International Organizations: A Companion 1781004560, 9781781004562

Table of contents :
Contents in brief
Contents in full
Acknowledgements
List of acronyms and abbreviations
1 An introduction to international organizations in theory and practice
2 International organizations: an early history
3 The modern historical context
4 The character and environment of international organizations
5 The United Nations
6 The United Nations semi-autonomous agencies
7 The United Nations specialized agencies
8 The development banks
9 The money managers
10 Economics, trade and commerce
11 The European Union
12 The European Union’s semi-autonomous agencies
13 Political alliances and security
14 The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
15 Intergovernmental scientific organizations
16 Transport and communications
17 International organizations: an ever expanding universe?
References
Glossary
Keyword index
Index

Citation preview

International Organizations

International Organizations A Companion Michael Davies

Formerly of the Inter-American Development Bank

Richard Woodward University of Hull, UK

Edward Elgar Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA

© Michael Davies and Richard Woodward 2014 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited The Lypiatts 15 Lansdown Road Cheltenham Glos GL50 2JA UK Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. William Pratt House 9 Dewey Court Northampton Massachusetts 01060 USA

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Control Number: 2013954342

ISBN  978 1 78100 456 2  (cased) ISBN  978 1 78347 416 5  (paperback) ISBN  978 1 78100 457 9  (eBook)

02

Typeset by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Stockport, Cheshire Printed and bound in Great Britain by T.J. International Ltd, Padstow

Contents in brief

Acknowledgements List of acronyms and abbreviations

xi xii

  1 An introduction to international organizations in theory and practice   2 International organizations: an early history   3 The modern historical context   4 The character and environment of international organizations   5 The United Nations   6 The United Nations semi-­autonomous agencies   7 The United Nations specialized agencies   8 The development banks   9 The money managers 10 Economics, trade and commerce 11 The European Union 12 The European Union’s semi-­autonomous agencies 13 Political alliances and security 14 The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 15 Intergovernmental scientific organizations 16 Transport and communications 17 International organizations: an ever expanding universe?

1 39 61 85 115 158 197 244 286 327 381 425 463 531 560 586 620

References Glossary Keyword index Index

641 661 666 669

Contents in full

Acknowledgements List of acronyms and abbreviations

xi xii

  1 An introduction to international organizations in theory   and practice 1.1 Why study international governmental organizations? 1.2 Defining and categorizing international organizations 1.3 Scholarly approaches to international organizations 1.4 Realism 1.5 Liberal theories 1.6 Constructivism 1.7 Critical theories 1.8 The book ahead

1 2 13 18 20 24 29 32 35

  2 International organizations: an early history 2.1 Beginnings 2.2 The interwar years 2.3 The Second World War

39 39 45 56

  3 The modern historical context 3.1 1945–49 3.2 The 1950s 3.3 The 1960s 3.4 The 1970s 3.5 The 1980s 3.6 The 1990s 3.7 The 2000s

61 63 66 69 71 75 77 81

  4 The character and environment of international   organizations 4.1 Governance, management and working methods 4.2 The operating environment

85 87 100

  5 The United Nations 5.1 Background

115 117

Contents in full 



5.2 5.3 5.4

Structure Current activities Evaluation and future challenges

·  vii 130 138 143

  6 The United Nations semi-­autonomous agencies 6.1 The UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 6.2 The UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 6.3 The UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) 6.4 The World Food Programme (WFP) 6.5 The UN Development Programme (UNDP) 6.6 The UN Environment Programme (UNEP)

158 162 168

  7 The United Nations specialized agencies 7.1 UN System coordination 7.2 The International Labour Organization (ILO) 7.3 The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 7.4 The World Health Organization (WHO) 7.5 The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 7.6 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 7.7 Other specialized agencies 7.8 The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) 7.9 The United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO)

197 200 201

  8 The development banks 8.1 The World Bank Group (the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) (IBRD) 8.2 The regional development banks of Latin America, Asia and Africa 8.3 The Inter-­American Development Bank (IDB) 8.4 The African Development Bank (Af DB) 8.5 The Asian Development Bank (ADB) 8.6 Other multilateral development banks 8.7 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 8.8 The European Investment Bank (EIB) 8.9 The Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) 8.10 The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)

244

176 179 184 189

209 216 223 232 238 239 240

254 267 268 270 273 274 275 277 279 281

viii  · 

International organizations

  9 The money managers 9.1 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 9.2 The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 9.3 The European Central Bank (ECB)

286 289 309 317

10 Economics, trade and commerce 10.1 The Organisation for Economic Co-­operation and Development (OECD) 10.2 The World Trade Organization (WTO) 10.3 The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 10.4 Regional trade associations 10.5 The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 10.6 Mercado Comun del Sur (Mercosur) 10.7 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 10.8 The World Customs Organization (WCO) 10.9 The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 10.10 The European Patent Organisation (EPO) 10.11 Commodity groups 10.12 The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 10.13 The International Grains Council (IGC)

327

11

The European Union 11.1 Background 11.2 Structure 11.3 Current activities 11.4 Evaluation and future challenges

381 383 398 410 413

12

The European Union’s semi-­autonomous agencies 12.1 Background 12.2 Structure 12.3 Evaluation and future challenges 12.4 Knowledge management institutions 12.5 Knowledge management institutions with operational responsibilities 12.6 Regulatory agencies for commerce 12.7 Operational agencies

425 431 433 434 436

13 Political alliances and security 13.1 The Americas 13.2 The Organization of American States (OAS)

463 467 469



328 338 348 351 351 356 359 361 363 369 370 371 376

445 448 454

Contents in full 



13.3 The Middle East 13.4 The League of Arab States (LAS) 13.5 Europe 13.6 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 13.7 The Council of Europe (COE) 13.8 Asia 13.9 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 13.10 The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 13.11 Africa 13.12 The African Union (AU) 13.13 Trans-­regional and global alliances 13.14 The Organization for Security and Co-­operation in Europe (OSCE) 13.15 The Commonwealth 13.16 The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) 13.17 The International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)

14 The Consultative Group on International Agricultural   Research 14.1 The Consultative Group 14.2 The CGIAR Centres 14.3 The special crops group 14.4 The farming systems group 14.5 The general group

·  ix 473 474 478 480 488 493 494 500 504 506 511 511 515 520 523 531 533 548 548 552 555

15 Intergovernmental scientific organizations 15.1 The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) 15.2 The International Bureau of Weights and Measures (BIPM) 15.3 The Centre for European Nuclear Research (CERN)/ European Organization for Nuclear Research 15.4 The European Southern Observatory (ESO) 15.5 The European Centre for Medium-­R ange Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) 15.6 The European Space Agency (ESA) 15.7 The European Synchrotron Radiation Facility (ESRF)

560 562

16

586 590 596 600

Transport and communications 16.1 The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 16.2 The Universal Postal Union (UPU) 16.3 The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

565 569 575 577 579 583

x  · 

International organizations



605



16.4 The International Maritime Organization (IMO) 16.5 The Intergovernmental Organisation for International Carriage by Rail (OTIF) 16.6 The European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol) 16.7 EU semi-­autonomous institutions dealing with transport 16.8 The Trans-­European Transport Network Executive Agency (TEN-­TEA) 16.9 The European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) 16.10 The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) 16.11 The European Railway Agency (ERA)

17

International organizations: an ever expanding universe? 17.1 IO performance – a glass half full? 17.2 Managing the fleet 17.3 Adjusting to twenty-­first-­century challenges 17.4 Epilogue

620 621 624 631 639



References Glossary Keyword index Index

609 611 613 615 616 617 618

641 661 666 669

Acknowledgements

As is inevitably the case, this book could not have been produced without the help and encouragement of others. Our thanks go to Professor Rorden Wilkinson of the University of Manchester for suggesting this collaboration, and Justin Morris, Simon Lee, Mahrukh Doctor and Tim Oliver, who read and provided constructive comments on several draft chapters. We are also indebted to Joan Davies for reading the final draft to improve the clarity and structure of the text. Needless to say there are several people at Edward Elgar Publishing who have provided support and advice, including Emily Neukomm, Megan Ballantyne and Helen Moss. While we acknowledge their contributions we accept that any errors of omission or commission are ours and ours alone. Figure 1.1 has been developed from an original concept that appeared in Volker Rittberger and Bernhard Zangl (2006), International Organization: Polity, Politics and Policies, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hants, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN HB 978–0-­333–72129–2, and is reproduced with permission of Palgrave Macmillan. Table 14.4 (‘CGIAR funding by undertaking (1992–2007)’) has been reproduced by kind permission of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research from E. McAllister et al. (2008), Bringing Together the Best of Science and the Best of Development: Independent Review of the CGIAR System, Washington, DC: CGIAR.

Acronyms and abbreviations

This list does not generally include acronyms for UN peacekeeping operations (which are provided in Table 5.1), scientific equipment, technical programmes or working-­level committees which may be found in the context of a specific organization or chapter. French or Spanish acronyms are used when they are most commonly found in the literature. Reference to dollars ($) always means the US dollar unless otherwise stated. ACER Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (EU) ADB Asian Development Bank Af DB African Development Bank AIDS acquired immune deficiency syndrome APEC Asia-­Pacific Economic Cooperation ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations AU African Union b billion (1000 million) BADEA Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa BEREC Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (EU) BIPM Bureau International des Poids et Mesures (International Bureau of Weights and Measures) BIRPI Bureaux Internationaux Réunis pour la Protection de la Propriété Intellectuelle (United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property) BIS Bank for International Settlements CABEI Central American Bank for Economic Integration CAP Common Agricultural Policy (EU) CARICOM Caribbean Community and Common Market CDB Caribbean Development Bank CEDEFOP European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (EU) CEO Chief Executive Officer Cepol European Police College (EU) CERN Centre Européenne pour la Recherche Nucléaire (European Organization for Nuclear Research)

Acronyms and abbreviations 

·  xiii

CGIAR Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (also CG) CIAT Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical (International Centre for Tropical Agriculture) (CGIAR) CIFOR Centre for International Forestry Research (CGIAR) CIMMYT Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maíz y Trigo (International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre) (CGIAR) CIP Centro Internacional de la Papa (International Potato Centre) (CGIAR) CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CO2 carbon dioxide COE Council of Europe COMECON Council for Mutual Economic Assistance CPVO Community Plant Variety Office (EU) CSCE Conference on Security and Co-­operation in Europe DAC Development Assistance Committee (OECD) DESA Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN) DG Director-­General EACEA European Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EU) EASA European Aviation Safety Agency (EU) EBA European Banking Authority (EU) EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ECA Economic Commission for Africa (UN) ECB European Central Bank (EU) ECDC European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (EU) ECE Economic Commission for Europe (UN) ECHA European Chemicals Agency (EU) ECHR European Court of Human Rights (COE) ECJ European Court of Justice or Court of Justice of the European Union ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (UN) ECMWF European Centre for Medium-­R ange Weather Forecasts ECOA European Court of Auditors (EU) ECOSOC Economic and Social Council (UN) ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States ECSC European Coal and Steel Community ED Executive Director EDA European Defence Agency (EU) EEA European Economic Area (EU/EFTA)

xiv  · 

International organizations

EEA European Environment Agency (EU) EEC European Economic Community (now EU) EFCA European Fisheries Control Agency (EU) EFSA European Food Safety Authority (EU) EFTA European Free Trade Association EFTA/SA EFTA Surveillance Authority EIB European Investment Bank EIGE European Institute for Gender Equality (EU) EMA European Medicines Agency (EU) EMCDDA European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EU) EMSA European Maritime Safety Agency (EU) ENISA European Network and Information Security Agency (EU) EP European Parliament (EU) EPO European Patent Organisation ERA European Railway Agency (EU) ESA Euratom Supply Agency (EU) ESA European Space Agency ESCAP Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN) ESCWA Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UN) ESO European Southern Observatory ESRF European Synchrotron Radiation Facility EU European Union EU-­GNSS European Global Navigation Satellite System Supervisory Authority EUI European University Institute (EU) EU-­ISS European Union Institute for Security Studies (EU) EU-­OSHA European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU) Euratom European Atomic Energy Community (EU) Eurocontrol European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation Eurofound European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (EU) Eurojust European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit (EU) Europol European Police Office (EU) EU Satcen European Union Satellite Centre (EU) FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations FCCC Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN) FFHC Freedom From Hunger Campaign Fonplata El Rio de la Plata Fund FRA European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (EU) Frontex European Agency for the Management of Operational

Acronyms and abbreviations 

·  xv

Coopera­­tion at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union GA General Assembly (UN) GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services (WTO) GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now WTO) GCC Gulf Cooperation Council GDP gross domestic product GEF Global Environment Facility GM genetically modified GNI gross national income Habitat UN Human Settlements Programme HDI Human Development Index HDR Human Development Report HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (Initiative) HIV human immunodeficiency virus IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IATA International Air Traffic Association IATA International Air Transport Association IBE International Bureau for Education (UNESCO) IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development or World Bank ICAN International Commission for Air Navigation ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization ICARDA International Centre for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (CGIAR) ICC International Criminal Court (UN) ICJ International Court of Justice (UN) ICLARM International Centre for Living Aquatic Resources Management or WorldFish (CGIAR) ICRAF International Centre for Research on Agro-­Forestry or World Agro-­Forestry Centre (CGIAR) ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent ICRISAT International Crop Research Institute for the Semi-­Arid Tropics (CGIAR) ICS international civil service IDA International Development Association (IBRD) IDB Inter-­American Development Bank (also IADB) IDP internally displaced person IEA International Energy Agency (OECD) IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development IFC International Finance Corporation (World Bank Group)

xvi  · 

International organizations

IFI international financial institution IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute (CGIAR) IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies IGC International Grains Council IGO intergovernmental organization IGY International Geophysical Year IITA International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (CGIAR) ILO International Labour Organization ILRI International Livestock Research Institute (CGIAR) IMF International Monetary Fund IMO International Maritime Organization IMSG International Metals Study Group IMSO International Mobile Satellite Organization INGO international non-­governmental organization Inmarsat International Maritime Satellite Organization Intelsat International Telecommunications Satellite Organization Interpol International Criminal Police Organization IO international organization IOM International Organization for Migration IP intellectual property IPC International Post Corporation IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (WMO/UN/ UNEP) IPGRI International Plant Genetic Resources Institute/Bioversity International (CGIAR) IPU Inter-­Parliamentary Union IRRI International Rice Research Institute (CGIAR) IsDB Islamic Development Bank IT information technology ITTO International Tropical Timber Organization ITU International Telecommunication Union IWMI International Water Management Institute (CGIAR) km kilometre LAS League of Arab States (Arab League) LDC least (or less) developed country League The League of Nations m million MDB multilateral development bank MDGs Millennium Development Goals (UN) MEP Member of the European Parliament Mercosur Mercado Comun del Sur

Acronyms and abbreviations 

·  xvii

MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (World Bank Group) NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement NARS national agricultural research services NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration (USA) NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NEA Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD) NGO non-­governmental organization NIEO New International Economic Order OAPEC Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries OAS Organization of American States OAU Organization of African Unity (now AU) OCAS Organization of Central American States ODA official development assistance OECD Organisation for Economic Co-­operation and Development OEEC Organisation for European Economic Co-­operation OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN) OHIM Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (EU) OIC Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (formerly Organization of the Islamic Conference) OIE World Organization for Animal Health (previously Office International des Epizooties) OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries OSCE Organization for Security and Co-­operation in Europe OTIF Organisation Intergouvernementale pour les Transports Internationaux Ferroviaires (Intergovernmental Organisa­­ tion for International Carriage by Rail) PAHO Pan-­American Health Organization (WHO) PIU public international union PLO Palestine Liberation Organization RDB regional development bank RO regional organization SA specialized agency (UN) SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation SADC Southern African Development Community SARS sudden acute respiratory syndrome SC Science and Partnership Council (CGIAR) SC Security Council (UN) SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization SDR special drawing right (IMF) SG Secretary-­General SI Système international (International System of Units) (BIPM)

xviii  · 

International organizations

SME small or medium-­sized enterprise TA technical assistance TEN-­TEA Trans-­European Transport Network Executive Agency (EU) TGV train à grande vitesse TRIPS Agreement on Trade-­Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (WTO) UIA Union of International Associations UK United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland UN United Nations UNAIDS UN Programme on HIV and AIDS UNCTAD UN Conference on Trade and Development UNDP UN Development Programme UNEP UN Environment Programme UNESCO UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNFPA UN Population Fund UNHCR UN High Commission for Refugees UNICEF UN Children’s Fund UNIDO UN Industrial Development Organization UNRRA UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration UNRWA UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East UNU UN University UNV UN Volunteers UNWTO UN World Tourism Organization UPU Universal Postal Union US United States of America, also USA USG Under-­Secretary-­General USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (the Soviet Union) VAT value added tax VP Vice-­President WARDA West African Rice Development Association/Africa Rice Centre (CGIAR) WCO World Customs Organization WEU Western European Union WFC World Food Council WFP World Food Programme WHO World Health Organization WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization WMO World Meteorological Organization WorldFish See ICLARM WTO World Trade Organization

1 An introduction to international organizations in theory and practice The year 2015 marks the bicentenary of the creation of the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine. Despite its small membership, narrow remit and that it lacked for many years some of the necessary paraphernalia, such as a permanent secretariat, the Commission is widely regarded as the world’s first intergovernmental organization (IGO). Since then the incredible growth in the number, complexity, diversity and influence of international organizations has been one of the most conspicuous trends in world politics, especially after 1945. Before the outbreak of the Second World War, international organizations of all types numbered only a few hundred. By 1965, however, there were in excess of 2000, a figure that would treble to almost 6500 by 1985 and double again to 12 400 by 2005 (see Table 1.1). Most of this is attributable to the proliferation of international non-­governmental organizations (INGOs). Unlike IGOs, which owe their existence to a formal multilateral1 agreement between sovereign states, INGOs are formed and constituted by non-­governmental actors, operate independently of any government and are not-­for-­profit organizations. INGOs take a variety of forms. Household names such as Oxfam, Amnesty International and Médecins Sans Frontières are considered INGOs by virtue of having linked affiliates in many different countries. Less renowned are umbrella organizations that coordinate the activities, pool resources, and represent or advance the interests of multiple organizations operating in similar areas. Examples include the International Chamber of Commerce, the World Council of Churches and the International Law Association. Until the last couple of decades, IGOs’ numbers also grew overall (see Table 1.1). By the mid-­1990s there were over 900 IGOs, up from just 49 in 1914 (Rittberger and Zangl 2006: 55). The total count of what the Union of 1  Where a term defined in the glossary first appears in any chapter it is highlighted in grey.

2  · 

International organizations

Table 1.1  The growth of international organizations (1955–2005) Type of international organization Universal (global) IGOs Intercontinental (trans-­regional) IGOs

1955

1965

1975

1985

Organizations of special form Total of intergovernmental bodies International non-­governmental Total of all categories

2005

17

25

29

31

37

35

115

174

257

51

39

33

296

190

178

378

266

246

260(est.)

485

709

727

546 (est.)

863

975

973

Regional IGOs Total conventional IGOs

1995

132

199

not given not given n/a

n/a

286

970

1827

2470

5634

8146 11 430

1102

2026

3016

6497

9121 12 403

Note: Categorization follows UIA definitions, including ‘universal’ as IGOs generally having membership of more than 60 countries and ‘special form’ as including banks, funds, courts, common markets, periodic conference series and training institutes. Source: UIA.

International Associations (UIA) defines as ‘conventional’ IGOs plateaued in the 1980s before starting to fall away. From humble beginnings and the efforts of influential individuals working within a loose governmental structure (see Chapter 2) IGOs have multiplied and matured to become, as subsequent chapters will demonstrate, omnipresent features of the contemporary landscape. Without studying them it is difficult to gain insight into much of the substance of world politics or the related theme of global governance.

1.1 Why study international governmental organizations? Despite their inferior numbers and slower growth, it is IGOs rather than INGOs that this book examines. IGOs may be quantitatively outgunned by INGOs, but they have superior influence in global governance because they are nourished by state power. The governments of states are, and for the foreseeable future will remain, the main repository of power and authority in world politics. In advanced countries state power pervades almost every recess of citizens’ lives from prosaic matters such as litter laws and food standards to those of overbearing importance, for example guaranteeing states’ security and committing them to international treaties such as the European Convention on Human Rights. In times of crisis states can muster unique and formidable capabilities. In military and security affairs that are widely advertised as the fulcrum of global politics, states hold the monopoly on the legitimate use of

An introduction to international organizations in theory and practice 

·  3

force. Counterinsurgents and terrorist organizations patently have the wherewithal to wreak massive destruction, but they are no match for the state’s ability to wage and sustain armed conflict and cannot legitimately compel people to take up arms. Similarly, in the economic and financial sphere, central banks afford states the luxury of minting money, a facility essential to the management of the 2007 financial meltdown. The power and authority exercised by states to regulate their domestic affairs and engage in their international undertakings, of which IGOs are the most formal embodiment, provide the scaffolding upon which the broader architecture of global governance is draped. This observation is well illustrated by the ascent of INGOs. The meteoric rise in INGO numbers is symptomatic of the re-­emergence of private and non-­state actors within global governance (see Graz and Nolke 2008). Private authority has always penetrated many fields of global governance, and there are several, such as the internet, telecommunications, shipping (Cutler 1999) and aspects of financial regulation (Porter 2005), where it is a comparable or dominant partner. Nevertheless the cited commentators are circumspect about the confines of private power and authority, which they note are contingent upon and tightly circumscribed by the acquiescence of states and state-­based institutions. Many INGOs, for example, trace their origins to meetings of intergovernmental organizations that brought national non-­governmental organizations (NGOs) into contact with analogous organizations from different countries, while others arose to neutralize IGO influence. Incentives to become an INGO are strengthened by the rules governing access to intergovernmental organizations, which sometimes oblige NGOs to have an international dimension. Intergovernmental organizations also utilize INGOs for their expertise and to deliver their operational mandates. Though INGOs are independent of government, their reliance on funding from IGOs can foster incestuous relationships that impel them to ‘go native’ rather than operate as standalone agents (Reimann 2006). Thus, states are indispensable ingredients in global governance, but their ability to effectively govern global quandaries has always been subdued by their sovereignty. While the authority of states ceases at their national frontiers, the objects they are tasked with governing stretch beyond them and, as Case Study 1.1 demonstrates, can assume planetary proportions. A regularly touted solution is a global government replicating the rule-­making and enforcement roles that states have traditionally undertaken domestically. The obstacles to this are manifold, not least that states are loath to forfeit their sovereignty to a higher authority. Another proposal is to entrust these responsibilities to private institutions of governance whose authority is less constrained by political borders. However, private actors are often the source

4  · 

International organizations

of, rather than the solution to, global problems, reservations that are heightened by question marks over their accountability and whether the free interplay of private interests delivers public goods effectively. Given the absence of a world government and the shortcomings of private governance, many aspects of international and global affairs are managed through a mosaic of collective action woven by the bilateral and multilateral interactions of states. Together these intergovernmental actions, the most formalized of which are IGOs, provide a modicum of global governance without abrogating sovereign principles. Figures 2.1 and 3.1 to 3.3 reveal the increasing numbers of IGOs and the growing complexity of their interconnections. Their infiltration of every substantive area of global governance further justifies a focus on IGOs. Moreover, in a world undergoing rapid globalization (Box 1.1), it seems reasonable to surmise that the growth of IGOs will resume as states search for mechanisms to govern the expanding collection of issues that they cannot tackle alone. BOX 1.1

GLOBALIZATION Globalization refers to the long-­term and contingent set of historical processes through which the world’s economies, societies, cultures, polities and communities are becoming more integrated. Latterly the bulging size of goods, services, technology, people, pollution and violence and the quickening velocity with which they ricochet around the planet are signalled as evidence of the intensification of globalizing tendencies. Fewer and fewer human activities or their effects coincide with artificially imposed political boundaries, most notably those of nation states. The

drawing of greater swathes of humanity into regional, continental and transcontinental networks, combined with the magnitude and rapidity of human activities, gives local events distant ramifications. Talk of the ‘death of distance’ is premature, but globalization denotes, to use Richard Falk’s phrase, that we inhabit ‘interlocking communities of fate’ whereby the trajectories of seemingly unconnected societies, economies and states are bound (unequally) together. Sources: Falk (1999); Held et al.(1999).

Later in this chapter we will see that theoretical approaches differ sharply in their assumptions about the motivations for international cooperation, its formalization through IGOs and whether, and under what conditions, IGOs can both assist states overcome the lingering distrust that infects international politics and facilitate durable and workable solutions to shared challenges. IGOs are one way for states to overcome straightforward collective

An introduction to international organizations in theory and practice 

·  5

action problems, for example dealing with health pandemics or developing codes of conduct for international financial transactions. They can be more efficient than ad hoc approaches by allowing states to pool resources and risk (peacekeeping), achieve economies of scale (humanitarian relief), share costs in an equitable way (international science) and avoid duplication (trade negotiations). Furthermore, they afford states a venue where issues can be continually explored and thus keep open the arteries of communication and accommodation even when formal negotiations have collapsed. Well-­publicized examples of states flouting or sidestepping agreements made through IGOs, for example the United States (US) and United Kingdom’s (UK) decision to invade Iraq in 2003 without United Nations (UN) backing, disguise the long-­term preferences of most states for working through IGOs most of the time to resolve international tensions. IGO membership remains highly stratified, but the trends point towards states becoming more deeply enmeshed in a web of IGO obligations. Analysis of states’ degree of integration into IOs from 1965 to 2000 reveals their membership has grown steadily (Pevehouse et al. 2004). The eight most integrated states over that period (mostly located in Northern Europe) had an average membership in 68 IGOs in 1965, 89 in 1985 and 108 in 2000. By contrast the eight least integrated states averaged membership in seven IGOs in 1965, 14 in 1985 and 15 in 2000. The states in this latter group have tended to be pariah states that may not wish to accede to IGO norms (e.g. North Korea), quasi-­states that are not universally recognized (e.g. Taiwan and San Marino), and small (mainly island) states which lack the resources to participate (e.g. Tuvalu and the Maldives). Virtually all other states, including the most powerful, have enlisted in ever greater numbers and devoted considerable resources to IGOs. For instance, between 1981 and 2009 while World Bank (IBRD) membership grew by 29 per cent the number of staff expanded by 300 per cent. It is improbable that states would invest so much unless significant benefits were forthcoming. In the public consciousness, IGOs are associated with catastrophe, ceremony or urban myths, such as the extreme wastefulness of the UN. In reality mundane work on esoteric topics is the stock-­in-­trade of many IGOs. Nonetheless obscurity should not be confused with obsolescence or invisibility with impotence. The unassuming undertakings of IGOs are vital elements in inching global governance forward. As Case Study 1.1 demonstrates, the many treaties and protocols concerning climate change would have been impossible without years of arduous technical work by IGOs allowing states to identify and frame their interests and taper their disagreements. Furthermore the influence of IGOs creeps, often unnoticed, into daily life. From the International Telecommunication Union’s allocation of

6  · 

International organizations

the radio frequencies used when you turn on your radio, to the sharing of costs agreed at the Universal Postal Union that ensure that international mail is delivered, to European Union (EU) rules that govern waste disposal and recycling, to the World Health Organization (WHO)/Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) standards governing trade in processed foods, through to the European Centre for Medium-­R ange Weather Forecasts’ (ECMWF) projections that underlie weather forecasts, there is continual unseen dependence on IGOs. Perhaps as a consequence of this greater involvement in the lives of citizens as well as states, IGOs are once again receiving greater attention. Today the world is awash with commentaries purporting to describe, explain, understand and critique IGOs, but not long ago a chorus of voices bemoaned the disarray afflicting the extant crop of IGOs and the decline in their academic study (Rochester 1986). Paradoxically it was disenchantment with IGOs that resurrected academic interest in the following decade. What had altered was that the scorn had spread from the ivory towers and interested parties to mainstream policy makers and the public, for whom IGOs were becoming convenient scapegoats. IGOs, especially those addressing economic and financial matters, became lightning rods for groups concerned about a seeming inclination for untrammelled capitalism. Critics asserted that bodies such as the World Bank Group (Chapter 8, section 8.1), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Chapter 9, section 9.1), the Organisation for Economic Co-­operation and Development (OECD) (Chapter 10, section 10.1) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Chapter 10, section 10.2) dressed their decisions in a technocratic discourse to camouflage their political implications. By presenting free-­market-­infused rules and proposals as the optimal way of proceeding, IGOs distracted attention from their distributional effects, that is, from the inherently political question of who would get what, how and when. Furthermore, critics suggested these rules were the outputs of IGOs in thrall to the interests of powerful states and corporations that stood to gain most from their application. Protestors sought to bring these perceived injustices to wider attention by targeting the meetings of economic IGOs, most notably at Seattle in 1999 (Box 1.2). Despite the usefulness of IGOs to states, politicians also played to the gallery, simultaneously castigating them as too powerful (when they were perceived to impinge on sovereignty), too brittle (when they proved unwilling to impinge on the sovereignty of the world’s bullies and tyrants), too wasteful (when national budgets were tight) and under-­resourced (when they wanted

An introduction to international organizations in theory and practice 

·  7

BOX 1.2

THE BATTLE OF SEATTLE The Battle of Seattle refers to the protest activity surrounding the 1999 WTO Ministerial Conference which was to launch a new round of global trade negotiations. Protests targeted to coincide with major international meetings became routine in the 1980s and 1990s, but what set Seattle apart was the attention it drew to the spectrum of grievances aired, their magnitude and their perceived impact. Orchestrated well in advance, the Seattle imbroglio attracted in excess of 50 000 campaigners representing some 200–600 groups. The visions of this colourful coalition, ranging from established INGOs agitating on the basis of broad principles to anarchists and those demonstrating for single issues, diverged hugely, but all were clear about what they opposed – the prevailing laissez-­faire hue of globalization. They believed it privileged the interests of rich and unaccountable corporate elites, rode roughshod over values of fairness, freedom and democratic

governance, and sabotaged prospects for environmental sustainability and development. They feared the new trade round was a device to lock in and extend this system. The Seattle meeting disbanded without launching a new trade round. The precise impact of the protests is contested, with many arguing that the pre-­existing fissures between the negotiating parties doomed the WTO talks from the outset. Nevertheless, the slant that the protests at the very least ossified these fissures and helped prevent agreement took hold in the popular psyche, as did the heavy-­handed policing and violent scenes that were beamed around the world. Ultimately the Battle of Seattle’s triumph in bringing the governance of economic globalization to wider public attention backfired. It gave WTO delegates the excuse to retreat to a remote hideaway in Doha, Qatar, where a fresh round of trade negotiations was launched in 2001.

something to happen). When decisions were delayed (or not taken at all) IGOs were blamed for pandering to specific constituencies. When unpopular decisions were taken, IGOs were accused of harbouring democratic deficits. Equally IGOs have stout defenders. Academics such as Jeffrey Sachs and Amartya Sen have enthusiastically adopted the quantification of development objectives sponsored by IGOs such as the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Index and the Millennium Development Goals. Scientists believing in climate change consider IGOs critical players in achieving progress (see Case Study 1.1.); and politicians in smaller states (such as the Nordic countries) see IGOs as the best way to leverage their influence. Likewise, the public expresses support for humanitarian organizations such as the United Nations Children’s Fund, as evidenced by its fund-­raising results. Even those less enamoured of IGOs

8  · 

International organizations

grudgingly concede that they offer the least bad answer to difficult problems. The Economist (2010b), a journal that regularly chastises the bureaucratic inefficiencies of IGOs, recently opined that such an organization offered the most plausible way of cleaning up the space debris orbiting the earth. These debates about whether IGOs have and will make a positive contribution to global governance go to the heart of the more empirical chapters which form the bulk of this text. Opinions regarding the potential and pitfalls for IGOs often stem from the analyst’s worldview. As observed in greater detail below, those writing from realist or radical perspectives generally suggest that IGOs are consortia of the world’s most powerful interests providing a legitimizing cover for predetermined outcomes. To these authors IGOs are simply the sum of their parts and have little or no independent impact on global governance. Liberal and constructivist writers are more optimistic, imbuing IGOs with the knack of smoothing paths towards international cooperation and creating pressure on states to implement norms that can alleviate the world’s ills. Inevitably the truth lies somewhere between the two poles, and only by studying IGOs empirically can we deduce which, if any, of these worldviews are the most accurate. CASE STUDY 1.1

International governmental organizations and the governance of climate change For millions of years, global climate has fluctuated gradually in cycles of ice ages and warm interludes. Past civilizations have vanished owing to their inability to adjust to climate change, but modern societies thought that climate variations were protracted, natural occurrences which humankind’s genius for adaptation could surmount. In the 1970s, however, scientific research revealed how human activity, in particular the rapid build-­up of ‘greenhouse gases’ caused by the burning of fossil fuels, was accelerating long-­term climatic trends, most notably the phenomenon of ‘global warming’, a colloquial term referring to rising atmospheric temperatures. The ramifications of climate change touch upon a myriad of policy areas, including security, migration, infrastructure planning, nutrition and health. The gloomiest prognoses fret that, while past civilizations have crumbled, today the very future of humanity is at stake, because failure to manage climate change effectively could render the planet uninhabitable. Such apocalyptic scenarios have brought climate change to the forefront of political agendas but, as perhaps the ultimate example of a puzzle that transcends national borders, it is something states are unable to tackle separately. Climate change is amongst the many

An introduction to international organizations in theory and practice 

·  9

CASE STUDY 1.1 (continued)

issues discussed within what is now a sophisticated and elaborate international regime for governing the global environment, of which IGOs have been an integral part throughout, although their role has evolved. Originally their primary function was knowledge generation, assembling, analysing and synthesizing data to establish trends and ensure information was internationally comparable. Once states had been sensitized to the existence and importance of these trends the emphasis shifted to drafting proposals, evolving behavioural norms and capacity-­building measures that would engage states in the climate change debate and tackle its impact. Later states used IGOs as venues for conducting negotiations to codify these rules. Most recently states have employed IGOs as monitors of agreements. The information which IGOs gather is the basis for identifying new trends upon which to improve existing agreements and implementation. Today’s widespread, but not universal, acceptance of human-­induced climate change owes much to the work of IGOs. IGOs did not discover climate change or even coin the term. Rather, by collecting and honing relevant information and providing a home in which scientists could discuss its implications, IGOs assisted scientists to turn climate change into a legitimate problem that the international community needed to tackle. Tracking climate data has long been the preserve of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). Its predecessor, the International Meteorological Organization, proposed and acted as a data repository for the second International Polar Year (1932–33), which subsequently inspired the International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 1957–58 (Chapter 15, section 15.1.3). Scientists participating in the IGY noticed changes in atmospheric composition, but it was WMO’s World Weather Watch, launched in 1963, and its Global Atmospheric Research Programme, run conjointly with the International Council of Scientific Unions between 1967 and 1982, that furnished them with further evidence of the alacrity of climate change. Growing awareness of threats to the global commons provided the impetus for new purpose-­built environmental IGOs. Climate change, among broader environmental issues, also percolated the agendas of existing IGOs. In 1972, a major UN conference on the environment held in Stockholm led to the creation of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP, Chapter 6, section 6.6); a year later ECMWF (Chapter 15, section 15.5) was founded to improve meteorological forecasting and, as a corollary, to support climate investigation and research both in its members and at WMO. Of existing IGOs, many of which have subsequently played prominent roles in the climate change debate, OECD (Chapter 10, section 10.1) was the first to acquire a dedicated environmental unit, in 1970, while the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (Chapter 7, section 7.5.1) was reinforced and its coordination of oceanic research and access to scientific data was expanded to cover all aspects of the oceans’ physical health, including climatic interrelationships. The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR, Chapter 14) started developing new varieties of essential crops that could be grown under changing climatic conditions and, later, expanded its global repositories of seeds, proposed norms to protect

10  · 

International organizations

CASE STUDY 1.1 (continued)

biological diversity and mapped the world’s agricultural water resources. Finally in the first decade of the twenty-­first century, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and International Maritime Organization (IMO), whose mandates cover industries responsible for 3 and 5 per cent of total carbon emissions respectively, started work on agreements aimed at reducing carbon emissions (Chapter 16). Together, by the end of the 1970s, IGOs, coordinated through UN and UNEP, had amassed a vast compendium of knowledge reinforcing the reality of climate change. What was initially a scientific curiosity about changing atmospheric conditions started to acquire a political dimension as scientists, often working with an IGO’s imprimatur, alerted the international community to its implications and agitated for action. The obstacles to international negotiations were nonetheless formidable, because there was dissension about the causes and the seriousness of the issue. Inconclusive evidence allowed states to avoid regulating activities which were alleged to contribute to climate change but from which they benefited. Uncertainty about the impact of climate change, the fact that the impact might not be felt for decades, concerns that costs and consequences would be unevenly spread and the problem of ascribing effects unambiguously to climate change based on incomplete and incomparable datasets were further difficulties. Many countries lacked the resources needed to assemble the statistics requested by IGOs, and national data was not always standardized, making international comparisons impossible (see also Chapter 12, section 12.4.1). IGOs, including UNEP, WMO and the European Environment Agency, stepped into the breach, providing technical assistance to help countries build the capacity to supply data to international standards. This produced frameworks to render national figures internationally comparable and was a vital step in framing the policy debate. Nevertheless, this phase reflected developed nations’ priorities to the exclusion of those of less developed countries (LDCs). In 1983, the UN General Assembly set up a World Commission on Environment and Development (the Brundtland Commission). In addition to popularizing the concept of sustainable development to bridge the differences between developed and developing countries, it concluded that a body was needed to assess global climate change data. The Commission’s call for an accepted scientific baseline for analysis was jointly acted upon by WMO and UNEP, and in 1988 they established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). IPCC’s mandate, structure and budget are determined by annual meetings of g­ overnment representatives, but IPCC is not an IGO. IPCC is a group of 3500 leading scientists advising UN on climate science but serving in an expert capacity not as r­ epresentatives of particular states. Reporting at six-­yearly intervals, IPCC synthesizes data from national sources, research institutes and IGOs and provides overarching global ­perspectives, forecasts and policy proposals. Brokering agreement about the causes and consequences of climate change was the basis for the next stages of IGO work, the cultivation of norms and rules. In 1982, UNEP commenced efforts to reduce the impact of carbon hydrofluorides, which had produced the ozone hole, leading to the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone

An introduction to international organizations in theory and practice 

·  11

CASE STUDY 1.1 (continued)

Layer (see Box 6.6). In 1992, there was a further UN Conference on Environment and Development (the Rio Conference). This continued to raise public awareness and resulted in the Global Environment Facility (GEF), a new institution administered jointly by IBRD, UNEP and UNDP (Chapter 6, section 6.6.1). GEF is designed to help developing countries switch to ‘carbon-­friendly’ technologies and was a first step in IGOs funding projects specifically addressing climate change. In 1990, IPCC’s initial report announced there were scientific reasons to be concerned about climate change. This spurred efforts, mainly through UNEP, WMO and the Rio Conference, for states to agree to the UN’s 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) designed to control and report on greenhouse gas emissions. FCCC committed its developed-­country signatories, which accounted for more than 60 per cent of carbon emissions, to reduce emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. Because the science was not fully accepted, FCCC set no mandatory targets; however, it did anticipate the need for targets by providing for them to be introduced in future protocols, thereby avoiding reopening many settled arguments. IPCC’s second report, in 1995, proclaimed scientific evidence of a perceptible human impact on the global climate and led to the UN-­sponsored 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol did not take effect until 2005, but it moved FCCC one step further, by defining targets to stabilize emissions of six greenhouse gases and setting quotas for developed countries, which were expected to reduce their average emissions by 5 per cent compared to 1990 and 29 per cent compared to estimated 2010 levels. Developing countries were not required to reduce emissions, as their per capita output of greenhouse gases was low and the situation was attributed principally to activities in the developed world. One major standout from Kyoto was the USA, the largest overall source of greenhouse gases, with an economy dependent on cheap fossil fuel. It brokered a separate agreement between Kyoto sceptics known as the Asia-­Pacific Initiative, which advocated technological change rather than pursuit of targets. Once greenhouse gas quotas were established they had to be monitored and administered. EU launched a trading mechanism, the European Trading System, to allow companies with surplus quotas to sell them to those needing more. Countries can compensate some of their emissions by financing carbon offset schemes in developing countries (e.g. reforestation projects). Development of new technologies and schemes to reduce emissions also qualify countries for additional carbon credits calculated and assigned by the UN. Monitoring, however, is not delegated to IGOs; resources, such as observation satellites and databases of emissions’ sources, are under state control, and IGOs can only verify their accuracy if there is binding agreement or if it is in states’ best interests. Outside Europe, stimuli to push countries towards achieving their targets were minimal. The 2009 UN Copenhagen Climate Change Conference was supposed to distil tough long-­ term targets, but agreement proved elusive. Disagreement centred upon whether per capita emissions should be the sole driver of measurement, when many countries with low per capita emissions, such as China and India, have substantial total emissions. Furthermore

12  · 

International organizations

CASE STUDY 1.1 (continued)

the US and China were opposed, albeit for different reasons, the US being against mandatory targets for the developed world and China not wanting intrusive monitoring of its emissions. A subsequent conference in Cancun, in 2010, eased tensions. It attained non-­ binding agreements with India and China (the second and third largest emitters), signed the US up to a pledge to reduce its emissions by 17 per cent compared to 2005 levels, and adopted guidelines to reduce deforestation, creating ‘forest credits’ to offset some developed-­country emissions. The 2011 Durban conference achieved little other than to extend the Kyoto Protocol and to agree limits to both developed and developing-­country emissions by 2015. In attempting to progress beyond monitoring, the UN System has defined four areas for future attention and action, namely mitigation, adaptation, technology and financing. These initiatives are primarily aimed at developing countries which do not have resources to resolve problems. Under mitigation, WHO is alerting members to the need for emergency health infrastructures to respond to weather-­related disasters, and the World Food Programme (WFP) is analysing states’ vulnerability to climate-­induced famine. Adaptation involves agencies such as FAO advocating climate-­smart agriculture and a UN mechanism to encourage renewable energy technology transfer. Technology is predominantly a private sector and academic concern; nevertheless UNEP is supporting work on small-­scale solar energy for rural uses, while WMO, UNESCO and the UN are jointly providing advice on integrated water resources management to mitigate flood risks. Finally, as regards financing, GEF can disburse up to $500m annually, and other funding mechanisms are now available, such as the multilateral development banks’ Climate Investment Funds venture to scale up innovative technology. IPCC was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007, but became embroiled in controversy following disclosures that its 2007 report lacked a degree of intellectual rigour and that some of its baseline data was opaque. Apart from raising doubts about the objectivity of IGOs, which in the view of some commentators trade on their reputation of being above manipulation by either states or private interests, this was also fuel for the sceptics’ fire, as they were free to cite other data they believed to be equally authoritative. Consequentially reforms have strengthened IPCC methodologies so that one agreed dataset is the basis for negotiations. The Montreal Protocol apart, the major UN conferences have not materially changed the status quo, although they have boosted public awareness and encouraged those calling for change. The international community has gradually come to understand that climate change is a complex global problem and that the impact on humankind’s future will be severe. While IGOs have been at the forefront of raising awareness, they have been less successful in negotiating enforceable norms, and the environmental agenda remains poorly focused. New international institutions have been installed, but piecemeal success, accompanied by conspicuous failures, raises the question as to whether more integrated international oversight of the global environment would be advantageous, and there is discussion of a new

An introduction to international organizations in theory and practice 

·  13

CASE STUDY 1.1 (continued)

UN specialized agency with an overarching mandate. This may reduce turf wars and give greater focus to the problem, but it may not bring greater pressure on the standout nations. Climate change also reveals the limits of IGOs. States are now involved in complex negotiations which pit climate change sceptics against believers, and developed against developing states, and encompass potential solutions ranging from clean technology to carbon trading and active engineering to reverse climate change. In due course IGOs may help surmount these problems. For the moment, however, it appears to be beyond the ability of IGOs to handle the tensions, with FCCC commitments and Kyoto targets being missed (although Kyoto has been extended to 2020).

1.2 Defining and categorizing international organizations Before we move on to the empirical study of IGOs, it is first necessary to define and categorize them. As already intimated, the term ‘international organization’ is invoked to depict a multitude of different bodies, but this book is concerned predominantly with one subspecies, the IGO henceforth referred to as international organizations (IO). Even in this small corner of the universe, however, there is enormous diversity, and copious classification schemes have emerged. For the purposes of this book, international organizations are defined as formal, continuous structures founded by an authoritative instrument of agreement between members (including two or more sovereign states) or an existing international organization through which members pursue their common interests. To clarify further, it is worth dissecting this definition. The requirement that IOs must be formal and continuous structures means they must be stable with a well-­defined organizational structure encompassing a headquarters, an international secretariat responsible only to the organization, a formal set of rules, decision-­making procedures and consultative organs that meet regularly in plenary sessions (see Chapter 4). This distinguishes them from one-­off conferences seeking solutions to immediate problems and informal summit meetings such as the G8 and G20 (Box 1.3). Authoritative instruments of agreement take many forms, but are habitually international treaties ratified by states. Some IOs are offshoots of existing ones, for example the UN’s Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Known as emanations, they are dismissed in some quarters because they are not independent of their parent organizations. Important

14  · 

International organizations

BOX 1.3

THE ‘GAGGLE OF Gs’ Informal groupings of sovereign states are part of the time-­honoured traditions of international politics. Several IOs considered in this volume trace their antecedents to such arrangements. Beginning in the 1970s, however, what Culpeper (2000) terms a ‘gaggle of Gs’ (the G7, G8, G20 and G77 amongst them) has assumed a prominent role in global governance. They perform similar functions to IOs, but their structures differ markedly. They seek to advance members’ common interests by amassing

and exchanging data, laying down guidelines, setting best practice standards and policing the actions of members through peer pressure. They also maintain close relationships with IOs and, through the development of consensus, act as catalysts for actions within them. While meetings tend to be regularized, they lack the trappings of IOs, having no founding treaty or constitution, no formal protocols, no decision-­making bodies or procedures and no independent secretariat.

emanations such as WFP and UNCTAD are included here because, while they depend on the parent organizations for their mandate and budget, they have considerable independence over their programme and management. Moreover, they have a separate legal personality, accept voluntary contributions for certain activities and work in areas not strictly covered by their parent’s principal mandates. To differentiate IOs from INGOs, signatories of the founding agreement must include at least two sovereign states. This does not mean that IO membership is restricted to states. Many IOs started life as private concerns that states later colonized (see Chapter 2). Like many successful colonists, states did not simply drive out the incumbents but harnessed what they had to offer. Consequently some IOs are curious hybrids of state and non-­state members, albeit with the former holding the trump cards. Finally, the common interest that members look to advance is usually stipulated in a formal agreement, such as a founding charter or convention. This is not to say all members share identical motivations for creating or joining the organization or that they benefit equally. IOs also tend to accumulate new responsibilities or journey beyond those proclaimed in their founding agreements, with or without further formal agreement. The definition of an IO is clear, but there is still occasional controversy about precisely which bodies meet these criteria. Some IOs slowly emerge by gradually acquiring the defined characteristics (for example the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine or CGIAR, see Chapter 14),

An introduction to international organizations in theory and practice 

·  15

while others, such as the International Bureau of Weights and Measures (BIPM), have retained the nomenclature and structure of their forebears, the public international unions (see Chapter 2, section 2.1). Even the definition we (and others) have adopted accommodates a group of organizations with extraordinarily diverse attributes, ranging from the UN System with upwards of 50 000 staff, an almost universal membership and tentacles delving into virtually every facet of human existence, to the International Copper Study Group with only a few members, a secretariat in single figures and a very narrow purpose. Typologies designed to gain a firmer grip on the multifaceted world of IOs have proliferated (Wallace and Singer 1970), and the best known categorize IOs according to their membership, competences, functions and authority. As Figures 1.1 and 1.2 highlight, few if any IOs conform to a specific ideal, their characteristics ranging over the entire spectrum of each category. The membership or potential membership of IOs is customarily characterized as being universal or restricted (Figure 1.1). Universal IOs are those that all states are eligible to join, whereas restricted IOs are open only to those which meet certain limiting factors. These factors may depend upon political, economic or scientific priorities but are most commonly geographic. Restricted organizations can be trans-­regional but often assume a regional or sub-­ regional form. The absence of a consistent definition of a region (see Box 1.4) means its use to define IOs must be treated with caution. The regional appellation applies with some accuracy to certain development banks (Chapter BOX 1.4

REGIONS AND SUB-­REGIONS Throughout history human interactions and communities have exhibited strong regional bias, and the contemporary era is no exception. Sustained growth in interregional flows of trade and finance seem to epitomize globalization, but they are dwarfed by intraregional activity (i.e. that taking place between entities within a specified region). Regions and sub-­regions are normally defined as a restricted number of states whose interdependence proceeds from their geographical proxim-

ity and/or cultural affinity. Regions vary widely in terms of their dimensions, homogeneity, levels of integration and institutionalization. On this last point, scholars continue to debate whether regional IOs are progenitors or progeny of regional integration. Regional and sub-­regional boundaries remain imprecise, something reflected in the regions defined by IOs. For example, the UN mostly recognizes six regions, while the World Bank Group recognizes seven.

16  · 

International organizations

8), security organizations (Chapter 13) and the various organizations supporting European integration (Chapters 11 and 12), but the memberships of many restricted organizations derive from ideology, history or political affiliation. As Figure 1.1 shows, universal IOs are generally subscribed to by all states. Only a few in the group, such as WTO or the International Atomic Energy Agency, fall short of complete universality, either because they are not seen as relevant by some states or because their role may be fulfilled by a regional organization. As previously observed, IO activities do not always correspond with their mission statements; nevertheless they are pigeonholed according to their competencies, that is to say, the range of expertise or activities required to undertake their mandates (Figure 1.1). At one extreme, there are IOs covering an entire spectrum of policy areas (UN or EU), while at the other there are IOs tasked with working on very specific issues like aviation (ICAO or Eurocontrol) and space exploration (European Space Agency and European Southern Observatory). Generally the more that limited technical objectives predominate over political and economic ones, the more restricted the mandate. Figure 1.1 shows that universal IOs, belonging predominantly to the UN System, lean towards a relatively narrow range of competence. Most IOs fall into the lower right-­hand quadrant, having both limited membership and limited competence. Possibly this indicates that many problems cannot be solved by states in isolation, but likewise that they are not susceptible to expedient resolution in universal IOs. Alternatively, organizations with small memberships either are not given the resources to expand their remit, members being happy to use the UN System for that purpose, or have a limited perspective of their key issues. Rather than look at competencies, the functional classification concerns itself with how those aims are delivered and delineates between programme and operationally oriented organizations. Programme organizations are those whose foremost role lies in supporting international cooperation, acting as a forum for knowledge production through collating, exchanging, analysing and disseminating information on the basis of which general rules, norms and principles governing expected standards of behaviour and the distribution of benefits are negotiated and promulgated (see Case Study 1.1). Operational organizations focus primarily on using multilateral and bilateral resources to achieve the outcomes required by their mandates, often through practical application of technologies and enforcement of established agreements. Deployment of peacekeeping forces, supplying financial resources, humanitarian relief and undertaking scientific projects provide some of the more obvious examples of operational activities. However, the majority of

WMO Interpol

WIPO

ILO

IMF

UPU ICAO

ITU

WFP

UNEP

UNHCR

UNDP

WHO

FAO

UNICEF

UNESCO

UNRWA

IBRD

IMO

UNIDO IFAD IAEA

UNWTO

WTO

Issue specific

Figure 1.1  A typology of international organizations, part 1

BIPM

BIS

OIC

OSCE

EBRD

IsDB

Commonwealth

Comprehensive

Source: Derived from Rittberger and Zangl (2006: 11), adapted with permission of Palgrave Macmillan.

U n i v e r s a l

UN

COMPETENCE

AU

IDB

IGC

EIB

NATO

EPO

OPEC

ECMWF

CERN

ESO

ESA

EFTA

Mercosur

ASEAN

CIS

ECB

ESRF

Arab League

OAS

Eurocontrol

OTIF

CGIAR

AfDB

COE

ADB

OECD

EU

R e s t r i c t e d

M E M B E R S H I P

18  · 

International organizations

operations, such as providing the finance and expertise to underpin technical assistance and training, are low-­profile. The balance between IOs with programme and operational functions is shown as evenly spread over Figure 1.2, with all IOs covering both functions to some extent. Ultimately implementation, policing and enforcement of norms and principles are state prerogatives; however, states have granted operational IOs, in particular, some measure of autonomy (authority), for example in reacting to humanitarian and financial crises. Interestingly the UN and EU, both with very wide competences, are at completely opposite ends of the authority spectrum. Supranational IOs are rare, if not a contradiction in terms; the authority of most IOs is tightly controlled by states. The EU most closely resembles an IO exhibiting supranational authority (Chapter 11), but even though it can instigate and enforce rules independently of direct government oversight it is ultimately responsible to the members’ collective will. At the other extreme, the UN and the regional political bodies are heavily dependent on their members’ approval in order to undertake activities. In fact the UN System clusters towards one typology (strong intergovernmental). In between there are organizations such as WTO and the International Court of Justice which referee disputes between members but where states initiate dispute settlement procedures and choose to apply any resulting sanctions. IOs have few material sanctions independent of their members, and many rely on ‘soft law’ and monitoring for compliance. A growing number of IOs have extensive peer review mechanisms which ‘name and shame’ members falling short of agreed norms and rules. The detrimental impact on their reputation can, under certain circumstances, induce these members to raise their game.

1.3 Scholarly approaches to international organizations Given the pervasiveness of IOs in today’s world, it is all too easy to present them as natural and eternal features of global governance. Within the literature on IOs, however, debates surrounding the factors accounting for their emergence and fortitude, their roles and functions, and their impact upon global politics have aroused considerable controversy. Often these clashes hinge upon differing assumptions about the nature of world politics, in particular the identity of the main protagonists and their incentives. While the main purpose of this book is analytical rather than theoretical, the various theoretical constructs developed in scholarly literature shed important light on possible explanations for the origins of IOs, their motivations and their salience to the management of humankind’s common affairs.

ESA & ESO

WFP

ECB

UN

CIS

UNIDO UNEP

EPO

Arab League

OIC

Mercosur

OSCE

ECMWF

ASEAN

OAS

BIPM

OTIF

WIPO

OECD

COE

IMO & ITU WMO ICAO UPU

EFTA

UNWTO

WTO

Strong intergovernmental

AU

FAO UNESCO WHO

ILO

BIS

Eurocontrol

EU

Commonwealth

CGIAR

Interpol

NATO

IAEA

UNDP UNHCR

IFAD

ESRF

UNICEF

IGC

OPEC

IMF

IsDB

AfDB UNRWA

IDB & ADB CERN

IBRD

EIB

Figure 1.2  A typology of international organizations, part 2

O p e r a t i o n a l

EBRD

Strong supranational

AUTHORITY

P r o g r a m m e

F U N C T I O N

20  · 

International organizations

We present four different schools of thought: realist, liberal, constructivist and radical (critical theories). These schools represent diverse coalitions of ideas, and some of the fiercest debates are conducted between members of the same school. Moreover, while these philosophies are drawn principally from the modern discipline of international relations, they often draw inspiration from wellsprings of ideas going back centuries or millennia. None of these grand narratives is compelling. The explanatory capacity of each is limited temporally, functionally and spatially. Temporally a distinction can be drawn between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. State interests were not always paramount in the emergence of the technically oriented IOs in the latter half of the nineteenth century (see Chapter 2). Those seeking an explanation for this will probably find stronger answers in liberal and constructivist theories than they will in realist theories. In contrast the formation of the economic and security architecture after the Second World War tallies more with realist approaches. Functionally, realism may also tell us much about the nature of the security regime, but it is less adept than liberal, constructivist and radical schools in understanding the environmental and technological regimes. Finally spatially, while liberal approaches might exemplify politics amongst European countries, especially those of the EU, they are less persuasive in regions with lower levels of interdependence, such as Africa and Asia. With this in mind, this book does not advocate any one position but adopts an eclectic approach that borrows from the different theoretical traditions to illuminate the reasons why various IOs emerged and why they act as they do.

1.4

Realism Descended from the writings of Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes, realism, despite some trenchant criticism, has been the dominant theoretical approach to explaining and understanding international relations and has achieved widespread influence amongst policy makers. There are different shades of realism, but they coalesce around common assumptions. Realist approaches are premised on states being the main actors in world politics viewed as both rational (able to rank preferences) and unitary (speaking and acting with one voice). States are thought to operate in a Hobbesian ‘state of nature’, an unforgiving environment where they seize every opportunity to deceive and exploit each other. This bleak outlook stems from suppositions made by realists about the innate selfishness of human nature and the structure of the international system. Classical realists (Carr 1939; Morgenthau 1948) argue that the human thirst to acquire, maintain and exercise power is motivated by self-­interest and that

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states, embodying groups of humanity, exhibit identical traits. Structural or neo-­realists (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 1994/95) assign the state’s need for power to the anarchical nature of the international political system. In domestic politics, recourse to violence to resolve power tussles is restricted by social mores and rules that ultimately can be enforced by the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force. In contrast, the international system is considered anarchical because of the absence of an overarching authority to erect or enforce rules capable of preventing the competition for power spilling over into the use of force. Anarchical conditions and self-­interest beget an international system predicated on the principle of ‘self-­help’, making it prudent for states to accumulate power to ensure that their interests prevail, primary amongst which is their own survival. Unfortunately the acquisition of power by states leads to a vortex of anxiety known as the security dilemma (Booth and Wheeler 2008). By acquiring more military power a state bolsters its own security but simultaneously erodes the security of other states. To nullify that threat these other states acquire more military power and thus, at the end of the cycle, the first state is no more secure than at the outset and a further cycle of military power accumulation begins. All realists judge that the best way to maintain peace in the international system is to strive for a balance of power. Throughout history states have forged alliances to counterbalance threats posed by shared foes. Nonetheless, the remorseless competition for power and security seriously inhibits cooperation amongst states and, when it does occur, it is inclined to be fleeting. Neo-­realists especially emphasize that survival in the self-­help world depends not on the absolute power of states but on their power relative to others. Even where states stand to make an absolute power gain through cooperative agreements, they may be reluctant to do so because it could translate into diminished security if other states party to the agreement gain more (Grieco 1988). States fear that allies may defect from agreements to achieve a relative power advantage, an advantage which could be used to inflict a devastating military defeat on the deceived party. The prisoners’ dilemma (Box 1.5) epitomizes this problem. Given this dismal worldview, realists believe that under no circumstances should states abdicate responsibility for their survival to other states or an IO. As George Kennan, a key architect of US Cold War (Box 1.6) security policy, commented in 1947, ‘faith in the ability of the United Nations as presently constituted to protect, now or hereafter, the security of the United States would mean only that the faithful have lost sight of the vital security interest of the United States’ (quoted in Gaddis 2007: 160). The realists’ insistence

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BOX 1.5

THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA The prisoners’ dilemma recounts the story of two people apprehended as suspects in a serious crime. Lacking sufficient evidence for a conviction, the prosecutors incarcerate and interrogate them separately. Both prisoners are informed that, if one of them confesses and the other does not, the confessor will be freed and his evidence used to prosecute the silent accomplice, who will receive a ten-­year prison sentence (the bottom left and top right boxes in the figure). If they remain silent, each will receive only a six-­month sentence owing to the original lack of evidence (the top left-­hand box). The best outcome for

both would be to remain silent and get this shorter sentence. Unfortunately both have strong incentives to confess irrespective of what the other does. If Prisoner A testifies, Prisoner B is better off testifying to save himself from the draconian sentence. If Prisoner A stays silent, Prisoner B is still better off testifying, as he will go free, and vice versa. By pursuing a rational strategy both end up confessing and receive five-­year prison sentences (the bottom right-­hand box), a worse outcome than if they had remained silent (i.e. cooperated).

Prisoner B

Silent

Prisoner A: goes free Prisoner B: 10 years

Testify

Prisoner A: 10 years Prisoner B: goes free

Prisoner A

Prisoner A: 6 months Prisoner B: 6 months

Testify

Silent

Prisoner A: 5 years Prisoner B: 5 years

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BOX 1.6

THE COLD WAR The Cold War refers to the period from 1947 to 1991 that witnessed an ideological and political clash between the democratic, capitalist states of the ‘West’ (headed by the USA) and the authoritarian, centrally planned states of the communist ‘East’ (headed by the Soviet Union – USSR). At the end of the Second World War, tensions between the values of these divergent ideologies produced fundamentally different blueprints for post-­war policies. Unable to reconcile these polarized positions, but also facing unacceptably high costs of forcing the other side into submission in a nuclear-­armed world, the US and USSR resorted to cultivating and consolidating coalitions underpinned by their dominant value system (see Chapter 13, sections 13.6 and 13.10). The absence of direct military confrontation between the US and USSR, the so-­called ‘superpowers’, led to the period being dubbed the Cold War. The superpowers conducted many ‘proxy wars’, conflicts in which the superpowers would support their ideological sympathizers in

client countries as opposed to fighting each other directly, including Korea (1950–53), Vietnam (1955–75), Cambodia (1967–75) and Afghanistan (1979–89). Cold War rivalries were expressed in other ways, including building military alliances, installing puppet regimes, races in arms and technology (such as the Space Race), providing development assistance, espionage, broadcasting propaganda and even sporting events such as the Olympics and chess. Throughout the Cold War there were periods of calm and crisis. Emergencies often prompted the superpowers to step back from the brink and relieve tensions, as they did in the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Subsequent arms limitation talks and confidence-­building measures drew the sting from the Cold War conflict and bred instruments such as the Conference on Security and Co-­operation in Europe to maintain the status quo and prevent the Cold War turning ‘hot’. The Cold War ended in 1991 with the dissolution of the USSR.

that incentives for international cooperation are outweighed by the downsides coupled with the ability of states to defect from agreements hardly seems conducive for the emergence and propagation of IOs; yet, outside the security domain, realists concede that states can and sometimes do cooperate through IOs. Realists postulate that IOs are created and sustained when they are in the interests of the most powerful states. IOs are an expression of the current distribution of power in the international system and instruments through which leading states collude to perpetuate it. Neo-­realists take the hypothesis concerning the motives of the most powerful states to its logical conclusion, arguing that, when one state, a hegemon, holds a preponderance of power in the international system, it will sponsor IOs to further its own interests and legitimize its providential position. Compared

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with other states in the system, the power of the hegemon is so overwhelming that it is willing to tolerate their relative gains provided it makes absolute gains itself. Meanwhile other states acquiesce in the hegemon’s leadership in exchange for the gains they reap. The hegemon uses its power to entice other states to join IOs by supplying public goods including, in the military sphere, security shields and, in the economic sphere, a market for distress goods and liquidity to the international financial system. In the long run the costs of such largesse and the relative gains of other states will result in the hegemon losing its preponderant position. Neo-­realists predict that, absent a hegemon willing or able to underpin them, IOs will shrivel and fail (Kennedy 1987). Neo-­realists, therefore, deny that IOs sponsor interstate cooperation, suggesting instead that the existence of an IO reflects the prior existence of a hegemon and its power to compel states to cooperate. For example, as Chapter 13 describes, neo-­realists question the extent to which security cooperation through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be credited with maintaining Europe’s continental stability and the West’s victory in the Cold War. Neo-­realists posit it was the bipolar power cartography of Cold War Europe, not NATO, that obtained the peace (Mearsheimer 1994/95: 13–14). In conclusion, realists view IOs as offspring of the state system incapable of altering the eternal truths of the international political system and hence state behaviours. Far from being independent actors IOs are empty vessels or, at the very most, intervening variables, through which states pursue national interests. Outcomes in international politics are not governed by IOs but by the nature of the international system that gives rise to them, the self-­ interested pursuit of power (for classical realists) and the anarchical nature of the international system and the distribution of power (for the neo-­realists).

1.5

Liberal theories Liberal theories of world politics and IOs also draw their insights from a diffuse group of intellectuals including international lawyers such as Hugo Grotius, political economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo, political theorists of the ilk of John Locke and Jeremy Bentham and political philosophers like Immanuel Kant. Liberals reject realists’ view of a world destined to remain trapped by the pitiless and primitive truths of power politics, believing instead that progress can alleviate humanity’s plight. The evils of injustice, inequality, repression and warfare are not the inexorable ­corollaries of human nature or the anarchic international system; rather they are the outcome of flawed institutions and mutual misunderstanding, which can be

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banished through enlightened collective action and institutional improvements. In short, many liberals see IOs as crucial players in the development of a more orderly and just international system. Liberals recognize states as the most important collective actors in world politics but place greater emphasis on a rainbow of non-­state actors, stressing in particular the importance of the individuals that compose them. For this reason many liberals see states as plural rather than unitary actors whose ambitions and interests vary, not merely as an upshot of changes in the underlying balance of power in the international system but also as a result of moral or ethical considerations, patterns of power and bartering between domestic and transnational groups. While concurring with realists that humans act rationally to promote their self-­interest, liberals think this selfishness is tempered by other characteristics. Kant, for example, believed human egoism was moderated by reason, through which people would come to reject the state of nature in favour of law and government. Moreover liberals do not believe that the pursuit of self-­interest must inevitably foster conflict. Individuals and states frequently must cooperate to attain their objectives, and most international interactions such as trade and tourism are peaceful and harmonious. Indeed, if properly harnessed, especially to protect the weak, the pursuit of self-­interest can be the motor of progress. A multiplicity of liberal perspectives exists, but space constrains us to the viewpoints of two schools that have become the standard bearers for liberal IO theories since 1945: functionalism and liberal institutionalism. Functionalist approaches insist that IOs emerge automatically in response to the interdependence resulting from technological and economic advances. This prompts a growing disjunction between the functions that political communities have to organize and the locus of political authority. Given these circumstances, functionalists believed that it would be logical for government functions to be organized regionally or globally through IOs composed of experts in the area concerned (Mitrany 1966). The form of these agencies would be determined by their function. Rivalries in the political and security spheres initially restrict cooperation to socioeconomic affairs where the battle lines between states are muted. Nevertheless functionalists believed that connections in more mundane matters such as health, transport, commerce and communications would inculcate the habit of cooperation and common values that would later allow collaborations to ‘spill over’ into the political and military realms. In short functionalists reason that the ‘Lilliputian ties of international functional cooperation would pin down the giant of conflict, weakening the urge to destruction and warfare by the promise of construction and co-­existence’ (Archer 2001: 137).

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Neo-­functionalists question whether IOs surface spontaneously from interdependence and instead attribute the phenomenon to conscious political decisions by sovereign states (E.B. Haas 1964). They observe that IOs dealing ostensibly with technical matters exert a considerable bearing on political decisions, not least those regarding resource distributions, making it improbable that states would willingly cede authority to them. Taking their lead from the history of European integration, neo-­ functionalists hold that hard-­nosed political calculations lurk behind the emergence of IOs, but that once launched they can arouse further political integration. An IO distributing food surpluses, for example, is liable to deepen its involvement, which might lead to decisions on, say, mandatory contributions being devolved to regional or international bodies. Actors eager to attain influence in this area would have to reorientate their efforts to these bodies and away from national institutions. Moreover the separate development of a regional or international policy on surpluses is likely to spill over into related areas such as humanitarian relief and monitoring food security. As the numbers of issues dealt with internationally multiply, the political systems of the states involved increasingly overlap, culminating in the state’s authority being supplanted by supranational organizations. At the very least neo-­functionalists envisage IOs as props of a post-­modern world order; at the most they are held as prototypes for a future world government. The emergence of the first IOs in the nineteenth century (see Chapter 2) and the later exponential growth of issue-­specific IOs seemed to match with functionalist theories. Nevertheless, limited spillover effects and the continued dominance of national over supranational forms of political organization undermined functionalist theories’ attractiveness. Gradually the functionalist position as the dominant theoretical approach to understanding IOs amongst liberal scholars has been supplanted by institutionalism. Liberal institutionalists reject functionalist notions that IOs are stepping stones to world government, arguing instead that they are mechanisms that support the efforts of states to surmount collective problems. This reflects their worldview which borrows realist assumptions about the anarchical international system and states acting rationally to promote their interests. Where they depart from realism is that they do not accept that anarchy and self-­interest must necessarily sound the death-­knell for durable international cooperation. Cooperation is possible where mutual interests exist and, in another important departure from realism, it is something that institutions such as IOs can sustain. Liberal institutionalists accept the realist premises that IOs cannot amend the underlying motivations of states and that IOs

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exist simply to regulate relations between rational state actors. Nonetheless, they believe that cooperation through IOs can have an independent effect on state behaviour through incentives which make them more predisposed to cooperate. In short IOs promote ‘cooperation under anarchy’ (Axelrod and Keohane 1985). The institutionalist research agenda derived from a conundrum for which the dominant realist approaches of the time could not account, namely: why did economic cooperation and the IOs through which it was pursued persist in the face of drastic changes in the balance of economic power? In 1945 the predominance of the US economy was categorical. The virility of the US economy, which accounted for half of global gross domestic product (GDP) and had surplus capital to invest, vividly contrasted with the position of its principal industrial competitors, for which the legacies of the Second World War were debt mountains and massively depleted human and physical capital. The story then followed the realist prescription. The US used its hegemonic power to erect a rules-­based international economic order, complete with IOs, designed to rehabilitate the economies of its Cold War allies and avoid the protectionist policies that had blighted the 1930s (see Box 2.2). The economies of Western Europe and Japan promptly recuperated, chipping away at the USA’s prevalent position. By 1970, although the USA was by far the world’s largest economy, its share of global GDP had shrunk to a quarter. Moreover, its competitiveness was cramped by an overvalued dollar stemming from its obligations to the Bretton Woods system (see Chapter 9), which in conjunction with President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programme and the Vietnam War was contributing to a chronic current account deficit. Realist theories predict that, as the US declines, the preoccupation with relative gains would reassert itself and it would become unwilling to underwrite the cost of the rules-­based economic order. This order would therefore disintegrate, along with the IOs it had supported. The US did unilaterally sever the link between the dollar and gold, thereby killing the Bretton Woods system, yet, severe economic upheavals notwithstanding, economic cooperation and the post-­war IOs that had buttressed it, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, OECD, IMF and IBRD, proved remarkably resilient. Some authors argued that the extent of US economic decline was exaggerated and therefore the endurance of economic IOs could be ascribed to continued US hegemony (Strange 1987). Liberal institutionalists, however, believed the institutions themselves offered the most compelling explanation for the perpetuation of international economic cooperation ‘after hegemony’ (R. Keohane 1984).

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Outside the security domain, where they concur with realists that relative gains are paramount, liberals argue that states are mostly preoccupied with making absolute gains. Possibilities for cooperation abound if parties are preoccupied with gaining something rather than contesting the distribution of those gains. Greater connections and communication between states and societies, encapsulated in R. Keohane and Nye’s (1977) term ‘complex interdependence’, should help states identify the prospects for cooperation yielding mutual, if asymmetric, benefits. On this basis liberal institutionalists predict that interdependent states will tend to cooperate, since benefits will be reciprocated by states they interact with and do not wish to offend. This generates strong incentives to formalize these interactions into permanent institutions which can help to entrench cooperation in several ways: zz Institutions

produce and provide a framework within which information can be shared. Transparency about the preferences of other actors and more accurate data regarding the effects of cheating and cooperating make it easier for rational actors to identify the benefits of cooperation. zz Institutions are places where states make quite precise commitments about expected standards of behaviour. By monitoring compliance and penalizing renegades, institutions reduce the temptation to cheat. In other words, institutions raise the costs of cheating because states will sacrifice gains from future cooperation. zz Institutions link issues, thus preventing states defecting in one domain because they fear they will lose the benefits of cooperation in another. For instance, the USA is reluctant to press China too hard on its exchange rate and monetary policies because it might impair their mutual cooperation on averting Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons programmes. Liberals are not arguing that institutions alter the state’s fundamental impulse to accumulate power but postulate that they can, under certain circumstances, alter the behaviour of even the most powerful states. Through application of norms, institutions can induce states to forgo short-­term gains realized from defection in order to achieve greater long-­term gains from cooperation. In this way institutionalists are able to explain why patterns of cooperation outlived US hegemonic decline. Through repeated interactions in the institutions sponsored by the hegemon, states have grasped the long-­term benefits of cooperation and the tangible ways in which institutions encourage future cooperation. Thus, when the hegemon declines to pay the costs of ­maintaining these institutions, other states step in to cover the shortfall and preserve the benefits of cooperation.

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Constructivism Over the past two decades constructivism, whose origins lie in sociology, has been adopted by those wanting to fathom the intricacies of international relations and IOs. Constructivism is better described as an approach rather than a unifying theoretical concept, and it complements, rather than substitutes for, existing theories by explaining phenomena that they treat as anomalies. Like realists and liberals, constructivists wish to explain and understand the interests and behaviour of actors in the international system, especially those of states. Where they differ is in their understanding of how those interests come about and the corollaries for state behaviour. Neo-­realist and liberal institutionalist theories make slightly different claims about state preferences (relative or absolute gains, for instance), but both assume that state interests are preordained by constraints imposed by the nature of the international system and the global distribution of material capabilities. States are pre-­constituted, in that they innately know what they want (power, security and wealth) and how to obtain it. They act according to the logic of consequences, choosing the course of action that will optimize their interests. In contrast, constructivists suggest that the interests of all actors, including states, are socially constructed. By this they mean that the interests and actions of states are constrained by social structures (ideas, values and norms) shared amongst actors in the international system about what constitutes a legitimate course of action: what constructivists call the logic of appropriateness. In other words, interests are not given to states; they are discovered through social interaction. Thus, ideas, values and norms can alter what states want. Constructivists are not dismissing material considerations entirely, but stress that material factors assume meaning only when they are fastened to ideas and identities. This helps to explain why the US thinks a nuclear-­armed Iran is dangerous but a nuclear-­armed UK is not. Moreover, they suggest that material factors are tempered by social structures informing states about legitimate standards of behaviour. As Finnemore (1996: 29) argues: Actors may ask themselves, ‘What kind of situation is this?’ and ‘What am I supposed to do now?’ rather than ‘How do I get what I want?’ Thoughtful, intelligent political behaviour, like other behaviour, may be governed by notions of duty and obligation as much as by notions of self-­interest and gain.

These social structures not only regulate the behaviour of actors; they also help to constitute their identities. For instance, despite it being a major intrusion into their sovereignty, many states allow their actions to be constrained

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by international norms concerning the human rights of enemy combatants. Partly this reflects contemporary attitudes towards the values placed on human life, but it is also because ‘human rights are a constitutive feature of liberal democratic states, in particular, and increasingly, at the international level, the identity of legitimate states’ (Fierke 2007: 171). Consider, for example, the furore about the treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, which hinged on whether torture is an appropriate practice for a state with a liberal identity. Until the 1860s, the prevailing international norm was that sovereignty conferred states and their leaders with the right to pursue and defend their interests irrespective of the humanitarian impact. Individuals had no intrinsic worth independent of their relation to states. Today, by contrast, liberal democratic states widely accept norms that ensure the humane treatment of non-­combatants, provide aid to prisoners of war, facilitate their repatriation and provide care for wounded enemy combatants. The origins, diffusion and socialization of states into accepting these norms cannot be deciphered though liberal or neo-­realist appeals to changes in material conditions. In this instance, norms emerged and diffused thanks to the determined entrepreneurship of private persons, most notably through the Geneva Conventions (Case Study 2.1). In many circumstances, however, IOs are prominent sources of norms and values, providing the mechanisms through which they are diffused and states are socialized into acceptance (M. Barnett and Finnemore 2004), for example the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Child. All the constructs we have encountered so far pinpoint norm generation as a function of IOs, but there are important differences in how constructivists view their role in this regard. Liberals and realists see IOs as weathervanes being buffeted by the harsh winds generated by power politics and national interests. The topics discussed in IOs and resulting norms are the outcomes of state preferences. Recall that even the more optimistic liberal institutionalists believe that while IOs might change state behaviour they do not transform states’ underlying interests. At most, norms play a regulatory role, helping to remove barriers for rational actors to cooperate over pre-­existing problems. By contrast constructivists see IOs as weather-­makers, not only working in conjunction with members to generate and disseminate new norms but also capable of exercising power and authority by pursuing agendas independent of, and sometimes contrary to, the mandates conferred by members, thus helping to reconstitute the world in the process. For constructivists, in other words, IOs are more than the sum of their member states; they take on a life of their own as (semi-­)autonomous actors. M. Barnett and Finnemore (2004) pinpoint three intertwined sources of IO authority:

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zz Delegated

authority arises out of the imprecision that characterizes the founding charters of many IOs, which leaves staff room to manoeuvre in their efforts to devise systems that deliver their mandate. Ambiguities are sometimes deliberate, reflecting the desire of states for ‘autonomous action from IO staff . . . precisely because they are neither able nor willing to perform the IO’s mission themselves’ (M. Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 5). zz IOs exhibit moral authority sourced from their personifications or their role in upholding values widely shared in the international community. By portraying themselves as neutral actors, protecting the interests of the international community rather than acting at the behest of the dominant powers, IOs can persuade states to defer to their judgement. zz Possibly most importantly, there is authority linked to expertise. A cacophony of voices permeates all political issues, but often ‘experts’ receive a privileged hearing because of their superior knowledge. From their earliest foundation, IOs have been repositories of knowledge. Many epistemic communities coalesce at IOs and trade upon their experience and intellectual prestige to present problems and solutions in a manner that allows states to identify particular interests. How epistemic communities manipulate and categorize information alters the understanding and prescriptions that result and the behaviour of actors. For example, throughout most of human history the majority of people have lived from hand to mouth (on under $2 per day in today’s economic terminology). Only recently, however, has this information been constructed as a ‘development problem’ necessitating action by leading actors. In short, IOs are not just regulative institutions; they are constitutive, altering the state’s understanding of its interests. This leads on to the other constructivist observation that IOs actively construct the world. Constructivism is premised on the belief that ideas, norms and values mould how actors think about the world, their interests and how they behave. Therefore if underlying ideas, norms and values alter, so will the world and the interests of actors within it. Constructivists see IOs as constitutive, using their authority and autonomy to frame issues as problems, identifying how they should be tackled and acting as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ to market these ideas to the international community (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). There are a host of examples where IOs have identified a new problem (such as extending intellectual property rights to plant material) and gone on to convince states it is something they need to tackle. In turn this reconstitutes the role of the state and the expectations about the role it should play. As previously discussed, some IOs themselves give rise to new independent structures to deal with issues (emanations). Thus the International Finance

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Corporation, an offshoot of IBRD, channels funding to the private sector in developing countries. Elsewhere solutions to problems might require the constitution of new actors, such as human rights monitors and peacekeepers, who would not exist unless there was first some agreement that these activities were legitimate targets for state authority.

1.7

Critical theories ‘Critical theories’ is an umbrella term encompassing the theories of writers who challenge the mainstream visions of international relations and IOs. Two things in particular set them apart. First, they do not regard the state or the state system as the starting point of the analysis. States are not ignored but are downplayed in favour of many other fissures dividing humankind. Compared with those taking other approaches, critical scholars are less likely to reify the state as a natural or continuing part of our physical and imagined landscape; they observe instead that the state rests upon historically specific constellations of social power. Thus, reconfigurations in social power may see the state displaced by alternative political communities. Second, they exude a strong normative streak, critical of the prevailing order and optimistic about the possibility of replacing it with something better. In this regard states and IOs are depicted as part of the problem rather than the solution, because they symbolize the interests of powerful elites that seek to perpetuate the present order under which they have enriched themselves through the systematic exploitation of others. They see the status quo as being unstable and unsustainable, because exploitation breeds conflict that will ultimately overrun attempts by dominant elites to manage it. A new order, premised on different arrangements of social power, will rise from the ashes. Here we concentrate mainly on Marxist approaches to world politics and their explanations for the emergence and actions of IOs. International relations was not a central preoccupation for Karl Marx, but his ideas have been commandeered by commentators operating under the banner of Marxism. Initially Marxist views of international relations appear to chime with those of neo-­realism and liberal institutionalism. Like these approaches, Marxism accounts for the dynamics of international politics by suggesting the international system is characterized by a hierarchical structure exerting huge influence over the position and behaviour of actors and over events. Whereas neo-­realists and liberal institutionalists posit that anarchy is the structural feature underlying the dynamics of international politics, Marxists consider that the principal structural feature moulding

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international politics is the dominant mode of production (the way in which goods and services are produced) and the relationships between the resultant economic classes. Capitalism has been the dominant mode of production since the middle of the nineteenth century, and today the global capitalist system provides the overarching structures for world politics. For Marxists the primary drivers of historical change in international politics are economic, and in particular the economic development of society. Marxists believe that each mode of production is beset by internal contradictions that will inevitably prompt its own collapse and this drives social change. Under capitalism, class conflict arises from the owners of the means of production exploiting wage earners. The deprivation resulting from this exploitation eventually becomes so severe that workers, in Marx’s famous phrase, ‘have nothing to lose but their chains’ and will rise up and requisition the productive assets. The lesson for Marxists is that, while capitalism predominates, conflict will be the prevailing norm in international affairs, conflicts whose origins are traceable to economic imperatives. Several Marxist writers argue that interstate wars stem from squabbles over access to resources and markets, while others suggest that some terrorist acts can be interpreted as desperate cries from groups disenfranchised or marginalized by global capitalism. Capitalist modes of production are typified by: private ownership of the resources needed to produce goods and services; resource allocations determined by the free interplay of individuals in the marketplace; and those who do not own the means of production selling their labour in exchange for wages, with profits accruing to resource owners. The ambition to make profits generates winners and losers, and this determines the place, posture and performance of actors in the international system. Actors are demarcated by their economic class, the main unit of Marxist analysis. Class is determined by the actor’s orientation to the mode of production. Under capitalism there are two classes, the bourgeoisie (who own the means of production) and the proletariat (who perform productive tasks), with the former systematically exploiting the latter in the quest for profit. Two of the most prominent Marxist interpretations of world politics, dependency theory and world systems theory, use these basic premises to illustrate why underdevelopment persists in many parts of the world. Dependency theorists posit that underdevelopment flows from a history of asymmetrical relationships grounded in colonialism and its vestiges in the post-­colonial world. Dependency theorists relate how, by forcibly occupying foreign territories, extracting raw materials and labour (sometimes

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through slavery) and using them as captive markets, developed states and the ­economic interests they represented drained the developing world of its wealth and power. Decolonization saw territorial occupation replaced by less obtrusive forms of domination. Elites in newly independent states were often those who had previously conspired with the colonists in the administration of subjugated countries. Instead of promoting the welfare of their citizens they now formed a domestic bourgeoisie conniving with their former colonial counterparts to exploit them. Rather than an expression of freedom, the state became an expression of dominant class interests designed to promote the conditions in which capitalism could thrive. World systems theories recount a similar tale of dominant colonial and later neo-­colonial exploitation. Building on ideas championed by Lenin and later structuralist theories offered by Raul Prebisch, world systems theories divide the world economy into two zones: the core (equating to the bourgeoisie) and the periphery (equating to the proletariat), each relating to the capitalist mode of production in a different way. More specifically they see a core composed of industrialized states and a periphery composed of developing states. Resources are expropriated from the peripheral countries and brought to the core countries, whose skilled labour and capital combine to manufacture them into more valuable goods. Most of these goods are sold in the core, but the remnants are exported for sale in the periphery. The world systems theorists hold that because the value of manufactured goods rises more rapidly than that of raw materials the periphery’s terms of trade progressively worsen. Capital accumulates in the core and leaves the periphery with insufficient capital to sustain its own development, placing it in thrall to the core. Evolving modes of production reconfigure social and political institutions in a manner reflecting underlying economic relationships, including in the international realm. IOs are instruments of the international bourgeoisie, whose central task is to further their interests by promoting policies that sustain the capitalist system and allow it to flourish and, by definition, perpetuate the exploitation of the proletariat. For example, Marxist writers excoriate IMF and IBRD as neo-­colonialists for making loans to developing countries conditional on reforms such as freeing trade, loosening capital controls and opening markets to foreign competition. This serves to expand capitalism by exposing their markets to competition from the core and reinforcing their subservient international position. Writers such as Prebisch believed IOs could be venues where political action could dismantle inequality through policies such as trade preferences, commodity agreements and overseas development assistance, but many were wary of the attendant dangers. A major obstacle is that the elites of the newly independent states

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attend IOs, where they are in league with the global bourgeoisie. Indeed IOs represent an opportunity for cementing ties between the ruling classes in the core and the periphery. Gramscian commentators advance a slightly different perspective. Writing in the early twentieth century, Antonio Gramsci sought to understand why it had proven impossible to ferment revolutions in advanced industrial societies. Partly he thought that talk of the inevitable demise of capitalism encourages passivity amongst the proletariat. If collapse is preordained, the proletariat can simply wait to inherit the Earth. He advocated a more subtle approach to politics. Marx had acknowledged the role of coercion, especially the coercion of the state, but Gramsci believed that this underplayed the importance of consent. Gramsci suggested that the dominant social group engineers a vision purporting to serve universal interests and recruits subordinate groups by making compromises with them. This pacifies and divides likely opposition to the dominant social group, whose ideas become hegemonic. For instance, the trade preferences and other concessions in which Prebisch placed his faith could be interpreted through the Gramscian lens as a sop from global capitalists to bind developing countries to a rules-­based international order that exploits them. For Gramscians, IOs reflect the dominant order from which the most powerful actors disproportionately benefit. Offering incentives for weaker states to join IOs can be an important way of generating consent for this order. Overall, most Marxist writers view IOs as part of a malign epicentre of global governance hawking policies that reinforce the prosperity of a ruling class while condemning the lion’s share of humanity to destitution, instability and insecurity.

1.8

The book ahead This book provides a comprehensive resource for studying and understanding international organizations and their interrelationships. The next three chapters guide the reader through the background to IOs, narrating the story of their rise and spread and giving practical insights into their common traits. Chapter 2 expounds upon the emergence and development of IOs from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to the dying embers of the Second World War. It examines the increasingly institutionalized international cooperation that accompanied the nascent state system and the failed attempts by states to build IOs capable of delivering peace and security that culminated in two world wars. The surge in the scope and significance of IOs from 1945 to the present is the subject of Chapter 3. Commencing with the progeny of wartime

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conferences, such as the UN, IMF and IBRD, the chapter ­hypothesizes about the reasons for the subsequent incursion of IOs into almost every corner of human activity. Chapter 4 summarizes the shared features of governance, management and secretariat activity that characterize IOs and the general external influences intruding on their operations. Thereafter the chapters contemplate groups of IOs with similar or complementary responsibilities. To assist in comparison and to develop a logical overarching framework, the chapters present the organizations in a standardized manner. For the more important IOs, the following headings are used to present the material, but for some of the smaller ones, while the material is presented in the same sequence, some headings have been amalgamated: zz Background sections chart the origin of the IO, its mandate, the means

through which it is pursued and how it has evolved.

zz Structure sections explore the internal governance of IOs, sketching the

roles, relative powers, decision-­making procedures and influence of key bodies, states and individuals, the functions of important units within the structure and the interaction with civil society actors (broadly conceived). In chapters where IOs have very similar or identical structures, for example the semi-­autonomous institutions of the UN (Chapter 6) and the EU (Chapter 12), structures are described once to avoid needless repetition. zz Current activities sections detail the contemporary work being undertaken by IOs in pursuit of their mandate. zz Evaluation and future challenges sections assess the extent to which IOs have achieved their stated objectives and outline the principal challenges confronting them as they seek to deliver their mandate in the future. Suggested reading lists, with short indications as to content, appear at the end of each chapter. Chapters 5 to 7 analyse what is arguably the hub of global governance, the UN System. Many readers will be familiar with the content of Chapter 5, which outlines the ideals to which the UN aspires and the record of the principal organs such as the Secretary-­General, General Assembly and Security Council in pursuing these ambitions. Chapters 6 and 7 scrutinize those UN semi-­autonomous and specialized agencies that together constitute the UN System. These agencies attract little publicity but indubitably make as ­significant a contribution to the UN mandate as their more illustrious peer. Chapter 8 investigates the multilateral development banks,

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starting with the World Bank Group, another institution closely linked to the UN, before going on to look at those which exist to service particular regions. Continuing with the economic theme, Chapters 9 and 10 address IOs involved in finance, trade and commerce. Chapter 9 assesses the IMF, the Bank for International Settlements and the European Central Bank in managing the global financial system. Chapter 10 considers global and regional trade organizations including WTO, commodity groupings such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, IOs protecting intellectual property and OECD’s mission to promote general economic well-­being. The text then turns to organizations whose avowed ends are political integration and security. Chapter 11 looks at the world’s foremost illustration of regional integration, the EU, and whether its intergovernmental bodies are sprouting supranational tendencies, while Chapter 12 chronicles the record of EU special and semi-­autonomous institutions. Political and security alliances, many of a regional nature including NATO, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Organization of American States, are the subject of Chapter 13. Chapters 14 to 16 deal with bodies that seldom, if ever, appear in the pages of an IO textbook. While they are concerned with rarefied technological and scientific matters, the public goods they yield make vital contributions to human well-­being. Since the 1960s, increased agricultural productivity consequent upon scientific cooperation at CGIAR has saved millions from starvation and malnutrition, and Chapter 14 sketches its work. Science and technology were fields in which some of the first IOs emerged, and Chapter 15 tackles the record of their modern equivalents such as the European Centre for Nuclear Research and WMO. Chapter 16 shows how bodies concerned with transport and communications, other areas with a lengthy pedigree of IOs, are helping to govern thorny problems in telecommunications, postal services and international transport. Finally, Chapter 17 summarizes the themes emanating from this study and surfs prevailing trends, deliberating on how IOs are evolving to meet the formidable challenges of the twenty-­first century. This chapter brings the reader full circle by suggesting, amongst other things, that IOs are going ‘back to the future’, with the prominence of private actors and the outright privatization of some IOs meaning they increasingly resemble their nineteenth-­century forebears.

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SUGGESTED READING

Archer, C. (2001), International Organizations, 3rd edn, Abingdon, UK: Routledge. [Excellent overview of the history, evolution, functions, classification and future of IOs] Baylis, J., S. Smith and P. Owens (eds) (2014), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 6th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Offers succinct primers on the main schools of international relations theory and contemporary global issues] Schechter, M.G. (2009), Historical Dictionary of International Organizations, 2nd edn, Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press. [A useful research resource with a bibliography, chronology, dictionary of IOs and short biographies of key players]

Internet resources Union of International Associations [The primary source of statistical data on IOs]: http:// www.uia.be

2 International organizations: an early history This chapter charts the history of international organizations (IOs) from their early nineteenth-­century origins through a period of growth and consolidation followed by an expansionary phase at the end of the Second World War. During this time the European state system started to mature, moving away from cooperation based on a tapestry of bilateral treaties towards a more institutionalized and multilateral approach to politics, as statesmen, diplomats and various private actors recognized the need for more sophisticated international governance structures. This chapter identifies IOs developing in three overlapping stages: the century from the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1815) to the commencement of the First World War (1914); the interregnum between the First and Second World Wars (1918–39); and the latter part of the Second World War when the Allied Powers began building a new international architecture. Starting with the creation of some technical organizations the overall period saw a steady growth in the numbers and functional coverage of IOs, with attention gradually turning to political and social activities, mirroring underlying changes in the European political environment. The experience gained from organizations formed during the nineteenth century paved the way for the structures and mandates of their successors. Although several of these primitive IOs vanished, many survive, albeit absorbed into other organizations or operating in different guises. Examination of their work shows that many contemporary preoccupations such as drug trafficking, cross-­border health issues, child labour and the impact of technology were equally of concern in the past.

2.1

Beginnings Concerted action to create multilateral mechanisms to foster cooperation first arose in the nineteenth century. This reflected the presence of four prerequisites for the development of IOs (Claude 1964: 17). First, given that states

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are the main constituents of IOs, the world had to be split into states functioning as sovereign political entities. Although the viewpoint is contested (Osiander 2001) many scholars trace the principle of sovereign statehood to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, after which, in Europe at least, modern nation states progressively displaced the characteristically medieval miasma of overlapping principalities and fiefdoms ( J. Anderson 1996). Second, these independent units needed sizeable interconnections. Advances in technology, communications and commerce propelled an unprecedented amplification of the intensity, extensiveness, velocity and impact of cross-­border migration, production, pollution, popular culture, trade and finance (Held et al. 1999). Economically speaking, by 1914 the world was almost as integrated as at the end of the twentieth century (Hirst et al. 2009). Interdependence gave rise to the third and fourth of Claude’s preconditions, namely cognizance amongst states of the frictions arising from their coexistence and an appreciation of the need for governance mechanisms. Uppermost in the minds of statesmen was mitigating frictions from security and economic interdependence. On the security front the end of the Napoleonic Wars, marking nearly two centuries of increasingly fierce bouts of European infighting, persuaded Europe’s Great Powers to search for international mechanisms to check violent remedies to international disputes and bring hostilities to a swift halt. Liberals were optimistic that the Industrial Revolution and the economic interdependence it sponsored were routes to peace. Industrialization and the innovations upon which it rested promised endlessly expanding wealth that could ameliorate social conflict. Tighter economic integration would raise the costs of warfare between states sharing significant economic interests. States recognized that realizing the full benefits of industrial expansion necessitated the development of harmonized rules and standards to govern and facilitate commerce, including rail and maritime transport, telegraphic and postal communications, intellectual property and units of measure. The starting points were two Congresses held by the victors in the Napoleonic Wars, the Congress of Vienna (1815) and the Congress of the Holy Alliance (1818), where for the first time the Great Powers sought multilaterally to plot the course of European politics. Their contribution enhanced the conditions allowing IOs to prosper, one aspect of which was the ‘Concert of Europe’. Founded by states that had united against Napoleon (France would join later), Europe’s Great Powers agreed to ‘concert’ against threats to international peace by maintaining a balance of power conducted through regular diplomacy and periodic conferences. Great Power meetings fizzled out, but the practice of state representatives meeting regularly took hold. Between

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1850 and 1914, 105 conferences were held under the broad aegis of the Concert system (Murphy 1994: 57–9), meaning instances of multilateral diplomacy became ‘a fact of life in the 19th century’ (Claude 1964: 21). As well as instigating a set of norms and rules for diplomatic dealings in security and military affairs, conferences held in the second half of the nineteenth century were often dedicated to fostering commerce and industry or strengthening societal bonds. The spasmodic nature of meetings and the absence of permanent organizational underpinnings meant the Concert system was not an IO in the strictest sense, but the Congress of Vienna can claim to have created the world’s oldest IO, the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine (although it had no secretariat until 1920). However, some conferences provided the intellectual starting points for embryonic IOs in the form of public international unions (PIUs). These efforts were piloted as much by individuals and private interest groups as by states. Indeed states were sometimes lukewarm supporters of PIUs, especially if their interests were threatened. Equally some PIUs developed to sideline state encroachment into private affairs. Concomitantly, many budding IOs such as the International Red Cross were hybrids (see Case Study 2.1), with membership combining states, private and professional associations and even individuals. Many were funded without direct government subvention and had secretariats provided exclusively by a host state. PIUs mostly focused on issues impacting on or handicapping the growth of economic interdependence. Prominent examples include the International Telegraph (later Telecommunication) Union in 1865, the International Meteorological Organization in 1873 (now the World Meteorological Organization) and the Universal Postal Union (UPU), founded initially as the General Postal Union in 1874. The International Bureau of Weights and Measures was started in 1875 to provide an international forum to agree on and maintain the standards to be used for the metric measurement system. In international trade and commerce three PIUs came into being and, like the technical organizations, have survived to the present. The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (the precursor of patent rights) entered into force in 1884, while the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (copyright) followed two years later. The administrative bureaux established by these conventions were merged in 1893 and became the United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property, whose functions were grandfathered into what is now the World Intellectual Property Organization. In 1890, the International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs was set up to provide information to facilitate inter-­country trade.

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CASE STUDY 2.1

The Red Cross – the origin and development of a hybrid international organization As with many early IOs, individuals were the catalyst for creating the Red Cross. Disturbed by the treatment of prisoners at the Battle of Solferino (1859), Henri Dunant, a Swiss national, distributed an account of his experiences to leading politicians, aristocrats and philanthropists. Their response inspired the foundation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1863 to protect the lives and dignity of the victims of war and to negotiate between warring parties, and Dunant’s role was ultimately recognized by the award of the 1901 Nobel Peace Prize. ICRC’s fundamental operating principles are humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, unity, universality and voluntary service, but its controlling legal authority is the Geneva Conventions. The Conventions obligate states to: ensure humane standards of treatment for non-­combatants and enemy wounded, facilitate the repatriation of prisoners of war, notify ICRC and allow it access to political prisoners. Many states initially resisted efforts to insert humanitarian concerns into the norms of warfare, believing it placed undue limits on their sovereignty. Nonetheless, the persuasive influence of individuals on ICRC played a pivotal role in obtaining states’ agreement to adopt the 1864 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field. This mixture of public and private actors persisted as the organization evolved. The Red Cross (now called the Red Cross and Red Crescent) is shorthand for three interlocking elements, collectively known as the Red Cross Movement, each with its own legal identity, which between them involve individuals, states and NGOs. The core and oldest component of the Movement is ICRC, initially consisting of five individuals including Dunant, which oversees the Conventions and negotiates between warring states. It is a Swiss organization with a self-­perpetuating managing committee of up to 24 private individuals (the Assembly), all of whom must be Swiss nationals. However, in view of its global activities and membership, 20 honorary members from other countries are now appointed to the Assembly. Initially Assembly members included Swiss government officials, which enhanced its ability to deal directly with states, but this practice ceased after the Second World War. ICRC is a primary authority on the application of international humanitarian law, and it monitors compliance with the Conventions subscribed to by member states. During the First World War the National Societies (see below) provided medical assistance to troops, but the need for a neutral body was also apparent, and ICRC developed its own field operations. ICRC interfaces with governments to ameliorate conditions for the victims of war, but its discussions with member states in conflict situations are kept completely confidential. After the Second World War it was strongly criticized for not taking a firmer and more public stance over the Nazi concentration camps, about which it had known. In mitigation ICRC believed that its policy of confidentiality and its consequent

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CASE STUDY 2.1 (continued)

ability to develop effective relationships were more important for its overall objectives than if it had condemned the camps publicly. ICRC’s work has been recognized by the award of three Nobel Peace Prizes, in 1917, 1944 and 1963. Agreement to create the second component, the National Societies, was secured at the 1864 meeting when the Geneva Convention was adopted. National Societies are NGOs which provide emergency medical support, operate ambulance services, run clinics and espouse national health policies and public fund-­raising (although they also receive governmental support). The National Societies were made interlocutors between governments and the Assembly, particularly to ensure that states were willing cooperants. In 1919 the Red Cross’s role was extended to deal with internal violence and disaster relief; thus the third component, the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), was created. IFRC, an INGO whose members are the 187 National Societies, delivers international humanitarian assistance. In responding to humanitarian crises IFRC takes the lead role, and the National Societies work with it, providing emergency supplies, specialized personnel and field workers to support relief efforts. The three component parts and representatives of the 194 governments that have ratified the 1949 Geneva Convention convene in the quadrennial meeting of the Movement known as the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, which is the forum for discussing policy and for making changes to the Conventions. Governments and other institutions participate directly and cooperatively in the Movement’s work, and it gets the majority of its funding from the public purse.

Socially and politically oriented institutions materialized around the turn of the twentieth century. In 1889 the Inter-­Parliamentary Union was launched as a meeting place for individual parliamentarians but later became a forum for official delegations from national parliaments. Concurrently the first regional organization was established, the International Bureau for the American Republics (1890), the precursor to the Organization of American States. Originally set up to foster trade, it soon became the Pan-­American Bureau, a political body which in its turn formed the Pan-­ American Health Organization. The threat of infectious diseases spreading across borders helped spur the formation of the International Health Office in 1907 to collect data and provide early warnings against health epidemics. In 1909, David Lubin, a US national, concerned that agricultural producers were disadvantaged by a dearth of world market price information, founded the International Institute of Agriculture in Italy, an organization that would become the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The Institute primarily collected and disseminated global agricultural statistics, and in 1929 it organized the ground-­breaking World Census of

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Agriculture. However, it also sponsored other important activities, including the first International Convention on Locust Control, an International Wheat Agreement to prevent overproduction and stabilize prices, and the first International Convention on Plant Protection. While some PIUs matured into fully fledged IOs, many fell by the wayside. Approximately one-­third failed to survive the First World War. Others ceased to be of direct interest to governments and morphed into INGOs or professional associations (e.g. the International Institute of Administrative Sciences, and the Permanent International Association of Road Congresses, now renamed the World Road Association). Some, like the International Court of Prize, whose treaty was never ratified by enough states, were stillborn. A further group was absorbed into new or existing IOs (e.g. the Universal Radio-­Telegraphic Union into ITU and the International Poplar Commission into FAO). Finally the International Sugar Union was disbanded in 1920 only to resurface seven decades later as the International Sugar Organization. The final notable development at the turn of the twentieth century was the ‘Hague System’ of meetings. Following Tsar Nicholas of Russia’s call for a conference on disarmament, two International Peace Conferences were held in The Hague in 1899 and 1907. From an IO perspective, their novelty lay in the decisions to invite non-­European powers to discuss international relations (44 states participated in the 1907 conference compared with 26 mainly European powers in 1899). Before being immolated in the flames of the First World War, the Hague meetings stumbled upon a core problem of international security organizations, namely how to evolve mechanisms to govern collective challenges without violating state sovereignty. Nonetheless, it also demonstrated states’ growing willingness to resort to formal procedures to arbitrate international disputes and, through the establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, moved further towards their institutionalization. Under the Concert system the institutionalization of world politics advanced significantly, culminating in the second part of the nineteenth century with PIUs being the chrysalis from which modern IOs would evolve. Some features of contemporary IOs were already present, including permanent staff and rudimentary versions of decision-­making instruments such as councils or governing bodies with restricted memberships. Some vital lessons, such as recognition of the special status of Great Powers, were learnt and would inform the development of post-­war IOs. Equally the results were far from the finished article; state interests were not always paramount and, coupled

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with habitually slack governance structures, there was an absence of independent secretariats and formal foundations in international law. By the outbreak of the First World War there were 49 IOs/PIUs, and the average number of memberships per state vaulted from 3.1 in 1879 to 16.7 in 1914 (Rittberger and Zangl 2006: 55). Although their memberships were dominated by a handful of states, colonialism meant their impact was wider. The UK, the putative hegemon, played a more ambivalent role in these developments than liberal institutionalist or realist theories would predict. The UK’s readiness to play the role of equilibrator helped to sustain a peaceful balance of power, but its support for IOs was less wholehearted. IOs were an encumbrance on its use of power and sometimes, as with international economic governance, clashed with its preference for regulation by dominant (often British) corporations. For liberals, early IO development reflects rational responses by states to interdependence. While they made only modest headway in the domains of ‘high politics’ where fundamental national interests were at stake, they made significant inroads in areas of ‘low politics’, generating common rules, norms and principles for mundane, if important, matters. Virtually all PIUs were clearing houses for information that first allowed states to identify the benefits of, and to generate the transparency needed to police, cooperative agreements. Alongside the Concert these arrangements possibly prevented trivial squabbles spilling over into more dangerous confrontations. Indeed, for constructivists, the salient role of early IOs was laying the foundations for a liberal world order, influencing agendas by uncovering previously unrecognized interests, providing ­intellectual leadership for the creation of new organizations and teaching states about the roles they ought to play in regulating and fulfilling the basic needs of their societies.

2.2

The interwar years The interwar epoch witnessed a quantitative and qualitative expansion of IOs. Quantitatively, Wallace and Singer (1970: 251–2) report a net increase of 44 IOs between 1918 and 1939, an upsurge matched by the growth in the average membership of these IOs and the average number of IOs to which states belonged. Qualitatively, the form and function of IOs were strengthening, moving away from loose confederations dealing with specific economic and technical matters towards fresh organizations with broader remits. The inspiration for this was the liberal construal of Europe’s recent history by those in the vanguard of building a peaceful international order at the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference following the end of the First World War. To

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realists the stifling of conflagrations amongst the Great Powers in the nineteenth century and the outbreak of the war were explained by the underlying distribution of power in the international system. The war vindicated their belief that the Concert of Europe and IOs were irrelevant to attaining peace and cooperation because they could not alter the distribution of power and states would not surrender autonomy over security matters. Contrastingly liberals, whose ideas were in the ascendant amongst the triumphant powers, believed the World War might have been avoided had there existed a more sophisticated and elaborate international architecture enabling states to take a more enlightened view of their interests. In addition to scribing a peace treaty, the Peace Conference sought to fashion a pristine international architecture including IOs to champion and nurture the basic liberal values needed to ensure that the ‘war to end all wars’ would be just that. Three organizations in particular surfaced to deal with issues seen as critical to the establishment of post-­war peace and social justice: the League of Nations (the League), the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The League and ILO were the institutions from which the concept of an international civil service, independent of any national influence, has developed and were the historical antecedents for the structure of present IOs.

2.2.1 The League of Nations The League was established by Articles 1 to 26 of the Treaty of Versailles. Unlike the Concert of Europe, the League had more appurtenances of an IO, including an international secretariat under the leadership of its first Secretary-­General (SG), Sir Eric Drummond (Box 2.1). Although he was always clear that the most senior positions would be filled by political appointees, reflecting the positions of the Great Powers, Drummond laid the platform for an independent international civil service. In that respect, the activities of his most senior officers and their immediate staff more closely foreshadowed the Commission of the European Union than the UN. The League’s governing body, the Assembly of member states, met annually in Geneva, coequal with which was a permanent Council. Anticipating the UN Security Council (SC) the League’s Council had both permanent and rotating members. The permanent members were the Great Powers: France, Italy, Japan, the UK and later Germany and the Soviet Union (USSR), while the rotating members were elected by the Assembly. Illustrating the importance of sovereignty, both the Assembly and the Council required unanimous decisions. The League’s structure was developed to operate in politico-­legal and socioeconomic spheres. On the political side were four commissions, on military affairs, disarmament, the treatment of minorities,

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BOX 2.1

SIR ERIC DRUMMOND – SECRETARY-­GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1919–33) The SG’s position was seen as an administrative rather than a political appointment. Thus the search for candidates focused on the ranks of European civil servants. Eric Drummond entered the British Foreign Office in 1900 and followed a high-­profile career, becoming private secretary to two foreign ministers and a prime minister. He participated in discussions on the formation of a post-­war organization to maintain peace and was instrumental in drafting several key documents for the Versailles Peace Conference. His balanced opinions, administrative ability and drafting skills made him an acceptable candidate to the founding governments. Drummond was not an interventionist (for example, he never once addressed the League’s Assembly), believing that his role should be that of facilitator rather than policy maker, and while he took political

positions these were usually in behind-­the-­ scenes discussions (Barros 1979). In public he and his senior staff acted as conduits to their respective governments, ensuring that all relevant aspects of a situation were considered. His importance lies in the fact that he saw the League’s staff as a neutral but fully representative secretariat whose loyalties lay not to their governments but to the organization, a philosophy carried forward into modern IOs. Drummond is therefore rightly seen as the founder of the international civil service. The structure of the Secretariat was his concept, and his personal example resulted in a Secretariat with a distinctive style and shared commitment for the League which survived its collapse. In this effort he was strongly supported by his French deputy, Jean Monnet, later a formative figure in the creation of the European Common Market (see Box 3.3).

and mandates. Mandates were the mechanism through which the League administered and prepared for independence those colonial territories expropriated from states defeated in the First World War that, at the time, were not capable of self-­government. On the socioeconomic side committees on drug trafficking, traffic in women, slavery, child protection and intellectual cooperation were supplemented by three embryonic organizations concerned with health, finance and economics, and communications and transport. The League was intended to preserve the peace, settle international disputes by tribunal and promote disarmament. Ultimately it collapsed under the weight of these endeavours but not before it had notched up some notable, if less celebrated, successes and had established many of the features that characterize contemporary international security governance. The term was never invoked, but the League was the forerunner of collective security, the idea that all members share an interest in global peace and security and so it is

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in their collective interest to confront aggressors, with a declaration of war on one member being tantamount to a declaration of war on them all. In the security field the League successfully resolved disputes between Sweden and Finland over the Åland Islands, between Poland and Germany over Upper Silesia, between Albania, Greece and Yugoslavia over their common frontier, and between the competing claims of France, Germany and Belgium over the Ruhr. The League’s intervention also prevented a war between Colombia and Peru over contested territory in the Upper Amazon basin. The ‘mandates’ which were maintained during the Second World War and transferred to the UN, which eventually oversaw their cessation, were also a lasting success. For 15 years the League administered the disputed Saar Territory and the Free City of Danzig, and in 1934 it launched the first international peacekeeping operation when it established an international force to oversee the Saar plebiscite, a referendum to determine whether the territory would opt to become German or French. Regrettably these triumphs were overshadowed by half-­hearted or non-­existent remedies elsewhere that seriously undermined the League’s authority. Within two years of the League’s creation, Greece, in complete disregard of the principles it had accepted under the Covenant of the League, attacked Turkey. Then, the following year, French and Belgian troops were sent into the Ruhr, and the Rhine republic was declared. These early events exposed weaknesses in the Covenant, particularly the League’s ability to respond effectively, which were not subsequently addressed, thereby creating an environment that was eventually to be exploited by three permanent members ( Japan, Germany and Italy), ultimately leading to the League’s collapse. Elsewhere the League found a more receptive audience. Together, the First World War, the disintegration of the Austro-­Hungarian and Ottoman empires and the Russian civil war had displaced millions of people, many of whom were unwilling or unable to repatriate. With their hopes of asylum dashed by the legal and administrative barriers erected by states since the end of the nineteenth century, Europe confronted a bleak humanitarian crisis. The League reacted by creating an IO in 1921, the High Commission for Refugees (HCR), headed by Fridtjof Nansen, the Arctic explorer, statesman and scientist. Nansen utilized his standing amongst leading statesmen to expand and entrench an IO designed originally as a temporary office to alleviate the exodus prompted by the Russian civil war. By the end of the 1920s, HCR had assisted refugee populations in Greece, Armenia, the Saar and Czechoslovakia and elaborated mechanisms to assist refugees, including ‘Nansen passports’ which allowed the stateless to travel internationally. HCR was made permanent in 1931 and rechristened the International Nansen

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Office for Refugees. This office of the League was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1938, worked throughout the Second World War and was eventually merged into the United Nations International Refugee Organization in 1946. The day-­to-­day work of the League presaged the UN System. Agreements regarding narcotic drugs restricted opium trafficking; in particular, a Convention in 1931 limited narcotics’ manufacture to quantities sufficient for medicinal purposes and allowed the League to prohibit their export to countries that could not account for their use. It held technical conferences dealing with reducing trade restrictions, controlling armaments, international maritime navigation, health, passports and the preservation of historic monuments, and it published a Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, a feature carried forward by the UN. Initially the League’s founders did not foresee much socioeconomic activity; however, by 1939, economic, social and humanitarian causes swallowed three-­fifths of its budget (Armstrong et al. 2004: 31), and a new organization to take responsibility for work in these fields was under active consideration (the Central Committee for Social and Economic Questions). Despite the limits imposed by the Great Depression (Box 2.2) the League supervised several successful initiatives. In health it subsumed the operations of the International Health Office and, financed by the Rockefeller Foundation, coordinated campaigns to fight several epidemics. Another health-­related initiative was the Office International des Epizooties (now the World Organization for Animal Health), which from 1924 monitored and controlled the spread of animal diseases. The League’s International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (1922) was a forum of 12 distinguished experts (including Einstein and Marie Curie) intended to discuss educational policy and advance the employment conditions of intellectual workers in a manner similar to ILO’s efforts for industrial workers. However, its activities were hampered by niggardly funding, and its work was transferred to a new, French-­backed organization, the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation. On the economic front, the League pioneered international support to national economies in trouble, providing loan facilities for post-­war reconstruction in Austria and Hungary and giving assistance to countries facing famine. The Austrian financial rescue package involved advances totalling £40m in the period 1919–21 to support the basic food needs of the population and a line of financial credits in 1922 amounting to $120m which stabilized the economy by 1925. Once post-­war currency fluctuations diminished, the League turned its attention to trade and secured a tariff freeze. However,

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BOX 2.2

THE GREAT DEPRESSION The Great Depression refers to the economic tribulations which engulfed the industrialized world in the 1930s. Financial systems imploded, and employment, industrial output, commodity prices and trade collapsed as states became locked in a deflationary spiral. In the US, for example, by 1932 industrial production hovered at just over half its 1929 level, one-­quarter of the workforce was unemployed and over 5000 banks had failed. Elsewhere in North America, Europe and Latin America the story was similar. In some places economic frustration prompted civil unrest and political revolution as citizens sought succour in the arms of egregious nationalists. The causes of the Great Depression are disputed. Some place the blame on the inherent instabilities of capitalism and particularly financial markets, in sponsoring an unsustainable boom which culminated in the 1929 US stock market crash. Others view governments as the main culprit, acting as willing accomplices to the US stock market boom and bungling their responses to the crash, thereby transforming a normal recession into a full-­blown depression. Governments were

charged with turning their backs on international economic cooperation just when it was most needed, resorting instead to raising trade barriers and devaluing ­currencies to promote economic competitiveness at their neighbours’ expense. This was a futile exercise, as other countries retaliated by devaluing their own currencies and increasing their own trade barriers, thereby exacerbating the deflationary spiral. With states retreating into economic nationalism, efforts by the League to kick-­ start the international economy through cooperative ventures gained minimal traction. The decision to return to the pre-­war gold standard without taking into account the economic damage wrought by the conflict and the reluctance of the USA to show the leadership necessary to avert economic calamity doomed the League’s endeavours. Nevertheless, two important lessons were learnt that would inform the post-­war economic IOs: unfettered capitalism needed to be sacrificed in the name of socioeconomic and political stability, and a durable international economic order was only possible with enlightened leadership.

when the Great Depression took hold, tariff barriers mushroomed as countries looked to their self-­interest. The League’s Economic Intelligence Service studied European and North American business cycles and the reasons for the Great Depression, but attempts to commence economic cooperation through a World Economic Conference failed in 1933 when delegates were unable to reach agreement on their monetary systems. Despite this, there were some economic successes during the period, including: the conclusion of the international wheat agreement; the development of a blueprint for double taxation agreements (which underpinned 200 bilateral agreements); commodity group meetings on sugar and quinine; and conventions concern-

International organizations: an early history 

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ing international trade, the use of ports and railways, and the simplification of customs procedures. Presaging the operative work of later IOs, in 1929 the League initiated development assistance through a programme designed to help China’s economic and social development. In 1935 Australia’s Prime Minister, Stanley Bruce, assisted by his economic adviser Frank McDougall, proposed that the League should assess global nutritional and health needs. In this they were closely supported by Sir John Boyd Orr, an eminent British nutritionist (see Case Study 4.1). The League, at Bruce’s suggestion, set up a commission of prominent agriculturalists, health specialists and economists. Its work was halted by the onset of war, but in 1937 a ground-­breaking League report for the first time connected food, nutrition and health and produced tables of minimum dietary needs. That the League failed is widely accepted, but the reasons for its failure remain contested. Broadly, however, in the words of the British historian Sir Lewis Napier, ‘the impartial were not interested and the interested were not impartial’. The proximate reason was the damage caused to its authority by frail responses to a series of international events, including Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931, Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia (now Ethiopia) in 1935 and Germany’s occupation of Austria and the Sudetenland on the eve of the Second World War. The seeds of these failures were sown in the Covenant, which established procedures for dealing with international disputes that in turn reflected imperfections in its progenitor, the international system of states. The Covenant stated that member states ‘agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by arbitrators or the report by the Council’. In other words, disregard of the decisions of the League was effectively condoned, and a country could ‘legally’ start a war after it had engaged in arbitration. Worries that the League would impinge upon state sovereignty prevented a more robust Covenant emerging and robbed it of the universality and coercive power which would have augmented its effectiveness. Despite President Woodrow Wilson being one of its main architects, the US declined to ratify the Covenant. This proved a serious setback from the start, as US isolationism stifled its readiness to rally to the aid of others. Likewise, although there were 53 members by 1923, larger powers including Germany and Italy withdrew and the USSR was expelled in the 1930s. Furthermore, the League was erected on the artificial balance of power existing at Versailles, when Germany and Russia negotiated from a weak position. Few gave consideration to what would happen when they recovered, but eventually, disliking much of what the Versailles agreement entailed, they rejected the related institutions.

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2.2.2 The International Labour Organization In 1818, Robert Owen, the British labour activist and founder of the cooperative movement, attended the Congress of the Holy Alliance to request international protection for workers. Owen’s appeal was ignored, but Daniel Legrand, a French industrialist, subsequently adopted his cause, and their petition led indirectly to ILO’s creation. ILO was also established through the Treaty of Versailles (Articles 387 to 399) to deal with the possibility of social unrest at the end of the First World War. The spectre of unemployment as millions of soldiers reintegrated into civilian life dovetailed with the desire to develop a common, more modern, concept of workers’ rights in recognition of the substantial role that industrial workers had played in supporting the war effort. There was also recognition that many workers around the world were exploited and worked in unhealthy and dangerous conditions. This attention of the state to the situation of the common man was a novel concept and reflects how states’ roles and attitudes were changing in response to the extension of the electoral franchise. The organization’s emphasis on workers’ rights resulted in it possessing a tripartite structure, with representation from governments, employers and workers. ILO was independent from the League in mind but not in body, as the League’s governing mechanism set its budget. Its first Director was the Frenchman Albert Thomas, who became Drummond’s partner in shaping the character and management style of the international civil service (Box  2.3). ILO had a more comprehensive membership than the League; from the start Germany was a member, and some countries such as Brazil remained in ILO even when they left the League. The US joined following the Great Depression and the consequential increase in US unemployment. Before the Second World War, ILO members agreed on several important international conventions. The inaugural ILO Conference approved conventions on hours of work (setting the now almost universally accepted concept of a 48-­hour week), maternity protection, night-­work for women, unemployment, and the minimum age of employment. In 1925 minimum social security provisions were adopted, and in 1930 a convention prohibited forced or compulsory labour. Less successful were its efforts to abolish child labour and to regulate employment conditions in agriculture. The war years, in fact, produced some further progress with agreement on a minimum age for agricultural workers and on freedom of association for workers.

International organizations: an early history 

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BOX 2.3

ALBERT THOMAS – ILO DIRECTOR (1919–32) Albert Thomas was a public relations professional by training and a socialist by conviction, who had turned to politics and risen to be Minister of Munitions in the French wartime government. He and Drummond worked together closely, but they were in many respects opposites. Far from being the self-­effacing civil servant, Thomas had a larger-­than-­life personality, and his enthusiasm for ILO’s cause resulted in a more interventionist institution than its founders had conceived. His introduction of the French cabinet system of centralized management combined with Drummond’s concept of an independent international civil service shaped the structure and nature of future international secretariats. A political activist with a deep interest in social questions, Thomas believed his

position required him to be at the centre of decision making. He spread ILO’s message through personal visits to governments, the issuance of ILO publications in several languages, and fashioning ILO offices in several capitals. He developed the concept of a world labour code, which resulted in 16 ILO conventions and 18 recommendations in less than two years. This activism eventually resulted in a backlash from more cautious states which reduced ILO’s budget and decelerated its work. Thomas responded by setting up a supervisory body of independent specialists to monitor implementation of ILO standards that reported annually to the ILO Conference. The result was that ILO standards became widely accepted as states started legislating for conventions that were already in force.

2.2.3 The Bank for International Settlements After the First World War some countries wishing to stabilize their currencies against the existing gold standard had insufficient gold stocks. Consequently they devised a gold exchange standard under which a limited gold supply was used to back currencies. Close cooperation was required, and for this purpose BIS was created in 1930. Apart from its core task of promoting cooperation and coordination between central banks BIS also managed German First World War reparations. It originally had only seven member countries, and like other, older, IOs its early history set the tone for some of its present procedures. The most visible of these was that, uniquely, its accounts were for many years expressed in Swiss gold francs. BIS was established and capitalized as a private company, but its shares were originally offered exclusively to central banks. However, the central banks of the US, France and Belgium did not subscribe to their full allotted capital, and their remaining shares were taken up by private banks. While these shares carried equal financial rights the private shareholders could not vote or attend BIS meetings.

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2.2.4 Other international organizations The League tried to exercise some degree of coordination and control over technical IOs, such as UPU, that had survived the First World War, but this initiative came to naught. Several of these IOs were located in Switzerland, with the Swiss government providing staff, who exercised considerable control over their activities; the Swiss government was therefore very reluctant to lose any influence. Alongside the rise of overtly political organizations, a further flurry of technical bodies materialized. The International Bureau for Education (IBE), originally an INGO, was opened to government membership in 1929 with the objective of stimulating research in education. IBE was involved with the development of, and was eventually integrated into, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO, see section 2.3). Coinciding with the year of the first commercial flight, an International Air Convention was signed at the Versailles Peace Conference dealing with the technical, operational and organizational aspects of civil aviation and establishing an International Commission for Air Navigation (ICAN), which operated from 1922. ICAN was primarily concerned with resolving the legal issues in cross-­border air navigation and technical standards for commercial aircraft. Simultaneously, the International Air Traffic Association (IATA) was created to coordinate commercial requirements (such as documentation) and standards. IATA was originally an association of European airlines, but in 1939 Pan American Airlines joined, giving it a more global perspective. Together IATA and ICAN developed the Warsaw Convention of 1929, which established airline liabilities for death, passenger injury and cargo loss. Another contemporaneous intergovernmental organization was the International Criminal Police Commission, precursor of the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol). It was founded in Vienna in 1923 as an international criminal record office and to harmonize extradition procedures. The USA founded a rival organization, the International Police Conference; however, because the majority of international crime was in Europe it was the European institution that flourished. In 1942, the Nazi government effectively colonized the organization, and it ceased to exist as an international entity until re-­established in 1946. Figure 2.1 shows the main IOs operating in 1935 and their, albeit few, interrelationships. Between 1860 and the start of the Second World War systematic international cooperation had become a reality on the political, social, scientific and technical fronts. The repercussions of the First World War bloodbath offered a seemingly fertile soil in which further seeds of ­international

ICRC

WMO

BIPM ICAN

IATA

International Nansen Office

International Institute of Agriculture

ITU

UPU

TECHNICAL and SOCIAL

IBE

OIE

BIRPI IPU

FINANCE

BIS

ILO

Pan American Sanitary Bureau

Figure 2.1  International organizations: their scope and responsibilities (1935)

H U M A N I T A R I A N

S C I E N T I F I C

1935

League of Nations

OAS

Global

Trans-regional

S E C U R I T Y

Regional

Direct relationship

International Criminal Police Commission

Indirect relationship

Commonwealth

POLITICAL

56  · 

International organizations

o­ rganization could germinate. The ‘high’ politics of war and security became staple topics of discussion in a formally codified IO, the League of Nations. While the League’s political accomplishments were unsatisfactory, related social and technical institutions achieved modest but real results. The number of issues covered by IOs continued to multiply, demonstrating that, despite the period’s economic upheavals, interdependence remained a reality. IOs also accumulated more of the panoply associated with contemporary IOs, with the emerging concept of an independent international civil service (see Box 4.2) and state representatives increasingly supplanting private individuals. Ultimately the League was overwhelmed by economic disorder and the descent into a second global conflagration. For some (Kindleberger 1973) this reflected the absence of a hegemon. For others, the Second World War marked the reassertion of the pitiless truths of global politics. Nevertheless, the interwar period was an important staging post in IO development. Despite its political ineffectiveness the League’s structure and conceptual foundations would be replicated to a considerable degree in the post-­war international architecture.

2.3

The Second World War The Second World War halted the rise and spread of IOs, with many ceasing operations, some permanently. Nevertheless, the unparalleled devastation of the war, shockingly emphasized by the atomic bombs detonated at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, injected fresh urgency into the search for mechanisms to mitigate and manage international conflict. During the war a series of Allied meetings took place. Their primary purpose was to further the conduct of the conflict, but they were also the furnaces in which the post-­war IOs were forged. China, European governments in exile, the USSR, the UK plus its Dominion partners and the US cooperated closely to develop the concepts that would form a foundation for future action. Discussions culminated in tripartite meetings between British Prime Minister Churchill, US President Roosevelt and USSR General Secretary Stalin in Tehran (1943) and Yalta (1945). The outcomes of these meetings converged with the continuing work undertaken by relocated League and ILO staff in North America. The result was five separate, yet interlocked, strands of action that led to the creation of the UN and its specialized agencies (SAs). First, the concept of a United Nations organization as a forum for the settlement of international political disputes and the maintenance of peace was discussed and nurtured. In 1941, prior to US involvement in the war, Churchill and Roosevelt met and signed the Atlantic Charter. The Charter proposed a set of principles for international collaboration in maintaining peace and security

International organizations: an early history 

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at the end of the war (Box 2.4). In 1942, the Allied nations met in Washington, DC to adopt the Charter and to sign a Declaration by the United Nations (an expression limited at that time to the Allied Powers actively engaged in the war). The preliminary structure of a new organization was agreed by China, the UK, the USA and the USSR at the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks Conference, also held in Washington, DC. At this point the League’s staff was co-­opted into drafting a charter for the new organization and, in 1945, at San Francisco, delegates from 50 nations met to adopt the Charter of the United Nations. The consequence of involving the League’s staff was that (as will be seen in Chapter 5), with the exception of SC and the Economic and Social Council, the UN largely mimics the League’s structure, although its powers are better defined. BOX 2.4

THE ATLANTIC CHARTER The operative clauses of the Atlantic Charter subscribed the USA and the UK to the following principles: First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other; Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned; Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them; Fourth, they will endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity; Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labour standards, economic advancement and social security;

Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want; Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance; Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-­loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments. Source: US Department of State Executive Agreement Series.

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International organizations

The second initiative commenced in 1942 as a consequence of the USA being drawn into the conflict. Henry Morgenthau, US Treasury Secretary, initiated a series of studies on post-­war international financial policy under Harry Dexter White’s leadership. Morgenthau envisaged an international agreement to eliminate competitive devaluations and monitor exchange controls as well as establishing a Bank for Reconstruction of the ‘United and Associated Nations’. White’s plan was for a liberal multilateral order which afforded states sufficient autonomy to attune their policies to the needs of their domestic constituents, what Ruggie (1982) has termed a system of ‘embedded liberalism’. He proposed an International Stabilization Fund to deal with the extremes of the economic cycle. Separately, similar work was being undertaken at the UK Treasury, led by the economist John Maynard Keynes. The two Treasuries exchanged ideas and cooperated to bring a new financial structure into being, but the US was the dominant influence and the resulting institutions bore its hallmarks. An Allied conference to discuss the proposed new international financial structure was convened in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944. Despite initial misgivings, the Bretton Woods Monetary and Financial Conference was a success, and from it there emerged international agreement to set up the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or World Bank) and an International Trade Organization. US hegemonic influence meant that, while IMF and IBRD are both UN SAs, they have a very different governance system from other UN institutions (see Chapters 8 and 9). The IMF’s principal responsibilities were to administer a code of conduct governing exchange rate policies, to provide short-­term financial resources for countries with currency imbalances and to discuss international monetary matters. The World Bank was initially set up to fund development projects with a relatively small capital subscription and was to depend on private investors for much of its resources. Since the only post-­war capital market with adequate liquidity was the US, IBRD was headed by Eugene Meyer, a US national. The International Trade Organization was stillborn, as its Charter was not ratified by enough countries, principal amongst them the US. However, under UN auspices, a periodic conference to negotiate multilateral trade agreements, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, filled some of the gap. Eventually, in 1994, the idea conceived at Bretton Woods was realized with the creation of the World Trade Organization (Chapter 10, section 10.2). Third, the ILO and League staff continued to function technically, albeit at a low level of activity. Whereas the League went into hibernation, ILO

International organizations: an early history 

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remained active, holding several regional meetings in Latin America and an extraordinary General Conference in Washington in 1941. Travel restrictions and wartime priorities meant a hiatus in ILO conferences after 1941, although it held a session of the Governing Body in London to prepare for the Philadelphia Conference of 1944 (see Chapter 7, section 7.2.1). In Philadelphia ILO members adopted the Declaration of Philadelphia, an annexe to the ILO Constitution aimed at rejuvenating the institution. The fourth set of activities resulted in the creation of three other IOs, which together with ILO, IBRD and IMF were to form the nucleus of the UN SAs. Frank McDougall, while in Washington for discussions on a new international wheat agreement (see Chapter 10, section 10.13), persuaded Roosevelt that food should be the first socioeconomic problem to be tackled by the UN. Roosevelt convened a United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture in Hot Springs, Virginia, which set up an interim commission headed by Lester Pearson, then Canadian ambassador to the US. The commission prepared a constitution for the new organization (FAO), proposed folding the International Institute of Agriculture into it, and defined an initial programme of work. Prior to the war, regulation of air traffic and airmails was the subject of a series of international conferences. The 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation continued this work and reached agreement on common standards for air navigation and rules governing the economics of air transport (Chapter 16). The convention created the International Civil Aviation Organization, which became a UN SA in 1947. Across the Atlantic, following on from the 1942 London Conference of European Allied Ministers of Education, the French and UK governments jointly proposed the creation of UNESCO. UNESCO, whose constitution was adopted at a 1945 London conference, was to continue the work of the League’s International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation but also had a broad remit over and above its principal subjects. Finally, the Allies had to deal with the resettlement of European refugees. For this purpose, in 1943 they launched the last IO to emerge during the Second World War, the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). An agency with immediate and narrowly focused objectives, UNRRA was funded from 1945 to 1947, and during that time it repatriated millions of refugees and managed hundreds of refugee camps in Austria, Germany and Italy. On its demise there were still 650 000 European refugees, so an International Refugee Organization continued its work, which in 1951 eventually became the UN High Commission for Refugees (Chapter 6, section 6.2).

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The UN Charter was signed on 26 June 1945 and ratified on 24 October 1945, two months after the war’s end. The most ambitious IO project yet, the UN was the first genuinely global IO, albeit that many people still lived under colonial oppressors. Moreover, the organization’s scope was unparalleled. In addition to an explicit focus on security and military affairs the UN’s tentacles poked into almost every facet of economic, social and humanitarian life. In January 1946, the first UN General Assembly met in the Central Methodist Hall, London, and the SC met in Church House nearby. Rules of procedure were adopted; ILO, FAO, IBRD, IMF and UNESCO were immediately linked to the UN as SAs cooperating within the aegis of the UN Economic and Social Council, and in a blaze of optimism the stage seemed set for post-­war international cooperation. SUGGESTED READING

Alcock, A.E. (1971), History of the International Labour Organization, London: Macmillan. [Deals with ILO’s early years from a thematic perspective] Barros, J. (1979), Office without Power: Secretary-­General Sir Eric Drummond 1919–1933, Oxford: Clarendon Press. [The establishment and politics of the League and Drummond’s role in it] Bendiner, E. (1975), A Time for Angels: The Tragicomic History of the League of Nations, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. [A revealing history of the tensions and prejudices surrounding the politics of the League and its creation] BIS (1980), The Bank for International Settlements and the Basle Meetings (50th anniversary 1930– 1980), Basel, Switzerland: BIS. [The official history of BIS] Claude, I.L. (1964), Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization, 3rd edn, London: London University Press. [Magisterial overview of the origins, development and prospects of IOs] Gill, G. (1996), The League of Nations from 1929 to 1946, New York: Avery. [A review of the League set in the context of the history of the interwar years] Morehead, C. (1998), Dunant’s Dream: War, Switzerland and the History of the Red Cross, London: HarperCollins. [An accessible history of ICRC] Murphy, C.N. (1994), International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance since 1850, Cambridge: Polity. [A comprehensive review of the role of IOs in constituting the modern liberal capitalist order] Reinalda, B. (2009), Routledge History of International Organizations: From 1815 to the Present Day, Abingdon, UK: Routledge. [A well-­presented and detailed sequential overview of the evolution of IOs] Schlesinger, S.C. (2003), Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations, Cambridge, MA: Westview. [The history of US involvement in events leading up to the creation of the UN] Walters, F.P. (1952), A History of the League of Nations, London: Oxford University Press. [A comprehensive history of the League’s work written by a former staff member]

Internet resources For the League of Nations: http://www.library.northwestern.edu/libraries-­collections/evanstown-­ campus/government-­information/ and http://www.unog.ch/library/

3 The modern historical context The blaze of optimism surrounding international cooperation that had greeted the signing of the UN Charter was swiftly doused by the harsh realities of international politics. The victorious wartime allies were soon at loggerheads, and within two years their differences had ossified into the Cold War (Box 1.6). During the post-­1945 period covered by this chapter, IOs provided forums for East–West interactions on many matters, including the prevention of nuclear proliferation, governance of the oceans, and technical topics such as allocating the radio spectrum. Unfortunately they also became another theatre in which the East–West battle was fought. Enmeshed in the conflict, several IOs ground to a halt or struggled to deliver their objectives. Further restricting IOs’ scope for action were their charters, which strictly delimited and in some cases forbade external interventions in domestic affairs as states prioritized the mutual recognition of their sovereignty. Indeed a glance at the literature suggests IOs have been in perpetual crisis since 1945, often being castigated for their ineffectiveness and sometimes recommended as candidates for extinction. Against this unpropitious background IOs have proved remarkably resilient, accelerating the functional expansion witnessed in the interwar period (see Chapter 2) and quadrupling in number since 1945 (see Table 1.1). IOs have also developed an intricate web of interconnections (see Figures 3.1 to 3.3). Moreover, prior to the Second World War most IOs had limited or regional membership aimed at tackling problems confined to the membership, but afterwards universal IOs increased in number and started to tackle truly global problems. While security remained their paramount concern and grabbed most attention, the majority of IOs were devoted to economic or social activities, reflecting the state’s expanding domestic role in these domains. This was exemplified by the UN System, which, in addition to carrying forward the existing work of the League of Nations (the League) and other early IOs, extended or delved more thoroughly into public finance, development, agriculture, health, education and later the environment and

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urban society. Despite the advance of universal IOs, regional organizations (ROs) continued to flourish, with states fashioning bodies to fund regional development, investigate a host of scientific problems and integrate transport systems. Thus, by the early twenty-­first century, few substantive areas remained untouched by an IO. The post-­war expansion of IOs reflects the intensification of those factors Claude (1964) identified as having sponsored the earliest IOs plus several new reasons. The first of these, the splintering of the world into sovereign entities, was boosted after 1945 by the implosion of former empires and states. The globalization of the state system significantly expanded the prospective membership and authors of IOs. Self-­interest, a desire for inclusion in international society and pressure from allies were just some of the reasons newly independent states were eager to exercise their sovereign prerogative of joining IOs. The size of the change is revealed by the growing UN membership, which went from 51 member states in 1945 to 76 in 1955, 99 in 1960, 127 in 1970, 154 in 1980 and 191 by 2010. Second, although not everyone believed IOs could curb the self-­help tendencies encouraged by the anarchical international system, after 1945 states became more interconnected and there was greater optimism about the prospects for mutual benefits arising from economic, social and scientific interdependence. In the nineteenth century the dismantling of national barriers, the development of compatible cross-­border transport and communications infrastructures, and agreed rules and norms governing interstate activity sponsored more interdependence, a self-­fulfilling process which generated demands for more IOs. In other words, by providing the conditions under which interdependence could thrive, IOs then find themselves perennially trying to cope with the complex world they have helped to unleash. After 1945 specialized IOs expanded rapidly, producing a tapestry of regimes to underpin international activity and to manage social tensions. Slowly, these IOs became more prominent, as did those fostering the right domestic climate for international activity, such as promoting financial stability and good governance. Thereby, IOs have linked nations together, subjecting them to a universal (if not universally accepted) set of rules that governs international interactions and plays a decisive role in globalization (Box 1.1). The contemporary intensity of globalization means states are more aware than their nineteenth-­century forebears of the potential benefits and frictions arising from interdependence and also how frictions can rapidly segue into crises. Indeed, events in the form of immediate crises or looming long-­ term problems (see Case Study 1.1) have often prompted demands for additional IOs or extensions to the remits of existing ones.

The modern historical context 

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A final factor in the post-­war creation and sustenance of IOs was US ­hegemony. Exhausted by the Second World War the previously dominant European states were rapidly becoming second-­tier powers, while the US was the undisputed hegemon and, for better or worse, many post-­war IOs bore its imprint (Foot et al. 2003). Despite a seemingly ambivalent relationship involving US politicians and institutions periodically denouncing IOs (individually or collectively), application of pressure through the weight of its financial contributions, and occasionally profound departures from IO norms, the US has been a staunch supporter of IOs, providing substantial funding, personnel and leadership. Explanations for this are manifold. Realists and liberal institutionalists take their cue from assumptions about international power distributions (see Chapter 1) and place self-­interest at the heart of their explanation. The former propose that the US uses IOs as tools to contain its enemies, while the latter suggest IOs perform roles that alter state behaviours in ways that promote the peace and stability the US desires. Later studies suggest that domestic politics, particularly the extent to which the ideology of dominant domestic groups intersects with that of IOs, are also important shapers of US attitudes towards IOs (Karns and Mingst 1990).

3.1

1945–49 The five years after the Second World War witnessed the most concentrated period of IO expansion to date, with 48 new IOs arriving on the scene (Wallace and Singer 1970: 254–5). Security IOs remained dominant, but compared with Figure 2.1, illustrating the interwar period, Figure 3.1 reveals an increase in organizations dealing with technical, social, humanitarian and trade issues and the emergence of additional ROs, most notably the League of Arab States (LAS). Nevertheless, beyond the UN system, IO interrelationships were scant. Immediate post-­war activity centred on the UN System. The UN’s founding was an important milestone in IO development (see Chapter 5). The UN Charter proscribed war except in self-­defence, gave the UN, acting on the Security Council’s (SC’s) findings, the right to make war, and also required states to uphold certain principles such as the peaceful settlement of disputes and the protection of human rights. Regrettably, for the reasons previously outlined, these idealistic notions soon ran aground. Barely had the UN opened for business than the Soviet Union (USSR) cast its first SC veto over a dispute on the 1946 withdrawal of French forces from Syria and Lebanon. Soon after, the General Assembly (GA) established an Atomic Energy Commission to govern nuclear activities, but the US and USSR produced such irreconcilable plans that the Commission was indefinitely adjourned, thereby setting the tone for the ensuing decades.

BIPM

OIE

ICRC

IOM BIS

FAO

UNESCO

FINANCE

UNHCR

WMO

WHO

ICAO

IBRD

UN

ITU

IMF

ILO

UPU

OEEC

GATT

Arab League

IPU

Figure 3.1  International organizations: their scope and responsibilities (1955)

Indirect Relationship

UNRWA

IATA

WCO

TECHNICAL and SOCIAL

Interational Wheat Council

CERN

Direct Relationship

H U M A N I T A R I A N

S C I E N T I F I C

1955

COE

TRADE

COMECON

ECSC

European Assembly

UNICEF

OAS

Organization of Central American States

Commonwealth

POLITICAL

Inter pol

Global

UN system

Trans-Regional

UNSF/EPTA

WEU

NATO

Warsaw Pact

Regional

Sub-Regional

D E V E L O P M E N T

S E C U R I T Y

The modern historical context 

·  65

The USSR’s occupation of Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade (1948– 49) dealt further blows to cooperation between the wartime allies, who preferred to strengthen and consolidate control over their respective ideological blocs. Western European countries started political and military cooperation, devising the Brussels Treaty Organization, later to become the Western European Union (WEU), the Council of Europe (COE) and, most notably, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an alliance between Europe and its transatlantic partners guaranteeing military cooperation and mutual self-­defence. This then prompted mirror-­image institutions in the Eastern bloc. Elsewhere the UN responded to emerging security threats with new bodies. In 1947, conflict erupted after the British vacated Palestine. The ensuing war displaced 700 000 Palestinians and engendered the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and the first UN peacekeeping mission, the UN Truce Supervision Organization. That same year British withdrawal from India and Pakistan also necessitated peacekeeping intervention; consequently the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan was established in January 1949. Beyond the sphere of military security the UN System rapidly expanded and by now dwarfed the League. Although the work of the new UN specialized agencies (SAs) such as FAO, UNESCO, WHO and ICAO derived from the League’s activities, their resources and depth of involvement were far greater. Existing IOs and PIUs, specifically ITU, UPU and ILO, were updated and brought under the UN umbrella. Finally, IBRD, IMF and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) extended the UN System’s tentacles into development and coordination of public finance and trade. The economic organizations were, to a point, put in cold storage owing to the economic hardships afflicting the main players and because of the absence of Eastern bloc countries, whose distaste for capitalism ran counter to the underlying economic philosophy of the Bretton Woods institutions. In fact the US rather than the IMF effectively managed the international monetary order until the late 1950s because of limited currency convertibility. Meanwhile, IBRD’s modest resources were soon overwhelmed by the enormous task of rebuilding Europe’s war-­torn economies. Fearing that destitute Western European states might fall prey to communism, the US conceived the Marshall Plan (Box 3.1), whose monies were to be allocated by another IO, the Organisation for European Economic Co-­operation (OEEC), which the US hoped would also foster European cooperation. Allocating money proved too heavy a burden for OEEC. Nevertheless, by developing networks

66  · 

International organizations

of European officials and fostering cooperation, it laid the foundation for subsequent European integration. After flirting with participation, the USSR ultimately declined Marshall Plan funding. Instead, in 1949, it created a counterbalancing Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) in Eastern Europe, as well as the more sinister COMINFORM, the Communist Information Bureau, whose task was to control the region’s communist parties. BOX 3.1

THE MARSHALL PLAN The European Recovery Program, better known as the Marshall Plan after US Secretary of State George Marshall, refers to the financial aid given by the US to reconstruct Europe’s ailing economies after the Second World War. Under the plan the US

3.2

provided economic assistance to European countries which jointly agreed to the use of resources under US-­imposed conditions. The Marshall Plan disbursed $13b over four years, with the largest amounts going to France and the UK.

The 1950s The flurry of post-­war IO building continued in the 1950s and, despite some closures, the overall IO population rose by over 50 (Wallace and Singer 1970: 254–5). Although plagued by Cold War politics the UN System’s expansion continued. By the end of the decade it had adopted its long-­term shape with the incorporation of many universal IOs concerned with technical or economic matters, including WMO, a former PIU, plus new organizations such as the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, later to become the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Additionally, the temporary post-­war refugee organizations were replaced by a permanent body, the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). The 1950s brought no respite to the UN. Following the communist victory in the Chinese civil war, the USSR demanded that communist China be recognized and take over nationalist China’s membership. When the other permanent members of SC refused this request the USSR boycotted the UN but selectively employed its veto to disrupt SC decision making. In 1950 North Korea invaded South Korea. A ‘peacekeeping force’ was assembled, but although sanctioned by the UN it was not a UN peacekeeping operation, as it was US led and controlled. Because the USSR returned to the SC to wield a veto, the US employed a novel mechanism to bring the discussion

The modern historical context 

·  67

out of SC and into the GA. This move became known as the ‘uniting for peace’ initiative and was later employed in other circumstances, including the Congo. Since the initiative coincided with its GA boycott, the USSR was outmanoeuvred and was unable to prevent its adoption. The Suez crisis was the other major political event that heavily involved the UN. In 1956 France and the UK (with Israel’s cooperation) attacked Egypt to reclaim the Suez Canal, which Egypt had appropriated. They blocked international intervention through their SC vetoes, but SG Hammarskjöld, with backing from Canada, Norway, Colombia and India, presented the GA with a proposal for a UN peacekeeping force, and following approval it was located in Egypt. As the decade progressed ROs appeared in greater numbers. Some, such as the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), were concerned with science and technology (see Chapter 15), while others, such as the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the Inter-­American Development Bank (IDB), spurred regional development. Nevertheless, the majority of ROs were a response to the increasingly febrile Cold War security environment. As Cold War enmities intensified, the struggle went global, and the Warsaw Pact Organization became the Soviet bloc’s counterweight to NATO. As part of its containment strategy (Box 3.2) the US moved to encircle the USSR with a web of bilateral and multilateral alliances, sometimes formalized through IOs, including in 1954/55 the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the South-­East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). BOX 3.2

CONTAINMENT Containment refers to US strategies to foil the spread of communism during the Cold War. The ideas underlying the doctrine were first articulated by US diplomat George Kennan in 1946, but the term ‘containment’ did not enter the public consciousness until 1947, with the publication of an anonymous article in Foreign Affairs (X 1947). This article argued that ‘the main element of any United States policy towards the Soviet Union must be that of long-­term, patient

but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies’. The US feared that, if left unchecked, the USSR would expand communist influence but recognized that in the nuclear era it would be difficult, if not foolhardy, to prevent communism’s spread through direct military confrontation. Instead the US employed a variety of other mechanisms such as strengthening alliances, fighting proxy wars, arms races and supplying soft loans (see Box 1.6).

68  · 

International organizations

Encouraged by the US and its desire for a peaceful and strong Western Alliance the 1950s witnessed the opening gambit in European political integration (see Chapter 11). French Foreign Minister Schuman, assisted by Jean Monnet (Box 3.3), proposed setting up the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to diffuse the tensions between France and Germany over access to strategic resources, and ECSC was born in 1951. Its rapid development of trade rules covering raw materials and steel products kindled enthusiasm for further European economic integration. Six years later, based BOX 3.3

JEAN MONNET – PRESIDENT, EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY (1952–55) As a French civil servant Monnet had been responsible for arranging the purchase and transport of materials for the First World War and was the main advocate of the Allies pooling their resources. This led to his being nominated to the secretariat of the League. He was Deputy SG from 1919 to 1923 but resigned, disillusioned with the consensus style of League decision making. At the start of the Second World War he was appointed to the joint Franco-­ British Economic Coordination Committee and joined the Free French government in London. Here he planned for post-­war French economic recovery and later implemented those plans as Head of the French National Planning Institute. The US supported Monnet’s idea for economic cooperation with Germany. He felt this would ensure French access to key natural resources and markets for its products as well as reducing the potential for political arguments with Germany over the Ruhr’s coal and steel resources. The outcome was the creation of ECSC, whose constitution expressed the desire for a ‘broader and deeper community’. His determination to ensure parity between defeated Germany and victorious France was critical

to setting a new direction for European initiatives. Appointed ECSC President when the industries were expanding to meet the demands of post-­war reconstruction, Monnet set up a lean and flexible administration whose mandate was to resolve issues pragmatically. He believed problems should be approached incrementally rather than embracing grandiose political philosophies, a process now known as the Monnet Method. This approach resulted in an open-­ ended framework for developing new initiatives and became the mould for future EEC/ EU administrations. His brief but successful tenure secured the revival of Western European heavy industry. De Gaulle’s arrival as French President constrained Monnet’s influence. Consequently in 1955 he left ECSC to head the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, a coalition of political parties and trade unions advocating European integration. In this role he helped launch the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and his most lasting legacy, the EEC, an organization central to Europe’s subsequent economic and political integration.

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·  69

on the ECSC experience, the European Economic Community (EEC) was established. Of the major European powers, only the UK remained outside the EEC. The value of trade cooperation was evident, and in 1960 the UK and six other European countries formed the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Between them these two developments sealed OEEC’s fate (see Chapter 10, section 10.1.1).

3.3

The 1960s During the 1960s, enthusiasm for IOs was unabated, with the population growing from 154 to 280. Several factors contributed to this, but ­decolonization was perhaps most significant. Decolonization started after the Second World War but quickened throughout the 1950s and 1960s. IOs, tacit supporters of decolonization during this period, now became unequivocal. In 1960 the UN adopted a Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and a year later unveiled a Special Committee on Decolonization which gave those countries a global forum, encouraging them to raise related problems such as apartheid. New members started altering the demographics of universal IOs. Developed states were increasingly outnumbered, although often not outvoted, by developing countries. While developing countries’ solidarity was not all it might have been, they nonetheless became more assertive in articulating a distinctive set of economic interests, culminating in demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO, Box 3.4). By shifting the balance within UN membership, decolonization gave impetus to new IOs aimed at dealing with problems specific to and advancing the interests of newly independent developing countries. Development, for example, had been on the radar of IOs since 1945 but was now propelled up the international agenda. Several UN bodies emerged as the organization sought to deliver its declaration to make the 1960s the Development Decade. These included the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the World Food Programme (WFP), the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA). The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) came into being in 1960 with a predominantly Middle Eastern membership, as oil-­rich Western countries did not join. However, initially an oil glut limited its ability to protect its members’ revenue. Decolonization also entailed problems for and reshaped the functions of other existing IOs. There was a short-­term drop in the IO population as colonial powers abandoned organizations that had coordinated activities in their

70  · 

International organizations

colonies. They were swiftly replaced by new ROs, including: in 1963, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), later to become the African Union (AU); in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); and, in 1971, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, now renamed the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). The motivations for these organizations were manifold but often reflected a desire by states to protect their newfound sovereignty from interstate and civil war and the hegemonic aspirations of regional powers. Elsewhere the Atlantic allies refocused the work of OEEC, replacing it with OECD, a forum for Western industrialized countries to discuss, develop and improve long-­term economic and social policies, including a focus on development. IBRD, reoriented towards poverty reduction, rapidly expanded its project funding, operational orientation and research capabilities. It was also instrumental in creating the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), a network of agricultural research centres (Chapter 14). Nevertheless, IBRD’s dominance by developed states led to demands in the borrowing community for greater control over their own destiny, resulting in two further regional development banks, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the African Development Bank (Af DB), in which regional states held overall control. During the 1960s IOs charged with overseeing the global economic system struggled to contain the interdependence they and their members had promoted, especially in the financial realm. The return of currency convertibility in 1958 and increasing US reluctance to underpin the global financial system as its relative power declined meant IMF could finally assume some of the responsibilities for which it had been designed. Unfortunately IMF’s ability to uphold the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates (see Box 9.1) and alleviate short-­term balance-­of-­payments imbalances was undermined by technical flaws that had haunted the system from the outset plus a series of political decisions (and non-­decisions) by states that fostered the reintegration of the international financial system (Helleiner 1994). These problems were exacerbated by the reluctance of some European states to accept US leadership and operate through an institution where the US was felt to carry excessive power. Consequently, as the 1960s progressed, discussions of international monetary management percolated into bodies such as the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and OECD as states contrived short-­term fixes to maintain the façade of Bretton Woods (Russell 1972). The rush to exit colonial territories had two overarching impacts. Decolonized states were courted by the rival superpowers, with the West starting to pump

The modern historical context 

·  71

aid into sympathetic nations. It also produced security vacuums which had to be filled by UN peacekeepers, who were deployed in a number of locations (see Table 5.1). The most significant of these was the Congo, where in 1960, in a parallel with Suez, Belgium had unilaterally intervened to protect its commercial interests. Congo swiftly became the UN’s biggest peacekeeping operation and the first in which it resorted to proactive military action. Congo was also the backdrop for the UN’s greatest tragedy, when its highly respected SG, Dag Hammarskjöld, and his immediate staff were killed in an air crash on their return from a 1961 peacekeeping mission. IOs were also operating against a background of increasingly fraught Cold War relations. In 1961 the construction of the Berlin Wall and extensive USSR nuclear testing saw NATO states respond with deployment of forces plus provision of economic assistance to Greece and Turkey. The following year, the Warsaw Pact held sweeping manoeuvres in Hungary and Poland close to NATO borders in which East German forces participated for the first time. The Cold War peaked with the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, which brought the world to the brink of nuclear conflict. Not all East–West interaction was confrontational, however. Later in the 1960s a degree of détente was established, first with the 1968 Treaty on Non-­ Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which involved the UN and IAEA in monitoring and safeguards, and later with the bilateral US–USSR Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. East–West relationships fluctuated, but détente paved the way for broader cooperation in the context of the Conference on Security and Co-­operation in Europe (CSCE) in the 1970s. Nor must it be forgotten that East–West polarization in the UN and other political forums contrasted with the situation in more technical IOs (such as ITU and IMO), where East–West interests often coincided.

3.4

The 1970s By the 1970s, a sophisticated web of IOs was woven into the fabric of global governance. Compared to 1955 (Figure 3.1), Figure 3.2 reveals the maturation of the UN System, the swelling ranks of regional and sub-­regional organizations, the spread of IOs into a host of new issue areas, and greater interconnections between IOs. The UN System alone sponsored in excess of 130 global conferences between 1974 and 1985, covering a spectrum of issues from racism to water. Nevertheless, the 1970s were a taxing time for IOs, which were in danger of becoming victims of their own success. The economic turbulence that punctuated the decade was seen by some as evidence that the interdependence encouraged by IOs was outpacing their

Direct relationship

ICRC

IOM

EIB

BIS

IBRD

FAO

UNESCO

IPU

UN

ITU

OPEC

OEC

Arab League

UNCTAD

IMF

ILO

UPU

UNEP

Figure 3.2  International organizations: their scope and responsibilities (1975)

IsDB

AfDB

ADB

IDB

ICAO

(UN) WTO

FINANCE

WMO

IMO

IATA

UNHCR

Arab Fund for Development, BADEA

West and East African DBs

CABEI, Fonplata, CDB, Andean DC

UNRWA

WFP

WHO

WIPO

Eurocontrol

WCO

TECHNICAL and SOCIAL

CGIAR (9)

WFC

ECMWF

BIPM

Intelsat

International Wheat Council

ESA

ESO

CERN

Indirect relationship

H U M A N I T A R I A N

S C I E N T I F I C

1975

GATT

TRADE

UNIDO

OAU

ECSC, Euratom, CEDEFOP, Eurofound

EEC

European Assembly

COE

Interpol

Global UN System Regional

Sub-regional

Warsaw Pact

Trans-regional

UNICEF

UNDP

WEU

OSC

Francophonie

NATO

EFTA

Nordic Council

ECOWAS

OCAS, CARICOM

COMECON

OAS

IAEA

ASEAN

OIC

POLITICAL Commonwealth

D E V E L O P M E N T

S E C U R I T Y

The modern historical context 

·  73

ability to manage it. These problems were exacerbated by overlaps and turf wars caused by the mushrooming IO population, budgetary restrictions arising from fiscal pressures impacting major financial contributors, and the first important cycle of institutional reorganizations (see Chapter 4). The US, which had frequently paid as much as 25 per cent of the assessed costs of many IOs, started to demand more equitable cost sharing, particularly from growing economies such as Japan and, as part of its strategy, attacked those IOs with rising budgets. Frustration over the perceived bureaucratization of world politics by IOs, which resulted in sclerotic decision making (Putnam and Bayne 1987), prompted some leading states to start concerting outside IOs through informal clubs such as the Group of Seven (G7, see Box 1.3). The seriousness of these challenges notwithstanding, IOs remained the institutions of choice for interdependent states, something reflected in their continued multiplication during the 1970s. Indeed, liberal institutionalists postulated that the extensive network of international economic organizations and the patterns of cooperation therein mitigated tensions, thereby preventing the economic upheavals of the 1970s from engendering a similar economic nationalism to that which had blighted the 1930s. During the decade, while many IOs toiled away at traditional concerns such as security and the economy, emerging problems were tackled through new IOs or by refashioning existing ones. Swelling international awareness of environmental problems, not least emergent concerns over global climate change (see Case Study 1.1), inspired the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) plus other technical organizations, such as the European Centre for Medium-­ Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF). Environmental issues also became central to the agendas of existing IOs such as OECD. Meanwhile the G7, lacking its own secretariat, relied heavily on IOs to deliver their promises and, as an informal forum away from the glare of publicity, became a venue where political leaders could break deadlocks hampering negotiations taking place in IOs. The breakdown of Bretton Woods in 1971 and the 1973 oil price spike produced monetary instability, inflation, lower rates of economic growth and an economic emergency for developing nations. The collapse of Bretton Woods removed one of IMF’s principal goals, to stabilize exchange rates and, while it continued to provide assistance to developed countries in short-­ term economic distress, its focus started to drift towards often controversial attempts to promote development. Moreover, the economic crisis shook faith in the Keynesian creed that had dominated post-­war policy making. By the end of the 1970s, the embedded liberalism characteristic of Bretton Woods was slowly being unpicked as many leading states and IOs reverted

74  · 

International organizations

to less ­trammelled free market ideas and policies. Whether this epiphany in economic thinking at IOs reflected a pragmatic adjustment to changing ideas already advocated by leading states or whether IOs were the progenitors of a new economic orthodoxy that reshaped the ideas and interests of leading states is an interesting although unresolved question. Irrespective, the transition to freer markets began to transform economic IOs’ normative focus from rules designed to partly insulate states from global markets to ones that were designed to expose them to market disciplines in the name of efficiency and competitiveness (Cerny 1997). The liberalizing mantra underpinning this ideology would promote further interdependence and aggravate the problems of global economic management. IOs had an important role in mediating the fallout from the oil crisis. Towering oil prices championed by OPEC members prompted balance-­ of-­payments difficulties for developing and developed countries, requiring IMF to open a new lending programme for the former. A key problem for developing countries was the soaring cost of agricultural inputs (principally fertilizers). FAO established the International Fertilizer Supply Scheme to help the worst-­hit nations, but it was soon apparent that this was insufficient. A world conference on agriculture resulted in two new UN agencies: the World Food Council (a now disbanded policy forum) and a new development bank, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (Chapter 8, section 8.10). Determined not to be held to future ransom by oil producers, developed states responded by organizing a consortium of oil consumers, the International Energy Agency (Chapter 10, section 10.1). BOX 3.4

THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER In the 1970s developing countries advanced proposals for a New International Economic Order characterized by rules and ­institutions more favourable to their interests. NIEO aimed to give developing countries greater control over their economic destiny, boost their economic growth, reduce their dependence on commodities by raising their share of industrial production, and narrow the gap in per capita income with developed countries. This was to be attained

through reforms to international commodity markets, greater development assistance, better market access for their exports, and reforms to GATT, IMF and IBRD so they were not dominated by developed countries. The UN GA passed several resolutions laying the foundations of NIEO, but ultimately negotiations failed, not least because developed states would not countenance fundamental reforms to the liberal international economic order.

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Europe was also changing. In 1973, Denmark, Ireland and the UK left EFTA to join the EEC. The same year the thaw in the Cold War allowed members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to explore détente through CSCE. After three years negotiating, CSCE resulted in the Helsinki accords, which recognized the existing boundaries of Eastern and Western European states, thereby implicitly acknowledging the changes brought about in Eastern Europe by the USSR, in exchange for which the USSR made concessions on human rights and travel (see Chapter 13, section 13.14). Outside Europe, Middle Eastern security and the Palestinian situation posed a mounting problem for the UN. Formed in 1964 the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) terrorist activities peaked in the 1970s with an attack on the Munich Olympic Games and the capture of oil ministers at an OPEC meeting in Vienna. From 1974 the Middle East question became a permanent item on the GA agenda and, despite considerable resistance, the PLO was granted UN observer status. The PLO started to mount operations against Israel from bases in Lebanon and, in 1978, Israel responded by invading Southern Lebanon to eliminate them. Anarchy ensued and peace, of sorts, was imposed by LAS. It mandated that Syria should lead an Arab peacekeeping force, which led to a 20-­year dominance of Lebanon by Syria. UN peacekeepers were introduced along the Lebanese–Israeli border but failed to eliminate local conflicts, and in 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon again, only withdrawing in 2000. Despite Middle Eastern turmoil, elsewhere there were more encouraging developments. Détente fostered improved relationships in Asia. China was admitted to the UN in 1971, and the end of the Vietnam War resulted in the closure of SEATO and CENTO. In Africa two sub-­regional organizations were formed, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Centred initially on their members’ economic development they later addressed security concerns.

3.5

The 1980s While overall numbers of IOs continued to rise in the 1980s the tempo slowed, reflecting the difficult economic conditions being faced by the major contributors. A large proportion of the new organizations that materialized were emanations rather than IOs deriving from international treaties. However, a discernible trend during the decade was a decline of IOs devoted to regional integration, through a mixture of ‘consolidation, apathy and abandonment’, especially in Africa and the Middle East (Shanks et al. 1996: 604).

76  · 

International organizations

The major exception to this was the widening and deepening of the EEC. By the close of the decade the EEC encompassed 12 states and had approved measures for achieving a Single Market by the end of 1992 through removing barriers to internal movement of goods, services, people and capital. Moreover the EEC was evolving from a mainly economic association of states towards a political union. Qualified majority decision making in defined areas diminished the power of individual states to block reforms and introduced a degree of supranationality to its authority. The European Assembly, which had no powers, was turned into a new European Parliament, a forum for legislative control. In the economic sphere IOs had a prominent role in entrenching the rejuvenated free market economic orthodoxy. EEC, IMF and OECD were in the vanguard of IOs cajoling developed countries into liberalizing their economies, in particular the loosening of capital controls. Conditionalities attached to IMF loans and IBRD structural adjustment lending exported this model to the developing world, a model later christened the Washington Consensus (Williamson 1990). The necessity for these loans stemmed largely from the debt crisis that engulfed developing countries in the early 1980s. The sources of the crisis were manifold, but a major contributory factor was the conservative monetary policies being used by developed states to purge inflation. This significantly increased the burden of debt repayments for developing states, a problem which came to a head when Mexico’s debt default sparked a crisis in Latin America. IMF responded with more flexible lending instruments, which helped avert an international banking crisis, but the cost was a ‘Lost Decade’ of development for Latin America. As usual, Cold War posturing characterized the first half of the 1980s. US President Reagan’s ambitious arms expansion programme and the USSR’s Afghanistan campaign ensured a customary stalemate. As part of continuing Cold War confrontation, the US withdrew from UNESCO in 1984 over proposals for a New World Information and Communication Order (see Chapter 7, section 7.5.1). Unbelievably, only five years later, the Berlin Wall had fallen, the Soviet puppet governments of Eastern Europe were crumbling, and the Cold War, though it lingered awhile, was in its death throes. A fierce debate still rages over the causes that ended the Cold War and the failure of academic theories to predict it. IOs probably had a marginal role (see Chapter 13, section 13.6), but the sudden evaporation of Cold War certainties and the balance of power that underpinned it prompted a reappraisal of the relevance of IOs forged in the Cold War crucible.

The modern historical context 

3.6

·  77

The 1990s In 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait but was swiftly ejected by a multinational force spearheaded by the US under a UN mandate. Following the end of hostilities President George Bush Sr proclaimed that the first Gulf War heralded a New World Order in which peace would be secured through institutionalized cooperation rather than the blunt instrument of power politics. In a speech to the UN GA (October 1990), Bush promised that the US would rein in the temptation to resort to unilateral action, promising a ‘partnership of nations . . . based on consultation, cooperation and collective action, especially through international and regional organizations’. The disintegration and final implosion of the USSR in 1991 left the US as the sole superpower. By pledging to exercise power through IOs the US hoped to allay fears amongst allies and enemies alike that it would act in an arbitrary, unrestrained or exploitative manner. Moreover, while immediate challengers to its supremacy had faded, the US realized it was not powerful enough, especially given the complexity of pressing international concerns, ‘to go it alone’ (Nye 2002). By addressing problems such as Africa’s extreme poverty, the impact of AIDS and the Palestinian question through IOs, the US could spread the burden of international management and bestow a veneer of legitimacy on agreed solutions. The New World Order rhetoric augured a golden age for IOs, but this hope was soon dashed. Amidst the post-­Cold War thaw the US used its UN veto power more sparingly, supported unprecedented numbers of IO-­ sanctioned peacekeeping operations, put its energies into new IOs such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) and promoted new roles for others such as the UN and NATO. However, there were powerful countertrends. As the decade progressed the USA’s unilateral proclivities reasserted themselves. It rejected the Kyoto Protocol aimed at reducing greenhouse gases, refused to recognize the new International Criminal Court, opposed UN SG Boutros Boutros-­ Ghali’s second term and withheld funding from various IOs. Some of this was driven by a backlash in US domestic politics, where critics contended that the hegemon’s right to pursue its interests should be unhindered by multilateral commitments and, especially after the 1993 loss of US troops in a UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia, a feeling that the burden was falling disproportionately on the US. By 1992 only two-­thirds of the IOs that existed in 1981 were still operational (Shanks et al. 1996: 594). Although there were some new bodies, the total numbers of IOs fell, principally because IOs that relied on Soviet largesse

78  · 

International organizations

or existed simply as an alternative to Western institutions were disbanded. However, IO relationships were increasingly complex compared to 1975 (contrast Figures 3.2 and 3.3), and there was a resurgence of non-­state actors in IO governance which culminated in the partial privatization of two IOs (Box 16.1). Simultaneously the average membership of IOs rose as states emerging from the rubble of the USSR and the collapse of Yugoslavia applied to join. Indeed membership of IOs such as OECD and the EU was proffered as an incentive for former communist countries to adopt democratic forms of government and capitalist economic models. As the Cold War drew down, the immediate threat of nuclear conflict receded, but old conflicts recommenced and new ones ignited. IOs accustomed to a bipolar balance of power were poorly equipped to deal with the proliferation of intrastate conflicts, failed states, terrorism, and humanitarian problems that ensued and that spawned genocide, ethnic cleansing and refugees. Once again the tide of events required IOs to adapt and evolve. Thus, as Russian attitudes towards the UN became more proactive, peacekeeping operations were mounted in countries such as Yugoslavia and Cambodia where they were previously unthinkable. In Yugoslavia, the most inflammable situation, the US took the lead in trying to prevent bloodshed, but the resultant internecine fighting involved both UN and NATO in peacekeeping capacities. During the Cold War UN interventions to uphold principles of human rights were vulnerable to SC vetoes as the competing ideologies disagreed about what constituted fundamental rights and contended that national sovereignty was sacrosanct. These pressures eased in the 1990s when a broader definition of security was adopted and new IOs emerged to deal with these issues. This allowed the UN to intervene more frequently in states engaged in widespread human rights violations. After protracted negotiations, states adopted the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court in 1998, a permanent tribunal to indict individuals accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity. NATO, suddenly denuded of its main enemy, reduced its forces by one-­third, developed a new strategic compact to identify different and often less tangible threats and, to Russia’s chagrin, developed partnerships with Eastern European countries anticipating their eventual membership (see Chapter 13). The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was formed in 1991 as an alliance of some former members of the USSR, but the most notable newcomer, erected on the foundations of the CSCE, was the Organization for Security and Co-­operation in Europe (OSCE). Covering much of the Northern hemisphere, OSCE shares a mission similar to other security IOs

BIPM

Direct relationship

ICRC

IOM BIS

IBRD

IFAD

FAO

UNESCO

OPEC Fund

EIB

UN

ITU

NAFTA/NAD Bank

OEC

Arab League

GCC

UNCTAD

IMF

ILO

UPU

EMI (later ECB)

ICAO

WMO

FINANCE

IsDB

EBRD

AfDB

ADB

IDB

UNHCR

WHO

IMO

UNEP UNWTO

WCO

IPU

Figure 3.3  International organizations: their scope and responsibilities (1995)

Arab Fund for Development, BADEA

South, West and East African DBs

Fonplata, CABEI, CDB, Andean DC

UNRWA

WFP

CGIAR (16)

OIE

WIPO

Inmarsat

IATA

TECHNICAL and SOCIAL

Eurocontrol

ECMWF

EPO

Intelsat

International Grain Council

ESA

ESO

ESRF

CERN

Indirect relationship

H U M A N I T A R I A N

S C I E N T I F I C

1995

OPE

WTO

UNIDO

IAEA

OAS

ASEAN

SAARC

OIC

EEC

EP

COE

ECOWAS SADC

TRADE

APEC

Mercosur

UNICEF

UNDP

WEU

D E V E L O P M E N T

Sub-regional

Interpol

CIS

S E C U R I T Y

Global UN System Regional

Trans-regional

OSCE

Francophonie

NATO

EFTA

Nordic Council

ECSC, Euratom, CEDEFOP, EEA, OHIM, EMEA, EUOSHA, Eurofound, ETF,European Drugs Agency, EMCDDA

AU

OCAS, CARICOM

Commonwealth

POLITICAL

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but also undertakes tasks neglected by NATO and the UN, especially with regard to internal disturbances (see Chapter 13, section 13.10). By the end of the decade OSCE was monitoring elections and supporting peacekeeping initiatives in places inconceivable only ten years previously. The ending of the East–West standoff heralded an era of genuinely global integration. IOs were at the forefront of developing rules to sustain and govern this integration, including a new European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to lend to the transition economies of Eastern and Central Europe, and Central Asia. At the start of the decade some commentators conjectured the world would turn towards competing economic blocs (Thurow 1992). Mercosur and NAFTA’s arrival, both partly the upshot of US–European wrangling over the GATT Uruguay Round, coupled with EU’s strengthening of the Single Market, seemed to confirm this. But this was not a clear-­cut trend, as one of the Uruguay Round’s outcomes was the absorption of GATT into WTO which, in contrast to GATT, was a formal IO with a strong mandate for the governance of global trade (see Chapter 10, section 10.2). Financial globalization, a process promoted by Washington Consensus policies and relished by economic elites, induced additional headaches for international financial organizations. Mexico’s 1994 financial crisis underlined the downsides of the re-­emergence of a liberal financial order. IOs did not heed the warnings, however, and three years later the South-­East Asian economies, previously lauded as the cradle of the world’s greatest post-­war economic ‘miracle’, were capsized by another financial storm. IBRD and IMF poured massive short-­term financial support into the Asian economies to prevent the crisis metastasizing into a systemic threat to the global financial system. When the Asian financial crisis was swiftly followed by others in the Russian Federation, Brazil and Argentina, the IMF’s philosophy was queried. Indeed the financial crises of the 1990s were a chastening experience for IOs, particularly IMF, as commentators questioned the effectiveness and democratic implications both of its rescue packages and of its subsequent decisions to intensify surveillance of members’ economies (Blustein 2003). Concerns that the tyranny of authoritarianism had been replaced by the tyranny of private interests engendered a backlash against globalization and those IOs held to be promoting it (Box 1.2). Anxieties over the excesses of capitalism reinvigorated the work of bodies such as ILO with its pursuit of worker rights. Although the world had not fragmented into economic blocs, insecurities and transformations resulting from the post-­Cold War environment provided fresh impetus for many regional projects (see Chapter 13). Three new members and the ratification of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty contributed to

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the widening and deepening of European integration as the EEC was transformed into the EU, with a broader political and social mandate. Maastricht was a springboard for new semi-­autonomous institutions (Chapter 12) developed to handle the expansion in the EU’s remit and also instigated a single European currency and eventually a new IO, the European Central Bank (ECB), to manage it.

3.7

The 2000s Despite unprecedented interdependence, continued global fragmentation into further sovereign entities, and the persistence of US hegemony (conditions seemingly ideal for the cultivation of IOs), the overall IO population declined marginally during the first decade of the new millennium (Table 1.1). Emanations did increase in number, but states seemed reluctant to fashion pristine IOs; rather existing IOs were retooled or consolidated or found themselves at the heart of multi-­stakeholder networks or institutions such as the UN Global Compact (see below). Several plausible explanations for this have been advanced, perhaps the most prominent being the tectonic shifts of international power. The USA persists as the world’s most powerful state, and its hegemony may endure for the immediate future (Norrlof 2010), but its pre-­ eminence could be contested by the ‘rise of the rest’ (Zakaria 2011), particularly the emerging powers of the Global South. Under these circumstances the US may now be averse to funding new IOs. Indeed, far from seeking to challenge the old order, rising powers are queuing up to be accepted through working within the IOs, underpinning the liberal international order. The 11 September 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks on New York and Washington brought home the changing nature of threats to international security. Security IOs spent much of the 2000s dealing with the repercussions of these and other terrorist atrocities and reoriented their strategies to prosecute the nebulous ‘war on terror’. Initial indications suggested President George W. Bush intended to remain faithful to the tenets of the New World Order, obtaining UN authorization to invade Afghanistan to destroy Al-­ Qaeda’s terrorist infrastructure. Under the tutelage of neo-­conservatives, however, the US rediscovered its penchant for contravening international norms, deciding in 2004 to invade Iraq in defiance of the majority of UN members. This failure to obtain UN authorization seriously undermined the legitimacy of the second Gulf War and weakened the UN as a forum for resolving problems. Al-­Qaeda dispersed into inaccessible locations, many of which were in failed states (such as Somalia and Yemen) whose weak or ­ineffective governments could not cooperate with the UN and ROs involved in regional security which needed national support to pursue their mandates.

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Security ROs, therefore, had a mixed record (see Chapter 13). NATO invoked its common defence clause for the first time in the aftermath of 9/11 and expanded eastwards and into the Baltic, absorbing eight former communist states. Later it deployed the International Security Assistance Force to stabilize and support the rebuilding of Afghanistan, consistent with its repositioning away from European territorial defence towards a wider remit. AU supplanted the discredited OAU and started to prove its worth in cooperation with sub-­regional organizations and NATO, but faced difficulties in Somalia. In other conflicts, however, security ROs abrogated their responsibilities. CIS was conspicuous for its inaction following Russia’s incursions into Georgia in 2008 and, until they were reinvigorated by the Arab Spring (2011), LAS and the Gulf Cooperation Council had a similarly low profile in ameliorating conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa. Generally, ROs continued to prosper in the twenty-­first century. Echoing the experience of universal IOs, regional bodies tended to consolidate by widening their membership and competencies. The biggest strides were made by the EU, which welcomed ten new Central and Eastern European members in 2004. In a further indication of possible supranational intentions, EU members pledged to move towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy and bolster the EU’s ability to engage in conflict prevention and crisis management. It developed civilian and military capabilities under the rubric of the European Security and Defence Policy, simultaneously absorbing the, albeit defunct, WEU. The EU’s expansion necessitated systematic institutional reform and, following ratification of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, there was an explosion of semi-­autonomous agencies to deal with a range of socioeconomic and security issues (Chapter 12). Nevertheless, the tortuous passage of the Lisbon Treaty, with some states resisting attempts to deepen the EU’s remit, revealed the institution’s growing pains and the problems of coping with a more diverse membership, dilemmas which were exacerbated by the onset of the global financial and deficit crises in 2007. The global financial crisis rejuvenated several international economic organizations. By the mid-­2000s the economic policy-­making elites had convinced themselves that modern macroeconomic policy had tamed the extremes of the business cycle. As fewer countries encountered economic difficulties and developing countries gained access to global private capital markets, economic IOs seemed to be deprived of their principal functions. Unfortunately the hubris of the economic elites was ill founded. The economic boom of the 2000s rested on an unsustainable pyramid of debt concealed by opaque corporate structures and esoteric financial instruments. At the beginning of the financial crisis the economic IOs were sidelined, but this situation was trans-

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formed by high-­profile bankruptcies and bailouts of financial companies; the latter, in conjunction with massive national stimulus packages, burdened governments with enormous debts and threatened a ‘return to depression economics’ (Krugman 2008). Suddenly IMF, which had been cutting staff and selling its gold reserves, was back in business (Chapter 9, section 9.1). The G20, reflecting the makeover in global power, replaced the G7/G8 as the premier forum for discussions of economic issues, and amidst the crisis tripled IMF’s lending capacity to $750b, mandated it to boost world liquidity and reaffirmed its position in economic surveillance and forecasting. IMF, ECB and the European Commission formed a troika attempting to resolve the crisis in the Eurozone’s debt-­stricken countries. The G20 called on other IOs to help them respond to the global economic crisis, charging the BIS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to develop a third iteration of its accords on capital adequacy, OECD to work on financial secrecy and tax abuses, and IBRD to mitigate the effects of the crisis on the world’s poorest, and pledged to complete the WTO Doha Round. The worldwide nature of the financial crisis epitomizes globalization, but its effects have also been keenly felt by IOs dealing with social and technical problems. The decade opened with the UN Millennium Summit at which states adopted the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs, see Chapter 5), charging IOs to take responsibility for many of them. Indeed a notable trend over the last two decades is for IOs to consort with diverse stakeholders to attain shared ends. The UN Global Compact, for example, brings the UN together with businesses, governments, civil society and labour groups from over 130 countries to develop a fair and sustainable model of globalization and promote activities that support wider UN ends, including the MDGs. Elsewhere WHO, UNICEF and IBRD are IOs prominent in the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, which unites governments, international development organizations, private foundations and the pharmaceutical industry in their desire to ensure all children are inoculated against preventable disease. There are also a number of specific global problems challenging IOs. These include rising and cheaper air travel, which has fostered a greater potential for the rapid spread of infectious diseases (see Chapter 7, section 7.4), concerns over increased atmospheric pollution (Case Study 1.1), and proliferating criminality, especially people trafficking and the movement of narcotic drugs (see Chapter 13, section 13.17). The past 50 years have seen expanding IO involvement in global governance. The process has been incremental, as the following chapters will describe, but occasionally critical incidents and opportunities have allowed IOs to make a decisive mark. The demise of communism, 9/11 and the global financial

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crisis have placed IOs in the vanguard of subsequent international action. States, in other words, feel that IOs now provide a comprehensive framework for resolving common problems and increasingly depend on them despite an underlying core of scepticism. The chapters that follow will track these developments and lead us towards a concluding commentary on the future direction and challenges for IOs. SUGGESTED READING

Ambrose, S.E. and D.G. Brinkley (2010), Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938, 9th edn, London: Penguin. [Provocative account of America’s growing entanglement in global affairs] Calvocoressi, P. (1996), World Politics 1945–2000, 8th edn, London: Longman. [A comprehensive, authoritative and readable overview of world politics in the second half of the twentieth century] Foot, R., S.N. MacFarlane and M. Mastanduno (2003), US Hegemony and International Organizations: The United States and Multilateral Institutions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Examines the relationship between US power and the major IOs, especially since the end of the Cold War] Held, D., A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt and J. Perraton (1999), Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, Culture, Cambridge: Polity. [Ground-­breaking account of the advance of the globalization of violence, trade, finance, production, people and pollution and the interrelationship between globalization and the state] Hobsbawm, E. (1995), Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991, London: Abacus. [Marxist historian’s challenging and enigmatic take on the creative destruction of twentieth-­ century history] Kegley, C.W. and S.L. Blanton (2011), World Politics: Trend and Transformation, 13th edn, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. [Comprehensive guide to contemporary global politics] Reinalda, B. (2009), Routledge History of International Organizations: From 1815 to the Present Day, Abingdon, UK: Routledge. [A detailed overview of the evolution of IOs] Zakaria, F. (2011), The Post-­American World: Release 2.0, New York: W.W. Norton. [Charts the rise of emerging powers and their likely impact on future global order]

4 The character and environment of international organizations Previous chapters have sketched the emergence and evolution of IOs, the escalating complexity of their dealings and their expanding influence in global ­governance. For the most part, they explained this by reference to features largely external to IOs such as power distribution in the international system, the interests of dominant actors (especially states) and the desire to manage problems arising from intensified interdependence. To fully appreciate the ascent of IOs and their contribution to global governance it is also necessary to understand their internal dynamics, to comprehend their character and how that affects their view of the external environment and their ability to fulfil their mandates. Therefore this chapter concentrates on the interior structure and main component parts of IOs, investigating their functions, their interactions and the factors conditioning their behaviour and effectiveness. To use a nautical analogy, if IOs are ships, while the first three chapters describe the international seas on which the ships are sailing and the contribution sea transport makes to human activities and subsequent chapters describe the construction, cargoes, routes and seaworthiness of the ships, this chapter monitors life aboard to see how captains and crews operate their ships and deal with nautical challenges. Much has been written about the internal organs, administrative procedures and governance structures of IOs (see Davies 2002). This literature is salient to students of IOs, as it re-­emphasizes several previous observations, for example that the work of an average IO employee is somewhat pedestrian. Students harbouring ambitions towards a career in IOs might be surprised to learn that their working day is more likely to involve routine tasks rather than an endless stream of challenging intergovernmental meetings. Furthermore, those writing from the theoretical standpoints outlined in Chapter 1 accept that understanding the internal machinery of IOs is a precursor to appreciating the role they play in global governance, albeit for reasons coloured by the assumptions they make about the nature of world politics.

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Realist and liberal institutionalist perspectives maintain that internal IO structures inevitably reflect the patterns of power prevailing in the international system. Recall that these writers portray IOs not as independent actors but as mechanisms created by and through which others, principally states, act. Rather than using naked coercion, powerful states employ their strength to slant internal governance mechanisms to ensure they dominate the agenda and that their interests prevail or, at the very least, that others’ interests do not. Powerful states often dominate IO decision-­making organs. The veto powers of the permanent members of the UN Security Council and the weighted voting which gives the US blocking powers in the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Executive Board are typical examples. Away from formal decision-­making bodies, stronger states, as this chapter later explores, possess tools that guarantee desirable outcomes at IOs, including providing the finance and influencing appointments. From these perspectives, the internal organs of IOs have no autonomy but exist only to execute members’ wishes. Using principal–agent analysis more recent research (Hawkins et al. 2006) suggests states (principals) deliberately invest IOs (agents) with some autonomy, as otherwise they would struggle to perform designated tasks. Many IOs operate in fluid environments and must respond adroitly to unfolding events rather than obtaining permission for every move. Likewise, examples abound of senior international civil servants playing key roles in brokering international agreements, including ceasefires across lines of conflict (the UN’s Ralph Bunche), developing financial rescue packages (Michel Camdessus and Stanley Fischer at IMF), and completing trade deals (Peter Sutherland in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations). Nevertheless, this research maintains that IOs only act autonomously within strict parameters laid down by states. In other words, realists and liberal institutionalists hold that IO autonomy is heavily circumscribed by states using the tools described to ensure IOs do their bidding. Constructivists in contrast consider that IOs have considerable independence of action. Constructivists suggest that, instead of merely doing what the major powers want, based on preordained interests, IOs can develop their own ideas and tweak their missions in ways which are sometimes inimical to their creators. Moreover, IOs can reshape the interests of their members. Constructivists assign a prominent role in these outcomes to IO leaders and their secretariats. Their autonomy springs from being the interpreters of the nebulous mandates in founding charters, through converting generic decisions into specific programmes, to using their expertise to respond to emergent problems and sometimes deciding what those emergent problems are (M. Barnett and Finnemore 2004). As this chapter describes, even powerful states can encounter resistance when attempting to reform IOs. States

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can alter an organization’s formal structures but are less able to change cultures with deeply ingrained routines and practices. To return to our nautical analogy, constructivists are not denying that states preserve a strong hand on the tiller, but posit that the captain (executive head), the crew (secretariat) and other actors can in certain circumstances affect the cargo and the final destination. Ultimately the question of where power lies in IOs and the direction in which it flows is a matter for empirical investigation, although given the multitude of IO structures it may not be susceptible to generalization. For instance, the same states that exert stringent control over IOs dealing with security matters, such as the UN, might adopt a more relaxed stance to IOs dealing with technical matters such as the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Whatever the case, it is worth re-­emphasizing the point raised by principal–agent literature that IOs without any autonomy from their members would find it difficult to fulfil their obligations. Therefore, all organizations have to manage the constructive tension between the powers flowing from the top down and the bottom up. With these preliminary observations in mind, this chapter next examines the typical structure of IOs. Here we stress interorganizational similarities, with departures from our general observations being covered in the structure sections of later chapters. Thereafter the chapter probes IOs’ governance, management and working methods through considering the principal actors involved (governments, senior managers, secretariats and non-­state actors) and how they interact within the organs of IOs to deliver results. Finally the chapter covers some enduring factors impacting upon their governance and operations, such as their mandates and financing. In the main these reflect the influence of states (mandates, financing and international law), although others depend on both states and individuals within secretariats (leadership, management problems and pressures for reform) or also involve non-­state actors (networks and to some extent finances).

4.1

Governance, management and working methods This section sketches the broad roles of governments, senior management, secretariats and non-­state actors, who together ensure the IO does not run aground. Typically the IO possesses organizational structures akin to that of Figure 4.1. States, acting through periodic or permanent assemblies of members, principally determine an IO’s overall direction, with day-­to-­day activities being the responsibility of secretariats composed of ­international

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civil servants and/or seconded officials. Following on from earlier ­comments, however, it is important to note that the arrows in Figure 4.1 point in both directions, signifying that power flows in both directions, giving secretariats and non-­state actors influence over the course the IO navigates. Governing Body of all Members

Governing Council (Selected members)

Secretary-General

Intergovernmental technical and administrative committees Secretariat

Non-state actors

Figure 4.1  The typical international organization’s structure

4.1.1 Governments States and their governmental representatives are the most important actors in IOs, exercising powers of patronage or determining financial resources and material and intellectual support. For this reason and because most IOs were created to relate to governments and civil servants rather than the population at large, their decision-­making and governance mechanisms are the logical starting point in looking at their workings. An IO generally functions through intergovernmental committees with varying levels of responsibility and influence. At the apex are formal executive and legislative organs, which come in two types. The highest level of governance is a governing body of all members, meeting normally at one-­to four-­year intervals, to make authoritative decisions such as approving international conventions and standards, appointing executive heads, adopting budgets and approving future work programmes. These meetings are widely publicized, quite formulaic with agendas that seldom differ from session to

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session, frequently attended by ministers and high-­level government representatives who make set speeches, and with proposals being adopted based on preceding discussions. Occasionally, members decide that an issue is sufficiently important to warrant convening a special conference outside their regular cycle of meetings. However, the results of many of these conferences have been long forgotten. Even those with concrete outcomes tended to give rise to bodies such as Habitat (see Chapter 6) that had little impact on the problems they were meant to solve. Immediately below the governing body there is often a governing council, normally composed of a limited number of members (usually selected to ensure a balanced geographic representation and/or the participation of key constituencies), to which is delegated the task of supervising and directing the secretariat in between meetings of the governing body. In most cases these councils work within parameters defined by governing bodies and have limited decision-­making powers, for example only authorizing changes to work programmes if no additional resources are required or promulgating rules that fit within already prescribed conventions. While most meet only periodically and are lower-­key events, some councils (such as the boards of the international financial institutions – IFIs) are in almost continual session, and states appoint permanent representatives to ensure consistent policy making. The bulk of an IO’s work is undertaken by intermediate intergovernmental meetings that take their lead from governing bodies. Amongst the more important are committees of management and overall direction. Usually attended by senior national civil servants these bodies are responsible for controlling finances, formulating work programmes, drafting legal texts or accepting the results of technical committees and subjecting them to scrutiny, revision and political compromise. While some groups have representation from all members, most have a broad but not comprehensive membership. Nevertheless, the work of mid-­level committees is ordinarily open to review by all members, who can, directly or indirectly, advocate their own views. At the lowest level are a plethora of technical committees and working groups, where differences can be aired and consensus may be developed but where the decisions are not binding or even approved. These low-­level committees do not usually have representation from all members, although they may be regionally or technically balanced to cover all potential viewpoints. Other than when committees have members appointed on a personal basis or are limited in size, governments are entitled to send delegations

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to meetings. These sometimes consist of a leader and deputies (alternate members), allowing them to cover issues from both political and technical perspectives. Powerful states may have several alternates, each dealing with a specialist subject, which confers considerable influence on them, as they can dominate detailed debate. Whereas the US and European Union (EU) fielded over 800 delegates at the Cancun meeting of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) governing body, Nigeria, a state not without resources, sent only 12 (Narlikar and Wilkinson 2004). In scientific IOs governments, while having only one vote, may have two full delegates; for example, at the European Centre for Nuclear Research (CERN) one delegate is generally an academic working in particle physics and the other a civil servant or scientific adviser. Lower-­level committees tend to work by consensus, but governing bodies and councils of almost all organizations have formal voting procedures. The majority have one-­member-­one-­vote systems that, theoretically, give all members an equal say despite the inherently unequal nature of the international system. This is not universal, however. The IFIs mostly have weighted voting reflecting members’ financial contributions, and there are other forms of weighted voting such as qualified majority voting at the EU (Box 11.2). Furthermore, the influence of major players is not solely dependent on the voting system. Powerful states can insist on permanent membership of key committees, while other states rotate their membership periodically. Just as the size and proficiency of their delegations confer technical advantages, their permanent presence gives them a greater weight in discussions with secretariats and between members, as they can forcefully advocate their positions and exert pressure on weaker states to reach agreement. As E.B. Haas (1990) observes, more powerful states constitute an ‘inner elite’ that is consulted more consistently by executive heads (see Chapter 10, section 10.2.2, WTO Green Room process). Formal voting mechanisms notwithstanding, IOs often adopt consensus decision making. Inevitably, in the context of international politics, this involves compromise, which by its very nature is not always satisfactory. In domestic political systems, if a government has sufficient votes at its command, decisions ultimately can be pushed through unilaterally and enforced using the state’s monopoly on coercive power. In the anarchical international environment, decisions can be engineered by more powerful states, but relying on coercive tactics can be self-­defeating, and even superpowers have to build alliances. Moreover, because there is no overarching authority, it is more difficult to reconcile competing interests, and decisions can be ignored. Consequently the decisions of IOs are frequently

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a lowest common denominator, and the aspirations of more progressive nations are constrained by the more cautious. If a multitude of states must unanimously accept every component of a negotiation then, despite the advantages of carrying all parties (particularly weaker states), getting agreement is likely to prove laborious. This is well illustrated by the protracted nature of the WTO Doha Round negotiations (Chapter 10, section 10.2). Should a final agreement ever be reached, it will probably bundle measures together so that, for all participants, losses in some areas are offset by gains in others.

4.1.2 Senior management The senior managements are considered to be executive heads, along with their immediate subordinates, who are usually at the level of Deputy and/ or Assistant Secretary-­General or equivalent. While the executive head may be the only person appointed directly by the governing body, the level below is also appointed with political considerations in mind. Senior management’s role is fourfold. First, in international negotiations or disputes they act as the voice of the total membership or the wider international community by using the prestige of the office to ‘propose, complain and advocate’ (Xu and Weller 2008: 41). An example is the UN Secretary-­ General (SG) using his ‘good offices’ to intercede between states. Second, they are responsible for delivering the programmes and monitoring the policies established by governing bodies. Third, they formally head and provide leadership to the secretariats. Finally, they are pivotal players transferring messages from national capitals to the IO and vice versa, for example when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s SG builds coalitions for military action. To fulfil these tasks executive heads ideally need to be politically astute, competent negotiators, technically knowledgeable, and inspiring and respected leaders with international profiles. Most importantly they have to show impartiality and retain the confidence of both governments and staff throughout their tenure, particularly the support of major budgetary contributors. Although the point is contested (Weiss 1982) some consider that ‘the quality of executive leadership may prove to be the most critical single determinant in the growth in scope and authority of international organization’ (Cox 1969). Case Study 4.1 demonstrates that some leaders have been inspirational and their effects profound, especially those who were the first leaders of their respective organization and had critical influence by conceiving and elucidating a future mission. The very best possessed a clear moral integrity and high sense of duty and responsibility, which they managed to

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communicate to their subordinates. Conversely, poor leaders have produced disillusionment and crisis. Inevitably, given their importance to the direction, management and administration of IOs, politics encroaches on the selection of executive heads. In the immediate post-­war period, many executive heads were appointed on merit following outstanding technical careers or their exposure to leadership under the duress of two world wars. Unfortunately, by the 1970s, this pool of talent had shrunk appreciably, and pressure for an appropriate balance in the management team (for example, representatives from all regions or a balance between developed and developing nations) had elevated nationality and politics above competence and integrity as the paramount selection criteria for senior posts (see Box 4.1). These trends have rippled down, impacting on lower management levels and organizational structure (for example by creating regional offices headed by high-­level officials with few responsibilities), with detrimental implications for institutional effectiveness. This problem is effectively captured in Weiss’s (2010) observation that, ‘when purely political considerations so clearly trump competence and autonomy regarding the appointment of senior and more junior personnel, both member states and “we the peoples” suffer’. BOX 4.1

SELECTING THE WTO DIRECTOR-­GENERAL (DG) In the 1999 election for WTO DG, governments became deadlocked over whether to appoint a person from a developing nation or from a leading non-­European trading nation. The result was a deal which did nothing for WTO’s effectiveness. The normal four-­year term of office

was split, and a New Zealander, Michael Moore, was appointed for a reduced three-­year term and a Thai, Supachai Panitchpakdi, for the following three years, leaving Moore a lame duck from the start and neither with enough time to fulfil a mandate.

Several studies have dissected the problems of selecting senior management (see Urquhart and Childers 1996). There is consensus that there should be published descriptions of the qualities and qualifications required for specific posts and independent selection panels which can propose a slate of suitable candidates for whom governments can then vote. A few organizations, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), have adopted this approach with some success, and the idea is slowly gaining ground.

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CASE STUDY 4.1

Three DGs of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) – their impact and ­management styles Lord (John) Boyd Orr (1945–48) Boyd Orr served as a doctor in the First World War, twice being decorated for bravery. After the war he was appointed Director of Nutrition at Aberdeen University, and eventually Professor of Agriculture, contributing to the League’s work on food production and price stability. His studies of British nutritional levels, which showed that malnutrition was rife even in advanced economies, led to the recognition that nutritional standards were essential to good health. In the Second World War, he served on the Scientific Committee on Food Policy, which developed wartime rationing, a programme so successful that it raised nutritional standards despite extreme food shortages. Although not proposed by the UK (an unthinkable situation in the present day), his international reputation ensured his election as FAO’s first DG. Like Albert Thomas of the International Labour Organization (ILO, see Chapter 2, section 2.2.2), Boyd Orr was a strong personality and an activist, whose outstanding intellectual leadership resulted in proposals which, although sometimes rejected or postponed through an initial lack of resources, eventually came to fruition. He established FAO’s technical competence by initiating the first World Food Survey in 1946, covering 90 per cent of the world’s population, a publication that FAO has continued to produce decennially. Meanwhile, the post-­war food crisis led to his proposing a World Food Board to stabilize agricultural prices, manage international reserves and provide food aid. This idea was rejected by FAO members reluctant to unleash an over-­mighty institution that could challenge their sovereignty, but they did establish an International Emergency Food Council, and his overarching idea eventually took hold and conceptually was the origin of the World Food Programme (WFP, see Chapter 6, section 6.4). He initiated an FAO catalogue of institutions housing rice and wheat breeding material and proposed a clearing house to collect and exchange genetic material, a role eventually assumed by CGIAR (Chapter 14). Boyd Orr was a hard worker who expected tireless effort from his staff and travelled widely to give FAO the initial prominence that it needed. The moral and intellectual compass for his leadership came from his strong (Presbyterian) social conscience and a belief that science should underlie FAO politics. Despite being authoritarian he imparted to his subordinates a sense of their mission and his own beliefs. In the words of his obituary (The Times, 26 June 1971) he ‘could bring conferences of government officials to their feet cheering his forthrightness and obvious sincerity’. His political skills were weaker, however, and he resigned to protest against the narrow mandate that states gave him, saying at the time that ‘the people want bread and we are to give them paper’, an ominous prophecy of

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CASE STUDY 4.1 (continued)

FAO’s future. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1949 and became a successful businessman, spending his final years supporting movements for world government. Binay Sen (1956–67) Sen was the first Asian to head a major IO and was well qualified for the post. A career in the elite Indian civil service saw him rise to the level of Department Secretary. During the 1943 Indian famine that killed nearly one million people he was put in charge of food relief. This eventually led to his appointment as Secretary of the Department of Food, where he created a central food reserve, which averted a second potential famine in 1946. He then entered India’s foreign service, being appointed ambassador to several countries. There are a number of parallels between his tenure and Boyd Orr’s. His nomination as DG was submitted not by India but by developed-­world countries. Like Boyd Orr, Sen was autocratic, but his efforts, unlike those of his predecessors, converted FAO from a data-­ collecting and research-­oriented body into one focused on tackling the food insecurity faced by millions in the developing world by enhancing its operative activities and turning it into a development agency. He is regarded as the most hands-­on and creative of FAO’s DGs and, with more political skills than Boyd Orr, he built up an impressive power base, challenging the established international order. At a global level, reviving Boyd Orr’s idea, he was instrumental in establishing WFP to distribute surplus food stocks, and at the first World Food Congress in 1963 he pressed for and obtained a declaration that there should be a universal right to freedom from hunger. Having strongly supported his election, the developed world gave him the resources he requested to expand FAO, quadrupling its budget at a time of global economic growth. Advocating a bottom-­up approach to development and the importance of subsistence farmers in providing for food security, he used the additional funding to open sub-­regional offices and to strengthen FAO’s cadre of field workers. In 1958/59 he instigated programmes to provide small farmers with improved seed varieties and to encourage them to use pesticides. In 1960, he launched the Freedom From Hunger Campaign (FFHC) to support small-­scale rural food projects. He also advocated a collaborative role for FAO. Using the authority to improve food marketing enshrined in the FAO Constitution (Article 1(d)) he established the Codex Alimentarius Commission, jointly with WHO, which defines uniform food quality and health standards (see Chapter 7, section 7.3). He invited NGOs, universities, research institutes and industry to join in FAO’s work, particularly by supporting FFHC, which stressed integrated rural development and gave them a voice as partners, a first for an IO but something viewed suspiciously by member states (Weitz 1997). Like other long-­ serving executive heads, Sen eventually lost some of his impetus and faced criticism over FAO’s excessive bureaucracy and poor management. He retired to India, where he was active in social work.

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CASE STUDY 4.1 (continued)

Edouard Saouma (1976–93) An agronomist by training, Saouma worked in Lebanon in several technical positions, rising to become Director of the National Institute for Agricultural Research in 1957. He joined FAO in 1962 as Deputy Regional Representative for South-­East Asia and was appointed Director, Land and Water Division in 1965. He briefly left FAO in 1970 to become Lebanon’s Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. He returned to FAO and his former position after one year, but his resignation and governmental position allowed him legitimately to cultivate the regional contacts needed to support his candidacy for DG. Saouma was initially welcomed as a new broom, following the vacillating leadership of Adeke Boerma, and he moved swiftly to reassert FAO presence in developing countries, particularly by setting up FAO offices. Nevertheless, he soon exposed another side of his character, namely a determination to cling on to power. Against the wishes of the major budget contributors but with the majority support of the developing countries, he instigated a Technical Cooperation Programme. This programme funded small-­scale, high-­priority projects approved by Saouma, who used them as a lever to obtain backing for his re-­election. Blatant in his manipulation of the rules and his authority to secure re-­election, he made one major error that was to haunt him. In 1982 he obtained Australian backing for a bigger budget in return for appointing James Ingram as WFP Executive Director. Ingram was a Trojan horse installed to emancipate WFP from FAO control, and they engaged in a running feud. This, combined with a personality clash with the Ethiopian delegate to FAO, culminated in Saouma’s 1984 refusal to authorize a shipment of 26 000 tons of food for Ethiopian famine relief, a delay resulting in an estimated 34 000 deaths. Consequently, Ingram garnered more independence for WFP, which it maintains. By the end of Saouma’s second term there was considerable disaffection with his petty and imperious management style. FAO’s effectiveness was hampered by the early retirement of experienced staff, who were replaced by political appointees. In contrast to Boyd Orr and Sen, Saouma ruled by fear rather than by providing intellectual or moral leadership. Although he was politically adept in maintaining the support of the G77, he was strangely naïve in dismissing the opinions of the major budget contributors, preferring confrontation to collaboration. Large donors accused him of mismanagement and withheld funding to force him out. Idiosyncratic voting patterns ensured him a third term, but suspicions persist that some national delegates had responded to Saouma’s material enticements rather than their country’s instructions. His legacy was an organization with low morale and less effective than when he was appointed, a situation exacerbated by his successor (see Box 4.3).

4.1.3 Secretariats Secretariats are the glue that binds together the international activities of members. IO officials undertake a myriad of tasks that ensure the smooth running of their organizations and that support desired objectives. They

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assemble, disseminate and analyse information or trends needed to understand the international dimension of problems, and provide an institutional memory (by accessing past records and decisions). They support the work of members by preparing and organizing meetings, and drafting texts of agreements and regulations. They work in the field to deliver political outcomes, humanitarian intervention and development assistance, and many are engaged in routine administrative tasks. The breakdown of staff functions in FAO is typical: 52 per cent of headquarters staff are in support grades, while 20 per cent are professionals with administrative functions or administering technical cooperation programmes. The remaining 28 per cent of staff are professionals working on core programmes, most of whom are not key influence brokers. Even when high politics is a driver (for example, large international conferences when an eminent person with high visibility is appointed as conference SG) the preparatory work mostly involves staff liaising with members, consolidating their positions on the issues, developing proposals or analyses, costing them and drafting provisional conference resolutions. A striking aspect of secretariats is the diversity of the staff. IOs have recently made considerable efforts to widen their recruitment base and particularly to give opportunities to females. Nevertheless, as elsewhere, glass ceilings exist, and the cultural proclivities of some ethnic groups work in the opposite direction. For example, appointing females to certain Middle Eastern offices can be awkward. A diverse, multinational staff generates a variety of experiences and viewpoints. This results in a more vibrant exchange of ideas when developing policies and projects and a staff that relates more closely to the cultures of member states. Managing a culturally diverse staff is nonetheless challenging, and drawbacks include consensus decision making and incremental change. Different languages and educational backgrounds also contribute to misunderstandings or even deliberate manipulation. That secretariats are generally cohesive bodies is a testament to the cultural overlay inherited from the early IOs. The treaties and agreements underpinning IOs are designed to guard the independence and ensure the safety of organizations and staff. These protections include the immunity of IOs from prosecution, exemptions attaching to their personnel, and the inviolability of premises and archives. This legal backdrop theoretically prevents one or more states exerting unreasonable control over an institution and its staff, as was the case when US Senator McCarthy persecuted suspected communists in the UN Secretariat. It also safeguards international civil servants working in dangerous situations, who require freedom of movement and action to fulfil their tasks. These inbuilt protections do not always work. Since the UN’s founding, 2900 UN

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BOX 4.2

THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE (ICS) The guiding principles of the ICS spring from Drummond’s work at the League (Box 2.1). In the post-­war period these principles were reinforced by the UN International Civil Service Advisory Board, which required that international civil servants should not ‘seek or accept instructions in regard to the performance of their duties from any government’ (UN 1954). Often the result has been a true Weberian bureaucracy whose officials are impersonal, are appointed on the basis of competence, function in accordance with defined rules, work in a clear hierarchy, make rational and clearly recorded decisions, and clearly separate their private and official persona (Weber 1947). In the past, permanency of

contract reinforced ICS independence, but latterly IOs, seeking staffing flexibility, have favoured fixed-­term contacts. The majority of states accept that the ICS should jettison any attachment to narrow national interests in favour of providing an international perspective and proposals that consider the views of all members in the context of internationally agreed objectives. For the most part international civil servants uphold the lofty ideals of competence, objectivity and independence. Nevertheless, scholarship on the role and recruitment of the ICS suggests these principles can be impugned, especially in organizations such as the UN where critical national interests are at stake (Weiss 2010).

peacekeeping personnel have died in the course of duty. In the 2000s alone, 413 UN civilian personnel were killed and the International Committee of the Red Cross lost 67 staff. These protections also have undesirable consequences, not least that IOs and their staff cannot be sued if they commit acts of gross negligence, nor can they be compelled to release information on their work. The statutes of most IOs require them to employ staff with ‘due regard [being] paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible’ (Charter of the United Nations, Article 101), but this is interpreted flexibly. Just as with senior management, a balance often has to be struck between nationality and experience, as states take a keen interest in appointments at all levels. The extreme example of balancing selection is found in the UN System, where every member has been allocated a desirable range of staffing points, based on its financial contribution and other factors. Against this range, each professional staff member funded from the ‘regular’ budget is ‘debited’ on the basis of one point for a staff member at the lowest grade, two points for the next highest and so on. Any shortfall or excess against a country’s range of points is an additional factor in determining if a national can be appointed, all other things being equal. Similarly, EU staffing

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reflects the geographical balance of the European Parliament. States deploy all manner of subterfuges to manipulate Secretariat appointments. The effects mirror those witnessed at senior management level, with the appointment of inferior candidates to the detriment of the IO and its constituents. Fearing upsetting key patrons, IOs sometimes reassign rather than dismiss incompetent officials, leaving deadwood that undermines morale and efficiency and stifles innovation and flair. Worse, international civil servants whose appointment or promotion was influenced by their home country may feel their loyalties lie therein rather than with the IO, especially if they anticipate returning home eventually. This may translate into a reluctance to criticize their own government, with their decisions slanted towards national interests rather than those of the wider international community. The idea that bureaucrats and bureaucracies can affect domestic policy is widely accepted (Hennessy 1989) and has even become part of popular parody through television comedies such as Yes Minister. The possibilities of international outcomes being manipulated or moderated by the ICS are countered by the dominance of theories that presume outcomes reflect state power and interests. As the introduction intimated, however, a growing body of research suggests that IOs take on a life of their own by cultivating ideas, advancing agendas and fine-­tuning their objectives independently of states, possibly reshaping members’ interests or metamorphosing in ways unanticipated by or even unfavourable to members. Xu and Weller (2008) suggest that the capacity for international civil servants to achieve influence depends on a combination of formal institutional structures and informal conditions. Formal institutional structures refer to the mandate of the IO established in founding charters or treaties and other issues covered elsewhere in this chapter, including who supplies the budget, voting procedures and influence over appointments. These arrangements determine the formal opportunities that exist for the ICS to wield influence. For example, while an IO’s mission might be stated, states often deliberately leave the ICS latitude to interpret it. This is especially true in technical IOs, where ‘state delegates may rely heavily on the competence of highly qualified and widely dispersed staff to identify, develop and recommend proposals for action’ (Xu and Weller 2008: 39). Informal conditions chiefly refer to the competence, expertise, legitimacy and culture of the ICS. For example, 12 Nobel Prizes have been awarded to individual international civil servants in recognition of their specific expertise. As with their domestic counterparts, international civil servants’ custodianship of information gives them a privileged position that, whether through honest endeavour or deliberate connivance, allows them to present particular arguments and shape debates and

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provides an opportunity for them to set the intellectual framework through which policy matters are probed (P.M. Haas 1992a). The legitimacy of the ICS stems from Weberian principles (Box 4.2), in particular by being seen to be neutral arbiters, above the political fray and loyal only to their IO’s principles.

4.1.4 Non-­state actors States are the principal members and actors in the majority of IOs. Nevertheless, most IOs have mechanisms to allow non-­members (states, quasi-­states, other IOs, INGOs, business and civil society organizations) to participate in their discussions and support their work (see Chapter 1). Indeed, in recent years the participation of non-­state actors in IO deliberations has intensified. This trend is being driven by factors including the need to tackle a seeming democratic deficit at the international level (a vacuum which was beginning to be filled by non-­state organizations), the burgeoning involvement of non-­state actors in delivering IO programmes and the increasing privatization of activities once seen as government prerogatives. Several postal services, for example, are fully or partly privatized, but the Universal Postal Union (UPU), the IO governing international mails, gives minimal recognition to that fact. Not only is this leading to unsatisfactory regulations but, as in other technical areas, UPU is now vying for influence with an INGO pioneered by private operators (Chapter 16, section 16.2.1). IOs and states are still adjusting to and not fully comfortable with this form of coexistence, and mechanisms are being sought to facilitate broader dialogue. IOs rarely interface with the general public on mainstream issues, whatever their eventual impact may be. A few IOs, such as UNICEF and the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), work directly with the public (see Chapter 6), but those with whom they work are often the least influential and most disadvantaged. IOs do not display a uniform approach to their relations with non-­members, but most have formal procedures for giving them a status within the organization. The input and impact of non-­members varies. At the most basic level (for example the UN’s Economic and Social Council), this might entitle them to observe proceedings, be consulted on specific topics and liaise with the Secretariat. Such low-­level engagement means a marginal voice and limited influence; moreover, these rights can be withdrawn. Even here IOs adopt very different approaches. Some, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-­operation and Development (OECD), generally prefer hub-­and-­spoke arrangements inviting non-­members to become associated with specific committees or projects, whereas others, such as the World Meteorological Organization, bestow organization-­wide observer status.

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The next step up is the development of specific representative organs and permanent channels through which non-­members can express their opinions and become involved. Examples are sector membership and the Telecom Convention of the International Telecommunication Union (Chapter 16, section 16.1) or the subsidiary emanations of IFIs which allow them to lend to the private sector. The most intimate and least usual types of relations with non-­members are those that put them almost on a par with members. These arrangements grant non-­state actors almost full and permanent access to the inner sanctums of IOs, integrate them into an organization’s ongoing work and confer voting rights in executive bodies, for example workers’ and employers’ organizations within ILO (Chapter 7, section 7.2).

4.2

The operating environment

4.2.1 Mandates Secretariats get their authority and direction primarily from mandates, which are most frequently contained in founding charters. The most effective IOs tend to be those with lucid objectives, something exemplified by comparing narrowly focused institutions such as WFP, CERN and UNICEF and broader-­based ones such as the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Council of Europe and the UN. Charters are notoriously difficult to amend. They are often compromises in the first place, and members are reluctant to open old sores. Altering a charter commonly requires a super-­majority of votes, which is difficult to achieve, especially if powerful members resist. The charters of many post-­war IOs are now hopelessly anachronistic, yet updates are slow to emerge. Mission statements or corporate visions have been formulated to overcome this problem, as even if constrained by original mandates they can be adopted without redrafting basic texts, although sometimes they are uninspiring attempts to cover all bases (Davies 2002). Broad mandates result in overlapping responsibilities, with concomitant potential for turf wars, poor programme prioritization, duplicated costs and uncertainty within the international community about which IO is best placed to act. As the volume of IOs has multiplied, clusters of interrelated activities and overlapping fiefdoms have emerged (see Figures 3.1 to 3.3). Statistics are a good example of where several IOs work in parallel. Most produce statistical yearbooks covering their areas of competence, but much of the information replicates that available elsewhere. Macroeconomic studies provide another example (see Table 4.1). Studies bearing an IO’s

X

IBRD RDBs OECD Bank for International   Settlements European Central Bank WTO CGIAR UN System

X X X

X X

X

Global

IMF

Organization

X

X

X

Regional

X X X

X

Country

Geographic cover

Table 4.1  Competition in macroeconomic studies

EU economic studies, finance and trade Trade flows and commodities Food trade and production (International Food Policy Research Institute) Sector studies in areas of specific organizational interest

Economic studies, foreign exchange and monetary issues, fiscal analysis, capital flows, trade and commodities, public expenditure, taxation Economic studies with a development perspective, external debt, capital flows Studies with a development perspective Trade and commerce, including studies of key industrial economies that are non-­members Finance, foreign exchange and monetary issues, capital flows

Subject areas of macroeconomic research

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imprimatur claim greater authority because of their rigorous statistical methodologies and their insulation from political influences. Nevertheless, expenditures and duplication raise questions about the value added by IO involvement when others (including some who can claim equal rigour and neutrality such as universities and economics ministries) provide the same public goods.

4.2.2 Financing Most IOs obtain their core funding (commonly called their regular or administrative budget) from governments, based on an agreed assessment formula and periodic budget proposals. There are exceptions. Some, such as the World Intellectual Property Organization, charge for their services, and others, such as the EU (Chapter 11) and the IFIs (Chapters 8 and 9), have independent resources allocated to them that do not require continual governmental negotiation. Humanitarian organizations, particularly UNICEF, UNHCR and WFP, solicit voluntary contributions from governments and contributions from the general public, often for specific emergencies, while other IOs and NGOs fund CGIAR (Chapter 14). Frequently the formula for assessing contributions gauges a state’s ability to pay, making many IOs highly dependent on contributions from the richest and hence most powerful states (see Table 4.2). To reflect their financial input, major contributors often have permanent seats, and therefore a larger proportional voice, in the budgetary committees that allocate funds to IO projects. Furthermore, there is rarely a time when at least one Table 4.2  Major contributors to IO budgets (2010) IO

UN ILO ICAO IBRD IMF OECD WTO NATO CGIAR

Top member states in order of contribution 1st

2nd

3rd

4th

5th

6th

USA USA USA USA USA USA USA USA USA

Japan Japan Japan Japan Japan Japan Germany Germany IBRD

Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany China UK Canada

UK UK UK France France UK Japan France UK

France France France UK UK France UK Italy EU

Italy Italy China China China Italy France Canada Germany

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major ­contributor is not facing its own financial constraints, which intensifies funding pressures. These problems are exacerbated by the propensity of major donors to exploit the power of the purse. During the Cold War both superpowers withheld funds from the UN budget when they felt it ran counter to their interests (see Chapter 5, ACABQ). Most recently the US has withdrawn its funding from UNESCO, in protest at Palestine’s ­admission to membership. Table 4.3 provides details of the budgets and staffing of selected IOs (Table 12.1 gives similar details for the EU semi-­autonomous institutions). Table 4.3 covers IOs with more than 200 staff, which eliminates several political ROs, some of which are permanently short of funds (see Chapter 13). To some extent, an IO’s cost depends upon its headquarters’ location. The UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and CGIAR, which have large staffs but low budgets, are located in low-­cost developing countries, but many IOs are headquartered in European and North American cities and encounter correspondingly exorbitant running costs. Budgets also reflect the degree to which the organization has operational as opposed to programme functions (exemplified by the difference between CERN and OECD), as normative work can be more easily curtailed or postponed. Table 4.3  Budgets and staffing of selected IOs (2009/10) Organization

Staff

Regular budget from members ($m)

UNRWA EU – Commission

29 000 26 200

540 12 200

UN WFP

15 500 9150

2400 345

UNICEF

8200

1100

CGIAR

8060

506

EP European Patent Organisation EU – other core institutions UNHCR NATO

7080 6700 6620 6500 5880

2085 800 1530 1300 292

Other funds, when reported ($m) 85 182 000 (total EU transfers between members) 3800 (peacekeeping) 5200 (pledges for food aid) 2300 (voluntary donations including governments) Individual centres can solicit additional funds 1350 earned from fees 515 2550 (military and security budget)

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Table 4.3  (continued) Organization

Staff

UNDP

4700

426

WHO FAO ILO CERN OECD IMF

4350 3100 2650 2600 2500 2200

464 473 373 1000 424 870

Eurocontrol International Atomic Energy   Agency UNESCO European Space Agency COE ECB

2150 2150

695 418

2150 2050 1750 1500

325 4170 375 527

1050 800 800 725

31 107 153 85

700 635 600 580

182 175 78 251

500 450

47 230

450 350

160 45

270 260

70 14

220

50

WIPO ICAO ITU Organization of American States   (OAS) European Southern Observatory WTO UNEP BIS Interpol Organization for Security and   Co-­operation in Europe African Union IMO WMO Association of Southeast Asian   Nations European Centre for Medium-­   Range Weather Forecasts

Regular budget from members ($m)

Other funds, when reported ($m) 1200 (voluntary pledges by governments) 1600 600 130 122 Holds 351 000 in members’ quotas 143 176

Holds 3 800 000 in members’ assets 257 from patent fees 141 52

102 430 000 of members’ assets managed 11

170 (non-­core costs) 21 (including World Maritime University) 28

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Between 1960 and the mid-­1980s IO budgets kept pace with their heightening responsibilities. Late in the 1980s, the main contributors ran into economic difficulties, and national austerity programmes focused attention on IO budgets. To convince governments of their cost-­effectiveness, most large IOs cut staff and diversified their search for new funding. However, because programme formulation is often divorced from financing, members veer towards agreeing a proliferation of minor programmes to satisfy specific constituencies without ensuring sufficient funding, thereby salami-­slicing budgets so that ultimately no programme is adequately resourced (see Chapter 7). IOs have successfully tapped alternative funding sources. For instance, as regular budgets have withered, IOs now rely more on government-­provided ‘trust funds’ to support specific programmes. In 2008–09 the UN System received 24 per cent of its total funding from trust funds (with a high of 52 per cent in WHO). Even the IFIs, which are less dependent on direct budget subventions, resorted to supplementary funding. In 2009 the World Bank Group had more than 500 trust funds disbursing $583m or 21 per cent of its regular budget. This has protected programmes but has had some negative side-­effects. Governments providing trust funds select which programmes to support and may impose conditions or use the IO to provide a veneer of legitimacy to their own policies. Furthermore, it encourages IOs to pursue ‘flavours of the month’ in an effort to secure resources. For example, even when it was not their mainstream concern many IOs created units or programmes with a focus on sustainable development. By favouring particular projects states can skew or even lead the IO away from core mandates agreed by the whole membership. Moreover, by excluding certain members from decisions about individual programmes, voluntary contributions can also endanger the quality and quantity of cooperation. To paraphrase a Nordic report (Nordic UN Project 1991): the diverse mix of voluntary and assessed contributions across the [UN] system and the proliferation of trust funds are inherently damaging to coherence [of programmes] and an indication of governance failure. Fragmented funding also leads to staff spending time drumming up funding, duplication of support services, a plethora of different accounting and operational requirements and overlapping responsibilities. If members seriously focus on prioritizing programmes within predefined budget envelopes, they can make strategic decisions that support mandates and reduce funding distortions.

4.2.3 Management The roles, responsibility for leadership and selection of senior management have been considered above, but the broader issue of how IOs are managed

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and whether management is effective is also relevant to understanding their operation. Spreading best practice in public management, often under the rubric of good governance, has been central to the mandates of many IOs for some time, yet they often fail to heed their own advice when it comes to their management and personnel practices (Woods 2000). The typical management structure is one problem area. IOs, with occasional exceptions, have hierarchical and centralized management, a so-­called high-­ power-­distance culture, which typically has a relatively large proportion of supervisory staff exercising command and control functions. Modern management theory de-­emphasizes hierarchy and advocates teamwork, with responsibility being delegated to the lowest possible level (Ostroff 1999). Executive heads with poor leadership skills are often reluctant to delegate, resulting in their span of control being considerably larger than that of their private sector counterparts, where delegation is commonplace. Many executive heads now have deputies, but rarely is there a clear functional separation between the two positions, leading to the deputy becoming simply one more layer in the bureaucracy, contrary to private sector best practice where chief executives and chief operating officers have different responsibilities. A centralized hierarchy is especially problematic in organizations, such as the UN or IFIs, where extensive field missions result in far-­flung personnel being managed by a bureaucratic overlay of reports, manuals and procedures. Organizations, such as UNDP and CGIAR, which have highly devolved structures tend to have greater management delegation. Nonetheless, when an organization makes a deliberate attempt to reorient its work to the field, there is a centrifugal effect whereby the opinion of staff in headquarters bears more weight than that of those on the spot. Flatter management structures, which are common in the private sector, devolve decision making from those working in a distant headquarters to those best positioned to assess what works on the ground. This encourages faster decisions more relevant to the communities they are designed to benefit and fosters greater adaptability to changing circumstances. The hierarchical tendency is reinforced by the ‘diplomatic’ aura surrounding the top levels of governance with its panoply of ministers and high-­ level officials. EU Commissioners are an example. They have strong links to their national hierarchies and, until very recently, occupied a separate building from the staff for whom they were responsible, reinforcing the distance between them and their colleagues. In well-­managed IOs the distance between members and staff can be reduced and a sense of mission transmitted through senior managers who have the standing to act and be accepted as

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intermediaries (Galtung 1986). In the large IOs, middle management plays an important role, particularly when, as in the EU, senior management is political and does not necessarily have long-­term organizational interests in mind. However, budget cuts since the 1990s have shrunk middle management, inhibiting its ability to perform this function, to the detriment of staff morale. The expanding size of IOs further constrains efficient management. The pace of IO enlargement outstrips hierarchies’ ability to adapt (sometimes because of the aforementioned politics that prevents senior managers being reassigned) and impacts on working methods. The three largest centralized institutions (the EU, the UN and the World Bank Group) provide examples of poor operational and administrative practice over time, with increasing size leading to more management layers and less efficient lines of control and responsibility (see Chapter 5, UN Oil-­for-­Food Programme). As IOs grow they go through four stages of internal development. Small IOs generally exhibit good internal communications and cooperation. With expansion, multiple staff work on similar tasks, and identifying effective performers becomes more difficult. This leads to the third stage, when staff develop personal networks to deliver results, sometimes based on contacting fellow nationals working in the relevant area and sometimes through knowing the most effective operators, but this insulates poor performers and weakens accountability. In the final stage these networks disintegrate as tapering functions limit their impact, and only when the organization restructures can there be improvement. Some IOs have sought to neuter centralization using matrix management; however, this conflicts with cultures (such as those in Asia and Latin America) where hierarchy is important and can worsen rather than improve management. Accountability is another lacuna in the management of IOs. Centralization means that few managers are held accountable for results, and decision making becomes a collective exercise of compromise. Prior to 1996, for instance, five departments were responsible for different aspects of the African Development Bank’s project execution, and no common records were maintained. An organization’s culture is embodied in the rules, norms and expectations that are built up over time. A particular cultural problem, reinforcing the tendency to avoid responsibility and accountability, is one in which administration, budget and finance are used as control mechanisms and justified as management processes rather than being a force for progressive improvement, for example performance evaluation, which is a very threatening cultural practice for many staff but which should stimulate management–staff dialogue. Managers are rarely held accountable for their

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use of resources. Staffing, which constitutes 60 per cent of many IOs’ costs, becomes a headcount process of filling seats rather than a programmatic one where efficacy of results is the guiding principle. Rigid annual budgets result in wasted resources, for which there are no sanctions, as managers are forced to spend allocated funds before financial year-­ends to avoid ‘losing’ them. Regional organizations tend to have worse management than global IOs. The involvement of fewer governments means there are fewer advocates of radical change to challenge conservative regional concepts of management. No region is immune from this trait. The dysfunctional management environment of IOs has only been addressed fairly recently, with reforms moving away from purely organizational considerations, such as appropriate departmental structures, and starting to focus on results (see section 4.2.4).

4.2.4 Reform Organizational restructuring is commonplace amongst governments and businesses as they seek to cope with changes. However, the rigid mandates of IOs, disagreement among members on the rationale for reform, and the traditional inertia of bureaucracies partly stultify reform pressures (see Box 4.3). Nevertheless, IO reorganizations are occurring with increasing frequency owing to government pressure for greater cost-­effectiveness in the delivery of mandates and, to a lesser extent, staff dissatisfaction. For example, IBRD’s first reorganization was in 1952, and its second was exactly 20 years later; since then, however, there have been reorganizations in 1987, 1993, 1996 and 2013. Indeed of the leading IOs only the EU and IMF did not undergo radical internal change in the 1990s. Elsewhere deep-­seated reforms were the springboard for renewed mandates and improved cost-­effectiveness at many IOs. Until the mid-­1980s, members possessed essentially positive views of IOs’ work, and occasional budget tightening in response to specific concerns was mostly accommodated by a hiring freeze or by cutting discretionary costs. Major reorganizations or reforms were predominantly in response to expanding mandates, were internally driven and resulted from operational needs, rather than concerns about management, quality or results. The end of the Cold War transformed the context in which many IOs operated (see Chapter 3) and affected how IOs were reformed. Because ideological splits faded, governments became more vocal about failings and more involved in the reform process, particularly through commissioning external evaluations reporting to governing bodies. Government discontent with IO management and overall effectiveness drives reform to focus on results, management

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style and administration. This was exemplified by the independent external evaluation (IEE) of FAO, which sought holistic reforms that covered all institutional shortcomings (Box 4.3), similar to those outlined in the sections on mandates (section 4.2.1), financing (section 4.2.2) and management (section 4.2.3). Reforms prompt upheavals that disrupt the smooth running of an institution, especially where poorly conceived changes lower staff morale, interrupt BOX 4.3

REFORM AT FAO 2007–09 After 30 years of poor management and 15 years of falling budgets the situation at FAO came to a head immediately following the second re-­election of DG Jacques Diouf over an argument between members about whether FAO should be broadly programme or operationally oriented. Members agreed to appoint an IEE which, for the first time in any major IO’s history, would examine all facets of its work – governance, programmes, administration and relationships with IGOs and NGOs. The IEE concluded that an unreformed FAO would almost inevitably be closed, necessitating the creation of a new IO. The IEE therefore proposed ‘reform with growth’ whereby, as targets were reached, the budget would expand to reward improved performance. The IEE made over 200 recommendations (FAO-­IEE 2007), including: • reducing the Secretariat’s role and making policy development the prerogative of members; • changing organizational culture by improving the process and timing of the programme budget, providing a more realistic basis for measuring results, and linking staff performance measurement to outcomes;

• tackling the problems of centralized hierarchy by strengthening FAO regional offices, thus moving decision making closer to member states; • decreasing funding distortions by eliminating programmes to focus on core FAO work; • improving the management structure; and • radically overhauling the FAO administration, enhancing delegation, moving from ex ante to ex post controls and ­improving human resources management. The 2008 FAO Conference accepted the IEE report in principle and established a committee of the FAO Council to examine each recommendation and make final proposals to a special session of the Conference held in 2009. This process resulted in 60 per cent of the IEE proposals being adopted, although several of those rejected concerned improvements to the governance process. Notably, members engaged in the discussions in a less polarized manner than before, creating a positive environment for reform. The 2009 Conference approved the recommendations, and reform with growth started to take effect.

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programme delivery and waste resources (for example, through overuse of redundancy packages). Successful reform requires speedy implementation and the active participation of top management; otherwise the process falters as conservative forces reassert themselves. The 1987 IBRD reorganization, which attempted to refocus work on the project cycle and to rationalize the institution, was so badly conceived and handled that it prejudiced later reforms in 1993 and 1996. The mistake was in the approach to selecting staff for new functions whereby each hierarchical level selected the next lower level, which isolated senior management, was enormously demotivating, and fostered a painfully slow selection process which tended to reject independently minded staff. The two subsequent reforms were poorly received, as management did not sense that staff would have probably responded better to gradual change than to further disturbance. The 1996 ‘Strategic Compact’ reform was an attempt to shift from a disbursement-­to a results-­based culture, but the matrix management structure adopted was overcomplicated, lending dropped dramatically for a while, and governments complained that IBRD had lost institutional knowledge as a result of frequent staff reassignments. The internet and a concomitant increase in demand for transparency and information have changed the way IOs present themselves externally, and they have moved quite quickly to embrace management models for knowledge-­based organizations, improving access to their research and data resources. Building on this and recognizing the burgeoning linkages between organizations (Figures 3.2 and 3.3), a different approach to reform now leaves existing mandates broadly unchanged but tackles problems through coordinated networks of government agencies, IOs, INGOs, business and civil society (Reinicke 1998). Problems including AIDS (WHO, UNDP, the Global Fund, the EU and IBRD, amongst others), initiatives for cheap vaccine production and immunization in tropical countries (WHO, IBRD, UNICEF, the Gates Foundation), the Roll Back Malaria campaign (WHO, UNICEF, IBRD and 80 NGOs) and the Cities Alliance, an urban poverty reduction development network (IBRD, supported by EU and Habitat), have been targeted in this way. However, coordination is elusive, even within well-­defined structures such as the UN System (see Chapter 7, section 7.1), and these loose alliances, while focusing resources, sometimes suffer from lack of leadership and conflicting priorities. Despite the formation of the Roll Back Malaria campaign the incidence of malaria increased and, because of insufficient funding for each initiative, the Vaccine Fund and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization had to consolidate their activities. Too often IO reforms have not attained their desired outcomes. Governments occasionally decide that the best way of forcing reform is to reinforce

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c­ ompetition, for example the now defunct World Food Council’s creation following continued dissatisfaction with FAO and funding of the Global Fund to combat HIV/AIDS rather than using institutions already working on the problem. However, this ignores the large fixed costs that accompany the operation of any IO. In a national context small regulatory or executive offices can be set up in competition with spending ministries, but the birth of a new IO results in a need to: zz build

a technical structure that responds to a plethora of different opinions; zz recognize conflicting demands in the distribution of jobs and opportunities; zz join in programme formulation at multiple levels in several international forums; and zz have a heavy governance structure including protocol and legal offices. These factors can impose considerable costs, as the new EU semi-­ autonomous agencies reveal (Chapter 12). Improved performance may be better achieved by downsizing an organization and its objectives. In other words, poor management is more effectively punished by reducing mandates rather than introducing competition. In the absence of successful reform, however, it is rare for governments to take the ultimate step and decide that an IO has performed so poorly or its mandate duplicates others to such an extent that it should be abolished, although they have closed or amalgamated IOs that they felt no longer had relevant mandates (see Chapter 17).

4.2.5 The impact of international law The growth in international law, combined with the factors that make up the legal personality of IOs (which include earlier-­referenced currency and fiscal privileges), has had a significant impact in both constraining and enabling IOs and forms part of the state-­driven institutional structures that limit secretariat activities (see above). In the nineteenth century, international law consisted predominantly of temporary bilateral agreements. UPU created international obligations at a ‘commercial’ level for the first time; then, with the Geneva Convention (Case Study 2.1) and the Versailles Peace Treaty, institutions and procedures were developed to ensure that treaties were respected. The League and the Organization of American States (OAS) commenced the codification of international law in the interwar period. The UN Charter accelerated the process, with Article 13 calling for the General Assembly (GA) to encourage ‘the progressive development of international law and its codification’ and integrating the Statute of the International

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Court of Justice fully into the Charter. The GA continued to codify international law, including the four conventions on the Law of the Sea (1958), Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations (1961 and 1963), the law of international rivers (1997), and definition of the relations between states and IOs. Meanwhile the development of the EU further advanced international law. Its legal framework is defined by the fundamental treaties known as the acquis communautaire. This is supplemented by underlying principles of integration as understood in an ongoing political and economic context, such as the recent principle of subsidiarity or regulations dealing with the abolition of artificial trade barriers, although some may say that EU legislation has put up its fair share of artificial barriers (see Box 11.7). The acquis has a clear legal standing over and above regulations developed by member states and is enforced by the Court of Justice of the European Union (see Chapter 11, ECJ). As the EU introduces complete and harmonized systems, its legislation supersedes that of members, giving the organization supranational characteristics. As the following chapters demonstrate, the advance of formal legal instruments has been paralleled by an escalating reliance on soft law. GA resolutions are one important example, as, although they are not easily enforced, they may have a bearing on the interpretation of international law without creating new specific rights and obligations. Organizations including OECD and OAS promulgate rules that depend on peer pressure rather than legal recourse to achieve their objectives. Others like ILO now develop conventions containing overarching principles that members are expected to endorse and then apply through their own legislation. At an organizational level, hardly any commitment, internal or external, can be entered upon without legal review or at the very least without appropriate caveats that then constrain interpretation. This heavy legal emphasis frustrates secretariats in their efforts to enforce decisions, especially those norms that rely on moral suasion, although sometimes the expert authority of international secretariats resolves such bottlenecks. Examples are the WHO decision to ban travel from states with high incidences of SARS in 2004 (Chapter 7, section 7.4.4), IMF and OECD assessments of national fiscal and economic policies, and UNDP’s Human Development Report (Chapter 6, section 6.5). Sometimes IOs have developed effective systems to enforce treaties. For instance, WTO has a tribunal system which can authorize states adversely

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impacted by another member’s illegal action to impose punitive tariffs, while the EU has the ECJ. There are also cases where international laws, once ratified, take precedence over national laws, although they may need new national legislation or enforcement by national authorities to put them into effect, such as UNESCO’s Universal Copyright Convention (1956). Other agreements, such as the IMO International Convention on Load Lines for shipping, become universal not because all states have adopted them but because they are a requirement to engage in trade with those which have. Reinforcing a realist view of IOs, international agreements often suffer from a lack of sting, strengthened by the move away from mandated norms towards voluntary codes, leaving secretariats powerless to intervene. Sanctions, such as were imposed on Iraq, South Africa or Rhodesia, can be circumvented with the assistance of friendly states and take time to bite, while public reprimand of regimes such as those in Myanmar, North Korea or Iran can be ignored. Environmental protection is an area where no meaningful sanctions have yet been developed, destruction of habitat and endangered species is still rampant, and countries with lax or corrupt regulators fail to improve their performance. While mechanisms such as listing countries that have not adopted a convention may be felt to be adequate responses to problems of non-­compliance they are ineffective compared to the ability to fine or punish through other means. Results, however, are more often mixed. Even if they are not always observed, some treaties, such as the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention dealing with international humanitarian rights, which is applied almost universally, can be effective. Another example is in human rights. Many crimes have gone unpunished and are eventually forgotten by the world at large (Chile, Central America and Cambodia). However, more recent successful prosecutions by international tribunals of a few individuals responsible for the most egregious transgressions, such as the Rwandan genocide and the massacres in former Yugoslavia, may have caused others to think twice before encouraging similar transgressions. SUGGESTED READING

Alvarez, J.E. (2006), International Organizations as Law Makers, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [A broad study of the theory, practice and history of IO law making] Barnett, M. and M. Finnemore (2004), Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. [Constructivist assessment of IOs centred on studies of IMF, UNHCR and UN] Ingram, J. (2007), Bread and Stones, Charleston, SC: Booksurge. [The story of WFP in the 1980s and 1990s; shows how a UN organization operates from a political and bureaucratic perspective, with commentary on FAO DG Saouma and Ingram’s struggle for control of WFP]

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Kahler, M. (2001), Leadership Selection in the Major Multilaterals, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. [How the executive heads of IMF, WTO and IBRD are chosen] Kille, K.J. (2006), From Manager to Visionary: The Secretary-­General of the United Nations, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave. [Focusing on Hammarskjöld, Waldheim and Annan, this book outlines the qualities required of UN SGs] Mathiason, J. (2007), Invisible Governance: International Secretariats in World Politics, Bloomfield, CT: Kumanarian Press. [Insider’s account of the life, duties and role of international civil servants] Sands, P. and P. Klein (2009), Bowett’s Law of International Institutions, 6th edn, London: Sweet & Maxwell. [Updates the definitive review of the law as it relates to IOs] Urquhart, B. and E. Childers (1996), A World in Need of Leadership: Tomorrow’s United Nations – A Fresh Appraisal, Uppsala, Sweden: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. [Problems and solutions in the selection of executive heads of UN organizations] Weiss, T.G. (1982), ‘International bureaucracy: the myth and reality of the international civil service’, International Affairs, 58 (2), 287–306. [Argues cumbersome administrative and management structures prevent secretariats from delivering their lofty aims] Xu, Y.-­C. and P. Weller (2008), ‘“To be, but not to be seen”: exploring the impact of international civil servants’, Public Administration, 86 (1), 35–51. [Assesses international civil servants’ capacity for independent action]

Internet resources UNESCO guide to the archives of some 40 IOs: http://www.unesco.org/archives/sio/Eng

5 The United Nations Reflecting its uniquely broad mandate the United Nations System is large and complex and is the pivot around which much of global governance and international diplomatic activity revolves. Indeed the UN Charter, signed in San Francisco in 1945, established it as the paramount IO, declaring that, should there be a conflict between members’ duties to the UN and commitments entered into elsewhere, ‘their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail’ (Article 103). Designed, according to Article 1 of the Charter (Box  5.2), ‘to maintain international peace and security’, the UN is best known for its security and political roles, especially in mediating international disputes and responding to aggression or breaches of the peace. However, following the liberal tenet that peace follows in the wake of prosperity, the UN’s founders also envisaged it would promote economic and social progress in cooperation with the activities of the technically oriented specialized agencies (SAs). It also achieves this through sponsoring global conferences (Box 5.1) and catalysing global public policy networks (Reinicke 1998). No other IO polarizes opinion like the UN. It has often evoked extreme reactions, ranging from those concerned that it usurps sovereignty or is a template for global government to those who see it as a panacea for the world’s ills. From the standpoints of longevity and state participation, the UN has been successful, especially in comparison to the League of Nations (the League). This is partly attributable to lessons derived from the League’s failings. Although some of the League’s structures survived into the UN, the Charter established a better notion of intergovernmental decision making that avoided the need for unanimity over security matters and acknowledged the most powerful members’ privileged positions. Furthermore, unlike the League, the UN also ‘developed a life and an ethos of its own’ (Roberts and Kingsbury 1993), largely thanks to Secretary-­General Hammarskjöld’s activist influence (Box 5.3), compared to Drummond’s passive role at the League (Box 2.1). Nevertheless, as with the League and all other IOs, the UN’s propensity to deliver its mandate is conditioned by the realities of international politics, with its security and peacekeeping roles attracting most scrutiny. Its ­military

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BOX 5.1

UN GLOBAL CONFERENCES The UN convenes global conferences on thematic issues. The GA approves the meeting, and normally the Secretary-­ General appoints a special high-­level representative to steer initial intergovernmental discussions who often then heads the meeting’s secretariat. Working with a core team this representative will visit key governments, including those concerned with the eventual funding of new proposals. The team also supports intergovernmental committees which prepare the agenda, commission studies and undertake preparatory work. The main conference meeting is structured similarly to governing meetings of the SAs (see Chapter 7), with a plenary session at which formal statements are made by high-­level attendees and a series of committees of the whole covering technical issues. Around these committees, smaller informal technical, geographical or political groups also convene. Decisions of the committees of the whole are summarized in a series of resolutions. These are then discussed by the

full plenary, which approves and adopts a final report. These conferences serve to: • set the UN agenda by providing forums for the discussion of fresh initiatives, bringing issues to international attention, or redefining existing ones; • unite experts from different fields to catalyse cooperation throughout the UN System and sometimes launch additional UN bodies; • deliver political commitments to create new or to codify existing norms, rules and international law; and • promote links between governments, NGOs and the UN. The frequency of global conferences has been curtailed by their failure to produce tangible results, their expense and the perception that they duplicate other forums. Nevertheless, as the 2010 Summit on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) demonstrates, they are still important for galvanizing international action.

operations have had some notable successes (for example in Cambodia and Mozambique), and on three occasions UN peacekeeping initiatives have been recognized by Nobel Peace Prizes (Ralph Bunche in the Middle East (1950), Martti Ahtisaari (2008) and the peacekeeping forces themselves in 1988), but the UN’s failures (and indeed failures to act) have been costly in terms of life (Rwanda) and reputation (Srebrenica, see Box 5.8). While much of the UN’s security and peacekeeping role is embedded in the Security Council (SC), several UN semi-­autonomous agencies (UNHCR, UNRWA and WFP) directly or indirectly contribute to easing security hotspots through humanitarian interventions (Chapter 6). Despite the focus on security, at least half the UN Secretariat works on socioeconomic matters, which absorb some 25 per cent of the regular budget. The

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Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) not only oversees all UN work in these areas but, under Article 58 of the Charter, has a mandate to coordinate the work of the SAs. The UN and SAs have between them developed an impressive framework of international norms covering human rights, crime, global commons and specific issues such as diplomatic immunity and international commercial arbitration. They have also engaged in extensive operational work, including development financing, disease eradication and disaster relief. Because of the political imperatives facing the organization and given the plethora of other IOs engaged in such matters, UN activities in these fields sometimes seem of less consequence and are less easily evaluated, but they are essential for long-­term international stability. Even allowing for external constraints, virtually all commentators recognize that reform to the present UN structure is central to improving its effectiveness. Unfortunately the nature of UN decision making means reforms need the support of half and sometimes two-­thirds of states in the General Assembly (GA), thus making it exceedingly difficult to broker agreement for even minor changes. More fundamental, and it might be argued necessary, reforms to reflect the geopolitical realignments that have taken place since 1945 face even more obdurate resistance, particularly reform of the SC, where the five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA, known as the P5) wish to preserve their advantageous position. This chapter covers only those UN organizational units directly reporting to the GA and/or the Secretary-­General (SG). Chapter 6 considers the UN semi-­autonomous agencies which have their own governance structures and executive heads, while Chapter 7 deals with many SAs. In an overview of this nature it is impossible to embrace all aspects of the UN, and consequently we cover five: the UN’s structure, which is described in detail because it is the model on which other IOs have been moulded; SC’s role in maintaining international peace and security; the UN’s international judicial system; its human rights work; and the Department of Economic and Social Affairs’ (DESA) role in the development agenda.

5.1

Background Discussions about an organization to succeed the League began during the Second World War. The resulting UN structure reflects the prevailing patterns of international power at that time (Chapter 2). The UN Charter encapsulates post-­war desires to prevent future conflict and promote socioeconomic cooperation but also explains many of the frustrating complexities and contradictions of UN operations. For instance, while Article 1 (2) calls

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BOX 5.2

IMPORTANT EXTRACTS FROM THE UN CHARTER Preamble WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, AND FOR THESE ENDS to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples, HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS.

Article 1 The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the

peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace; 2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-­ determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace; 3. To achieve international co-­operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and 4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends. Article 41 The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions . . . These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations . . . and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42 Should the Security Council consider that the measures provided for in Article 41 would be

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 inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations.

Article 52 Nothing in the present charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements . . . ­provided that such . . . activities are consistent

with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

Article 102 1. Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations . . . shall . . . be registered with the Secretariat and published by it. 2. No party to any such treaty or international agreement which has not been registered . . . may invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ of the United Nations.

upon states to respect equal rights, the UN’s ability to uphold this principle by protecting people subject to human rights violations is hindered by Article 2 (7), which largely proscribes the UN from ‘interven[ing] in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’. Although keen to avoid replicating the League’s failures the UN continued some of its tenets. The UN’s aims and the commitments made by states were essentially the same and, by stating in Article 2 (1) that ‘[t]he Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members’, the Charter reaffirmed one of the central precepts of international politics. There were, however, important differences: zz In the light of the Great Powers’ unwillingness to be bound by the League

and while supporting collective responses to threats to peace and security, the Charter recognized the special position of its most powerful members by establishing an SC veto, which enabled them to block collective actions threatening their interests. zz Whereas the disinclination of states to participate in collective action destroyed the League’s effectiveness, Articles 25 and 49 oblige members to accept SC decisions and assist with their execution. zz Article 2 (4) places a general ban on members threatening or using force against other states, except in self-­defence (Article 51) or where SC has authorized military measures to restore international peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter. zz Recognizing that flagrant human rights violations, abiding inequality and adverse economic conditions were sources of possible future conflict, the Charter gave the UN a much bigger socioeconomic role than the League.

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It is worth noting that, as with all constitutional documents, the precise meaning and scope of the rules alter as they are interpreted and applied. For example, Article 2 (7) quoted above means UN peacekeeping, humanitarian interventions, aid programmes and other activities must have the consent of the government of the state(s) concerned. Nevertheless, explicitly recognizing socioeconomic and welfare issues (such as development and human rights) as legitimate concerns for international action straight away pits the desire to intervene against state sovereignty. Gradually, successive SC judgments about what constitutes a threat to international peace and security (including terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, child soldiers and human rights) have shifted the boundaries between domestic and international responsibilities in favour of the latter. BOX 5.3

DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD – UN SECRETARY-­GENERAL (1953–61) Relatively unknown at the time of his appointment, Hammarskjöld (in the words of Brian Urquhart, a long-­serving senior UN official) provided ‘the most dynamic and striking leadership that any international organization had ever had’. Prior experience as Vice-­Chairman of the Organisation for European Economic Co-­operation’s Executive Committee, as Sweden’s representative to the Council of Europe and as Minister of State in the Swedish Foreign Office convinced governments that he was an able administrator who would direct the Secretariat just as Drummond had at the League (Box 2.1). These expectations were fulfilled for, after Drummond, Hammarskjöld had the most important formative influence on the character of the international civil service (ICS). He stood up for his staff’s independence against the threat of McCarthyism in the USA and pressure for political appointments from the USSR. He codified the UN’s personnel rules and through his own intellectual and moral example reinforced the need for integrity and independence in the Secretariat. In contrast, the P5’s hopes that

Hammarskjöld would also emulate Drummond’s behind-­the-­scenes leadership were not realized. When Hammarskjöld was confronted with crises at the height of the Cold War and the clamour from decolonized countries for the UN to address development issues, his cerebral approach gave way to a pragmatic streak and he became a leader in the interventionist mould of Albert Thomas (Box 2.3). He carved out a more autonomous role for the SG than the Charter’s authors envisaged, pioneering responses that persist as common UN practice, including deployment of peacekeeping forces, observer groups and the use of the Secretary-­General’s ‘good offices’ to settle disputes peacefully, for example in 1959 when he resolved a border incident between Cambodia and Thailand. Hammarskjöld’s efforts to uphold the Charter’s principles gradually eroded superpower support for his leadership. Hammarskjöld died in the service of the UN, in an air crash on 17 September 1961. Two months later he was, uniquely, posthumously awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

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Thus was formed the UN System we know today: a complex arrangement of political, technical and social institutions, some of which pre-­date the UN and others that are relatively new. Its history is multifaceted, having been shaped by events bound intimately to its attempts to maintain peace and security, not the least by a number of human tragedies.

5.1.1 Maintaining international peace and security The UN has various instruments that support its efforts to maintain international peace and security, but collective security is at its heart. Unlike the notion of collective defence, where IOs attempt to defend members against external threats (see Chapter 13), collective security aims to protect against threats from within the membership. This is achieved by the promise of collective action (military or otherwise) against aggressors who, in the belief such measures will be forthcoming, therefore abandon their belligerent intent. Article 24 confers SC with the ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’. Only SC can determine whether the prohibition on the threat or use of force has been broken and, if necessary, pass resolutions authorizing collective measures to maintain or restore international peace and security (Article 39). Articles 41 and 42 (Box 5.2) give SC mechanisms to implement its decisions by requiring members to take non-­military action or, if that is unsuccessful, to use armed force. For much of the Cold War (Box 1.6), SC was paralysed by the vetoes wielded by the superpowers, whose clashes regularly prevented it from determining the existence of a threat or actual breach to the peace and hence recommending actions to address it. Only twice during this time did SC use Article 41 to enforce its resolutions (sanctions against Rhodesia in 1966 after the declaration of white minority rule and an arms embargo against South Africa in 1977). While the USSR’s boycott of SC in 1950 allowed the GA to sanction a US-­led action in Korea, the force was overwhelmingly American. Korea apart, there was only one instance of military enforcement during the Cold War when, in 1961 in the Congo, UN peacekeepers were engaged in GA-­ authorized military action against mercenaries. Serious divides amongst the P5 rendered collective security impotent, so many major conflicts bypassed SC, and by the 1980s the UN stood on ‘the brink of irrelevance’ (Karns and Mingst 2004: 120). The Cold War’s end prompted a renewed interest in the UN as a forum for resolving international problems. In the 1990s SC passed 625 resolutions, more than in the entire Cold War. Moreover it began to extend its reasons for determining threats to international peace and security under Chapter

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VII of the Charter by citing non-­state actors such as pirates, terrorists or parties to domestic conflicts thought likely to inflame international tensions. Increasingly SC also considered human rights violations a threat to international peace and security. Massacres perpetrated by Cambodia’s government, the Iraqi government’s use of chemical weapons against its Kurdish population and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia lent momentum to an emerging norm of responsibility to protect (R2P), that is to say, that in cases where states abdicate their responsibility to protect their populations or are the architects of atrocities then foreign intervention can legitimately be authorized. The concepts behind R2P and the idea that SC could recommend action in such circumstances were endorsed at the 2005 UN World Summit. Nevertheless, because the Charter did not foresee internal interventions in member states, R2P remains controversial. While R2P was the rationale for establishing a no-­fly zone over Libya in 2011 to protect the civilian population against reprisals by the Gaddafi regime (implemented by NATO and some Gulf Cooperation Council states) a year later attempts to invoke the principle to protect opposition forces in Syria floundered upon the belief that sovereign rights predominate. Once Cold War distrust dissipated, collective measures also became more feasible. As a consequence SC has regularly recommended action under Article 41, including arms and trade embargoes. There have also been new tactics such as creating war crimes tribunals or ‘smart sanctions’ targeting individuals whose actions threaten international peace and security through travel restrictions and freezing financial assets. Other actions under Article 42 have included the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1990 and the bombing of Bosnian Serb forces in 1995. To prevent threats to international peace and security arising, Article 2 (3) demands states settle their disputes peacefully. Chapter VI of the Charter describes the role the UN can play in facilitating this process, but arguably the two best-­known methods employed by the UN are not specifically mentioned, namely the SG’s ‘good offices’ and peacekeeping. Based on moral authority and independent standing, the SG uses his good offices to try to broker agreements in situations where parties to a dispute do not wish to recognize the legitimacy of their opponents through face-­to-­face negotiations. Examples are U Thant’s work behind the scenes to defuse the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and Perez de Cuéllar’s 1985 intervention with South Africa and Angola to resolve obstacles to Namibian independence. As the number of international disputes has multiplied, use of UN mediators and SG ‘special representatives’ has become more frequent, such as former SG Annan’s 2012 mission to Syria.

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Peacekeeping, defined as ‘the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states through third-­party intervention, organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians’ (IPA 1984), was a response to superpower discord. Recognizing that the SC unanimity required for enforcement action under Chapter VII was unlikely to be forthcoming, Chapter VI (which stresses negotiation over intervention) was seen as a better alternative for containing threats to international peace and security by using peacekeepers. UN peacekeeping operations are authorized and controlled by SC. The general structure of a peacekeeping operation is that the SG appoints a special representative, who deals with political negotiations and humanitarian issues, while a military commander takes charge of deployed forces and logistical operations. Importantly, however, peacekeeping missions can function only with the common consent of the involved parties, who thus have an important role to play in defining the terms of the deployment. Peacekeepers are allowed to use force only in self-­defence and must be impartial. In total, the UN has conducted almost 70 peacekeeping operations, which since the end of the Cold War have grown in number, complexity and sophistication (Table 5.1). Indeed today there are almost as many ongoing missions as were undertaken during the entire Cold War. Peacekeepers are now increasingly deployed to patrol disputes within rather than between states (see Box 5.7), and their functions have significantly expanded. Furthermore, starting with an operation in Liberia in 1993, the UN started to mount peacekeeping undertakings with other IOs. Whereas early peacekeeping operations involved interposing lightly armed troops as neutral observers to monitor ceasefires and deter a fresh outbreak of hostilities, modern operations often have the additional task of peacebuilding, that is to say, efforts to consolidate the conditions for a durable settlement. In peacebuilding, the troops, who oversee mine clearance, disarmament and reintegrating soldiers, are assisted by numerous civilian personnel, who supervise elections, support human rights, provide development assistance and undertake policing.

5.1.2 The international justice system The International Court of Justice (The World Court – ICJ) is the UN’s ‘principal judicial organ’ (Article 92) and successor to the Permanent Court for International Justice, an independent body funded by the League. ICJ exists to hear and deliver binding judgments in disputes between states about matters of international law, for example the interpretation or alleged breach of an international treaty. While ICJ can pronounce a definitive legal

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Table 5.1  UN peacekeeping missions Mission

Acronym

Commenced

Ended

Truce Supervision Organization (Near East) Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan Emergency Force (I) Suez, Sinai and Gaza Observer Group in Lebanon Operation in the Congo Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian) Yemen Observation Mission Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus Mission in the Dominican Republic Indo-­Pakistan Observation Mission Emergency Force (II) Suez, Sinai Disengagement Observer Force in the Golan   Heights Interim Force in Lebanon Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan Iran-­Iraq Military Observer Group Angola Verification Mission Transition Assistance Group in Namibia Observer Group in Central America Iraq–Kuwait Observer Mission Angola Verification Mission II Observer Mission in El Salvador Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara Advance Mission in Cambodia Protection Force in Former Yugoslavia (Croatia) Transition Authority in Cambodia Operation in Somalia Operation in Mozambique Operation in Somalia II Observer Mission Uganda–Rwanda Observer Mission in Georgia Observer Mission in Liberia Assistance Mission for Rwanda Mission in Haiti Observer Mission in Tajikistan Aouzou Strip Observer Group (Chad/Libya) Angola Verification Mission III Preventive Deployment Force Former Yugoslavia,   Macedonia Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia Mission in Bosnia-­Herzegovina

UNTSO UNMOGIP UNEF I UNOGIL ONUC UNSF UNYOM UNFICYP DOMREP UNIPOM UNEF II UNDOF

1948 1949 1956 1958 1960 1962 1963 1964 1965 1965 1973 1974

Ongoing Ongoing 1967 1958 1964 1963 1964 Ongoing 1966 1966 1979 Ongoing

UNIFIL UNGOMAP UNIIMOG UNAVEM I UNTAG ONUCA UNIKOM UNAVEM II ONUSAL MINURSO UNAMIC UNPROFOR UNTAC UNOSOM I ONUMOZ UNOSOM II UNOMUR UNOMIG UNOMIL UNAMIR UNMIH UNMOT UNASOG UNAVEM III UNPREDEP

1978 1988 1988 1989 1989 1989 1991 1991 1991 1991 1991 1992 1992 1992 1992 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1994 1994 1995 1995

Ongoing 1990 1991 1991 1990 1992 2003 1995 1995 Ongoing 1992 1995 1993 1993 1994 1995 1994 2009 1997 1996 1996 2000 1994 1997 1999

UNCRO UNMIBH

1995 1995

1996 2002

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Table 5.1  (continued) Mission

Acronym

Commenced

Ended

Transitional Mission in Eastern Slavonia (Croatia) Mission of Observers in Prevlaka Support Mission in Haiti Civilian Police Mission in Haiti Observer Mission in Guatemala Observer Mission in Angola Police Civilian Support Unit in the Danube Region Mission in the Central African Republic Peacekeeping Mission in Sierra Leone Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo Mission in Kosovo Transitional Mission in East Timor Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea Mission in Support of Timor-­Leste Mission in Liberia Operation in Burundi Stabilization Mission in Haiti Operation in Côte d’Ivoire Mission in the Republic of South Sudan   (previously Mission in Sudan) Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad UN–AU Mission in Darfur Interim Security Force for Abyei (Southern Sudan) Supervisory Mission in Syria Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission   in Mali

UNTAES UNMOP UNSMIH MIPONUH MINUGA MONUA UNPSG MINURCA UNOMSIL MONUSCO UNMIK UNTAET UNMEE UNMIT UNMIL ONUB MINUSTAH UNOCI UNMISS

1996 1996 1996 1997 1997 1997 1998 1998 1998 1999 1999 1999 2000 2002 2003 2004 2004 2004 2005

1998 2002 1997 2000 1997 1999 1998 2000 2005 Ongoing Ongoing 2002 2008 2012 Ongoing 2006 Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing

MINURCAT UNAMID UNIFSA UNSMIS MINUSMA

2007 2007 2011 2012 2013

2010 Ongoing Ongoing 2012 Ongoing

j­ udgment about who is right and states are committed to comply (Article 94 (1)), its practical effects are in practice limited by state sovereignty. First, under Article 93 all UN members subscribe to ICJ, but it can only examine cases with the consent of the parties involved. Most countries choose to accept ICJ jurisdiction on a case-­by-­case basis or sign treaties containing provisions that automatically bring disputes before the Court. Sixty-­ six countries have made a general declaration stating they accept the Court’s jurisdiction for all legal disputes with other members. Nevertheless these declarations are normally conditional on reciprocity and contain numerous exemptions. Second, judgments are binding only on states party to the dispute and cannot be used as precedents, because otherwise this would breach sovereignty, as states would find themselves bound by rules arising

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from cases that they had not given ICJ consent to hear. Finally, although judgments are binding, ICJ cannot impose decisions on a losing party. Article 94 allows a winning party to ask SC to consider cases where the losing party does not comply. This has only happened once, in 1986, but the US exercised its SC veto so as to avoid compensating Nicaragua for having funded ­paramilitary activities. IOs also use ICJ to deliver advisory opinions or clarifications of legal matters falling under their jurisdiction. The UN and SAs have asked ICJ for advisory opinions on 19 occasions. Such opinions are not binding but can have important effects. For example, in 1962 China and France refused to pay their UN contributions which they believed would be used to fund a peacekeeping operation in Congo that they opposed. The GA asked ICJ to adjudicate, and it ruled that peacekeeping operations constituted ‘expenses of the Organization’ that states were obliged to pay under Article 17. This then led to the separation of the UN peacekeeping budget from the regular budget. Created in 1998, the International Criminal Court (ICC) is not a UN body, being overseen by meetings of the ‘states party’ to its founding Rome Statute (the States Party), but it does report to the GA. Its mandate is ‘to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators’ of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity and ‘thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes’. ICC is the culmination of efforts to promote international criminal law and impart justice to individuals (as opposed to states) accused of breaching it. These efforts started with the 1943 War Crimes Tribunal, which led to the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals (where war crimes were prosecuted) and continued more recently with SC mandates for the Yugoslav and Rwandese International Tribunals. Unlike earlier tribunals which dealt with explicit conflicts, ICC is a permanent body with a global remit and no time limits for bringing criminals to justice. Two main strategies underpin ICC’s mission. First, the States Party should, if necessary, revise their legislation to criminalize war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity and to ensure these crimes are defined in accordance with UN standards. Second, ICC can prosecute those accused of such crimes if a state is unwilling to act. The States Party, SC or the Court’s Prosecutor may refer cases to ICC, but a ‘Pre-­trial Chamber’ panel of judges decides if further action is warranted. At this stage judges examine the issues that might arise if a prosecution occurs and whether particular individuals should be indicted. Three conditions must be met for ICC to have the legal authority to prosecute: the person

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must be suspected of war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity; the crime must have been committed on the territory or by a citizen of a State Party; and national courts must have proved disinclined or unable to prosecute that case. Thus, ICC is a ‘court of last resort’ (Dicker 2012) that complements rather than supplants national courts. If a conviction is secured ICC can impose life imprisonment, sentences of up to 30 years and/or fines but not the death penalty. SC has the right to refer cases to the Court based on its responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, that is to say, SC can use ICC as another mechanism of enforcement under Chapter VII. SC can also suspend indictments or prosecutions for renewable one-­year periods, and an appeals mechanism exists for concluded cases.

5.1.3 Human rights Adopted in 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the basis of UN work on the protection and promotion of human rights. The Declaration’s principles evolved in a host of subsequent conventions codifying inter alia the rights of women, children and the disabled. Institutionally these norms were overseen through a complex arrangement centred on the UN Commission on Human Rights (CHR). All member states participated in CHR, which reported to ECOSOC. CHR made a ‘major contribution to the formulation of human rights norms and the monitoring of their implementation’ (Schrijver 2007: 821) but possessed serious failings, not least that periodic rotation of its leadership resulted in countries responsible for some atrocious human rights violations controlling the agenda. This, and CHR’s failure to seriously address egregious human rights violations in many countries, eroded its ‘credibility and professionalism’ (UN 2004), leading to agreement that it needed substantial improvement. Accordingly in 2006, a new body, the Human Rights Council (HRC), was established and supported by a revamped secretariat, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). OHCHR had originally come into being in 1994 to unite disparate UN human rights activities, monitor human rights in all members and produce an annual report on its findings. Compared to its predecessor HRC is smaller and members wishing to be elected to it must agree to their human rights record being included in a quadrennial Universal Periodic Review. Furthermore members accused of gross human rights violations can, as with Libya in 2011, be expelled from HRC. The quadrennial review process has three component reports: one submitted by the member state, another developed from official sources by OHCHR and the third prepared by OHCHR but from information provided by other actors including NGOs. These documents are peer-­reviewed by

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an HCR committee, and a consolidated report is submitted to the whole Council for further consideration, including recommendations to the GA (rather than to ECOSOC).

5.1.4 DESA and the development dimension The Department of Economic and Social Affairs’ work and track record seldom attracts attention in assessments of the UN System, but it has made an important contribution to UN development work, most recently in connection with establishing and monitoring the MDGs. It is the secretariat for many ECOSOC initiatives, on whose behalf it also coordinates SA activities. As Table 5.2 reveals, DESA covers a wide gamut of policy areas, and it has Table 5.2  DESA’s substantive divisions Division

Mandate

Sustainable development

Energy Transport Water, natural resources and minerals Institutions Social policy and development Social integration and employment Poverty eradication Ageing, family and youth Intergovernmental policy Development policy and Global economic monitoring   analysis Development strategy and studies Population Statistics

Public administration and   development management

Financing for development Forests

Demographic analysis Population studies International trade statistics Economic statistics (national accounts) Demographic and social statistics Environment, energy, industry statistics Socioeconomic governance Knowledge management Governance and public administration Forum on Forests

Overlap with other IOs IBRD, IAEA, OECD IMO, ICAO UNESCO, FAO

ILO IBRD, RDBs ILO IBRD, IMF IBRD, UNDP, UNESCO, OECD UNFPA WTO IBRD, IMF ILO UNEP, UNIDO IBRD IMF, IBRD, UNDP IBRD, RDB, OECD FAO, CGIAR

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been involved in establishing many important statistical norms, such as the common methodology for presenting national accounts. DESA’s role is to support deliberations in ECOSOC and GA by fostering consensus amongst states on development issues. Since 1990 DESA has facilitated 35 major development summits and conferences. DESA’s research and analysis influence these forums and wider international policy debates, especially through flagship annual publications like the World Economic Survey and the UN Statistical Yearbook. DESA enhances developing states’ abilities to translate the abstract ideas discussed in various UN forums into deliverable national programmes by sponsoring capacity-­building measures. As time has progressed, DESA’s technical remit has evolved from one focused on natural resources, public administration, gender and institutional development into areas that duplicate mandates of other IOs, such as the linkages between social and development policies, sustainable development including an Intergovernmental Forum on Forests, energy and population. Expansion has, however, weakened some aspects of its work. Originally its programmes were supported through technical assistance (TA) projects disbursed under UNDP funding, but external funding grew such that a specialized office separate from DESA, the Office of Project Services, was launched to handle most UN TA activities. Similarly, gender issues lacked focus, and a new semi-­autonomous agency, UN Women (Box 6.1), took over its work and gave the matter greater impetus commencing in 2010. Since the 1960s the UN has been dominated, numerically at least, by developing countries. A proliferation of activities devoted to addressing underdevelopment plus high-­profile initiatives such as the 1960s Development Decade and the much vaunted New International Economic Order in the 1970s (Box 3.4) promised more than they achieved. Thus, when as part of the MDGs the GA approved concrete targets for the first time (see Box 5.4), they were welcomed as an improvement over past sanctimonious expressions of concern. Specific accountability for achieving MDGs lies with member states, but responsibility for the international policy framework belongs to ECOSOC, while monitoring progress and multilateral support for national efforts is shared between DESA and the SAs. For DESA the practical embodiment of the MDGs is a series of ‘Research Villages’ where the UN has invested $250 per person to help the villagers out of poverty. Another component of the development dimension which also overlaps with DESA is the UN Regional Economic Commissions (see section 5.4.4). They had some early impact on economic policy in Europe and Latin America principally because the relevant Commissions were headed by respected

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BOX 5.4

THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS The MDGs were adopted as part of the Millennium Declaration agreed by the UN Millennium Summit in 2000. The Goals establish quantitative targets that governments are challenged to meet by 2015, supported where necessary by international donors and IOs. The main MDGs are to: • eradicate extreme poverty and hunger by halving the number of people living on $1.25 per day and the number who suffer from hunger; • achieve universal primary education; • promote gender equality and empower women;

• reduce child mortality by two-­thirds; • reduce maternal mortality by three-­quarters; • halt and reverse the incidence of malaria, AIDS and other major diseases; • halve the population without access to drinking water and improve slum dwellers’ lives. When originally established the MDGs were expressed through 18 targets and 48 indicators, covering each of ten regions or sub-­ regions, and gave a very detailed baseline for measurement, with annual progress reports being submitted to the GA (UN 2012).

economists, the Argentine Raoul Prebisch at the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the Swedish Gunnar Myrdal at the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE). Prebisch developed the ‘dependency or structuralist’ theory of economic growth (see Chapter 1, section 1.7). This reinforced approaches to national economic management based on Keynesian concepts coupled with the desirability of import substitution and initially proved successful. Consequently ECLAC had a major impact on Latin American economic policies until the ‘Lost Decade’ of economic stagnation in the 1980s. Myrdal’s influence made ECE an intellectual bridge between Eastern and Western Europe by becoming the forum for discussing specific technical problems and undertaking comparative studies, although the East–West ideological divide hindered its economic policy work.

5.2

Structure The UN structure (Figure 5.1) possesses a complexity to match the organization’s reach. The GA is the overarching authority and through its various committees and primary organs, such as ECOSOC and SC, it exercises control and keeps abreast of events. The official UN organogram tends to oversimplify its structure, which is composed of two closely interrelated levels, the UN System and the UN Secretariat. There are four distinct groups within the

UNDP

Internal Oversight

Figure 5.1  The structure of the UN System

General Services

Human Resources

Finance/Budget

Programme Planning

UNFPA

Security Coordinator

Humanitarian Affairs

UNICEF

UNCTAD

ECOSOC

Economic and General Assembly Affairs Social Affairs

UNHCR

Management

UNEP

Specialized agencies

ICJ (ICC)

Secretariat

SG/DSG

General Assembly

UNRWA

Public Information

Political Affairs

UNV

Habitat

5 Regional Economic Commissions

Security Council

IAEA

Legal Affairs

Peacekeeping Operations

Offices in Geneva, Vienna and Nairobi

Disarmament Affairs

UNU

Human Rights Council

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overall structure: the semi-­autonomous institutions (Chapter 6); the specialized agencies (Chapter 7), which have their own governance structures and are linked to the UN through ECOSOC; the central UN Secretariat; and the Economic Commissions.

5.2.1 The UN System Meeting for three months annually, the GA is the closest approximation there is to a global debating chamber where heads of state and other senior politicians make set speeches that gain considerable publicity. The GA is chaired by a President, who is elected for one year, with the post rotating between the UN regional groups. Apart from managing GA debates, the President assists the SG by searching for intergovernmental consensus during GA negotiations. The GA makes decisions on a one-­member-­one-­vote basis. Nevertheless, it is often on the GA’s fringes and in six ‘committees of the whole’ that important and detailed discussions take place. Most members maintain permanent missions in New York which meet informally, represent their governments in working-­level meetings and are active in developing coalitions of like-­minded members that often dominate GA debate. The GA structure of committees derives from that of the League. They are commonly known by their numerical designations and report their deliberations to the GA: zz The

First Committee (Disarmament and International Security Committee) links into the work of SC, but its many activities are shared with the Fourth Committee. zz The Second Committee (Economic and Financial Committee) oversees ECOSOC’s work. zz The Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee) also considers subjects that are in ECOSOC’s remit, but in addition covers the work of UNHCR, UNRWA and WFP. zz The Fourth Committee (Special Political and Decolonization Committee, formerly the Trusteeship Committee) originally supervised the Trusteeship Council, a body in abeyance since Palau, the final country under trusteeship, became independent. It now combines this role with the work of a Special Political Committee that originally existed to spread the First Committee’s workload. zz The Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary Committee) deals with administration and matters such as salaries which concern all those UN organizations and SAs which share common staff rules. zz The Sixth Committee (Legal Committee) deals with internal UN legal

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matters, treaties, conventions and issues referred to ICJ and ICC. It is here that governments debate international legal issues as well as consider and recommend approval of international treaties. It has established a number of standing bodies, including the International Law Commission, the Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and similar groups overseeing other major conventions. The UN Office for Legal Affairs is the repository for all international treaties as required by Article 102 (Box 5.2). The GA is simultaneously omnipotent yet impotent. Article 10 affords it almost unlimited latitude in terms of the subjects it may discuss, but its non-­ binding resolutions only have the status of ‘soft law’. Moreover, the tendency of the GA to operate by consensus often results in anodyne and lowest-­ common-­denominator resolutions. Nevertheless, articulation of an international consensus legitimizes particular ideas and policies and can build diplomatic momentum for formal treaties. Occasionally GA is itself the locus for negotiating formal treaties such as the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty. Until requested by SC, the GA cannot adopt resolutions on disputes that SC is actively considering, and the privileged positions of the P5 circumscribe its power in several other ways: zz GA

can propose amendments to the Charter, but ratification requires a two-­thirds majority supported by the P5 and two-­thirds of SC. zz Admission to and suspension of membership is made by the GA but only upon SC recommendation. zz While GA elects judges to ICJ, members of ECOSOC and non-­permanent members of SC, it only elects the SG on SC’s recommendation. zz GA controls the organization through its approval of the budget, but budgets must previously have been endorsed by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ, see below), to which major contributors belong. Reporting to the GA are three other intergovernmental assemblies which are integral to day-­to-­day UN activities. The first, SC, comprises 15 members, ten of whom are elected for two-­year terms, while the P5 have permanent seats and hold a veto over its non-­procedural decisions. Approval of SC decisions requires nine supporting votes subject to a veto not being exercised. SC is in permanent session so as to discuss fast-­developing political flashpoints and decide on possible enforcement actions. It is supported by a Military Staff Committee composed of the P5’s military representatives. The second, ECOSOC (with 54 members), coordinates the UN System’s development and socioeconomic activities. It holds one extensive annual

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meeting, where decisions are made by majority vote. The UN System’s growth and byzantine nature has left ECOSOC with an almost impossible task. Articles 62–66 authorize it to issue recommendations to the SAs, but it controls neither their budgets nor their secretariats. ECOSOC’s capacity to deliver a coherent and coordinated international programme is therefore constrained by the existence of many parallel lines of reporting authority. The third, the Human Rights Council (HRC), has 47 members and meets in Geneva for at least three sessions annually. Members are elected for three-­ year terms, renewable once. HRC membership is tilted towards Asian and African countries rather than the West, but members are chosen by the GA as a whole. Linking into the high-­level governance structure are councils, commissions, committees and oversight bodies established to support the GA’s work. Many of these were originated by ECOSOC, including councils to oversee the semi-­autonomous institutions and Regional Economic Commissions comprising all the members of a given region, each of which has its own secretariat (see below). Membership of these bodies varies. Almost always they include representatives of the largest contributor(s) or the P5, with membership being distributed regionally, although appointments are sometimes made on a personal basis. Six of them have system-­wide roles and report directly to GA: zz The

Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions reviews the UN budget and expenditures. The USA was ejected from this committee between 1996 and 2000, following continued refusal to pay fully its assessed contribution. zz The Committee on Contributions periodically reviews the formula based on GDP that determines each state’s budgetary contribution. The SAs often follow the committee’s recommendations as well (see also Chapter 4, section 4.2.2). zz The Committee on Programme and Coordination (CPC) evaluates the necessity of UN programmes and ensures that programmes do not overlap. zz The Joint Inspection Unit evaluates UN System activities but has had a poor record from its inception, as its appointees have been overly political and insufficiently technical in their approach. zz The International Civil Service Commission oversees the common personnel policies of the UN System. zz External Audit is a group of member-­appointed government auditors who work independently of but closely with the UN Office for Internal Oversight.

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Institutionally there are two centres of political power. SC is the first forum in which serious matters are raised, and within it the P5 have a controlling influence on political decisions by virtue of their vetoes. SC’s influence grew after the end of the Cold War, when the superpowers reduced their posturing and engaged in constructive negotiations. Conversely the developing countries have a greater voice in the GA through weight of numbers. This results in political decisions that reflect the balance of power but in socioeconomic decisions that lean towards objectives desired by developing countries which do not always sit easily with the major budgetary contributors. Throughout, the US has been the institutional hegemon, as it pays around 20 per cent of UN costs (falling from its original 25 per cent) and therefore considers that its voice should be primus inter pares on decisions requiring resources.

5.2.2 The Secretariat The UN Secretariat, headed by the SG, is headquartered in New York, with further large concentrations of staff in Geneva and Vienna. Also part of the Secretariat are the staff servicing the five Regional Economic Commissions, for Africa (ECA, based in Addis Ababa), Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP, Bangkok) and Western Asia (ESCWA, Beirut), plus ECLAC (Santiago) and ECE (Geneva), which together account for 22 per cent of the Secretariat’s staff. The Secretariat’s growth mirrors that of the UN. From 5000 staff in 1972, and despite budgetary stringency, the Secretariat’s size now stands at 20 200, with development functions accounting for most of the expansion. Two large units are not shown on Figure 5.1, the Office of Project Services, responsible for executing development projects, and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, based in Vienna. While the Secretariat’s core mission is supporting the work of the GA (Department of Political Affairs) and SC (Department of Peacekeeping Operations) it has expanded its reach into many other areas, some of which arose from large global conferences (such as those on the environment in 1972 and human settlements in 1976). Within the Secretariat (Figure 5.1) the largest numbers of staff work for the GA and its various committees and servicing the organization’s language needs (11 per cent of the total staff in each case). Geneva, with the heaviest concentration of UN Secretariat staff outside New York (10 per cent), houses inter alia ECE and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Two semi-­ autonomous organizations, UNHCR and UNCTAD, as well as ILO, ITU, WHO, WMO and WIPO, also have their headquarters in Geneva, which has therefore become the city with the biggest overall presence of UN System staff. After Geneva and Washington (home to WHO/PAHO, IBRD and

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IMF), Vienna is host to the fourth largest concentration of UN System staff, as it hosts UNIDO, IAEA and several UN offices. The post of SG is one of the world’s most demanding. The SG is the voice of the institution, has primary responsibilities for peacekeeping and development, coordinates the UN System’s work and is the institution’s chief administrative officer overseeing management, personnel, finances and budgets. The post of Deputy SG was created in 1998, but the position has not been given sufficient delegation to ensure more effective management. In contrast to Hammarskjöld’s time, increased political demands on the SG restrict his personal involvement in international problems. Article 99 permits the SG to alert SC to threats to international peace and security, but arguably he is more important as an advocate of key issues such as climate change. Today an SG’s efforts are spread thinly over the UN’s burgeoning portfolio and, while diplomatic skills remain important, contemporary SGs rely on a plethora of special representatives to mediate international disputes. Each SG (Box 5.5) has interpreted the Charter in a way that has enhanced the power, resources and autonomy of the office and the UN more generally. Nevertheless, SGs cannot always reconcile the Secretariat’s idealism with the interests of the powerful states upon whose support their success in office ultimately depends (see Box 5.6).

5.2.3 The international justice system ICJ has 15 judges elected by GA and SC for nine-­year terms. Collectively they should be selected to represent ‘the main forms of civilization and the BOX 5.5

SECRETARIES-­GENERAL OF THE UN Secretary-­General

Nationality

Period of office

Prior career

Trygve Lie Dag Hammarskjöld Sithu U Thant Kurt Waldheim Javier Perez de Cuéllar Boutros Boutros-­Ghali Kofi Annan Ban, Ki-­moon

Norwegian Swedish Burmese Austrian Peruvian Egyptian Ghanaian South Korean

1946–53 1953–61 1961–71 1972–81 1982–91 1992–96 1997–2006 2007–

Foreign minister Diplomat Educationalist, civil servant Diplomat Jurist and diplomat Foreign minister International civil servant Diplomat

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BOX 5.6

KOFI ANNAN – UN SECRETARY-­GENERAL (1997–2006) The first SG from the UN career civil service, Annan started as a junior administrator in WHO before proceeding to postings at ECA, UNHCR and UNEF, eventually ending up in peacekeeping and humanitarian affairs. In 1993 he became Under Secretary-­General for Peacekeeping Operations, overseeing 17 military missions. Although he was powerless to stop the slaughter in Rwanda and the massacre in Srebrenica (Box 5.8) he improved peacekeeping operations through inter alia creating a 24-­hour situation room and obtaining commitments for standby resources from member states. Soft spoken and dignified, Annan had a profile that suited the P5’s craving for an SG who would be ‘more secretary than general’. He lived up to this reputation in the sense that he implemented administrative and budgetary changes to improve the UN’s effectiveness, which included forming a Senior Management Group to bring greater operational coherence and a streamlined management structure that held down costs and promoted better coordination. He also considerably improved staff morale partly through persuading the US that his reforms justified payment of its withheld dues. Nevertheless, he was more of an activist than was anticipated. Several times he brought potential or active conflict situations to SC’s attention, including Sierra Leone, Liberia, East Timor and Eritrea, and consequently the number of peacekeeping operations reached a modern zenith during his tenure.

In 2001 he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize (jointly with the UN) in acknowledgement of his effective leadership and his work to stimulate intergovernmental cooperation. This particularly related to his peacekeeping activities, his efforts to support the fight against terrorism (which included garnering UN support for the invasion of Afghanistan following 9/11) and his commitment to dealing with HIV/AIDS. In peacekeeping he oversaw the independence referendum in East Timor and persuaded Indonesia that a peacekeeping force should assist in the transfer of power to the new state. While not finding a settlement to the Saharawi liberation movement’s claims for self-­determination in the Western Sahara he did manage to bring an end to hostilities. Outside the security sphere he worked to get governments to adopt the Millennium Development Goals. Ironically Annan’s activism ultimately undid his ability to push through further reform. He upset the US by adamantly opposing its 2003 invasion of Iraq. Subsequently the US exploited every opportunity to make his life difficult, not least over his alleged role in the Oil-­for-­Food scandal. Close colleagues believe that he was unfairly implicated in the misdemeanours of others, although bearing responsibility for their misconduct, and consequently his waning authority caused many of the proposals of two high-­level reviews of the UN to be stillborn.

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principal legal systems of the world’. Judges should act independently of nationality, and countries cannot have more than one ICJ judge. States that are a party to a dispute that do not have a judge on the panel may appoint one for the duration of their case. Decisions are taken by majority. ICC has a President and 17 judges, a Prosecutor’s office and a Registrar. The President, Prosecutor and Registrar constitute the Coordination Council, which manages ICC’s work. Judges are appointed by the States Party for single nine-­year terms and are selected to be representative of the main types of legal experience (principally systems of civil law, common law and religious law). Between nine and 13 judges must be specialists in criminal law, while between five and nine judges must be authorities in international law. Judges’ terms of office are extended until they conclude a trial. The Prosecutor opens investigations (subject to review by the Pre-­Trial Chamber) and decides on the standards of evidence needed to bring cases to trial. The 121 states that have signed the Rome Statute are obliged to assist ICC with all elements of a case by arresting subjects, delivering them to The Hague, accumulating evidence and providing prison space, as ICC has no independent enforcement capacity. If feasible, states should arrest and prosecute their own nationals. However, about 70 states have not signed, including three members of SC (USA, Russia and China) plus some of the world’s worst human rights offenders (Saudi Arabia, Zimbabwe, Uzbekistan and North Korea).

5.3

Current activities

5.3.1 Maintaining international peace and security By 2013 there were 16 ongoing peacekeeping operations (Table 5.1) involving some 100 000 peacekeepers, costing approximately $7.7b annually. MONUSCO is the largest with 18 400 troops (including AU forces), followed by UNAMID (16 000), MINUSMA (12 600) and UNIFIL (11 000). Three countries in which there are ongoing operations (Haiti, Congo and Sudan) would seem to pose long-­term problems for the international community. Since 1993 the UN’s three interventions in Haiti have not achieved a lasting resolution to its problems. Haiti is beset by chronic corruption, endemic violence, extreme poverty and a population which responds to populist politics. While OAS and UN have tried to instil democratic processes, the country’s political elite is riven by factions whose supporters quickly resort to violence. The Stabilization Mission (MINUSTAH) has 6800 troops and 2700 police from 41 countries but suffers from a lack of determined leadership, poor

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coordination and limited accompanying aid (see Chapter 8, section 8.3). The 2010 earthquake retarded progress by many years. In Congo attempts to foster democratic government are also elusive. Peacekeeping operations have grown gradually with each flare-­up in the conflict to the point where, in 2013, limited offensive operations had been sanctioned. Like Haiti the country is mired in corruption, but the problems facing the UN are amplified by the country’s size, the existence of fiefdoms owing no allegiance to the central government, and poor communications. Unlike the 1960s conflict, whose resolution was seen as a necessary part of post-­colonial change and was helped by a desire to keep Congo in the Western sphere of influence, there appears to be little political interest in resolving the present conflict swiftly. Despite a peace agreement giving independence to South Sudan and bringing 50 years of war to an end, fighting continues in Darfur (Box 5.7), where the UN and AU provide a joint peacekeeping force (see Chapter 13, section 13.12). The failure to finalize South Sudan’s borders has led to renewed but localized fighting requiring further peacekeeping interventions (UNMISS and UNIFSA). The Darfur conflict has spread to neighbouring countries, and a supplementary mission (MINURCAT) has been established in conjunction with an EU-­provided force of 3000 to ensure security for cross-­ border refugee communities. BOX 5.7

PEACEKEEPING IN DARFUR: A PORTENT FOR THE FUTURE? Despite the civil war in South Sudan, for many years Darfur, a remote semi-­arid area in the West, was relatively peaceful. The pastoral and indigenous Fur tribes, which were mainly Muslim, coexisted peacefully with Arab nomads. However, population pressures produced resource conflicts, which were exacerbated by the nomadic Arab forces (the Janjaweed) receiving support from the government to attack other ethnic groups with the express purpose of eliminating political opposition.

The escalating conflict has resulted in an estimated 300 000 deaths and 430 000 refugees. The conflict provides a view of the future difficulties that may arise in mounting peacekeeping operations. Seemingly driven by the Sudanese government, on Sudanese territory, against Sudanese people, the conflict initially appeared to be a domestic issue under Article 2 (7), which placed it beyond SC’s purview. Instead, Darfur provides an interesting test of the nascent R2P



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 doctrine, as potential Chinese and Russian vetoes have prevented SC from declaring Darfur a threat to international peace and security. AU initially stepped into the breach (Chapter 13, section 13.12) but ran into resource difficulties. In 2007, SC agreed the deployment of a joint AU–UN peacekeeping mission, with NATO supplying financial and logistical support to overcome the region’s geographic isolation. The Resolution authorizing the mission, and hence its operational mandate, is convoluted. Its preamble suggests that Darfur constitutes a threat to international peace and security without explicitly saying so. Because of this omission, peacekeepers can only be present with Sudan’s permission. However, the Resolution does authorize peacekeepers to use force in self-­defence

and to protect humanitarian workers or civilians (actions normally associated with enforcement actions under Chapter VII). The fact that the forces are AU-­led reflects Sudan’s demands, although the forces operate under conventional peacekeeping norms. Three other factors complicate the situation: ICC’s indictment of Sudanese President Bashir on genocide charges; the government’s distrust and hindrance of NATO’s logistical support, which is complicated by NATO having no regional legitimacy; and implicit support of the government by the Arab League (Chapter 13, section 13.4), the second RO with an interest in Sudan. Thus, while the Charter encourages ROs to spearhead resolutions to local disputes, when more than one is involved diplomatic complexities ensue.

Following the recommendation of the UN High-­Level Panel on Reform (HLP) (UN 2004) and continuing efforts to contain peacekeeping operations through continual involvement of all interested parties in trouble spots, in 2005 a Peacebuilding Commission was established to develop strategies to assist post-­conflict situations. The 31-­member Commission operates under GA mandates assisting mediation efforts and supporting the establishment of good governance structures. Currently it is working in Burundi, Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Central African Republic, Guinea and Guinea-­Bissau. The Commission expands its membership to accommodate all parties relevant to specific cases (such as neighbouring states) and, importantly, involves civil society in its work. The provision and effective operation of civilian police forces are vital to peacebuilding, and the UN is currently trying to identify countries willing to deploy their police along with developing clear operating guidelines and support for training activities. This initiative, like peacekeeping itself, is an evolving process (see section 5.4).

5.3.2 The international justice system The 12 cases ICJ adjudicated in 2012 included border disputes (Costa Rica versus Nicaragua and Burkina Faso versus Niger), whaling in the Antarctic (Australia against Japan), genocide in the Yugoslav conflict (Croatia

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and Serbia), and aerial herbicide spraying (Ecuador versus Colombia). Moreover, it is also considering cases from established hotspots, including the Cambodia–Thailand temple dispute (see Chapter 13, section 13.9.4) and armed activities in the Congo. In 2012, ICC concluded its first trial, when a Congolese citizen was sentenced to 14 years in jail. A verdict in one other Congolese case is pending, and another case was discharged. Six other prosecutions are being prepared or are ongoing and relate to events in the Central African Republic, Congo, Kenya and Sudan. Eleven ICC arrest warrants are outstanding. The warrants generating most attention are four covering massacres in Darfur, including that of Omar al-­Bashir, the Sudanese President, and charges against: Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda; Saif Ghaddafi following the events of 2011 in Libya; and Laurent Gbagbo, the former President of Côte d’Ivoire. ICC’s Pre-­Trial Chamber is also examining other individuals in the same countries. The Prosecutor’s office is continuing to investigate possible human rights abuses in Afghanistan, Colombia, Georgia, Guinea, Honduras, Mali, Nigeria and South Korea. In the case of Mali the government has requested ICC to investigate, while the other cases have been referred to it by third parties.

5.3.3 Human rights HRC completed a final group of 50 first-­cycle Universal Periodic Reviews in 2011, and in 2012 reported to the GA on 18 of them. It has since commenced a second cycle. OHCHR provides HRC with organizational support for this work and in the second cycle will be focusing on whether UN members have implemented first-­cycle recommendations. In its efforts to strengthen human rights mechanisms OHCHR is working with and encouraging member states to enshrine human rights norms in their legislation and protection systems. In the period up to 2014 it is targeting specific national improvements, ranging inter alia across obtaining ratification of existing treaties (30 countries), enhancing internal accountability (25 countries), increasing compliance with UN human rights mechanisms (48 countries) and achieving better participation of discriminated groups and women (22 countries). Another major priority is the protection of human rights in conflict situations and amongst migrant populations. OHCHR sends assessment or fact-­ finding missions to countries experiencing major human rights problems, and based on those findings HRC reports its own conclusions to the GA. In 2012 HRC reported on ten countries with serious human rights situations, including Belarus, the Congo, Iran, North Korea, Sri Lanka and Syria. Concurrently

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OHCHR provided TA to five countries to help improve their human rights’ procedures. HRC was not allowed to send a fact-­finding mission to Syria in 2012 but managed to assemble sufficient verifiable information for it to be able strongly to condemn the government for its transgressions on four occasions. OHCHR has other ongoing programmes, which include countering discrimination coupled with ensuring equal rights for minorities and women, pursuing the course of justice and strengthening the rule of law. Half of OHCHR’s staff are based in the field, where it runs 12 regional offices and has a presence in 49 countries, ranging from single human rights advisers (Kenya) through peacekeeping support (Haiti and Congo) to fully fledged country offices undertaking a complete range of activities (Guatemala and Mauritania).

5.3.4 DESA and the development dimension DESA’s core activity continues to be support of ECOSOC and its committees. Its Statistical Department coordinates the assembly of data required to assess the progress of MDGs, a process that has exposed shortcomings in the capabilities of many national statistical offices. Therefore, DESA has embarked on a process to improve national statistical capacities in the collection of socioeconomic data. This is allied to work to improve member states’ ability to upgrade and integrate macroeconomic analysis and fiscal and tax policies. As the MDG target date of 2015 approaches, DESA is starting to identify and define targets for a follow-­up set of global development goals. DESA, along with the Regional Commissions and some UN semi-­ autonomous institutions, has access to the UN’s own ‘Development Account’, amounting to $29m in 2012–13, for funding small-­scale TA projects. Most of the funds under this programme are disbursed through the Regional Commissions (23 of 51 projects), but DESA operates eight in support of the MDGs, improved national governance and renewable energy. The work to support the 12 Millennium Research Villages has received a second funding injection (mostly from the Soros Foundation) to bring work to completion before the 2015 evaluation deadline. Successful examples of Research Villages, such as Sauri in Kenya (where malaria has been halved, food production doubled and children helped to stay on at school), originally encouraged DESA to replicate them by selecting 66 more and then multiplying that number by an order of magnitude. However, new projects have not materialized as planned, since initial enthusiasm for the Research Villages has abated following recent conclusions, for example that progress in reducing the incidence of malaria is no greater than in villages without MDG support (Bump et al. 2012).

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Evaluation and future challenges The continued clamour for reform indicates members’ dissatisfaction with the UN’s performance. Too often, however, the UN’s supposed failings can be traced to those self-­same members who periodically plunge the organization into crisis by withholding funds or military resources and failing to develop effective coalitions, thus allowing transgressors to avoid scrutiny. These critics also overlook the possibly unrealistic expectations made of the UN and the many things the UN System has achieved, including the success of some peacekeeping operations, the elaboration of many aspects of international law, and that the UN is widely regarded, even by the most powerful states, as a legitimate actor or one that can bestow legitimacy on the actions of others. For example, the imbroglio which ensued over the 2003 US-­led invasion of Iraq stemmed largely from the absence of SC authorization. Weiss (2008) attributes the UN’s difficulties to four main problems: members’ inclination to resist encroachment on their sovereignty, the polarization around the North–South divide, the ‘feudal SAs’ which oppose closer integration of UN activities, and an outdated management of the ICS. In many respects, these constraints are akin to those faced by all IOs but are perhaps more keenly felt by the UN because of its profile and the importance of many of its operations. Thus, this section commences by examining some of these generic problems before going on to evaluate specific areas. To mainstream scholars of international politics, who place sovereign states at the heart of their analysis, the UN’s shortcomings are no surprise. Realists suggest the UN makes little or no difference to international peace and security by arguing that it is merely a façade behind which power politics are pursued. The UN must remain a puppet of the most powerful actors or they will disregard it. Moreover, while states may pay lip-­service to renouncing the use of force, they remain trapped by the security dilemma, and resort to coercion is an ever-­present possibility. Liberals are more optimistic, suggesting that IOs can, even in the sensitive arena of security, create conditions that make international cooperation possible. Repeated interactions at the UN and governance through an agreed set of rules stabilize states’ expectations about the peaceful behaviour of others and alter the balance of costs and benefits that resorting to force would entail. The major powers’ role in UN decision making has been studied extensively. During the Cold War the casting of 243 SC vetoes, mainly by the USSR (94 per cent of vetoes cast from 1946 to 1965) and the USA (58 per cent from 1966 to 1995), often resulted in gridlock. Thereafter, the veto was used more sparingly (just 20 times from 1996 to 2008), although China and Russia

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regularly abstained. Nevertheless, the use of the veto continues to prevent desirable actions. For example, in July 2012, Russia and China both vetoed a Resolution threatening sanctions against Syria, Russia because of its long-­ standing commercial and political interests in the country and China because it is against giving the UN any remit to intervene in domestic matters. A review of the UN’s relationships with sovereign states would not be complete without considering those with the hegemon, the USA. The US vacillates between being a staunch supporter and a fierce critic. Indubitably the US has exerted a powerful sway over the UN’s history, evolution and effectiveness, not least through its influence over the appointment of senior personnel. Nonetheless, its greatest impact is its material influence, which over time has dwindled but remains pivotal. Intermittently the US has expressed its displeasure by withholding UN contributions, although it temporarily lost its seat on ACABQ as a consequence (see section 5.2.1). Moreover, because the UN has no permanent logistical capacity, US capabilities are indispensable at the commencement of peacekeeping operations. Engagement with the hegemon is, as the experience of the League demonstrated, vital if the UN is to succeed. Equally, however, the UN is an important resource for the US. Too often assessments of US–UN relations emphasize occasions where the US is pitted against a majority opinion or where it disregards UN decisions. Examples of the former are its refusal to participate in ICC and its stance on climate change (Case Study 1.1). The 2003 US invasion of Iraq exemplifies the latter case. The very fact that the US sought UN approval suggests that the norm calling for SC authorization to legitimize aggressive action has taken deep root and, furthermore, the US eventually requested UN support to assist the interim government (Schlesinger 2008). US diplomatic manoeuvrings also push the UN into adopting policies that support US interests, such as over Afghanistan and Haiti and sanctions against North Korea and Iran (see also Chapter 7, section 7.6). In other words, the UN is important for the hegemon when it realizes that exercising hard power can be costly or even self-­defeating, especially if public opinion restricts unilateral action. In the same vein US calls for action have often coincided with the interests of other states, which then join in providing financial and military support in recognition of the collective security aspect of specific interventions. Even though it has grown to accommodate increasing mandates, the UN (particularly SC) is locked into a time warp that reflects the global political realities of 1945 (see also Chapter 17). Many UN reforms have been advocated, but few have succeeded. The Charter has been amended only

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three times. In 1963 SC was enlarged from 11 to 15 members, with nine supporting votes being required for a decision, and ECOSOC was enlarged from 18 to 27 members. In 1965 a process was introduced to allow a review of the Charter, and in 1971 ECOSOC was further enlarged to 54 members. Arguably the most important reforms to the UN since 1945, such as the decisions to deploy peacekeepers, have arisen informally when the Charter has been interpreted and applied to actual situations. Reform is difficult because of irreconcilable differences between states and the nature of UN decision making. Most developed states tend to concentrate on reforms to improve efficiency and effectiveness. Developing states tend to emphasize the need for greater equity in decision making (something of an irony given that their combined weight in a GA vote far exceeds their financial contributions). This means that, in the search for a two-­thirds GA majority, a reform package becomes so nuanced as to be meaningless or that radical proposals can be blocked by an active minority of unhappy states. It is almost universally agreed that the SC needs major reform to give it greater legitimacy in the eyes of member states, thereby enhancing their support for its decisions, especially decisions endorsed by the veto-­carrying P5. Reform proposals have tended to focus on SC’s size and composition, the desirability (or otherwise) of new permanent members, and the perpetuation of the veto. Unfortunately each proposal engenders further problems, examples being which countries would become new permanent members or which regions would get additional seats. As yet no one has advanced a formula that balances legitimacy, representation and effectiveness or one that would not be vetoed. Proposed reforms to the Secretariat, including the post of SG, have proven similarly contentious. Indeed it is occasionally suggested that states resist a more effective Secretariat because they fear losing control of it. In the 1990s the Oil-­for-Food Programme ruthlessly exposed the drawbacks of the UN’s management structure. The programme was mandated by SC to control the income from Iraq’s oil sales to ensure that Iraqis received humanitarian support rather than the proceeds being funnelled into Saddam Hussein’s coffers. SC failed to lay down clear guidelines, and oversight was poor, resulting in Saddam diverting more than 10 per cent of the $64b of oil sales for his own purposes. The top UN official managing the programme was charged with taking bribes, and many participants were accused of corruption, including close associates of SG Annan and some government representatives who were party to SC decisions. According to Weiss (2010: 42) the scandal’s prime cause was ‘an inattentive management system that was

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outmoded, inept and quite out of its depth in administering a program of that size and complexity’. Paradoxically the Oil-­for-­Food scandal simultaneously highlighted the need for reform while scuppering its chances, as several reforms proposed by HLP came to nothing following strong US opposition. Finally there is the problem of coalescing the UN’s sprawling mandate and the related problem of financing. Nowhere are all UN programmes and budgets reviewed holistically, this responsibility being split between ECOSOC, ACABQ and CPC, with the result that the UN assumes too many responsibilities with too few resources. Small amounts, spread over many programmes (salami slicing), almost guarantee that programmes will not achieve their intended impact. The budgets of most large cities surpass those of the UN, so it is not surprising that financial crises are a recurrent problem. This is exacerbated by states regularly failing to pay their UN dues, most notably during the 1990s when almost half of UN members were in arrears. Proposals for independent funding sources (for example a tax on international financial transactions) were rejected by states reluctant to see greater UN autonomy.

5.4.1 Maintaining international peace and security Since 1945 the incidence of major interstate wars has declined, but the UN has not put a stop to the use of force, and millions have been killed in conflicts around the world. For every author who argues that fewer major conflicts signal the institutionalization of those UN norms banning the use of force and territorial expansion, there is another who posits that this reflects the growing material costs of military conflict, especially in an era of weapons of mass destruction. The UN has regularly stood on the sidelines while powerful states have contravened the principles that the Charter committed them to uphold. Indeed while the Charter awards SC considerable power it is totally reliant on states to support its actions, and exercise of the veto, as in the case of the Syrian civil war, is still a constraint. While SC cannot prevent military conflict it has, as the 2003 invasion of Iraq demonstrated, raised the reputational costs of doing so. Moreover, SC has regularly sanctioned interventions, becoming progressively more resourceful in the collective measures being applied and the pretexts for them. Assessing the efficacy of UN interventions is challenging, because what might be deemed a success is open to discussion. In this section we evaluate the record and difficulties of peacekeeping as a proxy for its overall impact. In most instances UN operations merely apply a salve to deep-­seated wounds, but without UN intervention the plight of affected populations might be

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worse. For example, UN intervention in Yugoslavia is sometimes considered a failure because of tragedies such as the Srebrenica massacre (Box 5.8). However, in 1992, before UN involvement, fighting had killed 130 000, while subsequently this fell to 30 000 in 1993 and 3000 in 1994. Given that UN forces also delivered 2000 tons of humanitarian supplies daily, the UN’s impact was more effective than critics opine. Peacekeeping has generally worked well in situations of civil war (e.g. Namibia and Mozambique) (Howard 2007), but conflicts that have persisted interminably (e.g. the Indo-­ Pakistan conflict, the Middle East and Cyprus) all result from rushed exits and consequent decisions made by former colonial powers, two of which are among the P5. Neither France nor the UK has used its SC position to strengthen the SG’s efforts to resolve these situations. Analysts of UN peacekeeping are divided about its value. Hammarskjöld famously observed that ‘Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers but only soldiers can do it.’ Nevertheless there is mounting evidence that, except in some of the most difficult and interminable cases, peace is more enduring when peacekeepers are deployed, especially in intrastate conflicts. Peacekeepers make aggression more costly, build confidence amongst parties through their neutral monitoring of agreements, and lessen the possibility of minor incidents escalating into full-­scale war (Fortna 2008). Empirical investigations into the more complex peacebuilding operations are still in their infancy, but there is little convincing evidence to date that they are capable of effective state building. Over 3000 have died in UN service, and traumatic failures in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia (see Box 5.8) have left deep scars on the organization. Some of these failures reflect the shortcomings of the wider UN System. For example, SC’s inability to gain authority under Chapter VII meant that the peacekeepers sent to Rwanda needed the consent of all parties concerned. This severely restricted the peacekeepers, who did not have a mandate to use force to protect civilians, resulting in their becoming ‘bystanders to genocide’ (Armstrong et al. 2004: 100). These setbacks reveal several more practical challenges that the UN must address if future peacekeeping or enforcement missions are to succeed. Troop shortages contributed to the catastrophes in Rwanda and Somalia. Member states voluntarily supply forces and are reimbursed from the funds allocated for a specific operation. Recently some members have provided contingents as a way of ‘subsidizing’ their military costs, but their troops have been ill equipped for their role, and too often the overall success of UN missions is excessively reliant on small contingents from the best-­trained armies. In addition governments do not always pay their assessed share of contributions, a particular problem during the Cold War’s polarized political atmosphere.

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These problems are aggravated by the ambitions of modern peacekeeping operations. Many more SC mandates are hybrid in nature, as they cover peacebuilding as well as peacekeeping. In a growing number of cases, particularly where the consent of all parties has been missing, initial peacekeeping forces operating under Chapter VI subsequently acquire ‘peace enforcement’ mandates under Chapter VII; that is, a deteriorating situation means UN forces are switched from non-­combat or defensive operations to combat actions. However, this requires changing the logistics and mix of forces on the ground, as peacekeepers are rarely equipped for fighting. Military commanders often face rapidly changing conditions with little opportunity for consultation with SC. This can result in indecision, operational decisions that do not command SC support or alternatively ones that set members against one another. Demands for more complex peacekeeping operations look likely to expand, and efforts to adapt organizational structures to better command and coordinate them are ongoing. Following the difficulties encountered in the former Yugoslavia, which were partly due to a ‘disconnect’ between the military commander and SC decisions, the UN re-­examined its peacekeeping support structure. The number of officials dedicated to planning and executing peacekeeping missions has been expanded from just 12 in 1989 to over 600 (Dijkstra 2012: 581). Furthermore much more peacekeeping work is being channelled through the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). DPKO now incorporates a 24-­hour situation centre in New York which provides up-­to-­the-­minute information to SC and responds to field commanders’ needs. Moreover, DPKO is charged with ensuring the UN can mount a fully functioning mission of 5000 personnel within 90 days of an SC mandate and maintaining strategic stocks in permanent readiness at a ­logistics base in Brindisi. Assessments of the UN’s reforms commend its efforts but note there is still much to be done. For example, the UN’s ability to run peacekeeping operations remains ‘fragile compared to that of modern, capable military organizations’, and its reliance on ad hoc assembly of forces and its lack of integrated battalions hamper field effectiveness (Frechette 2012). Recent UN reviews of the Peacebuilding Commission suggest that, for it to be successful, its objectives and participation should be part of initial peacekeeping mandates, while its work would be enhanced by the UN System working as one, as is happening in Libya (see also Chapter 7, section 7.1), and by enhancing national capacity to undertake complementary development and good ­governance initiatives.

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BOX 5.8

SREBRENICA Following Bosnia-­Herzegovina’s declaration of independence from Yugoslavia in 1992, Bosnian Serb forces, backed by Slobodan Milosevic’s Serbian government, counter-­attacked a Bosnian Muslim enclave around Srebrenica to secure more territory. By the end of 1992 there was heavy fighting in Eastern Bosnia, and the situation in Srebrenica became critical because of the large concentration of Muslim refugees who had sought sanctuary there. Based on a proposal made by the International Committee of the Red Cross, SC declared Srebrenica to be a demilitarized ‘safe area’ under the Geneva Convention and assigned a small force of peacekeepers to protect it and support humanitarian relief. Initially things went well, but in May 1993 the safe area was extended without SC authorizing a corresponding increase in the protective force; instead Bosnian Muslim forces were allowed to control some of the enclave. This mixing of combatant and peacekeeping forces had disastrous consequences, as aggressive armed responses from Bosnian Muslim forces within the

demilitarized enclave put its safety into doubt. UN forces meanwhile were too few to mount an effective operation and were shackled by terms of engagement that prevented the use of force except in self-­ defence. SC also failed to make clear the implications of maintaining a safe area in this situation (Wahlgren 1999). Some UN members were complicit in the smuggling of weapons into the safe area, while others refused to put pressure on Bosnian Serbs. These factors eventually contributed to an observation post of 55 Dutch peacekeepers being overrun by Bosnian Serb forces and taken hostage. In the face of escalating Serbian attacks, 15 000 Muslim men of fighting age broke out of the enclave and the Serbs then made a frontal assault on Srebrenica. The remaining small Dutch contingent was overwhelmed, being ill equipped to intervene in the fighting, and retreated from the safe area. The result was  the ethnic cleansing of 40 000 Muslims and the mass murder of some 8000 men, a mix of boys, the elderly and many of fighting age.

5.4.2 The international justice system The performance of the international justice system reflects the clash between norms extolling the principle of state sovereignty and the binding nature of international law. Unquestionably the need to tread softly around the issue of sovereignty limits what ICJ and ICC can achieve, but even so neither institution is impotent. Protection of state sovereignty is the main barrier to cases reaching ICJ. Indeed astute management of treaty obligations and denial of consent allow many states to elude ICJ jurisdiction. Since 80 per cent of its cases have been instigated since the end of the Cold War it now appears that some of the

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prior reluctance to use the Court has dissipated. Altogether, by 2012, ICJ had issued decisions in 152 cases plus 25 advisory opinions, the majority involving low-­key issues like treaty interpretation and fishing rights. Additionally, many disagreements are settled out of court once cases commence. Despite the constraints, ICJ has made some notable contributions to world affairs and has consolidated and codified the corpus of international law. It has made some high-­profile decisions that have helped resolve disputes that had led to conflict, including border disputes between Burkina Faso and Mali (1986), El Salvador and Honduras (1992), and Libya and Chad (1994). Furthermore, concentrating purely on the number of cases underplays ICJ’s legal impact and the significance of its decisions for which there is a decent level of compliance. Even where there is no legal requirement to do so, states may feel a social or political obligation to alter their behaviour because an ICJ judgment has opined on a particular position, which otherwise brings subsequent material or reputational costs. For example, in 2003, states looking to exert pressure on Israel asked ICJ to consider the legality of the border wall being constructed by Israel alongside the West Bank territory. Likewise, in 1979, when the US embassy in Tehran was seized and its staff were held hostage, the US took its case to ICJ in the hope that a judgment against Iran would mobilize diplomatic opinion in America’s favour (Greenwood 2011). Although by 2013 ICC had indicted only 25 persons, the decision of 121 states to commit to the Rome Statute demonstrates both a growing acceptance of the norm that terrible crimes should be punished and the institution’s relevance to global politics. In turn this has generated a moral momentum that has allowed ICC norms and values to induce subtle shifts even in countries not party to the Rome Statute. For example, military authorities have redrafted their rules of engagement to avoid their troops committing acts that would fall under ICC jurisdiction. Countries with capable legal systems know that if they fail to investigate allegations of such crimes their international reputation could be damaged by referral to ICC. Moreover, ICC becomes a continuous factor in the minds of policy makers and troublemakers alike. Before the 2003 invasion of Iraq the UK Attorney-­ General thought it necessary to advise the Prime Minister as to whether British officials or military personnel could be brought before ICC. In some war-­torn countries there have been encouraging reactions to the threat of indictment. For example, in the Central African Republic child soldiers were demobbed following the Congo prosecutions, and at least one Afghan warlord has warned his troops of the dangers of human rights violations (B. Cooper 2009).

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Never before has there been an international institution with the powers to identify, indict, try and punish the perpetrators of heinous crimes. ICC overrides sovereignty and moreover ‘people now have a direct connection to international law and institutions to a degree that has never existed before . . . [That] the Court treats people as individuals of a universal category of humanity, and not as elements defined by citizenship . . . is a revolutionary change for international law’ (Hurd 2011: 235). This has, unsurprisingly, made ICC a target for criticism. In particular many argue that, while commitments to the Rome Statute may have begun to end the culture of impunity, ICC cannot claim to have made much progress in the second part of its mandate, to lessen the likelihood of such crimes. Resource constraints limit ICC to investigating only a small proportion of perpetrators, making it implausible to argue that the threat of indictment and punishment will deter those predisposed to mass atrocities ( Jessberger and Geneuss 2012). While the issuing of arrest warrants against leaders of the Lord’s Resistance Army did encourage them to negotiate with the Ugandan government, there are worries that similar actions could be counterproductive, encouraging those indicted to cling to power or commit further atrocities. Unlike the case with past international tribunals, ICC indictments often refer to ongoing conflicts, and its involvement may destabilize finely balanced, diplomatic efforts to achieve settlements, as arguably was the case with the warrant for President Omar al-­Bashir (see Box 5.7) (Kaye 2011). Sovereignty remains a key obstacle to ICC effectiveness. Even when states recognize ICC’s competence they can be reluctant to pursue the culprits for political reasons. Sometimes these are internal; for example, in Uganda Joseph Kony offered to negotiate provided ICC indictments would be dropped. In other cases, such as Omar al-­Bashir, the pressures are external, with many Arab and African countries calling for SC to suspend the indictment. These calls reflect both the impression of African states that ICC is unduly targeting them while ignoring atrocities elsewhere and concerns of some African leaders that ‘There but for the grace of God go I.’ Virtually all ICC’s cases concern Africa, but the majority have been referred to it by African states, which constitute almost a quarter of ICC members. The exceptions have been two cases initiated by the Court’s Prosecutor, concerning Kenya (following an explicit invitation by politicians, who could not decide how to investigate the violence that flared after the 2007 election) and Côte d’Ivoire (which although not a State Party has accepted ICC jurisdiction), and two cases referred by SC (Sudan and Libya). The SC cases are more controversial for a variety of reasons, not least because despite being subjected to ICC jurisdiction neither state is an ICC signatory.

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ICC’s main challenge is to bolster its credibility through obtaining broader participation and ensuring states abide by their existing commitments to flesh out some poorly defined parts of its mandate. For ill-­treated populations ICC has had little impact other than the implicit satisfaction of their seeing some high-­profile individuals being charged. Most victims cannot follow its protracted and faraway proceedings, and consequently a sense of justice denied festers. In 2010, ICC finally got a definition on what would constitute an ‘act of aggression’ under its mandate, but this will not come into force until 2017 at the earliest, while the appointment in 2012 of Fato Bensouda, a Gambian lawyer, as Prosecutor may allay some African perceptions of ICC bias.

5.4.3 Human rights Though the UN has been relatively successful in developing and enshrining human rights norms it has been powerless to prevent blatant violations. One of the main obstacles is that transgressors are shielded by Article 2 (7), which affirms non-­interference in domestic matters, although this is being weakened by R2P. However, as over Syria, when P5 members threaten a veto, action cannot be taken even in the direst circumstances. Critics assert that HRC repeats both this failing and those of the system it replaced. Thus states with dubious human rights records have successfully sought election, the 57 members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation have banded together to single out Israel for condemnation, and there are examples of double standards, with weaker countries being excoriated for practices overlooked in stronger states or those with powerful backers. HRC’s Universal Periodic (peer) Review process is also under attack. Committee discussion is restricted to three hours for each review plus a further hour when the final report is considered by the full Council. Given that the country concerned can make a presentation, the time for highlighting and discussing specific problems is very limited. Additionally, while NGOs participate in report preparation, their subsequent input is minimal (Sweeney and Saito 2009). The reports of HRC, as a subsidiary of GA, can only make recommendations, thereby binding neither the UN nor the states concerned. HRC, although no panacea for human rights abuses, is an improvement over CHR. It has issued a string of condemnations of human rights abuses and supported human rights monitors and investigations in countries including Burma, Sri Lanka, Côte d’Ivoire, Syria and Iran. Such investigations have increased in recent years (see section 5.3) and represent a significant improvement in the human rights regime despite some countries, such as Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe, resisting investigation. Whether peer pressure will advance further

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adherence to defined norms is a matter for future research. Nevertheless, there are indications that states are taking HRC seriously and, unlike the situation of selective assessments of CHR, because all members, including the P5, must undergo review, a climate of equal treatment exists. HRC also has the advantage of meeting more regularly and for longer than its predecessor; consequently abuses are less likely to be ignored because it is not sitting. The way in which all sides seized upon the Goldstone report, an investigation commissioned by HRC into violations of human rights and humanitarian law during the 2008–09 military operations in Gaza, demonstrates the desire by states to protect their image of upholding international norms (PoKempner 2010).

5.4.4 DESA and the development dimension Efforts being made to achieve the MDGs reflect the UN System’s wider performance in development issues. The UN’s singular achievement is to elaborate a norm which views extreme poverty as morally unacceptable (Hulme and Scott 2010). In pursuing this objective, the UN System has recorded outstanding successes alongside abject failures (see Table 5.3, and Chapters 6 and 7). The goals for cutting poverty and improving access to clean drinking water are set to be met, and that of universal access to primary education will almost be achieved. Nevertheless targets to reduce hunger, child mortality and unsanitary living conditions will be missed. Indeed it is disquieting to reflect that, in the time taken to read this chapter, hundreds of people will have died and the futures of thousands more impaired from causes related to these missed targets. Furthermore, overall global advances mask regional and national shortcomings. Both East and South-­East Asia look set to meet virtually all the MDGs, while Sub-­Saharan Africa is struggling to reach only one. Progress in China and India, which commenced in the 1990s (prior to the MDGs’ existence), has skewed global figures favourably. The persistence of underdevelopment can be attributed to factors beyond UN control. For instance, only six donor countries meet the target that 0.7 per cent of GNI be allocated for official development assistance – Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK. Thus it is difficult to assess the UN’s impact. Nevertheless shortcomings in the UN’s institutional structure have undoubtedly constrained its accomplishments. ECOSOC’s plethora of activities reflects its desire to please as many states as possible, and it has had a habit of overreaching. To quote the SG’s High-­Level Panel on System-­Wide Coherence (UN 2006), ‘ECOSOC’s mandate has been far greater than its exercise of it.’ Inevitably this has implications for DESA, where, despite or perhaps because of its being responsible for ­coordinating inter-­agency affairs, considerable technical overlap exists between DESA, the

Poverty and hunger 50% reduction in   poverty 50% reduction in   hunger (2008) Primary education Universal primary   schooling Gender equality In primary school   enrolment In secondary school   numbers Child mortality 66% reduction under   5 years old Measles immunization Maternal health 75% reduction in   mortality

Goal (date of latest data*)

▲

c ,

0

,

, ,

c 0 c

0

c c ▲

▲ c c

,

,

,

0

,

,

,

,

▲

,

c

▲

▲

West Asia, South-­East Middle-­East Asia

▲

North Africa

,

Sub-­ Saharan Africa

Table 5.3  Progress in achieving the Millennium Development Goals

c

,

,

,

▲

c

,

,

South Asia

c

▲

▲

▲

▲

,

c

▲

East Asia, China

Region

,

,

,

▲

,

0

c

▲

▲

,

0

▲

,

▲

Latin America and Caribbean

n/a

n/a

Central Asia (CIS)

,

,

,

▲

▲

,

,

c

All developing countries

,

n/a

n/a c ▲ ▲

,

0 ,

0 , , 0

n/a ,

▲

▲

0

▲

c

▲

c ▲

▲ ▲

c

▲

c

▲ ▲

▲ ▲ ▲

▲ ▲ ▲ , ▲

▲

▲

▲

▲

▲

c

n/a n/a

n/a 0

n/a

0

0

Source: UN (2012).

*All data is for 2010 unless indicated. Oceania is not included in the separate sub-­regional breakdowns because in most cases no data exists.

▲ – hit target; c – on track for target; , – progress made but target will not be hit; 0 – no progress or reversal; n/a – no data available.

Notes:

Diseases Halt and reverse spread   of HIV/AIDS Halt and reverse spread   of tuberculosis 50% reduction in   incidence of malaria Environment Reverse forest loss Halve lack of drinking   water Halve lack of sanitation Improve slum   conditions (2012) , c

0 ▲

▲

▲

c

, ▲

0 ▲

,

▲

▲

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SAs and the Regional Economic Commissions. Thus, resources in the areas for which DESA has a mandate often flow to more operationally distinctive organizations. Typical was its work on gender, where DESA failed to build a strong and cohesive policy framework, resulting in creation of UN Women (Box 6.1). Periodically the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services has criticized DESA for failing to undertake evaluations, and a major review of ECOSOC concluded that DESA needed to be strengthened, but few substantive reforms have occurred. The slow decline of the Regional Economic Commissions and their overlaps with DESA and other ROs (Berthelot 2004) suggest that a wholesale rationalization could be achieved by giving DESA responsibility for global activities and analysis while transferring regional work to other regional bodies. For example, ESCAP has been eclipsed by the Asian Development Bank as the intellectual leader in its region, and the EU has displaced ECE in Europe. UNDP also competes by producing regional perspectives to its Human Development Reports. The Economic Commissions are inherently wasteful, and they have institutionalized large bureaucracies which are difficult to disband except if they were to be transferred to organizations dealing with regional integration. SUGGESTED READING

Adebajo, A. (2011), UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. [Examines 15 UN African missions and the future of African peacekeeping] Bosco, D.L. (2009), Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of the Modern World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [SC’s influence on the modern world] Gereis, S.B. (2012), The United Nations: An Introduction, 2nd edn, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave. [A concise review of core UN functions] Gill, T.D. (2003), Rosenne’s The World Court: What It Is and How It Works, 6th edn, Leiden: Martius Nijhoff. [A basic and comprehensive text] Hassler, S. (2012), Reforming the UN Security Council Membership: The Illusion of Representativeness, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave. [Studies competing proposals for SC reform] Howard, L.M. (2007), UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Examines the UN’s peacekeeping record through case studies] Mingst, K.A. and Karns, M.P. (2011), The United Nations in the 21st Century, 4th edn, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. [Comprehensive introduction to the UN’s history, institutions and processes] Righter, R. (1995), Utopia Lost: The United Nations and World Order, New York: Twentieth Century Press. [Penetrating critique of the UN System, its management and members’ activities] Schabas, W.A. (2011), An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 4th edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Excellent overview of ICC’s origins, functions, structures and key cases] UN (Annual), Yearbook of the United Nations, New York: UN. [A comprehensive description of all UN activities during the year concerned]

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Urquhart, B. (1972), Hammarskjöld, London: Bodley Head. [Definitive biography by one of Hammarskjöld’s colleagues] Weiss, T.G. and S. Daws (eds) (2007), The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Covers the theory, main organs, relationships to other actors, reform and principal themes of the UN]

Internet resources International Court of Justice: http://www.icj-­cij.org International Criminal Court: http://www.icc-­cpi.int Links to the whole UN System: http://www.unsystem.org Principal UN website: http://www.un.org UN Joint Inspection Unit reports: http://www.unjiu.org Website containing official UN documents: http://documents.un.org Website of the independent UN Intellectual History Project, which has assembled verbal and written UN historical records: http://www.unhistory.org

6 The United Nations semi-­ autonomous agencies As Chapters 3 and 5 have demonstrated, the UN is the hub of global ­governance to which states have connected a host of institutions to wrestle with emergent problems. The organizations covered in this chapter, sometimes referred to as the UN Funds and Programmes, are united not by their functions but by their semi-­autonomous relationship with the UN. This relationship exists because they have originated from UN General Assembly (GA) resolutions rather than from international treaties, as is the case with the UN specialized agencies (SAs, see Chapter 7). The practical implication of this is that the GA (and by implication the Secretary-­General), by not granting them their own independent governance structures, retains control over their mandates, funding and oversight. Being semi-­autonomous agencies confers some advantages. These include: greater freedom of action, since they work at one remove from the GA (frequently within the flexibility of four-­year work programmes); avoidance of some of the UN Secretariat’s stifling administration; and an ability to raise funds outside the UN budgetary framework. However, concomitant disadvantages are that they have fluctuating funding and need to heed their own governance requirements (often driven by the views of governmental aid agencies), broader political dictates, and grandstanding within the UN. The semi-­autonomous agencies appeared in three broad waves. The first contained the precursors of the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). These organizations dealt with the humanitarian aftermath of the Second World War (see Chapter 2) but developed roots and, in the first two cases, permanence. In the 1960s, the second wave saw the founding of five semi-­autonomous agencies to advance the aims of the Development Decade: the World Food Programme (WFP), the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, Chapter 10, section 10.3), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Population Fund (UNFPA)

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and the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), which was eventually given SA status (see Chapter 7, section 7.8). The final wave materialized in the 1970s, with the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the UN Centre for Human Settlements (known as Habitat) being the outcomes of UN-­sponsored global conferences, along with the UN University (UNU), the largest of six research and training programmes funded from UN resources. In 2010 one further programme was created, UN Women (see Box 6.1). States had ideological and practical motivations for establishing semi-­ autonomous agencies, often resisting calls to upgrade them to SAs. While some of them (for example UNDP and UNFPA) were originally offices within the UN Secretariat, expansion of their responsibilities and funding generated calls for governance structures somewhat insulated from the UN, which at that time was being buffeted by clashing Cold War philosophies. The US, as the major donor in activities in which the USSR generally played a very minor role, in particular advocated having managements with a proven track record, responding to donor need rather than implementing politically balanced policies. One result was that US nationals have dominated as executive heads of semi-­autonomous agencies, most notably in UNICEF and UNDP. More practically, states thought that semi-­autonomous agencies, which were mostly launched with temporary but renewable mandates, would be easier to disband and, owing to their financial dependence on donor ­countries, would be more responsive to their demands. BOX 6.1

A NEW UN PROGRAMME Following the first World Conference on Women (1975) the UN pursued a plethora of separate activities designed to improve the situation of women worldwide. These included: a Commission on the Status of Women; two coordinating offices in the Secretariat; a Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; a voluntary development fund for women (UNIFEM) operated by UNDP to promote gender equality and the empowerment of women through development

planning; and the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women, whose objective was to increase the participation of women in developmental, political and social contexts by operating through a network of national NGOs, research studies and training programmes. UNFPA also reoriented its objectives to encompass women’s rights. UNICEF, which promoted women’s rights from its inception, made some progress, and UNIFEM influenced development

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 thinking through incorporating gender activities into project design (Murphy 2006), but three subsequent world conferences and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which highlighted deficiencies in women’s education and maternal health, show that these activities have yielded poor results. In agriculture, where women constitute most of the workforce, an evaluation found FAO to be ‘gender-­blind . . . or portray women in a passive role as victims or beneficiaries’ (FAO-­IEE 2007: 135), while the 2005 UN High-­Level Panel on System-­ Wide Coherence considered UN gender activities to be ‘incoherent, under-­resourced and fragmented’ (UN 2006: 35) and recommended structural changes to improve delivery. Consequently, in 2010, the GA

integrated all UN gender-­related activities into a single programme, the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women). UN Women’s mandate is to support governments in the elimination of discrimination against women, provide a source of research, data and ideas to intergovernmental bodies working on women’s issues, and hold the UN System accountable for its own and global progress towards achieving gender equality. Accordingly it will continue to call for greater participation of women in decision making, fight for better recognition of women’s role in agriculture and other basic production enterprises, and highlight the impact on women of poverty, violence and civil strife.

The semi-­autonomous agencies exhibit commonalities in structure, governance and working relationships, as they operate within the UN umbrella and all fall under ECOSOC’s mandate (see below). Typically they hold periodic meetings of all member states at which long-­term objectives and funding targets are agreed. Their governance is overseen by smaller councils of between one-­fifth and one-­quarter of members, selected to ensure regional balance, which generally meet annually. They are all directed by executive heads (Under-­Secretaries-­General or equivalent) who report to the SG but have considerable independence of action. While initially their administrative policies were significantly dictated by the UN, this influence has steadily diminished. Compared to that of the UN, their funding differs considerably. Whereas the UN budget is apportioned according to a predetermined formula reflecting members’ ability to pay, the Funds and Programmes, with the exception of some central secretariat costs which are financed by the UN, are funded voluntarily. The resources available to the four largest organizations exceed $40b annually, almost all of which flows to developing countries. The structure of these organizations is functionally driven, since much of their work is operational, and the UN imprimatur often gives them the legitimacy to operate in places where others are unwelcome. Often cooperating closely (see Box 6.2), the agencies supply specialist technical expertise to developing countries, emergency relief in disasters, post-­disaster reconstruc-

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tion, and grants to pursue national development objectives. Because much of their work is at a country level several are decentralized. Four (UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP and UNDP) are highly field-­oriented, and their staff rotates periodically to field assignments. Gradually, however, semi-­autonomous agencies have expanded their remit into programme-­oriented activities, variously acting as forums for the exchange of information, encouraging the collection and dissemination of national data, establishing standards to render this data internationally comparable, providing analyses of underlying trends and issues, developing international norms, and providing a bully pulpit from which to promote those norms by naming and shaming wayward states. Semi-­autonomous agencies also act as catalysts for fund-­raising, inspiring or mobilizing support for government action and manufacturing links between other actors. In circumstances where state capacity is limited and the size and complexity of their challenges have grown, they have been drawn into closer cooperation with NGOs/INGOs, although their governance structures have not changed in response. BOX 6.2

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS’ RESPONSE TO THE 2004 ASIAN TSUNAMI In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami, relief was provided by governments. Public response was immediate, and INGOs such as ICRC (Case Study 2.1) and Oxfam were quickly on the ground with help. IOs reacted more slowly. The semi-­autonomous agencies started to raise medium-­term funds to support the stricken areas and ramped up their local operations to complement INGO efforts. WFP solicited pledges of $13b, of which $5b came from non-­governmental sources, and fed half a million people in Indonesia, while UNICEF provided emergency educational facilities for the same number of children. IBRD support for community reconstruction meant that of the 1.8m left homeless by the disaster only 120 000 were in temporary shelter by the end of 2005. Generally funding of first-­phase dis-

aster relief is generous, but second-­phase needs, although equally important, tend to be overlooked. However, UNDP soon supported needs assessment missions and reconstruction planning. IBRD and the Asian Development Bank provided $1b and $800m respectively for rebuilding damaged infrastructure and restoring agricultural production, transport links and community facilities, with much of that funding flowing through governments. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) built shelters and health clinics and provided logistical support for Indonesia’s reconstruction. Other IOs were involved in medium-­term restoration of economic activity through their TA programmes. UNEP advised governments on mitigating the disaster’s environmental impact, FAO supported local fisheries,

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 WHO was involved in reinstating basic health services, and the UN World Tourism Organization helped Thailand orchestrate a reconstruction plan for its tourist infrastructure. The tsunami highlighted the need for advance warning and the difficulty of identifying casualties in a disaster. Subsequently Interpol established a disaster victim iden-

tification team that can be dispatched to an emergency to coordinate assistance, while UNESCO’s Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, which monitors the marine environment, extended its Global Ocean Observing System into the Indian Ocean and successfully alerted coastal communities to a lesser tsunami in 2012.

The nature of the semi-­autonomous agencies presents them with common challenges. The increased demands of populations impacted by war, natural disasters and endemic poverty means WFP and UNICEF have grown to be the third and fourth largest entities in the UN System. Diversion of resources to frequent emergencies endangers core programmes and long-­term objectives, since increasing efforts have to be devoted to soliciting funds and tailoring activities to the available voluntary contributions from governments. Working within the GA structure accentuates LDC influence, and the semi-­autonomous agencies’ overarching paradigms are more eclectic than the laissez-­faire front presented by the IFIs; however, larger donors retain considerable leverage over policies and senior appointments. For example, US Republican administrations withheld funds from UNFPA because it ­supported abortion programmes, forcing UNFPA to cut them.

6.1

The UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF)

6.1.1 Background UNICEF began life in 1946 providing emergency relief to children in Europe and later Asia and the Middle East. Upon being made permanent in 1953 its remit became global and its mandate expanded to counter the miserable conditions faced by children in newly decolonized countries through preventing disease, improving nutrition and promoting better healthcare services for mothers and infants. A turning point was passage of the 1959 UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child embodying universal ethical ­principles and ­international legal standards for the treatment of children. The Declaration did not specifically mention UNICEF, but it helped transform the organization into an advocate for children, with its core work being, in the words of its mission statement, ‘the protection of children’s rights to help meet their basic needs and to expand their opportunities to reach their full potential’. From 1961 UNICEF’s mandate was further expanded to cover the ‘whole child’,

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going beyond concerns related to physical well-­being to include education and the needs of mothers, on whom the burden of childcare falls disproportionately. Thus, by the 1960s, UNICEF regarded children as being intrinsic to the notion of development and sought to elevate them in the hierarchy of development concerns, advocacy recognized by the award of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1965. In short, UNICEF aims to help children first to survive and then to prosper by mitigating the poverty, violence, ­discrimination and disease that blight young lives. Children given proper early care have better life chances compared to those facing adverse health and home environments; accordingly, UNICEF devotes much attention to supporting those basic services in LDCs that enhance early childhood development, including primary healthcare, nutrition, safe water supplies, sanitation and immunization. Arguably UNICEF is most renowned for GOBI, a four-­point programme inspired by influential Executive Director James Grant (Box 6.3) to provide growth monitoring of child nutrition during early development, oral rehydration to treat diarrhoea, breastfeeding in early infancy, and immunization against measles, diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus, polio and tuberculosis. With more healthy children surviving infancy, UNICEF’s advocacy role, especially since the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, has now assumed greater prominence. UNICEF’s main long-­term objectives are to ensure that every child has a quality primary education and is protected from HIV/AIDS, violence, abuse and exploitation. Many initiatives specifically support girls, since better-­quality female education results in fewer unwanted births, improved child survival rates and nutrition levels, greater family income, and more female participation in local decision making. BOX 6.3

JAMES GRANT, UNICEF EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (1980–95) James Grant is widely considered to be among the most successful and influential IO executive heads, responsible for transforming UNICEF into a highly admired UN agency. Born in China, Grant spent the war in India, where he witnessed the Bengal famine of 1943. As was the case with FAO’s

Binay Sen (Case Study 4.1), this experience left a lasting impression. After graduating from Harvard Law School he worked in China for the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. He then entered US government service, specializing in development assistance, and held several posts

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 before eventually being appointed USAID’s Assistant Administrator. Grant became UNICEF Executive Director after being nominated jointly by US Presidents Ford and Carter. Describing the plight of children as a ‘silent emergency’, he galvanized the organization into a more dynamic and better-­focused field operation. His diplomatic skills were pivotal in convincing national leaders about the virtues of the immunization programmes central to GOBI, his principal legacy. On his travels he would fill his pockets with oral rehydration tablets, kits to test for iodine in salt and vaccine ampoules. In addition to administering them himself, he would invite heads

of state and government ministers to dispense oral polio vaccines. He also convinced many leaders to conceive and execute national action plans to meet children’s ­specific needs. His work culminated in the World Summit for Children and the ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Upon his death in 1995, US President Clinton pledged that his government would sign the Convention as a mark of respect. Grant’s impact on UNICEF staff was such that, as a final tribute to him, they raised $13m, thereby ensuring that, for the first time, UNICEF fund-­raising reached $1b in a single year.

Although UNICEF’s remit is now wider, it remains an important supplier of emergency relief and works closely with UNHCR in assisting refugees. UNICEF purchases some $1b in supplies and equipment each year, spending $187m on humanitarian assistance in 2011. UNICEF has a rapid response arm, a warehouse in Copenhagen (with an inventory of 22m items) and regional stockpiles which can quickly dispatch emergency supplies worldwide. For example, in 2010, following the Yushu earthquake in China, UNICEF delivered supplies to support 25 000 schoolchildren, including prefabricated classrooms, and in Chile’s earthquake it supplied 44 000 backpacks containing school supplies. Typically UNICEF assists developing countries by advocating solutions, advising them on their national plans of action, providing technical and financial resources and improving national monitoring. Because of its origins as a supplier of emergency relief, UNICEF is decentralized, with 88 per cent of its staff located in 155 country and seven regional offices; in fact it pioneered the use of national staff for programme delivery. Presently, around three-­quarters of its field staff are national, giving UNICEF programmes a sense of local ownership and smoothing links with local community groups, upon whom the successful delivery of country programmes rely heavily ( Jolly 1991). Since the 1990s the influence and participation of INGOs in UNICEF’s work have increased. Supported by free market policies which encourage governments to involve private actors in the provision of public goods,

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UNICEF has developed effective regional consultative structures allowing cooperating INGOs to exert a substantial influence on policy (P.W. Jones 2006). UNICEF’s attractiveness to donors, particularly through its close relationships with local partners and its multidisciplinary approaches, has also made it an authoritative voice in development debates. In addition to UNICEF naming and shaming governments into action and nudging them behind the scenes, the intellectual standing of UNICEF publications such as the annual State of the World’s Children, its expert reports and its statistical databases have given UNICEF an audience amongst civil society groups and the media, which have sometimes enabled it to inaugurate subtle shifts in attitudes towards child-­centred development. Most UNICEF income comes from governments, but it has pioneered broader fund-­raising and public relations initiatives. For many years it was the only arm of the UN System authorized to raise funds directly from the public, and its emergency fund-­raising campaigns and sale of greetings cards have become globally recognized. Fund-­raising is managed through a network of UNICEF national committees, which are independent entities with formal links to the organization and which are its conduit to civil society more generally. UNICEF also originated the concept of goodwill ambassadors, starting in 1954 with Danny Kaye, the star of a film about the children’s author Hans Christian Andersen. Many celebrities, mostly from the worlds of sport and entertainment, have since publicized UNICEF’s activities and lent their names to fund-­ raising, and this ‘celebrity diplomacy’ (A.F. Cooper 2007) has spread to other IOs. Its most recent, highly visible, manifestation was when the Spanish football team Barcelona adopted UNICEF in lieu of a team shirt sponsor.

6.1.2 Current activities Presently UNICEF’s operations concentrate on the four interlocking themes of child protection, advancing child survival and development, protecting children against HIV/AIDS, and promoting education and gender equality. Each theme contributes towards MDG efforts to reduce child mortality by two-­thirds. Another MDG supported by UNICEF is to reduce maternal death in childbirth by three-­quarters. Over 40 per cent of women in developing countries give birth without a midwife present, and death during childbirth is 250 times more likely than in the developed world. UNICEF is concentrating its support for basic services in Sub-­Saharan Africa and South Asia, which together account for 81 per cent of the deaths of children under five. It is also contributing to the MDG goal of universal primary education through programmes to improve the quality of primary schooling in at least 50 countries and to cut the number of uneducated girls by 30 per cent.

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UNICEF has made significant gains through implementing its core GOBI objectives (see section 6.1.1), which it now combines with food supplements and family planning. The survival and development of young children have improved, with oral rehydration alone halving child deaths from diarrhoea. UNICEF is the world’s largest distributor of vaccines to developing countries, and in 2010 it distributed 225m sachets of micronutrients to undernourished children. There is, however, little ground for complacency, as any relaxation will result in a resurgence of problems; for example, children must receive a complete series of injections to be properly immunized. UNICEF attention is now focused on the 12 worst-­performing countries. UNICEF links improvements in maternal health and mortality to better long-­term child survival rates by supporting training of more midwives and providing them with transport enabling them to reach remote communities. A parallel effort supports mothers and mothers-­to-­be through providing better and longer access to education, improved basic healthcare, sanitation and advice on childrearing. In fact, 17 per cent of UNICEF resources are currently targeted to these objectives. By 2010 over half the countries in which UNICEF operates had, at its instigation, adopted early childhood (i.e. pre-­ school) programmes, and UNICEF is piloting ‘Getting Ready for School’ programmes in six countries. Until the mid-­1990s UNICEF’s principal attention was on traditional issues of health, education and nutrition. Since then its State of the World’s Children has raised awareness of broader concerns, such as children in the urban environment (UNICEF 2012), adolescence (UNICEF 2011) and equality (UNICEF 2007), thereby reinforcing its advocacy work. Deplorably, many of the world’s children suffer from violence and exploitation. Most states have ratified the Rights of the Child Convention and ILO conventions prohibiting the commercial and military exploitation of children; nevertheless UNICEF estimates that some 250m children suffer under forced labour, forced marriage, human trafficking, sexual violence, genital mutilation, or recruitment as child soldiers or are maimed or killed by landmines. In various situations (for instance in the Kenyan slums and in South Africa during the football World Cup) UNICEF creates ‘safe spaces’ where children can gather without the risk of exploitation. Child protection is difficult, because exploitation is often a family matter, with poverty driving the young out to work in the fields or in occupations which use child labour to cut costs. Moreover, wars, disasters and rapid urbanization expose many children to criminal gangs. UNICEF assists children of all nations, races and creeds equally, and its neutral stance allows it to work in highly political environments, such as its support for Afghan refugees in Iran, where other agencies are prohibited.

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UNICEF is playing an increasing role in humanitarian crises alongside UNHCR and WFP. Where children are forced to become child soldiers in conflict zones UNICEF is amongst those negotiating for their release. Conflict also has a disproportional impact on women and children, who face special problems, including sexual violence, high incidences of HIV/AIDS and consequent rejection by their families. UNICEF therefore helps local groups trace families and establish reception centres where they offer psychological counselling, victim networks, medical treatment, food aid and rehabilitation through developing employment skills or provision of seed money. For example, UNICEF is ensuring that 80 000 children displaced by Sri Lanka’s recent civil war continue their basic education.

6.1.3 Evaluation and future challenges UNICEF’s operational worth is sometimes exaggerated, but the universal appeal of its mandate, substantial in-­country presence and speedy reactions to humanitarian emergencies have made it one of the UN System’s most respected agencies (P.W. Jones 2006). Although GOBI did not achieve its initial aim of immunizing 80 per cent of the world’s children against the target six diseases by 1990, it did achieve a three-­ to fourfold increase in immunization. When combined with parallel initiatives such as WHO’s campaign to eradicate polio, immunization rates have now exceeded the target in most countries and globally have reached 85–90 per cent. Effective use of simple technologies such as oral rehydration and village water pumps has allowed UNICEF to concentrate on broad delivery objectives without becoming distracted by a search for ever more sophisticated solutions. Thus, in the past two decades, the provision of safe drinking water has kept pace with expanding urban populations and exceeded rural population growth (UNICEF 2012). Most criticisms of UNICEF derive from its attempts to deliver on its enlarged mandate. Its disbursements are dwarfed by those of other bodies, and it has struggled to be anything more than a supplier of emergency materials and services. Horton (2004) suggests that UNICEF’s advocacy role detracts from its overarching mission by diverting resources from basic health needs, observing that promoting children’s human rights is pointless if healthcare outcomes prevent their survival. Nevertheless, broader appeals to child well-­ being are in vogue with development thinking, helping to secure the organization’s budget and legitimacy. UNICEF faces many challenges in delivering its mandate. It needs to redouble efforts to reduce the marginalization of children in the minds of

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d­ evelopment specialists. MDG malnutrition and mortality targets are far from being met, as 7.6m children under five years old still die annually of preventable diseases or causes linked to poor hygiene, sanitation and conflict. Local political conditions hamper UNICEF’s efforts to meet these targets. Of the five countries that accounted for half of under-­five mortality in 2010 (India, China, Pakistan, Nigeria and Democratic Republic of the Congo), three are unstable or inhospitable to outsiders. The country with the world’s highest child mortality rate is war-­torn Somalia, and polio is still endemic in Afghanistan, Nigeria and Pakistan. UNICEF works closely with other agencies and NGOs to combat HIV/ AIDS transmission, which continues to infect 2500 young people daily, but the challenges are enormous. Although there has been a 25 per cent fall in HIV/AIDS incidence worldwide, amongst young people a decline has been recorded in only seven African countries. UNICEF spends 4 per cent of its resources on this problem but relies on its partners for results. Technical advances have been made in preventing parent-­to-­child transmission, but success is dependent on better education and access to pregnant mothers, problems common to UNICEF initiatives.

6.2

The UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)

6.2.1 Background Refugees have been a long-­standing international issue. As Europe imploded in the first half of the twentieth century and states raised barriers to migration, the number of stateless people rose substantially and threatened regional security. The Second World War exacerbated these difficulties, prompting the establishment of the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in 1943, to deal with European refugees displaced by the war. As problems multiplied, fresh mandates were needed, and UNRRA became the International Refugee Organization, which in turn was replaced by the UN High Commission for Refugees in 1951 (see Chapter 2). Reflecting the desires of powerful states, especially the US, for an IO that respected the principles of non-­intervention in sovereign affairs, UNHCR and its executive head (the High Commissioner) initially received a restricted mandate to resolve European refugee problems which stressed legal protection rather than material assistance. It was funded only until 1953, with a staff of 34, and depended on donor countries for its operational functions. This limited its autonomy, and UNHCR seemed set for a marginal role. However, broad acceptance of UNHCR’s authority as a protector of vulner-

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able people, the use of the High Commissioner’s ‘good offices’ (see Chapter 5, section 5.1), and completion of tasks entrusted to it, coupled with global events and state interests, greatly expanded its responsibilities (M. Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Today, UNHCR not only protects refugees but is the UN’s leading humanitarian relief arm, capable of actively shaping state behaviour, with a 7700-­strong workforce dispersed across 126 countries and a budget of $3.6b. The centrepiece of UNHCR’s mandate is the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by a 1967 protocol, with its principal objective to ‘pursue protection, assistance and solutions for refugees’. Currently, UNHCR’s work spans all stages of a refugee catastrophe by providing emergency assistance at the onset, settling refugees in camps, providing material support to governments who host refugee populations, repatriating refugees when conditions permit and assisting them to find asylum in foreign countries. These tasks increasingly drag UNHCR into post-­conflict resolution and peacebuilding as it seeks to help refugees rebuild and lead dignified lives. The Convention also established the principle of non-­refoulement, the right of refugees not to be repatriated to a country against their will if they risk ­persecution on their return. Since 1951, the population covered by UNHCR has continually expanded. The Convention contained the first internationally agreed legal definition of a refugee as someone outside his or her home country facing ‘persecution or fear of persecution’ on grounds of race, religion, nationality or political opinion. Moreover, refugee status was made a condition of individuals not groups. Almost straight away, this definition was challenged by the scale of the exodus from Hungary after the USSR crushed its 1956 revolution. With 200 000 refugees it was impossible to screen all individuals to ensure they fitted the legal definition. UNHCR adopted inventive rhetoric allowing it to operate in this new refugee situation by arguing that the causes arose from the Second World War and therefore fell within its mandate. UNHCR’s effective response proved its worth to leading states, which increased their contributions, permitting further extension of its operations. The next year UNHCR expanded its geographical remit beyond Europe, responding to Tunisia’s request for assistance with refugees escaping Algeria’s civil war. The subsequent two decades saw UNHCR’s remit become global as decolonization prompted displacement and post-­independence conflict. Western donors accepted this expansion, fearing that the USSR would exploit instabilities to steal a march in the Cold War. Independence expanded the

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number of countries from the Global South on the UNHCR Executive Committee and in the GA, making it easier to pass resolutions sanctioning ­interventions outside Europe. Refugee numbers continued to rise through the 1970s and 1980s as conflicts and emergencies engulfed most continents. This period also saw UNHCR taking the first tentative steps toward helping internally displaced persons (IDPs), that is, people requiring material assistance because they were fleeing problems within a country and who fell outside the legal definition of refugees as people who had crossed borders. The conflicts that erupted in the post-­Cold War environment (see Chapter 3) brought further revisions to UNHCR’s mandate. In particular, the organization focused more on intrastate conflicts and providing humanitarian relief to IDPs. As threats to regional security, IDPs became a basis for SC authorized action, triggering UNHCR interventions in Iraq, East Timor, the Balkans, and West and Central Africa. Unfortunately these and other struggles, which also produced a spike in the number of conventional refugees, coincided with states tightening their asylum policies. States persuaded UNHCR to contain refugee movements within the country or region, consequently forcing it to extend its coverage to ‘war-­affected populations’. From the 1980s, these stricter asylum policies required UNHCR to retreat from an emphasis on resettlement or integration in third countries towards repatriation. In the 2000s these problems were exacerbated by the events of 9/11, the tendency of states (and their populations) to equate economic migrants and refugees, and the growing reluctance of developing-­country governments to host large refugee populations. Despite serious conflicts the number of refugees has declined as post-­Cold War discords dissipated. Nonetheless the number of IDPs rose from 1.2m in 1982 to 15.4m in 2011, partly because of the containment of refugee problems within countries and because of natural disasters. Thus the emphasis given to IDPs has become even more pronounced, and interventions to support IDPs have become a systematic part of UNHCR work. Past situations often started with a trickle of refugees slowly turning into a flood and gradually coming to global attention. Today, faster communications, mass media and the ability of large numbers of refugees to move considerable distances quickly call for immediate UNHCR response, and in 2004 it established a $25m contingency fund to enable rapid responses to sudden emergencies. In addition UNHCR has standby arrangements with several major contributors, suppliers and NGOs to provide specialist support and supplies at short notice for emergencies involving up to 500 000 persons.

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UNHCR is primarily operational, but it does have programme responsibilities, and the Convention has needed periodic clarification and supplementary rules to maintain its relevance. UNHCR publishes Guidelines on International Protection to cover situations where more lucidity is needed. A series of initiatives, starting with a process known as Convention Plus, supported by the ‘High Commissioner’s Dialogue’, has attempted to stimulate better burden sharing between developed and developing states. The process has produced no radical change to the Convention but has integrated refugee concerns in other forums and yielded several soft law agreements (Zieck 2009). One, the Framework for Durable Solutions, is a generic agreement allowing UNHCR better to resolve some situations, including recognition that refugee populations could generate employment rather than keeping them isolated and apart from a host community’s economy. BOX 6.4

SADRUDDIN AGA KHAN – HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (1965–75) Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan was born into privilege, high position and wealth. A keen collector of Islamic art, Sadruddin became interested in the fate of the Nubian temples threatened by the rising waters of the Aswan Dam, and in 1961 he was recruited by UNESCO as Executive Secretary of the commission for their preservation. His ensuing concern for the 100 000 people displaced by the dam introduced him to UNHCR’s work, and he was appointed Deputy High Commissioner shortly afterwards. In 1965 he was made High Commissioner, establishing a reputation for effectiveness, integrity and leadership. During his tenure the organization shifted its focus from European to global activities and started to cooperate productively with NGOs. Concurrently he established UNHCR as the recognized UN lead agency for humanitarian relief. The longest serving of all High Commissioners, he had to deal with refugee crises in Uganda, Sudan, Chile, Vietnam,

Cyprus and most particularly Bangladesh. In Bangladesh UNHCR had to resettle over 7m refugees once political stability returned. In 1978, UN SG Waldheim made him Head of Mission in Bangladesh with the task of overseeing national reconstruction and directing the UN System’s work. In recognition of his administrative abilities and effectiveness as a negotiator, in 1981 he received the most SC votes to succeed Waldheim, but was vetoed by the USSR. After 1981, he was appointed to coordinate aid to Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation and, following the Gulf War, he directed efforts to bring humanitarian relief to Iraq, persuading Saddam Hussein to agree to the ill-­fated Oil-­for-­Food Programme. Passed over again for the post of SG, this time partly because of his opposition to sanctions against Iraq, he set up a private foundation to promote the conservation of natural resources. He died in 2003.

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6.2.2 Current activities In 2011, the total population of concern to UNHCR was 35.4m (excluding Palestinian refugees, who are UNRWA’s responsibility), of which 9.8m were refugees, a rise from a 26-­year low of 8.4m in 2008, mostly caused by the situation in Somalia. UNHCR directly assists 5.5m refugees, but an even bigger problem is the 15.4m IDPs, of whom half have been displaced by conflict. Asia and Africa account for 61 per cent of all refugees, the largest refugee groups being Afghanis (2.6m), Syrians (2.2m), Iraqis (1.4m), Somalis (1.1m), Congolese (491 000) and Sudanese (491 000). The largest concentrations of refugees are located in Pakistan (1.7m), Iran (886 000), Syria (755 000), Germany (572 000) and Jordan (451 000). Germany is also the developed world’s principal destination for asylum seekers (63 000 in 2011), but Malta has most refugees per capita, with 201 refugees per 1000 head of population, placing great strain on its small economy (see Chapter 12, section 12.7.2). Almost continual adverse publicity in Western countries concerning refugees and asylum seekers detracts from the locus of the problem, as 80 per cent of the global refugee population is located in developing countries, thereby burdening already weak infrastructures. On average UNHCR spends $105 per annum per refugee, a small proportion of the support they receive, much of which comes from host countries. In 2010 UNHCR helped the largest number of persons impacted by natural disasters to date (2m), and in 2011 the ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings contributed to a further 3.5m IDPs requiring UNHCR support. Continuing instability in Iraq sustains large refugee problems in Syria and Jordan, countries whose resources are already stretched through hosting Palestinian refugee camps and, in Syria’s case, a new flow of IDPs. Sudan (with 500 000 new IDPs in 2010) requires expanded UNHCR activity, as instability and conflict previously confined to Darfur and neighbouring Chad have spread southwards to the boundaries with South Sudan.

6.2.3 Evaluation and future challenges Given the delicate nature of its work and that it manages situations where states have already failed to protect their populations, UNHCR has delivered significant improvements to the lives of some 400m refugees, as attested by the Nobel Peace Prizes awarded to it in 1954 and 1981. Within the limitations imposed by the international system, UNHCR has delivered durable solutions to some refugee problems and, especially since the end of the Cold War, demonstrated an ability to intervene quickly and effectively to assist IDPs. Although violations remain widespread and many countries

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resent international oversight of domestic behaviour, the norms and legal frameworks pursued by UNHCR have improved respect for human rights (Simmons 2009). In particular, UNHCR creates pressure for action against states by pointing to their infringement of widely agreed norms. Nevertheless, UNHCR has been criticized for a slow response to some crises, such as Kosovo in 1999 and, more recently, for repatriating refugees before political conditions could assure their safety, such as Rwandese refugees in 1996 (Gorlick 2001). Arguably the biggest challenge facing UNHCR is one that it has confronted throughout, namely the dichotomy between respecting sovereignty and persuading states to fulfil their humanitarian obligations to vulnerable populations agreed under international law, especially when state interests conflict with the humanitarian principles that UNHCR is trying to defend. State interests are paramount and pull UNHCR in different directions. It requires states’ permission to operate in their territories, but those states that provide funds or host large refugee groups exert pressure on it to intervene regardless of the difficulties. A clear example of this is UNHCR having to respond to states’ legitimate right to restrict asylum opportunities through efforts to contain refugees within their country of origin. This further exposes those very refugees to the human rights violations they were hoping to escape. Increasingly the security interests of states appear to be taking precedence over the safety of refugees, and UNHCR stands accused of neglecting its responsibility to protect in favour of an overly pragmatic approach to non-­refoulement (Loescher et al. 2008). In 1979 one in 20 refugees were resettled, but by 1996 this had declined to one in 400 (Troeller 2002). Repatriation of refugees displaced by ethnic or religious conflict involves UNHCR in national politics, as, once some are repatriated, it has to monitor their return and ensure that they are no longer at risk. This can be a very sensitive activity, also impinging on issues of sovereignty (e.g. Darfur, Box 5.7). A second challenge for UNHCR is the growing number of extended refugee situations, which casts doubt on its ability to solve refugee problems. Unwilling to accept hordes of refugees, states have encouraged UNHCR to shift its focus from resettlement and integration towards repatriation. By 2006, two-­thirds of refugees had been in exile for over five years (Loescher et al. 2008: 71), and since the early 1990s the average length of UNHCR’s involvement in a crisis has risen from nine to 17 years. The more protracted the situation, the more likely the occurrence of problems (such as terrorist cells inside refugee camps thriving and exacerbating interstate tensions) growing in complexity and escaping the attention of the international

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c­ ommunity. Many refugee camps have tacitly assumed a ‘permanent’ status requiring infrastructure and even development assistance, as they are often located far from population centres and support facilities. States commonly devolve the running of such camps to UNHCR. This not only stretches its budgetary resources (see below) but can drag UNHCR into the conflicts that cause refugee situations. UNHCR’s operations have evolved from dealing with refugees as an external problem (i.e. supporting individuals who escape their environment) to internal interventions, particularly when human-­created events displace large numbers of people. Ideally this justifies a change to UNHCR’s governing convention but, as with other IOs, this is proving difficult, so UNHCR has been reduced to tinkering around the edges when a bolder approach is needed. For example, even though IDPs constitute a majority of the population at risk, under international law they are not afforded the same degree of protection as refugees. Ignoring or downplaying them may undermine UNHCR’s relevance to key states, yet some countries discourage UNHCR intervention despite a clear need for action (e.g. to solve the situation of the Rohingyas in Burma and Bangladesh). Previously, UNHCR has adapted flexibly to expansion and diversification of the population at risk; however, its activities have been constrained by the desire not to abrogate the principles of non-­intervention in sovereign affairs, leading to a ‘protection gap’. When state infrastructures are collapsing, protecting populations at risk while simultaneously helping them becomes a highly dangerous activity, and UNHCR staff have required closer cooperation with and protection from peacekeeping and related activities. UNHCR staff are not trained to deal with such complex situations, which can escalate rapidly, and they risk being considered as favouring one side of a dispute. Despite the difficulties and dangers there is a growing consensus that IDPs require protection and that UNHCR is the agency best placed to deliver support. Nevertheless, using UNHCR to contain problems may again compromise its core mandate of protecting refugees and providing durable solutions to their plight. Funding is UNHCR’s final perennial problem. UNHCR receives less than 3 per cent of its regular budget from the UN, and its operations rely almost entirely on voluntary contributions. This is UNHCR’s biggest institutional weakness (Loescher et al. 2008) and the way developed states retain control. During its first three decades, support generally kept pace with the refugee population, but the post-­1980s growth of the population at risk plus

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c­ ompetition for funding from NGOs (increasingly favoured by governments) and other IOs (such as IOM, Box 6.5) pushed UNHCR’s budget to breaking point. A dearth of secure, long-­term financing makes planning particularly difficult, given the protracted nature of many refugee situations, and projects are regularly scaled down or cancelled. Moreover, around three-­quarters of UNHCR funding comes from ten countries, which tend to earmark donations for particular situations. Financial problems are likely to be exacerbated as global warming expands the population at risk and by pressures to respond to instant news. Finally, developing countries hosting large refugee populations require extra financial support, but the Convention Plus process has failed to secure this. BOX 6.5

THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION – COMPETITOR OR COLLABORATOR? The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration was initially responsible for the resettlement of post-­war European refugees, and its mandate, like that of UNHCR, expanded. In 1971 it responded to its first major non-­European crisis, resettling Bangladeshi nationals in Pakistan and Nepal. The decision to change its mandate and nomenclature to IOM in 1981 reflected the need for an intergovernmental forum to discuss migration, advise members on their policies and assist them to process and resettle migrants. IOM ensures the orderly migration of displaced persons to countries of permanent settlement and in certain cases assists in repatriation. It also helps with internal resettlement, such as when dam construction forces wholesale relocation of villages and towns. IOM mirrors UNHCR in providing relief for most politically generated mass migrations, including the exodus of Asians from East Africa, Kurds in Iraq and refugees in former Yugoslavia. Altogether it claims to have assisted more than 12m displaced

persons. As with UNHCR, its largest ongoing operation is for Afghans displaced to Pakistan, and it became heavily involved in post-­tsunami reconstruction of Indonesia (Box 6.2). Despite difficulties on the ground, IOM is also working in Darfur. Conceptually, there is a division of labour between organizations, like UNHCR and ICRC, which deal with immediate emergencies and medium-­term stabilization, and IOM, which should take over in the longer term. However, increasingly their responsibilities overlap. In seeking to distinguish itself from UNHCR, IOM focuses on specific groups such as victims of people trafficking and child soldiers. IOM also encourages return migration specifically of those with vital skills. In 2003, the two organizations clarified their roles and entered into joint arrangements with governments to eliminate possible confusion. UNHCR now spearheads the repatriation of large groups, whereas IOM covers individuals whose asylum requests have been rejected or who cancel their applications.

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6.3 The UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) 6.3.1 Background UNRWA was established in 1949 to provide humanitarian relief to Palestinian refugees displaced by the 1948 Arab–Israeli conflict. In addition it registers refugees and maintains a 17.5m-­document archive including birth certificates and title deeds dating back to before 1948. In the hope that the refugees would be able to return to a Palestinian homeland or would be resettled in the countries to which they had fled, UNRWA received only a temporary mandate. Palestinian refugees and governments in the region resisted resettlement, the former worrying that it would undermine their right to return and the latter that it would legitimize Israel’s existence. Aspirations for a Palestinian homeland have repeatedly been dashed, necessitating the continual renewal of UNRWA’s mandate, currently until 2014. Continuing Arab–Israeli conflict, most notably the wars of 1967 and 1973, and internal population growth have inflated the refugee population that UNRWA supports from 700 000 in 1949 to almost 5m. Of these, 3.6m reside in the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with the rest in 58 refugee camps in neighbouring countries. Originally UNRWA echoed UNHCR’s mandate of reintegrating, resettling or repatriating refugees. However, with reintegration and resettlement unacceptable to the refugees and repatriation unacceptable to the Israelis, who occupy the territory to which refugees would be repatriated, UNRWA has evolved into an agency which provides ‘assistance, protection and advocacy’ to the refugee population pending its return to a Palestinian homeland. Unlike the other semi-­autonomous agencies, which normally operate via local authorities or executing agencies, UNRWA has been described as a ‘quasi-­state institution’ (al-­Husseini 2000) because it has the functions and attributes conventionally associated with a government ministry. Host governments are responsible for law and order and overall control of refugee camps, but UNRWA carries out its own projects, builds and administers its own facilities and supplies the ‘essential services’ of rations, housing, healthcare, education, social services and emergency help to those in the West Bank, Gaza and the refugee camps. Historically, education has been UNRWA’s largest programme, accounting for two-­thirds of its staff and half its budget. Using curricula and materials donated by host governments, UNRWA, with help from UNESCO, has been the principal provider of free education to Palestinians, running 700 schools

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and ten vocational centres, with an enrolment of 500 000 pupils. It also has an active teacher training programme and awards university scholarships. The second largest programme is health services, with 137 clinics providing basic medical services to refugees. UNRWA prioritizes programmes for child immunization and prenatal care but also provides a range of treatments including dentistry, cancer screening and family planning. Refugees have to use host country hospitals, but UNRWA reimburses some of their costs. Allied to this work is the operation of sanitation services in the refugee camps, including the provision of safe drinking water. Under the heading of social services, UNRWA provides a social safety net while seeking to promote the development and self-­reliance of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups.

6.3.2 Current activities The MDGs now guide UNRWA’s programmes. UNRWA specifically targets the poorest in the refugee camps, estimating that in 2012 it would need $81m to provide 667 000 persons with supplementary food or cash subsidies for basic household items. In 2010, UNRWA’s clinics performed over 11m consultations but, as discussed below, recent violence has required it to expand its services to include physiotherapy, rehabilitation and mental health services. In an attempt to help refugees break the poverty cycle, UNRWA offers vocational training opportunities and microcredit facilities. In 2011, UNRWA financed 40 000 loans, an investment totalling $44m (UNRWA 2012). The febrile atmosphere of Middle Eastern politics complicates UNRWA’s operating environment, most importantly the bickering between the Palestinian Authority, which administers the West Bank, and Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip. Since the election of Hamas, a militant Islamic group classified as a terrorist organization by many Western countries, UNRWA finds it difficult to operate in Gaza, where Hamas is seen as a threat to its integrity and neutrality (al-­Husseini 2000). Funding has dropped, and Israeli pressures and restrictive border controls make it difficult to bring in supplies. This is exceptionally problematic, as UNRWA’s installations, already in need of investment, were severely damaged in the 2009 fighting between Israel and Hamas. Construction projects worth millions of dollars have been suspended, as materials cannot reach their intended destinations and import restrictions limit reconstruction efforts. The money assigned for maintenance and new equipment has been spent on repair of damaged facilities and grants to those who were made homeless. This has bequeathed UNRWA a legacy of rundown facilities, thereby undermining its ability to supply basic services. An additional 100 schools are needed, and looming financial shortfalls mean new staff and teachers are given only one-­year contracts. Similarly,

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damaged facilities and scarce medical supplies are plaguing healthcare services. All these problems are exacerbated by tensions between UNRWA and Hamas over what the latter sees as UNRWA’s secular influence on young Palestinians. Furthermore, UNRWA cannot cooperate fully with Hamas, as many Western countries would withhold funding (Economist 2010c), although it was an UNRWA official who first advocated that the outside world lift the supply blockage, resulting in Israeli forces intercepting ships carrying supplies and killing some of those on board.

6.3.3 Evaluation and future challenges Given the delicate political background and the conflict-­ridden environment UNRWA has proven remarkably successful at delivering essential services to Palestinian refugees, who do as well as and in some cases better than the indigenous population. They have access to free education and healthcare, 70 per cent own their homes, which as camps have developed are often superior to those inhabited by non-­refugees, and they are almost as likely as the indigenous population to own consumer durables such as cars, refrigerators and washing machines. Paradoxically the successful delivery of services has led to a sense of entitlement amongst the population and provides little inducement to move on. Moreover many agents, including UNRWA national staff, regional governments and NGOs, now have a vested interest in perpetuating UNRWA and the refugee situation rather than resolving it (Gottheil 2006). Whereas UNRWA handles only one-­seventh of the world’s refugee population, its staff is quadruple that of UNHCR. Because UNRWA operates in a context of continual friction it is frequently criticized by the parties involved. Palestinians accuse it of inactivity in times of crisis even though its supply line is heavily dependent on Israeli cooperation. The Israelis accuse it of providing support for terrorists, who sometimes seek refuge in its facilities. They also suspect that UNRWA has been subject to creeping politicization, with members of various political factions securing employment with the agency (al-­Husseini 2000). That UNRWA activities were never absorbed into UNHCR has been attributed to the political agenda of the Middle Eastern elites, who want an exclusive agency to highlight the political problem and to ensure that the refugee population continues to aspire to a return to the occupied territories (Gottheil 2006). Splits within the Palestinian Authority and the hard line taken by Israel suggest no imminent solution to the Palestinian problem and perpetuate the need for UNRWA. Indeed, even if there is progress towards peace, new problems are likely to require UNRWA support. These include the consequences

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of Palestinian refugees forfeiting the right to return to their original lands in Israel (i.e. the need to turn refugee camps into structured townships, the uprooting of groups to satisfy border realignments, and the need for infrastructure investment). In addition to the continual navigation of conflict, demographic trends and funding shortfalls are likely to pose UNRWA’s biggest challenges. Half UNRWA’s refugee population is under 25, further burdening the education system, and an ageing population will exacerbate the pressure on healthcare programmes.

6.4

The World Food Programme (WFP)

6.4.1 Background Imbalances between food production and consumption, leading to severe food shortages and famine, have concerned the international community since the days of the League. WFP was created in 1963 on the personal initiative of George McGovern, then Director of the US Office for Food for Peace and Special Assistant to US President Kennedy. When attending an FAO meeting to discuss the parameters of a scheme to alleviate hunger by recycling surplus food, McGovern advocated an organization to handle multilateral food aid and committed the US to providing 40 per cent of its initial resources. Delegations, including his own, were caught by surprise, but McGovern obtained Kennedy’s approval during the course of the meeting (Shaw 2008). WFP’s core aims are to deliver food aid to alleviate emergencies, but food aid is also a wider development tool. WFP donors pledge food, food storage facilities and cooking implements, plus financial resources. Financial pledges from donors are often earmarked for purchases from their food surpluses, along with a commitment to support some freight and distribution costs. Food aid is then distributed on site by WFP. During its first 30 years WFP was involved in a series of emergency food relief operations, most notably in Africa; nevertheless around two-­thirds of its resources were devoted to development projects, with over $13bn being invested in 1600 projects worldwide (Shaw 2008: 122). Initially many of these took the form of food-­for-­work programmes. Labour-­intensive projects were devised (including road building or irrigation schemes), and labourers were partially paid with WFP food distributed through government agencies and partially with government money. Later WFP programmes diversified, becoming more involved with projects to benefit nutrition, environmental sustainability or the promotion of self-­reliance through investment in women and education.

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Reflecting the rising numbers of natural and human-­created disasters since the 1990s, the proportion of WFP resources devoted to emergency relief has grown significantly, sometimes accounting for 90 per cent of its operational budget. WFP has an agreement with UNHCR that it assumes the principal role in supplying food aid for humanitarian emergencies. The International Emergency Food Reserve (an earmarked stock of surplus food established in 1975) has been bolstered since 1992 by the Immediate Response Account, a $30m revolving fund to enable WFP to purchase food for a specific emergency, rather than await earmarked supplies from donors. WFP’s governance structures have fluctuated, with implications for its operational autonomy. It began as a temporary operation jointly supervised by UN (ECOSOC) and FAO but integrated into the latter’s support structure. After two years, its mandate was amended to run for as long as food aid was necessary. From 1965, WFP’s work was overseen by the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes (CFA), with the GA and the FAO Conference each electing one half of its members. In 1991, after a protracted dispute between FAO’s DG Edouard Saouma and WFP’s Executive Director James Ingram (see Case Study 4.1), WFP secured greater independence from FAO, reporting directly to CFA on operational matters and consulting with the UN SG and FAO DG only on senior appointments. In 1996, it achieved complete operational and managerial independence under a newly constituted Executive Board (again appointed by UN and FAO in equal numbers), although still obliged to report periodically to both organizations. This marked a turning point, as WFP no longer needed FAO’s approval for major activities, could react more effectively and now has the largest budget of any UN agency (see Table 4.3). While food aid pledges generally provide a consistent level of resources (see Chapter 10, section 10.13), food price spikes reduce the available drawdown. In 2011 contributions to WFP from all sources amounted to $3.7b. The US was the largest contributor, providing $1.2b in multilateral food aid, a figure dwarfed by the $40b of bilateral food aid it distributes. The high level of US support reflects a congruence of US and WFP policies, but not all WFP initiatives have met with US approval (e.g. food aid to North Korea) (Ross 2007). WFP also fund-­raises from individuals and businesses, and their combined support provided $82m in 2011. WFP started as a small organization, with staff numbering in the low hundreds, mostly concerned with the logistics of shipment to the recipient country, which thereafter took over responsibility for distribution. It still

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runs one of the world’s biggest ship charter operations and ensures that consignments reach the recipients in good condition. Today, however, its staffing has changed commensurate with its enlarged operational remit, with most of its 9000 staff dealing with local logistics and distribution. WFP has always worked closely with governments and NGOs but now finds it more effective to employ its own staff to distribute food aid, particularly where it may be siphoned off by corrupt officials.

6.4.2 Current activities In 2011, WFP delivered emergency rations to 100m people in 75 countries. Most ongoing humanitarian operations run by WFP are in Africa, where it supports needy populations in Congo, Southern Sudan, Liberia, East Africa and the Sahel (particularly Niger), but it also operates globally, for example supplying relief to Pakistan, Haiti and Afghanistan. Emergency programmes usually last for two years, but communities often take much longer to recover. WFP, therefore, funds protracted relief and recovery operations in places such as Somali refugee camps and in Sudan and Ethiopia where governments lack the resources to take over. Anticipating potential disasters is a priority activity. WFP’s early-­warning system alerts governments and other interested parties to impending climatic disasters and crop failures. WFP also provides advice on logistics to the UN System, for example after the 2010 Pakistan floods. Besides this, it is developing an analytical capacity to monitor food security and advise recipient governments on the need for and practical aspects of developing a ‘safety net’ to meet their own long-­term food needs, even though FAO retains primary responsibility for this work. This is not only a sad reflection on the efficacy of FAO, whose mandate includes supporting national food security efforts, but also a legacy of insufficient cooperation between the two Rome-­ based agencies. Amongst WFP’s development programmes the most salient are those targeting children, women and HIV sufferers under the MDGs, and it is liaising closely with UNICEF to reduce child hunger and malnutrition. In 2011, WFP’s 200 primary school feeding programmes delivered 26m school meals in 60 countries. This programme has improved nutritional levels, lowered dropout rates and stimulated attendance and enrolment. However, it is no panacea to the problems of undernourished children in the developing world. While 66m malnourished children attend school, 67m do not, and even so nutritional deficiencies are best treated at pre-­ school age.

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Since the 1990s, within the UN System, WFP has been the biggest financer of projects to benefit women in LDCs and, despite often daunting ­obstacles, it continues to tailor food aid to recognize the pivotal role women play in development. Under its 2009 gender policy, WFP distributes food aid to mothers-­to-­be, those with infant children and adolescent girls and, by so doing, raises women’s nutritional awareness, encourages them to attend school and ensures their full involvement in community decisions concerning food distribution. WFP provides food aid as a central component of the treatment and care of HIV/AIDS sufferers, since the resultant health benefits also allow them to continue working. In 2010, this programme reached 2.5m people in 44 countries, including 1.3m who received food aid as part of their treatment.

6.4.3 Evaluation and future challenges WFP is recognized as a very capable organization with a sound reputation for obtaining, moving and distributing food aid to alleviate complex emergencies. By 2006, WFP food aid had reached over one billion people, saving many from starvation. Despite concerns that communities would become overdependent on handouts, food-­for-­work has generally succeeded, and wider WFP programmes receive favourable donor reviews. WFP has, however, been criticized for serving donor rather than recipient country interests, especially when it has enabled developed countries to unload surplus food, consequently depressing prices in LDCs. The need for emergency food relief shows no signs of subsiding. In 2011 there were 925m hungry people, one-­quarter of children in the developing world were underweight, and millions died of diseases that better nutrition would protect against. Thus, WFP along with other food and agricultural organizations (see Chapter 14) is poised for a critical role in the years ahead. That notwithstanding, the broad policy context within which food aid operates envisages recipient countries shifting from emergency situations to ones of greater stability supported by traditional development activities and food-­for-­work programmes. Indeed, former WFP recipient countries, like South Korea and Mexico, have become donors, and in 2005, after 25 years, China ended its need for assistance. As with other semi-­autonomous agencies, funding and resource shortages are WFP’s biggest challenges, but its problems are ‘more serious, many sided and complex’ (Shaw 2008: 201). Funds needed to purchase food are not enough when food aid requests coincide with periods of high prices caused by low production and stocks. Cash resources are particularly small. A reserve fund of some $70m, replenished annually, can be used in combina-

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tion with WFP’s Immediate Response Account to react quickly to emerging situations, but this is insufficient for major operations (Syroka and Wilcox 2006). Specifically, prolonged operations are difficult to fund continually. Moreover, as the WFP secretariat has expanded and since contributions are voluntary and overhead costs are assessed at only 7 per cent of contributions, it has become difficult to maintain a stable back-­office structure because of unpredictable demand (Shaw 2008). WFP is investigating ways of stabilizing its resource base and reducing its political susceptibility, including defining a regularly funded core budget and taking out reinsurance policies to cover disaster funding. WFP has also sought to broaden its resource base through partnerships with corporations that help WFP, where their core competencies (such as logistics) overlap, in staff training or to develop new products, including improved nutritional supplements and electronic food voucher systems. Funding of emergencies is highly dependent on political goodwill, and sometimes donors have withheld support (e.g. Zimbabwe in 2008, when election results were ignored) or had to be approached anew (e.g. Somalia, because some supplies inevitably found their way to Al-­Qaeda supporters). These problems are exacerbated through bilateral aid being tied to select emergencies and projects that donors wish to support. In theory WFP operates within the context of the International Grain Agreement, which promises a minimum tonnage of food aid (Chapter 10, section 10.13); however, in practice the tied nature of food aid causes resource management problems. For example, WFP’s agreement with the US requires that deliveries be made on US ships, which are costlier than most other carriers. Both OECD and the US General Accounting Office have observed that tied deliveries (often of subsidized commodities) reduce the food aid available. Greater donor flexibility would lessen WFP costs and stimulate agricultural development in low-­income countries, which are the cheapest sources of supply. For this reason WFP urges donors to provide cash rather than food. Unlike food donations, however, this puts it in direct competition with other UN bodies. Further funding difficulty stems from the agreement to prioritize relief to refugees under its agreement with UNHCR. There are worries that this might leach funds from long-­term development projects and undermine WFP’s logistical muscle and preparedness. Worse still, these operations tend to occur in complicated situations across sensitive borders. Although WFP’s organizational expertise helps overcome the lack of coordination between humanitarian and related operations, the cost is high, not least in WFP staff lives (see Chapter 4, section 4.1.3).

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International organizations

The UN Development Programme (UNDP)

6.5.1 Background Created in 1965, UNDP inherited its role from two separate, relatively small, UN grant programmes: the Special Fund and the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. The former funded medium-­sized projects aimed at specific ‘pre-­investment’ development objectives, such as natural resources surveys or the building and commissioning of training institutions, and the latter supplied skilled individuals to support governments that lacked suitably trained staff. UNDP’s funding objectives are now broader but are always aimed at enhancing national capabilities and government effectiveness. UNDP was formed exclusively as an agency to solicit and disburse multilateral development funding. It provides non-­reimbursable grants on a project-­by-­ project basis as opposed to the much larger loans which are disbursed by the multilateral development banks (MDBs). UNDP funding has evolved over time, and its disbursement process differs from MDB lending (see Chapter 8). At first, the SAs, using their expertise, helped governments identify suitable projects, which were submitted for UNDP approval and funding. UNDP then appointed those same SAs as executing agencies to implement projects in partnership with governments, which provided project co-­managers and ‘counterpart’ staff from their own resources with the intention that they eventually assume full control. The field programmes of many SAs, especially FAO and UNESCO, became heavily dependent on UNDP resources, as executing agencies were paid a fixed percentage to cover project overhead costs. Dissatisfaction with this arrangement, which saw SAs competing for limited resources, combined with increasing competence on the part of recipient governments to prepare and manage projects, altered UNDP’s approach in three respects. First, UNDP gradually shifted from disbursing funds through executing agencies to actively managing some projects. Second, in the 1970s UNDP introduced the Indicative Planning Figure (IPF) system whereby governments submit broad five-­year programmes described by sector rather than by project, and after a review process UNDP assigns a budget to each country. Within approved IPFs governments then develop project proposals, with or without the assistance of an executing agency, and UNDP evaluates each project. Third, the pool of executing agencies was widened to include government agencies. Three-­quarters of projects are now government executed, but this has lowered the overall success rate of projects. The weakened hold of some agencies on UNDP funding then provoked them into sponsoring their own TA programmes.

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UNDP has always been susceptible to oscillations in donor financing and has periodically experienced financial crises requiring programme and staff cutbacks. Resource shortfalls in its ‘own funds’ during the 1990s pushed UNDP into exploring bilateral and cooperative funding arrangements, including the Global Environment Facility (GEF) (jointly with IBRD and UNEP), UNAIDS (with WHO, IBRD and EU), the Global Alliance for Vaccines Initiative (with the Gates Foundation, WHO and UNICEF) and the Mountain Partnership (with FAO, UNESCO, the Asian Development Bank and some CGIAR centres). Fewer disbursement activities also prompted UNDP to carve out new roles moving further into direct project execution, such as operating projects for good governance and public administration reforms. One such example was its long-­standing work in Haiti. However, when the 2010 earthquake struck, 101 UNDP staff were killed, its local headquarters was destroyed and its operational capacity to support long-­term development was severely hindered. To cope with this disaster it responded with simple solutions. It funded 75 000 temporary jobs to help humanitarian activities, clear damaged buildings and recommence reconstruction while restoring its own programme capacity. Arguably, however, UNDP is now best known as the architect and custodian of knowledge related to human development and for commissioning the annual Human Development Report (HDR), which includes the Human Development Index (HDI). HDI was a reaction against the tendency of economists, especially those at IBRD/IMF, to equate development with economic growth. This crude focus on material acquisition ignored quality-­of-­ life issues and the reality that during the 1980s ‘in several countries human lives were shrivelling even as economic production was expanding’ (ul Haq 1995: 24). HDI’s authors recognized that the development process should reflect the aspirations of target populations but that this requires people to develop the collective capacity to participate by articulating their desires. HDI ranks countries according to a composite of indicators including life expectancy, school enrolment and GNI per capita. UNDP also sponsors regional analyses and latterly the production of regional and national HDRs. To date over 140 countries have published 600 national HDRs. Additionally UNDP has provided an institutional home for other UN programmes. Before it became a separate UN programme, UNFPA was a division of UNDP, dealing with population-­related activities such as reproductive health, family planning, population strategies, improved demographic measurements and, more recently, advocacy for population and

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female ­empowerment issues. Until 2010, UNDP also had responsibility for UNIFEM, but this has now been absorbed into UN Women (Box 6.1). UNDP still supervises and integrates the work of UN Volunteers (UNV) and the UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF). UNV funds and recruits some 7000 mid-­career graduate volunteers annually, for example to provide business consultants, administrators, technical specialists, assistance in emergencies, election monitors and humanitarian relief. UNCDF aims to encourage decentralized governmental decision making by supporting local government reform and small-­scale development projects, particularly in LDCs. UNCDF’s fund of $160m is negligible compared with MDB resources, but it has used it innovatively, including funding microfinance projects, with co-­financing provided by MDBs and bilateral donors.

6.5.2 Current activities UNDP’s overarching objective of national capacity development is expressed through funding four key programmes. The first, on which it spends 27 per cent of its budget, is to support governments in their efforts to meet MDG targets, giving particular emphasis to reducing poverty and gender inequality. Its next two priorities are funding initiatives for democratic governance and intervening to prevent crisis or assist post-­conflict recovery. Finally, UNDP seeks to promote sustainable development. Frequently these four programmes are interlinked, as exemplified by UNDP’s governance programme with its mantra of ‘governance for sustainable development’. However, as the MDG target date of 2015 approaches, UNDP is shifting its focus towards disaster recovery and local governance. The multifaceted interlinkages of UNDP assistance are seen in the following examples. In India UNDP is supporting the executing agency that oversees the country’s ’100 days of work’ scheme that guarantees supplementary income for the rural poor. This combines capacity-­building objectives with MDG poverty alleviation targets. Projects linking governance and post-­ conflict recovery included support for improving governance in the north of Mali and initiatives to build modern state institutions in Libya. Gender and post-­conflict objectives are combined in Sri Lanka, where UNDP is funding a programme to involve more women in politics. In Burundi, governance and gender are joint objectives in a programme financing free national identity cards for female voters. Not all UNDP’s projects have interlinkages. It helps governments run elections, with 60 countries receiving such assistance in 2010. It also supports governments that are implementing the UN Convention against Corruption, for

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example by developing an internet-­based system allowing citizens to report government corruption anonymously in Bangladesh and Thailand. In Jordan, UNDP support to implement an electronic property registration system for municipal governments improves property tax collection and steadies local government revenues. UNDP’s expertise also helps governments establish (or restore) effective political institutions and the rule of law. While making efforts to reach out to all stakeholders to overcome the distrust inherent in post-­conflict environments, UNDP gives special emphasis to marginalized groups, such as in Laos, where it funds a local radio station which integrates three minor ethnic groups into the broader community. Under the rubric of sustainable development, UNDP is a leading promoter of GEF (see also Case Study 1.1 and section 6.6) and is using that resource to imbue nations with the capacity to develop and execute plans for sustainable development.

6.5.3 Evaluation and future challenges Donors continue to rate UNDP operations highly, and the organization’s intellectual prestige means it is widely respected. Nevertheless, UNDP has throughout been prone to financial difficulties and has been a cause of dispute within the UN System. The HDR and eye-­catching nature of HDI combined with the political pressure generated from international rankings have broadened UNDP’s constituency. As an independent report, HDR often makes uncomfortable reading for governments and is regularly invoked by NGOs seeking to hold rulers to account. It would be an exaggeration to say HDR ended the dominance of IBRD/IMF’s economic ideas; nevertheless it has established UNDP’s distinct voice in the development debate. Murphy (2006) suggests HDR ‘had an almost immediate impact on the allocation of development funds’, reorienting them towards poverty reduction and social welfare. The edition covering the Arab world, in particular, has been very influential in shaping regional opinions on the nature of national governance (McNeill 2007). The reports are praised for introducing tools for understanding specific issues, such as the relationship between development and gender policies (Youngs 2007). Nonetheless by becoming a provider of ‘upstream’ policy advice and advocacy UNDP may have tried too hard to follow trends, detracting from its mandate to provide development funding. Compared to the more concrete projects of the past it is harder to assess these less tangible initiatives, and there is a danger of credibility gaps appearing in a search for positive results. Sources and levels of financial support have constrained UNDP throughout. As with the SAs, UNDP’s multilateral resources (currently around $1b)

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are now surpassed by bilateral funds (approximately $4b), which are often earmarked for programmes that can distort overarching policy objectives. Initially the US was UNDP’s major funding source, and its executive head was a US national. Gradually, however, US priorities shifted away from grand multilateral initiatives towards strategic bilateral partnerships, culminating in 2000, when it reduced its funding and UNDP’s top position was globally recruited, with a concomitant loss of US influence. Gradually the availability of UNDP funds has fallen relative to other IOs, and IBRD now has a larger TA programme, although World Bank funds are disbursed as loans not grants. In particular the less bureaucratic process needed to obtain TA funds from MDBs means governments prefer development banks as a source of financing. This, coupled with the specialized agencies’ own TA programmes, has diminished UNDP’s relative importance. To oversee its programmes UNDP has offices (headed by a Resident Representative) in 129 of the 176 countries in which it operates. Resident Representatives have long been involved in ‘turf wars’ within the UN System to be recognized as de facto heads of all UN development operations in a country. Some SAs, such as FAO and WHO, have their own local representatives whose offices to an extent compete with UNDP. In addition the UN has decided that there should be a UN Coordinator in each country, who is the SG’s representative with responsibility for integrating all UN activities. Following considerable inter-­agency infighting over the concept, the GA resolved that Resident Representatives should normally double as UN Coordinators. The UN High-­Level Panel on System-­Wide Coherence proposed that, because many developing countries are tired of dealing with multiple administrations and numerous assistance missions each with differing requirements, the UN System should further integrate its country-­level strategies under one local representative with one programme, one administration and one fund (‘one-­UN’). The panel foresaw UNDP leading on this, but despite piloting the concept in selected countries it has not been universally implemented. Turf wars continue, and the SAs are resisting an enhanced role for UNDP which would undermine their own local profile. Until UNDP stops running projects the SAs will continue to consider it a less than impartial arbiter of development needs and will maintain their own programmes. The above issues plus a period of weak leadership at both the international and country levels have undermined UNDP influence. Retaining its long-­ term position as a supplier of grants requires UNDP to become more relevant to its client states by narrowing its focus and concentrating support on the neediest and least capable states, leaving others to obtain funds elsewhere. This also implies a shift of resources to areas such as poverty reduc-

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tion, food security and resource management which it has neglected in recent years but where results can be more elusive. Re-­establishing stronger linkages with those former executing agencies that have developed their own funding sources will also be important, particularly in the one-­UN context.

6.6

The UN Environment Programme (UNEP)

6.6.1 Background A product of the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Environment (as is UN Habitat, Box 6.7), UNEP exists to ‘provide leadership and encourage partnership in caring for the environment by inspiring, informing and enabling nations’, in particular to catalyse and coordinate environmental work undertaken by multilateral environmental agreements and agencies (MEAs). Before UNEP, environmental responsibilities were dispersed throughout the UN System. UNEP offered the possibility of streamlining existing operations, but little agreement existed on what it should look like, with compromise the inevitable result. UNEP reflected the thinking of developed states, which did not want to give it operational and enforcement roles that would limit their room for manoeuvre and which might isolate environmental concerns rather than establish links with related issues. Thus, rather than the specialized agency envisaged by some, UNEP emerged as a semi-­autonomous body with the constraints outlined at the start of the chapter, whose mandate was primarily normative. Demands from poorer states for development to be the driver were rejected, but locating it in a developing country (Kenya) went some way towards mollifying LDC sensibilities. Nevertheless, these conflicting positions weakened UNEP from the start. In 1997, in response to LDC concerns and following the lead given by the Brundtland Commission (see Case Study 1.1), its mandate was expanded into ‘the leading global authority that sets the environmental agenda, that promotes the coherent implementation of the environmental dimensions of sustainable development within the UN System and that serves as an authoritative advocate of the global environment’. This, theoretically, placed it at the heart of environmental global governance, a complex interweaving of different initiatives, weakening some LDC resistance (Najam 2005). UNEP advances its objectives mostly through knowledge management and developing and administering relevant global norms. Firstly, it monitors the environment, collecting and analysing data received from governments and a network of research institutes. These are synthesized into reports, including the periodic Global Environment Outlook, which provides policy advice to members. UNEP also runs the Global Environment Monitoring System

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(GEMS), which collates data on water, air quality, biodiversity, pollutants and renewable resources to provide early warning of potential environmental threats. GEMS and other environmental information are accessed through several programmes, each with a slightly different perspective reflecting the interests of diverse funders. For instance, the Global Resource Information Database has a geographical focus, and Info-­Terra informs on the underlying science. Weakness in this structure has caused these disparate programmes to be subsumed within a Division of Environmental Information. Secondly, UNEP facilitates international collaboration over environmental problems. Its foremost role has been to support and coordinate negotiations leading to more formal international agreements, treaties and a portfolio of soft laws (Box 6.6). These include the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), which controls trade in rare species, and UNEP’s Regional Seas Programme, now an extensive international regime to control marine pollution (Desai 2006). Additionally UNEP builds developing-­country capacity to negotiate and implement MEAs. BOX 6.6

THE OZONE HOLE AND THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL Perhaps UNEP’s most renowned work pertains to the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Ozone forms a protective ‘skin’ in the upper layers of the atmosphere, reducing the solar radiation falling on the earth. In the 1970s concerns surfaced over widely used industrial chemicals known as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) reacting with atmospheric ozone, thereby causing a large patch of the ozone layer to vanish from the Southern Hemisphere (the ozone hole). UNEP studied the issue but faced opposition from certain scientists and states. State dissension pitted the Toronto group (mainly North American and Scandinavian states that wanted to phase out CFCs rapidly) against the EU (which produced most CFCs), Japan and the USSR. Disagreement prevented the negotia-

tion of a formal protocol but led instead to the Vienna Convention on Protection of the Ozone Layer, a loose declaration committing states to exchange information and establish guidelines to reduce ozone layer damage. Later, environmental groups, a widening ozone hole and growing consensus amongst an epistemic community of scientists coalescing around UNEP generated pressures to negotiate a more formal treaty. Accordingly UNEP convened a series of conferences to demonstrate the damage of inaction. Following protracted negotiations the Montreal Protocol, which now has 196 signatories, committed states to reduce CFC consumption to 50 per cent of 1986 levels by 1999, with an eventual phase-­out. Developed states have ceased

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 their use of CFCs, and developing countries, although arguing that they had not contributed to the release of CFCs and that a phase-­out might harm their economies, are committed to do the same. In return for developing-­country support, the Protocol allowed them temporarily to increase their use of CFCs and provided technical assistance to help them reduce future con-

sumption. Subsequently scientific evidence demonstrating the inadequacy of agreed limits resulted in stricter and tighter rules to eliminate CFCs, coupled with extension of the Protocol to cover more than 100 other ozone-­depleting substances. While the Protocol has contributed to reducing the ozone hole, the hole is still bigger than it was in 1980.

UNEP’s final task is monitoring and encouraging compliance with these ordinances. Often its role is to support the many MEAs that have evolved since the 1980s. For instance, UNEP provides the secretariats which oversee the operation of CITES and the Basel Convention on Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes. Almost all recent international conventions designed to protect the environment have established voluntary trust funds to provide resources for their implementation, some 40 of which are managed by UNEP. One such example is GEF, established in 1990 as part of the Rio Declaration (Case Study 1.1). Operated jointly with IBRD and UNDP, GEF provides financing for developing countries to cover the additional costs of activities that benefit the global environment, including conservation of biodiversity, cutting greenhouse and ozone-­depleting gases, protection of international waters and reduction in land degradation. States must accede to the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC, also see Case Study 1.1) or the Conventions on Biological Diversity, Desertification and Persistent Organic Pollutants to receive GEF support. Originally established for three years with a fund of $1b it has now trebled in size and has been extended in duration.

6.6.2 Current activities As developed-­world governments trim expenditures in response to current financial difficulties, UNEP is pursuing a Green Economy Initiative to advocate a more cost-­effective and better use of scarce resources to improve the environment. Through the medium of networks and workshops UNEP is pressing for investment in clean energy, sustainable technology and energy efficiency, acting as a catalyst for transferring environmentally friendly technologies to developing countries. Linked initiatives are the Economics of Ecosystems project to conserve and invest in ecosystems as ‘carbon sinks’, advocacy of more sophisticated and sustainable approaches to biofuel

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production, and efforts to develop more resource-­efficient sustainable agriculture. As inputs to global governance, in 2011, UNEP oversaw production of a UN System report on global drylands and desertification. Additionally, an expert panel identified 22 upcoming problems that will drive future UNEP work programmes, including the impact of electronic waste, consequences of the search for scarce strategic minerals, decommissioning nuclear reactors, the results of glacier retreat, depletion of marine resources, and migration caused by climate change. Through a series of sharply focused bulletins UNEP is providing a global alert service to forewarn of environmental threats such as extreme weather events and industrial accidents. UNEP is particularly active in Africa, providing assistance to governments unable to undertake their own environmental investigations. Examples include: reporting to the Nigerian government on the extent of pollution and local exposure to carcinogens from oil wells in the Niger Delta; investigating an industrial disaster in the Nairobi slums by identifying its causes and offering solutions for mitigating future risk; and, in the Congo, undertaking an assessment of the environmental impact of mining, industrial and agricultural policies. In the newly created Southern Sudan it is helping the government draw up a waste management plan, particularly for the capital, Juba.

6.6.3 Evaluation and future challenges In fulfilling its original mandate, UNEP has had a mixed record, and it cannot claim to have arrested, let alone reversed, global environmental degradation. Nonetheless it would be wrong to say it has been irrelevant. UNEP has some impressive achievements to its credit, not least in fostering and sustaining global norms through knowledge management and intergovernmental negotiations. Its most significant such contribution is probably the international regime that governs the ozone layer (Box 6.6). P.M. Haas (1992b) suggests that without this regime cooperation would have been narrower and less intense, enforcement would have been more sluggish, and there would have been greater variations in national responses, thereby inhibiting the decline in ozone-­depleting chemicals. UNEP is constrained by limited and unpredictable funding, its small size, and vague terms of reference. This requires it to work with other UN agencies in developing policies to combat desertification (IFAD and UNESCO), climate change (WMO), pollution (UNIDO and WHO) and marine sustainability (FAO). Its location makes it difficult to attract and retain staff,

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and it is far from the large UN centres where key issues are discussed and where the other agencies and several environmental convention secretariats are found, further hindering coordination (Ivanova 2005; Biermann 2007). Like FAO (Chapter 7, section 7.3) over the past 20 years UNEP has become over-­reliant on tied funding, reflecting donor preferences rather than a cohesive programme of capacity building (Ivanova 2007). In 2010, for example, it received $80m in core funding, but a further $127m was in tied trust funds. Elsewhere UNEP has been marginalized. It was a central actor in initial debates on climate change, playing a significant role in establishing the causal links between greenhouse gases and climate change, driving climate change up the international agenda and persuading states to accept binding, albeit modest, commitments to cut greenhouse gas emissions (see Case Study 1.1). UNEP was lauded for its preparatory role for the 1992 and 2002 UN Conferences, but IPCC and FCCC have since pushed it to the periphery of climate change negotiations. IPCC not UNEP is now the principal force in raising political awareness on the seriousness of climate change. A key UNEP objective is to catalyse new institutions and agreements to manage environmental problems. Consequently it has helped launch many institutions that now constitute an elaborate international regime. This has included mainstreaming the environment in domestic agendas, especially through the promotion of national environmental ministries. However, UNEP’s inability to take effective control of the environmental agenda has resulted in too many UN bodies with an environmental responsibility and a lack of coherence (UN 2007). FCCC and IPCC apart, other UN bodies working on the environment include the secretariats for the Montreal Protocol, the Convention to Combat Desertification (located within IFAD) and the Convention of Wetlands of International Importance (UNESCO). Paradoxically, the encroachment of IPCC, FCCC and a host of other MEAs on to UNEP’s territory reflects its success. While this enhances the case for UNEP as the ‘anchor organization’ (Ivanova 2010) coordinating this regime, in practice it is often bypassed. As Andresen (2007a: 332) puts it, UNEP is a good father, but once MEAs mature they wish to fly the nest and demonstrate their independence by keeping UNEP at arm’s length. UNEP’s meagre resources constrain its ability to influence MEAs, making coordination all but impossible. Moreover, the regime’s complexity attracts criticism from developing states that lack the expertise and resources to participate effectively. Even in arenas where UNEP has been widely praised, such as its knowledge management policy, statistical databases and ability to assess global environmental issues, coordination problems have surfaced. It is critically important

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that the information supplied by UNEP is respected, as it can damage the reputation of states and is used by green lobbies to pressure environmental backsliders. Although it has effectively analysed environmental problems it has failed to standardize inclusive cross-­country data (Ivanova 2010). Despite internal reorganization, the variety of reporting systems and their frequent sketchiness mean UNEP lacks the comparative data needed to assess states’ actions on addressing environmental problems. This has resulted in the emergence of parallel information systems, which undermines UNEP’s claim to be the curator of the world’s environmental data. For example, the G8 established GEOSS, a collaboration between governments and INGOs, which feeds into GEMS but which has been funded independently. Given the foregoing criticisms and mounting evidence that the environment is seriously threatened by human behaviour, many have advocated reforms. Solutions include narrowing UNEP to focus on its strengths (Heggelund and Backer 2007) or, more commonly, upgrading it to an SA (Ivanova 2007) or a fully fledged World Environmental Organization (Rosendal 2007). Proponents argue these reforms would give UNEP greater standing within its peer group, produce a long-­term vision and stimulate both operative and normative functions. The outcome would be more cohesive policies, more consistent funding (through assessments rather than voluntary contributions) and better coordination of the UN System. UNEP’s Governing Council has consulted on the issue, but numerous members, including the US, China and various G77 countries, maintain their aversion to a strong environmental IO (Andresen 2007b). Others observe that environmental issues are diverse, requiring distinct institutional responses and specialist knowledge that a general body could not deliver. Thus UNEP reform is in limbo. However, no new structure will be effective unless it fully integrates the work of all the UN-­related bodies dealing with environment and climate change. BOX 6.7

THE UN CENTRE FOR HUMAN SETTLEMENTS (HABITAT) – A POOR RELATION A follow-­up to the Stockholm Conference, the 1976 UN Conference on Human Settlements led to Habitat’s establishment in 1978. Habitat’s mission is to promote sustainable urbanization to alleviate the dismal conditions facing poor city dwellers.

Like UNEP, with which its projects are often linked, Habitat is located in Nairobi and is perpetually underfunded. Unplanned urban expansion has left many residents living in slums lacking access to water, sanitation, healthcare and

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 education. Slum dwellers face disease, crime and overcrowded or poor-­quality housing and have no security of tenure. Since the numbers living in urban poverty have swelled, the need to solve these problems has become more important. As hubs of national production, cities should energize development, as they did in the industrialized world, because it is assumed that people are choosing to transfer their labour from relatively unproductive subsistence agriculture to higher-­value-­added and hence better-­paid manufacturing and services jobs. Unfortunately the reality is frequently different, as many people are driven into cities in search of work. This shift from the countryside to cities has been most pronounced in developing countries. Whereas in 1950 there were only two cities with populations exceeding 10m (London and New York), by 2008 there were 22, of which 15 were in developing countries, and for the first time the majority of the world’s population inhabited urban centres. Underfunding has confined Habitat’s operational activities to small TA projects mostly to provide planning support to countries and municipalities. For example, Habitat’s high-­priority Water and Sanitation Programme, which focuses principally on delivering clean water and improved sanitation to African and Asian cities, depends  heavily on cooperation with UNICEF and WHO. Habitat, therefore, concentrates on normative activities, including monitoring and research, policy analysis

and the dissemination of best practices in urban governance, for example through its Best Practice and Local Leadership Programme, a network of government agencies and civil society organizations sharing a database of 4000 practical and tested ideas. Under the MDGs, Habitat was given greater prominence within the UN System in the hope it could help countries meet their commitments to improve the lives of one-­tenth of the world’s one billion slum dwellers. It was provided with $30m to mobilize domestic capital for providing shelter and infrastructure, a meagre amount in the light of the problem. This funding, which is managed in cooperation with the Cities Alliance (an IBRD collaborative programme), supports a few projects that identify upgrading initiatives and build local capacity to tackle urban development problems. Habitat has successfully identified and publicized the causes of urban poverty, but it has done less to mitigate the problem and, according to leading donors (DFID 2011), has not exerted leadership on the issue within the UN. However, donors are also at fault, as their persistent failure to resource Habitat properly prevented it from sustaining programmes and scaling up its successes. Moreover, Habitat has been overwhelmed by the scale of the problems of urban development, conditions exacerbated by the laissez-­faire paradigms promoted by leading donors (DiMuzio 2008).

SUGGESTED READING

Betts, A., G. Loescher and J. Milner (2012), UNHCR: The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection, 2nd edn, Abingdon, UK: Routledge. [An up-­to-­date appraisal of UNHCR] Black, M. (1986), The Children and the Nations: The Story of UNICEF, New York: UNICEF. [An authoritative history by a UNICEF staff member]

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Browne, S. (2011), The UN Development Programme and System, Abingdon, UK: Routledge. [Assesses UNDP’s origin, evolution, performance and future] Buehrig, E.H. (1971), The UN and Palestinian Refugees: A Study in Non-­Territorial Administration, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. [A dated but good description of UNRWA’s work and its perennial problems] DeSombre, E.R. (2006), Global Environmental Institutions, London: Routledge. [Covers UNEP’s work and its relationship to SAs and INGOs on a thematic basis] Ingram, J. (2007), Bread and Stones, Charleston, SC: Booksurge. [The story of WFP in the 1980s and 1990s; shows how a UN organization operates from a political and bureaucratic perspective, with commentary on FAO DG Saouma and Ingram’s struggle for control of WFP] Jolly, R. (forthcoming), UNICEF: Global Governance That Works, Abingdon, UK: Routledge. [Current overview by a former UNICEF Deputy Executive Director] Murphy, C.N. (2006), The United Nations Development Programme: A Better Way?, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [The origins and history of UNDP along with a consideration of its development initiatives] Shaw, J. (2011), The World’s Largest Humanitarian Agency: The Transformation of the UN World Food Programme and Food Aid, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave. [Comprehensive history of WFP’s relationships with other IOs]

Internet resources Habitat: http://www.unhabitat.org IOM: http://www.iom.int UNCDF: http://www.uncdf.org UNDP: http://www.undp.org UNEP: http://www.unep.org UNFPA: http://www.unfpa.org UNHCR: http://www.unhcr.ch UNICEF: http://www.unicef.org UNRWA: http://www.un.org/unrwa UNU: http://www.unu.edu UNV: http://www.unv.org UN Women: http://www.unwomen.org WFP: http://www.wfp.org

7 The United Nations specialized agencies The 17 UN specialized agencies (SAs) cover humankind’s major socioeconomic activities, ranging from agriculture, health, social welfare and education through to finance, industrial development, communications and nuclear energy. They are linked to the UN by special agreements under Article 63 of the UN Charter and, apart from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which reports to the Security Council (SC), their work is overseen by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). They are required to respect General Assembly (GA) resolutions and submit periodic reports to ECOSOC. The SAs operate within the broad framework of UN objectives but have greater freedom of action than the semi-­autonomous agencies (Chapter 6). This derives from their status as independent IOs with their own treaties and budgets financed by members’ contributions rather than by the UN. However, they tap appropriate UN programmes for ancillary resources. Four SAs (ITU, UPU, WMO and ILO) pre-­dated the UN, and another six (IBRD, IMF, FAO, ICAO, UNESCO and WHO) were contemporaneous. The loose structure through which the SAs were associated with the UN reflected political desires for an integrated post-­war international order, while excluding the UN’s political overlay, which was seen as being detrimental to SA operations without augmenting their overall efficiency (Nicholas 1962). Furthermore, the pre-­existing organizations joined in reluctantly and preferred a structure that perpetuated the less formal model established between the League of Nations (the League) and ILO (Chapter 2). Later SAs joined because of perceived institutional advantages of: zz generating a higher profile (WIPO and UNWTO); zz integration of policy initiatives (e.g. the International

Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), which works closely with FAO and IBRD); or zz access to technical assistance (TA) funding.

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The SAs provide their members with both operational and programme support, but with a steadily increasing share of resources being devoted to operative work they now lean slightly in that direction (see Figure 1.2). Their operational activities centre upon the provision of expertise and delivering TA programmes (funded by UNDP, bilateral trust funds or their own resources), often supported by field offices and reviews of members’ performance. These tasks are advanced by their programme functions. Extensive research, including maintaining internationally comparable statistical databases, means SAs are custodians of knowledge in their fields, producing authoritative studies, institutionalizing international standards, and formulating and advising on policies. Much of this work is managed through specialist committees which have the character of epistemic communities. The impact of SAs has been considerable but variable. Their unrivalled knowledge has allowed them to speak authoritatively on global issues and provide necessary coordination. Intensified globalization (Box 1.1) and the MDGs (Box 5.4) have put SAs in the spotlight, and they have become hubs for global campaigns organized around partnerships of governmental and non-­governmental actors. Some, like WHO, have achieved solid results and are pre-­eminent in their field. Others, such as UNESCO and UNIDO, are a ‘functional tragedy of our own making’ ( J.P. Singh 2011), delivering few results or concrete outcomes except to provide a structure within which members can consider common problems. In the past 30 years the influence of the SAs has dwindled, and specific organizations have been engulfed by crisis. The causes of decline relate to the interconnected problems of politicization, disagreements between developed and developing states about their mandates, managerial ineptitude and chronic funding shortfalls. Weak UN System coordination, which has contributed to overlapping responsibilities and unconstrained growth in mandates, has aggravated these problems (see section 7.1). Accusations of politicization, ‘the distortion of debate by the irrelevant introduction of political issues’ (Hoggart 1978), have afflicted nearly all SAs. Periodically they have found themselves dragged by their members into political topics peripheral to their mandates, for example UNESCO’s posturing over Israeli–Palestinian relationships and the belief that ILO’s association with the world trade union movement provided support for Soviet Cold War policies. This sense of politicization (particularly keenly felt by staff) has broadened as membership has grown and decisions have had to satisfy many more actors.

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A second concern is diverging views between developed countries (the specialized agencies’ main paymasters, which favour programme activities) and developing countries (the main recipients of SA assistance, which prefer operative activities). Developing countries complain that costs and their lack of the necessary expertise constrain their ability to participate in the development and implementation of agreed norms. The SAs can provide expert support by publishing generic legislation (FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius) or providing practical guidelines (ILO occupational safety information), but because LDCs cannot afford to attend all committees the SAs are, nevertheless, seen as reinforcing the power of developed nations. Third, while there are some exceptions, their staffs’ quality and quantity have deteriorated and their executive management has generally been poor. Top managers are political appointees selected less by competence than by nationality (see Chapter 4, sections 4.1.2 and 4.2.4). Well-­qualified candidates are frequently overlooked because a fellow national is already atop another UN organization (Urquhart and Childers 1996). Poor leadership, combined with rigid bureaucratic structures incompatible with the multifaceted problems being faced, bred distrust of SAs among their members, who consequently cut funding. Whereas SAs were originally funded almost exclusively through regular appropriations, with costs being shared across the membership, budget constraints have gradually forced SAs to solicit donor funding. In several SAs bilateral trust funds now constitute more than 50 per cent of their resources, thus allowing donors to promote programmes which suit their interests, often distorting an organization’s overall direction or diverting it from its core mission. Budgetary stringency has also contributed to declining staff numbers being spread over ever-­growing mandates (see Chapter 17). The next section briefly reviews the mechanisms through which SA activities are coordinated. The work of the four largest SAs (ILO, FAO, WHO and UNESCO), plus IAEA, UNIDO and UNWTO, is then considered. The remaining SAs are covered in other chapters. Three (IBRD, IDA and IFC) are component parts of the World Bank Group, which along with IFAD are reviewed in Chapter 8. IMF is another SA sitting somewhat outside the UN System and is described in Chapter 9. WIPO’s work is explained in Chapter 10, WMO is appraised in Chapter 15, and ITU, UPU, IMO and ICAO form the core of Chapter 16. Given the SAs share similar governance mechanisms, only one typical structure will be described in detail, that of FAO. However, two exceptions will be highlighted: WHO’s operations are decentralized, exhibiting ­similarities

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with those of UNDP and UNICEF, while ILO has a historical structure which differs from that of other SAs.

7.1

UN System coordination Governments oversee and attempt to coordinate UN System activities though UN oversight bodies and ECOSOC (Chapter 5). Formal agreements between the UN and the SAs specifically provide for ‘the desirability, in the interest of administrative and technical uniformity and of the most efficient use of personnel and resources, of avoiding, wherever possible, the establishment and operation of competitive or overlapping facilities and services’ (e.g. Agreement between the UN and ILO, Article XIII (1), May 1946). To achieve this, the UN System has gradually built up a complex mechanism for inter-­agency coordination based around the Chief Executives’ Board for Coordination (CEB), which is a twice-­yearly meeting of the executive heads of all UN System organizations. CEB can make working-­level commitments on behalf of each organization, but where major policy change is required executive heads first need to consult governing bodies. Furthermore CEB’s effectiveness has often depended upon the personal relationships and ­political rivalries of the UN SG and SA chiefs. Government dissatisfaction with inter-­agency coordination prompted SG Kofi Annan to reform CEB, turning it from a body which routinely endorsed lower-­level initiatives to a higher-­profile one which set an agenda for effective cooperation. The reforms established two CEB committees. The High-­Level Committee on Programmes (HLCP) comprises senior programme managers who discuss technical and economic issues. It is supported by a large number of subcommittees, including those dealing with long-­term development, nutrition, rural development, science and technology, water resources, drugs and crime, new and renewable energy and outer space. The High Level Committee on Management (HLCM) involves senior administrators who consider broad management, financial and personnel issues, with subcommittees covering budget and finance, human resources and IT. Each committee reviews and coordinates work at lower levels before raising issues to CEB. If delegated, they make relevant decisions, although any substantial financial commitments must again have approval from governing bodies. Decisions on issues not requiring extra funding often result in proposed principles or action plans that CEB then endorses. In some respects the coordination mechanism works well and has been improving (see Box 6.2). For example, the UN System has a common personnel framework, and all organizations prepare budgets for an identical

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biennial time frame, which makes comparison and resource allocation easier for governments. CEB pressures for better dissemination of the wealth of knowledge available in the UN System have stimulated more effective technical networks of interested agencies (see Chapter 4). Unfortunately these networks exacerbate already considerable overlaps amongst IOs, and even CEB’s highly complex and detailed coordination mechanism has not foiled the expansionist ambitions of executive heads who oppose initiatives that could undermine their influence. This partly reflects conflicts arising from original mandates, new developments and more complex interrelationships. Another area where cooperation has been weak is in the plethora of country-­ level offices run by the different SAs. Periodic attempts to rationalize representation by installing country-­level ‘supremos’ have proved unsuccessful, as the organization nominated to run the representations (usually the UN or UNDP) has not been strong enough (see Chapter 6, section 6.5).

7.2

The International Labour Organization (ILO)

7.2.1 Background Motivated by social reformers, pleas for basic international labour standards first emerged in the nineteenth century (see Chapter 2). Although human rights considerations would later become important, the reason for ILO’s creation in 1919, as part of the League system, came from a desire to stem social unrest arising from social injustice. Under capitalism firms need to lower wages and working conditions in order to remain competitive. The 1917 Bolshevik revolution lent credence to Marxist claims that the concomitant inequality would result in upheaval, especially as unionization meant important labour groups were becoming politically organized (see Chapter 1). The framers of the Treaty of Versailles were also worried that inequality and a putative race to the bottom in labour standards could cause trade friction that might spill over into threats to international peace and security. Thus, ILO was conceived as an institution where governments, labour and employers could agree minimum labour standards within a general context of social justice. Four fundamental principles have guided ILO: freedom of association and collective bargaining, elimination of compulsory labour, abolition of child labour and elimination of discrimination in employment. ILO continued operations during the Second World War, and its 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia added extra principles, including that: workers should have freedom of expression; labour is not a commodity; poverty is a danger; and all people have the right to prosperity and to pursue material well-­being

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with dignity and economic security. These additional principles reflected desires for IOs to set their work in the broader context of promoting human rights. Initially the principal avenue through which ILO prosecuted its mission was by coordinating the development and supervising the application of two types of international labour standards – conventions and recommendations. As all ILO standards must be incorporated into domestic law, standards are drafted in a general sense, thereby giving states discretion in their interpretation. States may decline to ratify ILO conventions but must report this to the Governing Body (see below). ILO’s 159 conventions in force in 2012 are binding on those states that ratify them, whereas its recommendations are exhortatory. ILO’s long, activist history has left a legacy of nearly 400 overlapping conventions and recommendations, ranging from the abolition of forced labour (1930 and 1957) to definition of a minimum employment age (1973), the protection of indigenous peoples from exploitation (1989) and maternity protection (2000). ILO also promulgates standards for specific industries, frequently in conjunction with other SAs. These include: the maritime industry (initially through a 1920 convention but, since 1958, jointly with IMO); agriculture (with FAO); and coal mining, iron and steel, textiles, building and chemicals industries (with UNIDO). Cooperatively with the International Organization for Migration (Box 6.5), ILO is also concerned with the working conditions of migrant labourers. Migrants frequently fall outside national social security schemes and are exploited either because they have no local voice or because their labour is illegal. Based on ILO’s compilations of best practice, guidelines have been created which governments are encouraged to adopt, thereby giving migrant labourers more protection. ILO’s second function is the compilation and dissemination of knowledge about employment, labour and social affairs. Founded in 1960, the International Institute for Labour Studies fronts ILO research. This is propagated through major publications such as The World Employment Report, which evaluates employment strategies, and the Yearbook of Labour Statistics, which provides worldwide comparative data on social trends and legislation. ILO research also offers policy advice to countries wishing to reform their employment practices or social security programmes through studying the full range of global social security concepts and related benefits (e.g. private and public healthcare systems or the different pensions’ philosophies). The final major component of ILO’s work is technical assistance. ILO ­recognized that trained personnel were needed to implement its standards

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successfully, especially in developing states, which were becoming the majority of its membership. TA has grown from nothing prior to 1948 to consuming over half of ILO’s budget, although, as in FAO, this has not always met with donors’ approval. ILO has activities in over 140 countries, often delivered in association with UN and IBRD poverty reduction programmes. Since 1966, ILO has run an International Training Centre in Turin, which also houses the UN Staff Training College. The Centre annually hosts around 300 courses, encompassing the latest developments of interest to decision makers and middle managers from governments, unions and employers’ organizations, particularly those from developing states. While many of the underlying debates remain unaltered, ILO’s coverage and working methods have evolved alongside the global economy. For example, numerous ILO standards relate to traditional, formal employment typical of the developed world but ignore the informal sectors of developing countries. During the 1970s, poverty and development were brought more fully within ILO’s remit, which paved the way for it to interface with IMF and IBRD. Likewise, as service industries have become a major source of global employment, ILO has pressed for service industry standards. Financial services, hotel workers, catering and the tourist industries are now under study, while a convention covering domestic work is in the pipeline. Arguably the biggest structural change affecting ILO since the 1970s is the superseding of Keynesian ideas by those of the free market. The labour standards promoted by ILO seemed to be irreconcilable with flexible labour markets, privatization, free trade and financial liberalization. In particular, free marketers’ advocacy of leaner welfare provisions prompted an existentialist threat to ILO. Conversely ILO’s boosters (see Hughes and Haworth 2010) argue that social inequities which are the corollaries of free markets were the organization’s saviour. Old fears about social division resurfaced, and consequently ILO stationed itself amongst a wider movement clamouring for ‘fairer’ globalization by defending the need for social protection. This harked back to concerns manifest in ILO’s formative years, namely that countries undermine labour standards when they wish to obtain unfair economic advantage, and produced calls for adding a Social Clause in WTO negotiations based on ILO standards. Ultimately developing countries, the principal beneficiaries of weak labour standards, scuttled the proposal. Nevertheless, this established labour standards as a legitimate aspect of the trade agenda and, as developing countries would not countenance their integration into WTO, left ILO as the default organization for this purpose. However, this accommodation with global capitalism has courted serious criticism (see section 7.2.4).

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The desire to inject globalization with a dose of social justice led to the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. This highlighted eight ‘core’ ILO conventions linked to the aforementioned four fundamental principles, with the aspiration of attaining their universal application. Importantly, however, states could commit to the Declaration and its principles without ratifying the underlying conventions. This marked part of a wider shift away from prescriptive regulations towards self-­regulatory codes of conduct. ILO felt that fewer, more fully supported targets would improve labour rights and that soft law approaches would better reconcile ILO objectives with the requirements of world trade (Hassel 2008). Nevertheless these developments remain controversial. Stressing tacit acceptance rather than ratification shifts the emphasis from labour rights to broad principles which are more difficult to implement and police and leaves an impression that the remaining conventions are somehow peripheral (Alston 2004). A similar process has engendered the 2006 Maritime Labour Convention, which rationalized over 60 existing regulations into core obligations and principles, a code for implementation and a framework allowing for some national discretion.

7.2.2 Structure Outwardly ILO is a conventional IO with an annual Conference where delegates meet to decide on policy, including adopting new standards by a two-­ thirds majority. Below the Conference a decision-­making Governing Body meets triannually between Conference sessions to direct the Secretariat’s ongoing work and examine the implementation of labour standards. Uniquely amongst IOs, these bodies are not exclusively governmental but are ‘tripartite’, as they also include both workers’ and employers’ representatives, who may speak and vote independently. National delegations to the Conference comprise two government representatives plus one each from a national employers’ and workers’ association. The Governing Body has 56 voting members, 28 appointed by governments and 14 each by workers’ and employers’ associations. In the Governing Body ten government seats are permanently assigned to countries of major industrial importance (currently Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK and the USA). The remaining seats, including the non-­governmental participants, are rotated triennially to maintain equitable regional representation. Theoretically this gives non-­members a substantial voice, but in practice decisions generally reflect states’ overall objectives, owing to the weight given to governments, the fact that consensual decisions are the norm, and because governments select the labour and employer associations that form their delegations.

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Below the Governing Body are specialist tripartite committees on, inter alia, occupational safety, industrial relations, workers’ education, management development and migrant workers. These committees are generally appointed with an eye to geographical representation but consist of experts who provide a sounding-­board for and are supported by research carried out by the Secretariat. Two bureaux within the Secretariat manage relations with employers’ and workers’ associations respectively. They run programmes of interest to each group, for example supporting employers’ organizations in countries promoting adoption of key international labour standards. The Secretariat also monitors application of ILO conventions. States are required to report on implementation, but this is often cursory at best. A committee of 20 independent ‘Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations’ examines these statements and reports annually to the Conference. Complaints about breaches of ratified conventions can be brought before ILO by states, the other tripartite members or the Governing Body itself. The Governing Body may instigate a commission of enquiry (a Conference committee), and if the complaint is upheld a member can be asked to alter its policies and, ultimately, the Conference can take action to secure compliance.

7.2.3 Current activities The core of ILO’s current programme is its Decent Work Agenda (DWA). DWA is an abstract construct intended to connect to globalization and the MDG. Again, designed as an aspiration to which all members can subscribe, it raises difficult questions (Standing 2008). DWA integrates employment opportunities with social dialogue, social protection, and the establishment of standards and principles. However, introducing comprehensive social benefits is limited by economic factors, even in advanced economies. Likewise DWA’s advocacy of ‘sound’ wages in member countries pits ILO against employers’ representatives and against other IOs, like OECD and IBRD, which believe pay should be determined by free markets. At a country level ILO is targeting TA to support Decent Work country programmes. Globally, in 2008, ILO adopted a Declaration of Social Justice for a Fair Globalization. This aims to encourage economic growth while dampening inequality. For example, ILO is pressing hold-­out members to ratify the treaties on child and forced labour by assisting them to develop national plans to eliminate both. It is also developing best-­practice guidelines for multinational corporations covering employment policy, training and workplace conditions, although it cannot enforce them.

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One-­quarter of ILO’s 2012–13 budget was allocated to creating employment opportunities in response to the 2007 financial crisis. This was particularly aimed at countries with endemic or high unemployment, by promoting policies which support cooperatives or small and medium-­sized enterprises (SMEs) and, in Africa, rural employment opportunities. The ability of corporations to shift production to countries with trained yet cheap labour requires action and investment to reskill workers exiting old industries and to enhance the skills of less educated workforces so that they can compete in the global market. Part of this shift involves developing policies that recognize a decline in trade union power and a trend towards less regulated employment. A further 15 per cent of ILO’s budget supports work on social protection. ILO continues to advise members on modern pensions regimes, occupational safety and health. Along with WHO it is developing policies that accommodate the growing burden of healthcare costs on LDCs.

7.2.4 Evaluation and future challenges ILO has shaped a consensus on minimum labour and employment standards and, through being a forum where states can be shamed into action, helped to get them implemented. Hughes (2005: 414) is more effusive, suggesting ILO embodies the idea that there is always an international dimension to national labour standards and has expanded ‘labour protection into the domain of human rights and tie[d] these to the pursuit of freedom and economic progress’. Nevertheless, after an active start, ILO declined after 1945, falling prey to Cold War bickering and witnessing a diminution of the hitherto independent voice of workers’ representatives. A long period of generally unproductive activity consequently reduced its standing. Poor ratification rates, dubious compliance and weak monitoring processes raise doubts about whether improvements in labour conditions are really attributable to ILO. Besides, the advances won by ILO are threatened by its narrowing legislative base and heightened reliance on soft law. Assessed against its overall objective of promoting human rights and social justice via improved labour conditions, ILO’s record is mixed, as convention ratifications attest. Attaining a consensus upon which to base a suite of 159 extant conventions is a significant achievement that is reflected in its 1969 Nobel Prize citation, which credited ILO with leaving a ‘lasting impact on the legislation of all countries’. Two-­thirds of ILO members have now ratified all eight ‘core conventions’, with the average number of ratifications reaching 167 in 2012. Nevertheless, while ILO conventions have attracted nearly 8000 ratifications, this equates to an average of only 43 per member, with ratification taking up to 20 years in some countries. While the eight core conventions

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have been widely ratified, only eight of the 22 conventions adopted between 1980 and 1995 have more than ten ratifications (Wisskirchen 2005). Although non-­ratification is an indicator of non-­compliance it does not necessarily measure a convention’s impact. For example, Scandinavian nations have ratified almost all conventions, while Germany has ratified only 40 per cent, but they have legislated similarly. Likewise, the US has ratified only 14 conventions but meets many ILO standards. Domestic politics accounts for these mismatches. Sometimes states avoid ratification to stifle conflict with powerful lobby groups; alternatively they may wish to prevent additional complexity being introduced into national legislation, or a convention’s provisions may be contrary to national policy. Thus, Germany has not ratified the revised 1952 Maternity Protection Convention because it absolves employers from paying for maternity benefits, whereas German law requires employer contributions (Wisskirchen 2005). As a consequence of low ratification rates, in 1997 ILO adopted a constitutional change allowing it to withdraw outdated conventions subject to Conference agreement, but four more ratifications are needed to bring this into force. A second source of non-­compliance arises when states backslide on conventions they have ratified. The 1973 Minimum Age Convention, ratified by 163 countries, bans all child labour, and a 1999 convention targeting the worst types of child labour exploitation has 175 ratifications. Notwithstanding this, ILO estimates there are still 218m child labourers worldwide, 57 per cent of whom work in hazardous occupations. ILO more successfully attacked the use of forced labour, but there are still 12m forced labourers, mostly in Asia. Some blame for this lies with weak enforcement mechanisms, exacerbated by resource cuts that prevent proper monitoring (Standing 2010). Despite 90 years of concern, too many people, including those who have been the principal focus of ILO interest, still work in appalling conditions, suggesting high levels of non-­compliance with ILO conventions. There are forces pushing in the opposite direction. Information provided by states to ILO is exploited by civil society groups to embarrass governments. States keen to maintain their international reputation may also adjust their policies. Similarly, corporations wishing to sidestep adverse publicity may shun investment in countries with poor labour standards, thus encouraging adoption of ILO standards irrespective of ratification. However, such pressures are ineffective in regimes that repudiate prevailing international norms, especially failed or pariah states. Only once has ILO imposed sanctions against a state, when Myanmar refused to stamp out forced labour, but even then ILO chose to cajole and negotiate rather than punish or expel.

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Writing from a Gramscian perspective, Cox (1977) argued that ILO was always a venue for reproducing power relations within the capitalist system. In these terms, ILO existed to perpetuate capitalism by managing its inherent contradictions. Nonetheless critics contend that ILO’s accommodation with capitalism since the 1970s, especially its concentration on core labour standards applied through soft law, could prove to be a pyrrhic victory by preserving its survival at the expense of its ability to protect and promote labour rights. For these writers, far from being in the vanguard of developing a workable alternative to free market globalization and the ‘commodification’ of labour, ILO has been one of its main handmaidens. First, rather than enshrining positive rights, the eight core conventions contain ­negative  rights, recognizing norms already covered by domestic law (Standing 2008). Second, these standards marginalize important labour rights such as employment security, maternity and pensions. By vacating the field in these areas ILO is handing victory by default to the free marketers. Standing (2008) traces the frailty of ILO’s response to the US departure in 1977. The US returned in 1980 but ‘used its position outside the organization to engineer a series of internal reforms that weakened ILO’s moral position and technical capacity’, frustrating its ability to resist the free market revolution. Whereas ILO had traditionally drawn its senior echelons, especially the DG, from amongst labour specialists, the US and other prominent members politicized the leadership, inserting those friendly to the free market project, often to ILO’s detriment. The US departure also started a trend towards relying on donors to finance specific projects. For example, despite fierce internal dissent, ILO’s dependence on IBRD finance forced it to support moves to adopt private sector solutions to pensions provision. The debate about refocusing ILO rumbles on. Optimists point out that after the 2007 financial crisis the G20 turned to ILO to support its employment agenda, thereby injecting fresh impetus to DWA and legitimizing ILO’s position as ‘the centre for normative action in the world of work’ (DG Juan Somavia, quoted in Hughes and Haworth, 2010: 74). ILO standards also provide a framework for the efforts of private sources of global labour governance (Hassel 2008). Certainly ILO has much to do. In 2011, 200m people were unemployed, and ILO (2012) estimates that 600m additional jobs will be needed by 2020 to contain global unemployment. On top of the figures for child and forced labour, 456m workers remain beneath the poverty line, and 1.5b are in vulnerable employment. Sceptics believe ILO, as presently constituted, is ill suited to the task. They suggest it has forgotten that it was created precisely because free markets produce social inequality and upheaval. Therefore until it stops being an apologist for the

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free market project it cannot effectively tackle these problems. Furthermore they suggest ILO needs organizational reform to better represent modern labour markets. Theoretically ILO’s tripartite structure is apposite for a context where NGOs are playing more prominent roles in world politics; in practice it looks increasingly antiquated, having failed to keep up with changes in labour structures. Despite declining membership, trades unions still dominate labour representation to ILO. Likewise, the major employers’ bodies at ILO tend to emphasize big business to the exclusion of other key groups, including the self-­employed, homemakers and the professions. The entrenched associations of unions and employers are reluctant to cede any influence (Standing 2008). Without inviting new stakeholders ILO is likely to continue producing ‘perfectly written codes that are perfectly inapplicable’ ( Javillier and Gernigon 2004).

7.3 The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 7.3.1 Background The League’s studies on the nutritional aspects of public health lapsed during the Second World War, but in 1943 the Hot Springs Conference on Food and Agriculture gave rise to FAO, under whose broader aegis this work was reactivated and combined with the International Institute of Agriculture’s mandate (IIA, see Chapter 2). Of the Allied Powers, only the USSR did not join FAO, although, because it participated at the founding conference, it is considered an original member. The USSR repudiated FAO because reporting on agricultural production statistics was a mandatory requirement of membership, something the USSR regarded as a state secret. Thus, FAO was spared some of the Cold War posturing that dogged ILO and UNESCO. Russia eventually joined in 2006. FAO’s primary mandate is to raise global nutritional levels, enhance agricultural productivity, improve the life of rural populations and ensure freedom from hunger. FAO’s Charter saw this as being achieved through research and knowledge dissemination, the development of global best practice, technical assistance and policy initiatives; thus, from the start it was an organization with both programme and operative roles. FAO’s work falls into five broad categories reflected in its internal structure: agriculture, fisheries, forestry, food security and the social aspects of agricultural production. Although FAO’s focus has shifted from protecting producers’ interests to also supporting consumers’ needs, it has continued the League’s efforts to deliver stable and integrated food production.

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FAO is a clearing house for agricultural knowledge. The library that it inherited from IIA now holds over one million items, and FAO’s multiplicity of databases and flagship documents (such as The State of Food and Agriculture, the World Food Report and the Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics) make it the leading source of authoritative, global agricultural data. This data underpins FAO’s policy advice and is critical to delivering its mandate. For this reason FAO devotes a significant portion of its TA to boosting national capacity for generating and analysing agricultural statistics. Initially, much of FAO’s attention was devoted to surveys of agricultural potential and feasibility studies for large-­scale agricultural development. One outcome was the Soil Map of the World, produced in cooperation with UNESCO, which was designed to form the basis of national mapping exercises that could optimize productive land use. The Global Information and Early Warning System launched in 1968 is another important application of FAO data. This system constantly reviews the world food situation to detect and coordinate action to avert impending food crises. FAO’s repository of knowledge provides the basis for the development of a mix of legally binding and voluntary international norms and rules, frequently through joint programmes with other SAs. On issues concerning food and public health FAO cooperates with WHO. Globally one person in three falls ill from contaminated food each year, and as many as 1.8m die from consuming poor-­quality food and water-­based products (WHO 2007). A joint programme, Codex Alimentarius, comprises 4770 standards based on the best available scientific evidence governing the safety, quality and fairness of the international food trade. Although it is seldom realized, Codex standards have often encompassed many contemporary controversies, for example those surrounding the safety of GM foods, pesticide residues and food additives. While this activity duplicates the work of EU and national authorities, it provides standards and definitions for countries that cannot develop their own, promotes mutual recognition of national food quality control systems and is the technical basis underlying implementation of WTO food trade rules (Chapter 10, section 10.2). FAO works with UNCTAD to get food-­producing countries involved in WTO and commodity trade agreements and help with their implementation. FAO also develops food irradiation standards in conjunction with IAEA. The consolidation and development of FAO’s mandate in the 1950s and 1960s saw its standing and resources expand rapidly until it was operating the largest field programme of any SA. This expansion reflected the need of newly independent nations to ensure national food security and appropriate agricultural infrastructures. One outcome was the World Food Programme

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(Chapter 6 and Case Study 4.1), which distributes surplus food to famine-­ stricken areas. During this period FAO pioneered some innovative concepts, such as the International Fertilizer Supply Scheme, which reduced LDCs’ fertilizer costs and improved pest management techniques, which lower farmers’ dependency on pesticides, cut costs and increase yields. FAO’s influence started to wane in the 1970s. The failure of field research to enhance food productivity significantly and FAO’s inability to manage the politics of food production (e.g. the declining relevance of commodity agreements) precipitated the arrival of competing institutions: the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) and the now defunct World Food Council. The oil crisis catalysed a third competitor, IFAD, a development bank which finances farming initiatives for the rural poor (Chapter 8, section 8.10). FAO surrendered much of its involvement in research to CGIAR, and its two main supplementary funding sources dried up. IBRD became a major contributor to CGIAR to the detriment of FAO but also downplayed agriculture in favour of more general rural development, while UNDP also shifted resources away from FAO. A vicious circle commenced. Diminished funding inhibited FAO’s field presence and influence, which in turn raised questions about whether it was worth supporting. In the 1980s and 1990s FAO’s problems were exacerbated by fissures between developed countries, which provided most of its funding and wished to prioritize programme work, and LDCs, which relied on agriculture and were more interested in operational work. These splits were exploited by an over-­politicized leadership, which against the wishes of key contributors diverted part of the regular budget to fund small-­scale TA projects and to broker support for new initiatives (Case Study 4.1). Major donors responded by stripping FAO of important responsibilities. WFP became independent of FAO, while FAO’s resources grew more slowly than those of other SAs. These problems persisted into the twenty-­first century. In real terms FAO funding dropped 31.5 per cent between 1994 and 2005 (FAO-­IEE 2007: 271), and since 1992 it has suffered the largest decline in staffing of any SA (Table 17.1). One study (DFID 2004) rated the organization the second least effective in the UN System. Concern was such that an exceptional independent external evaluation (IEE) of FAO was undertaken (see Box 4.3), following which reforms were initiated. FAO has managed to retain its primacy in forestry and fisheries. FAO’s forestry programme collates statistics, publishes the State of the World’s Forests and runs regional forestry conferences dealing with resource management.

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FAO’s reputation in forestry had declined by the 1990s owing to a slow loss of expertise to competing institutions (FAO-­IEE 2007: 125). Subsequently it developed effective partnerships with those organizations and, despite reduced funding, has contributed to the new global focus on forests as key components in mitigating climate change. FAO has particularly concentrated on developing norms to deal with illegal logging. In fisheries, FAO is at the apex of a governance regime based on some 30 trans-­regional IOs covering the world’s major oceans or specific fish stocks. Half of global fish stocks are fully exploited, with a further quarter being overfished, and FAO is the forum for negotiations on fisheries resource management. It assembles global fisheries statistics and provides periodic analyses in its State of the World Fisheries and Aquaculture, which leads to policy formulation at FAO’s intergovernmental Committee on Fisheries. While FAO has promulgated codes of conduct (e.g. the 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries), specific quotas to prevent overfishing and deliver sustainable yields are the responsibility of the trans-­regional IOs. However, effective governance depends on all parties agreeing on restraint, a difficult task when fishing is undertaken by countries which do not border the seas concerned (see also Chapter 12, section 12.6.4, European Fisheries Control Agency).

7.3.2 Structure FAO’s sovereign body is its biennial General Conference, at which all members are represented at ministerial level. At the Conference major policies are agreed, normally by consensus but when necessary on a one-­ member-­one-­vote basis. Each delegation has an opportunity to raise its own agricultural concerns and opine on FAO activities. The Conference’s detailed work occurs in four ‘management committees’, dealing with delegate accreditation, nominations for elective positions, resolutions and general matters respectively. In non-­conference years FAO holds regional conferences, and recent reforms have given them a greater role in directing the General Conference’s agenda by reporting their conclusions to it. Below the Conference is the FAO Council. Consisting of 49 members who are elected for three years, the Council meets biannually to supervise FAO’s ongoing work and to make decisions within the context of agreed policies. It has three standing committees, each with 10–15 members, which meet more frequently: the Programme, Finance, and Constitutional and Legal Committees. There are also five technical committees, open to all members, on Commodity Problems, Fisheries, Forestry, Agriculture and World Food

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Security. Below these committees are approximately 50 permanent or temporary technical bodies which cover the gamut of FAO-­related issues from agrarian reform to plant genetic resources. Membership of technical bodies is often restricted to specialists appointed on a personal basis, but each eventually reports to the Conference. The Constitution did not provide for a more powerful chief executive than in other SAs, but by exploiting the rules to their fullest some DGs have, for better or worse, exerted a potent influence on FAO (Case Study 4.1). In 2009, spurred by the disastrous repercussions of DG Saouma’s incumbency and as part of wider reforms aimed at improving FAO governance, members moved to counterbalance the DG’s power. They placed limits on the DG’s term of office, specified the office’s functions more precisely and gave the Chair of the Council a stronger role in day-­to-­day policy implementation. In contrast, the Secretariat’s technical structure has barely altered since the outset, except that it now has five medium-­sized regional offices and many country-­level representations. The regional offices support the work of regional conferences, but unlike the case in WHO they have no budgets for independent activities, and their staff ’s work is integrated into that of headquarters technical divisions. Poor and hierarchical management caused the Secretariat to become risk-­averse and resist change, investing in traditional bureaucratic activity when it should have been responding to the needs of a knowledge-­based community (FAO-­ IEE 2007). Restructuring and wholesale culture change are now taking place (see section 7.3.3).

7.3.3 Current activities Like several other UN initiatives, FAO programmes are geared towards the MDGs, which encompass two agriculture-­related objectives: halving hunger and reversing forest loss. FAO’s other major focus is sustainable development, and in 2011 it introduced a new periodic global analytical study, the State of the World’s Land and Water Resources, to highlight the need to conserve these resources. FAO’s primary MDG goal, to halve hunger, necessitates a focus on Sub-­ Saharan Africa. This is a region with a perpetual risk of famine where women constitute most of the agricultural workforce. FAO has stepped up its gender-­based activities, allowing support and resources to be channelled into ensuring girls complete their secondary education (another MDG). It also cooperates with those agencies having policy responsibilities for gender issues (including ILO and UNICEF) to raise members’

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awareness of the importance of gender in rural development through, for example, supporting improvements in statistical recording. Rural development and agrarian reform are a second area of support. FAO concentrates on the rural poor by advocating improved policy frameworks and monitoring subsistence farming. This includes supporting LDCs’ efforts to provide agricultural training and agricultural extension services combined with encouraging land reform. Giving subsistence farmers ownership of their land empowers the rural poor and hence advances the MDG. Nevertheless, the vested interests of large landowners prevent radical land reforms. The second of FAO’s MDG aims, to reverse forest losses, has not been achieved. Tropical forests remain threatened by illegal logging, although the overall loss rate has slowed. FAO’s current focus is to reduce forest fires, which consume 350m hectares annually, through providing members with advice on integrated fire prevention and control. Additionally, FAO is addressing forest losses caused by insect and fungal diseases through introducing improved phytosanitary standards. Initial FAO fisheries work concentrated on increasing the availability of fish as a source of protein for LDCs, but dwindling fish stocks have brought resource management to the fore. FAO is developing a plan to enforce its partially implemented Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, creating new regional fisheries bodies where necessary. As small-­scale coastal fishing is not covered by such agreements, FAO is starting a major consultative process to develop guidelines that will support sustainable local fishing. Reforms prompted by IEE in 2008 (Box 4.3) are slowly occurring (see also section 7.3.1), but the obstacles are substantial. Presently organizational improvements, such as devolving responsibility for field offices to regional management and introducing human resources reforms, are coming to fruition. ‘Reform with growth’, the notion that if FAO hits specific targets governments should reward this with improved funding, is at the core of the process. Currently it seems that members believe this is happening, as in the 2012–13 budget they agreed to a 5 per cent increase over the 2010–11 budget. The momentum is being maintained by Graziano da Silva, the new DG appointed in 2012, who has already introduced further changes and intends to improve programme prioritization. As programmes are only developed biennially, optimal prioritization cannot be fully achieved before 2014–15. Leading donors are watching developments closely and have indicated that, if reforms stall, funding will be switched to FAO’s competitors, putting its very survival at stake.

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7.3.4 Evaluation and future challenges During its first two decades FAO won a reputation for technical expertise, but this has been squandered by successive DGs who politicized the organization. Under their poor management FAO’s internal structures atrophied and staff morale collapsed, thereby undermining the organization’s ability to contribute effectively to international agricultural governance. In response, leading donors reoriented their support towards the competing institutions that emerged in the 1970s, slowly divesting FAO of responsibilities and influence. Given its present predicament it is worth emphasizing FAO’s overall contribution. The expansion of FAO’s early warning system continues, and since the 1970s there has been a fourfold rise in the organization’s emergency interventions. Similarly FAO rules and norms have been widely adopted. The Codex Alimentarius is a singular achievement, but FAO has also recorded other successes, for instance developing the first legally binding framework for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. FAO knowledge networks have been central to efforts to build the infrastructure for gathering and exchanging information to detect and prevent diseases spreading across international borders, such as the Emergency Prevention System for Transboundary Animal and Plant Pests and Diseases. A key component of this initiative was the highly successful Global Rinderpest Eradication Programme. In 1995 FAO commenced a global vaccination campaign to eliminate rinderpest, a bovine disease prevalent in Eurasia and Africa which kills 80 per cent of its hosts. No new rinderpest cases have been reported since 2001, and in 2011 it was announced that the disease has become only the second disease, after smallpox, to be officially eliminated by humankind. These successes and the persistence of global hunger (see Chapters 5 and 14) indicate that FAO still has a valuable role to play. Nevertheless, until the reform programme is carried through, FAO will continue to struggle with the legacies of poor management. Internal fragmentation saw budgets ‘salami-­sliced’, and insufficient funding means that in many areas of agriculture (e.g. plant breeding and irrigation management) FAO now competes with alternative institutions. For example, FAO’s difficulty in halting illegal logging in tropical forests has resulted in two CGIAR institutions working on forest-­related issues, one of which is concerned with resource protection; WHO took leadership in the recent global campaign against avian influenza, and WFP commenced independent monitoring of food shortages. Similarly, while FAO has the influence and potential to broker international agreements to conserve fish stocks, it has not been politically proactive in the debate, preferring to exercise its technical role, nor can it, or most of the

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fisheries commissions, enforce compliance. In trade, FAO’s role in negotiating agricultural trade and commodity agreements has been constrained by WTO, while its earlier statistical competence fell victim to scarce resources, with data received from governments being accepted without question and primacy in commodity statistics being ceded to private organizations. Paradoxically in organizational and management terms the external review suggested FAO was simultaneously too fragmented and too centralized. FAO is still dominated by the traditional division of agriculture into the study of animals, plants, soils/irrigation and mechanized support services, engendering a silo mentality which has been counterproductive in its efforts to encourage integrated agricultural production. Meanwhile management was too centralized and risk-­averse, deterring individual staff from acting on their own initiative and exacerbating tensions between headquarters and field offices. While a start has been made in reforming FAO, both problems require attention.

7.4

The World Health Organization (WHO)

7.4.1 Background Collaboration on international health issues commenced in the nineteenth century and resulted in an array of conferences and organizations, including the Superior Council of Health (a public international union) and the Pan-­American Sanitary Bureau. The latter became the Pan-­American Health Organization (PAHO), an offshoot of OAS, while elsewhere the League’s Health Organization became the focus for increased health cooperation. When WHO emerged in 1948 to assume the health-­related duties of the League and the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (Chapter 2), PAHO exerted a strong influence over its structure and mandate. That WHO was not in the vanguard of SAs conceived during the Second World War reflected initial US preferences for centring its international health activities on PAHO rather than on a global agency. Article 1 of WHO’s Constitution defines its overall goal as ‘the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health’. Straight away, tensions surfaced about how WHO should prosecute this mission. The 18-­member interim commission that planned WHO was dominated by advocates of ‘social medicine’, a doctrine which holds that health outcomes rest not simply upon the discovery and application of medical innovations but on underlying socioeconomic conditions. Therefore promoting paramount levels of health would require action to reduce social inequalities, moving WHO into

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areas like housing, education, nutrition and sanitation. Their legacy was a Constitution that defined health as ‘a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity’, recognized health as a fundamental right, and held states responsible for their populations’ health. This sat uneasily with those, especially the US, that felt states should have a limited role in healthcare or that equated social equity with the socialism of their Cold War opponents. They wanted WHO to focus narrowly on biomedical interventions to control disease. Recognizing the imperative to keep the US on board, the Constitution contained commitments to biomedical intervention, and WHO’s initial activities were biased in this direction. WHO’s monitoring of health trends and research-­related knowledge shapes the intellectual agenda and informs the development of norms and standards, but its fieldwork is significant, especially its campaigns to eliminate specific diseases and its TA. Broadly WHO activities centre on integrated control and eradication of communicable diseases, surveillance and prevention of non-­communicable diseases, and achieving equity in health systems’ policy and delivery. Work on communicable diseases started in earnest in the 1950s, commencing with tuberculosis and yaws, followed in 1955 by a malaria eradication programme based on extensive DDT spraying. Malaria was purged from developed countries, but efforts in LDCs were thwarted by omitting to involve local communities and poor infrastructure. Moreover scientists underestimated the damage DDT inflicted on the environment, the complexity of the disease and the levels of resistance. Efforts were abandoned in 1969 in favour of assimilating malaria control into community health programmes. Other major WHO programmes have included smallpox (successfully eradicated in 1979 through national vaccination campaigns supported by WHO resources and technical advice), polio and measles, plus tropical diseases including leprosy, river blindness, elephantiasis and guinea worm. By 1988 WHO was heavily involved in the fight against HIV/AIDS through training health workers, coordinating research and raising public awareness. This work was mired in controversy, and so challenging did the AIDS epidemic become that a special UN body (UNAIDS) was established in 1996 as a joint initiative of UN, UNDP, WHO and IBRD, which somewhat sidelined WHO. HIV/AIDS reflects WHO’s preference for partnerships to advance its eradication programmes, examples being the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund, Chapter 17) and the Roll Back Malaria campaign (Chapter 4). WHO’s regularly updated International Health Regulations are, unless a member opts out, legally binding agreements designed to help states respond

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effectively to and contain cross-­border health risks. The regulations cover standards for national health surveillance, diseases that members must report to WHO, routine health measures for ports of entry, and the actions WHO can take in response to health emergencies. In addition to being able to impose quarantine regulations in an epidemic, WHO has a well-­established system for notifying communicable diseases. Monitoring allows it to forewarn members of potential epidemics, provide advice on appropriate preventative measures and coordinate international vaccine production for pandemics. To this end its Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network investigates reported outbreaks and ensures technical support is provided to countries with poor health infrastructures. By the late 1960s, the disappointing results from some disease elimination campaigns and the constrained capacity of LDCs to oversee them led WHO to redirect its energies towards social medicine. This dragged WHO away from its ‘technical’ biomedical focus towards more overtly political policies which impinged on trade and development, thus confronting powerful vested interests. It also raised questions as to an appropriate role for the state. For example, non-­communicable diseases account for 75 per cent of deaths in developed countries and 40 per cent in LDCs; accordingly WHO has opined on the health impact of certain food, pharmaceutical and tobacco products. In the 1960s, producers of powdered milk products aggressively expanded marketing in LDCs, despite breast milk being nutritionally superior, more hygienic and cheaper. Consequently infant mortality increased and low-­income households faced high costs. WHO’s International Code on the Marketing of Breast-­Milk Substitutes sets guidelines for ethical marketing of such products without restricting sales or preventing their use. WHO also ran a joint campaign with UNICEF to promote the responsible use of powdered milk products in the developing world, which was instrumental in restoring the emphasis on breastfeeding. WHO has also sought to reduce smoking through the 2003 Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. This convention, now signed by 168 countries, encourages members to adopt national policies that raise awareness of the risks of smoking and makes provision for sharing information on appropriate industry regulations. Since the 1970s social medicine also has had a greater impact on WHO’s promotion of equity in healthcare systems. Development aid did not produce effective healthcare systems in LDCs, yet expanding populations heightened demand. Simultaneously the economic strains of the period limited the ability to respond. A key turning point was a 1978 global conference on primary healthcare, hosted by WHO and UNICEF, which rejected centrally provided healthcare, which had yielded poor results, in favour of community-­

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based approaches, the application of affordable technologies, and treating the underlying socioeconomic causes rather than the resulting symptoms. Under the rubric of ‘Health for All by 2000’, community healthcare became the spearhead for efforts to reduce maternal and child mortality. Thus, WHO provides TA to raise the standards of health teaching, introduces improved technologies and certifies medical schools. However, this more comprehensive social medicine approach has proved controversial. The tensions that had surfaced in drafting the Constitution reappeared, with critics arguing WHO was exceeding its mandate. Moreover, WHO found it difficult to demonstrate concrete outcomes to donors that were impatient for results. This led once again to a narrower, more technical approach to primary healthcare. IMF and IBRD conditionalities introduced market-­led approaches and further restricted healthcare spending. This weakened WHO’s social equity agenda, something exacerbated by WHO’s own budget freezes. By the late 1980s, IBRD’s health-­related lending exceeded WHO’s entire budget, and several WHO programmes had become dependent on IBRD support. By 2000 IBRD had eclipsed WHO as the leading provider of health-­related development finance and, thanks partly to anger over a WHO report which criticized healthcare systems in certain industrialized countries, its research, knowledge and monitoring functions were facing institutional competition from OECD (Chapter 10, section 10.1).

7.4.2 Structure WHO has a biennial intergovernmental governing conference, the Health Assembly, which sets policy, determines the work programme, adopts conventions with a two-­thirds majority and can establish regulations, for example to deal with epidemics or the distribution of medicines. It also appoints a 34-­member Executive Board, which meets biannually to oversee WHO’s day-­to-­day work. This board differs from those of other SAs, as it is composed of individuals appointed in their own right as specialists and not specifically as governmental representatives. Initially WHO’s professional staff was almost entirely drawn from the medical profession, which gave it a strong role as an epistemic community, reinforced by the ad personam nature of the Executive Board. Even though WHO now encompasses all health workers it is still strongly connected to its roots, and its expertise is recognized within the medical community. Below the Executive Board are many technical committees, again composed of specialists, some of a long-­term nature (e.g. that on essential drugs, which specifies medicines that should be readily available globally) while others deal with specific problems such as avian influenza.

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WHO has a three-­tier structure. At the pinnacle is the Geneva headquarters, beneath which are six regional offices. WHO is the only one of the SAs that is truly regionalized, and member states join a specific region, normally reflecting their geographic location. Each region has its own assembly, large secretariat and independent programme budget. The third tier is WHO’s 151 country offices. Headed by expatriated WHO officials, these offices support efforts to build up effective healthcare systems. The structure was designed to respect the independence of those regional health organizations brought under the WHO umbrella and foster close relationships with members. However, maintaining cohesion between the regions and headquarters has been difficult, as the regions have differing priorities, while coordination has depended upon the DG’s managerial effectiveness (Godlee 1994). Changes in the funding structure make coherence even more difficult to achieve, and the above-­mentioned budget freezes opened the door for states to shape the agenda by making extra-­budgetary contributions earmarked for specific projects. Today extra-­budgetary funding makes up almost three-­quarters of WHO expenditure, compared with around one-­ third in the 1970s.

7.4.3 Current activities Efforts to eliminate polio and HIV/AIDS prevention form the mainstay of WHO’s current work on contagious diseases. The polio eradication campaign is a good example of the difficulties facing WHO in countering communicable diseases. When the programme commenced in 1988, polio was endemic in 125 countries, but by 2002 it had been confined to seven countries and 800 victims. For a while the situation worsened. In Nigeria rumours that polio vaccination was a guise for imposing birth control slowed acceptance; in Pakistan’s tribal areas a vaccination campaign was used by the US/ CIA to identify Al-­Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden’s house, causing a backlash, and in the Congo civil war disrupts implementation. However, by 2012 there were only 223 polio cases, three countries where the disease was still endemic and only six where cases were reported. Although the difficulty of combating the most resistant pockets of infection has intensified, elimination is still the target. Reported HIV/AIDS infections reached 34m in 2010, and WHO had administered antiretroviral therapies to 6.7m HIV patients, far short of its target of universal treatment. However, mother-­to-­child transmissions have diminished substantially and, as HIV is no longer always turning into full-­blown AIDS, deaths from AIDS have slowed by around 20 per cent. Underlying this progress is a continuing programme in which WHO and UNAIDS educate

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member states and their populations on the causes of HIV/AIDS through promoting proven solutions and best practice. WHO has rescheduled its 100 per cent antiretroviral target to 2015 but now has the delivery mechanism largely in place. Tropical diseases, long neglected by the private sector and many developed countries, form the crux of WHO’s work on non-­contagious diseases. It administers the joint UNICEF, UNDP, IBRD and WHO Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases, which has an annual budget of $40m to stimulate research and to enhance developing-­country responses and knowledge. This programme attacks vector-­borne diseases such as malaria (see section 7.4.4) and dengue through differing combinations of prevention, treatment therapies and eradication. Typical of the work it sponsors is the development of cheap diagnostic tests to identify specific diseases, use of the drug Ivermectin to eliminate river blindness in West Africa, and publication of guides to good clinical laboratory practice. On the broader issues of social medicine WHO has now embarked upon advocacy programmes that encourage better lifestyles to limit heart diseases and that alert members to the heavy death toll from road accidents. Other new priorities include: developing WHO’s capacity to deal with the health consequences of natural disasters; addressing environmental threats to health, particularly climate change; and improving access to essential medicines. This last activity ensures that basic healthcare work is properly supported and WHO continually updates its Model List of [208] Essential Medicines, which is now accompanied by a list of 100 essential clinical devices.

7.4.4 Evaluation and future challenges Aside from a period of political turmoil during DG Hiroshi Nakajima’s tenure (1988–98), WHO has provided global leadership on health issues, championed new concepts such as primary healthcare, catalysed networks to deal with emerging problems, and set standards that have enabled other bodies to promote their health-­related ambitions. Despite worries about WHO’s ­cost-­effectiveness and country-­level impact (DFID 2011), the organization has delivered substantial results, for example smallpox eradication, with a budget that pales against national healthcare expenditures. Nevertheless, persistent debates over its mandate, the balance between programme and operational functions, tensions between headquarters and regional offices, and the fact that disputes are often resolved on the basis of changing interests and power rather than what is best for global health have raised questions about WHO’s future.

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Ridding the world of smallpox is WHO’s singular achievement, but elsewhere its success is mixed, with several major diseases persisting stubbornly. WHO provides the secretariat for the Roll Back Malaria Alliance (Chapter 4), and new therapies combined with treated mosquito netting have contributed to a 17 per cent drop in the global incidence of malaria since 2000, but it still kills around 650 000m persons annually, mostly children. In 2010, measles, for which an effective vaccine has existed for 40 years, killed 139 000 children in the developing world and maimed many others because 25 per cent of children in LDCs are not immunized. These widespread diseases pose considerable challenges for national resource allocation, as they thrive and spread in weak or failed states. Many diseases are extremely complex and not susceptible to control or eradication by the kinds of vertical biomedical strategies which many states demand of WHO. Instead they require wider social and institutional efforts to prevent propagation (Lee 2008). Some powerful civil society groups also oppose the social medicine approach to fighting particular diseases. For example, WHO’s campaign against HIV/AIDS attracts resistance from certain major religious groups who oppose WHO’s prevention policies or dislike its engagement with gay communities. WHO has been a very visible participant in dealing with potential global health epidemics, for example when it took the lead in monitoring and forewarning of a potential avian flu pandemic in 2005–07. The 2004 SARS outbreak exemplifies WHO’s global role in limiting epidemics. WHO activated its alert system and mobilized the medical research community. It placed travel restrictions on centres of infection and leant on China to reveal the severity of the problem. Nonetheless, WHO’s role should not be overstated. Some states had already issued their own alerts, and China was changing its disclosure policy prior to WHO pressure. Other states insisted on WHO changing its stance; for example, Canada managed to have the travel advice against Toronto lifted despite SARS still spreading there (Smith 2009). Subsequent reforms to the International Health Regulations have given WHO a greater freedom to act when lacking government notification, with a view to avoiding the delays that occurred in the SARS outbreak when China equivocated on disclosure. Health now features prominently on political agendas globally. Domestically, states are confronting questions about the role they should play in supplying healthcare, including how to ensure costs do not spiral out of control as populations age and medical advances continue. Internationally eight of the 16 MDGs are health-­related, and despite substantial advances several targets will be missed (see Table 5.3). Avian flu, while not a pandemic as initially feared, is another reminder of the importance for a global organization to

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coordinate and invest in appropriate medicines and vaccines. Nonetheless, global health governance has grown rich with institutional competitors eroding WHO’s role and authority. Many of these competitors reflect dwindling confidence in WHO’s ability to fulfil its mandate. For example, Lee (2008: 62) describes the formation of UNAIDS as an ‘institutional slap in the face’, articulating donor governments’ belief that WHO was unable to lead a global campaign. The multi-­partner networks, through which global health problems are increasingly attacked, to some extent reflect perceived WHO shortcomings. The Global Fund exists to attract and disburse funds for its designated diseases, reflecting donors’ eroding confidence in WHO’s ability to deliver. Private actors are also loath to channel money through WHO, and their financial, intellectual and organizational muscle is beginning to challenge WHO’s leadership. In 2011 the Gates Foundation gave $1.9b in health-­related grants, more than the entire WHO budget, and consequently has ‘considerable leverage in shaping health priorities and intellectual norms’ (Bowman 2012). Likewise, in the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization network, WHO has been reduced to being a partner rather than a leader or coordinator. Technical competence and financial clout combined with WHO’s lack of an overarching vision and coherence allow advanced states to shape its agenda and, as with other SAs, reliance on trust funds reduces WHO’s ability to direct its programmes to best effect, although it has ensured consistency between trust fund objectives and its own programme priorities. The final challenge for WHO is to reconcile the free market zeal of some major donors, which emphasizes private provision, with its desire to ensure affordable and effective healthcare for all. The chapter has noted how WHO has defied vested commercial interests over milk substitutes and tobacco. However, as WHO starts to examine social issues such as poor diet and apply the flexibility in the TRIPS agreements to guarantee better LDC access to generic drugs, the interests of large, multinational food and drugs producers will clash even more with WHO’s priorities.

7.5 The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 7.5.1 Background and structure UNESCO, created in 1946, has a wide remit. War-­weary states felt that the human condition in its broadest sense needed to be nurtured to ensure a

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peaceful future, based on the premise that ‘wars begin in the minds of men’. UNESCO set out to beget a culture of peace by ‘educat[ing] humanity to overcome its worst self through cultural dialogues, scientific collaborations, literacy and communications’ ( J.P. Singh 2011: 1). The result was an organization designated by its Constitution not only to influence the three main themes in its name but also to propagate concepts of human rights, justice, liberty, fundamental freedoms and peace and pursue the free exchange of ideas and knowledge. UNESCO works through knowledge production, advancing international norms and their dissemination through operational programmes. Its Institute for Statistics produces data on a host of difficult-­to-­measure activities such as education which informs its prolific publishing programme of some 120 titles annually. UNESCO is sometimes characterized as a think tank and boasts an impressive record of convening groups of eminent intellectuals to debate uncomfortable issues. This is reflected in its structure, which differs in one respect from that of other SAs. Article 7 of its Constitution mandates it to establish National Commissions in all member states which are to be representative of government and civil society bodies interested in education, science and culture. UNESCO consults them on topical issues and uses them as conduits to explain its policies. They have a formal role in advising national delegations to the biennial conference, and UNESCO staff can be seconded to them. UNESCO’s development and institutionalization of norms range from legally binding treaties to recommendations and declarations, which are less formal agreements seeking to exert pressure for change. More than for other major SAs, UNESCO’s mandate is implemented using soft power. Examples of these norms and their dissemination through operational projects are detailed below when considering UNESCO’s principal areas of activity: education, science, culture and communication. Education is UNESCO’s foremost policy domain. It has promoted universal education from the outset, and it aims to shape and support policy making in member states. UNESCO develops best-­practice information, teaching manuals and training kits on general topics falling within its mandate (such as peace studies) and maintains five education training centres. From the 1960s onwards UNICEF, IBRD and OECD have encroached on UNESCO’s education mandate, prompting a gradual reformulation of this remit. This culminated in the launch of the Education for All (EFA) initiative in 1990, which for the first time gave UNESCO an overarching education programme. EFA updated long-­standing UNESCO policies by stressing universal education and halving illiteracy while adding new ones, such as enhancing learn-

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ing achievement. These developments were formalized and received further impetus when UNESCO became the UN lead agency for the MDG education portfolio, thereby situating EFA within the wider development agenda. Mechanisms were also introduced to drive change by monitoring national and regional performance. UNESCO’s second major policy domain is in promoting science, but as with education there are crossovers with other IOs, as UNESCO works on sustainable energy (with OECD, the EU and the UN), HIV research (WHO and UNAIDS) and desertification (FAO, IFAD and UNEP). Indeed a rising proportion of UNESCO’s income derives from UN Funds and Programmes. UNESCO’s International Science Programmes are wide-­ranging, but the oldest and most renowned cover oceanography and hydrology. The Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, which monitors  the oceans, is UNESCO’s flagship science programme. The project has benefited from developments elsewhere, including agreement on the use of marine resources under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the drafting of which drew on UNESCO’s considerable expertise. It has also established the Global Ocean Observing System, the world’s premier information system for oceanography. In hydrology UNESCO has moved  away from assessing global freshwater resources, although it still hosts the Secretariat for the World Water Assessment Programme. It currently studies more efficient use of water supplies, monitors water quality and supports a hydrology training institute. While natural sciences have dominated, UNESCO now pays greater heed to social and human sciences,  particularly where natural and social sciences intersect, through developing ethical guidelines for scientists (including most recently a global standard for genome research), promoting human rights, eradicating poverty, and working on problems of urbanization and good governance. Despite attempts by states to dominate proceedings, scientific norms are largely developed and disseminated through UNESCO’s transnational networks. Many of UNESCO’s most salient programmes were developed through the International Council of Science, a 120-­strong group of national scientific bodies and 31 international scientific unions. UNESCO has also contributed to the advancement of other scientific IOs such as CERN (Chapter 15, section 15.3). In the social sciences the International Political Science Association, a well-­known academic body, was founded with UNESCO’s help, as was a leading publication, the International Social Science Journal. Under the heading of culture and communications, UNESCO has sought to preserve human heritage, protect cultural diversity and govern issues

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s­ urrounding information flows. UNESCO is best known for its 1972 World Heritage Convention and the related concept of World Heritage Sites (numbering 962 in 2012). Originally a response to rescue Egypt’s Abu Simbel temples from inundation by the rising waters of the Aswan Dam, the Convention identifies and assigns responsibilities to members for the protection of physical sites. UNESCO monitors heritage sites to ensure that they are maintained, carefully developed and not over-­commercialized. To this end it maintains a ‘World Heritage in Danger’ list and has withdrawn recognition of existing sites to highlight situations where restorative action is critically needed. Gradually UNESCO’s emphasis on protecting and promoting humankind’s heritage has spilt over into intangible aspects of culture (practices, rituals, intellectual resources and skills). The Convention on the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage defines culturally important works with a first list of 166 that includes Indian Vedic chants and the Argentine tango. The Convention for the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expression in part counterbalances moves to liberalize trade in cultural products at WTO (Graber 2006) and affirms the rights of states to enact policies that maintain indigenous cultures and promote cultural diversity. Communication has been UNESCO’s most contentious arena. UNESCO’s concerns include the flow and content of information, the infrastructure facilitating those flows, and the social setting through which information is propagated. In its formative years the US and the UK urged UNESCO to support freedom of information and of the media as inalienable human rights. This was antithetical to the USSR (which delayed joining until 1954) and prompted the departure of Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1947. From the late 1950s UNESCO’s focus changed to examine communication’s role in the modernization and development of post-­colonial societies. This led to criticism of the Western media’s negative portrayal of developing nations and sowed the seeds of UNESCO’s greatest controversy, the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). Proposed by DG Amadou M’Bow (see Box 7.1), NWICO sought to correct imbalances in information flows between developed and developing countries by allowing the latter to impose media restrictions and to license journalists. Developed states interpreted this as a communist initiative, especially as LDCs often followed state-­led development strategies that saw no need to separate the state from the media. NWICO was abandoned following the withdrawal of the US and the UK, key budgetary contributors. Having overcome its earlier aversion to capitalism, today UNESCO focuses on disseminating ideas about the knowledge society. UNESCO is involved in the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) launched by ITU in 1998 to examine the digital divide. Given that UNESCO’s thinking on the knowledge society dates to

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the 1970s, its deep repository of knowledge was invaluable to early WSIS work, which made many references to UNESCO’s reports. Nevertheless, as internet issues have come to dominate WSIS, UNESCO’s knowledge society agenda has been sidelined. BOX 7.1

UNESCO – FURTHER CONTRASTS IN LEADERSHIP The quality of leadership is an important factor in determining the success of IOs. As with FAO (Case Study 4.1), UNESCO’s leaders have varied, ranging from the inspirational Julian Huxley, UNESCO’s first DG, to the controversial Amadou M’Bow. Like FAO’s Boyd Orr, Huxley was a respected academic who had been active in the League’s technical work. As Executive Secretary to the UNESCO Preparatory Commission he was a strong advocate for incorporating science in its mandate. His broad qualifications and experience made him an ideal candidate to be DG, and once appointed he ‘bubbled with ideas and infected colleagues with enthusiasm’ (S.N. Singh 1987), stressing the interrelationship between humans and nature when advocating wildlife and wilderness conservation. He was particularly concerned about overpopulation and its relationship to poverty and ignorance. His experience in Africa also convinced him of the need for UNESCO to combat world illiteracy. However, he was, by his own admission, a poor administrator, who struggled to ward off political pressures. The situation at UNESCO parallels that of FAO to a further extent. Following a series of relatively short-­tenured executive heads, René Maheu (an energetic French academic) was appointed DG in 1961. Maheu (like FAO’s Sen) was authoritarian, and his legacy was a hierarchical institution that his suc-

cessor, M’Bow, enthusiastically embraced. M’Bow (like FAO’s Saouma) had delusions of grandeur, was ambitious for international recognition, travelled extensively, usually in pursuit of re-­election, and was very conscious of his own self-­importance (S.N. Singh 1987). Elected in 1966 as Senegalese representative to the UNESCO Executive Board he was subsequently appointed Assistant Director-­General for Education and in 1970 stood for election as DG. Exploiting UNESCO’s hierarchical predilection he extended his powers of appointment to all staff levels, delegated even less than his predecessor, used patronage excessively and demanded absolute loyalty. He also used nepotism and favours to manipulate the Executive Board. Unfortunately M’Bow lacked Huxley’s intellectual capabilities, failing to either inspire staff or establish a clear direction for UNESCO. He expanded its mandate but diluted its resources so that all programmes were equally underfunded. Furthermore, he became involved with sensitive issues without considering their full ramifications. His politics were defined by the positions of the Soviet bloc, which at the time was intent on homogenizing its disparate population, and of the G77. In particular he advocated that UNESCO should be involved in intellectual collaboration rather than in preserving cultural diversity. M’Bow’s first clash with some members

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 was over his criticism of Israel’s activities in Palestine, where he was caught between voicing his supporters’ opinions and the need to mollify major contributors. Further initiatives on apartheid and disarmament were less contentious; however, he then advocated NWICO (see above). This and accumulating poor management were the root causes of his downfall. He ignored US warnings when the Reagan administration took office, and the subsequent withdrawal of Singapore, the US and the

UK (members accounting for 30 per cent of UNESCO’s funding) prompted a budgetary crisis in 1985. The consequent U-­turn on NWICO destroyed his legitimacy as a sagacious representative of the developing countries. M’Bow bequeathed an organization with low staff morale, excessively politicized and poorly managed that plumbed depths that few IOs have achieved and, in a final parallel with FAO, one that has still not fully recovered its prestige and effectiveness.

7.5.2 Current activities After many years of difficulty UNESCO’s budget only reached its prior level with the return of the USA in 2002. However, UNESCO is again in conflict with the US, and another budget crisis looms. This time the US has withheld contributions in protest over the admission of Palestine to membership, which has severely constrained all programmes, a situation arising from UNESCO’s broad-­based mandate, which also cuts across UN activities. The mandate extends to human rights, democratic processes, conflict prevention and post-­conflict peacebuilding, plus a programme of support to Palestinian education (see Chapter 6, section 6.3). UNESCO’s current activities are governed by its Medium-­Term Strategy (2008–13), which emphasizes providing policy advice to members and knowledge dissemination (through studying trends and exchanging best practice) rather than the establishment of new norms. The strategy aims to provide education for all, mobilize scientific knowledge for sustainable development, foster cultural diversity, address emerging social and ethical challenges and build inclusive knowledge societies. Guided by the rubric ‘Education for All’, educational programmes account for one-­quarter of UNESCO’s total technical budget and one-­fifth of its staff. Meeting the MDG has priority, specifically advancing universal primary education by providing primary schooling for the one-­fifth of children that receive none. This and reducing gender disparity in education have both shown steady progress (see section 7.5.3), and the 20 most seriously affected countries are being supported with direct policy advice even though

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UNESCO can allocate only $300 000 per country. Other educational priorities include promoting lifelong education and improving UNESCO’s assessment of educational quality, the latter possibly in response to OECD’s PISA initiative (see Chapter 10, section 10.1.3). UNESCO’s belief is that science and technology form the best platform for achieving sustainable development. Therefore it is focusing on capacity building in member states, especially in the basic sciences and engineering. Protection and sustainable development of freshwater ecosystems are being pursued through the Man and the Biosphere Programme and by strengthening members’ policies aimed at conservation and use of water resources. UNESCO has recently initiated investigations into the causes and prevention of flooding and methods to prevent large dams silting up, a problem that reduces water-­holding capacity in developing countries. Here too UNESCO has an MDG responsibility, in this case halving those lacking access to safe water. At a more cerebral level, UNESCO is also campaigning to improve ethical standards across all sciences. Cultural and communications activities centre round the protection of cultural heritage, cross-­cultural dialogues, and universal access to information in the public domain. With the help of donors UNESCO TA helps safeguard specific heritage sites in danger of damage or neglect. One such example is Machu Picchu, where as a result of UNESCO’s concerns the Peruvian government, aided by the Inter-­American Development Bank, is restricting the daily influx of visitors, reducing environmental damage by constructing a cable car, and raising fees to fund better protection for the ruins.

7.5.3 Evaluation and future challenges UNESCO has imparted an array of scientific knowledge, orchestrated and formalized some notable international norms and delivered many operational programmes, but it has fallen short of its grand objectives. Some suggest UNESCO was doomed by the false premises upon which it was established, namely that human minds are not as malleable as assumed and that the causes of human misery cannot be reduced to the human psyche (Dutt 2009). Ironically for an organization setting store by ideas and intellectual vision, UNESCO was crippled by competing Cold War ideologies. Although more purposeful programmes have emerged since 1990, the idealistic doctrines that shape UNESCO’s agenda have often miscarried when power politics have intervened, especially where cultures have varying standards of ethical and just behaviour. Whether the values subscribed to by UNESCO’s intellectual elite speak for the majority of humankind is a moot

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point, and the overwhelming sense is of an organization shaped by rather than actively shaping the political weather ( J.P. Singh 2011). Though managerial and staff incompetence have marred UNESCO’s record (Box 7.1), two further problems stand out. First, UNESCO’s organizational structure compartmentalizes issues, something counterproductive to promoting a cohesive culture of peace. Insider accounts (Ordonez 2006) repeatedly stress the difficulties of horizontal cooperation as UNESCO’s constituent parts lobby for solutions to promote their own immediate interests or when member states press for them, a particular problem given the interdisciplinary nature of UNESCO’s mandate. Interorganizational competition exacerbates the second problem, that of resources. Whereas WHO and ILO suffered short but relatively sharp funding downturns, that of UNESCO has been prolonged. UNESCO’s regular budget of $653m for 2012–13 has hardly grown since 2000–01. Inevitably this has led to salami slicing and poor performance. For example, Limage (2007) observes that UNESCO’s support for the UN Literacy Decade consists of one mid-­level staff member. Presently 18 UNESCO conventions are in force, but compliance levels are mixed and resource constraints limit their enforcement. UNESCO’s efforts are further thwarted by insufficient staff in its 58 field offices. UNESCO’s Board decided in 2005 that it should focus less on its hitherto successful normative educational work (Dutt 2009) and target instead MDG education goals. Total primary school enrolment is rising, and there is now gender parity in attendance, but evidence linking this to UNESCO’s reorientation is scant. Furthermore UNESCO is finding it difficult to persuade its members to solve the problems of the world’s 759m illiterate people, fill the shortfall of two million primary teachers’ posts or educate the 56m children projected to be without schooling in 2015. A similar situation prevails in science, where its portfolio has been described as the ‘smallest S you can imagine’ (Knight 2002). UNESCO’s singular scientific achievement consists of the development of national science ministries. It achieved this by socializing states into a new norm, namely that managing and promoting science were appropriate tasks for modern states and that a national science bureaucracy was the best means of attaining this (Finnemore 1993). Nevertheless, UNESCO’s overly fragmented and ill-­focused approach leaves it relatively unknown except amongst scientists working on natural resources. Constrained budgets result in uncertain long-­ term funding for international scientific research, which increasingly involves

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big projects (see Chapter 15) and has made UNESCO an unreliable partner compared to IBRD, the EU or WMO. Furthermore, the private sector has avoided becoming entangled with UNESCO’s inflexible and bureaucratic processes. Seven legal conventions underpin UNESCO’s work on preserving cultural identities and human heritage, work which includes research on events that have shaped world history (such as the slave trade) and documenting endangered cultures. The conventions inter alia cover the protection of cultural sites in war zones, the export of cultural property and maintaining cultural diversity. Under the Convention on Diversity, many have questioned whether cultural diversity is an end in itself, especially where cultures are misogynistic and discriminatory. Again this work is beset by resource shortfalls, controversy and political manipulation. Despite successes, including the Mostar Bridge restoration in former Yugoslavia, the number of heritage sites now far outstrips UNESCO’s ability to police them, especially national parks covering vast areas. Deciding on accessions to protected lists is an expert-­ led process which frequently alienates local communities and has been criticized for a Western bias. Furthermore UNESCO, notwithstanding its extensive civil society links, prefers to deal with governments, often ignoring the fact that states may be the ones desecrating sites or cultures. Protecting endangered sites is a purely voluntary commitment, and UNESCO has been criticized by INGOs for sidestepping its own rules under pressure from members. For example, Ecuador successfully lobbied to have the Galapagos Islands removed from the list of heritage sites in danger despite only minimal improvements. Likewise the US petitioned to have the Everglades Forest placed on the list to bolster its position in discussions with domestic authorities and corporations (Economist 2010d). Looking ahead there is the likelihood of UNESCO being marginalized by more relevant or better-­resourced competitors. Since agriculture consumes 70 per cent of the world’s available freshwater it would be more logical for CGIAR or FAO to take the lead in sustainable water resources development. Likewise, UNESCO’s non-­staff resources for all sustainable development activities are limited to $5m annually, equivalent to the cost of two commercial wind turbines. UNESCO’s greatest successes have occurred when it has worked closely with national and sub-­national bodies, prompting many insiders to argue it should continue to decentralize and strengthen field operations. Improving field-­level relations with other IOs and integrating its work with theirs would streamline UNESCO’s operations, galvanize its implementation networks and stretch its resources. However, altering its modus operandi from one that is broad and shallow rather than narrow but deep may fall

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foul of prevailing organizational culture. In many respects UNESCO’s rigid structure, which is ill suited to interdisciplinary problems needing rapid contacts between sectors, is its biggest weakness.

7.6

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

7.6.1 Background and structure Dating from 1957, IAEA was one outcome of the US-­instigated Atoms for Peace programme to promote safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The core of the compact underpinning this initiative and the wider nuclear regime of which IAEA would become the nucleus was a guarantee that nuclear technology would be made available for peaceful uses by those states that pledged not to develop nuclear weapons, in exchange for accepting IAEA-­supervised controls on fissile material plus a monitoring and inspection regime to verify that such materials were being used appropriately. This bargain gave rise to IAEA’s most remarked-­upon role, the development of nuclear safeguards. Underpinned by a Model Safeguards Agreement, the Safeguards Programme audits and lays down guidelines for recording and disposing of nuclear materials to ensure that, in more than 900 installations worldwide, all radioactive material is accounted for and that none is diverted for illicit weapons. IAEA has the right to install surveillance equipment and inspect sites used for peaceful applications of atomic energy, a role which became more important following the entry into force in 1970 of a separate multilateral Treaty on the Non-­Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The nuclear ‘club’ has only nine members, the five permanent SC members (the P5) plus India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea. Under NPT states reaffirmed their resolve not to make or export fissile material unless it was subject to IAEA protocols. Acquiescence to the protocols in turn demonstrated compliance with NPT. IAEA inspectors report suspect nuclear activity to the IAEA Board of Governors, which meets five times annually. The 20-­member Board includes the ten most advanced nuclear nations, thus guaranteeing membership for the P5, India and, until recently, Pakistan. Most Board decisions are made by a simple majority vote and, if resolution cannot be achieved within IAEA or NPT rules, the Board can refer the matter to SC or GA. If non-­compliance is deemed a threat to international peace and security SC can authorize countermeasures (see Case Study 7.1), since IAEA can only withhold cooperation or TA. Israel, India and Pakistan never joined NPT, while North Korea withdrew in 2006, but all four are IAEA members, making it an alternative forum for informal discussions with countries outside NPT. Dissatisfaction

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with IAEA’s ability to uncover undeclared nuclear activities in North Korea, Libya, Iraq and Iran (Case Study 7.1) resulted in an additional 1997 Protocol to NPT; however, states have been slow to ratify these improved norms. IAEA’s second area of responsibility is nuclear science and safety. IAEA has three laboratories that coordinate research, test and sample for radioactive isotopes and train scientists. Moreover IAEA is the hub of a worldwide network of nuclear researchers, which together with its own laboratories produce independent data on nuclear safety and technology. These resources underpin IAEA’s policy advice and its oversight of internationally agreed safety standards for building and operating nuclear reactors, handling, storing, transporting and disposing of nuclear material, and preparing for nuclear emergencies. Shared knowledge and standards are rolled out via an extensive TA programme to countries that can benefit from the application of nuclear technology in agriculture, health, industry and power generation. IAEA standards are soft laws policed through non-­mandatory peer reviews. Although not in the original statute, nuclear security, arguably a corollary of nuclear safeguards and safety, is an increasingly important theme of IAEA’s work, as exemplified by A.Q. Khan’s activities (see Case Study 7.1). IAEA is not the forum for limiting nuclear weapons, but through its involvement in NPT it has become the centre of international efforts to promote cooperation on and monitor issues of nuclear security and limiting nuclear stockpiles. The USSR’s collapse and the potential for security lapses at its nuclear sites led to concerns that fissile material might be sold on the black market. In the post-­9/11 world, IAEA is working to prevent terrorists from obtaining nuclear weapons or nuclear materials that could be attached to conventional explosives to detonate a so-­called dirty bomb. IAEA is also assisting states to upgrade security plans for their nuclear facilities and to inventory all radioactive material within their borders, as radioactive materials used in medical, agricultural and other applications are dispersed over tens of thousands of sites worldwide and are vulnerable to theft.

7.6.2 Current activities Recent discoveries of undeclared nuclear activities highlight IAEA’s importance in today’s insecure world. Some 250 IAEA staff monitor compliance with nuclear non-­proliferation obligations and regularly check IAEA-­ installed surveillance equipment. IAEA is the forum for reassessing NPT, and preliminary discussions are ongoing for a formal review in 2015. As considered below this promises to be a difficult exercise, as members jealously guard their sovereignty over this very sensitive area.

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Iran’s continued defiance of IAEA has prompted some neighbouring states to reconsider their own nuclear policies. This has stimulated diplomatic moves to restore stability to the region, including proposals for a nuclear-­ free zone. While IAEA supports the concept, it is dependent on a lasting, wider regional peace initiative. North Korea has had an on–off relationship with IAEA. It expelled inspectors for the second time in 2009, but in 2012 unilaterally agreed to their returning to its nuclear facility at Yongbyon but not elsewhere, although IAEA is continuing to press for more general access. Until the meltdown of Japan’s Fukushima nuclear facility in 2011 a revival of peaceful nuclear power generation looked plausible. However, the incident has increased concerns that nuclear safety is inadequate, and IAEA, along with the Nuclear Energy Agency (see Chapter 10, section 10.1), is proposing improvements to safety regimes. The 2011 IAEA Nuclear Safety Action Plan provides a new methodology for risk assessment and upgrades in safety standards, including improved regulatory structures. The Agency is encouraging additional peer review of national safety plans and is enhancing its own ability to coordinate action in an emergency. Following Fukushima, IAEA is responding to requests from members to review their security plans for new nuclear facilities. The Agency is building a database containing the forensic signatures of radioactive material to establish the sources of illicit trafficking and is providing monitoring equipment to governments enabling them to spot-­check users’ facilities. In 2011, members reported 147 incidents of illicit trafficking, of which 20 involved attempts to sell material.

7.6.3 Evaluation and future challenges Given IAEA’s size and budget, Findlay (2012) describes it as ‘an indisputable bargain’, being widely regarded as one of the more effective parts of the UN System and making a discreet contribution towards a safer world. States hoping to exploit atomic energy still treat IAEA as the first port of call, and gradually it has matured into a critical part of the global security architecture. Alongside NPT, IAEA is credited with consolidating norms against the possession and use of nuclear weapons (Tannenwald 2007) and has handled several international flashpoints adroitly. Nevertheless, members’ misbehaviours, sovereign sensibilities, politicization and meagre funding have weakened IAEA’s ability to apply its safety benchmarks and verify the information states provide about their nuclear facilities. In many respects, IAEA’s main accomplishment is its nuclear safeguards regime. IAEA inspections intrude on state sovereignty to a degree unprecedented in the security field. The resulting transparency simultaneously

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d­ emonstrates compliance while reassuring states without nuclear weapons that their rivals are not potential threats, thus offering a route out of the security dilemma (see Chapter 1). In 2005 IAEA and its DG Mohamed ElBaradei jointly received the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of their roles in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and as an encouragement to persevere with recalcitrant Iran and North Korea. There is also some evidence that the reputational damage or material implications that would flow from non-­compliance have successfully deterred nuclear proliferation. The nuclear club has far fewer members than the 25–30 states predicted when NPT was signed. Significantly 26 states that commenced nuclear weapons programmes have, voluntarily or following the imposition of sanctions, ­forsaken them (Muller and Schmidt 2010). IAEA has got progressively better at detecting breaches of its safeguards and the development of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless the acquisition of weapons by India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea and the belated discovery of other nuclear weapons programmes demonstrate there are deficiencies in detecting non-­compliance and enforcing IAEA rules. The difficulties partly arise from an inherent tension between IAEA’s objectives of encouraging the adoption of nuclear technology and wishing to prevent its military use. Given the security dilemma, IAEA’s founders were naïve to think that all states would be scrupulously honest about their nuclear activities and that widespread peaceful use was compatible with non-­proliferation. Failure to expose non-­compliance is sometimes attributed to an inspection procedure which encourages ‘box ticking’ rather than urging IAEA staff to exercise their curiosity when discrepancies surface (Perkovich 2005). Where non-­ compliance has been exposed IAEA has tended to give violators the benefit of the doubt (Ogilvie-­W hite 2007), and members have been reluctant to refer non-­compliant states to SC. By 2012 only 115 states had ratified the 1997 NPT Protocol, demonstrating a resistance to more stringent reporting requirements and improved IAEA access to nuclear facilities. Some members are reluctant to give IAEA further obtrusive powers, while others are holding out until there is progress on reducing nuclear stockpiles. Inconsistent use of referral to SC and the seeming politicization of the Board of Governors, IAEA’s decision-­making body, have also undermined the regime’s legitimacy. For example, Iran is regularly reprimanded by IAEA and has been referred to SC, but Israel has never been censured despite flagrant breaches of IAEA rules. Similarly in 2009 IAEA approved a US proposal to lift an embargo on sales of peaceful nuclear material to India even though it had not ratified the safeguards protocols, thus giving India the potential to divert its own production for military use. Although in return India accepted

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limited inspection of its civilian facilities, this has weakened IAEA as hitherto strict safeguard conditions have been relaxed, encouraging others to circumvent inspection. Pakistan quickly negotiated a similar agreement with China, thereby further destabilizing an already tense situation. IAEA is also silent over Japanese and South Korean non-­compliance with some safeguard conditions. Furthermore, when members are referred to SC, determined action is often vetoed because of political and economic imperatives. CASE STUDY 7.1

Iran and IAEA – strengths and weaknesses in the nuclear safeguards regime Iran first obtained nuclear weapons technology in 1989 passed on through the illegal activities of Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan. By 2002 it was testing basic techniques using six centrifuges to produce 5kg of 5 per cent enriched uranium, the first stage in weapons fuel production. That year its activities first came to IAEA’s attention, and IAEA stepped up its inspection routines, negotiated an improved inspection protocol and obtained Iran’s agreement to suspend enrichment. A cat-­and-­mouse game then commenced, with Iran professing peaceful intent while slowly building up its capability to enrich uranium and IAEA trying to obtain better cooperation by exerting political pressure through a series of increasingly terse resolutions. By 2005 Iran was reported to have 164 operating centrifuges and had rejected remote IAEA monitoring while it recommenced enrichment. At this point IAEA’s members in the Non-­Aligned Movement switched their support from Iran (Ogilvie-­W hite 2007) and backed Western efforts to report it as ‘non-­compliant’ with its treaty obligations. This automatically resulted in a referral to SC. A first SC resolution was limited to requesting Iran to halt work and cooperate with IAEA. Further IAEA reports and SC resolutions of mounting stridency ended in SC agreeing to allow states to impose a first level of sanctions by restricting the sale of nuclear technology to Iran. However, Iran was not deterred, and sanctions were not fully observed. Russia, for example, continued to supply assistance to develop a nuclear reactor. Despite the US unilaterally imposing broader sanctions, by 2009 Iran was operating 3000 centrifuges, had amassed 700kg of enriched 5 per cent uranium and had commenced production of 20 per cent enriched material, the second step towards making a nuclear device. That year a secret enrichment facility at Qom was revealed, which IAEA was not allowed to inspect. This prompted both Russia and China to agree to stricter UN sanctions by banning the sale of further items and freezing the financial assets of certain individuals and state agencies. IAEA inspectors were then blocked from visiting several other sites. At this point the EU joined the US in adopting additional unilateral sanctions. SC has twice authorized further sanctions, principally expanding the number of Iranian organizations covered. By 2011 IAEA was reporting concerns that Iran’s research was aimed at developing military

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CASE STUDY 7.1 (continued)

nuclear capabilities. Subsequently, the US unilaterally prohibited financial institutions operating in the US from dealing with Iran, and in 2012 the EU embargoed purchases of Iranian oil. Sanctions started to bite, and in early 2012 Iran offered to recommence talks with the P5 plus Germany (the P5+1 group), although it made no concessions regarding the IAEA inspection regime and 9000 centrifuges were operating. Notwithstanding Iran’s deliberate obduracy, IAEA has maintained a basic level of inspections, although it failed to prevent proliferation and only slowly recognized Iran’s non-­ compliance. Despite mounting IAEA criticism, Iran, unlike North Korea, has not asserted its sovereign right to withdraw from NPT, principally because it maintains that it does not intend to produce weapons. While the application of sanctions has been patchy and slow to hurt, the current nuclear regime has provided a framework for international sanctions. Nevertheless, if IAEA cannot stop Iran advancing its military programme there is a danger that Israel will take unilateral action, completely destabilizing a region that is already under severe strain.

Based partly on the experience of past disasters (such as Chernobyl) IAEA has delivered an impressive array of standards and research on nuclear safety, but its effectiveness is hampered by states’ scepticism over its role and their disinclination to adopt the organization’s measures. States and the nuclear industry think IAEA should be confined to facilitating the adoption of nuclear technologies, merely making oversight recommendations rather than seeking to police them. The relatively weak peer review system allows states to audit safety procedures and self-­certify the safety of their nuclear sites, thereby avoiding intrusive oversight. The Fukushima disaster revealed that states have provided insufficient resources for IAEA to deliver its safety role effectively. IAEA swiftly established an emergency centre but struggled to staff it and had to wait for Japanese approval before providing assistance. The regime for nuclear security is more fragmented than that of nuclear safety. Some 90 countries have endorsed the interdiction principles associated with the Proliferation Security Initiative, an informal US-­inspired scheme to stop trafficking in weapons of mass destruction and nuclear materials. Recently two Nuclear Security Summits have taken place with ­participation from the UN, EU, IAEA and regional and trans-­regional security organizations. As a permanent and long-­standing IO with a vast repository of knowledge, IAEA has a legitimacy and credibility lacked by such ad hoc undertakings, especially amongst developing states, which view non-­UN bodies as a façade for promoting Western interests. However, the

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sensitive nature of the issue makes cooperation difficult. States are averse to sharing information with IAEA, let alone undergo peer review in such a secretive area. IAEA faces challenges across the entire spectrum of its responsibilities. It must be alert for compliance breaches and may eventually play a role in verifying steps towards nuclear disarmament. This might include overseeing the decommissioning of US and Russian nuclear weapons agreed under the 2010 START treaty and the Fissile Material Cut-­Off Treaty, which looks to outlaw the production of fissile material for weapons. Innovations in nuclear technologies, including the development of new reactors, need to be brought within the strengthened post-­Fukushima safety and safeguards regime. As memories of Fukushima recede, fossil fuels dwindle and pressure to meet CO2 emissions targets rises, enthusiasm for nuclear energy and IAEA services may reignite (Xu 2009). There is also further pressure for an improved inspection regime, because 45 countries are now operating or building nuclear power stations. These heighten security risks by potentially becoming new sources of plutonium. Deficiencies in monitoring powers and resources are obstacles to IAEA discharging its responsibilities. Outside the safeguard regime, IAEA verification powers are weak, and there are few sanctions for non-­compliance. Although it is widely agreed that for IAEA to detect non-­compliance it must exploit new technologies, develop a more inquisitive inspection culture and extend its verification capabilities, many states, as noted previously, have not ratified the 1997 NPT Protocol (Findlay 2012). IAEA ambitions are encumbered by financial stringency. In the last 30 years its budget has stagnated in real terms to the detriment of its human and physical infrastructure. It is generally agreed that the Secretariat is well managed but structural divides produce unhealthy competition between departments. One Cold War legacy is that key staff are limited to five-­year contracts so that the sensitive knowledge they acquire cannot accumulate for their own governments’ eventual benefit. The imminent retirement of around a fifth of staff could deprive it of expertise, and it faces intense competition from national regulators and the industry in its attempts to attract and retain top staff.

7.7

Other specialized agencies Most SA work in sectors involving considerable government activity (education and labour legislation), where establishing global norms is important (agriculture and shipping) or where global commons and public goods need administration (communications). However two SAs cover sectors where

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government activity is secondary to commercial interests, and to some extent this is reflected in their lesser importance and limited membership. Both IOs, the UN Industrial Development Organization and the UN World Tourism Organization, are covered briefly below. Reflecting government ambivalence, both had difficult gestation periods before becoming SAs. Although both subscribe to UN System themes such as sustainable development and poverty reduction their activities contribute little to global progress, mostly revolving around data dissemination.

7.8 The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) Many SAs originated from a specific founding conference, but UNIDO’s birth was an organic and protracted process. In the 1960s the UN Secretariat included a technical section studying LDC industrialization. The G77 pressed for a specialized agency devoted to industry, but major contributors, whose industries were well established, resisted an organization that might threaten their competitive advantage. Eventually a compromise was agreed and, in 1966, UNIDO was established as a UN programme with its own governance structure. Further G77 pressure resulted in a 1979 agreement to convert UNIDO to a specialized agency, but it took six years before enough states ratified its new status. UNIDO’s mandate is to promote ‘socially equitable and environmentally friendly industrial development’ in developing states. It provides a forum for global dialogue on sustainable industrialization through undertaking policy research and data analysis while disseminating knowledge of emerging industrial trends and effective policies. This knowledge informs and is drawn from UNIDO’s operational activities, particularly capacity-­building TA that allows LDCs to participate more effectively in global trade. For instance, UNIDO assists LDCs to meet benchmarks published by the International Organization for Standardization (an INGO) that are often prerequisites for products to gain access to foreign markets. UNIDO is contributing to three MDGs by: zz promoting productive opportunities that enable people to earn their way

out of poverty; gender equality through fostering women’s enterprises, especially in rural areas and by encouraging governments to adopt supportive policies; and zz enhancing environmental protection through raising awareness of improved technology and sustainable production techniques. zz advancing

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For example, its Cleaner Production Centres, established in 37 countries, are designed to make SMEs less polluting and more cost-­effective through better resource management. Two sectors of special concern to UNIDO are energy and agro-­industry, both of which are important to its MDG targets. Because FAO has gradually closed down its agro-­industry programmes UNIDO has moved in and now supports rural agricultural engineering through marketing activities and technology centres. UNIDO has a conventional SA structure but has only 12 country offices plus some regional facilities. The absence of a strong field presence reduces its impact, especially when work is predicated on involving governments with limited knowledge or ability to adapt to rapidly changing commercial needs. In fact it has been one of the most disappointing SAs, having only minimal impact on developing economies or the private sector. To an extent it has been the victim of ideological straitjackets imposed by members. In the 1960s and 1970s, when state ownership of industrial production was in vogue, UNIDO supported a number of inefficient state enterprises and some unrealistic policies. For example, in 1977 it adopted a resolution establishing a $300b industrial development fund that never had a chance of being resourced (Righter 1995). Then, reflecting changes in global development thinking, UNIDO restructured in 1993 to emphasize the private sector. As donor funding assumed progressively greater conditionality, UNIDO switched to advocating market-­led institutions to promote industrialization, a stance which is now widely criticized (H.-­J. Chang 2002). These failures call UNIDO’s survival into question. The US withdrew in 1996 and the UK has served notice that it will follow suit, arguing that UNEP and UNDP can do its work more effectively. However, the competitive world of development cooperation and UNIDO’s growing reliance on developing-­country funding could spur imaginative innovations in its mandate (S. Browne 2012). Opportunities exist for South–South technology transfer in the energy, IT, health and pharmaceutical industries, but this needs UNIDO to develop partnerships with a variety of stakeholders and to draw on private sector know-­how. This leads to the conclusion that UNIDO, like ITU (Chapter 16, section 16.1), may have to redefine its membership and work to involve the private sector more closely.

7.9 The United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) The World Tourism Organization was formed in 1967 when tourism was experiencing rapid growth. It traces its antecedents to a post-­war INGO, the

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International Union of Official Travel Organizations, which in turn derives from a 1925 public international union that organized periodic tourism conferences. At first it participated in ECOSOC meetings only as an observer, but in 1974 ratification of its Convention led to its establishment as an independent IO. Thereafter, it made overtures to join the UN System; in 1976 it became a UNDP executing agency and subsequently adopted UN personnel policies. Despite repeated rebuttals, some because it gave a prominent voice to private actors, it finally achieved SA status in 2003. This decision reflected the converging goals of UNDP and UNWTO and harmonized with a growing interest in exploiting tourism (a one-­trillion-­dollar industry employing 235m people) on the part of IFIs and national development agencies. UNWTO’s origins and history had originally been a barrier to UN System membership, but its inclusion was welcomed once the system sought to improve connections with private actors. UNWTO’s objective is to promote the competitiveness and sustainability of tourism, with programme activities being the primary means through which this is supported. UNWTO is a forum for policy discussions and a clearing house of applied knowledge for developing tourism. It is also the foremost source of knowledge on the international tourist trade and on relevant national legislation. UNWTO’s expertise positions it to influence national and international policies. Moreover, it is occasionally involved in developing international standards, for example the Global Code of Ethics for Tourism, a voluntary guideline for governments and the industry. UNWTO also advocates that the tourist industry should be given greater prominence on national and international agendas. For example, it has striven to get tourism featured in national emergency plans, especially where, as the Asian tsunami vividly demonstrated (Box 6.2), tourist infrastructure is threatened by natural catastrophes. An outgrowth of this is UNTWO’s Tourism Emergency Response Network, which monitors and responds to calamities such as the SARS outbreak (see WHO) and the eruption of the Icelandic volcano in 2010. UNWTO’s 155 full members are official governmental tourism bodies, but it has almost 400 non-­governmental affiliate members. No single member or group of members dominates the organization, and some prominent countries such as the USA and the UK have not joined. The affiliate members do not have high-­level decision-­making powers at UNWTO’s biennial Conference and biannual Council (where they are allowed one non-­voting participant), but below these governing bodies they have an equal voice in two of UNWTO’s three principal committees (the business and the education councils) and in a task force on destination management, which deals with marketing, economic impacts and the optimum flow of tourists to specific destinations.

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Development objectives have slowly moved UNWTO into an operational agenda, most notably though its Sustainable Tourism – Eliminating Poverty Initiative, which assists 90 projects worldwide. A growing TA programme is being used to promote national tourism strategies and, although the private sector still executes most infrastructure improvements, UNWTO’s operational activities mean it is starting to shape tourism development. UNWTO’s plethora of private participants prevents it from abandoning the laissez-­faire framework prevailing in today’s development debates. Its belief that the competitiveness of the tourism industry is ensured by liberalization and market forces appears incompatible with sustainable development (Ferguson 2007). For instance, UNWTO stresses that sustainable tourism should rely on SMEs delivering local services and products, but liberalization exposes them to competition from large, internationally competitive firms that may drive them out of business. Similarly UNWTO’s support for including tourism under the WTO GATS agreement (see Chapter 10, section 10.2.1) may reinforce the legal rights of international actors over local communities. Cheaper travel, following liberalization of the tourist industry, is increasing tourist footfall but poses sustainability issues, as scarce resources (e.g. water and fragile ecosystems) currently support non-­sustainable activities. The damage to delicate environments from large visitor numbers at UNESCO World Heritage Sites, such as Angkor Wat and the Pyramids, is a manifestation of this problem. Commensurate with its difficult gestation, UNWTO is not considered an essential intergovernmental forum, particularly by some countries with well-­ developed, self-­supporting tourism industries. They see no need for governmental membership when its services are available to affiliate members who also contribute to its budget; for example, the UK and the USA have more than 20 affiliate members each. UNWTO’s services are of greater value to those countries in the process of developing tourist infrastructures, where governmental involvement is influential or essential. SUGGESTED READING

Chorev, N. (2012), The World Health Organization between North and South, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. [Examines WHO as an international bureaucracy and how it has protected its interests against state co-­option] FAO-­IEE (2007), FAO: The Challenge of Renewal, Independent External Evaluation of FAO (C2007/7A.1), Rome: FAO. [A comprehensive review of FAO’s work and operations] Findlay, T. (2012), Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and Reform of the IAEA, Waterloo, Canada: Centre for International Governance Innovation. [A holistic review of IAEA with recommendations for future action]

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Marchisio, S. and A. Di Blase (1991), International Organization and the Evolution of World Society, vol. 1: The Food and Agriculture Organization, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff. [A somewhat uncritical but comprehensive overview of FAO] Singh, J.P. (2011), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO): Creating Norms for a Complex World, Abingdon, UK: Routledge. [Examines the E, S and C in UNESCO’s name in a historical context] Standing, G. (2008), ‘The ILO: an agency for globalization?,’ Development and Change, 39 (3), 355–84. [A critical review of ILO’s interface with global capitalism] Van Daele, J. (2008), ‘The International Labour Organization in past and present research’, International Review of Social History, 53 (3), 485–511.

Internet resources FAO: http://www.fao.org IAEA: http://www.iaea.org ILO: http://www.ilo.org UNESCO: http://www.unesco.org UNIDO: http://www.unido.org UNWTO: http://www.world-­tourism.org WHO: http://www.who.int

8 The development banks Throughout most of history the majority of humankind has been mired in poverty. Until 1945 poverty was seen largely as a natural condition and even, by some, a punishment for past sins. However, in the optimistic afterglow of the Second World War poverty assumed political dimensions, being considered as the outcome of deliberate decisions about who gets what, how and when. Even those who felt the developed world had no moral obligation to relieve Third World destitution came to believe that poverty could destabilize the international system or drive LDCs into the arms of the communist bloc. Thus, after 1945, poverty was increasingly construed as the side-­effect of a lack of ‘development’ and something that the fledgling UN System ought to address. Although there was agreement that action was necessary, quarrels about the definition of development, the policies to promote it and whether development objectives are achievable have been and are endemic, often with IOs as the leading protagonists. Today there are 23 multilateral development banks (MDBs, Table 8.1), whose primary purposes are to promote economic development and assist members who face immediate economic difficulties. The keystone for this movement was the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development or World Bank (IBRD), an outcome of the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference (Chapter 2). Initially IBRD funded discrete development or infrastructure projects and was closely involved in project design and management because its client countries lacked skilled personnel. Thus, IBRD not only built up its operational capacity but assembled data, undertook research and recorded best practice. Decolonization provided IBRD with a burgeoning clientele, and it rapidly became the largest source of multilateral development funding. IBRD’s initial success has sponsored imitators which cover particular regions and/or sectors. The Inter-­American Development Bank (IDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the African Development Bank (Af DB) ‘are sometimes described as “regional clones” [of IBRD] though in practice each has a quite distinct structure, financing base and ethos’ (Marshall 2008: 108). Proximity to their recipients allows the regional development banks (RDBs)

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Table 8.1  The development banks Organization

Global World Bank Group International Fund for Agricultural   Development Regional European Investment Bank Inter-­American Development Bank African Development Bank Asian Development Bank Islamic Development Bank European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Sub-­regional Council of Europe Development Bank Central American Bank for Economic   Integration East African Development Bank Andean Development Corporation Arab Fund for Economic and Social   Development Caribbean Development Bank West African Development Bank Arab Bank for Economic Development   in Africa El Rio de la Plata Fund (Fonplata) Nordic Investment Bank OPEC Fund for International   Development Eastern and Southern Africa Trade   and Development Bank North American Development Bank Black Sea Trade and Development   Bank Eurasian Development Bank

Date created

Number of member states

Loan portfolio ($b)

1945 1977

188 169

285 10

1957 1959 1963 1966 1975 1990

27 48 78 67 56 64

593 66 14 49 5 47

1956 1961

40 12

12 5

1967 1968 1968

4 18 18

0.2 14 8.5

1969 1973 1974

26 8 21

1.0 0.8 1.1

1974 1976 1976

5 8 12

0.3 20 3.4

1985

19

0.8

1993 1998

3 11

0.4 0.7

2006

6

2.8

to design projects taking into account local specificities, give weaker states a louder voice in regional development, and prevent an IBRD monopoly on multilateral development aid. Their narrower focus and their members’ more homogeneous policy needs give RDBs an opportunity to fund ­cross-­border

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projects that IBRD with its country-­centric approach generally overlooks. Sometimes the offshoots of political ROs (Chapter 13), RDBs can be agents of regional integration and respond to region-­specific problems and crises. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) and International Fund for Agriculture (IFAD) are other MDBs sharing features with IBRD, but they form a more heterogeneous cluster serving specific sectoral clienteles. A third tier of MDBs with narrow remits and limited funding assists sub-­regions (Box 8.1). Collectively the MDBs are the hub of global development governance, but no formal overarching structure unites them. The World Bank is a UN specialized agency, but with the exception of IFAD the other MDBs sit outside the UN family. Within the UN System the World Bank Group’s enormous resources allow it to dominate debate, although UNDP and UNICEF (Chapter 6) have successfully advocated programmes which diverge from IBRD norms. IBRD co-­financing and knowledge are often critical to the work of MDBs, which ‘fall over themselves to cooperate rather than compete with “big brother”’ (Amsden 1994: 633). All RDBs have recently upgraded their knowledge functions, but it is still an area where they rely heavily on IBRD. This should not be taken to infer, however, that RDBs are dependent on IBRD. RDBs are financed independently and have generated considerable aid flows. Making loans to support development dominates MDBs’ operational activities. All MDBs are funded by members’ subscriptions, with most using this money as collateral to raise additional funding from international capital markets up to an authorized level. Implicit sovereign guarantees given by members enable MDBs to borrow cheaply and pass the savings on to borrowers. Reflecting prevailing views of development (see below), many MDBs began by funding mammoth infrastructure projects and other ‘project lending’. A second loan category, non-­project or programme lending, which buttresses generic policy goals, includes assistance after natural disasters, reconstruction following conflict (where IBRD is still active), support during major economic downturns and, more particularly, structural adjustment loans to reform economic sectors (see Box 8.3). Over time project lending has been overtaken by non-­project lending, and MDBs generally have units for: zz concessionary lending, through offering subsidized or interest-­free, long-­

term loans to states with limited or no access to international financial markets;

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zz non-­concessionary

lending to states at market rates for projects private finance would be reluctant to fund alone; plus zz lending to private actors or providing guarantees for private investment. MDBs’ programme functions revolve around producing and transferring knowledge through a mixture of data production, global or regional monitoring, analytical studies, projections, policy review and advice, involving a continuous feedback cycle in which lessons learnt are applied to new problems. The World Bank, especially, has been at the forefront of development and poverty thinking (Vetterlein 2012). IBRD’s reincarnation as the ‘knowledge bank’ is merely the latest expression of the way its research and the intelligence garnered from past experience have shaped the definition of development and the related intellectual and policy-­making agenda (D. Stone 2000), a role shared with other MDBs. Initially definitions of development emphasized its economic aspects, seeing it in terms of economic growth and evidence of modernity, such as industrialization and urbanization. Consequently policies promoting development rested on generating investment and improvements in economic management. Development would later be interpreted as actions to augment ‘the richness of human life rather than the wealth of the economy in which human beings live’ (Sen 1999). This notion of ‘human development’ (see Chapter 6, section 6.5) construed development as a multifaceted problem encompassing health, education, nutrition, governance structures, gender and numerous other factors that necessitated manifold social, economic and humanitarian policies. However, the MDBs’ general espousal of free market economics associated with the Washington Consensus (Williamson 1990), which calls for states to focus on macroeconomic fundamentals and open up their economies to market forces (see Chapter 9, section 9.1), has led critics to conclude this is window-­dressing that continues to disguise the equating of development with economic growth (P. Griffin 2006): little surprise given the preferences of career staff (see section 8.1.4). The MDBs’ real potency lies in tying together their financial firepower and accumulated knowledge (Dethier 2007), as many loans are conditional on borrowers following strategies that transfer the banks’ ideas into country-­ level policies. Even if policy prescriptions are discounted, MDBs bring practical project management and technical know-­how to bear on project design. Furthermore, the major MDBs have started to follow IDB’s example and assign senior staff to work at the country level, thereby providing a general policy resource to governments and influencing the national development debate. Given the impact of their policies, MDBs are closely scrutinized and are no strangers to criticism. Most agree that in the second half of the last century

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there was an unparalleled improvement in the human condition, but the extent to which MDBs should take credit for these improvements has been questioned. For example, underdevelopment and poverty persist and are widespread (see Chapter 5). Difficulties and controversies attend any effort to assess MDB effectiveness, including persistent questions about statistical manipulation (Wade 2012), arguments which this chapter considers later. Washington Consensus policies have been roundly attacked for exacerbating and reproducing underdevelopment or promoting unsustainable development. Others suggest MDBs have wilfully ignored alternative policies that might have promoted development and reduced poverty faster. In rebuttal MDBs retort that governments either ignore their advice or suffer from chronic governance failures that inhibit policy effectiveness. One set of criticisms revolves around effectiveness. For many years MDBs measured their effectiveness by their loan disbursal rate but paid little heed as to whether loans met their objectives. An independent review of IBRD (IBRD 1992) rated 37.5 per cent of all loans as poor or barely adequate and found that only 44 per cent of projects were sustainable. This finding reverberated through the MDBs. Many then commissioned their own independent reviews, which arrived at similar conclusions. MDBs accepted that investment criteria had been unclear and that rapid lending growth had resulted in weak projects. The consequence was a general strengthening of evaluation processes and a focus on quality over quantity. Though effectiveness is a particular problem for RDBs it is even more so for sub-­regional development banks (Box 8.1). Smaller institutions often lack the financial and expert resources needed to formulate complex projects but find that small-­scale projects are not cost-­effective. Additionally, donors continually demand that new criteria must be considered in formulating projects, a workload which can overwhelm smaller organizations (Sagasti et al. 2006). Thus, for example, RDBs were slow to integrate environmental considerations into project design. Procedures for cooperating with IBRD can alleviate these problems, but collaboration adds intricacy and increases administrative burdens. For instance, ADB has to coordinate with three IBRD regional Vice-­Presidents (VPs), each responsible for different parts of Asia. Moreover, the effectiveness of interbank cooperation relies excessively on the personalities involved (Nehru 2012). The Council of Europe Development Bank (CEDB) exemplifies another concern: duplication. The scope of CEDB’s work incorporating social projects, job creation activities, education and health initiatives clashes both geographically and sectorally with the scope of the work of EIB and EBRD, both of which have resources orders of magnitude greater.

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BOX 8.1

SUB-­REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS: THEIR ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES The lowest tier of development banks, the sub-­regionals, tends to make relatively small disbursements to groups of states which individually find it costly to tap financial markets. Africa and Latin America possess the most sub-­regional banks, while there are only two in Asia, which reflects in part hardly any Asian regional integration. The sub-­regional banks fill important gaps in the provision of development finance, as many countries require loans for projects too small for larger MDBs. Sometimes sub-­regionals are the principal source of funding; for instance, the Andean Development Bank’s net lending to its members exceeds that of both IBRD and IDB to those members. Their members’ homogeneity and the banks’ more detailed knowledge of their clients give them a comparative advantage in niche markets. Thus, the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) has expertise in lending to very small nations and in coping with the aftermath of natural disasters or sudden economic shocks, situations for which small island states can rarely set aside sufficient resources. However, sub-­regional banks suffer drawbacks similar to other smaller IOs. Their

voice in the development debate is overshadowed by senior organizations, which can marshal superior resources and have concomitantly bigger impact. For example, despite its global remit, the OPEC Fund for International Development has committed only $5.6b in 25 years of operation (an average annual lending programme of $250 000 to each recipient country). Moreover, the absence of expertise to assess projects properly has led to participation in mediocre projects. Indeed, following the 2007 financial crisis, CDB lost its prime credit rating because of weak management processes. Personnel problems are exacerbated when sub-­regional banks are used to provide sinecures for the politically well connected. High overhead costs relative to disbursements lead many critics to conclude that sub-­regionals merely add a costly and ineffectual bureaucratic layer. In conclusion, sub-­regional banks provide useful facilities for small borrowers and inject a measure of competition into the lending process (for example by accessing regional funds and non-­governmental shareholders) but have a mediocre track record.

A second set of criticisms revolves around legitimacy. Critics assert that MDB conditionalities impinge excessively on state sovereignty and thus undermine domestic governance. This has become increasingly controversial as MDBs have invoked conditions relating to political processes and institutions under the rubric of ‘good governance’. However, MDBs’ authority is eroded by their own failure to follow rules of good governance (Woods 2000). For example, many senior MDB appointments, not least the World Bank Group’s President, are made on the basis of nationality irrespective of merit. Conversely others censure the banks for not pressing

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conditionalities hard enough, for designing projects that fail to incorporate penalties for non-­compliance, and for RDBs being too close to their borrowers. A third set of criticisms involves participation. MDBs are ultimately constrained by powerful members and the financial markets whose confidence they must maintain to raise funds; thus MDBs stand accused of being more responsive to and advocating lending philosophies that appease those interests rather than the interests of borrowers. The influence of major contributors to MDBs is considerable (for good or bad). They have voting powers reflecting their financial contributions and also exert substantial informal sway (Kilby 2011). The charters of most MDBs expressly forbid their engaging in political activities, stating that economic considerations alone should be the basis for lending decisions. In other words, MDB lending should not be coloured by considerations of ideology, civil rights or democracy. There is extensive evidence, however, that these rules are ignored (Bergesen and Lunde 1999: 44). During the Cold War, IBRD withheld loans to countries sympathetic to the communist bloc such as Albania and Vietnam, while Western allies such as Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo continued to receive generous support despite equally dubious democratic credentials. However, Bronstone’s (1999) study of EBRD demonstrates that hegemonic interests do get challenged in MDBs, while others have emphasized as driving forces the existence of internal cultures and agendas in the organizations (M. Barnett and Finnemore 1999) or coalitions which exclude hegemons (Lyne et al. 2009). Arguably the bias towards the interests of developed states and financial markets is reinforced by the end recipients of MDB finance being remote from the policy-­making and implementation process. In short, despite their claims to be focusing on human development, MDBs are scorned for viewing development as something done ‘to’ people rather than a process in which people’s input is an intrinsic part. While many IOs have strengthened their interactions with civil society, MDBs, the World Bank Group excepted, lag behind. The result is that development philosophies are still dominated by the Northern Hemisphere. For some (such as world system theorists, see Chapter 1) this is a deliberate strategy to perpetuate underdevelopment by binding LDCs into global markets, thereby entrenching capitalism’s hegemonic position and its inevitably unequal outcomes (Cammack 2004). The aforementioned emphasis on disbursement has contributed to many LDCs assembling debts that they could not repay. By encouraging LDCs into debt, MDBs have simultaneously reinforced LDCs’ dependence on external help and undermined their development, because

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BOX 8.2

THE HEAVILY INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES (HIPC) INITIATIVE A joint IMF–IBRD scheme launched in 1996, HIPC provides debt relief to the world’s poorest countries for which past loans have become an unbearable and inescapable burden. HIPC agreements require international financial institutions (IFIs) and donor governments to reduce or write off past debts in exchange for the target countries improving their governance and economic systems. This should leave countries with more sustainable economic fundamentals and prevent debt problems recurring. HIPC has four stages. First, a country has to maintain good economic performance for three years and develop a poverty reduction strategy in cooperation with civil society. Second, the Paris Club (Box 9.4) reviews the country’s debt rescheduling requirements, after which the IBRD and IMF boards determine the country’s HIPC eligibility. Third, with IFI assistance, the country establishes a track record of implementing policies to improve governance and reduce poverty. Finally, after another joint assessment, debt relief is approved and provided

by the Paris Club (the so-­called ‘completion point’). Forty-­three countries, mostly from Africa (Table 8.2), have qualified for HIPC by virtue of their external debt being 150 per cent of their exports or above 250 per cent of government revenue. By 2012, 38 of them had reached the completion point, with debt relief up to $76b approved. Between 2001 and 2010 those countries receiving HIPC debt relief increased poverty-­related expenditure by 3 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), and debt service payments fell from 4 per cent to 2 per cent of GDP, although some of this reflects non-­HIPC debt relief (IDA/IMF 2011). However, disbursements have been slow. Countries have to pass stringent tests before they are accepted into HIPC, tests that are dictated by the donor community and which can have serious socioeconomic repercussions. Indeed critics suggest HIPC downplays the importance of economic growth and poverty reduction and that recipients often lack the infrastructure required to initiate required reforms.

loan interest consumed money that could have been used to better people’s lives. For these critics the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC Initiative, Box 8.2) was designed to maintain rather than alleviate poor countries’ debt dependence. A fourth criticism relates to MDBs’ relationship with borrowers. External scrutiny, coupled with the size of MDB loans, has prompted greater awareness of corruption in some borrowing countries. About one-­third of IBRD loans are used for personal aggrandizement (Winters 2002). In view of this and the direct correlation between poverty, growth and corruption levels in a country (Kaufman 1999), corruption has become a key challenge facing

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all MDBs. IBRD President James Wolfensohn (1995–2005), the first executive head to speak out strongly about corruption, instigated a process to monitor institutionalized corruption in borrowing countries. Funding was allocated to improve borrowers’ governance structures, and some loans were refused or curtailed (notably to Kenya), while governments fighting corruption have been strongly supported (e.g. Uganda). Unfortunately IBRD’s fight against corruption was tarnished when Wolfensohn’s successor, Paul Wolfowitz, resigned following an investigation over his influence having been improperly used to benefit his partner, a Bank employee. Undeterred, the World Bank, supported by the other banks, has pressed on with this work by developing diagnostic tools to assess corruption in government institutions and public accounts combined with country-­specific corruption reviews. Table 8.2  Countries qualifying for the HIPC Initiative Asia

(Africa continued)

Afghanistan* Bhutan** Kyrgyz Republic Lao** Nepal** Latin America and Caribbean Bolivia* Guyana* Haiti* Honduras* Nicaragua* Africa Benin* Burkina Faso* Burundi* Cameroon* Central African Republic* Chad Comoros Congo Democratic Republic* Congo Republic* Côte d’ Ivoire* Eritrea

Ethiopia* Gambia* Ghana* Guinea* Guinea-­Bissau* Liberia* Madagascar* Malawi* Mali* Mauritania* Mozambique* Niger* Rwanda* São Tomé and Príncipe* Senegal* Sierra Leone* Somalia Sudan Tanzania* Togo* Uganda* Zambia*

Note: * Those receiving stage 4 HIPC relief; ** those that have decided not to participate. Source: IDA/IMF (2011).

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In addition to and partly as a consequence of their perceived shortcomings the MDBs face two broad challenges. The first is to cope with the changing global balance of economic power. China, in particular, has been joining MDBs with alacrity. While it is not yet challenging established structures and voting frameworks, its rising influence is pointed to by Af DB’s decision to hold its 2007 meeting in Shanghai. A second challenge, partly a function of shifting global power structures, is to face down the many other actors involved in the international aid architecture. Here MDBs confront a pincer movement between new actors willing to fund investment and a gamut of NGOs whose knowledge rivals the MDBs. Collectively these developments have lessened developing country dependence on MDBs. The MDBs are challenged by the ascent of new bilateral donors. Most development funding is bilateral, and there have always been donors who lend to developing countries without the irksome conditions imposed by MDBs. Recently, however, this has become more prevalent. Non-­OECD/ Development Assistance Committee countries (OECD/DAC, see Chapter 10, section 10.1) provided funding amounting to $11.2b in 2008, 143 per cent more than in 2005 (Economist 2011). China (through the medium of the China Development Bank) now lends more than IBRD or ADB, while others, including Brazil, India and Venezuela, are active in encouraging South–South cooperation, often with ulterior motives that clash with those of traditional donors, what Naim (2007) refers to as ‘rogue aid’. Indeed these new donors bring their own problems. Their higher interest rate loans increase the very debt HIPC is supposed to relieve. Stories abound of shabby construction owing to the lack of competition and of tied aid (aid conditional on purchasing a donor’s goods or services) delivering unsuitable equipment. While many emerging donors are critical financial shareholders in RDBs they tend to bestow their bilateral largesse on neighbouring states, potentially competing with and detracting from RDBs. The growing sophistication of financial markets with their (supposedly) superior ability to price risk, plus a greater willingness of investors to take those risks, has facilitated developing countries’ ability to tap private finance. The private sector has moved into areas it previously avoided and which had been the purview of the MDBs, for example in providing insurance similar to that offered by the World Bank Group’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA, see section 8.1.1). For many years much key development knowledge resided with MDBs (especially with IBRD), but knowledge is now more widespread, and countries that want assistance with their development programmes can increasingly appeal to the expertise of

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think tanks, universities or organizations run by charities, philanthropists and religious groups. For the moment IBRD’s voice is still authoritative, but some other MDBs are more vulnerable because their knowledge functions are underdeveloped. BOX 8.3

STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LENDING Structural adjustment lending is non-­project lending that provides general economic assistance to a sector of economic activity (such as education or health) typically to restructure government activity, shift some activities to the private sector, and downsize bureaucracies. Compared to the more physical objectives of traditional project lending, structural adjustment loans are

fast-­disbursing, medium-­term loans with broad objectives based on target indicators. Much structural adjustment lending is predicated upon Washington Consensus policies, and the associated conditionalities have reinforced those opinions that consider MDBs pay insufficient attention to social needs.

This introductory section has outlined the commonalities shared by MDBs, summarized criticisms of their work and described the challenges they face. The remainder of the chapter examines the history and activities of the main MDBs, starting with the World Bank Group. As all MDBs share some common features and operational modalities, the section on the World Bank Group will cover these points in detail, while commentary on the others will focus on differences from the norm, current activities and evaluation. The three regional clones of IBRD are grouped together, while the remaining large MDBs follow thereafter.

8.1 The World Bank Group (the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) (IBRD) 8.1.1 Background The World Bank’s primary function, as stated in its Articles of Agreement is: To assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members by facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes, including the restoration of economies destroyed or disrupted by war, the reconversion of productive facilities to peacetime needs and the encouragement of the development of productive facilities and resources in less developed countries. (Article 1 (i))

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In the event, the reconstruction part of IBRD’s mandate was superseded by US-­funded Marshall Plan aid in Europe (Box 3.1) and Dodge Plan support to Japan. Both generated resources far greater than those available to IBRD, which consequently built up its development portfolio. Today, IBRD is the nucleus of a wider World Bank Group of institutions (see Figure 8.1), which together are frequently and confusingly referred to as IBRD. It aspires to a ‘world free of poverty’ by making loans and applying and transferring knowledge to poor and middle-­income countries. IBRD plays an important role in coordinating development assistance, finding itself at the interstices of the plethora of UN agencies, other IOs, national aid agencies, NGOs and private foundations that together encompass global development governance. World Bank Group Board of Governors UN IBRD 188 members (President)

MIGA 178 members (Vice-President)

ICSID 158 members

IDA 172 members

IFC 184 members (Vice-President)

Figure 8.1  The World Bank Group

The World Bank Group’s component parts cater to discrete clienteles, and this affects the composition of their membership, operations and funding structures. When states join IBRD they ‘purchase’ a shareholding and deposit 20 per cent of their proportion of authorized capital as ‘paid-­in’ capital, the balance taking the form of an immediately redeemable promise of payment. Periodically members agree on a replenishment (or increase) of authorized capital, proportionately raising their paid-­in capital (in 2012 members agreed to a $280b replenishment level). In common with other MDBs, World Bank resources are slowly reaching a so-­called ‘sustainable level’, where income and repayments from earlier loans are flowing back at a rate that permits continuing disbursement of new loans without the need for replenishments.

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In 2012, paid-­in capital ($12.4b) represented some 7 per cent of the Bank’s $185b loan commitments, and in a typical year IBRD disburses loans worth $20b–$30b. IBRD does not lend from its own resources; instead, backed by its sovereign guarantees, it raises most of its capital directly from financial markets. IBRD is usually the largest non-­resident borrower in those countries where it raises funds and operates a sophisticated and consistently successful financial trading unit, which in a typical year has a trading volume of around $120b. Borrowing commercially, however, means that IBRD must maintain investor confidence. For this reason IBRD makes loans at market rates to creditworthy middle-­income governments and, exceptionally, to private enterprises if backed by a government guarantee. The majority of the Bank’s net income from fees and interest payments contributes to funding for the International Development Association (IDA), HIPC or TA. Loans are linked to specific projects or programmes assessed and authorized by the Bank (see Box 8.4), with many projects being co-­financed or designed to catalyse additional private and public investment. Recipient governments, as well as managing the Bank’s projects, also have to contribute financially, with the loans becoming part of their sovereign debt.

BOX 8.4

THE WORLD BANK PROJECT CYCLE At the heart of IBRD’s work is the so-­called ‘Project Cycle’, a six-­stage process taking a project from conception to completion. Projects are identified and prepared by means of country-­level sectoral reviews jointly conducted by Bank staff and national officials, which then become part of Country Assistance Strategy documents. Development of a project proposal may be undertaken with the assistance of an executing agency, to overcome some recipients’ dearth of technical know-­how. Next IBRD appraises the proposal; this involves on-­site assessment, examining the country’s implementation capacity, calculations of economic viability and review of ­technical designs. Once internal

management accepts the project, a loan document is negotiated, which is then presented to the Bank’s Board for approval or rejection. To reach this stage the process takes approximately 18 months, although certain loans can be processed very quickly. The recipient government executes and manages all subcontracts, but Bank staff or consultants supervise and monitor disbursements. This process involves annual inspections, providing technical advice, and monitoring against agreed benchmarks. Loan execution is typically spread over five to six years. The final stage is audit and evaluation. Evaluation is vital in learning lessons that can be applied in future projects.

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To avoid losing market confidence IBRD must avoid high-­risk investments in countries with poor credit histories, which are the very places with the most acute problems of underdevelopment and poverty. Thus, in 1960, IDA was created to make long-­term, concessionary grants and loans to the world’s poorest countries. In most respects IDA’s work is identical to IBRD’s, and they work within a single structure. To avoid damaging IBRD’s financial reputation, however, the mechanism for disbursing subsidized or concessionary loans is separated from the Bank’s principal capital. The riskier nature of IDA lending precludes it from tapping financial markets, and its capital derives mainly from transfers from IBRD net income and triennial donor replenishments. The International Finance Corporation (IFC), established in 1956, is a legally separate institution. IFC lends to the private sector, generally in low-­ and middle-­income countries, to mobilize rather than replace private capital flows. Therefore IFC does not fund private sector investments independently but co-­finances them, joining with private sector banks to provide a greater level of security to investment partnerships. IBRD  ­provides about 30 per cent of IFC’s $2.5b paid-­in capital, with members supplying the balance. Capital markets provide the additional resources needed to reach IFC’s annual borrowing needs of $20b. IFC treads a careful path between funding risky projects that the private sector would shun without IFC involvement and not endangering bondholders’ returns. The World Bank Group’s private investment activities are supplemented by the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and MIGA. Formed in 1966, ICSID provides an arbitration facility for commercial disputes between developing-­country governments and international private sector investors. Typical of its work is the adjudication of ten claims totalling $40b against Venezuela in 2011, following nationalization of commercial assets, which prompted Venezuela to withdraw from ICSID. From 1988 MIGA has insured private investments in developing countries against non-­commercial risk, in particular risks often excluded by commercial insurers, including war, civil disturbance, expropriation and restrictions on capital or income transfers. Availability of insurance allows firms to focus exclusively on business risks and encourages investment in unpredictable political environments. MIGA has to date covered some $22b in risks for almost 1000 investments in over 100 countries and stimulated $65b in additional investments. MIGA also provides marketing and legal advice to improve recipient countries’ ability to attract inward foreign investment.

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So far we have concentrated primarily on the World Bank Group’s financial dimensions. However, as the chapter’s introduction intimated, this money is tied to knowledge. The Bank is an important shaper of policies and intellectual debates including wider public perceptions of development. IBRD has over 100 internal ‘thematic groups’ and between 1998 and 2005 undertook over 700 research projects and published over 3600 research papers (Dethier 2007: 471). Intellectually, the Bank ranks second to Harvard University in terms of the volume and quality of academic articles published on development economics (Ravallion and Wagstaff 2010). IBRD works closely with academics, experts and practitioners to produce widely read and influential flagship publications, including the annual World Development Report (an overview of a specific development theme) and Global Economic Prospects, which analyses economic conditions and forecasts their likely impact on LDCs. Written for a general audience these reports are important for highlighting development problems and establishing them on political agendas. Another key publication is World Development Indicators, a country-­by-­country compendium of over 700 indicators covering all aspects of development since 1960. These and other studies draw upon IBRD’s repository of raw data and its many pioneering analytical tools, for example its definitive joint production with the UN, OECD and University of Pennsylvania of purchasing power parity indices. IBRD translates this research into workable policies and programmes that are disseminated through its loan conditionalities, TA and an increasing in-­country presence. In common with all financial institutions IBRD loans come with conditionalities attached, many insisting that countries follow its preferred policies. Donors’ preference to channel TA through IBRD rather than other IOs (see Chapter 6, section 6.5) meant that by the 2000s it had surpassed UNDP as the world’s biggest provider of multilateral TA. In 2011 it provided $354m to recipients, much of which was devoted to developing management skills and robust institutions, thereby putting countries in a stronger position to apply for loans and implement projects. Despite this, IBRD stays actively involved in projects because around one-­third of its staff are assigned to its 139 client countries. On the ground, however, relationships between IBRD country teams and government officials are often far from ideal, having been moulded by history, creditworthiness and the content of Country Assistance Strategies. IBRD’s evolution reflects structural changes within the international system and general attitudes towards development. Early on, its contributors’ political leanings led IBRD to lend to combat Soviet largesse for capital projects.

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Simultaneously the Bank’s prevailing view of development advocated economic growth and modernization. Initially, projects mostly involved building infrastructure such as dams, irrigation schemes, sanitation systems and commodity extraction. Despite a tentative start, by the 1950s IBRD’s basic operating procedures were set (see Box 8.4), and it had become a well-­regarded institution with an investment-­grade rating. Decolonization swelled the proportion of very poor, uncreditworthy countries within IBRD’s membership, ushering in both IDA and a gradual shift away from project funding towards poverty eradication programmes. This momentum accelerated under the McNamara presidency (Box 8.5), which was also a period which saw IBRD adopt many of its contemporary guises (Reid 1973). Poverty reduction was established as its central mission, and resources expanded fourfold as it embarked on new ventures, including founding the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research BOX 8.5

ROBERT MCNAMARA, WORLD BANK PRESIDENT (1968–81) Robert McNamara provided the World Bank with long-­lasting inspiration. He was drafted into the US Army Air Corps during the Second World War and then joined the Ford Motor Company, rising to be its President. He served as US Secretary of Defense in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and initiated US involvement in Vietnam. Thus, there was much trepidation when McNamara was appointed IBRD President in 1968. However, his passionate advocacy of development allayed these apprehensions, and he became a central figure in the development debate. Accepting that he was an international civil servant first and foremost he frequently clashed with his own government. His analytical approach and proven managerial skills forced an economic rigour and budgetary discipline on IBRD, but simultaneously he oversaw an enormous expan-

sion in funding and staff. Under McNamara IBRD took the first steps to becoming a knowledge-­based organization when he established a large economic research team and recruited the most technically qualified staff regardless of nationality. McNamara’s programme innovations included an annual review of world development economics and a focus on alleviating poverty through supporting agriculture and rural development, along with concerns for population growth and family planning. In his first five years he steered funds to projects in resource-­poor countries with large populations and invested in education and health. He travelled widely to understand the needs of developing countries, followed punishing and meticulous schedules and expected staff to match his commitment and encyclopaedic knowledge.

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(CGIAR, Chapter 14). More controversially this period witnessed the ­expansion of conditionality. From 1980 structural adjustment lending (Box 8.3) reflected growing understanding of the dynamics of poverty and development, including the belief that sustained social and political changes needed to accompany economic reforms. A major turning point was Latin America’s 1980s debt crisis. Defaults on sovereign debt saw countries, unable to access private financial markets, turn to IMF and MDBs for assistance. Under the rubric of the Washington Consensus, IBRD lending was predicated on countries undertaking painful structural adjustment programmes. This came to be seen by many as having contributed to the continent’s ‘Lost Decade’ of development. Up to this point IBRD had played a peripheral role in communist countries, but following the end of the Cold War it was their turn to accept structural adjustment reforms when making the transition to capitalism. The increasing focus on human development, with its broader concept of poverty encompassing social and political dimensions, accelerated structural adjustment lending in the 1990s. Since then there have been moves towards a post-­Washington Consensus era reflecting a serious engagement with human development. Certainly the McNamara era emphasis on poverty reduction has returned, and criticisms of structural adjustment loans have resulted in a shift away from (mandatory) conditionality towards softer benchmarks. Nevertheless, many observers note that, despite being swathed in the rhetoric of empowerment, sustainability and good governance, IBRD’s prescriptions still give precedence to macroeconomic competitiveness through unleashing the power of free markets (Weaver 2008).

8.1.2 Structure IBRD membership is conditional upon being a member of IMF. Reflecting their twin births, the Bank and the Fund share a single governing body, the Board of Governors, on which each member has a representative (normally its finance minister). The Board of Governors, like those of other MDBs, meets annually to deal with major policy issues, including increases in subscribed capital or initiatives such as HIPC. The annual meetings of MDBs’ boards of governors are unlike those of most IOs, as they are attended by representatives of financial institutions that are the banks’ investors. Two smaller ministerial committees of governors (both nominally IMF committees) meet six-­monthly to provide continuing global oversight and policy direction, the International Monetary and Financial Committee and the Development Committee (see Chapter 9).

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Most other decisions, including borrowing eligibility, loan approvals and the supervision and implementation of Bank Group policies, are delegated to a resident Board of Executive Directors (EDs). The 24 EDs are full-­time government appointees. The six largest donors (in decreasing order of contribution the USA, Japan, Germany, France, the UK and China) along with Russia and Saudi Arabia each have their own ED. Other contributors are grouped together and represented by shared EDs selected in rotation. EDs’ voting powers are based on the financial contribution made by the member(s) they represent, which in the Bank Group gives the US and other major donors considerable influence. Most Board decisions are made by consensus, but the possibility of a formal vote ensures due consideration of state interests. Bank staff discuss proposals with EDs before meetings to gauge levels of support and may consequently amend or withdraw proposals. In 2010, members responded to criticism that voting structures no longer reflected the balance of economic power and were weighted against LDCs, by awarding Sub-­ Saharan Africa an extra ED and upping the contribution levels of China, Brazil, Turkey and South Korea. Nevertheless, these changes only raised the proportion of developing-­country votes from 44 to 47 per cent (short of the 50 per cent originally demanded) and leave the poorest countries with under 5 per cent of the vote (Wade 2011). The Bank Group’s President heads the five legally distinct institutions described above, and the EDs supervise them all. Both IFC and MIGA have their own executive heads, who exercise independent control but report to the President. The Bank’s Presidents, who have always been American, occupy an immensely influential position. Not only do they chair ED meetings where Bank strategy is agreed, but they head a bureaucracy which has considerable autonomy to determine who gets loans and on what terms (Woods 2000). The continual US stranglehold on the Bank is controversial and creates tensions. These surfaced most recently in 2012 when the US candidate Jim Yong Kim was appointed President. Despite a more open contest than previously, Kim was widely thought to be the weakest contender, with no experience in government or finance. Six regional VPs oversee project operations and country offices supported by technical input from a series of ‘global practices’ that provide expertise and links to regional subject matter specialists. In addition there is a substantial economic research group, under the Chief Economist, and a World Bank Institute which trains developing-­country officials in project management and economic techniques. Responding to pressures for more accountability the Bank Group also has a three-­person Inspection Panel, which investigates complaints concerning departures from lending policies, plus an

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Independent Evaluation Group that reports to EDs and monitors operational activities. After the UN and the EU, IBRD is the third largest IO and is highly centralized, with around two-­thirds of its 9000 staff stationed in Washington.

8.1.3 Current activities Since the onset of the 2007 financial crisis the Bank Group has supported its weakest members who were least well equipped to deal with the consequences of a 17.6 per cent decline in export earnings and a 50m increase in the number of working poor (UN 2012). Annual IBRD/IDA lending has fluctuated in nominal terms from $18.6b in 2008, reaching $40.4b at the height of the financial crisis, but falling back to $30.9b by 2012. The Bank is still very active in funding traditional infrastructure and social development projects (for example, 20 per cent of loans by value still go to transport), although public administration, law and justice now account for 22 per cent of its portfolio. Recent food production and price crises have refocused attention on the long-­neglected agricultural sector (see FAO, Chapter 7, section 7.3 and CGIAR, Chapter 14), and the Bank has responded to G20 exhortations by doubling its agricultural disbursements to around $4b annually. Non-­project lending climbed after the financial crisis, with IBRD committing $27b to assist countries most affected by the Eurozone crisis, particularly middle-­income states. IDA replenishments in the early 2000s were insufficient to address the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Subsequent replenishments were more generous, with the 16th replenishment (for 2011–14) reaching a record level of $49b, with half going to Africa. Another target is to deliver a final boost to MDG funding, in particular the targets for immunization, health services and sanitation in the 79 countries that currently qualify for IDA support (i.e. 64 members with per capita GNI below $1135 plus 15 so-­ called ‘blend’ members in the lower middle-­income range). IFC lending is mostly backed by equity holdings in the borrowing companies; consequently in 2009 the financial crisis resulted in IFC making its first annual loss ($151m). Profits have since recovered, reaching $1.3b in 2012, of which $330m were provided to IDA. Its investments have recently shifted away from manufacturing towards energy, natural resources and support to financial institutions. IFC’s 2012 lending amounts to $16b, one-­third of which has gone to IDA countries. A Global Trade Liquidity Programme launched in 2009 provides $21b to cover guarantees for 12 000 small and medium-­sized enterprises (SMEs) currently facing credit restrictions, while

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a wholly owned IFC Asset Management Company has raised $4.1b from institutional investors for further IFC-­directed reinvestment.

8.1.4 Evaluation and future challenges Development governance is a complex and crowded arena. Nevertheless, the World Bank Group is still ‘the world’s premier development agency, especially as generator and sustainer of beliefs about the best policies and institutions for development’ (Wade 2011: 359). The Bank is one of the most visible manifestations of the global development agenda, a position based on: zz five decades of experience amassed over a multifarious array of subjects; zz its assessment of and willingness to tackle issues spanning sectoral

divides; zz close relationships with governments, NGOs and other IOs; and zz the marshalling of financial resources to translate its intellectual visions into concrete programmes.

Inevitably the Bank’s profile means it attracts close scrutiny and criticism, but it is impossible here to summarize the enormous literature evaluating its performance. Therefore, what follows expands upon the general criticisms of MDBs outlined in the introduction to the chapter, which in the Bank’s specific case are: its failure to eliminate poverty or promote sustained development because of adherence to the Washington Consensus philosophy; the degree to which its investments have been successful; the presupposition that its economic focus overrides environmental, social and democratic considerations; and flaws in its governance structure. A similarly selective approach assesses the challenges facing the organization by examining the difficulties of reform and the competition it faces from rivals and evolving geopolitical alignments. Assessing IBRD’s record on poverty alleviation is made difficult by the aforementioned statistical controversies. Staggering levels of poverty persist (Chapter 5), but the Bank argues that its interventions often follow years of economic mismanagement, are palliatives for countries with nowhere else to turn and that its prescriptions are frequently ignored. Moreover the World Bank observes that 26 borrowing countries have ‘graduated’ and are now net donors to the system, for example South Korea and Chile, whose success is such that they now belong to OECD (Chapter 10, section 10.1.4). Critics retort that none of the 20 biggest recipients of structural adjustment lending between 1980 and 1999 attained reasonable levels of economic

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growth (Easterly 2005), and the Bank’s own independent review (IBRD 1992) found that under 20 per cent of structural adjustment loans had been successful. Furthermore the success stories proclaimed by IBRD were often the result of policies at considerable variance to the free market doctrines extolled by the Bank. For example and despite IBRD’s (1993) claims to the contrary, the success of East Asian economies like South Korea resulted from systematic government interventions, an anathema to the Bank (Amsden 1994). Likewise China has lifted an unprecedented number of people out of poverty in a generation but is hardly an exemplar of free markets or good governance. Opponents conclude that the Bank’s unwillingness to countenance alternatives has mired millions in unnecessary poverty and, worse, that these policies are deliberately designed to perpetuate the systematic pillage of the weak and the powerless by the rich and the strong (Cammack 2004). Judging IBRD by reference to levels of global poverty and underdevelopment might be regarded as unfair. These are complex and intractable phenomena which require far greater resources than the Bank’s. Moreover, its effectiveness is conditioned by variables far beyond its control such as contradictory policies emanating elsewhere or the vicissitudes of the global economy. Therefore a fairer way of assessing IBRD’s development endeavours is to examine the performance of its project lending. In this regard the World Bank has a ‘chequered history’ (Weaver and Park 2007), with its own reviews rebuking it for concentrating on the quantity of disbursements rather than the quality of delivery (IBRD 1992). Sometimes this reflects the fact that the ideal of well-­planned development partnerships led by recipient countries does not materialize in practice. Country programmes and projects are messy, involve an enormous diversity of stakeholders and are insufficiently tailored to a specific context. The review suggested this was a result of the institution’s intellectual leadership by career economists schooled in neo-­ classical economics whose excessive involvement in projects and research at the expense of technical specialists tended to lead to social, environmental and democratic considerations being overlooked. This was encapsulated in the Bank’s enthusiastic support for the construction of large dams that displaced indigenous peoples and damaged the environment. Voluble campaigns orchestrated by prominent NGOs forced IBRD into reforms that strengthened civil society’s voice in its decisions. A high-­level inspection panel now examines particularly controversial projects, and dam construction is subject to independent review by the World Commission on Dams. Recently fewer dam-­building projects have been approved, and IBRD refused to support construction of China’s Three Gorges Dam. Following a slow start, the Bank strengthened its environmental portfolio after 2001,

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although an internal evaluation (IBRD 2008) identified problems typical of its overall operations. The Bank struggles to encourage environmental lending when governments are lukewarm and accord other investments a higher priority. The negative publicity from the dam controversy added to that resulting from structural adjustment lending stimulated the Bank to make further efforts to be less dogmatic. The Bank observed that its more successful loans had required borrowers to involve the most affected groups in decision making. For example, the HIPC Initiative gives civil society considerable control, as its input is mandatory before debt relief plans are approved (Brautigam and Segarra 2007). The pressure group Publish What You Fund recently ranked IDA as the most transparent of 58 aid donors, and Robert Zoellick, the penultimate IBRD President, claimed to have elicited a subtle intellectual shift, with IBRD becoming a ‘seeker of solutions, not a purveyor of p­ rescriptions’ (Zoellick 2012). Reforms have not fully assuaged accusations of weak environmental controls on its projects or that IBRD undermines democratic processes. This is most commonly asserted in connection with the conditionalities accompanying Bank loans, which, adversaries aver, impose straitjackets which intrude on the right of sovereign countries to determine their economic policies. In reality things are less straightforward. First, governments sometimes welcome conditionalities as pretexts for unpopular policies they wanted to implement. Second, there is a contradiction in criticizing the Bank for failing to stipulate conditionalities that would otherwise prevent environmental damage or ensure adequate democratic consultation. Finally all financial institutions place conditions on borrowers, frequently specifying how the money should be used. Indeed, for those parts of the Bank Group that raise capital on the open market, conditionalities are an important signal to investors that funds are prudently administered. Many right-­wing commentators argue that conditionalities are too loose or poorly enforced, especially for major borrowers such as Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and Turkey to which IBRD lending flows disproportionately. These borrowers know that ignoring conditionalities will not necessarily lead to a denial of funding. This is because IBRD’s exposure to them is such that, should they run into financial difficulties, it would have to bail them out to ensure its earlier loans were repaid, thereby avoiding a major default that could undermine IBRD’s profitability and credit rating (e.g. Argentina and Turkey). IBRD’s detractors assert that many of its problems derive from the organization’s governance structures, its dominance by donors and the hegemonic

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position occupied by the US. They argue that, consequently, the Bank prioritizes the interests of developed-­world financiers and donors over LDCs and those dwelling in poverty. EDs regularly push loans ‘that serve the broader foreign policy interests of powerful states despite clear advice from the staff that it does not fit the Bank’s criteria’ (Hurd 2011: 83). For example, IBRD plans to lend some $4b to Pakistan, a state critical to Western involvement in Afghanistan, yet Pakistan is rife with corruption and verging on failed state status. In other words, emphasizing technical and economic criteria for loans masks the inherently political nature of IBRD lending. The location of its headquarters in Washington, DC and its financial size exposes IBRD, more than most IOs, to the scrutiny of the US Congress, and examples abound of US influence, not just through its voting weight and its monopoly on the Bank’s presidency but through its influence on other key appointments, including Joseph Stiglitz’s dismissal as Chief Economist after he questioned the organization’s economic philosophy. Nevertheless, the US cannot achieve its aims unilaterally. Between 2004 and 2008 the US ED voted against loan proposals on 98 occasions, but 92 of them achieved the required majority and were approved (Lyne et al. 2009: 411). Moreover, some members have established trust funds with the Bank allowing them to support projects which may be contrary to US or even mainstream opinion (Weaver 2007). As in many other IOs this can distort the organization’s main mission. Given the widespread criticism, governance reform is, unsurprisingly, a key challenge for the Bank. Limited changes have commenced (see section 8.1.2), but the Bank’s internal organization also needs reform. For example, IBRD operations and project allocations revolve around countries. The upshot has been minimal regional coordination, even where neighbours face common problems. It also results in disparate internal approaches to topics requiring trans-­boundary solutions, like the environment. As Chapter 4 details, IBRD has embraced reform with great zeal, but past reorganizations have eroded institutional knowledge (Davies 2002). Unfortunately reforms have a ‘Sisyphean quality’, with efforts to streamline causing greater complexity because of the ‘culture of sophisticated analysis engrained in staff practice’ (Marshall 2008: 59). Reforms to the evaluation of dam projects for instance have responded to calls for inclusion and environmental assessment, but applications are now so scrupulously examined and the process is so convoluted and protracted that states now seek financial support elsewhere. IBRD’s final challenge, and one which faces all MDBs, is maintaining its relevance in rapidly evolving surroundings. Alternative sources of finance and knowledge, including private foundations and emerging bilateral donors, are challenging IBRD’s pre-­eminence. In 1990 private net capital inflows to devel-

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oping countries were $85b but by 2006 had reached $650b (Marshall 2008: 169), a figure far exceeding public aid flows. Developing countries’ increased ability to borrow at competitive rates on international capital markets left IBRD looking like a ‘dying institution’ (Einhorn 2006) until the financial crisis revitalized it. Nonetheless, IBRD’s 2011 replenishment was modest and only sufficient to sustain real-­terms spending at 1980 levels (Wade 2011), because donors faced their own budget crises and feared that a sturdier organization might further weaken opportunities for private sector financial institutions. In the near future the Bank’s support from and for middle-­income countries will protect its role. These countries still need to attain the MDGs, moreover they are home to 70 per cent of those living in poverty and require systematic help if the Bank is to meet its stated aim of ending extreme poverty by 2030. Better access to private finance means that many middle-­income countries are less interested in IBRD’s money and more in accessing the Bank’s knowledge on augmenting prosperity. To retain their long-­term support IBRD may need to rethink its portfolio, possibly even making knowledge generation and dissemination its main products. IBRD has invested considerable effort in knowledge management and has produced much valuable work, but research funding is stagnating (Dethier 2007).

8.2 The regional development banks of Latin America, Asia and Africa The RDBs covered in this section have similar policies, programmes and structures to IBRD. For example they each have a concessionary lending programme, a private sector arm and knowledge management functions. However, their mix of ownership differs, with voting majorities being held by regional members, which are normally borrowing countries; this, therefore, gives them greater scope to influence RDBs’ policies as reflected in their lending programmes, which while mimicking the broad contours of IBRD policy and ideas tend towards alternative priorities with less conditionality. RDBs’ combined lending is about 75 per cent of IBRD’s, and they have developed to a point that they finance traditional project lending alone and, as they have a fuller appreciation of the conditions in their borrowing members, feel they are better placed to assess social sector lending. Occasionally co-­ financing is their only possible mechanism for the placement of a loan. Thus, IDB can only support structural adjustment lending in conjunction with IBRD. A better division of labour between IBRD and the RDBs could result in more effective and efficient lending, with the RDBs handling ­infrastructure and social projects while IBRD deals with structural lending plus ­emergencies.

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Comparatively the three banks lack IBRD’s intellectual prestige but, responding to member demands, are now investing in knowledge management. Nonetheless, knowledge functions at RDBs are handicapped by relatively puny budgets, and their knowledge management structures are limited. Institutionally these RDBs suffer similar shortcomings. Inevitably, as near clones, they share some defects with IBRD. They, too, are biased towards lending to a few major borrowers. Algeria, Congo DR, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria and Tunisia have received most Af DB loans, reflecting their capacity to develop loan requests rather than successful implementation. Independent reviews revealed that the RDBs’ loan quality was no better than that of IBRD and for similar reasons. Nevertheless, some problems specifically afflict the three banks. Compared to IBRD, their decision making lacks transparency, and for many years they were undercapitalized, something recent replenishments have rectified. They have also been criticized for making too many concessions to regional borrowers, which has undermined the quality of their loan portfolios.

8.3

The Inter-­American Development Bank (IDB)

8.3.1 Background and structure Regional aspirations for a development bank coupled with changing US geopolitical strategy in the Cold War led to OAS founding IDB, which commenced operations in 1959 with capital of $850m and a $150m concessionary loan facility to provide financing to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). Reflecting both its origins and members’ desires, Filipe Herrera, IDB’s inaugural President, proclaimed: ‘We will be the Bank of Integration.’ IDB established an institute to study economic integration in 1965 to raise awareness of the benefits of regional cooperation and has consistently acted as an ‘honest broker’ (Bull and Bøås 2003), fomenting discussion, offering advice and funding infrastructure projects that link its member states. However, only with the eighth replenishment in 1994 did IDB receive a formal mandate to support ‘regional integration and modernization’. This mandate had an inauspicious start when one of its first major undertakings was to support the secretariat of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, which was rejected by the 2005 Summit of the Americas, thus damaging IDB’s reputation. Compared with IBRD, IDB has been a more flexible and accessible funding source, stepping in when IBRD has not sponsored specific projects, and from the outset it has lent to the social sectors. IDB takes its lead from policies institutionalized at IBRD but typically consults with governments to tailor

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them to regional needs. The 1980s debt crisis nearly broke IDB, and disbursements in the period 1989–93 were only one-­third of those in 1983–88 (Neumeyer 2003). Following the eighth replenishment, disbursements recovered, and since 1998 IDB has lent more to its region than IBRD, partly because most members do not qualify for IDA loans. Consequently IDB has assumed a regional importance which was only dreamt of in 1959. In 1989 IDB created the Inter-­American Investment Corporation (IIC) to mirror IFC’s private sector role. However, IIC has struggled. Initially it disbursed few loans, yet its staff expanded quickly and its management became top-­heavy. The result was near collapse, a negative balance sheet and flagging government backing. IDB then established a parallel Private Sector Department and a TA fund to encourage the growth of small businesses. These multiple initiatives resulted in confused mandates, which required the appointment of a private sector ‘supremo’ working closely with IDB’s President to resolve issues of overlap and wasteful competition. Originally IDB’s owners were LAC countries plus the USA (which held 41 per cent of the paid-­in capital). The accessions of Canada and, in 1974, a group of non-­regional donors reduced the shareholdings of existing members. The US is still the largest shareholder, but the LAC members’ total shareholding is slightly more than 50 per cent and they exert a proportionate influence over policy and operations. IDB has closer relationships with its members than has IBRD, something partly attributed to it having offices in all LAC countries and partly because, traditionally, IDB’s President comes from Latin America. Recent incumbents have had a visible regional political presence, reinforcing LAC members’ influence in IDB policy formulation. The US remains a powerful actor, not least because the Executive VP is always a US national and has overall supervision of IDB under the President.

8.3.2 Current activities, evaluation and future challenges IDB has been a qualified success, supporting regional democratic consolidation and institutional improvements. Many ascribe its achievements to its leadership’s desire to consult members extensively, which means that, despite being a weaker institution than some MDBs, its policies and proposals encounter less resistance (Nelson 2000). Equally important, however, has been comparatively generous US resourcing, reflecting a belief that IDB is receptive to US overtures (Feinberg 2006). Since the onset of the 2007 financial crisis IDB disbursements have doubled. Mirroring IFC, IDB has established an emergency funding facility for SMEs

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that were unable to obtain finance when private sector funding evaporated. In 2010, to sustain this lending, meet anticipated demands for sustainable energy projects and deal with poverty reduction and inequality, members agreed to a ninth replenishment of $70b, which increased IDB’s capital base by two-­thirds to $175b. The ‘Lost Decade’ of economic stagnation in the 1980s, exacerbated by further financial problems sparked by the 1994 Mexican crisis, provided only a fragile regional base for future progress notwithstanding the maturity of many national institutions and the emergence of regional democratization. Despite recent economic advances LAC is the world’s most unequal region. In 2010 Latin America had 17 countries with a Gini coefficient of 0.45 or more (where 1 represents total inequality), whereas there were only six in Africa and four in Asia (Birdsall et al. 2011). While IDB has consistently emphasized the need for the region to address inequalities and reform institutions to this end, it is felt that the close political links between IDB’s executive head and the elites of borrowing members have sidelined civil society (Nelson 2000). Ensuring that its own policies and projects are geared to benefit the masses and also involve civil society presents a key challenge for IDB. Future ninth replenishment lending is intended to fund traditional IDB concerns and improve the general population’s lack of access to services and employment opportunities. In 2011 there were already shifts in this direction. For example, IDB moved further into social sector lending by being the first MDB to disburse a loan to improve policing. It is the largest donor to Haiti, the region’s poorest nation, where it provided grants totalling $317m inter alia to construct a business park and rebuild 30 schools. Despite recent LAC resistance to Washington Consensus solutions, IDB plans to integrate private sector financing more fully into its operations.

8.4

The African Development Bank (AfDB)

8.4.1 Background and structure Af DB’s overarching mandate is poverty reduction. As a statement of political solidarity the African nations that founded Af DB excluded non-­regional countries from membership. However, potential donors were reluctant to assist, concerned that Af DB would eat into IBRD resources. The result was a weak organization lacking capital. To combat this, in 1974, non-­regional countries joined with Af DB to develop the African Development Fund (ADF), a concessionary loan window replicating IDA. Non-­regional countries still had

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no formal voice in the organization, but ADF’s lending soon exceeded that of Af DB ‘and the tail was clearly wagging the dog’ (R.S. Browne 2008). In 1982 this led Af DB to accept non-­regional members, but to preserve African control they were restricted to a minority voting share. Compared with ADB and IDB, Africa’s development bank has a more egalitarian vote distribution. Its nine biggest shareholders command about 40 per cent of the vote, and no country exercises a controlling share. However, voting share is not proportional to voting power. Members’ votes are pooled into groups; each group has one ED on the Bank’s Board of Directors, which makes delegated decisions on behalf of the Board of Governors. Thus, votes are exercised on behalf of a subset of members, sidelining the influence of some of the larger ones (Strand 2001). In its first three decades Af DB’s paucity of capital was exacerbated by poor management. A scathing internal report (Af DB 1994) criticized its culture as one where ‘many staff feel responsible for nothing and therefore take responsibility for nothing’, leading to a poor-­quality lending portfolio. Twenty-­five per cent of Af DB projects faced serious problems, mostly because of a lack of technical supervision or evaluation, insufficient government financial commitment, and problems with subcontractors. The report identified other contributing factors, including brittleness in the President’s office, distrust between staff and the Board of Governors, and politicization of the upper echelons of the bureaucracy. Non-­regional members consequently withheld replenishments pending reforms which were undertaken in the late 1990s. Af DB has enhanced its operational capacity, decentralized to the country level and sought to exert intellectual leadership on African development through honing the knowledge dimension of its work and disseminating this through flagship publications such as the African Development Report. Af DB has also upgraded the quality and quantity of its operational and financial staff, thereby improving its service to borrowers. These changes restored confidence, and Af DB’s 25 non-­regional members then made a substantial contribution to its 2011 authorized capital of $101b. Nevertheless, some legacies from the period of poor performance persist, owing to weak leadership and the organization’s structural and logistical shortcomings. The Bank’s operations were further dislocated when the 2002 Côte d’Ivoire civil war necessitated relocation of its headquarters to Tunisia.

8.4.2 Current activities, evaluation and future challenges Despite Af DB’s efforts the average African is barely better off today than 50 years ago. Af DB’s failure to lead Africa’s progress towards sustainable development is largely a reflection that its meagre resources have been

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o­ verwhelmed by the magnitude of the famines, crises, diseases, corruption and debt afflicting the region. Indeed Af DB has the least resources of the major RDBs and operates the smallest projects. Until recently its loan portfolio was around one-­third of IBRD’s African portfolio, although with the latest (12th) replenishment its lending capacity now almost equals IBRD’s. Af DB’s overall ineffectiveness stems, however, from its own mistakes and structural shortcomings, as discussed above, which led it to become too close to its borrowers and approve ill-­conceived projects. Higher default rates led Af DB to become the only RDB to suffer the indignity of temporarily losing its investment-­grade credit rating. Af DB must simultaneously pander to the interests of the borrowers (who have the votes and choose its senior management) and the lenders (upon whose largesse it depends). Many borrowing countries cannot afford non-­concessionary loans, and Af DB concessionary lending is reliant on non-­regional members, who will contribute $7.8b in the current replenishment. A renewed emphasis on African development has presented Af DB with an opportunity to expand and improve its regional profile, yet the Bank’s inflexible lending instruments are ill suited to cope with borrowers’ changing circumstances (Af DB 2004). Af DB’s ongoing strategy covers a range of areas, but four are worth highlighting. First, Af DB borrowers still favour large, government-­run projects. This and Af DB’s role in the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD, Box 13.5), which requires it to contribute to improving regional physical infrastructures, consume 40 per cent of its lending. To some extent, this clashes with its second goal of poverty alleviation, which needs the Bank to direct resources towards the poorest, who often depend on agriculture, which has received meagre funding (3 per cent of 2011 loans). Third, on the socioeconomic front, which received 11 per cent of 2011 disbursements, Af DB is pursuing a range of projects to help develop the private sector and improve educational attainment. These include targeting youth employment in North Africa, in the wake of the Arab Spring, and pursuing reforms after the unrest in Côte d’Ivoire. Finally, echoing other MDBs, governance issues have assumed a high profile. So far, however, there has been no attempt to adopt and advocate bold new policies in its dealings with members, and there are controversies over whether Af DB is breaking rules about loans being decided purely on economic grounds. It has been calculated that Africa requires investment in the region of $60b to meet MDG goals, and its regional members are pressing for a tripling of Af DB’s capital base to achieve this. This is only a realistic objective if the Bank seizes the opportunity to takes a strong stance against endemic corruption and poor governance and leads the way in reforming members’ financial infrastructures.

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The Asian Development Bank (ADB)

8.5.1 Background and structure In 1966, ADB commenced operations, with its 31 members wishing to accelerate economic growth, development and cooperation in Asia. Led by Japan, which had graduated from IBRD support, international funding was secured for ADB, with Japan and the US being the largest shareholders and, to some extent, vying for power in the organization. Whereas US power originates from its hegemonic position, Japan’s stems more from its internal influence (the President and many senior ADB officials are always Japanese), generous financial contributions to the Asian Development Fund (ADB’s concessionary lending arm) and TA. Japan’s leading role has two consequences. First, ADB has steered clear of policies based on free market economics, instead supporting the Asian state-­led development model. Second, its internal culture is Japanese, and institutional decision making is heavily consensual (Wesley 2003). Initially ADB concentrated on food production and rural development. It was vital in funding the Green Revolution (see Box 14.1) and in enhancing storage facilities for its members’ burgeoning agricultural output. Other infrastructure projects followed; then in the 1980s it moved into lending for energy, transport and communications. During the 1990s, replenishments came to depend on ADB assigning greater weight to social development and poverty reduction, a sometimes difficult adjustment for an organization used to funding massive infrastructure projects. Following the 1997 Asian financial crisis ADB reiterated its commitment to social development, so its attention turned to strengthening social safety nets, supporting financial sector development and good governance. The 1997 Asian financial crisis also gave a tonic to ADB’s work to foster regional integration. ADB’s charter explicitly mandates promotion of Asian economic cooperation. Nonetheless, it was slow to become involved in regional integration, concentrating instead on ‘growth triangle’ projects, ventures to integrate economic activity in countries in contiguous parts of a sub-­region. Responding to the crisis, ADB provided emergency assistance, principally to Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand, including its largest ever loan of $4b to South Korea to restructure its financial markets. Only the IMF, however, was willing and able to muster the capital to rescue the Asian economies, but in return it imposed harsh conditions (see Chapter 9). Proposals for ADB to establish an Asian Monetary Fund were quashed by the US, which felt it would rival IMF and reduce its influence. However,

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this did not prevent ADB involvement in other initiatives to enhance the resilience of the region’s financial system. For example, ADB was used as the framework to develop the Chiang Mai Initiative, a series of currency swap arrangements to alleviate speculative pressure, and has augmented its operational capacity to buttress proposals being piloted through other institutions such as ASEAN+3 (Dent 2008) (see section 13.9.1).

8.5.2 Current activities, evaluation and future challenges In 2010, ADB’s members tripled its capital to $165b, thus making it equal in size to IDB. Indeed ADB is forecast to usurp IBRD’s position as Asia’s dominant development bank. As with all MDBs, banishing poverty and underdevelopment remains its principal challenge. Many millions of Asians have been freed from the twin scourges of hunger and extreme poverty in recent decades, but the region still has the world’s largest concentration of poverty and its peoples frequently contend with natural disasters. Income inequity is rising, and poverty reduction in its poorest members is a priority. For this purpose ADB has commenced negotiations to augment the Asian Development Fund. Asian economies have grown because of successful government interventions and, financial meltdowns apart, are both more resistant to and less in need of structural support than those of Africa and Latin America. Accordingly project-­based lending remains the larger need, while ADB non-­project lending (for example in Vietnam and Pakistan) has been strongly criticized for inappropriate conditionalities (Raman 2009). ADB’s clientele is also changing. More members can now tap international capital markets or have substantial fiscal surpluses and need fewer ADB loans. Instead its middle-­income members are turning to ADB to enhance their knowledge and assist them operationally. However, this knowledge frequently resides outside ADB, which could find itself sidelined by states turning to private organizations and think tanks for advice.

8.6

Other multilateral development banks The organizations covered in this section share similar governance arrangements to those MDBs already reviewed but have narrower mandates and operate somewhat differently. EBRD focuses predominantly on the private sector, EIB funds EU initiatives, the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) engages in Shari’ah lending (Box 8.6), and IFAD is a global bank lending for agriculture and rural development.

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8.7 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 8.7.1 Background and structure EBRD is the newest RDB. It was created in 1991 to assist Central and Eastern European countries in their transition to free market democracies following the USSR’s collapse. EBRD’s remit has grown to encompass Central Asia and, since 2011, four countries in the South and Eastern Mediterranean (see section 8.7.2). Today over 30 countries receive its help. In common with other MDBs, EBRD provides members with TA, such as business advisory services, but also engages in niche activities like disbursing the Chernobyl Decommissioning Fund. EBRD differs from other MDBs in three main ways. Unusually two shareholders with seats on the Board of Governors are other IOs (the EU and EIB). Next, EBRD’s charter reverses the normal injunctions that exclude political considerations from lending decisions; instead it explicitly states that to receive financing countries must be actively applying democratic principles. Finally, EBRD’s main mandate is to develop the private sector in recipient countries by strengthening those institutions for corporate governance and financial markets needed for a thriving entrepreneurial culture. To this end 77 per cent of loans are made to privately owned businesses and financial institutions, especially projects that cannot easily attract commercial funding. By providing up to 35 per cent of costs plus the assistance of an expert team EBRD loans become magnets to mobilize additional capital. The policy of lending through financial intermediaries allows EBRD to offload the costly work of assessing borrowers’ creditworthiness, thus smoothing the passage of capital to smaller companies. Around one-­third of its loans are for national financial institutions to lend to local enterprises. It has lent €400m to 16 banks in the new EU member states, which in turn have made loans to 15 000 medium-­sized businesses. EBRD’s remaining portfolio is committed to publicly owned companies, either to improve their services or to prepare them for privatization. EBRD got off to an ill-­fated start under its first President, Jacques Attali, as he was oblivious to the management and leadership needs of a new organization. Within two years he was forced to resign, having lost members’ confidence because of the slow rate of loan disbursal, coupled with an audit which revealed flaws in the bank’s internal systems and his own financial impropriety. His successor, Jacques de Larosière (IMF Managing Director 1978–86), introduced the reforms needed to put EBRD on a good economic footing,

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by reducing its excessive administrative staffing, cutting waste and directing lending to the emerging nations of Eastern Europe and, more particularly, Central Asia. Subsequently EBRD has gone from strength to strength and was the first MDB to declare a dividend for its owners, reflecting the soundness of its investment portfolio.

8.7.2 Current activities, evaluation and future challenges By 2011, EBRD had invested €71.1b in 3374 projects, making it the largest single investor in its region. Moreover EBRD involvement attracted additional capital worth twice its contribution. Nevertheless, as the MDB with the most unequivocal laissez-­faire mandate, EBRD has been a target for free market sceptics. The organization accepts that its over-­hasty promotion of privatization in Eastern Europe before effective regulatory institutions were in place was misguided. Elsewhere EBRD’s impact has been peripheral, with many CIS countries stubbornly resisting moves towards free markets and democracy. Borrowers such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan barely meet EBRD’s fundamental financing conditions, yet no loan has ever been denied for a lack of democratic credentials, a policy EBRD justifies because it lends to the private sector and not to the state (Dimitrova and Pridham 2004). Unlike the other RDBs, whose staff come from a cross-­section of professions, EBRD’s operational staff is mostly recruited from the investment banking sector. Consequently, by the Bank’s own admission, non-­economic lending targets, such as the obligation to promote democracy, are sometimes downplayed. Currently EBRD’s main focus is helping its clientele to counteract the effects of the 2007 financial crisis, which disproportionately impacted its members because they were heavily dependent on external funding. In 2009, EBRD increased its operations significantly in attempts to restore liquidity, compensate for the retrenchment in trade finance and recapitalize some of its clients. It is also now pressing for action to develop local financial markets and make them more resilient. EBRD’s loan portfolio is the third largest after IBRD (Table 8.1), two-­thirds of its lending being disbursed for energy (the biggest sector), infrastructure and manufacturing. As the only MDB with a clear environmental remit EBRD has made energy security and efficiency key planks in efforts to help economies recover from the financial crisis. Only one country (the Czech Republic) has graduated from EBRD lending. Eight more have joined the EU and are now ineligible for loans, as membership gives them access to commercial markets and EIB funds. In 2008 this prompted EBRD’s outgoing President, Jean Lemierre, to wonder whether

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the organization should be disbanded. Nevertheless important challenges remain, with the focus of lending shifting towards Central Asia, where the most intractable problems are corruption, poor infrastructure, weak financial institutions and high investment risk. Moreover, EBRD has responded to demands to apply its experience of working in uncertain, post-­revolutionary environments by extending its activities into Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. In 2012, €2.5b was made available for North African investment, but full-­scale projects cannot commence until ratification of changes to EBRD’s founding treaty. Southern Mediterranean countries with weakly developed private sectors and state-­dominated economies seem ideal candidates for EBRD help. However, concerns have been expressed that the mistakes of Eastern European privatization will be repeated and that introducing private sector participation into their municipal services could damage poverty reduction efforts.

8.8

The European Investment Bank (EIB)

8.8.1 Background and structure Created in 1957 as the European Economic Community’s (EEC) investment bank, EIB has been an integral part of the funding mechanism for EEC projects and a potent symbol of European political integration. Its mandate is to stimulate economic activity in Europe’s less developed regions, to finance fresh EU initiatives and to fund projects of common interest to members. Thus, EIB’s role has extended beyond conventional investment projects into broader issues involving fiscal and social policies. Outside of traditional lending, EIB played an important role in the euro’s gestation (Chapter 9). It issued a series of euro-­denominated bonds in advance of the new currency’s launch, giving it a positive start in the market and generating an initial demand on the part of institutional investment portfolios. While 90 per cent of EIB’s loans are to EU states, it provides funding on their behalf to projects in over 100 non-­EU countries; for example, it co-­ financed construction of the new Beijing airport terminal and, along with EBRD, finances projects in the Mediterranean region. EIB also has operations common to other MDBs, such as its private sector arm, the European Investment Fund, which supports SMEs by releasing funds through intermediary banks and credit institutions, as well as acting as a venture capital resource. EIB’s capital comes from the familiar combination of subscriptions from members and borrowing on international markets. However, its shareholders’ stable economies and the fact that all EIB’s owners are also clients mean that it exhibits the following important differences:

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International organizations zz It

has a lower proportion of members’ paid-­in capital (5 per cent) and, unlike other MDBs, whose profits are often used to fund concessionary lending or additional development activities, EIB uses profits to fund replenishments. zz While most MDBs carefully review and monitor the projects proposed by their borrowers, EIB members’ capacity to develop sound proposals and execute them is far higher. The result was, until the arrival of the transition states, a relatively small staff with fewer technical specialists. zz Conditionality is lessened because there is a greater degree of peer pressure. zz Negotiating complexity and transaction costs are reduced, making it easier to fund cross-­border projects (Griffith-­Jones and Hertova 2008). EIB projects can be approved within six months, compared to a year or more for RBDs more generally. zz Finally EIB generally only lends 50 per cent of the funds for a project, the recipient government being required to match EIB’s contribution. Like EBRD, EIB lends to both public and private sectors, with its loans being designed to attract funding from elsewhere, including national governments, EU funds and private investors. Because its mandate is to promote balanced regional growth and bind the region together, EIB has always devoted considerable resources to the newest EU members, while sectorally transport has accounted for by far the biggest proportion of loans. EIB funds the Trans-­ European Transport Networks (Chapter 16, section 16.8), and its investment was critical to prestige projects like the Eurotunnel.

8.8.2 Current activities, evaluation and future challenges EIB started slowly, but ‘since the mid-­1970s the bank’s lending (and importance) has grown exponentially’ (Robinson 2009: 653). Today it is the best-­resourced MDB, dwarfing even IBRD. In 2011, it lent €61b, bringing its total loans outstanding to a record €395b. However, these raw figures understate EIB’s true importance. Typically every EIB loan is multiplied fourfold through other investments (Robinson 2009), bringing total investment to a figure closely approximating the entire EU budget. The Eurozone crisis thrust EIB into centre stage, as many European leaders turned to it to help revive the region’s moribund economies, since its resources do not count towards national deficits. The proportion EIB contributes to EU economic development has grown, because EU funding has dropped and Eurozone states have asked EIB to further boost disbursements to its weakest members. EIB has responded well, building on its already expanding portfolio, and in 2008–11 it increased disbursements by around €20b annually. It

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arranged €30b of loans and guarantees for SMEs following the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers and disbursed a record €104b in 2009. In addition to the above-­mentioned activities, EIB’s current operational plan (which expires in 2014) targets investment in IT, communications, education, innovation and research. After 2007, following admission of 12 new members, the EU expanded its structural funds to assist them (see Chapter 11). These are administered jointly with EIB with three objectives, namely to improve urban environments, upgrade transport, and enhance energy infrastructures, competition and security of supply. The pressure on EU budgets points to a potentially bright future for EIB, allowing it to make a significant contribution to future European integration. Although EIB has reached a sustainable funding level, in 2013 members agreed to a capital increase which inter alia will provide more support for SMEs. However, two-­thirds of its capital comes from the UK, France, Italy and Germany, countries with their own fiscal difficulties.

8.9

The Islamic Development Bank (IsDB)

8.9.1 Background and structure IsDB was established at a 1973 ministerial meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC, see Chapter 13, section 13.16). Membership of IsDB is conditional on OIC membership, and all members except Guyana belong to the Bank. As with OIC, IsDB exists to foster the well-­being of member countries and Muslim populations in non-­member states and to strengthen the broader Islamic community by promoting members’ development in accordance with Islamic principles. Compliance with Islamic principles affects the way IsDB raises and disburses funds (Box 8.6) and sets it apart from the other MDBs.

8.9.2 Current activities, evaluation and future challenges Trade finance and project financing accounted for 98 per cent of the $78b disbursed by IsDB in 2010, around 7 per cent of which has gone to the private sector. This money was largely shared between IsDB’s Asian and African members, but those in Africa receive much more concessional financing than their Asian counterparts. As might be expected, several of its trade credits are for supply of oil products. Most IsDB lending relates to the construction of physical infrastructure, with almost half its loans going to energy and transport, while education, agriculture, industry/mining and water/­sanitation

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BOX 8.6

ISDB SHARI’AH FINANCING Shari’ah financing prohibits usury, interpreted as the charging of interest on loans. Thus the non-­governmental component of IsDB funding has to be raised through Shari’ah-­compliant bonds (sukuk), for which the market is relatively small. IsDB’s lending operations have developed around four principal Shari’ah-­compliant loan vehicles: • provision of goods for an agreed price after they have been manufactured or constructed to specification; • partnerships either with one party providing the funds and the other the expertise and management or where they

share both responsibilities, with profits being assigned on a pre-­agreed basis; • fixed-­term leasing arrangements, when the rights to equipment are eventually transferred to the beneficiary; • purchase of certain goods needed by the recipient country, with resale on a cost-­ plus-­‘profit’ basis, sometimes referred to as ‘instalment sale’. IsDB’s concessionary lending facility provides interest-­free, conventional loans, although like all RDBs it charges service fees to cover its costs.

account for a further 10 per cent each. IsDB has played a major role in sustaining Islamic financing institutions, helping to set up both credit rating and regulatory agencies. Like other MDBs, IsDB has taken a counter-­cyclical position in the light of the financial crisis and boosted its lending. Trade financing increased by 20 per cent in 2010 to $3b, which was complemented by a further $3b in export credit finance, while project financing increased by 13 per cent. IsDB’s main challenge, as it has been throughout, is raising finance and finding projects that are Shari’ah compliant. The exclusion of Western donors and most emerging powers by virtue of their not being OIC members, plus mobilizing resources only through Shari’ah-­compatible activities, makes IsDB very reliant on subscribed capital and retained earnings. This and IsDB’s ­trans-­regional scope mean that its resources are thinly spread and it has less impact than the larger RDBs, which raise their capital on open markets. For example, in 2010 IsDB lent Bangladesh (its second largest borrower after Turkey) $400m, while in comparison ADB funded Bangladeshi projects amounting to $2b; similarly Burkina Faso, one of the poorest African countries, received $226m from Af DB yet only $10m from IsDB. Moreover, shareholdings are concentrated, with Saudi Arabia holding almost a quarter and eight countries another half (Egypt, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates). Echoing many other MDBs, a reform

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programme has been under way since 2007, a central part of which is to turn it into a knowledge bank. A final major challenge is to reconcile sometimes conservative Islamic mores with progressive developmental goals. For example, promotion of gender equality is discouraged by the patriarchal nature of some members, although IsDB is now active in promoting women’s education and access to finance.

8.10 The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 8.10.1 Background and structure IFAD, an outcome of the 1974 World Food Conference, commenced work in 1977 with a mandate to improve the economic situation of the rural poor by raising agricultural productivity, stabilizing incomes and improving food security. Originally IFAD was to achieve these objectives through financing projects and microfinance institutions. However, reflecting the general decline in international support for agriculture, it expanded its remit to cover the broader needs of rural development, funding improvements in education, health and infrastructure (such as better rural roads) and more effective rural institutions. Underpinning much of IFAD’s work is an understanding that to escape poverty the rural poor need a sound economic framework coupled with income-­generating opportunities. For example, IFAD’s microcredit programmes respond to the rural poor’s inability to access credit when they do not have secure land tenure and their income flow is uncertain. Microloans are often targeted to women, who generally have better repayment records than men, and are frequently made for home-­based activities to diversify family income. Women constitute the largest proportion of agricultural workers and are important to rural economies and societies, so IFAD channels between 40 and 60 per cent of its funding to them, depending on the programme. IFAD has tended to develop partnerships with national and international institutions and to supervise the operation of its projects through outsourcing implementation to other IOs. It hosts three secretariats, those of the UN Convention to Combat Desertification, the High-­Level Task Force on Global Food Security and the International Land Coalition, the last named being an agrarian reform group which aims to improve landholders’ tenure. IFAD has links with over 60 bilateral and multilateral donor institutions, the most prominent of which are CGIAR (Chapter 14), whose projects it has funded

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to the tune of $120m, and the Global Environment Facility (see Case Study 1.1). Not all partnerships have been effective, and one key partnership which failed to produce results was with FAO (Chapter 7, section 7.3), despite both being Rome-­based UN SAs. This has been attributed to IFAD’s reluctance to become entangled in FAO’s more bureaucratic environment, but the potential for effective synergy would undoubtedly improve international efforts in agriculture (FAO-­IEE 2007). IFAD funds projects and programmes in a manner similar to other MDBs. Seventy-­five per cent of its funds are disbursed as concessional loans or grants, with Sub-­Saharan Africa and Asia each receiving 40 per cent shares. However, IFAD differs from other MDBs in important respects. First, its mandate is restricted to one, albeit broad, sector. Second, despite being an almost universal organization, about 40 per cent of its funding comes from non-­OECD/DAC donors. The 1970s oil crisis left OPEC countries with a significant windfall, and they were persuaded to make a sizeable contribution to IFAD to help small farmers badly affected by the oil price spike. ‘Rough parity’ originally characterized the financial contributions of OPEC members and developed countries, with equal voting weights for each bloc. More recently contributions have come mainly from OECD/DAC donors, and voting shares have become more complex. Votes now reflect IFAD’s dual character, where it is simultaneously a part of the UN System (governed by the one-­member-­one-­vote principle) and the IFIs (where votes reflect members’ contributions). Votes are divided into two categories: 1800 ‘original’ votes allocated before the third replenishment (1989) and ‘new’ votes allocated for later contributions. The original votes are split into 790 ‘membership’ votes divided equally between all members and 1010 votes apportioned according to pre-­1989 contributions. Subsequent contributions have generated 2484 new votes at a rate of one vote per $158m of contributions; however, one-­third of these new votes are distributed equally to all developing-­country members. Similar changes have taken place in the composition of the IFAD Executive Board, where three broad groupings of countries are defined. OECD/DAC donors have eight members, oil-­exporting developing countries four and other developing countries six members. The net impact of these changes is to reduce the voice of the oil-­exporting group. The Board is supervised by a Governing Council that meets annually.

8.10.2 Current activities, evaluation and future challenges Like some of the sub-­regional development banks (Box 8.1) IFAD has developed a niche expertise in helping the rural poor, who are overwhelmingly

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dependent on agriculture, livestock and fishing for their livelihoods and who constitute three-­quarters of those living in absolute poverty. IFAD has lent $14b, attracted a further $10b of co-­financing to 900 projects and is a ‘prominent player’ (Shaw 2008: 87) in rural development in many countries. IFAD in common with other IOs involved in agriculture faces factors beyond its control in resolving agricultural problems, not least that the promised levels of funding have never materialized. Nevertheless, IFAD’s institutional and organizational shortcomings have exacerbated these problems. An independent external evaluation (IFAD 2005) concluded that IFAD’s work had had undistinguished results and that its loans related poorly to its development objectives. The evaluation found a lack of sustainability in IFAD’s investment in rural institutions, noting that ‘only half the projects evaluated had made more than a modest impact’. Similarly half of IFAD projects had to be redesigned in the course of implementation. Moreover, its move into microfinancing apart, IFAD failed to produce the hoped-­for innovative policies because of an internal culture discouraging risk taking. Much of this reflected a growing mismatch between IFAD’s institutional arrangements and its expanding functions. IFAD’s remit had extended far beyond the original narrow focus on agricultural productivity, and it did not have the staff expertise to become a fully fledged development bank. Since 2007 a thorough reform programme has sought to address these issues by bringing project supervision back in-­house, augmenting IFAD’s field presence and enhancing the organization’s reputation as a knowledge bank. IFAD’s fourth Strategic Framework (2011–15) was conceived against the background of climate change, food price spikes and the MDGs. Its principal aims are to: zz enhance the resilience of the rural poor by equipping them with resources

to make rural living profitable and sustainable;

zz upgrade relevant rural organizations, including those encouraging people

to take advantage of decent work opportunities (see ILO, Chapter 7, section 7.2); and zz improve the policy environment to boost agricultural production and associated non-­farm activities.

However, mirroring broader criticisms of the development agenda, IFAD’s emphasis on making rural communities more resilient to external pressures perpetuates dependency and underdevelopment rather than offering a ­solution to it.

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SUGGESTED READING

Bronstone, A. (1999), The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development: The Building of a Bank for East Central Europe, Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. [EBRD’s work with transition states explained in an ‘ideas-­based’ context that supplements conventional IO theories] Kappagoda, N. (1995), The Multilateral Development Banks, vol. 2: The Asian Development Bank, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. [Covers governance, loan performance and Japan’s role in ADB, plus country case studies] Marshall, K. (2008), The World Bank: From Reconstruction to Development to Equity, Abingdon, UK: Routledge. [A concise, insider’s view of IBRD which recognizes the institution’s defects] Meenai, S.A. (1989), The Islamic Development Bank: A Case Study of Islamic Cooperation, London: Kegan Paul. [Covers IsDB’s first 12 years of operations] Mingst, K.A. (1990), Politics and the African Development Bank, Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. [An evaluative comparison between Af DB and other MDBs and the politics of its decision making up to its first serious reorganization] Robinson, N. (2009), ‘The European Investment Bank: the EU’s neglected institution’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 47 (3), 651–73. [Explains EIB’s importance to European integration and sketches out lines of future research] Tussie, D. (1995), The Multilateral Development Banks, vol. 4: The Inter-­American Development Bank, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. [Covers governance, loan performance and case studies] Zoellick, R. (2012) ‘Why we still need the World Bank: looking beyond aid’, Foreign Affairs, 91 (2), 66–78. [Former IBRD President outlines IBRD’s recent work and makes a case for its retention]

Internet resources ADB: http://www.adb.org Af DB: http://www.afdb.org EBRD: http://www.ebrd.com EIB: http://www.eib.org IBRD: http://www.worldbank.org IDB: http://www.iadb.org IFAD: http://www.ifad.org IFC: http://www.ifc.org IsDB: http://www.isdb.org MIGA: http://www.miga.org

Sub-­regional development banks Andean Development Corporation: http://www.caf.com Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development: http://www.arabfund.org Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa: http://www.badea.org Black Sea Trade and Development Bank: http://www.bstdb.org Caribbean Development Bank: http://www.caribank.org Central American Bank for Economic Integration: http://www.bcie.org Council of Europe Development Bank: http://www.coebank.org East African Development Bank: http://www.eadb.org

The development banks  East and Southern Africa Trade and Development Bank: http://www.ptabank.org Eurasian Development Bank: http://eabr.org Fonplata: http://www.fonplata.org Nordic Investment Bank: http://www.nib.int North American Development Bank: http://www.nadbank.org OPEC Fund for International Development: http://www.ofid.org West African Development Bank: http://www.boad.org

Other Bretton Woods Project: http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org Independent External Evaluation of IFAD (2005): http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/iee

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9 The money managers The IOs in this chapter, namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the European Central Bank (ECB), underpin the ‘international financial architecture’ and have ­gradually become more deeply implicated in the globalization and ­governance of the financial system. Collectively they lead efforts to deliver the global public good of financial stability by predicting, managing and resolving financial crisis, acting as hubs for the development of global regulatory networks, crafting and enforcing norms and rules for cross-­border financial transactions, promoting macroeconomic policy coordination, undertaking and disseminating research about financial systems, advising governments on policies to foster economic growth, and providing mechanisms to settle international payments. Unlike the development banks (Chapter 8), which obtain their funds by drawing on guarantees provided by their members and use the resulting proceeds to further their work, these institutions manage their members’ real assets and have staff who invest those funds for members’ benefit. Individually each organization occupies a niche which emphasizes some of these functions over others. With an almost universal membership and substantial financial backing IMF is responsible for preventing financial markets from destabilizing the global economy, mainly through extensive surveillance, emergency financial support to economically embattled governments, and catalysing efforts to reinforce the regime for international financial cooperation. BIS is the central bankers’ central bank. A ­trans-­regional international organization (see Chapter 1), it too fulfils the function of fostering cooperation and surveillance, but its distinct contribution is to provide a range of banking services to facilitate central bank operations. The newest of the three, ECB, is a regional organization existing to manage monetary policy for the 18 members of the Eurozone. During the Eurozone crisis ECB’s mandate has been stretched beyond that envisaged by its founders, and the Eurozone’s importance to the health of the global economy has ensured ECB a seat at the top tables of global financial governance.

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The growth of international governance by IOs accelerated financial globalization. By variously smoothing economic disturbances, acting as lenders of last resort, instigating and policing international rules and promoting transparency, IOs have removed some of the uncertainties associated with cross-­ border financial transactions and stimulated their growth. Initially, however, IOs were tasked with restricting rather than cultivating financial integration. Adamant that the financial volatility of the interwar period should not be repeated, states agreed at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference to instigate strict curbs on financial markets so they could be managed in the public interest (see Box 9.1). Established to oversee the Bretton Woods system, IMF was supposed to allow limited financial reintegration to support the productive economy and manage economic imbalances that arose. Gradually, and often with leading states’ tacit support, new technologies and financial products allowed market actors to circumvent these rules. The pace of financial reintegration quickened during the 1960s and outran efforts by IOs to control it, which prompted the Bretton Woods’ collapse in 1971. Since then the financial environment and the IOs’ roles in governing it have changed drastically. Bretton Woods’ collapse coincided with the rebirth of the liberal philosophy, which held that markets work most effectively when private actors are left to manage risks without state interference. The extent to which IOs promoted this intellectual revolution is open to debate; what is unquestionable is the zeal with which they have propagated these ideas. Whereas the IMF originally insisted that states should maintain stringent controls on short-­term capital movements, from the 1970s it has campaigned for states to liberalize their capital accounts. Furthermore it has also advised states to float their exchange rates, allow markets to determine interest rates, deregulate their financial sectors and adopt light-­touch financial regulation. By the end of the twentieth century liberalization had given financial market actors a degree of freedom and encouraged globalization to an extent not witnessed since the period of the classical gold standard. This brought with it many additional problems with which IOs and an increasingly sophisticated international financial architecture have had to contend. The removal of barriers to financial movements, coupled with the growth of esoteric financial instruments designed to manage risks, sponsored an explosion of financial flows. For example, from an annual turnover of $15b in 1973, the world’s foreign exchange markets now handle $5trillion daily. The size, speed and volatility of these financial flows left many governments vulnerable to short-­term capital withdrawals, and consequently the incidence and severity of financial crises rose sharply. These problems were most pronounced in developing countries, whose integration into the world’s financial system had

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gained momentum after Bretton Woods, although the interconnected nature of global finance meant no country could be fully insulated from the dangers of contagion. This has been vividly demonstrated by the 2007 financial crisis, which has reignited speculation that because the relevant markets are beyond the control of public authorities they may eventually precipitate a crisis of such magnitude that the global financial system will collapse. Paradoxically, immediately prior to the 2007 crisis financial IOs, the IMF especially, looked to be slipping into obscurity. The world’s financial elites had convinced themselves that they had found the magic formula for economic stability. A combination of better government policies (often tutored and policed by IO surveillance), central bank independence, reduced state regulation, better international guidelines, the tendency of markets to be self-­ correcting and their genius for inventing products to manage financial risk had, except for a few minor difficulties, delivered a lengthy period of non-­ inflationary growth. With major financial crises seemingly part of history, countries being able to meet their funding requirements from markets awash with liquidity and a host of intergovernmental committees taking responsibility for elaborating regulations, questions were raised about downsizing financial IOs. Alas, the benign economic conditions enjoyed by much of the world in the 2000s were erected on massive global economic imbalances and an unsustainable expansion of public and private debt. Private debt in particular veiled a combination of accounting tricks, offshore financial scheming and securitized debt instruments that concentrated the financial risks they purported to disperse. Since the crisis, financial IOs have been rehabilitated. Nevertheless, they, and the international financial architecture of which they are a part, are under attack. Critics observe that growing financial instability has accompanied the development of the international financial architecture. Many suggest that this is the result of erecting the entire regulatory edifice on a misplaced faith in unsupervised markets to deliver stability. Even after the most serious financial crisis since the Great Depression (Box 2.2), financial IOs still cling to the belief that market discipline should underpin macroeconomic and regulatory policy and that market actors can manage risk in a manner compatible with the public interest (Crouch 2011). The other main criticisms of financial IOs surround legitimacy and accountability. Over time these IOs have intruded ever more into everyday life. This is perhaps most notable in the context of IMF conditionality (see below) but, as the financial crisis demonstrated, even abstruse matters concerning financial regulation can have serious repercussions. Despite finance being inher-

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ently political, as the allocation of money and credit is a crucial determinant of who gets what, how and when, the design of financial IOs appears to have calculatingly insulated them from troublesome political and national concerns. Financial IOs tend to be dominated by officials from national treasuries and central banks often espousing a free market mantra that represents the views of the financial industry and its desire for low inflation, fiscal prudence and lax regulation, to the detriment of other opinions. Finally, the governance of these IOs has lagged behind changes in the global financial order. Despite some recent reforms, Western countries retain their privileged voices in these bodies, and the financial power of the developing states, especially Brazil, Russia, China and India, is not yet fully recognized. Emerging powers are demonstrating a predilection for unilateral, bilateral or regional solutions that may encourage rival institutions and will detract from the legitimacy of existing IOs.

9.1

The International Monetary Fund (IMF)

9.1.1 Background Conceived at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference (see Chapter 2), IMF’s mission is to minimize the risk that the international monetary and financial system poses to global economic stability. IMF pursues this through programmes that stimulate international cooperation in monetary and financial affairs and that provide advice to states regarding the policies required to ensure economic stability. These aims are given operational effect through: zz ongoing

IMF surveillance and analysis of the international financial system and members’ economic policies; zz TA to assist developing countries improve their economic policies and institutions; and zz conditions attached to IMF loans made to states in economic difficulties as they seek to manage and resolve financial crises. IMF’s mission, the weight attached to different aspects of it, and the means through which it is delivered have progressively departed from those foreseen at Bretton Woods, which reflects the Fund’s own experiences, developments amongst its major creditors, globalization of the financial system, and changing ideological fashions. In pursuit of economic and financial stability IMF’s original Articles of Agreement foresaw six objectives, namely to:

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international monetary cooperation and provide machinery for international consultation and collaboration; zz promote exchange rate stability; zz assist in establishing a multilateral payments system for current transactions, eliminating foreign exchange restrictions hampering the growth of world trade; zz make the Fund’s general resources temporarily available to members, allowing them to rectify their balance of payments without damaging national or international prosperity; zz shorten the duration and lessen the degree of disequilibrium in international balance of payments; and zz be a lender of last resort to its members. Initially IMF was expected to execute this mandate by monitoring and taking action to avert disruption to the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system (see Box 9.1). In particular it was envisaged that IMF would assist states to coordinate their macroeconomic policies in order to minimize financial imbalances that would otherwise endanger fixed exchange rate parities and provide surveillance to deter states from forsaking those policies for short-­ term advantage. Moreover, IMF would be a source of short-­to medium-­term funding for states needing to access additional currency reserves to defend their fixed exchange rates. If states wanted to revalue their currencies by more than 10 per cent they could only do so with IMF approval and then only to correct a fundamental economic disequilibrium. This was designed to forestall the competitive devaluations that had helped wreck the international economy in the 1930s, but eventually led to countries undertaking devaluations below 10 per cent. BOX 9.1

THE BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM At the heart of the Bretton Woods system was a commitment by states to fix or ‘peg’ their currencies to the US dollar and pursue the policies necessary to maintain their exchange rate within a 1 per cent margin either side. Simultaneously the dollar’s value was fixed to gold at $35 per ounce, an exchange rate guaranteed by the USA. Confidence that dollars could always be

converted into gold at this rate effectively made the dollar ‘as good as gold’ and transformed it into the international reserve currency. To prevent fixed exchange rates being disturbed by speculation, states enacted capital controls that allowed money to be transmitted for long-­term investment and to pay for trade but forbade short-­term ­currency movements.

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 Financial globalization gathered pace in the 1960s stimulated by surreptitious state support and innovations such as the Euromarket that enabled the evasion of capital controls. Increasing short-­term capital movements and balance-­of-­ payments disparities placed growing strains on fixed exchange rates, especially as minor differences in states’ macroeconomic stances could now sponsor major speculative flows of money. The strains were exacerbated by a paradox first articulated by Belgian economist Robert Triffin. In order for the Bretton Woods system to work the US had to ensure there was sufficient liquidity by providing dollars to countries that wished to hold them (this was variously achieved by the Marshall Plan, the US military budget and purchasing foreign goods). However, by 1959 the number of dollars in circulation surpassed the volume of gold

backing them up. This meant the US could no longer guarantee to exchange gold at a fixed price, raising the spectre of a run on the dollar as states sought to exchange them for gold. Efforts to mitigate the pressures by devising complementary monetary policies were frequently sabotaged by states seeking short-­term advantage. Most salient was the attitude of the US, the linchpin of the Bretton Woods system. By the late 1960s the US seemed unable, because of its waning hegemony, or unwilling, because of the costs it imposed on its own economy, to underwrite the system. On 15 August 1971, the USA suspended the dollar’s convertibility into gold. Attempts to salvage Bretton Woods were finally abandoned in 1973 when the US devalued the dollar by 10 per cent and allowed the currency’s value to be determined by market forces.

Compared with IBRD, its sister institution, the Fund got off to a slow start. Initially management of the international monetary system was largely conducted unilaterally by the US with minimal recourse to IMF. For example, rather than boosting IMF’s resources when they proved insufficient to steady post-­war European economies and their exchange rates, the US instigated the Marshall Plan and prohibited IMF lending to European countries receiving Marshall Plan aid (see Box 3.1). IMF eventually became more active in the late 1950s as expanding international financial transactions (prompted by the restoration of European currency convertibility), increasing trade and financial innovations overextended many countries’ foreign reserves, which led to demands for its lending. At this point it is worth pausing to consider why and how IMF lends to its members. Unlike IBRD, which funds its lending from commercial markets, IMF is financed through each member paying an assessed ‘quota’, which is held on deposit with the Fund: 25 per cent in special drawing rights (SDRs, Box 9.2) or convertible currencies and 75 per cent in the national currency. Quotas are based on a complex formula which takes into account GDP, average foreign exchange reserves, national income and expenditure, and the

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variability of national current account receipts. Periodically quotas are renegotiated so as to maintain the sustainability of IMF resources. Like every international financial institution (IFI), IMF can supplement its capital by borrowing from any source, although it normally approaches members first. Furthermore IMF disbursements incur service and interest charges that are a key revenue stream. Whereas IBRD concentrates on longer-­term lending for specific development projects (Chapter 8), IMF complements this by supplying short-­term, emergency funds to countries experiencing a balance-­of-­payments crisis, that is to say, countries that cannot access affordable funding from private markets while maintaining adequate foreign exchange reserves. Lending allows states to pay for imports, rebuild reserves and stabilize their currencies, providing respite while they seek to remedy the underlying problems that sparked the crisis. IMF has developed different loan ‘facilities’, each tailored to cater to specific circumstances (Table 9.1); nonetheless, the original standby arrangement still forms the basis for approximately three-­quarters of IMF lending. Fundamentally the facilities work in a similar manner. In the first stage a state negotiates an ‘arrangement’ with IMF that stipulates how, in exchange for drawing on IMF funds, it will alter its policies to nurse its economy back to good health. Generally the weak negotiating position of the country seeking assistance allows IMF to impose sometimes controversial borrowing conditions (conditionality). Conditionality can only be imposed when a state borrows over and above its IMF holdings, and as a country progressively exceeds its quota it is subject to sterner conditionality. Once finalized the arrangement is presented as a letter of intent for approval by the IMF Executive Board. In some cases a provisional loan is agreed, which ensures market stability without necessitating disbursement. Following approval, IMF allocates to the borrowing country currencies or SDRs (Box 9.2) in exchange for its own currency. Technically these are not borrowings, as the Fund has received a deposit of the member’s currency in their place. However the Fund has to be repaid, as the member has to repurchase its currency. Often IMF releases funds in tranches, allowing it to choke off financial support to countries straying from their promises. In the 1960s, the gathering pace of financial globalization and failures of political management eventually overwhelmed efforts to maintain the Bretton Woods system (Box 9.1). Given that a central plank of IMF’s mandate was oversight of the system, blame for its collapse might easily be laid at the organization’s door. Certainly IMF had allowed significant currency misalignments and balance-­of-­payments disequilibria to persist; however, such an assessment is not entirely fair. While IMF might have done a better job

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Table 9.1  Key IMF facilities Facility (date created)

Objectives

Quota limits

Repayment period

Standby  arrangements 1952 (SBA)

Medium-­term (1–2 years), non-­concessional loans. Disbursement conditional on policy reforms. Can be offered on a precautionary basis. Longer-­term (3 years) balance-­of-­payments assistance for countries, which needed fundamental economic reform. Specific conditionality with strong emphasis on structural adjustment. Provides loans to strong economies experiencing financial crisis. Not subject to specific conditionality, as it is restricted to states with strong track records of macroeconomic policy making. Supports balance-­of-­ payments needs of countries with sound policies that may not meet FCL criteria but do not require the major adjustments associated with SBA. Conditionality is negotiated after the loan is agreed. More flexible lending facility within the original 1974 programme to deal with current financial conditions. Sustained lending for longer-­ term balance-­of-­payments problems. Some flexibility on timing of structural reform. Currently carries no charges.

200 per cent of quota in any 12 months and up to 600 per cent of quota over the course of the programme.

Three to five years

200 per cent of quota in any 12 months and up to 600 per cent of quota over three years.

Four and a half to ten years

No upper limit; can be paid as a single upfront amount.

Three to five years

Loans can be up to 250 per cent of a member’s quota in a six-­month period, with a maximum of 1000 per cent over two years.

Three to five years

Extends EFF disbursement period to four years.

Eight to ten years

100 per cent of quota annually to a maximum of 300 per cent.

Five and a half to ten years

Extended fund  facility (1974) (EFF)

Flexible credit  line (2009) (FCL)

Precautionary  and liquidity line (2010)

Extended fund  facility (2010)

Extended credit   facility (2010)

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Table 9.1  (continued) Facility (date created)

Objectives

Quota limits

Repayment period

Standby credit   facility (2010)

Similar to SBA but for lower-­ income countries. Provides short-­term balance-­of-­ payments assistance. Can be used in a precautionary manner; carries low charges (0.25 per cent). Rapid single payment to countries with urgent financing requirements. Used when the other facilities are inappropriate or unnecessary. Currently carries no charges. Deals with urgent balance-­ of-­payments needs without insisting on full conditionality.

100 per cent of quota annually to a maximum of 300 per cent.

Four and a half to eight years

25 per cent of quota annually up to 75 per cent cumulatively.

Five and a half to ten years

Loans of 50 per cent of a member’s quota annually up to a maximum of 100 per cent.

Three to five years

Rapid credit   facility (2010)

Rapid financing  instrument (2011)

of managing coordination of international monetary and financial policy the fact remains that states, not least the US, chose to pursue these discussions elsewhere (see Chapter 3). If there was a failure of international financial governance the OECD and BIS were as culpable as IMF. Irrespective of whether and to what extent the IMF was at fault for the Bretton Woods system’s collapse, it proved a turning point for the organization (Pauly 1997). Initially the events of the 1970s seemed to threaten key IMF mandates. First, its position as the pre-­eminent forum for consultations regarding international financial management was further challenged by the emergence of the European Economic Community and the G7 (see Box 1.3). Second, a new ideological tide questioned the necessity of organizing international economic cooperation and hence the machinery underpinning it. IMF’s original Articles of Agreement and the Bretton Woods system which they supported had been predicated on the fallibility of financial markets. It was held that the best prescription for preventing exchange rate gyrations from destabilizing the international economy was through political agreements and management of markets by the IMF and others. A fresh consensus was now emerging predicated on liberal economic ideas concerning

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the infallibility of markets. This re-­emergent doctrine felt economic stability could only be secured if exchange rates were allowed to ‘float’, that is to say, be determined by market forces. This reflected a faith in the tendency of markets to move towards equilibrium to prevent the build-­up of dangerous economic imbalances and that the exchange rate of a country experiencing a balance-­ of-­payments surplus would rise in response to demand for its currency. The stronger exchange rate would hinder the country’s exports of goods and services and make imported goods more attractive, with the concomitant erosion of its surplus. The assumption that market-­driven exchange rate adjustments would prevent economic shocks implied IMF’s role regarding international macroeconomic policy coordination was redundant. Finally, IMF’s responsibility to rectify balance-­of-­payments disequilibria was sometimes being bypassed. For instance, although the 1973–74 oil crisis generated considerable economic distress, the need for IMF to make emergency loans or limit financial imbalances was largely obviated by private international banks recycling surpluses from oil-­exporting nations to developed nations wanting to borrow to import more expensive oil. BOX 9.2

SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS (SDRs) States participating in the Bretton Woods system were required to maintain gold and foreign currency reserves in order to purchase their domestic currency in foreign exchange markets and maintain their fixed exchange rate. However, the growth of international trade and finance outpaced these reserves and so, in 1969, states agreed to create SDRs, a new ­international reserve asset under IMF patronage. SDR quotas are based on countries’ IMF subscriptions and contribute to their official reserves. Countries can agree to lend

their SDR holdings to other members or to exchange SDRs for convertible currencies. States may also draw directly on their SDRs without incurring loan conditionalities, which gives them a degree of flexibility in moderate economic downturns. Issuance and allocation of SDRs are controlled by the IMF Board of Governors to ensure an orderly growth in international liquidity. The SDR’s value (in August 2013 equivalent to $1.508) is defined by a weighted basket of four currencies, the details of which are reviewed quinquennially.

In response, IMF’s role was reinvented. In 1978 the IMF’s Articles, which originally barred members from floating exchange rates, were amended to allow them to select whatever exchange rate management system they wished. Concurrent amendments upgraded IMF’s surveillance function, especially over exchange rates (see below). Reflecting the doctrinal changes

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of the time the purpose of this surveillance was less to coordinate international macroeconomic policies and more to identify the ‘correct’ domestic policies for states to pursue in the name of international financial stability. In other words, if states followed appropriate domestic policies there would be no need, in a world of self-­correcting markets, for political intervention in the form of international macroeconomic policy coordination. The biggest reorientation, however, was in the nature of IMF lending. Under Bretton Woods the main risks to financial stability were deemed to be imbalances that threatened fixed exchange rates, which injections of IMF money were designed to preserve. In an era of floating exchange rates, IMF support was used to curb the flow of capital from countries whose financial distress posed a threat to global economic stability. As financial globalization meant that these threats increasingly emanated from developing countries, this altered IMF’s relationship with them. IMF lending until the 1970s is conventionally associated with the developed economies, with the US alone drawing on its IMF reserve tranche 20 times before 1978. However by the end of the 1950s the majority of IMF programmes actually involved developing countries. The 1970s then witnessed an intensification of these relationships to the extent that, by 1982, LDCs were IMF’s only clients. The key moment was the oil crisis, which given their limited ability to tap private international capital markets at sustainable interest rates hit developing country economies hardest. IMF responded by introducing more flexibility into the loan system, including the extended fund facility (Table 9.1), thereby recognizing the need for concessional treatment of developing countries while still imposing conditionality. This effectively moved the Fund into supporting development, something not in its original mandate, which attracted controversy and called into question its legitimacy. These controversies were epitomized by debates surrounding the IMF’s development of structural adjustment policies against the backdrop of the 1982 Latin American debt crisis (see Chapter 3). Despite extensive IMF intervention, Latin American countries had faced repeated financial crises. The Fund concluded that its previous policies provided short-­term relief but did not address the crises’ underlying causes. Its response was structural adjustment, namely more specific, detailed and intrusive loan conditionality, designed not only to restore a country’s balance of payments but to reform economic policies and institutions to prevent problems recurring. However, it was widely held that IMF’s remedies involving market liberalization under the rubric of the Washington Consensus were inappropriate for developing countries and contributed to Latin America’s ‘Lost Decade’ (Chapter 8). Indeed IMF and IBRD regularly clashed over structural adjustment,

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with IBRD believing IMF’s excessive focus on fiscal rectitude disregarded the damaging impact these policies had on poverty reduction and development (Stiglitz 2003). Since IMF intervention is often supported by IBRD and RDB loans, it is important that in the long term the various institutions exist in harmony. In the 1990s, IMF’s reputation was further discredited. Following the USSR’s collapse, Eastern European and Central Asian states joined the Fund and sought its advice and financial support to manage their transition from centrally planned to market-­based economies. However, in Russia especially, IMF was overcome by the scale of the problems (Gilman 2010) and demanded reforms that eventually contributed to the country’s 1998 financial crisis. This predicament, coming in the immediate aftermath of the Asian financial crisis (Box 9.3), severely shook IMF’s credibility and eroded belief in its ability to act as guardian of financial stability. Consequently states further detracted from IMF’s role and authority in international financial governance by involving a clutch of new institutions. In 1999, the G8 founded the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), a group bringing together finance ministers, national regulators, central bank governors and IFI representatives to identify weaknesses in the international financial architecture and formulate best-­practice guidelines to enhance it. The nascent G20 also offered a parallel forum for discussions about policies to deliver financial stability. Finally, states devolved greater responsibility for financial stability to the self-­regulating behaviour of market actors and private institutions, not least the credit ratings agencies. BOX 9.3

THE 1996–97 ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS In the second half of the twentieth century the world’s development success story was undoubtedly the rise of the high-­performing economies of East and South-­East Asia. Here countries, including Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, achieved consistently high growth rates, reduced inequities and lifted millions of people out of poverty. Rather than relying on the genius of markets to allocate resources as posited by the

Washington Consensus, the Asian ‘developmental state’ model (Johnson 1982) saw governments intervene systematically to promote the growth of selected industries. This required close government control over the financial system, including measures to entice savings and retain them through stringent capital controls, fixed exchange rates, trade restrictions providing initial protection from international competition, and large bureaucracies.

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 In the 1990s, under pressure from, amongst others, the US and the IMF to accept the Washington Consensus, these countries began to unpick key facets of the developmental state. As Asian countries loosened their controls, foreign capital flooded in. Then poor banking regulation, compounded by a belief that financial institutions and corporations fostered by the developmental state model had implicit government guarantees against failure, prompted unsustainable stock market, property and consumer booms. For a time high economic growth masked the problems, but by 1996 the Fund was warning Thailand that its heavy external borrowing and consequent overexposure to foreign exchange risks threatened its pegged exchange rate. In 1997 Thailand was forced to devalue. This immediately caused the debt burdens of those that had borrowed in foreign currencies to spiral, which led to a wave of bankruptcies and financial distress. Markets turned their attention to adjacent countries, especially Indonesia and Korea, where similar economic conditions existed. The speed and degree of contagion caught IMF by surprise, but it stepped in with

assistance packages from multilateral and bilateral sources worth $111b, including $57b to South Korea, then the largest single loan ever organized by IMF. IMF’s role in the crisis has been extensively criticized (Stiglitz 2002). It is sometimes accused of precipitating events through advocating premature and hurried financial liberalization. Moreover, its surveillance had failed to spot the problem until it was too late and then, by highlighting Thailand’s troubles in the way that it did, triggered international investors to withdraw support. Nevertheless, most opprobrium was reserved for IMF’s response after the crisis. IMF’s loan packages came with harsh conditions perhaps appropriate for the kinds of long-­term government insolvency it had encountered in the past but completely inappropriate for dealing with short-­term private sector illiquidity. For example, given the high debt burdens afflicting these economies, IMF conditions demanding higher internal interest rates to make national currencies more attractive to investors had a calamitous impact, leading to further bankruptcies and capital outflows and exacerbating the cyclical downturn.

However, as bodies like FSF and G20 were not formal IOs and lacked permanent secretariats, international financial governance after the Asian crisis still had to rely heavily on IMF surveillance. IMF’s extensive surveillance and knowledge dissemination role has always formed the bulk of its day-­to-­day work. It collects statistics on members’ balance of payments, external debt, financial institutions and government finance, data that is published monthly and in an annual yearbook, International Financial Statistics. IMF produces semi-­annual reports on the world economy, such as the World Economic Outlook, in which it analyses global and regional economic trends, and the Global Financial Stability Report, examining financial markets and their weaknesses. IMF is a prolific publisher of research papers and global analyses, such as the annual report Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. One long-­standing surveillance mechanism is a published review of member

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policies under Article IV of IMF’s Articles of Agreement. In what are known as Article IV consultations, an IMF delegation visits each country to assess economic developments, examine its policies and discuss them with government and central bank officials with the objective of agreeing necessary changes before problems surface. Nevertheless, the Asian financial crisis spotlighted weaknesses in IMF surveillance. Since then its oversight of exchange rate policies has been supplemented by better collection of information on members’ monetary and financial policies. The results have included highlighting good-­practice standards for data dissemination, transparency and banking regulation. In 2000 IMF joined with IBRD to formalize these developments within a Financial Sector Assessment Programme, a voluntary scheme which issues Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes. The reports describe how members manage financial risks and adhere to international standards in order to pinpoint vulnerabilities and reduce the potential for financial crisis. This is augmented by TA to help weaker members put the appropriate tools in place. Despite bolstering its surveillance capacity in the 2000s, IMF seemed to be drifting into irrelevance. Not only were discussions about financial stability increasingly occurring elsewhere but demand for IMF lending fell sharply. Between 2004 and 2008 IMF’s loan portfolio dropped 85 per cent to 10b SDR. Previous loyal customers like Argentina, Brazil, Turkey, Mexico, Thailand and Indonesia deserted IMF as benign economic conditions gave them affordable access to private funding. Asian countries, especially, developed swap arrangements and garnered enormous currency reserves capable of warding off financial speculators without having to suffer the humiliation and conditionality of another IMF bailout (see Chapter 8, section 8.5). The concomitant income shortfall placed pressure on IMF’s administrative budget. Gold sales and staff cuts seemed to portend a much diminished IMF until the onset of the 2007 financial crisis renewed interest in its facilities.

9.1.2 Structure IMF’s structure is similar to that of IBRD. This is unsurprising, since they were created contiguously, with membership of the Bank being contingent upon IMF membership, and their governing bodies meet jointly once a year. At the apex is the Board of Governors, which decides on high-­level internal matters such as the distribution of quotas or SDRs, admission of new members and amendments to the Articles of Agreement (see also Chapter

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8, section 8.1.2). Each member nominates a Governor, who is traditionally a minister of finance or a central banker. Most other decisions (including loan approvals, adopting policy changes and discussion of new regulatory proposals) are delegated to a permanent Executive Board of 24 Executive Directors (EDs), some of whom also sit on the IBRD Board, thereby reinforcing the links between the two organizations. Once the 2010 reforms are ratified all seats on the Board will be elected, with advanced European members giving up two seats in favour of emerging economies. While some countries presently have permanent seats on the Board (France, Japan, the UK and the USA) there are also single-­member constituencies (China, Germany, Russia and Saudi Arabia). However, most EDs represent a group of between four and 24 countries, elected by and casting all the votes for the group. IMF Board decisions are normally adopted by consensus, but sometimes votes are required. Each member has approximately 750 basic votes plus one additional vote for every 100 000 SDR of its quota; thus a member’s voting power is largely determined by the size of its quota. Quotas or votes are periodically redefined but, as 85 per cent of members (by quota) must ratify decisions and votes are only altered when a member is fully paid up, changes are slow to take effect. For instance, reforms agreed in 2008 only came to fruition in 2011. While the smallest shareholders have 0.03 per cent votes, the largest quota (17.69 per cent of the total) belongs to the USA, which translates into 16.75 per cent votes. Importantly this gives the US a veto over those IMF decisions requiring an 85 per cent majority for approval, including quota changes, allocation of SDRs and election of the IMF Managing Director (MD). As chair of the Executive Board, the MD is pivotal to IMF decision making, and consequently the US takes particular interest in the selection process. By convention the MD is a European national, since the World Bank President is American; however, the First Deputy MD is always American. US power is accentuated in several other ways. IMF’s location in Washington D.C. affords easy access and influence for US politicians and officials. Moreover, decision-­making processes begin long before items are formally presented to the Board. Many developing countries have a minimal presence at IMF, are less well prepared for meetings and are less able to engage in informal deals and discussions underlying consensus building. Indeed, although the Board seldom votes, consensus normally indicates that directors with sufficient votes have signalled their assent. Governments also meet twice-­yearly in two 24-­member committees, the International Monetary and Financial Committee (which mirrors the com-

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position of the Executive Board) and the Development Committee (a joint IBRD–IMF committee). The committees, to which other IOs send observers, have generally been opinion-­forming not decision-­making in nature, providing high-­level forums for international economic debate. The Monetary and Financial Committee supervises the management of the international monetary system, discusses policy changes needed by IMF and deals with sudden economic disturbances that pose a threat to international financial stability. It has recently taken a more proactive role vis-­à-­vis the Executive Board, sending it proposals for reform and giving it more guidance. The Development Committee (whose members are nominated for two-­year terms by the members of IBRD and IMF alternately) studies critical development issues and recommends measures to promote resource transfers to developing countries. The Secretariat employs many macroeconomists who undertake research and produce authoritative analyses which comment on members’ economic policies and act as early warnings of potential difficulties. The Secretariat is organized on a regional basis (area departments), and within each area department are groups specializing in specific countries who advise management and the Executive Board on the economies and economic policies of their assigned countries. Area departments assist in the development of IMF policies for their countries and negotiate loan conditions as well as overseeing their implementation. IMF has 84 country offices, which maintain continuing contacts with government officials and strengthen the Fund’s surveillance capacity. IMF’s technical departments provide more general back-­up, including contributing to emergency missions mounted when a country needs support. The Fiscal Affairs Department studies members’ public finances and conducts research on matters such as income distribution, poverty, public expenditure policy and social policies. The Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department supports central banks on exchange rate policies plus banking supervision and regulation, both activities that overlap with those of BIS. The Strategy Policy and Review Department designs and implements financial support programmes including the development of IMF’s surveillance policies. It also helps to mobilize other resources if needed, through the Paris Club (Box 9.4). These departments are further supported by a Research Department undertaking macroeconomic research, but the departments also conduct independent studies. The specialist departments provide technical advice to members, and TA accounts for 24 per cent of the IMF budget ($127m), which is supplemented by external resources that, in 2012, amounted to a further $107m.

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BOX 9.4

THE PARIS CLUB Dating from 1956, the Paris Club is an ad hoc group of 19 public sector creditors which convenes in the event that a country faces default and whose composition reflects the mix of the debtors involved. Normally the group recommends the rescheduling or postponement of the defaulter’s official loans in exchange for economic reform. Its secretariat is provided

by the French government, while IMF provides data and reports. Occasionally the Paris Club works in conjunction with the London Club, a corresponding group of private sector creditors, to search for mutually acceptable solutions. By 2013, the Paris Club had concluded 429 agreements with 90 debtor countries covering debts worth $573b.

The Secretariat’s influence is a matter of debate. All important IMF decisions are subject to the political filter provided by the Executive Board. Nevertheless, M. Barnett and Finnemore (2004) have demonstrated that the Secretariat’s superior knowledge and expert authority shape the Board’s agenda and the way issues are framed. While the Secretariat purports to present independent findings based on technical assessments, this conceals a political agenda, favouring certain economic models, that underpins its work. The Fund is regularly upbraided for hiring economists from a narrow stratum of top US universities all having the same background of economic thinking. In 2000, in an effort to improve transparency, the Executive Board created an Independent Evaluation Office (IEO), which reports directly to the Board. IEO has the tasks of enhancing IMF’s learning culture, supporting institutional governance, strengthening the Fund’s external credibility and promoting understanding of the organization. While IEO is not constrained in its ability to investigate Fund programmes, it focuses on long-­term, cross-­ cutting issues (see also section 9.1.4).

9.1.3 Current activities The 2007 global financial crisis resulted in a remarkable turnaround in IMF’s fortunes. The most emphatic manifestations of this are an expansion of its firepower and a resurgence of its operational activities, particularly loans to prevent the spread of financial instability. More subtly, the crisis appears to have reawakened states’ faith in IMF’s programme responsibilities, and it is once again at the centre of debates about reforming the international financial architecture.

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IMF’s main current activity involves schemes for states struggling with the aftermath of the 2007 crisis and the related problems afflicting the Eurozone. Between September 2008 and December 2011 IMF signed agreements with 70 countries. In 2011 new IMF commitments totalled 142.2b SDR compared with 0.6b SDR in 2007. An extra 52.6b SDR of new commitments in 2012 brought IMF’s total outstanding loan book to over 300b SDR; however, only 90b SDR of this had been disbursed, as countries have not drawn upon flexible credit lines (see Table 9.1). Two groups of borrowers are especially noteworthy. The first is the highly indebted Eurozone countries, where IMF is a co-­financer along with the EU and ECB, the so-­called ‘troika’. Initially European institutions tried to exclude IMF from Eurozone rescue packages but in May 2010 accepted that it could contribute loans worth up to €250b to EU’s stabilization fund, the European Financial Stability Facility. Though IMF is the junior partner it is the only troika member that can insist on conditionality and, as an external body able to offer objective assessments of the Eurozone’s peripheral economies, its presence is essential. The troika’s first loan (in 2010) was for €110b to bail out the Greek economy, of which €30b came from an IMF standby arrangement. This money was used primarily to repay private creditors rather than to reduce government debt. IMF admitted that the failure to reduce public debt, aggravated by conditionalities demanding austerity, failed to repair market confidence (IMF 2013), necessitating painful debt restructuring. A second €130b bailout in March 2012 included a €28b extended fund facility equating to 2159 per cent of Greece’s quota. The first Greek bailout was followed by others for Ireland (in 2010), Portugal (2011) and Cyprus (2013). IMF’s entanglement in the Eurozone imbroglio is possibly damaging its reputation. Over Greece in particular IMF bowed to the other troika members’ desire for austerity, undermining its potential as a neutral negotiator. Worse, it has created the impression that Berlin and Brussels are making decisions about IMF-­funded programmes and that the judgements reflect the demands of European donor governments rather than broader objectives of global financial stability. The second group is developing countries. In 2012 IMF had 5.5b SDR in outstanding concessional funding arrangements with LDCs. Many of these arrangements were ongoing commitments to states long supported by IMF loans. Nevertheless, a retrenchment in global financial flows, especially for those with restricted access to private capital markets, forced many states to ask for IMF assistance. Indeed, since the onset of the crisis, IMF concessional lending has risen to almost six times its long-­term average. Paradoxically,

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IMF’s other ongoing work in LDCs, in partnership with the development banks, is debt relief through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. HIPC has many shortcomings (Box 8.2), and IMF’s sale of gold holdings to fund HIPC potentially damages its lending capacity. That IMF has been able to make these loans reflects two other developments connected to the crisis. First, as Table 9.1 demonstrates, IMF has conceived new, more flexible lending facilities. These are characterized by rapid disbursement, higher lending limits and fewer conditions that are more supportive of LDCs, especially where borrowing countries have relatively strong economic track records. Second, and in a gesture of confidence in IMF, members agreed in 2009 to triple their quotas to $750b and pledged a further $450b as a credit line to supplement IMF resources if needed. Finally in the context of the crisis there has been high demand for IMF surveillance and policy advice. G20 communiqués have been filled with references to IMF and reaffirmations of its roles. Requests are regularly made in the context of international cooperation for the Fund to participate in surveys and develop ideas to reform the international financial architecture (A.F. Cooper 2010), for example working with ILO to reduce unemployment. Additionally, in response to criticisms that it again failed to detect a looming financial crisis, IMF launched its Financial Surveillance Strategy in 2012, which seeks to strengthen its surveillance capacity through encouraging greater cohesion across departments and eradicating previously overlooked problems such as capital flows and debt sustainability.

9.1.4 Evaluation and future challenges Amongst IOs arguably only the UN and the EU have attracted more critical commentary than IMF, and its obituary has been written many times (Dieter 2006). Opponents observe that, despite a mandate to promote international economic stability, it has: zz presided

severity;

over a string of financial crises of growing magnitude and

zz allowed

dangerous financial imbalances to persist amongst leading economies; zz through its conditionalities, intruded on sovereignty; and zz frequently exacerbated the problems its prescriptions set out to solve. Nevertheless, there are competing explanations for its failings. Free marketeers argue that IMF has failed because it interferes with the market mecha-

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nism. For example, IMF’s existence as an international lender of last resort foments moral hazard, because states know that even if they pursue reckless policies they will be eligible for a rescue. Their opponents argue that IMF’s shortcomings derive from its fixation with free markets, which without political management are prone to manias, panics and crashes (Kindleberger and Aliber 2011) and exaggerate poverty and inequality in countries subject to IMF conditionality (see Chapter 8). Indeed a central irony is that IMF’s existence is an acknowledgement that markets fail, yet the organization acts as though markets are perfect. Another aspect of moral hazard flowing from IMF loans is that in many crises they are used to repay private creditors. The belief that their losses will be limited encourages private actors to take excessive risks and become exposed to countries pursuing unsustainable policies. In IMF’s defence it might be said that its remedies are better than the alternatives, namely the collapse of the global financial system or bilateral rescues that leave states at the mercy of their peers. Our evaluation delves deeper into these debates and concludes that observers are sometimes too hard on IMF, but for its ‘phoenix’ to continue to rise reform is vital ( Joyce 2013). Arguably the most controversial aspect of IMF’s work surrounds the legitimacy and effectiveness of loan conditionality. Between 1952 and 2012 IMF arranged 1180 loans for member states, and almost four-­fifths of the members have accessed IMF credit. While there have been contradictory results depending on the data and methodology employed, IMF loans are generally held to have yielded disappointing results. The evidence suggests that IMF programmes hurt economic growth and raise inequality (Dreher 2009). Irrespective of the circumstances IMF invariably diagnoses balance-­ of-­payments problems as symptoms of excess demand and/or structural failings, and thus conditionality follows the same template, namely actions to constrain domestic demand followed by free market economic reforms advocated under the Washington Consensus. Typically remedial measures entail swingeing cuts to public expenditure, devaluation, privatization of state assets and capital account liberalization. These austerity measures, as Eurozone countries’ recent experience has demonstrated, can prove self-­defeating through reinforcing the economic downturn rather than stimulating the growth needed to boost tax revenues to pay down debts. Unfortunately worsening economic conditions and many of the recommended savings, for example cutting food and fuel subsidies, hit the most vulnerable groups hardest. The resulting social unrest (as seen in Greece and Portugal), what Stiglitz (2002) calls the ‘IMF riot’, gives foreign investors a reason to disinvest. As well as wreaking economic harm, IMF conditionality is also charged with asking states to implement policies bearing little or no relation to the causes of the crisis. This has raised suspicions that IMF is exploiting financial

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crises to entrench the free market model. Moreover, because IMF remedies do not tackle a crisis’s underlying causes, problems recur, requiring permanent rather than temporary IMF support. There is, however, another side to the conditionality debate. First, IMF is the lender of last resort. In other words it is only called upon in severe crises where other sources of assistance are unavailable. IMF interventions thus represent a skewed sample, and its remedies are unlikely to be panaceas for economies that have suffered years of mismanagement. Indeed dysfunctional governments, being most often in need of support, accept conditionalities to secure financing but are the least able to implement them. IMF research shows that, when a government’s commitment to loan conditionality is weak, decisions are avoided or diluted and the loan rarely achieves its objectives. Second, all financial institutions place conditions on their loans and conditionality is essential if moral hazard is to be discouraged and states made to realize there is a penalty for economic recklessness. IMF intervention is often the result of a government’s own inept policies, which will only change under external pressure. The democratic implications of conditionality are also contested. IMF programmes intrude considerably on domestic economic policy and the everyday lives of citizens. Yet critics assert that IMF pays more attention to foreign investors and domestic elites than the views of labour and the poor upon whom most of the costs are exacted. Nonetheless, IMF conditionalities become a convenient excuse for low economic growth. Furthermore, as with IBRD, governments sometimes welcome conditionalities to overcome domestic opposition to unpopular yet desirable policies they wish to implement. In other words, far from being forced to implement policies against their will, states use IMF as cover. In fact, IMF has little power to upbraid those who abrogate their commitments. Letters of intent are not legally enforceable, and although IMF can suspend voting rights or access to its funds such punishments have rarely been inflicted. Another weapon that IMF’s bigger borrowers have in their armoury is the threat of default. Both IMF and these borrowers know that a sovereign default has the potential to jeopardize the organization’s resources, and it has frequently rolled over lending to poor performers to avoid a potential default. Indeed in 2001 Argentina threatened default to renegotiate its terms with IMF. This issue has resurfaced in the Eurozone crisis. Portugal, Ireland and Greece have borrowed many multiples of their quotas and together received two times IMF’s combined lending to all other countries. This concentration of risk in one region raises the spectre of default being used as a mechanism

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to resist necessary reforms. IMF’s inability to end assistance, even if countries renege on their commitments, could undermine the credibility it has won back during the financial crisis. To allay criticism IMF has, since the inception of its 1999 Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy, sought to minimize the number of conditions, tailor them to the borrower’s economic situation and give recipients greater ownership (Best 2007). Since the 2007 financial crisis IMF has claimed that conditions have been relaxed further, with old nostrums such as capital account liberalization being set aside. However, many remain unconvinced that IMF has renounced its doctrinal commitment to free market conditionalities and assert that post-­crisis IMF programmes show ‘no fundamental divergence from the pre-­existing repertoire’ (Guven 2012: 870) of the Bretton Woods institutions. Worries about conditionality are compounded by deficiencies in IMF governance and accountability, especially concerns that decision making is unfairly dominated by developed nations. This translates into policies that are inappropriate for IMF’s main clients, developing-­world borrowers to whom IMF is least accountable, despite the fact that their repayments cover the organization’s running costs. Major donors can also abuse their position. For example, powerful states may look more kindly on programmes that stop countries defaulting on loans owed to their own commercial banks. R. Stone (2004) has uncovered evidence of systematic intervention by IMF in Africa to promote lenient conditionality towards favoured states. Copelovitch (2010) has confirmed that recipients closely allied to powerful donors receive more generous IMF terms. These problems have become more acute with the increasing financial power of several emerging economies. For example, while eight members had single-­country seats, 43 African countries shared two EDs whose combined vote was below 5 per cent. Ongoing reforms to bolster the Fund’s legitimacy by addressing concerns over the balance of power will continue at least until 2014. In 2008 quotas were adjusted slightly by shifting 2.7 per cent from Western nations to China, Mexico, South Korea and Turkey to recognize their mounting economic importance. However, this small adjustment was regarded as insufficient, and further changes were approved in 2010. These still leave intact the US veto and the European stranglehold on the MD but do bring Russia, India, Brazil and China within the ten biggest members by quota and redistribute 5 per cent of votes towards dynamic emerging markets and developing countries. Pursuit of reform has become even more contentious now that IMF’s principal borrowers are also European. The reforms also ignore the informal exercise of power in IMF (Woods and Lombardi 2006). For example, many decisions are negotiated

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outside the Board (see section 9.1.2), something that has caused considerable bitterness when the IMF rushed into the Eurozone bailouts without properly consulting with those Asian countries whose extra funding was underpinning the organization’s largesse. Renewed interest in IMF’s role as the stabilizer of the global financial system since 2008 suggests the organization’s prospects are bright (Moschella 2012). The fragmentation of global financial governance and shunning of IMF that began after the Asian crisis is starting to reverse, and the Fund is once again hosting discussions of reforms to the international financial architecture. However, this rehabilitation can only continue with members’ support, and several challenges lie in wait. First, as previously intimated, IMF needs further reforms to bolster its legitimacy amongst developing and emerging countries. For example, IMF’s high number of programmes conceals the fact that two-­thirds of its commitments in developing economies are in four countries: Ukraine, Hungary, Romania and Pakistan. Meanwhile more advanced borrowers such as Mexico, Turkey and Brazil now avoid IMF, preferring instead to accumulate large foreign exchange reserves as insurance against future crises. Set against the $8500b in foreign reserves now held by developing and emerging states, even IMF’s enhanced financial firepower looks insignificant, and its responses could be overtaken by the scale and speed of modern financial markets. However, these ‘surplus’ countries are unlikely to rely on or be willing to devote extra resources to IMF if their influence remains marginal. As before, if IMF has no borrowers then its role will be called into question. Second, the existence of large foreign exchange reserves is a sign of major imbalances in the global economy that could cause future financial instability (Wolf 2009). IMF should have a major role to play in fostering international cooperation to manage exchange rates and reduce these imbalances. Nonetheless, its ability to tackle this is hindered by the relationships of the two main protagonists to the IMF. Neither the USA (the world’s biggest debtor) nor China (the world’s biggest creditor) borrows from IMF. If leading states will not listen to IMF’s counsel its legitimacy is likely to be impaired. Third, IMF has a poor record of forecasting crises and has subsequently misdiagnosed them. Promised surveillance reforms (see section 9.1.3) are essential, but history suggests they will be resisted. Kaya (2012) observes that surveillance that would be sufficiently intrusive to supply global financial stability would pose intolerable intrusions on sovereignty. Even if reform were forthcoming the Fund would be wary of chastising its major donors.

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Furthermore IMF has to work in an environment of strict confidentiality concerning members’ financial management; otherwise it would not obtain unrestricted access to the sensitive data needed to make accurate analyses of their economies and to provide early warning of difficulties. However, this means that warnings given by the Fund are often not made public and can be ignored. Finally, IMF seems unwilling to abandon its attachment to free markets, an intellectual position that has become even more tenuous since 2008. As IEO stated in its evaluation of the financial crisis, ‘the IMF’s ability to correctly identify the mounting risks was hindered by a high degree of group-­think, intellectual capture, a general mindset that a major financial crisis in large advanced economies was unlikely and inadequate analytical approaches’ (IMF/IEO 2011). This built on an earlier appraisal that the Fund’s country teams had too many macroeconomists and too few financial and development specialists.

9.2

The Bank for International Settlements (BIS)

9.2.1 Background Founded in 1930, BIS is the oldest financial IO. Its mission is to promote monetary and financial stability by ‘promot[ing] the cooperation of central banks and to provide additional facilities for international financial operations; and to act as trustee or agent in regard to international financial settlements entrusted to it’ (BIS Statutes, Article 3). The operational parts of BIS’s assignment, such as helping central banks manage financial crises, remain important, but latterly the programme parts of its mandate have come to the fore. Since the 1970s BIS and its associated institutions have become central to efforts to develop international standards for banking supervision. Moreover BIS has a significant and influential role as a centre for knowledge management. Overlapping with IMF and OECD (see Chapter 4), BIS has a substantial research department investigating financial market and macroeconomic issues of interest to central banks. BIS maintains data on the international banking system, and its annual report is its primary vehicle for economic analysis, which contains in-­depth sectoral reviews of topics of immediate concern. BIS’s origins lie in the difficulties experienced in enforcing and managing Germany’s First World War reparation payments, which were regularly interrupted by the country’s economic difficulties. It became the intermediary through which reparations were paid, and it was invested with a working fund

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to smooth the flow of payments to recipients. Although the BIS reparations account remained open until 1968, Germany suspended payments in 1932, allowing central bank cooperation to dominate the organization’s agenda. BIS’s Statutes gave the organization the status of a limited company, with a working capital created from shares subscribed by its owners. Initially it was intended that the owners would be the central banks of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, the UK and the USA. For several reasons, principally isolationism and not being party to reparation payments, the US government avoided involvement. Accordingly, for 64 years, the US Federal Reserve did not take the US seat, and US participation was left to private bankers supported by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. US shares were therefore held by three commercial banks. Parts of the French and Belgian allocations were also held privately, an arrangement that continued up to 2001. As new members joined, share subscriptions were increased or redistributed. The founding members agreed to transact business exclusively with each other, not with commercial banks, for which purpose they established a coordination mechanism. As an operating bank, BIS offers central banks, including non-­members, a range of facilities. For example, BIS holds cash and gold deposits from each participating central bank, which can be moved swiftly from one central bank account to another without market intervention, and this facilitates effective short-­term support to currencies under attack. Problems associated with the Great Depression (Box 2.2) and the move away from a strict gold standard by the UK and others meant BIS was in action straight away, advancing credit to the central banks of Austria, Germany, Hungary, Spain and Yugoslavia in 1931. Shortly afterwards the US, the UK and France concluded a tripartite agreement to follow certain economic and monetary policies and to hold joint consultations on exchange rate movements. Later subscribed to by Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland, this agreement owed much to central bank governors meeting within a BIS-­ provided framework and marked the start of the regular, informal meetings of key central bankers that continue to this day. BIS’s post-­war survival was threatened by revelations that it had received gold looted by the Nazis from the Belgian and Dutch central banks. The Bretton Woods agreement gave IMF an overarching mandate and called for BIS’s liquidation, but this was fiercely resisted by central banks. BIS was therefore used to disburse Marshall Plan funds and was involved in developing and providing banking services to the European Payments Union, a clearing mechanism, established by the Organisation for European Economic

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­ o-­operation, that is widely credited with overcoming the obstacles to intra-­ C European trade caused by a foreign exchange shortages (see Chapter 10, section 10.1). Ironically, it was the Bretton Woods system that cemented BIS’s position. While defending the Bretton Woods system was formally IMF’s responsibility (see Box 9.1), BIS became intrinsic to Bretton Woods crisis management during the 1960s. Continental European countries had opposing policy perspectives to those of the US and the UK, which resulted in their favouring BIS over IMF, which they felt was too US dominated (see also Chapter 3). Beginning in 1961 eight central banks launched a Gold Pool to stabilize gold prices, monitored by a BIS-­provided secretariat. The Gold Pool’s initial success and its regular meetings built on existing mechanisms designed to enable central banks to develop compatible monetary policies to prevent the destabilization of fixed exchange rates. BIS also developed currency swap arrangements offering prompt support for currencies facing the threat of devaluation. The first post-­war collective use of central bank resources channelled through BIS was credits extended to the Bank of England in 1961 to support sterling, a process repeated in 1964, 1965 and 1967, augmented by ‘group arrangements’ in 1966 and 1968. Similar packages were devised for other prominent currencies, including the Italian lira (1964) and the French franc (1968). The capricious nature of the post-­Bretton Woods financial system emphasized the importance of central bank cooperation. Emergency financial assistance coordinated through BIS remained in demand. During the 1970s BIS assisted oil-­producing countries to recycle surpluses by investing them in US government bonds and later provided emergency financial assistance to IMF programmes, for instance in Mexico (1982) and Brazil (1998). Furthermore, demand continued for BIS to supply financial services and act as a venue for central bankers to discuss monetary policy. Starting in 1964 BIS hosted a European Economic Community (EEC) central bank committee charged with developing an integrated European monetary policy. Eventually that committee, supported by a BIS secretariat, had a decisive impact on the Maastricht Treaty’s framework for economic and monetary union, leading to ECB’s forerunner, the European Monetary Institute, being located at BIS. However, in other ways Bretton Woods’ demise transformed the content of central bank collaboration at BIS. The traditional emphasis on monetary and macroeconomic policy was supplemented by cooperation to develop global banking regulations. Today, BIS houses or provides the secretariats for nine regulatory committees or institutions, a process that commenced in 1974

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with what subsequently became known as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and also includes the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the International Association of Insurance Supervisors and the International Association of Deposit Insurers. The catalyst for BCBS was a series of banking failures which highlighted the twin dangers of the post-­Bretton Woods environment (Goodhart 2011). Accustomed to fixed exchange rates, many banks and regulators underestimated the risks posed to the soundness of financial institutions by oscillating currency values. This was aggravated by the growing mismatch between national regulatory authority and the increasingly international character of many banks, plus a lack of clarity over whether oversight responsibilities belonged to the ‘home’ supervisor, where the financial institution was headquartered, or the ‘host’ supervisor in whose territories banking subsidiaries and activities resided. In 1974, the G10 central bank governors responded by establishing BCBS and agreeing that BIS would host it and provide its secretariat. BCBS assembles those responsible for banking supervision to share their regulatory experiences as a precursor to developing global standards to improve banking regulation and cross-­border cooperation. Its first agreement, the Basel Concordat of 1975, clarified the issue of supervisory responsibility by enunciating the principle of ‘international cooperation based on home country control’ (Kapstein 1994), which would be extended into other fields of international financial regulation. This principle held that national regulatory authorities were answerable for the international activities of their domestic banks and for ensuring compliance with international regulations. To verify their banks’ foreign activities national regulators would have to rely on intensive information exchange with their overseas counterparts. Having agreed this general principle BCBS then turned to promoting regulatory convergence and uniform minimum standards. Following a decade-­long negotiation the 1988 Basel Capital Accord negotiated minimum levels of capital that banks should hold against contingencies reflecting the riskiness of their assets. The Accord had two main aims. The first was to enhance the soundness of banks by requiring them to maintain adequate capital to insure them against financial losses. The second was to level the competitive playing field. The US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England were in the vanguard of this latter initiative as they looked to restrain the competitiveness of Japanese banks (Seabrooke 2006). They argued that Japan’s more generous capital adequacy regime gave its banks an unfair advantage because it meant that a greater proportion of their capital could be prof-

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itably invested. Banks found several ways to circumnavigate these restrictions (see section 9.2.4), and the Asian financial crisis sparked negotiations for a revised Accord. Concluded in 2004, Basel II aimed at greater transparency and precision concerning the risks posed by different assets. Nevertheless some aspects of the agreement, including allowing banks a bigger role in assessing the riskiness of their balance sheets, were controversial, and in 2010, following the financial crisis, a third Basel Accord was presented. The BIS Board was exclusively European until the election of the central bank of Canada, the re-­entry of Japan in 1994 and the US Federal Reserve’s belated decision to take up its seat. Although BIS membership had slowly expanded (from 31 members in 1931 to 38 members by 1990), members were overwhelmingly from Europe and the British dominions. In the 1990s, the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the communist bloc generated new members, while reactivated Baltic states’ shareholdings, suspended in 1940, further reinforced European dominance. Thanks to the globalization of market economics and the entrepreneurship of General Manager Andrew Crockett, BIS underwent a seismic shift between 1996 and 2003, welcoming 19 new shareholders (17 non-­European) and establishing offices in Hong Kong and Mexico City to act as foci for regional discussions and liaison. More recently, in 2011, BIS invited the central banks of Colombia, Luxembourg, Peru and the United Arab Emirates to join, bringing the total membership to 60.

9.2.2 Structure BIS membership and governance structure resemble those of a private club of like-­minded members, where informality and the opportunity to meet in its technical committees are important and, indeed, might be considered the main outcome of its everyday work. The pinnacle of BIS decision making is the annual general meeting of all its members. Other central banks using its facilities may attend, but only shareholders may vote. BIS’s strategic direction is determined by and its main work channelled through its Board of Directors, a committee with ex officio seats reserved for six of its founding members (all except Japan), each of which may appoint a second director, with up to nine other members elected for three-­year terms making up the balance. To encourage frank exchanges of opinion, every two months the Board, joined by other members, hold off-­the-­record discussions on financial policies and current matters of interest. One meeting, the Global Economy Meeting, composed of 30 members from major developed and emerging economies, is also attended by 19 observer central banks. It monitors developments and risks in the global economy and provides guidance to three central bank committees, those on the:

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International organizations zz Global Financial System (23 members), which monitors markets for the

purposes of identifying and averting threats to global financial stability; zz Payment and Settlement Systems (25 members), which scrutinizes domestic and cross-­border payment and clearing systems; and zz Markets (21 members), which examines the functioning of financial markets. A second set of meetings open to all members (the All Governors Meeting) is where specific topics of a structural nature are discussed such as the suitability of exchange rate regimes, problems with fiscal rules and reform of derivatives markets. This meeting also oversees the work of a central bank statistical committee and a group concerned with central bank governance. The BIS Secretariat is organized similarly to other IFIs; it undertakes financial and investment work and supports a technical arm, mostly concerned with macroeconomic research. One-­fifth of BIS staff are financial traders. They invest members’ assets held on short-­term call for international currency transactions to obtain the best possible interest on their deposits and also invest the working capital to generate a profit, which is paid as a dividend to shareholders. In 2012, some 140 central banks and IOs used BIS services, with the total managed deposits held by BIS amounting to 196b SDR, 2.7 per cent of world foreign exchange reserves. The Secretariat’s other main function is to support the work of the many bodies related to global financial stability housed at its Basel headquarters.

9.2.3 Current activities The current BIS work programme centres round the Basel III standards, which came into effect in 2013 and are due to be fully implemented by 2019. A major activity of BCBS is to monitor their implementation and resolve outstanding issues such as precisely defining the capital adequacy assessment formula for systemically important global banks or developing common disclosure guidelines within which banks will report on their liquidity ratios. This work is closely allied to the work of FSB, and both institutions are studying the macroeconomic implications of the new regulations. FSB is developing a ‘resolution’ framework to assist national regulators wind down systemically important banks that get into difficulties and is also working on extending the regulatory framework into other systemically important financial institutions, particularly the so-­called ‘shadow banking’ organizations which may be used to circumvent Basel III rules. FSB, assisted by BIS’s Financial Stability Institute, is providing TA to developing econ-

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omies that lack the resources and skills to implement and monitor Basel III, principally through running a series of seminars. It is also monitoring G20 members’ commitments to improve their ‘over-­the-­counter’ derivatives markets to ensure they operate with greater transparency and with better, more standardized organization. The Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems is assessing the implementation of associated rules applicable to all international payment systems and central counterparties based on a report, Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures, issued jointly with the International Organization of Securities Commissions in 2012. These rules are also designed to strengthen members’ financial infrastructures.

9.2.4 Evaluation and future challenges For over 80 years BIS has quietly helped states to alleviate stresses in the international financial system and manage financial crises. Without BIS, central banks ‘would face severe information asymmetries, their assessments of creditworthiness would be harder to establish, and the effective management of currency crises would be more difficult’ (Seabrooke 2006: 141). During the last 40 years BIS has emerged as the pre-­eminent source of international banking regulations and, through the committees that it houses, has become a hub for discussion of supervisory standards in a host of related areas. The concentration of so many key secretariats in Basel has facilitated a productive interchange of ideas and information, yielding considerable synergies in global financial governance. For example, in the 1990s BIS provided the setting for bringing together banking, insurance and securities regulators to consider how best to supervise financial institutions operating across all three areas. This pioneering work was eventually consummated in the Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates. Studies of BIS committees (which are attended by some 5000 officials annually) have suggested that their effects can be profound, because they subtly reshape the ideas, and hence the interests, of their participants (Porter 2002). BIS has a solid track record of anticipating financial crises, for example being more sceptical than IMF about the complexity and opacity of the securitization process and the rapid expansion in debt and asset prices before the 2007 financial crisis. Unfortunately its messages and its work overall are specifically designed for the central bankers to whom it speaks, and not for the broader institutions of government, so consequently lack political impact. BCBS has had considerable success in globalizing its banking standards. Over 130 countries have subscribed to the Basel Accords, and there is some

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e­ vidence that it contributed to banks strengthening their balance sheets in the late 1980s and 1990s. Nevertheless, each Basel agreement has been described as ineffective or unfair. Being soft laws, they rely for their implementation on a combination of pressure arising from a peer review process and market discipline. Unsurprisingly implementation and enforcement of the Accords have been mixed. The misguided belief that markets could be trusted to manage risks if left unattended exacerbated these problems, as Basel II permitted the most sophisticated banks latitude to assess their own risks and the amount of capital to set aside. Their wildly optimistic view of their assets, compounded by the credit ratings agencies which were also given a major role in risk assessments, meant that Basel II effectively lowered capital requirements and was an important contributory factor in the banking collapses that caused the 2007 financial crisis. Moreover, the protracted Basel I and II negotiations meant they were outdated before they began, with banks resorting to securitization, structured investment vehicles and dubious offshore activities that removed assets from their balance sheets, thereby avoiding capital requirements. Finally, developing countries are disadvantaged because the Accords demand their banks hold higher-­ than-­average reserves to offset the relatively risky nature of their underlying local assets. By tightening up definitions of capital and risk, Basel III is set to raise the volume and quality of capital requirements substantially. Moreover, despite opposition from the banking industry, Basel III fills a major deficiency in its predecessors by introducing requirements pertaining to balance sheet liquidity. Nonetheless, significant problems remain (Blinder 2010). For example, Basel III still professes inordinate faith in market discipline despite its demonstrable failure during the financial crisis. Banks and credit ratings agencies retain primary responsibility for assessing and weighing risk. For some financial institutions, the new capital requirements enable them to retain more highly leveraged balance sheets than existed before the financial crisis. Arguments persist that Basel III (like Basel II) will amplify the impact of business cycles, by restricting credit in a recession and loosening it in an upturn. Finally, with some aspects of Basel III several years away from implementation, banks again have time to invent mechanisms to circumvent the rules. Another immediate challenge is the consequence of BIS expansion. Recognizing that no sensible discussion of international financial stability and regulation can occur without input from emerging markets, the global economic management meeting now underpins BIS work, and emerging economies are well represented on its main committees. No empirical

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work has yet been undertaken to assess how this has altered BIS’s club-­like atmosphere, but it seems likely that the inclusion of more states with diverse cultures, interests and financial systems will impede agreement. However, despite expansion, BIS’s historical founding owners still dominate the Board. Given that ECB now makes decisions on behalf of four Board members and is itself a member of BIS (currently also represented on the Board of Directors), this presents an opportunity to reallocate Board seats to reflect a broader global perspective, although the immediate prospects for this seem unlikely as, since the return of the Federal Reserve, European states are wary about BIS veering towards an Anglo-­Saxon model of financial regulation (Engelen 2005). The secrecy shrouding BIS also undermines its legitimacy. Central bankers view BIS as ‘their’ institution rather than one that belongs to states or their leaders and have deliberately kept it at one remove from the politicians and citizens whom financial policies affect. While central bankers and regulators who fail to meet expected standards of behaviour might be accountable to each other in the context of BIS regulatory networks they are seldom accountable to their political masters or the wider citizenry, especially as central banks have gained greater independence from government. The argument runs that because central banks have been captured by financial interests the collective outcome of BIS deliberations is a permissive regulatory regime suited to the interests of the financial industry rather than one designed to promote broader public interests (Lall 2011). Despite recent research (Young 2012) suggesting that regulatory capture is not as endemic as assumed and that it can have perverse effects (such as leading to more stringent standards), clandestine and unminuted meetings have only contributed to the perception of BIS being a place where an unelected and unaccountable elite seeks to govern financial globalization (Lebor 2013).

9.3

The European Central Bank (ECB)

9.3.1 Background From the outset, the persistence of separate national currencies hindered European integration. A potent symbol of national identity and sovereignty, their existence signified the absence of a genuine ‘European community’, and currency fluctuations inhibited the Single Market’s completion. Talk of European monetary cooperation dates to the 1950s, but it was not until 1970 that a blueprint for monetary union appeared, a plan that the Maastricht Treaty finally transformed into reality (see Chapter 11, section 11.1). In 1994 the European Monetary Institute (EMI) was created to reinforce central

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bank cooperation and start preparatory work for a single European currency, the euro. Four years later EMI was converted into ECB and, in 1999, the euro was introduced as an accounting currency. In 2002, euro notes and coins began to circulate amongst the currency area’s 11 inaugural members, and ECB assumed related central banking functions. ECB’s primary mandate, and one to which all other economic goals are subordinate, is to achieve price stability in the Eurozone through setting monetary policy. ECB pursues its monetary policy independently of member states and other EU bodies and, unlike other central banks, cannot act as lender of last resort to its governments. ECB is also responsible for typical central bank functions, including currency issuance, payment and settlement systems, foreign exchange operations, maintenance of statistical data and general economic research. It also manages member states’ official foreign reserves, and each country has deposited up to €50b so that ECB can control the euro’s liquidity. ECB’s pursuit of price stability is backed by the Stability and Growth Pact, which commits EU members to hold their public-­debt-­to-­GDP ratio under 60 per cent and their national deficits to 3 per cent. This was a response to fears that, by shielding states against rising interest rates and currency depreciation, the euro would encourage fiscal profligacy, as states would have an incentive to borrow to support an expansionary fiscal policy safe in the knowledge that the costs, in the form of higher inflation, would be shared by other members. States contravening these limits are liable to be fined up to 0.5 per cent of GDP (see also section 9.3.4).

9.3.2 Structure Inspired by the German Bundesbank and the US Federal Reserve, ECB’s structure is headed by a Governing Council and an Executive Board. The Executive Board is composed of a President, Vice-­President and four independent members who are elected for eight-­year, non-­renewable terms. The Board runs ECB’s day-­to-­day work, implements monetary policy, undertakes responsibility for regulatory activities, instructs members’ central banks as required and reports to the European Parliament, ECB’s general oversight body. Chaired by ECB’s President, the Governing Council includes Board members plus the Eurozone’s central bank governors. The Council meets twice per month to formulate monetary policy, define key interest rates and manage the money supply. Despite EU expansion, the Council continues to include all members, making it the largest board of any central bank (the US Federal Reserve, the next largest, has a board of 12). To improve decision making, voting rights have been limited to 15 central banks since 2003 and

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are assigned on a rotating basis but with different frequencies depending upon members’ economic weight. This was designed to ensure that voting governors would fairly represent the Eurozone’s diversity but in practice reinforced the power of the large economies (Howarth 2007). The final ECB body is the General Council which took over EMI’s work. Consisting of the President, Vice-­President and the central bank governors from all EU states, its existence reflects the importance of non-­euro EU economies to ECB’s economic and fiscal discussions, given that all are potential euro members. The General Council monitors and prepares those countries that intend to join the Eurozone, especially their application of the Stability and Growth Pact. The Secretariat in cooperation with the Statistical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat) collects and maintains Eurozone statistics, which are published in ECB’s annual report and monthly bulletins. While ECB is responsible for data on monetary matters, banking and investment, Eurostat provides more general economic statistics. The Economics Directorate supports decisions on interest rates by providing analyses of current developments and projections of economic indicators for the medium term, but like other central banks it also carries out macroeconomic research, focusing on the Eurozone.

9.3.3 Current activities ECB’s current activities are dominated by the Eurozone crisis. By the standards of EU institutions ECB’s response to the crisis was prompt and imaginative (see Chapter 11). The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF, now the European Stability Mechanism), a rescue fund, was fabricated by ECB in conjunction with IMF and the European Commission (the troika), and they have arranged financial assistance for Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus. Monetary policies, from cuts in interest rates to unorthodox bond-­ purchasing strategies, injected liquidity into the market. As the above discussion of IMF reveals, however, these actions were only a palliative, and market pressures returned. In 2012, ECB’s President, Mario Draghi, pledged to do ‘whatever it takes’ to safeguard the euro, effectively committing ECB to unlimited purchases of Eurozone bonds to keep government borrowing costs affordable. Until 2012, ECB limited its interventions to purchasing bonds in the secondary market, that is to say, buying them indirectly through the financial institutions that held them. Draghi’s plan was contentious, as it entailed EFSF obtaining bonds directly from governments (the primary market) acting as ECB’s agent, an arrangement that many regard as breaching its constitution (Buiter and Rahbari 2012).

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In July 2013, EFSF was superseded by a permanent rescue fund, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), although EFSF will continue to manage its outstanding loans. ESM will raise funds from the financial markets backed by €700b of Eurozone members’ subscribed capital, €80b of which has been paid in. Within an overall lending limit of €500b, it can purchase bonds in primary and secondary markets, offer precautionary credit lines to governments and, subject to approval by Eurozone countries and the troika, lend to governments suffering short-­term liquidity problems or needing to recapitalize troubled financial institutions. The crisis also accentuated the difficulties arising from separate national banking regulators. A new framework, the European System of Financial Supervision, has been devised by the Commission to improve regulatory processes. These efforts are headed by the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), comprising ECB, the Commission, EU members’ central banks and relevant Europe-­wide regulators and chaired by ECB’s President. ESRB oversees the supervision of the Eurozone’s financial sector and seeks to identify future risks, while ECB provides its staff and technical support. Within ESRB are three EU semi-­autonomous institutions (see also Chapter 12): zz the European Banking Authority, responsible for consistency of banking

regulations and depositor protection; zz the European Securities and Markets Authority, overseeing the Single Market for financial services and investigating individual products that might lead to instability; and zz the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, regulating the EU pensions and insurance markets.

9.3.4 Evaluation and future challenges The seamless transfer of sovereignty over monetary policy from states to a supranational body is ECB’s singular achievement. The pessimists, who prognosticated the euro’s swift demise and that ECB would be a weak institution, were confounded by its pursuit of low inflation and monetary stability, which in turn advanced the euro’s cause as an alternative reserve currency to the dollar. Moreover, ECB also seemed to have coped with an expanding membership and helped members overcome the worst of the financial crisis. For example, Ireland’s banking bailout would have been impossible without a large, liquid currency pool. Regrettably much of ECB’s success rested on a benign economic environment. The 2007 financial crisis ruthlessly exposed the technical and political flaws that had troubled economic and monetary union from the beginning. Two problems stand out:

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zz substantial

differences between Eurozone economies that make a single monetary policy unworkable; and zz the lack of fiscal and regulatory equivalents of monetary union, moves towards which are beleaguered by the long-­standing problem of reconciling EU integration with states’ reluctance to cede sovereignty. ECB judges Eurozone monetary conditions on the basis of average economic activity. This reflects a belief that Eurozone countries constitute what economists refer to as an optimum currency area, that is, an economic region whose different parts are similarly affected by economic policies and disturbances. Unfortunately the Eurozone economies vary enormously in terms of their levels of development and stage of the business cycle (see Table 9.2), inevitably resulting in monetary policies that are unsuitable for some. Theoretically ECB decisions are made to advance the common good, but many feel that it has fallen under the influence of the Northern Eurozone countries, especially Germany, for which the spectre of inflation is burnt deeply into the national psyche (Heisenberg 2003). Consequently ECB is sometimes accused of running too tight a monetary policy that allows it to meet its price stability Table 9.2  Eurozone key economic statistics (2011) Country

Eurozone Austria Belgium Cyprus Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain Source: Eurostat 2011.

GDP per capita (€)

Unemployment (%)

Government debt (% of GDP)

28 300 35 700 33 700 21 100 11 900 35 200 30 600 31 700 18 500 34 900 26 000 82 100 15 500 36 100 16 000 12 700 17 600 23 100

10.1 4.2 7.2 7.9 12.5 7.8 9.6 5.9 17.7 14.4 8.4 4.9 6.5 4.4 12.9 13.6 8.2 21.7

87.3 72.5 97.8 71.1 6.2 49.0 85.8 80.4 170.3 106.4 120.8 18.3 70.3 65.5 108.3 43.3 46.9 69.3

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target of 2 per cent inflation at the cost of low Eurozone growth. However, there is evidence that ECB has implicitly changed its target to an inflationary objective close to 2 per cent at its mid-­range, thereby permitting a slightly more flexible policy (K.M.G. Dominguez 2006). The second key problem is the mismatch between monetary policy, which is under ECB’s supranational command, and fiscal and regulatory policies, which remain the prerogative of nation states. Ordinarily there is a high degree of correlation between monetary and fiscal policy, as states use them as mutually reinforcing levers to steer their economies. Their separation in the Eurozone gravely undermines ECB’s efforts to implement a coordinated macroeconomic policy. Indeed it could be argued that this has played a central role in fuelling the Eurozone crisis. Tight monetary policy designed to control inflation choked off growth in some of the Eurozone’s peripheral states, which could no longer resort to lower interest rates and currency devaluation. It was hoped that they would restore growth and competitiveness by undertaking structural reforms in line with the Lisbon Strategy (see Chapter 11). Instead many of these countries exploited the fact that Eurozone participation had reduced their borrowing costs to spend excessively, using fiscal stimulus to offset tight monetary policy. The Stability and Growth Pact, which was supposed to police fiscal rectitude, has proven worthless. The euro’s introduction had already been postponed because many countries were struggling to meet the Pact’s debt criteria (see Table 9.3). To prevent further delay, countries whose debt-­to-­GDP ratios were outside the strictures of the Pact were allowed to join the euro if the ratio was diminishing fast enough for them to meet the target within a short time. Thus from the start several countries, most notably Greece, transgressed the Pact’s parameters, and they were soon joined by larger economies, including Germany, France and Italy. In 2005, under pressure from France and Germany, the European Commission inserted some flexibility into the Pact to accommodate members’ economic cycles. In other words, rather than punishing powerful offenders, the Commission loosened policy constraints to help them. Following the Eurozone crisis, tougher sanctions were unveiled for those breaching the Pact’s debt limits (see Chapter 11, section 11.4.2). Nevertheless, this does not deal with the source of the problem, which is insufficient monitoring capacity. For example Greece, which disguised its economic situation in order to join the euro, managed to conceal the extent of its government debt from the Commission for many years until the economy imploded in 2010. Financial regulation is another area where there is a problematic split between ECB and intergovernmental authority, leaving the gradual emer-

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Table 9.3  Eurozone government surpluses and deficits (2000–12) Country Eurozone Austria Belgium Cyprus Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain

2000 (%)

2003 (%)

2006 (%)

2009 (%)

2012 (%)

−0.9 −1.9 0.2 n/a n/a 7.1 −1.4 −1.2 −2.0 4.4 −1.8 6.3 n/a 1.5 −3.2 n/a n/a −1.0

−2.7 −1.1 0.2 n/a n/a 2.3 −4.1 −3.9 −1.7 0.2 −2.4 −0.1 n/a −3.0 −2.8 n/a n/a 0.3

−2.0 −1.9 0.0 n/a n/a 2.9 −2.7 −2.1 −2.6 2.3 −5.7 −1.5 n/a 0.1 −4.6 n/a n/a 1.4

−6.4 −4.3 −5.9 −3.5 n/a −2.8 −8.3 −3.4 −12.7 −12.5 −5.3 −2.2 −4.5 −4.7 −8.0 −6.3 −6.3 −11.2

−3.5 −3.0 −3.0 −5.5 −0.5 −1.7 −4.6 0.1 −6.6 −7.7 −2.9 −1.5 −2.6 −4.1 −5.0 −4.8 −4.4 −10.2

Note: n/a – not a member of the Eurozone at this date. Source: ECB annual reports.

gence of a Single Market for financial services lacking a unified regulator. Although there is some European-­level regulation, as banks merge and cross-­border management becomes more common, financial supervision remains largely the responsibility of national central banks or regulatory authorities, compromising ECB’s ability to deliver financial stability. As well as demonstrating the limitations of EU’s cross-­border supervisory arrangements the 2007 financial crisis also exposed important deficiencies in areas such as deposit insurance. Calls for pan-­European regulation after the financial crisis have again stumbled, as the UK and Germany, homes to EU’s two biggest financial centres, pull in opposite directions and have produced a familiar compromise: further EU semi-­autonomous institutions. As semi-­autonomous institutions are explicitly designed not to trespass on state sovereignty, they represent restatements of the problem rather than solutions to the EU’s regulatory shortcomings (see Chapter 12). Members have agreed that ECB should take over responsibility for oversight and interpretation of the regulations, but the details, particularly the role of national central banks, are still under discussion. For example, in 2014 ECB will commence supervision of the Eurozone’s biggest banks, but

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its ­information will be provided by national regulators, which can anyway ignore its advice. At an institutional level, criticism of ECB centres on the interlocking problems of accountability and transparency. As an independent central bank, ECB reflects the prevailing liberal belief that political interference in monetary policy is incompatible with low inflation, because politicians concerned about re-­election will favour lower interest rates to stimulate unsustainable borrowing and growth. Nevertheless, central bank independence has proved divisive, because it removes inherently political decisions about the distribution of and access to credit from the political process. While it might be true that politicians prefer low interest rates, it might be argued that independent central banks have pursued monetary policies that are too tight, thereby helping the financial sector, which wants to protect the value of its assets, from inflationary erosion but damaging manufacturers and producing high unemployment. In some respects ECB, with its principal targets and powers enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, is more independent than national central banks. ECB’s lack of transparency exacerbates accountability concerns and weakens the confidence of financial markets in its decision-­making processes. Despite publishing its macroeconomic analyses monthly, as compared to quarterly as is the case in many other systems, the 30-­year embargo on ECB minutes, which has been defended as facilitating apolitical decisions, obscures the reasoning behind ECB’s sometimes counter-­intuitive conclusions. Pressure to reform has now prompted the Bank to consider publishing summaries of its meetings. With the support of member states, the Commission and IMF, ECB’s immediate challenge is to sustain the Eurozone. ECB’s promise to defend the euro at all costs is unsurprising, as without the single currency it has no function. This pledge has provided a respite, but many things, from a banking failure to a country reneging on its austerity programme, could result in another market collapse. Many Eurozone governments’ debts are unsustainable given the low growth resulting from the austerity imposed by the troika, and it remains to be seen whether markets continue to believe ECB’s bond purchases are sufficient. Moreover, like previous responses, once fully assessed they have emphasized further policy flaws. For example, by allowing banks of Eurozone countries to borrow from ECB using government debt as collateral, ECB endangers its own balance sheet should there be defaults. Likewise excessive bond buying may hold down government borrowing costs but could have inflationary effects that would prevent ECB from meeting its primary price stability objective.

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Furthermore, little has been done to assuage the fundamental tensions underlying the Eurozone project, particularly to provide solutions to the problems posed by a currency existing without the backing of a single government or adequate supranational policy levers. For example, while ECB’s operational activities look set to expand through participation in ESRB, the changes needed to give it greater control over fiscal affairs are still unacceptable to many EU governments. Indeed European leaders have conducted a masterclass in indecision. Germany and France, the two economic powerhouses, differ in their response to the risks of moral hazard. Creditor countries, unwilling to provide unlimited support to what they see as the indolent Eurozone periphery, have used concerns about the surrender of sovereignty to produce feeble responses. For instance, EU leaders are moving cautiously towards a banking union, but many of the complementary policies needed to make it a success are either absent, such as powers to resolve failed banks and a euro-­ wide deposit guarantee scheme, or not fully thought through, such as having semi-­autonomous agencies rather than a pan-­EU financial services regulator and creating ESM rather than making ECB the lender of last resort. Indeed ESM exemplifies these problems. Endowed with €700b it is too small to cope should a major country such as Spain or Italy get into difficulties. Moreover, by requiring unanimous decisions to grant a loan, paralysis could ensue. If the financial crisis can be brought under control ECB’s next big policy challenge will be to consider further expansion. Indications are that the Bank will take a cautious view of new applicants, dealing with small economies first, thereby avoiding stresses on the currency that large economies could engender, which might further unbalance the Eurozone’s economic performance. An even longer-­term problem concerns the relationship with the UK, which shows no sign of wishing to join, preferring the advantages of independent monetary policy to those of a single currency. SUGGESTED READING

Chwieroth, J.M. (2009), Capital Ideas: The IMF and the Rise of Financial Liberalization, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. [Identifies how IMF staff thinking about capital controls transformed the organization’s behaviour] Goodhart, C. (2011), The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: A History of the Early Years 1974–1997, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Magisterial overview of the Banking Committee up to the start of the Basel II negotiations] Haan, J. de, S. Eijffinger and S. Waller (2005), The European Central Bank: Credibility, Transparency, and Centralization, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [An economic review of ECB activities and their impact] James, H. (2012), Making the European Monetary Union, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. [Compelling account of the building of the European Monetary Union and its contribution to the Eurozone crisis]

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Joyce, J.P. (2013), The IMF and Global Financial Crises: Phoenix Rising, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Assesses and evaluates IMF’s changing role in global financial crises] Lebor, A. (2013), Tower of Basel: The Shadowy History of the Secret Bank That Runs the World, New York: Public Affairs. [Extensive investigative history of BIS based on archival research and interviews with key players] Moschella, M. (2012), Governing Risk: The IMF and Global Financial Crises, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave. [Theoretical exposition of IMF’s evolution and role in financial crises since the 1990s] Woods, N. (2006), The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank and Their Borrowers, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. [A historical review of IMF and IBRD policies and related organizational development]

Internet resources BIS: http://www.bis.org ECB: http://www.ecb.europa.eu ESRB: http://www.esrb.europa.eu European Commission Statistical Office: http://www.epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu IMF: http://www.imf.org International Association of Deposit Insurers: http://www.iadi.org International Association of Insurance Supervisors: http://www.iaisweb.org Paris Club: http://www.clubdeparis.org

10 Economics, trade and commerce This chapter covers those IOs where trade, economics or commerce form their core mandates, subjects that were among the first dealt with by formal IOs. Customs tariffs, patents and copyright protection were all subject to rules promulgated through PIUs by the end of the nineteenth century, but not until the advent of the League was anything substantive achieved (see Chapter 2). These trends accelerated after the Second World War as states sought rules to govern their increasing economic interdependence. The chapter starts by considering one of the most undervalued organizations, the Organisation for Economic Co-­operation and Development (OECD). Initially intended to cohere the trade and industrial policies of the transatlantic community, OECD now embraces many topics relevant to a wider and more diverse membership. The crippling of the interwar trading system (Box 2.2) convinced post-­war planners that an IO was needed to stimulate and negotiate international trade agreements. These ambitions were beleaguered by domestic political constraints, particularly in the USA, and proposals for an International Trade Organization (ITO) were abandoned. Instead of operating within a formally mandated IO, the international trading regime came to revolve around the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a treaty underpinning spasmodic international negotiations under UN auspices. The dream of a fully fledged IO to oversee global trade was finally realized in 1994 with the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). GATT and WTO have supplied a framework for regional trade agreements sometimes negotiated within the mandates of broader IOs. Under WTO, regional trade bodies have proliferated and, with many others in the pipeline, the debate between advocates of global and regional trading continues (Bhagwati 2008) (Box 10.1). We study three significant regional trade organizations, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Mercado Comun del Sur (Mercosur) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

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The European Union (EU), although now a broader political association, is the oldest and largest regional trade organization and is considered in Chapters 11 and 12. Finally, the chapter illuminates some dimmer recesses of international commerce. Commencing with the two biggest IOs with responsibilities for patent and copyright protection, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the European Patent Organisation (EPO), it then covers two commodity organizations, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the International Grains Council (IGC). Commodity organizations are sometimes tiny, but the two chosen are representative of several IOs whose objective is to stabilize commodity supplies and prices.

10.1 The Organisation for Economic Co-­operation and Development (OECD) 10.1.1 Background Traditionally, studies of international organization and global governance have neglected OECD or dismissed it as a mere think tank or rich countries’ club. Nevertheless OECD and its forerunner, the Organisation for European Economic Co-­operation (OEEC), have exerted a pervasive influence on economic thinking, participated at crucial moments in post-­war economic history, from the Marshall Plan (Box 3.1) to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs, see Chapter 5) and, in partnership with other economic IOs, installed many of the regimes that ‘provide a framework of rules for the world economy’ (Nye 2002: 144). Indeed much of today’s conventional wisdom, like notions of trade in services or ‘the polluter pays’, originated at OECD. OECD’s genesis lies in the politics of European post-­war reconstruction. The US made the release of Marshall Plan funds conditional on European countries devising an organization to manage its resource flows: hence the emergence of OEEC. OEEC was not particularly effective in that undertaking (Milward 1984); however, it is credited with aiding European recovery through liberalizing trade and maintaining a system to settle trade transactions. Moreover, OEEC begot the continuous cycle of meetings amongst national officials which, along with multilateral surveillance and peer review, would later become OECD’s hallmark. By the late 1950s, the Marshall Plan’s objectives had been achieved and OEEC was winding down. Nevertheless, the transatlantic community felt it

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could benefit from having a forum to discuss economic policy and develop regulations governing economic activity. Part of the attraction was material. Cementing cooperative ties and common rules held out the prospect of boosting national incomes and making the West a more potent force in an escalating Cold War. Ideology provided an extra spur. OEEC symbolized the superiority of capitalist and democratic systems over state-­planned and authoritarian alternatives. The transatlantic community wished to ensure that its ideas triumphed in newly decolonized states, but OEEC, as an organization devised to accept rather than generate aid and fixated with European development, was poorly positioned to export its model. Following meetings between the main protagonists the European label was dropped, a development dimension was appended and in 1961 the OECD Convention was ratified. The Convention sets out OECD’s basic objectives as being to: zz Achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising

standard of living in Member countries, while maintaining financial stability and thus to contribute to the development of the world economy. zz Contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as non-­member countries in the process of economic development. zz Contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-­discriminatory basis in accordance with international obligations.

These straightforward ambitions mask complexities that have contributed to OECD becoming one of the more prominent and influential IOs. Pursuing these goals has steadily stretched its remit to encompass virtually all socioeconomic policy domains pertaining to modern states, something reflected in the span of OECD departments (Figure 10.1). OECD works not through international treaties backed by formal sanctions but through the power of ideas, peer pressure and the enactment of ‘soft law’. Functional and geographical expansion, covering a more diverse membership and connections with over 70 non-­member states, has barely altered OECD’s mission and methods (Woodward 2009). According to Thorkil Kristensen, the organization’s first SG, the ‘core of OECD’s work [is] the continuing process of consultation’ with the aim of producing shared approaches to policy problems. Ideas gain traction because the expertise of the Secretariat and national officials populating OECD committees bestows authority and because members know their performance will be regularly peer-­reviewed. Occasionally consensus reached at OECD leads to the development of formal, albeit soft law, agreements. Over 250 pieces of OECD soft

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law envelop a range of topics, including systems of national accounts, corporate governance, cartels, chemical safety, hazardous waste, pensions, genetics and tourism. International economic summitry also relies heavily on OECD. Without OECD’s statistical and analytical capacity and its role as a forum in which states can make informal commitments and pre-­negotiate issues, the engine of global governance would seize up.

10.1.2 Structure Compared to the membership of many IOs, that of OECD is quite homogeneous, with each of the 34 members committed to the principles of a market economy and democracy. OECD works mainly by consensus, something facilitated by its homogeneity and continuing conciliation through its committee process. The Council is OECD’s decision-­making body and the focal point of its activities. States appoint resident ambassadors to OECD, who meet bimonthly in Council to approve committees’ outputs. The Council convenes annually at ministerial level to take more important decisions and chart future initiatives. The Secretariat (Figure 10.1) is arranged to support the work of approximately 260 intergovernmental committees and working groups which are at OECD’s heart. OECD committees unite Secretariat officials and experts from member states (and sometimes non-­member states and civil society) to share ideas and experiences, thereby developing solutions for policy dilemmas. Through regular exchanges these interlocutors come to share similar outlooks on the world and how it works. In turn, these committees become powerful ‘communities of influence’ (Salzman 2000: 777) in national and international policy making, owing to the participants’ credibility. OECD has no coercive sanctions, so it polices agreements through ongoing surveillance, especially peer reviews of a country’s adherence to OECD edicts, whose results are generally published. This creates strong incentives for officials to advocate agreed positions in their capitals, as they know they will face their peers in future meetings. Likewise states, aware of OECD’s highly respected commentary, do not want adverse reports on their economic and social policies. OECD has several agencies and special entities (semi-­autonomous bodies) under its umbrella (Figure 10.1). The most important is the International Energy Agency (IEA). Created in response to the 1974 oil crisis, it coordinates members’ energy policies with a view to maintaining adequate strategic oil reserves. IEA marked a departure in the structure of IOs, as it was

Financial Action Task Force

Office of SG and G20 Sherpa Office

Executive Directorate

Council and Global Relations Secretariat

General Secretariat

Statistics

Internal Audit and Evaluation

Legal Affairs

Public Affairs and Communications

Science, Technology Centre for Tax Policy and Industry and Administration

International Transport Forum

Sahel and West Africa Club

Agencies and special entities

Public Governance and Territorial Development

Education

Employment, Entrepreneurship, Labour and Social SMEs and Local Affairs Development Environment

Nuclear Energy International Energy Agency Agency

Development Centre

Africa Partnership Forum

Figure 10.1  OECD organization chart

Secretary-General Deputy SecretariesGeneral

Economics

Trade and Financial and Enterprise Affairs Agriculture

Development Cooperation

Departments/directorates

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the first subsidiary body which did not automatically have a mandate from the parent organization’s full membership. Similar agencies within OECD are: the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), which studies safety in peaceful nuclear energy programmes; the Development Centre, a body for coordinating and studying the impact of development aid policies; the Sahel and West Africa Club, created in 1976 to direct aid to West Africa to combat the 20-­ year Saharan drought; and the International Transport Forum, which studies improvements to global transport.

10.1.3 Current activities Much of OECD’s work is programme oriented, and its public output is mostly in the form of reports and studies, of which it produces some 500 in a typical year. Its flagship publications are a monthly bulletin of Main Economic Indicators, the biannual editions of the OECD Economic Outlook, which provides two-­year macroeconomic projections, and regular OECD Economic Surveys of all members and selected non-­member countries. Most directorates publish their latest statistical analysis and policy advice, such as Education at a Glance: OECD Indicators and OECD Health Data. OECD is an authoritative source of 40 comparative, statistical, economic and social databases across 26 policy areas. OECD’s central preoccupation, as ordained by its Convention, is promoting sustainable economic growth. The Economics Department absorbs the biggest wedge of resources and frames the paradigm for OECD’s work programme, with emphasis being given to microeconomic over macroeconomic matters. Partly this reflects an ideological conviction that developing microeconomic and supply-­side policies is the best way of delivering sustainable economic growth. The global financial crisis is giving new resonance to OECD’s advice on structural economic reforms, particularly amongst Eurozone economies rescued by the IMF, ECB and EU (Chapter 9). Development too is a long-­standing OECD concern. Operating under the Development Cooperation Directorate (DCD), the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) does not disburse aid; rather it peer-­reviews national policies in order to increase the flow and effectiveness of official development assistance (ODA). This task is important because OECD members provide 90 per cent of ODA, totalling $134b in 2011. Much of DCD’s work is statistical and analytical, such as its publications Development Cooperation Report and Development Aid at a Glance. DCD is also aiming to enhance the quality of global development data and encourage developing nations to cultivate their own plans for achieving the MDGs.

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Recently OECD has taken a greater interest in promoting good governance by: advising on and providing agreements to assist in modernizing the public sector; the regulation of government activities; and tackling corporate misdemeanour. These include improving existing formal agreements that set standards for international taxation, combat bribery, and regulate export credits, capital movements and foreign direct investment. OECD is also spearheading efforts to restore trust and confidence in financial markets following the malfeasance and crises that punctuated the last decade. For instance, OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance, which have been widely adopted, provide benchmarks for shareholders’ rights, disclosure, transparency and board responsibilities. The World Bank Group and IMF use them as a basis for their reports on the private sector, and they constitute one of the Financial Stability Board’s 12 Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems. WTO’s advent downgraded OECD’s role in global trade governance. Now that officials meet at WTO they have less need for the OECD Trade Committee (Wolfe 2008). Nevertheless, OECD remains closely involved in trade discussions. It supports WTO’s efforts to provide a strong rules-­bound multilateral trading system by assisting developing countries in their WTO Doha Round negotiations (see section 10.2). It helps LDCs seek consensus on less tractable matters such as government procurement, trade facilitation, investment and competition policy, and probes trade’s connection with issues that include employment, the environment and agriculture. The merger of OECD’s Trade and Agriculture Directorates in 2006 signified the continued importance of its work on agricultural trade. The Directorate is studying the impact of agricultural subsidies and how agricultural trade can ensure more environmentally sustainable agricultural practices and mitigate future food shortages. OECD helps governments respond to new and increasingly complex concerns relating to the environment, science and technology. Its comprehensive programme includes guidelines for environmental practices, the economic impact of waste management, environmental assessments of members and economic aspects of climate change. Its environmental data and Environmental Performance Reviews nudge members towards environmentally friendly policies. In science, OECD is pursuing policies that impact on or involve biotechnology, such as control of infectious diseases, AIDS, cloning, stem cell research and genetic testing. In technology, OECD is searching for ways to restructure the IT and telecommunications industries and address cyber-­security (viruses and spam) and the broadband infrastructure. In the chemical industry OECD leads a hazard assessment of the 1000 most common products. This work involves public and private sector

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i­ nstitutions and will underpin the chemical testing regulations to be managed by the European Chemicals Agency (Chapter 12, section 12.6.3). In social policy OECD concentrates primarily on labour, health and education. OECD strives to identify policies that maximize employment opportunities. This covers family-­friendly policies, retirement, disability, integrating migrant workers, workforce skills (which also intersects with OECD’s education portfolio) and, in the current context, policies to support the unemployed and create jobs. OECD has produced ground-­breaking reports on education and labour markets since the 1960s. Lately however education has risen up its agenda and OECD possibly now surpasses UNESCO as a shaper of education policy worldwide (Rubenson 2008). Perhaps its best-­known project is the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), run in conjunction with UNESCO, which triennially measures the educational achievements of 15-­year-­olds in over 60 countries and which has prompted some soul searching amongst poorly performing participants. Members have advanced health and social welfare programmes, which OECD studies with a view to making improvements and transferring knowledge to developing economies. Moreover, with healthcare being a major drain on the public purse, OECD brings dispassionate analysis to what, as the travails of US healthcare reform demonstrate, can be an impassioned and divisive debate. Healthcare moved up OECD’s agenda in the 2000s. In 2004, OECD completed a project comparing members’ health systems, examining issues of equity, developing indicators of technical quality, assessing the need for long-­term care in ageing populations and measuring the performance of health systems from elements such as waiting times, the availability of private insurance and new technologies. The project’s conclusions set the agenda for a high-­level committee supported by a dedicated division in the Economics, Labour and Social Affairs Directorate. Energy is the most significant of OECD’s remaining activities. IEA’s original role as contingency planner, monitoring the production and consumption of oil and oil products to forewarn of adverse market movements, persists, but its remit has expanded to natural gas supplies, electricity power pools and alternative energy. Short-­term data is published in the monthly Oil Market Report, with long-­term forecasts appearing in the Medium-­Term Oil Market Report and the World Energy Outlook. IEA’s ongoing work stems from a mandate emanating from the 2008 G8 Summit, which asked it to investigate 13 issues relating to energy security, economic development and environmental protection. Since OECD countries then dominated global nuclear power, NEA was established within OECD in 1958. It is a forum for nuclear

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power specialists to discuss exceedingly complex technology with public safety issues such as nuclear waste management. NEA, working alongside IAEA and the EU, sponsors joint research, model regulation, safety codes and information exchange. The nuclear industry is critical to reducing CO2 emissions, but the 2011 Japanese earthquake exposed serious shortcomings in the management of nuclear safety and generated increased public concern. NEA has consequently embarked on programmes to strengthen regulatory frameworks for spent fuel management and promulgate best practice (see also Chapter 7, section 7.6).

10.1.4 Evaluation and future challenges In some senses OECD is a throwback to the PIUs (Chapter 2) which played host to epistemic communities where the provision of information becomes a key factor in shaping the perceptions of actors’ interests. There is growing evidence that OECD can reshape the interests of participating states (Mahon and McBride 2008), but it is not impervious to traditional power politics. Powerful states set the agenda, dominate important committees and pay less heed to OECD counsel than their weaker brethren. Because it trades principally in knowledge, measuring OECD’s influence is complex, with the organization’s ideas slowly leaching into national policies, allowing it to exert a ‘subtle discipline’ (Bayne 2000: 48) over the evolution of global governance. By shaping ideas and institutions, OECD makes things possible for its members and other IOs. Often it is the first and sometimes the only source of international rules to govern specific problems. Being the initiator bequeaths OECD a powerful influence over the evolution of these paradigms. Among the broad movements and policy debates to which it has made a substantial contribution are: zz Trade:

GATT’s penchant for trade liberalization was frequently conditional on prior activity by OECD. It was responsible for devising consensual knowledge and the modalities for GATT negotiations on government procurement (1960s), trade in services (1970s, 1980s) and agricultural trade (1980s) (Cohn 2002). It has also devised rules for topics like export credits which are not ripe for global negotiations. zz The environment: The ‘contentiousness and potential grandstanding’ that characterize UNEP (Salzman 2000: 815) make OECD a better place for advanced industrialized countries to discuss environmental concerns. Almost one-­third of OECD’s soft law relates to the environment, with OECD ordinances on trans-­boundary wastes and contaminants becoming the nucleus of agreements at UNEP, FAO and other organizations.

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OECD’s Model Tax Convention provides the basis for over 1500 bilateral tax treaties, and its Harmful Tax Competition initiative fronts efforts to evolve norms to improve fiscal transparency. zz Investment: OECD’s 1961 codes of Liberalization of Current Invisible Operations and Liberalization of Capital Movements have been instrumental in enshrining non-­discrimination, transparency and liberalization as norms for international trade and finance (Henderson 1993). These accomplishments lend credence to Nye’s (2004) assertion that soft power ‘is the means to success in world politics’. Similarly, Slaughter (2004) suggests that OECD’s penchant for expert networks and ongoing discussion makes it the archetype for a future disaggregated world order. Despite its many achievements and undoubted expertise, OECD faces perpetual questions about its future. These intensified in the 1980s and 1990s as related IOs and international forums usurped some of its predominant role in supporting sustainable economic growth. Until the 1980s, OECD’s Working Party Number 3 on Policies for the Promotion of Better International Payments Equilibrium provided an opportunity for central banks and finance ministries from a restricted number of members to discuss the effects of monetary and fiscal policy on the international financial system, but it has since been marginalized by discussions between the G7, and latterly G20, finance ministers. Likewise, country-­level macroeconomic research overlaps with that of IMF and the EU (see Table 4.1). However, during the last two decades OECD’s linkages with the G7/8 system and the G20 have improved. In particular, the G7/8 has leant heavily on OECD’s analytical muscle to maintain momentum on its projects between their intermittent meetings. In 2007 OECD was made the Secretariat for the G8’s Heiligendamm Process, a dialogue with their ‘Outreach Five’ countries (China, India, South Africa, Brazil and Mexico), a mandate extended at the G8’s 2009 L’Aquila summit. Since then OECD has acquired a ‘sherpa’ or preparatory Secretariat for G20 meetings. Universal IOs such as UNDP and IBRD now have more important voices in the development debate. In fact, critics maintain the ‘D’ is the ‘poor relation in the OECD’ (Woodward 2009: 86). The perennial failure of most DAC members to attain their pledge of donating 0.7 per cent of their GNI in ODA and a shorter-­term failure to pressure G7 countries to raise aid levels to those agreed at the 2005 G8 Summit in Gleneagles bear this out. Geopolitical upheavals are another worry. The collapse of the USSR seemed to corroborate OECD’s belief in the superiority of capitalism and democracy. However, lacking a prominent opponent, OECD looked bereft of a role.

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The emergence of new economic superpowers, none of which belonged to OECD, also undermined its role and legitimacy. Donald Johnston, SG from 1996 to 2005, summed this up by questioning how OECD could ‘shape the global economy if you’re basically working with a minority of it’. Reforms aimed at improving OECD’s performance, relevance and legitimacy have included the rationalization of directorates and the committee system, but more substantive changes centre on a strategy of enlargement and outreach. A first tranche of OECD expansion to include countries making the transition to stable industrialized democracies occurred between 1994 and 2000 with the absorption of Mexico, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland and South Korea. Then Chile, Estonia, Slovenia and Israel joined in 2010, and accession negotiations are continuing with Russia, Colombia and Latvia. None of these states are fully representative of the major economic players needed to counter charges of illegitimacy, and therefore a second aspect of OECD reform is ‘enhanced engagement’ with China, India, South Africa, Brazil and Indonesia. This aims to integrate systemically important players into OECD’s work, while stopping short of membership. Recognizing that the economic prosperity of advanced nations is intertwined with that of poorer ones OECD has strengthened relations with other non-­members, sponsoring global forums on topics such as agriculture, competition, trade, taxation and investment where members and non-­members share information and transfer knowledge. Finally, OECD is cementing ties with civil society. It has long-­standing arrangements through the Business and Industry Advisory Committee (composed of senior corporate figures) and the Trade Union Advisory Committee, on which trade union confederations are represented. Their members participate in relevant OECD committees and meet with Secretariat staff to advocate their positions. Latterly, OECD launched bolder initiatives to embrace civil society, most notably through an Annual Forum which brings together participants from government, IOs, business, the media and others to discuss a particular theme immediately prior to the Ministerial Council. Tensions underlying the reform strategy may stifle its effectiveness. Becoming a more inclusive organization might buy greater legitimacy but impede the search for consensus and overburden the Secretariat. Prospective members fall into two broad categories. Small countries will buy into OECD’s value system but are not major players. Conversely, the major players’ dubious commitments to democracy, extensive government intervention in the economy and poor human rights records make them reluctant to engage. Indeed China and Brazil display little enthusiasm for membership, believing that it is merely an attempt to inveigle them into Western-­dominated ­international regimes. There are also feelings that OECD’s civil society reforms are only skin deep.

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OECD’s civil society interlocutors share its ideology, reinforcing rather than challenging OECD’s ideas (Woodward 2008).

10.2 The World Trade Organization (WTO) 10.2.1 Background When negotiators sealed the GATT agreement in 1947, it was supposedly a stopgap until ITO assumed responsibility for governing international trade. However, as the introduction described, hopes for ITO were dashed by political horse-­trading and GATT became the focal point for the international trading regime. By 1994, when GATT integrated into WTO (one outcome of the Uruguay Round agreement), it had 128 members, had overseen a series of ever-­ lengthening and cumulative ‘rounds’ of trade negotiations committing states to liberalizing swathes of international commerce (Table 10.1), and had broadened its mandate from tariffs to include a range of non-­tariff ­barriers and Table 10.1  The GATT rounds Year

Round

1947 1949 1951

Geneva Annecy Torquay

Participating Coverage countries 23 13 38

1960–61 Dillon

26

1964–67 Kennedy

62

1973–79 Tokyo

102

1986–94 Uruguay

123

50 000 tariff reductions, covering about 20% of world trade. 5000 further tariff reductions. 8700 further reductions, lowering tariffs 25% compared to 1948 levels. Continuing reductions in 4400 tariffs, with cuts averaging 10%; harmonization of the newly created EEC’s members’ tariffs. Further tariff reductions averaging 35% and covering 75% of world trade; removal of anti-­dumping measures; discussion of preferential treatment for developing countries. Agreement on non-­tariff measures, exemptions for developing countries and ‘framework’ agreements for meat, dairy products and aircraft. Average tariffs reduced to 4.7% on industrial products and overall average tariffs cut by another 35%. Tariffs cut by a further 39%; Tokyo framework agreements made into rules; agreements on services, intellectual property, government procurement and WTO dispute settlement arrangements.

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‘behind-­the-­border’ obstacles to international trade. By the 1990s, however, GATT was unable to cope with new forms of protectionism, notably agricultural subsidies and market-­sharing agreements. Moreover, compliance with GATT rules relied on an honour system; there were no enforcement mechanisms or compliance deadlines, and rulings were often to no avail, as they had to be adopted by all members. WTO shares many of GATT’s features. It inherited GATT’s main function, namely providing a setting in which members can negotiate, implement and monitor international trade agreements. Furthermore, three underlying GATT principles were grandfathered into WTO. First, WTO would promote freer, but not free, trade. Second, the concepts of non-­discrimination and ‘most favoured nation’ meant that states should extend the same treatment to all imported goods irrespective of their origins and when a country improved a specific trading benefit for one partner it had to extend it to all WTO parties. Finally, reciprocity was the notion that states would grant access to their domestic market on the same basis that they gained access in another. Nevertheless, there were important differences. Whereas GATT focused exclusively on trade in goods, WTO’s mandate was broader, incorporating areas explicitly excluded from GATT such as agriculture, textiles, intellectual property (IP) rights and trade in services. Entering WTO involved a single undertaking that all WTO provisions applied to members rather than allowing states to cherry-­pick accession to new agreements. In addition to assuming GATT’s main roles, WTO’s Trade Policy Reviews strengthened surveillance and transparency. WTO has a stronger role in enforcing international trade agreements through a formal Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) which referees trade disputes (see section 10.2.2). Finally, WTO seeks to assimilate LDCs more fully into global trade. To this end it possesses a capacity-­building programme to assist LDCs with the expertise and infrastructure needed to participate in WTO negotiations, implement resulting agreements and utilize DSB. As well as conceiving WTO, the Uruguay Round’s agreements on goods, services and IP set the new organization’s agenda. The agreements covering goods (still called GATT) involve commitments to abolish or cut specific tariffs to defined levels (binding tariffs). Industrial countries agreed to implement binding tariffs by 2000, bringing their average tariffs down to 3.8 per cent, with 44 per cent of their imports attracting no duty. Meanwhile developing countries agreed to cut their tariffs by 2005 but to a lesser degree. For the first time, the Uruguay Round included tariff ­reductions for agricultural products. Agriculture is a major bottleneck in the Doha Round, but subsidies rather than tariffs are now the principal problem (see section

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10.2.3). The Uruguay Round also marked an assault on non-­tariff barriers, with agreements being reached on customs valuations, inspections at ports of entry, import licences and rules concerning places of origin. Non-­tariff barriers, this time import quotas, were also central to textiles negotiations, another hotly disputed category. The Round’s agreement required that textile import quotas be phased out over ten years, and textiles came fully within GATT rules in 2005. The Uruguay Round agreement on services, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), was the first time that services were included in the GATT/WTO framework, though to a limited extent. Mechanisms to encourage transparent services regulation have been introduced, but certain restrictions were maintained despite their contravening the concept of non-­ discrimination. For example, national service providers do not have to be given equal standing with overseas providers unless a specific commitment has been made. Because agreement could not be reached on all aspects of services, GATS has subsidiary agreements covering trade in financial services, professional services (such as accounting and legal services), air transport, telecommunications and shipping to which members voluntarily subscribe. For instance, only 47 countries belong to the WTO shipping agreement, where divisions between developed and developing countries preclude a wider settlement. Shipping costs are composed of transport and terminal costs. Transport rates are determined by monopolistic (but sanctioned) agreements between shipping lines plying specific routes (conference rates), and costs are a function of the degree of competition rather than distance or trade volume. Finding a better system has been elusive. Many shipping lines operate under flags of convenience, and their flag countries have no interest in a more competitive system. High port fees generate income for many states and, in theory, shipping liberalization, encouraging greater competition and use of larger vessels, might decrease transport costs for developing countries. In practice, however, they might not benefit, because their small trade volumes mean they have no need for large container vessels. The issue of IP protection is increasingly salient for international trade (see below and Box 10.2). The Uruguay Round produced the Agreement on Trade-­Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which is administered in consultation with WIPO. TRIPS largely gives multilateral emphasis to existing WIPO covenants, providing a mechanism for negotiating disputes and agreeing procedures. TRIPS also specifies how to apply IP agreements, gives adequate protection to such rights and enforces them. Unlike GATT and GATS, TRIPS does not detail specific areas of agreement, although it has extended the scope of some WIPO legislation into spheres such as the use of databases plus software and equipment rental.

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10.2.2 Structure Although GATT was part of the UN, shortly after its creation WTO withdrew from the UN System. Conceptually WTO was closely associated with the Bretton Woods institutions and, although IBRD and IMF are specialized agencies, it was felt that an arm’s length relationship would emphasize a break with the past. It also allowed WTO to change its governance and management styles, particularly to support its new enforcement role, and there were staffing issues which could only be resolved by moving away from the UN System’s outmoded personnel practices. WTO has a biennial Ministerial Conference, below which is the General Council. The General Council meets in intervening years and also assembles as a ‘committee of the whole’ to form the Trade Policy Review Body and DSB. Below the General Council are three more committees of the whole, each overseeing a major area of WTO’s work, the Councils for Trade in Goods, Trade in Services and Trade-­Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. There are also specialized committees which any member can attend but which mainly concern subject matter specialists. These include committees on Agriculture, Subsidies, Anti-­Dumping Practices, Trade and Development, and Trade in Financial Services. Most large trading nations appoint permanent representatives to WTO who attend these committees. Described by the WTO Consultative Board as ‘probably the most powerful and significant international tribunal system in existence’, the dispute settlement process is a defining characteristic of WTO and commences when a member formally accuses another of abrogating a WTO commitment. The process has three stages. First, there is a consultation period when the dispute may be resolved informally. If this fails, the second stage requires DSB to convene a three-­member adjudication panel. Opposing parties each appoint one panel member with the concurrence of the other side, and one panel member is jointly agreed. Panels consist of trade and/or legal specialists and report to DSB. Strict time limits prevent procrastination, but they can be overridden by agreement, as with the Boeing–Airbus subsidy dispute initiated in 2004 but not concluded until 2011. Conflicting parties are entitled to settle ‘out of court’ throughout the process. Indeed most disputes are resolved this way. If not, the panel will make a ruling, encouraging transgressors to comply voluntarily with WTO commitments. If no action is forthcoming, the aggrieved party can ask DSB for permission to impose trade sanctions against the recalcitrant party. Importantly WTO-­authorized retaliation is limited to the economic damage inflicted on the complainant, and it is the members not WTO that inflict the punishment. The entire DSB considers

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reports but can only reject the findings by consensus. If there is no consensus, a panel’s decision stands. In a third stage decisions can be appealed to an Appellate Body broadly representing WTO’s membership. Appointed by DSB for four-­year terms, the seven members of the Appellate Body are individuals outside government with a recognized standing in international law or trade. As with panel findings, DSB can only reject the Appellate Body’s decisions by consensus. WTO members also participate in informal groups with common agendas. These include: the Cairns Group (19 agricultural commodity exporters including Argentina, Australia, Brazil and Pakistan); the ‘New Quad’ (the US, the EU, Japan, Australia, Brazil and India); the Group of Ten (food-­ importing nations including Japan, Norway, Switzerland and South Korea); and a more recent Group of Twenty industrializing developing nations such as Brazil, India, China and South Africa. Generally discussions are shaped by these groups, although individually the US and the EU (which represents all its members) exert considerable power. Another informal mechanism is the so-­called ‘Green Room’ process where the WTO DG or committee chairpersons meet with key states to resolve specific issues before taking them to the whole membership.

10.2.3 Current activities WTO’s present work revolves around monitoring and reporting on the implementation of existing trade agreements, not least the Uruguay Round, supporting the trade dispute process and providing a secretariat to the Doha Round negotiations for a new multilateral trade agreement, which started in 2001. Dispute cases have steadily declined in number (Table 10.2) and, compared with WTO’s formative years when developed countries were the main protagonists, the process is now utilized more by developing countries. Between 2001 and 2009 over half of dispute settlement cases were brought by WTO’s, admittedly far more numerous, developing-­country members. Table 10.2  WTO dispute settlement cases (1997–2009) Year Disputes initiated Panels created Disputes resolved Source: WTO annual reports.

1997

2000

2003

2006

2009

43 15 8

33 12 17

26 19 15

20 12 7

14 10 4

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Two recently concluded cases involving China give a taste for the scope and complexity of WTO disputes. The first case was brought by several countries, including Mexico, Turkey, the US and the EU, against export restrictions on primary commodities for which China is a dominant supplier. The Dispute Panel found against China on two counts, ruling that the decision was discriminatory as China had not imposed similar restrictions on its own industries and that export restrictions flouted a WTO transition agreement requiring China to abolish export duties. The second case was brought by China against the EU for introducing anti-­dumping tariffs on iron and steel fasteners. In this case the EU’s policy dealing with dumping by a non-­ market economy was found to be consistent with WTO rules; however the panel found against the EU because it had not applied its policies correctly, failing to differentiate between state-­sanctioned dumping and the exports of ­companies that were not state controlled. Doha is already the longest-­running trade round, and progress, albeit a relative concept, was slowed by the acrimonious collapse of talks in Geneva in 2008. The Round’s early objectives included agriculture, textiles, investments, services, trade procedures, labour rights, the environment, intellectual property, subsidies and electronic commerce. This proved to be an overambitious agenda, which has consequentially been pruned. During Doha’s interminable negotiations the interests of leading states and their bargaining powers have altered significantly. Constructing a comprehensive agreement on shifting sands is virtually impossible, as changing circumstances and interests reopen previous agreements. For instance, since the Round’s commencement the growing economic importance of emerging economies in the Global South has given them greater sway in negotiations, especially following the financial crises in the developed world. As the Round has progressed, developed countries have petitioned for better access to developing-­country markets. The US, for example, is now demanding steeper cuts in Chinese and Indian tariffs. Fluid power shifts have sponsored wariness within, as well as between, blocs of states. India and Brazil have become more apprehensive about unfair competition from China than from developed economies. Current negotiations on goods envisage a flexible tariff structure in which developing countries could choose the track they wish to pursue, trading off flexibility in implementation against deeper tariff reductions, with those agreeing to the deepest cuts being allowed greatest flexibility to exempt specific categories. The original aim was to reduce developed-­ country industrial tariffs to below 3 per cent on average and those of

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­ eveloping countries to between 12 and 14 per cent, but final figures are d yet to be agreed. That liberalization of agricultural trade would be beneficial is largely accepted, but it remains a primary fault line. In addition to US and EU disagreements over agricultural subsidies, developing countries have become more assertive. Provisional agreement has been reached on cutting direct support for agriculture (despite some unresolved US and EU differences) and allowing members to shift funding to agricultural extension services, infrastructure and research. A target to cut subsidies by 20 per cent the year after Doha comes into effect would be matched by developing-­country commitments to reduce their residual agricultural tariffs using a flexible formula in which commodities with the highest tariffs would be cut most. Strong opposition persists from countries that heavily subsidize agriculture (Table 10.3). Special safeguard mechanisms are anticipated, permitting developing countries to impose temporary tariffs to counter sudden supply surges or prices for specific items, but negotiations to define triggers to implement the mechanism and ensure that countries do not exceed agreed tariffs are unfinished. Table 10.3  Agricultural subsidies of selected countries Country Australia Canada EU Japan Norway South Korea Switzerland USA

Subsidies ($b)

Subsidy (as percentage of farm income)

0.9 7.4 101.4 52.9 3.6 17.5 5.4 25.6

2 17 19 50 61 45 54 7

Source: OECD (2011).

The focus in negotiating agreements on services expands upon the Uruguay Round’s subsidiary agreements, particularly liberalization of financial and professional services. Telecommunications, education and environmental services are also in the mix. As with agriculture, liberalization of trade in services could be enormously beneficial to the global economy. However, because priority is given to goods and difficulties exist in quantifying barriers to liberalized services (such as visa restrictions and licensing), progress is snail-­paced. Negotiations are mainly targeting improved market access for non-­national service providers. However, the 2007 financial crisis dealt a blow to negotiations on financial services. To ensure that greater liberaliza-

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tion will not induce further unacceptable risk taking, progress has become contingent on the seemingly elusive wider search for competent, international regulatory structures (see Chapter 9). As tariffs gravitate towards zero, non-­tariff barriers are coming under examination. The Uruguay Round dealt with some, but others, such as health and safety rules, imposition of technical standards and constraints on remanufactured and recycled products, remain contentious. The abolition of textile quotas (see above) opens up possibilities for other non-­tariff barriers. Many countries to which textile production has shifted have low costs partly because their workers have poor legal and social security protection. Consequently trade unions in industrialized countries have called for the enforcement of relevant ILO conventions which would improve workers’ protection but raise production costs (see Chapter 7). Unlike the overall Doha negotiations, some trade facilitation negotiations, encompassing the movement of goods, border formalities and regulatory transparency, were agreed in 2013, and IP discussions on geographical definitions to protect items such as regional foods, wines and spirits are well advanced. The details of non-­tariff agreements generally rely on international standards adopted through other IOs, for example the joint FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius, which establishes minimum standards for foodstuffs, the FAO International Plant Protection Convention for plant health rules, or the World Customs Organization (see section 10.8).

10.2.4 Evaluation and future challenges The existence of a multilateral trading regime, centred on WTO, is sometimes taken for granted but represents one of the most significant accomplishments in global governance since 1945. Few of GATT’s drafters would have foreseen that it would survive to become the fulcrum of a comprehensive global trading organization. Following Russia’s accession in 2012 all major trading nations now fall within WTO’s 159-­strong membership, covering 97 per cent of world trade. Consequently, GATT’s norms of freer trade, reciprocity and non-­discrimination are now amongst the most widely accepted in international relations. The endurance of a liberal trading order, in the face of severe economic headwinds and occasionally serious infractions of the rules, suggests these norms are well entrenched. Indeed they offer grist for liberal institutionalist views that IOs can prevent states defecting from international agreements by alerting them to the long-­term benefits of international cooperation, building trust and offering transparency. Against this, WTO has yet to fulfil its prime purpose, namely completing a round of trade negotiations. Moreover, as events at its 1999 Ministerial Conference demonstrated, as a

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bastion of freer trade WTO has become a lightning rod for a wider backlash against market-­driven globalization (Box 1.2). Primarily WTO exists to provide a venue in which states can negotiate trade agreements, monitor their implementation and, ultimately, compel compliance. As membership expands and becomes more heterogeneous, reflecting the global diffusion of the norm of freer trade, compromise leading to consensus has become more elusive. Additionally GATT, by concentrating on more straightforward trade matters, left WTO to address those issues about which states are less malleable. The Doha Round, a conclusion to which seems as remote as ever, has been prolonged by a cumbersome process, and some opine that new negotiation models are needed (Narlikar and Wilkinson 2004). Suggestions for improvement range from narrowing discussions to make them less complex and more focused, to formalizing the Green Room process (see section 10.2.2), with a core group of around 30 states managing initial negotiations for each issue before involving the full membership. Such proposals are not a panacea. Restricted Green Room-­style meetings contributed to setbacks in the Doha Round (Albin 2008), eroding the legitimacy of decision making by freezing out weaker states. A sunnier story attends the monitoring and implementation of GATT/ WTO. WTO provides a permanent location in which trade representatives can meet, exchange information and peer-­review members’ policies. This ongoing debate could ultimately assist WTO in its prime objective of finalizing the Doha Round. Progress may be stumbling and intermittent but, importantly, all the major players remain committed to WTO and the Round. Implementation is further bolstered by the knowledge that gains from contravening WTO rules can be nullified by retaliatory action ­authorized through the dispute settlement process. The widespread use of DSB and the predominant acceptance of its findings suggest that states recognize WTO rules and norms and when they are being violated. Furthermore, despite growing protectionism following the 2007 financial crisis (Evenett 2009), it could be postulated that, but for WTO rules and continued use of its mechanisms to challenge backsliding, things might have been worse. WTO’s role as the flag bearer for freer trade has made enemies amongst those protesting against the perceived social, environmental and developmental injustices of untrammelled capitalism. The poorest 50 members are exempted from all trade rules. This provides a limited advantage, because half the benefit from trade liberalization comes from dropping internal

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r­ estrictions, a policy choice of the member alone (IBRD 2002). Indeed, at a local level, such as among trade union members and the farming community, the case has not been made, and WTO is seen as a threat and disconnected from day-­to-­day concerns. The WTO is professed to have institutionalized the power of Northern states and multinational corporations, thereby ­ensuring the free market project rolls forward. The vitriol directed at WTO is, however, often misguided. The idea that WTO is a behemoth opening up the economies of weaker states at the behest of corporate interests is debatable. WTO exists simply to administer the rules agreed by members. Only members have legal standing and access to WTO bodies, with no place for corporate lobbyists. That WTO disproportionately represents the interests of powerful states is a more valid claim, though this is not necessarily its fault. WTO is a creature of the fundamentally unequal state system (one example being that only the larger states can afford to maintain permanent trade delegations in Geneva), and its rules inevitably reflect the interests of the most powerful. Similarly while WTO creates rules to which all states should adhere and DSB can permit retaliation against even the most powerful wrongdoers, in practice a small economy cannot inflict serious reprisals on a powerful trading partner, yet grave economic damage may have resulted from the original infraction. An example is Antigua’s successful case brought against US restrictions on online gambling. The WTO ruling allows Antigua to levy punitive sanctions against the US and requires the US Congress to examine its discriminatory policies. Antigua’s sanction was to allow access to US media internet downloads without charge, but the effect on the US economy is negligible and therefore the ruling is being ignored. For all its shortcomings WTO’s multilateral approach may nevertheless serve weaker countries better than bilateral agreements where more powerful states could exert greater leverage. WTO also inveighs against accusations that it rides roughshod over concerns about public health, security and development. WTO has several mechanisms which explicitly cover such concerns, and many of the most celebrated cases cited rest on fundamental misconceptions. For example, WTO’s denigrators frequently quote the 1998 decision that a US ban on imported shrimp caught using techniques that kill sea turtles is in contravention of WTO rules. In fact WTO acknowledged the right of the US to ban these imports on environmental grounds but declared it an infringement because it discriminated between different groups of countries using identical techniques, a breach of most favoured nation and non-­discrimination principles. The global recession, during which the value of global trade contracted for the first time since 1982 and pressure to meet the MDGs, temporally

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injected fresh urgency into WTO’s most important challenge, concluding the Doha Round. Given that there seems to be no immediate resolution to the main negotiating fault lines, there have been some moves to limit the Round to those items already agreed, especially after the US Congress did not renew the President’s power to conclude an agreement on an all-­or-­nothing basis, potentially opening further debate at a later stage. Assuming Doha is completed, WTO’s life will not get any easier. Categories being lined up for the next round include educational services, energy and items dropped from the Doha Round such as postal services. The liberalization of these sectors, dominated by advanced economies, would give credence to those who argue that WTO is highly selective in the issues it tackles, thereby exacerbating problems in developing nations’ terms of trade.

10.3 The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 10.3.1 Background and structure GATT was the pre-­eminent forum for negotiating international trade rules, but by the 1960s it was just one element of a pyramid-­like international trading regime (Cohn 2002). While developed countries coalesced around OECD’s Trade Committee, UNCTAD was an IO reflecting the aspirations and needs of LDCs, providing a forum where they could debate broad policy perspectives before engaging in GATT negotiations. UNCTAD’s birth revealed growing dissatisfaction amongst LDCs with an international economic order dominated by developed states (often their former colonial masters), which they felt overlooked or fragmented discussions about development. Initially UNCTAD was only a quadrennial conference, but a permanent structure was created in 1964 aimed at integrating developing economies into the world trading system and promoting development through trade and investment. While integration was a key aim, UNCTAD also sought to secure more advantageous terms. Its first SG was Raul Prebisch, whose structuralist theory of economic growth influenced UNCTAD’s initial work as a forum for developing nations to challenge the status quo (see Chapter 1, section 1.7 and Chapter 5). UNCTAD’s role has evolved in tandem with the wider global trading regime. It remains a forum for LDC consensus building and their seeking preferential terms, but lately its knowledge-­based activities have come to the fore, such as conducting research and analysing policies. Growing developing-­country membership of, and active participation in, WTO has seen them shift away

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from considering overarching policy in UNCTAD to detailed negotiation in WTO. UNCTAD now attempts to equip LDCs with the intellectual and financial resources needed to articulate their case and counter the major trading nations in WTO. When GATT was converted into WTO, UNCTAD remained a semi-­ autonomous UN organization with similar budgetary and structural arrangements to those described in Chapter 6. The Secretariat’s functions parallel those of OECD; it undertakes studies, produces statistical data and moulds consensus in support of intergovernmental bodies. Its five divisions cover such broad subjects as globalization, development strategies, international trade, investment and technology while one division focuses on the specific problems of Africa and LDCs.

10.3.2 Current activities, evaluation and future challenges UNCTAD’s principal output is reports and policy papers, and its lack of concrete accomplishments is frequently cited but not entirely fair. UNCTAD reports have made an important intellectual contribution to discussions of trade and development (Taylor and Smith 2007). The Trade and Development Report provides authoritative data and policy advice on many topics. The World Investment Report examines the developmental roles of multinational corporations and foreign direct investment, while UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Review disseminates information about the investment environment of selected states. Moreover, UNCTAD is where developing countries can take the lead in negotiating trade preference agreements which fall outside WTO. These include getting privileged treatment for their exports to industrialized countries and to each other, most notably the Generalized System of Preferences (1971) and addressing maritime trade. UNCTAD has produced conventions controlling certain aspects of sea freight, which accounts for the movement of 95 per cent of world trade by weight, and it has brokered an agreement to protect the transport interests of landlocked countries, the majority of which are LDCs. UNCTAD provides a forum where LDCs can address commodity issues, the importance of which can be judged from the fact that 37 of the 43 highly indebted poor countries are heavily dependent upon commodities (see HIPC Box 8.2). UNCTAD is where specialized commodity groups bring their negotiations to a broader membership for agreement, for example those on cocoa, sugar, tropical timber and wheat. UNCTAD’s Common Fund for Commodities assists developing countries highly dependent on primary commodities to develop projects to stabilize their income flow. Poor project

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selection initially depleted its resources, but it has since solidified its endowment and is funded through a combination of voluntary contributions and interest from a capital fund. Primarily the Fund sponsors regional projects concerned with developing specific commodity markets. While in the past UNCTAD used a one-­size-­fits-­all North–South model of economic development to advocate global solutions to global problems (Taylor and Smith 2007), recent organizational changes have shifted attention to narrower constituencies such as those of Africa and LDCs. It provides the secretariat for the decennial global conference on LDCs and is advocating that they follow a growth-­driven model of development, drawing on public and private capital investment. Concurrently UNCTAD continues to provide intellectual and structural support to enhance LDCs’ negotiating capacity at WTO. Nevertheless, intellectual support of a communal nature does not always address members’ specific problems, and insufficient resources mean structural support, such as TA and training programmes, is undertaken in conjunction with WTO, OECD, IBRD, UNDP and IMF. An example is the International Trade Centre (ITC), a service operated jointly with WTO. ITC provides market research, business advice and support for product development, particularly for medium-­sized businesses in developing countries, with a view to enhancing their export competitiveness. Similarly, in order to help African nations it works within the New Partnership for Africa’s Development programme (Box 13.5), where funding can be secured. UNCTAD’s perennial challenge is defining its place in the global trading regime and effectively promoting the trading interests of weaker members of the international system. UNCTAD’s existence is testament to power inequalities, and its work has been regularly sabotaged by the failure of Northern countries to implement its agreements. Thus, while UNCTAD has aired ideas, much of its platform, including proposals for a New International Economic Order (Box 3.4), was never realized. Indeed, since the 1970s, UNCTAD has arguably been transformed from an IO advocating alternatives to Northern-­dominated regimes to one that accepts the pre-­eminence of Bretton Woods institutions and seeks accommodation with them. To some extent, UNCTAD has been a victim of circumstance. During the 1980s its members became more divided and more indebted, weakening its scope for action. Furthermore, the Cold War’s end undermined its potency, while membership of WTO locked countries into liberalizing norms. Recently, UNCTAD has been further marginalized by the emergence of new blocs (such as WTO’s G20 group) and new powers (such as China, which prefers dealing with LDCs bilaterally rather than multilaterally).

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10.4 Regional trade associations By 2012, WTO had registered more than 300 regional trade agreements, but only 34 have secretariats and can be considered IOs (Table 10.4). This section examines EFTA, which is contemporaneous with the EU and has an interesting structure necessitated by its interrelationship with the EU, and two of the newer ones, Mercosur and NAFTA, which involve important trading nations. Like the EU, several regional trade agreements are the result of political compacts reflecting desires to tighten regional integration and support closer politico-­economic ties or, following functionalist logic, have slowly developed political dimensions. These include the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) (see Chapter 13, section 13.11). The Americas have the most regional trade agreements, but their economic impact is sometimes small because the US dominates intraregional trade. The development of economically meaningful multilateral accords in Asia and Africa has also been relatively ineffectual. Potentially one of the more important, the Asia-­Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), has wide Pacific Rim membership and includes the ASEAN nations. However, after the 1997 Asian financial crisis the speed of multilateral integration ebbed, and instead Asian nations concentrated on bilateral mechanisms, with WTO registering 31 intraregional agreements along with many extra-­regional ones. Delays in the Doha Round are giving renewed impetus to regional agreements (Box 10.1), although multiple agreements are potentially inefficient and tend to confuse rather than advance regional free trade objectives.

10.5 The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 10.5.1 Background When six European countries formed the Common Market (Chapter 11), seven others (Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK), being resistant to the underlying political concepts, created EFTA, an association devoted to trade alone (Benoit 1961). By 1966 EFTA members had established a free trade zone for industrial goods. In 1972 EFTA and the EEC concluded a free trade agreement on industrial goods, thereby bringing Western European industry into one market, which by 1984 had eliminated all tariffs. In the 1970s, EFTA represented a considerable trading block of ten members and could influence the international trade agenda. For example, in 1972, EFTA introduced the ethical treatment of tuna and dolphins into GATT negotiations, the first time that an ­environmental issue

Americas Andean Community (CAN) Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) Central American Common Market (CACM) Dominican Republic–Central American Free Trade Association   (DR-­CAFTA) Latin America Integration Association (ALADI) Mercado Comun del Sur (Mercosur) North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Asia Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) Southern Asian Preferential Trade Arrangement (SAPTA) Trans-­Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Central Asia Common Economic Zone Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC)

Organization

Table 10.4  Regional trade agreements that have secretariats

1969 1973 1961 2005 1981 1991 1994 1976 1967 1982 2006 1995 2006 1996 1994 1992 1997

12 5 3 6 10 6 7 7 4 4 12 10 5

Date

5 12 5 7

Members

35 (G) 248 (G) – –

29 (G) 2444 (G&S) – 10 (G) 948 (G&S) –

182 (G) 670 (G&S) 5718 (G&S)

224 (G&S) 59 (G&S) 95 (G&S) 23 (G)

Value of trade in goods (G) and commercial services (S) ($b)

– cis.minsk.by ecosecretariat.org evrazes.com (in Russian)

unescap.org/tid/apta.asp aseansec.org aseansec.org saarc-­sec.org saarc-­sec.org –

aladi.org mercosur.org.uy nafta-­sec-­alena.org

comunidadandina.org caricom.org sieca.org.gt –

Website – http://www.

Sources: WTO, International Trade Statistics 2011 (G&S series) and various.

Oceania Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement   (SPARTECA) Sub-­Saharan Africa Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) East African Community (EAC) Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Southern African Development Community (SADC) Southern African Customs Union (SACU) West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) Middle-­East/North Africa Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Pan-­Arab Free Trade Area (PAFTA) Europe Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) European Economic Area (EEA) European Free Trade Association (EFTA) European Union (EU) 1994 2003 1981

1982 2000 1999 1993 1980 1910 2000 1989 1981 1998 2007 1994 1960 1958

5 14 13

19 5 10 15 15 5 8 5 7 17 9 30 4 27

8 (G) – 791 (G&S) 13 482 (G&S)

1 (G) 1137 (G&S) 28 (G)

134 (G&S) 3 (G) 142 (G) 193 (G) 408 (G&S) 0.02 (G) 43 (G)

– 0.02 (G) –

cefta.int – efta.int europa.eu.int

maghrebarabe.org gccsg.org arableagueonline.org

comesa.int eac.int ceeac-­eccas.org ecowas.int sadc.int sacu.int uemoa.int

– forumsec.org.fj –

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BOX 10.1

REGIONAL OR GLOBAL TRADE AGREEMENTS The relative merits of regional and global trade agreements are hotly disputed. Enthusiasts for global agreements argue that regional agreements can derail global negotiations as, by offering preferential trade access exclusively to their members, they violate the norms of reciprocity and non-­discrimination lying at the heart of the global trading regime. In Latin America, in particular, smaller nations desired superior access to US markets, and the US has used regional agreements to extend its influence. Too many regional agreements result in a ‘spaghetti bowl’ (Bhagwati 2008) of convoluted rules and regulations that deter

trade. Conversely proponents of regional agreements see them as stepping stones to global free trade. WTO permits regional trade agreements, and regional strength confers on countries a chance to develop their trading infrastructures and gives them a greater weight in global negotiations. Regional groups have emerged because countries fixated with national economic development cannot afford the desultory progress emblematic of global negotiations and small states feel that their objectives are better achieved by focusing on their principal trade partners than by subsuming their preferences into a global agreement.

had been included in multilateral trade negotiations. Subsequently EFTA has contracted and its influence waned. As members joined the EU, EFTA membership fell from ten to four (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland). Furthermore, EFTA’s character changed in 1992 when Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and the EU negotiated the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA), forcing EFTA to adapt its structure to also deal with EEA issues. EEA integrates those three states fully into the EU Single Market, giving them access to the EU with its freedoms of movement in goods, services, people and capital, without requiring them to accept the social and political conditions of full membership or EU agricultural policies. The downside is that although they have a voice in making EU law they have no vote.

10.5.2 Structure EFTA is three institutions under a single umbrella. The Secretariat’s role is to support the flow of free trade between the four members and others, while the Surveillance Authority (EFTA/SA) and the Court deal with EEA matters. EFTA’s structure follows the pattern of most similar organizations, with a policy-­making Ministerial Council, a Standing Committee to oversee

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the Secretariat and working groups supported by an SG in charge of technical and administrative functions. The Council meets monthly at the level of its heads of delegation and at least annually at ministerial level. EFTA/SA and the Court started operations in 1994, but almost immediately Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU, with consequential downsizing of each institution causing considerable initial operational difficulty. They are responsible for ensuring that members fulfil their obligations to EEA. EFTA/SA, which is headed by a three-­member College, takes decisions by majority vote and monitors compliance with certain EEA rules, for example state aid to industry or restrictive practices. If its decisions are not implemented and the offending party is not prepared to change, EFTA/SA pursues the case at the EFTA Court either for an advisory opinion or for a decision which it can enforce in a similar manner to the European Court of Justice (ECJ, see Chapter 11). EFTA/SA may also appear before ECJ in trade-­related matters involving EFTA members. Having a similar structure to EFTA/SA, the EFTA Court is headed by three justices, one from each member, who sit as a single bench to hear cases.

10.5.3 Current activities, evaluation and future challenges EFTA has had small successes; its environmental stance has been mentioned above, and in 2002 it negotiated the first preferential trade agreement of recent times between European countries and one of the developed East Asian countries (Singapore). Apart from agreeing on trading conditions with the EU, EFTA has negotiated 24 other trade arrangements, including those with Mexico (2000), Chile (2003), Egypt (2007) and Canada (2008). It continues to negotiate new agreements, most recently concluding ­agreements with Ukraine and Hong Kong. Currently the work of EFTA/SA and the Court dominates EFTA. EFTA/ SA acts in a comparable manner to the European Commission within the EU context. Typically it is delegated to approve specific regulations, such as those that protect human health or restrict trade in animal and agricultural products. Additionally, it inspects national bodies that regulate food-­ processing activities. EFTA/SA also takes members to the Court in two situations: inordinate delay in implementing an EEA directive (as measured by ‘transposition’, the rate of adoption of EU directives by each national legislature) and incorrect application or non-­conformity with a directive. In 2010, EFTA/SA pursued 26 transposition cases, and 16 other cases were taken to the Court. EFTA’s EEA members, however, are more assiduous in meeting EU rules than EU members. In 2007, Italy had over 200 transposition cases,

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and most other large states had between 120 and 180 being considered by the European Commission. More negatively EFTA, along with the EU, has been a laggard in the Doha Round negotiations on agriculture, as Norway and Switzerland support extensive agricultural protectionism (Table 10.3). EFTA’s size is also problematic. The need to deal with EEA issues discretely within the EFTA structure, because Switzerland does not participate, makes it unduly complex and costly. If either of the two largest members (Norway and Switzerland) were to join the EU the rationale for its separate existence would disappear.

10.6 Mercado Comun del Sur (Mercosur) 10.6.1 Background Like the membership of EFTA, that of Mercosur is small, covering five countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Venezuela and Uruguay), with Paraguay suspended for a year for abrogating Mercosur’s democratic membership conditions. Unlike EFTA, Mercosur’s members are potent economically. They constitute the world’s fourth largest economic entity (with a combined GDP of around $2.9 trillion) and include some of the largest agricultural producers. Created by the 1991 Treaty of Asuncion, Mercosur presently consists of a free trade agreement and a customs union, but its long-­term objective is to found a common market. The trade component of the programme aims to eliminate all intraregional tariffs with the exception of sugar production and vehicle manufacture. When Mercosur was formed, trade agreements were initially confined to Argentina and Brazil, Latin America’s two largest economies, which had been developing bilateral agreements since 1985. By 1995, after a three-­year transition period, the customs union came into force throughout the membership, and it was agreed that common external tariffs would be implemented in ten years. The main purpose of the tariffs is to protect members’ infant industries from outside competition. Mercosur subsequently negotiated agreements with two neighbouring trading partners, Chile and Bolivia, which have ten years to bring their tariffs into line with Mercosur’s although Bolivia has now applied for full membership.

10.6.2 Structure Mercosur is governed by its Common Market Council. One annual session of the Council is attended by national presidents, but otherwise it operates

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by consensus at a ministerial level with a six-­monthly rotating presidency. The Council takes policy decisions on issues negotiated beforehand in a Common Market Group. The Common Market Group is attended by government officials, meets quarterly and oversees implementation of Council decisions. There are also ten specialist subgroups. As a democratic structure is a condition for membership, a Mercosur Parliament brings together national parliamentarians to discuss trade. With the exception of Paraguay, parliamentarians are currently appointed, but from 2015 they will all be directly elected. Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru are associate members of Mercosur. Brazil and Argentina dominate Mercosur deliberations, although Chile also has a strong voice, even as an associate member, reflecting its regional economic importance.

10.6.3 Current activities, evaluation and future challenges The basic customs union has been established, resulting in an 85 per cent reduction in tariffs, which has contributed to a 360 per cent increase in intraregional trade and spurred flows of inward investment (IDB 2010). Nonetheless, the unwillingness of states to cede sovereignty means decisions of individual members still prevail over institutional objectives. The customs union is not operating effectively, and the Secretariat has few enforcement powers, resulting in some agreements being ignored (such as that on vehicle manufacture). In straitened economic times legitimate violations of Mercosur’s free trade principles through negotiated exemptions are commonplace. Financial crises in Brazil (1999) and Argentina (2001) prompted tit-­for-­tat protectionism between the two countries, and trade shrank dramatically. Likewise during the present economic slowdown the number of items no longer qualifying for automatic import licences into Argentina has rocketed to over 600 (Economist 2012b). Brazil and Argentina’s dominance gives Mercosur an unstable quality, and the organization has done much but achieved little (de Azevedo 2004). Selective applications of the rules and holes in the system of common external tariffs have increased average tariffs slightly in recent years. Members have even imposed additional tariffs on goods that have already entered Mercosur. New non-­tariff barriers have been introduced, offsetting  the progress made elsewhere, and Argentina in particular has created problems for its partners. For example, it has extended border processing times to protect its own tyre industry by slowing imports of Brazilian tyres. The largest member, Brazil, also tends to ignore Mercosur when convenient. Mercosur rules forbid bilateral agreements with non-­ members, and Argentina (probably acting as a proxy for Venezuela) denied

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Uruguay  the opportunity to negotiate a bilateral agreement with the US, but Brazil concluded a trade agreement with China without consulting its partners. Mercosur has started to move from a customs union to a common market and has had to strengthen its institutional capacity to assume concomitantly greater responsibilities. It is beginning to harmonize legislation on patents, standardize human, animal and plant safety regulations, and liberalize air transport and is establishing an arbitration mechanism. However, a ten-­year programme to open trade in services is proving difficult to implement. The objective of a common market remains distant, as there is no agreement for the institution’s legislation to become binding on members, which currently transpose Mercosur decisions into national legislation, a slow and piecemeal process. Negotiations to reach a trading agreement with the EU are proceeding with difficulty. Stemming from a weak Secretariat, Mercosur’s institutional frailties are slowing progress and there are political constraints. To some extent the negotiations reflect those on agricultural trade in WTO. Mercosur wants the EU to abolish its agricultural subsidies, but the EU is reluctant because of Brazil’s interventionist agricultural policies. A second constraint is a fundamental clash of interests. The EU sees the relationship as one that will boost its exports, while Mercosur’s objectives are to bolster its industrial capacity and reduce imports of high-­end manufactured goods (Robles 2008). The main debate in Mercosur, similar to that of the EU, is between broadening membership or deepening its remit. Widening will further Latin American economic integration but complicate efforts to deepen Mercosur. The failure to conclude an agreement on a Free Trade Area of the Americas has given Mercosur renewed regional influence. Mexico is negotiating to become an associate member, and agreements are also being developed with Andean Community countries. The inclusion of Venezuela as a full member, with its more state-­centric economic philosophy and sometimes aggressive approach to regional relations, may derail Mercosur’s expansion programme by polarizing positions. Venezuela gave financial support to Argentina, enabling it to repay IMF loans. Thus, there is concern that the two may act in concert, exacerbating the instability deriving from difficult relationships amongst the most powerful members. Members are considering deepening Mercosur to cover macroeconomic matters and defining a common economic framework through target indicators, similar to the EU Stability and Growth Pact see (section 9.3.1). However, deepening will require already

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reluctant members to cede more powers, institutional reforms designed to better manage members in changing circumstances, a greater involvement of civil society, strengthening of the nascent Mercosur Parliament, and improved ­enforcement mechanisms.

10.7 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 10.7.1 Background and structure NAFTA set out rules for free trade in goods, services and investments with a timetable for tariff reductions in its three member countries, the USA, Canada and Mexico. This includes access to government procurement (within certain limits depending on the level of government) and rules concerning IP protection based mainly on WIPO-­administered conventions. Since it entered into force in 1994, trade between the partners has almost trebled and investment flows have multiplied fivefold. The most visible impact has been in Mexico, where special border trading areas have been created in which mostly US-­owned factories (maquilladoras) employ Mexican labour. Indeed it might be argued that, without NAFTA, which heightened Mexico’s importance as a US trading partner, the US might have been less amenable to arranging the $50b in standby loans (including support from IMF and BIS) that mitigated the country’s 1994–95 financial crisis. Moreover, regional trade was an important driver of Mexico’s strong subsequent recovery. NAFTA has a frequently used dispute mechanism. Typical cases include US accusations that imported Canadian timber had been subsidized and Mexican challenges to US anti-­dumping tariffs imposed on imports of Mexican metal tubes. Members have the right to invoke the World Bank Group’s dispute mechanism (the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Chapter 8, section 8.1.1) or the rules of the UN Commission on International Trade Law or request the establishment of a NAFTA panel. Five-­member panels are established from national rosters maintained and agreed by the members. By mutual agreement, two panel members are chosen from the roster of each party to the dispute and the fifth member is appointed in strict alternating sequence from one of the parties. While it has an international governing body (the Free Trade Commission) composed of members’ trade ministers, there is no international secretariat or headquarters. Instead members maintain identical NAFTA Secretariat offices staffed by their own nationals that cooperate to administer the

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a­ greement. Thus, while its structure is somewhat different from that of a conventional IO, it displays most of the common features.

10.7.2 Current activities, evaluation and future challenges NAFTA is seen as having been a liberalizing force (Wise 2009) and, while trade would have undoubtedly increased during the period, can be said to have made a significant contribution to boosting intra-­North American trade. Since ratification the US has tripled trade with its two partners, and foreign direct investment to Mexico has risen tenfold. The US is NAFTA’s key member. NAFTA has cemented US–Canadian trade, historically always North America’s most important trading relationship, with a current value of some $680b. NAFTA’s largest impact, however, has been on Mexico, whose trade with the US has risen fivefold to a current value of $500b. By comparison Mexico–Canada trade (with a volume of only $27b) remains trivial. Indeed, NAFTA’s impact on Canadian trade appears negligible. NAFTA is not universally popular, nor has its impact been even. Although it has been an engine for Mexican economic growth, the benefits have accrued disproportionately to the country’s north. US investors have been attracted by clusters of complementary industries within easy reach of US markets. In the US (which has lost some manufacturing jobs to Mexico) NAFTA has not been considered particularly beneficial, particularly by unionized labour. NAFTA free trade conditions are not yet optimized, as indicated by the 150 dispute cases that have been initiated, and bilateral agreements remain important. As can also happen with WTO rulings (see section 10.2.4, Antigua), the US often ignores NAFTA rulings, as exemplified by the cross-­border transport dispute with Mexico. Cross-­border transport was to have been fully liberalized by 2000. However, US security, narcotics and migration concerns restricted movement of Mexican labour and transport, thus impairing cross-­ border economic activity (for example through enforcing long administrative delays and unnecessary trans-­shipments). In 2001, a NAFTA panel gave Mexico the right to impose punitive tariffs, but initially it did not retaliate. Only in 2009, when Mexico imposed selective tariffs on industries in the districts of key Congressional opponents, did the US start to comply. To make further progress NAFTA’s remit will need widening. Several sensitive manufacturing sectors fall outside NAFTA, such as automobiles, textiles and high-­technology, as do non-­tariff barriers. However, Wise (2009) observes that, although NAFTA has achieved 99 per cent of its tariff objec-

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tives, additional evolution needs institutions to stimulate debate and the US to exert stronger leadership and desist from antagonistic policies such as restricting immigration.

10.8 The World Customs Organization (WCO) 10.8.1 Background and structure In 1948, as part of intergovernmental discussions leading to OEEC’s creation, European countries established a Customs Cooperation Council, and in 1952 this body took on a global dimension, eventually becoming WCO. Its mission is to: zz enhance

the effectiveness and efficiency of customs administrations through the development and harmonization of global customs systems and procedures; zz increase interstate cooperation to combat customs offences; zz assist states to respond to changing dimensions in global trade; and zz foster more effective security procedures notwithstanding greater volumes of trade. WCO is also the forum for members to agree detailed definitions needed to implement WTO/GATT rules. For instance, WCO brokered international agreement on the methodology for valuing goods transiting borders, an agreement formally endorsed in the Tokyo Round. WCO norms play a key role in smoothing trade and related negotiations. Its harmonized commodity descriptions coupled with its definitions of the transaction value of an item are used by states to assess tariffs, determine import quotas and calculate trade statistics. WCO rules defining the origin of goods also complemented Uruguay Round negotiations. WCO’s role revolves around enforcement and coordination. Enforcement covers activities to counter organized international crime (in cooperation with Interpol), commercial fraud, smuggling of high-­value goods (such as drugs, cigarettes and alcohol), money laundering, counterfeiting, international copyright issues, trade in endangered species and traffic in illegal armaments. As with Interpol (Chapter 13, section 13.17), international enforcement is backed by databases on criminal activity, with WCO regional offices collecting and analysing information on the illegal movement of goods. Coordination involves WCO members agreeing plans to target specific problems, and it has a communications network which makes information available quickly. WCO also provides developing-­country members with

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TA to upgrade their customs infrastructures through training programmes, assessment missions, information on best practice and modern technology. WCO has a policy-­making Governing Council of all members meeting annually, but day-­to-­day activity is directed by a 24-­member Policy Commission elected on a regional basis, meeting biannually. It functions though several technical committees (such as those on Enforcement and Valuation), which support WCO’s objectives and provide forums for national cooperation.

10.8.2 Current activities, evaluation and future challenges Customs authorities have traditionally existed to raise revenue, but the gradual reduction of tariffs due to GATT and regional trade agreements has allowed them to shift emphasis towards border protection. In recent years WCO, too, has switched emphasis by encouraging its members to move away from controlling trade at ports of entry towards risk assessment. It now focuses on key geographical areas, including the locations most susceptible to drug running and access by terrorists (Widdowson 2007). Given the increase of global trade, WCO is developing simpler, standardized customs procedures to speed goods through ports of entry, authority for which is given by the WCO Convention on Harmonization and Simplification of Customs Procedures; a process that will be stimulated by the recently negotiated WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement. This includes integrated IT systems enabling customs authorities to exchange documents for time-­sensitive consignments shipped through international mail couriers and just-­in-­time supply chains. A future initiative under the aegis of this Convention is to develop customs processes for e-­commerce. The threat from international terrorism presents WCO with the crucial challenge of balancing security against expanding trade. WCO works with IATA and ICAO (Chapter 16, section 16.3) to standardize advance passenger information and is examining how to monitor the huge volume of international trade without prejudicing the needs of manufacturers dependent on international supply chains. Recent attempts to place parcel bombs on freight flights has emphasized the need for WCO norms to respond to changing global security issues through tracking shipping containers, inspecting selected consignments at their point of departure rather than on arrival, and providing advance electronic notification of shipments and their routeing. In future, importers with high security standards will be given priority customs clearance and, if a container is considered high-­risk, the importing nation can request X-­ray scans.

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10.9 The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 10.9.1 Background Before the advent of internationally valid patents, innovations had to be separately and laboriously registered in each country. The need for international protection of intellectual property first became apparent in 1873 when potential overseas exhibitors at the Vienna International Exhibitions of Inventions refused to participate, fearing their ideas might be stolen and reproduced in countries where they had no recourse to protection. As Chapter 2 noted, for many years international protection was governed by the Paris and Berne Conventions through a small secretariat, the United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPI). Later, UNESCO became involved with copyright, and under its auspices the 1956 Universal Copyright Convention was agreed. By the mid-­1960s it was apparent that filing multiple patent applications to ensure worldwide protection was cumbersome and costly. BIRPI had neither the staff nor the legal ability to provide a full patent service, and other IOs were beginning to encroach on its territory (May 2007: 23). Consequently, WIPO was established in 1970 with two principal objectives. On the programme side it inherited BIRPI’s role in updating, maintaining and managing the conventions applicable to patents and copyright. Operatively it was given a new function, that of granting a patent to be recognized by all states that had ratified a specific agreement (Table 10.5). Furthermore, inventors in countries without a patent office could apply to WIPO for global recognition of their rights. WIPO’s current mandate continues these objectives, with the aim of promoting innovation through developing an effective and integrated global IP system. The process of granting a patent is costly and time consuming. Both WIPO and EPO (see section 10.10) can award internationally valid patents, but both depend on national patent authorities and courts for much of their administration, enforcement and dispute settlement. There are, however, differences. While WIPO’s patents are automatically valid in all members signatory to an agreement, WIPO patent holders must register their patents and have them accepted in each jurisdiction, where challenges to patents must be adjudicated. Patents awarded by EPO are accepted by members as definitive but can be registered either membership-­wide or in specified member countries, and patent applications can be initially challenged at EPO.

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Table 10.5  Intellectual property treaties Year

Name

Coverage

1883 1886 1891 1925 1957 1958 1961

Paris Convention Berne Convention Madrid Agreement Hague Agreement Nice Agreement Lisbon Agreement Rome Convention

173 164 35 59 83 27 91

1968 1970 1971 1971 1973

Locarno Agreement Patent Cooperation Treaty Geneva Convention Strasbourg Agreement Vienna Agreement

1974 1977 1981 1989 1989 and 2000 1994 2000 2002

Brussels Convention Budapest Treaty Nairobi Treaty Washington Treaty Madrid Agreements (two) Trademark Law Treaty Patent Law Treaty WIPO Copyright Treaty

Registration of industrial property Registration of literary and artistic works False labelling of the origin of goods Registration of industrial designs Classification of trademarks Protection for designations of origin Registration for performers and broadcasters Classification of industrial designs Created WIPO and the single international patent Registration for phonograms International patent classification Classification of the design elements of trademarks Programmes transmitted by satellites Rights for developers of micro-­organisms Protection of the Olympic symbol Integrated circuit designs International trademark registration

51 51 89

2002

WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty Geneva Act Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks

Harmonization of trademark procedures Harmonization of patent procedures Rules updating copyright for the internet era Updating of treaties to cover the internet Updated convention on industrial designs Simplification of trademark rules and inclusion of new types such as holograms

42 25

2003 2006

Members

52 144 77 61 29 35 75 49 3 56

89

Source: WIPO.

10.9.2 Structure WIPO members meet annually in its General Assembly. Assemblies of members subscribing to 13 of the WIPO treaties (such as the Berne or Paris Treaty) also meet in parallel with the General Assembly to consider the specifics of each treaty. The General Assembly adopts policy decisions, future work programmes and WIPO’s budget. Below this interconnected structure of assemblies is a Coordination Committee of just under half of the

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BOX 10.2

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Intellectual property is divided into two categories: industrial property and copyright. Industrial property includes patents for inventions, trademark protection, computer software, industrial designs and geographical indications. Copyright covers books, works of art, design and performance arts including broadcasting, records, tapes and other electronic media. IP rights allow the owner of a patent, trademark or copyright to benefit from the work or investment concerned. Patents, therefore, provide incentives to individuals and institutions allowing them to license their work, thereby generating income, which encourages further innovation. The granting of such rights (usually for 20 to 50 years) was, until WIPO’s advent, the prerogative of

national patent or copyright offices, and their international applicability was defined by international conventions. Copyrights, unlike patents and trademarks, are granted automatically, and copyright protection has gradually increased, exceeding 50 years in some countries. Protecting IP has become more important as knowledge and the application of knowledge-­based products have grown in economic significance. Indeed, because knowledge and related products are traded, the issue has been brought under the WTO/ TRIPS umbrella. Considerable effort is also required to stop trade in counterfeit products (often coordinated through WCO), but the effectiveness depends on strong national legal structures to obtain recourse.

­ embership (in which the Berne and Paris Assemblies are each represented m by no more than one-­quarter of their members), which meets annually to oversee WIPO’s ongoing work. Below the Coordination Committee are eight committees dealing with the main IP categories (patents, trademarks and copyright) and special topics (IT, genetic resources and traditional ­knowledge, development issues, enforcement and budget). New treaties are discussed and formulated in committees before being brought to a Diplomatic Conference for adoption prior to ratification, the latter process being overseen by the General Assembly and Secretariat, which has many legal staff. Enforcement of conventions is the responsibility of members, supported by a Permanent Committee on Enforcement of Industrial Property Rights in which they can exchange opinions and search for solutions. Structured to administer the main WIPO treaties protecting intellectual property and based on the work of technical committees, the Secretariat makes proposals for improvements and harmonization of practices. Patent applications must be examined to ensure that protection does not already

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exist elsewhere, and qualified patent inspectors or examiners check and register applications under the different treaties. Ninety-­five per cent of WIPO’s budget is funded from the fees it receives for lodging patent and trademark applications, with any surplus income being assigned to a strategic capital reserve. While this implies that the WIPO budget is less constrained by governments, this is not the case, as the members still pay 5 per cent of the budget, and the annual operating surplus is insufficient to dispense with this contribution.

10.9.3 Current activities WIPO’s core work is defined by the Patent Cooperation Treaty, which covers some 163 000 global patents, a number growing at a rate of approximately 15 000 per year (WIPO 2010). Searching existing patents and trademarks to see if an idea is unique is time consuming. Classification allows an inventor or IP owner to decide if a patent already exists. Four classification systems administered by WIPO allow for easy identification of patents, trademarks, the components of trademarks, and industrial designs. This is a continually changing activity; for example, the biotechnology classification expanded from 300 to 700 groups in the period 1980–2000, and currently digital ­connectivity is the fastest-­growing area of work. Second only to patents are trademarks, and 540 000 are registered with WIPO. Following the 2006 Singapore Treaty, WIPO developed rules for novel trademarks, such as those involving sound effects or three-­dimensional figures. WIPO is also working on protection of copyright in broadcasting and on the internet. This includes preparing a new treaty to cover performance artists against the unauthorized use of their work in audiovisual media. National systems are critical for registering enforcing patents. Developing countries, in particular, fall short, as patent work is complex and the training of patent inspectors is costly. Past criticism of WIPO’s efforts to support developing countries has spurred it to greater activity. WIPO now has a regional focus to its work and a small TA programme to support those members with rudimentary patent offices or those that wish to establish one. To make the most effective use of its training funds it is investing in distance learning and has enrolled 12 000 patent officials from developing countries into on-­the-­job training courses. WIPO is also exploring ways of cooperating with other development agencies, including collaboration with WTO in the management of TRIPS. TRIPS overrides some WIPO conventions, to the advantage of nations lodging the most patent applications, as normally states can select the conventions they wish to accept. TRIPS

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gave LDCs until 2013 to register their procedures with WTO, and a joint WIPO–WTO programme is helping them document their legislation for publication.

10.9.4 Evaluation and future challenges Within the protection protocols already agreed, poor enforcement by member states is a major problem, impeding the implementation of an effective global IP system. Since 1994 WIPO has provided a Dispute Resolution Service, which intercedes in IP disputes by suggesting appropriately qualified mediators. However, there are countries, such as China, where both the degree of national determination and the justice system are inadequate to ensure protection of third-­party IP rights. This suggests that WIPO needs an instrument which makes states establish effective mechanisms or which can be used to adjudicate blatant cases of non-­compliance. The TRIPS agreement, which falls under WTO rules, now affords some protection, and the WTO dispute settlement mechanism provides an independent hearing when states contravene WIPO treaties; however, this has effectively marginalized WIPO (May 2007). So far, however, TRIPS disputes have only averaged two per year. In a parallel to trademark protection, the internet environment has problems in protecting domain names, for which no agreed international legal protocol exists. The body that registers domain names, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), is an INGO with a legal standing only in the US, and it encourages use of the Dispute Resolution Service to solve domain name disputes. WIPO continues to study the need for international protection for registered domains. Although this would provide better safeguards against internet piracy, existing trademark agreements are ­presently the only protections for domain names. Debates surrounding IP centre upon the political question of the appropriate balance between protecting private property rights as an incentive to entrepreneurs to invest and innovate and securing the public benefits that new knowledge, goods and services can bring. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the debate on pharmaceuticals, which pits the industry against developing countries (see Box 10.3). WIPO’s critics attest it focuses excessively on protecting private sector interests in developed economies at the expense of the interests of developing countries, for which technology transfer is vital to their economic prospects. Developing countries also complain that the current IP system discriminates against them, since both technically and financially they cannot provide a national service to register patents

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appropriately. Their problem is to provide inexpensive and effective ways of protecting local industries and inventions in the face of aggressive overseas competition, but WIPO’s TA resources that can be devoted to this are ­overwhelmed by the cost and complexity of the work. BOX 10.3

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT RIGHTS Patent protection is important to large pharmaceutical companies and developed-­ country governments to encourage investment in new drugs and ensure funding is available for costly research. WIPO, EPO and national patent offices are the means through which drug companies obtain protection for predefined time limits. The WTO/ TRIPS rules (which favour pharmaceutical companies) allow an exception to patent protection in the event of a serious health crisis. Countries can then issue compulsory licences to produce a generic drug or import from so-­called parallel producers, which may have a licence to produce at lower cost in a third country. Fair trade advocates consider that WTO exceptions should be the basis for the manufacture or import of expensive drugs to fight HIV/AIDS and thus override patent protection. South Africa invoked this rule to reduce the cost of HIV/AIDS drugs but was prose-

cuted by the big pharmaceutical companies supported by the USA. Politically this was a damaging move, highlighting the industry’s lack of compassion when faced with lower profits. Following a very public defence supported by many INGOs they dropped their challenge. South Africa, Brazil and Thailand have used TRIPS rules to encourage better access to medicines, and the threat of compulsory licensing has induced pharmaceutical companies to reduce the cost of some proprietary drugs. While this is a short-­term solution it may discourage pharmaceutical companies from developing other important drugs, for example anti-­malarial prophylactics, for which developing countries are the main market. Trying a different approach, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, as part of its mandate, purchases anti-­retroviral drugs in bulk at a discount and cooperates with the pharmaceutical industry to lower treatment costs.

Recent technical and scientific advances including mapping human, animal and plant genomes, biotechnology and the use of traditional medicines pose specific problems relating to global commons and their protection. One of WIPO’s permanent committees is working on a treaty to cover these issues. An associated agency, the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, has 63 member states and cooperates with WIPO specifically on rights derived from plant breeding (see also Box 14.2).

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10.10 The European Patent Organisation (EPO) 10.10.1 Background In 1947 some European countries established the International Patent Institute, a shared patent research service. A pan-­European patent organization was proposed at a 1949 Council of Europe (COE) meeting. This was not pursued, but COE did negotiate two patent conventions. In 1973, spurred by an EEC commitment to harmonize patent law, 20 states, inside and outside the EEC, negotiated the European Patent Convention, and the treaty established EPO as its administrative mechanism. With some differences (see section 10.9.1), EPO works analogously to WIPO, but it provides its 38 European members and associate members with fewer protection instruments. For example, while WIPO offers an integrated technical approach to global property rights, EPO does not deal with trademarks for which there is a separate EU semi-­autonomous organization, the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Chapter 12, section 12.6.2). EPO protection can also be selective and cover one, some or all of its members. In the period 1990– 2005 EPO awarded 760 000 patents, and while EPO receives more requests for filings than WIPO (245 000 annually compared to 160 000) only some 47 per cent result in awards of patents. EPO is not part of the EU but is impacted by EU legislation. In 2012 the EU finalized a consolidated European law of property rights designed to harmonize national laws and provide claimants with a legal instrument which can be consistently applied by all EU states, thereby simplifying the dispute process. This work was delayed for several years because the European Parliament could not reach agreement on EPO’s translation policy (see section 10.10.3).

10.10.2 Structure EPO is governed by an Administrative Council, which directs its work and has limited authority to amend the Convention. Each member has a seat on the Council, which has a complex voting structure depending on which article of the Convention is being considered, ranging from unanimity through to two-­thirds or simple majorities for some decisions and weighted voting if budget decisions are contested. It oversees the European Patent Academy, which trains new patent officers for countries opening up their economies and provides refresher training for existing ones. The establishment of patent rights is adversarial, and competitors have a fixed time in which to challenge a patent award. EPO has an independent system of 24 appeal committees plus special legal and disciplinary committees. Each ­committee includes

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legally and technically qualified members selected from a 30-­person roster. The committees receive some 2000 appeals annually, of which around three-­ quarters are settled.

10.10.3 Current activities, evaluation and future challenges Currently, the biggest categories in which EPO awards patents are medical sciences, communications, computing, and measuring and testing technologies. Half its patents originate in the USA and Japan. Increasing application volumes caused approval times to double to 3.5 years, although the 2007 economic slowdown reduced applications. Patent inspectors have resisted EPO attempts to accelerate the process, arguing that this would cause errors when awarding patents. However, EPO is conscious of the economic damage to inventors and industry prompted by delayed applications and looks set to override these objections. EPO was slow to establish itself, the cost of obtaining an EPO patent being high compared to the economic benefit. This was partly due to translation costs, as each patent, once granted, had to be translated into all its members’ languages (at an average expenditure of €31 000). This was particularly onerous as the average EPO application covered only seven countries; consequently applicants preferred to apply separately to each country. In 2003, members negotiated the London Agreement, which simplified the translation policy such that if the lingua franca of the applicant’s country is English, French or German there would be no further translation requirement and other countries could decide if they needed translations. Fourteen states now accept this procedure, and for those states EPO costs have dropped by over 20 per cent. Even so, EPO costs are still the world’s highest, but are further reduced by capping charges for applications covering more than seven countries and fee reductions for LDC applicants. EPO applications have risen such that national patent offices now issue only 10 per cent of European patents. Still, European patents remain highly fragmented, and EPO’s patents can be annulled by a court in any member state. Only when the EU finally concludes an agreement on a consolidated European law of property rights can EPO come into its own by providing a cheaper, seamless regional patent system, but this has been a lengthy process.

10.11 Commodity groups Commodity groups are IOs sponsored by producer and/or consumer nations to negotiate production, trade and economic issues relating to a specific commodity and sometimes for promoting sustainable development.

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The best known is the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), but 16 others exist (Table 10.6), many created under UNCTAD’s auspices (see section 10.3). Commodity groups operating within the structure of FAO (Chapter 7, section 7.3) do not meet the definition of an IO and are excluded. Commodity groups are not to be confused with international trade associations, INGOs which usually have a marketing focus. Several commodity IOs exist to stabilize prices. Despite the fact that members normally include the major supplier and consumer nations, this is an elusive objective. An example is the International Metals Study Group (IMSG), an umbrella secretariat supporting the work of international study groups for copper, nickel, lead and zinc. Each study group was designed to promote international cooperation on its specific commodity, with a view to ensuring market transparency through exchanging data on production, consumption and trade. In turn, it was hoped that transparency would end these commodities’ wild price oscillations. However, non-­agricultural commodity prices are more prone to swings and less susceptible to management (see Figure 10.2) because, while demand varies, supply is fixed and industry entry costs are high. Below we examine OPEC and the International Grains Council (IGC), one of the oldest agricultural commodity groups.

10.12 The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 10.12.1 Background In 1960, a joint Saudi Arabian–Venezuelan initiative resulted in the formation of OPEC, a cartel which coordinates members’ petroleum production policies to ensure fair and stable prices for crude oil, reliable incomes for exporting countries and those investing in the industry, and steady supplies. OPEC’s launch followed a period of falling oil revenues prompted by new sources of supply and coincided with national demands for better profit-­ sharing agreements with commercial oil producers. Nationalization of oil production reduced major oil companies’ influence in some OPEC countries, generated greater revenues and stimulated producing countries’ interest in the industry’s long-­term viability. Price controls were the cartel’s original objective, but they proved to be unachievable and instead members agree broad output levels. However, OPEC’s work extends beyond pricing and supply. It has established framework agreements for negotiating royalties from production companies and provided a forum to agree common policies covering costs of marketing and delivery which are shared with, or solely the responsibility of, production companies.

International Cocoa Organization International Coffee Organization International Cotton Advisory Committee International Grains Council International Jute Study Group International Metals Study Group, comprising:   International Lead and Zinc Study Group   International Nickel Study Group   International Copper Study Group International Network for Bamboo and Rattan International Olive Council International Organization on Vine and Wine International Rubber Study Group International Sugar Organization International Tropical Timber Organization Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

Organization

Table 10.6  International commodity organizations

1973 1963 1939 1942 1976 1959 1990 1992 1993 1959 2001 1944 1992 1986 1968 1960

29 14 21 38 16 44 17 84 72 11 12

Founded

42 70 41 52 30

Members

52 25 – 10 11 35 52 100

19 26 11 17 10 10

No of staff

Beijing Madrid Paris Singapore London Yokohama Kuwait City Vienna

London London Washington London Dhaka Lisbon

Headquarters

icco.org ico.org icac.org igc.org.uk jute.org imsg.org ilzsg.org insg.org icsg.org inbar.int internationaloliveoil.org oiv.int rubberstudy.com isosugar.org itto.int oapecorg.org opec.org

Website – http://www.

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60 000

$ US per metric ton

50 000

40 000 Copper Lead Nickel Zinc

30 000 20 000

10 000

0 Jul 01 Jul 02 Jul 03 Jul 04 Jul 05 Jul 06 Jul 07 Jul 08 Jul 09 Jul 10 Date Source:  London Metal Exchange monthly average trading prices.

Figure 10.2  Prices of IMSG commodities (2001–11)

The Arab–Israeli conflict transformed OPEC from a cartel into a redoubtable political actor. In 1967, Arab countries formed the related but separate Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), to hound Western countries over their support for Israel. This culminated in 1973 when OAPEC embargoed supplies to countries supporting Israel during the Yom Kippur war and OPEC announced a 70 per cent hike in oil prices. That year crude oil prices rose from $2 per barrel to $11.65, prompting serious financial problems in the developing world, high inflation in industrialized countries and the establishment of IEA within OECD, to counter OPEC pressure through analysing production and consumption trends (see section 10.1). Some of the concomitant windfall in revenues found its way into a new subsidiary agency, the OPEC Fund for International Development. However, its resources are meagre compared to the major development banks, so this well-­intentioned initiative has had minimal impact. OPEC members were also a majority contributor to the International Fund for Agricultural Development (Chapter 8, section 8.10). Despite OPEC’s interventions oil prices have continued to fluctuate dramatically (Figure 10.3). Competition from other energy sources and oversupply saw oil prices drop as low as $10 per barrel in the 1990s. Since then prices have rebounded because of rampant demand from emerging economies and supply disruptions in the Middle East stemming from the US–UK invasion of Iraq and the Arab Spring of 2011.

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125 100

$

75 50 25 0 1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

Note:  $ per barrel (2007=100).

Figure 10.3  Nominal price of crude oil

10.12.2 Structure OPEC has a conventional structure, with a Conference of Ministers that meets biannually or in special session when events require an instant response. Below the Conference is a Board of Governors, which directs the Secretariat and oversees implementation of decisions. Since 1973, the Board has been supported by an Economic Commission of national experts who advise it on trends and developments impacting on global oil prices. Saudi Arabia, the world’s biggest supplier, is OPEC’s most influential member, because it has the capacity to influence world prices. OPEC membership is open to ‘any country with substantial net exports of crude petroleum which has fundamentally similar interests to those of member countries’. The latter restriction has limited its attractiveness to other oil producers. Angola is the only state to join since 1971, Indonesia left the organization in 2008 when it ceased being a net exporter, and Russia, with its large proven reserves, remains outside OPEC (as did the UK when it was a net exporter). Brazil, which has recently discovered new resources, is disinclined to join.

10.12.3 Current activities, evaluation and future challenges Proven oil reserves have increased from 0.7 trillion barrels in 1983 to 1.3 trillion barrels in 2009, while OPEC’s share of global production has fallen by 20 per cent. However, OPEC members still supply 40 per cent of the world’s crude oil and account for 80 per cent of reserves, half of which are in Saudi

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Arabia. More than for any other commodity, prices are influenced as much by political events as by supply and demand. In late 2010, OPEC stated that its stable medium-­term target price for crude oil would be between $70 and $80 per barrel, but its lethargic response to the 2011 turmoil in the Middle East contributed to prices exceeding $100, despite the only lost supply being from Libya, which accounts for a meagre 5 per cent of OPEC production. Unfortunately for OPEC, these recent travails typify its long-­standing inability to coordinate policy, stabilize prices and steady income. Policy coordination has been inhibited by the interrelated problems of flawed information, insufficient monitoring and clashing national interests. There have been disagreements about whether price stability or steady income should be the principal goal and over the way in which OPEC’s goals can be achieved. Lack of shared production data makes it difficult for OPEC to estimate market trends. Moreover, solidarity is not its hallmark. OPEC decisions are non-­ binding; agreements are not monitored and are regularly ignored. In short, national interests have persistently overridden the cartel’s attempts to impose uniform price structures and production levels (Fattouh 2007). Gradually, OPEC’s prime purpose has shifted from seeking price stability through managing output to optimizing members’ revenues. There is, however, a schism between members with large reserves, which believe revenue can best be guaranteed by price stability, and those with small reserves, which want to restrict supply and push prices higher. Even if cooperation was better, several factors conspire to diminish OPEC’s capacity to deliver price stability and optimize incomes. First, although Saudi Arabia continues to be the buffer producer of last resort, smoothing the flow of production and stabilizing prices as required by its OPEC partners or global events, its failure to invest sufficiently in new infrastructure means that it is producing close to full capacity, thereby limiting its effectiveness to intervene. Second, non-­OPEC countries now impact on OPEC’s ability to manipulate production and hence prices. However, newer sources of supply are often in even less politically stable regions, and there have been exaggerated expectations of some supply sources coming online. Russia, currently the world’s second largest producer, has the potential to become the swing supplier, with pipelines opening up or being planned to supply Europe, China and Japan. Continuing high oil prices also spur economic exploitation of more costly deposits, such as those off Brazil’s coast, those from Canada’s Athabasca Tar Sands or the extra-­heavy oil in the Orinoco basin, the latter two both having potentially greater reserves than Saudi Arabia. Finally, alternative sources of energy are slowly reducing dependence on petroleum-­based products. Looking forwards, all this bodes ill for OPEC’s ability to confront

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looming problems cooperatively. For example, international efforts to tackle climate change by curbing fossil fuel consumption could shrink members’ annual income by as much as $60b, although eventually OPEC, with its large reserves, could regain part of any lost production. It is against the interests of OPEC countries to see oil prices drop too low through oversupply, but large demand-­driven price drops in the 1980s combined with increasing non-­OPEC production caused members to limit investment in new infrastructure and curb the search for new reserves, thus exacerbating recent price increases. Members have now invested in more efficient extraction processes, thereby increasing OPEC’s reserves, and announced expansions in refining capacity and new ‘upstream’ investment projects totalling $155b.

10.13 The International Grains Council (IGC) 10.13.1 Background International cooperation in grain production can be traced to the International Institute of Agriculture, which in 1933 sponsored the first  International Wheat Conference. In 1934, the League established an International Wheat Agreement (IWA), designed to curb oversupply and stimulate prices in an era of protectionism. These initiatives floundered, but the resulting Wheat Advisory Committee became the nucleus for more successful post-­war activity when a new IWA was agreed, with the focus shifting to stabilizing prices and supply. IWA established the International Wheat Council, with updated agreements being implemented in 1953, 1956, 1959 and 1962. In the mid-­1960s repeated monsoon failures in South-­East Asia and a sudden drop in export stocks generated concerns for world food security (see Chapter 14). The GATT Kennedy Round addressed some of the trade-­ related issues that distinguished true food aid from dumping, and this led to the 1967 International Grains Agreement and the first Food Aid Convention, under which signatories have a legal obligation to provide development assistance (Hoddinott et al. 2008). This assured developing countries that food aid donors would cooperate in relieving the threat of hunger, with some resources flowing through WFP and UNHCR. IWA was strengthened and merged with the Grains Agreement into the Wheat Trade Convention. In the mid-­1970s, sudden large USSR wheat purchases combined with inflated fertilizer costs pushed up grain prices, raising the spectre of famine in LDCs. A World Food Conference was convened in 1974 under UN auspices. This resulted in a

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continuing agreement to provide food aid, with the Wheat Trade Convention being renamed the Grains Trade Convention and extended to other grains. Later rice was brought within the agreement and, in 1995, the International Wheat Council’s remit was expanded and it was renamed the International Grains Council, with a mandate to facilitate international cooperation in the grains trade, improve market stability and enhance food security. In anticipation of reduced agricultural quotas following WTO’s birth, the International Grains Agreement has since been updated. The structure of the two complementary agreements, the Grains Trade and Food Aid Conventions, persists, but the Grains Trade Convention broadened IGC’s scope to cover pulses, oils, skimmed milk powder, sugar and seeds, besides giving it further mandates to monitor policy developments and maintain production and economic statistics.

10.13.2 Structure In common with all commodity groups membership is not universal but generally only attracts major suppliers and consumers. IGC meets biannually, and its elected posts rotate annually between producer and consumer nations. Several committees exist below the Council including: an Administrative Committee responsible for the routine running of IGC; a Market Conditions Committee, which monitors global trends and prices; and a Food Assistance  Committee (consisting entirely of donor states) responsible for implementation and assessment of the Food Aid Convention. A small secretariat provides members with statistics on the global grains market plus analyses of supply and demand. IGC also provides a forum to discuss issues under consideration at WTO, such as the impact of central purchasing cooperatives in Canada and Australia, which together account for one-­third of world wheat exports and heavily influence world prices.

10.13.3 Current activities Nominal grain prices fluctuate considerably. Until recently real long-­term prices were declining, but the use of grains to produce biofuels coupled with bad harvests, trade restrictions and escalating demand has now reversed this tendency (see Chapter 14). One of the largest biofuel producers, Brazil, is not an IGC member, but membership negotiations are ongoing so that future decisions can reflect the opinions of all major producers. The Food Aid Convention focuses food aid on society’s most vulnerable groups and LDCs. Mandatory targets established by the Convention have

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been met but, as Table 10.7 reveals, food aid has started falling, from 11m to 5.5m metric tonnes, with a general shift towards supporting emergencies. The Convention also established a target for financial contributions of €130m per donor and urged them to pay freight costs for LDCs. Cash contributions have increased, reaching $965m in 2009 or 58 per cent of committed food aid. Cash is used for regional food purchases, mostly disbursed through WFP, which on average purchases 40 per cent from developing countries, thereby stimulating local agricultural production while securing supplies faster and more cost-­effectively. Members are negotiating an update to the Convention in recognition of increasing agricultural liberalization. Table 10.7  Food aid deliveries by type (2000–10) Year

Emergency aid (million tons)

Programme/project aid (million tons)

Total (million tons)

2000 2005 2010

5.1 5.0 4.0

5.9 2.9 1.5

11.0 7.9 5.5

Source: WFP.

10.13.4 Evaluation and future challenges International agreements successfully stabilized grain prices until the 1973/74 commodity price boom, after which IGC shifted to being a source of data and locus for discussion (Wiggins and Keats 2010). Technology, the Green Revolution (Box 14.1) and greater production stability eased food security, removing the pressure on producers to guarantee the availability of global strategic stocks. Consequently the Food Aid Convention has gradually reoriented from setting challenging targets to ensuring that floor levels exist for available resources with the aforementioned reduction in formal commitments. While in most years food aid pledges have been met or exceeded, donors have generally had a countercyclical response in supplying food aid (Hoddinott et al. 2008). Setting a floor to delivery targets may respond to the long-­term emergency needs of the world’s one billion undernourished people, but the future role of developed nations as the source of additional grain supplies could diminish, with a consequent impact on global food security, as they could shift production into biofuel and build up their own reserves to limit price spikes. Therefore an improved Convention is ­necessary, possibly with a further shift to cash donations, allowing ­emergency purchases to be made on the open market.

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The Food Aid Committee has also been criticized. Being composed of donors, it ignores mechanisms (like regional stockpiles) that would be to the advantage of recipients or operational agencies. Instead it reinforces donors’ objectives, for example by supporting farm prices. Its decisions also lack transparency, although this is offset by more translucent reporting at WFP and in the OECD/DAC. Transparency issues arise because commitments are expressed as tons or dollar values of ‘wheat equivalent’, but members do not provide details on how they arrive at their calculations, making it ­impossible to hold countries to their commitments. A broader group of exporting countries will probably join the Grains Convention, kindled by demand-­driven price rises, technological improvements stimulating production in LDCs (see CGIAR, Chapter 14), and any agreement reached in the Doha Round. This may tilt the focus of the agreement back towards price stability, as new producers are likely to be less resource rich, have weaker economies and therefore be unable to stockpile grains. This is a challenge for IGC, as past experience shows that commodity agreements have generally not ensured price stability. Indeed history is littered with collapsed international agricultural commodity agreements (e.g. cocoa, coffee and natural rubber) as new entrants use the latest technologies to boost production and lower prices (Reinhart and Wickham 1994). SUGGESTED READING

Carl, B.M. (2001), Trade in the Developing World in the 21st Century, Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishing. [Large portions of this book examine the history of regional trade organizations] Carroll, P. and A. Kellow (2011), The OECD: A Study of Organisational Adaptation, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing. [Detailed analysis of OECD’s history and evolution] Cohn, T.H. (2002), Governing Global Trade: International Institutions in Conflict and Convergence, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. [Studies the interlinked roles of OECD, UNCTAD, GATT and WTO] Goldthau, A. and J.M. Witte (2011), ‘Assessing OPEC’s performance in global energy’, Global Policy, 2 (Special Issue), 31–9. Guellec, D. and B. van Pottelsberghe (2007), The Economics of the European Patent System: IP Policy for Innovation and Competition, (3rd edition) Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Describes EPO’s work and challenges] Hoekman, B.M. and M.M. Kostecki (2009), The Political Economy of the World Trading System: The WTO and Beyond, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Comprehensive review of world trading issues and organizations] May, C. (2007), The World Intellectual Property Organization: Resurgence and the Development Agenda, Abingdon, UK: Routledge. [A concise description of WIPO’s history and impact] Taylor, I. and K. Smith (2007), The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Abingdon, UK: Routledge. [A concise history and explanation of UNCTAD’s work]

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Wilkinson, R. (2006), The WTO: Crisis and the Governance of Global Trade, Abingdon, UK: Routledge. [Argues that problems of the Doha Round originate in the origins and evolution of the global trading regime]

Internet resources (See also Tables 10.4 and 10.6.) APEC: http://www.apecsec.org Common Fund for Commodities: http://www.common-­fund.org EPO: http://www.european-­patent-­office.org International Energy Agency: http://www.iea.org International Trade Centre (UN/WTO): http://www.itracen.org Non-­Ferrous Metals Sustainable Development Consultative Forum: http://www.nfmsd.org OECD: http://www.oecd.org OPEC Fund for International Development: http://www.opecfund.org UNCTAD: http://www.unctad.org WCO: http://www.wcoomd.org WIPO: http://www.wipo.int WTO: http://www.wto.org

11 The European Union European integration, long advanced as a way of stopping the continent’s frequent recourse to conflict, revived after 1945. This reflected the convergence of three factors. First, the destructiveness of two world wars had eroded continental Europeans’ faith in the sovereign state’s ability to guarantee their security. Second, many leaders were convinced that lasting peace needed mechanisms that could simultaneously rehabilitate Germany while constraining it through a framework of rules. Third, the impending Cold War bolstered American enthusiasm for European collaboration to act as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism. Chapters 3 and 13 outline the story of European integration in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, which centred around the Council of Europe (COE), the Organisation for European Economic Co-­operation and the Western European Union (WEU). In 1950 Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, assisted by Jean Monnet (Box 3.3) and supported by German Chancellor Adenauer, proposed forming the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), where Germany and France would jointly administer the region’s coal and steel resources. This arrangement was designed to ensure neither country could divert or accumulate strategic resources without the other’s knowledge, thus removing the tensions that had led to frequent pan-­European conflict (Chapter 2). It also assuaged French concerns about rising German economic competition and gave Germany greater international recognition, assisting in its post-­war rehabilitation. ECSC was established in 1951 by six nations (Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands), with Monnet becoming its first President. Though ECSC never succeeded in establishing the intended single market for coal and steel, it nevertheless stimulated the resurgence of European heavy industry by successfully reducing coal and steel tariffs. ECSC also launched the future pattern of European institutional architecture, including the forerunners of the Council of Ministers and the European Commission (the Commission), and inspired subsequent, more comprehensive rounds of ever-­closer integration leading eventually to the European Union (EU).

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From the outset the debate about European union has revolved around whether it should be broadly intergovernmental, where the pace of change is determined by states on the basis of national interest, or supranational, where governments compromise for the common good and cede some sovereignty to a pan-­European authority. Early on this was reflected in the decision of the, then, less integrationalist states to form the European Free Trade Association (Chapter 10, section 10.5). Gradually, though, the European project has acquired a more supranational character. The topics over which European-­level institutions have exclusive competencies have expanded, while those remaining exclusive to states have diminished, although competencies shared with or held by member states still far exceed the EU’s. The Union’s laws and regulations, collectively known as the acquis communautaire, generally override national legislation, and the rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union (more commonly known as the European Court of Justice, ECJ) are binding on members. However, the notion that the EU is the world’s ‘first truly postmodern international political form’ (Ruggie 1993: 140) is probably an exaggeration. The main decision-­making body remains the Council of Ministers, attended by representatives of member states who in many circumstances can veto initiatives and who can always retract their delegated authority. Similarly, although the EU increasingly develops common positions and represents members collectively, in most international forums members retain their own voices. Thus, the European project remains a curious hybrid, with intergovernmental and supranational forces pulling in different directions. Debates over the EU frequently play out in the context of whether expansion should be wider (covering more countries) or deeper (giving European institutions more power over a broader range of responsibilities). Membership has grown steadily from six to 28 but, while several more countries are negotiating to join, enthusiasm for widening has abated. In slowly deepening its reach, the EU has followed a philosophy known as the Monnet method whereby long-­term objectives are achieved through small, incremental steps that leave the degree of future integration ambiguous. These steps have been reflected in a series of treaties (Table 11.1) which have variously widened and/or deepened the Community. Like the UN, the EU is highly complex and has been extensively studied; therefore we will not attempt to adopt a comprehensive approach. This chapter sketches and seeks to account for the European project’s widening and deepening and its culmination in the EU before going on to examine the three central institutions – the Councils, the Commission and the European Parliament (EP). ECJ and the European Court of Auditors (ECOA), which

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have roles as independent checks and balances in the system, are also touched upon. There are some brief reviews of policy areas in which the EU is prominent, including the Single Market, social policies, the environment, energy, and foreign and security policy.

11.1 Background The widening and deepening of European integration since the 1950s has followed a long and winding path. Indeed it might be more accurate to say that widening and deepening have been on separate but intersecting paths prone to knocking each other off course. Though much of the process has been shielded from public view, occasionally events have aligned to drive integration forward through major new treaties. External events have included Cold War machinations and international economic slowdowns, while internal factors have revolved around the interests of the major powers (especially Germany, France and the UK) and the need to reform governance structures. Apart from the Treaty of Paris creating ECSC, the Treaty of Rome underlies all later developments, and it established three main objectives. First, through the launch of the EEC it kick-­started the process of establishing the Single Market (Box 11.3) by stipulating a 12-­year transitional period for unifying tariffs and reducing internal customs duties. Second, agricultural, transportation and social policies were targeted not only as part of the development of the Single Market but also to improve living standards, employment opportunities and general welfare. Finally, it bound the signatories into a pact to search for ‘ever-­closer union’. In addition to the EEC, the Treaty gave rise to other new institutions, including the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the European Investment Bank (Chapter 8, section 8.8), and, pending states’ agreement, contained an article allowing cooperation to be extended to almost any area. The Treaty also defined the institutions which were to govern the European project, specifically the European Commission, a Council of Ministers and ECJ, while it gave the ECSC Assembly of parliamentarians broader EEC responsibilities. In the following decade this Assembly morphed into the European Parliament. During the 1960s deepening took precedence over widening. Cooperation in areas such as energy, transport and social policy commenced lethargically, but greater headway was made in trade with a customs union completed ahead of schedule. This early success allowed the EEC to turn its attention to the agricultural policies needed to develop a strong trading bloc by introducing the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 1962 (Box 11.1). With the advantages of economic collaboration becoming apparent, a few countries

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that had shunned the EEC in favour of EFTA overcame their aversion to ceding some sovereignty and applied for membership. However, this phase of development was erratic. France twice vetoed the UK’s application for membership, thereby causing three other EFTA countries that were part of the same ‘package deal’ to remain outside the Community for a further decade. In 1965, there were further setbacks when France boycotted the EEC over CAP financing and proposals to adopt majority voting. After 1965 events seemed on track once more as ECSC, Euratom (its atomic energy equivalent) and the EEC merged into the European Community under a single governance structure (see Table 11.1). Table 11.1  EU treaties and membership levels at ratification Treaty/ agreement

Date signed

Members

Paris

1951

6

Rome

1957

6

Merger Treaty

1965

6

Budgetary Treaty

1970

6

Election of  Representatives to the Assembly Finance Treaty

1973

9

1975

9

Single European   Act

1986

12

Schengen   Agreement

1990

12

Maastricht Treaty  on European Union

1992

12

Objectives

Established ECSC and European Court of Justice. Created EEC, Euratom and the European Investment Bank. Institutional streamlining to merge the EEC, ECSC and Euratom into a single European Community with a Commission and a Council (of Ministers). Established a budgetary procedure involving EP. Defined income from ‘own resources’. Outlined rules for direct elections to EP by universal suffrage. Gave EP budget oversight responsibilities and established European Court of Auditors. Provided for institutional reform in preparation for new members, formalized existence of the European Council, quickened decision making by extending qualified majority voting, moved towards monetary union and expanded into environmental policy. Prepared the way for completing the Single Market. Provided for freedom of movement within a common border (only adopted initially by five states). Transformed the EEC into the EU and expanded its remit to include security/foreign policy, justice/home affairs, energy, education,

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Table 11.1  (continued) Treaty/ agreement

Date signed

Members

Amsterdam

1997

15

Nice

2001

15

Lisbon (Reform   Treaty)

2007

25

Objectives

telecommunications and transport. Prepared for economic and monetary union and initiated the processes leading to a single currency (the euro) and the European Central Bank. Formalized the principle of subsidiarity. Gave EP a greater role and introduced co-­decision procedures (Figure 11.3) and other governance changes. Reformed EU institutions in anticipation of major expansion. Strengthened EU institutions and EU’s role in health and consumer affairs and completely merged ECSC and Euratom into the EU. Repealed 1965 Merger Treaty. Paved the way for major EU enlargement by providing for new institutions and improved decision-­making and governance structures. Attempts to make the EU more democratic and efficient and better able to act with one voice in international affairs. Reformed existing and created new governing institutions needed for an enlarged EU as originally foreseen in the draft Constitutional Treaty rejected in 2004. Formally recognized the European Council within the EU structure. Extended EU competencies to tourism and climate change.

Between 1970 and 1986 membership doubled, but widening meant that deepening suffered. Three EFTA countries (Denmark, Ireland and the UK) joined the EEC in its first major enlargement (1973), followed by Greece (1981), Portugal and Spain (1986). The interests of existing and prospective members did not always align, requiring a series of compromises which, while advancing enlargement, caused complications later. The EEC’s budgetary problems, which came to a head in the early 1980s, exemplified the difficulties. Originally the EEC was funded by contributions from members, but the intention was for it to have its own independent resources which would expand with economic growth. During the 1970s the Community began to acquire its own resources through being allocated a share of national value added tax (VAT) revenues, customs duties and agricultural levies, although most funding still

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o­ riginated from members (see also section 11.2.2). This shift towards deepening was accompanied by a new European Regional Development Fund designed to mitigate the impact of economic change on poorer areas. The redistribution of spending, particularly to the poorer new members, at a time of global economic slowdown meant the EEC could not sustain deepening integration with the proceeds of economic growth. Nevertheless the real source of budgetary problems was the burgeoning CAP expenditures, which regularly depleted the EEC’s resources. Moreover, despite having below average per capita GDP, the UK was, along with West Germany, one of only two net contributors. This was because the UK’s relatively small agricultural sector only qualified it for limited CAP payments. A series of measures, including giving the UK a rebate on its contributions, eased the problem pending a shift in emphasis away from agricultural spending towards structural funds and the introduction of expenditure ceilings during the next and subsequent rounds of change. BOX 11.1

THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome established CAP in order to increase agricultural production, provide dependable incomes for agricultural workers, stabilize prices and guarantee supply. In addition to providing a single market for agricultural products these objectives were to be achieved through price stabilization using guaranteed minimum payments, the purchase of excess production, and trade protectionism to limit external competition. Controversial from the outset, CAP has nonetheless been difficult to amend. This is partly because the French government used CAP to recompense entrenched interests, thereby maintaining domestic support for European integration and as a balancing policy to favour France, since most of the original Common Market spending was for industry, which benefited Germany. Today the French agricultural lobby remains a forceful voice against change. France receives around 15 per cent of CAP disbursements although, like elsewhere in

Europe, French farming’s share of GDP and employment has plunged. However, increasing costs following enlargement, developments in the global trading regime and widespread criticism of CAP’s detrimental environmental and developmental impact have compelled reform. Between 1980 and 2013 CAP funding dropped from 72 per cent to 31 per cent of the EU budget. In the 2014–20 budget cycle CAP expenditures will continue to fall in absolute terms but will consume a rising proportion of the budget. Much of the emphasis has switched from the original production and income objectives to broader policies designed to promote rural development and environmental sustainability while ensuring farmers can compete regionally and globally. Thus, CAP payments are now made directly to farmers for animal welfare improvements or better land management, with minimum price safety nets being preferred to price support, which artificially increases production.

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Up to this point, the European project was as much about cooperation as integration. Severe constraints on the supranational powers of the European institutions meant states still held the trump cards. Widening membership revealed the problems of this intergovernmental approach, not least that the use of vetoes in the Council of Ministers could block progress, especially given members’ growing disparities. Europe’s poor economic performance, coupled with a newfound enthusiasm for supply-­side economic policies, revived interest in common market activities. Consequently for the next decade the EEC fixated on deepening integration, principally through the first major revision to the Treaty of Rome, the 1986 Single European Act (SEA), which introduced economic, structural and political reforms. SEA’s centrepiece was a promise to complete the Single Market Programme by 1992 (Box 11.3). SEA overhauled the EC’s governance structures, instilled extra elements of supranationality by expanding the powers of existing institutions, redefined the relationships between them, and adjusted decision-­ making mechanisms. Qualified majority voting (Box 11.2) was extended to further progress of the Single Market. EP (an elected body since 1979) was given fresh powers to amend Council decisions in certain circumstances and to approve new members. Finally, SEA expanded the Community’s mandate BOX 11.2

QUALIFIED MAJORITY VOTING (QMV) QMV was provided for in the Treaty of Rome so that the Council of Ministers could circumvent the continual need for unanimous decisions. First used in 1966 QMV has since been adapted and extended to ever wider circumstances. Under current QMV rules the largest countries have either 29 or 27 votes, the smallest countries either four or three votes, while the others have between seven and 14 votes. For a resolution from the Commission to pass under QMV the votes in favour must represent at least half the countries voting and 73.9 per cent of members’ weighted votes. To ensure that an electoral majority supports a decision a state can also request confirmation that the votes cast represent at least 62 per cent of the total

EU population. Resolutions emanating from bodies other than the Commission require the votes of two-­thirds of members for approval under QMV. New QMV rules agreed under the Lisbon Treaty (which also extended QMV to 68 additional domains) will come into effect in 2014, when decisions on Commission proposals will require 55 per cent of members’ votes from 15 countries representing 65 per cent of the EU population for agreement. This allows four states with more than 35 per cent of the EU population to be a blocking minority. QMV expansion is controversial because, while it makes for more efficient decision making, it erodes sovereignty by preventing individual states from blocking policies they oppose.

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and codified large areas in which the EEC was already active such as in environmental, regional and social policies (see Box 11.5). Elsewhere it deepened already existing mandates. For example, during the 1970s the first tentative steps were taken towards unifying financial policies through creating the European Monetary System and introducing the idea of monetary union. SEA not only revived prospects for economic collaboration but, aided by the wider political upheavals prompted by the Cold War and Commission President Jacques Delors’s ambitions (Box 11.4), also catalysed further political cohesion. Starting in 1990 the Schengen Agreement (see Table 11.1) facilitated cross-­border movement of goods and people. In 1992 the Maastricht Treaty created the European Union, a legal entity resting on the ‘three pillars’ of a new European Community, a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and activities covering justice and home affairs. Maastricht also legislated for the concept of ‘differentiation’, whereby a majority of members could join together in developing certain policies, leaving the minority behind (the so-­called ‘two-­speed’ Europe). However, this and other steps in the direction of supranationality, such as CFSP, invoked opposition from those worried about the implications of the Treaty for national sovereignty, which delayed ratification until 1993. BOX 11.3

THE SINGLE MARKET Moves towards a Single Market, expressed as the freedom to trade and freedom of movement for services, workers and capital, began with the Treaty of Rome. Common external tariffs and the abolition of customs dues between members were swiftly achieved, but non-­tariff barriers ranging from health and safety standards to differentiated levels of indirect taxation continued to inhibit the trade in goods. SEA required states to harmonize standards, and today the Single Market in goods has been largely realized, although the other three freedoms have seen less progress. Despite considerable legislation the Single Market for services, which account

for some two-­thirds of EU economic activity, is far from complete. Many of the obstacles such as differentiated planning and licensing rules are technical and, as with the Single Market for trade, are slowly being overcome by regulatory harmonization (see Chapter 12). Nevertheless, serious political hindrances persist. Entrenched interest groups resist reforms to open even basic services to competition, for example taxis and accountancy in Greece and Italy. Elsewhere SEA requirements to liberalize sectors, such as energy and telecommunications, are contested by state-­owned enterprises, while the professions, trade associations and unions are fearful of cheaper services undermining their privi-



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·  389

 leged positions. Some progress has been made, for example in opening public procurement and recognizing professional qualifications, but more needs to be done, particularly to help SMEs overcome the difficulties of starting new ventures in different member states. With the exception of public service jobs, workers can now freely seek employment throughout the EU, benefiting from transferable state pensions and host country social protection. When new states join, their EU-­wide employment rights are phased in to protect countries with high labour costs or unemployment. While economic rights are well established, there is greater controversy over access to social benefits, such as unemployment support, which several states restrict by length of residence. Initial resistance to merging capital markets and freeing capital flows reflected the ‘embedded liberal’ settlement prevailing after the Second World War (see Chapter 3). The weakening of European capital controls during the 1980s was part of the gathering liberal revolution, a process accelerated by SEA, which required complete removal of capital controls by 1992.

The objective of a single capital market received an enormous boost with the creation of the euro, and the Eurozone financial crisis has spurred further moves towards a common financial regulatory framework with agreement for EU-­wide regulators to oversee national supervisors (see Chapter 9). However, the single financial market still faces considerable resistance. There are constraints to entry of foreign retail banks both nationally (e.g. Italy) and regionally (e.g. Germany), and the Eurozone crisis demonstrated that individuals’ bank deposits were largely unprotected outside their own country. Delays in complying with fresh measures, covert state subsidies, continuing protectionism and concessions for new members mean the Single Market is riddled with loopholes that severely limit its effectiveness. The Commission has the continual task of monitoring compliance, and its Competition Directorate exists to ensure unhindered internal access to EU markets, checking that quantitative (quota) and qualitative (regulatory) restrictions do not breach the rules. For instance, in 2007 it capped roaming charges imposed by mobile phone operators.

Under the first pillar, the European Community initiated work on economic and monetary union, leading in 1998 to 11 countries agreeing to share a single currency (the euro) and a European Central Bank (ECB) overseeing their monetary policy (see Chapter 9). While this injected a further dose of supranationality, the other two pillars remained intergovernmental. The second pillar of a Common Foreign and Security Policy also had its genesis in the 1970s, with the meetings of foreign ministers in the process of European Political Cooperation (EPC). Despite improving diplomatic networks and the habit of consultation EPC’s practical results were modest. Following Maastricht, members renewed efforts to develop common positions and act together. They also framed a common Security and Defence

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Policy (SDP), which was intended to be a step towards a joint defence structure. Finally, in the third pillar of justice and home affairs, states began to pursue cooperation over immigration, asylum, the judiciary and the police (see Chapter 12, sections 12.5.1 and 12.7.3). The Maastricht Treaty introduced more institutional changes, which also dragged the EU’s institutions towards supranationality. It extended QMV, introduced the ‘co-­decision’ procedure (see Figure 11.3) and increased EP’s power vis-­à-­vis the Council of Ministers. The treaty ushered more competencies into the Commission’s realm (see Table 11.1); nevertheless supranational proclivities continued to be tempered by intergovernmentalism. The second and third pillars extended EU influence into areas impinging directly BOX 11.4

JACQUES DELORS, EUROPEAN COMMISSION PRESIDENT (1985–95) Delors was conceivably the most assertive and energetic of the Commission’s Presidents. In 1945 he joined the Bank of France as an economist, but in 1962 moved to the government’s General Planning Commission. From 1969 to 1972 he was economic adviser to the Prime Minister. In 1979 he was elected to EP and in 1981 became French Economics and Finance Minister. A strong advocate of integration and greater supranationality, Delors rekindled the Single Market project and delivered the political reforms needed to deliver it through the SEA. He won over opponents of liberalization and those critics who felt SEA unduly favoured business to the detriment of workers’ rights by reforming and increasing EU structural funds, using them to support economically disadvantaged regions, and launching the Social Charter (Box 11.5). He steered the policy debate and in 1988 produced the Delors Plan for European Monetary Union, work that would eventually lead to the Single

Monetary Authority and the Maastricht Treaty, which transformed the EEC into the EU. Delors’s natural forcefulness resulted in a strong Commission, which for a time was able to exert a powerful influence over the direction of the EU and its members. Under his leadership the Commission took policy initiatives, adopted a more visible international role and entered into a greater dialogue with member states. However, the outstanding vision and political skills that helped Delors handle a tempestuous period of European history with aplomb were not matched by his management skills. Disinterested in internal reform and with a tendency to avoid administrative decisions, he fostered a presidential system of management that centralized decision making within his own office and ignored the internal hierarchy. The result was a lack of teamwork within the College of Commissioners and a feeling of separation between the policy makers and the bureaucracy.

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on sovereignty, such as justice and foreign affairs, with the Council retaining close control over relevant decisions and the semi-­autonomous bodies dealing with these matters (see Chapter 12). The Treaty also fleshed out the principle of ‘subsidiarity’, an attempt to limit the EU’s powers by devolving decisions to the lowest possible levels of governance. The 1990s witnessed attempts by the EU to widen and deepen simultaneously. The momentum behind widening came externally from the USSR’s collapse, which allowed Eastern European countries to dream of profiting from the economic and political benefits of joining the EU. Harking back to 1945, some countries felt that the best way of dealing with a prospective resurgence of German power following reunification was to contain it within a broader European institution. Others were keen to join as they feared the economic potency of the Single Market would engender a ‘fortress Europe’ mentality that would discriminate against them. These sentiments coincided with existing EEC members’ ambitions to expand into the lucrative new Eastern European markets. The problem was how to manage this alongside the deepening integration deriving from the Maastricht Treaty. One measure was the development of a European Economic Area (Chapter 10, section 10.5) under which EFTA members could access the Single Market provided they implemented the requisite parts of SEA and abided by its rules. While Switzerland opted out, six EFTA countries signed up. However, at the 1993 Copenhagen Summit, the EU opened accession agreements with four of them, three of which joined in 1995 (Austria, Finland and Sweden), although Norway rejected membership in a referendum. This stimulated a second measure to ensure that aspiring members attained greater convergence before their accession. Hereafter new members would be required to implement the acquis communautaire and commit to free market democracy. This also marked the start of the EU working more closely with applicants, to prepare them for membership, and providing financial support for reform assisted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Chapter 8, section 8.7). Previously widening had largely consisted of accommodating additional members within adapted governance structures. However, with the EU opening accession discussions with 12 countries between 1998 and 2000, a major overhaul was needed of institutions originally designed for a membership half the size. This ambitious enlargement also highlighted other worries. Many of the new members were poor, with large agricultural sectors, and would be net EU budget beneficiaries. Despite considerable advances in

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e­ conomic collaboration, progress in the other two pillars was sluggish, and it was felt that further enlargement would drain energy and resources from projects to deepen integration. The treaties of Amsterdam and Nice therefore introduced changes in anticipation of enlargement. The Amsterdam Treaty gave more power to EP over appointments to the College of Commissioners. CFSP was to be managed by a High Representative, and the European Council was now able to agree common CFSP policies. EU responsibilities were extended into health and consumer affairs, and the treaty further elaborated on the concept of differentiation, initially agreed in the Maastricht Treaty, by enshrining that this could be done without requiring treaty amendments, an example being the Schengen Agreement, which was concurrently brought within the treaties. The Nice Treaty tidied up further institutional gaps concerning voting weights in the Council of Ministers, and the structure of the Commission, EP and ECJ, and also ushered in a phalanx of new EU agencies (Chapter 12). While the Nice agreement dealt with the institutional implications of enlargement there was a desire to unite the disparate strands of the Union’s mandate into a charter for future action. A Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe was proposed in 2003 but was abandoned following negative French and Dutch referendums. This left the EU needing to resolve some additional organizational problems made more imperative by the accession of another ten countries in 2004 and two in 2007. The Council decided to combine the 90 per cent of the constitutional document that was acceptable to all members into an amending treaty which, recognizing that some national electorates had strong negative opinions of the EU, allowed certain opt-­outs to ensure ratification. The resulting Lisbon Treaty led to reforms intended to strengthen the EU’s standing on the world stage. The Council adopted powers to appoint a President, who would personify the EU, and the High Representative (more correctly the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs), who as effectively the EU’s Foreign Minister was charged with overseeing CFSP. It also launched the European External Action Service, the EU’s diplomatic corps. Institutionally, Lisbon reformed and expanded QMV (Box 11.2) and gave EP and the Council of Ministers almost equal powers over proposed EU legislation. It abolished the distinctions between the pillars devised at Maastricht and shifted responsibility for some parts of the former second and third pillars to the Commission. Finally, it unveiled further semi-­autonomous institutions and extended EU powers (see Table 11.1), including over energy and transport policies.

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BOX 11.5

SOCIAL POLICIES The third common policy area identified in the Treaty of Rome is social policy, which was to be supported by a Social Fund. Apart from confirming the right to work throughout the Common Market, little legislative activity occurred in this field until 1975, when the first two semi-­ autonomous agencies (Eurofound and CEDEFOP, see Chapter 12) were created to assist policy initiatives on conditions of work and vocational training respectively. Despite opposition by businesses and some free-­market-­oriented members, the extension of QMV to social policies allowed the Commission to make some headway. By 1989 the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (the Social Charter) had been agreed by all members bar the UK. It contained 30

general principles covering, inter alia, employment, fair remuneration, social protection, equality in the workforce, health and safety at work and workers’ consultation. Further progress remained slow despite the Maastricht Treaty giving the UK various opt-­outs and allowing the other members to move ahead. Apart from grandiose statements of intent (e.g. the New European Strategy for Growth) it took the financial and Eurozone crises to stimulate action to revive flagging European economies. The response was the Europe 2020 Strategy, which incorporates three employment-­targeted social objectives, namely to modernize labour markets, reduce school dropout rates and give the poor and socially excluded greater work opportunities.

The foregoing account of the EU’s evolution reveals its proliferating policy competencies. Sometimes competencies were bestowed by conscious design, but reflecting a functionalist logic, quite often they have been accidental ‘spillovers’; for example, trade policies have necessitated the EU’s involvement in intellectual property, product safety and labour rights. The fields in which the EU has exclusive competence, that is, where only it can legislate or adopt legally binding acts, are shown in Figure 11.1; however, there are many areas, supposedly still the responsibility of states, where the EU’s influence is felt. To some extent this reflects the fact that the EU’s budget is overwhelmingly spent on operational activities managed by the Commission. Activities in the three original policy areas established by the Treaty of Rome were supported by specific funds such as CAP and the Social Fund (Boxes 11.1 and 11.5). A third fund, the Regional Development Fund, has enabled the EU to colonize several other key policy areas, particularly transport (see Chapter 16), education and health, with the aim of spreading the long-­term benefits of economic collaboration more evenly. A fourth long-­ standing fund is the Cohesion Fund, designed to support infrastructure and

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Increasing supranationality Shared competency – QMV

States retain full competency

EU has full competency

States have lead

EU has lead

National security

Foreign policy

Single Market

Customs

Law and order

Defence policy

Direct taxation

Research and technology

Social policy as defined by treaties

Competition rules for Single Market

Cohesion policy

Eurozone monetary policy

Health care Border controls National transport Postal and broadcasting services

Industry Space Development cooperation Civil protection

Planning Citizenship Electoral procedures Own resources (EU funding) Treaty changes

Humanitarian aid Culture Improvement of human health Tourism Education, sport, vocational training

Agriculture and fisheries

Fisheries conservation

Environment

Commercial policy

Economic and employment policy

International agreements in areas of EU competency

Consumer protection International transport Energy Safety of public health Freedom, security and justice

Intellectual property Administrative cooperation

Figure 11.1  Distribution of EU competencies

environmental projects in members whose per capita GNI is below 90 per cent of the EU average. Inequalities exacerbated by enlargement persist, especially amongst members whose economic development had been retarded by central planning. Since 2000 the EU has launched four new funds targeting specific sectors or problems. For example, the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund seeks to assist those made unemployed by trade liberalization to find work, and the European Fisheries Fund aids those affected by restrictions on overfishing. EIB (Chapter 8) has also been a major source of supplementary funding for EU projects.

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Environmental policy was not mentioned in the Treaty of Rome, but since appearing on the agenda in the late 1960s it has become one of the EU’s most prominent activities, resulting in over 500 directives (see Box 11.7) covering all aspects of pollution, conservation, waste control and hazardous substances. The key event was the 1972 UN Conference on the Environment, which pushed states to launch dedicated environmental organizations and to enact environmental laws. The next year the Commission adopted its first Environmental Action Plan (EAP) and, since then, it has gradually assumed primacy in this area. Over the next decade the Commission’s environmental role expanded and became more proactive until SEA provided a legal basis for EU environmental policy and commenced the process through which sustainable development would be central to EU activities. By the 1990s the EU was becoming a leader in the environmental field and, along with the US, China and India, is now a major player in climate change negotiations. To inform this work and stimulate the wider public’s involvement in environmental issues the European Environment Agency was established in 1995 (Chapter 12). In 2002, following ratification of the Kyoto Protocol (see Case Study 1.1), the EU led the way in establishing targets to reduce greenhouse gases and developed an emissions trading system (ETS, Box 11.6) as a mechanism through which it could be achieved. BOX 11.6

THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM Sometimes called a ‘cap and trade’ system, the EU’s Emissions Trading System allows the European Commission to allocate emissions trading quotas to each member state, which in turn distributes its quota to companies.

Effectively the quotas place a limit (a cap) on the CO2 emissions that each of the 11 000 companies covered by the scheme generates. Those with unused quotas may trade them to companies exceeding their emissions cap.

The earliest institutions, ECSC and Euratom, dealt with aspects of coal and nuclear energy supplies, but it was not until the 1973–74 oil crisis that the then EEC developed an energy policy strategy. The essence of this strategy has since evolved to encompass energy security, renewable energy and more pan-­European competition. EU imports 50 per cent of its hydrocarbons, a figure expected to rise to 70 per cent by 2030. Its vulnerability to supply disruptions was exposed in 2006–07 when Russia, which supplies 33 per cent of the EU’s oil and 40 per cent of its gas, blocked pipelines into Ukraine and Belarus, through which EU gas deliveries pass. The EU’s response culminated in the Energy 2020 programme, which promotes

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energy-­saving schemes plus research into renewable and alternative energies in the context of the EU’s 20/20/20 environmental initiative (20 per cent renewable energy, 20 per cent increase in energy efficiency and 20 per cent fewer greenhouse gases by 2020). It also seeks to bolster Europe’s negotiating power with external energy suppliers and complete the single energy market. The formative years of European integration focused on internal concerns, as America’s military shield and NATO’s existence limited the need for EU involvement in foreign policy and defence matters. The development of the second pillar and EPC saw members commence closer work on foreign affairs, but it not until the 1990s and Maastricht’s call to frame a CFSP that this began in earnest. The EU’s foreign policy work revolves around using the EU’s trade and its aid budget as levers for diplomacy, establishing partnerships with other major trading powers, improving relationships with Mediterranean neighbours and supporting peacekeeping activities, such as its intervention to settle the dispute between Russia and Georgia. Innovations such as the High Representative have given foreign affairs a better focal point within the EU, and the External Action Service is raising its profile externally (see section 11.2.2). The EU has taken steps to improve delivery of its development aid through the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), which disburses development assistance, humanitarian aid and disaster relief. ECHO has long-­term support arrangements with ICRC, UNHCR, WFP and WHO. Collectively EU’s military forces are impressive and even surpass those of the USA in some competencies. However, the inability to deploy its combined military power and its lack of a common defence policy limited the EU’s effectiveness in foreign affairs. Thus, despite initial US resistance (see Chapter 13, section 13.6), in 1999 the EU announced the development of a Common Security and Defence Policy. The policy’s headline goal of a 60 000-­strong Rapid Reaction Force able to deploy within 60 days was downscaled following the promulgation of the 2003 European Security Strategy. Subsequent declarations promised that the EU would be capable of ‘swift and decisive’ action to respond to the demands of humanitarian crises, peacekeeping and peacemaking by 2012. Response would be based on EU Battlegroups of 1500 soldiers capable of deployment within five to ten days. The old WEU structure, since resurrected as the European Defence Agency (Chapter 12), was adapted to support the defence policy.

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11.1.1 European Court of Justice ECJ is the EU’s judicial arm, whose function is to interpret and ensure observance of EU treaties. Its powers are threefold. First, it is a constitutional court that clarifies treaties and is the final court of appeal for all matters related to EU law. Second, it seeks to ensure that EU laws are fairly and equally applied. It ascertains that related EU and national legislation is compatible with the main treaties, intervenes when governments fail to follow EU rules and provides national courts with interpretations of EU laws when needed for domestic court cases. Finally, it adjudicates when individuals, corporations, states or EU institutions initiate proceedings over failures to fulfil treaty obligations, acting as a civil court to award damages for or against EU and public authorities. In this regard ECJ is unlike most other international courts, which exist to resolve disputes between states. In recent years, based on the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, ECJ has accepted human rights cases, despite the potential for conflict with COE’s Court of Human Rights (see Chapter 13). Concomitant with the widening and deepening of the EU, ECJ has attracted a growing number of new cases, which have risen from around 350 annually in the 1980s and 1990s to over 1200 by the end of the 2000s (see also section 11.3.1). Consequently, with litigation taking up to four years to reach a conclusion and even advisory rulings on legislation taking two years, by the mid-­ 1980s ECJ had a backlog of cases. To alleviate this, in 1988 a Court of First Instance (now renamed the General Court) was created to provide faster decisions for simpler cases. Typically, General Court cases cover trademark disputes, competition and employment law and appeals against Competition Directorate decisions on mergers or state aid. ECJ’s decisions are binding and have expanded the EU’s reach. Its judgments have established a number of important principles, perhaps most notably the primacy of Community law over national law where the EU has full competency (Figure 11.1). Most commentators agree that ECJ has acted as an agent of integration, but a lively and unresolved debate persists about whether the Court acts supranationally to promote integration despite member states’ interests or is a creature of state preferences (Carrubba et al. 2012; Stone-­ Sweet and Brunell 2012).

11.1.2 European Court of Auditors An independent body of national representatives, ECOA is responsible for auditing the accounts of all EU institutions, ensures the legality of

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t­ ransactions, ascertains that sound financial management processes and policies are in place and produces an annual report on the EU’s accounts. ECOA’s importance needs to be understood within the overall context of EU financial control as, other than when IMF is called upon to act, the EU annually disburses more than any other IO. The use of the nomenclature ‘court’ is misleading, as it is not a true court and has no independent powers to discipline, fine or change processes. For example, ECOA refers its fraud findings to the European Union’s Anti-­Fraud Office (OLAF) rather than pursuing cases itself. It can prosecute other EU institutions at ECJ, but this is a cumbersome way of inducing change.

11.2 Structure The EU has the most complex structure of all IOs. There are a number of reasons for this, but most importantly, unlike most other IOs, the EU interacts more intensively with governments, civil society, the private sector and the public. A simplified organogram is provided in Figure 11.2, but the interrelationships of the different bodies are much more convoluted. The three principal structural components of the EU described below are the Councils, the Commission and the European Parliament, which all work with consultative committees at different levels of decision making.

11.2.1 The Councils Although they are often confused or conflated, the European Council and the Council of Ministers are separate bodies. Both are intergovernmental institutions composed of member states’ representatives who look to advance national interests while bearing wider EU objectives in mind. Until the passage of the Lisbon Treaty, both were headed by a rotating six-­month presidency held by a member state. While this continues to be the case for the Council of Ministers, the European Council now appoints its own President. Traditionally within the Councils most influence is exercised through a combined French–German axis, two founding members that are determined to ensure that enlargement does not diminish their influence and that the EU project stays on course. Other larger members also exert considerable influence either because of their economic importance or because their population translates into a greater weighted vote in the Council of Ministers and more seats in EP. Britain can be particularly influential, as when it acts with both France and Germany it can create an almost unstoppable coalition, while Italy’s political instability means it exerts less influence than it should (Tallberg 2008).

Eurostat

Directorates

SG

COMMISSION

(1000)

Figure 11.2  EU organization chart

Semi-autonomous institutions

Associated Institutions (ECB, EIB)

Working Parties

Economic and Social Committee Council

Committees (22)

COURT OF AUDITORS

PARLIAMENT

Committee of the Regions

COURT OF JUSTICE

Working Parties (250)

Council of Ministers

COUNCILS European

COREPER

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The Council of Ministers is composed of national government ministers. Generally foreign ministers attend and oversee its work, but if a topic deals with a specific policy area then relevant ministers attend. The Council of Ministers once had over 20 different configurations, but this has now been reduced to ten. Of these the General Affairs Council, which prepares and follows up European Council meetings, is the most important. Other significant configurations are the Foreign Affairs Council, which looks after trade, external relations and development, Agriculture and Fisheries, and Economic and Financial Affairs (Ecofin), which deals with economic policy. The single currency is overseen by the 18 Eurozone nations (see Chapter 9) and, because of the impact of the Eurozone crisis, the group’s meetings (chaired by their own President) look set to supplant Ecofin in importance. These configurations meet monthly, while others convene between two and four times annually. The Council’s powers include coordinating members’ economic, justice and home affairs policies, concluding international agreements on the EU’s behalf, and oversight of CFSP. However, its principal functions are to amend and vote upon new EU laws and approve the EU budget, responsibilities it shares with EP. The Council makes its decisions either unanimously (i.e. where countries have a veto over decisions) or by QMV (Box  11.2). Unanimous decisions are required to amend treaties, to approve additional common policy initiatives or to invite new members to join. Once the Council decisions are reached the proposals are then subject to a complex review process involving EP (see below and Figure 11.3). Meetings of the Council of Ministers are prepared, coordinated and chaired by the country holding the rotating six-­monthly presidency. The exception is when the Council of Ministers is configured for foreign affairs discussions, which since the passage of the Lisbon Treaty are chaired by the High Representative. Presidency of the Council of Ministers originally gave states an opportunity to guide the EU meaningfully, especially as the Council sets the agenda for thousands of subsidiary working groups and committees. However, expanding membership now means members have to wait 14 years for their turn and, in the post-­Lisbon environment, it has become just one EU presidency amongst many, with its importance and powers much diminished. As much as 85 per cent of the Council of Ministers’ decisions are discussed and agreed beforehand, leaving only contentious issues to be settled politically (Hayes-­Renshaw and Wallace 2006). This work is undertaken by the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), the forum where

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members’ permanent representatives (ambassadors) manage the Council’s agenda, run its working parties and prepare meetings’ documentation. COREPER is supported by 250 specialist committees and working groups which bring together Commission staff, policy experts and members of permanent delegations to consider Commission proposals and make recommendations to COREPER. Two major committees, each with 344 members, provide the Council of Ministers with their opinions: the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. The former provides advice on social, education and health matters and must be consulted in many areas, such as employment, vocational training and the use of the Social Fund. It has tripartite representation covering the opinions of workers, employers and special interest groups, but members vote on resolutions in a personal capacity. The latter is mostly composed of elected politicians from lower levels of government and provides their perspectives on education, health, the transport network, and regional and structural policies. It must be consulted on regional matters. Finally, the Council of Ministers is supported by a 3000-­strong Secretariat, which provides administrative support and policy and legal advice and which is the repository of the Council’s institutional memory. The Secretariat is often a central player in negotiations surrounding new treaties and legislation, besides being particularly important when a small state, with limited resources, assumes the rotating presidency (Beach 2005). The other body, the European Council, is the meeting place for heads of government. Its origins lie in frustration with debates in the Council of Ministers, which were felt to be undermining a coherent sense of purpose. During the 1960s a series of ad hoc summits were held, but their failure to respond adequately to the crises of the period led to these meetings being formalized into the European Council in 1974. The Lisbon Treaty (which formally acknowledged the European Council as an EU institution) committed it to four annual meetings. Unlike the Council of Ministers the European Council does not exercise legislative functions; rather it meets to take strategic decisions such as endorsing new members, reforming EU institutions, discussing pressing foreign policy problems and responding to crises. The Council, however, possesses important powers of appointment. It appoints the High Representative and its own President, who now chairs the summits, nominates the Commission President and confirms the Commissioners suggested by members. Unless the treaties decree otherwise decisions are made by consensus. Consequently the Council’s effectiveness often derives from personal amities, levels of experience, degrees of ideological convergence and the domestic strength of national leaders.

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The Council and Commission both have Presidents with similar terms of office. The High Representative also has influence over those Commissioners with responsibilities impinging upon foreign policy. These factors result in a degree of functional overlap between the Commission and senior Council officials, along with some conflict in setting priorities. In appointing the Council’s first President and High Representative, member states had a choice between well-­known and powerful candidates, who would have probably exerted a strong influence on policies, and others who were less well known but who would act as facilitators and not challenge them. In the end members opted for the latter, appointing two relatively anonymous persons. Although one round of appointments does not signify a trend, it is likely that the pattern will continue, leaving Henry Kissinger’s long-­standing question ‘Who speaks for Europe?’ unanswered (see also section 11.4.1).

11.2.2 The Commission In contrast to the intergovernmental Councils, the Commission is arguably the most supranational EU institution. The Lisbon Treaty stipulates that the Commission’s role is to ‘promote the general interest of the Union’ and to ensure the EU’s laws and treaties are respected. Its main powers, discussed further below, are to propose new laws and ensure they are implemented by member states, manage the EU’s budget and conduct the EU’s external affairs. Thus, the Commission is partly a bureaucratic organization and partly an executive one, and with almost 33 000 staff (excluding semi-­autonomous agencies) it surpasses any other IO secretariat in size. The Commission is headed by a President, who is approved by EP for renewable five-­year terms. The President is responsible for the Commission’s day-­ to-­day running, establishes operating guidelines, apportions portfolios to Commissioners and chairs their meetings. However, the President also represents the Commission externally and is often vital to European Council negotiations. As the public face of the Commission and given the office’s high profile, the incumbent previously required members’ unanimous approval, which often led to the best candidate for the job being passed over. The Lisbon Treaty removed this effective veto by stating that from 2014 a candidate will be nominated by the European Council using QMV and approved by a majority vote in EP. Individual Commissioners are appointed from lists submitted by member states and then approved by the European Council and Parliament. Members’ power to each appoint one national Commissioner gives them considerable influence over the Commission’s agenda (Wonka 2007), and though the

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Commission’s President has a say in their appointment it puts the President in a weaker position than other executive heads, who normally appoint their own top management teams. The Commissioners collectively form the College of Commissioners, with a group of Vice-­Presidents as an inner management team. The High Representative, who has now replaced the external relations Commissioner, is a Commission Vice-­President, thereby muddying the waters by having a Council appointee involved in management functions. Commissioners can be dismissed by ECJ in cases of serious misconduct, and the President can ask individuals to step aside. EP cannot dismiss a Commissioner but, while it has never done so, can dismiss the entire College of Commissioners. Each Commissioner’s portfolio is linked to a corresponding Directorate-­ General (Directorate). Staffed by a mixture of EU career bureaucrats and national experts on short-­term secondments, the Directorates are similar to government departments and constitute the Commission’s basic management units. Each Directorate is led by a Director-­General, who provides the main link to the relevant Commissioner. Finally the Commission has its own bureaucracy, the Secretariat-­General, which provides advice, develops the Commission’s annual work programme and coordinates the Directorates’ work. This service is led by a Secretary-­General answerable to the Commission President. The EU has a career-­based, hierarchical civil service, but although there should be free staff movement across the EU there is little interchange between the different Directorates or institutions. Most new European laws and proposals to colonize extra policy areas emanate from the Commission. The Commission involves governments, NGOs and the private sector in some 800 to 1000 ongoing working parties and committees considering proposed legislation and other initiatives. Proposals consequently have a long gestation period within the bureaucracy before being considered by the College of Commissioners and then proceeding tortuously through the Council of Ministers and EP. EU legislation takes several forms, each having a different impact on members and distinct implementation processes depending on specific financial and technical requirements (Box 11.7). Once laws gain final approval the Commission is then responsible for ensuring they are implemented. To ensure the Commission does not alter policies in the course of implementation, the process is overseen by an extensive committee network, a process known as comitology (Box 11.8). The Commission depends on national bureaucracies to implement its initiatives, and states are required to report progress in complying with EU legislation. The Commission has powers to deal with members, EU

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BOX 11.7

EU LEGISLATION There are five categories of EU legislation. Regulations are the most powerful, as they are instantly binding on all members and do not have to be incorporated into domestic law to take effect. Directives are general objectives that must be respected by members. The goals of directives are binding, but members are left to decide how to attain these goals, which need to be incorporated into national law in order to take effect. Decisions are also binding but are normally targeted at specific members or institutions, while recommendations and opinions are just that and

have no binding force. The amount of EU legislation is considerable; EFTA estimated that, in the operation of the Single Market alone, there were almost 3500 legal acts in force at the end of 2002 (EFTA 2002). The Commission recognized that the complexity and volume of legislation were becoming a hindrance to national economies, and it embarked on simplification, consolidation and removal of unnecessary reporting requirements. By 2007, Single Market legislation had been reduced to 1630 directives and 675 regulations (House of Lords 2008b).

BOX 11.8

COMITOLOGY Comitology refers to the process of monitoring the Commission’s executive decisions. The process originated because of concerns amongst member states that the Commission would (accidentally or otherwise) alter agreed policies in the process of implementation. This process is overseen by a system of committees, of which there are several hundred, taking four different forms: • advisory committees, which provide views to the Commission that it should take into account but which have no power to block Commission decisions;

• management committees, which can refer Commission measures back to the Council with its power to block decisions using a qualified majority; • regulatory committees, which can refer Commission proposals to the Council and to EP; • regulatory committees with scrutiny, where proposed changes must be referred to both the Council and EP. The Commission cannot proceed if either body objects.

i­ nstitutions, corporations and other actors that are reluctant to implement changes. Most cases are resolved when the Commission issues a ‘letter of formal notice’ giving the party concerned a compliance deadline. Ultimately the Commission can take transgressors to ECJ, which is a fairly common

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occurrence. In 2011 there were 920 such instances, although only 200 actually made it to trial, since the threat of legislative review is often sufficient to induce compliance. Greece, Belgium, France and Italy lead the way in defaults, with around 75 recorded infringements each; by comparison the UK has around 40 cases and the Scandinavian and Baltic countries conform the most, each having around 25 cases (European Commission 2011). Periodically members have to agree upon a seven-­year framework for managing the EU budget. The Commission is involved at all stages of the budget process from the drafting of initial proposals and piloting it through the various EU institutions to finally ensuring that revenues are collected and funds disbursed. The budget is partly resourced from ‘own funding’, which is derived from the revenues from agricultural levies on non-­members’ imported products (now less than 1 per cent of revenue), EU customs duties (which constitutes 12 per cent) and one percentage point of VAT receipts (11 per cent). The additional resources (76 per cent) come from direct assessments on member states based on national GNI, a levy which cannot exceed 1.24 per cent of GNI. The most recent round of budget negotiations resulted in a baseline budget for 2014–20 of €960b. However, the budget debate is always controversial. Acrimonious issues pit member states against each other depending on their national priorities. Table 11.2 details the historical development of the budget. In the 2013 budget period the largest contributor was Germany (29 per cent), followed by France (17.5 per cent), Italy (12.7 per cent) and the UK (11.6 per cent). These countries are also the biggest net contributors (i.e. the total contributions minus the amount received back in EU assistance). Table 11.2  Development of the EU budget (1960–2010) Year

Total expenditure Of which:   Agriculture   Social Fund   Regional Fund   Administration   Other

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

€b

€b

€b

€b

€b

€b

0.028

5.5

16.1

46.6

93.2

141.5

– – – 0.023 0.005

5.2 0.06 – 0.1 0.23

11.6 0.5 0.75 0.9 2.35

27.2 3.2 4.6 2.3 9.3

41.5 6.1 26.7 4.7 14.2

43.8 8.2 49.4 6.5 33.6

Sources: European Community Annual Economic Report 1993 (OJ L34 1994) and The Budget of the EU 2000 and 2010.

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EP and the Council are jointly responsible for the 19-­step budget approval process. The Commission initiates proposals, which are commented upon by the Council and then reviewed by EP’s subject matter and budgetary committees. This draft budget is then returned to the Council. Originally the Council had a final say over compulsory expenditures (i.e. expenditures mandated in EU recommendations), while EP had the ultimate decision over discretionary ones. Recent changes now require the two institutions to meet in a conciliation committee to agree on a final budget; otherwise the Commission has to present a new draft. EP can reject the whole budget if it has ‘important reasons’. Most Commission functions relate to the membership’s internal affairs, but its final role is to conduct the EU’s external policies, which are many and varied. They include representing the EU in international trade negotiations, managing accession processes, fostering relations with neighbouring states, and coordinating the EU’s development and humanitarian assistance. For this purpose the EU maintains 130 overseas delegations, which since 2010 have formed the basis of the External Action Service.

11.2.3 The Parliament Parliament, the EU’s legislative arm, has gradually accrued powers of oversight and decision making ever since direct elections strengthened its claim for extra powers in order to properly represent voters. EP shares responsibility with the two Councils for revising and approving new laws, the budget, and key appointments including the Presidents of the European Council and the Commission. Moreover, EP is required to approve the accession of any new state to the Union and ratifies international treaties (such as WTO agreements). There are currently 736 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), elected through systems of proportional representation for fixed but renewable five-­ year terms. Each member state has a quota of MEPs based loosely on its population. Germany with 99 has the most, followed by the UK, France and Italy with 72 apiece. Conversely Malta has only five MEPs, while Luxembourg, Cyprus and Estonia have six. EU expansion contributed to a quadrupling of MEPs since the 1970s, and the Lisbon Treaty has fixed an upper limit of 750, with a maximum of 96 for any one state. Unfortunately this will institutionalize the problem that, on average, a French, German and British MEP represents ten times as many citizens as their Maltese counterparts. Rather than sitting in national blocs, MEP’s sit in multi-­country ideological groupings. These groups elect an EP President, who chairs plenary sessions,

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applies parliamentary procedure and represents Parliament in other EU institutions. The President also chairs the Conference of the Presidents, which brings together parliamentary group leaders to manage parliamentary business, and the Bureau of the European Parliament, which brings together the President and the 14 Vice-­Presidents and is responsible for administrative, organizational and staff issues. In many respects EP is like any other legislature. Most legislative scrutiny is undertaken through 20 standing committees, a host of temporary committees and committees of inquiry that deal with special situations such as that on organized crime, corruption and money laundering. Decisions about whether to approve legislation are taken in plenary sessions. Nevertheless, EP differs from conventional legislatures in some important respects. One idiosyncrasy is that while it is a unicameral legislature it operates out of three locations: Strasbourg (for plenary sessions of about one week per month), Brussels (for some plenary sessions and committee meetings lasting about two weeks per month) and Luxembourg (where its library and secretariat are based). EP cannot raise revenue, nor does it initiate legislation. Instead it reviews proposals arriving from the Commission, which involves a complex negotiating process with the Council of Ministers (see Figure 11.3). Normally a Commission proposal is discussed in a committee, whose recommendations are then voted on by the plenary. The outcome represents the Parliament’s position. Until the passage of the SEA this so-­called consultation procedure was Parliament’s one opportunity to amend proposals, leaving final approval to the Council of Ministers. SEA established the cooperation procedure, whereby legislation pertaining to the Single Market, regional policy, the environment and the European Social Fund could be reviewed in a second reading by EP following amendment by the Council of Ministers. The Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties extended this into new areas, with the former instituting the co-­decision procedure, which allowed for a third reading of legislation by EP. The right to give legislative proposals three readings accords EP almost equivalent power to that of the Council of Ministers in the legislative process. Following the Lisbon Treaty this was renamed the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ and is now the main process through which legislation passes. Lisbon Treaty reforms continued to shift the balance of power towards EP by giving national legislatures more influence over draft legislation. Now, when a majority of national parliaments agree to contest a proposal, their opinion must be heard. In such cases the parliaments, through assembling a ­majority of their MEPs, can insist that the Commission must withdraw a

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Commission’s proposed legislation First Parliamentary reading and amendments First opinion of the Council of Ministers (qualified majority)

Act adopted

Second Parliamentary reading

Rejection (absolute majority)

Amendments (absolute majority)

Approval or no decision

Council of Ministers approves

Act adopted

Act not adopted

or convenes Conciliation Committee Revised proposals from Committee Third Parliamentary reading

Rejection (absolute majority)

Accepted by Parliament

Act not adopted

Council of Ministers Within 3 months accepts by

Rejects

QMV or unanimously Conciliation Committee reconvenes Act adopted Do not agree joint text

Agree joint text

Council of Ministers confirms

Adopted by

Adopted by

position at first reading

Parliament

Council of Ministers

Parliament rejects

Parliament accepts

Act adopted

Act not adopted

Figure 11.3  The EU’s legislative process

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draft measure. EU citizens also have the right to petition EP on matters falling within EU mandates and which concern them personally or as a group. In a typical year EP receives some 750 admissible petitions concerning the applicability of EU legislation.

11.2.4 ECJ ECJ is, in reality, two courts: the European Court of 28 judges and eight advocates-­general and the General Court (formerly the Court of First Instance), also comprising 28 judges. Both are organized and operate in very similar ways. Justices, one in each court for each member, are appointed on the member’s recommendation and are normally selected from judges qualified to sit in the highest domestic courts or those with recognized competence. Candidates are reviewed by an independent panel of seven legal experts before being approved by member states. They serve renewable six-­ year terms. Sittings of the full Court are reserved for a small number of cases. Normally justices sit in panels of three or five for lesser issues and occasionally, at the specific request of a member state or EU institution, as a Grand Chamber of 15. The justices in each court elect their own President for a three-­year renewable term of office and are grouped in ‘chambers’ for the purpose of distributing cases. With the exception of the President each judge belongs to two chambers, and the composition of the chambers is changed annually, although in the General Court each chamber has its own President, whose cases are confined to that chamber only. The Presidents, with the assistance of Court Registrars, are responsible for administrative matters and also hear applications for preliminary rulings pending final decisions of the Courts. Advocates-­general have a standing equal to that of the judges and contribute to the legal process by conducting a type of pre-­trial review. They provide a neutral summary of opposing legal arguments and an initial recommendation on the case and justify any new legal interpretations. In the General Court one judge takes on the advocate-­general’s role when a case is being considered, which simplifies the legal process. ECJ operates similarly to the US Supreme Court. It sits in public to hear brief opening arguments and to pronounce a judgment, with one judge acting as a rapporteur to summarize the case for the panel of judges and to prepare the final ruling. In line with the Court’s founding in Napoleonic law, advocates-­general make a presentation at the conclusion of oral arguments; however, when the UK joined the EEC, legal precedence and oral arguments became more important, and judges started asking questions from the bench.

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11.2.5 ECOA The Court of Auditors also consists of 28 members, one from each state, who are appointed for six-­year terms. Following nominations from member states, the Council appoints auditors after consultation with EP. The auditors elect their own President for a three-­year term and work in three-­ to six-­member panels or operative ‘clusters’ to review different facets of EU expenditure, with one member having a coordination role within each cluster. ECOA’s principal conclusions are presented in a year-­end report presented simultaneously to the Parliament and the Council following incorporation of the Commission’s observations. EP is required to accept the report by the following April, often using the deadline as leverage to change the Commission’s spending plans.

11.3 Current activities The EU’s current activities are playing out against the turbulent backdrop of the Eurozone crisis (see Chapter 9). For example, the EU has seized upon the crisis as an opportunity to further the Single Market project. Claiming that rigorous and broader application of the Single Market would boost European competitiveness, the EU made its financial support to several Eurozone countries contingent on their removing obstacles to the Single Market’s better implementation. Nevertheless, domestic lobbies and worries over high unemployment have provoked serious opposition to such proposals, particularly where they intensify external competition, for example in services. The Commission’s 2010 review outlined the pursuit of several enhancements to Single Market policies. It is working to improve the European patent system (see Chapter 10, section 10.10) and continues to develop a comprehensive services directive which will make it easier for lawyers, architects, public relations companies and so on to operate across the EU. While the right to work on an equal footing is accepted, difficulties remain over the common acceptance of certain professional qualifications. Ingrained protectionism extends beyond services. Despite legislation to encourage pan-­EU operations, businesses continue to face considerable obstacles and have often found it easier to open subsidiaries than to expand directly into another country; Spain, for example, has 700 different rules governing the opening of a new retail outlet (Vogt 2005). The complexity of applying different taxation regimes to company activity is a related problem. States have a veto on decisions over tax harmonization measures. Despite this, the Commission is trying to develop uniform VAT rules and business taxes to reduce the costs to SMEs that operate throughout Europe.

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EU agricultural subsidies are currently 36 per cent of the value of gross European farm output. This is higher than in the US (20 per cent) and lower than in Japan (58 per cent) but explains why developing countries are so insistent on reforms in the WTO Doha Round (Chapter 10). The EU’s protectionist position in the Round is an obstacle to stimulating global agricultural trade. While the 2014–20 budgeted amount for CAP has fallen slightly (to €278b), those countries receiving extensive agricultural support minimized the reduction. Three-­quarters of CAP spending will still support farmers, but members will start a convergence process so that eventually all farm support will be paid at a uniform per-­hectare rate. The balance of CAP will target fisheries, rural development and the environment. The Europe 2020 Initiative is the principal driver of the EU’s social policy. High EU unemployment has led to the prioritization of financial support for reskilling workers, vocational training for young people, job creation and creating equal opportunities. Structural funds are used not only to support regions impacted by the decline of a dominant activity (e.g. fishing) or areas of long-­term unemployment but also to develop rural areas. The EU’s energy and environmental policies are now interwoven, particularly on renewable fuels and carbon reduction, with a long-­term target of ensuring that, by 2050, half the EU’s power production is carbon-­free. The EU is developing a Trans-­European Energy Network, similar to that for the transport infrastructure (Chapter 16), to allow surplus generation to be switched to areas in short supply, for example by linking national electricity grids more effectively. The decline of Europe’s coal industry (except in some newer members) contrasts with its sizeable nuclear energy industry and research programme. Under the Euratom programme, the EU is engaged in a major project to investigate the possibility of producing clean electric power through nuclear fusion and has established an experimental reactor in France (ITER) jointly with a consortium of non-­members. To reduce carbon emissions, the EU has started to investigate the combined impact of its energy, agriculture and transport policies, in particular air transport, which is projected to account for 25 per cent of the EU total by 2012. It is also pressing members to ensure that their public procurement activities encourage energy efficiency, for example in construction. The seventh EAP will recognize that implementation has been uneven and needs strengthening, especially members’ commitment to recycling. The entire life cycle of manufactured goods will be studied in an attempt to reduce consumption of scarce inputs and extend their useful life. The EU also wants members to reform taxation policies to reduce CO2 emissions.

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Under security/foreign policy and justice/home affairs there have been fewer developments, with most activity pivoting around the semi-­autonomous institutions (see Chapter 12). In security and projecting the EU’s global presence three ongoing initiatives are significant. The EU continues to provide logistical support to African Union peacekeeping initiatives and has taken over much of the USA’s role in Afghanistan, providing support for the Afghan government and training for its troops. It provides 26 per cent of the total ISAF contingent (see Chapter 13, section 13.6), and even though its forces will diminish by 2014, in parallel with the US, the EU will continue to provide security advice and police training. Following the events of 2013 in Mali, the EU is now providing training and logistical support for ECOWAS peacekeeping forces and the Malian army. Foreign policy interventions have been more cautious. The EU partners the permanent Security Council members and Germany in trying to persuade Iran to drop its nuclear programme (see Chapter 7, section 7.6) and, with the UN and the USA, continues attempts to resuscitate negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. In its disbursement of development aid ECHO assists in less publicized emergencies such as Western Sahara and Nepal while leaving the more visible ones to member states’ programmes (Bretherton and Vogler 2006). Under the rubric of home affairs, attention centres on issues of terrorism, asylum and immigration, particularly through reinforcing the EU’s borders (see Chapter 12, section 12.7.2).

11.3.1 ECJ In 2012, 632 cases were lodged with ECJ and 595 were concluded, leaving 886 cases pending. ECJ deals with a varied set of problems stemming from EU regulations, but cases most commonly concerned the environment, taxation, consumer affairs, intellectual property and social policy. The General Court received 617 new cases and concluded 688, leaving 1237 cases pending. Its largest workload focuses around trade and particularly intellectual property (238 cases). Although the General Court had been established to speed up the judicial process, cases proceeding through the main court take on average 17 months, while those in the General Court take 28 months. However, recent changes have accelerated decisions on trademarks and plant variety disputes. Examples of recent Court decisions are: zz Following

an antitrust case brought by the Commission against several companies producing switching gear for power grids, ECJ fined Siemens €397m.

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zz Collective

bargaining in the state sector with a view to protecting social benefits is not a reason to rule out public tenders for procurement contracts. zz The English soccer Premier League cannot prevent third parties showing games broadcast on overseas television channels providing the signal had been legally obtained.

11.3.2 ECOA The annual EU accounts remain ECOA’s main preoccupation, and its refusal to endorse overall EU financial statements persists (see section 11.4). In addition, ECOA also undertakes special audits of significant programmes. Three recent reviews are: zz a

€350m emergency grant to Italy after the L’Aquila earthquake, where ECOA considered that the rebuilt accommodation was too expensive and inappropriate for the demographic profile of those needing rehousing; zz the EU’s energy efficiency policies, which it found to be poorly monitored, lacking needs assessment and insufficiently cost-­effective; and zz the EU’s municipal waste management policies, which were not achieving the desired outcomes of reducing rubbish per capita and which, in particular, failed to ensure waste was treated before being moved to landfill sites.

11.4 Evaluation and future challenges Set against centuries of European disharmony and bloodshed, the development of the EU has been remarkable. Since its origin as a six-­country organization exclusively managing coal and steel resources, subsequent widening and deepening mean that the EU now impinges on almost all facets of the everyday lives of the citizens of its 28 members. The organization has become an enigmatic hybrid of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. The steady expansion of the EU’s supranational competencies has, for the most part, been sanctioned by treaties agreed by states, and states still heavily influence policy formulation, especially in areas of vital national interest such as taxation and security, where they can exercise vetoes. The benefits wrought by EU economic integration and the Single Market are widely acknowledged. The EU has also become a leader in implementing international environmental policies developed at the UN and OECD and, while not developing its own distinctive policies, it has acted as a ‘multiplier, turning soft international policy into stronger commitments for its members’ (Knill and Lenschow 2005).

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Seventy years of peace also imply success in the initial underlying objective of binding together states that were previously at war, something recognized by the award of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012. For Liberals the EU demonstrates how IOs can foster the enlightened self-­interest of states and remove the threat of war. Realists are unconvinced, however. They argue that the absence of war reflects the alignment of members’ interests rather than a triumph of IOs. They believe the EU, like IOs more generally, has done nothing to alter the nature of international politics and its presence has merely coincided with an interregnum prior to further European conflict and they warn about an economically ravaged Europe backsliding into war. The EU tests the boundaries between states and international institutions in a unique way which presents it with exceptional challenges. First, especially since the passage of the Maastricht Treaty, citizens have expressed concerns about their exclusion from decisions to award EU institutions and their political elites greater powers and responsibilities. Furthermore, deepening has not been accompanied by mechanisms to hold these institutions to account. The perception of a ‘democratic deficit’ is reflected in dwindling support for the EU and its institutions (see Table 11.3). Since 1992, six of the 27 national referendums on specific EU treaties resulted in a negative vote, yet on those relatively rare occasions where citizens have been given a say political elites have tended to press ahead regardless, which may have disillusioned European electorates. Second, the EU has always faced intense debates about what it is and what it wants to be, something reflected in the unresolved philosophical debates between wider and deeper and intergovernmental versus supranational. Enlargement has overstrained many initiatives and, given the large differences that separate members (see Table 9.2), has aggravated the difficulties in reaching agreement on a unifying vision. This is exemplified Table 11.3  Public opinions of the EU (2001–11) Observation Percentage of population with a positive image of the EU Percentage of population with a neutral image of the EU Percentage of population that trusts the EU Percentage of population that trusts the Commission Percentage of population that trusts the Council Percentage of population that trusts EP Percentage of population that supports the euro

2001*

2007

2011

50 n/a 53 50 43 58 61

52 31 57 52 47 56 63

31 41 34 36 32 41 53

Note: * Survey results in 2001 based on the population of 15 pre-­accession members only. Source: Eurobarometer surveys for autumn of each year.

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by disagreements over the appropriate response to the Eurozone crisis. Some believe the solution lies in further pooling sovereignty and the empowerment of EU institutions to dictate economic and financial policy to member states, while others advocate intergovernmental solutions where EU institutions set a broad framework of rules but leave individual members responsible for policies. Similar debates play out in most other policy areas and, with the wide variety of opt-­outs negotiated by member states, a multi-­speed or multi-­level EU looks increasingly likely.

11.4.1 The institutions Before examining the performance of individual EU institutions, this section considers in more detail the debates surrounding supranationality and the democratic deficit. IOs that intrude on national policies are frequently derided for being unaccountable to those that suffer under the consequences (see Chapter 1 and Chapter 9, section 9.1). While in most IOs sovereignty is respected and governments can, in theory, ignore their directives, the EU’s supranational proclivities, in certain circumstances, enable its institutions to dictate to or overrule members. Initially the EU’s supranational tendencies were kept in check. For example, smaller states’ worries that West Germany and France would dominate the ECSC High Authority resulted in the counterbalancing Council of Ministers, where states had a veto. Similarly Commissioners were chosen by national governments and had to be approved by the Council of Ministers and EP. Many early EU decisions concerned technical matters such as competition and regulation, whose impact, while having important distributional impacts, went largely unnoticed. From the 1980s, however, EU decisions impinged on sensitive sovereign issues that worried voters, including taxation, education, defence and social policies. Moreover, the ability of governments to resist unwelcome developments was eroded through the extension of QMV in the Council of Ministers, the growing assertiveness of the Commission under Jacques Delors (Box 11.4), and the arrival of the semi-­autonomous agencies (Chapter 12). The debates around supranationality and the democratic deficit appear unlikely to end soon. The notion that subsidiarity could redress both concerns has been undermined by the paucity of situations where it has been used (Booker and North 2003). Moreover the evidence is contradictory. For example, an examination of the implementation of EU legislation indicates that those members often perceived as favouring a supranational entity, such as France and Italy, have frequently ignored EU rules when they sensed

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internal opposition. Others, such as the UK, which strongly supports an intergovernmental approach, complicate and embellish EU legislation with additional national regulations (gold-­plating), leading to the perception that it has become excessively onerous. However, it is important to stress that the process of integration has not solely favoured supranationalism, as efforts have been made to address the democratic deficit. For instance, while the Commission retains ‘the capacity and legitimacy to act relatively independently of member states and as such may be the world’s most powerful international administration’ (Peterson 2008), the Lisbon Treaty trimmed its powers, shifting the balance towards EP and the Councils. Paradoxically the desire to ensure that states’ interests are not hijacked by a precipitous rush for ever-­closer union has led to criticism, covered further in the discussion of policy below, that the EU is unable to act swiftly when needed. That the issue of the democratic deficit is unresolved partly reflects wider problems of EU institutions and their slow and incomplete reform. The main bodies are regularly assailed for their remoteness from the average citizen, overrepresentation of smaller states, the sometimes poor quality of their representatives, and their wastefulness. The European Parliament exemplifies these problems. Despite being directly elected and acquiring more power, EP has found it difficult to relate to voters, and election turnout has dropped continuously from 63 per cent in 1979 to 43 per cent in 2009, frustrating attempts to have it recognized as the democratic ‘voice’ of the European people. Compared with national parliaments EP is a disengaged and exotic institution which many EU citizens find baffling. Elections to the Parliament lead to no change of ‘government’; there are tenuous links between national parties and the parliamentary blocs with which MEPs align, and few comprehend EP’s role and powers. Although it reviews EU legislation, EP’s real influence is limited, and the Council of Ministers ignores some 80 per cent of legislative proposals made under the co-­decision process. EP’s most visible impact has been in holding individual Commissioners to account. With large constituencies and roles poorly understood by constituents, MEPs are relatively unknown, though EP is now attracting more political heavyweights. Around one in six MEPs has national ministerial experience, and almost one-­third have been national parliamentarians. Nevertheless, EP has struggled to escape the impression that it provides a haven for failed national politicians. Furthermore, Parliament’s insistence on working at three loca-

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tions costs the EU an additional €200m annually and has contributed to a damaging image of wastefulness. A long-­standing criticism of the Commission was that too many Commissioners were ineffective, with few management skills and little leadership experience. However, the rising visibility, power and prestige of the Commission, plus more stringent selection processes, have been accompanied by improvements in Commissioners’ quality and experience. Today ministerial experience appears almost a prerequisite, and several former heads of government have served as Commissioners. Nonetheless, in many respects the Commission is a prime example of poor IO management (see Chapter 4). Twenty-­eight Commissioners make for a very unwieldy management structure, hindering executive decision making. Their highly political roles and powerful personal offices distance them from the Commission’s bureaucrats, and there is evidence of mounting tension between managers in the Directorates and Commissioners (Peterson 2008). Recent reforms, generated from within rather than externally (see Chapter 4, section 4.2.4), were designed to make the bureaucracy more effective but have not significantly altered its culture. DGs have been criticized for their lack of management skills (Cini 1996) and, while some attention has now been paid to this problem, reforms are still needed. There is widespread agreement that ECJ has been at the forefront of European integration (Alter 2008) and that its judgments have influenced an inordinate array of topics. While, in theory, the Council of Ministers can change the law and assert its authority, in practice divisions amongst states mean they are generally unable to marshal sufficient votes to overturn ECJ’s pro-­integrative rulings, even in controversial cases. Indeed ECJ has ‘used its rulings to claim substantial authority over national courts, national law and the interpretation of EU treaties’ (Carrubba et al. 2008: 436). ECJ’s increasing workload is a measure of its success, but the accompanying attention has exposed shortcomings. Only a minority of justices (37 per cent) have practical appellate backgrounds, which means in some cases just one judge on a panel is fully experienced (Chalmers 2012a). Cases move slowly and allow members to avoid compliance for over six years. Thus ECJ needs to further improve its procedures, particularly in the General Court. Delays also hinder national courts awaiting an ECJ opinion on the application of EU law. Some suggest that ECJ is compromising its judicial effectiveness because it has become too close to the EU’s executive institutions and everyday policy making. Chalmers (2012b) observes that ECJ ‘has too much institutional investment in the development of the European Union to

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d­ ischarge its checks and balances role successfully’. These concerns have been heightened now that ECJ can levy fines on states that fail to deliver balanced budgets, a power deriving from the 2012 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance which defines a new fiscal compact (see Chapter 9, section 9.3) and requires members to legislate for balanced budgets. ECOA, the organization’s auditing body, has routinely found errors, waste and mismanagement, consequently refusing to approve the overall EU accounts for the 19 years between 1994 and 2012. Its concerns lie not with the Commission’s internal accounts, where staff corruption is comparatively rare, but with the organization’s poor financial controls over grants disbursed to governments. That there are problems is unsurprising. Fundamental weaknesses arise from the Commission being concerned more with ensuring disbursement than with the effectiveness of expenditures, a problem similar to that experienced by IBRD (see Chapter 8), and from different national perspectives on corruption resulting in the absence of accepted standards on good practice. The EU’s approval process means that 40 per cent of spending happens in the last two months of each financial year, inevitably leading to rushed decisions and waste. Several national authorities have not accounted for their expenditures. Indeed, ECOA’s predictable eight-­year audit cycle forewarns officials seeking to hide malfeasance. Rotherham (2008) describes a depressing routine in which MEPs deliberate on ECOA’s annual report and invite the Commission to do better next time, while the Commission maintains that it is improving all the time. Political group leaders and their own national parties then persuade recalcitrant MEPs not to ‘make a fuss’. Consequently EP has not insisted that proper accounts are provided, nor has it sought to address ECOA’s obvious shortcomings.

11.4.2 The policies EU enlargement has led to more complex and protracted policy making. Politically the membership has become more heterogeneous, while continual expansion has sustained wide disparities in economic performance (see Table 9.2), although simultaneously it has secured an expanding, educated workforce and consumer base. Pursuit of the Single Market and economic integration has consumed the most political capital as the EU has sought to generate the wealth needed to support the European project. The EU is now the world’s biggest and richest marketplace, the principal source of foreign direct investment and a major global trading hub. The Single Market’s economic benefits have been widely discussed and are generally considered to have been positive. Free movement of goods and

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standardized regulations have stimulated trade, the free movement of workers has contained production costs, and capital has flowed into all corners of the Union, stimulating economic activity. In spite of this, elements of the Single Market and their distributive impacts have been roundly criticized. A prime example is CAP (Box 11.1), which achieved its objectives of boosting production, halting food shortages and providing rural employment at the expense of extreme distortions of agricultural markets and diversion of resources away from more productive investments. Agricultural protectionism and subsidies mean European consumers pay extra for their food. Excessive price support for European farmers led to excess production and surpluses. The EU’s purchases of surpluses then resulted in the now infamous ‘wine lakes’ and ‘butter mountains’. Worse, some of this excess was ‘dumped’ as food aid, depressing world prices and undermining the agricultural sectors vital to developing countries. Furthermore the largest and most efficient farm units, which already benefit from economies of scale, have prospered more than smaller ones. The main challenge is to eliminate remaining barriers to the Single Market. Of the Single Market’s four freedoms, most progress has been made with the movement of goods. As Box 11.3 describes, national markets for services, workers and capital have proved more resilient. Energy, telecommunications and transport services are proving slow to change despite the creation of several EU agencies to stimulate joint initiatives such as the Single European Sky (see Chapter 16). As regards free movement of labour, recent EU widening has stimulated a degree of protectionism to prevent immigration undermining national remuneration levels. In the EU financial sector, companies do not provide transparent information on cross-­border charges, the opening of cross-­border bank accounts remains difficult, and there is no single mortgage market. Financial businesses face different regulatory requirements across the EU and their ability to merge or to operate as consortiums is limited. Flaws in the oversight of transnational institutions revealed by the 2007 financial crisis have stimulated additional European agencies, such as the European System of Financial Supervision to oversee and harmonize national regulators (see Chapter 9, section 9.3). A key debate about the EU’s social and regional policies has been their effect on European competitiveness. Free marketeers believe that the benefits of liberalization wrought by the Single Market have been squandered by reimposition of regulation at the European level and excessive social protection. This has been regularly touted as the reason why Europe lags behind

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America in its ability to generate jobs, growth and productivity (OECD 1994). This analysis has never been universally accepted, especially within the EU. Nevertheless attaining economic growth and maintaining economic competitiveness while preserving social cohesion are a significant challenge. The EU’s first systematic attempt to do this, the 2000 Lisbon Strategy, was an abject failure (Wyplosz 2010) and was replaced in 2010 by the Europe 2020 Strategy. However, at a time of austerity, increased protectionism and stark differences in members’ economic health will make delivering the strategy difficult. An influx of poorer members has made the goal of narrowing inequalities still more difficult. Overlapping structural funds have funnelled money to poorer areas of rich states to sponsor projects which could easily be financed by the governments concerned, while in other countries structural funds have worsened internal inequality as those regions benefiting from them have raced ahead. Policies such as the Trans-­European Transport Network have increased regional GDPs but have had little impact on employment levels despite being targeted for the purpose (Becker et al. 2009). The EU’s rush to become a world leader in environmental policy has produced a potentially flawed strategy based on an eye-­catching slogan (20/20/20) that, if it is not achieved, may damage its credibility (Dinan 2009). Member states have the responsibility for implementing EU energy policy, and progress has been uneven, hampered by their different priorities and energy structures. Persistent protectionism prevented the 2007 target for full liberalization of the energy market from being met and, despite the Commission exerting further pressure, unbundling power generation from the delivery infrastructure remains unfinished. In 2012, 11 members, including Germany and Spain, had yet to comply with the directive. The EU’s efforts to ensure cheap and reliable sources of energy have been thwarted by a flawed ETS (see below) and by concerns that the use of biomass to generate energy produces more carbon than it saves. Initial progress towards the target of renewables providing 12 per cent of energy by 2010 was slow, but it is now estimated that it has been missed by only one percentage point overall, despite disappointing results in the transport sector. As previously intimated, environmental protection has become a major feature of the EU’s work; for example, it has significantly shifted the international regime on testing and reporting information on chemical compounds (see Chapter 12, section 12.6.3). In contrast, its leadership on the climate change agenda has fallen short. Members’ reluctance to allow the EU a greater say over taxation led to ETS being its chosen tool for minimizing greenhouse gases rather than a carbon tax (Box 11.6). Unfortunately ETS quotas were too generous, leading to a low carbon trading price that reduced incentives to

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cut CO2 emissions. Low ETS prices mean that burning coal is cheaper than investing in new power generation and, while the EU has been more effective in containing CO2 emissions than the US and Japan, its ability to meet future targets through ETS is doubtful. Moreover, in 2013 EP blocked proposals to expunge excess carbon credits from the market following pressure from energy-­intensive industries and consumer fears over rising energy costs. Intergovernmentalism remains strongest in the arenas of justice/home affairs and security/foreign policies. Nevertheless, even here the EU is encroaching on national systems. For example, the European arrest warrant is now widely employed to bring criminals to justice but has been criticized for being used by some members to secure arrests for minor infringements. In 2005, in a further reinforcement of the EU’s authority, ECJ made a landmark ruling that the EU may prosecute criminal offences providing they fall within areas where the EU has full competency and there is a clear need to combat serious shortcomings in implementing EU objectives. Although to an extent this ruling was taken care of in the Lisbon Treaty, which provides for the eventual creation of a European public prosecutor, it cuts across presently established boundaries whereby criminal matters are a member’s responsibility. These issues raise the question of how the EU can fairly bring all its citizens to equal justice under the law. This is particularly important given that it is costly and difficult for individuals to access ECJ unless they have institutional backing. In home affairs the desire for greater coordination to reduce economic migration has been heightened by the Eurozone crisis. Internal security initiatives aim to counter terrorism, increase the EU’s capacity to deal with cybercrime and target specific hotspots where organized crime is endemic, such as the West Balkans. There is general agreement that the EU can play a useful role in supporting national security efforts, but its programmes are disparate and insufficiently funded. In addition its intergovernmental oversight Committee for Operational Cooperation on Internal Security is secretive and has an ill-­ defined role. Externally, the EU has found it difficult to project its collective power, because developing the common positions needed for the EU to forge a distinctive foreign policy has proven inordinately difficult. Fundamental tensions between Atlanticists (who view the US as a vital underwriter of Europe’s security) and Europeanists (who think Europe should be responsible for its own security) are one major obstacle and have featured in debates about NATO’s future and its relations with the EU (see Chapter 13). The strong bilateral interests and linkages of bigger powers, such as France and the UK, mean they wish to retain unilateral control of their foreign ­policy.

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The result is that the EU has tended to rely on soft power. Thus Manners (2002) describes the EU as a ‘normative’ rather than a military power and considers that the EU’s development and propagation of international norms may be a means through which it can carve out a distinctive foreign policy. Nevertheless, the majority of scholars continue to argue that, for the EU to have any real impact in the unforgiving environment of international politics, it must be prepared to combine soft power with the willingness and ability to project military force. Although it is not entirely fair, the EU is regularly accused of being an economic giant but a military pygmy. It has undertaken around 30 small military and paramilitary missions, deploying peacekeeping troops to Macedonia (2003) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (2004), in addition to taking over NATO’s Bosnian peacekeeping responsibilities. It maintains a significant presence in Afghanistan, contributes to preventing piracy in the Indian Ocean (Box 16.2) and has sent police missions to a dozen countries. Nevertheless, despite some successes, external security missions tend to be limited and symbolic. When serious intervention is required, such as policing the no-­fly zone over Libya, states still prefer unilateral action or to use mechanisms such as NATO. The EU-­28 has a huge military establishment, but only around a tenth of it is on instant readiness, while the proposed EU Battlegroups have been reduced in number and are not yet deployed. The prospect for a single European defence capability remains remote, especially given present budgetary pressures. Furthermore, states’ unwillingness to abandon vetoes in this area requires a slow process of consensus building before collective military action can be taken or endorsed. This produces measured policies but not the rapid response many contemporary crises demand (for example over the invasion of Iraq in 2003). Parallel lines of responsibility and inter-­agency competition exacerbate these problems, which have been further complicated by the post-­Lisbon structural changes (see section 11.2.1). The Lisbon Treaty seemed to have stabilized the relationship ‘between and among national governments and supranational actors (the Commission, the Parliament and the Court)’ for the foreseeable future (Dinan 2010: 4); however, it resolved neither the widening/deepening nor the intergovernmental/supranational debates at the heart of integration. No sooner was this written than the Eurozone financial crisis reintensified debates about the EU’s nature and prospects. In many respects the confused, contradictory and discordant efforts to quell the Eurozone crisis summarize the EU’s malaise.

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Those favouring supranationality have used the crisis to highlight the problems of incomplete monetary integration and have exploited it to promote deeper Eurozone macroeconomic integration. Twenty-­five members have already accepted restrictions on their freedom of action through the 2012 ‘fiscal compact’, which gives the Commission stricter powers to monitor and control national deficits and debts, but given the failure of the Stability and Growth Pact (see Chapter 9, section 9.3) and its inability to deal with Germany’s continuing current account surplus, this could yet prove to be a flawed response. Nevertheless, intergovernmental inclinations remain strong. Even weak Eurozone members baulk at intrusion from Brussels, and responses to the crisis have been impeded by bickering. Given the pressures to reduce their deficits several important members resisted expanding the EU budget for 2014–20. The UK and the Czech Republic have not signed the fiscal compact, and German citizens are distinctly unhappy to be bailing out profligate members. Certainly most of the ten members currently outside the Eurozone will think long and hard before committing themselves to the project and will want to see what evolves. The responses to the Eurozone crisis typify debates in other areas, leading to growing acceptance that the EU will evolve into a multi-­tiered or multi-­speed union where a core of closely collaborating members, accepting considerable supranational governance, may exist in parallel to a looser periphery of members whose aims revolve around the Single Market and other mutually beneficial policies. The tense background of the Eurozone crisis plus widespread evidence of European voters’ ‘enlargement fatigue’ means further widening or deepening will require considerable political persuasion and leadership. In the medium term, widening will take precedence over deepening. Croatia became the EU’s 28th member in July 2013, and Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey are all candidates. Tougher preconditions, including a requirement to accept the EU acquis, mean future accession negotiations are likely to be protracted. Poor governance and criminal activity are major obstacles for the Balkan countries, but Turkey perhaps poses the most interesting set of problems. Turkey applied for EU accession in 1987, achieved candidate status in 1999, and accession negotiations commenced in 2005. Irrespective of its questionable democratic credentials and human rights record, the difficulty it will face in implementing the acquis makes membership impossible in the short term. Moreover, given its history, geographical location and culture, whether Turkey is in fact a European country raises interesting questions about the limits to widening and whether the admission of countries on the present periphery would fundamentally alter the EU’s character.

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Many public policy areas are not ‘Europeanized’, and so considerable scope remains for deepening, although they impinge on subjects of great sensitivity to states and their citizens. Moves that hint of a European super-­state or federation such as tax harmonization or the development of a European army are likely to encounter fierce resistance, especially when the Eurozone’s economies appear to be in deep trouble. Today, the confluence of political dissatisfaction and economic crisis means the EU is facing its biggest challenge yet, but a general wariness of invoking negative reactions means that many of the changes needed in response are being made through mechanisms that will avoid treaty change. SUGGESTED READING

Bomberg, E., J. Peterson and A. Stubb (eds) (2012), The European Union: How Does It Work?, 3rd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [A well-­designed textbook covering the EU’s principal actors] Cini, M. and N.P.-­S. Borragan (eds) (2013), European Union Politics, 4th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [A cohesive collection of essays loaded with case studies] Corbett, R., F. Jacobs and M. Shackleton (2011), The European Parliament, 8th edn, London: Harper. [An insider’s assessment of the development, internal structure, political composition and workings of EP and its relationship to other EU institutions] EU (regular publication), Official Journal of the European Union, Luxembourg: EU. [This series records all the EU legislation, decisions and rulings] Hayes-­Renshaw, F. and H.S. Wallace (2006), The Council of Ministers, 2nd edn, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave. [Examines the Council and its interaction with other EU institutions] Horspool, M. and M. Humphreys (2012), European Union Law, 7th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Covers EU law from the basic treaties through the EU institutions, particularly the ECJ, to its application in each main area of EU activity] McCormick, J. (2011), Understanding the European Union: A Concise Introduction, 5th edn, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave. [Comprehensive review of EU history, governance and principal policy competences] Schmidt, S.S. and R.D. Kelemen (eds) (2012), The Power of the European Court of Justice, Abingdon, UK: Routledge. [Covers some controversial Court interventions] Spence, D. (ed.) (2006), The European Commission, London: Harper. [Reviews the Commission and its relationships with other EU bodies including the European agencies]

Internet resources Commission: http://www.europa.eu.int Committee of the Regions: http://www.cor.eu.int Council: http://www.ue.eu.int Court of Auditors: http://www.eca.europa.eu Court of Justice: http://www.curia.europa.eu Economic and Social Committee: http://www.esc.eu.int European Parliament: http://www.europarl.eu.int Statistical Office of the European Commission: http://www.eurostat.ec.europa.eu

12 The European Union’s semiautonomous agencies European states have experienced the world’s most significant levels of international interdependence. During the nineteenth century this interdependence incubated international cooperation and nascent attempts at institutionalization through IOs (see Chapter 2). The violent forms of interdependence that characterized the first half of the twentieth century led not only to a fresh round of European IO building (see Chapters 3, 11 and 13) but also to new experiments in international organization, including organizations overseeing both international cooperation and a measure of international integration that eventually culminated in the EU. Recently the principal EU institutions (Chapter 11) have been supplemented by an overlay of EU agencies. Operating principally in the commercial, transportation, education, law enforcement and research sectors, these agencies are little known but have ‘given the EU more of the trappings of a conventional system of government’, induced reforms to their national counterparts and expanded the ‘pooling of policy authority between national governments and the EU institutions’ (McCormick 2011: 237). To date no single classification scheme has made definitive sense of this jungle of agencies, which vary in size, style, function, influence and relationship to the EU (Ekelund 2012). One usual starting point, however, is to distinguish between two broad types of agency. The first type is the genuinely autonomous organizations like the European Central Bank (Chapter 9), the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Chapter 8). These organizations are more like UN SAs, being tied to their parent body but exhibiting considerable freedom of action arising from their status as fully developed IOs defined by international treaties, with governance structures and budgets independent of the Commission. They tend to be much bigger and more influential than other EU agencies. We have named the second group the EU semi-autonomous agencies. Rather than originating from treaties they are the consequence of ­secondary

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l­ egislation and are emanations that have been initiated by existing EU institutions, notably the European Commission, the European Council and European Parliament (EP) (Groenleer 2009). These agencies share many characteristics with the UN semi-autonomous bodies in that they are designed to perform specific tasks, but have distinct legal personalities and a degree of operational and financial autonomy from their parent organizations (see Table 12.1). However, there are two differences. First, EU agencies have been suggested by the Commission either in the context of drafting new treaties or to improve operations and thus do not derive from members’ shared intentions as in the UN. Second, whereas UN agencies are mostly dependent upon voluntary contributions from states and operate at arm’s length from the UN, EU agencies receive much of their funding directly from the EU budget and almost all are subject to European Commission supervision. Within this broad definition the EU differentiates between a small cluster of Executive Agencies and a larger collection of Regulatory Agencies that are this chapter’s principal subject. The Executive Agencies are integral parts of the Commission and execute specific programmes such as the disbursement of EU research and development (R&D) funds. They have limited-time mandates defined by the programme being managed and are located in either Brussels or Luxembourg close to their supervisory Directorates-General. The Regulatory Agencies are diffused throughout Europe (see Table 12.1) but, despite physical separation, their powers are tightly linked to existing institutions. Indeed the term ‘regulatory agency’ is something of a misnomer for while some grant licences and opine on the application of EU standards, they generally lack the executive functions of equivalent domestic regulatory institutions as they mainly impart technical and management advice to their parent organization, predominantly the Commission. The parent organization (see Table 12.1) retains ultimate authority but the regulatory agencies’ knowledge-related inputs influence policymaking. Lacking a definitive classification system, this chapter splits the semiautonomous­agencies into four broad categories (Table 12.1). The first three categories – ‘knowledge management institutions’, ‘knowledge management institutions with operational responsibilities’ and ‘regulatory agencies for commerce’ – are programme-oriented agencies. The knowledge management institutions collate and exchange information, undertake research and use the combined scientific results to advise and assist European institutions’ policy-making and legislative endeavours. The knowledge management institutions with operational responsibilities are few, but their activities provide the basis for support to certain operations (for example Europol coordinating the arrest of criminal gangs). The commercial regulators also support knowledge

European Union Institute for  Security Studies (EU-­ISS) European Food Safety Authority  (EFSA) European Network and Information  Security Agency (ENISA) European Centre for Disease  Prevention and Control (ECDC)

European Monitoring Centre  for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) European Agency for Safety and  Health at Work (EU-­OSHA) European Police College (Cepol) Research – work safety Law enforcement – training Defence studies Research – food safety IT – security of networks Health – infectious diseases

Commission Council Council Commission Commission Commission, EP

Heraklion, Greece Stockholm, Sweden

Parma, Italy

Paris, France

Bramshill, UK

Bilbao, Spain

Copenhagen, Denmark Lisbon, Portugal

Research – environment Research – drug addiction

Dublin, Ireland

Research – conditions of life

Commission, EP

Thessaloniki, Greece

2005

2004

2002

2001

2000

1995

1993

1993

1975

1975

Headquarters Year location started

Education – vocational training

Parent Functional descriptor organization(s)

Programme-­oriented agencies Knowledge management institutions European Centre for the Commission  Development of Vocational Training (CEDEFOP) European Foundation for the Commission  Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) European Environment Agency (EEA) Commission, EP

Institution

Table 12.1  Basic data on the EU semi-­autonomous agencies (2012)

29

8

52

4

8

15

14

34

20

16

Budget (€m)

90

40

300

20

20

50

80

120

90

100

Number of staff

ecdc.europa.eu

enisa.europa.eu

efsa.europa.eu

iss.europa.eu

cepol.net

osha.europa.eu

emcdda.europa. eu

eea.europa.eu

eurofound. europa.eu

cedefop.europa. eu

Website – http://www.

Parent Functional descriptor organization(s)

Programme-­oriented agencies Knowledge management institutions European Union Agency for Commission Research – human rights  Fundamental Rights (FRA) European Institute for Gender Commission Research – gender  Equality (EIGE) equality European Institute of Innovation Independent Research – innovative  and Technology (EIT) (Commission) technology Knowledge management institutions with operational responsibilities European Police Office (Europol) Council Law enforcement – police coordination European Union Satellite Centre Council Defence – satellites  (EU Satcen) Research Executive Agency (REA)** Commission Research – applied science Regulatory agencies for commerce Office for Harmonization in the Commission Commerce – IP  Internal Market (OHIM) European Medicines Agency (EMA) Commission, EP Commerce – medicines Community Plant Variety Office Commission Commerce – IP  (CPVO) European Fisheries Control Agency Commission Commerce – fishing  (EFCA) European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) Commission, EP Commerce – chemicals

Institution

Table 12.1  (continued)

1995 1996 2005 2007

London, UK Angers, France Vigo, Spain Helsinki, Finland

66

5

154 12

336

21

2007

1994

11

2002

Alicante, Spain

68

2008

1998

94

2008

Vilnius, Lithuania Budapest, Hungary The Hague, Netherlands Torrejón de Ardoz, Spain Brussels, Belgium

7

2007

14

Budget (€m)

Vienna, Austria

Headquarters Year location started

120

40

440 40

650

90

70

400

50

30

50

Number of staff

echa.europa.eu

cfca.europa.eu

ema.europa.eu cvpo.europa.eu

oami.europa.eu

ec.europa.eu/rea

satcen.europa.eu

europol.europa.eu

eit.europa.eu

eige.europa.eul

fra.europa.eu

Website – http://www.

Communications – regulation Energy – regulation Financial regulation – banking Financial regulation – insurance and pensions

Commission

Commission Council, EP, ECB

European Union’s Judicial  Cooperation Unit (Eurojust) European Defence Agency (EDA)

Translation Centre for the Bodies of  the European Union (CdT) European Training Foundation (ETF)

Operational agencies Euratom Supply Agency

Council

Council

Commission, EP

Commission

Commission EU administration – translation Aid – human capital development in non-­EU states Law enforcement – prosecution Defence

Energy

European Insurance and Council, EP  Occupational Pensions Agency (EIOPA) European Securities and Markets Council, EP Financial regulation –  Authority (ESMA) investment markets Regulatory agencies with operational functions (see Chapter 16) European Aviation Safety Agency Commission Transport – air  (EASA) European Maritime Safety Agency Commission Transport – sea  (EMSA) European Railway Agency (ERA) Commission Transport – rail

Body of European Regulators for  Electronic Communications (BEREC) Agency for the Cooperation of  Energy Regulators (ACER) European Banking Authority (EBA)

The Hague, Netherlands Brussels, Belgium

Turin, Italy

Brussels, Belgium Luxembourg

Cologne, Germany Lisbon, Portugal Valenciennes, France

Frankfurt-­ am-­Main, Germany Paris, France

Ljubljana, Slovenia London, UK

Riga, Latvia

18

2004

2004

2002

1995

1995

31

38

21

63

3 (est.)

48

2003

1960

70

28

2011

2003

19

13

5

4

2011

2011

2011

2010

120

270

130

210

20

120

150

470

120

80

40

40

20

eurojust.europa. eu eda.europa.eu

etf.eu.int

europa.eu/ euratom cdt.eu.int

era.europa.eu

emsa.europa.eu

easa.europa.eu

esma.europa.eu

eiopa.europa.eu

eba.europa.eu

acer.europa.eu

berec.europa.eu

EU administration – IT Tallinn, Estonia management, home affairs

Commission

Commission

Research – pure science

Commission

Brussels, Belgium Brussels, Belgium Brussels, Belgium Valletta, Malta

Transport – infrastructure (see Chapter 16) Home affairs – asylum

Education

Commission

Brussels, Belgium

Prague, Czech Republic

Commission

Education

Commission

Commission

Health – support to EU-­wide public health programmes Satellite navigation – Galileo satellites

Commission

Luxembourg

Law enforcement – border Warsaw, Poland control

Headquarters location

Commission

Parent Functional descriptor organization(s)

2012

2011

2007

2007

2006

2006

2004

2004

2004

Year started

35

12

78 (est.)

32

15

37

5

4

70

Budget (€m)

120

50

40

200

90

80

50

40

100

Number of staff

ec.europa.eu/dgs

tentea.ec.europa. eu easo.europa.eu

erc.europa.eu

ec.europa.eu/eaci

eacea.ec.europa. eu

gsa.europa.eu

ec.europa.eu/eahc

frontex.europa.eu

Website – http://www.

Note: ** Executive agencies report to Directorates-­General in the Commission, while the Commission’s other agencies report to European Commissioners; Council agencies dealing with security report to the High Representative.

Trans-­European Transport Network  Executive Agency (TEN-­TEA)** European Asylum Support Office (EASO) Operational Management of Large-­  Scale IT Systems (IT Agency)

European Global Navigation  Satellite System (Galileo) Supervisory Authority (EU-­GNSS) European Education, Audiovisual  and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA)** Executive Agency for Competitive ness and Innovation (EACI)** European Research Council (ERC)**

Operational agencies European Agency for the Manage ment of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States (Frontex) Consumer’s Health and Food  Executive Agency (CHAFEA)**

Institution

Table 12.1  (continued)

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·  431

production and dissemination, but have a greater role in making and monitoring norms or rules (including in some cases the ability to adopt legally binding decisions) and certifying business activity. The final category contains the ‘operatively oriented’ agencies. These agencies still engage in some knowledge management, but this is secondary to activities which implement EU policies as defined by funding programmes (the executing agencies) or by jointly agreed strategies (for example Frontex). A small group of agencies dealing with the EU’s transport policies have both regulatory and general programme functions. They are covered in Chapter 16 because of their symbiosis with other IOs dealing with transportation, but are included in Table 12.1. The next section describes the general background to the emergence of semiautonomous agencies and the common challenges they face. The agencies share similar structures; nevertheless, at a detailed level there are considerable differences which, if important, are noted in commentary on specific organizations. Thereafter the chapter examines each of the four categories, the agencies in that category, and specific issues related to their development, functions and future challenges. Several semi-autonomous organizations are relative newcomers that are still developing their roles and have little track record to evaluate; accordingly they are only briefly mentioned.

12.1 Background The first semi-autonomous agencies appeared in the 1970s to deal with vocational training (CEDEFOP) and working conditions (Eurofound). Their emergence reflected administrative problems concomitant with European integration. At that time national agencies were largely responsible for implementing policies of the European institutions. However, national agencies’ differing approaches combined with the widening and deepening of European integration called the efficacy of this system into question. These latent problems became manifest following the Maastricht Treaty (see Chapter 11), for while regulatory power remained with national agencies uniform European rules alone would not necessarily remove barriers to the Single Market (Dehousse 1997). For example, inconsistent national approaches to certifying product safety could be exploited as a pretext for excluding goods originating from other member states. Thus, the successful removal of impediments to the Single Market in technical areas such as pharmaceuticals, food standards and testing electrical goods required administrative convergence to accompany legislative harmonization. The obvious solution to the mismatch between legislative rules and regulatory powers would have been to shift administrative and regulatory

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responsibilities to the Commission or equivalent pan-European regulators. This, however, was blocked by concerns over sovereignty. The compromise resulted in a second group of semi-autonomous agencies empowered to develop networks of representatives from national regulatory agencies that would supply the Commission with know-how while still preserving the role of domestic authorities. The networking function was supplemented with authorization to develop non-binding soft law, thereby harmonizing the work of national regulatory bodies by defining the procedures they must follow, for example in approval of medicines (Chiti 2009). ­

In the 2000s, a third and by far the largest group of agencies emerged to ease the Commission’s workload following the major EU enlargement in 2004 and consequentially the EU’s deepening involvement in new and sometimes controversial policy arenas. Partly this was also an attempt to restore the Commission’s reputation following the Santer Commission’s collapse in 1999 amidst accusations of malfeasance. It was felt that delegating policy implementation to semi-autonomous agencies would free the Commission to concentrate on policy initiation. Moreover, as with the Single Market, these regulatory agencies could supply technical expertise to assist policy making and would ensure the consistent and credible application of EU rules. Two other factors also contributed to the burgeoning enthusiasm for semi-autonomous agencies. One was the desire to shift some EU costs off the Commission’s own budget. Europol and Cepol, for example, are now funded directly by members and not through the EU. Second, members felt that shifting the Union’s focus away from the three main centres of Brussels, Luxembourg and Strasbourg would spread the economic benefits of hosting agencies and could counter the democratic deficit by giving their combined activities more visibility throughout the EU. The agencies that appeared in the 2000s have mainly been concerned with public safety and security. Specifically three agencies were established following some significant events which impacted on the population at large, namely: the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) subsequent to the BSE scare, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) after the sinking of the SS Erica (see Chapter 16), and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) following the 2003 SARS outbreak. There are three coordinating agencies dealing with individual security. Europol and the European Police College (Cepol) deal with certain police activities, and Eurojust works with members’ prosecuting services. Emergent organizations concerned with defence matters reflect changing institutional arrangements to support the nascent EU defence policy. In 2002 the Western European Union (WEU, Chapter 13) was absorbed into the EU structure, but some

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·  433

of its functions were reallocated to the EU Institute for Security Studies (EU-ISS) and the EU Satellite Centre (EU Satcen). WEU’s demise was completed when the Nice Treaty (see Table 11.1) created the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 2004 (see section 12.7.1). Since 2009, in response to the need to strengthen the EU’s financial system in the context of the Eurozone crisis, three new agencies have been developed overseeing the regulation and ­stability of the banking, insurance/pensions and securities markets (see Chapter 9).

12.2 Structure EU semi-autonomous agencies are overseen by management boards generally dominated by member state appointees. However, the participants and voting arrangements differ enormously. The commonest structures are those like the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) being composed exclusively of representatives of the member states and the European Commission. Nevertheless, even here there is considerable variation. For example, EFSA does not include representation from all member states, while the European Chemicals Agency (EHCA) is amongst those with representation from EP. Equally the border control agency (Frontex) and the European Environment Agency (EEA) allow states contiguous to the EU to sit on their boards, while European Economic Area states are full voting members in the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). In a few instances other IOs are also represented on the boards; thus the Council of Europe (COE) has a voting seat on the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), and the World Intellectual Property Organization has observer status at the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM). Bodies, like EMSA, dealing with industrial sectors sometimes reserve board representation for relevant civil society or commercial stakeholders. Important decisions are taken by super-majority, which constrains the Commission’s power in these agencies. Nonetheless, the Commission’s control of agency budgets does give it greater influence than is first apparent. Typically below the management board is a smaller executive board responsible for an agency’s ongoing activities. This is usually composed of the current chairman, other office holders and one Commission representative. Supporting this formal structure are technical committees to which individuals are appointed in their own right and which do not necessarily cover the whole membership. Together, the agencies employ over 5200 staff and account for around €1.6b of the EU annual budget. This excludes funds that they may administer

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for specific investment activities such as the Galileo satellite programme. Nevertheless most agencies have fewer than 300 staff and budgets under €20m (see Table 12.1). Commercial licensing activities have given rise to the two largest agencies, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and OHIM.

12.3 Evaluation and future challenges The relative paucity of academic literature on the semi-autonomous agencies reflects that almost half of them are about a decade old and still in their formative phase. Nevertheless, states have continually expressed concerns about their national bodies ceding policy control to these agencies, and observers have noted common themes concerning their impact and effectiveness and the issues they confront. Considerable disagreement persists over the impact of EU agencies. Commentators accept that they have succeeded in establishing effective systems for collecting and disseminating information in addition to developing strong scientific or stakeholder networks (Eureval 2009). Indeed concerns have been raised that the agencies were almost too successful because, in their attempts to establish independent positions, they had not always supported the Commission’s work, which was in fact their primary purpose. For example, Smismans (2003) reports how the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA) undermined the Commission through changing the original intent of its activities. Others point to their effectiveness being constrained by insufficient resources. Underfunding has tended to result in agencies ‘salami-slicing’ their activities instead of prioritizing carefully. The notion that the agencies are simultaneously successful and powerful yet weak and ineffective may reflect the compromise underlying their creation. As Keleman and Tarrant (2011: 926) observe, the agencies were ‘designed to fail’, with ‘opponents of regulatory harmonization hoping that the existence of weak networks will forestall the creation of effective regulatory structures. Proponents of harmonization, meanwhile, hope that networks may at least lay the groundwork for powerful regulatory bodies in future.’ EU semi-autonomous institutions have emerged in the absence of an ‘overall vision’ for their development and without a ‘common understanding’ of their purpose (European Commission 2008). This is because they have often been responses to specific challenges set within a bargaining process for apportioning power between member states and EU institutions. Thus Malta is represented on every agency notwithstanding that it may have no interest or expertise in a particular activity (for example railway regulation),

The European Union’s semi-autonomous agencies 

·  435

while landlocked countries participate in EFCA. This necessity to involve every government leads to slower and more costly processes than are strictly necessary. The multiplication of subsidiary bodies, each with subtly different relationships, management structures and reporting mechanisms could lead to a sprawling mass of overlapping and wasteful agencies, especially as the EU lacks any intergovernmental institution to coordinate their operations. Indeed the plethora of agencies is already producing such problems. Examples of overlap are: zz action

to combat avian influenza and similar zoonoses which, instead of being undertaken in an integrated manner, requires the separate participation of EU-OSHA (workers protection), EFSA (consumer protection and animal health), the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (protection of human health) and the Executive Agency for Competitiveness and Innovation (funding appropriate response mechanisms); and zz workplace training, where the European Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA), the European Training Foundation (ETF) and CEDEFOP have coinciding responsibilities. From a cost perspective, the agencies have been upbraided by the European Court of Auditors (ECOA) for poor planning and resource allocation. In an assessment of eight agencies, ECOA (2008) found that they had no performance indicators, their annual reports and external evaluations failed to provide information on results, and staffing plans were not linked to their long-term objectives. The agencies also add a further layer of institutional expenditures to the EU system which is already one of the most costly forms of governance found in multilateral institutions (Davies 2002). In the absence of central oversight, decisions to bestow the agencies with more power and responsibility without enforcing accountability are held to be complicating the EU’s democratic deficit (Schout and Pereyra 2011). The suspicion persists that the loose governance structure is a mechanism to allow the Commission to ‘supranationalize’ elements of policy by stealth through overriding and overseeing equivalent national institutions, such as those responsible for approving medicines or food safety (Booker and North 2003). Dressing issues up as ‘technical’ problems, to which semi-­autonomous agencies are seeking the best solutions, overlooks their distributional and hence political effects (Eberlein and Grande 2005). An ECJ judgment (the Meroni doctrine) theoretically restricts the agencies’ ­decision-making powers, requiring the Commission to promulgate regulations and take final responsibility. In practice a variety of intervening variables can give agencies

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a degree of independence (Wonka and Rittberger 2010). In highly technical areas (such as the approval of medicines) the Commission lacks the expertise to challenge an agency’s standpoint and routinely accepts EMA’s recommendations. Moreover, by using their expertise to shape policy debates, the agencies exert an influence greater than their direct regulatory authority implies (Majone 1997). G. Williams (2005) sees a link between the level of Commission funding and an agency’s independence. Most agencies obtain 90 per cent of their funding from the Commission, which severely constrains them, but five are partially funded through charging for their services (see section 12.6). Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate the independence and supranationality of semi-autonomous agencies. In addition to their financial dependence on the EU, their boards, although they remain flawed channels for accountability (Busuioc 2012), are overwhelmingly state dominated, and the agencies remain small compared to their national counterparts. Indeed rather than displacing national agencies they frequently rely on them for implementation. In short, the agencies’ independence is sometimes less than their legal mandates infer (Busuioc 2009).

12.4 Knowledge management institutions Frequently working through networks of collaborating national institutions and academic departments these agencies undertake applied social, scientific and technical research. Their research highlights and disseminates best practice and provides the basis for advice to the EU, national policy makers, related stakeholders and frequently the general public. Many of these agencies are well integrated into or underpin wider communities of influence with other IOs at their hub. Nevertheless, evaluations of these semi-autonomous agencies have revealed common problems. Such studies suggest ineffective links with the Commission and, despite their public information remit, a low profile in the community at large, problems that often arise because of their limited resources. Many knowledge management agencies are considered too small to be fully effective, and consequently they duplicate or undertake analyses that could be better done within the Commission or independently. Furthermore, these agencies must chart a careful course between science and politics. They sometimes need to temper their expert judgements to avoid undermining political support (for example over the safety of genetically modified (GM) crops), although this risks endangering the reputation for scientific independence upon which their authority rests.

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12.4.1 European Environment Agency (EEA) The biggest and most important knowledge management agencies are those tasked with overseeing aspects of environmental safety. As Chapter 11 discussed, environmental concerns have moved centre stage in EU policy making. Members recoiled at the possibility of a strong agency that could monitor states’ environmental records, and accordingly the responsibility for environmental policy and regulation was retained by the Commission. By law, however, every EU citizen is entitled to receive comprehensive information on environmental protection and pollution. EEA was established for this purpose, combined with providing support for policy formulation in the EU institutions and the agency’s 32 member states (which include states contiguous to the EU). It collates information, disseminates best practice, publicizes scientific findings, undertakes specialist studies and develops systematic environmental evaluation methodologies. Its data collection, analysis and distribution activities are principally carried on through the European Environment Information and Observation Network, which connects 350 NGOs, research establishments and member-government agencies. EEA’s work covers two broad areas of activity: analysis of environmental conditions, including climate, natural resources and endangered species, and assessment of the impact of specific activities on the environment. At intervals of five to six years, it publishes a comprehensive review: The European Environment: State and Outlook. EEA’s structure follows the generic pattern described above, with a Management Board composed of representatives from each member plus two representatives from the Commission and two scientists nominated by EP. Voting is restricted to EU states plus the Commission and EP representatives. There is a 20-person Scientific Committee, of individuals appointed in their own right, which provides technical opinions and whose Chair is an ex officio Board member without voting rights. Board decisions require a twothirds majority. EEA’s current focus is to support the implementation of EU’s Kyoto Protocol targets (see Case Study 1.1), which place heavy reliance on producing more electricity from renewable resources, through the 20/20/20 initiative (see Chapter 11). It is also examining the feasibility of carbon capture and underground storage. EEA identifies issues of concern for the Commission, most recently the need to pay more attention to the environmental impact of transport systems (with air travel becoming a predominant issue), air quality (particularly ozone levels), marine pollution, the costal environment and falling fish stocks (see also section 12.6.4, EFCA).

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Apart from the problem of reconciling resources with demands, EEA has generally had a positive reception from members and NGOs (Eureval 2009). It is credited with running a good scientific network but experiences difficulties in collecting sufficiently detailed data to support policy makers. Although this is improving, EEA is hampered by some poor national and regional environmental monitoring systems upon which it is dependent. A recent independent evaluation continued to give it respectable ratings but stressed the need for lucid objectives and more thorough engagement with all stakeholders (COWI 2013). To improve the quality and timeliness of its statistics, it is developing the Shared Environmental Information System, in which data will be inputted, at the country level, in a standardized format allowing immediate integration into consolidated databases and access by the general public.

12.4.2 European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) Proposals for a European agency to oversee food safety gained momentum during the 1990s prompted by public anxiety after a series of food scares, the absence of a forum to resolve food safety disputes and the need for an integrated food chain as part of the Single Market (Roederer-Rynning and Daugbjerg 2010). Thus, in 2002, EFSA was established to provide independent scientific advice and to issue timely warnings to member states and the public about hazards posed by the food chain. EFSA evaluates risks on the basis of scientific data, but it is not a regulatory body. Instead its advice is considered by the Commission, national authorities and the WHO/FAO Codex Alimentarius Commission (Chapter 7), each of which has defined regulatory responsibilities. Where organisms move between animals and humans (a zoonosis), EFSA cooperates with ECDC (see section 12.4.3), which has primary responsibility for general public health issues. EFSA’s structure differs from that of the other agencies in that its Management Board does not have national representatives. It is composed of nine persons appointed in their own right plus four representatives of the food industry and/or consumers and one Commission delegate. States are, however, represented through an Advisory Forum of the heads of national food safety bodies, part of whose remit is to facilitate liaison with national authorities. EFSA’s workload has expanded considerably because EU legislation has increasingly demanded the assessment of regulated products (such as food additives and verification of food producers’ health and nutritional claims). By 2011, EFSA had evaluated some 3000 health claims. Regulatory assessments consume 40 per cent of its resources, which like those of other agen-

The European Union’s semi-autonomous agencies 

·  439

cies are severely constrained. In its first decade EFSA published over 2500 scientific assessments and won plaudits from within the food industry for not only bringing consistency to different national inspection regimes but also its scientific rigour. The widespread acceptance of its findings has allowed EFSA to mediate food safety disputes amongst members and assuage public anxiety about food safety (European Commission 2010). However, the separation of risk assessment and risk management means that EFSA can advise the public of hazards but cannot do anything about them. This has, perhaps unfairly, damaged its reputation when fast-developing, high-profile food safety scandals have arisen such as horse meat adulteration in beef products. EFSA believes it is desirable to further harmonize members’ policies but faces considerable national resistance and sensitivity regarding any interference in the food chain and so consequently needs to work more effectively with national authorities (Groenleer 2009). One EFSA success story (in cooperation with ECDC) is the campaign to reduce the dangers of salmonella. Working together these agencies have established food-handling controls and encouraged members to reduce the incidence of salmonella in livestock, especially in poultry. This has resulted in a halving of salmonella cases over five years, with an estimated €1b economic benefit. EFSA also evaluates the safety of GM crops in order to determine whether the EU should allow them to be grown and consumed. In this respect it is caught between two positions, those of European food safety lobby groups, who generally distrust GM foods, and the World Trade Organization, which has ruled that EU restrictions on GM crops are illegal. ESFA has certified the safety of several GM crops, but the EU maintains its ban, while allowing case-by-case exceptions. This, however, undermines EFSA’s effectiveness and authority to stimulate policy change. EFSA’s future challenges arise from the EU being the world’s biggest food importer, much of which comes from countries with poor food control regimes. Under its 2012–16 Science Strategy, EFSA is seeking to address these and other threats arising from climate and demographic change by modifying its expert scientific panels and refining its data collection and risk assessments.

12.4.3 European Centre for Disease Control (ECDC) ECDC identifies, assesses and warns of threats from communicable diseases and other public health risks. ECDC, like EFSA, had a long gestation period, which was ended by a series of scares, most notably over SARS and avian influenza. Similarly, EFSA is designed to supplement rather than supplant national systems, and its responsibilities are confined to risk assessment rather than risk management; accordingly its work has focused more

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on disease control than prevention. Using the European Surveillance System, ECDC collects and analyses data from EU states about 52 communicable diseases which form the basis for its Annual Epidemiological Report, weekly Communicable Disease Threat Reports and a pan-European early-warning system. These cover a wide range of potential health threats from sexually transmitted diseases to tropical diseases, tuberculosis and, more recently, the spreading resistance to antibiotics. ECDC’s assessments are based on the opinions of specialist panels that advise on major epidemic risks, in particular the likelihood of diseases entering the EU from outside. ECDC has a network of European health scientists and coordinates the work of a number of European laboratories working on vaccine production as part of the process of establishing its scientific credibility. These mechanisms promote exchange of best practice, pool scientific knowledge and smooth the provision of TA support and training to countries with weak disease prevention infrastructures. ECDC’s performance has generated mixed reviews. Dealing with its first major pandemic, the H1N1 influenza virus outbreak in 2009–10, ECDC found that being limited to risk assessment meant it could exert little influence over members’ differing decisions concerning the procurement and distribution of vaccines and medicines. ECDC also finds itself caught between the desires of states with underdeveloped health infrastructures that wish ECDC to make recommendations and those with time-honoured medical establishments that see recommendations as a threat to the autonomy of their own disease centres and wish it to remain merely a source of advice. Indeed ECDC’s resources are meagre compared to WHO’s (Chapter 7) and the very national disease control centres upon which it relies for its information. However, ECDC has proven adept at integrating some of Europe’s previously disparate disease control networks and, if it can enhance its reputation for scientific excellence, it has the potential to become the centrepiece of European efforts in this field and possibly extend its influence into disease prevention (Greer 2012).

12.4.4 Other knowledge management institutions The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) assesses the EU drug situation, including associated criminality, drug-related diseases, risks from new addictive substances, tools to improve the monitoring and evaluation of drug policies, and the development of potential solutions. Initially EMCDDA concentrated on devising common reporting frameworks and means to ensure reliable and comparable data, especially the development of five epidemiological indicators. In the

The European Union’s semi-autonomous agencies 

·  441

2000s EMCDDA’s role expanded in line with the diversification of narcotics abuse and EU enlargement. As EMCDDA relies for its information on national centres the inclusion of countries with weak monitoring systems placed strains on its resources, much of which is intended for its annual assessment of the European drug situation. Latterly, EMCDDA’s emphasis has switched to identifying and transferring best practices and establishing a proactive European early-warning system which brings the risks inherent in new substances to public attention. This will be furthered by EMCDDA’s 2013–15 work strategy, which will see it develop tools to assist states diagnose the effectiveness of their drugs regimes and address weaknesses in their data concerning narcotics’ supply. EMCDDA’s success in getting common national approaches to data collection and consolidating EU-wide data has enabled policy makers to identify trends and patterns in drug use and conceive counteracting mechanisms (Griffiths et al. 2011). It also supplies data to agencies such as the UN, Interpol and Europol which are combating the international drugs trade. EMCDDA’s ongoing challenge is to reconcile scientific rigour with political realities, especially where its research reveals poor performance amongst member states. Three agencies in this group, each with a tripartite governance structure involving governments, employers and trade unions, deal with quality of work and training issues. The European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (CEDEFOP) provides information and background policy research on vocational education and some tuition of its own. CEDEFOP is an operational arm of the Leonardo educational programme and, through it, provides opportunities for specialists to meet and exchange experiences, funding study visits with an emphasis on hands-on applications. CEDEFOP develops training modules and improvements to existing schemes and supports several research programmes based in European universities. It is required to submit a triennial report on the state of European occupational education and, as part of its research remit, publishes an academic journal, the European Journal of Vocational Training. CEDEFOP’s European Training Village, a component of its information dissemination programme, provides an online facility where specialists can interact. It also works closely with ETF to provide non-EU states with vocational training support. CEDEFOP’s present priorities are to: zz deal

with the impact of 80m early school leavers without the skills to compete for jobs in the knowledge economy; zz examine skills mismatches and their underlying causes;

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the skills needed in healthcare, tourism, agriculture and nanotechnology; zz stimulate vocational training programmes in support of the green economy; and zz study the skills needs of ageing workforces. CEDEFOP has been consistently criticized for its weak knowledge dissemination mechanism, a lack of focus, poor coordination and poor quality research (European Commission 2003; Eureval 2009). The European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) advises the EU on socioeconomic matters with a view to enriching the quality of life by analysing work–life conditions. Alleviating the effects of Europe’s stagnating economy motivates Eurofound’s 2013–16 work programme, which centres round four themes: work–life balance, industrial relations, social cohesion issues, and (overlapping with EU-OSHA) boosting employment through improving the operation of labour markets. Eurofound’s work is based on two major, periodic pan-­European surveys, each covering some 44 000 individuals, the European Working Conditions Survey and the European Quality of Life Survey. The latter survey has recently examined the impact of the financial crisis on European families, while the former has complemented that work with a review of its impact on the workplace. The European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA) collects and distributes information on occupational health and safety and advises on best practice, in particular those preventative measures that could reduce or eliminate accidents. The agency links together national bodies responsible for health and safety and promulgates its recommendations through them. It also coordinates campaigns to reduce accidents in specific economic sectors and SMEs, especially in high-risk industries including construction, agriculture, fisheries, and the hotel and catering trades. It is currently developing occupational safety standards in anticipation of a future avian influenza pandemic and developing measures to deal with the impact of noise in the workplace. EU-OSHA’s ‘observatory’ identifies emerging trends and new hazards in areas such as biotechnology and the development of new chemicals and is currently studying potential risks to the green economy workforce. In the 2000s, the EU added three knowledge agencies dealing with security. The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EU-ISS) researches major security and defence issues and conducts a transatlantic security dialogue with the US and Canada. Its original mandate was to underpin the EU’s

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emerging common foreign, security and defence policies, but, as Chapter 11 demonstrates, this vision is far from being realized. As part of this responsibility it runs several task forces aimed at providing inputs to EU policy, such as those on the Middle East peace process and on follow-up to the chemical weapons convention. The ubiquity of IT in everyday life, not least its criticality to commercial transactions in the Single Market, prompted the launch of the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA). ENISA collects data, analyses risks and promotes best practice in computer network safety, with the ultimate objective of securing European information networks for both governments and businesses. It responds to requests from policy makers for advice on legislation to counter IT crime or to control the IT environment. ENISA supports national capacities to ensure that members’ IT security is effective, especially in newer EU members attempting to raise their standards. Its current work centres upon assessing and mitigating risks in the evolving IT environment (for example in the emerging technologies of cloud computing and mobile devices) by improving the resilience of electronic communications through enhancing its Critical Information Infrastructure Protection programme. It also encourages exchange of good practice by putting professionals who have experienced similar threats or difficulties into contact with each other. While it was originally meant to become a warning centre which notified members of serious IT threats, this function has not been pursued. Instead its focus is to ensure that there are national centres undertaking this work and that they report incidents to the network. ENISA has two interrelated weaknesses. Critically, its location, Heraklion, is far from the main centres of European IT development and, partly because of this, it has not fostered an effective network of IT security practitioners. The European Police College (Cepol) came into being two years after Europol, driven by similar influences (see section 12.5.1). Cepol, which has a small budget, is associated with the British Metropolitan Police College and draws on its facilities. Cepol has built a network of senior European police officers, educates them about EU institutions, organizes joint training and shares research across national forces. It has proved useful in assisting members police major European events (such as G7/8/20 meetings), where best practice and past experiences are pooled. However, given the alternatives (e.g. Europol) and the fact that other EU agencies include an educational role, the need for a separate training institution has been questioned. Three newcomers are relatively small, are still in a formative stage and have very little track record to assess. The European Institute of Innovation

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and Technology (EIT) aims to encourage EU technological innovation and is particularly concerned with identifying applications for ground-breaking technologies and boosting competitiveness by developing an entrepreneurial mindset which will get inventions out of the laboratory and into the marketplace. Though the organization got off to a slow start, with low expectations, it soon promoted three knowledge and innovation communities (KICs), networks of researchers, investors, businesses and governments, to work on new technologies. By 2012 EIT was partnering some 200 entrepreneurial groups, providing up to 25 per cent of their finance (€80m), with additional funding coming from governments, other EU sources and the private sector. EIT’s work has gathered momentum under the Europe 2020 (see Chapter 11) and related Horizon 2020 initiatives, which place innovation and entrepreneurship at their heart. Pending legislative agreement by EP and the Council of Ministers, the Commission is set to increase its annual support for pioneering technologies from €300m to €2.8b. In addition to reinforcing the efforts of existing KICs covering climate change, integrated computer technology and sustainable energy, some of this money will underpin investment driven by six further networks identified in EIT’s Strategic Innovation Agenda (2014–20). KICs on sustainable food supply chains, sustainable use of raw materials and healthy living/active ageing will commence in 2014, while others concerned with urban mobility, value-added manufacturing and smart, secure societies will start in 2018. The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) was created in 2007 and incorporates the mandate of the former European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. FRA provides objective data to EU institutions and member states about the best way to uphold EU citizens’ basic rights. Its research identifies threats to the rights outlined in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and highlights good practice. FRA does not deal with individual complaints but does promote awareness of the Charter’s existence and advises on obtaining redress. FRA maintains close relations with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and COE (see Chapter 13), and its present agenda centres upon racism and xenophobia, data protection, discrimination, and the rights of children and the victims of crime. The incorporation of stronger gender equality provisions not only in the Charter but also as an EU ‘value’ established in the Lisbon Treaty reflected pressure for the issue to be integrated or ‘mainstreamed’ into all EU activities. Following a protracted conception the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) became operational in 2009. EIGE’s tasks are to develop methodologies to collect and analyse comparable data on gender issues, underline best practices and draw attention to gender equality problems.

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EIGE’s mid-term work programme, which runs until 2015, emphasizes mainstreaming gender in everything from labour law to climate change. It will, inter alia, examine gender-based violence, involve men in gender equality programmes and develop toolkits to measure progress. For example, EIGE has developed a Gender Equality Index, a composite measure which records the multifaceted nature of gender inequality against which countries can assess their progress. Assessments of EIGE suggest that, like UN Women (Box 6.1), the agency has the potential to unite the EU’s previously disparate and poorly funded lines of activity on women’s issues. Nonetheless, its small size could mean that administrative and reporting tasks might drain resources from its policy work. In the 1990s the women’s constituency had pressed for a political body to oversee gender activities, but EIGE’s emergence as a technical and knowledge management institution, plus the relatively weak involvement of women’s organizations in EIGE’s governance, has raised concerns that it seeks to manage the status quo rather than develop cutting-edge and empowering political agendas (Hubert and Stratigaki 2011).

12.5 Knowledge management institutions with operational responsibilities Rather than merely managing knowledge for the purpose of informing others, the agencies in this small group apply their accumulated knowledge to support operational activities, with Europol being by far the largest. Beginning in the 1990s, the EU began to develop a complex legal and institutional infrastructure to combat cross-border crime under the rubric of justice and home affairs, starting with Europol, which was then followed in the 2000s by Frontex and Eurojust (see section 12.7.3).

12.5.1 European Police Office (Europol) Europol’s creation reflected the need for greater cooperation between law enforcement agencies as internal border controls were relaxed following the arrival of the Single Market. In 1992 the European Drugs Unit was given a narrow remit to combat organized drug crime. The Europol Convention (1996) then enlarged its responsibilities to include people trafficking, smuggling radioactive materials, terrorism, money laundering and cross-border vehicle crime, and Europol formally came into being in 1998. Since then it has been further expanded to cover counterfeiting, credit card fraud and child pornography. With Interpol already coordinating the fight against international crime, the need for an EU body was not readily apparent, particularly since the

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structure chosen to support Europol at the country level duplicated that of Interpol. Like Interpol (Chapter 13), Europol cannot make arrests or initiate investigations, although it can request members’ forces to commence them. It similarly coordinates their law enforcement agencies by acting as a clearing house for criminal intelligence, analysing trends, facilitating information exchange and strengthening cooperation. A key difference between the two organizations is that, while Interpol deals with individual criminals, in the main Europol deals with networks of cross-border criminality. Central to Europol’s work is its Operational Centre and several criminal databases, the biggest of which is the European Information System (EIS). In 2013, EIS contained details of 187 000 criminal acts and 48 000 known or suspected criminals and was searched around 110 000 times (although this is a fraction of Interpol’s 1b searches, see Chapter 13). Europol’s Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA) allows law enforcement agencies to access Europol databases and exchange operational messages (over 410 000 in 2012 in support of 16 000 operations). The use of SIENA far exceeds Interpol’s equivalent activity as a direct result of Europol’s focus on international criminal gangs with the concomitant need to coordinate on-theground activities. In 2012 Europol provided technical or forensic support to its members on nearly 600 occasions, mainly to supply evidence on international criminality. Unlike most other semi-autonomous agencies Europol reports not to the Commission but to the Council of Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs, which also appoints the Director. The passage of the 2010 Europol Council Decision strengthened EP’s involvement in Europol governance, especially with regard to the adoption and implementation of the annual budget. Authority is delegated to a Management Board, which meets biannually. It has one representative from each member state and one from the Commission and takes decisions based on a two-thirds majority. In 2012, Europol had just over 800 staff, including 145 liaison officers seconded from law enforcement authorities and, for the EU, a unique concentration of 100 law enforcement data analysts. Assessments of Europol’s efforts to build cooperation amongst law enforcement agencies observe that it has been ‘difficult, slow and ineffective’ (Busuioc and Groenleer 2011). Initially Europol’s impact was undermined because it focused on developing technical systems to improve information exchange without dealing with the distrust and reluctance that prevented information from being shared between law enforcement agencies. Police forces were also cautious about dealing with a body created through a political initiative in contrast to Interpol’s purely technical origins. These concerns

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hindered Europol’s ability to demonstrate its worth to its members and reinforced their preference to rely on existing bilateral initiatives or multilateral agencies (House of Lords 2008a). National agencies have slowly moderated their reservations over Europol, not least as a result of investigative successes to which the organization has contributed. Indeed a recent independent evaluation pointed to very high satisfaction ratings with Europol services and the added value resulting from its network of liaison officers and criminal analysts (Disley et al. 2012). Nevertheless, acceptance of Europol remains uneven, and there are flaws that need addressing. While Europol has intensified its anti-terrorism activities, to date its influence has been peripheral, because much anti-terrorism intelligence is handled by national intelligence agencies which still distrust Europol and prefer to work bilaterally (Pollak and Riekmann 2008). Furthermore Europol’s EIS database can only be accessed by 16 members, and therefore improving the interconnectivity of members’ data exchange services is a priority. Thus, Europol is pulled in two directions. Member states wish to limit its powers to intervene in national policing activities, while national police forces expect Europol to prove its worth at an operational level.

12.5.2 Others combining knowledge and operational activities The Research Executive Agency (REA) allocates and manages EU research grants in the applied sciences to both academics and SMEs on subjects such as space research, ageing, environmental degradation and energy security. REA is managing nearly 10 000 projects worth €6.4b under the Seventh Framework for Research, Technological Development and Demonstration Activities (FP7). As with the work of EIT, REA funding is designed to tackle societal challenges and bolster EU employment and competitiveness. Though FP7 expired in 2013 the time-bound REA will function until at least 2017 to manage the projects. Incorporating functions from WEU and working closely with its successor, EDA (see section 12.7.1), as well as with the European Space Agency, the European Union Satellite Centre (EU Satcen) supports the EU’s common foreign, security and defence policies by supplying and analysing data from earth observation satellites and providing a research and training capacity in satellite imagery. Satcen monitors regional conflicts, failed states, humanitarian tragedies and arms treaty verification activities. It also provides EU members’ armed forces with a satellite capacity which can be used in joint training exercises. While it works for the EU and backstops activities such as those of the combined naval force combating piracy off the Somali coast (see

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Box 16.2), it is also mandated to cooperate with NATO, OSCE and the UN on peacekeeping and humanitarian issues through tasks such as monitoring on-the-ground activities in Libya in 2011 and large refugee concentrations. It also supports the fight against organized crime by providing satellite facilities to Europol and Interpol and works closely with the Galileo Supervisory Authority (EU-GNSS, see section 12.7.4).

12.6 Regulatory agencies for commerce Some of these regulatory agencies, directly or indirectly, certify specified commercial products, thereby authorizing their sale and/or legal protection throughout the Union, while others regulate certain economic sectors at a pan-European level. All have some normative functions, including proposing policy changes to the Commission in their area of expertise and providing some networking or knowledge dissemination facilities, while their operational work, especially certification, depends on the submissions they receive. Their existence prevents different national certification structures and approval regimes from becoming non-tariff barriers to trade and helps to nourish the competitiveness and innovation that sustain the Single Market. Moreover, providing businesses with pan-European intellectual property (IP) protection, product certification and permits is more cost-effective than if they had to apply country by country. Nevertheless, these agencies rely heavily on governments to support their work, and the relationships and effectiveness of the provided services differ widely. The agencies have real regulatory or quasi-regulatory powers. Exceptionally OHIM and the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) issue licences independently of the Commission. The other bodies do not grant licences, but their expertise and the fact the Commission must take their recommendations into account mean that in practice their advice is heeded. Moreover, because the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), CPVO, EASA, EMA and OHIM derive a significant proportion of their income from fees, they have a measure of independence from the Commission. As can be seen from Table 12.1 there are also five agencies within this group, created since 2010, that coordinate or oversee national regulators. Given users’ favourable evaluations of the early regulators there is some confidence that these later agencies will also eventually contribute substantially to improving the functioning of their markets. Some have yet to develop full work programmes, and the three dealing with financial markets are touched upon in Chapter 9 (section 9.3). The other two coordinate regulatory matters in two areas of the Single Market that have proved difficult to manage: energy and electronic communications (see section 12.6.4).

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12.6.1 European Medicines Agency (EMA) EMA was created in 1995 to centralize the EU approval process for human and veterinary medicines by providing the Commission with scientific opinions about their safety and reliability. EMA is particularly concerned with the health effects of pharmaceuticals and assessing veterinary medicines to ensure that they pose no threat to the human food chain. Formally EMA merely advises the Commission as to whether it can award a licence. In practice EMA’s position is pre-eminent because of the highly specialized nature of its work and the fact that national regulators are closely involved in its decisions, product testing and the procedure of final approval. EMA recommendations are based on an extensive testing process, resulting on average in 250 000 pages of documentation for each pharmaceutical product (Gehring and Kraphol 2007). The findings are passed to the Commission, which in turn convenes its own Standing Committee on Medicinal Products for Human Use. This committee comprises scientific experts from member states, who finally decide if a product should be licensed, and is part of the comitology process (see Box 11.8). It has not rejected an EMA recommendation for over ten years. Once a product is approved it can be marketed throughout the European Economic Area. EMA also keeps approved medicaments under review, monitoring and when necessary revoking licences if serious side-effects are reported. Not all drugs fall within EMA’s remit; for example, if companies want to market in specific states they need only register their products with the relevant national authorities. Providing scientific advice to the Commission is EMA’s foremost role, but it also offers best-practice advice to the pharmaceutical industry to improve testing programmes, develop scientific protocols for evaluating and monitoring the use of medicines, provide data on pharmaceutical research and, when possible, help in the development of new or improved drugs by fast-tracking some applications. EMA’s structure is typical of the commercial regulatory agencies. It operates under the control of a 35-member Board, which has representatives appointed by each state, two each from the Commission and EP, and four civil society members representing patients and medical and veterinary organizations. State representatives are normally heads of the corresponding national agency for authorizing medicines. The civil society members are nominated through a consultation process between the European Council and EP. European Economic Area members appoint observers to the Board, which usually meets quarterly and adopts decisions by a two-thirds majority. One of seven technical committees assesses a product submitted for ­certification. Committee membership is again made up of representatives from national

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agencies plus representatives of patients, consumers and healthcare professionals. A network of some 4500 specialists provides information and test data to support the Secretariat’s work. EMA is widely lauded as one of the most effective EU agencies (Groenleer 2009), eliciting consistently positive client feedback. This is frequently attributed to the fact that almost 85 per cent of its income is derived from industry fees, thus affording it a degree of independence from EU processes. The agency’s variable charging mechanism makes it cheaper to license cutting-edge therapies with narrow applications, a group of products for which EMA’s one-time process is more cost-effective than multiple national registrations. EMA’s ongoing challenge, especially given its reliance on fees, is to balance industry demands to release new drugs quickly against the need for careful testing to ensure that lives are not endangered.

12.6.2 The Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM) While patent rights are the European Patent Office’s responsibility (Chapter 10, section 10.10), OHIM assesses, registers and protects EU trademarks and design rights. It provides equivalent protection to that accorded under the WIPO-negotiated Madrid Agreements (Table 10.5), to which the EU subscribes, with WIPO acting as a conduit for some applications. OHIM’s registration protocol differs from that of patents, as any prior national or international trademark takes precedence over a new application, provided its listing has been maintained in the appropriate jurisdiction. Once an application has been made it is published in the Community Trade Marks Register, and other trademark owners have a three-month window to oppose it. OHIM decisions can be appealed to an internal Board of Appeal, which also considers claims for trademark and design infringements, or to the ECJ General Court, which is its final appellate body. OHIM is the largest EU agency and is self-financed. Its workload, like that of EMA, has far exceeded expectations. In its first four years, applications were quadruple the projected rate and necessitated a fivefold expansion in staff. OHIM processed its one-millionth application in 2011, and in 2012 received a record 108 000 applications. By mid-2013, OHIM had registered 917 000 trademarks and design patents. Despite complaints about its lengthy appeals process, OHIM provides a service rated highly by clients. Furthermore, the advantages deriving from applications being made in any EU language, with the trademark being valid in all members, makes OHIM’s system more userfriendly than EPO’s.

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One side-effect of OHIM’s success is that its fee income has considerably exceeded expenditure, resulting in an operating profit of €80m in 2008. The agency’s financial independence places its member-driven Board in a strong position, and when the Commission demanded that it reduce its fees this was met with opposition from those national trademark offices that were wary of a more competitive OHIM threatening their own income. However, fees were halved in 2009, and the net profit is now around €25m annually. OHIM’s relationship with and links to national authorities are critical, as OHIM licences and appeals have to consider all prior registrations in all jurisdictions. This remains a major constraint, as not all national systems are efficient or effective, and so some of OHIM’s profits have been set aside in a €50m Cooperation Fund to assist national offices in 17 members upgrade their services. A further initiative, the Convergence Programme, is aimed at standardizing classification systems and other common benchmarks that will improve the overall processing and examination of applications in both OHIM and members’ systems.

12.6.3 European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) ECHA helps implement EU legislation which requires meticulous testing of all chemical products to assess their impact on human health and the environment. ECHA assists companies to comply with this legislation, makes information about chemicals publicly available, advances the safe use of chemicals and identifies and seeks to phase out hazardous products. Perhaps ECHA’s most noteworthy contribution is overseeing EU’s Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) process. Adopted in 2006 REACH responded to worries about new chemical compounds being marketed with little knowledge about their potential dangers. Thus, the regulation seeks to balance the competitiveness of the EU chemicals industry against its human health and environmental consequences. REACH has established procedures for accumulating and assessing information about chemicals, their properties and associated hazards, which involve chemical manufacturers or importers submitting a two-part ‘dossier’ to obtain regulatory approval. A dossier’s first part describes the intrinsic properties of a specific chemical, including all instructions relevant to its use, while the second part evaluates its environmental and health impacts. ECHA relies on national agencies to evaluate specific substances and has drawn on existing OECD standards to define the hazards posed by certain chemical classes. Because of the immensity of the task of evaluating thousands

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of chemicals the most common ones are being given priority, while OECD is leading an industry-wide effort to assemble the relevant data (see Chapter 10, section 10.1). ECHA makes recommendations to the Commission about whether the risks linked to a chemical can be managed. Those deemed unmanageable can be banned or their use restricted. ECHA has no enforcement responsibilities, leaving this to national authorities, which must ensure that exacting national legislation exists to detect and punish non-compliance. However, it does host an Enforcement Forum, which coordinates national activities, harmonizes enforcement, shares best practices and liaises with the chemicals industry. Given its short history it is too soon to offer a comprehensive overview of ECHA’s performance. Nevertheless, the early signs are promising, with 5000 products already evaluated. Because its standards apply both to EU manufactured chemicals and to imports, ECHA is shifting existing global and national norms on chemical safety (Layton 2008) and in its own words ‘is becoming the world’s leading regulatory authority on the safe use of chemicals’.

12.6.4 Other regulatory agencies With a fraction of the budget and employees (Table 12.1) the two remaining commercial regulators are considerably smaller but, nevertheless, perform important functions for their respective industries. The EU plant breeding and seed propagation industry employs 50 000 persons and has a turnover of €7b, while the EU fishing fleet is the world’s second largest and employs some 100 000 persons. The Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) provides IP protection to new plant varieties (see Box 14.2). The registration process is similar to that of other IP agencies. Applications can be filed either with national plant inspection facilities or directly with CPVO, after which a plant undergoes physical inspection to establish its novelty, distinctive features, uniformity and stability for breeding purposes. CPVO provides policy guidance to applicants, runs a Board of Appeal for submissions that are denied and assists IP owners establish their rights. By 2013, some 46 000 applications had been made, and they are now running at a rate of some 3000 per year. In total, 35 000 community plant variety rights have been granted, and around 21 000 remain in force, a fifth of which were granted to non-EU concerns, making it the most extensive IP system of its kind. CPVO’s services are rated highly by its clients, but again a lengthy appeals process is problematic. The EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and its associated norms seek to sustain a competitive fishing industry, while conserving fish stocks and limit-

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ing damage to marine ecosystems. CFP has been a controversial policy. For example, one (now revoked) regulation demanded that species be thrown back into the sea if their quota limits were reached, but by the time fish were extracted from nets they were already dead; thus the regulation served no conservation purpose. The industry and scientists have hotly disputed the sustainability of EU quotas that limit the catch of national fishing fleets, and quotas have caused considerable disagreement between states. Until 2012 CFP quotas generally favoured the industry, which therefore meant that to be effective they had to be tightly enforced. While rules and quotas are agreed at an EU level, implementation and enforcement were left to national agencies, many of which ignored or flexibly interpreted the rules to placate domestic fishing interests. These problems have been exacerbated by vessels operating far from sight, resulting in a classic public goods problem whereby fishermen have individual incentives to maximize their catch and their incomes to the detriment of overall fish stocks. Thus the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) was established as a response to persistent failures to enforce CFP. By coordinating national fisheries control and undertaking independent inspections and surveillance of their activities EFCA ensures CFP rules are respected and uniformly applied. Approximately half of EFCA’s resources are devoted to operational coordination, while much of the rest is allocated to capacity building (a key component of EFCA’s current work programme). EFCA’s highest priorities are the recovery of North Sea and Baltic cod stocks and Eastern Atlantic/ Mediterranean blue-fin tuna stocks. Pending formation of joint inspection teams using EFCA-assigned vessels, initial activity has focused on developing interstate cooperation to police fisheries more effectively through joint deployment plans, especially in controlling rampant illegal fishing for bluefin tuna in the Mediterranean. In addition EFCA is developing a satellite system for monitoring the activities of fishing fleets in cooperation with EU Satcen. Allowing for its limited resources and the politically fraught nature of fishing, a recent independent evaluation of EFCA described its performance as ‘promising’ (EFCA 2012), even though EFCA is still struggling to engender a culture of compliance. Many stakeholders noted shortcomings in EFCA’s systems, including the continued absence of systematic data on member states. Equally, however, many of EFCA’s perceived failings derive from the fundamental flaws in CFP outlined above. Many specialists still opine that the whole European fishing regime is ‘inefficient, ineffective, complex and does not produce the desired result’ and needs fundamental reform (UK House of Lords enquiry, 18 January 2008).

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Two regulatory agencies came into operation in 2010 and 2011 and are still in the process of developing their work programmes. The Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) supports the Commission’s oversight of the broadband and digital telecommunications markets by delivering opinions on draft national regulation, advising on electronic communications policies such as roaming charges, and encouraging common acceptance of best practice to provide a smooth European operating environment, for example in broadband interconnectivity. The Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) has regulatory oversight of the Single Market in electrical power and natural gas supplies. It assists and advises the Commission by inter alia participating in the development of cross-border regulation, taking decisions on specific situations relating to entry into the market and assembling data to assess whether markets are being manipulated.

12.7 Operational agencies Although these agencies engage in some programme activities they mainly apply resources or technologies to achieve their objectives. At one end of the spectrum are bodies such as the Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union, which looks after the translation needs of EU bodies, a mundane but important task in an organization with 23 working languages. At the other are agencies whose activities bring them into contact with some of the most sensitive areas of high politics, such as the four that work in the area of defence and security. These are domains where competence resides with member states rather than the EU. Thus they tend to possess governance structures that allow states to keep them under tight control.

12.7.1 European Defence Agency (EDA) As Chapter 11 revealed, the EU’s efforts to develop and deliver common foreign, security and defence policies have been beset by difficulties, not least the absence of interoperable national forces and a unified EU defence force. Thus, EDA’s overarching aim is to improve European defence capabilities by bringing greater coherence to defence cooperation and major procurement activities. It also provides the European Council with a policy perspective on future defence needs and how to plan for them. Most of EDA’s work is forward-looking, but it has some involvement with current military activity. For example, from 2009 EDA ran a series of helicopter training programmes for NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) because members’ helicopter crews were inexperienced in the terrain encountered in Afghanistan. This allowed the deployment of 76 additional crews, thereby strengthening ISAF’s capabilities.

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Given their national strategic importance, defence industries are specifically exempted from the Single Market. The consequence of this is that defence procurement and defence industries within the EU have remained fragmented, with a plethora of different national standards and designs. They are unable to achieve economies of scale, and the result has been more costly military equipment and a defence industry that has struggled to compete globally. Much of EDA’s work is devoted to overcoming this fragmentation. For example, EDA’s Effective Procurement Methods project is helping members to identify common requirements and foster cooperation amongst those willing to pool their procurement activities. Although defence industries are unlikely to be brought within the Single Market in the foreseeable future, the development of agreed standards and cross-national consortia or corporations are steps towards market liberalization. At any one time EDA is sponsoring some 40 defence research projects. Presently its Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) programme has developed and deployed a mobile laboratory which allows on-the-spot forensic examination of IED incidents, thereby providing feedback to reduce the impact of further attacks. As regards new weapons systems EDA is supporting European efforts to counter US dominance through coordinating initial work on heavy-lift military helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles and air-to-air refuelling systems. EDA has some military and non-military programme functions. It is harmonizing military airworthiness requirements so that future joint projects do not have to accommodate several different national systems and, in cooperation with EU-GNSS (see section 12.7.4), is developing improved coordination of maritime security, including the use of civilian satellites for surveillance. It also maintains some centralized monitoring systems, such as the European Defence Standardization Information System, and supports specialist networks, for example on cyber-defence and emerging technologies. Reflecting the sovereign sensitivity of defence and security, EDA falls under the direct responsibility of the European Council. Unlike all the other agencies its Steering Board operates at a high governmental level, being composed of Ministers of Defence and chaired by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, with an Executive Director reporting to the Board. Thus it is an intergovernmental agency with significant autonomy from the Commission, to which it only grants observer status. Members are also free to opt in or out of many activities and contribute to them only as they see fit. In fact Denmark is not a member at all. This is particularly true of weapons development, where consortia of members are established to see favoured

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systems through to completion. The other two EU defence agencies, EU-ISS and EU Satcen, report through and assist EDA. The 2011 operations in Libya, where US air-to-air refuelling support was needed because European tankers were incompatible, showed how reliant European forces are on US technology. An integrated EU force remains an aspiration, because there is still considerable disagreement about the type of integration, who should participate and on what basis (D. Keohane and Valasek 2008). Throughout, EDA has found itself awkwardly straddling competing logics, notably between intergovernmentalism and supranationality and the debate between Europeanists and Atlanticists (see Chapter 13, section 13.6). Almost nine-tenths of defence R&D expenditure in the EU is national, and most armaments are domestically produced. EDA’s structure, dominated by defence ministries and the European Council, institutionalizes national sovereignty and poses a significant barrier to the development of a more integrated approach to EU defence. EDA has developed a Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement, but members are free to purchase their military hardware anywhere. This then pits Europeanists against Atlanticists. The Europeanists look for defence to be provided by EU forces and wish to limit joint defence programmes to the EU. Atlanticists are more oriented towards NATO and welcome non-EU involvement in weapons research, development, procurement and acquisition. The reality is that the EU’s defence capacity is secondary to NATO’s and partially integrated into overall NATO strategy. F.-C. Chang (2011) concludes that EDA cannot achieve the development of integrated EU forces without a major change in members’ attitudes towards sovereignty over defence and security matters. Moreover, he speculates that diminishing European defence budgets, small-scale R&D development and the protection of national defence monopolies pose significant challenges for EDA.

12.7.2 European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States (Frontex) Governance of the EU’s frontiers dates to the development of the 1960s customs union. However, following the introduction of free movement within the Schengen area (see Chapter 11) and the growing treatment of migration as a security issue, EU states (with the exception of Ireland and the UK, which did not join Schengen) felt it necessary to establish a single external border control and apply common standards. This was given greater

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importance when enlargement to 27 members moved the external frontiers eastwards. Frontex assists its members to promote integrated border management by: zz keeping

the EU border situation under constant surveillance, undertaking risk assessments and anticipating problems; zz providing training to border guards and developing common training standards; zz coordinating and conducting joint operations between members using their staff and equipment; zz developing and deploying pooled resources such as its European Border Guard teams and jointly returning illegal immigrants to their home countries; and zz establishing working arrangements with countries from which many migrants originate. During negotiations over Frontex’s mandate there were profound disagreements between those, such as the Commission, who wanted a strong centralized agency and others who envisaged stronger cooperation between national agencies (Neal 2009). Eventually the latter model prevailed, because the relevant states used their voting strength in the European Councils. Consequently, Frontex’s effectiveness depends mostly on national immigration authorities, with its joint border operations having only a minor impact. In 2011 states turned back over 141 000 persons (of which 42 per cent came from Arab Spring countries and 38 per cent crossed Greek land borders). Frontex resources are such that its interventions at land borders only last on average for three months, so it succeeds in sealing borders temporarily only for them to reopen when it has moved on. Thus it was responsible for fewer than 1500 returnees that year. It has had far more success in its joint marine operations, which intercepted some 60 000 asylum seekers in 2011. Part of Frontex’s remit is capacity building to support border operations. Presently this activity involves provision of training, but in future an equipment pool is foreseen that can be mobilized quickly to reinforce weak spots in European frontier protection. However, further work and financing are needed to bring the concept to fruition. A decade on from its foundation, the goal of integrated border management remains distant. Substantial differences in members’ systems persist and, until all countries are fully committed to Frontex, the sense of ad hoc reaction rather than systematic planning will prevail. The implementation of integrated immigration and border controls was bolstered by the arrival of two new bodies, which became operational in 2012.

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An Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems manages extensive databases that provide information on foreign visitors, visas and fingerprints, thereby making it easier to identify illegal or previously returned immigrants. The European Asylum Support Office supports the development of a common EU asylum system by coordinating national policies and activities to ensure different members’ systems treat cases similarly. It also assists those members that experience sudden surges in asylum seekers, such as was the case in Malta in 2007 when, even with Frontex support, national facilities were overwhelmed.

12.7.3 European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit (Eurojust) Eurojust is designed to stimulate and improve the coordination of national prosecuting authorities by rendering mutual legal assistance in cases involving serious cross-border crimes. Like Europol it falls under the authority of the Council of Ministers and not the Commission. Eurojust’s key staff are approximately 50 seconded officials from member states with law and order backgrounds who maintain and exchange records on ongoing and potential criminal prosecutions. Eurojust complements European police cooperation, but unlike Europol it is purely operational and responds to requests from states seeking assistance with their investigations. For example, one of Eurojust’s most important functions is to provide logistical support for international judicial cooperation. In 2011, it arranged over 200 coordination meetings between judicial representatives from different states and provided the framework and some funding for 33 joint investigation teams (each established for a fixed period by agreement of those member states investigating a specific crime). Eurojust has no power to initiate its own investigations; nevertheless it can ask national authorities to commence prosecutions, and legislation exists to create a European Public Prosecutor (see Chapter 11, section 11.4.2), which would then give it the resources to do so. Since Eurojust had its operational capabilities strengthened by a 2008 European Council decision, cooperation between it and national authorities has improved. The organization has a reasonably strong record in dealing with the 1500 requests for assistance made by states annually, a perception reinforced by the US decision to enter into a cooperation agreement with Eurojust in preference to bilateral arrangements. By bringing together representatives from different legal systems, Eurojust also provides a facility for interpreting their complexities and finding ways to overcome the many barriers to cooperation or convoluted procedures, some of which persist. Thus, attempts to create a common European Criminal Record to hold details of those convicted of cross-border crimes have faltered over several defini-

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tional and data problems. Similarly, members categorize crimes differently, as some have no criminal records systems, while others hold their records for a limited time. Frequently, therefore, Eurojust has to start from the beginning each time it investigates a suspect. Different legal systems, insufficient knowledge of legal standards, various levels of legal probity and the conservatism of the legal profession are also serious problems. For example, Eurojust’s effectiveness is impeded by seconded officials having different degrees of delegation from their national authorities. Moreover it is in a similar position to Europol, as not all members trust it sufficiently to involve it in sensitive cases such as national security. Initially developing cooperation with Europol also proved difficult, but this seems largely to have been overcome. Europol joined 89 Eurojust coordination meetings in 2011, and access to Europol data, originally constrained by member-imposed restrictions, has progressed.

12.7.4 Other operational agencies The EU, in conjunction with the European Space Agency (ESA), has decided to install a European satellite navigation system (Galileo). The science behind this work and the delivery of the system is being undertaken by ESA and a number of specialized bodies (Chapter 15). The European Global Navigation Satellite System Supervisory Agency (EU-GNSS) advises the Commission on satellite-based navigation and on the commercial exploitation of the system. It opened the first of two ground control stations in 2010. Two satellites have been in orbit since 2011, and the aim is for the system to become operational by 2015, with 18 of the final complement of 30 satellites in orbit. The first two satellites are being used for a new European aircraft navigation system (see Chapter 16, section 16.6) and represent the initial commercial use of the Galileo system. Since the system has governmental and military applications, rigorous security specifications and data encryption will be needed, so EU-GNSS carries out this work in cooperation with EU Satcen. Security further involves protecting the system from any external threats and ensuring all components are robust. As the system comes online, EU-GNSS will license users, assign frequencies, collect revenues and market the commercial potential for Galileo (for example in agriculture and road transport). In 2002 the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) was fully incorporated into the Commission’s Energy Directorate; however, one remnant, the Euratom Supply Agency, survived as an independent agency. The Supply Agency has to ensure that all states have equal access to nuclear fuels to protect the viability of the EU nuclear industry and the 28 per cent

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of EU energy that the industry supplies. The organization acts as a joint purchaser for all nuclear fuels purchased by EU operators (17 800 tons in 2011) and can refuse to sign contracts to ensure diversification in supply sources. It also has first refusal to purchase nuclear fuels and other materials produced in EU states, and for this purpose states deposit a capital reserve with the agency, which it then uses to purchase supplies and charge users through a revolving fund. The agency recommends strategies to reduce the industry’s vulnerability to individual suppliers, maintains stockpiles, and also monitors markets to make sure they are not rigged. Since 2008 this work has been stepped up through the creation of the Nuclear Market Observatory. As a secondary function the Supply Agency monitors national transactions for the conversion, enrichment and fabrication of nuclear materials. Despite the potential for nuclear power to help meet EU emissions targets, following the Japanese Fukushima disaster and the consequential closure of German nuclear reactors a decline in the amount of uranium purchased by the agency is projected. The European Training Foundation works closely with CEDEFOP (see section 12.4.4) and is part of the EU’s external relations activities. It provides advice and TA to developing and transition countries looking to reform learning, vocational training and employment systems. It also recommends suitable projects for the Commission’s support and disbursed some €20m in TA during 2011. Key regions in which it is involved are the Balkans and those Mediterranean littoral countries impacted by the Arab Spring, where there is a need to improve employment opportunities. While not the main subject of this chapter, the majority of executive agencies (see section 12.1 and Table 12.1) also fall into the category of operational agencies. EACEA is described in more detail than the others to give a better understanding of their work, but all are disbursing funds earmarked in the 2007–13 EU budget.

12.7.5 European Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA) EACEA runs several programmes concerning education, culture, youth and the media, with a total value of €3.1b. Its activities were previously subcontracted to third-party administrators, but it was considered more costeffective to bring the work back ‘in-house’. It also maintains a website with up-to-date information on members’ educational systems. It reports to three Directorates-General – Education and Culture, the EuropeAid Corporate Office and Information Society and Media.

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The various EU educational programmes have grandiose titles, which in the tradition of EU nomenclature are relatively incomprehensible to the uninitiated and do not impart any sense of their mandate. The overarching programme is known as Socrates, within which there is a concentration on language teaching and EU citizenship. Other EACEA-managed activities cover youth exchange visits, voluntary service activities, cultural exchanges and citizenship initiatives – such as the town twinning project. It also supports NGOs that promote the EU and provide it with favourable public relations. Its media activities encourage European audiovisual industries such as film making or EU participation in film festivals and support training in the cinematographic and television industries. EACEA approves the projects to be funded by each grant programme. It develops the conditions and procedures for requesting grants, assesses applications, selects projects, negotiates agreements with the selected organizations, monitors progress, manages each programme’s finances and when appropriate visits projects. At a system-wide level it reports to the Commission on results and significant issues and contracts with external bodies to evaluate each programme.

12.7.6 Other executive agencies The Consumers Health and Food Executive Agency manages the €320m EU public health programme, which is intended to improve European citizens’ physical and mental well-being and reduce inequalities in treatment standards. It also supports mechanisms for a rapid response to health threats. The Executive Agency for Competitiveness and Innovation is responsible for implementing and managing €3.6b worth of EU programmes aimed at encouraging a wider uptake of renewable energy sources, and more efficient use of energy in transport, commerce and the home. The European Research Council has operational functions similar to REA’s (see section 12.5.2) and oversees the €7.5b EU grant programme for cutting-edge scientific research. FURTHER READING

Andoura, S. and P. Timmerman (2008), ‘Governance of the EU: the reform debate on European agencies reignited’, Working Paper No. 19, European Policy Institutes Network. [Excellent overview of the origin, definition and decision-making processes of EU agencies with key criticisms and an overview of the Commission’s 2008 reform proposals] Busuioc, M., M. Groenleer and J. Trondal (eds) (2012), The Agency Phenomenon in the European Union: Emergence, Institutionalisation and Everyday Decision-Making, Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. [Explains the varied roots of the agencies, their relationships with EU bodies, governance and accountability]

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Chiti, E. (2009), ‘An important part of the EU’s institutional machinery: features, problems and perspectives of European agencies’, Common Market Law Review, 46 (5), 1395–1442. [Examines the agencies’ powers, organizational architecture and their relationships with national bodies and wider networks of global governance] Dehousse, R. (1997), ‘Regulation by networks in the European Community: the role of European agencies’, Journal of European Public Policy, 4 (2), 246–61. [Examines the origins and powers of European agencies concerned with the Single Market] Ekelund, H. (2012), ‘Making sense of the “agency programme” in post-Lisbon Europe: mapping European agencies’, Central European Journal of Public Policy, 6 (1), 26–49. [Outlines the history, evolution and classificatory schemes for understanding EU agencies, and updates the story in a post-Lisbon context] Groenleer, M. (2009), The Autonomy of European Union Agencies: A Comparative Study of Institutional Development, Delft, The Netherlands: Eburon. [A useful overview with case studies of EFSA, EMA, EEA and Europol]

13 Political alliances and security The largest group of IOs by function comprises those with broadly political objectives, frequently including provision for ensuring security. Besides the UN and EU (Chapters 5 and 11), there are around 40 IOs whose mandates revolve around: zz promotion

of political unity, identity, cooperation and, sometimes, regional integration; zz maintaining peace and security through collective defence agreements, diplomatic dispute mediation, military intervention or peacekeeping; zz humanitarian activities including peacebuilding; and zz fostering sustainable development by lowering commercial barriers, capturing economies of scale from larger markets and promoting democratic governance. Virtually all the IOs in this chapter have founding treaties that enshrine the principle of sovereign non-­intervention and that proscribe activities that infringe upon sovereignty. Often this reflects their beginnings during a period when many newly formed or re-­emergent states clung jealously to the sovereignty for which they had fought. These IOs are diverse, encompassing mixed memberships, and they exhibit wildly differing levels of formality, institutionalization and success. Nevertheless, some general observations are possible. First, Interpol apart, membership is restricted, with the organizations bunched on the right-­hand side of Figure 1.1. A few are trans-­regional but, predominantly, political and security IOs relate to a geographical region or sub-­region (see Box  1.4). Second (staying with Figure 1.1), their mandates are relatively comprehensive. Their responsibilities have tended to grow, and this partly reflects the broadening of the concept of security from a preoccupation with states towards protecting individuals. To cope with this many have fabricated subsidiary socioeconomic organizations by emanation. These emanations are

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usually under-­resourced and mirror work undertaken by global IOs. Third, these IOs tend towards programme functions, with the majority featuring on the right-­hand side of Figure 1.2. More operational IOs, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while performing programme functions, can deploy substantial resources to fulfil their mandates. Fourth, Interpol and the Council of Europe (COE) aside and reflecting their focus on security, a fundamental state interest, these organizations exhibit a strong intergovernmental bias, being clustered in the lower half of Figure 1.2. These organizations also share structural commonalities. Generally the supreme authority is a governing conference of heads of state which endorses political initiatives, sets broad objectives, amends charters and appoints SGs. Beneath this is a more active body, often composed of foreign ministers, dealing with detail and which sometimes possesses delegated authority. Frequently parallel ministerial groupings exist to discuss socioeconomic issues, and below them are committees of subject matter specialists. Members appoint permanent representatives, with ambassadorial status, to the major regional organizations (ROs) who interface on ongoing activities and, when required, substitute for ministers at meetings. Power normally resides with the intergovernmental bodies, constricting the executive heads’ latitude for independent action. As with many IOs, their decisions are mostly reached by consensus, although formal voting can be invoked. Perhaps because of their remit, political and security organizations have, after the UN and EU, received the most academic attention. These empirical studies have yielded several plausible explanations but no single theory for their emergence, behaviour, persistence and impact (Arcenaux and Pion-­ Berlin 2007; Simon 2008). Neo-­realists suggest these organizations are rooted in regional or global power distributions, merely reflecting the preferences of the most powerful and, therefore, have no independent impact on outcomes. States perceiving threats may pursue alliances to augment their power, as when the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) emerged to offset Iran. Equally states may see an IO as a way of binding a hegemon into a restraining multilateral framework. Arguably this was the motivation behind the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as states tried to inhibit Indonesia and post-­ Soviet Russia respectively (Ojendal 2004; Kubicek 2009). Hegemons may exploit ROs as instruments of statecraft, thereby developing organizations that they can dominate. Other states join hopeful of making gains, for example by benefiting from the hegemon’s security structures. Arguably organizations such as GCC and the Organization of American States (OAS) emerged and prospered because they served the interests of regional and global powers.

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Liberal institutionalists argue that states overcome collective-­action problems arising from interdependence through advancing their interests in such organizations. While accepting IOs are instruments of states, they emphasize the role IOs play in constraining and enabling state behaviour through reducing transaction costs, enhancing transparency, monitoring compliance and generating expectations of further cooperation. By promoting cooperation, political and security IOs deliver absolute gains to members ranging from lower tariffs to maritime security. Constructivists explain the emergence of these IOs by recourse to converging norms or collective identities where shared experiences foster new institutions. Organizations are conceived as agents with their own preferences whose outputs actively shape the beliefs, identities and hence interests of actors by nurturing a sense of belonging within a community. Therefore, constructivists believe these IOs may actively alter outcomes in directions that realists and liberals would not predict, for example acting against a hegemon’s material interest by advancing a greater normative good, such as promoting democracy or human rights. The organizations in this chapter occupy a niche between nation states and the UN’s global security apparatus, reflecting the fact that many political and security problems are primarily regional (Buzan and Waever 2003). It therefore follows that ROs are best placed to resolve them. Indeed the fact that their mandates closely resemble the UN’s is a reflection of the UN Charter (Chapter 5), which, while it made the UN the ultimate guardian of global peace and security, gave ROs some autonomy to referee neighbourhood squabbles. Although the Charter explicitly defines the relationship between the UN and regional bodies, it is ambivalent about the breakdown of responsibilities. Sub-­regional, regional and trans-­regional security organizations offer several advantages over universal IOs (see Box 13.1). States (and their leaders) sharing regional, religious or cultural affinities and having frequent political interactions better understand the nuances of and credible remedies to conflicts. Moreover, the impacts from security problems fall disproportionately on adjacent and interdependent states, giving them an interest in preventing or managing those problems. Operationally ROs are better positioned to aid victims of aggression. In Africa, for example, AU can deploy peacekeeping forces significantly faster than the UN, while propinquity to the conflict makes operations easier to sustain. These organizations do have weaknesses. First, rather than surmounting national interests they provide a vehicle for them. During the Cold War, political and security organizations were often paralysed because superpower

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BOX 13.1

COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF REGIONAL AND TRANS-­REGIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS Advantages

Disadvantages

Relieve pressure on UN resources. Regional cultural affinity means problems are better understood and makes regional players more acceptable interlocutors. Cheaper and faster response. Common regional interests overcome narrow national interests. Legitimate vital interest in solving regional security issues. Enables smaller-­country participation.

Reluctance to intervene or lack of mandate. Greater partiality from participating actors. Lack of administrative, financial and logistical resources needed to intervene effectively. A vehicle for the pursuit of national interests, especially by regional hegemons. Jurisdictional conflicts or overlaps with the UN, sub-­regionals and other ROs. Source: Tavares (2009).

discord deprived ROs of the prominent role envisaged in the UN Charter. Most political and security organizations still depend on a hegemon’s financial and military muscle. Hegemons provide leadership but can hijack the organization for their own ends. Thus, instead of the RO’s military commanders being in charge of operations, the forces of a single country can exploit an RO’s legitimacy and superimpose their own decisions. Tavares (2009: 154) suggests that, ‘in all the interventions carried out by ECOWAS, SADC or the AU, the contributing countries aimed at projecting their national agendas’. Second, familiarity with the issues or bonds between leaders are not necessarily as advantageous as proponents of political and security organizations propound. Familiarity can breed contempt, and animosities between neighbouring states often run deep, sharpening differences and undermining the ability of ROs to appear impartial. Third, these organizations can be as ineffective as the UN. With the exception of NATO and CIS, few can sustain large-­scale field operations. Smaller ROs had 15 000 troops deployed in 2011 (Center on International Cooperation 2012), a number small in comparison to UN and NATO resources, but several UN deployments were efforts to salvage operations by African organizations (see Table 5.1). Furthermore ROs’ supposed readiness to respond is overstated, as building consensus for action delays deployments. Tiresome consensus building in NATO’s Kosovo campaign led the US to denounce what it described as ‘war by committee’ and later to forge a ‘coalition of the willing’ for the Afghanistan campaign

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outside the NATO framework. Resource shortfalls force ROs to coordinate their military and socioeconomic activities with the UN, which has a standing structure that can be mobilized to support ROs. For example, in Darfur AU forces are bolstered by the UN, and logistics are provided by NATO. Finally, overlap is a problem, as most regions have an assortment of organizations with matching mandates. Sovereign imperatives impair all political and security organizations, as states elevate the norm of non-­intervention above those to safeguard democracy and human rights. The degree to which ROs can insist on adherence to their norms varies considerably, ranging from little or no influence (ASEAN and the League of Arab States (LAS)) to those which have established peer review systems or expel errant members (AU and OAS). However, clear intent does not ensure compliance. Whereas European states have ceded some sovereignty to ROs (see Chapter 11), the colonial legacy has reified the principle of non-­intervention in their developing-­country equivalents (Acharya and Johnston 2007). Indeed, Third World countries have used regional agreements to enhance their sovereignty by subscribing feebly to the principles involved while accepting kudos for their participation (Herbst 2007). This chapter is organized regionally, starting with the Americas, which has the longest record of regional cooperation. Organizations with larger memberships and mandates are covered in some detail; sub-­regional organizations are only briefly reviewed as part of an initial regional overview; thus, there are some, for example the Pacific Islands Forum, which space precludes. The Organization for Security and Co-­operation in Europe (OSCE), the Commonwealth, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (formerly the Organization of the Islamic Conference, OIC), all trans-­regional, are covered at the end of the chapter, along with Interpol. While OSCE shares many features of ROs, the Commonwealth and OIC resemble clubs with members joined by common ‘social’ affinities rather than political imperatives, and their activities tend to emphasize socioeconomic issues. Interpol is unusual because, while most of these organizations deal with state security, its prime responsibility is the security of individuals.

13.1 The Americas Even though Latin American states (Caribbean nations apart) have been independent for nearly two centuries, the US has overshadowed their development. Simón Bolívar, in unshackling several countries from Spanish colonialism (1819–24), dreamt of an organization joining the recently liberated republics that would be a bulwark against exogenous threats and US

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hegemony. Conversely, following the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine (Box 13.2), the US considered that regional initiatives would consolidate and exert influence over Latin America, thereby bolstering security in its own backyard. Over the next century, Western hemispheric states forged a coterie of norms and rules concerning territorial boundaries, the principles of sovereignty, non-­intervention and dispute mediation ( J.I. Dominguez 2007) that underpinned the formal ROs that emerged after the Second World War. In recent times Latin America has made strides towards democratic governance and sustained economic growth. Nevertheless, the overall trends mask serious and potentially destabilizing problems. Widening income inequalities (see Chapter 8, section 8.3), organized crime (especially drug cartels) and economic tribulations (see Chapter 10, section 10.6) are eroding commitments to democratic governance and contributing to a resurgent taste for autocratic leadership. BOX 13.2

THE MONROE DOCTRINE In 1823 American President James Monroe, reacting to uprisings in Latin America against Spanish colonial rule, declared that no European power should consider the Americas as a place for further conquest

or colonization. Any attempt to do so would be interpreted as an aggressive act prompting US intervention, indicating that the region would henceforth be part of America’s sphere of influence.

As the only political and security RO embracing the US and Canada, OAS has dominated and often sidelined the proliferation of sub-­regional organizations. The Organization of Central American States (OCAS), a five-­country group founded in 1951, was initially designed to foster socioeconomic development, but soon embraced political dimensions. Unfortunately a long-­running dispute between Honduras and El Salvador (1969–80), and a breakdown in relations between Costa Rica and Nicaragua thwarted the sub-­region’s desire for political integration, which despite normalization of relationships has ceased to be a realistic objective. Mercosur’s political dimensions are similarly underdeveloped. The 15-­member Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) has existed since 1968 to encourage the industrial development and economic integration of its small island economies by fostering a Caribbean Common Market which can potentially improve members’

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competitiveness. By presenting a united front, CARICOM can enhance their leverage in international negotiations. Structural changes in the global economy, especially the elimination of preferences for agricultural exports and liberalization of manufacturing and services, make this more pressing. CARICOM has had some success in promoting cooperation in health, education, sport and disaster relief, but integrated approaches to foreign policy and attempts to mediate internal problems have faltered, as politicians have been preoccupied with local concerns or reluctant to surrender sovereignty (C.E. Griffin 2007). These factors also contribute to CARICOM’s failure to develop a dynamic trading system or internationally competitive industries (Ramsaran and Hosein 2008). First mooted in 1989, CARICOM finally agreed to create a Single Market in 2006, a step towards the 2015 objective of a Single Economy extending harmonization into fiscal and monetary policy. Unfortunately this project, like CARICOM more generally, is floundering from lack of political unity, which has prompted some to speculate that members’ frustration with slow progress and the organization’s inability to prioritize will seal its fate (Stoneman et al. 2012).

13.2 The Organization of American States (OAS) 13.2.1 Background The origin of OAS stems from the periodic International Conference of American States, whose inaugural meeting in 1889–90 created the Commercial Bureau of American Republics to facilitate inter-­American commerce. This became the Pan-­American Bureau in 1906 and, in 1910, the Pan-­ American Union. By 1945 the Western hemisphere possessed a patchwork of agreements negotiated at the International Conference of American States. These, and the parallel development of regional collective defence under the 1947 Inter-­American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, resulted in the birth of a 21-­member OAS in 1948. OAS now encompasses all 35 states on the American continent, with a broad mandate to sponsor regional peace and security, human rights, trade, education, narcotics control and representative democracy. Although OAS has dabbled in military and security matters, most academic attention has been reserved for the tension implicit in Article 2 of the OAS Charter, which calls for the endorsement and consolidation of ‘representative democracy with due respect for the principle of non-­intervention’. Cold War expediency initially trumped democratic pursuits. Cuba was suspended in 1962, but otherwise OAS remained silent about the continent’s dictatorial regimes. Indeed the US countenanced the overthrow of democratic governments in Brazil,

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Chile and El Salvador amongst others and invaded the Dominican Republic under OAS ‘auspices’ in 1965 in its eagerness to banish leftist ideologues from its own backyard. However, post-­Cold War changes in the international system plus the passing of many of Latin America’s authoritarian regimes have rejuvenated OAS’s pursuit of democracy and human rights. OAS now provides technical and legal assistance to countries building democratic institutions, devises programmes to foster democratic political cultures, oversees elections and undertakes peacebuilding initiatives, including demobilizing and reintegrating guerrilla movements. In 1991, OAS adopted Resolution 1080, which requires the SG to convene the Permanent Council in response ‘to the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic institutional process’ (see section 13.2.2). Following OAS General Assembly (OAS-­GA) resolutions, members have imposed restrictions on Haiti, Peru, Guatemala, Paraguay, Venezuela and Honduras for contravening democratic standards. This has been reinforced by Article 1 of the 2001 Inter-­American Democratic Charter, which states: ‘The peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it.’ The Charter demands members uphold democracy by taking diplomatic action and imposing sanctions and in extreme cases allows the OAS-­GA to suspend a member, thereby giving OAS a regional mandate to support democracy and initiate action when democracy is threatened.

13.2.2 Structure Heads of government meet biennially at the Summit of the Americas, and foreign ministers meet annually in the OAS-­GA. The Permanent Council of ambassadors meets regularly on matters of continuing interest. The SG has a more proactive role than executive heads of other similar ROs, with a delegated responsibility to bring threats to peace and security to members’ attention. OAS takes most decisions by consensus, but requires a two-­thirds majority to adopt peace and security proposals or to suspend membership. Military cooperation is the Inter-­American Defence Board’s responsibility. It used to operate at arm’s length from OAS, but the Democratic Charter integrated its work more closely with OAS objectives. In conjunction with attempts to boost members’ democratic credentials and counter drug trafficking, OAS has adopted a peer review process (the Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism – MEM), currently in its fifth cycle. Under MEM, each member’s progress in improving governance and countering their

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narcotics problems is reviewed by a panel of specialists convened from all members. Mandated activities are supported by Secretariat departments reinforced by subsidiary bodies. The Inter-­American Juridical Committee and an Institute of Justice Studies assist in developing sound legal governance. Work on human rights involves an Inter-­American Court on Human Rights, an Inter-­ American Commission on Human Rights and commissions for women and children. Several subsidiary organizations deal with socioeconomic affairs, the most salient of which are the Inter-­American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture and the Pan-­American Health Organization (see Chapter 7, section 7.4), both of which enjoy considerable autonomy. OAS finances rely heavily on the US, which contributes almost 60 per cent to the regular budget, although its willingness to pay has been erratic. President Kennedy’s 1961 Alliance for Progress initiative moved OAS into the socioeconomic field and stimulated it to create IDB (Chapter 8, section 8.3). Subsequently, US interest waned, especially during the Reagan presidency. OAS then drifted into a state of almost permanent financial crisis, came close to being disbanded and had little regional impact, involving itself in non-­ controversial issues of international law, culture and social policy.

13.2.3 Current activities Under its peace and security mandate, continuing political problems in Central America entail several ongoing OAS missions. These include strengthening democracy in Honduras and Guatemala, and brokering an agreement concerning Nicaragua and Costa Rica’s border dispute. OAS is supporting US-­led efforts to counter Colombia’s FARC insurgency and stem the flow of drugs which fund the insurgents. However, Colombia’s accusations that Ecuador and Venezuela support FARC have heightened regional tensions, and the SG is an intermediary in encouraging negotiation, a process complicated by Venezuela’s visceral suspicion of US support for Colombia. OAS is promoting democracy through decisions made at regional summits. Following the 2012 summit, OAS now monitors and reports on members’ commitments to public security. It also continues to organize and observe the fairness of elections. The most recent MEM evaluations provide the basis for OAS training courses for judges adjudicating money-­laundering trials and enforcement agencies combating drug running. There is a similar process in respect of what OAS terms ‘multidimensional security’, a ­campaign to

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counter the impact of drugs, terrorism and organized crime, including restricting illegal arms trafficking.

13.2.4 Evaluation and future challenges In its first three decades OAS intervened more frequently and effectively than its Middle Eastern and African counterparts to defuse tensions between members (Nye 1971; Zacher 1979), most notably in the 1969 ‘Soccer War’, when rioting at a football match brought El Salvador and Honduras to the brink of war. US hegemony and US ruptures with some Latin American countries debilitated OAS in the 1970s and 1980s. Throughout the Cold War OAS was regarded as a US stooge and treated warily by Latin American states, suspicions fuelled by the OAS standing idly by in the face of surreptitious activities to thwart or overthrow elected left-­wing governments in favour of repressive but US-­friendly regimes, for example in Chile (1973) and Nicaragua (1979) and unilateral US incursions in Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989). Its performance has improved markedly since the 1990s, and it continues to mediate to prevent quarrels escalating into violence. Nevertheless, shortcomings are evident, as military interventions have been generally unsuccessful and OAS has struggled to broker solutions once hostilities have commenced. OAS cannot shoulder all the blame for being hostage to Cold War enmities, but neither can it claim all the credit for the more positive outcomes witnessed thereafter. By the mid-­1970s all bar three OAS members harboured authoritarian regimes. The subsequent spread of democracy was linked more to the mutating dynamics of domestic and international politics than to OAS. Nevertheless, periodic invocation of Resolution 1080 demonstrates members’ commitment to democratic norms, and Secretariat-­supported initiatives have bestowed OAS with ‘the most well-­developed and active human rights machinery of any regional organization’ outside Europe (Tavares 2009: 75). Moreover, the 2001 Charter constitutes a safeguard against wholesale retrenchment of regional democracy. Despite advances, Latin America’s democratic credentials remain tenuous. Freedom House (2013) rates ten OAS members as ‘partly free’, indicating deficiencies in citizens’ political rights and civil liberties, with serious restrictions on media freedom in Venezuela and the rushed 2012 impeachment of Paraguay’s President showing the incompleteness of democratic consolidation. At the 2013 OAS-­GA, four states (Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela) tried, unsuccessfully, to restrict the activities of the Inter-­ American Commission on Human Rights. While OAS agreements and

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MEM might have helped to entrench democratic norms, the widening scope of OAS’s democratic mandate and interventions could equally reflect changing national interests following states’ transitions to democracy. In particular, democracies might be more willing than their authoritarian brethren to stomach some diminution of sovereignty in exchange for collective obligations to protect them against aggressors. Ultimately OAS protocols are constrained by loopholes, few authoritative judgements about democratic standards (Levitt 2006) and weak enforcement. Regional summits continue to support MEM but do not actively pursue mechanisms that allow robust interventions to uphold democratic standards. Unfortunately the dearth of clear rules slows OAS reactions and may encourage aspirant dictators to chance their arm. The effects of US power and the gulf in interests which frequently existed across the Rio Grande help to account for OAS’s mixed record in delivering security and democracy in the Americas. Interventions have been inconsistent, with OAS taking firmer action in situations where the US or the local population supported it (Boniface 2004). Challenges confronting OAS echo those of other ROs. Notwithstanding its members’ economic heft, OAS remains hampered by weak funding, with the US using the power of the purse to enforce its views. Under President George W. Bush, there was a period of re-­engagement, but funding was again restricted by the US Congress in 2011 over objections to restoring Cuba’s membership and reservations about the SG’s support for some autocratic regimes, a crisis aggravated by Brazil and Venezuela withholding their 2011 contributions. The profusion of regional bodies in Latin America has produced overlaps and turf wars. The newly minted Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, a 33-­member forum (excluding the US and Canada), will further intensify institutional competition. This new organization reflects perhaps the biggest challenge confronting OAS, namely sovereignty, in a region where many members prize non-­intervention. Apprehension exists that OAS norms could allow US meddling (Hawkins and Shaw 2008), and that there may be a resurgence of nationalism, with authoritarian rulers challenging OAS democratic norms, thereby encouraging North–South schism.

13.3 The Middle East Collective activity in the Middle East has been driven by the dual impact on regional stability of Israel’s creation and external powers vying for control

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over oil resources (see Chapter 10, section 10.12). Furthermore Iran’s revival as a regional power has stimulated Arab states to work together. Most Middle Eastern regimes are authoritarian and, notwithstanding the 2011 Arab Spring, spurn democratic values. Arab nations also need mechanisms to address Sunni–Shia and Kurdish differences, an underlying reason for several disputes which also concern Iran and Turkey. Middle Eastern IOs are typically weak, defer to members and have a marginal impact. The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC) was formed in 1981 by Western Gulf states as a collective defence pact to protect their interests against Iraq and Iran as well as to foster economic, educational and financial cooperation. Politically its record is uneven. GCC never became the hoped-­for regional security instrument and recently stoked Sunni–Shia tensions by intervening alongside the government in Bahrain. Nevertheless, Legrenzi (2011) suggests GCC has elicited subtle societal shifts in members, while others (Lawson 1999) note its success in dealing with security issues, for example negotiating a peaceful settlement to a 2011 dispute in Yemen. Elsewhere GCC has realized a ‘remarkable’ degree of monetary and structural convergence (Sturm and Siegfried 2005). Jordan joined GCC in 2013, and Morocco has been offered membership, while a Gulf Investment Corporation with $2b initial capital has been established. Algerian and Moroccan animosity over the Western Sahara has precluded the other sub-­regional organization, the North African Arab Maghreb Union, from any substantial political initiative.

13.4 The League of Arab States (LAS) 13.4.1 Background Founded in 1945, LAS was the first post-­war RO; truthfully, however, LAS is ethnic rather than regional (see Box 13.6). Membership is restricted to Arab states, thereby excluding regional powers such as Iran, Turkey and Israel but incorporating non-­regional states like Sudan, Mauritania and Somalia. LAS protects members’ sovereignty, supports the interests of Arab nations and nurtures their relationships. It is also supposed to mediate conflicts amongst members but, reflecting the primacy of sovereignty, can only do so at their behest. LAS is taciturn on members’ egregious human rights abuses, and no member has ratified the Arab Charter on Human Rights since it was promulgated in 1994 (M. Barnett and Solingen 2007). Security concerns were the subject of the 1950 Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty, but this was directed towards the external threat of Israel rather than intra-­Arab conflicts. LAS institutional weaknesses result from the time of its foundation,

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when many Arabs favoured merging their principalities into a single nation. To gain domestic support leaders paid lip-­service to this pan-­Arabism, but most preferred an organization which allowed them to pursue their divergent national interests while safeguarding their newfound sovereignty. The Arab League’s fractious membership unites around support for the Palestinian cause (see Chapter 6, section 6.3) and concomitant hostility to Israel. For many years it ran an economic boycott in partnership with OIC (see section 13.16.1), but disagreements obstructed a coordinated Arab military effort to confront Israel. Following the first Arab–Israeli war (1948), LAS forbade members to negotiate with Israel, an offence for which Egypt was expelled in 1979 after signing a peace treaty with Israel. Outright opposition to Israel has been slowly replaced with a more tolerant policy which allowed Egypt’s readmission in 1989. When Hamas was elected to govern the Palestinian Authority LAS tried with partial success to fill a funding gap caused both by Israel withholding customs dues it collects for the Authority and by reduced donor funding. Over time Arabism weakened, exacerbating disunity amongst LAS members, thereby reducing its relevance. In the first Gulf War (1990–91), Arab states were on opposing sides, with LAS’s SG resigning after Saudi Arabia chose to host American troops rather than those of its Arab neighbours. Some states, thereafter, preferred to work through new institutions better reflecting their interests, such as GCC. The events of 9/11, Israel’s response to the second Intifada and the Second Gulf War temporarily salvaged LAS in the 2000s. Nevertheless, continued fissures precluded it from playing meaningful roles over Darfur, the gassing of the Iraqi Kurds or Syria’s intervention in Lebanese politics, which was a direct consequence of LAS abrogating its own responsibilities in 1976, prompting SG Amre Moussa to contemplate the organization’s closure.

13.4.2 Structure The Charter provides for a governing Council to conduct ongoing work, including dispute mediation and settlement. The Council makes decisions by unanimity or by majority vote, the former being binding on members. It is usually attended by foreign ministers, meets biannually and has a subsidiary body, the Peace and Security Council (PSC), to improve its dispute settlement mechanisms. PSC comprises the foreign ministers of those members holding the current, two past and two forthcoming LAS presidencies. The SG reports to the Council, and his ‘good offices’ have been deployed effectively to intervene in several past disputes despite the membership’s general

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i­ nability to adopt clear positions, for example in arbitrating between Lebanese political factions. LAS provides a framework but not a constitutional role for heads of state to set policy in periodic summits, but because the summits follow LAS practices of unanimity few have produced unified positions. Consistent with the Charter’s explicit reference to the Palestinian problem, Palestine (or its recognized representative) has always been a member. Within the membership, however, there has been a power tussle between Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria. Notwithstanding some members’ wealth, LAS has severe funding difficulties stemming from countries suspending contributions to protest against its stance on Israel. Although this has not stopped ministerial meetings from covering the full range of governmental activities, the consequence is that its many specialist organizations are underfunded and do little for regional development.

13.4.3 Current activities LAS mediators are actively interceding in Middle Eastern flashpoints. Palestine persists as its major preoccupation as LAS tries to craft a unified Arab position which could lead to peace. Construction of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem and Israel’s defensive wall, which has de facto annexed more territory, continues to thwart a negotiated settlement to the Palestinian problem. The 2010 heads of state summit condemned new construction but could not agree on an appropriate response. In a new tack, LAS is lobbying for Palestinian membership of the UN and, while unsuccessful in 2011, Palestine did gain admission to UNESCO. In Lebanon LAS is attempting to defuse sectarian tensions that periodically disrupt the political process by pressurizing Syria to be more receptive to multiparty democratic processes. The Arab Spring uprisings have reinvigorated LAS. It supported regime change in Libya and, unprecedentedly, has suspended and sanctioned the Syrian government, sending an observer mission once Syria reneged on a LAS-­negotiated ceasefire. Sudan’s military intelligence chief headed this mission, something that drew criticism owing to that country’s authoritarian leanings, and some mission members withdrew when fighting worsened. A UN observer group that superseded it also failed, but a LAS Special Representative still works with the UN SG’s Special Representative to negotiate a ceasefire. The Arab League is also pursuing two broader regional initiatives. One is to form an Arab customs union by 2015, for which LAS started a detailed com-

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parison of the myriad different tariffs in 2012. The other is to pressurize the UN to convene negotiations within the Nuclear Non-­Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for a Middle Eastern nuclear-­free zone. LAS members believe that their gambits towards Israel have broken the vicious circle whereby Israel will not join NPT until it achieves regional recognition. Iran’s growing nuclear capability is also stimulating activity, but members accuse the West of double standards in its contrasting positions on Iranian and Israeli nuclear capacities.

13.4.4 Evaluation and future challenges LAS mediation has been relatively ineffective, resolving just six of the 77 conflicts it was involved with from 1945 to 1981 (M. Barnett and Solingen 2007). There have been exceptions, notably its protection of Kuwaiti independence against Iraq (1961–63) and negotiating an end to fighting in Lebanon (1958 and 1976), where it assembled a peacekeeping force to separate the belligerents. Indeed its record in mediating minor disputes is better. Nevertheless, deviating national interests often preclude effective LAS involvement, and it has been noticeably absent from many intra-­Arab conflicts. To overcome this weakness LAS created PSC to resolve disputes, but its ancillary support network remains inoperative. The Arab Spring’s rejuvenation of LAS has not yielded consistent political consensus; rather LAS responds to the power of the purse. LAS supported changes in North Africa, particularly in Libya, where rich Gulf States joined UN no-­fly-­zone enforcement activities. It took the initial lead in Syria, where rich states supported the Sunni majority, but it was less involved with Yemen’s problems, which GCC sees as its concern, while it has studiously avoided exposure to difficulties in the Gulf. LAS’s early (and periodically continuing) dogmatic position concerning Israel has made it an ineffective partner to the US and UN in trying to broker a peace agreement. The exclusion of Turkey (an increasingly influential yet moderate regional power) and Iran, a supporter of the most violently anti-­Israel groups, which engages politically through the proxy of Syria, has further constrained its usefulness in peace negotiations. Similarly, LAS is ambivalent about the situation in Sudan, where members’ sympathies lie with the ethnic Arabs. It has criticized the International Criminal Court’s indictment of President Bashir (Chapter 5) and, while urging a settlement, has not supported AU interventions in Darfur, confining itself to creating a commission of enquiry.

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13.5 Europe The development of European political ROs came in two phases. NATO, the Western European Union (WEU) and the Council of Europe (COE) were founded just as the Cold War commenced (Box 1.6), in recognition of the need for closer political association to foster broad socioeconomic cooperation and additionally to instil a sense of European unity and identity. For realists the origins and role of these ROs were to balance the power of and defend Western Europe against the USSR. Western Europe’s freedom and security were similarly of concern to liberals, who viewed these organizations as embodiments of a community grounded in and promoting shared norms of democracy and the rule of law. States were the principal forgers of these institutions, but individuals also contributed. Churchill’s warnings about the Iron Curtain spurred action on COE, and Monnet’s role in European integration is outlined in Box 3.3, but above all one man, Paul-­Henri Spaak, was highly influential (Box 13.3). The Cold War’s end sparked the second phase of European ROs. With the threat posed by the USSR diminished, realists felt European ROs, especially NATO, should be liquidated or reconfigured to reflect the balance of post-­ Cold War power (Mearsheimer 1994/95). Liberals meanwhile believed the USSR’s collapse vindicated democratic ideals and suggested reorienting ROs to maximize the propagation of democratic governance regionally and beyond. Europe’s institutional environment also became more crowded and characterized by considerable functional overlap. The EU’s expanded role in foreign and security affairs (Chapter 11) made WEU redundant and forced other sub-­regionals to restructure. BOX 13.3

PAUL-­HENRI SPAAK (1899–1972) Spaak made his international debut at the League of Nations and was at the centre of world politics for 15 years after the Second World War, playing a role in the foundation of four IOs. Born into a political family he fought in the First World War and was taken prisoner. After the war he entered the Belgian parliament, holding ministerial positions, including Minister of Foreign Affairs.

From 1938 to 1939 he was Prime Minister and during the Second World War served in Belgium’s government-­in-­exile. He became Prime Minister again in two short-­lived ­post-­war governments. In 1945 he was elected the first UN GA President and in 1946 was the driving force behind the Benelux community, an alliance between the Netherlands, Belgium and

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 Luxembourg. In 1948 he chaired a committee to improve OEEC’s work (Chapter 10) and later was appointed President of the OEEC Council. Then in 1949 he played a pivotal role in establishing COE and became President of its inaugural Assembly. As Belgian Foreign Minister he was amongst the negotiators of the Atlantic Charter, the precursor to NATO. Spaak’s effectiveness stemmed from his pioneering use of committees to settle tricky points, leaving only minor details to be agreed at high level, a process now common in international forums (e.g. the work of ‘sherpas’ at G20 meetings). His next role was as one of the EEC’s founders. He was Chairman of the committee that launched ECSC and Euratom, the institutions initiating European economic integration. As ECSC General Assembly President, he represented Belgium

in the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Rome. He supported Monnet’s proposals for deeper European economic integration but cautioned against overreach. Having achieved great international stature he was appointed NATO’s second SG (1957–61). Unfortunately his political standing worked against him, as he found it difficult to adjust from exercising power to a position in which he was expected to provide advice and take instructions. After resigning from NATO he returned to domestic politics as Foreign Minister. In 1966, when France withdrew from NATO, he advocated NATO’s relocation to Brussels and persuaded France to drop its EEC boycott. The difficulties with France and his preoccupation over Belgium’s position in the Congo led to his leaving politics and entering business.

Europe’s sub-­regional IOs have achieved limited success. The Nordic Council, which convenes parliamentary delegates and ministers from eight territories, advances socioeconomic, cultural and communications cooperation and coordinates some national legislation. The Council has developed a comprehensive approach to regional transport, a common legal framework for the treatment of its peoples, plus an Arctic Circle development plan within the context of the Arctic Council (see Chapter 17, section 17.3). Since 1991 the Nordic Council has developed economic and cultural links to the Baltic states, sponsoring the Council of the Baltic Sea States. The Western European Union, formed initially by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK in 1948 as the Brussels Treaty Organization, was intended to enhance European defence coordination and counterbalance any German military resurgence. Following NATO’s creation WEU atrophied, playing a minimal role in European defence. When Germany became a member in 1954 the need for WEU to act as a counterbalance vanished. An ‘anachronism for decades’ (Economist 2010a), WEU has been disbanded and integrated into the EU’s common defence strategy (see Chapter 11).

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13.6 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 13.6.1 Background NATO was established in 1949, and its founding principle is that of ‘collective defence’. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO’s charter) states that members ‘agree that an armed attack against one or more of them . . . shall be considered an attack against them all’; furthermore in the event of attack they pledge to ‘assist the Party or Parties so attacked by . . . taking such action as it deems necessary including the use of armed force’. NATO, alongside CIS, is the only IO to integrate both political and military structures and objectives. Lord Ismay, the first SG, pithily observed that NATO’s purpose was to ‘keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down’. Trepidation about a resurgent Germany was swiftly quashed and, as part of the US containment doctrine (see Box 3.2), NATO’s priority became to ensure transatlantic security by deterring Russian expansionism in Europe through upholding democracy, freedom, human rights and the rule of law but latterly it has undertaken some trans-­regional activities. That Article 5 was never invoked during the Cold War was testament to NATO’s two-­pronged strategy for containing the communist threat. The first prong consisted of deterring aggression through military muscle and political cohesion. NATO military bases were rapidly erected around Europe and the Atlantic, but by the end of the 1950s conventional forces in the Warsaw Pact (the USSR-­led military coalition) outnumbered NATO forces ninefold. To compensate for this and partly in reaction to the Cuban missile crisis, in the 1960s NATO adopted a collective approach to the use of ‘battlefield’ nuclear weapons by creating a European nuclear defence capacity that controversially stationed nuclear weapons in Europe. Politically NATO’s Cold War history is one of recurrent crises and fractious internal relations, especially between the US and some European countries. Indeed, in 1967, France withdrew from NATO (but remained in the controlling North Atlantic Treaty and NATO’s early-­warning radar system) in protest against the power wielded by the US. Towards the Cold War’s end, internecine squabbles were exacerbated when an increasingly assertive Europe developed a separate defence identity as part of the wider process of European integration. Nonetheless the ­anxieties aroused by the external security environment ultimately kept NATO members bound uneasily together. Desire for political unity and its military might generated the leverage for the second prong of NATO’s strategy, namely diplomatic engagement to defuse East–West antagonisms. NATO’s non-­intervention in the 1968 Czechoslovak

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uprising allowed the West German Ostpolitik initiative to reduce tensions through political engagement with Eastern Europe. Then in 1973 the US and USSR negotiated a reduction in conventional arms amassed by the Warsaw Pact and NATO. While early efforts stumbled, arms control (Box 13.4) eventually built the confidence needed for other initiatives (see section 13.14). BOX 13.4

ARMS CONTROL In international politics arms control refers to agreements governing the development, production, possession, deployment and use of weapons, thereby stabilizing the political environment and reducing potential conflict. Arms control is typically associated with disarmament (i.e. reducing the number and deployment of weapons systems), but this is not axiomatic, as agreements may selectively allow signatories to expand their arsenals to achieve parity. Several prominent arms control agreements exist. The 1969 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) was a USA–USSR bilateral deal to limit intercontinental

nuclear weapons. A 1979 sequel (SALT 2) was not ratified by the US, although the negotiated restrictions have been respected. SALT was followed in 1987 by the interim Intermediate-­Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which circumscribed NATO and Warsaw Pact deployments of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. The best-­known multilateral initiative is the Treaty on the Non-­ Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1970), which limits the spread of nuclear weapons (see Chapter 7, section 7.6). Several regional agreements have established nuclear-­weapons-­free zones, such as those for Antarctica and Latin America.

Paradoxically NATO’s prevalence in the Cold War lies at the heart of its subsequent malaise, as communism’s fall removed the common threat that ensured NATO’s cohesion. Four noteworthy trends have emerged from the last two decades that are evidence of NATO’s still incomplete transition ‘from classical military alliance to comprehensive security organization’ (Lindley-­French 2006: 79). First, NATO forged closer links with its erstwhile opponents through the Partnership for Peace programme. From 2002, it formed a NATO–Russia Council, which facilitated transparency in defence planning such as notification of ongoing training manoeuvres, and developed cooperative military relationships, for example to combat terrorism. NATO then expanded to incorporate ten former Warsaw Pact members, which resulted in a degree of institutional schizophrenia, as some members felt that the Russian threat was strategically diminished, while others, having experienced Russian domination, wanted to maintain the conventional military umbrella.

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Second, with the prospects of a territorial attack by another state now remote, NATO’s definition of security was widened to include proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, ethnic rivalries, human rights, piracy, cyber-­attacks, energy security and threats from rogue states. In addition to preventing and managing conflicts, NATO role was also broadened to include post-­conflict stabilization. NATO intervened as a proactive peacekeeping force in the former Yugoslavia, most notably and controversially when, without UN SC approval, it used air strikes and ground forces to force Serbia’s withdrawal from Kosovo to avert a humanitarian crisis. Under UN auspices, 40 000 NATO troops then continued to provide sub-­regional security and logistical support to humanitarian relief efforts and reconstruction. Third, many threats to members’ security emanate from outside the transatlantic theatre, forcing NATO to act ‘out of area’ to counteract them. This is exemplified by the fact that the only time that Article 5 has been exercised was following the 9/11 attacks on the USA. In the 1990 Gulf War, NATO’s logistical capacity was used to supply UN-­sanctioned forces, which showed it could be effective when supporting operations beyond members’ boundaries. Today NATO’s most prominent commitment is in Afghanistan, where it commands the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF, see section 13.6.3). Elsewhere it is combating piracy in the seas around the Horn of Africa, training Iraq’s armed forces and assisting the missions of African security organizations. Finally, NATO’s enlarged remit requires a recalibration of its capabilities away from forces designed for static territorial defence towards forces capable of rapid, prolonged deployment in any theatre. To this end, NATO has instigated a 25 000-­strong Response Force (NRF). This became operational in 2006 but by 2013 had only achieved half its intended complement.

13.6.2 Structure Three intergovernmental groups are at NATO’s apex: the North Atlantic Council, the Nuclear Planning Group and the Defence Planning Committee. Below these committees there are two interrelated structures, civilian and military, between which there is close correspondence (see Figure 13.1). Members appoint permanent representatives to both arms of NATO, who meet as required and take decisions by consensus. NATO’s civilian structure is concerned with defence investment, the pooling of defence assets, peacekeeping, crisis management and civil emergency planning. The SG, who chairs the North Atlantic Council, has always been

Public Diplomacy

Defence Investment

Figure 13.1  NATO organization chart

Executive Management

Defence Planning

Political Affairs and Security

Civilian Structure

Financial Control

Situation Centre

Intelligence

Logistics

Other Commands

Transformation (ACT)

Allied Command

Operations (SACEUR)

Strategic Commands

Communications

Central Military Committee

Allied Command

Planning

Operations

International Military Staff

Military Committee

Military Command Structure

Office of (Internal) Security

Regional Security

Operations Policy

SG

NATO Council

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European, often a high-­profile former national politician, reflecting European desires to have a visible presence juxtaposing US military power. As NATO extends its remit beyond the European theatre the SG engages in public diplomacy, diverting attention from more sensitive military discussions. The military structure oversees military coordination, preparedness and operations. It is headed by the Military Committee, comprising Chiefs of the Defence Staffs and their permanent military representatives. Here, US opinion dominates, as it provides most resources and appoints the Supreme Allied Commander, who ‘has never been the first servant of the Council but the viceroy of the American President’ (Calleo 1970: 27). The Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe has a nerve centre in Mons (Belgium) and is divided into Northern and Southern commands plus a new command covering Central Europe (Allied Command Transformation). NATO has a huge physical infrastructure including air and naval bases, logistical centres and a defence college. Its 11 500km pipeline network connects refineries, ports and airfields through nine separate distribution systems. Specific agencies have responsibilities for production logistics (armaments supply, developing the Tornado fighter, etc.), standardization, military air traffic management, electronic warfare, meteorology and oceanography.

13.6.3 Current activities Since 2006, when it took over primary peacekeeping and peacebuilding responsibility from a US coalition, NATO’s biggest commitment is ISAF in Afghanistan. Here 125 000 NATO troops help the government with internal security and train Afghan forces. NATO’s mandate excludes direct action against the Taliban or Al-­Qaeda and is confined to security, control of drug trafficking and supporting improved governance. Underlying these activities is an attempt to win over the ‘hearts and minds’ of a population weary with war and suspicious of outsiders, a task made difficult by the power of local warlords and their drug-­trafficking activities. ISAF frees up more combat-­ experienced coalition forces for counterinsurgency activities in the most dangerous provinces. NATO’s operations are compromised by many members’ reluctance to commit substantial contingents owing to domestic political considerations and Afghanistan’s corrupt government. States that have committed troops sometimes confine their use to non-­military activities or impose restrictive rules of engagement, a tactic that does not command respect in a culture where might is right. ISAF is being downscaled, some members have already

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withdrawn and NATO is looking to disengage completely by December 2014, leaving behind a residual military training operation. A second problem is NATO’s relationship with Russia, which has become more confrontational following Russia’s 2008 attack on Georgia. Despite the permanent joint council (see section 13.6.1) the major obstacle to better relations is NATO’s continuing but low-­key deployment of flexible missile defences primarily aimed at Iran and North Korea. Putin’s return to the Russian presidency has ratcheted up the confrontational rhetoric, and he ostentatiously avoided attending the 2012 NATO summit. NATO therefore faces a choice between continuing deployment and withstanding Russian pressure or attempting to appease Russian sensibilities by possibly sharing operational information. The third problem is the debate over the nature of NATO. A new operational division is developing NATO’s capacity to handle non-­military threats, and it is now prepared for intervention in crises outside Europe. Europe’s economic difficulties could have a profound impact on its resources, and in 2010 NATO undertook a Strategic Concept review, one consequence of which is to start shrinking the military command structure. Another outcome was to pursue ‘Smart Defence’ initiatives (including sponsorship of research on military equipment and technology), which involve a pooling of resources such as logistics and air-­to-­air refuelling tankers, but, as the Libyan experience showed, this concept is hostage to members unwilling to participate in specific operations.

13.6.4 Evaluation and future challenges Enthusiasts extol NATO as the bedrock of European security, deterring Soviet expansionism, stabilizing the Balkans and supporting democratization of former communist countries (Michta 2007). Its expansion beyond the European theatre has, as operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan and Libya demonstrate, been sufficiently successful that notwithstanding some members’ reservations (such as Germany, which avoids involvement in any aggressive operation) future initiatives can build upon the successes and lessons learnt. Liberal scholars argue that NATO’s importance lies both in its military resilience and in its embodiment of a community upholding democratic values. By spreading common ideals and institutions NATO increases the benefits of transatlantic cooperation, strengthens the community and makes it a valuable part of the twenty-­first-­century global security architecture. Neo-­realists,

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with their visceral distrust of alliances, dismiss its importance to Cold War victory. NATO, they argue, personified the bipolar power distribution, and it was this, rather than NATO, that prevented the Cold War turning ‘hot’ (Mearsheimer 1994/95). Realists summon national interests to explain NATO’s post-­Cold War survival, arguing that European nations gain from having greater recourse to project military strength, while the US can lower the political costs of overseas adventures by cloaking them in the legitimacy derived from operating through an IO (Sireci and Coletta 2009). NATO confronts three perennial, interconnected challenges which, if not resolved, could consign it to irrelevance. The first, as previously intimated, is division between the US and European members and further schisms amongst European nations. The second is a resource gap between the threats NATO faces and the power it can generate. Splits in the Alliance’s solidarity and reluctance to resource its military needs risk NATO being seen as insufficiently powerful and present opportunities for enemies to exploit. Together they produce a third, existential, challenge: what is NATO for? States agree that NATO’s overriding objective is to ensure transatlantic security but, beyond the core principle of collective defence, have repeatedly failed to agree on its post-­Cold War strategy. The complexity of the post-­Cold War security environment exacerbates these problems. From the beginning the diverging strategic visions of the US and European countries pulled NATO in contradictory directions, hegemonic attitudes conflicting with European preferences for legitimacy grounded in international law. As Lindley-­French (2006: 2) puts it: Throughout the Cold War, Americans sought to maintain continental American invulnerability, whereas Europeans saw vulnerability as simply a fact of life. Americans saw security and defence as intrinsically linked to their own ideas, Europeans saw security and defence as intrinsically linked to where they lived. Americans saw the Cold War as a global struggle, Europeans as simply the latest chapter in the European power struggle down the ages. Americans were containing Soviet communism, Europeans were confronting Russians. Europeans were in retreat from global leadership, Americans were preparing for it. It was, and is, ever thus.

Twenty-­one members belong to the EU, and its ambition to be a global player has deepened fissures within NATO. A central pillar of the EU’s Maastricht Treaty (Chapter 11) was a Common Foreign and Security Policy allowing states to act jointly in foreign affairs. In 1999 EU leaders promulgated a common Security and Defence Policy (SDP) to give the EU the ‘capacity for

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autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces’ to react to international crises. This heralded the development of a distinct EU security stance and potentially created a rival to NATO. The US viewed these developments suspiciously, insisting that EU members continued to participate in NATO as individual countries not as a supranational group and that the EU should not develop an independent military HQ or planning staff. However, the EU has fortified SDP institutions in ways which encroach on these areas (Schmidt 2006–07). European states’ reluctance to allocate appropriate resources means SDP’s aspirations far outstrip its capabilities, and it is abundantly clear that SDP cannot substitute for NATO for many years. One sign of rapprochement was the 2003 EU–NATO strategic partnership giving the EU operational access to NATO assets, provided NATO declines to act and gives its unanimous approval. Shared memberships and the location of both organizations in Brussels notwithstanding, EU–NATO relations are marred by suspicion, duplication and clogged channels of communication (Drozdiak 2010). Euro-­American frictions also appear in discussion about the resource shortages that impair NATO’s ability to meet current, let alone future, ambitions. At $685b, US defence expenditures dwarf the $300b spent collectively by EU states. This colossal technological and investment gap gives some European members a free ride. Only Britain and France consistently attain NATO’s target of spending 2 per cent of GDP on defence, leaving many members unable to provide frontline operational support, though some non-­EU members such as Turkey (1.9 per cent) and Canada (1.5 per cent) do contribute substantially. These problems became self-­evident in 2011, when NATO members voted unanimously to enforce the UN-­mandated no-­fly zone over Libya in support of the rebellion against the Gaddafi regime. While NATO was lauded for undertaking a sophisticated air war that achieved its objectives, the operation exposed the selective nature of members’ commitments, notably Germany’s opting out of the operation and only eight members flying sorties. Moreover, several allies ran out of munitions, and the mission was overwhelmingly dependent on technologies like mid-­air refuelling that only the US could supply. These lopsided commitments jeopardize NATO’s cohesion, raising questions about its determination to confront future threats, particularly those beyond members’ borders. Until recently the scale and scope of NATO’s Afghanistan mission would have been impossible, but it also demonstrates NATO’s limitations in projecting power outside the transatlantic theatre. Critics assert that NATO’s forces are too small and incorrectly configured to deliver the broader portfolio of activities it now subsumes (Berdal and Ucko 2009) and that operations, like Afghanistan, may undermine Article 5’s

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provision for mutual defence. This is exemplified by the NRF, which because European forces are overstretched has nowhere near the promised personnel. Various solutions have been proposed to boost NATO, from optimistic proposals to expand membership to any willing democracy (Daalder and Goldgeier 2006) to practical solutions dealing with specific difficulties, such as giving the EU responsibility for alliance-­wide cyber-­security and enhancing cooperation through the ‘connected forces initiative’. Membership splits also affect discussions about NATO’s future. Whereas the US and its closer European allies imagine a ‘global expeditionary NATO’, newer East European members, Belgium and Germany see NATO as a guarantor of security against possible encroachment from the East (Noetzel and Schreer 2009). While NATO’s rhetoric emphasizes that its flexible, proactive and outward-­looking nature has allowed it to operate in Darfur and to combat Somali piracy, many NATO forces remain more suited for a Cold War situation. NATO’s revamped Strategic Concept sought to navigate these competing positions through agreeing a more supple strategy to combat new threats but leaves much of the detail to be decided and ignores difficult issues. For example, many contemporary security threats, like the cyber-­attack that crippled Estonia in 2007, seem irreconcilable with the ‘armed attack’ central to Article 5. The recent US forays into Iraq and Afghanistan have exposed limits to US global policing; consequently it may reconsider NATO’s advantages over assembling ad hoc coalitions. NATO interoperability means each mission does not start afresh. NATO has the expertise and wherewithal to deliver reconstruction and stabilization (E. Williams 2008), it wields legitimacy that ad hoc coalitions lack, and it is a useful conduit when US initiatives are blocked by UN vetoes. Nevertheless, US willingness to circumvent NATO demonstrates the limited usefulness of the alliance to the USA (Goldgeier 2009). The clinching argument is that, given the USA’s strategic ‘pivot’ towards Asia, if NATO does not assume a global role the US will lose interest (Goldgeier 2010), further draw down its Europe-­based forces (which have declined by 86 per cent since 1989), condemn NATO to oblivion and make it more difficult for European states to ensure their own security.

13.7 The Council of Europe (COE) 13.7.1 Background COE’s founding statute, agreed in 1949 by ten states, gave it a wide remit in socioeconomic, scientific, public administration and legal fields, with a

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particular emphasis on human rights. Barring national defence, the statute allowed COE to range across almost any policy sector, but the direction it has chosen has ‘depended largely on circumstances and external factors’ (MacMullen 2004). As IOs with mandates to govern economic affairs and pursue European integration proliferated, COE’s scope has narrowed to promoting human rights, democracy and the rule of law. This is achieved through consolidating common political, cultural, social and legal standards into a coda of European law and through sharing solutions to ongoing dilemmas. These include programmes to improve social cohesion, combat racial and ethnic intolerance, protect minorities, encourage media freedom and study emerging fields like the environment or IT (cybercrime and e-­democracy). COE’s membership expanded steadily and then accelerated after the Cold War with the admission of some former Soviet republics and now comprises 47 members. COE worked with newer IOs to ensure its activities complemented their more focused and sometimes stronger mandates. Indeed COE is an ‘ante-­chamber’ where countries wishing to join the EU can prove their respect for democracy and human rights as well as improve their legal and social structures in preparation for membership. Alongside other IOs (e.g. OECD and UNESCO) it has contributed to several European initiatives, including the European Patent Office (Chapter 10, section 10.10), the Centre for European Nuclear Research (Chapter 15, section 15.3) and the European Space Agency (Chapter 15, section 15.6). COE’s most significant and notable activities surround the development of the most extensive human rights regime of any RO (Tavares 2009). In 1950 COE promulgated the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, establishing, inter alia, rights to life, privacy, conscience and religion, plus four freedoms: of expression, of association, from discrimination and from servitude. Subsequent protocols refined the Convention and appended extra rights, but not all members have ratified them. The Convention established the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) (often confused with the European Court of Justice – ECJ, Chapter 11), to which individuals can appeal after exhausting their national legal processes. Since 1997 ECHR has been made permanent, its procedures have been simplified, and a Human Rights Commissioner has reported on members’ activities, a process designed to promote human rights more emphatically. COE membership is conditional on ratifying the Convention and ECHR decisions. Many COE activities directly or indirectly support democratic ideals and foster the rule of law. Surprisingly, COE has been the forum for negotiating

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over 200 treaties and conventions, including the Berne convention on rare and endangered species, a European convention to freeze assets from organised crime, a convention for the prevention of torture, and a convention for the protection of national minorities. Periodically it has built on the work of other IOs, tailoring broader legislation to suit its members, whose interests tend to be relatively homogeneous, one example being the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, developed jointly with OECD. COE develops basic social policies, such as defining minimum social security standards, improving the administration of justice (by supporting legal training and better judicial systems) and, in response to heightened threats, drafting legislation to combat terrorism. COE has promulgated over 180 codes and guidelines aimed at standardizing public health, educational and legal practices, covering subjects as varied as social security programmes, migrant workers and motor insurance; for example, it has developed legally binding standards for organ transplants and medical substances.

13.7.2 Structure Three heads of state summits have been convened: in 1993 to discuss the fall of communism, in 1997 to reinforce COE’s human rights mandate, and in 2005 to set COE’s future trajectory. Summits apart, COE has a broadly parliamentary structure, with two main organs, the Committee of Ministers (COM) and the Assembly. COM is the custodian of COE values and where delegates finalize common positions. Here there are parallels with OECD (Chapter 10, section 10.1), as Foreign Ministers attend COM annually, but normally it is composed of Permanent Representatives. The Assembly, consisting of nationally appointed parliamentarians, meets quarterly and is the principal forum for developing and agreeing proposals before passing them to COM for approval. The Assembly has 14 committees devoted to investigating specialized matters. Some 300 specialist subgroups provide authoritative advice and display characteristics of epistemic communities, but Trommer and Chari (2006) observe that these subgroups’ successes are as much driven by policy overlaps and common ideological missions as by assembling a definitive body of knowledge. Below the Assembly there is a consultative Congress of Local and Regional Authorities. Meeting annually and designed to enhance democratic regional and local governance, the Congress has 636 members representing over 200 000 authorities. COE usually works by consensus, but COM and the Assembly require a two-­ thirds majority to adopt formal conventions or legislation, although informal recommendations require unanimous agreement. This seems counterintuitive, except that members are free to pick and choose which conventions

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or parts thereof they wish to apply. Larger membership has increased the complexity of and time spent on negotiating agreements. Therefore COM has created a small bureau comprising its past, present and next Presidents to manage the organization’s agenda and facilitate internal dialogue and relations with the EU. The SG and Secretariat play a low-­key role, but their expertise is acknowledged and, as in all IOs, the Secretariat supplies the technical know-­how. With no hegemon, an inconspicuous Secretariat and a tripartite presidential bureau, the power distribution in COE is diffuse, with no one actor or group predominating. ECHR has one full-­time judge per member and is divided into five sections balanced by gender, region and different legal systems. When a Court vacancy arises, the relevant member nominates three judges, and the Assembly selects one to fill the position. Judges normally sit in ad hoc chambers of seven to hear cases, and the President of the Court or the VP presides over all chambers. Where cases involve a member, the chamber co-­opts a judge from that state as an ex officio member of the bench. A Grand Chamber of 17 judges can be convened for serious cases and can refer them to the full Court. ECHR decisions are binding but are enforced by national courts.

13.7.3 Current activities ECHR consumes the largest share of COE’s budget, and the simplification of its procedures has stimulated interest in its potential as a source of redress. Since the 1990s the number of applications to ECHR has expanded 50-­ fold, and it has accumulated a backlog of cases (150 000 by 2012). Cases originating in Russia account for 25 per cent of the backlog, and four other states (Turkey, Italy, Romania and Ukraine) account for another 36 per cent. To expedite decisions ECHR is making limited use of three-­ or one-­judge panels, subject to acceptance by the relevant state, and members are considering reforms that will reduce future cases. Presently ECHR is involved in the controversial area of human rights of persons accused or suspected of terrorism where (for example in the UK) the state adopts extrajudicial remedies. Negotiations are ongoing for the EU to subscribe to the Convention of Human Rights, which would make ECJ subject to ECHR decisions. Potentially this could produce a situation whereby an intergovernmental body which allows members to selectively apply its decisions gives a judgment to a supranational body that requires the same members to adopt its decisions. COE’s range is demonstrated by a selection of its current campaigns. The 2005 heads of state meeting stepped up COE work to combat terrorism,

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official corruption, people trafficking and organized crime. Building on a long line of related policies dating to 1972, it is examining how members ensure that counter-­terrorism activities do not infringe basic human rights and developing new norms on special investigative techniques and witness protection. It is also refocusing on social policies, particularly to protect the rights and prevent the social exclusion of vulnerable groups. Starting in 2011 COE has had a team dedicated to reducing the Roma’s marginalization and is promoting a project to train Roma mediators. Preventing and prosecuting the perpetrators of violence against women and children are another prominent plank of COE work. COE is attempting to convince states to abolish corporal punishment (22 had done so by 2012) and promote child-­friendly services. In education it is supporting programmes teaching intercultural relations and, with the EU and UNESCO, is unifying Europe’s higher education certification. Finally COE’s Internet Governance Strategy is seeking to ensure that cyberspace is secure, reliable and universally accessible yet balances the promotion of freedom against protecting fundamental rights.

13.7.4 Evaluation and future challenges Despite being eclipsed by more sharply focused or better-­resourced ROs, COE’s low-­key approach has yielded important achievements. ECHR, the world’s only legally binding human rights court, is a singular success. Nonetheless, the quality of judges, especially those from states with dubious human rights records, occasionally leaves something to be desired. ECHR has demonstrated a persistent willingness to upbraid states breaching the Convention. Indeed ECHR has weighed into contentious fields sidestepped by other IOs, including securing improvements to Turkey’s prisons and compelling Russia to compensate victims of abuse in Chechnya. Outside ECHR, COE has engaged governments on subjects they have been reluctant to discuss nationally, and its evidence-­based diplomacy has prevailed in the development of a host of beneficial social and legal norms grounded in ‘soft law’ (MacMullen 2004). For example, COE was instrumental in getting a European-­wide moratorium on capital punishment, and its Committee on the Prevention of Torture is the only pan-­European body that can inspect members’ prisons. COE occupies an important niche in the European political system. As an unashamedly intergovernmental organization overwhelmingly reliant on ‘soft law’ it is a useful forum to which European states preparing for, excluded from or wary of the EU’s supranational proclivities can bring their problems and get assistance for administrative and constitutional reform. This may explain Russia’s decision to join even though membership had the potential

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to cause it public discomfort in areas where it lacked democratic norms. In contrast to the case in the EU, states do not generally make formal commitments at COE and so tend to be more pliant. Furthermore being able to ‘pick and mix’ policies allows members to partake in European integration at their own pace, reducing incentives to block new initiatives. However, COE lacks proactive tools (such as peer review) to encourage the laggards. COE has similar drawbacks to other IOs reliant on soft laws in that states ignore them. Liberals and constructivists point to the fact that COE can rely on moral suasion to induce uncooperative members to comply, but this is ineffective if they do not wish to defend their reputations. Russia, for example, has repeatedly disregarded its commitment to abolish the death penalty, and although ECHR may rule against a member that does not mean compliance follows. However, COE can act as a proving ground for ideas and policies that are later adopted by more formal institutions, which may account for the enthusiasm with which civil society participates in its ­activities (Trommer and Chari 2006).

13.8 Asia Asia’s immensity and diversity raise questions about whether it is really one cohesive region. US strategic and economic influence is considerable, but since 1945 Asian politics has been marked by the rise of Japan, China and India, none of which has shown consistent predisposition towards aggressively imposing its influence on the region, as all three have depended on economic interdependence to maintain their development. The different geopolitical designs of China, India and Japan plus Communist China’s prolonged exclusion from any formal political alliance are amongst the reasons why no pan-­Asian political alliance was formed. Asian institutions tend to reflect this environment, with many of its international bodies remaining informal arrangements rather than fully institutionalized IOs. Indeed commentators maintain that changes in Asia’s economic, social and political landscape are driven more by universal IOs and the international system more generally, while Asian ROs play only a ‘modest role’ (Beeson 2008: 100). Asian IOs confront formidable problems. Asia has the world’s largest proportion of impoverished people and regional powers whose fingers hover over the nuclear trigger. It is wracked by failed states, insurgencies and civil conflict, and authoritarianism is widespread. At a sub-­regional level ineffective organizations generally mirror patterns found elsewhere. Eight Indian subcontinent nations form the South Asian

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Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), a collaborative mechanism to accelerate economic growth, foster social progress and consolidate mutual trust. However, India’s hegemonic initiatives have been treated cautiously by other members, while its fraught relations with Pakistan have disrupted consensus building and ensured SAARC’s achievements have been trivial. In 2001, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and China founded the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a political alliance with undefined objectives other than mutual security and limited military cooperation. China has used SCO to collaborate with its northern neighbours in anti-­terrorism activities, particularly against threats from Muslim fundamentalists and ethnic separatists. The value of SCO military cooperation seems marginal, except that Chinese–Russian cooperation counterbalances Western military activity and SCO has become a forum to pressure the US to decommission its Central Asian bases. Recently Iran was invited to attend meetings in an attempt to open a dialogue on its nuclear programme.

13.9 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 13.9.1 Background Until the late 1940s, colonial domination and geography kept South-­East Asian countries largely isolated from each other, hindering development of ROs. Decolonization and the Cold War transformed this, as conflicts between newly independent countries were plentiful, civil wars erupted and virtually all countries had skirmishes with communist insurgents. This final point, especially in combination with the aspirations of regional and global hegemons and China’s Cultural Revolution, placed Asia squarely on the Cold War chessboard, providing the pretext for the US to foster the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) as part of its containment strategy (see Box  3.2). SEATO, which closed in 1977, was not an indigenous regional project. Nevertheless it built a network of Asian bilateral diplomatic relationships. ASEAN’s formation by Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore in 1967 institutionalized these relationships and sought to curtail threats to their sovereignty caused by domestic strife and the threat of war. Tensions between the founding members resulted in an insipid mandate. ASEAN’s fundamental norms, enunciated in several key documents, most notably the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, are to: zz respect

the sovereignty of members, resolving not to interfere in their domestic affairs;

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zz promote regional peace and security through forsaking the threat or use

of force; zz foster economic cooperation, social progress and cultural development.

ASEAN’s processes lean heavily on the personal connections of political elites, which eschew formality in favour of extensive informal consultation and non-­binding consensus decision making, all key features of the so-­called ‘ASEAN way’. It shies away from controversy, particularly in the security realm, fearing that this will weaken ASEAN unity and political influence. Consequently it has shunned peacekeeping, fearing this would violate sovereign prerogatives, which it was founded to prevent. Instead members agree to disagree, and intractable conflicts are generally discussed indirectly. In the 1980s and 1990s ASEAN’s membership expanded (with the accessions of Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar) and its remit grew to embrace trade, finance, the environment and non-­traditional security threats. The most salient development was the announcement in 1992 of moves towards an ASEAN Free Trade Area. In parallel with this ASEAN’s security apparatus was revamped to include meetings with neighbours, other regional blocs and global powers, a process known as ASEAN+. Three groups are of interest, ASEAN+3, ASEAN+8 and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (see Figure 13.2 for details of these and other ASEAN-­associated institutions). ASEAN+ meetings allow members to engage with a variety of powerful regional players in a multilateral framework. ASEAN+3 discusses several issues falling within ASEAN’s mandate, including regional security dilemmas. Although problems such as the status of the Spratly Islands and nuclear weapons programmes are nowhere near resolution, they are being discussed openly. ARF deals with political, security and social issues relevant to the broader region; however, it carefully avoids contentious problems, including Taiwan and the Indo-­Pakistan conflict. ARF’s economic work has slowly become more structured, giving birth to two separate institutions, Asia-­Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the East Asia Summit (Figure 13.2). In the new millennium ASEAN has shown signs of greater ambition. The 2003 ASEAN Concord II foreshadowed the installation of an ASEAN Community by 2015 based on security, economic and socio-­cultural pillars. In 2008 the ASEAN Charter became the organization’s first overarching constitutional document, giving it a formal legal personality and, while reiterating ASEAN’s ingrained sovereign tenets, committed members to democracy, good governance and promotion of human rights. Nonetheless the Charter and some of the changes envisaged under the Security Community, ­including

Figure 13.2  ASEAN’s structure

Committee of Permanent Representatives

Subcommittees for: Narcotics, Environment, Culture, Social Development, Science and Technology

Five Economic Subcommittees

ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights

INTERNAL

SG and Secretariat

28 Sectoral Ministerial committees

Regular bilateral meetings with the EU, Japan and 13 other nations

Asia Pacific Economic Council

ASEAN Regional Forum 27 Asia Pacific nations

ASEAN + 8 Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, USA

ASEAN + 6 Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea

ASEAN + 3 China, Japan, South Korea

Coordinating Council (Foreign Ministers)

Three ASEAN Community Councils Political/Security Economic Community Socio-cultural

East Asia Summit 18 East Asian states plus Russia and USA (follows HOS Summit)

Summit of Heads of State

EXTERNAL

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bolstering regional partnerships in conflict prevention, resolution and post-­ conflict rebuilding, seem likely to conflict with the cherished principles of non-­intervention (D.M. Jones 2008) or to be eviscerated by the ASEAN way. For example, the Charter provided for a ‘human rights body’, which in 2009 was formalized as the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights. However, the principle of non-­intervention has resulted in a toothless organization lacking investigatory or enforcement powers.

13.9.2 Structure Heads of state summits and a Coordinating Council of Foreign Ministers, which prepares for and follows up on summits, convene annually and biannually respectively. Under the Coordinating Council, three Community Councils are responsible for progress within the ASEAN Community, and below them are ministerial committees answerable for specific policy fields (Figure 13.2, ‘Internal’). Permanent Representatives pursue members’ interests and liaise with the Secretariat. ASEAN has a further ten subcommittees, which deal with detailed economic and socio-­cultural issues. It has tacked on to this structure regular bilateral and multilateral meetings with other states (Figure 13.2, ‘External’). For its first decade ASEAN had no Secretariat, steering activities being rotated among members. Even now its SG is appointed in alphabetical rotation from the members, which is another reason for ASEAN’s weakness. Indonesia is the organization’s ‘big beast’, but it does not impose itself as much as hegemons elsewhere; nevertheless other members are careful not to challenge it. Indonesia has been a reluctant participant in ASEAN’s economic initiatives, but it benefited from ASEAN support over East Timor, to the detriment of ASEAN’s own reputation. However, ASEAN’s generally pro-­Western stance matches Indonesia’s.

13.9.3 Current activities Within the Security Pillar of the ASEAN Community there is an ongoing dialogue with China over its maritime claims against Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea, and ASEAN is advocating that all interested parties adopt a Code of Conduct. North Korea’s nuclear threat is another major concern, and ASEAN is pursuing the establishment of a South-­East Asian nuclear-­weapons-­free zone at the UN. Non-­traditional security concerns are also prominent in regional plans, covering disaster preparedness (see below), illegal commerce, piracy and terrorism. The last two have been a problem for Indonesia and the Philippines in particular. Half

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the world’s shipping trade passes through Singapore and the Malacca Strait, and ASEAN members are cooperating within ASEAN+8 to combat piracy. ASEAN established ASEANPOL in 2009, a regional version of Interpol to counter criminality and enhance security, and is developing regional mechanisms for fighting terrorist activities. The Economic Pillar is dominated by a disparate set of bilateral agreements between ASEAN and other states. An internal free trade agreement has been in effect since 1992, but it is riddled with exceptions and weakened by these bilateral agreements. While ASEAN appears to be determined to reinvigorate the agreement, for example through integrating all tariffs into one coda, there is competition from wider initiatives such as APEC. Trade in services is slowly being addressed, and mutual recognition agreements for the professions are being developed under a commitment to free movement of skilled labour. Progress is slower on establishing free movement of capital and investment. Recently progress on economic matters slowed still further, overshadowed by political differences over dealing with China’s maritime claims (see section 13.9.4). Outbreaks of avian influenza and SARS have propelled public health cooperation to the forefront of its agenda under the Social Pillar, and ASEAN is cooperating with WHO to improve response to future pandemics. It has a regional stockpile of antiviral medicines sufficient for 500 000 persons and is assessing each member’s preparedness for a pandemic. A related area of activity is disaster preparedness, with attention being paid to coordination of resources and communications. However, the main thrust of the social programme is education and improving the labour force. This covers many aspects, including capacity building of national civil services and improving IT skills. As ASEAN tries to move industrial production up the value chain, it is also promoting a ‘decent work’ agenda (see Chapter 7, section 7.2).

13.9.4 Evaluation and future challenges The organization’s mandate and the ‘ASEAN way’ are not conducive to tackling the region’s more intractable problems. Consequently ASEAN’s practical results are modest. ASEAN’s purported success in keeping the peace and its one contribution to conflict resolution, ensuring Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodia and paving the way for the 1990s reconciliation process, owe more to regional power distributions and the shared interests of China and the US than to ASEAN. Its desire to respect sovereignty has saved members from losing face but has resulted in grandiloquent gestures that dodge rather than resolve conflict (Beeson 2008). Consultation and confidence building

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through ASEAN may have drawn the sting from specific conflicts, but its failure to deal adequately with pollution from Indonesia’s forest fires, the onset of the Asian financial crisis and its timidity over dictatorships in East Timor and Myanmar have all been ascribed to the non-­intervention principle and tarnished its reputation. Given its heterogeneous and often fractious membership, ASEAN’s greatest achievement has been articulating a set of norms and encouraging members to accept them, even if doubts persist about the contribution they have made to maintaining peace (Nesadurai 2008). It will be essential for ASEAN to reconcile its norm of non-­intervention with the future envisaged by the ASEAN Charter and ASEAN Community and potential international governance challenges. The Charter calls for ‘adherence to the rule of law, principles of democracy and constitutional government’. Members can be reported to the ASEAN Summit for breaches of the Charter, but there is little likelihood of that happening in the short term, and there are no sanctions for non-­compliance. The more assertive profile of the ASEAN Security Community also disconcerts some members, thus making it difficult to apply. For example, ASEAN tried unsuccessfully to intervene in the 2011 border conflict between Cambodia and Thailand. The dispute, which displaced 50 000 persons, was over a 4.5km2 temple site that both claim but which was awarded to Cambodia by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Thailand would not tolerate ASEAN intervention, while Cambodia preferred UN mediation because of ICJ’s favourable ruling. Despite many pronouncements, security governance in ASEAN remains piecemeal, with states acting bilaterally with willing partners that have the competence to assist (Rees 2010). As with other domains, ASEAN is poised to help but, if it cannot cope with issues that impinge on sovereignty when members’ interests diverge or which require sophisticated or strong state capacity to resolve, it will continue to flounder. ASEAN has given rise to a bewildering array of offshoots which, in the absence of alternatives, have put it at the heart of the region’s multilateral diplomacy. Although these initiatives yield few concrete outcomes they do allow issues to be discussed and provide a space for bilateral meetings, even at times between North and South Korea. Notwithstanding the variety of trade initiatives, doubts persist about members’ commitment to economic integration; rather their objective is to increase their share of world trade, for example by ensuring the free flow of manufacturing components (Robles 2004). Tariffs have fallen but, as previously noted (see section 13.9.3), exceptions to the rules are commonplace,

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non-­tariff barriers persist, product standards vary and political obstacles could obstruct liberalization of trade in services (Severino 2007). Moreover most of the progress in freeing trade rests on bilateral deals, and the resulting complex web of bilateral accords complicates rather than simplifies regional trade and is perhaps the biggest indictment of ASEAN in the economic sphere. The changing regional and global balance of power has serious implications for ASEAN’s future effectiveness. Good political relations with China are important, yet contemporaneously ASEAN’s pro-­Western stance has served members well. Recent US moves to reassert itself in the region and China’s growing aggression over maritime claims in the South China Sea are bringing latent tensions into the open. In 2012, a split between countries competing with China over claims to maritime territories (which wanted ASEAN to register their concerns) and those with no competing claims (which wanted to avoid alienating China, on whose largesse they increasingly depend) meant that for the first time in ASEAN’s history a Foreign Ministers’ meeting concluded without issuing a communiqué. If great power rivalries contaminate other dimensions of ASEAN’s work its potential as an effective deliberative forum will be undermined. Moreover, echoing ASEAN’s economic characteristics, countries may start to look towards bilateral ties with Great Powers as a means of achieving their security, thus weakening their allegiance to ASEAN.

13.10 The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 13.10.1 Background CIS is an alliance of former Soviet republics formed in 1991 to manage the USSR’s disintegration. Members agreed to join a collective defence agreement, to foster economic development and to cooperate in areas including human rights, the environment and culture. They also accepted a mutual obligation to renounce the use of force and respect sovereignty. During a frenzied first year, states signed over 250 agreements and inspired a welter of institutions, but tangible outcomes were few. From the outset members have been uncertain about the purpose of CIS. Some states saw CIS solely as a transitory organization to oversee the USSR’s dissolution. Wary of an organization which might circumscribe their newfound sovereignty or, worse, effectively cede it back to Russia, the region’s hegemon, they cultivated alternative alliances that could better promote their interests. In 1999, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova

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agreed a cooperative defence covenant outside CIS (known as GUUAM or GUAM after Uzbekistan departed the group in 2005), stimulated by concerns over Russia’s military deployments and its efforts to control the region’s energy supplies and infrastructure. Members also pursued bilateral ties and inaugurated sub-­regional institutions that better reflect their interests, for example the Eurasian Economic Community, a Russian-­sponsored six-­ member CIS grouping which has, on economic matters, surpassed CIS as ‘the pre-­eminent regional organization [in] the post-­Soviet space’ (Kubicek 2009: 247). These reservations translated into lukewarm commitments to CIS. Few members participate in all CIS institutions, decisions are seldom endorsed by all members, and breaches of agreements are commonplace (Nitikin 2008). For example, an economic community based on the Russian rouble was formed in 1991 and a free trade agreement in 1994. The rouble zone stoked inflation in Russia and was swiftly abandoned, while the free trade area was stillborn after Russia failed to ratify it. By the end of the 1990s CIS’s inability to promote regional cooperation and integration led many to forecast its demise (Kubicek 2009: 238). Under the Putin and Medvedev presidencies Russia has accorded a higher priority to relations with CIS states as it has sought to reassert its regional power; nevertheless, CIS fragmentation continues. The CIS military dimension is centred round the Collective Security Treaty and an agreement that the USSR’s nuclear weaponry passed into Russian command. The treaty, originally limited to five years, was not renewed by all signatories and spawned another example of organizational fragmentation, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), involving only six CIS members. CSTO organizes combined military exercises and provides peacekeeping forces to intervene in situations concerning its members and elsewhere. CSTO membership precludes joining other military alliances, thus bolstering Russia’s influence, and CSTO has replaced the Warsaw Pact as the region’s forum for initial discussions on strategic arms reduction with the West.

13.10.2 Structure The highest policy-­making levels of CIS are the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government. Below those two bodies a ministerial Council of Heads of Collective Security considers defence and internal security. Defence cooperation is based on CSTO, which like NATO has a dual structure of political and military commands, a joint military

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force which coordinates members’ operations, and a single, coordinated air command. There are several other ministerial councils, the most important being the Council of Foreign Ministers, which oversees ongoing activities under delegation from the Council of Heads of State. Below the ministerial councils are some 50 other bodies working on specific issues, although not all members are participants. An Inter-­Parliamentary Assembly can formulate common legislation, but since this is on a take-­it-­or-­leave-­it basis its impact is negligible. A Court for Economic Arbitration exists for economic disputes, but it is weak. It has no enforcement mechanism, a narrow remit and is confined to interstate disputes. Consistent with ‘variable geometry’ (see below), not all states have accepted its jurisdiction. Reflecting members’ desire to avoid central direction there was originally no CIS secretariat, but in 1999 reforms created an Executive Council, supported by a Secretariat and Executive Secretary, whose roles are to coordinate rather than to implement. In contrast to the monolithic Soviet system and given the organizational disarray previously described, CIS’s structure operates on the principle of ‘variable geometry’, through which members can selectively engage (Dragneva 2004). Nygren (2008) observes that CIS works in almost the opposite way to other IOs. Most IOs build consensus for new norms from the working level upwards, thereby first resolving technical complexities. CIS members generally first agree to a high-­level, in-­principle declaration and subsequently negotiate how it is to be executed. Only when all details have been resolved is an agreement ratified, resulting in many formal meetings but minimal implementation. Ratification is also flexible. Members can accept the overarching principle but not implement it or reject the principle but negotiate related agreements. Full consensus, therefore, is not a necessary precondition for policy development. Of 886 documents adopted by the Councils and Assembly between 1991 and 1998, only 130 were signed by all members (Kubicek 2009).

13.10.3 Current activities CIS has a plethora of bodies and meetings developing cooperative policies. Examination of their recent reports continues to show that they are long on rhetoric and short on implementation (see section 13.10.2). Their main outputs are draft conceptual agreements (for example on integrated currency markets and the development of rail transport) or framework agreements (such as that on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy), which are submitted to higher-­level bodies for approval, but very few concluded conventions or concrete regulations appear at any level.

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State security impels current CIS collaboration. Success in creating a unified air command has not been matched by other security activities, although CSTO is developing a joint rapid reaction force, as well as supplementing members’ internal security endeavours. CIS members cooperate on counter-­ terrorism (particularly responding to insurgent Islamic fundamentalism) and fighting cross-­border criminal activities (drugs and people trafficking). Members are also addressing continuing instability in the North Caucasus region and ethnic tensions in several sub-­regions. The 2011 combined military exercises, the largest to date, were designed to develop members’ responses to ‘Arab Spring’ types of civilian unrest. Economic development is pursued through 68 sectoral cooperation bodies within an overall ten-­year development plan focusing principally on trade, transport, energy, agriculture and communications. Mineral resources provide 30 per cent of CIS GDP but are concentrated in four states (Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan). To spread the benefits and allay the concerns of weaker states, agreements are being formulated to guarantee their access to those resources. Other current programmes are designed to bring CIS tariffs into line with WTO rules (of particular importance following Russia’s 2012 accession to WTO) and to ensure food security through liberalization of trade in foodstuffs and improvements in agricultural cooperation. Mirroring the EU, CIS is establishing transport corridors to simplify and speed the movement of goods, but it differs from the EU in that there is no central funding for this initiative. In an environment where businesses face uncertain regulatory structures, members are also developing a single intellectual property regime and coordinated currency control regulations.

13.10.4 Evaluation and future challenges CIS deserves credit for providing some semblance of stability as the USSR imploded, but Russia’s initial alarm over the USSR’s demise has slowly given way to a more outwards posturing, with a desire to recapture its prior international importance. CIS, therefore, now deals more frequently with external threats, particularly those of concern to Russia, which also uses CIS to better the welfare of and safeguard the 25m Russian nationals living in Russia’s sphere of influence, known as the Near Abroad. Otherwise, CIS can hardly be depicted as a success. Russia has struggled to make it an effective foreign policy tool, because unlike the Warsaw Pact it is an association of independent states rather than a mechanism coordinating the component parts of a whole. CIS activities have also been restricted by other organizations trespassing on its patch. In the South and East, SCO shares both members and remit. NATO’s expansion and the professed desires of Georgia and Ukraine

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to become members threaten from the West. Nevertheless, the future of CIS, as an integral part of Russia’s diplomatic and strategic armoury, seems secure. Russia sees CIS institutions as counterpoints to Western-­oriented IOs and NATO and as a bulwark against US encroachment in the Near Abroad, where bilateral agreements have allowed US forces into other members’ territories to pursue Al-­Qaeda and the Taliban. As the regional hegemon, Russia tends to ignore CIS norms and acts unilaterally, making allies distrustful of many CIS initiatives. Indeed principles of sovereign non-­interference, peaceful dispute settlement and economic cooperation ‘have been breached more than practised’ (Kubicek 2009: 242), as Russia’s annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia in 2008 (prompting the latter to leave CIS) exemplified. CIS sent peacekeeping forces to Moldova (1992), Georgia and Abkhazia (1994) and Tajikistan (1993– 2000), but they were initially unilateral Russian deployments that only later received the CIS imprimatur, suggesting this was a thinly veiled attempt to interfere in local disputes. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Georgia’s aggressive posturing leading to a short war, and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, where the US has a military base, have all caused consternation in Russia, and CIS provides Russia with an economic and military structure to counter these problems. CIS fragmentation reveals the existential crisis at the heart of the organization, as members other than Russia lack a common interest in active participation and little incentive to support the institution when other opportunities arise. Thus CIS is held together by two countervailing interests, the hegemon projecting its power and the others containing it. Sushko (2004) summarizes the integration process within CIS as: ‘amaz[ing] with their numbers, ambitious character, short duration and continuous failure. Russia, the main promoter of this process, changes the “brands” of its ideas nearly annually, desperately continuing to package the same empty concepts in an attempt to draw neighbouring states into Moscow’s sphere of interest.’

13.11 Africa Africa, more than any other region, has failed to respond to the challenges of the modern era. Its colonial history, dominated mainly by Britain and France, resulted in incongruous boundaries, causing inter-­ and intrastate conflicts. Despite some optimistic signs it remains a continent of extreme poverty, devastating famines and corrupt, undemocratic, power-­hungry governments, which foster weak institutions. Reflecting this ambiance African ROs have achieved little. Attempts to foster democracy plus the growing importance of

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human security and economic issues have renewed efforts to develop ROs, although resource shortfalls are a constraint. There are 15 overlapping, small, ineffective, African sub-­regional organizations (Laakso 2005: 490), such as the East African Community, the Economic Community of Central African States and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, but two merit some consideration. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was started in 1975 to promote economic cooperation, with the ultimate aim of economic union. Political realities in the sub-­region meant that security progressively displaced economics as its primary function. In a 1993 treaty revision, provision was made for ECOWAS to supply peacekeeping support in sub-­regional conflicts. Notwithstanding familiar injunctions commanding respect for sovereignty, ECOWAS has developed into one of Africa’s more redoubtable security actors, having undertaken peacekeeping operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-­Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire. Because instability in a single member poses a threat to the whole sub-­region, ECOWAS has had success, particularly in cooperation with AU, in arresting problems, for example pressurizing Guinea to reintroduce democracy, and suspending the membership of Niger following a coup and Côte d’Ivoire when presidential election results were overridden. Like AU missions, those of ECOWAS have been hampered by poor coordination, lopsided military contingents, and nations (most notably Nigeria, the regional hegemon) disguising intervention motivated by national interests under the cloak of IO legitimacy. Mali, West Africa’s newest trouble spot, initially received meagre ECOWAS attention because of Nigeria’s own internal problems and the sheer size of the military intervention needed until UN, EU and other external support was provided. A dearth of funding exacerbates these issues, as the assistance of external paymasters is crucial, leaving ECOWAS vulnerable to manipulation. Economically ECOWAS has reduced regional restrictions on the movement of goods, services and people and helped improve communications and transport infrastructures. A $360m Bank for Economic Cooperation, Compensation and Development was established to finance development projects and to compensate members adversely impacted by trade liberalization, but it has never been fully funded. In 2001 six members created the West African Monetary Institute, hoping to introduce a second African regional common currency, the first being the Franc zone. Its role is similar to that established for the European Monetary Institute, the precursor to ECB, namely to oversee the conditions needed for national economic convergence. However, the proposed central bank has not been established.

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The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was founded in 1981 as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference, its original purpose being to harmonize development and reduce members’ dependence on South Africa’s apartheid economy. SADC initially received much external political support. In 1994, when South Africa’s international isolation ended, it became the pivotal member, causing SADC’s remit to alter. Peace and security mandates have now been added to its trade and development activities. The SADC Secretariat is small, because unusually each member state takes responsibility for a specific activity, such as Angola (energy), Mozambique (transport) and Zimbabwe (food security). At its more powerful members’ behest, SADC twice intervened in internal conflicts (Congo Democratic Republic and Lesotho), with disastrous results (Likoti 2007). This explains why SADC now considers internal conflicts to be purely domestic affairs and its reluctance to intervene in Zimbabwe following the disputed 2008 elections, for which it was heavily criticized. Although some members felt that a more determined stance against Zimbabwe was appropriate, South Africa’s hegemonic influence ensured SADC’s inaction. However, in 2011, with South Africa becoming exasperated with President Mugabe, a SADC report strongly criticized his political party (Zanu PF) for betraying agreements made with the opposition. Nathan (2006) attributes SADC’s ineffectiveness in security matters to the lack of common values once apartheid ceased to be a unifying element (members range from Botswana’s pluralistic society, with Africa’s highest per capita income, to Zimbabwe, with its anti-­colonial rhetoric and almost ‘failed state’ status), members’ unwillingness to cede sovereignty to an RO, and the weakness of the region’s states.

13.12 The African Union (AU) 13.12.1 Background The creation in 1963 of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), with a charter promising to forge cohesion among African nations, better the lives of their peoples and respect UN definitions of human rights, seemed to promise Africa the strong communal voice needed to bring the continent prosperity and a more powerful political presence. While OAU could never have solved Africa’s manifold problems, its history was undistinguished. Zacher (2001: 231) credits OAU as a ‘major influence’ in obtaining the withdrawal of troops in nine of the 11 African wars after 1963, but this was overshadowed by its neglect of widespread atrocities in inter alia Rwanda, Sudan, the Congo Democratic Republic, Somalia, Sierra Leone and Angola and indulging dictators engaged in egregious human rights abuses. African conflict prevention,

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management and resolution became the UN’s preserve (see Chapter 5) and, from the 1990s, were increasingly delegated to sub-­regional IOs. OAU’s failure to deliver its mandate paved the way, in 2002, for a new organization, the African Union. Echoing its predecessor the AU Constitutive Act calls for the organization to ‘promote peace, security and stability on the continent’ and holds sovereignty sacrosanct. However, there are two important differences. First, as well as concerns with democracy and human rights, AU’s remit broadened to include sustainable development, good governance, gender equality and health. AU is able to suspend members flouting democratic and human rights principles, and NEPAD (Box 13.5) is the mechanism through which many of these wider objectives are pursued. Second, while interference by other states remains prohibited, AU can intervene in a member’s affairs in ‘grave circumstances’, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. BOX 13.5

THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT (NEPAD) The latest in a line of African development initiatives, NEPAD was conceived as AU’s economic development arm. In conjunction with HIPC (Box 8.2), it aims to halt Africa’s marginalization, eliminate poverty, improve governance, empower women and support sustainable development. The NEPAD Secretariat helps mobilize financial resources for Africa, particularly from bilateral sources. Within NEPAD an African Peer Review (APR) Mechanism exists to pressure members to improve their governance. While NEPAD has received support from OECD, with its long experience of peer review (Chapter 10), APR reports have taken longer than origi-

nally foreseen, while governments have struggled to fund the resource-­intensive exercise. Most reports have been relatively ineffectual, but some have had an impact. Ghana, already an example of good governance, is developing a land use plan and has introduced anti-­corruption and human rights legislation based on APR review. While 33 governments have signed up to APR, basket cases (including Zimbabwe and Congo) have neither volunteered nor been pressed for a review, reflecting the historical tendency for African leaders to avoid embarrassing each other publicly, which has further limited NEPAD’s effectiveness.

13.12.2 Structure AU’s primary decision-­making body, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, meets annually to set overarching policy and approve major decisions, but its most important function is to decide if AU should ­intervene

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in an internal conflict. It delegates supervision of ongoing activities to a biannual Executive Council of foreign ministers (also attended by Permanent Representatives, who also have their own Committee, which meets frequently). Both subsidiary bodies work by consensus, although lacking consensus a two-­thirds majority applies. Mirroring the UN, AU has a 15-­member standing Peace and Security Council (PSC), with almost complete authority to keep the peace or impose sanctions but which cannot initiate direct intervention. PSC’s work is assisted by a ‘Panel of the Wise’, a Secretariat, an early-­warning system based on information provided by sub-­regional organizations, and a Military Staff Committee. It is currently assembling a standby force with sufficient funds to support immediate operations. The standby force became operational in 2010, despite only ECOWAS’s brigade being ready, although two more contingents have since been added. The AU Authority or Commission, modelled after the EU Commission, oversees the Secretariat’s day-­to-­day work. Except for redesignating Heads of Department as Commissioners, changes in the OAU Secretariat’s personnel or structure when it developed into AU were trivial. The Pan-­African Parliament, a nationally nominated consultative and advisory body, has made a tentative start, running ten parliamentary committees. However, funding problems constrain its activities to two short sessions annually. A planned court and financial mechanisms remain on the drawing board. AU’s membership covers all African nations except Morocco; however, there is no regional hegemon. South Africa and Nigeria prefer to influence sub-­ regional organizations, and some potential hegemons are precluded from exerting strong influence either because of their internal problems (Congo Democratic Republic) or because they have insufficient economic clout (Ethiopia). This opened the door to activist governments such as Libya and Uganda taking the lead, sometimes for their own self-­promotion.

13.12.3 Current activities Ongoing AU peacekeeping activities are concentrated in Darfur and Somalia. AU provides around one-­third of the joint UN–AU force of 21 000 separating the warring parties in Darfur following the AU-­brokered ceasefire. NATO provides AU with airlift and logistical support but is hampered by an uncooperative Sudanese government. Attempts to place AU peacekeepers in Somalia had limited success, as only Uganda and Burundi responded, and activities were confined to Mogadishu. However, a 2010 terrorist attack on Uganda by Shabab (a Somali group associated with Al-­Qaeda) galvanized members to expand the force. Guinea and Djibouti now provide troops and,

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since 2011, Ethiopian and Kenyan forces have been deployed west and south of Mogadishu, putting Shabab on the defensive. As with Sudan, however, AU depends on external supplementary resources from the USA, EU, NATO and LAS. On the economic and governance fronts, NEPAD notwithstanding, external engagement by donors is still apathetic; in fact, donors are disillusioned with NEPAD’s selective impact on governance behaviours (Cilliers 2003). In a new development, aimed at greater economic integration, the 2012 AU summit pressured sub-­regional bodies to conclude their trade agreements within two years, hoping they could become a platform for a Pan-­African free trade area within three years, an optimistic timetable given the dismal history of African integration (Welz 2012).

13.12.4 Evaluation and future challenges Compared to OAU, AU has undoubtedly been more proactive and ambitious. Structural innovations including NEPAD, PSC and the standby force have given it initial mechanisms, however imperfect, on which to build a vision for Africa’s future. Unfortunately external powers remain a major influence in Africa, and China has recently become active, particularly stepping into the vacuum left by others in some less salubrious regimes. In seeking to uphold peace and security AU has intervened in Burundi (2003–04 and 2007), Darfur (2004–07) and Somalia (2007–present). The standby force, although an AU initiative, is being assembled brigade by brigade by selected sub-­regional organizations, giving rise to a potential for conflict of objectives and operational disagreements. Furthermore AU depends on G8 support to fund planning and training activities, while equipment compatibility, different military standards and logistics are unresolved problems. All in all, therefore, while a start has been made, AU is far short of having an effective peacekeeping arm. AU has defended democracy by helping to reverse coups in the Comoros Islands, Togo, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Additionally it has ostracized states where power has changed hands unconstitutionally, suspending Mauritania (2005, 2008), Togo (2008), Madagascar, Guinea (both 2009), Niger, Côte d’Ivoire (both 2010), Mali (2012) plus Egypt and the Central African Republic (both in 2013). Even though suspensions have not acted as a deterrent they have prompted moves by most suspended members to be reinstated. Internally AU has also tried to send positive signals. The AU

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Chair rotates sub-­regionally, and the Chair-­elect hosts the annual Assembly. In 2007 Sudan was due to host the fifth Assembly, but negative reaction from members to the government’s activities in Darfur saw the meeting transferred to Nigeria. The sixth Assembly was held in Sudan, but automatic election of the host to the AU chair did not follow, seeming to set a new trend of organizational integrity. This impression was subsequently negated by elections of Libya’s Gaddafi (2010) and Equatorial Guinea’s Obiang (2011). Unfortunately, despite signs of AU’s proactivity, there are some countervailing trends. In peacekeeping, sluggish deployments, poor training, weak coordination and lack of leadership have constrained AU interventions (P.D. Williams 2009), with only the first intervention in Burundi being a noteworthy success (Okumu 2009). In Darfur AU forces were spread too thinly to be effective, one region of 12 000 km2 being covered by just 750 troops, and stabilization was only effective once the better-­resourced UN had joined the operation. That peacekeeping forces are drawn from a few countries undermines the perceived neutrality of AU interventions, which in many cases are driven by national agendas. A vestigial respect for non-­intervention has prevented AU from involvement with, or impugning the leaders of, member states experiencing horrendous human rights violations, such as Zimbabwe, Equatorial Guinea and the Congo Democratic Republic (two of which have been PSC members). As regards human rights, although African nations themselves refer cases to the International Criminal Court, AU has consistently complained that Africa is being singled out and has not cooperated to bring the accused to justice. Furthermore AU has equivocated when faced with succession movements pursuing self-­determination (e.g. Southern Sudan and Western Sahara) to discourage similar movements elsewhere. The delayed release of an APR report criticizing South Africa gave rise to concerns that AU backs down in the face of powerful members. Subsequently states have been reluctant to participate in APR, particularly when national election cycles end. While NEPAD is a vehicle for improving governance, the perception is that its top-­down approach will fail and that AU needs to pay more attention to other development issues, specifically urbanization, public health, transport infrastructures and rural development (Makinda and Okumu 2008). NEPAD’s adherence to laissez-­faire concepts and its neglect of civil society partners have prompted criticism (Herbert and Gruzd 2008), but the reasons for its lack of impact lie elsewhere. Though IBRD and Af DB have allocated resources to support NEPAD, the developed world has reneged on its commitments. Moreover, stalled WTO talks on agricultural trade (Chapter 10, section 10.2) inhibit small-­scale farmers from becoming an engine of development.

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Finally, AU is severely constrained by personnel, finance and management deficiencies. The Secretariat is too small and inexperienced for its tasks, and its analytical capacity is inadequate, something that is also true of member states. The brightest minds gravitate towards more prestigious postings in the UN System and Af DB. As the Secretariat is a holdover from OAU, unless there is a strong political pressure for reform the OAU modus operandi may be perpetuated. Funding shortfalls, while improved over OAU levels, are a severe impediment, and peacekeeping activities cannot be sustained without major commitments by members. AU’s role is considered sufficiently crucial for it to be the only political and security RO which is supported financially from outside the region. Only 40 per cent of the current $274m budget comes from members (the core Secretariat costs), the remainder being donated bilaterally. Thus, though the Secretariat has a Conflict Management Division which supports current activities and plans for the future, it cannot function without NATO logistical support.

13.13 Trans-­regional and global alliances Sections 13.14 to 13.17 review the three main trans-­regional organizations with political and security responsibilities and Interpol. The Commonwealth’s perceived advantage to Britain has resulted in two similar but less successful organizations: the International Organization of the Francophonie, a 53-­country association sharing French cultural and language ties; and the 23-­member Organization of Ibero-­American States, which fosters cultural ties between Spanish-­and Portuguese-­speaking countries. The Inter-­Parliamentary Union, an early PIU (see Chapter 2), studies the work of the world’s legislatures to improve their effectiveness, encourages legislative cooperation across diverse political systems, and provides them with a deliberative forum. Though it aims to encourage democracy, a democratic parliament is not a precondition for membership.

13.14 The Organization for Security and Co-­operation in Europe (OSCE) 13.14.1 Background Composed of 56 states ‘from Vancouver to Vladivostok’, the word ‘Europe’ in the organization’s title is, to some extent, a misnomer. OSCE’s ancestry lies in the détente period of the 1970s with the Conference on Security and Co-­operation in Europe (CSCE) and its ensuing Helsinki accords (see Chapter 3). While US–USSR relations soured over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and US incursions in the Caribbean, CSCE persevered in

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confidence-­building measures such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact exchanging information on troop strength, military budgets and deployment of weapons systems. Galbreath (2007) credits CSCE with defusing some of the tensions associated with the Cold War’s twilight years. After the USSR’s collapse, CSCE adopted the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, which recognized the Cold War’s demise. Subsequently CSCE evolved into a fully fledged IO, acquiring new institutions to further democracy, human rights and military reform. It was renamed OSCE in 1994. OSCE’s overarching objective is to promote security across Europe, Central Asia and North America, with its work focusing principally on two areas defined in the Helsinki Final Act. The first covers politico-­military aspects of security. Originally concerned with interstate conflict, OSCE has reoriented its work towards the civil wars, ethnic conflicts, terrorism, people trafficking and organized criminality that have marred the post-­Cold War era. It is the only IO with specific mandates for national minorities, with its High Commissioner on National Minorities being a pioneering accomplishment. The second deals with human security through advocating democracy and human rights. OSCE’s work is based on norms established by the 1999 Charter for European Security, supplemented by decisions of its Permanent Council. Norms are applied through a multi-­pronged strategy of dialogue and confidence-­ building measures. These include the aforementioned monitoring of troop movements, quiet behind-­the-­scenes diplomacy, mediating during ceasefires, and post-­conflict peacebuilding, plus sharing experiences, for example on how best to tackle organized crime, improve policing and monitor elections.

13.14.2 Structure OSCE has a conventional three-­tier structure. Periodic heads of state summits set overarching objectives. A Council of [Foreign] Ministers meets annually to make decisions supporting those objectives and to govern the organization. Below this a Permanent Council of national representatives meets weekly. OSCE makes decisions by consensus, and no one country or group of countries dominates. A Parliamentary Assembly provides a forum for broad debate, and a Court of Conciliation and Arbitration supports OSCE efforts to resolve matters that could result in or have caused conflict. There are three permanent subsidiary institutions: a Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC), which discusses arms control, disarmament and confidence-­building measures; an Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, which furthers democracy and

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the rule of law; and the aforementioned High Commissioner for National Minorities, whose task is to identify and help resolve ethnic tensions that might endanger peace. Leadership is exercised by an annually rotating Chairperson-­in-­Office, supported by the predecessor and successor incumbents. The Chairperson, always a Foreign Minister, provides political leadership and represents OSCE to governments. The SG represents the Chairperson, with the result that the Secretariat is not proactive in its involvement in interstate disputes, leaving this to the Chairperson, who brokers any initial resolution. The SG oversees a relatively small Secretariat of 565 staff, but OSCE is heavily field oriented, having some 18 field missions, all of which are ‘East’ of Vienna, with more than 2200 field observers seconded from members, the majority working in former Yugoslavia.

13.14.3 Current activities In the politico-­military arena, three continuing conflict situations dominate OSCE’s work, and for each OSCE has a consultation mechanism designed to ease tensions and stimulate dialogue. Progress, however, is slow. The Geneva group handles problems involving Georgia and is attempting to broker small confidence-­building measures. The 5+2 group, working on Moldova, has recommenced meeting after a five-­year hiatus. The Minsk group, dealing with the Armenia–Azerbaijan dispute, investigates cross-­border incidents but also sponsors meetings of the Presidents and Foreign Ministers of the opposing parties. In 2010, following Russia’s 2008 attack on Georgia and in an attempt to develop better relations between members, OSCE initiated the Corfu Process. This is designed to resolve these protracted conflicts, revitalize overall confidence building and deepen members’ cooperation against external threats. In this last respect OSCE is assisting countries neighbouring Afghanistan to improve their border controls. More generally, FSC is the focal point for a continuing dialogue on weapons non-­proliferation and arms exports, building on agreements already reached on portable ground-­to-­air weapons and the security of national weapons’ stockpiles. Several OSCE missions handle post-­conflict situations, especially those in former Yugoslavia and the Balkans. Kosovo is a typical example, where OSCE is involved in inter-­community dialogue, improving the judiciary, police reforms and countering human trafficking. Encouraging better policing and improved border security is a major activity, and ten ongoing OSCE field missions involve some element of police support and advice on preventing illegal immigration. A further initiative, linked to its minorities’ mandate, is to train police

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to handle hate crimes, coupled with improvements in policing the Roma communities. OSCE is working on counter-­terrorism activities; it has convened meetings on suicide terrorists and runs a programme in CIS countries, jointly with Interpol and the International Civil Aviation Organization, to link border police to Interpol databases. In fostering improved norms, election monitoring continues to be an important task, with 14 elections observed or evaluated in 2012. Post-­election human rights abuses in Belarus have caused concerns at OSCE, but as the government’s response has been to close the OSCE mission the organization now has to pursue a dialogue without a local presence.

13.14.4 Evaluation and future challenges OSCE has achieved some important successes, but there are clearly gaps in its effectiveness. As with CSCE, which took 2500 meetings to agree the Helsinki Final Act, much of its work consists of small steps. Thus the concept of an overarching security community from Vancouver to Vladivostok is far from being a reality, although Russia, through the V to V Dialogue, is advocating a legally binding European Security Treaty, which would set down clear processes for OSCE dispute resolution interventions. Broadly OSCE has contributed to restraining the latent military threats within its membership. It has the potential to contribute to stability in the Caucasus, where ethnic conflict continues and where it maintains a number of confidence-­ building observer missions. Significant accomplishments have been the 2002 Treaty on Open Skies, which allows pre-­programmed aerial surveillance flights over signatories’ airspace, plus its work in building trust within Croatia. OSCE has not stopped all conflicts but has prevented some from reigniting. It facilitated a productive dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan and persuaded Estonia and Lithuania to address the concerns of their ethnic Russian minorities, while its election-­monitoring methodology has been adopted by several other organizations. Nevertheless, the euphoria following OSCE’s formation has dissipated, owing to its failure to stem some of the region’s worst conflicts, especially in Central Asia, where its effectiveness is constrained by resources and poor awareness of internal political dynamics (Warkotsch 2007). OSCE is increasingly dogged by reviving East–West tensions and, arguably, its initial successes drew on a honeymoon period when East–West interests converged. Beleaguered Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Western nations that espoused him saw OSCE as a bulwark against his overthrow and to secure democratic reform. The validation of European borders by CSCE and its advocacy for the rights of the Russian diaspora deepened this support. Financial dependence on the West also constrained Russia from being more

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assertive over security issues in its backyard. In 2000, however, these interests started to diverge, making OSCE’s task harder. Partly because of OSCE and Western support, Yeltsin bequeathed a strong presidency to Vladimir Putin. Subsequently higher energy prices emancipated Russia from Western aid and undercut OSCE’s support for civil society groups that had bolstered regimes antagonistic to Russia, such as the ‘colour revolutions’ in Georgia and Ukraine. Russian dissatisfaction with OSCE election monitoring in Ukraine and Moldova (where OSCE was vocal in trying to secure free elections in the disputed territory of Transdniestria) led to it withholding some assessed dues and imposing tight restrictions on OSCE observers. As Russia is a major contributor, this caused a budget crisis, which sparked a review of OSCE’s functions with a view to mollifying Russia. The review proposed that OSCE focus on its relative advantages, such as providing police training and electoral observers, supporting early-­warning activities, and conflict prevention measures. It also stimulated the Corfu Process. Reform then fell foul of Russian–US disagreement, and OSCE’s inability to intervene in the Georgia–Russia conflict exposed further weaknesses. The election of Kazakhstan to chair the organization in 2010, interpreted by some as another sop to placate Russia, has raised concerns about whether OSCE will sustain its emphasis on political openness and reform in the former Soviet republics. However, OSCE remains the only regional or trans-­regional organization to which both the USA and Russia belong and so, despite East– West infighting, it is a venue for continuing dialogue. Russia now uses OSCE as a forum to raise issues such as the new US missile defence system and NATO encroachment on the Near Abroad, where tensions persist (see sections 13.6 and 13.10). While OSCE can achieve little on its own and overlaps with other ROs, it fills niches overlooked by other European security organizations, like advocacy for minorities and election monitoring. Importantly, in key locations it has field representatives who facilitate dialogue and are OSCE’s eyes and ears. They maintain considerable contact with civil society, which gives OSCE useful early warnings of violent extremism and discrimination, but they are less effective in providing forewarning of political disputes.

13.15 The Commonwealth 13.15.1 Background The Commonwealth is mainly an association of former members of the British Empire and has some entitlement to being considered the oldest

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continuing political association of states. Petitions for consultative channels within the British Empire date to 1869 (McIntyre 2008), and regular meetings of colonial prime ministers became the norm from 1907. The Commonwealth took shape in 1931, centred around the six dominions (Australia, Canada, the Irish Free State, Newfoundland, New Zealand and South Africa), but not all former colonies joined, and Ireland withdrew in 1948. Commonwealth membership expanded after the Second World War to incorporate countries that had achieved independence. Apart from having experienced direct or indirect British rule, most Commonwealth members share little in common, nor are there any overriding regional, political or economic reasons for their participation. Indeed, the Commonwealth is impossible to characterize. Most of its 54 members are republics, yet the British monarch is its titular head. Members are a medley of the world’s biggest, wealthiest, smallest and most destitute states, yet the Commonwealth’s consensus approach is designed to allow them all an equal voice. The organization treasures the diversity of the two billion people it represents yet transacts all business in English. It lacks a founding charter, yet it has evolved stringent rules about the standards expected of members. It has all the paraphernalia of an IO (though it only acquired a Secretariat in 1965), yet some of its most important work is carried out by a thriving ‘unofficial’ Commonwealth (see section 13.15.2), a sprawling coterie of professional, business and civic associations (McIntyre et al. 2007) that runs exchange visits, funds activities to improve professional skills, promotes cultural exchange and strengthens Commonwealth NGOs. The Commonwealth’s aims are similarly inchoate, but broadly it seeks to foster dialogue between members, encourage peace and democracy, and promote sustainable development, social justice, human rights and the rule of law. It dabbles in many subjects, including education, health, environment, gender, culture, sport and security. Typical examples of its work include distance learning programmes developed for use by educational institutions through the Commonwealth of Learning initiative and a software package to assist governments manage their international debts. The Commonwealth relies principally on soft mechanisms of capacity building and knowledge sharing to pursue its objectives rather than resource transfers or norm creation and enforcement. However, the organization does provide some development assistance, and its richer members tend to target their aid to Commonwealth countries. Even in the security realm the Commonwealth utilizes soft power. Only once has the Commonwealth

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deployed peacekeepers (to supervise Southern Rhodesia’s transition into Zimbabwe). It chooses instead to pursue conflict resolution through the good offices of the SG, whose personal appointees seek to mediate in Commonwealth trouble spots. Thus, the Commonwealth ‘is a series of continuing debates, in which ideas rather than power politics are decisive’ (Bourne 2007: 32). The Commonwealth has slowly developed tighter behavioural norms for members, but implementation again rests on peer pressure not formal sanctions. The 1991 Declaration of Commonwealth Principles (the Harare Declaration) was the culmination of a process starting with the 1971 Singapore Declaration through which members now pledge to uphold, as fundamental principles, democratic political processes, the rule of law, good governance, human rights and equal opportunities. The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG), instituted in 1995, polices these rules, provides good offices to defuse difficult political situations and has the power to recommend penalties for wayward states, including ultimately suspension. The Commonwealth has successfully intervened in internal matters, brokering several political compromises, including in Tonga, Kenya (in both cases leading to new constitutions), Guyana and Swaziland.

13.15.2 Structure The biennial Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) discusses broad matters of international relations and development cooperation, but decisions are generally non-­binding and reached by consensus. Finance Ministers meet annually, and CMAG deals with adherence to the Harare Declaration. There are also ministerial and sub-­ministerial meetings on specific topics. The SG wields little formal authority, but the position provides a ‘bully pulpit’ for those, such as former SG Ramphal, who wish to use it. The relatively small Secretariat organizes meetings and operates a TA programme (the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation). A Small State Office provides, inter alia, a joint representational office at the UN. There is also the unofficial Commonwealth, a parallel network of professional, business and civic groups, which with an associated body, the Commonwealth Foundation, supports mostly non-­governmental educational and cultural initiatives. With a tri-­sector focus on business, civil society and youth, the unofficial Commonwealth’s best-­known enterprises include the Commonwealth Games (the largest international sporting event after the Olympics), the Commonwealth Institute, and exchange programmes such as the Commonwealth Business Council.

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Initially the British government viewed the Commonwealth as a conduit for British influence, giving it an ‘imperial role without imperial rule’ (Stockwell 1999). The UK remains an important member, supplying 30 per cent of the budget, but no longer plays a hegemonic role. This reflects the ‘equality of status’ lying at the heart of the Commonwealth and is a deliberate ploy by the UK to ‘punch beneath its weight’ to avoid allegations of neo-­imperialism (P.D. Williams 2005). The UK’s declining power in the organization during the second half of the twentieth century reflects two further developments. EU membership downgraded Britain’s trade links with Commonwealth countries. This had a concomitant impact on its political influence, as UK foreign policy gradually shifted away from the Commonwealth as a locus. Additionally, the UK’s policies on apartheid and Southern Rhodesia slowly eroded its standing within the Commonwealth (see also section 13.15.4).

13.15.3 Current activities Fiji is currently suspended until it restores democracy, and the Commonwealth is engaged with the military dictatorship to achieve this objective. It is also watching developments in Zimbabwe in the belief that it will eventually return to membership following its withdrawal when suspended in 2002. Members’ national elections are regularly monitored, usually in cooperation with other IOs, with 13 being observed in the period 2011–13. The Commonwealth actively supports small states providing them with the visibility and resources which singly they cannot realize. It convenes a biennial small states meeting to coordinate policy and exchange best practice. It is also pressing for World Bank Group and IMF governance reforms to give smaller states a greater voice in decision making, while a joint Commonwealth– IBRD task force gives them a higher development priority and helps them prepare for external shocks to which they are vulnerable, such as climate change and natural disasters. The failure of the Copenhagen climate change meeting notwithstanding, the Commonwealth remains actively engaged in follow-­up discussions on small states’ behalf. To encourage good public sector governance the Commonwealth is training civil servants in all aspects of public administration, ranging from procurement to human resources. It supports countries embarking on public–private partnership initiatives through propagating information on  best practice. It also provides guidance on drafting legislation, advises on better government procurement practices, and runs training in performance management.

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13.15.4 Evaluation and future challenges The Commonwealth is a quiet success compared to some more grandiose IOs. Commonwealth sanctions played a central role in opposing independent white rule in Southern Rhodesia in 1966, and it later applied sanctions on South Africa in the fight against apartheid. It has recorded several small victories, including becoming a strong advocate for the HIPC Initiative, defending small states against hostile proposals from other IOs such as OECD (Chapter 10, section 10.1) and lobbying for Africa at G8 meetings (Bourne 2007). However, detractors believe its impact is exaggerated (Srinivasan 2005), and ‘a lot of little accomplishments do not make a great organization or even a good and valuable one’ (Chan 2005). The UK considers it gives poor value for money, principally because its activities are spread too thinly (DFID 2011) and, along with a 2011 eminent persons’ report to CHOGM, has advocated that it focus on its comparative advantages, such as supporting small states. The Commonwealth has attempted to support democratic governance by suspending, at various times, Fiji, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe. Results have been variable. Nigeria eventually returned to democracy, but in Fiji the military insists that other constitutional reforms have priority. CMAG involvement was successful in Tanzania, less so in Uganda and unsuccessful in Zimbabwe. Violations of Commonwealth values are also transcended by political considerations, with Pakistan and Kenya’s support for the war on terror helping to shield them from CMAG displeasure. The eminent persons’ report proposed a more robust line be taken against members who contravene human rights, but the report was shelved owing to concerns over proposals to appoint a human rights commissioner and to increase the roles of CMAG and the SG. Furthermore, the organization’s decision to hold its 2013 CHOGM in Sri Lanka reinforced the view that its stance on human rights is weak. The seeming neutrality of the Commonwealth, which is less dominated by the interests and ideologies of powerful states, offers it the opportunity to play a seminal role in this century’s emerging issues. For example, Commonwealth countries are home to 500m Muslims and, as the US is not a member, it is a less charged atmosphere in which to discuss strategies to combat Islamic fundamentalist terrorism (P.D. Williams 2005). The Commonwealth bridges the North–South divide, making it a useful precursor to formal negotiations elsewhere on subjects as diverse as tax havens and climate change. Recent developments in membership emphasize this point. Originally membership centred round relationships with the UK, but since a CHOGM decision in

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2008 the Commonwealth has accepted applications from states not previously British colonies, on condition they adhere to the Harare Declaration. Mozambique, a country with strong ties to some Commonwealth countries because of its cooperation over sanctions on Rhodesia, was admitted in 1995, and Rwanda joined in 2005. Others, such as Timor-­Leste, are considering membership, even though their links are tenuous. The fact that states are attempting to join suggests the organization is doing something right. A unique challenge concerns the Commonwealth’s future leadership. Until now the British monarch has always been the Commonwealth’s titular head, but the question of whether the post should pass to Queen Elizabeth II’s successor or to a Commonwealth figure has been raised. The Queen represents members’ shared history and gives the institution a higher profile than its resources imply, but increasingly members are distancing themselves from that heritage, as indicated by the swelling ranks of republics. The more diverse the membership the less important the titular head becomes and the more difficult it will be to continue the traditional consensual informality of the institution, and other IOs may then provide more appropriate forums.

13.16 The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) 13.16.1 Background When the Ottoman Empire collapsed, the resulting vacuum was occupied by warring tribes, with Saudi Arabia seeking political primacy. Before the 1960s, attempts to form a pan-­Islamic institution (see Box 13.6) had come to naught, possibly because of Saudi resistance, but the eventual catalysts were the 1967 Arab–Israeli war and the burning of Jerusalem’s Al-­Aqsa Mosque in 1969. The OIC Charter’s ambitions are to promote ‘noble Islamic values’ and ‘revitalize Islam’s pioneering role in the world’ through engendering Islamic solidarity, assisting members to secure their own independence, fostering Islamic activities and safeguarding Muslim holy places. To this end it maintains a permanent Al-­Quds Committee on the status of Jerusalem. OIC, like LAS, provides political and economic support to Palestine, and its relationships with Israel have fluctuated. In 1981 it coordinated an economic boycott of Israel as part of a (non-­military) jihad. This was revoked in 1991, in an attempt to further the Middle East peace process. In 2001 OIC withdrew from contacts with Israel to protest against Israel’s military response to the Intifada in the West Bank and Gaza, especially over the destruction of civilian property.

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As OIC is a trans-­regional body, its reach extends beyond the Middle East, so it has intervened politically to assist Muslim communities worldwide. It attempted mediation in conflicts in Bangladesh, Chad and Lebanon and, in the 1990s, extended its activities to Afghanistan by coordinating funding of projects for Afghan refugees. It also supports Muslim minorities such as those in former Yugoslavia, where in cooperation with the UN its members provided some troops to protect threatened Muslim populations in Bosnia-­Herzegovina. BOX 13.6

PAN-­ARABISM AND ISLAM The terms ‘Arabism’ and ‘Islam’ should not be confused or used interchangeably. In its most restricted sense the designation ‘Arab’ refers to the inhabitants of the Arabian peninsula and their ethnic descendants (including those in North Africa). However, culturally it extends to places like Sudan where Arabic is a predominant language. Islam is the religion which most Arabs practise, but it is now a global faith with adherents who term themselves Muslim,

not all of whom speak Arabic. Many countries with a Muslim majority are far from the Arab world (e.g. Indonesia), but they have adopted religious beliefs and practices advocated by and originally designed for the peoples of the Arabian peninsula. One of the most misunderstood of these is jihad, a term which in Western minds has militaristic overtones associated with the Crusades but which has a much broader meaning relating to a struggle for self-­improvement.

OIC members support economic, social and cultural cooperation. This includes funding the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB, Chapter 8, section 8.9). Under OIC’s social remit an Islamic Solidarity Fund for Development helps Islamic institutions construct mosques and establish Islamic centres and schools, as well as universities in Uganda and Niger. Its economic assistance often has humanitarian overtones; for example, it provided aid to the Sahel countries in the major drought of 1972 and more recently funded relief efforts in Chechnya, in the Indian Ocean region following the 2005 tsunami and post-­war reconstruction projects in Sierra Leone.

13.16.2 Structure The 57-­member OIC’s supreme decision-­making body is the triennial Islamic Summit of Kings and Heads of State. An annual Council of Foreign Ministers adopts resolutions to ensure that general policies are implemented. Decisions are made by consensus or failing that by a two-­thirds majority. An Executive Committee makes day-­to-­day decisions. Its members are the

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past, present and next Chairpersons of both the Summit and the Council, a representative of the host country (Saudi Arabia) and the SG, who therefore has more influence and a higher profile than in some ROs. There are four standing committees, the Al-­Quds Committee and others dealing with economic, cultural and technological issues. By virtue of its major financial contribution, Saudi Arabia is the predominant member, although at times larger, more radical Arab states have exerted considerable influence.

13.16.3 Current activities OIC’s ten-­year programme of action stresses support for Islamic solidarity and the protection of Islamic minorities. Reflecting its broader-­based membership, it is not taking sides in the Arab Spring revolutions and is silent on Syria. It is active in providing support to the Afghan government and in attempts to bolster AU in bringing peace to Darfur, and a committee is discussing solutions to the fighting in Somalia. Dialogue with non-­members Thailand, the Philippines and India over problems with their Muslim minorities continues spasmodically. OIC is also sponsoring discussions to protect Iraqi holy places from the ravages of sectarian violence. OIC is building on reforms initiated in 2003, with the fourfold aim of becoming less Arab-­centric, countering extremism (where OIC’s diversity is an advantage), fostering a more moderate image of Islam and improving the West’s understanding of Islam, one facet of which is the opening of an office in Brussels (Harders and Legranzi 2008). This is coupled with attempts to encourage a more democratic approach to governance in the Islamic world, which includes consideration of an OIC Commission on Human Rights and the establishment of an Islamic Court of Justice. The latter is stillborn, as insufficient states have ratified the relevant treaty. It is also starting to engage with Islamic civil society, with the limited aim of enhancing its response to humanitarian disasters.

13.16.4 Evaluation and future challenges OIC has been beset by political rivalries and interstate conflicts (often driven by sectarian distrust) such as the Iran–Iraq War and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Its members’ politics range from Saudi Arabia (pro-­Western, ultraconservative, Sunni) to Iran (revolutionary, theocratic, Shia) and, as both are influential members with their own cliques, this tends to reinforce divisions. OIC’s modest successes have been achieved mostly because of Saudi Arabian financial support and through setting realistic but limited goals. However, OIC was united in its denunciation of the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan and

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continues to support Palestinian aspirations. Iran’s membership potentially positions OIC to play a role in defusing tensions over that country’s nuclear ambitions, for OIC has supported Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear technology despite some members’ concerns. As part of its attempts to improve Islam’s image, OIC has firmly condemned terrorism, particularly as several Islamic countries suffer from indiscriminate  terrorism, and in 1999 it adopted a Convention on Combating International Terrorism. However, like LAS, it distinguishes between terrorism and ‘legitimate resistance to foreign occupation’, which, it considers, defines the Palestinian situation and justifies its support of movements such as the Moro NLF in the Philippines. This is at odds with broader international concerns over terrorism reflected in UN resolutions. Consequently OIC members have blocked the UN from adopting a definition of terrorism that would be a springboard for new international norms. Additionally, reflecting its internal sectarian tensions, it has failed to develop policies to fight Islamic fundamentalism, particularly those using Islamic ideology to justify terrorism. In debating policies to support democracy and improve human rights OIC finds itself in a contradictory position, as its major members have considerable democratic deficits. While OIC protests against Israeli human rights abuses, it fails to address its members’ own abject records, as exemplified by the impasse over its Commission on Human Rights. OIC has been more successful in drawing attention to the problems of Islamic minorities in non-­ member countries and getting other institutions to protect them. Economic activities revolve around IsDB, which supports better trade flows between members, and OIC’s ten-­year plan foresees a free trade area, although this has not moved beyond broad rhetoric. There have been discussions on a common market, but this remains a quiescent activity given the members’ economic and geographic heterogeneity.

13.17 The International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) 13.17.1 Background International police cooperation dates from the mid-­nineteenth century, when states sought to clamp down on perceived internal security threats from communists, anarchists, liberals and social democrats (M. Barnett and Coleman 2005). By the century’s end the recurrent interaction of law enforcement professionals had bred cross-­border trust, collaboration, shared

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knowledge and expertise. When fading security threats meant states lost interest, these ties sustained police cooperation, and consequently international policing operated somewhat independently of states. The 1914 International Judicial Police Congress first proposed an IO to fight crime, but the First World War intervened. In 1923 the International Criminal Police Commission was established to monitor international criminals (Chapter 2, section 2.2.4), which by 1938 had an intelligence network in 31 states. Operations ceased during the Second World War, but in 1946 it was refounded as the febrile post-­war environment stimulated demand for cross-­border police cooperation. In 1956, following the adoption of a new constitution, it was renamed the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), its membership globalized and its caseload expanded 100-­fold. Interpol is not a police force but exists to facilitate cooperation between national forces, although in limited situations it deploys operational teams (see section 13.17.3). Its core task is to improve security through managing the exchange of information on international crime and fugitives. From simple beginnings this service has expanded to cover photographs, fingerprints and DNA details of 160 000 known criminals, and more than 7000 ‘wanted’ notices are published annually. A less formal process covers alerts released directly by member forces through the Interpol communications network. Notices and alerts are colour-­coded to assist in prioritizing action (with red for wanted persons, orange for security alerts/terrorism, blue for information requests, etc.). Typically there are around 11 000 alerts each year, and in 2010 some 8000 suspects were apprehended on the basis of Interpol notices. Interpol also maintains several extensive databases, including records of important stolen and lost documents (such as passports, ­immigration permits or blank identity documents) and lists of stolen vehicles and art works. These records are used to combat criminals involved in smuggling, drugs, people trafficking and credit card fraud. In 2009 around one billion searches were made in all Interpol databases, resulting in 110 000 successful ‘hits’. Interpol operates a dedicated and secure 24-­hour communications network, which allows police forces to exchange confidential communications, including information on terrorist financing. In a typical year more than 16m messages are sent over the network, the majority between European countries. Interpol’s staff maintain these databases, provide operational analyses and assess trends in criminal activity. Interpol also has a capacity-­building role through advancing professional development and the dissemination of best practices. It has some resources available for equipment purchases for forces that would benefit from improved technology and provides training

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in new techniques, particularly for forces in LDCs. This allows them to use Interpol’s services more effectively, for example through giving them better local access to its communications network, plus providing search tools to carry out digital analyses and software to access encrypted documents. The final, and most controversial, aspect of Interpol’s remit is counter-­ terrorism. Interpol was unwilling to combat the skyjackings, bombings and assassinations in the 1960s and 1970s, fearing that it would invite too much state involvement, leading to its channels of communication being overrun by state interests. Furthermore, Article 3 of Interpol’s convention requires it to avoid ‘any intervention of a political, military, religious or racial character’. In other words Interpol should limit itself to common criminals and exclude ‘political’ crimes. The aphorism that ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ illustrates why Interpol was reluctant to become entangled in this way. However, to maintain its relevance, Interpol loosened the notion of ‘political’ crimes and after the 1980s devoted more resources to supporting counter-­terrorism, especially when criminality becomes a primary outcome of terrorist activities. The spread of international terrorism has placed new emphasis on police cooperation, particularly in monitoring the training and financing of terrorist networks.

13.17.2 Structure The General Assembly of all members meets annually to decide overall policy, and the constitution states that, as Interpol is a technical organization, delegates should be high officials of departments handling police affairs, officials in direct contact with Interpol or subject matter specialists. Decisions are taken by majority vote. The running of Interpol between General Assemblies is delegated to a small Executive Committee, which meets semi-­annually and guides the Secretariat’s work. Its 13 members have four-­year terms, and its composition balances regional representation. The Secretariat is structured to deal with specialized crime, operational police work and the support and development of national services, although it is assisted by working groups and expert committees mainly drawn from members’ police services. To support national services Interpol has six small regional bureaux, whose heads also organize the associations of chiefs of police for their regions. Almost half the professional Interpol staff members are on detachment from national police forces, and they return home on completion of their assignments. Detachment ensures that national forces have staff with Interpol operational experience and, conversely, that the most up-­to-­date knowledge and techniques are introduced to Interpol.

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At a country level, Interpol intelligence is funnelled to dedicated national central bureaux, which are fully controlled by member states, while a communications network links Interpol headquarters through these bureaux to individual police officers. Thus, Interpol has the characteristics of a trans-­ governmental network or epistemic community of police.

13.17.3 Current activities The globalization of criminal activity is generating greater demands for Interpol’s services. Interpol has identified capacity building of members’ forces, upgrading of its own databases, emergency response facilities and communications infrastructure as priorities for improvement. It is accepting external funding for initiatives to counter emerging threats, such as a joint Interpol–FIFA training programme on enhancing integrity in sport and anti-­ piracy programmes supported by the UN. Much of Interpol’s current activity involves improving the infrastructure that supports cooperation. Interpol’s flagship initiative is the Singapore-­based Global Complex for Innovation, a cutting-­edge research facility to be opened in 2014. This will target cyber-­security, digital crime, and corruption (particularly in sport) and identify emerging criminal trends. It will also house Interpol’s Command and Coordination Centre (CCC), which provides a single point of contact for any police authority faced with a crisis situation requiring immediate international support. CCC incident response teams, composed of specialists from member forces, will be deployed at short notice to assist members prepare for major international events such as the Olympics and G20 meetings or to deal with the aftermath of major disasters. To ensure its communications system is available without interruption, Interpol is upgrading its I24–7 network, which allows instantaneous information exchange, and building in redundancy so that it may be accessed through more than one portal. As part of upgrading its databases, Interpol is centralizing information on persons involved in or supporting piracy, those convicted of terrorist activities, and lost, stolen or trafficked firearms or explosives. Criminals employ ever more sophisticated logistical and money-­laundering techniques, sometimes integrating their operations into a single structure. Interpol is cooperating with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the World Customs Organization (Chapter 10, section 10.8), OAS (section 13.2) and Europol (Chapter 12, section 12.5.1) to gather information, provide training and integrate international responses to major drug cartels. One example is regional coordination in West Africa, which is a major drugs supply route

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between Latin America and Europe. Another is in training police forces in the countries neighbouring Somalia to help them intercept proceeds from piracy. Despite Article 3 of its Convention (see section 13.17.1), Interpol and the UN are increasingly working together, particularly in bringing those wanted for war crimes and crimes against humanity to justice. Persons wanted by international courts and tribunals and those subject to UNSC travel bans are placed on Interpol notices, and a special series of notices cover Al-­Qaeda and the Taliban. Interpol is also supporting the policing components of UN peacebuilding operations and anti-­piracy operations in the Indian Ocean.

13.17.4 Evaluation and future challenges Interpol, like some other IOs with narrow mandates, provides the international community with effective and widely used services. Centralized databanks realize economies of scale and allow for quick, cost-­effective, global access to sensitive information in an era when criminals can rapidly exploit cross-­border opportunities. As a meeting place for police forces it fosters an environment in which national forces are exposed to global values and norms, thereby generating pressure to abide by those norms and hopefully improving their standards. Interpol’s strict avoidance of politically motivated criminality under Article 3 of its convention sometimes earned it the opprobrium of powerful states. Following the slaughter of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics, Interpol refused West German requests for information about Arab terrorists. Conversely, in 1950, three Czechoslovakian aircraft were hijacked by people fleeing the communist regime and were flown to an American airfield in Germany. Interpol rejected the US argument that this was an act by political refugees absconding from a hostile regime, asserting that it was simple air piracy, and consequently exchanged information with the Czechoslovakian authorities about the incident. Piqued, the US left Interpol, only resuming full membership in 1958. As Interpol has moved into more sensitive areas, however, the lines demarcating Article 3 have blurred, and there have been several controversial cases where Interpol appears to have been manipulated by powerful members. Processes for incarcerating suspected terrorists (for example US use of Guantanamo Bay) sit outside accepted judicial norms and debase the checks and balances that ensure that ‘wanted’ notices are issued following due process. This has further weakened Interpol’s impartiality. Suspicion that political objectives underlie Interpol’s activities can hinder collaboration. There is, however, little doubt that public security is served by using Interpol resources

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to counter terrorism. A study sponsored by the US Department of Homeland Security (Sandler et al. 2011) very favourably assessed Interpol’s cost–benefit advantage in the fight against terrorism. The Interpol stolen travel document database was four times more effective than the equivalent US national database in identifying arriving passengers using stolen passports. While international terrorism is the primary challenge facing Interpol, computer crime is a close second. Criminals are equally adept in using the very technology exploited by Interpol. Forged websites extracting financial data from unsuspecting individuals, pornography and hacking are the visible face of such problems. Since hacking is often a coordinated international activity, Interpol provides a central mechanism for police forces to analyse and trace those concerned. Increasingly, police need to tap into criminal communications and analyse the hard disks of suspects’ computers but frequently lack the required skills and resources. Even though Interpol’s training programmes play an important role in keeping smaller forces abreast of new techniques, it is not a mainstream disburser of international TA funding, so its resources are limited. In some fields Interpol’s primacy is being challenged by new, more specialized bodies. For example, Europol, ASEANPOL and the Financial Action Task Force are amongst the many bodies that now counter money laundering and terrorist financing. Interpol’s established network and the size and mounting complexity of its databank give it a significant operational and cost advantage; indeed M. Barnett and Coleman (2005) believe it has developed new databases specifically to reinforce its position. Given the use made of Interpol by European police forces, Europol’s creation (Chapter 12, section 12.5.1) might have posed a threat to its effectiveness. In fact EU member forces show a preference to use Interpol rather than Europol, as Interpol has tried-­and-­tested mechanisms that deliver results. Furthermore, as an epistemic community, Interpol is also preferred to Europol with its more political origins. Regional bodies need Interpol, as it is the only central facility for assembling information on criminals who operate outside their areas. SUGGESTED READING

Anderson, M. (1989), Policing the World, Oxford: Clarendon Press. [Places and describes Interpol in a broad context] Galbreath, D.J. (2007), The Organization for Security and Co-­operation in Europe, Abingdon, UK: Routledge. [Traces OSCE’s development from CSCE with case studies of its work] Horwitz, B. (2011), The Transformation of the Organization of American States: A Multilateral Framework for Regional Governance, London: Anthem Press. [Explores the recent evolution of OAS plus its promotion of regional security and democratic governance]

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Ihsanoglu, E. (2010), The Islamic World in the New Century: The Organization of the Islamic Conference, 1969–2009, London: Hurst. [Contemporary, but written by the current SG and diplomatic in its critique] Jannis, M.W., R.S. Kay and A.W. Bradley (2000), European Human Rights Law: Text and Materials, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Covers COE, ECHR and its substantive rulings] Jones, L. (2012), ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention in Southeast Asia, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave. [Critiques the idea that ASEAN has upheld principles of non-­intervention, arguing that elites have regularly intervened to suppress popular protest] McIntyre, W.D. (2001), A Guide to the Contemporary Commonwealth, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave. [Concise, factual and evaluative overview of the Commonwealth’s governmental and non-­state actors] Olcott, M.B., A. Aslund and S.W. Garnett (1999), Getting It Wrong: Regional Cooperation and the Commonwealth of Independent States, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. [A readable overview of a secretive organization] Schmidt, G. (2001), A History of NATO: The First 50 Years, 3 vols, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave. [A comprehensive review of NATO from politics to weapons systems] Tavares, R. (2009), Regional Security: The Capacity of International Organizations, Abingdon, UK: Routledge. [Concise and salient overview of political ROs] Webber, M., J. Sperling and M.A. Smith (2012), NATO’s Post-­Cold War Trajectory: Decline or Regeneration?, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave. [Uses the lenses of international relations theory to argue NATO will survive, but wracked by crisis] Welz, M. (2012), Integrating Africa: Decolonisation, Sovereignty and the African Union, Abingdon, UK: Routledge. [Examines members’ perspectives of AU to explain Africa’s stalled integration process]

Internet resources Arctic Council: http://www.arctic-­council.org ASEAN: http://www.aseansec.org AU: http://www.africa-­union.org CARICOM: http://www.caricom.org CIS: http://www.cis.minsk.by COE: http://www.coe.int Commonwealth: http://www.thecommonwealth.org Council of the Baltic Sea States: http://www.cbss.org East African Community: http://www.eac.int ECOWAS: http://www.sec.ecowas.int Gulf Cooperation Council: http://www.gcc-­sec.org Intergovernmental Authority on Development: http://www.igad.int International Organization of the Francophonie: http://www.francophonie.org Inter-­Parliamentary Union: http://www.ipu.org Interpol: http://www.interpol.int LAS (full English language site not yet ready): http://www.arableagueonline.org Maghreb Arab Union: http://www.maghreb-­arabe.org NATO: http://www.nato.int NEPAD (AU): http://www.nepad.org Nordic Council: http://www.norden.org OAS: http://www.oas.org

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OIC: http://www.oic-­oci.org Organization of Ibero-­American States: http://www.oei.es OSCE: http://www.osce.org Pacific Community: http://www.spc.int Pacific Islands Forum: http://www.forumsec.org.fj SADC: http://www.sadc.int SCO: http://www.sectsco.org South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation: http://www.saarc-­sec.org WEU: http://www.weu.int

14 The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research For much of recorded history average life expectancy was less than three decades. This wretched outlook stemmed, in large part, from chronic nutritional shortages. In 1798, Thomas Malthus prophesied that these miseries would be exacerbated as population growth outpaced agricultural productivity. Happily, the Malthusian catastrophe was averted by the scientific and technological revolutions that massively expanded food production in the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century this trend accelerated. Propelled by agricultural subsidies, food surpluses emerged in many developed countries after the Second World War. Indeed diseases related to excessive calorie intake are now the biggest source of fatalities in industrialized societies. In the developing world, the Green Revolution (Box 14.1) sparked enormous strides in agricultural productivity in the latter half of the twentieth century. Swathes of Asia and Latin America no longer suffer endemic food shortages, food prices have drifted downwards and, despite the global population doubling since 1960, per capita food consumption has grown. By the mid-­1990s there were 75m fewer malnourished people in the developing world than 15 years earlier, and the proportion of undernourished people in the population fell from 28 per cent to 15.5 per cent (UN 2012). Regrettably, as the twenty-­first century dawned, the Malthusians were back with a vengeance. Improvements in recent decades cannot mask the abominable conditions in which a substantial minority of humanity live, and the world confronts a food crisis which the WFP’s Executive Director has described as a ‘silent tsunami’ submerging the world’s poor. Progress on malnutrition is now in reverse, although expanded agricultural productivity has come at a heavy social and environmental price. Globally, two billion people suffer from deficiencies in the vitamins and minerals that ward off disease and are essential to bodily growth, and 24 000 people die daily from hunger-­ related causes, making such causes the world’s biggest killer. Moreover,

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hunger and poverty create a vicious circle. Enfeebled by hunger many people are unable to work or to learn, thus trapping them in poverty. Before the global economic recession aggravated matters further, increases in world food prices since 2005 had denied millions of people access to adequate rations. Prices were pushed higher by acute food shortages combined with mountainous oil prices which magnified prices of fertilizers and transport. Extreme weather conditions resulted in inferior harvests, exposing insufficient food reserves, while defective policy responses, such as export restrictions, hindered trade in foodstuffs and presented a challenge to policy makers (Clapp and Cohen 2009). The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), which touts laissez-­faire market-­driven solutions to stimulate agricultural trade, has had meagre success in persuading countries to reduce rather than increase state intervention, which in the long term tends to amplify peaks and troughs in supply and demand. Dismissing this as a temporary setback seems mistaken. By 2050, according to UN estimates, there will be at least another 2.5b mouths to feed; however, cereals and grains will be diverted to feed livestock to satisfy increased protein-­rich diets in newly industrializing countries, there will be greater competition for already scarce agricultural land from biofuel manufacturers, and land productivity will decline from overuse, water shortages and climate change. For millions in developing countries food (in)security is a matter of life and death. Hunger and poverty are multi-­causal phenomena with no straightforward policy solution. Famines induced by cruel or misguided rulers, the forces of nature and barriers to agricultural trade are perennial problems, but virtually all mainstream commentators accept that food insecurity can be alleviated by sustainable boosts in agricultural productivity. Though it is no panacea, humankind’s hopes are again pinned on scientific innovation. Large agribusinesses are aggressively expanding their research but, as the case of pharmaceuticals vividly demonstrated (Box 10.3), relying exclusively on corporate actors is dangerous, as their exploitation of knowledge for profit may deny access to those in the greatest need. An alternative model is to pursue research via an IO which will derive and disseminate the knowledge as a global public good. The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) is just such a body. Surprisingly, given the centrality of agriculture and food to the human condition and the role of scientific cooperation in raising past and future agricultural productivity, CGIAR and other IOs devoted to the issues seldom feature in textbooks concerned with global politics. The other food and agriculture IOs touched upon in this book, such as FAO, IFAD and WFP,

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veer towards operational mandates and boast frontline functions in allaying hunger. In contrast, CGIAR has a more programme-­orientated mandate to produce the knowledge needed to tackle poverty by delivering sustainable increases in agricultural productivity. CGIAR provides public goods that developing states struggle to cultivate on their own because they lack human capital and scientific infrastructure. As the range of tropical plant and animal diseases is completely different from those occurring in temperate zones, the Centres are located in developing countries, enabling them to replicate relevant agricultural conditions, providing a pool of scientists working with the most modern techniques and equipment who communicate their findings to subsistence farmers through established national networks. Even IFPRI, a think tank located in Washington, DC, has five regional offices to keep it in touch with conditions in the field. With these preliminary observations in mind this chapter covers the 15 international agricultural research organizations that together constitute CGIAR. The chapter commences by examining CGIAR’s overarching features before going on to look at three broad groupings of institutions under its canopy: a ‘special crops’ group, a farming systems group and a more general group with broad-­based agricultural, forestry or fisheries perspectives.

14.1 The Consultative Group 14.1.1 Background CGIAR’s origins lie in the development of two programmes for agricultural research, the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre (Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maíz y Trigo, CIMMYT) and the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). CIMMYT was a programme funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Mexican government in 1943, which expanded in 1966 into an independent Mexican institute, and IRRI, based in the Philippines, was established in 1960 and funded by the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations. By the late 1960s these institutions had substantially contributed to assuaging human hunger by developing the plant varieties that triggered the ‘Green Revolution’ (Box 14.1). In 1967, the foundations funded two more institutions, the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) in Nigeria and the Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical (International Centre for Tropical Agriculture, CIAT) in Colombia. CGIAR’s establishment in 1971 reflected ‘an almost providential alignment of global circumstances, organizations and structure’ (Dalrymple 2008: 353). First, the late 1960s witnessed mounting concern over global food scarcity,

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BOX 14.1

THE GREEN REVOLUTION The Green Revolution refers to the modernization of agriculture after the Second World War and, in particular, the application of science and technology to augment agricultural productivity. In the 1960s and 1970s CIMMYT and IRRI used conventional plant-­breeding techniques to develop high-­yielding crop varieties resistant to many adverse tropical growing conditions. Their quick propagation, especially throughout Asia, expanded harvests, reduced the permanent threat of hunger

and transformed many countries from net grain importers to net exporters. The Green Revolution’s critics maintain it had unacceptable social and environmental repercussions. For instance, the input costs led some farmers to lose their land, while mechanization contributed to rural unemployment. Proponents, however, maintain that this released labour for more productive employment, thereby helping these countries to ascend the developmental ladder.

especially following devastating droughts in densely populated countries of South Asia, prompting a willingness by aid donors to sponsor agricultural projects. Second, there was a Cold War dimension. US strategists felt that an abundance of food would bring social stability and neuter socialist movements in developing states. Third, there was the entrepreneurship of IBRD President Robert McNamara (Box 8.5). He noted the relative success of CIMMYT and IRRI, compared particularly to FAO, in supporting effective national agricultural research services (NARS) in the developing countries. Recognizing that the funding needed to prolong this work was outstripping what private foundations could donate he conceived the idea of a network of international agricultural research centres, each focusing on specific aspects of agriculture, which would improve the lot of subsistence farmers and the world’s poor. Seed money provided by IBRD, which became the mainstay of the central CGIAR Secretariat’s budget, helped launch nine more research centres in the 1970s. CGIAR develops and applies technology to achieve a sustainable expansion of agricultural output and productivity, thus enhancing food security and reducing poverty, hunger and malnutrition. As Table 14.1 reveals, however, CGIAR’s remit has widened to incorporate a greater range of crops, subjects and geographical areas in response to the inclinations of the development community (Shaw 2008). By the end of the 1970s new institutions covering other key crops, such as potatoes and legumes, had joined rice, maize and wheat in CGIAR’s research portfolio. A geographical emphasis was simultaneously adopted, recognizing that common problems exist within specific

1971 1971 1971 1971 1973 1975 1972 1974 1980 1974 1975 1991 1992 1991 1993

1960 1966 1967 1967 1970 1970 1972 1974 1974 1974 1975 1977 1977 1984 1993

International Rice Research Institute International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre International Centre for Tropical Agriculture International Institute of Tropical Agriculture International Potato Centre West Africa Rice Development Association/Africa Rice Centre International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-­Arid Tropics Bioversity International (International Plant Genetic Resources Institute) International Food Policy Research Institute International Livestock Research Institute (previously ILRAD) International Centre for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas World Agro-­Forestry Centre (International Centre for Research in   Agro-­Forestry) WorldFish Centre International Water Management Institute Centre for International Forestry Research

Joined CGIAR

Created

Institution

Table 14.1  The CGIAR Centres

Penang, Malaysia Colombo, Sri Lanka Bogor, Indonesia

Manila, Philippines Mexico City, Mexico Cali, Colombia Ibadan, Nigeria Lima, Peru Bouaké, Côte d’Ivoire Patancheru, India Rome, Italy Washington, DC, USA Nairobi, Kenya Aleppo, Syria Nairobi, Kenya

Headquarters

worldfishcenter.org iwmi.cgiar.org cifor.org

irri.org cimmyt.org ciat.cigar.org iita.org cipotato.org warda.org icrisat.org bioversityinternational.org ifpri.org cigar/ilri icarda.org worldagroforestrycentre.org

Website – http://www.

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climatic zones. Subsequently other aspects of agriculture were supported, such as livestock and genetic resources. However, with a tendency almost without equal among international institutions, unsuccessful Centres were, for a variety of reasons, liquidated. For example, the scope of the International Network for Bananas and Plantains was too restrictive to achieve broad-­ based results, and the International Livestock Centre for Africa (ILCA) had overlapping mandates with what is now the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI). Initially fixated with expanding the proverbial ‘pile of rice’, CGIAR embraced the integrated vision of development espoused by the international community during the 1980s by focusing on the broader context surrounding agriculture. Its remit came to entail a range of human and environmental components, including nutrition, gender and community cohesion, as it strove to incorporate beneficiaries into the research process. The vogue for environmentally sustainable agriculture in the 1990s stretched CGIAR’s forays to fisheries, forestry and water, reorienting CGIAR away from pure research and towards capacity building. More emphasis was also afforded to tweaking the content of advice to make it context sensitive (Kassam 2003). At the turn of the millennium, CGIAR adopted an updated strategy which moved it still further away from scientific research by encompassing various social and cultural goals. The 15 Centres each have a particular specialism, but typically their research programmes all include improving crop varieties to suit specific farming conditions, devising integrated farming systems based on traditional inputs and protecting against crop diseases and insect infestation. A collaborative philosophy underpins CGIAR. Research work inevitably overlaps because, while the nature of traditional inputs, diseases and insect infestation varies, the specific problems of each climatic zone are addressed with common techniques and often the same crop types. Synergies between different Centres offset the costs of overlap; they share data and analysis extensively and, in addition to their own farms and research stations, they also host research plots and staff managed by other institutions. Moreover, integrated approaches to agricultural production, particularly in Africa and Asia, require thorough collaboration between institutes concerned with plants, livestock and tree crops. For example, CIAT’s work on increasing production of staple foods in the Western hemisphere aims to lift production of beans, cassava, rice and beef. It cooperates closely with IRRI and the Africa Rice Centre (WARDA) on rice production techniques, assisting in the introduction of IRRI’s improved varieties and breeding semi-­dwarf rice varieties suitable for Latin America. It shares research findings: on legumes with IITA, which also has a strong

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interest in this crop in view of its importance in Africa, with CIMMYT on maize production, and with other Centres (such as the World Agro-­Forestry Centre, ICRAF) to devise new cost-­effective technologies to improve soil fertility in hillside ecosystems and the Amazon basin, giving farmers stronger incentives to invest in their land. The developing-­country farmer typically cultivates fewer than five hectares, mostly on poor-­quality soil with irregular water supply, using traditional labour-­intensive methods. Even if subsistence farmers have access to irrigation, fertilizers and small machines they may not be able to afford them, and marketing support is almost non-­existent. Furthermore, poor literacy limits farmers’ appreciation of the global and regional pressures that buffet their industry, such as the impact of climate change or plant and animal diseases and the rewards to be gleaned from pioneering farming techniques. Farming practices consequently tend to be conservative, only adjusting after poor harvests rather than anticipating preventative measures. Therefore, to improve practice on the ground, CGIAR Centres rely heavily on NARS, which in conjunction with ministries of agriculture support intensive national ­agricultural extension programmes for fanning knowledge out to the small farmer, through dissemination of new plant varieties, training programmes, demonstrations and targeted publications. CGIAR Centres support NARS by assisting in the development and execution of their extension programmes, such as providing training modules highlighting new products or introducing techniques they have developed. For example, new seed varieties are released to NARS to produce and distribute, and initial support is provided to ensure the propagation process is successful.

14.1.2 Structure The IOs described in this chapter do not easily fit the patterns of creation, management and development of other IOs. The umbrella funding and policy-­making institution, CGIAR, is a trans-­regional IO fashioned by emanation from IBRD, FAO and others, yet the individual Centres, some of which pre-­date CGIAR, have their own structures and were formed independently to meet a perceived need. Centres may initially appear to house epistemic communities, but the nature of the staff, their structures and their governance do not fully support this. There are no wide-­ranging groups developing policy or involving communities of specialists in an overarching international framework; furthermore, the Centres’ scientific staff range from graduates working under supervision to profoundly experienced ­tropical agriculturalists. CGIAR membership is open to IOs and private foundations as well as states and is further evidence of IOs retreating towards the hybrid

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s­ tructures resembling those of the early PIUs, in this case a network of interested ­participants, including NARS. Between 2008 and 2010 CGIAR’s structure was reformed (Figure 14.1). The new structure separates priority setting from funding, as it was felt that contributing states and organizations (the donors, see Table 14.2) provided support to favoured Centres or programmes rather than supporting CGIAR as a whole. The CGIAR biennial Conference, under the chairmanship of IBRD, convenes donors, the Centres and host or collaborating governments to set broad programme directives. Unlike the overarching governing bodies of other IOs the Conference, which makes decisions by consensus, cannot compel participants to adopt a specific policy or budget, and membership of CGIAR is by virtue of active participation in a Centre. The Conference and its subsidiary bodies are supported by a small Science and Partnership Council (SC) composed of distinguished ­agricultural and social scientists providing technical advice on emerging Biennial Conference on Agricultural Research for Development

The CGIAR Consortium

Partner Governments

CEO

Directors-General

The CGIAR Fund

Science and Partnership Council (FAO)

Donor governments

IOs/other donors

Consortium Board

Fund Council

Centres’ Boards of Trustees

Secretariat (IBRD)

Figure 14.1  The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research

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Table 14.2  The growth of CGIAR Year Number of Centres Members Developed countries Developing countries Foundations International organizations Total Funding ($m) Developed countries Developing countries Foundations International organizations Other Total

1972

1982

1992

2002

2009

6

12

18

15

15

9 – 4 3 16

17 4 3 8 32

18 6 2 9 35

21 20 3 12 56

22 26 4 13 65

8.2 – 10.2 2.3

97.6 2.2 2.3 41.8

176.4 1.7 4.1 65.1

213.1 12.7 9.1 96.2

143.8

247.3

331.1

333.0 20.0 8.0 78.0 92.0 531.0

20.7

priorities and avenues for research. The donors now meet separately in a Fund Council, assisted by the CGIAR Secretariat staffed by the World Bank, to agree budget targets, ensure funding is appropriately distributed for core activities and establish some necessary operating procedures. CGIAR is jointly funded by national development assistance agencies, such as the UK’s Department for International Development and the US Agency for International Development, IOs (e.g. FAO, IBRD and UNDP), and independent foundations, such as the Gates Foundation. This loose conglomerate of funding agencies results in CGIAR being subject to less direct government oversight than conventional IOs, giving it greater flexibility but a more complex financial structure. Indeed securing a consistent flow of funding was one common interest that IBRD, states and the Centres had in founding CGIAR. The governments collaborating in research and the Centres now have their own forum, the CGIAR Consortium, which mirrors that of the donors. The Consortium includes a CEO (a strengthening of the role formerly undertaken by the CGIAR Executive Secretary), who along with a further small secretariat fuses the Centres under a stronger leadership focusing on delivery of results and cost efficiencies achieved through eliminating duplicate programmes and rationalizing common services. A ten-­member Consortium Board, including the CEO, sets long-­ and medium-­term objectives within parameters defined by the Fund Council and identifies the resources needed to maintain core programmes such as gene banks and basic research. Within

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this structure, the Centres prepare their own plans, which are reviewed by the CEO before being submitted for funding. Thereafter, the Centres are allowed to solicit funding for specific projects. Each Centre has its own charter and a Board of between ten and 20 trustees, mostly with connections to agriculture but also representing the diverse funding, technical and policy interests of a specific institution. Trustees serve in a personal capacity, and in each Centre about half come from developing countries and three are nominated by CGIAR. The Boards have legal and functional roles similar to those in national non-­profit institutions. They appoint DGs, set policy within overall CGIAR objectives, approve plans submitted to the Consortium, assist in mobilizing resources, monitor performance, and oversee each Centre’s operations. In most cases the Boards meet biannually, with technical and administrative subcommittees meeting periodically. WARDA provides the exception to this pattern of governance. Originally conceived as an RO, upon joining CGIAR it created a Board of Trustees, but intergovernmental oversight was maintained.

14.1.3 Current activities CGIAR’s long-­term research efforts to improve the sustainability, quantity, quality and marketability of foodstuffs broadly fall into five categories: 1. increasing productivity through genetic improvements in plants, livestock and fish and better management practice, particularly in controlling insect infestation and plant diseases; 2. saving biodiversity through maintaining gene banks and crop germplasm; 3. protecting the environment by conserving natural resources (especially soil and water) and mitigating the impact of agriculture on ecosystems; 4. diversifying agriculture to raise levels of nutrition and encourage farmers to take advantage of high-­yielding cash crops; and 5. improving public policies for food and agriculture, strengthening both NARS and national capacities to develop agricultural systems. There are also some medium-­term objectives, which are often corollaries of these categories, including: focusing resources on alleviating production problems for the poor (especially for women, who constitute 60 per cent of the agricultural workforce in developing countries); expanding access to staple crops, thereby lowering their prices to benefit those whose main expenditure is food; and emphasizing post-­harvest technology to reduce waste in the storage and processing of basic commodities. CGIAR’s most recent initiative is developing systems and varieties to protect crop yields

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against the anticipated effects of global warming, a process that will develop as the impact of climate change becomes clearer. CGIAR Centres are engrossed in myriad parallel lines of research; thus it is impractical to review all activities, but the following examples give a flavour of its contemporary work under the broad categories previously outlined. Supplementing crop and animal productivity involves many Centres in countless selective and cross-­breeding experiments. This is a painstaking process whose outputs come to fruition after many years. CIMMYT for example focuses upon maize, wheat and barley, which together constitute 60 per cent of the world’s cereal production. Having previously improved the nutritional content of its maize cultivars and introduced some disease resistance, CIMMYT is today concerned with developing ‘quality protein-­rich’ varieties for Sub-­Saharan Africa. This involves reducing the crop’s susceptibility to drought and its wasteful use of (costly) nitrogen-­based fertilizers by using stress-­test techniques to identify strains that thrive in dry, nitrogen-­poor soils. Likewise, CIMMYT is crossing maize with grasses resistant to disease and insect damage in the hope of fabricating more resilient and productive varieties. Protecting biodiversity is the second prong of CGIAR’s mandate. This is done through gene banks, which are large refrigeration units storing original genetic material, mostly seeds from wild varieties as well as common and uncommon cultivars. These are used in cross-­breeding experiments to produce more resistant and climate-­tolerant varieties. Such genetic resources are vital in rehabilitating agricultural systems blighted by natural or human-­ created cataclysms. Collectively CGIAR’s 11 gene banks (Table 14.3) hold over 700 000 accessions. In 2006, CGIAR’s gene banks authorized concords with the Governing Body of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, devolving the security and exploitation of these resources to UN/FAO. Improved land use is part of CGIAR’s environmental remit and is one objective of the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-­Arid Tropics (ICRISAT). ICRISAT’s investigations cover a zone with fragile, infertile soils facing long-­term and permanent degradation. More intensive mulching using crop residues conserves moisture, which prevents poor soils from drying out or degrading and can increase sorghum yields by one-­third. The black soils common in this zone were once considered unworkable immediately after monsoon rains, but the combined use of seedbeds to give an early start to new cultivars, graded planting beds, furrows to facilitate drainage and better meteorological knowledge has allowed two-­crop cycles on land that previously only

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Table 14.3  CGIAR gene banks Centre

Special crops Centres CIMMYT CIP

Crop(s)

Number of accessions (rounded)

Maize and wheat Potato, sweet potato and other Andean roots and tubers Rice Rice

155 100 16 500

65 600 134 200

ILRI

Cassava, forages and beans Barley, chickpea, faba bean, wheat forages and lentil Chickpea, groundnut, pearl millet, pigeon pea, sorghum and minor millets Bambara groundnut, cassava, cowpea, soybean, wild vigna and yam Forages

Other Centres Bioversity International World Agro-­Forestry Centre

Musa Sesbania

IRRI Africa Rice Centre (WARDA) Farming systems group CIAT ICARDA ICRISAT IITA

Total

110 800 20 000

156 300 28 300 18 300

1 300 1 800 708 200

Source: CGIAR (2010).

had one. Farmers have also been encouraged to rotate annual crops with perennial ones that stabilize the soil. These simple techniques, involving little but an input of labour, are passed on to farmers through agricultural extension services. Under the heading of diversifying and introducing high-­value-­added crops to increase smallholder income, CIAT is encouraging small-­scale producers to plant fruit trees and helps them raise yields by improving propagation techniques, controlling fruit flies, delaying ripening and preventing post-­ harvest deterioration. All Centres contribute to the final overarching objective of improving public policy and strengthening NARS, working with them to increase their effectiveness and providing them with advice and inputs. For example, CIAT uses mobile phones to advise farmers and field workers where drought-­resistant seeds can be obtained. This activity is spearheaded by the Centres constituting the general group, particularly IFPRI, the Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) and the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) and is described more fully in section 14.5.

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14.1.4 Evaluation and future challenges As an organization created by emanation, CGIAR could perhaps have been expected to remain within policy confines defined by IBRD and FAO. However, this has not happened, and it has developed into an independent IO which has attracted the support of several national and international funding agencies, including the regional development banks and UNDP. In 1998 an independent, systemic review gave CGIAR a ringing endorsement, stating that it had been a most effective use of development aid and its survival was essential if food insecurity, poverty and hunger were to be eliminated (IFAD 1998). The most recent review (McAllister et al. 2008) calculates that improvement in varieties alone benefits the global economy by $10b annually. CGIAR has proved an elastic and adaptable organization with some startling achievements to its credit. Amongst IOs, CGIAR is the largest developer and disseminator of global public goods in agriculture (Kassam 2003; Dalrymple 2008). Over half the winners of the World Food Prize, which recognizes those who have done most to advance the calibre, amount or access to food, have been CGIAR researchers. Several Centres have substantial publishing programmes designed to spread the knowledge of improved varieties and farming techniques, and CGIAR scientists publish their research in academic journals worldwide. Training and outreach have been central CGIAR activities, and 75 000 scientists, many now occupying senior positions in NARS, were trained in CGIAR Centres (Shaw 2008). Together, NARS and CGIAR ‘can justly claim to have reduced poverty, probably more than any other single policy initiative’ (Thirtle et al. 2003: 1973). Although progress has slowed since the spectacular initial successes of CIMMYT and IRRI, CGIAR research has enhanced available crop germplasm, and its high-­yielding crop varieties now account for more than half the total wheat and rice grown in the developing world. Between 1961 and 1991, Asian rice production ballooned by 135 per cent, with yields increasing by 86 per cent. Global wheat production (admittedly concentrated in developed countries) rose 166 per cent, with productivity rising by 145 per cent (FAOSTAT). High-­yield production results in less marginal land being converted to agriculture, allowing developing countries to place large tracts of land in trust, as foci for biodiversity. CGIAR’s successes are partly attributable to a management structure that promotes a higher quality of representation and participation of trustees compared to the formal governmental structures found in other IOs and a rare inclination amongst IOs to subject its governance to external scrutiny. It has an independent evaluation mechanism, which has two processes.

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The first, programme oversight (undertaken by SC and supported by FAO), periodically reviews each Centre’s technical and management functions. The second assesses the efficacy and effectiveness of CGIAR boards through periodic reviews and self-­assessments. The first review of 13 boards in 1991 was disappointing, as 12 performed below expectations. A further review in 2004 was more promising, with only three boards having poor assessments. Overall, the strength of the CGIAR model is that it has prioritized efficiently, terminating failing Centres and rejecting applications to join from agricultural centres with unsustainable structures. Nevertheless, CGIAR has its critics. It does not always punch its weight in global debates vital to its mandate such as the food crisis and climate change, while the results of individual Centres have been uneven (McAllister et al. 2008). Depressingly, CGIAR’s current work programme, while highly laudable and adorned by ‘pro-­poor’ terminology, is scarcely different from the objectives of the IOs involved in agriculture 30 years ago, an indication of the lack of progress since the leap forwards during the Green Revolution. Whereas in the 1960s staple crop yields raced ahead by 3–6 per cent annually, today they crawl forward by 1–2 per cent a year, and in developing states the rate is now zero (Economist 2009). Furthermore, CGIAR’s detractors maintain that its commitment to social concerns is purely rhetorical, as it pursues biological gains at the expense of environmental sustainability and social cohesion (Cernea and Kassam 2006). The stabilization of food supplies for the poorest in Latin America and Asia has not extended to Africa. Since 1971 CGIAR has devoted 41 per cent of its resources to Africa, but the spectre of hunger still haunts the continent. Sub-­Saharan Africa’s plight is especially disheartening, as the absolute number of hungry people has risen consistently since 1980. McAllister et al. (2008) observe that the cost-­effectiveness of CGIAR research in Africa has been less than elsewhere, as only 10 per cent of African agricultural land has been planted with improved CGIAR varieties. Fully 80 per cent of the benefit of CGIAR research in Africa, measured by increased productivity, was attributed to one programme, the biological control of cassava mealybug in West Africa. Despite targeting a fifth of funding at strengthening NARS, key partners in delivering results to the farm level, CGIAR efforts have floundered. ISNAR, a Centre dedicated to supporting NARS, was closed as donor interest waned. It was in competition with FAO and was criticized for failing to coordinate with the objectives of other Centres and provide seamless delivery to national partners. Additionally, NARS are nationally funded bodies which frequently suffer from chronic budget shortages, and CGIAR resources are insufficient

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to bridge the gap. Paradoxically, so successful have CGIAR research programmes been that some, especially small, states have used this as a pretext not to bolster their national programmes. Consequently CGIAR fritters away resources counteracting failures in national strategies. At the other extreme some Asian countries, particularly India and China, have independently developed highly successful NARS, which are now in a position to match CGIAR in results and scientific prestige and could benefit from a proposal to outsource some CGIAR research. The Centres have a distance learning programme (with an umbrella concept of a virtual university for agricultural education) and have engaged in agricultural extension to a greater extent than heretofore, an interpretation of their mandate that is taking them into unknown territory, especially when CGIAR resources are under pressure. Independent evaluations of FAO and IFAD have previously commented on the disjointed nature of knowledge management between the different agricultural IOs, and in response a CGIAR Chief Information Officer has been recruited to integrate the Centres’ efforts. Examination of the Centres, despite their essentially practical orientation, shows that they are increasingly participating in and involved with global conferences and development work. CGIAR’s paramount challenges revolve around funding, corporate competitors and shortcomings in related regimes. Funding has always been a significant constraint and is likely to remain so, despite creation of the Fund Council during the recent reforms. The share of Western aid devoted to agriculture has been decimated, contracting by three-­quarters between 1980 and 2006 (Economist 2009). Since 1990, CGIAR’s real-­term budget has stagnated, leading to a decline in capital investment. The rationalization of Centres, downsizing and better management made CGIAR more frugal ( J.R. Anderson 1998). However, unrestricted funding (which supports core CGIAR objectives) declined by $123m between 1995 and 2007, while restricted funding (targeted to specific local, short-­term projects with more immediate results) increased by $141m (McAllister et al. 2008). In particular, continuing a long-­term trajectory, expenditures on the key research objective of enhancing productivity dropped between 1992 and 2001, as those Centres examining the environment, biodiversity and augmenting national capacities were favoured over Centres working on commodities (Table 14.4). This is compounded by complexities in the funding arrangements whereby Centres rarely get all their funds at the start of an annual cycle. This undermines long-­term work programmes, as the resulting uncertainty means many staff are hired on short-­term contracts. The 2005 food price spike aroused donors from their apathy and reinvigorated support for agricultural development. In

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2009, G8 leaders, at their L’Aquila summit, pledged to increase agricultural development expenditure by $20b over three years, and IBRD increased its spending by 50 per cent to $6b. Although pledges have fallen behind target they have not translated into large increases for CGIAR as, despite continued support for its programmes, scientific research lacks the immediacy and political potency of humanitarian catastrophes induced by food shortages. Table 14.4  CGIAR funding by undertaking (1992–2007) Undertaking

Increasing productivity Saving biodiversity Protecting the environment Improving policies Strengthening NARS

1992

2001

2007 (est.)

US$m

% of total

US$m

% of total

US$m

% of total

127.4 19.9 29.7 25.5 56.1

49.3 7.7 11.5 9.9 21.7

123.3 34.2 67.2 49.0 81.1

34.8 9.6 18.9 13.8 22.9

178.5 46.9 72.4 80.4 103.2

37.1 9.7 15.0 16.7 21.4

Source: McAllister et al. (2008), reproduced with permission of CGIAR.

Private sector competition provides another challenge. Well-­known multinational agribusinesses including Monsanto, DuPont and Syngenta have muscled in on territories traditionally dominated by CGIAR and are now leading players in the development of genetically modified (GM) crops. Monsanto alone spends $980m on research and development, 80 per cent of which goes broadly into plant breeding, quadruple the sum spent by CGIAR on improving productivity (Table 14.4). These corporations and their sway over the governance of global food and agriculture are controversial (Clapp and Fuchs 2009). Opponents argue that the price of their inputs cripples farmers in developing countries and that this is exacerbated annually because farmers are banned from replanting second-­generation GM seeds. Monsanto’s ascendancy in the seed market for leading GM crops such as corn and soya beans (where it has a 65 per cent market share) and cotton (a 45 per cent share) asphyxiates competition and curbs innovation (Moss 2009). CGIAR’s decision in 2007 to converse more with the private sector is possibly a first step in a broader collaboration and a source of anxiety for many commentators. If prospective nutritional demands are to be met, most acknowledge a role for the private sector in bringing affordable technologies within reach of developing-­country farmers but see CGIAR and related IOs as guarantors that the public interest is not trampled in the pursuit of profits (Box 14.2). CIMMYT, for example, cooperates with Monsanto in developing GM varieties that will be affordable by low-­income farmers. Given

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the messianic faith of leading donors and other key opinion formers in the market’s proclivity for solving humanity’s dilemmas, CGIAR’s future cannot be assured. Analogous to the tale of global transport and communications (Chapter 16), leading states may well be using global food and agricultural IOs to advance, diffuse and entrench the free market project. Just as attributing advances in agricultural productivity to CGIAR would be a gross exaggeration it would also be unfair to apportion the blame for persistent food shortages entirely at its door. CGIAR’s work is just one ingredient in the necessary cocktail of policies, and defects in other regimes frustrate its effectiveness. Take, for example, the vagaries of global trade. Greater productivity and lower tariffs on agricultural trade helped shrink food prices and improve nutritional intake in many LDCs. Conversely protectionism, in the form of producer subsidies and resistance to GM varieties in developed states, has kept food prices artificially high and closed some markets to potential export income. Much depends, therefore, on negotiations at the WTO Doha Round, where subsidies are proving an intractable issue and where farmers are a powerful lobby in both the developed and the developing world (Chapter 10). BOX 14.2

THE OWNERSHIP OF PLANT VARIETIES Protecting plant resources provides a similar dilemma to that for pharmaceutical products (Box 10.3) but in this case in order to ensure that indigenous communities benefit economically. New uses for many plants (particularly medical uses) are being discovered but raise questions about who owns the patent rights to plant extracts sourced from developing countries and often from the traditional land of indigenous peoples. The 1992 UN Convention on Biological Diversity created legally binding principles on conservation of biodiversity and established a state’s entitlement to benefit from naturally occurring genetic resources. WTO/ TRIPS allows countries to exclude from patentability flora and fauna, except microorganisms and cross-­bred varieties which

can be protected by patents. The 2001 FAO International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources guarantees access to genetic resources in collections and a share of any resulting income. These treaties, coupled with commercial GM practices restricting propagation of new hybrids to the patent holder, create a complex policy environment for CGIAR, which is committed to free exchange of plant material, considering them a global public good, although most of its collection comes from developing countries that could otherwise derive an income from their use. Sometimes CGIAR Centres have patented their findings to protect them from commercial exploitation but continue to provide free access to the technology. On



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 behalf of indigenous peoples, CIAT challenged and overturned a patent awarded to a US commercial grower to license a yellow bean that he claimed was a cross between existing native varieties in his own collection and not a new genetic strain. CIAT proved conclusively that the variety was a natural plant found in Mexico and not a derivative. Its interest in pursuing the case was also occasioned by concerns that, if patents were awarded to commercial growers for existing natural strains, CGIAR Centres could not distribute trial seeds freely. Underlying intellectual property issues therefore influence the way in which the Centres work with the private sector. Restricting access to plant material

through patents and commercial agreements may limit the development of new varieties needed to increase global food production, yet there is a need to reward communities that preserve valuable resources and to recognize that in traditional agriculture some farmers derive income from propagating seeds. In 2004 a Global Crop Diversity Trust was established, which disburses a $250m endowment for conserving genetic resources and gives developing countries’ farmers some benefit from patent rights, for example through distribution of appropriate high-­quality seeds. India even requires that profits from plant patents be shared equally with farmers through a national fund.

14.2 The CGIAR Centres The rest of the chapter splits the Centres into three groups and treats each separately. This is purely for analytical purposes, thereby enabling readers to gain a handle on the phalanx of activities undertaken by CGIAR and does not imply that Centres cooperate differently within, as opposed to across, groups. Indeed the rivalries rooted in funding trends notwithstanding (see above), the Centres’ powerful cooperative instinct is one of the main reasons why CGIAR has a comparative advantage in agricultural research. Recall that Centres operate within the overall mandates of increasing agricultural productivity, protecting the environment, conserving biodiversity, diversifying agriculture and improving national policy making, but individually they often focus on some more than others. Given the similarities between Centres the narrative is not exhaustive but picks out examples which typify their work.

14.3 The special crops group 14.3.1 Background The special crops group comprises five Centres: CIMMYT, IRRI, WARDA, ICRAF and CIP (the International Potato Centre), which focus on generally related crop species. Their core responsibilities lie in advancing agricultural

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productivity and saving biodiversity through plant-­breeding programmes and as custodians of gene banks for wheat, maize, barley, rice and potato. IRRI, being the first CGIAR Centre, was the prototype for later Centres. IRRI and CIMMYT were intrinsic to the Green Revolution (Box 14.1); IRRI developed a strain of short, strong-­stemmed rice (IR8), whose upright leaves use solar energy more efficiently, permitting denser planting. Allied to those advantages IR8 has multiple grain shoots, is resistant to insects and diseases and matures considerably faster than traditional varieties, allowing at least two crops annually. Within six years of introduction IRRI varieties had increased the value of the global rice harvest by $300m. Concurrently CIMMYT produced the first high-­yielding dwarf wheat. Propagated in Mexico it was successfully transferred to other climatic zones. These varieties were producing over half the total wheat crop in developing countries by 1980, and production started to grow faster than consumption. For example, India’s wheat production tripled in 15 years. For this and other contributions to international agriculture, CIMMYT’s Director, Norman Borlaug (Box 14.3), won the 1970 Nobel Peace Prize. CIMMYT also produced triticale, the first human-­made cereal. Triticale has a protein content superior to that of bread wheat and it can be used in many baked products. In particular it grows well in acid soils where wheat does not prosper. The special crops Centres allocate most of their efforts to their breeding programmes. After wheat, rice and maize, potato is the most important food crop worldwide. CIP is the Centre charged with emulating for potatoes the trail blazed by IRRI and CIMMYT. The chief problems confronting CIP are that potato is very susceptible to pests and rots easily in storage, and propagation is difficult. Minute worms called nematodes are major potato pests, but varieties have now been developed that incorporate biological controls. Agro-­forestry is an important element of small-­scale tropical farming. ICRAF, the responsible Centre, is an outlier amongst the special crops groups. Rather than breeding, ICRAF’s principal interest concerns the contribution of tree crops such as coffee, nuts, palm products and fruits to farming systems. That said, the importance of medicinal products to South American tribal forest economies has prompted ICRAF to develop an inventory of tree crop genetic resources in conjunction with Bioversity International and to initiate a gene bank. A major advantage of tree and bush crops is that they diversify and increase smallholder income, and ICRAF has sponsored introduction of several new crops, for example peach palm (producing hearts of palm and fruit) and bush mango (which provides a cornflour substitute). Another programme is aimed at increasing the stock of Prunus africana, a tree whose bark

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provides a medicine for treating the prostate gland. This tree’s usefulness has endangered the natural stock, and ICRAF is encouraging smallholders to grow it and reap some of the benefits of a $200m crop.

14.3.2 Current activities Eliminating crop disease and expanding productivity are ongoing issues but will be complicated by the kinds of factors outlined in the introduction to this chapter. Changes in global climate will gravely impact Asia’s rice-­growing areas, and in response IRRI is developing new cultivars to tolerate several weeks of immersion in flooded fields and using plant photosynthesis to ­cultivate varieties that grow better in hotter climates while using less water. Special crops Centres are also sensitive to the consequences of their remedies. CIMMYT and CIP’s quest for disease resistance persists, but it is recognized that the widespread use of a few varieties exposes farmers to the risk of an epidemic, as disease can sweep more easily through monocultures. For example, late potato blight, the disease responsible for the 1840s Irish Potato Famine, spread in great part because a single variety was planted, permitting the disease to decimate the national crop. CIMMYT is countering monocultures by producing ‘multi-­lines’, which are mixtures of different varieties, sharing common parent sources, with similar characteristics such as height, maturity periods and yield but which vary enough to reduce overall exposure. Replicating the variations inherent to traditional agriculture is also beneficial for those who subsist on the produce because, while monocultures may produce higher yields, they can also exacerbate malnutrition because of the absence of micronutrients. Breeders are also looking for new production possibilities as well as varietal improvements. In the developing world potato is a staple only in the Andean region, East Africa and Nepal, but the Central Asian uplands are ideal and unexploited environments for potatoes, and CIP is introducing suitable varieties there. It is also developing quick-­growing potatoes, which will limit their exposure to high temperatures and humidity, making them suitable for the tropics. Currently potatoes are grown from tubers, which are heavy, expensive to reproduce and account for one-­third of the cost of producing a crop. CIP is evolving seeds that will be cheaper to multiply, store, transport and plant. Typically, seeds constitute only 3 per cent of the cost of a crop, and 80 grams of potato seed produce as many potatoes as two tons of tuber, although with less consistent characteristics. However, cross-­ breeding programmes are slowly improving consistency, and CIP has successfully produced potatoes from seed in Peru with yields triple the national

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average. Storage and post-­harvest losses are also being investigated, including for example developing dehydration techniques allowing for longer and cheaper storage in smallholdings. ICRAF now focuses on improving productivity, creating markets for agro-­ forestry products and using agro-­forestry systems to improve the environment. It has also moved heavily into agricultural extension, particularly supporting a tree-­planting programme in cooperation with UNEP. Its original aim of planting 5b new crop trees between 2000 and 2010 was extended to target the planting of 13b trees, of which 12b had been planted by 2012.

14.3.3 Evaluation and future challenges Commodity-­based Centres have suffered most from the tendency of donors to back quick fixes rather than undertake protracted research into agricultural productivity. CGIAR’s new financial structure may protect this important activity, but Centres have received clear signals that they need to rationalize and contain costs. One place where the axe may fall is WARDA. WARDA operates along similar lines to IRRI but has been far less successful and plagued with instability. Civil strife in Liberia forced its relocation to Côte d’Ivoire, only for a second internal conflict to force it to move again, to Benin, where it is hosted on an ICRISAT campus. Regional politics apart, it is debatable whether WARDA adds value as an independent IO, and a merger with IRRI, which has greater experience on integrated rice production systems, appears sensible. For 30 years improved varieties of wheat had proved resistant to the devastating wind-­borne disease of stem rust, and it looked as though an age-­ old problem had been overcome. Suddenly in 2002/03 a new strain of the disease emerged in East Africa (UG99), decimating 70 per cent of the crop. As prevailing winds carry spores in an easterly direction, this caused considerable alarm, as the major wheat-­growing areas of Pakistan and India are highly dependent on monocultures. CIMMYT has coordinated a multi-­ prong programme in which it maps the spread of UG99 (which by 2009 had reached as far as Iran and South Africa) and tests the resistance of current plant varieties. Meanwhile East African NARS, with support from private foundations and bilateral donors, are developing cultivars with UG99 resistance. CIMMYT has experienced a 40 per cent cut in real terms to its wheat programme since 1980 but, along with the International Centre for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA), has fabricated 60 experimental wheat varieties, of which nine have reached markets in the affected areas.

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ICRAF is moving away from pure research into extension work, and its tree-­ planting programme has been a success. However, this means its aims are shifting into fields more usually occupied by traditional funding agencies, NARS and NGOs, which may indicate concern for weaknesses in its research objectives. One problem for ICRAF is that, while its research is at a global level, in the developing world there is insufficient attention paid to forest as opposed to agricultural research. BOX 14.3

NORMAN BORLAUG, CIMMYT (1964–79) Born in rural Iowa and educated as a forester and plant pathologist, Borlaug worked for the US Department of Agriculture before moving to the DuPont de Nemours Foundation in 1942, to conduct research on fungicides. He joined the Rockefeller Foundation in 1944 as a plant breeder and geneticist and was assigned to its Mexican programme. Here he assembled a team of scientists to develop improved wheat varieties, which were then propagated for use elsewhere, particularly India and Pakistan. This work, along with the improvement of rice varie-

ties at IRRI, became the foundation of the Green Revolution (Box 14.1). In 1966 Borlaug became Director of the Centre’s Wheat Improvement Programme and later Director of CIMMYT. He advocated an integrated approach to agricultural development in which the shift to new varieties was to be supported by further breeding work to adapt them to local conditions, coupled with a transfer of knowledge to the farmers and seed distributors. On his retirement from CIMMYT he became a Professor at Texas A&M University and worked as a consultant. He died in 2009.

14.4 The farming systems group 14.4.1 Background and current activities The farming systems group consists of CIAT, IITA, ICRISAT and ICARDA. Like the special crops group these Centres focus on increasing agricultural productivity and saving biodiversity. While they have core plant specializations, breeding programmes to combat pestilence and enrich productivity, and hold gene banks, they differ from the special crops group because they have a holistic approach to agricultural production covering climatic or geographical regions of the developing world. Thus, they are responsible for a range of crops, and it is both the crops themselves and the role crops play in farming systems that they are interested in. Their findings are used to develop systems useful for small farmers, including tillage, rotation

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and storage techniques, since getting crops to market is critical in generating income. This work requires broad cooperation in breeding, research and trials to take advantage of each Centre’s specializations and agro-­climatic conditions and collaboration with NARS on country-­specific solutions. Usually these Centres have large central research farms, typically with greenhouse-­ controlled climates and laboratories, and smaller field stations in other countries. CIAT and IITA study agriculture in tropical climates, while ICRISAT and ICARDA conduct research in the semi-­arid and arid lands respectively. CIAT is oriented towards Western hemisphere upland and urban agriculture. The region’s agro-­climatic conditions cover mountain slopes, fertile uplands, river valleys, drought-­prone lowland plains and rainforests. Since most food production in its region is based on subsistence farming, CIAT focuses on farming practices which require minimal inputs but deliver stable yields. This includes introduction of fruit trees, pig production, which is ideal for urban smallholdings, and beef production, which has a ready market in a region where per capita beef consumption is close to that of Western Europe but where productivity is one-­quarter that of the USA. IITA meanwhile concentrates on lowland tropics. Agriculture here is typically a pattern of intensive cropping that quickly denudes thin soils of their nutrients. Traditionally, the solution to this problem was shifting cultivation and letting land lie fallow for long periods so that it could recover, but population pressure means this is now impractical. To counter the consequent decline in productivity, IITA’s research focuses on crop rotation and practices that improve soil nutrition and carrying capacity. As tillage increases erosion, systems requiring minimum tillage incorporating natural weed control have been developed, while the use of tall intercropped plants provide shade for heat-­and drought-­sensitive species. ICRISAT deals with crops and farming systems in the semi-­arid regions of Africa, South Asia and the Middle East. In much of its region rainfall, while uncertain, can be intense for short monsoon periods, and ICRISAT mostly concentrates on dry-­land farming techniques. ICARDA specializes in the dry areas which form a swathe of land across North Africa, the Middle East, and Western and Central Asia, covering around one-­third of the earth’s land surface. Here farming practice is based on traditional nomadic patterns with animal husbandry at its centre. Gradually, however, settled populations are predominating, occasioning great pressure on poor land. Working with ICRAF it is now starting to incorporate high-­value tree crops, such as olives, pistachios and almonds, in its farming systems and is moving into horticulture. Unsurprisingly irrigation and water management form the

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core of ICARDA’s research, to provide farming systems and practices which cope with drought and combat desertification while diversifying rural livelihoods. As part of this objective ICARDA has undertaken a comprehensive assessment of Western Asia’s hitherto poorly mapped water resources. Water conservation incorporates moisture conservation measures, plastic housings for vegetable production and developing drought-­tolerant species, such as durum wheat, for small-­scale farmers who cannot use external inputs. ICARDA programmes generally combine rangeland management of sheep and goats, the traditional livestock found in the region, with forage, pasture crops and staples.

14.4.2 Evaluation and future challenges As part of their overall focus on farming systems these Centres have chalked up some notable crop-­specific successes. Cassava is the principal source of calories for over 300m people, and IITA has propagated high-­yielding varieties with disease and pest resistance which have tripled production levels, and also replicated this with sweet potato varieties and yams. Similarly, ICRISAT has bred varieties of millet, with yields five times the average for the semi-­arid tropics. There have also been successful cooperative efforts; for example, IITA worked closely with CIMMYT to develop quick-­maturing maize cultivars with specific disease resistance. However, McAllister et al. (2008) conclude that the impact of integrated management systems is less efficacious than genetic improvements, mostly because they are location and culture specific. Notwithstanding their successes, there has been some negative commentary on their work. Overlaps exist in their mandates; for example, IITA and ICRISAT disagree over the boundaries between tropical and semi-­arid Africa, while CIMMYT and ICARDA vie over responsibility for wheat crops. ICARDA in particular has faced criticism. It experienced funding difficulties, and its relationship with regional member states is weak, leading to poor implementation rates ( J. Anderson 1996). Consequently it has focused on traditional development projects more than on research, and this has absorbed scarce resources. It has, however, recently reoriented towards more globally relevant outputs, including one to improve agricultural practices in Afghanistan. Syria’s political upheaval has forced the dispersal of staff to sub-­ regional centres, leaving ICARDA’s future viability in doubt. This group of Centres bear the brunt of the challenge of climate change, which is likely to exacerbate already formidable and erratic precipitation ­patterns, translating into problems for subsistence farmers, with use of

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drought-­tolerant varieties becoming more important. Projections are tentative, but it is clear that new rainfall and temperature patterns will drench some areas and parch others, conveying pests and diseases to different places, with knock-­on effects for the different Centres. Although the threat of famine in Asia has receded, 30 per cent of the population of Sub-­Saharan Africa remain malnourished and at risk of famine, and the result is that, at an institutional level, the challenge to produce more food has shifted away from the semi-­tropical institutions and on to IITA; however, its resources (as a share of CGIAR funding) have fallen more than those of others in the group.

14.5 The general group 14.5.1 Background and current activities CIFOR, WorldFish, IWMI, ILRI, Bioversity International and IFPRI make up the general group of Centres, whose focus is broader than that of the previous groups. Two (IFPRI and Bioversity) deal mainly with policy issues, with IFPRI having a think tank role. The others cover both policy and specific aspects of natural resource management (forestry, fisheries, water and animals respectively), but ILRI has an extensive farm-­based research infrastructure similar to those in the farming systems group. The three latecomers to CGIAR (CIFOR, WorldFish and IMWI) reflect and have profited from CGIAR’s reorientation away from pure scientific research and conserving biodiversity towards strengthening national policy making and implementation, taking environmental and social factors into account. Centres concerned with natural resources and institutional strengthening accounted for 37 per cent of CGIAR resources in 2004–05 compared with 10 per cent at the commencement of the 1990s (Pingali and Kelley 2007). These Centres have some programmes with similar aims to the other two groups, but environmental protection and improving national policy making rank higher in their hierarchy of concerns. Social factors are now prominent parts of their work. They cover social implications of market reforms and agricultural subsidies (IFPRI), community ownership of forests to give forest dwellers a greater interest in outcomes and income flows (CIFOR), human aspects of water management, including waste water, allocation of resources and the competition between agricultural and urban users (IWMI), and the social interactions underpinning costal fisheries management (WorldFish). IFPRI is the only Centre that does not work on the practical application of technology to production or conservation. It is an economic and food policy research institute, focusing on food production, distribution and

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c­ onsumption, the impact of technology, and international trade in food. IFPRI’s research is geared to strategies to reduce hunger and malnutrition, particularly improving the distribution of essential foods, but also covers the use of technology, lending and investment programmes. A major study has been undertaken jointly with IWMI to project food production and water use to 2025, which has been critically acclaimed (McAllister et al. 2008) and which has flagged a potential future crisis. IWMI’s primary focus is to enhance the efficient use of water resources for agriculture and specifically to improve irrigation techniques. However, recently, it has shifted its efforts from basic irrigation towards the holistic management of river-­basin water systems, including the use of rainfall. Agriculture accounts for 70 per cent of the world’s water use, but supplies are being rapidly consumed and water scarcity is projected to reduce global food production by 350m tons by 2025 (Rosegrant et al. 2002). IWMI studies real systems rather than trials under research conditions. Jointly with WHO, it is developing safer methods of using city waste water run-­off for crop production, the objective being integrated water management rather than the use of water for irrigation. CIFOR’s aims are to: strengthen forest policy research; determine the underlying causes of deforestation; improve tree selection in the conservation of existing forests and plantations; enhance watershed management; study the ecology of natural tropical forests; develop the marketing and better management of forest products; and study sustainable forestry economics, particularly for rural communities. The government of Indonesia, CIFOR’s host nation, has designated a special forestry reserve of 300 000 hectares for its use. FAO estimates that some 75 per cent of crop biodiversity has been lost (Economist 2012a). Allocating responsibility for and oversight of the Centres’ extensive collections of genetic material is coordinated and supervised through Bioversity International. It has established gene banks for plant resources such as grasses, tropical vegetables, beets, coffee and plantains and coordinates the activities of 60 national and international centres. Bioversity is responsible for ensuring that plant species not covered by CGIAR are collected and stored. It prioritizes regions where plant material is most at risk, including the Mediterranean, South-­West Asia and the Sahel. For example, in the Mediterranean, it has assigned priority to fig, almond, olive, pistachio and pomegranate varieties, and certain national agricultural research stations maintain those collections. Because CGIAR gene banks are in locations susceptible to natural disasters or political instability the Norwegian

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government has set up a gene bank at Svalbard, which holds duplicates of the Bioversity collection, though the operation of Svalbard is not a CGIAR activity. The final two Centres, ILRI and WorldFish, deal with livestock and aquatic resources respectively. Two-­thirds of agricultural land is rangeland and livestock, which generates 40 per cent of agricultural output. ILRI’s objective is to improve animal health, nutrition and productivity in tropical regions, particularly in Africa, where nomadic herding is still economically important. It undertakes research to identify disease-­resistant animal genes and studies animals’ impact on environmental degradation. WorldFish’s original purpose was to foster aquaculture in tropical mangrove swamps, but after joining CGIAR its mandate grew to cover all aspects of coastal, small-­ scale fisheries. It does not cover deep-­sea fishing, as its focus is on fish as a resource for the world’s poor. Nevertheless, the depletion of deep-­sea stocks means the economic importance and commercial value of shallow-­water stocks have risen. Thus, WorldFish has moved into fish breeding (e.g. breeding saltwater-­tolerant freshwater fish species), reef aquaculture, developing suitable feedstuffs for fish farms and the problem of disease and pollution in high-­intensity fish-­breeding programmes.

14.5.2 Evaluation and future challenges The general group has met with mixed results. Successes such as Bioversity’s global germplasm collection and IFPRI’s recognized competence in the policy arena have been tempered by disappointments over ILRI’s failure to find vaccines or cost-­effective drug regimes for the worst tropical animal diseases. The challenge for the group is to promote enlightened policies to alleviate the problems outlined at the start of the chapter. Climate change makes Bioversity’s work even more critical. Species will vanish from their natural habitat as conditions change. Unless they are collected and preserved, genetic variation will be diminished, leaving research laboratories less able to engineer improvements. While CIFOR is one of the newest Centres and has a limited track record, the need to conserve and eventually rebuild existing tropical rainforests is vital to stabilizing the carbon cycle. However, there is a need to develop a coherent international approach to reforestation. CIFOR’s responsibilities overlap with those of other IOs, including FAO’s Forestry Department (see Chapter 7, section 7.3), ICRAF, the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) and the UN. Each is concerned with similar subjects, like forest preservation, development of new and better economic incentives to foster improved forest management, and research into global trends. The 2007 evaluation of FAO noted the effectiveness of

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IO ­cooperation in forestry, but competition consumes scarce resources. For example, ITTO’s Malaysian forest research site is similar to CIFOR’s in Indonesia. FAO’s long-­term decline (Chapter 7, section 7.3) has had an impact in CGIAR, particularly with the institutions in this group, given their more holistic mandates. In some cases FAO’s weakness has resulted in opportunities for cooperation. For example, IFPRI and FAO both have mandates to forecast long-­term trends in agriculture, and IFPRI supplements FAO’s work in maintaining records of global food production through computer modelling of future development scenarios, such as the impact of research and the existence of good road networks. They have also cooperated to support developing countries at WTO negotiations, and as FAO’s analytical capacity has withered IFPRI has stepped into the breach. In another case FAO’s weakness led to short-­term disruption followed by cooperation. In 2001 Bioversity and FAO quarrelled over the management of plant patent rights, resulting in Bioversity abandoning its offices in FAO’s Rome headquarters. The disagreement was eventually resolved, and they now work closely on the policy aspects of maintaining and expanding plant collections, releasing their potential for the betterment of the general population. Finally, CGIAR Centres have also moved into areas previously dominated by FAO, resulting in competition rather than cooperation. IWMI now considers itself the global centre for aggregating knowledge on water, food and the environment and as part of this work produces the World Water and Climate Atlas. It is currently mapping global water productivity and water poverty into a supply-­and-­demand model. CGIAR (rather than FAO) has coordinated a ‘comprehensive assessment’ of global water resources, concluding that small-­scale irrigation and water use yield better results than the large-­scale schemes which governments prefer. Also in competition with FAO, WorldFish undertakes computer modelling of fish stocks and maintains major global databases on fish species and trawling surveys. However, WorldFish has a major technical problem to resolve. One-­fifth of fish eaten today is farmed, but fish farming will not stop the depletion of global resources, nor does aquaculture do much to improve the protein intake of the most vulnerable. Coastal fish farming degrades the environment, creates pollution on a scale equivalent to industrial animal husbandry and uses two kilograms of protein to produce one kilogram of fish. Although other sources of protein are available (such as soya beans) they change the physiology of fish species in various ways, and extensive scientific research is needed before solutions can be proposed for general use.

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SUGGESTED READING

Anderson, J. and D. Dalrymple (1999), The World Bank, the Grant Program and the CGIAR: A Retrospective Review, Washington, DC: IBRD. [Covers IBRD’s role within the CGIAR system and assesses CGIAR achievements] Clapp, J. and M.J. Cohen (eds) (2009), The Global Food Crisis: Governance Challenges and Opportunities, Waterloo, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press. [Deals with the causes, consequences and necessary policy responses to the global food crisis] Dalrymple, D.G. (2008), ‘International agricultural research as a global public good: concepts, the CGIAR experience, and policy issues’, Journal of International Development, 20 (3), 347–79. [Outlines CGIAR’s origins and contribution to agricultural knowledge, with a useful appendix of recent CGIAR achievements] Economist (2011), ‘The 9 billion-­people question: a special report on feeding the world’, 398 (8722). Kassam, A. (2003), ‘An overview of social science research in the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research’, International Social Science Journal, 177, 441–62. [A CGIAR Science Council Secretariat member charts the broadening of the organization’s research agenda. Decent pen portraits of some individual Centres] Koo, B., P.G. Pardey and B.D. Wright (2004), Saving Seeds: The Economics of Conserving Crop Genetic Resources Ex Situ in the CGIAR Centres, Wallingford, UK: CABI Publishing. [The history, operation and economic value of five CGIAR gene banks] McAllister, E. et al. (2008), Bringing Together the Best of Science and the Best of Development: Independent Review of the CGIAR System, Washington, DC: CGIAR. [A comprehensive review of CGIAR’s technical objectives and governance]

Internet resources (See also Table 14.1.) CGIAR: http://www.cgiar.org

15 Intergovernmental scientific organizations Issues surrounding science and technology sponsored some of the earliest episodes of organized international cooperation (see Chapter 2). Nevertheless, the majority of scientific and technical PIUs that sprouted in the nineteenth century became INGOs in the formative decades of the twentieth century. After 1945 new, mainly European-­inspired and -­dominated, IOs dedicated to the sciences emerged. This chapter documents seven international scientific organizations, ranging from venerable and relatively scholarly institutions such as the International Bureau of Weights and Measures (BIPM), created in 1875 for standardizing international measurements, to those on the cutting edge of human endeavour, such as the European Space Agency (ESA), founded a century later. International scientific organizations make important, if frequently ignored, contributions to human understanding in arcane topics such as particle physics (the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) and European Synchrotron Radiation Facility (ESRF)), astronomy (the European Southern Observatory (ESO)) and meteorology (the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and European Centre for Medium-­R ange Weather Forecasts (ECMWF)). The functions of international scientific organizations are primarily operational (see Figure 1.2) in that their mandates stress scientific research and the application of technology to push the boundaries of scientific knowledge as global public goods. CERN, ESA, ESO and ESRF in particular offer opportunities for pure or applied scientific research by providing machines or laboratory facilities beyond the financial means of individual states. Pure research feeds into a secondary group of functions, namely establishing and refining internationally agreed metrics. These benchmarks form the basis for reproducible scientific experiments, standardized statistical frameworks, sharing uniform information, monitoring or analysing research findings and forecasting possible outcomes. Finally, they foment and house ­epistemic communities by promoting interchanges between scientists with discrete specialisms. Aside from ESRF, which is open to a large and varied

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c­ ross-­section of users, tight networks of scientific experts dominate the work of these IOs. Sometimes this is achieved through highly technical but relatively all-­inclusive committees feeding their results up to the top (BIPM and WMO), and in others it is because the organization is a focal point, providing data and dedicated facilities for researchers (CERN and ESO). The insights gleaned from these cooperative ventures are valuable in their own right but also make important contributions to everyday life. For example, WMO and ECMWF’s intricate models of climate systems yield more accurate weather forecasts that are of enormous immediate value. Better tracking of rainfall, hurricanes and other extreme weather events can save lives, as authorities can evacuate areas at risk. In the developed world the weather is a workaday conversational topic, but for many inhabitants of developing countries the weather is, as the previous chapter intimated, a matter of life and death. Knowing the optimum moment to plant crops so that they are not ravaged by drought or flooding is critical for food security and hence survival. Arguably, however, the true salience of the knowledge produced by cooperation in scientific IOs lies not in its daily applications but in its role in deciphering and mitigating longer-­term problems facing humanity and facilitating wider processes of global governance. The narrow scientific mandates of the bodies covered in this chapter mostly preclude their advocacy of policy programmes, but their authoritative data, provided or authenticated by respected epistemic communities, contributes to the development of regimes that do. Clashing intellectual positions and disputed knowledge are amongst the barrage of obstacles to international cooperation (see Chapter 1). Dependable scientific intelligence provided by experts working through  these IOs is vital to the development of the consensual knowledge needed for states to clarify their national interests and negotiate accordingly. In other words, the influence of these IOs rests predominantly on the individual and collective acumen of their participants rather than the overt power of leading states. Case Study 1.1 provides a pertinent example of how authoritative IO data is helping to remove some bottlenecks to international agreement on climate change by tapering discord amongst the scientific community over the sources and magnitude of global warming and whether environmentally friendly policies can be decoupled from economic growth. Possible commercial benefits mean that a feature common to many of the IOs covered in this and the following chapter is the potential for private sector participation once risk is understood, initial capital investment achieved and spin-­offs identified. Thus, a private company develops ESA’s launch vehicles, and ESRF recovers some of its costs from industrial users. Indeed, as the

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equipment needed to spearhead international scientific research becomes larger, more complex and more costly, governments are looking for private partners and potential industrial applications to justify their decisions and be the basis for cost sharing. Increasing expenditures arising from scientific progress are a recurring theme in this chapter but have had differing impacts on scientific IOs. Financial constraints have forced ESO to shelve its ambitious programme for further telescopes, but elsewhere thrift has spurred the search for alternative funding solutions, such as global consortia (see Chapter 17). The organizations are considered in historical sequence, starting with WMO and BIPM before going on to examine the five complementary European scientific IOs that emerged thereafter. CERN, the first of these IOs, shares similar scientific and technological concepts with ESRF, albeit for different purposes, while another two, ESA and ESO, have a joint objective in the exploration and understanding of outer space, and ECMWF provides its members’ meteorological services with critical analytical capabilities that are individually unaffordable.

15.1 The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) 15.1.1 Background and structure WMO, which became a UN SA in 1951, is the successor to the International Meteorological Organization, founded in 1873. WMO provides respected scientific information on the earth’s atmosphere and climate, tracks global weather conditions and facilitates the exchange of information on weather and hydrology, aimed at improving weather forecasts. Weather forecasting has progressed from a process of limited observation and projection based on past statistical series to a complex science encompassing satellite observation of a wide range of phenomena and computer modelling of global climate patterns. WMO’s historical position at the centre of global meteorological cooperation makes it the accepted forum for integrating and analysing global data, even though satellite-­derived information emanates from only a few countries; consequently it has maintained its competence in the increasingly complicated science of weather forecasting. WMO has a conventional SA structure (Chapter 7), governed at the highest level by a Congress attended by the heads of national meteorological services, which meets quadrennially to set policy, and a 37-­member Executive Council, which meets annually and which is delegated to run the ­organization between Congresses. The Council is composed of heads of meteorological

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services appointed in their personal capacity but includes the presidents of regional meteorological associations (RMAs). Below the Council are eight Technical Commissions of experts from all member states, meeting, as required, on topics including hydrology, aeronautical meteorology, oceanography and marine meteorology, agricultural meteorology and atmospheric science. WMO membership is almost universal. No single country or group unduly dominates, but the UK’s distinguished history of weather recording gives it an important voice. Members are grouped into six RMAs, which coordinate regional meteorological activities. The RMAs’ work and structure are subordinate to, and broadly directed by, the WMO Congress, but each one pursues its own programme with its own resources. RMAs also meet quadrennially (for which they receive some secretariat support) and report the results to the WMO Congress. If an RMA wants to change WMO policy it must submit a resolution to the WMO Council and, if its decisions impact on the work of other RMAs, proposals must be approved through WMO. The WMO Secretariat mostly manages international scientific gatherings to support WMO programmes, as well as ensuring the reliability and accessibility of data generated by governments. However, in keeping with WMO’s scientific orientation, some staff undertake research and produce publications based on the global data WMO collates.

15.1.2 Current activities Five major technical programmes form the bulk of WMO’s work. The core WMO programme is the World Weather Watch, a long-­term project to coordinate and standardize national weather monitoring efforts. WMO maintains a dedicated communication system which transmits data from 3000 airborne, 7000 marine and 10 000 terrestrial meteorological stations. Furthermore, a satellite weather observation system links 19 European, Japanese, Russian, American and Chinese satellites that provide continual weather coverage along three global orbits. The programme monitors tropical cyclones and Antarctic weather patterns, and provides early warnings of potential disasters. A second, more analytical assignment, the World Climate Programme, draws on World Weather Watch data and provides annual reviews of global weather patterns, models future trends and monitors the impact of weather on water resources, health and the carbon cycle. Along with UNEP, WMO sponsors the work of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which provides the authoritative evidence upon which policy makers rely to conclude international agreements such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC, see Case Study 1.1). WMO and IPCC also provide the data used by the FCCC Secretariat to monitor the performance of states against their international environmental commitments.

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WMO’s Atmospheric Research and Environment Programme surveys the ozone hole (Box 6.6) and the composition of the atmosphere and aims to improve the precision of meteorological forecasting, particularly in developing countries. Knowledge of the upper atmosphere is imperative, as any changes are indicative of human-­made impacts and the trajectory of climatic change. It also helps forecast significant weather systems such as monsoon rains and cyclones. In the Hydrology and Water Resources Programme WMO monitors and studies changes in global weather patterns that result in flooding. This activity is increasingly important, as countries already susceptible to severe climatic phenomena are experiencing escalating floodwater damage to their infrastructures and concomitant economic costs. Under this rubric WMO coordinates regional initiatives to understand the hydrology of major river basins such as the Congo, Mekong, Amazon and Danube and of critical marine and land areas including the Sahara, the Caribbean and the Baltic. The final major WMO programme, for the Applications of Meteorology, supports meteorological services through providing TA, seminars on new developments and training fellowships, improving their ability to provide accurate forecasts and to apply meteorology to shipping, aviation and agriculture, essential activities needing advance warning of severe conditions.

15.1.3 Evaluation and future challenges International meteorological cooperation is one of the twentieth century’s great success stories (Zillman 2008), providing the foundation of the integrated observation system described above and smoothing the process of international agreement. WMO’s role in coordinating the 1957–58 International Geophysical Year is one example of this cooperation, and it resulted in the 1959 Antarctic Treaty protecting that continent from economic and political exploitation. Even global warming sceptics accept that WMO’s work constitutes an essential global public good related to management of a key global commons. An important factor in WMO’s success is that it has maintained its scientific focus, with delegates to its high-­level conferences drawn from national meteorological services rather than being politicians or civil servants with a broader remit. The consequence is that WMO’s emphasis is technical, leaving political negotiations to be conducted elsewhere. Two big challenges confront WMO. One is to continue supporting work to mitigate the impact of climate change. The human suffering, economic damage and social problems wrought by increasingly treacherous weather patterns demand better early-­warning systems, particularly for hurricanes,

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cyclones, tornadoes and flash floods. The inability of developing-­country meteorological services to provide advance warning frequently leads to large-­scale catastrophe. The 2000s witnessed 3840 climate-­related natural disasters affecting over 2.3b people, killing 840 000 and causing economic losses of $896b (CRED 2009). Though developing countries are most affected, the weather’s impact can be equally catastrophic in developed countries. Following the 2005 Indian Ocean tsunami, in 2009 the G8 countries announced their intention to support improvements to the WMO extreme weather watch satellite system to incorporate early warnings of future major natural phenomena. The other challenge, given the controversy surrounding IPCC statistics, is for WMO to be a primary provider of the neutral scientific data required to support FCCC efforts to spur implementation of national policies, monitor progress towards reducing global warming, and act as a strong voice when politically agreed objectives are missed. States have persistently missed Kyoto Protocol targets (Case Study 1.1) and, as the annual conferences since the 2009 Copenhagen Conference demonstrate, offer only lukewarm and sporadic support for tougher, longer-­term targets.

15.2 The International Bureau of Weights and Measures (BIPM) 15.2.1 Background and structure There exist two basic systems of measurement. The oldest system is that based on the pound weight and the yard, sometimes known as imperial measures. This system, developed organically from customary methods of measurement, was subject to variations depending on local interpretation and was eventually standardized by the British Weights and Measures Act of 1878. However, the most common system used today, particularly in science, is the MKS or metric system, which uses the metre, kilogram and second as its fundamental units. From its beginnings the MKS system was based on abstract units defined by French laws of 1799 in an attempt to rationalize the imperial system and base calculations on the decimal system. The standard metre, originally conceptualized as being one ten-­millionth part of the distance from the Equator to the Pole through Paris, was first scientifically defined in 1875 at a conference (the Metre Convention). This conference also created BIPM, an organization that survives to define international standard measures today. In science MKS slowly overtook the imperial system because it offered a more convenient computational basis. For many years the imperial system held its own in trade and commerce; however, it has steadily fallen out of

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favour as commercial regulation, such as that of the EU, adopted MKS units. Despite the predominance of MKS, certain commonly used former imperial units are now defined by BIPM (rather than by the UK) in view of their scientific or commercial importance, including the nautical mile, angstrom, hectare and standard atmosphere. BIPM ensures consistency in global standards for scientific measurement, acting as the depository and custodian for MKS master standards, refining them as scientific advances and modern measuring instruments such as lasers permit. Seven basic units have been defined for the MKS system, also known as Système international (SI), and all other units are derived from them (Box 15.1). After 1925, definitional work broadened to incorporate measurement of units of electricity, photometry and radiation and the measurement of sub-­units (such as the centimetre). This was followed by studies of related measures and compound units and assessment of the physical ­environment’s impact on the basic units. BOX 15.1

BASIC STANDARD MEASURES The seven basic SI standard measures are the units of: time (the second), mass (kilogram), distance (metre), temperature (kelvin), light (candela), substance (mole) and electric current (ampere). All other units of measurement can be deduced from these seven either by simple derivation (e.g. the centimetre is one-­hundredth of the metre) or by compound scientific relationships. Definitions of these units have evolved using natural effects which have well-­established but increasingly precise constant values (such as the speed of light) and consequently are now very complex. For instance, whereas the metre was once simply defined by an appropriately marked distance on a rigid bar of platinum–iridium alloy in melting ice, today it is defined as: the length of the path travelled by light in a vacuum during a time interval of 1/299 792 458th of a second as defined

by 1 650 763.73 wavelengths in a vacuum of orange-­red radiation, corresponding to the transition between two specific energy levels of the krypton-­86 atom! Only the kilogram is still defined as it was originally, that is, by reference to an artefact, ‘the international prototype kilogram’, a platinum–iridium alloy cylinder preserved at BIPM. However, measurement techniques are now so sensitive that even the smallest change due to dirt or cleaning is noticeable. Infinitesimal changes to the mass of the reference cylinder cause errors in highly sensitive calculations that depend on the standard, and it is now felt that the definition should be improved. Redefinition will improve the precision of a number of electrical measurements, calculations in quantum physics and the measurement of the smallest particles, but the underlying science is still being debated.

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BIPM is the forum for discussing technical improvements to the standards and for agreeing on calculation of derived measurements. For example, it oversees the accurate determination of certain scientific constants and designates the prefixes used in science to denote very large or very small numbers, thus providing clarity and a standard means of expressing scientific results. To be useful, particularly in scientific experimentation, a standard has to be reproducible, and knowledge of all the factors impinging on a standard makes this possible. Consequently BIPM also verifies the accuracy of national copies of the different units and calibrates instruments used for accurate measurements. BIPM’s activities extend beyond the science of measurement (metrology) to using its authority and expertise to provide greater certainty to measurements that underpin international agreements. Internationally traded goods often have to meet defined engineering and purity tolerances, and independent quality control laboratories certify them appropriately. BIPM works with INGOs and governments to ensure acceptability of the measurements produced by such laboratories, thereby eliminating costly remeasurements at destination and reducing non-­tariff barriers to trade. Thus, it cooperates with FAO and WHO in the work of the Codex Alimentarius (a series of food standards, see Chapter 7, section 7.3), with the International Standards Organization, an INGO which sets benchmarks for commerce and industry, and with the International Atomic Energy Agency in establishing radiation measurement standards. It researches into and provides standards for many practical applications, such as gas analysis, where it defines air quality in terms of ozone, nitrous oxide and other harmful chemicals, and it sets standards for the traceability of reference materials which have application for forensic science, food purity, medicinal products and diagnostic devices. BIPM measurements are also used to calibrate satellite equipment and the resultant data, including that generated by the US Global Positioning System (GPS), which locates places on the earth’s surface very accurately. BIPM’s governing body is its General Conference, attended by heads of national metrology institutes or government officials responsible for science and technology, which meets quadrennially. In intervening years the International Committee for Weights and Measures, an appointed body of 18 scientists, runs the organization. Like WMO, BIPM is an IO that plays host to an epistemic community, in this case one comprising some 80 national and international institutions concerned with standards in the physical sciences. They contribute to the work of its ten Consultative Committees devoted to, for example, electricity, thermometry, definitions of the metre and the

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second, and ionizing radiation. Feeding into these committees are many scientific working groups, each dealing with specialized aspects of metrology. BIPM is amongst the oldest of all IOs and, despite moving with the times scientifically, its structure has barely altered. Largely immunized against external developments, BIPM’s epistemic community has remained narrow. By contrast, the issues confronting other early organizations, such as UPU and ITU (see Chapter 16), have become increasingly politicized, forcing upon them structural changes to accommodate a variety of actors sitting outside narrow technical epistemic communities.

15.2.2 Current activities, evaluation and future challenges Scientific investigation and verification are protracted processes. As science improves metrology, BIPM is establishing alternative definitions of standards which are equally accurate but which can be reproduced more easily, particularly by countries without their own metrology institutes and by industry. Thus, the second, which is defined by caesium radiation counts, also has a definition based on optical clocks. This work advances when technology presents new opportunities and now that the definitions for the basic units are firmly established, the kilogram excepted, will represent a growing part of BIPM’s work. While BIPM’s past work has been concerned with accuracy, the application of new technologies and even the validity of earlier measurements also depend on determining the uncertainties inherent even in the most accurate measurements, a subject which BIPM now actively supports. For example, advanced computer chips and nanotechnology manipulate substances at their atomic levels, but it is known that at these levels the position of particles cannot be defined exactly, and degrees of acceptable manufacturing tolerance need to be specified to high precision. Similarly the precision of modern measurements can cast doubt on past results, particularly when measuring small differences over long periods. In investigating climate change (Case Study 1.1), surface temperatures of the oceans change by less than 0.5 degrees in a decade, and in the same period amounts of ozone gas may vary by 1 per cent. BIPM is working with WMO to validate early results against SI-­calibrated definitions, a process known as traceability, which aims to define the exactitude of earlier findings and thus authenticate global warming calculations. Over its long history BIPM has provided the scientific community with tools for precise measurement, and its core definitions have become widely

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applied and increasingly important in precision manufacturing. As improved definitions have reduced errors, BIPM’s work has shifted from pure science towards the more practical applications of measurement. It sits at the apex of a metrology community which is hardly noticeable to the general public but which in Europe alone accounts for €87b in economic activity, with each euro spent on measurement generating a further three euros of additional economic activity (G. Williams 2002).

15.3 The Centre for European Nuclear Research (CERN)/European Organization for Nuclear Research 15.3.1 Background After the Second World War eminent figures in the scientific community, notably Italy’s Edoardo Amaldi and France’s Pierre Auger, convinced European governments of the need to challenge the USA’s escalating dominance in sophisticated scientific research (Lebeau 2001). An economic logic, namely high cost, underpinned the decision by European states to pursue their goals collectively through IOs, but there was also a political logic, particularly for the creation of CERN and ESA. The US viewed these IOs as guarantors of the economic and military prowess of their Cold War allies. European governments eager to maintain an identity separate from that of the principal Cold War protagonists (see Box 1.6) wished to insulate these IOs from pressures to develop military technologies. For these reasons and in contrast to more politicized scientific IOs such as the now defunct Eurochemic and Euratom (Chapter 11), CERN and ESA were conceived as technical institutions whose mandates are weighted towards scientific research. CERN was founded in 1954, following discussions sponsored by UNESCO, to conduct pure research into particle physics in order to better understand atomic structures and the origins of the universe. Initially there was a split between those who wanted a collaborative network of research institutions and those who preferred an independent laboratory. This was eventually resolved in favour of the latter, but the present structure resembles a hybrid of the two. The theoretical concepts underlying the design of CERN’s particle accelerators were developed by Danish Nobel Prize winner Niels Bohr, and the first accelerator commenced operations in 1957. Simply put, particle accelerators (the circular variety of which are known as synchrotrons) use

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BOX 15.2

THE STRUCTURE OF THE ATOM Understanding CERN’s work requires some appreciation of the structure of the atom. Sixty years ago atoms were thought to consist of three sub-­particles, electrons, with a negative charge, circulating round an atomic nucleus made up of protons, with a positive charge, and neutrons, particles with mass but no charge. Later scientists demonstrated that there are several even smaller building blocks. These building blocks are of two different types: fermions and bosons. Twelve fermions have been discovered, and they make up the basic components of the solid matter in the world around us. Fermions are further divided into two groups of six particles,

leptons and quarks. Linking back to the old theory, electrons are now classified as one of the leptons, while protons and neutrons are made up of quarks. Quarks can form a number of unstable particles known as, hadrons (hence the Large Hadron Collider). The bosons (of which six have been discovered, four at CERN) carry the different forces that exist in nature. Bosons exist only fleetingly, as they merely carry ‘information’ from one particle of matter to another. The boson most recently discovered, the Higgs boson, should account for the force of gravity and, once fully investigated, should complete the symmetry of the atomic model.

e­ lectromagnets to generate powerful electric fields which impart energy to narrow beams of basic particles to bring them to very high speeds. Beams start their journey in linear accelerators and then pass into synchrotrons, where they make many circuits before being released to collide, producing new particles. They can be projected into specially designed particle detectors or smashed into each other in particle colliders. Detectors record what happens when there is a collision by measuring the direction, energy and type of any new particles. CERN, the world’s largest laboratory, has built and operated four generations of colliders. Its vast physical infrastructure straddles the Swiss–French border outside Geneva and consists of a series of linked accelerators and particle detectors, located underground (Figure 15.1). The first synchrotron (PS in Figure 15.1) incorporated six detectors, but it is now used to provide initial particle acceleration for more advanced machines. Subsequent generations of machines grew in magnitude and sophistication, culminating with the world’s largest accelerator, the Large Hadron Collider (LHC), which commenced operation in 2008 (Box 15.3). LHC’s job following its successful identification of the Higgs boson in 2012 is to probe its properties and behaviour or otherwise provide credible evidence for alternative theories.

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The Large Hadron Collider (LHC)

Super Proton Synchrotron (SPS)

Proton Synchrotron (PS)

Linear Accelerators

LHC detectors Switching apparatus

CERN neutrinos beamed to Gran Sasso, Italy

Figure 15.1  The CERN physical configuration

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BOX 15.3

THE LARGE HADRON COLLIDER LHC accelerates two beams running in opposite directions through an array of 9600 electromagnets. The beams circuit the ring around 11 000 times per second, reaching a velocity proximate to the speed of light, replicating conditions at the time of the Big Bang. They provide 600m collisions per second, from which the most interesting particles may appear once per day. As only a fraction of these collisions can be recorded and measured, the discovery of new particles is an arduous process. LHC has stronger magnetic fields than earlier machines, and superconducting materials kept at very low temperature are used to create them. Since most superconducting equipment is relatively small, LHC, which operates near to absolute zero temperature (colder than outer space), poses a number of engineer-

ing challenges which caused it to go over budget and fall behind schedule. Indeed a small gas leak brought the machine to a standstill for one year immediately after it commenced operations. LHC is incredibly complex. To ensure optimum experimental conditions, all its components have to be working sequentially and uniformly, and even the moon’s gravitational influence on the beam of particles has to be taken into account. Then, when a particle beam is released into a detector, split-­second timing is required to ensure the results are recorded. Equally complex are the enormous underground detectors that absorb and record the impact of the particles. One of them, the Compact Muon Solenoid, weighs 12 500 tonnes, while another, Atlas, is over 25 metres tall and 100 metres long.

15.3.2 Structure CERN’s structure provided the blueprint for subsequent European scientific ROs. They all have Councils, with national representation from both scientists and policy makers, and technical committees, with a limited number of appointees whose scientific standing is the deciding factor underlying their selection. CERN’s Council oversees its work, sets its budget and decides on long-­term programme objectives, advised by a Scientific Policy Committee of eight distinguished physicists. States only have one vote, but they appoint two delegates to the Council, one of whom is generally a particle physicist and the other a civil servant or government scientific adviser. CERN is funded by a group of European countries, and its 3000 staff are responsible for building and operating the physical apparatus on site. CERN does have some research scientists, but most staff are responsible for the infrastructure. Their activities are split into civil engineering, cooling and ventilation engineering, electrical engineering, facilities management and alarm systems. The experimental results are fed to a worldwide network of

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8500 research collaborators located at 600 institutions in over 50 countries. These researchers are not CERN employees, but some receive CERN grants to fund their work. CERN is thus a host for epistemic communities, with no one nation or even its Secretariat predominating in the interpretation of its results. Unlike the epistemic communities of WMO and BIPM, that of CERN is considerably broader, comprising not only relevant national ­institutions but also universities and independent research bodies.

15.3.3 Current activities Having discovered the Higgs boson, LHC’s next task is to investigate its properties and the nature of mass, thereby advancing attempts to combine the two great but disparate theories of science (quantum mechanics and relativity) into one overarching theory. During 2013/14 the LHC is being reconfigured to produce even higher speeds, and the extremely high temperatures that will result will also give insights into how the universe was formed. CERN creates a variety of particle beams for different experiments. All but one of the particle types are used in experiments on site, the exception being beams of neutrinos, which are projected 730km under the Alps to Gran Sasso in Italy. Neutrinos are being used in experiments attempting to prove the existence of ‘dark matter’, a component of the universe that has been postulated to explain the movements of galaxies and far stellar bodies but which remains undiscovered. LHC is also being used to study antimatter. It is believed that when the universe was created there were almost equal amounts of matter and antimatter; however, matter has predominated, and the antimatter seems to have disappeared, although some scientists hypothesize that certain far-­off galaxies may consist entirely of antimatter. In 1995 a CERN experiment first recorded the fleeting existence of anti-­hydrogen in a detector. In its first year of operation LHC successfully isolated and captured particles of anti-­hydrogen for a short time, another first, and scientists will next try to replace matter with ­antimatter and record the results.

15.3.4 Evaluation and future challenges CERN’s achievements in the realm of particle physics are considerable. Twice it has received the highest level of peer recognition through its researchers being awarded the Nobel Prize for Physics. This, together with the vital role it has played in creating the internet, positions CERN amongst the most successful IOs. Several fundamental particles and related matter have been

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discovered at CERN. These include: pions (1958); the w+, w– and z bosons (1983), for which Carlo Rubbia and Simon van der Meer received a Nobel Prize; and quark–gluon plasma (2000), which existed just after the Big Bang. Another Nobel Prize was awarded to George Charpak, in 1992, for the invention of the multi-­wire proportional chamber in 1968. This is a particle detector which linked the observation process to computers for the first time and dramatically increased the speed of recording and analysing collisions. To this illustrious track record must now be added the discovery of the Higgs boson, which seems to settle arguments concerning which of the postulated models of atomic structure is correct. CERN was a key contributor to the development of the internet and continues to play a part in its improvement. The large network of researchers associated with CERN needed to access the results of the experiments (which generate vast amounts of data). In 1978, CERN developed a series of computer protocols and software to facilitate this. A refined and improved version of this was released for public use in 1993 and is the basis for running the World Wide Web (www). Sir Tim Berners-­Lee, the CERN staff member primarily responsible for developing the concept, later headed the consortium supervising the web. In addition, in 1984 CERN developed the concept of hypertext, indispensable to the establishment of web-­based linkages. To cope with the 10m pieces of data produced by each LHC collision and to exchange 250 000 calculations daily, CERN already possesses the world’s biggest computer grid, consisting of 80 machines in 25 countries. This handles only a quarter of LHC’s needs in full operation, which will possibly produce 1 per cent of future world data output (Economist 2004), and CERN’s computer network is being upgraded. As the main constraint is the time the web takes to move data from one site to another, CERN is developing a distributed computing system large enough to handle LHC data output. Ultimately this should extend the practical applications the internet can support by facilitating the exchange of huge databases, such as those existing in financial markets. CERN’s work also has commercial application, as is the case with much theoretical physics, although it is not open to private sector research, which requires more flexible and less extreme operating facilities. The engineering behind LHC provides experience in constructing machines working at very low temperatures that can be used by engineers elsewhere (such as in the manufacture of superconductors and microelectronics). Synchrotrons are used in materials science to investigate the properties of chemicals and metals and to test new materials. Handling materials at high temperature, in vacuums and at low temperatures, as is done at CERN, provides ­experimental

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experience that can be applied in activities ranging from IT to metallurgy, and some of the concepts behind particle detectors have been applied to medical diagnosis. New and even more complex machines are required to probe the boundaries of science. The costs of such machines threaten to overwhelm even the largest economies or well-­funded multilateral organizations such as CERN. The existing US collider, Tevatron, and a planned replacement more powerful than LHC were abandoned on cost grounds, thereby reinforcing CERN’s dominant position. CERN’s existing members are nonetheless mindful of the need to spread future research costs. Although they are primarily responsible for costs and retain full control, CERN now accepts contributions for specific experiments from non-­member states and is discussing widening membership.

15.4 The European Southern Observatory (ESO) 15.4.1 Background and structure The ESO is an IO dating from 1962 whose principal objective is to design and operate state-­of-­the-­art optical and radio telescopes. Located in Chile, the telescopes are used by European astronomers for research into the cosmos and the origins of the universe. ESO was developed by European astronomers at the same time as particle physicists were advocating CERN. Fewer countries were interested in funding another seemingly extravagant scientific project and so ESO’s gestation period was longer and its activities were initially restricted to planning, developing and negotiating its long-­term facilities. The physical location of a large operating unit of an RO in a completely different part of the world is an unusual feature of ESO (and ESA) and, although not a contributing member, Chile has access rights to the facilities and a voice in planning decisions. New technologies are developed at ESO’s German headquarters before the telescopes are built. Its first observatory was established at La Silla, in the Atacama Desert, one of the planet’s least light-­polluted, most climatically favourable and interference-­free areas, but new facilities are now concentrated at Paranal on the Chilean coast. La Silla was developed in the 1970s and, on completion, had 15 telescopes, the most recent being a linked pair of four-­metre reflecting telescopes. At its peak La Silla supported some 600 research programmes annually. Some of its older instruments are closing, and only three telescopes will remain. Even when the next generation telescope, the Very Large Telescope (VLT) now being built at Paranal, is completed,

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these remaining La Silla instruments, having running costs one-­tenth those of VLT, will provide an experimental site for new technologies and instruments. ESO provides around 75 per cent of Europe’s telescopic resources, and its facilities are used by some 2000 astronomers in a cooperative epistemic network similar to that of CERN, but in ESO the researchers have more responsibility for directing experiments. ESO has a similar management and collaborative structure to CERN’s, with a Governing Council on which each member has two representatives and technical committees advising the Council. ESO partners other institutions and governments concerned with stretching our knowledge of the universe. In particular it works with ESA (which provides it with satellite imagery facilities) and with the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Hubble telescope, being a depository for Hubble’s 200 000-­strong image library. ESO has joined with the same partners in developing the successor instrument to Hubble, the Next Generation Space Telescope, and it also supports several cooperative activities in Chile.

15.4.2 Current activities, evaluation and future challenges VLT started operations in 1998; it is now ESO’s main operating site and when completed will contain some of the world’s most advanced optical and radio telescopes. VLT is an array of four large 8.2-­metre reflecting telescopes coupled to four smaller 1.8-­metre ones, which together will give exceptional image clarity and a high degree of resolution, effectively ­doubling the ­telescope’s power. An initial success of VLT has been the discovery of a star that is almost as old as the cosmos, formed just 500m years after the Big Bang, thus furthering astronomers’ understanding of the creation of the universe. Using its New Technology telescope, in 2004 ESO also made the first direct sighting of an extra-­solar planet and claims to have discovered the ­furthest known galaxy from the earth, although this is now disputed. Paralleling the case with other scientific IOs, governments justify the heavy costs of supporting ESO by requiring it to nurture new technologies drawing on its basic science. Past ESO industrial applications have included optical spin-­offs such as high-­resolution cameras, very sensitive spectrographs and optical fibre technology. Spin-­off potential has also been an element in assessments of future projects, and ESO is currently designing two other large optical telescopes incorporating considerable technological advances. They would be modular constructions built cost-­effectively on a production line, and the movement of the segments would be coordinated by a computer, which would diminish the distortions created by atmospheric disturbance.

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The first is the Extremely Large Telescope (ELT), which would be a single instrument 42 metres in diameter. If successful, ELT might be the precursor to a 100-­metre instrument, the Overwhelmingly Large Telescope (OWL); however, uncertainty about OWL’s cost–benefit appears likely to derail its approval. Paralleling CERN, ESO needs to make better use of its existing funding or develop new sources. It cooperates with non-­member states, including Australia, Japan and the USA, and has joined an international consortium to develop a new telescope (see Chapter 17, section 17.3). Widening ESO’s membership and transforming it into a trans-­regional IO, with concomitant changes in governance, is a second avenue that is being pursued. Chile is already a non-­contributing member, and in 2011 Brazil was accepted as a full member, presaging closer astronomical cooperation between Europe, Latin America and other emerging industrial countries.

15.5 The European Centre for Medium-­Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) 15.5.1 Background and structure Advanced weather forecasting needs dedicated, ample and costly computing capacity, as meteorological observations from thousands of sources have to be accumulated and fed into computer models for analysis and projections. This prompted ECMWF’s foundation in 1973, a centre operating one of the world’s most powerful computers, providing meteorological research facilities and medium-­range weather forecasts for its 20 members, but which has no policy or executive responsibilities. ECMWF began distributing its forecasts directly to members’ national weather services in 1979, and the forecasts’ precision is maintained by an iterative process of capturing new data, assessing it and combining it with existing forecasts. ECMWF’s computer model develops scenarios based on data from 20 different atmospheric levels and land and oceanic observation sites. It supplies over 50 different forecasts, ranging from local three-­ day to regional 21-­day forecasts. Five-­ and ten-­day advance notifications of severe weather along with quarterly and half-­yearly seasonal forecasts allow members to plan for adverse conditions. ECMWF also disseminates specific forecasts on winds, precipitation, cloud cover and the size and intensity of ocean waves, and the information it gathers is used to monitor the ozone layer, the probability of extreme weather events, potential flooding and the extent of sea ice. On a practical level this supports public and private sector

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decisions relating to water resource management, agricultural production, fisheries and the routeing of ocean-­going ships. In 1999 ECMWF issued 170 000 daily forecasts, a figure that by 2008 had risen exponentially to 9.8m daily forecasts and data updates. ECMWF has expanded its activities beyond its membership and shares information and forecasts from its immense databank with international research institutions and WMO members as a global public good. It cooperates closely with WMO using data from WMO’s World Weather Watch programme, contributes to WMO technical working groups and corroborates the accuracy of WMO data. For example, it projects the impact of El Niño on the Americas, supports WMO activities to monitor cyclones and African weather patterns and provides forecasts to the African regional meteorological centre. ECMWF’s forecasts benefit from ESA satellite data from observing sunspots, electromagnetic storms and other climatic conditions, and it provides data for EU environment programmes and its flood alert system. ECMWF’s structure echoes those of the other European scientific organizations, but both delegates that members send to its Council are scientists.

15.5.2 Current activities, evaluation and future challenges ECMWF weather models, in particular forecasts in the five-­to eight-­day range, have improved considerably since 1992 despite only minor ­improvements in input data. While weather forecasts are a picture at a given future moment they are incomplete without knowledge of the probability of the forecast’s accuracy. This is important, for example, in the insurance industry, allowing premiums to be priced correctly. ECMWF is therefore starting to produce ‘ensemble forecasts’, which estimate probabilities by varying the parameters impacting on the main forecast. Like WMO, ECMWF is preoccupied with the impact of global warming and has the most advanced operational earth model available to scientists, which allows it to develop, monitor and update climate change projections for IPCC. These facilities are also used to run computations for members’ specific needs. For example, the UK’s Meteorological Office is one of a handful of global centres responsible for monitoring atmospheric volcanic ash. The 2010 eruption of the Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajökull caused considerably more physical and economic impact than normal, and the Meteorological Office was linked in to ECMWF’s powerful computer models to project the ash cloud’s behaviour.

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ECMWF is also facing cost pressures. At its inception it was expected to generate annual commercial revenues in the region of €800m, giving it an independent income stream and allowing it to operate its own satellites. Because the majority of its forecasts are provided free, it has fallen far short of this, gathering just €4m in 2011. Consequently ECMWF depends on assessed contributions and, as ground observations are costly, the use of satellites is increasingly important. However, a single satellite cannot measure conditions consistently over the whole range of different atmospheric boundaries which impact on forecast accuracy. The high capital costs of satellites and their limited availability are therefore major constraints to improved data quality.

15.6 The European Space Agency (ESA) 15.6.1 Background and structure Formed in 1975 out of two existing institutions, the European Space Research Organization (ESRO) and the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO), the 14-­member ESA has metamorphosed from being a minor player in space exploration and a launch facility for telecommunications satellites to one whose mandate extends to developing and implementing European space policy, approving and launching exploratory satellites, and fostering an appropriate industrial policy in related activities such as satellite communications. Set against the Cold War backdrop, ELDO was created by ten European nations to provide a strategic launch asset and to keep pace with rocket technology with encouragement from, but independent of, the USA. A civilian project, ELDO used British technology designed for Blue Streak, an independent UK missile launcher, to develop the Europa rocket, but it was unsuccessful. Disillusioned by Blue Streak’s costs the UK eventually decided to use American rockets and withdrew from ELDO. ELDO then developed the Ariane rocket jointly with France. The latest version, Ariane 5, has become the primary European launch vehicle, but ESA sometimes uses rockets ­produced and launched by Russia or the USA depending on payload needs. Parallel with ELDO’s gestation, scientists at CERN stimulated discussions on an initiative to study space. Following intergovernmental negotiations ESRO was founded to undertake space research and was attractive to those non-­militaristic states reluctant to join ELDO, such as Switzerland and Sweden. Membership was also extended to Australia, as ELDO’s rockets were launched from its Woomera firing range. ESRO’s restrictive mandate

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excluded telecommunications, but it became important both strategically and commercially for Europe to have its own satellite communications network. The solution was to merge ELDO and ESRO into ESA, giving it a broader mandate covering both pure and applied space applications, as well as cooperation with other actors, such as NASA. ESA’s budget is only one-­third of NASA’s, meaning it must select its missions (Box 15.4) carefully. Unlike CERN, which covers all its equipment expenditures, ESA has satellites that are paid for by its collaborators (such as universities and research stations), which design the experiments and build the satellites, making for a more cost-­effective operation. A sizeable proportion of ESA’s budget is spent on launching telecommunications and weather satellites and, in future, the Galileo global positioning system. Part of ESA’s strategy is to optimize the number of components and objectives in any given mission. Ulysses, launched in 1990, undertook observations of Jupiter in 1992 and made two South and North Polar passes of the sun in 1995 and 2001, all the while studying solar winds and cosmic rays in deep space. Much of ESA’s research has been directed towards studying the sun (six missions in total), but the composition of comets and the nature of the X-­ray spectrum have also been major themes. BOX 15.4

THE SCIENCE OF ESA SPACE MISSIONS Space exploration has generated commercial spin-­offs in telecommunications, while satellite imagery is used in farming and weather observations and for monitoring the environment, but most ESA missions have scientific objectives. Not all missions have been successful (the space probe Beagle notably crashed into the surface of Mars in 2004), but recent missions include the following: • SOHO (1996–99), launched jointly with NASA, examined the sun’s magnetic field. It showed the sun pulsates owing to contrasting forces of gravity and nuclear fusion, and was the most prolific source of discovery of new

comets to date, finding 500 during its mission. • SMART 1 (2003–04) provided X-­ray spectrometer exploration of the moon to determine its chemical composition and successfully tested a plasma propulsion system. • Rosetta (2004–14) will attempt to land a probe on comet Wirtanen in 2014, thereby providing information on the true composition of comets. • FIRST (2007), a space telescope, was designed to examine the infrared and sub-­millimetric wavelengths and molecular clouds in space, to determine how galaxies form.

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Like CERN, ESA has an intergovernmental governing Council and advisory committees that deal with its scientific objectives and launch capabilities. However, it is also responsible for encouraging relevant industrial policies in member states, particularly through distributing its subcontracts equitably. Another responsibility of ESA’s Council is to coordinate members’ space research to avoid duplication. At the ESA Space Research and Technology Centre scientists work on technologies and systems for future space probes and, once missions have been given approval, prototype designs are passed on to collaborating institutions for execution. ESA staff are responsible for core activities, namely project management, rocket launches and guiding satellites to their destination. ESA is headquartered in Paris, but its operational control centre is in Darmstadt in Germany, and it uses launch sites in Australia, Kazakhstan and French Guiana.

15.6.2 Current activities The word ‘current’ is something of a misnomer in respect of space exploration, as planning, execution and travel time to destination mean long lead-­in times before any results are produced. The ESA space probe Cassini was 15 years in the planning; its payload Huygens was launched in 1998 and took seven years to reach Titan, one of Saturn’s moons, for two hours of data transmission. ESA contributed Spacelab to the NASA space shuttle programme, a module designed to transform the shuttle into a space station, but the programme was abandoned after the 1986 Challenger disaster. Nonetheless, cooperation in human space flight has been revived, and ESA is operating a module for the International Space Station (ISS) using its Spacelab experience. This module, Columbus, is a self-­contained laboratory which can be changed to conduct different experiments over ISS’s lifespan; for example, European scientists are conducting experiments to investigate the impact of weightlessness in materials science, crystalline semiconductors, animal cell research, tissue culture and fluid dynamics. ESA has committed to supporting 20 of the 50 launches required to complete ISS, the majority of which are service flights bringing supplies and removing waste products in specially designed automatic docking vehicles (ATVs). Three ATVs have been launched since 2008, with two more in the pipeline.

15.6.3 Evaluation and future challenges ESA has a successful track record. By 2004, it had undertaken 68 launches of its Ariane rocket with only two failures. Its concentration on satellite

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e­ xperiments rather than human space flight has made it more cost-­effective than NASA, but its ISS collaboration is expensive. Although ESA has provided astronauts for ISS, not all members have subscribed to this programme. The USA has extended the life of ISS to 2020 and revised its human space programme, focusing on using Russian space vehicles as the main launch platform. This required ESA to reappraise its own policy. While no definitive position on human space exploration has been taken, ESA has set up an astronaut training programme and is designing a re-­entry vehicle, indicating it might, costs permitting, undertake human missions. The Cold War’s end has opened the possibility of collaboration and cost sharing in what was previously regarded as a militarily sensitive area; hence, ESA is cooperating with Russia to develop a spaceship (Clipper) to replace the Russian Soyuz vehicles, although it is not designed to carry freight payloads. ESA and India are involved in joint missions such as telecommunications satellites, and China’s space aspirations offer further potential collaboration. That said, space exploration remains a political statement, and highly visible events, such as a return to moon exploration, are unlikely to be collective efforts in the first instance. ESA is also developing new propulsion methods. The launch of SMART 1 to the moon was the first time a space probe used a plasma thruster, an unconventional power source using solar panels to throw a stream of electrically charged particles out of the back of the engine instead of hot gases from burning fuel. SMART 1 took 13 months to reach the moon because of the low efficiency of its solar panels, but this form of propulsion has great potential, as it can accelerate craft to very high speeds and therefore reach destinations faster. However, on long trips small nuclear generators would be required to provide power, which is both technically and politically difficult at present. Work has started on a second-­generation thruster which is potentially more powerful, and before 2015 ESA will test-­launch it, to see if it is suitable for delicate space manoeuvres. European space policy for which ESA has a leading responsibility has both civilian and military perspectives. One key component is the Galileo global positioning system (see Chapter 12, section 12.7.4), and ESA, in cooperation with the EU, will launch the 30 satellites that constitute Galileo, which is designed to give complete European mapping cover. Galileo’s lowest level of detail will be open to all users and will likely be used for road pricing and air traffic control among other applications, but the highest level, which will locate objects to within one metre, will be encrypted and restricted for use by member states, mostly for military purposes. Despite initial US resistance Galileo will be compatible with GPS, which does not cover all of Northern

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Europe, but it will not be used for missile guidance systems. Test satellites for the Galileo system were launched in 2006. Presently its biggest problems are spiralling costs and the inability to develop a suitable management structure that will involve the private sector, which has cast doubts on its commercial viability. Other components of the European space policy concern space security, where the European Union Satellite Centre (Chapter 12, section 12.5.2) has key responsibilities, the use of space technology to monitor climate change (see section 15.5) and a long-­term vision for European space objectives, as yet undefined.

15.7 The European Synchrotron Radiation Facility (ESRF) 15.7.1 Background and structure Some countries possess their own synchrotron research facilities, but ESRF’s machine is Europe’s biggest. The ESRF synchrotron is similar to those at CERN (see section 15.3.1) but is available for both public and private sector use. From 1980 to 1982  an ESRF team worked at CERN, drawing on CERN technology to design the ESRF machine. On-­site planning began in 1986, and ESRF formally came into existence in 1988, with trial operations commencing in 1992, the full complement of 40 working stations (or beamlines) being made available by 1998. Each beamline has independent controls, allowing experiments to be individually designed, managed and recorded. As with CERN, ESRF synchrotrons are used as powerful electron microscopes, delivering detailed information on the composition of materials. Unlike CERN, where a single synchrotron is used to pursue one main objective, ESRF has a machine that produces two types of beam (powerful X-­rays accelerated round the system, as in CERN, and weaker beams emanating from the electromagnets), which are capable of being used in many ways. ESRF research ranges widely across both pure and applied science, covering biology, chemistry, physics, metallurgy and earth sciences, and industrial processes, where it is of particular relevance to electronics, pharmaceuticals, agribusiness, cosmetics and construction. Indeed many of the experiments that take place at ESRF are of direct commercial interest. For example, radiation emitted by charged particles is used in X-­ray diffraction studies for production of semiconductor chips and for investigating the surface properties of materials used in aircraft. ESRF is overseen by an intergovernmental Council, responsible for financing, planning and overall policy objectives, on which all members are

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r­ epresented, which in turn is advised by a Science Committee. Access to the most powerful beams is controlled by the ESRF Secretariat, which is divided into groups responsible for the main disciplines such as material science or crystallography. Each Secretariat group has control of some five or six beamlines, reviews applications from researchers and allocates experiment time. On behalf of members, national research groups allocate time on the weaker beams to national applicants as they see fit. Like CERN, ESRF has many researchers working in association with the physical facility, and these currently number some 6000. They conduct around 800 different experiments annually, with double that number in the pipeline. Unlike the case at CERN, many of these researchers pay for access to the synchrotron, since they are often independently funded industrial or university research teams and their results may have commercial applications.

15.7.2 Current activities, evaluation and future challenges Synchrotrons are amongst the most useful scientific research tools. Large synchrotrons are available in Japan and the USA, but because they give priority to domestic organizations ESRF is more convenient and accessible for European researchers. While ESRF provides greater access to its equipment to a broader cross-­section of scientific disciplines than CERN, much of the work it supports is proprietary in nature and not available as a global public good. Results await publication in scientific papers and the data from many experiments is withheld until a commercial application is patented; it is therefore difficult to measure the cost–benefit of ESRF. The work that ESRF supports can be seen from a selection of the wide range of current experiments. The synchrotron can reproduce the typical temperatures and pressures found in the earth’s core, which allows earth scientists to study the nature of changes taking place at the centre of the earth using very small samples of material. ESRF also supports palaeontologists examining the structure of small fossils without destroying them by cutting and grinding. In the applied sciences, chemists use ESRF to measure the split-­ second chemical changes that take place during catalytic reactions in order to improve the efficiency of catalytic processes, and metallurgists can study the growth of minute stress cracks in metals to find ways to strengthen alloys. Users complain that time allocations on ESRF are unresponsive to their needs. For example, microbiology needs frequent short periods of access, but most allocations are for several days at a time. ESRF’s success as a widely used facility was such that in 2008 the members decided upon an upgrade to add eight new beamlines by 2015 and improve existing equipment, some

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of which would be specifically designed for nanotechnology research. This came at a capital cost of €104m, but the decision coincided with a period of economic contraction, and members found it difficult to find the funding. Consequently, the EU agreed to fund most of the upgrade from its research budget. If the full capacity of the synchrotron were to be realized there could be 64 different access stations running simultaneously, split evenly between each type of beam. SUGGESTED READING

Hermann, A. et al. (1987, 1990 and 1996), The History of CERN, 3 vols, Amsterdam, The Netherlands: North Holland. [CERN’s official history, with scientific information on its accelerators and recording instruments] Krige, J. et al. (2000), A History of the European Space Agency, 2 vols, Noordwijk, The Netherlands: ESA. [ESA’s official history, covering the development of the main scientific and engineering activities] Page, C.H. and P. Vigoureux (eds) (1975), The International Bureau of Weights and Measures 1875– 1975, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. [A history of BIPM and developments in metrology] Wilson, A. (2005), ESA Achievements: More than Thirty Years of Pioneering Space Activity, Noordwijk, The Netherlands: ESA. [A lavishly illustrated official guide covering each ESA space mission] Woods, A. (2005), Medium Range Weather Predictions: The European Approach – The Story of the European Centre for Medium-­Range Weather Forecasts, New York: Springer. [Covers ECMWF’s history and technical work]

Internet resources BIPM: http://www.bipm.org CERN: http://www.cern.ch ECMWF: http://www.ecmwf.int ESA: http://www.esa.int ESO: http://www.eso.org ESRF: http://www.esrf.eu WMO: http://www.wmo.int

16 Transport and communications Transport and communications provide fitting themes to conclude this review of IOs, for they bring the IO story full circle in terms of their synchronous development with the international state system, the globalizing tendencies they have impugned and cultivated, and their interface with private actors. Whenever we receive mail from abroad, make an international telephone call, tune into radio or television programmes, or take a journey overseas we benefit from the work of IOs with competencies in transport and communications. The standards erected and policed through these organizations facilitate connections across state boundaries and, in some cases, provide the basis for the seamless regional or global integration of national systems developed separately. Moreover, their deliberations frequently contribute to related regimes, including health (by preventing the spread of epidemics via travel), the environment (by minimizing the effects of pollutants) and security (terrorism and piracy). During the nineteenth century, progress in transport and communications technologies unleashed unprecedented levels of activity across adolescent state borders. Initially incompatibilities between different national systems and the absence of shared standards prevented the full benefits of these technologies being exploited. In telecommunications, for instance, infant telegraph systems were exclusively national, and at a frontier messages had to be transcribed and physically transferred across a border to be re-­sent from the other side. The tangle of bilateral and regional agreements that sprang up to assist the interconnection of national networks proved cumbersome, prompting states to sign a treaty in 1865 creating a public international union (PIU) in this domain, the International Telegraph Union, later to become the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Parallel PIUs emerged to govern postal services (the Universal Postal Union, UPU), rail transport (the Central Office for International Carriage by Rail, COICR) and, in 1909, road transport (the Permanent International Association of Road Congresses, now the World Road Association, an INGO). These

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o­ rganizations were later joined by a precursor to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), covering air transport. Thus, by 1939, shipping was the only major mode of international transport or communications without an ­accompanying IO. The membership and responsibilities of these IOs swelled in response to further innovations in and the diffusion of technology. After the Second World War major institutional restructuring occurred. ITU, UPU and ICAO became UN SAs, eventually attracting almost universal membership. By 1970, with the coming of Intelsat, a body managing communications satellites, IOs covered the spectrum of communications from semaphore to satellites. Maritime transport also finally acquired its own IO, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), while in 1985 COICR became the Intergovernmental Organisation for International Carriage by Rail (OTIF). In Europe regional organizations appeared. The European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation was devised in 1960 to govern the continent’s increasingly crowded airspace, while the last decade has witnessed the birth of EU semi-­autonomous agencies as the EU seeks to deliver on promises to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of Europe’s transport infrastructure. As international transport and communications have thrived, so has the demand for IOs as places where states and, as we detail below, an escalating number of private actors develop rules to govern these industries. The globalization of transport and communications remains highly stratified (for example, a substantial minority of the world’s population have never made a telephone call), but international travel and communications have experienced, and continue to experience, exponential growth thanks to new technologies and prosperity bringing what was the preserve of the few within reach of the masses. For instance, in 1948 the airline industry carried just 18m passengers, but by the 1990s this figure exceeded one billion (Zacher 1996). By 2011, passengers had almost tripled to 2.8b, one-­third of whom cross international borders on scheduled flights. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) forecasts that, in 2014, international scheduled flights will convey 1.3b passengers. Tempting as it is to assume that the technological advances that have revolutionized these industries would alone have stimulated mushrooming international connections, it is unlikely they would have done so without the scaffolding of rules erected and overseen by IOs to ensure their safe, efficient and effective operation. Imagine, for example, the inefficiencies and dangers that would arise from states having unilateral standards or incompatible equipment for managing aircraft movements rather than this being executed on the basis of multilateral norms and principles agreed through ICAO.

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The universal IOs in this chapter are primarily programme oriented. Their most significant outputs are norms enshrining general governing principles such as the right of access to and collective decision making over their global commons, plus meticulous technical rules covering everything from the mundane (e.g. standardizing passport pages) to the serious (e.g. air safety). IMO, ICAO, ITU and UPU have an enviable record of technical competence, providing forums in which experts share best practice and discuss internationally comparable data as a preliminary to developing rules that cohere disparate national systems into global norms. Compliance relies overwhelmingly on peer pressure and self-­regulation. Soft power is particularly effective in this arena, as states contravening widely agreed rules and norms can be excluded from their benefits. For example, ports will only allow ships to dock if they are registered in states meeting IMO standards, inhibiting any transgressor’s ability to trade. The operational aspects of these IOs largely consist of technical assistance (TA) to complement their regulatory roles. The resources and range of TA vary considerably by organization: ITU provides some support to members with poor communications networks and those initiating regulatory reform; IMO has focused on training, and ICAO on upgrading facilities such as airport infrastructure. Fellowship programmes, providing government officials with overseas exposure to new technological and regulatory challenges, are also commonplace. The ROs have more of a balance between operational and programme functions, and those with stronger linkages to the EU have more supranational approaches to decision making. While these ROs have produced their own norms and detailed technical regulations, they place greater stress on the direct application of technologies such as Eurocontrol’s provision of a regional air traffic control system or the European Railway Agency’s (ERA) mandate to ­standardize European railway rolling stock. The final noteworthy feature of these IOs is the evolution of their relationship with private actors. Strictly speaking IOs are public institutions populated and controlled by sovereign states, but as previous chapters document they have, to varying degrees, relied on the perspicacity, monitoring and implementation capacity of private actors to deliver their mandates. Nowhere has this been more pronounced than in transport and communications, where nineteenth-­century pioneers were often individuals or private companies whose influence penetrated the nucleus of fledgling IOs. With the exception of road transport and shipping, which have remained predominantly private sector industries, the exorbitant costs of building the infrastructure to exploit these technologies plus recognition of the contribution they could make (and the dangers they might pose) to security and public welfare saw telecommunications, postal services and airlines annexed into state concerns.

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This led to the gradual bifurcation of governance into IOs, which were principally the domain of governments, and INGOs, which often paralleled IOs but were the domain of private actors. The transformation of some of these IOs into SAs seemed to formalize the separation of public and private governance structures, but private actors, though more quiescent, never vanished completely. In the 1980s, these dormant players erupted into action as governments, especially in the developed world, privatized some transport and communications services and infrastructures; consequently states ceased providing those services and became regulators of private sector providers. This trend has required IOs in this domain to reconsider their modus operandi by broadening their constituency and resurrecting the old order of public–private hybrids. However, they have developed contrasting relationships with the private sector. ITU has developed structures similar to the EU, where greater but limited participation and consultation take place with non-­governmental actors. Elsewhere INGOs work in close cooperation with the IO, as is the case between ICAO and IATA. In two cases the re-­emergence of the private sector has been taken to its logical conclusion with the privatization of Inmarsat and Intelsat (Box 16.1). Unlike the epistemic communities encountered in Chapter 15, which focused on pure science and were somewhat insulated from the political rough and tumble, it will be seen that the epistemic communities in these IOs are politically charged. Setting high standards, for example, can squeeze competition from developing countries. Similarly, decisions about the respective roles of the public and private sector are expressly political. Over the last two decades, powerful states have used IOs to diffuse an agenda which suggests that markets and the private sector hold the key to effective governance in these fields. BOX 16.1

PRIVATIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS ORGANIZATIONS The International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat) and the International Maritime Satellite Organization (Inmarsat) were trans-­regional IOs established to launch and operate geostationary communications satellites. Their particular interest lies less in their

functions and more because they are the first IOs to be fully privatized. Initial capital requirements confined their membership to around a dozen developed countries, but gradually many larger and economically powerful developing countries joined, eventually giving each ­organization



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 approximately 80 members. Intelsat was formed in 1965 to operate satellites providing land-­based global communications. Its initial global coverage required three geostationary satellites, but today it operates 53, providing a vast range of communications. Inmarsat was formed in 1979 by IMO. Originally operating not-­for-­profit marine communications systems, Inmarsat subsequently expanded to cover all types of mobile global communications (sea-­to-­sea, air-­to-­air and land-­to-­land), changing its name to the International Mobile Satellite Organization while retaining the same acronym. It is smaller than Intelsat, having only 10 satellites. In the late 1990s the US wished to reduce the monopolistic impact of both organizations to allow the US private sector communications satellite industry to grow. Consequently, in 1998 a small spin-­off

company (New Skies Satellite NV) was created to manage Intelsat’s working capital and six of its satellites. The remaining operations continued within Intelsat before being privatized in 2001 as Intelsat Ltd with government shareholders. Intelsat Ltd was bought out by a private equity consortium in 2005 and completed its transformation in 2006 when it was merged with PanAm Satellite Ltd, a private sector operator. In 1999, Inmarsat was split into two: the satellite operations group (still called Inmarsat) and a small regulatory IO, the International Mobile Satellite Organization (IMSO). IMSO works closely with IMO, ICAO and ITU to ensure that vessel-­to-­land communications are reliable and responsive to maritime and aviation distress calls. Inmarsat was sold to a private equity consortium in 2005 before being floated as a public company on the London Stock Exchange.

Global organizations 16.1 The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 16.1.1 Background In the seven decades following the signature of the 1865 International Telegraph Convention, which gave rise to ITU, innovations including the telephone, wireless telegraphy and radio required additional international legislation to govern the increasingly intricate nature of cross-­border communications. Different legislative enactments were united under the 1932 International Telecommunication Convention, which since then has underpinned ITU’s mandate. Further waves of innovation, including the rising demands of television and most recently digital transmission, complicated the governance of the radio spectrum. Space communications added further to ITU’s portfolio, as it was tasked with assigning orbits for communications satellites. Primarily ITU is programme oriented, with three overarching goals: to improve telecommunications infrastructures (particularly in the ­developing

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world), to narrow the digital divide been rich and poor, and to expand the benefits of the ‘information society’. ITU’s development agenda has expanded since 1989 to support all three goals, especially in LDCs and at a regional level. It provides advice on expounding national telecommunication reform strategies and improving regulation to more fully involve the private sector as a partner in augmenting access. Other development funding is spread evenly over advancing new technology, expanding infrastructure, and capacity building. In supporting an international infrastructure ITU assigns radio frequencies to states for international communications and sets the parameters governing their use. In turn states reassign frequencies within their control. Without this, radio interference would be endemic, and the most powerful transmitters would drown out their competitors, catastrophically undermining navigation and public safety. Unlike UPU (see section 16.2), ITU does not regulate a global service but provides a forum for regulators to meet and exchange best practice. ITU also develops internationally agreed standards to ensure compatibility of cross-­border communications equipment and defines how tariffs will be apportioned and accounted for in international communications. Progressively governments have devolved operational responsibility for telecommunications to the private sector, and ITU has adapted its activities in response. ITU’s technical committees dealing with standardization have always consulted the private sector, particularly companies developing cutting-­edge technology, but ITU has tried to enhance its private sector interactions through two initiatives. The ITU Convention has been revised to include ‘sector members’, and the World Telecommunications Policy Forum (Telecom) gives the private sector a stronger voice (see section 16.1.2). Finally, ITU is charged with promoting universal access to communications networks, a task vital to narrowing the digital divide and promoting the information society. Mobile telephony greatly facilitates all three objectives, as it requires less infrastructure than conventional phones, but this involves ITU working with commercial providers, for example in delivering affordable access to mobile networks, which are overwhelmingly private sector owned.

16.1.2 Structure The four-­yearly Plenipotentiary Conference is ITU’s governing body, and this in its turn elects a Council of 48 states which deals with policy and the management of ITU between Conferences. The Council’s seats are distributed

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on a regional basis, with Africa and Asia/Australasia having the most. The combined votes of Eastern and Western European regions give them a voting majority, but ITU generally works by consensus. The three technical lines of ITU work (or Sectors) are managed through different mechanisms. Radio frequency decisions are made at World Radio-­Communications Conferences, which are held every two to three years, supplemented by a 12-­member panel of experts who approve changes in the interim. Technical standards are supervised by a World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly, which meets quadrennially. The development agenda is also discussed at a quadrennial World Telecommunications Development Conference and at regional meetings which set policy directions and evaluate progress of ITU projects. Working under each conference are many study groups and advisory panels involving both public and private sector members. For example, work on standards is undertaken in a series of study groups dealing separately with equipment, tariffs and network management. These fully involve the private sector, but states retain the power to adopt proposed standards which are not binding, although some fall within WTO rules. While governments hold the decision-­making powers, non-­governmental actors, such as national operators, scientific bodies, industry organizations or development agencies, may join ITU as Sector members (or associates, a membership category that confers a lower level of access), subject to approval by the government concerned. ITU is the only SA whose constitution formally recognizes non-­state actors, and Sector membership entitles the entity to participate fully in all discussions at the Sector level. This has generated a new funding stream, as Sector members pay a significant annual fee for each Sector in which they participate. The final way that ITU solicits private sector input is through Telecom, an annual convention jointly convened with the private sector which rotates between ITU’s regions. The 2011 ­convention attracted some 6500 attendees and 235 exhibitors.

16.1.3 Current activities ITU industry-­wide norms are critical in a sector experiencing rapid technological progress requiring global access standards. Recent examples include compression standards for video transmission over the internet and protocols for electronic authorizations so that electronic documents can be given legal identity. Immediacy is not the only need, however, and ITU has many long-­term regulatory initiatives. For example, large computer servers need to run in air-­conditioned environments, and ITU is developing energy consumption standards to reduce their environmental impact. It is also devising standards for universal, interchangeable batteries, adaptors and chargers

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for portable electronic equipment, work boosted by a recent manufacturers’ agreement to adopt a universal mobile phone charger. A further technological development relates to cyber-­security, where ITU has linked up with an INGO, the International Multilateral Partnership against Cyber Threats, to provide some 40 developing countries with a facility to notify them of cyber-­ threats and pool resources to combat new threats. ITU also supports an effort to harmonize national legislation so that cybercriminals cannot exploit legislative weaknesses. In working to narrow the digital divide, ITU has partnered with public and private sector providers to create communal broadband facilities in schools, community centres and rural villages and is training key facilitators to support these initiatives. However, as at least 75 per cent of communications traffic is now provided commercially compared to 35 per cent in 1990 (ITU 1998), arguably the most important contribution will come from freeing trade in telecommunications services. WTO is now the forum for dealing with the commercial aspects of international telecommunications under the WTO/GATS agreement (see Chapter 10, section 10.2), which is binding on signatory states, and ITU provides technical input into WTO negotiations. As detailed below, ITU’s advocacy of freer trade and greater reliance on private solutions to the digital divide are controversial. Those of a more radical disposition view ITU as a stalking horse for the intertwined interests of Western political and commercial elites whose fondness for markets will reinforce existing inequalities.

16.1.4 Evaluation and future challenges In many respects, ITU can be considered to have successfully managed its mandate, which despite rapid technological developments remains substantially unchanged. The emergence of a more integrated global telecommunications system is testament to the infrastructure of rules and norms promulgated by ITU. Technological advances would anyhow have driven the long-­term decrease in telecommunications costs, but ITU rules have encouraged the dissemination of communications technology, ensuring a rising proportion of the global population can participate in the information society. In short, the ITU regime has created a global commons through avoiding a regulatory and technological free-­for-­all and giving all states a voice in global telecommunications governance. Nevertheless, large discrepancies in exploitation and availability of technology within and between countries mean there is still much to do to close the digital divide. Moreover, while basic ITU norms remain intact there are concerns that they are being eroded by developed states and their decision to unleash and conscript into the organization

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powerful private interests upon which the delivery of ITU’s mandate now heavily depends. The conventional view of ITU is that its Secretariat plays an important role in developing policies and arbitrating agreements within the epistemic community that it encompasses. However, reminiscent of other SAs (see Chapter 7), the ability of developed nations to field a wide range of expertise allows them to dominate ITU’s epistemic communities. One example is the decision to switch over from analogue to digital broadcasting in Europe, the Middle East and Africa by 2015, a target achievable and desired in Europe, but not elsewhere (Irion 2009). Lee (1996) has concluded that ITU’s structure ‘reinforces the hegemonic influence’ of the major states that use the Secretariat’s seeming neutrality to disguise their attempts to retain predominance in a rapidly advancing technical area. The power of developed countries is reinforced by ITU’s attempts to involve the non-­governmental sector. The costs of Sector membership and Telecom participation are prohibitive for many developing-­country institutions. For example, whereas the US and UK have 61 and 22 Sector members respectively, there are just 13 from India and six from South Africa. Furthermore, by advocating greater reliance on the private sector ITU has moved beyond the purely technical and into the more political trade arena, adopting a stance which benefits its more powerful industrial members whose companies dominate the supply of superior telecommunications equipment. The apportionment of international tariffs is a source of tensions both between countries and between governments and the private sector. With operating companies becoming progressively more involved through privatization, revenue sharing has become complicated, and the current system managed through ITU needs overhauling. Revenue sharing is not based on the cost of service but on agreed formulae that provide developing countries with a substantial revenue stream. This results in artificially high costs for individual users in those countries, which lowers the take-­up of services and therefore the potential income of providers. This pits developed against developing countries, as global providers which support cost structures that enhance their market share are generally based in the former, while developing countries wish to maintain their existing governmental revenue streams. ITU is still trying to establish its role in the digital age. Its mandate, to narrow the digital divide and update regulations to facilitate greater investment in developing countries, is critically important for the further economic expansion of those states with minimal physical infrastructure. Ninety per cent of the world’s population now has access to a mobile network, including

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four-­fifths of rural households (ITU 2010). Nevertheless the world’s poorer regions still have a lower user density than elsewhere (Table 16.1). ITU could promote some solutions, such as lower access charges for those on very low incomes, if developing-­country governments could be persuaded to forgo their aforementioned income stream. Equally, however, to fulfil its objective of bringing affordable telecommunications to the world’s poorest, the ITU is dependent on private sector technological and marketing muscle. Multinational telecommunications corporations could lower the price and enhance the availability of modern technology, but ultimately their profit motivation could clash with ITU’s avowed aim to promote technology as a public good. Indeed within the IT industry and particularly the internet there is considerable resistance to any IO (or government) having oversight or a coordinating role. For example, the internet’s not-­for-­profit coordinating body (the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers  – ICANN) consists of a select group of universities, individuals and IT organizations which agrees internet protocols and assigns domain names. Table 16.1  The digital divide (2010) User category

Households with a television (%) Households with a computer (%) Households with internet access (%) Internet users (per 100 inhabitants) Fixed broadband subscriptions (per 100 inhabitants) Mobile broadband subscriptions (per 100 inhabitants) Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 inhabitants)

Developed world

Developing world

Africa

98.0 71.0 65.6 71.6 24.6 51.1 116.1

72.4 22.5 15.8 21.1 4.4 5.4 67.6

– – – 9.6 0.2 3.6 41.4

Source: ITU (2010).

ITU’s support for the information society has been limited by its lack of engagement with civil society. Unlike many SAs, ITU has very few accredited INGOs either as observers to its governing bodies or as Sector or associate members. This shortcoming contributed to an unsuccessful dialogue with civil society on the ITU development agenda in 1999 and, despite providing the Secretariat for the UN World Summit on the Information Society, ITU failed to develop mechanisms to engage civil society fully (Mueller et al. 2007). The Summit rejected future ITU leadership because it was considered to be inflexible and insufficiently open to multiple stakeholders (Irion 2009), seemingly opening opportunities for UPU to play the greater role described in section 16.2. Designing effective conduits for engagement with non-­state

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actors is imperative not just for the information society agenda but for ITU’s general prospects. The Telecom Convention is supposed to give the private sector a stronger voice in ITU’s work but is widely viewed as merely a trade fair reflecting outdated thinking about the structure of the industry. In short, ITU needs to manoeuvre delicately in order to walk the tightrope between critics that deem it has already given too much power to the private sector and the private sector’s demand for greater voice and representation. If the latter is not forthcoming, a rival private sector organization may be formed, similar to that in postal services, undermining ITU’s authority.

16.2 The Universal Postal Union (UPU) 16.2.1 Background and structure The adoption of the postage stamp after 1840 opened the mails to the general population and shifted responsibility for postal delivery from private arrangements involving couriers and transport operators on to states. Resembling telecommunications, postal services initially developed along national lines, with bilateral arrangements governing delivery and payment for international mails. Dating from 1874, UPU’s founding rationale was to improve the efficiency of the international postal service with the purpose of facilitating communication. Therefore it set about replacing the jumble of bilateral accords with multilateral rules and norms that would link national postal services into a seamless worldwide network. Central to this was UPU’s creation and administration of the ‘single postal territory’, the concept that international mail posted in one country generally has unrestricted access to the country of destination. Under this rubric UPU is the forum where rules governing the movement of mails and the formulae for reimbursement of costs in international postal traffic (the Remuneration of the Exchange of International Mails (REIMS)) are decided. The need for REIMS arises because revenues from postage stamps affixed by the sender accrue to the postal service in the originating state but some costs are borne by the service making the final delivery. Membership of UPU is almost universal, as postage stamp issuers have to be members in order for their stamps to be accepted elsewhere. UPU’s evolution echoes that of ITU. UPU has been compelled to update and devise new rules to cope with challenges from technological innovations, commencing with the telegraph and telephone, through to electronic communications like fax and e-­mail. Moreover, these technologies have gnawed away at the competitive advantages of UPU members, while ­commercial pressures from alternative delivery systems, including private couriers and

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the internet, have made UPU a forum for devising schemes to boost the revenues of postal services. Tensions between postal operators and governments caused the large postal companies to create the International Post Corporation (IPC) in 1989. The operators felt that this INGO was necessary, as UPU was not providing leadership in their competition with the courier industry, and they also had to prepare for the likelihood of non-­ monopolistic but internationally interconnected postal services. Since then, UPU has been grappling with the changes needed for greater private sector involvement in what was originally a purely governmental operation. In 1992, it split regulatory responsibilities from operative and commercial ones by creating two internal committees, one for each aspect of its work, the Council of Administration (CA) and the Postal Operations Council (POC) respectively. Under privatization states are evolving from being service providers to regulators, and this has a knock-­on effect in IOs which have to be more flexible to take advantage of new opportunities. Competition and the demands of a globally interconnected economy have forced postal services to be more customer oriented, efficient and cost-­effective than under an exclusively government-­run regime. Postal services in developed economies are under pressure to be self-­financing rather than burden the taxpayer (Triangle Consulting 2004). This, coupled with the continuing need for governments to act as service providers of last resort (thereby becoming guarantors of residual high-­cost services), has allowed UPU to expand its work beyond regulation into provision of global services important to its members, with costs shared by all, including keeping a central register of universal postcodes, managing an electronic network for tracking and tracing parcels and registered mail, and supporting postal financial services. Thus, UPU now provides a quality control service for international mails, randomly testing the effectiveness of deliveries. This service provides information on how mail moves through the different stages leading to final delivery and draws on the cooperation of IPC, which uses radio frequency identification transponders affixed to some mail to monitor its own members’ service standards. UPU’s structure is typical of an SA (Chapter 7). The highest, policy-­making authority is the quadrennial Universal Postal Congress. Between Congresses decisions are delegated to CA and POC, with 41 and 40 members respectively. Both CA and POC can promulgate interim regulations pending their eventual adoption by the Congress. For reasons similar to ITU, UPU has accommodated the private sector by creating user groups (or cooperatives in UPU parlance) where private and public sector specialists meet together to feed proposals into POC. However, as most developing countries still have

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government-­run postal services they have ensured that states retain decision-­ making powers. There is also a Consultative Committee with six governmental members, nominated by CA and POC, which is the forum for direct dialogue with members of the postal community (represented by INGOs for postal users, employees and operators) but which does not directly impact on policy proposals. The Consultative Committee meets biannually ­alongside CA and POC meetings.

16.2.2 Current activities The UPU settlement formula is based on weight and the number of items processed, but international postal volumes have dropped (Figure 16.1), putting financial pressure on all members. Initially decline was slow, allowing for gradual adjustment, but recently the pace has accelerated, although the value of certain postal business (including overnight document and parcel delivery) has risen. UPU is developing electronic systems to improve members’ efficacy, such as international tracking of express mails and transmitting international money orders. A new UPU Express Mail Cooperative has 150 members and was instigated to compete more effectively with private sector couriers, with ‘bonus’ payments being made to members that introduce electronic tracking and that define and meet minimum delivery standards. 9 8.5 8

b. pieces

7.5 7 6.5 6 5.5 5 4.5 4 1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

Year Source:  UPU 2010, extrapolated from 2008 data.

Figure 16.1  International postal volumes (1980–2010)

2005

2010

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The availability of postal addresses is taken for granted in developed countries but, aside from renting a post office box, no equivalent facility exists in many developing countries. Consequently direct mail delivery is irregular or limited in frequency. The lack of proper address systems means that most of the world’s poor are unable to receive essential mail, and substantial commercial opportunities are forgone by the postal services themselves (e.g. direct mailings). UPU is supporting those members wishing to improve their addressing systems with technical advice, particularly on postal coding. UPU’s Advanced Electronic Services Group is developing ‘hybrid mails’ in which e-­mails and regular deliveries are combined for fast transmission of large documents to locations not served by broadband. Postal registered e-­mails, coupled with legal and strictly validated international postmarks and signature authentication processes for e-­mail users, will certify dispatch and receipt of important e-­mails, and these facilities will be integrated into the ‘.post’ internet domain name (see section 16.2.3).

16.2.3 Evaluation and future challenges Privatization and competition from electronic communication are the two main challenges limiting UPU’s effectiveness. Privatization induces pressure for more efficient management of postal traffic and pricing structures that ensure a profitable operation, which consequently requires that private operators, including express couriers, contribute to decision making. Unfortunately UPU has yet to find a suitable structure to integrate both sides of the industry, and the private sector remains excluded from substantive UPU discussions. UPU is considering whether assimilating private sector interests is best served through an ILO model or a dual structure akin to ICAO and IATA. However, most UPU members are resistant to private sector participation and could thwart these ambitions. They have already rebuffed private sector proposals to better define the work of CA and POC with operational matters being devolved to a broader church fully involved in POC. IPC was initially well positioned to represent national operators, in a manner similar to that of IATA (see Case Study 16.1), as its members handled some 80 per cent of global postal traffic. Nevertheless, IPC members are divided on some key issues, since some are fully privatized and others remain in government control (Triangle Consulting 2004). When IPC reorganized to reflect industry changes it decreased its focus on international policy and thus plays a smaller role in its industry than IATA. As regards e-­mail traffic, UPU is vying with ITU for the responsibility of managing global electronic communications, and there are signs that it is winning the battle through not seeking a policy role. After ITU was denied

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the opportunity to manage international IT development in 2009, ICANN granted UPU exclusive management of the ‘.post’ domain name. As described above, UPU will use this to license e-­identification for hybrid mails and to create ‘postal’ identities on the internet. This makes it the first IO to be given the responsibility for governance of a domain name and registration of its users. As voice communications are also now possible over the internet, this potentially moves UPU into ITU territory.

16.3 The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 16.3.1 Background Despite aviation being in its infancy, an International Air Convention covering technical and operational aspects of civil aviation was negotiated as part of the First World War Peace Conference (Chapter 2, section 2.2). This Convention established principles governing flights over foreign territory, navigation rules, certificates of airworthiness, and aircraft registration and an IO to oversee them, the International Commission for Air Navigation (ICAN). ICAN became operative in 1922 and monitored developments in civil aviation, proposing rules that were periodically incorporated into existing agreements. European airlines meantime cooperated under an RO, the International Air Traffic Association, set up to standardize paperwork and consult on the technicalities of aircraft operations. In 1945, this evolved into a global organization, the International Air Transport Association (IATA). A further Convention on International Civil Aviation was agreed in 1944 (the Chicago Convention, see Chapter 2, section 2.3), and ICAO was established as an SA in 1947 as a successor to ICAN. Article 44 (a) of the Convention charges ICAO to support the development of ‘safe and orderly growth’ in aviation through developing uniform regulations, procedures and standards, most notably a seamless air traffic management system, with universally accepted communications conventions. While ICAO’s primary function is to ensure air safety, it also develops principles and practices for air navigation, and regulates airworthiness, airport management, flight crews and flight controllers. Additionally, it establishes standards for licensing airline personnel covering pilots, engineers, air traffic controllers and flight dispatchers. As most air accidents occur on take-­off or landing, communications are crucial, and ICAO specifications for data exchange, automated flight handling, meteorological information and ground-­to-­air control are continually being updated. More recently ICAO has acquired responsibility for fostering international agreement on ­reducing

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the aviation industry’s CO2 footprint. ICAO assists developing countries by providing TA support in the form of legal expertise, feasibility studies, long-­ term civil aviation planning and a fellowship programme. In addition, it collects aviation statistics, develops legislation and provides economic analyses of the industry. For countries with little aviation industry experience, ICAO offers a service to help them purchase the most appropriate operational equipment. ICAO remains an intergovernmental organization little changed from its original structure. However, reflecting the growing dominance of the private sector, IATA is slowly evolving as an INGO (see Case Study 16.1), becoming influential as an industry mouthpiece at ICAO forums. The two organizations, together, encompass the epistemic community involved, and despite some overlaps there is an accepted division of labour. ICAO deals with legislative coordination and mandatory international regulations, such as standards for airport ground control, navigation rules, noise pollution and international security coordination. IATA represents the interests of airlines and fosters commercial regulation, such as rules for the carriage of dangerous cargo, passenger identification, ground security, in-­flight emergency procedures, and agreements concerning advance passenger information. Although IATA has observer status at ICAO meetings it cannot directly influence new regulations but is consulted on many initiatives, and the two secretariats work closely together. Indeed IATA makes important contributions to ICAO’s specialized work, often drafting proposals for its technical groups.

16.3.2 Structure ICAO’s sovereign body is the General Assembly of member states, which meets triennially to set overall policy objectives. The Assembly assigns the management of ICAO and its work programme to an elected Council, which unlike many other SAs is a permanent body that meets for six months in each year and whose nominated delegates are assigned by their governments for the duration of their terms of office. Representation on the 36-­member Council covers three principal constituencies: member states of importance to aviation, states with large contributions to air navigation, and states representing the regions of the world. The greatest volume of air traffic is between Europe and North America, and these two regions weigh heavily in ICAO decisions by virtue of their 11 Council seats. Owing to its historical predominance in aircraft construction, however, the US has had the most influence in developing equipment standards and, as in other IOs in this group, the resources that the major aviation nations bring to ICAO forums give them a dominant influence. The Council can amend or adopt new standards and practices as

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annexes to the 1944 Convention. The Council’s work is supported by an Air Navigation Commission, an Air Transport Committee dealing with economic issues, a Committee on Joint Support of Air Navigation Services and a Finance Committee.

16.3.3 Current activities Flying is the safest form of transport but, while accident numbers have plateaued, fatal accidents involving developing-­country airlines are 15 times more frequent than for developed-­country carriers (A. Barnett and Wang 1998). The liberalization of aviation has generated intense competition from non-­national flag carriers and low-­cost airlines, reinforcing the need to ensure that the industry remains safe and well regulated in the face of economic pressures. Before 2010 ICAO selectively audited members for compliance with international safety standards; however, in that year it changed its approach and now continually monitors safety criteria (while IATA audits individual airlines). ICAO has no power to sanction non-­compliant states but, in a parallel to the case in the maritime industry, states can deny landing rights to airlines with lax safety standards and can counsel their own airlines to avoid the worst airports, effectively freezing them out of the industry. ICAO’s TA programmes support safety objectives and include the provision of expertise to developing nations for airport management, ground control, navigation and support for the operations of their national airlines. ICAO is working closely with WTO to develop rules for international competition that will fall within the GATS agreement, such as those governing over-­flights of national airspace. These rules include rights to access markets, conditions of carriage and policies to balance the different interests of developing-­country carriers and large commercial airlines. This work supports ICAO’s long-­term objective of an industry with a standard set of regulations. IPCC calculates that air transport accounts for 3 per cent of greenhouse gas emissions, a figure that is rising and makes a greater overall impact because high-­altitude emissions have more serious consequences. Aviation was exempted from the Kyoto Protocol on the understanding that ICAO would implement an emissions control policy by 2007, a target that was missed. ICAO continues to pursue agreement on targets for the industry. A study group will be proposing new CO2 emission standards to be adopted in 2015 and, simultaneously, ICAO is developing a framework for market-­ based measures to control emissions, covering more efficacious air traffic control, taxation of aviation fuel, carbon offsets and emissions trading (see also section 16.3.4).

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16.3.4 Evaluation and future challenges The existence of a unified regulatory regime is a singular achievement that has contributed substantially to the safety and efficiency of aviation. Nevertheless ICAO today stands accused of being locked into a dated industry model where states hold all the cards and negotiate bilateral rights, often with their flag carriers in mind (European Commission 2007). The European Commission believes that ICAO should rely more on regional bodies to implement and enforce norms and, in response, ICAO has bolstered support for regional initiatives. This is particularly true of the safety enforcement regime, which despite improvements is relatively weak. Safety is paramount and has two foci, general flight safety and terrorist threats. The key to flight safety lies in airport management, and ICAO advocates airport privatization, believing that concomitantly greater investment will foster better safety regimes. Terrorists still regard airlines as soft targets and continue to find ways of attacking aircraft, for example in 2010, when attempts were made in Yemen to disguise explosives as cargo. ICAO’s semi-­permanent Council has allowed it to respond quickly and effectively to operating challenges and has resulted in legal instruments that are ‘well thought out and of high quality albeit still a product of political discussions and compromises’ (Nielsen 2008). It reacted quickly to the use of hijacked aircraft on 9/11 by requiring locked flight-­deck doors, developing verbal communication protocols with ground controllers and auditing national airport security processes. Similarly, the 2002 SARS outbreak caused ICAO to issue immediate guidelines requiring airlines to take measures to limit the transmission of a communicable disease that was incubated in a few countries but which could spread rapidly through air travel. ICAO has three objectives for reducing the industry’s environmental impact. In two cases, noise and emissions, some progress has been made, with new engine standards coming into effect in 2013. ICAO is making less headway with its third objective, to stem the industry’s contribution to CO2 emissions. ICAO has to balance: the needs of developing countries, many of which have very small but growing aviation sectors; those of the developed world, where aviation is a key industry; the desires of the industry (as represented by IATA) to foster continued expansion; and the movement to develop economic incentives to reduce carbon emissions (such as the EU Emissions Trading System). Accordingly it developed a three-­prong approach to the problem. Those covering emissions standards and control measures are considered above, but ICAO’s 2010 General Assembly agreed soft targets that could increase fuel efficiency by 2 per cent annually up to 2050 ­(including

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use of alternative fuels and more efficient engines) but has nonetheless accepted IATA’s position that reductions will be limited to 1.5 per cent annually until 2020, implying that the rate of reduction will be back-­end loaded. While ICAO’s support for economic measures to reduce CO2 emissions is constrained by the need to keep the private sector on board, rising fuel costs have provided an impetus, making the industry more amenable to fuel-­saving regulations, and IATA made independent commitments to action at the 2009 Copenhagen environment conference. CASE STUDY 16.1

The International Air Transport Association – changing from an IO to an INGO in response to privatization IATA is the trade association for the airline industry; membership is voluntary, and 240 airlines are members, covering 95 per cent of international flights. Its core service is the single-­ ticket concept, which allows passengers to book complex travel itineraries on member airlines through one agency, with guaranteed bookings on onward flights. This is backed by a financial settlement system linking approved travel agents and freight forwarders to IATA’s clearing house facility. IATA also provides a similar service for trans-­shipped air cargo (unlike sea freight, which depends on shipping-­line-­to-­shipping-­line transactions). Consequently, airlines outside IATA are mainly charter operators or low-­cost carriers that sell simple single-­route tickets. Initially almost all airlines were national flag carriers and, in 1970, 74 per cent of IATA members were partly or wholly state owned. Had the protectionist proposals of the UK and Canada been accepted at the 1944 Chicago Convention, IATA’s functions would have been given to ICAO (Chuang 1972); however, US negotiators did not want an IO with discretionary powers over their thriving airline industry, and a compromise solution resulted in a separate institution to handle commercial rights. Many of its functions (such as agreements on routes and fare sharing) are typical of a cartel, but they were sanctioned by governments and remain in place. Privatization has left only 22 per cent of IATA members still in government ownership and, together with deregulation, has increased competition from independent operators and altered IATA’s raison d’être. Rather than simply representing a cartel it has gradually transformed into an industry group concerned with obtaining market reforms, cost cutting, setting commercial standards and expanding air travel. IATA lobbies governments for legislative changes needed by its members, which depending on their applicability are sometimes promulgated through ICAO but which often also require the participation of key states. One such initiative was the adoption of a uniform passport page, which has enabled

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CASE STUDY 16.1 (continued)

airports and airlines to design standardized processes to handle passengers’ details. IATA reaches decisions through consensus, but its rules are not binding unless they have been incorporated into national or international legislation, a lengthy process that reflects its IO origins. IATA is now less dependent on members’ budget subventions and more reliant on generating income through marketing its products and new services. These include providing a forum for airlines to negotiate landing slots and berthing fees, and improving the regulatory environment for ground service suppliers and privatized airport operators. IATA has also expanded into consulting services, such as revenue forecasting, evaluating route strategies, running customer surveys and providing aviation business intelligence. Today IATA has an annual turnover of approximately $200b, with standard settlement times and very few defaults. IATA offers associate membership to other sectors of the industry such as passenger associations, airport authorities and travel agents. Partnership programmes with these groups generate further income, including certification of some 90 000 travel agents, allowing them to use IATA’s logo as a quality standard.

16.4 The International Maritime Organization (IMO) 16.4.1 Background Marine transport was the first global industry but, despite 95 per cent of world trade measured by weight and 67 per cent by value moving by sea (Steinberg 2001), it was a latecomer to the IO scene. ILO was concerned with the working conditions of sailors, but the League of Nations never became directly involved in shipping for three reasons. First, shipping has always been a private sector activity. Second, at the time only a few states were interested in shipping legislation. Third, historically Britain, the hegemonic maritime power until the Second World War, saw no need for multilateral activity (Vorbach 2001), as it could impose rules unilaterally. For example, in 1876 Britain adopted the Plimsoll Line (a visible mark on a ship’s side which indicates the depth in the water to which it can be safely loaded), and because a law was passed by Parliament in 1906 requiring that all ships entering British ports complied with the Line it became a global standard. Attitudes started to change following the sinking of the Titanic in 1912, when an International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) sketched rules for hitherto unregulated issues on ship construction, lifeboats, mandatory ships’ watches and record keeping. SOLAS become an integral part of the rules of IMO, maritime transport’s first IO, created in 1958.

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The growth of flags of convenience after 1945 and the rapid expansion of shipping, previously regulated by major trading states, provided the impetus for international regulation (Vorbach 2001). IMO’s main objective, summarized in its current mission statement, is to ensure ‘safe, secure and efficient shipping on clean oceans’. Every propelled, seagoing merchant ship over 100 gross tonnes in size (except fishing boats, pleasure craft and specialized vessels such as lightships) must carry an IMO ship identification number. IMO’s work includes developing, codifying and encouraging countries to adopt standards for navigation, protection of the marine environment, and TA support for developing nations, some of which are important providers of flags of convenience. IMO has updated SOLAS twice to accommodate modern navigational technology and safety requirements. It has also developed rules for the carriage of hazardous substances, emergency distress systems, safety certification for fishing vessels, marine traffic regulations and minimum certification requirements for seafarers (in cooperation with ILO). The 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships covers all aspects of pollution prevention, from chemical and oil spills to the jettisoning of ships’ rubbish and sewage. IMO treaties also specify the financial compensation that polluters have to pay following major incidents and define the regulations governing shipment of dangerous cargoes. IMO was also instrumental in the creation of Inmarsat (see Box 16.1). It has helped establish and improve national maritime academies around the world and has developed training modules for their use. However, many developing countries cannot provide advanced nautical training, despite their willingness to allow registration of ships under flags of convenience. Therefore, since 1983, IMO has sponsored the World Maritime University, which provides training on the regulations and inspections required by IMO conventions. More recently it has created the International Maritime Law Institute to train lawyers in marine legislation and a Maritime Academy in Italy which provides short courses for seafarers. The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) governing the use of the high seas is one of the major legal instruments developed by the UN and has been ratified by 140 countries. While its provisions include such established concepts as the 12-­nautical-­mile territorial limit and the 200-­nautical-­mile economic zone, more detailed and operational legislation is discussed and agreed within this overall framework under IMO auspices. In combating marine pollution, for example, the requirements to introduce double-­hulled tankers was an IMO initiative, and the dumping of industrial waste at sea is now strictly controlled.

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16.4.2 Structure IMO’s structure is that of a conventional SA (Chapter 7). A biennial Assembly sets policy and makes key administrative decisions, leaving ongoing management to a 40-­member Council (although the Council cannot take decisions on maritime safety and pollution prevention). Below the Assembly and Council are committees on maritime safety and protection of the marine environment and a series of technical subcommittees. As with ICAO, membership in the bodies below the Assembly is weighted towards two groups, states which are major flag carriers and those with a large seaborne trade, but a third constituency then ensures fair regional representation. While there appears to be a consensual approach, states whose ports are the most used hold real decision-­making power. IMO’s costs are shared between its members in proportion to the tonnage of their merchant fleets. Unfortunately half of shipping is registered with flags of convenience, meaning the weightiest contributors to its budget are countries, like Liberia and Panama, which are not noted for their ability to make regular payments. IMO differs from many SAs in the degree to which INGOs participate in its deliberations. Vorbach (2001) distinguishes between ‘vertical’ participation processes that move decisions up the IMO structure and ‘horizontal’ participation by INGOs outside the formal structure which improves the consultative process and results in relevant legislation. For example, the Comité Maritime International, a group of jurists, shipowners and insurers, initially drafts most IMO conventions. This means more complex procedures for consultation than exist in most IOs but results in IMO representing the ­interests of its epistemic community to a greater extent than ICAO, where non-­state actors work mostly within IATA.

16.4.3 Current activities, evaluation and future challenges IMO is one of the smallest SAs but has achieved considerable success in obtaining compliance with marine regulations in an industry which is one of the most open of all, since ships can be registered with any country and crews recruited from any source. UNCLOS codified the rights of port states to inspect shipping, and ports can refuse to accept ships that do not comply with international safety and pollution standards, limiting the ability of the originating country to benefit from international trade. While some flag states are lax in applying IMO regulations, by devolving responsibility to port states and requiring ships to carry compliance certificates or be inspected IMO has a powerful implementation tool (see section 16.9).

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IMO conventions have been widely accepted, applying to 98 per cent of global shipping tonnage. The organization has performed an essential role, putting the Secretariat in a position to spearhead the formulation of new regulations and initiatives (Vorbach 2001). Thus, because countries providing flags of convenience have generally avoided enforcing IMO standards on their fleets (as few of their registered vessels actually berth in them), IMO has moved from passive to proactive monitoring of implementation. A system is being developed to audit members and provide technical assistance to those whose implementation could be improved. Thus IMO has effectively responded to the safety and efficiency parts of its mandate. The biggest challenge currently facing IMO is maritime security, both at ports and from piracy (Box 16.2). Following 9/11, it became clear that ocean freight containers could be used for terrorist purposes. Consequently, a system of secure container inspections at ports of origin is being considered, linked to an advanced review of container contents. This requires common BOX 16.2

PIRACY The recent upsurge in piracy is an example of technical agencies of the UN having to enter the realm of high politics and work within the UN. UNCLOS outlaws piracy on the high seas and allows states to bring pirates to justice. For many years piracy has been a problem in the Malacca Strait off Indonesia, where there were 30 pirate attacks in 2010, but this was principally confined to opportune robbery from the most vulnerable ships. More recently, an explosion of piracy off the Somali coast has precipitated an international response. This situation resulted from Somalia’s status as a failed state. The collapse of state authority encouraged illegal fishing and the dumping of toxic waste in Somali territorial waters. To protect their livelihood local fishermen would intercept foreign vessels to stop their activities or demand payment for the fish they had expropriated. This defensive activity soon turned to the more menacing and

criminal activity of violently seizing ships to demand a ransom. In 2008 in the seas off Somalia there were 140 attacks on ships (some of them very large bulk carriers), with 39 crews being held for ransom. These attacks exposed a flaw in UNCLOS, which only covers activity on the high seas. WFP (which delivers emergency aid to Somalia) and IMO approached the Security Council, seeking a political solution to the crisis. SC initially encouraged member states to provide support to ships in the area, particularly to escort WFP-­chartered vessels. Piracy peaked in 2011 with 237 attacks but has since declined by 70 per cent as SC-­sanctioned pre-­emptive action took effect. Led by an EU naval task force several states, including the US, India and China, set up the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa to track and protect shipping. IMO is the policy coordinator and technical adviser to SC.

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standards and more efficient processing of paperwork, which up to now is prepared while a ship is at sea. IMO is cooperating with the World Customs Organization in developing agreed standards (see Chapter 10, section 10.8). IMO’s second key challenge is to extend its environmental remit from a restricted focus on oceanic pollution to one concerned with the industry’s broader impact, including climate change. Shipping is not as visible a polluter as aviation but contributes equally to CO2 emissions. The Kyoto Treaty, which sets national targets for CO2 reduction, with developed nations reducing their emissions more than developing ones, gave IMO the responsibility for brokering agreement on reducing ships’ emissions. Placing the onus for maritime CO2 reduction primarily on developed nations would allow shipowners, who can change their registered flag at will, to elude their responsibilities. IMO’s first initiative was to reduce atmospheric pollution by requiring larger vessels to switch to low-­sulphur fuels. Unfortunately most vessels enjoy protracted lifespans, implying that overall progress will be slow, especially as ships with flags of convenience have less pressure to comply. Further negotiations on controls to apply to all shipping resulted in a formal agreement to reduce CO2 emissions by 30 per cent by 2030. These rules combine design standards that must be applied to new vessels with improved operational guidelines, such as optimum sailing speeds and better port management. As for environmental pollution, IMO is working to extend its Marine Pollution Convention to cover those potentially hazardous substances in addition to oil that are transported by sea and promoting innovative technologies to strengthen safety records and environmental protection rules. Additionally, the delivery of old ships to breakers’ yards in developing countries, while providing employment and revenue to the countries concerned, brings with it problems of proper protection of workers against harmful materials (like asbestos and oil residues); IMO, in conjunction with ILO, is preparing guidelines to cover this activity plus improved maritime safety.



Trans-­regional and regional organizations

16.5 The Intergovernmental Organisation for International Carriage by Rail (OTIF) 16.5.1 Background and structure OTIF began life in 1890 as the Central Office for International Carriage by Rail (COICR), drawing its members predominantly from Europe and some

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states of the Mediterranean littoral and Middle East, areas with extensive international rail networks, although recently Russia has joined the organization. Up to 1956, the Swiss government provided COICR’s Secretariat in a manner analogous with the staffing of early IOs. However, in 1985, because of burgeoning EU integration and privatization in the rail industry, COICR was reborn as OTIF, and the present structure and mandate were adopted. OTIF’s work revolves around the Convention Concerning International Carriage by Rail, first promulgated in 1890 and regularly updated since, which parallels the Warsaw Convention of the airline industry (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.4). At OTIF, members negotiate changes to the Convention and other aspects of international rail transport law covering both passengers and freight. OTIF has also developed other rail regulations, including those covering the carriage of dangerous goods, border formalities that speed the movement of freight and rolling stock, and tariffs and rules for the use of national railway infrastructure and equipment by foreign operators. At a technical level it validates harmonized specifications for railway equipment. Within the EU, infrastructure regulation is now undertaken by ERA (see section 16.11), but OTIF continues to have a wider remit, for example by specifying minimum conditions for international passenger ticketing and freight haulage. OTIF’s 44 members meet in a triennial General Assembly to direct policy and adopt major revisions to the Convention. Five Committees report to the Assembly: an Administrative Committee, the Revision Committee, which considers changes to the Convention, and three expert committees covering the carriage of dangerous goods, technical standards and border procedures. Since EU states set their own common standards within a different framework, the EU as a bloc exerts hefty influence on OTIF’s decisions, and the EU has applied to be accepted as a member in its own right, which is similar to its status at WTO. ERA with five times more staff than OTIF is able to develop regulations faster and give them detailed technical review without needing to convene expert working groups.

16.5.2 Current activities and future challenges Privatization of all or parts of some members’ rail systems has posed a major challenge for the industry and OTIF. Privatization requires alterations to the various OTIF conventions to reflect the participation and rights of new actors, particularly to deal with the separation of infrastructure (track) from passenger and freight operations. Failure to consider the impact of these changes on the private sector risks a deleterious impact on investment decisions. Two

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examples will suffice. Private sector companies issuing tickets for international travel must respect OTIF’s conditions of carriage guidelines. However, these were developed for acceptance by unified and nationalized rail systems and not for a situation where some operating companies may not accept or follow specific OTIF conditions. Certain opt-­outs are therefore needed and are still being negotiated. OTIF rules also govern the use of rolling stock and the obligations of its owners when equipment is used on foreign tracks. This incorporates registration of rolling stock and gives owners priority when they reclaim leased equipment that has travelled beyond national borders, a move that has been welcomed as potentially reducing the long-­term cost of private sector railway financing. Just as IMO and ICAO are the main international bodies for their industries, OTIF aspires to a similar global role regarding rail transport, not just a trans-­ regional one. However, the exorbitant cost to aspiring members of upgrading rail infrastructure to meet OTIF standards is a serious obstacle to expansion. For example, Russia will initially apply OTIF rules only to two short sections of track in the Baltic littoral that are connected to the EU by rail ferry services, in order to assess the economic and technical impact for the rest of its rail system. Russia is linked into the Central Asian network, where many aspiring members operate, and transition agreements will certainly be required for any new members. Nevertheless, as many rail systems are unlikely ever to come in contact with each other, a global IO is not ­essential for effective operations.

16.6 The European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol) 16.6.1 Background and structure In 1957, an ICAO European regional conference discussed the need for a pan-­European response to air control given the greater interdependence of European states, increasingly crowded skies and technological advances in aviation, especially the advent of faster aircraft. Shortly afterwards Eurocontrol was created by the 1960 European Convention on the Cooperation for the Safety of Air Navigation. Its principal function is operational, namely to provide unified air traffic control for all civil aircraft flying over Europe at an altitude greater than 7.5km (25 000 feet) or outside its members’ national airspace. This remit covers some 50 per cent of international air traffic and is managed through three Eurocontrol centres, in the Netherlands, Germany and Ireland (for transatlantic traffic). As there are over 30 air traffic control systems in Eurocontrol’s airspace, it has a long-­standing, wider objective of

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integrating pan-­European air traffic management to amplify flight capacity through better use of Europe’s restricted airspace. A common control system brings economic, safety and scheduling benefits to the industry, and full integration would reinforce the EU single market in aviation, which was achieved in the 1990s. The EU funds the ‘Single European Sky’ (SES) initiative in support of this objective. Eurocontrol’s mandate has also been expanded to cover ground movement of aircraft, since fuel consumption is impacted both by flight time and by ground waiting times, and a more joined-­up system is desired. Eurocontrol coordinates national air control activities including centralized collection of traffic fees for its members and bilateral partners. Other functions include training air traffic controllers who handle inter-­European flights and, jointly with NATO, managing use of European upper airspace for both civil and military flights. Based on data that it collects, Eurocontrol also provides members with traffic analysis and projections as a contribution to developing EU and national aviation policies. Eurocontrol membership is not confined to EU states, as it includes Switzerland, Norway, Turkey and parts of former Yugoslavia. In anticipation of its key role in the SES initiative, members have improved Eurocontrol’s governance structure and given more powers to the Secretariat, although full implementation is pending ratification of amendments to the Eurocontrol Convention. It has a conventional IO structure, with a General Assembly of all members (to be renamed the Commission), which is a ministerial-­level meeting held at two-­ to three-­yearly intervals, a (Provisional) Council of all members, whose participants are the national heads of civil aviation, which meets at least annually, and permanent committees dealing with civilian– military flight interface issues, traffic rules, security and performance standards. The General Assembly sets overall policy, while the Council oversees the application of policies and decides on policy adjustments that respond to immediate needs as well as the management of the organization.

16.6.2 Current activities, evaluation and future challenges Eurocontrol has made a significant contribution to improving the safety of European airspace and is making strides towards integrated European regional control centres to facilitate the SES initiative, save flying time and rationalize issues such as the impact of military airspace on commercial routes. Its central flight centre in the Netherlands replaced those of four member states, and another centre is being set up in Central Europe to merge eight others.

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Eurocontrol’s technical competence in overcoming the challenges of establishing a unified control system has been recognized, but sovereignty concerns cramp its ability to promote efficient European aviation. The 1944 Chicago Convention enshrines national sovereignty over airspace and, given its strategic importance, states are wary of abdicating control to a third party. Eurocontrol’s original Convention gave it full responsibility for managing national airspace, but in 1981 an amendment limited Eurocontrol ‘to provide and operate, wholly or in part, air traffic services’. Thus, borders in the air remain, although following the Schengen Agreement those on the ground have slowly disappeared. Restrictions on commercial air traffic result in delays, while high-­intensity use of limited airspace leads to excessive fuel consumption, environmental damage and economic losses. Moreover, compared with the organization covering US airspace, Eurocontrol is less productive and more costly. Eurocontrol’s costs rise alongside the number of flights, but in the US more flights generate decreasing unit costs. Partly this is attributable to managing a single national airspace compared to a multinational one, but there is clearly scope for improvement (Cleaz-­Savoyen 2004). The expected doubling of European air traffic between 2010 and 2020 emphasizes the need for efficient use of airspace. Ongoing EU initiatives will support some expansion, but without SES the full potential for regional air travel cannot be achieved. Eurocontrol’s integrated control centres are key to this, but the organization also provides other services in support of the objective, for example analysing projected demand on the busiest airports and proposing improvements to airport infrastructures that could add capacity. It is testing a new system involving a process known as autonomous separation, which allows aircraft to fly closer together under their own control using a navigation system developed by the EU and exploiting three satellites which are verifying the technology behind the future EU Galileo positioning system (see Chapter 12, section 12.7.4 and Chapter 15, section 15.6). These practical measures should eventually lead to cost and environmental benefits even in the absence of SES.

16.7 EU semi-­autonomous institutions dealing with transport The Single Market initiated under the Treaty of Rome (Chapter 11) enshrines the freedom of movement of goods, services and people; consequently, melding transport infrastructures and services has been an EU priority. The economic necessity for this is demonstrated by the fact that in Europe a truck takes 57 hours to complete a 2000km journey compared to 33 hours in the USA (Brömmelstroet and Nowak 2009). Since 1993, ­infrastructure

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d­ evelopment has concentrated on constructing a series of major transport arteries known as trans-­European networks (TEN). The objective is to develop efficient transport corridors throughout Europe, combining sea, road, rail and air links by funding port construction, upgrading airports, developing high-­speed rail lines and building new motorways. Funded by EIB (Chapter 8, section 8.8) and member states, these projects include well-­known initiatives like the French train à grande vitesse (TGV), the Channel Tunnel and the Oresund Bridge between Denmark and Sweden. Originally conceived as a Keynesian approach to stimulating economic activity through supporting big government-­funded infrastructure projects, latterly many initiatives have been financed by public–private partnerships, for example electronic toll systems on German motorways and improvements to the London Underground. The TEN programme expanded following the 2002 EU enlargement and has become a key component of the EU’s structural investment programme. New TEN corridors have been defined to connect the Baltic states to Central Europe and to link Eastern Europe, through Greece, to Turkey. The overall cost of these corridors is estimated to be some €400b in the period up to 2013, for which the current EU budget has allocated €20b, the balance being made up by EIB and national resources. Completing the network requires states to build or upgrade 5000km of roads, 4000km of high-­speed rail line and 1500km of inland waterways. Reviews of the programme criticized its lack of coordination and poor planning, divergent state priorities which prompted delays, and slow disbursements, with the programme straining planning and implementation resources of EU accession states. The European Commission reacted to this criticism by creating TEN-­TEA, an Executive Agency with operational responsibilities to stimulate and ­coordinate activity and see the programme through (see also Chapter 12). Furthering these integrated transport objectives is the responsibility of semi-­ autonomous EU institutions for each of rail, air and marine transport. In Chapter 12, semi-­autonomous EU institutions are categorized by the nature of their work, and the three that follow combine regulatory and operative responsibilities. They develop and advise the Commission on common technical standards to be applied in their fields of competence and carry out mandated regulatory functions including licensing and oversight of commercial operators. Since 1993, freight operators have been able to trade freely across the EU and EFTA, an activity facilitated by harmonized documentation and regulations. However, developing a single market for passenger transport has been more difficult. For example, European Commission insistence that separating rail track management from operations is necessary to encourage competition has been thwarted by countries wedded to public ownership,

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and the average delay in implementing EU transport directives exceeds two years (Groenleer 2008). The three agencies largely conform to EU semi-­autonomous structures as described in Chapter 12, that is, an intergovernmental board supported by specialist committees. Where the agencies differ is in their arrangements for consulting non-­state actors. That for rail, ERA, is conventional, in that it accommodates non-­state actors by involving them in working groups as needed. The different nature of private sector participation in maritime and aviation affairs demands alterative arrangements for EMSA and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). EMSA has four seats on its Board for representatives of the shipping industry. EASA’s Board remains purely governmental because of the key economic importance of the aircraft industry to some states (in particular those in the Airbus consortium), but a separate 20-­ member Advisory Board exists to provide representation from the industry and those working in it. Below this are two further Consultative Groups, one representing those parts of the aviation industry falling under EASA control and the other being a group of government advisers. As TEN-­TEA, EMSA, EASA and ERA are relatively young, the descriptive sections will be confined to an overview of each, with no breakdown by topic.

16.8 The Trans-­European Transport Network Executive Agency (TEN-­TEA) Under delegation from the European Commission, TEN-­TEA has overall responsibility for execution of the €5.8b TEN programme, with three principal roles. First, it provides technical support to EIB and the Commission to evaluate infrastructure proposals submitted by member states. Second, it assists states with limited technical resources to plan and execute projects. Finally, occasionally it will provide a technical resource for all members to share when creating seamless systems. For example, a unified EU toll road charging system using the Galileo position monitoring system has been proposed, and TEN-­TEA will test and develop common measuring systems for member states. TEN-­TEA commenced work in 2007 with an annual budget of €40m and, like all EU Executive Agencies, is due to close upon completion of its work programme (2015), but further EU expansion and the long-­term nature of the work will probably result in continuation. A more recent additional TEN-­TEA objective covers all states and results from EU initiatives on the environment. The EU aims to shift long-­distance freight from roads to other modes of transport, which will require improved

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rail connections with inland waterways and coastal shipping routes. For this purpose 66 per cent of EU infrastructure funding, and hence most TEN-­TEA projects, will be for rail systems and, given the technical obstacles to rail integration that exist at present, ERA (see section 16.11) will work jointly with TEN-­TEA. Another initiative designed to move freight away from roads is the ‘Motorway of the Sea’, which will require TEN-­TEA to develop improved and joined-­up logistics and new IT systems for several key ports in Europe, supporting better intermodal transport hubs.

16.9 The European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) EMSA was created in 2002 in response to the SS Erica oil spill off the coast of Brittany in 1999. Working within the context of IMO-­mandated global agreements such as international pollution conventions and international marine traffic regulations, EMSA’s objective is to enhance maritime safety, prevent loss of life and minimize the risk of maritime pollution. This is done by providing the European Commission with technical support to develop appropriate legislation and monitoring compliance through inspections of shipping and port facilities, particularly those used for handling hazardous cargoes. While IMO develops and promulgates international legislation, enforcement, as stated earlier, depends on ports of entry and flag states, since IMO has only limited resources for auditing states. EU directives are more specific and require EU ports to inspect some 25 per cent of ships using EU waters, although many EU states have not achieved this target. EMSA will evaluate the performance of existing facilities and protocols, as well as the training offered by non-­EU states to seafarers working on EU-­registered ships. It also inspects the classification societies (such as Lloyd’s Register of Shipping) whose ships are licensed to use EU ports and the shipping regimes of non-­member states whose ships use EU facilities and sail in EU waters. EMSA will develop common EU procedures for investigating maritime accidents and, where possible, coordinate multinational responses to major pollution incidents. It has a contract for ten standby oil-­spill control vessels, which are strategically located around European waters and which will support national efforts in the event of a serious spill. EMSA is aiming to establish a shipping management system to track vessels in European waters. The system will be used by the European Defence Agency (Chapter 12, section 12.7.1) to track shipping for security purposes and by EMSA to identify appropriate ships for inspection, particularly those with hazardous or suspect cargoes. EMSA will also promulgate on-­board security regulations for EU flag carriers. In carrying out these tasks it will provide training to national inspectorates in subjects such as accident investigation.

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16.10 The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) EASA is responsible for safety and environmental regulation of the EU aviation industry. In theory one set of standards controlled by one regulatory authority will cost-­effectively support a more efficient industry. EASA issues and renews certificates of airworthiness, from which it derives some of its operating income. However, it has had a less auspicious start than EMSA, as the major states have been reluctant to cede authority to EASA because of extreme sensitivity over safety in the industry and because they have built up cadres of highly experienced technical staff. Presently those states with important aviation industries issue certificates of airworthiness for aircraft types and spare parts based on application of ICAO regulations. Created in 2002, EASA is currently only authorized to regulate and provide certificates of approval for aeronautical products sold in the EU, including certification of the organizations and technical staff involved with aircraft design, production and maintenance. Since the decisions of EASA (unlike those of EMSA) are binding, an independent Board of Appeal exists to which regulations or rulings can be referred by the industry, thereby strengthening confidence in the safety of European aviation and depoliticizing technical decisions. The agency compiles data on aircraft safety and provides technical advice on issues such as aircraft pollution to EU delegates negotiating international agreements. Unlike ICAO, it does not currently deal with the whole gamut of regulations, such as those dealing with security and passenger management, and ICAO continues to monitor application by member states for the majority of cases. Eventually EASA will have a mandate matching that of ICAO, with which it will have to cooperate in developing new regulations and negotiating ICAO rules on behalf of the EU. This will support the growing trend for a single EU international negotiating stance (see Chapter 11). This expanded mandate encompasses overseeing a free market in the industry, establishing safety and environmental rules, imposing standards on airports and certifying flight crews. To achieve this, EASA will also have to develop a good working relationship with Eurocontrol, which deals with flight control and ground control procedures and personnel. Given ICAO’s predominance in setting industry norms, the reluctance of states to accept EASA’s authority, and its secondary role in the regulatory hierarchy, questions remain about the organization’s value. In this respect, it has yet to find an equivalent relationship with ICAO to that of EMSA with IMO.

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16.11 The European Railway Agency (ERA) ERA’s mission is to support the EU’s rail transport policy by encouraging standard operational facilities, uniform specifications for rolling stock, and common safety rules. This will promote an integrated rail network, particularly for freight transport. ERA overlaps with OTIF in areas such as interoperability and safety regulations but has greater authority over its member states, reflecting the EU’s supranational characteristics. Because of this and because the greatest volume of rail traffic coordinated by OTIF is in the EU, the relationship between the two institutions is different from that of EMSA or EASA and its respective global counterpart. Instead of OTIF setting the basic standards and ERA adopting or adapting them for EU use, in some instances OTIF contributes to drafting ERA regulations by consolidating and presenting the views of non-­EU member states. Although TEN-­TEA has overall responsibility for developing the rail links within the EU transport corridors, ERA will be the facilitating body for linking the railways of states straddling the corridors, creating physical infrastructures such as tunnels and bridges as well as standardizing equipment. A long-­term aim of ERA is to develop a single traffic management system with central registration of rolling stock and monitoring of rail accidents. Existing national rail systems present considerable obstacles to integration. Two examples suffice. Seven different signal and speed control systems were required for the Thalys TGV to travel between Paris and Brussels, while it took two years to resolve the operating difficulties for a similar high-­ speed link between Paris and Frankfurt. Similarly it is impossible to run the double-­decker passenger rolling stock commonly found on the Continent in the UK, as bridges and tunnels are too low. Improved cross-­border operations, greater standardization and interchangeability of equipment will foster Single Market initiatives, making European rail operators more cost-­effective. SUGGESTED READING

Chuang, R. (1972), The International Air Transport Association: A Case Study of a Quasi-­ Governmental Organization, Leiden, The Netherlands: Sijthoff. [An analysis of IATA up to its apogee as an IO and the start of its transition to becoming more of an INGO] Lee, K. (1996), Global Telecommunications Regulation: A Political Economy Perspective, London: Pinter. [Telecommunications and ITU analysed through the lens of IO theory] MacKenzie, D. (2010), ICAO: A History of the International Civil Aviation Organization, Toronto, Canada: Toronto University Press. [Tracks ICAO’s role in the evolution and politics of international civil aviation] Mankabady, S. (1986), The International Maritime Organization, 2 vols, Beckenham, UK: Croom Helm. [Covers all aspects of IMO’s work and structure]

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Stevens, H. (2003), Transport Policy in the European Union, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave. [A comprehensive review of EU transport policy and the relationships with other IOs] Zacher, M.W. with B.A. Sutton (1996), Governing Global Networks: International Regimes for Transportation and Communications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Assessments of the international regimes and IOs involved in shipping, aviation, telecommunications and postal services]

Internet resources EASA: http://www.easa.europa.eu EMSA: http://www.emsa.europa.eu ERA: http://www.era.europa.eu Eurocontrol: http://www.eurocontrol.int IATA: http://www.iata.org ICAO: http://www.icao.int IMO: http://www.imo.org Inmarsat: http://www.inmarsat.com Intelsat: http://www.intelsat.com International Mobile Satellite Organization: http://www.imso.org International Post Corporation: http://www.ipc.be ITU: http://www.itu.int OTIF: http://www.otif.org TEN-­TEA: http://www.ec.europa.eu/ten UPU: http://www.upu.int

17 International organizations: an ever expanding universe? Debates about IOs are frequently dominated by polemical voices advancing dogmatic conclusions. Detractors disparage IOs as wasteful bureaucracies whose futility exacerbates the problems they were designed to address, while advocates herald them as panaceas for global maladies. Often these suppositions are derived from studies of a few IOs or even particular incidents that chime with a specific worldview. Certainly the history of IOs mingles outstanding successes with egregious failures but, our own personal opinions notwithstanding, the wider survey of IOs undertaken here paints a more nuanced picture. This concluding chapter teases out some of these nuances to gauge the contribution of IOs to the emergence and effective governance of a globalized world and to consider their prospects. Section 17.1 assesses IOs’ delivery record and hence their involvement in shaping human interaction. Over the past 200 years, IOs have become firmly embedded in the ecology of global governance and, as preceding chapters reveal, made some notable contributions to ameliorating the human condition. Since 1901, when Henri Dunant (Case Study 2.1) and Frédéric Passy (a cofounder of the Inter-­Parliamentary Union) shared the Nobel Peace Prize, IOs have received the prize on 14 further occasions. In addition 15 individuals who at different times worked for or were closely associated with IOs have between them received three Physics Prizes (Chapter 15, section 15.3), three Economics Prizes (Gunnar Myrdal of ECE, Joseph Stiglitz of IBRD and Sir Arthur Lewis of UNDP and the Caribbean Development Bank) and nine other Peace Prizes. The most recent Peace Prize recipients were Martti Ahtisaari, a former UN USG and UN Special Representative for Namibia and Kosovo (2008), the EU (2012) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (2013), while other recipients have been noted throughout the text. The regular award of Nobel Prizes is an overt measure of the impression IOs have made but, as Chapter 1 noted, often the most important impacts of IOs are those that foster the certainty, reciprocity and trust that underpin international cooperation and which are

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ongoing and hidden from public view. Furthermore, where IOs have not met their objectives, due consideration must be given to the constraints imposed by international politics. Indeed IOs have achieved considerably more than those cynical models that dominate theoretical debate would predict or could explain. Section 17.2 expands upon the shipping analogy encountered in Chapter 4 to delineate the recent evolution in the profile of IOs and to summarize less conspicuous but recurring themes from the text. In addition to becoming more numerous, ‘ships’ have become more varied, as lumbering ‘super-­ tankers’ and nimble ‘rescue vessels’ have joined the fleet navigating the seas of global politics. Likewise, not only have ‘cargoes’ multiplied and diversified, but IOs have changed their practices, with operational work and ‘soft’ law and power coming to the fore. These developments have necessitated that some ships be refurbished, replaced or retired, while others have been ‘lost in storms’ or met with accidents through ‘pilot error’. Finally there have also been changes of ownership or new ‘crews’, especially following the ­resurgence of private authority in global governance. Section 17.3 asks whether existing trends will perpetuate and sketches the challenges facing IOs. Here we are sensitive to the dangers of extrapolation. The vicissitudes of international politics have repeatedly presaged the demise of individual IOs only for them to resurface with renewed vigour (e.g. IMF, NATO, OAS and OAU). Similarly those commentators who hailed a bright outlook for IOs under the rubric of George Bush Senior’s New World Order and later lapped up the Obama administration’s rhetorical commitment to multilateralism also foretold the ruin of IOs during the presidency of the more unilateralist George W. Bush. Our central contention is that IOs will continue to evolve in tandem with the international system. Paradoxically, the evolution of the international system may pose challenges for the legitimacy of the present family of IOs and so, while they are likely to survive and prosper, their future form may, in some cases, alter drastically.

17.1 IO performance – a glass half full? Casual readers could be forgiven for concluding that as a group IOs are permanently in crisis. Partly this reflects that most of our study has been devoted to extant IOs. Some 8 per cent of IOs, such as the European Coal and Steel Community, have been wound down upon successful completion of their mandates, but three times as many have been closed as failures (see Table  17.2). Closures include the World Food Council, which stopped being relevant to members, the Organization of Central American

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States, ­suspended after clashes between members, and the International Tin Council, which was liquidated after its buffer stocks ran up huge losses. Most remaining IOs can be said to have partially fulfilled their mandates, but trying to assess their aggregate record is fraught with difficulties. First, IO mandates are sometimes so vague and susceptible to interpretation that they can always be judged as successes. IOs involved with development can point to the inroads made into poverty alleviation but, with almost 2.5b people still subsisting on under two dollars daily, vast challenges persist. Second, mandates often possess a timeless quality, as they have no deadlines. Third, IOs are victims of their own success. By cultivating interdependence, IOs have made their own tasks more complex. For instance, IMF, OECD and BIS have agitated for the liberalization of financial markets, but the resultant upswing in the volume and velocity of international financial transactions have, as the 2007 financial crisis attests, made it extremely difficult for them to deliver on mandates to ensure financial stability and economic growth. Moreover, solutions to one problem often engender difficulties elsewhere. By promoting poverty reduction policies the development institutions are achieving their own mandates while simultaneously making demands on WHO to respond to the changing health problems of a wealthier population. Fourth, there is the counterfactual question of what a world unmediated by IOs would look like. IOs may not be the best means through which the most pressing governance problems might be probed, but while imperfect they may be superior to ‘a zone of ungovernance’ or the abdicating of responsibility to states or private actors that may be the source of the problems. Ultimately, an IO is normally just one of many actors responsible for governing a particular area, making it difficult to isolate its effects. These observations notwithstanding, this book has identified several ways in which IOs have contributed positively to global governance. IOs underpin many of the regimes that supply a modicum of international order, such as WTO’s supervision of global trade and ICAO’s oversight of civil aviation. IOs have expanded the scope and content of international law and have gone some way towards ensuring it is upheld. The emergence of international criminal courts and decisions authorized by the GA, COE and others have enshrined universal human rights and norms legitimizing the international community’s right to intervene where justice and human rights are being denied. Meanwhile treaties governing armaments, oceans, the Antarctic and outer space have circumscribed potential arenas of conflict. IOs have provided forums for preventing and settling disputes peacefully, confining conflicts once they have broken out, responding to the needs of displaced populations and supporting post-­conflict reconstruction. Indeed in many

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crises, human-­made or ­otherwise, IOs are increasingly in the vanguard of the response through being first on the scene or coordinating the efforts of others. Most IO contributions, however, are low-­profile. Scientific IOs and the ­epistemic communities which coalesce around them have contributed enormously to expanding the boundaries of knowledge. The information-­gathering and analytical capacities of IOs have been imperative in spotting, framing, popularizing and refining understanding of contemporary issues. When IOs are the first to identify problems or present them in a specific way, they can exert a powerful ‘path dependence’ over how problems are perceived and tackled. IOs have regularly alerted states to these challenges and states’ interests in solving them. Plenty of today’s conventional wisdom, from development’s social dimensions to protection of World Heritage Sites, traces its origins or propagation to IOs. Other IO inputs are less tangible but nonetheless important. They regularize contacts between national officials, who come to develop a more refined appreciation of each other’s views and problems. This helps spread mutual understanding and removes some of the barriers that beset international cooperation. For example, a new scientific RO in Jordan (SESAME – Synchrotron-­Light for Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle East) includes Israel as a member (alongside Iran, its ‘sworn enemy’), thereby becoming the first Middle Eastern regional body with Israeli participation. On the downside, millions die annually of scourges, including war and poverty, that IOs were intended to eradicate. IOs have been unable to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, deplorable human rights abuses and problems of the environment and its degradation. Unquestionably some of the blame for this is attributable to IOs or their leaders (see the comments in Chapter 7, section 7.5, and Case Study 4.1, Saouma), and numerous examples have been cited where IOs have operated in ways that are counterproductive or even contrary to their mandates. However, condemnation of IOs should be tempered by consideration of the constraints they face, not least that they are populated by nation states sometimes prone to the parochial pursuit of instant gratification rather than the long-­term benefits that might accrue from cooperation. Even in highly technical IOs, such as ITU and UPU, attempts to address their mandates often founder because of the interests of powerful states (see Chapter 16, sections 16.1 and 16.2). States’ unwillingness to sacrifice sovereignty has dealt IOs a difficult hand. For example, the UN and ROs have been assigned overambitious (if not fundamentally incompatible) mandates to safeguard norms of sovereign non-­intervention while simultaneously being required to protect populations should a state fail to stem mass atrocities, such as genocide and

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ethnic cleansing. Similarly, as recent IMF, ECB and EU demands for austerity in Eurozone countries demonstrate, IOs that provide conditional financial assistance to alleviate economic crisis are regularly assailed for impinging on sovereign prerogatives. Sovereign considerations have left many IOs bereft of the tools and resources they need and have fostered governance structures that entrench the interests of powerful states, thus preventing or severely delaying essential interventions. Virtually every IO has experienced a funding emergency as states fail to reconcile their financial contributions with their demands upon the institution. Thus, upbraiding IOs for the persistence of global poverty overlooks the relatively meagre resources they have for the task. Development work swallows the bulk of UN and SA personnel and budgets, but these are dwarfed by bilaterally and privately financed initiatives (not to mention budgets for national defence and agricultural subsidies).

17.2 Managing the fleet In Chapter 4 IOs were likened to seagoing vessels whose owners and operators make various decisions regarding their cargoes and routes. Here we extend this analogy to interpret some of the main evolutionary trends amongst IOs, revealed in the preceding chapters.

17.2.1 Changes in freight When they reach harbour, ships unload their cargoes (the equivalent of mandates, programmes and activities) and take on fresh freight before recommencing their journey. As the first three chapters noted, IOs centred on security grab the headlines, but the cargoes of contemporary IOs are the most varied in history. Not only does the accumulation of cargoes reflect the emergence of new multilateral challenges such as climate change (Case Study 1.1), the extension of trade liberalization and, in Europe, the need to manage a common currency but, furthermore, practically all issues have gained an international dimension, even those like health and education more ­commonly considered purely national prerogatives. Change to cargoes has been accompanied by changes in how they are discharged. Although it should not be overstated, IOs have tended towards undertaking more operational activities. This is most pronounced in the scientific, humanitarian and development organizations. Table 17.1 shows a clear shift in staffing resources from the three largest UN SAs (which are less operationally focused and whose overall staffing has declined by 37 per cent since 1992) towards the three largest UN semi-­autonomous agencies, which are more operationally focused and have experienced a 290 per cent

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staff expansion. Explanations for the growth of operational work differ but are indicative of the growing demands made of IOs to respond to escalating incidences and awareness of humanitarian crises, coupled with defence mechanisms when IOs need to demonstrate positive results to their patrons. Programme-­oriented work such as developing and disseminating international norms is of enormous importance, but it is time-­consuming and lacks the obvious impact of operational activities. Table 17.1  Staff changes in selected IOs Year

1972 1992 2004 2009

Agency ILO

FAO

WHO

WFP

UNHCR

UNICEF

2860 2910 2540 2650

6470 5520 3730 3065

3600 5400 4150 4350

800* 1550 2760 9150

300 2200 4850 6500

1020 4450 5720 8200

Note: *1972 WFP data is estimated, as at that time WFP’s national staff were employed on its behalf by UNDP. Source: UN/CCAQ personnel statistics and annual reports.

A second noteworthy tendency is IOs’ strengthening preference to deliver their cargoes by applying soft power and soft law. As noted above, IOs have spearheaded the legalization of global governance. WTO (Chapter 10, section 10.2) and the EU (Chapter 11) are amongst the IOs to have successfully developed a body of hard law: precise, legally binding obligations that are interpreted and implemented by a delegated authority (Goldstein et al. 2000). Predominantly, however, IOs have relied on ‘soft law’, whose realm ‘begins once legal arrangements are weakened along one or more of the dimensions of obligation, precision and delegation’ (Abbott and Snidal 2000: 422–3). Abbott and Snidal (2000) go on to suggest that soft law is chosen because it makes legalization easier to realize, particularly where states are most sensitive about their sovereignty and ‘facilitates compromise and thus mutually beneficial cooperation, between actors with different interests and values, different time horizons . . . and different degrees of power’. IOs increasingly monitor and enforce compliance with international law through ‘soft’ mechanisms such as self-­evaluation and peer review rather than through hard mechanisms like military intervention or economic sanctions. Peer reviews, the meticulous scrutiny of one actor’s performance against agreed best practices by equivalent actors, are among the most popular techniques employed by IOs. Originally most associated with OECD, peer reviews have become part of the surveillance activities of many other major IOs, such as

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ILO (Chapter 7, section 7.2) and IAEA (Chapter 7, section 7.6) or even those that promulgate hard laws such as the WTO’s Trade Policy Review Mechanism (Chapter 10, section 10.2). Such processes assuage some of the uncertainties surrounding international cooperation by gradually enabling actors to understand the potential benefits of their agreements. The third striking tendency is for IOs to have cargoes necessitating navigation through domestic politics. IOs now intrude on ‘behind-­the-­border’ issues in a myriad of ways, including shaping new constitutions, pushing for policy and judicial reforms in post-­conflict environments, defining the rights of women and children, pronouncing upon appropriate socioeconomic policies and determining how development assistance is spent. Indeed, by making receipt of aid conditional upon good governance, IBRD, UNDP, IMF, OECD and the RDBs have exerted considerable pressure on states to overhaul radically their public institutions.

17.2.2 Refurbishment and replacement Extra freight and the shifting treatment accorded to it dictated the launch of new vessels plus the replacement and refurbishment of others. Between 1955 and 2005 there was a net increase of 114 conventional IOs (Table 1.1) and, of the 78 IOs decommissioned between 1950 and 2010, one-­third were relaunched as new vessels (Table 17.2). Of the additions to the fleet the most notable were the ‘super-­tankers’, universal IOs (bunched on the left-­hand Table 17.2  IOs that have closed (1950–2010) Decade

Number closed

Breakdown by type of closure Achieved objectives

Became new IO

Failed

Comments

Redundant

1950s

7

3

3

1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s

6 15 7 36

1

1 6 1 11

1 7 2 7

3 2 3 18

2000s Totals Percentage

7 78

4 26 33

1 18 23

1 28 36

1

1 6 8

1

Wind-­down of wartime activities and decolonization

Nordic cutbacks and Soviet bloc closures

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side of Figure 1.1) to which all or nearly all states belong, tackling global concerns such as international patent protection, mitigating environmental damage or promoting economic development. Joining them were a rising number of IOs with sizeable but more limited memberships and mandates, plus agile, frequently technically oriented IOs with small memberships. The factors motivating the reincarnation of IOs differ between individual cases, but some recurrent causes are discernible. One is the need to rebuild IOs inappropriately configured to deliver their existing mandate. OAU’s evolution into AU, improving the latter’s ability to confront those bent on undermining security and human rights, is one prominent example (Chapter 13, section 13.12). A second is reconfiguring IOs in response to the changing problems they need to confront. For example, GATT’s absorption into WTO partly reflected the former’s inability to deal with non-­tariff barriers and novel trade issues (Chapter 10, section 10.2). Third, many organizations have been altered to allow extra members to come aboard. As well as necessitating the expansion of the physical capacity of the institutions, a critical mass of new members puts more hands on the tiller and sometimes requires alterations to organizational and decision-­making apparatuses. The restructuring of NATO (Chapter 13, section 13.6) and EU institutions (Chapter 11) to accommodate Eastern European members in the 1990s and 2000s is a good illustration. Fluctuating power distributions amongst those already aboard stimulate similar outcomes. The IMF (Chapter 9, section 9.1) and the World Bank Group (Chapter 8, section 8.1) are slowly rebalancing their voting structures to accommodate the growing clout of emerging economies such as China, India and Turkey. Other IOs may have to follow suit if they are to retain their relevance (see below), and this will impact on the course they chart. Finally there is the need to upgrade the technology available to the crews to deliver outcomes more effectively, such as dispute resolution mechanisms (WTO) or innovative financing ­arrangements (CGIAR). A growing response to novel developments is for IOs to launch emanations. Precisely identifying the number of emanations is hampered by methodological inexactitude in the UIA historical data, which is self-­selecting, sporadically places seemingly similar organizations under different headings and bundles emanations together with other institutions as ‘organizations of special form’. Nevertheless, by demonstrating that the group has grown faster than conventional IOs, the UIA data (Table 1.1) is indicative of their rise. Emanations covered in this text include the private sector lending arms of the RDBs, CGIAR (Chapter 14), which is an emanation of IBRD and FAO, plus the four emanations of IBRD (Chapter 8).

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17.2.3 Lost at sea/shipwrecked So far we have established that the IO armada is expanding, that the majority of vessels remain afloat and that many closures are accounted for by ships being dismantled or refitted. Sailing the high seas is nonetheless a hazardous proposition, and disasters, some self-­inflicted and others connected with the external environment, befall a small but significant proportion of vessels. Indeed dismantling and refurbishments account for less than half of IOs closed since 1950; the remainder have been lost in storms or through the fault of the captain or crew. Capricious conditions, particularly massive storms whipped up by clashes between rival states, the changing balance of power, and economic necessity jeopardize even the most seaworthy of vessels. Since the Second World War three critical events have caused 46 IOs to fail or become redundant (Table 17.2). In the 1950s, decolonization caused the failure of IOs created by colonial powers to integrate their territories (such as the Inter-­African Committee on Statistics). In the 1990s, economic considerations and the EU’s availability as an alternative forum prompted Nordic countries to disband 13 ROs. The biggest upheaval, however, was the end of the Cold War and the USSR’s collapse. Of the IOs disbanded since 1950, the 1990s accounted for 46 per cent (Table 17.2). Shanks et al. (1996) calculate that 48 IOs of all kinds were dismantled at the Cold War’s end, but again inconsistencies in the UIA data and the former Soviet system’s opaqueness make an exact number and explanation for their demise difficult to verify. For example, the former Soviet Organization for the Cooperation of the Ball-­ Bearing Industry is an industry association, and the Organization of the Joint Power Grid has been resurrected as the Electrical Energy Council of CIS, although the ­infrastructure is now operated independently by each member. Throughout the book we have highlighted the influence of individuals on IOs, especially the way in which the ship’s captain can, for better or worse, change the course charted. Even the most skilled leaders would have difficulty steering through the major upheavals outlined above. Although these events are rare, today’s more complex machinery and more congested waters require a fresh generation of leaders with better-­defined skills. While IOs are inevitably constrained by power politics, states tend to imbue them with some autonomy, opening opportunities for entrepreneurial leaders to choose their own routes and establish their place in global governance (Chapter 4). Presently the OECD’s Angel Gurria and UNEP’s Achim Steiner are proving adept at raising the profiles of their organizations and attracting support. Conversely poor leadership, for example Jacques Diouf at FAO (see Box

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4.3), results in IOs drifting listlessly. Most such organizations have managed to avoid catastrophe, but key crew members have abandoned them and ­competition has robbed them of some cargo.

17.2.4 New owners and crews This book is concerned with IGOs whose structures are generally dominated by state actors both old and new. Nevertheless, to varying extents all IOs interact with or provide opportunities for participation, and sometimes membership by, non-­state actors. Since the mid-­1970s non-­state actors have experienced a renaissance in their relationship with IOs and have exerted greater sway over them. By far the commonest way in which non-­state actors assert their influence is through participation in charting the course of the organization. This ranges from ad hoc invitations to work on specific tasks, through longer periods of dialogue or consultation, to those who work ­permanently on a variety of tasks and contributing to decisions. Another dimension of this is for non-­state actors to assume greater prominence and a degree of ownership. Non-­state participation in IOs has deep roots. The ITU’s founding constitution of 1865 made provision for non-­state involvement and, beginning in 1869, civil society organizations were intrinsic to the consultative channels that eventually gave birth to the Commonwealth. Generally, although states have remained dominant shareholders, IOs appear to possess an innate proclivity to embrace more than state-­centric activities. As private sector involvement creeps upwards, some organizations are reverting to hybrid structures and, in a handful of cases, private actors have assumed ownership. In many respects, this marks IOs going ‘back to the future’. Before the advent of sovereign states and IOs, international activities were governed predominantly by private authority structures (Cutler et al. 1999). Chapter 2 noted that PIUs were effectively private organizations (INGOs) or public– private hybrids launched, staffed and maintained by individuals operating in their own interests rather than acting for states. Where individuals were also state officials they often acted in an unofficial capacity, such as at Interpol (M. Barnett and Coleman 2005: 595), or tried to arrest state encroachment (Murphy 1994: 81). The International Committee of the Red Cross (Case Study 2.1) and International Railway Congress Association were both established as private associations to avoid political problems associated with devising and ratifying formal treaties. Between the First and Second World Wars this admixture slowly separated when the remit of states expanded as a consequence of modern warfare, democracy and social responsibility (see Chapter 2). Private individuals

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yielded their position (and authority) to state representatives as PIUs were transformed into the IGOs we are familiar with today, while those PIUs that did not interest states became INGOs. The role of private actors waned in the interwar period, reaching its nadir immediately after the Second World War, but it never disappeared entirely. The League of Nations relied heavily on philanthropy and private convening of conferences; Rockefeller offered the UN the land for its headquarters; some humanitarian agencies engaged in public fund-­raising; OECD’s Centre for Educational Research and Innovation was initially supported by Shell and the Ford Foundation; and FAO funded many small-­scale projects with civil society support (Chapter 7, section 7.3). For reasons explored below, from the mid-­1970s onwards the relationship between IOs and non-­state actors again became more intimate and extensive. By the turn of the millennium even IOs traditionally resistant to non-­state interventions, for instance ASEAN, were becoming more accommodating (Nesadurai 2008), and this inspired the invention of concepts such as ‘complex multilateralism’ (O’Brien et al. 2000) to connote an international decision-­making environment characterized by ‘a proliferating and fluctuating set of intergovernmental and multistakeholder arrangements with more assertive and diverse actors’ (Forman and Segaar 2006: 205). The salience and implication for IOs of these developments are the subject of considerable debate. Based on the evidence of the preceding chapters we submit that the biggest shift has been within the crew. At the most basic level this sees IOs engaging more directly with individuals, for example as recipients of assistance from or as contributors to humanitarian organizations or as supplicants at the European Court of Human Rights. IOs have also expanded the quantity and quality of opportunities for non-­state actors to contribute to their work and solicit inputs more proactively. Compared with the immediate post-­war period more IOs now routinely consult various private actors across a broader policy spectrum, sometimes permitting them a substantial role and voice in preliminary decision making. In 1945, the UN bestowed consultative status on only 41 NGOs/INGOs, but 3534 such organizations had this status in 2011. Category 1 (general) consultative status provides an organization with privileged access, including the right to address ECOSOC, and starting from 14 in 1945 there were 140 by 2013. The growth of organizations in UN consultative status (of which there are three categories) took off in the 1990s and is attributed to the Rio Summit, which actively sought non-­state participation (Alger 2002). Similar growth patterns can be seen in the SAs; thus a comparable single event, the 1979 World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development,

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prompted greater FAO–INGO interaction (Marchisio and Di Blase 1991). In the Commonwealth non-­governmental involvement increased following reform of the Commonwealth Foundation in 2002. In IOs with an inclination to cooperate with non-­state actors, major events can, therefore, change the quality and intensity of such interaction. More IOs are also developing specialized channels for sustained dialogue with non-­state actors. OECD’s consultations with business and trade unions (see Chapter 10, section 10.1) have a long pedigree, as have technical relationships between ICAO, representing governments, and IATA, representing the airline industry (Chapter 16, section 16.3), while UPU has created user groups to feed private sector opinion into its policy making. While nonetheless significant, there has been less private involvement in IOs as shareholders and owners. Exceptionally, a few organizations have always been governed in whole or in part by non-­state owners, with ILO’s tripartite structure and the composite ownership of CGIAR by governments, IOs and NGOs being prominent examples. Some EU semi-­autonomous agencies, particularly those operating in the social sphere, have emulated ILO’s tripartite structure. Ownership by non-­state actors has been taken to its logical conclusion in the area of satellite communications with the outright privatization of Inmarsat and Intelsat (Box 16.1), and some of the scientific IOs are inching in a similar direction (see section 17.3). Even where non-­state shareholdings are peripheral their impact can still be felt. Their influence with key members can allow interventions in decisions, one instance being the London Club of private sector debtors, which negotiates with IMF when nations default (Box 9.4). Their role as funding sources also confers authority, examples being the new networks of IOs, governments and foundations to combat specific problems, such as the Gates Foundation’s support to eliminate malaria through the Global Fund and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization. The Global Fund has one Board seat reserved for the private sector, one for HIV/AIDS victims, one for contributing foundations and one for NGOs. Non-­governmental sources are becoming an important source of independent funding, which can insulate IOs from some interstate political pressures.

17.3 Adjusting to twenty-­first-­century challenges In 2012 scientists working at CERN announced that they had found the Higgs boson, confirming its reputation as one of the most successful and esteemed IOs (see Chapter 15, section 15.3). Therefore it is appropriate to start this section, which speculates about prospects for IOs, with a nod to

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a dictum often attributed to Niels Bohr, one of CERN’s co-­founders, who warned that ‘it is difficult to make predictions, especially about the future’. Our conclusion is guardedly optimistic. Some casualties are inevitable, for the reasons explored above, but we believe the wider IO family will survive and prosper. This confidence rests upon the prevalence and likely intensification of the conditions that nourished the preliminary IOs and sustained their descendants. The resilience of IOs is partly attributable to their malleability, and the earlier chapters have underlined the challenges of power politics, external developments and financing with which IOs have always tussled. All the same, great uncertainty surrounds their future form and activities, which might alter drastically as they adapt in symbiosis with the ­international system. Here three interrelated factors pertinent to inducing alterations in the appearance and constitution of IOs are discussed: zz the changing constellation of international power and authority, particu-

larly the purported decline of the US and emerging powers of the Global South; zz competition from alternative mechanisms of governance and from wider transformations in patterns of power and authority in global governance, especially the proclivity for devolving responsibility to the private sphere; and zz questions of IO legitimacy and accountability.

These developments will not prompt the disappearance of IOs but may alter what they look like, who is in charge and how they function. The present composition of global politics exemplifies Claude’s (1964) prerequisites for the cultivation of IOs. His first precondition was for a world segregated into sovereign states. For decades academics have contemplated whether the advent of nuclear weapons (Herz 1957), political integration (Hoffman 1966) and economic globalization (Ohmae 1995) renders states obsolete. In fact, and possibly because of these challenges, nation states have proliferated, and many ethnic groups clamour for statehood. Thus states, the main constituent of IOs, look poised to remain the dominant form of political community in world politics. Claude’s second precondition was for interconnection between sovereign entities. The debate about the nature, extent and significance of globalization (Box 1.1) rumbles on, but even sceptical commentators accept that international relationships have intensified (Hirst et al. 2009). Globalization is reversible, but it is doubtful that any setback would be permanent unless its cause was sufficiently severe (say a global war or climatic catastrophe). In any case, such events would not ­necessarily overthrow states as key organizing coordinates for world politics. The two

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final preconditions are that states should be conscious of the tensions that can surface from interdependence and thus contrive instruments to manage them. Barely a foreign policy speech passes without reference to the problems and prospects of interdependence and the need to work with international partners to solve collective problems. The growth in number and membership of IOs and the fact that states are not leaving them in droves imply that, for all their imperfections, IOs remain the institutions of choice as states endeavour to manage interdependence. For example, as the Arctic ice cap melts, minerals will become accessible and shipping routes will open up. Realizing the prospective gains from cooperation, not least because of the formidable costs of operating in the region, states have resorted to discussion in the Arctic Council. Founded in 1996, to promote amongst other things scientific research, the Arctic Council has slowly grown in ambition. In 2010 it promulgated its first binding agreement on search and rescue missions, followed by a second on oil spills in 2013. That same year the Council acquired a Secretariat and became a fully fledged IO. The overall outlook for IOs then looks hopeful. More states, more interconnectedness and greater awareness of resulting problems will probably result in additional IOs or extra responsibilities for existing bodies. Nevertheless, to flourish, IOs will have to continue to adapt. Chapter 3 suggested that, in addition to the factors identified by Claude, the spasm of post-­war IO building owed much to and bore the hallmarks of US hegemony. Realists and liberal institutionalists suggest that IOs are best created and maintained when there is a hegemon willing and able to underpin international cooperation and overcome the collective action problems inherent in the anarchical conditions prevailing in world politics. Therefore any suggestion that US power is crumbling or that rising powers will dethrone it as hegemon could signify another period of ‘stormy disturbance’ where many IOs will capsize. Prophesying US decline has been a popular pastime for academics, journalists and policy makers. Joffe (2012) identifies five waves of ‘declinist’ sentiment dating from the late 1950s. Present-­day literature on the fate of US hegemony outlines a number of plausible scenarios from those who believe the US will endure as the world’s predominant power (Beckley 2011/12), through those who see the US as a pre-­eminent player in a multi-­polar order (Nye 2011) or an increasingly ‘ordinary’ actor in a diverse world (Kupchan 2012), to those who prophesy the end of US hegemony as power transfers inexorably to the East (Subramanian 2011). Clearly this debate will rage on, but there is an emerging consensus that even if US decline is being overplayed ‘the rise of the rest’ (Zakaria 2008) will encroach on its power, with ramifications for IOs.

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Realists take the view that IOs reflect the balance of power. If they do not they are swiftly superseded, an example being those IOs that comprised the UN System at the end of the Second World War. A substantial portion of the system (most notably the Bretton Woods institutions and the UN SC) still mirrors the balance of power existing after the Second World War. Frozen in the ‘1945 moment’ these IOs are sometimes incapable of representing the interests of rising powers, which are starting to ‘route around’ them by instigating parallel institutions (Barma et al. 2007). Since 2008, leaders of the major industrialized developing countries have held their own summit meeting, and in 2010 the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States emerged as a possible rival to the US-­dominated OAS. These parallel institutions will tug at the legitimacy of current IOs and if they win over sufficient adherents may supplant them as the struts supporting the norms of an alternative international order. Those in the realist camp also foresee the prospect of major war as rising powers challenge the hegemon. Such a major rupture in the international system need not signify the end of IOs, as emergent hegemons may create new or reform current IOs to institutionalize their dominant roles and consolidate their leadership. Liberals also believe that IOs will survive US hegemonic decline. Liberal institutionalists concur with realists that hegemony is a boon for IO creation but suggest that because IOs alert states to the benefits of cooperation they will be preserved after the hegemon fades (see Chapter 1). Ikenberry (2008) suggests that the US has cleverly fashioned a liberal international order underpinned by multilateral institutions that is ‘hard to overturn and easy to join’. US-­ designed institutions are easy to join because they are open to participation by any states willing to abide by international rules and norms. These norms and rules gave emerging states latitude to advance their interests but crucially tied their ongoing success to persistence of the liberal international order and related IOs. The eagerness with which China and Russia have joined WTO reflects their assessment of the benefits from participation in a multilateral trading order. The liberal international order is difficult to overturn because warfare, the way realists envisage international orders being toppled, would entail losing the benefits of interdependence and in the nuclear age would be prohibitively destructive. Thus, rather than parallel institutions developing, the likelihood is that existing IOs will restructure to accommodate fresh realities. Evidence that this process may be under way can be seen by IOs evolving to accommodate the newfound influence of emerging powers that have gained membership or been drawn into the outreach activities of exclusive clubs like BIS and OECD. Elsewhere, most notably the absence of voting reform in UN SC, the record is patchy, but ultimately the momentum toward giving emerging powers a greater say in IOs will be difficult to resist.

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In addition to evolving interstate power relations, IOs face a second challenge from wider transformations in patterns of global power and authority. Throughout the book there have been numerous instances of ‘forum shopping’, the practice of actors, mostly states, pursuing issues in the institution expected to provide them with the most favourable outcome. Generally actors were choosing between competing IOs, but there is now added scope for them to select from amongst a ‘huge supply’ (Rosenau 2000) of governance mechanisms that, at first glance, compete against IOs by performing similar tasks better. IO critics assert that successful responses to contemporary challenges demand greater speed, flexibility, proactivity and accountability, and more effective implementation and enforcement mechanisms than IOs can muster. Therefore actors are predisposed to have international problems addressed by a galaxy of think tanks, universities, INGOs and less bureaucratic intergovernmental forums such as heads of state summits (see Box 1.3) and trans-­governmental networks. If states shift their attention and resources to these alternative governance structures IOs would start to wither. However, the realities are somewhat different. These alternative governance mechanisms may boast pace and efficiency, but they have substantial drawbacks. Along with IOs, they lack accountability and reflect (and sometimes magnify) power asymmetries. For example, states occasionally allow private organizations to handle the initial diplomatic stages of conflict resolution (Hocking 2004). Unencumbered by political baggage, private organizations can establish channels of communication that IOs cannot and can offer warring factions innovative solutions precluded by orthodox diplomatic protocols. Leading exponents of private diplomacy, including the Crisis Management Initiative, the Carter Centre’s Conflict Resolution Programme and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, have chalked up some notable successes, the last-­named contributing to ending Kenya’s post-­election violence in 2007 after Kofi Annan invited their involvement. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of these organizations is impaired by funding shortfalls, ­overlaps and an inability to enforce agreements. Given their limitations these alternative mechanisms are more likely to complement rather than substitute for IOs, existing alongside them and continuing the long history of adjustment and cross-­fertilization between IOs and other actors. They have the potential to reconstitute existing IOs and produce hybrid institutions akin to their nineteenth-­century forebears. The example of trans-­governmental networks is instructive here. Unlike conventional IOs, which presume unitary states as their members and participants, Slaughter (2004) envisages a world of disaggregated states whose component

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parts (courts, regulators, government ministries and legislatures) form trans-­ governmental networks. Trans-­governmental networks perform similar functions to IOs, including information exchange, the development of ideas and best practices, reducing transaction costs, helping to enforce national laws, and capacity building in developing states. However, they do not meet the strict definition of IOs, because they lack one or more pieces of the physical and legal infrastructure, such as a permanent headquarters or founding treaty. There are trans-­governmental networks that originated and exist independently, but many networks have been kindled in IOs. For instance, the IMF Charter helped forge a trans-­governmental network of Finance Ministers because it required that they convene as its Board of Governors. Equally trans-­governmental networks need IOs to give practical effects to their agreements, for example turning informal memoranda of understanding into formal treaties, making IO standards integral to peer reviews of national policies or supplying supporting secretariats. The G8/20 system relies heavily on IO secretariats to investigate issues and effect changes, while BIS provides the Secretariat to the G10 and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Private actors may have the potential to displace IOs, but the aforementioned shortcomings mean the dominant modality is likely to be a sometimes uneasy interaction and acclimatization. Importantly the contemporary salience of private actors results from deliberate decisions and non-­decisions by states that still retain the capacity to contain them. Much of the momentum behind the re-­emergence of private structures of governance dates to the crumbling of the Keynesian ideology amidst the economic upheavals of the 1970s. Elites, not least in the USA, resorted to liberal ideas that the free interplay of individuals in the marketplace was the best way of delivering public goods and for states to promote their interests. Widespread liberalization and privatization in the North combined with the information and communication revolution ‘diffus[e] power away from governments and empower[. . .] individuals and groups to play roles in world politics . . . that were once reserved for governments of states’ (Nye 2002: x). Power shifts towards private actors can alter the nature of the problems IOs are investigating. Privatization, for instance, puts industries at one remove from government control, diminishing the importance of government representatives as interlocutors, as at UNIDO. Private ownership also changes the nature of an industry. Postal and telecommunications services once were exclusively state run. Many have now become private companies answering to shareholders that demand profits and efficiency. Already private operators have developed parallel institutions (e.g. UPU and IPC, Chapter 16, section

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16.2), as they need faster responses than IOs provide, wish to avoid culture clashes or oppose IO meddling (e.g. the IT industry looking to prevent ITU becoming involved in internet governance, Chapter 16, section 16.1). To forestall their marginalization IOs have, as previously described, enacted a series of reforms to take account of private interests. However, in seeking to obtain legitimacy for specific initiatives, IOs have often activated unforeseen levels of participation. In turn this has necessitated further reform, such as ITU’s Telecom Convention, with its dominance by the richest states, whose non-­state sectors can possess sufficient resources to participate effectively (Chapter 16, section 16.1), the IPCC (Case Study 1.1), and IBRD’s World Commission on Dams. As IOs incorporating non-­state actors multiply, there will be more potential candidates for privatization or part-­privatization, especially in response to tight funding, through widening their collaborations, hiving off non-­core activities and finding supplementary income streams. Full privatization appears most likely amongst scientific and transport IOs. Of the scientific IOs, possible candidates are those involving private user groups, such as ESRF (Chapter 15, section 15.7) and Galileo (EU-­GNSS, Chapter 12, section 12.7.4). The high cost of advanced scientific equipment has previously forced European nations to collaborate (Chapter 15); however, as governments look to retrench, private sponsors may be asked to contribute but will extract a greater decision-­making role in exchange for their support and risk taking. The Atacama Large Millimeter Array consortium (ALMA) is one such trans-­regional project. ESO and institutes in the US, Canada, Chile and Japan have jointly developed a radio telescope with very high resolution to give exceptional images and brightness. The costly science behind ALMA required development of controls of extreme delicacy and complexity which could have private sector applicability. Any privatization of transport IOs looks set to occur in a manner similar to that of Intelsat. In Eurofima (the European Company for the Financing of Railroad Rolling Stock) governmental membership is yielding to government-­sponsored shareholders and, given the trajectory of the railway industry, presumably eventually private sector shareholders. The postulated involvement of the private sector may seem exaggerated, but the idea that a private corporation would have the wherewithal (or even the right) to launch a satellite would have been ­laughable 40 years ago but not now. There is also potential for a host of part-­privatizations. IOs desiring to trim costs may look to offload training institutes that could be self-­financing (such as IMO’s World Maritime University and ILO’s Turin Centre). Elsewhere WIPO and EPO provide a private sector service, and 90 per cent of WIPO’s

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budget is funded from fees received for lodging patents and trademarks. Thus, it is feasible for registration activities to be separated from normative functions and turned into not-­for-­profit centres. Finally, the private sector arms of the development banks, which in some cases are almost self-­sustaining, could, like national export–import banks, be spun off as ­international lending institutions. Many of the changes outlined in this chapter have been aimed at bolstering the credentials of IOs as legitimate institutions. Legitimacy is important to IOs both as an end in itself (giving the international community something it wants) and as a means to an end (legitimacy ensures the resources required for their work). Traditionally notions of legitimacy relate to the political community grounded in nation states where, especially in democratic societies, the legitimacy of political institutions rests on them being accountable and transparent. In contrast, IOs are part of the international system characterized by different norms. Because the work of IOs is habitually channelled through governments, the general public has only a slight acquaintance of and plays a marginal role in IOs. For example, recent calls for the European Court of Human Rights to interfere less in decisions made by UK courts are not based on public sentiment but government ‘indignation’. For 40 years the Court’s decisions (based largely on a UK-­drafted constitution) were considered a bulwark in defence of democratic society, but it only took a few controversial rulings against the UK government for that good record to be ignored and the institution damned, although the rulings (which dealt, for example, with torture) if given against a totalitarian regime would have received government support. As the 1990s anti-­globalization protests (Box 1.2) made clear, it is dawning on citizens that while decisions made at IOs affect the lives of millions there is little scope for them to have an input, to hold IOs accountable or even to find out how decisions are reached. In short, IOs fall short of the standards of accountability and legitimacy demanded in democratic systems, suffering what is often referred to as a ‘democratic deficit’. This is most commented on in the context of the EU, where the democratic deficit alienates the institution from many Europeans, a factor contributing to the hostility towards the ‘troika’ of actors imposing austerity on debt-­ridden European states. To combat this, IOs have begun to embrace the global communications and knowledge management revolution to make their resources more available and their work more widely appreciated. It is now possible to access the UN System’s website and move seamlessly from one organization to another in search of information. Nevertheless, access is still in its infancy and can and

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should be extended (Lloyd et al. 2008). IOs remain quite secretive about their budgets and expenditures at a time when many national bodies are required to be transparent, and many retain unnecessarily strict regimes regarding the release of documents. For all the work being undertaken to enhance access and improve transparency there are significant counter-­trends. Paradoxically some of the reforms enacted may have exacerbated issues of legitimacy. Relations with private interest groups have seen the IFIs and particularly IMF regularly castigated for being in thrall to Wall Street and US Treasury interests and consequently promoting policies that are anathema to the wider public (Wade and Veneroso 1998). Similarly the rise of powerful new states and concomitant alterations to internal governance structures may impair IOs’ ability to deliver their mandates. Wade (2011: 349) talks of ‘multipolarity without multilateralism’, whereby the need to respect and reconcile more views results in inertia at IOs, which again may prompt actors to look elsewhere for their ­cooperative ventures.

17.4 Epilogue This study has provided a broad panorama of IOs from both theoretical and ‘hands-­on’ perspectives over the 200-­year period since their first appearance. IOs have many faults to contend with, but they remain in rude health and have proven to be an extraordinarily resilient institutional form. The old adage that if IOs didn’t exist they would have to be invented still applies, but there is no room for complacency. Looked at over a longer period IOs have evolved to meet the demands of their constituents. Nevertheless, the typical bureaucratic response of ‘wait and see’ may be insufficient to meet the challenges of a more dynamic age, and the executives of IOs may have to be much bolder in their proposals for institutional reform and adaptation. States and IOs rest on particular constellations of social power which, should they alter, could sweep them away. For Marxists the future is already written. They postulate that the internal contradictions of global capitalism will unleash radical social change, remaking global politics and obliterating IOs which personify capitalism’s exploitative relationships. Furthermore the expiration of capitalism will eliminate the problems of war, poverty and class division with which many IOs are concerned. Functionalists espy a future in which the power and authority of states and extant IOs are gradually usurped by a world government (which might be a form of IO). Nevertheless, these predictions seem unlikely to materialize soon, and we will continue to inhabit a planet of competing visions, interests and political models. Concomitantly

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the future of international governance and indeed humanity will rest heavily on the types of IOs to which we are accustomed. Given those presuppositions, it is incumbent upon both practitioners and academics to look more broadly than heretofore at the whole range of IOs in order to select and build upon those elements in their structures and working practices that deliver optimum benefits for their stakeholders. Modern technology has encouraged participatory democracy, and IOs (or more specifically international civil servants) will have to respond to individuals’ desires to engage more in their work and to develop global initiatives that command public respect. SUGGESTED READING

Altinay, H. (2012), Global Governance Audit, Global Economy and Development Working Paper 49, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. [As the title implies!] Newman, E. (2007), A Crisis of Global Institutions? Multilateralism and International Security, Abingdon, UK: Routledge. [Suggests many problems of IOs derive from the nature of the international system and should be reformed to cope with future security demands] O’Brien, R., A.M. Goetz, J.A. Scholte and M. Williams (2000), Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Reviews the growing role of civil society in IO work] Slaughter, A.-­M. (2004), A New World Order, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. [Assesses the problems and prospects of trans-­governmental networks]

Internet resources Brookings Institution: http://www.brookings.edu Centre for International Governance Innovation: http://www.cigionline.org Global Governance Institute: http://www.globalgovernance.eu Global Public Policy Institute: http://www.gppi.net

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Glossary

Acquis communautaire – The accumulated body of European Community laws, binding on member states, which underpins the EU’s legal authority. Agricultural extension – The process of educating farmers by providing advisory services, inputs and knowledge of new technology through a government service or sponsored demonstrations. Anarchy – A condition of the international system arising from the absence of a central governing authority to provide order by creating and enforcing rules. Apartheid – System of racial segregation practised in South Africa from 1948 to 1994 that discriminated against non-­whites to ensure white minority dominance. Big Bang – A theory which postulates that the universe was created from a massive and instantaneous explosion resulting in an ever-­expanding universe. Bilateral(ism) – Relations between two sovereign states. Capital controls – Measures restricting the movement of money across national borders. Capitalism – An economic system characterized by private ownership of the means of production. Resources are allocated by private actors operating in a ‘free market’, the accrual of profit to owners, and non-­property owners selling their labour for wages. The state’s role is restricted to correcting market failure and enforcing property rights. Cartel – An agreement or association formed to fix prices, production and marketing arrangements. Civil society – The multitude of non-­governmental organizations and associations seeking to mould the rules governing social life. Co-­financing – Two or more lending institutions financing the same project. An MDB will frequently seek co-­financing from governments, other IOs, export credit institutions or the private sector. Collective defence – A group of states bound together by treaty committing them to share in military planning and contribute military resources to deal with external threats to their collective security within the general principle that an attack on one is an attack on all. Concessionary lending – Lending undertaken by development banks at below-­market interest rates. Concessionary resources are usually ring-­fenced from regular investment resources (which are raised on the open markets) and funded through periodic voluntary contributions by donors. Conditionality – Targets for reform or improved economic performance that must be met if a loan (especially one made by the IMF or an MDB) is to be granted or if loan tranches are to be released. Cost-­effectiveness (cost–benefit) – Cost-­effectiveness compares the relative cost and outcomes of multiple options with a view to establishing the most beneficial. Cost–benefit analysis is a more precise version of cost-­effectiveness in which outcomes are quantified financially. Customs union – An international agreement reducing or eliminating trade barriers between members and defining common external tariffs for imports from non-­members. Decolonization – The process whereby colonies attain independence from colonial powers to become sovereign states. Deregulation – The reduction, redefinition or elimination of state mediation of economic activity. Diplomacy – The process of communication and negotiation amongst international actors. Most commonly associated with the ongoing discourse between diplomatic staff representing nation states.

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El Niño – A climatic warming cycle over the Pacific Ocean which impacts on weather patterns in the Americas. Epistemic communities – Networks of professionals with recognized knowledge and expertise in a specific domain. Eurozone – Those countries that have formally accepted the euro as their currency and that share a common governance to manage it. Executing agency – A body that delivers programmes or projects for organizations that provide funds. Typically executing agencies receive a percentage of the funding to cover their costs. Failed state – A state in which the government is unable to fulfil its essential sovereign functions such as protecting its citizens, retaining a monopoly on legitimate coercion or maintaining diplomatic links. Flag carrier – Governments negotiating bilateral commercial aircraft landing agreements nominate specific airlines (flag carriers) to receive preferential advantages. In the past those airlines were often state owned. In shipping, flag carrier refers to any ship sailing under a specific national flag (see Flag of convenience). Flag of convenience – The practice of ship owners registering their vessels in a specific state in order to benefit from more relaxed sailing regulations, lower taxes and lenient labour rules. Ships registered in such countries are described as sailing under a flag of convenience. Free market economics – Approaches to economic and social policy which minimize the role of the state and maximize that of the private sector through mechanisms such as removing ­subsidies, privatization, and trade and financial liberalization. (See also Washington Consensus.) Fundamentalism – The strict interpretation of and/or adherence to theological doctrines. Genocide – The calculated and systematic elimination of a particular national, ethnic, racial or religious group. Global commons – Resources that are not owned or controlled by any state and which cannot be regulated under state laws on property rights. These include parts of the Earth that lie beyond national jurisdictions such as the high seas and the atmosphere. Global governance – ‘The sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their global affairs’ (Commission on Global Governance 1995). Global public goods – Items whose quantity is not diminished by their use and which anyone can consume. Often these involve items of importance to the international community but which would be undersupplied if left to market forces or unilateral action by states and so are tackled multilaterally (q.v.). Global South – Countries formerly known as the Third World (q.v.) and the social movements advancing their interests. Gold standard – A system of global monetary governance under which governments agreed to convert their currencies into gold at a fixed rate, prioritizing their commitment to maintain a fixed exchange rate over domestic policy autonomy. Good governance – The set of principles and/or institutions generally considered to be preconditions for effective governance. Considerable disagreement exists over the appropriate principles and institutions, but many IOs boil good governance down to the construction of efficient and democratic public institutions where stakeholders have an opportunity to participate in critical decisions and where decision makers are held accountable. Governance – The exercise of political power and/or authority with the aim of managing, controlling or directing humankind’s collective affairs. Gross domestic product (GDP) – The value of goods and services produced in a country. Hegemon – A state holding a preponderance of power in the international system.

Glossary 

·  663

Human development – A paradigm which holds that development is not just about economic growth but about creating an environment in which people lead healthy and productive lives, enjoy a decent standard of living and participate in political and social life. Humanitarian intervention – International action to prevent or secure the cessation of serious human rights violations or to avert the consequences of natural or human-­created catastrophes. Institutions – Persistent structures or mechanisms that govern human behaviour, ranging from  formal IOs to informal but often widely accepted norms, conventions and ideational constructs. Intellectual property rights – Protections afforded to the creators and owners of works derived from human intellectual creativity. Interdependence – Conditions in which one actor is affected by the decisions of others. International regime – The ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-­making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations’ (Krasner 1983: 2). International society – A group of states that develop and perceive their relations with one another to be bound by a shared set of rules, norms, practices and institutions (q.v.). Intifada – The name given to two separate Palestinian uprisings in the West Bank and Gaza, against Israeli occupation, in 1987–93 and 2000–05. Keynesianism – Economic philosophies and policies based on the ideas of John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946). Keynesian economics is premised on the belief that private decisions made in the marketplace can sometimes result in inefficient outcomes that justify state intervention to encourage economic growth and stability. Laissez-­faire economics – See Free market economics. Liberalization – Policies that reduce levels of government intervention in economic activity. McCarthyism – Making unsubstantiated allegations of treachery or treason. This derives from US Senator Joe McCarthy, the Chairman of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, who in the 1950s used his position to identify and eliminate communist sympathizers, leading to a distorted witch-­hunt culminating in the public denunciation of many innocent parties. Matrix management – A two-­dimensional approach to organizational structure that responds to the needs of organizations with twin goals, such as supporting technical specializations and regional policies. Managers report equally to the head of each dimension. Matrix management rationalizes reporting structures in complex organizations but dilutes responsibility for results and complicates internal processes. Moral hazard – When a party does not behave as prudently as it should because it is partly shielded from the full consequences of the risk. Multilateral – Relations amongst three or more states. Multinational corporations – Firms that own or control assets in more than one country. Neo-­colonial – Vestiges of arrangements used by colonial powers to exert continued control over their former dependencies; sometimes used more loosely to describe the influence of developed states of the North over the developing states of the Global South (q.v.). Non-­Aligned Movement – An association of less developed countries not formally allied with or against a major power bloc. Non-­governmental organization – Any formal group that engages in collective action independently of government. Some definitions exclude groups engaged in commercial activity in order to exclude firms and multinational corporations (q.v.). Non-­tariff barrier – Policies adopted by states to restrict imports without the imposition of tariffs. Such barriers include quotas, anti-­dumping measures and banning goods manufactured under certain conditions (e.g. using child labour) or with certain materials. Norm entrepreneurs – Individuals or organizations that catalyse and endorse a new norm.

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Norms – The rules and protocols encompassing acceptable behavioural standards for actors belonging to a specific community. Operative work – The work of an IO concerned with practical application of the technologies and objectives with which it is associated. Pariah state – A state whose behaviour runs counter to accepted international norms and rules, sometimes referred to as a rogue state. Plenipotentiary – A government official with full powers to sign an international or bilateral treaty, but without the power to ratify it. Public goods – See Global public goods. Quasi-­state – A state that is not universally recognized and which may be a member of only a few IOs (e.g. Taiwan or Kosovo). Quasi-­state agency or institution – An organization/structure which is under the guidance of a government (or other higher authority) and subject to its laws but which is autonomous and establishes its own regulations. Reparations – Actions taken to right a wrong; specifically punitive financial penalties levied on the losers of war to secure compensation for those countries whose assets were taken or used in the course of the fighting. Rogue state – See Pariah state. Soft law – Agreements that are not binding but which have legal standing (e.g. a resolution of the UN GA or a code of conduct). Soft power – An actor’s ability to achieve results through cooperation and attraction. Sovereign debt – Debts guaranteed by a government or in the case of MDBs by governments collectively. Sovereignty – The absolute authority of the state within its territorial borders and the idea that the state recognizes no higher authority in the international system. State – This term is used variously to refer to: an individual country in the international system; a community of people sharing the same domestic political system; or the institutions of government within a particular country. Subsidiarity – A principle, most closely associated with the EU, that policy issues should be decided by the lowest relevant level of political authority and as close as possible to the citizen. Supranational – A decision-­making method whereby states delegate their authority to an independent institution capable of imposing decisions on them even if they disagree. Sustainable development – Development that ‘meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987: 8); a holistic approach to development that ensures that the environmental quality of the land, air and oceans is maintained and that biodiversity is preserved. Taliban – A politico-­religious group noted for its strict adherence to Islam, which came to power in Afghanistan in 1996, following its success in resisting the 1979 Russian invasion and the collapse of the first post-­invasion government. The Taliban repressed its own population and harboured Al-­Qaeda terrorists. This led the US to attack it in 2001 under a UN mandate and install a replacement government. Subsequently the Taliban has operated from North-­Western Pakistan. Terrorism – Violent acts against civilians or symbolic targets perpetrated by non-­state actors with the aim of attaining religious, political or ideological goals. Third World – A collective term for the less developed countries which is used sparingly today owing to pejorative connotations. Trans-­regional international organization – An IO whose members come from more than one geographic region but which has eligibility rules that preclude global membership.

Glossary 

·  665

Transition states – States mostly within the former USSR or Soviet bloc making the transition from centralized to free market economics (q.v.) and from authoritarian to democratic forms of governance. Trust funds – Voluntary contributions made by governments to fund, in whole or in part, defined activities consistent with an IO’s objectives with specific reporting and expenditure requirements. UN System – All those organizations formally linked to or part of the UN, which includes the specialized agencies and IAEA. Washington Consensus – A free market financial and economic philosophy based on macroeconomic discipline, market-­based economies and the opening of economies to trade and foreign direct investment which inter alia calls for fiscal discipline, tax reform and deregulation. (See also Free market economics.)

Keyword index

Keyword

Main IO

Secondary IOs

Africa Agriculture Americas Animals Arms control Asia Astronomy Aviation Banking Central Asia Children Climate Communications Crime Culture Desertification Development Disarmament Disaster relief Economics (macro) Economics (micro) Education Emergencies Energy Environment Europe Fiscal studies Fisheries Food Forestry Gender studies Global warming Governance Health High seas

AU FAO OAS FAO UN ASEAN ESO ICAO BIS CIS UNICEF WMO ITU Interpol UNESCO UNEP UNDP UN ICRC IMF

Af DB CGIAR IDB OIE OSCE ADB ESA EASA ECB ADB UNFPA ECMWF UPU Europol EU FAO IBRD OSCE WFP BIS

ECA IFAD ECLAC ILRI IAEA APEC UNESCO IATA IMF EBRD

Eurocontrol EBA OSCE SCO

ESA EU-­GNSS Eurojust OIC ICARDA UN NATO UNHCR OECD

UN UNEP BEREC UN WCO Commonwealth IFAD UNESCO RDBs OECD CIS UNICEF UN IBRD ECB

IBRD UNESCO UNHCR OECD/IEA UNEP EU IMF FAO FAO FAO UN Women UN UNDP WHO UN

OECD EU ICRC EU EEA COE BIS EU CGIAR CIFOR UNFPA UNEP IBRD UNICEF IMO

UN UNICEF WFP IAEA EU EBRD ECB EFCA EFSA ICRAF UNICEF WMO IMF UNAIDS EMSA

RDBs UNRWA UNICEF OPEC WMO ECE OECD WorldFish IFAD UN EIGE ECMWF OECD UNFPA UNESCO

ECOWAS EU Mercosur

SADC WTO NAFTA

NATO ESCAP

CIS SCO

CARICOM

WMO UNCTAD IOM UN

WTO IBRD UN ACER IBRD OSCE

IFPRI OECD IOM Habitat EIB

IFPRI

WFP

UN UNRWA

ECDC

Keyword index  Human rights Humanitarian relief Humanities Immigration Industry Intellectual property IT Justice Labour conditions Law Lending, global Lending, regional Medicine Meteorology Metrology Middle East Migration Military Narcotic drugs National accounts Natural resources Nature Nautical Nuclear safety Nuclear weapons Palestine Particle physics Patents Peace Peacekeeping Police Politics, Africa Politics, Americas Politics, Asia Politics, Europe Politics, global Politics, Middle East Population Postal services Railways Refugees Rural development Science, applied

OHCHR UNHCR

COE ICRC

FRA WFP

IOM UNICEF

OSCE UN

UNESCO IOM UNIDO WIPO

EU EBRD EPO

Frontex EU WTO

UNHCR ILO OHIM

OECD CPVO

CERN ICC EU COE IMF Af DB EMA ECMWF

ENISA ECJ EU-­OSHA ECJ IFAD EBRD

ITU Eurojust IMO ICJ

ECHR UNIDO

EIB

IDB

OIC IsDB EU Frontex CIS EDA Europol EMCDDA ECB OECD OPEC IMSG UNEP EMSA ILO Euratom UN IAEA NATO UN OIC ESRF EPO OHIM UNESCO OSCE AU NATO Europol Cepol ECOWAS SADC CARICOM OCAS CIS SCO CIS NATO Commonwealth OIC UN

ESCWA UNHCR SCO Interpol UN

WEU

ICJ ILO UN IBRD ADB WHO WMO BIPM LAS IOM NATO UN IMF UN UNESCO IMO IAEA UN UNRWA CERN WIPO UN UN Interpol AU OAS ASEAN EU UN LAS UNFPA UPU OTIF UNHCR IFAD UNESCO

·  667

IOM

IsDB

OECD CIS LAS CPVO ECOWAS

OSCE

UN UN SAARC OSCE OIC GCC

UN UN

UNICEF CGIAR ECMWF

UNRWA RDBs ESA

CIS

UN ERA ICRC IBRD CERN

IOM FAO CGIAR

WFP ESRF

668  · 

International organizations

Science, pure Security Shipping Social sciences Space Standards Statistics Telecommunications Tourism Trade Transport Urbanization Water Weather Working conditions

UNESCO BIPM CERN See Politics and Arms control. IMO EMSA UNESCO ILO UN ESA ESO EU-­GNSS BIPM WMO UN EU IBRD ITU BEREC UNWTO WTO UN Habitat IWMI WMO ILO

EU EU IBRD FAO ECMWF EU

IBRD ICAO

ESA

ESO

IMF

OECD

RDBs

IMF IMO

OECD OECD

UNCTAD IBRD

UNESCO EU-­OSHA IMO

Index

accelerators see synchrotrons accountability 107, 261–2, 288–9, 302, 307, 324, 435, 632, 638 acquis communautaire 112, 382, 391, 661 ADB 156, 161, 245, 248, 273–4, 280 Adenauer, Konrad 381 Af DB 107, 245, 268, 271–2, 280, 510 Afghanistan 81, 82, 422, 412, 482, 484–5, 487, 513 Africa 153, 154–5, 181, 191, 206, 249, 251, 252, 262, 271–2, 282, 307, 353, 504–5, 544 Aga Khan, Sadruddin 171 agricultural extension 214, 334, 537, 545, 661 agricultural trade 333, 344, 419, 510, 532, 547 agriculture 262, 386, 411, 531, 532, 534, 536, 537, 540, 543, 556 AIDS see HIV/AIDS Al Bashir, President Omar 140, 141, 151, 477 Al Qaeda 99, 183, 220, 484, 527 Americas, the 351, 352, 467–8, 470 Amsterdam, Treaty of 385, 392, 407 anarchy 21, 26–7, 90, 661 Andean Development Bank 245, 249 Annan, Kofi 122, 136–7, 200, 635 anti-globalization 7, 638 apartheid 69, 228, 506, 518, 519, 661 Arab League see LAS Arab Maghreb Union 474 Arab Spring 82, 172, 272, 373, 476, 477, 522 Arctic Council 479, 633 Argentina 306, 356, 358 Armenia 513, 514 arms control 232, 233–4, 235, 236–7, 481 ASEAN 104, 351, 352, 464, 494–500, 630 Asia 249, 252, 274, 282, 297–8, 351, 352, 493–4, 531, 534 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 351, 352, 495, 498 Asian financial crisis see financial crisis, Asian astronomy 576, 580 Atacama Large Millimetre Assembly 637 Atlantic Charter 56–7, 497 atomic particles see particle physics

Attali, Jacques 275 AU 82, 104, 140, 412, 465, 466, 505, 506–11, 522, 627 Australia 579 Austria 49, 321, 323, 355 aviation 487, 602, 603, 604, 611, 617 Azerbaijan 513, 514 Ban, Ki-moon 136 Bangladesh 171, 175, 280 banking 312–3, 315, 320, 323 Basel Committee (BIS) 83, 312–3, 314, 315–6 Belgium 310, 321, 323, 478 Benelux Community 478 Berne Convention (copyright) 41, 363, 364 Big Bang 572, 661 bilateral activities 111, 188, 199, 253, 421, 481, 494, 498, 500–01, 511, 624, 661 Bioversity International 535, 542, 556, 557, 558 BIPM 560, 565–9 BIS 53, 101, 104, 286, 294, 309–17 Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (EU) 429, 484 Bolívar, Simón 467 Borlaug, Norman 549, 552 Bosnia 122, 147, 149 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros 77, 136 Boyd Orr, Lord John 51, 93 Brazil 253, 356, 357–8, 577 Bretton Woods 58, 287, 289, 310–11 system 70, 73, 287, 290–91, 292, 295, 296 Brundtland Commission 10, 189 Brussels 407, 426, 432, 479, 487, 522 budgets see international organizations, budget and finances Burundi 509, 510 Bush, George Sr.77, 621 Bush, George W 81, 473, 621 Cambodia 122, 499 Canada 102, 359, 487 capitalism 33, 80, 201, 207, 250, 346, 639, 661

670  · 

International organizations

carbon emissions see greenhouse gases Caribbean 154–5, 252, 268 Community 352, 468–9 Development Bank 245, 249 cartel 371, 375, 661 Central America 468, 471, 472 Central Asia 80, 154–5, 275, 277, 297, 352, 512, 514 central banks 286, 289, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 315, 317, 318, 323 Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine 1, 41 Central Office for International Carriage by Rail 609 Central Treaty Organization 67, 75 CERN 90, 104, 569–75, 579, 583 CGIAR 101, 211, 215, 259, 532–47, 631 Boards of Trustees 538, 540, 543–4 funding 103, 282, 534, 538, 539, 545–6, 551, 554 Chicago Convention (ICAO) 59, 600, 604, 613 children 154, 163, 166–7 Chile 263, 575 China 12, 56, 75, 102, 117, 144, 153, 154–5, 222, 253, 261, 264, 300, 343, 367, 493, 494, 500–04, 634 Churchill, Winston 56, 478 CIAT 533, 535, 542, 548, 553 CIFOR 535, 555, 556, 557 CIMMYT, 533, 534, 535, 541, 542, 549, 550, 551, 554 CIP 535, 542, 549, 550 CIS 78, 82, 154–5, 276, 352, 464, 480, 500–04, 628 CITES Convention 190, 191 civil society 140, 207, 209, 250, 264, 270, 330, 337, 398, 433, 493, 515, 516, 522, 595, 629, 661 Classical Realism see Realist school climate change see international organizations and climate change Codex Alimentarius 94, 210, 215, 345, 438, 567 COE 65, 104, 369, 397, 433, 479, 488–93 Development Bank 245, 248 co-financing 186, 267, 303, 661 Cold War 23, 24, 61, 67, 71, 76, 103, 108, 121, 206, 229, 238, 250, 329, 350, 388, 472, 478, 486, 494, 512, 569, 628 collective defence 47, 463, 480, 500, 661 Collective Security Treaty Organization 501, 503 commodities 210, 349–50, 370–1, 372, 379, 503 Commonwealth, the 515–20, 629, 631 communications 590, 591, 594–5, 596 Community of Latin American and Caribbean States 473, 634

Community Plant Variety Office (EU) 428, 448, 452 Concert of Europe 40–41 concessionary lending 246, 257, 267, 268, 270, 272, 273, 280, 282, 661 conditionality 219, 249, 254, 258, 265, 278, 303, 305–6, 661 see also IMF conditionality Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 71, 75, 511–2, 514 Congo, Democratic Republic 71, 121, 139, Congress of the Holy Alliance 40, 52 Constructivist school 20, 29–32, 86, 465, 493 containment 67, 480 Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf see Gulf Cooperation Council corruption 138, 139, 186–7, 251–2, 272, 277 see also good governance cost benefits/effectiveness see international organizations cost-effectiveness Côte d’Ivoire 151, 271 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 66 Council of the Baltic Sea States 479 crime 361, 445–6, 458–9, 524, 526–7, 528 Critical theories 20, 32–5 Gramscian 35, 207 Marxism 32–3, 201, 639 World System theories 34, 250 Cuba 469, 473 customs union 356, 357, 383, 476, 661 Czech Republic 65, 226, 276 Darfur, Sudan 139–40, 141, 508, 509, 510, 522 Decent Work Agenda (ILO) 205, 208 decision-making 90–91 decolonization 69, 162, 169, 244, 259, 628, 661 de Larosière, Jacques 275 Delors, Jacques 388, 390, 415 Denmark 153, 455 dependency theories 33–4 détente 71, 511 development 69, 74, 129, 164, 184, 187, 218, 247, 250, 259, 296, 332, 349, 510, 536, 591 Development Assistance Committee see OECD Development Committee (IMF/IBRD) 260, 300 digital divide 593, 594–5 Diouf, Jacques 109 disaster relief see humanitarian emergencies diseases 155, 163, 167, 168 215, 217, 218, 220–21, 222, 439–40

Index  see also HIV/AIDS; malaria; smallpox Doha Round 83, 342, 343, 346, 348, 351, 355, 379, 411, 547 drugs see narcotic drugs Drummond, Sir Eric 46, 47 Dunant, Henri 42 Dunbarton Oaks 57 East African Community 353, 505 Eastern Europe 66, 75, 76, 78, 82, 275, 276, 297, 391, 627 EBRD 245, 275–7, 391 ECB 101, 104, 286, 303, 311, 317–25, 385 ECMWF 104, 561, 577–9 Economic Community of Central African States 353, 466, 505 Economic Community of West African States 75, 353, 412, 505, 508 ECOSOC (EU) 399, 401 ECOSOC (UN) 117, 128, 129, 133–4, 145, 153, 180, 197, 630 education 154, 224–5, 230, 334, 516 EEC see European Union EEC EFTA 351, 353, 354–6, 382, 384, 391 Surveillance Authority/Court 354–5 Egypt 475 EIB 245, 275, 277–9, 383, 394, 614, 615 Elizabeth II, Queen 520 emanations 13–4, 75, 81, 100, 426, 537, 628 emergencies see humanitarian emergencies energy 334, 395–6 environment 9, 155, 189, 193, 248, 276, 333, 335, 395, 540, 558, 603, 606, 609 epistemic communities 31, 190, 198, 335, 490, 526, 560, 567–8, 589, 594, 623, 662 EPO 103, 368, 369–70, 450 ESA 104, 459, 579–83 ESO 104, 562, 575–7 ESRF 583–5 Ethiopia 95 Eurasian Economic Community 352, 501 Euratom 383, 384, 385, 411 Supply Agency 429, 459–60 euro see Eurozone Eurocontrol 104 Eurofima 637 Eurojust 429, 458–9 Europe 59, 75, 81, 353, 381, 425, 478, 492, 512, 560, 613

·  671

European Agencies (EU) for: Aviation Safety 429, 433, 615, 617 Chemicals 334, 428, 433, 451–2 Defence 429, 433, 454–6, 616 Environment 427, 433, 437–8 Fisheries Control 428, 435, 453–4 Fundamental Rights 428, 433, 444 Insurance and Occupational Pensions 320, 429 Maritime Safety 429, 615, 616 Medicines 428, 433, 449–50 Network and Information Security 427, 443 Railways 429, 618 Safety and Health at Work 427, 434, 442 The Cooperation of Energy Regulators 429, 454 The Management of Operational Cooperation at External Borders of Member States see Frontex (EU) The Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems 430, 458 European Asylum Support Office (EU) 430, 458 European Banking Authority (EU) 320, 429 European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (EU) 427, 438, 439–40 European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (EU) 393, 427, 441–2 European Coal and Steel Community 68, 381, 384, 385 European Commission see European Union Commission; Commissioners European Court of Auditors (EU) 384, 397–8, 399, 410, 413, 418, 435 European Court of Human Rights (COE) 489, 491, 492, 638 European Court of Justice (EU) 382, 383, 397, 399, 404–5, 409, 412–3, 417–8, 421, 435, 491 European Economic Area (EEA) 353, 355, 391, 433, 449 European Financial Stability Facility (EU) 303, 319–20, 325 European Food Safety Authority (EU) 427, 433, 438–9 European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (EU) 393, 427, 442 European Global Navigation Satellite System Supervisory Authority (EU) 430, 459 European Institute for Gender Equality (EU) 428, 444–5 European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EU) 428, 443–4 European Launcher Development Organization 579 European Monetary Institute see ECB

672  · 

International organizations

European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EU) 427, 440–01 European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation see Eurocontrol European Parliament 76, 103, 369, 383, 384–5, 390, 392, 399, 400, 406–9, 416, 418, 421, 446 European Police College (EU) 427, 443 European Police Office (EU) see Europol European Research Council (EU) 430, 461 European Securities and Markets Authority (EU) 320, 429 European Space Research Organization 579 European Stability Mechanism see European Financial Stability Facility European Systemic Risk Board (EU) 320 European Training Foundation (EU) 429, 460 European Union 82, 103, 139, 156, 275, 303, 343, 353, 358, 369, 381–424, 489, 585, 627 agencies 325, 392, 425–6, 431–6, 448, 454, 587, 614–5, 631 budget/finance 384, 385, 405–6, 418 comitology 404 Commission 383, 389, 390, 399, 402–3, 404, 406, 407, 416, 417, 426, 432, 435, 436 commissioners 106, 390, 402–3, 416, 417 Common Agricultural Policy 383, 386, 394, 411, 419 Common Fisheries Policy 394, 452–3 COREPER 399, 400–01 Council 384, 385, 392, 398–9, 401–2, 406, 455 Council of Ministers 382, 383, 387, 392, 398–401, 407, 416, 446, 459 EEC 68–9, 76, 277, 294, 311, 351, 369, 383, 384, 386–7, 479 energy policy 394, 395–6, 411, 419 environmental policy 394, 395, 411, 419–20 executive agencies 426 foreign policy 388, 389, 392, 394, 396, 412, 421, 443 Institute for Security Studies 427, 433, 442–3 Judicial Cooperation Unit see Eurojust legislative process 392, 404, 407, 408, 415–6 qualified majority voting 76, 384, 387, 390, 393, 394, 400 Satellite Centre 428, 433, 447–8, 459, 583 security and defence policy 388, 389, 394, 396, 412, 422, 432, 443, 447, 454, 456, 486–7 semi-autonomous agencies see European Union agencies; executive agencies Single Market 317, 320, 323, 383, 384, 388–9, 390, 410, 418–9, 431, 455

social policy 390, 393, 394, 411, 419–20 trans-European Networks 411, 614 treaties 384–5 Europol 428, 445–7, 528 Eurozone/euro 277, 286, 318, 321–2, 323, 324–5, 385, 389, 423, 624, 662 crisis 83, 278, 303, 305, 306, 319, 322, 410, 421, 422, 433 executing agency 184, 241, 256, 662 Executive Agency (EU) for: 431 Competitiveness and Innovation 430, 461 Education, Audiovisual and Culture 430, 460 Health and Consumers 430, 461 Research 428, 447 The Trans-European Transport Network 278, 430, 614, 615–6, 618 executive heads 91–5, 106, 159, 200, 213, 227–8, 252, 262, 270, 300, 402, 470, 475, 497, 517, 522 failed states 78, 81, 207, 447, 493, 662 FAO 59, 74, 93–5, 104, 109, 160, 180, 181, 202, 209–16, 240, 345, 371, 544, 547, 558, 625 Financial Action Task Force (OECD) 528 financial contributions see international organizations budget and finances financial crisis 315 2007 82, 206, 262, 269, 276, 288, 302, 320–21, 323, 344, 346, 622 Asian 80, 273, 297–8, 313, 351 Latin American 76, 260, 269, 296 Financial Stability Board/Forum 297, 298, 311, 314, 333 Finland 355 First World War see World War First fisheries 212, 214, 452–3, 557 flag carrier 602, 604, 662 flag of convenience 340, 606, 607, 662 food aid 179, 182, 183, 376 Aid Convention 376, 377–9 safety 210, 439 security 93, 94, 181, 201–11, 376, 503, 532, 534 Ford Foundation 533, 630 forestry 211–2, 214, 557 Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN) 11, 191, 563, 565 France 59, 102, 117, 261, 300, 310, 321, 323, 325, 381, 384, 386, 399, 480, 487 Francophonie, International Organization of the 511

Index  free market 74, 203, 208–9, 223, 242, 247, 276, 289, 305, 309, 347, 391, 547, 662 free trade 203, 268, 351, 356, 360, 495, 498, 500, 501, 509 Frontex (EU) 430, 433, 456–7 functionalism see Liberal school G 7/8 14, 73, 83, 194, 294, 298, 336, 509, 565, 636 G 10 14, 312, 636 G 20 14, 83, 208, 262, 298, 304, 336, 636 G 77 14, 95, 194, 227, 239 Gaddafi, Muammar/Said 122, 141, 487, 510 Galileo (EU) 430, 448, 459, 580, 582–3, 582–3, 613, 615 Gates Foundation 110, 185, 223, 539, 631 GATS see WTO GATT agreement see WTO organization 58, 327, 335, 338–9, 345, 376, 627 Gbabgo, Laurent 141 gender 154, 156, 182, 186, 281, 444–5, 536, 540 gene banks 541, 542, 556–7 General Assembly see UN General Assembly Geneva 135, 220 Convention 42, 113 genocide 78, 126, 147, 149, 507, 662 Georgia 513 Germany 51, 102, 237, 261, 300, 321, 323, 325, 381, 399, 412, 487 Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization 110, 185, 223 global commons 117, 368, 564, 588, 593, 662 global conferences see international conferences Global Environment Facility 11, 185, 187, 191, 282 Global Fund, the 111, 223, 368, 631 global governance 2–4, 71, 85, 158, 246, 286, 308, 662 global organizations see universal organizations global public goods 102, 286, 453, 532–3, 543, 636, 662 global warming 8, 578 globalization 4, 80, 83, 203–4, 286, 287, 291, 313, 526, 632 Gold Standard 50, 287, 310, 662 good governance 62, 106, 140, 185, 249, 333, 518, 626, 662 governance 88–90, 186, 213, 251, 266, 289, 307, 463, 561, 620, 622, 632, 635, 662 governing bodies 88–90, 204, 260 see also CGIAR, Boards of Trustees; IMF Board of; World Bank Group Board of

·  673

Gramsci, Antonio 35 see also Critical theories Grant, James 163–4 Great Depression 50, 310 Great Powers 40, 46, 119 Greece 303, 321, 322, 323 Green Revolution 273, 531, 533, 534, 549 greenhouse gases 8, 11, 191, 193, 395, 411, 420–21, 602, 603–4, 609 Gulf Cooperation Council 82, 353, 474, 475, 477 Gulf Wars 77, 81, 475, 482 Habitat see UN Human Settlements (Habitat) Hague System, the 44 Haiti 138, 185, 270 Hamas 177, 475 Hammarskjöld, Dag 67, 115, 120, 136, 147 Harare Declaration 517, 528 health 154, 163, 167–8, 177, 334, 440, 449 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 251, 252, 253, 256, 265, 304, 507, 519 hegemons 24, 28, 45, 63, 77, 81, 135, 144, 250, 265–6, 273, 300, 464, 466, 472, 494, 497, 500, 504, 505, 506, 508, 594, 633–4, 662 Helsinki Accords 75, 511, 512, 514 HIV/AIDS 155, 163, 165, 168, 217, 220–21, 368, 631 human development 247, 260, 663 Index 185, 187 human rights 113, 127, 141–2, 152–3, 472, 474, 489, 492, 497, 510, 523, 622 humanitarian emergencies 161–2, 164, 167, 180, 181, 378, 521, 663 Hungary 169, 308 Hussein, Saddam 145, 171 Huxley, Sir Julian 227 IADB see IDB IAEA 104, 210, 232–8, 567, IATA 54, 362, 600, 601, 602, 604–5 IBRD 34, 58, 80, 101, 108, 110, 161, 188, 211, 219, 244, 247, 250, 301, 534, 539 IDA 255, 256, 257, 262, 265, 510, 518 see also World Bank Group ICAO 59, 104, 362, 514, 600–04, 617 ICARDA 535, 542, 553, 554 Iceland 354 ICRAF 535, 542, 549, 551, 552 ICRC/Red Cross 42–3, 97, 149, 629 ICRISAT 535, 541, 542, 553, 554

674  · 

International organizations

IDA see IBRD IDA IDB 245, 267, 268–70, 471 IFAD 74, 211, 245, 281–3, 373 IFPRI 532, 533, 535, 555–6, 557, 558 IITA 533, 535, 542, 553, 554 ILO 52, 59, 100, 104, 201–9, 345, 625, 631 ILRI 535, 542, 557 IMF 34, 58, 70, 76, 80, 83, 101, 104, 273, 286, 287, 289–301, 311, 627 Board of 251, 260, 292, 295, 299–300, 302 conditionality 76, 219, 288, 292, 295, 298, 303, 304, 305–7 loan facilities 292, 293–4, 296, 299, 303, 304 quotas 291–2, 293–4, 295, 300, 304, 307 see also Special Drawing Rights IMO 104, 113, 202, 538, 589, 605–9, 616 imperial measurements 565 India 12, 153, 232, 235, 253, 493, 494, 594 Indonesia 497, 556, 608 information technology 333, 443, 528 Inmarsat 589–90 Institutionalism see Liberal school intellectual property 340, 345, 363–4, 365, 366, 367, 450, 452, 547–8, 558, 663 Intelsat 587, 589–90 Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture 471 interdependence see states interdependence of Intergovernmental Authority on Development 505 Intergovernmental Organisation for International Carriage by Rail, 587, 609–11, 618 intergovernmental organization see international organization Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (UN) 10–11, 12, 193, 563, 565, 602 International Bureau for Education 54 International Bureau for the American Republics 43, 469 international civil service 47, 86, 97–8, 120 International Commission for Air Navigation 54, 600 international conferences 41, 71, 89, 116 International Copper Study Group 15, 371, 372, 373 International Court of Justice (UN) 123, 125–6, 136, 138, 140–41, 149–50, 499 International Criminal Court (UN) 126–7, 138, 141, 150–52, 477 International Criminal Police Organization 54, 524 International Energy Agency see OECD

International Finance and Monetary Committee (IMF) 300–01 international financial institutions 80, 90, 100, 105, 251, 639 funding of 246, 255–6, 277–8, 291–2, 310 International Grain Council/Agreement 183, 372, 376–9 International Health Office 43, 49 International Institute of Agriculture 43, 59, 209, 210, 376 international law 111–3 International Lead and Zinc Study Group 371, 372, 373 International Metals Study Group 371, 372, 373 International Meteorological Organization 562 International Mobile Satellite Organization 590 International Nansen Office for Refugees 48 International Nickel Study Group 371,372, 373 international non-governmental organizations 1, 2, 3, 164–5, 368, 560, 595, 596, 604, 607, 630–1, 663 International Organization for Migration 161, 175, 202 International Organization for Standardization 239 international organizations 5–8 and climate change 8–13, 193, 283, 554–5, 564–5 authority of 18, 19, 31, 61, 86, 100, 102, 105, 129, 628 see also international organizations mandates budgets and finances 73, 95, 102–5, 107–8, 111, 146, 160, 165, 174–5, 180, 183, 193, 211, 230, 385–6, 448, 515, 539, 637–8 see also CGIAR funding classification of 13–8, 19 closure of 621–2, 626, 628 culture 87, 96, 98, 106, 107, 109, 110, 213, 250, 266, 271, 273, 302 competence of 16, 17, 393, 394 cost-effectiveness 105, 111, 191, 234, 248, 249, 435 , 448, 519, 527, 528, 543, 582, 613, 661 definition of 13–4 functions of 16, 19, 55, 64, 72, 79, 463 future of 631-9 growth of 1–2, 45, 61, 63, 66, 69, 75, 77–8, 81, 539, 626, 627, 633 legitimacy of 23, 86, 99, 143, 145, 167, 237, 249, 288, 296, 317, 337, 632, 638, 639 mandates 209, 216, 223, 224, 228, 254, 270, 277, 286, 289–90, 309, 329, 339, 361, 463, 469, 494–5, 512, 520, 590–1, 600, 606 see also international organizations authority of; mandates; UN Charter

Index  membership of 5, 15, 17, 463 reform of 108–11, 117, 144–5, 213, 214, 264–5, 266, 271, 281, 283, 337, 392, 522, 538 staff of 95–9, 103–4, 108, 199, 276, 301, 624–5 statutes of 96–7 structure of 87–90, 106, 131, 132–4, 160, 204–5, 212–3, 219–20, 224, 255, 299–301, 318–9, 331, 341, 342, 364–5, 399, 433, 464, 482–4, 496, 538, 540, 572, 601 theory of 8, 18, 20–35, 85 International Plant Genetic Resources Institute see Bioversity International International Postal Corporation 597, 599 international regime 9, 190, 420, 561, 663 International Sugar Organization 44, 372 International Tin Council 621 International Trade Centre 350 International Trade Organization 58, 327, 328 International Tropical Timber Organization 372, 557–8 International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 368 International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs 41 internet 110, 367, 574, 637 Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 367, 595 Inter-Parliamentary Union 43, 511 Interpol 104, 361, 445–6, 514, 523–8 Iran 234, 235–6, 412, 474, 485, 522, 523 Iraq 81, 122,144, 373, 474 IRRI 533, 534, 535, 542, 549, 550 IsDB 245, 279–81, 521, 523 Israel 75, 152, 177, 178–9, 228, 232, 235, 373, 473, 476, 477, 520, 623 Italy 51, 102, 321, 323, 355 ITU 104, 590–96, 629 Telecom 591, 592, 594, 596 IWMI 535, 555, 556, 558 Japan 102, 234, 261, 273, 300, 312, 335, 493 Kennedy, John F 179, 471 Kenya 151 Keynes, John Maynard 58, 663 knowledge management/production 16, 110, 189, 202, 210, 214, 224, 253–4, 258, 268, 298, 335, 426–8, 436, 545, 638 Korea 121 North 232, 234, 237, 485, 497

·  675

South 263, 264, 273, 298 Kuwait 77, 122, 477, 522 Kyoto Protocol 11, 437, 565, 602 labour conditions 201, 202, 203, 205, 206 Large Hadron Collider 570–2, 573, 574 LAS 75, 82, 474–7, 523 Latin America 154–5, 249, 252, 268, 269, 270, 296, 358, 467–8, 472, 531 Latin American financial crisis see financial crisis Latin American Law of the Sea see UN Convention on the Law of the Sea leadership 91, 93, 106, 120, 171, 199, 227–8, 275, 390, 628 League of Nations 46–51, 56, 57, 115, 132, 201, 209, 216, 376, 605, 630 Lebanon 75, 476, 477 legal environment 112 less developed countries (LDC) 10, 162, 182, 189, 199, 211, 214, 218, 223, 226, 239, 250, 261, 303–4, 333, 348–9, 350 Liberal school 20, 24–8, 45, 143, 414, 478, 485, 493 Functionalism 25, 639 Institutionalism 26–7, 29, 63, 73, 86, 345, 465, 633, 634 Neo-functionalism 26 Libya 122, 151, 456, 476, 487 Lie, Tygvie 136 Liechtenstein 354 Lisbon, Treaty of 82, 385, 387, 392, 402, 407, 416, 421, 422, 444 London Club 302, 631 Lost Decade, the 76, 260, 270, 296 Luxembourg 153, 321, 323, 407, 426, 432, 479 Maastricht, Treaty of (EU) 80, 311, 317, 324, 384, 388, 390, 407, 486 macroeconomics 101–2, 286, 295, 324, 3322 malaria 110, 142, 155, 217, 222 Malta 434 management 105–8, 213, 216, 271, 417, 511, 543–4 see also senior management mandates 16, 86, 98, 100–01, 111, 198, 622, 623 see also international organizations authority of; international organizations mandates Marshall Plan 65–6, 255, 291, 310, 328 Marxism see Critical theories matrix management 107, 110, 663

676  · 

International organizations

M’bow, Amadou 226, 227–8 McCarthyism 96, 120, 663 McNamara, Robert 259, 534 Mercosur 352, 356–9, 468 Mexico 76, 80, 182, 359, 360, 533 Middle East 75, 154–5, 177, 187, 234, 473–4, 476, 473–4, 476, 623 Millennium Development Goals 83, 129, 130, 142, 153–5, 160, 186, 213–4, 228, 239, 262 MKS system 565–6 Moldova 513 Monnet, Jean 47, 68, 381, 382, 478 Monroe Doctrine 468 Montreal Protocol 10, 190–91, 193 moral hazard 305, 304, 325, 663 Morgenthau, Henry 58 Morocco 508 Mozambique 520 multilateral development banks 184, 244, 245, 246–50, 253 see also international financial institutions funding of Myanmar 207 NAFTA 352, 359–61 Nansen, Fridtjof 48 narcotic drugs 49, 440–01, 526–7 national agricultural research services 534, 537, 542, 543, 544–5, 551, 553 National Air and Space Agency (USA) 576, 580, 581 NATO 24, 65, 78, 82, 103, 140, 422, 456, 466, 479, 480–8, 508, 512, 515, 627 natural disasters 221, 246 neo-functionalism see Liberal school neo-realism see Realist school Structural Netherlands, the 153, 310, 321, 323, 478 networks 110, 191, 201, 223, 225, 432, 437, 443, 572–3, 635–6 New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development 272, 350, 507, 509, 510 New International Economic Order 69, 70, 74, 129, 350 New World Information and Communications Order 226, 228 New World Order 77, 81, 621 New York 135 Nigeria 90, 168, 220, 505 Nobel Prize 42, 43, 49, 98, 116, 120, 137, 163, 172, 206, 235, 414, 549, 573–4, 620 non-aligned states 236, 663

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Treaty on the 232, 233, 235, 477, 481 non-state actors 25, 78, 99–100, 122, 615, 629–31, 635, 637 non-tariff barriers 338, 340, 345, 388, 500, 567, 627, 663 Nordic Council 479 regional organizations 245, 626, 628 norms 9, 16, 30–31, 146, 153, 161, 189, 199, 202, 224, 286, 345, 346, 431, 448, 467, 490, 499, 502, 512, 587–8, 622, 634, 664 North Africa 82, 154–5, 272, 277, 353, 474 Norway 153, 354, 355 nuclear proliferation 232, 233–4, 235 safety 233, 234, 237 safeguards 232, 234–5 Nuclear Energy Agency see OECD nutrition 51, 531, 536, 555 OAS 104, 268, 468, 469–73 OECD 83, 99, 101, 104, 183, 294, 327, 328–38, 451 Development Assistance Committee 282, 332, 336, 379 International Energy Agency 74, 330, 332, 334, 373 Nuclear Energy Agency 234, 332, 334–5 Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (EU) 428, 433, 448, 450–51 Office International des Epizooties 49 OIC 152, 279, 476, 520–23 Oil Crisis (1973/4) 74, 211, 295, 296, 373, 395 OPEC 75, 282, 371–6 Fund for International Development 245, 249, 373 operational organizations 16, 17, 19, 103, 160, 198, 261, 429–30, 431, 459, 464, 560, 624–5, 664 Organisation for European Economic Cooperation 65, 310–11, 328–9, 361 Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 620 Organization of African Unity 506, 511, 627 see also AU Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries 372, 373 Organization of Central American States 468, 621 Organization of Ibero-American States 511 OSCE 78, 104, 444, 511–5 Ozone Hole 10, 190–91, 192

Index  Pakistan 168, 232, 235, 266, 308 Palestine 65, 103, 176, 178–9, 228, 475, 476, 520, 523 Authority 177, 178, 412 Liberation Organization 75 Pan-American Health Organization 216, 471 Pan-Arabism 474–5, 521 Paraguay 356 pariah state 5, 207, 664 Paris Club 251, 302 Convention (patents) 41, 363, 364 particle physics 569–70, 572, 573, 574 patents see intellectual property peacebuilding see UN peacebuilding peacekeeping 123, 482, 495, 501, 505, 510 see also UN peacekeeping peer review 18, 234, 233, 237, 316, 328, 329, 470, 507, 625–6 Peréz de Cuéllar, Javier 122, 136 Permanent Court of Arbitration 44 Permanent International Association of Road Congresses 586 permanent representatives 132, 261, 300, 464, 470, 482, 490, 497, 508 see also European Union COREPER pharmaceuticals 367–8, 449 Philadelphia, Declaration of 59, 201–2 piracy 422, 447, 482, 498, 527, 608 Poland 226 Portugal 321, 323 postal services 598–9, 636-7 poverty 153, 154, 244, 259, 263, 264, 267, 274, 281, 493, 543, 622 Prebisch, Raul 34, 130, 348 Prisoners’ Dilemma 21, 22 private actors 83, 223, 241, 287, 288, 588–9, 592, 622, 630, 635, 636 private sector 218, 240, 253, 257, 266–7, 269, 275, 276, 277, 279, 333, 367, 398, 546, 561–2, 546, 588, 595, 596, 599 privatization 276, 589–90, 597, 604, 610–11, 631, 636, 637 programme organizations 16, 19, 103, 426, 427–8, 464, 533, 590 see also norms public goods see global public goods Public International Unions 41, 44–5, 241, 327, 511, 560, 586, 629, 630 Putin, Vladimir 485, 501

·  677

qualified majority voting see European Union qualified majority voting quasi-state 5, 99, 664 quasi-state institution 176, 664 Radical school see Critical theories railways 610, 614, 618 Reagan, Ronald 76, 228, 471 Realist school 20–24, 63, 86, 113, 143, 414, 464, 478, 486, 633, 634 Classical 20 Structural 21, 23–4, 29, 30, 464, 485–6 Red Cross/Red Crescent see ICRC refugees 169–70, 172, 176 Convention on the Status of 169 regional development banks 101, 244–6, 267–8 regional organizations 2, 15, 55, 64, 67, 70, 72, 76, 82, 108, 465–7, 588 regional trade associations 327, 351, 352–4 reparations 53, 309–10, 664 responsibility to protect 122, 140 restricted organizations 15–6, 17 Rhodesia see Zimbabwe Rights of the Child, Convention on the 163–4 rinderpest 215 Rockefeller/Foundation 533, 630 Romania 308 Rome 282 Statute of 78, 126, 138, 150 Treaty of 383, 384, 386, 387, 393, 479 Roosevelt, Franklin D 56, 59 rural development 94, 259, 273, 281, 283, 386 Russia 78, 117, 144, 261, 297, 300, 345, 375, 481, 485, 491, 500–01, 503–4, 515, 582, 611, 634 see also USSR Rwanda 147, 520 Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), Convention for 605, 606 Sahel 332 sanctions 113, 236–7 Saouma, Edouard 95, 180, 213 SARS 222, 498, 603 satellites 562, 563, 579, 580, 582, 587, 590, 637 Saudi Arabia 261, 280, 300, 371, 374, 375, 522 Schuman, Robert 68, 381 science 225, 229, 230, 560–01, 583, 584 Seattle, ‘Battle’ of 7 Second World War see World War Second

678  · 

International organizations

secretariats 95–9 135, 213, 281, 301–2, 314, 319, 330, 402, 403, 594 Secretary-General see UN Secretary-General security 78, 82, 121, 234, 463, 480, 485, 495, 503, 509, 512, 524, 608 Security Council see UN Security Council Security Dilemma 21 Sen, Binay 94 senior management 91–5, 107, 137, 199, 249 September 11, 2001 (9/11) 81, 475, 482, 603, 608 Shanghai Cooperation Organization 494 shari’ah finance 280 shipping 340, 498, 587, 605, 606, 616 Singapore 228 Single European Act 384, 387–8, 407 single postal territory 596 small and medium-sized enterprises 206, 240, 242, 269–70, 277, 279, 447 smallpox 217, 222 soft law 18, 112, 133, 171, 190, 204, 316, 329–30, 335, 432, 492, 625, 664 soft power 224, 336, 422, 516, 588, 625, 664 Somalia 77, 82, 147, 168, 508, 509, 522, 608 South Africa 506, 510, 519, 594 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 493–4 South-east Asian Treaty Organization 67, 75, 494 Southern African Development Community 75, 353, 466, 506 Southern Sudan 139 sovereignty see states sovereignty of Spaak, Paul–Henri 478–9 Spain 321, 323 Special Drawing Rights (IMF) 291, 292, 295, 300 Specialized Agencies (UN) 184, 197–9, 587 Srebrenica, Former Yugoslavia 149 Stability and Growth Pact (EU) 318, 322, 423 Stalin, Joseph 56, states 20–21, 25, 28, 622, 632–3, 664 integration of 40, 80, 268, 273, 279, 287, 348, 351, 358, 381, 504 interdependence of 20, 25, 26, 28, 40, 45, 62, 70, 71, 74, 81, 327, 425, 465, 493, 611, 622, 632, 633, 663 power of 2–3, 21, 28, 81, 85, 90, 102, 143, 146, 266, 273, 350, 416, 589, 623, 637 sovereignty of 3, 29–30, 42, 46, 61, 115, 119, 149, 151, 168, 173, 233, 249, 304, 320, 357, 432, 463, 467, 473, 474, 494, 500, 504, 613, 623–4, 664 statistics 100, 128, 161, 194, 210, 298

Stockholm Conference 9, 189, 194, 395 Strasbourg 407, 432 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties 71, 481 structural adjustment lending 76, 254, 260, 263–4, 296–7 structural realism see Realist school sub-regional IOs 64, 72, 79, 245, 248–9, 465, 468–9, 505, 509 subsidiarity 112, 385, 391, 415, 664 Sudan 139, 151, 477, 508, 510 see also Darfur Suez Crisis 67 supranationality 18, 76, 112, 320, 382, 389, 390, 394, 402, 415–6, 422–3, 436, 588, 664 sustainable development 128, 186, 189, 231, 370, 395, 463, 664 Sweden 153, 355 Switzerland 42, 54, 310, 354, 355, 391, 610 synchrotron 570–2, 574, 583, 584, 623 Synchrotron-Light for Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle East 623 Syria 75, 122, 476 Système International see MKS Taliban 484, 527, 664 tariffs 50, 338, 339, 343, 344, 357, 388, 499, 503 taxation 336 technical assistance 129, 142, 184, 188, 198, 202–3, 210, 239, 288, 301, 588 telecommunications 586, 636-7 terrorism 78, 81, 233, 412, 445, 482, 492, 494, 503, 514, 523, 524, 525, 528, 603, 664 Thailand 298, 499 Thomas, Albert 53 trade 203, 216, 218, 279, 333, 335, 345, 347, 349, 359, 428–9, 518, 567, 594, 624 trademarks see intellectual property trans-governmental networks 110, 526 transition states 80, 260, 275, 297, 337, 391, 665 Translation Centre for the Bodies of the EU 429, 454 transposition 355 trans-regional organizations 2, 15, 55, 64, 72, 79, 212, 280, 286, 465–6, 511, 537, 589, 610, 664 Triffin Paradox 291 TRIPS see WTO trust funds 105, 191, 199, 266, 665 Tsunami, the Asian 161–2, 521, 565 Turkey 280, 423, 487

Index  Uganda 141 UK 45, 59, 102, 117, 153, 228, 240, 261, 300, 310, 323, 386, 393, 399, 487, 518, 563, 604, 638 Ukraine 308 UN 11, 57, 60, 62, 63, 66, 75, 83, 103, 115–56, 523, 527 Capital Development Fund 186 Charter 97, 111, 117–20, 121, 122, 123, 145, 146, 197, 465 consultative status 630 Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 225, 606, 607, 608 coordination 188, 200–01 Department of Economic and Social Affairs 128–9, 142, 153–6 Economic and Social Council see ECOSOC (UN) Funds and Programmes 158–9, 160–61, 225 General Assembly 60, 117, 132–4, 135, 232 High Commission for Human Rights 127, 141–2 Human Rights Council 127, 134, 141, 152 Human Settlements Programme (Habitat) 194–5 peacebuilding 140, 148, 169 peacekeeping 65, 71, 77, 78, 96–7, 116, 123, 124–5, 137, 138–9, 146–8 Regional Economic Commissions 129–30, 135, 142, 156 Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 59, 168, 216 secretariat 96, 131, 135–6, 145 Secretary-General 91, 120, 122, 136 Security Council 60, 119, 121, 123, 133, 135, 145, 151, 232, 235, 236, 608 permanent members of 117, 121, 133, 135, 152, 232, 237, 412 reform of 145 veto 78, 119, 133, 143–4 System 15, 16, 18, 61, 97, 101, 105, 131, 134, 188, 200–01, 341, 634, 665 Volunteers 186 Women 129, 156, 159–60 UNAIDS 185, 217, 223 UNCTAD 210, 348–58, 371 Common Fund for Commodities 349–50 UNDP 184–9, 211 UNEP 10, 11, 12, 104, 189–94 UNESCO 59, 104, 113, 162, 198, 223–32, 334, 363, 569 UNFICYP 124 UNFPA 159, 162, 185 UNHCR 103, 168–75, 625

·  679

UNICEF 103, 162–8, 218, 625 UNIDO 198, 202, 239–40 UNIFEM 159, 186 Union of International Organizations 2, 627, 628 United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property 41, 363 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 127 universal organizations 2, 15–16, 17, 61, 336, 493 UNMOGIP 65, 124 UNRWA 65, 103, 176–9 UNTSO 65, 124 UNWTO 240–42 UPU 99, 596–600 urbanization 194–5 Uruguay 356 Round 338, 339–40, 345, 361 USA 11, 12, 21, 27, 51, 56, 58, 63, 73, 77, 81, 102, 117, 126, 135, 137, 143, 144, 188, 208, 216, 228, 240, 261, 266, 269, 273, 291, 296, 300, 310, 359, 360, 466, 468, 471, 473, 484, 487, 515, 527, 590, 604, 632, 633, 634 USSR 51, 56, 63, 66, 77, 143, 209, 226, 227, 233, 336, 500, 628 see also Russia U Thant, Sithu 122, 136 Venezuela 253, 257, 356, 358, 371 Versailles Peace Conference and Treaty 45–6, 52, 201 Vienna 135, 136 Congress of 40 voting 90, 261, 271, 282, 300 see also European Union qualified majority voting; UN Security Council veto Waldheim, Kurt 136, 171 Warsaw Convention (ICAO) 54 Pact 67, 480, 481, 512 Washington 135, 266, 533 Consensus 76, 80, 247, 248, 254, 260, 296, 298, 305, 665 weather forecasts 561, 562, 578 West African Monetary Institute 505 West African Rice Development Association/Africa Rice Centre 535, 540, 551 Western European Union 65, 82, 396, 432–3, 479 Westphalia, Peace of 40 WFP 12, 94, 95, 104, 162, 179–83, 215, 378, 379, 625 White, Harry Dexter 58

680  · 

International organizations

WHO 12, 210, 215, 216–23, 345, 498, 625, 622 Wilson, President Woodrow 51 WIPO 104, 340, 359, 363–8, 437, 450 WMO 9, 99, 104, 561, 562–5, 568 World Agro-Forestry Centre see ICRAF World Bank Group 105, 205, 254–67, 627 Board of 251, 255, 256, 260–61 ICSID 255, 257, 359 IFC 255, 257, 262 MIGA 255,257 see also IBRD World Court see International Court of Justice World Customs Organization 345, 361–2, 609 WorldFish 535, 555, 557, 558 World Food Council 74, 111, 211, 621 World Heritage Sites 226, 231, 242 World Organization for Animal Health see Office International des Epizooties

World System theories see Critical theories World War First 42, 44, 52, 309, 524 Second 42, 56, 117, 168, 201, 209, 524 World Wide Web (www) 574, 599–600 WTO 90, 92, 101, 104, 203, 210, 216, 327, 333, 338–48, 350, 362, 377, 439, 503, 510, 627, 634 Dispute Settlement Process 339, 341–2, 342–3, 346 GATS 340, 593, 602 GATT 345, 361 TRIPS 223, 340, 366, 367, 368, 547 Yeltsin, Boris 514 Yugoslavia 78, 147, 148, 482, 513 Zimbabwe 518, 519, 520