ways that promote peaceful political competition. Parties mediate by melding and broadening different interests. Parties mediate conflict when public policy has become too politicized and when demands have become irreconcilable. Parties can help shape political debate in ways that calm the waters on highly charged issues. In the past, parties have neutralized the ‘radicalizing effects of sudden industrialization’ (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, 46). Parties can also neutralize the polarizing effects of modernization for new democracies, particularly those beset by ethnic tensions, by forcing compromise and conciliation (Levy, 2004). Parties also help organize the legislative rules and procedures, the legislative committees and the legislative agendas. In new democracies, where these norms and procedures have not been established, parties play a crucial role in establishing order and stability. Parties also discipline politicians within the legislature to prevent chaos and confusion. In Latin America, countries with weak parties are unable to frame and enact coherent policies, and are prone to regime crisis (Levitsky and Cameron, 2003). In contrast, countries like Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay have strong party systems and as a result, are less liable to crises of governability (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995). Parties can also prevent gridlock by serving as a bridge between the executive and the legislature to ensure democratic governability. Parties also help voters exert vertical accountability by ensuring that the government is accountable for its actions. Parties do so by helping voters identify past performances using information shortcuts (Downs, 1957). When parties are weak and fragmented, voters confront a wide array of choices, which makes it much harder to distinguish between different candidates or vote retrospectively. Because parties are better organized than independent politicians, opposition parties can also exercise horizontal accountability. Opposition parties use the legislature to oversee the executive in order to prevent exploitation, such as stacking the courts with biased judges who might serve as pawns to the executive (Levitsky and Cameron, 2003). A united opposition may also try to prevent attempts by the executive to fuse the ruling party with the state and pack unelected state institutions, which are supposed to be impersonal and impartial, with partisan supporters. Parties also help the opposition effectively challenge the incumbent government that may be trying to cling to power. Opposition movements without parties tend to be fragile, fragmented and incoherent, with limited capacity to mobilize, organize and coordinate collective action (Levitsky and Cameron, 2003). Strong parties enable the opposition to stand firm against autocratic moves by the incumbent regime (Randall and Svåsand, 2002). In Peru, though opposition candidates were not always co-opted by the regime, there were too many of them to pose a challenge. During the tenure of Alberto Fujimori (1992–2000), independent opposition politicians and the weak parties they were attached to worked against each other in confronting the regime.

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Instead of coalescing, parties were built around power-hungry politicians, none of whom were able to check the abuses of the Fujimori government. In Venezuela under Chávez, the erosion of the two main parties led to the fragmentation of the party system – and consequently to the ossification of democratic institutions. When the parties fragmented, they were unable to prevent the expansion of emergency powers, which enabled Chávez to rule by decree (Corrales and Penfold-Becerra, 2007). Chávez made his disdain of political parties well known, declaring he would not rule with them (Corrales and Penfold-Becerra, 2007). Parties also play a role in the recruitment, nomination and socialization of political leadership. In doing so, strong parties also prevent the rise of anti-party candidates (or politicians who prefer to subordinate political parties to their own personal needs). In consolidated democracies, anti-party candidates rarely succeed. When populist, anti-party candidates (see Chapter 8) rise to power using established parties as their vehicles, they tend to embody their parties. In countries with weak parties, voters are more likely to vote based on image, candidate characteristics and personal connections to a politician, rather than based on ideology, making anti-party candidates more common. Anti-party politicians are often less interested in promoting democracy and more interested in repudiating the system (Mainwaring, 1998; Levitsky and Cameron, 2003). In Peru, Fujimori created a makeshift party in 1990 to help him win office. This success led to a slew of other anti-party politicians hoping to capitalize on the success of the anti-party movement. These anti-party candidates (again, these are populists) are amateurs, who lack the ability to govern effectively. Because they are political neophytes, they are more likely to circumvent democratic processes to get things accomplished in the absence of any political skills. In Latin America, the election of political outsiders and independents has frequently resulted in governments that are ineffective and, in some cases, undemocratic (Levitsky and Cameron, 2003). Anti-party politicians are unrestrained by their parties, leading to erratic and disjointed policies and democratic decay. When Fujimori won the election in 1992 as an anti-system candidate running with a non-party called Cambio 90 (which lacked a platform, base or structure), his primary goal was staying in office. He governed by dismantling institutions that stood in his way, such as the legislature and the judiciary, and his own party and the opposition were too weak to stop him (Levitsky and Cameron, 2003). The absence of a strong party system has also been a disservice to Pakistan’s fledgling democracy. Its current party system is broken, and parties are personality driven. Two of the main parties, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz Sharif (PML-N) are instruments of two families – the Bhuttos and the Sharifs – both of whom have shown a penchant for corruption. Both have made significant concessions to the military while simultaneously weakening the power of politicians within their own parties. As a result, parties have been unable to provide accountability (especially during periods of military

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rule) and have served as mere tools of powerful personalities. There are questions about whether or not the ruling Pakistan Movement for Justice Party embodies its leader, Prime Minister Imran Khan – both he and the party have been accused of serving as puppets controlled by the military (Shah, 2019). Parties are also important agents of habituating the public to democratic norms and practices (Randall and Svåsand, 2002). Conflict that takes place between the governing and opposition parties helps to establish democratic norms and procedures. The interactions between political parties help build up norms of tolerance (Lipset, 2000). Parties also accustom citizens to democratic procedures by helping mobilize and motivate the electorate to vote. Parties integrate citizens into the political process, structure political identities and enable citizens to participate and ‘have a vested interest in the system’ (Diamond and Gunther, 2001, 7–8). Parties in the past played an important role in mobilizing the public, creating social networks and a loyal following of supporters (Mainwaring, 1998). But parties around the world have decayed and have stopped performing these functions (if they ever performed them at all). Studies of authoritarian populism argue that this style of leadership emerges in countries with free and fair elections, but weak political and intermediary institutions. When parties and labour unions cannot aggregate and channel societal demands, and cannot mediate between the citizens and the state, a crisis of representation occurs (Levitsky and Loxton, 2013). In Latin America, class-based parties never truly materialized. In the post1930s transition from oligarchic rule to mass politics, oligarchic parties were not able to represent the masses. The absence of parties that could accurately represent people created an opening for populist leadership. Leaders in Latin America were winning elections due to their ability to mobilize people who had been neglected by the oligarchy (Inglehart, 1977). For example, Hugo Chávez emerged on the scene when Venezuelan political parties had ossified, the bureaucracy had become corrupt and bloated, and the mood of the country was filled with dissatisfaction. In Europe, we are seeing the emergence of populist movements driven by the decline in class voting, class-based parties and mass membership in traditional organizations. The development towards a post-industrial society has de-aligned many voters, increased the importance of divisions and thereby created space for new, less ideological parties. Organized labour groups used to be better organized and almost always supported left-leaning parties more than middle class groups did. Left-wing parties supported the redistribution of wealth to decrease income inequality. But class voting has dissipated; it is only half as strong as it was in the 1950s. As a result, social safety nets have also been dismantled. This led to the emergence of new parties that were not class-based, but wanted progressive social change, such as the green and libertarian parties that emerged in countries like Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Sweden and Switzerland. These parties did not emphasize social class and economic redistribution, but focused on cultural issues that were polarizing for the older labour classes. Post-materialist values focused on tolerance of multi-culturalism,

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protection of minority rights, freedom of expression, secularism, gender equality, flexible and fluid gender roles, and environmental protection (Inglehart and Norris, 2017). These are the values that the EU supports, values that, as the Brexit vote revealed (see Box 8.2), are not appealing to everyone. Populist leaders have also emerged as politics has become more candidatecentred than party-centred (Karvonen, 2010; Teles, 2015). When personalities become more important than party organizations, the mechanisms of democratic accountability become weaker. In many countries in Latin America where authoritarian populism emerged, parties are personality-driven brands that can be invented right before a campaign (Vergara and Watanabe, 2016). This means that parties are not well-developed organizations with a stable commitment to a set of policies. Without strong commitment to an ideology, party switching is common and the political system cannot provide meaningful representation for its citizens. Democracy in the Philippines has suffered because it has no real parties in terms of philosophy or institutional longevity (Montinola, 1999; Kasuya, 2001); parties have often been simply a vehicle for individual candidates or specific elections. As a result, party switching (‘turncoatism’) is also commonplace, as parties lack clear ideologies. Today support for parties is at an all-time low in many democracies around the world (Zmerli and Van der Meer, 2017). Parties and politicians are held in very low regard by the public, and command low levels of trust. Most parties in Latin America were not effective in incorporating citizens and are widely unpopular. Prior to the emergence of authoritarian populist leadership in Latin America, only 21.9 per cent of the public in Latin America expressed confidence in political parties, and 16 per cent claimed to be ‘close’ or ‘somewhat close’ to a party organization (Payne et al, 2002). In the Philippines, surveys reveal only modest trust in political parties. Citizens do not rely on their political representative to solve problems. Weak parties have a direct influence on citizens – they interact less frequently with citizens, and they cause citizens to become less engaged in the political process (Karp and Banducci, 2007). Because parties have become weaker, there has been a real failure of representation, and that has facilitated the emergence of autocratic leaders who are eager to fill the void.

Conclusion Electoral malpractice is another avenue of autocratization. Incumbents aiming to weaken vertical mechanisms of accountability target elections in ways that make the playing field unfair. As the chapter laid out, there are various forms of electoral malpractice that the incumbent can utilize to prolong their rule. The more obvious forms, such as offering financial rewards to voters in exchange for their support, placing restrictions on opposition activity and counting the votes inaccurately are commonplace in grey-zone regimes and autocracies. However, in advanced democracies, the tactics are more subtle and involve using legal

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methods to suppress voter turnout, amending the rules to affect how votes are translated into seats and passing legislation that fails to effectively monitor how voters are being influenced. In democracies, the rise of dark money is sparking concerns that the electoral process is not transparent. The most concerning part is that some citizens seem to be completely in the dark about the slow erosion of the electoral process. In spite of these concerns, all around the world there are citizens who are very aware of the different forms of strategic manipulation taking place. In fact, the end of 2010s saw protests taking place around the world. Citizens rose up against corruption, government mismanagement and various forms of electoral manipulation and fraud. Even though the predominant trends are polarization and apathy, there are also segments of the population that are activated and interested in supporting democratic governance. The path to achieve this is not so easy however. The next chapter explores one of the consequences of the global democratic recession – that the pendulum has now swung in the other direction – and there are citizens who are cognizant that there is a crisis of governance. We explain the roots and the nature of these protests. We then investigate the various solutions to democratic rollback. What can be done to help democracies succeed? KEY QUESTIONS 1. Is gerrymandering always undemocratic? Explain why or why not? 2. Choose two democratic countries and examine their campaign finance laws. Which country’s laws are better for democratic outcomes? 3. In what ways does patron–clientelism violate vertical accountability? 4. Which is more problematic for democracy: eradicating term limits or dark money? 5. Can a country be democratic without strong political parties?

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Protests and Reforms Introduction In 2019, protests took place all over the world. From Lebanon to Hong Kong, from Chile to Bolivia, from Iraq to France, protests have erupted in democracies, authoritarian regimes and grey-zone regimes alike. In total, citizens in twentynine democracies and thirty-four autocracies protested against autocratization in 2019 (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2020). Just as citizens are critical to accelerating democratic decline, they are essential in pushing for positive change. Earlier chapters explained that the number of coups as a means of authoritarian breakdown is declining. At the same time, there is also an increase in citizenaccepted autocratization as well as citizen-led non-violent revolutions that have forced out autocratic leadership. From 1946 to 2008, 4 per cent of all regime changes were caused by revolutions. From 2010 to 2012, this rose to 25 per cent (Kendall-Taylor and Frantz, 2014). We are seeing a resurgence in what was once a rare pathway to authoritarian breakdown – people taking to the streets to protest a variety of issues. Varieties of Democracy (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2020) reports that the share of countries with large pro-democracy mass protests rose from 27 per cent in 2009 to 44 per cent in 2019. These pro-democracy protests have led to democratization in twenty-two countries since 2010. The chapter will show how the protests of the 2010s have been driven by similar factors that drive populism – inequality, corruption, bad governance and poor representation. We are also seeing the citizen response to authoritarian populism, with individuals who have never been politically active before being compelled to fight for their democracy. In addition to explaining the key drivers that protests have in common, we also explain the conditions under which protests are likely to lead to real change and when they are unlikely to lead to reform. We also explain what protests mean for democracy. Are they beneficial to democracy or do they simply constitute a warning that democracy is in trouble? After laying out how citizens are responding to crises of governance, the chapter investigates the possible reforms needed to reverse backsliding and strengthen

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democracy. We start by examining the role of electoral laws, campaign finance laws, laws that lead to voter suppression and compulsory voting (Braconnier et al, 2017a). We investigate what laws have proven most effective in ensuring high voter turnout (Gerber and Green, 2017). In doing so, we highlight the extent to which institutions actually structure political behaviour. The chapter also looks at reforms to the media. High concentration of media ownership and the blurring of lines between the media and the state impede the public’s ability to access accurate information. What types of media reforms can improve the quality of information that citizens receive? The chapter also looks at the role of civic programmes in teaching democratic values and fostering an understanding of how democracy works. Studies have shown that democracy can increase political participation and lead to higher levels of public efficacy for democracy. The chapter explores how civic programmes are able to make a positive impact. The chapter closes with an examination of the role of gender equality and increased levels of women in government for democracy.

Key concepts Protests around the world We are currently witnessing a global uptick in protest activity (and protests cycles), with some of the largest protests in world history taking place in the 2010s (Ortiz and Béjar, 2013). By protests, we are referring to an organized (and/ or unorganized) social movement that challenges authority and aims to enact political change (Jasper and Goodwin, 2003). Political change could include changes to policies, institutions and even regimes. A protest cycle constitutes protests that take place at a similar time, with similar demands and characteristics (Tarrow, 1998). Protests certainly ebb and flow over time, but often coalesce around a specific set of ideals. For example, the protest cycle of 2011 demonstrated an articulation of similar new issues, ideas and desires, which had a profound impact. These protests were so significant that Time magazine declared 2011 the year of the protestor. Political protests sprang up in unlikely places, such as in the Middle East. The Arab Spring protests against authoritarian rule that began in Tunisia spread quickly to Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen. Anti-austerity protests also broke out in Greece, Spain and Portugal in response to the global economic crisis. Most protests are not successful in achieving their aims. Of the protests that took place from 1989 to 2011, almost two-thirds attracted less than 10,000 participants at their largest rallies, with most ending in three days or less (Brancati, 2016, 28). Less than 10 per cent of protests led to the government being ousted, and less than 25 per cent of protests extracted concessions from the government. Instead, in about two-thirds of protests, the military and police responded with brutal

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repression, and neighbouring countries took note and cracked down on potential protests as well. However, the 2019 protests led to some notable ousters. Protests are more likely to be successful when they are part of a global cycle of protest and when the grievances articulated resonate with society. Though not always successful, protests in 2019 gained worldwide attention. In France, protests were sparked by a rise in fuel taxes. This spiralled to a series of other protests against working conditions for French firefighters and police officers. In the UK and the US there has been a constant stream of protests in objection to (and in favour of) Brexit and Trump’s policies respectively. In the US in 2011, the Occupy Wall Street movement brought attention to rising gaps between rich and poor. In Spain, protests in Catalonia have broken out, seeking greater autonomy for the region. In Italy, protests, known as the Sardines movement, have emerged in opposition of the right wing views of former Deputy Prime Minster Matteo Salvini and his allies. Protests that broke out in Malta against corruption and the mysterious death of a journalist exposing corruption led to the resignation of leader Joseph Muscat. Anti-corruption protests have also broken out repeatedly in Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Czech Republic and Slovakia. In Romania, 150,000 people took to the streets to protest the government’s efforts to weaken anti-corruption legislation in 2019. Much of the Romanian diaspora returned home to take part in the protests, which represented another confrontation between the citizens and the political elites. Changes had been proposed to essentially make crimes of corruption unpunishable. In response to the protests, the prime minster dropped the decision to give amnesty to those convicted of corruption. Several powerful politicians were forced to resign as well. In spite of these efforts, the ruling Social Democratic Party (PSD), which has been trying to dismantle anti-corruption measures, still has a majority in the parliament. Protests have also broken out all over the Middle East, but with only moderate success. Protests in Iran rallied against government lies, corruption, repression and mismanagement of the economy, leading to a strain on the average citizen. The Iranian regime has responded with repression and little reform. However, protests elsewhere have led to leadership resignations. Protesters took to the streets in Iraq in 2019 against government corruption, high unemployment, government mismanagement and interference from Iran and the US. In response, Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi was forced to step down in February 2020. In Lebanon, protests broke out after the government tried to place a tax on phone calls made using WhatsApp, and on gasoline and tobacco. Hundreds of thousands of Lebanese citizens also protested government corruption and worsening economic conditions. Prime Minister Saad Hariri stepped down in January 2020 in response. Massive protests that broke out in Algeria after longtime leader Abdelaziz Bouteflika announced his candidacy for a fifth presidential term also resulted in his resignation. Finally, demonstrations broke out in Sudan in

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December 2018 in response to deteriorating economic conditions. These protests continued into early 2019 until the military overthrew President Omar Bashir in April. Immediately following the coup, protesters demanded that civilian leadership take over. In Hong Kong, protesters have taken to the streets against the increasingly repressive environment they face under the Hong Kong leadership, which Beijing presumably controls. These protests have been leaderless, but activists have coordinated using secure apps such as Telegram to identify and avoid police deployments (which were pulled in October of 2019) (Hale, 2019). Young people have been at the forefront of these protests, but the protests have brought out many different groups. Trade unions, doctors and nurses have come out to protest as well. At one protest in June 2019, at least 2 million people out of Hong Kong’s 7 million were participating (BBC News, 2019b). The local district council election held on 24 November 2019 resulted in pro-democracy candidates taking charge of seventeen out of eighteen district councils, flipping hundreds of seats that had been held by pro-Beijing candidates (Kirby, 2019). In Indonesia, the largest protests since 1998 broke out over several controversial bill revisions and proposals. The first was a new criminal code that would outlaw sex outside of marriage and sentence unmarried couples living together to six months imprisonment. President Joko Widodo has also faced pushback about a law that would partially dissolve the Corruption Eradication Commission. Students and universities across Indonesia orchestrated demonstrations against both these new law revisions, with lecturers cancelling classes in order to demonstrate. The thousands that took to the streets were met with tear gas and water cannons. The parliament delayed the vote on the unmarried couples bill after the protests broke. Several protesters died in clashes. Chile has faced violent protests over growing inequalities, and more specifically a hike in subway fares. Young students have used social media to call on riders to jump subway turnstiles in protest. In response, the army was called out, causing total chaos. Over 180  people were arrested, fifty-seven police officers were injured and eleven people died as a result of the riots. President Sebastián Piñera had to declare a state of emergency and suspend the subway. In Bolivia, protests broke out over Evo Morales’ attempt to invalidate the election results and block a second round of voting in the presidential elections. Protests broke out and Morales promised a new election. However, the protests were so significant that the chief of the armed forces urged Morales to step down. Acting President Jeanine Añez took over, leading to counter-protests in favour of Morales, which became violent. As many as three dozen people were killed in clashes with police, while another 800 were injured. Additionally, over 1,500 were arrested (Human Rights Watch, 2020). All of these protests of the 2019–2020 and the 2011–2012 periods reveal a crisis of legitimacy and failures of representation. The lack of economic opportunities, growing inequalities and government mismanagement and corruption have

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increasingly frustrated citizens. The most recent protest cycle has involved citizens taking matters into their own hands. In the post-Cold War period (1989–2011), political parties and their supporters organized two-thirds of all protests (Brancati, 2016). However, in the recent protest cycle, we see that protesters have not cooperated with political parties, and have bypassed the mainstream media. Protesters also have not used traditional leadership structures, but have relied instead on the internet and public places for collective debate.

What explains the rise in protests? Democracies tend to exist in clusters of both time and proximity (Gleditsch and Ward, 2006; Leeson and Dean, 2009). Democratic protests may also have a similar demonstration effect, which helps them spread. Proponents of this view argue that transnational activists can provide information and support to other activists to facilitate these protests and to offer strategic support, which facilitates contagion (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006; Weyland, 2009). For example, the colour revolutions took place over a longer time period (roughly spanning the early and mid-2000s) and involved countries mostly from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe such as Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Serbia. The Serbian opposition group that Otpor! organized the Bulldozer Revolution trained the activists responsible for the Rose Revolution in Georgia as well as members of Pora, which played a prominent role in the Orange Revolution. The Arab Spring involved countries across North Africa and the Middle East and took place over a shorter time span, starting from December 2010. Events were organized along similar themes and most of the protests took place in central squares of cities (Anderson, 2011). Thus, activists in neighbouring countries can provide the push needed to help organize protests that otherwise would not occur (Weyland, 2012). Proximity increases people’s awareness of previous protests because it influences how much individuals interact with one another, the likelihood that they share a common language, and consume similar media (Kopstein and Reilly, 2000; Gleditsch and Ward, 2006). In spite of this, protests are usually triggered by an internal event, usually a corrupt election or an economic crisis, where a greater percentage of individuals are unemployed, impoverished or believe that their standard of living has deteriorated. These major events are able to drive collective action against governments, because usually most citizens are aware of them. Fraud is more likely to draw protests when the incumbent is in the final term of office (Hale, 2005). Economic crises play a role because citizens often blame governments for generating the crises (Brancati, 2016; Brancati and Lucardi, 2019). Both are important on their own, but may also be connected; poor economic conditions are associated with a higher chance of fraudulent elections (Brancati, 2016). The importance of economic conditions and fraud is in line with a grievancebased approach for explaining protests. Grievances include political injustices and

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deteriorating political conditions. Grievances can also centre around economic conditions such as the transition to a market economy, the erosion of access to basic social services and increasing economic inequalities. This theory suggests that protests will break out when conditions suddenly worsen and aggrieved groups seek to blame someone for the disturbing course of events (Goodwin, 2012). Nevertheless, grievance-based models started to receive criticism because there are grievances all around the world, but not all necessarily lead to protests. Proponents of grievance-based models argue, however, that other theories did not acknowledge the importance of emotions and morality (Verhulst and Walgrave, 2009; De Juan and Wegner, 2019; Tatar, 2020). Grievances that can tap into moral outrage and help conjure up important memories resonate with people. Social movements can draw from a wide array of symbols (Williams, 2004). Accordingly, these scholars argue that grievances are always at the core of any social movement (Shadmehr, 2014). Other authors claim that political protests are driven by openings or opportunities, particularly in non-democratic societies (McAdam, 1996). These include changes in institutional structures, political characteristics or informal power relations that can offer an opportunity to produce meaningful change. Some scholars argue that social protests are common in new democracies, especially the early stages of the democratization process. For these scholars, the freedoms brought by democratization increase opportunities for mobilization (McAdam and Tarrow, 2010). Another approach argues that the rise of movements is due to the presence of external resources that are available to the movement and organizational structures that help people mobilize and engage in collective action. This can include organizations, financial resources, connective structures, networks and relationships that are important to the organization of a social movement. Other approaches look at the role of movement leaders and the frames through which individuals understand a movement’s goals and activities (Snow et al, 2008). Leaders can frame messages in ways that attract a wider constituency. For example, a compelling protest leader has the power to draw people in to the movement. Leaders are also able to maintain unity, prevent schisms and prevent factions from engaging in risky behaviour that could hurt the cause. As already mentioned, the bulk of the protests in the most recent protest cycles have been leaderless. Hong Kong protesters even adopted the rallying cry, ‘ Be formless, shapeless, like water’, to indicate that they cannot be suppressed (Serhan, 2019). Another theory argues that protests are more likely to take place in regimes that have undeveloped party systems that create a representation gap. The lack of proper channels for representation encourages strategies that are more disruptive and provocative. Earlier scholarship has argued that underdeveloped intermediary institutions lead to the emergence of radicalized protesters who were more likely to be alienated and impoverished (Cloward and Piven, 1979; Huntington, 2006).

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Though there may be a representation gap driving the recent protest cycle, radicals have not been the driving force. In fact, the new trend is that individuals who have never been politically active in the past have become so dissatisfied with their governments that they feel compelled to take part (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2020).

Protests and democracy Many scholars see protests as important to complementing political participation by offering direct forms of representation. The concept of the ‘movement society’ reinforces the idea that protests are a normal feature of democratic politics (Meyer and Tarrow, 1998). Protests can foster greater democratic openness by making democratic processes more transparent. Protests can also ensure greater responsiveness by forcing governments to be more accountable. Nevertheless, some scholars have argued that social movements are not necessarily a good sign for democracy. Widespread social movements and political protests demonstrate that the legitimacy and stability of the system is danger (Crozier et  al, 1975). These sustained social movements in many cases have contributed to institutional weakening of regimes through unconstitutional means, rather than democratic strengthening (Mainwaring, 2006).

Who is the protester? More recent studies have found that in advanced industrial democracies in Latin America and Europe, and in the US, protesters are well educated and more likely to be engaged in various forms of civic activity (Schussman and Soule, 2005; Norris et al, 2006; Moseley and Moreno, 2010). Voters were more likely to protest and were generally more interested in politics. Therefore, social protest is just another way of legitimately expressing political demands. Young people have been at the heart of most political protests, especially educated, middle-class youth (Thyen and Gerschewski, 2018). Higher income and education levels have been positively associated with higher rates of protest at the individual level (Schussman and Soule, 2005; Dalton et al, 2010). Education fosters a culture of democracy and also signifies that the individuals have a greater array of resources available, and greater ability to network and use technology to coordinate. Youth are essential to protests in a stagnant economy, because of the low opportunity costs of participating (Bricker and Foley, 2013; Farzanegan and Witthuhn, 2017). Non-governmental civil society groups have also been involved in protests, and professional unions and religious groups have taken part as well, though to a much lesser extent (Brancati, 2016). The role of the labour classes is critical for which protests are most successful in pushing for democratic reform. In a study investigating how citizens promote democracy in 150 countries, it was found that industrial workers have been key

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agents of democratization and democracy, even more so than urban middle classes (Dahlum et al, 2019). When industrial workers mobilize in opposition to a dictatorship, democratization is likely to follow. Industrial workers can use unions and international labour networks to coordinate powerful challenges against authoritarian regimes.

Protests and social media Increasing internet use raises the likelihood of protests in authoritarian regimes, but does not have much of an effect in democracies. In Tunisia, the internet was heavily controlled using a sophisticated cyber-censorship apparatus that blocked websites and used surveillance to punish and persecute online critics of the regime headed by long-time leader, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. In 2010, just prior to the Jasmine revolution, the government increased its efforts to muzzle online discourse, attempting to block social media platforms. In spite of these efforts, some websites containing critical content of Ben Ali survived and were crucial in informing citizens about the blatant corruption, wasteful spending, mismanagement and human rights violations. Videos went viral of lavish shopping sprees by Ben Ali’s wife. Once the protests began, more images and videos with dramatic information were shared that resonated with Tunisians (Reuter and Szakonyi, 2015). By January 2011, Ben Ali was forced to resign. Social media has facilitated protests in a number of ways. Social media has allowed users to communicate their grievances more rapidly and to a much wider audience. Social media users are not journalists, so they can disseminate information in more emotional and provocative ways, not being bound by the professional norms of objectivity. They can share information that is more personal and motivational. Additionally, it is easier to create and share content on social media. It takes just seconds to compose a tweet, upload a video or snap a photo, and this content can help unify people behind a goal or a cause. Social media can also be used to plan events and overcome collective action problems. Social media groups help members organize and make announcements, post calendar items and communicate with one another. Messages can rapidly reach a wide audience at a low cost. This creates virtual communities in which news, messages and events can go viral. In doing so, social media helps to overcome the coordination problems involved in protesting. Social media gives users the impression that a protest will be well attended because it provides greater certainty of how many people in the community were reached, and how many will likely attend. More accurate (and possibly optimistic) information regarding how much support a protest will generate can motivate people to come out and protest.

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Case study: Protests and decay in India India is one of many countries that has been rocked by protests in 2019 and 2020. Protesters have taken to the streets to protest growing autocratization and hyper-nationalism. India has been falling in democratic quality since Narendra Modi became prime minister in 2014, but democratic decline really accelerated after the conservative Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won in a landslide in 2019. Since then Modi has suppressed dissent with brutal force, incarcerated political opponents and touted an exclusionary form of Hindu nationalism that comes at the expense of civil liberties. Unlike other populist authoritarian-style leaders, Modi is popular with upper castes and younger voters, but the party enjoys a wide range of support across various voting blocs. The BJP’s 2014 electoral victory came after a series of corruption scandals tainted the once‑dominant Congress Party. A survey in 2013 found that 69 per cent of respondents thought the Congress Party-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government was corrupt, and that corruption was getting worse (Rukmini, 2013). Thus the Congress Party’s corruption had become a national crisis that, according to Modi, only he and the BJP could solve (Chacko, 2018). The desire to replace corrupt elites was a core element of Modi’s success. The BJP cultivated the image as an underdog fighting the corrupt establishment and representing the common man (Chakravartty and Roy, 2015). Modi offered direct appeals to the public using familiar language, and anti-elitist and anti-pluralistic rhetoric (Jaffrelot and Martelli, 2017). Once it came to power, the BJP was transformed under Modi’s leadership. Though it was once a well-institutionalized political party, under Modi, party networks were subsumed under his authority and party leaders were sidelined in order to focus on Modi’s personal and charismatic appeal (Jaffrelot and Martelli, 2017). Modi was considered the saviour of the BJP for how he was able to bring the party back from the brink of extinction (Filkins, 2019). He did so by tapping into anti-Muslim sentiment among Hindus. Hindus felt that Muslims had been given special treatment by the Congress. Privately many Hindus believed that Muslims supported violence and were a drain on the state. Modi signalled to his followers that he shared their bigotry. He was willing to play on the deep resentments that Hindus had of Muslims, but which were considered too offensive to voice publicly (Filkins, 2019). The BJP then promoted a version of nationalism in which Indian identity is equated with Hinduism (Plagemann and Destradi, 2019). The Modi administration also uses social media to manufacture anti-Muslim bigotry and to empower Hindu nationalists (Sinha, 2018). Hindus are characterized as frequent victims of Muslim violence. In every election campaign, Modi has used anti-Muslim rhetoric and framed Muslims as anti-national, leading to a rise in hate crimes against minorities (Varshney, 2019).

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The BJP has also passed legislation that discriminates against Muslims. The National Register of Citizens, which was initially implemented in 2013 in the state of Assam, documents all legal citizens of India in order to identify and then deport illegal immigrants. The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), which was passed in 2019, enables individuals who had fled neighbouring countries due to religious persecution to have a path to citizenship – with the exception of Muslims. Almost 2 million residents of Assam, where a third of the population is Muslim, are at risk of becoming stateless because they do not have a path to citizenship. Spontaneous protests erupted against the unconstitutional CAA, but the Central Bureau of Investigation and the Enforcement Directorate have been weaponized to harass dissenters. Modi has mobilized social media trolls and party cadres to trash protesters, calling them jihadists and threats to national security, while simultaneously attacking the established media. Modi even declared that ‘those who perpetrate violence can be identified by their clothes’ (ET Online, 2019). A minister of state in his government announced that protestors causing property damage should be ‘shot on sight’ (Rao, 2019). Authoritarian laws were used to cut internet access and parts of the country faced laws that prohibit demonstrations. Modi has also used national security threats as a pretext to suppress political opponents. In 2019, Modi eliminated the special constitutional status for the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and then placed two of the former chief ministers, who were democratically elected members of parliament who opposed this, under house arrest. National security was invoked as a reason to keep them in detention (BBC News, 2019a). As India’s democracy faces a steep decline, the economy is also in freefall. Most of Modi’s promises have not come to fruition, and the country is likely to face an eventual backlash. In 2020, over 100,000 came out again to protest the Citizenship Bill. The loudest voices of dissent have come from women. From housewives to students, activists to lawyers, it has been mostly individuals who have never had any past political engagement that have been at the forefront of these protests. Women have blocked roads, organized sit-ins and surrounded male protesters to prevent them from being beaten by police. Women are likely to suffer the most from the CAA, which requires documents to prove their citizenship. As women are disproportionately poorer than men, they are less likely to have this type of documentation. Women have also come out in protest against what they view as the toxic masculinity of the Modi regime that glorifies violence and emphasizes exclusion. The protests have tarnished India’s image domestically and abroad as the world’s largest democracy. With Modi unable to digest any criticism, the government has responded with strong-arm tactics. Modi has been able to pursue these types of exclusionary policies in part because of his belief that a significant number of Indians view his agenda favourably. As of December 2020, protests continue to take place with farmers taking to the streets to protest reforms that would allow private actors to play a greater role in the farming sector (BBC News, 2020). Time will tell if these protests can convince him otherwise.

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From protests to reforms? As the chapter has explained, citizens all around the world are responding to autocratization and bad governance by protesting. But does it have any impact? Is it more effective than other strategies? Protests often do not lead to genuine change, but non-violent strategies are more effective than violent ones. In a study that examined hundreds of campaigns, non-violent campaigns are twice as likely to achieve their objectives as violent campaigns (53 per cent compared to 26 per cent) (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). Non-violent protests can recruit more participants from a broader demographic and make it more difficult for the security institutions to justify responding with repression. Non-violent protests can cause severe disruption with boycotts and strikes constituting the most effective strategies. Also critical to the success of any protest is maintaining resilience in the face of repression. This same study argues that it only takes the active participation of 3.5 per cent of the population in a protest to ensure serious political change. Most protests do not gain these types of numbers. By that logic, for a protest in the US to be successful it would require 11 million people to take to the streets. However, some protests have been successful without meeting that threshold. The height of the People Power Campaign in the Philippines to oust Ferdinand Marcos attracted 2 million participants. The Brazilian uprising to oust the military dictatorship attracted 1 million people. The Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia had 500,000 participants. Economic crises and fraudulent elections were powerful drivers for ousting dictatorships. Nevertheless, protests have different success rates in democracies and in autocracies. Today citizens are not only dealing with autocratic rule, but also with autocratization. What can be done to stymie autocratization in democracies? Getting people to take to the streets is not the only strategy to combat autocratization. In what follows, the chapter examines potential reforms to help improve democracy and prevent backsliding. The book highlighted in earlier chapters that some of the key drivers of democratic decay have been rising levels of corruption, inequality (both perceived and real) and authoritarian populism. Media sensationalism, weak parties and rule of law erosion were also highlighted to as important precursors to democratic backsliding. Though there is no silver bullet to end autocratization, it is important to look into solutions that can address some of these issues. We focus on solutions that have citizens at the centre and thus constitute ways of improving vertical, diagonal and discursive forms of accountability. These reforms concentrate on improving citizens’ participation, knowledge and influence. In most cases, to get reforms implemented and to ensure they are adhered, it takes a vibrant civil society that is willing to apply pressure to prevent micro-assaults on democracy from taking place unnoticed.

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Fair and representative electoral systems The legitimacy and fairness of the electoral process is crucial for the establishment and maintenance of a healthy democracy (Elklit and Reynolds, 2002; Mozaffar and Schedler, 2002; Schedler, 2006). Electoral systems that do not encourage voters to vote – because the elections or electoral systems are perceived to be unfair or unrepresentative – are problematic for democracy because they weaken vertical forms of accountability. For this reason, many of the reforms to counter democratic backsliding focus on the electoral process. There is a rich body of literature that examines the role of electoral systems in democratic consolidation. In particular, proportional systems have received a lot of scholarly attention. Proportional representation (PR) systems are electoral systems where the proportion of the votes directly translates into the proportion of seats. Such systems can be found in countries such as the Netherlands or Israel. There is usually some sort of threshold, which affects the degree of proportionality. The lower the threshold, the easier it is for parties to gain a seat in the legislature. It is not necessary to come in first in order to gaining seats; all a party has to do is gain enough votes to cross the threshold. Research has found that PR systems tend to produce greater congruence between the government and citizens (Powell and Powell, 2000; Lijphart, 2012). Studies have also argued that PR systems are better for encouraging female and minority representation, particularly if the minorities in question are not geographically clustered (Lijphart, 1997). PR systems ensure that every group feels accurately represented. Studies have shown PR systems create a better sense of fairness than do single-member district (SMD) majoritarian systems (Elklit and Reynolds, 2005; Lijphart, 2012). One reason for this is that districts are not always apportioned fairly. Though this varies from country to country, systems that use SMD can be vulnerable to gerrymandering (see Chapter 11) and electoral manipulation. Another concern of majoritarian systems is that elections appear to be zero-sum contests. The supporters of the losing party are more likely to lose trust in the government and the political system, and have lower levels of democratic satisfaction (Whiteley et al, 2016). Thus, the gap in political trust between electoral winners and losers widens. With PR systems, individual voters are also more likely to vote for the party that they really support, rather than vote strategically for a party that is the lesser of two evils (Lijphart, 1994, 2012). Advocates of PR systems also argue that these systems help build better institutionalized political parties that represent the public more effectively (Dalton, 1985; see also Lijphart, 1994). Other studies have demonstrated that PR systems are associated with higher levels of political support than more disproportional systems (Andersen et al, 2005). When the US Supreme Court ruled against the Democratic Party in the 2000 presidential election, many Democrats lost trust in the political system (Craig et al, 2006). In multi-party systems, these feelings of despair and loss of

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trust may not be as strong. For this reason, the literature leans in favour of PR as a means of enhancing trust in the political system (Powell and Powell, 2000). Some case studies confirm that when countries move to more proportional systems, democracy is enhanced. For example, a study of Lesotho found that switching from an SMD system to a mixed-member proportional system in 2002 resulted in a greater perception of regime legitimacy (Fox and Southall, 2004). Critics charge, however, that proportional systems are more prone to democratic collapse because they expand the number of parties and the level of fragmentation. There are too many parties that emerge, most of which are too weak to perform their democratic functions. The Brazilian presidential system, for example, has weak parties due to its proportional electoral system. High levels of party fragmentation can lead to deadlocks and policy paralysis. Due to the problem of fragmentation, many scholars have argued in favour of majoritarian systems. Also known as SMD, plurality or first past-the-post systems, these electoral systems usually lead to two choices, with parties having to coalesce into permanent coalitions in order to remain competitive. The advantages are that parties are forced to be broad-based and represent many different interests to win, thus building bridges with diverse social groups. In order to win, parties also have to offer the electorate a coherent programme for governing and prove their ability to garner a majority. Because parties need to have wide appeal, extreme parties that can threaten democracy and political stability are kept at bay (Powell, 1982; Sartori, 2005; Huntington, 2006). However, proponents of majoritarian systems counter that it is harder to assign blame in PR systems, which means that there is less vertical accountability for voters. Another powerful counter argument is that there are historical cases of PR systems encouraging extremism by enabling extreme parties to have too much power and not encouraging moderation. The cases of Salvador Allende barely winning a plurality of support in Chile (leading to polarization and the 1973 military coup), and Adolf Hitler barely winning a plurality of support in Germany are often mentioned. The PR system used in Iraq has also faced criticism for favouring the Shiites and not offering much accountability. Others argue that it is not SMD systems that are the problem, but systems that do not lead to transfers in power. When citizens have to endure repeated electoral defeat of their party, they may lose trust in electoral processes. Thus, the electoral defeat of a party only has an impact if it is repeated (Curini and Hino, 2012; Beaudonnet et al, 2014; Delgado, 2016). This too can be mitigated in systems that have some form of power-sharing. For example, though Belgian politics is divided along linguistic lines, there are still high levels of political trust in the system due to the perception of an extensive power-sharing system (Hooghe and Stiers, 2016). Rein Taagepera (2007) adds to this debate by saying that what is most important is to keep electoral rules simple so that outcomes can be predictable. The rules should also be maintained for at least three elections in a row, so that the electoral

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system has time to develop. In line with Lijphart’s (2012) reasons, Taagepera suggests that the rules chosen should be focused on ensuring that groups will not accumulate dissatisfaction. In spite of the many benefits of PR systems, the likelihood of countries completely overhauling their electoral system is lower compared to that of other enacting other reforms. We lay out reforms that figure in many debates on improving democratic quality.

Campaign finance reform In addition to changes to the electoral laws, reforms of campaign finance regulations can significantly enhance the quality of democracy. The lack of campaign regulation affects the quality of democracy, since special interest groups are able to financially control the government at the expense of citizens. To ensure that citizens are able to effectively exercise influence in the political process, it is critical to ensure that money does not play too important a role in elections. As more countries have followed the US’s lead and allowed money to impact the electoral process to a greater extent, campaign finance reform has become a bigger topic of political debate. As explained in Chapter 6, one of the bigger drivers of democratic decay is rising inequalities (both perceived and real). These inequalities are heightened by unregulated campaign financing – where wealthy narrow interests have undue influence and power because elected officials have to return favours to those that have contributed heavily to their campaigns. This results in policy capture, where decisions are made that benefit special interests over ordinary citizens. Surveys of citizens confirm that this has an effect on political satisfaction. According to the Edelman Trust Barometer Report (2019), four out of five citizens around the world think that the system is not working in their interests, due to the perception that only money talks.1 Campaign finance reform may be critical to improving satisfaction, public trust and perceptions of equality. There are several aspects of campaign finance reform that are important to consider. First, disclosure requirements that call for transparent financial reporting are crucial to ensuring that the sources of money are known and preventing the influence of dark money (see Chapter 11). This means that donors must disclose their identities, donation amounts and/or spending. Additionally, regular public reports should be submitted to an independent supervisory body that can monitor these disclosures and that has the power to apply sanctions in the case of non‑compliance. Political parties and electoral candidates should be required to submit financial statements with clear documentation of donations and spending. This is to help understand how money is flowing, since the electorate has the right to know where donor money is coming from in a clear and accessible manner. Second, it is critical to have limits on contributions in order to limit the influence of potential donors. Some types of donors, such as foreign donors,

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trade unions or big corporations, can be banned outright. After the Watergate scandal, the 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) was amended to limit individual contributions to candidates and political committees in the US. The Federal Election Commission was created to enforce these restrictions, which meant that individual candidates had to raise funds from a wider range of small donors. However, political action committees were set up by corporations and unions to raise money for candidates in order to circumvent this rule. Third, because of how frequently candidates and parties evade rules on contribution limits, it is also essential to also limit the expenditures of political actors. This can include bans on outright vote buying as well as restrictions on the abuse of state resources to benefit the incumbent. Limits on spending by political parties and candidates can take place over the campaign period or throughout the election cycle. This is to prevent a spending arms race where whoever has the most funds wins the most votes. Fourth, public funding, or how much public money is allotted to campaigns, is another important issue in campaign finance. States can ensure that all eligible parties receive the same amount or that funds are distributed proportionate to seats won, votes won or candidates fielded. Expenses can also be reimbursed by a flat rate per vote received or per registered party member. In Sweden, parties are supported by the government. Those that win a minimum of 2.5 per cent of the nationwide vote receive funding. Roughly two-thirds of funding for parties comes from the state in Sweden. Other provisions from the state can include tax relief, offering premises for campaign meetings, space for the placement of campaign materials, free or subsidized postage and/or subsidized transport facilities. All post-communist countries have free radio and TV broadcasting available for candidates and parties. About 94 per cent of them grant subsidies such as free postage and free use of public buildings (Ikstens et al, 2002). It may also help to have provisions that link direct public funding of political parties to gender equality. This would encourage improving the share of women in parliament (for more on this, see the case study at the end of this chapter). There can also be provisions for free or subsidized access to the media for political parties and candidates, to reduce the importance of money politics. As the bulk of money in US elections is spent on campaign television ads, offering free or subsided access may make a difference in levelling the playing field. Additionally, some countries have limits on television advertising. Equally important is placing restrictions on negative ads. This can improve the quality of information the public receives so that candidates and parties focus on clarifying their own political agenda rather than running attack ads that focus on the character flaws of their opponents and rarely provide useful information. Banning negative ads is also important to encouraging political participation. Studies have suggested that negative campaign ads reduce voter turnout, and can lead to disenchantment, scepticism and distrust (Patterson, 1993; Moy and Pfau, 2000; Lengauer et al, 2012).

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Fifth, shorter campaign periods can help alleviate the issues with money politics dominating the electoral process, as it would create a natural limit to spending and donations. Shorter campaign periods also ensure that politicians can focus on representing their constituents and enacting good policies. Around the world, there is a wide variation in the length of campaigns. In the US, where candidates are perpetually in campaign mode, too much time is spent campaigning, and not enough legislating and governing. The length of the 2016 presidential campaign was 596 days. By contrast, Mexican law limits campaigns to 147 days; the UK had a 139-day campaign in 2015; the Philippines has ninety-day campaigns; Canada had a seventy-eight-day campaign in 2015; and Japan’s campaigns last a mere twelve days (Kurtzleben, 2015). With all of these suggestions, it is important to note that any legal requirement is only effective when the state is able to enforce its laws. Campaign finance laws may look promising on paper, but without an independent body to regulate campaign finance and impose sanctions when violations occur, the laws will be regularly ignored. This independent body should be well-staffed, well-funded and not politicized by serving at the behest of the incumbent. Additionally a multi-pronged approach is more effective than a single reform. No single policy instrument can make a difference by itself. We now give a brief overview of the campaign finance laws in democracies around the world. The lengthy campaign period in the US has attracted attention for its shortcomings. It demonstrates the importance of a multi-pronged approach rather than a single policy instrument. The US has an incredibly long campaign period, with no law stipulating its length. As mentioned previously, though there are limits on how much donors can give, there are no limits on what a candidate or party can spend, and candidates are free to spend their own money. Billionaire Michael Bloomberg entered the race as a candidate for the Democratic Party in the 2020 election because he was able to spend as much of his own money as he pleased. The 2020 election is likely to prove to be the most expensive in US history (Torres-Spelliscy, 2020). The 2012 election cycle broke records with a total of $6 billion spent. Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney spent $844.6 million while President Barack Obama spent $874.6 million. Political action committees (PACs) spent $970 million, while $123 million was spent by dark money donors. As much as 81 per cent of the dark money went to help Republican candidates, while only 19 per cent was in support of Democratic candidates. There are also no limits on television advertising spends, with Obama putting $265 million more into television ads than Romney did (Hudson, 2012). There are also no limits on negative attack ads. Finland has a similar system in terms of spending limits to the US, but has very different outcomes. This has to do with the length of the campaign season, which is much shorter. Parties also receive government aid if they are represented in the Parliament or had received 2 per cent of the national vote in the most recent election. All successful candidates must report their campaign funding. There

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are also ethics guidelines that control media coverage of elections and legislative mandates that ensure the impartiality of public service broadcasters. Austria limits spending by political parties to 7 million euros, though there are no limits to how much can be accepted in donations. Austrian political parties receive public funding, with the amount dependent on the number of people eligible to vote in the previous election and the number of votes cast for the party. There are no provisions for media access or air time for political parties, though the Austria Broadcasting Company commits itself to providing equal access and pricing to political parties during campaigns. In Canada, spending limits are regulated by the Canada Elections Act. The law limits contributions to political parties and candidates, and only citizens or permanent residents can donate up to a maximum of around $1000 each. There are also limits as to how much candidates and parties can spend, and certain networks are required to allocate free air time to political parties. In Japan, there are limits on donations for political campaigns as well as on spending, though these limits do not apply to all campaign activities. The amount a donor can give to a candidate is roughly $15,000 per year. Foreigners and corporations that are in debt or receive subsidies from the government cannot contribute to campaigns or parties. Labour unions and businesses can only give to established parties and not to individual candidates. Individuals and groups can only donate to parties during election periods, though parties can distribute donations to individual candidates at any time. Political organizations must disclose donations but not individuals candidates. Nevertheless, there is little monitoring to review campaign financing and parties can pass on corporate contributions to candidates, which means that wealthy special interest groups have an influence over electoral outcomes. This may explain why the centre-right Liberal Democratic Party has been in power for decades. There are also rules on broadcasting, with laws that stipulate that equal opportunity must be given to all candidates and parties, but these laws have not impacted the LDP’s dominance. In New Zealand, there are limits on how much candidates and parties can spend on election ads in the three months prior to an election. There are now limits on how much a person or company based in New Zealand can donate to a candidate or party, and they also must disclose their identities. The Broadcasting Act of 1989 stipulates that candidates and parties cannot broadcast negative attack ads or use their own funds to purchase additional broadcasting time, placing limits on the amount of television and radio advertisement. In the UK, legislation in place since 1883, referred to as the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act, prevents excessive spending by candidates and parties. Donations above a certain amount must be reported for transparency. Political parties also receive a certain amount of broadcasting time on television and radio free of charge. Candidates have low spending limits, with most campaign money going to parties rather than candidates. Spending includes all expenses incurred for the purpose of election campaigning during the regulated period, including transport

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costs, staff and advertising. Candidates cannot purchase advertisements and most of the funds are used for leaflets and posters. As a result, candidates usually spend far less than the ceiling. In the 2010 election, candidates spent 15 per cent of the total regulated expenditure. The British prime minister is allowed to call an election at any time during their term. Campaign periods are relatively short, ensuring that less money is spent on campaigns. In Germany too, campaigns are much shorter and much less expensive than in the US. German campaigns last only six weeks and cost the main parties somewhere between 20 to 30 million euros each. These costs however are for the entire party, not just individual candidates. In contrast, the average US Senate election costs run to about $10.5 million. President Obama’s 2012 re-election campaign cost $874 million, excluding money from political action committees. A smaller German party may only spend about 4 million euros for all of its candidates. The German government and party membership dues pay most of the campaign costs. Corporate sponsors and individual donations pay for about a third of the cost. Costs are lower mostly due to there being fewer television ads, which are the major expense in US campaigns. In Germany, each party creates a ninety-second ad for the entire election that can air on television a certain number of times, in proportion to the number of votes it won in the last election. That means a smaller party’s ad may only run about four times on each of the two major channels. Mexico has been in need of campaign finance reforms for decades. Some promising reforms have been made, but problems still remain. In the past, the dominant Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) secretly siphoned money from state-owned companies to fund their campaigns while political action committees circumvented regulations for the National Action Party (PAN). Mexico now has a mixed financial system in place that publicly funds campaign activity while allowing for limited private contributions. Electoral laws put into place in 2007 have a formula for how much public funds are allocated to political parties, which is dependent on the number of Mexican citizens registered to vote multiplied by 65 per cent of the capital’s minimum wage. Of this amount, 70 per cent is allocated based on the number of votes a party receives during the past congressional election while the other 30 per cent is distributed equally among all registered parties. Those who win seats have a huge advantage in terms of public funding. Private donations are limited to 10 per cent of the money spent in the previous presidential campaign. Nevertheless, though electoral officials are regulating how public funds are spent, they do not have the resources to monitor private donations or the entire campaign financing process. It has been estimated that illegal campaign contributions amount to four times the legal amounts (Ugalde, 2013). South Africa provides direct political funding and parties are able to use public subsidies to fund their electoral campaigns as well as other regular activities. Under the current system, parties get money based on ‘proportionality’ –

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that is on the basis of their performance in the last election, with 90 per cent allocated based on how many MPs each party has in the National Assembly, and 10 per cent distributed among parties contesting in the provinces (Government Gazette, 2019). A new bill was enacted in 2019 to prohibit donations from foreign governments, stipulate what funding can be used for, regulate disclosure of donations and create penalties for violations. Public funding in South Africa does reach smaller parties that are not in parliament, but there is no free air time for their electoral campaigns. Anonymous donations are banned but foreign donations are allowed, as are donations from trade unions and private companies. The guidelines for private contributions are limited to 10 per cent of the money spent in the previous presidential campaign (around $2.6 million using 2012’s election numbers), but there are no caps on spending. South African parties are obliged to itemize their income but not their spending, and there is no requirement to disclose the sources of their donations. None of these disclosures have been made public in practice, but there is oversight from the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), a well-funded, independent commission. Sanctions are sometimes enforced on violations in take the form of freezing disbursements of public funding. Botswana, in contrast, does not provide any direct public funding for parties or candidates. Like South Africa, anonymous donations are banned, though foreign donations and those of trade unions and private companies are permitted. There are limits to what each candidate can spend – roughly £3,500 – but no limits on what parties can spend, which benefits the dominant Botswana Democratic Party. Botswana also does not offer free air time for electoral campaigns. It requires that political parties report on their finances (though only for the election, and not regularly) and there is judicial oversight of this process. In practice, none of these reports have been made public and overall there appears to be little transparency in the campaign funding process. In the Philippines, there is a ban on donations from anonymous donors and foreign interests both to parties and to candidates, but there is no ban on donations from corporations or trade unions. There is no provision for direct funding for political parties and no provisions for free or subsidized access to the media for parties. Candidates, however, are offered free or subsidized access. Advertising slots are supposed to be equitably allotted, but are not always distributed equally in practice. Candidates and parties have spending limits – the equivalent of 3 cents spent per voter in their constituency. However, there are no clear limits on additional media advertising spending for election campaigns, and in practice there is excessive spending on television ads that start well before the ninety-day campaign period. Additionally, parties and candidates are not required to regularly report their finances, though both have to report on their campaign finances once. These reports must reveal the identity of donors. These reports have been made public only sporadically. Furthermore, the Commission on Elections, which is responsible for monitoring and enforcing political finance laws, has

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been politicized because its head is politically appointed by the incumbent, so there are questions about how much power it has. Sanctions for violations are also rarely implemented and candidates can get around paying the fines. These examples were just a sampling of some of the issues with campaign finance in democracies. In some cases, the issue is that many countries democratized without much experience in regulating elections. New democracies drafted constitutions that did not impose regulations on party funding and campaign finance. But money has become increasingly influential in elections in older democracies as well, due to lax and ineffective laws in monitoring financing, and the need for reforms that cover multiple aspects of campaign finance.

SNAPSHOT: CAMPAIGN FINANCE AROUND THE WORLD According to a 2012 report (Ohman, 2012) from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 143 countries (88 per cent of the world) require some form of financial reporting from political parties or candidates. However, only 53 per cent require reporting from both parties and candidates, which leaves a loophole where funds can be channelled without having to be transparent. In 25 per cent of countries, there is no institution tasked formally with examining the financial reports or investigating violations of political finance regulations. In more than 25 per cent of the countries that do require financial reports from political parties or candidates, there is no requirement for the information to be made public. In 68 per cent of countries, there is a ban on donations to parties from foreign sources, but only 22 per cent have a ban on corporate donations. There is no limit to the amount that can be donated to political parties or candidates in 55 per cent of countries. Almost 70 per cent of countries, however, provide parties with free or subsidized media access.

Laws to encourage political participation Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963, 2015) emphasized that citizen participation lies at the heart of democracy. As this book has explained, many autocratic power grabs have occurred not just because they had some public consent, but also because there was a great deal of non-participation, and thus little vertical accountability. Political participation is important to keep various abuses of power in check (Chang and Golden, 2004; Ferraz and Finan, 2008). Therefore encouraging political participation is critical to democracy, not just for its intrinsic appeal, but also because it can remedy other sources of democratic decay (Dalton, 2008). To some extent, low political participation rates can be blamed on voter apathy or cynicism, which may be driven by the sense that one’s vote does not count either because of flaws in the electoral system or the perception that ordinary

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citizens are powerless. However, lower participation is also affected by laws that deliberately suppress voter turnout, known as voter suppression laws (Hajnal et al, 2017). Shorter early voting periods, repeal of same-day voter registration, reduced polling hours, decreases in the number of poll locations, increased restrictions on voting for felons and greater challenges to absentee voting or voting from abroad are examples of voter suppression laws, and they are all problematic for democracy (Larocca and Klemanski, 2011; Weiser, 2014). Most scholarly attention has focused on voter suppression efforts in the US, where the earliest examples date back to 1885 and 1908 when poll taxes and literacy tests were introduced. Both legal and extra-legal attempts at voter suppression have also happened in Australia, Canada, Israel, Brazil and Hungary, to name a few. In the case of the US, various states have tried to implement laws to suppress minorities from voting. Georgia and Texas have gained notoriety for intimidation tactics, threatening to investigate African Americans and Hispanics for voting more than once or for filling out a form incorrectly. Tennessee (a state which has one of the lowest rates of voter turnout in the country) attempted to pass a law that would enable the state to fine groups that submitted 100 or more voter registration forms that lacked a complete name, address, date of birth, declaration of eligibility and signature. The penalty could be up to $10,000 per county where violations occurred, along with misdemeanour charges for voter registration groups who fail to fill out forms correctly or do not complete state training. A federal judge struck down on the Tennessee law for violating constitutional rights. Florida has tried to suppress voter turnout by finding a way to nullify the impact of a citizen-led initiative that gave 1.4 million felons who had served their sentences the right to vote in 2019 (Anderson, 2019). The state legislature tried to stipulate that no former felon could vote until all of their court fines and fees had been paid – effectively a poll tax. A federal judge had to temporarily block the law, but there has been confusion around eligibility, which will likely depress voter turnout among former felons concerned about getting in trouble with the law again. Recent research has examined the effects of voter identification laws on democracy in particular. Studies have shown that voter identification laws have a similar impact to measures like poll taxes, literacy tests and residency requirements. Though a few earlier studies have found mixed results of the impact of these new laws (Gronke and Cook, 2007; Gronke et al, 2008), more recent studies have determined that voter identification laws empirically suppress minority turnout (Hajnal et al, 2017). Studies have speculated that the reason may be that these laws send a message to minorities that they are not wanted at the polls, as minority voters are less likely to possess identification. The results also show that voter registration laws have a stronger effect on primaries. The argument in favour of voter identification laws is that they ensure the integrity and legitimacy of elections and prevent voter fraud. However, voter fraud is such a rare phenomenon in elections in consolidated democracies that these efforts could be viewed as insincere.

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In addition to formal rules that suppress voter turnout, there are also non-legal manoeuvres that impact voter turnout that often go unpunished. There have been reports in Canada (only in 2011) and the US (a constant threat) of robocalls being used to scare off voters, and of fliers that threaten people who attempt to vote or falsely claim that the deadline for registrations has passed (Maher and McGregor, 2012; Parker et al, 2018). Some legal experts have argued that legislation should be passed regarding defrauding people of their right to vote and criminalizes this type of activity (Stringer, 2007). Studies have also looked at the ease with which citizens can register to vote. For many citizens in democracies across the world, the onus is on the state and political parties to ensure that voters are registered. There are different strategies that states can use to make it easier for citizens to register to vote, such as same-day voter registration, motor vehicle voter registration and automatic voter registration. Automatic voter registration is an opt-out system, where voters would have to opt out of registering rather than the other way around. Today in the US, sixteen states have approved automatic voter registration. Canada – where 92 per cent of eligible citizens are registered to vote – the government works to identify unregistered voters and newly eligible ones. In the weeks leading up to the federal elections, voter information cards are sent out to all registered voters to remind them to vote and let them know where and when they can do so. Very little academic work has studied the impact of automatic voter registration, but an experimental study found that automatic voter registration increases the likelihood of minority representation at the polls and voter turnout (Braconnier et al, 2017b). In addition to automatic voter registration, compulsory voting has been cited as an important measure to increase voter turnout. Proponents of compulsory voting claim that it can strengthen norms and commitments to democracy, both from citizens and the public (Lijphart, 1997). This is important for developing a lifelong habit, as once a norm has been internalized, it becomes a part of regular life. Studies have demonstrated how habits form early in life, and citizens can develop a voting habit in their first election (Franklin, 2004; Healy and Malhotra, 2013). For example, a voter who is eighteen at the time of a presidential election is 4 per cent more likely to vote in the next election than someone who just missed the age cut off (Meredith, 2009). Additionally, a citizen’s propensity to vote is enhanced if their first vote was in an election with high voter turnout (Bechtel et al, 2018). Compulsory voting is not the only method for increasing voter turnout but it tends to be more effective than other measures. Though automatic registration and weekend voting is helpful, it is not as conducive to increasing voter turnout as compulsory voting (Chapman, 2019). Compulsory voting increases turnout rates as much as 15 per cent or more (Birch, 2009).2 In countries where compulsory voting is strictly enforced (such as Belgium and Australia), turnout is 90 per cent or more. In countries

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where compulsory voting is not strictly enforced, such as Paraguay, turnout is much lower, just under 70 per cent. We have also seen the effects of abolishing compulsory voting. In the Netherlands and Chile compulsory voting was eliminated in 1970 and 2012, respectively, leading to a huge decrease in voter turnout (Ferwerda, 2014) and, in the Netherlands, an increase in the stratification of voting (Irwin, 1974). Compulsory voting is also more likely to increase the number of parties (Jensen and Spoon, 2011) and is associated with higher rates of democratic satisfaction (Birch, 2009). Additionally, if the incentives are set up properly to encourage all groups to vote, compulsory voting should be an important way to counteract a cycle of disengagement among marginalized communities (Birch, 2009; Hill, 2011). This is important to addressing political inequalities in a democracy, because upper income groups tend to be more likely to vote, which means that public officials are more likely to prioritize the concerns of these voters (Griffin and Newman, 2005). Increasing voter turnout is important because the vote is the primary mode of participation, where the maximum input is equal across actors (Verba et al, 1995, 24). With more people voting, government responsiveness and representation of all groups improves. As such, studies have demonstrated that compulsory voting is associated with lower levels of inequality and corruption (Chong and Olivera, 2008; Birch, 2009). Not all countries that implement compulsory voting do so in ways that achieve these objectives, however. Brazil’s compulsory voting has had the unintended consequence of increasing stratification in voter turnout. Compulsory voting was mandated by the 1988 constitution, but the types of sanctions imposed for not voting incentivizes the upper and middle classes to vote, but not the poorer classes. Voting is only compulsory for the literate population aged eighteen to sixty-nine, which means that those who are illiterate are left out of the process. Citizens who abstain from voting face fines of about $1.60 or 3–10 per cent of the regional minimum wage. Anyone who fails to vote or pay the fine cannot participate in a civil service exam or public bidding process. They also are forbidden from working for the government, obtaining a passport, enrolling at a public university or getting a loan from a state bank. As these punishments affect the middle and upper classes much more than the poor, the result has been that the former groups have been more likely to vote, while the poor have had almost no incentive to do so (Cepaluni and Hidalgo, 2016). The Brazilian case illustrates the importance of creating incentives for adhering to compulsory voting that get all income groups to comply, not just the wealthier classes. Though there is ample support for the positive impact of compulsory voting from empirical studies, there is a concern that if it is not well enforced, it can have little effect. Here, Sarah Birch (2016) proposes several measures that can help. First, the constitution should say explicitly that citizens should participate in elections, thus making voting a legal duty. This then provides the basis for civic education in schools to include voting and its significance in a democracy.

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A number of countries have this embedded in their constitutions, such as Italy, Colombia and Portugal. Another alternative is to have a collective sanction for not voting, which means that there is a mandatory minimum that must participate in an election for it to be considered valid. Any election that does not meet this threshold is considered invalid. Turnout requirements have been used for referenda, but outside of Eastern Europe these types of thresholds are relatively rare. The final alternative is to offer incentives for voting, such as a lottery for voters, preferential access to educational and state employment opportunities, reduced military service or reduction in fees for state services.

Box 12.1: Strategies to strengthen judiciaries In addition to supporting efforts to foster a more activated and informed citizenry that can press for equality, representation and the rule of law, states can also strengthen their judiciaries (Ezrow and Frantz, 2013). Judiciaries are critical to upholding the rule of law, and are also targets of executive power grabs. Making sure that they do not become politicized requires implementing procedures to help judicial institutions maintain their integrity. The possible measures include: • depoliticizing the election and appointment of judges • using established procedures to guide the selection, appointment and promotion of judges • establishing objective and clear criteria for the allocation of cases to judges • offering adequate remuneration and ensuring that work conditions are satisfactory for members of the judiciary system • ensuring that investigations are transparent • setting ethical standards for judges and offering proper ethics training

Strategies to avoid media capture As Chapter 9 explained, a higher concentration of media ownership has been problematic for democracy and has led to a phenomenon known as ‘media capture’. This is where the media is controlled directly or indirectly by the government or by large conglomerates with strong political interests. Capturing the news media has become a technique governments and corporations use to gain greater influence. In the economic sense, capture describes a process by which regulators are supportive of the agencies and institutions that they are meant to regulate, which undermines discursive and diagonal forms of accountability. Media capture also entails corporations dictating political narratives through their control of the media to influence how citizens vote, which affects vertical accountability. For example in Italy, with no political background, Silvio Berlusconi created his own party, Forza Italia, and used his control over 45 per

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cent of the national television media to catapult him to the premiership (Baker, 2006). Once in power, he was able to control how the media was regulated and the reporting on his administration. The Spanish telecom giant Telefónica has been accused of purchasing El País in order to use the newspaper to advocate on behalf of conservative government policies. Media capture also helps to explain the rise of populism, one of the drivers of democratic decay. As large corporations have gained control over the media, they have focused on negative and character-driven dramatizations of populist candidates, which generate greater ratings and readership (Bos and Brants, 2014). Once a populist leader takes power, independent journalism – or media outlets that have not been captured – faces a constant attacks (see Chapter 9). In many Western democracies, the media is increasingly deregulated, leading to unchecked media concentration that has given a few media groups vast amounts of social and political influence. Studies have demonstrated that increased economic concentration of media ownership makes the occurrence of media bias more likely (Corneo, 2006). This exacerbates political inequalities as there will be a stratification of knowledge among citizens about media capture, power and influence. Unlike politicians, financial executives cannot be voted out of office, though they have a critical effect on political outcomes due to their control over information (Petrova, 2008). The media is an important conduit between how public opinion is formed and how the government responds. Just as egalitarian elections are critical to democracy, so too is a media that has an egalitarian distribution of control (Baker, 2006). To understand the risks to media pluralism, studies often look at audience concentration, ownership concentration and regulatory safeguards against this, cross-media ownership concentration and regulatory safeguards against this, ownership transparency and regulatory safeguards for this, political control over media outlets and distribution networks, political control over media funding and finally, political control over news agencies. More data is needed on how to track media concentration, but recent case studies have demonstrated the extent of media concentration in specific countries, finding that concentration of stateowned and private-owned media is on the rise (McChesney, 2016). While media ownership has become more highly concentrated, there has also been a proliferation of different sources of media. Many scholars assumed that new forms of media, with the low barrier to entry, would be good for democracy. It was assumed that the more competition there was, the harder it would be for the government or big corporations to capture the media (Dyck and Zingales, 2002; Besley and Prat, 2006). However, as ad revenues fell, so too did the quality of the media. Media outlets that had more rigorous standards needed financial support from corporations (Cagé, 2016). Additionally, the rise of social media platforms such as Facebook spawned new forms of media capture that scooped up much of the advertising revenues, and were also able to use personal data and algorithms to determine what types of news and information reached citizens (Bell, 2016).

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A nine-country study of news websites found that leading websites produce the same kind of news that favour the voices of authority (Curran et al, 2013). The concentration of digital distributors has led to huge monopolies, which are maximizing profits rather than advancing the public interest (Fenton, 2016; McChesney, 2016). In the UK, just three companies control 71 per cent of the national newspaper circulation, with five groups controlling 80 per cent of the combined print and online readership (Fenton, 2016). This concentration of media power means that journalists have more pressure to comply with the corporations for which they work. The growth of new forms of media has led to other issues as well. Large companies worsen the capture problem by taking most of the profits for themselves and decreasing incentives for owners to perform their traditional roles. This has resulted in more media owners entering this sector in order to promote a political agenda, rather than having to purely financial incentives (Nielsen, 2017; Schiffrin, 2017). There are several ways to prevent media capture (Nelson, 2015). Not surprisingly, the first is to use anti-trust and fair competition rules, though these rules need to be sensitive to economic pressures faced by the media industry. There should also be more transparency of ownership, with the requirement of full disclosure of owners and their political and economic interests. Additionally, there should be an independent media regulatory authority. This will help to ensure that regulatory decisions are based on objective criteria rather than on political pressures. The independent body needs to serve as a buffer between the government and news production. Independent institutions are also needed to carry out effective media policy. There should also be rules on government advertising to ensure that budgets are allocated in a transparent and competitive way. Furthermore, a transparently funded public service media should be promoted to ensure high quality journalism. Finally, media literacy needs to be included in schools and made available to a wide range of citizens. It is important that citizens know how to differentiate high-quality information from poorly researched and sourced information, and not automatically share the latter on social media. Civil society and foreign donors can also help prevent media capture and neutralize its effects. Both groups can be more involved in media policies and getting organizations to focus on the media sector (World Bank, 2017). Civil society movements can push for legislation that not only supports free expression but also works to ensure that media norms are upheld. In Latin America, panAmerican institutions such as the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, the American Convention on Human Rights and other multi-country legal and professional associations have worked to set norms and standards. Civil society movements in Latin America have also played an important role in designing reforms and pushing for their implementation. As a result of these pressures, broadcast laws in Latin America have been passed to support access to information and protect freedom of expression.

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Civic education As Chapter 4 explained, education is important to democracy (Almond and Verba, 1963), but whether or not civic education can play role in democracy is more controversial. While many theorists have argued that civic education is important to transferring knowledge about how the political system and democracies work, and to promoting freedom of expression and participation, an influential early study claimed that civic education has a negligible effect on democracy (Langton and Jennings, 1968). However, more recent studies have countered that civic education can be beneficial to democracy, albeit with certain caveats. Studies that have looked at the impact of civic education on democracy have provided several pieces of advice. Civic activities work best when they are frequently attended. In other words, one-off workshops are not as effective. They also work best when they incorporate active learning as opposed to lecture-based instruction. Finally, they also work best when the instructors are well trained (Campbell, 2008; Dassonneville et al, 2012; Finkel, 2014). When civic education programmes take these factors into account, they have the potential to create positive effects for democracy. Nevertheless, a better informed citizenry does not directly or automatically lead to more democratic support. Case studies conducted in Kenya, South Africa and the Dominican Republic showed that civic education was not able to foster democratic satisfaction, support for democracy or political trust. Only in Kenya was there a modest increase in political tolerance. However, these programmes were important to improving civic competence and knowledge of the political system, democratic processes and institutions. Thus, civic education programmes can play a role in politically empowering and mobilizing individuals to participate in the democratic political system, and supporting them to be more engaged (Finkel, 2014). By encouraging participation, civic education helps countries experiencing democratic reversals and those progressing towards consolidation. In Kenya, civic education was able to counter the impact of instability and institutional failure (Finkel et al, 2012). Studies are finding that civic education programmes, both formal and informal, can have a positive impact, particularly for people from disadvantaged backgrounds (Campbell, 2008; Neundorf et  al, 2016). They contribute to making citizen involvement more egalitarian. Civic education programmes help encourage political engagement of young citizens, and have an important socializing effect. At the same time, civic education can have a lasting effect into adulthood (Hooghe and Wilkenfeld, 2008). A study of civic education programmes in Hungary and Poland found that younger generations are more supportive of authoritarianism than older generations in Hungary, whereas the opposite is true in Poland (Fesnic, 2016). This study demonstrates the importance of an effective civic education programme in socializing citizens to the norms of democracy in the post-authoritarian transition period.

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Case study: Women and democracy Historically, the global level of women’s political empowerment has vastly improved. However, the general trend is that women’s political empowerment and access to leadership is stagnating. According to the Varieties of Democracy 2017 dataset (Lührmann et al, 2018a), it was the first time in seventy years that we did not see the global level of women’s political inclusion and empowerment advance. 3 Advancements have taken place in terms of the number of female journalists, property rights for women and how power is distributed by gender. In particular, there have been improvements in the number of female parliamentarians. But many countries have performed worse when it comes to freedom of discussion for women. In terms of voting, the gap between genders and voting is shrinking in Western industrialized democracies and is almost insignificant (Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2010). Women are also as likely as men to sign a petition or donate to a political campaign. But gender gaps persist in other types of political participation. Men are more likely to engage in collective forms of political participation such as going on strike, demonstrating, and contacting political officials and party members (Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Marien et al, 2010). Participation in political parties and running for office is still dominated by men. In fact, only 15 per cent of the world’s population lives in societies where political power is evenly distributed. Studies have demonstrated that there are positive ramifications to having an increased share of women in parliament. More female parliamentarians in Africa led to high levels of female political participation and engagement (Barnes and Burchard, 2013). Research in Scandinavia found that greater representation of women in parliaments improved gender equality and the quality of democracy (Sainsbury, 2001). Impact of female political participation Greater involvement of women in government is not only good for democracy and women’s rights, it also has other positive implications. Research suggests that the greater levels of women participating in government increases spending on health care, education and other family and social policies (Childs and Withey, 2004; Karam and Lovenduski, 2005; Bolzendahl and Brooks, 2007). In Rwanda, which has the highest percentage of women in parliament, issues such as education and healthcare are now raised more easily and more frequently than before (Devlin and Elgie, 2008). A greater number of female council leaders in villages in West Bengal, India, led to higher education levels for girls and better outcomes for girls (Beaman et al, 2012). More women working, in turn, lead to a positive cycle of gender equality. Cross-national time series study finds that countries that have had a longer experience of women’s suffrage also have greater rates of female labour force participation and lower fertility rates (Beer, 2009). Additionally, a recent study finds that democracies with higher levels of gender equality in the political system lead to lower levels of corruption (Stensöta and Wängnerud, 2018).

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Women rights and democracy Many studies have examined the important relationship between women’s rights and democratization (Wang et al, 2017). A dataset that examined the state of democracy in 177 countries from 1900 to 2012 revealed that countries do not become fully democratic without providing political and social rights for women. Societies transitioning from authoritarian rule need women’s involvement in order to develop a functioning democratic government. Women’s rights increase the costs of authoritarian repression and enable women to organize. Without guaranteeing women’s rights, no country has managed to fully democratize (Wang et al, 2017). Democracy needs women to be treated as equals if it is to be inclusive, representative and enduring. On the flipside, countries that democratize will also have higher levels of female representation over time (Fallon et al, 2012). Greater levels of freedom of speech and assembly have led to higher levels of political participation in Ghana, for example. A shift from one-party to multi-party elections also leads to greater levels of participation by women (Tripp, 2001). Not surprisingly, the most democratic countries in the world are also the most gender inclusive. Scandinavian countries stand out for their inclusiveness and the quality of their democracies, whereas countries in the Middle East are far less gender inclusive and also far more authoritarian. Thus, there are a number of reasons why involving women in politics is beneficial. Even though women tend to represent their party, class, ethnic group and other sectional interests above their gender, an increased presence of women can make a difference in championing women’s interests. When women reach or exceed 30 per cent of a deliberative decisionmaking body, they are more effective in advocating for changes to public spending priorities that favour gender equality.4 They can also have a role model effect in encouraging more women to seek leadership roles. For this reason, some scholars have advocated the use of electoral quotas to increase the proportion of women holding public office. Other measures include reforming campaign finance laws to provide special assistance to female candidates.

Conclusion Protests taking place around the world have signalled that citizens are growing increasingly frustrated with their governments. Many of the protesters in this most recent protest cycle were not politically active in the past, but a host of different factors has driven them to take to the streets to fight for democracy or to oppose growing threats to it. As previous chapters explained, there has been a fair amount of complacency in the face of power grabs by would-be autocrats that has spelled trouble for democracies both young and old. Polarization has also driven some to support autocratic leadership styles, but not all citizens have responded in the same way. Though there is ample support for authoritarian leadership and apathy, there is also outrage channelled through peaceful protests.

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Protests are a mixed bag for democracy. On the one hand, they are a sign that people are politically active. On the other hand, they are also a sign that the government, and possibly democracy, is not delivering. Protests are a symptom of bigger problems of representation. For democracy to be strengthened, reforms must focus on how to help citizens engage in the political process in more meaningful ways. It is also essential to ensure that everyone, regardless of background, can participate. Because elections are so critical to democracy, ensuring that citizens vote is a first step in preventing backsliding. Citizens need access to accurate information and need to know how to process that information. Civic programmes may be able to assist with this, but an overwhelming responsibility lies with the media. The media must ensure that it focuses on informing rather than on stoking fires. An important step in incentivizing this is to break down the high concentration of media ownership. It is also important to encourage civil society as a means to keeping the media focused, keeping politicians honest and helping citizens understand their rights and liberties. In particular, women are important to democratization and democratic consolidation. For democracies to succeed, there must also be strong support for improving women’s rights and empowering women to take part in the political process. The rise of women participating in government has been overwhelmingly positive for democracy. The evidence is strong that supporting women in politics leads to higher living standards, greater regard for human rights and more confidence in democracy. Confidence in democracy is perhaps the strongest weapon against democratic backsliding. KEY QUESTIONS 1. What are the common causes that drive individuals to protest? Do you agree that protests are more likely to cluster in time or space, or is the role of genuine grievances more important? 2. Why are most protests not successful? When they are successful, what factors explain why this may be the case? 3. Is compulsory voting a violation of people’s rights or critical to democracy? If you believe it is important, why do not all countries mandate it? 4. What can citizens do about voter suppression? 5. Is it the media’s responsibility to inform the public? What needs to be done to ensure that citizens are better informed? Should the responsibility be on citizens, the media or the state?

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Conclusion This book began with the premise that the optimism about the state of democracy that characterized the end of the Cold War is over. Instead of seeing a steady rise of democracy across the globe, the level democracy has not advanced since 2006. This democratic slump has generated widespread concerns among analysts and policy-makers over the current trajectory of democracy around the world. The book sought to answer the question of why this is the case and the processes by which democracies are falling apart. To do so, it has covered a large body of research on democratic backsliding and authoritarian resurgence within the context of contemporary global political and economic dynamics. In spite of this gloomy picture, the historical record demonstrates that democratic development has experienced many ups and downs, and nowhere is that more evident than in the late 2010s. As the previous chapter explained, 2019 was the year of the protest. There were over sixty protest movements worldwide in autocracies and democracies alike, against autocratization. Varieties of Democracy reported that 2019 had the highest global average of pro-democracy protests of all time, with higher levels of mobilization than even during the fall of the Soviet Union or the Arab Spring (Lührmann et al, 2019). These protests are promising signs for the future of democracy. But just as mobilization efforts were spreading around the globe, the world was hit by the COVID-19 pandemic (for more on this see Box C.1). This initially stalled protests efforts in the spring of 2020, but by late May the US was seeing some of the largest and most prolonged protests in recent history over police brutality against African Americans and other systemic injustices. Around the same time, democratic protests erupted in Belarus against long-time dictator Alexander Lukashenko – the largest pro-democracy protests in the country’s history.

Box C.1: COVID-19 and democracy In the final chapter of this book, we explored the rise in protests against democratic backsliding, economic mismanagement and corruption. As the chapter explained, many of the same conditions that enabled countries to become less democratic also drove protests against the excesses of backsliding regimes. The protests that took place in 2019

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and early 2020 were a sign that not all citizens were complacent about the recent rise in autocratization. In spite of this promising news, the world was hit with an unprecedented pandemic that has caused most protests around the world to cease. On 11 March 2020 the World Health Organization declared that the COVID-19 outbreak was officially a pandemic, or a disease spreading around the world in multiple countries at the same time. At the time of writing, there were millions of cases and over a million people had died. The pandemic grounded flights, caused economic growth and international trade to grind to a halt, collapsed production chains and overwhelmed hospitals. The virus has completely besieged states, which faced difficult decisions about how to contain and mitigate the crisis. Crises are very risky for democracies – they are opportunities for governments to crack down and not return to the status quo. Crises have the potential to undermine democratic values and further authoritarianism. Historically, emergency measures have tended to become the new normal. Not surprisingly, as a result of this extraordinary crisis, extraordinary laws have had to be introduced. Though there are certainly difficult trade-offs that governments have to weigh in balancing well-being, economic welfare and freedom, the UN special rapporteurs on human rights have cautioned that the response from governments in the name of public health should not be used as a pretence to repress civil liberties and political rights. But because of the lethality of the virus and the need to social distance, civil liberties have been curtailed everywhere, on a massive scale (Hodal, 2020). Freedom of assembly has been restricted, as has freedom of movement. In some cases, elections will have to be postponed to safeguard the safety of voters. In many countries around the world, these extreme measures have been taken to save lives. However, some countries have also used the virus as an excuse to suppress political activity. In Uganda, President Yoweri Museveni is using the outbreak to stop elections, public rallies and political gatherings (Daily Monitor, 2020). In Bolivia, elections were postponed by interim President Jeanine Áñez, who has since consolidated more power and announced her plan to run for election (Ramos and Machicao, 2020). Many countries have also given their leaders emergency powers. In the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte declared a state of calamity for six months and has been granted emergency powers by Congress (McCarthy et al, 2020). In El Salvador, President Nayib Bukele requested emergency powers enabling him to limit not just travel and assembly, but also free speech. In Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu used the crisis to declare a state of emergency, and then used his emergency powers to delay his corruption trial. Other regimes have used the virus to undermine the press and the opposition. Egypt revoked the credentials of correspondents who had reported research that criticized it for politically

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managing the official count of cases. Jordan ordered a closure of all print and news outlets (Daragahi, 2020). Additionally, an emergency defence law gave Prime Minister Omar Razzas the power to deal firmly with anyone who spread rumours, false news or panic (Gebrekidan, 2020). In Cambodia, Hun Sen’s regime has used the pandemic to arrest those that spoke out about the crisis, targeting the media and the opposition. In Thailand, Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha has the authority to impose curfews and to censor the media. Anyone who is perceived to be criticizing the government’s response to the crisis has been sued (Gebrekidan, 2020). In the Philippines, Duterte has threatened to shoot anyone who creates chaos. The president has warned that he would crack down on ‘fake news’, but it is Duterte himself who is the arbiter of what is fact and fiction (McCarthy et al, 2020). Other countries are becoming much more militarized in response to the crisis. In El Salvador, security forces were given the power to crack down on those that violated quarantine and the police were used to pepper spray thousands of street vendors and others that had flooded the streets demanding financial support. Opponents of this have charged that Bukele is taking a public health crisis and focusing on militarizing society and suspending civil liberties (Maza, 2020). In Chile, a state of catastrophe was declared and the military was sent out to police the streets in order to mute dissent and protests in public squares (Gebrekidan, 2020). In Hungary, Viktor Orbán’s government has taken advantage of the pandemic to implement sweeping reforms that effectively give Orbán total power. On 30 March 2020, the government ruled that he can rule by decree for an indefinite period and that he has the power to suspend existing laws. Parliamentary oversight has been suspended, and there is no sunset clause in the law as to when it will be ended. Elections and referenda were also suspended, adding the concerns that one-man rule could go on indefinitely. Hungary has also made it a criminal offense to spread misinformation about COVID-19, a law that targets journalists. Hungary also permanently amended two articles of the criminal code to further limit freedom of expression and impose fines on people who break quarantine orders and curfews. To top it off, Hungary ended legal recognition of trans people (Walker, 2020). Concurrently, some authoritarians and populists received some of their lowest-ever approval ratings due to botched responses to the crisis. As public opinion plays a key role in propping up regimes, there is no doubt that COVID-19 has affected the democratic landscape for years to come.

Nevertheless, while there are promising signs for democracy, there are also large global trends, which the book has detailed, that are causes for concern. One of the biggest concerns is that citizens around the world are frustrated with democracy, or have become inclined to accept non-democratic alternatives. This goes against one of the most important prerequisites for democratic consolidation: a democratic political culture. The role of citizens in believing in the intrinsic

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value of democracy is critical to its success. Loss of trust in institutions, politicians and one another has led to a crisis that authoritarian forces have been able to exploit. Politics has become incredibly polarized, and in many cases citizens have become increasingly apathetic. Technology may be playing a role in driving polarization and apathy. Social media has not led to in-depth discussions about policy but instead has fuelled political polarization, exposing individuals to almost exclusively like-minded points of view. Opinions have been hardened and meaningful political debates are few and far between. Technological change was also supposed to help spread and facilitate democratic norms and values, but authoritarian regimes have proven more adept in leveraging these new technologies to not only sustain their rule but to sow divisions in democracies. New technologies increase the capacity of autocracies to shape political narratives to control citizens’ allegiances. Thus the state of democracy in the twenty-first century raises many important questions. Why are we in a democratic slump? What factors are driving this slump? How is democratic decay taking place? What’s new about these processes that is different from the past?

Key themes of this book One of the key themes of the book is that democratic backsliding, autocratization or democratic decay is a slow process that entails small, micro-assaults on institutions and norms. Unlike in the past, we are not seeing clear breaks with democracy – the number of military coups and executive takeovers are decreasing. Instead, many of the cases of autocratization are taking place in countries that have elected populist leaders, who have risen to power through democratic elections but have sought to augment their own power by weakening the democratic institutions of accountability. These executive power grabs have taken place with some public support due to growing dissatisfaction with democracy. Populist leaders in particular have been adept at taking advantage of rising apathy and polarization, and have fuelled divisions for their own benefit. To present these trends and processes of democratic decay, Chapter 1 started with an in depth overview of the state of democracy and autocracy in the twentyfirst century. The chapter also defined concepts such as democratic backsliding, decay and autocratization and presented a road map for how these processes take place. Because democratic decay has left so many regimes in democratic limbo, Chapter 2 clarified what we mean by grey-zone regimes – or regimes that are neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic. To do this, the chapter first defined both democracy and autocracy, and then discussed how to classify regimes that fall somewhere in the middle, explaining why there are so many more of these regimes than at any point in the past. As citizens are integral to democracy, Chapter 3 looked at public opinion and how we measure it public opinion. One of the book’s main contentions is that

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the public is playing a symbiotic role in the autocratization process. To understand this better, the book explored the relationship between the public and democracy, and which public opinion trends are indicators of the health of a democracy. Chapter 4 explored how undemocratic values are formed and shaped, while Chapter 5 looked at the role of technology in the rise of authoritarianism and in shaping global discourses. It explained that unlike at the end of the Cold War, authoritarian norms are competing against democratic norms, with authoritarian actors selling competing narratives that have resonated with some citizens. Chapters 6 and 7 explored the drivers of public discontent and polarization. Chapter  6 looked at the role of globalization in shaping public opinion in favour of non-democratic alternatives, while Chapter 7 explained the role of corruption in souring citizens’ support. Paradoxically, the chapter argued that pervasive corruption may increase citizens’ receptiveness to non-democratic forms of rule. Chapter 8 looked at how populist narratives and leaders tap into and take advantage of discontent, while also exploring their role in sowing distrust, polarization and support for autocratic power grabs. Chapters 9–11 looked at how autocratization takes place and the precursors that make countries more vulnerable to assaults on democratic processes and norms. Chapter 9 first looked at the assaults on the media. This is often one of the first actors of accountability to be targeted by would-be autocrats. Delegitimizing the media enables leaders to control the narrative of what is fact and fiction. As the chapter underscores, however, this has been facilitated by the media’s own failings to educate and inform. A constant focus on negative and sensationalistic news stories has tarnished the media’s image, making it easier for leaders to denigrate the fourth estate. Chapter  10 looked at the assault on institutions of horizontal accountability such as the judiciary, the bureaucracy and the legislature. By assaulting these institutions, the leader is hollowing out the state, making it much more difficult for the state to function and offer services, more difficult for the legislature to accurately represent societal demands, and more difficult for the judiciary to adjudicate without political interference. Chapter 11 looked at the assaults on vertical accountability by examining how the executive can undermine electoral integrity. While the number of cases of massive voter fraud are dwindling, we are seeing that micro-assaults on electoral integrity are becoming more frequent – thus tilting the playing field – sometimes without voters noticing. Weak and dysfunctional parties and an eroding rule of law are precursors that have facilitated executive aggrandizement. The final chapter of the book looked at evidence of the pendulum swinging in the other direction – the role of mass pro-democracy protests taking place around the globe. Chapter 12 explained what factors may be driving these protests, how extensive they are and what this means for democracy. The chapter also explored possible reforms to address the issues that democracies are facing, namely reforms that help citizens involve themselves in democracy in more meaningful and effective ways.

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Future for democracy Though the protests are reason for optimism, at the moment the future of democracy does not look promising. All of the global indices that measure democracy are reporting that the world is becoming more autocratic – most notably in some of the biggest and most powerful countries in the world. Autocratization is affecting the US, India, Brazil and Russia at a time when the world is also facing a global pandemic. Not surprisingly, these are also the countries worst hit by the pandemic – they are the top four in most COVID-19 cases in the world. Latin America is also struggling with democracy, recording lows that had last been observed right after the Cold War ended. As a region, it too has been one of the hardest hit by the virus. The 2010s have seen increasing attacks on clean elections, growing levels of media censorship and attacks on personal freedoms. Many countries also face toxic levels of polarization and political violence that is spiralling out of control. The economic crisis brought about by COVID-19 will likely not help matters, as citizens may get more desperate for quick fixes and stability. The immense social and economic damage caused by the pandemic has put a massive strain on democracy. Pew Research in 2019 had demonstrated a strong link between views of the economy and assessments of democratic performance (Wike and Schumacher, 2020). In a survey of twenty-seven countries around the world, respondents from twenty-four countries who felt that the national economy was not performing well also said that they were dissatisfied with democracy (Wike et al, 2019). As we head towards a global recession, a ripe environment is forming for autocratic style leaders to seize upon. This makes it all the more important to educate citizens about how democracies work, what reputable sources of information are and how citizens can get more involved, with a particular focus on young citizens. An educated citizenry is more likely to participate and assert its rights (Berinsky and Lenz, 2011). To fight autocratization, citizens need to push back against seemingly banal and trivial efforts to increase executive power and undermine the electoral playing field. We must also continue to closely watch political participation trends. In addition to political protests, more conventional forms of participation such as voting should be closely scrutinized. Global average voter turnout has decreased significantly since the early 1990s, with some of the biggest declines taking place in established European democracies. Voter turnout has been decreasing in democracies, autocracies and grey-zone regimes alike (IDEA, n.d.). These are concerning signs that the electoral rules and voting systems are desperately in need for reform, as are processes that can encourage civic participation and a higher sense of voter efficacy. As the book laid out, democracies are decaying slowly around the world, but as the example of Ecuador post-Correa demonstrates, they can recover. Though leaders are incredibly important to the process of reversing these trends

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of autocratization (as was the case with Ecuador), the public’s role cannot be understated. Future research needs to continue to focus on how to inform citizens more effectively both about political issues in general, and about democratic processes. This is an ongoing endeavour. As former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated, ‘No one is born a good citizen; no nation is born a democracy. Rather, both are processes that continue to evolve over a lifetime’ (UN SecretaryGeneral, 1998).

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Notes Introduction 1 2 3

Armenia had a revolution in 2018 that has led to democratic progress. By ‘democrats’, we mean both democratically elected leaders and the public. https://afrobarometer.org/press/africans-want-high-quality-elections-especially-if-they-bringchange-afrobarometer-surveys

Chapter 1 1

2

Varieties of Democracy is a multidimensional and disaggregated dataset that measures democracy all over the world, over time. Scholars that exclusively use the term autocratization also believe that terms like ‘backsliding’ and ‘rollback’ suggest that democratic decline is taking place unintentionally.

Chapter 3 1

2

3

Citizens were also losing respect for political parties (Hagopian, 2016). The rate of partisan identification fell to 12 per cent by 2015, with most of the losses suffered by the leftist Workers’ Party (PT). It found 59 per cent had not much confidence in Congress, while 20 per cent had none at all; 66 per cent had not much confidence in political parties, while 21 per cent had none at all; and 52 per cent had not very much confidence in government, while 14 per cent had none at all. In the early 1980s confidence in government was a bit higher, with only 47 per cent saying that they did not have much of it. People prefer to elect persons as leaders who are about twenty IQ points more intelligent than themselves, but not more (Gibb, 1969), and the intelligence of leaders is correlated with their political success and moral standards. Generally, people prefer leaders who are similar to them (Caprara et al, 2007).

Chapter 4 1 2

3

Adorno et al (1950) included the belief in a supernatural power in the F-scale. Acemoglu et al (2008) suggest that, with country fixed effects, there is no remaining relationship between education and democracy. Ideology and authoritarianism also stabilize near the outset of adulthood (Sears, 1983).

Chapter 5 1 2

3

Patriotism and civic nationalism are very similar concepts. A recent study showed that conservatives are four times more likely to share fake news (Tucker et al, 2017). Taken from Wardle, 2017.

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Chapter 6 1

2

3

4

The first wave of globalization started in the nineteenth century and ended at the beginning of the First World War. The second wave of globalization started after the Second World War, but really kicked into gear after the Cold War ended. Trade levels go up and down erratically over time. The 2008 crash, the Eurozone crisis, and the worldwide drop in the price of oil and other commodities combined to put a huge dent in global trade. The IMF reported in its World Economic Outlook for October 2016, that since 2016 trade had been growing at just 3 per cent a year, less than half the average of the previous three decades. Turkey, Jordan, the Palestinian territories, Lebanon and Pakistan hosting the most refugees and asylum seekers. In non-Western democracies, voter turnout may be affected by clientelistic exchanges rather than political preferences (Solt, 2008). Impoverished citizens offer political support in exchange for particular benefits.

Chapter 8 1

Instead, personalist leadership, military coups and conflict continue to afflict the region. In spite of this, Africa relatively speaking, is not experiencing the type of democratic recession affecting the rest of the world.

Chapter 9 1

2

3

The highest number of journalists killed on record was in 2006, when 155 were killed, mostly for reporting in Iraq. www.reuters.com/article/us-slovakia-politics/slovak-prime-minister-tells-journalists-they-aredirty-prostitutes-idUSKBN13I1RK www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/04/mauritania-mandatory-death-penalty-blasphemy#

Chapter 10 1

2

3 4 5

6

A study of 145 countries demonstrates that between 1789 and 2008 61 per cent of authoritarian reversals took place because of coups, while another 30 per cent were caused by the incumbent seizing power (Svolik, 2015). There is some disagreement over whether horizontal accountability entails having the power to impose formal sanctions (Mainwaring, 1999). A measure that was subsequently overturned by the European Court of Justice. www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/10900-report-on-the-doj-and-the-rule-of-law Egypt has had a history of using military courts to try civilians, but new laws have expanded their jurisdiction. Svolik (2008) notes that an increase in GDP per capita at the time of transition to democracy from the median $2,858 to $7,831 (for presidential systems) will compensate for the low odds of survival that a presidential executive implies.

Chapter 12 1

2 3

4

www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2019-02/2019_Edelman_Trust_Barometer_ Global_Report.pdf Blais (2006) claims that compulsory voting increases turnout by 5–10 per cent. By political inclusion and empowerment, the dataset examines civil liberties for women, and women’s civil society and political participation (such as voting and collective action). www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/gender-equality/

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396

Index Note: Page numbers for tables appear in italics.

9/11 terrorist attacks 100, 112

A Abacha, Sani 155 Abdallahi, Sidi Ould Cheikh 58 Abdel Aziz, General Mohamed Ould 58 Abdul-Mahdi, Adil 265 El Abidine Ben Ali, Zine 54 aborted democratization attempts ix, 26 abuse of power 167 accountability xi, xiii, xv, 194–5, 212 vertical xv, 35, 195, 242, 258, 275 see also horizontal accountability adjudication agencies 231 administrative corruption ix, 152, 167 administrative institutions 48, 152, 154, 183–4, 222, 228–30 Adorno, Theodor 95 advertising xi, 119, 208–9, 277, 281 Afghanistan 2 Africa 6–7, 19, 71, 97, 121 and China 105 and civic education 289 and corruption 155, 159–60 and cronyism 154 and elections 106, 248, 280–1 and electoral commissions 233 and electoral manipulation 250, 251, 253 and inequality 129 and interpersonal trust 75 and journalists 204, 205 and the judiciary 237 and the media 201, 203, 252 and polarization 79

and political corruption 153 and populism 188–9 and referenda 224 on trust in the courts 74 and voter turnout 81 and watchdog agencies 232 and women in parliament 290 African National Congress Party (ANC) 188–9 Afrobarometer 70 agencies 231–5 agriculture 130 Ahmed, Abiy 189 AKP (Justice and Development Party) 4, 28–9, 54, 219, 223, 227 Albania 71, 81 Alden, Edward 186 Alemán, Arnoldo 223 Algeria 265 alienation 82 Allende, Salvador 275 Alliance for the Peoples of America (ALBA) 107 Almond, Gabriel 68, 86–7, 282 Aló Presidente! 211 Altemeyer, Robert 95 America 74, 138 see also Canada; Latin America; US Americans 71 Amnesty International 197 Añez, Jeanine 266, 294 Annan, Kofi 128, 299 anocracies 52 anti-austerity protests 264

397

DEMOCRATIC DECAY AND AUTHORITARIAN RESURGENCE

anti-party candidates ix, 259 apathy 5, 82, 84 Arab Barometer 70 Arab Spring ix, 2, 106–7, 115–16, 121, 264, 267 Argentina 30, 31–2, 53, 79 and Catholic Church 88 and electoral commission 233 and emergency powers 224–5 and the judiciary 226 and the media 93, 208, 210 and populism 183, 188 Armenia 55–6 artificial intelligence 118–19 Asia 19, 74, 81, 138, 140, 171–2 see also China; India; Indonesia; Sri Lanka; the Philippines Asian Barometer 70 associational activity 196 atheists 90 auditors general 232 Aung San Suu Kyi 203 austerity 131, 134, 137 Australia 75, 197, 247 Austria 45, 111, 170, 197, 202, 279 authoritarian breakdown or replacement ix, 57–8 authoritarian collaboration ix, 106–7 authoritarian deepening or resurgence ix, 25, 26, 41 authoritarianism 101, 103–23 authoritarian learning ix, 105–6 authoritarian legacies ix, 92–4 authoritarian personality ix–x, 90, 94–100 authoritarian populism 169–90 authoritarian promotion x, 107–10 authoritarian regimes 1, 2, 46–7, 53–6, 73, 80–1 authoritarian survival 58–9 autocracies 1, 11, 19, 56, 108, 122, 296 and elections 58, 250, 251, 253, 256–7, 261, 298 and the media 116, 199, 252 autocratization x, 4, 21–6, 32–6, 40–1, 296, 298–9 see also elections; executive aggrandizement; judiciary; media; the bureaucracy; the legislature

automatic voter registration 284 Azerbaijan 47

B backsliding see democratic backsliding Bahrain 107 the Balkans 113 ballot stuffing 154, 255, 256 Baltic countries 141 Banda, Hastings 155 Banfield, Edward 87 Bangladesh 52–3, 138, 154, 197, 201, 204 and the judiciary 227 and the legislature 223 and watchdog agencies 232 banks 132–3 Barroso, José Manuel 169 Bashir, Omar 266 Belarus 41, 105, 110, 293 Belgium 171, 275 Ben Ali, Zine El Abidine 270 Berlusconi, Silvio 211, 286–7 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 271, 272 Bhutan 19, 74 Bhutto, Zulfikar 183, 230 bias, confirmation x, 120 Bizzarro, Fernando 19 Bloomberg, Michael 278 Boix, Carles 239 Bolivia 31–2, 107, 159, 184, 198, 266 constitution 227 and elections 247, 294 and populism 171, 187–8 Bolsonaro, Jair 17, 83, 118, 162, 171, 173, 188 Bosnia and Herzegovina 110 bots 110, 118, 119, 121–2 Botswana 45, 281 Botswana Democratic Party 45 Bouteflika, Abdelaziz 265 Brazil 17, 23, 47–8, 71, 72–3, 83, 159 and authoritarian nostalgia 94 and the bureaucracy 229 and the Catholic Church 88 and compulsory voting 285 and corruption 157–8, 162 and COVID-19 pandemic 298 and elections 233, 251, 255 electoral system 275

398

INDEX

and interpersonal trust 75 and the judiciary 237 and the media 201 and polarization 79 and populism 173, 188 and protests 273 and rule of law 236 and social media 118 on trust in the courts 74 Workers’ Party 80 breakdown authoritarian ix, 57–8 democratic xi, 26–32 Brexit 137, 185–6, 254, 265 bribes 152, 157 British Election Survey 137 British National Party (BNP) 7–8 Broadcasting Act (New Zealand) 279 Bucaram, Abdalá 155 Buhari, Muhammadu 167 Bukele, Nayib 294 Bulgaria 72, 75, 81, 161, 205, 240, 265 Bulldozer Revolution 267 the bureaucracy 222, 229–31 bureaucratic corruption ix, 152, 157–8 Burkina Faso 19 Burundi 201 Bush, George W. 100, 231

C California F-scale 95 Cambodia 121, 295 Cambridge Analytica 118 Cameron, David 171 campaign finance rules x, 5, 251–2, 255, 276–82 Canada 247, 255, 278, 279, 284 Canada Elections Act 279 Caribbean countries 129 cars 223 Catholicism 88–9 Caucasus 113 censorship 122 Central Asia 105 Central Europe 73, 160 Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) Party 59 charismatic leaders 99–100, 172 Charmorro, Violeta 34

Chávez, Hugo 41, 77, 100, 105, 162, 179, 187 and the bureaucracy 230 and cronyism 154 on elections 183–4 and electoral commission 234 and emergency powers 224 and the judiciary 227 and the legislature 225 and the media 54, 176, 203, 206, 208, 211 most popular former president 188 and Ortega 107 and political parties 259, 260 and the poor 178, 181 and referenda 223 and slogan 173 and term limits 248 and watchdog agencies 232 checks and balances x, 218, 219 child mortality rates 6 Chile 45, 53, 79, 94, 233, 255, 275 and compulsory voting 285 and COVID-19 pandemic 295 and protests 266 Chilean Catholic Church 88–9 China 6, 25, 41, 104, 105–6, 107, 129 and authoritarian promotion 108–9 and digital authoritarianism 121, 122 and immigration 138 and import shocks 137 and inequality 129 and trade shocks 136 citizens, critical xi, 68, 213 Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA)/Poland 272 civic culture x, 87 The Civic Culture (Almond and Verba) 86, 87 civic education 289 civic nationalism x, 113 civic participation 75 civil liberties x, 199 civil service 222, 228–9, 230, 231 Civil Service Reform Act (US) 231 civil society xiii, 48–9, 58, 193, 194, 195–9, 214 definition x and the media 292 and populist leaders 183 and social trust 69, 70, 161 Civil Society Index 197

399

DEMOCRATIC DECAY AND AUTHORITARIAN RESURGENCE

civil society movements/organizations 19, 36, 52, 288 class voting 179 clientelism xiv, 2, 31, 49, 164–7, 229 Clinton, Hillary 146 cognitive effect x, 91 Cold War 31, 57 collaboration, authoritarian ix, 106–7 Colombia 71, 75, 89, 225, 228, 242 colour revolutions x, 104, 164, 267 Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) 158 Commission on Elections (Philippines) 281–2 Commonwealth of Independent states (CIS) 108 communism 92, 94 Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 71 competitive authoritarian regimes x, 53–6 compulsory voting 284–5 Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) 198 confirmation bias x, 120 Congress Party (India) 271 consolidated democracies 4–5, 23, 25, 73 constitutional capture x, 25 constitutional hardball xi, 219 Constitutional Tribunal Act (Poland) 228 constitutions 23, 24, 220, 226, 227, 228, 232 Control of Corruption Index (CC) 156 Correa, Rafael 34, 35, 107, 180, 187, 188 and civil society 198 and executive aggrandizement 220 and the media 210, 211 and referendum 225 and term limits 248 and watchdog agencies 232 Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act (UK) 279 corruption xiv, 6, 10–11, 24, 58, 151–68 administrative/bureaucratic ix and female political participation 290 and globalization 131–2 grand xii, xiii and military coups 29 in Mongolia 49 and populist leaders 185 in semi-authoritarian regimes 52 Corruption Eradication Commission 266 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 156 Costa Rica 88, 141, 255

Cote d’Ivoire 115, 250 counter-narratives 214 coups xiii, 31, 32–3, 53 courts 74, 183, 236 see also judiciary COVID-19 pandemic 6, 293–5, 298 Crimea 104 crises 179, 179–80, 267, 294 critical citizens xi, 68, 213 Croatia 81 cronyism xi, 153–4 Cuba 197 culture, civic x, 87 culture, political xiv, 86, 101 cynicism, political xiv, 68 Cyprus 73, 156 Czechoslovakia 273 Czech Republic 45, 81, 161, 199, 202, 265

D Dahl, Robert 79, 147 Danish People’s Party 171 dark advertising xi, 119 dark money xi, 254, 262 decay xiii, 229 see also democratic decay deconsolidation, democratic xi, 22, 23, 24, 37 de-democratization 24 deepening, authoritarian ix, 25, 26, 41 defective democracies xi, 46, 48–50 degradation, executive 219–20 delegative democracies xi, 47–8 deliberative democracy xi, 117 demand side models 179 democracies xi, xii, xiii consolidated 4–5, 23, 25, 73 diffuse support for xiv, 66–7, 140, 141, 159, 160, 161 new 1–2, 58, 72, 164 public dissatisfaction with 3–4 regimes and dimensions of 51 specific support for xv, 66, 71–3, 140, 141 state of 18–21 democracy promotion 108 democratic backsliding 2, 3, 4, 5, 21–2, 24–6, 36–8, 296 accounted for 40 per cent of all democratic failures 33

400

INDEX

and consolidated democracies 23 definition xi and democratic swerving 34 and Fidesz 48 and flawed democracies 45 and grey-zone regimes 59 through executive aggrandizement 27–9 democratic breakdown xi, 26–32 democratic decay 24, 26, 36–8, 140–4, 158–64, 296 see also democratic backsliding democratic deconsolidation xi, 22, 23, 24, 37 democratic deterioration 24 democratic erosion 23, 24, 26, 157, 205 Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland (DFRF) 47 Democratic Party (US) 245, 246, 274, 278 democratic protests 5 see also protests democratic recessions 22, 24 democratic regression 24 Democratic Republic of Congo 115, 155 democratic rot see democratic backsliding democratic satisfaction 66, 71–2, 83, 140, 141, 158, 160 democratic swerving xi, 34, 42 democratization waves 20–1, 22, 43, 57, 89, 92–3, 233 Deng Xiaoping 41 Denmark 143, 145, 146, 171 de Tocqueville, Alexis 195 diagonal accountability xi, 194–5 Diamond, Larry 3, 18, 21, 22, 53, 67, 195 diffuse support for democracy xiv, 66–7, 140, 141, 159, 160, 161 definition xi digital authoritarianism 121–2 discriminatory legalism xi, 210, 236 discursive accountability xi, 194, 195, 212 dissatisfaction, democratic 3, 72, 141, 159, 165, 296 see also democratic satisfaction Doe, Samuel 155 Dominican Republic 289 Duterte, Rodrigo 25, 117, 173, 176, 180, 181, 295 and civil society 197 and emergency powers 225, 294 and the judiciary 227

E Eastern Europe 18, 70–2 and corruption 160 and education 93 and electoral commissions 233 and far-right parties 80 and hyper-nationalism 113 and income equality 145 and the media 94 and political trust 73, 91, 161 and populism 170 and voter turnout 81, 82 East Germany 57 Easton, David 74 echo chamber 119–20 economic crises 131, 264, 267 economic equality 147 economic inequality 97 economic performance 31, 165 Economist Democracy Index 22, 44 Ecuador 34–6, 48, 50, 107, 187, 188, 298 and civil society 198 and elections 247 and interpersonal trust 75 and kleptocracy 155 and the legislature 225 and the media 203, 206, 208, 209–10, 211 and rentier populism 31–2 and term limits 248 and watchdog agencies 232 education 90–2, 93, 139, 269, 289 Egypt 2, 116, 121, 183, 201, 236, 294–5 elections xii, 31, 44, 55–6, 104, 233–5, 241–62 in Africa 19, 106 and artificial intelligence 119 in authoritarian regimes 46–7, 54, 58–9 and COVID-19 pandemic 294 and ethnic diversity 115 and fake news 120 and fraud 33 and funding 278, 280–1 in Germany 280 and immigration 146 in Nicaragua 34 in Nigeria 166 and populist leaders 184, 187 and Russia 109–10 in semi-authoritarian regimes 51 and trust 75

401

DEMOCRATIC DECAY AND AUTHORITARIAN RESURGENCE

electoral autocracy 53 electoral backsliding, and voting 249 electoral commissions 233–5 electoral democracies xii, 19, 45–6, 109 see also flawed democracies electoral fraud 53, 154–5, 160, 164, 243, 244, 255–6 in Africa 19 and causing democracies to fail 33 in competitive authoritarian regimes 55 definition xii and international observers 58 and journalists 200 and political participation 163, 166 and protests 262 in the US 245 in Zimbabwe 250 electoral malpractice xii, 241, 243, 244–57, 261–2 electoral manipulation 241, 243, 244–57, 274 electoral mispractice xii, 234, 243 electoral systems 239, 274–6 elites 134, 141, 142, 155, 164, 166, 173 and elections 257 and right-wing populists 133, 177 and rule of law 237 El Salvador 89, 159, 294, 295 emergency powers 224–5, 294 endogenous breakdown 26–7 Environmental Protection Agency (US) 231–2 equality economic 147 and gender 290 Equal Protection Clause 246 Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip 28, 29, 41, 154, 172, 238 and the civil service 229 and emergency powers 224 and journalists 203 and the legislature 223 Eritrea 47, 197 erosion, democratic 23, 24, 26, 157, 205 Estonia 75, 81, 156 Estrada, Joseph 178 ethical effect xii, 90 Ethiopia 189 ethnic diversity 114–15 ethnicity 188, 189

EU (European Union) and Brexit 185–6 and free trade 137 and the media 213 and third wave of democratization 21 Eurasia 201 Eurasia Barometer 70 Eurobarometer 70, 72, 186 Europe 70–1, 72, 74, 135 and democratic satisfaction 140 and free trade 137 and immigration 138 and the media 201 and political parties 260–1 and populism 179 European Commission 156 exclusionary nationalism xii executive aggrandizement xii, 27–9, 37, 194, 219–20, 235, 297 executive degradation 219–20 executive hegemony 219 exogenous terminations 26, 27 extreme right-wing parties 7

F Facebook 110, 115, 117, 119, 120, 131 fake news 118, 120, 122, 143 famines 6 far left 98, 145 far right 80, 110, 135, 145, 199 far-right parties 80, 132, 138, 171 fascists 21 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA)/US 277 Federal Election Commission (US) 277 female political participation 290, 291, 292 Fidesz 25, 80, 170, 223, 235, 247 and backsliding 48 and patronage 228 finance rules, campaign x, 5, 251–2, 255, 276–82 financial crises 132–3, 142 Finland 145, 171, 278–9 Finns Party 171 Fish, M. Steven 237 Five Star Movement 171 flawed democracies xii, 44, 45, 46, 54–5, 73 flooding xii, 122, 214 Foa, R.S. 71

402

INDEX

foreign aid 21, 57, 104, 155 The Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities) Regulation Act (Bangladesh) 197 former Soviet Union 74, 109, 267 Forza Italia 286 Fox and Friends 174 France 45, 71, 79, 134, 170, 265 and elections 110, 119 fraud xii, 19, 163, 205, 267 see also electoral fraud Freedom House 18, 34, 193, 201, 205 Freedom House Index 22 Freedom of the Press Report 2017 11–12, 193 Freedom on the Net 121 Freedom Party of Austria 170 free trade 136–8 FRELIMO Party 56 friction 121 Fujimori, Alberto 27, 33, 56, 173, 184, 188 and electoral commission 234 and emergency powers 224 and the judiciary 227 and political parties 259 Fukuyama, Francis 1 funding, elections 277, 278, 279–81, 282

G Gallup polls 73, 74, 79 the Gambia 19 GDP 31, 131, 136, 158 gender equality 290 Georgia 104, 107, 164, 267 Germany 21, 75, 87, 111, 118, 275 and elections 280 and immigration 138, 143 gerrymandering xii, xiv, 5, 242, 245–7, 274 Gezi protests 29 Ghana 71, 204, 291 global financial crisis, 2008 132–3 globalization 57, 122, 127–49 Google 106, 110 governance bad 67, 263, 273 poor 30, 72 grand corruption xii, xiii, 152, 153, 167 Great Recession 104 Greece 72, 73, 111, 135, 264

grey-zone regimes 9, 22, 38, 40, 43–53, 56–9, 73, 242 definition xii and legislatures 226 and the media 199 grievances 133, 189, 265, 267–8, 270 in-groups 78, 95, 96, 99, 114, 143 Guatemala 89, 158, 255 Gulf Cooperation Council 107

H Hariri, Saad 265 Hasina, Sheikh 154, 197, 223 hate speech 117 hegemonic elections xii, 256 hegemony, presidential xiv, 219 Hindus 271 hollowing xiii, 24 Hong Kong 266, 268 horizontal accountability xiii, xv, 32, 194, 217–18, 219, 222 in Colombia 242 in Ecuador 36 and political parties 258 and presidential systems 238 and rule of law 235 horizontal networks 48, 195, 196 Horowitz, Donald 114 horserace journalism 212, 213 human rights 6, 89, 158 Human Rights Watch 29 Hungary 17–18, 25, 48, 50, 161, 240 and advertising 209 and civic education 289 and the civil service 222 and civil society 197 and COVID-19 pandemic 295 and electoral commission 234–5 and executive aggrandizement 219–20 and Fidesz 80 and gerrymandering 247 and hyper-nationalism 112–13 and the judiciary 227–8 and the legislature 223 and the media 201, 202, 205–6, 207, 210 and polarization 79 and populism 145, 170–1, 183 and rule of law 235

403

DEMOCRATIC DECAY AND AUTHORITARIAN RESURGENCE

Hungary (continued) and voter turnout 81 and watchdog agencies 232 Huntington, Samuel 20, 21, 76, 89 Hussein, Saddam 26 hyper-nationalism xiii, 112–13

I Ibrahim, Anwar 52 IDEA (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance) 22, 282 identity, national 113, 142 ideology 98–9 illiberal civil society xiii, 199 IMF (International Monetary Fund) 131, 133, 135 immigration 135, 137, 138–9, 141, 142–3, 145–6, 186 import shocks 137 income equality 145 income inequality 140, 145, 179, 237, 260 Independent Electoral Commission (IEC)/ South Africa 281 India 75, 79, 129, 240 and the bureaucracy 229–30 and COVID-19 pandemic 298 and electoral commission 233 and female political participation 290 and inequality 129, 141 and the media 204, 210 and migration 138 and NGOs 197–8 and populism 171 and protests 271–2 indoctrination 93, 94 Indonesia 50, 71, 129, 171–2, 266 industrial workers 269–70 inequality 31, 97, 129–30, 134, 140–2 and corruption 157 and financial crises 132 and participation 147–8 and polarization 144–5 infant mortality rates 6 information bubbles xiii, 81 information communication technologies (ICTs) 19 Inglehart, Ronald 86, 88, 91 instability 30, 47, 57, 58, 76, 98, 112

and civil society 196 financial 132 and hyper-nationalism 113 in Kenya 289 and new media 139 and presidential systems 238 and Russia 104 institutional crises 179 institutional decay xiii, 229 Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) 55, 280 internet freedom 121 interpersonal trust xiii, 49, 68–70, 75, 161 Ipsos MORI 79, 143 Iran 265 Iranians 116 Iraq 2, 26, 52, 265, 275 Ireland 73, 156 Islam 80, 89, 91, 170, 197, 199 see also Muslims Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRTP) 250 Israel 112, 172, 198, 202, 251, 294 Italy 21, 71, 72, 79, 87, 110 and associational activity 196 and corruption 156 and the media 202, 211, 286–7 and populism 171 and protests 265 Ivory Coast 19

J Jamaica 36 Japan 45, 79, 161, 229, 278, 279 Jobbik 170 Johnson, Boris 80 Jordan 105, 295 journalists 200, 203–5 judicial capture 25 judicial corruption xiii, 152–3, 158, 167 judiciary 74, 221–2, 226–8, 236–7, 286 Justice and Development Party (AKP) 4, 28–9, 54, 219, 223, 227

K Kach party 251 Kagame, Paul 248 Kaunda, Kenneth 36–7, 106 Kazakhstan 54

404

INDEX

Kenya 71, 78, 115, 250, 253, 289 Khan, Imran 260 Khashoggi, Jamal 205 Kibaki, Mwai 115 Kim Jong-un 47 Kirchner, Nestor 224–5 kleptocracy xiii, 153, 155 Korea North 47, 197 South 3, 27, 33 Kosovo 75, 204, 223 Kuchma, Leonid 56, 109–10 Kuciak, Ján 205 Kuomintang party (KMT) 253 Kyrgyzstan 104, 164

L Laclau, Ernesto 188 land inequality 142 Latin America 3, 23, 31–2, 47–8, 74, 88–9 and corruption 156, 159, 161 and COVID-19 pandemic 298 and education 93 and elections 255 and electoral commissions 233 and electoral manipulation 248, 250, 253 and globalization 133, 135, 137 and inequality 129, 140, 141 and interpersonal trust 75 and the judiciary 228 and kleptocracy 155 and the legislature 225 and the media 202–3, 206, 208, 288 and political culture 87–8 and political parties 258–9, 260, 261 and political trust 142 and populism 171, 172, 179, 187–8 and protests 266 and rule of law 236 and voter turnout 81, 163 Latinobarómetro 70, 73, 75, 142, 156, 237 Latvia 81, 161 Law and Justice Party (Poland) 4, 18, 34, 111, 247 and the judiciary 226, 228 and the media 205 leaders, personalist/populist 38, 39–40, 40, 172–8

leadership, personalist xiv, 38, 58 learning, authoritarian ix, 105–6 Lebanon 229, 265 the left 98–9, 132 left-wing parties 179, 260 left-wing populism 181, 188 left-wing populist parties 92 left-wing populists 135, 145, 177–8 legacies, authoritarian ix, 92–4 legalism, discriminatory xi, 210, 236 Legal Nord 171 the legislature 27, 220–1, 222–6 legitimacy 160, 165, 195, 222, 237, 266, 269 and elections 243, 274, 283 and the media 203 and populist leaders 184 Le Pen, Marine 136, 169–70 Lesotho 275 liberal democracies xiii, 20, 45 Liberal Democratic Party (Japan) 45 liberalized autocracy 53 Liberia 154, 155, 221, 232, 234 Libya 2 life expectancy rates 6 Lijphart, A. 276 Lindberg, Staffan 21 Lipset, Seymour Martin 79, 89, 258 Lithuania 81, 161 López, Leopoldo 250 Lukashenko, Alexander 41, 110, 293 Lula, President 83 Lungu, Edgar 37

M Macapagal-Arroyo, Gloria 226 Macedonia 81, 202, 223, 229, 253 Macron, Emmanuel 119 Madagascar 224 Maduro, Nicolás 27, 56, 78, 155, 171, 225 majoritarian systems 274–5 Making Democracy Work (Putnam) 196 Malawi 155 Malaysia 52, 242, 247 Mali 205 al-Maliki, Nouri 26 malpractice, electoral xii, 241, 243, 244–57, 261–2 Malta 205, 207, 209, 265

405

DEMOCRATIC DECAY AND AUTHORITARIAN RESURGENCE

manufacturing jobs 130 Marcos, Ferdinand 27 mass media 139–40 maternal death rates 6 Mauritania 58, 207 McClelland, David 87 media 54–6, 93–4, 108–9, 139–40, 193, 194, 199–214 and civil society 292 in Egypt 294–5 and elections 252 and personality cults 99 and polarization 81, 147 and populist leaders 183 and Trump 174–6 and trust 143 in Turkey 29, 112 see also social media media capture xiii, 286–8 media freedom 11–12, 34, 112, 193 see also media media malaise xiii, 212–14 mediatization of politics xiii, 143 MENA (Middle East and North Africa) 105 see also Middle East Menem, Carlos 183, 188, 226 Merit Systems Protection Board 231 Mexico 49, 50, 71, 87 and Catholic Church 89 and corruption 161 and elections 55, 255, 257, 278, 280 and electoral commission 233 and immigration 138 and interpersonal trust 75 and polarization 79 and voting 250, 253 micro-assaults 4, 226, 273, 296, 297 middle classes 130, 131 Middle East 2, 74, 105, 129, 172, 201, 265 migration 138 see also immigration the military 49–50, 230 military coups xiii, 27, 29–30, 32–3, 53 military rule 2, 51, 71, 93, 166, 239 mispractice xii, 234, 243 mobility 138 Mobutu, Joseph 155 Modi, Narendra 117, 271, 272

Moldova 81 Mongolia 49 Montenegro 204, 223, 229 Morales, Evo 107, 171, 180, 184, 187, 188, 266 and the judiciary 227 Morales, Jimmy 158 Moreno, Lenín 36 Morocco 105 Mounk, Y. 71 movement society xiii, 269 Mozambique 56, 197 Mubarak, Hosni 26 Mugabe, Robert 33, 54, 248 multi-lateral institutions 129 multi-national corporations 129 multi-party systems 274–5 Muscat, Joseph 265 Museveni, Yoweri 184, 294 Musharraf, Pervez 27, 52 Muslim League–Nawaz Sharif (PML-N) 259 Muslims 89, 117, 146, 171, 174, 197 and India 271–2 and Poland 199 Myanmar 19, 53, 117, 203, 206

N NAFTA 134 Namibia 248 Nasser, Gamal Abdel 183 National Action Party (PAN)/Mexico 280 National Front, France 170 national identity 113, 142 nationalism x, xii, 93, 112–13, 114, 139 nativism xiv, 170, 177 Nazarbayev, Nursultan 54 neo-Nazi parties 111 Nepal 19, 206 nepotism xiv, 153 Netanyahu, Benjamin 172, 202, 294 the Netherlands 75, 143, 171, 214, 285 Network Enforcement Act (Germany) 118 networks, horizontal 195, 196 new democracies 58, 72, 164 new media 116–17, 120, 139 The New York Times 119 New Zealand 279 NGOs 106, 108, 112–13, 183, 197–8

406

INDEX

Nicaragua 34, 56, 154, 155, 159, 171, 201 and the judiciary 227 and the legislature 223, 225 and the media 201, 203, 204 and NGOs 198 and term limits 248 and voting 250 Niger 197 Nigeria 19, 71, 115, 121, 151, 155, 166–7 non-violent protests 273 Nordic countries 75 North Africa 19, 129, 201 North America 74, 138 Northern Europe 73 Northern Italy 196 North Korea 47, 197 Norway 145, 171 nostalgic deprivation xiv, 145 Nujoma, Sam 248 Nye, Joseph xv

O Obama, Barack 278 Obasanjo, Olusegun 152, 166, 167 Occupy Wall Street 265 O’Donnell, Guillermo 32, 33, 47–8, 194, 238 OECD (Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development) 91, 130, 138 offshore accounts 131 oil rents 31–2 operational corruption 153 Orange Revolution 105, 164, 267 Orbán, Viktor 17–18, 25, 48, 170–1, 183 and civil society 197 and COVID-19 pandemic 295 and executive aggrandizement 219 and the judiciary 228 and the legislature 223 and the media 176, 202 and watchdog agencies 232 Ortega, Daniel 34, 56, 107, 171, 198, 225, 227 Ortega, Rosario 154 out-groups 77, 78, 95, 114, 117, 143 and authoritarians 96, 98 and income inequality 145

P Pakistan 27, 30, 51, 52, 171, 183 and the bureaucracy 229, 230 and journalists 204 and political parties 259–60 Pakistan Movement for Justice Party 260 Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) 230, 259 palace coups 27 PAN (National Action Party) 55 paper ballot system 75 Papua New Guinea 50 Paraguay 159 Park Chung Hee 27 Park Geun-hye 33 parliamentary systems 73–4, 238, 239, 240 participation, political 147–8, 184, 282–6, 290, 291, 292, 298 and civil society 196 and corruption 162–4 and Nigeria 166 and semi-authoritarian regimes 52 and voter turnout 81–2, 298 participatory cultures 87 patriotism xiv, 113–14 patronage xiv, 164, 183, 228, 229 patron–clientelism xiv, 2, 58, 164–7 Pendleton Act (US) 230–1 People Power Campaign 273 Peréz, Carlos Andrés 155 performance deficit 24 personalist leadership/personalism xiv, 38–41, 58, 212, 238 personality, authoritarian ix–x, 90, 94–100 Peru 48, 56, 71, 75, 141, 184 constitution 220 and electoral commission 234 and emergency powers 224 and the judiciary 74, 227 and the legislature 27, 225 and the media 208 and political parties 258–9 and populism 173, 188 Petrobas 162 petty corruption xiv, 152, 156, 167 Pew Research 70, 147, 159, 174, 201–2, 298 and Brazil 73, 83 Global Attitudes Data (2017) 71

407

DEMOCRATIC DECAY AND AUTHORITARIAN RESURGENCE

the Philippines 3, 25, 27, 50, 71 and the Catholic Church 89 and civil society 197 and elections 51–2, 255, 278, 281 and emergency powers 225, 294 and the judiciary 227, 228 and the legislature 226 and the media 205, 295 People Power Campaign 273 and political parties 261 and populism 172, 173, 178, 180, 181 and social media 117, 176 and vote buying 253 and watchdog agencies 232–3 Piñera, Sebastían 266 PML-N (Muslim League–Nawaz Sharif) 259 PODEMOS 92 Poland 4, 18, 34, 75, 81, 111, 240 and the Catholic Church 89 and civic education 289 and corruption 156, 159, 161 and gerrymandering 247 and the judiciary 226, 228 and the media 201, 203, 205 and NGOs 197 and populist parties 145 and Solidarity strikes 139 and uncivil society 199 and watchdog agencies 232 polarization 5, 65, 77–81, 83–4, 127, 137 and corruption 161–2 and globalization 128, 136, 144–7 and the media 213 political 119–20 and social media 296 police corruption 152, 158 political action committees (PACs) 278 political advertising 119 political alienation 82 political apathy 82 political corruption xiv, 152, 153–5, 156, 157, 167 political culture xiv, 86–8, 101 political cynicism xiv, 68 political inequality 147–8 political participation see participation, political political parties 58, 257–61 Political Parties Organic Law (Spain) 251

political polarization 119–20, 296 political socialization 94 political sophistication 76 political trust xiv, 67–8, 70, 73–4, 143, 161 and education 91 and inequality 142 political violence 78, 89, 115, 198, 298 politics, mediatization of xiii, 143 POLITY 22 the poor 147–8, 157, 181, 236–7 poor governance 30, 72 Popović, Nenad 210 populism 7, 38–40, 80, 114, 137, 169–90 and corruption 152 and the media 213–14 and media capture 287 populist leaders 172–8, 183, 185, 187, 202, 261, 296 and elections 184 and power grabs 180 populist parties 92, 145, 162, 170–1 populists 111, 117, 135 Pora 267 pork barrel policies xiv, 164–5 Portugal 73, 156, 264 post-materialist values 91–2, 111, 260–1 poverty 30–1, 129, 177–8 power abuse of 167 soft xv, 2, 104, 105, 107, 122 power grabs 37, 38, 40, 41, 214, 235, 257, 296 and executive aggrandizement 219 and populist leader 180 presidential hegemony xiv, 219 presidential systems 237–9 the press 11–12, 294–5 see also media PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) 55 primary education 90 Progressive Party of Norway 171 promotion, authoritarian x, 107–10 property rights protections 142 proportional representation (PR) 244, 274, 275, 276 protectionism 135 protests 5, 115–16, 262, 263–73, 291–2, 293–4 public opinion 60, 65–84 Putin, Vladimir 41, 51, 55, 110, 206, 224, 250

408

INDEX

Putnam, Robert 69, 76, 92, 196 PVV (Netherlands) 171

Q Qatar 197

R racial gerrymandering xii, xiv, 245 radical right-wing parties 7, 114, 146 radical right-wing populist parties 7, 8, 98, 99, 139 radio 144, 147, 176, 208, 252, 277, 279 and Bolsonaro 17 and China 108 in Eastern Europe 94 in Ecuador 210, 211 in Hungary 205, 210 in Nicaragua 204 Rahmon, Emomali 106 Rajapaksa, Gotabaya 154 Rajapaksa, Mahinda 154, 227 ‘rapid deaths’ 32 Ratsiraka, Didier 224 Razak, Najib 242 recessions, democratic 22, 24 REDMAP 246 referenda 223, 224, 225, 227 regression, democratic 24 religion 88–90 rentier populism xiv, 31, 32 replacement, authoritarian ix, 57–8 Reporters without Borders 201, 205 Republican Party (US) 55, 174, 245, 246 reserved domains 49–50 the rich 141–2, 148 rights, women’s 291, 292 right-wing parties 92, 98, 114 right-wing populism 7, 137, 181 right-wing populist parties 98, 136, 138, 181–2 right-wing populists 111, 133, 135, 145, 177, 178 Rodrik, Dani 134, 136 Rokkan, S. 258 Romania 75, 81, 265 Romero, Archbishop Óscar 89 Romney, Mitt 278 Rose Revolution 267

rule of law 49, 217, 235–40, 297 rule of law backsliding xiv, 24–5 Russell Dalton, 65 Russia 41, 54, 55, 104, 105 and authoritarian nostalgia 94 and authoritarian promotion 108, 109–10 and bots 119 and COVID-19 pandemic 298 and digital authoritarianism 121 and elections 51, 256 and immigration 138 and interpersonal trust 75 and the media 206 and NGOs 106 and referenda 224 and sharp power 107 and terrorism 112 and voting 163, 250, 251 Rwanda 248, 290

S Saakashvili, Mikheil 107 safety nets 134 salaries 31, 130, 133, 229 Sall, Macky 250 Sandinista regime 34 Sardines movement 265 Sarkisian, Serzh 55, 56 Sata, Michael 37, 189 satisfaction, democratic 66, 71–2, 83, 140, 141, 158, 160 Saudi Arabia 107, 138 Scandinavia 73, 171, 290, 291 Schedler, A. 9 self-coups 27, 33 semi-authoritarian regimes xv, 41–2, 46, 50–3, 54, 55 Senegal 163, 203, 225, 249, 250, 251 Serbia 18, 52, 240, 265, 267 and the civil service 229 and the legislature 223 and the media 202, 204, 207–8, 209, 210, 211 Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) 207–8 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 108 sharp power xv, 107 Shinawatra, Thaksin 48, 172, 184–5, 204, 232, 233

409

DEMOCRATIC DECAY AND AUTHORITARIAN RESURGENCE

Shinawatra, Yingluck 172, 185 Sierra Leone 19, 197 silent counter-revolution xv, 111–12 Singapore 44 single member district systems (SMD) 244–5, 274, 275 Sirleaf, Ellen Johnson 154, 232, 234 el-Sisi, General Abdel Fattah 26 Slovakia 81, 145, 156, 161, 199 and the media 202, 205, 208 and protests 265 Slovenia 81, 161 ‘slow deaths’ 32, 33 smear campaign 201, 214 social capital 69, 115, 196 Social Democratic Party (PSD)/Romania 265 social exclusion 162 social inequality 157 see also inequality socialization 66, 94 social media xv, 115–20, 121–2, 252, 287 and polarization 296 and populism 176 and protests 266, 270 social trust 68–70, 92, 142, 143, 161, 196 socio-tropic voting xv, 134 soft power xv, 2, 104, 105, 107, 122 Solidarity strikes 139 Somoza, Antonio 155 Somoza regime 34 Soros, George 197 South Africa 18, 71, 75, 79, 97 and civic education 289 and cronyism 154 and elections 82, 280–1 and the judiciary 237 and political corruption 153 and populism 188–9 and watchdog agencies 232 South Asia 3 Southeast Asia 129 Southern Europe 72, 73, 135 Southern Italy 196 South Korea 3, 27, 33 Soviet Union 1, 3 Spain 72, 73, 75, 79, 159, 264, 265 and electoral manipulation 251–2 and globalization 135

and PODEMOS 92 and unemployment 131 and voter choice 251 Sri Lanka 19, 50, 154, 171, 206, 227, 228 Stiglitz, Joseph 127 strikes 134, 139 Sub-Saharan Africa 19, 129, 159–60, 201 Sudan 200, 265–6 Suharto 155 supply-side factors 180 support for democracy diffuse xiv, 66–7, 140, 141, 159, 160, 161 specific xv, 66, 71–3, 140, 141 support for regime performance 71–2 Supreme Court (US) 246 surveys 70, 73, 74, 75, 79, 82, 83 and measuring corruption 156 on religion 89–90 see also individual surveys Svolik, Milan 219, 238 Sweden 110, 111, 145, 277 Swedish Democrats 171 swerving, democratic xi, 34, 42 Swiss People’s Party (SVP) 170 Switzerland 75, 111 Syria 2, 197

T Taiwan 3, 74, 253 Tajikistan 106, 250 Tanzania 59, 121, 205 Teleamazonas 210 Telefónica 287 telephone justice xv, 228 television 108, 210, 211, 212 advertising 277 Temer, Michel 73, 236 term limits xv, 184–5, 248 terrorism 112, 138, 197, 206 Thailand 3, 19, 30, 48, 184–5 and the media 204, 295 and populism 172, 178 and watchdog agencies 232, 233 third wave xv, 18, 21, 22, 89, 92, 238 threats, coping with 96–7 Tilly, Charles 33–4 Time 264 Tocqueville, Alexis de 195

410

INDEX

trade shocks 136, 137 Transparency International 151, 152, 156 True Finns Party 171 Trump, Donald 5, 17, 120, 147, 172, 173, 174–5 and adjudication agencies 231–2 and elites 133 and executive aggrandizement 219 and immigration 146 and the media 202, 210 trust xiii, 23, 48, 49, 67–70, 75, 142–4 and corruption 160–1 and financial crises 132, 133 and globalization 131 political xiv, 73–4, 91 social 92 Tunisia 2, 19, 54, 72, 91, 270 Turkey 4, 27–9, 75, 94, 219, 238 and the civil service 229 and corruption 152 and cronyism 154 and education 93 and electoral manipulation 249 and emergency powers 224 and the judiciary 227 and the legislature 223 and the media 112, 201, 203–4, 206, 208, 209 and polarization 79, 80 and populism 172 and PR 244 Turkmenistan 197 Twitter 110, 115, 117, 175 Tymoshenko, Yulia 110

U Uganda 184, 294 UK and Brexit 185–6, 254, 265 and Chinese trade shocks 136 and elections 278, 279–80 and global financial crisis, 2008 133 and globalization 133 and immigration 137, 138, 143 and inequality 130 and interpersonal trust 75 on military rule 71 and polarization 80 and populism 171

and Russia 110 and voter turnout 81 UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party) 8, 171 Ukraine 18, 56, 81, 104, 106 and cronyism 154 and Orange Revolution 105, 164 and Russia 109–10 UMNO 242, 247 uncivil society 198–9 unemployment 131, 181 UN International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights 242–3 United Progressive Alliance (UPA) 271 Uribe, Álvaro 242 Uruguay 53, 74, 88, 141, 233 US and 9/11 terrorist attacks 100, 112 and the bureaucracy 230–1 and campaign finance regulations 277 and China 136, 137 and clientelism 229 Congress 218 Constitution 23, 24 and COVID-19 pandemic 298 and dark money 254 and decline in the quality of democracy 18 and elections 81, 119, 120, 163, 278, 280, 284 and electoral malpractice 243 and electoral manipulation 249, 252 and executive aggrandizement 219 and fake news 118 as flawed democracy 45 and gerrymandering 245–7 and global financial crisis, 2008 133 and globalization 135 and in-groups 96 and immigration 138 and inequality 130 and interpersonal trust 75 and invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq 2 and the media 147, 201–2 on military rule 71 and polarization 79, 80, 162 and political alienation and apathy 82 and political trust 73 and populism 172, 173

411

DEMOCRATIC DECAY AND AUTHORITARIAN RESURGENCE

US (continued) and protests 265, 293 and public opinion 76 and rich citizens 141 and rule of law 237 and third wave of democratization 21 on trust in the judiciary 74 and undemocratic developments 5 and voter suppression 283 and wages 131 Uzbekistan 197

V Vargas, Getúlio 236 Varieties of Democracy 18–19, 22, 45–6, 197, 201, 290 on protests 263, 293 Velvet Revolution 273 Venezuela 27, 31–2, 53, 56, 100, 105, 155 and the bureaucracy 230 and civil society 198 and corruption 161, 162, 185 and cronyism 154 and electoral commission 234 and electoral manipulation 250, 252 and emergency powers 224 and the judiciary 227 and the legislature 225 and the media 54, 201, 203, 206, 252 and polarization 77, 78, 80 and political parties 259, 260 and populism 171, 178, 179, 181, 183–4, 187, 188 and referenda 223 and rule of law 236 and term limits 248 and vote buying 253 and watchdog agencies 232 Verba, Sidney 68, 86–7, 282 vertical accountability xv, 35, 195, 242, 258, 275 Vietnam 19 violence, political 78, 89, 115, 198, 298 Vlaams Blok 171 vote buying xv, 154, 253 vote miscounting 154 voter choice 250–1 voter identification laws 283

voter suppression xv, 249–50, 283 voter turnout 148, 163, 262, 277, 283, 284, 285 decreasing 81–2, 298 voting 179, 248–9 Voting Rights Act (US) 246 Vučić, Aleksandar 202, 211

W Wade, Abdoulaye 203, 225, 249 wages 130, 131, 133, 137 wasta 229 wasted votes 245, 246 watchdog agencies 232–5 waves of democratization 20–1, 22, 89, 92, 238 welfare state xv, 134 Western Europe 70–1, 72, 140, 159 WhatsApp 118 Widodo, Joko 266 women and democracy 290–1, 292 and protests 272 and rights 291, 292 Workers’ Party (Brazil) 80, 83, 162 working class 130, 131 World Bank 133, 156 World Values Surveys 70, 71, 74, 75, 82, 89, 137

X xenophobic discourse 177 Xi Jinping 6, 25, 41

Y Yanukovych, Viktor 106, 110, 154 Yemen 2 YouGov 186 Yushchenko, Viktor 110

Z Zaire 155 Zambia 7, 36–7, 106, 189 and the media 252 and voting 31, 250, 251 ZANU-PF 250, 252 Zia, Khaleda 223 Zimbabwe 33, 54, 248, 250, 251, 252, 256 Zuma, Jacob 18, 153, 154, 188–9, 232

412

“This is an essential read for all students of politics interested in the future of democracy. Lindstaedt presents a comprehensive study of a global crisis.” Anja Neundorf, University of Glasgow

“Offers a comprehensive and highly readable account of the ways in which corruption, restrictions on accountability and normative shifts have driven recent authoritarian backsliding across the globe.” Sarah Birch, King’s College London

Natasha Lindstaedt is Deputy Dean and a Professor in the Department of Government at the University of Essex. She has written widely on authoritarian regimes, democracy, corruption and failed states.

Why do democracies fall apart, and what can be done about it? This book introduces students to the concept and causes of democratic decay in the modern world. Illustrating the integral link between public commitment to democratic norms and the maintenance of healthy democracies, it examines the key factors in decaying democracies, including: • Economic inequality; • Corruption; • Populist and authoritarian discourse; • Declining belief in political institutions and processes.

Drawing on real-world developments, and including international case studies, the book outlines the extent to which there is a ‘democratic recession’ in contemporary politics and shows how transnational networks and technology are impacting on this development.

ISBN 978-1-5292-1039-2

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