China, Media, and International Conflicts 1032198737, 9781032198736

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
List of figures
List of tables
List of contributors
Acknowledgements
Chapter 1 Studying media–conflict relationships through the lens of China
Chapter 2 Strategy framing of international conflicts: A multi-dimensional framework for transnational comparative content analysis
Chapter 3 Media type and framing of the Sino–US Trade War: An analysis of articles from party and nonparty news organisations in China
Chapter 4 Soft power clashes? China in platform geopolitics: Global aspirations and political struggles
Chapter 5 Competing narratives of the Xinjiang question and China-West geopolitical rivalry
Chapter 6 The politics of remembering: Commemorating the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea in an era of China–US rivalry
Chapter 7 The domain of the State: Interpreting the 2012 Senkaku/Diaoyu islands disputes at liberal-oriented Chinese commercial newspapers
Chapter 8 How is NATO viewed in China?: NATO’s strategic communication and perceptions of Zhihu users
Chapter 9 Indian media’s China dilemma: Sino–India 2020 face-off through the lens of Indian press: analysis of editorials
Chapter 10 China’s overlooked role in the Syrian crisis
Chapter 11 Palestinian online news framing of China’s positions on the Question of Palestine (2020–2021): Mediatised representation
Chapter 12 Reimagining Western media portrayals of China: US and Ghanaian coverage of China’s COVID-19 response
Index

Citation preview

CHINA, MEDIA, AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS Edited by Shixin Ivy Zhang and Altman Yuzhu Peng

China, Media, and International Conflicts

This book focuses on China’s media diplomacy and its interplay with a range of international conflicts. It assesses the representation and framing of China, as well as the perception and reception of China’s media communication in relation to various crises and conflicts. Including detailed analyses of many cases, it highlights the complex, fluid, and dynamic relationship between media and conflict and discusses how this both exemplifies and affects China’s relations with the outside world. In addition, in contrast to most existing studies of mediatised conflict in the digital age, it provides a very valuable non-Western perspective. Shixin Ivy Zhang is Associate Professor in Journalism Studies at the University of Nottingham Ningbo China. Altman Yuzhu Peng is Assistant Professor in Intercultural Communication at the University of Warwick, UK.

Communicating China

Past, Present and Future Series Editors: Xiaoling Zhang, Professor, Department of Media and Communication, Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, China Corey Schultz, Associate Professor, School of International Communications, University of Nottingham Ningbo China

The Communicating China series aims to deepen insights into narratives constructed in various media by and about the People’s Republic of China (hereafter China). The series has three inter-related themes: communication coming from China’s different actors to the world; the sources (re)shaping the narratives; and the perception, reception and representation of China around the world. This approach includes not only government-led external communication and those narratives coming from non-state actors, including their discursive goals, forms, platforms and impacts, but also how the narratives are received and responded to. Analysing China’s external communication and its reception will enable us to re-examine the popular but fluid concept of public diplomacy and the current global balance of soft power. It interrogates these concepts, which were developed largely in western countries, and investigates China’s evolving public diplomacy narratives by tracing the continuities and changes from Mao Zedong’s era to that of Xi Jinping. In so doing, it will also assess whether China’s strategies complicate existing paradigms of public diplomacy for influence, and whether China is creating new models. Works in the series will thus critically evaluate and contribute to the conceptualization of narratives, image building, public diplomacy, propaganda and soft power in the new world order. 1. China’s International Communication and Relationship Building Edited by Xiaoling Zhang and Corey Schultz 2. China, Media, and International Conflicts Edited by Shixin Ivy Zhang and Altman Yuzhu Peng

China, Media, and International Conflicts

Edited by Shixin Ivy Zhang and Altman Yuzhu Peng

First published 2023 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2023 selection and editorial matter, Shixin Ivy Zhang and Altman Yuzhu Peng; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Shixin Ivy Zhang and Altman Yuzhu Peng to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 9781032198736 (hbk) ISBN: 9781032198743 (pbk) ISBN: 9781003261278 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003261278 Typeset in Times New Roman by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

Contents

List of figures List of tables List of contributors Acknowledgements 1

Studying media–conflict relationships through the lens of China

vii viii ix xiii 1

ALTMAN YUZHU PENG AND SHIXIN IVY ZHANG

2

Strategy framing of international conflicts: A multidimensional framework for transnational comparative content analysis

9

SHUJUN LIU AND MARK BOUKES

3

Media type and framing of the Sino–US Trade War: An analysis of articles from party and nonparty news organisations in China

28

XIANWEN KUANG

4

Soft power clashes? China in platform geopolitics: Global aspirations and political struggles

41

ALESSANDRA MASSA AND GIUSEPPE ANZERA

5

Competing narratives of the Xinjiang question and China-West geopolitical rivalry

58

CHI ZHANG

6

The politics of remembering: Commemorating the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea in an era of China–US rivalry 74 YIBEN MA AND CHI ZHANG

vi

Contents

7

The domain of the State: Interpreting the 2012 Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands disputes at liberal-oriented Chinese commercial newspapers

92

TIANTIAN DIAO

8

How is NATO viewed in China?: NATO’s strategic communication and perceptions of Zhihu users

111

SHIXIN IVY ZHANG, ALTMAN YUZHU PENG, AND RANNA HUANG

9

Indian media’s China dilemma: Sino–India 2020 face-off through the lens of Indian press: analysis of editorials

129

SUHAIL AHMAD

10 China’s overlooked role in the Syrian crisis

148

SELIM ÖTERBÜLBÜL

11 Palestinian online news framing of China’s positions on the Question of Palestine (2020–2021): Mediatised representation

166

SHADI ABU-AYYASH

12 Reimagining Western media portrayals of China: US and Ghanaian coverage of China’s COVID-19 response

192

KELLY CHERNIN

Index

209

Figures

2.1 Susan Strange’s structural power theory 2.2 Conceptual framework of structural power and strategy framing 7.1 Frequency comparison of news reporting on Diaoyu/Senkaku islands 1 August 2012–31 October 2012 (The Beijing News [BJN], Oriental Morning Post [OMP], and Southern Metropolis Daily [SMD]) 7.2 Frequencies of “China’s tough stance” news frame along timeline echoing the unified support of China’s tough stance (The Beijing News [BJN], Oriental Morning Post [OMP], and Southern Metropolis Daily [SMD]) 7.3 Frequencies of “Consequences of the disputes” frame (The Beijing News [BJN], Oriental Morning Post [OMP], and Southern Metropolis Daily [SMD]) 11.1 A comparison between the online traffic of the three news agencies chosen in this study according to HOTH’s website traffic tool 11.2 Distribution of China-related news among the three news agencies 11.3 Types of news topics found in the collected contents 11.4 Identified frames distribution in the analysed contents 11.5 A headline in Ma’an news agency in Arabic: “Chinese ambassador to Palestine affirms his county’s support for the Palestinian people.” 11.6 A headline appeared in Wafa news agency in Arabic: “President of China affirms his county’s steady support to the Palestinian people in retrieving their legitimate rights.” The Chinese President’s remarks came in a letter he sent to the UN conference of the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People, held in November 2021

12 15

96

100 103 177 179 180 181 183

185

Tables

2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 3.2 4.1 6.1 7.1 7.2 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4

Items of personal-level and national-level strategy framing Logit model predicting strategy framing and issue framing Logit model predicting personal- and national-level strategy framing Comparison of frames used in the Sino–US Trade War by news organisations in China Comparison of tones used in the Sino–US Trade War by news organisations in China Alexa’s top-ranking sites Top 10 keywords in the 171 media reports on the commemoration of the war collected from the People’s Daily and the People’s Liberation Army Daily Development of 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku islands disputes Percentage of three news frames in The Beijing News (BJN), Oriental Morning Post (OMP), and Southern Metropolis Daily (SMD) August–October 2012 Description of frames definition Description of frames’ causal attribution Description of frames’ moral evaluation Description of frames recommendation

18 19 20 36 36 44 82 94 95 182 183 184 185

Contributors

Shadi Abu-Ayyash is currently Assistant Professor in the Department of Media and Communication in the faculty of Graduate Studies at the Arab American University of Palestine. He obtained his Ph.D. in digital arts and humanities from the National University of Ireland, Galway. His research interests include communication theory, mediatisation, media management, Palestine solidarity movement, social movements, online activism, frame analysis, and public relations. Suhail Ahmad is currently Assistant Professor in the Department of Journalism and Mass Communication at Govt. College for Women, M. A. Road, Cluster University Srinagar, J&K (India). He obtained his Ph.D., M.Phil., and M.A. degrees from the University of Kashmir. He has also taught at the Central University of Kashmir and the University of Kashmir as adjunct faculty. His areas of interest include News Reporting, News Editing and Media, and Peace & Conflict Studies. Dr. Suhail worked as Trainer for a project conducted by BBC, InterNews, and DataLeads to counter fake news. He has also conducted the Social Affairs Journalism course for Panos South Asia. Giuseppe Anzera is Full Professor at the Department of Communication and Social Research, Sapienza University of Rome, Italy, where he teaches Sociology of International Relations and Sociology of Politics. His research and publications are focused on geopolitics, international security, and international political communication, including conflict analysis, interstates arms transfers, analysis of soft power for the construction of strategic narratives, hydrodeficit issues, and migration flows analysis. He is involved in several research projects and research networks and is experienced in working in multidisciplinary teams, with a focus on geopolitics, international political communication, and sociology of politics. Mark Boukes is currently Associate Professor in the Department of Communication Science at the University of Amsterdam, where he also obtained his Ph.D. in 2015. His research interests lie in the intersections of Journalism, Infotainment, and Satire, Political and Corporate Communication, and Media Effects. He is the author of Economic news: antecedents and effects

x

Contributors (2021) and has published 50 scholarly articles in, for example, Journal of Communication, Communication Research, Journalism, Chinese Journal of Communication, Public Opinion Quarterly, Communication Monographs, New Media and Society, Communication Methods and Measures, Political Communication, and Public Relations Review. He is an editorial board member of the following journals: Journal of Communication, Communication Theory, and Mass Communication and Society.

Kelly Chernin has Ph.D. from Pennsylvania State University. Her research focuses on social movements and how memory influences future democratic change in the wake of mass communications. She spent time in Hong Kong and China researching and writing about the Tiananmen Movement of 1989 and Hong Kong’s 2014 Umbrella Movement. She is currently an assistant professor in the Department of Communication at Appalachian State University. Tiantian Diao is Core Researcher affiliated with the research division of one of the leading telecommunication companies in Japan, the Kokusai Denshin Denwa International (KDDI) Research atelier. At KDDI research, Tiantian specialises in researching the rapidly changing business environment surrounding the digital industries in Asia and at the global level. Tiantian has obtained a Ph.D. degree with an outstanding Ph.D. dissertation from the University of Hong Kong. Prior to pursuing a Ph.D. degree, she has worked as a reporter and editor in China. Ranna Huang (M.A., University of Sydney, Australia) is Ph.D. candidate at the University of Nottingham Ningbo China. Her research interests include comparative studies of media systems, journalism studies, and public relations studies. The title of her thesis is A new framework of comparing hybrid media systems in the digital age: a case study of legacy media system and social media system in China. Xianwen Kuang (Ph.D. in Journalism, University of Southern Denmark) is Associate Professor at the Department of Media and Communication, Xi’an Jiaotong – Liverpool University, China, and a Fellow of the Higher Education Association (HEA). He has published articles in international peer-reviewed journals, including Journalism, Problems of Post-Communism, Global Media and China, International Journal of Communication, The China Quarterly, and Chinese Political Science Review. He is co-editor of Journalism Pedagogy in Transitional Countries (2022). Shujun Liu is currently Research Associate in the School of Social Science at Cardiff University and obtained her Ph.D. from Tsinghua University (China) in 2022. Her research interests lie in Political Communication, Chinese Journalism, and Social Media Activism. She has published some scholarly articles in Journalism and Journal of International Social Sciences and has presented multiple articles at the annual conference of International

Contributors

xi

Communication Association (ICA) and International Association for Media and Communication Research (IAMCR). Yiben Ma is Convenor of the Preliminary Year Programme for International Communications Studies at the University of Nottingham Ningbo China. He obtained his Ph.D. in Media and Communication from the University of Leeds. His research interests are in political communication, including Chinese online nationalism, propaganda, social media and democratisation, and critical discourse analysis. He is a co-editor of Research Handbook on Political Propaganda (Edward Elgar). Alessandra Massa is Postdoctoral Researcher in the Department of Communication and Social Research at the Sapienza University of Rome and an adjunct lecturer of Corporate and Institutional Communication at Link Campus University (Rome). She earned her Ph.D. in “Communication, Research, Innovation” from the Sapienza University of Rome. Her research interests focus mainly on international political communication, digital diplomacy, popular geopolitics, and online disinformation. She participates in several research activities, working with multidisciplinary teams on the following topics: radicalisation, international migration, conflict representation, online platforms, diplomacy, and government and public sector communication. She authored several books and scientific articles on international political communication, disinformation, and digital political narratives. Selim Öterbülbül is working as Research Assistant in the Department of International Relations at Ankara University, Faculty of Political Science. He obtained his Ph.D. from the Department of International Relations at Dokuz Eylul University (Turkey) and the degree of Master of Science from the Middle East Studies at Middle East Technical University (METU). His research interests lie in China’s Foreign Policy, Middle East Politics, Grand Strategy Concept, and Foreign Policy Analysis. He is currently working on China’s grand strategy under Xi Jinping and Sino-Middle Eastern relations. Altman Yuzhu Peng is currently Assistant Professor in Intercultural Communication at the University of Warwick and obtained his Ph.D. from Newcastle University (UK). His research interests lie at the intersections of Critical Discourse Studies, Feminism, and Media and Cultural Studies. He is author of A Feminist Reading of China’s Digital Public Sphere (2020) and has published 20 scholarly articles in Asian Journal of Communication, Convergence, Critical Discourse Studies, Chinese Journal of Communication, International Feminist Journal of Politics, International Journal of Communication, Journal of Gender Studies, Media International Australia, Social Semiotics, and Television and New Media. Chi Zhang is British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of St. Andrews and an Associate Member of the Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence. She has published in journals Terrorism

xii Contributors and Political Violence, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Politics and Religion, and Asian Security. She is the editor of Human Security in China: A Post-Pandemic State and the author of Legitimacy of China’s CounterTerrorism Approach: The Mass Line Ethos. Shixin Ivy Zhang (Ph.D., University of Leeds, UK) is Associate Professor in Journalism Studies at the School of International Communications, University of Nottingham Ningbo China. She is specialised in journalism studies, media and conflict, media globalisation, and media management. She is the author of three research monographs entitled Impact of Globalization on the Local Press in China (2014), Chinese War Correspondents: Covering Wars and Conflicts in the 21st Century (2016), and Media and Conflict in the Social Media Era in China (2020). Her articles appeared in a number of high-quality international peer-reviewed journals such as Journalism, Journalism Studies, Digital Journalism, Media, War and Conflict, Chinese Journal of Communication, Asian Journal of Communication, and Journal of Mass Media Ethics.

Acknowledgements

Editors of this anthology would like to thank all authors, series editors, and the Publisher for their help, input, and fine contributions to the project. Our great appreciation also goes to the research assistant, Yijiao Wang, who is currently a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Nottingham Ningbo China and provided superb editorial assistance throughout the process. Thank you all for your great efforts to make this book a success.

1

Studying media–conflict relationships through the lens of China Altman Yuzhu Peng and Shixin Ivy Zhang

In late February 2022, Russia launched a massive military invasion of its southwest neighbouring country – Ukraine from its northern, eastern, and southern borders, marking a devastating escalation of the tensions between the two nations in recent years. With such an unprecedented scale of military action in Europe after World War II, the invasion immediately turned the geopolitical tensions between global powers to the forefront of public attention. However, unlike the sentiments sympathising with the Ukrainian side being widely shared across most parts of the world, voices criticising the Kremlin’s aggression are much less vibrant in China at both an official level and amongst the grassroots (Peng, 2022). The fact of China being seen as one of Russia’s only powerful alliances on the world stage and the widespread speculation of its leadership’s prior knowledge of the invasion raise a necessary question concerning the role that China plays in international geopolitical frictions and conflicts in an increasingly globalised world (Repnikova & Zhou, 2022). Indeed, China has now played an increasingly pivotal role on the world stage. The rise of the East Asian superpower not only provides opportunities for the prosperity of global trade but also poses challenges to the stability of the geopolitical order. In recent years, we have witnessed the trade war between China and the USA during the Trump administration, the removal of the Chinese hightech giant – Huawei from the UK’s 5G network infrastructure, and the ongoing Sino-foreign political frictions in the wake of Hong Kong’s pro-democratic movements, as well as the US-led collation’s accusation of China’s genocide of Uighur Muslims. These incidents unveil the deep distrust between the East Asian superpower and major Western democracies. Such distrust has been heightened by the COVID-19 pandemic, given the Chinese authority’s problematic handling of early stage outbreaks and the way in which this is politicised by right-wing populist politicians in Euro-American nations (Peng & Chen, 2021, Zhang, 2022). Yet, the pandemic also reminds us of the importance of international solidarity and cross-national collaboration in severe global crises. With China’s political infrastructure unlikely to be reformed through a top-down process, it is indeed necessary for the outside world to fully account for Chinese people’s popular views on international political affairs. Such an account offers scope to foreground the exchange of liberal ideas within the authoritarian regime, which enables us DOI: 10.4324/9781003261278-1

2 Altman Yuzhu Peng and Shixin Ivy Zhang to better predict the future direction of its democratisation that has a long-term impact on the peace on Earth and the wellbeing of mankind (Peng et al., 2022).

De-Westernising the media and conflict studies Situating itself at the intersection of media studies, international relations, and area studies, this edited volume aims to contribute to the studies of a complex, elusive, and dynamic relationship between media and conflict through the lens of China. The book addresses the representation and framing of China’s image, as well as the perception and reception of China’s role in times of crises and conflicts, both domestically and internationally. Existing research of mediatised conflict in the digital age is still very much a Eurocentric area, which requires to be de-Westernised, especially with the addition of the missing link of China. Media and conflict studies are multi-dimensional and multi-faceted. On the one hand, with China increasingly showing an ambition to exert influence on the world stage, the East Asian superpower is also facing heightened security risks due to crises in the Asia-Pacific region. These crises include its border disputes with India in Tibet, with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, and with many Southeast Asian countries in the South China Sea, as well as the North Korea nuclear crisis. On the other hand, China, as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, also has increasingly more involvement and interest in the seemingly isolated international conflicts, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, and the Libyan and Syrian crises. How mediated effects play out in these crises is indeed an important, yet under-investigated research area that requires further intellectual intervention. It is important to note that mainstream narratives of the global geopolitical order and international conflicts, which inform popular political opinions in Western societies, have long been constructed upon a Eurocentric standpoint (Said, 2009). This long-standing Eurocentric tradition is also reflected in academia, offering limited room for articulating the agency of non-Western communities. In issues concerning China, this tradition is revealed by how existing media studies literature often considers the East Asian country as an exotic research object and tends to apply theoretical models developed upon the Western experience of capitalism and national identity to the analysis of it (Thussu, 2018; Zhao & Wu, 2020). Such a problematic research tradition is, in part, addressed by recent area studies scholarship, which encourages intellectual integration of the ‘context in […] the locals being examined’ (Kollner et al., 2018, p. 3). Yet, much of the scholarship in the field follows a top-down research paradigm, focusing on political infrastructure and state politics (Christiansen & Rai, 1996; Goodman, 2014; Zhao, 1998), with limited attention being paid to the everyday life experience of people. Today, the widespread penetration of social media platforms allows Internet users to generate enormous digital data that contribute to civic engagement (Castells, 2009; van Dijk, 2006). In this process, more and more intersecting vectors become involved in the shaping of global socio-political trends, with ordinary Internet users playing an increasingly significant role in the process

Studying media–conflict relationships 3 (Peng & Talmacs, 2022; Zhang, 2019; Zhang et al., 2018), despite repressive authoritarian regimes’ strict control over people’s digital civic engagement (Rod & Weidmann, 2015; Stockmann & Luo, 2015; Wang, 2020). The above omissions in existing literature point towards the urgency of advancing an interdisciplinary approach to the cross-border cultural encounters between Chinese people and their Western counterparts through the Internet.

Theorising media and conflict The media and conflict studies have become a ‘distinct area of scholarship’ (Bräuchler & Budka, 2020, p. ix) with scholars from around the world and from different disciplines examining the diverse media use, practices, and effects in different conflict stages and scenarios. A growing volume of academic literature including journal articles and research monographs has contributed to the field of media and conflict. To name a few prominent publications, the journal of Media, War and Conflict (2008) dedicates to studying the transformations of mediated war. Media and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century (Seib, 2005) focuses on the role of media technologies and addresses the issues of public diplomacy, terrorism, gender, and war coverage. Media & Conflict Reporting in Asia (Tekwani, 2008) uses case studies to reveal the challenges faced by journalists who report conflicts in Asia. The edited volume Theorising Media and Conflict (Bräuchler & Budka, 2020) studies the interpenetration and the co-constitutiveness of media and conflict from the anthropological perspective. Theoretically, with the driving force of ICTs (Information Communication Technologies) and the prevalent use of digital/social media, we have witnessed the paradigm shift from the mediation of conflict to the mediatisation of conflict. As Cottle (2006, p. 9) points out, ‘The media’s relationship to conflict, therefore, is often not best thought of in terms of “reflection” or even “representation” given its more active performative involvement and constitutive role within them.’ It is not our aim, nor is it practical, to map out all the theories pertaining to the media–conflict relationship. Next, we highlight and address a few widely cited, debated, and continuously developed theories in order to chart the main theoretical trajectory in contemporary media and conflict studies. With regards to the media–conflict relationship, a large number of scholarly publications address the CNN effect based on observations of Western humanitarian interventions in Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Rwanda during the 1990s. The CNN effect, referring to the news media’s influences on foreign policy, was best captured and manifested in Robinson (2000)’s policy–media interaction model: media influence occurs when the policy is uncertain and media coverage is critically framed, whereas media influence is unlikely to occur when the policy is certain. Though the CNN effect debate has challenged the ‘elite-domination of news media’ (Robinson, 2011) and regards media as ‘an independent actor in the policy-making process’ (Lusk, 2019), many scholars call for ‘moving beyond’ and ‘reconsidering’ the CNN effect by adopting other theoretical frameworks such as relational sociology, field theory, and multilevel interaction model

4 Altman Yuzhu Peng and Shixin Ivy Zhang (Robinson, 2011; Gilboa et al., 2016; Lusk, 2019). Since the late 2000s, a new contested paradigm emerged in the age of global new media. While the CNN effect focuses on the mass media-driven foreign policy in the West, the Al-Jazeera effect refers to the influence of new media (satellite TV, the Internet) upon global (Arab) politics (Seib, 2008). Taking a step forward upon the CNN effect, Seib (2008) states, ‘We are seeing a comprehensive reconnecting of the global village and reshaping of how the world works’ (p. ix). However, scholars critique the Al-Jazeera effect as a myth and argue that the ‘Arab satellite stations did not primarily serve to inform and enlighten the oppressed Arab people’ (El-Ibiary, 2011, p. 203). O’Loughlin (2009) also argues that more news information and opinions do not equal more democracy. He calls for more comparative studies as he writes, ‘Without comparative research into the role of media in Arab societies, those trying to achieve change in the Middle East or elsewhere will find the Al-Jazeera effect to be more of a challenge than an opportunity.’ In parallel to the CNN and Al-Jazeera effect, another key theoretical model in relation to media–policy relations in times of crisis and conflict is Entman’s (2008) cascading network activation model. This cascading model, based on the case of the USA, illustrates the diffusion of foreign policy frames from elites to media, and then to the public with a feedback loop and external influencers such as global media organisations. As explained by Robinson (2011), Entman (2008)’s model has identified that elite dissensus, as a key situational variable, allows greater media independence. However, this model fails to ‘capture the centrality of social media and broadcasting channels as platforms for frame promotion and distribution’ (Golan et al., 2019). In view of this deficiency, Golan et al. (2019) update the model by adding paid, shared, and owned media beyond the earned media. Following another research strand, mediatisation of conflict or mediatised conflict might be the most prominent concept in researching media–war (conflict) relations. Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2015) take ‘mediatisation’ as a process by which warfare is increasingly embedded in and penetrated by media. Drawing on the case study of the Ukraine Crisis, they divide the process into three phases and claim that we are currently in the third phase of Arrested War, following Broadcast War and Diffused War (ibid.). However, the study on mediatised conflicts is still at an early stage and needs further theoretical development (Mortensen et al., 2015). In response, Zhang (2019) combines the concepts of Arrested War and the actor-network theory, thereby proposing a model of actor-network in mediatised conflict. Applying this new model in the examination of the Sino-Indian border crisis, she argues that both professional media outlets and web users employ social media platforms to set, counter-set, or expand the public agenda. These actor-networks and the macro social–political context are influential in the mediatisation of conflict in the social media era. Last but not least, news framing theory as ‘a research paradigm’ (Entman, 1993) has been widely used in examining the war coverage in both mass media and social media. In 2018, the journal Media, War and Conflict published a special issue on framing war and conflict. The editors of this special issue comment that

Studying media–conflict relationships 5 framing analysis as a key method has been refined over the past 25 years, but the debate about whether framing analysis shall be standardised or (un)standardised remains (Al Nahed & Hammond, 2018, p. 347). In the concluding piece of this special issue, Knüpfer and Entman (2018) delineate four conceptual pathways to study conflicts in a digital and transnational networked environment, including fragmentation within media systems; increased transnational information flows; new framing processes and effects; and architectures/logics of digital platforms. They also call for scholars to improve theoretical models, adopt comparative approaches, and conduct empirical studies. In this regard, numerous studies have employed framing analysis to examine the news coverage, both texts and visual images, of contemporary conflicts in relation to geopolitics. Taking the conflict in Ukraine as an example, Ojala and Pantti (2017) examine the textual and visual practices of four EU newspapers and argue that despite their differences, the papers’ framing patterns align with the Western foreign policy in Europe while alienating Russia. Liu (2020) compares the news framing of British and Russian media and finds that while the Russian media use economic consequences and morality frames on Ukraine, the British media prefer a human-interest frame, thus revealing an illiberal trend in both the hybrid regime and the liberal democracy. Various theoretical and methodological approaches have been adopted to study the media and conflict over the years. In addition to the aforementioned framing analysis, both quantitative and qualitative methods have been used in the existing literature such as case studies, ethnography, anthropology, content analysis, (critical) discourse analysis, surveys, interviews, and network analysis. To further develop the theoretical models and methodological approaches, this volume of collected essays advances an inside-out approach to foreground both China’s understandings of Western democracies reflected in its communicative practices and processes as well as an outside-in approach to account for the outside world’s perceptions of the role that China plays in international conflicts, which either directly or indirectly concern the East Asian rising power. In doing so, this book examines the complexity of an indigenous Chinese worldview that forges popular socio-political opinions in Chinese society. An analysis of this worldview helps the international community to better understand the sociopolitical rationale and cultural logic of Chinese views on world politics and the outside world’s views on Chinese politics, amid the rise of the East Asian great power and its heightened frictions with major Western democracies in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Outline of the book In this edited volume, scholars from around the world explore and study the role of media in China’s involvement in international conflicts either from the view of China (inside-out) or from the global view of China (outside-in). Chapters are thematically organised to address three key themes: (1) models and platforms; (2) terrorism, military, and wars; (3) crises and conflicts in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. The collection of essays, both empirically rich and theoretically nuanced,

6 Altman Yuzhu Peng and Shixin Ivy Zhang will contribute to the studies of complex, fluid, and dynamic media–conflict relations. Chapter 2 is a theoretical chapter in which Shujun Liu and Mark Boukes put forward a new framework of structural power and strategy framing. Departing from framing theory (the issue frame and the strategy frame), their study takes countries, rather than politicians, as research objects to compare international conflict reporting within different political systems. In Chapter 3, Xianwen Kuang scrutinises the US–China trade war by accounting for media type as a predictor that influences a media outlet’s framing of the news event. Chapter 4 focuses on the geopolitics of platforms. Giuseppe Anzera and Alessandra Massa reconstruct the clash between China’s distribution of diplomatic content and the rules and practices of online platforms. It outlines how Chinese presence on international online platforms unravels political tensions as private actors shoulder the burden of geopolitical contrasts. In Chapter 5, Chi Zhang offers an insightful analysis of how the convergence of the ‘global war on terror’ and ‘China’s people’s war on terror’ captures the transnational nature of terrorism and counterterrorism. She argues that the lack of source credibility prevents the Chinese state from engaging in meaningful conversations with international critics. Chapter 6 examines the 70th anniversary of the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) army entering the Korean War, known as the War to Resist USA and Aid Korea (1950–1953) in China. Yiben Ma and Chi Zhang discuss how the collective memories about the war are constructed and reframed as a way not only to unite domestic nationalist sentiments against the alleged US hostility but also to legitimise China’s narrative about its moral righteousness in a potential war with the USA. Chapter 7 studies Chinese press coverage of the 2012 Senkaku–Diaoyu Islands Disputes. Combining news framing analysis with the interview data, Tiantian Diao finds that the Chinese press only uses strategic juxtaposition to implicitly criticise the anti-Japan protests. In Chapter 8, Shixin Zhang, Altman Yuzhu Peng, and Ranna Huang discuss the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) social media image in China by exploring perceptions of social media users on Zhihu, the Chinese equivalent of Quora. In Chapter 9, Suhail Ahmad examines the editorial stance taken by India’s leading English newspapers – The Times of India and Hindustan Times – during the Sino-Indo conflict in 2020. His research sheds new light on the Indian portrayal of China’s rise in the current global geological order. Chapter 10 examines the overlooked role that China plays in the Syrian crisis. Specifically, Selim Öterbülbül analyses and compares the coverage of China’s votes and vetoes in the UNSC (United Nations Security Council) Resolutions concerning Syria in the Chinese, Western, and Middle Eastern media. In a similar vein, Chapter 11 by Shadi Abu-Ayyash focuses on the Palestinian online news framing of China’s political position on the Question of Palestine in 2020 and 2021. He finds that China’s positions are represented in a very positive light, which aligns with the traditional perception and schemas amongst Palestinian political elites. In the last Chapter 12, Kelly Chernin examines COVID-19-related news narratives

Studying media–conflict relationships 7 from the USA and Ghana. Her findings point out the way to frame non-Western powers in an effort to facilitate collaboration and avoid a new Cold War-like environment.

Reference list Al-Nahed, S., & Philip Hammond, P. (2018) Framing war and conflict: Introduction to the special issue. Media, War & Conflict, 11(4), 365–368. Bräuchler, P., & Budka, B. (eds.) (2020) Theorising Media and Conflict. Berghahn Books. Castells, M. (2009) Communication Power. Oxford University Press. Christiansen, F., & Rai, S. M. (1996). Chinese Politics and Society: An Introduction. Routledge. Cottle, S. (2006) Mediatized Conflict. Open University Press. El-Ibiary, R. (2011) Questioning the Al-Jazeera effect: Analysis of Al-Qaeda’s media strategy and its relationship with Al-Jazeera. Global Media and Communication, 7(3), 199–204. Entman R. M. (1993) Towards clarification of a fractured paradigm. Journal of Communication, 43(4), 51–58. Entman R. M. (2008) Theorizing mediated public diplomacy: The U.S. case. Press/ Politics, 13(2), 87–102. https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161208314657 Gilboa, E. et al. (2016) Moving media and conflict studies beyond the CNN effect. Review of International Studies, 42(4), 654–672. Golan, G. J., Manor, I., & Phillip Arceneaux, P. (2019) Mediated public diplomacy redefined: Foreign stakeholder engagement via paid, earned, shared, and owned media. American Behavioral Scientist, 63(12), 1665–1683. Goodman, D. S. (2014). Class in Contemporary China. Polity Press. Hoskins, A., & O’Loughlin B (2015) Arrested war: The third phase of mediatization. Information, Communication & Society, 18(11), 1320–1338. Knüpfer, C. B., & Entman, R. M. (2018). Framing conflicts in digital and transnational media environments. Media, War & Conflict. 11(4): 476–488. Kollner, P., Ahram, A. I., & Sil, R. (2018). Comparative area studies: What it does, what it can do. In A. I. Ahram, P. Kollner, & R. Sil (Eds.), Comparative Area Studies: Methodological Rationales and Cross-Regional Applications (pp. 3–28). Oxford University Press. Liu, Z. (2020) News framing of the Euromaidan protests in the hybrid regime and the liberal democracy: Comparison of Russian and UK news media. Media, War & Conflict, 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635220953445 Lusk, A. (2019) Moving beyond the CNN effect or stuck in the middle? How relational sociology remaps media and security studies. International Studies Review, 21, 1–11. Mortensen, M. (2014) Journalism and eyewitness images: Digital media, participation, and conflict. Abingdon: Routledge. Ojala, M., & Pantti, M. (2017). Naturalising the new cold war: The geopolitics of framing the Ukrainian conflict in four European newspapers. Global Media and Communication, 13(1), 41–56. O'Loughlin, B. (2009). Politics, democracy and social affair. International Affairs, 85(3), 630–631.

8 Altman Yuzhu Peng and Shixin Ivy Zhang Peng, A. Y., & Chen, S. (2021). Traditional Chinese medicine works: A politicalised scientific debate in the COVID-19 pandemic. Asian Journal of Communication, 31(5), 421–435. http://doi.org/10.1080/01292986.2021.1913618 Peng, A. Y., & Talmacs, N. (2022). Jacinda and the limits of gender on the Chineselanguage Internet: A critical discourse analysis. Feminist Media Studies, 1–17. https:// doi.org/10.1080/14680777.2022.2090408 Peng, A. Y., Kuang, X., & Hou, J. Z. (2022). Love NBA, hate BLM: Racism in China’s sports fandom. International Journal of Communication, 16(3), 133–3, 153. https://ijoc .org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/18993/3810 Repnikova, M., & Zhou, W. (2022). What China's social media is saying about Ukraine. The Atlantic, Retrieved July 2, 2022, from https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/ archive/2022/03/china-xi-ukraine-war-america /627028/ Robinson, P. (2000) The policy-media interaction model: Measuring media power during humanitarian crisis. Journal of Peace Research, 37(5), 613–633. Robinson, P. (2011) The CNN effect reconsidered: Mapping a research agenda for the future. Media, War & Conflict, 4(1) 3–113 Rød, E. G., & Weidmann, N. B. (2015). Empowering activists or autocrats? The Internet in authoritarian regimes. Journal of Peace Research, 52(3), 338–351. Said, E. (2009). Introduction to orientalism. In S. Thornham, C. Bassett, & P. Marris (Eds.), Media Studies: A Reader (3rd ed., pp. 111–123). New York University Press. Seib, P. (2005) Media and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century. Palgrave Macmillan. Seib, P. (2008) The Al Jazeera Effect: How the New Global Media Are Reshaping World Politics. Potomac Books. Stockmann, D., & Luo, T. (2015). Authoritarianism 2.0: Social media and political discussion in China. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1–49. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2650341 Tekwani, S. (2008) Media & Conflict Reporting in Asia. Asian Media Information & Communication Centre. Thussu, D. K. (2018). International Communication: Continuity and Change. Bloomsbury. van Dijk, J. A. G. M. (2006). The Network Society: Social Aspects of New Media. SAGE. Wang, W. (2020). Mediatised politics: A perspective for understanding political communication in China. Javnost, 27(2), 112–125. https://doi.org/10.1080/13183222 .2020.1727277 Zhang, C. (2022). Contested disaster nationalism in the digital age: Emotional registers and geopolitical imaginaries in COVID-19 narratives on Chinese social media. Review of International Studies, 48(2), 219–242. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210522000018 Zhang, S. I. (2019). Mediatisation of conflict in the social media era: A case study of Sino-Indian border crisis in 2017. Journalism, 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1177 /1464884919870329 Zhang, Y., Liu, J., & Wen, J.-R. (2018). Nationalism on Weibo: Towards a multifaceted understanding of Chinese nationalism. China Quarterly, 235, 758–783. https://doi.org /10.1017/S0305741018000863 Zhao, S. (1998). A state-led nationalism: The patriotic education campaign in postTiananmen China. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 31(3), 287–302. https:// doi.org/10.1016/S0967-067X(98)00009-9 Zhao, Y., & Wu, J. (2020). Understanding China’s developmental path: Towards socialist rejuvenation? Javnost, 27(2), 97–111. https://doi.org/10.1080/13183222.2020.1727274

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Strategy framing of international conflicts A multi-dimensional framework for transnational comparative content analysis Shujun Liu and Mark Boukes

The world today is characterised by multifarious conflicts that occur on a domestic, regional, or international scale (Cottle, 2006). These conflicts are often not just armed battles; they are proceeding more frequently in terms of global economic and strategic interests, broadly including competitions for tangible resources, like oil, minerals, or other forms of property, as well as intangible political power and influence over rules in regional or world affairs (McQuail, 2006). Put differently, most conflicts nowadays are not only fought by mass conscript armies who feel and make public the pain; they are more likely to be handled by policymakers or specialist professionals using foreign policy, political rhetoric, or high technology. These unarmed clashes are particularly common among the world’s great powers. In order to survive in this global world, these countries have been seeking to amass the greatest amount of power in multiple areas. Meanwhile, though, the threat of nuclear weapons would compel them to avoid escalating tensions to the point of armed warfare (Mearsheimer, 2001). Among inter-state competitions, the rivalry between the USA and China in recent years has received worldwide media attention. It is commonly known as the Thucydides Trap, meaning that a rising power (i.e., China) aspiring to regional or global leadership will inevitably provoke the established power (i.e., the USA) to counter the potential threat (Allison, 2015). News media serve as the primary conduit for the public to learn about the complexity of conflicts. News reports are not simply conceived as representations of the conflicts; rather, they are generated by the media’s active interrelationships and participation in the conflicts, which leads to the conceptualisation of mediatised conflict (Cottle, 2006). Existing theories on journalism practice in foreign conflicts – e.g., the notion of hegemony (Herman & Chomsky, 1988), indexing (Bennett et al., 2006), CNN effects (Robinson, 1999), and the mediatisation of conflict (Giboa et al., 2016) – were developed primarily in the armed warfare context. These theories, however, do not offer a clear framework for analysing the media’s role in the currently less lethal, but more complex conflicts driven by multiple interrelated factors (Associated Press, 2021). Meanwhile, these theoretical propositions on journalistic practices were mainly constructed in DOI: 10.4324/9781003261278-2

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western democratic countries, and are rarely generalised to or tested in nondemocratic countries with a comparative perspective.

Framing: issue framing and strategy framing To sort out the multifaceted dimensions of news reports on international conflict nowadays, this study departs from issue framing and strategy framing – two frames often studied in news covering western domestic elections and policy debates. Issue framing focuses on the substantial policies, actions, and politicians’ opinions, whereas strategy framing addresses the competitive elements and conflict processes. Based on this observation, this study proposes a modified framework by incorporating an international dimension to these two frames. In this regard, we could take countries, more than individual politicians or political parties, as competitive subjects. Our framework can then be applied to compare international conflict reportage from different political systems. Meanwhile, since presidents in some countries bear primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, journalists may associate politicians’ personal motivations and tactics with the formulations and executions of their countries’ foreign policies (Entman, 2003). Hence, strategy framing is further subdivided into two layers: (1) national-level strategy framing and (2) personal-level strategy framing. In this theoretical endeavour, we first elaborate on the structural power theories from the area of international political economy (IPE). Next, we go over the most commonly used media theories for studying the reportage of foreign conflict. After that, we use a modified framework related to strategy and issue framing for studying international conflict news using the China–US trade conflict as an example to demonstrate how this framework can be applied in content analysis. It is important to remember that the current chapter primarily focuses on developing theoretical arguments. More detailed information on the case study of the China– US trade conflict and empirical data can be found in a journal article (Liu et al., 2022).

Bringing politics back into media analysis Against the backdrop of political conflict, the relationship between political antagonists and the news media could be comprehended as a “competitive symbiosis” (Wolfsfeld, 1984): political actors use the press to advance their messages to a wide range of audiences, meanwhile the press relies on the information provided by (both) antagonists to produce news. As such, analysing related coverage without taking the conflict itself into consideration is incomplete. As Wolfsfeld (1997) argued, the best way to understand the role of media in conflicts is to bring the political struggles back into the analysis of media performance, as the political surroundings are more likely to have an influence on the press than the press is on the political process. In this regard, our chapter examines the nature of international conflicts through the structural

Strategy framing of international conflicts 11 power theory originating from the international political economy (IPE) (Strange, 1988). Armed inter-state war has become a rare event in most developed countries since the end of World War II, because of the commercial interdependence, nuclear deterrence, and the construction of international peacekeeping forces (Szayna et al., 2017). Nonetheless, unarmed political disputes continue to occur frequently in various areas, including trade, investment, energy, and geopolitics, for instance (Hewitt, 2017). The great powers are more likely to engage in this kind of competition, as their sheer scale is commonly viewed as a threat to other countries and the existing world pattern (Manevich & Chwe, 2017). In the international political economy (IPE) area, multiple theoretical propositions have been developed to comprehend what “power” means. Max Weber (1978, p. 53) defined power as “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance.” Seeing power from a relational perspective, this theoretical thought addresses the capacity of one country to get another country to do something it would otherwise not do (Azmanova, 2018). By comparison, Susan Strange (1988, p. 25) proposed to view power in structural terms. She refers to “the power to decide how things shall be done, the power to shape the framework within which states relate to each other, relate to people, or relate to corporate enterprises” (Strange, 1988, p. 25). This is similar to the conceptualisation of meta-power, the power “to change the rules of the game” (Krasner, 1985, p. 14). The structural power theory sheds light on the complexities of inter-state conflicts, as it enables to grasp at the latent power struggle amidst the substantial issues. According to Strange (1988, p. 23), a country’s structural power is embodied in four fundamental dimensions: (a) security, (b) production, (c) finance, and (d) knowledge. The secondary structure is located beneath these four basic dimensions and includes, but is not limited to, the areas of (i) trade, (ii) energy, (iii) transportation, and (iv) welfare (see Figure 2.1). These four basic dimensions shape the operation of a secondary-level system, which, in turn, could affect a country’s security, production, finance, and knowledge, and thus the handling of structural power in global affairs (Strange, 1988, p. 161). According to this theory, inter-state trade exchanges are not solely for economic benefits; the underlying aim is to gain structural power in world politics. Overall, wealth is an essential means of power, whether for security or aggression, while power is valuable as a means of acquiring or retaining wealth. Both of them are the proper ultimate ends of national policy (Francois et al., 2019). News media play an essential role in the inter-state conflict that encompasses both wealth and power elements. On the one hand, journalists are responsible for presenting ideas, images, and information about surrounding environments. It is possible that the competition for political power will be covered in news about tensions specifically on trade, energy, transportation, and welfare. Meanwhile, when faced with foreign threats, news reports can be tactically spun by political authorities to incite hatred towards antagonists among citizens, while also constructing a positive national image to consolidate political power domestically.

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Figure 2.1 Susan Strange’s structural power theory

Hence, we could expect the inflammatory discourses related to war, tactics, and strategy to appear in related coverage. In the following section, we elaborate on the news media’s role to comprehend what mechanism(s) might affect news presentations of foreign conflict.

The role of media outlets in international conflicts Beyond the nature of the inter-state conflict per se, the media–politics interaction has the potential to influence conflict-related news coverage because this interaction determines the degree of autonomy that journalists experience – subservient or intervenient (Entman, 2003). The concepts of hegemony (Herman & Chomsky, 1988) and indexing (Bennett et al., 2006) are often applied in studies on the media performance of foreign conflicts. However, these two schools of thought emerged primarily before the Cold War’s end, and both concepts address the decisive role of political authorities, implying that mainstream media see themselves as largely constrained by the official agenda established by political elites. Therefore, research based on these theoretical propositions mainly focuses on issues of propaganda, censorship, and possible influences on public opinion. With the end of the Cold War, traditional patterns of media deference to foreign policy elites seemed to have also been disrupted. News media are gradually owning more autonomy in their coverage of foreign policy beyond just being passive receptacles for governmental discourses (Entman, 2003). One

Strategy framing of international conflicts 13 of the most representative discussions on media empowerment is the “CNN effect” (Robinson, 1999). It theorises that with the advancement of real-time communication technology, and the growth and consolidation of global media groups (Doyle, 2002), news media are increasingly taking an interventionist role by forcing policymakers to respond to whatever issues journalists focused on. Put differently, journalists gradually turn to cover foreign conflicts in an increasingly independent style even to an extent that they may influence foreign policymaking (Robinson, 1999) to a certain degree. Cottle (2006, pp. 8–9) used the term “mediatized conflict” to refer to “the complex ways in which media are implicated within conflicts while disseminating ideas and images about them.” Despite that the relationship between media outlets and political authorities has altered due to the aforementioned complexities, the two roles of news media (i.e., subservient or interventionist) are not mutually exclusive. Instead, they may coexist and complement each other as evidenced by the proposition of framing contestation (Entman, 2003). News reports of a given event could be understood as a result of framing contestations. The final representation, according to Entman (2003), can fall anywhere along a spectrum. On the one end, a specific frame would dominate reporting, while alternative discourses would be marginalised, like the reportage during the Cold War; on the other end, journalists would interact proactively with the dominant frame, e.g., by offering a counterframe to the political logic, resulting in a phenomenon known as framing parity (Entman, 2003). Over the decades after the “CNN effect,” the exponential growth of digital media platforms has dramatically facilitated information flow, and with it comes formations of ideologically like-minded echo chambers (Gilboa et al., 2016). The multiplication and fragmentation of the media landscape have muddied the conflict environment, breeding more disrespect and suspicion between political elites and citizens. If the “CNN effect” exemplified the first phase of the mediatised conflict, then the advancement of digital media has resulted in the second phase, in which conflicts are represented in a more diffuse manner (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2015). The period following the 2010s marks the third phase of conflict mediatisation. Armed warfare between countries (e.g., Russia and Ukraine) is commonly accompanied by a full-scale informational conflict (Ojala et al., 2018). Usergenerated content and the chaotic dynamics online are absorbed and harnessed by professional media, government, and military policymakers as a way to seize, define, and arrest the meaning of conflicts (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2015). With more actors involved, such as digital media platforms, mainstream news outlets, and online users, the media ecology has increasingly become less stable (Zhang, 2021). In this sense, journalists from legacy news outlets are often shifting their roles from content creators to content verifiers (Khaldarova & Pantti, 2016). Against the backdrop of foreign conflicts, media outlets might thus function differently due to various changing conditions they are witnessing. As a result of the social, institutional, and technological factors, journalists working within media organisations tend to report in various ways (Reese & Shoemaker, 2016). An important and critical way to understand journalism practice and the function

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of news media in times of international conflict is by virtue of framing analysis, which we discuss in the following section. Strategy framing and issue framing under western democracies As a method of constructing cultural meaning, framing reflects the process by which political and media elites exert political influence over each other and try to influence the public (Riker, 1986). Using news framing, in particular, journalists selectively report certain aspects of social events while ignoring others to provide a perspective for audiences to comprehend and evaluate social events (Entman, 2007). Effective political communication necessitates framing events, issues, and actors in ways that enhance perceptions and interpretations that benefit one side while hindering the other (Entman, 2003). Among the multiple generic news frames, strategy framing – addressing the latent motivations and tactics of politicians’ conducts – provides more information about the situation in an interpretative manner; that corresponds well with the media logic (De Vreese, 2014). The concept of strategy framing, also known as game framing, was first studied in the context of western campaign news (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). Using strategy framing, a political campaign or policy debate is comprehended as a game, with competing politicians acting as players. Journalists are more concerned with which competitor is ahead or behind, politicians’ tactics and strategies, as well as public polls or opinions (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997, p. 20; Jamieson, 1993, p. 187). The assumption behind strategy framing is that the (presidential) election or policy debate is conceived not as a rational process for the common good; but, instead, it is a practice through which politicians aim for some fixed goal, like branding their political images, acquiring promotion opportunities, or winning the presidency (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997, p. 20). In contrast, issue framing is commonly studied as the opposite of strategy framing. It serves as a window through which audiences can observe officials engaging in constructive dialogues about policy issues. Thus, issue framing addresses policy contents, politicians’ opinions on policymaking, and potential solutions to problems. The issue frame assumes that the goal of political debates is to solve social problems and build a better society (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997, p. 35). As Entman (2003) argued, issue framing’s function is to “define effects or conditions as problematic,” “identify causes,” “convey a moral judgment,” and “endorse remedies or improvements.” Generally, the distribution of issue-framed articles has declined in comparison to coverage that emphasises strategic elements (Lawrence, 2000; Patterson, 2011). Several reasons explain this trend. First, journalists are prone to selecting contradictory or dramatic news elements in order to attract the public’s interest (Bennet, 1996). Employing strategy framing, journalists can highlight or exaggerate the competition among political actors and thus can intensify the sense of urgency. Additionally, it is often difficult for journalists to grasp complex policy issues in a short time. To meet the deadline, they have to expressly summarise the

Strategy framing of international conflicts 15 complex policy issues as two opposing groups (Fallows, 1997). Moreover, by acting as sports commentators, journalists could perform a seemingly neutral and balanced role by focusing on winning or losing, as well as the tactics or personal style of both parties without taking a side obviously (De Vreese & Elenbaas, 2008).

Strategy framing of international conflicts Most strategy framing studies have been carried out in news coverage of domestic politics in western democratic countries (Aalberg et al., 2012). One reason could be that the conflict-driven manner of strategy framing stresses the battle over political ideas, which is less likely to occur (or to be publicly displayed) in countries with a unified ideology. Furthermore, strategy framing is argued to be widely used in the commercially oriented media landscape because news reports with more strategic elements are allegedly more appealing and more easily understood by audiences and thus can assist media organisations to maximise their readership (Schmuck et al., 2017). In line with the preceding discussion, the current study claims that strategy and issue framing could be used in analysing news content on international conflicts. Combining the nature of international conflicts per se, we put forward a modified theoretical framework by adding an international dimension to the original structure of strategy framing (see Figure 2.2). In this newly modified framework, the participating countries, more than individual politicians, are the competitive actors. Meanwhile, this framework still investigates journalists’ emphasis on politicians’ personal strategy since domestic politics can sometimes influence a country’s engagement in foreign conflicts more than the foreign environment alone (Entman, 2003). Especially presidents are increasingly serving as the primary interpreters and evaluators of international

Figure 2.2 Conceptual framework of structural power and strategy framing

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conflicts (Balmas & Sheafer, 2015). They may even use foreign conflicts to divert public attention away from domestic disputes, thereby demonstrating their authority to voters. For example, the trade relationship with China was a major point of contention in the 2016 US presidential election between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton (Noland et al., 2016). Therefore, we separate strategy framing into two levels: national level and personal level (Liu et al., 2022). Borrowing the conceptualisation of war journalism (Galtung & Fischer, 2013, p. 98), we formulate the theoretical arguments of national-level strategy framing as follows: addressing which country is ahead or behind, devising strategies to win the competition, and soliciting support and sympathy from thirdparty countries or international communities. The personal level is, in contrast, concerned with politicians’ personal motivations behind foreign policies, personal styles in dealing with foreign matters, and domestic public opinions or polls on politicians’ popularity, performance, and/or policies (Lawrence, 2000). Issue framing, instead, emphasises the substance of foreign policy, politicians’ statements on policy issues, and possible solutions to foreign frictions (Lawrence, 2000). Our theoretical framework, hence, could assist to comprehend the nature and the complexities of international political conflicts in news. According to the structural power theory, great powers’ ultimate aim to initiate a “war” in specific areas (i.e., trade, investment, or technology) is to maintain or strive for structural power dominance in global affairs, which is consistent with theoretical discussions of strategy framing. Issue framing can be used to understand depictions of friction in certain areas, in line with the secondary level of structural power. Meanwhile, from the perspective of news media’s function, the employment of strategy framing in western domestic political news is widely seen as a manifestation of media logic and interventionist reporting style. Accordingly, we could envision that news media’s active engagement in the context of international conflicts could also contribute to the prominence of strategy framing both at the national and personal levels. To explain how the newly modified framework can be applied to study coverage of the multifarious international conflicts, we present a case study on analysing the news content about the China–US trade conflict across countries with different political systems and national interests.

Case study: the China–US trade conflict Context The China–US relationship has been of growing concern both to themselves and other related countries. The deterioration of the bilateral relationship is widely thought to have begun with the Trump administration’s imposition of a series of punitive tariffs and non-tariff barriers on Chinese imports, aiming to force China to change to what the USA describes as “unfair trade practices.” China also retaliated in response to the USA’s actions with corresponding measures (Kapustina et al., 2020). State behaviour in foreign trade has traditionally been explained by rationalist approaches without cognitive or motivational distortions (Van Aaken & Kurtz,

Strategy framing of international conflicts 17 2019). Nonetheless, the China–US trade conflict since 2018 has taken the form of a zero-sum confrontation, even devolving into a so-called “cold war” propelled by opposing ideologies (Huang, 2021). As multiple battles (e.g., national security, technology development, and social ideology) have been drawn into the bilateral disputes, the two giants’ genuine purposes are more than economic benefits; rather, they are interested in acquiring the political power and influence to make rules and win the world leadership. To study how the media have portrayed this international clash, a content analysis was conducted on news articles from China, the USA, Singapore, and Ireland with a focus on the China–US trade conflict. China and Singapore are both one-party dominant countries with greater political control over their news contents, whereas the USA and Ireland are two democratic countries with more media independence. Meanwhile, China and the USA are deeply engaged in this conflict, whereas Singapore and Ireland are both neutral states (Karsh, 2012, p. 169). Thereby, two explanatory factors – media independence and conflict involvement – for the presence of strategy framing and issue framing were constructed. The time span is from the beginning of Barack Obama’s second term (20 January 2013) to the signing of the Phase 1 trade deal by the two contenders (15 January 2021). Trump’s campaign declaration (16 June 2015) and the policy announcement to impose tariffs on Chinese imports (22 January 2018) are taken as two watershed points. As a result, the time frame was divided into three parts, (1) the pre-trade war during Obama’s presidency, (2) Trump’s campaign, and (3) the actual trade war. Overall, we explore (1) how the factors of media independence, conflict involvement, and conflict phase influence the presence of strategy framing and issue framing in trade war news, and (2) how personal- and national-level strategy framing are distributed in the four countries’ reports. Method From each country, two flagship newspapers with opposing political ideologies or stances were chosen. The state-owned People’s Daily (n = 424) and China Daily (n = 1,179) were selected from China. While the former is the mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, the latter, mainly targeting international readers, takes a slightly liberal view on social issues and is occasionally more critical of the government (Chang, 2014). The New York Times (n = 508) and Wall Street Journal (n = 777) were selected for the USA; the Strait Times (n = 534) and Lianhe Zaobao (n = 538) from Singapore; and the Irish Times (n = 113) and Irish Independence (n = 105) from Ireland were selected. These newspapers, respectively, carry a liberal or conservative bias. We selected the news which contains keywords1 in its head or lead. After systematic sampling with two or three intervals (see Liu et al., 2022), the final sample size is 1,872. Items of issue and strategy framing from previous studies (Lawrence, 2000) were modified to adapt to the context of international conflict. Issue framing was

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Table 2.1 Items of personal-level and national-level strategy framing Personal-level strategy framing

Krippendorff’s α National-level strategy framing

Politicians’ .69 motivations Politicians’ style and .77 public image Domestic public .82 opinions and polls on politicians

Krippendorff’s α

National motivations

.80

National style and image

.85

Opinion from international .72 communities or other countries Winner, losers or other war- .69 or sports-related language

measured specifically concerning (1) “policy contents,” (2) “actual conditions,” (3) “official opinions,” and (4) “possible solutions” related to China–US trade issues. Strategy framing was measured from personal and national levels, respectively, concerning politicians’ and countries’ (1) political motivations, (2) public images, (3) public opinions, and (4) win-or-lose discourses.2 Inter-coder reliability of all items was assessed using Krippendorff’s α (see Table 2.1). All items respectively related to issue and strategy framing, and sublevels of strategy framing, were added and then recoded into dichotomous variables. Logistic regression analysis was applied for data analysis. Results Presence of strategy and issue framing According to Model 1a in Table 2.2, news from democratic countries contains more strategy framing (69.3%) than news from one-party countries (57.6%; p < .001). The factor of conflict involvement, on the other hand, has no effect on the presence of strategy framing (p = .823). After including an interaction item between these two variables, an interaction significant effect was discovered (p < .001; see Model 1b), indicating that the effect of conflict involvement depends on the degree of media independence. News from a democratic country that is directly engaged in the conflict (the USA: 74.3%) contains more strategy framing than news from the indirectly involved country (Ireland: 51.7%). In contrast, for one-party dominant countries, journalists from the indirectly involved country (Singapore: 63.7%) employ more strategy framing than their counterparts from the directly involved country (China: 51.7%). Thus, news from China carried the least strategy framing, whereas this was most prominent in news coverage from the USA. Regarding the effect of a temporal factor on the presence of strategy framing, results in Model 1a show that the actual trade war period witnessed more strategy framing (65.0%) than the period before the trade war actually started (Phase 1) (54.6%; p = .018). There are no statistically significant differences between Phase

Strategy framing of international conflicts 19 Table 2.2 Logit model predicting strategy framing and issue framing Predictors

Intercept Main effects Media independence Conflict involvement Phase 2 Phase 3 Interaction effects Independence × Involvement Control variable Word count χ2 Pseudo R2 N

Presence of strategy framing

Presence of issue framing

Model 1a

Model 2a

Model 1b

Model 2b

−0.96 (0.20) *** −0.56 (0.22) ** 3.52 (0.60) ***

3.64 (0.61) ***

0.50 (0.11) ***

−0.28 (0.17)

−0.07 (0.23)

−0.02 (0.11)

−0.49 (0.13) *** 0.24 (0.16)

0.31 (0.20) 0.43 (0.18) *

0.27 (0.20) 0.33 (0.19)

–

1.28 (0.22) *** –

0.40 (0.31)

0.001 (0.001) *** 163.09 0.07 1,865

0.001 (0.001) *** 0.0003 (0.0002) 198.10 76.86 0.08 0.06 1,865 1,865

0.0003 (0.0002) 78.54 0.06 1,865

0.14 (0.16)

0.08 (0.20)

−0.42 (0.67) −0.43 (0.67) −2.16 (0.59) *** −2.20 (0.60) ***

Note. Cell entries are logistic regression coefficients and standard errors are in parentheses. An interaction item was added to Model 1b and Model 2b. Phase 1 is a reference in these four models. * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.

1 (61.0%) and Phase 2 (68.1%; p = .128), or between Phase 2 (60.1%) and Phase 3 (63.1%; p = .350). Thus, it is really the difference between non-conflict and conflict periods that spurred the presence of strategy framing. There were no significant differences in the presence of issue framing between democratic (91.3%) and one-party dominant countries (90.1%; p = .379) (see Model 1a). After adding an interaction item (see Model 1b), the results remain the same (p = .193). Despite this, we discovered that issue framing was 13% more likely to be present during Obama’s presidency than during the actual trade war since 2018 (Phase 3; p < .001). Thus, whereas the pre-Trade War period was characterised by less strategy framing, more issue framing was present back then. Presence of personal- and national-level strategy framing We also investigated the presence of personal- and national-level strategy framing in the four countries (see Table 2.3). Results of Model 3a show that the presence of personal-level strategy framing can be separately predicted by the factors of a country’s media independence (p < .001) and conflict involvement (p = .007). When compared to countries with fewer media autonomy (27.8%), news from countries with more media independence (39.1%) included more personal-level

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Table 2.3 Logit model predicting personal- and national-level strategy framing Predictors

Intercept Main effects Media independence Conflict involvement Phase 2 Phase 3 Interaction effects Independence × Involvement Control variable Word count χ2 Pseudo R2 N

Presence of strategy framing at personal level

Presence of strategy framing at national level

Model 3a

Model 4a

Model 3b

Model 4b

−3.34 (0.30) *** −3.00 (0.30) *** −0.59 (0.20) ** −0.24 (0.21) 0.51 (0.11) ***

−0.32 (0.20)

0.58 (0.10) *** −0.17 (0.17)

0.31 (0.11) **

−0.14 (0.14)

−0.33 (0.11) ** −0.78 (0.13) ***

1.66 (0.29) *** 1.58 (0.28) ***

1.64 (0.29) *** 1.50 (0.28) ***

−0.16 (0.20) −0.09 (0.18)

−0.20 (0.20) −0.19 (0.18)

–

1.24 (0.24) ***

–

1.19 (0.21) ***

0.001 (0.0001) *** 192.54 0.08 1,871

0.001 (0.0001) *** 220.58 0.09 1,871

−0.59 (0.20) ** 0.001 (0.001) *** 113.51 0.04 1,871

146.02 0.06 1,871

Note. Cell entries are logistic regression coefficients and standard errors are in parentheses. An interaction item was added to Model 3b and Model 4b. Phase 1 is a reference in these four models. * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.

strategy framing. Additionally, journalists from conflict-affected countries may use more personal-level strategy framing (34.7%) than their counterparts coming from neutral countries (28.1%). The same goes for the presence of national-level strategy framing. As shown in Model 4a, national-level strategy framing is more prevalent in countries with more media independence (58.7%) than in countries with a lower level of media independence (44.3%, p < .001). Reports from indirectly involved countries, in converse, contained more national-level strategy framing (54.9.7%) than those from China and the USA, two directly engaged players (46.7.9%; p = .002). According to Models 3b and 4b, the interaction effects between media independence and conflict involvement are found to be positively significant (p < .001 both for Models 3b and 4b): this implies that the presence of personal- and national-level strategy framing is both dependent on the interaction effect between these two factors. Specifically, for directly involved countries, the proportions of personal- and national-level strategy framing are significantly higher in news from the USA (47.0%; 60.9%) than that from China (26.1%; 35.9%); for indirectly involved countries, in contrast, Singapore’s news (28.9%; 54.9%) contains more elements of personal and national strategy than that of Ireland (22.8%; 50.8%). Inside, the parentheses are proportioned personal- and national-level strategy framing for each country. Regarding the temporal changes in the presence of these two subframes, results of Model 3a show that the presence of personal-level strategy framing is considerably more prominent during the actual trade war period (41.7%) and Trump’s

Strategy framing of international conflicts 21 campaign period (64.8%), compared to the Obama’s term (9.3%). Even after adding an interaction item to Model 3b, the results remain constant. In contrast, there are no significant differences in the prominence of national-level strategy framing over time (p = .43 and .64 in Model 4a; p = .32 and .31 in Model 4b).

Discussion The presence of issue framing, which focuses on substantial policy, was found to be at a high level in news across all four countries. This indicates that journalists have extensively reported on the policy content and exchange conditions in the China–US trade war context. Nonetheless, issue framing’s prominence declined during the most competitive period. This is in stark contrast to strategy framing’s increasing prominence while the actual trade war unfolded. This confirms previous research (in the domestic context) that the public is gradually losing access to policy news when conflicts intensify, whereas the coverage of the competitive elements itself becomes more prominent in such times (Lawrence, 2000). Media independence and conflict involvement cannot determine the use of strategy framing independently but mostly interact with one another. The conditionality could be explained in part by these countries’ various media landscapes. In Singapore’s hybrid media system, for example, journalists serve as the government’s mouthpiece in domestic politics while adhering more closely to Anglo-American ideology in global affairs (Wu, 2020). The presence of personaland national-level strategy framing also hinges on the interrelated relationship between these two factors (conflict involvement and media freedom). It is worth noting that the presence of personal-level strategy framing increased significantly since Trump’s campaign began. This could be explained by the fact that presidents are in charge of enacting, implementing, and enforcing foreign policies. Thus, strategy framing at the personal level may be more prominent as the trade issues become more prominent in the media. Additionally, presidents’ personalities may attract more media attention. For example, during Trump’s presidency, he frequently exploited journalistic conventions to increase his media presence: he used press-bashing as a type of political performance commensurate with his populist rhetoric (Carlson et al., 2021). Almost at the same time, it is argued that the leadership cult surrounding China’s president, Xi Jinping, is growing, which could be documented by journalists in the form of his personality and private life (Lu & Sobleva, 2014). In contrast, no significant differences were found in the presence of national-level strategy framing between the three phases, implying that when reporting on unarmed inter-state frictions, journalists tend to reveal the potential motivations of contending countries regardless of the escalation or de-escalation of the frictions.

Conclusion To better comprehend the news content on international conflict, this chapter has attempted to reintroduce the background of the conflict by analysing the structure

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of international conflict using an analytical framework from the field of international political economy (IPE). Subsequently, we have reviewed existing theories on the media–politics interaction because the role that news media play could affect the news content that they report. On this basis, this chapter has focused on the strategy framing apparatus in news content production. Specifically, we have presented a modified framework that considers countries as competitive actors while also taking domestic politics into account by virtue of personal-level strategy framing. The findings of the case study on China–US trade conflict news indicate that our newly modified framework could be employed to disentangle the complexities of international conflict. The genuine purpose of the China–US trade war (i.e., competition for global power) could be approached from the national-level strategy framing, while also taking into consideration each country’s domestic politics via personal-level strategy framing. By comparison, substantial trade issues between the two countries can be observed through the lens of issue framing. The prevalence of strategy and issue framing in news across the studied four countries demonstrates that this framework could be exploited to study news content from countries beyond just the western democratic context, thereby broadening the generalisation of existing strategy framing theory. Limitations of this framework should be noticed. The modified framework is mainly investigated in trade war reports from legacy media outlets, without taking the characteristics of digital media into consideration. Hence, more research could be conducted on the social media scenario. In addition, elements of strategy framing (e.g., political motivation, personal style) could be projected not just by the news media outlets, individual officials themselves might also tactically expose their own or their opponents’ motivations or style to cater to public needs (Hänggli & Kriesi, 2010) and thereby consciously attract media attention. Hence, future research could delve deeper into the actors that are involved in this framework, including but not limited to governments, politicians, and reporters themselves.

Notes 1 Keywords: trade AND China AND (United States OR America OR US OR USA OR U.S. OR U.S.A.). 2 See Appendix for the specific item wording.

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Huang, Y. (2021). The U.S.-China trade war has become a cold war. Available at: https:// bit.ly/3ot2CaP Jamieson, K. H. (1993). Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction, and Democracy. Oxford University Press. Kapustina, L., Lipková, Ľ., Silin, Y., & Drevalev, A. (2020, January 13). US-China trade war: Causes and outcomes [Paper presentation]. SHS Web of Conferences, online. https://bit.ly/3DtGLq9 Karsh, E. (2012). Neutrality and Small States. Routledge. Khaldarova, I., & Pantti, M. (2016). Fake news: The narrative battle over the Ukrainian conflict. Journalism Practice, 10(7), 891–901. Krasner, S. D. (1985). Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism. University of California Press. Lawrence, R. G. (2000). Game-framing the issues: Tracking the strategy frame in public policy news. Political Communication, 17(2), 93–114. Liu, S., Boukes, M., & De Swert, K. (2022). Strategy faming in the international arena: A cross-national comparative content analysis on the China-US trade conflict coverage. Journalism, Advance online. doi:10.1177/14648849211052438. Lu, X., & Soboleva, E. (2014). Personality Cults in Modern Politics: Cases from Russia and China. (CGP Working Paper Series, 01/2014). Freie Universität Berlin, Center for Global Politics. Manevich, D., & Chwe, H. (2017, August 1). Globally, More People See U.S. Power and Influence as a Major Threat. Pew Research Center. https://pewrsr.ch/3chzGwQ McQuail, D. (2006). On the mediatization of war: A review article. International Communication Gazette, 68(2), 107–118. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). Future of the American Pacifier, The. Foreign Aff., 80, 46. Noland, M., Hufbauer, G. C., Moran, T., & Robinson, S. (2016). Assessing Trade Agendas in the US Presidential Campaign. Peterson Institute for International Economics. https:// www.piie.com/publications/piie-briefings/assessing-trade-agendas-us-presidential -campaign Ojala, M., Pantti, M., & Kangas, J. (2018). Professional role enactment amid information warfare: War correspondents tweeting on the Ukraine conflict. Journalism, 19(3), 297–313. Patterson, T. E. (2011a). Out of Order. Alfred A. Knopf. Reese, S. D., & Shoemaker, P. J. (2016). A media sociology for the networked public sphere: The hierarchy of influences model. Mass Communication and Society, 19(4), 389–410. Robinson, P. (1999). The CNN effect: Can the news media drive foreign policy?. Review of International Studies, 25(2), 301–309. Riker, W. H. (1986). The Art of Political Manipulation. Yale University Press. Schmuck, D., Heiss, R., Matthes, J., Engesser, S., & Esser, F. (2017). Antecedents of strategic game framing in political news coverage. Journalism, 18(8), 937–955. Strange, S. (1988). States and Markets. Printer Publishers. Szayna, T. S., Watts, S., O’Mahony, A., Frederick, B., & Kavanagh, J. (2017). What Are the Trends in Armed Conflicts, and What Do They Mean for US Defense Policy. Rand Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1904.html Weber, M. (1978). Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. University of California Press.

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Appendix: coding instructions Issue frame

Coding instructions

Reliability

.79 This variable has two codes: 0 = no, 1 = yes. Coders should type 1 if the news story describes (1) the China–US bilateral trade agreement and trade deal; (2) the multilateral trade agreement and trade deal of China or the USA; (3) the governmental regulations on imports or exports; or (4) the process of trade policymaking by executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. Otherwise, coders should type 0. .69 This variable has two codes: 0 = no, 1 = yes. 2 Does the article Coders should type 1 if the news story contain any describes or explains the present trade concrete conditions, traces past experiences, or descriptions of the anticipates future development of the China– situation of the US trade relationship. Otherwise, coders China–US trade should type 0. relationship? This variable has two codes: 0 = no, 1 = yes. .86 3 Does the article Coders should type 1 if the news story contain any reports the opinions of policymakers standpoints, views, explicitly. Otherwise, coders should type 0. or opinions of officials on the China–US trade issues? .76 This variable has two codes: 0 = no, 1 = yes. 4 Does the article Coders should type 1 if the news story mention any mentions the official actions, like bilateral efforts made negotiation, implementation of policy, towards solving and announcement of statements, to try to or mitigating the solve the frictions between two countries. China–US trade Otherwise, coders should type 0. conflict? 1 Does the article give any information on some policies that are developed to deal with the China–US trade relationship?

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Shujun Liu and Mark Boukes Personal strategy framing

Coding instructions

Reliability

.69 This variable has two codes: 0 = no, 1 = yes. 1 Does the article Coders should type 1 if the news story at mention any policy, least once refers to whether politicians or action, or speech other officials implement trade policies in regarding the order to (1) win voters or public supports China–US trade for election or office-holding, (2) display issues taken by a or improve the personality, reputation, or politician to win image of politicians, (3) consolidate the public support or existing regime, and (4) promote the official consolidate one’s position. Otherwise, coders should type 0. political position? .77 2 Does the article This variable has two codes: 0 = no, 1 = yes. mention a Coders should type 1 if the news story politician’s mentions the attitude, tendency, or bias personal style or of politicians portrayed by a journalist, personality? protagonist or his/her partners, competitors, or independent sources. The tendency must be expressed by using terms of clearly positive or negative judgement. e.g., “good,” “promising,” “ominous,” “disappointing,” or the article provides some factual information which could shape a positive or negative image of a politician. Otherwise, coders should type 0. .82 This variable has two codes: 0 = no, 1 = yes. 3 Does the article Coders should type 1 if the news story mention domestic mentions attitudes or opinions of a large public opinions group of people on the China–US trade on the China–US relationship. It should be noticed that the trade relationship opinion should be a collective view, desires, or politicians’ wants, and thinking of the majority people or policies? a group of people. Otherwise, coders should type 0. National strategy framing

Coding instructions

Reliability

.80 This variable has two codes: 0 = no, 1 = yes. 1 Does the article Coders should type 1 if the news story mention any policy, emphasises some tactical, calculated, or action, or speech strategic move a country made about trade regarding the or other economic issues for fulfilling one China–US trade country’s political motivations. The national issues taken by a interests include (1) winning global and country to win a area leadership; (2) winning leadership in a world or regional technical field; (4) winning the ideological leadership, to win battle; (5) competition between political the battle regarding systems; (6) improving national image, the political system, reputation, or international position; (7) or to gain a better challenging the existing world order or financial position? system constructed after the Second World War; (8) improving one country’s financial condition. Otherwise, coders should type 0.

Strategy framing of international conflicts 27 .85 2 Does the article This variable has two codes: 0 = no, 1 = yes. mention a country’s Coders should type 1 if the news story national style or portrays the image, reputation, or character images? of a country using some adjectives, adverbs, rhetoric, modifier, or factual information. Otherwise, coders should type 0. .72 This variable has two codes: 0 = no, 1 = yes. 3 Does the article Coders should type 1 if the news story refers mention the to attitudes or opinions from other countries opinions on the or international communities (e.g., World China–US trade Trade Organization) on the China–US trade relationship from relationship. Otherwise, coders should type other countries 0. or international communities? .69 4 Does the article This variable has two codes: 0 = no, 1 = yes. mention winner, Coders should type 1 if the news story loser, or other warat least once makes use of a language of related languages? sports and war, such as battle, competition, winning, or fight. Otherwise, coders should type 0.

3

Media type and framing of the Sino–US Trade War An analysis of articles from party and nonparty news organisations in China Xianwen Kuang1

Introduction The Sino–US Trade War that broke out in March 2018 has been the focus of news reporting on bilateral relations between the two countries involved, i.e., China and the USA. Informed by the framing theory which indicates that news reports can influence how people think about an event or issue by highlighting some aspects and ignoring others (Entman, 1993a; Iyengar, 1990; Kerbel et al., 2000; Lecheler et al., 2015), we expect that news on the Trade War will influence citizens’ attitudes on it. Thus, to better understand the latter, i.e. Chinese people’s opinions towards the Trade War, we would primarily need to know how news organisations in China frame the Trade War. Although there have been many studies on news framing of international conflicts/wars (e.g. Basilaia et al., 2013; Dimitrova and Strömbäck, 2005; Ojala et al., 2017), few have investigated the framing of one between China and the USA, the two world political and economic giants. Existing studies (e.g. Brewer, 2006, Jang, 2013, Jang et al., 2015) indicate that national interests have been the focus of media framing of international conflicts. However, trade conflicts are considered different from other conflicts like territorial disputes in which most people/organisations are within the united front with their government. Some people/organisations which benefit from bilateral trade might be against a trade war. Therefore, how news organisations within the country frame the Trade War might be different from how they frame the other types of conflicts. As political orientation shapes reporting/framing of news issues (AkhavanMajid & Ramaprasad, 1998, Budak et al., 2016, Patterson, 1993, Shoemaker and Reese, 1996), this chapter will examine how news organisations with different political affiliations/orientations, e.g. party and nonparty organs in China (Kuang & Wei, 2018, Liu and Yao, 2015), frame the Trade War. Most existing studies on the framing of international conflicts/wars (e.g. Dimitrova and Strömbäck, 2005, Ruigrok et al., 2005) have not taken political affiliation as a key independent variable in their analysis yet. Besides, although there have been several studies on the reporting of Chinese news organisations on bilateral conflicts, e.g. Yang (2003) and Dai (2010), they DOI: 10.4324/9781003261278-3

The Sino–US Trade War 29 all consider them representative of all news organisations in China. The rationale for this is that all news organisations in China are state-owned and their reporting on bilateral conflicts which involve the protection of national interests should be largely similar. This assumption sounds rather commonsensical, but it ignores the fact that even with issues involving national interests, the understanding of what is best for the nation and what are the priorities in safeguarding national interests is different across people and organisations. They might be standing on the same front in principle but could have debates on what should be discussed more when addressing the conflict with another country. Therefore, it is worth studying how exactly different news organisations in China present and discuss the conflict, despite the fact that they are largely in line with each other in terms of ideology. To examine the possible differences across Chinese news organisations on the framing of the Sino–US Trade War, framing analysis on the news articles would be relevant as it delves into the perspectives of how people see the issue and the aspects that people choose to emphasise to construct their articulation and argument. Therefore, content analysis on the framing of the Sino–US Trade War by the online news portals of two party news organisations and two nonparty counterparts in China was conducted. In the first step, a pilot study was carried out to identify several salient frames that the Chinese news organisations used in their coverage of the Sino–US Trade War. After that, a quantitative content analysis was done to determine the frequencies of the particular frames appearing in the news articles by both the party and nonparty news organisations’ online portals before a comparative analysis of the frames by the two types of news organisations was carried out. The online versions of the news organisations were chosen as the study objects because the news industry in China has been digitalised today. In the next part of this chapter, a review of the existing literature on the media type and news framing of international conflicts will be presented. However, before this is discussed, it is necessary to address the context of news production in China.

News production in China A number of studies have investigated how different factors influence the making of news. These factors are usually one or more of those summarised by Shoemaker and Reese (1996) in their Hierarchy of Influences Model, including individual-level factors like social background and gender of journalists, media routine, organisation-level factors, e.g. media ownership, extra media-level factors such as legal constraints, regulations, market forces, political control, and ideological-level factors like cultural bias and patriotism. The majority of these studies in China, however, have specifically looked into how media marketisation and political/government control together shaped the news media landscape and news-making (Kuang, 2020). In general, these studies consider that the influences of political powers and the government on the production of news in China are stronger and more direct than those in democracies. Provided that news

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organisations in China are all state apparatus, they appear to be more authoritative and conservative (Ostini & Fung, 2002). Using a sophisticated media control system, the propaganda authorities in China have the capacity to influence the reporting of every piece of news, though they usually only ban or constrain reporting of some very sensitive news which could challenge the legitimacy of the Party-state (Brady, 2008; Kuang, 2018; Liebman, 2011; Lorentzen, 2014). In the most serious cases, the central propaganda authorities would send directives to all news organisations in the country to confine the reporting of these very sensitive issues (Zhang & Fleming, 2005). In some sensitive periods, the propaganda authorities would call for regular meetings with editors and managers of both traditional and online media to reaffirm news reporting guidance and disciplines (Wu, 2010; Kuang and Wang, 2020). While in the non-sensitive periods, control of the production of news is a case-by-case issue which means that a propaganda notice or ban will be sent to newsrooms once an emerging issue is a sensitive one (Kuang, 2017). Meanwhile, for taboo issues like the Taiwan and Xinjiang issues, guidelines on the reporting are well received by all newsmakers who attend the regular meetings (Jia, 2002; Kuang and Wang, 2020). It is believed that government control on the reporting of international conflicts involving China, e.g. the territorial disputes with Japan and India and the Sino–US Trade War, will be similar to those of the sensitive issues in China as the mishandling of such critical issues addressing national interests would be detrimental to the legitimacy of the state. However, different from those very sensitive domestic issues, the Sino–US Trade War was not initiated by China, which bore little responsibility for its breaking out. Therefore, it does not seem to be necessary to ban the reporting of it, nor it is possible as the Chinese people would be aware of it anyway following the imposing of increased tariffs on Chinese goods to the USA. This implies that the news organisations would have a certain degree of freedom to report on the Trade War, but it is not clear how much freedom is granted and whether the extent varies across different types of news organisations.

Political affiliation and types of news organisations in China There are different types of news organisations in China. In terms of the size of target audiences and access to political news sources, the country has national-/ central-level, provincial-level, municipal-/city-level, and district-/countylevel news organisations. A national-/central-level news organisation targets a nationwide audience. Also, its national-/central-level status has strong political implications concerning its access to political sources for news-making. For example, People’s Daily as a national-/central-level news organisation, whose administrative rank is sub-ministry level as it is under the direct supervision and management of the ministry-level Central Propaganda Department of China, has full access to the news sources in most ministries in the Central Government.

The Sino–US Trade War 31 In terms of political affiliation and level of commercialisation, there are party and nonparty news organisations in China. For newspapers, the distinction between party and nonparty newspapers is often compared to the Western elite– tabloid dichotomy (Shao, 2002; Wang, 2004). However, they are fundamentally different (Kuang, 2020). Different from the most elite and tabloid news organisations in the West which are privately owned, all Chinese ones are stateowned (ibid.). In fact, all of the news organisations were party-affiliated before the media commercialisation of the country in the 1990s but not anymore after that (Wei, 1999). It was widely known that media commercialisation as part of China’s state-sponsored economic reforms aimed to liberalise the operation of all media organisations economically though not politically. Part of the reason is that the Chinese Party-state can no longer subsidise the running of all media organisations. Thus, the existing party news organisations were allowed to set up sub-news outlets which were more market-targeting and mass-appealing so that these new outlets could make good revenues to subsidise the operation of their parent news organisations which had been kept as the propaganda organs of the Party-state (Kuang, 2020). These newly established sub-news outlets were called nonparty news organisations. Despite that they are all state-owned, party and nonparty news organisations differ from each other on three key dimensions, including news content, political status, and circulation (Wei, 1999; Huang, 2000; Kuang, 2020). In terms of news content, party newspapers focus more on policies and party guidance, whereas nonparty newspapers highlight materials appealing to the public (Shao, 2002; Kuang, 2020). As for political status, party news organisations as the authoritative voice of the Party-state conveying policies have high political status, whereas nonparty newspapers are not considered to be official media (ibid.). Last but not least, the circulation of most party newspapers depends on mandatory subscriptions paid by the state (Shao, 2002; Huang, 2007), while nonparty newspapers rely on market circulation (Kuang, 2020). However, as most news organisations go online today, the two types of news organisations do not differ from each other much in the aspect of circulation any longer because party news organisations are no longer relying on state units’ mandatory subscriptions but increasingly dependent on market circulation.

Party/nonparty news organisations and framing of international conflicts Existing research indicates that party and nonparty news organisations in China do show variations when reporting on the same issues. Nonparty news organisations are considered to have more autonomy in the reporting of various issues, especially the more sensitive ones (Kuang, 2020). The more autonomy of nonparty news organisations is a result of the growing bargaining power of the news organisations following the media marketisation process. This is because the more commercialised news media require their journalists to develop more audience-appealing stories with high news values, thus promoting a sense of

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professionalism (Liu, 2011). The autonomy for a nonparty news organisation is also possible when media regulation is no longer a sole game of the Partystate, but rather one in which multiple non-state actors are negotiating the making of policies and the expansion of news reporting boundaries on different issues (Akhavan-Majid, 2004; Huang, 2007a). Party news organisations, on the other hand, have less news selection autonomy than their nonparty counterparts (Kuang, 2020) as they are typically shouldering more responsibilities to develop rapport between the party and the public by serving as the mouthpiece of the former and loudspeakers of its policies (Shirk, 2011, p. 7). As a result, the journalists and editors in the party organs practice a greater extent of self-censorship and also comply with the orders from the propaganda authorities more than their peers in the nonparty organisations (see e.g. Zhang, 2010; Zhang, 2011; Kuang, 2020). Such differences in news selection autonomy between the two types of organisations are also represented in how the news is presented in their publications. Nonparty news organisations would usually use sensational headlines and bold layouts (Liu, 2011). Moreover, they are less hesitant to cover hot topics, including those exposing the wrongdoings of local officials and governments, and are often eager to publish the news before a propaganda notice or news ban on the reporting of the issues reaches the newsroom (Liu, 2011; Kuang, 2020). More nuanced differences in the reporting of the same issues between party and nonparty news outlets are found by Kuang and Wei (2018) on the framing of sensitive issues in China by the two types of news organisations. Developed around the concept of news framing which is defined as the process in which media organisations would emphasise some aspects of a news issue more than others when reporting it (Entman, 1993b, p. 52), the study found that the influence of political affiliation of news organisations on news framing is subject to the sensitivity of news. Likewise, Luther and Zhou (2005) found that when reporting on nationally sensitive issues, the two types of news organisations use similar frames. However, when reporting locally sensitive issues, party and nonparty news organisations show big differences in frame use (Kuang and Wei, 2018). The explanation for this is that the spreading of locally sensitive issues only concerns the local government in the place where the news event broke out, but not so much the other local governments or those of higher levels (ibid.). This gives the news organisations in other localities and at higher levels, e.g. the national news outlets, more freedom to report on locally sensitive news. Despite the freedom, party news organisations are more self-censored and they would usually be more cautious in the reporting of negative news about state apparatus and its officials than the nonparty ones. While the Sino–US Trade War is definitely a highly important issue in China and state influences on the reporting of it are considerable, it would be debatable to consider it a nationally sensitive issue as the breaking out of it was not attributed to the wrongdoings of the Chinese Party-state and its government, which was discussed in this chapter earlier. As we can also see from the existing news reports on the Trade War, propaganda authorities did not seem to have censored

The Sino–US Trade War 33 the report of it heavily. Therefore, it could be assumed that party and nonparty news organisations will have some certain autonomy to report on the Trade War and their framing of it could be different as party news organisations are expected to be more conservative and cautious in selecting some particular frames in their reports. As it was introduced, news framing is a method used by news media people, e.g. journalists and editors, to “select, exclude, emphasize and elaborate some aspects of an issue and provide references to others about which aspects of the issue are important” (Reese, 2001, p. 10). According to De Vreese (2005), there are two types of frames being used in existing studies’ frame analysis, i.e. the generic frames and the issue-specific frames. Generic frames are used when researchers are comparing at least two different issues, while issue-specific frames are usually applied in studies analysing the framing of one particular issue as such frames are uniquely used to analyse a specific issue or topic at hand. There are five generic frames which are most discussed in existing studies, including the human interest frame, the economic consequence frame, the responsibility frame, the conflict frame, and the morality frame (Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000; Zhou, 2008; Kuang and Wei; 2018). Definitions of these frames are widely recognised and shared by researchers doing framing analysis. However, for issue-specific frames, as the framing of the particular issue has been rarely studied, researchers would need to conduct a pilot study to identify the frames. As this study is specifically about the framing of the Sino–US Trade War, which has not been studied before, a pilot study is necessary. The frames that have been generated in the pilot study and their definition will be introduced in the Methods section of the chapter. Besides the frames that are used by Chinese news organisations to report on the Sino–US Trade War, this study is also interested in analysing the tones of the Chinese news reports towards the USA and China, i.e. positive, neutral, and negative. This is because analysis of them helps to understand the general position of the Chinese news organisations in the Trade War and why some particular frames are more often used than others. Since the frames used across the party and nonparty news organisations are expected to be different, we will also look at whether the tones used by the two types of news organisations are different too.

Research questions Based on the discussions above, this chapter aims to address the following research questions: 1. Which frames are more likely to be adopted by the Chinese news organisations in their reporting of the Sino–US Trade War? 2. How do party and nonparty news organisations vary in the use of each frame in their reporting? 3. What are the most frequently used tones of their news reports towards China and the USA, respectively?

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4. Do party and nonparty news organisations show variations in their use of tones towards China and the USA?

Methods This study mainly involves a quantitative content analysis of news articles and opinion pieces collected from the online news portal of four news organisations in China, including Xinhua News Agency, People’s Daily, The Paper, and Global Times. Among the four, the first two, i.e. Xinhua and People’s Daily are party news organisations, while the last two, i.e. The Paper and Global Times, are nonparty news organisations. The articles are sampled from all the news items published in the four news portals in the first one-and-a-half years since the Sino–US Trade War broke out, i.e. between March 2018 and August 2019. By using the keywords of the Sino–US Trade War and Sino–US Trade conflicts in Chinese to search within each news portal, 906 news stories in total were identified, including 173 from Xinhuanet.co m, 184 from People’s Daily’s online portal People.com.cn, 283 from Paper.cn, and 268 from huanqiu.com (the news portal of Global Times). From the sampling pool, an equal number of 60 news stories from each news organisation and a total number of 240 are selected for the quantitative content analysis. Before the quantitative content analysis, a pilot qualitative analysis of the news articles was conducted to identify the main news frames used by the news organisations in the reporting of the Sino–US Trade War. By the end of the analysis, six frames emerged, including (1) Impact on the US frame, (2) Impact on China frame, (3) Impact on the World frame, (4) Peace or Compromise frame, (5) Strategic Game frame, and (6) Trade/Tariff Policy frame. By name, the Impact on the US, China, and the World frames mean the impact brought by the Sino–US Trade War on the macro-economy, society, industries, enterprises, etc. of the USA, China, and the World, respectively. One example of this is the Global Time report on 27 May 2019, titled “Foreign news media: [The] Sino-US Trade War harms almost every field of the American economy.” The news article began straightforwardly in the lead with the main idea of the title and listed the industries which were affected before it introduced the details of the impacts on each industry. The Peace or Compromise frame, on the other hand, emphasises the perceptions and actions appealing for negotiation, corporation, or ceasefire. One news report in the People’s Daily on 17 November 2018, quoted President Xi Jinping’s remarks at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) CEO Summit 2018, “No matter it is cold war, hot war or trade war, there is no real winner,” indicating the use of a Peace or Compromise frame. The Strategic Game frame highlights the perspectives of the political strategies on the maintenance of Sino–US relations. Another news report in the People’s Daily using this frame highlighted the responses of Kang Lu, the Spokesman of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the USA’s trade measures with China on 15 June 2018. It quoted Lu who stated the efforts that the two sides had made in the past for solutions to the trade conflicts but expressed disappointment over the USA’s inconsistency.

The Sino–US Trade War 35 Last but not least, the Trade/Tariff Policy frame focuses on the policies of either side in the bilateral trade and the potential political actions and remedies indicated by the policies. For example, Xinhuanet.com used this frame in its report titled, “Three days after the Trade War, the China side released four meaningful points of message” on 10 July 2018, to introduce the four counter-measures that China had made following the USA’s tariff increase on Chinese goods since 6 July 2018. The definitions of the frames above were used as coding instructions to code the appearance of each frame in the 240 news articles. When a particular frame was found to have appeared in the news story, 1 was coded under this news item, otherwise, 0 was. As for the tones, which include Positive/Neutral/Negative to the USA and Positive/Neutral/Negative to China, binary codes 0 and 1 are also used to signify the absence and appearance of the tone, respectively. Statistics of the results for the coding of all the 240 items were imported to the IBM SPSS and processed to examine the correlations between the type of news organisation, i.e. party or nonparty news organisation, and the use of each frame and tone. Significance levels of the correlations, the p-value as well as effect size indicated by Cramer’s V were assessed to confirm whether the differences between the two types of news organisations in the use of the frames and tones are significant. The statistical significance level set is at alpha 0.05, which is the case for many existing studies, while the interpretation of effect size by Cohen (1988 as cited in Ellis, 2010), which sets the cutting points of 0.5, 0.3, and 0.1 for strong, medium, and weak associations, respectively, is adopted.

Results In response to the first research question, i.e. which frames are more likely to be adopted by the Chinese news organisations in their reports on the Sino–US Trade War, the data show that the Trade/Tariff Policy and Impact on the USA frames are most often used with 40 percent and 25 percent of the total 240 news reports adopt the two frames, respectively (see Table 3.1). The less often used frames are the Peace/Compromise frame (13 percent), the Impact on China frame (10 percent), the Impact on the World frame (7 percent), and the Strategic Game frame (4 percent). To answer the second research question, i.e. how party and nonparty news organisations vary in the use of each frame in their reporting of the Sino–US Trade War, a series of chi-square tests were run to see whether the two types of news media show significant differences in the use of each frame. The results indicate that party and nonparty news organisations show significant differences in the use of four frames, including the Trade/Tariff Policy frame (52 percent vs. 28 percent), Impact on the World frame (13 percent vs. 1 percent), Impact on China frame (4 percent vs. 16 percent), and Impact on the USA frame (18 percent vs. 32 percent) (also see Table 3.1). The small p values for the four frames, respectively, i.e. 0.000, 0.000, 0.003, and 0.011 (smaller than 0.005) have clearly confirmed that the differences are statistically significant. Besides, the Cramer’s V values

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Table 3.1 Comparison of frames used in the Sino–US Trade War by news organisations in China Frames Impact on the USA Impact on China Impact on World Peace/Compromise Strategic Game Trade/Tariff Policy a

Totala

Party

Nonparty

Chi-square tests

(N = 240)

(N = 120)

(N = 120)

p

V

25% 10% 7% 13% 4% 40%

18% 4% 13% 9% 4% 52%

32% 16% 1% 16% 4% 28%

0.011 0.003 0.000 0.118 1.000 0.000

0.165 0.193 0.234 0.101 0.000 0.247

More than one tone can be found in each news article. Therefore, the total percentage of all tones adds up to more than 100.

Table 3.2 Comparison of tones used in the Sino–US Trade War by news organisations in China Tones Positive to the USA Neutral to the USA Negative to the USA Positive to China Neutral to China Negative to China a

Totala

Party

Nonparty

Chi-square tests

(N = 240)

(N = 120)

(N = 120)

p

V

0% 16% 78% 60% 10% 0%

0% 8% 87% 75% 3% 1%

0% 18% 68% 45% 17% 0%

1.000 0.034 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.314

0.000 0.137 0.220 0.306 0.222 0.065

More than one tone can be found in each news article. Therefore, the total percentage of all tones adds up to more than 100.

for the Trade/Tariff Policy frame (0.247), the Impact on the World frame (0.234), the Impact on China frame (0.193), and the Impact on the USA (0.165) all fall between Cohen’s “weak” (0.1) and “medium” (0.3) cutting points, meaning that the inter-correlations between the party affiliation of news organisations (party or nonparty) and the use of these frames are between weak and medium. Regarding the third research question on the most frequently used tones of the Chinese news organisations’ reports towards China and the USA, respectively, the results presented in Table 3.2 show that the Negative-to-the-USA tone and the Positive-to-China tone stand out. Altogether 78 percent of the 240 news reports from the four news organisations adopt the Negative-to-the-USA tone, while 60 percent of the reports use the Positive-to-China tone. The Neutral-to-the-USA tone (16 percent) and the Neutral-to-China tone (10 percent) are used much less, while a few Positive-to-the-USA tones and Negative-to-China tones appear in the reports. To address the fourth research question on whether party and nonparty news organisations show variations in their use of tones towards China and the USA in their news reports on the Sino–US Trade War, another series of chi-square tests

The Sino–US Trade War 37 were performed. The test results confirmed that the uses of four tones, including the Positive-to-China tone (75 percent vs. 45 percent), the Negative-to-the-USA tone (87 percent vs. 68 percent), the Neutral-to-China tone (3 percent vs. 17 percent), and the Neutral-to-the-USA tone (8 percent vs. 18 percent), across the party and nonparty news organisations, are significantly different. The small p values for the four tones, i.e. 0.000, 0.001, 0.001, and 0.034, suggest that the differences are statistically significant. The Cramer’s V value of 0.306 for the Positive-toChina tone indicates that the association between the political affiliation of news organisations and the use of the specific tone is between medium and strong. The V values for the other three tones, including the Negative-to-the-USA tone, the Neutral-to-China tone, and the Neutral-to-the-USA tone, are all between the cutting points of 0.1 and 0.3, indicating a weak to a medium association between the political affiliation of news organisations and the use of the three tones. The two types of news organisations show no significant differences in the use of the Negative-to-China tone and the Positive-to-the-USA tone with large p values and very small V values.

Conclusion and discussion This chapter investigates how news organisations with different political affiliations in China, i.e. party and nonparty news organisations, frame the ongoing Sino–US Trade War that broke out in March 2018. With a quantitative content analysis of 240 news reports sampled from four representative news organisations, including two party and another two nonparty outlets, the chapter can conclude that the two frames of Trade/Tariff Policy and Impact on the USA are most frequently used by the Chinese news organisations in their reporting of the Sino–US Trade War. This shows that when reporting on the Sino–US Trade War, the news media in China would usually address (1) the policies of either China or the USA in the bilateral trade and the potential political actions and remedies indicated by the policies and (2) the impact brought by the Sino–US Trade War on the USA’s macro-economy, society, industries, enterprises, etc. The use of the Peace/Compromise frame, the Impact on China frame, the Impact on the World frame, and the Strategic Game frame is much less. The Chinese news organisations’ utmost concern over the trading policies and the potential actions of the policies in the two countries reflects the urgent need for the state agencies and the public to understand the developments of the issue and the situations between the two sides. Besides, their enthusiasm in discussing the impact of the Trade War on the USA but less so on the impact on China implies their beliefs that the Trade War will have a greater impact on the USA than on China. Besides, the results on the tones used in the reports show that the Negativeto-the-USA tone and the Positive-to-China tone are most often used by Chinese news organisations. This further supports the fact that the Chinese news media are more confident that the Trade War will have less harm on China than on the USA. Considering that the news organisations in China are very likely receiving directives from the propaganda authorities on the reporting of the Sino–US Trade

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War, such perspectives could have also reflected the government’s thinking on the issue. More discussions on the impact of the Trade War on the USA and the significant use of the Negative-to-the-USA tone also reveal how the USA is portrayed by Chinese news organisations, which potentially contributes to the rise of nationalism in Chinese society. An analysis and comparison of the news reports by the party and nonparty news organisations also confirm that the two types of news media indeed show significant differences in the use of most frames and tones. Most notably, party news organisations significantly used more Trade/Tariff Policy frames and Impact on the World frames and less Impact on the USA and Impact on China frames than their nonparty counterparts. This could imply that the party news organisations, which are taken as the mouthpiece of the Party-state and the Chinese government, would want to focus more on the policies and impact on the world so as to mobilise more international support for the solving of the trade conflicts. The nonparty news organisations, on the other hand, are keener on discussing the possible impact on both countries, which would be more interesting to their audiences. This could reflect the fact that the nonparty news organisations are more commercialised and that they would want to attract more readership by highlighting the impact on China and the USA and less so on the impact on the world. The most striking differences between the party and nonparty news organisations were found in their use of the Negative-to-the-USA tone and the Positive-toChina tone. Despite that both tones are very often used by the two types of news organisations, party news organisations use much more the Negative-to-the-USA tone and the Positive-to-China tone. Such strong leaning of the tones favouring China over the USA reflects the more nationalistic nature of the party organs, which is however understandable due to their political affiliation.

Note 1 The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the publication of this chapter: Research Development Fund of Xi’an Jiaotong – Liverpool University [RDF-19-01-25].

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4

Soft power clashes? China in platform geopolitics Global aspirations and political struggles Alessandra Massa and Giuseppe Anzera

Soft power and online platforms: more than economics? Thirty years after publishing its first conceptualisation by Joseph Nye (1990), soft power has proved to be an instrument with a robust explanatory capacity in reading contemporary politics. Soft power suggests that the power of conditioning the international environment results from the wise use of non-material resources possessed or skilfully constructed by a state. Non-tangible elements, such as values, style of conducting foreign policies, and culture, act as catalysts for emulation by other states. Coercion is replaced by co-optation: other actors follow a state perceived as dominant because they wish to do so, while issues of collective interest arise from the modulation of agenda-setting – less visible the more influential the favoured actor (Nye, 1990, 2004, 2008). Players such as China have become globally visible. Accordingly, China has been able to imagine non-domestic zones of influence (including cultural ones) following its conspicuous economic rise. The actions of soft power diffusion (Glaser & Murphy, 2009; Hagström & Nordin, 2020; Kurlantzick, 2007; Nye, 2012; Wang, 2011) – particularly those that have affected areas of strategic interest (Gill, 2010) – have often seen the cultural dimension intertwined with economic interventions (Vlassis, 2016), transforming economic success into a lever of soft power. The immaterial spaces designed by online platforms are transformed into an arena to exercise soft power. Indeed, platforms become examples and agents of soft power when they represent success stories. Platforms are a hybrid: they affect the dimensions of culture and self-expression but have to do with business systems, generating full-fledged economic models (Srnicek, 2016). Finally, platforms regulate online public discourse even by soft power storytelling initiatives deriving from internal regulatory devices or external norms governing political communication (Cammaerts & Mansell, 2020). Therefore, we will explain how the transfer of soft power actions online is not always peaceful but contributes to revealing latent conflicts or transforming itself into a conflictual element. First, we will address the emerging conflict inscribed along the lines of publicity and privatisation that characterise the transfer of diplomatic actions – traditionally intended to advance states’ interests on behalf of a DOI: 10.4324/9781003261278-4

42 Alessandra Massa and Giuseppe Anzera community – in spaces governed by private interests. Furthermore, we will evaluate how this transfer of soft power functions re-proposes geopolitical formats and fractures configured as conflictual relations or hostilities. Through the analysis of a case study – the information operations promoted by the Chinese government on the micro-blogging platform Twitter – we will then describe how the governance of platforms is intertwined with states’ interests.

Online platforms, between publicity and privatisation: rethinking the geopolitical gaze An online platform is “a programmable architecture designed to organize interactions between users” (Van Dijck et al., 2018, p. 9). Platforms run on data retrieved from content and information posted by users. Furthermore, they rely on automated algorithms and interfaces that simplify their use. Finally, their subsistence is guaranteed by proprietary relationships that embrace specific business models, managed through user agreements (ibid.). The debate on the role of platforms is rich in contributions that emphasise their role as social infrastructure (Van Dijck, 2013), the weight of technological architectures (Plantin & Punathambekar, 2019), and the economic logic that influences the production of value (Andersson-Schwartz, 2017). Platforms are a powerful vehicle for articulating public values, allowing users to redefine individual expression and political claims (Van Dijck et al., 2018). While the academic analysis of the Chinese background is rich and includes broader platform definitions than those commonly used in Western scholarship (Davis & Xiao, 2021), the study of the Chinese Internet seems to attract resistant readings concerning globalisation and the transnational resilience to the homologating tendencies characterising contemporary platform societies, involving a dichotomous reading of the geopolitical order, characterised by “techno-orientalism, and methodological nationalism” (de Kloet et al., 2019, p. 250). Herold and De Seta (2015) noted that the failure to internationalise Internet research when studying the Chinese platform ecosystem signals a territorial closure and a search for analytical specificity that does not always occur when discussing the same phenomena in a Western location. Hong and Harwit (2020) argued that looking at the Internet would seem to reproduce Cold War logic, downplaying the role of the materiality of infrastructure or political economy. Platforms allow redrawing of the boundaries of nation-states since they act on the operations of protection or opening of information spaces (Chong, 2007). Moreover, platforms are expressions of a geographic context whose values reflect and trace dominant patterns of economic value production (Barbrook & Cameron, 1996; Marvick, 2013). Nevertheless, platforms claim to have no role in content production: as Gillespie (2018) argues, their commodity is mediation. However, this mediation is not always visible, and rarely is this mediation neutral (Pasquale, 2017): who designs the filters when they are automated? And in what capacity, and according to what criteria, are decisions made when mediation is the result of human intervention? Therefore, it is essential to analyse what

China in platform geopolitics 43 happens when soft power management occurs in environments ruled by private actors.

Geopolitics and platforms: the cartographies of online services The development of online platforms – considered as an economic agent and as a venue for the exercise of political power – has contributed to re-propose, in public and academic debate, some issues related to the geography of technological networks. The rise of platforms has nurtured global imaginaries, permeated by asymmetric and sticky logics that respond to specific models of international relations (Kwet, 2019). Jin (2013) has spoken of platform imperialism to describe the hegemonic character of US-based platforms. This trend would reflect the vital input of the US government in maintaining and promoting such a predominant role in global connective assets, tracing the emphasis on cultural devices as an elective tool in the diffusion of traditional soft power (Vlassis, 2021). This “hegemonic” dimension based on the success of scale economies acquires significance on both a formal and symbolic level. First, infrastructural platforms (Van Dijck et al., 2018) enable other programs to function and constitute an information ecosystem where users perform their everyday actions. Then, platforms act on users’ empowerment by directing forms of self-expression through their features. Finally, they respond to market forces, which they help create and characterise with a distinct capitalist imprint; platforms cannot be said to be neutral instruments or not politically charged. Indeed, platforms incorporate practical or ideological indications introduced by the subjects responsible for programming their functions. Platforms primarily pursue an economic intent, which develops within a political and ideological context, which they tend to export on an international level. Today, the condition of platform imperialism described in 2013 by Jin seems quite different. If the top ranking illustrated by the author saw the top ten of the most visited websites and applications (according to the ranking proposed by Alexa.com) populated mainly by websites of US origin, except for two Chinese websites, nowadays the situation seems to be reversed. The current top ranking is seen among the ten most visited sites globally, seven Chinese-origin websites, and only three US-origin websites (see Table 4.1). Indeed, Chinese web platforms and applications cover a wide range of functionalities: search, instant messaging, sales, and e-commerce characterise users’ activities who use Chinese platforms. However, the great leap forward of Chinese platforms highlights the astonishing growth of the domestic – or, at most, regional (Lee, 2018) – user base1 because few of the services of Chinese platforms can be said to be addressed to a global dimension. The most successful Chinese platforms are mainly market-driven, based on e-commerce or advertising, applying a capitalist approach (Zhang, 2020). Non-profit strategies and those aimed at emphasising the autonomous production of content by users are absent. The distribution of online platforms’ users traces the presence of a digital ecosystem separated by the Great Chinese Firewall, a digital space delimited by the strict rules of access (and censorship) to the Chinese platform market. This bifurcation has led to the creation of

44 Alessandra Massa and Giuseppe Anzera Table 4.1 Alexa’s top-ranking sites Ranking

Platform

Country of origin

Function

1 2 3 4 5 6

Google.com Youtube.com Tmall.com Qq.com Baidu.com Sohu.com

USA USA China China China China

7 8 9 10

Facebook.com Taobao.com 360.cn Jd.com

USA China China China

Search engine Content sharing B2C sales Instant messaging Search engine Advertising, search engine, online multiplayer gaming Social networking Sales Search engine Electronic commerce

Source: our elaboration from Alexa.com data (accessed: 11/10/2021).

two large blocks: one of Western inspiration groups’ platforms commonly known as GAFAM (Google-Alphabet, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft), while the other is mainly addressed to the Chinese market, represented by the platforms gathered under the acronym BAT (Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent) (De Kloet et al., 2019). In Keane and Yu’s (2019) definition, Chinese platforms are emblematic of a “digital empire in the making”: the Chinese platformed market results from a long history of entering markets that are either geographically adjacent or of strategic interest through the creation of physical infrastructure – as well exemplified by traditional Chinese soft power strategies. These infrastructures result from complex agreements between domestic Internet operators and the central government. They proved instrumental in creating a digital Silk Road, emphasising growth and economic success, and showcasing a model of inclusive globalisation facilitated by the spread of the Internet (Shen, 2018). Chinese entrepreneurs later focused on exporting Chinese for-profit technologies to create communication ecosystems. This operation is based on a diversification of markets: platforms such as Alibaba or Tencent mainly address a localised audience, and TikTok is now an established global player. In contrast, hardware device manufacturers such as Lenovo and Huawei try to build an integrated ecosystem (Keane & Yu, 2019). Keane and Wu (2018) argue that China’s strategy of going out is developed on three levels. The first level involves exporting goods and services and settles within a material dimension. The second level plays on a symbolic stage and transmits an ideology. Finally, the third level involves a relational activation, based on the presence abroad of Chinese delegations dedicated to foreign investments and integrated into academic or working networks. This strategy can work best when all three levels pursue the same objectives, which, in the Chinese case, often respond to the demands of the central government. The latter can intervene in platformisation processes through censoring or regulatory mechanisms, influencing their trajectories and outcomes (Hong, 2017). While governments may

China in platform geopolitics 45 be interested in promoting an ideology (Keane & Wu, 2018), platform operators let economic trajectories guide interactions. Entrepreneurs can look in different directions than the government, anticipate its moves, attempt unexpected mediations with non-traditional actors, or impose inadvertent accelerations with platform features (Keane, 2016). As a result, platforms can become part of the delicate international equilibrium, affecting competitive structures based on economics and cultural hegemonies.

Platform struggles: presences and competitive markets Market penetration through platforms takes on traits of political competition. On the one hand, there are the rules and customs of the countries of origin. But, on the other hand, the laws of the host countries bind companies that – in an economy of scale – compete in global markets and, thanks to their sometimes almost-monopolistic power, are little inclined to respond to external solicitations, especially when these clash with their public presentability or invalidate their expertise, as proved by the Google entry in China. In 2006, Google landed in China.2 In agreement with the US Congress, the search engine established as a condition for its permanence in China the presence of a reference to the .com version of Google (without censorship) for each page with the .cn domain. Things started to get worse for Google in 2009 when the Chinese staff received requests from Li Changchun. Media reports claim that, as Minister of Propaganda and member of the Politburo, Changchun, during a trip abroad, searched for his name on Google: the search results were considered unflattering and harmful to his figure (Epstein, 2010). For this reason, the Chinese politician asked the search engine to remove the links to Google.com from the Chinese version, as these links were considered illegal. The platform, therefore, explained that eliminating the links would be a violation of the agreements made with Congress, going to the extent of declaring that it would have preferred to exit the Chinese market rather than carry out such an operation. The Chinese government perceived Google as a tool piloted by the USA to force political change in China (Griffiths, 2019) and started accusing Google of being permissive with the filters that prevent the accessibility of pornographic content. At the same time, YouTube, the video-sharing platform based on Google’s architecture, was finally shut down for showing police violence after demonstrations in Tibet. Google suffered a series of suspensions while technical inconveniences slowed down users’ access to the search engine, pushing them to use Chinese alternatives. Within Mountain View company, then, voices of scepticism (including that of Sergey Brin, Google’s co-founder) about the efficacy of the compromises to maintain Google’s presence in China were increasingly frequent. Minor cultural adjustments could be sold to international public opinion as concessions to market logic. However, censorship pressures did not lend themselves well to public presentability and branding strategies in all those markets where freedom of expression was constitutionally guaranteed, emphasising the domestic political

46 Alessandra Massa and Giuseppe Anzera and reputational risks that come with foreign expansion strategies, sometimes unsustainable even by hi-tech giants (Stevens et al., 2015). Also, in 2009, Google discovered a hacking attack on its security systems. The company’s public statements link the significant breaches to the company’s networks, known as Operation Aurora, to the People Liberation Army. These events led Google to leave China due to the difficulties of mediation between Beijing’s demands, the US government’s distrust of attempts at dialogue between one of the companies considered as the “spearhead” among domestic hi-tech corporations, and a potential geopolitical opponent. At the same time, Google’s adventures show how necessary it is to cultivate diplomatic skills for companies that must compromise with different instances by following languages other than profit (Sheehan, 2018). Almost simultaneously with Google’s withdrawal decision, the then-US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, delivered a speech that launched Internet Freedom3 policies. This speech, focusing on the importance of network technologies for global connections, highlights the US administration’s view that the Internet is a powerful amplifier of political ties. In the Clintonian rhetoric, the USA aims to carve out a leading role in the diffusion and the liberal imprinting cultivated in such technologies. As the Secretary of State puts it, “as the birthplace for so many of these technologies, including the Internet itself, we have a responsibility to see them used for good.” Thus, targeting network technologies involves a process of mutual reinforcement of governmental wishes and corporate choices. Indeed, Clinton argues that “US companies are making the issue of Internet and information freedom a greater consideration in their business decisions.” Likewise, Chinese platforms are characterised by the desire to cultivate a central role in the domestic market and attempt to penetrate foreign markets despite mistrust. Platformed competition responds to a simple assumption: states support platforms that insist primarily on their territories, and conflicting fault lines are expressed concerning the dominance of “territorial” platforms. Commercial “guerrilla warfare” has affected the entry of Chinese players into the US market, as occurred in the harsh confrontation that opposed the US government to the platform TikTok. The platform allows for short videos that can quickly reach plenty of users (it is estimated that the platform registers 1 billion users) (Iqbal, 2021), thanks to the logic of popularity (Van Dijck & Poell, 2013). TikTok is controlled by a Chinese group, the ByteDance company, and the US government has repeatedly stated that it would work to amplify the wishes of the Chinese Communist Party, as it is “committed to promoting the CCP’s agenda and messaging” (Paul, 2020). In addition, TikTok and the instant messaging app WeChat would possess US user data, which the Chinese government would use for cataloguing and recognition operations. The verbal outcries were followed by executive order promulgated on August 6, 2020, by Donald Trump. The US president stated that TikTok and WeChat would be prevented from processing transactions from US users. In addition, apps would no longer be allowed to be downloaded from US app stores upon enactment. In a subsequent executive order promulgated on August 14, 2020, Trump

China in platform geopolitics 47 threatened that TikTok would be banned outright if not sold to a US company by November 14. However, the orders launched by the Trump administration never went into effect, blocked first by an injunction promulgated by a judge in the US district court for the District of Columbia and then by the June 2021 withdrawal of the orders by Trump’s successor, Joe Biden (Friefeld & Shepardson, 2021). Nonetheless, the TikTok affair has helped to clarify how, despite the generalised belief that sees the Internet as a potential destroyer of geographies and platforms as operators capable of dictating rules of homogenisation in cultural production (Nieborg & Poell, 2018) and in the strategy of producing politically relevant content, the boundaries of states still matter. Then, the conflicts of soft power settle within various intersecting directions: Google’s events in China exemplify how the platforms’ pursuit of (at least seemingly) ethical business draws them as morally connoted operators striving to extend domestic values such as openness and transparency. On the other hand, platforms and the narratives surrounding their rise, as in the case of TikTok’s entry into the US media market and consumption habits, are subject to issues involving classic hard power themes, such as economic sanctions and threats of exclusion. The behaviour of governments in dealing with platforms (Van Dijck, 2021) shows how their governance (Gorwa, 2019), following the “standard” definition of soft power as the imposition of normative values and formulation of management policies that can trace the character of a state, is a litmus test of the weakness of state institutions only when the liability of local operators accompanies this. Identifying “domestic” platforms allows states to exploit such players as soft power instruments: both when they are used as pathfinders for international openness and when their access is foreclosed and their development is curbed.

To moderate China’s story well: Twitter, China, and the rise of platformed diplomacy Online platforms have become the favoured scenario for the new practices of digital diplomacy. Platforms present themselves as an ideal place for managing outward-looking activities, responding to the realist need to advance one’s goals pragmatically while intervening in the constructivist definition of the international reality, allowing states to interact on symbolic self-representation. While digital diplomacy can be considered as the use of digital media to convey diplomatic initiatives, academic literature, reports by specialised think tanks, and professionals’ testimonies provide several definitions of the phenomenon. These definitions can concentrate on the description of the updated practices of diplomacy in the digital environment, as described by the so-called public diplomacy 2.0 (Cull, 2013), on the novelty of media and tools used in contemporary Twiplomacy (Šimunjak & Caliandro, 2019), or on the relational activation suggested by the networked diplomacy idea (Zaharna et al., 2013). Since they involve both the promotion of the national image and international information management, these hybrid operations are driven by visibility

48 Alessandra Massa and Giuseppe Anzera management. The filters that make the nature of information explicit in online platforms tend to become thinner or thicker, depending on the actors’ capabilities and their ability to camouflage. In the transition to the digital environment, invisible filters tend to increase. Filters imposed by platforms are based on technological components hidden from end-users (Gillespie, 2018); some other filters consent to enhance strategies based on computational propaganda (Wolley & Howard, 2018), aiming to hide political identities. China has begun to plan its positioning on all those Western platforms that have preferred not to bypass China’s Great Firewall, given the strict rules defining China’s information space. Western platforms’ strategical occupation also stems from the desire to orient public discourse by promoting strategic narratives (Miskimmon et al., 2014). These narratives inscribe the Chinese rise within the scenarios of international politics, refocusing the public gaze on the past, mitigating the perception of a competitive presence, and understanding future Chinese actions (Harting, 2015; Lams, 2018; Van Noort, 2017). Part of the attention of Chinese diplomacies and political actors in sharing narratives to reshape international political framing (Mintz & Redd, 2003; Szostek, 2020) stems from a broader centralised governmental strategy to tell China’s story well. According to President Xi Jinping’s vision, Chinese media and representatives must show a multidimensional picture of China, strengthening Chinese soft power (Jacob, 2020). At the same time, Chinese political elites are engaging in public diplomacy actions – consisting of peremptory statements on online platforms, mainly Twitter4 – defined as wolf warrior diplomacy (Martin, 2021). This kind of diplomacy is characterised by a bold and assertive style, committed to publicly defending Chinese interests by adopting aggressive dialogical forms (Zhu, 2020), and is driven by recognising an explicit and forceful political presence. National identification is simultaneously a driver and an expected outcome of these actions. As trends described by transformative diplomacy (Duncombe, 2017) suggest, online platforms allow for the objectification of conflicts by creating frames that help crystallise confrontations in public opinion. Moreover, these diplomatic incursions into online platforms popularise non-canonical languages, such as irony and insults, contributing to the polarisation of political positions. Alongside these explicit presences, journalistic reports and public releases from the platforms have revealed how China has taken advantage of the faults of online platforms – such as the possibility to intervene in programmability (Van Dijck & Poell, 2013) and algorithmic manipulation – for automated information operations aimed at distributing propaganda (Woolley & Howard, 2017). Similar operations involved globally distributed information about the protests in Hong Kong and the dissemination of politically oriented news during the crisis due to COVID-19 aimed at European audiences. However, Twitter is interested in shaping the rules that draw the boundaries of debate allowed within the platform’s framework. Platform’s corporate policies and public statements define the possibilities of international political actors. Twitter’s engagement can be explained in two ways. On the one hand, the platform has gained, over the years, an internationalist vocation due, above all, to the

China in platform geopolitics 49 role that Twitter played during the Arab Spring (Bruns et al., 2013; Comunello & Anzera, 2012). The other reason has to do with public presentability, whereby the care of the information space is part of the branding strategies of a platform that has, over time, acquired a reputation as a venue where (international) events happen. The interaction strategies with state actors established through the modulation of terms of service and moderation rules are part of broader trends concerning deplatforming: platform operators determine the limitations of presence while establishing their primacy as managers and gatekeepers of the platformed ecosystems (Van Dijck et al., 2021). Such a commitment implies a selection of the voices admitted to the international political debate: in this way, platform operators design their soft power, indicating a normative, stylistic, and formal framework to which they must conform to the pain of exclusion. Specifically, Twitter has undertaken two impactful initiatives on international political communication. The first concerns the labelling operations through which the platform identifies some accounts’ state affiliation. According to Twitter policies, these labels “provide additional context” while recognising the accounts controlled by governments. Many accounts are considered for their political nature: there are those accounts considered “the official voice of the nation-state abroad,” like foreign ministers, ambassadors, and diplomatic leaders, as they are “heavily engaged in geopolitics and diplomacy.” Conversely, if foreign leaders use Twitter for personal use, they are not labelled government officials.5 While guidelines about identifying government-affiliated accounts are clear, the platform does not state equally clearly the reason “why some accounts are labeled and others not” (Schliebs et al., 2021, p. 9). The second initiative concerns disclosure operations involving information manipulation, like bots and automated mechanisms to simulate movements of opinion or saturate the debate on specific topics with misleading or politically oriented information. Through a statement published on its blog (Twitter Safety, 2019), Twitter announced, in August 2019, the identification of 936 accounts engaged in carrying out a coordinated strategy of manipulating information about the protests that were taking place in Hong Kong. The monitoring of IP addresses undertaken by the platform showed how part of this coordinated traffic, mainly aimed at discrediting the protesters and their political claims, was coming from China, where, however, the platform is blocked for ordinary users. If part of the information flow came from accounts with access to VPNs, other accounts came from unblocked IP addresses located in China, suggesting the participation of digital vanguards in operations to defend and project the national image during disputes affecting the international environment. Compared to other platforms, Twitter presents clear guidelines facing automated content. According to Marechal (2016), policy formulation concerns human rights: even if platforms are not required to care about collective wellbeing, their affirmation as spaces in which citizens’ opinions are expressed, stirred by their technical features, would impose particular attention on their regulation. However, Twitter’s detailed policy has much more to do with the material dimension than the ideal one: regulatory guidelines aim to meet the

50 Alessandra Massa and Giuseppe Anzera favour of advertising, while issues affecting ordinary users do not always violate community standards (Marechal, 2016). Twitter attributes automated manipulation primarily to technical matters explaining why it applied the “information operation” frame to these initiatives. More than the contents of the tweets, the concerted and non-transparent nature of the operations undermines the rules of engagement through which the platform hosts the accounts. These examples illustrate how states and platforms adopt realist and constructivist approaches to managing and controlling diplomatic activities. The realist vision (Waltz, 2008) is goal-oriented and aimed at profit or advancing selfish interests. Thus, states mainly utilise online platforms to saturate the information space by introducing strategically relevant content to pursue political goals. Platforms are interested in keeping active controversial accounts. Political elites seem, at times, to escape the rules of moderation to which ordinary users are subjected, as platforms can present themselves as a place where debate takes place. On the constructivist front (Wendt, 1992), all those interventions aim to act on the understanding of international politics, even in dialogical and relational forms, defining polarities and characterisation of the actors. States, through their narratives, aim to intervene in the interpretations of global reality by coordinating movements that rely on the naturalisation and normalisation of knowledge. Platforms exercise their soft power in information management as they intervene in “extended” media systems. Content-sharing platforms take on an infrastructural dimension (Plantin et al., 2016). They induce trans-local and diverse systems to integrate with the national systems, sometimes centralised and widely accessible for most users insisting on a specific territory (Graham & Marvin, 2001). However, this essentialisation does not necessarily correspond to empowerment, as platform operators hope to maintain their status as (monopolists) private actors. In this context, the values concerning freedom of information and self-expression are metaphorical dimensions proving the “ethical” functioning of information systems in the light of the pressures that different media systems (Hallin & Mancini, 2004) must face because of globalisation and the increasing complexity of media ecologies (Hallin, 2020). An almost bidirectional path is traced. Media environments can no longer be interpreted as a closed box with rigid national boundaries since platforms cross borders by vocation. Conversely, it cannot be assumed that national actors with political and competitive intentions keep themselves out of non-national media environments. In this sense, interference can come in different forms, responding to two models of narratives fuelling soft power: 1. Benevolent self-representation, in which the commercial vocation of the platforms is fully recognised since the codes to which states’ presence conform are those of a non-chauvinist aggregator rather than the ones representing polarising political marketing; 2. Aggressive saturation of the information space, where the tendency of platforms to become a “no man’s land” with vague regulations and frameworks transforms them into territories of conquest by interested players.

China in platform geopolitics 51 Both models have possibilities in winning the information race: there are states which succeed in responding to the commercial vocation, while others react to the paradox of authoritarianism (Kreps, 2020), for which it is precisely those states that are less accustomed to democratic management of information are better able to exploit platforms’ features to spread their messages.

A geopolitical approach to platform ecosystems The geopolitical approach implies that states are searching for resources (physical or intangible) that will ensure their survival: when Internet politics comes into play, then, one must assess “why and how states compete to shape policies, technologies, and norms that structure the role of the internet in society” (Powers & Jablonski, 2015, p. 5). As Carr (2016, p. 1) argues, technologies are seen as a “constitutive and material element of state power” when considering a traditional international relations approach. In this contribution, we interpreted the notion of technology as an artefact (such as online platforms) that enables people and organisations to do some things. At the same time, the complex geopolitical and informational ecosystem designed by platforms helps to unveil the tension between technologies and sovereignty. Technologies allow different actors to organise and create oppositional movements, while platform operators design territorialities that transcend individual states’ control of the information space. Moreover, technologies disrupt the relationships between micro, meso, and macro (Rosenau, 1990), creating networks where ties (including economic ones) complicate traditional security issues. Carr (2016) claims that the Internet influences a state’s power by amplifying its possibilities in the international arena or creating new opportunities to challenge power or intrude into domestic political spaces. However, the Internet challenges state power in complex ways depending on how the state attempts to control the processes of digitalisation and platformisation through regulatory or political strategies. According to the classic literature on international relations, technologies can be analysed using two main approaches (ibid.). On the one hand, a realist approach can be identified. Technologies can be considered a dimension of the industrial age, tending to be neutral and goal-oriented. On the other hand, a second approach moves within the guidelines of the information society and sees technologies as an expression and tool with which to build forms of social power (Van Ham, 2010): intrinsic values can characterise technologies, which eventually influence how states engage in representational operations and relationship building. These visions are even more complicated when looking at platforms: these can be understood as user-friendly tools that allow actors to perform actions – from the most basic level, such as dissemination of information, to the ones involving security. At the same time, platforms have the power to manage visibility. However, platforms cannot be considered neutral: their economic orientation determines their strategies, while platforms’ values define the setting of actions granted to a state and, sometimes, limit its possibilities. Moreover, the governance

52 Alessandra Massa and Giuseppe Anzera of platforms, meant as economic actors and cultural promoters, is directly affected by national legislation, which platforms can pragmatically choose to disregard or submit to. Thus, complex evaluations involve financial aspects, user expectations, the stickiness of platforms understood as a “place to be,” and platform operators’ ethical and political presentability. Finally, accesses and exits re-propose conflictual lines in which the aspects of economic sovereignty (and, in some cases, of longed “technological autarchy”) seem to be nothing more than the re-proposition of conflictual elements that trace a geopolitical vision characterised by the emphasis on competitive fractures. Intended as an infrastructure, the Internet should be considered an open space characterised by interoperability (Plantin et al., 2016). O’Hara and Hall (2018) describe patterns of Internet regulation, which influence the relationships between states and commercial actors as online platforms, echoing distinctive features of states. The ideology that permeates the US Internet oscillates between openness to Silicon Valley’s disruptive innovations and Washington’s political decisions in defence of profit. The Chinese nature of the Internet space, on the other hand, is peculiar in terms of control and surveillance. This model promotes its technological giants, configured as private companies, but operates in a controlled framework where the government sets the standards (O’Hara & Hall, 2018). When moving abroad, Chinese tech companies prove to be entrepreneurial and bold. It is assumed that they will be able to rely on domestic characteristics to score competitive advantages in the development of artificial intelligence-related technologies (Lee, 2018). These two conflicting models – the US model, based on laissez-faire and the apparent de-politicisation of technologies; and the Chinese model, based on the centralisation and functionality of politically oriented technologies – signal two soft power strategies, both referred to the competitive relationships established in market economies. The US soft power focuses on the global branding of its products, reflecting ideologies and values in their economic success. The Chinese soft power, in turn, sees in its platforms the outposts of economic growth and a model of political management of technologies. These models are not necessarily destined to clash: the rules of profit will see future relations settle within regimes of mutual tolerance, at least if the entrances to digital markets do not end up affecting sensitive issues that pertain to political-normative regulation and value attitudes, such as freedom of expression and censorship, surveillance and privacy, autonomy and control.

Notes 1 At the end of 2020, estimated Internet access was approximately 989 million people, up from 617 million in 2013 (Statista, 2021). 2 The periodization follows Griffiths (2019). Given the contemporary nature of the events described in the following paragraphs in text, some of the reconstructions presented derive from journalistic reports. When available, these reconstructions will be corroborated by academic literature.

China in platform geopolitics 53 3 Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks on Internet Freedom, https://2009-2017.state.gov/ secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/01/135519.htm (accessed 12/10/2021). 4 A report by Oxford Internet Institute (Schliebs et al. 2021) estimates that there are at least 189 Chinese diplomatic accounts on Twitter. 5 Quoted excerpts are taken from the post published by the Twitter Help Center “About government and state-affiliated media accounts on Twitter,” https://help.twitter.com/en /rules-and-policies/state-affiliated-china.

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5

Competing narratives of the Xinjiang question and China-West geopolitical rivalry Chi Zhang

Ethnic conflicts in Xinjiang Xinjiang is home to 11.62 million Uyghurs, which constitute 44.96% of the total population in Xinjiang (Consulate-General of the People’s Republic of China, 2021). Uyghur separatism and religiously inspired extremism are blamed to be the driving force behind political unrest in Xinjiang. The 2009 Urumqi Riots were an outburst of long-simmering Uyghur–Han conflicts that killed 197 and injured 1721 (Hu & Lei, 2009; W. Shan, 2021). Despite the Chinese Communist Party’s crackdowns, terrorist cases surged in 2013 and 2014, resulting in the enactment of the sweeping Anti-Terrorism Law in 2015. Since then, terrorist attacks have occurred only sparingly. Before the “re-education camps” in Xinjiang became widely known in 2018, Uyghur activists and separatists have been seeking to internationalise their cause for decades (Chen, 2013; Clarke, 2010). Clarke highlights the impact of 9/11 on the elevation of the Uyghur issue to an international issue (Clarke, 2010, p. 224). Indeed, China has quickly adjusted its official narratives to align with the Global War on Terror and advocate the legitimacy of its People’s War on Terror (Rodríguez-Merino, 2019). While the Maoist “People’s War” has been used in previous domestic mass mobilisation campaigns, the current “People’s War on Terror” has effectively allowed the CCP to internationalise its domestic crackdown on the Uyghur separatist movements. Much research has been done on ethnic conflicts in Xinjiang. Given the close cultural and linguistic ties between Uyghurs and their Turkic neighbours in Central Asia as well as Turkey, researchers working outside China have long questioned China’s “continual rule” over the region (for example Gladney, 1991; Millward, 2006). The Chinese authorities consider “pan-Turkism” and “panIslamism” the main external factors that have caused ethnic conflicts in the region (Pan & Hu, 2011). The location of Xinjiang is of strategic importance as it sits in the crucial passageway for the Belt and Road Initiative (Hayes, 2020). Xinjiang is susceptible to other regional conflicts, such as China–India skirmishes that further stirred nationalism in both countries since 2020, terrorist attacks in Pakistan, and the tumbling turbulence in Afghanistan following the withdrawal of the US forces in August 2021. DOI:  10.4324/9781003261278-5

Competing narratives of the Xinjiang question 59 Internal central–local dynamics and unequal levels of development between the Uyghurs and the Han, and the assimilationist integration policies have reinforced Uyghurs’ awareness of their distinct ethno-nationalist identity (Cappelletti, 2020; Clarke, 2007). The dominance of the Han in Xinjiang, as a result of an unwelcome state-orchestrated migration from other provinces to the region in the 1950s – along with other assimilationist cultural and language policies – has convinced some scholars that Xinjiang has been “colonized” through the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) (Cliff, 2009; Millward, 2000; Sautman, 2000; Seymour, 2000). Within the frame of coloniality, the assistance that Beijing has directed from other provinces to Xinjiang has been viewed with suspicion, and a large number of resources poured into the region for economic development and poverty alleviation have also been evaluated through the lens of “civilising mission” (Hayes, 2020). This decolonial approach moved the discussion from religious extremism to an ethno-nationalist call for independence. The support for Uyghurs’ cause towards independence is manifested through tiny but significant challenges to the official Chinese narratives and framing, for example, Uyghur activists and decolonial scholars replacing “Xinjiang” with “East Turkestan,” and refusing to refer to Uyghurs as merely an ethnic minority in China (Millward, 2021). While Uyghurs are Muslims by religion, Uyghur separatists are not necessarily religiously motivated to establish a caliphate. Gladney’s (2003) observation – that some of their claims are secular and their demands go beyond religious freedom – still stands today. The increased exposure of the Uyghur issue, made visible by years of lobbying (see Chen, 2013) and financial support from such organisations as the National Endowment for Democracy, has come to contest the CCP’s narratives of harmonious Uyghur–Han relations. The official Chinese frames about the “truth” in Xinjiang, now increasingly underpinned by state-controlled nationalism, have had limited impacts on winning over international audiences, especially members of the Uyghur diaspora (Culpepper, 2012).

The accusation of genocide and the CCP’s responses With a few scholars’ endorsements of the accusation of genocide (Ondřej & Smith Finley, 2020), what happened in Xinjiang quickly became a flashpoint in the anti-China sentiments that have been exacerbated since the outbreak of COVID-19. Much of the initial and empirical research that has underpinned the genocide accusation is conducted by Adrian Zenz, a central figure in the entire Uyghur controversies in the context of US–China rivalry. His hawkish position and biblical, anti-LGBT worldview have been explored in The Wall Street Journal (Chin, 2019) and The Grayzone (Singh & Blumenthal, 2019). His affiliation with the Victims of Communist Memorial Foundation (VOC) gives a hint of his stance against communist regimes. While these backgrounds alone might still be insufficient to discredit his research, his methodology that has led to the estimation of one million detainees based on very limited and ideologically biased primary sources has

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been challenged by Singh and Blumenthal (2019). They argue that Zenz’s estimation of “over 1 million” is based on “a single report by Istiqlal TV, a Uyghur exile media organization based in Turkey” that “advances the separatist cause.” A regular guest on Istiqlal TV is Abdulkadir Yapuquan, leader of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), whose “interviews often extended into hours-long emotional tirades against China” (Farooq, 2019). ETIM is listed as a terrorist organisation by such intergovernmental organisations including the UN (United Nations Security Council Subsidiary Organs, 2014), the EU (Official Journal of the European Union, 2012) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2005). It was once recognised by the USA (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2004) and the UK (Home Office, 2017; Reuters Staff, 2016) as a terrorist organisation. However, the USA removed it from its list of terrorist groups in 2020 as Sino–US relations deteriorated (AFP in Washington, 2020). Zenz’s corroborating evidence comes from Radio Free Asia (RFA), a US government-funded news agency. Radio Free Europe, based on which RFA is established, played a significant role in spreading anti-communist propaganda in Soviet satellite states, which contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union (Nekola, 2014). These sources, according to Singh and Blumenthal, are ideologically charged and draw on pre-existing anti-CCP sentiments. Reinforcing Beijing’s image as the perpetrator of the suffering of Uyghurs is the recent international concern about forced labour in the region (Lehr, 2020). In February 2020, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) based in Canberra published a report, entitled “Uyghurs for sale,” accusing the Chinese government of using Uyghurs as forced labour “in the supply chains of at least 82 wellknown global brands in the technology, clothing and automotive sectors” (Xu et al., 2020, p. 3). ASPI receives funding from the Australian government, the US Department and military contractors (ASPI, 2021). The ASPI report identified over 380 detention centres, which have been refuted in a Global Times article, citing Eljan Anayt, spokesperson of the Xinjiang regional government (Global Times, 2020). While the Global Times’ counter-narratives did not successfully whitewash the detention centres, the ASPI report was also questioned because of its ties with the military–industrial complex (Robin, 2020). Several state- and semi-state actors played a role in the designation of genocide. On 19 January 2021, the then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced on Twitter that “I have determined that the People’s Republic of China is committing genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang” (McGoey, 2021). Two months later, on 8 March, Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy (NISP), founded in 2019 and based in Washington DC, published “The Uyghur Genocide: An Examination of China’s Breaches of the 1948 Genocide Convention,” co-produced with the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights. The report claims to be the “first independent expert application of the 1948 Genocide Convention to the ongoing treatment of the Uyghurs in China,” arriving at “clear and convincing” conclusions about China’s breaches of the Convention.

Competing narratives of the Xinjiang question 61 In addition to forced labour, the labelling of China’s treatment of Uyghurs as “genocide” has been backed up by Adrian Zenz with details about sterilisations, IUDs and mandatory birth control (Zenz, 2020a). The genocide accusation provoked a backlash from the CCP which vented its anger towards scholars. For example, Jo Smith Finley, the author of “Why Scholars and Activists Increasingly Fear a Uyghur Genocide in Xinjiang,” was sanctioned together with other critics of Beijing (Global Times, 2021). Some scholars raised questions about the rigour of the genocide accusation. Gordon Dumoulin, Jan Oberg and Thore Vestby published an article entitled, “A Critical Analysis of a Report by The Newlines Institute and The Raoul Wallenberg Center.” Their article was published by the Sweden-based Transnational Foundation for Peace & Future Research (TFF) established in 1986 and funded by various donors, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1991–1999), Stockholm (Gordon Dumoulin et al., 2021). They pointed out that all those who have contributed to “The Uyghur Genocide” report are either Westerners or based in Western institutions and that the genocide accusation is primarily based on secondary sources and West-based news agencies and thus lacks compelling evidence to prove the genocide. They found that the evidence, for example, those presented by the Xinjiang Victims Base, were collected through questionable methods from unverifiable sources. They argued that the one-sided presentation of evidence, the biased selection of political and ideological sources – “Christian fundamentalism + hawkish U.S. foreign policy + Muslim Brotherhood circles (Ahmed Alwani) + extreme anti-Communism + pro-Israel circles + the human rights political machinery (in favour of pro-war/humanitarian intervention),” and the Sinophobic portrayal of China in Western media have undermined the credibility of the genocide accusation. They also challenged the validity of the leaked 403-page documents which, with little corroboration, constituted evidence of China’s genocidal intent towards Uyghurs. Their efforts to question the credibility of the genocide thesis were later reported by People’s Daily Online, with a photo of a Uyghur happily chatting with his smiling neighbours (Jun, 2021). While the authors were not commissioned by the Chinese propaganda apparatus, they were all involved in engagement with China. Gordon Dumoulin is a “Beijingbased Dutch educator and a proponent of cultural-cultural competence” (Bhaya, 2020). Jan Oberg is one of the founders of TFF, a “peace researcher, mediator and peace commentator” (FarsNews Agency, 2021). Thore Vestby is a former member of the Norwegian Parliament and “co-founder of Ichi Fund, which is aiming at facilitating cooperation in education and culture among the Belt and Road countries” (Nordic Chinese Communication, 2017). Given all three authors adopted a “pro-engagement” approach to China to varying degrees, their critique against the genocide thesis has inevitably been used by the Chinese state as part of its narratives. International audiences may find attempts to challenge the stories of victims difficult to accept, because those who dare to speak up made a great sacrifice by reliving their trauma. However, it is also true that fake images and videos of Uyghur persecution have been circulating. For example, in an interview with

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Daniel Dumbrill, Uyghur activist Arslan Hidayat acknowledged his mistake in retweeting a video of a Uyghur girl, falsely claiming she was crying because she was experiencing separation anxiety from being separated from her mother who was detained (Dumbrill, 2020). There have been several cases of photos and videos being misused or taken out of context, as well as the use of “troll” accounts, to evidence China’s brutality (see Genries, 2020; Özel, 2020). Given the global attention on the issue, the monetisable traffic generated by posing these fake materials provides extra economic incentives in addition to political ones. However, the circulation of fake torturing materials in the attempt to bring attention only serves to undermine the credibility of real testimonies. It is worth noting that several non-Chinese “vloggers” living in China have echoed the official Chinese narratives and shown their trips to Xinjiang and how “easy it is to make you look like some kind of concentration camp” (CGTN, 2021a). These include, for example, Jason Lightfoot (British), the father-and-son team channel Barrett run by Lee and Oli (British), Daniel Dumbrill (Canadian), Noel Lee (Singaporean) and Fernando Munoz (known as FerMuBe on YouTube, Colombian) (Here! Dongguan Staff, 2021). Despite their denial of receiving funding from the CCP, the fact that they have been interviewed by the Chinese Global Television Network (CGTN) has made them suspicious in the eyes of Western media such as the BBC (see Allen & Williams, 2021). Such a suspicion is further reinforced by the heavy censorship of content that criticises the Chinese authorities. The above two examples indicate a tendency whereby the Chinese state has been gathering fragmented, ad-hoc efforts in the English-language public discourse that consciously or unwittingly aligned with China’s interests. This move corroborates China’s evolving strategy to present itself as a benign actor in the international community, vis-à-vis a threat. However, as these actors gravitated towards the Chinese official narratives, they also risk losing their legitimacy in the eyes of Western audiences. For example, the Grayzone is not funded by the Chinese state, but since its founder, Max Blumenthal, has become close to the official Chinese position, he has been discredited as having “a hardline anti-imperialist ideology and a deep-seated antagonism towards U.S. interventionist foreign policy,” which is consistent with his sympathy towards the Assad regime and Venezuela’s political leader Nicolas Maduro (Thompson, 2020). These non-state actors became the “useful idiots” for the CCP – a label originally given to Western admirers of the Soviet Union (Atkinson, 2021). As the discussions over the Xinjiang question have moved from human rights violations to proposed solutions, claims of mass internment, forced labour, forced serialisation, systematic rape and birth control became a shortcut that reduces China’s counter-radicalisation policy in Xinjiang to another “Holocaust” (Chamas, 2021; Zenz, 2020b). This strategy of “naming and shaming” has effectively achieved the intended goal to garner the public’s attention. However, rather than inducing compliance, the shaming of China by equating it with the Nazis is conditioned by the currently intensifying US–China geopolitical relationship, and the designation and the subsequent calls to action may cause further retribution (see Terman & Voeten, 2018). While human rights violations have become a

Competing narratives of the Xinjiang question 63 consensus among critics, some hesitate to compare China’s treatment of Uyghurs to the kind of genocide that happened in Nazi Germany and Rwanda. This comparison has four implications. First, the genocide designation without sufficient legal evidence obscures the scale of the problem (Lynch, 2021). The overuse of the term in some cases and genocide denial in others (Bloxham, 2006) undermines the objectivity of the term, rendering it an empty political label. Given the high threshold for proving the genocidal intent (Richardson, 2021) and the absence of evidence of industrial-scale extermination (Fiskesjö, 2021), the genocide allegation has so far only led to dead-end discussions. Second, the pressure imposed on the academia to explicate their political stance, in other words, to “choose sides,” normalises political bias and forestalls critical engagement with the source materials. Consciously or unwittingly, scholars are lending themselves to geopolitical manoeuvring. While research is always political from a Coxian perspective as “theory is always for someone and for some purpose” (Cox, 1981, p. 128 emphasis in original), active pursuit of political bias precludes effective engagement with key players in the game. As genocide and crimes against humanity constitute the ground for intervention within the framework of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), these allegations have direct political implications for geopolitical manoeuvring, considering how previous cases of intervention have been politicised. Third, before sufficient evidence can be gathered, labelling China as a Nazilike evil regime reinforces the CCP’s claims about the presumption of guilt and, therefore, makes it difficult to engage the Chinese intellectuals and public who are the main driving force capable of shaping policies from within. The namingand-shaming strategy feeds into China’s claim about the “ulterior motives” of some people in the West to contain China from rising to compete with the USA, thus bolstering its legitimacy at least among its nationalist supporters, instead of inflicting political damage. Fourth, the comparison reduces the complex realities in Xinjiang to a set of symbols. In the Holocaust literature, the Holocaust “has become a metonym … a signifier for, among other things, the Nazi genocidal campaign against the Jews; the reign of evil upon the face of the earth and the rationale for the existence of the State of Israel” (Tal, 1996, pp. 6–7). Similarly, what happened in Xinjiang has been reduced to “a set of symbols that reflect the formal codification of that experience” (Tal, 1996, p. 6). As a result, the genocide allegation has been made so indisputable by an overwhelming number of reports and the subsequent sanctions, that the slightest challenge to the “genocide” accusation would be dismissed as poor scholarship and/or sympathy towards the Chinese state. The intolerance for nuanced research impairs the understanding of local complexities which require evidence-based and long-term research.

Geopolitical competitions Notwithstanding the divergences within “the West” and China respectively, the current political climate is ideologically divided where the confrontations between

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declining liberal democracies and rising authoritarian states foreshadow a New Cold War on multiple fronts, including the US–China trade war, but also tensions between China and other liberal democracies, such as the new trilateral security pact between the USA, the UK, and Australia, the UK’s ban of Huawei’s 5G kit, the detention of Meng Wanzhou by Canada and deteriorating tensions between China and Australia. The issue of human rights has become a key talk point for distinguishing “us” from “them” in what is likely to be the pre-war mobilisation period retrospectively. The US–China rivalry is an important context for the discussions over the Xinjiang question. Without this context, the blame games will lead to dead-end discussions as neither the USA nor China is completely exempt from poor human rights records in their histories. Tracing the origins of those who accused and defended China, in addition to concerted efforts from state-funded organisations, such as CGTN and ASPI, the Internet provides various platforms where non-state actors made ad-hoc efforts to evidence their respective views. However, these efforts, even though initially made spontaneously, inevitably became concurrent with the official narratives and were subsequently dismissed as promoting the official agenda. The missing middle ground for those who can communicate with both sides coincides with polarisation, creating a situation where discussions and condemnations are increasingly confined to like-minded groups. This environment has been driving people away from balanced analyses. As Heerten and Moses (2014, p. 171) describe, in their attempt to historicise the discourse about the Nigeria–Biafra war, as opposed to proving whether genocide took place: the temptation to restage the war’s propaganda campaigns – and express the accompanying emotion of outrage – was difficult to resist … by westerners sympathetic to one side or the other, leading to partisan advocacy rather than balanced analyses. To move the discussion beyond the blame game, it is, therefore, more constructive to interrogate the effects of the genocide controversy. The USA’s involvement in the issue became explicit in October 2018, when the Congressional-Executive Commission on China reported the mass internment of over “1 million Uyghurs and other Muslim ethnic minorities in ‘political reeducation’ camps” (CongressionalExecutive Commission on China, 2018, p. 1). Beijing initially denied this accusation, before changing its language to celebrate the “free vocational training” provided in the camps (L. Kuo, 2018). The genocide accusation has effectively prioritised the situation in Xinjiang in a long list of human rights violations across the globe. The allegation has been followed up by concrete policy changes, including the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act which bans all goods manufactured in Xinjiang, under the presumption of being made using forced labour, unless proven otherwise (Martina, 2021). The blanket sanction based on the presumption of guilt on the part of companies, together with the media’s push for denouncing any use of Xinjiang cotton, ensnares companies like Changji Esquel Textile Co. Ltd. the kind of socially

Competing narratives of the Xinjiang question 65 responsible company that should have been engaged if the USA truly sought to benefit the Uyghurs (K. Kuo, 2021). The difficulties for Esquel in removing itself from the US entity list indicate the current degree of politicisation in trade. Sanctions like this kind accelerate decoupling and impoverish poverty-stricken farmers in Xinjiang (K. Kuo, 2021). Given the current state of Sino–Western relations, existing sanctions only hurt the people they claim to protect (Brophy, 2021; Zhang, 2021). As William Overholt suggests, there is a need for a more carefully targeted way of exerting pressure on China (K. Kuo, 2021). Multinational corporations like Esquel could have played a constructive role in engaging local Uyghurs as well as local governments if they were not sanctioned.

Beijing’s responses The genocide allegations have provoked a shift from Beijing’s attention to domestic stability maintenance (weiwen) in Xinjiang to international criticisms. Chinese state media, quoting Chinese scholars, frame the entire Xinjiang question as a “political bargaining chip” that Washington uses to maintain its hegemony (CGTN, 2021b). This framing allows the CCP to channel the nationalist sentiments in response to the rising post-pandemic anti-China sentiments to justify its defence against international criticisms of human rights violations. Beijing’s initial denial of the existence of the “re-education camps” indicates a perception gap in the understanding of the Uyghur conflict, and thus Beijing’s responses to it. Not only the idea of “de-radicalisation” is “imported” (Zhou, 2017, p. 1202), but China’s approach to preventing radicalisation and facilitating withdrawal from violent extremism also comprises securitisation, surveillance and “re-education” (Kam & Clarke, 2021), methods that international audiences would quickly associate with an Orwellian dystopia. In response to international criticisms, CGTN released four documentaries. At the time of writing, the first two of this documentary series have been “identified by the YouTube community as inappropriate or offensive to some audiences” (CGTN, 2019). Date of release

Title of the documentary

5 December 2019 7 December 2019 19 June 2020

Fighting terrorism in Xinjiang The black hand – ETIM and terrorism in Xinjiang Tianshan Still Standing: memories of fighting terrorism in Xinjiang “The War in the Shadows”: challenges of fighting terrorism in Xinjiang

2 April 2021

These documentaries reflect an upgrade within the CCP’s image-managing campaigns, considering how they have been edited and visually presented, which closely resembles the mainstream communication style, thus holding appeal to international audiences (Shan X., 2019). This upgrade indicates that the CCP is

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acutely aware of its earlier failures in communicating itself, echoing Xi’s calls to “tell the Chinese story well” and foster an image of China that is “trustworthy, lovable and respectable” (Jacob, 2020; McDonell, 2021). However, these efforts are based on a fundamentally erroneous assumption that international audiences do not approve of China’s counter-terrorism approach because they are not aware of the brutality of terrorist incidents. The “Thematic Exhibition of Anti-terrorism and De-radicalisation in Xinjiang” has been curated in various places in Xinjiang for foreign delegations. In a five-day visit from 13 to 17 May 2021, gory scenes of violence were shown to ambassadors and diplomats from Latin American and Caribbean countries in the “Thematic Exhibition of Anti-terrorism and De-radicalisation in Xinjiang,” so that they could understand the “real situation” in Xinjiang, the “inhumane” nature of terrorists, and thus sympathise with the need for vocational training (Li, 2021). Similarly, delegates from Africa were “shocked” by the cruelty of terrorists’ killing of the innocent. Martin Mbazumutima, Burundi’s Ambassador to China, describes it as “antihuman, anti-social and inhumane” (Zheng & Wang, 2021). The same exhibition has been shown to a group of 13 students from Pakistan, India, Kenya and five other countries studying at Xinjiang Medical University, who “strongly condemned” the violence of terrorists and praised China’s counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation efforts (Zhao, 2021). Local exhibitions are perhaps even gorier, to the extent which the Global Times journalist Fan Lingzhi claims that he “psychologically prepare himself” even after several watches (Fan, 2021). These efforts have mixed consequences for two reasons. First, given the perception gap discussed earlier between Beijing and the international audiences, the reproduction of the official narratives is considered offensive by international audiences, as the documentations themselves are considered proofs of the state’s crimes. The negative reception of the international audiences is evidenced by them flagging the two CGTN documentaries on People’s War on Terror as inappropriate on YouTube. Second, the display of gory scenes serves as a reproduction of violence, feeding into a cycle of violence between the Han and Uyghurs. The CCP has been aware of this risk from the outset as some of the footage was held from the public “due to the government’s security concerns” (CGTN, 2019). However, the cascade of international criticisms seemed to have forced the CCP to proceed with this approach of “disclosing terrorists’ violence” at the risk of exacerbating Uyghur–Han tensions. Another example of ineffective responses is the production of videos that prove Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims are living happily under the care of the CCP. CGTN has produced several videos featuring family members of Uyghur or Kazakh activists to discredit their claims (for example, see Cui, 2019). These videos often include attacks on the person’s character, praises for the CCP and pleas from the activists to stop what they are doing. These videos follow a similar formula and appear to be staged for propaganda purposes. These videos, instead of conveying the intended message, are read by Uyghur activists as threats – a Uyghur Human Rights Project, founded in 2004 by the Uyghur American Association with a grant from the National Endowment for Democracy,

Competing narratives of the Xinjiang question 67 labels them as “proof-of-life” videos used by terrorists to show that the victim is still alive (Uyghur Human Rights Project, 2021). Furthermore, the fallacy of ad hominem constitutes much of China’s legitimacy campaigns, most notably evident from the attacks on the BBC’s “underworld filter” which sought to discredit reports by Western media by criticising the greyish filter it uses for Western audiences, while little progress has been made to present a compelling picture of human security in Xinjiang. Beijing’s responses and its subsequent legitimacy campaigns have triggered further efforts from academia, think tanks, legal practitioners, journalists, human rights activists and the Uyghur diaspora to investigate and gather evidence for the genocide allegation. The conference “The Xinjiang Crisis: Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, Justice” held at Newcastle from 1 to 3 September 2021 is one of such efforts. A few days after this conference where one of the five sanctioned MPs, Nusrat Ghani, vowed to continue lobbying the government, Chinese ambassador Zheng Zeguang was barred from the British Parliament to protest such sanctions (Landale, 2021). The ongoing discussions around the Xinjiang question also feed into the ideological confrontation between China and the West, reinforcing the idea that the diffusion of authoritarianism and liberal democracy inevitably leads to increasingly intense geopolitical competition between two different value systems. In this broader context, it is interesting to note that beyond the statelevel interactions, manifested by state-funded media and think tank outlets, emerging social media platforms have become a window for examining non-state interactions. The black-and-white portrayal of the hostile, Western others and the innocent, demonised us has been challenged by emerging social media platforms that had acted fleetingly as a “window through China’s Great Firewall” before they were banned (Reuters, 2020). For example, videoconferencing app Zoom had been requested by Beijing to suspend accounts of activists who tried to commemorate the 1989 Tiananmen Square protest (Reuters, 2020). Clubhouse, an invite-only social audio app, was banned as Beijing was losing control over the discussions about Xinjiang (Xiao, 2021). These platforms allow the supporters of the genocide accusation to not only lobby Western governments and organisations that have sanctions in their toolkit but also sway public opinion within China. Clubhouse hit the headlines by reporting “a Chinese woman delivering an emotional public apology to a woman from the country’s oppressed Uyghur minority” (Xiao, 2021). Sympathy from the Han Chinese is not unprecedented. In Your Western Regions, My East Turkestan, Wang Lixiong presents a “rare example of a Han intellectual conducting research from the Uyghurs’ viewpoint” (Smith Finley, 2019, p. 81). These fleeting moments of empathy were quickly banned as they stir fear within the regime about increasing support for liberal democracy and the possibility of an Arab Spring-like wave of democratisation. Given the existing Uyghur–Han tensions that have been exacerbated by the “us and them” dichotomy that underpins the People’s War on Terror, it is unlikely that sporadic empathy from the Han would be influential enough to counter-act inflating nationalism

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and xenophobia in mainstream Chinese society. As the links between the Uyghur exile community and Western governments deepen, the Xinjiang question will be further spotlighted in the geopolitical competition between China and the West.

Conclusion This chapter has discussed how the current international discussions surrounding the Xinjiang question are conditioned by geopolitical rivalry. Rather than producing a legal report on the applicability of the term “genocide,” this chapter has sketched out the political interests behind different actors and the implications of labelling. This chapter has shown that in the current hyperpolarised political environment, the dramatic portrayal of China as the subject of all evil is eclipsing the middle ground for debate and thus the conditions for peace in the region. The suddenly increased exposure of the Xinjiang question in the news and the labelling impair the abilities of academia to engage more critically with ethnic conflicts in Xinjiang. The great power confrontations have created an environment conducive to polarised views. In this environment, scholars have been directed away from their role as much-needed mediators during geopolitical competitions, and they unwittingly became complicit in the geopolitical blaming game that is prolonging, instead of alleviating the conflicts. Whether the current naming-and-shaming strategy will achieve any substantive goal in human security on the ground remains to be seen. The current international attention on the Xinjiang question has given Uyghur activists leverage to advocate for independence. However, most of the personal testimonies that are currently available reflect the situation in Xinjiang prior to 2019, as confirmed by a number of scholars and activists at “The Xinjiang Crisis” conference in Newcastle. The political sensitivity of the Xinjiang question in the context of US–China rivalry, compounded by the COVID-19 restrictions, has increased the opaqueness of the situation in Xinjiang. What can be seen, however, is that the current rhetorical inflation of the Xinjiang question has provoked legitimacy campaigns, inflamed nationalist sentiments and hit Xinjiang’s economy, the impacts of which have been felt acutely by the Uyghur population. While the recent documentaries produced by the Chinese state media indicate a degree of proficiency in presenting a controversial issue to international audiences, Xi’s call to “tell China’s story well” remains an uphill struggle.

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Ondřej, K., & Smith Finley, J. (2020, December 7). China’s Neo-Totalitarian Turn and Genocide in Xinjiang. https://www.societyandspace.org/articles/chinas-neo-totalitarian -turn-and-genocide-in-xinjiang Özel, A. (2020, September 21). We have busted the CIA’s lies. https://www.aydinlik.com .tr/www.aydinlik.com.tr/ Pan, Z., & Hu, H. (2011). International factors influencing the formation and development of Eastern Turkistan [“东突”产生和发展过程中的国际因素]. N. W. Journal of Ethnology, 4, 129–139. Reuters. (2020, June 12). Zoom was a window through China’s ‘Great Firewall’—But it may be closing. NBC News. https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/zoom-was -window-through-china-s-great-firewall-it-may-n1230511 Reuters Staff. (2016, July 20). Britain adds Chinese militant group to terror list. https:// uk.reuters.com/article/uk-china-britain-security/britain-adds-chinese-militant-group-to -terror-list-idUKKCN1000PR Richardson, S. (2021, September 2). ‘Break their lineage, break their roots’: China’s crimes against humanity targeting Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims’. The Xinjiang Crisis: Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, Justice. Robin, M. (2020, February 14). The think tank behind Australia’s changing view of China. Australian Financial Review. https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/the-think -tank-behind-australia-s-changing-view-of-china-20200131-p53wgp Rodríguez-Merino, P. A. (2019). Old ‘counter-revolution’, new ‘terrorism’: Historicizing the framing of violence in Xinjiang by the Chinese state. Central Asian Survey, 38(1), 27–45. https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2018.1496066 Sautman, B. (2000). Is Xinjiang an internal colony? Inner Asia, 2(2), 239–271. https://doi .org/10.1163/146481700793647788 Seymour, J. D. (2000). Xinjiang’s Production and Construction Corps, and the sinification of Eastern Turkestan. Inner Asia, 2(2), 171–193. https://doi.org/10.1163 /146481700793647805 Shan, W. (2021, April 14). Xinjiang: What the West doesn’t tell you about China’s war on terror. http://capetown.china-consulate.org/eng/xwdt/t1870194.htm Shan X. (2019, December 7). Responding to International Criticism, China Publishes Official Xinjiang Anti-terrorism Documentaries [回击国际批评 中国官方发新疆反恐 影片]. RFI. https://www.rfi.fr/cn/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD/20191207-%E5%9B %9E%E5%87%BB%E5%9B%BD%E9%99%85%E6%89%B9%E8%AF%84-%E4 %B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E5%AE%98%E6%96%B9%E5%8F%91%E6%96%B0 %E7%96%86%E5%8F%8D%E6%81%90%E5%BD%B1%E7%89%87 Singh, A., & Blumenthal, M. (2019, December 21). China detaining millions of Uyghurs? Serious problems with claims by US-backed NGO and far-right researcher ‘led by God’ against Beijing. The Grayzone. https://thegrayzone.com/2019/12/21/china-detaining -millions-uyghurs-problems-claims-us-ngo-researcher/ Smith Finley, J. (2019). The Wang Lixiong prophecy: ‘Palestinization’ in Xinjiang and the consequences of Chinese state securitization of religion. Central Asian Survey, 38(1), 81–101. https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2018.1534802 Tal, K. (1996). Worlds of hurt: Reading the literatures of trauma. Cambridge University Press. Terman, R., & Voeten, E. (2018). The relational politics of shame: Evidence from the universal periodic review. The Review of International Organizations, 13(1), 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-016-9264-x

Competing narratives of the Xinjiang question 73 The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of Shanghai Cooperation Organization. (2005, December 5). On terrorist organization East Turkestan Islamic Movement. https:// ecrats.org/en/activity/information/terrorist_organizations/2786 Thompson, C. (2020, July 30). Enter the Grayzone: Fringe leftists deny the scale of China’s Uyghur oppression. Coda Story. https://www.codastory.com/disinformation/grayzone -xinjiang-denialism/ United Nations Security Council Subsidiary Organs. (2014). Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement. United Nations Security Council Subsidiary Organs. https://www.un.org /sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/eastern-turkistan -islamic-movement Uyghur Human Rights Project. (2021, February 1). “The Government Never Oppresses Us”: China’s proof-of-life videos as intimidation and a violation of Uyghur family unity. Uyghur Human Rights Project. https://uhrp.org/statement/the-government-never -oppresses-us-chinas-proof-of-life-videos-as-intimidation-and-a-violation-of-uyghur -family-unity/ Xiao, B. (2021, February 9). I listened in on the invite-only Clubhouse app for days—This is what Chinese netizens said about Uyghurs. ABC News. https://www.abc.net.au/news /2021-02-10/china-bans-clubhouse-app-as-netizens-stand-with-uyghurs/13136624 Xu, V. X., Cave, D., Leibold, J., Munro, K., & Ruser, N. (2020). Uyghurs for sale. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale Zenz, A. (2020a). Sterilizations, IUDs, and mandatory birth control: The CCP’s campaign to suppress Uyghur birthrates in Xinjiang. Jamestown Foundation. https://jamestown .org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Zenz-Sterilizations-IUDs-and-Mandatory-Birth -Control-FINAL-27June.pdf?x71937 Zenz, A. (2020b, July 1). Uighurs in Xinjiang targeted by potentially genocidal sterilization plans, Chinese documents show. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/ china-documents-uighur-genocidal-sterilization-xinjiang/ Zhang, C. (2021, July 1). Sanctions on China won’t help Uyghurs and other migrant workers. The Conversation. http://theconversation.com/sanctions-on-china-wont-help -uyghurs-and-other-migrant-workers-162884 Zhao, M. (2021, August 17). ‘Xinjiang is unforgettable, I would like to live here’—Visiting foreign students study in Xinjiang [“新疆让人流连忘返，我愿意生活在这里”— —来华留学生在新疆参访考察]. http://www.xjtzb.gov.cn/system/2021/08/17 /036678510.shtml Zheng, Z., & Wang, Y. (2021, May 30). Xinjiang provides an example of anti-terrorism and de-radicalisation [新疆提供了反恐去极端化的样本]. http://news.ts.cn/system /2021/05/30/036638777.shtml Zhou, Z. (2017). Chinese strategy for de-radicalization. Terrorism and Political Violence, 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2017.1330199

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The politics of remembering Commemorating the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea in an era of China–US rivalry Yiben Ma and Chi Zhang1

Introduction The 23rd of October 2020 marked the 70th anniversary of the Chinese People’s Volunteers Army (CPVA) entering the Korean War, which in China is known as the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea (1950–1953). In a week-long of high-profile events commemorating the 70th anniversary of the war, China mobilised its extensive propaganda apparatus to recall people’s distant memory of the country’s past, by producing and reproducing the stories about the war, the victory of which has long been hailed as the epitome of China’s defiance of US military supremacy and determination to protect its independence. Histories of Chinese resistance against foreign aggressions – narrated mainly through the so-called patriotic education and official mainstream media – are often repurposed to serve the political interests of the Communist Party of China (hereafter “CPC”). The commemoration, which took place amidst the escalating tensions between China and the USA over a range of issues including trade tariffs, high tech, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and COVID-19, has further elevated domestic nationalism and resolved in standing up to the threats posed by the USA. Based on the analysis of news coverage in relation to the commemoration of the war on China’s official media, namely the People’s Daily and the People’s Liberation Army Daily, this chapter aims to discuss how the collective memories of the war were constructed and reframed in a way not only to unite domestic nationalist sentiments against the alleged US hostility but also to legitimise China’s narrative about its moral righteousness in a potential war with the US-led UN forces. This chapter argues that, by commemorating the 70th anniversary of China’s involvement in the Korean War, the CPC attempts to manipulate the memories of the past to garner domestic patriotic support and build an international image of China as a responsible world power which is committed to peaceful development.

The politics of remembering The narration and remembering of the past are vital processes in the formation of a nation. A nation is built upon “subjective properties” such as myths and collective memories of the past, and as Smith (1996: 383) rightly claims, memory DOI: 10.4324/9781003261278-6

The politics of remembering 75 is bound to a homeland, and “one might almost say: no memory, no identity; no identity, no nation.” Memories are not genuine reflections but certain narratives of the past, which can be rediscovered and reinterpreted by political elites to create a strong sense of belonging of people to the nation (Smith, 1998; 1999). Cultural symbols, public ceremonies, and traditions are products of political engineering, and in Hobsbawm’s words (1983), they can be “invented” to allow people to imagine and remember a collective past. Shared memories of a community help mobilise nationalist sentiments and identification among its people, but this does not mean that they can be invented out of nothing. Smith (1991:358) contends that the past “acts as a constraint on ‘invention’,” because “it is not any past, but rather the past of that particular community, with its distinctive patterns of events, personages and milieux.” This reminds political elites of the need to consider carefully the specific parts of a community’s culture, memories, and traditions that can provide the strongest nationalist appeals among the people for political mobilisation. Therefore, the ways in which “a country remembers its past helps determine its future progress” (Schell, 2016:144). Among many historical memories of a nation, those memories relating to past wars, either victorious or traumatic, can serve as effective emotional resources for national coherence and unity. However, it is also worth noting that war memory is selective with certain wars being constantly reminded of and others being intentionally forgotten (He, 2007). The process of remembering tells us much about a nation’s domestic agenda as well as its foreign relations as international politics evolves over time. For instance, in examining the discursive memory of the Sino-Vietnamese war in 1979, Yin and Path (2021) find that the way in which both countries remember, forget, and re-remember the war not only reflects the fluctuations in the bilateral relations but also shapes how the two nations perceive opportunities and external threats. The memory discourse of the Sino-Vietnamese war, however, remains far less told and visible in China’s official historiography compared with the one of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–1945. Scholars have already provided a wealth of literature which discusses the importance of the Second Sino-Japanese War (commonly known in the Chinese official discourse as the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression) in helping the Chinese government shape its nationalist policies, form collective memories, and define its own position in the international community (Hatch, 2014; Mitter, 2020; Reilly, 2004; 2012; Shirk, 2007; Sneider, 2013; Weiss, 2014; Xu and Pu, 2010). As an integral episode contributing to what is now the so-called “Century of Humiliation” (Callahan, 2004; Gries, 2004), the bitter memories of China’s huge loss in the two Sino-Japanese wars and the suffering of the Chinese people in the hands of Western powers, however, were largely absent during Mao’s era. Since the communists took power in 1949, memories devoted to the war against Japan were consigned to historical oblivion and only the victorious revolution under the leadership of Chairman Mao was commemorated (Coble, 2007). It is, therefore, clear that the selective use of memories serves to justify the legitimacy of the incumbent leadership.

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Public memory of the war against Japan was only restored and became what Coble (2007) terms “new remembering” from the mid-1980s. This was mainly a response to the decline of Marxist, Communist, and Maoist ideologies in legitimating the state and the resultant crises of faith in socialism and the CPC, which led to the pro-democracy demonstrations in 1989 (Zheng, 1999; Zhao, 2000; 2004). The CPC needed to find a replacement for the waning Marxist–Leninist– Maoist ideology and found the answer in nationalism as a new form of identification which according to Zhao (2000: 17–18) remains “a most reliable claim to the Chinese people’s loyalty and the only important value that was shared by both the regime and its critics.” In 1994, the Central Committee of CPC issued the “Outline on Implementing Patriotic Education” which stipulated patriotic lessons be taught to all citizens nationwide, especially young people (He and Guo, 2000). The “Century of Humiliation” – the period of colonialist and imperialist intervention between 1839 and 1949 (Kaufman, 2010), has been a recurring topic in patriotic education. The “Century-of-Humiliation” discourse retells and reproduces stories of China’s victimisation since the Opium War on the one hand, and CPC’s heroic achievements in ending China’s past humiliation and safeguarding the nation on the other. The patriotic education projects enable the CPC to present and impose upon its citizens a narrative about China’s past, which emphasises the rise of the CPC as the choice made by the Chinese history and people, and its irreplaceable role in restoring China’s past glory. The projects can be implemented successfully on such a scale not only because the CPC has chosen special historical narratives which can resonate with the public emotion and can be arrayed in the “popular garment of patriotism” (He, 2007: 67) but also because it is able to control “the institutional tools of memory construction” such as school textbooks, museums, commemorative rituals, and ceremonies (ibid.: 47). In 1994, different ministries and governmental departments jointly launched the “three ‘onehundred’ for patriotic education,” that is to say, a hundred films, a hundred songs, and a hundred books of patriotic themes were selected for the general public to study (He and Bao, 2000). Governments at different levels were also required to establish “patriotic education bases” such as museums, monuments, and historic sites, which were used to promote and reinforce the Party’s historiography (Wang, 2008). In the wake of extensive campaigns of patriotic education, a number of museums in memory of China’s past wars, be it the anti-Japanese war, civil wars between the Communists and the Nationalist Party (also known as KMT: Kuomintang), and the Korea War, were built. Instead of considering museums materially as sites where one can find historical objectivity, they were mainly used to serve the political needs and values of the present. In his research about the Memorial Museum of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance to Japan, Mitter (2000) explains how the appropriation of the past war helps the Partystate shape its nationalist identity and enhance its ruling legitimacy by reiterating its leadership in the anti-Japanese national united front. The ways in which the past is told also suggest a major shift in China’s foreign relations. Sneider

The politics of remembering 77 (2013: 45) points out that the building of the Memorial Hall of the Victims of the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders in 1985 was a response to Japan’s attempt to remove the texts that described the war as an “invasion” and “an act of aggression” in its textbook. The “history problem,” as defined by Guo (2021:2) as “a patterned controversy [started in 1982] over very different views about the legacies of the Second Sino-Japanese War,” surfaces recurrently along with the ups and downs of Sino–Japan relations. The teaching of this dominant memory of China’s past has also been extended to every aspect of people’s cultural life, and media have become useful means of education. In analysing TV dramas relating to China’s War of Resistance against Japan in the highly commercialised Chinese media industry, Wang and Chew (2021) explain the huge ideological influence the Party can exercise over the production by setting the principle of remembering and reinforcing the officially endorsed views of the war. In a similar vein, Nie (2013) discusses how online games about the war against Japan can serve as useful propaganda tools to reproduce and manufacture a national memory in an attempt to unify an increasingly fractured society against a common enemy. Compared with more ideologically explicit inculcation in school textbooks, practices of patriotic education have become much more subtle and playful especially in the era of digital media, when interactive and participatory initiatives are developed to enable young people not only to remember but also to help promote dominant Party’s ideologies through the activities of play (Lagerkvist, 2008; Repnikova and Fang, 2018; Chen et al., 2021; Zhang and Ma, 2021). While the nation’s past can be remembered through conscious consumption of national myths, symbols, and traditions, such as telling stories of heroes in school textbooks, collective mourning on the national memorial day for the victims of the Nanjing Massacre, and attending the flagraising ceremony in the Tiananmen Square, on the other hand, in discussing his seminal work on “banal nationalism,” Billig (1995: 42) argues that the remembering of nationhood can also “occur without conscious awareness: it occurs when one is doing other things, including forgetting.” As discussed above, the nation’s past can be remembered in less conscious ways through tourism, entertainment, and play. China’s expression and memory of the past are largely shaped by a dualistic and complex victor and victim psychology (Gries, 2004). As Callahan (2010) describes, China is a “pessoptimist” nation whose self-identity is shaped by a tightly intertwined sense of pride and humiliation. The founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 symbolised the end of China’s Century of Humiliation when Chairman Mao famously declared that “the Chinese people have stood up.” With Deng Xiaoping’s opening-up and reform policies, the Party mainly adopted “pragmatic nationalism” which was different from Mao’s militant type of nationalism, to unite the whole nation in the time of rapid social transformations by emphasising the importance of economic modernisation to China’s rejuvenation (Zhao, 2005). With China’s increasing economic and military might and growing participation in international affairs, what Oksenberg (1986) calls “confident nationalism” is on the rise, especially in Xi Jinping’s era. When addressing the

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19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, President Xi (2017) announced that the Chinese nation, which since modern times began had endured so much for so long, has achieved a tremendous transformation: it has stood up, grown rich, and is becoming strong; it has come to embrace the brilliant prospect of rejuvenation. However, what accompanied such a confident narrative of the nation is the recurring reminder of the Century of Humiliation. As repetitively claimed in the official discourse, becoming strong under the CPC’s leadership is the only way to restore its ancient glory and cleanse past humiliation. Chinese media have been telling stories about China’s traumatic fall from being the centre of the world to the Sick Man of Asia (Callahan, 2004), a stigmatic term which, according to Yang (2005), was intentionally used by Chinese intelligentsia to evoke people’s nationalist awareness of saving the nation since China’s loss in the Opium War. Closely related to the discourse of humiliation is the mnemonic practice of “the backward will be beaten,” a mythic lesson from the past which reminds people that China’s past suffering was a result of its economic, military, and technological backwardness (Wang, 2020). The institutionalised knowledge of “the backward will be beaten” is mainly located in the historical commemoration of China’s past wars, and it aims to inculcate in the public that national development and self-strengthening are essential strategies that can prevent China from being beaten again (ibid.). The discourse of national humiliation justifies China’s current developments, and on the other hand, it is mutually reinforced by a sense of insecurity (Callahan 2004). China’s insecurities not only come from the memory of the humiliating past but also result from a consistent creation and projection of an image of the hostile “others” – the threats from its real and perceived enemies (Dai, 2001; Pugsley, 2006). Japan remains the main enemy in the Chinese people’s psyche due to the war crimes and atrocities it committed. Contemporary Chinese nationalism though increasingly targets a new enemy, that is the USA which, as Callahan (2006) claims, “only played a secondary role in the imperialism” in China’s Century of Humiliation. However, the criticisms China constantly receives from Western countries especially the USA on issues like human rights and democracy not only enable the CPC to instil “an aura of victimization and international conspiracy within the expectant nation” (Tok 2010: 24) but also make its people align with the official nationalist agenda so that they would believe that the “anti-China forces” in the official discourses are real and that these forces are trying hard to contain China’s emergence. The USA’s interference in the Taiwan issues, the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the subsequent China–US jet collision, and more recently the arrest of Huawei’s CFO Meng Wanzhou have all been interwoven into the official discourses to give further credence to the assumption that the USA is hostile to China. The following section will provide some more contextual information about the US–China rivalry that characterises the current bilateral relations.

The politics of remembering 79

The War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea in the context of China–US rivalry As discussed in the previous section, how past wars are commemorated helps to illuminate the current political dynamics. The commemoration of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea has symbolic implications which can be better understood in the context of China–US rivalry, especially since Trump’s administration in 2016 through to the first year of Biden’s administration. While we examine the commemoration in relation to the narratives of the “new Cold War,” we do not seek to determine whether the current China–US rivalry qualifies for such a label. Instead, we investigate how the narratives surrounding the “new Cold War” are utilised to make sense of the potentially catastrophic confrontations between the two great powers and how the increasingly routinised efforts of commemoration serve to reinforce constructed boundaries of identity. The USA under Trump was characterised by abnormality and chaos. The USA’s role in the international community was quickly changing, evident from its withdrawal from multiple fronts: the Paris Agreement, Trans-Pacific Partnership, NATO, WHO, and UN Human Rights Council. The vacuum left by the USA’s withdrawal offered great opportunities for China to step up its efforts towards fulfilling the “Chinese Dream” and the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” China’s foreign policy shift from Deng’s “low-profile” to Xi’s “Going Out” is well reflected by its increasing attention and involvement in peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief (Hirono & Lanteigne 2011; Jones & Mulloy, 2021). These aspects of building an image of a responsible great power are most needed for China, especially in the Korean Peninsula, where the conflict has never technically ended, and destabilising factors such as lack of food, subsistence, shelter, as well as medical care in the context of COVID-19 could easily be spilt over and threaten regional stability. Even after Biden promised the USA’s return to its allies, the legacy of Trump remains (Aslan, 2021). A deeply divided USA is unlikely to welcome a self-proclaimed communist regime, as China is promoting a set of Socialist Core Values to counter-act the liberal values that many Western countries deem “universal”. On the contrary, the long-standing feud with communism became a unifying force and helped deflect attention away from domestic policy failures. A consensus has been emerging among the US political elites that consider the US–Chinese relationship “as a zero-sum economic and military struggle” (Sanders, 2021). At the same time, China is also boosting its domestic legitimacy campaigns by flooding the media with pro-CPC rhetoric to balance the grievances that emerged from heavy-handed COVID containment measures, slow economic growth, the wealth gap, and the move to abolish presidential term limits. These legitimacy campaigns were used to deflect attention away from domestic problems to “external enemies,” and the USA became an apparent target. In this process, domestic propaganda campaigns might also influence China’s approach to shaping discourse at the international level (Edney, 2014).

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In the context of the China–US rivalry, the wave of commemoration, which culminated at the 70th anniversary of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, is one side of the competing narratives constructed by China and North Korea on the one hand, and the USA and its ally, South Korea, on the other. As China celebrated the Chinese People’s Volunteers’ courage and sacrifice, Xi condemned the USA for its “unilateralism, protectionism and extreme egoism.” The war, dubbed “the Fatherland Liberation War” in North Korea, was also celebrated for its “valuable mental heritage” (The Associated Press 2020a). The supreme leader Kim Jong-un echoed the Chinese official narratives by stating that “every part of our country is closely associated with the red blood shed by the service personnel of the Chinese People’s Volunteers” and that his government would never forget “their noble soul and lofty self-sacrificing spirit” (The Associated Press, 2020b). The threats from a common enemy bring the two countries together to use a narrative of the shared past to serve their own agenda of the present. Ironically, as Jung (2015) finds, there are fissures in the memory of the Korean between China and North Korea, and each side has been revising and reinterpreting the war as the bilateral relations fluctuated. What is also worth noting is that while the Chinese government has been carefully maintaining an image of friendship with North Korea, public opinion on the Chinese internet is noticeably critical of this communist comrade (Shen, 2012). On the other hand, on the 70th anniversary of the war, the USA and South Korea commemorated what they call the Korean War, with a clear purpose of strengthening their alliance and denuclearising North Korea (Deutsche Welle, 2020). On 27 July 2021, Biden proclaimed the “National Korean War Veterans Armistice Day” to commemorate the “service and sacrifices” of both the USA and South Korea, “allies with a long history of shared sacrifice,” which “have left an indelible determination to sustain peace and promote regional stability” (The White House, 2021). The USA’s sacrifice and its legacy of “peace and regional stability” are in sharp contrast with the official Chinese narratives that portray the USA as the “aggressor.” The USA’s move and framing capture the intensity of the conflict between the two countries in establishing their own versions of history, thus their respective regimes of truth, based on which their legitimacy is reaffirmed. The USA’s efforts to reaffirm its alliance with South Korea were unsurprising, considering that China and South Korea share the same approach of treating “external and internal threats” as two sides of the same problem, and both have constantly provided humanitarian aid to North Korea when all other countries stood by in 2017 (Jones & Teitt, 2020). As the only US ally in mainland Asia, which was willing to embrace a US military presence, South Korea’s support was essential in the event of any potential military conflict between the two great powers (Lee, 2020). On a broader scale, the attention to China in the USA was thought to be long overdue. Twenty years into the Global War on Terror, the USA eventually pulled out from the Middle Eastern fronts, with the withdrawals from Syria in 2019 and Afghanistan in 2021, spanning both Trump and Biden administrations. The

The politics of remembering 81 revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) that involved the USA, India, Japan, and Australia, and the new trilateral security pact between Australia, the UK, and the USA, known as the AUKUS, speak volumes of the unwritten concerns within the West about the rising power that is ideologically at odds with the US-led liberal order (Grossman, 2020). Indo-Pacific became the battlefield of China–US competition where Indo-Pacific countries will, at best, benefit from competing development models and, at worst, be forced into a zero-sum geopolitics-centric competition (Vu & Pham, 2021). As the ideological confrontations between the China-led socialist camp and the US-led liberal world continue to entrench, nationalism and the construction of heroic narratives played an essential role in stabilising the identity of Chinese citizens and diaspora who might form a potential supporter base within the West. The narratives of the Cold War evoke the fear of existential catastrophe in the event of nuclear annihilation, routinised practices of commemoration provided a sense of order and certainty in an era in which political uncertainty causes great anxiety. The centricity of memory in the construction of the present was reflected in the very title of a 20-episode documentary on the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea – The Power of Memory (jiyi de liliang, 记忆的力量) (Wang, 2020).

Methodology and data Against this backdrop of the growing rivalry between the USA and China as discussed above, this chapter focuses on the Chinese official discourses relating to the remembrance and celebration of the 70th anniversary of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. It is worth noting that while the Korean War was a UN-authorised military operation which involved troops from UN members such as the USA, UK, and Canada, the USA sent most of the troops and played a leading role in commanding the war. As shown in the data we collected, the Chinese official discourses foregrounded the USA as the key enemy. However, Chinese official media did occasionally specify that China fought the war against the UN forces, but emphasising the forces were “US-led” (yi meiguo weishou). Based on the analysis of the official media reports about the commemoration of the war, this chapter aims to find out how the war in the past has been rediscovered and reinterpreted by the CPC to tell the domestic and international audiences who China was, who it is now, and who will it be under the CPC’s leadership. The timing of the commemoration, that is to say, a year before the centenary anniversary of the founding of the CPC, and months after the outbreak of COVID-19, also carries its own political symbolism. A series of high-profile commemorative events of the war took place in the week commencing 19 October 2020 and culminated when President Xi delivered a speech which marked the 70th anniversary of CPVA entering the war. The authors chose to investigate media reports about the commemoration of the war published in two state-run media outlets – the People’s Daily and the People’s Liberation Army Daily. The former is an official newspaper of the Central Committee of the CPC, which allows the general public and researchers alike to

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obtain information about the official policies, ideologies, and stance of the Party. The latter is the official newspaper of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which covers the latest and exclusive news about the PLA. Data were collected from their respective websites (www.people.com.cn and www.81.cn) for a period of three weeks from 11 to 31 October 2020, during which commemorative events were intensively covered. A total of 171 reports were collected, including 42 from the People’s Daily and 129 from the People’s Liberation Army Daily. While the sampling has its limitations in terms of presenting a more comprehensive picture of how the Chinese official discourse has been received by the public, this methodology is in line with our research design that focuses on how the past was reproduced in the official discourse. All the collected reports were read and checked, and they mainly covered three main topics, including official commemorative events such as President Xi’s speeches, exhibitions and films related to the war, war heroes, and heroism, and the retelling of the history of the war including the memories of the veterans. We also employed NVivo – a qualitative data analysis software – to help identify the most frequently mentioned keywords and the overall themes as implied in the dataset. The analysis generated by NVivo shows the Top ten most frequently mentioned keywords in Table 6.1. These top keywords were indicative of the general tones and patterns adopted by the Chinese official media in reporting the commemoration of the war. We contextualised these keywords by examining how they were related and elaborated in the collected reports. We also analysed the data more closely by focusing on the language adopted by the two newspapers, for instance, the choices of words in representing the war, what aspects of the war were highlighted and emphasised, while others were made inexplicit or even not mentioned at all. We found that there were two primary themes underpinning the reports we collected. First, the War to Resist US and Aid Korea was celebrated in the Chinese official discourse as a hard-won victory due to the CPVA’s spirit of heroism. Second, the Chinese government described the war as a just war that brought peace to China and the world, and when addressing the significance of the war for today, it also Table 6.1 Top 10 keywords in the 171 media reports on the commemoration of the war collected from the People’s Daily and the People’s Liberation Army Daily Keyword

Times of appearance

The people (renmin) China/Chinese (zhongguo) Resist the USA and Aid Korea (kangmei yuanchao) Volunteers Army (zhiyuanjun) War (zhanzheng) Spirit (jingshen) Great (weida) Heroes (yingxiong) Victory (shengli) Peace (heping)

1,417 1,399 1,283 1,214 1,029 812 722 668 606 529

The politics of remembering 83 stressed China as an important player contributing to world peace. These are the two themes that shape the subsequent discussion.

Great victory and great heroism On 23 October 2020, President Xi Jinping delivered a speech that commemorated the 70th Anniversary of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. President Xi provided his historiography of the war in the speech and set the general tones and themes for Chinese official media to follow and reproduce the mnemonic discourse of the war. Despite complex reasons that drove China into the Korean War, the CPC attributed the war to US aggression, as reiterated in Xi’s commemorative speech: When new China was founded and so many things needed to be done, the Chinese people were so eager for peace. However, this wish of the Chinese people was brutally challenged, and the imperialist aggressors forcibly imposed the war on the Chinese people … In early October of 1950, despite the repeated warnings from the Chinese government, the US Army flagrantly crossed the 38th Parallel and burned the war to the border between China and North Korea. US military aircrafts that invaded North Korea bombed China’s north-eastern border areas many times, causing serious losses to people’s lives and property and posing serious threats to the security of our country. (The People’s Daily, 2020) The official media also emphasised that China’s entry was at the request of the North Korean Party and Government, which further legitimised China’s involvement in a foreign war that took place beyond its territory. Although Xi hailed the war as “the great victory” that “safeguarded the peaceful life of the Chinese people, stabilised the situation in the Korean Peninsula and upheld peace in Asia and the world,” he admitted that the war caused a heavy cost of lives of over 197,000 Chinese people (The People’s Daily, 2020). In recounting the war, both newspapers underlined that the war was hard-won under conditions of extreme disparity between China and America in terms of military equipment and comprehensive national power. The war between China and America was described, in the People’s Liberation Army Daily (2020a), as a war between one armed force (the Chinese army) versus three armed forces (US-led army, navy, and air force), and a war between a country which had nuclear weapons and the other which only had grenades. The memory of China’s success in defying American military superiority seven decades ago was invoked to show not only the greatness of the victory but also its willpower to defeat America again if a war will eventually become inevitable. While China’s status now as the world’s second-largest economy and its ever-growing military might was highlighted, what lingers though is the recurring memory of China’s Century of Humiliation and backwardness. The great victory of the war was celebrated not simply as a military achievement but more

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importantly as an epitome of the end to China’s humiliating past in the hands of Western powers, as well as hard evidence that enabled China to get rid of the label of the “Sick Man of East Asia.” Comparing the backwardness of old China with what China has achieved allows the CPC to demonstrate its assertiveness to both domestic and international audiences that China has returned to its rightful place in the world and is committed to defending its own national interests (Callahan, 2004). Another common feature relating to CPC’s propaganda about the war commemoration involves using the words, memories, and perspectives of the enemies to express both their fears of and respect for CPVA. General Douglas MacArthur and General Matthew Ridgway were the two American military commanders whose names were often mentioned in relation to China’s official memory of the Korean War. The Chinese official media on the one hand depicted the two generals as highly respected military legends but, on the other hand, retold the history through the perspectives of the two American generals (often in the form of quoting their words) to express their respect to the CPVA and reflections on the lesson they were taught from that war. Often than not, the official media did not provide details about the sources of the quotes and the contexts in which those words were said. To illustrate further the historic significance of China’s “great victory,” both newspapers quoted Henry Kissinger’s views on the Korean War from his book On China (2012: 146), in which he comments that “the Korean War was something more than a draw … It also built up military credibility that China, as an adversary worthy of fear and respect, would draw on through the next several decades.” In addition to remembering the hostility of enemies, eulogising heroes is equally an effective means to boost national unity and identification (Landsberger, 2001; Ma, 2018). Commemorating fallen soldiers who sacrificed for the motherland is a common practice in China, and heroes are carefully selected by CPC as role models to promote certain moral values and educate members of the public on how the past should be remembered (Hung, 2008). The CPC exerts discursive power in controlling the processes of defining, honouring, and worshipping heroes (Hung, 2008; Cai, 2018). In commemorating the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, the CPC contributed the “great victory” to the heroic spirit of CPVA, which glorified desirable qualities, such as loyalty to the motherland, sacrifice for the interests of the people, and fearlessness of hardships. Official media provided extensive coverage of martyrs, promoting heroic stories of soldiers, such as Huang Jiguang who used his body to block machine gun fire and protected his comrades, and Qiu Shaoyun who endured extreme pain in silence in order not to reveal his unit’s location and was burnt to death after a firebomb went off by his side. One of the most told heroic stories, as constantly reproduced in the two examined official newspapers and featured in a hugely successful Chinese war blockbuster The Battle at Lake Changjin, was a tragedy about the “Ice Sculpture Company,” which referred to a company of over 100 soldiers who held the fighting position in extremely cold weather and were frozen into ice sculptures. Sacrifice was glorified and even romanticised, and the ability to endure extreme pain and even death became one of the essential requirements for one to

The politics of remembering 85 be recognised as a revolutionary hero (Sheridan, 1968). While such stories caused patriotic resonance and encouraged the living to emulate, it did not mean CPC’s narratives of heroism and martyrdom receive no challenge. Former journalist Luo Changping, for instance, who questioned on social media the justification for China’s involvement in the Korean War, and described “Ice Sculpture Company” soldiers as stupid for following orders which led them to death, was detained for defaming national martyrs (China Digital Times, 2021). The CPC maintained its monopoly in the cult of heroism and promotion of certain mnemonic practices through coercion and propaganda, leaving little room for alternative narratives to emerge.

China’s contribution to peace The second theme that emerged from the data is that the war contributed to regional and world peace. The remembering of the war today helps China establish its image as a responsible international player. This section provides an indepth analysis of the ritualistic nature of remembering and the spirit of heroism as accentuated by “self-sacrifice,” through which the CPC conveyed the above message. As the international community questioned the prospect of a “peaceful” rise (Buzan, 2010; Yue, 2008), the CPC used the commemoration to emphasise its image as a peaceful nation. However, as China’s involvement in the war constituted a violation of its own non-intervention principle, it was ever more important to highlight Chinese forces as “volunteers,” as opposed to soldiers. Emotionprovoking stories that highlighted volunteers’ self-sacrifice were central to CPC’s claim of legitimacy. The retelling of the same stories through new forms, such as documentaries, films, and on social-mediated communication, reinforced a sense of continuity and linked the target audience with the same past. In doing so, the constructed images of heroes in the past became a central part of the present as they served to legitimise the current political agenda and mobilise support in the event of a military conflict. The stories of the hard-won victory also functioned to reduce individuals’ feeling of helplessness in the face of great power rivalry by conveying the message that “we are in control despite adversity.” Thus, the repeated reproduction of stories of national heroes constituted meaning-making rituals in which historians assumed the role of “high priests” (Bryan, 2016). These ritual practices injected meaning into an order-less world in which group boundaries had been blurred by globalisation (Kinnvall, 2004). The relationship between retelling the past and the present is perhaps best illuminated by anecdotes of volunteers naming their unborn children “kangmei” (Resist US Aggression) and “yuanchao” (Aid Korea) (Wang, 2020). Given the importance of lineage in Chinese culture, the act of naming one’s children per se constituted a patriotic ritual – the shared memory was not only passed on through the retelling of stories, which can be forgotten when the stories were no longer being retold, but more concretely through names, which the named would carry with themselves until their death (unless they change their names).

86 Yiben Ma and Chi Zhang The practice of naming ensures that one’s children are constantly reminded of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea every time they are being called. The recurring theme of self-sacrifice added to the heroism and nobility of death in the given circumstance, in this case, the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. Indeed, one of the commemorating films is titled, “The Sacrifice” in English. Although its English title is not a literal translation of its Chinese title Jingang Chuan (金刚川), “The Sacrifice” accurately captured the heroism presented in the film. The act of self-sacrifice was accentuated in this given context, because not only the sacrifice was not made for fellow countrymen, but it was not even made to protect one’s own country. What added to the tragedy was that those who died had to be buried in a foreign land, a poignant violation of the Chinese social norm of “luoye guigen” that motivated members of the Chinese diaspora to return to their original roots before they die. Persuading “volunteers” to fight for a neighbouring state required more mobilisation than fighting for one’s own land (Rawnsley, 2009). The Chinese proverb “If the lips are gone, the teeth will be cold” (chunwang chihan) did help to convince volunteers of the urgency of their contributions (Institute of Political Work, The Academy of Military Science 2020). Still, fighting against a UN-authorised war led by well-equipped US military personnel required more mobilisation than a proverb. The sacrifice, made for a neighbouring country where people did not even share the same language and culture, had been repeatedly highlighted in official Chinese narratives to reinforce the message that China’s involvement in the war was just and noble. The contrast between the noble cause and violent deaths coloured the heroic martyrdom with a sense of tragedy. In doing so, the glorification of self-sacrifice cancelled out negative connotations that were often associated with self-destruction in Western culture and contributed to the integrity of the official Chinese narratives that celebrated its alleged moral superiority in relation to the USA in this war. Entering the Korean War was justified in the Chinese official media discourse not only as a hard decision China had to make in order to defend its homeland (baojia weiguo) but also as a testimony of China’s commitment to world peace. As commented in one of the editorials in the People’s Liberation Army Daily (2020b), The source of strength of the CPVA and the fundamental reason for their victory was the justice of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. This just war won the sympathy, support and assistance of peace-loving countries and people around the world. Eventually, the just army won the war, disrupted the deployment of the imperialists to expand their influence, and maintained peace in Asia as well as in the world … The Chinese people love and cherish peace, and regard maintaining world peace and opposing hegemonism and power politics as their sacred duty, and resolutely oppose the wilful use of force or use force to deal with international disputes, and firmly oppose wantonly interference in other countries’ internal affairs under the guise of so-called “democracy”, “freedom” and “human rights.”

The politics of remembering 87 The above excerpt presents an image of moral contrasts, in which China is portrayed as a defender of world peace, and the USA and its allies as the antithesis of “peace-loving countries and people around the world.” Chinese official media constantly emphasised that the war was used to end the war the imperialists had started (yizhan zhizhan) and it was the means through which China gained respect and world peace was restored. The CPC refers back to the past wars to garner domestic nationalistic support, but also to shape a favourable image to the world. The findings of this chapter echo Rana Mitter’s (2020) observation in his book China’s Good War – that the CPC has reassessed China’s experience of the Second World War and constructed a narrative which depicts China not as a traumatic victim, but primarily as a strong, victorious, and morally righteous nation which contributed to the creation and protection of the post-war international order. We contend that the CPC’s high-profile commemoration of the Korean War should not be merely regarded as China’s defiance of the USA’s military might. The growing economic and military strengths have made China more assertive and capable than ever before to confront the USA. More importantly, China has already claimed itself as a victor of the Korean War since the armistice was signed in 1953, and such a victorious war narrative was constantly reiterated through the official mnemonic practices (Jung, 2015). Rather, the commemoration of the war should be regarded as an(other) attempt made by the CPC to get its own version of the war to be heard by the world audience and to project its image as a global leader that is committed to defending the international order which is being threatened by America’s unilateralism and hegemonism. As Mitter (2020: 4) points out, China is keen for “its growing presence in the world to be seen as one of normative and moral leadership, rather than leadership defined solely by economic and military weight.” By emphasising its sacrifice and more important contribution to the good war in the past, China is seeking historical backing to serve its own narrative of being a peaceful, responsible, and just international leader.

Conclusion Drawing on the analysis of media reports from the People’s Daily and the People’s Liberation Army Daily, we argued that the commemoration of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea carried significant political symbolism and was used to reaffirm the CPC’s legitimacy at a time of Sino–US rivalry when great uncertainties were arising. What this chapter adds to the existing analyses of China’s reliving of the trauma of the Century of Humiliation is an altruistic dimension of China’s role in the war. As China was seeking to shape its image as a responsible great power, it inevitably was confronted with the hurdle of its foreign policy principle of non-intervention. In line with China’s defence policy, the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea had never been framed as foreign intervention, and North Korea has never been framed as an “ally.” The heroic sacrifice that China generally made for its “brother” not only justified the past but, more importantly, gave more moral weight to China in the current stand-off with the USA. The remembering of China’s past contributed to the continuity of

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the Chinese identity that arose from wars, and will potentially give meaning to China’s foreign policy that will seek to project its image as a contributor to international peace, despite the constraint of the non-intervention principle.

Note 1 We are very grateful and acknowledge Ms. Jiate Wang’s generous support for collecting and collating the data.

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7

The domain of the State Interpreting the 2012 Senkaku/Diaoyu islands disputes at liberal-oriented Chinese commercial newspapers Tiantian Diao

Introduction For Sino-Japanese relations, territorial disputes surrounding the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands have been a long-standing and recurrent issue. The Diaoyu/Senkaku islands are a chain of five uninhabited islets, and three barren rocks located in the East China Sea were named Diaoyu in Chinese and Senkaku in Japanese. The authorities in China, Japan, and Taiwan all claim sovereignty over these islands. Disputes surrounding the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands triggered the escalation of diplomatic and military actions between China and Japan in 1971, 1978, 1990, 1996, 2004–2005, and 2010 (Cho & Choi, 2016; McCormack, 2011). The 2012 Diaoyu/ Senkaku islands controversy led to the greatest tension to have emerged between China and Japan in decades. Chinese media performance in covering the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands disputes attracts significant scholarly attention. Analysis of Chinese media reports on this territorial conflict provides a showcase to understand the changing domestic context of foreign policymaking affected by the ever-changing media landscape in an authoritarian context “just as it is in other political systems” (Shirk, 2007, p.69). The Diaoyu/Senkaku islands-related reports are used to demonstrate how the relationship between Chinese media and the government’s foreign policymaking process has turned from “unidirectional to bi-directional,” that the government and the press mutually affect each other (Wang & Wang, 2014). Furthermore, researching Chinese media’s news coverage of island disputes helps scholars to understand the strategically manipulated news content that works in alliance with the other factors that contribute to the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy and the regime’s selective tolerance and responsiveness during the escalation of these disputes (e.g., Callahan, 2007; Gries et al., 2016; Kennedy, 2009; LIU, 2006; Reilly, 2012; Schneider, 2016). Zhang (2014) argues that the Chinese legacy media (Xinhua, People’s Daily, and China Central Television) fanned the flames of anti-Japanese sentiment while exaggerating tensions in 2012. These existing studies faithfully follow the vein of political communication and examine the relationship between the news content, Chinese public opinion toward Japan, and China’s foreign policy. However, such an analytical lens often fixates on the effects of the media content on public opinion DOI: 10.4324/9781003261278-7

The domain of the State 93 and overtly emphases the media’s “linkage mechanism” under China’s nonfree but commercialised media environment. It shies away from the production aspect of the influential news content on territorial disputes. The news producers are not considered “independent, strategic actors” (Baum & Potter, 2008) but are driven either by the State or the market. The failure to not put the news producers in the centre of analysis has further led to the ignorance of the intramedia ideological division in China. In particular, less attention was given to the liberal-oriented commercial newspapers which produce a significant percentage of media outlets circulating within China. Previous research has pointed out that commercial papers with a liberal stance are important complements to the Party newspapers (Guan et al., 2017), but very few studies zero in on these newspapers’ coverage of Sino-Japanese territorial disputes. There is a need for a study to provide a synergistic understanding of the production of news on territorial disputes that also sheds some light on the liberal-oriented commercial newspapers. This chapter selects The Beijing News (Xinjingbao), Oriental Morning Post (Dongfang zaobao), and the Southern Metropolis Daily (Nanfang dushibao) that locate in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou in the first tier of the Chinese journalistic landscape to study. These three newspapers share a similar liberally oriented stance, and they enjoy a reputation for quality reporting and a sense of social responsibility among the Chinese journalist community. These three newspapers have played significant news-making roles by serving as primary news providers for commercial portal sites since the 2000s. Therefore, a close examination of their practices will also provide valuable references to understand digital content production for future studies. Using the three newspapers as cases, this chapter seeks to answer: what kind of issue-specific interpretation that the liberally oriented commercial newspapers produced for the 2012 Senkaku/Diaoyu disputes? How and why have journalists and editors produced them? This is qualitative research and adopts a combined methodological approach. Through the dialogue between the analysis of news content, the interview data, and three newspapers’ internal discussions on news reporting practices, it dissects the subframes that were produced for interpreting the 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku islands disputes. News texts published between 1 August 2012 and 31 October 2012 by the three newspapers were collected through the Wiser News database. The news texts analysis follows the social constructivism approach, and particular attention was given to the juxtaposition of the sub-topics within the news article and the expressions used for describing Japan and China. The interviewed journalists were responsible for covering Japan between 2009 and 2015, and the interview outlines are constructed based on the “social organization of news work” (Schudson 2000). The access to the three newspapers started in December 2016, and the interviews were conducted between May 2017 and April 2020 through face-to-face meetings and follow-up telephone interviews. Through snowballing, it was possible to interview 35 media workers. Meanwhile, the three newspapers’ internal publications were also collected during the fieldwork to help triangulate the analysis of the news texts and the interview data.

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Development of the 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku islands disputes and the three subframes for conflicts interpretation The Diaoyu/Senkaku islands issue is one of the most critical and sensitive issues in Sino-Japanese relations. Unfortunately, the disputes resurfaced at the beginning of 2012, and Table 7.1 provides a brief introduction to the conflict’s development in 2012. The triangulated analysis of the news texts, news workers’ interview data, and newspapers’ internal publications indicates three interpretive subframes for the Chinese public to understand the conflicts around a remote water area, as Table 7.2 presents: (1) Japan’s responsibility for the disputes, (2) China’s tough stance on Japan, and (3) consequences of the disputes. Between August and October 2012, The Beijing News, Oriental Morning Post, and the Southern Metropolis Daily, respectively, produced 282, 334, and 249 news articles about the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands issue. The news reports under the first Table 7.1 Development of 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku islands disputes Date 2 January 2012 3 March 2012

Key incidents of the 2012 disputes escalation

Four Japanese citizens landed on one of the disputed Senkaku islands. Chinese State Oceanic Administration and Ministry of Civil Affairs published “standard” names for the Diaoyu island and its affiliated islets. 27 March 2012 Japanese chief cabinet secretary Osamu Fujimura announced that Japan had registered the island as a national asset. 16 April 2012 At the Heritage Foundation speech in Washington, DC, Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara announced that the Tokyo Metropolitan government was considering the purchase of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. 27 April 2012 Tokyo Metropolitan government set up an account to accept donations for the purchase of the islands. 10 June 2012 Six Japanese diet members headed to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. 4 July 2012 Hong Kong Baodiao group sailed from Taiwan to the Diaoyu/ Senkaku islands. 7 July 2012 Japanese Prime minister Yoshihiko Noda declared that the national government was considering the purchase of the islands on July 7, one of the most sensitive dates in the Sino-Japanese war. 11–12 July 2012 Chinese fishing vessels sailed through the Diaoyu/Senkaku waters. 14 August 2012 Seven Hong Kong Baodiao activists reached the islands with the flags of both China and Taiwan. 19 August 2012 Ten Japanese activists swam to the islands and raised Japanese flags. 2 September Japan’s national government decided to purchase the islands from a 2012 private Japanese owner. 10 September The Japanese national government announced the purchase/ 2012 nationalisation of the islands from the Kurihara family. 14 September Six Chinese surveillance ships sailed into waters around Diaoyu/ 2012 Senkaku islands. 18 September Two Japanese activists landed on the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands on the 2012 anniversary of Japan’s invasion of Manchuria.

The domain of the State 95 Table 7.2 Percentage of three news frames in The Beijing News (BJN), Oriental Morning Post (OMP), and Southern Metropolis Daily (SMD) August–October 2012 Category

BJN

OMP

SMD

Japan’s responsibility for disputes escalation Japanese government’s c position Disputes become Japanese domestic political leverage Japanese nationalists and conservatives’ provocation The “Unrepentant” Japan Japan's territorial conflict with neighbour countries Interference of the USA Subtotal China’s tough stance on Japan Chinese official reactions Baodiao activists Chinese civic support (tourists’ trip cancellation) International support (including Taiwan) Historical evidence of Chinese sovereignty Using economic “weapon” on Japan Subtotal Consequences of the disputes Anti-Japan behaviours (rational patriotism while criticising the violence) Deterioration of Sino-Japanese commercial ties Negative influence on Japanese corporations Economic consequences on China Preventing the degradation of Sino-Japanese relations Subtotal General Total Number of articles (N)

90 7 11 10 17 31 14 32.3% 110 79 8 10 7 5 1 39.4% 42 20

86 39 9 6 11 21 26 33.5% 104 61 3 21 6 2 11 31.1% 53 5

90 17 2 5 12 32 22 36.2% 74 53 5 5 8 2 1 31.7% 33 11

7 3 3 9 14.2% 40 282 839

7 13 8 20 19.2% 65 308

3 3 4 8 11.0% 52 249

subframe, “Japan is responsible for the escalation of the disputes” takes a similar percentage in three newspapers. The second subframe “China’s tough stance on Japan” was found at 39.4% in The Beijing News’ total reports, which is slightly higher than the other two papers because of its better access to governmental sources in Beijing. The third news frame “Consequences of the disputes” should be considered the part of news produced under strict informational control. The interview data indicate that the violence-related information during the anti-Japanese protests has been censored. The “General” category includes the news coverage of Japan’s security policy in East Asia and the Sino-Japanese war anniversary, which did not mention the disputed islands but implied Japanese politicians’ behaviour with regard to the origins of the territorial disputes. The commentary written by special contributors stressing multi-themes about geopolitics was also included in the “General” category. The three newspapers’ coverage of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands disputes between 1 August 2012 and 31 October 2012 had three consecutive waves in reporting (See Figure 7.1)

Figure 7.1 Frequency comparison of news reporting on Diaoyu/Senkaku islands 1 August 2012–31 October 2012 (The Beijing News [BJN], Oriental Morning Post [OMP], and Southern Metropolis Daily [SMD])

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The domain of the State 97 The first wave of reporting was between 15 August and 31 August 2012. This first peak in the volume of news coverage corresponded with both China and Japan’s nationalists’ sailing to the disputed islands. On 1 September 2012, all three newspapers released an article about Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda’s letter to President Hu Jintao, stressing his desire to prevent the worsening of Sino-Japanese relations. Following this, the number of news articles covering the Diaoyu islands dropped significantly at the very beginning of September. However, with the Japanese national government’s announcement of the purchase/nationalisation of the disputed islands from the Kurihara family on 10 September 2012, the number of reports rose again. The period covers another sensitive date: September 18 – the “National Humiliation Day.” The volume of news coverage about the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands reached a second peak around 2 October. These two waves of reporting were in line with the anti-Japan protests during that month. The third wave of reports started on 19 October, one day after 76 Japanese diet members visited Yasukuni Shrine. The media practitioners have formed a production routine to provide instant follow-up about the conflicting sides of China and Japan.

Addressing the cause of the 2012 disputes: Japan is responsible for the 2012 conflict escalation While explaining the complicated islands disputes of 2012 to the public, the interpretation of the Japanese government’s action forms the fundamental informing base that “Japan is responsible for the escalation of the 2012 disputes.” Throughout August and October, the three newspapers closely followed the Japanese government’s position in claiming sovereignty over the Diaoyu/ Senkaku islands, Japanese domestic politics, and right-wingers’ activities. From the news producers’ perspective, this subframe was the most crucial, as it was at the core of providing a valid explanation for the Japanese government’s decision to “nationalizing” the Diaoyu islands in 2012 (Interview on 22 May 2018, and 27 February 2019). When The Beijing News, Oriental Morning Post, and Southern Metropolis Daily covered the 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku islands disputes, their reporting stance was to stress “Japanese government claiming that no dispute exists.” Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda had denied that there was a dispute over the Senkaku islands on various occasions – at the Japanese House of Representatives (BJN, 24 August 2012; OMP, 25 August 2012), the United Nations (BJN, 17 September 2012), and the Japanese Extraordinary Diet session (BJN, 30 October 2012). The Oriental Morning Post (16 August 2012) criticised the Democratic Party of Japan’s get-tough policy on territorial topics. The later reports of OMP gave more details about the Japanese government’s hard-line policy; for example, it included the leads: “Japan’s 24-hour surveillance over the Diaoyu islands water area” (OMP, 21 August 2012), the “possible lawsuit against the Chinese Baodiao activists (Diaoyu islands protectors) instead of just repatriating them” (OMP, 22 August 2012), and the increasing expense of the “Japan Ground Self-Defence

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Force’s purchasing of amphibious assault ship aimed at defending the islands” (OMP, 28 August 2012). Similarly, the Southern Metropolis Daily also focused on covering the details of Japan’s strategy in dealing with the Senkaku disputes, including the “action plan of the Japanese Coast Guard that allowed the use of guns in an action plan of ‘protecting’ the Diaoyu islands,” which was quoted from the JNOCNEWS, a Japan-located Chinese news website without fact-checking. Despite China’s demand for Japan to cancel the purchase, the Japanese Foreign Minister “insists that the purchase will not be withdrawn as the nationalisation has been accomplished” (BJN, 13 September 2012).

Bridging the Japanese domestic politics, nationalists, and the islands disputes To explain the Japanese government’s “firmly standing (juebu rangbu)” posture over the Senkaku islands, the three newspapers connected it to Japanese domestic politics and how the islands issue was used to achieve certain political goals. The three newspapers gave extensive attention to both the Noda administration and the oppositional Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). As the leader of the Democratic Party of Japan, “Prime Minister Noda is confronting a leadership vote in his party, but it seems the party intends to have a new leader (if he cannot fulfil the domestic requirement and handle the Senkaku issue well)” (BJN, 7 September 2012). On 12 September, The Beijing News delivered an article stating that “Noda seized the opportunity to make himself known as a tough figure towards China.” The special contributor Shen Yi from Fudan University expressed a similar opinion in a commentary on Oriental Morning Post on 17 August 2012, suggesting that “Japan played the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute card to fulfil its domestic political needs.” As for the oppositional Liberal Democratic Party, the news texts emphasised that “the LDP attacked the ‘weak’ Democratic Party and required the government to proceed with the ‘nationalization’ of the islands” (BJN, 18 August 2012). Meanwhile, another important Japanese political figure of the LDP, Shinzo Abe, was reported as using the defence of sovereignty to win the Party’s leadership election (BJN, 27 September; 29 September 2012; OMP, 27 September, 16 October 2012; SMD, 13 September 2012). As such, all three newspapers featured Japan’s domestic political background of “nationalizing” the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands prominently. The Japanese nationalists behind the scenes of the 2012 disputes also received significant attention. While this happened in 2012, the Diaoyu/Senkaku topic was initially brought into public view after the most well-known right-wing politician Shintaro Ishihara’s announcement about the Tokyo Metropolitan government’s purchasing plan in April 2012. Meanwhile, the nationalists’ provocation over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands issue is criticised as the result of the Japanese government’s deliberate “tolerance” to the right-wingers (OMP, 4 September, 4 October 2012). The “Japanese nationalists’ provocation” is bonded to the previous two subjects the “Japanese government’s hard-line position” and “the islands disputes have become domestic political leverage,” whereby certain right-wing

The domain of the State 99 politicians were seen as bearing responsibilities for stirring up the islands disputes in 2012.

An unrepentant Japan, neo-imperialism, and the USA Just like all the other Sino-Japanese relations turbulence, the 2012 Diaoyu/ Senkaku islands disputes were also easily intertwined with the historical war images of Japan in the three newspapers’ reporting, where the expression “unrepentant Japan” is frequently utilised. The three-month period coincided with World War II anniversaries, 15 August as the “victory over Japan day,” and 18 September (National Humiliation Day), which marks the Japanese army’s invasion of northeast China in 1931. The Japanese Diet members’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine on 15 August 2012 were thus woven into the interpretation of the Japanese government’s decision to purchase the disputed islands by the three newspapers. Oriental Morning Post ran an editorial emphasising that “Japan challenged the post-World War II order when claiming sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands” on 2 September. Around these most important anniversary dates, Japanese politicians’ visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, which is symbolic of Japanese imperialist aggression, further triggered the “unrepentant Japan” narrative and offered the grounding to interpret the “nationalization” of the Diaoyu/ Senkaku islands in the context of Japan’s denial of its past war responsibility (BJN, 16 August 2012; OMP, 12 August, 15 August 2012; SMD, 16 August 2012). The geopolitical involvement of the USA attracted news producers’ attention. From the perspective of the journalists and editors, the USA played a critical role in the perpetuation of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands disputes in Sino-Japanese relations (Interview on 29 November 2018). The specific description of the Japan–US military drill action by utilising the phrase “seizing the islands” made the point that the military exercises were targeting the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. As a result, Japan is portrayed as being driven by USA’s hegemonic power under the US–Japan Security Treaty, with Tokyo lacking an independent ability to make strategic decisions for herself (BJN, 27 August, 16 October; OMP, 27 August; SMD, 27 August 2012).

The reaction of China: China’s tough stance against Japan Between August and October 2012, the second subframe, “China’s tough stance on Japan,” represented a substantial amount of the three newspapers’ coverage of the 2012 Sino-Japanese islands disputes. The protagonists in the reaction of China included Chinese officials, Chinese civic support, the Baodiao (Diaoyu islands protectors) activists, the international community, and the historical evidence of Chinese sovereignty. As shown in Figure 7.2, the peak of the reports stressing China’s tough stance toward Japan came after the Japanese government’s official announcement of purchasing the islands from the Kurihara family on 11 September 2012.

Figure 7.2 Frequencies of “China’s tough stance” news frame along timeline echoing the unified support of China’s tough stance (The Beijing News [BJN], Oriental Morning Post [OMP], and Southern Metropolis Daily [SMD])

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The domain of the State 101 When The Beijing News, Oriental Morning Post, and the Southern Metropolis Daily explain China’s reaction to the 2012 disputes, they are consonant with the official statements by closely following the Chinese government’s responses, including the official statements of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defence, the People’s Liberation Army, the China Maritime Safety Administration, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs overseeing the fishing industry. In 2012, the Diaoyu/Senkaku disputes had effects beyond the mere words of diplomatic statements. The China Marine Surveillance vessels started to take actual patrolling actions over the waters off the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands after 11 September. The patrolling of the Chinese vessels was closely followed throughout September and October in 2012 (BJN, 12 September, 15 September, 20 September, 4 October, 11 October, 21 October, 26 October, 31 October; OMP, 12 September, 13 September, 15 September, 17 September, 19 September, 7 October, 17 October, 20 October; SMD, 12 September, 15 September, 17 September, 18 September, 19 September, 17 October, 21 October, 26 October, 29 October, 31 October), and this patrolling indicated that “China is capable of defending its territorial integrity.” Official statements delivered by CCP leaders and different governmental institutions carried the headline “absolutely no concession by China regarding the Diaoyu Islands.” In addition, the three newspapers all delivered stories of the Baodiao activists who landed on the disputed islands in August 2012 based on their original interviews to provide personalised angles about the public support for China’s claim over the islands’ sovereignty. After the China National Tourism Administration issued “an official reminder of tourism safety to Japan” on 2 September, members of the Chinese public boycotted travel to Japan. This was closely followed by the newspapers, including 70% of travellers in Shanghai giving up visiting Japan in the upcoming golden week (OMP, 24 September 2012), and the tourism agencies’ full-refund policy for the cancelled trips to Japan (BJN, 19 September; 25 September 2012). The news coverage of tourists assisted in constructing the narrative that the Chinese public showed their collective action against Japan’s nationalisation of the Diaoyu islands.

Drawing the international community and Taiwan to support China Under the news frame “China’s tough stance on Japan,” a number of reports signify that China’s claim against Japan has a moral basis and is supported by the international community. This point was reflected in the coverage of the South Korean high court’s comparatively “light” ten-month sentence imposed on Liu Qiang, an activist convicted of arson in an attack on the Japanese embassy in Seoul (OMP, SMD, 24 August 2012). The support from Germany and Spain (SMD, 19 September 2012), Britain, France, and Germany (BJN, 2 October 2012) was also published through sourcing from Xinhua. Southern Metropolis Daily delivered the message that China had obtained the support of Russia and that they would “hold a discussion about defending the achievements of World War II” (SMD,

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31 October 2012). By covering the international support, the criticism was also levelled at Japan’s action, which in turn signified that China’s stance in insisting on the sovereignty claim of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands was morally justified. Taiwan’s role was depicted as the co-operator with mainland Chinese compatriots, and all three newspapers chose the expression “China-Taiwan” to follow the fundamental “One-China policy.” A constantly mentioned episode among journalists is that when they published the photograph of the landing of Baodiao activists on the disputed islands in 2012, the Southern Metropolis Daily directly removed the flag of Taiwan from the photo, and The Beijing News deliberately cut the image and only kept the People’s Republic of China (PRC) flag. To avoid the possible political risk, Oriental Morning Post used another photo when covering this incident. The three newspapers removed all the symbols that could relate to the Republic of China (Taiwan) to fulfil the requirement of propaganda departments.

Delivering the consequences within limited journalistic autonomy These three newspapers addressed the following themes in their interpretation of the 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku islands disputes: the anti-Japanese protests and the negative economic influence on China and Japan. Meanwhile, they also proposed suggestions for preventing further degradation of Sino-Japanese relations caused by territorial disputes. The peak of news provisions on these consequences came between September 12 and 19 September 2012 (see Figure 7.3). In 2012, as the anger built up in China and Japan, mass protests broke out in “287 prefectural-level cities,” marking the highest peak of the on-going tensions between the two nations (Wallace & Weiss, 2015) throughout China between August 15 and the end of September 2012. Regarding the protests, the official Chinese news narrative is that the protests were “overall peaceful” and that they called for the Chinese public to express their patriotism in a rational way. The fact is that there were many protesters vandalising Japanese goods and smashing shops selling Japanese brands. Because of the ban on reporting these riots, the reporters and editors could only use some situational practices and roundabout ways to imply the level of violence during the anti-Japan protests. The Beijing News, Oriental Morning Post, and Southern Metropolis Daily expressed their criticism of the violent anti-Japan protests. However, by doing so, they have to cap the criticism by claiming that “Japan is responsible for the escalation of the dispute” and “Chinese public’s tough stance is reasonable.” The criticism toward the violence of the protests was not very obvious until several local police authorities explicitly highlighted that the vandalisation during the protests was a flagrant violation of the law. On 16 September 2012, The Beijing News ran a commentary entitled, “Being a patriot means being a citizen that obeys the law”: Baodiao as a movement does not empower the activists to break the law or hurt the other citizens. Being a patriot today is quite different from what

Figure 7.3 Frequencies of “Consequences of the disputes” frame (The Beijing News [BJN], Oriental Morning Post [OMP], and Southern Metropolis Daily [SMD])

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On 18 September, the anniversary of the Japanese military invasion of China, The Beijing News published another commentary entitled, “Being confident on the ‘national humiliation day’”: Solving the territorial disputes between China and Japan relies on a strong nation and not on empty slogans. To achieve this, it is necessary to improve hardware like the economy, military and technology; meanwhile, it is of equivalent importance to enhance soft power like the democracy established on the rule of law, fairness, and justice, equality and freedom. Right after this paragraph, it states that The Japanese government’s “purchase” of the islands is illegal and made the Sino-Japanese relations to drop to the lowest point. Since last weekend, in some cities, many people have gone out into the streets to express their patriotism and to protest against the Japanese government … Japan should take full responsibility for such kinds of situation, and Japan holds the key to maintain[ing] the peace in Sino-Japanese relations and deal[ing] with the Diaoyu islands issue rationally. Apparently, the author of this commentary paralleled the criticism of anti-Japan violence with the claim that “The Japanese government is responsible for the anti-Japan sentiment rising in China.” In the Southern Metropolis Daily, there was a similar way of clustering the topics within one report. Although the purpose of publishing such an editorial article was to criticise that “the car-vandalizing, and shop and restaurant smashing were not patriotic actions but crimes,” it still had to articulate that the protests were reasonable “in response to the Japanese government’s provocation.” At the same time, the three newspapers waited for the police authority’s confirmation about the anti-Japan violence and then delivered the reports. For journalists, choosing the timing wisely is very important when covering a sensitive topic like this. On 25 September and 26 September 2012, The Beijing News released two articles on domestic news pages: one about the protesters who smashed cars in Shenzhen and the other about people suspected of wrecking cars during the Changsha protests in Hunan province. Both articles were sourced from local police investigations. As a significant incident during the 2012 anti-Japan protests, the Li Jianli case was mentioned repetitively by different reporters and editors during the interview. A Toyota car owner Li Jianli was struck on the head by protesters on 15 September 2012 in Xi’an, Shanxi Province, which might

The domain of the State 105 cause a severe reduction of cognitive and language ability for the rest of his life. Even though the Li Jianli incident occurred on 15 September The Beijing News could not publish anything about it until 27 September after the video of his attack went viral on social media. It is undeniable that the Li incident created a rupture for reporters who could publish something on the violence of the protests in late September.

Economic setbacks not only for Japan but also for China In Sino-Japanese relations, a popular mantra is that the relationship is “Hot Economics, Cold Politics.” Although the three liberal-oriented newspapers released news on a Chinese official call to boycott Japanese brands and start using the “economic weapon” with Japan, they also stressed that the economic setback would not only affect Japan but also China. For example, The Beijing News published an interview with Jiang Zengwei, the deputy minister of Commerce on 14 September 2012. During the interview, Jiang states that “the Japanese government’s purchase of the islands will undoubtedly exert a bad influence on Sino-Japanese economic and trade ties.” Jiang also indicates that China would consider using economic weapons to combat Japan’s nationalisation of the islands. However, on the same day, The Beijing News published an interview with a professor at the Institute of International Studies of Tsinghua University, Liu Jiangyong, who explained, Boycotting the Japanese products will not help solve the territorial disputes. Some might think that not buying Japanese products will make the Japanese government give up the firm posture when dealing with territorial issues, but such an idea is unrealistic and immature. The territorial disputes can never be solved in such a way. In our current economic activities, it is impossible to distinguish which one is a “pure” Japanese product, because the economic activities have already been internationalized, highly globalized, and we have very significant mutual interdependence. (BJN, 14 September 2012) Similar comments were delivered on the following day, 15 September, by The Beijing News, entitled, “We should be careful about taking economic measures against Japan.” Through interviewing experts of Japanese studies in China, The Beijing News tried to reveal the complexity of the Sino-Japanese economic ties, to demonstrate a counter stance to the simplified proposition of using economic weight to put pressure on Japan. In later reports, it stressed that not only the Japanese corporations’ profits were harmed, but the Chinese workers were also negatively affected. The Beijing News published an article in the section of automobile industry news on 24 September titled, “When Japanese car’s promotion was suspended, the Chinese dealers suffered.” The reporter investigated “the negative influences on Chinese car dealers have just begun” by listing economic data and interviews with car dealers in different Chinese cities. It specifically stressed

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that many Japanese cars adopted the “Sino-Japan Joint Venture” operation and due to the anti-Japanese protests that “a Chinese company responsible for promoting Japanese cars had lost businesses”; at the same time, “the stock price of the Guangzhou Automobile company that is involved in major cooperation with Japanese brands, drops to its lowest in history.” This news aims to deliver the message that any boycott of Japanese cars also hurts the Chinese economy. Similar content was also evident in the 23 October article in the Oriental Morning Post, where the reporter cites the opinion of an anonymous senior executive of an automobile company: Japanese brands are important to sustain balanced competition in the Chinese automobile market. A reduced number of Japanese cars in the market might cause other brands’ prices to increase and the service quality to decrease. This would eventually hurt the Chinese consumers themselves. (OMP, 23 October 2012) This piece was published alongside a report on how “Japan’s exports to China dropped by 14 percent in September.” Therefore, the reporter and editor highlighted the economic consequences that both China and Japan would suffer. On September 18, the “National Humiliation Day,” the Oriental Morning Post was reprinted from the China International Capital Corporation. The report was entitled, “Anti-Japan sentiment hurts the Japanese home appliance brand but won’t bring advantage for the Chinese brand.” China and Japan share interdependent Sino-Japanese economic relations, and a rift between these two big economic entities would definitely cause damage to both sides. In comparison, Southern Metropolis Daily’s coverage was more focused on a local perspective and covered how the protests affected the immigrant workers in those China–Japan joint venture-controlled factories operated in the Guangdong province. As newspapers with a liberal stance among Chinese media, the three papers called for efforts to prevent the further deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations.

Conclusion and discussion The 2012 disputes surrounding the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands were one of the most critical and intense Sino-Japanese territorial conflicts in the 21st century. This chapter puts the focus on the liberal-oriented The Beijing News, Oriental Morning Post, and the Southern Metropolis Daily and uncovers their interpretation of the 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku islands disputes, that Japan should take full responsibility for the 2012 disputes escalation, and China’s tough reaction toward Japan is reasonable. Meanwhile, the three newspapers tried to highlight that the negative consequences caused by protests and boycotts are for both sides. Different incidents that occurred from August to October 2012 were incorporated into the reporting to form an interpretation of the 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku disputes. The interviewed journalists and editors, especially those who have worked in the field for more than ten years, shared their self-reflection about the enduring,

The domain of the State 107 coherent narrow repertoire when covering the Diaoyu/Senkaku disputes throughout the years, “the explanation provided by the Chinese media on the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands issue always lacks ‘informativeness’, even though the island dispute is a repetitive and important issue in Sino-Japanese relations” (Interview on 22 May 2018; Interview on 16 August 2018; Interview on 27 February 2019). The Diaoyu/Senkaku issue is one of the most critical issues with persistent newsworthiness, but regional commercial newspapers’ lack of long-term correspondents1 in Japan created difficulties for direct access to Japanese news sources. The very limited news source is a fundamental problem from the senior editors’ perspective. Meanwhile, reporters and editors pointed out that the English media’s coverage of the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue often overtly emphasised the Japan–China conflicts within which China was considered to play a larger role, which was not useful for them to explain the territorial disputes. Journalists particularly pointed out that the reasons behind the Japanese government’s decision to purchase the disputed islands were not thoroughly analysed by English media sources. Meanwhile, reporting China’s reaction is a zero-sum space topic for the media. The journalists and editors consider that they are constrained by national interests, “the maximum we can say is that the islands are disputed, but in 2012 the Japanese government declared no disputes over the islands, or the island’s issues are subject to domestic Japanese law. So, these facts have left us stuck in the middle, and it is a deadlock” (Interview on 22 May 2018; Interview on 29 November 2018; Interview on 27 February 2019). Some reporters agreed with the idea that the Japanese government’s “nationalisation” of the islands was an attempt by the DPJ to defuse the situation by taking it out of Ishihara’s and local right-wing LDP politicians’ hands (Gries et al., 2016, p. 162). However, they could never explain the disputes in such a way to the Chinese public who was used to an authoritarian context where the central government exercises overall control over local and metropolitan governments. From the news producers’ view, this is a great failure. In international news reporting, some areas are geographic dead ground, and journalists only have limited access to the context and tend to draw an “us versus them” contradiction when covering these countries (Curran et al., 2009). Japan is not a geographically remote or culturally distant country for China, but the news workers could only produce an interpretation of Japan’s role based on the “thin” informational ground created by the CCP’s political needs. The 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku disputes are connected to the issues of rising nationalism, domestic protests, and social stability which are extremely crucial for the CCP’s ruling (Weatherley, 2006). Therefore, when covering China’s reaction to the 2012 disputes, the three newspapers’ sourcing practices are limited to only the official statements, which is a combined impact of the State’s tough stance and the other governmental department’s faithful following of the central government. Existing research has shown that the Sino-Japanese conflicts can easily turn into a public opinion crisis (Stockmann, 2010), if the State’s posture toward Japan is not as strong as the public expects, such a mismatch might lead to social instability and a widespread backlash against the Chinese Communist

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Party. After the Japanese national government announced the “nationalization” of the islands, various Chinese governmental departments had ready-made scripts to express their tough stance toward Japan. Once these announcements were released, the news media continued to update them. For news producers, there is a lack of firm external sources to provide alternative information to explain China’s role, but they can only accept the top-to-bottom “flooding” at the expense of the other possible viewpoints (Roberts, 2018). In terms of the high percentage of official releases as news sources, reporters and editors at the three liberal-oriented newspapers brought up an unexpected point. As the three newspapers have comparatively liberal-oriented stances, they would like to use the official sources which are with very dry slogans but still much better than the jingoistic, name-calling nationalistic reporting like the Global Times (Interview on 14 November 2017, and 22 December 2018). Thus, using official sources to indicate China’s reaction is also a choice made by the news producers themselves. Consequently, “China’s tough stance on Japan” appeared to be the prism through which many looked when reporting on China’s role in the 2012 disputes. There is only more latitude for the reporters and editors when covering the consequences of the disputes. The three newspapers shared remarkably similar strategies when covering the consequential anti-Japan protests and the violence in 2012. When depicting the protests in China, the management personnel of the newspaper, the editors, and the journalists had to constantly evaluate the political risk of publishing the protests-related news. The news producers internalised the propaganda requirements into the news production process, and they defaulted to the position that “Japan should be held responsible for the escalation of the disputes” and the “tough Chinese stance is reasonable” as a cover-all expression allowing the otherwise unacceptable opinions (Interview on 26 February 2019). This is seen in their criticism of the violence in the protests, the rising nationalistic sentiment, and Chinese officials’ tolerance of the violent protests. At the same time, these three liberal-oriented newspapers all used a similar critical tone against the proposition of using the market economy to advance Chinese interests in the Diaoyu islands. The three papers also emphasised how the Chinese and Japanese economies had become highly dependent on each other to criticise the short-sighted view of calling for a boycott of Japanese products. The journalists and editors were trying to bring up the criticism of the anti-Japanese protests and the negative economic outcomes for China. But this could only lurk in the overwhelming number of news reports that stress the “evil” unreasonable Japan versus the victimised “good” China that must have a firm and uncompromising stance. As news workers at liberal-oriented newspapers, the limited journalistic professionalism is presented as situational, marginal practices accompanied by resistance toward the official narratives about the protests. The analysis of this chapter demonstrates the complexity of the liberal-oriented newspapers’ failure to produce an alternative narrative from the State’s official line in interpreting the 2012 disputes. It also indicates that even as liberaloriented newspapers seemingly agree with the State’s narratives, they still try

The domain of the State 109 to differentiate themselves from the Global Times which sells nationalism for profits. The analysis of the 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku islands disputes in this chapter reveals that the Chinese media’s reporting activity is a “complex phenomenon that resists simplistic analysis of the ‘freedom versus control’” (Cho & Chan, 2010, p. 165). Although it is not representative of the entire news organisation in all of China, this chapter nonetheless gives us certain grounds for rethinking how contemporary news emanating from China should be read and understood.

Note 1 The privilege of setting up long-term overseas bureaus is given to state-sponsored news organizations. The regional newspapers could send out temporary reporters overseas.

Reference list Baum, M. A., & Potter, P. B. K. (2008). The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis. Annual Review of Political Science, 11(1), 39–65. Callahan, W. A. (2007). Trauma and Community: The Visual Politics of Chinese Nationalism and Sino-Japanese Relations. Theory & Event, 10(4), 1–57. Cho, H. J., & Choi, A. (2016). Why do Territorial Disputes Escalate? A Domestic Political Explanation for the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute. Pacific Focus, 31(2), 254–282. Cho, L., & Chan, Y. (2010). Investigative Journalism in China. Hong Kong University Press. Curran, J., Iyengar, S., Brink Lund, A., & Salovaara-Moring, I. (2009). Media System, Public Knowledge and Democracy: A Comparative Study. European Journal of Communication, 24(1), 5–26. Gavan, J. (2011). Small Islands – Big Problem: Senkaku/Diaoyu and the Weight of History and Geography in China-Japan Relations, 2011. The Asia-Pacific Journal, 9(1), 1–14. Gries, P. H., Steiger, D., & Wang, T. (2016). Popular Nationalism and China’s Japan Policy: the Diaoyu Islands protests, 2012–2013. Journal of Contemporary China, 25(98), 264–276. Guan, B., Xia, Y., & Cheng, G. (2017). Power Structure and Media Autonomy in China: The Case of Southern Weekend. Journal of Contemporary China, 26(104), 233–248. Kennedy, J. J. (2009). Maintaining Popular Support for the Chinese Communist Party: The Influence of Education and the State-Controlled Media. Political Studies, 57(3), 517–536. LIU, S.-D. (2006). China’s Popular Nationalism on the Internet. Report on the 2005 anti Japan Network Struggles. Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 7(1), 144–155. Pan, Z., & Chan, J. M. (2003). Shifting Journalistic Paradigms: How China’s Journalists Assess “Media Exemplars.” Communication Research, 30(6), 649–682. Reilly, J. (2012). Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China’s Japan Policy. Columbia University Press. Roberts, M. (2018). Censored: Distraction and Diversion Inside China’s Great Firewall. Princeton University Press. Schudson, M. (2000). The Sociology of News Production Revisited (Again). In Mass Media and Society, 3(1), 175–200.

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Schneider, F. (2016). China’s ‘info-web’: How Beijing governs online political communication about Japan. New Media & Society, 18(11), 2664–2684. Shirk, S. L. 2007. Changing media, changing foreign policy in China. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 8(1), 43–70. Stockmann, D. (2010). Who Believes Propaganda? Media effects during the Anti-Japanese Protests in Beijing, The China Quarterly, 202, 269–289. Wallace, J. L., & Weiss, J. C. (2015). The Political Geography of Nationalist Protest in China: Cities and the 2012 Anti-Japanese Protests. The China Quarterly, 222, 403–429. Wang, J., & Wang, X. (2014). Media and Chinese Foreign Policy. Journal of Contemporary China, 23(86), 216–235. Weatherley, R. (2006). Politics in China since 1949: Legitimizing Authoritarian Rule. Routledge. Zhang, Z. (2014). Fanning the Flames of Public Rage: Coverage of Diaoyu Islands Dispute in Chinese Legacy Media. In The Dispute Over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (pp. 81– 118). Palgrave Macmillan.

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How is NATO viewed in China? NATO’s strategic communication and perceptions of Zhihu users Shixin Ivy Zhang, Altman Yuzhu Peng, and Ranna Huang

Introduction Amid the rise of China’s economic and military power and international influence, the military alliance NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) has paid greater attention to China, the formerly “unknown variable,” in the multilateral and multipolar world (Kropatcheva, 2014; Stewart & Emmott, 2019). For the first time, China becomes an important topic in political discussions within NATO with reactions ranging from “hysteria to indifference” (Oertel, 2019). In June 2020, The Economist reported that the alliance is exploring ways to adapt to the rising power of China with an aim of retaining a sense of purpose in 2030 (NATO sets its sights on China, 2020). As Oertel (2019, p. 67) noted, “relations with and posture towards an increasingly assertive China will be a key theme for NATO in the coming decades.” On 14 June 2021, NATO leaders discussed issues at the NATO Summit in Brussels, such as Russia’s aggressive behaviour, terrorism, cyber-attacks, disruptive technologies, the rise of China, and climate change. In the Communiqué, it states, China’s stated ambitions and assertive behavior present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and areas relevant to Alliance security … China is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal with more warheads and a larger number of sophisticated delivery systems to establish a nuclear triad … It is also cooperating militarily with Russia. (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2021, n.p.) Meanwhile, NATO declares that it maintains a constructive dialogue and engages with China on common challenges such as climate change. On the side of China, except for NATO’s bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, NATO was absent in Chinese official communication since “NATO as such has not played a significant role in Chinese foreign policy” (Šebok & Turcsányi, 2021, p. 10). China views military alliances as “anachronistic” and NATO as a “product of the Cold War.” Chinese official media have depicted NATO as a tool for perpetuating the US hegemony. “While China has not officially DOI: 10.4324/9781003261278-8

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opposed NATO’s eastern enlargement, it has generally perceived and framed this development in negative terms” (Šebok & Turcsányi, 2021, p. 10). In response to NATO’s new China strategy, Chinese diplomats often rebutted NATO’s “China threat” theory and condemned NATO’s role in the Ukraine crisis. After the Russia– Ukraine conflict broke out in March 2022, Zhao Lijian, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, said at a press conference, “the key to solving the Ukraine crisis is in the hands of the United States and NATO” (Xinhua, 18 March, 2022). On 8 March, China Daily published an opinion piece with the headline “NATO expansion triggered Russia–Ukraine conflict.” In this article, Boyle (2022) writes, “People should understand the root cause behind the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The bid to expand NATO poses a serious threat to Russia.” This statement has more or less reflected the general public attitude towards NATO in China. NATO’s external perceptions are central to NATO’s strategic communication (Stratcom). On its official website – NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, it states, Today’s information environment, characterized by a 24/7 news cycle, the rise of social networking sites, and the interconnectedness of audiences in and beyond NATO nations territory, directly affects how NATO actions are perceived by key audiences. That perception is always relevant to, and can have a direct effect on the success of NATO operations and policies. (stratcomcoe.org) In the academic field, a growing body of literature has investigated NATO perceptions in both NATO and non-NATO countries. “Research into NATO perceptions has been an increasingly popular topic” (Chaban, Beltyukova & Fox, 2018). However, few studies have looked into the views of members of the Chinese public towards NATO. Even for the recent report titled, “China as a narrative challenge for NATO member state” published by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, the authors used sources from Chinese officials and state media (Šebok & Turcsányi, 2021). In this context, this chapter aims to examine how Chinese social media users perceive NATO and the main narratives and discourses employed by online users. The chapter proceeds as follows: it starts with a literature review on NATO’s relationship with China, NATO’s strategic communication and external perceptions, as well as social media in China. We then raise research questions and illustrate research methods. The underlining discourses of Chinese social media users in view of NATO are presented and discussed before we offer concluding remarks. The findings of the research enable us to predict the future trajectory of Sino–NATO relations and to explain the online public opinion towards NATO, considering the Chinese government’s domestically oriented approach to international diplomacy.

NATO’s relationship with China NATO is a regional intra-governmental security organisation formed on 4 April 1949 to contain and counter the former Soviet Union and to strengthen

How is NATO viewed in China? 113 transatlantic defence and security. In the academic field, scholars have debated NATO’s relationship with China. On the one hand, Sino–NATO relations are full of tensions. NATO may see threats and risks posed by China due to its emerging military superpower status, its partnership with Russia, as well as its potential to combine economic power with technological supremacy in cyberspace (Oertel, 2019) as well as its potential to drive the transatlantic alliance apart (Bechná & Thayer, 2016). Moreover, the USA regards China as a hegemonic threat and hopes to draw NATO into the anti-China military front (Bechná & Thayer, 2016; Wang & Wu, 2020). For China, historical considerations (e.g. the event of the embassy bombing in 1999), the expansion of NATO’s sphere of influence, the geography and dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region and Central Asia, and the Russia factors are unfavourable for the cooperation between China and NATO (Wang & Wu, 2020). On the other hand, NATO and China can form and maintain a collaborative relationship. Both parties share a common interest in maintaining global security in the areas of crisis management, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, non-proliferation, and counter-piracy (Chacho, 2014). After all, the close geographical location, the global risks such as the pandemic and climate change, and the economic and trade exchanges between China and some NATO member countries make cooperation possible (Wang & Wu, 2020). Historically, Sino–NATO relations did not attract much attention during the Cold War (Lin, 2012; Chacho, 2014). A crisis occurred in 1999 after NATO bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo conflict, which killed 3 and wounded 27 Embassy employees (Chacho, 2014). The bombing might have provoked the “most hysteric Chinese nationalist movement,” but the Chinese nationalist sentiments did not lead to China’s nationalist foreign policy (Shen, 2004, p. 126). In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in 2001, Afghanistan brought NATO to Asia. Since China shares a border with Afghanistan via the Wakhan Corridor, China was driven to engage NATO and vice versa (Lin, 2012). In 2002, the Chinese ambassador in Brussels visited NATO headquarter. Since then, both parties developed political dialogues on terrorism, maritime piracy, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, and crisis management (ibid.). In 2007, NATO wanted to establish direct “military-to-military” relations with the Chinese armed forces and shake off the embassy-bombing shadow (ibid.). However, the embassy bombing has left its mark on the Chinese people, and this has affected China’s stance towards NATO (Wang & Wu, 2020). The USA plays a fundamental role in NATO. As Oslen (2020, p. 65) puts it, “without the US there is no NATO.” NATO was founded under the leadership of the USA, and the USA has used NATO as a tool to control Europe and expand its global influence after the Cold War. “NATO’s transformation has always followed the national strategy of the US” (Wang and Wu, 2020, p. 70). Since 2010, the USA’s strategic priorities have shifted from Europe and the Middle East to China in the wake of the Obama administration’s “rebalancing” or “pivot to Asia” in 2011 and the Trump administration’s “strategic competition,” “decoupling” between the USA and China, and the reconceptualisation of Asia-Pacific into Indo-Pacific. Pressured by the Trump administration to harden its policy on

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China, NATO is “slowly but steadily edging toward casting China as an outright military competitor”; whereas “previously, the collective West avoided involving NATO in the context of the rising China” (Avdaliani, 2020; Gittings, 2021, p. 33). Following the London Summit in December 2019, NATO issued the London Declaration, which states that “We recognize that China’s growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance” (Wang & Wu, 2020, p. 68). Addressing China for the first time in its declaration, the significant shift in the Alliance’s vision can be explained by a few factors. First, China fits NATO’s global security agenda and justifies NATO’s relevance. As Sauer (2019) states, alliances only make sense in times of war, but NATO remained in existence after the Cold War, which is “an anomaly in international politics.” Similarly, Heisbourg (2020, p. 85) observes, “without a superpower threat, NATO became strategically unanchored.” To remain existent and relevant, NATO moves towards internationalisation with a security agenda focusing on Eurasian affairs beyond the outdated Euro-Atlantic-centric model (Avdaliani, 2020). In essence, such a Eurasia-centric strategy for NATO would “enhance not only the coordination of allies’ defense strategies but also help align EU and US policies on China” (Rynning, 2019, p. 17). Indeed, China is a factor in NATO’s strategising because European allies must assist US priorities in Asia in return for its investment in European security. As former US Secretary of Defense Mattis stated, “an assertive China” is part of NATO’s remit (Rynning, 2019, p. 14). Meanwhile, NATO and the USA have adopted slightly different approaches to address China. The USA has transformed its strategy from the post-9/11 counter-terrorism agenda towards a “high-end fight against near-peer adversaries,” referring to wars with China and Russia (Davis, 2021, p. 6). For NATO, Stoltenberg stated that “we are not entering a new Cold War, and China is not our adversary, not our enemy” (Atkins, 2021). Wang and Wu (2020) also pointed out that, while the USA pursues “American priority,” global hegemony, and military means, Europe pursues more “soft power” and “model norms,” hoping to establish a multipolar world of competition and cooperation. But, despite the rhetorical variance, “there’s a new Cold War in the making, and it’s being crafted in Washington, not Beijing” (Atkins, 2021). Second, NATO’s eastward expansion meets with China’s westward march (Lin, 2012). In the aftermath of 9/11, NATO’s out-of-area operations first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq have taken NATO eastwards from its previous focus on Europe and the Mediterranean (Scot, 2016; Depledge, 2020). NATO’s eastward expansions not only posed danger to Russia (Rolland, 2019) but also brought it closer to Asia and the Indo-Pacific (Avdaliani, 2020). Meanwhile, China has been pivoting West towards the Mediterranean through the Belt and Road Initiative. Some NATO member states are also members of the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization). Thus, in view of China and NATO’s intersectional interests, “the dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region and Central Asia are also important factors that affect China-NATO relations” (Wang & Wu, 2020, p. 69).

How is NATO viewed in China? 115 Third, though China is not a direct threat, NATO is concerned about the impact of the Sino-Russo strategic partnership on transatlantic security. China and Russia are regarded as two primary rivalries of NATO, militarily and politically. In an expert group report entitled, “NATO 2030: United for a New Era,” the message is clear: “NATO has to adapt itself for an era of strategic rivalry with Russia and China.” This approach will “entrench a systemic three bloc rivalry between China, Russia and NATO-EU-US” with risks of nuclear war (Davis, 2021, p. 4). In dealing with Russia and China, the report recommends that NATO should continue the dual-track approach of deterrence and dialogue with a “persistently aggressive” Russia and devote “much more time, political resources, and action” to China (Davis, 2021, p. 5). Over the past decade, Russia and China have strengthened their diplomatic relations and strategic partnership. China and Russia have a long and volatile history (Røseth, 2019). Since 2008, the two sides have increased their defence and military technology cooperation, especially after the 2014 Ukraine crisis. In 2017, President Xi Jinping was awarded the highest order of the Russian Federation in recognition of the “comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation” between the two states (Røseth, 2019, p. 268). China and Russia have held joint military exercises including joint drills under the SCO since 2005 and joint naval exercises since 2012 in the Mediterranean (2015), South China Sea (2016), and Baltic seas (2017). In 2018, for the first time, China’s PLA (People’s Liberation Army) participated in Russia’s Vostok-2018 military exercises, which marked Russia’s policy change towards China and “another milestone in the increasingly close defense relationship between the two countries” (Carlson, 2018). Since Vostok-2018 simulated military conflict with NATO, Russia, and China sent a clear signal to the USA and its NATO partners that even though they have no intention to form a military alliance, they will increase defence coordination in response to the “undue pressure” from the West (Carlson, 2018). Fourth, NATO needs to engage with China to tackle common challenges and issues such as climate change, arms control, and terrorism. In 2021, Stoltenberg expressed that NATO is planning for more cooperation with China, but at the same time, NATO will respond to the threats posed by China. In Brussels, China is featured as a political, military-technical topic. European diplomats believed “engagement is the only way forward” for NATO (Holslag, 2019, p. 138). Over the years, there have been discussions about establishing a NATO–China Council, along the lines of the NATO–Russia Council since 1997, as well as a joint NATO– SCO council, to expand co-operations between the two parties (Avdaliani, 2020; Lin, 2012; Brzezinski, 2009). In fact, NATO and China already cooperated in the areas of counter-terrorism and counter-piracy. For instance, the Chinese navy engaged with the NATO navy in conducting counter-piracy missions Operation Ocean Shield in the Gulf of Aden in 2011 (Lin, 2012). Unfortunately, NATO has downplayed political dialogues and cooperation with China since 2019. The aforementioned expert group report “relegates the subject of dialogue to a footnote” and ignores the NATO–China military staff talks between 2010 and 2018 in which a wide range of subjects was addressed, including North Korea,

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the South China Sea, Maritime Security and Counter-Piracy, China’s defence and military reforms (Gittings, 2021). Turning to the lens of China, China often looks to economic engagement more than military engagement (Gittings, 2021). Chinese officials believed that NATO should disband after the Cold War; NATO’s eastward expansion also alarmed the Chinese of the USA’s extended influence. “China has less incentive to interact with the Alliance,” as Beijing preferred to engage in global security issues on a bilateral, regional (the EU and the SCO), and global (the UN) basis (Chacho, 2014). Lin (2012) also argued that China would like the SCO to play an increasing role, and Chinese scholars proposed NATO–SCO cooperation in counter-terrorism. In recent years, in response to NATO’s hardened policy and hostile stance towards Beijing, Chinese diplomats rebutted NATO’s “China threat” theory. “China has never practiced anything like ‘coercive diplomacy’ or ‘intimidating diplomacy,’” said Hua Chunying, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, at a press briefing. We hope NATO will uphold a correct view on China, look at China’s development and domestic and foreign policies in a rational manner, and do more things that are conducive to international and regional security and stability. China stands ready to conduct dialogue and cooperation with NATO on the basis of equality and mutual respect. (Davis, 2021, p. 7)

NATO’s strategic communication The term, Stratcom, originated in the USA and gained significance after the 9/11 attacks in 2001. Since 2006, this term has been widely used in politico-military circles in Europe due to its “neutral connotation” (Dimitriu, 2012). Stratcom is a complex, multi-faceted process that involves dialogue and approach, relationship building as well as attuning to cultural and historical sensitivities. However, the term is criticised as lacking conceptual clarity (ibid.). Stratcom is critical in information warfare. Stratcom is “the state’s projection of certain strategic values, interests and goals into the conscience of domestic and foreign audiences” (Pashentsev, 2013, p. 210). All public communication strategies seek to build trust in the target audience. Stratcom, as a tool related to public diplomacy, is used to target the behaviour of various actors by shaping public attitudes and garnering positive media coverage (Wolff, 2014). Considering the complexity of social media affordances that facilitate various modes of interaction (Chen & Peng, 2022), conflicts are no longer simply played out in the physical domain, and they also have a virtual dimension (Zhang, 2020b). We are witnessing a new form of global conflict, “the weaponization of social media” (Dimitriu, 2012; Singer & Brooking, 2018). But Stratcom as an integral element of warfare is widely neglected by communication science (Zerfass et al., 2018). In the case of NATO, it has employed Stratcom during military interventions, such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. But it still has

How is NATO viewed in China? 117 a public image problem and faces public perception challenges such as weak public support for the alliance and diverging opinions on its role in the world (Wolff, 2014). In the media, there were often calls for terminating the alliance as a “dysfunctional geostrategic irrelevance” or a “Cold War relic.” “NATO’s historical role was treated as a bore” (Brzezinski, 2009). Even President Macron warned NATO of being “brain dead” (Powell, 2020). In response, since 2008, NATO has used social media and video-sharing platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to build its relationship with the public. In 2012, the Public Diplomacy Division of NATO launched the We-NATO initiative in partnership with Facebook. However, the We-NATO platform was dead in 2013 and NATO dropped the campaign (Wolff, 2014). In 2014, the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence was established in Latvia, which aims to “help NATO’s goal of countering Russian strategic narratives” (Wellings et al., 2018). The study of external perceptions, narratives, and attitudes is significant in strategic communication. “Perceptions play a critical function in international relations and that it is particularly important to understand the perceptions of other states over issues of regional and international security which are of mutual concern” (Dannreuther, 1997). In addition to numerous researches on perceptions of NATO in Europe, existing literature has mainly explored external views on NATO from Russia and NATO partners. For instance, Dannreuther (1997) studied Russian perceptions of NATO’s enlargement and found that “Russia continues to have a highly ambivalent, and at times explicitly negative, attitude to NATO and the post-Cold War developments within NATO.” Chaban et al. (2018) adopted strategic narrative theory and Entman’s cascading activation framing theory to study images and perceptions of NATO in its five global partners in the AsiaPacific, namely Australia, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea. Published their findings in a Special Issue of Asian Security, Chaban et al. (2018) concluded that the biggest issue in face of NATO is the lack of local resonance, thus NATO should revise and tailor its location-specific communication strategies. Specifically, focusing on elites in Australia and New Zealand, Wellings et al. (2018) find “a keen desire for an on-going partnership with NATO, particularly in maintaining interoperability and in the area of ‘emerging security challenges.’” Bacon and Burton (2018) find that Japanese elites perceive NATO as a guarantor of global norms and international law, but they are critical of NATO’s handling of Russia. Yoon et al.’s (2018) research reveals a contrast between relatively positive general views on NATO among elites in Mongolia as opposed to more sceptical views observed in the ROK. How NATO is viewed in China has been under-studied despite the fact that China has become a significant “competitor,” if not an outright enemy, to NATO. In addition, nearly all the existing literature about external perceptions of NATO has focused on the views of political, military, and social elites as well as the media narratives of the mainstream press. In the age of social media when social networking sites have become major battlefields in the information war, it is time to examine the online views of members of the public towards NATO in China.

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Zhihu as a research site External observers tend to consider Chinese social media as a repressive environment because the government implements strict censorship and surveillance policies aiming to suppress digital civic engagement within the Chinese border (King et al., 2017; Stockmann & Luo, 2015). However, recent studies have noted how both progovernment nationalists and dissidents engage in social-mediated debates that are not entirely in line with state propaganda campaigns (Fang, 2020; Wallis, 2015). With such research findings in mind, one may argue that the Chinese-language social media sphere still offers scope to foreground public opinion in China, despite the government’s attempt to control digital information flows (Zhang, 2020b). In particular, Zhihu has emerged as a key platform that allows one to observe socio-political trends in contemporary Chinese society. Often described as the Chinese equivalent of Quora, Zhihu allows netizens to answer questions raised by their peers on the site. The socio-technological architecture of the site encourages its users to share high-quality, information-rich content (Peng & Talmacs, 2022). Significantly, middle-class intellectuals comprise the largest cohort on the site, as over 80 per cent of Zhihu users are either university students or professionals with a bachelor’s degree or above (Zhang, 2020a). With middle-class intellectuals representing the political ballast in society, their frequent engagement with trending socio-political issues has turned the site into a fertile ground where popular opinions in China are nourished (Goodman, 2014). In the light of this, we prescribe a Zhihu-based research design to unpack how NATO is perceived by the Chinese middle classes to understand how international geopolitical orders are understood in Chinese society today.

Research questions The orthodox view towards Chinese media is “propaganda is everywhere” and “under President Xi Jinping, the Chinese narrative as well is leaning more and more towards authoritarian nationalism” (Biscop, 2018, p. 12). Today, NATO’s strategic focus has shifted to target both China and Russia. But no research has been conducted to examine the social media images and public perceptions of NATO in China. To fill in this gap, we raise the research questions below: RQ1: How does the Chinese public perceive NATO on Zhihu? RQ2: What are the main discourses Zhihu users adopt in the discussions of NATO? RQ3: What are the ideologies and power relations manifested in the dominant discourses?

Methods To address these research questions, we collected empirical data from the Zhihu platform. In light of an ideal-type research design, which chooses case

How is NATO viewed in China? 119 studies “[b]ased on their potential to capture specific aspects of the issue under investigation” (Peng & Sun, 2022, p. 6), we purposively selected the question of “how to view ‘China-Russia Threat’ on the agenda of the meeting of NATO Defense Ministers?” (如何看待「中俄威胁」成为北约防长峰会主要议题?) posted in February 2021. The current question was one of the most recent posts specifically focusing on the relationship between NATO and China. Calling for fellow netizens to assess such a topic, it promoted 75 lengthy follow-up commentaries, which reflect a small, but a salient group of Chinese netizens’ views on the role NATO plays in current international geopolitics. We retrieved a total of 75 posts from the thread of follow-up posts beneath the question for analysis. To analyse the sampled posts, we adopted a thematic analysis method, which codes textual data by categorising them into different thematic categories (Guest, MacQueen, & Namey, 2014). To perform the analysis, we specifically borrowed techniques from critical cultural studies, accounting for how discursive power is reflected in Zhihu users’ postings beyond their textual meanings. Our analysis revealed five main themes and corresponding narratives surrounding NATO. The results of the analysis are presented in the following section.

Findings and analysis Thematic analysis indicates that Zhihu users tend to provide analysis of NATO’s policy change and behaviour in the context of global politics. They express their understanding of NATO’s recent moves to target China and Russia as threats and generally hold negative and critical attitudes towards NATO. Online users’ perceptions of NATO are manifested in five main themes and dominant narratives: (1) NATO uses China as an imagined/external enemy to justify its own existence; (2) NATO uses the “China-Russia threat” to comply with the strategy and interests of the USA while fighting for their own defence autonomy; (3) NATO uses China to divert public attention from internal to external affairs; (4) NATO is doomed; and (5) China shall prepare for war. These five overlapping themes and narratives are discussed in detail below. Theme 1: NATO uses China as an imagined or external enemy for its own existence. Zhihu users are aware of the increased hostilities towards China in NATO member states, which reflect the intensification of geopolitical frictions between China and major Western democracies. Interestingly, while believing that China poses no real threat to Europe, these netizens perceive NATO as weak and incapable of defending its member states. In their eyes, the existence of NATO could be called into question if the Alliance does not promote the “China-Russia threat” rhetoric. In this sense, China has strategic values as NATO needs to use China to gain support from the USA, to unify NATO members and partners, so as to maximise its own interests.

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Shixin Ivy Zhang, Altman Yuzhu Peng, and Ranna Huang Post-15, 23 February. “It is expected that NATO uses China as an imagined enemy. Apart from China and the US, there are two places that have the largest strategic values in the world: Asia-Pacific (Indo-Pacific) and Europe.” Post-31, 23 February. “The US wants to reunify NATO and re-build NATO members’ confidence in the US. It must find an enemy for NATO. Russia is an old enemy (of the US). Exaggerating threats from Russia will help the US to control NATO members. Who can blame that none of NATO members is capable to fight? The bigger the Russian threat is, the more advantages the US gets. For NATO, Russia is the leverage of the US; and China is the EU’s token of allegiance (投名状) to the US.” Post-15, 23 February “This is a joke, surprisingly but reasonably. While the world is troubled with the virus, vaccination and economy, every county consolidates its resources and gets ready to invest in those areas. NATO, as a military organization, suddenly holds a meeting and speaks nonsense at a time when it is not needed. This looks odd, but it just demonstrates its existence.”

As revealed by the above extracts, Zhihu users perceive NATO as a “weak” and “incapable” military organisation, which merely establishes China as its new enemy to showcase its own value and relevance, and to show its allegiance to the USA. Such a perception is consistent with the rise of nationalist sentiments in China, which is energised by the government’s propaganda that portrays the West as its enemy (Zhang, 2020a). Theme 2: NATO uses the “Sino-Russo threat” to comply with the USA’s grand strategy while fighting for their defence autonomy. While nearly all Zhihu users seem to believe that the USA is the real leader, dominator, and financier of NATO, some of them acknowledge Germany and France’s quests for their defence autonomy. With the differing interests shared by the US and European nations, some Zhihu users predicate that NATO speaks louder than their actions. Post-13, 24 February. “Simply speaking, the issue of ‘China-Russia threat’ is the agenda of the UK and the US. Now the world has become a multipolar world. Germany and France would rather be a pole in the tent on their own. NATO turned the so-called Sino-Russo threat as a main issue in the agenda just because the UK and the US want to bind with the EU to maximize their own interests.” Post-19, 23 February. “There is no need to make a big fuss about the ‘China-Russia threat’ on the agenda of the NATO Defense Ministers meeting. The EU and the US have their own thoughts. France and Germany have been striving for the EU’s defense autonomy, free from the US-led NATO mechanism. But they have not come to the point to break up with the American imperialists. Besides, those EU countries want the US to continue

How is NATO viewed in China? 121 to provide them with a free defense system. Otherwise, do you really think they will establish an EU security force to deal with the Russia threat?” Post-74, 21 February. “Speaking of a politically incorrect view first: China’s military power is sure to be the subject of NATO discussions. If I were the representative of NATO, I would raise the China issue as well …. But NATO’s discussion about China will be an empty talk … This meeting is actually another version of the Iraq War in 2003: When Americans requested NATO to send troops to Iraq, none of the European countries but the UK did …. Thus this meeting can be regarded as the US’ tester of the European countries’ attitude … Rather than looking to the NATO meetings, it is better to keep watch on the status of the European force that reflects the will of Europe.” As the above discussions revealed, some Zhihu users are well aware of the dominant role that the USA plays in NATO. At the same time, they do not simply align the US-led NATO with the EU. Rather, they recognise and support the EU’s defence autonomy in the multipolar world, although such support might often feed into the thesis of challenging the USA’s superpower status. This shows that a group of Zhihu users are indeed observant of geopolitics playing out on the world stage. This offers a glimpse of the user demographics of the platform, which is dominated by middle-class netizens, who are relatively well-informed compared with the average Internet population (Peng & Talmacs, 2022). Theme 3. NATO uses China to divert public attention from internal to external affairs. Some Zhihu users suggest that NATO picks China as a target to divert the public attention from their mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Middle East refugee problems, Iran’s nuclear issues, Turkey issue, and disagreement within NATO. The purpose is to solve their own problems and uphold the interests of NATO. Post-69, 21 February. “Under the condition that NATO and the West are troubled with the Covid-19 pandemic, it is the only best way to find a scapegoat to divert the public attention and lessen the pressure of domestic and global public opinions on the Western power holders. So, it is natural that (they) slander (扣屎盆子) China and Russia that the US and the EU have held a grudge for long at this NATO Defense meeting.” Post-72, 21 February. “These actions NATO took are meant to solve its own problems by targeting China and Russia as adversaries. It is against the development trend of the current times and, eventually, the gains will not make up for the losses. The China-Russia alliance mainly affects the interests of NATO countries. The cake is small, and (NATO) did not get a slice of it. Thus (NATO) stacks the deck (搞小动作) and finds an excuse to deal with China, trying to prevent the alliance between giants.”

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Shixin Ivy Zhang, Altman Yuzhu Peng, and Ranna Huang Post-28, 23 February. “First, the exaggeration of the China-Russia threat can shift the internal contradictions by creating external conflict, thus, suppressing or lessening the discontent towards the mishandling of the pandemic. Second, this is Biden’s attempt to bring the US back to prime time. Although Trump complained about NATO many times and even criticized NATO as an obsolete organization, ‘making America great again’ hit an accord in their minds. There are always different voices within NATO. Countries represented by Germany and France seem to be off-the-track. Macron even claimed that NATO’s common enemy is terrorism, not Russia or China. So, this meeting is meant to make one voice outside and enhance the unity inside.”

These excerpts and discourses reveal that Zhihu users recognise the diversity of voices within NATO. As Wang and Wu (2020) point out, with the disappearance of the common enemy – the Soviet Union – Europe [has] started to construct its own defense mechanism. Various voices subsequently arose within NATO, such as Atlanticism led by the US, Europeanism dominated by France and Germany, and those of Central and Eastern European countries that joined NATO later on. With such a premise in mind, Zhihu users believe that NATO uses China as a “scapegoat” and “China-Russia threat” as an “excuse” to divert public attention and implement its coercion strategy. As one user noted, “taking China-Russia as one integrated issue is no more than a coercion strategy. Externally, it helps to contain China’s rise; internally, it forces the EU to take sides between China and the US” (Post-66, 22 February). This logic points towards their predication of the future trajectory of NATO. Theme 4. NATO is doomed. According to a few Zhihu users, NATO is a relic of the Cold War that is doomed when the world is moving towards “a community of shared future.” They discuss NATO’s destiny vis-à-vis the confrontation between rising China and the declining USA. Post-21, 23 February. “The Cold War mentality is truly outdated. Now we have the ‘community of shared future.’ Japan does not believe China will start a war; Taiwan does not believe Beijing will use military forces to unite Taiwan. You tell Western Europe that China will fight over there? Even the stupid does not believe it.” Post-36, 23 February. “It nonetheless demonstrates the incompetence of European militaries. Under the conditions of Russia’s current military capability and conventional war, European militaries still depend on external force to defend Europe, (NATO) shall be disbanded.”

How is NATO viewed in China? 123 Post-48, 23 February. “The US-Europe relations have been consumed by Trump. In order to repair US-Europe relations, the US does not have any attractive plans; thus, the political heritage like NATO starts to work. (The US) uses China and Russia to scare Europeans and then ties them to the NATO chariot. By then I (US) am still the big boss, and you will unite around me. It is good that China moved ahead of the US and signed the ChinaEurope investment and trade agreement. To break down NATO, (we) need to be strong. If the US continues declining, I believe sooner or later, NATO, the Cold War relic, will be thrown into the trash in history.” As these excerpts and narratives indicate, given the historical context of NATO and the transformation of global politics, NATO is doomed if it cannot defend Europe on its own. Moreover, with the declining USA and enhanced SinoEuropean economic ties such as 17 + 1, and the Belt and Road Initiative, Zhihu users suggest that China and Europe (NATO) may even become partners to resist the USA. After all, China is not the Soviet Union that posed a direct military threat to Europe, but “trade partners (God of Wealth)” (Post-19, 23 February). Such geopolitical assessments transcend the simplistic view of considering major Western democracies as a homogenised anti-China unity that is widespread in Chinese society, although they do not conceal their nationalist essence, which centres around their wishes for China to strategically weaken the US-led coalition. Theme 5: China shall prepare for war. Dramatically different from the above posters, who maintain the need for China to rise peacefully, some Zhihu users believe that even though an all-round war is unlikely to break out, China shall enhance its defence capability and get ready for war. Post-18, 23 February. “Under the nuclear balance, the odds are low that an all-round war breaks out. It mostly takes the form of proxy war.” Post-26, 23 February. “There is always someone who feels that if we back down, others will not fight us. Then why do we develop military capability in recent years? During the Sino-Indian war in 1962, the Great Man (Chairman Mao) thought for 10 days and 10 nights, and he still could not figure out why India fought us. Do you think if there is no war between China and the US, nobody else will fight us? Face the reality, give up the illusion. (We shall) expand the military power. (We) do not start a war, but (we) shall be able to face the war threat anytime.” Post-9, 24 February. “In the eyes of Europe and the US, Russia, China, North Korea and Iran are the axes of evil. So (we) shall have no illusions and get ready for war anytime.” The above-mentioned narratives reveal the strong national identity of Zhihu users. As Chinese citizens, they speak for China and use the first person “we” to refer to

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China in their postings. In particular, they demonstrate national pride by calling on China to strengthen its military power, to be well prepared for war and/or war threats, and to defend and uphold the interests of the nation. Meanwhile, there are critical voices about the netizens’ national sentiments. For instance, “I want to hear @xxx’s opinions. Most views expressed here are answers that arouse emotions and publicize their own patriotic stance” (Post-60, 22 February). This quote suggests that expert voices rather than pure propaganda or slogans are highly valued on social media platforms at a time when everybody can express their opinions and sentiments. The thematic analysis also reveals that in addition to the analytical and argumentative style of postings as indicated above, Chinese social media users’ sarcastic style of language use points towards the personalisation of international politics in digital cultures. Personalised politics, according to Bennett (2012), refers to the phenomenon in which “individually expressive personal action frames displace collective action frames.” Empowered by the proliferation of social media and personalised communication technologies, “the rise of personalized forms of political participation is perhaps the defining change in the political culture of our era” (Bennett, 2012). In this study, individual users often employ personalised forms of sarcasm, metaphor, parody, and humour in their postings to criticise NATO and the West as a whole. For instance, they use metaphors such as “rabbit” to refer to China; “demon” (罗刹) to Russia; “boss” to the USA; and “chariot” to NATO. Below are two examples that show the usage of sarcasm and parody in online discussions as part of the political culture: Post-7, 24 February. “What’s the use of it? NATO is meant to confront the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is gone, what does it play for? What’s the use of confronting China? China is not the Soviet Union, and it forms economic bonds with the major (NATO) nations. Hence, the most terrible opponents are those who forget themselves. They do not know who they are.” Post-66, 22 February. “NATO: we do not have the guts to crush bandits. But we have the guts to accumulate wealth under the name of crushing bandits, and big guts!” The personalisation of international politics is a key feature of Chinese Zhihu users’ postings, which underlines the playfulness of Chinese social media users’ engagement with international political topics online. Yet, it is such commentaries that reveal the most problematic aspects of China’s nationalist politics, which risk energising support for the Chinese government’s military actions against its neighbouring countries.

Conclusion Drawing on the thematic analysis of postings on Zhihu, China’s largest questionanswering platform, we have examined the image and perceptions of Chinese

How is NATO viewed in China? 125 social media users towards NATO in the context of the changing Sino–NATO relations and NATO’s strategic communication. Three conclusions are made. First, Zhihu users tend to discuss NATO’s strategic focus on China from historical, political, military, and economic perspectives. They provide an analysis of threat perception, international relations, and global politics in the debate. The main themes and narratives are more or less affirmative of official discourses. These themes and narratives include: NATO uses China as an imagined/external enemy for its own existence; NATO uses “China-Russia threat” to comply with the strategy and interests of the USA while fighting for their own defence autonomy; NATO uses China to divert public attention from internal to external affairs; NATO is doomed; and China shall prepare for war. Second, in view of the image and perceptions of NATO, Zhihu users tend to perceive NATO as an “outdated,” “weak,” “incapable,” and “incompetent” military organisation, which was originally established in defence of Europe, but has now become more of a “tool” and “chariot” for the USA to control Europe and to implement the USA’s global strategy. These users understand that NATO makes China its new target for its own interests, willingly or unwillingly. They recognise the diverse and different voices within NATO and support the defence autonomy of Europe. Some users even perceive NATO as a potential partner of China to resist the hegemonic power of the USA. Third, Zhihu users discuss and situate NATO’s strategy in the context of global great power politics – the superpower struggles among the USA, China, and Russia. Their discourses and narratives, on the one hand, underline a mixture of analysis of international relations and nationalist sentiments and, on the other hand, point towards the personalisation of international politics via the personal forms of language use. Considering the ideal-type, case-study nature of the current research design, our findings cannot be overgeneralised to capture every aspect of public opinion within China. However, considering the aggregation of middle-class netizens on Zhihu, postings on the platform indeed offer a glimpse of this specific group of the Chinese population, whose opinions carry more weight in China’s political processes. With their implication in mind, we argue that the current research findings showcase how social media platforms embody a web of technological and human complexities with different actors, interests, and relations (Zhang, 2021). As it stands, it remains unclear in terms of what strategies NATO adopts (or is going to adopt) to communicate its interests and values to the Chinese audience. Yet, it becomes apparent that middle-class Chinese netizens, represented by those who are actively on Zhihu, generally hold a negative and critical attitude towards NATO. While commenting on the USA’s public diplomacy efforts in the Middle East, El-Nawavy (2006) writes, “no matter how savvy its public diplomacy efforts in the Middle East, they will be ineffective in changing Arab public opinion if that public is dissatisfied with US policies on the ground.” The same can be said of NATO’s strategic communication vis-àvis Chinese public opinion. The revelation of the findings suggests that NATO requires to develop a specific, strategic communication plan should it wish

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to engage with audiences in China, where public opinion towards it is highly negative.

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Indian media’s China dilemma Sino–India 2020 face-off through the lens of Indian press: analysis of editorials Suhail Ahmad

The relationship between India and China has been fraught with differences and distrust. These fissures, mostly over territorial claims, constantly come to the fore with the 1962 war marking the lowest ebb in the bilateral relations. More recently, the deadly border clashes in June 2020 once again brought to light the deep chasm between the two sides. The root cause of the conflict is the 3,440 km-long disputed border (Line of Actual Control [LAC]), but it had not claimed any lives since 1975 till the 2020 incident. Even as other important news developments paled in comparison with the COVID-19 pandemic which wreaked havoc across the world in 2020, the Sino– India confrontation hogged international headlines. The border issue remains a major hurdle in the bilateral relations between the two nations. Besides, the confrontation between two nuclear powers with a combined population of more than 2.7 billion has ramifications which go well beyond their borders. The nature of skirmishes also made it noteworthy with the soldiers engaged in hand-to-hand combat involving rocks and clubs. India said 20 of its soldiers were killed in the June 15, 2020, clash in the Galwan Valley, a remote unpopulated corner of Ladakh in the Himalayas at an altitude of 14,000 feet. Though Beijing acknowledged the casualties initially, it did not disclose details till February of the following year, revealing that four of its soldiers died in the incident. The border clashes marked a new low in the ties between the two neighbours. The subsequent troop build-up in the region led to fears of further escalation. The possibility of a two-front war against Pakistan and China was being discussed as an imminent threat and no longer ruled out as a distant possibility. Several rounds of talks between the two sides did not yield any concrete results to end the stalemate. The mainstream media in both countries relied extensively on official government statements, generally covering them uncritically. While Altieri, Kannan and Maheshwari (2020) consider this “heavy pro-government tint” in media coverage on expected lines with respect to Chinese media, they see it as a “worrying trend” in India, the world’s largest democracy. The Indian media had to work with whatever details trickled from unnamed sources in the government and security establishment. Journalists seemed to be too willing to “reproduce unverified, contradictory and speculative information” that suited the government DOI: 10.4324/9781003261278-9

130 Suhail Ahmad (Chandrashekhar, 2019). Inaccessibility to the remote Galwan Valley made it easier for the government to control the media narrative. China’s official account also left many questions unanswered, revealing few and selective details that appeared to be “aimed at conveying a carefully crafted message to the domestic audience” (Krishnan, 2021). In the immediate aftermath of the border clashes, a cursory comparison of the coverage on the two sides revealed that while Chinese state media downplayed the deadly military confrontation, the Indian media was relatively more belligerent though it gradually toned down the rhetoric. The differences in the media coverage can be understood in the context of the media systems which have evolved in the two countries. Jeffrey and Sen (2015) explored the similarities and differences between the media in a Party-state (China) and the media in a capitalist state of private ownership (India). Among other similarities, including the dependence on advertising, they argue that mass media in both countries play a pivotal role in domestic politics, and as part of that role, they may tell provocative nationalist stories (Jeffrey & Sen, 2015 p. 4). Shen and Chowdhury (2020) concluded that media in the two countries echo the respective establishment’s threat perceptions as well as accentuate old and new tensions, influencing mutual perceptions and leading to the “poisoning of public opinion” on both sides. Content analysis of news reports in Times of India and Hindustan Times in the first six months of 2012 found predominantly adversarial China coverage (Chowdhury, 2015). However, a study commissioned by the think-tank Observer Research Foundation in 2016 found that there was neither “consistent antipathy nor over-concern” with the border dispute. Analysing the editorials in five newspapers, namely, Times of India, The Hindu, The Indian Express, The Economic Times and The Financial Express during the years 2012–2014, the ORF study found that while the print media’s perception of China was dominantly negative, it also pointed out possible areas of cooperation (Chatterji & Chaudhury, 2016). Sen (2015) expresses concern over the “uninformed discourse” on China in the Indian press with its tendency to sensationalise news stories “from inventing Chinese military bases in Pakistan to its mining plans in the Indian Ocean.” He also refers to newspapers rushing to produce “breaking news,” under pressure from fierce competition heralded by 24 × 7 news channels, which can often mean compromising on facts. This in turn makes a meaningful and informed public debate on China impossible. In the introduction to his book India’s China Challenge, Krishnan (2020) points out how India grossly underinvests in trying to understand its “most important neighbour” at every level, from the media to the government. For instance, he cites how there were only four Indian reporters based in China and not a single TV channel that had set up a China bureau, while in contrast almost every European country seemed to have reporters in Beijing. This chapter analyses the editorial stance of the two leading English-language national dailies of India i.e., Times of India (TOI) and Hindustan Times (HT) in the aftermath of the Galwan Valley clashes. The editorials published during the six months from June to November 2020 were analysed. TOI dedicated 38 editorials,

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while HT published 27 editorials on the Indo-China standoff during this period, with a total tally of 65 editorials between them. TOI is the most-read English newspaper in India, according to the Indian Readership Survey (IRS) for the third quarter of 2019 with an all-India average issue readership of 58.2 lakh (5.82 million). HT is the second most-read English daily in the country with 32.4 lakh (3.24 million) readers (“TOI widens gap,” 2020). With such a large readership, these dailies have a huge potential to shape public opinion on crucial national security matters and thereby influence government decision-making. During the 2020 Indo-China standoff, both the newspapers set out the agenda on the issue early on by advocating a threefold military, economic, and diplomatic response to China. As the two dailies juggled these three well-known instruments of the powerplay, this chapter contextualises the subject with the role of media in the “border politics” of competitive nationalism and the increasingly profit-driven nature of the coverage. The main body is divided into three sections with relevant sub-themes. The first section examines how the border confrontation was defined to the audiences at the outset, viable military options, and the differences between anti-Pakistan and anti-China rhetoric. The second part looks at the economic countermeasures suggested by the newspapers. The third section assesses the diplomatic brief set out in the editorials, while the final part looks at the nature of media coverage under the Narendra Modi government.

Print capitalism and nationalism Exploring the role of print media and capitalism in the creation of nationalist political identity, Jeffrey (2010) cites the works of Harold Innis (The Bias of Communication), Marshall McLuhan (The Gutenberg Galaxy) and Benedict Anderson (Imagined Communities). For McLuhan, print technology isolated the individual yet also created massive groupings by means of vernacular nationalism. Anderson attributed the development of nationalism to the convergence of capitalism and print media. Jeffrey explains how print capitalism’s thrust in India was to propagate “subliminal ideas about the existence and legitimacy of an Indian nation.” Mass vernacular newspapers laid the basis for the nation as their readership could imagine sharing a collective experience of the news, irrespective of their geographical distance from each other and of social hierarchies (Munro, 2021). Similarly, Karl Deutsch (1966) emphasised the significance of channels of communication allowing group members to “communicate more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects.” One of the main observations which emerged from the fourth regional workshop organised by the South Asia Forum for Human Rights (SAFHR) on the theme “Media Crossing Borders” was about the role of mass media in the production of the “border politics” of competitive nationalism, configuring the borders from the dominant statist lens. In reporting competing claims over territory, the media tends to surrender fairness and accuracy to patriotic impulses and national imperatives. With its coverage of border issues mainly based on official sources, the media is

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vulnerable to manipulation. If the information is biased or misleading, it can do more harm than good, widening mistrust and ill feelings. In South Asia, border politics tends to become an extension of competing domestic power struggles (Habib, 2004). The nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is known for its media strategy to secure electoral gains. Rajagopal (2005) spells out the party’s strategy to cultivate a “good media image” to improve its electoral prospects. He cites an interview with L.K. Advani wherein the BJP veteran said the election victories and defeats have much to do with the kind of image a party projects even if that image doesn’t conform to reality. In line with this policy, the party has projected an image of strength and defiance when it comes to China’s border claims.

Advertising allurement Media watchdogs have expressed concern over how the Indian media has become more profit driven than conviction driven. But this is not a new phenomenon as Sen (2015) cites the example of the industrialist owner of TOI, Ramakrishna Dalmia, who bought the newspaper in 1946. He quotes a senior editor saying, “To Dalmia a newspaper plant was no different from a cement factory. Making profit was the sole motivation.” This corporate mindset of TOI management persists to this day as can be gauged from a quote attributed to his scion and current owner Samir Jain when he got it written on the mast of the paper: “Made in … (name of the city) and said his newspaper is no more different from any other product, to be sold.” In 2019, Media Ownership Monitor (MOM), a project carried out by Reporters Without Borders and a Delhi-based digital media company DataLEADS, found greater dependence on advertisement revenues. This dependence serves as a potential form of control over editorial content. As Somanchi and David (2020) found out, government advertising accounted for a sizeable chunk of revenue for the media. The total ad expenditure of the BJP-led government was an astounding Rs 1,179 crore in 2018–2019. As a political party also, BJP’s advertising expenditure witnessed a significant spike. From around Rs 17 crore in 2003–2004, the party’s reported ad spending rose to Rs 470 crore in 2014–2015 (Somanchi & David, 2020). With media companies relying on government advertisements, especially in times of economic downturn as witnessed during the COVID-19 pandemic, they are obliged to comply or reciprocate with favourable coverage. This ultimately shapes the information people get.

Methodology Since the objective of this study was to examine the editorial treatment of the 2020 Indo-China border confrontation by Indian print media, it employed the qualitative technique of discourse analysis to understand how the two dailies interpreted the chain of events triggered in the Galwan Valley.

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As Wimmer and Dominick (2014) point out, there is no concrete set of procedures for conducting a discourse analysis and it usually involves identifying keywords, themes, imagery, and patterns in the text. In addition, the researcher might conduct a rhetorical analysis that looks at how various arguments are constructed and arranged … with special attention to the context, examining such factors as the circumstances surrounding the message, and the intended audience. (p. 417) Theoretical backdrop The study is anchored in the theories of Agenda Setting (McCombs and Shaw, 1972) and Framing (Entman, 1993) since they deal with the impact mass media has on “what issues the public thinks about” and “how it thinks about them,” respectively. Past research has explored the distinct agenda-setting influence of the news media regarding public perceptions of foreign countries (Ray, 2004). Similarly, the media’s ability to tell people how to think about something through their use of specific frames makes the study of frames relevant. As Entman himself observed, whatever its specific use, the concept of framing consistently offers a way to describe the power of a communicating text (p. 51). Why print Print is the oldest form of mass media in India and perhaps the most robust and dynamic, with over 17,500 registered newspapers in different languages offering a wide diversity of opinions. Owned by the Times Group or Bennett Coleman & Company Limited (BCCL), Times of India is the oldest English newspaper in India. Originally called “The Bombay Times and Journal of Commerce,” it was founded in 1838 in Mumbai (then Bombay). TOI saw its ownership change several times. In 1946 the paper was bought by industrialist Ramakrishna Dalmia before his son-in-law Sahu Shanti Prasad Jain took over. Since then, the company is fully owned by the Jain Family. The Times Group has other businesses including radio, TV, internet, magazines, education, and films. While the current readership status is the obvious reason for its inclusion in the sample, it also has a legacy of covering China as far back as the early 1900s. Ronojoy Sen (2015) explored TOI’s coverage of developments in India–China relations for over a hundred years including the 1950s marked by India’s embrace of Communist China followed by the deterioration of ties leading to the disastrous 1962 war. He asserts that TOI did not follow any particular ideology or take a particular line. With the second-largest circulation after TOI, Hindustan Times is also one of the oldest English newspapers in India, inaugurated in 1924. HT Media Limited is owned and operated by Shobhana Bhartia, the daughter of industrialist Krishna Kumar Birla and the wife of industrialist Shyam Sunder Bhartia. The

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private-ownership company has expanded its operations from print to other media such as radio, internet, and marketing. HT has a reputation for being a pro-Congress party which Bhartia attributes to the legacy of the paper being closely associated with the Indian freedom movement and M.K. Gandhi, who led the Quit India Movement against Britishers. Gandhi inaugurated the HT press in 1924 and his son, Devadas Gandhi, was appointed as editor. In a 2013 interview with Newslaundry, Bhartia said HT espoused a more centrist-secular political affiliation akin to Congress though she ruled out blanket support for any particular party. Why editorials Editorials are distinct in nature and scope as they reflect the stance of a publication on an issue or event in a way that perhaps news reports cannot. Typically, editorials formulate opinions about recent news events. Editorials take a firm stand on a problem and attempt to persuade the reader to think the same way. An editorial often proposes a solution or advises taking some definite action. Editorials explain the meaning or significance of a situation or event and help readers to understand complex, controversial, or sensitive issues. They are generally decided by the editorial board where possible stances are argued out and positions are taken. As the sidebar note on the TOI online Edit page mentions, the edits are written by a “team of senior journalists with wide-ranging interests who debate and opine on the news and issues of the day.” An important function of editorials is the construction of public opinion and the expression of ideologies. They set the political agenda and influence social debates, decision-making, and other forms of social and political action. The editorial opinion is generally institutional, and not personal. Even when written by a single editor, editorials count as the opinion of “the” newspaper (Van Dijk, 1995). A conventional editorial is based on three main parts, beginning with the summary of the event followed by an evaluation of the event and concluding on a pragmatic note with suggestions, advice, or warnings. Thus, an editorial briefly tells “what happened” and reminds the readers what the event was as it is more fully described in concurrent or earlier news reports. Secondly, it spells out what was good or bad, wrong or right about the event, and especially about the people involved. Thirdly, it may offer solutions or advice. For example, what the authorities should or should not do. But as Van Dijk observes, an editorial may not express the opinion explicitly. The degree of explicitness depends not only on the nature of the opinions themselves but on the context, viz., the role and political position of the newspaper as a conservative or liberal newspaper and its relation with the ruling party. In a paper on “Ideology Detection in the Indian Mass Media,” Sharma et al. (2020) referred to the “ideological bias” in the Indian mass media, in terms of the coverage given to statements of prominent people on key policies. The newspapers analysed included TOI and HT, and as per the study, they cover

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pro-policy statements, aligned with the ruling BJP, more than anti-policy statements. Research objectives The study worked around the following objectives: (1) to find out the frequency of editorials in Indian newspapers on the 2020 Indo-China impasse; (2) to identify dominant themes in these editorials; and (3) to assess the solutions suggested by the editorials.

Research questions To realise the stated objectives, the following research questions were formulated: RQ1 – How often did the newspapers carry editorials on the Indo-China theme? RQ2 – What were the subjects or themes of the editorials? RQ3 – What were the solutions proposed or endorsed by the editorials? To answer the first question, the frequency of editorials based on Indo-China ties was assessed through quantitative analysis. The second and third questions were explored through qualitative analysis after categorising the editorials under various themes. I: Military response: dilemma and dichotomy The editorials published by TOI and HT dubbed the border confrontation as a “unilateral and coercive” action by the Chinese side violating international norms. Both dailies deemed China as India’s “greatest strategic threat” and its “most serious national security challenge” in recent years. TOI attributed China’s “aggressive and provocative” moves to its “imperialist ambitions” akin to the East India Company of old “that first offers mutual benefits, gains trade advantages, then presses its unilateral interests and claims through military means.” HT attributed the border clashes to China’s attempt to dissuade India from joining the chorus for a probe into the COVID-19 origin. Immediately after the Galwan Valley clashes were reported, the TOI editorial claimed that the Indian army had operational plans in place to respond to Chinese encroachments with its “own cross-LAC manoeuvres” and that Indian troops could hold posts on the Chinese side of the LAC. Both TOI and HT editorials called for boosting military capabilities and enhancing military cooperation with the USA and other major Western powers. The dailies suggested deepening international partnerships, particularly through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD) commonly known as the Quad, an informal strategic forum comprising India, Japan, Australia, and the USA while boosting India’s maritime security to check China. The TOI and HT editorials highlighted the need to display military strength with effective mobilisation at the border. However, in one of the later editorials, TOI conceded that military action or war was a “risky proposition” and unlikely

136 Suhail Ahmad to settle matters. TOI asserted that talks at both the military and diplomatic levels were the only way to manage the crisis (“Cool Down Border,” TOI, 8 September 2020). Similarly, HT issued a clarion call to “prepare for all scenarios” (“Assess China’s actions, not words,” HT, 25 June 2020). HT praised Prime Minister Narendra Modi for deciding “to take on the adversary irrespective of potential costs” (“PM Modi has made his choice,” HT, 3 July 2020). Meanwhile, arguing that counterbalancing China through platforms like QUAD might raise the “probability of misjudgment and conflict,” TOI made a rather radical suggestion to revive the 1959 LAC with China retaining Aksai Chin in the Ladakh region while giving up its claims on Arunachal Pradesh touting it as the “best solution” to the crisis. After all, New Delhi has no hope of wresting Aksai Chin from Beijing just as Chinese claims on Arunachal are a pipe dream. (“Pragmatic solution,” TOI, 11 October 2020) Some experts believe that the decision to make Ladakh a union territory in August 2019 followed by Indian Home Minister Amit Shah’s claim in the Parliament to gain control over Aksai Chin drew Beijing’s attention and may have led to the 2020 Ladakh standoff (Basu, 2020). China’s proximity to India’s archrival Pakistan and other neighbours has led to fears of encirclement (Shen and Chowdhury, 2020). HT flagged the threat of coordinated action from both China and Pakistan (“India sends a clear signal to China,” HT, 4 September 2020), while TOI suggested forging security alignments with the USA and other major Western powers to counter the threat of two-front war (“Danger on LOC,” TOI, 19 June 2020). China has superior military firepower than India. In 2020, China had the largest active military force in the world, with about 2.18 million active troops. China also ranked second in military spending, according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (“Global military expenditure”, 2020). China ranked third in aircraft strength with 3,210 aircraft in comparison with India’s 2,123 aircraft. China’s armoured fighting vehicles stood at 33,000, while India had just over 8,600 (Yadav, 2020). During the 2017 Doklam crisis as the two governments tried to disengage, the Indian media witnessed a role reversal maintaining studied silence and even the hyper-patriotic channels, known for their prime-time warmongering, withdrew into a shell (Gupta 2017). Against this backdrop, it seemed Modi was reluctant to escalate a major conflict with China in 2020 also although much of his political charisma lies in projecting an image of an assertive India under his leadership. “China is no pak” Modi government’s approach to China has been different from its aggressive posture against Pakistan. Given China’s military and economic might, New

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Delhi’s strategy to counter it involves a broader mix of economic and diplomatic tactics. The government approach is also reflected in the way the media covers the issue. While the Indian news anchors spoke of breaking the back of the Chinese economy by boycotting their products, they didn’t stress any outright military response. This is in stark contrast to the Indian media’s obsession with Pakistan bashing. Modi’s strongman image was effectively bolstered by his decision to order airstrikes against Pakistan twice, in 2016 and 2019. In September 2016, India claimed it carried out “surgical strikes” on militants across the de-facto border in Kashmir in response to a militant attack on an army base days earlier. Indian officials claimed the strike was successful and caused significant casualties. Islamabad denied the claims. Later a Bollywood film Uri: The Surgical Strike dramatised India’s 2016 covert military action. The film bolstered Modi’s nationalist reputation. The phrase “surgical strike” became hugely popular and was used as an electoral slogan by the BJP. At one election rally, Modi said only he had the courage to conduct surgical strikes (Ponniah, 2019). The mainstream media, especially TV news channels, followed the event with nationalistic rhetoric and jingoism (Pandit & Chattopadhyay, 2017). In 2019 India launched air strikes against militants in Pakistani territory after more than 40 Indian paramilitary soldiers were killed in a suicide attack in south Kashmir. New Delhi blamed Pakistan-linked Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) for the attack and said the retaliatory strikes targeted a terrorist training camp in Balakot. Pakistan said its jets had forced back the Indian planes and denied there were any casualties. BJP leaders invoked Balakot at campaign rallies in the run-up to the general elections. The brinkmanship evoked jingoism in India that, experts opine, helped Modi secure re-election with an unprecedented mandate. Addressing one such election rally, Home Minister and the then-BJP chief Amit Shah said Modi had shown he is a man with a “56-inch chest” by destroying militant hideouts in Pakistan (“Modi is the man with 56-inch chest,” 2019). The announcement about the Indian operation was first made in a briefing by a senior official who shared a few details and took no questions. Yet unconfirmed details, presumably leaked by the so-called highly placed sources, played out in the media, including casualty numbers that varied from 300 to 600. A Reuters report from the ground in Pakistan suggested the Indian attack on Balakot did not do much damage. Before the Indian military operation, a dominant section of the media had already called for an all-out war. A day after the attack, Arnab Goswami of Republic TV thundered, “We want revenge, not condemnation … It is time for blood, the enemy’s blood.” This underlines the fact that armchair jingoism routinely takes over public discourse in India, stoking tension while obscuring larger issues of military intelligence, strategy, and resources (Chandrashekhar, 2019). The ghost of 1962 The 1962 war, in which India suffered a defeat at the hands of China, has been embedded in collective Indian memory and remains an open wound desperate

138 Suhail Ahmad for closure (Bhaskar, 2021). Indian media’s China reportage is, for the most part, marked by shrill jingoism and distrust and the craving for revenge of 1962 is widespread from warmongering television anchors to alarmist newspaper headlines (Shen & Chowdhury, 2020). No wonder, the 2020 Ladakh standoff brought back the ghost of 1962. TOI conceded that the government was back to India’s pre-1962 situation and suspected that Chinese aggression in the Galwan Valley may be part of a strategy to “remind India of its vulnerabilities.” The run-up to the 1962 war had also seen New Delhi and Beijing accuse each other’s troops of trespassing in [the] Galwan Valley … Beijing could be using the latest standoff to push India’s psychological buttons by reminding it of 1962. (“Gloves are off,” TOI, 16 June 2020) Similarly, the HT editorial also recalled China’s “long history of deception” and the 1962 debacle when it engaged in an offensive operation and expanded its claims, exacerbated by India’s weak strategy (“Assess China’s actions, not words,” HT, 25 June 2020). Meanwhile, the BJP government sought to convey that unlike in 1962, when the country was governed by the Congress government under Jawaharlal Nehru, the current dispensation was courageous enough to counter China. Union minister and senior BJP leader Ravi Shankar Prasad said that it was no longer the India of 1962, and the country was now led by a “courageous” leader in Narendra Modi. He also referred to surgical and air strikes during the first term of the Modi government (“It is not the India of 1962,” 2020). Some media outlets echoed these views of the ruling party. II: Economic response: uneasy equation Asserting that it cannot be business as usual with China, editorials in TOI and HT called for a review of New Delhi’s trade ties with Beijing and to reduce the dependence on Chinese imports. Both dailies called for “inflicting economic costs” by imposing sanctions against Chinese companies. The two dailies stressed bringing economic reforms – promoting local industries, especially those with strong export potential, dropping high import barriers, and seeking economic cooperation with the USA and other Western countries. TOI endorsed the Indian government’s decision to block 59 Chinese mobile applications, calling it a “smart move” and a blow to China. It argued that China could use these platforms to mount cyberattacks against India and termed the ban as a “security imperative and a strong message to Beijing” besides being an opportunity for Indian startups. However, this hardened position gradually softened as can be gauged from the June 22 editorial titled, “Avoid pop nationalism,” cautioning that reflexive calls for a boycott of products or services which have some Chinese investments can be counterproductive. It flagged the challenge of insulating India’s economy from China without incurring prohibitive costs.

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HT carried a similar editorial on the same day acknowledging that since Chinese companies are good at heavy engineering, India would do well to tap this expertise and continue to keep these supply chains going in its own interest (“On China, put India first,” HT, 22 June 2020). In a later editorial (“Imposing costs on China,” 30 June 2020), HT cautioned that India cannot afford to sever all its economic links with the world’s second-largest economy, conceding that Chinese finance was essential to sustain India’s start-up economy. Putting up a reality check it stated that much of the telecom infrastructure of India was from China and cannot be replaced without enormous disruption. When the Indian government banned 59 Chinese apps citing threats to the country’s sovereignty and security, a section of the media was quick to project it as yet another “surgical strike.” Republic TV’s Arnab Goswami seemed to be the most ecstatic about the move. In a dramatic fashion, which would later inspire funny video memes, he announced: The sheer suddenness of the move, the unexpected nature of the move, the unpredictability of the move, the fact that there was no warning to the Chinese. They don’t know what hit them, now the Chinese will know that when we want to act, we shall act as we wish. (Deol & Grewal, 2020) While the Indian government had already been pushing the “Atmanirbhar Bharat” (“self-reliant India”) slogan, a phrase popularised by Prime Minister Modi, it became a clarion call in the wake of the fallout with China. China’s economy has grown by leaps and bounds over the years with India struggling to catch up. China’s economy has grown into the world’s second largest, nearly five times that of India’s. While the Indian talking heads called on people to boycott Chinese products and services, it cannot sidestep the fact that the economic dependence of India on China is real and can be gauged from the stats released by China’s General Administration of Customs (GAC). Despite their strained ties, India’s trade with China in 2021 crossed $125 billion, with imports from China nearing a record $100 billion, underlining the demand for Chinese products (“Amid boycott,” 2021). The trade deficit reached $69.4 billion (Krishnan, 2021). As Chowdhury (2015) argues, China has become ubiquitous in Indian economic life, providing cheap electronics and toys to high-end telecom gear and fintech financing. III: Walking a diplomatic tightrope Both TOI and HT called for taking diplomatic countermeasures against Beijing. One of the dominant themes of editorials in this respect was forging international partnerships to counter China, particularly through QUAD Group which has gained more attention because of the geopolitical situation due to the increasing clout of China. However, while TOI called for shunning bilateralism

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and embracing multilateralism in foreign policy vis-à-vis China, HT was more restrained, suggesting that India should resolve the dispute with China bilaterally. TOI edit asserted that the only way to counter China was through multilateral platforms and tie-ups with like-minded countries, asserting that a coalition of democracies was the “best way” to handle Beijing. On the contrary, HT cautioned against any overt role of the USA in a bilateral dispute as it “may not necessarily make things easier for India.” [The] Galwan Valley is best handled at the bilateral level with the US’ support being used only as background noise. (“The Delhi-DC-Beijing triangle,” HT, 30 June 2020) Calling for a strong diplomatic campaign against China, both newspapers suggested that New Delhi should speak up against China’s “expansionist territorial claims” and condemn human rights violations of Uighur Muslims in China’s Xinjiang province and mobilise international opinion for the same. Both dailies suggested that India should consider taking a stronger position on Tibet. As pointed out by HT edit captioned “India must stand up for Tibet” (6 July 2020), “fear of antagonizing China has often meant that Indian governments, including the present dispensation, have been inconsistent in their approach to Tibet.” It called on the government to “shed its hesitation, honour the Dalai Lama with the Bharat Ratna and speak up for Tibetan rights on international platforms.” The TOI editorial on “India-Taiwan trade deal” (21 October 2020) argued, “When China itself has no qualms about claiming Indian territories like Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh, India doesn’t have to be unduly sensitive about Beijing’s theoretical claims over Taiwan.” It concluded that while engagement with China was essential and should continue, there can be no appeasement. It also called for resolving issues with neighbours such as Nepal and Bangladesh. However, by August TOI was advising caution and “walking a diplomatic tightrope.” After becoming the Prime Minister in 2014, Modi met Chinese President Xi Jinping at least 18 times but has not had even one telephone call since the border crisis began in 2020 which is quite unlike his trademark personality-centric diplomacy. Meanwhile, China continued to pursue aggressive diplomatic and military gestures against India. On 1 January 2022, Beijing’s new land border law came into force, spurring speculations as to whether it would be used to justify a more assertive Chinese posture to secure its land border amid the faceoff with India. On New Year’s Eve, Beijing renamed 15 places in Arunachal Pradesh, stating that these old names existed since ancient times and had been changed by India with its “illegal occupation.” Emboldened by India’s cautious response, the Political Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy wrote an angry letter to Indian Members of Parliament for attending a meeting organised by the Tibetan government-in-exile, terming it as an “illegal organization.” Singh (2022) attributes the “submissiveness” by the Modi government towards the Chinese to several factors including the lopsided trade relationship.

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Delhi has little geopolitical or economic leverage over Beijing to boast of. There are no arrows left in Mr. Modi’s quiver. The best Delhi can do is to prevent any further loss of territory to China with extensive military deployment on the LAC, while hoping that Beijing will give Mr. Modi an honourable diplomatic exit from this crisis. IV: Media and the Modi cult Like many mainstream TV news channels, print media outlets like TOI and HT also endorsed the Modi government’s response to Chinese moves at the Ladakh border. After Modi’s claim that no one has intruded into the Indian territory and conflicting statements from the government, TOI came to its defence stating that the “government dilemma is understandable” since “complete transparency may not be possible in a situation like this.” Both TOI and HT did not question Modi’s vague claim even as experts have been spelling out its long-term repercussions. In one of its editorials, HT was effusive in its praise for the Indian premier after he visited Ladakh and addressed the troops there. On Friday morning, Prime Minister Narendra Modi shaped India’s future foreign policy and security doctrine for years to come … he sent out a symbolic political message that India will stand up to defend its territorial integrity, in all circumstances. (“PM Modi has made his choice,” HT, 3 July 2020) In another editorial “LAC: India lays out its case” (16 September 2020) HT praised defence minister Rajnath Singh’s statement in Parliament on the border standoff, terming it as “sharp, comprehensive and an excellent summary” of the situation on the LAC after months of political ambiguity. Conceding that there were some gaps in the speech, the HT editorial, however, considered it “understandable given the sensitive nature of the situation.” Defending the government, the editorial stated that the government needed to be given the “benefit of the doubt” because of the complex nature of the crisis. In one of the editorials, while suggesting a revival of the 1959 LAC with China retaining Aksai Chin in the Ladakh region, TOI asserted, “Narendra Modi alone has the capacity to sell an LAC deal in India, as no one will question his nationalist credentials” (“Pragmatic solution,” TOI, 11 October 2020). The media has built a cult of personality that portrays Modi as a selfless leader and the nation’s saviour. TV anchors compete to outdo one another as the loudest Modi supporters so much so that they have collectively come to be called “Godi Media” (the idiomatic equivalent of “lapdog media”). This pejorative term has been popularised by Ramon Magsaysay Award winner and senior NDTV India journalist Ravish Kumar who often uses it on his prime-time show, referring to the biased Indian news media, perceived as mouthpieces of the ruling party.

142 Suhail Ahmad Indian news audiences are used to Modi flexing his nationalist muscle on issues of national security and sovereignty and he can count on a “friendly media landscape” (Gettleman, 2022). The country’s vast media have become “increasingly subservient” to the Modi government since he was first elected Prime Minister in 2014. The ruling party BJP has been accused of using various tactics, ranging from “forcing advertisers to cut off outlets that are critical of its policies to shutting down channels, to ensure the press is reshaped into its cheerleader.” The broadcast media particularly “glosses over the Modi government’s failures” (Madhok, 2021). However, early on there was an awkward moment for the Modi cheerleaders in the media after his rather controversial statement on the Galwan Valley episode. In an all-party meeting called on 19 June 2020 to discuss the situation on the India– China border, Modi said, “Neither has anyone intruded into the Indian territory nor has anyone captured any military posts.” This statement led to an outcry as just two days earlier, the Ministry of External Affairs had accused Chinese troops of crossing the LAC and trying to erect a structure in the Galwan Valley. Opposition leaders seized the moment with Congress leader Rahul Gandhi tweeting: “Prime minister has surrendered Indian territory to Chinese aggression. If the land was Chinese: Why were our soldiers killed?” (“Is Modi saying China crossed into China?,” 2020). Military and strategic experts also expressed disappointment and warned of serious consequences of the statement. The inadvertent effect of Modi’s remarks was that it allowed China to claim that the Indian side itself was admitting there was no Chinese intrusion into the Indian territory and that on the contrary India was the aggressor. One of the plausible interpretations of this wariness from the Indian side and the attempt to downplay the border clashes was if the government released all the gruesome details, it might have incited people to demand sterner action which could potentially escalate into a war. In any case, a dominant section of Indian media downplayed the statement to allow the government to wriggle out of the controversy. Later when Modi visited Ladakh on July 3 and addressed the troops on the frontline, it allowed the media to allay the apprehensions raised by his June 19 declaration and once again portray him as a strong leader. While the TV news media played out the visuals of the Prime Minister’s speech in Ladakh all day, the print media was also effusive in its praise though attributing it to experts. HT hailed Modi’s Ladakh visit and termed it as a “game-changer.” Quoting experts, the HT report termed Modi’s visit to Ladakh as an expression of India’s “resolve to beat Chinese aggression and a clear articulation of Indian redlines.” For the sake of balance, the report also included a solitary quote which dismissed the hype, but it was relegated to the concluding paragraphs, clearly reflecting the slant of the newspaper. It quoted Christopher Clary, assistant professor of political science at the State University of New York, saying that the PM did not promise to avenge the fallen, as he did after the 2019 Pulwama attack (“PM Modi’s surprise visit to Ladakh is a game-changer,” 2020). TOI carried a similar report hailing Modi’s visit to Ladakh and terming it as a “clear signal that India is ready to escalate the cost on China for its misadventurism.”

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Many Indian news channels are believed to support the BJP government and sometimes they brazenly try to fend off any criticism against it. As Shen and Chowdhury (2020) observe, “editorial spins often originate from television channels, which increasingly set the agenda for competitive “breaking news” transmissions and the belligerent news analysis shows.” After the reports of Chinese intrusion in Ladakh, Sweta Singh, an anchor with Hindi news channel Aaj Tak, said the Indian army should be blamed for the incident, and not the central government. “The duty to patrol the borders is of the army and not the government … If the reports say that China overtook Indian land, it raises a question on the Indian Army,” she said, drawing sharp criticism on social media. These gaffes are seen as desperate attempts by a section of TV news media to shield the government from criticism and portray it as infallible. After the sudden and dramatic announcement of demonetisation in 2016, many news channels called it Modi’s “masterstroke,” a term which would be used in many more instances to praise him. It was Sweta Singh from Aaj Tak who took it to a whole new level by making a bizarre claim that the new 2,000-rupee note had an inbuilt nano chip that would be able to communicate with a satellite if a bunch of notes were stashed somewhere. Needless to say that this was proved to be false, but there was no apology from the anchor or her channel for misleading the audience. Similarly, in the wake of the Galwan clashes, some media outlets peddled fake news to mislead people into believing that the Chinese suffered more casualties than India in the Galwan Valley. News agency ANI claimed that 43 Chinese soldiers had died in the clash, without giving further details, while the Chinese media was yet to reveal casualties on its side. Hindi news channel, Aaj Tak and English news channel “Times Now” broadcast a video claiming that it was of a cemetery of Chinese soldiers killed in the Galwan Valley. Several fact-checking sites clarified that the video aired by the two channels was actually that of a military cemetery of Chinese soldiers killed in the 1962 war. Fact-checking site Alt News exposed how the “Times Now” channel fell for fake WhatsApp forward listing names of 30 dead Chinese soldiers. Playing it up as breaking news, the “Times Now” claimed China had accepted that 30 of its soldiers had been killed by Indian troops (Chaudhuri, 2020). When there are no incentives, the government can resort to other tactics to ensure favourable coverage, especially on national security issues and the COVID19 crisis. For instance, before Prime Minister Modi announced a nationwide lockdown in the wake of the COVID-19 outbreak, he personally asked some owners and editors from the mainstream print media to publish positive stories about the pandemic. Caravan magazine scrutinised the subsequent COVID-19 coverage of these newspapers, finding out that they were “evidently uncritical” of the government’s response to the pandemic and that there was “little mention of the poor planning” of the government despite early warnings (Sagar, 2020). In July 2021, the Indian Income Tax department raided Dainik Bhaskar, one of India’s most Hindi prominent newspapers, in what was seen as retaliation against its hard-nosed coverage of the government’s response to the pandemic.

144 Suhail Ahmad As COVID-19 second wave swept through India, Dainik Bhaskar splashed photos of funeral pyres on its front pages, reported on corpses floating in the Ganges River, and challenged the government’s narrative and statistics. The Press Club of India termed it an “act of intimidation by the government to deter the independent media” (Shih & Masih, 2021).

Conclusion The media plays an important role in influencing public opinion and developing better understanding between countries as also highlighted by the Press Council of India in its norms of journalistic conduct. The analysis of editorials published on the 2020 Indo-China standoff by Times of India and Hindustan Times, with a combined readership of well over nine million, partially confirms what some of the earlier studies done on the media coverage of the bilateral ties had found. The two newspapers used strong language to frame China as an aggressive power inimical to India’s interests and called for an economic, diplomatic, and military response. Upgrading the defence capabilities and stitching alliances were seen as ways of resisting Chinese aggression. This study examined the rhetoric and the argument advanced in the editorials, putting them in the larger context of the military, economic, and diplomatic standing of the two countries which shape the tone and tenor of the relationship. Accordingly, one could gauge a pattern in the editorials of TOI and HT marked by a mixture of confrontation, caution, cynicism, and conciliation. In the early days of the crisis when reports of Indian casualties surfaced in the Galwan Valley, the editorials were more confrontational in a tone which gradually sounded cynical about the real intentions behind Chinese actions and disengagement proposals before striking a more conciliatory note. Even though some editorials called for a strong response, they did not match the war rhetoric usually reserved for Pakistan. Realisation of the power asymmetry between India and China was also evident from some of the editorials while they referred to Beijing’s assertion of political and diplomatic heft, military might, and economic leverage besides India’s internal constraints and compulsions to avoid prolonged conflict. Both newspapers called for effective military mobilisation at the border to send out a message of strength while ramping up the defence capabilities and entering security alignments with the USA and other major Western powers. Some editorials advocated pragmatism and restraint to explore peace through negotiations. The editorials echoed the government’s dilemmas while framing an adversarial relationship with a more powerful neighbour. While praising the Indian government’s decision to ban Chinese apps, the editorials called for inflicting economic costs and imposing sanctions against the imports. However, they also sounded caution against knee-jerk calls for boycotting products or services with Chinese investments. Besides, the need to reduce India’s burgeoning economic dependence on China was also duly highlighted. Calling for diplomatic countermeasures against Beijing, the TOI and HT editorials suggested New Delhi to criticise human rights violations in Xinjiang

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and raise official diplomatic engagements with Taipei. They also called for securing alliances with Indo-Pacific democracies. Indicating softening of the stand, the later editorials called for pursuing bilateral dialogue with Beijing to find an acceptable solution. TOI, particularly, made a rather startling suggestion, seeking revival of the 1959 LAC with China touting it as the best solution to the crisis. Like much of mainstream media, TOI and HT also seemed to be in awe of PM Modi. While the opposition leaders highlighted the apparent ambiguity and contradictions in the government’s response to the Ladakh standoff, the editorials in the two newspapers had no probing questions to pose and rather were keen to give the “benefit of the doubt” to the government citing the nature of the crisis. The decision to ban Chinese apps was hailed much like the earlier decisions of the government which were labelled as “masterstrokes” as the media continued to feed the cult of personality around Modi as a strong and selfless leader.

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10 China’s overlooked role in the Syrian crisis Selim Öterbülbül

In recent years, Chinese involvement in international conflicts has grown beyond expectation when considering the country’s widely acknowledged strategy of keeping a low profile on the international stage. China as one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council has more and more involvement and interest in international crises, even taking pride in being the largest contributor to UN peacekeeping operations among the permanent members of the UN Security Council (“Troop and police,” 2021). That change has been explained by a shift from focusing merely on economic gains to strengthening political support and norm-shaping ability in rising to great power status (Hirono & Lanteige, 2011; Yan, 2014). China’s international behaviour has become complicated in regards to international conflicts even if Beijing is taking sides with the elected government. Based on the country’s focus on no interference in the domestic affairs of other states, its foreign policy decisions should not be understood as indifference to those crises but as a deliberate choice to keep its strategic principle in diplomacy. Nevertheless, China has been standing aloof from Middle East conflicts unless those conflicts affect its economic interests or energy security. Even though Syria has never been a close economic or political partner of Beijing, an unprecedented Chinese engagement in Middle East issues was also marked by the Syrian crisis, while Beijing has been emphasising respect for sovereignty, regional stability, and combatting terrorism. Yet, China has gained comparatively little attention in analysing the Syrian crisis, although the roles played by regional or global actors have been discussed in media and academic circles. Building on a brief analysis of China’s reactions to international conflicts while keeping in mind Beijing’s commitment to respecting sovereignty, this chapter examines China’s role in the Syrian Civil War. It begins by exploring China’s reactions to international conflicts within the framework of the principle of non-intervention. Then, it focuses on China’s foreign policy orientation regarding the Syrian Civil War through its voting pattern on UN Security Council resolutions. The last part investigates the media representation of China over its casted votes/vetoes to analyse how its role in this specific conflict has been received and perceived by the international audience. Media coverage in the aftermath of UN Resolutions concerning Syria whether adopted or vetoed by the Security Council will define the scope of analysis on China’s representation in this crisis. The main DOI: 10.4324/9781003261278-10

China’s overlooked role in the Syrian crisis 149 argument in this chapter emphasises that China’s overlooked role in the Syrian crisis is the result of China’s relatively new policy to engage issues in the Middle East and a reflection of China’s diplomatic priorities. That new policy is based on standing aloof from military conflicts and not challenging the principle of nonintervention but still establishing its own sphere of influence through political, economic, and diplomatic means. In addition, an active engagement with other great powers in relation to the Syrian crisis also makes China’s low profile evident while defending the principle of non-intervention on normative grounds.

China and the principle of non-intervention China’s unprecedented economic growth leads to a discussion on the role of Beijing in world politics as most of China’s global activism, influence, and foreign policy choices are closely related to its economic development and needs. This rising power image has officially been framed within the discourse of “peaceful rise/development.” It has lately been defined as “international development cooperation” with an undertone of rising to deter adversarial reactions in building a win–win partnership for sustainable development (Xi, 2015). The main objective of this political stance is to “promote development and harmony domestically and pursue cooperation and peace internationally” according to the White Paper on China’s Peaceful Development in 2011. While economic development brought wealth and new capabilities to China, two identities have been developed. The first identity of China pursues a great power status in foreign affairs due to the new type of relationship between great powers openly professed by Xi (Xi, 2012; Hao, 2015). The second emphasises that China is a developing nation belonging to the third world in solidarity with other developing nations. Moreover, China often prides itself as the voice of the underdeveloped global south (Van Ness, 1993). As Pu (2019) points out, China’s image as a developing country is highly related to the developmental objectives and different foreign audiences, especially in the global south. The relationship between discourse and foreign policy choices can demonstrate consistency in foreign policy principles and behaviour. Yet, it might create contradicting stances in praxis when responding to a crisis. These contradicting or concurring images of China in international conflict can be traced back by searching how China is represented in the media when a message is expressly sent to which audiences. The role of China in a world of conflicts is not limited to economic relations but also covers political, diplomatic, and military activities. While Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy legacy dictates “never claiming leadership and maintaining a low profile,” China under Xi Jinping demonstrates further engagement with international issues. To begin with, Chinese engagement started with a discussion as to how China can comply with the basic rules and principles of the liberal international order if it will strive for leadership within it like other emerging powers (Ikenberry, 2011; Johnston, 2013). Furthermore, the limits of Westphalian norms regarding the primacy of national sovereignty have been discussed through China’s reactions to the international crisis when its own strategic

150 Selim Öterbülbül interests relating to interventionism are challenged. As a champion of the principle of non-intervention, China has adhered to the principle even more since the Tiananmen Square Protest in 1989 and further foreign criticism of the country’s human rights record as well as its policies in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong. The principle of non-intervention is a major rhetorical and diplomatic tool of Beijing to repel critiques that take a hard-line in its domestic affairs. The principle keeps the moral high ground in diplomacy to oppose interference in the internal affairs of states, primarily its own. Non-intervention is adopted as the basic principle of China’s foreign policy since China’s initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. It protects China’s core interests mentioned as “state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and national reunification, China’s political system established by the Constitution and overall social stability, and the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development” in the aforementioned White Paper. There are three political advantages to championing the principle of nonintervention in China’s foreign affairs. First, it would defend the traditional primacy of state sovereignty and keep out foreign interference in issues related to its domestic affairs and national security. Then, China’s moral commitment to the principle would be favoured in many developing states by referencing the Chinese narrative of anti-imperialism and not copying “Western colonialists” amid claims China exploits others’ natural resources (“China denies …,” 2015). Finally, China’s peaceful development cooperation would have credibility by avoiding hegemonic discourse and behaviour in the eyes of foreign audiences. In that regard, Beijing’s commitment to the principle has been tested in many crises due to it having a permanent member seat in the UN Security Council. When further engagement with international issues is required, China’s reaction to the problem would be determined by the general principles of its foreign policy as well. Nevertheless, there is another argument that the persistent advocacy of the principle turns into an impediment for Beijing to have more involvement in contributing to global issues. The pioneering role of Chinese companies triggers a discussion on how China would intervene in support of them when their interests needed to be defended (Duchâtel et al., 2014). In connection with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Ghiselli and Morgan (2021) discuss that Chinese companies, especially on the BRI, appear to be counting on China’s support in times of crisis and have not behaved in a way that is more risk averse, despite the official regulations, warnings, and advice from Sinosure, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce, and the Ministry of Public Security of China. Therefore, the need for Chinese companies to work in unstable regions would lead to a pragmatic adjustment in maintaining the principle merely on moral grounds. However, such needs also meet challenges by selectively engaging with risks incurred in protecting China’s interests overseas. Several suggestions have been made for the pragmatic adjustment of the policy such as “constructive involvement,” “creative involvement,” or “responsible protection” instead of sustaining the “passive” interpretation of the principle (Zheng, 2016). In reaching a flexible implementation of the principle, reflections on domestic and international

China’s overlooked role in the Syrian crisis 151 audiences are particularly important. This is because the new pragmatic adjustment should not be perceived as a threat that damages China’s relationship building and Xi’s self-proclaimed China’s image in world politics. The above discussion can be summarised in terms of three outcomes in regards to shaping China’s image in the eyes of foreign audiences and the durability of the principle of non-intervention as a foreign policy pillar in particular. To begin with, the traditional commitment to the Deng-ist principles such as keeping a low profile does not serve the purpose of avoiding great power confrontation or shaping the perception of others on the rise of China (Yan, 2014). Many states, especially the USA, consider China to be a significant challenge regardless of its keeping a low profile; instead, Beijing has been labelled as a free rider because it tends to avoid responsibilities in global issues while developing as an alternative patron and provider of public goods (Fulton, 2018; Cooley & Nexon, 2020). This criticism does not serve the purpose of Xi Jinping’s strategic intentions if China established a major country status with Chinese characteristics to reform the international system and global governance (Xi, 2017; Iida, 2020). Furthermore, China uses diplomatic tools for the peaceful settlement of disputes. It could act as a proactive peacemaker in the eyes of both domestic and foreign audiences when regional or international crises occur. These efforts for the peaceful settlement of disputes coincided with the zero-enemy policy and the diplomacy-first approach to facing the challenges of a dispute (Sun & Zoubir, 2018). The next outcome is the ascension of the Chinese presence in international missions for global peace engagement. China has found a legitimate ground in UN authorisations for intervention in international conflicts through its financial support and military participation in peacekeeping missions, humanitarian aid operations, and international disaster relief missions (Zhao, 2011). There is a major shift from the dictum of keeping a low profile in China’s military engagement with international crises through its expanding UN presence. Moreover, China exercises its veto power on the Syrian Civil War in a successive fashion rather than abstaining from voting regarding the UN Security Council resolutions, which turns the Chinese right to veto into leverage in further political and economic negotiations. Although China points out that the use of force is an ineffective tool for conflict resolution, the real objective has already been preventing the humanitarian crises and peacekeeping operations from turning into a justification for the US-led multinational practice of the use of force authorised by the UN Security Council (Fravel, 1996). Furthermore, China has increased its contribution to international involvement in any humanitarian crisis instead of being an outsider, which might be considered a form of benevolent hegemony as claimed by Danner and Martín (2019). That does not only cover China’s active military involvement in the UN Peacekeeping Missions but also refers to the Chinese contribution to the normative discussion by proposing “responsible protection” like a norm maker (Carlson, 2016; Gegout & Suzuki, 2020). China’s approach to having more direct involvement does not have to require military intervention but adopts an alternative interference with non-military means, especially on diplomatic, economic, and normative grounds. Thus, Chinese attachment to a normative basis

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makes Beijing a relevant player in discussions on humanitarian intervention, and in Middle East politics as well. Even though Sørensen (2019) suggests there is a growing domestic expectation of regaining international status and respect for China as a great power, humanitarian intervention does not seem to be a way of realising these voices since any call for international intervention does not occur from Chinese society but comes rather from political and academic circles, the outer circle of policy-making (Shirk, 2007). But the outcome of the Arab Uprisings has shaped China’s reaction to such international crises because of a new kind of threat directed at the human security of its own citizens. The upheaval in the Middle East states threatened the investments, energy supply, and financial interests of Chinese companies, as well as the security of Chinese citizens who work abroad, because of the escalation of violence, military clashes, and instability. It started to question China’s perception of the principle but also the efficiency of its military capabilities such as the PLA’s military organisation other than war, guarding interests abroad, and its understanding of security in general (Ghiselli, 2021). To sum up, there is no static non-intervention approach on the part of China in order to be active and selective in its engagement with international crises, guiding regional or international organisations, and defending the normative basis of intervention in relation to different perceptions of Western states (Huang, 2011).

China and the Syrian Civil War China’s Middle East policy has been driven by its economic interests since the country became a major oil importer from the region in the mid-1990s. The economy-oriented relationship requires regional stability and reliable relations with trade and investment partners. Even though China’s military role in the region can be expected to develop due to its desire to secure its economic interests and oil supply from the region, Beijing stands aloof from regional confrontations beyond calling for dialogue, political solutions, and the peaceful settlement of disputes, especially in the Arab Uprisings. China’s position in regional affairs has been criticised as being a free rider of the security network, which has been established, financed, and sustained by the USA (Shambaugh, 2011). In accordance with the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, China adheres to respecting sovereignty in seeking collective good in its relations and social harmony in the region. This has resulted in keeping friendly relations with all parties in the region even if they confront each other, until the point that China needs to choose one over another to protect its strategic interests. Furthermore, China’s reaction to the instability of the Arab Uprisings and the armed conflict in many states faced criticism for not acting as a responsible great power. This political stance has been explained by China opposing humanitarian intervention and voting with Russia in the UN Security Council because China strives for authoritarian solidarity (Pei, 2012; Olimat, 2013). However, this claim is problematic as there is no ideologically bipolar order in the contemporary world order and even Mao’s selective engagement with those

China’s overlooked role in the Syrian crisis 153 ideological groups has already been forsaken. China did not actively support other regimes whether authoritarian, non-democratic, or communist, for the sake of an ideological commitment. Regime security has the utmost importance for the CCP, and this is why China takes such a defensive attitude in regard to regime change. Moreover, China supports those regimes for defending its normative commitment to the principle of non-intervention, which was described by Dittmer (2010) as “a principled consistency” in constructing a self-image. That position also sustains its pragmatic, case-by-case approach to protecting Chinese interests as it used to do (Chaziza, 2019; Kleine-Ahlbrandt & Small, 2008). The Chinese government did not change its policy towards the Arab states as Wang Yi (2014) stressed in China’s fundamental position in the region through the “four supports”: China supports Arab states in following their chosen paths, supports Arab states in resolving the region’s difficult issues through political means, supports Arab states in achieving a win-win and common development with China, and supports Arab states in playing a bigger role in regional and international affairs and in more effectively safeguarding their legitimate rights and interests. Regarding Sino-Syrian relations, Syria has never been a strategic priority or a close partner for China due to its limited economic and political relations, as well as its lack of major oil or natural gas reserves. When protests in Syria turned into a civil war, China kept a rather low profile in comparison to other great powers’ ascending military involvement. Yet, that does not mean that Beijing has been indifferent to the crisis as its permanent seat in the UN Security Council requires it to choose at least a diplomatic stance on the issue. Therefore, China has developed four main objectives to secure its interests and political stance in general. First, China aims to build a constructive relationship with all sides of the crisis including the Assad regime, different parties of the opposition groups, major powers, and other regional countries. China has displayed an unwavering commitment to promoting and supporting peace talks, which fits with its diplomacyfirst approach, but has gone so far as to assume a good mediator role between the government in Damascus and other parties. The second objective is to reject any kind of foreign intervention in the crisis by reaffirming and even defending respect for state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. China’s expanding discourse has deliberately framed humanitarian intervention as seeking “regime change” by Western powers (Fung, 2018). Iranian and Russian military involvement on the side of the Assad regime has been considered the decision of a legitimate government that calls for foreign help from Chinese officials. As Wang Yi stressed in his latest visit to Damascus on 18 July 2021, China strongly supports Syria in safeguarding its state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national dignity and opposes any attempt that seeks “regime change” in Syria. The use of weapons of mass destruction has become a symbol of the inaction of the Obama administration in arguments in favour of intervention. When the Assad regime accepted the deal agreed to by the USA and

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Russia to turn over its stockpiles of chemical weapons for destruction, the main reason for the US-led military intervention was removed, as that Obama’s “red line” in regards to chemical weapons. Then, the main concern of the international community has begun to shift to the fight against terrorism and extremism caused by the rise of ISIS and other terrorist groups. From the beginning of the crisis, China paid much attention to the humanitarian situation, access to aid and workers for the efficiency of the humanitarian relief efforts, and calls for a cessation of hostilities in Syria rather than providing military support. It is one of the main reasons why China has been criticised for being an outsider in such humanitarian crises, which Shichor (2015) associates with the philosophy of Wu Wei (inaction, effortlessness): adapting a rather neutral position. The Chinese diplomatic stance might not be interpreted as direct support to the regime in Damascus in the broader scheme of a neutral diplomatic position and multilateral efforts in the region. However, the inaction when action has been needed in such a crisis would change the balance of power in favour of a particular side, in this case, tacit support for the pro-Assad forces. As a matter of security interests, another objective has occurred in response to the presence of Uyghur foreign fighters among the opposition groups (Greitens, Lee, & Yazıcı, 2019). Moreover, the rise of ISIS became a concern of the world as well as China’s in particular because the terrorist organisation threatened Beijing to retaliate against its policies in Xinjiang. Although China has avoided any direct military involvement in the conflict, such a security threat shapes the Chinese approach to the crisis into a more military-oriented way as the PLA pledged military assistance along with humanitarian assistance (Liu, 2016). In accordance with the CCP’s “three evils” defined as terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism, China intensifies its support to combat terrorism and international law enforcement cooperation. In addition to that threat directed at the mainland, the Uyghur foreign fighters issue has been considered not only as an extremist or separatist menace but also as a potential terrorism threat to Chinese interests overseas and especially on the Belt and Road Initiative (Duchâtel, 2019). China’s consistent approach to the conflict made the final objective of their foreign policy clear in that it sought to support the post-war rebuilding of Syria by the quasi-stability and the government’s superiority in that conflict. China’s cautious but pragmatic diplomatic engagement in Syria has led Chinese economic might into being a significant contributor to the reconstruction of the country. A decadelong conflict in Syria displaced around 12 million Syrians internally or externally. Moreover, the estimated cost of damage is more than $388 billion including damaged infrastructure and housing stock of the country, according to the World Bank report (The World Bank, 2017). So, the reconstruction of the country is a huge burden for the government in Damascus that can only be realised with foreign assistance and credits, and this is where China can be an important provider. China’s economic capability enables infrastructure investments and an economic partnership compatible with grand strategic plans as the BRI despite the threat of Western sanctions and the adverse effects of ongoing risks. Such a grand plan would cast a giant shadow to create high expectations for China’s imminent role

China’s overlooked role in the Syrian crisis 155 in Syria and the Middle East. Ghiselli and Al-Sudairi (2019) note China’s role has to show consistency with the political and economic realities of Sino-Syrian relations, instead of having an exaggerated narrative. It can be argued that this exaggeration is a deliberate choice for both sides to project the potential as being larger than the reality. On the Syrian side, Chinese involvement in the reconstruction process and national reconciliation for a political solution are requested. It signifies the commitment of an economic giant to Syria’s reconstruction but also can be a bargaining chip in order to lure other great powers to contribute (Zhou, 2017). On the other side, China can also overstate its great power status in realising new national interests, ambitions, and preferences for world order through the image of great plans such as the BRI to an audience, even though the reality does not reach that level of active participation in the post-war reconstruction efforts, yet (Burton, 2020). Thus, Syria turns into a test for the advancement of the BRI in the most difficult political environment with a cautious attitude towards great risks and benefits to realise this grand prospect.

China votes: media representations of UN Security Council resolutions Chinese foreign policy behaviour can be traced back to its voting patterns in the UN. In the post-Arab Uprisings period, China has had little impact on the conflicts while facing the need to realign its Middle East policy regarding its own diplomatic and economic capabilities and the political and military realities on the field. China has not actively used its veto power in the UN Security Council compared to the veto record of the USA and the USSR/Russia. However, there has been a boost in Chinese vetoes by the Syrian crisis to the level of 10 out of 16 vetoes, all together with Russia, all of which have been cast since Beijing replaced Taiwan’s permanent seat. In the latest decade, Russia issued a veto on 16 draft resolutions concerning the situation in Syria in accordance with its ascending military involvement and the question of chemical weapons. Considering Russian and Iranian support for the Assad regime, or the Western support for the opposition, China’s impact was limited to joining Russia in the UN Security Council to thwart a regime change by framing humanitarian intervention as foreign interference. All vetoed drafts were criticised by the Chinese ambassadors for paving the way for interventionism by Western states, which would not provide an inclusive solution to the crisis. The UN General Assembly also passed nonbinding resolutions such as the “Situation in the Syrian Arab Republic” (A/RES/66/253) on 21 February 2012, the “Situation of Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic” (A/RES/72/191) on 19 December 2017, and most recently the “Situation of Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic” (A/RES/77/193) on 16 December 2020 in spite of against votes by China and Russia. Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun explained China’s position in UN General Assembly (GA) resolutions in the same vein as vetoing similar drafts in the UN Security Council, concerning an outside intervention that could become a tool of the West instead of having room for peaceful

156 Selim Öterbülbül dialogue and a political solution. He argues that “previous cases show that blatant external intervention has provided few episodes of peace and prosperity, as promised by the West” (“Justification for China’s,” 2012). China aims to prevent condemnation and sanctions against Syria while rejecting pressures on the government in Damascus because all these draft resolutions have been considered by Chinese representatives in the UN as a way for regime change and a violation of the principle of non-intervention, respect for sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Since the beginning of the conflict in Syria, the UN Security Council has adopted 27 resolutions up until December 2021. The first phase was mainly related to the implementation of the UN Special Envoy and the deployment of missions to observe the ceasefire. All resolutions reflect Chinese concerns about actions and violations on the normative ground while emphasising the political solution instead of military means or sanctions. As seen in the titles of those resolutions, the main objective has shifted from violence and conflict resolution to humanitarian relief missions and extension of formalities over years by the deadlock of the political solution. So, the second phase is mainly based on calling for a ceasefire and renewing authorisations for border crossing of humanitarian access. Chinese activism in the UN has been highlighted as being unprecedented in disarmament and arms control under international law by the Chinese media (“For the first time,” 2021). In the eyes of both domestic and international audiences, coverage focuses on Chinese support for humanitarian relief efforts in line with these resolutions (“China supports,” 2014). This is because humanitarian aid became one of the significant concerns of the international community by the deadlock in the political solution process (“UN resolution,” 2014; “UN Security,” 2021). Chinese efforts to keep any reference to intervention and military means out were praised, but, in time, the controversy was depicted as an arbitrary act of “punishment” on the part of the West against a country “close with Russia and China” (“UN resolution,” 2020). In the Western media, a veto decision was given much more attention than a passed resolution in order to question Russian and Chinese intentions and even blame them for siding with the “brutal Assad regime” (“Hague accuses,” 2011). It should be noted that Russian interests are clearer than Chinese ones in the eyes of the Western media, so explanations of the Chinese position are given much more attention and understood through different arguments (Grammaticas, 2012, “Russia and China,” 2012). On the other hand, many draft resolutions have not been adopted, owing to the negative vote of permanent members of the Security Council. On 4 October 2011, China and Russia vetoed a resolution (UNSC, 2011) regarding the situation in Syria, which would have described it as a threat to international peace and security, called on the government in Damascus to immediately cease its mass killings and violence to have an inclusive Syrian-led political process conducted in an environment free from violence, condemn the continued grave and systematic human rights violations and the use of force against civilians by the Syrian authorities and issued sanctions for the oppression. In explaining China’s perception, Li Baodong remarks:

China’s overlooked role in the Syrian crisis 157 to respect Syria’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity … to defuse differences through political dialogue, and contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in the Middle East. Most important, it should depend upon whether it complies with the Charter of the United Nations and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States … sanctions or the threat thereof does not help to resolve the question of Syria and, instead, may further complicate the situation. (UN Security Council, 2011) Li also called for political dialogue and reform and outlined that any action has to respect the aforementioned principles as well as comply with the UN Charter and the mediation efforts of the relevant countries and organisations in the region. The same concerns were put forward in explaining the second Chinese veto on a draft resolution in addition to the good office efforts of the Arab League instead of complicating the issue (UN Security Council, 2012). In spite of normative reasoning in the Chinese statements, Vitaly Churkin also referred to the military realities in the field such as calling for the Syrian opposition to distance itself from extremist groups who are committing acts of violence and ending attacks by armed groups on State institutions, in order to further support Russian perspectives on their involvement (UN Security Council, 2012). The media coverage of the aforementioned vetoes has two different facets. The Chinese media associates the rationale with acting as a responsible great power calling for a political solution instead of complicating the issue and seeking a regime change (“China opposes,” 2012). The statement of Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun, a special envoy of the Chinese government, was singled out to argue that China has casted its veto power in an effort to seek a reasonable political dialogue, not to support the Assad regime (“China’s vote,” 2012). However, it is important to note that the Chinese media coverage of these veto decisions brings to the fore Russian efforts in the UN Security Council while referencing the statements of Russian diplomats, even before the Chinese officials (“Beijing’s Middle,” 2012). China’s concerns were noted along with Russian ones while highlighting the Russian effort to amend the draft resolution (“Russia, China,” 2012). The fact that Russian diplomatic endeavours are given such an emphasis without any mention in the media of China planning anything alike Russia’s proactive interference, diplomatically and militarily according to Kounalakis (2016). Another emphasis was that there would not be any negative impact caused by the Chinese attitude on Sino–Middle East relations in general (“Chinese UN,” 2012). Even though there was a constant reference in Chinese media to the regional stability, political solution, call for dialogue, and mediation efforts of the Arab League, there was no emphasis on Syria’s suspended memberships and sanctions on Syria approved by regional organisations, unlike media from the region (“Arab League,” 2011). On the other side of the controversy, coverage in the Western media as well as regional media explains the issue as being the resistance of the Russian-Chinese axis to Western intervention (Escobar, 2011). It has started with a rather high tone towards Russian military involvement while China has just called for stepping

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up the pressure by curtailing its energy ties (“Clinton urges,” 2011). The Russian presence in the region has been regarded as a more important leverage than that of China (Charbonneau, 2012). Over two joint vetoes of Russia and China, the pressure of the international community (which raised concerns about violence and mass killings) was directed at the two countries by the Western media. The explanation of the rare double veto as China along with Russia has coincided with the Western accusation such as “selling out the Syrian people and shielding a craven tyrant,” “betraying the Syrian people,” and the lack of effort to stop the attacks on civilians and flows of refugees from Syria (MacFarquhar, 2011). These accusations were highlighted by the Chinese media as how China reacts and resists one-sided resolution plans that work for the Western interest instead of China’s peaceful development (“China halts,” 2012). Moreover, the Chinese media coverage explains the reasons for such criticism with Beijing’s rejection “to be a pawn in the wheeling and dealing of the West” (“Beijing’s Middle,” 2012). In addition to Beijing’s perception, the lack of a unanimous decision has also been noted by the Chinese media referring to the abstained votes of non-permanent members of the UN Security Council (“Russia, China,” 2011). To explain different perceptions of great powers in the early stage of the Syrian conflict, Kounalakis (2016) compares opinion articles from the China Daily and the Washington Post in 2012 to argue that the sample of the American media explains the need to intervene because of ongoing violence against civilians. On the Chinese side, the coverage of the China Daily stresses the need for diplomatic efforts and dialogue among parties to reach a political solution while referring to the primary role of the UN to end the conflict. In the early stages of the Syrian crisis, the inaction of the UN has been explained by the Western media through Chinese and Russian attitudes to the crisis without discussing the outcomes of the concurrent intervention in Libya like these are two separate issues. However, there has been gradually more reference to the Libya case in explaining the inconsistency of great power politics in the Syrian Civil War by asking “Why Libya, But Not Syria” in academic studies and media coverage (Naim, 2011; Pape, 2012; Rogin, 2016). The UNSC Resolution 1973 authorised a no-fly zone for Libya, yet NATO has broadly interpreted it to legitimise its military intervention to unseat the Gaddafi regime. NATO’s interpretation of the UNSC Resolution 1973 strengthens Chinese suspicions of Western efforts and is further used as an example of how UN authorisation can be interpreted in order to enact regime change (Fung, 2019). To react to Western recriminations, the prime negative impact of the Libya case was highlighted by the NATO air campaign, because it practically resulted in toppling down Gaddafi’s regime instead of protecting civilians and implementing an authorised “no-fly zone” (“UN Security,” 2011; “Why China,” 2011; Chang, 2014). Moreover, the Chinese media puts an emphasis on not only NATO’s involvement but also US-led military intervention even with references to Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq (“Perverse hegemonism,” 2022). China voted against the following drafts that were in July 2012 (S/PV.6810), May 2014 (S/PV.7180), December 2016 (S/PV.7825), February 2017 (S/

China’s overlooked role in the Syrian crisis 159 PV.7893), September 2019 (S/PV.8623), December 2019 (S/PV.8697), and July 2020 (S/2020/661, S/2020/693). The Chinese vetoes continue to reflect normative concerns, and delegitimise regime change efforts, but also point to humanitarian crises and the actions of terrorist organisations in the later stage of the conflict. All parties were called to respect Syria’s sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity by the Chinese diplomats. In addition to that, the worsening humanitarian situation in the country has been explained as terrorist organisations attempting to spread their influence. Chinese media and official narratives continued to frame the Chinese position on the Syrian crisis as an act of a responsible power (“China remains,” 2019). Furthermore, Western pressure for intervention has been depicted as a remnant of the unipolar world order (Kiracofe, 2013). Therefore, a firm Chinese commitment to such efforts became significant in challenging the unipolar system practices in order to regain great power status in line with Xi Jinping’s major power diplomacy. In response to China’s responsible power image, the Western media has criticised Russian and Chinese positions by arguing that such decisions cause “the most vulnerable suffer for the political gains of those at the top” (“With a UN,” 2020). Moreover, China’s concerns about radicalisation and the spread of terrorism in connection with Uyghur foreign fighters were not only mentioned in Chinese media coverage but also noted by the Western media (“China state,” 2013; Meilian, 2013). China’s persistent rejection of any foreign interference has been connected to a focus on its own domestic issues to prevent foreign critiques from the beginning of the crisis (Walsh, 2011). China has also brought the post-war reconstruction of Syria and its economic and social development to the forefront, which would affect its benevolent provider image and the potential Chinese contribution to the process (UNSC, 2019). All coverage in Chinese, Western, and Middle Eastern media focused on statements as to whether the motivation for China is foreign support for an underdeveloped and ruined economy or another ambition to expand its influence in Syria (“China eyes,” 2017; Solomon & Osseiran, 2017; “China to play,” 2018; “China builds,” 2021; “Syrian economy,” 2021).

Conclusion China’s role in UN Security Council discussions on the Syrian crisis works to achieve three outcomes. First, China can delegitimise arguments in favour of foreign intervention as a violation of state sovereignty and, later, an act of regime change. In this way, China explains and justifies its position in the eyes of other states and domestic, regional, and international audiences, especially after the Libya case. This is because the Libya case makes clear how the Western powers can interpret the UN Security Council resolutions for the purpose of regime change and foreign military interference. There was no social pressure from all of the neighbouring countries and regional organisations such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Arab League in the Syrian crisis like the call of the Arab League and the African Union for the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya. Although China abstained during the vote on Resolution 1973 concerning

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the Libya crisis, China did not make the same decision in regards to resolutions concerning the Syrian crisis after what was implemented in Libya. Moreover, China’s arguments were strengthened by the lack of unanimous support on the part of numerous regional actors for intervention, as well as what has been experienced in Libya and in many regional states in regards to the Arab Uprisings. Second, one of the major intentions of Beijing has been to stand aloof from armed conflict and the use of military means, unless the instability threatened vital economic interests or the security of Chinese citizens. For Beijing, abstention is also a responsible attitude, which gives peace a chance and shows disapproval of using not only military means but also international sanctions to address disputes. Unlike Russia, China limited its involvement on diplomatic and political grounds instead of participating in military conflicts, despite rumours of pro-Assad military support. Chinese entanglement in the Syrian crisis can be expected to increase due to the investments of Chinese companies in the reconstruction of the country. The media coverage of China’s role in the Syrian crisis further engages the diplomatic and economic expectations of both sides by focusing on the conflict resolution and aftermath in Syria (“Syria joins,” 2022). Finally, the Chinese position in the Syrian conflict promotes a norm-maker role by discussing the concept of responsible protection in diplomatic discourse instead of implementing the vague definition of humanitarian intervention (Garwood-Gowers, 2016). This explains Chinese vetoes as the decision of a responsible power to avoid any foreign interference. In the early stages of the upheaval, Zhao Lei (2011) pointed to a developing Chinese attitude as: Being a significant shift in Chinese strategic culture from passively following international norms to actively making them … Chinese leaders … emphasize “discourse power” and the principle that a great power should constructively set agendas, not just follow the rules set by others. (Lei, 2011) Moreover, the comparison of Western and Chinese media coverage on the violation of human rights is important to understand different perceptions on defending human rights as well as defending state sovereignty, normatively and collectively. The evolving role of China in global affairs demonstrates the changing Chinese attitude towards international norms, from passive compliance to proactive contribution and participation in the norm-shaping debate. It functions along the lines of the great power diplomacy of Xi Jinping and the self-ascribed norm-maker agenda of a great power identity. In conclusion, China’s overlooked role might be seen as rather neutral, cautious, or even passive compared to other great powers’ direct engagements in Syria. Even though “hide and bide” is no longer an indisputable guideline in the foreign policy logic of China, it can still influence such cautious but efficient outcomes. As seen in a recent survey by Sim and Greer (2021), China still has a positive image in the eyes of members of the public in the Middle East. The second identity of China as a developing nation certainly does not hurt in that

China’s overlooked role in the Syrian crisis 161 process, so it can sustain a “win-win” partnership in the Middle East and a contribution to the reconstruction of Syria despite its equal responsibility as a great power. Finally, the China-based media coverage has to be noted as effective as their Western counterparts in building an independent great power image and making the Chinese rationale heard by the regional and international audience. It would be the key determinant for convincing that audience by communicating with China more efficiently in terms of whether it engages in conflict resolution or relationship building.

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China’s overlooked role in the Syrian crisis 163 Greitens, S.C., Lee, M., & Yazıcı, E. (2019). Counterterrorism and preventive repression China’s changing strategy in Xinjiang. International Security, 44(3), 9–47. https://doi .org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00368 Hague accuses Russia and China of ‘siding with brutal regime’ in Syria. (2011, October 5). The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/oct/05/hague-russia-china -siding-syria Hao, Q. (2015). China Debates the ‘new type of great power relations’. Chinese Journal of International Politics, 8(4), 349–370. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pov012 Hirono, M, Lanteigne, M. (2011). Introduction: China and UN Peacekeeping. International Peacekeeping, 18(3), 243–256. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2011 .563070 Huang, C-H. (2011). Principles and Praxis of China’s peacekeeping. International Peacekeeping, 18(3), 257–270. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2011.563554 Iida, M. (2020). Xi Jinping’s diplomacy and the rise of his political authority. Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, 9(20), 127–142. https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028 .2020.1843217 Ikenberry, J. (2011). The future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism after America. Foreign Affairs, 90(3), 56–68.https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2011 -05-01/future-liberal-world-order Johnston, A.I. (2013). How new and assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?. International Security, 37(4), 7–48. https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00115 Justification for China’s vote against UN Syria resolutions. (2012, February 19). Xinhua. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cezw//eng/xwdt/t907464.htm Kleine-Ahlbrandt, S., & Small, A. (2008). China’s new dictatorship diplomacy. Foreign Affairs, 87(1), 38–56. Kiracofe, C.A. (2013,June 13). Syria targeted by US advocates of unipolar global order. Global Times. https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/714749.shtml Kounalakis, M. (2016). China’s position on international intervention: A media and journalism critical discourse analysis of its case for ‘Sovereignty’ versus ‘Responsibility to Protect’ principles in Syria. Global Media and China, 1(3), 149–167. https://doi.org /10.1177/2059436416654918 Lei, Z. (2011). Two pillars of China’s global peace engagement strategy: UN peacekeeping and international peacebuilding. International Peacekeeping, 18(3), 344–362. https:// doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2011.563107 Liu, Z. (2016, August 16). Chinese military to provide ‘aid and training assistance’ to Syrian government. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china /diplomacy-defence/article/2004676/chinese-military-provide-aid-and-training -assistance MacFarquhar, N. (2011). With rare double UN Veto on Syria, Russia and China try to shield friend. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/06/world/ middleeast/with-united-nations-veto-russia-and-china-help-syria.html Meilian, L. (2013, July 1). Xinjiang terrorists finding training, support in Syria, Turkey. Global Times. https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/792959.shtml Naím, M. (2011). Why Libya, But not Syria? Five answers. The Huffington Post. https:// www.huffpost.com/entry/why-libya-but-not-syria-f_b_863493 Olimat, M.S. (2013). China and the Middle East: From Silk Road to Arab Spring. Routledge. Pape, R.A. (2012). Why we shouldn’t attack Syria (yet). The New York Times. https:// www.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/opinion/why-we-shouldnt-attack-syria-yet.html

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Pei, M. (2012). Why Beijing Votes With Moscow. The New York Times. https://www .nytimes.com/2012/02/08/opinion/why-beijing-votes-with-moscow.html Perverse hegemonism behind US disastrous democratic experiments. (2022, January 11). Xinhua. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/20220111/10c1b71318894cd98ba627d 86723eabe/c.html Pu, X. (2019). Rebranding China: Contested Status Signalling in the Changing Global Order. Stanford University Press. Rogin, J. (2016). Obama’s biggest mistake isn’t Libya. It’s Syria. Bloomberg. https://www .bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2016-04-11/obama-s-biggest-mistake-isn-t-libya-it-s -syria Russia, China veto UN draft resolution on Syria. (2011, October 5). The China Daily. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-10/05/content_13837609.htm Russia and China block UN action on crisis in Syria. (2012, February 4). The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/05/world/middleeast/syria-homs-death-toll -said-to-rise.html Russia, China use double veto to block UN draft on Syria. (2012, February 5). Global Times. https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/694573.shtml Shambaugh, D. (2011). Coping with a conflicted China. The Washington Quarterly, 34(1), 7–27. Shichor, Y. (2015). Wu Wei (do nothing): China and the Syrian crisis. Roundtable No.6 of the China Observatory. Shirk, S.L. (2007). China Fragile Superpower. Oxford University Press. Sim, L.C., & Greer, L. (2021, June). What does the Arab Street think of China and Russia? The answers may surprise you. The Atlantic. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs /menasource/what-does-the-arab-street-think-of-china-and-russia-the-answers-may -surprise-you/ Solomon, E., & Osseiran, N.(2017, July 26). Lebanon hopes Syrian reconstruction will lure Chinese investment. The Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/23ad0722-7110 -11e7-aca6-c6bd07df1a3c Sørensen, C.T.N. (2019). That is not intervention; That is interference with Chinese characteristics: New concepts, distinctions and approaches developing in the Chinese debate and foreign and security policy practice. The China Quarterly, 239, 594–613. Sun, D., & Zoubir, Y. (2018). China’s Participation in Conflict Resolution in the Middle East and North Africa: A Case of Quasi-Mediation Diplomacy?. Journal of Contemporary China, 27(110), 224–243. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2018.1389019 Syrian economy lies in ruins and China sniffs opportunity. (2021, July 21). The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/21/syrian-economy-ruins-china-sniffs -opportunity-assad Syria joins BRI to rebuild amid wars, Western sanctions, pandemic cooperation with China. (2022, January 13). Global Times. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202201 /1245834.shtml The World Bank. (2017, July). The Toll of War: The Economic and Social Consequences of the Conflict in Syria. World Bank Group. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country /syria/publication/the-toll-of-war-the-economic-and-social-consequences-of-the -conflict-in-syria Troop and police contributors. (2021, 31 December). United Nations Peacekeeping as of 31 December 2021. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors UN resolution on Syrian Aid. (2014, July 14). The New York Times. https://www.nytimes .com/interactive/2014/07/14/world/middleeast/14nations-doc.html

China’s overlooked role in the Syrian crisis 165 UN resolution on Syria tainted by geopolitics. (2020, November 20). Global Times. https:// www.globaltimes.cn/content/953954.shtml UN security council okays no-fly zone over Libya. (2011, March 18). Xinhua. https://www .chinadaily.com.cn/world/2011-03/18/content_12189602.htm UN Security Council. (2011, October 4). 66th Year. Summary Report of the 6627th Meeting. (S/PV.6627). UN Security Council. (2012, February 4). 67th Year. Summary Report of the 6711th Meeting. (S/PV.6711). UN Security Council. (2019, September 19). 74th Year. Summary Report of the 8623rd Meeting. (S/PV.8623). UN Security Council extends Syria cross-border aid. (2021, July 9). Al Jazeera. https:// www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/9/un-security-council-extends-syria-cross-border -aid-for-12-months Van Ness, P. (1993). China as a third world state: Foreign policy and official national identity. In L. Dittmer & S.S. Kim (eds.), China’s Quest for National Identity (pp. 194–214). Cornell University Press. Walsh, E. (2011, August 29). China in Syria Series: III. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat .com/2011/08/china-in-syria-series-iii/ Wang Yi: China Will Uphold ‘Four Supports’ for Arab States. (2014, January 6). https:// www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/201401/t20140106_678110.html White Paper on China's peaceful development (2011). Information Office of the State Council. http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/09/09/content_281474 986284646.htm Why China and Russia rebuffed the West on Syria. (2011, October 5). BBC. https://www .bbc.com/news/mobile/world-middle-east-15180732 With a UN Veto, Russia and China Add to Syria’s Misery. (2020,July 20). The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/20/opinion/russia-china-syria-united -nations.html Xi, J. (2012). Work Together for a Bright Future of China-US Cooperative Partnership. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceus//eng/zgyw/t910351.htm Xi, J. (2015). Seeking Mutual and Sustainable Development and Becoming Win-win Cooperation Partners. Foreign Language Press. Xi, J. (2017). The Governance of China II. Foreign Languages Press. Yan, X. (2014). From keeping a low profile to striving for achievement. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 7(2), 155–184. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pou027 Zhao, L. (2011). Two Pillars of China’s Global Peace Engagement Strategy: UN Peacekeeping and International Peacebuilding. International Peacekeeping, 18(3), 344–362. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2011.563107 Zheng, C. (2016). China debates the non-interference principle. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 9(3), 349–374. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pow010 Zhou, L. (2017). Syria courts China for rebuilding push after fall of Islamic State strongholds. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy -defence/article/2121552/syria-courts-china-rebuilding-push-after-fall-islamic

11 Palestinian online news framing of China’s positions on the Question of Palestine (2020–2021) Mediatised representation Shadi Abu-Ayyash Introduction Throughout the history of the Palestinian national struggle, Palestinian political elites, in their discourse, have always considered China as a friend in their quest for independence. They perceive the global power as a supportive international player, with Beijing historically viewed as expressing continued support for Palestinian independence. Historically, welcoming warm relations with China has been part of the Palestinian national movement’s discourse, expressed in official speeches, media talks, and bilateral meetings with Chinese officials. On many occasions, Chinese and Palestinian leaders alike have openly described their country’s mutual relations as a form of “friendship.” One of these recent occasions was in July 2021, when Chinese President Xi Jinping was quoted during a phone call with his Palestinian counterpart Mahmoud Abbas, saying: “China and Palestine are good brothers, good friends and good partners, and the two sides have always firmly trusted and supported each other on issues concerning their respective core interests and major concerns” (Xinhua News Agency, 2020). Similar expressions of friendship and alliance were conveyed by an Abbas aid who described China as a “strategic ally” to the Palestinian people (Xinhua News Agency, 2020). Such statements can be consistently found in official Palestinian discourse regarding the Chinese position on the Palestinian Cause.1 Chinese policies towards Palestine in particular and the Arab region in general have been studied from several angles, whereby scholars suggest that these policies are guided by two factors: morality and interests (Azem, 2019; Ayyadi, 2019; Chen, 2017). The moral aspect stems from China’s open support for the decolonisation of Palestine and the creation of a Palestinian independent state, while interests are at the heart of the country’s economic priorities. After the Cold War, China’s economic involvement in the Middle East considerably expanded, driven by economic needs, mainly the country’s growing energy demands (Chen, 2018; Sachs & Huggard, 2020). Nonetheless, on the Question of Palestine, traditional Chinese support for the Palestinian struggle has been steadily shaping its diplomatic engagement with the region, with a recent shift in DOI: 10.4324/9781003261278-11

Mediatised representation 167 policy, manifested in Beijing’s support for the two-state solution and a negotiated solution based on the 1967 borders (Al-Sudairi, 2016). In addition to its historical stance on the matter, China’s further involvement in peace initiatives and economic relations with Palestine are guided by the hope of contributing to achieving stability in the region – a goal that is vital to the success of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Ibrahim et al., 2022). While considerable analysis of the role of politics and economy in shaping China’s positions on Palestine can be found in the relevant literature, there has been limited academic work that addresses the role of online news media in shaping Palestinian perceptions of China. An examination of how China’s positions are framed in the Palestinian media remains a much-needed approach that could provide a wider understanding of the framing elements that contribute to this representation in an era where the media, including online media, is rapidly and increasingly involved in influencing public debate and contributing to issues of representation. In the current era of mediatisation, where the media affects every aspect of human function, including international relations and journalism, online news media is increasingly playing a role in framing public perception and representations. Through reaching wider audiences, online news media performance, which is guided by media logic (Altheide, 2016), still generates news content using the traditional method of journalism writing in which framing of issues, persons, and countries is at the core of news content creation. Furthermore, the media process of shaping debates, which can be studied through analysing framed representations, is in line with the following questions proposed by Cottle (2006): What does the media do? How does the media influence conflict and politics? The media framing process and media representations play a combined role in presenting the country’s positions on contentious conflicts in a certain way. Furthermore, framing is one element in the process of mediatised conflict that consists of three dynamics. The first dynamic is when the media’s focus is on an event in the news. The second dynamic is news framing, and the third involves the media’s contribution to shaping communication performances among the public and institutions (Lundby, 2018; Eskjær et al., 2015). Media amplifying is the process where news of a particular issue or event is highlighted through focus, analysis, and extensive coverage. This element may not be understood in isolation from influencing factors on news production and agenda, mainly media ownership. The second dynamic of framing is centred on the way these events are produced in a particular form in the news content, in line with the particular media outlet’s agenda. Framing is a process that consists of characterising an issue in news reports to have an impact on how it is understood by the audience and which may also resonate with existing schemas among the audience(s) (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). The third dynamic is where the media plays a major role in structuring the communications practices of power relations among involved parties. This dynamic may be seen as the consequent effect of the previous two dynamics. That

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is to say, highlighting an issue and presenting it within the particular frame(s) has a potential impact on forming guidance and directions for public debate. Thus, news salience and production that echo dominant public schemas sum up the process in which media is the main player in the environment of mediatised conflicts. Further deliberation of these three dynamics will be addressed in this chapter. In the Palestine context of mediatised conflicts, some of the most heavily reported political events over the last few years included former US President Donald Trump’s Middle East plan, or the so called “Deal of the Century,” announced in 2020. Other major events were the confrontations in Jerusalem’s Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhood, where Israeli settlers occupied Palestinian homes and the subsequent Israeli war on Gaza in 2021. Palestinian online news media continuously reported and analysed the reactions of countries around the globe to these two events, including coverage of China’s positions. In light of these two major political developments, this chapter aims at providing an analysis of how China’s relations with the Palestinians, its public discourse and statements between 2020 and 2021, were represented by the main three Palestinian online news agencies: the publicly owned Palestine News and Information Agency (Wafa) and two privately owned agencies (Ma’an and Wattan). Examination of how China’s positions on political developments in Palestine are framed in Palestinian online news is vital to understanding the relationship between the news media framing process and international politics, mainly in relation to the national struggle and political conflict in Palestine. It further sheds light on how news content contributes to framing and representing international political players in the news. The chapter opens by providing a brief history of Palestine–China relations, introducing the concept of mediatised conflict, media representation, and news framing. The method of research will be followed by results and discussion.

Literature review China’s positions in Palestine China’s policy towards the Middle East and Palestine has historically been influenced by global politics and is guided by Beijing’s goals of achieving national security and world peace (Ayyadi, 2019). While this economic global power recognises the importance of the region economically and politically, Chinese foreign policy and its involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict do not reflect the country’s weight as an influential superpower in international politics. Furthermore, the country does not have strategic leverage to support its ability to impact a solution for the conflict, even though it does have advantages that enable it to play a “unique role” (Chen, 2017, p. 21). Despite its contemporary growing economic relationship with Israel, China was among the first global powers to support the Palestinians. Historically,

Mediatised representation 169 official Chinese support of Palestine has been steady, regardless of rising political and economic elements. What’s more, China’s relationship with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) has traditionally been very close, a relationship which the late Palestinian President Yasser Arafat described in the early 1970s as “the biggest influence in supporting our revolution and strengthening its perseverance” (Harris, 1977, p. 123). At the end of the 1960s, China recognised the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people, providing the Palestinian resistance with military training and weapon supplies (Azem, 2019) and later recognising the State of Palestine in 1988. China also supplied weapons and arms to revolutionary Palestinian organisations between 1965 and 1970, weapons, according to Israeli intelligence, worth $5 million (Harris, 1977). Regardless of the close historic relations between the two countries at the political level, the image of Palestine in Chinese culture has been described as “ambiguous” (Qingguo, 2021, p. 52) and is influenced by several factors, mainly the rise of Israeli efforts to influence Chinese public opinion, including on social media. It suggested that China’s position on the Palestinian Question has been historically in line with the position of the international community2 – that is, it supports the implementation of UN-related resolutions, mainly Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian territories militarily occupied in 1967, in order to enable the creation of a Palestinian state – and is shaped by firm support of the Palestinian cause. Still, China’s relationship with the cause has not been constant but divided into four phases (Chen, 2017): “friendly historical relations between China and the Jewish nation; Pro-Arab and Anti-Israel (1949-1979); … balance between Arabs and Israel (1979-2013); and active participation of the PalestineIsrael issue under the Belt & Road Initiative” (p. 4). While Palestinians have traditionally viewed China as a friend and ally since the early 1990s, Beijing has been gradually presenting itself as a mediator between Palestinians and Israelis, establishing diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992 (Zreik, 2022). Although Beijing’s mediating efforts may suggest a balanced stance between both parties, its diplomatic and economic relation with the Israelis and the Palestinians during the last two decades “has largely reinforced Israeli predominance – a marked contrast to China’s historic position in relation to the conflict” (Burton, 2018, p. 2). Even though Chinese economic interests in the region are among the country’s priorities, it has maintained its political stance on the Question of Palestine. The Sino-Palestinian relationship has been influenced by economic and political factors, whereby China’s policies in the region have shifted towards prioritising diplomatic and commercial ties, where both Chinese and Palestinians maintained mutual sympathy and China remained vocal in supporting Palestinian rights (Burton, 2022). This position is apparent in official Chinese comments on major political developments in Palestine, including on former US President Donald Trump’s peace plan, dubbed the “Deal of the Century.” It confirmed China’s traditional

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position calling for the implementation of UN resolutions pertaining to the occupied Palestinian territories (Middle East Monitor, 2020). China’s political stance on political developments in Palestine has always been amplified in local Palestinian media in regard to its conventional relationship with Palestinians and its weight in the international arena. Media amplification, which is a main element in the dynamics of mediatised conflicts, plays a role in highlighting the positions of countries and parties on local and international conflicts. Mediatised conflict Mediatisation research has been developed to examine the media’s roles in culture and society, in particular, to understand the mechanisms by which processes of media expansion, media interrelation, and media influence on social institutions, such as politics and conflicts, are taking place (Hjarvard, 2013). Among the several aspects of media influences referred to in this concept is the way in which social institutions increasingly rely on media in their performance. At the same time, media is gaining independence as put by Miller (2014): “At the heart of the mediatization concept is the notion that not only have media come to constitute an independent institutional sphere, but in doing so, they have made other institutions dependent on them” (p. 116). Although the concept of mediatisation has been gaining popularity and attracting discussion among communication researchers, the debate (Ekström et al., 2016) on the extent to which this approach is valid in explaining the media-related change in society is still developing. While there is a sort of agreement that the concept is a change-oriented process (Bengtsson et al., 2021), the methodological approach to research remains a challenge, as there are no “standardised forms of mediatisation research” (Krotz, 2017, p. 109). As a result, several yet different methodological approaches have been adopted for mediatisation research, focusing on several contemporary media-related issues, paving the way to introducing related subfields including mediatised conflict. While it is valid to employ several social sciences – data collection and analysis tools in this interdisciplinary concept, it has been argued that some attempts to conceptualise the term mediatisation have its ambiguity and far-reaching claims (Ekström et al., 2016). However, the focus on media content production remains an essential aspect of understanding the dynamic role media news play in society, in particular in representing issues within the environment of mediatised conflicts. A mediatised conflict approach is essential in contexts of conflicts and political arenas to examine how news media framing conflicts contribute to the representation of involved actors and the main issues pertaining to these conflicts. Media representation of conflicts may be seen as an outcome of the media framing process in which political positions are covered and presented in a certain way. Cottle’s (2006) Mediatized Conflict discusses the role and involvement of media in conflicts through the publication of ideas and images about these conflicts. While he dismisses the idea that capturing the role of media in conflicts can

Mediatised representation 171 be achieved only through the lens of representation, he argues that the process should also be concerned with how media performs in conflicts. “Mediatized conflict, then, as well as referring to different possible media roles, representations and arenas for the public display and deliberation of conflicts, sets out to explore this media performance or media doing” (p. 9). The framing process remains a vital function in the process of mediatized conflict, a process that is built on three dynamics (Lundby 2018; Eskjær et al., 2015). While the first phase of media, raising an issue, is essential to understanding the role of media in conflicts, it has not been fully discussed from the aspect of forces that influence why this or that particular issue is raised in the news. This dynamic can be understood in light of agenda setting. This is where media outlets organise the importance of news and present them, influenced by their ownership, in their attempt to sway the public debate. In his work, Media Ownership and Agenda Control: The Hidden Limits of the Information Age, Schlosberg (2017) argues that the issue of media ownership is somewhat similar in different media systems across the globe, in which “agenda control is often best secured through alliance between political and media elites rather than conflict” (p. 7). Although it may not be an accurate assumption that the performance of media systems around the globe is similarly influenced, to some extent, such a comparison may be relevant in the Palestinian media landscape where media institutions are characterised as government-owned, partisan, private, and non-governmental. While there may be differences between the public/government news media and other local news in Palestine on how local issues are covered, similarities in presenting and framing China’s position on the Question of Palestine can be seen. Another Palestinian-specific factor that needs consideration when analysing elements influencing news content produced by Palestinian journalists and which contributes to the news agenda and framing dynamic in newsrooms is the national struggle for independence. Elements of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and internal Palestinian politics (Hazboun et al., 2019) and the interplay among national, professional, and personal identities (Robins & Roushanzamir, 2017) have an influencing impact on Palestinian journalists and the news coverage of media outlets. The second dynamic of mediatized conflict is framing. Framing is the process in which news content is produced in a certain way with a particular angle, which editors and journalists employ on a daily basis when producing news content. It consists of selecting “some aspects of a particular issue and making them salient while other aspects are ignored. Frames refer to a specific presentation of issues or events and therefore construct reality in a meaningful but selective way” (vonSikorski & Matthes, 2020, p. 1) and are produced in a way that resonates with schemas among audiences (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). Palestinian news outlets are saturated with political news since they are constantly reporting on local and international issues pertaining to the conflict with Israel (Abualrob & Alkhayyat, 2014). In times of political and on-ground escalations with Israel, news media in Palestine tends to cover the events from the

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perspective of local, regional, and international reactions, where China’s discourse is highlighted. While the third dynamic of mediatized conflict lies in the role the media plays in structuring communication of power relations among the public and institutions, (Lundby, 2018; Eskjær et al., 2015), it may be sceptical to attribute media’s influence on public debate solely to traditional news media. Moreover, this conceptualisation fails to focus on news production influenced by ownership, political climate, and local factors, in setting news agendas. For instance, the role played by social media platforms in shaping debates, including in the Palestinian context, is evident. Social media along with other forms of media, new or traditional, has always been part of the Palestinian national struggle (Burris, 2019). Nevertheless, censorship by social media companies continues to influence media practices (King, 2021). This representational role the media plays does not only have an effect on the public’s perception of international players but also on the development of relations among countries, by influencing the positions of their politicians. One example of how international relations are studied from a mediatisation perspective can be found in the work of Li (2017) who examined Africa–China relations by analysing the media and communications role in the dynamics of this relationship. Meanwhile, Trenz and Michailidou (2014) suggest that mediatisation is a useful tool for better learning about the operation and transformation of international politics. Framing and media representation A widely accepted and utilised conceptualisation of the framing process can be found in Entman’s (1993) definition, which identifies four elements of the process. For him, framing involves selecting “some aspects of a perceived reality and making them more salient in a communicating text in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (p. 52). Framing, as Gamson et al. (1992) conceptualise it, is “more like a storyline or unfolding narrative about an issue” (p. 385) and “a central idea or storyline that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them. The frame suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1994, p. 376). In journalism, Gitlin (1980) explains that media frames organise events for journalists who cover world news and for audiences who consume media reports. They are “persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual” (p. 7). He further suggests that analysis of journalism content should take into account what the frames are in addition to the shared frames regarding events by different media in different times. The construction of a particular meaning through the use of language is a main aspect of the framing process, albeit a non-objective construction. Meanwhile,

Mediatised representation 173 representation in media, as Hall (1997) argues, relies on language in the production of meaning, including representing ideas and feelings. He further explains that meaning is produced as a result of signifying practice. For Hall, meanings provided by media are shaped by content producers and their subjective viewpoints (Dixon, 2019). Furthermore, Fürsich (2010) argues for the twinning relationship between representations and media functions. She suggests that representations are at the heart of the continuing daily media flow and contribute to creating common perceptions of people, groups, and institutions. That is, representations are basic elements of knowledge creation about ourselves and the surrounding world.

Framing China in global media Studies that examined the image of China in global news media revealed that the country’s representations in news media varied between negative and positive perspectives, whereby China’s economic power and internal policies contributed to building these frames. Frames shaped by negative representations of China are found in Western media, while frames tend to be more favourable in select case studies from Arab and African media. Previous studies that extensively examined media framing of China concluded that the country has been framed from different perspectives; the most dominant among these frames are China’s global economic power, mutual cooperation vs conflict, and negative image frames. An economic power frame Zhang and Wu (2017) conducted work on the representation of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, by comparing English-language newspapers in China and media in the United Kingdom. The analysed content included news reports by the China Daily and Financial Times between 2015 and 2016. Results showed that the China Daily’s framing of issues was in line with Chinese mainstream media, positively framing the initiative and presenting China as an international co-operator and responsible power. Contrastingly, the Financial Times portrayed China as a country with an impact on the global economy as well as an authoritarian state and a geopolitical threat. In analysing Chinese-African media relations from the soft power perspective, Wasserman (2018) suggests that when taking into consideration economic benefits, African media coverage of China tends to be shaped by balance and optimism. However, Chinese media working in Africa “are viewed with a large degree of skepticism and distrust … due to deep-seated preconceptions, biases and stereotypes about Chinese media among African journalists and audiences” (p. 11). Meanwhile, Nassanga and Makara’s (2016) study suggests a neutral and positive perception of China in Uganda and elsewhere in Africa. Transnational cooperation vs conflict frames A study of Russia’s major media framing of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (Kuteleva & Vasiliev, 2021) between 2013 and 2019 identified the main frame as

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the Sino-Russian cooperation, concluding that Russian newspapers adopted the official narrative on Sino-Russian relations, which follows existing trends rather than contributing to building them. Another study on the media representation of China was conducted in a Latin American context (Estupinan, 2017), which applied the content analysis approach to five Latin American media outlets. This study found that China was presented as a favourable partner. However, the results revealed highly negative presentations in relation to topics such as environment, copyrights, democracy, and the military. The study suggests that framing techniques in Latin America are influenced by international media outlet stereotypes. Although a very modest amount of research has been conducted in the Arab region on the representation of China in local or regional media, a few studies have found rather conflicting findings. Khan et al. (2022) studied stereotypes of China in the context of China’s Belt and Road Initiative by analysing respondents of 405 participants in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, and Yemen. The research, aimed at examining the effects of Arab media use on the formation of Chinese stereotypes, found that Arabs have positive perceptions of ChineseArab relations. A comparative framing analysis of BBC News and Al Jazeera English (AJE) news on China’s internal political affairs between January 2013 and December 2014 (Arif & Hayat, 2018) revealed the dominance of two frames on both news channels. While the cooperation frame was evident in AJE news content in relation to China’s trade and investments, the conflict frame was more prominent in BBC news. Despite the tendency to positively frame China in Arab media, China’s position on conflicts in the region affects and determines the way it is presented in the news. For example, Ding and Sun’s (2021) study of the images of China and Britain in the Syrian state-run news agency, SANA, and a “revolutionary” outlet “Enab Baladi” revealed that SANA limited its coverage of China’s involvement in the Syrian crisis to government affairs, while news on Britain’s involvement in the country was covered by the “revolutionary” outlet. Furthermore, the revolutionary outlet presented China’s involvement as negative and British involvement as positive, while SANA news presented a very positive image of China and a negative image of Britain. Here we also see that Chinese relations with governments in the region play a role in its presentation in public media. Negative image Rodríguez-Wangüemert et al. (2019) conducted a study to understand how China is portrayed and framed on Spanish TV news channels. They found that China was presented through four main frames: “Capacity, potential, development”; “Gloom, shadow and darkness”; “Dangerous environment”; and “Exotic organization,” arguing that the “mostly negative image of China does not correspond with its current and historical relationship with Spain, nor with the relevant position that this emerging power has reached on a global scale” (p. 123).

Mediatised representation 175 Chen and Gunster (2019) examined China’s image in Canada British Columbia’s alternative public sphere, where they applied a qualitative critical discourse analysis of four alternative media and advocacy sources. This showed how China is framed as a powerful country with influence on Canada’s economic policies in relation to energy infrastructure. At the same time, it was positively framed in relation to its leadership in renewable energy and global climate negotiations. Nevertheless, the study found that a negative image of China was much more notable than a positive image. Representation of China in the US-based New York Times and Los Angeles Times between 1992 and 2001 (Peng, 2004) showed that the tone of the coverage, despite its increase over time, remained negative. A recent study conducted by Huang et al. (2021) which analysed over 260,000 China-related articles in The New York Times found that a shift in US–China relations occurred in tandem with changes in the coverage of China, arguing that The New York Times influences American views of China. These studies’ results are not far from the elements of media ownership that influence content framing and their associated traditional schemas. What’s more, the division between the global south and north media presentation of China, the economic interest factor manifested by China’s growing economic role in the global theatre, its positions towards international conflicts, and also relations between China and governments at the official levels may have contributed to building these frames in the news. Although as the literature suggests China has been involved in the Palestine Question as early as “al-Nakba”3 in the late 1940s, research mostly focused on the political aspect of this involvement, neglecting the role of media in influencing Palestinian-Chinese relations and China’s position on the conflict. Therefore, examining how China’s positions on political developments in Palestine are framed in Palestinian online news media is essential in helping to understand the relationship between the news media framing process and local political journalistic practices and ownership, mainly pertaining to political conflicts. Hence, in an attempt to fill the knowledge gap, this chapter’s data analysis serves to provide an understanding of how China is presented in Palestinian media, by answering the following research question: how did major Palestinian news agencies present China in their coverage of the country’s positions on political developments in Palestine from 2020 to 2021?

Method and data collection This chapter applies textual framing analysis of Arabic-language news stories extracted from the three major Palestinian news agencies: Palestine News and Information Agency, Wafa (‫)وفا‬, Ma’an (‫)معا‬, and Wattan (‫)وطن‬, in order to identify the main frames in which China-related news was presented in their coverage of the country’s position on the Palestinian Question from 1 January 2020 to 31 December 2021.

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China-related news pertaining to other Palestinian issues or bilateral relations was excluded from the analysis. A comprehensive selection of news articles covering China’s official comments only on two major events was included in the analysis: Trump’s Deal of the Century in 2020 and the Sheikh Jarrah confrontations and war on Gaza in 2021. This inclusion and exclusion of news articles resulted in the number of total news articles found during the analysis period being reduced to N = 86, in which N = 58 was found in the Wafa news agency, N = 16 in the Ma’an agency, and N = 12 in the Wattan agency. Two major events between 2020 and 2021 were selected for their political importance and for their ramifications on the Palestinian Question. These two events attracted international political attention and divided the international community. Trump’s Deal of the Century: 2020 On 28 January 2020, former US President Donald Trump announced his administration’s Middle East plan, known as the “Deal of the Century”, which proposed a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The plan departs from UN resolutions and is shaped by a biased approach to the conflict in which Israeli ambitions are realised at the expense of Palestinian rights. This controversial plan, which polarised the international community (Allawzi et al. 2022), was rejected by the Palestinians along with regional and international bodies, including the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Similarly, other international players including China, Russia, European Union representatives, and African Union member states have all asserted the importance of resolving the conflict on the basis of UN resolutions (United Nations website, 2020). The Permanent Representative of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations, Ambassador Zhang Jun expressed his country’s support for resolving the conflict based on UN resolutions. During a Security Council meeting on 11 February 2020 he said, The Council must base its work on resolutions adopted in the past and call upon the parties to abide by them, calling upon all parties to fully implement all relevant resolutions, including by lifting the blockade on the Gaza Strip. (UN, 2020, p. 11) Trump’s deal is seen as a plan that advances Israeli interests, the objectives of which are primarily maintaining colonial rule and expansion, which have evident similarities with the Bantustan model of Apartheid in South Africa (Dana, 2021). The plan, furthermore, aims to legitimise “the status quo by enabling Israeli expansionism and the systemic denial of Palestinian rights, which is a flagrant violation of international law and has no legal validity” (Saffarini, 2020, p. 15). Sheikh Jarrah confrontations and the war on Gaza: 2021 In 2021 another major political development took place in Palestine that attracted international political and media attention. In early May, Jewish Israeli settler groups forcefully occupied Palestinian homes in the Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhood of occupied

Mediatised representation 177 Jerusalem, forcing homeowners into the street. This occurred in tandem with Israeli troops attacking worshippers in Jerusalem’s Al-Aqsa Mosque, the holiest Muslim site in the country and the third holiest site in Islam, during the holy month of Ramadan. Consequently, protests and clashes between Palestinians and Israeli occupation troops erupted in Palestinian cities and in Palestinian Arab-majority cities in Israel, as well as mass protests in Arab and world capitals. These clashes led to a military confrontation between Israel and Palestinian factions in Gaza that included continuous and heavy Israeli airstrikes on Gaza for 11 consecutive days. The Chinese position on this escalation was conveyed by its permanent representative to the United Nations Zhang Jun. While his statement used the “both sides” discourse, he expressed his country’s concerns over the eviction of Palestinian families in the Sheikh Jarrah and Silwan neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem and called on Israeli authorities to halt violence against Muslim worshippers and respect the status quo of holy sites in Jerusalem (Xinhua, 2021). The three news agencies The three news agencies were selected for analysis in this chapter for their coverage of Palestine’s local and international news coverage of China’s comments on Palestine between 2020 and 2021, readership diversity, ownership type, and variety of online traffic (see Figure 11.1). 1- Palestine news and information agency: Wafa This state-owned news agency was established in 1972 as an independent body that was structurally, politically and administratively linked to the PLO Executive

Figure 11.1 A comparison between the online traffic of the three news agencies chosen in this study according to HOTH’s website traffic tool. Note: From HOTH’s website (2022). https://www.thehoth.com/

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Committee, with a mandate to confront the dominant Israeli propaganda at the time and serve as an independent platform to report events from the official Palestinian perspective without being subject to any trusteeship (guardianship) or subordination (Wafa, 2022). 2- Ma’an news agency The agency describes itself as “a non-profit media organization established in 2002 with the aim of promoting independent media in Palestine, establishing relationships between local, regional and international media as well as promoting freedom of speech and pluralism in media coverage” (Ma’an, 2022). 3- Wattan News Agency Wattan describes itself as an independent news site that seeks to present democratic, national media and is part of a media system that includes “Watan TV, Watan Centre for Media and Watan for TV Production,” concerned with all developments related to the Palestinian cause, including political, economic, human rights, cultural, and sports news (Wattan, 2022). Framing analysis In framing literature, many studies have relied on the inductive approach, which examines news texts related to the general frames identified by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000), namely conflict, economic consequences, human interest, and morality frames. However, this study follows Matthes and Kohring’s (2008) model in which the inductive approach is employed to identify issue-specific frames based on Entman’s (1993) definition of the concept. In this research, extracted content was classified into the four elements by which Entman defined framing, namely: problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/ or treatment recommendation. Content of news was thematically grouped together, guided by Matthes and Kohring’s (2008) model. After this, the 20 themes, which appeared in the analysed news reports present in the content, were grouped into 4 main frames: political support (25 occurrences), solidarity (8 occurrences), economic support (15 occurrences), and mutual cooperation (20 occurrences).

Findings and discussion The results showed that China–Palestine-related news mostly concentrated on the political developments in Palestine. As Figure 11.2 shows, the lion’s share (67%) of China-related news was covered by the state-owned news agency Wafa, while the other two private agencies only occupied around one-third of the analysed content. This result may resonate with the notion of media amplification of events (Lundby, 2018; Eskjær et al., 2015), which is a first phase dynamic of mediatized

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Figure 11.2 Distribution of China-related news among the three news agencies

conflict. This phase is the initial step in which media outlets shed light on a particular event. In this case, China’s reaction to Trump’s deal and the Sheikh Jarrah confrontations were present in the news coverage and have been highlighted. Although the three agencies did amplify the Chinese reaction to the events and developments in Palestine in their coverage, data shows that the state-run agency, Wafa, showed more interest and coverage of China’s official statements on the two matters. In this case, China’s political positions in regard to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict are highly considered newsworthy, mainly by the official news agency, which is in line with the official Palestinian stance that perceives China as a historic friend and ally and a superpower that supports the cause. In comparison to the work of Ding and Sun (2021) which found the official Syrian news agency SANA’s coverage of China’s involvement in the Syrian crisis as positive, these results are similar with the exception that they show how Palestinian news agencies do not limit coverage of China to government affairs as Ding and Sun (2021) found. Furthermore, this study and Ding and Sun’s (2021) work resonate with the idea of media ownership’s influence on the size and shape of how world governments’ news is covered. In this case, the state-owned media tended to positively cover China’s news in correspondence with their government’s good relations with Beijing. Similar findings appeared in Kuteleva and Vasiliev’s (2021) study which concluded that Russian newspapers adopted the official narrative of Sino-Russian relations in their framing of China–Russia relations. Identified themes Seven similar themes of news coverage were found in the contents of the three agencies. Coverage of China’s political statements on the political developments in Palestine received the highest attention: n = 25; joint conferences and meetings n = 18; political communication between the Chinese and Palestinian officials in the

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form of exchange of letters; political conversations and phone calls n = 14; coverage of mutual agreements n = 10; speeches n = 8, opinion pieces n = 6; and interviews with Chinese and Palestinian officials commenting on China’s positions n = 5. As Figure 11.3 indicates, approximately 30% of the content was dedicated to covering China’s stance on political developments in Palestine, followed by 21% to joint meetings and activities. While previous studies found that China’s image is linked to its economic activities (Rodríguez-Wangüemert et al., 2019; Zhang & Wu, 2017; Chen & Zhao, 2021), these results indicate that Palestinian journalists are more concerned with the country’s political positions, offering less attention to economic-related news. This may also be understood in light of the way news media in Palestine covers the conflict with Israel. As such, journalists rush to highlight the positions of countries in regard to any new development in the conflict, including the positions of supportive countries, China being no exception. These results are in agreement with studies, which suggest that the conflict with Israel highly influences Palestinian news production (Abualrob & Alkhayyat, 2014; Hazboun, et al., 2019). Issue frames Grouping the identified themes resulted in four main frames, namely the political support frame, solidarity frame, economic support frame, and cooperation frame.

Figure 11.3 Types of news topics found in the collected contents

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Figure 11.4 Identified frames distribution in the analysed contents

As Figure 11.4 shows, the political support frame occupied 37%, followed by the cooperation frame at 28%, the economic support frame at 23%, and the solidarity frame at 12%. While these frames indicate a positive representation of China, presenting Beijing’s statements on Palestine as supportive, amplification of this representation goes hand in hand with the general perception of China among political elites and media circles. In light of media representations, Stuart Hall suggests that since meaning is constructed by content creators and their subjective viewpoints (Dixon, 2019), China’s positive representation in Palestine news media through these identified frames is a result of selection and inclusion practised by Palestinian journalists in framing the political stances of global powers. Frame elements 1) Problem definition The political support frame was amplified through the headlines and body of the news articles, in which language of support, political cooperation, and ending the Israeli occupation were found throughout the texts (see Table 11.1). This positive language, based on the rhetoric of support, is also used in the other themes of

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Table 11.1 Description of frames definition Frame Element

Topic

Problem definition

Topic 1: political support

Description

• China supports the Palestinian political initiative • Palestinian leadership closely works with China • Chinese President calls for solving the Palestinian Question • Welcoming the Chinese peace initiative Topic 2: solidarity • China supports the Palestinian people’s rights Topic 3: economic • China supports the Palestinian economy Support Topic 4: • Cooperation in the media sector cooperation • Palestinians benefited from the Chinese experience in combatting COVID-19 • Arrival of the Chinese medical delegation is a message of friendship

economic, cooperation, and solidarity support. At the core of amplifying China’s solidarity with the Palestinian people’s rights is this often-repeated central idea. In fact, this portrayal of China’s support in areas of politics, economy, and other areas of cooperation all is seen as a form of solidarity. Furthermore, the language of economic and cooperation frames reinforces the major frame of support. Cooperation in areas of media, education, and other fields is also presented as part of friendly relationships between the two countries. Even the economic frame’s language is highlighted by supportive language rather than mutual economic benefits. 2) Causal attribution The portrayal of China’s political support and cooperation in regard to Palestinian political rights is presented as positive attribution to world peace and security. While this amplified support portrayed in China’s political statements is seen as positive and in line with UN resolutions, the amplification of Israeli actions that contradict with international legitimacy is portrayed as negative attribution. As such, China’s criticism of Israeli actions is also highlighted and presented in the coverage of its political reactions (see Table 11.2; Figure 11.5). On the economy, news articles also highlight and present Chinese support as a contribution to improving the Palestinian economy. Not only is coverage of economic support a focal point, but the possible benefits of this support for the economy are also highlighted in the texts. Contrastingly, growing economic relations between China and Israel have been mostly absent from the texts. 3) Moral evaluation The presentation of China’s support, solidarity, and cooperation with the Palestinians, which is positively framed and represented by news agencies, is

Mediatised representation 183 Table 11.2 Description of frames’ causal attribution Causal attribution

Topic 1 (political support): benefit attribution

Topic 1 (political support): Risk attribution Topic 2 (solidarity): benefit attribution Topic 3 (economic support): benefit attribution

Topic 4 (cooperation): benefit attribution

• Contributes to global stability and world peace • Contributes to freedom • A path to ending the Israeli occupation • Any political initiative should abide by UN resolutions • Israeli settlement expansion in the occupied Palestinian territories • Demolition of Palestinian homes • Israeli violence • Israeli policies are counterproductive • Contributes to friendship • Improves Palestinian economy • Improves economic relations • Improves Palestinian business and health sectors • China seeks to invest in industrial zones in Palestine • Expands the economy production bases • Builds a joint future for humanity • Improves Palestinian media capacities

Figure 11.5 A headline in Ma’an news agency in Arabic: “Chinese ambassador to Palestine affirms his county’s support for the Palestinian people.” Note: From Ma’an news agency (2020, March 17). https://www.maannews.net/news/1010 177.html

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Table 11.3 Description of frames’ moral evaluation Moral evaluation

Topic 1 (political • support): benefits • • • Topic 2 (solidarity): • benefits

Traditional Chinese anti-colonisation position Welcoming China’s political position Rejecting Israeli policies Rejecting Israeli annexation of Palestinian land Justice is needed for Palestinians

posited as a moral Chinese stance, opposed to Israeli occupation policies. From a moral perspective, it is highlighted as part of China’s traditional anti-colonisation approach. This may resonate with suggestions by scholars that China’s policies in the region are driven by morality and interests (Chen, 2017; Azem, 2019; Ayyadi, 2019). However, aspects of economic interest have been given little attention in the framing process conducted by Palestinian journalists in these news agencies. This does not necessarily mean that China’s aim of achieving stability in the region is driven by its goal of facilitating the success of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as previous studies suggest (Ibrahim et al., 2022), but that Palestinian media is merely more concerned with highlighting the global power’s political support for their national liberation goal. This could also explain why coverage of China does not include its growing economic relations with Israel (Table 11.3; Figure 11.6). 4) Treatment or recommendations China’s position of political support and its consequent solidarity have been presented as valid political viewpoints, which contribute to peace and stability. The country’s positions have been highlighted in the media as a solution to the conflict based on UN resolutions and on a “land for peace” basis. This media conceptualisation of Chinese positions is further positioned within the framework of international community consensus over resolving the IsraeliPalestinian conflict based on UN resolutions and the two-state solution. This is not far from the suggestion (Chen, 2017) that China’s position on the Palestinian Question is in line with the position of the international community (Table 11.4).

Conclusion This chapter has examined the representation of China in online Palestinian news media (2020–2021), in particular during highly contested political developments in Palestine, mainly Trump’s “Deal of the Century” and the confrontations in Jerusalem’s “Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhood.” The data and analysis show that the main Palestine-based news agencies, both public and private, positively represented China in their news content. Welcoming China’s political support was highlighted and all China–Palestine news was

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Figure 11.6 A headline appeared in Wafa news agency in Arabic: “President of China affirms his county’s steady support to the Palestinian people in retrieving their legitimate rights.” The Chinese President’s remarks came in a letter he sent to the UN conference of the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People, held in November 2021. Note: From Wafa news Agency (2021, December 1). https://www.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/37144

Table 11.4 Description of frames recommendation Treatment/ recommendation

Topic 1 (political support): recommendation Topic 2 (solidarity): recommendation

• • • • •

Implementation of UN resolutions Land for peace basis Political negotiations Two-state solution A united international community to resolve the conflict

included within a major support frame, broken down into four sub-frames: political support, economic support, solidarity, and cooperation. Representation of China in the Palestinian media does not contradict the traditional perception of global power among Palestinian politicians and media institutions. Bilateral relations are always put in the context of the Palestinian national struggle, in which countries are classified as friends or foes of the national cause. Furthermore, China’s economic involvement in Palestine is also presented in the media as part of its political support rather than mutually beneficial relations. It seems that the representation of China in the news has not been influenced by growing Chinese-Israeli economic relations, a development

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largely neglected in Palestinian news coverage. This can be attributed to two reasons. First is media ownership influence, whereby the state-owned news agency maintained a positive representation of China due to its strong relations with the Palestinian leadership. The other two independent news agencies also highlighted the friendly and positive comments on Palestine made by Chinese officials. The second reason that contributed to this positive representation of China is related to China’s discourse on the Palestinian cause, as Chinese officials maintained their country’s traditional discourse of supporting the Palestinian people and expressing solidarity with them. In conclusion, representation should not be examined outside the context of media framing, which is influenced by the local political context and media ownership. As demonstrated in this chapter, media representation of China in different parts of the world is influenced by historic stereotypes and the nature of Chinese involvement in these regions. While the Western media’s representation of China is influenced by old cultural stereotypes, political ideology, and economic factors, in Africa, China’s representation is influenced by the country’s economic motivation. When examining the study’s results through the lens of mediatized conflict dynamics, in particular, raising issues in the news and frame production, we can conclude that although online Palestinian media outlets act similarly in highlighting only China’s supportive responses to developments in Palestine, it is the stateowned media that leads this positive representation in terms of content size. This ownership effect can also be noticed when analysing how China-related news is very positive and salient, while its growing relations with Israel are highly neglected. In addition to contextual and local factors that must be taken into consideration when adopting a mediatized conflict approach for analysing media performance in political conflicts – in the Palestinian case, the impact of the national struggle on news coverage – it is also vital to take into consideration the effect of media ownership and its consequent effect in setting news agendas and news frames production. It should be noted that this study has limitations in time and scope. It only examines news on China in the last two years, focusing only on news stories related to the Question of Palestine. Further analysis that expands the entire period of the study, including China-related news unrelated to the Question of Palestine, may provide a different form.

Notes 1 The Palestinian Cause refers to the Palestinian people’s struggle for independence from Israeli military colonization, which took place in two phases: between 1947 and 1948, Zionist militias uprooted and ethnically cleansed Arab Palestinians from their towns and villages, leaving them refugees, and declared the creation of the State of Israel on Palestinian land. The second phase occurred when Israel completed its occupation of the remaining land of Palestine in 1967, known as the West Bank, including Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. The Palestinian national struggle, the unresolved conflict with Israel, and the continuous colonization of Palestine are what can be referred to as the Palestinian Question or Cause.

Mediatised representation 187 2 “Todays’ image of an international (legal) community is closely linked to progressive moral ideals, most notably human rights and equality, and it is frequently associated with the UN Charter and the substantive rules and normative goals imbued in it” (Schmidt, 2015, p. 1). 3 “The Nakba is the disaster that befell the Palestinian people in 1948, after the Jewish forces (subsequently Israeli) had embarked on a massive operation of ethnic cleansing that aimed at ridding Palestine of its indigenous population, in order to found on its land a nation-state for the Jews” (Ghanim, 2011, p. 17).

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12 Reimagining Western media portrayals of China US and Ghanaian coverage of China’s COVID-19 response Kelly Chernin In the early weeks of March 2020, as COVID-19 began to spread throughout the USA and residents went into quarantine, President Donald Trump tweeted about a new pathogen he referred to as the “Chinese Virus.” Although the tweet elicited backlash, organisations like the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) cautioned against using locations as a disease name because of the potential for negative stereotyping. Despite this caution, the antagonistic term caught on with groups in the USA (Yam, 2020). While it could be argued that this phrase, along with “kung flu,” sparked a rise in Asian hate crimes throughout the USA, it also pointed to a larger issue surrounding Western media’s portrayal of China more generally, an issue that potentially undermines the relationship with a rising global power. Western media conglomerates view China as an enigma at best, and an enemy at worst. Scholarly articles have long examined the world from a Western lens making it difficult to situate China’s role as a global health leader, economic centre, and diplomatic entity. Chen (2010) wrote, “Once we recognize how extremely limited the current conditions of knowledge are, we learn to be humble about our knowledge claims. The universalist assertions of theory are premature, for theory too must be deimperilized” (p. 3). In an effort to reevaluate China’s role on the global stage, this chapter will explore how Western and African media systems framed China’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. The chapter will also explore China’s reaction to international coverage. Western media (namely the USA) tended to be antagonistic. Conservative media in the USA emphasised the president’s description of COVID-19 as the “Kung Flu” (Flood, 2020). Although moderate and more liberal media outlets refrained from promoting such language, the coverage of China’s response to both their domestic handling and offers of international aid tended to be sceptical. Subsequently, given China’s Belt and Road Initiative, participating members in Africa (for the purposes of this study, Ghana) tended to look more favourably on China’s approach to the pandemic giving the Chinese ambassador to Ghana the opportunity to pen opinion pieces for major national publications. China’s soft power approach in the region and their effort to shift the focus of the initiative to health and environmental investments has garnered the favour of Ghanaian leadership. DOI: 10.4324/9781003261278-12

Western media portrayals of China 193 Media frames of China as well as China’s reaction to media coverage may serve as an opportunity to explore how best to develop and adapt new theories of diplomacy and media coverage that move away from traditionally Western methods of approaching international cooperation that favours imperialist mentalities (see Chen, 2010). Globalisation is forcing a move away from Western media and diplomatic dominance, creating a need to develop new ways to accommodate and view China’s role on the global stage.

Media and diplomacy Media can be a powerful diplomatic tool when it comes to shaping public perceptions. Nye (2005) developed the theory of soft power in an effort to recognise the role non-militaristic elements play in global cooperation. Soft power was a way to influence external groups through the means of attraction using culture, values, and policy. Hard power is still a prominent factor when it comes to international diplomacy; both China and the USA have significant defence budgets. However, in recent years, many countries, including the USA, have utilised soft power tactics to influence global audiences. As such, media narratives can impact public opinion and behaviour in profound ways. Facebook posts were cited as a mitigating factor in Myanmar’s genocide of the Rohingya (Mozur, 2018). Media has also been used to influence violent actions in conflict zones (Ahmad, 2021; Bratic, 2016). Ahmad (2021) noted that during the recent Iraqi conflict, media was used to reframe disagreement in ways that posed alternative solutions to violence. However, with different ethnic and religious stakeholders, positive messaging and solutions were not always seen as successful. In another study that specifically focused on how different international newspapers framed the relationship between China and Pakistan, it was evident that media narratives were influenced by political and diplomatic factors. The study noted that USA and Indian newspapers appeared “terrified” of the Chinese and Pakistani relationship affirming that the countries in which these papers were published viewed China as a potential threat. The authors state the USA saw China as a major economic competitor not wishing for the country to gain more global power, while India wished to hold more power within Asia. In contrast, Pakistani and Chinese newspapers emphasised the importance the relationship has for the development and success of both nations (Hameed & Shahzad, 2020). These studies point to the importance that media portrayals have in developing and maintaining international relationships and how influencing public opinion is a mitigating factor. Building on Hameed and Shahzad’s (2020) study, this chapter also explores how the media from other countries covers China but looks more closely at how Western dominance, both from a global power and media perspective, not only influences public perceptions but also elicits antagonistic responses from China.

The West versus China Western national and international organisations have dominated global development over the past century. Western influence, especially US international

194 Kelly Chernin policy, has generally been framed as bringing democratic ideals to oppressed lands without taking into consideration colonial legacies. Non-Western countries were expected to develop following democratic ideals often situating other political ideologies, namely communism as problematic. International aid was thus determined by a country’s ability to conform to Western standards and left little room for countries to develop on their own terms (Zvobgo & Loken, 2020). In Africa, “pseudo democracies” were often established in an effort to meet standards imposed by organisations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade Organization (WTO) (Agulanna & Osimiri, 2017). These fledgling democracies often failed to meet the standards put in place by Western-dominated organisations. “The adoption of such aid programs illustrates the inherent asymmetry that comes from foreign aid packages, where self-determination is sacrificed for an infusion of cash resources and agenda-driven global aid organisations” (Gaither & Curtin, 2019, p. 127). International diplomacy and aid were based on building relationships with countries that were willing to adapt to Western ideals and shunning those that did not comply. This diplomatic approach dominated the post-WWII era with the height of the Cold War and its legacy is still apparent today (Zvobgo & Loken, 2020). In the past, the USA defined modernity with regard to culture, technology, and political assembly, but today modernity has different facets. The USA’s political system used to be a form of soft power; however, that power has slowly waned (Zakaria, 2021). Just as the former Soviet Union was seen as the antithesis of Western ideals, China’s global rise is seen in a similar vein. China’s entrance as a global power offers countries another form of international aid through diplomacy that many find more favourable than the strict standards imposed by Western-dominated organisations. While the West focuses on individualism, Chinese development favours more collectivist values (Khan et al., 2018). Chinese aid is not contingent on democratisation efforts but rather emphasises Confucian ideals situated in the notion of the Great Harmony perspective. This perspective can be viewed in two ways: one where there is a “unified utopia” based on equal rights and the other that champions diversity under the guidance of consensus building. Both forms of this Great Harmony perspective adhere to Confucian ideals of respecting authority (Callahan, 2015; Hou, 2019). For countries in Africa, these values align more with their own collectivist principles as opposed to notions of individualism (Poe, 2003). As such, China offers a different and oftentimes more appealing approach to development. This is not to say that China offers a better approach, nor does this view overlook critiques of Chinese means of aid and diplomacy, rather it simply provides a different outlook that may help to shape a more inclusive understanding of global relationships. In addressing different modes of diplomacy and aid as it relates to Western and Chinese models, it is important to look at the countries being impacted. In a postcolonial era, national identity is still constructed based on asymmetrical colonial powers (Fanon, 1963; Gaither & Curtin, 2019). For many African countries, including Ghana, development has been defined by major global ideologies that reinforce colonial and post-Cold War mentalities. In an effort to move beyond colonial

Western media portrayals of China 195 legacies, a key agenda is to reclaim a national identity that existed prior to colonialism thus “combat[ing] the hegemonic West” (Chen, 2010; Fanon, 1963; Nandy, 1983). China’s present Belt and Road Initiative is often framed as China returning to an era of trade and development that existed prior to Western dominance (Khan et al., 2018). And, media frames help to both promote and hinder these perceptions. Diplomacy and media influences While there has been a rise in non-Western media landscapes with the introduction of Al Jazeera, India and Nigeria’s expanding film industry, and a growing interest in Korean pop culture, Western media still dominates. The US media/ entertainment industry is the largest in the world, making up a third of the global industry (Select USA, n.d.). As such, the USA has the power to frame how a lot of the world views other countries as well as the USA itself. They have the power to write and shape historical perspectives which reinforce Western diplomatic mentalities and thus maintain a significant global influence. Narratives that reinforce top-down mentalities favour the “forced identity of the colonizer.” However, in recent times there has been a movement to establish counternarratives from a bottom-up approach that challenge these dominant systems (Gaither & Curtin, 2019). In the past, media was seen as a neutral force that aided development (Huntington, 1968), but this view ignores the socio-political and economic conditions that shape domestic and international media landscapes (Thussu, 2000). As development communication and public diplomacy become more intertwined, information propagated through media channels alters how foreign citizens know the world around them, and that this transformation can lead to positive social change. More recent paradigmatic shifts toward participatory communication models demonstrate that both fields have moved toward inclusive conceptualization of influence and social change. (Pamment, 2015, p. 188) Both frameworks attempt to emphasise the public good while attempting to acknowledge power relations. However, Pamment (2015) does acknowledge that while these two areas utilise similar approaches, public diplomacy views their process from the perspective of positive change, whereas developmental communication does a better job of acknowledging the power inequalities promoted by hegemonic US soft power approaches. Nonetheless, the articulation of how these two theories are defined does point to a greater need to be more inclusive of media narratives that originate outside of pre-existing power structures and point to the lack of media objectivity as it relates to global power.

Exploring media narratives This chapter employs an applied thematic analysis (Guest, MacQueen, & Name, 2012) focusing on close readings of print media stories relating to China’s

196 Kelly Chernin COVID-19 policy and the country’s subsequent reaction. An emphasis on the “descriptive and exploratory orientation” (p. 7) of various articles related to this topic was important because these narratives help to showcase the importance of Gaither and Curtin’s (2019) point with regard to the role counternarratives can play in disrupting dominant systems. Tone and frame were examined themes along with content and quoted expertise (i.e., what sources were quoted as experts on the subject matter). This is by no means an exhaustive exploration of everything that was written on the subject over the duration of the pandemic but instead seeks to use these narratives in an effort to demonstrate the impact of international media frames in shaping domestic public opinion. “A nation is expressed through the narratives that accumulate around it” (Gaither & Curtin, 2019, p. 123). A nation state is still a relevant unit of analysis despite globalisation, and media narratives play an important role in understanding the culture and policy of different nations. To better understand the role that domestic media narratives have on public opinion with regard to China, media narratives from US and Ghanaian news publications were examined. Both countries have strong economic ties to China. In addition, the USA and Ghana have similar political structures having a democratic system dominated by two major political parties that fosters an atmosphere of partisanship (Bob-Milliar & Lauterbach, 2021). US publications were selected to represent narratives from a dominant system given that the USA has the largest media industry in the world (Select USA, n.d.). Articles from the USA were selected from a variety of news sources that spanned the US media’s political spectrum. Conservative source Fox News was examined along with more neutral and left-leaning sources like The Atlantic and The New York Times. Ghana, like the USA, is considered “free” according to Freedom House rankings (Freedom House, 2022). While there are apparent differences between the US and Ghana’s political and media landscapes, Ghana still provides a close contrast to look at media frames from a non-Western perspective, thus providing an opportunity to explore counternarratives and knowledge construction that disrupt master narratives viewed from the lens of Western power (Chakrabarty, 2000). As such, news stories from the Daily Graphic and Ghanaian Times, state-owned papers with a reach that covers the entire country, and the Ghanaian Chronicle, a widely circulated independent paper, (Amissah, 2017) were examined. Following Hall’s (2017) work on articulating national identity and in an effort to explore these media frames from a lens that also recognises the Great Harmony perspective (Hou, 2019), it was essential to look at how these various discourses have been articulated by diverse actors in an effort to understand the nature of these international relationships. Chen (2010) writes, “Western imperialism has long been part of the Chinese psyche and […] will only be adequately addressed when China has been fully modernized” (p. 11). Examining China and Ghana’s perceived relationship through media narratives provides an outlook that not only looks at counternarratives but investigates an alternative non-Western power relationship. Taking this into account along with Zakaria’s (2021) notion that the USA is no longer considered the mediator of modernity, China’s reaction to these

Western media portrayals of China 197 different media narratives was also explored. The following analysis is based on themes derived from an inductive exploration and purposive sampling to determine how dominant and nondominant countries frame China through media narratives (Guest et al., 2012). US coverage of China during the COVID-19 pandemic According to a recent Pew Research study, 73% of US adults say they have an unfavourable opinion of China, a rise of 26 points since the start of the pandemic. Seventy-eight percent put a majority of the blame for the pandemic’s spread on China’s initial handling of the outbreak in Wuhan. Additionally, 26% of US adults believe China is an enemy of the USA. There is now more support for the USA to take a stronger stance when dealing with China than ever before. It should also be noted that while both Democrats and Republicans have negative views of China, Republicans are more likely “to have a very unfavorable view of China, to criticize the Chinese government’s role in the global pandemic and want to take a tougher policy approach to the country” (Silver, Devlin & Huang, 2020, para. 8). The study did cite Trump’s trade policy with China and the pandemic as reasons for the increased negative response (Silver, et al. 2020). The increase in adverse attitudes can possibly be attributed to recent media coverage of the pandemic. A year and a half into the pandemic, Fox News ran a story based on the comments of Kansas Republican Senator, Roger Marshall, who claimed that the USA, among other countries, needed to “shame” China. Marshall went on to critique the Biden administration for not being hard on China during an investigation into the origins of the virus (Kaplan, 2021). While this article was more neutral than most of Fox’s television coverage (i.e., Sean Hannity and Tucker Carlson’s shows), there was no attempt to present a side favourable to China or their offering of pandemic aid to other countries. In another Fox article, the phrase that “reporters have “egg on their face”’ was strongly emphasised. The phrase referred to the lack of early reporting on the Wuhan lab-leak theory. The quote was from ABC News’ Chief White House Correspondent Jonathan Karl. Fox published more of Karl’s quote stating, Because Trump was saying so much else that was just out of control, and because he was, you know, making a frankly racist appeal talking about kung-flu, and the Chinese virus, he said flatly this came from that lab, and it was widely dismissed … but now serious people are saying it needs serious inquiry. (Karl quoted in Kugle, 2021, para. 3) The article uses the term “many” to describe the number of journalists making this claim; however, only one journalist and another article focusing on the story are mentioned. To emphasise the point noted by Karl and throughout the article, it posited that “liberal” journalists ignored the claim because of Trump’s other comments. The classification of partisan journalistic divides that were further

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exacerbated by Trump’s presidency is important to note and does support the Pew findings that views with regard to China’s role in spreading the virus are generally split along the lines of party affiliation. Nature, a scientific publication, published an article around this same period saying that “most scientists say SARS-CoV-2 probably has a natural origin … However, a lab leak has not been ruled out” (Maxmen & Mallapaty, 2021, para. 2). The article goes on to examine this claim in a more objective nature than the Fox article bringing in scientific expertise to explore the various claims. The Fox article only published a two-word quote from Dr. Anthony Fauci saying he was “not convinced” that the virus now occurred naturally. Based on a timeline of Fauci’s comments surrounding the nature of the lab-leak theory, the Fox article quote was taken out of context. While Fauci did say there should be an investigation into the origins of the virus, he did push back against claims made by Republican lawmakers using his original remarks “as proof of something nefarious” (Brewster, 2021). The New York Times also published an article on the lab-leak theory, taking a stance more similar to Nature’s bringing in the perspective of scientists as opposed to journalists. The Times article states “it appears to be a classic example of groupthink, exacerbated by partisan polarization” (Leonhardt, 2021, para. 12). The article notes that global health officials “seemed unwilling to confront Chinese officials” while also emphasising that the original statements made by Arkansas Republican Senator, Tom Cotton, were initially ignored, given his history of making false claims with regard to China. Unlike the Fox article, The New York Times did present the findings in a more nuanced way that gave credibility to both perspectives. The discussion surrounding the WHO’s interaction with China was another prominent issue discussed in US media with regard to China’s handling of the virus. As President Trump announced that he would stop funding for the WHO, China stepped in to pledge additional money to the organisation. However, in the past, China only contributed the minimum amount to be considered a member of the organisation. The Atlantic article quoted Rear Admiral Kenneth Bernard, a former political adviser to the director-general of the WHO saying, “The Chinese give as little money as they can get away with […;] they give little money as will buy influence” (Gilsinan, 2020, para. 3). The article goes on to articulate how China is positioning itself as an alternative benefactor for developing nations as the USA withdrew from global organisations during the Trump administration. Even though the tone of this article is more neutral, using direct quotes to assert the opinion, the article does address China’s human rights abuses and highlights the views of those who believe that authoritarian regimes should not have as much power as China does with regard to the United Nations and other key global organisations. It also concludes that while China is stepping in to provide more financial backing, this still does not resolve many of the political issues the country faces as far as international perceptions (Gilsinan, 2020). In addition, in May of 2020, The New York Times published an article titled, “With Selective Coronavirus Coverage, China Builds a Culture of Hate” which

Western media portrayals of China 199 also questioned the legitimacy of China’s global authority. The article began by chronicling the Chinese online success of programs like Trevor Noah’s “The Daily Show” for criticising Trump’s failures at handling the USA’s pandemic response. Clips from the show were shared extensively on Chinese social media. This aligns with Luqiu and Yang’s (2020) view that China promotes media portrayals that favour their narrative of events. It goes on to highlight the inequalities of Chinese media coverage that tends to portray China’s response to the pandemic as positive, while the pandemic response of other countries painted scenes of “purgatory” and the “apocalypse.” Given China’s efforts to legitimise the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) grip on power, these narratives help to frame Chinese policy as a model of success. “For many people in China, the push is working. Wielding a mix of lies and partial truths, some young people are waging online attacks against individuals and countries that contradict their belief in China’s superior response” (Yuan, 2020, para. 9). The article mainly addresses how Chinese media is promoting a “culture of hate” toward the USA; however, it fails to acknowledge that the USA employs a similar media mentality. The New York Times and other US publications have covered stories regarding the rise of Asian hate crimes in the wake of President Trump’s use of terms like the “Chinese virus,” but only after significant public outcry. The USA and China do have very different media systems, making it difficult to compare (McKenzie, 2006). While The New York Times and other reputable US publications are publishing important stories, both the USA and China tend to use the other country as a scapegoat or cast them as the villain. Zakaria (2021) has noted that this period of US and Chinese relations is the tensest it has been since the two countries opened diplomatic ties in the 1970s. The USA should still continue to exert pressure on China when appropriate; however, the approach of only highlighting negative aspects of China seems to drive China to take a more antagonistic response. A more nuanced approach to coverage of China could possibly create a space where opposing views do represent the Great Harmony perspective that promotes different global attitudes guided by consensus, thus fuelling less hatred toward foreigners and other countries that is now a major theme with regard to Chinese and US public opinion. Ghanaian media coverage of China and COVID-19 After Ghana’s independence from British colonial rule in 1957, the country seemed more aligned with Marxist ideology. In the midst of the Cold War, Ghana was caught up in the identity politics established by the West and the former Soviet Union. Today, both China and the USA are major trading partners with Ghana. According to World Bank trading statistics, Chinese trade accounts for $1,896 million and the US 976 million (WITS, n.d.). China frames the relationship between the two countries as mainly positive. In an interview with Ghanaian media, Chinese Ambassador Lu referenced many of the joint Chinese and

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Ghanaian projects like the China-invested African World Airlines (AWA) and the Union Asogli power plant. In relation to the pandemic, Lu stated: After the outbreak of [the] Covid-19 pandemic, China and Ghana united as brothers and supported each other. Ghana voiced its support to China at the first moment of the pandemic. China ardently helped Ghana to fight the virus by providing a large [a]mount of anti-pandemic supplies. The first chartered flight containing anti-pandemic supplies donated by the Chinese government to Africa chose Ghana as its first destination. (Lu, 2021, para. 1) The ambassador goes on to detail China’s COVID-19 support by referencing the materials donated to various Ghanaian medical institutions, noting China’s collaboration with UNICEF and the WHO on other COVID-19-based initiatives. In a study conducted by Wang (2018), the most common words Ghanaians associated with China were “technology,” “leader,” and “biggest power.” However, this study also noted a growing anti-China sentiment among Ghanaians. The study goes on to explore two major local news outlets, myjoyonline.com and GhanaWeb. With regard to myjoyonline, the study found that “most articles appear to be neutral, quotation based, and do not involve much of the reporters’ opinion, unless it [was] an interview” (Wang, 2018, p. 32). Subsequently, GhanaWeb was found to be less neutral and promoted more anti-Chinese rhetoric. While Wang studied local news outlets, this study selected popular national news organisations in contrast to those selected from the USA. Wang does note that “there is a lack of opinion columns by experts in the field which creates a space for the readers to interpret and form their own opinions” (2018, p. 32). This is an interesting observation, given that the Ghanaian Times featured a two-part article penned by the Chinese ambassador to Ghana focusing on the “C.H.I.N.A. way for a better post-Covid world.” CHINA serves as an acronym to describe an initiative shared by Xi Jinping with C – standing for cooperation against COVID, H – to handle risks in an effort to reboot recovery, I – initiative global development agenda, N – no Cold War mentality, and A – abide by promises. Under “abide by promises” the ambassador, Lu, discusses the number of vaccines China has pledged (Lu, 2022). In the Daily Graphic, Edward Boateng, Ghana’s Ambassador to China is quoted in an article responding to allegations that China discriminated against Africans living in China during the pandemic. Boateng acknowledged that China’s strict quarantine procedures were justified, given the spread of the pandemic and that the event being framed as a form of discrimination was a mistake (Arku, 2020). Given that both the Ghanaian Times and Daily Graphic are government-run, it makes sense that coverage was more neutral overall and that both papers would seek to promote a strong relationship between the two countries by giving both ambassadors a space to speak as experts. Nana Akufo-Addo, the President of Ghana, tends to welcome China’s developmental aid and infrastructure support. Therefore, the newspapers in his

Western media portrayals of China 201 government’s control are more likely to also support the relationship between Ghana and China (Bob-Milliar & Lauterbach, 2021; Wang, 2018). A basic keyword search for COVID-19 and China offered very few hits in The Chronicle, one of Ghana’s national independent papers. However, one feature article discussed racist attitudes perpetuated by Western countries. If there were any remaining doubts about COVID-19 racism, these countries [Canada, Saudi Arabia, and the U.K.] shed it and showed the world they could not help wearing bigotry on their sleeve. Countries that were rightly opposed to [labeling] COVID-19 the “China virus”, were quick to target Africa, which is not the original source of the new variant, for detecting it among in-bound [travelers] and quickly reporting it. (Ishiekwene, 2021) The article goes on to discuss the inequities in the global economy as it pertains to aviation rules and targets the USA and Europe for promoting unfair practices that tend to exclude less developed nations, specifically Nigeria, which has the largest economy in Africa. The tone of this article is more opinion based but nonetheless highlights a small sense of solidarity with China against the West and the continued legacy of alienating non-Western countries. China’s reaction At the start of the pandemic, when COVID hit Italy, China seemed eager to help other nations combat the spread of the pandemic. China sent doctors, nurses, and medical supplies to help with Italy’s outbreak (Reuters, 2020). However, this level of collaboration was not extended to the USA. In response to US coverage of China’s handling of the pandemic, China’s Foreign Ministry released a statement with 24 “reality checks.” These reality checks presented various allegations made by US media followed by China’s counter-response. Allegation 15, regarding the expulsion of US journalists in an effort to “hide the truth about Covid-19,” was a rebuttal stating, “China’s measure was a response to the US long-term oppression of Chinese media in the U.S. especially the recent expulsion of 60 journalists. China has released information in an open, transparent, responsible and timely manner” (Embassy of PRC in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 2020). US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, announced in March of 2020 that five Chinese media outlets would be forced to reduce staff by 40%. This policy impacted China’s state news agency Xinhua in addition to China Global Television Network, China Daily, China Radio International, and the People’s Daily. The USA noted that its reasoning for this move was due to China’s increasing crackdown on free speech (BBC, 2020). Allegation 16 focused on a statement made that China is controlling the WHO. In response, the Chinese Foreign Ministry said, China firmly support[s] multilateralism. We have all along been in good communication and cooperation with [the] WHO. But we have never attempted

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Many of the other rebuttals focus on elements of the US media narratives previously addressed. In response to the narrative that China was solely responsible for the spread of COVID-19, the Foreign Ministry stated that “there is zero legal basis for holding China accountable and making it pay for Covid-19. Essentially, some U.S. politicians are trying to shift blame out of domestic political agenda.” This statement does point to China’s reactionary stance to the narrative that many Republican politicians have promoted since the start of the pandemic. Allegations 21 and 24 pointed to China’s international response. The first allegation that China was only assisting other countries for political purposes was the focus of one of The Atlantic articles discussed previously and mirrors some of what was said with regard to China’s efforts to increase their influence as a WHO member in the wake of President Trump’s withdrawal of funds from the organisation. China’s rebuttal states, “China’s assistance to other countries is a return of their kindness in helping with [the] Covid-19 response. It is also a concrete step to put into action the vision of building a community with a shared future for mankind.” Regardless of the intent, China has donated resources to help countries in Africa and elsewhere in an effort to respond to growing pandemic aid needs (Embassy of the PRC in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 2020). Allegation 24 specifically addressed China’s response in Africa and the allegations of discrimination. In response, the Foreign Ministry wrote, “China’s Covid-19 response measures apply to both Chinese and foreigners without discrimination. China follows a zero-tolerance policy on discriminatory words and actions.” China’s response was justified in the state-run Ghanaian publication by Edward Boateng, Ghana’s Ambassador to China.

Moving beyond Western classifications It should be noted that many of the articles cited above posed legitimate critiques of China’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. China is ranked 177 out of 180 in terms of press freedom by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) (RSF, n.d.). Freedom House gives China a score of 0/4 for freedom of expression and belief noting that “China is home to one of the world’s most restrictive media environments and its most sophisticated system of censorship particularly online” (Freedom House, 2021, para. 30). China does need to make improvements as far as press freedom, access to information, and human rights are concerned more generally. Of relevance is the notion that China becomes increasingly more antagonistic as countries like the USA continue to highlight only negative coverage. While these criticisms are warranted and necessary, perhaps a different approach to

Western media portrayals of China 203 media coverage pertaining to China should focus on framing the country more as a collaborator and less as an enemy or scapegoat for the mishandling of domestic issues. Both state-run and independent papers in Ghana use this frame and have continued to maintain strong diplomatic ties with China and have continued to receive pandemic aid. The more China is framed as an enemy, the more antagonistic they seem to become, which will likely lead to even less transparency on the part of the CCP. While Wang (2018) notes a growing anti-Chinese sentiment in Ghana, it is speculated that this sentiment is spread more through word-ofmouth and more localised news sources. Newspapers at the national level seemed to be more supportive of the relationship with China with the independent paper even addressing the role racism toward non-Western actors played in pandemic responses. Utilising Chen’s (2010) methodology toward deimperialisation, perhaps a better way to view diplomatic relations through media narratives is to move beyond Western modes of categorisations that emphasise binaries like East versus West and instead look at the relationship more fluidly. Wang (2018) notes that the failure to address cross-cultural understandings leads to “racially-framed allegations of each other” (p. 23). China’s entry to the world stage has at least offered a new frame of reference with regard to how global power is addressed, but there need to be more than two dominant perspectives in an effort to combat the possibility of another Cold War mentality of us or them. Feminist ethics, which employs an outlook based more on the concept of compassion and inclusivity, may be one way to redefine diplomatic efforts and media frames (Thompson & Clement, n.d.). While this approach can be used to champion causes focused on gender equality, like Chen’s (2010) theory, it also seeks to move beyond strict categorisations. This theory acknowledges the historical legacy of patriarchal and often racist, neocolonial policies at play on the world stage. Postcolonial feminists recognise the problems associated with universal ideas that often support the ideologies of the West. Feminist approaches to diplomacy look beyond the notion of focusing solely on providing developmental assistance and advocating for more holistic approaches (Thompson & Clement n.d.). Therefore, this attitude can also be used to help reimagine media narratives and attempt to promote the inclusion of more counternarratives that view actors like China using a less antagonistic lens. This approach could also give countries like Ghana a chance to assert more of their own independence, offering more development opportunities that go beyond China’s model of aid through the Belt and Road Initiative. In addition to a feminist ethics approach, the growing field of public interest communications may also serve as a potential new model to explore more collaborative approaches to global power and media frames. Again, this approach seeks an “open-ended” outlook that looks beyond binary categorisations and endeavours to explore the public interest as a “multi-interest conflict complex.” From a Chinese perspective, the public interest is in a constant negotiation following the guiding principles behind the Confucian Great Harmony ideal (Hou, 2019). Chinese diplomatic approaches in countries like Ghana give greater autonomy

204 Kelly Chernin to the nation to define their own national identity. “In Africa, those publics are constructed through the communal and collective more than the individual, making the public interest inextricably linked to cultural values including family, kin, and tribe” (Gaither & Curtin, 2019, p. 124). For developing countries reimagining their own identity beyond colonial legacies, looking at who articulates the public interest is essential. Ghana’s media frames China in a less antagonistic way than the USA and thus is able to maintain a strong diplomatic and trading relationship with China. The relationship is articulated as being beneficial to both countries, which are able to define the connection on their own terms based on similar collective values. China and the USA also share similar values, but these principles reinforce problematic behaviours that hinder as opposed to helping the global public interest. Both countries value their own political stability and legacy (Hou, 2019). However, the challenging similarity lies in how both countries react when placed in challenging positions. The USA’s war on terrorism, specifically the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, demonstrates that the USA also has the ability to act in a non-transparent manner (i.e., the uncorroborated evidence that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction [Taibbi, 2019]). What is in the public interest is constantly being redefined (Stoker, 2020); yet, it is in the public interest to establish greater global cooperation between the two countries. Unlike the Cold War, China and the USA are trading partners (Zakaria, 2021) and both countries need to find a way to negotiate the power they hold in this diplomatic relationship, which has profound implications for the entire global community. Chinese and US media both present the other nation as the enemy, and these media frames only serve to create a more antagonistic relationship. These frames also potentially reinforce the idea that countries that have less power on the global stage must decide between either of these opposing aid structures, which in part hinders development that could include more culturally nuanced modes of growth that would do more to benefit those countries with less power. For many external parties, particularly Western countries against Chinese economic operations in Africa, it is not shocking for them to outpour prodemocracy, environmental protection, and labor rights discussions that put Chinese ventures in Africa as an anecdote of plundering resources, robbing local economy, and violating human rights. Negative media, therefore only intensifies anti-Chinese populism on the ground. (Wang, 2018, p. 31) Even though Ghanaian media narratives were more favourable toward Chinese aid with regard to COVID-19 and the Belt and Road Initiative in general, Ghanaians are still likely exposed to US media narratives, given the nation’s global media outreach. While China does offer another approach to international development, the antagonism between the USA and China does more to hinder aid that would be less exploitative and thus more beneficial to countries with less power.

Western media portrayals of China 205 The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the interconnectedness of the global community. New pandemics and the impacts of climate change will impact everyone. As such, it is increasingly important to develop media frames that support a sense of greater cooperation with all global powers and not just those that share the same ideology. Developing a more nuanced understanding of how China is framed by Western media is at least a start.

Conclusion In a globalised world, it is impossible for nations to operate as isolated silos. Media frames do impact diplomatic relations, especially in countries like the USA and Ghana with partisan divides that impact how citizens select their leaders. Diplomatic relations are important for trade, environmental initiatives, peacekeeping, and as the pandemic has shown, global health. It is important to understand how domestic media narratives can shape perceptions that fuel negative reactions to how other nations are being portrayed. It is also important to note that power is not stagnant and the early 21st century has shown that Western modes of aid are not always the most effective or even offer the best developmental solutions. China’s response to COVID-19 has not always been ideal; however, the nation should not be viewed as a scapegoat for other nations’ failed pandemic responses. China is a major global player and countries like Ghana view China as a strong ally and trading partner. In an effort to prevent another Cold War-like environment, it is important to look at China’s soft power policies through the Belt and Road Initiative and global pandemic response not as a threat to Western power but as an alternative route to progress for developing countries. More importantly, these different approaches should not be viewed as a contradictory binary pitting East and West against each other. The relationship should be fluid and constantly rearticulated in an effort to benefit the entirety of the global public interest. From the perspective of US and China relations, both countries need to focus on what is in the global public interest as opposed to just looking at progress based on their own ideologies. In a talk given to the National Committee on U.S.China relations, Zakaria (2021) stated another “Cold War is a choice, polarity is a given.” Both countries are global powers with different ideologies and the relationships between these countries and their allies should be viewed as a constant negotiation and not as an antagonistic dichotomy. Limitations Focusing on only one country’s coverage of China and its COVID-19 response cannot be extrapolated to represent the entirety of the African continent comprising 52 sovereign nations, or even the use of the USA as the sole representative of Western media coverage. The media systems of all three countries explored in this chapter have different funding mechanisms and levels of control; therefore, future studies could look at how state control and funding mechanisms play a role in promoting various media frames. It should also be noted that given a

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topic related to global health, looking at coverage that focuses more on the expertise of scientists and the cross-national collaboration of medical professionals as opposed to journalists and ambassadors would also provide an important perspective. However, this exploration of media portrayals does offer a small view of the function media plays in global relations and how media can influence international relationships that serve to either divide nations or bring them together.

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Index

Page numbers in bold refer to tables; italics refer to figures. Abbas 166 actor-network theory (ANT) 4 administrative rank 30 Afghanistan 113–16 agenda setting 133 Al-Jazeera effect 4 Arab Uprisings (Arab Spring) 152, 155, 160 Arafat,Yasser 169 Arrested War 4 Asia 3, 5 Asia-Pacific 117, 120 Asia-Pacific region 2, 113–14 associations 35 authoritative 30–1 autonomy 31–3 Baltic seas 115 bargaining power 31 Belgrade 78, 111, 113 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 114, 123, 150, 154, 167, 173–4, 184 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 132, 135–8, 142–3 bilateral relations 16, 28, 75, 78, 80, 129, 176, 185 bold 32 Bosnia 3, 116 Broadcast War 4 Brussels 111, 113, 115 capitalism 2, 131 Central Asia 113–14 CGTN 62, 64–6 chi-square tests 35, 36 China Daily 112 ‘China threat’ theory 116

China-US trade conflict 10, 16–18, 21–2, 25 China-US trade relationship 25, 27 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 153–4 Chinese-Israeli economic relations 185 Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) army 6 circulation 31 climate change 111, 113, 115 CNN effect 3–4, 9, 13 codes 35 coding instructions 35 Cohen, J. 35–6 Cold War 12–13, 17 commemoration 74, 78, 79–87 Communist Party of China (CPC) 74, 78 comparative analysis 29 comparative perspective 10 conflict frame 33, 173–4 conflict involvement 17–18, 19–20, 21 conflict phase 17 conservative 30–3 content analysis 9–10, 17, 29, 34, 37 counterparts 29, 32, 38 Covid-19 1, 5, 121, 197- 201 Cramer’s V 35, 37 critical issues 30 cutting points 35–7 DataLEADS 132 decolonisation 166 de-radicalisation 65–6 detrimental 30 Diffused War 4 digital media platform 13 Digital Silk Road 44 diplomacy 193–5, 203

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documentaries 65–8 Doklam 136 domestic politics 15, 21–2 East Asia 84, 95 East Asian superpower 1–2 economic consequence frame 33 economic interests 169 economic relations 183 economic relationship 168 editorials 129–31, 134–5, 138–41, 144–5 editors 30–3 elite 31 Eurasia-centric 114 Europe 1, 5, 113–25 foreign conflicts 12–16 foreign policy 9–16 framed representations 167 frames 171; conflict frames 10, 173 framing 173, 178–81; content framing 175; framing contestation 13; game framing 14; issue framing 10, 14–22, 26; media framing 167, 170, 173, 175, 186; news framing 4–6, 14, 28–9; and strategy framing 9–10, 14–17, 18–9 framing analysis 5 framing contestation 13 framing process 167–8 framing theory 6, 22, 28, 117 freedom 30, 32 Galwan 129–32, 135, 138, 140–6 Gaza 176–7, 187n1 gender 3 generic frames 33 genocide 59–68 Ghana 7, 192–6, 199–206 global South 149, 175 Global Times 34 Google 44, 45–7 government control 29–30 guidance 30–1 headlines 32 hegemony 9, 12 hero(es) 77, 82–5 Hierarchy of Influences Model 29 Hindustan Times 6, 130–3, 144 Hong Kong 1 hot topics 32 Huawei 1 human interest frame 33 humanitarian intervention 152–60

humiliation 76–8, 83, 87–9 hybrid media system 21 IBM SPSS 35 ICTs (Information Communication Technologies) 3 ideology 29 impact 34–8 independent variable 28 indexing 9, 12 Indo-Pacific 113–14 international community 169, 176, 184–5 international conflicts 148–51 international law 154–6 international political economy 10–11, 22 Iraq 114, 121 Ireland 17–20 ISIS 154 Israel 169, 171, 177–85, 186n1 Israeli intelligence 169 Israeli-Palestinian conflicts 2 Israeli settlers 168 Israeli war 168 issue frames 180 issue-specific frames 33 Japan 75–8, 81, 92–108, 122 Jerusalem 168, 177, 184, 186–7 journalism 167, 172 journalistic practices 9 journalists 29–33 Korean War 6, 74, 80–7 Kosovo 3, 116 Kosovo conflict 113 Kremlin 1 Ladakh 129, 136, 138, 141–5 layouts 32 legitimacy 30 Libya 158–60 Line of Actual Control 129 local officials 32 locally sensitive 32, 39 London Declaration 114 Ma’an news agency 178–9 mandatory subscriptions 31 market forces 29 market-targeting 31 mass-appealing 31 media amplification 170, 178 media commercialisation 31 media control system 30

Index media independence 17 media logic 14 media marketisation 31 media ownership 29, 171, 179, 190 Media Ownership Monitor (MOM) 132 media-politics interaction 22 media routine 29 media’s role 9, 12 media type 28–9 Media, War and Conflict 3–4 mediatisation 170; mediatisation research 170–2, 178; mediatised 186; mediatised conflict 171–2, 186 Mediterranean 114–15 memory 74–85 Middle East 4–6, 113, 121, 125, 166–8, 170, 176 Modi, Narendra 131, 136, 138, 141 morality frame 5, 33, 178 mouthpiece 32, 38 national interests 26, 29–30 nationalism 74, 76–7, 81 national movement 166 nationalistic nature 38 national-level strategy framing 17, 20–2 nationally sensitive 32 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 6, 111 NATO expansion 112–16 NATO Summit 111, 114 negative news 32 news content 31 news making 29–30 news media 29–33 news media landscape 29 news outlets 13 news production 108 news reporting boundaries 32 news reports 9–15, 28, 33, 35–8 news selection autonomy 32 news sources 30 news values 31, 35 newsrooms 30 9/11 58 non-party news organidations 109n1 non-state actors 32 North Korea nuclear crisis 2 Obama administration 113, 153 Observer Research Foundation 130 official media 31 one-party dominant country 17–9 online media 167

211

online news 167–8 online platforms 41–3, 47–8, 50–2 online portals 29 opinion pieces 34 Palestine 166–186, 187n3; occupied Palestinian territories 169, Palestinian 166–181, 182–4, 185–6, 187n3; Palestinian Cause 169, 178, 186; 183; Palestinian journalists 171, 180–4 Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 169 Palestinian media 167 patriotic education 74, 76–7 Peace/Compromise frame 35 People’s Daily 17, 30, 34 People’s War on Terror 58, 65–7 percent 35–7 personal-level strategy framing 10, 18–22 pilot study 33 PLA (People’s Liberation Army) 81–3, 101, 108 platform imperialism 43 platformed diplomacy 47 policies 31–2, 35–8 political affiliation 30–2, 37–8 political control 29 political implications 30 political motivation 18 political orientation 28 political power 29 political status 31 President Xi Jinping 34, 48, 83, 115–8, 140, 166 principle of non-intervention 156 propaganda authorities 30, 32, 37 propaganda notice 30, 32 public diplomacy 3, 47–8, 116–17, 125, 195 p-value 35 Quora 118 Reporters Without Borders 132, 202 representation 166–8, 170–5, 184–7 responsibility frame 33 Russia 1, 5, 7, 111–25, 173–9 Russia-Ukraine conflict 112 Rwanda 63 sacrifice 61 sampling pool 34

212

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sanctions 63, 65, 67 SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) 60, 114 self-censorship 32 Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands Disputes 92–4, 97–102, 106–7, 109 sensational 32 sensitive news 32 Sheikh Jarrah confrontations 179 Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhood 168, 176, 184 significance levels 35 significant differences 37–8 Singapore 17–18, 20–1, 25 Sino-Indo conflict 6 Sino-Japanese relations 92, 94, 95, 97, 99, 102–9 Sino-NATO relations 133, 125 Sino-US Trade War 29–30, 32–7 Somalia 3 South China Sea 2, 115–16 Southeast Asian countries 2 spreading 32 state apparatus 30 state owned 29, 31 statistics 35 Stoltenberg 114–15 Strange, Susan 11, 12 Strategic Game frame 34–7 strategy framing 9–22 structural power theory 11, 16 sub-news outlets 31 subsidising 31 supervision 30 surgical strike 137, 139 survival 51 Syrian Crisis 6, 148–9, 158–60 tabloid 31 taboo issues 30 tactic 10–15 target audiences 30 Tariff Policy frame 34–8 terrorism 3, 5–6, 111–13 The Economist 111 The Times of India 6, 130, 133, 144 The War to Resist US and Aid Korea 74, 79 Thucydides Trap 9

Tibet 2 TikTok 44–7 tones 33–8 trade conflicts 28, 34 trade war 1, 6, 19–22, 28–38 transnational comparative content analysis 9 The Paper 34 Trump administration 1, 16 Trump, Donald 168–9, 176 Twitter 42, 47–50, 53n4n5 Uighur Muslims 1, 140 Ukraine 1, 5 Ukraine Crisis 4 UN resolutions 170, 176, 182–5 UN Security Council 2, 148, 152–3, 155–9 United Nations (UN) 176–7 UNSC (United Nations Security Council) Resolutions 6 United States 22n1 Uyghur foreign fighters 154, 159 variations 31, 34, 36 veto 148, 151, 155–60 victory 74, 82–5 vloggers 62 Vostok 115 Wafa (Palestine News and Information Agency) 168, 175, 177 Wakhan Corridor 113 Wang Yi 153 war journalism 13, 16, 22–4 war on Gaza 168, 176 Wattan news agency 178 weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation 113 western campaign news 14 World War II 1, 11 wrongdoings 32 Xi Jinping 77, 83, 149–51, 159–60 Xinhua Net 34–5 Xinjiang 58–68 zero-sum confrontation 17 Zhao Lijian 112 Zhihu 6, 111, 118–12