Inter-state and intra-state conflicts in global politics : from Eurasia to China 2021034397, 2021034398, 9781793652546, 9781793652553, 1793652546

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Contents
Acknowledgments
List of Abbreviations
Introduction
Part I: Turkish Foreign Policy
Chapter 1: Orientation of Turkish Foreign Policy: Disengagement from or Re-engagement to the West
Introduction: A Conceptual Discussion
Neo-Idealism, Soft Power, and Multilateralism in Foreign Policy (2003–2011)
Neo-Westernism in Foreign Policy, De-Europeanization in Domestic Politics (2011–2016)
Eurosianism and Anti-Westernism (2016–2020)
Post-2020: Disengagement from or Re-Engagement to the West
Conclusion
Notes
References
Chapter 2: The Legal Foundations of Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean Policy
Introduction
The Legal Status of the Continental Shelf
Delimitation of Continental Shelf
Turkey’s Continental Shelf
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
Maritime Jurisdiction Areas of Turkey, Greece, the GCASC, and the TRNC in the Eastern Mediterranean
The EEZ Announcement of the GCASC in the Eastern Mediterranean, Its Views on the Subject and Turkey
Evaluation of the Issue
Conclusion
Notes
References
Chapter 3: Turkey’s Foreign Policy toward the Balkans: Policy Principles, New Agendas, and Perceptions
Introduction
Turkey’s Balkans Policy during the 1990s
Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Balkans during the 2000s
The Mediator and Facilitator Role of Turkey: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina
New Actors, New Agendas, and New Concepts in Turkey’s Balkans Policy
“Neo-Ottomanist” Allegations for the Turkish Foreign Policy in the Balkans
Conclusion
Notes
References
Chapter 4: Energy Security, Geopolitics, and Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the Caspian Basin
Introduction
Energy Security, Energy Projects, and Geopolitics in the Caspian Region
Turkish Foreign Policy in the Caspian Region
Conclusion
Notes
References
Part II: The Middle East and Africa
Chapter 5: Turkey’s Approaches on the Safe Zone Plans in the North of Syria
Introduction
Turkey’s First Regional Plans on Syria (2011–2013)
Transformation of Kurdish Autonomous Regions into Buffer Zones
Moving from the Buffer Zone Plans toward the Safe Zone Plans in 2014
Conclusion
Notes
References
Chapter 6: Soft Power, Domestic Dividends, and Turkish Foreign Policy: The Case of Palestine
Introduction
Turkish-Palestinian Relations in Historical Perspective
From Securitization to Soft Power: Turkish Foreign Policy and Palestine in the AKP (Justice and Development Party) Era
Domestic Calculations and International Factors in Palestinian Policy
Soft Power and Turkish Aid in Palestine
Conclusion
Notes
References
Chapter 7: The Middle East in the Republic of Poland Foreign Strategy in the Post–Cold War Era
Introduction
Poland’s Foreign Policy Priorites after 1989
The Middle East in Polish Foreign Policy after 1989
The American Factor in Polish Middle East Policy
Conclusion
Notes
References
Part III: Terrorism, Intra-State and Inter-State, Conflicts
Chapter 8: The Structure of Intra-State Conflicts in the Post–Cold War Era
Introduction
Intra-State Conflicts and Ethnic Identity
Conditions Encouraging or Leading to Intra-State Conflicts
Intra-State Conflicts and the Use of Force
Conclusion: Implications for Conflict Resolution
Notes
References
Chapter 9: Nonviolent Action and Nonviolent Resistance: Nonviolent Peacekeeping and Unarmed Civilian Protection (UCP)
Introduction
Peacekeeping
Nonviolent Action, Nonviolent Resistance, and Shanti Sena (Peace Army)
Conclusion
Notes
References
Chapter 10: Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Possible Threats They May Pose
Introduction
The Phenomenon of FTFs
The Threat Posed by Foreign Terrorists
Methods of International Struggle Used Against FTFs
Conclusion
Notes
References
Part IV: EU and Refugee Problem
Chapter 11: The Integration Issue of the Syrian Refugees Who Acquired Turkish Citizenship: A Field Study
Introduction
Legal and Administrative Regulations: Foreigners’ Acquiring of the Citizenship Status
Granting Citizenship to Syrian Immigrants
The Evaluation of Citizenship Processes within the Scope of the Field Research
Conclusion
Notes
References
Chapter 12: Turkey-EU Relations: Preference or Necessity?
Introduction
Association Relation between Turkey and EU Relations
Membership Application of Turkey to the EU
Membership Candidacy of Turkey to the EU
Accession Partnership Document and National Program
Negotiating Framework Document and the Accession Negotiations between Turkey and the EU
Agreement between the EU and Turkey on the Readmission of Persons Residing without Authorization
Conclusion
Notes
References
Part V: China
Chapter 13: Will China Be Able to Transform Itself into a Great Maritime Power?
Introduction
Chinese Military and Naval Strategy
The Shipbuilding Industry of the Chinese Navy
From the Panda Diplomacy to the Dragon Realism
Conclusion
Notes
References
Chapter 14: Energy Diplomacy and Foreign Policy Choice: Turkmenistan’s Relations with China
Introduction
Conceptual Framework
Foreign Policy Decisions and Behaviors
Turkmenistan’s Foreign Policy vis-à-vis China
Conclusion
Notes
References
Chapter 15: Turkish World and the Future of the New Great Game in China’s Westward Politics
Introduction
China’s Westward Policy
Russia
Western World
Chinese Policy in the Turkish World
Conclusion
Notes
References
Part VI: Eurasia and Central Asia
Chapter 16: Transboundary Water Problem and Environmental Security in Central Asia
Introduction
Theoretical Framework of International Law on Constructivism and Transboundary and Boundary Waters
Doctrines on the Use of Transboundary Waters
Strategic Waterways in the Central Asian Region
Conclusion
Notes
References
Chapter 17: The Turkic Republics in the Eurasian Security System
Introduction
Eurasia after the Independence of the Turkic Republics
Eurasian Security System
Conclusion
Notes
References
Chapter 18: Possible Effects of NSTC on Regional Power Struggle in Eurasia
Introductıon
A New Commercial Move in Eurasia: North-South Corridor
India’s Relations with Russia and Iran and China’s Position
Possible Reflections of North-South Corridor at Central Asia and South Caucasus
Conclusion
Notes
References
Index
About the Editor and Contributors
Editor
Contributors

Citation preview

Inter-State and Intra-State Conflicts in Global Politics

Inter-State and Intra-State Conflicts in Global Politics From Eurasia to China

Edited by Tayyar ARI

LEXINGTON BOOKS

Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Lexington Books An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www​.rowman​.com 6 Tinworth Street, London SE11 5AL, United Kingdom Copyright © 2022 The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Arı, Tayyar, 1960- editor. Title: Inter-state and intra-state conflicts in global politics : from Eurasia to China / edited by Tayyar Ari. Description: Lanham : Lexington Books, [2022] | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Summary: “The main purpose of the study is to discuss the inter-state and intra-state conflicts and the main problem areas in the geography extending from China to Eurasia. The book consists of eighteen chapters, all written by senior professors and associate professors”— Provided by publisher. Identifiers: LCCN 2021034397 (print) | LCCN 2021034398 (ebook) | ISBN 9781793652546 (cloth) | ISBN 9781793652553 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: International relations. | Security, International. | Conflict management. | World politics—21st century. Classification: LCC JZ5595 .I538 2021 (print) | LCC JZ5595 (ebook) | DDC 327.1—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021034397 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021034398 ∞ ™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

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Contents

Acknowledgmentsix List of Abbreviations

xi

Introductionxv PART I: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY 1 Orientation of Turkish Foreign Policy: Disengagement from or Re-engagement to the West Tayyar ARI 2 The Legal Foundations of Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean Policy Mehmet DALAR

1 3 17

3 Turkey’s Foreign Policy toward the Balkans: Policy Principles, New Agendas, and Perceptions Bülent Sarper AĞIR

35

4 Energy Security, Geopolitics, and Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the Caspian Basin Gökhan ÖZKAN and Fatma SARIASLAN

53

PART II: THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

71

5 Turkey’s Approaches on the Safe Zone Plans in the North of Syria 73 Ömer Göksel İŞYAR 6 Soft Power, Domestic Dividends, and Turkish Foreign Policy: The Case of Palestine Sabri CIFTCI v

89

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Contents

7 The Middle East in the Republic of Poland Foreign Strategy in the Post–Cold War Era Magdalena KUMELSKA-KONIECKO

107

PART III: TERRORISM, INTRA-STATE AND INTER-STATE, CONFLICTS 125 8 The Structure of Intra-State Conflicts in the Post–Cold War Era Muzaffer Ercan YILMAZ 9 Nonviolent Action and Nonviolent Resistance: Nonviolent Peacekeeping and Unarmed Civilian Protection (UCP) Sezai OZCELIK

127

143

10 Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Possible Threats They May Pose Saadat DEMİRCİ

161

PART IV: EU AND REFUGEE PROBLEM

179

11 The Integration Issue of the Syrian Refugees Who Acquired Turkish Citizenship: A Field Study Veysel AYHAN

181

12 Turkey-EU Relations: Preference or Necessity? Kamuran REÇBER and Samet YILMAZ

199

PART V: CHINA

217

13 Will China Be Able to Transform Itself into a Great Maritime Power? 219 Mesut Hakkı CAŞIN 14 Energy Diplomacy and Foreign Policy Choice: Turkmenistan’s Relations with China Yaşar SARI

235

15 Turkish World and the Future of the New Great Game in China’s Westward Politics 249 Mehmet Seyfettin EROL PART VI: EURASIA AND CENTRAL ASIA

267

16 Transboundary Water Problem and Environmental Security in Central Asia Giray Saynur DERMAN

269

Contents

17 The Turkic Republics in the Eurasian Security System Kamer KASIM

vii

285

18 Possible Effects of NSTC on Regional Power Struggle in Eurasia 303 Göktürk TÜYSÜZOĞLU Index 323 About the Editor and Contributors

331

Acknowledgments

The classical understanding of global security has been under question since the end of the Cold War, as the international community witnessed a rapid decline in traditional inter-state conflicts but the emergence of many new threats. Since the early 1990s, transnational issues, such as the spread of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, energy crises, environmental degradation, massive human rights violations, human trafficking, civil wars, refugee crises, and many other problems, have reshaped the world, posing a direct challenge to state sovereignty as well. Furthermore, the years to come are likely to witness a severe competition of major powers on natural resources, particularly energy resources. In this regard, disputes on unfair trade practices and worries about dependence on externally concentrated or monopolistic sources of goods, services, and technologies have to be addressed. This book has been written to address many contemporary issues on some regional basis to contribute to problem analyses before developing effective resolution strategies. I am indebted to a large number of people for their cooperation, encouragement, and critical assistance in completing this work, although it would be impossible to mention all. I am especially grateful to the contributors of this book for their enthusiastic support with their expertise throughout the study. Similar appreciation goes to those friends and scholars who have been helpful to me in various ways in the preparation of this work. I also wish to express my heartfelt thanks to my family for their continuous love and encouragement which gave me the needed strength to complete this study. Finally, it is pleasing to thank Lexington/Rowman & Littlefield publishing group for its continuing support in publishing the book. Prof. Dr. Tayyar ARI Editor ix

List of Abbreviations

APD Accession Partnership Document ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare BRI Belt and Road Initiative BRICS Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa BTC Baku-Tiflis-Ceyhan (oil pipeline) BTE Baku-Tiflis-Erzurum (natural gas pipeline) CCP Chinese Communist Party CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CMC Central Military Commission COD-CTE The Committee on Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Related Issues CODEXTER The Committee of Experts on Terrorism COREPER Committee of Permanent Representatives CNPC China National Petroleum Corporation CPD Common Position Document CRP Cyprus Resettlement Project CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization ECJ European Court of Justice EEC European Economic Community EEU Eurasian Economic Union EAEU Eurasian Economic Union EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone FSA Free Syrian Army FTF foreign terrorist fighters GCASC Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus GCG Greek Cypriot Government GPT Gulf Peace Team ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization xi

xii

ICBM IEA INGOs INSTC IRIGC ISIS JCPOA JDP KFOR MNCs NFD NPT NSC ODA OIC PBI PGNIG PKK PLO PLA PLAN PRC PYD RATS SAARC SCO SEECP SFOR SGC SLOC SNC SSF TANAP TAP TAPI TESEV TEU TFEU TIKA TPAO TRNC TURKPA

List of Abbreviations

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles International Energy Agency International Non-Governmental Organizations International North-South Transport Corridor India-Russia Intergovernmental Commission Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Justice and Development Party NATO-led Kosovo Force multinational corporations Negotiating Framework Document Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty National Security Council Official Development Assistance Organization of Islamic Cooperation Peace Brigade International Polish State-Controlled Oil and Gas Company Kurdistan Workers’ Party Palestine Liberation Organization People’s Liberation Army People’s Liberation Army Navy People’s Republic of China Democratic Union Party (Syria) Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Shanghai Cooperation Organization South-East European Cooperation Process Stabilization Force Southern Gas Corridor Sea Lanes of Communication Syrian National Council Strategic Support Force Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline Trans Adriatic Pipeline Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation Treaty on European Union Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency Turkish Petroleum Corporation Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-Speaking Countries

List of Abbreviations

TÜRKSOY UAE UCP UNCLOS UNDOF UNEF UNHCR UNIFIL WPB

International Organization of Turkic Culture United Arab Emirates unarmed civilian protection United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea United Nations Disengagement Observer Force United Nations Emergency Force United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon World Peace Brigade

xiii

Introduction Tayyar ARI

The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s has had a dual impact on international relations. On the one hand, the Soviet military withdrawal from Eastern Europe and the Third World brought an end to the Cold War, allowed democratization to proceed in many states previously ruled by Marxist dictatorships, and led to significant progress in resolving several conflicts that had occurred due to the superpower ideological rivalry. Even it became fashionable to argue that military force has run its course in international politics. It is true that defense budgets in many parts of the world radically decreased. This trend, despite very few contrary examples (for instance, China), appears to hold. On the other hand, however, it would be rather unwise to argue that the world is now at peace. Many new threats have replaced the Cold War’s ideological clashes. For instance, until the end of the Cold War, the conventional wisdom in the world was that ethnicity and nationalism were outdated concepts and mostly resolved problems. On both sides of the Cold War, the trend seemed to indicate that the world was moving toward internationalism rather than nationalism. As a result of the threat of nuclear warfare, great emphasis on democracy and human rights, economic interdependence, and gradual acceptance of universal ideologies, it became fashionable to speak of the demise of ethnic and nationalist movements. Despite contrary expectations, however, a fresh cycle of ethnopolitical movements has re-emerged recently in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Africa, and many other parts of the world, resulting in many local and regional conflicts. Overall, international relations have become truly global in the post–Cold War world. Communications are instantaneous, and the world economy operates on all continents simultaneously. So the international community’s most significant test will be building partnerships and institutions for cooperation that can meet new global challenges. Yet the prospects for collective rules xv

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Introduction

and regulations, rather than unilateral accusations and restrictions, remain vague and uncertain at this point. The study is composed of six major parts. The first part focuses on Turkish foreign policy. In this respect, the part revisits the conceptual and theoretical foundations of Turkish foreign policy during the Justice and Development Party (JDP) period. In chapter 1, Tayyar Arı will discuss the Turkish foreign policy orientations as of the period after the JDP by dividing them into three periods. It will be analyzed and also answered on how Erdogan Administration will recalibrate the foreign policy with the European Union (EU) and the United States. It will address that after JDP came to power, certain discourses such as soft power/hard power debate, multilateralism, Westernization/de-Westernization, self-centric Westernism, isolationism, middle power, regional power, and global player have been frequently observed in Turkish foreign policy studies. The chapter will answer the question of whether the vision of Turkish foreign policy is within the context of disengagement or re-engagement to the West. Afterward, in chapter 2, Mehmet Dalar talks about the legal foundations of Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean policy, focusing mainly on the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the continental shelf as regulated by international conventions on the sea. The other maritime areas are also dealt with to the extent they are connected to the chapter. Dalar examines maritime areas that are leading to disputes and factors that affect the relations between Turkey and other Eastern Mediterranean countries. In this respect, Dalar also discusses whether the Greek Cypriot Administration is authorized to make an international treaty to determine jurisdiction areas in the Eastern Mediterranean. In chapter 3, Bülent Sarper Ağır summarizes and discusses Turkey’s foreign policy toward the Balkans after the Cold War. Ağır argues that in the post–Cold War era, Turkey pursued active diplomacy to contribute to the regional security and peace in the Balkans due to the violent dissolution process of the former Yugoslavia. To Ağır, while preservation of regional stability and peace and integration of regional countries with Euro-Atlantic institutions have continued to be the main goals of Turkey’s Balkans policy, the growing engagement of Turkish foreign policy with the region during the 2000s has required development of new policy principles, instruments, and agendas. Therefore, the new assertiveness of Turkey’s Balkans policy, Ağır says, has been subject to “Neo-Ottomanist” allegations. Ağır concludes that Turkey should continue to regard the global actors, regional dynamics, and the position of regional actors in the formulation of its policies toward the region. The first part ends with chapter 4, Gökhan Özkan and Fatma Sarıaslan’s analysis on Turkey’s post–Cold War foreign policy in the Caspian Basin, within the context of energy security, attempting to evaluate the impact of

Introduction

xvii

natural gas and oil pipeline projects on Turkey’s regional policies. Özkan and Sarıaslan also try to analyze global and regional actors’ struggle to control the Caspian Basin’s critical energy infrastructure in conjunction with the Turkish foreign policy. The second part of the book focuses on the Middle East and Africa as regions where foreign policies, mainly those of Turkey, have been exercised. In this regard, chapter 5, by Ömer Göksel İşyar, deals with Turkey’s approaches to the “safe zone” plans in northern Syria during the period between 2011 and 2017. İşyar begins his study by saying that almost all Western plans for future Syria generally involve establishing a number of sub-regions in the country. These regions mostly coincide with the locations of Syria’s oil and gas reserves. Turkey, however, has not supported these plans. To İşyar, further, Ankara is also aware of the US administration’s support for the Kurdistan regionalism in Syria. In contrast to this, when the crisis erupted, the Ankara administration considered a “security belt” in the northern regions of Syria. Turkey has also been trying to establish some “security zones” for the refugees. In other words, it has sought the “humanitarian safe havens.” These could also provide a “security umbrella” for the opposition forces. In this context, Turkey has been working on some “humanitarian corridor plans,” just as seen in the Libya crisis. Within this framework, the Turkish Armed Forces have prepared itself for building possible “buffer zones” or “security pockets” in Syria. However, all of these plans failed, and they have not been implemented to date. Nevertheless, İşyar concludes that, since 2016, Turkey, on the west side of the Euphrates River in Syria, has organized some military operations and established many “terror-free zones.” In the following chapter, chapter 6, Sabri Ciftci talks about soft power and Turkish foreign policy by examining the Palestinian case. Historically, Turkish-Palestinian relations were greatly shaped by Turkey’s security needs and Israel’s instrumental value for Turkish interests. Domestically, Turkey’s Palestinian policy resulted in significant dividends for Erdogan and the JDP. Internationally, being a champion of the Palestinian cause helped Turkey to improve its image abroad. To evaluate these propositions, Ciftci first provides a brief historical account of Turkish-Palestinian relations. Then, he explores the international outcomes of this foreign policy by examining the Turkish aid to Palestine as a soft power tool. Geographic and temporal distribution of aid data at both national and sub-national levels are utilized along with the Arab Barometer Surveys to assess Turkey’s public perceptions as a regional actor in Palestinian territories. In chapter 7, Magdalena Kumelska-Koniecko attempts to analyze Poland’s foreign policy toward the Middle East. She primarily focuses on internal and external factors conditioning Polish approach toward the Middle East; doctrinal purposes and premises; the means of implementation; and the effects of

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Introduction

undertaken actions. She points out that the Middle East region, after 1989, has found only secondary importance in Poland’s foreign strategy. This mainly results from the Polish geopolitical location, national interests’ hierarchy, and medium international potential. Furthermore, the Polish Middle East strategy is strongly influenced by the United States, which causes miscomprehension, especially among EU countries and the Middle East partners. She concludes that there is a strong need to redefine the Polish strategy in the Middle East, especially the Polish government must define its own national interests and tools for their implementation. The third part of the book deals with international terrorism, intra-state, and inter-state conflicts. The part begins with Muzaffer Ercan Yılmaz’s analysis of the structure of intra-state conflicts in chapter 8. By looking through major ethnopolitical conflicts around the globe and trying to find out some main points in common, Yılmaz concludes that such conflicts are correlated with, but not limited to, the desire to express cultural identity, discrimination, anti-democratic political system, economic underdevelopment, and unjust distribution of national wealth, unresolved past traumas, as well as external support. Yılmaz also reveals that ethnopolitical conflicts cannot be resolved through force alone. Although a certain degree of the use of force would be functional in controlling radical groups and thus would be an integral part of the overall conflict resolution process in intra-state conflicts, it would be quite erroneous to assume that such conflicts can be resolved through force alone. In the resolution process, multi-level efforts are needed by domestic and international actors to be responsive to the underlying causes of intrastate conflicts. In chapter 9, Sezai Ozcelik talks about nonviolent mechanisms in peacekeeping. In order to present an alternative to traditional peacekeeping, Ozcelik outlines the nonviolent intervention of international conflicts, namely nonviolent and unarmed peacekeeping. The example of Shanti Sena (Peace Army) is presented as supporting nonviolent struggle within society and maintaining nonviolent deterrence and nonviolent social change. The post–Cold War examples of nonviolent peacekeeping are also described by addressing the World Peace Brigade (WPB), the Peace Brigade International (PBI), and the Gulf Peace Team (GPT). Özçelik finds out that nonviolent peacekeeping is much safer than traditional peacekeeping because millions have been died using the old school methods of armed conflicts or war. In chapter 10, Saadat Demirci discusses the issue of foreign fighters and possible threats to regional and global security. She points out that foreign fighters became very important in determining the internal war in the Syrian crisis as they are a political instrument in foreign policy for proxy wars. The fourth part of the book focuses on the EU and refugee problems. In this respect, in chapter 11, Veysel Ayhan discusses the integration issue of

Introduction

xix

the Syrian refugees who acquired Turkish citizenship. His study involves analyzing survey results and in-depth interviews with 650 families who have obtained Turkish citizenship, 10 individuals whose citizenship applications are ongoing, and 5 people whose citizenship applications have been rejected. In chapter 12, Kamuran Reçber and Samet Yılmaz question whether becoming an EU member is a preference or a necessity for Turkey. They point out that Turkey and the EU relationship corresponds to more than sixty years. This relationship commenced with Turkey’s application to establish an association with the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959, and it has intensified since the accession negotiations of Turkey, which began in 2005. The authors argue that Turkey’s initiative was a manifestation of its will to forge close relations with the Western European states and international organizations, and it might have been evaluated as a necessity during the Cold War. However, with the end of the Cold War, this necessity has turned into a preference. The fifth part focuses on China itself. In this respect, in chapter 13, Mesut Hakkı Caşın questions whether China will transform itself into a great maritime power. He starts by arguing that the post–Cold War world, as we know it, is coming to an end, and great power politics is back. Consequently, the role of naval forces of the states will continue to grow. In this regard, he asserts that great powers’ maritime policies will play an essential role in supporting their grand strategies. Indeed, he goes on to say, the 21st century witnesses the return of China as an economic and political superpower, and this fact has fundamentally changed the global and regional geo-economic and geopolitical landscapes. Its broader implications for international politics have become a significant issue of our time. In this respect, for Caşın, although Chinese foreign policy historically focused on land territories, the new strategic doctrine of China is organized around the will to expand its immediate maritime interests and consequently have command of the western Pacific Ocean. In chapter 14, Yaşar Sarı examines Turkmenistan’s foreign policies to China through energy diplomacy and foreign policy choice frameworks and reveals specific characteristics of Turkmen foreign policy. He assumes that Turkmenistan’s foreign policy has plausible and clear foreign policy objective. The main objective is to benefit from the competition between the great powers without being entirely dependent on any great powers. Turkmenistan utilizes its natural resources for this aim and promotes its neutrality status for staying away from political issues and developments. Thus, Turkmenistan tries to keep its relations, mainly its economic relations, by using its positive neutrality. In chapter 15, Mehmet Seyfettin Erol discusses the effects of China’s Westward Policy on the Turkish world. He argues that Turkestan’s historical ties with the Xinjiang region and border disputes with Russia are the main

xx

Introduction

security problems. In economic relations, he says that the BRI is the most important variable. To explain the subject more comprehensively, for Erol, it is necessary to look at the policies of Russia and the Western world, which have interests in the region. The final sixth part of the book concerns Eurasia and Central Asia. In this regard, Giray Saynur Derman, in chapter 16, examines the transboundary water problem and environmental safety in Central Asia. Derman argues that in the years to come, water will be more critical than ever. It is more likely that water conflicts will take place more than energy conflicts. The hegemonic powers will try to keep water resources somehow under their control to dominate world politics. As an example of waters with conflict potential, “transboundary” and “international waters” in Central Asia are discussed in this regard. To Derman, with the increased demand for water, especially for agriculture and energy-generating power plants, imbalances in transboundary water resources have emerged, and sharing and usage have become a problem among Central Asian countries. Lack of adequate communication, cooperation, and generally accepted international regulations serve this issue to remain unsolved. Derman concludes that Central Asian states should resolve regional cooperation within the context of international legal principles and develop projects for solutions to revise their infrastructures and develop the most efficient water usage. In chapter 17, Kamer Kasım talks about the Turkic Republics in the Eurasian security system. Kasım asserts that the integration of the Turkic Republics into the international system made them important players in Eurasian politics and security. The Turkic Republics played an active role in various regional arrangements to provide security. The Turkic Republics’ preferences and strategies have been different in regional organizations. However, the positions of the Turkic Republics in different international organizations do not prevent them from coordinating their policies. Hence, Kasım tries to analyze the Turkic Republics’ role in Eurasia and their relations with the main actors in the region within Eurasian security and regional organizations, addressing that this would also contribute positively to the security of Eurasia as a whole. In the last chapter, chapter 18, Göktürk Tüysüzoğlu attempts to examine possible effects of alternative roads on the power struggle in the Eurasia region. With India, Russia, and Iran’s joint initiative, the action was taken to create an alternative transportation to link these three countries. Starting from Mumbai in India, the transportation route, which is planned to arrive by sea first to Iran’s Chabahar and then to the Caspian coast by road and rail connection, will be connected to Russia by land and sea via Azerbaijan and by the Caspian Sea by sea. This route, which is expected to be extended to Saint Petersburg and thus reaching the European market, will also provide a

Introduction

xxi

connection to Central Asia via Russia. Tüysüzoğlu argues that this project, which is expected to create an alternative to the Suez Canal in the context of trade relations between South Asia and Europe, also has the potential to become a regional competitor to China’s One Belt, One Road initiative. The project, may cause the competition between China and India to be reflected in this region in the long term. As the editor of this book, I owe all contributors more thanks than I know how to express. My special thanks also go, once again, to Rowman & Littlefield publishing group that has provided constant support as the book wound its way through the lengthy editorial process.

Part I

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

Chapter 1

Orientation of Turkish Foreign Policy Disengagement from or Re-engagement to the West Tayyar ARI

INTRODUCTION: A CONCEPTUAL DISCUSSION Recently, in particular, after Justice and Development Party (JDP) came to power, certain discourses such as soft power/hard power debate, multilateralism, Westernization/de-Westernization, self-centric Westernism, isolationism, middle power, regional power, and global player have been frequently observed in Turkish foreign policy studies. Turkish foreign policy can be evaluated by dividing it into two periods: before and after the Arab Spring (2002–2011 and 2011–2020) during the JDP era. In this context, soft power and liberal policies dominated the first period, while in the second period, that is, during and after the Arab Spring, Turkey adopted security-based policies. It is assumed that realistic and hard power-oriented policies were more visible in the second period. However, this study is divided into three periods: 2002–2011, 2011–2016, and 2016–2020. It is noteworthy that Turkish foreign policy in the period between 2003 and 2011 was based on soft power, humanitarian diplomacy, and zero problems with neighbors within the context of neoliberal and neo-idealist principles. However, after 2011, foreign policy, especially with the Arab Spring, adopted a policy that could be clearly defined as acting in concert with the West and, in a sense, as neo-Westernism in foreign policy and de-Europeanization in domestic policy. During the Arab Spring process, Turkey acted in concert with the West, participated in the NATO missile defense system, and emphasized the Euro-Atlantic centrism at every opportunity. Turkey’s foreign policy based on the Euro-Atlantic political alliance meant a return to Turkey’s traditional foreign policy, and it was quite different 3

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from the policy which was followed before 2011 and was called “self-centric Westernism” or “multilateral Westernism.” The main feature of this period, similar to the traditional one, was to act in concert with the West, but soft power and humanitarian diplomacy remained as basic concepts. However, instead of the multilateral feature of the previous period, anchoring the Western alliance system became a priority. This period was the years when relations with Russia and Iran were quite tense. During the period covering the years 2011–2016, it is widely thought that Turkey pursued increasingly security-oriented policies instead of soft power. It can be claimed that this period stemmed from Davutoğlu’s inability to evaluate the changing conjuncture in foreign policy due to his excessive focus on domestic politics. The developments that would support this judgment were developments such as Gezi events in May–June 2013, Kobani events of 2014, and 2015 PKK operations in the southeastern cities. On the other hand, Turkey was isolated and remained alone because of the foreign policy followed in the Syrian crisis. A new period started after Davutoğlu left the prime ministral position in May 2016, especially after the coup attempt on July 15, 2016. In this period, there was a significant decrease in the intensity of Turkey’s relations with the West in general and the United States in particular while the existing institutional relations were maintained; on the one hand, there was a rapid increase in the relations with Russia and Iran. Referring to this period, Turkey saw the West as the other while seeing itself as the other of the West. This situation increased the anti-Westernism in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey’s orientation could be identified as Eurasianism or multilateral Eurasianism. It can be claimed that Turkish foreign policy was getting away from soft power and turning to hard power after 2011, but this does not mean that Turkey left the soft power. The characteristic of the post-2016 era is that hard power appears in the foreground too much.1 In this study, it is argued that after 2016, the general tendency in foreign policy is Eurasianism,2 whereas in the instrumental context, hard power comes to the fore. It can be noted that in this period, a more assertive and a visible foreign policy was followed, and from time to time, in this context, a tough and nationalist stance was displayed.3 After analyzing Turkey’s foreign policy, which was swung from multilateral Westernism to Eurosianism and/or anti-Westernism in the three periods of JDP, this study will conclude by questioning the post-2020 period and foreign policy. It will analyze and answer how Erdoğan administration could recalibrate the foreign policy that locked the EU process and the relations with the United States, which is hosting Fethullah Gulen, and supporting PYD and imposing sanctions on Turkey. Consequently, the vision of Turkish

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foreign policy will be set forth within the context of disengagement from or re-engagement to the West. NEO-IDEALISM, SOFT POWER, AND MULTILATERALISM IN FOREIGN POLICY (2003–2011) After 2003, Turkey’s foreign policy was based on soft power and “zero problems with neighbors”4 policy instead of security-centered/oriented foreign policy and “Turkey’s four sides surrounded by enemies” paradigm. Turkey adopted a foreign policy based on multilateralism and self-centered policy rather than a Western-centric foreign policy. This foreign policy was envisaged to be equally close to all actors. This policy of Turkey was also identified as a multilateral and independent foreign policy. It was envisaged to follow policies that deepened toward different regions despite the West when necessary. The first reflection of this policy was to oppose the motion allowing US troops to use Turkey’s bases and military facilities during Iraq’s invasion on March 1, 2003. This was not an appropriate case in traditional foreign policy in relations between the United States and Turkey. Turkey’s relations were compatible with the United States and the West, with a few exceptions throughout the Cold War, as Turkey did not pursue a foreign policy contradicting the United States’ interests. Turkey earned a great reputation in the eyes of the international community by not supporting the invasion of Iraq, but it damaged Turkey’s relations with the United States very seriously. While trying to protect its relationship with the EU and the United States, Turkey had been trying to improve its relations with other neighboring countries. Despite being a member of NATO, Turkey worked to advance different aspects of its relations with Russia. During this period, the volume of the commercial relations between Turkey and Russia reached an impressive figure, 38 billion dollars, in 2008. Turkey also intensified relations with Middle East countries. It was thought that the “strategic depth” approach, which reflected the thoughts of Ahmet Davutoğlu, who was the first advisor to the prime minister and served as the minister of foreign affairs since 2009, was marked by this period.5 In this period, significant progress was achieved, especially in relations with Iran and Syria. Turkey also made a major change in the approach to the Palestinian problem, but this situation caused a number of problems with the United States and Israel. It was claimed that Turkey was moving away from the West, which was conceptualized based on “axis shift.”6 Turkey, while achieving important steps for demilitarization/civilianization and democratization, also tried to give the impression that it did not follow an identity-oriented foreign policy. Thus, even though at some point it caused

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some concerns in the West, Turkey’s policy led to very positive impressions in the international community.7 In fact, it was not a complete break from Turkey’s pro-Western foreign policy. Turkey only tried to act somewhat more independently.8 Supporting the Assad government when pressure was applied on Syria over the assassination of Hariri in 2005 and establishing direct contact with Hamas, which won the 2006 elections, increased concern in the West. While Turkey was supporting Hamas and preserving its relations with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in a balanced manner, this stance continued to draw the reactions of Israel and the United States. Turkey, during this process, did not focus enough on Central Asia, the Caucasus, and even the Middle East but mainly focused on Iran and Syria. Due to the 2009 Davos summit and the one-minute response of Erdoğan, Turkey’s foreign policy continued to be criticized in the West while reaching the most popular point in the Islamic world. These developments increased criticism that Turkey was moving away from the West. Turkey and Brazil mediated the Tehran Declaration of May 17, 2010, to find a solution to Iran’s nuclear activities, but P5+1 countries rejected it. Consequently, Turkey’s negative vote in response to the UN resolution dated June 9, 2010, to impose comprehensive sanctions on Iran alarmed the United States and increased the axis shift criticism. Turkey’s voting against the resolution raised Western concerns about Turkey. The security bureaucracy in the United States that made Iran’s nuclear activity a priority foreign policy objective was worried about Turkey’s behavior. Despite some criticism in the West for Turkish foreign policy until these developments, it is possible to say that Turkey’s foreign policy is appreciated by both the international community.9 However, the recent stance of Turkey has worried not only the Western world but also regional countries that see Iran as a significant threat, such as Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Egypt. NEO-WESTERNISM IN FOREIGN POLICY, DE-EUROPEANIZATION IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2011–2016) Although the Arab Spring, which started in the first months of 2011 for the Turkish foreign policy, was taken as a turning point, the real change started with NATO’s Lisbon summit in November 2010. Until that time, the United States had been pursuing its policy on missile defense systems alone and was planning to deploy missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic in this context. However, when Obama came to power, it was decided to establish the same system within NATO. In this context, Poland, Romania,

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and Turkey would gain importance. Early warning radar systems were to be deployed in Kurecik, Turkey’s Malatya province, and were complete for operation in January 2012. The establishment of the system against Russia and Iran caused deterioration of relations with Moscow and Tehran, with which Ankara had so many positive relations until then. Although Turkey was a NATO country, it developed its relations with these countries in the changing international security structure and established more balanced and multilateral relations. However, with this policy, Turkey would revert back to the re-alliance policy. This policy was perceived as quite a radical transformation; the atmosphere of trust that was created in relations with Russia and Iran was also corrupted. This was not appropriate with the principles and foreign policy perspective that Davutoğlu had advocated until then. Turkey decided to enter a firmer engagement with the West again and was moving away from the multilateral policy in this regard. It is possible to express this new foreign policy as the New Westernism. The difference between foreign policy, which is expressed as the New Westernism, and traditional Westernism was that the JDP administration relied on an Islamist background, and in this context, the Islamist dimension continued in foreign policy. To act in concert with the West in approaching the problems in the Middle East became the most prominent feature of this new period. Turkey developed a quick reflex to new developments concerning the Arab Spring and thought that the West would support these developments. In fact, in the beginning, it was thought that moderate Islamist opposition that had no problem with the West could come to power in these countries, and in this context, Turkey could be a model for them. When we look at the model issue, it is seen that quite a lot of literature has been formed on model discussions.10 And also in the region, “public opinion surveys run by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) between 2010 and 2012 repeatedly showed that approximately 60 percent of the Arab public saw Turkey as a model and believed that Turkey could contribute positively to the transformation of the Arab World.”11 However, by the end of 2012, the number of positive insights about whether Turkey could be a model for the Middle East began to decline because in the Syrian crisis, it became a complete puzzle as to who followed the right policy and who did not. As the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) became a serious threat in 2013, Assad ceased to be a priority problem for the West and the United States. While Turkey was approaching the West and neo-Westernism was used to define the new foreign policy, the concept of de-Westernization12 was used to define the state of Turkey by referring to the security-oriented policies pursued in domestic politics. The main determinants of Turkey’s foreign policy

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of neo-Westernism other than Islamist elements were humanitarian diplomacy and soft power. However, this new foreign policy prevented Turkey from evaluating the different options and thus limited the range of motion. Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu ignored the hesitations of the United States for providing serious military support to Syrian opponents and only allowed the supply of light weapons within the framework of the train and equip program. On the one hand, Turkey faced Russia and Iran in the Syria conflict; on the other hand, the required support could not be found from the West and the Middle Eastern countries. This situation of Turkey was the subject of debate in the context of the concepts of splendid isolation and precious loneliness. Meanwhile, in 2013, Turkey signed a readmission agreement with the EU that entered into force in October 2014 and signed the agreement on the exchange of migrants on March 18, 2016. With them, migration to Europe, particularly to Greece, decreased by over 95%. However, in Turkey, the number of Syrian refugees increased very fast. In return, the EU opened two more chapters in Turkey-EU relations.13 While the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey in 2014 was about 800,000, a year later, in 2015, it reached 2.2 million. Turkey’s foreign and domestic policy in this period began to be exposed to harsh criticism. Meanwhile, the ISIS presence in Syria and Iraq rapidly increased; ISIS attacked Turkey’s consulate in Mosul in August 2014, and a wide area, including Mosul in the north of Iraq, got under the control of ISIS. Some developments, such as Hezbollah’s full involvement in the Syrian war in August 2013, the direct support of the Syrian regime by Iran, and the deployment of Russian aircraft at the base of Hmeymim in August 2015, changed the balances in Syria. The emphasis on soft power, humanitarian diplomacy, and ongoing humanitarian activities and the desire to continue relations with the Middle East and Islamic countries made this period different from the classical period of Turkish foreign policy. However, the main axis and main philosophy that determined domestic and foreign policies were Westernism or neo-Westernism. Nevertheless, in response to efforts to get closer to the West, Turkey failed to get support from the West; instead, the relations with Iran and Russia, as well as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, deteriorated, and Turkey lost popularity in the Islamic countries. While these developments led to the debate of “loneliness” in public opinion, some people expressed this situation with the concept of “precious loneliness”14 or “splendid isolation.”15 This period ended with the resignation of Prime Minister Davutoğlu, who had been in office since August 2014, and the appointment of Binali Yıldırım instead. This change occurred just before the July 15, 2016, military coup attempt.

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EUROSIANISM AND ANTI-WESTERNISM (2016–2020) The first step was laid down by President Erdoğan in June 2016 for the normalization of relations, which was strained as a result of the downing of Russian SU-24 aircraft violating Turkey’s airspace on November 24, 2015. Erdoğan sent a letter to Putin in June 2016 stating that he was very upset, that the plane was not deliberately dropped, and that the trial process for the pilot continued. In fact, some steps were taken for the normalization of relations between the parties. A statement made in May by Russian president Vladimir Putin and letters of congratulations concerned with Russia Day sent by Turkey president Erdoğan and prime minister Binali Yildirim to the counterparts on June 12 were important initiatives for the good intentions of both sides. The Astana process started in December 2016 by Turkey with Russia, and Iran was to implement regional diplomacy in solving regional problems. At the Astana conference held on May 4, 2017, de-escalation zones were created in Syria. Also, Putin met Erdoğan in Sochi on September 17, 2018, and they formed a consensus to sustain the ceasefire in Idlib with Russia and Turkey acting as guarantor states. However, the situation in Syria changed considerably with the developments in 2014 and 2015. Russia, which had been supporting the Syrian regime until August 2015 and actively using the naval base in Tartus and airbase in Hmeymim, became a country determining the future of Syria. Meanwhile, while the military presence of Iran became more visible in Syria, Hezbollah was involved in the war in Syria in favor of the Syrian regime in May 2013. Also, the fight against ISIS had become a priority in Syria. In other words, especially after October 2014, it was seen that the international community focused more on the ISIS attacks. In Iraq and Syria, attention was suddenly shifted to the ISIS. Therefore, the situation in Syria became much more complicated than before 2014. The West certainly did not look at the problem from the same viewpoint as Turkey. These developments forced Turkey to reconsider its relations with the West and the United States and to search for new alternatives. The Erdoğan administration, which could not get support from the West and the United States during the July 15 coup attempt, was subject to serious criticism by the relevant countries in this process. That the United States allowed Fethullah Gulen, who was the main suspect of the coup attempt, in the United States, the American administration disregarding the issue of extradition. During this period, Turkey was exposed to some sanctions by the Trump administration.16 Consequently, the Erdoğan administration turned to different alternatives. Therefore, what lay in the background of the relationship that Turkey

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developed with Russia and Iran in this period was not only pursuing a multilateral foreign policy but also the effect of frustration in relations with the West. Even though Turkey defended its relations with Russia and Iran by saying it was pursuing a multilateral foreign policy, it couldn’t avoid its foreign policy turning anti-Western and Eurasian and centering on Russia and Iran but including Central Asia, the Caucasus, and China. It is also possible to define this period as a reactive foreign policy and Eurasian multilateralism. Although this Eurasianism and anti-Westernism in the foreign policy provided certain advantages to Turkey to be effective in Syria, the Idlib process in January 2020 was to express a new disengagement. In other words, the main objective of Turkey’s Eurasianism experience was to gain leverage and increase the options. Still, the sustainability of this policy was understood to be a significant challenge in some ways. During this period, Turkey’s policy was getting closer to Russia and Iran, moving away from the West and the Middle East. Thus, some critical approaches argue that Turkey in the 2011– 2019 period moved away from Western values and the EU norms within the context of domestic policy developments. In other words, some studies claim that anti-Western/anti-European discourse started in 2011, and Turkey’s position in internal politics was defined as de-Europeanization or disengagement from Europe.17 Others argue that the process started with Westernization and turned into anti-Westernism.18 POST-2020: DISENGAGEMENT FROM OR RE-ENGAGEMENT TO THE WEST It is possible to determine the post-2020 era as Western-centered multilateralism because Turkey’s multilateral Eurasian policy necessitated re-evaluation due to the Russian and the Syrian regime’s use of excessive force at the beginning of 2020, violation of the ceasefire in Idlib, and the Ukraine crisis in the first quarter of 2021. Thus, on the one hand, the confrontation of interests with Russia in Idlib (Syria), Libya, and the Caucasus, on the other hand, the deterioration of relations with the EU countries supporting Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Biden administration’s anti-Erdoğan policy increased the need for Turkey to pursue a multi-engaged and balanced foreign policy instead of engaging to one of the great powers. Turkey’s dissatisfaction with the policy followed by Russia and the United States is not limited only to the government; the public opinion also reacted to relevant countries. Failure of Turkey’s initiatives to normalize relations with the United States and the West disappointed the Turkish public. It caused the questioning of

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historical alliances with the West and created a potential for a new psychological isolationist and nationalist foreign policy. Multilateralism/multilateral Westernism has always been a very desirable policy choice for Turkey, but little has been succeeded in different periods. In other words, Turkey’s main axis has always been Westernism. Turkey has designed its economic and political structure within the context of Westernization/modernization, and social life has been dominated in this perspective. In this process, Turkey has demonstrated its intention in this regard by providing medical supplies to many countries in Europe. This process has been accepted as an opportunity for the normalization of relations with the EU countries. Ankara has intended to leave aside the strained relations and regain momentum for the EU accession process. It is also noteworthy that President Erdoğan has carefully avoided using an anti-European language recently. However, on the one hand, tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean between Turkey and Greece and, on the other hand, deteriorating relations with France resulting from some policy differences are likely to block the relations between Turkey and the EU. As long as China and Russia become a primary threat to the United States, the importance of NATO will continue to increase. London and Brussels Declarations Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on December 3–4, 2019, and June 14, 2021, states the following: “Russia’s aggressive actions constitute a threat to Euro-Atlantic security; terrorism in all its forms and manifestations remains a persistent threat to us all . . . We recognize that China’s growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance.”19 Thus, it can be seen, particularly in the context of NATO, that the United States will continue to need Turkey because the United States, which is struggling with great challenges such as Iran, international terrorism, and nuclear proliferation in global politics, will continue to need a military organization not only for Europe’s defense but also for the security of Asia and the Pacific. In this context, Turkey’s engagement to the Euro-Atlantic alliance will be very important to the United States and other members of the alliance. However, while the increasing global security issues make Turkey an important ally for Germany and Eastern European countries, it does not help the progress of the process for Turkey’s EU membership because Turkey-EU relations seem to be highly dependent on the relations between Turkey and Greece. Therefore, as long as tensions continued and normalization could not be achieved, there would be no progress in Turkey-EU relations. In this context, the accession process of Turkey to regain momentum can be accelerated for the normalization of Turkey’s relations with the West.

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Otherwise, the competition and tension are likely to continue between the parties. This may complicate the situation inside the alliance and Turkey’s commitments, and it may delay establishing a long-term sustainable relation with the EU. CONCLUSION It can be addressed that the periodical changes in Turkey’s foreign policy orientations may not be understood as deep and sustainable changes at least in the near future, as long as Turkey’s institutional, political, economic, military, and physical relations continue. However, after 2016, Turkey’s policy orientation could be seen as disengagement from the West, focusing on Russia, Iran, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East. This foreign policy named Eurosianism was exposed as anti-Westernism, moving Turkey away from the West. On the other hand, as in all non-Western countries, an independent and multilateral foreign policy has always been supported by all groups of the Turkish society. When considering Turkey’s geography which is very close to Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and North Africa, Turkey’s seeking a neutral, balanced, and multilateral foreign policy is not unfounded. As a state whose population is mostly Muslim and that has a historical and political relationship with Muslim geography, it sometimes caused anxiety in the West. It must also be noted that there is a widespread belief in Turkey that it is always disappointed about the relations with the West. In other words, Turkey, as an ally, was unable to receive the fruits of its relations with the West. Turkey thought that it was left alone in the Syria crisis and responded with a foreign policy called multilateral Eurasianism, focusing on Russia and Iran to solve the problem after 2016. Turkey reaped some benefits of this policy change, in particular in the Syrian issue. However, those countries saw the relations with Turkey not as long-term strategic relations but relations based on pragmatic reasons because they are aware of the commitments and responsibilities of Turkey as a NATO member in the last stage, and it must be pointed out that Turkey is a member of NATO and the European Council and is willing to be a full member of the EU. In conclusion, on the one hand, Turkey aimed to send a message to the West by reducing the level of relations with Russia and Iran; on the other hand, recent developments mentioned above troubled Turkey’s re-engagement to the West. It can be noted that the tensions between Turkey and some members of the EU within the context of policies related to Syria, Libya, and the Eastern Mediterranean complicate the relations of both sides.

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NOTES 1. Patrick Kingsley, “Turkey in Turmoil and Chaos since Purge Aimed at Dissenters,” The New York Times, April 12, 2017. https​:/​/ww​​w​.nyt​​imes.​​com​/2​​017​ /0​​4​/12/​​world​​/euro​​pe​/tu​​rkey-​​erdog​​​an​-pu​​rge​.h​​tml, accessed 20 January 2019; Metin Gurcan, “Turkey’s New Erdogan Doctrine,” Al-Monitor, November 04, 2016. https​ :/​/ww​​w​.al-​​monit​​or​.co​​m​/pul​​se​/or​​igina​​ls​/20​​16​/11​​/turk​​ey​-wa​​nts​-u​​se​-it​​s​-har​​d​-pow​​er​-so​​ lve​​-r​​egion​​al​-pr​​oblem​​s​.htm​​l, accessed 25 April 2020. 2. Özgür Tüfekçi, The Foreign Policy of Modern Turkey: Power and the Ideology of Eurasianism, I.B. Tauris, London, 2017. 3. Lars Haugom, “Turkish Foreign Policy under Erdogan: A Change in International Orientation?” Comparative Strategy 38, no. 3 (2019): 206–223. 4. Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Zero-Problems Foreign Policy.” Foreign Policy 20, no. 5 (2010), https​:/​/fo​​reign​​polic​​y​.com​​/2010​​/05​/2​​0​/tur​​keys-​​zero-​​probl​​ems​-f​​o​reig​​ n​-pol​​icy/. 5. Alexander Murinson, “The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy,” Middle Eastern Studies 42, no. 6 (November 2006): 945–964. 6. Ekrem T. Başer, “Shift-of-axis in Turkish Foreign Policy: Turkish National Role Conceptions before and during AKP Rule,” Turkish Studies 16, no. 3 (2015): 291–309; Laura Batalla Adam, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the AKP Era: Has There Been a Shift in the Axis?” Turkish Policy Quarterly 11, no. 3 (Fall 2012): 139–148. 7. Tayyar Arı and Ferhat Pirinççi, “Turkey’s New Foreign Policy towards the Middle East and the Perceptions in Syria and Lebanon,” Akademik Bakış 4, no. 7 (Winter 2010): 1–16. 8. Kürşad Turan, “Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy: A Shift or a Passing Interest?” Akademik Bakış 6, no. 11 (Winter/Kış 2012): 65–84. 9. Tarik Oğuzlu and Mustafa Kibaroğlu, “Is the Westernization Process Losing Pace in Turkey: Who’s to Blame?” Turkish Studies 10, no. 4 (2009): 577–593; Ahmet Sözen, “A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges,” Turkish Studies 11, no. 1 (2010): 103–123; Ziya Öniş, “Multiple Faces of the ‘New’ Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique,” Insight Turkey no. 13 (2011): 47–65. 10. Jean-Loup Samaan, “The Rise and Fall of the ‘Turkish Model’ in the Arab World,” Turkish Policy Quarterly 12, no. 3 (Fall 2013): 61–69, http:​/​/tur​​kishp​​olicy​​.com/​​Files​​ /Arti​​clePD​​F​/the​​-rise​​-and-​​fall-​​of​-th​​e​-tur​​kish-​​model​​-in​-t​​he​-ar​​ab​-wo​​​rld​-f​​all​-2​​013​-e​​n​.pdf​, accessed 11 May 2020); Hassan Nafaa, “The ‘Turkish Model’ in the Mirror of the Arab Spring,” in Turkey and the Arab Spring Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy from a Transatlantic Perspective, Nathalie Tocci, Ömer Taşpınar, Henri J. Barkey, Eduard Soler, Lecha Hassan Nafaa (eds.), The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington, D.C., 2011, 35–44. Halim Rane, “An Alternative to the ‘Turkish Model’ for the Emerging Arab Democracies,” Insight Turkey 14, no. 4 (2012): 47–65; Fadi Elhusseini, The Arab Spring Effect on Turkey’s Role, Decision-making and Foreign Policy, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, New Castle, UK, 2018. 11. Kemal Kirisci, “The Rise and Fall of Turkey as a Model for the Arab World,” Brookings op-ed, Thursday, August 15, 2013. https​:/​/ww​​w​.bro​​oking​​s​.edu​​

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/opin​​ions/​​the​-r​​ise​-a​​nd​-fa​​ll​-of​​-turk​​ey​-as​​-a​-mo​​del​-f​​​or​-th​​e​-ara​​b​-wor​​ld/, accessed 15 January 2020. 12. Birgül Demirtaş, “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans: A Europeanised Foreign Policy in a De-europeanised National Context?” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 20, no. 10 (2015): 1–17. 13. Thanks to the Turkey–EU togetherness and March 18 Statement, the EU could overcome the refugee crisis. The Turkey–EU relations, which remained static until 2015, regained momentum. The November 29, 2015, March 7, 2016, and March 18, 2016, Turkey-EU Summits were held. The summits resulted in important decisions, such as revitalizing of the accession negotiations, strengthening of the high-level dialogues in crucial areas, particularly political, economy, and energy dialogues, cooperation on fight against terrorism, burden-sharing in migration management, acceleration of the Visa Liberalization Dialogue, and upgrading of the Customs Union. The most important reflection of decisions taken at the summits were opening of the Chapter 17—Economic and Monetary Policy and Chapter 33—Financial and Budgetary Provisions, which were blocked before. Besides, through the onefor-one deal set out in the Turkey–EU Statement of March 18, loss of lives has been prevented and the migrant flow to the EU has been decreased as a result of Turkey’s efforts to close the Aegean route (https​:/​/ww​​w​.ab.​​gov​.t​​r​/tur​​key​-e​​u​-rel​​ation​​​s​_4​_e​​n​ .htm​l). 14. Tarık Oğuzlu, “‘Precious Loneliness’ and Turkey’s Awakening to Regional Realities,” Orsam, 02.09.2013, https​:/​/ww​​w​.ors​​am​.or​​g​.tr/​​en​/pr​​eciou​​s​-lon​​eline​​ss​-an​​d​ -tur​​key​-s​​-awak​​ening​​-to​-r​​​egion​​al​-re​​aliti​​es/, accessed 12 May 2020. 15. Ioannis Ν. Grigoriadis, “From ‘Central Power’ to ‘Splendid Isolation’: Turkish Foreign Policy’s Declining Ambitions,” ELIAMEP Working Paper, 67, August 2015; Bill Park, “Turkey’s Isolated Stance: An Ally No More, or Just the Usual Turbulence?,” International Affairs 91, no. 3 (2015): 581–600. 16. Tayyar Arı, “Comparing the Bush, Obama and Trump Foreign Policies: Continuity and Change in American Middle East Policy,” in Ultra-Nationalist Policies of Trump and Reflections in the World, M. Kemal Öke and H. Avcı (eds.). Berlin: Peterlang, 2020, 63–67. 17. Sinem Aydın-Düzgit and Alper Kaliber, “Encounters with Europe in an Era of Domestic and International Turmoil: Is Turkey a De-Europeanising Candidate Country,” South European Society and Politics 21, no. 1 (2016): 1–14; Münevver Cebeci, “De-Europeanisation or Counter-Conduct? Turkey’s Democratisation and the EU,” South European Society and Politics 21, no. 1 (2016): 119–132; Seda Gurkan, “De-Europeanisation through Securitisation: Insights from Turkey,” https​ :/​/ec​​pr​.eu​​/Even​​ts​/Pa​​perDe​​tails​​.aspx​​?Pape​​rID​=3​​9092&​​​Event​​ID​=12​​4; Demirtaş, “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans: A Europeanised Foreign Policy in a De-Europeanised National Context?” 2015. 18. Alper Kaliber and Esra Kaliber,“From De-Europeanisation to Anti-Western Populism: Turkish Foreign Policy in Flux,” International Spectator 54, no. 4 (2019): 1–16. 19. London Declaration, https​:/​/ww​​w​.nat​​o​.int​​/cps/​​en​/na​​tohq/​​offic​​ial​_t​​exts_​​​17158​​ 4​.htm​, accessed 15 June 2020.

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REFERENCES Arı, Tayyar. “Comparing the Bush, Obama and Trump Foreign Policies: Continuity and Change in American Middle East Policy,” in Ultra-Nationalist Policies of Trump and Reflections in the World, M. K. Öke and H. Avcı (eds.), 45–72. Berlin: Peterlang, 2020. Arı, Tayyar and Ferhat Pirinççi. “Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East and The Perceptions in Syria and Lebanon,” Akademik Bakış 4, no. 7 (Winter/ Kış 2010): 1–16. Aydın-Düzgit, Sinem and Alper Kaliber. “Encounters with Europe in an Era of Domestic and International Turmoil: Is Turkey a De-Europeanising Candidate Country.” South European Society and Politics 21, no. 1 (2016): 1–14. Başer, Ekrem T. “Shift-of-axis in Turkish Foreign Policy: Turkish National Role Conceptions Before and During AKP Rule.” Turkish Studies 16, no. 3 (2015): 291–309. Batalla Adam, Laura. “Turkey’s Foreign Policy in The AKP Era: Has There Been a Shift in the Axis?” Turkish Policy Quarterly 1, no. 3 (Fall 2012): 139–148. Cebeci, Münevver. “De-Europeanisation or Counter-Conduct? Turkey’s Democratisation and the EU.” South European Society and Politics 21, no. 1 (2016): 119–132. Davutoğlu, Ahmet. “Turkey’s Zero-Problems Foreign Policy.” Foreign Policy 20, no. 5 (2010), https:// forei​​gnpol​​icy​.c​​om​/20​​10​/05​​/20​/t​​urkey​​s​-zer​​o​-pro​​blems​​-fo​re​​ ign​-p​​olicy​/. Demirtaş, Birgül. “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans: A Europeanised Foreign Policy in a De-europeanised National Context?” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 20, no. 10 (2015): 1–17. Elhusseini, Fadi. The Arab Spring Effect on Turkey’s Role, Decision-making and Foreign Policy. New Castle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2018. Grigoriadis, Ioannis Ν. “From ‘Central Power’ to ‘Splendid Isolation’: Turkish Foreign Policy’s Declining Ambitions,” ELIAMEP Working Paper, 67 (August 2015). Gurcan, Metin. “Turkey’s new Erdogan Doctrine,” Al-Monitor, November 04, 2016. https​:/​/ww​​w​.al-​​monit​​or​.co​​m​/pul​​se​/or​​igina​​ls​/20​​16​/11​​/turk​​ey​-wa​​nts​-u​​se​-it​​s​-har​​d​ -pow​​er​-so​​lve​​-r​​egion​​al​-pr​​oblem​​s​.htm​​l. Accessed 25 April 2020. Gurkan, Seda. “De-Europeanisation through Securitisation: Insights from Turkey.” https​:/​/ec​​pr​.eu​​/Even​​ts​/Pa​​perDe​​tails​​.aspx​​?Pape​​rID​=3​​9092&​​​Event​​ID​=12​​4. Haugom, Lars. “Turkish Foreign Policy under Erdogan: A Change in International Orientation?” Comparative Strategy 38, no. 3 (2019): 206–223. Kaliber, Alper and Esra Kaliber.“From De-Europeanisation to Anti-Western Populism: Turkish Foreign Policy in Flux.” International Spectator 54, no. 4 (2019): 1–16. Kingsley, Patrick. “Turkey in Turmoil and Chaos Since Purge Aimed at Dissenters.” The New York Times, April 12, 2017. https​:/​/ww​​w​.nyt​​imes.​​com​/2​​017​/0​​4​/12/​​world​​ /euro​​pe​/tu​​rkey-​​erdog​​​an​-pu​​rge​.h​​tml. Accessed 20 January 2019. Kirisci, Kemal. ”The Rise and Fall of Turkey as a Model for the Arab World.” Brookings op-ed, Thursday, August 15, 2013, https​:/​/ww​​w​.bro​​oking​​s​.edu​​/opin​​ ions/​​the​-r​​ise​-a​​nd​-fa​​ll​-of​​-turk​​ey​-as​​-a​-mo​​del​-f​​​or​-th​​e​-ara​​b​-wor​​ld/. Accessed 15 January 2020.

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Murinson, Alexander. “The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy.” Middle Eastern Studies 42, no. 6 (November 2006): 945–964. Nafaa, Hassan. “The ‘Turkish Model’ in the Mirror of the Arab Spring.” In Turkey and the Arab Spring Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy From a Transatlantic Perspective, Nathalie Tocci, Ömer Taşpınar, Henri J. Barkey, Eduard Soler, Lecha Hassan Nafaa (eds.), 35–44. The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington, DC, 2011. Oğuzlu, Tarik and Mustafa Kibaroğlu. “Is the Westernization Process Losing Pace in Turkey: Who’s to Blame?” Turkish Studies 10, no. 4 (2009): 577–593. Oğuzlu, Tarık. ‘Precious Loneliness’ and Turkey’s Awakening to Regional Realities, Orsam, 02.09.2013, https​:/​/ww​​w​.ors​​am​.or​​g​.tr/​​en​/pr​​eciou​​s​-lon​​eline​​ss​-an​​d​-tur​​key​-s​​ -awak​​ening​​-to​-r​​​egion​​al​-re​​aliti​​es/. Accessed 12 May 2020. Öniş, Ziya. “Multiple Faces of the ‘New’ Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique.” Insight Turkey 13 (2011): 47–65. Park, Bill. “Turkey’s Isolated Stance: An Ally No More, or Just the Usual Turbulence?” International Affairs 91, no. 3 (2015): 581–600. Rane, Halim. “An Alternative to the ‘Turkish Model’ for the Emerging Arab Democracies.” Insight Turkey 14, no. 4 (2012): 47–65. Samaan, Jean-Loup. “The Rise and Fall of the ‘Turkish Model’ in the Arab World.” Turkish Policy Quarterly 12, no. 3 (Fall 2013): 61–69, http:​/​/tur​​kishp​​olicy​​.com/​​ Files​​/Arti​​clePD​​F​/the​​-rise​​-and-​​fall-​​of​-th​​e​-tur​​kish-​​model​​-in​-t​​he​-ar​​ab​-wo​​​rld​-f​​all​-2​​ 013​-e​​n​.pdf​. Accessed 11 May 2020. Sözen, Ahmet. “A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges.” Turkish Studies 11, no. 1 (2010): 103–123. Tüfekçi, Özgür. The Foreign Policy of Modern Turkey: Power and the Ideology of Eurasianism. I.B. Tauris, London, 2017. Turan, Kürşad. Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy: A Shift or a Passing Interest? Akademik Bakış 6, no. 11 (Winter/Kış 2012): 65–84.

Chapter 2

The Legal Foundations of Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean Policy Mehmet DALAR

INTRODUCTION Developments in technology, the military, and the economy in the 20th century related to exploiting maritime areas have raised concerns about states’ security, the acquisition of natural resources, and the protection of the marine environment. This situation has caused the need to make a legal arrangement with general content about the maritime areas and create codification related to the seas to eliminate the concerns of the states. The increase in transportation opportunities and possibility of war has also increased the perceptions of threats from the sea. As a result, states have tended to dominate land areas and territorial waters, especially in their immediate vicinity, to effectively protect their territories.1 Therefore, the multilateral conventions were concluded in the 20th century to determine states’ maritime jurisdiction. THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF Article 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention defines Continental Shelf. The term “Continental Shelf” is used to refer to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas, and to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands. Different from the 1958 Geneva Conventions, the 1982 UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea) embraced an arrangement by introducing two new criteria: width and natural prolongation of the coastal state.2 Article 76 of 1982 UNCLOS defined and regulated the Continental Shelf as follows: 17

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The Continental Shelf of a coastal state comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance. The fixed points comprising the line of the outer limits of the Continental Shelf on the seabed, drawn by the mentioned above either shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured or shall not exceed 100 nautical miles from the 2,500-meter isobath, which is a line connecting the depth of 2,500 meters.3

The Continental Shelf Convention of 1958, signed in Geneva, determines this area, not as an area where the state will exercise its absolute sovereignty. However, the coastal state will exercise some sovereign powers in obtaining natural resources in this area. The 1982 UNCLOS similarly administers this area. Accordingly, starting from the baseline, the area containing the seabed, seafloor, and subsoil to a certain distance has been described as Continental Shelf. Therefore, this term includes the seabed, the seafloor, and the subsoil rather than the sea surface. This area is subject to the high sea regime, except for some sovereign powers that the state will use here. Article 77 of the 1982 UNCLOS provides that the coastal state will have the capacity to research, acquire, and operate natural resources in this area. The coastal state has been granted powers in some areas other than researching and finding natural resources on the Continental Shelf. This includes the platform and facilities required to conduct exploration and operation activities in the area. DELIMITATION OF CONTINENTAL SHELF There are different provisions between the 1958 Geneva Convention and 1982 UNCLOS regarding delimitation of the Continental Shelf. According to Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention, the delimitation of the Continental Shelf between states with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be determined by agreement. In the absence of an agreement and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each state is measured.4 As for the provisions of 1982 UNCLOS, Article 83 states that the delimitation of the Continental Shelf between states with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be determined by an agreement based on international law, as mentioned in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, to achieve an

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equitable solution. The case of no agreement can be concluded within a reasonable time with the states in conflict resorting to the settlement of dispute procedures as stipulated by the convention.5 The question of the delimitation of the Continental Shelf has created significant discussions about and various interpretations of the 1958 and 1982 Conventions. As a result of this, case law and a variety of treaties were also developed. While delimitation is in principle an aspect of territorial sovereignty, where other states are involved, an agreement is required. Most of the difficulties in this area are indeed resolved by an agreement following equitable principles or/and the guiding principles of international law.6 The 1969 International Court of Justice resolution on the North Sea Continental Shelf Case states that the important element in the Continental Shelf is the natural prolongation of the coastal state, that the implementation of equal distance is not mandatory, that there is no compulsory limitation to all events and sea areas, and that principles of equity are important factors to delimit continental shelves among states.7 In this case, the Court remarked that state practice had to be both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked. This was held to be indispensable to the formation of a new rule of customary international law.8 TURKEY’S CONTINENTAL SHELF Turkey has the Continental Shelf beyond its territorial sea without any announcement and de facto exploiting this area. Turkey concluded a treaty in 1978 with the Soviet Union, the successor to Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia, to limit the Continental Shelf. In 1997 an adjacent border agreement was reached with Bulgaria.9 In the Mediterranean, Turkey signed a Continental Shelf agreement in September 2011, with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) to react to the Greek Cypriot Government’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) delimitation agreement with Egypt. Turkey warned the Greek Cypriot Government (GCG) to not carry out drilling activities in the south of Cyprus.10 On March 2, 2004, Turkish representative of the UN, while objecting to the GCG-Egypt agreement, informed the UN SecretaryGeneral that Turkey’s Continental Shelf begins at the point of 32º 16′ 18″ E longitude and ends at the point of 28° 00′ 00″ E longitude from alongside 34° 00′ 00″ N latitude. On November 27, 2019, the treaty on the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean was accorded between Turkey and the Government of the National Accord-State of Libya. This treaty determined the maritime boundary between Turkey and Libya. The boundaries of the Continental Shelf and the EEZ in the Mediterranean between Turkey and

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Libya begin at the point of 34° 16′ 13.720″ N latitude and 26° 19′ 11.640″ E longitude and ends at the point of 34° 09′ 07.9″ N latitude and 26° 39′ 06.3″ E longitude. This provision creates a maritime borderline of approximately 29 nautical miles between the two states.11 EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE (EEZ) Article 57 of 1982 UNCLOS states that EEZ shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. Under this provision, the coastal state cannot determine its EEZ to be more than 200 miles, and even in this region it cannot affect the rights of other states. According to Article 56 of 1982 UNCLOS, the coastal state that will use this region in good faith has partial sovereign jurisdiction over exploring and exploiting, conserving, and managing the natural resources of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents, and winds. The coastal state has jurisdiction over and a duty with regard to the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations, structures, marine scientific research, and protection and preservation of the marine environment. As foreseen by Article 58 of 1982 UNCLOS in the EEZ, all states, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy and are subject to the relevant provisions of this convention, the freedoms of navigation and overflight and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft, and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of the convention. The coastal state, while using its jurisdiction in the EEZ, cannot prevent marine navigational and aerial transportation of other states whether for civil or military purposes. Apart from the abovementioned jurisdictions of the coastal state, the regime of this area is subject to the high sea regime. As for the EEZ of Turkey, on December 5, 1986, Turkey declared a 200-mile EEZ area in the Black Sea by resolution of the government. Turkey ensured the delimitation of the continental shelf area in the Black Sea in 1978 with the agreement concluded with the Soviet Union, the predecessor of Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia. It was accepted that the limit determined by this agreement could also be valid for the EEZ with the letter exchange in 1986 and 1987. In addition, an adjacent border agreement was signed with Bulgaria in 1997. The agreement with Bulgaria in 1997 determined the adjacent boundary of the EEZ.12 In the Mediterranean Sea, Turkey informed the UN about its maritime jurisdiction area and made a maritime delimiting agreement with Libya in 2019, the details of which will be given in what follows. In the Eastern Mediterranean, islands such as Cyprus, Kastellorizo (Meyisti), Sicily, Messina, and Malta are important. Cyprus has a key role

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in controlling the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean regions. It has an important position in trade by sea and air, and the rich natural resources in its seabed make the island the center of attention. On Cyprus, two separate states, namely the TRNC, formed by the Turkish community, and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC), formed by the Greeks, have political power. One of the main factors that make the Eastern Mediterranean important and critical for Turkey is the unilateral policies and implementations of the GCASC researching natural resources such as oil and natural gas in seabed and undertaking agreements with regional states. Moreover, the coincidence of the Continental Shelf boundaries of the coastal states in the Eastern Mediterranean with each other is an important factor in the occurrence of the issue. The boundaries of the EEZ foreseen in the treaty on the EEZ between the GCASC and Egypt and Israel coincide with Turkey’s Continental Shelf boundaries.13 To determine the states’ marine jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean, as the closed or semi-closed sea, it is necessary to delimit maritime area by agreements among the states in the Eastern Mediterranean. This is especially the case because the total distance of the opposite coast of the regional states does not exceed 400 miles anywhere. For example, the distance between Anatolian coasts and Egyptian coasts is nowhere around 400 miles. In any case, without any agreement, it is inevitable for the states to coincide with their Continental Shelf and the EEZ. Therefore, unless the maritime jurisdiction is delimited among the states in the region, there will be no high sea area outside the EEZ and the Continental Shelf in the Eastern Mediterranean.14

MARITIME JURISDICTION AREAS OF TURKEY, GREECE, THE GCASC, AND THE TRNC IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN Turkey Apart from its 12-mile territorial waters in the Mediterranean, it has a Continental Shelf in the sea. The Council of Ministers granted a license to TPAO (Turkish Petroleum Corporation) by decree no 7/8594 on July 2, 1974, to explore oil in the southeast of Rhodes island, an area designated by the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, outside the Turkish territorial sea. Granting a license to TPAO, the Turkish government declared these areas as its Continental Shelf. Turkey intervened when foreign vessels conducted seismic surveys in these regions and forced them to leave the area.15

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Reacting to the 2003 agreement on the EEZ delimitation between the GCASC and Egypt, Turkey identified its Continental Shelf in the Mediterranean with a note sent to the UN in 2004. In this note, Turkey stated that the GCASC is not competent alone to sign an international agreement concerning maritime issues without the consent of Turkish Cypriot. The delimitation of the EEZ or Continental Shelf in the Mediterranean, particularly in areas in the western part of the longitude 32º 16′ 18″ E, concerns existing legal and sovereign rights of Turkey as arising from international law principles. The delimitation of the EEZ or Continental Shelf beyond the western part of the longitude 32º 16′ 18″ E should be affected by an agreement between the concerned states based on equity principles. Turkey notes that it does not recognize the mentioned agreement and reserves its legal rights related to maritime areas containing the seabed and subsoil and superjacent waters in the west of longitude 32º 16′ 18″ E.16 Turkey’s Continental Shelf in the Eastern Mediterranean consists of the area from longitude 32º 16′ 18″ E to longitude 27º 22′ 00″ E between east longitude and latitude 33º 50′ 00″ N to the Anatolia coast. In line with the equal distance line with the Egyptian coast, this area as a Continental Shelf or the EEZ of Turkey comprises approximately 145,000 square kilometers. This area constitutes onethird of all the Continental Shelf of Turkey. This area is larger than Turkey’s Continental Shelf on the Aegean Sea, and it is ten times more than that of the Marmara Sea and Cyprus, and it is equal to Turkey’s entire Continental Shelf in the Black Sea. Indeed, as it is stated below, the agreement signed between Turkey and Libya indirectly confirmed this area. If the GCASC and Greece’s ongoing initiatives are concluded in this regard, 145,000 square kilometers of the Turkish Continental Shelf will drop to 41,000 square kilometers. And 71,000 square kilometers will be Greece, and 33,000 square kilometers will be the area of the GCASC. Having the longest coasts in the Mediterranean, Turkey will be at disadvantage in such a situation.17 To secure maritime jurisdiction identified in the legal guarantee, Turkey signed a deal with Libya. On November 27, 2019, Turkey and the Government of National Accord—State of Libya (internationally recognized government) signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the Delimitation of Maritime Jurisdiction Areas in the Mediterranean. According to this document, the boundaries of the Continental Shelf and the EEZ in the Mediterranean between two states begin at the point of 34º 16′ 13.720″ N latitude and 26º 19′ 11.640″ E longitude and ends at the point of 34º 09′ 07.9″ N latitude and 26º 39′ 06.3″ E longitude.18 Considering the coastal length facing the area and allegedly based on equity principles, this agreement reflects that islands do not automatically generate the Continental Shelf or the EEZ, and the coastal projection of Turkey cannot be reduced.19 Although this agreement sets the

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two countries’ maritime border as 28 kilometer, it comprises Turkey’s maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean. According to Greece, this agreement disregards Cyprus’ territorial sea and the territorial sea of Crete Island. Seeking to build a pipeline carrying gas to Europe across these areas, Greece objected to the said agreement. Greece denounced it as illegal and a violation of its sovereign rights in the Mediterranean and sent a note to the UN expressing its reaction to the agreement.20 Greece Regarding maritime jurisdiction areas, Greece aims to “limit the maritime jurisdiction based on the medium line (equal distance method) on the line of Crete, Kasos, Karpathos, Rhodes, and Meis islands.”21 In this context, it began to hold talks with Egypt and Libya, but these attempts have not yet been concluded due to Turkey’s sensitivities and reactions to the issue. On the other hand, Greece is waiting for a good time to negotiate a delimitation agreement with the GCASC. Nevertheless, discussions were held in the Greek Parliament to declare the EEZ forehead without any agreement. Besides, it is argued that Israel recognized the EEZ area claimed by Greece, and in some maps published by Israel, the Greek EEZ area was shown as the continuation of the GCASC EEZ area.22 As stated above, Greece objected to the agreement signed between Turkey and Libya on maritime delimitation in the Mediterranean. GCASC Its territorial sea is 12 miles wide and has a Continental Shelf law based on 200-meter depth or availability criteria. The natural prolongation factor was also taken into account in determining the Continental Shelf. It was envisaged that the Continental Shelf’s outer border with opposite coasts and with Cyprus would not go beyond the medium line unless decided by the related states. In addition, the GCASC reported its baselines to the UN in May 1993. With the laws that came into force after being published in the Official Government Gazette dated April 2, 2004, the GCASC declared 24 miles wide adjacent region and 200 miles wide EEZ.23 With the announcement of the EEZ, the GCASC has changed its Continental Shelf law. In 2014, the GCASC notified the UN about the fact that it made amendments to the Continental Shelf law and the EEZ, and determined its Continental Shelf as an area of 200 miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. In the case where any part of the EEZ overlaps with part of the EEZ of any other state with opposite coasts to those of the Republic, the delimitation of

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the EEZ of the GCASC and the EEZ of the other state shall be determined by an agreement between them; in the absence of an agreement, the limit of the zone is the median line or the equidistance line from the respective baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. As to the Continental Shelf, the outer limit of the Continental Shelf of the GCASC is defined to a distance of 200 miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. In relation to any state whose coasts lie opposite to those of the GCASC, the Continental Shelf’s outer limits shall, unless otherwise agreed between the GCASC and the concerning state, be the same as the limits of the EEZ of the GCASC.24 The GCASC signed EEZ delimitation agreements with Egypt in 2003, Lebanon in 2007, and Israel in 2010. The delimitation was determined with these agreements based on the median line method.25 In 2007, the GCASC signed an agreement on the delimitation of the EEZ with Lebanon. The GCASC approved this agreement but objecting to the Israeli-Greek Cypriot delimitation agreement, Lebanon didn’t ratify because the GCASC did not consult it on the amendment of the median unitary line with Israel.26 On December 17, 2010, the agreement was signed between the GCASC and Israel on the delimitation of the EEZ. Having entered into force on February 25, 2011, after approval by two states, this agreement accounted for the median line between them in determination of the EEZ in Article 1.27 Turkey reacted to this agreement with a note dated December 21, 2010. In this note, Turkey asserted that the GCASC had no authority to make a deal without the consent of Turkish Cypriots as representative of the whole of Cyprus, and this agreement would not contribute to peace and stability in Cyprus. It does not consider the rights of the Turkish Community in Island. Hence, Turkey rejected the agreement between the GCASC and Israel not because it has claims on the maritime areas concerned, but to show discontent to the GCASC’s unilateral actions and because the agreement violates the rights of the TRNC.28 TRNC Declaring its independence in 1983 and not recognized by any state other than Turkey, the TRNC has a territorial sea with a breadth of 12 miles. Beyond its territorial sea and up to the outer border of natural prolongation of Cyprus, it has 200 miles of the Continental Shelf.29 On September 21, 2011, a Continental Shelf delimitation agreement was signed between Turkey and the TRNC. This agreement was signed due to the drilling activities of the GCASC in the Mediterranean. The agreement delimits a part of Turkey’s area and Continental Shelf of the TRNC with a line formed by twenty-seven coordinates determined on the basis of international law and equitable principles.

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The agreement takes into consideration the legitimate, equal, and inherent rights of the Turkish Cypriots like those of the Greek Cypriots over the entire Continental Shelf of the island.30 THE EEZ ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE GCASC IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, ITS VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT AND TURKEY As mentioned above, the GCASC aims to exercise sovereign rights on the EEZ area by making EEZ agreements with the regional states outside Turkey. After signing a treaty on EEZ delimitation with Egypt, the GCASC also obtained support from the EU and declared on April 2, 2004, that it had EEZ area on behalf of the “Republic of Cyprus” to be effective from March 21, 2003, without considering the rights of Turkey. On January 26, 2007, the GCASC announced thirteen oil/natural gas exploration license sites (thirteen parcels) around the south of Cyprus and invited bids for these parcels. From these parcels tendered for research, the rights of parcel numbered twelve were taken by US Noble Energy Company.31 In response to the GCASC, Turkey gave oil research and exploration licenses to TPAO in the Eastern Mediterranean in 2007.32 Turkey states that if the GCASC starts searching for oil on the said parcel, it will sign a delimitation agreement with the TRNC based on the equal rights on the entire island and give the oil exploration license to TPAO in whole of the TRNC maritime jurisdiction areas. Turkey also added that it would support the negotiations to find a permanent solution for the Cyprus Question. Granting authority to TPAO for searching oil and natural gas with the permission of the TRNC, Turkey started researching oil by sending its research vessel K. Piri Reis to Eastern Mediterranean.33 Opinions of Turkey and TRNC As mentioned above, Turkey demonstrated its reaction to the GCASC-Egypt EEZ delimitation agreement by its note numbered 4739 sent to the UN on March 2, 2004. On this note, Turkey mentions that it does not recognize the said treaty. According to Turkey, the GCASC does not have any authority to represent Cyprus without considering Turkish Cypriots’ rights. The GCASC is not entitled to negotiate and conclude international treaties and adopt laws related to exploiting the whole island’s natural resources. Turkish and Greek Cypriots should exploit jointly the natural resources of the island. The unilateral activities of the GCASC do not only ignore the existing rights of Turkish Cypriots but also challenge maritime jurisdiction areas of Turkey in the west of the island in the Mediterranean. Also, the unilateral actions of the GCASC

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harm peace negotiations to settle the question of Cyprus and have a negative impact on the relations between the two sides. Turkey states that it has legitimacy and legal rights in Eastern Mediterranean, especially from the west of longitude 32º 16′ 18″ E, as registered to the UN, and will protect its rights in its maritime jurisdiction areas. Moreover, Turkey maintains that Greek Cypriots have no authority to search for oil and natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean without a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus Questions.34 The TRNC government states to have equal sovereign rights on the island and have half their rights with Greece on natural resources such as oil and natural gas to be mined in Cyprus’s sea areas. The TRNC opposes the agreements signed by the GCASC with Egypt, Lebanon, and Israel. The TRNC argues that the GCASC does not represent Cyprus solely. Without the Turkish community’s consent on the island, the maritime delimitation agreements signed by Greek Cypriots with other states are contrary to the establishment and guarantee treaties of 1959 and prevent permanent settlement on the island. Arguing that maritime jurisdiction delimitation agreement to be signed in the Eastern Mediterranean should consider the rights and interests of the TRNC and Turkey. It urged that the delimitation agreement must be concluded among the regional states based on equality principles.35 Opinions of the GCASC In response to Turkey’s note dated March 2, 2004, the GCASC sent a note to the UN on December 28, 2004. In this note, the GCASC states that the Turkish arguments do not comply with international law and the facts set out by them. Refusing the Turkish objections, the GCASC reacted to the Turkish denomination of “the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus” as its name because the delimitation agreement was signed between two sovereign states, one of which is the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. As a member state of the EU, its name is recorded as “Republic of Cyprus” in UN resolutions. Being party to 1982 UNCLOS together with Egypt, the GCASC pointed out that the agreement signed with Egypt on EEZ delimitation is completed with the 1982 UNCLOS and established principles and rules of international law, and exercised sovereign rights to delimit the EEZ lying between the respective coasts in distance less than 400 miles. Submitting a law proclaiming its Continental Shelf in 1974 and a set of coordinates and chart depicting its baseline in 1993 to the UN Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea without any objection by Turkey, the GCASC asserted that under international law such practice amounted, inter alia, to tacit recognition of these claims and of the entitlement of the GCASC to legitimate claims of maritime jurisdiction areas. The GCASC stated that it uses internationally accepted techniques and methods in accordance with the principles of the

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International Hydrography Organization’s instruction manual when limiting the area of the EEZ with Egypt and Turkey’s argument of “limiting the EEZ by said agreement affects fair agreements between regional states regarding the western part of the longitude 32º 16′ 18 E″ is not based on the UNCLOS and international law because of the following reasons. The issues that Turkey claims in its note about the western part of the eastern meridian of 32º 16′ 18″ mean that the sovereign “Republic of Cyprus” as an island state is deprived of the maritime jurisdiction areas. These claims contradict Articles 56, 77, and 121 of 1982 UNCLOS and the International Court of Justice decisions. Articles 74 and 83 of the said convention explain that states that have opposite and adjacent coasts in accordance with Articles 38 of the International Court of Justice status can determine the delimitation of the EEZ and Continental Shelf areas by an agreement to achieve a fair and equitable conclusion. Ignoring the relevant regulations of the 1982 UNCLOS, Turkey deliberately rules out the provisions of the convention foreseeing delimitation agreement. In addition, according to the GCASC, Turkey, with unfounded allegations, intervenes in sovereign and legitimate rights of regional states such as the “Republic of Cyprus” and Egypt, and in agreements, they will sign.36 EVALUATION OF THE ISSUE The TRNC government officials state that they have equal sovereign rights on the island and its natural resources, such as oil and natural gas extracted from Cyprus’s sea. The thirteen oil and natural gas exploration license sites announced by the GCASC are 70,000 square kilometers. Of these, areas 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7 coincide with 7,000 square kilometers of Continental Shelf of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, where Turkey reserves its rights with its note sent to the UN on March 2, 2004. This area, which the GCASC is trying to hold, is larger than the area it governs. The GCASC has opened a tender to issue licenses in the remaining 11 areas, including areas that violate Turkey’s rights, except for areas 3 and 13, which are between Lebanon and eastern Cyprus. The GCASC’s current practices also violate the rights of both the TRNC and Turkey. The area opened by the GCASC for tender reaches 55,000 square kilometers. After leaving the remaining 7,000 square kilometers area that violates Turkey’s rights, the TRNC has the rights of the remaining 48,000 square kilometers.37 Looking at the GCASC-Israel EEZ agreement of 2010, it may be considered that this agreement is not in accordance with the 1982 UNCLOS. It is seen that the EEZ determined by this agreement coincides with Turkey’s maritime jurisdictions. However, both the GCASC and Israel have made

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such an agreement without considering Turkey’s opinion, one of the other relevant states in the Eastern Mediterranean. The said states holding Turkey outside of this agreement have no contact with Turkey in the requirements for a proper solution to equity in the event of a dispute. This agreement, which seems to have made a fait accompli, naturally did not consider “justice and other relevant conditions to be considered for the whole of the international community.” However, if the general geographical features of the region are considered, the condition of the island, its size, its proximity to the coastal states, the distances of the countries facing the coasts, and the coastal lengths of the coastal states are the factors that should be taken into consideration to obtain an equitable result.38 Suppose a state has acted within the framework of international law rules that have been accepted by conventions on the delimitation of the states’ jurisdiction maritime areas, without ignoring the coastal lengths of the states. In that case, it should be considered the delimitation methods that the islands do not restrict the maritime front of the continental state’s land. As mentioned earlier, it must also be taken into account that the foreign islands’ special circumstance near the coasts of the continent state. In this condition, the foreign islands do not have the EEZ or Continental Shelf as much as continental states. Therefore, the Continental Shelf or the EEZ of Cyprus should not block the continent states’ maritime areas. For this reason, considering the principle of proportionality, there should not be more maritime jurisdiction areas beyond the median line among the GCASC, Egypt, Lebanon, and Israel. Considering this, it can be thought that Turkey has the rights arising from sovereignty in the maritime areas determined by the agreements signed among the mentioned states. On the other hand, different from Turkey, while the GCASC determined and declared its EEZ and signed EEZ delimitation agreements with mentioned states, it used diagonal lines instead of vertical lines. This diagonal method provided the GCASC with more than enough maritime jurisdiction areas. In line with this, it increased both the maritime areas and the number of states that it will make agreements with. But Turkey used vertical lines instead of diagonal lines to provide more jurisdiction maritime areas in favor of continental states than that of insular states. If the GCASC had considered vertical lines used by Turkey, it would have signed an agreement only with Egypt, maybe partially with Israel. In this situation, it would not have so many maritime jurisdiction areas other than two-thirds of its current areas.39 Besides, Article 123 of the 1982 UNCLOS provides for states that have coasts on closed or semi-closed seas to cooperate on issues such as joint scientific research, living resource management, and environmental protection. Therefore, this Article implicitly foresees that a coastal state that declares EEZ should cooperate with other states and avoids unilateral actions.

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Without considering Turkey’s reactions and without solving the Cyprus Question, it is doubtful that the mentioned initiatives of the GCASC can bring successful results. It is not incompatible with both the Cyprus Constitution and the guarantee treaties to act solely without the Turkish community’s consent on the island. The continental agreement signed between Turkey and the TRNC is essential to deter the GCASC’s unilateral activities. The factor inciting Turkey to sign an agreement with the TRNC is caused by drilling activities carried out by the GCASC without considering the reaction of Turkey. There was no regulation regarding the Turks’ rights to living in the north of the island in the EEZ agreements signed by the GCASC with Egypt, Israel, and Lebanon. Moreover, the mentioned states do not recognize the TRNC. For this reason, Turkey needs to be committed to protecting both its rights and the TRNC’s rights before the international community. Even though the said states ignore Turkey having the longest coastline in the Mediterranean, signing EEZ agreements does not constitute a problem regarding international law. It can be said that this situation may cause objection in terms of international law in the case of Turkey’s sovereign rights to incur losses as a result of the implementation of the mentioned EEZ agreements. CONCLUSION The demands of the states to exploit the maritime areas for various purposes, especially for obtaining natural resources, and accordingly, their tendency to dominate larger maritime areas are increasing invariably. Bilateral and multilateral treaties on the maritime jurisdiction areas aim to prevent conflicting claims to states’ sovereignty and regulate the maritime areas on which the states can fully or partially enjoy their sovereign rights. The criteria to be taken into consideration in the delimitation of the jurisdiction of the states, whose coasts are opposite or adjacent to each other, and the maritime areas that the islands can have are regulated by these treaties. However, the decisions of international judicial bodies on concrete events have affected both the practices of the states and the interpretation of the treaties. One of the principles accepted in international law is that states should not use their rights to the detriment of other states and act in good faith (bona fides). States should always acknowledge these rules accepted as general principles of law while implementing the provisions of the agreements approved by them. In the same way, in domestic law order, principles have been constituted in order not to abuse the rights and to use them with good faith and honesty. International courts have always considered the principle of equity when resolving tangible disputes and interpreting treaties. Each maritime area has unique and substantial features. Considering these facts, states should share

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their jurisdiction over these areas, and compromise according to the peculiarities of these areas. Surrounded by sea on its three sides, Turkey has the right to establish sovereignty on these maritime areas and utilize them under international law with its active foreign policy. Turkey has demonstrated its commitment by making the agreement on maritime delimitation with Libya. Although the dispute that emerged between Turkey and Greece and between Turkey and the Greek Cypriot on the determination of maritime jurisdiction areas will not lead to armed conflict, this dispute can delay the establishment of permanent cooperation between states and may lead to the presumptive tension in the future. Recognizing the Greek islands close to Turkey’s coasts, which can narrow Turkey’s jurisdiction areas, and unilateral initiatives of the GCASC without solving the Cyprus problem makes the solution of the issue difficult. As mentioned earlier, the coastal lengths, geographical, geological features, and historical rights of the states and the condition of the islands require maritime delimitation based on equitable principles. Suppose two or more states sign agreements on a third state in the region without consulting this state or ignoring its reaction. In that case, they may jeopardize the legal reliability and permanence of those agreements. For this reason, it is necessary to make agreements that all states with a coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean are included, based on the criteria of equity. Otherwise, when states sign agreements without considering other states in the same region, this not only delays the resolution of the problems but also deepens the conflicts.

NOTES 1. Yücel Acer and İbrahim Kaya, Uluslararası Hukuk Temel Ders Kitabı (Ankara: USAK, 2010), 144. 2. Selami Kuran, Uluslararası Deniz Hukuku, 3. Baskı. İstanbul: Türkmen Kitabevi, 2007, 199. 3. “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982,” United Nations, accessed December 20, 2019, https​:/​/ww​​w​.un.​​org​/d​​epts/​​los​/c​​onven​​tion_​​agree​​ments​​/ text​​s​/unc​​los​/​u​​nclos​​_e​.pd​​f. 4. “Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958.” 5. “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982.” 6. Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, fifth edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 527. 7. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969, accessed December 21, 2019, https​ :/​/ww​​w​.icj​​-cij.​​org​/f​​i les/​​case-​​relat​​ed​/51​​/051-​​19690​​220​-J​​UD​​-01​​-00​-E​​N​.pdf​; Shaw, International Law, 528. 8. Shaw, International Law, 73.

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9. Shaw, International Law, 402. 10. T. C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, accessed December 24, 2019. http:​/​/www​​.mfa.​​gov​ .t​​r​/no_​​-216_​​-21​-e​​ylul-​​2011-​​turki​​ye-_-​​kktc-​​kita-​​sahan​​ligi-​​sinir​​landi​​rma​-a​​nlasm​​asi​-i​​ mzala​​nmasi​​na​-il​​iskin​​-disi​​sleri​​-​baka​​nligi​​-basi​​n​-ac_​​.tr​.m​​fa. 11. Resmi Gazete, 7 Aralık 2019, accessed February 18, 2020. https​:/​/ww​​w​.res​​ migaz​​ete​.g​​ov​.tr​​/eski​​ler​/2​​019​/1​​2​/201​​​91207​​-3​.pd​​f. 12. Pazarcı Hüseyin, Uluslararası Hukuk Dersleri, II. Kitap, 6 (Baskı, Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1999), 413; Kuran, Uluslararası Deniz Hukuku, 234–235. 13. Ahmet Cemal Ertürk, “Doğu Akdeniz’de MEB Paylaşımı: Güney Kıbrıs-İsrail Örneği,” 10 Mayıs 2011, BİLGESAM, accessed June 2, 2012, http://www​.bilgesam​ .org​/tr​/i; Turgut Turhan, “GKRY ve İsrail Doğu Akdeniz’de neyin peşinde?,” Kıbrıs Gazetesi, 16 Ocak 2011, accessed June 11, 2012, http:​/​/www​​.kibr​​isgaz​​etesi​​.com/​​print​​ .php?​​news=​​​10999​​3. 14. Sertaç Hami Başeren, “Doğu Akdeniz’deki Son Gelişmeler,” 05.11.2009, Interview notes with Ayşe Bahar Hurmi, accessed May 29, 2012, http:​/​/lib​​rary.​​atili​​m​ .edu​​.tr​/k​​urums​​al​/pd​​fs​/do​​gua​kd​​eniz.​​pdf. 15. Sertaç Hami Başeren, “Doğu Akdeniz Deniz Yetki Alanları Uyuşmazlığı,” Stratejik Araştırma ve Etüt Merkezi (SAREM) Dergisi 8, no. 14 (2010): 156. 16. “Bulletin no. 54, Law of the Sea, 2004,” United Nations, accessed February 5, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​.un.​​org​/D​​epts/​​los​/d​​oalos​​_publ​​icati​​ons​/L​​OSBul​​letin​​s​/bul​​letin​​pdf​​/b​​ ullet​​in54e​​.pdf, p. 127. 17. Sertaç Hami Başeren, Başeren, “Doğu Akdeniz’de Gerilim” 2007, accessed June, 30, 2012, http:​/​/www​​.tuda​​v​.org​​/inde​​x​.php​​?opt​i​​on​=co​m conte​nt&vi​ew=ar​ticle​ &id=9​5%3Ad​ou-ak​deniz​-serh​at-h-​baere​n&cat​id=40​%3Amu​enhas​r-eko​nomik​-boel​ ge&It​emid=​54&la​ng=tr​. 18. Resmi Gazete, 7 Aralık 2019. 19. MFA, Turkish Foreign Policy on Maritime Boundary Energy Issues in the Eastern Mediterranean, accessed February 28, 2020, http:​/​/www​​.mfa.​​gov​.t​​r​/sit​​ e​_med​​ia​/ht​​ml​/Tu​​rkish​​-Fore​​ign​-P​​olicy​​-on​-M​​ariti​​me​-Bo​​undar​​y​-Ene​​rgy​-I​​ssues​​-in​-t​​he​​ -Ea​​stern​​-Medi​​terra​​nean.​​pdf. 20. “U. N. to post maps of Libya-Turkey maritime deal,” Ahwal, 16 February 2020, accessed February 29, 2020, https​:/​/ah​​valne​​ws​.co​​m​/tur​​key​-l​​ibya/​​un​-po​​st​-ma​​ps​ -li​​bya​-t​​urkey​​​-mari​​time-​​deal#​. 21. “U. N. to post maps of Libya-Turkey maritime deal.” 22. Yaycı, “Doğu Akdeniz’de,” 19. 23. Cyprus Government Gazette, 02 April 2004, accessed February 27, 2020. http:​ /​/www​​.cyga​​zette​​.com/​​Gazet​​te​.dl​​l/​%7B​​0205C​​F0F​-1​​442​-4​​C20​-8​​E47​-7​​41BB1​​EFB99​​ 8​%7D/​​WPPgV​​iew​?I​​ssueN​​o​=382​​9​&Pag​​eNo​=0​​&PgIn​​​dex​=0​​&Issu​​eDate​​=5218​​&Sect​​ No​=1;​ The Republic of Cyprus, accessed February 27, 2020. http:​/​/www​​.mfa.​​gov​.c​​ y​/mfa​​/mfa2​​016​.n​​sf​/mf​​a84​_e​​​n​/mfa​​84​_en​? OpenDocument; Başeren, “Doğu Akdeniz Deniz Yetki Alanları,” 139. 24. The Republic of Cyprus, The Exclusive economic zone and The Continental Shelf Laws 2004 and 2014, accessed February 2, 2020. https​:/​/ww​​w​.un.​​org​/D​​epts/​​los​ /L​​EGISL​​ATION​​ANDTR​​EATIE​​S​/PDF​​FILES​​/CYP_​​EEZ​-C​​​S​_Law​​_2014​​.pdf. 25. Exclusive economic zone and Continental Shelf, accessed February 2, 2020. http:​/​/www​​.mfa.​​gov​.c​​y​/mfa​​/mfa2​​016​.n​​sf​/mf​​a86​_e​​n​/mfa​​86​_en​​​?Open​​Docum​​ent.

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26. Mees, Cyprus-Lebanon, Cyprus-Israel Offshore Delimitation, accessed February 16, 2020. https​:/​/ww​​w​.mee​​s​.com​​/2012​​/9​/28​​/op​-e​​d​-doc​​ument​​s​/cyp​​rus​-l​​ebano​​n​-cyp​​rus​ -i​​srael​​-offs​​hore-​​delim​​itati​​on​/f9​​94d75​​0​-6​d1​​a​-11e​​7​-967​​5​-d5a​​0b051​​0107. 27. U. N., Legislation, and Treaties (Israel), accessed February 16, 2020. https​ :/​/ww​​w​.un.​​org​/D​​epts/​​los​/L​​EGISL​​ATION​​ANDTR​​EATIE​​S​/STA​​T​EFIL​​ES​/IS​​R​.htm​ and https​:/​/ww​​w​.un.​​org​/D​​epts/​​los​/L​​EGISL​​ATION​​ANDTR​​EATIE​​S​/PDF​​FILES​​/ TREA​​TIES/​​cyp​_i​​​sr​_ee​​z​_201​​0​.pdf​. 28. MFA, 21 December 2010, no. 288, accessed February 16, 2020. http:​//​www​​ .mfa.​​gov​.t​​r​/no_​​-288_​​-21​-d​​ecemb​​er​-20​​10_​-p​​ress-​​relea​​se​-re​​gardi​​ng​-th​​e​-exc​​lusiv​​e​-eco​​ nomic​​-zone​-​_ee​z​_​-del​​imita​​tion-​​agree​​ment—sign​​ed​-be​​tween​​-gree​​k​-cyp​​riot-​​admin​​ istra​​tion-​​and​-i​​s​rael​​.en​.m​​fa. 29. Başeren, “Doğu Akdeniz Deniz Yetki Alanları,” 161. 30. MFA, 21 September 2011, accessed February 16, 2020. http:​//​www​​.mfa.​​gov​ .t​​r​/no_​​-216_​​-21​-s​​eptem​​ber​-2​​011_-​​press​​-stat​​ement​​-on​-t​​he​-co​​ntine​​ntal-​​shelf​​-deli​​mitat​​ ion​-a​​greem​​ent​-s​​igned​​-betw​​een​​-t​​urkey​​-and-​​the​-t​​rnc​.e​​n​.mfa​. 31. Yaycı, “Doğu Akdeniz’de,” 17–28. 32. Başeren, “Doğu Akdeniz Deniz Yetki Alanları,” 160. 33. Yusuf Kanlı, “Doğru politikalar eksik uygulamalara kurban gitmemeli,” Kıbrıs Star gazetesi, 14.11.2011, accessed June 2 2012, http:​/​/www​​.star​​kibri​​s​.net​​/inde​​x​.asp​​ ?habe​​rID​​=1​​05522​. 34. MFA, Greek Cypriot’s Unilateral activities, accessed 20 February 2020. http:​/​ /www​​.mfa.​​gov​.t​​r​/gre​​ek​-cy​​priot​​_s​-un​​ilate​​ral​-a​​ctivi​​ties-​​in​-th​​e​-eas​​tern-​​med​it​​erran​​ean​.e​​ n​.mfa​. 35. Yaycı, “Doğu Akdeniz’de,” 34; Başeren, “Doğu Akdeniz Deniz Yetki Alanları,” 140. 36. “Bulletin, no. 57, Law of Sea, 2005,” United Nations, accessed February 5, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​.un.​​org​/D​​epts/​​los​/d​​oalos​​_publ​​icati​​ons​/L​​OSBul​​letin​​s​/bul​​letin​​pdf​​/b​​ ullet​​in57e​​.pdf, 124–125. 37. Başeren, “Doğu Akdeniz’de Gerilim.” 38. Turhan, “GKRY ve İsrail.” 39. Yaycı, “Doğu Akdeniz’de,” 4445.

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“Bulletin no. 54, Law of the Sea, 2004,” United Nations, Accessed February 5, 2020. https​:/​/ww​​w​.un.​​org​/D​​epts/​​los​/d​​oalos​​_publ​​icati​​ons​/L​​OSBul​​letin​​s​/bul​​letin​​pdf​​ /b​​ullet​​in54e​​.pdf. Bulletin, no. 57, Law of Sea, 2005. Accessed 5 February 2020. https​:/​/ww​​w​.un.​​org​/D​​ epts/​​los​/d​​oalos​​_publ​​icati​​ons​/L​​OSBul​​letin​​s​/bul​​letin​​pdf​​/b​​ullet​​in57e​​.pdf. “Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958,” United Nations, Accessed January 16, 2020. https​:/​/le​​gal​.u​​n​.org​​/ilc/​​texts​​/inst​​rumen​​ts​/en​​glish​​/conv​​entio​​ns​/8_​​1​_195​​8​_con​​ t​inen​​tal​_s​​helf.​​pdf. Cyprus Government Gazette, 02 April 2004, Accessed February 27, 2020. http:​ /​/www​​.cyga​​zette​​.com/​​Gazet​​te​.dl​​l/​%7B​​0205C​​F0F​-1​​442​-4​​C20​-8​​E47​-7​​41BB1​​ EFB99​​8​%7D/​​WPPgV​​iew​?I​​ssueN​​o​=382​​9​&Pag​​eNo​=0​​&PgIn​​d​ex​=0​​&Issu​​eDate ​​ =5218​​&Sect​​No​=1. Çelik, Edip. F. Milletlerarası Hukuk, İkinci Kitap. İstanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 1987. Ertürk, Ahmet Cemal. “Doğu Akdeniz’de MEB Paylaşımı: Güney Kıbrıs-İsrail Örneği.” 10 Mayıs 2011, BİLGESAM, Accessed June 2, 2012. http://www​.bilgesam​.org​/tr​/i. Kanlı, Yusuf. “Doğru politikalar eksik uygulamalara kurban gitmemeli.” Kıbrıs Star gazetesi, November 14, 2011, accessed June 2, 2012, http:​/​/www​​.star​​kibri​​s​.net​​/ inde​​x​.asp​​?habe​​rID​​=1​​05522​. Kuran, Selami. Uluslararası Deniz Hukuku, 3. Baskı. İstanbul: Türkmen Kitabevi, 2007. Mees, Cyprus-Lebanon, Cyprus-Israel Offshore Delimitation. Accessed February 16, 2020. https​:/​/ww​​w​.mee​​s​.com​​/2012​​/9​/28​​/op​-e​​d​-doc​​ument​​s​/cyp​​rus​-l​​ebano​​n​-cyp​​rus​ -i​​srael​​-offs​​hore-​​delim​​itati​​on​/f9​​94d75​​0​-6​d1​​a​-11e​​7​-967​​5​-d5a​​0b051​​0107. MFA, 21 December 2010, No. 288. Accessed February 16, 2020. http:​/​/www​​.mfa.​​ gov​.t​​r​/no_​​-288_​​-21​-d​​ecemb​​er​-20​​10_​-p​​ress-​​relea​​se​-re​​gardi​​ng​-th​​e​-exc​​lusiv​​e​-eco​​ nomic​​-zone​-​_ee​z​_​-del​​imita​​tion-​​agree​​ment—sign​​ed​-be​​tween​​-gree​​k​-cyp​​riot-​​admin​​ istra​​tion-​​and​-i​​s​rael​​.en​.m​​fa. MFA, 21 September 2011. Accessed February 16, 2020. http:​/​/www​​.mfa.​​gov​.t​​r​/no_​​ -216_​​-21​-s​​eptem​​ber​-2​​011_-​​press​​-stat​​ement​​-on​-t​​he​-co​​ntine​​ntal-​​shelf​​-deli​​mitat​​ion​ -a​​greem​​ent​-s​​igned​​-betw​​een​​-t​​urkey​​-and-​​the​-t​​rnc​.e​​n​.mfa​. MFA, Greek Cypriot’s Unilateral activities. Accessed February 20, 2020. http:​//​ www​​.mfa.​​gov​.t​​r​/gre​​ek​-cy​​priot​​_s​-un​​ilate​​ral​-a​​ctivi​​ties-​​in​-th​​e​-eas​​tern-​​med​it​​erran​​ean​ .e​​n​.mfa​. MFA, Turkish Foreign Policy on Maritime Boundary Energy Issues in the Eastern Mediterranean. Accessed February 28, 2020. http:​/​/www​​.mfa.​​gov​.t​​r​/sit​​e​_med​​ia​/ht​​ ml​/Tu​​rkish​​-Fore​​ign​-P​​olicy​​-on​-M​​ariti​​me​-Bo​​undar​​y​-Ene​​rgy​-I​​ssues​​-in​-t​​he​​-Ea​​stern​​ -Medi​​terra​​nean.​​pdf. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. Accessed December 21, 2019. https​:/​/ww​​w​.icj​​ -cij.​​org​/f​​i les/​​case-​​relat​​ed​/51​​/051-​​19690​​220​-J​​UD​​-01​​-00​-E​​N​.pdf​. Pazarcı, Hüseyin. Uluslararası Hukuk Dersleri, II. Kitap, 6. Baskı, Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1999. The Republic of Cyprus. Accessed February 27, 2020. http:​/​/www​​.mfa.​​gov​.c​​y​/mfa​​/ mfa2​​016​.n​​sf​/mf​​a84​_e​​n​/mfa​​84​_en​​​?Open​​Docum​​ent. The Republic of Cyprus. Accessed February 2, 2020. http:​/​/www​​.mfa.​​gov​.c​​y​/mfa​​/ mfa2​​016​.n​​sf​/mf​​a86​_e​​n​/mfa​​86​_en​​​?Open​​Docum​​ent.

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The Republic of Cyprus, The Exclusive economic zone and The Continental Shelf Laws 2004 and 2014. Accessed February 2, 2020. https​:/​/ww​​w​.un.​​org​/D​​epts/​​los​/l​​ egisl​​ation​​andtr​​eatie​​s​/pdf​​files​​/cyp_​​eez​-c​​​s​_law​​_2014​​.pdf. Resmi Gazete, 7 Aralık 2019. Accessed February 18, 2020. https​:/​/ww​​w​.res​​migaz​​ete​ .g​​ov​.tr​​/eski​​ler​/2​​019​/1​​2​/201​​​91207​​-3​.pd​​f. Shaw, Malcolm N. International Law, fifth edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. T. C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı. Accessed December 24, 2019. http:​/​/www​​.mfa.​​gov​.t​​r​/no_​​ -216_​​-21​-e​​ylul-​​2011-​​turki​​ye-_-​​kktc-​​kita-​​sahan​​ligi-​​sinir​​landi​​rma​-a​​nlasm​​asi​-i​​mzala​​ nmasi​​na​-il​​iskin​​-disi​​sleri​​-b​aka​​nligi​​-basi​​n​-ac_​​.tr​.m​​fa. Thornton, Helen. “Hugo Grotius and the Freedom of the Seas.” International Journal of Maritime History, 2004: 17–38. Turhan, Turgut. “GKRY ve İsrail Doğu Akdeniz’de neyin peşinde?,” Kıbrıs Gazetesi, 16 Ocak 2011. Accessed June 11, 2012. http:​/​/www​​.kibr​​isgaz​​etesi​​.com/​​print​​.php?​​ news=​​​10999​​3. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Accessed December 20, 2019. https​:/​/ww​​w​.un.​​org​/d​​epts/​​los​/c​​onven​​tion_​​agree​​ments​​/text​​s​/unc​​los​​/u​​nclos​​_e​.pd​​f. U.N. Legislation and Treaties (Israel). Accessed February 16, 2020. https​:/​/ww​​w​.un.​​ org​/D​​epts/​​los​/l​​egisl​​ation​​andtr​​eatie​​s​/sta​​t​efil​​es​/is​​r​.htm​ and https​:/​/ww​​w​.un.​​org​/D​​ epts/​​los​/l​​egisl​​ation​​andtr​​eatie​​s​/pdf​​files​​/trea​​ties/​​cyp​_i​​​sr​_ee​​z​_201​​0​.pdf​. “U. N. to post maps of Libya-Turkey maritime deal,” Ahwal, Feb. 16 2020. Accessed February 29, 2020. https​:/​/ah​​valne​​ws​.co​​m​/tur​​key​-l​​ibya/​​un​-po​​st​-ma​​ps​-li​​bya​-t​​urkey​​​ -mari​​time-​​deal#​. Yaycı, Cihat. “Doğu Akdeniz’de Deniz Yetki Alanlarının Paylaşılması Sorunu ve Türkiye.” Bilge Strateji 4, no. 6 (2012): 1–70.

Chapter 3

Turkey’s Foreign Policy toward the Balkans Policy Principles, New Agendas, and Perceptions Bülent Sarper AĞIR

INTRODUCTION For Turkey, the transition to democracy and a free-market economy in the Balkans in the post–Cold War era has facilitated the improvement of bilateral and multilateral relations with regional countries. In addition to its political, diplomatic, and military engagements, since the 2000s, Turkey has extensively considered the components of identity and culture in its regional politics. Thus, Turkey has been diversifying its foreign policy with new actors, principles, agendas, and instruments. However, Turkey has also continued to contribute to the peacekeeping operations in the region and support the integration of the regional countries with Euro-Atlantic institutions, namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). In this respect, Turkey’s main aim is to contribute to regional peace and security. Since the 2000s, progress in Turkey’s economy, its candidate status for the EU membership, and its increasing efforts to be a soft power1 in the region have been facilitating factors in Turkey’s Balkans policy. In respect of Turkey’s soft power implementations, the institutions such as the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), Yunus Emre Institute, and Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities have played key roles through the restoration of the historical buildings, establishing the student exchange programs, and creating joint projects. Moreover, the regional platforms such as the Southeast European Countries Cooperation Process 35

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(SEECP) and the Regional Cooperation Council have been a foreign policy priority for Turkey. This chapter intends to analyze the Turkish foreign policy toward the Balkans region, particularly focusing on the last two decades. Accordingly, the main concerns, principles, instruments, and perceptions of Turkey’s Balkans policy will be evaluated. With this analysis, some questions such as how Turkey’s activism has evolved since the end of the Cold War and to what extent Turkey’s role and actorness is relevant will be critically assessed. The end of the Cold War, policies of the United States and the EU toward the Balkans, Turkey’s relations with regional countries, “neo-Ottomanist” allegations about Turkey’s Balkans policy, and the growing role of soft power elements in Turkish foreign policy will constitute the main subject matters of the chapter. TURKEY’S BALKANS POLICY DURING THE 1990S In the formulation of the Turkish foreign policy, the Balkans region has an important place, and traditionally, Turkey has supported the peace, security, and stability in the region. In accordance with Turkey’s general foreign policy direction, Turkey’s Balkans policy is designed in interaction with global and regional developments. Turkey’s regional relations with the United States and other Western allies and Turkey’s security perceptions, domestic developments, economic issues, and vulnerability to the humanitarian issues in the region are all the main determinants of Turkey’s Balkans policy.2 In the post–Cold War era, Turkey’s geographical placement in the region, Balkans-origin people of Turkey’s population, conflicts in the region and their implications on Turkey, and the Balkans’ place as a gateway of Turkey to Europe were the strategic reasons for Turkey’s active foreign policy in the region. On the other hand, Turkey sought to avoid a religious and ethnicbased foreign policy to seem a part of any polarization in the region. Until the late 1990s, Turkey’s presence in the region was limited to the realm of high politics and was constrained by the Turkish Republic’s secularist outlook.3 The ethnic conflicts and political turmoil during the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and the risk of spillover of them caused concern in Turkey.4 Therefore, at the initial stage, Turkey principally supported each country’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence in the region. However, following the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia’s independence declarations by the EU, Turkey recognized all newly independent republics of the former Yugoslavia in 1992. During the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Turkey pursued an active diplomacy campaign to involve the members of international society such as the United Nations (UN), NATO, and the

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Organization of Islamic Conference in the war and to seek effective actions to end hostilities. Consequently, Dayton Agreement was signed between parties in November 1995, and Bosnia-Herzegovina’s territorial integrity and sovereignty could be preserved. When the armed conflicts broke out in Kosovo in 1998, Turkey made intensive efforts for a diplomatic solution to the issue and engaged in bilateral and multilateral consultations. Turkey’s cautious policy about the Kosovo question disappeared with Turkey’s involvement in NATO operation against Yugoslavia in March 1999.5 After the end of the NATO bombing and following the Serbian forces’ withdrawal from Kosovo, Turkey contributed to the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) in July 1999. As it can be observed, Turkish foreign policy throughout this period sought to engage in the international community’s efforts to project stability in the region.6 In terms of diplomatic initiatives to stabilize the region, Turkey was involved in the SEECP, the Stability Pact, and the NATO-led Southeast European Initiative. Additionally, Turkey is also involved in international peacekeeping and peace-building operations in the region. While Turkey avoided unilateral military actions, it did not hesitate to support and encourage the operations that sought to restore peace and stability in the region. In this respect, Turkey participated in the Implementation Force and Stabilization Force (SFOR) and Combined Police Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, UN Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia, and Operation “Alba” in Albania. Thus, during the 1990s, Turkey was targeted to contribute to stability and security in the region. PRINCIPLES OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE BALKANS DURING THE 2000S Turkey’s intent to enhance its relations with regional actors has been documented in its national strategy toward the Balkans in the following way: Basic elements of Turkey’s policy towards the Balkans can be summarized as follows: developing relations to the highest level with the Balkan countries and enhancing the existing atmosphere of regional peace and stability . . . Historical relationship and good neighborly relations, based on mutual respect in support of independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, as well as noninterference in domestic affairs—all constitute favorable grounds for furthering relations in all fields.7

Accordingly, Turkish foreign policy in recent years has been followed in consideration of several underlying principles such as rhythmic diplomacy,

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multi-dimensional foreign policy, zero problems with neighbors, order instituting actor, and proactive foreign policy.8 Indeed, Turkish foreign policy has undergone significant changes in its understanding, vision, tools, and mechanisms used during the 2000s. This process gained momentum after Ahmet Davutoğlu took up his post in 2009 as the minister of foreign affairs.9 For Davutoğlu, it should be considered not only the geographic position of Turkey, but also its culture, history, and civilization in the formulation of Turkish foreign policy. The peculiarity of Turkey in terms of geoculture would provide dynamism in its foreign policy.10 Therefore, in addition to traditional components of national power, Davutoğlu added two power components in his formulation of Turkish foreign policy: history and culture, which are commonalities and advantages to both sides—Turkey and all Balkan countries.11 In terms of relations with the Balkans, European integration, robust economic growth, increasing cultural attractiveness, and the slowdown of the EU enlargement process have all enabled Ankara to pursue a more activist and unilateralist policy of engagement since 2009.12 According to Davutoğlu’s major work on the Balkans under the title of “A Forward Looking Vision for the Balkans,” fundamental policy principles of Turkey’s Balkans policy can be summarized by the key concepts of regional ownership and inclusiveness, regional integration, European integration, and establishment of a common stance in regional and international organizations.13 As the first policy principle, the concept of regional ownership means that the region’s problems should be resolved by the participation and will of the regional actors. It is also a reflection of the proactive diplomacy conception of new Turkish foreign policy. It includes a leadership role for solving problems in near abroad of Turkey and for developing relations with other countries. One of the most practical results of proactive diplomacy has been the facilitator role of Turkey in the context of Bosniak-Serb disagreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this respect, the trilateral mechanism between Turkey, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia, for instance, has constituted a historical step for providing regional stability. The second policy principle is regional integration. In this respect, Turkey believes that the SEECP and Regional Cooperation Council can mobilize the regional dynamics in the context of common targets. The SEECP, including Turkey, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Greece, Croatia, Montenegro, and Moldavia as a full member, is a symbol of efforts for developing regional cooperative relationships. The slogan of the Turkish Chairmanship of the SEECP during 2009–2010, “From Shared History to Common Future,” is an indication of Turkey’s attitude toward the Balkans.14 On the other hand, Regional Cooperation Council which includes members of the SEECP, UN Mission in Kosovo, Troika

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countries of the EU, and other international organizations determines its basic mission in terms of maintaining regional cooperation, providing political dialogue, and promoting Euro-Atlantic integration process of the region. The third policy principle is the importance of taking the European integration process into account. Accordingly, Turkey desires to see the Balkans as “an integral part” of Europe rather than a periphery. In 2010, the European Commission noted Turkey’s activism in the Balkans in its Progress Report by stating: “Turkey has taken a number of initiatives in the Western Balkans, expressing commitment to promoting peace and stability in the region. Turkey supports the integration of all countries in the region both with the EU and at the Euro-Atlantic level.”15 In the early 2000s, Turkish foreign policy toward the Balkans had a relatively low profile in its strategic assessments since developments in the Middle East and the EU’s increasing responsibility in the Balkans. In this respect, the EU’s Thessaloniki Summit in 2003 opened up eventual membership for the regional countries. While the EU has become a determinant factor in the region, it also pushed Turkey into a marginalized position.16 Thus, it can be easily understood why Turkish decision-makers emphasize historical and cultural elements in formulating Turkey’s Balkans policy. The economic crisis in Eurozone countries as a result of the recent global financial crisis, the migration/refugee crisis, and the Brexit process has completely sidelined the enlargement policy within the EU.17 The slowdown of the EU enlargement process has enabled Ankara to pursue a more assertive foreign policy toward the Balkans, particularly since 2009.18 However, it should be mentioned that the EU integration process is far more “strategic” than any other partnership offers from Russia, Turkey, or the United States.19 For instance, the mediator role of the EU has been determinant in the normalization process between Serbia and Kosovo, and both Serbs and Kosovars look toward Brussels for a solution, not any other international actor such as Turkey.20 The fourth policy principle necessitates the development of a common stance and position in regional and global organizations. Thus, it is believed that collectively, countries of the Balkans region can act cooperatively in terms of regional and global issues. For example, in March 2009, during his visit to Turkey, Serbian foreign minister Vuk Jeremic stated that Serbia voted in favor of Turkey during the election of non-permanent membership to the UN Security Council. These four Turkish foreign policy principles toward the Balkans have been formulated in the context of radical changes in the region with the new millennium. However, while peace and stability were gradually restored throughout the region,21 similar to the 1990s, Turkey’s security policy in the region during the Justice and Development Party (JDP) government

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continued to have two main pillars. First of all, Turkey has continued to participate in the EU and NATO-led peacekeeping missions in the region and provided firm support to the regional countries in their endeavor to become part of NATO.22 In this framework, Turkey has contributed to the EU Force Althea, which replaced the NATO-led SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, the NATO-led KFOR, and the EU’s Operations of Concordia (military) in Macedonia. Secondly, Turkey has sought to develop its bilateral military ties with the regional states through defense cooperation agreements, donation of military equipment, and training of officers in Turkish military academies.23 Thus, Turkey intends to contribute the stability and security of the region. Another similarity can be observed in Turkish foreign policy toward Macedonia’s stability and security and Kosovo issue in the 2000s. The Balkans region has become relatively stable since the 2000s, with the exception of short-lived armed conflicts between ethnic Albanian militias and Macedonian security forces in Macedonia in 2001. The efforts of the international community helped to have a compromise between conflicting parties by signing of Ohrid Agreement in August 2001. Turkey considered the Ohrid Agreement as an important step for the stability of Macedonia and followingly participated in the NATO-led Operation Essential Harvest in order to disarm the Albanian militias. One of the most complicated questions in the Balkans for Turkey was the dispute over Kosovo. In the 2000s, in terms of the final status of Kosovo, Turkey followed an extremely cautious policy and pursued it until the declaration of Kosovo’s independence. During his Pristina and Belgrade visits in October 2005, Turkish minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül stated: “Kosovo cannot turn to the period before the NATO operation, cannot be divided and annexed to any country.” Accordingly, Turkey acted with the international community in the process of determination of Kosovo’s final status. Following the declaration of Kosovo’s independence on February 17, 2008, Turkey recognized Kosovo Republic right after recognizing this country by the United States. The recognition of Kosovo’s independence by Ankara cast a shadow on Turkey-Serbia relations for a while. In the direction of its general policy, Belgrade withdrew its ambassador in Ankara. Despite Serbia’s reaction to Turkey, Ankara avoided straining its relations with Serbia. THE MEDIATOR AND FACILITATOR ROLE OF TURKEY: THE CASE OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA Like the 1990s, Turkey’s interest in preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina has continued during the JDP period.

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Ankara has continued to improve its close political, military-diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with this country. In this respect, Turkey has given attention to developing close relations with all ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Accordingly, Turkey has started to take a conciliator and mediator role in Bosnia-Herzegovina through the inclusion of Serbia due to its considerable leverage on Bosnian Serbs. Recognition of Belgrade’s central importance in establishing peace and stability in the Balkans by Ankara, and as a response, significant support lent by Belgrade in Turkish initiatives to broker peace in the Balkans have facilitated the Turkey/Serbia/Bosnia-Herzegovina trilateral mechanism. Indeed, for today’s Bosnia-Herzegovina, the growing autonomy of the Serbian entity and its leadership’s questioning attitudes about empowering of a central Bosnian state constitute a source of contention on sovereignty and integrity of the country. With the failure of the Butmir Process as a joint attempt of the United States-EU to contribute to the solution of the problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ankara launched its initiative to bring the parties together and encourage them to have more dialogue with each other.24 In this framework, Turkey helped steer negotiations between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Turkey took the initiative to improve bilateral relations with Serbia when President Abdullah Gül visited Belgrade on October 26–27, 2009. During this visit, while Serbian president Boris Tadic emphasized the “strategic dimension” of relations between Turkey and Serbia, President Gül emphasized Turkey-Serbia relations’ strategic characteristic in terms of solving many regional issues. The two presidents confirmed the integrity of BosniaHerzegovina for the stability of the region.25 The rapprochement between Serbia and Turkey had immediate positive reflections on the relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. On February 10, 2010, the Bosnian Foreign Ministry declared that after a series of trilateral meetings between Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and Turkey, Belgrade decided to accept BosniaHerzegovina’s ambassador after a three-year interruption.26 Moreover, on March 31, 2010, the Serbian parliament adopted a declaration condemning the crimes against humanity in Srebrenica. On April 24, 2010, President Abdullah Gül, Serbian president Boris Tadic, and the chairman of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidential Council Haris Siljadzic came together in İstanbul for the first trilateral summit and expressed their commitment to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina through the signing of the İstanbul Declaration on Peace and Stability in the Balkans. During the summit, Serbian president Tadic stated that “Serbia would not undertake any steps that would destabilize Bosnia-Herzegovina, nor would it challenge its borders and its integrity, which would endanger the stability in the region.” Thus, the summit was

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“a turning point” and “a new beginning” in terms of diplomatic relations between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.27 The second trilateral summit was convened on April 26, 2011, in Karadjordjevo, Serbia, with Gül, Tadic, and three members of the Bosnian Presidency, Nebojsa Radmanovic, Bakir Izetbegovic, and Zeljko Komsic.28 As the most important outcome of the summit, Boris Tadic said that “Serbia will never back a referendum in Bosnia that would lead to a division of Bosnia and question its territorial integrity and entirety.” It was a surprising reaction to the referendum plan of Milorad Dodik, the president of the Republika Srpska entity of Bosnia-Herzegovina.29 On the other hand, during Karadjordjevo Summit, Tadic said also that “I expect the same kind of principled position by all countries in the region when it comes to Serbia’s integrity.”30 Speech of Tadic displayed that a final solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina is still connected to Kosovo’s status. The third summit among parties took place in May 2013, where the three presidents signed an agreement on economic cooperation.31 On January 29, 2018, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan hosted Serbian president Aleksandar Vucic and presidency member of Bosnia-Herzegovina Bakir Izetbegovic in İstanbul. Thus, trilateral meetings at the presidential level were renewed after five years. The three presidents reiterated the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina.32 Consequently, through the trilateral consultation mechanisms, Turkey demonstrated that it has a crucial potential to contribute to establishing sustainable peace and economic development and more harmonious relations between the ethnic groups living in the region. However, when involved in sensitive mediation efforts, it is argued that Turkey should find international partners who can dissipate the notion that it has a hidden agenda in pursuit of its state ambitions.33 Indeed, Turkish efforts have been met in some corners of the region with considerable mistrust. For instance, while most Bosniaks see the Turkish presence as guaranteeing their interests in a future unified state, Bosnian Serb leaders perceive the Turkish involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a potential challenge to the autonomy of the Serbian entity.34 For example, Milorad Dodik explained the involvement of Turkey in BosniaHerzegovina in the following words: “If I went to Turkey and talked about the Kurds and their problems in Turkey and demanded that their election procedures be changed, it would be the same.”35 As another case, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s famous statement in Kosovo on October 23, 2013, that “Turkey is Kosovo, and Kosovo is Turkey” led to the cancellation of Serbian president Tomislav Nikolic’s participation in the next trilateral meeting.36

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NEW ACTORS, NEW AGENDAS, AND NEW CONCEPTS IN TURKEY’S BALKANS POLICY Birgül Demirtaş argues that while the fundamental goals of Turkish foreign policy toward the Balkans have remained almost the same, the partial differences can be observed in new instruments and agendas during the JDP government.37 During the 2000s, apart from political, diplomatic, and military relations with the Balkans, economic initiatives and soft power implementations have increased their importance in Turkish foreign policy. Indeed, Turkey has expanded the reach of its soft power, particularly in the Western Balkans, to a considerable extent through the building of educational institutions and cultural centers, providing scholarship opportunities to the local populations and restoring the monuments inherited from the Ottoman era.38 By implementing soft power, Turkey has aimed to further promote itself as a potential partner and an influential actor within the region. With the JDP governments in the 2000s, non-conventional foreign policy actors of the Turkish state such as the TIKA and the presidency of Religious Affairs have increased their role in Turkish foreign policy toward the Balkans.39 Here are strong links between Muslims and Turks in the region and Turkey due to the historical and cultural bonds. Turkey hosts around 10–12 million people who partly have roots in the Balkans.40 They have put pressure on their governments for establishing good relations with other states in the region as a pressure group. Moreover, there are 9 million people in the Balkans who identify themselves as Muslim41 and consider Turkey as an important regional actor. Turkey seeks to benefit from the region’s Muslim populations as anchors for its engagement. However, in much of the region, there is a perception of growing Islamization in Turkey itself, which is viewed negatively in the religiously moderate and secular Balkan societies.42 Turkey’s cultural opening to the region is a significant attempt of the JDP governments for the consolidation of ties with the regional countries. In this framework, the Yunus Emre Institute was established in 2007 and has acted with thirteen of its cultural centers in six Balkan countries so far.43 Yunus Emre centers are not just places where the Turkish language is taught, but they also host events for seminars of prominent Turkish authors. Turkish art courses are offered, and some centers have been promoting Turkish use by providing it as foreign language elective courses at secondary schools.44 These centers would help Turkey to increase its cultural influence in the region. One dimension of Turkish foreign policy toward the region has been related with its engagement with Muslim populations of the region. While the followers of the doctrine of Wahhabism have become increasingly

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active throughout the Western Balkan region during the last three decades,45 Turkey has an ideal position to assert itself as a democratic model among Muslim-majority countries. Indeed, in the eyes of the international community and states such as Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and North Macedonia, Turkey is viewed as a country capable of promoting “moderate Islam” in the region.46 Turkish Islam is seen as “softer” than the one in the Gulf region and a barrier to fundamentalist influences. For instance, both Muslims and Christians in North Macedonia agree on the idea with high degrees (81.7% and 67.5%) that “Turkey can be a model for Muslim countries.”47 Another important aspect of Turkish foreign policy toward the region is related to the economy. Although Turkey’s political, cultural, and diplomatic influence in the region has increased substantially, there is still massive room for improvement, especially economically.48 Even though Turkey has sought to increase the volume of its economic relations with the region, the global economic crisis of 2008 caused a significant drop of Turkey’s share in Bosnia’s trade volume from 4% to more than 2.5%. In the case of North Macedonia, Turkey’s share in its trade turnover is around 3.5%.49 To eliminate the negative impacts of the global economic crisis over the Balkans and search and negotiate for ways to develop economic relations among the countries of the region, Turkey hosted the “First Balkan Economic Summit” in November 2008. The summit agreed to foster close economic cooperation to use the regional countries’ potentials efficiently. Recently, energy pipeline projects have also been another element in Turkey’s political and economic vision regarding the Balkans. During Russian president Vladimir Putin’s visit to Turkey in December 2014, a memorandum of understanding was signed between Russia’s Gazprom and Turkey’s Petroleum Pipeline Corporation to construct a new project called the Turkish Stream. Turkish Stream envisioned delivering natural gas from Russia to Turkey via the Black Sea and then further to the Balkans. On April 7, 2015, Turkey, Greece, Serbia, North Macedonia, and Hungary announced that they are ready to join the Turkish Stream. Turkish Stream would have enabled Turkey to play a very central role in the Balkan energy security scene.50 “NEO-OTTOMANIST” ALLEGATIONS FOR THE TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE BALKANS While the emphasis on the Ottoman legacy in the formulation of Turkey’s foreign policy started back in the 1990s, it has become more expressed during the 2000s.51 Although previously mind-master of Turkey’s foreign policy

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Ahmet Davutoğlu rejected claims about neo-Ottomanism, he believes that historical heritage of the Ottoman period should be considered as one of the central elements in organizing Turkey’s foreign policy.52 In his pioneering book Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth), different from Turkish foreign policy’s secularist outlook, Davutoğlu argued that Turkey should base its Balkans policy on the two important Muslim peoples of the region: Bosniaks and Albanians.53 Davutoğlu expressed that “we have more Bosnians in Turkey than in Bosnia itself, more Albanians than in Albania . . . Because of these historical connections, all these countries have certain expectations from us.”54 This perspective displays that cultural, religious, and ethnic factors are an integral part of the relations between Turkey and the Balkan countries. It is argued that there are two different perceptions of Turkey in the region. Some observers perceive Turkey as a rising regional power, whereas others hold that Turkey is pursuing a neo-Ottomanist foreign policy in the region.55 In terms of latter perception, new assertiveness of Turkish foreign policy has led to the rise of suspicions about Turkey’s “true intentions” in the region. In this respect, emotional rhetorics of the Turkish politicians and diplomats can cause doubts among particularly the non-Muslim populations of the region. For example, during his visit to Sarajevo in October 2009, Ahmet Davutoğlu made a speech in which he stated that Turkey would seek to re-create and establish a “golden age” of the Balkans witnessed during Ottoman period.56 However, Nebojsa Radmanovic, the Serbian member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina presidency, interpreted the statement of Davutoğlu as “an imperialistic intention towards the Balkans.”57 As another example, Turkish national education minister Ömer Dinçer said that negative expressions about the Ottomans and Turks in Kosovar history books should be expunged during his visit to Kosovo in August 2011. His statement triggered the debate in Kosovo over the Ottoman and Turkish image. Particularly, the non-Muslim populations in the region tend to see the new Turkish engagement either as the return of the “former occupier” who demonstrates its imperial ambitions again or as a protector of Balkan’s Muslims.58 Therefore, it is important to state that since sometimes one speech or one misunderstood statement can have tremendous negative repercussions, it is necessary to be very careful in dealing with this very sensitive neighborhood. It will be reasonable to focus on common targets like European integration and pursue an inclusive foreign policy perspective by considering all regions’ identity groups. Accordingly, by rejecting the description of the new Turkish foreign policy as “neo-Ottoman,” Davutoğlu emphasized the significance of the EU and NATO in Turkey’s Balkans policy.59 Otherwise, Turkey cannot convince the public opinion of the Balkans for its impartial approach to the region.

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CONCLUSION Turkey will continue to play a crucial role in the Balkans thanks to its political, economic, historical, cultural, and religious bonds with the region. However, the extent of this role will depend on the European integration process of the rest of the Balkans. As a matter of fact, one of the main determinants of multilateral relations in the Balkans is the integration efforts of the regional countries with Euro-Atlantic institutions. Turkey supports and promotes this integration process of the region and also believes that the achievement of Euro-Atlantic integration of the region will guarantee sustainable regional peace, stability, and welfare. The last decade of the 20th century clearly displayed that regional disputes and conflicts in the Balkans can directly influence Turkey. It is not only related to the existence of relative communities of Turkey in the Balkan countries and Balkan originated citizens in Turkey, but also the geostrategic, economic, and political importance of the region for Turkey. Therefore, Turkey has continued to be a highly relevant actor with its contributions in peacekeeping missions. Furthermore, Turkey has cooperatively been involved in regional institutional platforms and played a facilitator and mediator role among disputing parties for reaching a compromise. Indeed, the general objectives of Turkey’s foreign policy toward the Balkans are the strengthening of regional peace, security, and stability and improving bilateral and multilateral relations with regional countries. A new discourse, new issues, and role conceptions appeared in Turkey’s Balkan relations starting from the early 1990s but consolidated in the 2000s.60 The slowing of EU accession talks for the Western Balkans has paved the way for Turkey to find new opportunities to expand and deepen the relations throughout the region. The appreciation of the importance of the common cultural, societal, and political linkages with the region resulted in developing a combination of soft power and economic agendas for the region.61 However, Turkey should continue to regard the global actors and regional dynamics and the position of regional actors while formulating its policies for the region. NOTES 1. İbrahim Kalın, “Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey,” Perceptions 26, no. 3 (2011): 5–23. 2. İlhan Uzgel, “Türkiye ve Balkanlar: Bölgesel Güç Yanılsamasının Sonu,” in Beş Deniz Havzasında Türkiye, ed. Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2006), 219–220.

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3. Kerem Öktem, “Global Diyanet and Multiple Networks: Turkey’s New Presence in the Balkans,” Journal of Muslims in Europe 1, no. 1 (2012): 27–58. 4. İlhan Uzgel, “Relations with Balkans,” in Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006, Facts and Analyses with Documents, ed. Baskın Oran (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2010), 818–822. 5. Uzgel, “Türkiye ve Balkanlar,” 232. 6. Gülnur Aybet, “Turkey’s Long and Winding Road to the EU: Implications for the Balkans,” Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 8/1 (2006): 77. 7. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Turkish Strategy towards the Balkans,” accessed April 15, 2020, http:​/​/www​​.mfa.​​gov​.t​​r​/rel​​ation​​s​-wit​​h​-the​​-balk​​an​-re​​​gion.​​ en​.mf​​a. 8. Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision, an Assessment of 2007,” Insight Turkey 10, no. 1 (2008): 77–96. 9. Bülent Aras, “Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy Revisited,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 16, no. 4 (2014): 404. 10. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik, Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001), 545–547. 11. Cüneyt Yenigün, “Turkey’s Balkans Policy: Resurrection of Turkey in the Balkans,” in Balkans: Foreign Affairs, Politics, and Socio-Cultures, ed. Cüneyt Yenigün and Ferdinand Gjana (Tirana: Epoka University Publications, 2011), 539–540. 12. Dimitar Bechev, “Turkey in the Balkans: Taking a Broader View,” Insight Turkey 14, no. 1 (2012): 133. 13. Ahmet Davutoğlu, “A Forward Looking Vision for the Balkans,” Center for Strategic Research, Turkish Foreign Ministry, accessed on March 16, 2020, http:​//​ sam​​.gov.​​tr​/wp​​-cont​​ent​/u​​pload​​s​/201​​2​/01/​​visio​​n​_pa​p​​er​_en​​1​.pdf​. 14. Oya Dursun-Özkanca, “Turkey and the European Union: Strategic Partner or Competitors in the Western Balkans?,” Journal of Regional Security 11, no. 1 (2016): 37. 15. European Commission, “Turkey 2010 Progress Report,” COM(2010) 660, accessed December 12, 2019, http://bit​.ly​/1W5hxSJ. 16. Uzgel, “Relations with Balkans,” 817–839. 17. Florian Bieber and Nikolaos Tzifakis, “The Western Balkans as a Geopolitical Chessboard: Myths, Realities and Policy Options,” BiEPAG Policy Brief, accessed February 5, 2020, http:​/​/bie​​pag​.e​​u​/wp-​​conte​​nt​/up​​loads​​/2019​​/08​/T​​he​_We​​stern​​_Balk​​ ans​_a​​s​_a​_G​​eopol​​iti​ca​​l​_Che​​ssboa​​rd​.pd​​f. 18. Bechev, “Turkey in the Balkans,” 133. 19. Zarko Petrovic and Dusan Reljic, “Turkish Interests and Involvement in the Western Balkans: A Score-Card,” Insight Turkey 13, no. 3 (2011): 170. 20. Bechev, “Turkey in the Balkans,” 141. 21. Uzgel, “Relations with Balkans,” 817–839. 22. Fatma A. Kelkitli, “Turkey and the Western Balkans during the AKP Period,” Avrasya Etüdleri 19, no. 44 (2013): 97. 23. Kelkitli, “Turkey and the,” 97. 24. Erhan Türbedar, “How Is Turkish Foreign Policy Is Perceived in the Balkans,” Center for Eurasian Studies, 1 April 2010, accessed April 19, 2020, https​ :/​ /

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av​​im​.or​​g​.tr/​​Blog/​​HOW​-I​​S​-TUR​​KISH-​​FOREI​​GN​-PO​​LICY-​​PERCE​​IVED-​​​IN​-TH​​E​ -BAL​​KANS. 25. Kadri Gürsel, “Stratejik Ortak Sırbistan,” Milliyet Gazetesi, 29 October 2009, accessed March 1, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​.mil​​liyet​​.com.​​tr​/ya​​zarla​​r​/kad​​ri​-gu​​rsel/​​strat​​ejik-​​ ortak​​-sirb​​​istan​​-1155​​766. 26. Kelkitli, “Turkey and the,” 95. 27. Muhidin Mulalic, “Prospects for Trilateral Relations between Turkey, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Insight Turkey 21, no. 2 (2019): 130–131. 28. Mulalic, “Prospects for Trilateral,” 131. 29. Kelkitli, “Turkey and the,” 95–96. 30. Mulalic, “Prospects for Trilateral.” 31. Dursun-Özkanca, “Turkey and the,” 37. 32. Mulalic, “Prospects for Trilateral,” 133. 33. Janusz Bugajski, “Turkey’s Impact in the Western Balkans,” Atlantic Council, 2012, accessed on March 5, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​.atl​​antic​​counc​​il​.or​​g​/wp-​​conte​​nt​/up​​ loads​​/2011​​/12​/0​​30112​​_ACU​S​​_Buga​​jski.​​PDF. 34. Petrovic and Reljic, “Turkish Interests,” 161. 35. Tanjug, “Turkey Interferes in Bosnia’s Internal Affairs,” 5 May 2012, accessed on April 20, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​.b92​​.net/​​eng​/n​​ews​/r​​egion​​.php?​​yyyy=​​2012&​​mm​=05​​ &dd​=0​​​5​&nav​​_id​=8​​0097. 36. Zoltan Egeresi, “Neo-Ottomanist Hegemonic Order and its Implications on Ankara’s Foreign Policy in the Balkans” (PhD diss., Corvinus University of Budapest, 2018), 189. 37. Birgül Demirtaş, “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans: A Europeanized Foreign Policy in a De-Europeanized National Context?,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 17, no. 2 (2015): 130. 38. Kelkitli, “Turkey and the,” 103. 39. Öktem, “Global Diyanet,” 29–30. 40. Adam Balcer, “Turkey and the Western Balkans: Between Soft Security and the Ottoman Legacy,” Atlantic Council, Center for European Strategy, 2013, accessed on February 15, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​.atl​​antic​​counc​​il​.or​​g​/wp-​​conte​​nt​/up​​loads​​ /2012​​/1​1​/B​​alcer​​.pdf. 41. Kerem Öktem, “Between Emigration, De-Islamization and the Nation-State: Muslim Communities in the Balkans Today,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 11, no. 2 (2011): 158. 42. Bugajski, “Turkey’s Impact.” 43. Egeresi, “Neo-Ottomanist Hegemonic,” 198. 44. Demirtaş, “Turkish Foreign,” 133. 45. Christopher Deliso, The Coming Balkan Caliphate: The Threat of Radical Islam to Europe and the West (London: Praeger, 2007). 46. Öktem, “Global Diyanet,” 29. 47. Sadi Bilgiç and Salih Akyürek, Balkanlar’da Türkiye ve Türk Algısı (İstanbul: Bilgesam, 2012), 62. 48. Balcer, “Turkey and the.” 49. Balcer, “Turkey and the.”

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50. Dursun-Özkanca, “Turkey and the,” 45. 51. Uzgel, “Relations with Balkans,” 834. 52. Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign.” 53. Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik, 316–319. 54. Roman Muzalevsky, “Turkey’s New Foreign Policy in the World,” American Diplomacy, 2012, accessed April 10, 2020, http:​/​/www​​.unc.​​edu​/d​​epts/​​diplo​​mat​/i​​tem​ /2​​012​/0​​106​/c​​a​/muz​​alevs​​​ky​_tu​​rkey.​​html. 55. Türbedar, “How Is Turkish.” 56. Bülent Sarper Ağır and Murat Necip Arman, “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Western Balkans in the Post-Cold War Era: Political and Security Dimensions,” in Turkey’s Foreign Policy and Security Perspectives in the 21st Century: Prospects and Challenges, ed. Sertif Demir (Boca Raton: Brown Walker Press, 2016), 153. 57. Edina Becirevic, “The Theory and Practice of Ahmet Davutoğlu,” Democracy and Security in Southeastern Europe 1, no. 1 (2010): 59. 58. Zarko Petrovic, Turkey in the Western Balkans, Goals and Means of the New Foreign Policy (Belgrade: The International and Security Affairs Centre, 2011). 59. Ağır and Arman, “Turkish Foreign.” 60. Demirtaş, “Turkish Foreign.” 61. Ağır and Arman, “Turkish Foreign.”

REFERENCES Ağır, Bülent Sarper and Murat Necip Arman. “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Western Balkans in the Post-Cold War Era: Political and Security Dimensions.” In Turkey’s Foreign Policy and Security Perspectives in the 21st Century: Prospects and Challenges, edited by Sertif Demir, 143–166. Boca Raton: Brown Walker Press, 2016. Aras, Bülent. “Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy Revisited.” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 16, no. 4 (2014): 404–418. Aybet, Gülnur. “Turkey’s Long and Winding Road to the EU: Implications for the Balkans.” Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 8, no. 1 (2006): 65–83. Balcer, Adam. “Turkey and the Western Balkans: Between Soft Security and the Ottoman Legacy.” Atlantic Council, Center for European Strategy. 2013. Accessed February 15, 2020. https​:/​/ww​​w​.atl​​antic​​counc​​il​.or​​g​/wp-​​conte​​nt​/up​​loads​​/2012​​/1​1​/B​​ alcer​​.pdf. Bechev, Dimitar. “Turkey in the Balkans: Taking a Broader View.” Insight Turkey 14, no. 1 (2012): 131–146. Becirevic, Edina. “The Theory and Practice of Ahmet Davutoğlu.” Democracy and Security in Southeastern Europe 1, no. 1 (2010): 56–60. Bieber, Florian and Nikolaos Tzifakis. “The Western Balkans as a Geopolitical Chessboard: Myths, Realities and Policy Options.” BiEPAG Policy Brief, 2019. Accessed February 5, 2020. http:​/​/bie​​pag​.e​​u​/wp-​​conte​​nt​/up​​loads​​/2019​​/08​/T​​he​_We​​ stern​​_Balk​​ans​_a​​s​_a​_G​​eopol​​iti​ca​​l​_Che​​ssboa​​rd​.pd​​f.

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Bilgiç, Sadi and Salih Akyürek. Balkanlar’da Türkiye ve Türk Algısı. İstanbul: Bilgesam, 2012. Bugajski, Janusz. “Turkey’s Impact in the Western Balkans.” Atlantic Council. 2012. Accessed March 5, 2020. https​:/​/ww​​w​.atl​​antic​​counc​​il​.or​​g​/wp-​​conte​​nt​/up​​loads​​ /2011​​/12​/0​​30112​​_ACU​S​​_Buga​​jski.​​PDF. Davutoğlu, Ahmet. Stratejik Derinlik, Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu. İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001. Davutoğlu, Ahmet. “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision, An Assessment of 2007.” Insight Turkey 10, no. 1 (2008): 77–96. Davutoğlu, Ahmet. “A Forward Looking Vision for the Balkans.” Center for Strategic Research, Turkish Foreign Ministry, 2011. Accessed March 16, 2020. http:​/​/sam​​.gov.​​tr​/wp​​-cont​​ent​/u​​pload​​s​/201​​2​/01/​​visio​​n​_pa​p​​er​_en​​1​.pdf​. Deliso, Christopher. The Coming Balkan Caliphate: The Threat of Radical Islam to Europe and the West. London: Praeger, 2007. Demirtaş, Birgül. “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans: A Europeanized Foreign Policy in a De-Europeanized National Context?” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 17/2 (2015): 123–140. Dursun-Özkanca, Oya. “Turkey and the European Union: Strategic Partner or Competitors in the Western Balkans?” Journal of Regional Security 11, no. 1 (2016): 33–54. Egeresi, Zoltan. “Neo-Ottomanist Hegemonic Order and Its Implications on Ankara’s Foreign Policy in the Balkans.” PhD diss., Corvinus University of Budapest, 2018. European Commission. “Turkey 2010 Progress Report.” COM (2010) 660. 2010. Accessed December 12, 2019. http://bit​.ly​/1W5hxSJ. Gürsel, Kadri. “Stratejik Ortak Sırbistan.” Milliyet Gazetesi, 29 October 2009. Accessed on March 1, 2020. https​:/​/ww​​w​.mil​​liyet​​.com.​​tr​/ya​​zarla​​r​/kad​​ri​-gu​​rsel/​​ strat​​ejik-​​ortak​​-sirb​​​istan​​-1155​​766. Kalın, İbrahim. “Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey.” Perceptions 26/3 (2011): 5–23. Kelkitli, Fatma A. “Turkey and the Western Balkans during the AKP Period.” Avrasya Etüdleri 19, no. 44 (2013): 89–110. Mulalic, Muhidin. “Prospects for Trilateral Relations between Turkey, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Insight Turkey 21, no. 2 (2019): 129–148. Muzalevsky, Roman. “Turkey’s New Foreign Policy in the World.” American Diplomacy 2012. Accessed April 10, 2020. http:​/​/www​​.unc.​​edu​/d​​epts/​​diplo​​mat​/i​​ tem​/2​​012​/0​​106​/c​​a​/muz​​alevs​​​ky​_tu​​rkey.​​html. Öktem, Kerem. “Between Emigration, De-Islamization and the Nation-State: Muslim Communities in the Balkans Today.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 11, no. 2 (2011): 155–171. Öktem, Kerem. “Global Diyanet and Multiple Networks: Turkey’s New Presence in the Balkans.” Journal of Muslims in Europe 1, no. 1 (2012): 27–58. Petrovic, Zarko. Turkey in the Western Balkans, Goals and Means of the New Foreign Policy. Belgrade: The International and Security Affairs Centre, 2011. Petrovic, Zarko and Dusan Reljic. “Turkish Interests and Involvement in the Western Balkans: A Score-Card.” Insight Turkey 13, no. 3 (2011): 159–172.

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Tanjug. “Turkey Interferes in Bosnia’s Internal Affairs.” 05 May 2012. Accessed on April 20, 2020. https​:/​/ww​​w​.b92​​.net/​​eng​/n​​ews​/r​​egion​​.php?​​yyyy=​​2012&​​mm​=05​​ &dd​=0​​​5​&nav​​_id​=8​​0097. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Turkish Strategy towards the Balkans.” 2019. Accessed on 15 April 2020. http:​/​/www​​.mfa.​​gov​.t​​r​/rel​​ation​​s​-wit​​h​-the​​-balk​​an​-re​​​ gion.​​en​.mf​​a. Türbedar, Erhan. “How Is Turkish Foreign Policy Is Perceived in the Balkans.” Center for Eurasian Studies, 01 April 2010. Accessed on April 19, 2020. https​:/​/ av​​im​.or​​g​.tr/​​Blog/​​HOW​-I​​S​-TUR​​KISH-​​FOREI​​GN​-PO​​LICY-​​PERCE​​IVED-​​​IN​-TH​​ E​-BAL​​KANS. Uzgel, İlhan. “Türkiye ve Balkanlar: Bölgesel Güç Yanılsamasının Sonu.” In Beş Deniz Havzasında Türkiye, edited by Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan, 219–255. Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2006. Uzgel, İlhan, “Relations with Balkans.” In Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006, Facts and Analyses with Documents, edited by Baskın Oran, 817–839. Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2010. Yenigün, Cüneyt. “Turkey’s Balkans Policy: Resurrection of Turkey in the Balkans.” In Balkans: Foreign Affairs, Politics, and Socio-Cultures, edited by Cüneyt Yenigün and Ferdinand Gjana, 531–550. Tirana: Epoka University Publications, 2011.

Chapter 4

Energy Security, Geopolitics, and Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the Caspian Basin Gökhan ÖZKAN and Fatma SARIASLAN

INTRODUCTION Energy security is defined as “the continuous availability of energy in varied forms, in sufficient quantities, and at reasonable prices and via reliable means of transport.”1 Energy security became a more important concept especially after the 1973 oil crisis. It has become a strategic concept for international politics in the 21st century since economic factors have become vital as political and military factors for national security. The 21st century has not only demonstrated that energy security is a prerequisite for economic stability but also substantiated that energy security is an indivisible part of a state’s overall security. Regional and global actors on the international stage are trying to increase their influence on hydrocarbon-rich regions to enhance their energy security. They want to have more say in exploiting these resources and how they are transported to international markets. The increasing significance of energy supply security in world politics has multiplied the geopolitical importance of countries and regions that are rich in hydrocarbon reserves, such as the Caspian Basin and the Middle East. Various projects have been developed to exploit and transport hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian Region to international markets. Regional and global actors are trying to realize projects in line with their national interests. This creates a clash of interest among major actors in international politics and increases the possibility of international conflicts. The Middle East and Caspian Basin are the most hydrocarbon-rich regions in the world. Turkey’s geographical location makes it both a Middle Eastern and a Eurasian country and increases its geopolitical importance. Geopolitical 53

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factors have become more decisive in states’ foreign policies and have also important reflections on Turkish foreign policy. In this study, Turkish foreign policy in the Caspian Basin will be analyzed in connection with energy security and geopolitics. ENERGY SECURITY, ENERGY PROJECTS, AND GEOPOLITICS IN THE CASPIAN REGION Energy security is a continuous and stable supply of energy from reliable sources, in sufficient amounts, at reasonable prices, and via reliable means of transport. At the state level, energy security ensures the realization of functional components of economic security since economic security is based on the formation of the necessary volume of energy resources to implement reproductive processes and ensure social stability.2 Natural resources can contribute to the economic development and overall economic capabilities, be converted into a national power, and affect its foreign security and economic relations.3 At the international level, energy consumer states, to ensure their energy security, try to diversify their energy resource types, source countries, and supply routes. After the end of the Cold War, geopolitical changes in the world and changing dynamics of the international system broadened the concept of energy security so that explaining it only in terms of security of supply is no longer adequate.4 Energy security has a multidimensional character and includes a broad range of aspects5 that can be affected by energy supply, geopolitical power, economic growth, sustainability, and social expansion.6 There are three basic constituents of energy security supply: security, competitiveness, and sustainability.7 From a theoretical perspective, the realist paradigm claims that matters related with energy resources are more of soft power items.8 Nonetheless, after the oil crisis of 1973, energy security became a widely used concept in terms of political economy.9 The International Energy Agency (IEA) was established in 1974 when developed countries noticed they were not adequately equipped to deal with the oil embargo imposed by major producers that pushed prices to historically high levels with the 1973 oil crisis. In the 2000s, energy security became a priority not only for industrialized countries but also for international organizations such as the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).10 After the end of the Cold War, various projects were developed to transport the natural gas and oil of Central Asia and the Caucasus to international markets. Carrying oil from the Caspian Region to the Mediterranean, the Baku-Tiflis-Ceyhan (BTC) is a pipeline that transports the Caspian oil,

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particularly the Azerbaijan oil, to international markets via Georgia and Turkey. Baku-Tiflis-Erzurum (BTE) pipeline was constructed parallel to the BTC pipeline to transfer Central Asia’s gas to Europe via Turkey. Another project that aimed to transport the Caspian Region’s hydrocarbon resources to international markets was the Trans-Caspian Pipeline Project, which was planned to transport the Turkmen and Kazakh gas to Azerbaijan via a pipeline under the Caspian Sea and then to Turkey and Europe from Azerbaijan. Even if agreements were signed about this project in 1998 and 1999, the project never reached a mature stage and could not be realized. The Nabucco was a project that aimed to transport the natural gas and oil resources of Central Asia, the Middle East, and the Caucasus to Europe via Turkey.11 If it was realized, it would be possible to supply the Caspian gas to the EU, bypassing Russia. The EU decision-makers accelerated their efforts to lower EU’s energy dependence on Russia after the gas supplies from Russia to the EU were cut because of price disagreements between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009. In this connection, for the EU, Turkey became one of the key countries for transportation of the natural gas and oil of the Caspian Region over the routes that bypass Russia. So, overlapping of the EU and Turkey’s geo-economic and political interests resulted in the first step of the Nabucco project in July 2009. The Nabucco was considered a key piece of the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) initiative. The main aim of the SGC was the diversification of the EU’s natural gas sources to reduce risks that might arise from one exporter and to ensure its energy security.12 Although the Nabucco project was strongly supported by the United States and the EU since it would diminish EU’s energy dependence on Russia, it could not be realized.13 The South Stream Project, which was seen as the rival project of the Nabucco pipeline project, was evaluated as Russia’s geopolitical project that aims to maintain its control over the transportation of the Caspian Region’s natural gas to Europe. The project, which would bypass Ukraine, Belarus, and Turkey, was started in 2007. In 2008, Russia and Greece signed an agreement and decided to lay the pipes, which were planned to transport natural gas from Russia to Europe via the Black Sea, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, Croatia, Italy, and Hungary.14 This project was transformed into the Turkish Stream Project in 2014. On December 1, 2014, Putin announced that the South Stream had been canceled and replaced with pipelines of the same capacity to deliver gas across the Black Sea directly to Turkey.15 Of the 63 bcm/year of capacity, 14 bcm/year of capacity would replace the volume currently delivered to Turkey via Ukraine and the Trans-Balkan pipeline while the rest would be delivered to the Turkish-Greek border where Gazprom would set up a natural gas “hub” for Southern European customers.16 Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) is a project that aims to transport Azerbaijani natural gas to Turkey and Europe. As a natural gas pipeline

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stretching from the Turkish-Georgian border to the Turkish-Greek border, TANAP will supply natural gas to Turkey and European countries. The construction of the pipeline started in 2015 and was completed in 2018. It carried the first gas to Turkey and Europe in 2019. The pipeline will annually deliver 6 bcm of Azeri natural gas to Turkey for domestic consumption, while the remaining 10 bcm will be transferred to Europe via the 878-kilometer cross-border Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) that runs from Greece to Italy via Albania.17 The TAP began delivering the first gas from Azerbaijan to Italy on December 30, 2020. The TANAP and TAP projects, as geostrategic projects that aim to enhance energy security of Turkey and EU, will be the successful implementation of the EU’s Southern European Corridor initiative, which Turkey has eagerly supported to bring it closer to the EU, to ease Turkey’s EU membership, and to ensure possible revenues for the Turkish economy. Turkey believes that Turkey’s EU membership will contribute to the energy security of the EU.18 The TANAP project will enable the EU to bypass Russia as a natural gas supplier since resources that will be used for TANAP will be from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz natural gas resources. In September 2015, Turkey and Russia signed the memorandum of understanding to build the “Turkish Stream,” which would abolish the South Stream Project and redirect the gas pipeline to Turkey and the EU member states. Instead of South Stream that was planned to reach Europe through the Black Sea to Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Slovenia, and Austria, Russia intended to redirect the project to Turkey through a different Black Sea pipeline to create a “hub” for Southeastern Europe at the Greco-Turkish border.19 The Turkish Stream’s fate became uncertain when relations between Turkey and Russia deteriorated after Turkey downed a Russian jetfighter at the Turkish border with Syria on November 24, 2015.20 The construction of the pipeline was put on hold as Turkish-Russian relations soured. But relations improved again, particularly after the failed coup attempt in Turkey on July 15, 2016. This led to the normalization of relations between Turkey and Russia. The intergovernmental agreement for realization of the “Turkish Stream” was signed during Putin’s visit to Turkey.21 The pipeline’s construction started in May 2017, and the offshore section of the project was finished in November 2018. In January 2020, Turkey and Russia formally launched the Turkish Stream pipeline.22 It is argued that the Turkish Stream, which will carry Russian natural gas to Southern Europe through Turkey, will create a new energy corridor that will bypass the EU regulatory challenges.23 In this sense, the Turkish Stream appears to mark Russia’s response to its inability to reach a compromise with the EU on regulation, particularly related to the Third Energy Package as well as to a worsened outlook on gas demand in Europe.24 The Turkish Stream pipeline, which was meant as an alternative to

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the Trans-Balkan pipeline via Ukraine, also aims to eliminate Russia’s transit dependency on Ukraine.25 After discovering rich natural gas and oil reserves, Central Asia and the Caucasus became important regions both for regional and global actors such as Russia, China, the EU, and the United States. These actors struggled to realize the pipeline projects that would transport the region’s rich gas and oil resources to international markets via routes in line with their national interests. Russia, having rich natural gas and oil reserves, is one of the main energy suppliers of the world. Energy exports are among the main instruments of Russia’s global foreign and security policy.26 The BTC, BTE, Nabucco, and the TANAP were evaluated as projects that can damage Russia’s national interests. It was argued that Russia was losing its control over the critical energy infrastructure in the region as the Turkmenistan-KazakhstanUzbekistan-China Gas Pipeline and the BTC pipeline indicated.27 Increasing energy trade is an important aspect of China’s relations with Central Asia.28 China emerged as one of the major actors of energy geopolitics in the region due to its direct investments in the Caspian Basin,29 which was seen as one of the ideal alternatives because of its geographical proximity.30 China developed the Central Asia Natural Gas Project which was realized in 2009. The first Turkmen gas was pumped to the pipeline and reached Beijing in December 2009. Over 90% of Turkmenistan’s total exports are natural gas exports to China. This figure was near zero before the Central Asia-China gas pipeline was opened in 2009.31 China also developed the Altai Natural Gas Project with Russia.32 China is also increasingly becoming a competitor for the EU for natural gas from both the Caspian Region and Russia. Since Russian gas supplies could not easily meet the demand coming from both European and Chinese markets, competition between the two offered a bargaining position for Russia.33 The EU is dependent on energy resources. According to the Green Papers of 200034 and 2006,35 the EU’s import dependency is rising. The EU produces only a third of the gas it consumes and depends on non-member countries for almost half of its energy requirements, and this dependence is as high as 81% in the case of petroleum. The EU’s natural gas import will increase 84% between 2005 and 2030 because of the gap between the EU gas production and consumption. It is more catastrophic for oil: the EU’s oil imports will increase 93% between 2005 and 2030.36 The EU is highly dependent on Russia’s energy resources. Historically, Russia’s energy exports to Europe began in the 1970s during the Cold War.37 Europe’s dependence remained low during the Cold War because of the political opposition of the United States regarding Soviet gas exports to Europe. But it increased swiftly especially after the dissolution of the USSR. External conditions in the late 1980s,

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the collapse of the USSR, and the opening of Central and Eastern Europe brought the necessity of dealing with this region in terms of energy policy. In order to restructure its energy sector, the EU had to coordinate and formulate policy to deal with this region.38 With the new millennium and expansion of the EU in 2004 with twelve new member countries, the dependence of the EU on Russia increased.39 After the expansion, the EU started to meet nearly 40% of its energy demand from Russia. The EU tried to diversify energy supplier countries and lowered its energy dependence on Russia to reduce risks and increase its energy security. The United States’ foreign policy in the Caspian Region has focused on controlling the critical energy infrastructure to transport energy resources of the Caspian Region to international markets in the West.40 Suspicious of the involvement of a growing number of actors such as Russia, China, and Iran in the region, the United States sees the Azerbaijan-GeorgiaTurkey-Europe route as the best alternative and reliable route. Thus, the US-supported pipeline projects such as the BTC, BTE, Nabucco, and the TANAP enable European countries to tap into the region’s energy resources to reduce dependency on Russia. Especially after the cut of natural gas to Europe from Russia because of problems between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009, and after the clashes between Georgia and Russia in 2008, the United States and the NATO made energy security one of their top priorities. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE CASPIAN REGION After the end of the Cold War, Turkey re-evaluated its place and function in the international system and revised its security and foreign policies. In this conjuncture, the newly independent Turkish Republics, which have linguistic and cultural ties with Turkey, created excitement in Turkey. New opportunities and challenges for the Turkish foreign policy emerged as the previously closed Turkish world was opened up.41 During the first few years after the dissolution of the USSR, the struggle between the Atlantists and Eurasianists42 in internal politics was reflected in the foreign policy debates, which had important implications for Russia’s regional policies. At the beginning of the 1990s, Russia followed Westernoriented policies which were perceived positively by Turkey. These policies ensured new channels for regional economic cooperation.43 But later, Russia, within the framework of its “Near Abroad” policy, declared former Soviet Union territories as its vital sphere of influence. After Russia’s Military Doctrine was adopted in November 1993, Russia constructed military bases in the Caspian Region and Russian soldiers started to control the borders of

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some countries in the region. Russia used its control over the critical energy infrastructure over which the Caspian Region energy resources are exported to Europe to pressure the regional countries.44 Meanwhile, the United States and the EU developed alternative pipeline routes to decrease the Russian influence in the region.45 In this connection, Turkey’s geostrategic location allowed it to be an energy bridge between the Caspian Region and Europe. Pipeline projects such as the BTC created opportunities for Turkey to develop its relations with the regional countries.46 After the dissolution of the USSR, the Turkish Republics followed a “multi-vectorism” policy, which was a rational, realist foreign policy based on pragmatic aims rather than ideological objectives.47 They tried to stand at equal distance from the United States, Russia, and China.48 Newly independent states tried to develop their oil and gas industry and attract foreign investment mainly to overcome their economic difficulties. They also enhanced their efforts to construct new pipeline projects which would transport these resources to international markets. For example, Azerbaijan made agreements with the consortium led by the British Petroleum (BP) with the political support of the United States and Turkey49 and realized the BTC and BTE pipeline projects.50 During the 1990s, Turkey supported the Trans-Caspian project that would transport the Turkmen and Kazakh oil and gas to Azerbaijan under the Caspian Sea. It also supported transportation of the Turkmen, Kazakh, and the Azeri oil and gas to Europe over Georgia and Turkey. The BTC and BTE pipelines were realized with the support of the United States. Driven by a political rationale of the United States, goal of these pipelines was to bypass Russian territory and weaken Kremlin’s hold over transit routes into Europe.51 Nonetheless, in spite of the political support from the EU and the United States, the Trans-Caspian Pipeline could not be realized due to disagreement among the Caspian littoral states on the delimitation of the Caspian Sea52; due to financial and political disagreement between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan; due to new energy agreements Turkmenistan signed with Russia after the Blue Stream Pipeline; and due to pipeline projects developed to transport the Turkmen gas to China. During the 1990s, Turkey generally positioned itself against Russia by taking an active role in projects that aimed to bypass Russian-controlled transportation lines. But at the beginning of the new millennium, Turkey and Russia moved past their bitter strategic rivalry in the Caucasus and Central Asia and cooperated in many areas.53 Turkey’s attitude toward transport routes became more inclusive of Russian interests, which also contributed to evolving political relations. As a result, a major pipeline, Blue Stream, carrying Russian natural gas from Russia to Turkey underneath the Black Sea, became fully functioning in 2003 and was inaugurated in 2005.54

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Turkey’s importance is growing in the energy geopolitics of Eurasia, particularly in light of intensified competition between the EU and Russia over pipelines. Turkey wants to transport energy resources to Europe via Turkey. While transforming Turkey into an energy hub, the pipeline projects also increase Turkey’s energy supply security by giving opportunity to import gas and oil resources from various countries.55 Turkey also attempts to increase its geopolitical importance by trying to be one of the key countries of not only the east-west but also the north-south energy corridor. Turkey tried to be the key country of the north-south energy corridor by transporting the Russian natural gas and oil to Asia via the Blue Stream-2 Pipeline and the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline.56 Blue Stream-2 was proposed as an extension of the 16 bcm per year Blue Stream-1 natural gas pipeline.57 By proposing the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline (building a north-south pipeline from Samsun to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan), Russia intended to export oil to Turkey via the Black Sea.58 It was argued that the SamsunCeyhan pipeline, carrying Russian crude from the Turkish Black Sea coast to the Mediterranean, would boost the prospects for Russia to build a refinery at the Turkish Mediterranean port. It was also claimed that Russia had aimed to secure Turkish backing for Russia’s South Stream gas pipeline by the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline project.59 None of these pipelines could be realized as of April, 2021. Strong economic and energy ties are important in the bilateral relations of Turkey and Russia. The Turkey-Russia relationship has developed extensively, particularly at economic dimension, in the last decade. Turkey and Russia furthered cooperation in several areas, including strategic arms procurement such as S-400, nuclear energy,60 and oil and gas transmission projects.61 Turkey’s decision to conduct its first nuclear power plant project with Russia created worries. It was argued that partnering with a Russianled consortium could further intensify Turkey’s energy dependence on Russia.62 Russia is a key economic—particularly energy—partner with which Turkey seeks to avoid direct confrontation.63 Although Turkey and Russia’s economic relations have always been sensitive to evolving political relations, it was argued that a strong tendency to solve political problems has partially stemmed from strong economic ties between the two countries.64 It was also argued that both countries preferred to compartmentalize economic issues and geopolitical rivalries to avoid negative spillovers from either. And this strategy, which was called “compartmentalization,” has especially been reflected in energy cooperation.65 Due to this strategy, Turkey and Russia tried to transcend serious disagreements in order to be able to continue the multidimensional cooperation that they started in the 2000s.66

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CONCLUSION After the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR, fifteen countries, including five Turkish Republics, gained independence. This changed Turkey’s policies in the Caspian Region fundamentally. Turkey evaluated the new conjuncture in the region as an opportunity to increase its cooperation with the region countries and to enhance its regional power status. At the end of 1993, after Russia declared its “Near Abroad” policy and its military doctrine. Struggle among regional and global actors started over transportation routes that hydrocarbon reserves of the region would be transported to Europe. The EU and the United States, which did not want the regional countries to enter into Russia’s sphere of influence again, supported the BTC, BTE, Nabucco, and TANAP projects to transport the region’s hydrocarbon reserves to Europe over routes that bypass Russian territories. Russia developed the South Stream Project to bypass Ukraine and Turkey and to maintain its control over the critical energy infrastructure in the region. South Stream Project was later canceled and the Turkish Stream Project was developed. It is expected that rivalry over transportation routes through which the Caspian Region oil and natural gas will be transported to international markets will intensify. Regional and global actors will try to realize the projects in line with their national interests. Located strategically between two continents and serving as a transit state between major energy markets and major energy producers, Turkey cooperates with the United States and the EU and supports projects that will transport the Azerbaijani, Turkmen, and the Kazakh natural gas and oil to Europe via Georgia and Turkey. Turkey also cooperates with Russia in the Turkish Stream Project and in other projects. Turkey is also interested in being the key country of the north-south energy corridor. Turkey is strategically located between the energy-rich countries in the Caspian Region and the Middle East and energy-dependent countries in Europe. As natural gas and oil pipeline projects linking these regions are realized, Turkey transforms into an energy hub and a regional power. Recent pipeline projects such as the TANAP, the TAP, and the Turkish Stream enhanced Turkey’s geostrategic importance significantly.

NOTES 1. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Energy Assessment: Energy and the Challenge of Sustainability, 2000: 113.

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2. Anna Chernysheva et al., “Diversification of Transit Risks of Russia as a Basis for Economic and Energy Security in European Countries,” European Research Studies Journal XXI, no. 4 (2018): 163. 3. Zenonas Tziarras, “Israel-Cyprus-Greece: A ‘Comfortable’ Quasi-Alliance,” Mediterranean Politics 21, no. 3 (2016): 412. 4. Mehmet Efe Biresselioğlu, “Clashing Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean,” Insight Turkey 21, no. 4 (Fall 2019): 115. 5. For a comprehensive description of energy security including fifteen dimensions, see Abdelrahman Azzuni and Christian Breyer, “Energy Security and Energy Storage Technologies,” Energy Procedia 155 (2018): 240. 6. Maysoun Hameed et al., “A Review of the 21st Century Challenges in the Food-Energy-Water Security in the Middle East,” Water 11, no. 682 (April 2019): 4, doi:10.3390/w11040682. 7. Şuhnaz Yılmaz and Duygu Sever-Mehmetoğlu, “Linking Foreign Policy and Energy Security: An Asset or a Liability for Turkey?,” Uluslararası İlişkiler 13, no. 52 (2016): 107. 8. Giedrius Česnakas, “Energy Resources in Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Approach,” Baltic Journal of Law & Politics 3, no. 1 (2010): 31. 9. For a detailed overview regarding the issue, see Sefer Yılmaz and Duhan K. Kalkan, “Enerji güvenliği kavramı: 1973 petrol krizi ışığında bir tartışma,” Uluslararası Kriz ve Siyaset Araştırmaları Dergisi 1, no. 3 (2017): 169–199. 10. Zurab Khamashuridze, “Energy Security and NATO: Any Role for the Alliance?,” Connections 7, no. 4 (2008): 43. 11. John M. Roberts, “The Black Sea and European Energy Security,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 6, no. 2 (2006): 207–223. 12. Emre Erşen and Mitat Çelikpala, “Turkey and the Changing Energy Geopolitics of Eurasia,” Energy Policy 128 (2019): 587. 13. It should be noted that the global financial crisis in 2008 further undermined investment prospects for this expensive project. See Pınar İpek, “The Role of Energy Security in Turkish Foreign Policy (2004–2016),” in Turkish Foreign Policy: International Relations, Legality and Global Reach, ed. Pınar Gözen Ercan (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 178. 14. Rafael Leal-Arcas, “EU Relations with China and Russia: How to Approach New Superpowers in Trade Matters,” Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 4, no. 1 (2009): 22–42. 15. Luca Franza, “From South Stream to Turk Stream,” Clingendael International Energy Programme (CIEP), 2015. 16. Jonathan Stern, et al., “Does the Cancellation of South Stream Signal a Fundamental Reorientation of Russian Gas Export Policy?,” Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (January 2015): 5–6. 17. At the Kipi point in Greece, the TANAP pipeline is connected to TAP. This system will transport gas from the Turkish-Greek border through Greece, Albania, Adriatic Sea to Italy. The TANAP and TAP projects, together with the South Pipeline Capacity Expansion Project (15 bcm by 2021), will significantly increase the supply of Azerbaijani gas to Europe. See Gulnar Osmanovna Khalova et al., “Republic of

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Turkey Gas Complex Development: Problems and Prospects,” International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy 9, no. 1 (2019): 240–241. 18. Younkyoo Kim and Stephen Blank, “The New Great Game of Caspian Energy in 2013–14: ‘Turk Stream,’ Russia and Turkey,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 18, no. 1 (2016): 43. 19. Yılmaz and Sever-Mehmetoğlu, “Linking Foreign Policy,” 117. 20. Pınar İpek, “Oil and Intra-state Conflict in Iraq and Syria: Sub-state Actors and Challenges for Turkey’s Energy Security,” Middle Eastern Studies 53, no. 3 (2017): 406. 21. Eda Kuşku-Sönmez, “Dynamics of Change in Turkish Foreign Policy: Evidence from High-level Meetings of the AKP Government,” Turkish Studies 20, no. 3 (2019): 393. 22. “Turkey, Russia launch TurkStream Pipeline Carrying Gas to Europe,” Reuters, January 8, 2020. 23. Stern, et al., “Does the Cancellation of South,” 3–4. 24. Franza, “From South Stream to Turk Stream,” 53. 25. Stern, et al., “Does the Cancellation of South,” 3. 26. Stephen Blank, “Russian Energy and Russian Security,” The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations 12, no. 1 (2011): 173–188. 27. Martin C. Spechler and Dina R. Spechler, “Russia’s Lost Position in Central Eurasia,” Journal of Eurasian Studies 4, no. 1 (2013): 1–7. 28. Sinem Ünaldılar Kocamaz, “The Rise of New Powers in World Politics: Russia, China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Uluslararası İlişkiler 16, no. 61 (2019): 135. 29. Yılmaz and Sever-Mehmetoğlu, “Linking Foreign Policy,” 110. 30. Xiaojie Xu, “The Oil and Gas Links between Central Asia and China: A Geopolitical Perspective,” OPEC Review (March 1999): 33–54. 31. Maximilian Hess, “Central Asian Gas Exports to China: Beijing’s Latest Bargaining Chip?,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, June 16, 2020. 32. For more information about the Altai Pipeline, see James Henderson, “The Commercial and Political Logic for the Altai Pipeline,” Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (December 2014). 33. Yılmaz and Sever-Mehmetoğlu, “Linking Foreign Policy,” 110. 34. Commission of the European Communities, “Green Paper: Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply,” Brussels, 2000. 35. Commission of the European Communities, “A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy,” Brussels, 2006. 36. European Union, “An Energy, Policy for Europe,” Brussels, 2007. 37. Robert A. Ritz, “A Strategic Perspective on Competition between Pipeline Gas and LNG,” Energy Policy Research Group (2018): 8. 38. Janne Haaland Matlary, Energy Policy in the Europan Union (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), 6. 39. Especially three groups of countries (Central Europe countries, the Baltic countries, and Southeastern Europe countries) are highly dependent on Russian gas. See Ralf Dickel et al., “Reducing European Dependence on Russian Gas: Distinguishing

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Natural Gas Security from Geopolitics,” The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies Paper 92 (October 2014): 10. 40. Roger N. Mcdermott, “United States and NATO Military Cooperation with Kazakhstan: The Need for a New Approach,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, no. 21 (2008): 615–641. 41. F. Stephen Larrabee, “Turkey’s Eurasian Agenda,” The Washington Quarterly 34, no. 1 (2011): 103–120. 42. For a brief history of Russian Eurasianism, see Lerna K. Yanık, “Debating Eurasia: Political Travels of a Geographical Concept in Turkey,” Uluslararasi İliskiler 16, no. 63 (2019): 35–38. 43. In 1992, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) was established and provided a significant platform on which two countries could gradually strengthen their regional dialogue and develop bilateral economic relations in the fields of energy, trade, and tourism. See Mitat Çelikpala and Emre Erşen, “Turkey’s Black Sea Predicament: Challenging or Accommodating Russia?,” Perceptions XXIII, no. 2 (Summer 2018): 74. In fact, even if Turkey does not consider the BSEC as one of main organizations that could help it enhance its energy security and even if its main priorities for the BSEC are trade and transport rather than energy, the energy issue was one of the main drivers for Turkey to initiate the establishment of the BSEC in 1992 due to growing energy need of the country. See Remziye Yilmaz-Bozkuş “Turkey’s Relations and Energy Cooperation with the BSEC,” Insight Turkey 21, no. 3 (Summer 2019): 178–179 and 188. 44. Bertil Nygren, “Putin’s Use of Natural Gas to Reintegrate the CIS Region,” Problems of Post-Communism 55, no. 4 (2008): 3–15. 45. Laurent Ruseckas, “Turkey and Eurasia: Opportunities and Risks in the Caspian Pipeline Derby,” Journal of International Affairs 54, no. 1 (2000): 217–236. 46. Nasib Nassibli, “Azerbaijan’s Geopolitics and Oil Pipeline Issue,” Perceptions 4, no. 4 (2000): 114–115. 47. Reuel R. Hanks, “Multi-vector Politics and Kazakhstan’s Emerging Role as a Geo-strategic Player in Central Asia,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 11, no. 3 (2009): 257–267. It is argued that the underlying logic of Turkey’s policy toward the Central Asian countries in the 1990s was to increase Turkey’s geostrategic and economic presence in a neighbourhood rich in energy resources, with which it enjoyed close ethnic ties. See Senem Aydın-Düzgit, “Can Non-democracies Support International Democracy? Turkey as a Case Study,” Third World Quarterly 41, no. 2 (2020): 271–272. 48. Punchoh Stobdan, “India and Kazakhstan Should Share Complementary Objectives,” Strategic Analysis 33, no. 1 (2009): 1–7. 49. Jan H. Kalicki, “Caspian Energy at the Crossroads,” Foreign Affairs 80, no. 5 (2001): 120–134. 50. It is argued that since the completion of the BTC and BTE pipelines, Turkey has gradually shifted its pipeline priorities and focused more on energy security as a goal in its foreign policy. See İpek, “The Role of,” 178. 51. Tolga Demiryol, “Between Security and Prosperity: Turkey and the Prospect of Energy Cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean,” Turkish Studies 20, no. 3 (2019): 446.

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52. Emre Tunçalp, “Turkey’s Natural Gas Strategy: Balancing Geopolitical Goals & Market Realities,” Turkish Policy Quarterly 14, no. 3 (Fall 2015): 78. 53. Şaban Kardaş, “Turkey’s S400 vs. F35 Conundrum and Its Deepening Strategic Partnership with Russia,” German Marshall Fund of the United States, no. 9 (May 2019): 1. 54. Evren Balta, “From Geopolitical Competition to Strategic Partnership: Turkey and Russia after the Cold War,” Uluslararası İlişkiler 16, no. 63 (2019): 83. 55. Remziye Yilmaz-Bozkus, “Analysis of Turkey’s Role as a Possible Hub,” GeoJournal 84 (2019): 1361. 56. Gareth Winrow, “Turkey: An Emerging Energy Transit State and Possible Energy Hub,” The International Spectator 46, no. 3 (2011): 86. 57. It is argued that Blue Stream Project became a controversial issue because it could increase Turkey’s energy dependence on Russia. See Bahadır Kaynak, “From Blue Stream to Turkish Stream an Assesment of Turkey’s Energy Dependence on Russia,” Journal of Social Sciences 3, no. 1 (Summer 2018): 83. 58. Suat Kiniklioglu and Valeriy Morkva, “An anatomy of Turkish–Russian Relations,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 7, no. 4 (December 2007): 541. 59. Cenk Sidar and Gareth Winrow, “Turkey & South Stream: Turco-Russian Rapprochement and the Future of the Southern Corridor,” Turkish Policy Quarterly 10, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 54. 60. It was announced that the first reactor of the plant planned to be operational in 2023. See “Turkey considering new partner for nuke plant in Sinop,” Anadolu Agency, January 20, 2020. 61. Oktay Bingöl, “Changing Balancing Behaviors in Turkish Foreign Policy during AKP Period (2002-2019),” Gazi Akademik Bakış 13, no. 25 (Winter 2019): 72. 62. S. Duygu Sever, “Turkey’s Nuclear Energy Policy in the Context of Environment: A Case of Europeanization?,” Turkish Studies 20, no. 4 (2019): 587; Senem Aydın-Düzgit, Evren Balta, and Andrew O’donohue, “Turkey, Russia, and the West: Reassessing Persistent Volatility, Asymmetric Interdependence, and the Syria Conflict,” Istanbul Policy Center (April 2020): 9. 63. Ole Frahm and Katharina Hoffmann, “Dual Agent of Transition: How Turkey Perpetuates and Challenges Neo-patrimonial Patterns in Its Post-Soviet Neighbourhood,” East European Politics (2020): 11. 64. Balta, “From Geopolitical Competition,” 83. 65. Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz, “Turkey and Russia in a Shifting Global Order: Cooperation, Conflict and Asymmetric Interdependence in a Turbulent Region,” Third World Quarterly 37, no. 1 (2016): 71–95. 66. Emre Erşen, “2000’li Yıllarda Türkiye-Rusya İlişkileri, ‘Kompartımanlaştırma’ Stratejisinin Sorunları,” in Kuşku ile Komşuluk, Türkiye ve Rusya İlişkilerinde Değişen Dinamikler, eds. Gencer Özcan, Evren Balta and Burç Beşgül (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2017), 147.

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Part II

THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

Chapter 5

Turkey’s Approaches on the Safe Zone Plans in the North of Syria Ömer Göksel İŞYAR

INTRODUCTION Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2011, Turkey has developed policies in general based on two main regional plans, which include the Syrian side of the border as well: “the buffer zone” and “the safe zone.” As the policies on these two regional theses are needed to be carried out beyond the borders of the country, Turkey’s approaches on the issue have an international character and a dimension. The “international buffer zone” thesis refers to a neutral/impartial area between the parties of a conflict. These are the areas where the military elements of the conflicting parties cannot enter. These areas are either completely demilitarized or left under the control of forces outside the conflict such as the international coalition. In practice, states can establish such external buffer zones by themselves. Recently, the United States proposed establishing a US.-European Union coalition force to manage a possible buffer zone in the east of the Euphrates River. On the other hand, the “international safe zone” thesis primarily emphasizes the human dimension if it is not national. Therefore, areas considered international safe zones are open for all humanitarian organizations to enter and operate. First of all, these areas are established and protected by international organizations because of their relatively neutral positions in international conflicts. Besides, the safe zones’ boundaries must be as clear and precise as possible. As a result, the safe zones are more likely to be larger than the buffer zones. Nevertheless, these must be safer. The most important point is that it is expected that the safe zones serve as safe havens, especially for the

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refugees who have fled their country. Thus, it can be noted that the safe zones differ from the buffer zones in terms of such characteristics. TURKEY’S FIRST REGIONAL PLANS ON SYRIA (2011–2013) The aim of the Ankara administration to establish a buffer zone on the Syrian border was mentioned for the first time on October 23, 2011. Abdel Bari Atwan, the editor in chief of Al Quds al Arabi newspaper, was the first one who mentioned Turkey’s plan. Thus, it has started gradually to become an international problem. The political power in Ankara planned to transform such an area into a safe haven for the first Syrian refugees who came to Turkey. Also, the thesis developed by Riyad Al Asaad (in November 2011), who was the first commander of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), to establish a safe zone on the border was supported by members (like Ömer Savaf) of the Syrian National Council (SNC) in İstanbul. This was a safe zone plan in a sense, especially for the benefit of the Syrian military opposition. Meanwhile, the Ankara administration has introduced the first official safe zone plan (on November 16, 2011) with a depth of 5 kilometers from the border. In this proposal, Turkey has supported establishing a humanitarian corridor as in the Libyan model, which was proposed first by France, particularly for the Syrian city of Homs in that period. In this sense, the thesis supported by Turkey can be formulated as a combination of these three things: no-fly zone, international observation, and humanitarian intervention. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu first stated it as a “buffer zone” on November 29, 2011. However, it could not obtain a concrete US support. On the other hand, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan strongly supported (February 27, 2012) establishing many safe zones for Syria. These would absolutely protect the civilians if established through a resolution of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. An American bureaucrat, AnneMarie Slaughter, had initially developed this thesis.1 Slaughter’s proposal in this sense was mainly to establish some safe zones for civilians who wanted to flee from Syria.2 Prime Minister Erdoğan supported this plan (February 27, 2012) by considering such a requirement: “First of all, an American-Russian cooperation will be required to make such a UN resolution possible.”3 The Turkish leadership also proposed some “hybrid plans” to overcome the chaotic environment created by the Syrian Army advancing in cities like Homs, Hama, and Idlib in March–April 2012. We call them “hybrid plans” because these were the plans formulated as the mixture of “buffer zones” and “safe zones.” This means that the hybrid plans include establishing the buffer

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zones and/or the safe zones in the relevant regions. What was considered at this point would the establishment of some rescued areas out of the Syrian regime’s reach. Meanwhile, the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, was still advocating the hard choice of military intervention in Syria. Clinton’s formulation was quite clear: a “military intervention” could create some “rescued areas,” and subsequently, these could lead to liberated “safe zones” and/or “no-fly zones.” These complex plans found support in the Pentagon. Some hawkish circles in US politics had supported those plans despite some reservations from President Obama’s. Those circles’ main argument was that the rescued areas could eventually be transformed into a wide-range no-fly safe zone in time. Actually, it would give a progressive solution process. Firstly, as far as the Commander of the Land Units, General Hayri Kıvrıkoğlu stated and showed, adopted this proposal as of March 28, 2012, and studied a plan for a buffer zone in the border. However, it was clear that a military intervention seemed inevitably necessary to carry out such a plan. Indeed, the Pentagon also made a plan for this purpose. According to the mentioned plan, the five NATO member states’ (including Turkey) air force units would carry out an operation by settling in the three most important air bases in the region (i.e., İncirlik, Diyarbakır, and Limassol). However, nobody could persuade Obama to accept this plan. At that time, the only option the president accepted was the operations for humanitarian corridors. Even some resolution drafts on these plans were submitted to the UN Security Council. Nevertheless, the Russian Chinese vetoes in the UN could not be overcome the issue. According to the Turkish government, the factor that would make such an operation inevitable could only increase the human flow density toward the Turkish-Syrian borders. However, such a density of human flow did not occur enough. It reached only at the level of 17,000 asylum seekers. Moreover, this kind of flows could be quite risky. As a matter of fact, the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane) and PYD (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat) terrorist groups could also try to infiltrate into the masses. At this stage, some prominent Kurdish leaders in Turkey, especially the co-chairman of the Peace and Democracy Party, Selahattin Demirtaş, realized that as a result of these plans, there would be parts that could break out of Syria. Therefore, they powerfully supported the plans. Thus, the dream of “Independent Kurdistan” in some minds has been revived. On the other hand, Russia intensified its efforts to prevent this plan. It strengthened Syria’s air defense system against the projected initiatives toward a mixture of no-fly, safe, and buffer zones. Just as Russia deployed powerful air defense systems (e.g., Pantsyr-21, Buk M-2, Bastion, Yak-130) in the Syrian field, it was also determined to continue the veto barrier in the UN Security Council against similar types of plans. After the deployment

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of these air systems, consequently, a Turkish F-4 jet operating in the Syrian airspace was shot down on June 22, 2012. Under these conditions, Prime Minister Erdoğan recalled his proposal to establish a buffer zone on the border again. This proposal was even submitted to the National Security Council (NSC) in July 2012. Despite all of these efforts, this goal was never achieved. Thereupon, as the last remedy, a defacto buffer zone was established in Hatay by Turkish authorities. In addition, the CIA agents were already supplying all kinds of weapons for opponents in the region. The main aim was to help the regime-counters that would move through Hatay to take over Aleppo. Subsequently, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton embodied this plan on July 24, 2012. In this sense, Clinton said, “We must work more closely with the opponents in Syria to get them to capture more places. Eventually, a safe zone will be created in Syria, and thus, maybe a rescued area will be provided for the counter groups.”4 Indeed, the agenda of Clinton’s visit to Turkey on August 11, 2012, was primarily about this buffer zone plan. The buffer zone issue was also directly discussed between Turkish and American leaders. Indeed, during the Erdoğan-Obama meeting held at the Nuclear Security Summit (August 2012) in South Korea, the two parties principally reached a gentleman’s agreement on the establishment of a buffer zone in Syria. However, this agreement could not be put into action, and so it could not be taken any further. More precisely, no suitable setting could be found for this matter. One of the underlying reasons why the US side positively approached to the issue (buffer zone) had a disturbing dimension for Turkey. The main rationale for Obama’s approach was formulated as follows: “Buffer zone means an autonomous region for Kurds.” The PKK had already sensed the situation. Therefore, the terrorist organization, encouraged by these plans and developments, even started autonomy-related rehearsals at home, which are as follows: • In this sense, unlike its previous operations, the PKK started to apply a “hitand-stay” tactic by attempting to create a rescued area between Şemdinli and Dağlıca provinces; • The name “Rojava” was beginning to be used for the first time to address the “Kurdish lands” in Syria; • The chairman of the SNC in Istanbul, Abdulbasit Seyda (August 21, 2012), made an observation with the statement that “the USA has finally realized the necessity for the establishment of a no-fly zone in Syria.”5 Turkey was still regarding this region as a buffer zone and/or a safe haven. This was essentially a kind of Libyan model. It was successfully implemented

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there, as in the Benghazi buffer zone model. So how this would be established in Syria? The official army (ground forces) would not enter this area, so that a sheltered flight restricted zone would be created through the air operations. In this sense, Assad’s forces could no longer crush the opponents there. In these interventionist plans, Turkey and the United States would be the leading parts. After all, these two states would have created many secured pocket regions in the borderline without encroaching on Syrian territory. However, the UN veto could not be overcome again. Thereby, Russia did not make the same mistake as it did before in Libya. After all, having failed these efforts, the United States supplied the Stinger Missiles to warring opponents. As a result, a de-facto no-fly zone would be established through armed militants. However, Russia, on the other hand, gave some signal-inhibitor decoys to the hands of Syrian regime and tried to prevent the actual situation that was planned to be created by the United States. And yet, the United States showed its unwillingness to have a conflict with Russia by taking a step back in this situation. Hillary Clinton summarized the new situation as follows: “At first, an analysis and planning should be done.”6 Leon Panetta, the Secretary of Defense, also said: “The no-fly zone is not in our agenda.”7 By the way, the existence of a correlation between a “simulation game” played among some US think tanks and Davutoğlu’s “new formula” (October 15, 2012) drew attention. Indeed, both pointed out that “If the number of asylum-seekers coming to Turkey reaches 100,000 and above, it may force the international community to establish a buffer zone in Syria.” For this purpose, Turkey’s armed intervention seemed inevitable. Meanwhile, Turkey accepted the new “Rules of Engagement” in Syria. This set the stage for a de-facto buffer zone. Well, how did it do that? Syrian troops (all military elements) could not approach the northern border up to 15 kilometers; Turkey also launched humanitarian operations in the border. Therewithal, camps were established for refugees in the zero point of the Turkish-Syrian border. In fact, these were the de-facto buffer zones. Actually, the regime-counters started to attack Aleppo by using this region. Even an operational mechanism between Turkey and the United States was founded on August 23, 2012. However, the number of Syrian asylum seekers in Turkey has barely risen to 80,000 at that time. So the determined 100,000 threshold had not been reached. It was understood that the Bashar Assad Regime would not easily be defeated with the existing methods. This was clearly voiced for the first time by the strategist Henri Barkey. He made an important assessment by saying, “Let’s prepare ourselves for Assad not going immediately.”8 In light of this fact, a new proposal (of the United States) was the no-fly zone plan in the Northern Iraq Model. At that time around, Turkey did not consider the plan

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to be satisfying enough. Prime Minister Erdoğan criticized the plan as follows (October 29, 2012): “This requires a UN resolution. Besides, the no-fly zone has resulted in very heavy costs caused by the events that previously took place in Iraq. We cannot bear the same burdensome costs in Syria.”9 Considering the ongoing deadlock in Syria, a US-Russian consensus was achieved as of November 4, 2012, and so two superpowers agreed upon a New Syria Plan. Accordingly, it was prescribed to establish a Peace Observation Force in Syria under the control of the UN Security Council. Because of this consensus, the United States gave up achieving the following goals of both overthrowing Assad and creating a no-fly and/or buffer zone. An undesirable situation occurred in this environment. The PYD got stronger in the north of Syria. So that even the prominent opposition groups started to call this area the “Black Stripe.” On this point, Turkey has made the following official recommendation:10 the establishment of a buffer zone cleared of Kurdish armed terrorist groups between Rasulayn and Amude provinces. This region would be 100 kilometers in length and 5 kilometers in depth. Finally, the opposition groups, supported by Turkey, were channeled to the following regions: Afrin, Ayn Al-Arab, and Tel Tamyr districts on the shortest route to Aleppo. However, shrapnel-bombs began to be dropped in Turkey’s Ceylanpınar district in November 2012. Thereupon, the Turkish government brought its classical no-fly zone plan forward again. Moreover, F-16 flights were continuously carried out along the Syrian border. Patriot Air Defence Systems sent by NATO to Turkey was placed in southeast Anatolia. In other words, there had been an increase in the functionality of NATO forces in southern borders. Nevertheless, the Patriots were not placed at the exact zero points of the border. If they were accurately placed there, a long-voiced de-facto nofly zone at least with a depth of 25 kilometers would have been established there as requested by Turkey. In such a case, the powerful proficiency of the “Patriot effect” could be sensed enough. However, it did not happen. Whereas the Three-Stage Plan submitted by the Pentagon to the Senate on December 6, 2012, was designed to fulfill Turkey’s needs pointed out previously. Then what were these three stages identified in the mentioned plan? The first stage was the dispatching of Patriots; the second stage was the declaration of a nofly zone; and the third stage was the actual bombing of the site to clear the region out of regime forces. However, Russia unsurprisingly blocked this plan again. Indeed, it has pacified it by sending more modern air defense systems to the hands of Syria. Upon this, a car bomb explosion at the Cilvegözü border gate on February 11, 2013, has led Turkey to embark on a new initiative. With the Turkish-French cooperation, a de-facto buffer zone was created on the Hatay-Kilis-Karkamış borderline. The opposition groups, organized by Turkish military units, tried

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to hold on there. Thus, the presence of the regime forces at the border was weakened steadily. But on the contrary, the PYD has benefited from this situation. Ultimately, a cantonal area was created on the borderline. This region started to become clear on the Afrin-Qamishli-Cezire-Derik line. On this line, the presence of neither the Turkish nor the Syrian state authority could be detected. So as it is understood from all of these, Turkey has continued to defend the no-fly zone and the safe zone plans until Erdoğan’s visit to Washington (May 16, 2013). However, during this visit, the American side revealed that it did not support these plans. Moreover, it seems that even in the future, it would never support them. Above all, the US General Staff did not also find such plans realistic. President Obama also resisted this kind of plan. The president’s first preference was to continue the diplomatic bargaining in the upcoming meetings of Geneva-2 in the beginning of 2014. From Obama’s point of view, the most practical and realistic way under these circumstances was to continue drawing attention to a possible Kurdish buffer strip. The reason on his mind was that “a Kurdish buffer strip would prevent the spread of the sectarian war in the Middle East to Turkey.” As we understood, Obama tried to sell this plan to Turkish leaders in this way. On the other hand, even the Turkish General Staff ruled that the idea of a no-fly zone would no longer be useful within the context of Obama’s plans. The points were mentioned in a report by the Turkish General Staff (May 28, 2013), which is as follows: • The no-fly zone was previously applied in the north of Iraq, and loss suffered was experienced in the target country. Therefore, this plan would benefit uncontrollable terrorist groups, especially the PYD/YPG (Yekîneyen Parastina Gel) in Syria. • In this case, it would have serious dangers for Turkey. • No-fly zone would cause the breakdown of Turkey’s relations with neighboring countries. • Maybe the only benefit of establishing a no-fly zone for Turkey could be the right to speak on Syria’s future in the case of the collapse of the Assad regime. TRANSFORMATION OF KURDISH AUTONOMOUS REGIONS INTO BUFFER ZONES Foreign Minister Davutoğlu (July 2013) interestingly took a quite positive attitude toward the idea of a Kurdish buffer between Turkey and Syria. According to Davutoğlu, in this case, the humanitarian corridors could have

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possibly passed through this buffer zone in the future. Some possible military operations could also be carried out inside Syria, starting from this region. For this aim, Turkey’s domestic peace process (solution process) with its Kurds would have to be supported explicitly. While all these discussions are going on, the Syrian Army continued to advance rapidly and dangerously toward the Aleppo region. There was not so much time. Moreover, current conditions were also not in favor of Turkey. Under these conditions, Erdoğan made a new proposal to Russia in August-September 2013 as follows: transforming the Aleppo region into a buffer zone. Erdoğan held two phone calls with President Putin on this matter. According to the proposal, if possible, this buffer zone could be useful to not only protect Aleppo but also prevent a new human flow to be directed to Turkey. The region could also be turned into a safe zone in the future. Humanitarian aid could also easily be sustained in such a region. However, prior to Erdoğan’s visit to Washington D.C. in October 2013, the possibilities of the expected buffer zone and the land operation were also considered. Turkey chose to stay carefully away from all the plans, which included PYD. But this political stance did not fulfill the expectations of the United States. The US side continued to blame Turkey for deterioration of the situation. Some news about it appeared in American media (e.g., New York Times). There were increasing numbers of news alleging Turkey to confer aid to the Al-Qaeda type of organizations like Al-Nusra. As can be seen, Turkey’s latest plan did not come to fore. Turkey, afterward, maintained its request for a buffer zone in Syria under the umbrella of NATO as of February 2014. What did Turkey want to achieve with its insistence? This time the Turkish administration planned to establish a buffer zone against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) organization in Aleppo and its north. The aim was to prevent ISIS from moving toward Aleppo. But the PKK–PYD regarded this plan as “an attempt for the invasion of Kurdistan” (as Murat Karayılan says) under a reactive approach. He threatened Turkey as follows to block this plan: “If Turkey deploys its troops in the buffer zone, the solution process will disappear.”11 Therefore, at this point, a cantonal zone versus buffer zone dichotomy took place in the sight of the American strategists. According to PYD’s point of view, dispersing the cantonal region that the Kurds were trying to create was as easy as falling off a log in establishing a buffer on the Turkish Armed Forces field. In this regard, again, any resolution of approval could not be taken by the UN Security Council. Nonetheless, the Pentagon continued to look more positively on buffer zones in Syria compared to Obama. Therefore, Davutoğlu’s (September 2014) approach favored continuing the search for a buffer zone. According to Davutoğlu, the buffer zone should have been at least 30 kilometers in depth.

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In his words, “If a buffer zone could have been established when the first time we said; the ISIS could not have spread to such a wide area.”12 On the other hand, after the emergence of ISIS, Erdoğan revised his thesis and updated Turkey’s plan on it as follows: “Not a buffer but a nofly and safe zone based on humanitarian aid.” Meanwhile, ISIS had also emerged in the Syrian field. The terrorist organization’s effectiveness in Syria manifested itself, especially in the “Kobane Battle” in October 2014. In other words, the Westerners put forward the Kurds as a natural buffer in front of ISIS. At this stage, Turkey did not want to engage in direct combat against ISIS. The United States wanted to establish a “Kurdish Corridor” in the Syrian area under these circumstances. The Turkish Armed Forces, on the other hand, tried to counter this development with a “Turkish Buffer.” According to its military plans, a buffer zone, safe zone, and/or a no-fly zone would be created in the area where the Turkish Armed Forces would be deployed. MOVING FROM THE BUFFER ZONE PLANS TOWARD THE SAFE ZONE PLANS IN 2014 At this stage, Turkey’s attitude regarding the safe zone plans in Syria evolved for the first time very clearly against the PKK with an attempt of the Turkish Armed Forces. Prime Minister Davutoğlu clarified the contents of Turkey’s plan on October 15, 2014, as follows: “Turkey’s request for a safe zone is not to be confused with the military buffer zone. As Turkey, we do not ask for a military buffer zone for ourselves; we request for a safe zone for civilians based on humanitarian justifications.”13 The United States’ stance was also closer to this safe zone plan compared to the buffer zone option. According to this new plan, Turks could remain in the forefront of the region, not militarily but logistically. However, there was a big unanswered question: How could unarmed security be possible? In this way, Turkey eventually turned to the safe zone plan. Developments in this direction have taken place particularly after the tripartite security summit between the Prime Minister, the General Chief of Staff, and the National Intelligence Service after President Erdoğan’s New York/UN contacts. During this period, a new synthesis plan, which Erdoğan voiced on September 27, 2014, was the No-fly Safe Zone Plan, which consisted of three phases. The first phase was the declaration of a no-fly zone. Only an international coalition force could make this zone safer. The second phase would be the establishment of the full-fledged safe zone. Approximately 1.5 million refugees could be taken back to this region. The third and the last phase was the clarification of who would be trained and equipped in and for this region.

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To adapt to this new plan, the Turkish General Staff revealed its red lines about the safe zone as of September 2014. According to these red lines, purifying all terrorist organizations in the region would be very important. Indeed, none of these would enter the region. Total disarmament of the region was a sine qua non. The establishment of the region based on international law and in compliance with the UN resolutions would be the most beneficial option for Turkey. Considering the sensitivities of Damascus administration also should not have been neglected. In this framework, giving the impression that the operations would also benefit all Syrians and even the regime had to be emphasized with ultimate care. In short, it should not be given the impression that this operation was carried out against the regime. The aim of the operation is to cut off the ‘so-called’ Kurdish Corridor plan of the Greater Middle East Project through a Turkish safe zone map. It should be avoided a no-fly zone that is spanning over a wide region in the safe area. Such a widespreading region could benefit many malicious organizations such as ISIS and the PKK. In short, this region should not be transformed into a “rescued area” for terrorists. Discourses such as “Hammer Force type units” should not be used about the Turkish Armed Forces, and this kind of false impression should not be given. Based on the first examinations made by the Turkish Armed Forces, initially, the establishment of thirteen critical security zones must have been located in extending the Turkey-Syria border.14 Interestingly, these thirteen critical points also covered all regions within the scope of Turkey’s current safe zone plan. Within the context of Turkey’s new approach, it could lead to serious problems in foreign policy if all other specified regional plans were desired to be realized alone. Namely, first of all, the Turkish Armed Forces were not being wanted in the buffer zone. There would be no land operations in the no-fly zone, and only the coalition’s air operations would be carried out. However, Turkey did not already think of these two plans separately; they could only complement each other. For Turkey, a Turkish-American military power could jointly take part in a possible buffer zone. From Turkey’s perspective, the buffer zones and their derivative regions could only be tactical, not purposive. One of the problems with buffers and other kinds of regions was that they were only a part of the anti-terrorism strategies, not the counter-terrorism, so their function could not destroy all terrorists, but only to push them back southwards. On the other hand, Turkey believed that through the new rules of engagement, a strip extending in the north of Syria was already a de-facto zone that prevented almost all unwanted flights. So any subsequent safe buffer zone plans were expected to have the functionality to disarm all the areas against terrorists. In addition, humanitarian aid should have been delivered easily to civilians in the region.

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In this regard, Erdoğan, unlike the Turkish Armed Forces’ view, highlighted that this region to be established should also provide a base for organizing anti-Assad groups. First of all, the FSA should have had space there for its action and mobility. Meanwhile, Peoples’ Democratic Party’s co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş also had a proposal against Turkey’s last regional plan. According to his proposal on September 28, 2014: “Turkey could turn the Rojava region into a safe zone.”15 In other words, Demirtaş proposed a regional partnership with the Turkish government against ISIS. So a buffer zone could also be set up against this terrorist organization. But Syrian foreign minister Walid al-Muallem, naturally opposed to Turkey’s Three-Stage Plan. According to Muallem, Turkey will be in the same league with the Israeli state against Syria. Israel had similar demands and plans in its border regions with Syria. Beyond all these planning and promises, when it’s looked at the developments in practice on the field, a rescued area was created in the Suruç-Kobane line by the United States during the Kobane Battle. Turkey also gave support to establish this line by creating a logistical corridor through its territory. It was seen that some EU states (especially France) also contributed to these plans. However, the United States did not give support once again to Turkey’s Three-Stage Plan as of October 2014. President Erdoğan again tried to have the safe zone plan accepted by his interlocutors by using options such as “joining the coalition against the ISIS” and “opening the İncirlik Air Base to the coalition” as bargaining chips. In other words, these options were used as trump cards. At this stage, Turkey’s safe zone approach has been a sort of antithesis of not only the Kurdish cantonal district approach but also converting the region between Kobane and Qamishli into a rescued area. Today, the cantonal district thesis has turned into a “cardboard district.” Under these conditions, Turkey and its NATO allies have ultimately reached an İncirlik Consensus. According to this consensus, implementing a no-fly zone in Syria would be possible through the actual flights to be carried out from İncirlik Base. However, the veto barrier in the UN could not be overcome once again on the issue of converting this region into a buffer or safe zone. As Turkey could not reach its goals, it chose clearly to remain unresponsive to the Kobane Battle and continued its objections to a possible “Kurdish buffer.” Prime Minister Davutoğlu got closer to the safe zone idea as an “A-plan” to overcome the veto barrier in the UN, but as known, it also requires a UN resolution. It should not be vetoed. Moreover, Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also worked on a “B-plan.” In October 2014, Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu applied to NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg on the buffer

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zone issue and said, “The buffer should be established by NATO.”16.Turkey also used the issue of participation in the coalition against ISIS as a trump card to have the United States accept this buffer zone plan. Indeed, Turkey put forward three conditions for participation to the coalition on October 3, 2014, during the negotiations with Brett McGurk, Special Representative of the US President to Combat ISIS. These were as follows: to carry out a land operation, to put the Assad regime on target, and to establish a buffer, safe, or no-fly zone. Besides, a reinforcement proposal given by President Erdoğan to the United States was the placement of approximately 1.5 million Syrian refugees in the region to be established here. As negotiations continue on the issue, Prime Minister Davutoğlu announced his safe zones plan (October 17, 2014—Al Jazeera). So, where these safe zones would be established? Davutoğlu gave the details on this subject: north of Aleppo, Idlib, north of Latakia, some parts of Al-Hasakah, Jarabulus, and Ayn al-Arab (Kobane). These places, which Davutoğlu envisaged to be safe zones, would essentially be sheltered against two basic threats: the Assad regime and ISIS. Because these two actors were brutally attacking civilians in these regions of Syria. In this case, there was an important unanswered question: “Who would establish these regions”? For Turkey, the answer was quite clear: jointly by the Turkish Armed Forces and the international coalition. However, the United States rejected this plan again. The safe zone plan of the United States was much different. According to its plan, the PYD units and Peshmerga would be brought to the places where ISIS was evacuated. Naturally, Turkey objected to this US plan. Erdoğan made the following new proposal during his visit to France (November 2, 2014): turning the north of the thirty-sixth parallel into a safe zone including Aleppo and placing 1.6 million Syrian refugees living in Turkey in the region to be established. However, firstly, the infrastructure of the region would have to be created in whole. On the other hand, the Assad regime started successfully to clean the route between Damascus and Aleppo while the Kobane Battle continued. Indeed, the city of Aleppo was completely surrounded by regime forces on November 6, 2014. Meanwhile, Turkey was still waiting for a UN resolution to solve the safe zone problem before allowing the United States to use the İncirlik Base. CONCLUSION In the Syria crisis, Turkey had a closer attitude toward “the Kirkuk Model” (emphasizing the territorial integrity of the country in cooperation with external powers) than “the Bosnian Model” (a division of lands according to the influence regions of external powers) supported by the United States.

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Thus, according to Turkey, a divided Syria was more dangerous than the continuation of the al-Assad regime. So Turkey is trying to develop an antithesis against the Northern Syrian Federalism (this concept refers to the democratic federation project of the Syrian Kurds), an American-centered project. Turkey was aware of the US-backed project to establish a terrorist state, so it was quite worried about this situation. Moreover, the US troops were deployed to act as a buffer between Turkey and the so-called PYD regions. The rationale for this deployment was justified as the necessity to prevent American weapons given to the PYD-YPG from falling into the PKK’s hands in Turkey. Despite all Turkish objections, the American administration maintained its insistence on “the corridor project” continuing since the Obama era. And against that, Turkey has wanted to establish a safe zone to be controlled by the Turkish Army and by approximately 10,000 FSA fighters who were to be trained as the paramilitary personnel in the region extending from Jarabulus to Idlib. NOTES 1. Slaughter was the former director of Policy Planning for the US Department of State. 2. Anne-Marie Slaughter, “How to Rescue the Syrian Peace Plan,” Financial Times, February 6, 2012, http:​/​/www​​.ft​.c​​om​/in​​tl​/cm​​s​/s​/0​​/a7ec​​5e70-​​50b4-​​11e1-​​8cdb-​​ 00144​​feabd​​c0​.ht​​​ml​#ax​​zz3zh​​7hWnb​​y. 3. Murat Yetkin, “Afganistan, Suriye ve Askerî Müdahale,” Radikal, March 17, 2012. 4. Phil Orchard, “Reconsidering Safe Areas as a Means to Protect Civilians,” AP R2P Brief 4, no. 4 (2014): 2. 5. Abdulbasit Seyda, “We Want Urgent Solution of Syrian Problem Out of UN,” Anadolu Agency, August 21, 2012, http:​/​/aa.​​com​.t​​r​/en/​​world​​/we​-w​​ant​-u​​rgent​​-solu​​ tion-​​of​-sy​​rian-​​probl​​em​-o​u​​t​-of-​​un​/34​​2489. 6. Colin Freeman, “Syria: No-Fly-Zone Moves a Step Closer as Hillary Clinton Assesses ‘Worst Case’ Scenario of Chemical Attack,” The Telegraph, August 11, 2012, http:​/​/www​​.tele​​graph​​.co​.u​​k​/new​​s​/wor​​ldnew​​s​/mid​​dleea​​st​/sy​​ria​/9​​46909​​5​/Syr​​ia​ -no​​-fly-​​zone-​​moves​​-a​-st​​ep​-cl​​oser-​​as​-Hi​​llary​​-Clin​​ton​-a​​ssess​​es​-wo​​rst​-c​​as​e​-s​​cenar​​io​-of​​ -chem​​ical-​​attac​​k​.htm​​l. 7. Leon Panetta, “Syria No-Fly Zone not on Front Burner,” FoxNews​.com​, August 14, 2012, http:​/​/www​​.foxn​​ews​.c​​om​/po​​litic​​s​/201​​2​/08/​​14​/pa​​netta​​-syri​​a​-no-​​fly​ -z​​one​-n​​ot​-on​​​-fron​​t​-bur​​ner​.h​​tml. 8. Ömer Göksel İşyar, Suriye Krizi ve Türk Dış Politikası: Uluslararası Politikanın Çözümlenemeyen Düğümü, 2. Baskı (Bursa: Sayda Yayınları, 2017), 210. 9. Hasan Öymez ve Cüneyt Karadağ, “Erdoğan-Merkel Ortak Basın Toplantısı,” Haberler​.com​, October 31, 2012, http:​/​/www​​.habe​​rler.​​com​/e​​rdoga​​n​-mer​​kel​-o​​rtak-​​ basin​​-topl​​antis​​i​-2​-4​​​05402​​0​-hab​​eri/.

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10. The El Menar TV, November 2012. 11. Mahmut Hamsici, “Is Turkey’s Peace Process with the Kurds Collapsing?” BBC News, September 9, 2013, http:​/​/www​​.bbc.​​com​/n​​ews​/w​​orld-​​europ​​e​-2​40​​14555​. 12. Akif Beki, “Davutoğlu: ÖSO Desteklense Bunlar Olmazdı,” Hurriyet​.com​.t​r, September 20, 2014. 13. “Güvenli Bölgenin Çerçevesi Netleşiyor,” TRT Haber, October 16, 2014. 14. The thirteen critical points are as follows: the region between Yayladağ and Keseb under the control of the Syrian Army; the region between Girmeli and Qamishli under the control of the Syrian Army; the region between Karbeyaz and Azmarin under the control of the FSA; the region between Cilvegözü and Bab el Hawa under the control of Islamic Front; the region between Öncüpınar and Esselame under the control of Islamic Front; the region between Islahiye and Meydan-ı Ekbez under the control of PYD; the region between Mürşitpınar and Ayn el Arab under the control of PYD; the region between Ceylanpınar and Ras el Ayn under the control of PYD; the region between Şenyurt and Derbesiye under the control of PYD; the region between Cizre and Andivar under the control of PYD; the region between Çobanbey and El Rai under the control of ISIS; the region between Karkamış and Cerablus under the control of ISIS; the region between Akçakale and Tel Abyad under the control of ISIS. 15. Selahattin Demirtaş, “Uçuşa Yasak Bölge Neye Yarayacak?” Haberler​.com​, September 27, 2014. 16. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, “Tek Başına Kara Harekatı Gerçekçi Değil,” October 9, 2014, http://www​.finanstrend​.com.

REFERENCES “Güvenli Bölgenin Çerçevesi Netleşiyor.” TRT Haber, October 16, 2014. Beki, Akif. “Davutoğlu: ÖSO Desteklense Bunlar Olmazdı.” Hurriyet​.com​.t​r, September 20, 2014. Çavuşoğlu, Mevlüt. “Tek Başına Kara Harekâtı Gerçekçi Değil.” October 9, 2014, http://www​.finanstrend​.com. Demirtaş, Selahattin. “Uçuşa Yasak Bölge Neye Yarayacak?” Haberler​.com​, September 27, 2014. Freeman, Colin. “Syria: No-Fly-Zone Moves a Step Closer as Hillary Clinton Assesses ‘Worst Case’ Scenario of Chemical Attack.” The Telegraph, August 11, 2012, http:​/​/www​​.tele​​graph​​.co​.u​​k​/new​​s​/wor​​ldnew​​s​/mid​​dleea​​st​/sy​​ria​/9​​46909​​5​/Syr​​ ia​-no​​-fly-​​zone-​​moves​​-a​-st​​ep​-cl​​oser-​​as​-Hi​​llary​​-Clin​​ton​-a​​ssess​​es​-wo​​rst​-c​​as​e​-s​​cenar​​ io​-of​​-chem​​ical-​​attac​​k​.htm​​l. Hamsici, Mahmut. “Is Turkey’s Peace Process with the Kurds Collapsing?” BBC News, September 9, 2013, http:​/​/www​​.bbc.​​com​/n​​ews​/w​​orld-​​europ​​e​-2​40​​14555​. İşyar, Ömer Göksel. Suriye Krizi ve Türk Dış Politikası: Uluslararası Politikanın Çözümlenemeyen Düğümü. 2. Baskı, Bursa: Sayda Yayınları, 2017. Naumkin, Vitaly V. Settlement of the Syrian Conflict: Prospects for National Dialogue and International Cooperation: Rationale Behind Russian Policies.

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Conference by Vitaly Naumkin. The Transcript of the Trialogue Club International Meeting, April 18, 2018, http://www​.pircenter​.org. Orchard, Phil. “Reconsidering Safe Areas as a Means to Protect Civilians.” AP R2P Brief 4, no. 4 (2014): 2. Öymez, Hasan ve Cüneyt Karadağ. “Erdoğan-Merkel Ortak Basın Toplantısı.” Haberler​.com​, October 31, 2012, http:​/​/www​​.habe​​rler.​​com​/e​​rdoga​​n​-mer​​kel​-o​​rtak-​​ basin​​-topl​​antis​​i​-2​-4​​​05402​​0​-hab​​eri/. Panetta, Leon. “Syria No-Fly Zone not on Front Burner.” FoxNews​.com​, August 14, 2012, http:​/​/www​​.foxn​​ews​.c​​om​/po​​litic​​s​/201​​2​/08/​​14​/pa​​netta​​-syri​​a​-no-​​fly​-z​​one​-n​​ot​ -on​​​-fron​​t​-bur​​ner​.h​​tml. Seyda, Abdulbasit. “We Want Urgent Solution of Syrian Problem Out of UN.” Anadolu Agency, August 21, 2012, http:​/​/aa.​​com​.t​​r​/en/​​world​​/we​-w​​ant​-u​​rgent​​-solu​​ tion-​​of​-sy​​rian-​​probl​​em​-o​u​​t​-of-​​un​/34​​2489. Slaughter, Anne-Marie. “How to Rescue the Syrian Peace Plan.” Financial Times, February 6, 2012, http:​/​/www​​.ft​.c​​om​/in​​tl​/cm​​s​/s​/0​​/a7ec​​5e70-​​50b4-​​11e1-​​8cdb-​​ 00144​​feabd​​c0​.ht​​​ml​#ax​​zz3zh​​7hWnb​​y. Yetkin, Murat. “Afganistan, Suriye ve Askerî Müdahale.” Radikal, March 17, 2012.

Chapter 6

Soft Power, Domestic Dividends, and Turkish Foreign Policy The Case of Palestine Sabri CIFTCI

INTRODUCTION Foreign policy is a complex “two-level game”1 involving the interaction of domestic and international factors. Turkey’s relations with Palestine and Israel provide a suitable case for studying this complex interaction. International factors such as national security interests and regional ambitions in the Middle East can partly explain Turkey’s relations with Palestine (and, by extension, Israel). Domestic factors such as elite ideology, electoral calculations, and public opinion can also play a role in shaping Turkey’s Palestinian policy.2 In this chapter, I examine the outcomes of Turkish foreign policy strategies in Palestine in relation to both international and domestic political factors. Specifically, I explore (i) the domestic political dividends that may result from pursuing a pro-Palestinian foreign policy and (ii) the impact of this policy position and especially of Turkish aid to Palestine as a soft power tool in creating a positive image for Turkey among Palestinians and the Middle Eastern publics. Being a champion of the Palestinian cause is expected to pay domestic political dividends in any Muslim-majority country. Just as Gamal Abdel Nasser, Saddam Hussein, and Ayatollah Khomeini, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey exploited the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for domestic and international political gains. Turkey has shifted its foreign policy doctrine on the Israeli-Palestinian issue from a Western-oriented benevolent position largely informed by the national security doctrine toward a more assertive policy guided by soft power capabilities and Islamist identity. This paradigmatic shift toward a strong pro-Palestinian position at the expense of tense relations 89

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with Israel is driven by tangible electoral payoffs in domestic politics as well as by the advantages stemming from the rise of Turkish soft power strategies in the international arena. For example, pro-Palestinian position and Turkish aid to West Bank and Gaza are highly conducive to creating a positive image for Turkey in the Middle East. While the post-Arab Spring developments resulted in increased use of military options in Syria, Libya, and Iraq by Turkey, soft power strategies continue to shape the overall foreign policy architecture. Our knowledge concerning the effects of Turkish soft power on domestic and international political outcomes, however, remains meager. The remainder of this chapter explores the domestic and international outcomes of Turkish aid as a soft power tool through the lens of Turkish-Palestinian relations. It combines historical inquiry of these relations and the analysis of the Arab Barometer Surveys and the Turkish aid data to assess the perceptions of Turkey. The analysis scrutinizes the breakdown of Turkish aid at the sub-national level in Palestine to explore the associations among foreign policy goals, aid distribution, and public sentiment about Turkey in Palestinian provinces. TURKISH-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE The origins of Turkey’s Palestine policy go back to the reign of Abdulhamid II, who closely watched the demography of Palestine because of Jerusalem’s religious significance. Combined with the Arab nationalist resentment against the centuries-long Ottoman domination, the Western and secularist outlooks of modernization reforms during the Republican period might have resulted in negative perceptions of Turkey in the Middle East.3 Turkey strived to build good relations with its Arab neighbors throughout the interwar period, but this effort did not produce any tangible outcomes. During the Cold War, the foreign policy elite viewed Soviet expansionism as the greatest threat to Turkish national security. Alliance with the West, thus, was perceived as an absolute necessity to ensure international security. Regional stability and cooperation with the Middle Eastern states were seen as mere instruments of this foreign policy doctrine. For the leaders of the Democrat Party (DP) that came to power in 1950, the Arab-Israeli conflict was a distraction masking the country’s real security threats. Turkish administration aimed to reconcile the conflict between the Arab States and Israel because they realized that maintaining good relations with Israel was instrumental for anchoring its security to the West and for ensuring continual flow of US aid.4 Reflective of these calculations, Turkey denounced the Israeli occupation of Palestine during the Baghdad pact meetings, but at the same

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time carefully navigated the diplomatic relations to not alienate Israel. For that reason, Turkey recognized Israel as a state as early as in 1949. In the 1960s, the Turkish foreign policy elite engaged in a similar balancing act by simultaneously maintaining its alliances with the West and building cooperative relations with the Arab States. During the 1967 Arab–Israel War, the Turkish administration did not allow the US administration to use the İncirlik airbase.5 Formal support for the Palestinian independence was not granted, but Turkey continued to participate in Islamic conferences. For example, at the 1969 Rabat conference, Turkey refused to sign any declaration that would have contradicted with its past commitments to Israel. Turkey also kept its distance from the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) by eschewing official recognition. This policy, presumably, aimed not to alienate the Western allies by reneging Turkey’s international commitments regarding Israel’s statehood. Turkey’s Palestinian policy has significantly changed in the 1970s. In effect, even as early as 1964, the infamous Johnson letter6 regarding the Cyprus issue served as a stark warning to the Turkish foreign policy elite. Policymakers realized that they could not completely rely on the US or European powers in their security calculations. Throughout the 1970s, Turkish policymakers continued to anchor in Western security architecture while at the same time taking significant steps toward establishing cooperation with the Arab-majority countries. This development, presumably, is a result of the diplomatic efforts aiming to build international support for the Turkish position in Cyprus, especially following the American sanctions in the wake of the military intervention in the island in 1974. Although Turkey increasingly steered toward a pro-Palestinian direction in its Middle Eastern foreign policy in the 1970s, this strategy fell short of recognizing the PLO. As Aykan7 argues, several factors led to this contradictory position including PLO’s involvement in international terrorist attacks, its support for leftist and Kurdish militants, its unfavorable position about the Turkish involvement in Cyprus, and Turkey’s cautious policy about maintaining close relations with the West. Turkey allowed PLO to open Chargé d’affaires (Maslahatguzar) in 1979, corresponding to the diplomatic standing of Israel’s diplomatic mission in Turkey. Turkey’s relations with its Arab neighbors slowly improved in 1980s, thanks to Turkey’s increasing trade with the Middle Eastern countries and Prime Minister Turgut Özal’s conservative background. In this context, Turkey’s Palestine policy can be characterized as the continuation of its past strategy, namely a complex, but contradictory balancing act. Following Israel’s intention to move its capital from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, the Turkish government closed its consulate in Israel and demoted its diplomatic relations with Israel in 1980.8 At the same time, Turkey continued to improve

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its relations with the Muslim world by taking an active position in Islamic conferences and supporting a pro-Palestinian position. In 1988, Turkey officially recognized Palestine as a state. However, Turkey also continued to engage diplomatically with Israel and took a middle of the road position in the United Nations. This complex balancing act took a pro-Israeli turn in the 1990s. TurkishIsraeli relations improved, especially in the area of military cooperation and trade. The February 28, 1997, intervention fell short of a full-scale military coup, but it reset the parameters of Turkish domestic politics by establishing a tutelary regime targeting Islamist actors. Some observers of Turkish politics argue that securitization of domestic issues such as Islamism and Kurdish identity were the main drivers of Turkish foreign policy in the 1990s.9 In this context, Palestine was one of the rallying points among Turkish Islamists. The rapprochement with Israel, especially led to novel new political strategies in the new millennium. Incidentally, the upcoming period in Turkish politics coincided with increasing tensions between Israel and Palestine, the new waves of Intifada, the rise of Hamas, and Israel’s increasing aggression in Gaza. FROM SECURITIZATION TO SOFT POWER: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AND PALESTINE IN THE AKP (JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY) ERA The rise of the AKP marked the beginning of a new era in Turkish foreign policy, though the party’s policies did not constitute a complete rupture with the past. For example, the AKP pursued a Europeanization policy that resulted in significant advances in Turkey’s EU membership during its first term (2002–2007).10 In the meantime, Turkey aimed to improve its policies simultaneously with Israel and Palestine. Despite this continuity, we can talk of a paradigm shift11 in Turkish foreign policy after 2007. Geopolitical realities, domestic struggles between the Islamists and the secularist establishment, and the rise of the trading state are cited as the main drivers of this paradigmatic shift.12 Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “strategic depth” vision also greatly influenced the direction of Turkish foreign policy in the post-2007 era. He argued that a strong Middle Eastern and Eurasian emphasis was a necessary component of Turkish foreign policy.13 The AKP’s first term coincided with a significant rift in Palestinian politics between the Hamas and al-Fatah. Turkey moved very quickly to present Hamas’ electoral victory in Gaza as an opportunity for peace.14 A significant amount of development assistance and humanitarian aid was sent to Gaza making Palestine one of the top five recipients of Turkish aid. Turkish administration also openly supported Hamas leaders, but continued to recognize the

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Fatah-led government in Ramallah. In general, Turkish administrators hoped to play a mediating role in the Middle East to bring Palestinian and Israeli parties together while also facilitating reconciliation efforts between Israel and Syria.15 This policy was greatly disturbed by several crises fundamentally altering Turkish-Israeli relations. Operation Cast Lead in 2008 was seen as the last straw that broke the camel’s back. Several days before this war, the then the Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert met with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Ankara for peace negotiations between Israel and Syria. He never informed Erdoğan of this pending operation creating a deep embarrassment for the Turkish government at home. According to some accounts, Israel killed 1,383 civilians including 333 children in this campaign.16 From this point on, Turkish-Israeli relations spiraled downward. In early 2009, Erdoğan harshly criticized Israel in front of Peres in Davos World Economic Forum, a remarkable event known as “the One-minute crisis.” Later, Turkey barred Israel from participating in the joint Anatolian Eagle military exercise. Relations between the two countries reached a new low following the Gaza Flotilla Incident in May 201017 when nine Turkish citizens were killed during an attempt to break Israel’s blockade of Gaza to carry humanitarian aid.18 This incident led Erdoğan to issue a statement that condemned Israel for committing state terror and demanded a formal apology as well as compensation for the victims. Turkey asked for an emergency meeting in the UN and an independent investigation into the war crimes. The resulting Palmer report fell short of meeting Turkish expectations. Despite the longest diplomatic crisis in Turkish-Israeli relations, economic ties between the two countries, especially in the weapons industry and energy sector continued to improve. The total trade between the two countries surpassed $4 million in 2011 and reached $5.3 million in 2014 giving Turkey a net advantage.19 The US administration pressed for the negotiations between his two allies in the Middle East. The two countries came to an agreement following Netanyahu’s formal apology in 2013 and Israel’s compensation of victims in 2016. Energy deals between the two countries, the Syrian conflict, and domestic political factors played a role in this rapprochement, but not all issues were resolved on the table. Turkey initially refused to close Hamas offices in Turkey contrary to the Israeli position, but eventually approached Fatah at the expense of Hamas.20 DOMESTIC CALCULATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL FACTORS IN PALESTINIAN POLICY What explains the changing course of Turkey’s Palestinian policy during the AKP era? Domestic political calculations or international factors?

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Championing the Palestinian cause, presumably, provided significant political dividends for Erdoğan. “One-minute crisis” and Erdoğan’s unapologetic rhetoric toward Israel in the aftermath of the Operation Cast Lead and Flotilla incident helped increase Erdoğan’s popularity among his supporters and possibly led to the electoral victory in the 2011 elections. Pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli rhetoric also helped Erdoğan to navigate the challenges of Gezi Park protests in 2013, the most significant test to his rule. As Gürbüz succinctly states: “The Palestinian question has become most useful in supporting Erdoğan’s narrative that Zionist-influenced players have plotted a systematic campaign against him due to his leadership role in the Muslim world.”21 At the international level, Erdoğan’s ambitions to make Turkey one of the top ten economies in the world and a leader in the Middle East also shaped the foreign policy strategy. Through soft power strategies, the Turkish administration aspired to improve the country’s international image. This is easily said than done, of course, especially after Turkey had to confront various challenges in implementing this vision in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Specifically, the conflict in Syria and its implication about the Kurdish separatist movement significantly altered these calculations. By and large, however, the Turkish foreign policy elite continued to implement soft power strategies for winning the hearts and minds of the Middle East. A pro-Palestinian policy served Turkish ambitions in the Middle East by constructing a positive image for Turkey as a stable, prosperous, and democratic country. Whether this was actually the tendency of public opinion or not is an empirical question that can be answered by looking at Turkish soft power strategies and the public opinion data in Palestine and the Middle East. SOFT POWER AND TURKISH AID IN PALESTINE Soft power22 refers to the ability of a state to attract or persuade as opposed to coerce other actors in international relations. According to Nye,23 soft power “occurs when one country gets other countries to want what it wants” without the use of any hard power means including military capabilities or economic might. Soft power requires persuasion through attractiveness of ideas, institutions, or culture. As Oğuzlu24 succinctly puts, “being a soft power in this context would suggest that other actors would change their behavior in line with the preferences of the power-holder not because the power-holder induces them to make a cost-benefit calculation, but because they view the power-holder’s identity and policies as legitimate.” The legitimacy and attractiveness of a state’s foreign policy gain currency insofar as it is perceived positively by others.25 Turkey has increasingly

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become an attractive model in the Middle East thanks to its impressive economic development and democratic institutions.26 Winning the hearts and minds of publics in other countries is also crucial to soft power strategies. As such, it seems reasonable to measure public perceptions to assess whether soft power resonates among the citizens of other countries. In a recent study, Arı27 found that Turkey’s economic and political stability resulted in positive perceptions of the Turkish model not only among the public but also the elites and intellectuals. Turkey also used soap operas, its historical heritage, and culture to make herself a center of attraction in the Middle East. Aid is another foreign policy instrument that could be used to advance a country’s image in world politics. Kavaklı28 argues that humanitarian aid may be more conducive to populist goals and governments may increase humanitarian aid to recipient countries according to their citizens’ ethnic or religious sensitivities. Some recent studies started to explore the consequences of official development assistance (ODA) and humanitarian aid as soft power strategies.29 Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) plays an important role in implementing Turkish soft power strategies by distributing Turkish aid across the world. TIKA was established in 1992 to increase ties with the Central Asian republics. It had gained traction since 2004 and expanded its activities to include 150 countries and 61 coordination offices. Turkish official development aid increased from $85 million in 2002 to $8.120 billion in 2017, and humanitarian aid reached over $8 billion in 2019, making Turkey the largest donor of humanitarian aid in the world.30 As of 2017, Turkey was ranked sixth in total ODA surpassing such countries as Italy, Sweden, Netherlands, Canada, and Norway. Palestine has become one of the top recipients of Turkish aid, helping Turkey to achieve two goals. First, advertising ODA and humanitarian aid to Palestine generated domestic political dividends. All else equal, being a champion of the Palestinian cause, should help develop positive perceptions in the Arab Street (presumably also among the public in Muslim-majority countries). Nasser, for example, gained popularity among the Arab citizens for his support of the Palestinian cause in the 1960s. Others, including Khomeini and Saddam Hussein, pursued similar strategies to gain public support for their actions. According to the latest Arab Barometer Surveys, most Arab citizens hold negative views about Israel. For example, when Arab citizens31 were asked about the greatest threat to their own country, 38% mentioned Israel followed by the United States with 14%. The proportion of the respondents who see Israel as the greatest security threat reaches to 39% in Algeria, 43% in Lebanon, and 63% in Egypt. Given this negative public sentiment, standing for the Palestinian cause is likely to boost the image of a leader and her country among Middle Eastern citizens. Turkish aid to Palestine, thus, should be considered in light of this public sentiment.

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Figure 6.1  The Breakdown of Turkish Aid to Palestine (1993–2017). Note: The chart shows Turkish aid to Palestine in million USD with constant prices. Source: OECD https:// data​.oecd​.org​/oda​/net​-oda​.htm (2019). According to the OECD, official development assistance (ODA) is a type of “government aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries.”

Palestine’s share of Turkish aid gradually increased in the last decade. Next to Syria and Yemen, Palestine is one of the top recipients of Turkish humanitarian assistance. However, it’s not ranked among the top ten countries in its share of bilateral assistance, lagging behind some African countries as well as Yemen, Sudan, and Afghanistan as of 2017. Figure 6.1 shows that both ODA and humanitarian aid to Palestine have increased since 1993, but, in absolute terms, the amount of ODA is much larger than the humanitarian aid. We can see a spike in Turkish aid with the AKP’s rise to power after 2002. Humanitarian aid significantly increased in 2006, 2014, and 2016 and took a downturn in 2009 and 2010. These years mark the turmoil and several crises in Turkish-Israeli relations, including the “Flotilla incident.” The decline in the Turkish aid may be due to logistical reasons, because Israel tightened the blockade against any aid into West Bank and Gaza at that time. As reconciliation efforts got underway in 2013, both ODA and humanitarian aid continued their upward trend until 2017. The largest increase in Turkish aid is seen during the 2012–2014 period.

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The ODA transfers and Turkish humanitarian aid in Palestine are used for a variety of projects including health sector investments, education, water and sanitation infrastructure, vocational training, and housing. While these projects are implemented in different localities, there has been an increase in the number of projects implemented in Gaza provinces. Table 6.1 demonstrates the scope and geographical distribution of TIKA activities in Palestine since 2010.32 Geographical distribution of Turkish aid activities at the governorate level does not have a specific pattern, yet most activities concerning water infrastructure and access to clean water are concentrated in Gaza governorates. Construction and furnishing of schools appear to take place mostly in West Bank. Past studies have highlighted the importance of TV shows, cultural activities, institutions, identity, and economic power in generating positive perceptions about Turkey as a regional player in the Middle East.33 Recently some studies found that humanitarian aid34 and Turkish scholarships35 can help improve Turkey’s international image. Table 6.1 shows that the soft power toolkit also includes the buildings of hospitals, schools, and wells, donation of medical equipment, and training of various experts. TIKA has concentrated most of its educational infrastructure activities in the West Bank and access to clean water projects in Gaza. Recently, there has been an additional focus on housing construction, especially in Gaza. Given these figures, does Turkish aid influence aggregate opinion about Turkey in Palestine? Arab Barometer Surveys contain questions allowing researchers to tackle these questions. One question in the first two waves asked if respondents think Turkey is a complete dictatorship (1) or full democracy (10). This item has some advantages that will be helpful in assessing whether Turkish aid changes the aggregate tendencies of Palestinian public opinion. First, the first wave of Arab Barometer (AB) was conducted in 2006, right before Turkish aid (both ODA and humanitarian) started to go up. The second wave was conducted in 2010. Between 2006 and 2010, ODA increased significantly, while humanitarian aid declined with a local spike right before 2011 (see figure 6.1). Thus, the timing of the surveys is conducive to measuring the effect of ODA on attitudes toward Turkey. Second, deterioration of relations with Israel, Erdoğan’s unapologetic attitude in foreign policy, and his support for Palestinian cause just before the second wave was conducted provides an additional opportunity for measuring the effect of foreign policy discourse next to Turkish aid on the perceived image of Turkey. Third, this question is a good proxy for assessing soft power of a country since democracy is favored by large majorities in the Arab world.36 Figure 6.2 shows the distribution of responses to this question. In 2006, most Palestinian respondents did not view Turkey as a full democracy. However, in 2010, the majority of Palestinians perceived Turkey as a

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Table 6.1  The Extent and Geographical Distribution of Turkish Aid in Palestine Year

Activity

Governorate/ Municipality

2010

Education

Qalqilya

2011

Training Water

2012

Education

NA Khan Yunis, Rafah, Deir El Balah, Beit Lahia NA

Training

NA

Palestine

Health

Tubas City

Water Education

Rafah Nablus

Training

Hebron, Jerusalem NA

West Bank Gaza West Bank West Bank Palestine

Water Donations

Jabalia NA

Gaza Gaza

Education

Nablus

West Bank

Jerusalem

West Bank West Bank Gaza

2013

2014

Hebron Health

Gaza Tubas City

Explanation

West Bank Palestine Gaza

Qalqilya Turkish School

Palestine

Academic and vocational ducation for incapacitated people, academic scholarships Police, doctor, treasury expert, agricultural training Tubas City Hospital

Training

NA

West Bank West Bank Palestine

Donations

NA

Palestine

Education

NA

Palestine

El Bireh

2015

Region

Agricultural training Sewage infrastructure, clean water well

Water infrastructure, wells Nablus Turkish Girls School El Halil Primary School, Nizamiye Turkish School Police, doctor, waterworks expert training Various water infrastructure Fuel aid, agricultural machinery aid Repair of Al Fatimiye School, Furnishing of Nablus Turkish Girls School Computer Lab for Refugee school El Halil Primary School, construction, furnishing Gaza-Turkish Friendship Hospital Furnishing of Tubas Turkish hospital Reinforcement of El Bireh Hospital Doctor, statistical experts, postal service, industrial jobs Ambulance, medical equipment 13 academic scholarships (Continued )

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Table 6.1  The Extent and Geographical Distribution of Turkish Aid in Palestine (Continued) Governorate/ Municipality

Region

Explanation

Gaza

Gaza

Health

Gaza City

Gaza

Training Donations

NA NA

Palestine Palestine

2016

Training Donations

Rafah NA

Gaza Palestine

2017

Education

NA

Palestine

Donations Other

NA Tulkarm Gaza

Palestine West Bank Gaza

Health

Gaza

Gaza

Water

Gaza City

Gaza

Training

Janin

Other

Gaza Gaza

West Bank Gaza Gaza

$1,000 scholarships to students in Gaza, academic support for Gazan students in Turkey Gaza-Turkish Friendship Hospital, finalized Vocational, police training Medical equipment, wheelchairs Vocational training Medical equipment, wheelchairs Educational Technology Support Medical equipment, beehives Al-Wusta Housing Construction Gaza Valley Housing Construction Gaza-Turkish Friendship Hospital Gaza University water sanitation Agricultural training

Year

2018

Activity

Security personnel Housing Renovations, energy plant construction

Source: TIKA annual reports www​.tika​.gov​.tr. NA refers to missing information or projects involving all Palestine.

full democracy and hence viewed it in positive terms. So, amid the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations, aggregate public opinion in Palestine shifted toward a favorable position for Turkey. TIKA’s activities along with democratization reforms might have helped accomplish the goals of soft power strategies by improving Turkey’s image in Palestine. How do Palestinian citizens perceive Turkey in the governorates of Gaza and the West Bank? The Arab Barometer Surveys include a question about the future of economic relations between Turkey and Palestine (waves 3 and 4). Figure 6.3 shows the difference between these two waves in the percentage of respondents who reported that the economic relations should get better. Positive values will show that perceptions about Turkey got more positive over time.

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Figure 6.2  Changing Perceptions of Turkey in Palestine.Y-axis shows percentage of respondents and X-axis shows the scale ranging from complete dictatorships (1) to full democracy (10). Source: Arab Barometer Surveys (www​.arabbarometer​.org).

Turkish aid concentrated in several governorates including the Gaza governorates (Rafah, Dair al Balah, Gaza City, Khan Yunis), Qalqilya, Jerusalem, and Tubas (table 6.1). Of these governorates, the Gazan provinces were especially targeted for access to clean water, health investments, and humanitarian aid. Figure 6.3 illustrates a stark difference between some of these governorates and those that are not as frequently mentioned in TIKA reports. For example, three Gaza governorates (Rafah, Deir al Balah, and Gaza City) are the top three locations where Turkey’s positive image got stronger over time. TIKA opened or furnished several schools in Qalqilya and Jerusalem, and in these governorates positive perceptions about Turkey are high. However, in most West Bank governorates, positive perceptions of Turkey were in decline between the two surveys. It should be noted that a majority of people in these governorates still believe that economic relations with Turkey should get better, but there is somehow a decline in positive perceptions. These results should be interpreted cautiously, because the surveys are not representative at the governorate level. Furthermore, the surveys are not conducive to measuring the possible effect of Israeli blockade, intensification of the Jewish settlement and securitization

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Figure 6.3  Perceptions of Turkey in Palestinian Governorates. Source: Arab Barometer Surveys (www.arabbarometer.org).

activity, and Israel’s increasing military intervention all of which might have shaped the responses to these survey questions. CONCLUSION Since 2002, soft power strategies emerged as effective instruments of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East. Turkish aid to the Middle East and Africa increased dramatically as a result of these new foreign policy directions. One important finding of this chapter is that support for the Palestinian cause played a central role in informing AKP’s foreign policy vision. Domestically, Turkey’s Palestinian policy resulted in significant electoral dividends for Erdoğan. Internationally, being a champion of the Palestinian cause helped improve Turkey’s image in the Middle East. The analysis provides mixed evidence about the effectiveness of the Turkish soft power strategy in Palestine. Palestine has become one of the top recipients of Turkish aid in recent years. The distribution of Turkish aid across Palestinian governorates does not have a clear pattern, but generally Gaza governorates receive the lion’s share of this aid. As a result, Palestinians

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living in three Gazan governorates, Rafah, Deir al Balah, and Gaza City, hold the most favorable positions toward Turkey. In addition, the analysis reveals that Turkey’s image as a model of democracy has improved among the Palestinians. Most Palestinian citizens desire to advance economic and security ties with Turkey. Overall, we can expect that Turkey’s relations with Israel and Palestine will continue to play a central role in Turkish foreign policy. Turkish-Israeli relations are no longer solely determined by the Turkish security dilemma but rather by a complex international and regional order. At the same time, Turkey has invested heavily in Palestine to enhance its image in the Muslim world. Turkish authorities will likely continue to pursue multidimensional policy strategies and engage in a complex balancing act in the near future involving both Israel and Palestine.

NOTES 1. Robert D Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of TwoLevel Games,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 427–60. 2. Few notable studies include, Sabri Ciftci and Güneş Murat Tezcür, “Soft Power, Religion, and Anti-Americanism in the Middle East,” Foreign Policy Analysis 12, no. 3 (2016): 374–94; Pinar Ipek, “Ideas and Change in Foreign Policy Instruments: Soft Power and the Case of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency,” Foreign Policy Analysis 11, no. 2 (2015): 173–93; Talha Köse, Mesut Özcan, and Ekrem Karakoç, “A Comparative Analysis of Soft Power in the MENA Region: The Impact of Ethnic, Sectarian, and Religious Identity on Soft Power in Iraq and Egypt,” Foreign Policy Analysis 12, no. 3 (2016): 354-73; Tarik Oğuzlu, “Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 61, no. 1 (2007): 81–97. 3. Mahmut Bali Aykan, “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 1950s to the 1990s,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 25, no. 1 (1993): 91–110; Oğuzlu, “Soft Power in Turkish,” 81–97. 4. Aykan, “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 1950s to the 1990s.” 5. Mensur Akgün, Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar, and Aybars Görgülü, “Politics in Troubled Times: Israel-Turkey Relations,” Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, 2014. 6. In this letter, the US president Lyndon B. Johnson issued a stark warning to Turkish prime minister İsmet İnönü about Turkey’s possible engagement in Cyprus. Johnson warned that the Turkish authorities are not allowed to use American weapons and that the United States would not protect Turkey against the Russian invasion if Turkey were to launch a military operation to protect the Turkish community in Cyprus (The New York Times, June 6, 1964. “Johnson

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Warns Inonu On Cyprus; Invites Him to U.S. for Talks-Turkey Said to Give Up Plan for a Landing” accessed on August 2, 2019. https​:/​/ww​​w​.nyt​​imes.​​com​/1​​964​ /0​​6​/06/​​archi​​ves​/j​​ohnso​​n​-war​​ns​-in​​onu​-o​​n​-cyp​​rus​-i​​nvite​​s​-him​​-to​​-u​​s​-for​​-talk​​sturk​​ ey​.ht​​ml). 7. Aykan, “The Palestinian Question in,” 98. 8. Akgün, Gündoğar, and Görgülü, “Politics in Troubled Times: Israel-Turkey Relations”; Alsaftawi, “Turkish Policy towards Israel and Palestine: Continuity and Change in the Relations of the Turkish-Palestinian-Israeli Triangle under the Rule of the Justice and Development Party (2002-2016).” 9. Oğuzlu, “Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy”; Ali L Karaosmanoǧlu, “The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey,” Journal of International Affairs (2000): 199–216. 10. Sabri Ciftci, “Secular-Islamist Cleavage, Values, and Support for Democracy and Shari’a in the Arab World,” Political Research Quarterly 66, no. 4 (2013): 781– 93; Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yilmaz, “Between Europeanization and Euro‐Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era,” Turkish Studies 10, no. 1 (2009): 7–24. 11. Ahmet Sözen, “A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges,” Turkish Studies 11, no. 1 (2010): 103–23. 12. Tarik Oğuzlu, “Middle Easternization of Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?,” Turkish Studies 9, no. 1 (2008): 3–20; Ziya Öniş, “Multiple Faces of the ‘New’ Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique,” Insight Turkey 13, no. 1 (2011): 47–65; Kemal Kirişçi, “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State,” New Perspectives on Turkey 40 (2009): 29–56. 13. One important element of Davutoglu’s foreign policy vision is “zero problems with neighbors” which spectacularly failed in the post-Arab uprisings period. 14. Mustafa Gurbuz, “Between Idealism and Realpolitik: Erdoğan’s Quest for Palestine,” Arab Center, Washington DC, 2018, http:​/​/ara​​bcent​​erdc.​​org​/p​​olicy​​_anal​​ yses/​​betwe​​en​-id​​ealis​​m​-and​​-real​​polit​​ik​-er​​dogan​​s​-que​​​st​-fo​​r​-pal​​estin​​e/. 15. Akgün, Gündoğar, and Görgülü, “Politics in Troubled Times: Israel-Turkey Relations”; Mustafa Gurbuz, “Between Idealism and Realpolitik: Erdoğan’s Quest for Palestine.” 16. Gaza: Operation Cast Lead, Amnesty International UK, 16 Feb 2017, https​:/​/ ww​​w​.amn​​esty.​​org​.u​​k​/gaz​​a​-ope​​ratio​​​n​-cas​​t​-lea​d. 17. https​:/​/ww​​w​.tel​​egrap​​h​.co.​​uk​/ne​​ws​/wo​​rldne​​ws​/mi​​ddlee​​ast​/p​​alest​​inian​​autho​​ rity/​​77890​​77​/Tu​​rkey-​​conde​​mns​-I​​srael​​-over​​-dead​​ly​-at​​tack​-​​on​-Ga​​za​-ai​​d​-flo​​tilla​​.html. The Telegraph, Turkey Condemns Israel over Deadly Attack on Gaza Aid, 31 May, 2010, accessed on 12 July, 2019. 18. Akgün, Gündoğar, and Görgülü, “Politics in Troubled Times: Israel-Turkey Relations”; Ciftci, “Secular-Islamist Cleavage, Values, and Support for Democracy and Shari’a in the Arab World.” 19. An Angry Erdogan Stands to Harm Israel-Turkey Economic Ties, Haaretz, May 21, 2018, https​:/​/ww​​w​.haa​​retz.​​com​/m​​iddle​​-east​​-news​​/turk​​ey/​.p​​remiu​​m​-wit​​h​-dip​​ lomat​​ic​-cr​​isis-​​turke​​y​-isr​​ael​-t​​rade-​​ties-​​ma​y​-b​​e​-in-​​troub​​le​-1.​​60955​​50.

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20. Shira Efron, Future of Israeli-Turkish Relations (Rand Corporation, 2018); Mustafa Gurbuz, “Between Idealism and Realpolitik: Erdoğan’s Quest for Palestine.” 21. Gurbuz, “Between Idealism and Realpolitik.” 22 This section liberally borrows from one of my co-authored papers examining soft power and public opinion in the Middle East. Ciftci and Tezcür, “Soft Power,” 374–94. 23. Joseph Samuel Nye Jr, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (Public Affairs, 2004), 166. 24. Oğuzlu, “Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 83. 25. Chih-yu Shih, “Assigning Role Characteristics to China: The Role State versus the Ego State,” Foreign Policy Analysis 8, no. 1 (2012): 71–91. 26. Ciftci and Tezcür, “Soft Power, Religion, and Anti-Americanism in the Middle East”; Oğuzlu, “Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy”; Tayyar Arı, “Soft Power of Turkey and the Perception in the Middle East Until Arab Spring,” PrePrint, 2019. 27. Arı, “Soft Power of Turkey and the Perception.” 28. Kerim Can Kavakli, “Domestic Politics and the Motives of Emerging Donors: Evidence from Turkish Foreign Aid,” Political Research Quarterly 71, no. 3 (2018): 614–27. 29. Ipek, “Ideas and Change in Foreign Policy Instruments: Soft Power and the Case of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency”; Kavakli, “Domestic Politics and the Motives of Emerging Donors: Evidence from Turkish Foreign Aid.” 30. TIKA, “About Us.”, https​:/​/ww​​w​.tik​​a​.gov​​.tr​/e​​n​/pag​​e​/abo​​ut​​_us​​-1465​​0, accessed July 11, 2019. 31. These figures are obtained from the fourth wave of the Arab Barometer survey conducted in Algeria, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Syrian refugees. See http://ww​.arabbarometer​.org, accessed on July 11, 2019. 32. Table 6.1 presents only a sample of activities and does not include the food and special aid during religious celebrations and activities carried by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Turkish NGOs have become very active in Palestine in the distribution of humanitarian aid since 2009 as reported in TIKA annual reports. 33. Ciftci and Tezcür, “Soft Power, Religion”; Ipek, “Ideas and Change in Foreign Policy Instruments: Soft Power and the Case of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency”; Köse, Özcan, and Karakoç, “A Comparative Analysis of Soft Power in the MENA Region: The Impact of Ethnic, Sectarian, and Religious Identity on Soft Power in Iraq and Egypt”; Arı, “Soft Power of Turkey and the Perception in the Middle East Until Arab Spring.” 34. Kavakli, “Domestic Politics,” 614–27. 35. Bulent Aras and Zulkarnain Mohammed, “The Turkish Government Scholarship Program as a Soft Power Tool,” Turkish Studies 20, no. 3 (2019): 421–41. 36. Ciftci, “Secular-Islamist Cleavage, Values, and Support for Democracy and Shari’a in the Arab World”; Mark Tessler, Amaney Jamal, and Michael Robbins, “New Findings on Arabs and Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 23, no. 4 (2012): 89–103.

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REFERENCES Akgün, Mensur, Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar, and Aybars Görgülü. “Politics in Troubled Times: Israel-Turkey Relations.” Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, 2014. Alsaftawi, Mohammed. “Turkish Policy towards Israel and Palestine: Continuity and Change in the Relations of the Turkish-Palestinian-Israeli Triangle under the Rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP)(2002-2016).” Ghent University, 2017. Aras, Bulent, and Zulkarnain Mohammed. “The Turkish Government Scholarship Program as a Soft Power Tool.” Turkish Studies 20, no. 3 (2019): 421–41. Arı, Tayyar. “Soft Power of Turkey and the Perception in the Middle East Until Arab Spring.” Pre-Print, 2019. Aykan, Mahmut Bali. “The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 1950s to the 1990s.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 25, no. 1 (1993): 91–110. Barkey, Karen. “Islam and Toleration: Studying the Ottoman Imperial Model.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 19, no. 1–2 (2005): 5–19. Bertelsen, Rasmus G. “Private Foreign-Affiliated Universities, the State, and Soft Power: The American University of Beirut and the American University in Cairo.” Foreign Policy Analysis 8, no. 3 (2012): 293–311. Ciftci, Sabri. “Secular-Islamist Cleavage, Values, and Support for Democracy and Shari’a in the Arab World.” Political Research Quarterly 66, no. 4 (2013): 781–93. Ciftci, Sabri, and Güneş Murat Tezcür. “Soft Power, Religion, and Anti-Americanism in the Middle East.” Foreign Policy Analysis 12, no. 3 (2016): 374–94. Efron, Shira. Future of Israeli-Turkish Relations. Rand Corporation, 2018. Gurbuz, Mustafa. “Between Idealism and Realpolitik: Erdoğan’s Quest for Palestine.” Arab Center, Washington DC, accessed on Jan 17, 2021. http:​/​/ara​​ bcent​​erdc.​​org​/p​​olicy​​_anal​​yses/​​betwe​​en​-id​​ealis​​m​-and​​-real​​polit​​ik​-er​​dogan​​s​-que​​​ st​-fo​​r​-pal​​estin​​e/. Ipek, Pinar. “Ideas and Change in Foreign Policy Instruments: Soft Power and the Case of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency.” Foreign Policy Analysis 11, no. 2 (2015): 173–93. Karaosmanoǧlu, Ali L. “The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey.” Journal of International Affairs, 2000: 199–216. Kavakli, Kerim Can. “Domestic Politics and the Motives of Emerging Donors: Evidence from Turkish Foreign Aid.” Political Research Quarterly 71, no. 3 (2018): 614–27. Kirişçi, Kemal. “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State.” New Perspectives on Turkey 40 (2009): 29–56. Köse, Talha, Mesut Özcan, and Ekrem Karakoç. “A Comparative Analysis of Soft Power in the MENA Region: The Impact of Ethnic, Sectarian, and Religious Identity on Soft Power in Iraq and Egypt.” Foreign Policy Analysis 12, no. 3 (2016): 354–73.

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Mustafa Gurbuz. “Between Idealism and Realpolitik: Erdoğan’s Quest for Palestine.” Arab Center, Washington DC, 2018. http:​/​/ara​​bcent​​erdc.​​org​/p​​olicy​​_anal​​yses/​​ betwe​​en​-id​​ealis​​m​-and​​-real​​polit​​ik​-er​​dogan​​s​-que​​​st​-fo​​r​-pal​​estin​​e/. Nye Jr, Joseph S. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. Public Affairs, 2004. Oğuzlu, Tarik. “Middle Easternization of Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?” Turkish Studies 9, no. 1 (2008): 3–20. ———. “Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 61, no. 1 (2007): 81–97. Öniş, Ziya. “Multiple Faces of the ‘New’ Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique.” Insight Turkey 13, no. 1 (2011): 47–65. Öniş, Ziya, and Şuhnaz Yilmaz. “Between Europeanization and Euro‐asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era.” Turkish Studies 10, no. 1 (2009): 7–24. Putnam, Robert D. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.” International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 427–60. Shih, Chih-yu. “Assigning Role Characteristics to China: The Role State versus the Ego State.” Foreign Policy Analysis 8, no. 1 (2012): 71–91. Sözen, Ahmet. “A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges.” Turkish Studies 11, no. 1 (2010): 103–23. Tessler, Mark, Amaney Jamal, and Michael Robbins. “New Findings on Arabs and Democracy.” Journal of Democracy 23, no. 4 (2012): 89–103.

Chapter 7

The Middle East in the Republic of Poland Foreign Strategy in the Post–Cold War Era Magdalena KUMELSKA-KONIECKO

INTRODUCTION The Middle East is one of the most crucial regions in contemporary international relations. Its unique importance results from such factors as (a) geopolitical conditioning—location at the junction of Europe, Asia, and Africa, including such busy shipping lanes as the Suez Canal, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles, enabling the connection between the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the Arabian Sea; (b) economic conditioning—the region possesses two-thirds of the world’s crude oil and almost a half of natural gas resources; (c) cultural and religious conditioning—the region densely houses three of the predominant global religions: Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. Poland’s interest in the region dates back to the Middle Ages, though it was restricted by geographical distance and cultural dissimilarity; “it was especially during 16th and 17th-century wars between Poland-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Turkey that the region sparked the interest not only of travelers, missionaries and people studying cultures, but also of Polish rulers and traders.”1 During the 16th century, Polish nobility started to import, mainly from Turkey and Persia, cold steel, weaponry, silk, clothes, carpets, and spices. “This was reflected in noblemen’s clothing and contributed to shaping the Polish Sarmatian tradition.”2 “Before reclaiming independence in 1989, the Polish policy towards the Middle East was conditioned by internal and external premises coming from affiliation to the Eastern Block.”3 For example, in the 1940s, the Polish government, like the USSR, approved the creation of the state of Isreal, and later analogously to Moscow, it supported the Arab states against Isreal. During 107

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the Cold War, the Polish approach toward the Middle East was characterized by hostility toward Israel (in 1967, as the manifestation of support for invaded Egypt and Syria, Poland broke off diplomatic relations with Israel), aiding Palestine, developing close, political ties with Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Egypt. “In the cold war era, an active policy of the People’s Republic of Poland in the region of the Middle East could be observed as the participation of the Polish soldiers in peacekeeping and stabilization missions, such as UNEF in Egypt, UNDOF in the Golan Heights, or UNIFIL in Lebanon.”4 “Due to political cooperation in the 70’ and 80’ of the 20th century, Polish enterprises set up broad cooperation in the field of trade and investment with business partners in Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Marocco, and Syria.”5 Also, scientific cooperation developed, especially in the field of archaeology. After the collapse of the USSR and the definitive end of the Cold War, Poland started to create its foreign policy. Concerning the Middle East, the Polish government decided to redefine the preceding direction. The first example of a new approach was agreed to normalize relations with Israel, simultaneously preserving ties with the Arab states. Nevertheless, domestic problems and focusing on priorities objectives weakened Poland’s interest in the Middle East. POLAND’S FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITES AFTER 1989 The end of the Cold War brought significant changes in Polish foreign policy. “Polish authorities believed in Poland’s return to Europe concept, based on Poland’s confidence in Western civilization.”6 Prime Minister Mazowiecki was deeply convinced that traditional consolidated democratic states would enable Poland to fulfill its objectives. Polish diplomacy under the guidance of Professor Krzysztof Skubiszewski reckoned Germany could play a crucial role in Poland’s accession to the European Union. In contrast, the United States was pivotal for the Polish aspiration to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). On November 14, 1990, Poland and Germany have signed the Border Treaty, which recognized the Polish-German border’s course under the provisions of World War II peace conferences (Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam). Less than a year later, in 1991, the states signed a treaty between the Republic of Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany on the excellent neighborhood and friendly cooperation. The Polish-German collaboration was mutually beneficial—German became a promoter of Polish interests in the European area. On the other hand, Poland became a “link” between the East and the West.

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The priority objective of the Polish raison d’état, since becoming independent of the USSR’s domination, was to base Polish security on allied relations with the most powerful country in the world—the United States. From the very beginning of 1989, Poland desired to give a unique character to the Polish-American relations. Polish authorities expected Washington to support the transformation process and embrace Poland with American security guarantees. The United States perceived Poland as a leader of a transformation among the Middle East European countries. Poland was the first country in the region, which was covered by the US system of general customs preferences; “Washington transferred 200 M $ to Stabilization Fund for Poland and reduced Poland’s debt by 70%.”7 On March 20, 1990, Poland and the United States signed an economic agreement and declaration on relations between the Republic of Poland and the United States. From Warsaw’s perspective, the declaration of will was far from Polish expectations, but at the beginning of 1990s the United States could not offer more. Nine years later, Poland and Hungary and the Czech Republic became new members of NATO. Without America’s will and equally indispensable changing geopolitical circumstances, enlarging NATO in the East wouldn’t have been possible. Gaining membership in the NATO in 1999 and the European Union in 2004 was the capstone of Polish priorities launched at the beginning of the 1990. Poland’s foreign policy after 1989, beyond the Euro-Atlantic vector, was also concentrated on the Eastern vector. One of the priorities of the Polish raison d’état was a full recognition of Poland’s sovereignty by the Soviet Union, followed by the arrangement of bilateral relations on a partnership basis and good neighborly cooperation. Polish authorities were extremely cautious in contact with Moscow, especially regarding the Soviet Union’s superpower position’s indubitability, or Poland’s withdraw from the Warsaw Pact or the Council for Cooperation and Economic Aid. “Polish eastern policy of the beginning of 1990 was based on the concept of two-track strategy, which meant the simultaneous development of rebuilt relations with the USSR and union republics.”8 Polish diplomacy till 1994 signed border treaties promoting neighborly ties and cooperation with all Eastern neighbors , including the Russian Federation (1992), Belarus (1992), Ukraine (1992), and Lithuania (1994). Furthermore, regulating border courses was one of many criteria the NATO set for the candidate countries. Undoubtedly, Polish diplomacy’s success was the popularization of the belief that in the name of the future good relations with neighbors, one should give up making a balance of historical past and urge partners to adopt a similar attitude.

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THE MIDDLE EAST IN POLISH FOREIGN POLICY AFTER 1989 Regaining independence after 1989 allowed Poland to conduct foreign policy autonomously, also toward the Middle East region, “in which three tendencies could be observed: reviving and making new diplomatic contacts and strengthening institutional cooperation; strengthening economic contacts enabling trade exchange; engaging in activities for developing democracy and respect for human rights.”9 At the beginning of the 1990s, Polish authorities decided to normalize relations with Israel. The renewal of diplomatic relations took place in February 1990, but “already in 1986, the so-called interest representatives were opened in Tel-Aviv and Warsaw.”10 Rebuilding Polish-Israeli relations was important because of joint history and diasporas living in both countries. “The renewal of diplomatic relations was accompanied by the signing of an air transport agreement that facilitated passenger transport between the countries.”11 In May 1991, Polish president Lech Wałęsa came to Tel-Aviv and gave a speech in Knesset concerning future bilateral relations: The lasting and deep relations that currently connect Poland and Israel include close cooperation in politics, defense, economy, culture, and education. These relationships are based on mutual interests, shared values, and a similar assessment of the international situation, but are also a natural continuation of almost 1000 years of common Polish-Jewish history.12

Since 1990 Poland and Israel have signed nineteen agreements and understandings. The importance of mutual Polish-Israeli contacts is also emphasized by the fact of joint government meetings, the so-called intergovernmental consultations, that take place continuously since 2011; “the only country beside Israel involved in such cooperation with Poland is Germany.”13 “In January 1991 Poland participated in the implementation of Desert Shield and Desert Storm operations, which gave Polish authorities wider perspective on the Middle East problems.”14 “Polish government sent to the Gulf a hospital vessel called The Wodnik and a rescue vessel called The Piast.”15 There were also 200 Polish soldiers in the region; however, it is worth emphasizing that they didn’t take part in the combats. An important element of Polish engagement in the Middle East was representing American interests in diplomatic relations with Iraq, which were broken off by the United States after Iraq had attacked Kuwait. “Poland represented the US interests in Iraq till 2003.”16Warsaw also helped Washington with evacuating American agents from Iraq to Saudi Arabia. Through such active engagement, the

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Polish image among the regional states did not devaluate, but rather its positive aura worked out in previous decades, was intensified. “This in turn, allowed to tighten economic and political relations with particular Middle East countries.”17 Beyond opening to the Middle East issues, Poland pursued the US vision on regional order in this part of the world. In some sense, it was a strategic decision to gain the US favor for the Polish case vide membership in NATO. At the beginning of the 1990s, Polish authorities first of all aimed to tighten up trade relations with the Middle Eastern states. The most attractive from the Warsaw perspective were the Gulf countries—the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. The examples of institutionalized, mutual, economic contacts were established in 2002 Polish-Arab Chamber of Economy. Three years later, the Polish-Arab Association of Friendship was established as the forum for cooperation in the field of culture, information, science, and tourism. In 2016 Poland accredited its representative in the League of Arab States, emphasizing the Gulf countries’ importance in the Polish Middle East Strategy. By far, the most noticeable rise in Polish interest in the Middle East occurred at the beginning of the New Millennium, which was triggered by various internal and external factors. Firstly, on May 1, 2004, Poland became a member of the European Union, which meant taking part in EU foreign and security policy toward the Middle East and participation in Global South countries’ support. “Obviously, this support was not only financial but also included sharing Polish know-how in various areas.”18 The EU membership gave Polish foreign policy a global dimension; Poland has been participating in EU initiatives like the Mediterranean Partnership and European Neighborhood Policy. Secondly, the militarization of American foreign policy due to the 9/11 terrorist attack, the beginning of the American war against global terrorism, and its supporters greatly influenced Poland’s foreign and security strategy. From the very beginning, Poland provided full support to the American ally. Referring to allied loyalty and obligations arising from the NATO membership, Poland took part in the military operation against Afghanistan and later Iraq. Poland took command of the Iraqi Middle-South zone. “The assumed Polish strategic objectives were not fulfilled, apart from gaining by the Polish soldiers crucial, tactical and warlike experience.”19 In 2004 the Polish government adopted a document called Poland’s strategy toward developing non-European countries. According to the strategy, Poland as a member of the European Union, would implement obligations coming from the Barcelona Process and Wider Europe—New Neighborhood Strategy concerning cooperation with the Middle Eastern states. According to the document, Polish diplomacy should take steps to

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stabilize the Middle East region a Persian Gulf sub-region. “As a leading objective, the fulfillment of commitments resulting from the mission in Iraq was prominently displayed, as well as support for efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on the Road Map of the Middle East Quartet.”20 Poland as a member of the European Union, consequently a participant in the globalization process, had to start making more contributions to development aid aimed at modernization and socioeconomic development of countries from non-European areas, including the Middle East. “Such engagement was one of Poland’s new tasks within the EU structures in efforts to guarantee peace and security, and to support democratization initiatives of individual countries.”21 Polish development aid is directed mainly at Palestine as well as Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan in the framework of the small grant system: Assistance activities for the Palestinians under the development cooperation program focus on improving access to education, equalizing educational opportunities and raising the level of education, improving water and sanitation infrastructure, including better access to water and municipal waste management, professional activation in the field of agriculture, trade and services as well as supporting business activity and strengthening the self-government of entrepreneurs.22

The total value of development assistance provided by Poland to Palestine in the period 2005–2016 exceeded PLN25 million. The aid was intended for:23 1. Human capital—improving the quality of health care, inclusive education and universal access to high-level education and civic education, and social integration of people from groups at risk of exclusion. 2. Agriculture and rural development—food security, productivity and competitiveness of agricultural production, access to markets, use of modern technologies in agriculture, and modernization of local infrastructure. 3. Entrepreneurship and the private sector—competitiveness and innovation of micro- and small enterprises, social economy, and entrepreneurship with special focus on women and youth. “In Multiannual Development Aid Program 2016-2020 Poland confirmed the priority of Palestine in the distribution of development assistance.”24 The objectives toward Palestine remained as mentioned above. “Since 2012, Poland has been continuously providing humanitarian aid to Lebanon in the areas of shelter, health protection and education. In order to ensure the most effective response to the protracted crisis, Poland adopts an approach in which it seeks to link humanitarian and development activities.”25 According to Poland’s strategy toward developing non-European countries, the most important priority for Poland in relation with the Middle East

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countries is economy. Besides reinforcing economic ties, Poland had set such goals as:26 • Fulfilling the obligations coming from Iraq Mission. • Supporting peace between Israel and Palestine. • Sustaining dialog with the Arabs states, Israel, and Iran. • Seeking cooperation with the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf. • Explaining objectives of Poland’s involvement in Iraq (especially on society level). • Striving to achieve the status of responsible partner of the region. “In compliance with Poland’s Strategy towards developing un-European Countries internal and external conditions of a given country, e.g. political destabilization, conflicts, religious fundamentalism will have an impact on undertaking cooperation or failure to do so.”27 Incontestably, this approach restricts potential cooperation. More importantly, the concept of religious fundamentalism is not very clear, as the strategy does not specify the meaning. The strategy states that the Polish government engaging with the Middle East countries will use: political dialog, diplomatic presence, cooperation and development aid, promotion of Polish culture, and science. According to the document “the most effective tools of Polish foreign policy in the region are agreements and understandings.”28 Between 2003 and 2007, the Republic of Poland has signed with several Middle East countries: six bilateral agreements, two bilateral memorandums, five bilateral deals, two bilateral cooperation agreements, and one bilateral protocol. “Among the most important countries in the Middle East, the document has highlighted: Iraq, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait.”29 Poland wished to develop close economic relations with those countries, especially in the field of energy resources. “This is dictated by the need to diversify supplies from the Russia Federation.”30 Qatar turns out to be a country that supports Poland in its diversification of Russian gas supplies. In 2009, Polish Oil and Gas Mining signed a twenty-year contract with Qatar for gas supplies. The first delivery of Qatari gas to the Polish terminal in Świnoujście took place in November 2015 and is regularly supplied. A very effective tool of Polish Middle East foreign policy is humanitarian support given by Polish non-governmental organizations. Also, it helps to build a positive impression of Poland in this part of the world. Organizations such as Caritas Polska, the Polish Medical Mission and the Polish Humanitarian Action had the biggest contribution in the aid. For example, Caritas Poland engaged in providing medical help to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sudan. Thanks to their activities, it was possible to reconstruct and further equip medical

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centers in Al-Hilla, Al-Hur, and Al-Kut. The Polish Medical Mission pursued in Afghanistan a project on developing infrastructure and medical diagnostic in Mazar-e-Sharif. Within the framework of this project, the organization purchased four fully equipped emergency ambulances. What is more, with the cooperation with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and with the Polish government support, the Polish Medical Mission opened delivery rooms in hospitals in Kuetcie, Chaman, Nuszki, and Kandahar. The Polish Humanitarian Action between 2002 and 2009 sustained in Afghanistan permanent mission, whose objective was to build 3 schools, 12 wells providing water for 20, 000 people. In the provinces of Babil and Wasit, the organization rebuilt and equipped 16 schools, 7 youth centers, 3 sport centers, equipped those centers; it also rebuilt 6 wells, built 8 schools, equipped playgrounds and organized summer play centers for children from Al-Hilla.31

THE AMERICAN FACTOR IN POLISH MIDDLE EAST POLICY Since the beginning of the 1990s in the Polish approach toward the Middle East region, American strategic thinking was a noticeable element, especially after September 11, 2001. After that, it became clear that Polish and American objectives toward the Middle East were convergent. Before al-Qaeda’s terrorist attack on the United States, Poland despite very good economic relations with Iraq “(commercial exchanges between $200–250 M per year)”32 supported the US actions against Iraq between 1990 and 1991. Apart from political support, Polish authorities decided to send to Iraq a military contingent and medical personnel. In the following weeks, negotiations were conducted with the government of Saudi Arabia regarding the rules for the participation of Polish soldiers and civilian employees within the anti-Iraqi coalition. In the end, they decided to send a contingent carrying humanitarian aid, which included two Polish Navy vessels, rescue and evacuation, and medical personnel who were stationed in the territory of Saudi Arabia. The participation of Polish Marines in operations in the Persian Gulf region proved to be a great challenge because they were to perform combat operations for the first time after the end of World War II. “Of course Polish navy previously performed some tasks outside the Baltic Sea basin, but those were mainly navigation and training cruises, rescue exercises and tasks resulting from membership in the Warsaw Pact.”33 The Polish contingent’s participation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a part of the anti-Iraqi coalition forces was governed by the Agreement of December 16, 1990,

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between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The document stated that the Polish contingent stationed members in Saudi Arabia and at sea were to enjoy the immunity belonging to the administrative and technical staff of diplomatic missions. “Alongside with marines, in accordance with the agreement: 14 doctors, 38 medical technicians, 98 nurses and 2 liaison officers were also part of the Polish Contingent.”34 “In the 90’ and later, Polish military forces were also present in peacekeeping missions under the assistance of the United Nation Organization, which was a symptom of responsibility for the stability of international order, established after the end of cold war.”35 According to President George H.W. Bush’s vision of New World Order “regional conflicts were considered as a predominant military threat which needed to be resolved.”36 Although the United States is mainly ambivalent about the UN peacekeeping missions, the UN stabilization activities in the Middle East were coherent with the American security strategy. Therefore, one may risk a statement that Poland’s participation in peacekeeping missions in the Middle East entered into the American foreign policy. Analyzing Polish and American strategic documents, one can see the convergence of international objectives as well as the common perception of security challenges.37 Both countries identify the Middle East region as the most significant challenge for contemporary international relations. What is more, the United States and Poland believe that the vast majority of security threats come from the Middle East. Among both countries’ strategic goals in the Middle East are promoting democracy, developing a free market economy, and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. Another common thing for Poland and the United States is the perception of contemporary security threats. Among the most significant modern security threats, both states include international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of massive destruction, the activity of the so-called failed states or authoritarian regimes, and religious extremism. All of these threats occur in the Middle East. Since 2001, Poland has supported the United States in the global war on terror against al-Qaeda and recently took part in military operations against Daesh. On June 17, 2016, Polish president Andrzej Duda, against campaign claims, decided to send Polish troops to join Global Coalition countering the so-called Islamic State. “In compliance with premises one Polish military contingent consisting of 150 soldiers and army employees was sent to Kuwait; another contingent consisting of 60 soldiers and army employees was sent to Republic of Iraq.”38 Polish forces in Kuwait were empowered by four F16 fighters, and they were engaged in

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Inherent Resolve Operation, whereas the Polish contingent stationed in Iraq was responsible for counseling and training Iraq Special Forces. Acting in favor of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Poland, apart from participating in non-proliferation regimes, also undertakes specific measures to reduce unconventional weapons in the world. In 2005 Poland signed in Tripoli a memorandum—an agreement on cooperation in non-proliferation of weapons of massive destruction. Poland could support Libya in transferring into civil its ordnance factories producing chemical weapons. “Moreover, Poland also offered assistance in building a factory producing conjugated nitric acid, as well as training courses for Libyan engineering staff.”39 Since Poland regained independence, its Middle East approach is consistent with American security strategies. On the one hand, this line is an element of the more comprehensive West strategic vision, and after all, Poland belongs to the West. But on the other hand, it is an example of a lack of assertiveness and its own policy. In the situation of pursuing non-assertive foreign policy, a matter of national interest is thrown into doubt. Thereupon, a fundamental question arises: Does the non-objective entity pursue its own or other country’s interests? In Poland’s case, some government decisions, for instance, sending a Polish contingent to Iraq in 2003 and organizing in Warsaw in 2019 the Middle East Conference on Peace and Security, remain questionable. In both cases, Polish interests, unfortunately, were of secondary importance. Warsaw’s military and political support given to Washington is mostly conditioned by the need to increase American security guarantees. Despite political affiliation, most of the Polish governments presented such an approach. It is a consequence of Polish historical experience and geopolitical location. Poland’s border security, especially the eastern border, has become particularly relevant after the Russian annexation of Crimea. “The priority of the present Polish government is to establish American military base in Poland to counter Russia’s regional ambitions.”40 But for now the American soldiers will stay on Polish territory only temporarily. Polish authorities’ support of the American strategy in the Middle East implies consequences for Poland’s relations with other entities of international relations. It is particularly apparent in Poland’s relations with the European Union. For instance, American intervention in Iraq in 2003 led to the most profound crisis in transatlantic relations, and Poland became an object of numerous attacks, especially from the German and France side. It is worth emphasizing that Poland was at the finish line of its accession to the EU during this period. There were some concerns that dispute around the Iraqi war that it might have a negative impact on the whole process. “Poland’s participation in military actions against Iraq, apart from gaining valuable combat

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experience, was negatively assessed by the majority of Polish scientific community as well as the Poles.”41 According to Professor Maria Wągrowska: “participation in the Iraqi operation was the most controversial undertaking in Poland’s foreign and security policy for 15 years. It wasn’t preceded enough in depth analysis of profits and losses for foreign and internal policy, as well as argumentation convincing majority of citizens.”42 It is explained even more explicitly by Professor Roman Kuźniar: Poland’s participation in the war and the stabilization of Iraq was an example of badwagoning strategy understood as what is good for the United States will be also beneficial for Poland. Unfortunately, it was a wishful thinking, based on the wrong perception of American policy and the failure to calculate the profits achieved thanks to this war by the Polish side.43

It was difficult for the Polish authorities to convince incredibly skeptical European countries on Iraq’s Polish position. A similar misunderstanding (not only among the EU countries) accompanied the organization in Warsaw, the Middle East Conference. Officially, the purpose of the conference was peace and stability in the Middle East. But how can this be achieved without crucial actors like Iran, Palestine, or Turkey?44 It happened because the real goal of the Trump administration was to isolate Iran and strengthen Israel’s security. “Moreover, the conference aim was also to persuade the Arab countries of the Gulf region to create a common front against Iran perceived by the current American administration as the main factor of destabilization in the region.”45 Interestingly, Arab countries and Israel met in Warsaw for the first time since 1991 (Madrid Peace Conference), indicating anti-Iranian front construction, at least in the political sphere. What was the role of Poland in this event? Indeed, a country with medium potential, a co-organizer of a large international event, strengthens its global visibility. By being part of the international community members, Poland might be seen as a promoter of the American vision of the Middle East order. Such an international image has been attributed to Poland since its military engagement in the war against Iraq. As with the war in Iraq, the Warsaw summit revealed a clear divide between the United States and the European Union. The most considerable differences between the United States and the European Union are seen in the background of Iran “The EU remains strongly supportive of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) that was abandoned by the US, even if it criticizes Iran’s ballistic missile programme.”46 According to the International Agency of Nuclear Energy, “Iran carries out each of the points included in the agreement,”47 thus the United States had no valid reasons to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

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Regarding Iran, the Polish stance is unfortunately vague. Again, the Polish authorities are putting themselves between Brussels and Washington, which neither serves Poland nor the transatlantic alliance. What is more, this unclearness in Poland’s position also reflects on its international image. Some may fault Poland for being untrustworthy. The effects of confusing Polish policy are already known. Iran has withdrawn from the agreement regarding the supply of liquefied gas to Poland. Additionally, Polish national energy companies such as PGNiG and Orlen, which signed a cooperation agreement with Iranian counterparts, won’t be able to proceed. On another note, it is worth knowing that since 2013, the Polish-Iranian trade has increased sixfold.48 Reaction from European countries may occur during next European budget negotiations. CONCLUSION The Middle East region has never been a top priority for Poland. This mainly results from the Polish geopolitical location, the hierarchy of national interests, and medium international potential. Poland’s average international importance procures Warsaw to choose a bandwagon strategy, suggesting a lack of vision. Despite Polish ambitions to play a more critical role in global international relations, no comprehensive strategy regarding Polish activity in the Middle East has been developed yet. It is an example of the provinciality of Polish foreign policy and, at the same time, a conscious resignation from the opportunities offered by the region. And the Middle East region offers a lot, not only in the economic sphere but also in social, scientific, or cultural. Poland possesses professional, scientific resources that should be used to prepare a comprehensive strategy for developing bilateral and multilateral relations in the region. The starting point for the Polish Middle East concept could be to rely on historical, mostly positive, relations between Poland and the region countries. A good example that can serve as a model is PolishTurkish relations, which had last continuously for 605 years, even during the lack of Polish subjectivity. Turkey was the only country in the world that did not recognize the Partitions of Poland. If Poland wants to play a more critical role in the Middle East, it must revise its foreign policy and define its national interests and instruments, enabling its implementation. Moreover, to avoid the impression of promoting the American vision of the Middle East, Polish foreign policy should be much more assertive toward the American ally. The execution of Polish foreign policy by the current government calls into question the correctness of the Middle East strategy, much less adopting an assertive attitude toward the United States.

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NOTES 1. Stanisław Pawlak, “Poland’s policy towards the Middle East,” in Poland’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, ed. Stanisław Bieleń (Warszawa: Difin, 2011), 389. 2. Marek Derwich, Monarchia Jagiellonów (1399-1586) (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskie, 2004), 165. 3. Agnieszka Dzisiów-Szuszczykiewicz, “Raport. Bliski Wschód—wyzwanie dla polskiej polityki zagranicznej?,” Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe, no. 7/8 (2008): 147. 4. Katarzyna Czornik, “Bliski Wschód w polityce zagranicznej Polski w drugiej dekadzie XXI wieku. Aspekty polityczne,” in Polityka zagraniczna Polski w zmieniającym się ładzie międzynarodowym, ed. Ryszard Zięba and Tomasz Pawłuszko (Kielce: Uniwersytet Jana Kochanowskiego, 2016), 238. 5. Agnieszka Dzisiów-Szuszczykiewicz, “Raport. Bliski Wschód—wyzwanie dla polskiej polityki zagranicznej?,” Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe, no. 7/8 (2008): 147. 6. Ryszard Zięba, Główne kierunki polityki zagranicznej Polski po zimnej wojnie (Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, 2010), 19. 7. Longin Pastusiak, Prezydenci amerykańscy wobec spraw polskich (Warszawa: Bellona, 2003), 280–331. 8. Magdalena Kumelska, “Kierunek wschodni w polskiej polityce zagranicznej po 1989 roku,” in Polska—25 lat transformacji systemowej. Polityka. Gospodarka. Bezpieczeństwo, ed. Teresa Astramowicz-Leyk and Waldemar Tomaszewski (Olsztyn: Uniwersytet Warmińsko-Mazurski, 2014), 180. 9. Jan Bury et al., “Polska a Szerszy Bliski Wschód (BMENA). Stosunki i perspektywy współpracy,” Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny, no 2 (2006): 85. 10. https​:/​/em​​bassi​​es​.go​​v​.il/​​warsa​​w​/Rel​​ation​​s​/his​​toria​​-stos​​unkow​​/Page​​s​/his​​t​oria​​ _il​-p​​l​.asp​​x, accessed on 13 April 2020. 11. Stanisław Pawlak, “Poland’s policy towards the Middle East,” in Poland’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, ed. Stanisław Bieleń (Warszawa: Difin, 2011), 400. 12. https​:/​/em​​bassi​​es​.go​​v​.il/​​warsa​​w​/Rel​​ation​​s​/his​​toria​​-stos​​unkow​​/Page​​s​/his​​t​oria​​ _il​-p​​l​.asp​​x, accessed on 13 April 2020. 13. Marcin Szydzisz, “Polityka zagraniczna RP wobec Bliskiego Wschodu—zmiana czy ciągłość?,” Bezpieczeństwo i Dyplomacja, no. 1 (2016): 187. 14. Aleksandra Dzisiów-Szuszczykiewicz, “Raport. Bliski Wschód—wyzwanie dla polskiej polityki zagranicznej?,” Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe, no. 7/8 (2008): 148. 15. Katarzyna Czornik, “Bliski Wschód w polityce zagranicznej Polski w drugiej dekadzie XXI wieku. Aspekty polityczne,” in Polityka zagraniczna Polski w zmieniającym się ładzie międzynarodowym, ed. Ryszard Zięba and Tomasz Pawłuszko (Kielce: Uniwersytet Jana Kochanowskiego, 2016), 239. 16. Marek Dziekan, Historia Iraku (Warszawa: Dialog, 2002), 192. 17. Edmund Ghareeb and Majid Khadduri, War in the Gulf 1990-1991. The IraqKuwait Conflict and Its Implications (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 159–170.

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18. Jan Bury et al., “Polska a Szerszy Bliski Wschód (BMENA). Stosunki i perspektywy współpracy,” Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny, no. 2 (2006): 86. 19. Wiesław Lizak and Paulina Warsza, “Polityka zagraniczna Iraku,” in Wprowadzenie do polityki zagranicznej muzułmańskich państw Bliskiego Wschodu i Afryki Północnej, ed. Marta Woźniak-Bobińska and Anna M. Solarz (Warszawa: Scholar, 2018), 194. 20. Strategia RP w odniesieniu do pozaeuropejskich krajów rozwijających się 2004. 21. Aleksandra Dzisiów-Szuszczykiewicz, “Raport. Bliski Wschód—wyzwanie dla polskiej polityki zagranicznej?,” Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe, no. 7/8 (2008): 168. 22. https://www​.polskapomoc​.gov​.pl​/Bliski​,Wschod​,264​.html, accessed on 15 April 2020. 23. See more: https://www​.polskapomoc​.gov​.pl​/Palestyna​,22​.html, accessed on 15 April 2020. 24. Multiannual Development Aid Program 2016-2020. 25. Ibidem. 26. Strategia RP w odniesieniu do pozaeuropejskich krajów rozwijających się 2004. 27. Ibidem. 28. Ibidem. 29. Ibidem. 30. Daniel Boćkowski, “Polska polityka zagraniczna wobec świata muzułmańskiego. Próba definicji problemu,” in Polityka zagraniczna RP. 20 lat po przełomie. Tom 1: Koncepcje, bezpieczeństwo, kwestie prawne i polonijne, ed. Andrzej Jarosz and Krzysztof Olszewski (Toruń: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika, 2011), 111–119. 31. Jan Bury et al., “Polska a Szerszy Bliski Wschód (BMENA). Stosunki i perspektywy współpracy,” Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny, no. 2 (2006): 94. 32. https​:/​/cw​​dpgp.​​wp​.mi​​l​.pl/​​pl​/ar​​ticle​​shist​​oria-​​misji​​-3​/20​​18​-09​​-11b-​​wp​-w-​​opera​​ cji​-p​​ustyn​​na​-​bu​​rza​-1​​990​-1​​991​/p​​df/, accessed on 2 April 2020. 33. Ibidem. 34. Ibidem. 35. Polacy w służbie pokoju 1953-2003 (Warszawa: Agencja Wydawnicza CB, 2002), http:​/​/www​​.unic​​.un​.o​​rg​.pl​​/misj​​e​_pok​​ojowe​​/doc/​​​MISJE​​.pdf, accessed on 22 April 2020. 36. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 1991. 37. Compare: Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2014; Biała Księga Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2013; Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego 2003; The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 1991, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 1996; The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002; The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2009. 38. Katarzyna Czornik, “Bliski Wschód w polityce zagranicznej Polski w drugiej dekadzie XXI wieku. Aspekty polityczne,” in Polityka zagraniczna Polski w zmieniającym się ładzie międzynarodowym, ed. Ryszard Zięba and Tomasz Pawłuszko (Kielce: Uniwersytet Jana Kochanowskiego, 2016), 253.

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39. Jan Bury et al., “Polska a Szerszy Bliski Wschód (BMENA). Stosunki i perspektywy współpracy,” Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny, no. 2 (2006): 91. 40. Jan Smolenski and Virginia Pietromarchi, “US lead Middle East conference in Warsaw: All you need to know,” February 13, 2019, https​:/​/ww​​w​.alj​​azeer​​a​.com​​/inde​​ pth​/f​​eatur​​es​/le​​d​-mid​​dle​-e​​ast​-s​​ummit​​-wars​​aw​-19​​​02122​​30343​​271​.h​​tml, accessed on 23 April 2020. 41. Compere: Marian Wolański, Uwarunkowania i kierunki polskiej polityki zagranicznej w pierwszej dekadzie XXI wieku (Toruń: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika, 2004); Roman Kuźniar, Droga do wolności. Polityka zagraniczna III Rzeczpospolitej (Warszawa: Scholar, 2008); Ryszard Zięba, Polityka zagraniczna Polski w strefie euroatlantyckiej (Warszawa: Uniwersytet Warszawski, 2013). 42. Maria Wągrowska, “Udział Polski w interwencji zbrojnej i stabilizacyjnej w Iraku,” Raporty i Analizy, no. 12 (2004): 2. 43. Roman Kuźniar, Polityka i siła. Studia strategiczne—zarys problematyki (Warszawa: Scholar, 2006), 345–346. 44. Iran was uninvited whereas Palestine refused the invitation; Turkey, Lebanon, and Qatar also did not attend to the conference—M.K.K. 45. Tomasz Zalewski, “Co się uda osiągnąć (a czego nie) na konferencji bliskowschodniej w Warszawie?,” Polityka, February 12, 2019, https​:/​/ww​​w​.pol​​ityka​​.pl​ /t​​ygodn​​ikpol​​ityka​​/swia​​t​/178​​1934​,1​,co​​-sie-​​uda​-o​​siagn​​ac​-a-​​czego​​-nie-​​na​-ko​​nfere​​ncji-​​ blisk​​owsc​h​​odnie​​j​-w​-w​​arsza​​wie​.r​​ead, accessed on 26 April 2020. 46. Patrick Wintour, “European powers to present cool front at Warsaw summit,” The Guardian, February 12, 2019, https​:/​/ww​​w​.the​​guard​​ian​.c​​om​/us​​-news​​/2019​​/feb/​​ 12​/eu​​ropea​​n​-pow​​ers​-t​​ake​-b​​ackse​​at​-in​​-us​-p​​olish​​​-summ​​it​-on​​-midd​​le​-ea​​st, accessed on 26 April 2020. 47. https​:/​/po​​lskie​​radio​​24​.pl​​/5​/12​​23​/Ar​​tykul​​/2313​​955​,Eksp​​ertka​​-PISM​​-duzy​​-pote​​ ncjal​​-eska​​lacji​​​-na​-l​​inii-​​USAIr​​an, accessed on 26 April 2020. 48. Marcin Zaborowski, “Konferencja bliskowschodnia, czyli jak zostać podwykonawcą USA,” Polityka, February 12, 2019, https​:/​/ww​​w​.pol​​ityka​​.pl​/t​​ygodn​​ ikpol​​ityka​​/swia​​t​/178​​2104​,1​,ko​​nfere​​ncja-​​blisk​​owsch​​odnia​​-czyl​​i​-jak​​-zost​​ac​​-po​​dwyko​​ nawca​​-usa.​​read,​ accessed on 26 April 2020.

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Wintour, Patric. “European powers to present cool front at Warsaw summit.” The Guardian, February 12, 2019. https​:/​/ww​​w​.the​​guard​​ian​.c​​om​/us​​-news​​/2019​​/feb/​​12​ /eu​​ropea​​n​-pow​​ers​-t​​ake​-b​​ackse​​at​-in​​-us​-p​​olish​​​-summ​​it​-on​​-midd​​le​-ea​​st, accessed on 26 April 2020. Wolański, Marian. Uwarunkowania i kierunki polskiej polityki zagranicznej w pierwszej dekadzie XXI wieku. Toruń: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika, 2004. Zaborowski, Marcin. “Konferencja bliskowschodnia, czyli jak zostać podwykonawcą USA.” Polityka, February 12, 2019. https​:/​/ww​​w​.pol​​ityka​​.pl​/t​​ygodn​​ikpol​​ityka​​ /swia​​t​/178​​2104​,1​,ko​​nfere​​ncja-​​blisk​​owsch​​odnia​​-czyl​​i​-jak​​-zost​​ac​​-po​​dwyko​​nawca​​ -usa.​​read,​accessed on 26 April 2020. Zalewski, Tomasz. “Co się uda osiągnąć (a czego nie) na konferencji bliskowschodniej w Warszawie?” Polityka, February 12, 2019. https​:/​/ww​​w​.pol​​ityka​​.pl​/t​​ygodn​​ ikpol​​ityka​​/swia​​t​/178​​1934​,1​,co​​-sie-​​uda​-o​​siagn​​ac​-a-​​czego​​-nie-​​na​-ko​​nfere​​ncji-​​blisk​​ owsc​h​​odnie​​j​-w​-w​​arsza​​wie​.r​​ead, accessed on 26 April 2020. Zięba, Ryszard. Polityka zagraniczna Polski w strefie euroatlantyckiej. Warszawa: Uniwersytet Warszawski, 2013. Zięba, Ryszard. Główne kierunki polityki zagranicznej Polski po zimnej wojnie. Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, 2010. www​.polskapomoc​.gov​.pl​/Bliski​,Wschod​,264​.html, accessed on 15 April 2020. www​.polskapomoc​.gov​.pl​/Palestyna​,22​.html, accessed on15 April 2020. https​:/​/cw​​dpgp.​​wp​.mi​​l​.pl/​​pl​/ar​​ticle​​shist​​oria-​​misji​​-3​/20​​18​-09​​-11b-​​wp​-w-​​opera​​cji​-​p​​ ustyn​​na​-bu​​rza​-1​​990 1991/pdf/, accessed on 2 April 2020. https​:/​/po​​lskie​​radio​​24​.pl​​/5​/12​​23​/Ar​​tykul​​/2313​​955​,Eksp​​ertka​​-PISM​​-duzy​​-pote​​ncjal​​ -eska​​lacji​​​-na​-l​​inii-​​USAIr​​an, accessed on 26 April 2020. https​:/​/em​​bassi​​es​.go​​v​.il/​​warsa​​w​/Rel​​ation​​s​/his​​toria​​-stos​​unkow​​/Page​​s​/his​​t​oria​​_il​-p​​l​ .asp​​x, accessed on 13 April 2020.

Part III

TERRORISM, INTRA-STATE AND INTER-STATE, CONFLICTS

Chapter 8

The Structure of Intra-State Conflicts in the Post–Cold War Era Muzaffer Ercan YILMAZ

INTRODUCTION Until the end of the Cold War, the conventional wisdom in the world was that ethnicity and nationalism were outdated concepts and largely resolved problems. On both sides of the Cold War, the trend seemed to indicate that the world was moving toward internationalism rather than nationalism. As a result of the threat of nuclear warfare, great emphasis on democracy and human rights, economic interdependence, and gradual acceptance of universal ideologies, it became fashionable to speak of the demise of ethnic and nationalist movements. Despite contrary expectations, however, a fresh cycle of ethnopolitical movements has re-emerged in Eastern Europe (including the Balkans), Central Asia, Africa, and many other parts of the world. In fact, with the end of the Cold War, which increased international cooperation while decreasing the possibilities of inter-state wars, the main threat to peace does not come from major inter-state confrontations anymore, but from another source: intra-state conflicts. These conflicts occur within the borders of states. These conflicts have replaced the Cold War’s ideological clashes as the principal sources of current conflicts. To be sure, from May 1988 till today, there have been fifty-eight conflicts the United Nations (UN) has intervened in and only three of them were inter-state in character (Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Chad-Libya border dispute in 1994, and Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute in 1998–2000). If we add the Iraqi invasion by the United States, the total number of inter-state conflicts during the whole post–Cold War period is only four, whereas fifty-four overt internal conflicts have occurred in the same period.1 127

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The era of intra-state conflicts appears to be holding. However, the international community cannot be said to be well prepared for this trend. Major international organizations, including the UN, were designed to cope with inter-state problems, historically the primary source of threat to global peace and security. On the other hand, the fact that internal conflicts occur within the borders of states made major international actors reluctant to intervene as well, either for legal concerns or for concern to avoid probable loses.2 Thus, unless they escalate, the international community has preferred not to involve in intra-state conflicts. Yet such conflicts would be as serious, costly, and intense as any in the past. And somehow they need to be managed and resolved, or else international peace and security will not be in a stable situation, for even if intra-state conflicts appear to be local, they can quickly gain an international dimension due to global interdependence and various international support. When external parties provide political, economic, or military assistance or asylum and bases for actors involved in local struggles, these conflicts inevitably assume an international dimension. Undoubtedly, effective management of intra-state conflicts by domestic and international authorities presupposes an understanding of their nature and causes. This study attempts to explain the causes of such conflicts by observing many points that seem to be common in major internal conflicts around the globe. INTRA-STATE CONFLICTS AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Before getting into a detailed discussion, a few points need to be clarified regarding the scope of intra-state conflicts and the relevance of ethnic identity in them. The essence of intra-state conflicts involves inter-group rivalries between two or more ethnocultural groups that feel different from each other. But this rivalry would especially be translated into an overt conflict when the groups (or at least one of them) view their relationship as unfair under the existing political order. Then, the groups that perceive themselves as underprivileged would seek changes through conflict, ranging from recognition of cultural rights to autonomy to political separation or full independence. The conflict is usually directed toward the members of the dominant group(s) or to the state authority dominated by them. Thus, in almost all intra-state conflicts, the very legitimacy of the state is also under question and domestic law is considered breakable as it is perceived to be in favor of dominant groups. The ethnic criteria used by conflicting groups to define themselves may include common descent, shared historic experiences, or valued cultural

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traits. In some cases, race and blood ties may also be significant, but in general, there is no warrant for assuming that anyone’s basis for ethnic identity is inherently more important than any other. In the final analysis, the selfattachment to a group is a matter of personal feeling, which may be subjectively defined based on different criteria. It should also be noted that as we learn from research on human development, no one is born with a distinct identity. One’s sense of self, or identity, is slowly developed as the individual enters into a wide variety of social interactions with other individuals in a given environment. Thus, in this socialization process, the factors impacting the crystallization of ethnic identity may vary. While some social environments give more weight to race or common descent, others may emphasize other bases for ethnic identities, such as religion, language, or shared culture. We know for sure that once ethnic identity is formed, it becomes rather resistant to change. Although change and mutability are endemic in all social identities, hypothetically speaking, we observe that this happens only exceptionally. The reason for this lies in the fact that there usually is a very strong relationship between ethnic identity and one’s sense of self. Since an established ethnic identity satisfies the individual’s need to know who s/he is and who others are and the need to belong, love, and be loved, it is rather inflexible to change. Indeed, the self-esteem of individuals often rises and falls with the fate of their group. The success of the in-group uplifts the individuals in that group, and failure hurts them. People may be willing to die rather than change their identities and that the group may cling to its identity all the more when political and military pressure is intensified are perhaps understandable within this context. While ethnic identity is a natural and universal phenomenon, it would be erroneous to assume that ethnic identity itself is a direct cause of ethnic conflicts. If that were the case, then so many ethnic groups worldwide would be in constant conflict just on the grounds of their differences. But we observe that this is not the case, and indeed, cooperation among diverse ethnic groups is as common as inter-group conflict, if not more common. In light of that, it would be reasonable to assume that intra-state conflicts result from certain negative conditions. We now must discuss some of such conditions by looking through many common points in different conflicts. CONDITIONS ENCOURAGING OR LEADING TO INTRA-STATE CONFLICTS The Desire to Express Ethnic Identity First of all, whether we look at the intra-state conflicts that the UN has intervened in the post–Cold War period or major others, it becomes apparent that

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these conflicts are not independent of the desire to express distinct group identity. Such conflicts tend to occur when groups feel serious restrictions on the expression of their ethnocultural distinction. The restrictions talked about here may involve limitations to the use of local language (i.e., in schools and courts), exclusion of certain ethnic groups from political power, or limitations to the expression of local customs. In general, the greater the scope of real or perceived restrictions, the more likely the potential for the ethnic challenge against the status quo. Hence, contrary to common sense, ethnic identity is valued in and of itself, and for many ethnic groups, the mere urge to express their distinct identity may be independent of the pursuit of economic well-being or power. As Ted R. Gurr astutely observed: One cannot explain away the significance of ethnic identity by arguing that what really motivates ethno-political groups is the quest for well-being. The important factor is that such groups organize around their shared identity and seek gains for members of their group. It is seriously misleading to interpret the Zapatistas as just a peasants’ movement or the Bosnian Serbs as the equivalent of a political party. They draw their strengths from ethnic and cultural bonds, not associational ones.3

A strong sense of group identity and collective grievances with respect to real or perceived restrictions are both necessary conditions for sustained ethnic mobilization, but they are not sufficient. Some degree of cohesion is also needed to convert common grievances and identity into purposeful action. A group’s cohesion is shaped by its social, political, and economic organization, past and present. Cohesion tends to be greater among groups held together by dense networks of communication and interaction. It is also greater among groups concentrated in a single region, such as the Tamils of Sri Lanka, rather than dispersed, like the Chinese of Malaysia. That aside, effective leadership is usually necessary to form coalitions and policies toward ethnic mobilization. Leadership helps the expression of shared grievances of groups and translates them into group action. Failure to create strong leadership and thus form coalitions particularly reduces the scope and political impact of collective action, making it easier for states to co-opt or ignore ethnopolitical challengers. Discrimination Another common point in different intra-state conflicts around the globe seems to be discrimination. The most apparent aspect of discrimination involves unequal treatment of minority groups by dominant groups and

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not creating conditions for their progress. In most Third World countries, inequalities among ethnic groups in status and access to political power have also been deliberately maintained through local law and public policy. Statebuilding almost everywhere in the Third World resulted in policies aimed at assimilating minority peoples, restraining their historic autonomy, and extracting their resources and labor force for the use of the state, dominated by a certain ethnic group or groups. Some minority peoples, including most of the overseas Chinese of Southeast Asia, have shared power and prosperity at the center of new states. Some others, particularly those in Africa where the reach of state power is limited, have been able to hold on to de-facto local autonomy. But the general effect of state-building or expansion of state power in most parts of the world has been to substantially increase the grievances of most ethnically distinct groups, those who have either not been strong enough to protect their local autonomy or not been allowed to participate in power at the center. Having said that, it should also be mentioned that discrimination is not limited to legal discrimination, most evident in the Third World. Evident inequalities in status and well-being may also cause deep grievances for underprivileged ethnic groups elsewhere. For instance, minorities in Western countries usually work in lower-status jobs and have a low-income level. Even though there is no legal restriction for upward social mobility, these people are mostly entrapped in underprivileged conditions, and very few can actually get ahead in the system. The discontent regarding their disadvantage compared with privileged groups may, at times, motivate these people for political mobilization. Many minority groups’ uprisings in France a year ago, the hidden tension between white and non-white Americans, between the Black and white in South Africa do not seem to be independent of this kind of structural discrimination. The perception of limited possibilities for upward social mobility tends to anger and motivate many minority groups to utilize conflict as a means to achieve what the privileged groups have. Finally, minorities in multi-ethnic states often face cultural discrimination too. That is, social practices would be such that while dominant group culture is valued, minority norms and customs are disvalued and marginalized. Some examples of cultural discrimination may include making fun of minority languages and customs, portraying minorities as “bad men” in movies and television programs, excluding them from popular social gatherings, and negatively stereotyping them as a group, in general. By discrimination policies, dominant groups aim to assimilate minorities, but indeed, in-group solidarity usually increases within ethnic groups facing serious legal, structural, or cultural discrimination. The groups whose underprivileged status is maintained through repression may be hesitant to act on dominant groups in the short run, but they certainly nurture deep grievances

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against them. Eventually, these grievances may manifest themselves in conflict when conditions become “ripe”4 for ethnic mobilization. Political System Just having talked about the issues of the urge to express ethnic identity and discrimination, the feature of the political system should also be discussed in this regard as these issues are also linked with it. It is usually the case that liberal democracies provide many structural mechanisms preventing, at least, legal discrimination and easing identity expression. For example, in most liberal democracies, minority rights are strictly protected by law, different ethnic groups have a space to exercise their group identities, and social problems can find democratic channels to express themselves. Equally or more important, the distribution of political power can be shaped, or re-shaped, through political elections. Therefore, issues concerning ethnic groups can be peacefully dealt with in liberal democracies before they escalate to large-scale conflicts. That aside, a burgeoning literature has discussed the pacific culture of democracies, usually called as “democratic culture.” In its origin, democratic culture is driven from the interactions of individuals with the system of democracy but in time, it becomes a reality dominating inter-individual relations. Democratic culture promotes peace through common social practices, such as openness to dialogue, tolerance to differences, peaceful resolution of social conflicts, and rejecting violence as a means to handle problems as well. Such qualities not only foster social harmony but also give rise to the belief that conflict may produce win–win solutions, and it may not be a solely negative phenomenon. On the other hand, in authoritarian, totalitarian, and other nondemocratically constituted states, the absence or weakness of systemic mechanisms that can alleviate social tension may easily escalate ethnic issues to the point of violent conflict. In such regimes, dominant group privileges are usually supported by local law and popular culture too, perpetuating, therefore, discrimination and repression at the political level, as well as at the societal level. Hence, it is perhaps no coincidence that serious internal conflicts tend to more frequently occur in anti-democratic societies, while it can be observed that in ethnically heterogenic but democratic countries, such as Switzerland, Canada, and Belgium, no serious inter-ethnic conflicts take place. That seems to confirm a positive relationship between liberal democracy and social peace.5 Economic Distress and Unjust Distribution of National Wealth Another factor that contributes to the occurrence of ethnic conflicts in multiethnic societies is economic distress and unjust distribution of national

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sources. When the intra-state conflicts that the UN has intervened are examined, it becomes clear that the GDP per capita in these countries is approximately $3,000 according to the data by The World Factbook. Even in some countries, such as Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and Haiti, it is under this figure. Research shows that there is a strong correlation between human needs deprivation and conflict. If people are not satisfied in terms of their basic needs, they may easily become conflict-prone against other individuals and the system under which they live.6 Aside from widespread poverty, in countries suffering from intra-state conflicts, there usually exist great gaps in the distribution of welfare among different ethnic groups. While dominant groups often get the “lion’s share” and enjoy prosperity, most minorities suffer poverty and they are entrapped in a structural violence. This relative deprivation of economic well-being in comparison to dominant groups may motivate disadvantaged ethnic groups for political mobilization. Hence, although ethnic identity is valued in and of itself, the economic dimension is still important, for a multi-ethnic state that is characterized by widespread poverty and evidently unjust distribution of national wealth is a state where ethnic antagonisms are likely to grow. Economic well-being and perception of just distribution, on the other hand, may contribute to a sense of security and give ethnic minorities a stake in the system. Donald L. Horowitz calls this the “distributive approach to ethnic conflict resolution,” as opposed to structural approaches based on creating a political framework. He points out that such an approach can include preferential policies aimed at raising certain groups to a position of equality through investment, employment practices, access to education, and land distribution.7 As a matter of fact, albeit ethnically heterogenic, the fact that there are no serious ethnic conflicts in the European Union (EU) countries where the annual GDP per capita is about $30,000 on average confirms a positive relationship, among other things, between economic well-being and inter-group harmony. This can be said to be the case for many other multi-ethnic but wealthy states, such as Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and so on. Collapse of Central Authority Sometimes ethnic conflicts may also result from the collapse of state authority. Just as serious ethnic conflicts may lead to the collapse of the state at times, the collapse, by itself, may also give rise to inter-ethnic conflicts. The reason for this is that the state, especially modern state, has many positive functions in terms of sustaining social peace, and with its collapse, serious problems inevitably arise.

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To be more specific, first of all, state collapse causes a local anarchy in which individuals and group find themselves in a state of serious insecurity. In the absence of a central authority, security is inevitably subjectively pursued, whereby many social conflicts occur out of it. Additionally, in-group solidarity usually increases in the absence of a central authority as individuals try to get a sense of security by clinging more to their group. Increasing ingroup solidarity, in turn, exacerbates ethnocentric behaviors, that is, extreme in-group favoritism and discrimination against out-groups, a social–psychological component of inter-group tension, if not conflict. Second, the collapse of the state also results in a power struggle for governance among different ethnic groups. All major groups want to get a dominant position to run the country and pursue a more privileged status in comparison with other groups. But since different groups play the same game, their efforts inevitably clash and the power struggle among them may manifest itself in serious inter-group conflicts. Finally, with the collapse of the state, both local and foreign investments decrease, whereby the fulfillment of people’s basic needs becomes very problematic. As a result of that, spreading poverty, on the one hand, and pursuit of needs fulfillment with subjective methods, on the other, may create a conflict-prone structure. In short, although it is not the only cause, the collapse of central authority may be a serious source of inter-ethnic conflicts. As a matter of fact, I. William Zartman, who studied intra-state conflicts in Africa, reached the conclusion that such conflicts were strongly correlated with state collapse.8 Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, who studied the ethnic conflict in Somalia, came up with a similar conclusion in that the conflict was due mainly to the failure to restore the state authority.9 Likewise, the inter-ethnic conflicts occurred in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia after the disintegration of them in the 1990s also do not seem to be independent of the dissolution of central authority. Historic Traumas Alongside the interest-based considerations in intra-state conflicts, there are frequently obligatory psychological issues that are, in effect, tainted with irrationality too. Political, economic, historical, and military events can sometimes become so psychological and so “stubbornly fixed” in the minds of adversaries that it may be impossible to fully understand inter-group conflicts without an understanding of the large group psychology. In this regard, a hidden dimension that usually plays a significant role in ethnic conflicts is historic traumas. Historic traumas refer to events that invoke in the members of a group intense feelings of having been humiliated

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and victimized by members of another group. Of course, a group does not choose to be victimized and subsequently lose self-esteem, but it does choose to psychologize and mythologize to dwell upon the event. The group draws the emotional meaning of traumatic events, and mental defenses against them, into its very identity. Members of each new generation share a conscious and unconscious wish to repair what has been done to their ancestors to release themselves from the burden of humiliation. What is more, once a terrible event in a group’s history becomes a historic trauma, the truth about it does not matter. From that time on, the reality is interpreted through inner perceptions and feelings. Especially when a new conflict situation appears, and tension arises, the current enemy’s mental image becomes contaminated with the image of the enemy in the chosen trauma, even if the new enemy is not related to the original one. A good example of the negative effects of historic traumas on current interethnic conflicts is Cyprus’ case. A closer look suggests that the contemporary conflict on Cyprus is not an isolated issue having its own “private” life but is a significant part of the larger Greco-Turkish issue with a 1,000-year history. Despite a relatively long-time of togetherness (since 1571), in general, neither the Greeks nor the Turks of Cyprus have ever considered themselves as members of a distinct Cypriot nation. They were, and still are, separate communities with strong emotional attachments to their respected motherland countries. Because of this “total body identification,” historical enmities between the larger Greek and Turkish nations have been transported to Cyprus. Both Cypriot communities brought past grieves and ideals of their respected nations to the island. Even the images of each side toward the other are pretty much the same as those of the motherland Greeks and Turks. Therefore, when the Republic of Cyprus was created by outside powers in 1960, there was an artificially created state, but there was no cohesive Cypriot nation to support it.10 Aside from larger Greco-Turkish hostilities, the Cypriot communities themselves have experienced many traumas at the hands of each other. The Turkish Cypriots, for instance, still remember the period between 1963 and 1974 as their major chosen trauma, while the Greek Cypriots similarly refer to their own chosen trauma, which has started with the Turkish invasion in 1974. Past hurts affect the interactions of the two communities as they do the formal negotiation process. This is one of the main reasons why the peace process on Cyprus, or outside it, does not go smoothly.11 Another example would be the Serbs’ ruthless attitudes toward Turkish, Albanian, and other Muslim communities after the disintegration of Yugoslavia. For the Serbs, these communities were the descendants of the Ottomans that defeated them in Kosovo in the 14th century. Although over 600 years have passed, the Serbs did not forget their defeat and wanted to

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destroy the “ashes of the Ottomans” in an effort to “purify” Serbian nationalism. This policy manifested itself in the genocide attempts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and other minority areas in the 1990s, where the international community was too late to intervene. However, it would be erroneous to claim that historic traumas directly cause ethnic conflicts. If that were the case, then ethnic groups that experienced great traumas at the hands of each other in the past would be in a constant state of struggle at present. But we know that this is not the case in light of historic facts. Nevertheless, it can be argued that historic traumas would particularly become activated under some negative conditions and further escalate a conflict after it has begun, fostering, thus, a climate of distrust, which, in turn, inhibits the search for a peaceful solution.12 The implication is that ethnic conflicts ought not to be analyzed only on the ground of visible or more concrete issues, such as land, territory, or economic issues, but concrete problems should be evaluated through a historic lens, and in this regard, the interplay between past and present should not be missed. In fact, if relational problems connected to historic traumas seem to define present issues and there seems little chance for progress toward a solution without overcoming them, then the priority should be given to confidence-building measures. Concrete issues should be handled afterward. The International Context The factors that have been addressed and discussed so far are among the major internal dynamics of serious intra-state conflicts. But most ethnic conflicts are also tied with international support, and they may not be fully understood without taking this dimension into account. To begin with, foreign sympathizers can contribute substantially to an ethnic group’s cohesion and political mobilization by providing material, political, and moral support. For example, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has organized and supported Palestinians’ oppositional activity in Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel’s occupied territories. Likewise, Rebellious Iraqi Kurds have had the diplomatic support of the Iranian regime, Israel, and the United States. Similarly, in Cyprus, Greek Cypriots have been supported by Greece, while their Turkish counterparts by Turkey. The most destructive consequences usually occur when competing powers support different sides in ethnopolitical conflicts. Such proxy conflicts are often protracted, very deadly, and not likely to end in negotiated settlements unless it is in the interest of external powers. When external support is withdrawn, possibilities for settlement may open up, as it happened in Angola in 2002. In Afghanistan, however, the cessation of Russian and US support in the early 1990s led to a new phase of civil wars, fought among

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communal rivals for power. The country was devastated by conflict among political movements that represented the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and other minorities who opposed efforts by the historically dominant Pushtuns to regain political control. Proxy wars were especially common during the Cold War, yet by no means were limited to superpower rivalries. As it is remembered, in their 1980s war, both Iran and Iraq encouraged Kurdish minorities on their enemy’s terrain to fight from within. Ethnic mobilization is also prompted by the occurrence of ethnopolitical conflict elsewhere through the processes of diffusion and contagion. Diffusion refers to the spillover of conflict from one region to another, either within or across international boundaries. For instance, in the last century, about a dozen ethnic groups in the Caucasus, including the Ossetians, Abkhaz, Aeries, Chechens, Ingush, and Lezghins, have been caught up in ethnopolitical struggle through the diffusion of proactive and reactive nationalism. Political activists in one country usually find sanctuary and get support from their transnational kindred. Generations of Kurdish rebels in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran have sustained by far one another’s political mobilizations in this way. Likewise, the Chechens outside Russia descended from the exiles and political refugees of an earlier era and gave open support to their rebellious cousins in the Caucasus. As a rule, a disadvantaged group’s potential for political mobilization is increased by the number of segments of the group in adjoining countries, by the extent to which those segments are mobilized and by their involvement in overt conflict.13 Contagion, on the other hand, refers to the process by which one group’s actions provide inspiration and guidance for other groups elsewhere. While, in general, internal conflicts are by themselves contagious, the strongest force of communal contagion tends to occur within networks of similar groups. Informal connections have developed, particularly since the 1960s, among similar groups that face similar circumstances so that, for instance, New South Wales Aborigines in the early 1960s organized freedom rides, and Dayaks in northern Borneo in the 1980s resisted commercial logging of their forests with rhetoric and tactics remarkably like those used by native Canadians in the early 1990s. In general, groups that are tied into networks acquire better techniques for effective mobilization: plausible appeals, good leadership, and organizational skills. More important, they benefit from the inspiration of successful movements elsewhere; successes that provide images and moral incentives that motivate activists. In sum, myriad international actors help shape the aspirations, opportunities, and strategies of ethnic groups in conflict. Thus, the nature of international engagement is a major determinant of whether ethnic conflicts are of short duration or long and whether they end in negotiated settlements or humanitarian disasters. Contagion may not be preventable due to advanced

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communication in today’s world that is largely beyond the control of any international actor, but conflict resolution efforts in intra-state conflicts certainly require a stable international environment, especially far from majorstate confrontations.14 INTRA-STATE CONFLICTS AND THE USE OF FORCE Despite their complexity in terms of both internal and external dynamics discussed above, most intra-state conflicts are still tried to be “resolved” by using force to a large extent in practice. At the national level, this is done through suppressing rebellious groups by the national military and police forces, punishing or exiling the activists in this regard. At the international level, the UN and regional forces are deployed for one of three purposes: to stop immediate violence, to help to recast the institutions of the society, or to provide protection and the basic necessities of life, often through the establishment of safe havens. Depending on the requirements of a given situation, one or another of the above approaches is chosen, or they can be combined if needed. It must be admitted that sometimes a certain degree of force would be an integral part of the overall conflict resolution process in intra-state conflicts. Take international peacekeeping, for example. Especially when adversaries are engaged in mutual violence or armed clashes, peacekeeping often appears to be the most urgent strategy. Until violence is stopped or at least managed, it is unlikely that any attempts to resolve competing interests, change negative attitudes, or alter socioeconomic circumstances giving rise to the conflict will be successful. In fact, by far, thousands of civilian and military peacekeepers who have toiled over the past five decades have been successful, in general, in keeping people alive and in preventing conflict escalation in most inter-ethnic conflicts. In the absence of peacekeeping forces, any group wishing to sabotage a peace initiative may find it easier to provoke armed clashes with the other side since there is no impartial buffer between the sides which can act as a restraining influence. The absence of a suitable control mechanism may enable even a small group of people committed to violence to wreak enormous havoc. In contrast, the presence of an impartial third force can be an important factor for stability. Finally, peacekeeping forces can also contribute to peacemaking process by: • Monitoring or even running local elections, as in Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, the Congo, and East Timor (now independent Timor-Leste).

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• Guarding the weapons surrendered by or taken from the parties in conflict. • Ensuring the smooth delivery of humanitarian relief supplies during an ongoing conflict, as in Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, and Sudan. • Assisting in reconstructing state functions, as in Bosnia–Herzegovina, El Salvador, the Congo, and Liberia. Providing inter-communal gatherings with secure meeting places and safe escorts to and from negotiations, as on Cyprus, for instance, where the Ledra Palace Hotel, located in the UN zone in Nicosia, has been used for inter-communal meetings.15 The deployment of national forces in conflict settings would be more problematic, for these forces tend to take a side and act in favor of dominant groups in power. Thus, intervention just by national forces would indeed exacerbate tension and escalate the conflict. But on the other hand, provided that they are neutral, just, and reasonable, even national forces can be said to be functional in terms of excluding some radical wings from the essence of the problem. However, it would be quite erroneous to assume that intra-state conflicts can be resolved through force only. These conflicts may be suppressed through force for a while, but they cannot be resolved in the conflict resolution sense. What are more, violent tactics eventually invite counter-violence. Thus, rather than turn to increasingly militarized solutions—a habit that indeed pervades thinking about conflict management at the national and international level—we must more seriously consider nonviolent alternatives which take account of the range of complex issues involved in violent conflicts and the people who experience them. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION Several significant lessons can be drawn from the above analyses and arguments, which can be summarized as follows: The dynamics of intra-state conflicts are highly complex. Thus, the theories that emphasize the supposedly crucial role of a single factor are misleading and insufficient to capture the complexity of ethnopolitical conflicts. For this reason, conflict resolution strategies should also be multi-sided. In light of the above discussions, this involves finding formulas that enable the expression of distinct group identities; preventing legal, structural, and cultural discrimination; democratization; economic development and relatively just distribution of national wealth; confidence-building measures, as well as a stable international environment. Particularly, conflict management strategies that fail to recognize the significance of people’s ethnic identities or that fail to address the grievances

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that animate their political movements fail to reduce conflict. Thus, ethnic conflicts should not be merely seen as an economic issue or a “foreign-party game.” Successful formulas ought to be found to satisfy people’s need to express their distinct group identity. Intra-state conflicts are almost always a two or n-party game. Hence, concentrating conflict resolution efforts on one party to the exclusion of others is a no-win strategy. For the durable resolution of these conflicts, all related parties must be involved in the peace process. Intra-state conflicts cannot be coped with effectively through force only. By force, problems can be suppressed for a while, but they cannot be resolved. Ethnic groups whose subordinate status is maintained through force and repression nurture deep grievances against dominant groups, even if they may be hesitant to act on them in the short run. But in the long run, when conditions become suitable, they take action to change the status quo for the better. Preventing or resolving intra-state conflicts is not feasible through the efforts of one actor only. Multi-level efforts must be put by several actors, domestic and international. Perhaps the best result can be obtained if various efforts by different actors can be combined. Since the problem (of ethnopolitical conflict) is many-sided, and obviously, there is no single formula, the wisest thing to do is to attack all fronts simultaneously. If no single attack has a large effect, many small attacks can have large cumulative results from many directions.

NOTES 1. “UN Statistics,” The United Nations, https://www​.un​.org​/en/, date accessed 12.09.2019. 2. For example, during Clinton administration, the US government issued PDD25 (Presidential Decision Directive-25), limiting the conditions that the United States can participate in UN peacekeeping operations. For details, see The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (Washington, DC: US Department of US Publication 10161, May 1994). 3. Ted R. Gurr, “Minorities, Nationalists, and Ethnopolitical Conflict,” Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, edited by Chester A. Crocker et al. (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1996). 4. By ripe, it is meant those conditions making ethnic mobilization possible, such as enough in-group power to combat with dominant groups, cohesion, leadership, organization, external support, and so on. 5. On the relationship between liberal democracy and social peace, see Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (1986); Bruce Russet, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

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University Press, 1993); Johusa Muravchik, “Promoting Peace Through Democracy,” Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, edited by Chester A. Crocker et al. (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1996). 6. For details, see John W. Burton, Deviance, Terrorism, and War: The Process of Solving Unsolved Social and Political Problems (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979); John W. Burton, Conflict: Human Needs Theory (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990); John W. Burton, Violence Explained (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1997). 7. Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 653–681. 8. See I. William Zartman, Collapsed States (Boulder: L. Rienner, 1995). 9. See Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction (Washington, DC: Brooking Institution, 1995). 10. Stephen Xydis, Cyprus: Reluctant Republic (The Hague: Mouton, 1973); Vamik D. Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz, Turks and Greeks: Neighbours in Conflict (Cambridgeshire, England: The Eothen Press, 1994). 11. Vamik D. Volkan, “Cyprus: Ethnic Conflicts and Tensions,” International Journal of Group Tensions 19, no. 4 (1989); Muzaffer E. Yılmaz, “The Political Psychology of the Cyprus Conflict and Confidence Building Measures Sustaining Peace Efforts,” Balikesir University, Bandırma İİBF Journal 1, no. 2 (2004). 12. See, Muzaffer E. Yılmaz, “Enemy Images and Conflict,” Istanbul University SBF Journal, no. 32 (2005). 13. Gurr, op​.cit​., 72. 14. Muzaffer E. Yılmaz, “UN Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era,” International Journal on World Peace 12, no. 2 (2005): 15–16. 15. Mats Berdal, “Ten Years of International Peacekeeping,” International Peacekeeping 10, no. 4 (2003); Nina M. Serefino, Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations (New York: Novinka Books, 2005).

REFERENCES Berdal, Mats. “Ten Years of International Peacekeeping,” International Peacekeeping 10, no. 4 (2003): 5–11. Burton, John W. Deviance, Terrorism, and War: The Process of Solving Unsolved Social and Political Problems. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979. ______. Conflict: Human Needs Theory. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990. ______. Violence Explained. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1997. Doyle, Michael W. “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (1986):1151–1169. Gurr, Ted R. “Minorities, Nationalists, and Ethnopolitical Conflict.” Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, edited by Chester A. Crocker et al., 167–195. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1996.

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Horowitz, Donald L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. Lyons, Terrence, and Samatar, Ahmed I. Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction. Washington, DC: Brooking Institution, 1995. Muravchik, Johusa, “Promoting Peace through Democracy.” Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, ed. Chester A. Crocker et al., 512–545. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1996. Russet, Bruce. Grasping the Democratic Peace. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993. Serafino, Nina M. Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations. New York: Novinka Books, 2005. The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, Washington, DC: US Department of US Publication 10161, May 1994. “UN Statistics.” The United Nations. https://www​.un​.org​/en/, date accessed 12.09.2019. Volkan, Vamik D. “Cyprus: Ethnic Conflicts and Tensions,” International Journal of Group Tensions 19, no. 4 (1989): 214–241. ______.& Itzkowitz, Norman. Turks and Greeks: Neighbours in Conflict. Cambridgeshire, England: The Eothen Press, 1994. Xydis, Stephen. Cyprus: Reluctant Republic. The Hague: Mouton, 1973. Yılmaz, Muzaffer E. “The Political Psychology of the Cyprus Conflict and Confidence Building Measures Sustaining Peace Efforts,” Balikesir University, Bandırma İİBF Journal 1, no. 2 (2004): 212–254. ______. “Enemy Images and Conflict,” Istanbul University SBF Journal no. 32 (2005): 1–12. ______. “UN Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era,” International Journal on World Peace 12, no. 2 (2005): 13–28. Zartman, I. William. Collapsed States. Boulder: L. Rienner, 1995.

Chapter 9

Nonviolent Action and Nonviolent Resistance Nonviolent Peacekeeping and Unarmed Civilian Protection (UCP) Sezai OZCELIK

INTRODUCTION Unarmed civilian protection (UCP) is defined as the civilian use of nonviolent means to protect people and prevent violence.1 The definition of peacekeeping includes nonviolent components as “actions that are specifically approved by a national or international body designed to enhance peace, security, and stability; they are undertaken cooperatively and individually by civilian police, military, humanitarian, good governance, and other interested agencies and groups.”2 The issue of security traditionally has revolved around the security of the nation-states and the central problem of inter-state wars. The central subject of international security is to answer how and why international society and international organizations act on war and violence and the threat of war and violence. The idea that “the world is bigger than five” requires us to ask whether international organizations in general and the United Nations (UN), in particular, prevent war and violence in the international system. The causes of war are both tangible (material resources and territory) and intangible (nationalism, ideology, identity, and religion). However, the solutions to war and violence are elusive and few. The balance of power and the use of force may encourage international peace and security and deter breaches of the peace as well as inter-state aggression, threats, and violence. Contemporary wars have become more and more complicated, chaotic, and sophisticated which have both internal and external roots and sources. Since the beginning of the millennium, international security is reconceptualized as human security that is a people-centered approach, focusing on different 143

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dimensional threats to individuals.3 Such threats may include not only direct violence and war but also structural and cultural violence issues such as hunger, disease, extreme poverty, and environmental disaster. The improvement of global security and world peace is the raison d’être (reason for existence) of the UN. The UN has practiced the concept of multilateral peacekeeping over the last eighty-five years. The peacekeeping operations have three main objectives: collective security, preventive diplomacy,4 and peaceful settlement of international conflicts.5 The idea of creating an international nonviolence “Peace Army” can be traced to the Shanti Sena (Gandhian peace brigade). The Shanti Sena members used nonviolent, unarmed tools, not to kill but die for their peacekeeping duties. The present study aims to shed light on the evolution of nonviolent peacekeeping ideas and present some examples in the post–Cold War conflicts. In the post-Corona world, it is possible to refrain from the threat or actual use of force and replace it with unarmed, civilian, and nonviolent peacekeeping. Nonviolent peacekeeping may become an alternative paradigm to traditional and expanded peacekeeping. With the help of social media, citizens may become a central force for pro-democracy and anti-dictatorship movements with the emphasis on nonviolence for preventing the escalation of violence and conflict with the early warning and early response system. The pacifist approach to peacemaking and peace-building needs to replace traditional diplomacy that is based on a hierarchy of power and the promotion of national interest. Nonviolent alternatives to traditional peacekeeping usually have religious perspectives on pacifism and nonviolence in international conflicts. Peace scientists advocated establishing a nonviolent peace force that consists of a ready international corps of people trained in conciliation, negotiations, riot control, and nonviolent methods. Nonviolent peacekeeping forces should cooperate with the UN, other international organizations, multinational corporations (MNCs), and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). According to Kritz, “ethnic and religious conflicts, disputes over selfdetermination or secession, and the violent power struggle between opposing domestic political factors account for 96 percent of the major armed conflicts recorded in recent years worldwide.”6 For the success of future collective security activities, there is a need for not compromising three main principles of the UN Charter: the principle of non-intervention of internal affairs of states, the principle of non-use of force, and the principle of equality and self-determination. Because of the need for the UN’s adjustment, SecretaryGeneral Boutros Boutros-Ghali produced the report, An Agenda for Peace (1992) was indicative of the changing nature of UN’s actions in the post– Cold War world. Rather than being satisfied with the simple prevention of escalation of the conflict, which had been its major objective during the Cold

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War, the post–Cold War period has witnessed the emergence of peacekeeping as one of the conflict resolution tools. The following questions are the focus of this study: To what extent is the militarization of peacekeeping necessary for dealing with violent internal conflicts? What nonviolent mechanisms could be used instead? Should nonviolent peacekeeping be analyzed within this proverb: “A bad peace is better than a good war”? Can well-trained unarmed nonviolent civilian forces be able to protect other civilians from both state and non-state armed actors and groups? What added values do the presence of international civilian nonviolent peacekeeping provide to international peace and security? How could the presence of international civilian nonviolent peacekeeping forces mitigate conflict escalation and reinforce conflict resolution? What are the leverages of nonviolent peacekeeping? What roles could the Sharipian and/or Gandhian nonviolent approaches play in nonviolent peacekeeping? PEACEKEEPING Definition and Traditional and Expanded Peacekeeping Peacekeeping has been developed during the Cold War as a response to the needs of the Cold War system. Because of competition between superpowers, peacekeeping has been a tool of conflict management, a means of preventing war in one part of the world, drawing in the superpowers, and escalating to the brink of nuclear war. But there was an idealistic element of peacekeeping that it was important for the international community to save lives wherever possible. With the end of the Cold War, this dual imperative (realpolitik and humanitarian) changed in favor of humanitarianism.7 Moreover, the greater understanding between the superpowers enabled the UN to dramatically increase the number of peacekeeping operations in the post–Cold War period. And the UN’s role during the Gulf War demonstrated that as long as there was a consensus in the Security Council, the organization could be successful in maintaining peace. The UN established ten new peacekeeping operations by the end of 1991. This rapid expansion seemed to indicate that the UN would finally fulfill its primary goal of preserving peace.8 Boutros-Ghali’s conflict resolution framework has been expanded to present peacekeeping as future thinking about conflict management. Peacekeeping is defined as “the deployment of military or police personnel, and frequently civilians as well to assist in the implementation of agreements reached between governments or parties who have been engaged in conflict.”9 In other words, it refers to any international effort involving an operational component to promote the termination of armed conflict or the resolution of longstanding disputes. There are six basic principles for peacekeeping: consent,

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impartiality, restraint in the use of force, credibility, legitimacy, and promotion of national and local ownership.10 It is possible to outline two types of peacekeeping: traditional and expanded. “Traditional peacekeeping has as its principal role the positioning of forces between or among combatants . . . the goal [of which] is to contain or prevent further conflict”. Expanded peacekeeping is one of the components of peace agreement with third-party international military reinforcement. As a result, it is not surprising that UN peacekeeping was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988.11 Even though there are common features between collective security and peacekeeping, there are differences. The first distinguishing attribute of peacekeeping is the performance of a non-coercive mission. The goal of the traditional military operation is to deter an opponent or defeat that opponent in battle. And these missions usually include enforcement and coercion with military force. However, peacekeeping operations are usually deployed following a cease-fire agreement by the protagonists. Peacekeeping troops do not have a mission of stopping the bloodshed. Whereas traditional military mission involves the defense or attempted seizure of territory, peacekeeping forces have no offensive role in the conflict. They do not seek to acquire territory, nor do they use military force except self-defense. Second, peacekeeping forces are lightly armed and they are designed only to use those arms in self-defense. Peacekeeping troops have neither an offensive military mission nor the capability to carry one out. For example, a typical peacekeeping soldier is equipped only with a rifle, and peacekeeping units have access only to vehicles for transportation.12 A third distinguishing component of peacekeeping is its neutrality. In the collective security system, the target of enforcement action is the aggressor. As a result, peacekeeping forces do not mark one side or the other side for the responsible of the military conflict. They are not designed to provide a military advantage to either side. The concept of neutrality goes beyond the purpose of the force to the composition and activities of the troops. Most UN peacekeeping forces are composed of military personnel from nonaligned states such as Fiji, Canada, and Sweden.13 Another distinguishing feature of peacekeeping operations is that they must have the permission of the state or states on whose territory the troops will be stationed. They recognize and respect the sovereignty of states and assign a role for the implementing agency commensurate with the authority granted by the states involved.14 Finally, peacekeeping forces generally perform a range of functions that distinguish them from collective security. The first function is that they detect violations of cease-fires and supervise troop withdrawals. Second, they have roles as buffer or interposition forces. Therefore, they prevent isolated hostile incidents or accidents that could escalate to full-scale war. And they provide a moral barrier to hostile action. A third function concerns the maintenance of law and order, especially common

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for peacekeeping operations deployed in intra-national conflicts. They have police and administrative duties. A final function of peacekeeping operations is the performance of humanitarian activities. They set up services for the local population, and these activities help bring acceptance for peacekeeping force and lessen the danger of attack.15 Traditional peacekeeping operations have shared several operational characteristics. First, they inherently have been reactive to international conflict. The UN, like many organizations, is crisis-driven: peacekeeping operations are not often suggested, much less authorized, until lives have been lost and the prospects for war expansion are great. A second characteristic surrounds the authorization of the typical peacekeeping mission. Peacekeeping was contemplated under the UN Charter Chapter VI and a half that refers to the UN’s role in conflict resolution efforts outlined in Chapter VI and its role in collective security under Chapter VII. Traditional peacekeeping has two essential conditions: the consent of tall primary parties involved in the conflict and a temporary cease-fire. At the height of the Cold War, some peacekeeping operations relied on the political support of members of the General Assembly. More recently, the Security Council has reassumed the mantle of leadership on peace and security issues. The third aspect of a typical peacekeeping operation is its formation mechanisms. Peacekeeping operations remain distinctly ad hoc. Then, the size of peacekeeping operations generally ranges from 1,000 or 2,000 to 20,000 depending on the willingness of states to contribute troops, the mission assigned by the operation, and the breadth of the area of deployment. The last characteristic is command and control. Peacekeeping operations are under UN command. The commander of the operation is often from a neutral state.16 “Peacekeeping is . . . the imposition of neutral and lightly armed interposition forces following cessation of armed hostilities, and with the permission of the state on whose territory these forces are deployed, in order to discourage a renewal of military conflict and promote an environment under which the underlying dispute can be resolved.”17 Peacekeeping functions include observation, interposition, maintaining law and order, and humanitarian activity. These functions are not mutually exclusive, depending on the type of conflict, some or all may be part of the peacekeeping mission. In any case, peacekeeping operations are conceptually and operationally distinct from collective security and peace observation missions, although they share some commonalities and has similar historical roots. The other functions are long term which try to build a new social structure that considers the needs of the antagonists. According to the researchers, “the first role is not very effective but is easy to implement. The second may be very effective, but is exceedingly difficult to implement.”18 The solution is to add peacemaking (negotiation and mediation) and peace-building (social

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change through socioeconomic development and reconstruction) components to the peacekeeping role. It is achieved because of the nature of conflicts. For peacekeeping to become useful and practical, the conflict must be between equals and have competition over goals rather than interests (horizontal conflict). However, most conflicts are between unequal parties in which oppressed groups attempt to free themselves from domination (vertical conflict). Because most conflicts are intra-state conflicts, peacekeeping forces solely result in securing an often unjust status quo.19 Therefore, it is possible to suggest two solutions. The first one is clearly to identify the aggressor. The second one is to use force. In other words, the principle of non-use of force should not be applied to intra-state conflicts. The international community has increasingly accepted the use of force in these situations: “protecting humanitarian operations during continuing warfare, protecting civilian populations in designated safe areas and pressing the parties to achieve national reconciliation at a pace faster than they were ready to accept.”20 However, there is another alternative that is based on Gandhian nonviolence principles. Thus we can reach Galtung’s aim and transform the relationships in the conflict. The main power of Gandhian nonviolent peacekeeping is that it can be applied to vertical as well as horizontal conflicts: More problematic is the idea of expanded peacekeeping which leads to what I see as the militarization of peacekeeping . . . Rather than turn to increasingly militarized solutions—a habitus that pervades thinking about conflict management at the international level—we must consider instead non-violent alternatives which take account of the range of complex issues involved in violent conflicts and the people who experience them.21

NONVIOLENT ACTION, NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE, AND SHANTI SENA (PEACE ARMY) It is an old dream of peace-lovers—an unarmed, nonviolent army to keep the peace. The dream is still alive, perhaps now more than ever because of the failures of the blue-helmeted UN peacekeepers to end fighting in war-torn areas such as Somalia, Rwanda, and former Yugoslavia. This section talks about Gandhi’s way of Shanti Sena that is a civilian people’s army. Shanti Sena is a Gandhian organization specializing in nonviolently helping to quell urban riots. The civil society and the multiple networks of INGOs examine the problem-solving skills in a conflict-ridden world. In such a context, the possibility of “civilian peacekeeping” takes on new meaning. Shanti Sena/ Peace Army experience is the most important of practical knowledge for

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contemporary peace brigade projects. The main argument is that there can be a new model for peacekeeping activities that can be carried out by private as well as public bodies and that it can be done within the framework of Gandhian nonviolence. Moreover, international unarmed peacekeeping initiatives (in particular, Maude Royden’s Peace Army, the World Peace Brigade, the Cyprus Resettlement Project [CRP], Peace Brigade International [PBI], and the Gulf Peace Team [GPT]) which are based on nonviolence principles have attempted to combine various elements that are necessary for the effective long-term resolution of inter-group and international conflicts. And because the Shanti Sena was conceived as an intra-state nonviolent force rather than as a nonviolent army with international duties, it will be the most appropriate model for peacekeeping in the 21st century. There is a long but little-known history of attempted unarmed interpositionary peacekeeping22 from Maude Royden’s Peace Army in the 1930s to the Gulf and Balkan Peace Teams in the 1990s. All of these initiatives have attempted to physically place a nonviolent “buffer” force between two opposing armed forces to prevent an outbreak of renewed fighting among those forces.23 Yet the GPT did manage, for the first time, to place a group of peace campaigners between belligerents in a time of war. Although it is doubtful whether independent inter-positional peacekeeping activities will ever be able to command the economic and logistical resources and, more importantly, raise enough volunteers to achieve a critical mass that would make a difference in terms of preventing or stopping hostilities, unarmed peacekeeping forces present an unprecedented and revolutionary alternative for two paradigms in international relations. The establishment of such forces can serve in the two realms: nonviolent escort duties and peacemaking and peace-building. Moreover, especially grassroots efforts and NGOs encourage the establishment of local peace brigades and interest the UN in creating a truly nonviolent and unarmed peacekeeping force. For example, PBI has conducted projects in Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti, Sri Lanka, Balkans, and Chiapas. Moreover, Mahatma Gandhi may have been surprised when he first heard of the nonviolent resistance of Badshah Khan’s Pathan tribesmen resistance during the Salt Satyagraha of 1930.24 “Khan’s miracle” was entirely consonant with Gandhi’s idea of nonviolence. And Badshah Khan was one of the best examples of nonviolence in Islam.25 It is theoretically possible that international peacekeeping resorts to without the use of force or enforcement measures. However, it is a fact that force and enforcement tend to extend and prolong both inter-state and intra-state conflict. Even though there have been some proposals for making peacekeeping operations more effective, the voices for unarmed peacekeeping forces are the most important attempt for 21st-century peacekeeping. The alternatives to the mainstream style of peacekeeping are not merely theoretical; there have

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been many attempts to think through a nonviolent and unarmed approach, and several examples have been attempted in practice. The first attempt at the idea of a nonviolent Peace Army was implemented in the Sino-Japan conflict in September 1931. Dr. Maude Royden, who was an acquaintance of Mahatma Gandhi, proclaimed: “I would like now to enroll people who would be ready if war should break out to put their bodies unarmed between the contending forces, in whatever way it be found possible-and there are ways that you do not think of now in which it would be possible.”26 In her other work, she explained what they wanted “an army of pacifists who should offer themselves of the League of Nations as the ‘shock troops’ of peace.”27 Although volunteers enrolled themselves for service in the Peace Army during the first weeks of conflict, the plan faded away without government help and the Peace Army was put to the test. After World War II, Ralph Bell advocated an approach to war that he saw as an alternative to the pacifist (do nothing because of a lack of an agreed practical policy) position and the militarist (want to fight) position. He called this approach the “Active Non-Violent Resistance Army.” Bell’s central thesis was that merely to say “No to war” was not enough; what was required was an alternative positive approach.28 Even though Bell strove to create an alternative model, there was already a model in operation. In India, the Shanti Sena, or “Peace Army,” founded by Gandhi’s spiritual heir, Vinoba Bhave, had been active since 1957. The Sena, however, included peacemaking and peace-building functions as a function of equal importance to the third-party intervention role that had been the main focus of the advocates of inter-positionary peacekeeping. As an organization, the Shanti Sena is committed in principle to grassroots peacekeeping and peace-building actions. These actions were concerned with restoring peace in communal disturbances, working with refugees (after the war in Bangladesh and the international sphere in Cyprus), doing peace work in India’s sensitive border areas, and establishing training camps to instill the ethos of service and nonviolence in the youth of India. Gandhi insinuated the possibility of a Peace Army as the defense force of a disarmed and neutral India and desired that his followers work for the poor and structural violence rather than enter the realm of power politics. Interestingly, the Shanti Sena’s focus would have shifted from the realm of peacekeeping, through peacemaking, to peace-building to establish a Sarvodaya29 social order. After the founding of the Sena, many called the “internationalization of the Shanti Sena idea.” Generally, these calls concentrated on the Sena as a peacekeeping force. It is important to examine two leading figures and their philosophies to understand the Indian Shanti Sena. These two figures are Jayaprakash Narayan (JP), Gandhi’s political heir, and Vinoba Bhave, Gandhi’s spiritual heir. Vinoba claimed that he aimed to bring about a threefold revolution. First, he wanted to change people’s hearts; second, to bring about a change

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in their lives; and third, to change the social structure.30 He believed that wars would only cease when a world government came into existence. There were two alternate ways to bring this about. First, the UN had to be strengthened so that it could boast an army bigger than that of either the United States or the USSR or raise a large Peace Army to function in the way that Maude Royden envisaged. Second, the causes of the war had to be removed by bringing about mutual goodwill between people through a spiritual revolution that would ultimately make the coercive apparatus of the state redundant.31 It can be achieved where satyagrahis can go to the theatre of war, facing bullets, offer nonviolent resistance. Vinoba would prefer that fellow-pilgrims Shanti Sainik32 go to their own countries and create model units of the Shanti Sena rather than pushing for the creation of an international Shanti Sena forces.33 Gandhi described seven characteristics that every Shanti Sainik must have: 1. He or she must have a living faith in nonviolence. This is impossible without a living faith in God. 2. The messenger of peace must have equal regard for all the principal religions of the Earth. 3. Peace work can be done singly or in groups. 4. The messenger of peace will cultivate through personal service contracts with the people in his locality. 5. A peace-bringer must have a character beyond reproach and must be known for his/her strict impartiality. 6. The peace brigade will not wait until the conflagration breaks out but will try to handle the situation in anticipation. 7. There should be a distinctive dress worn by members of the peace brigade so that they would be recognized without difficulty.34 In short, world peace armies were secondary in his overall strategy of generating nonviolent revolution. He emphasized the nonviolent revolution through the spiritual uplift of the self and then the masses. On the other hand, JP viewed the peacekeeping role of the Shanti Sena as a primary objective. Both are anarchists, but Indian anarchism is more gradual than the Western one. But JP was more anarchistic in the Western sense, reverting to active struggle and “negative” satyagraha. Unlike Vinoba, he was also anti-state and advocated using people’s power against that of the state.35 Vinoba stressed spiritual values and primarily considered the conversion of the individual. JP, as a Marxist, was more practical and more practical that if the environment had been changed, people would have been changed. Both believed that the Sena leads to the building up of the ideal nonviolent society of the future.36 In other words, both dealt with stopping exploitation and structural violence.

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The World Peace Brigade Fifty-five delegates representing thirteen countries gathered in Lebanon to establish the World Peace Brigade (WPB). The WPB reflected the Indian Shanti Sena’s work of providing a nonviolent alternative to the police force as well as a nonviolent alternative to the army. For JP, it changed one’s ways of thinking: The only existing agency for maintaining world peace, the United Nations, is employing nothing but armed forces to achieve peace; and no one sees any contradiction in that. The very idea that it is possible to achieve peace through a non-violent force is absent from the minds of both the peoples and their governments. The emergence of a World Peace Brigade would give that idea a concrete form. That might become a landmark in the world’s quest for peace.37

The functions of the Brigade included border patrols in troubled areas, the offer of volunteers to any nation prepared to disarm, the inspection and control of disarmament agreements, the undertaking of fact-finding missions, and the development of an information network so that pre-emptive measures could be taken before crises develop. The WPB existed for only a few short years and managed to conduct three projects—the the proposed Northern Rhodesia March, the Everyman III voyage, and the Delhi to Peking Friendship March—none of them particularly successful. In 1969, Galtung noted, “many people have been thinking in terms of world peace brigades that would mobilize volunteers to penetrate through national borders and intervene in cases of intra-national manifest and/or latent violence.”38 The WPBs must have taken place under three conditions: nonviolence, international composition, and non-governmental auspices. During the Vietnam War, nonviolent activists were mobilized and sent toward a war zone. The emphasis shifted away from inter-positionary peacekeeping to constructive ventures in conflict areas. This approach was taken a few years later by the CRP. The aim was to help restore peaceful conditions in Cyprus by using nonviolence in conjunction with the mandate of the UN. For this purpose, 15,000–20,000 Turkish villagers were resettled and negotiation was held with both Greek and Turkish leaders. However, the coup and the Turkish intervention put an end to the project. The CRP proved that the presence of a reconciliation group or an international nonviolent third force may help solve the problem through mediation without hampering the work of the judiciary or the government. Peace Brigade International (PBI) and the Gulf Peace Team (GPT) After the Cyprus project ended, an idea to develop a peace force linked to the UN was developed. And it was proposed that peaceworkers were sent

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to conflict areas where they would assist with arbitration and mediation, provide unarmed buffer forces if necessary, undertake reconciliation work between communities, and engage in relief work. To press for conflict resolution, the teams could organize nonviolent actions in the form of marches, fasts, and civil obedience. The PBI was established in 1981 and dedicated to unarmed peacekeeping and peacemaking.39 Another important intervention area was Central America in which the PBI was sent to the Nicaragua–Honduras border in September 1983 to prevent attacks of the US-backed guerrillas. The most important PBI mission was the stationing of a seven-member team in Guatemala in March 1983 to succeed in reconciliation, promote human rights advocacy, and work with relatives of abductees to pressure the government. The PBI implemented Peace Army training camps in Sri Lanka and South Africa in spring 1986.40 The PBI has aimed to promote, support, and coordinate local peace brigades in communities, states, or provinces. In practice, it has not attempted to set up any unarmed inter-positional peacekeeping force. The PBI provided nonviolent political space to promote human rights and position itself between two conflicting parties. It was an example of transnational citizen multi-track diplomacy and peacemaking. The Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait in August 1990 and the UN sanctions resulted in the formation of the GPT. The GPT effort was reactive rather than proactive. The aim of the GPT was an international multi-cultural team working for peace and opposing any forms of armed aggression, past, present, or future, by setting up one or more international peace camps between the opposing armed forces. They wanted to withstand nonviolently any armed aggression by any party to the Gulf War in 1991.41 CONCLUSION In the post–Cold War era, there is little difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The main feature of expanded or second-generation peacekeeping operations is that there is no more consensus about three principles of peacekeeping namely the non-use of force, consent, and impartiality. Yet, many scholars and practitioners advocate realist assumptions about peacekeeping. However, it becomes obvious that the realist paradigm does not present effective alternatives to intra-state conflicts. Even though UN peacekeeping troops received the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize for their contribution to international peace and security, the international community is increasingly questioning the future of peacekeeping. The trans-systemic paradigm as an alternative method of the realist paradigm can be applied nonviolent methods not only

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in peacekeeping but also in other conflict resolution methods. All other methods and concepts such as multi-track diplomacy, inter-culturalist approach, environmental and economic security, grassroots movements, gender, and spirituality should implement nonviolent principles. In other words, nonviolent methods should also be applied to other methods not only to peacekeeping. Nonviolent peacekeeping operations have had a well-documented past and the Shanti Sena was a successful example. The Sainiks pledge to fight against injustice and violence. Besides, its successors like the WPB and PBI adopt a more modest and realistic approach. Maybe, we should adopt a combination of possible approaches to conflict. It might be possible to combine the peacekeeping function of the UN soldier, the peacemaking function of the mediator, that is, of the Quaker type, and the peace-building function of the peace-corps volunteer. And the best example of this approach is Gandhi’s nonviolence satyagraha brigades.42 A conclusion about peacekeeping will generally revolve around the question of whether a humanitarian (nonviolent) third-party intervention results in a more effective settlement of violent disputes than does an authoritarian (violent) third-party intervention. How can we measure “effectiveness?” It is concluded that we can measure effectiveness in terms of the quality of the conflict outcome (varying from the most positive, compromise, to the least positive, domination), the duration of the conflict intervention (the number of time peacekeepers spent intervening), the permanence of the conflict outcome (how many repeat interventions were necessary), and the casualties of the conflict intervention (the number of deaths and injuries among first, second, third, and fourth parties during the intervention). The results supported that nonviolent third-party interventions provide a higher quality of outcome and better outcomes in terms of duration and the level of casualties.43 In short, the nonviolent peacekeeping method requires economic and logistical resources. Also, there is a need to raise enough volunteers to achieve a critical mass that would make a difference in preventing or stopping hostilities. The most appropriate task for an international Shanti Sena is interventional peacekeeping, especially peacemaking and peace-building. Moreover, we should continue our efforts to encourage the establishment of local peace brigades and to interest the UN in the creation of truly nonviolent and unarmed peacekeeping forces. NOTES 1. Ellen Furnari, “Introduction to Case Studies on Unarmed Civilian Protection,” in Wielding Nonviolence in the Midst of Violence: Case Studies of Good Practices in Unarmed Civilian Protection, ed. Ellen Furnari (Norderstedt: Books on Demand, 2016), 17.

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2. Alex Morrison, S. Cumner, Hanbin Park, and Kristeva A. Zoe, “Peacekeeping,” in Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, & Conflict, ed. K. Lester (Oxford: Academic Press, 2008), 1571. 3. Ayse Dilek Ogretir Ozcelik, “Aggression Theories Revisited: Lorenz’s Neoinstinctivism, Wilson’s Socio-Biology and Skinner’s Behavioral Theories,” Journal of Asian Scientific Research 7, no. 2 (2017): 38–45; Ayse Dilek Ogretir Ozcelik, “Explanation and Understanding of Human Aggression: Freudian Psychoanalytical Analysis, Fromm’s NeoFreudian Perspective and Bandura’s Social Learning Theory,” International Journal of Social Science and Economic Research 2, no. 1 (2017): 2151–2164. 4. Sezai Özçelik, “The Theory and Practice of Preventive Diplomacy: The Case of Preventive Deployment in Macedonia,” Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi 11, no. 3 (Bahar 2006): 103–128. https​:/​/de​​rgipa​​rk​.or​​g​.tr/​​tr​/pu​​b​/uid​​ergis​​i​/iss​​ue​/3​9​​253​/4​​ 62241​. 5. Ayse Dilek Ogretir and Sezai Ozcelik, “The Study of Ethnocentrism, Stereotype and Prejudice: Psycho-Analytical and Psycho-Dynamic Theories,” Journal of Qafqaz University no. 24 (Fall 2008): 236–244. 6. N.J. Kritz, “The Risk of Law in the Post-conflict Phase: Building a Stable Peace,” in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, Crocker et al. (Washington, DC: USIP Press, 1996), 584. 7. Sezai Özçelik, Uluslararası Çatışma Analizi ve Çözümü (Ankara: Nobel Yayınevi, 2020). 8. David S. Sorenson and Pia Christina Wood. “Introduction,” in The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, eds. David S. Sorenson and Pia Christina Wood (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 1–18. 9. Gareth Evans, Cooperating for Peace (St. Leonards, NSW, Australia: Allen&Unwin, 1993), 99. 10. Alex J., Bellamy, Paul D. Williams, and Stuart Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2010), 142. 11. Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel, “Cascading Generations of Peacekeeping: Across the Mogadishu Line to Kosovo and Timor,” in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement, eds. Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel (Tokyo: UN University Press, 2001), 11. 12. Gary Wilson, The United Nations and Collective Security (New York: Routledge, 2014), 116–151. 13. N.D. White, Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the Maintenance on International Peace and Security (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 2nd ed., 238. 14. Brian Frederking, The United States and the Security Council: Collective Security since the Cold War (New York: Routledge, 2007), 42. 15. Paul F. Diehl, Peace Operations (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2008), 4–5. 16. A. Joachim Koops et al. “Introduction,” in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Joachim A. Koops et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 1–8. 17. Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping (London: John Hopkins University Press, 1994), 13.

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18. Johan Galtung and H. Hveem, “Participants in Peacekeeping Forces,” in Essays in Peace Research: vol.2, War, Peace, and Defence, ed. J. Galtung (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1976), 264. 19. Thomas Weber, Gandhi’s Peace Army: The Shanti Sena and Unarmed Peacekeeping (Syracuse University Press, 1996), xviii. 20. Ghali-Boutros Boutros, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992 (New York: United Nations: para. 34). http:​/​/www​​.un​.o​​rg​/do​​cumen​​ts​/ga​​/res/​​47​ /a​4​​7r120​​.htm (Erişim Tarihi: 01.06.2020). 21. A.B. Fetherston, “Habitus in Cooperating for Peace: A Critique of Peacekeeping,” in The NewAgenda for Global Security, ed. Stephanie Lawson (Allen and Unwin: Canberra, 1994), 116. 22. Thomas Weber, “From Maude Royden’s Peace Army to the Gulf Peace Team: An Assessment of Unarmed Inter-positionary Peace Force,” Journal of Peace Research 30, no. 1 (1993): 45–64. 23. Michael Harbottle, ed., The Peacekeeper’s Handbook (New York: International Peace Academy, 1978), 20. 24. Eknath Easwaran, Nonviolent Soldier of Islam, Badshah Khan: A Man to Match His Mountains (USA: Blue Mountain Center of Mediation, 1999), 110. 25. Sezai Özçelik, “From Terrorism to Nonviolence and the Islamic Peace Paradigm: Jihad, Just War, Peace and Islamic Nonviolence,” Peace and Conflict Studies Journal 12, no. 2 (2005). Available at: https​:/​/ns​​uwork​​s​.nov​​a​.edu​​/pcs/​​vol12​​​/ iss2​​/4. 26. Thomas Weber, “From Maude Royden’s Peace Army to the Gulf Peace Team: An Assessment of Unarmed Interpositionary Peace Forces,” Journal of Peace Research 30, no. 1 (1993): 46. 27. Thomas Weber, Gandhi’s Peace Army: The Shanti Sena and Unarmed Peacekeeping (Syracuse University Press, 1996), 199. 28. Ralph Bell, Alternative of Peace (London: James Clark, 1959), 77. 29. .Sarvodaya. The uplift of all, or welfare of all. See also Sarvodaya Movement— movement for the welfare of all; the name adopted by the Gandhian constructive workers for their movement, after Gandhi’s death. 30. Weber, Gandhi’s Peace Army, 142. 31. M.S. Wallace, Security without Weapons: Rethinking Violence, Nonviolent Action, and Civilian Protection (New York: Routledge, 2017). 32. Shanti Sainik, peace soldier; a member of the Shanti Sena. 33. K.S. Brahathi, Thoughts of Gandhi and Vinoba: A Comparative Study (New Delhi: Concept Publishing, 1995), 112. 34. N. Radhakrishnan, “Brief Overview of the Shantisnea (Gandhi’s Peace Brigade),” in Global Nonkilling Leadership Forum Book of Proceedings, eds. Glenn D. Paige and Joam Evans Pim (Hawaii: Center for Global Nonviolence, 2008), 291. 35. Thomas Weber, Gandhi as Disciple and Mentor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 155.

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36. April Carter, Peace Movements: International Protest and World Politics since 1945 (New York: Routledge, 1992), 245–250. 37. Weber, “From Maude Royden’s,” 50. 38. Weber, Gandhi’s Peace Army, 39. 39. Kent D. Shifferd, From War to Peace: A Guide to the Next Hundred Years (Jefferson, NC: McFarland Company Inc, 2011), 180. 40. Mark Shepard, Gandhi Today: A Report on Mahatma Gandhi’s Successors (Friday Harbor: Washington: Simple Production, 2012), 52–53. 41. Bela Bhatia, Jean Dreze and Kathy Kelly, War and Peace in the Gulf: Testimonies of the Gulf Peace Team (UK: Spokesman, 2001). 42. Timothy A. McElwee, “The Role of UN Police in Nonviolently Countering Terrorism,” in Nonviolence: An Alternative for Defeating Global Terror(ism), eds. Senthil Ram and Ralph Summy (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2007), 193. 43. Peter Woodrow, “Training for Nonviolent Action,” in Protest, Power and Change: An Encylopedia of Nonviolent Action from ACT-UP to Women’s Suffrage, eds. Roger S. Powers and William B. Vogele (New York: Routledge, 1997), 529–533.

REFERENCES Bell, Ralph. Alternative of Peace. London: James Clark, 1959. Bellamy, Alex J., Paul D. Williams and Stuart Griffin. Understanding Peacekeeping, 2nd ed. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2010. Bhatia, Bela, Jean Dreze and Kathy Kelly. War and Peace in the Gulf: Testimonies of the Gulf Peace Team. UK: Spokesman, 2001. Brahathi, K.S. Thoughts of Gandhi and Vinoba: A Comparative Study. New Delhi: Concept Publishing, 1995. Carter, April, Peace Movements: International Protest and World Politics since 1945. New York: Routledge, 1992. Crocker, Chester, “The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong.” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 3 (May–June 1995): 2–8. Diehl, Paul F. International Peacekeeping. London: John Hopkins University Press, 1994. Diehl, Paul F. Peace Operations. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2008. Easwaran, Eknath, Nonviolent Soldier of Islam, Badshah Khan: A Man to Match His Mountains. USA: Blue Mountain Center of Meditation, 1999. Evans Gareth, Cooperating for Peace. St. Leonards, NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1993. Fetherston A.B, “Habitus in Cooperating for Peace: A Critique of Peacekeeping,” in The New Agenda for Global Security, ed. Stephanie Lawson, 101–118. Allen and Unwin: Canberra, 1994. Frederking, Brian. The United States and the Security Council: Collective Security since the Cold War. New York: Routledge, 2007. Furnari, Ellen “Introduction to Case Studies on Unarmed Civilian Protection,” in Wielding Nonviolence in the Midst of Violence: Case Studies of Good Practices

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in Unarmed Civilian Protection, ed. Ellen Furnari, 16–24. Norderstedt: Books on Demand, 2016. Galtung, Johan and H. Hveem, “Participants in Peacekeeping Forces,” in Essays in Peace Research: vol. 2, War, Peace, and Defence, ed. J. Galtung, 264–281. Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1976. Ghali-Boutros Boutros. An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. New York: United Nations, 1992. http:​/​/www​​.un​.o​​rg​/do​​cumen​​ts​/ga​​/res/​​47​/a​4​​7r120​​.htm (Erişim Tarihi: 01.06.2020). Koops, Joachim A., et al. “Introduction,” in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim A. Koops et al., 1–13. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. Kritz, N.J., “The Risk of Law in the Post-conflict Phase: Building a Stable Peace,” in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, eds. Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, 587–605. Washington, DC: USIP Press, 1996. McElwee, Timothy A. “The Role of UN Police in Nonviolently Countering Terrorism,” in Nonviolence: An Alternative for Defeating Global Terror(ism), eds. Senthil Ram and Ralph Summy, 187–205. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2007. Morrison, Alex, S. Cumner, Hanbin Park, and Kristeva A. Zoe. “Peacekeeping,” in Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, & Conflict, ed. K. Lester, 1571–1588. Oxford: Academic Press, 2008. Ogretir, Ayse Dilek and Sezai Ozcelik. “The Study of Ethnocentrism, Stereotype and Prejudice: Psycho-Analytical and Psycho-Dynamic Theories,” Journal of Qafqaz University, no. 24 (Fall 2008): 236–244. Ogretir-Ozcelik, Ayse Dilek. “Aggression Theories Revisited: Lorenz’s Neoinstinctivism, Wilson’s Socio-Biology and Skinner’s Behavioral Theories,” Journal of Asian Scientific Research 7, no. 2 (2017): 38–45. Ogretir Ozcelik, Ayse Dilek. “Explanation and Understanding of Human Aggression: Freudian Psychoanalytical Analysis, Fromm’s NeoFreudian Perspective and Bandura’s Social Learning Theory,” International Journal of Social Science and Economic Research 2, no. 1 (2017): 2151–2164. Özçelik, Sezai. “From Terrorism to Nonviolence and the Islamic Peace Paradigm: Jihad, Just War, Peace and Islamic Nonviolence,” Peace and Conflict Studies Journal 12, no. 2 (2005). Available at https​:/​/ns​​uwork​​s​.nov​​a​.edu​​/pcs/​​vol12​​​/iss2​​/4. Özçelik, Sezai. “The Theory and Practice of Preventive Diplomacy: The Case of Preventive Deployment in Macedonia,” Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi 11, no. 3 (Bahar 2006): 103–128. https​:/​/de​​rgipa​​rk​.or​​g​.tr/​​tr​/pu​​b​/uid​​ergis​​i​/iss​​ue​/3​9​​253​/4​​ 62241​. Özçelik, Sezai. Uluslararası Çatışma Analizi ve Çözümü. Ankara: Nobel Yayınevi, 2020.

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Radhakrishnan, N. “Brief Overview of the Shantisnea (Gandhi’s Peace Brigade),” in Global Nonkilling Leadership Forum Book of Proceedings, ed. Glenn D. Paige and Joam Evans Pim, 289–299. Hawaii: Center for Global Nonviolence, 2008. Shepard, Mark, Gandhi Today: A Report on Mahatma Gandhi’s Successors. Friday Harbor: Washington: Simple Production, 2012. Shifferd, Kent D. From War to Peace: A Guide to the Next Hundred Years. Jefferson, NC: McFarland Company Inc, 2011. Sorenson, David S and Pia Christina Wood. “Introduction,” in The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, eds. David S. Sorenson and Pia Christina Wood, 1–18. London: Frank Cass, 2005. Thakur, Ramesh and Albrecht Schnabel. “Cascading generations of peacekeeping: Across the Mogadishu line to Kosovo and Timor,” in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement, eds. Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel, 3–26. Tokyo: UN University Press, 2001. Wallace, M.S. Security Without Weapons: Rethinking Violence, Nonviolent Action, and Civilian Protection. New York: Routledge, 2017. Weber, Thomas. “From Maude Royden’s Peace Army to the Gulf Peace Team: An Assessment of Unarmed Inter-positionary Peace Force,” Journal of Peace Research 30, no. 1 (1993): 45–64. https​:/​/do​​i​.org​​/10​.1​​177​/0​​02234​​33930​​​30001​​005. Weber, Thomas. Gandhi’s Peace Army: The Shanti Sena and Unarmed Peacekeeping. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996. Weber, Thomas. Gandhi as Disciple and Mentor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. White, N.D. Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the Maintenance on International Peace and Security, 2nd ed. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997. Wilson, Gary. The United Nations and Collective Security. New York: Routledge, 2014. Woodrow, Peter, “Training for Nonviolent Action,” in Protest, Power and Change: An Encylopedia of Nonviolent Action from ACT-UP to Women’s Suffrage, eds. Roger S. Powers and William B. Vogele, 529–533. New York: Routledge, 1997.

Chapter 10

Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Possible Threats They May Pose Saadat DEMİRCİ

INTRODUCTION The term foreign fighters are used in UN resolution no. 2170 (2014) and no. 2178 (2014). In the context of the Syrian conflicts, it is referred to as foreign terrorist fighter (FTF) in the literature and political statements. FTFs are an important force of conflicts. It is observed that the terrorist organizations in which FTFs are more violent and have more efficiency in the region than the others. The “establishing Caliphate” that brings them together is the ideology of spreading radical religious values to the whole world. Since 2012, the radical groups that have flocked to Syria have become members of terrorist organizations such as ISIS and Al-Nusra to take their place in the region. Before the Syrian war, FTFs took part in the Mujahids phase in Afghanistan between 1980 and 1992, on the side of the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s, in the wars against Chechnya terrorist organizations and Russia, and in the conflicts against foreign invasions in Iraq by the year of 2003. In 2014, upon the call made by ISIS leader Al-Baghdadi for the participation of all Muslims in Jihad organizations, the number of FTFs increased rapidly, and they were growing in numbers between 27,000 and 31,000 when the 2016 year came. As of 2017, it is known that this number reached 50,000. FTFs between 3,922 and 4,294 of these came from Europe. The terrorists returning from their conflict zones to their country after conflict are a great threat. In this context, the FTF element will be discussed and the possible threat elements after the return will be explained. THE PHENOMENON OF FTFS The movement of foreign terrorists, which started when ISIS declared its Caliphate and called for a struggle for a truly Islamic state, continued to 161

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increase with the Syrian civil war. The phenomenon of foreign terrorists has become a conceptual term with the United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution no. 2178, passed on September 24, 2014. In the UN Documents, this concept is called “foreign terrorist fighters.” According to this resolution, “Foreign terrorist fighters” are defined as “people who go abroad to take part in terrorist attacks against countries, of which they are not citizens, to prepare or to train terrorists and to take part in conflicts.”1 The UN Security Council had referred to FTFs in resolution no. 2170 before it specified the term in resolution no. 2178. Technically, the Security Council carried the definition to a legal platform and declared it illegal by adding the word “terrorist” to the definition of “Foreign Fighters.”2 According to a statement made by terrorism expert Hegghammer from the Norwegian Institute for Security Studies, four elements characterize foreign terrorists: • They join clashing groups and take part in their activities. • They are not citizens of the region in which the conflict takes place, and they do not have any relatives among those involved in the conflict. • They are not members of an official military establishment. • They do not perform their activities for money. It is known that FTFs have always been involved in historical events. Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, known as one of the founders of al-Qaeda and a modern jihadi theorist at the end of the 1980s, called for struggle and defense for a Muslim union. It is known that thousands of foreign terrorists who responded to the call later joined the ranks of al-Qaeda, but the dimensions it has taken with the Syrian war have gone beyond all. In 2014, thousands of foreign terrorists joined ISIS when ISIS leader Al-Baghdadi called on all Muslims to join jihadist organizations. It is known that in 2016 the number was between 27,000 and 31,000. As of 2017, this number had reached 50,000.3 To give an idea of the diversity of the countries involved, foreign terrorists from a total of 86 states, other than Iraq and Syria, participated in the war, according to reports by Western researchers. The highest numbers of participants were from 12 countries: 6,000–7,000 from Tunisia, more than 2,500 from Saudi Arabia, 2,000–2.500 from Turkey and Yemen, 1,700 from France, 1,200–1.500 from Algeria, and 500–1,000 from Indonesia, Egypt, England, Germany, and Lebanon.4 The number of participants from the former Soviet and CIS countries had increased by three fold as of 2014 and was indicated to be 2,000 people in 2016.5 In 2015, 150 Canadian and 200 American citizens tried to join ISIS.6 ISIS proposed a “Caliphate” over a real and concrete region where they would provide control and domination instead of a call based on ideology

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and propaganda, as was done by Al-Qaeda. This idea induced a massive influx of foreign terrorists to the regions dominated by ISIS. Radical terrorist organizations attach great importance to the involvement of foreign terrorists in the organization. In particular, these organizations attach special importance to those who are educated, have various professions, and have received medical, computer, and programming education. These militants, who have more knowledge and expertise than local terrorists, are usually within the ruling elite.7 FTFs have great potential to change the course of a conflict. The prolongation and radicalization of conflicts in the problematic regions of the Middle East depend, in many cases, on FTFs taking part in terrorist organizations in these regions.8 Although the Syrian war started as a civil war, it has turned into an international war arena that involves various radical-minded terrorist organizations and international forces that initiated a fight against them. In addition, it is observed that foreign terrorists are more destructive and violent than domestic terrorists, who avoid harming the areas where they were born and raised and their families still live, and try to stay clear of execution and massacres. All of the ISIS members who executed victims by beheading them in front of cameras were foreign terrorists.9 The first foreign terrorists entered Syria in 2012. According to Western sources, in 2014, there were 12,000 foreign terrorists from 81 countries within the ranks of various terrorist organizations in Syria, and this figure increased to 31,000 in early 2016.10 On the basis of geographical distribution, it has been found that terrorists mostly come from France, England, Belgium, and Germany. Those who come from European countries and join terrorist organizations are people with limited knowledge of Islam. They were raised far from their own culture and religion in the countries where they were born. It is easy to motivate these people with religious propaganda of the organizations and recruit them as members. According to Europol’s data, between 3,000 and 5,000 citizens have left Europe to participate in conflicts in Iraq and Syria.11 It is known that many terrorists are coming from Central Asia, China, and Russia outside Europe to become members of terrorist organizations. Between 2010 and 2016, 1,000 people from Kyrgyzstan and 300 people from Kazakhstan joined Al-Nusra terrorist organization.12 It is known that for those coming from Central Asia, terrorist organizations such as “Katibat Imam al Bukhari” and “Jannatoshiklari” (terrorist organizations operating in Northern Pakistan) are intermediaries. According to the information provided by the Uzbek newspaper Caravanserai, a similar number of citizens have become members of radical terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and Al-Nusra. On January 1, 2017, one of them, ISIS member Abdulkadir Masaripov, attacked a night club called “Reina” in Istanbul, killing forty people. It is

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known that the East Turkistan Islamic movement from China’s Xinjiang Uighur region has 2,000–5,000 members in Syria.13 According to the information provided by the European Union Institute for Security Studies, Bosnia, Albania, and Kosovo, which house the largest Muslim populations in the Balkans, are among the leading terrorist exporters to the Middle East.14 Among the terrorists from the Western Balkans were experienced foreign terrorists who came to the region during the Yugoslavian war in 1990, settled there and became the citizens of the Balkan countries. It is known that the highest number of terrorists is from Kosovo (359) and Bosnia (323). Between 2011 and 2016, the number of terrorists from Macedonia was recorded as 155, from Albania 144, from Monte Negro 23, and Serbia 49. It is known that half of the terrorists who went abroad were killed there; some of them returned to their homelands, while others were scattered among the opposition troops fighting against the Syrian government in Idlib, according to the 2018 records.15 THE THREAT POSED BY FOREIGN TERRORISTS It is known that after the disbanding of ISIS, FTFs, once fighting for ISIS, can now be found in Libya, Yemen, Pakistan, Somalia, and the Philippines, besides Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. It is estimated that more than 6,000 exISIS member were FTFs in Afghanistan, of whom between 3,922 and 4,294 FTFs came from Europe. The majority of the participants are known to be from Belgium, France, Germany, and England.16 The threat coming from FTFs will be handled in several categories in the study. The first group involves terrorists bearing European citizenships and is located currently in Syria and Iraq. The second and third consists of those who wanted to be involved in jihadist adventures and fight for their values, from which they had been distanced in European countries. Terrorists who go to conflict zones with this intention in mind are affected by terrorist organizations, of which they are members, and return to their countries with more radical views. Returnees are the second category and, at the same time, the most dangerous. President of Russia, V. Putin, met with CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) country leaders on October 16, 2015. He briefly summarized a common concern for all the countries, saying, “There are between 5 and 7 thousand citizens of the Russian Federation within the ISIS terrorist organization, and we cannot allow them to apply in our country the experiences they have gained in conflict zones.”17 According to estimated data, between 15,000 and 20,000 foreign terrorists are expected to return to their countries.18 The presence of a number of ISIS sympathizers in many countries increases the success rate of the organization’s activities. According to research conducted by the “ICM Research” group for the Daily Mirror in 2015, for example, there are 1.5

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million people in the UK only who are sympathizers of ISIS. As of the beginning of 2016, the estimated number of ISIS foreign fighters was approximately 30,000.19 The reasons for the return of terrorists vary. Some of them are disappointed by the conflicts and want to return, while others return to organize terrorist attacks in their country of residence. The Paris attacks,20 in which 214 people died in 2015, and the Brussels attacks,21 where 300 people were killed on March 22, 2016, were the actions of those who returned for this reason. It is possible to address the returnees of this kind by dividing them into several classes, and indeed Barett creates several types of classification in this regard: 1. Those who return shortly. Barett underlines that it is difficult to predict this group’s course of action. They can try to solve their problems through violence, especially if they are exposed to the same conditions when they return. However, they may be morally and psychologically tired and disappointed. It is possible that after a certain time, they may turn to the idea of jihad again and connect its failure to the intervention of the foreign powers.22 2. Those who return later are those who continue to believe in the Caliphate and the idea of jihad, supplemented by Sharia rules. However, they are disappointed and condemn the actions of ISIS. Due to their inexperience caused by their absence from conflict zones before, the rate of violence they faced may have affected them further. Despite this, their radical ideas may remain strong, and they may get used to extremist violence. So there is the possibility of their taking action beyond control and prediction. 3. “Experienced fighters” carry violence to other geographies by participating in other conflicts or engaging in terrorist activities after leaving the conflict zone. Those who return from the conflict area to their homelands or a third country are likely to be involved in a terrorist act, and they create the blowback effect. The terrorists belonging to this group go to another conflict zone when the conflict ends in an area. Usually, they settle in Afghanistan, Libya, and Iraq, where conflicts occur frequently. 4. Terrorists who fled from organizations or were captured and expelled should also be viewed as a separate threat category. They can participate in underground organizations in their regions and continue their actions, as well as carrying out attacks or making propaganda to gain recruits to the organization. They can also provide necessary support and advice to those who cannot go abroad to organize onsite attacks. 5. Suicide bombers who are trained especially to organize attacks and allowed to return to their homelands for this purpose. A list of 107 volunteers who wanted to be suicide bombers was determined in Iraq in 2017.23

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METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL STRUGGLE USED AGAINST FTFS Foreign terrorists constitute a new problem index within the system of the international fight against terrorism. Apart from participating in Western countries’ actions, foreign terrorists returning to or from these countries are a serious threat to their security. Terrorists who gained experience in Syrian and Iraqi conflicts join local terrorist organizations and organize a new cell chain for groups with an international terrorist network. Besides, they continue planning and carrying out terrorist attacks and enabling the flow of finances, making propaganda, and recruiting new members. The process of combating terrorism so far has shown that an effective struggle is not possible without creating a platform supported by international laws to arrest, prosecute, and punish terrorists abroad and then return them to their country of origin to be penalized. This part of the study is devoted to the study of international law initiatives launched against foreign terrorists with UN resolution no. 2178.24 UN resolution no. 2178 (2014) confirmed Iraq and Syria’s territorial integrity and independence and condemned terrorist activities in these countries. It called on all member states of the UN to take necessary measures against the actions of ISIS and similar terrorist organizations within the framework of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Resolution 1373 (2001) and in accordance with their international legal responsibilities.25 The UN organization once again confirmed that international terrorism is a serious threat to peace and security with its resolution no. 1278 (2014) and gave instructions to member states to determine strategies for a joint struggle against this threat. In this context, it suggested that the states secure their national borders against the free movement of foreign terrorists, implement legislative measures that would prevent terrorists from receiving financial and other support, and arrest and punish terrorists who return to their countries.26 In this context, the UN member states must: • Act within the framework of human rights, the law on refugees, and international humanitarian law, and take serious measures within the scope of the fight against terrorism regarding crimes such as membership to a terrorist organization, planning, preparing, helping, and supporting terrorist attacks, and crossing the borders of a foreign state for the purpose of a terrorist attack.27 • According to resolution no. 2178 (2014), crimes specified in resolution no. 2178 (2014) and 1373 (2014) should be treated as serious crimes by all UN member states in their domestic law, and criminal practices related to them

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should be determined. The actions determined in this context should be obvious and clear in the legal sense.28 Thanks to the definitions and instructions given in the resolution, the concept of FTFs was purged of uncertainties. They provided a global and legal approach to FTFs, rather than a simple academic definition. With these resolutions, a series of practices and sanctions were determined to solve the problem of FTFs.29 The Hague–Marrakech Memorandum was developed and adopted by the Global Counterterrorism Forum on September 19, 2014, for a more effective fight against FTFs.30 The paper contains the following acceptable practices to help develop strategies, programs, and approaches to combat FTFs: • Prevention of participation in terrorist organizations, assistance in participation and support (Good practices 1–4); • Identifying FTFs preparing to go abroad for purposes of terrorism, preventing them from going abroad, and taking part in activities (Good practices 5–9); • Detection of FTFs after their return and enforcement of necessary criminal sanctions (Good practices 10–14); • Identification of radical-minded terrorist organizations (Good practices 15–18). According to the Hague–Marrakech Memorandum’s Good Practices, the relevant states are required to develop and implement appropriate legal measures and administrative procedures to effectively monitor criminals and reduce the threat posed by FTFs. It is important for states to evaluate possible deficiencies in the system of countering FTFs, to foresee threats through inter-state communication, and to take necessary measures against threats. Heavy penalties should be imposed on crimes such as engaging in conflicts in the territory of another state, supporting members of a terrorist organization, and helping it gain new members.31 In the context of the implementation of the Security Council’s resolutions no. 2170 (2014) and 2178 concerning the call of the UN to implement measures against FTFs, the European Security Organization prepared a declaration together with the council of ministers on December 5, 2014, regarding the role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in the fight against FTFs. In the first paragraph of the declaration, the member states were convoked for cooperation with the other states on issues such as the detention and trial of FTFs, denying them shelter, and the return of the captured FTFs to the country of their origin or trial in their country.32 Alternative

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suggestions were proposed by the Council of Europe to overcome the legal and technical problems that could arise in this context. In November 2014, the Committee on Combating the Anti-Terrorism Expert (CODEXTER), the administrative committee responsible for developing anti-terrorism policies, addressed issues related to FTFs. On January 22, 2015, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe examined the report of the (COD-CTE) Committee, which was tasked with preparing additional protocols to the Anti-Terrorism Agreements and addressing the issue of charging criminal liability to FTFs in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution no. 2178 (2014).33 As a result of the preparatory work, Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism was opened for signature in Riga on October 22, 2015. According to the protocol, persons traveling abroad for the purpose of committing, contributing to or participating in terrorist offenses, or providing or receiving training for terrorism in the territory of another state should be designated as FTFs.34 Articles 2–6 of the protocol contain basic provisions that determine the offenses that will enable the parties to implement penal practices within the scope of the protocol: • Establishing or participating in an association or group for the purpose of terrorism (article 2). • Receiving training for terrorism (article 3). • Traveling abroad for the purpose of terrorism (article 4). • Funding travel abroad for the purpose of terrorism (article 5). • Organizing or otherwise facilitating travel abroad for the purpose of terrorism (article 6). Thirty-four EU member states signed the protocol. In addition, a comprehensive strategy including both internal and external measures against the FTFs problem was developed by the EU Council and the European Parliament. On March 7, 2017, the Council of the European Union adopted the anti-terrorism directive project. Member states designate the following acts as criminal offenses and propose criminal sanctions for them under the new protocol: • Traveling for terrorism (article 9); • Funding travel abroad for terrorism (article 10); • All other assistance provided for traveling abroad for terrorism (article 11) and similar offenses (article 14).35 Another important problem with FTFs is the arrest and trial of the returning terrorists. Those arrested are likely to become more radicalized during the

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detention process and continue their terrorist activities when released. There is no detailed regulation regarding the returning terrorists in resolution no. 2178.36 In this context, France prepared a draft resolution and submitted it to UN Security Council. The draft proposed that the Syrian war crimes should be described as war crimes and human rights violations and be examined by the International Criminal Court. Within the scope of this decision, it was stipulated that all foreign terrorists be prosecuted for acts committed outside the EU borders and charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity. However, the proposal submitted by nearly sixty countries to the UN to refer to war crimes committed in Syria to the International Criminal Court (UCM) was vetoed by Russia and China in May 2014.37 In the face of these developments, European countries brought amendments to their national legal systems. They tried to overcome the restrictions imposed for the trial of FTFs due to their offenses outside Europe by making additional decisions in their laws. Belgium and Germany drafted a law that would prevent their citizens from traveling to conflict zones and make it a crime. While France, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and the UK confiscate suspected jihadists’ passports within the scope of administrative measures, Belgium prohibits such suspects from being deregistered and benefiting from social security. States have internal laws on their use of armed forces against acts of terrorism. However, individual practices cannot be expected to be successful in this regard. It is a well-known fact that most terrorists had become more radicalized in their prisons and proved this by committing more brutal acts when they were released. For this reason, many countries are developing “rehabilitation projects” so that they can be brought back to their society with necessary supports as well as strict practices. The Danish city of Aarhus has gained international recognition for its efforts to prevent radical terrorism. Despite the terrorist attack in Copenhagen on February 14, 2015.38 Denmark continues to provide psychological, educational, and social support with the “Aarhus Model”39 project to re-integrate suitable candidates into society. A similar practice was implemented within the framework of “Life” project in Germany. The project was prepared on the basis of counseling, psychological support, and assistance for the integration of the “returning” terrorists into society. This model has three stages. The first step is to clear the old terrorists from their ideologies and to convince them that their beliefs have nothing to do with their cultural and religious ties. The second stage is the pragmatic approach, and in this context, former terrorists are provided with support for work, housing, and if necessary, education to keep up with social life. The third stage is spiritual support, and in this context, it is planned to provide consultancy services to the families of the terrorists to adapt to and keep up with their old life. Apart from this, practices such as changing the social environment and ensuring the revision of their values are implemented.40

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The most relevant point of the FTF problem is the features surrounding the question of identity rather than the number of terrorists. The uncertainty about the identity of terrorists is a greater obstacle to the fight against them.41 The identity of the foreign terrorist is an important determining factor that explains his/her purpose. When his/her identity is determined, an estimate is made about the act s/he wants to commit, and necessary measures are taken to prevent him/her. The projected purpose of the terrorist whose identity has been identified can be determined, and the default map that s/he can create in this direction can be drawn. As can be seen, the stages of struggle are far from being clear and generally formed on the basis of “estimates” and assumptions. However, in order to prevent attacks, any evidence and signs that may arise must be evaluated because predictions have an important role in determining the evidence. Identity disclosure can clarify the organization, association, and social environment of which s/he is a member. Therefore, it is necessary to establish an international information network among the states to collect relevant data and expand the exchange of information. Accordingly, with a new resolution, the UN decided to develop biometric data collection systems, which include fingerprints, photographs, and facial recognition data. One of the UN’s major achievements has been the publication of UN recommended practices for the responsible use and exchange of biometrics. With this data, the travel map of terrorists can be created, and their organizations and activities can be followed via the countries they visit. On October 23, 2017, it was decided to establish a system for collecting preliminary information about passengers from all member states of ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization). The council members agreed that airline companies operating in all member states’ regions should request that authorities be given information about passengers in advance to identify the persons on the sanctions lists. According to UN data, fewer than sixty countries have implemented this practice. Knowing that large resources may be required to implement the decision on collecting personal and biometric data for passengers, members of the Security Council have instructed the Anti-Terrorism Committee to provide technical assistance to poor countries.42 In addition, the UN has instructed the member states to make their threat assessments on the basis of objective evidence within the framework of international rules and laws, to avoid prejudices and not to discriminate against certain groups due to their identity.43 These recent methods used to combat terrorism imply an extra intrusion in people’s private lives. With this method, the travel maps of persons suspected of having connections with a terrorist organization are created through identity scans. These people are kept under surveillance to predict possible actions.

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CONCLUSION As long as radical-minded international terrorist organizations such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and Al-Nusra are fed with new participants from various countries, the FTF problem will continue to keep the world under threat. Terrorism recognizes no religion, cultural trait, or race. This phenomenon, which has assumed global dimensions, accommodates its members from all over the world under one umbrella. The foundation of this roof is based on faith. It is the concretization of spiritual feelings that unite members of the organization within a framework of values. “Jihad” for Islam and the promised “Caliphate” are sufficiently emotional enough to influence radically minded Muslims. As long as radical terrorist organizations carry their ideology to all corners of the world through their members, dimensions of the threat will increase day by day and gain new momentum. FTFs are just one dimension of this momentum. Terrorist organizations that have infiltrated the region during the Syrian civil war and whose number has increased rapidly have shown that it is impossible for one state to keep the FTF problem under control and that it is spreading rapidly and is a phenomenon posing huge threats. The positive aspect of this question is that states have decided to wage a joint struggle against foreign terrorists by establishing a coalition. FTFs have ceased to be a problem for any country now and do not threaten the whole world. Another positive aspect is that apart from the immigrant and refugee problems, European states have realized that the integration of FTFs—their adaptation to the region of their residence—has a great problem-generating potential. They are taking initiatives in this regard. Germany’s “Life” and Denmark’s “Aarhus” projects constitute a good example of this. The success of these projects will solve the sociological and vital problems of immigrants in Europe and prevent terrorist organizations from recruiting new members. The methods determined within the scope of this project can be used in the context of criminal arrests and re-integration of potential terrorists into society. For they have been subjected to extremism but have not been included in an organization for any reason.

NOTES 1. For the complete text of UN Security Council resolution no. 2178, see http://www​.un​.org​/en​/sc​/ctc​/docs​/2015/SCR​%202178​_2014​_EN​​.pdf (Accessed on November 21, 2019). 2. Haldun Yalçınkaya, “İŞİD’in Yabancı Savaşçıları ve Yarattığı Tehdit: Türkiye’nin Tecrübesi (2014-2016),” Orsam Report No 210:11.

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3. Foreign Fighters, An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq, The Soufan Group. December 2015: 4. 4. H. Lang and M. Al Wari, “The Flow of Foreign Fighters to the Islamic State, Assessing the Challenge and the Response,” Center for American Progress (March 2016): 6. 5. Richard Barrett, “Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees,” The Soufan Center (2017): 40, accessed November 21, 2019, http:​/​/ the​​soufa​​ncent​​er​.or​​g​/wp-​​conte​​nt​/up​​loads​​/2017​​/11​/B​​eyond​​-the-​​Calip​​hate-​​Forei​​gn​-Fi​​ ghter​​s​-and​​-the-​​Threa​​t​-of-​​Retur​​nees-​​TSC​-R​​​eport​​-Octo​​ber​-2​​017​-v​​3​.pdf​. 6. Julıan Hattem, “FBI: More Than 200 Americans Have Tried to Fight for ISIS,” The Hill (8 July 2015), http:​/​/www​​.theh​​ill​.c​​om​/po​​licy/​​natio​​nal​-s​​ecuri​​ty​/24​​7256-​​ more-​​than-​​200​-a​​mer​ic​​ans​-t​​ried-​​to​-fi​ ght-for-isis-fbi-says. 7. H. Lang and M. Al Wari, “The Flow of Foreign Fighters to the Islamic State. Assessing the Challenge and the Response,” Center for American Progress, March 2016. 8. O. Novikova, “İnostrannıye Boyeviki vızov bezopasnosti Zapada,” İNİON RAN, Aktualnıye Problemı Zapada, no. 3 (2016), http://upe​-journal​.ru​/article​.php​?id​=109. 9. Jovo Martinovic, “Balkan Jihadist Return, disillusioned with ISIS ‘Caliphate,’” Balkan Insight (August 11, 2017), www​.balkaninsight​.com. 10. N. Plotnikov, I. Mrkich, ed., “İnostrannıye Boyeviki v Ryadah Terroristicheskih Organizatsiy v Siriyi i İrake,” RAN İnstitut Vostokovedeniya, Moskva-Belgrad (2019): 15, http:​/​/boo​​k​.ivr​​an​.ru​​/f​/ra​​n​-6​-i​​nostr​​annye​​-b​oev​​iki​.p​​df. 11. Peter Teffer, “Up to 5,000 Europeans Joined Jihad Europol Chief Says,” EU Observer. – Brussels (2015), Accessed November 21, 2019, https://euobserver​.com​/news​ /127202. 12. N. Plotnikov, İ. Mrkich, ed., “İnostrannıye Boyeviki v Ryadah Terroristicheskih Organizatsiy v Siriyi i İrake,” RAN İnstitut Vostokovedeniya, Moskva-Belgrad (2019): 19, http:​/​/boo​​k​.ivr​​an​.ru​​/f​/ra​​n​-6​-i​​nostr​​annye​​-b​oev​​iki​.p​​df. 13. N. Plotnikov, İ. Mrkich, ed., “İnostranniye Boyeviki,” 19. 14. Jelena Beslin, Marija Ignjatijevic, “Balkan Foreign Fighters: From Syria to Ukraine,” European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), June 2017, https:// www​.iss​.europa​.eu. 15. N. Plotnikov, İ. Mrkich, ed., “İnostrannıye Boyeviki,” 22. 16. A. Kazantsev, “Problema Verbovki i Vozvrata Boyevikov Terroristov: Opıt Evropı i Perspektivı Rosiyi,” Rossiyskiy Sovet Po Mejdunarodnım Delam (RSMD), No 27 (2016). 17. Congress of Leaders of CIS Countries (16 October 201, accessed November 21, 2019), http:​/​/kre​​mlin.​​ru​/ev​​ents/​​presi​​dent/​​news/​​​50515​. 18. Ch. Vallance, “Collapse of Isis Will Lead to Attacks,” accessed November 21, 2019, http:​/​/www​​.bbc.​​com​/n​​ews​/w​​orld-​​europ​​e​-3​76​​91490​. 19. Haldun Yalçınkaya, “IŞİD’in Yabancı Savaşçıları ve Yarattığı Tehdit: Türkiye’nin Tecrübesi (2014-2016),” Uluslararası İlişkiler 53, no. 14 (2017):17–28. 20. BBC News, 2019 “Paris Saldırıları En az 127 Kişi Hayatını Kaybetti,” Accessed November 31, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​.bbc​​.com/​​turkc​​e​/hab​​erler​​/2015​​/11​/1​​ 51113​​_par​i​​s​_sal​​diri.

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21. BBC News, “Brüksel Saldırısı, Ölü Sayısı Artabilir,” Accessed November 31, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​.bbc​​.com/​​turkc​​e​/hab​​erler​​/2016​​/03​/1​​60323​​_bruk​​sel​_a​​​gir​_y​​arali​​lar. 22. R. Barrett, “Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees,” The Soufan Center (2017): 40, Accessed November 21.2019, http:​/​/ the​​soufa​​ncent​​er​.or​​g​/wp-​​conte​​nt​/up​​loads​​/2017​​/11​/B​​eyond​​-the-​​Calip​​hate-​​Forei​​gn​-Fi​​ ghter​​s​-and​​-the-​​Threa​​t​-of-​​Retur​​nees-​​TSC​-R​​​eport​​-Octo​​ber​-2​​017​-v​​3​.pdf​. 23. Novikova, O. Novikova, O., “İnostrannıye Boyeviki Vızov Bezopasnosti Zapada,” İnion RAN, Aktualnıye Problemı Zapada, no. 3 (2016), http://upe​-journal​.ru​/article​.php​ ?id​=109. 24. United Natıons Securıty Councıl, S/RES/2178 (2014), Access 20 March, 2020, http:​/​/www​​.un​.o​​rg​/en​​/sc​/c​​tc​/do​​cs​/20​​15​/SC​​R​%202​​178​​_2​​014​.e​​n​.pdf​. 25. TBMM, Karar No. 1071, Accessed on March 20, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​.tbm​​m​ .gov​​.tr​/t​​bmm​_k​​ararl​​ari​/k​​ara​r1​​071​.h​​tml. 26. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2178 (2014), Accessed March 22, 2020, https://undocs​.org​/S​/RES​/2178(2014). 27. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2178. 28. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2178. 29. Haldun Yalçınkaya, “IŞİD’in Yabancı Savaşçıları,” s. 28. 30. The Hague–Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon [Electronic resource]. “Foreign Terrorist Fighters” (FTF) Initiative. Electronic data (1 file). URL: http:​/​/www​​ .theg​​c tf​. o​​r g​/ do​​c umen​​t s​/ 10​​1 62​/ 1​​4 0201​​/ 14Se​​p t19_​​T he​+ H​​a gue-​​M arra​​k ech+​​F T​F​ +M​​emora​​ndum.​​pdf, 23.03.2020. 31. Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) Initiative, “The Hague–Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon,” Accessed on November 23, 2020, http:​/​/www​​.theg​​ctf​.o​​rg​/do​​cumen​​ ts​/10​​162​/1​​40201​​/14Se​​pt19_​​The​+H​​ague-​​Marra​​kech+​​FT​F​+M​​emora​​ndum.​​pdf. 32. A. Volevodz, “Mejdunarodno-Pravovıye Osnovı Protivodeystviya BoyevikamTerroristam i Vnutrigosudarstvennoye Pravo,” Moskovskiy Jurnal Mejdunarodnogo Prava 1 (2017): 103, https​:/​/do​​i​.org​​/10​.2​​4833/​​0869-​​0049-​​2017-​​​1​-98-​​109. 33. A. Volevodz, “Mejdunarodno-Pravovıye Osnovı,” 98. 34. Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, Council of Europe Treaty Series, No. 217, accessed March 28, 2020, http:​ /​/www​​.coe.​​int​/r​​u​/web​​/conv​​entio​​ns​/fu​​​ll​-li​​st/-/​ conventions/treaty/217. 35. Directive of the European parliament and of the council on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, Foreign Fighters. An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq. The Soufan Group, December 2015: 4, accessed March 31.2020, URL: http:​/​/eur​​-lex.​​europ​​a​.eu/​​legal​​ conte​​nt​/EN​​/TXT/​​PDF/?​​uri​=C​​ONSIL​​:PE​_5​​3​_201​​6​_INI​​T​&qid​​=14​89​​18580​​0451&​​ from=​​EN. 36. Yalçınkaya Haldun, “Birinci Yılında Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyinin 2178 Sayılı Kararı ve Yabancı Terörist Savaşçılar,” Ortadoğu Analizi 70, no. 7 (September-October 2015): 59.

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37. BBC News, “Suriye: Uluslararası Ceza Mahkemesi’ne Sevke Veto,” 22 May 2014, Accessed December 15, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​.bbc​​.com/​​turkc​​e​/hab​​erler​​/2014​​/05​/1​​ 40522​​_s​uri​​ye​_ve​​to. 38. An armed attack was carried out on a cafe, where a conference was held on the subject of “freedom of expression and religion,” which included the Swedish cartoonist Lars Vilks, who drew a caricature of the Prophet Mohammed and sparked a debate in Copenhagen, the capital of Denmark, and French Ambassador François Zimeray. A civilian was killed in the attack, and three police officers were injured. Euronews, “Kopenhag’da Silahlı Saldırı: 1 Ölü 3 Yaralı,” 14.02.2015, Accessed on April 04, 2020, https​:/​/tr​​.euro​​news.​​com​/2​​015​/0​​2​/14/​​kopen​​hag​-d​​a​-sil​​ahli-​​saldi​​ri​-​1-​​ olu​-3​​-yara​​li. 39. The Aarhus model was launched in 2007 with a municipal initiative. It involves the coordination and effective work of state departments together with other organizations against extremist movements. With the “tip line” application, any suspicion of terrorism can be reported at any time, and a separate procedure is followed for each situation. Sometimes, a consultant is allocated to bring the former terrorist, who has returned from the terrorist organization, back to the society, and all kinds of practices are required, including psychological help. This project showed its effectiveness in one year. While around thirty terrorists joined jihad in 2013, it is known that only one person became a member of the terrorist organization in 2014. European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, “Aarhus model: Prevention of Radicalization and Discrimination in Aarhus,” Accessed April 04, 2020, https​:/​/ec​​ .euro​​pa​.eu​​/home​​-affa​​irs​/n​​ode​/​7​​423​_e​​n. 40. Ch., Lister, “Returning Foreign Fighters: Criminalization or Reintegration?” Brookings Institution, Brookings Doha Center, August 2015: 14, accessed November 21, 2019, http:​/​/www​​.bbc.​​com​/n​​ews​/w​​orld-​​europ​​e​-3​76​​91490​. 41. Wall, R., “Foreign Fighters Are Still Able to Travel to War Zones Despite Efforts to Halt Flow,” WSJ. 27, October 2015, accessed April 3, 2020, http:​ /​ / www​​.wsj.​​com​/a​​rticl​​es​/u-​​n​-cou​​ntrie​​s​-can​​t​-sto​​pflow​​-of​-f​​oreig​​n​-fig​​hters​​-to​-w​​​ar​-zo​​nes​ -1​​44595​​8056. 42. Novosti OON, “Sovet Bezopasnosi OON Prizval Gosudarstva Boleye Aktivno Vıyavlyat Boyevikov Terroristov Pokidayushih Zonı Konflikta,” https​:/​/ne​​ws​.un​​.org/​​ ru​/st​​ory​/2​​017​/1​​​2​/132​​0692. 43. Gromoglasova, E.,“Kontrterroristicheskaya Borba s Pozitsiy Terri​toria​lno-P​ rostr​annst​venno​goPod​hoda,​” International Trends 15, no. 4 (51) (October–December 2017): 147.

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http:​/​/bel​​ferce​​nter.​​ksg​.h​​arvar​​d​.edu​​/file​​s​/The​​_Rise​​_of​_M​​uslim​​_Fore​​ign​​_F​​ighte​​rs​ .pd​​f. http:​/​/www​​.css.​​ethz.​​ch​/pu​​blica​​tions​​/pdfs​​/Fore​​ign​_F​​ighte​​r​s​_20​​14​.pd​​f. http:​/​/www​​.mfa.​​gov​.t​​r​/tur​​kiye_​​nin​-y​​abanc​​i​-ter​​orist​​-sava​​scila​​rla​-m​​uc​ade​​lesi.​​tr​.mf​​a. https​:/​/we​​b​.arc​​hive.​​org​/w​​eb​/20​​17042​​00955​​26​/ht​​tps:/​/cl​​arion​​proje​​ct​.or​​g​/uk-​​polls​​ hows-​​15​-mi​​llion​​-isis​​​-supp​​orter​​s​-bri​​tain-​​4/. Kazantsev, A., “Problema Verbovki i Vozvrata Boyevikov Terroristov: Opıt Evropı i Perspektivı Rossiyi,” no. 27 (2016), Rossiyskiy Sovet Po Mejdunarodnım Delam (RSMD). Lang, H. and M. Alwari. “The Flow of Foreign Fighters to the Islamic State. Assessing the Challenge and the Response,” Center for American Progress, March 2016. Lister, Charles. “Returning Foreign Fighters: Criminalization or Reintegration?,” Brookings Institution, 2015. Martinovic, Jovo. “Balkan Jihadist Return, Disillusioned with ISIS Caliphate,” Balkan Insight (August 2017), Accessed November 21, 2019, www​.balkaninsight​ .com. Novikova, O., “İnostrannıye Boyeviki Vızov Bezopasnosti Zapada,” İnion RAN, Aktualnıye Problemı Zapada, no. 3 (2016), http://upe​-journal​.ru​/article​.php​?id​ =109. Novosti OON “Sovet Bezopasnosi OON Prizval Gosudarstva Boleye Aktivno Vıyavlyat Boyevikov Terroristov Pokidayushih Zonı Konflikta,” https​:/​/ne​​ws​.un​​ .org/​​ru​/st​​ory​/2​​017​/1​​​2​/132​​0692. Pereira, D. and Jakarta Holds, “Key to Keeping S-E Asia Safe in War on Terror.” Global Indonesian Voices (23 February 2015), http:​//www​.glob​alind​onesi​anvoi​ ces/1​9275/​Jakar​ta-ho​lds-k​ey-to​-keep​ing-s​-a-as​ia-sa​fe. Plotnikov, N. and Mrkich, İ. ed., “İnostrannıye Boyeviki v Ryadah Terroristicheskih Organizatsiy v Siriyi i İrake,” RAN İnstitut Vostokovedeniya, Moskva-Belgrad (2019):19, http:​/​/boo​​k​.ivr​​an​.ru​​/f​/ra​​n​-6​-i​​nostr​​annye​​-b​oev​​iki​.p​​df. Pokalova, Elena. “Driving Factors Behind Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 9, no. 42 (September 18, 2017), https​:/​/ww​​w​.tan​​ dfonl​​ine​.c​​om​/do​​i​/epu​​b​/10.​​1080/​​10576​​10X​.2​​018​.1​​42784​​2​​?nee​​dAcce​​ss​=tr​​ue. “ProstrannstvennogoPodhoda,” International Trends 15, no. 4 (51) (October– December 2017): 147. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Türkiye’nin DAEŞ ile Mücadelesi ve Yabancı Terörist Savaşçılar (YTS) Konusuna Yaklaşımı,” Accessed November 24, 2019, http:​/​/www​​.mfa.​​gov​.t​​r​/tur​​kiye_​​nin​-y​​abanc​​i​-ter​​orist​​-sava​​scila​​rla​-m​​uc​ade​​ lesi.​​tr​.mf​​a. “Responses in Eleven Countries,” Center for Security Studies (SSC). – Zurich, 2014, Accessed April 3, 2020. TBMM, Karar No. 1071. Accessed March 20, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​.tbm​​m​.gov​​.tr​/t​​bmm​ _k​​ararl​​ari​/k​​ara​r1​​071​.h​​tml. Teffer, Peter, “Up to 5,000 Europeans Joined Jihad Europol Chief Says,” EU Observer. – Brussels (2015), Accessed November 21, 2019, https://euobserver​.com​ /news​/127202.

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United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2178 (2014), Accessed March 22, 2020, https://undocs​.org​/S​/RES​/2178(2014). Vallance, Chris. “Collapse of IS will lead to attacks, say EU officials” BBC Newsi, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37691490 Vidino L., Snetkov A., Pigoni L., “Foreign Fighters: An Overview of Responses in Eleven Countries”, Center For Security Studies (SSC). – Zurich, 2014, Accessed April 3, 2020, http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/Foreign_Fighters_2014.pdf Volevodz, A., “Mejdunarodno-Pravovıye Osnovı Protivodeystviya BoyevikamTerroristam i Vnutrigosudarstvennoye Pravo,” Moskovskiy Jurnal Mejdunarodnogo Prava 1 (2017): 98–109. Voting Result Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Combating Terrorism and Replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and Amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA (First reading) Adoption of the legislative act 3526th meeting of the COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (General Affairs) 7 March 2017, Brussels. Accessed November 31, 2020, http:​/​/eur​​-lex.​​ europ​​a​.eu/​​legal​​-cont​​ent​/E​​N​/TXT​​/PDF/​​?uri=​​CONSI​​L​:ST​_706​8​_2017​_INIT​&rid​ =5. Wall, R., “Foreign Fighters Are Still Able to Travel to War Zones Despite Efforts to Halt Flow,” WSJ. 27, October 2015. Accessed April 3, 2020, http:​//​ www​​.wsj.​​com​/ a​​rticl​​es​/u-​​n​-cou​​ntrie​​s​-can​​t​-sto​​pflow​​-of​-f​​oreig​​n​-fig​​hters​​-to​-w​​​ar​-zo​​nes​-1​​44595​​8056. Yalçınkaya, Haldun, “Birinci Yılında Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyinin 2178 Sayılı Kararı ve Yabancı Terörist Savaşçılar,” Ortadoğu Analizi 70, no. 7 (September–October 2015): 59. Yalçınkaya, Haldun, “IŞİD’in Yabancı Savaşçıları ve Yarattığı Tehdit: Türkiye’nin Tecrübesi (2014-2016),” Uluslararası İlişkiler 53, no. 14 (2017): 17–28. Yılmaz, Eren Alper, “Yabancı Savaşçı Sorunu ve Türkiye Üzerindeki Muhtemel Tehdit Algıları,” Accessed November 27, 2019, http:​/​/pol​​itika​​akade​​misi.​​org​/2​​019​ /1​​0​/28/​​yaban​​ci​-sa​​vasci​​lar​-s​​orunu​​-ve​-t​​urkiy​​e​-uze​​rinde​​ki​-mu​​ht​eme​​l​-teh​​dit​-a​​lgila​​ri/.

Part IV

EU AND REFUGEE PROBLEM

Chapter 11

The Integration Issue of the Syrian Refugees Who Acquired Turkish Citizenship A Field Study Veysel AYHAN

INTRODUCTION Turkey has been exposed to individual or mass migration from various regions throughout history. In the post-Ottoman period, after the migration movements that took place during World War I and following the exchange agreement signed with Greece, the Muslim communities that came to Turkey from the Balkans in masses can be described as the first mass migration of the young Republic. After nearly 400,000 cognates were forcibly displaced from Bulgaria toward the end of the Cold War, about 500,000Iraqi Kurds migrated to Turkey due to Iraq’s internal instability. Consequently, it should be stated that Turkey faced three separate mass migration incidents in terms of mass migration before the migration of Syrians. It should be remarked that the citizenship activities and procedures of mass migrants, mainly from the Balkans, were carried out smoothly. Accordingly, it can be claimed that the Republic of Turkey has a profound experience in mass migration and granting citizenship status since its establishment. Still, it should be noted that there are severe arguments on Syrian immigrants at both political and social levels. In this study, citizenship processes will be examined within the context of Syrian immigrants.

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LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS: FOREIGNERS’ ACQUIRING OF THE CITIZENSHIP STATUS Turkey’s asylum law is based on national and recognized international regulations. Within this framework, Turkey’s asylum policy consists of the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol to which it became a party. Both regulations cover comprehensive regulations regarding asylum law, taking as reference the basic principles of the “Convention on the International Status of Refugees” dated October 28, 1933, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.1 In this context, the 1951 Geneva Convention is regarded as the first comprehensive international document as it led the asylum policies after World War II. The representatives of twenty-six countries who gathered in Geneva, Switzerland, signed the “Convention on the Legal Status of Refugees” (1951 Geneva Convention) on July 28, 1951. Thus, the definition of “refugee” was determined with a particular agreement directly related to asylum law. Within this context, the rights of asylum and the obligations of the states were regulated in detail. However, the 1951 Convention brought the condition of geographical limitation to the state parties. Thus, only those who migrated from the European geography were granted the right to gain refugee status. Within the scope of the criticisms brought to the 1951 Convention, studies for modification of the convention started. Furthermore, the state parties adopted new legal regulations in the asylum with the 1967 Protocol. However, since Turkey, which is also a party to the 1967 Protocol, did not remove the geographical limitation requirement in the 1951 Convention, refugee status was granted to asylum applications from outside of Europe. Although many parties lifted the geographical limitation requirement, Turkey chose to maintain its geographical limitation annotation in 1967. Consequently, primarily foreigners who had to migrate from the Middle East and Africa or Central Asia for various reasons could not obtain the right to apply directly to refugee status. On the other hand, Turkey’s citizenship law does not involve procedures and regulations concerning the right to apply for asylum seekers’ citizenship. Although there are special regulations for immigrants in the Settlement Law No. 5543, since these regulations cover those related to the Turkish lineage and culture, they do not give the right to apply to other foreigners.2 Accordingly, citizenship work and transactions of foreigners who come to Turkey through asylum or mass migration are carried out within the scope of the Turkish Citizenship Law No. 5901.3 “Regulation on the Implementation of the Turkish Citizenship Law” was published in 2010 under the Council of Ministers’ decision to implement the Turkish Citizenship Law No. 5901.4

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According to Article 4 of the regulation directing the execution of citizenship services, “The procedures concerning the acquisition, loss, proof of Turkish citizenship and multiple citizenship are carried out by the Ministry in the country and by the foreign representative offices abroad.” As per the law in the Turkish Citizenship Law No. 5901, the right to citizenship is clearly stated with the following regulation: 1. Acquisition of Turkish Citizenship by Birth 2. Acquisition of Turkish Citizenship by the Decision of the Competent Authority • General way • Regaining • By marriage • Exceptional Acquisition of Citizenship Exceptional Acquisition of Citizenship is a regulation left directly to the political authority’s decision, regardless of all the conditions stated earlier in the law. Based on the example of Syrians, they mostly obtain the Republic of Turkey citizenship through Exceptional Citizenship. Under the relevant articles of the Temporary Protection Regulation and the Equal Treatment in Return Law No. 1062, which was practiced for Syrian immigrants, Syrian citizens were not allowed to apply for Turkish citizenship through real estate acquisition as the treasury confiscated their immovable properties in Turkey.5 Thus, the works and procedures of Syrian immigrants regarding Citizenship of the Republic of Turkey are mainly carried out within the scope of Exceptional Citizenship. As stated in Article 12 of the Turkish Citizenship Law No. 5901, foreigners can acquire Turkish citizenship by the decision of the Council of Ministers, regardless of the other conditions required for the acquisition of Turkish citizenship in general, granted that they do not have a condition that would constitute an obstruction against national security and public order. Indeed, the protests against the regime in Syria began in March 2011 and dragged the country into a civil war in a short time, which forced thousands to seek refuge in Turkey. As Syrian asylum seekers migrated to Turkey in masses, the Ministry of Interior prepared a regulation aimed at foreigners. The “Temporary Protection Regulation,” published in the Official Gazette on October 22, 2014,6 defined the services provided to Syrians who had to migrate from Syria in masses as well as their rights and obligations in Turkey. In the introduction part of the Regulation, the procedures and principles of temporary protection proceedings that may be provided to foreigners, who are forced to leave their countries and are unable to

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return to their countries they left and arrived at or crossed our borders in masses to seek urgent and temporary protection and whose international protection requests cannot be taken under individual assessment; to determine procedures to be carried out related to their reception to Turkey, their stay in Turkey, their rights and obligations and their exits from Turkey, to regulate the measures to be taken against mass movements, and the provisions related to the cooperation between national and international organizations under Article 91 of the Law No. 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection of 4/4/2013

was defined as the purpose of the regulation in question. On the other hand, in Article 25, clear regulations were made regarding citizenship. According to this article, “Temporary protection identification document shall grant the right to stay in Turkey. However, this document shall not be deemed to be equivalent to a residence permit or documents, which substitute residence permits, as regulated by the Law, shall not grant the right for the transition to a long-term residence permit; its duration shall not be taken into consideration when calculating the total term of residence permit duration and shall not entitle its holder to apply for Turkish Citizenship.” As stated in Article 25, paragraph 1, Syrians cannot obtain the right to apply for Turkish citizenship directly within the scope of their stay in Turkey with a temporary protection identity document given to them. GRANTING CITIZENSHIP TO SYRIAN IMMIGRANTS The citizenship affairs and transactions of Syrians who applied for the right to citizenship within the scope of the Turkish Citizenship Law No.5901 and the relevant regulation were carried out. In this regard, in 2018, 10,000 of them acquired citizenship since they were from Turkish mothers or fathers or through marriage, that is, because they met the conditions specified in the law.7 Still, the number of Syrians who met these conditions was minimal. While the discussions on citizenship were continuing in 2016, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan officially announced for the first time that Syrian immigrants in Turkey would be granted citizenship in a speech he made at an iftar program he attended in Kilis. In his speech, the president said, concerning citizenship, “I believe that there are those who want to become the Republic of Turkey citizens among our brothers. There are steps taken by our Ministry of Internal Affairs regarding the issue. We will give our brothers and sisters the opportunity of citizenship through the office formed by our ministry who are working hard to handle this issue.”8 After the announcement made on July 2, 2016, the citizenship procedures of Syrians with Temporary Protection IDs also evolved into a new process. It was announced that the

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number of Syrians who obtained citizenship as of November 2018 was 55,000. This number increased to 76,443 in January 2019. It was declared that 92,280 Syrians were granted citizenship on August 2, 2019. The number of Syrians granted Turkish citizenship as of December 30, 2019, was 110,000 according to the Ministry of Interior’s statement. Among them, 53,000 of these people were adults, and 57,000 were children.9 Considering that the number of registered Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey is nearly 3,600,000, it is outstanding that the proportion of Syrians who acquired citizenship between 2011 and 2020 is around 3%. On the other hand, when examined comparatively with European countries, it is noteworthy that Turkey’s citizenship processes are both uncertain and a low number of immigrants receive citizenship. For instance, according to a study conducted in EU countries, approximately 43% of immigrants born outside of Germany have acquired citizenship in 6–10 years. In the whole of Europe, this rate is approximately 35%.10 On the other hand, the number of Syrians born in Turkey is also striking. According to the statement made by Minister of Interior Süleyman Soylu on September 19, 2019, the number of Syrian babies born in Turkey is approximately 450,000.11 Based on the Turkish Citizenship Law No. 5901 and the Temporary Protection Regulation, Syrians cannot acquire citizenship directly by birth. In Germany, within the framework of the legislation that entered into force on January 1, 2000, foreign parents can acquire citizenship if their children born in Germany provided that they meet specific conditions. On the condition that one of the parents has been legally residing in Germany for at least eight years when the child is born, or that one of the parents has an indefinite residence permit, besides, if a Swiss citizen or his family member has the right of free movement (BGBl. 2001 II S. 810) based on the contract signed between the European Community and member states and the Swiss Confederation, the foreigner born in Germany is directly considered a German citizen.12 However, it should be remarked that there are no similar practices in Turkey. THE EVALUATION OF CITIZENSHIP PROCESSES WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE FIELD RESEARCH Within the scope of the field research conducted regarding the realization of Syrian migrants’ citizenship processes, 650 families were interviewed applying two different methods. One of the methods applied was the in-depth interview technique. The second method was direct phone calls. Approximately 82% of the interviewees were family members between 18 and 49 in terms of average age. While Hatay, Istanbul, and Ankara were among the first three in

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Figure 11.1  The Provinces Where Field Research Was Conducted. Source: Data collected by author.

terms of provinces, cities such as Kayseri, Mersin, Kilis, and Gaziantep were also covered in the study (figures 11.1 and 11.2). Approximately 92% of the study participants said that they did not receive any orientation or information concerning the Republic of Turkey citizenship, including the rights and responsibilities brought by citizenship, from any public institution or non-governmental organization during and after the citizenship process. During the citizenship application process and under temporary protection status, the groups invited said they were not directly faced with the Republic of Turkey laws, practices, citizenship, legal, or language knowledge level questions throughout the first application process. Furthermore, they stated that their Turkish knowledge level was not measured directly at the time of application, and they did not get any guidance in this direction. On the other hand, in Germany’s application process, it is noteworthy that the public has developed applications that make the German language course compulsory. In addition to the language course, they also add orientation training on history, geography, culture, and social structure to the program. Throughout the field study, the question, “Would you like to get orientation training about the rights and responsibilities given to you by the Republic of Turkey citizenship?,” was asked to the participants (figure 11.3). Approximately 66% of the participants responded to the question positively, even though they received citizenship. Indeed, it is noteworthy that after the acquisition of citizenship, people who became citizens for some reason faced problems, particularly due to the language barrier, in exercising their rights, or did not have any information concerning their rights and responsibilities. Many factors such as the absence of a significant change in the social

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Figure 11.2  Did Anyone from the Public Institutions Provide You With Information About Your Citizenship Rights during Your Republic of Turkey Citizenship Application Process and after Obtaining Citizenship? Source: Data collected by author.

environment of people who have obtained citizenship, the language barrier continuing to pose as an obstacle for accessing reliable information, and the fact that the public and NGOs do not develop special programs for such people cause the inadequacy to continue. In this context, not sharing descriptive information and documentation about Turkey and the rights and responsibilities of citizenship throughout the direct citizenship application procedures or after the citizenship status is achieved is regarded as a deficiency. It is remarkably beneficial for the General Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs to provide some information modules on citizenship. It would also help to prepare informative documentation and distribute them to immigrants whose citizenship application procedures are ongoing. It is striking that there is a clear need for orientation activities, particularly in the language field. The difficulties of people who have acquired citizenship in expressing themselves in the language field also lead to poor social adaptation. It is obvious that many activities aimed at achieving social cohesion have a limited impact due to the language barrier at the final stage.

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Figure 11.3  Would You Like to Receive Orientation Training on the Rights and Responsibilities of the Republic of Turkey Citizenship? Source: Data collected by author.

On the other hand, the Germany example, which has significant experience in orientation training and hosts around 1 million Syrian migrants, is also remarkable. Language and orientation courses are organized under the name of the integration course for immigrants in Germany. The language course is usually taught at the B1 level as a German learning level and is certified by a final exam (“Deutsch-Test für Zuwanderer” or DTZ in short) at the end of the course. The 600-hour language course cost is covered either by the immigrant or by the public depending on the immigrant’s economic condition. In the orientation course provided with the language course, general information about Germany’s history, culture, society, and politics is provided. The orientation course is usually served as a 100-hour course content in many areas. As part of the orientation courses, private lessons for women, parents, or young people (up to twenty-seven years old) are also organized.13 It is noteworthy that similar processes are operating in Scandinavian countries. For instance, 600 hours of training is envisaged in Norway, and at least 50 hours of it includes information about Norwegian culture, history, and

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society. After the citizenship procedures are completed, citizenship certificates are given with a ceremony by local governments.14 In the scope of the study, 84% of the participants responded that they needed help in any matter when asked: “After you became a citizen, have there been any issues you wanted to be informed?” (figure 11.4). It is noteworthy that the required issues are expanding over a wide area from individual needs to public services. When examining the required issues in general, it should be noted that issues can be resolved with orientation and information on social cohesion in the citizenship application and assessment processes and questions that require special support. In particular, it is possible to meet requests for information about public services through orientation courses. On the other hand, it is evident that information requests, particularly for the economic field, require a special effort. It was stated in in-depth interviews that data concerning establishing a company, company registration, tax system, work permit application, and banking transactions have an essential place in terms of performing commercial activities. Another issue that was needed after citizenship was about the right to benefit from public services. Participants also stated that they have insufficient knowledge

Figure 11.4  After You Became a Citizen, Have There Been Any Issues You Wanted to Be Informed of? Source: Data collected by author.

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Figure 11.5  What Issues Did You Feel in Need of Support? Source: Data collected by author.

of public services, such as access to education, benefiting from health rights, and social assistance. Although they received much support from their Turkish neighbors, some participants stated that they did not know how to apply to these institutions. In this regard, the participants responded to the question about the issues they needed the support for as given in figure 11.5. The residence time for Syrian-origin immigrants who have obtained citizenship status in Turkey before citizenship starts from two years and extends to six years. Accordingly, it was determined that the needs varied from person to person and depending on the province they lived in. “However, Syrian refugees with Turkish citizenship who live on Turkish soil do find themselves blocked from certain benefits they could previously access, such as free hospital treatment, financial aid from the Turkish Red Crescent, and government sponsored grants for Syrian students.”15 In this context, the main priority of those living and dealing with business in big cities such as Istanbul, Bursa, and Gaziantep is to get information regarding work permits, conditions of starting a business, and banking transactions. During the interview with them, it was stated that some banks refused to open bank accounts because the bank staff did not accept their documents, while another bank rejected them because they can’t speak Turkish. Priority of female refugees in Turkey is attend basic Turkish language courses and access to public services. However, based on field research data, it is noteworthy that learning the Turkish language is one of the most critical problems encountered by Syrian migrants who have acquired citizenship. It was also stated that the said groups

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did not take any language courses throughout the citizenship application processes. On the other hand, according to the “Citizenship Survey” Findings Report, which was carried out by KONDA/IPM in 2016 with 2,587 people in their households in 28 provinces, knowing Turkish is considered an essential criterion for obtaining citizenship in Turkey. While 63% of the participants said that “legal status is sufficient” to obtain Turkish citizenship, 52% stated that it is necessary to speak Turkish.16 Indeed, considering that one of the most critical issues demanded by immigrants who have acquired citizenship afterward is to master the Turkish language, it is revealed that the language course specified in the KONDA research can be an element that can be demanded in the citizenship processes. Thus, some interviewees stated that they could not spare time to learn Turkish due to the intensity of their working hours, while others stated that they could not access the ministry that certified courses or attend a Turkish language course due to economic reasons. In fact, in the interviews held with the participants of the Turkish course organized by the Ministry of National Education General Directorate of Lifelong Learning and the International Middle East Research Center (IMPR) between 2016 and 2017, to which 1,300 people attended, the reasons for participating in the courses were asked. Participants stated that obtaining the ministry certificate, the courses being free, and the course being held in public buildings, respectively, were the factors that directly affected their participation in Turkish language courses.17 Accordingly, it is stated that it would be beneficial to provide orientation training on the subjects needed, especially language learning, in cooperation with the public or by institutions, organizations, private sector, or NGOs that are recognized and certified by the public during the period of citizenship procedures. Indeed, even though different humanitarian organizations in the country have exceptionally organized Turkish courses for the last six years, it is observed that the courses certified by the Ministry of Education are quite limited. Besides, it is beneficial to provide orientation and information lessons on history, culture, and society in citizenship processes or directly for immigrants. It was observed that a significant portion of the interviewees who became citizens afterward did not have the required information on history, society, or culture. Indeed, if we take the example of Syria, it is evident that particular lessons such as history, society, administrative structure, and constitutional rights will strengthen immigrants’ social cohesion. In the study, the question, “What do you think the citizenship criteria are?,” was asked to those who have obtained the Republic of Turkey citizenship (figure 11.6). Remarkably, the participants did not have a common view of the criteria. Still, approximately 38% of the participants stated that education and profession are essential in obtaining citizenship. As a matter of fact, the

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Figure 11.6  What Do You Think the Citizenship Criteria Are? Source: Data collected by author.

official authorities in Turkey also stated that profession and education are critical criteria for obtaining citizenship. Indeed, Minister of Interior Süleyman Soylu stated that “5,292 teachers, 1,432 engineers, 1,235 self-employed, 743 doctors, 732 technicians, 507 small business owners, 427 managers, 396 merchants, 392 accountants, lawyers, pharmacists, senior managers, nurses, architects, translators, bankers, academics” were granted citizenship, and that education and profession are an essential criterion in citizenship procedures.18 An essential part of the participants also established a relationship between citizenship and education and professional qualifications. On the other hand, the ratio of those who perceived employment and/or employment in Turkey with a work permit as an essential criterion for being granted citizenship was 7% in total. Nevertheless, it is outstanding that there were several perceptions in the in-depth interviews on this matter. In the meeting with a businessperson who employs more than twenty workers in Gaziantep, he said that although his application was not concluded, the Syrian working with a work permit received citizenship and stated that he did not believe that having a firm or business is a criterion. Some report mentioned that who have high educations, professional qualifications, or the economic ability to invest or start businesses in Turkey, and aims to keep in Turkey integrate those refugees who are perceived as beneficial to the country.19

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On the other hand, 11% of the participants think it is important not to commit any crime in Turkey and not undergo a security investigation. “To obtain Turkish citizenship, a Syrian has to go through seven stages. After the required papers reach the population registry, they are sent to the directorate general and the interior ministry. The hardest, fourth stage includes a security check up, three months ahead of a final decision.”20 Indeed, according to the official statements, the mentioned criteria are also present. However, remarkably 34% of the participants did not have clear information about the criteria. In other words, although they have acquired citizenship, one-third of the participants stated that they did not precisely know which criteria played a role in naturalization. Thus, it is remarkable that both those who obtained citizenship rights and those whose citizenship applications are rejected do not know how the processes are evaluated. In this context, the lack of clear legal criteria brings along discussions. The fact that people who did not comply with the above criteria throughout the citizenship process have also acquired citizenship creates uncertainty in immigrants about the criteria. Consequently, transparent disclosure of the citizenship criteria will be necessary for applicants to complete the preparatory phase properly and easily. Finally, the participants were asked, “In how many years was the citizenship application process completed?” The participants stated that the citizenship procedures took place at certain stages and an application was made with the documents after getting the first invitation, and that officials carried out their home visits within one year. Still, it is remarkable that the application procedures they followed up online after the said household visit were concluded in approximately 1–1.5 years. Accordingly, it should be noted that the period between the first application and obtaining citizenship is approximately between 2 and 2.5 years. At this point, it was stated that there was only one face-to-face meeting between the public officials and the relevant persons while the citizenship procedures were ongoing, and that the public directly carried out other processes. CONCLUSION The number of Syrian migrants in Turkey was approximately 2 million in 2015. In July 2019, this number was around 3,600,000. In this context, it is noteworthy that at least 2 million Syrians stay in Turkey for seven or eight years. On the other hand, citizenship processes became official in 2016 with the statements of President Erdoğan. It was declared that approximately 110,000 Syrian migrants acquired citizenship between 2016 and 2020. Numerically speaking, it should be noted that Syrians’ citizenship processes

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comparatively extend over a longer period than in many EU countries. Accordingly, when a projection is made on the existing citizenship policies, it is crucial to envision that the number of Syrian immigrants who can acquire citizenship in the next ten years will be between 300,000 and 350,000. When we make the same prediction for Germany, it can be foretold that this number may be at least between 600,000 and 700,000. On the other hand, the condition of Syrians born in Turkey remains uncertain. According to various reports, the number of Syrian migrants born in Turkey in one day varies between 310 and 330. Considering that the number of Syrian immigrants born in Turkey in September 2019 was 450,000, it may be around 1,200,000 in the next ten years. Thus, the number of Syrians born in Turkey will possibly be around 1,700,000. Consequently, citizenship debates are likely to grow to be a much more critical issue in the coming years. There are big concerns that Syrian children born in Turkey risk statelessness. In this context, when many examples worldwide are examined, language and orientation activities become highly essential. Among the citizenship requirements in many EU countries are language and orientation lessons. Considering that the citizenship issue for Syrian immigrants will cause fierce debates in the next ten years, it is beneficial to take specific steps for planning the preparation processes better. In this context, it is anticipated that it will be beneficial to plan language and orientation courses primarily for Syrians under temporary protection applying for the Republic of Turkey citizenship and share the said contents with applicants transparently. Although at least A1 level is sufficient in language skills, courses such as citizenship law, civil rights, criminal law, culture, geography, and history should be provided within certain hours in the scope of orientation courses. On the other hand, a significant portion of the Syrians under temporary protection who applied for citizenship stated that they did not have any information on how the application process works. The challenges encountered in evaluation processes cause severe information pollution in the field and cause different actors to exploit the process. To prevent all these negativities, citizenship criteria and application processes should be shared transparently with people who have applied for citizenship. In this context, it is beneficial to simplify the process to the applicants according to predetermined legislation and share the criteria with them. It is beneficial to assign responsibility to an institution so that all citizenship procedures can be followed directly by the applicants online. Thus, both orientation and other processes can be followed closely and information can be provided successfully. In this context, it is beneficial to provide regular information and guidance to the relevant people after they become citizens. Otherwise, the realization of the benefits part, which is the justification for Exceptional Citizenship, remains weak.

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NOTES 1. İbrahim Kaya, Esra Yılmaz Eren, “Legal Status of Syrians in Turkey: The Rights and Obligations of Those in Between,” Seta Publishing. No: 55, Istanbul, 2015: 11–20. 2. For a detailed study, see Official Gazette, https​:/​/ww​​w​.res​​migaz​​ete​.g​​ov​.tr​​/eski​​ ler​/2​​006​/0​​9​/2​00​​60926​​-1​.ht​m (date of access: 11.09.2019). 3. For a detailed study, see Official Gazette, Turkish Citizenship Law, no. 27256, 12 June 2009. 4. See Official Gazette, https​:/​/ww​​w​.res​​migaz​​ete​.g​​ov​.tr​​/eski​​ler​/2​​010​/0​​4​/2​01​​ 00406​​-9​.ht​m (date of access: 09.08.2019). 5. For a detailed study on the issue, see Sezen Üçüncü, “The Acquisition of Immovable Property in Turkey by Foreign Natural Persons by Purchasing after the Enactment of Law No. 6302,” Public and Private International Law Bulletin 34, no. 2 (2014): 89–152. 6. Official Gazette, “Geçiçi Koruma Yönetmeliği,” no. 29153, 22 Oct., 2014. 7. Sputniknews, “AK Party Uslu announced the number of Syrians granted citizenship,” 14.11.2018, https​: /​/ tr​​. sput​​n ikne​​w s​. co​​m​/ tur​​k iye/​​2 0181​​ 11410​​3 6137​​1 64​- k​​a c​- su​​r iyel​​i​- vat​​a ndas ​​​ l ik​- h​​a kki-​​k azan​​d i/ (date of access: 08.10.2019). 8. BBC News, “Erdogan’s statement on citizenship for the Syrians in Turkey,” July 3, 2016 https​:/​/ww​​w​.bbc​​.com/​​turkc​​e​/hab​​erler​​/2016​​/07​/1​​60703​​_erdo​​ga​n​_s​​uriye​​ liler​(date of access: 18.06.2020). 9. Refugees Association, “Number of Syrians in Turkey in July 2020” July 23, 2020 https​:/​/mu​​lteci​​ler​.o​​rg​.tr​​/turk​​iyede​​ki​-su​​riyel​​i​-say​​isi/?​​gclid​​=Cj0K​​CQjwv​​vj5BR​​ DkARI​​sAGD9​​vlLNu​​9MTfk​​Xitto​​kKRdX​​4wIC5​​b7ZnE​​L3Ib9​​et6Lm​​JDF​eo​​h9chT​​ luHME​​aAndj​​EALw_​​wcB (date of access: 13.03.2020). 10. Migration Policy Group, “Access to Citizenship and Its Impact on Immigrant Integration: Handbook for Germany,” 4, https​:/​/ca​​dmus.​​eui​.e​​u​/bit​​strea​​m​/han​​dle​/1​​ 814​/2​​9765/​​ACIT_​​Handb​​ook​_G​​erman​​y​_ENG​​​LISH.​​pdf​?s​​equen​​ce=1 (date of access: 01.09.2020). 11. Refugee Association, “Number of Syrians in Turkey in July 2020” July 23, 2020 https​:/​/mu​​lteci​​ler​.o​​rg​.tr​​/turk​​iyede​​ki​-su​​riye​l​​i​-say​​isi/ (date of access: 16.08.2020). 12. Official Website of the German Consulate, “Citizenship,” https​:/​/tu​​erkei​​.dipl​​o​ .de/​​tr​-tr​​/serv​​ice/-​​/1514​​534​​#c​​onten​​t_1 (date of access: 24 July 2020). 13. For detailed information, see the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, https​:/​/ww​​w​.bam​​f​.de/​​EN​/St​​artse​​ite​/s​​tarts​​eit​e_​​node.​​html (date of access: 09.02.2020). 14. Arnfinn H. Midtbøen, Grete Brochmann, Marta Bivand Erdal, Mathias Kruse, Kristian Kriegbaum Jensen, Pieter Bevelander, Per Mouritsen and Emily Cochran Bech, “Assessments of Citizenship Criteria: Are Immigrants more Liberal?,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 46, no. 13 (2020): 2627–2628.

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15. Hosam al-Jablawi, “Return to Syria Is Less Likely as Syrian Refugees Receive Turkish Citizenship,” Oct.13, 2017, https​:/​/ww​​w​.atl​​antic​​counc​​il​.or​​g​/blo​​gs​/ sy​​riaso​​urce/​​retur​​n​-to-​​syria​​-is​-l​​ess​-l​​ikely​​-as​-s​​yrian​​-refu​​gees-​​rece​i​​ve​-tu​​rkish​​-citi​​zensh​​ ip/ (date of access: 22.09.2019). 16. KONDA and IPM, “‘Citizenship Research’ Findings Report,” March 2016:19–24. 17. Interview notes with IMPR Authorities, 2020. 18. See Haber Türk Newslater, “İçişleri Bakanı Süleyman Soylu: Türkiye’deki Suriyelilerin çoğu Misak-ı Milli sınırları içinden,” https​:/​/ww​​w​.hab​​ertur​​k​.com​​/icis​​ leri-​​bakan​​i​-sul​​eyman​​-soyl​​u​-tur​​kiyed​​eki​-s​​uriye​​liler​​in​-co​​gu​-mi​​sak​-i​​-mill​​i​-​sin​​irlar​​i​-ici​​ nden-​​22837​​66 (access 19.08.2020). 19. Nor Skribeland, Özlem Gürakar. “A Critical Review of Turkey’s Asylum Laws and Practices: Seeking Asylum in Turkey,” Norwegian Organisation for Asylum Seekers, 2018, p. 35. 20. Jablawi, Ibid.

REFERENCES BBC News, “Erdogan’s statement on citizenship for the Syrians in Turkey,” July 3, 2016 https​:/​/ww​​w​.bbc​​.com/​​turkc​​e​/hab​​erler​​/2016​​/07​/1​​60703​​_erdo​​ga​n​_s​​uriye​​liler​ (date of access: 18.06.2020). Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, https​:/​/ww​​w​.bam​​f​.de/​​EN​/St​​artse​​ite​/s​​tarts​​ eit​e_​​node.​​html (date of access: 09.02.2020). Haber Türk Newslater, “İçişleri Bakanı Süleyman Soylu: Türkiye’deki Suriyelilerin çoğu Misak-ı Milli sınırları içinden,” https​:/​/ww​​w​.hab​​ertur​​k​.com​​/icis​​leri-​​bakan​​ i​-sul​​eyman​​-soyl​​u​-tur​​kiyed​​eki​-s​​uriye​​liler​​in​-co​​gu​-mi​​sak​-i​​-mill​​i​-​sin​​irlar​​i​-ici​​nden-​​ 22837​​66 (date of access 19.08.2020). Jablawi, al Hosam, “Return to Syria is Less Likely as Syrian Refugees Receive Turkish Citizenship,” Oct, 13, 2017, https​:/​/ww​​w​.atl​​antic​​counc​​il​.or​​g​/blo​​gs​/sy​​riaso​​ urce/​​retur​​n​-to-​​syria​​-is​-l​​ess​-l​​ikely​​-as​-s​​yrian​​-refu​​gees-​​rece​i​​ve​-tu​​rkish​​-citi​​zensh​​ip/ (date of access: 22.09.2019). Kaya, İbrahim and Esra Yılmaz, Eren, “Legal Status of Syrians in Turkey: The Rights and Obligations of Those in Between,” Seta Publishing. No: 55, Istanbul, 2015, pp. 11–20. KONDA and IPM, “‘Citizenship Research’ Findings Report,” March 2016. Midtbøen, H. Arnfinn and Grete, Brochmann, Marta, Bivand Erdal, et al., “Assessments of Citizenship Criteria: Are Immigrants More Liberal?,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 46, no. 13 (2020): 2625–2646. Migration Policy Group, “Access to Citizenship and its Impact on Immigrant Integration: Handbook for Germany,” https​:/​/ca​​dmus.​​eui​.e​​u​/bit​​strea​​m​/han​​dle​/1​​814​ /2​​9765/​​ACIT_​​Handb​​ook​_G​​erman​​y​_ENG​​​LISH.​​pdf​?s​​equen​​ce=1 (date of access: 01.09.2020). Official Gazette, “Türk Vatandaşlığı Kanununun Uygulanmasına İlişkin Yönetmelik,” Issue: 27544, Date: 06 Apr., 2010.

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Official Gazette, “Geçiçi Koruma Yönetmeliği,” no. 29153, Date: 22 Oct., 2014. Official Gazette, “İskan Kanunu,” Issue: 26301, Date: 26 Sep., 2006. Official Gazette, “Türk Vatandaşlık Kanunu,” Issue: 27256, Date: 12 June 2009. Official Website of the German Consulate, “Citizenship,” https​:/​/tu​​erkei​​.dipl​​o​.de/​​tr​-tr​​ /serv​​ice/-​​/1514​​534​​#c​​onten​​t_1 (date of access: 24 July 2020). Refugee Association, “Türkiye’deki Suriyeli Sayısı” July 23, 2020, https​:/​/mu​​lteci​​ler​ .o​​rg​.tr​​/turk​​iyede​​ki​-su​​riye​l​​i​-say​​isi/ (date of access: 16.08.2020). Skribeland, Özlem Gürakar. “A critical review of Turkey’s asylum laws and practices: Seeking Asylum in Turkey,” Norwegian Organisation for Asylum Seekers, 2018. Sputniknews, “AK Party Uslu announced the number of Syrians granted citizenship,” 14.11.2018, https​:/​/tr​​.sput​​nikne​​ws​.co​​m​/tur​​kiye/​​20181​​11410​​36137​​164​-k​​ac​-su​​riyel​​i​ -vat​​andas​​​lik​-h​​akki-​​kazan​​di/ (date of access: 08.10.2019). Üçüncü, Sezen. “The Acquisition of Immovable Property in Turkey by Foreign Natural Persons by Purchasing After the Enactment of Law No. 6302.” Public and Private International Law Bulletin 34, no. 2 (2014): 89–152.

Chapter 12

Turkey-EU Relations Preference or Necessity? Kamuran REÇBER and Samet YILMAZ

INTRODUCTION Turkey-EU relations that have lasted for more than sixty years continue within the framework of the association law and the accession negotiations. The association between Turkey and the European Economic Community (EEC) was achieved by the Ankara Agreement1 and the Additional Protocol, which entered into force on December 1, 1964, and January 1, 1973, respectively. The Customs Union Decision, established on the basis of the association law, entered into force on December 31, 1995. The accession negotiations of Turkey began on October 3, 2005. Additionally, Turkey and the EU negotiate on visa waivers. Turkey’s initiative to establish an association with the EEC was a manifestation of its will to forge close relations with the Western European states and international organizations, and it may be evaluated as a necessity during the Cold War. However, with the end of the Cold War, this necessity has turned into a preference. Problems concerning the progression of the accession negotiations and implementation of the association law constituted by the Ankara Agreement have faltered the bilateral relations. In this framework, in consideration of the accession negotiations and association law, this study discusses whether Turkey’s effort to be a member of the EU is a preference or necessity in terms of Turkish foreign policy, and it also makes some propositions for future relations. ASSOCIATION RELATION BETWEEN TURKEY AND EU RELATIONS Turkey made an application to the Council of the EEC to establish an association based on Article 238 of the Treaty establishing the EEC 199

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on July 31, 1959. The negotiations between Turkey and the European Community2 (the EU hereafter) that commenced on September 28, 1959, ended with the signing of the Ankara Agreement.3 The bilateral relations have been conducted by the association law which comprises primary and secondary norms since the agreement entered into force. The Ankara Agreement and its annexed Protocols, the Additional Protocol and its complementary Protocols, Declarations, and Harmonization Agreements are the primary norms of the association law. The decisions of the Association Council established by Article 6 of the Ankara Agreement “to ensure the implementation and the progressive development of the Association”4 are the secondary norms.5 The Ankara Agreement stipulates integration between Turkey and the EU. In other words, the agreement is aimed at not only the establishment of the Customs Union but also the membership of Turkey to the EU over a period of time. Therefore, rather than accession in a short period, it anticipates Turkey’s gradual integration into the EU, depending on the fulfillment of mutual rights and obligations.6 Article 28 states that “as soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community.” This provision is not only a good faith of the contracting parties but also imposes an obligation on them. This obligation is related to the full membership of Turkey to the EU. The parties should fulfill their duties for the achievement of the full membership in accordance with the association agreement. Turkey should implement tariff reductions and “approximate its domestic law and policies to the EU system in accordance with the association law.” The EU should give any assistance needed as much as possible so that Turkey can achieve its obligations. The parties may take the necessary measures through the Association Council for a proper continuation of the association regime. MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION OF TURKEY TO THE EU Turkey made an application to the Council of the EU (the Council hereafter) to become a member of the EU on April 14, 1987. The full membership application was implemented on this basis of Article 237 of the Treaty establishing the EEC, Article 205 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, and Article 98 of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. The application was made to three communities separately. Thus, it was free from the association relation. In

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other words, in accordance with the procedure of EU Founding Treaties in force at that time, as a European state, Turkey delivered its application, separate from the association relation. However, in terms of the association relation, an interdependence still exists between Turkey and the EU. In this sense, it cannot be denied that the association relation affected this application. The full membership application was assessed by the Council and delivered to the European Commission (Commission hereafter) on April 27, 1987, for review. The Commission gave instructions to all departments to obtain the necessary information and data to assess the results of Turkey’s membership. It evaluated the collected data and gave its opinion (avis) on December 20, 1989. It was stated that Turkey was not yet ready to be a member. On behalf of the Commission, Commissioner Matutes expressed the opinion that membership applications would not be put in the process without achieving the aims of the Single European Act until 1993 and that it would be assessed whether the EU would have fifteen or eighteen members after 1992. According to the opinion, the membership of Turkey would be evaluated after 1992. Although many years have passed since Turkey’s full membership application to the EU, the Council has not given a clear answer on it. The opinion of the Commission is not binding. Yet, it means that the EU tacitly rejected Turkey’s application. That the Council also adopted the opinion of the Commission at the beginning of the 1990s confirms this situation. However, to be specified below, Turkey’s acceptance as a candidate to the EU has added a new dimension to Turkey’s relations with the EU. Nevertheless, other states which made an application to be members did not wait as much as Turkey has done. This situation displays that Turkey has not fulfilled the membership conditions, or that the EU does not want to see Turkey as a member.7 MEMBERSHIP CANDIDACY OF TURKEY TO THE EU At the European Council meeting in Luxembourg in 1997, the EU aimed at enlargement in two phases, considering the adaptation to the Copenhagen Criteria. Turkey was excluded from this enlargement. The Turkish officials criticized the decision taken at the summit and decided to suspend its relations with the EU. Turkey was invited to the European Conference on March 12, 1998, by the UK holding the Presidency of the Council. The Turkish officials stated that Turkey could attend the conference if the Luxembourg Summit decisions would be elaborated and gained sufficient content for Turkey. The presidency conclusions adopted at the Cardiff Summit held on

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June 15–16, 1998, specified that the first progress reports of the Commission on other candidate states would be published toward the end of 1998, and the progress report on Turkey would be based on Article 28 of the Ankara Agreement and the presidency conclusions of the Luxemburg Summit. This situation was seen as not satisfactory enough by Turkey.8 However, Turkey’s adoption as a candidate state with the presidency conclusions of the Helsinki Summit on December 11, 1999, eliminated the unfavorable situation for Turkey. The fourth, ninth, and twelfth paragraphs of the presidency conclusions were directly related to Turkey, while the fifth and sixth paragraphs were also indirectly concerning.9 Unlike classical international organizations, also in consideration of its legal system established by the Founding Treaties, the EU has an effect on the domestic law of member states through its norms that are directly or immediately applicable. The member states have created a unity of legal norms by transferring or constraining their sovereign powers in certain areas by the Founding Treaties. The unity of legal norms renders the EU supranational in terms of the specified areas of jurisdiction. Thus, it may be claimed that the EU has a federal character in certain areas while it has confederal features in other certain ones. Considering its powers, it is fair to say that the EU has a sui generis legal order.10 The secondary norms of EU law have direct effect on the domestic law of the member states in certain conditions. Additionally, in case of a conflict between the EU law and domestic law, the former is superior. The EU Founding Treaties do not regulate the superiority of the EU law, but the decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the Costa v ENEL case specified that the law stemming from the Founding Treaty is an independent source of law, and it has an effect on the domestic law of the member states.11 The ECJ did not explicitly address the conflict between the national constitutional law of the member states and EU law in the Costa v ENEL case. Concerning the issue, the court gave a ruling in the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case. It stated that the EU law has supremacy over the constitutional law of the member states.12 The member states also have an obligation to refrain from any measures, which may jeopardize the attainment of the EU’s objectives. They are obliged to comply with the EU Founding Treaties and secondary norms established by the competent bodies of the EU based on these treaties. In this sense, though Turkey, as a candidate state, has achieved a certain degree of success, it could not reach the expected level yet.13 Turkey should harmonize its domestic law with the EU acquis. Notably, harmonizing the constitutional law with the EU law is a priority since the harmonization of domestic law without harmonizing the constitutional law with the EU shall bring about some drawbacks such as contradictions with the constitution.

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ACCESSION PARTNERSHIP DOCUMENT AND NATIONAL PROGRAM After declaration as a candidate state with the presidency conclusions of the Helsinki Summit, an Accession Partnership Document (APD) for Turkey was prepared by the EU’s relevant authorities. Turkey published a draft concerning the APD on November 8, 2000, which the General Affairs Council approved on December 4, 2000.14 In the presidency conclusions of the Nice Summit on December 7–9, 2000,15 the European Council expressed its content regarding the APD and requested Turkey to prepare its National Program within the scope of the pre-accession strategy. After the adoption of the APD, the Council approved it on March 8, 2001, and thus, the legal foundation of Turkey’s accession strategy to the EU gained formality. The National Program, the most important document for the accession process, was accepted by the Council of the Ministers of Turkey on March 19, 2001, and given to Commissioner Günther Verheugen, responsible for the enlargement of the EU, on March 26, 2001.16 The first National Program was later revised in 2003 and 2008.17 The European Council stated in the presidency conclusions of the Goteborg Summit on June 15–16, 2001, that, with the introduction of the National Program, the relations between Turkey and the EU got closer. However, it was also denoted that improvements on human rights were needed, and the framework of the financial aid to Turkey within the scope of the pre-accession strategy would be specified toward the end of 2001.18 The APD19 has been revised and updated over time. The main priorities based on the APD were related to Turkey’s capacity to achieve its obligations prescribed by the Copenhagen Criteria and the Negotiating Framework Document (NFD) adopted by the Council on October 3, 2005. The APD divided the obligations of Turkey into two categories as short term and medium term. It was expected to achieve the short-term obligations within one or two years and the medium term ones within three or four years. These obligations were related to both EU law and its implementation. Turkey should also consider the elements stated in the progress reports. Moreover, Turkey aims to harmonize its domestic law in accordance with the Ankara Agreement, Customs Union Decision, and decisions of the Association Council on the commercial regime of agricultural products. It should be noted that harmonization of national law with the acquis is not sufficient. It is also essential that the acquis is supposed to be effectively implemented.20

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NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT AND THE ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE EU The presidency conclusions of Brussels Summit on June 17–18, 2004, stated that upon the report and proposal of the Commission, the negotiation process would begin immediately if the European Council accepted in December 2004 that Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen Political Criteria. The presidency conclusions of the Brussels Summit on December 16–17, 2004, specified that the European Council was pleased with the adoption of the six pieces of legislation identified by the Commission. It was also noted that based on the Commission report and recommendation, Turkey sufficiently achieved the Copenhagen Political Criteria to open accession negotiations, provided bringing these specific pieces of legislation into force. Hence, the European Council invited the Commission to submit a proposal for a framework for negotiations with Turkey to the Council and requested the Council to agree on that framework with a view to opening negotiations on October 3, 2005. Thereafter, the Council gathered at the General Affairs and External Relations level adopted the NFD. The document elaborated on the qualification and continuation of relations between Turkey and the EU and the attitude of the parties in detail.21 Negotiation Process The launching of the accession negotiations for Turkey’s full membership to the EU was the most critical stage since its obligations within the scope of thirty-five chapters were defined by the EU. Finalization of the negotiations on the specified areas between the parties as soon as possible shall accelerate the membership process of Turkey. However, the negotiations may falter due to various developments. The screening process, the first stage of the accession negations, of Czechia, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, and Southern Cyprus, declared as candidate states with the presidency conclusions of the Luxemburg Summit held on December 12, 1997, started on March 31, 1998. The starting date of the accession negotiations of Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia was determined as February 15, 2000, with the presidency conclusions of the Helsinki Summit held in December 1999. An Intergovernmental Conference is established to conduct the accession negotiations after making a decision on the date of the opening of negotiations with the candidate state. The Intergovernmental Conference is composed of the representatives of the candidate state and the member states of the EU. Thus, the conference may be seen as a bilateral structure.22 The accession

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negotiations continue through, on the one hand, the Intergovernmental Conferences with the participation of ministers of the candidate state and the member states and, on the other hand, the meetings consisting of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and the negotiation committee of the candidate state. While the ministry level meetings deal with the main positions, strategies, and political issues, those at the level of permanent representatives handle technical issues. The accession negotiations commence with the screening. During this stage, the candidate state gets prepared for the accession negotiations. It is specified in which areas it has harmonized with the EU acquis. Additionally, the establishment of necessary administrative structures or strengthening them is handled to implement the EU law effectively. The Commission conducts the screening process and provides the necessary documents to the Council. It also, together with the Presidency of the Council, prepares a Draft Common Position as a response to the National Negotiating Position Document. The candidate state must submit its position documents to the Commission. The communication between the candidate state and the Commission is quite important during the preparation phase of the negotiating positions.23 The Commission examines the candidate state’s position document and prepares a Draft Common Position as a response. It takes a great deal of time to prepare the position documents concerning the chapters and to send them to the candidate state for approval in the negotiation process. The EU competent institutions generally respond with (including a request to answer from this state) questions to the candidate state’s position documents. This method may require the preparation of new Negotiation Positions for the candidate state and new Common Positions for the EU. Reaching a consensus for establishing Common Position Document (CPD) may be difficult. If the representatives of the member states agree on the CPD, the Council makes this document official by approving it in accordance with its internal regulation. The document, then, is sent to the relevant candidate state, and negotiations begin. In principle, the candidate state enters into an obligation to adopt and implement the whole EU acquis. However, this situation may impose a financial burden on it. Thus, the candidate state may require a schedule for implementation of the obligations specified in the acquis. The EU may also request for a transition stage for the policy areas that may cause problems to the member states. In this case, the differences between the Position Document and the CPD are attempted to be minimized by elimination of the transitional requests of the candidate state and the member states or by conditional acceptance. The parties’ derogation demands in each chapter, together with the reasons, are examined, and the chapters agreed on are conditionally closed. However, the EU protects its right to return to the conditionally closed chapters. This

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situation ensures to reopen the chapters due to changes and novelties in the laws or problems that may arise in practice.24 During the accession negotiations, in addition to specifying the derogations, issues such as the candidate state’s contribution to the EU budget and the way of participation in policies defined by the Founding Treaties are handled by the parties. The negotiations, in general, commence with the chapters that may be finalized in the short term. However, it is difficult to make the same classification for all candidate states because their priorities and positions concerning the chapters may differ. After completing the accession negotiations, a Draft Treaty of Accession is prepared by the Commission and then examined by a working group consisting of representatives of the Council, the Commission, the relevant candidate state(s), and the member states. The final form of this draft is provided by the Intergovernmental Conference. Afterward, the draft treaty is submitted to the EP (European Parliament) and the Council to be approved as specified in Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The EP, also considering the report of the competent committee working within the EP, opens a reading concerning the Treaty of Accession at the General Assembly in accordance with the approval procedure. The decision of approval is taken by an absolute majority of the EP members. The Council, after giving the consent of the EP, votes for the treaty. The approval requires unanimity in the Council. The EP and the Council approve the Treaty of Accession, and then it is signed by the representatives of the member states and the candidate state. It enters into force after the ratification of all the contracting parties, the member states of the EU and the candidate state, by their domestic law (parliament approval or referendum). Thus, the accession process is finalized.25 Current Situation in the Accession Negotiations of Turkey As mentioned above, the accession negotiations of Turkey started on October 3, 2005. The legal instrument concerning the process is the NFD. Screening meetings have been conducted for thirty-five chapters regarding the areas of the acquis. The first meeting was held on October 20, 2005, on Science and Research, and the last one was held on October 13, 2006, on Judiciary and Fundamental Rights. As of the first half of 2020, sixteen chapters have been opened to negotiations.26 Sixteen Chapters Opened to Negotiation between Turkey and the EU: Chapter 25: Science and Research (provisionally closed) (Austria, 12.06.2006) Chapter 20: Enterprise and Industrial Policy (Germany, 29.03.2007) Chapter 18: Statistics (Germany, 26.06.2007) Chapter 32: Financial Control (Germany, 26.06.2007)

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Chapter 21: Trans-European Networks (Portugal, 19.12.2007) Chapter 28: Consumer and Health Protection (Portugal, 19.12.2007) Chapter 6: Company Law (Slovenia, 17.06.2008) Chapter 7: Intellectual Property Law (Slovenia, 17.06.2008) Chapter 4: Free Movement of Capital (France, 19.12.2008) Chapter 10: Information Society and Media (France, 19.12.2008) Chapter 16: Taxation (Czech Republic, 30.06.2009) Chapter 27: Environment (Sweden, 21.12.2009) Chapter 12: Food Safety, Veterinary and Phytosanitary Policy (Spain, 30.06.2010) Chapter 22: Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments (Lithuania, 05.11.2013) Chapter 17: Economic and Monetary Policy (Luxembourg, 14.12.2015) Chapter 33: Financial and Budgetary Provisions (Netherlands, 30.06.2016) Screening Reports Pending in the Council of the European Union: Chapter 2: Freedom of Movement of Workers Chapter 13: Fisheries Chapter 14: Transport Policy Chapter 15: Energy Chapter 23: Judiciary and Fundamental Rights Chapter 24: Justice, Freedom and Security Chapter 30: External Relations Chapter 31: Foreign, Security and Defense Policy Chapters Unilaterally Blocked by Southern Cyprus: Chapter 2: Free Movement of Workers Chapter 15: Energy Chapter 23: Judiciary and Fundamental Rights Chapter 24: Justice, Freedom and Security Chapter 26: Education and Culture Chapter 31: Foreign, Security and Defense Policy Moreover, eight chapters have been suspended since December 2006 on account of the fact that Turkey did not put the Additional Protocol into effect. This reason was also used for the chapters, opened to negotiations, not to be provisionally closed. The eight suspended chapters are as follows: Chapter 1: Free Movement of Goods Chapter 3: Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services Chapter 9: Financial Services Chapter 11: Agriculture and Rural Development

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Chapter 13: Fisheries Chapter 14: Transport Policy Chapter 29: Customs Union Chapter 30: External Relations The Commission confirmed the fulfillment of seven closing benchmarks (CB) of five chapters. These chapters are as follows: Chapter 6: Company Law (1 CB) Chapter 20: Enterprise and Industrial Policy (1 CB) Chapter 21: Trans-European Networks (1 CB) Chapter 28: Consumer and Health Protection (1 CB) Chapter 32: Financial Control (3 CB) In addition to the accession negotiations, a Readmission Agreement was signed between Turkey and the EU. Dealing with this issue shall be suitable to understand the current relations between the two parties. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EU AND TURKEY ON THE READMISSION OF PERSONS RESIDING WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION The ECJ issued many preliminary rulings stating that the citizens of the Republic of Turkey have the right to freely enter the territories of member states without being subject to visa procedures. However, since the competent EU institutions have not established the necessary legal acts, the member states put additional restrictive procedures on the citizens of the Republic of Turkey, especially concerning the provision of services and the right of establishment. The EU requested Turkey to adopt a Readmission Agreement in response to providing a visa waiver with the Turkish citizens on entering into territories of the member states. An agreement on the readmission of illegal migrants was proposed on March 4, 2003. Four meetings were held between the parties regarding the content of the Readmission Agreement from 2005 to 2006. The negotiations continued on a technical level in 2009 and 2010.27 Following the negotiations, abbreviated as the Readmission Agreement, “Agreement between the European Union and Turkey on the Readmission of Persons Residing without Authorization” which was initiated by Turkey and the EU on June 21, 2012, signed on December 16, 2013, and approved by the GNAT (Grand National Assembly of Turkey) with the law No. 6547 on June 26, 2014,28 has brought significant rights and obligations to the parties. The agreement entered into force on October 1, 2014 (conditionally), in

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accordance with the provisions of Article 24.29 However, due to the disagreements between the parties on fulfillment of certain conditions, important parts of the agreement cannot actually be operated. The Readmission Agreement is an indefinite save for using rights such as termination or issues regarding fulfillment of the conditions provided for. The parties may terminate the agreement, giving a notice. If one of the parties notifies termination, the agreement may expire six months after this notification. The provisions of the agreement shall apply to persons who do not or who no longer fulfill the conditions for entry to, presence in, or residence on the territories of Turkey or one of the member states of the EU. It is specified in the preamble and Article 18 that the agreement shall be without prejudice to the rights, obligations, and responsibilities of the EU, its member states, and Turkey arising from international law including from international conventions to which they are party, in particular the European Convention of November 4, 1950, for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Convention of July 28, 1951, on the Status of Refugees as amended by the Protocol of January 31, 1967, on the Status of Refugees, the international conventions determining the state responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged, the Convention of December 10, 1984, against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, where applicable, the European Convention of December 13, 1955, on Establishment, international conventions on extradition and transit, multilateral international conventions, and agreements on the readmission of foreign nationals. The parties accepted that, as prescribed or adopted under the EU law, the agreement shall be implemented without prejudice to the rights and procedural guarantees for persons who are subject to return procedures in or who apply for asylum in a member state. They also adopted that the agreement shall not prejudice to the association law and the case law of the ECJ. The Readmission Agreement does not include in all the member states of the EU since the UK,30 Ireland, and Denmark partly participated in the Schengen acquis. The agreement is not binding for these states. It is specified that the provisions of the agreement, which falls within the scope of the provisions of Article 67 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the following regulations (the area of freedom, security, and justice), do not apply to the UK and Ireland, unless they “opt-in” in accordance with the protocol on the position of the UK and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security, and justice annexed to the TEU and the TFEU. The same situation is also relevant for Denmark. The protocol No. 22 of the Lisbon Treaty specifies the position of Denmark.31 A Joint Declaration attached to the Readmission Agreement states that the agreement does not apply to the territory of the Kingdom of Denmark, or to nationals of the

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Kingdom of Denmark. In such circumstances, it is appropriate that Turkey and Denmark conclude a Readmission Agreement in the same terms as the agreement. The agreement shall not prejudice to the rights and procedural guarantees of persons being a subject of return procedures as specified by the Directive 2008/115/CE of the EP and of the Council of the Ministers on December 16, 2008,32 on common standards and procedures in the member states for returning illegally staying third-country nationals in particular with regard to their access to legal advice, information, temporary suspension of the enforcement of a return decisions, and access to legal remedies. The application of the agreement shall not prejudice to the rights and procedural guarantees for persons applying for asylum as provided by the Council Directive 2003/9/EC, dated January 27, 2003,33 specifying minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers, and by the Council Directive 2005/85/EC, dated December 1, 2005,34 on minimum standards on procedures in the member states for granting and withdrawing refugee status, and in particular with regard to the right to remain in the member states pending the examination of the application. The application of the agreement shall not prejudice to the rights and procedural guarantees for persons holding a long-term residence permit granted under the terms of the Council Directive 2003/109/EC, dated November 25, 2003,35 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents. It is also specified that the agreement shall not prejudice to the rights and procedural guarantees for persons granted residence under the terms of the Council Directive 2003/86/EC, dated September 22, 2003,36 on the right to family reunification. Moreover, no provision in the agreement shall prevent the return of a person under other formal or informal arrangements. The agreement, on the basis of reciprocity, is aimed at providing with effective and swift procedures for identification and safe and orderly return of persons who do not or who no longer fulfill the conditions for entry to, presence in, or residence on the territories of Turkey or one of the member states of the EU, and to facilitate the transit of such persons in a spirit of co-operation. As it is stated, the agreement specifies that, on the basis of the norms provided, Turkey shall readmit the third-country nationals who have illegally and directly entered into the territory of the member states after having stayed on, or transited through, the territory of Turkey and its citizens who illegally enter the territory of the member states and who do not or who no longer fulfill the conditions (expiry of the visa period etc.) in force under the law of the member states. Moreover, the agreement provides that, in accordance with the rules of the agreement, the member states shall readmit their nationals of the member

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states and third-county nationals who do not, or who no longer, fulfill the conditions in force for entry to, presence in, or residence on the territory of Turkey. It is stated in the agreement that the contracting parties shall readmit the third-country nationals after a three-year transition period from the entry into force of the agreement. Thus, Turkey shall readmit the third-country national who illegally entered the territory of the member states after transiting through its territory three years after the entry into force of the agreement. CONCLUSION Considering the association law and obligations within the scope of the accession partnership, the membership of Turkey cannot be achieved only by the implementation of its obligations. The EU should be positive and reasonable concerning the issue. Turkey’s relations with the EU may be evaluated as a necessity until the end of the bipolar international structure called as the Cold War. However, following the end of this structure, the necessity has turned into a preference for Turkey. The NFD of Turkey, prepared by the competent EU bodies, may be seen as favorable. However, it is undeniable that most of the provisions specified in the document are problematic. As it is stated above, provided that there is no substantial change in conditions, it is not likely that Turkey shall be a member state in the short term. Furthermore, the acceptance of some demands which are stated in the negotiation chapters, such as restrictions and permanent protection measures, seems difficult. Even if the negotiation falters or no progress is achieved, Turkey should continue the reforms at the national level to reach the level of civilization. The stagnation of the relations between Turkey and the EU in terms of the accession negotiations arises from the attitudes of the parties and the failure to fulfill mutual expectations. There is no other candidate state that waited so long for the membership than Turkey has. Despite the expectations, the EU offers privileged or strengthened partnership models instead of full membership. However, the association law has provisions (Article 28 of the Ankara Agreement) anticipating the membership of Turkey. Thus, Turkey should maintain its insistent attitude concerning the provisions of the association law, which are its vested rights. The expectation that the Readmission Agreement shall give a new impetus to the relations between Turkey and the EU has not occurred. NOTES 1. Accord créant une association entre la Communauté économique européenne et la Turquie – Protocole n° 1 : protocole provisoire – Protocole n° 2 : protocole

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financier – Acte final – Déclarations, Journal officiel des Communautés Européennes, 29.12.1964: 3687–3697, accessed March 31, 2020, https​:/​/eu​​r​-lex​​.euro​​pa​.eu​​/lega​​l​ -con​​tent/​​FR​/TX​​T​/PDF​/​?uri​​=C​ELE​​X​:21964A1229(01)&from=FR. 2. Haluk Günuğur, “Aspect Historique des Rapports entre la Turquie et la CEE,” Gazi Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi 3, no. 1–2 (1987): 59–63. 3. Kamuran Reçber, Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği Ortaklık Hukuku (Bursa: Dora, 2016), 9. 4. Reçber, Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği, 20. 5. Mehmet Genç, “Türkiye-AT Ortaklık Mevzuatında Uyuşmazlıkların Çözümü,” In Prof. Dr. Nurhan AKÇAYLI’ya Armağan (Bursa: Uludağ Üniversitesi, 2000), 129. 6. Tuğrul Arat, “Türkiye’de AB Mevzuatına Uyum Çalışmaları,” In Avrupa Birliği El Kitabı (Ankara: Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası, 1995), 221–234. 7. Reçber, Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği, 38–51. 8. Parlement européen, La Turquie et les Relations avec l’Union européenne, Fiche Thématique No 7, Luxembourg, le 10 février 2000, accessed March 31, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​.eur​​oparl​​.euro​​pa​.eu​​/enla​​rgeme​​nt​/br​​iefin​​gs​/pd​​​f​/7a1​​_fr​.p​​df, 17-18. 9. Reçber, Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği, 106–108. 10. Kamuran Reçber, Avrupa Birliği Hukuku ve Temel Metinleri (Bursa: Dora, 2018), 174. 11. C-6/64, Arrêt du 15.07.1964, Costa/E.N.E.L., Rec. 1964, accessed March 31, 2020, https​:/​/eu​​r​-lex​​.euro​​pa​.eu​​/lega​​l​-con​​tent/​​FR​/TX​​T​/PDF​/​?uri​​=CELE​​X​:6​ 1964CJ0006​&from​=FR. 12. C-11/70, Arrêt du 17.12.1970, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH/ Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, Rec. 1970, accessed March 31, 2020, https​:/​/eu​​r​-lex​​.euro​​pa​.eu​​/lega​​l​-con​​tent/​​FR​/TX​​T​/PDF​/​?uri​​=CELE​​X​ :6​1970CJ0011​&from​=EN. 13. Reçber, Avrupa Birliği Hukuku, 175–177. 14. Accession Partnership Document, accessed March 31, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​.ab.​​ gov​.t​​r​/fil​​es​/AB​​_Ilis​​kiler​​i​/Tur​​_En​_R​​ealit​​ons​/A​​pd​/Tu​​​rkey_​​APD​_2​​008​.p​​df. 15. Conclusions de la Présidence Conseil Européen de Nice 7, 8 et 9 Décembre 2000, accessed March 31, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​.con​​siliu​​m​.eur​​opa​.e​​u​/ued​​ocs​/c​​ms​_da​​ta​/ do​​cs​/pr​​essda​​ta​/fr​​/ec​/0​​04​00-​​r1.​%2​​0ann.​​f0​.ht​​m. 16. Reçber, Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği, 227–230. 17. National Programmes for the Adoption of the Acquis, accessed March 31, 2020, https://www​.ab​.gov​.tr/​_42260​_en​.html. 18. Conclusion de la Présidence du Conseil Européen de Göteborg, 15 et 16 Juin 2001, accessed March 31, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​.con​​siliu​​m​.eur​​opa​.e​​u​/ueD​​ocs​/c​​ms​_Da​​ta​ /do​​cs​/pr​​essDa​​ta​/fr​​/​ec​/0​​0200-​​r1​.f1​​.pdf. 19. Union européenne “Décision du Conseil du 18 février 2008 relative aux principes, aux priorités et aux conditions du partenariat pour l’adhésion de la République de Turquie et abrogeant la décision 2006/35/CE (2008/157/CE),” Journal officiel de l’Union européenne L 51, 26.2.2008, accessed March 31, 2020, https​:/​/eu​​r​-lex​​.euro​​ pa​.eu​​/lega​​l​-con​​tent/​​FR​/TX​​T​/HTM​​L/​?ur​​i​=CEL​​EX​​:32008D0157​&from​=fr. 20. Reçber, Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği, 231.

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21. Kamuran Reçber, Tam Üyelik Müzakere Çerçeve Belgesi’nin Analizi (Bursa: Alfa Aktüel, 2006), 3–4. 22. Reçber, Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği, 233–234. 23. Ibid., 234–235. 24. Ibid., 235–236. 25. Ibid., 237–238. 26. Current Situation, accessed March 31, 2020, https://www​.ab​.gov​.tr​/65​_en​.html. 27. Reçber, Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği, 244–245. 28. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Avrupa Birliği Arasında İzinsiz İkamet Eden Kişilerin Geri Kabulüne İlişkin Anlaşma, Resmi Gazete, accessed March 31, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​ w​.res​​migaz​​ete​.g​​ov​.tr​​/eski​​ler​/2​​014​/0​​8​/201​​​40802​​-1​-1.​​pdf. 29. Türkiye-AB Geri Kabul Anlaşması’nın yürürlüğe girmesi konusunda Komisyon Üyesi Malmström tarafından yapılan açıklama, accessed March 31, 2020, http:​/​/eur​​opa​.e​​u​/rap​​id​/pr​​ess​-r​​eleas​​e​_STA​​TEMEN​​T​-14​-​​285​_t​​r​.htm​. 30. The UK withdrew from the EU on January 31, 2020. It shall continue to undertake the obligations arising from the EU acquis until December 31, 2020. 31. Reçber, Avrupa Birliği Hukuku, 685–692. 32. Directive 2008/115/CE du Parlement Européen et du Conseil du 16 décembre 2008 relative aux normes et procédures communes applicables dans les États membres au retour des ressortissants de pays tiers en séjour irrégulier, Journal officiel de l’Union européenne, L 348, 24.12.2008, accessed March 31, 2020, https​:/​/eu​​r​-lex​​ .euro​​pa​.eu​​/lega​​l​-con​​tent/​​FR​/TX​​T​/PDF​/​?uri​​=CELE​​X​:​32008L0115​&from​=FR. 33. Directive 2003/9/CE du Conseil du 27 janvier 2003 relative à des normes minimales pour l’accueil des demandeurs d’asile dans les États membres, Journal officiel de l’Union européenne, L 031, 06.02.2003, accessed March 31, 2020, http:​//​eur​​-lex.​​ europ​​a​.eu/​​LexUr​​iServ​​/LexU​​riSer​​v​.do?​​uri​=O​​J​:L​:2003​:031​​:0018​:0025​:fr​:PDF. 34. Directive 2005/85/CE du 1er décembre 2005 relative à des normes minimales concernant la procédure d’octroi et de retrait du statut de réfugié dans les États membres, Journal officiel de l’Union européenne, L 236, 13.12.2005, accessed March 31, 2020, http:​/​/eur​​-lex.​​europ​​a​.eu/​​LexUr​​iServ​​/LexU​​riSer​​v​.do?​​uri​=O​​J​:L​:2005​:326​​:0013​ :0034​:FR​:PDF. 35. Directive 2003/109/CE du Conseil du 25 novembre 2003 relative au statut des ressortissants de pays tiers résidents de longue durée, Journal officiel de l’Union européenne, L 16, 23.1.2004, accessed March 31, 2020, http:​/​/eur​​-lex.​​europ​​a​.eu/​​legal​​ -cont​​ent​/F​​R​/TXT​​/PDF/​​?uri=​​CELEX​​:320​03L0109​&from​=en. 36. Directive 2003/86/CE du Conseil du 22 septembre 2003 relative au droit au regroupement familial, Journal officiel de l’Union européenne, L 251, 3.10.2003, accessed March 31, 2020, http:​/​/eur​​-lex.​​europ​​a​.eu/​​legal​​-cont​​ent​/F​​R​/TXT​​/PDF/​​?uri=​​ CELEX​​:320​03L0086​&from​=en.

REFERENCES Accession Partnership Document. Accessed March 31, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​.ab.​​gov​.t​​r​/ fil​​es​/AB​​_Ilis​​kiler​​i​/Tur​​_En​_R​​ealit​​ons​/A​​pd​/Tu​​​rkey_​​APD​_2​​008​.p​​df.

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Accord créant une association entre la Communauté économique européenne et la Turquie – Protocole n° 1 : protocole provisoire – Protocole n° 2 : protocole financier – Acte final – Déclarations, Journal officiel des Communautés Européennes, 29.12.1964: 3687–3697. Accessed March 31, 2020, https​:/​/eu​​r​-lex​​.euro​​pa​.eu​​/lega​​l​ -con​​tent/​​FR​/TX​​T​/PDF​/​?uri​​=C​ELE​​X​:21964A1229(01)&from=FR. Arat, Tuğrul. “Türkiye’de AB Mevzuatına Uyum Çalışmaları.” In Avrupa Birliği El Kitabı, 221–234. Ankara: Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası, 1995. C-11/70, Arrêt du 17.12.1970, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH/Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, Rec. 1970. Accessed March 31, 2020, https​:/​/eu​​r​-lex​​.euro​​pa​.eu​​/lega​​l​-con​​tent/​​FR​/TX​​T​/PDF​/​?uri​​=CELE​​X​:6​1970CJ0011​ &from​=EN. C-6/64, Arrêt du 15.07.1964, Costa/E.N.E.L., Rec. 1964. Accessed March 31, 2020, https​:/​/eu​​r​-lex​​.euro​​pa​.eu​​/lega​​l​-con​​tent/​​FR​/TX​​T​/PDF​/​?uri​​=CELE​​X​:6​1964CJ0006​ &from​=FR. Conclusion de la Présidence du Conseil Européen de Göteborg, 15 et 16 Juin 2001. Accessed March 31, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​.con​​siliu​​m​.eur​​opa​.e​​u​/ueD​​ocs​/c​​ms​_Da​​ta​/do​​ cs​/pr​​essDa​​ta​/fr​​/​ec​/0​​0200-​​r1​.f1​​.pdf. Conclusions de la Présidence Conseil Européen de Nice 7, 8 et 9 Décembre 2000. Accessed March 31, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​.con​​siliu​​m​.eur​​opa​.e​​u​/ued​​ocs​/c​​ms​_da​​ta​/do​​ cs​/pr​​essda​​ta​/fr​​/ec​/0​​04​00-​​r1.​%2​​0ann.​​f0​.ht​​m. Current Situation. Accessed March 31, 2020, https://www​.ab​.gov​.tr​/65​_en​.html. Décision du Conseil du 18 février 2008 relative aux principes, aux priorités et aux conditions du partenariat pour l’adhésion de la République de Turquie et abrogeant la décision 2006/35/CE (2008/157/CE), Journal officiel de l’Union européenne, L 51, 26.2.2008. Accessed March 31, 2020, https​:/​/eu​​r​-lex​​.euro​​pa​.eu​​/lega​​l​-con​​tent/​​ FR​/TX​​T​/HTM​​L/​?ur​​i​=CEL​​EX​​:32008D0157​&from​=fr. Directive 2003/109/CE du Conseil du 25 novembre 2003 relative au statut des ressortissants de pays tiers résidents de longue durée, Journal officiel de l’Union européenne, L 16, 23.1.2004. Accessed March 31, 2020, http:​/​/eur​​-lex.​​europ​​a​.eu/​​ legal​​-cont​​ent​/F​​R​/TXT​​/PDF/​​?uri=​​CELEX​​:320​03L0109​&from​=en. Directive 2003/86/CE du Conseil du 22 septembre 2003 relative au droit au regroupement familial, Journal officiel de l’Union européenne, L 251, 3.10.2003. Accessed March 31, 2020, http:​/​/eur​​-lex.​​europ​​a​.eu/​​legal​​-cont​​ent​/F​​R​/TXT​​/PDF/​​?uri=​​CELEX​​ :320​03L0086​&from​=en. Directive 2003/9/CE du Conseil du 27 janvier 2003 relative à des normes minimales pour l’accueil des demandeurs d’asile dans les États membres, Journal officiel de l’Union européenne, L 031, 06.02.2003. Accessed March 31, 2020, http:​/​/eur​​-lex.​​ europ​​a​.eu/​​LexUr​​iServ​​/LexU​​riSer​​v​.do?​​uri​=O​​J​:L​:2003​:031​​:0018​:0025​:fr​:PDF. Directive 2005/85/CE du Conseil du 1er décembre 2005 relative à des normes minimales concernant la procédure d’octroi et de retrait du statut de réfugié dans les États membres, Journal officiel de l’Union européenne, L 236, 13.12.2005. Accessed March 31, 2020, http:​/​/eur​​-lex.​​europ​​a​.eu/​​LexUr​​iServ​​/LexU​​riSer​​v​.do?​​uri​ =O​​J​:L​:2005​:326​​:0013​:0034​:FR​:PDF. Directive 2008/115/CE du Parlement Européen Et Du Conseil du 16 décembre 2008 relative aux normes et procédures communes applicables dans les États membres

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au retour des ressortissants de pays tiers en séjour irrégulier, Journal officiel de l’Union européenne, L 348, 24.12.2008. Accessed March 31, 2020, https​:/​/eu​​r​-lex​​ .euro​​pa​.eu​​/lega​​l​-con​​tent/​​FR​/TX​​T​/PDF​/​?uri​​=CELE​​X​:​32008L0115​&from​=FR. Genç, Mehmet. “Türkiye-AT Ortaklık Mevzuatında Uyuşmazlıkların Çözümü,” In Prof. Dr. Nurhan AKÇAYLI’ya Armağan, 129–144. Bursa: Uludağ Üniversitesi, 2000. Günuğur, Haluk. “Aspect Historique des Rapports entre la Turquie et la CEE,” Gazi Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi 3, no. 1–2 (1987): 59–63. National Programmes for the Adoption of the Acquis. Accessed March 31, 2020, https://www​.ab​.gov​.tr/​_42260​_en​.html. Parlement européen, La Turquie et les Relations avec l’Union européenne, Fiche Thématique No 7, Luxembourg, le 10 février 2000. Accessed March 31, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​.eur​​oparl​​.euro​​pa​.eu​​/enla​​rgeme​​nt​/br​​iefin​​gs​/pd​​​f​/7a1​​_fr​.p​​df. Reçber, Kamuran. Avrupa Birliği Hukuku ve Temel Metinleri. Bursa: Dora, 2018. Reçber, Kamuran. Tam Üyelik Müzakere Çerçeve Belgesi’nin Analizi. Bursa: Alfa Aktüel, 2006. Reçber, Kamuran. Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği Ortaklık Hukuku. Bursa: Dora, 2016. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Avrupa Birliği Arasında İzinsiz İkamet Eden Kişilerin Geri Kabulüne İlişkin Anlaşma, Resmi Gazete. Accessed March 31, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​ .res​​migaz​​ete​.g​​ov​.tr​​/eski​​ler​/2​​014​/0​​8​/201​​​40802​​-1​-1.​​pdf. Türkiye-AB Geri Kabul Anlaşması’nın yürürlüğe girmesi konusunda Komisyon Üyesi Malmström tarafından yapılan açıklama. Accessed March 31, 2020, http:​/​/ eur​​opa​.e​​u​/rap​​id​/pr​​ess​-r​​eleas​​e​_STA​​TEMEN​​T​-14​-​​285​_t​​r​.htm​.

Part V

CHINA

Chapter 13

Will China Be Able to Transform Itself into a Great Maritime Power? Mesut Hakkı CAŞIN

INTRODUCTION Strategic competition is a power struggle between two or more leading states to control the international political order. As a general rule, there usually is an existing hegemon and an established order along with one or more revisionist power(s) that challenges the hegemonic power. This kind of competition is currently playing out across the Pacific, between the United States, as the leader of the status quo camp, and China, as the revisionist power. In this context, China’s primary objective is to unseat the United States from its maritime primacy in the Pacific region.1 It is also accepted by the United States, which reflects itself in a document released by the Trump administration on May 21, 2020.2 The strategy document recognizes China as the strategic rival of the United States. It declares a long-term strategic competition not only between the two states but also between the two systems. China’s maritime ambitions and activities may pose the most significant risk for the global order established by the United States in the last seven decades. As China expands its foreign policy interests and strategic power further into the Pacific Ocean, a division is developing between Beijing’s policies in the western Pacific. China’s multifaceted diplomacy has begun to affect the policies of traditional powers in the region. Since the early 1990s, Chinese political and military decision-makers have articulated three principles to guide China’s relations with major powers: “non-alliance, non-confrontation, and not directed against any third party.”3 The leaders of modern China have pursued a long-term political strategy of developing its comprehensive national power and ensuring a favorable “strategic configuration of power.” Chinese leaders have benefited from what they view as a “period of strategic opportunity” during the first two decades of the 21st century to develop 219

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domestically and expand China’s “comprehensive national power.” Over the coming decades, they are focused on realizing a powerful and prosperous China that is equipped with a “world-class” military, securing China’s status as a great power to emerge as the preeminent power in the Indo-Pacific region.4 In this regard, China aims to fill the power gap left by the Soviet Union. China’s advantage is comparatively more prominent than the Soviet Union, thanks to its impressive economic growth of more than 10% annually for the last three decades. China has managed to reflect its economic growth to its significant technological modernization innovation capability. It started a highly impressive shipbuilding program that comprises building a large and modern maritime capacity in both civilian and military aspects. As a result, Beijing has launched a new strategy designed to reconfigure global norms and institutions. Today, China transforms the world as it transforms itself.5 In the context of this chapter, if we look through a theoretical perspective, my argument here is that realism can explain China’s strategic behavior. As the central theoretical theme of this chapter, China has been involved in a military partnership with the Soviet Union during the Cold War era. Today, the military elites of China do not hesitate to openly challenge the United States in the Pacific region and its allies. China’s main partner in this endeavor is the Russian Federation, as in the early period of the Cold War era. China’s grand strategy is a product of realist power politics in an anarchical world, and a power shift in its favor drove its naval ambition. The demise of the Soviet Union enabled China to turn its focus from land to sea. China has made the most of this opportunity and created a sophisticated long-term strategy.6 Because maritime transformations pursued by new great powers led to much strategic instability without exception, we must underline that in terms of diplomatic history, the great power competition, the rise of land powers, has always been accompanied by a nationalist impulse for great power status in the maritime space. Great power competition in the Asia-Pacific region, mainly centered around containing China, will create a more complex and potentially more dangerous new arms race in the short term. Chinese leaders characterize China’s long-term military modernization program as essential to achieving great power status. President Xi has restructured the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) in China’s seven military regions into five theater commands. He also reorganized the Central Military Commission (CMC) by establishing and subordinating the army’s service headquarters; raising the stature and role of the strategic missile, air, and naval forces; and establishing a Strategic Support Force (SSF) to integrate space-, cyber-, and electronic-warfare capabilities. The current Xi Jinping administration has inherited the maritime strategy and the national goal to build a reliable sea power. In July 2013, President Xi Jinping stressed that

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the leaders should “further concern about the sea, know about the sea, manage the sea and make new achievements to enhance the progress of building a sea power.”7 As Andrew Erickson argues,8 “China’s naval build-up is only part of an extraordinary maritime transformation-modern history’s single example of a land power becoming a hybrid land-sea power and sustaining such an exceptional status. Underwriting this transition is a vast network of ports, shipping lines and financial systems, and-of course-increasingly advanced ships.”9 Meanwhile, China’s leaders are laying both the intellectual and material groundwork for out-of-area ventures. As a result, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) chiefs aim to guarantee passage regarding access from the time a ship leaves harbor in the China Sea and the Pacific in East Asia until it docks in the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, or European seaport.10 China is now viewed as an aspiring power for dominance in the Asia-Pacific and eastern Eurasia, more broadly, bidding for primacy by evicting the United States. Across multiple dimensions, China is seen as asserting itself aggressively, seizing disputed territories in the South China Sea, infiltrating the domestic politics of US democratic allies as far away as Australia, openly threatening Taiwan with reunification by force, and attempting to bring states into its orbit via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) of infrastructure development.11 CHINESE MILITARY AND NAVAL STRATEGY China’s transformation from a land-based power into a sea-based one can be considered as the most important change in the modern history of strategy. It has only been possible with an extraordinary man’s accession to power: Deng Xiaoping. He opened China’s economy and set the country on a path to become the world’s largest trading nation. Chinese naval ambitions have come into prominence as a consequence of the open-up and reform policy introduced by Deng.12 Deng Xiaoping deliberated the significant change in Chinese military strategy in September 1980 with these words: “In our future war against aggression, exactly what guideline should we adopt? I approve of these four characters—‘active defense.’” Chinese military strategy has begun to be transformed thereafter. It was the main course change from the strategy implemented in the mid-1960s. The old strategy was based on fighting a protracted war deep inside Chinese territory.13 Concordantly, the naval strategy of China has also gone through some significant changes. Many scholars argue that doctrinal change in China’s thinking on naval strategy has undergone two major changes: from the “near-coast defense” strategy before the mid-1980s to the “near-seas active defense” after the mid-1980s, and then to the advancement of a “far-seas

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operations” strategy by the mid-2000s. In the 1980s, under the leadership of PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy) Commander Liu Huaqing, the Chinese Navy assumed responsibility for defending all Chinese-claimed maritime space within the first island chain, an area that the PLA calls the “near seas.” In 1982, Admiral Liu Huaqing assumed command of the navy. Liu brought with him a firm conviction that China had vital maritime interests which was the navy’s task to protect. Liu Huaqing, trained at the Voroshilov naval academy, an advocate of Mahan’s theories, and a supporter of aircraft carrier programs, was a case in point. Liu Huaqing himself, as commander in chief of the navy, also penned several important articles in the public prints, most likely in an attempt to raise awareness toward maritime issues, to which the navy could contribute. Under Liu’s auspices, for instance, the Research Center for Evaluating Naval Equipment was launched in 1983, and the Navy Military Art Research Institute was founded in 1985. Thus, Liu’s influence was decisive in bringing about China’s naval modernization. China’s widening maritime concerns and increased budget resources in the 1980s favored the PLAN modernization, which proceeded along three paths—indigenous construction, foreign purchase, and reverse engineering. Liu Huaqing has declared the essentials of China’s new naval doctrine strategic framework as “resolute coastal defense,” “naval war of movement,” and “guerrilla warfare at sea,” accepted with major changes for new challenges. Early in 1986, Admiral Liu proposed to build an aircraft carrier. However, at that time, it was not approved due to complicated domestic and international environments. As mentioned above, such discussions on sea power and continental power, this achievement impacted to Chinese Navy, which in the late twenty-five years has a significant modernization effort, poses an acute challenge to engagement and investment in deterrent capability, its regional predominance in Asia-Pacific area, with critical implications for the future of the international system. Chinese military strength, meanwhile, is also expanding rapidly. With a growing surface and subsurface force and experience in expeditionary missions, its navy is now capable of conducting some out-of-area operations. China’s air force is fielding new generations of advanced fighters and attack aircraft, and increasingly deploying them to assert Chinese claims over the South and East China seas. Generally speaking, Beijing’s primary maritime security concern has always been homeland defense, which includes defending its extensive and most prosperous coastland, seeking reunification with Taiwan, and defending its maritime rights and interests in the near seas. Beijing’s major economic concern is the sustainable development of its national economy. That demands the safety and security of vital Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) so that China can

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enjoy unimpeded access to overseas sources of energy and materials as well as global markets.14 Furthermore, the 1990s’ “strategic transition” was based on the assumption of a decline in the Soviet Union. In the late 1990s, China’s third-generation leader Jiang Zemin stated that while continuing to implement the near-seas active defense strategy, the PLAN should “in the long run pay attention to enhancing the far-seas defense and operations capabilities.” We have to keep in mind that in strategical terms, just beyond the Cold War, China was already signaling to the world that it intended to develop a large naval power. The new strategy of “far-seas operations,” endorsed since the mid-2000s, may have major implications for the future development of China’s naval capabilities. It was only in 2007–2008 that the PLAN began regularly operating out of the area, in the so-called “far seas.” In December 2001, China’s third-generation leader Jiang Zemin emphasized that, while continuing to implement the strategy of active defense in the near seas, the Chinese Navy should “be careful to develop defense and operations capabilities in the far seas in the long term.” This mission statement hastened the transition to a new force structure as the Chinese Navy moved out of territorial waters, effectively covering a vast geographical area from the Pacific to the East Indian Ocean in international waters. Therefore, by creating “naval cities,” satellite facilities for new ports in the open sea and military airports have accelerated their construction. China decided to act upon a growing debate regarding the future role of China as a “responsible stakeholder” in world affairs, including military-related activities. China decided to dispatch a PLAN squadron off the coasts of Somalia. This act echoed Zheng He’s voyages to Eastern Africa six centuries ago and was picked on by the media. In 2009, Beijing also celebrated the sixtieth anniversary of both the PRC (People’s Republic of China) and the PLAN.15 In China, “naval strategy” serves two key purposes. It defines the principles guiding how the fleet will be used today, and it outlines the plans for building the capabilities needed to meet the requirements of tomorrow. By 2015, China’s naval strategy had officially changed to “near seas defense, far seas protection.”16 The Xi Doctrine seeks to make the Asia-Pacific region “China’s backyard,” and the South China Sea will no longer be in dispute— it will simply be the South China Sea. Thus, President Xi Jinping furthered Hu’s vision at a high-profile study session when he argued that China should take more of “an interest in the sea, understand the sea, strategically manage the sea, and continually do more to promote China’s efforts to become a maritime power.”17 Xi Jinping has demanded that China be capable of protecting a broad range of interests on foreign shores, including financial, oil, mining, and other commercial interests. Like other countries, China

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uses its navy as a tool of cooperative naval diplomacy. Port visits and other engagements send messages of goodwill to foreign navies, statesmen, and the publics. China’s overseas interests are found both on land and at sea. On land, the most important interest is protecting the security of Chinese citizens. But as China’s 2015 National Defense White Paper indicates, the PRC has also charged the military with protecting Chinese “institutions” and “assets abroad.”18 Before beginning a proper analysis of the strategy, it is necessary first to identify what is that China too seeks to keep foreign powers at bay by deterring military intervention through what has been termed anti-access/ area-denial (A2/AD), in essence making the costs of power projection unacceptable to an attacker—an objective that does not require China to achieve military parity. Chinese naval forces can be traced primarily to the maturation of an important shift in Beijing’s naval doctrine toward an anti-access doctrine. Recent efforts have rightly argued that the Chinese Navy aims to have “anti-access” or “counter-intervention” capabilities in PLAN military strategy and doctrine. China’s doctrinal shift also serves a much larger objective than simply protecting extensive Chinese claims in the East Asian seas, Taiwan included. A successfully implemented anti-access strategy has the potential to insulate East Asia from “external” interference and, in the absence of a local “peer competitor” with the means to balance China, perfectly serves Beijing’s hegemonic aspirations in the region.19 THE SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY OF THE CHINESE NAVY Since its inception, China’s shipbuilding industry has always been involved in constructing ships for the PLAN. Outside of China’s shipbuilding industry, factories and R&D institutes in the aerospace and electronics industry contributed to naval development by producing naval variants of surface-to-surface missiles and surface-to-air missile systems. These improvements in naval design and production have continued with the next generation of destroyers.20 The story of China’s naval modernization is not only one of quantitative improvement, but also one of significant qualitative enhancement as well. China has not released a long-term naval shipbuilding plan, but analysts can make reasonable estimates about its future force structure.21 Considering the last twenty-five years of China naval ship construction policies, Chinese military leaders expressed desire and ability to continue to increase its spending on naval shipbuilding; the cost advantages its shipbuilding industry enjoy compared to foreign naval shipyards, and Chinese shipbuilders’ continued trend of indigenous technical mastery of sophisticated designs and systems

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integration. Chinese Naval policy objectives engaged in a robust surface combatant construction program, producing new guided-missile cruisers, guided-missile destroyers, and guided-missile frigates, which will significantly upgrade the PLAN’s air defense, anti-ship, and anti-submarine capabilities. China’s military industry has organized with the arrival in China of Varyag in March of 2002. Chinese aircraft carrier is the primary example of the transformation of the PLAN’s forces. China’s first aircraft carrier, Liaoning (Type 001), entered service in 2012. China’s second aircraft carrier (first indigenous carrier), Shandong (Type 001A), entered service on December 17, 2019. China’s third carrier, Type 002, is under construction. China’s fourth carrier, reportedly also to be built to the Type 002 design, may begin construction as early as 2021. Observers have speculated that China may eventually field a force of four to six (or possibly more than six) aircraft carriers. In late November 2019, it was reported that the Chinese government, while deciding to proceed with the construction of the fourth carrier, has put on hold plans to build a fifth carrier, known as the Type 003, which was to be nuclear-powered, due to budgetary and technical considerations. Under construction, every major PLAN surface combatant can embark on a helicopter to support over-the-horizon targeting, ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare), and search and rescue. By the second decade of the 2000s, the PLAN was using Chinese designs for surface ships primarily equipped with Chinese weapons and sensors. Furthermore, the era of past designs has given way to producing a modern multi-mission destroyer, frigate, and corvette classes as China’s technological advancement in naval design have begun to approach a level commensurate with, and in some cases exceeding, that of other modern navies.22 We can say that in the mid and long term, the Chinese commercial and military shipbuilding industry will continue at a very rapid pace for the next couple of decades, because of their government making shipbuilding one of their power factors in terms of “national strategic purposes.” Ever since its first nuclear experiment, the Chinese policy on nuclear weapons has been declared as that of “No First Use” (NFU). Sea-based nuclear weapons reduce the reaction time available to an adversary, due to launches taking place closer to their territory (compared to land-based ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles)). The direction of launches can also be varied, posing a more significant challenge to any missile defense system, which is easier to focus on expected directions of attack. Chinese strategists have also been influenced by the trend that every other nuclear-weapon state that has signed on to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has increased the role of sea-based nuclear weapons in its nuclear posture, and the proportion of sea-based nuclear capability in national nuclear deterrent

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systems will continue to rise. Chinese strategists point out that “nuclear submarines armed with strategic nuclear missiles are the ideal type of nuclear retaliation capability.”23 We should underline that the PLAN recognizes that to conduct complex joint operations, exercise greatly enhanced command and control, and effectively employ modern weapons, it needs a better-educated, more experienced officer corps. China has been steadily modernizing its submarine force, and most of its submarines are now built to relatively modern Russian and Chinese designs. China’s modernizing force includes several types of submarines. The geography of the Chinese coastline, its surrounding islands, and the depths of waters in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea impose significant constraints on Chinese naval operations. Most of China’s submarines are non-nuclear-powered attack submarines (S.S.s). China also operates a small number of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and a small number of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The number of SSNs and SSBNs may grow in the coming years, but the force will likely continue to consist mostly of S.S.s. FROM THE PANDA DIPLOMACY TO THE DRAGON REALISM The economic development of China over the past forty years has inevitably brought about an increase in its military capacity. As anyone with a hammer in his hand sees every problem as a nail, China has begun to abandon its tendency to solve its problems with economic and soft power elements. This situation made it to be felt more prominently, especially in the process of the COVID-19 pandemic. Deng Xiaoping’s “hide your strength, bide your time” approach has been replaced by Xi Jinping’s strategy, which does not hesitate to threaten the United States. In this context, it is remarkable that Xi Jinping expresses that China will not hesitate to use force, especially for Taiwan.24 Besides, this issue was also mentioned in the recently published Defense White Paper of China, and it was emphasized in the document that China would not hesitate to use force to solve the Taiwan problem.25 A similar situation shows itself in the reaction to the protests in Hong Kong. Finally, during the session of the Chinese People’s Congress held this year, the Hong Kong National Security Law was adopted. In a sense, the special status of Hong Kong, which gained its independence from the UK in 1997, was abolished.26 In this regard, the reaction of US Secretary of State Pompeo reveals the seriousness of the situation.27 It is also a significant development for the United States that China reiterated that it might resort to military solutions in Taiwan, if necessary. This is a clear sign that China expects that the United States

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may support Taiwan’s independence in the coming period. Since it is now clearly seen that the United States and China are drifting into a new cold war day by day, countries such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, and the Philippines in the region are the natural allies of the United States in this new cold war. However, the situation is particularly problematic for developing countries in the region. They will be under extreme pressure to choose sides. This is not just pressure for the countries of the region. It also applies to Europe’s leading states, including traditional US allies such as Germany, France, the UK, and Turkey. All of these countries don’t want to be a party to any tension between these two great powers. Because there are fundamental differences between the Cold War period that lasted until the collapse of the Soviet Union after World War II and the period we are in. China had become the largest trading partner of almost all countries globally in the last twenty years following 2001 when it became a member of the World Trade Organization. This has dramatically increased interdependence. The economic consequences of the military and political tension between China and the United States will negatively affect all countries of the world. This pressure may have devastating effects, especially for developing and underdeveloped countries. As of the point we have reached today, it is unlikely that the United States and China will face a direct military conflict. However, a proxy war may be possible. In this context, problems such as Taiwan’s independence, the nuclearization of North Korea, and the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas in the South China Sea come to the fore. However, problems such as border conflicts between India and China should not be overlooked. The tension that may arise between China and the United States will undoubtedly reflect itself in the seas. Considering the development of the Chinese sea power, we can witness that China will establish maritime domination over the first island chain and, subsequently, the second island chain and Djibouti, following Japan’s example in its region. In such a scenario, a long-term strategic tension that covers the whole world will become inevitable. Turkey will remain under pressure to take sides if the tension increases between the two great powers. Considering the relatively low-level economic relations between Turkey and China and sensitive issues such as Xinjiang, Turkey will take sides with the United States. However, problems with the United States and Western European countries in the recent period may cause some issues in this regard. Against this background, it is evident that the world should prepare itself for the US-China cold war in an environment where China has given up its soft power and panda diplomacy and rapidly progressing toward a dragon realism.

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CONCLUSION This study shows that, firstly, in our opinion, China’s maritime power today and near the future grew in numbers, became increasingly modern and professional, and expanded its scope speed, marching up to become a sea power of the first order. In this regard, we think there is no doubt that China’s power projections are aimed at modernizing its naval power. This challenge is parallel to Chinese military behavioral patterns and will strongly modernize its military forces. Thirdly, and geographically, the PLAN’s out-of-area mission set is centered on the Indo-Pacific. In particular, the Northern Indian Ocean contains the sea lanes linking China to resources and markets abroad. However, China also has interests in other parts of the world. China shows a clear intention to expand its power toward the Western Pacific Ocean, as the first and second island chain concept demonstrates. China’s naval strategy objectives aimed to dominate the Asia-Pacific region will prevent the great powers and regional actors from possible “external” enemies. This desire could be realized by fielding a powerful naval force that is devoted to sea denial missions. Indeed, in the long term, Chinese leaders are focused on developing the capabilities for China to increase its pressure on other claimant states in the South China Sea and “unwelcome” forces such as those of the United States in a concerted fashion. This pressure, which had hitherto been primarily political and economic, is becoming increasingly militarized. Other South China Sea states are also asserting their claims and developing their naval capacity, albeit to a lesser degree than China. Combined with other drivers of regional naval modernization discussed earlier, there exists a trend to naval growth in the region. Fourthly, from the balance of power theory, China has tried its best to push the United States out, keep Japan down, and India out while simultaneously favoring her dominance over regional affairs. Thus, it is a new and dynamic phenomenon that China’s Naval Power has become a permanent actor not only in Pacific-Atlantic-Indian Oceans in the Gulf of Aden and has expanded the scope of Chinese military diplomacy to the West but also in the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and even the Baltic Sea. Russia and China perform joint drills in the Black Sea and escort the Syrian chemical weapons in the Mediterranean Sea and escorts the Syrian chemical weapons in the Mediterranean Sea. Chinese overseas naval forces are currently concentrated in the Gulf of Aden. It will fuel growing concerns in the region about China’s naval activities. We can say PLAN has become a permanent actor in the Gulf of Aden and to the Black Sea, which expanded the scope of Chinese military diplomacy. This reflects convincing proof that even voluntary escorting of

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the Syrian chemical weapons is an excellent example of the shift in Chinese behavior at sea for its future intentions. Most importantly, Beijing’s political and military leaders intend for China’s Naval Power to be a technological superpower and self-sufficient in technology. We think that the South China Sea may bring more tension, although China is likely to complete the task of making it into a Chinese lake. PLAN bases and artificial islands in the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands are complemented by building another base further north in the Scarborough Shoal; Beijing will have a stiff triangle of control.28 In our opinion, China has reached the capacity to use its modernized navy as a “coercive diplomatic leverage” to transfer power to future disputed territories. Chinese president Xi Xinping wants the Chinese Navy to be a world-class “first-class force” and wants the launched Navy modernization to be completed by 2035. Xi Jinping stated that the Chinese victory over Japanese military aggression was due to 5,000 years of Chinese civilization and peace-loving. However, it is assumed that this brief chapter confirms that it will not be a surprise that China, the rising power as the Pacific center of global economic production, will take a revisionist approach to take more active roles in world politics in the future, in parallel with its economic and military growth. Yes, since war and peace cannot be unarmed, it can be said that the messages of how the international community will follow China in the future will soon become more evident. The result is likely to be a China that is ever-more eager to reshape global governance and conditions, as it senses the high tide of its power receding.

NOTES 1. Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, “Where Does Canada Fit in the US–China Strategic Competition across the Pacific?,” International Journal 71, no. 2 (2016): 214–230. 2. “United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China,” May 21, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​.whi​​tehou​​se​.go​​v​/wp-​​conte​​nt​/up​​loads​​/2020​​/05​/U​​.S.​-S​​trate​​gic​ -A​​pproa​​ch​-to​​-The-​​Peopl​​es​-Re​​publi​​c​-of-​​​China​​-Repo​​rt​-5.​​20​.20​​.pdf, accessed August 11, 2020. 3. Evan S. Medeiros, “China’s Foreign Policy Actions – Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification,” China’s International Behavior, RAND Corporation, 2009: 93–96. 4. “2019 Pentagon Report to Congress on Chinese Military Development,” USNI News, 3 May 2019.

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5. Chinese president Jiang Zemin launched his country’s first “go out” policy, encouraging the country’s state-owned enterprises to go abroad in search of natural resources. Elizabeth C. Economy, “The Game Changer: Coping with China’s Foreign Policy Revolution,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 6 (November/December 2010): 142–152. 6. The most important element of its post–Cold War strategy is represented in Deng Xiaoping’s guidance expressed on September 1989. He constructed an international strategy known as the “24 character strategy” designed to enhance China’s power and international position for the future. Some of these characters manifest as “observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time (until the completion of modernization); maintain a low profile.” 7. Zhihai Xie, “China’s Rising Maritime Strategy: Implications for Its Territorial Disputes,” Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies 3, no. 2 (2017): 111–124. 8. Andrew S. Erickson, “Chinese Shipbuilding and Sea Power: Full Steam Ahead, Destination Uncharted,” http://cimsec​ .org​ /chinese- shipbuilding- andseapower- full- steam- ahead- destination- uncharted/39383, accessed August 11, 2020. 9. Erik Khzmalyan, “Troubled Waters: The US Navy and the Return of Great Power Politics,” January 18, 2019, https​:/​/ww​​w​.geo​​polit​​icalm​​onito​​r​.com​​/trou​​ bled-​​water​​s​-the​​-us​-n​​avy​-a​​nd​-th​​e​-ret​​urn​-o​​f​-g​re​​at​-po​​wer​-p​​oliti​​cs/, accessed August 11, 2020. 10. Dmitry Flipoff, “Red Star over the Pacific: A Conversation with James Holmes on China’s Maritime Rise,” August 13, 2019, cimse​​c​.org​​/red-​​star-​​over-​​the​-p​​acifi​​c​-a​ -c​​onver​​satio​​n​-wit​​h​-jam​​es​-ho​​lmes-​​on​-ch​​inas-​​​marit​​ime​-r​​ise​/4​​1300,​ accessed August 11, 2020. 11. Patrick Porter, “Advice for a Dark Age – Managing Great Power Competition,” The Washington Quarterly 42, no. 1 (2019): 7–25. 12. Jonathan D. T. Ward, “The Influence of Sea Power upon China,” Proceedings, Vol. 145/8/1,398, August 2019, https​:/​/ww​​w​.usn​​i​.org​​/maga​​zines​​/proc​​eedin​​gs​/20​​19​/ au​​gu​st/​​influ​​ence-​ seapower- upon- china, accessed August 11, 2020. 13. Fravel M. Taylor, Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy since 1949 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019), 24. 14. In accordance with its national interests, Beijing has developed two maritime strategic goals over last decades. The primary goal is to defend China proper. This includes defending China from its various maritime rivals, developing necessary capabilities to maintain maritime territorial and economic interests and rights, and supporting potential contingencies against Taiwan. The secondary goal is to protect its development interests which are expanding globally. Those interests include enhancing capabilities to protect vital SLOCs and strategic chokepoints, countering piracy threats, and protecting Chinese citizens working and studying abroad if and when necessary. Zhengyu Wu, “Towards Naval Normalcy: ‘Open Seas Protection’ and Sino- US Maritime Relations,” The Pacific Review 32, no. 4 (2019): 666–693.

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15. Jun J. Nohara, “Sea Power as a Dominant Paradigm: The Rise of China’s New Strategic Identity,” Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies 6, no. 2 (2017): 210–232. 16. Ryan D. Martinson, “The Role of the Arctic in Chinese Naval Strategy,” December 20, 2019, China Brief Volume: 19 Issue: 22, https://jamestown​ .org​ / program​/the- role- of- the- arctic- in- chinese- naval- strategy/, accessed August 15, 2020. 17. Nick Danby, “China’s Navy Looms Larger,” Harvard Political Review, October 5, 2019, http:​/​/str​​ategi​​cstud​​yindi​​a​.blo​​gspot​​.com/​​2019/​​​10​/ch​​inas-​ navylooms- larger​.htm​l, accessed August 20, 2020. 18. Information Office of the State Council, “China’s Military Strategy,” May 2015, www​.china​.org​.cn​/china​/2015- 05/26/ content​_35661433​.h​tm, accessed November 18, 2019. 19. Yves- Heng Lim, “Expanding the Dragon’s Reach: The Rise of China’s Antiaccess Naval Doctrine and Forces,” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 1–2 (2017): 146–168. 20. Evan S. Medeiros, Roger Cliff, Keith Crane and James C. Mulvenon, “A New Direction for China’s Defense Industry,” RAND Corporation (2005): 110–154. 21. Patrick M. Cronin, Mira Rapp- Hooper, Harry Krejsa, Alex Sullivan and Rush Doshi, “China’s Naval Evolution: Strategy, Capabilities, and Missions for a Global PLAN,” Center for a New American Security (2017): 7–15. 22. “China Military Power Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win.” 23. Amit Ray, “Forecast of Chinese SSBN Force Levels,” Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India 15, no. 2 (2020): 44–58. 24. Lily Kuo, “‘All necessary means’: Xi Jinping reserves right to use force against Taiwan,” January 2, 2019, https​:/​/ww​​w​.the​​guard​​ian​.c​​om​/wo​​rld​/2​​019​/j​​an​/02​​ /​all-​​neces​​sary-​ means​-xi-j​inpin​g-res​erves​-righ​t-to-​use-f​orce-​again​st-ta​iwan,​ accessed August 16, 2020. 25. Anthony H. Cordesman, “China’s New 2019 Defense White Paper,” July 24, 2019, https​:/​/ww​​w​.csi​​s​.org​​/anal​​ysis/​​china​​s​-new​​-2019​​-defe​​nse​-w​​​hite-​​paper​, accessed August 16, 2020. 26. Keith Bradsher, “China Approves Plan to Rein in Hong Kong, Defying Worldwide Outcry,” May 28, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​.nyt​​imes.​​com​/2​​020​/0​​5​/28/​​world​​/asia​​ /chin​​a​-hon​​g​-kon​​g​​-cra​​ckdow​​n​.htm​​l, accessed August 16, 2020. 27. Carol Morello, “Pompeo declares Hong Kong no longer autonomous from China,” May 28, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​.was​​hingt​​onpos​​t​.com​​/nati​​onal-​​secur​​ity​/p​​ompeo​​ -decl​​ares-​​hong-​​kong-​​no​-lo​​nger-​​auton​​omous​​-from​​-chin​​a​/202​​0​/05/​​27​/27​​73096​​c​-a03​​6​ -11e​​a​​-9d9​​6​-c3f​​7c755​​fd6e_​​story​​.html​, accessed August 16, 2020. 28. Charles Parton, “Foresight 2020: The Challenges Facing China,” RUSI Journal, February 11, 2020, https​:/​/ru​​si​.or​​g​/pub​​licat​​ion​/r​​usi​-j​​ourna​​l​/for​​esigh​​t​-202​​0​ -cha​​lleng​​​es​-fa​​cing-​​china​, accessed August 30, 2020.

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REFERENCES Blumenthal, Daniel. “The Unpredictable Rise of China,” February 3, 2019, https​ :/​/ww​​w​.the​​atlan​​tic​.c​​om​/id​​eas​/a​​rchiv​​e​/201​​9​/02/​​how​-a​​meric​​ans​-m​​isund​​ersta​​nd​-ch​​​ inas-​​ambit​​ions/​​58186​​9/ . Accessed August 10, 2020. Bradsher, Keith. “China Approves Plan to Rein in Hong Kong, Defying Worldwide Outcry,” May 28, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​.nyt​​imes.​​com​/2​​020​/0​​5​/28/​​world​​/asia​​/chin​​a​ -hon​​g​-kon​​g​​-cra​​ckdow​​n​.htm​​l. Accessed August 16, 2020. Cordesman, Anthony H. “China’s New 2019 Defense White Paper,” July 24, 2019, https​:/​/ww​​w​.csi​​s​.org​​/anal​​ysis/​​china​​s​-new​​-2019​​-defe​​nse​-w​​​hite-​​paper​. Accessed August 16, 2020. Cronin, Patrick M., Rapp-Hooper, Mira, Krejsa, Harry, Sullivan, Alex and Doshi, Rush, “China’s Naval Evolution: Strategy, Capabilities, and Missions for a Global PLAN,” Center for a New American Security (2017): 7–15. Danby, Nick. “China’s Navy Looms Larger,” Harvard Political Review, October 5, 2019, http:​/​/str​​ategi​​cstud​​yindi​​a​.blo​​gspot​​.com/​​2019/​​10​/ch​​inas-​​navy-​​looms​​​-larg​​er​ .ht​​ml. Accessed August 20, 2020. Economy, Elizabeth C. “The Game Changer: Coping with China’s Foreign Policy Revolution.” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 6 (November/December 2010): 142–152. Erickson, Andrew S., “Chinese Shipbuilding and Sea Power: Full Steam Ahead, Destination Uncharted,” http:​/​/cim​​sec​.o​​rg​/ch​​inese​​-ship​​build​​ing​-a​​nd​-se​​apowe​​r​-ful​​l​ -ste​​am​-ah​​ead​-d​​estin​​ati​on​​-unch​​arted​​/3938​​3. Accessed August 11, 2020. Flipoff, Dmitry. “Red Star over the Pacific: A Conversation with James Holmes on China’s Maritime Rise,” August 13, 2019, cimse​​c​.org​​/red-​​star-​​over-​​the​-p​​acifi​​c​-a​-c​​ onver​​satio​​n​-wit​​h​-jam​​es​-ho​​lmes-​​on​-ch​​inas-​​​marit​​ime​-r​​ise​/4​​1300.​ Accessed August 11, 2020. Holmes, James, “Has China’s Navy Caught Up (and Surpassed) Japan?,” May 23, 2020, https​:/​/na​​tiona​​linte​​rest.​​org​/f​​eatur​​e​/has​​-chin​​as​-na​​vy​-ca​​ught-​​and​-s​​urpas​​s​ed​-j​​ apan-​​15721​​6. Accessed August 10, 2020. “2019 Pentagon Report to Congress on Chinese Military Development,” USNI News, May 3, 2019, https​:/​/ne​​ws​.us​​ni​.or​​g​/201​​9​/05/​​03​/20​​19​-pe​​ntago​​n​-rep​​ort​-t​​o​-con​​gress​​ -on​-c​​hines​​e​​-mil​​itary​​-deve​​lopme​​nt. Accessed August 10, 2020. Information Office of the State Council, “China’s Military Strategy,” May 2015, www​.china​.org​.cn​/china​/2015​-05​/26/ content​_35661433​.h​tm. Accessed November 18, 2019. Kawasaki, Tsuyoshi, “Where Does Canada Fit in the US–China Strategic Competition across the Pacific?” International Journal 71, no. 2 (2016): 214–230. Khzmalyan, Erik. “Troubled Waters: The US Navy and the Return of Great Power Politics,” January 18, 2019, https​:/​/ww​​w​.geo​​polit​​icalm​​onito​​r​.com​​/trou​​bled-​​ water​​s​-the​​-us​-n​​avy​-a​​nd​-th​​e​-ret​​urn​-o​​f​-g​re​​at​-po​​wer​-p​​oliti​​cs/. Accessed August 11, 2020. Kuo, Lily. “‘All necessary means’: Xi Jinping reserves right to use force against Taiwan,” January 2, 2019, https​:/​/ww​​w​.the​​guard​​ian​.c​​om​/wo​​rld​/2​​019​/

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j​​an​/02​​/all-​​neces​​sary-​​means​​-xi​-j​​inpin​​g​-res​​erves​​-righ​​t​-to-​​u​se​-f​​orce-​​again​​st​-ta​​iwan. Accessed August 16, 2020. Lim, Yves-Heng. “Expanding the Dragon’s Reach: The Rise of China’s Anti-access Naval Doctrine and Forces,” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 1–2 (2017): 146–168. Martinson, Ryan D. “The Role of the Arctic in Chinese Naval Strategy,” 20 December 2019, China Brief Volume: 19 Issue: 22, https​:/​/ja​​mesto​​wn​.or​​g​/ pro​​gram/​​the​-r​​ole​-o​​f​-the​​-arct​​ic​-in​​-chin​​ese​-​n​​aval-​​strat​​egy/. Accessed August 15, 2020. Medeiros, Evan S. “China’s Foreign Policy Actions – Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification,” China’s International Behavior, RAND Corporation, 2009. Medeiros, Evan, Cliff, S. Roger, Crane, Keith and Mulvenon, James C. “A New Direction for China’s Defense Industry,” RAND Corporation, 2005. Michta, Andrew A. “China’s Long Game,” May 27, 2019, https​:/​/ww​​w​.the​​-amer​​ican-​​ inter​​est​.c​​om​/20​​19​/05​​/27​/c​​hinas​​​-long​​-game​/. Accessed August 10, 2020. Morello, Carol. “Pompeo declares Hong Kong no longer autonomous from China,” May 28, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​.was​​hingt​​onpos​​t​.com​​/nati​​onal-​​secur​​ity​/p​​ompeo​​-decl​​ ares-​​hong-​​kong-​​no​-lo​​nger-​​auton​​omous​​-from​​-chin​​a​/202​​0​/05/​​27​/27​​73096​​c​-a03​​6 ​ -11e​​a​​-9d9​​6​-c3f​​7c755​​fd6e_​​story​​.html​. Accessed August 16, 2020. Nohara, Jun J. “Sea Power as a Dominant Paradigm: The Rise of China’s New Strategic Identity,” Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies 6, no. 2 (2017): 210–232. Parton Charles. “Foresight 2020: The Challenges Facing China,” RUSI Journal, February 11, 2020, https​:/​/ru​​si​.or​​g​/pub​​licat​​ion​/r​​usi​-j​​ourna​​l​/for​​esigh​​t​-202​​0​-cha​​ lleng​​​es​-fa​​cing-​​china​. Accessed August 30, 2020. Porter, Patrick. “Advice for a Dark Age- Managing Great Power Competition,” The Washington Quarterly 42, no. 1 (2019): 7–25. Ray, Amit. “Forecast of Chinese SSBN Force Levels,” Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India 15, no. 2 (2020): 44–58. Taylor, Fravel M. Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy since 1949. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019. United States of America Defence Intelligence Agency, “China Military Power Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win,” 2019, https​:/​/ap​​ps​.dt​​ic​.mi​​l​/dti​​c​/tr/​​fullt​​ext​/ u​​2​/​106​​6163.​​pdf. Accessed August 20, 2020. “United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China,” May 21, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​.whi​​tehou​​se​.go​​v​/wp-​​conte​​nt​/up​​loads​​/2020​​/05​/U​​.S.​-S​​trate​​gic​-A​​pproa​​ ch​-to​​-The-​​Peopl​​es​-Re​​publi​​c​-of-​​​China​​-Repo​​rt​-5.​​20​.20​​.pdf. Accessed August 11, 2020. Ward, Jonathan D. T., “The Influence of Sea power upon China,” Proceedings, August 2019, https​:/​/ww​​w​.usn​​i​.org​​/maga​​zines​​/proc​​eedin​​gs​/20​​19​/au​​gust/​​influ​​ence-​​ seapo​​​wer​-u​​pon​-c​​hina. Accessed August 11, 2020. “What does China really spend on its military?” May 25, 2020, https​:/​/ch​​inapo​​wer​.c​​ sis​.o​​rg​/mi​​litar​​y​-s​pe​​nding​/. Accessed August 10, 2020.

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Wu, Zhengyu. “Towards Naval Normalcy: ‘Open Seas Protection’ and Sino-US Maritime Relations,” The Pacific Review 32, no. 4 (2019): 666–693. Xie, Zhihai. “China’s Rising Maritime Strategy: Implications for its Territorial Disputes,” Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies 3, no. 2 (2017): 111–124.

Chapter 14

Energy Diplomacy and Foreign Policy Choice Turkmenistan’s Relations with China Yaşar SARI

INTRODUCTION Energy has become the core subject of China-Turkmenistan relations. Turkmenistan has prosperous energy resources, mostly still untapped natural gas, and oil reserves. It makes energy cooperation one of the most important strategic assets for both sides and, therefore, a vital element of China’s relations with Turkmenistan. Moreover, China has been developed close economic relations since the 1990s in parallel to the increasing presence of Chinese investors. Moreover, Turkmenistan’s importance has further increased for China because it has turned into the transportation hub for the Chinese manufactured goods to the Middle East and Europe. Thus, the economic situation of the country also has an essential effect on foreign policy choices. If it is to be evaluated in terms of Turkmenistan, which is the subject of this study, natural resources are important for foreign policy preferences and results. Turkmenistan needs both foreign investment and customers for its natural resources. Moreover, transporting natural resources to international markets can be both the instruments of its foreign policy and the goal Turkmen ruling elites want to achieve. Countries dependent on their natural resources to have economic relations with the emerging superpower appear to be an acceptable policy and an effective method for ruling elites to prioritize their interests and strengthen their regimes. Thus, given economic diplomacy as a higher priority, it is essential to make foreign policy choices related to China meaningful. Therefore, Turkmenistan has given importance and priority to economic diplomacy when it deals with China. Therefore, the Turkmen ruling elites 235

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expect that their economic ties with China and being part of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects bring Turkmenistan to a robust international stand and rapid commercial and economic development. This includes supporting the economy’s internationalization, selling its energy resources at world market prices, attracting foreign investment, and being a transportation hub for Chinese products to the West. Thus, economic diplomacy has been given higher priority to ensure not only to strengthen economic ties but also to promote national elites’ interests and values. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK While many global and regional actors are active in Central Asia, few states can influence politically and economically Central Asian countries. Even though Russia remains the most influential and dominant power, one must now consider China’s growing influence in the region. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, China has three distinctive approaches to the Central Asia region as a whole and each Central Asian country as an individual. First, China has considered Central Asia significant to its national security and territorial integrity starting from 1991.1 The security dimensions of China’s engagement included denial of any support to ethnic minorities in East Turkestan (officially known Xingjian Uyghur Autonomous Region) from Central Asia, demilitarization of the border, and anti-terrorist cooperation. China views Central Asian states as critical buffer states for stabilizing and developing its East Turkestan region. The creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has served China’s security and economic interests in the area. Second, China has perceived each Central Asian country as a bilateral partner for the economic sphere. Thus, China becomes the leading trade partner for the Central Asian states. The Central Asia-China natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China symbolizes China’s growing economic momentum.2 Third, China has viewed Central Asia as part of its global ambition since 2013. Energy and transportation projects are the main projects in Central Asia, and they are essential for China’s global power status. Thus, China’s engagements with Central Asia serve as a vehicle to advance its security, trade, and energy goals. Energy and trade relations become the core subjects between Central Asian countries with China. The Central Asian countries’ very rich in energy resources, mostly still untapped natural gas and oil reserves, which some of them are located in Turkmenistan, make energy cooperation one of the most important strategic assets for both sides.3 Moreover, China has been involved in the region since the 1990s in parallel to the increasing presence of Chinese investors. The region’s importance has further increased for China because

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Central Asia turned into the transportation hub for the Chinese manufactured goods to the Middle East and Europe. Thus, with the BRI projects, China opens to global aspects of its relations with Central Asian states. Before the BRI program’s announcement, China economically engaged bilaterally with Central Asian countries, especially with Turkmenistan. Therefore, energy projects are the cornerstone of China’s Central Asian vision and future world order projection. FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS AND BEHAVIORS The Central Asian region has rich energy resources important for its geopolitical position in the Eurasian continent. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a political and economic vacuum emerged in the area. So, the interests of major powers increased. Moreover, global economic power continues to shift, and new and emerging actors in global and regional politics change the countries’ alignment. China is one of the emerging global powerhouses. It is increasingly shaping international politics and its neighbors’ policy agenda, such as those of Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan is a relatively newly independent state, and the post–Cold War transformation of power configuration globally allows Turkmenistan to survive independently. Survival became the fundamental purpose of its early diplomacy.4 Not only that, but it also provides a sense of security for the leadership of the country too. Therefore, being a newly independent state, the ruling elites’ priority in Turkmenistan was to survive and keep their authority over the country. The country’s rulers have refused to commit themselves politically and economically to any other major powers and maintain close relations with their former boss, Russia, and major neighboring countries, including China, Iran, and Turkey. Foreign policy decision-making is a complex process in which different actors and factors play important roles and influence. Although the realist school of international relations claims otherwise, not only developments in the international system but also the domestic policy’s developments and the country’s domestic political structure and the regime are the critical factors in the foreign policy decision-making process. For this reason, to analyze a country’s foreign policy, it is necessary to consider the political regime of that country, the personalities of the leadership or orientation of the ruling elite, economic conditions, ideologies, and the level of interaction between the country’s ruling elite and powerful institutions. Therefore, foreign policy is not a simple phenomenon that only considers external actors and structures and sees it through the chess or billiard ball metaphor.5 In this respect, apart from the structural factors affecting the foreign policy process, the country’s political regime also plays a decisive role. Primarily,

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it is valid for authoritarian regimes. In countries with an authoritarian character, such as Turkmenistan and China, decision-makers’ international and domestic political approaches are also critical. Another critical aspect of authoritarian regimes is that they cannot ignore their own public opinion preferences and sensitivities. They tend to ensure their administration’s legitimacy when making foreign policy decisions and look after their own political legacy.6 The second factor is the leadership and political elite’s approach to foreign policy. In authoritarian governments, the leader’s character determines which preferences to consider on a specific foreign policy issue and how the decision will be implemented. Leaders of authoritarian countries may make decisions with few advisors to control events, accumulate power, and make a final decision that does not contradict the general expectations. They also care about their personal or ruling elites’ interests too.7 The third factor influencing the foreign policy-making process and decisions is the dominant ideological or political tendencies among the ruling elites. In authoritarian regimes, there are two curves. The first trend is pragmatism. Authoritarian leaders are not directly affected by the preferences of the public opinion in the country during the decision-making process. However, if there is an intense nationalist trend in the country, authoritarian leaders cannot ignore this trend.8 Moreover, authoritarian leaders also need to promote their policies to the public to gain public support. Leaders use to promote their policies through “framing.”9 Leaders try to impose or encourage frames that affect how the public views a particular situation. In our case, the Turkmen leaders have framed the energy cooperation with China as a win-win project for their nation. They promoted and emphasized the BRI projects as centering their countries on the global political map. However, framing the public may produce a vice versa result because frames create certain expectations. As expected, authoritarian Turkmen regimes have silenced those who see their respective states’ relations with China critically, and ruling elites promote a single line for their China policies. The economic situation of the country also has an important effect on foreign policy choices. If it is to be evaluated in terms of Turkmenistan, which is the subject of this study, then natural resources are important for foreign policy preferences and results. Turkmenistan needs both foreign investment and customers for its natural resources. Moreover, transporting natural resources to international markets can be both the instruments of their foreign policies and the goals they want to achieve. Countries dependent on their natural resources to have economic relations with the emerging superpower appear to be an acceptable policy and an effective method for ruling elites to prioritize their interests and strengthen their regimes. Thus, given the

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economic diplomacy as a higher priority, it is essential to make foreign policy choices related to China meaningful. Therefore, Turkmenistan has given both importance and priority to economic diplomacy when it deals with China. Its economic relations impact its political elites, companies, and overall country’s financial activities. Therefore, the ruling elites expect that its economic ties with China and being part of BRI projects bring countries to a solid international stand and rapid commercial and economic development. This includes supporting the economy’s internationalization, selling its energy resources at world market prices, attracting foreign investment, and being a transportation hub for Chinese products to the West. Moreover, after securing their stand on the top of the government structure, Turkmen ruling elites use foreign policy for more diverse interests. They are linked to other sectoral policies, such as energy, security, and trade. So economic diplomacy becomes a means and ends for these countries. Thus, economic diplomacy has been given higher priority to ensure not only to strengthen economic ties but also to promote national elites’ interests and values.10 TURKMENISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY VIS-À-VIS CHINA With the collapse of the Soviet Union, while the union republics gained their independence one by one, Turkmenistan became one of the last countries to declare its independence. It declared independence on October 27, 1991. The first leader of the country, Saparmurat Niyazov (who later called himself Turkmenbashi), aimed to make Turkmenistan an officially neutral country and use its natural resources for its development. The Niyazov’s neutrality policy to prevent Turkmenistan from turning into a competition area of global powers was approved by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly unanimously on December 12, 1995. Achieving positive, permanent neutrality, Turkmenistan has accepted international obligations such as not being involved in any military alliance and grouping. This situation has become the basis of Turkmenistan’s relations with all other countries. The neutrality policy has its implications. First, Turkmenistan remained outside of any military or military-political formation and bloc and tried to escape from the great powers’ pressure. Second, this allowed Turkmenistan to act more politically independent while establishing relations with other countries and to develop a foreign policy based on natural resources for which it has significant reserves.11 In addition, the permanent neutrality status adopted by Turkmenistan has enabled the state to reduce the Russian government’s pressure which

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Russia seeks to increase its influence on the post-Soviet states with the “Near Abroad” (Blizhneye Zarubezhye) policy adopted in 1993.12 Moreover, the neutrality policy’s objective was to attract more direct investments in economic relations with other countries by not being included in any bloc. This has primarily facilitated Chinese investments in Turkmenistan. Despite Niyazov wanting to use his country’s neutrality to concentrate on economic development, until his death in December 2006, Turkmenistan had neither technical nor financial resources nor means to operate its energy resources, especially natural gas reserves. Selling the natural gas extracted from the fields that opened and operated during the Soviet era was possible only through Russia. The pipeline that carried Turkmenistan’s natural gas to Russia was built during the Soviet period. The only way to export from this pipeline made Turkmenistan dependent on Russia in terms of economy, politics, and security areas in the 1990s. Russia’s severe economic crises in 1993 and 1998 negatively affected Turkmenistan’s economy. Moreover, Russia sold the Turkmen’s gas at higher prices to Western countries. Turkmenistan had to turn a blind eye to the natural gas resale. Turkmenistan sold to Russia at far below world market prices, and Russia sold to Europe a price several times more than what it paid to Turkmenistan. For that reason, Turkmenistan did not get the income that was expected from its natural resources.13 For instance, Gazprom, the Russian giant natural gas company, was active in marketing Turkmen natural gas in the 1990s and early 2000s. Because of Gazprom’s monopoly on Turkmen natural gas’ marketing, it controlled the price of natural gas buying from Turkmenistan, so Turkmen leader Niyazov spent his past several years to end dependence on Russia and find other roots in the world market. During this time, two projects failed and did not produce the result that Turkmen ruling elites wanted to reach: Trans-Caspian and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipelines.14 This was changed with Turkmenistan’s first president Niyazov’s death on December 21, 2006, and Gurbanguli Berdimuhamedov, while remaining loyal to Niyazov’s agreements, signed new contracts to attract new direct investments. Therefore, President Niyazov’s death has affected many aspects of its domestic and foreign policies, including the energy trade. As a result, Turkmenistan, which had to sell its natural gas to Russia’s Gazprom Company far below the world prices until the mid-2000s, started to sell its natural gas to China and the pipelines built. With China’s entry into the Central Asian energy market, Turkmenistan has become China’s important energy provider. It has also helped to have more independence for the Turkmenistan foreign policy. President Berdimuhamedov aimed to open his country to the world with the “national awakening” policy as soon as he came to power, thus integrating with the outside world, especially the global economy. To achieve this,

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Turkmenistan created a commission in 2009 to assist in energy diplomacy. The commission’s main task is to protect the national interest of Turkmenistan in “pipeline diplomacy.”15 Turkmenistan’s official neutrality policy also fulfills a critical function to ensure peace in the region through development to implement this policy. In short, it is believed that Turkmenistan’s neutrality policies and diversification of energy buyers will contribute to the national interest of the country and “peaceful development” in the region.16 For example, as a move supporting these policies, Turkmenistan deputy prime minister Rashid Meredov suggested establishing the Energy Security Council within the UN with his speech at the UN General Assembly on September30, 2013.17 Turkmenistan and China have developed similar outlooks on regional and international affairs since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992. While Turkmenistan had its share of the state-formation challenges, China was dealing with the aftershocks of the 1989 Tiananmen Square crisis, which cast a shadow on China. China has influenced Turkmenistan in terms of its economic development without changing its political system. Turkmenistan has declared a policy of active neutrality. This perfectly suits China’s regional and international aims. It is compatible with China’s Five Principles (mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual nonaggression, mutual non-interference, equality and cooperation, and peaceful co-existence).18 The two countries support each other’s core interests. Turkmenistan’s close relations with China have influenced Turkmenistan’s regional politics too. For example, to secure strong ties with China, it had to significantly improve its relations with Uzbekistan. The Sino-Turkmen strategic political partnership involves the exchange of regular presidential visits and close coordination. Chinese prime minister Li Peng visited Turkmenistan in 1994.19 Niyazov visited China several times and established close relations with Chinese leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Their bilateral ties developed gradually. However, Niyazov’s 2006 visit laid the ground for a natural gas-based partnership realized by his successor, Berdimuhamedov, credited with building and nurturing solid bilateral ties with China. Since assuming office in 2006, Berdimuhamedov has visited China several times. His Chinese counterparts Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping have visited Turkmenistan regularly to meet with its leaders in regional and bilateral forums. Even though Turkmenistan’s foreign relations with China started after its independence, until the early 2000s, China’s relations with Turkmenistan were limited. Especially after China announced a new strategy in 2002 to reach China’s global energy resources, whose domestic production was insufficient since the mid-1990s, this strategy is the “opening out” strategy. According to this strategy, the Chinese government decided to support Chinese companies’ investments abroad to meet energy demand and granted

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privileges and exemptions.20 It started to make investments in various countries, such as the energy sector, in return, providing loans to explore energy resources in these countries. Some of these investments were made in Turkmenistan and neighboring countries. One of the most important of these is the Central Asia-China Natural Gas Pipeline. This project consisted of four lines. Two pipelines passing through Kazakhstan were completed in 2010. The construction of the third line also linked through Beyneu to Shmykent to the central pipeline system. Completing three pipelines makes China receive 55 billion cubic meters of natural gas from Turkmenistan. The fourth pipeline, called Line D, is expected to pass through Kazak​hstan​-Uzbe​kista​n-Taj​ ikist​an-Ky​rgyzs​tan.21 China, which started to gain a special place in Turkmenistan’s foreign policy in the 2000s, is trying to reinforce its cooperation in the field of energy with the investments it has made in this field in Turkmenistan. The increase in mutual contacts results from China’s particular interest in Turkmenistan, despite Turkmenistan’s neutral status. Energy and pipeline projects have been one of the most critical elements of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy. As a matter of fact, Turkmenistan’s relations with China since 2006 have been based on a common interest between meeting China’s increasing energy needs and Turkmenistan, which wants to utilize its natural reserves most properly. For example, China desired to secure buying Turkmen natural gas in thirty years. The negotiations on this issue completed with the visit of Berdimuhamedov to Beijing in 2007. Developing relations with China and other countries in the Asia-Pacific is also preferred as it allows Turkmenistan to move without facing pressure to change its current system.22 The new Chinese president Xi Jinping’s visit in September 2013 to Ashgabat is vital in terms of signing important treaties and showing the extent of the relations between the two countries. The interest shown by the Chinese state in the Galkinish natural gas reserve, one of the world’s largest natural gas fields, indicates China’s long-term solid foundation with Turkmenistan. Thus, Xi Jinping’s trip is essential in showing what stage the strategic relationship between China and Turkmenistan has reached.23 Therefore, energy in general and natural gas in particular supply from Turkmenistan to China constitutes the core of bilateral relations. China imports more than half of Turkmenistan’s natural gas exports. These relationships are expected to increase with time. Thus, Turkmenistan is expected to continue to play an essential role in China’s energy supply and energy security in line with China’s BRI targets. China is expected to increase its natural gas import from 53 billion cubic meters in 2015 to 270 billion cubic meters in 2030.24 Turkmenistan has a high degree of economic dependence on China where it sells its natural gas. Moreover, due to the Chinese investments made in

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the energy sector, Turkmenistan also risks having financial dependence on China. The loans given by China for the energy sector are being paid to China through Turkmen natural gas. In 2011, China provided a loan of 8 billion dollars, and its support continued in 2013. While the total trade value between China and Turkmenistan reached 10 billion dollars in 2013, it decreased to 5.9 billion dollars in 2016 due to decreased natural gas prices. The low prices of natural gas have impacted the current economic crisis in the country.25 First, Sino-Turkmen relations are guided by several principles, one of which is being reliable partners. Both sides see each other as a reliable strategic partner, which entails delivering on their commitments and obligations. Chinese investments and uninterrupted Turkmen flow of natural gas to China are examples of these commitments. Second, both sides’ non-intervention in each other’s internal affairs. Due to its economic dependence on China and non-interference policy, Turkmenistan neither comments nor criticizes Beijing’s assimilation policy regarding Turkish Muslim minorities in China. China also refrains from commenting on Turkmenistan’s internal developments. Third, both countries are also committed to respecting each other’s economic development strategies and policies. Turkmenistan’s energy policy is based on “diversification.” Turkmenistan aims to ensure that Turkmen energy resources reach the world energy market conveniently and quickly. The Turkmen government follows a diversification policy based on increasing the number of pipelines and countries to which Turkmenistan sells natural gas to ensure the country’s political and energy security. This policy also forms the backbone of Turkmen foreign policy. Thus, Turkmenistan’s energy security depends on balancing the country’s national interests with those of transit and consumer countries. Turkmenistan conducts a balanced foreign policy based on this principle.26 Finally, Turkmenistan is also one of the vital countries in the revival of the Silk Road. In this context, Turkmenistan is a candidate to become an important route through which international trade passes. Therefore, BRI projects strengthen Turkmenistan’s place in the world natural gas market and reduce Russia’s dependence, thus pursuing a multilateral and more independent foreign policy. It also strengthens the position of the Turkmen leadership in domestic politics. CONCLUSION Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China has implemented a relationship based on the principles of “a responsible great power” and “good neighboring” policies with the neighboring Central Asian states.27 As the basis of this relationship, China sees the Central Asian states as the countries that securely provide

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energy sources and be market for Chinese manufactured goods. It has made investments under this strategy, especially in Turkmenistan. Chinese leaders realized that the best way to have energy security is through the neighboring Central Asian countries. In addition to that, Chinese leaders thought that China could balance the United States and Russia in the region by developing its own policies on the region. This approach has allowed the Central Asian countries to pursue a policy of balance between great powers. Central Asian countries have achieved different results in this balanced policy due to the differences in the country leaders’ preferences, geographical, demographic, political, and economic conditions. Turkmenistan has differentiated from other Central Asian countries by adopting the neutrality policy that it has adopted separately from other countries and making its commercial relations the main element of its foreign policy. The neutrality policy has brought Turkmenistan responsibilities such as not joining the military bloc and alliance and not joining the inter-state troops that require collective responsibility. Such responsibilities have given Turkmenistan an advantage. As required by Turkmenistan’s neutrality policy, the policy of not being part of foreign military bases in its territory saved Turkmenistan from possible pressure on this issue. Energy resources are still the primary tools for Turkmenistan for its foreign policy. For this reason, China’s focus on energy instead of political issues has helped China and Turkmenistan to develop close and effective relations in terms of energy in a short time. Thus, the “China factor” has positively impacted Turkmenistan’s foreign policy. Turkmenistan is now a strategic partner of China. It is actively participating in building BRI projects. In conclusion, Turkmen’s foreign policy strategy on China is more or less based on economic relations, especially the energy and transportation sectors. China’s non-interventionist policy on domestic politics is used to its advantage when conducting any form of economic and diplomatic relations with Turkmenistan. These countries’ hydrocarbon resources make these countries attract more powerful Chinese interests and investments and allow for significant autonomy in the foreign policy area. NOTES 1. D. Zhekanov, Hu Haixin, F. Orazakynkyzy, “Some Obstacles of Bilateral Business Relations between Kazakhstan and China,” Bulletin of International Law 90, no. 2 (June 2020): 13–20. 2. Assel G. Bitabarova, “Unpacking Sino-Central Asian Engagement along the New Silk Road: A Case Study of Kazakhstan,” Journal of Contemporary East Asian Studies 7, no. 2 (2018): 149–173.

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3. Azhar Serikkaliyeva, “The Role of the Central Asian Region in China’s New Silk Road Economic Belt Project,” Eurasian Research Journal 1, no. 1 (January 2019): 66–81. 4. Alexander Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules (Oxford: Oxford University, 2012), 21–24. 5. Juliet Kaarbo, “A Foreign Policy Analysis Perspective on the Domestic Politics Turn in IR Theory,” International Studies Review 17, no. 2 (June 2015): 189–216. 6. Jessica Chen Weiss, “Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China,” International Organization 67, no. 1 (January 2013): 31. 7. Brandon J. Kinne, “Decision Making in Autocratic Regimes: A Poliheuristic Perspective,” International Studies Perspectives 6, no. 1 (February 2005): 117–120. 8. Weiss, “Authoritarian Signaling,” 4–6. 9. Valerie M. Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory, Second Edition (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 104. 10. Maaike Okano-Heijmans, “Conceptualizing Economic Diplomacy: The Crossroads of International Relations, Economics, IPE and Diplomatic Studies,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 6, no. 1–2 (January 2011): 7–35. 11. An exception is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) because Turkmenistan joined the organization before its official neutral status was recognized by the UN in December 1995. 12. Yaşar Sarı, “Türkmenistan’ın Enerji Politikaları,” Türkmenistan, ed. Kamer Kasım (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2016), 155. 13. Luca Anceschi, “Integrating Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Making: The Cases of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan,” Central Asian Survey 29, no. 2 (June 2010): 143–158. 14. Luca Anceschi, “Turkmenistan and the Virtual Politics of Eurasian Energy: The Case of the TAPI Pipeline Project,” Central Asian Survey 36, no. 4 (2017): 409–429. 15. March Lanteigne, “China’s Energy Security and Eurasian Diplomacy: The Case of Turkmenistan,” Politics 27, no. 3 (2007): 147–155. 16. Andrew C. Kuchins, Jeffrey Mankoff, and Oliver Backers, Central Asia in a Reconnecting Eurasia: Turkmenistan’s Evolving Foreign Economic and Security Interests (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 31. 17. Sarı, “Türkmenistan’ın Enerji Politikaları,” 157. 18. Utku Yapıcı, “From Positive Neutrality to Silk Road Activism? The Continuities and Changes in Turkmenistan’s Foreign Policy,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 20, no. 3 (2018): 302. 19. Gaye Christoffersen, “China’s Intentions for Russian and Central Asian Oil and Gas,” NBR Analysis 9, no. 2 (1998): 25. 20. Sarı, “Türkmenistan’ın Enerji Politikaları,” 177. 21. İshak Turan, Çin’in Enerji Güvenliği Politikası: Kuşak Yol İnsiyatifi ve Avrasya’da “Yeni Büyük Oyun” (Ankara: Nobel Yayıncılık, 2020), 199–200. 22. Ivaylo Gatev, “Playing the Game or Changing the Rules of the Game: Chinese and European Approaches to Energy Cooperation in Central Eurasia,” East Asian Community Review 1, no. 3–4 (2018): 170.

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23. Kuchins, Mankoff, and Backers, Central Asia in a Reconnecting Eurasia, 13–14. 24. Vakulchuk, Roman, and Indra Overland. “China’s Belt and Road Initiative through the Lens of Central Asia.” In Regional Connection under the Belt and Road Initiative: The Prospects for Economic and Financial Cooperation, ed. Fanny M. Cheung and Ying-Yi Hong, 115–133 (London: Routledge, 2019), 125. 25. A.g.e. 26. Yusin Lee, “Opportunities and Risk in Turkmenistan’s Quest for Diversification of Its Gas Export Routes,” Energy Policy, no. 74 (2014): 330–339. 27. Zhu Feng and Lu Peng, “Be Strong and Be Good?: Continuity and Change in China’s International Strategy Under X Jinping,” China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies 1, no. 1 (April 2015): 19–34.

REFERENCES Anceschi, Luca. “Integrating Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Making: The Case of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.” Central Asian Survey 29, no. 2 (June 2010): 143–158. Anceschi, Luca. “Turkmenistan and the Virtual Politics of Eurasian Energy: The Case of the TAPI Pipeline Project.” Central Asian Survey 36, no. 4 (2017): 409–429. Bitabarova, Assel G. “Unpacking Sino-Central Asian Engagement along the New Silk Road: A Case Study of Kazakhstan.” Journal of Contemporary East Asian Studies 7, no. 2 (2018): 149–173. Christoffersen, Gaye. “China’s Intentions for Russian and Central Asian Oil and Gas.” NBR Analysis 9, no. 2 (1998): 1–34. Cooley, Alexander. Great Games, Local Rules. Oxford: Oxford University, 2012. Feng, Zhu, and Lu Peng. “Be Strong and Be Good?: Continuity and Change in China’s International Strategy Under X Jinping.” China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies 1, no. 1 (April 2015): 19–34. Gatev, Ivaylo. “Playing the Game or Changing the Rules of the Game: Chinese and European Approaches to Energy Cooperation in Central Eurasia.” East Asian Community Review 1, no. 3–4 (2018): 165–183. Hudson, Valerie M. Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory. Second Edition, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014. Kaarbo, Juliet. “A Foreign Policy Analysis Perspective on the Domestic Politics Turn in IR Theory.” International Studies Review 17, no. 2 (June 2015): 189–216. Kinne, Brandon J. “Decision Making in Autocratic Regimes: A Poliheuristic Perspective.” International Studies Perspectives 6, no. 1 (February 2005): 114–128. Kuchins, Andrew C., Jeffrey Mankoff, and Oliver Backers. Central Asia in a Reconnecting Eurasia: Turkmenistan’s Evolving Foreign Economic and Security Interests. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015. Lanteigne, March. “China’s Energy Security and Eurasian Diplomacy: The Case of Turkmenistan.” Politics 27, no. 3 (2007): 147–155.

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Lee, Yusin. “Opportunities and Risk in Turkmenistan’s Quest for Diversification of Its Gas Export Routes.” Energy Policy, no. 74 (2014): 330–339. Okano-Heijmans, Maaike. “Conceptualizing Economic Diplomacy: The Crossroads of International Relations, Economics, IPE, and Diplomatic Studies.” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 6, no. 1–2 (January 2011): 7–35. Sarı, Yaşar. “Türkmenistan’ın Enerji Politikaları.” In Türkmenistan, edited by Kamer Kasım, 153–197. Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2016. Serikkaliyeva, Azhar. “The Role of the Central Asian Region in China’s New Silk Road Economic Belt Project.” Eurasian Research Journal 1, no. 1 (January 2019): 66–81. Turan, İshak. Çin’in Enerji Güvenliği Politikası: Kuşak Yol İnsiyatifi ve Avrasya’da “Yeni Büyük Oyun.” Ankara: Nobel Yayıncılık, 2020. Vakulchuk, Roman, and Indra Overland. “China’s Belt and Road Initiative through the Lens of Central Asia.” In Regional Connection under the Belt and Road Initiative: The Prospects for Economic and Financial Cooperation, edited by Fanny M. Cheung and Ying-Yi Hong, 115–133. London: Routledge, 2019. Weiss, Jessica Chen. “Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China.” International Organization 67, no. 1 (January 2013): 1–35. Yapıcı, Utku. “From Positive Neutrality to Silk Road Activism? The Continuities and Changes in Turkmenistan’s Foreign Policy.” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 20, no. 3 (2018): 293–310. Zhekanov, D., Hu Haixin, F. Orazakynkyzy, “Some Obstacles of Bilateral Business Relations between Kazakhstan and China.” Bulletin of International Law 90, no. 2 (June 2020): 13–20.

Chapter 15

Turkish World and the Future of the New Great Game in China’s Westward Politics Mehmet Seyfettin EROL

INTRODUCTION The dissolution of the USSR and the emergence of independent states paved the way for China to increase its influence. The expansion of China to its west was institutionalized with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001 and entered a new and more intense phase with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Beijing’s growing influence in the region and China’s opening to the Eurasian world presents challenges to countries such as Russia, the United States, Turkey, and India. Today many people believe that Russia and China are increasingly cooperating against the United States. Still, we think that Moscow’s interests might be better served by a long-term strategy to prevent Beijing from spreading west. Russia, Turkey, the United States, and India could join together to further this goal by building a “Turkish Great Wall” in Turkestan. We already see some steps in this direction. The Turkish-Russian cooperation started when the United States intervened in Afghanistan, intensified with the signing of the Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia on November 16, 2001, and further strengthened their cooperation against the US involvement in Syria. In the long term, these initiatives could work against China. With that in mind, this study looks at China’s “Westward Policy,” its BRI, and their possible effects on the Turkish world. We also make various policy suggestions designed to prevent this region’s domination by outside powers such as China.

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CHINA’S WESTWARD POLICY With the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 and the emergence of independent states in Turkestan, China’s influence started to increase. The economic crisis in the former Soviet Union and China’s economic rise took place simultaneously and led Beijing to deepen its impact. Moreover, continuing border problems between China and the former Soviet countries were used as a trump card by Beijing. Besides, the establishment of Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Tajik nation-states fuelled Uyghur nationalism in eastern Turkestan. These events have transformed Turkestan into a strategically important region in terms of multidimensional policies and projects and made it especially relevant to the security concerns motivating China’s Eurasian policy. Cyclical changes in the international arena and Turkestan, along with concerns about China’s domestic and foreign security and economic interests, also affect its strategy and policy. Security, energy, economic corridors, and global and regional geopolitics all play an important role in China’s multifaceted Turkestan policy. The security issue is critical to China’s internal affairs and regional policies, and in this context, East Turkestan is of the highest importance to Beijing. But China faces a deadlock on this issue. On the one hand, it has fostered cooperation with Turkestan’s nations to further its economic development; on the other hand, it is working hard to ensure that economic relations and interactions between people living there do not trigger Uyghur separatist movements. In this context, it’s crucial to remember that there is a deep-rooted historical suspicion between China and Turkestan. China’s highest priority is to solve the problem of mistrust with both Russia and Turkestan. The problem was caused mostly by border problems that remain unresolved from Russia’s Tsarist period. Jiang Zemin, who was elected president of China in 1989, speaks Russian, and is very focused on border problems, has successfully fostered trust. Negotiations on border problems between China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia had succeeded mainly by the second half of the 1990s. The “Shanghai Five” concept, which emerged immediately after this success, was the most critical indicator of the trust that had started to form between the parties. Thanks to the development of bilateral relations, the parties significantly reduced their military forces in the border regions. However, an institutional mechanism was needed to ensure border security. On April 26, 1996, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed the Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions to meet this need.1 Based on this agreement, the parties adopted an Agreement on the Mutual Reduction of Armed Forces in the Border Area in 1997. Beijing’s priorities in the region started to change after border problems between China, Russia, and the Turkestan republics were resolved. In the

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next stage of this process, Beijing worked to develop cooperation with the Turkestan republics to combat separatist movements in East Turkestan. This policy gained momentum with establishing the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism (SCO). The organization’s member states have all signed the SCO. This agreement set SCO’s agenda and reset China’s interests in the region. The solution of border and security problems led to a qualitative shift in China’s relations with the Central Asian countries and expanded cooperation between all players in the region. In this regard, SCO was step two in Beijing’s strategy of opening to the region. The fact that Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, as well as Russia and China, were members of the organization meant that Russia began sharing influence with China in Central Asia, which is perceived as the “back garden of Moscow.” As Dmitri Trenin stated, “the SCO could well be dubbed ‘China in Central Asia.’”2 In other words, China has institutionalized its influence in Turkestan through the SCO. With support from countries in the region, China has also begun to accelerate operations in East Turkestan. The main goal of the operations carried out under the so-called “counter-terrorism” operations was to stem the East Turkestan Movement, maintain stability in China’s northwest, and fight separatism. It is also possible to read the expression “fighting against separatist movements” here as “fighting against Turkism.” Chinese expert Zhao Huasheng points out that this is not a new development but rather the Chinese regard as an “historical event.”3 Today it’s clear that China is increasing its presence in the region under the guise of security cooperation, a move that is supported by its growing energy and economic cooperation with area nations. There are two reasons why China’s interest in Turkestan energy resources started to increase in the 2000s. First, the rapid rise of the Chinese economy led to an increase in energy demand. Secondly, after the September 11 attacks, China assumed instability in the Middle East and searched for alternative energy sources. This period also saw the rapid development of India’s economy and China’s increased competition with the great powers in the field of energy. Besides, with the US intervention in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), energy security started to be discussed worldwide. Tensions between the United States and Iran and the United States and Venezuela further pushed China to seek alternatives. However, China’s top priority is internal security. Also, the stability of the Turkestan states is vital to Beijing. In this context, China has started to associate its fight against terrorism with its security problems and the SCO countries’ problems. In this regard, the heads of states of SCO countries established the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in 2002 in

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Tashkent, Uzbekistan’s capital. As a result, China began to invest in oil and natural gas fields in Turkestan and show interest in energy transmission projects that extend to this area. This increased Chinese interest in Turkestan reinforced negotiating opportunities for countries in the region vis-à-vis Russia. Turkmenistan, which ranks fourth in the world in terms of natural gas reserves, sold most of the gas it produced in the 1990s and early 2000s to Russia with the balance going to European countries, Iran, and China through Gazprom. However, during this period, China invested $8 billion in the country’s gas industry, extended large amounts of credit to Turkmenistan, and built the 1,800-kilometer Central Asia-China gas pipeline. Today, if Ashgabat has problems selling natural gas to Russia and Iran, his difficulties are mitigated because of Turkmen gas’ most important buyer in China. As a result of this bilateral agreement, which runs until 2038, China’s imports will increase with its annual demand for gas. More recently, Kazakhstan has come to the fore, especially in the area of energy cooperation. Trade volumes between Kazakhstan and China have reached $11 billion, and oil and natural gas are transported from the eastern shores of the Caspian Sea to China via pipelines. The primary customer for various metals, copper, and uranium produced by Kazakhstan is also China. The country’s debt to China is about $12 billion. China, which runs very efficient operations in the Kazakhstan oil industry and has also bought mines here, has outpaced Russian and European companies. Uzbekistan also sells natural gas, oil, and uranium to China. In return, China has invested in more than 70 large and 500 medium-sized companies in Uzbekistan, primarily in telecommunications and machinery. Most oil and gas exploration in Kazakhstan is carried out by the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC).4 Although China’s primary energy sources continue to be from the Middle East and Africa, Beijing is trying to ensure energy security with its investments in Turkestan. Increasing instability in the Middle East and Africa has increased the importance Beijing places on energy projects in Turkestan. In addition to security and energy, another factor that makes the Turkestan region a priority for China is economic relations. For Beijing, Turkestan is both an economic growth area and a gateway to Europe and the Middle East. In this context, it is not a coincidence that the BRI, or China’s plan to open up to the world, did so through Turkestan and was announced in Kazakhstan by Chinese president Xi Jinping. From a broader perspective, the success of the BRI on a global scale will be a function of its success in Turkestan. The BRI has three Eurasian routes. The northern line passes through Russia. It means that China will depend on Russia, and Russia’s awareness of this has galvanized Moscow to make the northern line a top priority. The middle line passes through Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South

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Caucasus, and Turkey. The southern line, Central Asia, and the West Asia Corridor pass through unstable or highly destabilized lands such as Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Here once again, Turkestan’s geography emerges as an essential part of the BRI. While SCO means sharing the region with Russia, the BRI signals that the balance has begun to tilt in favor of Beijing. In other words, China wants a larger portion of the Turkestan cake it shares with Russia. Regional and global actors are developing their strategies to counter Beijing’s new move. Here the international geopolitical importance of Turkestan emerges once again.5 The increased influence of China on Turkestan, defined as the heartland of Eurasia, will harm the interests of Russia, Turkey, Iran, and EU and undermine the global superiority of the United States. This is why China’s economic, cultural, and political effectiveness, energy policies, and its BRI gain geopolitical significance in the region. This makes it necessary for us to examine which strategies that global and regional actors are developing to counter the growing influence of China. RUSSIA Although Moscow must foster cooperation with Beijing today to strengthen its hand against Washington, it sees China as a threat. Disputes between the United States and Europe over NATO are pushing Russia into China’s lap, but it is a geopolitical fact that Russia and China will face off against each other in the long term. Russia applies two strategies against China simultaneously. The first is to cooperate with China and not allow it to pursue an aggressive policy. Regional and global cooperation projects such as Russia-India-China Trilateral Summits, SCO, and the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) summits are tools Russia uses to achieve this goal. Second, Russia is trying to foster military and economic cooperation against China in the former Soviet Union countries. Within this framework, Turkestan is gaining strategic importance. Moscow’s cooperation with Beijing is multidimensional. First, Russia needs China to balance the United States. The “strategic triangle” proposal among Moscow, Beijing, and New Delhi was advocated by Russia’s former prime minister Yevgeny Primakov for the first time in 1998 (The Primakov Triangle). According to him, this triangle represents a force for regional and international stability. The idea of a “strategic triangle” has taken concrete shape due to negotiations by the former foreign ministers of Russia, China, and India—Igor Ivanov, Tang Jiaxuan, and Yashwant Sinha, respectively—at the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2002.6

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This meeting’s timing strongly indicates that all three countries are not satisfied with the unipolar world order established by the United States. In this respect, we can define the strategic triangle as the basis or the driving force of the new, multipolar world order. Russia, India, and China are working together to establish peace and stability globally, especially on the Eurasian continent, where Russia faces west, China faces east, and India faces south. Turkestan, located in the middle of the Eurasian continent, is at the back of all three countries. The US military presence in Afghanistan, just south of Turkestan and in an area where all these countries’ influence intersects, pushes the Eurasian triad toward cooperation. Although all three countries’ priorities are different, at this stage, all three find the collaboration useful. Two priorities lie behind Moscow’s initiative. The first is to create a common front against the United States on the continent. Second, Moscow understands that Beijing’s influence in the region increases, although Russian officials will not explicitly say so. To limit this effect, Russia needs India to balance China, so India’s decision to join SCO in 2017 was a massive win for Moscow. True, the enlargement of the SCO decreased its effectiveness, but the enlargement is a win for Russia’s efforts to balance the United States outside and China inside, thanks to this triple-cooperation format. Russia’s second strategy for dealing with China is to keep the countries of Turkestan on its side and to use Turkestan as a buffer against China. In this respect, organizations such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which Russia led, are attempts to stop China. However, there is no common identity between the Turkestan republics and Russia. Besides, Russia’s economy is not large enough to balance China. On the other hand, we can be sure that TurkishIslamic identity can be used as an essential factor in forming a common regional “Turkestani” identity. Therefore, Turkey could undertake certain responsibilities in creating an anti-China alliance, as it cooperates with Russia to counter China’s threat. For example, Eurasian-based Turkish-Russian cooperation, which started in Syria and originated on November 16, 2001, can be used against China in the long term, even though it was designed to work against the United States in the short and medium term. It is useful for comparing Russia’s perception of Turkestan and the Turkish world in the 1990s with its perception in the 2010s. With the fall of the USSR in the 1990s, the Turkish world’s reality took clear shape. In the first stage, due to Turkey’s active policy in the region and US support for Turkey, Russia followed cautious policies. In part, this was due to Moscow’s concerns that discourse with the “Turkish Union” might lead autonomous regions within the Russian Federation, such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, to embrace separatist movements. Therefore, to reduce the risk of a new Turkestan state

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emerging on its southern borders, Russia found it more convenient to share the region with China. Turkestan’s states also view cooperation between Russia and China favorably because Beijing’s activities balance Moscow’s. For example, the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline, which started operating in 2006, broke Russia’s monopoly in Kazakhstan. Similarly, the Central AsiaChina Gas Pipeline (Turk​menis​tan-U​zbeki​stan-​Kazak​hstan​-Chin​a), which began operating in 2009, reduced the region’s dependence on Russia.7 Russia-China cooperation was in the interest of both parties until 2013. However, with China’s BRI, the balance started to change in favor of Beijing, explaining why Russia has begun developing strategies to balance China. In other words, China’s BRI forces Russia to take more determined steps and develop effective policies in the region. In this context, the Turkish Union shaped by discourse within Turkestan may be a new tool that Moscow can foster and use against Beijing. Regnum, an important news agency in Russia, has started to use the name Turkestan, abandoning the term Central Asia in its sources as of June 2018.8 The head of the agency, Modest Korolev, made the following statement on this subject on his social media account9: “After that, Regnum will use the traditional name ‘Turkestan’ by giving up the definitions of ‘Central Asia (Tsentralnaya Aziya)’ or ‘Kazakhstan and Central Asia (Kazakhstan Srendyaya Aziya)’ used for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.” Considering the close relationship between the government and the press in Russia, it can be argued that Moscow has gradually started to give importance to the issues of “Turkestan,” “Turkishness,” and the “Turkish Union.” Based on that assumption, the first President of Kazakhstan, Elbasy Nursultan Nazarbayev, changed the name of the country’s South Kazakhstan Province to Turkestan Province in June 2018 and moved the city center from Chimkent to Turkestan (Yesi). This happened because even the name of Turkestan is perceived as a threat by Beijing. We know that the Turkish world has an important place in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy. After independence, Nazarbayev developed close cooperation with the Turkish states, particularly Turkey and Azerbaijan. Recent developments show that Kazakhstan has convinced Moscow that this policy does not conflict with Russia’s interests. It is understood that Russia sees the discourse about “Turkestan” and “Turkish Union” as anti-Chinese. Representation of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Khakassia, and Yakutia, which are affiliated with the Russian Federation, in the International Turkish Culture Organization (TURKSOY) also reflects this attitude of Moscow. Likewise, it was important to allow the celebration of the 750th anniversary of the establishment of the Golden Horde state in Tatarstan in 2019. Moscow’s “Turkestan” rhetoric against Beijing’s expansionist policy is evident from Russia and Turkey’s increasingly friendly relations in part

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because Russia needs Turkey to make this policy work. The relations that since 2015 have rapidly risen to the level of strategic cooperation did not rupture despite the fighter jet crisis and the problem was overcome in a short time. This cohesion is based not only on developments in the Middle East but also on Turkey’s influence in Turkestan. Russia sees Turkey as a part of the alliance against China that will be formed in the medium and long term. In other words, Ankara is an important actor holding the Turkestan countries together within the framework of the Turkish Union. Ankara can play a critical role in spreading Turkish awareness to Turkestan because Turkey is seen as a leader by Turkish people, including the Uighurs in East Turkestan. WESTERN WORLD It is unthinkable for the United States to be indifferent to this game, which is unfolding right before their eyes in Eurasia’s heart. In particular, the United States must dominate the region or at least maintain regional balance to maintain its global hegemony. In this respect, the American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 was launched not to fight against terrorism but rather to inject US military activities into Turkestan. In this regard, the issue of withdrawing US troops from Afghanistan is nothing but election fodder to the US presidents. This is the case because an American withdrawal from South Turkestan would deliver the region to China and lead China to gain the upper hand there and then throughout the continent. In other words, China, which controls Eurasia’s heart, will become a significant power across the whole continent and subsequently across the entire world. That’s why the United States’ goal in Afghanistan is to prevent not only Russia but also China, from becoming dominant in this area. We can also evaluate the EU’s policies and the United States toward Iran in the context of global power competition in Eurasia. Here, both sides are trying to attract Iran to their ranks. The EU wants to do it with soft power and diplomacy; the United States uses hard power and threats. In this context, Russia and China are trying to do their best to avoid losing Iran to the West because an Iranian shift in favor of the Western powers will strengthen the United States in Turkestan. While this is happening, the United States is implementing a containment strategy against China. The National Security Strategy published in 2017 offers important details about this policy.10 For example, Southeast Asia, referred to as Asia-Pacific in some literature, is referred to as the Indo-Pacific by the Trump administration. This choice of words is important because it indicates that the United States attaches importance not just to East Asia but also to South Asia. In the document, the Indo-Pacific geography is defined

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as “The region which stretches from the west coast of India to the western shores of the United States.”11 China is the main threat to the United States in this area, and America’s main allies are Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Australia, and India. When we add Iran and Turkestan to this group, the chain around China closes. Trump places particular emphasis on the position of India, which his administration sees as a major defense partner of the United States: “We welcome India’s emergence as a leading global power and stronger strategic and defence partner.”12 In the American containment strategy against China, Japan forms the East Asian pillar and India, the South Asian pillar. In East Asian geopolitics, Chinese-North Korean cooperation is balanced by the US-Japan-South Korea alliance. In the South Asian dimension of Washington’s Chinese policy, China-Pakistan cooperation is balanced by the United States-IndiaAfghanistan line. Iran needed to reopen Afghanistan, which is located in the middle of the continent. Because of tensions between the United States and Iran, Washington benefits from cooperation between Iran and India. The Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to Iran on June 12, 2019, is important in this context. Tokyo also favors China’s containment by South Asia. Japan’s investment in Iran’s Chabahar Port, which is important in Afghanistan-India cooperation, should be interpreted as Japan’s attempt to be effective in Asian geopolitics. If the US-Iran crisis is resolved and Iran begins to be democratized, the US-Japan-India-Afghanistan line will be completed with Iran. The resignation of US National Security Advisor John Bolton is a clear indication that Washington wants to reach an agreement with Iran. When we consider competition between the United States and China, we can say that the United States will eventually cooperate with Russia and strengthen Turkestan. The US pressure on Russia, Turkey, and Iran benefits China. For this reason, the United States should abandon its oppressive policies and support the Eurasian countries. Otherwise, the American attempt at domination will lead the countries of the region to cooperate with China, which will damage the United States’ position in the international system. For these reasons, the West needs a “New Turkish World Policy” that includes Russia. CHINESE POLICY IN THE TURKISH WORLD Regarding the rise of Turkestan discourse against China, the countries’ attitude in the region is vitally important. This is the case because even if Russia, the United States, or another country plans to cooperate with the regional states against China, the project will fail if Turkestan countries do

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not cooperate among themselves. Therefore, we need to briefly examine the attitudes of Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan toward unity. Turkey Turkey can play an important role in strengthening Turkish identity in the region. While Russia ensures the Turkestan region’s security against China, Turkey can contribute by providing ideological integrity and building a common identity in the region. However, security and ideology are not enough to resist China because the Turkestan region also needs strong economic support. Today this economic support comes from China’s BRI, which is why alternative projects and financial resources are required to stop China. In this context, cooperation with the United States can happen if we consider the US-China competition and build the Turkestan Union’s economic leg. In this context, the alliance and institutional relationships between Turkey and the United States may become important. This depends on the course of Syriancentered (or greater Middle East–centered) Turkish-American relations. The future of US-Russia relations will also play an important role; cooperation between these two nations will be critical, although it seems unlikely to happen in the short-to-medium term. Kazakhstan Chinese policy in Kazakhstan is important for several respects. First, in the post-independence period, Kazakhstan has been the most consistent state in the region in terms of foreign policy. Some even claim that Nazarbayev is responsible for shaping Moscow’s Turkestan policy. In fact, the countries of the region have established close relations with Turkey due to Kazakhstan’s balanced relations with Russia. Second, Kazakhstan emphasized its Turkish identity while building a Kazakh identity. In recent years the particular emphasis has been placed on the Kazak state as “The Cradle of Turkish Civilization.” The country’s “Great Steppe” identity supports this emphasis.13 In addition, the presence of Hoca Ahmet Yesevi, the architect of the Turkish-Islamic understanding in Kazakhstan and especially in the city of Turkestan is of great importance for Kazakhstan’s Turkish identity. Thirdly, in the Turkish world, Kazakhstan has pursued an effective foreign policy. Currently, Kazakh politicians are among the leading spokespeople and advocates of Turkish integration in places such as the Turkish Academy, the Turkish Council, and TURKSOY. It clearly reflects Kazakhstan’s preeminent role. In large part, Kazakhstan is the leading

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force in Turkestan for the integration of the Turkish world to maximize its economic power. In particular, the country’s border on the Caspian allows it to foster cooperation with Azerbaijan. And the stable relations that Kazakhstan has established with Russia also propel it to take a leading role in Turkestan. Fourth, the presence of many Kazakh minorities in East Turkestan requires Kazakhstan to effectively manage its relations with China and develop appropriate and effective strategies. According to Chinese sources, around 1.5 million Kazakhs live in their country. But experts in Kazakhstan and the 2008 Chinese census reveal that the number is twice that, or about 3 million. NurSultan’s policy on Kazakhs in China can be summarized in these words: “Let those who want to come to Kazakhstan come here; those who want to stay in China stay there.” In part, he says this because Kazakhstan needs Kazakhs in China. Two topics are important here. First, Kazakhstan needs Kazakhs living abroad, including in China. After the dissolution of the USSR, Kazakhstan generated more emigrants than any other country in the world. Its population, which was 17 million in 1989, fell to 14 million in 1999. To raise its population to former levels, Kazakhstan invites Kazakhs abroad to return home and has developed various programs to achieve this goal. Secondly, more Kazakhs are needed if the country is to build a strong national identity, and the country cannot achieve this goal without the return of Kazakhs living abroad who have retained their national identity and speak their mother tongue. It is a problem because the 1.5 million Kazakhs who live in Russia cannot speak their native language. The situation is different in China, whose Kazakhs often speak Kazakh better than Kazakhstan natives. This is the case because East Turkestan was occupied after 1949, after establishing the People’s Republic of China. In addition, compared to the Soviet Union, minorities have been treated more favorably in China, at least until recent years. In short, the Kazakhs from China are accustomed to the Kazakhization of the country, especially because they protect their national identity and live largely in the northern regions of Kazakhstan. The “Let the Kazakhs who want to stay in China stay there” approach is based on the idea that the Kazakhs in East Turkestan live on the land of their ancestors. Kazakhstan needs to have a Kazakh minority in China, but China’s assimilation policies have caused people to question the validity of this approach in the last two years. The fifth reason why Kazakhstan needs to develop an effective policy toward East Turkestan is that there are more than 100,000 Uyghur Turks in Kazakhstan, the largest Uyghur diaspora in the world. Among the Uyghur diaspora, the Uyghurs in Kazakhstan mostly protect their native language and national culture. One reason for this is that they live collectively in the same

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settlements in Kazakhstan; the other reason is that Kazakhstan’s policy is to protect the national identity of ethnic groups in the country. Kazakhstan is working to represent Uyghurs in the Turkish world. For example, in October 2018, Kazakhstan’s Uyghur Community of Music and Theatre came to Turkey with the support of TURKSOY and has performed in various cities.14 For all these reasons, Kazakhstan can play an important role in forming a Turkestan Union. In addition, according to Zhao Huasheng, the perception of a “Chinese threat” is much higher in Kazakhstan than in other regional countries,15 and this gives Kazakhstan a greater incentive to take on this responsibility. Kyrgyzstan The attitude of Kyrgyzstan, a neighbor of China’s, toward East Turkestan, is also important. Because of its weak economy, Kyrgyzstan is the Turkish state that most heavily depends on China. At the 19th SCO Summit in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, that was held on June 13–14, 2019, Kyrgyzstan president Sooronbay Ceenbekov said this when meeting with Chinese president Xi Jinping: “The minorities issue is a domestic issue for China. I would especially like to state that I support your policies in this matter.”16 According to Zhao Huasheng, only a minority of people in Kyrgyzstan believe that the Chinese are a threat and the issue is not a serious problem for bilateral relations.17 But we must remember that the Kyrgyz society is more aggressive than other Turkestan communities and defends its views at the expense of the revolution, so it will not remain silent against China. This is especially the case because in the Manas Epic that shapes the Kyrgyz identity, the Kyrgyz fight the Chinese. In this context, despite Ceenbekov’s pro-Chinese statements and the fact that the Kyrgyz economy depends on China, it is a great success that Kyrgyzstan remains neutral on the Beijing-backed United Nations statement that there was no pressure against Muslims in China in July 2019. The effectiveness of Bishkek’s policy in the Turkish world makes Kyrgyzstan an important segment of the “Turkish Wall.” Kyrgyzstan is also a founding member of the Turkic Council. Kyrgyz heads of the state attended all Turkish summits, and Bishkek launched the World Nomad Games project and made an important contribution to the integration of Turks into sports. Uzbekistan Uzbekistan also has an important role to play when it comes to unity against China in Turkestan. Although Uzbekistan does not have a common border

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with China, culturally, Uzbeks share values with the Uyghurs. Kazakhs in Kazakhstan define Uzbeks as Sart, and Kazakhs in East Turkestan also call Uyghurs Sart. Here we define Sart as the city and people engaged in agriculture. The Syr Darya and Amu Darya basin, where Uzbekistan is located, and the Tarim River basin, where Uyghurs live, have been under the control of the same state in many historic periods. However, the important point is that people here lived mostly outside of the city. Indeed, masses in the city managed to perpetuate their own culture. This situation shows that the common values between Uzbek and Uyghurs endure. As stated above, Uzbekistan has no border with China. Therefore, the perception of “Chinese threat” in Uzbek society is relatively weaker than in other countries in the region,18 and this has led to closer relations between Uzbekistan and China. For example, in the Beijing-backed United Nations statement stating that there was no pressure against Muslims in China in July 2019, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan remained neutral while Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan offered support. With the coming of Shavkat Mirziyoyev to power, Uzbekistan started to pursue a more effective policy in the region. Uzbekistan’s close cooperation with Kazakhstan and membership in the Turkic Council will strengthen the country’s Turkestan identity. The return of Tashkent to the discourse of “Turkestan” may lead it to develop a more effective policy toward East Turkestan. Undoubtedly, Uzbekistan is an important actor in the Turkish world for many reasons, including its population (33 million), strategic location, and military power. The participation of Uzbekistan gives the Turkic Council the opportunity to become a stronger actor in opening the region up to South Asia and to stabilize Afghanistan. Tajikistan Tajikistan is an integral part of the Turkestan region, although it does not define itself as having a Turkish identity. Due to the national identitybuilding process that began in the Soviet period, Tajiks see themselves as part of the greater Persian world. However, Iran, the most important power in the Persian world, mostly emphasizes its Shiite identity—a fact that leads many Tajiks to believe that they are not a part of the Persian world. In addition, Wahhabi-Salafist ideologies, which spread strongly from Afghanistan to Tajikistan, offer nothing but war and destruction to Tajiks. In this case, Tajikistan needs to strengthen the link between Turkestan and other regional countries. It is especially important for Tajiks to revive and strengthen the traditional Hanafi-Maturidi tradition, which belongs to Turkestan. Because of its economic weakness, Tajikistan depends on China. Beijing runs a “debt trap policy” for Dushanbe.19 Thanks to this policy, China is renting land from Tajikistan for forty-nine years.20 Also, according to the

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Washington Post, Beijing has established a base in Tajikistan to control the Wakhan Corridor, which forms the Afghanistan-China border.21 Dushanbe needs to balance these links against this increasing dependency and the risks it creates. There is no East Turkestan issue currently on Tajikistan’s agenda.22 But if the countries of the region bring the Turkestan discourse to the fore, people believe that Dushanbe will support this discourse because of security concerns. CONCLUSION The countries of Turkestan should take a common stand against China. To make this possible, they need to nurture and emphasize their common identity and values. Over the last thirty years, the values they shared during the Soviet period have lost their importance. This is especially true as states in the region seek to shed common values such as the Russian language imposed by Tsarist Russia and the USSR. In addition, the increasing importance of English has pushed Russian into the second tier of languages. In the process of reviving the national identity of Turkestan countries, the importance of Islam is a given; the public shows an obvious interest in religious values. However, this interest has also opened a door in the region to foreign religious movements. Instability in countries with strong Muslim identities pushes people in the region away from a traditional understanding of Islam and toward radicalism. A decrease in the importance of Russia-centered values and Islam may lead to a new trend: the emergence of democratic values. But the democratization process is still in its early stages in the region. The common Turkestan identity should be strengthened both to create a resistance front against China’s pressure and strengthen the national identity of the regional states. These trends are expanding Turkey’s importance because Turkey is an important model that has internalized a tolerant understanding of Islam, democracy, and Turkish identity. In this context, one positive development would be the development of projects by the countries in the region that drive them to become members of the Turkic Council, particularly Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. China’s way to become a hegemonic power is through its policy of “Towards the West.” For this, it is necessary to control the western, southern, and eastern Turkestan regions. Although China emphasizes soft power in the West and its South Turkestan policy, its practices in East Turkestan and the historical “Great China Project” give us an idea of what the future holds in West and South Turkestan. And what we see is that China is becoming more demanding and daring as it gets stronger.

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The submission of Turkestan to Chinese control will seriously affect not only the states of the region but also the Western world, especially the United States. Turkestan has already begun an intense struggle between China and others. And this will make Turkestan the center of the “New Great Game” soon, making new balances and equations inevitable in the region. In conclusion, China is the threat facing both this region and the West in the medium and long term. The way to prevent or at least balance this threat is by creating a “Turkestan Union”—in other words, the construction of a third power center between a rising China and a weakening West (US/EU) that fills the power gap in the region. Recent developments make the formation of a Turkish Wall inevitable. This formula or suggestion may come to the fore more clearly in the near future. Undoubtedly these matters suggest a new opportunity for Turkey and Turkestan republics, but Russia’s interests, as well as those of the West, require this. Russia’s changing policy toward Turkey and the Turkestan Republics is also useful to evaluate from this perspective. A Turkish world-centered initiative can be implemented directly, or Turkey and Russia-based (i.e., a North-South axis) Central Eurasian Union/ Federation may also come into existence. Otherwise, the whole region, and of course the West, will lose. NOTES 1. Huasheng Zhao, “Central Asia in China’s Diplomacy,” in Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, edited by Eugene Rumer et al. (New York: M.E. Sharpe Armonk, 2007), 140. 2. Dmitri Trenin, “Russia and Central Asia: Interests, Policies, and Prospects,” in Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, ed. Eugene Rumer et al. (New York: M.E. Sharpe Armonk, 2007), 83. 3. Zhao, “Central Asia in China’s,” 141. 4. Yavuz Kerimoğlu, “Çin’in Orta Asya Politikaları,” INSAMER. Accessed September 12, 2019, https​:/​/in​​samer​​.com/​​tr​/ci​​nin​-o​​rta​-a​​sya​-p​​oliti​​kalar​​​i​_194​​2​.htm​​l. 5. See Mehmet Seyfettin Erol, “Küresel Güç Mücadelesinde Avrasya Jeopolitiği ve Türk Avrasyası,” in Küresel Güç Mücadelesinde Avrasya’nın Değişen Jeopolitiği: Yeni Büyük Oyun, ed. Mehmet Seyfettin Erol (Ankara: Barış kitap, 2011), 11. 6. “Russia-India-China Summit,” IAS4SURE. Accessed March 6, 2019 http:​/​/ www​​.ias4​​sure.​​com​/w​​ikiia​​s​/gs2​​/russ​​ia​-in​​dia​-c​​h​ina-​​summi​​t/. 7. Özlem Arzu Azer, “Çin’in Enerji Güvenliği Bağlamında Kafkasya ve Orta Asya Politikası,” International Conference on Eurasian Economies 2012. Accessed July 4, 2019 https://www​.avekon​.org​/papers​/441​.pdf. 8. “Российское ИА Regnum будет называть Среднюю и Центральную Азию Туркестаном (Russian News Agency Regnum Will Use Central and Central Asia as Turkestan),” Kaktus Media. Accessed July 4, 2019 https​:/​/ka​​ktus.​​media​​/doc/​​37599​​6​_ ros​​siysk​​oe​_ia​​_regn​​um​_by​​det​_n​​azyva​​t​_sre​​dnuu_​​i​_cen​​traln​​yu​_az​​​iu​_ty​​rkest​​anom.​​html.

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9. Modest Korelov Facebook Page. Accessed July 4, 2019. https​:/​/ww​​w​.fac​​ ebook​​.com/​​modes​​t​.kol​​erov.​​35​​?fr​​ef​=nf​. 10. “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” White House. Accessed December 19, 2017, https​:/​/ww​​w​.whi​​tehou​​se​.go​​v​/art​​icles​​/new-​​natio​​nal​-s​​ ecuri​​ty​-st​​ra​teg​​y​-new​​-era/​. 11. “National Security Strategy,” White House. 12. “National Security Strategy,” White House. 13. See Mehmet Seyfettin Erol and Dinmuhammed Ametbek, “Türk Dünyası’nın Birlik Arayışı: Bir Üst Kimlik Olarak ‘Büyük Bozkır,’” Türk Birliğinin Mümkün Yolları, ed. Ahmet Nafiz Ünalmış and Mehmet Nuri Parmaksız (Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları, 2019), 9–32. 14. “Uygur Müzik ve Tiyatro Topluluğu Türkiye’de,” TÜRKSOY. Accessed July 4, 2019, https​:/​/ww​​w​.tur​​ksoy.​​org​/t​​r​/new​​s​/201​​8​/10/​​31​/uy​​gur​-m​​uzik-​​ve​-ti​​yatro​​-topl​​​ ulugu​​-turk​​iye​-d​​e. 15. Zhao, “Central Asia in China’s,” 173. 16. Aydar Erkebaeva, “Jeenbekov: Kıtaydın Uluttuk Azçılıktar Maselesi Ölkönün Jeke İçki İşi,” Kloop. Accessed July 3, 2019, https​:/​/ky​​.kloo​​p​.asi​​a​/201​​9​/06/​​13​/zh​​ eenbe​​kov​-k​​ytajd​​yn​-ul​​uttuk​​-azch​​ylykt​​ar​-ma​​seles​​i​-lk-​​n​​-n​-z​​heke-​​ichki​​-ishi​/. 17. Zhao, “Central Asia in China’s,” 176. 18. Zhao, “Central Asia in China’s,” 174. 19. Dmitriy Sergeyevich Popov, “Kitaysko-tadzhikskiye otnosheniya: problemy i perspektivy,” Russian Strategic Research Institute. Accessed July 6, 2019, https://riss​ .ru​/analitycs​/2623/. 20. Tim Fernholz, “Eight Countries in Danger of Falling into China’s ‘Debt Trap,’” Quartz. Accessed July 6, 2019, https​:/​/qz​​.com/​​12237​​68​/ch​​ina​-d​​ebt​-t​​rap​-t​​hese-​​eight​​ -coun​​tries​​-are-​​in​-da​​nger-​​of​-de​​bt​-ov​​erloa​​ds​-fr​​om​-ch​​​inas-​​belt-​​and​-r​​oad​-p​​lans. 21. Gerry Shih, “In Central Asia’s Forbidding Highlands, a Quiet Newcomer: Chinese Troops,” Washington Post. Accessed September 13, 2019, https://wapo​.st​ /2ky8tPv. 22. Zhao, “Central Asia in China’s,” 177.

REFERENCES Azer, Özlem Arzu, “Çin’in Enerji Güvenliği Bağlamında Kafkasya ve Orta Asya Politikası,” International Conference on Eurasian Economies 2012. Accessed September 3, 2019, https://www​.avekon​.org​/papers​/441​.pdf. Erkebaeva, Aydar, “Jeenbekov: Kıtaydın Uluttuk Azçılıktar Maselesi Ölkönün Jeke İçki İşi,” Kloop. Accessed July 3, 2019, https​:/​/ky​​.kloo​​p​.asi​​a​/201​​9​/06/​​13​/zh​​eenbe​​ kov​-k​​ytajd​​yn​-ul​​uttuk​​-azch​​ylykt​​ar​-ma​​seles​​i​-lk-​​n​​-n​-z​​heke-​​ichki​​-ishi​/. Erol, Mehmet Seyfettin, “Küresel Güç Mücadelesinde Avrasya Jeopolitiği ve Türk Avrasyası.” In Küresel Güç Mücadelesinde Avrasya’nın Değişen Jeopolitiği: Yeni Büyük Oyun, edited by Mehmet Seyfettin Erol. Ankara: Barış kitap, 2011. Erol, Mehmet Seyfettin and Ametbek, Dinmuhammed, “Türk Dünyası’nın Birlik Arayışı: Bir Üst Kimlik Olarak ‘Büyük Bozkır.’” In Türk Birliğinin Mümkün

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Yolları, edited by Ahmet Nafiz Ünalmış and Mehmet Nuri Parmaksız, 9–32. Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları, 2019. Fernholz, Tim, “Eight Countries in Danger of Falling into China’s ‘Debt Trap,’” Quartz. Accessed July 6, 2019, https​:/​/qz​​.com/​​12237​​68​/ch​​ina​-d​​ebt​-t​​rap​-t​​hese-​​ eight​​-coun​​tries​​-are-​​in​-da​​nger-​​of​-de​​bt​-ov​​erloa​​ds​-fr​​om​-ch​​in​as-​​belt-​​and​-r​​oad​-p​​lans/​. Kerimoğlu, Yavuz, “Çin’in Orta Asya Politikaları,” INSAMER. Accessed September 12, 2019, https​:/​/in​​samer​​.com/​​tr​/ci​​nin​-o​​rta​-a​​sya​-p​​oliti​​kalar​​​i​_194​​2​.htm​​l. Modest Korelov Facebook Page. Accessed July 4, 2019, https​:/​/ww​​w​.fac​​ebook​​.com/​​ modes​​t​.kol​​erov.​​35​​?fr​​ef​=nf​. “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” White House. Accessed December 19, 2017, https​:/​/ww​​w​.whi​​tehou​​se​.go​​v​/art​​icles​​/new-​​natio​​nal​-s​​ecuri​​ty​-st​​ ra​teg​​y​-new​​-era/​. “Российское ИА Regnum будет называть Среднюю и Центральную Азию Тур кестаном (Russian News Agency Regnum Will Use Central and Central Asia as Turkestan),” Kaktus Media. Accessed September 4, 2019, https​:/​/ka​​ktus.​​media​​ /doc/​​37599​​6​_ros​​siysk​​oe​_ia​​_regn​​um​_by​​det​_n​​azyva​​t​_sre​​dnuu_​​i​_cen​​traln​​yu​_az​​​iu​ _ty​​rkest​​anom.​​html. Popov, Dmitriy Sergeyevich, “Kitaysko-tadzhikskiye otnosheniya: problemy i perspektivy,” Russian Strategic Research Institute. Accessed July 6, 2019, https://riss​ .ru​/analitycs​/2623/. “Russia-India-China Summit,” IAS4SURE. Accessed March 6, 2019, http:​/​/www​​.ias4​​ sure.​​com​/w​​ikiia​​s​/gs2​​/russ​​ia​-in​​dia​-c​​h​ina-​​summi​​t/. Shih, Gerry, “In Central Asia’s Forbidding Highlands, a Quiet Newcomer: Chinese Troops,” Washington Post. Accessed September 13, 2019, https://wapo​.st​/2ky8tPv. Trenin, Dmitri, “Russia and Central Asia: Interests, Policies, and Prospects.” In Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, edited by Eugene Rumer et al. New York: M.E. Sharpe Armonk, 2007. “Uygur Müzik ve Tiyatro Topluluğu Türkiye’de,” TÜRKSOY. Accessed July 04, 2019. https​:/​/ww​​w​.tur​​ksoy.​​org​/t​​r​/new​​s​/201​​8​/10/​​31​/uy​​gur​-m​​uzik-​​ve​-ti​​yatro​​-topl​​​ ulugu​​-turk​​iye​-d​​e. Zhao, Huasheng, “Central Asia in China’s Diplomacy.” In Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, edited by Eugene Rumer et al. New York: M.E. Sharpe Armonk, 2007.

Part VI

EURASIA AND CENTRAL ASIA

Chapter 16

Transboundary Water Problem and Environmental Security in Central Asia Giray Saynur DERMAN

INTRODUCTION Due to climate conditions, inefficient use of resources, environmental pollution, and water have become a new object of international dispute. The policy of sharing and controlling water resources has become a new strategy of the world’s hegemonic powers. Therefore, the so-called “water wars” have been mentioned more frequently after energy wars. Especially “transboundary” and “international waters” are waters with conflict potential. Transboundary waters of Central Asia, the watersheds that become the elements of regional conflict, constitute one of the region’s most complex problems. However, it has been ignored so far. Central Asia has the largest and cleanest water resources in the Eurasia region, with its natural and geographical potentials. The waters coming from the mountains of Pamir, God, and Altai, from the rivers of Amu Darya, Syrdarya, Irtysh, Ural, Ili, Talas, and from the lake of Aral constitute potential conflict areas of the region. Central Asian countries were rather busy with their economic problems during their initial years of independence and were unaware that water problems would cause regional and transboundary crises. After establishing central water policies by the USSR in the region, there was an increase both in population and water usage in agriculture. Thus, sharing and use of water became a problem among Central Asian countries. This situation has also caused detrimental effects on ecology and the environment. Method Both quantitative and qualitative methods are used in this research. Review of the literature, analysis of the documents, and collection of qualitative data 269

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methods were used. However, the complexity and intertwining of variables made it difficult to measure the relationship between them. Analysis International relations and foreign policy are analyzed using a constructivist approach as a level of analysis. How the international waters in Central Asia can be put into a theoretical framework in terms of international law and what can be done for the solution of the uprising water issue have been evaluated in this section. One of the most critical challenges in Central Asia is the transition process targeted from the old distribution principles of water resources established during the Soviet era to the integrated water resources management system. In the period of the Soviet Union, the decisions regarding the waterways in the Central Asian region were determined by the strategies of the central government.1 Thinking and planning as the only economic area in the Central Asian region, the creation of agricultural products from the products determined in central economic development, the newly opened agricultural lands in the lower basin regions increased the need for water and then became an insurmountable one. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the problem of waterways emerged as new problem areas. Independent republics in Central Asia have acquired a transboundary character, with many natural resources, including major waterways. The uneven distribution of water resources in Central Asia caused the upstream and downstream countries to become interdependent. Tensions have also resulted from water-borne states’ political-economic interests and poor management of resources (regional, basin, national, and local) at all levels. Deserts, semideserts, steppes, and arid climate make the entire ecosystem vulnerable. One of the biggest challenges available in Central Asia is the foundation of a new targeted attitude toward the integrated water resource management system, which was functioning according to the old distribution principles of water resources established during the Soviet era. The use of water is a technical issue, requiring an integrated approach, especially in areas of agriculture, energy, and industry. In the Soviet era, the water management system was centralized to prevent conflicts over water allocation.2 In addition, its compulsory energy system is provided to upstream countries (Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan) by downstream countries (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) in exchange for water services. The transition from “centralization” to flexible “decentralized measures” in water management caused imbalances in water resource distribution; this situation has created political-economic tensions among the Central Asian countries.3 Today, being away from Caspian Basin, Kyrgyzstan, and

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Tajikistan have limited fossil fuel reserves. Thus, it became vital for these countries to generate energy from the operation of the potential of transboundary water resources in Central Asia. The lack of common laws among Central Asian states, the presence of national identity conflicts, the priority of national interests and the ever-increasing need for water, and the failure to comply with existing agreements cause the inefficient and irrational use of water resources in Central Asia.4 The main issue is the lack of cooperation between the Central Asian states. In this study, the probability of the tensions experienced due to the water issue to turn into a possible regional conflict constituted the data set. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON CONSTRUCTIVISM AND TRANSBOUNDARY AND BOUNDARY WATERS Constructivism has been a new theory since the 1990s and has become one of the most important paradigms of international relations recently. Realism, liberalism, and Marxism dominated the Cold War period, leaving Marxism out of the day, and more realism, liberalism, and constructivism have rapidly come to the fore. Particularly constructivism has a broad scope as a rapidly developing theory.5 According to the constructivists, the basic structures of the international system are social but not material. Therefore, it sets out a more rooted perspective on international security to get rid of the traditional view of the international system. The main goal of this theory is to provide an understanding of social phenomena rather than explaining social orders in the world we are in. At the same time, it tends to refuse universal qualifications that are considered to be certain in the positivist view of traditional theories. Constructivists set out from the assumption that neo-realism, associated with security, is related to the distribution of the material capabilities in the structure of international relations. Common knowledge, economic resources, and actions are also included in social structures. Therefore, the relationship between these three concepts determines the social fabric.6 Especially after the Cold War, new rational formations in the world have started to establish a linear connection between the social structures and foreign policy of identity and culture.7 Constructivism differs from the first theories of critical theory due to its emphasis on empirical analysis. However, constructivist theorists, who stand out with Alexander Wendt, have systematically addressed conceptual and theoretical implications in matters relating to world politics. For this reason, they began to analyze political discourses and practical applications by detaching critical approaches from abstract lines.8 It is impossible to predict and explain post–Cold War developments

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and its global impact by neoliberal and neo-realist theories. Along with these developments, other factors such as human rights, non-state actors, the development of international institutions, the issue of control of weapons of mass destruction, the emergence of terrorism, international migration and refugee problems, and the stereotyped meta-theoretical approaches of critical theory are far from responding to these problems. This situation brought up problematic issues such as rethinking critical theory and introducing new approaches.9 All constructivists say that they explain social life with three basic arguments that help them describe world politics more than other theories. According to the first argument, structures put political and social actors in a traditional form. Because when it comes to structures, it is emphasized that norms and ideas are at least as effective as material structures. For the neo-realist, this refers to the balance of military power, while for Marxists, it refers to the capitalist economic order.10 For the constructivists, material resources can only make sense if they are connected. With the example given by Alexander Wendt, the relations of the United States with its neighbors Cuba and Canada cannot be explained only by the balance of military forces of neo-realists. The first question that is suggested is why United States, which can be a close ally with Canada, has mutually hostile attitudes with Cuba. Constructivists say that the main point explaining mutual relations is different identity structures in inter-societal relations because ideological approaches between societies and differences in enemy perceptions come to the fore.11 Alexander Wendt summarizes the constructivist approach in the best way; he addresses that “identities are determinative of interests.”12 For example, if you have an academic title, you need to research and publish for the interests of these titles. Being a Christian monarch requires defending religion for its absolutism and pursuing the interests of identity, such as keeping nationalist movements under control. Likewise, being liberal wants to take a stand against repressive regimes and restrictions of the free-market economy.13 Comparing constructivism and rationalism, three important points are emphasized. The first is the constructivists, in contrast to the rationalists, who see actors as egoist beings that are thought to have nothing to do with each other; it evaluates the same actors as assets that constantly interact. Secondly, rationalists see actors’ interests as their final form before social interaction and the acceptance that they are given. According to the constructivists, this situation is realized in the social interaction process and results from the acquired identity. It also argues that it has emerged through the accumulation of communication and institutionalized norms. Finally, while rationalists see society as a strategic environment in which interests

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are realized, constructivists see actors as conscious social and political structures. They assume that they are a constructive structure with interaction within society.

DOCTRINES ON THE USE OF TRANSBOUNDARY WATERS On May 21, 1997, “The Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses” was accepted; anyhow, it entered into force seventeen years later in 2014. The convention, which is also referred to as the “UN Watercourses Convention,” was meant to help preserve and manage the fair utilization of water resources. However, it is confirmed only by thirty-six states and not accepted by most countries, especially the key ones. For the time being, this convention can be accepted as a promising premature step in establishing international watercourses law. Since there is no generally affirmed legal regulation regarding the use of transboundary waters, states benefit from their doctrines, which are the secondary sources of international law in terms of utilizing transboundary waters. Despite this gap in international law, states tend to prepare a legal basis for their transboundary waters activities. Absolute Dominance (Harmon) Doctrine According to this doctrine, which was named as the Harmon doctrine inspired by the US Chief Prosecutor Judson Harmon in 1895, an upper riparian state bears no responsibility to the lower riparian state due to the benefiting action to be found in the flowing part of a cross-border river within its own country. Accordingly, the dominance of the country from which the water originates is essential.14 The absolute sovereignty doctrine is usually advocated by the jurists of countries in the upstream state. However, the United States gave up the idea that this doctrine is the rule of law over time. Apart from the Treaty of the Rio Grande River between the United States and Mexico of May 21, 1906, and the Treaty of the Border Waters between the United States and Canada, there is no other treaty that adopts absolute sovereignty. The same is true for national and international court orders. Except for the decision of the Royal Administrative Court of Australia dated January 11, 1913, regarding the river Leitha, no arbitration decision was applied to the doctrine of absolute country sovereignty, or there was no problem supporting this doctrine.15

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The Absolute Territorial Integrity Doctrine According to this doctrine, a country cannot use natural conditions within its borders against the neighboring state by claiming country sovereignty. The country has no right to stop the river from flowing from its territory to another country or pollute it. This doctrine, which gave superiority to the lower riparian countries to benefit from river waters, emerged as the opposite view to absolute sovereignty doctrine. According to this doctrine, the lower riparian state has the veto right to change the natural flow of the river by adjusting the amount and quality of the water while using the river waters of the upper riparian state.16 Reasonable Use Doctrine According to this doctrine, each riparian state has the right to benefit from that stream reasonably and equitably in its own country. The Fairness and Reasonable Use doctrine was first introduced internationally by the United States in the Colombian river conflict that emerged with Canada.17 According to the doctrine, some opinions have been put forward by those who adopt the doctrine, as the extent to which the benefit will be the most beneficial and the least damaged will vary according to the disputes.18 In the fifth article of the Helsinki Decision of the International Law Association (UHD), which adopted the doctrine, the factors that determine the principle of fair use are not limited to these conditions.19 UHD, which was gathered in 1966, accepted some non-binding rules as recommendations. With these studies carried out in Helsinki, waterways were handled as international water collection basins.20 However, this doctrine is criticized by international legal experts as a principle that is far from certain and difficult to implement.21

STRATEGIC WATERWAYS IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN REGION During the USSR period, the issue of water sharing between the Central Asian Soviet Republics was elaborated three times. These negotiations were coordinated by the central Ministry of Water Resources and Reclamation, and the Soviet Communist Party made their final decisions.22 It was established in 1986 for the Seyhun and Ceyhun Rivers (River Basin Organization). This organization has also taken over the operational responsibility of dams in the region, and Kyrgyzstan has avoided this establishment; because he thought he had the purpose of controlling the waterways. Considering the water use

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in this period, the Soviet administration allowed Kyrgyzstan to use 24% of the water. After the dissolution of the USSR, the newly emerged states assigned different priorities. Due to various reasons, such as the emergence of the economic crisis and the disappearance of the habitual centralized structure, the irrigation-energy system in Central Asia cannot be implemented.23 The main existing problems regarding the use of transboundary waters in the region are: • Karakum Water Canal (Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan); • Golden Century Lake (Turkmen Lake) Turkmenistan; • Aral Lake Basin and its geopolitical importance (the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers); • Fergana Valley; • Water quotas (Togtogul, Nurek, Tuyamuyun); • Water drains and energy compensation: sharing of Seyhun and Ceyhun waters; • Construction of new hydropower facilities: Rogun, Sangtuda, and KambarAta I-II dams; • Dams Planned on the Zarafşan River (Tajikistan-Uzbekistan); • China’s dam projects to be built on Irtysh and Ili Rivers; • Afghanistan’s share in water use. Aral Lake Basin and Geopolitical Status In the 1950s, the Soviet government set up a program that promotes agriculture and cotton production during the Khrushchev era, causing Aral Lake, one of the world’s largest inland seas, to be exposed to environmental disasters.24 The beds of Amu Darya (Seyhun) and Syrdarya (Ceyhun) feeding the Aral Sea were changed and directed to cotton fields in Central Asia. Dams and irrigation channels built on Seyhun and Ceyhun caused a decrease in the water feeding Aral.25 As a result of these wrong policies implemented during the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the water level in the Aral Sea started to decrease significantly since the 1960s.26 This inland sea, which has decreased by more than 100 meters in depth and decreased from 70,000 square kilometers to 18,000 square kilometers in its area from the 1960s to the present, has shrunk by 75%. Its environment has become a desert. The water level has dropped nearly 23 meters since the primary water sources were directed. Villages and towns dealing with fishing on the Aral coast have been abandoned, the climate has changed, and Turkistan’s ecology has turned upside down.27 Thus, Aral has become a dead lake. Located in Central Asia and surrounded by many different states, Aral Lake’s drying created a major regional problem.28 After 1990, the rate of

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water loss decreases gradually. There are negative feedback systems in the region that slow down water loss. As the sea surface area decreases as a product of the drying process, evaporation decreases, limiting the drying process. Another negative feedback is increased salinity—as salinity increases, evaporation also reduces, partially offsetting the positive feedback of water loss. The presence of both positive and negative feedback systems, in general, affects the rate of water loss in the region. A significant part of the Aral Sea waters is used in agriculture. This reaches 92% of the total demand. Hydro-energy production is also used for residential use and industrial purposes.29 Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are dependent on watershed waters for their vital activities. Water is used here for irrigation purposes. Uzbekistan obtains 76% of its total exports from cotton and the related industry.30 A serious deterioration has occurred in Aral Lake due to cotton cultivation and the construction of hydroelectric dams.31 The Amu Darya, which is the most important river of the Aral basin, passes the Karakum Desert and empties its waters into Aral Lake. In terms of the geopolitics of the Aral, the basin is examined in two main regions. The basin part of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, located in the upper basin of the Ceyhun and Seyhun rivers, where precipitation is collected, and Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, which are riparian countries to the Aral Lake, located downstream of the rivers. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan use this situation as a trump card to benefit their neighbors Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. By cutting the water for a short time, they could buy cheap gas, oil, and agricultural products from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. However, if Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’s water resources are interrupted in the long term, they will harm both their economies and the environment. It will also increase the potential for conflict in the region.32 Uzbekistan, the fifth largest cotton producer and the second largest exporter globally, faced a decrease in cotton production due to drought. Tajikistan in the region demands water fees from Uzbekistan, claiming that it is the owner of the water flowing from its territory. On the other hand, Turkmenistan tries to create the Turkmenbashi Artificial Lake in the Karakum Desert. Aral Lake has been the livelihood of hundreds of thousands of people with the fish trade. Unfortunately, due to this drought, people have lost their livelihoods. International experts have begun to work toward this situation, but there is still no conclusion.33 The International Fund (IFAS) was established in 1993 to protect the Aral Sea and develop projects. It worked to improve the environment and develop better water management strategies. In this context, the Water and Environmental Management Project was developed between 1998 and 2002. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan use their water resources for hydropower generation. However, they are not aware that they cause ecological problems and disasters.34

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Central Asian countries argue that there is an “absolute sovereign right” over the water flowing through its territory.35 This situation will create a conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which are upstream countries in the Aral basin, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, which are downstream. Fergana Valley Fergana Valley is the soft belly of Central Asia. Located in the middle of Central Asia, the valley covers 100,000 square kilometers. This area was shared between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in the USSR, and it is a region with fertile soil through which the Seyhun river passes. About 12 million people live in the region. This figure is close to one-fifth of the Central Asian population. Over 51% of the population of Kyrgyzstan and its agricultural/industrial production, 31% of Tajikistan’s population and 90% of its industrial production, and 75% of Uzbekistan’s agriculture and 25% of its population and agricultural/industrial production are in this region.36 In 1944, some Meskhetian Turks displaced from their homeland and settled in this area during the Stalin era. However, during the clashes of the 1989 Fergana events, Meskhetian Turks were massacred. As a result, the majority of Meskhetians fled to Kazakhstan, and some of them settled in Turkey. A significant number of Uzbek communities live in Osh and Celalabat states of Tajikistan.37 Including these Uzbeks in non-Uzbek territories, the majority of the people (85%) living in Fergana Valley are of Uzbek origin. Fergana Valley has always been a place of interest throughout history for China, Arab, Persian, and Turkish khanates. Containing a vast amount of water resources, the valley is very suitable for agriculture and settlement. Thus the region is desirable for many nearby different ethnic groups causing conflicts among them. Agriculture is the most important sector that provides employment. The rapid increase in population and the presence of different ethnicities are the factors that make this region available for the control of great powers.38 As it happened to be in the past, today, the region continues to be a region of interest for global powers. The borders of the region are not definite, and the border security is not sustained, facilitating the passage of the drugs coming from Afghanistan through the Badakhshan and Osh routes.39 The Problems of Kazakhstan and China with Transboundary Rivers The ecosystem of the river Ili has been disrupted by the negative impact of constructions and hydroelectric projects in the West of China. In this case, Balkhash Lake is also damaged in the southeastern region of Kazakhstan.

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China is working on ninety different dams and irrigation canal projects over the river Ili and its branches. When the planned projects are completed by 2050, 60% of the river Ili’s water will be either kept in these dams or used for irrigation purposes and will not pour to Balkash lake. Considering that Balkash lake supplies 30% of its water from the river Ili, the decrease in this content will inevitably cause a similar disaster, as observed in the Aral case. With its overcrowded population and rapidly growing industry, China, resulting in an increasing demand for water resources and pollution, affects the Central Asian hydro politics and creates tension. Considering the management of transboundary waters, it is feared that China’s policies will disturb ecological balance.40 China is determined to realize its projects concerning the use of Irtysh river water. It plans to transfer huge amounts of water from the Irtysh River to the Karamay oil field in the Xinjiang region through a channel that will negatively affect the river basin’s ecosystem. According to experts, China’s plans to use increasing amounts of Black Irtysh river water will negatively affect Kazakhstan and Russia’s economies. Kazakhstan has no sea or ocean access. Although Kazakhstan has eight water basins, seven are transboundary rivers (the Irtysh, Ural, Tobol, Isim, Ili, Shu, Talas, and Syrdarya). Kazakhstan suffers from a lack of adequate water resources. As the Kazakh leader Nursultan Nazarbayev exclaimed, “the water problem should not be politicized any longer,” it could be understood that Kazakhs want this vital problem to be solved as soon as possible and doesn’t want this issue to remain as an unsolved political problem. Seventy percenty of Kazakhstan’s main rivers, such as Ili—Irtysh, are formed within China’s territory. China insists that cross-border streams are not shared by international rules but by the number of people living along the border water.41 While this is acceptable for Kazakhstan, China and Kyrgyzstan still have not signed the international water treaty and have not taken a step toward a solution. CONCLUSION Water allocation and management problems in Central Asia have arisen due to the need for agricultural areas, the expansion of the demographic structure, the inoperative infrastructure, and poor management since the end of the centralization structure both in the post-USSR and post-independence period in Central Asia. The current issue of water allocation and management of transboundary waters in Central Asia is quite complicated. The ongoing problems negatively affect the interests of all Central Asian countries and their neighbors. In

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Central Asia, water is seen as a factor that can be used to threaten the security of the region. The regional security threat is usually due to hegemony claims and the tendency to use force to resolve disputes between states and within themselves. These trends are a combination of pluralism and the rule of law. In this regard, the transboundary water allocation problem in Central Asia is included in the general political security perspective. Delays in solving the problem can lead to critical conditions for inter-state cooperation in the region, which may adversely affect the economic and political development of states. Highlighting “energy against water” has become a very important factor in internal and external border security. Countries in the downstream sell gas and electricity to their neighbors at market prices and stop delivery in case of debt. This system, which has long existed since Soviet times, fails to sustain water compensation mechanisms. Therefore, a new mechanism is needed. Application of the principles of international law, especially the UN treaties, may help to the solution of the problem. Currently, each of the Central Asian countries aims to solve the water problem unilaterally without considering the other riparian states’ interests. However, if it had been possible to find a common solution, water would become a factor that has the potential to unite the regional countries and interests. Today, it seems like this issue could be solved only with the Central Asian leaders’ political will so that the existing legal framework based on international water laws on transboundary water channels can be improved. Despite the current difficulty of legal regulations and cross-border water management institutional mechanisms, relations can still be improved for mutual benefits to establishing multilateral cooperation in the region. The existing framework needs to be strengthened and modernized. States’ obligation to cooperate is also a prerequisite for achieving fair, reasonable, and harmless cross-border water management. Cooperation between the coastline states is inevitably needed as a result of the fact that an international watercourse is a common natural resource. Experts agree that the problems of water use in Central Asia cannot be solved bilaterally. For the solution of complex water, energy, and agricultural issues, multilateral agreements based on legal order established by a supreme body that constitutes the region’s representatives are needed. The water law will probably facilitate the creation of a suitable water management strategy for each transboundary watershed. Because religious and cultural roots are fed from the same source, such as waterways, Turkestan countries should increase their preferential trade and interdependence relations and develop projects together to prevent foreign interventions. With projects primarily from Russia and China, global powers may reflect their realist point of view toward the construction of the region,

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and in this way, they may hold control of the region. In consideration of the presence of energy in the area, the practiced policies of great powers may easily turn the region into a playground of their own, just as it happened in the case of the Middle East. It is inevitable that the power controlling the waterways will have a say in the region. The country with the power to direct the water projects in the region will also have the capability to make military agreements with the countries in the region. This, in turn, gives it the domination power over the downstream countries as it will be possible to manipulate public uprisings and management changes that will put pressure on the agricultural communities. To avoid all these possible undesirable scenarios, Central Asian states should resolve with regional cooperation within the context of international legal principles and develop projects to revise their infrastructures and develop the most efficient water usage. NOTES 1. Giray Saynur Derman, “The Struggle for Power in the Changing Geopolitics of Central Asia,” Civil Academy 6, no. 6 (Summer 2008): 77. 2. Zainiddin Karaeve, “Border Disputes and Regional Integration in Central Asia,” Harvard Asia Quarterly IX, no. 4 (Fall 2005): 1–4. 3. Shairbek Juraev, “The Water Problem in Central Asia: Is There a Solution?,” 4 July 2001, http:​/​/www​​.caci​​analy​​st​.or​​g​/vie​​w​_art​​icle.​​php​?a​​rticl​​eid​=2​​85​​&SM​​SESSI​​ ON​=NO​. Accessed May 05, 2006. 4. International Crisis Group, Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential, ICG Asia Report no 33 (4 April 2002). 5. Andrew Linklater, Christian Reus-Smit, Jack Donnelly, Jacqui True, Matthew Paterson, Richard Devetak, Scott Burchill, Terry Nardin, “Konstrüktivizm” Uluslararası ilişkiler Teorileri, Muhammed Ağcan, Ali Aslan (Çev.), İstanbul: Küre, 2014, 308. 6. John Baylis. Uluslararası İlişkilerde Güvenlik Kavramı, “Uluslararası İişkilerde Çatışmadan Güvenliğe,” in Ursula Oswald Spring (ed.) M. Aydın, H. G. Brauch, M. Çelikpala, İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2012, 159–160. 7. Tayyar Arı, “Orta Asya’da Siyasal, Toplumsal ve Ekonomik Yapılar, Güvenlik Sorunları ve İşbirliği Girişimleri,” Orta Asya ve Kafkasya: Rekabetten İşbirliğine, Tayyar Arı (Der), Bursa: Mkm, 2010, 17. 8. Arı, “Orta Asya’da Siyasal, Toplumsal,” 19. 9. Andrew Linklater, et al., ed., “Konstrüktivizm,” Uluslararası ilişkiler Teorileri, M. Ağcan, A. Aslan (Çev.), İstanbul: Küre, 2014, 293. 10. Kenneth Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (Spring 1988): 615–628. 11. Linklater, “Konstrüktivizm,” 294–295. 12. Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 393–425.

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13. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 76. 14. Cem Sar, Uluslararası Nehirlerden Endüstriyel ve Tarımsal Amaçlarla Faydalanma Hakkı, Ankara: SBF Yayınları, 1970, 57. 15. Vefa Toklu, Su Sorunu Uluslararası Hukuk ve Türkiye, Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1999, 21. 16. Cem Sar, Uluslararası Nehirlerden, 108. 17. Nitza Shapiro-Libai, “Development of International River Basins: Regulation of Riparian Competition,” Indiana Law Journal 45, no. 1 (1969) http:​/​/www​​.repo​​sitor​​ y​.law​​.indi​​ana​.e​​du​/il​​j​/vol​​​45​/is​​s1​/2. 18. Hüseyin Pazarcı, Uluslararası Hukuk, Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 2013, 23. 19. Nitza Shapiro-Libai, “Development of International.” 20. H. Pazarcı, Uluslararası Hukuk, 27. 21. A. Wells, Hutchins and Harry A. Steele, “Basic Water Rights, Doctrines and their Implications for River. Basin Development,” Law and Contemporary Problems 22, no. 2 (1957): 276–300. 22. Giray Saynur Derman (Bozkurt) (ed.), Blue Black Sea New Dimensions of History Security Politics Strategy Energy and Economy, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013, 127. 23. International Crisis Group, Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential, ICG Asia Report no 33 (4 April 2002). 24. “The Aral Sea Crisis,” http:​/​/www​​.colu​​mbia.​​edu/~​​tmt21​​20​/im​​pacts​​%20to​​ %20li​​fe​%20​​in​%20​​the​%​2​​0regi​​on​.ht​​m. Accessed 26.07.2020. 25. International Crisis Group, Central Asia: Water and Conflict, ICG Asia Report No 34 (30 May 2002). 26. G. Kılıç, “Orta Asya’da Su Sorunu: Bir Yılan Hikâyesi,” http:​/​/www​​.anal​​istde​​ rgisi​​.com/​​sayi/​​2​011/​​08/ orta- asya- da- su- sorunu-bir-yilan-hikayesi, 2011. 27. Orhan Kavuncu, “Su Forumu ve Türkistan’da Su Problemi,” Türk Yurdu Dergisi, no. 260 (April 2009): 23. 28. Stefan Klötzlı, “The ‘Aral Sea Syndrome’ and Regional Co-operation in Central Asia: Opportunity or Obstacle?” in Conflicts and Environment, Nils Petter Gleditsch (ed.), Netherlands: Springer, 1997, 417–434. 29. The population of the Aral Sea Basin is estimated to reach 55 million in 2020. 30. İrfan Kaya, “Aral Havzası Anlaşmazlığının Değerlendirilmesinde Hukuksal Çerçeve ve Uygulanabilir Öneriler,” in Dünyada Su Sorunları ve Stratejileri Aziz Koluman (ed.), Ankara: ASAM Yayınları, 2002, 122. 31. Stefan Klötzlı, “The Water and Soil Crisis in Central Asia—a Source for Future Conflicts?,” ENCOP Occasional Paper, no. 11. Zürich Bem: ETH Zürich Swiss Peace Foundation, 1994. 32. M. M. Rahaman, “Principles of Transboundary Water Resources Management and Water-Related Agreements in Central Asia: An Analysis,” International Journal of Water Resources Development 28, no. 3 (2012): 475–491. 33. Mehmet Seyfettin Erol, “Orta Asya’da Güvenlik Sorunları,” Hacettepe Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmalar Dergisi, no. 1 (Güz 2004): 85–112.

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34. “The Aral Sea Crisis,” http:​/​/www​​.colu​​mbia.​​edu/~​​tmt21​​20​/im​​pacts​​%20to​​ %20li​​fe​%20​​in​%20​​the​%​2​​0regi​​on​.ht​​m, accessed on 27 October 2019. 35. Giray Saynur Derman, “The Struggle for Power in the Changing Geopolitics of Central Asia,” Civil Academy 6, no. 6 (Summer 2008): 71–84. 36. Thierry Kellner, Yeni Orta Asya Jeopolitiği, SSCB’nin bitiminden 11 Eylül Sonrasına, Çev. Reşat Uzmen, İstanbul: Bilge Kültür Sanat, 2009, 293. 37. M.A. Olimov, “Regionalism in Tajikistan: It’s impact on the Fergana Valley,” Perspectives on Central Asia 1, no. 3 (Winter 1996): 27. 38. Dursun Yıldız, Orta Asya’daki Saatli Bomba Su Sorunu, İstanbul: Truva Yayınları, 2012, 133. 39. Nodira Bukharizade, “Vodnye resursy v Central’noj Azii: zavisimaâ nezavisimost,” Fergana News, June 17, 2015. [http://www​.fergananews​.com​/articles​/8589 accessed November 10, 2015. 40. Dursun Yıldız, Orta Asya’daki Saatli Bomba, 87. 41. Stephen Blank, “Rogun Dam Project Epitomizes Central Asian Security Dilemmas,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 9, no. 168 (September 17, 2012).

REFERENCES “Aral Sea Crisis,” http:​/​/www​​.colu​​mbia.​​edu/~​​tmt21​​20​/im​​pacts​​%20to​​%20li​​fe​%20​​in​ %20​​the​%2​​0reg​i​​on​.ht​​mAcce​​ssed October 27, 2019. Arı, Tayyar, “Orta Asya’da Siyasal, Toplumsal ve Ekonomik Yapılar, Güvenlik Sorunları ve İş birliği Girişimleri,” in Orta Asya ve Kafkasya: Rekabetten İşbirliğine, Tayyar Arı (ed.), 13–39. Bursa: Mkm, 2010. Baylis, John, Uluslararası İlişkilerde Güvenlik Kavramı, “Uluslararası İişkilerde Çatışmadan Güvenliğe,” , in Ursula Oswald Spring, Mustafa Aydın, Hans Günter Brauch, Necati Polat, Mitat Çelikpala (ed.), 153–164. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2012. Blank Stephen, “Rogun Dam Project Epitomizes Central Asian Security Dilemmas,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 9, no. 168 (September 17, 2012), https​:/​/ja​​mesto​​wn​.or​​g​/pro​​ gram/​​rogun​​-dam-​​proje​​ct​-ep​​itomi​​zes​-c​​entra​​l​-asi​​an​-se​​​curit​​y​-dil​​emmas​/, accessed July 19, 2015. Bukhari-zade, Nodira, «Vodnye resursy v Central’noj Azii: zavisimaâ nezavisimost’» [Water resources in Central Asia: a depending independence], Fergana News (June 17, 2015), http://www​ .fergananews​ .com​ /articles​ /8589, accessed November 10, 2015. Derman, Giray Saynur (Bozkurt) (Ed.), Blue Black Sea New Dimensions of History Security Politics Strategy Energy. UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013. Derman, Giray Saynur, “The Struggle For Power in the Changing Geopolitics of Central Asia,” Civil Academy 6, no. 6 (Summer 2008): 71–84. Erol, Mehmet Seyfettin, “Orta Asya’da Güvenlik Sorunları” Hacettepe Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmalar Dergisi 1 (Autumn 2004): 85–112.

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Hutchins, A. Wells and Steele, A. Harry, “Basic Water Rights, Doctrines and their Implications for River Basin Development,” Law and Contemporary Problems 22, no. 2 (1957): 276–300. International Crisis Group, Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential, ICG Asia Report No 33, Brussels, 4 April 2002. International Crisis Group, Central Asia: Water and Conflict, ICG Asia Report no 34 (30 May 2002). Juraev, Shairbek. “The Water Problem in Central Asia: Is There a Solution?,” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, July 4, 2001, http:​/​/www​​.caci​​analy​​st​.or​​g​/vie​​w​_art​​ icle.​​php​?a​​rticl​​eid​=2​​85​​&SM​​SESSI​​ON​=NO​, Accessed May 05, 2006. Kaya, İbrahim, “Aral Havzası Anlaşmazlığının Değerlendirilmesinde Hukuksal Çerçeve ve Uygulanabilir Öneriler,” in Dünyada Su Sorunları ve Stratejileri , Aziz Koluman (ed.). Ankara: ASAM Yayınları, 2002. Karaeve, Zainiddin. “Border Disputes and Regional Integration in Central Asia,” Harvard Asia Quarterly IX, no. 4 (Fall 2005): 1–4. Kellner, Djalili R.M., Yeni Orta Asya Jeopolitiği, SSCB’nin Bitiminden (Çev.). İstanbul: Reşat Uzmen Bilge Kültür Sanat, 2009. Kılıç, G., Orta Asya’da Su Sorunu: Bir Yılan Hikâyesi, http:​/​/www​​.anal​​istde​​rgisi​​ .com/​​sayi/​​2​011/​​08/ orta- asya- da- su- sorunu-bir-yilan-hik-yesi. Klötzli, Stefan, “The ‘Aral Sea Syndrome’ and Regional Co-oparetion in Central Asia: Opportunity or Obstacle?” in Conflicts and Environment, Nils Petter Gleditsch (ed.), 417–434. Netherlands: Springer, 1997. Klötzli, Stefan, “The Water and Soil Crisis in Central Asia—a Source for Future Conflicts?,” ENCOP Occasional Paper, no. 11. Zürich Bem: ETH Zürich Swiss Peace Foundation, 1994. Linklater, Andrew, Christian Reus-Smit, Jack Donnelly, Jacqui True, Matthew Paterson, Richard Devetak, Scott Burchill, Terry Nardin, “Konstrüktivizm” Uluslararası ilişkiler Teorileri (Çev. Muhammed Ali Ağcan, Ali Aslan). İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2014. Nitza, Shapiro-Libai, “Development of International River Basins: Regulation of Riparian Competition,” Indiana Law Journal 45, no. 1 (1969), Available at: http:​/​ /www​​.repo​​sitor​​y​.law​​.indi​​ana​.e​​du​/il​​j​/vol​​​45​/is​​s1​/2. Olimov, M.A., “Regionalism in Tajikistan: It’s impact on the Fergana Valley,” Perspectives on Central Asia 1, no. 3 (Winter 1996). Orhan, K. “Su Forumu ve Türkistan’da Su Problemi,” Türk Yurdu Dergisi, no. 260 (2009): 23–27. Pazarcı, Hüseyin, Uluslararası Hukuk, Ankara: Turhan Kitapevi, 2013. Rahaman M. M., “Principles of Transboundary Water Resources Management and Water-Related Agreements in Central Asia: An Analysis,” International Journal of Water Resources Development 28, no. 3 (2012): 475–491. Sar, Cem, Uluslararası Nehirlerden Endüstriyel ve Tarımsal Amaçlarla Faydalanma Hakkı. Ankara: SBF Yayınları, 1970. Stephen, C. McCaffrey, “The Harmon Doctrine One Hundred Years Later: Buried, Not Praised.” Natural Resources Journal no. 36 (1996): 549–560.

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“The Aral Crisis,” http:​/​/www​​.colu​​mbia.​​edu/~​​tmt21​​20​/im​​pacts​​%20to​​%20li​​fe​%20​​in​ %20​​the​%​2​​0regi​​on​.ht​​m. Accessed July 26, 2020. Toklu, Vefa, Su Sorunu Uluslararası Hukuk ve Türkiye. Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, Ankara 1999. UN, Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Adopted by the UN General Assembly in resolution 51, no. 229 (21 May 1997). Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979. Waltz, Kenneth, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory.” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (Spring, 1988): 615–628. Wendt, Alexander, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46, no. 2 (Winter:1992): 393–425. Wendt, Alexander, Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Yıldız, Dursun, Orta Asya’daki Saatli Bomba Su Sorunu. İstanbul: Truva Yayınları, 2012.

Chapter 17

The Turkic Republics in the Eurasian Security System Kamer KASIM

INTRODUCTION The increasing weight of Eurasia in international politics puts the region foreground in regional security discussions. The integration of the Turkic Republics, which gained independence after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, to the international system and their effectiveness in various international institutions made them important players in the Eurasian security system. The fact that Eurasia has become a region of the competition after the Cold War era led to the emergence of different security and cooperation projects. In terms of regional security, there are agreements between regional countries as well as organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). On the other hand, the Turkic Council has become an increasingly important platform that puts the Turkic Republics together. The Turkic Council proved its existence and success through annual summits held via videoconferences during the COVID-19 process. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), and the United States’ New Silk Road Project are also proposals related to the region. Regional projects have been put forward with different expectations. For example, SCO was founded so that it could solve border problems under the name of the Shanghai five, and then it was transformed from the Shanghai forum to SCO in 2001. The organization, established to combat terrorism, separatism, and extremism, has reached eight members. CSTO, on the other hand, is a structure that Russia has led to maintaining its regional influence in the field of security, and which has transformed from the 1992 Tashkent Common Security Treaty to CSTO and brings a common defense obligation to its members in case of a threat. 285

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The geostrategic importance of Eurasia, the region’s natural resources being an alternative to the Middle East, and the need for pipelines for the oil and natural gas-rich regional countries to deliver them to international markets have increased competition in Eurasia. The Turkic Republics became important as the main actors in this competition and the Eurasian security arrangements. The preferences of the Turkic Republics in regional organizations created after the Cold War era were different. For example, Turkmenistan has not made military alliances due to the status of permanent neutrality registered by the United Nations (UN). On the other hand, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan became members of CSTO and EEU. The Turkic Republics, except for Turkmenistan, are members of the Turkic Council. This chapter will analyze the role of the Turkic Republics in the Eurasian security system and their relations with the main actors of the system and the effects of their positions in different organizations in Eurasia. At this point, what should be understood from the Eurasian security system will also be discussed. EURASIA AFTER THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE TURKIC REPUBLICS The rich energy resources of the countries included in the international system after their independence made Eurasia the center of attention. It was even claimed that the Great Game in the 19th century started to be played with different actors again, and Mackinder’s theory of Heartland came to the fore again in this environment. One reason for competition is the need for pipelines for the region’s energy resources to flow into the open seas. In addition, the rise of China and its emergence in Eurasian politics with its activities and projects created a different picture. After the independence, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan have started to make their mark on the new era as actors who have a voice in the regional policy. There are difficulties in establishing a security system in the region where there are many countries that gained their independence after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and most importantly, the problems from the Soviet Union period remain. An important element of regional security is that countries should believe that going to war will cost more than possible earnings.1 Such a situation will reduce the effects of the security dilemma. Moreover, the fact that the institutional structures are not sufficient and the perceptions of the threats faced by the states in the process of consolidating their independence brought the security dilemma to the fore. In Eurasia, the members of organizations for security are heterogeneous structures. There are important problems among themselves, and the impression that the created

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structures are in the interest of a regional hegemonic power makes the security system difficult to consolidate. When we approach with the assumption that regional conflicts will be resolved through institutional arrangements, it is seen that such institutionalization is missing in Eurasia. States have become members of many organizations with the idea of balancing other countries or bandwagoning of great powers to ensure their security. In the region where the security dilemma is dominant, states act by evaluating the relative and/or absolute gains of the countries they perceive threats.2 The special situations of the countries that gained their independence after the Cold War are also effective in the region. Although Russia’s strategy of returning to the region with its Near Abroad policy was effective with CSTO and EEU, China’s economic capacity made it an important player in Eurasia, and countries that gained independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union also saw China as a balancing force.3 After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States developed strategies for the region, especially in transporting energy resources to the international markets in the safest way. The security aspect was included in the energy-oriented perspective of the US regional policy after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The United States received support for its policy of fighting against terrorism. However, the impression that the US military presence in the region would be permanent caused Russia and China’s discomfort. In addition, the perception of some of the US initiatives as threats by the administrations in the countries of the region also affected the United States’ view. For example, the US military base in Uzbekistan was closed due to the US criticism of the Uzbek administration handling of the Andican incident.4 The policy named “Peaceful Ascension,” which China put forward in 2000s, enabled regional countries to act more comfortably in their relations with China since this Chinese policy does not contain a perspective on countries’ regimes. Even the countries of the region considered China as a force to balance Russia. However, there is also a process that had made this picture start to change when China gave an economically dominant image. Russia has some advantages, which enabled it to balance its economic disadvantages against China. As a successor of the Soviet Union, Russia has long-term ties with regional countries and knowledge about the region. The domination of the Russian language has also another advantages vis-à-vis China.5 EURASIAN SECURITY SYSTEM The Turkic Republics seem to join international organizations to integrate into the international system and consolidate their independence. However, each country’s different expectations and threat perceptions and foreign

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policies also affected their positions in Eurasia. The fact that Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan are rich in energy resources not only makes them more sensitive in terms of energy security but also actors of the competition in the transport of energy resources. In terms of effective structures in the region, it would be appropriate to reveal the roles of the relevant countries in Eurasian security by examining the role and perspective of each Turkic Republic. The CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), which was created to continue political, economic, and military ties among the former Soviet Republics after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, is one of the first regional organizations of the post–Cold War era in which the Turkic Republics were members. Under the CIS Charter in 1993, there is an emphasis on developing mutually advantageous cooperation between the member states and cooperation in the fields of economy, security, environment, human rights, and social and cultural development. However, the CIS could not turn into an effective political structure. In addition to the reluctance of the member countries, the failure of the realization of some of the declared goals caused this result. Although there are over sixty organs or units within the CIS, they have not been effective. Even a significant part of the decisions taken by bodies such as the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly and the Council of Presidents are not approved by all members.6 The role of the Turkic Republics in the CIS is also linked to this picture. Azerbaijan states that it maintains its relations with the CIS member countries at the bilateral level.7 Kazakhstan attaches importance to the emphasis on cooperation within the CIS. This focuses more on the development of bilateral trade, as in the CIS Member States Summit, held in Astana in 2018.8 Due to the CIS Presidency of Turkmenistan in 2019, Turkmenistan made a declaration containing its primary objectives. Here, there is an expression of encouraging initiatives that promote stability and security in the CIS region among the CIS member countries and revive the partnership between the member countries’ foreign policy units.9 Despite the expectations of further cooperation expressed by the Turkic Republics at the official level, no further steps could be taken at this point in the CIS, especially regarding the security pillar. The CSTO was established as a security organization with a military structure, and the CSTO members pledged to help each other in security matters. Among the Turkic Republics, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are members of the CSTO. It might be argued that the CSTO, the Russian-centered organization in Eurasia, is more effective in terms of security. The CSTO has a Joint Rapid Response Force. Kazakhstan contributes here with one battalion and one brigade and Kyrgyzstan with one battalion.10 The CSTO would only be successful in meeting its objectives as long as problems between the CSTO members are resolved and better coordination among members are to be

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established. Even though Uzbekistan is not a member of the CSTO, it could cooperate with the organization in certain advantageous cases of Uzbekistan. Countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which are dependent on Russia on the issues such as the supply of modern military equipment and training of security forces, need more protection from the CSTO. The CSTO imposes an obligation for member states to cooperate against external threats to the member countries. Article 5 of the CSTO Charter indicates non-interference into the affairs falling within the member states’ national jurisdiction. One issue discussed at this point is that despite Kyrgyzstan government’s request during the conflicts in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, the CSTO was not involved, with the view that this was an internal problem. The CSTO members were asked to be changed to give the organization a legal mandate to enable it to intervene in the case of the request of the related government, as was in Kyrgyzstan’s case in 2010.11 Kazakhstan considered the CSTO as a priority security organization.12 An important point of the CSTO in terms of Turkic Republics and the Eurasian security is the issue of the help of other members in case of a threat toward a member. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia, a member of the CSTO, and Azerbaijan was a problematic point in this respect. In fact, a military operation that Azerbaijan carried out to liberate its territory under occupation would not be considered an intervention in Armenia in terms of international law but the exercise of the legitimate right of defense.13 Azerbaijan conducted a successful military operation that resulted in an agreement signed on November10, 2020, which led to the liberation of the occupied territories.14 Another organization with a security dimension in Eurasia is the SCO. The SCO was founded by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The number of members increased to eight with Pakistan and India’s membership at the Presidents’ Council meeting held in Kazakhstan in 2017. The SCO aims to strengthen mutual trust among the SCO members and cooperate in areas such as politics, economy, research, technology, and culture and strive to ensure and guarantee peace, security, and stability in the region.15 The SCO is the organization that China leads as its establishment. China wanted to show that it has no expansionist intentions while solving border problems with its neighbors. The SCO has met China’s expectations with its activities in the field of security, but it has been inadequate in terms of economy. Russia’s aim in the SCO is to have control in cooperation between the regional countries and China and use the role of the SCO as an instrument to keep Western countries away from Central Asia. Russia especially has supported the membership of India with which it has close cooperation. While China accepted India’s membership, China wanted the membership of Pakistan, which is a strategic partner of

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China; as a result, the two countries became members of the SCO at the same time. Thus, SCO has covered 45% of the world population. Russia does not prefer the SCO to become the main organization in terms of military and economic cooperation in the region. Russia wanted the CSTO to become a main actor in the region. Economically, Russia did not support China’s proposal to establish a regional bank and suggested China join the Eurasia Development Bank, 65.97% controlled by Russia. This was not acceptable for China, as there was a capital contribution of the bank proportional to the GNP (Gross National Product).16 For this reason, China focused on the BRI for its economic expectations. The Turkic Republics, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan were influential in the formation of the SCO. Of these, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are also members of the CSTO and have close cooperation with Russia in security. The SCO draws a framework in which members exchange views, especially against threats originating from Afghanistan. Kazakhstan is the country that raises issues such as food safety and insufficient water resources within the SCO. Kazakhstan supports cooperation in security within the SCO and even participates in the Peace Mission 2007. However, within the framework of the SCO, Kazakhstan did not make the legal arrangement that allowed foreign forces to pass through its territory. The motivation of Kyrgyzstan within the SCO is like that of Kazakhstan. For Kyrgyzstan, a member of the CSTO, besides the security cooperation with Russia, the SCO functions as an instrument to institutionalize its relations with China. The position of Uzbekistan in the region changed from time to time. Uzbekistan opposed the dominant position of Russia, and it would act independently in foreign and security policies. The SCO is a formation in which Uzbekistan can cooperate with China and Russia at the same time. However, Uzbekistan does not participate in the SCO’s military exercises. Despite this, Uzbekistan, which is active in the SCO in the fight against terrorism, is home to the Executive Committee of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the SCO.17 Azerbaijan and Turkey are the dialogue partners in the SCO. Azerbaijan also wants to be an observer member of the SCO.18 In terms of Azerbaijan, the SCO, which is seen as a way of developing relations with China, is also considered as a platform where the Nagorno Karabakh problem can be addressed.19 Another organization that started to be effective in Eurasia is the Turkic Council. The Turkic Council was established in 2009 with the Nakhichevan Treaty.20 Turkic Council has related institutions; Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic Speaking Countries (TURKPA), International Organization of Turkic Culture (TÜRKSOY), Turkic Academy, Turkic Business Council, and Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation. Hungary’s observer membership of the Turkic Council and the opening of the Turkic Council’s office in Budapest

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strengthened the Turkic Council. Turkmenistan is the only Turkic Republic, which is not a member of the Turkic Council.21 Each Turkic Republic has expectations from the Turkic Council. First of all, such an organization can be an exemplary model in the Turkic World. Azerbaijan finds the Turkic Council useful in terms of safety and effectiveness in energy and transportation lines. Kazakhstan is a supporter of unity and close cooperation in the Turkic World. In this regard, the founding President Nazarbayev has come to the fore in every platform. For this reason, Kazakhstan is also active in the Turkic Council. Since Kyrgyzstan is relatively small, the unity in the Turkic Council will help it take a determined stance against external pressures. Uzbekistan has been distant from the formations and initiatives in the Turkic World for a long time due to the problems in its relations with Turkey, which is a leading country in this aspect. The Turkic Council’s establishment was a product of the Turkic Summit meetings process, which was started with Turkey’s initiative after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The normalization of Uzbekistan-Turkey relations with Sevket Mirziyoyev’s Presidency in Uzbekistan accelerated the developments leading to Uzbekistan’s membership to the Turkic Council.22 An important development that could ensure the effectiveness of the Turkic Council in Eurasia has been the interest of Hungary toward the organization. Participation of the Hungarian president Orban in the Turkic Council Summit held in Cholpan-Ata in 2018 and Hungary’s observer status were very important developments. In this sense, Hungarian prime minister Victor Orban’s speech at the summit also had historical importance. In his speech, Orban emphasized Hun-Turkic roots and emphasized that Hungarians are descendants from Attila.23 In Eurasia, besides the abovementioned structures focused on security and cooperation, there are also regional integration and cooperation proposals with international economic dimensions and/or formations that can be called mega projects. These are the EEU led by Russia, China’s BRI, and the US-based New Silk Road. These are the organizations or projects concerning the Turkic Republics and the Eurasian security system. The EEU has emerged as a product of Russia’s effort to establish economic unity in the geography of the former Soviet Union. If possible, Russia even wanted a kind of political revival of the former Soviet structure. The treaty establishing the EEU was signed between Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus in Kazakhstan on May 29, 2014, and entered into force on January 1, 2015. After establishing the EEU, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan became members in the same year, and Moldova became an observer member in 2018. The EEU aims at providing free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor and pursues coordinated, harmonized, single policy in the sectors determined by the treaty and international agreements within the Union. The EEU includes

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14.5% of world oil production and 20.2% of natural gas production.24 While Kazakhstan aimed at economic integration in Eurasia, Russia wanted to spread this to other fields. Russia expected the EEU to strengthen its hand in bargaining with other integration projects. Despite this, the rationality of the coexistence of economies with similar characteristics within the EEU has been questioned. After the EEU was launched in 2015, the currency of Kazakhstan, Tenge, was devalued, and its exports to Russia fell below the pre-EEU volume, leading to the questioning of the value of the EEU in Kazakhstan.25 Kyrgyzstan is another Turkic Republic, which is a member of the EEU. Due to economic difficulties, the income of citizens working outside of Kyrgyzstan is important for the country’s economy, Kyrgyzstan has high expectations from the EEU. First, there was an expectation that the quotas for Kyrgyzstan’s citizens to work in Russia would be lifted and that agricultural products could be sold to Kazakhstan more easily by removing trade barriers. However, the fact that the EEU imposed high taxes on imports from non-member countries was a factor that would adversely affect the Kyrgyzstan-China trade. It was thought that this would be compensated by trade with the EEU member countries. Considering 2016 trade figures after Kyrgyzstan’s membership in 2015, trade volume with the EEU member countries decreased by 21.6%.26 Nevertheless, in Kyrgyzstan, the EEU is seen as a balancing factor in China’s economically dominant position. EEU is a Russia-based project, although Nazarbayev was the intellectual father of Eurasian integration. The problems have arisen since economic policies could not be harmonized among the member countries.27 It can be said that the EEU could not attract much attention, and it is especially overshadowed by China’s BRI. The BRI was announced in 2013 with the speech delivered by Chinese president Xi Jinping in Kazakhstan. The territorial line of the project concerns the Turkic Republics. The project, which aims to connect the territory extending from China to Europe by road, railway, and power lines, has also been regarded as the challenge of Russia’s historical impact on Eurasia. Russia, on the other hand, wanted to join the project of China since Russia did not have the capacity to compete against the project.28 Despite the positive atmosphere in economic relations, there are doubts about China’s intention in the BRI. China’s possession of lands from Kazakhstan with the deal about the so-called disputed territory created a reaction against China. Land privatization in Kazakhstan also caused a discussion that the Chinese might buy land in Kazakhstan, which erupted tension and criticisms of China.29 Kyrgyzstan is much more vulnerable to China’s economic impact. Even though Kyrgyzstan’s trade with China showed a tendency to slow down with

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Kyrgyzstan’s membership of EEU, Kyrgyzstan has maintained its importance in delivering Chinese goods to the entire region with the Free Trade Agreement signed between EEU and China in 2018.30 As a matter of fact, after the announcement of this project, China’s investments in this country and the amount of credit given to Kyrgyzstan have also increased. However, the reasons such as increasing economic weight of China in Kyrgyzstan and knowing that the land was given to China in the border arrangement, like the case between Kazakhstan and China, caused a negative perception toward China in Kyrgyzstan.31 Although China is one of Uzbekistan’s most important commercial partners, the cooperation between the two countries in terms of the BRI did not realize due to Islam Kerimov’s attitude toward regional integration projects. When Sevket Mirziyoyev became the president of Uzbekistan, he declared Uzbekistan’s intention to join the BRI. The participation of Mirziyoyev in the Belt and Road Forums was both an opportunity to develop trade between the two countries and the step of creating Uzbekistan’s joining of the BRI. During the Belt and Road Forum of April 25, 2019, China and Uzbekistan declared the goal of $10 billion bilateral trade volume.32 Turkmenistan keeps its distance toward regional integration projects due to its permanent neutrality status. However, there are three natural gas lines that have been completed and opened from Turkmenistan to China, and the capacity will increase even more with the operation of the fourth one.33 The activation of the railway that connects Turkmenistan to China via Kazakhstan and extends to Iran on the other hand, has created a new trade route. Thus, it might be argued that Turkmenistan started to play an active role in China’s BRI. Turkmenistan, which has security concerns due to its border with Afghanistan, is already vital in the BRI, especially in terms of power lines.34 Azerbaijan is also interested in the BRI. During the 2015 visit of Azerbaijan president Ilham Aliyev to China, a memorandum was signed to encourage the creation of the economic pillar of the Silk Road and to develop trade and economic ties between the two countries. The negotiations between Azerbaijan and China focused on the transportation of Chinese goods to Europe through the Caspian crossing road passing through Azerbaijan. If China is connected to the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway project, it will increase its container capacity from 20,000 to 500,000 a year.35 The US-based New Silk Road project emerged as a product of the policy, which aims to deliver energy resources to the international markets safely after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The Silk Road Strategy Act was enacted in 1999. The Silk Road Strategy Act aimed to develop market economies and democracies in the region. The United

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States also aimed to assist in developing the infrastructure necessary for communications, transportation, education, health and energy, and trade on an East-West axis to build strong international relations and commerce.36 It is difficult to say that the United States has developed a consistent strategy for the region. The US policy, although it was supported at the beginning by the regional states, later disturbed the governments of regional countries and the United States’ inability to further develop its relations with the countries in the region reduced its effect.37 Among the organizations, which have been related to Eurasian security, the influence of the Turkic Council is gradually increasing. For example, Turkic Council held an Extraordinary Video Summit on Corona Virus on April 10, 2020, in which countries showed cooperation and solidarity in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. Health Ministers of member countries also held a video conference on April 28, 2020, to discuss the figures of COVID19 in their countries and health infrastructures, diagnosis and treatment methods, and quarantine measures.38 In the Informal Summit of the Turkic Council held on March 31, 2021, the member states expressed their solidarity with Azerbaijan and proclaimed the city of Turkistan as a Spiritual Capital of the Turkic World.39 The Turkic Republics have tried to open space for their policies via using competition among the regional powers in Eurasia. Besides their membership of the abovementioned organizations, they also follow policies to ensure security through bilateral relations. The changes of strategies and focuses of the countries, which have a dominant role in regional security, also impacted the Turkic Republics’ expectations and strategies in terms of security. The solution of the bilateral disputes among Turkic Republics will also increase their profile in world politics. A typical example for this is the agreement between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan about the disputed energy field in the Caspian called Dostluk (Friendship) by both countries.40 CONCLUSION The increasing importance of Eurasia in the international arena has brought the issue of security of the region to the agenda. The Turkic Republics, which gained their independence after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in Eurasia, have important roles. In addition to their roles in CIS, CSTO, SCO, and the Turkic Council, their roles in the organizations and projects focused on economy like EEU, Belt and Road, and New Silk Road showed the indivisibility of security. Among these, the Turkic

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Council that brings together all Turkic Republics other than Turkmenistan is based on identity. Observer member status of the EU member Hungary also distinguishes the Turkic Council from other similar organizations in Eurasia. CSTO and SCO are still to be seen as dominant organizations in the field of security. Among these two, the SCO has been more comprehensive for the Turkic Republics since besides the membership of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, Turkey and Azerbaijan are also dialogue partners of the SCO. Although the Turkic Republics are members of different international organizations and their roles and expectations in the formations for economic integration are different, this does not prevent them from supporting each other. The Turkic Republic, which is a member of an international organization, can support the non-member Turkic Republic in terms of the decisions and activities of the institution in which it is a member. A typical example of this was the EEU Summit in 2016 which was supposed to be held in Yerevan. However, there was a ceasefire violation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in April 2016. Kazakhstan made an initiative in favor of Azerbaijan, which is not a member of EEU, and the EEU Summit was held in Moscow instead of Yerevan.41 If the Turkic Republics developed their relations in political, economic, and military fields and act together, they would be more effective with regard to the security of Eurasia. This would also contribute positively to the security of Eurasia. Coordination and cooperation in a wide range of areas from border security to energy security and counter-terrorism would largely eliminate regional security concerns. NOTES 1. Mark W. Zacher, “The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force,” International Organization 55, no. 2 (2001): 215–250; Robert Jervis, “Theories of War in an Era of Leading Power Peace,” American Political Science Review 96, no. 1 (2002): 1–14. 2. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 167–214. 3. For Near Abroad policy see, Neil Malcolm, “The New Russian Foreign Policy,” The World Today (February 1994): 28–33. Roy Allison, Military Forces in the Soviet Successor States, Adelphi Paper, 280, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993. Suzanne Crow, “Why Has Russian Foreign Policy Changed,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report (1994): 2–4. Rajan Menon, “After Empire: Russia and the Southern Near Abroad,” in The New Russian Foreign Policy, ed. Michael Maldelbaum (New York: the Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), 100–167.

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4. “Uzbekistan Kics Out of US Military Base,” The Guardian, August 1, 2005, https​:/​/ww​​w​.the​​guard​​ian​.c​​om​/wo​​rld​/2​​005​/a​​ug​/01​​/usa.​​n​ickp​​atonw​​alsh. 5. Kamer Kasım, “Türkistan’da Rusya-Çin Rekabeti: Bölgesel ve Küresel Yansımaları,” 20. Yüzyılın Başlarından Günümüze Türk Dünyasındaki Siyasî, İktisadî ve Kültürel Gelişmeler Uluslararası Sempozyumu, Almatı/Kazakistan, 24–27 April 2018, http:​/​/www​​.atam​​.gov.​​tr​/wp​​-cont​​ent​/u​​pload​​s​/Tek​​-Dosy​​a​-Ka​z​​akist​​an​.pd​f (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 2019), 41–72. 6. See, Martha Brill Olcott, Anders Aslund and Sherman Garnett, Getting It Wrong: Regional Cooperation and the Commonwealth of Independent States (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 1999. Paul Kubicek, “Commonwealth of Independent State. An Example of Failed Regionalism,” Review of International Studies 35 (2009): 237–256. 7. See, the Web page of Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry, accessed April 20, 2020, http://www​.mfa​.gov​.az​/en​/content​/947. 8. Elya Altynsarına, “CIS Heads of Government Council in Astana: Kazakhstan calls for expanding trade relations,” The Astana Times, November 5, 2018, https​:/​/as​​ tanat​​imes.​​com​/2​​018​/1​​1​/cis​​-head​​s​-of-​​gover​​nment​​-coun​​cil​-i​​n​-ast​​ana​-k​​azakh​​stan-​​calls​​ -for-​​expan​​​ding-​​trade​​-rela​​tions​/. 9. See, the web page of Turkmenistan Foreign Ministry, accessed April 20, 2020, https://www​.mfa​.gov​.tm​/en​/sng. For Turkmenistan’s foreign policy see Kamer Kasım, “Türkmenistan Dış Politikası,” in Türkmenistan, ed. Kamer Kasım (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2016), 97–130. 10. “Kolektif Güvenlik Anlaşması Örgütü (KGAÖ), Sputnik, November 1, 2016, https​:/​/tr​​.sput​​nikne​​ws​.co​​m​/inf​​ograf​​i k​/20​​16110​​11025​​58407​​4​​-KGA​​O​-Rus​​ya/. 11. Richard Weitz, “Assessing the Collective Security Treaty Organization: Capabilities and Vulnerabilities,” US Army War College Press, https​:/​/ss​​i​.arm​​ywarc​​ olleg​​e​.edu​​/pdff​​i les/​​PUB1​3​​91​.pd​​f, October 2018. For the Charter of the CSTO see, https​:/​/en​​.odkb​​-csto​​.org/​​docum​​ents/​​docum​​ents/​​ustav​​_orga​​nizat​​sii​_d​​ogovo​​ra​_o_​​kolle​​ ktivn​​oy​​_be​​zopas​​nosti​_/. 12. “Tokayev says CSTO is a Priority Organisation for Kazakhstan,” New Europe, June 28, 2019, https​:/​/ww​​w​.new​​europ​​e​.eu/​​artic​​le​/to​​kayev​​-says​​-csto​​-is​-a​​-prio​​rity-​​ organ​​isati​​on​​-fo​​r​-kaz​​akhst​​an/. Malika Orazgaliyeva, “Astana Hosts CSTO Collective Security Council Summit,” The Astana Times, 10 November 2018. 13. Kamer Kasım, “Azerbaycan-Türkiye İlişkilerinde Ermenistan Boyutu,” in 1918’den Günümüze Azerbaycan, ed. Mehmet Topal and Rıza Mammadov (Eskişehir: Anadolu Üniversitesi, 2019), 167–176. Kamer Kasım, “Dağlık Karabağ Sorununun Bölgesel Etkileri,” in Diplomasi ve Savaşın Değişen Rolü, X. Uluslararası Uludağ Uluslararası İlişkiler Kongresi, ed. Tayyar Arı and Kader Özlem (Bursa: Dora Basım Yayım Dağıtım, 2018), 39–54. 14. For details see Kamer Kasım, “Foreign Policies of the Caucasus Republics,” in Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasia, ed. Yaşar Sarı and Seyit Ali Avcu (Eskişehir: Anadolu University, 2020), 179–181. 15. See Shanghai Cooperation Organization, http://eng​.sectsco​.org​/about​_sco/. 16. Alexander Gabuew, “Bigger Not Better: Russia Makes the SCO a Useless Club,” Carnegie Moscow Center, June 23, 2017, https://carnegie​.ru​/commentary​/71350.

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17. Marcel de Hass, “Relations of Central Asia with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 30, no. 1, June 23, 2017, https​:/​/ww​​w​.tan​​dfonl​​ine​.c​​om​/do​​i​/ful​​l​/10.​​ 1080/​​13518​​046​.​2​​017​.1​​27164​​2. 18. “Azerbaijan may get observer status in SCO,” Azer News, September 18, 2018, https​:/​/ww​​w​.aze​​rnews​​.az​/n​​ation​​/1376​​​90​.ht​​ml. 19. “Azerbaijan seeks to raise co-op with SCO to new level,” Azer News, April 10, 2018, https​:/​/ww​​w​.aze​​rnews​​.az​/n​​ation​​/1300​​​56​.ht​​ml. 20. The web page of the Turkic Council, http:​/​/www​​.turk​​kon​.o​​rg​/tr​​-TR​/g​​enel_​​bil​ gi​​/1​/10​. 21. Kürşat Zorlu, “Türk Dünyasının Önemini Kavramak,” Vatan, September 5, 2018, http:​/​/www​​.gaze​​tevat​​an​.co​​m​/kur​​sad​-z​​orlu-​​11969​​13​-ya​​zar​-y​​azisi​​-turk​​-duny​​asi​ -n​​in​-o​n​​emini​​-kavr​​amak-​/. “Türk Konseyi Macaristan Ofisi Açıldı,” Anadolu Ajansı, September 19, 2019, https​:/​/ww​​w​.aa.​​com​.t​​r​/tr/​​dunya​​/turk​​-kons​​eyi​-m​​acari​​stan-​​ofisi​​ -ac​il​​di​/15​​88304​. 22. “Türkiye-Özbekistan İlişkileri Güçleniyor,” Anadolu Agency, February 12, 2018, https​:/​/ww​​w​.aa.​​com​.t​​r​/tr/​​dunya​​/turk​​iye​-o​​zbeki​​stan-​​ilisk​​ileri​​-gucl​​​eniyo​​r ​ /106​​0872. 23. See for Victor Orban’s speech, “Prime Minister Victor Orban’s Speech at the 6th Summit of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States,” http:​/​/www​​.mini​​ szter​​elnok​​.hu​/p​​rime-​​minis​​ter​-v​​iktor​​-orba​​ns​-sp​​eech-​​at​-th​​e​-6th​​-summ​​it​-of​​-the-​​coope​​ ratio​​n​-cou​​ncil-​​of​​-tu​​rkic-​​speak​​ing​-s​​tates​/, 3 September 2018. 24. See the web page of Eurasian Economic Union, http://www​.eaeunion​.org/​ ?lang​=en​#about​-info. 25. Andrei Yeliseyeu, The Eurasian Economic Union: Expectations, Challenges, And Achievements, GMF Policy paper, http:​/​/www​​.gmfu​​s​.org​​/site​​s​/def​​ault/​​files​​/publ​​ icati​​ons​/p​​df​/Eu​​rasia​​n​%20E​​co​nom​​ic​%20​​Union​​.pdf (May 2019): 10–17. 26. Christopher Schwartz, “Will Kyrgyzstan Leave the Eurasian Economic Union?,” The Diplomat, August 9, 2016, https​:/​/th​​edipl​​omat.​​com​/2​​016​/0​​8​/wil​​l​-kyr​​ gyzst​​an​-le​​ave​-t​​he​-eu​​rasia​​n​​-eco​​nomic​​-unio​​n/. 27. Danat Islambek, Kazakhstan Set to Ease Import Restrictions at Kyrgyz Border, Astana Times, November 30, 2017, https​:/​/as​​tanat​​imes.​​com​/2​​017​/1​​1​/kaz​​akhst​​an​-se​​t​ -to-​​ease-​​impor​​t​-res​​trict​​ions-​​​at​-ky​​rgyz-​​borde​​r/. 28. Pete Baumgartner, “China’s Massive ‘One Road’ Project Largely Bypasses Russia, But Moscow Still On Board,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 26, 2017, https​:/​/ww​​w​.rfe​​rl​.or​​g​/a​/r​​ussia​​-chin​​a​-one​​-belt​​-one-​​road-​​proje​​ct​-pu​​tin​-x​​​i​/285​​ 79849​​.html​. 29. Bruce Pannier, “Central Asian Land and China,” RFE/RL, May 2, 2016, https​: /​/ ww​​w​. rfe​​r l​. or​​g​/ a​/ c​​e ntra​​l​- asi​​a n​- la​​n d​- an​​d​- chi​​n a​​/ 27​​7 1136​​6​. htm​​l . Connor Dilleen, “More than just about Belt and Road: does China hold territorial ambitions in Central Asia?,” The Strategist, September 11, 2017, https​:/​/ww​​w​.asp​​ istra​​tegis​​t​.org​​.au​/j​​ust​-b​​elt​-r​​oad​-c​​hina-​​hold-​​terri​​toria​​l​-amb​​iti​on​​s​-cen​​tral-​​asia/​. 30. Chris Devonshire-Ellis, “China-Russia Great Eurasian Partnership on Development Track as EAEU Agree to Regional Free Trade,” Silk Road Briefing,

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February 12, 2019, https​:/​/ww​​w​.sil​​kroad​​brief​​i ng​.c​​om​/ne​​ws​/20​​19​/02​​/12​/c​​hina-​​russi​​a​ -gre​​at​-eu​​rasia​​n​-par​​tners​​hip​-d​​evelo​​pment​​-trac​​k​-eae​​u​​-agr​​ee​-re​​giona​​l​-fre​​e​-tra​​de/. 31. Sebastien Peyrouse, “Discussing China: Sinophilia and Sinophobia in Central Asia,” Journal of Eurasian Studies 7, no. 1 (January 2016): 14–23. Sebastien Peyrouse, “Central Asia’s Tortured Chinese Love Affair,” EastAsiaForum, November 30, 2016, http:​/​/www​​.east​​asiaf​​orum.​​org​/2​​016​/1​​1​/30/​​centr​​al​-as​​ias​-t​​ortur​​ed​-ch​​ine​se​​-love​​-affa​​ir/. 32. “Uzbekistan Fully Supports China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Times of Central Asia, alınan kaynak AVİM, April 26, 2019, https​:/​/av​​im​.or​​g​.tr/​​en​/Bu​​lten/​​ UZBEK​​ISTAN​​-FULL​​Y​-SUP​​PORTS​​-CHIN​​A​-S​-B​​ELT​-A​​N​D​-RO​​AD​-IN​​ITIAT​​IVE. 33. See, “Turkmenistan-Energy,” https​:/​/ww​​w​.glo​​balse​​curit​​y​.org​​/mili​​tary/​​world​​ /cent​​ralas​​ia​/tu​​rkmen​​​-ener​​gy​.ht​​m​.Yaş​ar Sarı, “Türkmenistan’ın Enerji Politikaları,” in Türkmenistan, ed. Kamer Kasım (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2016), 175–181. 34. “Xi urges more pragmatic cooperation with Turkmenistan under Belt and Road Initiative,” Xinhua, June 10, 2017, http:​/​/www​​.xinh​​uanet​​.com/​​/engl​​ish​/2​​017​-0​​6​/10/​​c​ _136​​​35425​​2​.htm​. For Belt and Road Project and energy security of China see İshak Turan, Çin’in Enerji Güvenliği Politikası, Kuşak Yol İnisiyatifi ve Avrasya’da “Yeni Büyük Oyun” (Ankara: Nobel Yayınları, 2020). 35. “Azerbaijan Could Be Transit Hub for Chinese Goods,” Belt & Road News, September 3, 2019, https​:/​/ww​​w​.bel​​tandr​​oad​.n​​ews​/2​​019​/0​​9​/03/​​azerb​​aijan​​-coul​​d​-be-​​ trans​​it​-hu​​b​-f​or​​-chin​​ese​-g​​oods/​. 36. 106th Congress 1st Session H.R. 1152, https​:/​/ww​​w​.gov​​info.​​gov​/c​​onten​​t​/pkg​​/ BILL​​S​-106​​hr115​​2pcs/​​pdf​/B​​ILLS-​​10​6hr​​1152p​​cs​.pd​​f, 3 August 1999. 37. See, Kamer Kasım, “American Policy toward the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and Implications for Its Resolution,” in Trapped Between War and Peace: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh, ed. Gulshan Pashayeva and Fuad Chiragov (Baku: Center for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2018), 221–244. 38. “Turkic States Agree to Cooperate against the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Daily Sabah, April 10, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​.dai​​lysab​​ah​.co​​m​/pol​​itics​​/dipl​​omacy​​/ turk​​ic​-st​​ates-​​agree​​-to​-c​​ooper​​ate​-a​​gains​​​t​-cov​​id19-​​pande​​mic. “Presidents of the Turkic Council Will Hold an Extraordinary Video Summit on 10 April 2020 on Corona Virus,” April 10, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​.tur​​kkon.​​org​/e​​n​/hab​​erler​​/pres​​ident​​s​ -of-​​the​-t​​urkic​​-coun​​cil​-w​​ill​-h​​old​-a​​n​-ext​​raord​​inary​​-vide​​o​-sum​​mit​-o​​n​-10-​​apr​il​​-2020​​ -on​-c​​orona​​-viru​​s​_199​​0. Ruslan Rehimov, “Turkic Council Stresses Coordination in COVID-19 Fight,” Anadolu Agency, April 28, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​.aa.​​com​.t​​r​/en/​​ lates​​t​-on-​​coron​​aviru​​s​-out​​break​​/turk​​ic​-co​​uncil​​-stre​​sses-​​coord​​inati​​on​-in​​-c​ovi​​d​-19-​​ fight​​/1821​​770. 39. “Turkistan Declaration of the Informal Summit of the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States,” Astana Times, April 1, 2021, https​:/​/as​​tanat​​imes.​​com​/2​​021​ /0​​4​/tur​​kista​​n​-dec​​larat​​ion​-o​​f​-the​​-info​​rmal-​​summi​​t​-of-​​the​-c​​ooper​​ation​​-coun​​cil​-o​​f​​-tur​​ kic​-s​​peaki​​ng​-st​​ates/​. 40. “Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan sign deal on Caspian hydrocarbon field,” Anatolia News Agency, January 22, 2021, https​:/​/ww​​w​.aa.​​com​.t​​r​/en/​​econo​​my​/az​​erbai​​jan​-t​​ urkme​​nista​​n​-sig​​n​-dea​​l​-on-​​caspi​​an​-hy​​d​roca​​rbon-​​field​​/2118​​835 .

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41. Tuncel Turgut Kerem, “Karabağ’da Yaşanan ‘4 Gün Savaşının’ Kısa Bir Değerlendirmesi,” Avrasya İncelemeleri Merkezi, April 14, 2016, http:​/​/avi​​m​.org​​ .tr​/t​​r​/Yor​​um​/KA​​RABAG​​-DA​-Y​​ASANA​​N​-4​-G​​UN​-SA​​VASI-​​NIN​-K​​ISA​-B​​​IR​-DE​​ GERLE​​NDIRM​​ESI.

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Islambek, Danat, “Kazakhstan Set to Ease Import Restrictions at Kyrgyz Border,” Astana Times, November 30, 2017, https​:/​/as​​tanat​​imes.​​com​/2​​017​/1​​1​/kaz​​akhst​​an​-se​​ t​-to-​​ease-​​impor​​t​-res​​trict​​ions-​​​at​-ky​​rgyz-​​borde​​r/. Jervis, Robert, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 167–214. Jervis, Robert, “Theories of War in an Era of Leading Power Peace,” American Political Science Review 96, no. 1 (2002): 1–14. Kasım, Kamer, “American Policy toward the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and Implications for its Resolution,” in Trapped Between War and Peace: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh, ed. Gulshan Pashayeva and Fuad Chiragov, 221–244. Baku: Center for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2018. Kasım, Kamer, “Azerbaycan-Türkiye İlişkilerinde Ermenistan Boyutu,” in 1918’den Günümüze Azerbaycan, edited by Mehmet Topal and Rıza Mammadov, 167–176. Eskişehir: Eskişehir, Anadolu University Publication, 2016. Kasım, Kamer, “Dağlık Karabağ Sorununun Bölgesel Etkileri,” in Diplomasi ve Savaşın Değişen Rolü, X. Uluslararası Uludağ Uluslararası İlişkiler Kongresi, ed. Tayyar Arı and Kader Özlem, 39–45. Bursa: Dora Publication, 2018. Kasım, Kamer, “Foreign Policies of the Caucasus Republics,” in Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasia, ed. Yaşar Sarı and Seyit Ali Avcu, 176–209. Eskişehir: Anadolu University, 2020. Kasım, Kamer, “Türkistan’da Rusya-Çin Rekabeti: Bölgesel ve Küresel Yansımaları,” In 20. Yüzyılın Başlarından Günümüze Türk Dünyasındaki Siyasî, İktisadî ve Kültürel Gelişmeler Uluslararası Sempozyumu, Almatı/Kazakistan, 24–27 Nisan 2018. Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2019, 41–72. http:​/​/www​​.atam​​.gov.​​tr​/ wp​​-cont​​ent​/u​​pload​​s​/Tek​​-Dosy​​a​-Kaz​​​akist​​an​.pd​​f. Kasım, Kamer, “Türkmenistan Dış Politikası,” in Türkmenistan, ed. Kamer Kasım, 97–130. Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2016. “Kazakh-Chinese One Belt One Road Cooperation Discussed in Astana,” Belt and Road News, June 9, 2019, https​:/​/ww​​w​.bel​​tandr​​oad​.n​​ews​/2​​019​/0​​6​/09/​​kazak​​h​-chi​​ nese-​​one​-b​​elt​-o​​ne​-ro​​ad​-co​​opera​​tion-​​​discu​​ssed-​​in​-as​​tana/​. “Kolektif Güvenlik Anlaşması Örgütü (KGAÖ),” Sputnik, November 1, 2016, https​:/​ /tr​​.sput​​nikne​​ws​.co​​m​/inf​​ograf​​i k​/20​​16110​​11025​​58407​​4​​-KGA​​O​-Rus​​ya/. Kubicek, Paul, “Commonwealth of Independent State. An Example of Failed Regionalism,” Review of International Studies 35 (2009): 237–256. Malcolm, Neil, “The New Russian Foreign Policy,” The World Today (February 1994): 28–33. Menon, Rajan, “After Empire: Russia and the Southern Near Abroad,” In The New Russian Foreign Policy, edited by Michael Maldelbaum, 100–167. New York: The Council on Foreign Relations, 1998. Olcott, Martha Brill, Aslund, Anders and Garnett, Sherman, Getting It Wrong: Regional Cooperation and the Commonwealth of Independent States (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999). Orazgaliyeva, Malika, “Astana hosts CSTO Collective Security Council summit,” The Astana Times, 10 November 2018.

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Pannier, Bruce, “Central Asian Land and China,” RFE/RL, May 2, 2016, https​:/​/ww​​ w​.rfe​​rl​.or​​g​/a​/c​​entra​​l​-asi​​an​-la​​nd​-an​​d​-chi​​na​​/27​​71136​​6​.htm​​l. Peyrouse, Sebastien, “Central Asia’s Tortured Chinese Love Affair,” EastAsiaForum, November 30, 2016, http:​/​/www​​.east​​asiaf​​orum.​​org​/2​​016​/1​​1​/30/​​centr​​al​-as​​ias​-t​​ortur​​ ed​-ch​​ine​se​​-love​​-affa​​ir/. Peyrouse, Sebastien, “Discussing China: Sinophilia and Sinophobia in Central Asia,” Journal of Eurasian Studies 7, no. 1 (January 2016): 14–23. “Prime Minister Victor Orban’s Speech at the 6th Summit of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States,” September 3, 2018, http:​/​/www​​.mini​​szter​​elnok​​.hu​ /p​​rime-​​minis​​ter​-v​​iktor​​-orba​​ns​-sp​​eech-​​at​-th​​e​-6th​​-summ​​it​-of​​-the-​​coope​​ratio​​n​-cou​​ ncil-​​of​​-tu​​rkic-​​speak​​ing​-s​​tates​/. Rehimov, Ruslan “Turkic Council Stresses Coordination in COVID-19 Fight,” Anadolu Agency, April 28, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​.aa.​​com​.t​​r​/en/​​lates​​t​-on-​​coron​​aviru​​s​ -out​​break​​/turk​​ic​-co​​uncil​​-stre​​sses-​​coord​​inati​​on​-in​​-c​ovi​​d​-19-​​fight​​/1821​​770. Roy, Allison, Millitary Forces in the Soviet Successor States, Adelphi Paper, 280. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993. Sarı, Yaşar,“Türkmenistan’ın Enerji Politikaları,” in Türkmenistan, ed. Kamer Kasım, 175–181. Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2016. Schwartz, Christopher, “Will Kyrgyzstan Leave the Eurasian Economic Union?,” The Diplomat, August 9, 2016, https​:/​/th​​edipl​​omat.​​com​/2​​016​/0​​8​/wil​​l​-kyr​​gyzst​​an​-le​​ave​ -t​​he​-eu​​rasia​​n​​-eco​​nomic​​-unio​​n/. Shanghai Cooperation Organization, http://eng​.sectsco​.org​/about​_sco/. “Tokayev says CSTO is a priority organisation for Kazakhstan,” New Europe, June 28, 2019, https​:/​/ww​​w​.new​​europ​​e​.eu/​​artic​​le​/to​​kayev​​-says​​-csto​​-is​-a​​-prio​​rity-​​organ​​ isati​​on​​-fo​​r​-kaz​​akhst​​an/. Tuncel, Turgut Kerem, “Karabağ’da Yaşanan ‘4 Gün Savaşının’ Kısa Bir Değerlendirmesi,” Avrasya İncelemeleri Merkezi, April, 14, 2016, http:​/​/avi​​m​.org​​ .tr​/t​​r​/Yor​​um​/ka​​rabag​​-da​-y​​asana​​n​-4​-g​​un​-sa​​vasi-​​nin​-k​​isa​-b​​​ir​-de​​gerle​​ndirm​​esi. Turan, İshak, Çin’in Enerji Güvenliği Politikası, Kuşak Yol İnisiyatifi ve Avrasya’da “Yeni Büyük Oyun,” Ankara: Nobel Yayınları, 2020. “Türk Konseyi Macaristan Ofisi Açıldı,” Anadolu Ajansı, September 19, 2019, https​:/​ /ww​​w​.aa.​​com​.t​​r​/tr/​​dunya​​/turk​​-kons​​eyi​-m​​acari​​stan-​​ofisi​​-ac​il​​di​/15​​88304​. Turkic Council Web Page, http:​/​/www​​.turk​​kon​.o​​rg​/tr​​-TR​/g​​enel_​​bil​gi​​/1​/10​. “Turkic States Agree to Cooperate against the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Daily Sabah, April 10, 2020, https​:/​/ww​​w​.dai​​lysab​​ah​.co​​m​/pol​​itics​​/dipl​​omacy​​/turk​​ic​-st​​ates-​​agree​​ -to​-c​​ooper​​ate​-a​​gains​​​t​-cov​​id19-​​pande​​mic. “Turkistan Declaration of the Informal Summit of the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States,” Astana Times, April 1, 2021, https​:/​/as​​tanat​​imes.​​com​/2​​021​/0​​4​/ tur​​kista​​n​-dec​​larat​​ion​-o​​f​-the​​-info​​rmal-​​summi​​t​-of-​​the​-c​​ooper​​ation​​-coun​​cil​-o​​f​​-tur​​kic​ -s​​peaki​​ng​-st​​ates/​. “Türkiye-Özbekistan İlişkileri Güçleniyor,” Anadolu Agency, February 12, 2018, https​:/​/ww​​w​.aa.​​com​.t​​r​/tr/​​dunya​​/turk​​iye​-o​​zbeki​​stan-​​ilisk​​ileri​​-gucl​​​eniyo​​r​/106​​0872. Turkmenistan Foreign Ministry, https://www​.mfa​.gov​.tm​/en​/sng. “Turkmenistan-Energy,” https​:/​/ww​​w​.glo​​balse​​curit​​y​.org​​/mili​​tary/​​world​​/cent​​ralas​​ia​/ tu​​rkmen​​​-ener​​gy​.ht​​m.

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“Uzbekistan Kics Out of US Military Base,” The Guardian, August 1, 2005, https​:/​/ ww​​w​.the​​guard​​ian​.c​​om​/wo​​rld​/2​​005​/a​​ug​/01​​/usa.​​n​ickp​​atonw​​alsh. Weitz, Richard, “Assessing the Collective Security Treaty Organization: Capabilities and Vulnerabilities,” US Army War College Press, https​:/​/ss​​i​.arm​​ywarc​​olleg​​e​.edu​​ /pdff​​i les/​​PUB1​3​​91​.pd​​f, October 2018. “Xi urges more pragmatic cooperation with Turkmenistan under Belt and Road Initiative,” Xinhua, June 10, 2017, http:​/​/www​​.xinh​​uanet​​.com/​​/engl​​ish​/2​​017​-0​​6​ /10/​​c​_136​​​35425​​2​.htm​. Yeliseyeu, Andrei, The Eurasian Economic Union: Expectations, Challenges, And Achievements, GMF Policy paper, http:​/​/www​​.gmfu​​s​.org​​/site​​s​/def​​ault/​​files​​/publ​​ icati​​ons​/p​​df​/Eu​​rasia​​n​%20E​​co​nom​​ic​%20​​Union​​.pdf (May 2019): 10–17. Zacher, Mark W. “The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force,” International Organization 55, no. 2 (2001): 215–250. Zorlu, Kürşat, “Türk Dünyasının Önemini Kavramak,” Vatan, September 5, 2018, http:​/​/www​​.gaze​​tevat​​an​.co​​m​/kur​​sad​-z​​orlu-​​11969​​13​-ya​​zar​-y​​azisi​​-turk​​-duny​​asi​-n​​in​ -o​n​​emini​​-kavr​​amak-​/.

Chapter 18

Possible Effects of NSTC on Regional Power Struggle in Eurasia Göktürk TÜYSÜZOĞLU

INTRODUCTION One of the most emphasized issues in international politics recently is the competition in Eurasia. The region, which was previously evaluated in the context of the effort of establishing hegemony at the former Soviet geography, is examined today in terms of the strategic moves of different actors and Russia’s handling of these motives. At this point, China, which aims to connect Southeast Asia and Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, has come to the fore with the One Belt, One Road initiative. As a matter of fact, this initiative concerns Eurasia directly in terms of both road and railway routes and large-scale infrastructure projects. In particular, Central Asia and the South Caucasus are seen as regions where China is expected to have large financial, economic, and commercial visibility in the coming period. This political activity, which China can achieve, has also mobilized other actors that are closely related to Eurasia. At this point, another actor that needs to be emphasized is India. As a matter of fact, this country is also looking for a way out to stay behind the regional competition with China. It tries to overcome the geographical advantage India needs different transportation routes and partners to export its increasing production and compete, especially with China in commercial terms, we see that an initiative called the North-South Corridor has been developed in order to reach Eurasia and even Eastern/Northern Europe. This initiative, which was introduced by the India-Iran-Russia trio in the early 2000s, has been accelerated only recently; it is seen as a commercial transportation move that integrates maritime transport and land and rail routes, which will start 303

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in Mumbai and reach Russia, and then reach Northern Europe and Central Asia. In the study, information will be given about the North-South Corridor. Afterward, Russia-India and India-Iran relations will be emphasized, and China’s attitude will be evaluated on these issues. Finally, the reflections of the North-South Corridor in Central Asia and the South Caucasus will be emphasized. A NEW COMMERCIAL MOVE IN EURASIA: NORTH-SOUTH CORRIDOR An effort that is considered “new” in Eurasia, which is understood by Russia and China’s hegemonic expectations and the institutional or bilateral efforts they put forward, is in the process of maturation. This initiative, known as the International North-South Trade Corridor (INSTC), which aims to connect South Asia to Eurasia, aims to operate in India, Iran, and Russia. After connecting Mumbai city of India to Bandar Abbas of Iran and especially the port of Chabahar by sea, this corridor will reach Iran and the Caspian Sea by crossing Iran toward rail and road networks northwards.1 Russia will be the main actor to enable the corridor to reach Eastern and Northern Europe and Central Asia. In other words, the corridor will reach Finland in one way and Central Asian countries, including Afghanistan, in the other. Undoubtedly, the actor that has emerged with the goal of becoming a “source” country in this particular corridor is India. At the same time, Iran and especially Russia will come to the fore in terms of having both a hub and energy resources. As a matter of fact, while Russia is going to be opened in terms of commercial and energy transfer to the Persian Gulf/Hormuz Strait and the Indian Ocean through this corridor,2 the main goal of India in this corridor is to overcome the transportation problems that it has been dragged into commercially and to sell its products to Eurasia and even to Europe efficiently. Because of the problems with Pakistan and China, New Delhi, which could not be opened from the west and north to Central Asia, opens a commercial route to itself by using the sea route and defining Iran, which is faced with a serious diplomatic/political isolation, as a port.3 This connection that India has established with Iran is revealed by the Indian investments in Chabahar. Essentially, this effort points to a move similar to China’s use of Pakistan for the One Belt, One Road Initiative. Gwadar Port in Pakistan, on the other hand, appears as the Port of Chabahar in the North-South Corridor.4 The idea of the North-South Corridor emerged during the negotiations between India, Russia, and Iran between 2000 and 2002. In other words, it can be stated that it was a much earlier move than the One Belt, One Road

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Initiative. In this context, the claim that the North-South Corridor initiative is a sudden response to China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative may be falsified on a timely basis. However, it is said that it will compete with the initiative put forward by China in terms of content and expresses an alternative commercial activity and transportation route especially at the Eurasian axis.5 Of course, it is obvious that the INSTC is behind One Belt, One Road in terms of scope and cost. As a matter of fact, when we look at the regions and countries covered by the two projects, it is understood that almost every actor, outside of India, is also included in the One Belt, One Road Initiative, and they consider the two projects as a more lucrative alternative than considering each other as competitors. Since New Delhi is also aware of this situation, it reveals that this corridor has nothing to do with One Belt, One Road Initiative.6 The countries included in the North-South Corridor are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Armenia, Belarus, Ukraine, Oman, Syria, and Turkey. For now, this initiative, which covers twelve countries, includes countries from very different geographies and some with very serious political problems.7 However, it is considered that countries that have problems with each other can be managed in the context of the project since the target is set as a “common gain” and a political agenda is not determined in any way. Bulgaria and Kyrgyzstan also participated at the INSTC Summit held in Iran in March 2019, showing that they want to participate in this project. With the completion of the 164-kilometer railway between Qazvin and Rasht in 2019, one of the most important connection points of the INSTC was launched. The total length of the INSTC is expected to be 7,200 kilometer. As mentioned earlier, this corridor is planned to be multi-modal, that is to say, there will be transportation integration in the context of sea-land-rail connections.8 This initiative, through which the participating countries hope to achieve commercial integration between Mumbai, Bandar Abbas, Chabahar, Tehran, Tabriz, Baku, Astrakhan, and Moscow, can eliminate the dependence on the Suez Canal in relation to the India-Europe connection, as well as the Indian Ocean to the Baltic and Central Asia. Central Asian and the Caucasian countries aim to participate in all kinds of projects that will enable them to be integrated into the world trade, bring themselves financial gain, and provide infrastructure support. In this regard, it is important to reach South Asia and Europe as an alternative route by being in the North-South Corridor after China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative.9 Undoubtedly, this move could prevent these countries from borrowing too much from China in the long run, as well as prevent them from getting caught up in the “debt trap” that was emphasized.10 This initiative will also reduce the transportation cost between Asia and Europe by at least 30 %. It is even expected to reduce transit trade costs by

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40%. The fact that there are fewer countries on the route compared to the One Belt, One Road Initiative and the Suez Canal connection may mean less border crossing and fewer problems. It can be stated that the main connection line of the INSTC is the railway network between Russia, Azerbaijan, and Iran. The completion of the Rasht-Qazvin line allows the railway network starting from Bandar Abbas to reach the Caspian coast and Astara on the Azerbaijani border. Because the network that reaches Azerbaijan from Astara reaches the Russian territory via Samur-Makhachkala toward the north.11 The “official” opening of the INSTC was made by sending the first cargo from India to Russia using Bandar Abbas, which has already not a “deep water port” and is therefore expected to transfer its position to Chabahar in the future. Chabahar Port is located at the Sistan-Balochistan region of Iran. This region, adjacent to Pakistan’s Balochistan State, is also neighbor to Afghanistan. Sistan-Balochistan, which also witnessed terrorist acts against the Iranian security forces after the rise of Baloch nationalism, is also vulnerable to separatist attempts from Pakistan’s Balochistan Province.12 However, the fact that it is located at a point opening to the Sea of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz makes Sistan Balochistan in general and Chabahar in particular an important position for commercial transportation. Iran, India, and Afghanistan agreed with a compromise they made in 2003 to make Chabahar a commercial center.13 This move is similar to China’s infrastructure investments in the Gwadar Port of Pakistan in the axis of the One Belt, One Road Initiative and the move to designate this region as a commercial center for itself. Chabahar is about 70 kilometer from Gwadar in Pakistan. The attempt of the construction of the Port of Chabahar will point out India’s effort to develop a western route by bypassing Pakistan while reducing Afghanistan’s commercial and transport-oriented dependence on Pakistan. This move, which is seen as one of the important components of the North-South Corridor, also makes Iran a commercial center and connection point. The first phase of the Chabahar Project has been officially completed as of December 2017. Total investment is expected to be more than $8 billion. Chabahar-Afghanistan highway, which was completed with the India investment in 2009, completes the India-Iran-Afghanistan route through the highway connecting Herat and Kandahar to Kabul in the south of Afghanistan and then to Mazar-i Sharif at the north. In fact, a connection to Uzbekistan is established through the Mazar-i Sharif so that Indian goods can reach Central Asia. However, the capacity of the highway and security problems especially in Afghanistan, are seen as serious obstacles in the commercial context. India also plans to set up a rail line from Chabahar to the Bamiyan Region in Afghanistan, at the cost of $900 million.14 Thus, an alternative to the highway and a commercial

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line with more capacity will be created. India intends to reach the iron mines on this line, especially in Afghanistan, in Hajigak, where it is operated by an Indian consortium. The India-Iran-Afghanistan Corridor, which has been operating since December 2017, has significantly reduced Afghanistan’s trade dependence on Pakistan. For example, the trade volume at the Torkham border between these two countries, which was previously $2.5 billion a year, dropped to $500 million. Although this is not only related to the Chabahar Project, this initiative is considered to have a major impact on this decline. Afghanistan realizes an annual export of $1 billion through this line, mainly focusing on vegetables, fruits, and food. This figure is expected to double in a few years.15 Russia, which has an important role in the connection of the NorthSouth Corridor at ensuring the connection of Europe and Central Asia, looks very warmly to this project, which will create a commercial mobility around the Caspian Sea in order to alleviate the negative effects of the economic sanctions imposed by the United States, after the Ukraine Crisis. A consensus signed between India and Russia in February 2019 to accelerate the project is also important. In addition, the treaty signed under the leadership of Russia among the riparian countries in the summer of 2018 also created a favorable atmosphere for advancing the NorthSouth Corridor, although it does not solve all the problems regarding the status and sharing of this sea.16 The tension between Azerbaijan and Iran can also be kept under control through INSTC. Iran is worried that the Azerbaijani Turks in its territory will show a separatist tendency under the name of “South Azerbaijan” and that Baku and even Ankara will support it.17 Azerbaijan is also uncomfortable with the possibility of Iranian-backed conservatives and groups such as Talesh origin causing problems.18 The fact that Iran has good relations with Armenia, where Azerbaijan is “officially” at war, is also met with a reaction in Baku. Iran, Azerbaijan, and Armenia are the countries included in the INSTC. But Azerbaijan will take part in the rail network integration between Iran and Russia. On the other hand, Armenia will find a place in this project through Iran, and the main route of INSTC, the Russian-Azerbaijan-Iran railway network, will not reach Armenia directly. INSTC will encourage mutual trade between the participating countries, modernize the transportation infrastructure, create a mutual dependency in the logistics sector, and also ensure the development of Central Asia-Caspian states that are not mature at these areas. Although the dependency to be created through commercial and economic cooperation is not targeted at the first place, it may also bring about the development of social and political relations on the basis of mutual trust.

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INDIA’S RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA AND IRAN AND CHINA’S POSITION Russia, one of the most important parts of the INSTC project, is also in strategic partnership with China. Russia, which is stated to have opened a space for Beijing at the background of the development of the One Belt, One Road Initiative and especially in the focus of Eurasia, has also acted in general with China at the UN Security Council.19 It can even be said that the Russian-Chinese rapprochement plays a critical role in the context of the systemic multipolarity of the international system and the weakening of American hegemony in particular. Russia helps Beijing in return for contracts, which can be said to be quite profitable for China’s military development and meeting its needs. The most important market of the Russian Defense Industry is China.20 However, despite all these factors, Russia’s relations with India, which is extended to the Cold War era, create a certain discomfort in Beijing. After Narendra Modi came to power, India, which has turned to the Hindutva strategy, has embarked on an aggressive foreign policy and the two countries have engaged in military, commercial, and political competition in many points, especially in the Indian Ocean.21 Obviously, Russia has become the most important actor in balancing an increasingly deep competition between China and India.22 The fact that Moscow is seen in both Beijing and New Delhi as an actor whose support is needed, and should never be allowed to slip into the opposite camp, also helps to reveal the systemic effectiveness of Moscow. One of the most important reasons behind Vladimir Putin’s becoming so visible and providing an activity beyond Russia’s economic power is the “compulsory” balancing position that Moscow has assimilated in Asia. Russia-India relations have been carried out in the dimension of “strategic cooperation” since the Cold War period. In the 1970s when China approached the United States against the USSR, India was one of the most important partners of the USSR in Asia. The end of the Cold War can be described as a development that underlines the competitive dimension in India-China relations. As of this conjuncture, Russia, on the other hand, started to develop a strategic/systematic partnership with India, especially with the military-technical cooperation dimension, as opposed to the Cold War period. Traditionally, it can be said that Russia-India relations have been progressing on five main areas of cooperation. These are seen as: politics, defense interaction, civil nuclear energy development, cooperation against terrorism, and space studies. These issues shape the relations between the two countries since the Cold War era.23 However, recently, trade has been added to these five elements. In fact, Modi and Putin have set the

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goal of achieving a mutual trade volume of $30 billion as a 2025 target. Considering that there is a volume of $9.4 billion in 2017, it can be said that this figure is quite ambitious.24 As a matter of fact, the two countries’ leaders also stated that they are working to sign a “free trade agreement” between the EEU and India at the Russia-India Annual Summit held at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, in order to reach their mutual target of 2025.25 In this case, India will increase its trade not only with Russia, but also with all the countries that are members of the EU, and New Delhi’s regional visibility in Eurasia will increase. Undoubtedly, this will give the opportunity to balance China’s moves in the region. It is also necessary to mention the existence of the India-Russia Intergovernmental Commission (IRIGC), which directs the relations between the two countries, to understand how deeply the India-Russia relations are shaped.26 It is not possible to talk about another example of this intergovernmental commission that operates on a large scale. This commission, which directs the relations between the two countries, is divided into two main sections. The first part deals with issues such as trade, economy, science, technology, and cultural cooperation, and the Deputy Prime Minister of Russia and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of India are responsible for the operation of this department. The second part deals with military-technical cooperation, and the defense ministers of both countries lead in this. Both departments meet annually, and other ministers and bureaucrats contribute to commission work on related issues. Russia’s support of SAARC (South Asian Regional Cooperation Organization), a regional integration initiative led by India as well as INSTC, and Moscow’s willingness to join New Delhi as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, makes China suspect about Russia’s proximity to India.27 The military aspect of Russia-India relations is causing discomfort in China as well as in the United States. This is because the military-technical cooperation established during the Cold War period is maintained in an increasingly strong framework by gaining a strategic context. India’s most important arms supplier is Russia, where it makes 68% of the total arms purchase. It has been followed by the United States, which has been getting closer to New Delhi and China in recent years (14%). Israel has a certain visibility at 7.2%.28 New Delhi develops “joint” weapons programs with Russia on the basis of the “Make in India” program. It even enables the production of advanced weapon technologies in India within the framework of companies established on the basis of partnership. This relationship has been widened since the military-technical cooperation agreement signed in 1988. The technological infrastructure of the weapon systems, which is the partnership’s subject, is gradually developing after Modi developed a more

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interventionist foreign policy integrated into Hindu nationalism. BrahMOS missile systems, fifth generation fighter jet program (Sukhoi/HAL FGFA), Sukhoi Su-30MKI jet production program, Ilyushin Tactical Cargo Plane, Kamov-226T dual-engine helicopters, and various frigate types are high-level military vehicles produced within the frame of the “Make in India” program and with the partnership of Russia.29 India receives the S-400 Air Defense System from Russia, just like China. Despite Washington’s intense opposition and even warning that it may face various restrictions, New Delhi, which sees its relations with Russia as a “priority,” makes a five-battery purchase. Even the prepayment for this order was made as of September 2019.30 Before and after the Russia-India Summit in Vladivostok, New Delhi made a total of $14.5 billion in arms purchase deals with Russia. This situation proves how satisfied the Russian arms industry is with the Indian market. Undoubtedly, Beijing is uncomfortable with the Indian Army, which is being equipped with the state-of-the-art Russian weapons. A strong Indian Navy, which will reveal itself, especially in relation to the Indian Ocean-Pacific connection, points out a situation that will both create a desire to ally with India by other countries and threaten China’s claims in the South China Sea in the long term. INS Vikramaditya aircraft carrier production program, Akula-II nuclear submarines (rented from Russia and can be purchased by India at the end of the contract), and the nuclear submarine Chakra-III, which will also be rented from Russia and join the Indian Navy in 2025, can be seen as a Russian contribution.31 Russia will establish smart cities and industrial production facilities near New Delhi and Mumbai and integrate these cities and facilities with highspeed trains, roads, and even new port facilities to be built. Russian technology will be used in this entire construction process, and, over time, a smart city will be built on the basis of the partnership of the “Make in India” program. In contrast, India invests heavily in oil extraction in Russia’s Sakhalin-I field (the Indian company OGNC-Videsh has a 20% share in Sakhalin-I). Another important element of Russia-India relations is cooperation in civil nuclear energy. Russia, which has close relations with China, will build more than twenty nuclear power plants in India in the next twenty years.32 Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant, in which Russia contributed to its construction, is operational with two units. The two countries have agreed on adding two separate units to this power plant. India-Iran relations point to another regional cooperation that China closely follows. China is Iran’s largest trading partner. At the same time, China is the country that invested the most in gas and oil fields in Iran, especially in the South Pars field, and bought the most oil and gas from this country. Although the sanctions imposed on Iran after the US withdrawal from the P5 + 1 Treaty negatively affected Chinese companies’ energy investments, such as CNPC

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(China National Petroleum Corporation as paranthetical) in Iran, China has experienced certain unrest in Iran. It must contribute to the development of the country with its highway, railway, and other infrastructure investments. Recently, Iran’s rapprochement with India has been closely monitored by China. Although it has not reached an advanced level as China-Iran relations, the fact that the competition in the Indo-Pacific region is moving around the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz causes unrest in Beijing. The fact that Modi made speeches indicating the importance of the rapprochement shows a consensus on the cooperation between the two countries. As of today, Iran’s share in India’s total foreign trade volume is 2.6%. According to the calculations between April 2018 and February 2019, it is a remarkable development that the total trade volume between the two countries is $15.6 billion, and this figure is growing steadily. A large part of this figure is Iran’s oil and gas exports to India (the total figure is $12.7 billion, and a large part—80-85%— consists of oil/natural gas exports).33 Iran was the third country in oil import of India before it turned into a country that was again heavily sanctioned by the Trump administration. This position of Iran, following Iraq and Saudi Arabia, was negatively affected after the end of the energy purchase exemption granted by the United States to countries such as India. As a matter of fact, this situation had the same appearance in the period between 2011 and 2015, when it faced sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program. Considering that New Delhi has to import 95% of the oil it needs, it is obvious that the US sanctions imposed on Iran have a negative outlook for India. As a matter of fact, New Delhi provided at least 11% of the oil it needed from Iran just before the sanctions came into effect again.34 The United States’ termination and renewal of the exemptions granted to India and several other countries caused India to end its oil and natural gas purchases from Iran. Undoubtedly, the authorities of the two countries continue their efforts to find a solution in this regard. Since the sanctions imposed by the United States do not prevent the Indian investments regarding the Port of Chabahar and the North-South Corridor, the cooperation on these issues continues.35 In fact, it is known that India wants to make an investment of $20 billion at Chabahar, which is known as a joint investment, in the long term.36 India, which realized the construction of the Zaranj-Delaram highway in Afghanistan and completed a section of the corridor that will extend from the Iranian border to Central Asia, also provides financial support to Iran in constructing the highway between Chabahar-Milak.37 As a matter of fact, the highway to be connected to Zaranj from Milak will have established a connection from Afghanistan to the rest of Central Asia. The Shiite Muslims, who are citizens of India, are seen as much more privileged by the state than other Muslims (Muharram is officially recognized)

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also reflects the positive atmosphere in the relations between the two countries.38 Many students from Iran are taught at prestigious Pune and Bengaluru universities in India. It is possible to state that Kashmir is the most important source of tension in India-Iran relations. However, Iran has prevented many of the decisions Pakistan wanted to take against India in the context of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).39 Because Tehran acts in the direction of an Islamic ideology, it has to show that it stands with the Muslims of Kashmir, whom it sees as “oppressed” and “victims.” However, especially Pakistan, because of its attitude in the OIC, does not trust Iran. On the other hand, China is aware that Kashmir is a potential tension that can throw the cooperation dimension in India-Tehran relations behind. Beijing can try to manipulate it in the context of the relations between the two countries by using this issue in the future. POSSIBLE REFLECTIONS OF NORTHSOUTH CORRIDOR AT CENTRAL ASIA AND SOUTH CAUCASUS INSTC has sought to create a commercial, economic, and infrastructureoriented regional integration between South Asia and especially the Indian subcontinent and Eurasia. Central Asia is a geographical area where a certain balance has been observed in the context of activity between Russia and China recently. This balance is shaped by Russia’s know-how, military power and by the commercial and financial power of China. With the efforts to increase the visibility and success of the EEU, the willingness to benefit from the projects that focus on the attractive commercial, financial, and infrastructure investments offered by the One Belt, One Road Initiative also puts the countries of the region under serious pressure. INSTC, on the other hand, has not yet been included in the regional reality developed by these two actors. Afghanistan will be the most important country that INSTC will positively affect in Central Asia. As a matter of fact, since this country is bordered by countries such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Iran, it will be the most important country that provides India-Central Asia connection with full enforcement of the road and railway connections. Being one of the key countries of commercial transportation will improve the economic structure of Afghanistan, as well as enabling the infrastructure investments required by the country.40 The improvement of the economic infrastructure and the evolving of the country to a trade hub will also significantly limit the power of actors such as Al-Qaeda or the Taliban, who are fed by the social unrest. It should not be forgotten that actors on the Caspian coast reached a consensus at a time when INSTC was on the agenda. Turkmenistan, which is one

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of these countries, will be included in this project even if it is not officially named as a partner in INSTC. The Treaty of Ashgabad, which accelerated INSTC and Turkmenistan is a party to, was also signed in this country.41 This treaty provides the establishment of an international transport corridor to facilitate the transportation of goods between Central Asia and the Persian Gulf. Undoubtedly, this aim implies an approach underlining the North-South Corridor. Turkmenistan is in close contact with India as an actor in the TAPI (Turk​menis​tan-A​fghan​istan​-Paki​stan-​India​) Energy Project, as well as its commercial, transportation, and energy-oriented ties with Iran.42 Kazakhstan, which has a very important role in the revitalization of the idea of Eurasianism and especially at the realization of the idea of the EEU, is one of the participants of INSTC. The key factor for Kazakhstan is to reduce its dependence on Russia and expand its commercial, financial, sociocultural, and ultimately, political contact with different actors. The sanctions that Russia faced also negatively affected the EEU and the need for balancing Moscow’s economic/political power in Central Asia directed Nursultan (Astana) to come in contact with China and India.43 As part of the Nurlu Jol project, Kazakhstan, which plans to integrate with the One Belt, One Road Initiative and which is the scene of China’s infrastructure and industrial investments within the framework of this initiative, is evaluating all the alternatives that can make it a regional hub.44 Kazakhstan plans to establish a close relationship with New Delhi as a country that meets India’s uranium needs and is also aware of the ever-growing need for Indian energy.45 Undoubtedly, this attitude will be a step to improve Kazakhstan’s ability to become the diplomatic center of Central Asia. The inclusion of this country in INSTC has also constituted a critical basis for Kyrgyzstan’s participation. Uzbekistan is not yet part of INSTC. However, it continues its negotiations on participation. Tashkent, which developed close financial and commercial relations especially with China under the leadership of Shovkat Mirziyoyev, is not a member of the EEU despite Moscow’s demand. It is thought that Tashkent, which has recently turned to a multidimensional foreign policy approach, will join INSTC in the medium term. Because this project has no “political” aspect and binding conditions are also in the background. On the other hand, Tajikistan has a certain affinity with New Delhi as the country that maintains Farkhor Air Base, where India has the first and only military base outside the country.46 India acts with Tajikistan on Afghanistan’s security and wants to prevent the Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements from taking over control in Kabul. Because New Delhi thinks that if these actors gain control in Afghanistan, the political mobility against Indian administration will be strengthened in Kashmir. What makes Tajikistan so important on behalf of India is the security of Afghanistan. The presence of Tajikistan, which is neighboring both Afghanistan and Uzbekistan and extending to the

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Chinese border, is also valuable on the axis of the commercial transport route in Central Asia. Azerbaijan pursues goals such as both increasing its regional effectiveness and generating transit revenue in this initiative. Desiring to develop in areas other than the energy sector, Bakû will be critical in terms of being able to participate in this project, diversifying the economy, and generating income in the future. Bakû aims to sell oil to India in the context of this project. Azerbaijan is partnering to build warehouses and terminals to be used for oil and other goods in Astara, which is located on the Iran-Azerbaijan border. In fact, a cargo terminal was completed in 2019 with the contribution of Baku. Astara railway terminal, whose capacity will be 2 million tons annually, is expected to reach a capacity of 5 million tons over time with the contribution of Azerbaijan railways.47 Qazvin-Rasht-Astara railway, which has a very critical role within the scope of INSTC and will provide a railway connection to Bandar Abbas and Chabahar with the completion of the RashtAstara (Iran)-Astara (Azerbaijan) axis, will be completed in a few years. The working group established by Iran, Russia, and Azerbaijan to overcome infrastructure restrictions and eliminate administrative problems has been working very intensely recently. In this context, negotiations are ongoing to ensure cooperation between the three countries in terms of customs tariffs and quotas. Although Armenia’s participation to INSTC through Iran creates a certain disappointment in Azerbaijan, the regional role to be achieved in INSTC comes to the forefront for Baku. It is in question that Yerevan opens to the Black Sea via Georgia or reaches Russia. At this point, Georgia-Russia relations will have to be carried out at all times in a stable and collaborative manner. But, as evidenced by the five-day war in 2008, and the ongoing tension between Georgia and Russia, these relations are always difficult to maintain consistently. In this regard, Azerbaijan is pleased to see that the INSTC project will walk along the main transport axis of Russia-AzerbaijanIran, as envisaged. CONCLUSION Although the INSTC initiative has not yet reached the required maturity in terms of financial requirements and infrastructure, it will create an important commercial corridor as a transportation alternative linking South Asia to Eurasia and even Northern Europe. This corridor, which has the capacity to mutually include the energy resources of Russia, Iran, and Azerbaijan, will also have a positive impact on India’s export channels and overcome this country’s trade congestion due to geographical and political imperatives. This project, which was introduced for the first time in the early 2000s, has an incomparable

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view toward the One Belt and One Road Initiative in terms of financial size and scope. In fact, some projects (especially in Central Asia) are planned to receive investment support from the Asian Infrastructure and Development Bank within the scope of INSTC. In this context, it is not possible for INSTC to compete with One Belt, One Road in terms of appearance and scope. As an actor in both initiatives, Russia plays a crucial role in balancing China and India. Of course, this would allow Moscow to reflect its strength as it opened space for Eurasia and the EEU to work closely with both initiatives. Moreover, Russia’s presence not only enhances the coverage and accessibility of both projects in terms of geographical and political terms, but also facilitates the participation of Central Asian countries. The United States closely monitors the development of these two initiatives. Competition with China may lead to an understanding to undermine the development of the One Belt, One Road Initiative. However, India’s cooperation with Iran, especially within the scope of INSTC, where Washington is getting closer to Beijing in the Indo-Pacific region, creates discomfort in the United States. INSTC will create a reality that increases the regional importance of Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus and Afghanistan in Central Asia. In this context, AzerbaijanIran relations and Afghanistan’s political stability will be the main issues. It is likely that INSTC participants and especially India will play an active role in the stability of Afghanistan in the upcoming period, while a decrease in the tension in the Tehran-Baku relations is expected. However, it can be seen that this initiative will underline the global positions of India and Russia in general.

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Index

Aarhus Model, 169 Abdel Nasser, Gamal, 89 Abe, Shinzo, 257 absolute sovereignty doctrine, 273, 274 absolute territorial integrity doctrine, 274 Accession Partnership Document (APD), 203 Afghanistan, 96, 111, 113, 114, 136, 161, 164, 165, 240, 249, 251, 254, 256, 257, 261, 262, 275, 277, 290, 293, 304, 306, 307, 311–13, 315 Africa, 12, 15, 17, 101, 107, 127, 131, 134, 153, 182, 223, 252, 253, 303 Albania, 37, 38, 44, 45, 56, 164; Albanians, 45 Algeria, 95, 108, 162 Al-Qaeda, 80, 114, 115, 162, 163, 171, 312, 313 Amu Darya, 261, 269, 275, 276 Angola, 136, 138 Ankara Agreement, 199, 200, 203, 211 Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), 225 anti-terrorism agreement, 168 Anti-Terrorism Committee, 170 Arab Spring, 3, 6, 7, 90, 94 Aral, lake of, 269 Aral Lake Basin, 275 assassination of Hariri, 6 Astana process, 9

Atlantists, 58 Atomic Energy Community, 200 Azerbaijan, 20, 55, 56, 58, 59, 255, 259, 286, 288–91, 293–95, 305–7, 314, 315 Azzam, Abdullah Yusuf, 162 badwagoning strategy, 117 Bahrain, 6 Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, 293 Baku-Tiflis-Erzurum (BTE), 55, 57–59, 61 balance of military forces, 272 Balkans, 16, 35–41, 43–46, 49, 51, 127, 149, 164, 181; Western Balkans, 39, 43, 46, 164 Baltic Sea, 114, 228 Baltic Sea basin, 114 baseline, 18, 23, 26 Belgium, 132, 163, 164, 169 Berdimuhamedov, Gurbanguli, 240 Black Sea, 20, 22, 44, 55, 56, 59, 60, 107, 228, 314; Black Sea pipeline, 56 Black Stripe, 78 Blue Stream Pipeline, 59 Bosnia, 36–38, 40–42, 44, 45, 136, 139, 161, 164 Bosnian Model, 84 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 144

323

324

Index

BRICS, 253 Bulgaria, 19, 20, 38, 55, 56, 181, 204, 305 Caliphate, 161, 162, 165, 171 Caspian Basin, 16, 17, 53, 54, 57, 270 Caspian Region, 53–55, 57–59, 61 Caspian Sea, xx, 55, 59, 252, 304, 307 Caucasus, 6, 10, 12, 54, 55, 57, 59, 137, 253, 303, 304, 315 Central America, 153 Central Asia, 6, 10, 12, 15, 20, 21, 54, 55, 57, 127, 163, 182, 236, 237, 242, 251–53, 255, 269–71, 275, 277–79, 283, 289, 303–7, 311–15; Central Asian countries, 20, 236, 237, 244, 251, 269, 270, 277–79, 304, 315 Central Military Commission (CMC), 220 Chechens, 137 China, 6, 10, 11, 15, 19, 21, 57–59, 163, 164, 169, 219–29, 231, 233, 235–44, 249–63, 265, 275, 277–79, 285–87, 289–93, 303–6, 308–13, 315; Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 19, 20, 221, 236–39, 242–44, 249, 252, 253, 255, 258, 285, 290–93; China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), 252, 310; China’s Westward Policy, 19; Chinese People’s Congress, 226; New Silk Road, 285, 291, 293, 294; People’s Republic of China (PRC), 223, 224; Xiaoping, Deng, 221, 226; Xinping, Xi, 229 Christianity, 107 Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), 254, 285–90, 294, 295 Colombia, 149 The Committee of Experts on Terrorism (CODEXTER), 168 Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), 205 Committee on Combating the AntiTerrorism Expert, 168

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 162, 164, 288, 294 Congo, 133, 138, 139 constructivism, 271 continental shelf, 16–28, 31 Convention on the International Status of Refugees, 182 Convention on the Law of NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses, 273 Convention on the Legal Status of Refugees, 182 Copenhagen Criteria, 201, 203 Copenhagen Political Criteria, 204 Customs Union, 14, 199, 200, 203, 208 Cyprus Questions, 26 Cyprus Resettlement Project (CRP), 149, 152 Davos summit, 6 Dayton Agreement, 37 demilitarization, 5, 236 Demirtaş, Selahattin, 75, 83 democratization, 5, 112, 139, 262 downing of Russian SU-24 aircraft, 9 Early warning radar systems, 7 Eastern Mediterranean, 10–12, 16, 17, 19–23, 25–31, 33 East Timor, 138 East Turkestan, 236, 250, 251, 256, 259–62 economic interdependence, 15, 127 Egypt, 6, 8, 19, 21–29, 95, 108, 162 Energy security, 53, 54 England, 162–64 environmental safety, 20 ethnopolitical, xv, xviii, 130, 136, 137, 139; ethnopolitical conflicts, xviii, 136, 139; ethnopolitical movements, 15; ethnopolitical struggle, 137 Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), 285– 87, 291–95, 309, 312, 313, 315

Index

Europe, 10–12, 16, 19, 20, 35, 37–40, 45–47, 54–58, 65, 73, 91, 108, 109, 111–13, 116–18, 133, 163, 164, 167–69, 171, 182, 185, 199–204, 206–9, 221, 227, 252; Eastern Europe, 15, 58, 127; EU Council, 168; EU enlargement process, 38, 39; Eurasia Development Bank, 290; Eurasianism, 4, 10, 12, 313; Euro-Atlantic alliance, 11; EuroAtlantic institutions, 16, 35, 46; Euro-Atlantic political alliance, 3; Euro-Atlantic security, 11; European Coal and Steel Community, 200; European Commission, 201; European Council, 12, 201, 203, 204; European Court of Justice (ECJ), 109, 111, 112, 116, 117, 133, 164, 168, 202, 206–9; European Economic Community (EEC), 19, 199, 200; European Parliament, 168, 206; European Union, 16, 35, 40, 47, 54, 73, 108; Eurozone countries, 39; Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 16, 19–29 Fergana Valley, 275, 277 Flotilla incident, 93 foreign fighters, 18, 161, 165 foreign terrorist fighters, 161, 162, 170, 171 foreign terrorists, 161–64, 166, 169, 171 former Yugoslavia, 16, 36, 148 France, 11, 74, 83, 84, 116, 131, 162– 64, 169, 207, 227 free-market economy, 35, 272 Gandhi, Mahatma, 149, 150 Gaza, 90, 92, 93, 96–102 Geneva Convention (1951), 182 Geneva Convention (1958), 17 Germany, 11, 108, 110, 162–64, 169, 171, 185, 186, 188, 194, 206, 227 Global Counterterrorism Forum, 167

325

great power politics, 19 Greco-Turkish issue, 135 Greece, 8, 10, 11, 22, 23, 26, 30, 38, 44, 55, 56, 136, 181 Guatemala, 149, 153 Gulf of Aden, 228 Gulf Peace Team (GPT), xviii, 149, 152, 153 Hague–Marrakech Memorandum, 167 Hamas, 6, 92, 93 hard power, xvi, 3, 4, 94, 256 Harmon doctrine, 273 hawkish circles, 75 Helsinki Summit, 203, 204 Hezbollah, 8, 9 High Commissioner for Refugees, 114, 166 Hindu nationalism, 310 Hong Kong National Security Law, 226 humanitarian aid, 81, 82, 92, 93, 95–97, 100, 112, 114 humanitarian corridor plans, 17 humanitarian safe, 17 human rights, 9, 15, 110, 115, 127, 153, 166, 169, 203, 272, 288 Hungary, 44, 55, 56, 109, 204, 290, 291, 295 hybrid plans, 74 Implementation Force, 37 Indian Oceans, 228 industrialized countries, 54 inter-group rivalries, 128 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 170 International Court of Justice, 18, 19, 27 International Criminal Court, 169 International Energy Agency (IEA), 54 international humanitarian law, 166 International Law Association, 274 International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), 144, 148 International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), 304–9, 312–15

326

Index

international terrorism, ix, xi, 18, 115, 166 International Turkish Culture Organization, 255, 290 international unarmed peacekeeping initiatives, 149 interpositionary peacekeeping, 150 intra-state conflicts, 18, 127–30, 133, 134, 136, 138–40, 148, 153 intra-state nonviolent force, 149 Iran: ballistic missile programme, 117; Khomeini, Ayatollah, 89; nuclear activities, 6; nuclear deal (JCPOA), 117; Tehran Declaration, 6 Iraq, 5, 7–9, 77–80, 90, 108, 110–17, 137, 161–66, 181, 251, 253, 311; Desert Shield, 110; Desert Storm, 110; Hussein, Saddam, 89, 95; ISIS, 7–9, 80–84, 161–66, 171; Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, 7, 80 Israel, 5, 6, 17, 21, 23, 24, 26–29, 83, 89–97, 101, 102, 108, 110, 113, 117, 136, 309; Judaism, 107; Olmert, Ehud, 93; Operation Cast Lead, 93, 94 KFOR (NATO-led Kosovo Force), 37, 40 Kosovo, 37–40, 42, 45, 135, 136, 164 Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant, 310 Kurdistan regionalism, 17 Kuwait, 6, 110, 111, 113, 115, 127, 153 Lebanon, 24, 26–29, 95, 108, 112, 136, 152, 162 Ledra Palace Hotel, 139 Liberia, 133, 139 Libya, 10, 12, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 30, 77, 90, 116, 127, 164, 165; Libya crisis, 17 Lisbon summit, 6 Macedonia, 37, 38, 40, 44, 164 Malaysia, 130 maritime areas, xvi, 17, 22, 24, 28–30 maritime power, 19

mass migration, 181, 182 Mazar-e-Sharif, 114 Middle East, 5–8, 10, 12, 17, 18, 21, 39, 53, 55, 61, 67, 79, 82, 89, 90, 93–95, 97, 101, 107–18, 163, 164, 182, 191, 235, 237, 251, 252, 256, 258, 280, 286, 303; Madrid Peace Conference, 117; Middle East countries, 5, 111, 113 military doctrine, 58 military intervention, 75, 91, 101, 224 Mirziyoyev, Shavkat, 261, 291, 293 missile defense system, 3, 6, 225 Monte Negro, 164 Mozambique, 138 Multiannual Development Aid Program, 112 multinational corporations (MNCs), 144 Nabucco, 55, 57, 58, 61 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, 289, 290, 295 Namibia, 138 NATO, 3, 5–7, 11, 12, 35–37, 40, 45, 54, 58, 75, 78, 80, 83, 84, 108, 109, 111, 253 natural prolongation, 17–19, 23, 24 natural resources, 9, 17–21, 25–27, 29, 235, 238–40, 270, 286 naval forces, 19, 220, 224, 228 Niyazov, Saparmurat, 239 Noble Energy Company, 25 nonviolent and unarmed peacekeeping, 18 nonviolent deterrence, 18 nonviolent intervention, 18 nonviolent mechanisms, 18, 145 nonviolent peacekeeping, 18, 144, 145, 148, 154 nonviolent social change, 18 nonviolent struggle, 18 non-Western countries, 12 North Atlantic Council, 11 Northern Iraq Model, 77 North-South Corridor, 303–6, 311, 313 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 225

Index

official development assistance (ODA), 95–97 Orban, Victor, 291 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 167 Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), 312 Palestine, 17, 89–92, 94–102, 108, 112, 113, 117, 136; Palestinian Liberation Organization, 6, 91, 136 Pamir, mountains of, 269 Panetta, Leon, 77 Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic Speaking Countries, 290 Peace Brigade International (PBI), 18, 149, 152–54 peace-building, 37, 144, 147, 149, 150, 154 peacekeeping forces, 138, 145, 146, 148, 149, 154 peacekeeping operations, 35, 145–47, 154 peacekeeping soldier, 146 Peacekeeping troops, 146 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 220, 222 Persian Gulf, 112, 114, 221, 304, 311, 313 Piri Reis, 25 PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), 4, 75, 76, 80–82, 85 Poland, 6, 17, 18, 107–18, 204; Polish foreign policy, 108, 113, 118; Polish government, 18, 108, 110, 111, 113, 114, 116; Polish Humanitarian Action, 113, 114; Polish Marines, 114; Polish Medical Mission, 113, 114; Polish Middle East concept, 118; Polish Middle East strategy, 18 Potsdam, 108 proxy wars, 18, 137 Pushtuns, 137 Rabat conference, 91 radical terrorist organizations, 163 Ramallah, 93

327

Readmission Agreement, 208–11 realist paradigm, 54, 153 reasonable use doctrine, 274 refugee crisis, 39 refugee problems, 18, 272 Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), 251 religious conflicts, 144 Russia, 4, 5, 7–12, 19–21, 39, 44, 55–61, 75, 77, 78, 80, 113, 116, 137, 161, 163, 164, 169, 228, 236, 237, 240, 243, 244, 249–59, 262, 263, 278, 279, 285, 287, 289–92, 303, 304, 306–10, 312–15; Gazprom, 44, 55, 240, 252; Near Abroad, 58, 61, 240, 287; Putin, Vladimir, 9, 44, 308 Rwanda, 139, 148 Saudi Arabia, 6, 8, 111, 113–15, 162 seabed, 17, 18, 20–22 seafloor, 18 security belt, 17 security pockets, 17 security umbrella, 17 Serbia, 38–42, 44, 55, 56, 164 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 236, 249, 251, 253, 254, 260, 285, 289, 290, 294, 295 Shanti Sena, 18, 144, 148–52, 154 Sino-Japan conflict, 150 Slaughter, Anne-Marie, 74 Slovenia, 36, 56, 204, 207 soft power, 3–5, 8, 16, 17, 35, 36, 43, 46, 54, 89, 90, 94, 95, 97, 99, 101, 226, 227, 256, 262 Somalia, 134, 139, 148, 164, 223 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), 309 South China Sea, 221, 223, 226–29, 310 Southeast Asia, 131, 256, 303 South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP), 36–38 Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), 55 South Stream, 55, 56, 60, 61; South Stream Project, 55, 56, 61

328

Index

Soviet Union, 19, 20, 58, 109, 134, 220, 223, 227, 236, 237, 239, 250, 253, 259, 270, 285–88, 291, 293, 294 Sri Lanka, 149, 153 Stabilization Force (SFOR), 37, 40 Strategic Support Force (SSF), 220 submarine areas, 17, 18 subsoil, 17, 18, 20, 22 Sudan, 96, 113, 133, 139 superjacent, 17, 20 sustainability, 10, 54 Syr Darya, 261, 275 Syria, 5, 6, 8–10, 12, 13, 17, 56, 73–85, 90, 93, 94, 96, 108, 112, 137, 161–64, 166, 169, 183, 191, 249, 253, 254, 305; Afrin, 78, 79; Aleppo, 76–78, 80, 84; al-Asaad, Riyad, 74; Assad government, 6; Ayn Al-Arab, 78; buffer zone, 17, 73–78, 80–84; Damascus, 82, 84; Free Syrian Army (FSA), 74, 83, 85; Hasakah, 84; Hmeymim, base of, 8; Idlib, 9, 10, 74, 84, 85, 164; Kobane Battle, 81, 83, 84; Kurdish buffer strip, 79; Kurdish corridor, 81, 82; Latakia, 84; al-Muallem, Walid, 83; New Syria Plan, 78; no-fly safe zone plan, 81; no-fly zone, 74–79, 81–84; Northern Syrian Federalism, 85; Al-Nusra, 80, 161, 163, 171; PYD (Democratic Union Party (Syria)), 4, 75, 78–80, 84, 85; Qamishli, 79, 83; QamishliCezire-Derik line, 79; Rasulayn, 78; safe zone, 17, 73–76, 79–85; security zones, 17, 82; Syrian civil war, 162, 171; Syrian immigrants, 181, 183, 184, 194; Syrian National Council (SNC), 74, 76; Syrian refugees, 8, 19, 74, 84, 190; Syrian war crimes, 169; Tel Tamyr, 78 Taiwan, 221, 222, 224, 226, 227 Tajiks, 137, 261 Tamils of Sri Lanka, 130 Tarim River basin, 261

territorial waters, 17, 21, 223 Third World, 15, 64, 131 threat of nuclear warfare, 15, 127 Tiananmen Square crisis, 241 traditional peacekeeping, 146, 147 Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP), 55–58, 61 Trans-Balkan pipeline, 55, 57 transboundary water problem, 20 Trans-Caspian Pipeline, 55, 59 Turkey: anti-Westernism, 4, 10, 12; asylum law, 182; asylum policy, 182; axis shift, 5, 6; Balkans policy, 16, 35, 36, 38, 39, 45; citizenship, 19, 183–85, 190, 191, 193; citizenship law, 182–85; coup attempt (in Turkey) on July 15, 4; de-Europeanization, 3, 10; de-Westernization, 3, 16; Erdoğan administration, 4, 9, 16; foreign policy, 3, 4, 6, 8, 16, 17, 36–40, 43–45, 54, 58, 91, 92, 94, 101, 102; foreign policy orientations, 12; General Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs, 187; Gezi events, 4; Grand National Assembly of Turkey, 208; humanitarian assistance, 96; humanitarian diplomacy, 3, 4, 8; identity-oriented foreign policy, 5; İncirlik, 75, 83, 84, 91; JDP, 3, 4, 7, 16, 17, 39, 40, 43; Kıvrıkoğlu, Hayri, 75; National Security Council (NSC), 76; neo-Ottomanism, 16, 45; neo-Westernism, 3, 7, 8; one-minute crisis, 93, 94; Özal, Turgut, 91; precious loneliness, 8; pro-Western foreign policy, 6; Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline, 60; self-centric Westernism, 3, 4, 16; splendid isolation, 8; strategic depth, 45; traditional Westernism, 7; Western-centered multilateralism, 10; Western-centric foreign policy, 5; Westernization, 3, 10, 11, 16;

Index

329

Yildirim, Binali, 9; zero problems with neighbors, 3, 5, 38 Turkic Academy, 290 Turkic Council, 260–62, 285, 286, 290, 291, 294, 295 Turkic Republics, 20, 285–92, 294, 295 Turkic World, 291, 294 Turkish Academy, 258 Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), 35, 43, 95, 97, 99, 100 Turkish Council, 258 Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), 7 Turkish Great Wall, 249 Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO), 21, 25 Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), 19, 21, 24–27, 29 Turkish Stream, 44, 55, 56, 61 Turkmenistan, 6, 19, 57, 59, 235–44, 251, 252, 255, 261, 262, 270, 275–77, 286, 288, 291, 293–95, 305, 312, 313 Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-PakistanIndia Pipeline (TAPI), 240, 313 TURKPA, 290 TURKSOY, 255, 258, 260, 290 two-level game, 89

241, 308, 309; stabilization activities, 115; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 17, 18, 20, 26–28; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 166; United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 108 United States, 4–11, 13, 16, 18, 36, 39–41, 55, 57–59, 61, 73, 77, 78, 80, 81, 83, 84, 95, 108–10, 114, 115, 117, 118, 127, 133, 136, 151, 219–21, 226–28, 244, 249, 251, 253, 254, 256–58, 263, 272–74, 285, 287, 294, 307–9, 311, 315; Bush, George H.W., 115; CIA, 76; Clinton, Hillary, 75–77; Obama, President, 6, 75, 76, 79, 80, 85; Pentagon, 75, 78, 80; United States’ foreign policy, 58; US National Security Advisor, 257; US politics, 75 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 182 USSR, 57, 58, 61, 107–9, 151, 249, 250, 254, 259, 262, 269, 274, 275, 277, 278, 308 Uyghur nationalism, 250 Uzbeks, 137, 261, 277

UCM, 169 UHD, 274 Ukraine, 10, 19, 20, 55, 57, 58, 61, 109, 305, 307 Unarmed Civilian Protection (UCP), 143 United Arab Emirates (UAE), 6 United Nations (UN), 17, 30, 34, 36, 74, 92, 114, 127, 143, 152, 158, 162, 166, 239, 260, 261, 286; collective security system, 146; peacekeeping missions, 115; peacekeeping troops, 153; Secretary-General (UN), 144; Security Council (UN), 39, 74, 75, 78, 80, 145, 147, 157, 162, 167–71,

Warsaw Pact, 109, 114 water wars, 269 Wendt, Alexander, 271, 272 West Bank, 90, 96–100 Western alliance system, 4 World Peace Brigade (WPB), xviii, 152, 154 World War II, 108, 114, 150, 182, 227 Yalta, 108 Yemen, 6, 96, 108, 162, 164 Yugoslavian war, 164 Zapatistas, 130

About the Editor and Contributors

EDITOR Tayyar Arı, a professor of international relations, graduated from Middle East Technical University in 1984 and received his PhD from İstanbul University in 1991. He has been at Bursa Uludağ University since 1984. He became an associated professor in 1996 and a professor in 2002. Since then, he has been teaching at the same university and some private universities in Istanbul. Prof. Arı did his postgraduate study at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., and has been to several countries for research and international conference purposes, particularly to the Middle Eastern, European, and Eurasian countries. He has several books and articles published in Turkish and English on the Middle East, Eurasia, Turkish-American relations, and South Asia. Currently, Prof. Dr. Tayyar Arı is serving as the head of the Department of International Relations at Bursa Uludag University. CONTRIBUTORS Kamuran Reçber is a professor of the Department of International Relations at Bursa Uludağ University. He completed his doctorate program in the Department of Law at the University of Nice Sophia Antipolis, France, in 1997. His interests are European Union law, Turkey–European Union relations, international organizations, and international law. His books include Court of First Instance of the European Communities (Turkish), which received the 2002 Young Scientists Award granted by Turkish Social Sciences Association, Diplomatic and Consular Law (Turkish), European Union Law and Basic Texts (Turkish), Turkey–European Union 331

332

About the Editor and Contributors

Relations (Turkish), and International Law (Turkish). His research has also been published in Alternative Politics, Review of International Law and Politics, Ankara University Journal of the Faculty of Political Science, Ankara Review of European Studies, and TODAIE’s Review of Public Administration. Ömer Göksel İşyar is a professor at the Department of International Relations at Bursa Uludag University. Mr. İşyar received his PhD degree in German foreign policy and the European Union from the University of Uludag. He then held a post-doctoral fellowship from the DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service) at Siegen University in Germany. Ömer Göksel İşyar’s research focuses on Turkish foreign policy, Eurasian issues, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Mr. İşyar is the author of Turkish Foreign Policy: Problems and Processes, Eurasia and Eurasianism, Comparative Foreign Policies. He is currently writing a book about “Turkish Eurasianism.” Mesut Hakkı Caşın, who is a professor of international law at Yeditepe University, after completing his undergraduate education at İstanbul University Faculty of Law in 1983, started his master’s degree in Public Law at Gazi University and continued in American Constitutional Law at San Antonio College, Texas. He completed his doctorate education on “International Security Strategies and Disarmament” at Istanbul University Faculty of Political Sciences in 1994. He served in different bases of the Turkish Air Force. In 1999, he retired from his position as International Treaty Audit Officer of the Turkish General Staff of Plans and Principles. He teaches international law and international relations in undergraduate, master’s, and doctoral programs at Ozyegin University Faculty of Law, Istinye University, Air Warfare School, National Defense University. He is currently a member of Yeditepe University Faculty of Law and a member of the Turkish Presidential Security and Foreign Policy Board. Kamer Kasım is a professor at Bolu Abant Izzet Baysal University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of International Relations. He graduated from Ankara University Faculty of Political Sciences, Department of International Relations, in 1993. He received his MA degree in 1996 and PhD Degree in 2000 from Manchester University (UK). He was a visiting scholar at Michigan State University (USA) in 2011 and National Chengchi University (Taipei, Taiwan) in 2014. He was in Prague Metropolitan University (Czechia) in 2014 and Yarmouk University (Jordan) in 2019 as an Erasmus scholar. Prof. Dr. Kamer KASIM has written substantially about international relations and particularly focused on the Caucasus and Central Asia and international security.

About the Editor and Contributors

333

Mehmet Seyfettin Erol, a professor at Hacıbayram University in Ankara, graduated from Boğaziçi University, Department of Political Science and International Relation, in 1993. In 1995, he completed his master’s degree at Bosphorus University. Having completed his doctorate at Ankara University in 2005, he received his associate professorship in “International Relations” in 2009 and his professorship title in 2014. Prof. Erol worked at the Eurasia Strategic Research Center (ASAM) between 2000 and 2006. Since 2016, Prof. Erol has served as the president of the Ankara Center for Crisis and Political Studies (ANKASAM). Prof. Erol, who has been working between the years 2006 and 2018 as a member of the academic staff of Gazi University since 2018, is working in the same position at Hacı Bayram Veli University, the Department of International Relations. He has many articles published in different academic journals. Giray Saynur Derman completed her undergraduate education at Marmara University in 1991, her master’s degree in 1995, and her doctorate in 2003 at the Institute of Turkic Studies. Dr. Derman received her PhD from Marmara University, İstanbul, in 2003. Between 1992 and 2003, she worked as a research assistant at Marmara University, Institute of Turkic Studies. Between 2004 and 2011, she worked as an assistant professor doctor in the Department of International Relations at Sakarya University, Turkey. Between 2011 and 2018, she worked at the same university. Professor Derman is currently a professor doctor in the Communication Faculty at Marmara University. Her research focuses particularly on international relations, Turkish foreign policy, Russia, Ukraine, Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Black Sea Region, including Turkish-EU, Turkish-US, and Turkish-Russian relations, as well as Balkan politics. Her broader interests cover regional conflicts, regionalism, and foreign policy analysis. Muzaffer Ercan Yılmaz is professor of International Relations, currently at Bursa Uludağ University, Bursa, Turkey. He graduated from Ankara University in 1994, completed his MA in International Politics from The American University, Washington, DC in 1998, and earned his PhD in Conflict Analysis and Resolution from George Mason University, Fairfax, VA in 2002. He is the author of five books on different areas of International Relations and Conflict Resolution. He has also published more than eighty international articles and twelve book chapters. His research interests particularly include conflict analysis in war-torn societies, international mediation, and peace building in post-conflict countries. Mehmet Dalar graduated from Uludağ University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of International Relations, in 1993.

334

About the Editor and Contributors

He completed his master’s degree at Dicle University, Institute of Social Sciences, Department of Public Law, in 1995. Completing his PhD at Uludağ University, Department of International Relations, in 2004, Dalar received his associate professor degree in 2011 and became a professor of international law in 2016. Working as a lecturer at Abant Izzet Baysal University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of International Relations, in Bolu, Dalar teaches international law, human rights, and constitutional law. He has studied many subjects, especially on international law, European Union, Middle East, and human rights. Veysel Ayhan, after completing his bachelor’s degree at Uludağ University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of International Relations (1995–1998), has been in England and the UAE during 1998–1999. He completed his MA at Uludag University, the Department of International Relations (1999–2002). In 2002, he started his academic life at Uludağ University as a researching assistant. During 2002 and 2005, he carried out his PhD in the same department at Uludag University. Ayhan has done many academic works on migration, forced refugees in Syria, Iraq, Iran, and the Middle East. His works and interviews have been published in various national and international press organizations. He has been continuing his academic studies at Abant İzzet Baysal University and International Middle East Peace Research Center. He speaks Turkish, English, and Kurdish. Sezai Ozcelik is a full-time professor at the Faculty of Administrative and Political Science, Department of International Relations at Çankırı Karatekin University, Turkey. He received his PhD from the School of Conflict Analysis and Resolution (SCAR former ICAR), George Mason University in Fairfax, VA, USA, in 2004. He received his MA degree from the International Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCR) at the American University, Washington D.C., USA, in 1998. He completed his BA in the Department of International Relations, the Faculty of Political Science at Ankara University in 1994. In 2012–2013, he worked and researched as a post-doctral fellow at the Coventry University, Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, UK. His research interests include interdisciplinary research on conflict resolution, peace studies, international relations, negotiation, and urban and environmental science. Gökhan Özkan is a professor of international relations at Bursa Technical University. He is Dean of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences and Head of the Department of International Relations. After completing BA program at İstanbul University, he obtained an MA degree at New York University. He completed his PhD program at Yeditepe University,

About the Editor and Contributors

335

Department of Political Science and International Relations. He is the author of many books and academic papers in international journals. He has written extensively on Turkish foreign policy, global governance, energy security, and international politics. Yaşar Sarı currently works as a professor of international relations at Bolu Abant Izzet Baysal University, Bolu, Turkey. He previously worked at the Department of International Relations in the Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University and the International and Comparative Politics Department at the American University of Central Asia in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, as well as Virginia Commonwealth University and the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, USA. He received his PhD from the University of Virginia, MA from Old Dominion University, and BA from Istanbul University. He has published articles and book chapters related to the Caucasus and Central Asian regions, Turkey, and Russia. Göktürk Tüysüzoğlu is an associate professor at Giresun University, Department of International Relations. He got his PhD from Istanbul University, Department of Political Science and International Relations. His research interests include Wider Black Sea Basin, Russian foreign policy, Eurasian politics, and international security. His studies are being published in various international peer-reviewed journals like the Journal of Eurasian Affairs, Mediterranean Quarterly, and Uluslararası İlişkiler (Turkish). Saadat Demirci, born in 1979 in Kyrgyzstan, assumed the title of doctor by defending her doctoral thesis titled “Global Terrorism” in 2016 and graduated from Ankara University, Faculty of Political Sciences. She has been an assistant professor at Çankırı Karatekin University, Department of International Relations, since 2008. She administers courses on international law, current issues of international law, terrorism, and use of force at undergraduate and graduate levels. She works in the fields of terrorism and use of force, security and peaceful resolution of conflicts, and immigration and refugee problems. She conducts research on the issue of terrorism as a sociological problem beyond the security problem of states. Bülent Sarper Ağır is currently working as an associate professor of international relations (exclusively English) at Aydın Adnan Menderes University, Turkey. He received his BA and MA degrees in the discipline of international relations from Ege University, and his PhD degree from Ankara University. Bülent Sarper Ağır joined Central European University (Hungary) and Paradigm Research Center (Kosovo) as a visiting scholar. His main areas of research and expertise are Balkan studies, security studies, and Turkish

336

About the Editor and Contributors

foreign policy. He has published several academic articles and book chapters on international relations. He is the editor of Kosovo: Past, Present, and Future, published by Nova Science Publishers, New York, USA. Sabri Ciftci is the Michael W. Suleiman Chair and associate professor of political science at Kansas State University, USA. His research interests include Islam and democracy and Turkish politics. He has widely published in journals such as Comparative Political Studies, Political Research Quarterly, Foreign Policy Analysis, Democratization, and Party Politics. Fatma Sarıaslan completed her BA degree in international relations at Istanbul University, at Faculty of Political Sciences in 2003. She received MA degree from Istanbul University in 2006. She completed her PhD in international relations in 2016 at Bursa Uludağ University. She worked as a foreign trade expert at the Ministry of Trade for thirteen years, coordinating several projects, including government-funded and European Union funded projects. In 2018, she began her full-time academic career as an assistant professor at Bursa Technical University, at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences. Her publications are in political economy, Turkish foreign policy, Turkey–Middle East relations, and Islamophobia. Magdalena Kumelska-Koniecko is an academic teacher at the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn (Poland). She is also an assistant professor and received her PhD degree in the discipline of political science, from University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn. Dr. Kumelska-Koniecko specializes in international relations, primarily in American foreign and security policy. She is the author of the book Globalne implikacje polityki zagranicznej George’a W. Busha (2019) and author and coauthor of a dozen academic studies concerning her scientific interests. She is a member of the Polish Political Science Association, Polish International Relations Association, and Polish Geopolitical Association. Samet Yılmaz is an instructor at the Department of International Relations at Bursa Uludağ University, Turkey. He completed his doctorate in the field of international relations at Bursa Uludağ University in 2019. His interests are political geography, governance, and territorial dimension of the European integration process and regionalism in the European Union. His research has been published in Alternative Politics, International Journal of Social Inquiry, Ankara University Journal of the Faculty of Political Science, and Ankara Review of European Studies. He recently published a book titled European Union and Territoriality: The Territorialization of Union Space and Inside-Outside Distinction (Turkish).