India’s Naval Strategy and Asian Security 9781138950917, 9781315668512

Table of contents :
Cover
Title
Copyright
Contents
List of figures
List of tables
Notes on contributors
Acknowledgements
List of abbreviations
1 Introduction
Part I The making of India’s naval strategy
2 India’s maritime strategy
3 Tomorrow or yesterday’s fleet? The Indian Navy’s emerging operational challenges
4 In the far seas: projecting India’s naval power
5 The unsinkable aircraft carrier: the Andaman and Nicobar Command
6 India’s naval diplomacy: the unfinished transitions
Part II The external dimensions of India’s naval strategy
7 India in the US naval strategy
8 ‘New normal’ in the Indo-Pacific: Sino-Indianmaritime security dilemma
9 Looming over the horizon: Japan’s naval engagement with India
10 A sea of opportunities: South East Asia’s growing naval cooperation with India
11 India and regional maritime security
12 India’s naval moment
Index

Citation preview

India’s Naval Strategy and Asian Security

This book examines India’s naval strategy within the context of Asian regional security. Amidst the intensifying geopolitical contestation in the waters of Asia, this book investigates the growing strategic salience of the Indian Navy. Delhi’s expanding economic and military strength has generated a widespread debate on India’s prospects for shaping the balance of power in Asia. This volume provides much needed texture to the abstract debate on India’s rise by focusing on the changing nature of India’s maritime orientation, the recent evolution of its naval strategy and its emerging defence diplomacy. In tracing the drift of the Navy from the margins of Delhi’s national security consciousness to a central position, analysing the tension between its maritime possibilities and the continentalist mindset, and in examining the gap between the growing external demands for its security contributions and internal ambivalence, this volume offers rare insights into India’s strategic direction at a critical moment in the nation’s evolution. By examining the internal and external dimensions of the Indian naval future, both of which are in dynamic flux, the essays here help a deeper understanding of India’s changing international possibilities and its impact on Asian and global security. This book will be of much interest to students of naval strategy, Asian politics, security studies and IR in general. Anit Mukherjee is an Assistant Professor in the South Asia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. C. Raja Mohan is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, India, and leads the Strategic Studies Initiative of the Foundation. He has published several books, including Samudra Manthan: Sino-­Indian Rivalry in the Indo-­Pacific (2013).

Cass Series: Naval Policy and History Series Editor: Geoffrey Till ISSN 1366–9478

This series consists primarily of original manuscripts by research scholars in the general area of naval policy and history, without national or chronological limitations. It will from time to time also include collections of important articles as well as reprints of classic works.   1 Austro-­Hungarian Naval Policy, 1904–1914 Milan N. Vego

  7 The Italian Navy and Fascist Expansionism, 1935–1940 Robert Mallett

  2 Far-­Flung Lines Studies in Imperial Defence in Honour of Donald Mackenzie Schurman Edited by Keith Neilson and Greg Kennedy

  8 The Merchant Marine and International Affairs, 1850–1950 Edited by Greg Kennedy

  3 Maritime Strategy and Continental Wars Rear Admiral Raja Menon   4 The Royal Navy and German Naval Disarmament 1942–1947 Chris Madsen   5 Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas Milan N. Vego   6 The Pen and Ink Sailor Charles Middleton and the King’s Navy, 1778–1813 John E. Talbott

  9 Naval Strategy in Northeast Asia Geo-­strategic Goals, Policies and Prospects Duk-­Ki Kim 10 Naval Policy and Strategy in the Mediterranean Sea Past, Present and Future Edited by John B. Hattendorf 11 Stalin’s Ocean-­going Fleet Soviet Naval Strategy and Shipbuilding Programmes, 1935–1953 Jürgen Rohwer and Mikhail S. Monakov 12 Imperial Defence, 1868–1887 Donald Mackenzie Schurman; edited by John Beeler

13 Technology and Naval Combat in the Twentieth Century and Beyond Edited by Phillips Payson O’Brien 14 The Royal Navy and Nuclear Weapons Richard Moore 15 The Royal Navy and the Capital Ship in the Interwar Period An Operational Perspective Joseph Moretz 16 Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power Thomas M. Kane 17 Britain’s Anti-­submarine Capability, 1919–1939 George Franklin 18 Britain, France and the Naval Arms Trade in the Baltic, 1919–1939 Grand Strategy and Failure Donald Stoker 19 Naval Mutinies of the Twentieth Century An International Perspective Edited by Christopher Bell and Bruce Elleman 20 The Road to Oran Anglo-­French Naval Relations, September 1939–July 1940 David Brown 21 The Secret War against Sweden US and British Submarine Deception and Political Control in the 1980s Ola Tunander

22 Royal Navy Strategy in the Far East, 1919–1939 Planning for a War against Japan Andrew Field 23 Seapower A Guide for the Twenty-­first Century Geoffrey Till 24 Britain’s Economic Blockade of Germany, 1914–1919 Eric W. Osborne 25 A Life of Admiral of the Fleet Andrew Cunningham A Twentieth-­Century Naval Leader Michael Simpson 26 Navies in Northern Waters, 1721–2000 Edited by Rolf Hobson and Tom Kristiansen 27 German Naval Strategy, 1856–1888 Forerunners to Tirpitz David Olivier 28 British Naval Strategy East of Suez, 1900–2000 Influences and Actions Edited by Greg Kennedy 29 The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Navy in the Baltic, 1921–1940 Gunnar Aselius 30 The Royal Navy, 1930–1990 Innovation and Defence Edited by Richard Harding 31 The Royal Navy and Maritime Power in the Twentieth Century Edited by Ian Speller

32 Dreadnought Gunnery and the Battle of Jutland The Question of Fire Control John Brooks 33 Greek Naval Strategy and Policy, 1910–1919 Zisis Fotakis 34 Naval Blockades and Seapower Strategies and Counter­Strategies, 1805–2005 Edited by Bruce A. Elleman and Sarah C.M. Paine 35 The Pacific Campaign in World War II From Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal William Bruce Johnson 36 Anti-­Submarine Warfare in World War I British Naval Aviation and the Defeat of the U-­Boats John J. Abbatiello 37 The Royal Navy and Anti­Submarine Warfare, 1944–49 Malcolm Llewellyn-­Jones 38 The Development of British Naval Thinking Essays in Memory of Bryan Ranft Edited by Geoffrey Till 39 Educating the Royal Navy Eighteenth- and NineteenthCentury Education for Officers H.W. Dickinson 40 Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century The Turn to Mahan James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara

41 Naval Coalition Warfare From the Napoleonic War to Operation Iraqi Freedom Edited by Bruce A. Elleman and S.C.M. Paine 42 Operational Warfare at Sea Theory and Practice Milan Vego 43 Naval Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations Stability from the Sea Edited by James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen 44 Indian Naval Strategy in the 21st Century James R. Holmes, Andrew C. Winner and Toshi Yoshihara 45 Seapower A Guide for the Twenty-­First Century (Second Edition) Geoffrey Till 46 Naval Power and Expeditionary Warfare Peripheral Campaigns and New Theatres of Naval Warfare Edited by Bruce Elleman and S.C.M. Paine 47 Sea Power and the Asia-­Pacific The Triumph of Neptune Edited by Geoffrey Till and Patrick Bratton 48 Maritime Private Security Market Responses to Piracy, Terrorism and Waterborne Security Risks in the 21st Century Edited by Claude Berube and Patrick Cullen

49 Twenty-­First Century Seapower Cooperation and Conflict at Sea Edited by Peter Dutton, Robert S. Ross and Øystein Tunsjø

53 Empire, Technology and Seapower Royal Navy Crisis in the Age of Palmerston Howard J. Fuller

50 Navies of South-­East Asia A Comparative Study James Goldrick and Jack McCaffrie

54 Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century Christian LeMiere

51 Seapower A Guide for the Twenty-­First Century (Third Edition) Geoffrey Till

55 Maritime Strategy and Sea Control Theory and Practice Milan Vego

52 Naval Modernisation in South­East Asia Nature, Causes and Consequences Edited by Geoffrey Till and Jane Chan

56 India’s Naval Strategy and Asian Security Edited by Anit Mukherjee and C. Raja Mohan

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India’s Naval Strategy and Asian Security

Edited by Anit Mukherjee and C. Raja Mohan

First published 2016 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2016 selection and editorial matter, Anit Mukherjee and C. Raja Mohan; individual chapters, the contributors The right of the editors to be identified as the authors of the editorial matter, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice : Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-­in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-Publication Data Names: Mukherjee, Anit, 1972– editor. | Raja Mohan, C., editor. Title: India’s naval strategy and Asian security / edited by Anit Mukherjee and C. Raja Mohan. Description: New York, NY : Routledge, 2016. | Series: Cass series–naval policy and history | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2015023556| ISBN 9781138950917 (hardback) | ISBN 9781315668512 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: India. Indian Navy. | Sea-power–India. | India–Military policy. | National security–Indian Ocean Region. | Indian Ocean–Strategic aspects. | Naval strategy. Classification: LCC VA643 .I57 2016 | DDC 359/.030954–dc23 LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015023556 ISBN: 978-1-138-95091-7 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-66851-2 (ebk) Typeset in Baskerville by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

Contents



List of figures List of tables Notes on contributors Acknowledgements List of abbreviations

  1 Introduction

xi xii xiii xviii xix 1

A nit  M ukherjee and C .   R aja  M ohan

Part I

The making of India’s naval strategy

11

  2 India’s maritime strategy

13

R ajeswari P illai R ajagopalan

  3 Tomorrow or yesterday’s fleet? The Indian Navy’s emerging operational challenges

37

I skander R ehman

  4 In the far seas: projecting India’s naval power

65

A bhijit S ingh

  5 The unsinkable aircraft carrier: the Andaman and Nicobar Command

86

A nit M ukherjee

  6 India’s naval diplomacy: the unfinished transitions C . R aja M ohan

106

x   Contents Part II

The external dimensions of India’s naval strategy

125

  7 India in the US naval strategy

127

T imothy D . H oyt

  8 ‘New normal’ in the Indo-­Pacific: Sino-­Indian maritime security dilemma

144

K oh S wee L ean C ollin

  9 Looming over the horizon: Japan’s naval engagement with India

175

T omoko K iyota

10 A sea of opportunities: South East Asia’s growing naval cooperation with India

192

R istian A triandi S upriyanto

11 India and regional maritime security

215

S am B ateman

12 India’s naval moment

237

A nit  M ukherjee and C .   R aja  M ohan



Index

247

Figures

5.1 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4

Organisational chart of ANC China’s oil consumption vs production Indian land-­based maritime air strike coverage in the IOR Value of India’s total commodity exports Chinese land-­based maritime air strike coverage in the SCS

96 148 154 155 157

Tables

5.1 5.2

5.3 5.4 5.5 8.1

8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8A.1 8A.2 8A.3 8A.4 10.1 10.2

The Andaman and Nicobar Islands Land availability and usage in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands Geographical location of military assets Service wise military assets of the ANC List of Commanders-­in-Chief, ANC Fleet dispositions of newly inducted PLAN major surface vessels PLAN’s IOR port calls PLAN’s Gulf of Aden counter-­piracy deployments India’s maritime security-­related CSBMs with key Asia-­Pacific powers other than China Comparing maritime security-­related CSBMs established by China and India with IOR littoral states Major Sino-­Indian CSBMs India’s maritime security-­related CSBMs with key Asia-­Pacific powers other than China India’s maritime security-­related CSBMs with other Indian Ocean littoral states China’s maritime security-­related CSBMs with Indian Ocean littoral states other than India The depth and scope of naval cooperation Bilateral naval cooperation between India and South East Asian countries

87 89 94 95 98 149 151 152 158 160 163 164 166 168 195 197

Contributors

Sam Bateman retired from the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) as a Commodore and is now a Professorial Research Fellow at the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS) at the University of Wollongong in Australia, and an Adviser to the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. His naval service included four ship commands ranging from a patrol boat to guided­missile destroyer. He has written extensively on defence and maritime issues in Australia, the Asia-­Pacific and Indian Ocean, and was awarded his PhD from the University of NSW in 2001 for a dissertation on ‘The Strategic and Political Aspects of the Law of the Sea in East Asian Seas’. He is a widely respected regional maritime security expert and regularly provides comments for Australian and international media. Co-­authored reports for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) include Our Western Front: Australia and the Indian Ocean (2010), Staying the Course: Australia and Maritime Security in the South Pacific (2011), Making Waves: Australian Ocean Development Assistance (2012) and Terms of Engagement – Australia’s Regional Defence Diplomacy (2013). He has also co-­authored policy papers for RSIS including ASEAN and the Indian Ocean (2011). His co-­edited books include Maritime Challenges and Priorities in Asia – Implications for Regional Security (Routledge, 2012). His current research interests include regional maritime security, piracy and maritime terrorism, oceans policy, the strategic and political implications of the Law of the Sea, and maritime cooperation and confidence-­building. Koh Swee Lean Collin is an Associate Research Fellow at the Maritime Security Programme, part of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies which is a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He primarily researches on naval affairs in the Indo-­Pacific, focusing on South East Asia, and generally issues related to naval technologies, naval modernisation, naval arms control and the offence-­defence theory. Collin has published a number of op-­eds, policy and academic journal articles

xiv   Contributors as well as chapters for edited volumes covering his research areas. He has also taught various professional military education and training courses with the Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute. Besides research and teaching, Collin contributes his perspectives to various local and international media outlets, including BBC, Bloomberg, Channel News Asia, Reuters and The Straits Times. As part of his doctoral research work, Collin is in the process of compiling a database consisting of up to 18 selected countries in the Indo-­Pacific, comprising information related to their naval forces development and structures, national policy discourses, confidence-­building and cooperative measures, as well as incidences of the threat and use of force at sea. Timothy D. Hoyt is a Professor of Strategy and Policy, and the John Nicholas Brown Chair of Counterterrorism at the US Naval War College. He joined the Naval War College in 2002, and was Co-­Director of the Indian Ocean Regional Studies Group there from 2009 to 2012. Professor Hoyt taught previously at the Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program from 1998 to 2002. He received a PhD in International Relations and Strategic Studies from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University. Professor Hoyt is the author of Military Industry and Regional Defense Policy: India, Iraq and Israel (Routledge, 2007), as well as over 50 articles and book chapters on subjects including strategy, grand strategy, terrorism, irregular warfare, nuclear proliferation, warfare in the developing world and South Asian security. Tomoko Kiyota was most recently a Resident Sasakawa Peace Foundation Fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS, Hawaii. She was awarded a PhD in security studies from the Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies, Takushoku University, Tokyo in March 2015. She taught postgraduate students at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal University, Karnataka. Kiyota was also a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi and a Research Intern at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), New Delhi. She has working experience at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and the Embassy of Japan in New Delhi as a Political Analyst. While she explored India’s arms development in her doctoral programme, Kiyota published several book chapters, commentaries and articles on India–Japan relations, US–India–Japan relations and Japanese national security. Her recent publications include: ‘Love and Hate: India’s Anti-­Americanism and its Impact on Japan–India Relations’, in Shihoko Goto, ed., The Rebalance within Asia: The Evolution of Japan–India Relations (2014); ‘Japan’s South China Sea Conundrum’, in Pradeep Kaushiva and Abhijit Singh, eds, Geopolitics of the Indo-­Pacific (2014) and ‘Shinzo Abe’s Struggle in the Indian Ocean Region’, Asia Pacific Bulletin, No. 290, November 2014.

Contributors   xv C. Raja Mohan is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF ), New Delhi, and heads its strategic studies programme. He is a Visiting Research Professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. He is a Non-­resident Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC. He earlier taught at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. Prof. Mohan was a Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), New Delhi. He served three terms on India’s National Security Advisory Board. His books include: Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy (2003); Impossible Allies: Nuclear India, United States and the Global Nuclear Order (2006) and Samudra Manthan: Sino­Indian Rivalry in the Indo-­Pacific (2013). Anit Mukherjee is an Assistant Professor in the South Asia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He joined RSIS after a postdoctorate at the Centre for the Advanced Study of India (CASI), University of Pennsylvania and a PhD from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University. From 2010 to 2012 he was a Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi. While in the doctoral programme he also worked at the Brookings Institutions and was a Summer Associate at RAND Corporation. He has published in the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal (Asia), RUSI Journal, India Review, The Caravan and Indian Express, among others. Formerly, he was a Major in the Indian Army and is an alumnus of India’s National Defence Academy (NDA), Khadakwasla. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF ), New Delhi. Dr Rajagopalan joined ORF after an almost five-­year stint at the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), Government of India (2003–2007), where she was an Assistant Director. Prior to joining the NSCS, she was a Research Officer at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi. She was also a Visiting Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Politics, National Chung Hsing University, Taichung, Taiwan in early 2012. She is the author of three books: The Dragon’s Fire: Chinese Military Strategy and its Implications for Asia (2009); Uncertain Eagle: US Military Strategy in Asia (2009); and Clashing Titans: Military Strategy and Insecurity Among Asian Great Powers (2012). Her research articles have appeared in edited volumes, and in India Review, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, The National Interest, Air and Space Power Journal, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Strategic Analysis and the Journal of Strategic Studies. She has also published in newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal, Times of India, Hindustan Times and Economic Times.

xvi   Contributors Iskander Rehman recently took up the post of Postdoctoral Fellow at the Brookings Institution. He is also a Non-resident Fellow in the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council. Prior to joining the Council, Dr Rehman was a Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), where he focused on Asian defence issues and emerging security challenges in the Indo-­Pacific. From July 2012 to July 2013, he was a Stanton Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Dr Rehman has also held predoctoral fellowships at the German Marshall Fund, in Washington, DC, as well as at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and the Observer Research Foundation (ORF ), both in New Delhi. He has published a number of think tank reports, and his work has featured in the Naval War College Review, Asian Security, the Indian Express, The Economist, The National Interest and the Financial Times, among others. He holds a doctorate in political science, with distinction and a specialisation in Asian studies, as well as a master’s degree in political science and a master’s degree in comparative politics, from the Institute of Political Sciences in Paris (also known as Sciences Po). Abhijit Singh is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) in New Delhi and specialises in maritime security. His current research focus is on the Indo-­Pacific Region, wherein he has been exploring potential security frameworks. Commissioned in the Executive Branch of the Indian Navy in July 1994, he is a specialist in Gunnery and Weapons Systems and has served on board front­line naval ships. Prior to joining the IDSA in August 2013, Cdr Abhijit was a Research Fellow at the National Maritime Foundation (NMF ), New Delhi, where he wrote extensively on littoral security in the Indian Ocean Region. Co-­editor of two books – Indian Ocean Challenges: a Quest for Cooperative Solutions (2013) and Geopolitics of the Indo-­Pacific (2014), he has authored papers on the Pakistan Navy and the Iranian Navy and also assisted the late Vice Admiral GM Hiranandani (Retd) in the authorship of the third volume of Indian Naval History, Transition to Guardianship, released in December 2010. His articles and commentaries are regularly published in the World Politics Review, The Diplomat and the CSIS Pacific Forum. Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto is Indonesian Presidential PhD Scholar with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs at the Australian National University (ANU). Before joining the ANU, Andi was an Associate Research Fellow with the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore and a Researcher with the International Relations Department at the University of Indonesia. His research focuses on maritime security in the Indo-­Pacific and Indonesian defence policy. In April–May 2014,

Contributors   xvii he was attached with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) in Canberra as the inaugural Indonesian Visiting Fellow to research on Australia–Indonesia maritime security cooperation, which was published in November 2014. He also co-­authored a chapter in an edited book by Christopher Roberts, Leonard Sebastian and Derry Habir, Indonesia’s Ascent: Power, Leadership, and the Regional Order (2015). Andi’s publications have also appeared in India Review, the Strait Times, The Australian, the Jakarta Post and the Global Times (China), among others.

Acknowledgements

This book symbolises the continuous cooperation and partnership between the Observer Research Foundation (ORF ), New Delhi and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore. It owes its origins to a joint conference held in Delhi during February 2014. We would therefore like to begin by thanking both our institutions for their support. We would also like to thank all the contributing authors for their cooperation and for putting up with our constant demands. Despite their busy commitments and travels they were prompt in their responses. Rajesh Basrur helped us in conceptually thinking through the issues and sharpening our approach. Darshana Baruah was invaluable in organising the conference and also provided critical editorial support in preparing the manuscript. This book would not have been possible without the guidance and support of our colleagues at Routledge. We would especially like to thank Geoffrey Till, Andrew Humphrys, Hannah Ferguson and others who worked on the manuscript. Finally, we would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their critical appreciation which helped us in developing this book. We accept full responsibility for shortcomings and welcome critical feedback.

Abbreviations

A2/AD ADIZ ADMM-­Plus AMF ANC ARF ASCM ASEAN ASUW ASW ATV BIMSTEC C4ISR CINCAN CNS CSBM DRDO EAMF EAS EEZ ENC FAC FDI FOB HACGA HADR HDW IFC IONS IOR IORA

Anti-­Access/Area Denial Air Defence Identification Zone ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus ASEAN Maritime Forum Andaman and Nicobar Command ASEAN Regional Forum Anti-­Ship Cruise Missile Association of South East Asian Nations Anti-Surface Warfare Anti-­Submarine Warfare Advanced Technology Vessel Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-­Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Commander in Chief Andaman and Nicobar Command Chief of Naval Staff confidence and security-­building measure Defence Research and Development Organisation Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum East Asia Summit Exclusive Economic Zone Eastern Naval Command Fast Attack Crafts Foreign Direct Investment forward operating base Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Howaldtswerke-­Deutsche Werft Information Fusion Centre Indian Ocean Naval Symposium Indian Ocean Region Indian Ocean Rim Association

xx   Abbreviations IOR–ARC IOZP ISM ISPS ISR IUU JMSDF JSDF LAC LPD LSA MARCOS MoU MSEWG OVL PLAN PoK ReCAAP SADC SCS SLOC SSBN SSN UAV UNSC VTOL WPNS

Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation Indian Ocean Zone of Peace Inter-­Sessional Meeting International Ship and Port Facility Security intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance illegal, unregulated and unreported Japan Maritime Self-­Defence Forces Japan Self-­Defence Force Line of Actual Control Landing Platform Docks Logistics Support Agreement Marine Commando Force Memorandum of Understanding Maritime Security Expert Working Group ONGC Videsh Ltd People’s Liberation Army Navy Pakistan-­occupied Kashmir Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia Southern African Development Community South China Sea Sea Lanes of Communication nuclear strategic missile submarine nuclear-­powered attack submarine Unmanned Aerial Vehicles United Nations Security Council vertical takeoff and landing Western Pacific Naval Symposium

1 Introduction Anit Mukherjee and C. Raja Mohan

India and its Navy had long been marginal to the security politics of post-­ colonial Asia. This was in contrast to the central role that the armed forces and the economic resources of the undivided Subcontinent played in shaping the outcomes of the Second World War. For a century and a half before the Second World War, the Indian Army was the main instrument of the British Raj in promoting regional stability and providing security to the smaller states all across the region now widely referred to as the Indo-­ Pacific. If the Partition of the Subcontinent broke the ‘India Centre’1 of the security order in the region, Delhi consciously opted out of the Cold War politics by declaring a policy of non-­alignment and promoting solidarity among the post-­colonial states in Asia and Africa. Although Nehru sought to develop military cooperation with key regional partners like Indonesia and Egypt in the 1950s, it was too weak and limited to make an effect on the larger balance of power in the region. India’s preoccupation with defending the new borders created by the Partition as well as China’s control over Tibet exhausted India’s military energies and there was little room for Delhi to imagine a larger security role in Asia beyond the Subcontinent. India’s focus on the land borders also meant the Navy had little salience in independent India’s security strategy. For a brief moment though in the late 1980s, when Rajiv Gandhi launched India’s military modernisation, sought to expand the Navy and intervened in Sri Lanka and Maldives, there was some concern in East Asia at Delhi’s regional assertiveness. Many of these concerns were rooted less in fears about India’s own capabilities and more in the implications of its partnership with the Soviet Union against whose policies much of Asia was united against in the 1980s. The collapse of the Soviet Union, India’s Look East Policy and the Indian Navy’s tentative outreach to South East Asia quickly removed the perception of India as a regional naval threat. Seven decades after the Second World War drew to a close and a quarter century after Delhi launched its Look East Policy, India and its Navy are very much at the centre of the regional debates on Asian security. The steady expansion of the Indian growth rates in the reform era that began in the early 1990s saw India emerge as the tenth largest economy in

2   A. Mukherjee and C. Raja Mohan the world and the third largest in Asia (in nominal terms) by the early 2010s. The increase in India’s economic weight has been followed by the growth in India’s defence budgets and a modernisation of its military capabilities. By 2013 India had the eighth largest defence budget in the world. Since the early 1990s, India has been fully integrated into most of the East Asian regional institutions. Its bilateral relations with the major powers – the United States, China, Japan – and the key regional actors including Korea, Australia, Vietnam and Indonesia have acquired much depth in the last two decades. India’s improved standing in Asia comes at a moment when the region entered a period of turbulence. The relative harmony among the major powers since the early 1990s has broken down. The concord between China on the one hand and the United States and its Asian allies on the other established in the 1970s now seems a distant memory, as Beijing’s assertiveness threatens to undermine the regional order. The absolute gains in India’s regional standing and the changed regional dynamic has resulted in Delhi being widely seen as the ‘swing state’ that could make significant contributions to a new balance of power in the region. This in turn has significantly increased the interest of a number of actors in deepening security cooperation with India. If the Bush Administration saw India as a potential balancer in the region, the Obama Administration described India as the ‘linchpin’ of their pivot strategy towards the Asia-­ Pacific.2 As Washington warmed up to Delhi so have Japan and Australia, both of whom are seeking much stronger defence partnerships with India. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has declared a strategic partnership with India and key members of the forum are eager to see India play a larger security role in the region. Although China is deeply concerned about India’s potential alignment with the United States, it is hoping to prevent such an outcome by a more intensive engagement with Delhi. Much like Deng Xiaoping’s China in the early 1980s, India finds itself in a strategic sweet spot in the 2010s. Unlike in the past when it was the Indian Army that represented Delhi’s weight in the regional balance, it is India’s Navy that is at the centre of the regional and international attention. Given the primacy of the Royal Navy in the Indo-­Pacific, the Indian Navy under the Raj was a coastal force that undertook constabulary functions in the immediate environs of the Subcontinent. Independent India quite early on decided to build a strong and balanced Navy. But Delhi neither had the resources nor the need to build such a force amidst the preoccupation with continental threats. This situation began to change as Delhi’s economic reforms of the early 1990s generated a maritime imperative and increased the salience of the Navy for a globalising India. As the size, capabilities and reach of the Indian Navy grew since the early 1990s, there has been a growing international interest – both academic and policy – in understanding its doctrine and strategy and its impact on regional security.

Introduction   3

India’s new maritime orientation India’s new maritime orientation has its roots in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. The 1992 economic reforms and India’s subsequent opening up to the forces of globalisation led to a dramatic change in its trading pattern. For instance, according to one study, ‘in 1990–1991, India’s total external trade (import and export) accounted for a mere 6 per cent of the GDP [and] by 2010–2011, it had increased to 52 per cent’.3 Crucially, according to the Indian Shipping Ministry, ‘about 90% by volume and 70% by value of the country’s international trade is carried on through maritime transport’.4 India’s economic growth therefore is increasingly tied to its maritime domain. It was not at all surprising then that the Indian Navy, while releasing its military strategy in 2007, titled it Freedom to Use the Seas.5 This indicated the importance that the Navy attaches to the idea of freedom to trade, navigate and sail the seas. Interestingly the Navy’s strategy document not only focuses on the military dimensions of sea power but takes a much broader view of India’s maritime interests and strategy. Hence it discusses issues like maritime trade, energy security and protection of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Besides such explicit articulation there are other indicators of a renewed interest in India towards maritime issues. In 2008, the Indian Navy commenced anti-­piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden ‘to protect Indian ships and Indian citizens employed in sea-­faring duties’.6 These operations have witnessed the deployment of Indian naval ships near the African coast and some pretty robust responses in dealing with the pirates. So far it has prevented over 40 attacks on Indian and foreign merchant ships and has safely escorted over 2671 merchant ships of varying nationalities, including 311 Indian flagged vessels.7 In November 2008, as a result of the terror attacks in Mumbai, India has also renewed its attention on coastal defence. With a coastline extending up to 7500 kilometres this is a formidable challenge, but the government has taken a number of steps to strengthen coastal security.8 The new maritime orientation was not only security-­ focused and in 2011 the Ministry of Shipping unveiled a document envisioning a maritime agenda up to 2020.9 This document admitted shortcomings in India’s overall maritime infrastructure and described a plan to support ship building, port handling and increase maritime trade and commerce.10 Finally, in 2014, a change of government and the coming to power of Prime Minister Narendra Modi reinvigorated India’s foreign and defence policies. Among the first decisions taken by the government was to rename India’s ‘Look East Policy’ as ‘Act East Policy’, thereby signalling the desire to engage more forcefully with the Asia-­Pacific region. This engagement is across all sectors and includes physical connectivity, economic ties and in foreign and defence policies.

4   A. Mukherjee and C. Raja Mohan

Structure of the volume This volume has two parts. The first part – Chapters 2–6 – is focused on India’s naval strategy. The second part – Chapters 7–11 – describes how three of the most significant external powers in the Indo-­Pacific – the United States, China and Japan, are engaging in the naval domain with India.11 It also analyses India’s naval cooperation with the ASEAN and its participation in the regional maritime institutions. The concluding chapter explains why we think this is India’s ‘naval moment’ and the challenges and opportunities faced by the Indian Navy. Chapter 2, by Rajeswari Rajagopalan, describes the drivers of India’s maritime and naval strategy. It begins by describing the historical forces shaping India’s naval strategy and argues that the absence of an immediate naval threat led to all round neglect. Parsing the historical trends in India’s naval modernisation and budgets, Rajagopalan notes the contemporary turn towards a ‘greater appreciation of the changing naval threat scenario’. She analyses the key drivers of India’s naval strategy, including the threat perceptions, expanding maritime interests, imperatives for naval modernisation and enhanced budget allocations. In the next section she describes the broad elements comprising this strategy including defeating Pakistan, deterring China and respond to emerging threats. She underlines the ‘problems in matching India’s capabilities with its ambitions’. In Chapter 3, Iskander Rehman examines some of the major operational challenges that the Indian Navy will have to face in the next decade and more. He begins by describing this transformation of maritime warfare in an era of nuclear and precision strike weapons. Using the scenario method, he looks at likely future warfare between India and a nuclearised Pakistan and the contours of a Sino-­Indian naval conflict. On the former Rehman argues that, with Chinese help, Pakistan has sought ‘to create an A2/AD [Anti Access-­Area Denial] “bubble” over the Northern Arabian Sea’. In addition he argues that Pakistan is bolstering its submarine capability and ‘is rapidly moving towards the nuclearisation of its Navy’. Regarding Sino-­Indian naval dynamics, the author observes that rivalry is in its ‘preliminary stages’, but suggests that the Indian Navy should be prepared to counter ‘the potentially unconventional nature of future Chinese naval power projection in the Indian Ocean Region’. In a rigorous scrutiny of the Indian Navy’s planning and force design to counter these threats, Rehman argues that it should reevaluate its current emphasis on short-legged carrier-centric forces and focus instead on submarine warfare and on building the capability for a ‘penetrating force’ and long-range maritime interdiction. Chapter 4 provides an in-­depth examination of the Indian Navy’s power projection capability. The author, Abhijit Singh, assesses the debates within the Indian Navy on this issue and his central argument is that the Navy’s ‘inability to develop the substantive capacities for sustained

Introduction   5 operations in the “far-­seas” is due both to a lack of capacity and the political will to project hard-­power in the extended neighbourhood’. The author begins by conceptually discussing the idea of ‘far-­seas’ operations and then describes the evolution, debates and imperatives underlying the ‘forward operations’ mindset in the Indian Navy. He argues that the institutional change within the Navy on this issue began in 2005 under the leadership of Admiral Arun Prakash. This process has been helped by the lessons learnt by the Navy as a result of overseas operations including anti-­piracy missions and for the Indian Ocean Tsunami relief. The chapter dwells upon issues pertaining to forward operating bases and mutual logistical support agreements. Regarding the former, the author argues that while some forward bases are being built up in India’s own territories, however, establishing bases abroad ‘need a leap of imagination and faith – a transition India is yet to make both politically and operationally’. Similarly, after explaining the desirability of logistical support agreements, the author explains how this issue too is considered politically sensitive. The penultimate section of this chapter criticises the contemporary conceptual thinking within the Indian Navy and argues that ‘an excessive focus on benign and constabulary missions in the Indian Ocean Region, and tardiness in the procurement of critical assets for littoral operations and land-­attack, has prevented the Navy from playing a strategic role in the Indo-­Pacific’. Abhijit Singh recommends that in order to develop a far seas capability the Indian Navy needs to re-­ orient its mindset and acquire appropriate platforms. Chapter 5, by Anit Mukherjee, analyses the functioning of India’s first joint command in the Andaman and Nicobar islands. These islands have been attracting a lot of attention as a possible fulcrum of the Indo-­Pacific as it provides a strategic ‘bridge between the Indian and Pacific oceans’.12 The author describes the growing strategic significance of this island chain and how it affords India the capability to dominate the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) in the Indian Ocean. Next, the chapter describes the competing visions surrounding the economic and strategic development of these islands. On the one hand there are those who advocate massive construction and building of a transhipment port to fully exploit the natural resources and location of these islands. However, their vision is being opposed by environmentalists, conservationists and those who want to maintain the ecological balance. The author reviews the debate surrounding the creation of the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) – the first joint command in the Indian military. While describing the rationale for more joint commands he explains how the visions of the architects of this command were undone by inter-­services rivalry and bureaucratic politics. He examines the military deployment, tasks, organisation chart, force levels, functioning of the ANC and development of bases on the islands. The penultimate section provides an overall appraisal of the Command including its implications for civil-­military relations, higher defence management and the future of tri-­services commands. The author

6   A. Mukherjee and C. Raja Mohan concludes that the ANC has not yet changed the geopolitics of the region. Instead, it is ‘more of a coastal protection force than one which can project power’. Mukherjee’s chapter reiterates India’s need to focus on internal capability building and streamline defence management processes in order to play a larger role in the Asia-­Pacific. Chapter 6, written by C. Raja Mohan, examines the history of India’s naval diplomacy and lists the factors that have limited its effectiveness. The chapter begins by describing India’s post-­independence turn towards non-­ alignment and military isolation leading to reluctance ‘to offer significant military cooperation to friendly countries outside the Subcontinent’. There were however two exceptions to this – India was, and continues to remain, an active participant in UN peacekeeping missions and Indian extended considerable military support to countries within the subcontinent. In reviewing India’s renewed military engagement after the end of the Cold War, Raja Mohan points out that India has embraced both bilateral and multilateral forums. At the same time, he argues, some in Delhi are ‘constrained by the belief that such activity might violate India’s traditional commitments to state sovereignty and non-­alignment’, leading to inconsistencies. The rest of the chapter explores the tension arising from competing ideas among India’s strategic and naval analysts. It describes, in some detail, the ‘difficulties the Indian Navy has had in finding an appropriate balance between the ideas of power projection, interoperability and contribution to collective security on the one hand and imperatives of territorial defence and strategic autonomy on the other’. He concludes on an optimistic note however noting that Prime Minister Narendra Modi may be more willing than his predecessors to complete ‘the long-­overdue policy transitions in India’s maritime strategy’. Part II of this book focuses on the external dimensions of India’s naval strategy. Chapter 7 written by Timothy D. Hoyt analyses India’s role in the United States naval strategy and explores opportunities for enhanced naval cooperation. Hoyt begins his chapter by describing the growing military to military ties between the United States and India and explains the rationale behind this. Despite making ‘great strides in building trust and opening new opportunities’ for defence cooperation, Hoyt notes, there are still many constraints on the relationship. After assessing these constraints, ranging from differing interests to institutional limitations, the author describes three possible futures for this relationship, and ‘the drivers that might accelerate change in a given direction’. The first is the status quo arrangement with continued and gradual improvement in ties, the second possibility is greater cooperation especially in South East Asia and the third is much higher level of engagement driven by fears of an aggressive China. Hoyt’s chapter reveals that despite obstacles the trend in US–India relations is largely positive and expected to strengthen over time. Chapter 8, written by Koh Swee Lean Collin, describes naval cooperation and competition between India and China. After describing

Introduction   7 the security dilemma that characterises Sino-­Indian relations, the author argues both countries ‘recognise their mutual economic interdependence’ and are working on confidence building measures. Next, Koh argues that that India and China have to ‘accept and cope with’ the reality of a ‘new normal’ wherein they will have a growing naval presence in the Western-­ Pacific and Indian Ocean Region respectively. This ‘new normal’ arises from increasing capability and a geopolitical interest to obtain a presence in what was previously considered each other’s backyard. These interests include growing economic ties, energy flows and diplomatic engagement. As a result, the author argues, the Sino-­Indian security dilemma which has traditionally existed on land is currently extending into the maritime dimension. He concludes that both countries should downplay their security dilemma at sea and despite many difficulties try to ‘find common grounds for cooperation’, especially in the naval arena. Chapter 9 is written by Tomoko Kiyota and examines Japan’s engagement with India and focuses on maritime security. At the outset of this chapter, Kiyota makes two important arguments. First, an aspect overlooked by much of the contemporary literature, changes in Japan’s policy towards India ‘is an extension of the reform of Japanese national security policy’. In other words, Japan’s defence reforms and increasing ‘activism’ on the part of Japan Self-­Defence Force (JSDF ) is partly responsible for enhanced ties with India. Second, the author points out that the ‘differing perceptions of the term “alliance” could be a potential obstacle for mutual trust and understanding’. Describing the drivers of India–Japan relations, Kiyota argues that the transformation in US–India bilateral relations played an important role in changing Tokyo’s perceptions of Delhi. In addition, the author argues that Japan’s interest in India has been boosted by the rise of ‘military realists’ – those most concerned about the rising military threat from China – in Japanese politics. They then, under the rubric of defence reforms, pushed for increased security cooperation with India. The next section describes the naval interaction between Japan and India including exercises and possibility of defence trade. Chapter 10 analyses naval cooperation between India and all the South East Asian countries. Its author, Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, parses the naval element in India’s Look East Policy, renamed Act East Policy in 2014. Supriyanto categorises naval cooperation as consisting of three types – probing, developmental and advanced. In turn, each of these types can be discerned by examining the scope of activities undertaken – information sharing; joint patrols, training and exercises; as well as arms transfers and defence/naval technological cooperation. Probing indicates low level cooperation, the developmental stage shows more enhanced ties and the most developed form of cooperation is at the advanced level. Using these metrics allows us to discern the strength of naval cooperation across different countries. The author briefly describes naval cooperation between India and ten ASEAN countries and concludes that the Indian Navy is at an advanced level of

8   A. Mukherjee and C. Raja Mohan cooperation only with Singapore. It is at the developmental stage with ­Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam and is at a probing stage with Brunei, Cambodia, Myanmar, Philippines and Timor Leste. In an important discussion, the author discusses the perspectives of South East Asian countries towards India’s role in the ongoing territorial disputes in the South China Sea. He argues that India, unlike China, is viewed as a benign power and most countries view it as a ‘potential strategic counterweight against China’s behaviour in the South China Sea’. There is scope, therefore, according to the author, for India to contribute to stability in the South China Sea. The author concludes that variance in naval cooperation with India suggests different motives on individual South East Asian countries. Chapter 11, written by Sam Bateman, analyses India’s involvement in regional institutions in the Asia-­Pacific. While doing so it assesses India’s overall involvement and its implications for its emerging maritime strategy. Bateman’s chapter begins by describing the efforts to build institutions in the Indian Ocean Region. While arguing that it is ‘less institutionalised compared with the Asia Pacific’, he describes the factors that have prevented this. Next he analyses existing institutions in the Indian Ocean Region including the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and various initiatives in the Bay of Bengal. While describing future prospects, Bateman argues that ‘while institutions under ASEAN may make progress, the prospects of effective institutions in the IOR, or the wider Indo-­Pacific, are less bright’. While focusing in detail on India’s approach to regional institutions, the author argues that this is marked by certain ‘paradoxes’. For instance, India gives increased priority to bilateral relations rather than regional institutions, appears to be opposed to multilateral security cooperation unless it is driving it and prefers to operate under the United Nations. He argues that these paradoxes translate into a seemingly ‘haphazard’ strategy as it is a ‘bit “all over the place” ’. Bateman recommends that it might suit Indian interests to articulate a more comprehensive policy for regional engagement. In the concluding chapter, we offer some reflections on the rare strategic moment at hand for the Indian Navy. We point to the Navy’s potential to acquire, simultaneously, a greater salience in Delhi’s national security calculus and become the principal instrument of India’s new ability to shape the balance of power in Asia and its waters. It notes the significant changes in the strategic orientation under the government of Narendra Modi that came to power in 2014 and its readiness to reimagine India’s great power relations, especially the United States and China. Although Modi is widely seen as departing from the Nehruvian tradition of non-­alignment and strategic autonomy, we argue that his maritime vision corresponds with that of K.M. Panikkar who saw in the middle of the last century a self-­confident India becoming the anchor of security in the vast Indo-­Pacific littoral and taking on the mantle of the British Raj. Panikkar believed that India could do this in partnership with the West

Introduction   9 and fully respecting the legitimate interests of China. After a prolonged detour during the second half of the twentieth century, India appears poised to arrive at the same destination in early twenty-­first century. While pointing to this tantalising dual possibility for the Indian Navy at the national and regional level, the concluding chapter underlines the host of enduring challenges that Delhi will need to address in turning the unprecedented possibilities for India in the naval domain into a reality. In tracing the drift of the Navy from the margins of Delhi’s national security consciousness to a central position, parsing the tension between its maritime possibilities and the continentalist mindset, and in examining the gap between the growing external demands for its security contributions and internal ambivalence, this volume offers rare insights into India’s strategic direction at a critical moment in the nation’s evolution. By examining the internal and external dimensions of the Indian naval future, both of which are in dynamic flux, the volume hopes to make a unique contribution to the understanding of India’s changing international possibilities.

Notes   1 For a discussion of India’s centrality in the Asian security order before the Second World War, see Peter John Brobst, Future of the Great Game: Sir Olaf Caroe, India’s Independence and the Defence of Asia (Akron, OH: University of Akron Press, 2005).   2 See remarks made by former US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, ‘Partners in the 21st Century’, IDSA Key Speeches, 6 June 2012, www.idsa.in/keyspeeches/ LeonEPanettaonPartnersinthe21stcentury.   3 See Military Affairs Center, Net Security Provider: India’s Out of Area Contingency Operations (New Delhi: Magnum Books, 2012), p. 13.   4 See Ministry of Shipping, Maritime Agenda 2010–2020 (New Delhi, 2011, p. 1).   5 See Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy (New Delhi: Indian Navy Integrated Headquarters, 2007).   6 See Indian Navy, ‘Anti-­Piracy Operations’, http://indianNavy.nic.in/operations/ anti-­piracy-operations.   7 See Ministry of Defence, Annual Report 2013–14 (New Delhi: Government of India, 2013), p. 31.   8 See Indian Navy, ‘Coastal Maritime Security Initiatives’, http://indianNavy.nic. in/operations/coastal-­maritime-security-­initiatives and Ministry of Defence, Annual Report 2013–14 (New Delhi: Government of India, 2013), pp.  35–36, 51–53.   9 See Ministry of Shipping, Maritime Agenda 2010–2020 (New Delhi: Government of India, 2011). 10 See Shyam Saran, ‘Enhancing India’s Maritime Security’, The Tribune, 25 February 2014, www.tribuneindia.com/2014/20140225/edit.htm#7. 11 Arguably Australia is also a significant power; however, as its naval cooperation with India is a relatively recent phenomenon it has not been included in this volume. 12 See David Scott, ‘The “Indo-­Pacific” – New Regional Formulations and New Maritime Frameworks for US–India Strategic Convergence’, Asia-­Pacific Review, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2012, p. 92.

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Part I

The making of India’s naval strategy

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2 India’s maritime strategy Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan

Introduction As India’s economic and military power rises, there has been greater attention to what India seeks to do in the maritime realm. India straddles a vital piece of maritime real estate, on top of major Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) that connect not only markets to the world’s factory in China but also the source of energy in the Middle East and the major consumers of energy in East Asia. This brings into focus India’s potential role in securing these SLOCs among other roles. The Indian Navy is the fifth largest in the world and the most powerful in the region, but it faces major problems in maintaining an adequate fleet because of problems of procurement, especially considering that India is still dependent on imports. On the broader maritime front, the inadequate size of its shipbuilding industry, port handling facilities and connectivity as well as the size of its merchant fleet all reveal the shortcomings in India’s maritime strategy. Driven by India’s growing maritime interests, including energy security and global trade, there is a fresh perspective in India’s strategic thinking, one moving away from the predominantly continental approach. As former Foreign Minister and current Indian President Pranab Mukherjee argued, after nearly a millennia of inward and landward focus, we are once again turning our gaze outwards and seawards, which is the natural direction of view for a nation seeking to re-­establish itself, not simply as a continental power, but even more so as a maritime power, and consequentially as one that is of significance on the world stage.1 Most recently, there is also a renewed emphasis on maritime infrastructure, as illustrated in the BJP Manifesto that talked about establishment of a National Maritime Authority.2 Prime Minister Modi’s Sagar Mala project is evidence of this new focus. If this plan takes off, there will be a holistic approach to developing the maritime infrastructure, including ports.

14   R. Pillai Rajagopalan India’s port capacity has suffered until now given the multiple authorities between the central and state governments.3 The infusion of private sector on a BOT (Build, Operate and Transfer) principle is likely to yield better results in strengthening India’s maritime capabilities. Along with the capacity building, the Indian political leadership has to also spell out its maritime strategy in clearer terms. In order to enhance its global reach for trade and energy, protection of the sea routes is an important task, and India has a powerful navy with two aircraft carriers. India’s geographical location additionally gives it the unique advantage of being able to dominate the maritime traffic connecting the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea and the Western Pacific. With increasing Chinese foray into the Indian Ocean, the potential for conflict is real.4 While traditionally India has had an advantage in the Indian Ocean in relation to China, this might no longer hold true as China’s naval capacity increases. While India’s maritime ambitions have grown, there are questions about whether these ambitions match its capabilities. This chapter is a study of India’s maritime strategy. It begins by describing the evolution of Indian maritime strategy. Next, it examines key drivers shaping India’s maritime strategy, followed by an analysis of its key elements. The chapter concludes with an analysis arguing that there is a mismatch between India’s maritime ambitions and capabilities.

Evolution of India’s maritime strategy India was a maritime power until the arrival of the Europeans in the middle of the last millennium. But with the advent of Central Asian invasions after the thirteenth century, India began to have a more ‘continental outlook’5 and accordingly its naval power began to decline, which was also reflected in the dwindling Indian share in global trade.6 As Panikkar points out, the ‘unfortunate tendency to overlook the sea’ and assuming that ‘the security of India is a matter exclusively of the North-­West Frontier and of a strong enough army to resist any aggression across the Hindu Kush’ has been a serious issue.7 Indian naval strategists continue to argue that ‘It was our inability to contest the European control of the Indian Ocean in the 18th century that led to nearly two centuries of foreign domination.’8 Neither the British rulers nor the newly independent Indian political leadership paid much attention to this domain, which was reflected in the financial allocations, procurement of technology and capabilities, and the lack of operational readiness of the Indian Navy. David Scott points out however that there were Indian strategists like K.M. Panikkar and Keshav Vaidya as well as Sardar Patel, India’s Deputy Prime Minister, who gave great importance to naval power even though this will not ultimately be translated into a strong navy in the Nehru period.9 Daniel Spence suggests racial reasons for British advisers discouraging India from developing a

India’s maritime strategy   15 more effective navy in the 1950s.10 Also the considerable demobilisation after the Second World War left only a small number of ships and trained personnel in the Royal Indian Navy. This force was further sized to two-­ thirds after the India–Pakistan partition. Furthermore, the huge shortage of funds in the early years after India’s independence for naval modernisation was a big factor in limiting India’s choices.11 For the first decade after independence, India’s primary strategic focus was towards the north-­east and the north-­west. For different reasons, the threat from both Pakistan and China was primarily a land and air threat, rather than a naval one. Pakistan had a relatively meagre naval capability but not an inconsequential land and air capability. China on the other hand had no naval capability that could reach into the Indian Ocean or the Bay of Bengal. Ashley Tellis has argued that the new Indian leadership’s approach was that of a ‘Fortress Indica’ to insulate itself from any ‘external interference’.12 Thus, given the lack of significant naval security threats, India’s naval strategy was determined more by budgetary and bureaucratic considerations than security ones. Nevertheless, the Indian Navy’s share of the defence budget did go up from 4 per cent in 1950–1951 to 12 per cent in 1959–1960, allowing it to build up a ‘modest force’.13 In the aftermath of the 1962 war, a comprehensive government review of defence requirements ascertained that China was the ‘primary threat’.14 Accordingly, the government decided to increase the strength of the army and the air force. Given that India was already resource-­stretched, the new decision meant that the Indian Navy’s proposal for a force level of 130 ships did not receive much support and a phased plan was adopted to replace the ageing ships.15 In the absence of a justifiable naval threat from China and Pakistan, it was difficult to make an effective naval demand for further acquisitions. As Admiral Hiranandani notes, there was consensus among all the international interlocutors (United States, United Kingdom and the USSR) that India did not face any significant naval threats.16 But this neglect meant that the navy was unprepared for the 1965 India–Pakistan War in which it therefore played a very minimal role. Subsequent to the war, responding to the navy’s unhappiness, the government did approve new acquisitions, which also led the navy to turn towards the Soviet Union because the United States and the United Kingdom were unwilling to meet these needs. This led to some new acquisitions, mainly missile boats and India’s first submarines. During this period, India also began to develop a domestic warship building capability with British assistance, leading to the Nilgiri class frigates. All these led to a more capable Indian Navy playing an active and offensive role in the 1971 India–­ Pakistan War. This also clearly established that India was ‘the clear maritime power among the South Asian countries’.17 India’s naval orientation began to undergo a change in the 1970s with its expanding oil requirements as well as the oil shock of 1973. Nevertheless,

16   R. Pillai Rajagopalan the Navy continued to receive the smallest share of the defence pie. Despite long coastlines that needed to be protected and the growing Indian interests in sea-­borne trade – not least India’s dependence on imported oil – the political leadership could not be impressed upon to give the Navy a bigger share of attention and resources. The absence of ‘determined seaward threats to Indian independence’ as also ‘the early expectation that the British and the Americans would continue to protect the Indian Ocean’ made it difficult to convince the civilian leadership of the urgent need for major naval modernisation.18 Thus, naval modernisation continued to be left at the mercy of financial availability, and the Indian Navy continued being the most neglected of the three services in India.19 Additionally, as Tellis argues, ‘the British legacy allowed both the Indian and Pakistani establishments intimacy with land warfare to the detriment of naval operations’, thus contributing to the neglect of the navy as India debated defence of the country.20 Through the 1970s, India continued to acquire the Soviet naval equipment in line with the slow shift in Indian military acquisitions to the Soviet Union. But despite a growing fleet of submarines, India’s naval thinking appeared rooted in the sea control mode. The Navy as well as the Indian political leadership did suffer a significant jolt when the US Task Force 74 entered the Bay of Bengal during the 1971 India–Pakistan War. Though the overall purpose of the Task Force 74 has remained clouded and it is unlikely that it would have participated in the operations, its very presence brought to the fore the importance of naval power. Task Force 74 had a huge impact on Indian strategic thinking, including possibly in India’s decision to conduct the nuclear tests in 1974.21 As George Perkovich notes, Indian strategists continue to cite the deployment of Task Force 74 as an example of why India needs nuclear weapons.22 But as far as naval strategy is concerned, the impact was rather short lived. Though some scholars have suggested that India moved from a sea control to sea denial strategy briefly in the 1970s, it did not appear to have had much reflection in terms of India’s naval acquisitions.23 India continued to emphasise surface combatants, more suited to a sea control strategy than sub-­surface capabilities that would indicate a sea denial focus. During this period, India also began to move towards the larger definition of maritime interests especially in terms of protection of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). With constitutional recognition of the EEZ being made in May 1976, the Indian Coast Guard was set up for protection and management of the EEZ in 1977.24 By the 1980s, India was actively looking for a second aircraft carrier and land-­based air-­borne long-­range anti-­submarine capabilities. With increasing extra-­regional naval presence close to Indian shores and the Cold War superpower rivalry at its doorstep, there also began a new ‘operational orientation’ in the Indian Navy. This involved moving away from a pure coastal defence to ‘altering the naval balance’25 in the Indian Ocean

India’s maritime strategy   17 Region, which involved ‘both complete peninsular sea control and preservation of extra-­peninsular zones of influence’.26 India’s naval budget did go up from about 8 per cent in the early 1980s to more than 13 per cent by the late 1980s.27 India also acquired a second aircraft carrier by 1986 and leased a Soviet nuclear submarine by the late 1980s. India’s naval budget expanded substantially in the 1990s; however, the naval expenditure as percentage of the defence budget increased only marginally from 12.73 per cent in 1990–1991 to 14.51 per cent in 1998–1999.28 Though the capital expenditure was the largest chunk of the navy budget, the size of the Indian fleet declined dramatically in the 1990s from 44 warships in 1990 to 36 by 1998.29 Despite that, during crises, the Indian Navy had also become more assertive, both during the Kargil war in 1999 and Operation Parakram in 2001–2002. The Indian Navy undertook aggressive manoeuvres in the Arabian Sea, which ‘resulted in Pak­ istan’s fleet being shackled to its immediate coastline’.30 In more recent times, India’s naval strategy has begun to shift with a greater emphasis on international cooperation and broader maritime security. India actively participated in both disaster relief missions as well as SLOC protection duties in cooperation with other navies, both within the region and outside.31 Naval strategies increasingly began to talk about naval diplomacy as an important aspect of the navies’ strategic tasks.32 On the other hand, over the last decade, the Indian Navy has been also increasingly concerned about the expansion of the Chinese Navy and its impact on India’s naval security. In essence, therefore, the Indian Navy today is grappling with a cooperative approach towards maritime security as well as worrying potentially about a long-­term threat from China. Both of these represent new concerns and tasks, which are in some ways contradictory since the diplomatic and cooperative aspects of strategy suggest closer relationships with potential adversaries such as China. It is unclear how the Indian Navy’s strategic thinking will deal with these competitive imperatives.

Naval modernisation over the years After being neglected for about three decades since Indian independence, Indian Navy began to assume certain importance in the early 1980s. The step-­sisterly approach towards the Indian Navy underwent some change in the mid-­1980s with the Navy going for major procurement. After the initial procurement of the Foxtrot class submarines from the Soviet Union in the late 1960s, the need for refurbishment or fresh procurement was quite strong by the early 1980s.33 This led to the contract with the German Howaldtswerke-­Deutsche Werft (HDW) for four conventional submarines (Shishukumar series) with two being bought off the shelf and two being built at Mazagon Docks Ltd in Mumbai. In an exercise of capability building on the Indian side, and as per the agreement with HDW, Indian Navy

18   R. Pillai Rajagopalan personnel were trained at Kiel in Germany for indigenous construction of submarines. This was seen as a good deal for India given that technology was comparable to the best available globally and also it enabled transfer of technology. However, the deal soon ran into problems with allegations of bribery and the net result was blacklisting of HDW, thus adversely impacting on India’s indigenous development plans. India then moved on to the Soviet Union for the procurement of eight Kilo class submarines (Sindhughosh class), which were inducted into service between 1986 and 1991. Meanwhile, the indigenously constructed INS Shankul (of the Shishukumar class) also entered into service in 1994, making India’s submarine arm quite strong. With 20 submarines in its fleet, it was quite an accomplishment for the Indian Navy, although many of the first Foxtrot series were nearing their end of life. This feat was also evident in its training and maintenance establishments thus affecting positively the morale of the force in general. Another major highlight during the 1980s was the leasing of the nuclear submarine from the Soviet Union. A Charlie I (NATO designation) class SSN was commissioned into the Indian Navy as INS Chakra in 1988 for a period of three years until 1991. The experience gained in the operating of the SSN gave the Indian Navy a first-­hand experience in manoeuvring a nuclear submarine, which came in handy while constructing India’s own Arihant-­class nuclear submarine. The modernisation of the 1980s is however seen as more of an exception rather than a well-­thought-out strategy that drove such expansion. The 20-year development programme revealed in 1978 was an ambitious one to develop the Indian Navy into blue water navy.34 The plan offered to strengthen the naval capabilities; however, in the absence of an overall strategy, Tellis argued, the ‘resulting force structure may do more to add to than resolve India’s security dilemmas’.35 This modernisation effort could also have been a consequence of the 1965 War when Pakistan conducted a naval raid on the Indian seaport of Dwarka, embarrassing the Indian Navy. This resulted in a shift in strategy from deterrence by denial (which seeks to deter by convincing the adversary they would lose any test of arms) to deterrence by both denial and punishment (the latter seeks to deter by threatening disproportionate retaliation for any transgression).36 Two further developments followed the shift in India’s deterrent doctrine: indigenisation of capabilities resulting in increased activity at the Mazagon Dock Ltd in Mumbai and Garden Reach Workshop in Kolkata, two public sector units under the Ministry of Defence; and shift in the foreign military procurement policy, moving away from British Navy to Soviet Navy.37 These changes brought about better financial allocations for the shipyards leading to the development of frigates in the 1970s.38 The shift in the foreign procurement policy brought about a massive change in the Indian Navy’s inventory, which by the 1970s became a Soviet-­ dominated one. The new thinking also translated into reconsideration of

India’s maritime strategy   19 the financial allocations: the Navy’s share of the defence expenditure grew from a mere 4.9 per cent in 1968 to almost 8.8 per cent by 1979–1980.39 The Navy being a capital-­intensive force as compared to the Army and Air Force also began to get a better proportion of the financial resources for capital expenditure, moving from 7 per cent in 1963–1964 to almost 49 per cent in 1973–1974.40 After a cycle of procurement and modernisation, the 1990s was a dead decade as far as naval acquisitions are concerned. Some of the procurements completed in the early 1990s were from the agreements concluded in the 1980s but there was no additional procurement undertaken in the 1990s, which reflected the general economic malaise that the country was going through. This was also a phase when India had to make important strategic choices as the USSR, one of India’s crucial defence partners, was replaced with a far weaker Russia.41 The Indian government’s approach to naval power is undergoing a change because of greater appreciation of the changing naval threat scenario. The emerging security threats are important drivers for change in the Indian Navy’s orientation to undertake multiple and diverse roles in its immediate and extended neighbourhood, including naval diplomacy in  the form of training and exchanges, constabulary activities including ensuring free navigation and open seas, soft power projection through humanitarian and disaster management missions. Such activities are undertaken in order to achieve its primary maritime objective to ‘ensure national security and provide insulation from external interference so that the vital tasks of fostering economic growth and undertaking developmental activities can take place in a secure environment’.42 Also a better performing economy (in relative terms, as compared to the Hindu growth rate of 3 per cent in the 1980s), trade and energy compulsions and a navy with better capability mix is bringing back a certain focus to the maritime domain.

Key drivers of India’s maritime strategy We can identify a few key factors that are driving India’s maritime strategy. These include the absence of a significant regional naval threat, the obsolescence–rearmament cycle of naval equipment, a larger budget allocation because of greater economic capacity, and the development of India’s nuclear deterrent. Building a maritime infrastructure A key driver of India’s maritime strategy is the need to build an adequate infrastructure to meet the needs of a fast growing economy that is becoming increasingly economically integrated. India’s international trade is growing and a significant part of this is carried by sea but Indian ships

20   R. Pillai Rajagopalan undertake only around 10 per cent of this trade.43 It is estimated that the Indian shipbuilding by deadweight tonnage (DWT) is only one per cent of the world shipping as against 35 per cent of China.44 However, with a global pick-­up in the shipbuilding industry, there has been a corresponding growth in India as well.45 Some estimates suggest that by 2020 Indian share of global shipbuilding could be as much as 20 per cent.46 Recognising an opportunity, the government announced subsidy plans for both public and private units with an aim of removing some of the investment obstacles. With the government taking a proactive role, the Indian shipbuilding industry has also been able to tap into the global market. India also enjoys certain advantages such as cheap labour costs and domestic supporting industry for components that matches with its maritime interests dictated by the long coastline of more than 7500 km. Despite this growth momentum, several global factors continue to hamper the growth potential. These include: disconnect in global demand and supply; uncertain global economic recovery; issues related to oil and gas market; climate change-­induced dynamics and environmental sustainability, among others.47 Despite the efforts to enhance India’s maritime profile, India’s current port handling facilities, including berthing, cargo and storage facilities, are lacking. Even with such a long coastline India has only 12 major ports and 200 non-­major ports. Of the 200 non-­major ports, a sizeable number of them are under-­developed, with the result that there are only a few that offer ‘all-­weather berthing facilities’. It was reported that in 2012–2013, there were only 61 non-­major ports that could handle cargo traffic.48 However, given the growing volume of traffic that even the non-­major ports have to handle, the maritime states are paying greater attention to beefing up the capacities, including through the participation of the private sector. All of this has meant that India’s trade with the external world has remained at a miniscule share of only 1 per cent of the DWT worldwide.49 The current situation of limited capacity against high demand has also caused port congestion, resulting in overstretched berths leading to pre-­berthing delays and longer ship turnaround time.50 This scenario would change significantly if India manages to enhance its capacities.51 At present, India is faced with inadequate port handling facilities and it also does not have direct shipping lines with major ports around the world. This has led to India undertaking its trade mostly through transhipment. It is estimated that of its total global trade, 4 per cent is routed through Dubai, 35 per cent through Colombo, 29 per cent through Singapore and 15 per cent through Malaysia.52 This has increased the freight cost by several times. If India’s economic growth has to be enhanced, it has to re-­visit some of these issues on a priority basis. The Maritime Agenda 2010–2020, released in January 2011, has outlined a few key goals. They include the development of a port capacity of around 3200 MT (million tonnes), capable of

India’s maritime strategy   21 handling an estimate traffic of 2500 MT by 2020 as compared to the capacity of slightly over 900 MT in 2010 (including major and non-­major ports),53 an expansion of India’s share of global shipbuilding to 5 per cent from the current 1 per cent, and boosting India’s share of seafarers in the global shipping industry from the current levels of 6–7 per cent to 9 per cent by 2015.54 It has been reported that the government is incentivising private sector participation by allowing for 100 per cent FDI in projects related to construction and maintenance of ports and harbours.55 Similar measures are being taken up in the shipbuilding sector as well. L&T, Adani, ABG are some of the major companies who have showed interest in this domain. Non-­traditional maritime threats Non-­traditional security threats are becoming important challenges in India’s neighbourhood, particularly as it relates to the Indian Ocean. These include piracy, maritime terrorism, organised crime at sea, drug and human trafficking, smuggling of arms and climate change, rising threats to fish stocks.56 The more serious of these relate to maritime non-­ state violence, especially terrorist groups that have operated at various times through sea. This includes the LTTE, Al Qaeda and the LeT. There is also a nexus between terrorism and piracy.57 These challenges will necessitate India to have a strategy that is ‘more oriented toward littoral operations, or a green-­brown water navy’.58 Other non-­traditional threats include climate change-­induced forced migration (from Bangladesh and Maldives), which could become a major concern for India.59 There are similar challenges of food shortage, polluted seawater in the East African region, which again triggers migration, mostly illegal in nature. Depletion of fish stock, poor and unregulated fishing in the Indian Ocean are also important challenges. Regional threats India has not faced any significant regional naval threat and it is unlikely to do so in the future because of India’s preponderance in South Asia. So far, the Pakistan Navy is the only one that has posed somewhat of a threat though this was also a relatively minor one.60 Because Pakistan’s trade is mostly sea-­borne, they are forced to maintain a merchant fleet, which is faced with huge vulnerabilities in the India–Pakistan context. A repeat of 1971 and a blockade of the Karachi Port, which is their mainstay, remains a serious concern for Pakistan. Pakistani naval analysts have talked about upgrading Jinnah Naval Base at Ormara in Baluchistan and developing coastal radar stations such as PNS Ahsan there; however, the fact that they have not been able to develop these ports and bases says a lot about the inherent weakness of the Pakistan Navy.

22   R. Pillai Rajagopalan However, Pakistan is gaining strength in one vital area – submarines. Pakistan currently has eight submarines, which includes five Agosta Class ones and three miniature ones.61 Pakistan sees submarines as vital mostly for its sea denial capacity and they are used extensively for a range of operations including surveillance, precision strikes, battle group operations and the control of Pakistan’s border seas. The Pakistan Navy remains the only navy in the Indian Ocean Region to have submarines with Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) systems. Pakistan has three AIP-­powered Agosta 90B submarines, of which two were assembled at Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works (KSEW).62 India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is developing AIP and also the new Scorpene submarines that are being procured from France will have AIP capability, a first for the Indian Navy. More recently, the Pakistani political leadership has also made efforts to revitalise its naval capabilities and strategies. In a recent interview, one of the Pakistani analysts said, ‘as a Muslim-­majority country with a fully serviceable Navy [surface vessels, submarines and a naval air arm], the Pakistan Navy hopes to become “the guardian navy of the Gulf regions” ’.63 It is also reported that Nawaz Sharif is focused on prioritising ‘ “critical projects”, including building and procuring new submarines and frigates, and constructing new naval bases at Turbat and Gwadar’.64 These promises have not convinced the analysts that Pakistan will make much progress given the cash-­strapped economy that it is today. China is the other major regional threat to India.65 China has traditionally remained a land power and its emphasis has been on enhancing its capabilities in that regard. However, China is making quick progress with a focused attention on air and naval power. Also the rising economic profile of China is making it operate well beyond the region. Economic compulsions often determine a nation’s military strategy, as illustrated in the Chinese Navy. Chinese naval expansion and its modernisation are to some extent determined by its enormous need for energy resources.66 With China’s huge dependence on oil imports, concepts such as protection of SLOCs have emerged in the last decade or so due to the aggravating shortage of energy resources as well as the vulnerability of transporting such resources. Beijing has serious fears that this could become a reality at the time of a crisis, as China still lacks the naval power necessary for the protection of SLOCs. Overall, though, China not being a South Asian naval power reduces the pressure on New Delhi and leaves India’s regional naval dominance untouched. Navy budget and financial aspects One of the most important drivers shaping India’s naval strategy has been the financial outlays available with the Indian Navy. Of all the three services, the Navy has had the smallest share of the defence budget. Despite

India’s maritime strategy   23 this the increase in the overall defence budget is driving much of the naval modernisation today. There is little to suggest that a significant part of the Indian Navy’s expansion is threat-­specific. The strategy document put out by the Indian Navy, for instance, outlines in broad terms the roles and missions that it envisages for itself to the extent where it fails in capturing specific threats and challenges. Consequentially, this leads to a lack of coherence in terms of financial outlays. This can be further substantiated by examining the budget allocation for the Indian Navy. For instance, there has been a sharp decline in percentage share of the Navy budget from 17.67 per cent in 2008–2009 to 13.82 per cent in 2009–2010.67 While this percentage share increased from 2011–2012 to 2012–2013 by approximately 4 per cent, the following years again saw a decline in this percentage share from 18.12 per cent in 2012–2013 to 15.72 per cent in 2014–2015.68 This variation in the percentage share of the Navy budget fails to capture a threat-­ based expansion plan. Despite the fluctuation in the share of India’s naval budget with respect to the total defence budget, the rising GDP levels have meant that the actual investment has gone up. This has allowed the Indian Navy to pursue modernisation of its fleet. The Navy, being capital intensive, also spends far more of its budget on capital expenditure as compared to the other two services. For example, the general ratio of revenue to capital expenditure is 70 : 30 in the defence services, although the Navy has maintained it at a ratio of 48 : 52.69 This includes a variety of acquisitions over the last decade. Major ones included Anti-­Submarine Warfare (ASW) systems including aircrafts, ships, other advanced systems such as sonars and torpedoes, diesel engines/gas turbines for ships (indigenously developed), aircraft carrier, nuclear submarine (on lease). This increased budget has also helped the Indian Navy to develop an indigenous production capacity to design and produce a range of ships including seaward defence boats, landing craft, landing ships, survey ships, corvettes and frigates. Particularly important achievements are the Godavari class frigates, the Khukri class corvettes, and large 6000-ton destroyers built at Indian shipyards. The other indigenous construction programmes in Indian shipyards include the Shishumar class Hunter-­ Killer Submarines (SSK), landing ships and missile vessels. As for the future, India has an ongoing programme for the construction of frigates, corvettes, submarines and a fleet tanker to meet the force level requirements of the Indian Navy. Today, the Indian Navy’s expanding role is also being welcomed by other major maritime powers such as the United States and Japan – a stark contrast to their perception during the 1980s. This will aid some of the capability acquisition that India plans in the years ahead. Japan’s offer of US-­2 amphibious aircraft is one indication, even though this sale has yet to come to fruition for reasons of bureaucratic politics in both countries.70

24   R. Pillai Rajagopalan Nevertheless, it is also true that India’s naval acquisition plans are as badly affected by bureaucracy and red tape as for the other services. The bureaucratic impediments and case-­by-case approval has meant huge delays in the procurement-­induction cycle. Despite streamlining the procurement to some extent, with the issuing of defence procurement policies, the role of the civilian bureaucracy has been particularly significant. As Cohen and Dasgupta point out, ‘The Ministry of Finance, which has its own defense wing, has the authority to intervene in specific spending decisions of the Ministry of Defence, often with an eye toward limiting costs’.71 For a country that is import-­dependent to the tune of 70 per cent, this is one area that needs to get fixed on a priority basis. Life-­cycle driven modernisation A big part of India’s naval modernisation is also being driven by natural life cycles of weapon systems. After a cycle of major acquisition and expansion in the late 1970s and 1980s, the Indian Navy is in dire need of fresh procurement to replace its ageing ships and vessels. The 1990s was a dead decade as far as new procurement is concerned. For a decade between 1986 and 1996, the Indian Navy made no new inductions other than the previously ordered three Kilo-­class submarines, one corvette and one tanker.72 From 1997 to 2000, India ordered two additional Kilo-­class submarines and three frigates but the level and pace of procurement suffered a great deal in the 1990s.73 After enjoying an unprecedented situation being the first Asian country to operate an aircraft carrier five decades ago and a nuclear powered submarine two decades ago, today, the same Indian Navy is plagued by issues of obsolescence. Unless naval systems are replaced, the Indian Navy could face an unprecedented situation of fleet depletion. In addition, accidents afflicting the Indian Navy’s frontline warships and submarines such as the explosions that destroyed INS Sindhurakshak Kilo-­class submarine are a big blow to the Indian Navy. That further increases the pressure both to modernise as well as expand the fleet to make up for such losses. Indian Navy’s ‘Maritime Capabilities Perspective Plan’, released in 2005, outlining ambitious plans to dominate the Indian Ocean Region, made a crucial shift in terms of moving away from quantity to quality and capabilities. The Plan is seen as ambitious because the Navy plans to have a 160-ship-­strong navy, including 90 frontline combat units, which includes warships like aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates and corvettes.74 However, even a cursory look at the procurements over the last few years does not offer much hope that India will meet these targets. Given that naval capabilities are capital-­intensive and complex defence systems, with long construction periods, the delay in sanctioning projects for indigenous development or overseas procurement indicates that the Indian Navy’s prowess is seriously at risk. The document in particular emphasised

India’s maritime strategy   25 enhancement of capabilities as against strengthening in just quantitative terms. While this is desirable, the number equation is equally significant. This is one area the Indian Navy is beginning to flounder seriously. India has been faced with a row of procurement issues, starting from the HDW submarine to the Scorpene deal with France. The inability on the part of the Ministry of Defence to take decisive decisions in replacing the ageing fleet of warships and submarines has left the Indian Navy quite badly off. The procurement woes have left India today with just 20 major surface combatants including INS Vikramaditya and INS Viraat aircraft carriers, destroyers and frigates and the submarine fleet has come down to just 14 boats. The much-­talked about Indian plans to induct 24 submarines replacing the ageing fleet by 2030 does not appear feasible. In its plan to upgrade its submarine capabilities, the Navy plans to equip them with new sonars and torpedoes. According to reports, the Navy has decided to go along with the German Atlas Elektronik in its effort to upgrade the heavyweight torpedoes, capable of targeting surface and underwater targets (SUT) for the four HDW Type 209 Shishumar class submarines.75 It is reported that Atlas Elektronik will also possibly win the contract for the supply of Active Towed Array Sonars (ATAS). The ATAS systems are meant for other vessels including the Delhi-­class destroyers and Talwar-­class frigates.76 As per the contract, the winning company is required to do transfer of technology to the Indian defence public sector company, Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) in order to develop ten more of the sonars for the Kolkata-­class destroyers, Shivalik-­class frigates and the Kamorta-­class corvette. The planned upgradation will add a lifespan of 15 years to its current cycle. While obsolescence and life-­cycle pattern do induce certain new acquisitions, the key question is whether there is an underlying strategy that is emerging along with the new acquisition. As for the Indian Navy’s aircraft carriers, INS Vikrant was decommissioned in 1997. INS Viraat replaced the Vikrant as India’s main aircraft carrier in the 1990s after it was acquired from Great Britain in the late 1980s, but it is also reaching the end of its life cycle. India’s efforts to reach a deal on a second aircraft carrier ran into difficulties with Russia for several years. The entire saga came to an end with Russia handing over to the Indian Navy its aircraft carrier, Admiral Gorshkov, in November 2013. Negotiations for Admiral Gorshkov got stalled several times due to cost and delay given the lack of capacity on the part of Russia. Having made advanced payments, the Navy was caught in a bind over the delays as well as the increased cost for retrofit.77 Admiral Gorshkov, now renamed as INS Vikramaditya, was handed over to the Indian Navy only in November 2013 and reached Indian shores in January 2014, two decades since the negotiations began. The delay has cost India dearly both because the costs of the carrier had ballooned in the meantime as well as not having the capability for several years beyond what was initially thought. India also has plans to build two 40,000-ton plus indigenous aircraft carriers but this project has

26   R. Pillai Rajagopalan also been severely delayed and the first of these carriers are not expected to see service for at least another decade. Current plans suggest that the second of these carriers will be about 65,000 tons and might be nuclear powered.78 As for the strength of the Indian submarines fleet, it is yet another story. Even as India emphasises undersea warfare, its submarine fleet has been fast depleting with no corresponding replenishment. Traditionally India never looked at the Chinese Navy with any concern but its growing footprint in India’s backyard should raise new challenges for the Indian Navy. India’s submarine force, which is key for exercising a sea denial strategy, has declined because a good number of older subs are being retired – the Kilos started retiring in 2013, for example – and an insufficient number of newer submarines have been acquired to replace them.79 India’s process of procuring six Scorpenes from France in addition to developing six additional submarines at the Mazagon facility have run into rough waters. The delay could seriously impact upon India’s undersea force levels. Developing indigenous capacity to build submarine is itself a complex exercise but then to integrate them into effective undersea battle platforms is far more challenging. Another weakness in India’s submarine fleet is that it still remains a coastal fleet as it lacks nuclear-­powered submarines, and also its reach is limited since the missiles on these submarines have limited range. Although India launched a nuclear submarine, the INS Arihant in mid-­ 2009, it is still undergoing sea trials and expected to enter service in 2015.80 INS Arihant was originally designated as an Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV), and the Navy plans to develop two more such ATVs with a goal of building five or six new nuclear submarines. It was unclear whether these ATVs were to be nuclear strategic missile submarines (SSBNs) or simply nuclear-­powered attack submarines (SSNs), though it appears now that these will be the former. If India wants to maintain an effective nuclear triad, it would need a force of several submarines. A third issue is about the Navy’s focus, which focuses a great deal on large surface ships rather than submarines, which is also contributing to the depleting submarine fleet. In fact, under the original P-­75I programme, there was a 30-year Submarine Construction Plan approved in 1999. However, internal squabbles within the Navy have slowed down the implementation of the plan substantially. The fact that last two naval chiefs were naval aviators who did not appear to have great interest in allocating limited available funding for submarine programmes did not help matters. It has also been reported that while A.K. Antony was at the helm of affairs in the Ministry of Defence, there were huge delays with regard to strategic programmes. For instance, decisions on India’s nuclear triad were not cleared by Antony who, according to one report, believed that ‘decisions involving India’s strategic nuclear program should be taken by

India’s maritime strategy   27 the Prime Minister’s Office. In the process, there was little or no real progress concerning any additional SSNs and SSBNs.’81 Meanwhile, the Russian nuclear-­powered Akula  II SSN – the K-­152 Nerpa – under a ten-­year lease to India was inducted into the Indian Navy in April 2012. Three hundred Indian Navy personnel were trained in Russia for the operation of the Akula II submarine, renamed INS Chakra. The Russian Navy’s Akula-­II could be equipped with 28 nuclear-­capable cruise missiles with a striking range of 3000 km, whereas the Indian version was meant to be armed with missiles with a range of 300 km, given Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) restrictions. India is also augmenting its anti-­submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, with an eye on China. While the United States’ decision to sell India sophisticated ASW aircraft such as the P-­8 India (P-­8I) is significant as a means of countering any Chinese submarine activities in the Indian Ocean, these are not such comprehensive or advanced systems as sonar, or magnetic anomaly detectors.82 Nevertheless, India’s ability to control the Indian Ocean could be enhanced significantly. Nuclear Navy An additional modernisation imperative for the Indian Navy is the need to develop the third leg of the Indian nuclear triad in the form of the missile submarine. India had begun a project for nuclear-­propelled submarine, the ATV, in the 1980s, though progress was slow. Moreover the original ATV project appears to have been for an SSN which subsequently became a design for an SSBN, now called the Arihant. Though the Arihant is not yet operational, it is thought to be the first of three such missile submarines. India’s overt nuclearisation has increased the incentive for all of India’s services to pursue a nuclear role. The Indian Navy has an advantage in that the submarine leg of the triad is generally considered the most secure since nuclear missile submarines are virtually undetectable once they are underwater. But building such boats and putting nuclear missiles on them does create some complications for command and control over these forces. India has so far stressed tight central control over nuclear weapons as well as de-­mated nuclear weapons. It is unclear how these can be achieved with nuclear missile submariners because some level of pre-­ delegation is required for nuclear submarines since communication with them is difficult. In addition, it is not clear if the missiles on such submarines can be kept de-­mated from their nuclear warheads. It is also not clear if these issues of command and control over nuclear missile submarines have been thought through by the Indian political leadership. Thus, India’s overt nuclearisation has also led to a larger strategic role for the Indian Navy though most of these plans are still on the drawing boards and some significant issues are yet to be sorted out.

28   R. Pillai Rajagopalan

Elements of India’s maritime strategy The Indian Navy has put out a strategy document that outlines its key roles and missions. While this is commendable, the document is also somewhat indiscriminate in outlining almost every conceivable role, both in wartime and in peacetime that it becomes somewhat difficult to judge what the key priorities and methods are. As a public document, it also suffers from being relatively bland and not identifying to any great extent key potential adversaries and challenges that the navy faces. So while the formal strategy paper is an initial guide, it is insufficient for understanding the key elements of India’s maritime strategy. Other analysts such as Iskander Rehman have identified the key organisational motivations driving the maritime strategy as the desire for greater prestige within Indian security management, greater autonomy by having a part in India’s nuclear deterrent and greater resources for a blue water navy.83 Here, I outline some of the key elements of what appears to be India’s naval strategy. Deterring and defeating Pakistan Deterring and defeating threats if deterrence should fail is the primary aim of India’s stated strategy. This specifically refers to Pakistan and cannot be considered seriously in any context other than within the region, considering that Pakistan is the most likely adversary within the region. This is not very different from India’s traditional naval strategy and this has remained unchanged since the 1950s. Though Pakistan or the region is not explicitly named in the doctrine, it is clear that ‘decisive defeat’ cannot be a realistic objective or strategy with regard to China considering both the distance and the limited range of India’s naval power. The traditional ‘deterrence and defeat’ strategy was complicated until 1971 because Pakistan had two wings which both needed to be tackled, though in 1971 this actually became an advantage since Pakistan had left the East mostly unguarded. Nevertheless, even in 1971, the Indian Navy had to fight on both sides, thus splitting its force, though it did not matter very much in the final outcome. Deterring China Although China never presented itself as a major naval and maritime threat, Indian naval strategists like K.M. Panikkar had worried about the naval policy of a resurgent China.84 Back in the 1960s, one of the key arguments for a major revamp of India’s naval capabilities was in view of a possible Chinese foray into the Bay of Bengal. Echoing similar concerns, Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan talked about Chinese intentions and capabilities in Lok Sabha in 1963. He also clarified that the government had agreed on the need for a submarine fleet.85 Against the backdrop of a

India’s maritime strategy   29 massive defeat in a land war with China in 1962, Chavan argued that India should not rule out the possibility of an air and sea battle.86 China’s rising economic, political and military equations with the Indian Ocean Region states have been of increasing concern to India. Since 1993, China has become a net importer of oil, most of which is expected to come from West Asia, and transported through the Indian Ocean. Even as securing energy interests are significant drivers, China’s Indian Ocean policy has been much beyond that. China’s policy is based on countering what it considers as Indian attempts at hegemony over the Indian Ocean.87 Yoshihara contends that Chinese strategists view India as seeking hegemony in the region and that this could lead to greater great power competition in the Indian Ocean.88 China has slowly attempted to introduce its naval power in the region through anti-­piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden and by seeking port facilities in the region. While the Chinese interest and presence is becoming a key consideration for policymakers in New Delhi, the reality is that the Indian Ocean Region has always witnessed several countries jostling for power. With 80 per cent of the world’s trade taking place on the sea, the role of external powers in the region was inevitable. On the new dynamics at play, former Indian Navy chief Admiral Arun Prakash notes that ‘while the PLA Navy makes forays into the Indian Ocean, the Indian Navy has newfound commitments in the South China Sea’.89 China’s naval presence in all of India’s neighbouring countries has created its own undercurrents. Should there be a clash, even a limited one, the Indian Navy will have to factor in and be prepared for a two-­front scenario – from Pakistan and China. And unless India rectifies some of the weakness of its fleet, it could prove to be challenging. New and emerging security threats In addition to dealing with its two major conventional threats, India’s maritime strategy also has to deal with emerging threats. This partly involves the threat of terrorism, especially in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks, where the terrorists came from Pakistan by sea. India’s long coastline provides a number of security challenges. Given the proximity of Pakistani coasts, India has to worry about small bands of terrorists seeking to attack high-­value targets including atomic installations in Mumbai and Chennai, tourist centres in Goa and naval installations all around the coast. Piracy, an age-­old problem, has also become much more troublesome over the last decade because of a variety of factors. The unsettled political situation in East Africa represents the most serious push factor, while the increasing maritime trade and traffic is a significant incentive drawing piracy. But piracy also represents, just like terrorism, a difficult problem for conventional large navies because these are not problems that these

30   R. Pillai Rajagopalan navies had traditionally considered their primary mission. They represent a cumbersome problem that can neither be ignored nor easily dealt with. Maritime trade and commerce Maritime security concerns have gained greater prominence in recent years given the continuing trends of globalisation and the fact that a significant part of India’s international trade is sea-­borne, as it is for most countries. About 90 per cent by volume and 70 per cent by value of India’s trade is carried on through maritime transport even though the capacity is woefully inadequate.90 Any disruption to this trade and transport corridor will create serious domestic economic difficulties. This in itself has become an important contextualising factor for successive governments to support naval and maritime modernisation. While maritime trade was always important for India, its importance has become even more so in the context of India’s rapid economic growth as well as India’s increasing integration in the global economy. International trade as proportion of India’s GDP has trebled in the last two decades since India’s economic liberalisation, going from about 14 per cent in 1991 to 42.5 in 2012, according to World Bank data.91 Thus, currently, international trade contributes almost half of India’s GDP. Considering that more than 90 per cent of this trade is carried out over the seas, the importance of maritime security becomes readily understandable for India. Another important aspect of India’s security is energy security. As an energy-­deficient state, India needs to import a big part of the energy that it uses to power its economy. India’s energy imports went from 34 Mtoe in 1990 to 236 Mtoe in 2009, with crude oil representing 70 per cent of this increase.92 Net energy imports as proportion of India’s energy use, which is another measure of India’s dependence on energy imports, have gone up from about 8 per cent in 1991 to 28 per cent by 2011.93 Since much of this import is over the seas, the protection of these SLOCs has become a vital imperative in India’s maritime security. These represent the key elements of India’s maritime strategy, though this is definitely not an exhaustive list. Protecting SLOCs, dealing with sea-­ borne terrorism and crime, protecting India’s EEZ, dealing with environmental challenges and managing natural disasters also form important components of India’s maritime strategy.

Ambitions versus capabilities While India’s maritime ambitions have grown, it faces a number of problems in translating this ambition into actual policy. There are four key problems in matching India’s capabilities with its ambitions. The first is whether there is consensus between the political leadership and the

India’s maritime strategy   31 Indian Navy about the Indian Navy’s missions and strategy. Historically, it is not clear that there is any great coordination or consensus between the Indian naval leadership and the political leadership about issues of strategy. This has not mattered very much in the past because the Navy did not have a central role to play in India’s security. But this could be a problem going forward since the Navy’s role in India’s security has increased over the last decade. Though the Navy has produced two strategic papers, whether these were issued in consultation with political leadership is not clear. While the leaders of the Indian Navy have frequently talked and written about an expanded role for their service, India’s political leaders have rarely made such statements. If such consensus is lacking, this will tell on procurement since it will require political acceptance. Second, India’s maritime capabilities have not matched its ambitions. India’s Maritime Military Strategy of 2007 is a very ambitious document and includes every conceivable role for the Indian Navy but whether this is feasible or how much of this has been achieved is an issue. As David Brewster comments, ‘India has a long history of strategic ambitions surpassing its capabilities, of strategic goals and military expansion plans going unfulfilled.’94 Often the Indian ambitions in this regard are part of its larger goal of achieving a big power status than a carefully considered maritime strategy. A third major problem in matching ambitions and capabilities is the well-­known muddle in India’s procurement system. As was pointed out earlier, Indian naval power is not where it should be, with major systems being seriously delayed and imports remain the primary source of Indian capabilities. India’s procurement over the last several years has suffered because of disagreements about procedures for defence procurement. Frequent changes in India’s procurement policy have left suppliers as well as services confused, with the result being serious delays in acquiring capabilities as well as technology transfer and indigenisation process. This is partly a consequence of charges of corruption in major defence deals with bureaucrats as well as political leaders putting off acquisition decisions. This failure in acquisitions affects all services but because the Navy is a particularly capital-­intensive service, it will be more telling on the Navy. A fourth problem is that the Indian Navy has continued to rely on foreign suppliers for major platforms. Though India started manufacturing of submarines under licence in the late 1980s, there has been little progress in India’s capacity to manufacture submarines. The Arihant project has taken almost two decades and even this was possible only because it was a strategic nuclear programme. India also has several decades of experience in building surface combatants but it is a long way off being able to depend on domestic suppliers for its equipment. This dependence on foreign suppliers has serious problems because Indian capabilities are subject to the capabilities and willingness of foreign producers. There are good examples such as

32   R. Pillai Rajagopalan those of Russian Gorshkov/Vikramaditya aircraft carrier and the French-­built Scorpene submarine. Both programmes have been delayed because of problems on the suppliers’ side.95 There is little likelihood that the domestic shipbuilding industry will design and develop capabilities to satisfy the Indian Navy, which means that it will have to continue being dependent on foreign suppliers for its platforms and equipment. Adding to this is the so-­called ‘L-­1’ problem or the lowest cost tender acceptance system of procurement.96 The ‘L-­1’ principle has limited India’s options in terms of the capabilities requirement. While cost should be a determining factor, capability mix required by the Navy should take precedence over cost. In the absence of a coherent approach and political direction, there is likely to be continued drift in India’s maritime strategy and the gap between ambition and capability is only likely to widen.

Conclusion India’s maritime strategy is responding to India’s growing needs and these requirements are set to grow in the future. While there are major continuities with the past, there are also some major discontinuities, two of which are India’s new relationship with the United States and its allies in Asia and the nuclearisation of the navy. On the other hand, India’s dysfunctional defence management system has meant that India does not have the capability to meet its many varied needs of its naval strategy, though this is not for lack of resources. Since this is a fundamental institutional problem, it is not clear if this can be resolved in the near future. Similar challenges affect India’s broader maritime security too. The challenges India is facing in this realm include readiness to deal with sea-­ borne terrorism, threats to India’s EEZ and natural disasters. These threats have grown but India’s capacity to deal with them has not kept pace. Similarly, India’s maritime resources in terms of port facilities and shipbuilding infrastructure, vital to India’s international trade and prosperity, have not grown sufficiently. While India has outlined ambitious goals, it will be at least another decade before they are met, and even this is assuming that the Indian government pursues these goals with greater urgency. Ultimately, whether on the narrow naval aspects or on the broader maritime challenges, India’s performance is dependent on Indian state capacities to deliver. Unless this improves, India is unlikely to achieve its objectives.

Notes   1 Pranab Mukherjee, ‘Speech for the Admiral A.K. Chatterjee Memorial Lecture’, Kolkata, 30 June 2007, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=28921.   2 BharatiyaJanata Party, ‘Ek Bharat Shreshtha Bharat’, BJP Manifesto 2014, www. bjp.org/images/bjp_manifesto_an_abridged_version_english_26.04.14.pdf.   3 P. Manoj, ‘Sagar Mala Project to Strive for Holistic Development of India’s Maritime Sector’, Live Mint, 7 November 2014.

India’s maritime strategy   33   4 Shyam Saran, ‘Enhancing India’s Maritime Security’, excerpted from his keynote address at the ORF-­RISS Workshop on India’s Maritime Security, Op Ed, The Tribune, 25 February 2014.   5 Ashley J. Tellis, ‘Securing the Barrack: The Logic, Structure and Objectives of India’s Naval Expansion’, Naval War College Review, Summer 1990, p. 77.   6 Andrew C. Winner, ‘India as a Maritime Power?’, in Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Asia Looks Seaward: Power and Maritime Strategy (Westport, CN: Praeger Security International, 2008), p. 126.   7 K.M. Panikkar, India and Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea Power on Indian History (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1945), p. 7.   8 Address by the Chief of Naval Staff [Admiral Nirmal Kumar Verma], Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, 17 March 2011, http://indiannavy.nic.in/ sites/default/files/CNSSpeech_17–03–11_DSSCWellington.pdf.   9 David Scott, ‘India’s “Grand Strategy” for the Indian Ocean: Mahanian Visions’, Asia-­Pacific Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2006, pp. 97–129. 10 Daniel Owen Spence, ‘Imperial Transition, Indianisation and Race: Developing National Navies in the Subcontinent, 1947–64’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2014, pp. 323–338. 11 Satyindra Singh, Blueprint to Bluewater: THE INDIAN NAVY 1951–65 (Indian Navy), www.indiannavy.nic.in/about-­indian-navy/blueprint-­bluewater. 12 Tellis, ‘Securing the Barrack’, p. 82. 13 G.M. Hiranandani, Transition to Triumph: History of the Indian Navy 1965–1975 (New Delhi: Naval Headquarters-­Lancer Publishers, 2000), p. 10. 14 Ibid., p. 8. 15 Ibid., p. 8. 16 Ibid., p. 9. 17 Rahul Roy-­Chaudhury, Sea Power and India’s Security (London: Brassey’s, 1995), p. 77. 18 Tellis, ‘Securing the Barrack’, pp. 78, 83. 19 For a detailed narrative on the priorities during the 1960s and 1970s, see Raju G.C. Thomas, ‘The Indian Navy in the Seventies’, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 4, Winter 1975–1976, pp. 500–518. 20 Ashley J. Tellis, ‘The Naval Balance in the Indian Subcontinent: Demanding Missions for the Indian Navy’, Asian Survey, Vol.  25, No.  12, December 1985, p. 1195. 21 The United States presence in Diego Garcia and the Task Force 74 deployment are, as the authors note in this article, ‘seeped into Indians’ cultural memory – even among those who know nothing about the sea’. See James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, ‘Strongman, Constable, or Free-­Rider? India’s “Monroe Doctrine” and Indian Naval Strategy’, Comparative Strategy, Vol.  28, No.  4, 2009, p. 333. 22 George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 165–166. 23 As Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta note, for a brief period after the 1971 war, India moved briefly toward sea denial but then the sea control tendency reasserted fairly quickly. See Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming Without Aiming: India’s Military Modernization (New Delhi: Penguin/Viking, 2010), p. 89. 24 Rahul Roy-­Chaudhury, ‘Maritime Surveillance of the Indian EEZ’, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 22, No. 1, April 1998, pp. 49–59. 25 Ravi Rikhye, ‘Projecting an Indian Presence in the Indian Ocean’, Vikrant, May 1979, pp. 32–34, cited in Tellis, ‘Securing the Barrack’, p. 87. 26 Tellis, ‘Securing the Barrack’, p. 87. 27 Scott, ‘India’s “Grand Strategy” for the Indian Ocean’, p. 104.

34   R. Pillai Rajagopalan 28 Rahul Roy-­Chaudhury, ‘Indian Naval Expenditure in the 1990s’, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 22, No. 5, August 1998, pp. 675–690. 29 Ibid., p. 682. 30 Scott, ‘India’s “Grand Strategy” for the Indian Ocean’, p. 107. 31 Gurpreet Khurana, ‘Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India–Japan Cooperation’, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2007, pp. 139–153. 32 David Scott, ‘India’s Drive for a “Blue Water” Navy’, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, Winter 2007–2008, pp. 7–8. 33 For a detailed analysis on the Indian Navy’s procurement in the 1980s and earlier decades, see G.V.C. Naidu, ‘The Indian Navy and South East Asia’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 13, No. 1, June 1991, pp. 72–85. 34 Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming Without Aiming: India’s Military Modernization (New Delhi: Penguin/Viking, 2010), p. 88. 35 Tellis, however, suggests that India shifted to a purely deterrence by denial strategy after 1965. See Tellis, ‘Securing the Barrack’, p. 78. 36 Tellis, ‘Securing the Barrack’, p. 84. The new approach put in place accounted for taking the war campaign to the enemy. Accordingly, several Osa-­class missile boats that were acquired from the Soviet Union in the 1960s were put into action. The new strategy was seen as successful, as demonstrated during the 1971 War. 37 Thomas, ‘The Indian Navy in the Seventies’, p. 502. 38 Ibid., p. 502. 39 Scott, ‘India’s “Grand Strategy” for the Indian Ocean’, pp. 103–104. 40 Defence Service Estimates, 1962–1963 to 1965–1966, and 1973–1974, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, New Delhi, cited in Thomas, ‘The Indian Navy in the Seventies’, p. 500. 41 G.V.C. Naidu, The Indian Navy and Southeast Asia (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2000), p. 16. 42 Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy (New Delhi: Indian Navy Integrated Headquarters, 2007). 43 Indian ships carried 9.10 per cent of the country’s overseas cargo during 2012–2013 as against 10.87 per cent in 2011–2012. See Government of India, Ministry of Shipping, Transport Research Wing, Basic Port Statistics of India 2012–13. 44 Saran, ‘Enhancing India’s Maritime Security’. 45 FICCI and KPMG, Indian Shipbuilding Industry: Poised for Takeoff?, Global Conference and Exposition on Shipbuilding, 2007, www.investingintamilnadu.com/india/ doc/infrastructure_opportunities/Indian_Ship_Building_Industry.pdf. 46 Vijay Sakhuja, Asian Maritime Power in the 21st Century: Strategic Transactions: China, India and Southeast Asia (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2011), p. 147. 47 Government of India, Ministry of Shipping, Transport Research Wing, Update on Indian Port Sector (31.03.2014), http://shipping.gov.in/showfile.php?lid =1713. 48 Ibid. 49 Saran, ‘Enhancing India’s Maritime Security’. 50 Sakhuja, Asian Maritime Power in the 21st Century, p. 164; ‘Ports and Terminals’, India Core, www.indiacore.com/ports.html. 51 For a details of India’s current and future ports handling facilities, see ‘Ports in India’, prepared by Sahil Parmar, Anuj Gandhi and Rucha Brahmbhatt, www. slideshare.net/anujgandhi30/ports-­in-india. 52 Saran, ‘Enhancing India’s Maritime Security’. 53 Government of India, Ministry of Shipping, ‘Maritime Agenda 2010–2020’, January 2011, pp.  26, 29, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=69044 and http://shipping.gov.in/showfile.php?lid=261.

India’s maritime strategy   35 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid., p. 21. 56 Aditi Chatterjee, ‘Non-­traditional Maritime Security Threats in the Indian Ocean Region’, Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India, 2014, pp. 1–19. 57 Martin N. Murphy, ‘The Abundant Sea: Prospects for Maritime Non-­State Violence in the Indian Ocean’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol.  8, No.  2, December 2012, pp. 173–187. 58 Daniel Rahn, ‘Unlocking India’s Maritime Strategy’, Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 2006, p. 70. 59 Samir Saran, ‘Globalisation and Climate Change Paradox: Implications for South Asian Security’, in K.V. Kesavan and Daljit Singh (eds), South and Southeast Asia: Responding to Changing Geo-­Political and Security Challenges (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2010), pp. 141–161. 60 Winner, ‘India as a Maritime Power?’, p. 127. 61 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2014, p. 271. 62 Andrew Detsch, ‘Pakistan’s Oversized Submarine Ambitions’, The Diplomat, 9 October 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/pakistans-­oversized-submarineambitions/. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 It might be naïve on the part of India to conclude that China is not a typical South Asian power and hence dismiss it a threat to India. India has to broaden its security perimeter and examine security challenges in a southern Asian context rather than a geographical South Asian prism. 66 Andrew S. Erickson, ‘China’s Modernization of its Naval and Air Power Capabilities’, in Ashley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner (eds), Strategic Asia 2012–13: China’s Military Challenge (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2012). 67 Ministry of Defence, ‘Demands for Grants (2012–2013) Fifteenth Report’, Standing Committee on Defence (Fifteenth Lok Sabha), April 2012, http://164.100.47.134/lsscommittee/Defence/FINAL%20DFG%20%20 REPORT%20–2012–13.pdf. 68 Ministry of Defence, ‘Demands for Grants – Navy and Airforce (2014–2015) Fourth Report’, Standing Committee on Defence (Sixteenth Lok Sabha), 22 December 2014, http://164.100.47.134/lsscommittee/Defence/16_Defence_4.pdf. 69 Harsh V. Pant, ‘India in the Indian Ocean: Growing Mismatch Between Ambitions and Capabilities’, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 2, Summer 2009, p. 284. 70 Ajai Shukla, ‘Shinmaywa US-­2 Seaplane Could be Showpiece of Defence Partnership’, Business Standard, 25 January 2014; Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, ‘India, Japan Should Focus on Asian Strategic Framework’, Analysis, Observer Research Foundation, 16 January 2014, http://orfonline.org/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/analysis/AnalysisDetail.html?cmaid=61853&mmacmaid=61854. 71 Cohen and Dasgupta, Arming Without Aiming, p. 5. 72 Rahul Roy-­Chaudhury, India’s Maritime Security (New Delhi: IDSA-­Knowledge World, 2000), pp. 127–131. 73 Cohen and Dasgupta, Arming Without Aiming, p. 90. 74 ‘Chapter 1: Warship Building: An Overview’, Report No.  32 of 2010–2011, Indian Navy, http://saiindia.gov.in/english/home/Our_Products/Audit_ report/Government_Wise/union_audit/recent_reports/union_performance/ 2010_2011/Defence_Services/Report_no_32/chap1.pdf. 75 ‘Navy to Upgrade Torpedoes, Sonars of Warships Soon’, New Indian Express, 6 November 2013, www.newindianexpress.com/nation/Navy-­to-upgrade-­torpedoessonars-­of-warships-­soon/2013/11/06/article1874648.ece#.Uv4WIWKSygE. 76 Ibid.

36   R. Pillai Rajagopalan 77 Based on conversations with Russian policy analysts as well as Indian scholars on Russia. 78 Sujan Dutta, ‘Navy Plans Nuke-­powered Carrier’, The Telegraph, 4 December 2013, www.telegraphindia.com/1131204/jsp/nation/story_17641840.jsp#.Uv8Lo 0KSyDI. 79 Peter J. Brown, ‘Leaks in India’s Submarine Strategy’, Asia Times Online, 29 September 2010, www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LI29Df01.html. 80 ‘Agni-­5, INS Arihant to be Ready for Induction Next Year’, PTI, 7 February 2014, www.livemint.com/Politics/7k215HpGXMgLSWbBNviaDI/Agni5-INS-­ Arihant-to-­be-ready-­for-induction-­next-year.html. 81 Brown, ‘Leaks in India’s Submarine Strategy’. 82 Ibid. 83 Iskander Rehman, ‘India’s Aspirational Naval Doctrine’, in Harsh V. Pant (ed.), The Rise of the Indian Navy (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2012), pp. 63–67. 84 Scott, ‘India’s “Grand Strategy” for the Indian Ocean’, p. 100. 85 Times of India, 3 April 1963, cited in Thomas, ‘The Indian Navy in the Seventies’, p. 512. 86 Cited in Thomas, ‘The Indian Navy in the Seventies’, p. 512. 87 David Brewster, India’s Ocean: The Story of India’s Bid for Regional Leadership (London: Routledge, 2014), p. 32. 88 Toshi Yoshihara, ‘Chinese Views of India in the Indian Ocean: A Geopolitical Perspective’, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 36, No. 3, May–June 2012, pp. 489–500. 89 N.C. Bipindra, ‘The Great Indian Ocean Games’, New Indian Express, 1 December 2013, www.newindianexpress.com/magazine/The-­Great-Indian-­OceanGame/2013/12/01/article1916045.ece#.Uv-­350KSyDI. 90 ‘India Requires Infrastructure to Match Growth Forecasts’, SupplyDemand Chain Executive, 7 November 2013, www.sdcexec.com/news/11225816/with-­90percent-­by-volume-­and-70-percent-­by-value-­of-indias-­international-trade-­movingby-­sea-development-­of-the-­countrys-ports-­are-to-­be-critical. 91 World Bank, Date: Merchandise Trade (As % of GDP), http://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/TG.VAL.TOTL.GD.ZS. 92 International Energy Agency, Understanding Energy Challenges in India: Policies, Players and Issues (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2012), p. 27. 93 World Bank, Data: Energy Imports, Net (% of Energy Use), http://data.worldbank. org/indicator/EG.IMP.CONS.ZS. 94 David Brewster, ‘An Indian Sphere of Influence in the Indian Ocean?’, Security Challenges, Vol. 6, No. 3, Spring 2010, p. 17. 95 Vivek Raghuvanshi, ‘Indian Navy Wants to Fast-­Track Purchase of Russian Subs’, Defense News, 2 August 2014, www.defensenews.com/article/20140802/ DEFREG03/308020016/Indian-­Navy-Wants-­Fast-Track-­Purchase-Russian-­Subs. 96 Ranjit B. Rai, ‘Indian Navy’s Second Submarine Line Will Witness Strong Competition’, India Strategic, May 2011, www.indiastrategic.in/topstories1019.htm.

3 Tomorrow or yesterday’s fleet? The Indian Navy’s emerging operational challenges Iskander Rehman

Introduction For officers in the Indian Navy, 2013 was – to paraphrase Charles Dickens – both the best, and the worst of times.1 Over the course of a single, eventful year, the Indian Navy received delivery of an aircraft carrier from Russia, the INS Vikramaditya, and launched its first indigenously built aircraft carrier, the INS Vikrant. Meanwhile, New Delhi inched closer toward the operationalisation of its long planned nuclear triad, when the miniature reactor aboard the INS Arihant, India’s first nuclear strategic missile submarine (SSBN), went critical. In August 2013, the Indian Navy also launched its first dedicated military communications satellite, the GSAT-­7. In the course of the same year, however, India’s fleet suffered a series of catastrophic mishaps, ranging from an accidental explosion aboard a fully armed Kilo class submarine, which led to the tragic death of 21 officers and sailors, to ships running aground in shallow water. In February 2014, after smoke engulfed a compartment of another Kilo class boat, leading to additional casualties, Admiral D.K. Joshi, the Indian Chief of Naval Staff, resigned.2 This startling combination of events illustrates the difficulties tied to the study of India’s naval modernisation. Indeed, while the Indian Navy is pursuing an ambitious plan for expansion, it is grappling, in parallel, with a sizable set of challenges. These challenges range from severe manpower shortages and infrastructural deficits, to chronic delays in procurement. Combined, they considerably retard the realisation of India’s full naval potential. In addition to these organisational and financial roadblocks, the Indian Navy finds itself at pains to clearly articulate its future war fighting role. Operating under the ‘fog of peace’, India’s naval strategists must plan decades ahead, all while living in the midst of a singularly complex and protean regional security environment.3 As Emily Goldman has aptly noted, In uncertain times, the problem is not how to respond to a specific threat. The challenges are to identify and understand a range of

38   I. Rehman threats, anticipate the types of wars that may arise in the future, balance responses to present challenges with preparations for future contingencies, and ensure the state is well positioned to compete effectively when new unanticipated challenges arise. . . . Surviving and thriving in the international system depend on choices made before threats coalesce, during the ‘fog of peace’.4 This chapter seeks to deepen the discussion on India’s naval trajectory, by engaging in a granular analysis of the Indian Navy’s current and projected force design, and by exploring some of the major operational challenges it may come to face in the next 10–20 years. The chapter is organised in four parts. The first section provides a brief overview of the general transformation of maritime warfare and competition in a maturing precision-­ strike regime. Drawing on the study of these trends, the chapter then proceeds to examine the potential characteristics of a future naval confrontation involving India and Pakistan, India and China, or India and a Sino-­Pakistani maritime entente. In its final section, the chapter argues that the Indian Navy’s current carrier-­centric force design may be ill-­ equipped to respond to future operational challenges. It suggests alternative manners by which India can both refine and strengthen its naval force structure, and outlines candidate ideas for future iterations in the evolution of India’s maritime military strategy.

The transformation of maritime competition The proliferation of precision-­guided systems has resulted in the growth of increasingly formidable land-­based reconnaissance strike complexes, structured around dense constellations of Anti-­Access and Area-­Denial (A2/AD) systems.5 The growing ability of coastal states to both locate and prosecute mobile targets at extended ranges offshore has raised questions over the continued operational relevance of high-­value, high-­signature, surface vessels. American military futurist Andrew Krepinevich predicts that, as competitors create and enhance their scouting and precision-­strike capabilities the result will be a progressive shrinking of ‘uncommanded seas’ and the continuing expansion of areas of contested sea control or, what seems more likely, mutual sea denial – a veritable ‘no-­ man’s land’ for surface vessels, be they warships or cargo vessels, over large areas.6 Given the growing vulnerability of large capital ships, maritime competitors will inevitably find themselves compelled to invest in less ‘access-­ sensitive’ platforms such as submarines, and in dispersed, networked, flotillas of smaller, lower signature, surface vessels. In order to operate

The Indian Navy’s operational challenges   39 under acceptable risk parameters, aircraft carriers may be deployed at increasingly remote distances from the littoral, and thus be required to field carrier wings comprised of assets with considerable range and endurance.7 These platforms will also need to be survivable in A2/AD environments, and potentially operate autonomously or semi-­autonomously in the event of a severe disruption of command and control.8 Indeed, a number of both state and non-­state actors are refining technologies that aim to fracture or degrade battle network connectivity. Contemporary Chinese strategists, in particular, in their discussions of ‘beyond-­limits’ or ‘unrestricted’ warfare, place a heavy emphasis on the disruption of enemy battle networks, through the use of offensive cyber attacks, electronic warfare or the targeting of enemy satellite infrastructure.9 In effect, maritime conflict will increasingly become ‘cybered’ in nature, and long before any kinetic exchange, adversaries will be able to employ ‘precision cyber tools’ in order to tilt the conflict in their favour.10 Meanwhile, electronic warfare is becoming such a crucial aspect of modern warfare that figures such as Admiral Jonathon Greenert, America’s current Chief of Naval Operations, have stressed the importance of treating the ‘electro-­magnetic (EM) – cyber environment’ as a war fighting domain ‘on par with – or perhaps even more important than – land, sea, air and space’.11 Forward deployments in contested littorals, or so-­called ‘green water operations’, may become especially challenging for navies in certain quadrants of the Indo-­Pacific.12 This is not solely due to the efflorescence of land and sea-­based A2/AD architectures along certain nations’ continental edges, but also to the distinct properties of the littoral environment itself. Asia’s increasingly populated and cluttered coastal regions, especially in countries such as China and Pakistan, will naturally have an effect on the conduct of littoral operations. The sheer density of emissions from television stations, cellular networks and radio stations can flood the electromagnetic spectrum with a ‘wall of sound’, and ambient noise in shallow, tropical waters can render the use of ship-­borne sonar extremely challenging. Within such a congested, intensely trafficked environment, diesel-­ electric submarines might loiter unheard, while conventional or hybrid actors stationed aboard small missile boats can hide amidst throngs of civilian vessels. Finally, the prospective emergence of newly nuclearised naval actors, that opt to exercise strategic ambiguity by employing dual-­use systems, or to engage in coercive nuclear escalation, poses a severe threat to crisis stability at sea.13 After having briefly enumerated the challenges faced by military competitors in the contemporary naval domain, the remainder of this chapter seeks to better gauge how these increasingly universalised constraints can be applied to the more specific operational quandaries the Indian Navy might have to face in the medium- to long-­term future. Two potential forms of future naval conflict are thus identified and examined. The first

40   I. Rehman details the various operational challenges inherent to a limited conflict against a nuclearised Pakistani Navy. The second explores what form a future Sino-­Indian naval conflict might take, and draws attention to the potentially unconventional nature of future Chinese naval power projection in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). After having outlined the challenges inherent to both putative conflicts, the chapter concludes by outlining how Indian security managers might better tailor their future naval force design and strategy.

Limited naval warfare under conditions of nuclear ambiguity The strategic interactions in-­between India and Pakistan’s navies have traditionally been defined by two fundamental asymmetries, and in both cases, these same asymmetries are set to grow. The first asymmetry is with regard to their conventional strength. Indeed, since independence, India has boasted a larger and stronger fleet. As India’s maritime service continues to expand in size and capabilities, its margin of conventional superiority over Pakistan’s chronically underfunded fleet will widen even further. The second major asymmetry is with regard to the scope of their strategic outlook. Whereas the Indian Navy has come to envision itself as net security provider in the wider Indian Ocean and beyond, the Pakistan Navy continues to articulate its own, more narrow, strategic vision for the Arabian Sea, and firmly opposes the prospect of untrammelled Indian naval primacy in its near waters. On a more tactical level, the Pakistan Navy has traditionally focused on offensive sea denial, and on coastal interdiction, whereas the Indian Navy, with its carrier-­centric force structure and doctrinal emphasis on sea control, is increasingly centered on projecting air and amphibious power ashore.14 Ever since the Indo-­Pakistani war of 1971, when India’s Osa class missile boats conducted a daring night-­ time raid against Karachi, Pakistani naval planners have sought, first and foremost, to prevent the Indian Navy from acquiring the ability to apply debilitating pressure along Pakistan’s maritime flank. The Pakistan Navy’s concerns were compounded by their Indian counterpart’s actions during Operation Talwar, in the midst of the 1999 Kargil War, and during Operation Parakram, during the 2001–2002 standoff. In both cases, the Indian Navy surged elements from its Eastern and Western fleets in order to engage in coercive manoeuvring in the North Arabian Sea. Both nations’ strategic communities drew radically different conclusions from these deployments. For Indian security managers, the fact that both naval actions had been unopposed served as a stirring testament to the utility of the Indian Navy’s so-­called ‘silent role’, both as a means of deterring sub conventional or horizontal escalation, and as an instrument of intra-­conflict signalling. For many Indian navalists, these actions had the value of demonstrating the strategic relevance of the Indian Navy in a

The Indian Navy’s operational challenges   41 subcontinent whose martial history has been largely defined by terrestrial conflict. India’s Maritime Strategy, for example, makes the following assessment: The Indian Navy short-­listed three goals, namely to ensure safety and security of our maritime interests against a surprise attack, to deter Pakistan from escalating the conflict into a full-­scale war and to win the war convincingly at sea. The lesson that emerges for the Indian Navy is on two counts. Firstly, there will be space and scope to conduct conventional maritime operations below the nuclear threshold. Secondly, a window of opportunity would exist to influence the land battle.15 For Pakistani naval planners, however, both incidents were a sobering reminder of their coastal nation’s glaring vulnerability to blockade and strategies of commodity denial.16 Pakistani naval officers deplored the fact that Pakistan had yet to devise an effective response to India’s ability to ‘interfere with Pakistan’s economic and logistical vitality’, and noted the challenges this posed in terms of the country’s vulnerability to maritime coercion.17 In 2012, then Chief of the Pakistan Naval Staff Admiral Asif Sandila voiced his concerns over India’s ‘phenomenal naval buildup’, before adding that, ‘We [the Pakistan Navy] need to ensure that the balance is redressed and naval power is not concentrated in any one center of the region.’18 The fact that India’s navy has demonstrated pan-­ regional ambitions, and has throughout its recent history deployed its assets primarily within the context of custodial and humanitarian missions, is of little comfort to Pakistan. Even India’s decision to revitalise its coastguard, in the wake of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, is viewed by Pakistani commentators as a potential means of establishing a ‘multilayered blockade’ of Pakistan’s coastal belt in the event of a future conflict.19 Indeed, notes one Pakistani naval commander, ‘The Indian Navy may have global designs, but in any future war, it will use all of its assets to cripple our navy.’20 In the course of private discussions, Pakistani military officials readily express their concerns over the Indian Navy’s recent acquisition of large landing platform docks (LPD) such as the INS Jalashwa (or former USS Trenton), and dismiss out of hand the notion that these acquisitions will serve primarily as platforms for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations.21 Consistent with such thinking, Pakistan has devoted a considerable amount of energy towards alleviating what is perceived as a growing strategic predicament. First, it has sought to lessen its formerly debilitating reliance on Karachi by expanding and diversifying its network of naval bases. The Pakistan Navy now stations its submarines at Jinnah Naval Base in the small Balochi port of Ormara, 240 km west of Karachi, and regularly rotates surface vessels to the deep-­sea port of Gwadar, another 215 km

42   I. Rehman further along the Makran coast.22 As a result, notes a close observer of military developments in South Asia, a successful blockade of Pakistan would require the Indian Navy to exert sea and air control over a much longer stretch of Pakistan’s seaboard.23 Second, Islamabad has sought, with Chinese assistance, to create an A2/AD ‘bubble’ over the Northern Arabian Sea. Pakistan has thus acquired over 120 C-­802 anti-­ship cruise missiles, which it has dispersed to mobile launchpads along its coastline.24 The Chinese-­made C-­802, or Saccade, is a subsonic missile with a range of approximately 120 km. Its small radar reflectivity and low flight characteristics have led to it being described as one of the most ‘effective anti-­ship missiles’ currently in existence.25 Pakistan has also invested, once more with Chinese assistance, in naval platforms specifically designed for sea denial, such as stealthy Fast Attack Crafts (FACs), equipped with Anti-­Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs).26 In 2010, the Pakistan Navy created its own Naval Air Defence Arm (the PNAD), which relies on small, decentralised units of Pakistani Marines equipped with Chinese-­designed Hong Ying  6 (FN-­6) man-­portable (MANPAD) air defence systems, and more sophisticated French-­designed Mistral 1 tripod-­mounted infrared guided surface-­to-air missiles.27 These units are designed primarily to delay or degrade India’s ability to use low-­ flying rotary wing aircraft for Anti Surface Warfare (ASUW) or Anti-­ Submarine Warfare (ASW) missions along Pakistan’s littoral. By operating in small teams concealed along Pakistan’s clustered and rugged coastline, or aboard fishing vessels, these units could make it difficult for Indian helicopter squadrons to provide low-­flying air support for follow-­on amphibious or naval operations. The Pakistan Navy’s main priority in terms of acquisitions, however, remains submarines. As one former Pakistani Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) noted, ‘submarines have all along been our [Pakistan’s] main strength and at the heart of our naval strategy of offensive sea denial’.28 The Pakistan Navy currently operates five French submarines, three Agosta 90-B submarines acquired in the 1990s, and two more antiquated Agosta 70 boats from the late 1970s. In the mid-­1980s, these two boats were modified, and given the ability to fire Harpoon anti-­ship missiles while submerged. Pakistan’s trio of Agosta 90-B submarines has since been similarly modified. This development, notes James Goldrick in his detailed historical study of South Asian navies, vastly increased the Indian Navy’s ASW challenge, and ‘threw out of kilter many of the operational assumptions under which the Indian Navy has been operating since the 1971 war’.29 Senior Pakistani government officials have recently intimated that Pakistan could soon conclude a long discussed deal to procure eight additional SSKs from China.30 This would raise the Pakistani subsurface force level to 13 submarines (provided Pakistan chooses to maintain the two ageing Agosta 70s) at a time when India is struggling to maintain a dwindling and ageing flotilla of 14 boats. Perhaps more importantly, if the submarines

The Indian Navy’s operational challenges   43 imported from China are the Type 041, or Yuan class, as is rumoured, ten of Pakistan’s submarines will be equipped with air-­independent propulsion (AIP), allowing them to remain submerged for relatively long periods of time.31 This would give them a notable tactical edge over India’s submarines, which have yet to be fitted with such a capability. The Pakistan Navy also maintains a small force of approximately a thousand commandos, the Special Service Group Navy (SSG(N)), based at PNS Iqbal in Karachi. These commandos are equipped with three Italian-­designed Cosmos midget submarines, and swimmer delivery vehicles (SDVs). In the event of conflict, they are trained to rapidly disperse and launch a series of destabilising unconventional operations against Indian sea-­based and shoreline infrastructure. Despite their limited endurance and payload capacity, Pakistan’s midget submarines could pose a clear danger to Indian naval vessels transiting through congested littoral areas, and could be used to lay mines along India’s principal maritime approaches.32 Pakistan has also devoted increasing attention to Air Force–Navy integration in maritime strike warfare. As one naval theorist has noted, the approach of smaller coastal states such as Pakistan toward seapower, ‘will be characterised by a tendency to make the most of joint action and coastal topography. It will aim at the deterrence of large-­scale naval action through the infliction of punishment, rather than crudely attempting to defeat it.’33 In the wake of the 1971 war, which had demonstrated the disastrous effects of the Pakistan Navy and Pakistani Air Force’s (PAF ) failure to cooperate, Pakistan began to place a much greater emphasis on joint planning. A squadron of PAF Mirage 50 aircraft was thus based in Karachi, fitted with Exocet missiles, and assigned a maritime strike role. The Pakistan Navy’s naval air arm has also been heavily geared toward ASUW, and is viewed as a critical component of the service’s strategy of offensive sea denial.34 Meanwhile, Islamabad is reportedly working discreetly with Beijing to arm the PAF with standoff missiles designed to destroy or disable Indian capital ships in the event of an Indian-­imposed blockade. The loss of an aircraft carrier would be a devastating psychological, as well as material, loss for the Indian Navy. Cognizant of this fact, Pakistani strategists emphasise the importance for Pakistan to focus on sinking an Indian aircraft carrier in the first stages of conflict, and plan to equip Pakistan’s newly acquired JF-­17 fighter jets with China’s CM-­400AKG missile. The CM-­400AKG, currently under development, is a long-­range, supersonic missile with a range of 180–250 km. One Pakistani Air Commodore described the kinetic impact of the missile as being ‘enough to destroy any high-­value target, like an aircraft carrier’.35 In parallel to Pakistan’s strengthening of its A2/AD capabilities, there are indications that Islamabad is rapidly moving towards the nuclearisation of its navy. In 2012, Pakistan formally established a Naval Strategic

44   I. Rehman Forces Command, and there are reports that a naval variant of the nuclear­capable Babur cruise missile is under development.36 When interviewed, Pakistani commanders mentioned the precedent set by Israel’s alleged decision to place nuclear-­tipped cruise missiles aboard conventional submarines, and suggested, somewhat provocatively, that Pakistan should follow suit.37 Another option, some have argued, would be stationing nuclear weaponry aboard surface ships and maritime-­patrol aircraft.38 Not only would this provide the country with greater strategic depth, it would also extend some of the more dysfunctional elements of Indo-­Pakistani nuclear interactions from land to sea.39 By threatening either directly or indirectly, to employ low-­yield nuclear weapons at sea, or against an advancing Indian aircraft carrier strike force, Islamabad can hope to acquire escalation dominance and considerably dilute its larger neighbour’s coercive naval power.40 Moreover, the introduction of nuclear weapons will have a major impact on the future of naval war fighting in the Indian Ocean. As veteran naval analyst Captain Wayne Hughes has noted, fleets caught under a nuclear shadow are compelled to operate under different principles. Most notably, ships must loosen up their deployment patterns and adopt more dispersed configurations in order to better shield themselves from the ripple effects of a nuclear blast.41 For Pakistani planners, acquiring nuclear-­armed cruise missile submarines (SSG) would provide an opportunity to skew its existing power relationship with India in Pakistan’s favour, primarily by injecting an even greater degree of uncertainty and ambiguity in India’s tactical calculus, but also by preventing the Indian Navy from concentrating the bulk of its power projection platforms in one specific location.42 Such a toxic combination of dual-­use systems and doctrinal opacity could prove highly detrimental for crisis stability. In the event of conflict, there would be no way for India to ascertain whether Pakistani vessels or maritime patrol aircraft were nuclear-­armed or not, and a radioactive ‘fog of war’ would float over combat operations. Modern naval theory has frequently pointed to the inherent ‘flexibility’ of naval deployments as being conducive to more finely tailored policies of deterrence and/or coercion.43 This thinking was particularly prevalent during the 1990s, when modern blue-­water navies did not appear to face similar threats to their freedom of manoeuvre. In 1992, the US Navy Department published ‘The Navy Policy Book’, which aimed to summarise the US Navy’s core values and abiding principles. One noteworthy passage reads as follows, Naval forces provide policy-­makers with unique flexibility. We can quickly position a powerful fighting force off the coast of a country, out of sight to influence subtly, or within sight to make strong statement. Similarly, we can remove ourselves from the situation quickly once our objectives have been achieved.44

The Indian Navy’s operational challenges   45 More than a decade and a half later, ‘India’s Maritime Strategy’ strikes a remarkably similar note, commenting that, Naval forces have unique escalation control characteristics that contribute to effective crisis management. They can be intrusive or out of sight, threatening or non-­threatening, away from media glare or right in its middle, and easily dispatched but just as easily withdrawn. The flexibility available in employing naval forces provides escalation control in any crisis.45 The problem with such assertions, however, is that they tend to overlook the fact that operational flexibility is not necessarily conducive to greater crisis stability. Increased interactions in the maritime domain, particularly in times of tension, may in fact result in greater friction, particularly if both fleets are operating under a nuclear shadow.46 In some instances, this might even lead to inadvertent escalation, particularly if involving an actor such as Pakistan, which has historically displayed a strong proclivity for maritime brinkmanship.47

China’s anti-­access umbrella Whereas Indian strategists tend to overlook Pakistan’s growing capacity to deny the Indian Navy its operational objectives, an enormous amount of attention is devoted to China’s naval rise and its implications for the IOR. For decades, Sino-­Indian military competition was a strictly continental phenomenon. Centred on the long, disputed, land border, it manifested itself primarily through the resourcing and positioning of land and air assets. Over the past decade or so, however, both countries’ maritime environs have progressively morphed into arenas for a more incipient form of Sino-­Indian rivalry.48 The precise contours of this rivalry, which has yet to fully materialise into a more formalised form of naval competition, remain somewhat indistinct. The relatively inchoate nature of China’s future military presence in the Indian Ocean feeds a steady flow of commentary and speculation on the nature of China’s naval intentions, and on their potential impact on India’s maritime security. Indian observers are well aware of the fact that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s expansion, and transition from a ‘near coast’ and ‘near seas’ fleet toward a more expeditionary, blue-­water force, has been driven, to a large extent, by Beijing’s growing trade and resource equities in the IOR.49 Indeed, it is estimated that oil originating from the Middle East and Africa constitutes at present close to 60 per cent of China’s global imports – and this portion is only set to grow as China increases its dependence on overseas energy supplies.50 A number of African countries have emerged as major sources of strategic raw materials, providing China with minerals such as iron ore and cobalt, agricultural produce and large amounts of timber.51 Meanwhile,

46   I. Rehman Indian Ocean littoral states have become fertile export markets for Chinese consumer products, and Chinese state-­owned enterprises are involved in a plethora of large-­scale infrastructural projects in countries as varied as Kenya, Bangladesh and Madagascar. Since independence, India’s perception of extra-­regional naval activity in the IOR has been strongly coloured by a mixture of circumspection and mistrust. This was particularly true during certain periods of the Cold War, when Indian security managers fretted over their country’s continued vulnerability to naval suasion and ‘gunboat diplomacy’.52 India’s present anxieties with regard to the nature of China’s future naval presence in the Indian Ocean are somewhat more multifaceted and complex. China’s port infrastructure projects, in some of the countries closest to India, such as in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, are cause for particular concern, as are its vigorous efforts to court a number of small, strategically located island states in the Indian Ocean.53 However, while the tenor of India’s journalistic commentary is frequently somewhat sensationalistic in its stridency, government documents and officials are more temperate in the formulation of their misgivings.54 India’s Maritime Strategy, for instance, refers obliquely to ‘the critical need to wean the littoral states of our immediate neighborhood away from the increasingly pervasive influence of states hostile to Indian interests’.55 Indian naval and government officials, for their part, appear relatively sanguine when discussing China’s various developmental and infrastructural projects, while remaining extremely vigilant over the possibility of Beijing’s relatively loose constellation of access arrangements gradually tightening into a more structured form of military presence. A former Indian National Security Advisor, for example, noted, there are no Chinese bases in the Indian Ocean today despite talk of the ‘string of pearls’. . . . There is, however, extensive Chinese port development activity in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pak­ istan, and active weapons supply programs to the same states. The question is whether and to what extent this improved access and infrastructure will translate into basing arrangements and political influence in the future.56 In today’s increasingly globalised and interconnected world, there is a recognition that there is little that New Delhi can do to arrest the deepening of Beijing’s ties with its neighbours, apart from intensifying its own efforts to ‘outbid’ China by floating its own increasingly generous offers of trade, investment and military assistance.57 As one former Indian CNS, Admiral Arun Prakash, has argued, ‘the appropriate counter to China’s encirclement of India is to build our own relations, particularly in our neighborhood, on the basis of our national interests and magnanimity towards smaller neighbors’.58

The Indian Navy’s operational challenges   47 As the Indian Ocean Rim gradually becomes the theatre to a shadowy struggle for access and influence, certain smaller island states are well placed to reap rich strategic dividends.59 This was already the case during much of the Cold War, when states such as the Seychelles grew increasingly adept at instrumentalising US–Soviet rivalry to their advantage.60 For Indian naval planners, the stakes in this murky competition are high, as the outcomes of the ongoing Sino-­Indian struggle for maritime influence will ultimately determine the strategic contours of any future Sino-­Indian naval conflict. Indian sea-­power thinkers have also expressed concern over what they perceive to be a recent surge in Chinese ‘probing’ actions in the Indian Ocean. The question of Chinese submarine deployments in the Indian Ocean, and especially of nuclear submarine deployments, is a source of anxiety. In 2013, the Indian press leaked the findings of a classified Indian Defence Ministry report, which reportedly alleged that Chinese nuclear submarines were making increasingly ‘frequent forays into the Indian Ocean’.61 In February 2014, Lt Gen. Michael Flynn, the Director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, declared that China had ‘recently deployed for the first time a nuclear-­powered attack submarine to the Indian Ocean’.62 In the past, Indian naval officers had repeatedly suggested that the forward deployment of Chinese nuclear submarines would be cause for grave concern.63 Now that China’s subsurface penetration of the Indian Ocean has been confirmed, it will be interesting to see how the Indian Navy chooses to respond to this unwelcome new strategic reality. China’s steady rotation of naval task forces to the Gulf of Aden is also viewed with a certain degree of circumspection in New Delhi. While Indian strategists applaud China’s anti-­piracy efforts, they also fret over the second-­order effects of such deployments, which provide a means of accustoming Chinese mariners to blue-­water operations and of familiarising the PLAN with the maritime geography of the Northwestern Indian Ocean.64 Similarly, China’s recent signature of a contract allowing it to explore polymetallic sulphide ore deposits over a 10,000 square kilometre portion of the South-­West Indian Ocean’s seabed have been perceived by India’s Directorate of Naval Intelligence as an excuse for the PLAN to map the Indian Ocean’s underwater topography, with future submarine operations in mind.65 For the time being, therefore, Sino-­Indian naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean remains very much in its preliminary stages, as China slowly but surely expands its influence and presence in the IOR. What if this were to change, however, and Sino-­Indian conflict were to erupt and expand horizontally to the maritime sphere? Even if China’s so-­called ‘string of pearls’ were to become a more tangible military reality, this would not, argue some Indian strategic thinkers, necessarily amount to an insuperable challenge in the event of conflict. Chinese naval task forces dispersed amongst several nodal points situated in India’s near seas could present easy targets

48   I. Rehman for India’s Air Force and naval aviation, and commentators such as C. Raja Mohan have opined that, India’s immediate problem . . . is not the prospect of China acquiring military facilities in the Indian Ocean. Given the long and vulnerable lines of communication from China’s eastern seaboard into the Indian Ocean, China’s bases will be easy pickings in a war.66 More generally speaking, policy-­makers in New Delhi increasingly appear to believe that, by virtue of its peninsular geography, and position athwart China’s main sea lanes of communication, India possesses something of a game-­changing maritime edge over its trans Himalayan neighbour. Expressions of such confidence can be found in a report on Indian grand strategy penned by a group of esteemed Indian strategists in 2012. The report, entitled Nonalignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century, comments on the extant stalemate along India’s unresolved land borders and urges decision-­makers in New Delhi to leverage ‘the potential opportunities that flow from peninsular India’s location in the Indian Ocean’.67 This vision is vigorously promoted by India’s vocal body of navalists, who argue that India should reallocate funds away from large ground forces, and towards the Navy. This reallocation, they argue, would serve to resource a more cost-­effective strategy, which focuses on imposing heavy costs on China at sea rather than on land, primarily through the interdiction or disruption of its flow of maritime trade through the Indian Ocean.68 Such actions would be greatly facilitated, supposedly, by India’s possession of a prime piece of strategic real estate: the Andaman and Nicobar islands.69 By radiating naval and air power from the Andaman and Nicobar Command, argue some Indian policy-­makers, New Delhi could potentially sever China’s energy and trade ‘jugular’. In short, Indian security managers appear, for the time being, relatively confident in terms of their ability to rapidly prevail in a high-­ intensity naval conflict in the Indian Ocean. This assumption, however, may be dangerously misplaced. It assumes that Chinese strategists would play by India’s rules, by steaming contingents of surface vessels through the Strait of Malacca, and within easy range of Indian air and missile strikes. It neglects to take into account the potential for more hybridised Chinese naval force postures, involving forward-­deployed sea denial and anti-­access systems, or for more unorthodox forms of power projection, operating in concert, and under the protection, of an anti-­access umbrella. Perhaps more importantly, for Beijing it might make more sense to pre-­ empt any Indian attempt at maritime interdiction by simply ‘outflanking’ India militarily – and bringing air and missile pressure to bear on India’s own maritime centre of gravity (COG), in the Arabian Sea.70 Indeed, Chinese strategists are already deeply concerned over what former President Hu

The Indian Navy’s operational challenges   49 Jintao once famously referred to as China’s ‘Malacca Dilemma’, and fret over the possibility of being subjected to an Indian or United States naval blockade in the Indian Ocean.71 Judging by the Pentagon’s latest report on Chinese military power, Chinese long-­range precision-­strike systems already cover large swathes of the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal.72 In the future, China’s shore-­based maritime Reconnaissance-­Strike Complex (RSC) could provide protective cover for Chinese naval task forces, or inflict a devastating first strike on India’s blue-­water fleet.73 Heavy salvos of long-­range ASCMs and Anti-­Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) could rain down on Indian aircraft carriers, and rapidly sink or cripple Indian Navy surface combatants. Missile attacks would likely strike Indian airfields, as well as ports and other logistical nodes along India’s coastline, preventing Indian armed forces from rapidly generating combat power in the opening hours of conflict.74 Consistent with Chinese military doctrine, mass cyber and electromagnetic attacks would seek to fracture and overwhelm Indian battle networks, preventing Indian fleet commanders from rapidly coordinating an effective response. Chinese bombers and long-­range fighters positioned in Yunnan or on the Tibetan plateau, and equipped with long-­range ASCMs, could engage in maritime interdiction operations, or in the suppression of India’s coastal air defences. Rather than station surface vessels in the Indian Ocean, where they would be vulnerable to airborne prosecution, China might opt to forward deploy less access-­sensitive platforms, such as submarines, in friendly states such as Pakistan. By positioning nuclear or diesel-­electric submarines in the Arabian Sea, the PLAN could pose a severe threat to India’s western coastal regions, as well as to its principal Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC).75 Chinese submarines could seed underwater mine fields close to major Indian ports, such as Mumbai and Karwar, and could send small teams of Chinese Special Operation Forces to engage in disruptive acts of sabotage, attack offshore installations and underwater pipelines, and cut or tap into underwater fibre-­ optic cables. Operating under the cover of Pakistan’s more localised A2/AD envelope, Chinese submarines could seek to disrupt India’s seaborne trade and energy supplies, or to engage India’s surface vessels with wake-­homing torpedoes and sea-­skimming ASCMs.76 If fitted with the newly navalised version of the DH-­10 cruise missile, which reportedly boasts a range of 1500–2000 km, Chinese submarines could engage in standoff precision strikes against targets located deep within India’s interior.77 Alternatively, China could choose to adopt a more minimalist military posture, and simply focus on extending the range and efficacy of its Pakistani ally’s reconnaissance strike complex. For example, Beijing could provide Pakistan with additional mobile land-­based ASCMs, over the horizon radar systems (OTH-­R), or with a denser thicket of air defence systems. In the future, signals intelligence (SIGINT) facilities in Pakistan could, conceivably, be jointly managed by both Pakistani and Chinese forces. China’s strengthening of its military posture in the IOR could also unfold in a less provocative, and more gradual manner. Rather than

50   I. Rehman running the risk of unnecessarily provoking a strong Indian reaction by deploying ostensibly offensive military assets, Beijing, under the guise of regional capacity building, could slowly ‘shape the future battlespace’, by developing the ISR and support infrastructure needed to sustain a military campaign in the IOR.78 By spreading coastal radar chains and shore-­based electronic sensors across various island territories, or by discreetly laying undersea low frequency active acoustic arrays (LFAA) along portions of the Indian Ocean seabed, China could increase its operational awareness of India’s maritime environs, and potentially provide vital cueing data to its air, missile and subsurface assets in the event of conflict.79 Similarly, squadrons of unarmed Chinese Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) prepositioned in certain Indian Ocean littoral states – ostensibly for assistance in anti-­piracy or anti-­smuggling efforts – could provide Chinese forces with low-­end ISR in certain contested maritime regions, and provide additional discrimination and targeting information to Chinese military assets. Chinese agents could also be embedded amongst expatriate Chinese workers located throughout the IOR, and instructed to engage in acts of sabotage and disinformation in times of conflict.

Toward a better tailored force design Since the end of the Cold War, India has benefited from a relatively benign maritime threat environment. This state of affairs has allowed the Indian Navy to, slowly but surely, build up its surface feet, and channel its efforts toward soft power projection, and naval diplomacy. India’s maritime peace dividend, however, may not be set to last for much longer, and issues relating to the Indian Navy’s future war fighting role are only infrequently addressed in the security studies literature. In this final section, candidate ideas are laid out, with the hope of providing a blueprint for an Indian naval force design better adapted to future challenges. Arguments are made in favour of a more distributed fleet architecture, less centred around carrier battle groups, and for the development of a ‘penetrating force’, capable of punching a hole in contested littoral environments and restoring freedom of manoeuvre. India, it is suggested, should also focus on strengthening the resiliency of its fixed bases, as well as its surface vessels, and on preserving New Delhi’s capacity to generate naval and air power while under missile bombardment. Finally, India might benefit from more vigorously investing in long-­range precision strike and from better leveraging the tactical benefits derived from maritime airpower. •  A more distributed and resilient fleet architecture Indian naval officers view aircraft carriers as potent symbols of national prestige, and as highly versatile platforms, capable of accomplishing a broad array of tasks, ranging from conventional combat to SLOC protection, or

The Indian Navy’s operational challenges   51 Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR). Commander Gurpreet Khurana makes the observation that carriers can serve as powerful instruments of dissuasion, ‘bestowing on India a capability to maintain its influence in these waters, and achieve a strategic dissuasion against any inimical extra-­regional power’.80 Aircraft carriers can, indeed, prove to be extremely valuable assets when responding to humanitarian emergencies or engaging in NEOs (non-­ combatant evacuation operations). A carrier can provide a self-­generating supply of fresh water, medical assistance or engineering expertise to populations in dire need, and have revealed themselves time and time again to be vital humanitarian platforms. However, as maritime operating environments become increasingly less permissive and large-­signature surface vessels appear ever more vulnerable, a number of strategists are questioning the future wartime utility of aircraft carriers, particularly if these same carriers are equipped with short-­range tactical fighters unable to penetrate highly contested airspaces or fire ordnance beyond the reach of an adversary’s littoral strike network. Some American commentators have even called for complete divestment from carriers in order to invest more heavily in submarines and small ‘influence squadrons’ of corvettes, patrol boats and amphibious ships.81 There is little chance that India would ever contemplate such a drastic move. Yet, it may be worth questioning whether the Indian Navy should concentrate so much of its resources and combat power in a relatively small number of high-­value units – whether aircraft carriers or expensive guided missile destroyers, such as the Kolkata class DDGs. By placing too many of the Indian Navy’s combat-­capability ‘eggs’ into a relatively small number of proverbial ‘baskets’, India may be providing its prospective adversaries with an inordinate tactical advantage. It is worth noting that in the past, the fear of losing an aircraft carrier has frequently prevented the Indian Navy from fully leveraging its maritime superiority.82 In the short to medium term, the Indian Navy might be particularly reluctant to deploy the INS Vikramaditya for any high-­end combat mission, considering the fact that it has yet to acquire a close-­inweapon-­system (CIWS) and was delivered without an air defence system.83 Indian defenders of the carrier battle group argue that its vulnerability to missile and torpedo attack can be alleviated by the shielding presence of its numerous escort vessels, which form a ‘layered defense’ around the carrier. This may only be partially true – after all India’s guided missile destroyers would be hard pressed to defend an Indian carrier from an incoming ballistic missile strike or a cruise missile saturation attack. The close presence of so many escorts also leads to a more concentrated fleet architecture, and thus to a greater vulnerability to tactical nuclear weapon strikes. It also ties down numerous high-­value naval assets that might be better employed accomplishing different tasks elsewhere. India’s nuclear attack submarines, for example, might be expected to help ‘screen’ India’s aircraft carriers from enemy submarines in the event of conflict. Confining

52   I. Rehman them to such a role would prevent them from engaging in forward-­ deployed sea denial. Although India will no doubt remain strongly attached to the use of carrier aviation, it might consider progressively expanding and diversifying its surface fleet, divesting from large, high-­signature platforms such as destroyers, in order to acquire more frigates, corvettes and missile boats. India might also consider increasing the strike range and capability of its carrier air assets. As Walter Ladwig has noted, the INS Vikramaditya and INS Vikrant are each slated to carry only a relatively limited number of air assets. Even operating in tandem, two Indian carriers would generate less striking power than the French carrier Charles de Gaulle, and ‘nowhere near that of a single US super carrier’.84 Neither aircraft carrier possesses a launch catapult, which means that they will need to rely on rotary wing, rather than fixed wing platforms for airborne early warning (AEW), which will considerably reduce their surveillance coverage. India’s future carrier wings are expected to be principally composed of two relatively short-­range tactical aircraft, the Russian-­designed Mig-­29K and the indigenously built naval variant of the Tejas lightweight fighter. This raises questions over their ability of the Indian Navy to generate airpower within highly contested maritime environments. The Indian Navy has indicated that its second indigenously designed aircraft carrier would be larger (in the 50,000 ton range), and equipped with a more efficient launch system, either via steam catapult, or as some as yet unconfirmed rumours have suggested, an electromagnetic aircraft system (EMALS). This would enable the Indian Navy to field an aircraft wing superior both in size and in strike range and density. Going forward, it would behove Indian naval planners to prioritise the acquisition of more long-­ranged and low-­signature air platforms. For instance, it has been reported that under a Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) programme, the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADE) and the Defence Avionics and Research Establishment are jointly developing the AURA system, a low-­observable unmanned aircraft with the ability to carry precision-­strike munitions.85 Few details have been publicly released on the AURA, apart from some concept drawings. India might consider producing a naval variant of the AURA, which could operate from aircraft carrier decks. When designing the carrier-­based AURA, Indian defence engineers should seek to prioritise certain capabilities, such as the ability to penetrate contested air environments through stealth, the AURA’s payload capacity and ability to engage in electronic warfare, and, most importantly, its unfuelled range, which should be at least double that of its current short-­ range tactical fighters. Finally, India might opt to improve the resiliency of its surface fleet by investing more heavily in electronic countermeasures, and equipping its vessels with deception emitters to confuse or decoy ASBMs or ASCM salvoes. Indian ships could also be fitted with systems for producing radar-­ opaque smoke clouds, which can confuse missile terminal guidance radar

The Indian Navy’s operational challenges   53 systems. India should also consider progressively moving away from kinetic missile interceptors, which are both cost-­prohibitive and limited in their effectiveness, in order to focus its R&D efforts on more promising next-­ generation missile defence systems, such as directed energy weaponry (DEW) and electro-­magnetic railguns.86 •  Developing a penetrating force for green water operations As early as 1995, an Israeli naval officer noted, in an article that some now consider almost prophetic, that modern navies would encounter increasing difficulties in the conduct of littoral operations.87 For the Indian Navy, acquiring, and preserving, the ability to successfully establish localised sea control within cluttered and bathymetrically challenging littoral waters is of critical importance. If India can no longer credibly threaten Pakistan’s sea lanes of communication, or operate within strike range of Pakistan’s major ports, it will lose its capacity to translate its naval superiority into effective coercive power. New Delhi would lose one its few viable options to impose costs on Pakistan, and India’s ability to dissuade Pakistani acts of sub-­conventional provocation would find itself thus further reduced. The Indian Navy recognises the difficulties inherent to littoral operations, observing in the 2007 Maritime Strategy, that, ‘phased operations in the littoral would be more complex, as there could be gaps in gaining information ascendancy due to unavoidable and inconclusive littoral melees’.88 First of all, it would be extremely difficult for Indian ships and aircraft to successfully identify and discriminate between numerous small surface craft, particularly if Pakistan chooses to conceal missile-­armed FACs amongst clusters of fishing vessels. India’s surface fleet would also experience difficulty in locating and prosecuting Pakistani diesel-­electric and midget submarines, particularly if they chose to ‘bottom’ and evade ASW sonar detection by settling on a shallow seafloor, switching off their engines and closing their seawater inlets. Even the hypothetical presence of such platforms deployed along Pakistan’s coastline could create a ‘subsurface threat-­in-being’ for the Indian Navy, and dissuade it from deploying some of its more valuable assets –particularly if the Pakistani Navy were to seed remote-­controlled mines along some of its principal maritime approaches. Finally, Indian surface ships would also run the risk of being crippled by Pakistan’s mobile shore-­based missile batteries, and would be impeded in their ability to conduct effective airborne reconnaissance and battle damage assessment (BDA) by the threat posed by units of Pakistani Marines equipped with MANPAD systems. In addition to adopting a more distributed fleet architecture, the Indian Navy might therefore also benefit from developing a small, ‘access generating’ or ‘penetrating’ littoral flotilla. This force would be placed at the vanguard of naval operations in challenging littoral environments, and would be characterised by a greater emphasis on exquisite targeting, and

54   I. Rehman on the use of vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) UAVs as airborne weapon and sensor platforms. For instance, the Indian Navy might consider acquiring more anti-­ship missiles with infrared seekers, which can better discern individual ship silhouettes and shapes, thus allowing them to bypass civilian vessels.89 Developments in unmanned rotary-­ wing craft technology also offer new opportunities for fleets seeking to scout or penetrate contested littoral regions without risking significant loss of life. The Indian Navy might thus benefit from acquiring large numbers of armed VTOL UAVs for reconnaissance, situational awareness and precision targeting support. Deploying in swarms from the decks of a flotilla of corvettes, sophisticated VTOL UAVs could expand the reach of the ships’ sensors with optical and infrared capabilities for over 100 nautical miles. The Indian Navy should also invest more heavily in small, low-­signature surface vessels such as the Kamorta class corvette, not only for ASW but also for ASUW, and mine countermeasures (MCM) missions, and focus on augmenting the size of its Special Operation Force units.90 Indian MARCOS Commandos, covertly inserted ashore via SDV or via submersible, could greatly enhance the Indian littoral battle force’s situational awareness, helping to provide terminal precision guidance for Indian missile and air strikes, and conducting BDA missions.91 Finally, the Indian Navy should consider developing an undersea battle network, composed of smart mines, midget submarines, sensors and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs), in addition to larger nuclear and diesel-­electric submarines, in order to help reconnoitre, and if necessary sanitise, contested undersea environments. UUVs, in particular, are likely to fulfil an increasingly wide spectrum of tasks in the future, ranging from MCM, to ISR and ASW.92 In the future, submarines may deploy towed payload modules carrying missiles and sensors that can be embedded on an adversary’s continental shelf, or form the central components of undersea ‘systems of systems’, with large ‘mother’ submarines serving as underwater carriers for shoals of smaller UUVs.93 •  Breaking China’s kill chain In order to better ride out a Chinese missile bombardment campaign, New Delhi should focus on better dispersing and hardening its naval and air bases, as well as its fuel and ammunition depots. Both the Indian Navy and Indian Air Force might thus envisage investing in large numbers of rapid runway repair kits, and consider incorporating emergency landings on highways into their pilots’ regular training practices. Along the Sino-­ Indian land border, India might find itself engaged in a sustainment/ interdiction competition with Chinese missile and air assets. New Delhi might therefore focus on acquiring a deeper inventory of long-­range precision-­strike systems, such as the Nirbhay class cruise missile, currently

The Indian Navy’s operational challenges   55 under development.94 Indian aircraft equipped with long-­range anti-­ radiation missiles and beyond visual range (BVR) ordnance could engage in standoff strikes against Chinese air defences, radar systems and runways. Tibetan railway infrastructure might present another target of opportunity for Indian combat aircraft. Finally, competition in the EM-­Cyber domain will form a core component of any Indian counter anti-­access campaign. Over the past two years, the Indian Navy has begun to recruit a dedicated cadre of future cyber warfare specialists.95 This is a step in the right direction, and should receive additional MoD funding and support. New Delhi could also attempt to disable or temporarily blind China’s satellite infrastructure through other non-­kinetic means, such as ground-­based electronic jammers and ‘dazzling’ laser systems. The Indian Air Force might also benefit from inducting dedicated electronic warfare platforms. •  The importance of the P-­8I India’s acquisition of eight Boeing P-­8I (Poseidon) Neptune Aircraft – with an option for four more – constitutes perhaps one of the most encouraging developments, as it will significantly enhance the Indian Navy’s ability to conduct long-­range maritime reconnaissance and ASW. The Poseidon’s Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) will also allow the Indian Navy to more easily detect diesel-­electric submarines’ periscopes – a critical factor when addressing the Pakistani submarine threat. Presently based at Rajali, in Tamil Nadu, India’s P-­8Is will eventually be deployed to India’s Eastern Naval Command. With a mission radius of 600 nautical miles for six hours on station and up to 1200 nautical miles for four hours on station, India’s P-­8Is will allow the Indian Navy to greatly enhance its maritime and littoral surveillance capabilities over the Bay of Bengal, as well as its ability for maritime interdiction and ASW. •  More effectively leveraging maritime airpower By virtue of its peninsular geography, India appears ideally positioned to engage in airborne maritime interdiction. For the time being, however, the Indian Air Force remains heavily wedded to counter-­air and Supression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) missions, and remains reluctant to assign platforms to primarily maritime interdiction-­oriented roles. The Indian Air Force currently possesses only one squadron of specifically designated maritime strike aircraft – ten Jaguar IM fighters, recently fitted with Harpoon Block II ASCMs. In the future, India might consider acquiring a small fleet of long-­range bombers equipped with ASCMs, in order to better radiate airpower out into the southern reaches of the Indian Ocean. India’s future Rafales also have the potential to effectively prosecute targets at sea, particularly if upgraded for Rafale F3-R standard, and equipped with conformal fuel tanks (CFTs) and Exocet AM39 Block  2

56   I. Rehman ASCMs.96 Similarly, India’s Sukhoi-­30 MKIs, with their 1800 km range, ability to loiter over targets and capacity for being refuelled mid-­flight, appear well placed to play a vital maritime interdiction role over large tracts of India’s maritime environs.97 In effect, squadrons of Su-­30MKIs have already been moved to refurbished airbases along India’s eastern and southern seaboards in order to keep ‘strategic vigil’ over the Indian Ocean.98 For the time being, however, it would appear that these deployments have been made primarily with aerial reconnaissance and counter-­ air missions in mind, rather than for purposes of establishing a genuine maritime strike force. For all the talk of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands serving as an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’, the Indian Air Force seems to remain highly reticent to station high-­end aircraft away from the Indian mainland – and this despite the fact that the Andaman and Nicobar Command’s (ANC) airfields are being lengthened and upgraded in order to accommodate heavier aircraft. In conversations with this author, Indian Air Force officers have strenuously argued that there is no need to place valuable assets on the Andaman and Nicobar islands, as mainland-­based fighters, with the increase of range and air-­to-air refuelling techniques, now have the range to cover almost the entire Indian Ocean Region.99 As Patrick Bratton has noted, the Indian Air Force’s reluctance to parcel out assets to the ANC theatre command may be imputed, in part, to its organisational culture, and traditional fear of seeing its independent strategic role diluted through jointness.100 This points to a more fundamental issue – the troubled state of inter-­service relations in India, and the lack of genuine inter-­service synergy between the Indian Air Force and Navy. Although both services have greatly enhanced their level of cooperation, most notably through the Tropex Exercises, which take place every year in the Indian Ocean, such efforts tend to be not so much ‘integrated’, as ‘coordinated’, with air assets from both services provided with pre-­ designated air corridors and operating under the orders of their respective service commanders.101 To be fair, Navy/Air Force synchronisation in maritime strike warfare is notoriously hard to achieve. Indeed, one could argue that the United States only really mastered such a level of operational proficiency through the catalytic experience of the First Gulf War.102 In order for the Indian Air Force and Indian Navy to achieve more than a rudimentary level of jointness, major changes will need to come down from on high. In particular, India’s political leadership will need to reform higher defence management and adopt some deep and wide-­ranging organisational reforms.103

Conclusion Over the past decade, India has pursued an ambitious naval modernisation programme and the Indian Navy is now increasingly perceived as a highly capable security provider in the IOR. India’s naval expansion,

The Indian Navy’s operational challenges   57 however, has frequently been stymied by a series of infrastructural, organisational and political failings. These failings have had a damaging effect not only on the Indian Navy’s force structure, but also on its officers’ morale, and urgently need to be addressed. In particular, India’s MoD will need to improve pay and service conditions for Indian officers and sailors, and expedite the procurement of much needed platforms. The state of India’s submarine fleet is cause for grave concern, as is the glaring vulnerability of some of India’s capital ships to air or missile attack. Perhaps most importantly, India’s current carrier-­centric force design may be ill adapted to future operational challenges. In order to remain strategically relevant, the Indian Navy must place greater emphasis on penetrating contested maritime environments and on acquiring a more flexible, and distributed, fleet architecture. Future coercive campaigns along Pakistan’s coastline may require a greater investment in low-­signature surface vessels, unconventional warfare and littoral ASW. Meanwhile, if a conflict with China were to horizontally escalate to the maritime domain, the Indian Navy would need to work more closely with its sister services in order to prevent itself from being outflanked in the Arabian Sea, while successfully dismantling core components of China’s reconnaissance strike complex. This will require an enhanced ability to engage in standoff precision strikes, as well as stronger investments in electronic and cyber warfare.

Notes    1 Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities (London: Penguin Classics, 2003 edn), p. 5.    2 See Santany Choudhury, ‘India’s Naval Chief Resigns After Latest Mishap’, the Wall Street Journal, 26 February 2013.    3 India’s Maritime Military Strategy describes the current era as being one of ‘violent peace’, subject to the ‘volatility of international geopolitics’. See Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy (New Delhi: Indian Navy Integrated Headquarters, 2007), p. 10.    4 Emily O. Goldman, Power in Uncertain Times: Strategy in the Fog of Peace (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), p. 3.    5 Anti-­access (A2) strategies seek to inhibit military movement into a theatre of operations, whereas area-­denial (AD) operations can be defined as activities seeking to deny freedom of action within a designated area. As Evan Montgomery has noted, these two objectives often overlap. See Evan Braden Montgomery, ‘Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific: China’s Rise and the Future of U.S. Power Projection’, International Security, Vol.  38, No.  4, 2014, p. 12.    6 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Maritime Warfare in a Maturing Precision-­Strike Regime (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2014), p. 77.    7 Nora Bensahel and David W. Barno, The Carrier Air Wing of the Future (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2014).    8 Mark Gunzinger and Bryan Clark, ‘The Next Carrier Air Wing: Stealthy UCAS Needed for Contested Airspace’, Defense News, 24 February 2014, www.

58   I. Rehman defensenews.com/article/20140224/DEFFEAT05/302240037/Commentary-­ Next-Carrier-­Air-Wing.    9 Chinese military theorists view electronic and information warfare as key enablers for follow-­on operations. One well-­known strategist, for example, makes the following observation, In the modern military, each combat unit and each weapon system are coagulated to become one operational body through the bonding action of the military information system, and if it loses this bonding action, then the military becomes a plate of loose sand. Yuan Wenxian, Lectures on Joint Campaign Operations (Beijing: PLA National Defense University Press, 2009), p. 2.   10 Peter Dombrowski and Chris C. Demchak, ‘Cyber War, Cybered Conflict, and the Maritime Domain’, Naval War College Review, Vol.  67, No.  2, 2014, p. 90.   11 Admiral Jonathon W. Greenert, ‘Imminent Domain’, Proceedings, Vol.  138, No. 12, 2012.   12 As early as 2001, some observers were calling attention to the increased vulnerability of surface platforms operating within contested littoral waters. See, for example, Daniel Goure, ‘The Tyranny of Forward Presence’, Naval War College Review, Vol. 54, No. 3, 2001, pp. 11–24.   13 For a discussion of the range of incentives for weaker states to threaten the use of nuclear weapons during conventional conflict, see Daryl G. Press and Keir A. Lieber, Coercive Nuclear Campaigns in the 21st Century: Understanding Adversary Incentives and Options for Nuclear Use (Monterey, CA: Center on Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013).   14 For an Indian perspective on Pakistan’s strategy of offensive sea denial, see Vijay Sakhuja, ‘Naval Policy and Strategy of Pakistan’, Air Power Journal, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2004. See also Cdr Abhijit Singh, ‘The Pakistan Navy: A Transformation from Fledgling Force to Fighting Machine’, Journal of Defense Studies, Vol.  5, No. 4, 2011.   15 Freedom to Use the Seas, p. 73.   16 See Moeed Yusuf, ‘Pakistan’s View of Security in the Indian Ocean’, in John Garofano and Andrea J. Dew (eds), Deep Currents and Rising Tides: The Indian Ocean and International Security (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), p. 142.   17 Raja Rab Nawaz, Maritime Strategy in Pakistan (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, 2004), p. 69.   18 Usman Ansari, ‘Interview of Admiral Asif Sandila, Chief of Naval Staff, Pak­ istan Navy’, Defense News, 20 February 2012, www.defensenews.com/ article/20120220/DEFREG03/302200008/Interview-­Adm-Asif-­Sandila-Chief-­ Naval-Staff-­Pakistan-Navy.   19 Fahran Bokhari, ‘Push and Pull: Pakistan’s Navy Confronts an East/West Divide’, Jane’s Navy International, 19 May 2011.   20 Commander Sajjad Ali Shah Bokhari, ‘Indian Nuke Subs Game-­Changer in Next War’, Dawn, 19 August 2013, www.dawn.com/news/1036866/indian-­ nuke-subs-­game-changer-­in-next-­war/print.   21 Author’s conversation with Pakistani defence officials, December 2012, New Delhi.   22 Ridzwan Rahmat, ‘Pakistan Navy to Shift Submarines from Karachi to Ormara’, Jane’s Navy International, 23 April 2014.   23 Christopher Clary, Deterrence Stability and the Conventional Balance of Forces in South Asia (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2013), p. 16.   24 Usman Ansari, ‘Pakistan Navy Test-­Fires Land-­Attack Missile’, Defense News, 21

The Indian Navy’s operational challenges   59 December 2012, www.defensenews.com/article/20121221/DEFREG04/31221 0004/Pakistan-­Navy-Test-­fires-Land-­Attack-Missile.   25 C-­802/Ying Ji-­802/Saccade, Federation of American Scientists: Military Network, www.fas.org/man/dod-­101/sys/missile/row/c-­802.htm.   26 Kate Tringham, ‘Pakistan’s First AZMAT-­class FAC Launched by China’, Jane’s Navy International, 27 September 2011.   27 David C. Isby, ‘Pakistan Navy Demonstrates Shore-­Based SAMS’, Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, 2 July 2011.   28 Usman Ansari, ‘Interview of Admiral Asif Sandila, Chief of Naval Staff, Pak­ istan Navy’, Defense News, 20 February 2012, www.defensenews.com/ article/20120220/DEFREG03/302200008/Interview-­Adm-Asif-­Sandila-Chief-­ Naval-Staff-­Pakistan-Navy.   29 James Goldrick, No Easy Answers: The Development of the Navies of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh (South Godstone, UK: Spantech and Lancer, 1997), p. 145.   30 Sushant Singh, ‘Pakistan Government to Buy Eight Submarines From China’, The Indian Express, 2 April 2015.   31 Two of Agosta-­90B submarines are currently equipped with the French-­ designed MESMA AIP system.   32 For a description of the similar threat posed by Iranian midget submarines to United States and Gulf Navy ships in the Persian Gulf, see Awad Mustafa, ‘Gulf Navies Seek Solutions to Iran Midget Sub Threat’, Defense News, 9 November 2013, www.defensenews.com/article/20131109/DEFREG043/ 311090021/Gulf-­Navies-Seek-­Solutions-Iran-­Midget-Sub-­Threat.   33 Geoffrey Till, Sea-­Power: A Guide to the Twenty-­First Century (New York: Routledge, 2009, 2nd edn), p. 73.   34 Pakistan currently has an inventory of about half a dozen operational P-­3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft. Each carries a mixed payload of eight Harpoon missiles and six torpedoes. The P-­3s are based at the Naval Air Base PNS Mehran, located near Karachi. In May 2011, Pakistan’s naval air arm suffered a serious blow when the naval base was attacked by Islamic militants from the TTP (Tehrik-­i-Taliban Pakistan). The militants succeeded in destroying two aircraft with rocket-­propelled grenades (RPGs) before being neutralised by Pakistani Special Operation Forces. A small squadron of Sea King helicopters equipped with Exocet missiles are also stationed in Karachi.   35 Pakistani Air Commodore Mahmood Khalid, quoted in Robert Hewson, ‘Airshow China 2012: CM-­400 AKG Becomes Pakistan’s “Carrier Killer” ’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 16 November 2012.   36 ‘Naval Chief Inaugurates Naval Strategic Forces Headquarters’, Inter Services Public Relations, 19 May 2012, www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-­press_ release&id=2067. For reports of Pakistan developing a naval variant of the Babur, see Usman Ansari, ‘Pakistan Navy Test-­fires Land-­Attack Missile’, Defense News, 21 December 2012, www.defensenews.com/article/20121221/ DEFREG04/312210004/Pakistan-­Navy-Test-­fires-Land-­Attack-Missile.   37 Author’s conversation with Pakistani military officials, November 2012.   38 See Commander Muhammad Azam Khan (Retd.) ‘S-­2: Options for the Pak­ istan Navy’, Naval War College Review, Vol. 63, No. 3, 2010, pp. 86–103.   39 For a superb and detailed description of the Pakistani military’s thinking with regard to coercive nuclear escalation, see Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), Chapters 8–9.   40 For a more detailed study of emerging naval nuclear dynamics in the Indian Ocean, see Iskander Rehman, ‘Drowning Stability: The Perils of Naval Nuclearization and Brinkmanship in the Indian Ocean’, Naval War College Review, Vol.  65, No.  4, 2012, and Iskander Rehman, Murky Waters: Naval Nuclear

60   I. Rehman Dynamics in the Indian Ocean (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, forthcoming 2015).   41 Wayne P. Hughes Jr, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, Second Edition, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), p. 147.   42 See also Iskander Rehman, Shallow Nations, Deep Waters (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013), http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/05/31/shallow-­nations-deep-­waters/g836.   43 For an excellent overview of thinking with regard to naval coercion and diplomacy, see Commander Kevin Rowlands, ‘Decided Preponderance at Sea: Naval Diplomacy in Strategic Thought’, Naval War College Review, Vol.  65, No. 4, 2012.   44 John B. Hattendorf, U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents (Newport, RI: US Naval War College Newport Papers, 2006), p. 39.   45 Freedom to Use the Seas, p. 74.   46 The 1973 Mediterranean crisis, which led to extremely tense naval interactions between the Soviet and United States navies, provides a fascinating historical case study of naval friction. See Lyle J. Goldstein and Yuri M. Zhukov, ‘A Tale of Two Fleets: A Russian Perspective on the 1973 Naval Standoff in the Mediterranean’, Naval War College Review, Vol. 57, No. 2, 2004, pp. 28–63.   47 Pakistani vessels have, in the past, threatened direct collisions with Indian naval ships, and ‘buzzed’ Indian flotillas with maritime aircraft. See ‘India and Pakistan Clash over Naval Ships’, Rediff News, 18 July 2011, and Sandeep Unnithan, ‘Stronger Tides: Pakistan Warship Violated Safety Norms, Damages Indian Frigate’, India Today, 25 June 2011.   48 For a detailed exploration of these strategic trends, see C. Raja Mohan, Samudra Manthan: Sino-­Indian Rivalry in the Indo-­Pacific (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012).   49 For an excellent study of the strategic and bureaucratic drivers behind China’s naval transition, see Nan Li, ‘The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy: From “Near Coast” and “Near Seas” to “Far Seas” ’, Asian Security, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2009.   50 For more details on China’s energy import sources, see US Energy Information Administration, China: Overview, 4 February 2014 (last updated), www. eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=ch.   51 See ‘China and Africa: Little to Fear but Itself ’, The Economist, 21 September 2013.   52 For a discussion of the evolution of India’s mindset with regard to extra-­ regional presence in the Indian Ocean, see Iskander Rehman, ‘From an Ocean of Peace to a Sea of Friends’, in Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu et al. (eds), Shaping the Emerging World: India and the Multilateral Order (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013), pp. 131–153.   53 For a sampling of Indian concerns, see Maseeh Rahman, ‘Chinese Plans in Seychelles Revive Indian Fears of Encirclement’, Guardian, 22 March 2012, www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/22/china-­seychelles-indian-­fearsencirclement; Ranjit B. Rai, ‘China’s String of Pearls – Is Male Next?’, Indian Defence Review, 24 July 2013, www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/chinas-­ string-of-­pearls-is-­male-next/; and P.K. Ghosh, ‘Indian Ocean Dynamics: An Indian Perspective’, East Asia Forum, 5 April 2011, www.eastasiaforum. org/2011/04/05/indian-­ocean-dynamics-­an-indian-­perspective/.   54 See Daniel J. Kostecka, ‘Places Rather Than Bases: The Chinese Navy’s Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean’, Naval War College Review, Vol. 64, No. 1, 2011.   55 Freedom to Use the Seas, p. 83.   56 ‘No Chinese Military Bases in Indian Ocean: Menon’, Outlook, 11 September 2009.

The Indian Navy’s operational challenges   61   57 As one former Indian naval officer noted, ‘the only way that India can neutralize China’s burgeoning influence in these countries is through diplomatic and not military means’. Author’s conversation with Vice-­Admiral Premvir Das (Retd), 2010.   58 Admiral Arun Prakash, ‘China and the Indian Ocean Region’, Indian Defense Review, Vol. 21, No. 4, 2006, p. 11. For a superb overview of India’s strategic and diplomatic efforts in the IOR, see David Brewster, India’s Ocean: The Story of India’s Bid for Regional Leadership (New York: Routledge, 2014).   59 See Harsh V. Pant, ‘Island Nations Play China, India’, YaleGlobal, 9 January 2013, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/island-­nations-play-­china-india.   60 See Selig S. Harrison, ‘India, the U.S., and Superpower Rivalry’, in Selig S. Harrison and K. Subrahmanyam (eds), Superpower Rivalry in the Indian Ocean: Indian and American Perspectives (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 249.   61 Rahul Singh, ‘China’s Submarines in Indian Ocean Worry Indian Navy’, Hindustan Times, 7 April 2013, www.hindustantimes.com/india-­news/newdelhi/ china-­s-submarines-­in-indian-­ocean-worry-­indian-navy/article1–1038689.aspx.   62 Lt Gen. Michael T. Flynn, Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘Annual Threat Assessment: Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee’, United States Senate, 11 February 2014, www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/ News/2014_DIA_SFR_SASC_ATA_FINAL.pdf.   63 James R. Holmes, Andrew C. Winner and Toshi Yoshihara, Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty-­First Century (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 155.   64 For an excellent study of China’s anti-­piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden since their inception in December 2008, see Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange, No Substitute for Experience: Chinese Anti-­Piracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden (Newport, RI: US Naval War College China Maritime Studies, 2013), www.usnwc.edu/Research–-Gaming/China-­Maritime-Studies-­Institute/Publications/documents/CMS10_Web_2.aspx.   65 Amitav Ranjan, ‘China Set to Mine Central Indian Ocean, Delhi Worried’, The Indian Express, 31 July 2011, http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/china-­setto-­mine-central-­indian-ocean-­delhi-worried/824900/.   66 C. Raja Mohan, ‘String of Ports’, The Indian Express, 11 April 2014. Kings College professor Harsh V. Pant concurs with this assessment, positing that, ‘Given the immense geographical advantages that India enjoys in the Indian Ocean, China will have great difficulty in rivaling India in the Indian Ocean.’ See Harsh V. Pant, ‘China’s Naval Expansion in the Indian Ocean and India-­ China Rivalry’, The Asia-­Pacific Journal, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2010.   67 Sunil Khilnani et al., Nonalignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century (New Delhi: Center for Policy Research, 2012), pp. 38–41.   68 For an excellent summary of this debate see Shashank Joshi, ‘Can India Blockade China’, The Diplomat, 12 August 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/ can-­india-blockade-­china/.   69 For example, Shyam Saran, a former Indian Foreign Secretary, has stated that India’s ‘control over these islands, strategically placed as they are, help us manage China’s rise and protect our turf as it were’. See Address by Shyam Saran Special Envoy of PM on, ‘India’s Foreign Policy and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands’, at Port Blair, 5 September 2009, www.maritimeindia.org/ sites/all/files/pdf/Shyam_Saran_Address.pdf. However, for a contrary view about the capabilities of the Andaman and Nicobar Command see Chapter 4 in this edited volume.   70 Some Indian analysts have rightly argued that India faces a severe ‘Hormuz dilemma’ of its own. Indeed, India now imports 82 per cent of its oil needs,

62   I. Rehman mostly from the Gulf. See Victor Mallet, ‘India’s Reliance on Imported Energy Threatens Long-­Term Recovery’, The Financial Times, 12 September 2013. For ‘Hormuz dilemma’, see C. Uday Bhaskar, ‘China and India in the Indian Ocean Region: Neither Conflict nor Cooperation Preordained’, China Report, Vol. 46, No. 3, 2010.   71 See Toshi Yoshihara, ‘Chinese Views of India in the Indian Ocean: A Geopolitical Perspective’, Strategic Analysis, Vol.  36, No.  12, 2012, and Geoff Dyer, The Contest of the Century: The New Era of Competition with China – And How America Can Win (New York: Knopf, 2014), Chapter 2. In reality, however, a distant blockade of China would be fraught with numerous challenges, ranging from the difficulties in screening and identifying merchandise bound for China to the blunting effect of Chinese rationing and stockpiling. For sceptical views of the effectiveness of a distant blockade see Gabriel S. Collins and William S. Murray, ‘No Oil for the Lamps of China’, Naval War College Review, Vol.  61, No. 2, 2008 and Evan Braden Montgomery, ‘Reconsidering a Naval Blockade of China: A Response to Mirski’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4, 2013.   72 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (Arlington, VA: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013), p. 81.   73 US Naval War College Professors Jim Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara employ the Mahanian concept of a ‘Fortress Fleet’, to describe such a strategy, and note the following, If Chinese land forces can hoist a protective umbrella over the near seas, PLA Navy units will be able to range freely within the waters Beijing deems important without leaving the protective cover of shore defenses. Under this aegis, defense will increasingly blur into offense, even eastward of the first island chain. Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Red Star Over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012), p. 74.   74 For a detailed analysis of the difficulties in generating airpower while under sustained missile bombardment, see John Stillion and David T. Orletsky, Airbase Vulnerability to Cruise-­Missile and Ballistic-­Missile Attacks: Technology, Scenarios, and U.S. Air Force Responses (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999).   75 Offshore oil fields near Mumbai provide nearly one-­third of India’s crude oil, and gas fields in the Bay of Bengal meet about 75 per cent of India’s national demand. See Mrityunjoy Mazumdar, ‘Indian Navy Inducting Support Vessels for Securing Offshore Resource Fields’, Jane’s Navy International, 10 October 2013.   76 For a detailed study of the various applications of Chinese submarine-­ launched cruise strikes see William S. Murray, ‘Underwater TELs and China’s Antisubmarine Warfare: Evolving Strength and a Calculated Weakness’, in Peter Dutton et al. (eds), China’s Near Seas Combat Capabilities (Newport, RI: US Naval War College, China Maritime Studies, 2014).   77 J. Michael Cole, ‘China Developing Navalized Version of DH-­10 Cruise Missile’, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 2 August 2012.   78 In one recent Indian simulation, described by retired Indian brigadier Arun Saghal, the PLAN had access to various ‘lily pads’ in the Indian Ocean. These small bases temporarily stationed and berthed Chinese vessels, and provided ‘technical support, maintenance, refueling and associated material supplies’, to Chinese carrier battle groups, which operated supported by ‘two to three nuclear-­powered attack submarines (SSN)’ and under the cover of ‘shore-­ based medium range missiles, including anti-­ship ballistic missiles’. See Arun

The Indian Navy’s operational challenges   63 Saghal, ‘China’s Military Modernization: Responses from India’, in Ashley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner (eds), Strategic Asia 2012–13: China’s Military Challenge (Washington, DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2012), p. 282.   79 Since 2012, an increasing number of Chinese-­language sources have indicated that China is in the process of deploying an ocean-­floor surveillance network along its coastline. Some Chinese analysts, note Lyle Goldstein and Shannon Knight, have openly suggested that in the future China should deploy deepbed sonar arrays in locations such as the Bay of Bengal, ‘in order to support ASW operations in those sea areas’. See Lyle Goldstein and Shannon Knight, ‘Wired for Sound in the Near Seas’, Proceedings, Vol.  140, No.  4, 2014. Quote drawn from the authors’ translation of You Min, ‘How China Can Guard Against U.S. Nuclear Submarines’, Naval and Merchant Ships, Summer 2013, pp. 32–37.   80 Commander Gurpreet S. Khurana, ‘Aircraft Carriers and India’s Naval Doctrine’, Journal of Defense Studies, Vol.  2, No.  1, 2008; also see Commander Abhijit Singh, ‘INS Vikramaditya and the Aircraft Carrier Debate’, The Diplomat, 10 December 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/ins-­vikramaditya-and-­ the-aircraft-­carrier-debate/.   81 Captain Henry J. Hendrix, At What Cost a Carrier? (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2013).   82 Iskander Rehman, ‘India’s Future Aircraft Carrier Force and the Need for Strategic Flexibility’, IDSA Strategic Comments, 1 June 2010.   83 Vivek Raghuvanshi, ‘Indian Navy to Open Search for Carrier Air Defense System’, Defense News, 11 March 2014, www.defensenews.com/article/ 20140311/DEFREG03/303110023/Indian-­Navy-Open-­Search-Carrier-­AirDefense-­System.   84 Walter C. Ladwig III, ‘Drivers of Indian Naval Expansion’, in Harsh Pant (ed.), The Rise of the Indian Navy: Internal Vulnerabilities, External Challenges (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), pp. 19–41.   85 Huw Williams, ‘Unmanned Intentions: India Sets its Sights on Domestic Capabilities’, Jane’s International Defense Review, 19 March 2013.   86 For a discussion of how directed energy weaponry or DEW could help reverse the cost-­imposition calculus of future missile competitions in favour of the defence, see Mark Gunzinger and Chris Dougherty, Changing the Game: The Promise of Directed-­Energy Weapons (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2012).   87 Rear Admiral Yedidia Ya’ari, ‘The Littoral Arena: A Word of Caution’, Naval War College Review, Vol. 48, No. 2, 1995.   88 Freedom to Use the Seas, p. 108.   89 Norway’s Naval Strike Missile (NSM), with its highly sophisticated capacity for discrimination, could be a useful acquisition in this regard. See Christopher P. Cavas, ‘Norway’s Naval Strike Missile Aims for the Pacific’, Defense News, 9 April 2014, www.defensenews.com/article/20140409/DEFREG01/304090033/ Norway-­s-Naval-­Strike-Missile-­Aims-Pacific.   90 India’s Marine Commando Force (MCF, or more commonly known as MARCOS) has, reportedly, only 2000–2500 personnel. MARCOS commandos are trained to conduct harbour attack, ship sabotage and rapid amphibious assaults. See ‘Special Forces, Maritime: India’, Jane’s Amphibious and Special Forces, 14 December 2012.   91 For a detailed exploration of how Special Operation Forces can serve as an early-­entry force to blind or disrupt enemy C4ISR networks, see Christopher Dougherty and Jim Thomas, Beyond the Ramparts: The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013).

64   I. Rehman   92 Rosalyn Turner, ‘The Unmanned Underwater Future’, The Strategist, 9 April 2014, www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-­unmanned-underwater-­future/.   93 Krepinevich, Maritime Warfare in a Maturing Precision-­Strike Regime.   94 The Nirbhay cruise missile is a subsonic cruise missile, with a reported range of over 1000 km. See Kelvin Wong, ‘India Plans Second Nirbhay Cruise Missile Trial’, Jane’s International Defense Review, 6 February 2014.   95 ‘Navy Plans Dedicated Cadre of Cyber Sea Warriors’, The Times of India, 13 July 2012.   96 See ‘Rafale Tested With Maximum Weapons Load-­12 Guided Weapons Underwing’, Defense Update, 27 January 2014, http://defense-­update. com/20140127_rafale_omnirole_configuration.html#.U2kycO2JWS0.   97 India’s Hindustan Aeronautics Facility in Nask is reportedly in the process of modifiying some of India’s Sukhoi-­30MKI’s fuselage in order to allow them to be fitted with BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles. See Rajat Pandit, ‘After Army and Navy, IAF Gears Up for Supersonic BrahMos Missile Punch on Sukhois’, The Times of India, 10 February 2014.   98 ‘Antony to Inaugurate Su-­30 Squadrons at Thanjabur Air Base’, The Times of India, 26 May 2013.   99 In 2011, a Times of India article reported that the air defence of the islands would be ensured by IAF Su-­30 MKI fighters based in Midnapore. See Jayanta Gupta, ‘Kalaikunda Fighters in Charge of Andaman and Nicobar Islands Defenses’, The Times of India, 3 October 2011. 100 For more on this see Chapter 5 in this volume; also see Patrick Bratton, ‘The Creation of Indian Integrated Commands: Organizational Learning and Andaman and Nicobar Command’, Strategic Analysis, Vol.  36, No.  3, 2012, p. 450. 101 For a detailed discussion of jointness or the lack thereof in India’s armed services, and of the troubled state of civil-­military relations, see Anit Mukherjee, ‘Failing to Deliver: Post-­Crises Defense Reforms in India, 1998–2010’, (New Delhi: IDSA Occasional Papers, 2011), www.idsa.in/occasionalpapers/Post CrisesDefenceReformsinIndia. 102 Benjamin S. Lambeth, ‘Air Force-­Navy Integration in Strike Warfare: A Role Model for Seamless Joint-­Service Operations’, Naval War College Review, Vol. 61, No. 1, 2008. 103 Such measures would include, amongst others, finally appointing a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) in lieu of the largely ineffectual Chiefs of Staff Committee (CSC), demanding a higher level of technical expertise from the MoD’s civilian bureaucracy, the establishment of additional joint theatre commands, and a closer integration between civilian and military bureaucracies. For a deeper discussion on the numerous maladies resulting from the continued irresolution of these issues, see Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming Without Aiming: India’s Military Modernization (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010).

4 In the far seas Projecting India’s naval power Abhijit Singh

Introduction In recent years, India’s growing sea-­power and maritime reach has been the focus of much analytical interest.1 The term ‘maritime reach’ – used occasionally as a euphemism for ‘expeditionary capability’, but more often as a substitute for the more politically correct expression ‘Out of Area Operations’ – evokes interest as it signifies a nation’s political willingness to use maritime power for strategic purposes in its near and extended neighbourhood.2 It also underscores the need for a navy to possess both the operational and conceptual tools to undertake missions far away from its home shores, and a proactive and pre-­emptive approach that enables power-­projection in its regions of strategic interest. Over the years, the Indian Navy’s operational outlook has evolved considerably. Since 2005, it has been acquiring top-­of-the-­line military maritime assets, and has updated its operational procedures to address emerging crises in the Indian Ocean.3 With the induction of frontline ships, airborne surveillance assets, shore-­based and carrier-­based aircraft, amphibious platforms and unmanned aerial vehicles, the navy’s participation in maritime security, constabulary operations and benign missions has grown significantly. Despite its growing capabilities and the expanding frame of operations, however, the Indian Navy hasn’t lived up to its promise of strategic ‘power-­projection’.4 Maritime observers point out that notwithstanding its contribution to regional maritime security, the Indian Navy is yet to develop the combat capability and operational sustenance needed for projecting power in the far-­seas.5 The aim of this chapter is to critically appraise the Indian Navy’s evolving maritime reach by plotting the recent evolution of its operational capability, its ‘far-­seas’ outlook and developing force-­architecture. It provides an assessment of the debates within the navy on the contentious subject of expeditionary operations, and an account of its evolving strategic thinking vis-­à-vis forward-­operations capabilities. The central argument is that the Indian Navy’s inability to develop the substantive capacities for sustained operations in the ‘far-­seas’ is mainly attributable to

66   A. Singh a lack of capacity and willingness to project hard-­power in the extended neighbourhood. An excessive focus on benign and constabulary missions in the IOR, and tardiness in the procurement of critical assets for littoral operations and land-­attack, has prevented the navy from playing a strategic role in the Indo-­Pacific.

‘Far-­seas’ and expeditionary operations To enable a clear understanding of the Indian Navy’s far-­seas power-­ projection, it may be useful to outline a working definition of the term ‘far-­seas’. The term may conceptually be described as a maritime space that either lies outside the known operating limits of a nation’s maritime forces, or beyond the traditional sphere of influence of the state, where a maritime force faces a strong strategic imperative for operational presence. From a practical stand-­point, however, there are two ways of viewing far-­ seas operations. One is to present it as a defining capability that allows a maritime force to project hard-­power over the distant littorals, decisively influencing events on land. The focus of such an approach is on deployment of coercive force that shapes the strategic environment and helps advance national interests. By its very nature, the hard-­power discourse is structured in a realist framework that perceives the maritime domain as a contested zone, and navies as combat instruments meant to preserve sovereign stakes and pursue national interests. The second approach is to look at far-­seas presence in benign outreach terms as a regional enabler, gainfully deploying the expressions ‘net-­ security provider’ and ‘out-­of-area contingencies’. The high-­seas, the pragmatic narrative argues, is a global common and must be secured through cooperative endeavours and joint-­operations to tackle common threats. The emphasis here is on the benevolent use of maritime power, for humanitarian assistance and to protect against non-­traditional threats such as pirates, traffickers, arms smugglers, and even environmental hazards. The two approaches have opposing animating ideologies, but the former establishes a more compelling rationale for strategic reach: the need to project coercive power over prolonged periods in the far-­seas. While India’s strategic thinkers broadly accept the need for a far-­seas presence (with a slight preference for the benign outreach approach), most discussions on the subject invariably end up as a debate on ‘expeditionary operations’. India’s defence forces avoid the official use of the term ‘expeditionary’ – in part because of the aversion of their political masters for any military activism that could be construed as interference in the internal affairs of another state; so much so that even well-­ intentioned ‘stabilisation operations’ that might mistakenly be construed as an intrusion in another nation’s internal affairs evoke a sceptical response.6

Projecting India’s naval power   67 In the main, however, the ambiguity concerning maritime ‘expeditionary operations’ stems from the inability of practitioners and analysts to come to grips with the navy’s combat role in a land conflict. Since the navy has no control over affairs on land, sceptics believe it cannot be a consequential actor in a territorial war.7 The proponents of expeditionary operations, on the other hand, argue that distance operations are a sine qua non for a blue water force and a defining element of a maritime strategic vision that must seek to preserve national stakes in regional and foreign waters.8 For supporters of the concept, ‘expeditionary capability’ is an indispensable military tool in a rapidly changing geo-­political climate that affords a navy the means and ability to project power over distances and time. Not only must the Indian Navy develop the capability to project hard power in distant waters, they posit, it must also have a well-­developed and clearly articulated doctrine for operating in the distant-­seas.9 More importantly, proponents of expeditionary operations see naval force as a key contributing element in the outcome of a land war – both through maritime posturing and direct assistance to the ground effort.10 Citing the navy’s decisive contribution in land conflicts during Operation Talwar in 1999 (when its warships deployed off-­Karachi threatening a partial blockade)11 and its significant contribution during the 2004 Tsunami relief operations, as also the non-­combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in Lebanon (2006) and Libya (2011), supporters argue in favour of ‘far-­seas’ operations capability as a crucial component of India’s naval force architecture.12 A defining debate on the relevance of the navy in a land conflict was held during the naval commanders’ conference at New Delhi in 2006.13 The Indian Navy’s top brass deemed the issue to be of critical importance in view of the operations of the US Navy in land-­locked Afghanistan. Against the backdrop of the emerging challenges of information and communication technology, net-­centric warfare and integrated operations with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and satellites, the naval leadership recognised forward presence as a crucial capability in ensuring the navy’s continuing relevance in confronting threats to national security and addressing international crises.14 This is significant because a year later, the Indian Navy’s Maritime Strategy (2007) officially acknowledged the role of expeditionary capability in continental wars, aiming to ‘target the adversary’s territory from the sea, by the delivery of ordinance’.15 It also underlined the need for the navy to have the capability to ‘project power’, as a means of supporting foreign policy objectives and achieving national aims.16 More importantly, the Indian Navy’s military maritime strategy validated ‘forward presence’ as being ‘the enabling element of conventional deterrence’,17 even though this was meant to apply expressly to the Indian Ocean. The navy’s re-­conceptualisation of its strategic role was aptly complemented by the Indian Army’s own endeavours to expand its amphibious

68   A. Singh capability by re-­raising the 91 Infantry Brigade in 2009 for amphibious warfare,18 even as it avidly mulled an ‘out-­of-area’ role.19 Meanwhile, cognisant of the changing international discourse, and the increasing overlap between national interests and international diplomacy, the Indian Navy began to see itself as a tool of benign intervention and diplomatic outreach.20 Indian naval thinkers envisaged a role for naval forces beyond the application of hard maritime power to also include out-­ of-area contingencies. Discussions about the navy’s expeditionary role, therefore, increasingly took into account the need for India to project ‘benign power’ and focus on non-­military initiatives to influence its neighbouring regions.21 This was in keeping with the trend of maritime strategic thought, the world over, where national maritime forces are perceived to be a fungible military tool, capable of projecting both hard and soft power.22 In the event, ‘forward presence’ has become a popular concept among naval practitioners, with the Indian Navy’s top brass often using it as a surrogate term to describe an institutional aspiration for far-­seas capabilities.23 Soon, forward-­operations became a key element of the Indian Navy’s operations philosophy, with the Indian Navy’s Maritime Doctrine (2009) affirming the need for a distance-­operations capability.24 In elaborating the Indian Navy’s role as not being limited to just security and constabulary functions but also to include diplomatic and humanitarian missions, the navy’s strategic thinkers expanded the ambit and nature of the envisaged role in the extended neighbourhood.25 However, an important distinction was made: even as a vast swath of maritime space – stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca and beyond – was declared as being strategically significant for India, some areas were deemed to be areas of ‘primary’ interest (the IOR); others only of ‘secondary’ importance (the Western Pacific).26

The evolution of a forward operations mindset The transformation of India’s political approach to maritime power is equally noteworthy. For many years after independence, the political class remained wary of the concept of forward presence. The reluctance to accept military operations in areas beyond India’s region of perceived influence stemmed, principally, from a perception that it involved costly offensive missions in alien surroundings that exacted a high operational and diplomatic cost. Publically available records suggest that the earliest reference to a distant maritime operations capability for India was made by Defence Minister George Fernandes in October 1998, when in an address to the combined conference of Indian Military Commanders, he spoke of the need for a ‘tri-­service’ Rapid Reaction Force (RRF ) capable of ‘reaching any corner if a threat arose’.27 Mr K.C. Pant, Former Deputy Chairman,

Projecting India’s naval power   69 India’s Planning Commission, made a similar observation when he noted, ‘the three elements at the core of the Indian Navy’s doctrine are the development of rapid reaction manoeuvrability, along with the concentration of firepower, and land-­attack capability to influence the war on land’.28 These visionary musings about developing capability to operate away from home could, however, not be complemented by substantive efforts even as the defence services remained stuck in their operational straightjackets. The first stirrings of institutional change came about in 2005, when Admiral Arun Prakash, the then Chief of Naval Staff, made a strong pitch for robust expeditionary capabilities and directed the Indian Navy’s Directorates of Plans & Operations to begin preparing the Staff Qualifying Requirements (SQRs) for procuring a fleet of Landing Platform Helicopters (LPHs).29 This coincided with his efforts to form a new Directorate of ‘Strategy, Concepts and Transformation’ at the Naval Headquarters in New Delhi and the office of the Flag Officer Doctrines and Concepts in Mumbai. However, despite organisational efforts and the unveiling of a joint doctrine for amphibious operations, things did not move swiftly enough on the procurement front.30 The navy’s operational transformation attained momentum in 2007, when it acquired the INS Jalashwa, ex-­USS Trenton from the United States. In the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, the Indian Navy’s leadership felt that the absence of ‘sea-­lift’ capability was a striking void, and sought to make it up by procuring a Landing Platform Dock. By acquiring the ship, however, the navy did not just get an important Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) asset, it also imported the basic concept of expeditionary operations – an idea, which until a few years ago, it had been extremely sceptical about. It was also a sign that the naval leadership was beginning to entertain the idea of power-­projection and far-­seas deployments. In time, the Indian Navy increased its operational engagement with South East Asia, the Middle East, the Mediterranean and Africa, and began the process of developing cooperative arrangements for maritime security in the Indian Ocean.31 The change was also progressively reflected in statements and policy pronouncements by India’s foreign policy elite. At the IISS’ Global Strategic Review in 2009, for instance, Shiv Shankar Menon, then retired Foreign Secretary, suggested a collective security arrangement among the major maritime nations for ‘a real concert of Asian maritime powers’.32 In 2010, India’s Foreign Secretary, Nirupama Rao, made a case for stakeholders of the IOR, both littorals and users, to contribute to building sustainable regional security on the basis of mutual interest and benefit.33 The foreign policy pitch soon factored in the need for regional maritime security. In an address to the naval Commanders’ Conference in 2011, Defence Minister A.K. Antony spoke of ‘the navy’s mandate to be a net-­security provider’.34 A similar reference was made by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during the foundation laying ceremony of India’s

70   A. Singh National Defence University in 2013, even as he urged the Indian Navy to ‘assume its responsibility for stability in the Indian Ocean region’.35

The imperative of forward operations With ‘forward operations’ being the new mantra,36 the defence bureaucracy too acquiesced in the navy’s strategy of projecting itself as a security provider in the Indian Ocean. In April 2011, a detailed brief by the Ministry of Defence to the Standing Committee on Defence outlined plans to strengthen India’s naval capabilities.37 The brief highlighted a proposal for expeditionary assets as a major potential capability. Soon after, the 12th defence plan validated the concept of stand-­off capability, upholding the need for India to achieve ‘desired power projection force levels, undertake military operations other than war, and the ability to influence events ashore’. More specifically, it called for the development of adequate stand-­off capability for ‘sea lift and expeditionary operations’ – the ability to undertake military operations far from the homeland.38 Soon, the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) Long term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) – a broad vision document for the 12th, 13th and 14th Defence Plans – identified two major roles for the Navy: the traditional ‘blue-­water’ operational role and a ‘coastal’ security function. The Indian Navy, meanwhile, got down to implementing this mandate in earnest. In October 2011, the navy declared consolidated plans for new operational bases, forward naval bases, operational turnaround bases and naval air enclaves.39 The reference was to three forward operating bases planned at Andaman and Nicobar Islands (Campbell Bay, Diglipur and Kamorta); two naval air enclaves in Andaman and Karwar; and two operational turnaround bases in Paradip and Tuticorin.40 A few months later, the Indian Navy commissioned the Dweeprakshak at Kavaratti in the Lakshadweep islands and then the INS Baaz, at Campbell Bay on the southernmost fringe of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.41 The two bases are significant outlying maritime facilities – the former overlooking the nine-­ degree channel, the latter in close proximity of the Strait of Malacca and the six-­degree channel. Their key geographical location renders them potential surveillance outposts, forward operating bases and a logistics hub for Indian naval ships. The recent inductions into the Indian Navy reveal a strategic dimension in the Indian Navy’s operational plans. The most significant acquisition has been the INS Vikramaditya, which the Indian Navy sees a key strategic enabler and a vital instrument of regional power-­projection.42 Other assets, including the Teg, Shivalik and Kolkata class frigates, and large amphibious ships (INS Jalashwa and Airawat) too are an important part of the Indian Navy’s developing distance-­seas capability and designed to cater to emerging maritime security challenges. Meanwhile, the addition of two

Projecting India’s naval power   71 fleet tankers (INS Shakti and Deepak) has given the Indian Navy the much needed replenishment capability for long-­range deployments.43 With a displacement of over 27,000 tonnes the ships are designed to not only refuel large ships but also carry armament and assist in HADR operations.44 The acquisition of the six new submarines (P-­75 class) in the next few years will add to the navy’s strategic power projection capability. Three additional frigates – reportedly the Krivak IV class from Moscow – and the P-­8I Poseidon long-­range maritime patrol aircraft from the United States are likely to strengthen the navy’s regional maritime posture. Importantly, the navy seems to have begun the process of strengthening the Eastern flank by positioning many of its strategic assets – including the INS Jalashwa, Airawat and the Shivalik class ships – in the Eastern fleet based in Visakhapatnam. The P-­8I Poseidon long-­range maritime patrol aircraft and the Italy-­made new fleet tanker, INS Shakti too are based on the East coast; as is the indigenous nuclear submarine, Arihant, presently undergoing trails in the Bay of Bengal. With a forward-­base at Tuticorin and an operational facility at Paradeep, the turnaround time of the Eastern fleet – dependent earlier only on Visakhapatnam and Chennai for replenishments – has been significantly reduced.45 These assets, along with the new UAV base at INS Parundu in Ramnad, and a nuclear submarine centre near Vishakhapatnam, in fact, makes the Eastern Naval Command the fulcrum of the navy’s strategic operations. Most crucially, the Indian Navy’s plans to substantially expand sea-­lift capability are beginning to gradually take shape. In 2011, the Indian government cleared a proposal to build four Landing Platform Docks (LPDs)46 and eight Landing Craft Utilities (LCUs).47 These are meant to boost the country’s amphibious warfare and island protection capabilities, and are likely to be based at the ANC – India’s first and only regional ‘theatre command’ – another firm indication that the ANC is an increasingly important part of India’s strategic maritime matrix. To a considerable degree, the impetus for building up forward maritime operations capability has been driven by China’s aggressiveness in the South China Sea (where India too has commercial interests) and the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) increasing naval footprint in the Indian Ocean. China’s regular naval anti-­piracy deployments since 2008 off the coast of Somalia, the use of naval and air assets to support the evacuation of Chinese citizens from Libya in early 2011, and the recent submarine deployment in the IOR has provided evidence (if any is needed) of Beijing’s long-­term plans for the Indian Ocean. The PLAN’s recent additions, particularly the three 20,000 tonnes type 071 LPDs that are regularly deployed in the IOR as part of the anti-­piracy task-­forces, have spurred India to acquire its own strategic assets. Despite its many endeavours to expand its maritime reach, however, the Indian Navy has not been able to develop a genuine far-­seas capability. Despite the significant force accretions of the past few years, the service

72   A. Singh isn’t any closer to a true power-­projection capability than it was at the turn of the last decade when it embarked on the quest for maritime strength. To an extent, this is a consequence of the fact that most of the Indian Navy’s recent acquisitions aren’t geared towards developing a classical ‘expeditionary’ capability (focused on sustained far-­seas operations and coercive combat power). While the latest assets do provide added strength, they do little to overcome the logistical challenges the Indian Navy faces in the far-­seas. More importantly, the new ships and submarines do not possess a dedicated land attack capability – a crucial factor in projecting hard power. The advanced land-­version of the 290-km range Brahmos missile was test fired only in July 2014 and its on-­board installation may still take time.48 Meanwhile, a proposal for the construction of five new fleet support ships (FSS) for far-­seas replenishment is still pending approval.49 By most accounts, the Indian Navy’s modernisation drive seems aimed at developing the force architecture for a regional security strategy.50 While some may consider this sufficient for raising India’s profile in the IOR, it may not be enough to project power in the wider Indo-­Pacific region. The rhetorical emphasis on sea-­lift and security operations does not disguise the fact that the navy lacks the strike power and sustenance of an adept power-­projection force.

Lessons from overseas operations It is not as if naval operations managers have been ignorant of the conceptual and material deficiencies affecting far-­seas operations. Overseas missions over the past two decades have provided many instructive lessons, pointing to the lack of holistic capabilities for prolonged presence in the distant waters. During the anti-­piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, for instance, Indian naval ships faced a set of challenges that facilitated a finer understanding of sustained far-­seas operations. The first lesson was about the need for a reliable and robust logistical network. Over a thousand miles away from India, operating in pirate-­infested waters, Indian Navy ships were dependant on foreign ports and tanker-­ships for fuel and other essential supplies. While the ships on task have the endurance to carry out the anti-­piracy mission for shorter durations, the extended deployments meant an increased reliance on naval facilities at Djibouti and Salalah for valuable fuel and logistics.51 The lessons of sub-­conventional combat were equally instructive. As Indian warships found out in the initial months of the counter-­piracy deployment off-­Somalia, low-­intensity conflict situations made it incumbent on a naval force to fine-­tune its combat procedures and minimise casualties.52 Naval officers who served on ships deployed on anti-­piracy missions, pointed out that gunnery crews had to be trained to engage suspected pirates intermittently and in short bursts, so as to minimise fatalities.

Projecting India’s naval power   73 Visit and Board Search and Seize (VBSS) procedures needed to be re-­ worked for low-­conflict situations. A third challenge came in the form of ‘maritime law’. Early during the anti-­piracy deployments, naval command teams realised that the rules-­ofengagement (ROEs) in international water posed a peculiar risk. Most anti-­piracy measures were premised on preventive actions, but pre-­empting pirate attacks was an inherently risky proposition because it involves apprehending pirates before the commission of an act (usually in an unarmed state, having dumped their arms into the sea). Navies experienced in sub-­ conventional operations therefore learnt to navigate the law – understand its complexities and nuances, and interpret statutes favourably to suit the military mission.53 Similarly, the Indian Navy’s relief and rescue operations during the 2004 tsunami operations highlighted a new set of imperatives. The key lesson was about the critical need for maritime infrastructure. Operating in tsunami-­affected areas, Indian naval ships realised that the damaged port facilities and jetties precluded the use of alongside berthing. As a result, landing of relief supplies ashore had to be undertaken using boats and landing craft – and in some cases only the ship’s helicopter.54 A need was also felt for crane facilities, multi-­purpose hovercraft (capable of being transported on larger naval ships), prepositioned supplies and dedicated hospital ships.55 While the Indian Navy utilised survey ships in the role of hospital ship, these lacked medical facilities on a scale appropriate for the relief effort. The absence of an effective disaster management organisation hampered interagency coordination. The Defence Crises Management Group (DCGM) did not have any policy guidance for Armed Forces assistance in national disasters, and the field Headquarters set up by the ANC could not effectively coordinate the relief effort with a central agency.56 The absence of strategic communications too proved a handicap as the navy found itself unable to communicate effectively with multiple military and civilian agencies ashore. For all its good work during the operation, there was little effort made to record and publically disseminate the initiatives taken.57 The message implicit in the many lessons learnt during the navy’s out-­ of-area missions was that a strategic force can only operate in an ecosystem of composite capabilities – where shore-­logistics, strategic communications and crisis management skills are as important as mere sea-­lift and amphibious capability. To operate in the distant-­seas, therefore, naval assets need an array of individual and collective competencies that can enable sustained overseas presence.

Access to forward operating bases (FOBs) Developing capabilities, however, does not still help the Indian Navy resolve its many strategic dilemmas. The navy’s key predicament about

74   A. Singh f­ ar-­seas capability concerns the development of forward operations facilities. FOBs play a key role in consolidated logistics provisioning, repair and resupply, and air support. To enable forward presence, the Indian Navy has been establishing forward bases in India’s remote island territories. Many of these facilities have been useful in providing maritime tactical support, but the limited infrastructure at these bases hasn’t been able support full-­scale support operations, thereby rendering far-­sea deployments an onerous and impracticable undertaking.58 This, in turn, has led to speculation that India might consider developing military facilities in distant foreign littorals.59 The proponents of foreign FOBs quote Sardar K.M. Panikkar, India’s foremost maritime historian and visionary thinker. In 1945, Panikkar had made a fervent case for forward bases, arguing India needed an Oceanic Policy that would result in maritime fortification of the nation.60 His proposition for the establishment of ‘a steel ring around India with air and naval bases at suitable points’ and the need for ‘security in the islands of the Bay of Bengal, and Singapore, Mauritius and Socotra’ emphasised military bases for effective defensive and offensive operations in South East Asia and the Western Indian Ocean.61 Importantly, he predicted, the defence of the long and open Indian coast line would be possible not just by having forward military presence but also by possessing suitable island cover in the form of advanced bases.62 Panikkar’s pitch for foreign bases, though compelling, masks some challenging realities. In a contemporary setting, FOB dynamics are extremely complex. Besides the obvious economic investments, substantial diplomatic efforts are required in securing and sustaining such a facility. Even assuming an FOB is offered by a friendly state without many preconditions, putting it to operational use is a significantly complicated undertaking.63 The experience of the United States Navy with FOBs has shown that using ground facilities and air-­space needed to conduct maritime operations is a knotty issue, because of the need to share it with other entities.64 While the navy is the main player in establishing and operating the base, other services too have a role to play in the effective conduct of the operations. Besides, in multinational missions, other naval forces too may need to be accommodated at the same forward location. This would sometimes entail sharing space with multiple agencies responsible for the command, control and communications of the individual components of the collective mission, necessitating an integrated plan-­of-action to coordinate the security effort. The trickiest part of getting access to an FOB is the drawing up of a legal agreement stating the terms and conditions of actual usage. Military bases abroad require the drawing up of a formal treaty to be signed between the host-­state and visiting nation. The negotiations can be protracted and involve the detailing of what facility can be used and what cannot. In practice, an FOB agreement is often drawn up in a manner that

Projecting India’s naval power   75 restricts the visiting force’s operational freedom.65 More importantly, despite their presumed usefulness, FOBs entail a substantial economic and political cost.66 India would, thus, have to weigh its options carefully before ever considering the development of long-­term basing and logistics facilities at foreign locations, even it were manifestly in Indian interests to do so. Ultimately, FOBs abroad need a leap of imagination and faith – a transition India is yet to make both politically and operationally.

Mutual logistical support agreements A more viable option for the Indian Navy is to enter into logistics agreements. Such agreements are useful instruments as they reduce a visiting navy’s logistics footprint in the operational area. At the same time, by remaining narrowly focused on the provisioning of fuel, basic non-­lethal stores and other essential services, these agreements are also perceived to be less politically intrusive. Even here, India has been hesitant. Misgivings over the implications of foreign warships being repaired and resupplied in Indian ports have stalled any movement forward. Despite a robust maritime relationship with Washington, for instance, New Delhi has resisted a Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), believing it is a ploy for a binding supply and services agreement where India will always be a provider and never a beneficiary.67 The MoD’s wariness of the arrangement has led the Indian Navy to reportedly discontinue an existing fuel transfer arrangement with the United States Navy.68 The reasons for India’s opposition to the LSA have been many. Besides resistance from left-­leaning ideologues who have railed against the unfettered access the agreement seeks to provide to Indian military bases, there have been fears expressed about the possibility of India’s participation in United States regional military operations. Some critics argue that signing the LSA paves the way for more intrusive agreements like the Communications, Interoperability and Security Agreement (CISMOA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) that hurt Indian interests in the long run by tying the Indian armed forces to United States systems. Still others contend the dividends of logistics cooperation are skewed in favour of the United States, as the Indian Navy hardly ever operates near America. LSA, they aver, is just a pretext to create a military alliance in Asia.69 Supporters of LSA contend, however, that the agreement does not permit permanent basing rights for the military forces in either country. Neither does it allow for any Indian forces to participate in any ongoing United States military operation, or even compel India to forge an alliance with the United States. There are no requirements to commit Indian forces or in any way participate in any United States military operation. To the contrary, supporters contend, the agreement is a key enabler of joint

76   A. Singh Indo-­US maritime operations, as it facilitates joint-­patrolling of sea-­lanes, anti-­piracy cooperation and maritime collaboration to tackle other irregular challenges such as transnational crimes, search and rescue, pollution control and rescue and relief operations during natural disasters.70 Each of these is a crucial area maritime security, cooperation under which listed out in the March 2006 India-­US Maritime Cooperation Framework (MCF ).71 India’s reluctance to sign up to logistics agreements is not limited to the United States. Even with Japan, with which India has developed a much closer maritime convergence, there has been an unwillingness to allow for a reciprocal logistics arrangement.72 And while relations with Tokyo have improved, the fact remains that neither the Indian Navy, nor the Japan Maritime Self-­Defence Forces (JMSDF ), can undertake prolonged and sustained maritime operations in opposite theatres without a logistics arrangement with each other. Interestingly, while India has many training and support Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) with ASEAN countries (including Vietnam and Singapore), it does not have specific naval logistical agreements. With looming prospects of China expanding its access to logistics in IOR, however, India might have to seriously consider its own repair, refuel and replenishment arrangements in the Western Pacific.

Justifying ‘far-­seas’ operations While some of the Indian Navy’s constraints in developing its maritime reach are real, one is hard to explain: the lack of conviction in justifying ‘far-­seas’ operations in a strategic context, and the consequent delay in the development of expeditionary capability.73 This is surprising because coercive naval power in distant waters has a clear and compelling logic, well acknowledged by the world’s leading navies. The rationale for expeditionary forces was best explained by the renowned American political scientist, Samuel P. Huntington, in a policy paper over six decades ago. ‘If the sea is a base from which the navy operates its offensive activities against land’, Huntington posited, the core of its combat capability consisted of three domains of naval warfare: carrier based aviation, amphibious power and modern naval artillery. . . . As long as the navy carries out functions performed on land at sea bases closer to the scene of operations, the nation would always have the upper hand in conflict.74 More than 60 years later the innate logic of this scholarly prescription has not dimmed. Mobile naval power still gives combat force the flexibility to achieve from the sea, objectives that are deemed impossible on land. And as earlier, the most critical capability in maritime operations away from the mainland is that of lifting and landing forces.

Projecting India’s naval power   77 The centrality of ‘sea-­lift’ for far-­seas operations is borne out by the versatile role played by contemporary multi-­purpose amphibious ships. In a modern day maritime environment a navy needs platforms that can all at once refuel other ships, transport troops, serve as command and control platforms and take part in peacekeeping and disaster relief operations. In times of crises, navies often fall back on amphibious capability – a striking endorsement of which was offered by the Russian Chief of Navy in 2009, when, speaking of the French amphibious warship Mistral, he remarked: ‘the ship could have alone landed as many troops in Georgia in 40 minutes as the Black Sea fleet did in 26 hours’.75 Russia is not the only country to see the merit of an expeditionary capacity. The PLAN too has been building Amphibious Transport Docks and raising amphibious divisions – all in an effort to substantially increase its sea-­lift capacity. Since naval power has more uses than just waging war, it is also important to evaluate the utility of ‘far-­seas’ capability in less-­than-war scenarios. Warships may be of critical use for sea-­control and power-­ projection in wartime, but its peace-­time uses of gunboat diplomacy and soft-­power projection are even more consequential for the political leverage they offer. In the words of Edward Luttwak, distant-­sea power is used as a form of ‘armed suasion’ – an activity that is characterised by both ‘supportive and deterrent elements’.76 For the Indian Navy, trying hard to make a compelling case for being relevant in the far-­seas, Luttwak’s postulation may hold a message: without a genuine distance-­operations capability the force will soon be reduced to a coastal force. If the navy’s critical operational capability is allowed to fall below a certain threshold, the slide into oblivion will be permanent.

Conceptual and material impediments The Indian Navy’s approach to maritime security fits well with its image of a responsible regional maritime force. It, however, seems based on a sweeping conception of a ‘new normal’ for navies – the need for collective policing and benign operations. While this has indeed contemporised maritime strategy, it has also resulted in a conceptual swing from traditional security roles to soft-­power projection and collective operations, eroding the logic of strategic power projection – an operational necessity for the protection of national strategic interests. The new approach regards coercive ‘expeditionary’ capability and land-­attack assets as being strategically provocative.77 It privileges the idea that benign outreach and diplomatic missions can replace hard-­power projection in the distant littorals, disregarding the fact that far-­seas presence is a critical imperative in forging a favourable balance-­of-power. The second conceptual impediment the Indian Navy faces is its inability to envision a greater role in the Indo-­Pacific region. This stems from a desire to restrict the boundaries of its vision to the Indian Ocean. The

78   A. Singh Indian Navy has in recent years focused its energies on coastal defence and Indian Ocean Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC), not factoring the Western Pacific into its strategic calculus. An institutional consensus in the navy is that it neither possesses the assets nor the operational mandate to be a substantial presence in the Pacific. Such a view has rendered far-­ seas operations an impractical, if not ‘imperfect’ undertaking. This has been led by an insufficient emphasis on the need to craft a ‘new power equation to safeguard India’s core interests and values’.78 Also, while the Indian Navy does outwardly acknowledge the need for forward presence, it has not shown the conceptual ingenuity to interpret ‘forward operations’ expansively and purposefully. If anything, the navy seems fixated with its role as a protector of territorial and economic interests.79 In fact, a conservative estimation of its own strategic strengths and objectives has resulted in the use of naval power solely within the confines of the Eastern and Western Indian Ocean. In expanding its maritime reach, the Indian Navy also faces material challenges. With a number of projects in the pipeline and a few still to be ordered, the navy needs an enhanced capital budget. But the naval budget outlay for the past two years hasn’t given much reason for cheer. In 2013, the navy’s original allocation of capital budget for 2012–2013 was cut by cut by nearly $1.2 billion, primarily on account of the slippage of delivery of aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya by almost one year.80 In the defence budget for 2013–2014, the navy’s allocation fell by 2.82 per cent over the previous year’s budget.81 With the share of resources declining, it will be challenging to acquire and maintain the desired level of power-­projection assets. A critical deficiency is in the undersea department. While recent submarine inductions – INS Chakra (an Akula class submarine from Russia) and Arihant (an indigenously produced nuclear powered submarine with ballistic missile) are significant strategic assets, the emasculation of the Indian Navy’s submarine fleet has been stark. With only 13 ageing diesel-­ electric submarines – only half of which are operational at any given time – and planned acquisitions some distance away, the navy is in a near-­crisis situation.82 For an effective far-­seas capability, however, the navy needs submarines to perform land attack and special-­forces insertion. To add to the navy’s woes, a shortage of Anti-­Submarine Warfare (ASW) ships and helicopters meant for the defence of forward deployed combat units has rendered blue-­water operations a risky proposition. Another area of concern is the deficient infrastructure for support of distant-­seas deployments. Major naval bases require an overhaul of existing facilities and forward-­operating bases need to be developed for strategic operations. The Indian Navy, however, appears wary of large-­scale acquisitions and asset development without the requisite professional training.83 Procurement plans, the naval leadership feels, must not proceed at a pace that does not allow for the establishment of a reliable and robust man-­machine interface.84

Projecting India’s naval power   79 With a national thrust for self-­reliance, the navy has been prioritising domestic production, but its ongoing indigenous projects are facing huge time and cost over-­runs. Many of the frontline projects like the indigenous aircraft carrier, the P  71 submarines, Project 15A frigates (Kolkata) and Project 28 (Kamorta) missile corvettes have been delayed raising questions about the navy’s commitment to self-­reliance. Technology absorption and expertise-­creation marks another challenge – especially in projects like submarine construction. Under the circumstances, it appears the Indian Navy may be in for a period of slower growth in the next few years, a contingency that may impact its far-­seas presence.

Conclusion The Indian Navy’s security role has grown substantially, but its power-­ projection capability still remains underdeveloped. The critical deficiency in formulating a forward-­operations strategy is the absence of logistics, littoral operational and offensive capability. The capabilities being developed presently appear to target specific benign threats, rather than take into consideration the broad range of possibilities that a true far-­seas capability is meant to address. While sealift capability has certainly grown (fitting well with India’s vision of being a rising power in the Asia-­Pacific region), the Indian Navy has still not seen drastic improvements in logistics, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR), and land attack capability, which could see it develop into a strong strategic instrument. The lack of logistics supply arrangements and repair and resupply facilities in the distant littorals has impacted the Indian Navy’s presence in the Indo-­Pacific. India has been averse to formal logistics agreements, but these could be of considerable value in a context where the Indian Navy may be required to play a wider security role in the Indo-­Pacific region. The navy is aware that its expanding operational mandate demands a continuous state of readiness to deploy rapidly and adapt to a broad range of operating environments at short notice. For this, it needs to develop an entire spectrum of capabilities and competencies that facilitate seamless operations across theatres and functional domains. The desired capabilities, however, cannot be developed and deployed in a manner that compromises on the foundational aspects of systems’ safety and training. In the long run, a concerted and deliberate attempt at improving reach and sustenance would result in a more balanced and effective far-­seas capability. While the Indian Navy’s initiatives do advance its objectives of developing a robust regional outreach, they do not serve the cause of forward presence. In the absence of integrated logistics and ‘land-­offensive’ cap­ ability, the Indian Navy’s security role remains limited to the Indian Ocean. The overt emphasis on sea-­lift and security operations does not

80   A. Singh detract from the fact that the navy lacks the strike power and flexibility to project meaningful power in the distant littorals. The drivers for the Indian Navy’s far-­seas presence are its increasing stakes in the stability of the Asia-­Pacific. If India has to play an important role in maritime governance it must have a substantial presence in the wider Indo-­Pacific region. Operating in these vast open spaces demands strategic mobility that allows for the leveraging of the oceans, and the creation of alternative avenues for the application of hard and soft maritime power. It is important, therefore, for the Indian Navy to have assets that are mobile, scalable and flexible. For the Indian Navy to assume the mantle of a genuine ‘security provider’ – one capable of both providing public goods and preserving the security and stability in the Indian Ocean and regions beyond – a ‘strategic’ capability and matching mindset are a rank imperative. With the right impetus given to ‘far-­seas’ operations, the Indian Navy could play a leading role in forging a new maritime order where it is a consequential force for regional stability and public good.

Notes   1 Raja Mohan, ‘In Search of Sea Power’, Samudra Manthan – Sino-­Indian Rivalry in the Indo-­Pacific (Washington, DC: Carnegie, 2012), pp. 35–45.   2 David Scott, ‘India’s “Extended Neighborhood” Concept: Power Projection for a Rising Power’, India Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2009, pp. 107–143.   3 For a detailed discussion on the Indian Navy’s recent growth see Walter Ladwig, ‘Drivers in Indian Naval Expansion’, in Harsh Pant (ed.), The Rise of the Indian Navy – Internal Vulnerabilities, External Challenges (Ashgate: London, 2012), pp. 14–34.   4 James R. Holmes, Andrew Winner and Toshi Yoshihara, Indian Naval Strategy in the 21st Century (New York: Routledge, 2009), p.  83; also see Harsh V. Pant, ‘India in the Indian Ocean: Growing Mismatch Between Ambitions and Capabilities’, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 2, Summer 2009, p. 290.   5 Ladwig, ‘Drivers in Indian Naval Expansion’, pp. 14–34; the author posits that the Indian Navy’s quest has been increasingly focused on modern platforms and less concerned with the overall size of the fleet. The decline of force levels in key areas like undersea and amphibious capability show that the Indian Navy is positioning itself as a benign hegemon with limited capacities of HADR and SLOCs security.   6 C. Raja Mohan, ‘India’s New Role in the Indian Ocean’, Paper presented at Seminar (617): INDIA 2009, January 2010, www.india-­seminar.com/ 2011/617/617_c_raja_mohan.htm.   7 Zorawar Daulet Singh, ‘India’s Geostrategy and China: Mackinder versus Mahan?’, Journal of Defence Studies, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, Vol. 7, No. 3, July–September 2013, pp. 137–138.   8 Admiral Arun Prakash, ‘Future Strategy and Challenges for the Indian Navy’, From the Crow’s Nest, A Compendium of Speeches and Writings (New Delhi: Lancer, 2007), p. 93.   9 Discussions during the Naval Commander’s Conference 2006 brought out the need for a distance seas doctrine; see Vijay Sakhuja, ‘Maritime Rapid Reaction Force’, Indian Defence Review, Vol. 21, No. 4, October–December 2006.

Projecting India’s naval power   81 10 K. Raja Menon, Maritime Strategy and Continental Wars (London: Frank Cass 1998), pp. 156–157; the author points out that contemporary military conflicts are not just about conquering territory but rather about controlling vital littorals and choke-­points. The need for a shift and capable naval fleet that can continuously use hardware to overwhelm the shore, he points out, is paramount. 11 Major General (Retd) Ashok K. Mehta, ‘The Silent Sentinel’, Frontline, 5 August 1999, www.rediff.com/news/1999/aug/05ashok.htm. 12 Vijay Sakhuja, ‘Indian Naval Diplomacy: Post Tsunami’, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 8 February 2005, www.ipcs.org/article/navy/indian-­navaldiplomacy-­post-tsunami-­1640.html. 13 During the 2006 Naval Commanders Conference, Admiral Arun Prakash emphasised a ‘shift in focus from autonomous, open sea operations like sea control or blockade to a direct linkage with land battle/littoral operations’. This was also when the ‘Operational Manoeuvre from the Sea’, and its favourable influence on the progress of land-­air battle, was discussed; see ‘Naval Commander’s Conference – Time To Introspect?’, India Defence Consultants, 4 May 2006. 14 Arun Kumar Bhatt, ‘Focus on Navy’s Influence on Land Operations’, The Hindu, 7 May 2006. 15 India’s Military Maritime Strategy (MMS) states that to be an instrument of national security in conflict, the Indian Navy will need the capability to utilise both direct and indirect means to address the land battle with the aim of influencing events ashore, imply the acquisition of expeditionary capabilities, Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy (New Delhi: Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), 2007), p. 100. 16 As per the MMS, the major task of the Indian Navy during the twenty-­first century will be to use warships to support national foreign policy. ‘During the long years of peace, we need to project power and show presence; catalyse partnerships through our maritime capability; build trust and create interoperability through joint/combined operations and international maritime assistance’, Maritime Military Strategy, ibid., p. 11. 17 Ibid., p. 81. 18 Bhatt, ‘Focus on Navy’s Influence on Land Operations’. 19 ‘Indian Army Mulls Ambitious War-­plan’, Times of India, 18 September 2009. 20 Manav Sehgal, ‘Naval Cooperation: A View from India’, in Gregory P. Gilbert and Michelle Gillette (eds), Australian Maritime Issues – 2009 (Canberra: The Sea Power Centre, 2010), pp. 283–294. 21 See Vijay Sakhuja, ‘Political Components of Maritime Power’, Asian Maritime Power in the 21st Century – Strategic Transactions – China Indian and South East Asia (Singapore: Pentagon Press, 2011), p.  195; also see Prithvi Ram Mudiam, ‘Indian Power Projection in the Greater Middle East: Tools and Objectives’, The Greater Middle East in Global Politics (Lieden: Brill, 2007), pp. 417–439. 22 Walter Ladwig III, ‘India and Military Power Projection – Will the Land of Gandhi Become a Conventional Great Power?’, Asian Survey, Vol.  50, No.  6, 2010, pp. 1162–1183. 23 When former Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral D.K. Joshi spoke of the Indian Navy’s expansion plans last year, it seemed as a candid expression of a natural desire for far-­seas capability; see ‘An Interview with Indian Navy Chief Admiral D.K. Joshi’, NDTV.com, 9 November 2013, www.ndtv.com/article/india/indian-­ navy-can-­operate-in-­distant-waters-­poised-for-­major-expansion-­navy-chief-­ admiral-dk-­joshi-to–443747.

82   A. Singh 24 The Indian Naval Doctrine uses the term ‘distance-­operations’ as a substitute for ‘far-­seas’ missions, describing it as a capability that includes, but is not confined to, expeditionary operations – a popular synonym for ‘power projection’; see Indian Maritime Doctrine (New Delhi: Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), 2009), pp. 83–84. 25 This appears to be in line with the navy’s official mandate in the 2004 version of the Maritime Strategy which underscored the need for an assertive strategy for the Indian Navy to dominate the Indian Ocean; ibid., p. 105. 26 Ibid., p. 68. 27 John Cherian, ‘Troubled Equations’, Frontline, Vol.  16, No.  1, 2–15 January 1999, www.frontline.in/static/html/fl2827/stories/20120113282706100.htm. 28 K.C. Pant, ‘National Security – the Maritime Aspect’, India’s Development Security: The Next Decade and Beyond (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2003), p. 377. 29 Prasun Sengupta, ‘Vertical Envelopment’, FORCE Magazine, September 2012, www.forceindia.net/SepCoverstory8.aspx. 30 Ibid. 31 Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Annual Report 2013–14, Section 4, ‘Indian Navy’, pp. 29–40. 32 Shiv Shankar Menon, ‘The Evolving Balance of Power in Asia’, Address at IISS Global Strategic Review, 13 September 2009, www.iiss.org/~/media/Silos/ Newsletters/2009/Autumn-­Newsletter-2009–2/Autumn-­Newsletter-2009–2.pdf. 33 Speech by Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao on ‘Maritime Dimensions of India’s Foreign Policy’, organised by the National Maritime Foundation, December 2010, www.maritimeindia.org/Eminent%20Person/Speech-­Foreign Secretary.html. 34 ‘Navy to Safeguard Indian Ocean Islands: Antony’, Indian Express, 13 October 2011. 35 ‘India Well Positioned to Become a Net Provider of Security: Manmohan Singh’, The Hindu, 24 May 2013. 36 Freedom to Use the Seas; the document recognises that ‘influencing events on land and the ability to conduct operations in the littorals’ is one of the primary roles of the Indian Navy. It also acknowledges the importance of ‘amphibious operations in conduct of expeditionary operations’ and of ‘direct delivery of ordnance from stand-­off ranges, both through land attack missiles and by carrier-­based aircraft’. 37 Standing Committee on Defence, Indian Ministry of Defence, ‘Demands for Grants (2012–2013)’, 30 April 2012, pp. 70–71. 38 ‘12th Defence Plan: Focus on Navy’s “Expeditionary” Ops’, Indian Express, 4 May 2012. 39 ‘Navy Plans Major Expansion in Manpower, Shore-­based Infrastructure’, Times of India, 15 October 2011. 40 The navy’s existing air enclaves are at Tuticorin, Kamarta, Diglipur, Campbell Bay and Paradip; see Nithin Gokhale, ‘How the Indian Navy is Expanding and Modernising’, NDTV.com, 25 June 2012, www.ndtv.com/article/india/how-­ indian-navy-­is-expanding-­and-modernising-­235746. 41 ‘Naval Air Station Opened in Campbell Bay’, The Hindu, 31 July 2012. 42 Abhijit Singh, ‘Vikramaditya – Deployment Options for India’, Issue Brief, Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, February 2014. 43 Manu Pubby, ‘With New Fleet Tanker, Navy to Have Enhanced Footprint’, Indian Express, 22 January 2011. 44 Ibid. 45 Turnaround time is the time needed for a ship to enter harbour, replenish stores, re-­fuel and leave the port. For naval operations in the Northern Bay of Bengal, Paradip is better suited for operational turnaround than Vishakhapatnam.

Projecting India’s naval power   83 Similarly, for ships in the Southern Nay of Bengal, Tuticorin is a more convenient option for replenishment and refuelling than Chennai. 46 ‘India To Construct 4 LPDs’, Indian Defence, 12 December 2013, http://indiandefence.com/threads/india-­to-construct-­4-lpds.38955/. 47 ‘Navy to Get 8 Amphibious Assault Vessels’, NDTV.com, 11 September 2011, www.ndtv.com/article/india/navy-­to-get-­8-amphibious-­assault-vessels-­132631. 48 Land-­attack missiles differ from anti-­ship cruise missiles in that the former are meant to hit enemy targets hidden behind mountains or in a cluster of buildings and have a different trajectory profile; see ‘Brahmos Test-­fired from Orissa Coast’, The Hindustan Times, 8 July 2014. 49 ‘New Power Projection Capabilities Sought for the Indian Navy-­Fleet Support Ships’, Defence News, 27 May 2014, www.defencenews.in/defence-­news-internal. aspx?id=JmvYKpRpmJg=. 50 For a discussion see David Scott, ‘India’s Aspirations and Strategy for the Indian Ocean – Securing the Waves?’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4, 2013, pp. 484–511. 51 ‘Djibouti is Helping India Combat Piracy in Indian Ocean’, India Africa Connect, 10 November 2013, www.indiaafricaconnect.in/index.php?param=news/6767. 52 Observations are based on interactions with Indian naval officers that served on ships deployed for anti-­piracy patrols off Somalia. According to one interaction, Indian Marine Commandoes trained the ships’ crew in the initial days of the Somalia patrol. This mainly involved updating conventional firing procedure by engaging suspected pirates intermittently and in short bursts. Visit and Board Search and Seize (VBSS) procedures too were re-­worked and updated for low-­conflict situations. 53 For a discussion see Julio Trevis, ‘Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the Coast of Somalia’, The European Journal of International Law, Vol.  20, No.  2, 2009, pp.  399–404; also see Michael J. Struett, Mark T. Nance and Diane Armstrong, ‘Navigating the Maritime Piracy Regime Complex’, Global Governance, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 93–95; and James Kraska, Contemporary Maritime Piracy, International Law, Strategy and Diplomacy at Sea (Praeger: California, 2011), pp. 105–120. 54 The absence of a ship-­to-shore capability played a role in shaping the navy’s decision to acquire the INS Jalashwa from the United States; see ‘Overseas Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Operations’, Net Security Provider: India’s Out-­ of-Area Contingency Operations, Institute of Defence Research and Analyses (New Delhi: Magnum, 2012), p. 38. 55 Sunil Balakrishnan, ‘HADR Operations: Lessons Learnt by the Indian Navy’, in Pradeep Kaushiva and Abhijit Singh (eds), Indian Ocean Challenges – A Quest for Cooperative Solutions (New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2013), pp. 119–123. 56 The Headquarters, Integrated Defence Staff (HQIDS) has now been tasked to coordinate efforts of the DCMG by interacting with relevant ministries; see ‘Overseas Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Operations’, Net Security Provider: India’s Out-­of-Area Contingency Operations, p. 37. 57 Ibid. 58 Discussions with naval planners at Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defense (Navy), New Delhi. 59 Raja Mohan, ‘In Search of Sea Power’, Samudra Manthan – Sino-­Indian Rivalry in the Indo-­Pacific (Washington, DC: Carnegie, 2012), pp. 46–47. 60 K. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean. An Essay on the Influence of Sea Power on Indian History (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1945), p. 12. 61 Ibid., p. 15. 62 Ibid., p. 93. 63 Zdzislaw Lachowski, ‘Foreign Military Bases in Eurasia’, Stockholm International

84   A. Singh Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Policy Paper No.  18, June 2007, http://books. sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP18.pdf. 64 Ibid. 65 The United States experience with military bases in Japan (Okinawa), and the Philippines suggests FOBs can be restrictive in operational terms. 66 Catherine Lutz, ‘US Bases and Empire: Global Perspectives on the Asia Pacific’, The Asia-­Pacific Journal, Vol. 12, March 2009. 67 Saroj Bishoyi, ‘Logistics Support Agreement: A Closer Look at the Impact on India–US Strategic Relationship’, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1, January– March 2013, pp. 151–164. 68 Sourabh Gupta, ‘US-­India Defence Ties: The Limits to Interoperability’, East Asia Forum, July 2011, www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/07/31/us-­india-defence-­ ties-the-­limits-to-­interoperability/. 69 The LSA envisages Indian and American armed forces providing logistical support, transportation including airlift, refuelling, and storage services for each other’s warships and aircraft on a reciprocal basis at the time of joint military exercises and disaster relief operations; Bishoyi, ‘Logistics Support Agreement’, pp. 151–154. 70 Ibid. 71 See ‘Indo-­US Joint Statement’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, March 2006. 72 Sourabh Gupta, ‘Time for Japan, India to Go Beyond Words’, Asia Times Online, 7 June 2013. 73 Most of the Indian Navy’s far-­seas acquisitions have had to be justified by stating the need to deliver humanitarian assistance. 74 Samuel Huntington, ‘National Policy and Transoceanic Navy’, US Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 80, No. 5, 1954. 75 Kraska, Contemporary Maritime Piracy, International Law, Strategy and Diplomacy at Sea, p. 184. 76 Edward N. Luttwark, The Political Uses of Sea Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), pp. 1–2. 77 Holmes et al., Indian Naval Strategy in the 21st Century, p. 85; in an illuminating exposition of maritime operations philosophy, the authors bring out three categories of navies: free-­rider, constable and strongman navy. The Indian navy, they content, presently belongs to the second category where it has been concentrating its energies on maritime security and benign missions. But this is only likely to last as long as there is a distant naval protector (the United States). As the Indian Navy gradually slides towards a ‘strongman’ force it will need to develop the capability for forward defence in the distant-­seas. This would require the honing of traditional combat skills and capability. 78 Arun Prakash, ‘India’s Maritime Growth: Rationale and Objectives’, VarunaVak, National Maritime Foundation Policy Paper No. 1, July 2011, p. 35. 79 For a discussion on sea-­power in a globalising world see Sureesh Mehta, ‘Changing Roles of Navies in the Contemporary World Order with Specific Reference to the Indian Navy’, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3, April 2009. 80 The overall defence budget in 2012–2013 was cut by $2.7 billion from the original allocation. Of this amount 67 per cent was for capital expenditure, most of which was to be spent on modernisation. The Indian Navy was the worst hit; see Laxman Behera, ‘India’s Defence Budget 2013–14 – A Bumpy Road Ahead’, IDSA Comment, 4 March 2013. 81 Ibid. 82 Ajai Shukla, ‘A Powerful Navy Lacks Submarine Punch’, Business Standard, 1 October 2014. 83 ‘Farewell Press Conference of Admiral Nirmal Verma, Chief of the Naval Staff ’,

Projecting India’s naval power   85 Indian Navy Official Website, 7 August 2012, http://indiannavy.nic.in/cns-­ speeches/farewell-­press-conference-­outgoing-cns; also see ‘Interview with Admiral D.K. Joshi, 7 November 2013’, www.ndtv.com/article/india/navy-­chiefadmiral-­dk-joshi-­to-ndtv-­full-transcript-­443752. 84 Ibid.

5 The unsinkable aircraft carrier The Andaman and Nicobar Command Anit Mukherjee

India’s first joint command, the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC), was created in October 2001. The assumption at that time was that this Command would serve not only as an experiment but as a harbinger of other joint commands. Establishing this Command also fetched geopolitical attention to the capabilities and intentions of the Indian military. Most prominently, though not unexpectedly, Chinese analysts have portrayed these islands as a ‘ “metal chain” that could lock shut the Malacca Strait’.1 Such sentiments have only increased since then Chinese President Hu Jintao made a statement, curiously only a few years after the ANC was established, expressing concern about the security of sea routes by calling it the ‘Malacca dilemma’.2 So has the experiment of India’s first joint command succeeded? And to what extent has it fulfilled the vision of its architects? What does the functioning of the ANC reveal about the Indian military, and how it formulates strategy? Finally, has the ANC attained the capabilities to change the geopolitics of the region? While answering these questions, this chapter makes five main claims. First, the strategic development of the Andaman and Nicobar islands has been hindered due to competing visions. On the one hand are those who advocate for rapid economic and strategic development to derive full utility from the natural advantage that these islands have to offer. On the other hand, are environmentalists, tribal right activists and conservationists who advocate for minimum human activity and against large scale development. Thus far, the vision of those opposing increased human activity seems to be having the upper hand. Second, the ANC has been a ‘grand failure’ in terms of what was envisaged by its architects. Not only has it failed to usher in more joint commands, its experience might be cited by those within the military community who are opposed to this idea. Third, the functioning of the ANC has been hindered by bureaucratic politics and battles over turf. Fourth, the functioning of the ANC reveals problems in India’s civil-­military relations and higher defence organisation. Finally, despite all these problems, there has been a slow process of capability accretion mainly in response to fears of increased Chinese

The Andaman and Nicobar Command   87 presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Indicative of the security dilemma in India–China relations, such capability accretion will gradually develop into the foreseeable future. The chapter begins with a brief description of the location and layout of the islands. Next it describes the debate and competing visions surrounding the economic and strategic development of these islands. This is followed by a description of the underlying vision that led to the creation of a joint command. Next, it examines the military deployment, tasks, organisation chart, force levels and development of bases on the islands. The next section analyses the functioning of the ANC including speculation that the ANC may be designated as a single service command under the Navy. While concluding it provides an overall appraisal of the ANC including its implications for civil-­military relations, higher defence management and the future of tri-­services commands.

An introduction: the Andaman and Nicobar Islands Table 5.1 lists some basic facts about the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.3 These islands are populated by a mix of indigenous tribes constituting around 7.6 per cent of the population and the rest are migrants from different parts of India including descendants of those who were exiled by the British to the penal colony. This island chain is around 1200 km from the Indian mainland. It takes two hours by flight from the mainland to the islands and 50–70 hours by ship. By contrast it is closer to South East Asia. Landfall Island, the northern most tip of the Andaman chain, is just 45 km from Myanmar’s Coco Islands while its southernmost tip, Indira Point, is 160 km away from Indonesia’s Aceh province. The Thai port of Phuket, an economic and tourist hub, located at the entrance to the Malaccan straits, is only 550 km away. In turn this archipelago consists of two main island groups. The Andaman group includes the major islands of North Andaman, Middle Andaman, South Andaman and Little Andaman while the Nicobar group of islands consists of, among others, Great Nicobar, Car Nicobar, Katchall and Little Nicobar. These island

Table 5.1  The Andaman and Nicobar Islands Number of islands Inhabited islands Area Population Tribal population Coastline (excluding creeks) Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Seismic zone Working season

556 37 8249 sq. km. 381,000 28,530 1962 km. ¼ of India’s coastline 600,000 sq. km. 30% of India’s EEZ Category V (most severe) November–May (seven months)

88   A. Mukherjee groups are separated by a channel, called the ten degree channel, which is approximately 150 km wide. The strategic significance of these islands lies in its ability to monitor and dominate major sea lanes of communication. As acknowledged by the erstwhile Planning Commission in its State Development Report, there are ‘three prominent International Shipping Routes [that] pass between these islands at Coco/Preparis Channel in the North, 10-degree channel in the middle, and the 6-degree channel in the South, underscoring the strategic significance of the island territory’.4 By virtue of its location the islands therefore provide the capability to monitor and, if required, dominate the Strait of Malacca, one of the most important shipping lanes in the world.5 This has, as mentioned before, already fetched much geopolitical attention with China expressing concerns about India’s ability to reportedly ‘impede oil traffic heading for China through the Malacca Strait’.6 These fears are amplified by public discussions among Indian analysts about the war fighting advantages accrued from ‘blockading China’.7 Some argue that China’s new initiative of the Maritime Silk Route is part of its ‘attempt to neutralize its “Malacca Dilemma” ’.8 The island chain and the capability it affords to the Indian military therefore make it central to the overall strategic picture in the Indo-­Pacific.

An outpost or a springboard: contesting visions of development The Andaman and Nicobar Islands have been treated as neglected backwaters until the recent past.9 The distance from the mainland, under-­ developed island transportation, lack of connectivity with surrounding regions and relatively high cost of essentials like water, electricity and building materials all combined to prevent the development of the islands. Indicative of under-­development, the islands have always been and still remain a revenue deficit Union Territory. However, in recent times there have been two different visions for the islands. The first envisages the islands as an environmental paradise attracting responsible, eco-­tourism. The second emphasises the locational advantage of the islands and lobbies for the creation of the island as a developmental hub – to rival the ports of Singapore and Colombo. These competing visions are described below. For many, the main attraction of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands is that, unlike other tourist areas, they are still largely untouched by development. Apart from the indigenous tribal population – some of them still in isolation – these islands are also a natural habitat for many endangered species of birds, animals and maritime life. Due to these characteristics there are two powerful ministries that have a significant role to play in these island territories – the ministries of environment and tribal affairs. Both ministries in turn have been helped immeasurably by judicial activism by the Supreme Court. Responding to a petition alleging misuse of

The Andaman and Nicobar Command   89 ‘forest land’ the Supreme Court, in 2001, appointed the one-­man Shekhar Singh Commission ‘to look into the state of the island’s forests and other related matters’, and submit its recommendations within six weeks.10 This commission suggested various measures to prevent deforestation and also preserve the biodiversity of the islands.11 The Supreme Court accepted most of the recommendations made in this report and it formed the blueprint for conservation efforts on the islands. This judgement encouraged activists to make demands to declare the islands as an environmental paradise and oppose human activity on the islands. Instead, they argue that the best way to generate revenue is to allow high-­end, eco-­tourism which leaves behind a minimal human imprint. As a result of these efforts – both by conservationists and activists, there is a strict court-­enforced order on the usage of forest land. As seen from Table 5.2, which shows land availability and usage, only 6 per cent of the total land area is designated as revenue land and the other 94 per cent is mostly protected.12 An alternate vision for these islands is one that was supported by the erstwhile Planning Commission. This envisaged taking advantage of the location of the islands astride the sea lanes of communication by the following measures:13 1 2 3 4 5

Establish a transhipment port at Great Nicobar. Along with a transhipment port, create a ship repair facility. Set up of an oil refinery in the Southern group of islands. Create a bunkering facility on the islands. Declare a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) on the islands to ensure investment flows.

Out of all these measures the creation of a transhipment port has been debated for a long time – and is among the central ideas put forward by those who envision the islands as a developmental hub.14 Those who advocate for this are quick to point out that such a port can easily handle shipping that is currently being routed through the ports of Colombo and Singapore and thereby provide huge economic benefits. Logically, if such a facility is established then the military will also get a larger role to play Table 5.2  Land availability and usage in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands Class

Area (sq. km.) %

Notified reserved/protected forests Water bodies, coastal land, mudflats, marshes, mangrove,    etc. Revenue deemed forest Revenue land available Total

7171.00 394.54

86.93 4.79

162.50 520.56 8249.00

1.97 6.31 100.00

90   A. Mukherjee primarily in protecting and securing the port facility and shipping routes. This will automatically enhance the military’s presence and deployment. However, this idea of a transhipment hub and the subsequent development of the island chain face strong opposition from environmentalists and tribal rights activists. In addition, overturning the judgment of the Supreme Court will require legislative intervention which, at the moment, appears unlikely. There is a strategic significance of these differing visions for the future of the islands. Due to the Supreme Court ruling on land usage, it is difficult for the armed forces to acquire land and to build up bases that can host a large body of troops, ships or aircrafts. Pointing this out, the Principal Secretary of Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Shakti Sinha, observed that ‘whenever I’m faced with demands to give away say 3000 hectares of land, we don’t have the land [of] even 100 hectares . . . this point needs to be understood’.15 As a result any large scale military deployment and creation of bases will be dependent on which of the two visions for the islands is adapted. Unsurprisingly, most military officers favour the developmental model and argue that only by embracing the economic opportunities afforded by the islands can India use them as a springboard for projecting its power and interests in the region.16 They therefore advocate for placing more capital assets – ships, aircraft and drones – on the islands in order to enhance the capability of the military forces operating in the area. However, there are others who argue that it may be better to imagine these islands as an ‘outpost’. This, they argue, would not only be environmentally responsible but also economically prudent and will have diplomatic payoffs as neighbouring countries do not feel threatened. Moreover short sailing time will ensure that India can build up its forces in the region as and when required. The best articulation of this vision of the ANC was by Admiral Arun Prakash: Prudence demands that we remain prepared for all eventualities. However the sensitivities of our neighbours have to be kept in mind while considering any accretion of forces in the ANC. Hence, as far as military preparedness for security of the islands is concerned, rather than actually positioning assets here, it is more important to develop the infrastructure to be able to support them effectively, when the need arises. Therefore in the planning process, we need to look ahead and ensure that we create the basing maintenance, support, and logistics facilities for an appropriate army, navy and IAF force levels.17 The outcome of this debate therefore has a significant role to play not just in the economic development of the island chain but also in the Indian military’s force structures, deployment and overall posture. For the moment it appears that those advocating for the island chain as an ‘outpost’ have more traction in South Block but by no means is this debate

The Andaman and Nicobar Command   91 comprehensively settled. Tracking this debate then would be important for discerning India’s overall strategy.

The architects’ vision: creation of the tri-­services ANC India has generally been slow to fully exploit the strategic potential of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. According to Patrick Bratton, ‘the islands were never a focus for Indian foreign and security policy in the first 20 years of independence. It was only in the 1960s that security threats to the islands came to the attention of Delhi’.18 Due to these changing threat assessments the concept of a unified ‘Fortress Andaman and Nicobar’ or Fortran was implemented under a Vice Admiral. While the Army placed an infantry battalion and subsequently a brigade under the fortress commander, the IAF kept its units under one of the IAF commands, on the mainland with a liaison unit in the fortress HQ.19 Over the years, in a very incremental fashion Fortran acquired a tri-­services character with the induction of 108 Mountain Brigade in 1990 and later the raising of 37 Wing Air Force at Car Nicobar in 1993. Even then it remained a mostly neglected and little heard of outpost for the military, as most officers were reluctant to get posted to the formation. It was only after the 1999 Kargil war and the subsequent defence reforms that the Andaman and Nicobar Islands fetched attention.20 To a large extent this was due to the interest shown by then Defence Minister George Fernandes and Arun Singh, the Chairman of the Task Force for the Management of Defence, functioning under the Group of Ministers.21 The latter especially saw this as an opportunity to implement a long cherished goal – to push forward the idea of joint commands in the Indian military.22 In terms of jointness, or the ability of the three services to operate together, the Indian military is among the least joint major military power.23 In other words the three services – army, air force and the navy – operate fairly independently in terms of operations, planning training and acquisitions. This has fetched a fair degree of criticism from members of its strategic community.24 One of the main reasons for an absence of jointness has been the tradition of single service commands wherein the three services operate different commands even when sharing the same geographical area of responsibility. Criticising this arrangement Admiral Arun Prakash observed that there are ‘nineteen commands between the three services and the Integrated Headquarters but not one of them is collocated with the other; and there is no co-­relation, linkage, etc.’25 It was with a view to fix this problem that Arun Singh imagined creation of a new joint command in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.26 The underlying assumption was that co-­locating the services in the same command will

92   A. Mukherjee force them to work together and thereby impress upon them the logic of jointness. Accordingly, the Arun Singh led Task Force on Defence recommended the creation of ‘the first Joint Command in the country’ – the ANC, to replace Fortran.27 The emphasis on the ‘first Joint Command’ was significant as, according to members of the Task Force, there was an expectation that this Command would form the template for future geographically located Joint Commands.28 In later years, Admiral Arun Prakash, who was a member of the Task Force on Defence, admitted this and argued: The unwritten charter of the ANC, which I consider even more important, was a conceptual one. It was to evolve, from first principles, a framework for a unified formation and to test it in the crucible of the command along with working rules. This framework, if successful, would then become the template for replication elsewhere, especially if theatre commands were contemplated.29 This perspective – that ANC was an experiment in jointness – was embraced and repeated by members of the Indian strategic community. For instance, while describing the functioning of the ANC, Gurpreet Khurana argued that it was ‘in effect, a “laboratory” to evolve an indigenous model towards the theatre command concept for possible implementation in the future’.30 But nearly a decade after this experiment, there is little appetite or indication that more geographically oriented joint theatre commands would be established. On the contrary, based on press reports, it appears as if the ANC would be permanently allotted, or reverted back, to the Indian Navy. In other words, the experiment was a failure.

Tasking, assets, deployment and functioning of the ANC When the joint Command was established, according to the first Commander in Chief Andaman and Nicobar Command (CINCAN), then Vice Admiral Arun Prakash, the following were the functions allotted to it: 1 2 3 4 5 6

Defence of the territorial integrity, waters and airspace of the islands. Ensuring that eastern approaches to the Indian Ocean remain free from threats for unhindered passage of shipping. Monitoring of SLOCs (Sea Lanes of Communication) in designated AOR (Area of Responsibility). Exercising surveillance over EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone). Establishment of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) for air defence and air space control. Undertake joint planning for contingencies and infrastructure planning.31

The Andaman and Nicobar Command   93 However, curiously, in later years the establishment of an ADIZ for air defence and air space control was seemingly dropped. Hence, in listing its charter an official publication of the ANC enumerated tasks closely matching those listed above except for the need to establish an ADIZ.32 Although the reason for this is as yet unclear, according to a former Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the ADIZ is valid and relevant only to the extent that they can be enforced by the power that imposes them. . . . For an ADIZ to be enforced, you not only need extensive radar coverage to detect intrusions, but also the means to intercept and force/shoot down the intruder. So, if MoD had no intention of positioning suitable radars and interceptors in the A&N, it made sense not to pursue the ADIZ proposal.33 In other words, instead of attaining the capability to fulfil its original charter of duties the Ministry of Defence thought it better to drop the task altogether. After the establishment of the ANC its assets were slowly augmented. Table 5.3 provides the geographical location and military deployment while Table 5.4 lists the quantum of military assets available to the ANC.34 Most of the assets are deployed near Port Blair and in the Andaman Islands.35 Figure 5.1 below depicts the organisational chart of the ANC.36 While creating this Command, a ‘systems approach’ had been adopted and staff officers were designated on a functional basis.37 It was envisaged that while the component commanders will be headed by respective service officers, the joint staff was to be composed of all three services working seamlessly. In addition, as a norm it was decided that the Chief of Staff would belong to a different service to the Commander in Chief. Finally, a ‘unique feature of the unified command in A&N islands is that the Coast Guard (CG) is also under the operational command of the CINCAN though it is administratively autonomous’.38 The ANC has conducted a range of activities from military diplomacy to anti-­poaching and protection of the EEZ and the island chains.39 However, one of its greatest challenges was when the Andaman and Nicobar Islands was hit by the Indian Ocean wide tsunami in December 2004. The Air Force base at Car Nicobar suffered greatly and it lost 122 personnel including family members of serving personnel. Despite widespread damage and unprecedented challenges the ANC rallied together to launch a massive rescue and rehabilitation effort.40 Apart from such Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations, the Command also plays an important role in military diplomacy.41 Due to its proximity it conducts regular exercises with the navies of neighbouring countries including Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand. Most prominently it conducts a biennial gathering of regional navies called Exercise Milan. In 2014, this exercise ‘had the

*NAS Shibpur

*INS Kardip

Diglipur

Kamorta

1 Territorial Army (TA) Battalion

108 Infantry Brigade at Birchgunj (14 km away from HQ, ANC)

Army

37 Wing comprising of helicopters, Dorniers and an Air Defence unit

15 FBSU including 153 Squadron AF and 4 Maritime Element AF (MEAF)

Air Force

Note Headquarters of all the components are co-located with ANC Headquarters in Port Blair.

Campbell Bay

*INS Baaz

*ANFLOT *INS Utkosh *INS Jarawa *Misc units including ship    repair yard

Port Blair

Car Nicobar

Navy

Location

Table 5.3  Geographical location of military assets

*District Headquarters (DHQ 10)

*New Station approved

*District Headquarters (DHQ 09)

*Regional Headquarters plus including various patrol vessels *745 Squadron: Dornier aircraft and Chetak helicopter

Coast Guard

The Andaman and Nicobar Command   95 Table 5.4  Service wise military assets of the ANC Navy

1  ANFLOT:     •  Offshore Patrol Vessel (INS Saryu): 1     •  Landing Ship Tank (LST): 4     •  Fast Attack Craft (FAC): 5     •  Landing Craft Utility (LCU): 8     •  Sagar Prahari Bal (protection of Port Blair): 12 fast interception boats

Army Air Force Coast Guard

2 INS Utkosh: Naval Air Station consisting of INAS 318 with three Dornier aircraft and 321 Flight equipped with three Chetak helicopters 3  INS Kardip: Advance Base 4 INS Jarawa: (Floating Dock Navy) provides ‘dry dock facilities to Naval vehicles’ 5 INS Shibpur: Functions as Forward Operating Air Base (FOAB) that can land Dorniers and Chetaks 6 INS Baaz: Primarily meant to enhance airborne ‘maritime’ surveillance 1 Two regular Battalions and 1 TA (Territorial Army) Battalion along with armoured personnel carriers (BMPs) 1 37 Wing at Car Nicobar comprising of helicopters (122 HF), Dorniers (151 Squadron) and an Air Defence unit 2  15 FBSU at Port Blair 1 Numerous surface assets including Offshore Patrol Vehicles, Fast Patrol Vessels, and inshore patrol vehicles 2 745 Squadron at Port Blair: Dornier aircraft and Chetak helicopter

Note Landing Ship Tank (LST) can carry up to eight tanks/BMPs and berth a helicopter and six small Landing Craft Utility (LCU).

highest number of participants since its inception in 1995’.42 For the main part the activities of the ANC have been confined to island protection and prevention of smuggling and anti-­encroachment activities. As discussed in the next section, the ANC is incapable of doing much else because of limited assets.

Problems with the ANC From the time of its inception in 2001, the ANC has dealt with a variety of problems and challenges.43 While improvements have been incremental some basic problems, like non-­cooperative attitude of other services, remain. This section analyses these problems including designation of operational boundaries, support from service headquarters and civilian agencies and jointness. The operational boundaries of the Command and its designated area of responsibility, according to Gurpreet Khurana, are from: ‘the Longitude

96   A. Mukherjee

C-in-C (3 star)

Chief of Staff (2 star)

Components

Command staff

Shore establishments

Army (1 star)

Operations

Naval ship repair yard

Navy (1 star)

Logistics

Supplies

Air Force (1 star)

Maintenance

Victualling

Coast Guard (2 star)

Figure 5.1  Organisational chart of ANC.

extending south from the land border between Bangladesh and Myanmar (western limit), the beginning of the Malacca Straits or Longitude 100 degree East (eastern limit), and the Equator (southern limit)’.44 According to Lieutenant General N.C. Marwah, a former CINCAN having the distinction of the longest tenure, the designation of such an area of responsibility is a ‘basic flaw’ in the design of the ANC.45 He argues that such a division of boundaries provides a greater role to the Eastern Naval Command (ENC), whose area of responsibility is just short of the Andaman Islands. As a result the Indian Navy is able to justify its decision to deploy most of its capital acquisitions, including of the amphibious INS Jalashwa, to the ENC instead of the ANC. Indeed over the last decade the ENC has emerged as one of the most important, and powerful, commands. According to one analysis, from 2005 to 2011, in a span of six years, the fleet strength of the ENC increased from 30 warships to 50 warships – a growth of over 66 per cent – and is ‘roughly a third of the Indian

The Andaman and Nicobar Command   97 Navy’s entire fleet strength’.46 During the same period, the assets of the ANC have only marginally increased, as discussed later in this chapter. Lieutenant General Marwah’s argument is that this has been allowed to happen in part due to the manner in which the operational boundaries have been assigned. A related and the more consequential problem facing the ANC has been the lack of support – intellectual, logistical, administrative and in terms of assets from the service headquarters. In the first place, the creation of the joint ANC was itself a surprise as the Navy sacrificed a potential Command, with all its resources and posts, to further the idea of joint commands. However, it soon became disappointed with the attitude and cooperation of the other two services. This is summed up well by Admiral Arun Prakash: the navy was on the verge of receiving approval for a ‘Far Eastern Naval Command’ (FENC) in Port Blair when the 2000 GoM was convened. In a rare gesture of magnanimity, the navy offered FENC as proving ground for India’s first Joint formation. In the bargain, the navy also handed over all assets (land, buildings, transport, airfield) to ANC. The other two services REFUSED to hand over any assets, and dragged their heels over most issues relating to reinforcing/consolidating the fledgling ANC.47 Once the Navy realised that the Army or the Air Force was not cooperative and forthcoming with its resources for the ANC, it also followed a similar policy. This – the non-­cooperative attitude from all the three services – has since become the single biggest obstacle and challenge for the ANC.48 In turn, this has created problems not only for the resources available for the ANC but also in its interaction with the respective service headquarters. Simply put, since its creation, the ANC has hardly added any major assets – in terms of warships, aircraft or even land forces. The Navy, as argued earlier, has been strengthening the ENC and has based most of its latest acquisition under that Command. According to former CINCAN, Lieutenant General Aditya Singh, there was ‘a problem of turf ’ between ENC and ANC so much so that for ‘exercises in Langkawi (Malaysia) personnel were sent from ENC’.49 To be sure there has been some accretion of warships but they are primarily offshore patrol vehicles and not any capital ship.50 Similarly, the Air Force, historically and intellectually opposed to giving away its resources, has also resisted calls for deploying its aircraft in the Island chain. In fact, currently it justifies away the need to base its aircraft at the ANC entirely, as described by Patrick Bratton: the air force argues that with the increase of range with air-­to-air ­refuelling techniques, mainland-­based Indian fighters have the range  to cover almost all of the Indian Ocean region, rendering

98   A. Mukherjee ­ re-­deployment to the ANC (or other potential theatre commands) p superfluous.51 The Army resists deploying more forces on the grounds that the availability of land is an issue. Apart from a lack of assets, the ANC also faces problems in its day to day interaction with the other services. While the ANC commands the respective component commanders for administrative, maintenance and logistical purposes these components depend on their service headquarters. According to Lieutenant General Aditya Singh, ‘the respective services function under own service arrangements and so the equipment and logistical details as well as the posting of personnel is all controlled by the services’.52 Finally, the non-­cooperative attitude of the service headquarters also extends to the secondment of its personnel to this Command. According to Lieutenant General Aditya Singh, the ‘initial lot of officers posted to ANC were not among the best’ and the services treated it as a dumping ground.53 Problems also accrued from the relatively short tenures of the CINCAN, as this was a rotational appointment to be shared among the services. Table 5.5 lists the names and duration of tenures of all the CINCAN Table 5.5  List of Commanders-in-Chief, ANC S. No. Name

From–to

Duration

 1

Vice Admiral Arun Prakash

14 months

 2

Vice Admiral O.P. Bansal

 3

Lt Gen B.S. Thakur

 4

Lt Gen Aditya Singh

 5

Vice Admiral A.K. Singh

 6

Air Marshal P.P. Raj Kumar

 7  8

Air Marshal S. Radhakrishnan Vice Admiral Vijay Shankar

 9

Vice Admiral D.K. Joshi

10

Lt Gen N.C. Marwah

11

Air Marshal P.K. Roy

12

Vice Admiral P.K. Chatterjee

8 October 2001–30 December 2002 15 January 2003–29 September 2003 1 October 2003–13 January 2005 14 January 2005–27 February 2006 28 February 2006–25 October 2006 2 December 2006–31 December 2007 1 January 2008–30 September 2008 30 September 2008–30 September 2009 30 September 2009–28 December 2010 1 January 2011–31 October 2012 2 November 2012–30 June 2014 1 July 2014–current

8 months 15 months 13 months 8 months 12 months 9 months 12 months 15 months 22 months 19 months 12 months +

The Andaman and Nicobar Command   99 from the time of its creation. As can be seen only four out of 12 Commanders served tenures over 15 months. Such relatively rapid turnover affects the stability of the Command. Apart from problematic working relations with the other service headquarters, the ANC has also had to deal with a lack of support from civilian agencies including the Ministries of Defence, External Affairs, Defence Research and Development Organisation and Intelligence agencies. According to the Parliament’s Defence Standing Committee, which examined this issue, in 2009 HQ, ANC continued ‘to be deficient of civilian support staff with just seven officials in place as against the authorized strength of 115 posts’.54 In other words a deficiency of almost 90 per cent existed primarily because, in the words of a Defence Ministry official, ‘nobody wants to go there’.55 A final set of issues, the raison d’être, of the Command concerns jointness. Has establishing the Command helped in furthering jointness among the three services? Officers who have served at the ANC aver that it has. A colonel who served at the HQ of the ANC rather enthusiastically argued the ANC ‘has risen from being an experiment to an inspiration; a true representation of seamless jointness between its four components’.56 However, on ground jointness has required a lot more effort and undoubtedly has not been seamless. At a fundamental level, the ANC is part of the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) working under the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC). As originally conceived by the Arun Singh led Task Force on the Management of Defence, the IDS was supposed to be headed by a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), however due to a variety of reasons this post was not accepted and has still not been accepted by the government. Due to this the IDS and by extension the ANC suffer from a lack of bureaucratic power and depend upon the cooperation of the individual services. As argued earlier, for the most part, such cooperation has been non-­existent. Jointness also came up with some practical difficulties like the absence of a common military law among the three services.57 In addition the services have had long running disputes especially over land in the island chain which created some bitterness.58 Finally, the component commands are still service specific which throws up a whole host of questions about the degree of operational jointness.59 Jointness in any military is usually a controversial and hugely contested topic and therefore problems in establishing a joint theatre command were only to be expected. The single biggest achievement of the ANC was to show that it could be done, and to create additional points of interaction between officers of all three services. Despite that single service outlook and perceptions prevented the overall development of the ANC. As we shall see in part this was due to the absence of political directives which, in the long run, may undo the entire experiment of a joint command.

100   A. Mukherjee

Contemporary debates The problem of force accretion in the ANC and its woeful resources has fetched some intellectual attention within the Indian military. Vice Admiral Arup Singh, former Commander of the Eastern Naval Command, argued that there should be a ‘one time budgetary outlay for building up dedicated capital assets exclusively for the ANC’.60 A former Chief of Integrated Defence Staff, who wishes to remain unnamed, similarly argued that ANC could be India’s ‘pivot of manoeuvre in the Ocean’ and said that capability plans for enhancing the ANC have been made and put up to the Cabinet Committee on Security for its approval.61 Despite these exhortations however no such plans have been announced by the government. Instead according to some media speculation there are plans afoot to revert the Joint ANC back to the Navy.62 Some analysts – incorrectly – attributed such an idea to the Naresh Chandra Committee that was established to re-­examine defence reforms.63 While some of these stories were merely speculation, it was clear that a concerted effort was launched by the Indian Navy to lobby for the ANC to be returned to it. To some extent this was understandable; the Navy had generously offered up a command in the hope that this would lead to more joint commands and enhance overall jointness, but its lofty goals went unrealised. Instead, the other services continued bickering over budgets, resources, roles and missions. When asked about the Navy’s attempt to regain control of the ANC, Admiral Arun Prakash argued: There was scepticism about ANC within the navy in 2000–2001, and this was reinforced within a couple of years as the other services progressively withdrew support for ANC and for the concept. Over the years, I presume, opinion in NHQ [Naval Headquarters] has crystallized that it should revert to being a ‘naval command’ . . . its reversion to the navy will be a most retrograde step.64 However, this story should be read in conjunction with other reports that speculated that more joint commands – encompassing special forces, cyber and aerospace, may be established.65 These reports were confirmed by Air Chief Marshal N.A.K. Browne, then, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, who further confirmed that ‘the Andaman and Nicobar Command, now headed by officers from the three services on a rotational basis, will be under a Navy Vice Admiral’.66 While the government has yet to give its formal approval to these plans, such reports indicate that the Indian military has completely reimagined joint commands and has discarded the earlier ‘rotational service’ model to a permanent ‘lead service’ model. Admiral Arun Prakash acknowledged that this was a departure from previous thoughts on the matter and argued that,

The Andaman and Nicobar Command   101 apparently a new brand of ‘Jointmanship’ has, evolved by COSC consensus. In this ‘deal’ certain new functional Commands (+ANC) will be permanently owned by a particular service which will provide the CinC, while the DyCinC [Deputy Commander-­in-Chief] will rotate between the other two.67 But the logic underlying this radical departure from previous thinking on this matter was never made clear. Nor was it entirely clear if the military had closely studied the experiences of other militaries and implementing best practices. Instead this appeared to be an ad-­hoc decision that resulted in creation of new posts, organisations and minimised inter-­services acrimony by equally dividing up the commands. The question of military and cost effectiveness seemingly never entered the picture.

Overall appraisal of the ANC So how should one appraise the ‘experiment’ of India’s joint theatre command? According to Lieutenant General N.C. Marwah, compared to what it promised and what it could have delivered, the ANC is ‘one sad story’.68 Indeed, from what was imagined by the architects of the joint command – despite statements to the contrary, the ANC seems to have been a ‘grand failure’ especially in its intention to be the first among India’s joint theatre commands. Instead, it appears that the experience of the ANC has made the Indian military go in the opposite direction in favour of ‘lead service’ joint commands. The ANC’s failure lay primarily at the conception stage – without the CDS post, the ANC belonged to nobody and without a bureaucratically powerful boss it was subsequently neglected and starved of resources by the other three services. Over time this became a ‘Cinderella command’, and with such a fate it was but natural that the services hereafter decided to opt for the ‘lead service’ joint command model. Politicians and civilian bureaucrats in the Ministry of Defence, hindered both by a lack of expertise and a norm of non-­interference in what is perceived to be operational matters, did not step into to change the situation. According to Admiral Arun Prakash, that was a fatal error as ideally within a few years of the ANC the model and the experiment should have been extended to other commands. ‘If the MoD and SHQ [service headquarters] had ANY vision, they would have, by 2005–2006, replicated ANC in (say) a Southern Theatre Command with HQ in Trivandrum or a Joint Training Command or Logistics Command.’69 The experience with the ANC reveals a couple of insights about the Indian military and the formulation of its strategy. First, jointness as a function has been left to the services and such an approach has not worked in practice. The three services are unwilling to fuse their operations and resources and instead are zealously protecting turf. Second, civilians have little role to play in operational matters and have left this almost

102   A. Mukherjee entirely to the individual services. Some reformers within the military have therefore come to the view of the need for greater civilian involvement ‘to force change on a reluctant military’.70 Finally, the ANC, unlike predictions from some analysts, has not significantly changed the geopolitics of the region. Hindered by a lack of resources the ANC is more of a coastal protection force than one which can project power. To be sure, physical assets are slowly being built up – mainly in terms of runways, to support larger scale operations but the effort is nowhere commensurate with the potential. For the moment then India’s so-­called ‘metal chain’ has large gaps in it.

Notes   1 See Robert D. Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power (New York: Random House, 2010), pp. 125–126.   2 See Marc Lanteigne, ‘China’s Maritime Security and the “Malacca Dilemma” ’, Asian Security, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2008.   3 For an overview of these islands including geographical, historical, demographic and strategic trends see R.V.R. Murthy, Andaman and Nicobar Islands: A Geo-­political and Strategic Perspective (New Delhi: North Book Centre), 2007.   4 See Planning Commission, Andaman and Nicobar Island Development Report, (New Delhi, 2008), p. 75.   5 For more on the importance of the Malacca strait see Donald B. Freeman, The Straits of Malacca: Gateway or Gauntlet? (Montreal: McGill-­Queen’s University Press, 2003).   6 ‘Know Your Own Strength’, The Economist, 3 March 2013.   7 See Shashank Joshi, ‘Can India Blockade China’, The Diplomat, 12 August 2013.   8 See Zorawar Daulet Singh, ‘Indian Perceptions of China’s Maritime Silk Road Idea’, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2014, p. 139.   9 For a good overview of the development of the island chain see Sanat Kaul, Andaman and Nicobar Islands India’s Untapped Strategic Assets (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2015). 10 See Pankaj Sekhsaria, ‘To Save an Archipelago’, Frontline, Vol. 19, No. 2, 8–21 June 2002, www.frontline.in/navigation/?type=static&page=flonnet&rdurl=f l1912/19121310.htm. 11 For a copy of this report see http://as.and.nic.in/envis/pdfs/SHEKHARSINGHCOMMISSIONREPORT.pdf. 12 These data are taken from the following: Andaman and Nicobar Administration, Presentation to the Planning Commission (Annual Plan 2013–14), http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/stateplan/Presentations13_14/an_island1314. pdf. 13 See Planning Commission, Andaman and Nicobar Island Development Report, pp. 78–79. 14 For more on this see Murthy, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, pp. 97–112. 15 See Shakti Sinha, ‘Infrastructure and Development Plan Required to Enhance National Economy’, in G.S. Inda (ed.), Proceedings of a Seminar on the Strategic Importance of Andaman and Nicobar Islands, CENJOWS, August 2010. 16 See comments attributed to then CINCAN commander Lt Gen N.C. Marwah in ‘India’s Andaman and Nicobar Command Completes a Decade’, Thaindian News, 9 October 2011, www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategorized/indias-­ andaman-military-­command-completes-­a-decade_100569202.html; also see

The Andaman and Nicobar Command   103 ­ urpreet Khurana, ‘Shaping Security in India’s Maritime East: Role of G Andaman and Nicobar’, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2006, p. 178. 17 See Arun Prakash, ‘A Vision for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands’, in Arun Prakash, From the Crow’s Nest: A Compendium of Speeches and Writings on Maritime and Other Issues (New Delhi: Lancer Publications, 2007), p. 146. 18 See Patrick Bratton, ‘The Creation of Indian Integrated Commands: Organisational Learning and the Andaman and Nicobar Command’, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 36, No. 3, May–June 2012, p. 446. See pp. 445–447 for a description of the historical evolution of the ANC. 19 See Arun Prakash, ‘Evolution of the Joint Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) and Defence of Our Island Territories (Part II)’,USI Journal, Vol.  133, No. 551, 2003. 20 For more on the post Kargil defence reforms see Anit Mukherjee, ‘Failing to Deliver: Post-­Crises Defence Reforms in India, 1998–2010’, in Kanti Bajpai and Harsh Pant (eds), India’s National Security: A Reader (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013). 21 For more on this see Bratton, ‘The Creation of Indian Integrated Commands’, p. 446. 22 Interview with Vice Admiral P.S. Das, who was a member of the Task Force on the Management of Defence, New Delhi, 24 June 2009. 23 For more on how India, among major military powers, is an exception to this trend of joint or unified commands see Bratton, ‘The Creation of Indian Integrated Commands’, p. 441. 24 See P.S. Das, ‘Jointness in India’s Military – What it is and What it Must Be’, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2007 and Vinod Anand, ‘Integrating the Indian Military: Retrospect and Prospect’, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol.  2, No. 2, 2008. 25 See Arun Prakash, ‘Keynote Address’, Proceedings of USI Seminar on Higher Defence Organisation (New Delhi: United Service Institution of India, 2007), p. 9. 26 Interview with Vice Admiral P.S. Das, who was a member of the Task Force on the Management of Defence, New Delhi, 24 June 2009. 27 See Group of Ministers Report, Reforming the National Security System: Report of the Group of Ministers on National Security (New Delhi: Government of India, 2001), pp. 102–103. 28 Interviews conducted at different times, with five officials of this Task Force. 29 See Prakash, ‘A Vision for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands’, p. 147. 30 See Khurana, ‘Shaping Security in India’s Maritime East’, p. 173. 31 See Prakash, ‘A Vision for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands’, p. 147. 32 For the charter of duties listed in the official publication see Vinod Kumar (ed.), The Year of Resurgence: A Tribute to Jointness (Port Blair: Andaman and Nicobar Command, February 2006), p. 9. 33 Email from Admiral Arun Prakash to author, 17 April 2014. 34 Data for Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 rely on Kumar, The Year of Resurgence, pp. 6–7 and ‘Andaman and Nicobar: Saga of Synergy’, Sainik Samachar, October 2011, www.sainiksamachar.nic.in/englisharchives/2011/oct16–11/h5.htm. 35 For a map of the deployments on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, see Sujan Dutta, ‘Hawk Eye on Malacca Strait’, The Telegraph, 10 July 2012. 36 This chart is reproduced from the following website: http://ids.nic.in/webabhiids/org.html. 37 For more on this approach and how it was originally envisaged see Prakash, ‘Evolution of the Joint Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) and Defence of Our Island Territories (Part II)’. 38 See ‘Andaman and Nicobar: Saga of Synergy’, Sainik Samachar. 39 For more about these activities of the ANC see Pushpita Das, ‘Securing the

104   A. Mukherjee Andaman and Nicobar Islands’, Strategic Analysis, Vol.  35, No.  3, May 2011, pp. 470–472. 40 This is best described in Kumar, The Year of Resurgence, pp. 13–94. 41 For a range of activities undertaken by the Command see Promod Sangwa, ‘Andaman and Nicobar Command: From an Experiment to an Inspiration’, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol.  5, No.  4, October 2011, pp.  154–156. Also see pp. 470–472. 42 See Ekatha Ann John, ‘Milan 2014: Naval Exercise off Andamans Concludes’, Times of India, 10 February 2014; a total of 16 foreign navies plus the Indian Navy took part in Milan 2014. 43 For more on problems faced by the ANC see Bratton, ‘The Creation of Indian Integrated Commands’, pp. 447–448. 44 Khurana, ‘Shaping Security in India’s Maritime East’, p. 173. 45 Interview, Gurgaon, 12 November 2013. 46 See Sudha Ramachandran, ‘Indian Navy Pumps up Eastern Muscle’, Asia Times, 20 August 2011. 47 Email from Admiral Arun Prakash to author, 18 April 2014. 48 For more on this see Bratton, ‘The Creation of Indian Integrated Commands’, fn 87, p. 458. 49 Interview, Gurgaon, 5 November 2013. 50 For instance an Offshore Patrol Vessel INS Saryu was commissioned in the ANC in January 2013; see ‘INS Saryu commissioned near Andaman and Nicobar Islands’, The Hindu, 21 January 2013; for more on future plans for deployment of naval ships see ‘Andaman and Nicobar: Saga of Synergy’, Sainik Samachar. 51 See Bratton, ‘The Creation of Indian Integrated Commands’, p. 449. 52 Interview, Gurgaon, 5 November 2013. For more problems in refitting of ships see Bratton, ‘The Creation of Indian Integrated Commands’, pp. 447–448. 53 Interview, Gurgaon, 5 November 2013. 54 Standing Committee on Defence (SCOD), Thirty Sixth Report: Status of Implementation of Unified Command for Armed Forces (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, February 2009), p. 26; for more details also see pp. 14–15. 55 SCOD, Thirty Sixth Report: Unified Command, p. 14. 56 See Sangwa, ‘Andaman and Nicobar Command’, p. 154. 57 For more on this see Indra Sen Singh, ‘Uniform Code of Military Justice: Need of the Day’, The Purple Pages, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2007, pp. 92–97. 58 See SCOD, Thirty Sixth Report: Unified Command, p. 7. 59 These questions were even raised by the Standing Committee; see SCOD, Thirty Sixth Report: Unified Command, p. 7. 60 Interview, New Delhi, 5 November 2013. 61 Interview, New Delhi, 11 November 2013. 62 See Sudhi Ranjan Sen, ‘India to Strengthen Andaman and Nicobar Command to Take on China’, NDTV News, 26 November 2013 and Vivek Raghuvanshi, ‘India Gives Navy Control of Andaman and Nicobar Command’, Defense News, 29 November 2013. 63 See Nitin Gokhale, ‘Hopes for Indian Defense Reform Fade’, The Diplomat, 16 December 2013. Two members of the Naresh Chanda committee confirmed to the author that such a measure was not recommended by it. 64 Email to author, 18 April 2014. 65 A proposal along such lines was announced by former Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Air Chief Marshal N.A.K. Browne; see Rajat Pandit, ‘Indian Armed Forces Mulling Three Joint Commands’, Economic Times, 24 September 2012. One analyst argued that such a measure would be taken concurrently with reverting the ANC back to the navy; see Subhash Kapila, ‘India Setting up

The Andaman and Nicobar Command   105 Three New Armed Forces Commands’, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 5575 dated 7 October 2013. 66 See ‘Separate Commands for Special Operations, Cyber Security, Space: NAK Browne, Chief, IAF ’, Economic Times, 2 October 3013. 67 Email from Admiral Arun Prakash to author, 18 April 2014. 68 Interview, Gurgaon, 12 November 2013. 69 Email from Admiral Arun Prakash to author, 18 April 2014. 70 See Vijai Singh Rana, ‘Enhancing Jointness in Indian Armed Forces: Case for Unified Commands’, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2015, p. 48.

6 India’s naval diplomacy The unfinished transitions C. Raja Mohan

Introduction The rising profile of the Indian Navy in the Indo-­Pacific and Delhi’s adoption of military diplomacy as an integral part of its external engagement have helped reinforce the perception that India is a net security provider in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and beyond. After a rather tentative engagement with its South East Asian neighbours in the early 1990s, the Indian Navy today conducts regular exchanges with many countries of the Indo-­Pacific littoral stretching all the way from Southern Africa to the South Pacific and from the Eastern Mediterranean to the East China Seas. The Indian Navy’s regular forays into the Western Pacific since the beginning of the last decade have been welcomed by many regional countries. While the primary interest of India is in the Indian Ocean littoral, it has declared the South China Sea and other littorals abutting the Indian Ocean as secondary areas of interest. Meanwhile Delhi is a much sought after naval partner for the major powers – the United States, France, Russia and Britain – that have operated in the Indian Ocean for long. Many regional actors, including Japan, Australia, the Association of South East Asian Nations and others in the Gulf and Africa are seeking a stronger engagement with the Indian Navy. As a rising maritime power, China has begun to pay considerable attention to India’s naval capabilities and its emerging partnerships in the Indo-­Pacific littoral. As the maritime footprints of India and China overlap, the Indian Navy has become a new element in the changing power dynamic between the two Asian giants. On the multilateral front, India is now a full member of the security dialogue mechanisms led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF ), the East Asia Summit (EAS), the extended maritime forum and the biennial meetings of the ASEAN Defence ministers in an expanded format (the ADMM-­Plus). Delhi is also trying to inject some security content into the moribund forum called the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Delhi has also taken the initiative to convene the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) that brings the chiefs of navies every two years to discuss maritime issues from a

India’s naval diplomacy   107 professional perspective. India also participates in the activities of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS). By any measure, India’s naval activism, in its scale and scope, has become very impressive over the last two decades. This chapter examines the sources of India’s growing naval profile that many find somewhat out of character for India, long seen as rigidly non-­aligned and preoccupied with the defence of its long and contested land borders with Pakistan and China. The chapter also scrutinises the many factors that complicate and limit the effectiveness of India’s naval engagement in the Indian Ocean and beyond. The first two sections of the chapter deal with India’s turn towards military isolationism in the early decades after independence and the renewal of defence engagement, especially the naval one, after the Cold War. This review is followed by a discussion of five specific unfinished policy transitions that limit the effectiveness of India’s naval diplomacy.

Non-­alignment and military isolation As India became independent in 1947, the Cold War divisions were beginning to congeal in Europe and intrude into Asia. As India sought to insulate itself from the impact of the Cold War, Delhi was determined to avoid entangling alliances and any military partnerships with the great powers. Independent India’s reluctance to let its military weight bear upon the tensions between the West and the Soviet Union impulse was, in part, a reaction to the expansive external use of Indian armed forces during the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries by the British Raj. As the Indian nationalist movement gathered strength after the First World War, it rejected the use of Indian military manpower for imperial purposes and without the consent of the Indian people.1 As Cold War military blocs confronted India, Nehru declared that India would not align with either the East or the West and would pursue an independent foreign policy. Besides defining the national orientation as non-­alignment, India moved towards the construction of a broader forum of solidarity among the newly liberated nations. What began as the Asian Relations Conference in Delhi (1947) moved towards the organisation of the Afro-­Asian conference in Bandung (1955) and the eventual formation of the Non-­ Aligned Movement (NAM) that met at the summit level for the first time in 1961. If rejecting bloc politics was central to India’s national perception of non-­alignment, the NAM membership was limited to those countries that did not have foreign military bases on its soil. In the years after independence, India slowly wound down its external military links with Great Britain forged over a period of nearly 200 years of colonial rule. While London and Washington would have preferred to see a measure of coordination among the armies of the Commonwealth against the emerging global Communist threat, India’s new approach of non-­alignment ran counter to it. Nehru chose to remain a part of the

108   C. Raja Mohan Commonwealth, but only after making it clear that India would have nothing to do with the Western military alliances. The Indian Navy did participate in the Joint Exercises off Trincomalee of the Commonwealth until 1964, but those links too got severed soon after. If non-­aligned India disentangled itself from the military relationship with Britain, it was not going to allow itself to be tied down by the new partnership with the Soviet Union. As it sought weapons from the Soviet Union at the turn of the 1960s, India was careful to circumscribe its military engagement with Moscow. Despite being bound to the Soviet Union, through the friendship treaty of 1971, India carefully avoided undertaking joint exercises or other service-­to-service contacts with Moscow.2 After a brief experiment with military cooperation with Egypt and Indonesia in the Nehru Years, India was reluctant to offer significant military cooperation to friendly countries outside the Subcontinent that sought them. The case of Singapore in the mid 1960s, which sought military cooperation with India after its separation from Malaysia but was turned down by Delhi, easily comes to mind. That India signed a defence cooperation agreement with Singapore in 2003 marks an important shift in the way India has begun to look at defence diplomacy after the Cold War. One major exception to India’s military isolationism in the Cold War period was Delhi’s active participation in the international peacekeeping operations authorised by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). This would seem to be a continuation of the Raj legacy of expeditionary operations in a different form after decolonisation. The huge ‘military surplus’ of the Subcontinent created during the British rule seemed to endure despite all the political changes of the past six decades: partition, permanent Indo-­Pak conflict, the occupation of Tibet by China and the resultant Sino-­Indian military tensions on the Indo-­Tibetan border. Despite these challenges, the now-­separate armies of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are among the major contributors to the United Nations Peace-­keeping forces.3 Delhi squared its new commitment to international peacekeeping with the policy of non-­alignment by conspicuously limiting its participation to only those operations that had the mandate of the UNSC and were not part of great power rivalry. India became one of the biggest contributors to the international peacekeeping from the 1950s.4 A second and equally important exception to India’s military isolationism during the Cold War was New Delhi’s continuing role after independence as a security provider to the smaller states of the Subcontinent. In the colonial era, the British Raj was the pre-­eminent power in the Indian Ocean and was the guarantor of security for a number of states abutting the Subcontinent. This primacy of the Raj has been described as the ‘India Centre’ in the system of British imperial defence. Yet, the Raj was not merely an extension of London’s policies in the Indian Ocean littoral. It  devised and implemented policies that arose out of the geographic and  political imperatives of securing India.5 Partition had ruptured the

India’s naval diplomacy   109 strategic unity of the Subcontinent and enormously weakened the so-­ called ‘India Centre’ in Asian security affairs. The Cold War between the United States and Soviet Russia, and the re-­emergence of a centralised China in control of Tibet and Xinjiang, likewise chipped away at the presumed primacy of New Delhi in the region. Yet India sought to preserve all it could of its once impressive glacis in the Subcontinent. Independent India revived the British Raj’s protectorate arrangements with Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim in 1949–1950. Sikkim was eventually integrated into India, and New Delhi saw itself as responsible for both the external and internal security of the Himalayan Kingdoms.6 More broadly, Delhi also argued that its own conflicts with neighbours should be managed in a bilateral rather than a multilateral context and viewed with great suspicion the interests of major powers in its neighbourhood. To the extent it could, New Delhi also sought to prevent its neighbours from granting military bases and facilities to great powers.7

After the Cold War: renewed military engagement After the Cold War, as India reconfigured her economic and foreign policies, it was inevitable that it would take a fresh look at its military isolation of the previous decades. Soon after the demise of the Soviet Union, India launched a military engagement with the United States. The basis for the interaction between the Indian and US armed forces was provided by the so-­called ‘Kickleighter’ proposals of the early 1990s.8 Named after the then US commander of the Pacific Armies, they provided a framework for service-­to-service interaction between the armed forces. At the same time it also reached out to its neighbours in South East Asia and initiated naval exchanges with them. After that the floodgates of India’s defence diplomacy opened up. Although it was subject to many hiccups, political and bureaucratic, the vector of India’s military engagement, especially naval engagement, with the rest of the world has been on a rapid upward trajectory. India has bilateral defence cooperation agreements with more than 40 countries from Brazil in Latin America to Australia in the Pacific and from Mozambique in Africa to Mongolia in inner Asia.9 These agreements, which vary greatly in their scope and intensity, can be grouped into three categories – major powers, neighbours and other actors of interest to India in the Indian Ocean littoral and beyond. Starting with the major powers, India’s defence cooperation with the United States is probably the most expansive in terms of the areas covered. It has also, not surprisingly, been the most politically controversial at home and of special interest to the world. For a country that had little defence interaction with India since independence, except for a brief period between the late 1950s to early 1960s that was marked by Sino-­ Indian tensions, Washington has emerged as a major defence partner of India. After period of stop and go interaction between the armed services,

110   C. Raja Mohan they have taken off since the Bush Administration came to power in 2001. India, which never bought a single weapons platform from the United States in the Cold War period, has acquired since 2005 a number of systems including the Landing Platform Doc (LPD) ship Trenton, C-­130 and C-­17 military transport aircraft, and has ordered P-­8 maritime surveillance aircraft in the last few years. Starting from a zero base at the turn of the 2000s, India’s FMS (foreign military sales) purchases from the United States reached nearly $6 billion at the end of 2011.10 By 2013, total US arms sales crossed the $10 billion mark and made Washington the largest arms supplier to India.11 Even more significant has been the 2005 framework agreement that defines a number of political missions, including peacekeeping, humanitarian relief and maritime security, for operational cooperation. The agreement was a clear departure from the tradition of India’s defence engagement in one important sense. None of independent India’s defence cooperation agreements with other powers in the past identified explicit political missions. The agreement also called for greater defence industrial collaboration.12 While India and the United States have made much progress on defence cooperation in the 2000s, its trajectory has not always been smooth and moved only in fits and starts. India’s forward movement on defence engagement with the United States opened the door for a similar, but on a much lower scale, interaction with Great Britain, France and Russia. The new relationship with Washington has been instrumental in deepening defence ties with the US allies in Asia like, Japan, South Korea and Australia.13 India has also begun tentative military exchanges with China that includes high level exchanges, port calls and joint exercises. Larger political mistrust, however, continues to limit the Sino-­Indian military exchanges.14 India’s military engagement with the armed forces of Bangladesh too had been virtually non-­existent until the late 2000s. With the cooling of the relationship since the mid 1970s, Delhi too did not make much of an effort at military diplomacy in Dhaka. That has changed in the last few years. India has recognised the importance of engaging the army as an institution and has actively sought to intensify its ties since 2008. The broad framework agreement for cooperation signed by Manmohan Singh and Sheikh Hasina in 2011 has provisions for substantive military and security cooperation. In an interesting development in 2011, India signed a strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan that includes the option of substantive Indian military support to Kabul.15 The agreement came amidst the impending United States withdrawal from Afghanistan and unresolved tensions between Kabul and Islamabad. While the agreement might have considerable geopolitical possibilities, the military cooperation between Delhi and Kabul is constrained by geography and the hostility of Pakistan. India’s military ties with the smaller states too have begun to acquire some traction. After the failed intervention in the

India’s naval diplomacy   111 Sri Lankan civil war in the late 1980s, Delhi has returned to engage the armed forces of Lanka. While Colombo has responded positively, Delhi is constrained by the opposition of the Tamil Nadu government. Colombo’s inability to resolve the Tamil ethnic question after its victory in the civil war had made it difficult for Delhi to be seen as extending military cooperation. In Nepal, while India maintains close relationship with the national army, there is widespread political opposition to the 1950 India– Nepal treaty, seen in Kathmandu as unequal and hegemonic that provides the political basis for a close military partnership. Delhi has been willing to revise the treaty, but is yet to find a stable interlocutor that can change the terms of the pact. Meanwhile, India revised its 1949 treaty with Bhutan in 2007 to make it more in tune with contemporary realities but retaining the essence of the security partnership between a large state and tiny partner. In 2011, India also signed a new partnership agreement with the Maldives that focuses on deepening maritime security cooperation. Despite the many difficulties, Delhi is on the road to modernising its security ties with most of its neighbours, except Pakistan.16 Unlike the major powers and immediate neighbours, where political issues limit the possibilities for military diplomacy, the context has been far more welcoming for Delhi’s defence diplomacy with different regional actors and critically located small states in the Indian Ocean littoral that India considers its extended neighbourhood. The enthusiasm for defence cooperation with India has been widespread in Africa, the Indian Ocean littoral, East Asia and the Pacific.17 In fact the early focus of India’s defence diplomacy after the Cold War was South East Asia. The objective was to reverse the mistrust that had accumulated during the 1980s, when the expanding Indian Navy was seen as a proxy of the Soviet Union and hence a threat to the region. In the last two decades, India has gone way beyond that initial objective to establish substantive defence cooperation and naval exchanges with all the major South East Asian countries including Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Vietnam. The Indian Navy has been at the forefront of lending a military dimension to India’s Look East policy unveiled in the 1990s.18 Over the years, India’s military diplomacy has expanded to cover Mongolia in inner Asia, North East Asia and the South Pacific. Some have characterised this engagement as an effort to counter-­ balance China; Delhi is a long way from becoming a challenger to Beijing in South East Asia and the Pacific.19 Yet, the mounting disputes in the South China Sea since 2009 saw India become vocal about issues of freedom of navigation in the littoral and claiming its rights to exploit hydrocarbons in Vietnamese waters disputed by China.20 India, however, was too cautious to inject itself too deeply into the South China Sea conflict and is acutely conscious of its severe limitations in projecting power into the Pacific littoral. The Indian Ocean, however, is another matter. It has attracted much attention from India’s naval diplomacy in recent years.21 Given its geographic centrality to the Indian Ocean, Delhi is determined to consolidate

112   C. Raja Mohan its strategic advantages in the littoral. The entry of China into the Indian Ocean has added yet another incentive for India to step up the pace and intensity of its defence diplomacy. In recent years, India has concentrated on deepening maritime security cooperation with Mauritius, Seychelles, Mozambique and Madagascar in the Western littoral, Oman, Qatar and United Arab Emirates in the Arabian Sea, and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal. After the Cold War, India’s military diplomacy has not been limited to bilateral engagement. India began to shed some of its earlier political hostility to multilateral security initiatives. Much of its traditional suspicion of multilateral security arrangements arose from its opposition to US alliances like the SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organisation) and CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation) that were set up in the 1950s. India was also deeply sceptical of collective security proposals that emanated from the Soviet Union. India did not welcome Brezhnev’s 1969 proposal for Asian collective security and was not willing to see its own bilateral treaty of 1971 as part of such a system.22 India also remained ambivalent of the Soviet leader Gorbachev’s proposal for Asian collective security in 1988.23 India’s traditional preference for defence bilateralism was slowly complemented by a number of new multilateral initiatives. In its outreach to the South East Asian countries in the 1990s, Delhi unveiled the Milan multilateral exercises in 1995. It has now been institutionalised as a biennial event that draws in a large number of countries in the Indo-­Pacific littoral.24 In 2008, India took another initiative by convening the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium that brought together all the navy chiefs from the Indian Ocean.25 In 1996 India joined the security forum of the ASEAN, the ARF. In 2005, the ASEAN leaders invited India to join the East Asia Summit process that was to focus on broader political and security issues facing Asia. In 2010, India attended the first expanded gathering of the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting that was dubbed ADMM-­Plus.26 India has also taken the lead in recent years on reviving the moribund Indian Ocean Association for Regional Cooperation, now renamed IORA.27 In an important initiative, India has begun to develop a trilateral framework for naval cooperation with Sri Lanka and the Maldives, which could emerge as the core of India’s security cooperation in the Indian Ocean.28 In assessing India’s new security multilateralism, it is difficult to miss one paradox. While India has been eager to join the new Asian multilateral institutions, its participation in these forums has been quiet and low-­key. Many leaders of the ASEAN have often complained about India’s lacklustre performance in the East Asian multilateral institutions.29 Yet, India has also shown leadership in creating new institutional mechanisms like the Milan and the IONS. Delhi seems far more comfortable in multilateral military institutions set up under its leadership rather than those where the agenda and direction are set by the others. The source of this paradox can be traced to the unresolved political debates within India.

India’s naval diplomacy   113 While sections of the establishment demand India demonstrate leadership in the arena of multilateralism, others are concerned that participation in multilateral military activities might undermine India’s traditional commitment to state sovereignty and non-­alignment. Yet in the post-­1990s period India had to adapt to the imperatives of security cooperation within multilateral forums, for example those led by the ASEAN. As a rising power and a nation with claims for leadership in the past, it had also begun to take the initiative in setting up new multilateral initiatives like the IONS or reviving the old ones like the IORA. India’s traditional opposition to alliances meant India would not participate in any military coalitions, institutionalised or ad hoc. While India did dispatch its armed forces for international peacekeeping operations since the 1950s, it did so only when the operation was sanctioned by the UNSC. There was some easing of this policy in the last decade when Delhi participated at the end of 2004 in Tsunami relief operations along with forces from the United States, Japan and Australia.30 This was probably the first time that India participated in a military coalition. But there remains considerable reluctance within the defence establishment on joining ad hoc coalitions not sanctioned by the United Nations. While India’s growing military weight has increased demands for its contributions to regional and global security in partnership with others, the conservatives in the foreign and defence establishments in Delhi are constrained by the belief that such activity might violate India’s traditional commitments to state sovereignty and non-­alignment. As the internal argument plays out, there are bound to be inconsistencies in India’s approach to security multilateralism.

Economic change and the maritime imperative The preceding review has brought forth the steady and expansive evolution of India’s military diplomacy since the end of the Cold War. The focus of this external military engagement has been the Indian Navy. The Indian Navy, which was marginal to India’s defence and foreign policy for long decades, began to acquire a new salience in the nation’s external engagement in the era of economic reform. In a globalising India, the Navy, unlike the other two services, was well placed to carve a niche for itself in Delhi’s new international relations. From being a closed economy focused for decades on self-­reliance, India turned to economic liberalisation and globalisation in the 1990s. The accelerated growth has ended India’s prolonged isolation and begun to enhance its relative economic weight in the international system. Even with the current slower growth rates, India is likely to emerge as one of the world’s five largest economies within a couple of decades. The steady accretion of economic power has allowed India to build up its military muscle by devoting a small portion of its GDP for defence spending. India is today the ninth largest spender on

114   C. Raja Mohan military in real terms while spending barely 2 per cent of its GDP on defence.31 Equally interesting is the fact that a relatively small share of total defence spending on the navy (less than 20 per cent) already helped grow India’s navy into one of the largest in the world. Delhi’s new interest in sea power is driven by the growing importance of trade, especially seaborne trade, in India’s economy. India’s two way trade which stood at less than $50 billion in the mid 1980s stood at nearly $750 billion in 2013. This in turn amounts to 40 per cent of India’s GDP ($1.8 trillion). This intense international exposure of the Indian economy is changing the nature of India’s national interests. As the world’s leading importer of natural resources India is also focused on promoting exports to different corners of the world. India’s economic interests today are dispersed all across the Indian Ocean and beyond and are no longer limited to its immediate neighbourhood in the Subcontinent. Like many of great trading nations of the world in the past, India is seeking to build a strong navy. With 90 per cent of its trade travelling by the sea – India’s overland trading routes remain underdeveloped – the maritime domain has acquired an unprecedented importance in Indian foreign policy.32 India’s new interest in acquiring maritime power marks a historic break from its continentalist tradition. Naval nationalists in India do speak of the ancient maritime tradition. But there is no denying that India’s interest in the seas through its history has been episodic. India’s principal security threats tended to remain on its north-­western frontiers. Even when it was ruled by the world’s foremost naval power, Great Britain, India’s military energies were devoted to the defence of India’s expansive land borders. The power of the Royal Navy, paradoxically, limited the incentive for building a strong Indian Navy during the British Raj.33 The Indian nationalists did imagine a strong maritime future and a special role for itself in the Indian Ocean. But its economic strategy and the challenges of defending its old and land frontiers necessarily limited India’s maritime possibilities. It is only in the last decade that India’s economic logic has come in alignment with its maritime aspirations. For contemporary India, maritime strategy has become integral to the management of its economic interdependence and securing the prosperity of its large population. While India’s new regional maritime engagement is impressive, it is also constrained by a number of tensions within Delhi’s strategic thinking. The conflict between the old political ideas and the new maritime imperatives express themselves in at least five broad areas that are discussed below.

Between autonomy and responsibility The Indian Navy’s outward orientation, however, continues to run into the residual legacies of autarchy and isolationism. Most analysts of Indian foreign and security policy, whether at home or abroad, would argue that the organising principle of India’s contemporary international relations is

India’s naval diplomacy   115 the notion of ‘strategic autonomy’. The use of this phrase is relatively new and has replaced the emphasis on ‘non-­alignment’ that dominated India’s world view in the past. Students of India’s foreign policy have seen the new emphasis on ‘strategic autonomy’ as a ‘realist mutation’ of the traditional emphasis on non-­alignment.34 While ‘strategic autonomy’, rooted in realism, is an improvement over the ideology of non-­alignment, it may not be adequate to cope with the changing nature of India’s national interests. Just as the mantra of ‘self-­reliance’ is no longer the organising principle of India’s economic strategy, ‘strategic autonomy’ can’t be the lode star guiding India’s foreign and security policy. Autonomy is a great prize for weak middle powers which are trying to insulate themselves from the regimen defined for them by the great powers. For many decades, India has seen itself as a weak developing state that must protect its territory, interests and freedom of choice from the dictates of the great powers. As India becomes a major power in its own right, Delhi’s strategic objective is transforming into something different. India now needs to contribute to the management of the external environment and not seek autonomy from it. The new strategy must be about expanding its choices amidst its growing interdependence with the rest of the world. Externally, the international pressure on India to take a larger role in the region and the world is becoming relentless. Delhi is already beginning to feel some of it as other powers begin to see Delhi as critical for shaping the strategic balance in the Indo-­Pacific. The increase in the economic and military mass of India has generated a strong perception of the emerging power as a ‘swing state’ that will influence the balance of power in the Indo-­Pacific.35 Washington has begun to argue that Delhi is the ‘lynchpin’ in the American pivot to Asia amidst the expanding defence relationship with India.36 As India’s defence cooperation with the United States grows, sections of the strategic community in China have expressed fears of India joining the United States’ plans to contain China. The idea of a ‘strategic triangle’ involving these three powers has begun to gain some traction in recent years.37 The evolution of this triangle remains uncertain given the considerable fluidity in the relations among the three powers. Some Americans see the importance of accommodating the rise of China through the construction of a condominium; some others see India as a natural balancer against China’s rise. Yet other Americans argue that Washington must balance against both Beijing and Delhi. Some in Beijing worry that India’s naval power, acting in collaboration with the United States and Japan, could hit at the vital maritime interests of China. Delhi is itself quite hesitant about identifying the hierarchy of its threats. At some point, India will have to make strategic choices amidst the growing tensions between China and the United States as well as between Beijing and its Pacific neighbours. Non-­alignment and strategic autonomy, however, may not provide an  adequate foundation for India in dealing with the changing power

116   C. Raja Mohan equations in the Indo-­Pacific, especially the rise of China. India has traditionally viewed itself as equal to China. Over the last couple of decades, there has been a rapid widening of the gulf between the strategic capabilities of the two countries. By the early 2010s, China’s GDP has become four times larger than that of India; so has Beijing’s annual defence spending. This gap in turn has generated the need and possibility for a stronger military partnership with the United States. India’s potential interest in such an engagement was signalled by the signing of the ten year defence framework agreement with the United States in 2005. The historic civil nuclear initiative unveiled in the same year was considered by many at home and abroad as part of an effort to build a new alliance-­like relationship with the United States.38 This proposition however generated considerable political backlash within India that led to multiple difficulties in implementing the two initiatives. The problem was a lack of consensus within the political elite in general and especially within the Manmohan Singh government. There was also the enduring appeal of non-­alignment and strategic autonomy as well as concerns that drawing too close to Washington might complicate Delhi’s engagement with Beijing. Singh’s successor, Narendra Modi, appears less constrained by the ideology of non-­alignment and is quite eager to deepen defence cooperation with the United States while enhancing political and economic engagement with China.39 There are no definitive answers to the question on the sustainability of such an approach. What is clear though is the fact that as India copes with the rise of China, many of its traditional foreign policy conceptions will come under stress in the coming years.

Between territorial defence and power projection Since independence, India’s traditional impulse was to protect its own territory and the waters around it. The Partition of the Subcontinent and the creation of new borders made internal conflict in the Subcontinent a perennial one; the emergence of China as a new land neighbour after its entry into Tibet added to India’s security burdens. If India’s land forces were weighed down by the defence of its borders, India’s naval strategy too was guided by the logic of sea denial and a maritime diplomacy that sought to limit the role of the external powers in the Indian Ocean. As the logic of economic globalisation unfolded over the last two decades, the Indian naval leadership began to invent a new maritime strategy that is in tune with its new circumstances and with it Indian naval diplomacy too has evolved. Since the late 1990s, Indian leaders have repeatedly underlined the expanded geographic scope of India’s maritime interests. Vajpayee, for example, told the combined commanders in 2003 that as we grow in international stature, our defence strategies should naturally reflect our political, economic and security concerns, extending

India’s naval diplomacy   117 well beyond the geographical confines of South Asia. Our security environment ranges from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca across the Indian Ocean, including Central Asia and Afghanistan in the North-­west, China in the North-­east and South East Asia. Our strategic thinking has also to extend to these horizons.40 That the phrases from ‘Aden to Malacca’ or ‘the Suez to the South China Sea’ are not empty talk is reflected in the operations of the Indian Navy that has frequently shown the Tricolour all across the Indo-­Pacific. More importantly, anti-­piracy activity in the Gulf of Aden (since 2008) and relief operations in Lebanon (2006), the Eastern Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004–2005) and Libya (2011) have underlined the growing capacity of the Indian Navy and the new political will in Delhi to act far from its shores. The far sea operations, to be sure, have not reduced the salience of territorial defence. The navy was fully mobilised in the Arabian Sea during the two military crises with Pakistan – the Kargil war of 1999 and the confrontation during 2001–2002. The outrageous terror attacks on Mumbai during November 2008 reinforced the importance of protecting its waters from terrorist threat. Successful power projection also depends on reorienting the armed forces towards expeditionary capabilities. Despite expansive expeditionary operations under the Raj and impressive international peacekeeping operations since independence, the word ‘expeditionary’ remains a taboo in Delhi’s discourse.41 The notion of ‘power projection’ continues to sit uneasily with our political classes who feel more comfortable with the old verities of ‘Third Worldism’. Power projection also needs a more vigorous military diplomacy that can reinforce the Navy’s capability to operate far from our shores. This would mean creation of arrangements for friendly ports and turn-­around facilities in other nations that will increase the range, flexibility and sustainability of Indian naval operations.42 No great power has built a blue water navy capable of projecting force without physical access and political arrangements for ‘forward presence’. Having long rejected ‘foreign bases’ in the Indian Ocean, it is somewhat discomforting for India’s political and strategic communities to even contemplate the new imperatives. The idea of India having naval bases, however, is not entirely new. K.M. Panikkar, who remains an inspiration for Indian naval thinking, emphasised the need for a ring of bases in the Indian Ocean to ensure India’s maritime security.43

From national security to regional security Although the imagination of an expeditionary role for the Indian Navy remains controversial, the idea that India must look beyond its own security and provide it to others is beginning to re-­emerge in Delhi. From the late eighteenth century to the mid twentieth, it was British power, radiating

118   C. Raja Mohan first out of Calcutta and then Delhi, that kept peace in the Indian Ocean. It was commonplace then to call the Indian Ocean a British Lake. Although Britain was the sole super power then, it could not have exercised hegemony without the extraordinary resources of an undivided Subcontinent and its geographical location at the heart of the Indian Ocean. In the decades after independence, India abandoned this tradition and adopted military isolationism as it turned inward economically and coped with the pressures for territorial defence. Despite the division of the Subcontinent, India did retain a measure of the past legacy in terms of its ability to contribute troops to international peacekeeping under the auspices of the United Nations. While India’s territorial conflicts with its neighbours have not disappeared, the nuclearisation of the Subcontinent has muted them into very different tensions, especially at the sub-­ conventional level. As India’s economic power and military prowess grow, it is but natural that other powers have begun to see Delhi as a ‘net security provider in the Indian Ocean’.44 That India, especially its navy, could be a net security provider has begun to figure in Delhi’s own official political discourse.45 Yet it is not clear if the Indian political leadership has fully internalised the significance of this proposition. The Indian Naval Headquarters has begun to emphasise the importance of assisting the weaker states of the Indian Ocean littoral in building their own capacities. As the Indian Naval Chief said in 2009, We have also been mindful of the need to assist our smaller neighbours to help themselves. Our capability-­enhancement and capacity-­ building initiatives with Sri Lanka, Seychelles, Maldives and Mauritius have adequately enabled them to deal with many of their security concerns on their own. I am convinced that, as India grows in economic and military stature, it would have to take upon itself the role of further equipping its neighbours in ways that would not only enhance their own security but contribute positively to regional stability as well.46 The Indian Navy has provided training, advisers and equipment to some of the smaller countries in the Indian Ocean. Whether it was helping Mauritius operate a Coast Guard, strengthening Sri Lanka’s ability to control its waters, or improving the ability of Mozambique, Madagascar and Maldives to monitor their maritime domain, India has taken a number of steps. This somewhat ad hoc policy has included the recent transfer of ships to Seychelles, Maldives and Mauritius. To realise its true potential as a security provider in the Indian Ocean, Delhi needs to develop a comprehensive programme for security assistance. This involves the development of a range of policy instruments including transfer of arms, financial support for military exports, and a strong domestic defence industrial base

India’s naval diplomacy   119 to match the growing demand for military cooperation with India. Delhi also needs to devise frameworks for intelligence sharing as well as stationing of Indian military personnel and equipment in other countries. This, in turn, calls for the national security apex to bring synergy and coordination to the activities of the Navy, the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office.

From territorial seas to maritime commons Since independence India had a complex attitude towards the notions of collective security. While its idealist rhetoric always emphasised the notion of collective security, its practice often shunned any idea of deploying the Indian armed forces for collective security activity outside the United Nations. But in the last two decades, India has increased its participation in collective security efforts. Equally important India has begun to adopt the rhetoric of contributing to the management of maritime commons and was more open to collaboration with other major naval powers. The ‘global commons’ refers to various realms – like oceans, air, outer space and cyberspace – that are not under the control of any one state but are critical for the functioning of contemporary international life. The commons are a consequence of technological evolution and form the connective tissues of our globalised world. The dominant powers of each age had undertaken the responsibility to keep the maritime commons open for use by all and contribute to the maintenance of good order at sea. The new emphasis on the protection of the commons underlines two important evolutions in India’s maritime thinking. One is that as a rising naval power, India is taking a much broader view of its responsibility than the mere pursuit of its narrowly defined national interests. Contributing to the public goods – such as keeping the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) open – has become one of the stated objectives of the Indian Navy.47 The other is the shift away from the territorial approach to the maritime commons that India had taken in the past. When the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea was being drafted in the 1970s, India sided with those seeking to extend the territorial jurisdiction of the coastal states. India, like many other developing states, sought to restrict the rights of great powers to conduct naval operations near their waters. Today as a maritime power in the making, India needs open seas rather than waters that are enclosed in the name of national sovereignty. There has also been an emphasis on the ‘freedom of navigation’ and protection of SLOCs. The 2007 maritime military strategy of the Indian Navy is titled ‘Freedom to Use the Seas’.48 This in fact preceded the eruption of territorial disputes in the South China Seas. India’s new non-­territorial conception of the seas stands in contrast to the maritime philosophy of China.

120   C. Raja Mohan

Between the ‘regional’ and the ‘extra-­regional’ One important feature of post independence Indian maritime thinking has been the opposition to the presence of extra-­regional powers in the Indian Ocean. In the Indian debate that followed the announcement of the East of Suez policy by Great Britain in 1967, the Indian strategic community rallied around Sri Lanka’s proposal for making the Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace (IOZP). Arguing that the great power naval presence in the Indian Ocean will exacerbate regional insecurity, Delhi opposed the entry of the United States and Russia into the Indian Ocean after the British withdrawal. India’s chattering classes believed in the moral superiority of their position in favour of a collective security mechanism in the Indian Ocean.49 Yet, India’s campaign for an IOZP was seen by some as part of the Soviet propaganda against the West and an attempt to limit the naval options of the United States. Meanwhile the littoral states, many of whom were dependent on either the United States or the Soviet Union, had little commitment to the notion of collective security. India’s own neighbours including Pakistan projected India’s support to the IOZP and demand for the withdrawal of ‘extra-­regional navies’ as a thinly disguised plot to make the Indian Ocean ‘India’s Ocean’.50 India’s lack of realism was unsustainable after the end of the Cold War two decades ago. Along with its economic reforms, India began to engage all great powers, including the United States, which had a presence in the Indian Ocean. Yet when India took the initiative for convening the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium in 2008, it insisted that the membership must be limited to ‘regional’ states of the littoral. India’s support for the IOZP in the 1970s was probably rooted in the fear about the United States (recall 1971 and the Enterprise incident!) and opposition to Washington’s alliances with China and Pakistan. India’s rejection of ‘extra-­regional’ powers in the current phase appears to be a reflection of Delhi’s concerns about the new Chinese profile in the Indian Ocean. As a rising maritime power facing an increasingly complex power dynamic in the IOR, India might eventually have to go beyond the unproductive divide it has set up between the ‘regional’ and the ‘extra-­regional’. From a practical perspective, then, India cannot either wish away the extra-­regional presence of the United States or prevent the significant rise in Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Instead of proclaiming a Monroe Doctrine that it can’t enforce, India might have to find ways to deal with the reality of American and the growing Chinese interests and presence in the Indian Ocean. Since the early 1990s, India has given up the demand that great powers vacate the Indian Ocean and has slowly but certainly expanded its engagement with the United States. Differences within India, however, remain on how far and how close Delhi should get to Washington. The case of China is somewhat different. If Delhi has been slow to recognise the consequences

India’s naval diplomacy   121 of China’s growing naval capabilities and reach, it has begun to react with some concern in recent years. China’s growing naval profile in the Indian Ocean, Beijing’s cultivation of special political relationships including access arrangements with key countries in the littoral, and President Xi Jinping’s diplomatic initiative on building a Maritime Silk Road have all begun to compel Delhi to respond more vigorously to China’s emergence as an Indian Ocean power. Realists in Delhi know that there is no way to prevent Beijing’s entry into the Indian Ocean. Like all the earlier great powers, China, they suggest, is bound to become a force to contend with in the Indian Ocean in the not too distant future. The challenge, they insist, is in consolidating India’s natural geographic advantages in the region, strengthening strategic partnerships with traditional allies in the littoral, recalibrating the relationships with the neighbours and reducing their incentives for playing the China card against India, expanding cooperation with other maritime powers like the United States, Japan and Australia and beginning a substantive maritime dialogue with China. While signs of this new approach are evident, Delhi has much work to do in translating these objectives into credible policies.

Conclusion In conclusion, the Indian Navy stares at an important paradox. Even as its capabilities and reach have grown, the Indian Navy must come to terms with the logic of collaborating with other countries, big and small, to secure its maritime interests in the region. The Indian Navy has broken out of the ‘lone ranger’ syndrome and has outlined a doctrine that is in tune with Delhi’s emergence as a trading state with widely dispersed interests. It is deeply conscious of the virtues of being part of ad hoc coalitions. The Indian Foreign Office has begun to recognise the virtues of naval diplomacy. Maritime security and enhanced naval cooperation with other countries has become a standard part of India’s diplomatic tool kit. Yet at the political level there is a deep discomfort with any presumed deviation from the notion of non-­alignment and avoiding power politics. This has also found some intellectual justification in the form of widespread emphasis on strategic autonomy as a key national objective.51 At the policy level, the civilian bureaucracy, including the foreign office and the ministry of defence and the political leadership continue to struggle with the logic of military cooperation and security diplomacy. The implementation of a variety of naval cooperation agreements has been constrained by insufficient institutional capabilities within the central government. The lack of sufficient defence production capability at home has also prevented India from the growing demands for transfer of naval equipment to smaller countries. Within these limitations, India’s naval engagement has significantly expanded. Once India brings its policy in line with the new maritime

122   C. Raja Mohan imperatives, India’s naval diplomacy is likely to become more productive and consequential in the coming years. The government led by Narendra Modi, elected to power in mid 2014 and the first to have a majority in the lower house of the Parliament in 30 years, is perhaps better placed than many of its recent predecessors to vigorously pursue India’s maritime interests. The BJP led government has shed the baggage about non-­ alignment and has called for a ‘web of allies’ to strengthen India’s national power.52 Mr Modi has surprised many at home and abroad by reaching out to the United States and its allies, Japan and Australia, and seeking a stronger defence partnership with all of them. At the same time, Modi has warmed up to an economic engagement with China. With an emphasis on renewing India’s rise Modi has liberalised rules for foreign direct investment in the security sector and is pushing for a rapid expansion of India’s defence industrial base and arms exports.53 It is possible to imagine that Mr Modi will be more successful in completing the long-­overdue policy transitions in India’s maritime strategy.

Notes   1 For a discussion, see Stephen P. Cohen, The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 88–113.   2 P.R. Chari, ‘Indo-­Soviet Military Cooperation: A Review’, Asian Survey, Vol. 19, No. 3, March 1979, pp. 230–244; see also S. Nihal Singh, The Yogi and the Bear: The Story of Indo-­Soviet Relations (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1986).   3 See, for example, David Axe, ‘Why South Asia Loves Peacekeeping’, The Diplomat, 20 December 2010, http://the-­diplomat.com/2010/12/20/why-­southasia-­loves-peacekeeping/?all=true.   4 Satish Nambiar, For the Honour of India: A History of Indian Peacekeeping (New Delhi: Lancer, 2009).   5 For a discussion of the concept of the ‘India Center’ see Peter John Brobst, The Future of the Great Game: Sir Olaf Caroe, India’s Independence and the Defence of Asia (Akron: University of Akron Press, 2005).   6 Srikant Dutt, ‘India and the Himalayan States’, Asian Affairs, Vol.  11, No.  1, 1980.   7 Devin T. Hagerty, ‘India’s Regional Security Doctrine’, Asian Survey, Vol.  31, No. 4, April 1991, pp. 351–363.   8 For a review see John H. Gill, ‘U.S.–India Military-­to-Military Interaction’, in Sumit Ganguly, Brian Shoup and Andrew Scobell (eds), Beyond Words: U.S.– Indian Strategic Cooperation into the 21st Century (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 113–130.   9 For a broad survey, see Brian K. Hendrick, India’s Strategic Defence Transformation: Expanding Global Relationships (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2009). 10 US Department of Defense, Report to Congress on U.S.–India Security Cooperation, November 2011. 11 Rajat Pandit, ‘U.S. Pips Russia as Top Arms Supplier to India’, Times of India, 13 August 2014. 12 For the text of the agreement, see Embassy of India, ‘New Framework for the US–India Defence Relationship’, Washington, DC, 28 June 2005, www.indianembassy.org/press_release/2005/June/31.htm.

India’s naval diplomacy   123 13 For a review, see David Brewster, India as a Pacific Power (New York: Routledge, 2012). 14 See R.N. Das, ‘The Sino-­Indian Defence Dialogue: Addressing the Persistent Security Dilemma’, IDSA Comment (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses), 7 December 2011, www.idsa.in/idsacomment/TheSino IndianDefenceDialogue_rndas_071211. 15 For a review of these agreements, see C. Raja Mohan, ‘Modernizing the Raj Legacy’, Seminar, No. 629, January 2012. 16 Ibid. 17 For a brief overview, see David Scott, ‘India’s “Extended Neighbourhood” Concept: Power Projection for a Rising Power’, India Review, Vol.  8, No.  2, April–June 2009, pp. 107–143. 18 Pankaj Kumar Jha, ‘India’s Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia’, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, January 2011, pp. 47–61. 19 Iskander Rahman, ‘Keeping the Dragon at Bay: India’s Counter Containment of China in Asia’, Asian Security, Vol. 5, No. 2, May 2009, pp. 114–143. 20 See David Scott, ‘India’s Role in the South China Sea: Geopolitics and Geoeconomics in Play’, India Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2013, pp. 51–69. 21 See David Brewster, ‘An Indian Sphere of Influence in the Indian Ocean?’, Security Challenges, Vol. 6, No. 3, Spring 2010, pp. 1–20. 22 R.V.R. Chandrasekhara Rao, ‘The Brezhnev Plan and the Indo-­Soviet Treaty’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 8, No. 46, 17 November 1973, pp. 2059–2065. 23 Elizabeth Wishnick, ‘Soviet Asian Collective Security Policy from Brezhnev to Gorbachev’, East Asia, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1988, pp. 3–28. 24 Pankaj Kumar Jha, ‘India’s Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia’. 25 For a discussion, see Yogesh V. Athawale, ‘The IONS Initiative and the Prospects for Security Cooperation within the IOR’, Maritime Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2010, pp. 98–115. 26 Pankaj Kumar Jha, ‘India’s Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia’. 27 C. Raja Mohan, ‘Ocean’s Nineteen’, Indian Express, 2 November 2012; for a critique of IOR–ARC see Christian Wagner, ‘The Indian Ocean Rim – Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR–ARC): The Futile Quest for Regionalism?’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2013, pp. 6–16. 28 R.K. Radhakrishnan, ‘India, Sri Lanka, Maldives Sign Agreement on Maritime Cooperation’, The Hindu, 6 December 2012. 29 C. Raja Mohan, ‘An Uncertain Trumpet?: India’s Role in Southeast Asian Security’, India Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2013, pp. 134–150. 30 S. Jaishankar, ‘2004 Tsunami Disaster: Consequences for Regional Cooperation’, presentation at the 26th annual Pacific symposium, Hawaii, 8–10 June 2005. 31 International Institute of Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2014 Press Statement, www.iiss.org/en/about%20us/press%20room/press%20releases/press%20 releases/archive/2014-dd03/february-­0 abc/military-­b alance-2014-press-­ statement-52d7. 32 See, for example, Shivshankar Menon, ‘Maritime Imperatives of India’s Foreign Policy’, Lecture at the National Maritime Foundation, Delhi, 11 September 2009, www.indiahabitat.org/download/Maritime_Imperatives.pdf. 33 K.M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea Power on Indian History (New York: Macmillan, 1945). 34 Guillem Monsonis, ‘India’s Strategic Autonomy and the Rapprochement with the US’, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2010, pp. 611–624. 35 For a discussion of the concept of swing states, see Daniel M. Kliman and Richard Fontaine, Global Swing States: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Turkey and the Future of the International Order (Washington, DC: Center for a New American

124   C. Raja Mohan Security, 2012). See also James Kraska, Global Swing States and the Maritime Order (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2012). 36 The US defence secretary Leon Panetta in 2012 used the term ‘lynchpin’ to describe India’s role in US pivot to Asia; see Leon Panetta, ‘Partners for the 21st Century’, Address to the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, 6 June 2012, www.idsa.in/keyspeeches/LeonEPanettaonPartnersinthe21stcentury. 37 See Zhao Minghao, ‘The Emerging Strategic Triangle in Indo-­Pacific Asia’, The Diplomat, 4 June 2013; Ananya Chatterjee, ‘India-­China-United States: The Post Cold War Evolution of a Strategic Triangle’, Political Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2011, pp. 74–95. 38 For a discussion see C. Raja Mohan, Impossible Allies: Nuclear India, United States and the Global Order (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2006). 39 See William J. Antholis, ‘Mr. Modi’s Dynamic Diplomatic Debut’ (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 24 September 2014), www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-­ front/posts/2014/09/26-modi-­dynamic-diplomatic-­debut-antholis. 40 See PIB summary of Vajpayee’s speech to combined commanders conference, New Delhi, 1 November 2003, http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/ rnov2003/01112003/r011120034.html. 41 For a discussion see Abhijit Singh, ‘Indian Navy’s New Expeditionary Outlook’, Occasional Paper No. 37 (New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, 2012). 42 Indian Navy, Integrated Headquarters, India’s Maritime Military Strategy 2007, pp. 80–82. 43 Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean, p. 15. 44 It was US defence secretary Bob Gates who first articulated the concept when he stated in 2009 that ‘we look to India to be a partner and net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond’. See his speech at the Shangri La Conference, Singapore, 30 May 2009, www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20 la%20dialogue/archive/shangri-­la-dialogue-­2009–99ea/first-­plenarysession-­5080/dr-­robert-gates-­6609. 45 Addressing the naval commanders in 2011, defence minister A.K. Antony underlined the Indian Navy’s role as a security provider. See Press Information Bureau, ‘Indian Navy – Net Security Provider to the Island Nations in IOR: Antony’, 12 October 2011, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=76590. 46 See Admiral Sureesh Mehta’s address to the Shangri La Conference, Sin­ gapore, 30 May 2009, www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/ archive/shangri-­la-dialogue-­2009–99ea/second-­plenary-session-­3292/admiral-­ sureesh-mehta-­8152. 47 See Admiral D.K. Joshi, ‘Role of Indian Navy in Maintaining Peace in Indian Ocean Region’, Speech at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, 5 March 2013, www.idsa.in/keyspeeches/RoleofIndianNavyinMaintaining PeaceinIndianOceanRegion_CNS. 48 Indian Navy, Integrated Headquarters, Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy (New Delhi, 2007). 49 See, for example, K.P. Misra, ‘Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: The Concept and Alternatives’, India Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 1, January 1977, pp. 19–32. 50 For a discussion see Dieter Braun, The Indian Ocean: Region of Conflict or Zone of Peace (London: Croom Helm, 1983). 51 See, for example, Center for Policy Research, Nonalignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the 21st Century (New Delhi, 2012). 52 See BJP Election Manifesto, 2014, p. 40. 53 Rama Lakshmi, ‘India Is the World’s Largest Arms Importer. It Aims to Be a Big Weapons Dealer too’, Washington Post, 16 November 2014.

Part II

The external dimensions of India’s naval strategy

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7 India in the US naval strategy Timothy D. Hoyt1

Background US–India naval cooperation began 20 years ago. The fact that it took 45 years for India and the United States to begin even modest interactions at sea suggests the enormous constraints on cooperation between the world’s two greatest democracies. The relationship in that 45 year gap was marred by conflicting interests and diplomatic gaffes: the controversy over the Cold War and the principle of Non-­Alignment; the US alliance with Pak­ istan and imposition of sanctions on the subcontinent in 1965; Britain’s withdrawal from west of Suez; India’s decision to sign a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR, the ‘Enterprise Incident’ in 1971; India’s 1974 nuclear test; Diego Garcia; India’s decision not to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; and the growing presence of US Central Command (CENTCOM) and re-­emergence of the US–Pakistan alliance on India’s western borders.2 The end of the Cold War, however, created new opportunities for Indo­US cooperation, and the maritime arena is particularly promising for military-­to-military cooperation. First, the Indian Ocean is quite distant from the United States, and American presence there, while powerful, is modest, and not focused on the subcontinent. The vast majority of US business and national security concern in the Indian Ocean lies in the Persian Gulf region. Second, navies traditionally face peacetime contingencies in which cooperation is routine and helpful – rescue operations, humanitarian missions and disaster relief, to name a few.3 Therefore militaries can train for and cooperate on non-­combat contingencies as an initial step in building closer military and diplomatic relationships. Third, navies operate out of sight of the coasts of the homeland. This can be very important for political systems that are sensitive to partisan condemnation when altering traditional policy. Both states face this criticism – the United States for undermining traditional relationships (Pakistan) and commitment to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and India for abandoning non-­alignment and getting too close to a traditional foreign policy bogeyman.

128   T.D. Hoyt The United States engaged much more significantly in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), and with India itself, during the early twenty-­first century, and the ‘demand’ for improved US-­Indian defence and naval relations is accelerating. First, the United States has engaged, for the first time, in two simultaneous wars and multiple crises in the Indian Ocean theatre. Although US military commitments to both Iraq and Afghanistan are winding down, the United States continues to worry about Iranian nuclear developments, Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia, piracy around the Horn of Africa, terrorism from ‘Core Al Qaeda’ based in Pakistan, and the re-­emergence of Islamist extremism in both Iraq and Syria. As a result of the changing international environment and US role, the 2007 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS21) formally recognised that the primary theatres for US naval combat forces were now the Pacific Rim and the Indian Ocean. In effect, the American ‘Two Ocean Navy’ which has secured the maritime commons since 1940 has shifted focus, and Asia has, at least in official rhetoric, replaced Europe as the primary theatre.4 Second, the early twenty-­first century also marks the emergence of a more modern Chinese military coupled with a more assertive foreign policy. China now aggressively contests border and territorial disputes with most of its neighbours, where once it took a more nuanced diplomatic approach. Obscure areas with foreign names – the Senkakus, the ‘Nine-­ Dashed Line’, Aksai Chin – now dominate the headlines due to Chinese intransigence. Maritime incidents are becoming more common, including a recent near-­collision between a PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy) vessel and a US cruiser. Growing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean, including recent exercises in the Lombok Straits, and recent Chinese incursions into Indian-­held territory in Aksai Chin may help further solidify US and Indian perceptions of common interest and a common threat. Third, the continuing shift of the global economy towards Asia is matched by an accelerating demand for energy. This demand is primarily met by the oil producing states of the Persian Gulf region. These provide significant proportions of the energy requirements of the four leading Asian economies (China, Japan, India and Republic of Korea) as well as other South East Asian states. The Indian Ocean, therefore, is a critical transit route for maintenance of the global economy – interruptions in energy supplies will create not just national but also system-­wide shocks.5 In the modern state system, maintenance of freedom of the seas has, generally, fallen to the large naval powers. India, as the leading regional navy, and the United States, as the largest naval power, have a joint interest in maintaining a strong presence in the Indian Ocean and in ensuring its availability for energy transit. These three broad trends, emerging in the early twenty-­first century, hold promise for accelerating the US–India military partnership. The United States and India have moved to a much closer level of formal cooperation and consultation than at any time during the Cold War. Starting

India in the US naval strategy   129 with the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership agreement of 2004,6 and then the 2005 New Framework for the US–India Defense Relationship7 the two countries have made great strides in building trust and opening new opportunities for defence consultation and coordination. Both US and Indian analysts argue that the defence sector represents one of the most promising areas for joint cooperation. Despite the regular reference to India and the United States as a ‘natural strategic partnership’, however, progress has been relatively slow, and remains a matter of frustration on both sides.

Constraints on the Indo-­US relationship There are three broad reasons why the apparent transformation in the Indo-­US relationship is advancing at a relatively modest pace, even in the military sphere. First, the interests and perspectives of the two nations often differ, and their shared past continues to influence the pace of change. Second, the benefits of accelerating cooperation do not necessarily warrant the high domestic political costs that might have to be paid for a closer relationship. Last but not least, there are significant geopolitical and technological barriers to closer cooperation. These obstacles can be overcome with time, but they currently represent substantial obstacles to rapid growth or change. The first and most important obstacle is that neither state appears to know exactly what they want from the relationship, the value they place on it, or even the feasibility of their vision of the future. This will, naturally, affect the costs they are willing to pay to achieve that relationship. The fact that the relationship has improved, and continues to improve, may be enough – but it is not a recipe for accelerating and deepening the partnership. There remain a number of key issues where US and Indian interests may differ, or at least not coincide – particularly in the context of the emerging international system in the twenty-­first century. The United States – as a global leader and architect of key elements of the system – broadly supports an international system where change in power relationships and the US leadership role occur slowly. India, as an emerging economic power with different perspectives on how the system should be governed, may prefer a much more rapid evolution in those power relationships, even at the cost of instability. Within the region, traditional US ties to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia – both strongly linked to international terrorism that attacks Indian territory and interests – are a matter of great concern to India. Similarly, the United States has concerns about traditional Indian diplomatic and economic ties to Russia and Iran. Both states are ambivalent about confronting China. These macro-­level differences naturally affect both expectations and outcomes in the emerging US–India relationship.

130   T.D. Hoyt The range of anticipated outcomes in the United States is quite broad, and frequently unrealistic. Editorials and analyses, frequently written by ‘experts’ who have no little or no real understanding of the history of this relationship, often paint an absurdly optimistic future. They interpret the diplomatically vague term of ‘natural strategic partner’ to be the equivalent of ‘special relationship’, reference India’s 1962 war with China, and conclude that India will gladly join the United States in containing, confronting or deterring China in the near future. These assessments make a basic mistake of assuming that similar languages, economic policies and political systems will equate to similar outlooks on foreign affairs.8 US policy documents take a much more cautious approach. India is viewed as a potential ‘net security provider’ in the Indian Ocean Region.9 US policy seeks to expand economic relations, improve India’s position as the economic pillar of the region, and expand opportunities for security cooperation and defence trade.10 The United States does not anticipate an alliance relationship with India, nor (for the moment) a defence relationship that will facilitate the kinds of levels of cooperation and interoperability that the United States shares with other traditional allies and partners. The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS21) encapsulates many of the elements of cooperation that the United States seeks with India and other partners. The 2007 original version was also notable for its relative lack of emphasis on traditional wartime missions, although the revised version pays them greater attention. The advantage of the CS21 framework for the US–India relationship is its willingness to incorporate informal partnerships with an emphasis on peacetime roles. India’s resistance to formal security relationships is rooted in the early years of independence and the Non-­Alignment Movement. The fact that a recent effort to reconsider Indian foreign policy in the twenty-­first century was entitled Non-­Alignment 2.0 suggests the hold this tradition has on the imaginations of Indian foreign policy elites.11 India’s Indian Maritime Military Strategy, while focused more on wartime missions (and considerably longer than the US CS21), also emphasises the peacetime roles of navies, and represents a template for continued naval cooperation, not only with the United States but also with other partners.12 Humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peacetime presence and constabulary operations all represent ‘easy’ areas of cooperation with other states. Again, the Indian Navy has the ability to exercise away from the public eye. This permits it to carry out increasingly sophisticated tactical evolutions in exercises with other navies that test not only peacetime but also some wartime missions. The Indian Navy and military more generally, still face very high barriers to closer cooperation because of political traditions. Indian politicians are reluctant to participate in military coalitions unless they have UN authorisation. As the Indian participation in the anti-­piracy operations off the Horn of Africa demonstrates, however, even existing UN authorisation

India in the US naval strategy   131 is sometimes insufficient to create the necessary space for coalition participation, and India remains operating with but not in the coalition framework there. India’s institutional reluctance to operate flexibly in coalitions raises questions about its ability to take on the ‘net security provider’ role in the Indian Ocean that US policy seeks. Peacetime maritime security is premised on a ‘thousand ship navy’ built from willing coalitions. India’s inability to participate in coalitions, much less lead them, suggests that currently it is poorly positioned to supplement the United States as the guarantor of sea lanes in the Indian Ocean. In addition, the US role in the Indian Ocean is complicated but widely accepted. Although the United States has few allies in the Indian Ocean littoral, it also has few real enemies (Iran being the outstanding example, although that may be moderating). As a result, when the United States attempts to lead maritime efforts in the region, it possesses the will, the capacity and relationships with potential partners that facilitate their acceptance of US leadership. India’s relations in the IOR have not demonstrated a capacity for flexible leadership. Within its immediate neighbourhood, India is often viewed as acting like China, preferring bilateral relationships where it can exert its superior size and power to dictate rather than bargain. India therefore has little tradition for, and perhaps a preference against, working in coalitions, and also has little experience in or reputation for sacrificing its own interests in order to sustain coalition activity.13 This creates a fundamental obstacle to US policy – India for the moment may lack both the will and the capacity to act as a regional leader, alone or in coalition. This represents a significant obstacle to short-­term improvements in cooperation. A second set of obstacles is the continuing high cost and low benefit, for both states, of making larger accommodations that might accelerate the relationship. Both sides might reasonably argue that they have sacrificed interests on behalf of the partnership. The United States overturned decades of non-­proliferation policy, creating a new loophole in the non-­ proliferation framework to allow India to engage in commercial nuclear activity. India has made significant concessions in its relationship with Iran – an important energy partner and traditional friend. Each side questions whether it has received benefits that would justify new efforts at accommodation.14 The costs for accommodation can be high in domestic political terms. The fight over the civilian nuclear deal in the United States was carried out in the halls of the Capitol, and represented a significant shift (some called it a reversal or abdication) of policy at a time when other, more hostile proliferation threats are considered to be increasing.15 Viewed purely as a transaction, the deal has paid no benefits – it is doubtful that the United States will ever sell India a nuclear reactor, given the less

132   T.D. Hoyt expensive and more proven alternatives available. The main point of the deal was symbolic – to take the single most annoying obstacle to improving the relationship off the table. In this, it was successful – but it was not a ‘magic solution’ to the issues and disagreements that shaped the relationship for six decades. One area where the United States hoped for immediate returns on this nuclear ‘investment’ was in the defence trade. In fact, it did receive immediate returns. Overturning decades of distrust for the United States as a military supplier, India requested the transfer of a large amphibious ship (INS Jalashwa, formerly USS Trenton). The Indian military also ordered a number of highly capable, but quite expensive, aircraft – the C-­130 Hercules transport, the C-­17 transport and the P-­8I maritime patrol and attack aircraft. These deals amounted to billions of dollars – far more than India had ever spent on US equipment. Nevertheless, the US business community fixated on the MRCA (Medium Range Combat Aircraft) deal and India’s failure to purchase F-­16 or F/A-­18 combat aircraft, opting instead for the French Rafale. Here, unrealistic views of the transactional relationship hurt both sides – the United States for assuming India would purchase American combat aircraft despite India’s perception of a long history of technology restrictions, and India for assuming that the United States would appreciate the degree to which they had altered their historical policies on arms acquisition to purchase any major US military equipment. The high costs of cooperation are detectable in other ways. India’s coalition governments create opportunities to constrain the development of the relationship. The strength of the Communist Party in Calcutta and its opposition to US ties slowed the nuclear deal and also helped determine both the locations and the shape of bilateral and multilateral military exercises. Regional parties wield particular influence in India’s coalition governments, and are often either uninterested in foreign affairs or remain suspicious of negotiations and commitments with the United States. National elections in India always cause a slowdown in high-­visibility exercises, so that they do not create an electoral impact. The most recent Indian national elections, however, produced a government which can rule without relying on partners – this may create opportunities for more substantial change. Institutional traditions and capacity also shape the relationship. In the United States, there remain pockets of sympathy towards Pakistan and distrust of India – remnants of both Cold War institutional memory and the non-­proliferation policies of the 1990s. The temporary revival of the Pak­ istan alliance in the twenty-­first century is unlikely to derail the US–India relationship. Although many in the United States have worked closely with Pakistan, warmth for Pakistan is decidedly limited given that country’s sanctuary for the Taliban, support for other militant groups, and the discovery of Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad in 2011. More problematic,

India in the US naval strategy   133 however, is institutional caution in the US government over the impact certain levels of cooperation with India may have on the US–China relationship. Even the Chief of Naval Operations is sensitive about publicly discussing China as an adversary.16 This reflects an ongoing debate in the United States over how best to handle Chinese aggressiveness. India’s Ministry of External Affairs, in turn, is no stranger to deep-­ seated, perhaps even generational mistrust of the United States. The fact that younger Indians have a much more positive view of the United States, and of the opportunities a stronger relationship might open up for India, does not have much impact on the older cadres of the Indian Civil Service, educated in the Cold War at the height of renewed US–Pakistan alliance and when ties with the Soviet Union were at their closest. India’s Ministry of Defence – and in particular the top civilian bureaucrats – shares these perspectives. Unlike the different elements of State and Department of Defense in the US, top leadership in India’s bureaucracy tend to have a more unified view of the relationship, tempered by seniority and tradition. Efforts at closer engagement, therefore, have a tendency to be squashed or profoundly limited by senior decision makers from an older generation – perhaps best exemplified by former Minister of Defence, A.K. Antony. Another significant constraint on the Indian side is simple lack of capacity. The US bureaucracy, particularly on matters of national security, is motivated and relatively efficient. US management style devolves decision making authority and places great emphasis on meetings, rapid resolution of issues and signing of certain fundamental agreements (like the Logistic Support Agreement, or Status of Forces Agreements), which then in turn facilitate much higher levels of cooperation. The US system is basically sequential – once one series of cooperative agreements is signed, greater opportunities are opened. The Indian bureaucracy, particularly on matters of national security, is ponderous and innately cautious. The Indian management style keeps authority for decisions at very high levels, places great emphasis on caution and careful consideration of each decision, and is highly resistant to being treated as ‘just another state’ – particularly by the United States. In addition, the Indian bureaucracy is structured so that there are many potential roadblocks to successful implementation of a decision. Some institutions, particularly the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), have a virtual veto over procurement issues, simply by arguing ‘we can do that here’ (despite a long history of unsuccessful programmes and unmet promises). In the Indian system, therefore, very few people are empowered to make decisions, but many have the capability to obstruct progress. This mismatch of capacity and institutional preferences creates enormous logjams in cooperative activities. The United States, for instance, believes in forming multiple working groups, each dealing simultaneously with distinct issues, which if resolved quickly by lower-­level functionaries then lay the ground work for much more sophisticated

134   T.D. Hoyt cooperation. The Indian system is deeply resistant to this operational style, since one of the few major decision makers will have to be assigned to each group, and none is empowered or encouraged to make rapid decisions in such a delicate relationship. This institutional structure results in constant frustration on both sides – the Americans believe their Indian counterparts are either timid or inefficient, while Indians see the Americans as pushy and domineering. Efforts to change this relationship, therefore, carry some risk and high potential costs due to very different perceptions and approaches, without promising immediate returns on investment. Cooperation in the national security arena is particularly sensitive to India, given its world view and its perception of its own history. Alliances and cooperation are viewed as two-­edged swords – India was, after all, conquered by the British largely through a policy of local alliances against more powerful princes. National security policy is opaque – some would say ill-­defined – and highly sensitive to over-­militarisation except in crisis.17 Civil military relations strictly circumscribe the authority and even influence of military leadership, there is no military-­industrial-political complex like that found in the United States and other Western democracies, and India’s aversion to the kinds of national security planning common in the West is so pronounced that some observers have argued India is culturally unsuited to serious strategic thought (a proposition that, naturally, is not accepted by Indians).18 The opportunity for misunderstanding is enormous – with consequent risks of damage to the evolving relationship. Although both states emphasise national security cooperation as an area of major potential, national security cooperation with India is very difficult. This is particularly true in the defence trade – an area where both Indians and Americans hope to see massive mutual benefit. Indian reflexive distrust of the United States as a supplier is understandable – the United States imposed an arms embargo on India in 1965 (during a war that Pakistan started – although Pakistan was embargoed as well), ‘tilted’ to Pakistan in 1970–1971 (including the Enterprise Incident), and created a non-­proliferation regime that Indians have described as ‘technology denial’ and as ‘nuclear apartheid’. US reliability, therefore, is clearly a matter of concern, and a major barrier to entry in the Indian defence market. A major problem on the Indian side, however, is its otiose decision making process and the Byzantine nature of arms procurement. India has little civilian expertise on national security affairs, and members of the Lok Sabha exercise little oversight or influence. Most decisions are made by civilians in the Ministry of Defence – Indian Civil Service appointees or career officials with strong experience in management and governance, but no particular talent for or experience in defence matters. Military input into procurement decisions is quite limited, but the military can (and does) cause significant delays in projects by increasing requirements

India in the US naval strategy   135 to reflect changes in international defence developments. Contracting is a slow, highly orchestrated process, and any money unspent at the end of the fiscal year reverts back into the general fund. As a result, billions of dollars and very important contracts have vanished due to bureaucratic paralysis – a source of enormous frustration to both the Indian military and to outside vendors. In addition, since independence India has sought self-­sufficiency in arms production through a mix of foreign purchase (preferably with provisions for licensed production of components or entire systems) and local development through DRDO and Indian Defence Public Sector Units (DPSUs). India’s military industries are state-­run, and fiercely protected as irreplaceable industrial facilities and as valuable domestic political vote banks and patronage opportunities. There is almost no integration between India’s military sector and private industry. As a result, improvements in quality of commercial goods and manufacturing processes are not transmitted into the Indian defence sector, and the Indian commercial sector receives few of the ‘spin-­off ’ benefits of costly imported technologies in the aerospace and other sectors. Finally, as mentioned above, DRDO has a powerful institutional ability to interfere in the procurement process by simply stating its ability (rightly or wrongly) to develop an equivalent at home.19 India’s defence industrial complex, therefore, poses strong challenges to cooperation. Indian defence manufacturers, whether the large DPSUs or the smaller and more specialised Ordnance Factories, have exhibited consistent issues with quality control, and are less modern and less efficient than state-­of-the-­art industries overseas. For the most part, these industries are not profit driven, which not only contributes to inefficiency but also lessens incentives for private investment. Although the Foreign Direct Investment limit in certain industries has been raised to 49 per cent, this still may be insufficient incentive for firms to take the risk of major investment without guarantee of a controlling interest, influence on management decisions, or an assured profit. So long as the defence industrial establishment remains wedded to its Nehruvian roots (state run, isolated from private industry, focused on self-­sufficiency) and locked in the current bureaucratic structures, arms procurement and cooperation will be problematic, frustrating and fundamentally constrained. The economic costs for US participation in defence cooperation, therefore, may be much higher than the immediate benefits. The political costs for changing the current defence industrial structure appear unacceptable for India – although, again, there may be opportunities for change with the new Modi government. Finally, in the defence sector India and the United States approach technology transfer very differently. For India, technology acquisition is a matter of long-­standing national policy, rooted in the belief that the British conquest was enabled by superior technology. For India, technology

136   T.D. Hoyt transfer is the cost of entry into a relationship – a means of demonstrating both friendship and sincerity. Restrictions on technology transfer are an indication of distrust if not hostility, and certainly not an indication of reliable partnership. The United States, on the other hand, has a strong tradition of using defence technology transfer as one of the final stages of a partnership. The transfer of technology is a capstone event, after trust has been built, reliability established and interoperability nurtured and developed. The reluctance to transfer technology early probably has its roots in Cold War politics – under the policy of containment, systematic technology denial to the Soviets and key Soviet allies was an important tool in maintaining Western military advantage. In addition, the United States is particularly sensitive to the experience of nuclear proliferation, which was partially enabled by its unusually open ‘Atoms for Peace’ programme of the 1950s. Regardless of the causes, however, US policy views technology transfer as one of the last, rather than one of the first, steps in a partnership.20 As the civilian nuclear deal suggests, the political costs of changing policy may be high, and the benefits imperceptible. The United States, in this case, made major concessions (from its perspective), and achieved only modest benefits. India, expediting purchase of US equipment in a significant change from past behaviour, did not reap significant benefits and, indeed, seemed to only provoke US annoyance. Recent initiatives, like the 2012 Defense Trade and Technology Initiative, have attempted to accelerate Indo-­US cooperation, but the pace of change remains slow. The third set of barriers lie in the realm of geopolitics and technological limitations – which are, of course, profoundly affected by the previous two sets of factors. The geography of India and the United States, and the theatres where they might cooperate, create significant limitations on that cooperation. Those limits are reinforced by existing technological capabilities – although the latter might be amenable to cooperative solutions. The United States has long had an interest and presence in portions of the Indian Ocean. The Carter Doctrine of 1979 pronounced the Persian Gulf region to be a major national interest of the United States, prompting the creation of Central Command and the increased prioritisation of Diego Garcia as a regional military facility (with facilities there tailored primarily for CENTCOM contingencies, despite India’s understandable concerns). The Gulf region became an increasing focus of US security attention after the end of the Cold War, due primarily to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and the continued low-­level hostility between the United States and Iraq. On the other side of the Indian Ocean, the United States has a long-­ standing commitment to the security of allies and transit in the Pacific Ocean. Close bilateral relationships (Japan, Republic of Korea, Thailand, Philippines and Australia) as well as flawed multinational alliances (South

India in the US naval strategy   137 East Asian Treaty Organization, or SEATO) cemented a US commitment to the region during the Cold War. Defeat in the Vietnam War led to a decreased commitment to South East Asia, but the continued presence of US naval forces and the fundamentally maritime character of that region played a critical role in helping nurture the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a political, economic and eventually security factor in the region. These two US major commitments – now codified in CS21 as the two areas where the United States will continue to forward deploy capable combat forces for deterrence and, if necessary, warfighting – are separated by the Bay of Bengal. This area remained virtually devoid of US naval forces except when they passed in transit. It remains one of the most remote spots in the world for US naval operations – extremely distant from CONUS, with only limited options for basing and no close allies. Throughout the twentieth and twenty-­first centuries, this area remained a virtual null space in US global naval presence. The absence of significant allies and significant enemies, even in the worst moments of the Cold War, meant that the Bay of Bengal was primarily a transit route and the scene of only the most episodic naval shows of force (the most unfortunate being the ‘Enterprise incident’ of 1971, which had a very negative impact on the evolution of US–India understanding). Interestingly, India exhibited a similar ‘null space’, although to a lesser degree. As the Indian Navy began to emerge as a potent regional force in the 1960s and 1970s, its initial focus was (understandably) Pakistan. Until 1971, when the Indian Navy played a major role in the liberation of Bangladesh, the Indian Navy had to patrol both the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. The main Pakistani fleet concentration, however, was in Karachi, so the bulk of Indian combat forces and naval presence was focused on the west until after the 1971 war. India’s interest in the East began to increase in the 1980s, and Indian naval capability was sufficient to create a major naval presence in the Bay of Bengal. The ‘Look East’ policy of the 1990s sought to make new connections with ASEAN and the South East Asian economies. These new political and economic connections, while still growing, now appear increasingly important with the rise of Chinese naval power. Still, India’s naval and political reach has not extended deeply into the Pacific Rim or the broader Pacific. One might almost argue that geopolitics have allowed India and the United States, wary of one another, to effectively deconflict their naval presences until fairly recently. The factor that is driving the United States and India towards greater cooperation, of course, is that emergence of Chinese power – economic, political and particularly naval. As observed above, there are substantial constraints to US and Indian cooperation, one of which is that neither state wants to publicly declare China as an enemy. In truth, it is not (yet) clear that China’s course is irrevocably hostile, although its increasingly

138   T.D. Hoyt aggressive posture in the last ten years does raise serious questions about Chinese intentions. One of the most creative efforts to accelerate Indo-­US military cooperation is a blatant act of constructivism – the emergence of a new geopolitical term that creates, potentially, shared interests and concerns. That term, of course, is the Indo-­Pacific. This is a conceptually powerful term, uniting two massive bodies of water, six continents and more than half the world’s population and economic productivity. It binds, in theory, the United States and India as the two poles, each master in its own ocean but interested in the other, sharing democratic values, economic interests and geopolitical concerns. Unlike another similar construct – the ‘Atlantic Community’ – the tyranny of distance is genuinely daunting in the Indo-­Pacific, which also (for the moment) lacks a unifying security threat to match the Soviet Union. This creates both geopolitical and technological challenges. How will the pillars of this construct create a broader community of nations, develop cooperative national security policies, and exploit potential military and economic synergies not only with each other but also with other regional states? One consideration is how each state will begin to influence, in partnership, areas that were previously ‘null space’? Alfred Thayer Mahan provides insight into one important facilitator – the development of a base infrastructure, which in turn requires maturation of political relationships. A second method, however, is technologically driven – the development of fleet support units that will sustain forces at great distance. This is an area where the United States excels, after almost 75 years of global naval presence. For India, however, it represents an important and yet realisable challenge. Indian naval units generally have relatively short ranges – more than adequate for the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal operations, but insufficient for sustained presence in, say, the South China Sea or Horn of Africa. A fleet train will provide greater support for surface ship presence in more distant waters. Recent Chinese developments, however, have made the survival of surface ships in the vicinity of China much more problematic. Chinese submarine forces are formidable, and combined with the surface fleet and new anti-­ship ballistic missile developments create a very problematic new Anti-­Access/Area Denial (A2AD) capability. While surface forces are necessary for both peacetime presence and wartime flexibility, actual war fighting in the South China Sea may require a very different force mix. The most important forces for war fighting in the future will be submarine forces – which can not only stealthily operate in the South China Sea, but also will be useful for both close and distant blockade of Chinese shipping and other economic targets. India’s submarine force is not optimally postured for these types of operations – the submarine force is ageing, short-­ranged and/or technologically suspect (the Arihant, while

India in the US naval strategy   139 nuclear powered, remains a test-­bed). The current force could be effective, but would have to rely on basing in the region – a significant geopolitical challenge. India is modernising its submarine force, but the first tranche of replacements (Scorpene-­class diesel boats) lack the range for distant operations. Investigation of alternatives with longer range, whether nuclear (Akula II) or conventional (Australian Collins-­class or equivalent) should be a priority, if India really wants to operate in the Indo-­Pacific.21 This could provide a venue for joint development and production – both Australia and Japan have sophisticated submarine forces and demands for follow-­on long-­ range conventional submarines – but that type of venture would require changes of policy in both international and domestic politics. Even if India does not want to participate in the broader Indo-­Pacific, it appears that China is already a player. Chinese surface ships began carrying out anti-­piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden in 2007, and have gained significant expertise in maintaining readiness far from existing supply and repair capacities. The Pakistani port of Gwadar appears to have collapsed as an economic venture, but remains a potential military facility. More recently, Chinese submarines and submarine tenders have appeared in Sri Lanka, and Chinese nuclear submarines have carried out patrols in the Indian Ocean.22 Even if India does not want to move into Chinese waters, it does have to confront the growing presence of Chinese naval capabilities in Indian waters.23 The relationship between national interest and force projection in this broader Indo-­Pacific region will remain an important element of the US– Indian relationship. Both sides will wrestle with geopolitical and technological solutions to deploying forces in distant regions. Neither possesses the resources to do everything it wants, nor the relationships to ensure its interests across the entire region. But the two states share sufficient interests, and have similar enough perceptions of threat, to make an evolving strategic partnership ‘natural’. The question is what shape it might take, and what might accelerate the evolution of the relationship.

The Indo-­US relationship: three futures The Indo-­US relationship continues to evolve in a positive direction, despite constant complaints in the editorial sections of major newspapers in both countries. In this author’s experience, the relationship has never been stronger, and an additional impediment to improvement will be removed later this year as the United States significantly lowers its engagement in Afghanistan and with neighbouring Pakistan. However, the ultimate shape of the relationship remains a question, as does the pace of change. This section will briefly examine three possibilities, and the drivers that might accelerate change in a given direction. First, the relationship could continue to improve on inertia, revolving around the status quo. This would, in time, create a division of labour that

140   T.D. Hoyt mirrors the current state. Indian presence in the Pacific and South East Asian seas would remain modest, while the United States would be virtually absent from the Bay of Bengal except as a transit route. Indian naval and military growth would allow it to project power and capability more broadly in the IOR, but both Indian and US political preferences would minimise India’s role in the Persian Gulf. In times of crisis, India would gradually acquire the ability to take over peacetime maritime leadership in the IOR, if US forces had to surge elsewhere. Over a period of decades, US presence might decrease, and Indian presence might expand. A second possibility is a greater degree of coordination and cross-­ regional cooperation. In this scenario, India would increase its political and economic cooperation in South East Asia. This is a natural development, especially given the recent reductions in Indian economic growth, but could be accelerated with political prioritisation. Increased political and economic engagement could lead to greater military cooperation as well – still short of commitment, but perhaps enough to gain base access if desired, and to build greater levels of interoperability with both local navies and the United States. This would project Indian power into regions where it is currently limited, but would not necessarily address the ‘null space’ issue – the United States in the Bay of Bengal (which would, in all likelihood, require much higher levels of Indo-­US military cooperation as well as greater US access to Indian port facilities and air bases), or India in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf.24 This option is both possible and, perhaps, preferable – it represents a natural expansion of Indian interest and influence, without the heavy political costs of a much closer relationship to the United States. It does, however, raise one significant concern – what obligation would it create for India in the event of Chinese aggression in South East Asia or the Pacific Rim, once India has both closer relationships and greater military options in those regions? The third possibility is a much higher level of Indian engagement with the United States, either directly or through mutual partners. This scenario would be driven by a continuation or escalation of current Chinese aggressive foreign policy activities on all its borders. Chinese policy is already driving its neighbours to reconsider national security policies and priorities, and in many cases to increase defence spending and both modernise and upgrade existing military forces. Because China is trying to bilateralise all of its territorial conflicts, its neighbours may begin to respond as a coalition. As one of those neighbours, with expanding interests in contested areas elsewhere in the Pacific Rim, India could certainly be an important partner in such a coalition. The political costs of entering such a relationship would be high. As noted before, India’s record of participation in coalition activities is modest, and it would require a level of political commitment that might exceed the hitherto cautious thresholds of senior Indian political leaders. Similarly, the role the United States played in formation and leadership of

India in the US naval strategy   141 the coalition would help determine India’s willingness to participate – a muted role would lower political risks and costs for India, but might not meet the requirements of other players. Finally, such a coalition would have high international costs associated with it. China would certainly believe its traditional suspicions of a global containment regime were being realised. This would affect trade and economic development, as well as threats to India’s unresolved borders. It would contribute to suspicion, insecurity and increased levels of tension. The question is whether India’s joining a coalition will be the cause or effect of Chinese aggressiveness, and whether a coalition is a useful way to deter or mitigate that aggression. Each of these scenarios actually requires political choices – including a choice not to do anything (in the first case) – but each could be realistic given current trends. The question is which choice is best for the Indo-­US relationship and broader regional and international security, and whether political leaders are willing to take the risks associated with driving in a more positive direction. The US naval strategy could work with any of these three outcomes, but the latter two scenarios suggest the possibility for a much closer defence relationship, based on current trends. Both states should consider if these futures are desirable, and how best to move towards them without endangering the relationship or paying too high a domestic political cost.

Notes   1 NOTE: the views expressed here are those of the author alone, and not those of the US Naval War College, the US Navy, the Department of Defense, or any other institution of the US Government.   2 Two excellent studies on the US–India Cold War relationship are Dennis Kux, Estranged Democracies: India and the United States (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1992); and Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). An excellent new work is Rudra Chaudhuri, Forged in Crisis: India and the United States since 1947 (New York: Oxford University Press/London: Hurst/New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2013).   3 India’s maritime perspectives are laid out publicly in an excellent document, see Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), INBR-­8, Indian Maritime Doctrine (New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, 2009).   4 See A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (Washington, DC: 2007) available at www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf. A revision was recently released, and can be found at http://news.usni.org/2015/03/13/document-­u-s-­ cooperative-strategy-­for-21st-century-­seapower-2015-revision.   5 Robert D. Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power (New York: Random House, 2010) was one of the first major works to examine energy flows as a potential key contributor to Sino-­Indian rivalry.   6 See the January 2004 ‘Statement by the President on India’ at www.whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040112–1.html, and the State Department press release at http://2001–2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/36290.htm.   7 See http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/3211/2005–06–28%20New%20Framework%20for%20the%20US-India%20Defense%20Relationship.pdf.

142   T.D. Hoyt   8 A rare exception is Ashley Tellis, Unity in Difference: Overcoming the U.S.–India Divide (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015).   9 See the Quadrennial Defense Review 2010 at www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20 of%2029jan10%201600.pdf. Indian leaders appear comfortable with this language and concept. See for example ‘India Set to Become Net Provider of Security in Region: PM Manmohan Singh’, Times of India, 23 May 2013 at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-­set-to-­become-net-­provider-of-­ security-in-­region-PM-­Manmohan-Singh/articleshow/20222203.cms. 10 The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review offered greater insight into the anticipated US–India relationship. For a discussion, see Rahul Bhonsle, ‘U.S. QDR – Tracing Shifts in India–U.S. Defense Relations – Analysis’ at www.eurasiareview. com/06032014-us-­qdr-2014-tracing-­shifts-india-­us-defence-­relations-analysis/. 11 See Non-­Alignment 2.0 at www.cprindia.org/sites/default/files/NonAlignment% 202.0_1.pdf. This document was supported by the Center for Policy Research and National Defence College in Delhi, 2012, and contributors included Sunil Khilnani, Rajiv Kumar, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Lt Gen. (Retd) Prakash Menon, Nandan Nilekani, Srinath Raghavan, Shyam Saran, Siddharth Varadarajan. 12 See Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy (New Delhi: Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), 2007) at www.irfc-­nausena.nic.in/mwg­internal/de5fs23hu73ds/progress?id=rM9_dIxZPeP9m7os5w_XaI9YKa3QSE1 tIVZurqA5KMA. 13 This may be changing, given India’s careful handling of its role at the Indian Ocean Rim Association and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. 14 Tellis, in fact, recommends that ‘Washington should return to the best of its past practices toward New Delhi: acting to deepen the relationship by strengthening India’s capabilities without any expectation of clear quid pro quos.’ Whether this is feasible in the current domestic, political and economic environment in the US is uncertain. Tellis, Unity in Difference, p. x. 15 A particular concern for the last dozen years has been Iran’s development of uranium enrichment capability. This alarms both traditional hawks and traditional non-­proliferation advocates, and further complicates the US–India relationship due to India’s traditional ties with Iran. 16 ‘Greenert: Don’t “Unnecessarily Antagonize” China’, USNI News, 17 June 2014 at http://news.usni.org/2014/06/17/greenert-­dont-unnecessarily-­antagonize-china. 17 Jaswant Singh, Defending India (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1999) is a particularly effective analysis of the Indian system by a very influential politician. 18 See Kanti P. Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo (eds), Securing India: Strategic Thought and Practice (Essays by George K. Tanham with Commentaries) (New Delhi: Manohar, 1996). For a slightly different perspective, see Timothy D. Hoyt, ‘The Indian Way of War’, in Thomas G. Mahnken and Dan Blumenthal (eds), Strategy in Asia: The Past, Present, and Future of Regional Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), pp. 147–161. 19 The Indian arms industry is examined in depth in Deba R. Mohanty, Arming the Indian Arsenal: Challenges and Policy Options (New Delhi: Rupa Co., 2009); and ‘India’ in Timothy D. Hoyt, Military Industry and Regional Defense Policy: India, Iraq, and Israel (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 22–65. 20 Ashley Tellis has argued against this in a recent monograph on assisting Indian aircraft carrier construction. Careful reading of the monograph does, however, suggest how many obstacles lie in the way of vigorous Indo-­US defence industrial cooperation, even in an area where the US clearly has expertise and where India could use US assistance. See Ashley J. Tellis, Making Waves: Aiding India’s Next-­Generation Aircraft Carrier (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015). 21 Reports that Australia may try to purchase the Japanese Soryu-­class diesel

India in the US naval strategy   143 s­ ubmarine raises the possibility of access to much longer-­ranged, more sophisticated submarines. A joint programme between India, Australia and Japan could impose significant cost controls through a bulk order, as well as encourage technology transfer and interoperability. 22 See Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate, February 11, 2014 at www.armed-­services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Flynn_02–11–14.pdf where Lt Gen. Michael Flynn, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, notes that 2013 was the first verified patrol of a PLAN nuclear sub in the Indian Ocean. 23 For some careful thoughts about Chinese presence, see James Holmes, ‘Coming to the Indian Ocean, the Chinese Navy: How Should India Respond?’, The National Interest Online, 7 October 2014 at http://nationalinterest.org/ feature/coming-­the-indian-­ocean-the-­chinese-navy-­how-should-­india-11415. 24 In the past, the United States has been reluctant to ask for Indian help in the Gulf region, in part for fear of antagonising Pakistan, which was viewed as a reliable counter-­terrorism partner in the maritime domain. Recent events, including Al Qaeda attacks on Pakistani Navy installations in Mehran (2011) and Karachi (2014) raise questions about the political reliability of Pakistan’s naval officer corps, as officers were reportedly involved in both attacks.

8 ‘New normal’ in the Indo-­Pacific Sino-­Indian maritime security dilemma Koh Swee Lean Collin

Introduction The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) was aptly described by Robert Kaplan as ‘the centre stage for the challenges of the twenty-­first century’.1 Indeed, the IOR has attained growing strategic and economic importance. Adding to the evolving Western-­Pacific geopolitical landscape, it presents an arena for geopolitical rivalries. Instead of treating these two regions as separate and in view of their connectivity and the interdependence, it is more relevant to regard the Indo-­Pacific as a broader, coherent geopolitical construct.2 As key resident Indo-­Pacific actors, China and India possess broad interests commensurate with their rise. However, both Asian giants are also setting their footprints in each other’s traditional domains of interest – namely, the IOR and Western-­Pacific region. This chapter argues that such overlapping maritime forays present a ‘new normal’ because hitherto, Sino-­Indian geopolitics had mainly revolved around land-­based issues. This ‘new normal’, backstopped by growing interests and naval capabilities, looks set to persist. This essentially means that both Beijing and New Delhi have to accept and cope with this reality. The ‘new normal’ takes place in the context of recent flare-­ups of the Sino-­Indian land territorial disputes. Seen in this light, this chapter argues that the emergence of the ‘new normal’ may signify an extension of the traditionally land-­based Sino-­Indian security dilemma into the maritime dimension. Yet both countries emphasised their common security interests and the need for naval cooperation. Indeed, their dual-­nature makes navies useful foreign policy instruments of both countries to pursue cooperation in this ‘new normal’.3 Still, the two Asian powers need to put words into action to enhance naval cooperation. This chapter relies on an extensive database compiled by the author over the past six years as part of ongoing research on Indo-­Pacific naval modernisation processes. It remains a work in progress, consolidating and corroborating a diverse array of sources including press remarks and policy statements, including official and academic Chinese-­language materials. This chapter first provides an overview of the broader context of

Sino-Indian maritime security dilemma   145 security dilemma between China and India. Then, it examines the sources underpinning the emergence of an Indo-­Pacific ‘new normal’ between the two rising powers, followed by discussion about the plausible extension of this security dilemma into the maritime dimension. The chapter concludes with suggestions for future Sino-­Indian naval cooperation.

Broader context of the Sino-­Indian security dilemma Generally, a security dilemma is defined as a social phenomenon centring on a paradoxical situation in which Party A’s action, such as the acquisition of armaments, to improve its own security could be perceived by Party B as potentially threatening hence propelling reciprocal actions. This is in turn perceived by Party A as undermining its security, prompting it to undertake further counter-­actions. This tendency of assuming the worst of each other’s intention and ensuing action-­reaction process results in a net degradation instead of enhancement of security felt by both parties.4 A security dilemma constitutes one facet of Sino-­Indian relations. Ever since fighting a border war in 1962, the outstanding land boundary dispute along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and contending territorial claims, particularly Arunachal Pradesh and Chinese occupation of Indian-­claimed territory within Pakistan-­occupied Kashmir (PoK), have been sources of security concern. Not to be overlooked also is that their military build-­ups, including nuclear armament, are at least partially motivated by each other.5 Beyond rivalry, it is also necessary to examine strategic convergences between China and India. To begin, India continues to view Pakistan as the ‘principal security threat’ according to an internal assessment made by the Ministry of Defence in October 2013.6 Even though China remains a security concern, Sino-­Indian rivalry has not returned to Cold War-­like animosity. Both countries follow a common diplomatic philosophy of Panchsheel for peaceful co-­existence, which they view as the fundamental basis for interstate relations.7 They also recognise their mutual economic interdependence and share similar preferences for multi-­polarity and multilateralism. Beijing and New Delhi also adopted conciliatory approaches in stabilising outstanding disputes while tempering mutual concerns with pragmatism. In fact, both recognise their relations to be characterised by both cooperation and competition. For example, then National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon described Sino-­Indian relations as ‘more complex’ but downplayed the ongoing rivalry, describing it inevitable between ‘two neighbours who are growing and changing so rapidly’ while emphasising maintenance of a ‘dynamic equilibrium’ between the two countries.8 The new Indian Government under Prime Minister Narendra Modi appears keen to engage Beijing which advocated a ‘new security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation’ to foster Sino-­Indian relations.9 There were practical efforts undertaken.

146   C.S.L. Koh In July 2014, amidst allegations of Chinese intrusions across LAC, Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping discussed about the boundary dispute on the side-­lines of the Brazil-­hosted 6th BRICS Summit.10 Prior to Xi’s visit to New Delhi two months later, Modi coined ‘Inch toward Miles’ (India China towards Millennium of Exceptional Synergy) as an overall objective for the development of Sino-­Indian relationships. Yet he also stressed the need for both countries to ‘show mutual sensitivity to each other’s concerns and aspirations’.11 During his visit, Xi sought to emphasise bilateral complementarities by ascribing the two countries as not just ‘express trains’ driving Asian economic development but also ‘twin anchors’ for building an inclusive Asia-­ Pacific security architecture.12 Beijing also assured that China is not seeking ‘military or other means to try and hem in India’.13 The Modi–Xi summit ended on a high note with the issuance of a joint statement that emphasised a forward-­looking bilateral relationship from a broader, strategic perspective, recognising Sino-­Indian economic interdependence and compatibilities in developmental goals. Partnership for development was identified to be the core content of the overall strategic cooperative partnership, according to the joint statement, in line with their common interests.14 Both countries so far have undertaken steps to ameliorate their mutual concerns. Newly promulgated Sino-­Indian confidence and security-­ building measures (CSBMs) rose sharply from 8 during the 1980s–1990s to 16 in 2000–2008 (see Table 8A.1). This coincided with the Taiwan Strait tensions thus making it expedient for Sino-­Indian CSBMs. The blossoming of CSBMs during this period also followed bilateral tensions in the aftermath of New Delhi’s nuclear tests in 1998, which Beijing claimed to be targeted at China.15 It is important to note that before 2009 the CSBMs were largely political declarations and dialogues pertaining to the LAC. After 2009, there are qualitative improvements to new CSBMs emphasising ‘concrete’ initiatives such as the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) inked in October 2013. Underneath these high-­profile Sino-­Indian cooperative events, however, had been persistent undercurrents of insecurity. Notwithstanding the BDCA, further border incidents recurred including intrusion into Indian airspace by Chinese military helicopters.16 Yet, New Delhi sought to downplay the incidents, especially the ones in June 2014 that coincided with the visit by Vice-­President Hamid Ansari to Beijing to celebrate the 60th anniversary of Panchsheel, and the subsequent visit to China by Indian Army Chief General Bikram Singh.17 Nonetheless, the newly elected Modi Government approved a plan to expedite the border infrastructure projects in June 2014. The LAC situation was compounded by another controversy surrounding the ‘cartographic depiction’ of Arunachal Pradesh as an integral part of Chinese territory in maps newly published by Beijing.18 Following this, in early September Chinese troops allegedly intruded

Sino-Indian maritime security dilemma   147 across the LAC and even constructed new roads in Indian territory. Soon after, New Delhi urged Beijing to adhere to the ‘One India Policy’ and pay due sensitivity towards the issue of Arunachal Pradesh.19 Xi’s visit to New Delhi took place in the midst of the incident, during which Modi warned the Chinese President that ‘even such small incidents can impact the biggest of relationships just as a little toothache can paralyse the entire body’.20 The LAC standoff lasted almost 20 days and only ended after both sides de-­escalated by withdrawing troops and restoring the status quo. Beijing appeared eager to downplay the incident which may derail the goodwill following the Modi–Xi summit. Responding to media speculations that soon after he returned from New Delhi, Xi’s exhortation for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to improve combat readiness and sharpen its ability to win a regional war in the age of information technology was directed at India, Beijing clarified that it is ‘far-­fetched’.21 Not long after, the Chinese Defence Ministry announced that both governments established effective communication channels to ‘properly handle’ the LAC situation.22 But the September incident must have seriously miffed New Delhi. In October 2014, Indian National Security Advisor A.K. Doval said New Delhi views China as a ‘very important neighbour’ but stressed that development of ties with the latter should not entail ‘any compromise on our territorial interest and sovereignty at the cost of our national security’.23 The following month, India announced measures being undertaken to build ‘matching infrastructure’ including 3812 kilometres in total length of border roads along the LAC in response to China’s build-­up in the Tibet Autonomous Region.24 Beijing thereafter warned New Delhi against ‘moves that may further complicate the situation’.25 But India was adamant, sternly responding that ‘no country can give warning to India. India has emerged as a strong country in the world.’26 Following Tokyo’s acceptance of India’s invitation in January 2014 to assist in infrastructure development in India’s north-­east – traditionally out-­of-bounds for Chinese investors due to the border dispute, New Delhi awarded a contract to Japan International Cooperation Agency to help build part of the LAC road network.27 These recent border flare-­ups took place despite steps undertaken to ameliorate mutual concerns surrounding the traditional Sino-­Indian disputes. The following discussion examines those sources underpinning the Indo-­Pacific ‘new normal’ between China and India and extension of the broader Sino-­Indian security dilemma into the maritime dimension.

China’s IOR ‘new normal’? China’s national interests appear to be predicated on peaceful development, which constitutes one of those ‘core interests’ defined by then Chinese Defence Minister Liang Guanglie in 2011, besides the maintenance

148   C.S.L. Koh of socialist political system and territorial sovereignty.28 Seen in this context, given the unevenness of development throughout China, especially its less-­ developed western interior, energy security remains a perennial concern for Beijing since it underpins sustained economic growth that forms the basis of ‘peaceful development’. This is especially so since China’s energy consumption per capita looks set to increase.29 Figure 8.1 illustrates this persistent problem for China: domestic oil consumption far outstripping domestic production capacity. Even if the use of alternative energy sources, which constitutes a minuscule 4 per cent of the total national mix,30 is anticipated to increase in the future Beijing would remain largely reliant on petroleum imports, particularly from the IOR, to satiate its growing energy needs. In 2013 alone, 153.9 million tonnes of oil were transported from Middle East to China, second only to 164.2 for Japan and compared to 124.6 for India. In the same year, a total of 64.9 million tonnes of oil moved from Africa to China compared to 4.7 and 31.5 for Japan and India respectively.31 Beijing sees a strategic imperative to secure and maintain unimpeded access to vital Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) plying through the IOR. Both traditional and non-­traditional threats could potentially jeopardise China’s access to these crucial economic lifelines. The likelihood of hostile military action against Chinese tankers has to be considered. In this context, China’s naval strategy needs to be understood from its perceptions of the Washington-­led ‘island chain’ Western-­Pacific containment strategy that in recent literature encompasses the Malacca Strait.32 This 16,000 14,000 12,000 10,000 8000 6000 4000 2000 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013

0

Consumption

Production

Figure 8.1 China’s oil consumption vs production (in thousand barrels daily) (source: by author using data extracted from BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2014, British Petroleum: www.bp.com/statisticalreview).

Sino-Indian maritime security dilemma   149 strategic waterway is certainly perceived as such since the US Navy maintains access to adjoining Singapore’s naval facilities under agreements signed in 1990 and 2005. This helps Washington project and sustain its naval presence throughout the Indo-­Pacific, including the South China Sea. The Malacca Strait thus constitutes China’s ‘soft belly’ resulting in what is popularly termed Beijing’s ‘Malacca Dilemma’. With the cooling of Taiwan Strait tensions since 2008, the PLA Navy (PLAN) started devoting more attention to its South Sea Fleet to cope with both South China Sea disputes and with an eye towards safeguarding Chinese access to SLOCs in the IOR (see Table 8.1).33 Since 2007, Chinese political and naval leaders have begun talking about ‘new historic missions’ for the PLAN, emphasising ‘out-­of-area’ operations.34 This ‘new historic missions’ strategy was put into action in December 2008 when China decided to participate in multinational efforts in the Gulf of Aden against the scourge of piracy threats against SLOCs. Beijing seemed to be hinting that when it told the press in January 2009 following the deployment of the first PLAN escort task force to the Gulf of Aden: the Somali mission shows China’s efforts to undertake its international obligations as a permanent member of the UN Security Council . . . it also demonstrates our confidence in the PLA’s handling of various security threats and accomplishing of diversified military missions. But it never signalled that we were deviating from the defensive policy.35 This statement appears to indicate China’s naval strategy remains premised on near-­seas active defence focusing on the immediate Western-­ Pacific waters, despite growing interest in far-­seas operations. But the PLAN has since been intensifying its ‘out-­of-area’ operational capabilities, Table 8.1  Fleet dispositions of newly inducted PLAN major surface vessels1

ESF NSF SSF

From 1970s until 1999

2000–2008

2009 onwards (projected till 2017)

34 12 30

11  7 11

 9  7 16

Source: Author’s database comprising information compiled from online database of IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships; successive editions of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Military Balance; Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy in the Twenty-first Century, Second Edition (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010). Notes ESF: East Sea Fleet; NSF: North Sea Fleet; SSF: South Sea Fleet. 1 Major surface vessels in this case refer to aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates, amphibious assault landing ships and fleet replenishment oilers – all of which can have dual-roles in warfighting and peacetime SLOC protection.

150   C.S.L. Koh including repeated training cruises into the Western-­Pacific open-­seas. The PLAN’s growing confidence in such operations was reflected in the exercise conducted by a small flotilla in the Indian Ocean in January 2014, which was also testament to China’s growing ability to overcome its ‘Malacca Dilemma’.36 But this steady accumulation of experience also imbued Beijing with newfound confidence to expand its international security role. It has evinced aspirations for a bigger global security role and providing more public goods to the international community based on the ‘3Cs’ security concept.37 This concept is used in conjunction with Beijing’s call to build ‘Harmonious Oceans’ – envisaging enhanced international cooperation to promote global peace, security and common development of the world’s oceans.38 The PLAN appears to have regarded the Indian Ocean as a testing ground for the ‘Harmonious Oceans’ approach. Indeed, China has ramped up its IOR naval presence in recent years. Table 8.2 shows, at the time of writing, 47 PLAN IOR port calls since 2010 compared to merely 12 in 1985–2009 – an unprecedented increase within a short timeframe. This is certainly attributed to the growth of PLAN’s force projection capabilities, helped in no small part by intensified blue water training and, of course, regular Gulf of Aden counter-­piracy deployments since 2008. Prior to these developments, capacity limitations and preoccupation with the Taiwan Strait had confined the PLAN to Western-­Pacific waters. Beijing is evidently keen to expand this budding IOR presence. During the Sri Lanka-­hosted Galle Dialogue in 2012, the PLAN pledged to ‘actively maintain’ IOR peace and stability, stressing its role as a ‘staunch force in safeguarding the world peace and an active advocate and implementer of the idea of constructing a “harmonious ocean” ’.39 Beijing further demonstrated its growing IOR naval footprints when the frigate Ma’anshan completed China’s first port-­to-port World Food Programme convoy naval escort in July 2011. More recent notable efforts included deploying frigate Yancheng to escort Syrian chemical arms under the United Nations Security Council–Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons auspices in January 2014. These were missions that transcend Beijing’s concerns regarding energy SLOCs, and meant to symbolise China’s growing stature as a major international security player. During the Asia-­Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in November 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping said China is able and willing to offer more public goods for the region and the international community as its overall national strength grows.40 This may herald further expansion in PLAN ‘out-­of-area’ missions. Prospects for deploying aircraft carrier into the IOR became higher following the maiden voyage of PLAN’s first carrier Liaoning to the South China Sea.41 But increased frequency for ‘out-­of-area’ missions is hampered by PLAN shortfalls in fleet replenishment oilers. Such auxiliary vessels are designed to sustain combat units at sea without necessitating the whole task force to dock in ports. As Table 8.3 shows, a single oiler had to support two consecutive PLAN Gulf of

Sino-Indian maritime security dilemma   151 Table 8.2  PLAN’s IOR port calls Date (day/month/year)

Destination

PLAN ships

11/1985 10–11/1993 15/11/1993 28/07/2000 10/08/2000 19/05/2001 28/05/2001 15/06/2002 21/11/2005 28/11/2005 08/08/2009 03/10/2009 25/03/2010 29/08/2010 10/2010 15/10/2010 21/10/2010 26/10/2010 04/11/2010 27/11/2010 07/12/2010 2011 09/03/2011 28/03/2011 05/04/2011 15/04/2011 03/09/2011 01/12/2011 04/12/2011 03/2012 09/05/2012 17/08/2012 26/03/2013 02/04/2013 10/04/2013 06/2013 29/06/2013 07/2013 30/07/2013 08/08/2013 19/08/2013 28/08/2013 13/09/2013 12/10/2013 02/11/2013 30/12/2013 02/01/2014 12/01/2014 14/05/2014 18/05/2014 23/05/2014 24/05/2014 02/06/2014 05/06/2014 11/06/2014 17/06/2014 07/09/2014 20/09/2014 31/10/2014

Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka Bangladesh and Pakistan Bombay, India Dar es Salaam Port, Tanzania Simonstown Naval Dock, South Africa Karachi, Pakistan Bombay, India Alexandria Port, Egypt Karachi, Pakistan Cochin, India Kochi, India Aden Port, Yemen Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates Thilawa Port, Myanmar Djibouti Mombasa, Kenya Dar es Salaam Port, Tanzania Victoria, Seychelles Chittagong, Bangladesh Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Colombo, Sri Lanka Kochi, India Karachi, Pakistan Dar es Salaam Port, Tanzania Durban, South Africa Victoria, Seychelles Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Shuwaikh Port, Kuwait Port Sultan Qaboos, Oman Mozambique Kochi, India Lagos, Nigeria Grand Harbour, Malta Algiers, Algeria Casablanca, Morocco Victoria, Seychelles Male, Maldives Djibouti Port, Djibouti Karachi, Pakistan Mumbai, India Chittagong, Bangladesh Thilawa Port, Myanmar Sattahip Naval Base, Thailand Djibouti Port, Djibouti Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Dar es Salaam Port, Tanzania Mombasa, Kenya Trincomalee, Sri Lanka Dakar, Senegal Visakhapatnam, India Thilawa Port, Myanmar Lagos, Nigeria Cameroon Luanda, Angola Walvis Bay, Namibia Cape Town, South Africa Colombo, Sri Lanka Bandar Abbas, Iran Colombo, Sri Lanka

Hefei, Fengcang Zhenghe Zhenghe Shenzhen, Nancang Shenzhen, Nancang Harbin, Taicang Harbin, Taicang Qingdao, Taicang Shenzhen, Weishanhu Shenzhen, Weishanhu Shenzhen Shenzhen Ma’anshan, Qiandaohu Guangzhou, Chaohu Daishandao Daishandao Daishandao Daishandao Daishandao Lanzhou, Kunlunshan, Weishanhu Lanzhou Daishandao Ma’anshan, Wenzhou Zhoushan, Xuzhou Zhoushan, Xuzhou Zhoushan, Xuzhou Wuhan, Yulin, Qinghaihu Wuhan, Yulin, Qinghaihu Wuhan, Yulin, Qinghaihu Haikou, Yuncheng, Qinghaihu Zhenghe Dayang No. 1 Qingdao, Yantai, Weishanhu Qingdao, Yantai, Weishanhu Qingdao, Yantai, Weishanhu Qingdao, Yantai, Weishanhu Daishandao Harbin, Mianyang, Weishanhu Daishandao Daishandao Daishandao Daishandao Harbin, Mianyang, Weishanhu Jinggangshan Jinggangshan Jinggangshan, Taihu Hengshui, Jinggangshan Hengshui, Jinggangshan Luoyang, Yancheng, Taihu Weifang, Zhenghe Weifang, Zhenghe Luoyang, Yancheng, Taihu Luoyang, Yancheng, Taihu Luoyang, Yancheng, Taihu Luoyang, Yancheng, Taihu Luoyang, Yancheng, Taihu Changzheng 2 Changchun, Changzhou Changzheng 2, Changxingdao

Source: Author’s database relying on various sources.

152   C.S.L. Koh Aden deployments over at least six months. For example, oiler Weishanhu supported the first and second task forces before being relieved by sister ship Qiandaohu which in turn supported the third and fourth task forces. The PLAN has recently commissioned more ships of the same Type-­903 ‘hu’ (Chinese for lake) class. But until a critical mass of oilers becomes available, PLAN access to friendly IOR ports would have to remain the most logical alternative. However, China’s quest for access to IOR port facilities is not without controversy. The ‘string of pearls’ – a theory that first emerged in the 1990s – refers to a network of port facilities in smaller IOR states which China uses to establish naval presence, through investments into port development projects and covert surveillance facilities to spy on Indian and extra-­regional navies in the region.42 In June 2014, referring to an approved project to build a surveillance radar station in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Indian Environment Minister Prakash Javadekar said that China has a presence on Myanmar’s Coco Island: ‘if China is sitting in front and is doing something that we can’t even monitor. . . . So these kinds of projects, which are of importance to the country’s security, we have started clearing on a priority basis.’43 Barely a year since its first Gulf of Aden deployment, there were talks within the PLAN to establish overseas bases, such as in Somalia, to support security commitments in the IOR but this was denied by Beijing.44 Clearly, some within the Chinese political and

Table 8.3  PLAN’s Gulf of Aden counter-piracy deployments Date (day/month/year)

PLAN escort task force

Constituent ships

26/12/2008 03/04/2009 16/07/2009 30/10/2009 04/03/2010 30/06/2010 02/11/2010 21/02/2011 02/07/2011 02/10/2011 28/02/2012 03/07/2012 09/11/2012 16/02/2013 08/08/2013 30/11/2013 25/03/2014 01/08/2014 02/12/2014

1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th 14th 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th

Wuhan, Haikou, Weishanhu Shenzhen, Huangshan, Weishanhu Zhoushan, Xuzhou, Qiandaohu Ma’anshan, Wenzhou, Qiandaohu Guangzhou, Chaohu Lanzhou, Kunlunshan, Weishanhu Zhoushan, Xuzhou, Qiandaohu Ma’anshan, Wenzhou, Qiandaohu Wuhan, Yulin, Qinghaihu Haikou, Yuncheng, Qinghaihu Qingdao, Yantai, Weishanhu Yiyang, Changzhou, Qiandaohu Huangshan, Hengyang, Qinghaihu Harbin, Mianyang, Weishanhu Hengshui, Jinggangshan, Taihu Luoyang, Yancheng, Taihu Changchun, Changzhou, Chaohu Changbaishan, Yuncheng, Chaohu Linyi, Weifang, Weishanhu

Source: Author’s database tapping on various sources.

Sino-Indian maritime security dilemma   153 military leadership are keen to thread this carefully. For example, during a December 2009 interview, senior PLAN official Yin Zhuo advocated overseas bases to facilitate the navy’s international security commitments but also acknowledged that PLAN warships in waters near the Gulf of Aden have aroused foreign suspicions of China’s intent.45 So far, Beijing continues to insist that port access and investment deals inked with IOR countries are purely commercial.46 Nevertheless, such deals fulfil two important purposes that could become a source of concern for India. First, these ports could provide refuelling stops for not just tankers but also warships, allowing the expansion and sustainment of PLAN presence in the IOR. The port visits to Sri Lanka by PLAN nuclear-­powered submarines in September and October 2014, despite India’s concerns, was such an instance.47 Second, some of the mainland IOR ports provide overland energy transportation alternatives to SLOCs that help Beijing overcome the ‘Malacca Dilemma’. Pakistan’s Gwadar Port is notable here. A centrepiece of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor agreement signed in July 2013, Gwadar is intended for Chinese tankers to offload their supplies which would then be transported overland to Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.48 But Gwadar also has potential military utility. Back in 2011, Islamabad sought Chinese assistance to construct a naval base in Gwadar, although this was denied by Beijing.49 New Delhi would not have failed to notice that Indian tankers exiting the Persian Gulf would transit SLOCs running through the Arabian Sea merely 180 miles west of Gwadar – well within easy range of Chinese naval forces should they be deployed along the Pakistani coasts especially in times of war, say, a renewed LAC conflict. Responding to a written query in the Rajya Sabha in August 2013, then Indian Defence Minister A.K. Antony said that Gwadar Port ‘could be used for military purposes in the future’, describing this as a ‘matter of concern’.50 From a political perspective, the planned Sino-­Pakistani corridor is already viewed as a concern to India, since part of this mega project would take place in PoK, notwithstanding Beijing’s assurances.51 In response to the PLAN’s expanding IOR presence, New Delhi has especially emphasised eastern seaboard defences overlooking the Bay of Bengal, such as an Indian Navy outpost on Sagar Island whose surveillance covers sea approaches to Chittagong in Bangladesh and Sittwe in Myanmar which Beijing sought access to.52 Of all Indian military dispositions fringing the IOR, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands pose one of the foremost challenges to China’s SLOC security.53 The archipelago, which hosts a military operational command including facilities for fighter jets, overlooks the Malacca Strait entrance. It confers India a latent ability – superior to that of the nearest PLA forward base on Hainan Island – to project military power over the strategic waterway. As Figure 8.2 shows, Chinese SLOCs transiting through the IOR to the Malacca Strait fall within India’s land-­based maritime air-­strike coverage.54 China’s energy lifelines thus remain under the potential risk of India’s strangulation in times of

Figure 8.2 Indian land-based maritime air strike coverage in the IOR (source: map extracted from d-maps.com. Overlays of the Indian Air Force and Naval Aviation strike fighters’ radii of operation added by the author for illustrative purposes. Technical details obtained from IHS Jane’s database online: www.janes.com/).

Sino-Indian maritime security dilemma   155 c­ onflict. Then Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Sureesh Mehta once remarked that the ‘weak area’ for Beijing has been India’s IOR naval presence, arguing that ‘we sit in the Indian Ocean and that is a concern for China and they are not happy as it is not so easy for them to come inside’.55 Therefore, despite Beijing’s moves to ameliorate the ‘Malacca Dilemma’, its continued reliance on SLOCs in the IOR for its energy needs puts it in a vulnerable position. Despite having demonstrated its ability to traverse the Lombok Strait during the January 2014 exercise, Beijing remains dependent on the Malacca Strait which is still the most cost-­efficient international shipping route. Compounding the ‘Malacca Dilemma’ are limited successes in creating alternative overland routes. With the exception of Pakistan and Myanmar, China has not attained breakthroughs on mainland South East Asia. Beijing earlier backed Malaysia’s plan to revive the 300-kilometre Trans-­Peninsula (Kedah-­Kelantan) Pipeline to provide an alternative route for energy supplies from the IOR to East Asia but nothing further has been heard since.56 More recently, Bangkok opposed the Beijing-­backed Kra Isthmus Canal Project.57

India’s Western-­Pacific ‘new normal’? Analogous to China’s IOR energy concerns, India has vital economic interests in the Western-­Pacific. East Asia, as Figure 8.3 illustrates, occupies a substantial share of India’s total commodity exports. Therefore, India is similarly reliant on access to SLOCs plying through Western-­Pacific waters. 100 90 80 Percentage

70 60 50 40 30 20 10

19

96

19 –19 97 97 19 –19 98 98 19 –19 99 99 20 –2 00 00 0 20 –20 01 01 20 –20 02 02 20 –2 03 00 3 20 –20 04 04 20 –20 05 05 20 –20 06 06 20 –2 07 00 7 20 –2 08 00 8 20 –2 09 00 9 20 –20 1 10 0 20 –2 11 01 1 20 –20 12 12 20 –2 13 01 –2 3 01 4

0

Africa

South and West Asia

East Asia

Figure 8.3 Value of India’s total commodity exports (in million US$) (source: by author using data extracted from Export-Import Databank of the Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India. http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/default.asp).

156   C.S.L. Koh Trade routes to these trading partners have to pass through the Malacca Strait and South China Sea (SCS). There is also growing Indian energy interest in the Western-­Pacific. State-­owned ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL) for instance has a substantial 20 per cent stake in the Sakhalin-­I offshore energy field in Russian Far East.58 This further amplifies the importance of Western-­Pacific SLOCs to India. New Delhi’s Western-­Pacific energy involvement looks set to expand, following an agreement in October 2014 between OVL and Petro Vietnam to explore offshore energy blocks in the South China Sea. But this whole affair has been shrouded in controversy ever since OVL inked the first pact with Petro Vietnam for South China Sea explorations in late 2011.59 The Sino-­Vietnamese oil rig standoff in May 2014 was plausibly motivated by Beijing’s displeasure following an India–Vietnam agreement to expand SCS energy cooperation in November 2013. New Delhi has insisted that besides energy interests it is merely keen on maintaining freedom of navigation in the SCS. In July 2012, for example, India’s Ambassador to Vietnam Ranjit Rae expressed concern over escalating SCS tensions, stressing that half of India’s export-­import trade flows through the area.60 At least some Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) leaders had called for a more active Indian role in helping address the disputes yet New Delhi avoided taking such a position that could be misconstrued by China. Then Indian External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid said that the disputes ‘need to be resolved between the countries concerned’.61 But such assurances might not have convinced Beijing. Rather New Delhi’s SCS energy interests have been perceived by China as interference in the disputes.62 For the first time, the Indo-­US joint statement issued after the Modi–Obama summit specifically mentioned the SCS situation.63 Moreover, India has been forging closer defence links with Vietnam – one of China’s SCS arch-­rivals. The latest India–Vietnam agreement to enhance defence ties, including assisting Hanoi modernise its military, came soon after the oil rig standoff although New Delhi assured Beijing that its expanding cooperation with Hanoi is not aimed at China.64 Nevertheless, Vietnam has been a primary pillar in India’s ‘Look East’ policy and would become more important as this policy looks poised to upgrade into ‘Act East’ under Modi’s watch.65 The blossoming India– Vietnam defence links feature regular Indian Navy port visits to Vietnam.66 Even though the IOR remains a primary area of interest whereas the SCS counts as just a secondary one, according to official Indian Navy documentation,67 there has been increasing interest in the SCS by Indian Navy planners. In December 2012, then Chief of Naval Staff Admiral D.K. Joshi remarked that the Indian Navy would be poised to secure India’s SCS energy interests if necessary.68 Beijing would not have failed to pick this up. It has been monitoring the Indian Navy’s SCS deployments, especially frequent calls to Vietnamese ports close to sensitive Chinese military installations, such as Hainan Island. In July 2011,

Sino-Indian maritime security dilemma   157 the Indian Navy warship Airavat was transiting in international waters off the Vietnamese coast from Nha Trang to Haiphong when an unidentified radio call claiming to be ‘Chinese Navy’ demanded that the ship explain its presence.69 This incident, albeit an isolated one, shows the potential Chinese military challenge to Indian freedom of navigation in the SCS. PLA capabilities in the SCS are concentrated around the southern coastal provinces, especially Hainan Island. China’s development of anti-­access and area denial capabilities such as the anti-­ship ballistic missile is perceived to be a security concern for Indian shipping.70 The Indian Navy’s continued SCS forays may encounter increased challenges, especially after Beijing promulgated an East China Sea (ECS) Air Defence Identification Zone in late 2013 and may in future establish one

Figure 8.4 Chinese land-based maritime air strike coverage in the SCS (source: Map extracted from d-maps.com. Overlays of the PLA Air Force and Naval Air Force strike fighters’ radii of operation added by the author for illustrative purposes. Technical details obtained from IHS Jane’s database online: www.janes.com/).

158   C.S.L. Koh over the SCS.71 Figure 8.4 shows Chinese land-­based airpower capable of fully covering the SCS, posing potential risks for Indian shipping. Besides perceived Indian interference in SCS issues, another source of concern for Beijing has been New Delhi’s further eastward forays. In particular, India has sought closer maritime security links with Japan, with whom China has seen recent cooling ties over contentious issues such as the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute. Indo-­Japanese strategic convergences underwrote this burgeoning defence cooperation. For example, New Delhi described Japan as ‘like-­minded’ and sharing similar objectives in ensuring security of the ‘global commons’ – referring to Indo-­Pacific freedom of navigation.72 Table 8.4 shows Indo-­Japanese maritime security-­related CSBMs to have achieved the steadiest growth from the 1990s till present. India welcomed greater Japanese naval presence in the IOR with an eye on China’s expanding naval footprints in the area. New Delhi said the inaugural Japan– India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX) conducted in the IOR in 2012 was intended ‘as a check against China and its increasingly active maritime forays’.73 Beijing could have perceived Indo-­Japanese complicity in the US-­led containment strategy.74 This is not helped by the fact that Washington sought greater security partnership with India in the context of its Asia-­ Pacific ‘pivot’.75 In 2007, Beijing expressed concerns after Australia, India, Japan, Singapore and the United States held the first expanded Indo-­US naval exercise Malabar in waters east of Tokyo.76 Subsequent Malabar exercises reverted to bilateral but Japan ‘re-­joined’ in July 2014. Nevertheless, Washington tried to assure China there is no plan for a trilateral military nexus.77 Furthermore, although the Indian Navy is keen on deeper naval cooperation with Japan, New Delhi remains reluctant because of sensitivities surrounding Sino-­Indian relations.78

Extending Sino-­Indian security dilemma into the maritime domain As discussed in the earlier sections, China and India have legitimate security interests revolving around access to Indo-­Pacific SLOCs on which Table 8.4 India’s maritime security-related CSBMs with key Asia-Pacific powers other than China

Australia Japan South Korea Russian Federation United States Multilateral

1990s

2000–2010

2011–present

0 1 0 4 5 0

2 10 4 3 13 4

0 9 1 5 5 4

Source: Author’s database relying on various sources (see Table 8A.2 for list of initiatives).

Sino-Indian maritime security dilemma   159 they depend for socio-­economic development. Their growing naval presence in each other’s traditional maritime domain presents a ‘new normal’, in part driven by PLAN’s burgeoning blue water capabilities. Notwithstanding mutual assurances, these overlapping forays reflect an extension of the broader Sino-­Indian security dilemma which traditionally revolved around land-­based territorial disputes. In the midst of an uneasy, tenuous situation along the LAC, India in particular has sought to counter China’s IOR outreach despite publicly downplaying it. For example, in September 2009 then Indian National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon called the perceived Chinese ‘string of pearls’ a ‘pretty ineffective murder weapon as any “clue” aficionado will tell you’, but added that the question about Chinese IOR port activities should be ‘whether and to what extent this improved access and infrastructure will translate into basing arrangements and political influence in future’.79 The twenty-­first century Maritime Silk Road Initiative, part of China’s ‘One Road, One Belt’ Indo-­Pacific connectivity project proposed in early 2014, could be interpreted in two ways: one being to assuage India of Beijing’s benign intention; the other to provide a pretext for expanding China’s IOR presence. For the latter possibility, Beijing appears to pay special attention to an India ‘buy-­in’, seeking to reach consensus with New Delhi on jointly implementing the ‘One Belt and One Road’ project that includes the Maritime Silk Road Initiative.80 Beijing also assured New Delhi that it does not desire to ‘get into India’s sphere’ by inviting the Maldives and Sri Lanka to join the Maritime Silk Road Initiative which was described as a ‘strategic economic project’.81 Even though India supported China’s initiative to build the Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar economic corridor, it appeared to have reservations towards the Maritime Silk Road Initiative.82 The Modi Government is poised to launch Project Mausam: Maritime Routes and Cultural Landscapes across the Indian Ocean, first unveiled to the 38th session of the World Heritage Committee in June 2014, ostensibly as a counter to the Maritime Silk Road Initiative.83 Following Male’s agreement to join the Maritime Silk Road Initiative in October 2014, Indian authorities remarked: ‘There was a Silk Route, but there was also a Spice Route, a Mausam Route, and other routes.’84 In addition, New Delhi sought to enhance maritime links in South East Asia, pushing for maritime security cooperation and establishment of a Joint Working Group on Maritime Connectivity as part of broader effort to forge deeper engagement with ASEAN on the basis that New Delhi is keen to become a ‘net security provider’.85 In response to China’s expanding footprints, India has ramped up efforts to demonstrate its credentials as a preferable choice for the region’s key security provider. This is despite repeated emphasis by New Delhi that it is not seeking ‘exclusivity’ in the IOR.86 There have been ongoing efforts to enhance security ties between India and its IOR neighbours.87 To this end, India stressed common maritime security interests

160   C.S.L. Koh and pledged to help safeguard SLOC security in the IOR.88 Table 8.5 illustrates new maritime-­related CSBMs between India and IOR neighbours saw slower growth between 2000 and 2008 and 2009 and present compared to those of China during the same periods. But in absolute terms, New Delhi still enjoys a comfortable lead due in part to India’s inherent advantage as the resident IOR power, which creates more opportunities for cooperation. So far, India has been successful in this regard. For example, a trilateral grouping first formed in early 2013 by India, the Maldives and Sri Lanka to foster maritime security cooperation was expanded to include Mauritius and Seychelles.89 China and India are keen to downplay their security dilemma at sea and sought to find common grounds for cooperation. In December 2011, China and India agreed to enhance defence exchanges and inter-­military communications at the 4th Annual Defence Dialogue.90 This came after the Airavat incident in the SCS five months earlier. Both governments were perhaps mindful of and mutually concerned about the prospect of similar future naval incidents. Hence, further steps were taken to ameliorate the Sino-­Indian security dilemma at sea. Notably, Chinese and Indian foreign ministers held an inaugural Maritime Dialogue in March 2012, during which they agreed to bolster naval and coastguard links. There seems to be some further traction. In 2013, China proposed ‘new type’ military relations with India, calling defence diplomacy ‘an important indicator of the depth of the bilateral cooperation’.91 This was followed by New Delhi’s remark that Sino-­Indian maritime rivalry is not inevitable . . . both India and China have common interest in keeping the sea lanes of communication through the Indian and Western Pacific Oceans open. These lines are vital to India’s trade and energy flows. So are they for China.92 Prospects for enhancing naval linkages improved after Chinese and Indian defence ministers agreed in July 2013 to boost military exchanges, including joint air force and naval exercises.93 In February 2014, China proposed an inter-­navy dialogue to augment the Maritime Dialogue.94 If it materialises, Table 8.5 Comparing maritime security-related CSBMs established by China and India with IOR littoral states

1990s 2000–2008 2009–present

China

India

5 9 20

9 31 43

Source: Author’s database relying on various sources (see Tables 8A.3 and 8A.4 for lists of initiatives).

Sino-Indian maritime security dilemma   161 it would signal the beginning of the institutionalised naval cooperation that Beijing has repeatedly evinced interest in. Yet prospects for further naval cooperation are easier said than done. So far, China and India have conducted army counter-­terrorism exercises. However, bilateral naval drills remain sporadic and limited in scope. The first Sino-­Indian passage exercise in 2000 involved only basic coordination of ship manoeuvres and inter-­vessel communications. There appeared an upswing in bilateral training exercises when search-­and-rescue drills were conducted in 2003 and 2005, the same year that then PLA Chief of Staff General Liang Guanglie visited an Indian Western Naval Command base, INS Angre, during which he discussed Sino-­Indian military cooperation and exchanges involving all three services.95 Following a defence MoU inked in 2006, the two navies staged a SLOC security exercise in 2007, which might have marked a positive start of institutionalised Sino-­Indian naval cooperation. But the second iteration was suspended following bilateral visa issues in 2009. In fact, Sino-­Indian naval links are often exposed to political upheavals. For instance, following India’s 1998 nuclear tests, a scheduled Indian Navy port-­call to China was cancelled.96 In December 2000, Beijing declined an invitation to participate in the India-­hosted International Fleet Review 2001 apparently because of the Indian Navy’s SCS war games.97 Without any mechanism to formalise naval links, Sino-­ Indian naval exchanges are confined mainly to such low-­intensity exchanges as port-­calls and fleet reviews. In the same vein, the agreement incorporated in the Modi–Xi joint statement to conduct joint air force and naval exercises – an idea which existed for years – may just remain in the pipeline for some time. Mutual suspicion and unease may take time to ameliorate in order to enhance Sino-­Indian naval cooperation. For example, the PLAN reportedly turned down a request made by Vice-­Admiral O.P. Bansal, Flag Officer Commanding of Eastern Naval Command, to tour the combat information centre (CIC) – the sensitive nerve centre onboard a warship – of a PLAN frigate in 2003.98 Similarly, PLAN Chief Admiral Wu Shengli’s request to visit the CIC onboard an Indian Navy frigate was turned down when the ship visited Qingdao in April 2014.99 After Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 went missing in March 2014, New Delhi declined Beijing’s proposal to allow PLAN warships to conduct searches in Indian territorial waters around the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, out of concern of Chinese spying on Indian military installations.100 The persistent exclusion of China from India-­led IOR initiatives, such as multinational exercise Milan and Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) reflects nagging concerns about China’s strategic intent.101 The latest factor that could potentially undermine improvements to Sino-­Indian naval cooperation was the first of a regular series of Sino-­Pakistani naval exercises conducted in September 2014 despite concerns earlier expressed by India.102

162   C.S.L. Koh

Conclusion The overlapping of Chinese and Indian forays into each other’s maritime domain present a ‘new normal’ for bilateral relations in the context of their growing interests and naval capabilities. But this is one also destined to be characterised by mutual suspicion and unease, not just cooperation. Seen in this light, this Indo-­Pacific ‘new normal’ reflects an extension of the traditionally land-­based Sino-­Indian security dilemma revolving around thorny terrestrial disputes. In view of the intractability of these issues, as exemplified by recent LAC flare-­ups, the mutual suspicion and unease look set to continue characterising naval cooperation as a result of this extension of Sino-­Indian rivalry from land to the maritime domain. Beijing and New Delhi have to live with the ‘new normal’ while finding ways to ameliorate their security dilemma. Naval cooperation offers an attractive avenue. China and India could bring cooperation forward by building on existing initiatives, for example enhancing Gulf of Aden joint counter-­piracy efforts. China could probably be invited to the IONS first as an observer or dialogue partner before full membership at a later stage.103 Implementation of the proposed joint air and naval exercises would invariably depend on the overall climate of Sino-­Indian relations. As such, it might be worth exploring the regularisation of search-­and-rescue and SLOC security exercises, based on the previous ones conducted. Further expansion of the exercise scope could consider explosive and ordnance disposal and mine countermeasures, which both navies should be familiar with since they have dealt with these fields as members of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium. Such exercises are also operationally less sensitive compared to combat training involving sophisticated capabilities and concepts of operations. On a final note of pragmatism, despite recent positive signs, naval cooperation necessarily requires a longer time to evolve because of persistent issues dogging Sino-­Indian relations. As discussed earlier, Sino-­Indian naval cooperation and its lack of institutionalisation are in no small part influenced by political upheavals. One should at best be cautiously optimistic about the future prospects of naval cooperation. In this regard, beyond public rhetoric emphasising cooperation and downplaying rivalry, both China and India need to put their ideas into real action.

Sino-Indian maritime security dilemma   163

Appendices Table 8A.1  Major Sino-Indian CSBMs Initiative

Year promulgated

Sino-Indian discussion on border dispute Sino-Indian Joint Press Communique 1988 Joint Working Group on the India-China Boundary Question Sino-Indian Joint Communique 1991 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas (AMPTLAC) Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas Sino-Indian Expert Group (EG) meeting on boundary issues Sino-Indian Border Personnel Meeting Sino-Indian Security Dialogue Mutual exchange of detailed maps on the disputed border areas along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) Sino-Indian Bilateral Mechanism for Counter-Terrorism Dialogue Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation Special Representatives meeting mechanism on border issues India-China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity Sino-Indian Strategic Dialogue Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question Protocol between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Modalities for the Implementation of Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the IndiaChina Border Areas Sino-Indian Joint Declaration on ‘Ten-Point Strategy’ Memorandum of Understanding for Exchanges and Cooperation in the Field of Defence Protocol of Cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China and the Ministry of External Affairs of India Sino-Indian foreign minister hotline Sino-Indian Annual Defence Dialogue (ADD) Joint Statement on A Shared Vision for the 21st Century of the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India Agreement to establish direct hotline between prime ministers of China and India Discussion to establish direct INCSEA-type communication links between the Indian Navy and People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Sino-Indian Maritime Dialogue Agreement between The Government of the Republic of India and The Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Establishment of a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India–China Border Affairs Establishment of inter-ministerial cooperation for regular information exchange in areas of maritime trade and security Negotiations for inter-military HQ direct hotline (Indian Eastern Command – PLA Chengdu Military Area Command) Common understanding on framework for settlement of boundary dispute Agreement to enhance defence exchanges Negotiations for director-general of military operation (DGMO)-level hotline Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) Sino-Indian Defence Ministers Joint Statement 2013 Agreement to strengthen ‘strategic communication and coordination’ at various levels between border forces to maintain peace, tranquillity and stability along the Line of Actual Control Agreement in principle to increase military contact and exchanges along the Line of Actual Control Agreement on establishment of Directors General of Military Operations (DGMO) hotline (under auspices of BDCA) People’s Republic of China–Republic of India Joint Statement on Building Closer Partnership for Development Agreement to hold Maritime Dialogue

1981 1988 1988 1991 1993

Source: Author’s database relying on various sources.

1996 1996 1999 2000 2000 2002 2003 2003 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005

2006 2006 2006 2007 2008 2008 2010 2011 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2014 2014 2014 2014

164   C.S.L. Koh Table 8A.2 India’s maritime security-related CSBMs with key Asia-Pacific powers other than China Partner state

Initiative

Year promulgated

USA USA

India–US Joint Services Committees US Navy Pacific Fleet–Indian Navy Executive Steering Group Naval Exercise Malabar Russia–India Joint Naval Exercise (RINEX; first since the breakup of USSR) Naval Special Forces Interoperability Exercise Flash Iroquois Indo-US Military Cooperation Agreement Military cooperation agreement Agreement to establish sub-working group for defence cooperation in the naval sphere MOU on Defence Cooperation Protocol on defence and technical cooperation Coastguard Exercise Sahyog-Kaijin India–Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Military Technical Cooperation (IRIGC-MTC) Moscow Declaration between the Russian Federation and the Republic of India on International Terrorism Naval search-and-rescue exercise Provision of refuelling support for USN in the Arabian Sea (as part of Operation Enduring Freedom for the US-led Global War on Terror) Trilateral maritime search-and-rescue exercise Security Cooperation Group (SCG) Joint naval patrol for high-value US shipping through Strait of Malacca (Op Sagittarius) Naval Exercise INDRA Indo-Japanese Joint Working Group on Counter Terrorism Naval Explosive and Ordnance Disposal Exercise Spitting Cobra Indo-Japan Coast Guard High Level Delegation Meeting Agreement to intensify coastguard cooperation against piracy and maritime terrorism in the Indian Ocean MOU on Defence Industry and Logistics Cooperation Indo-Korean Coast Guard Joint Exercise New Framework for the US–India Defence Relationship (Defence Cooperation Framework Agreement) Indo-US Disaster Response Initiative Naval salvage and diving exercises Exercise Shatrujeet MOU on Cooperation in Defence Joint Statement on enhanced defence cooperation and exchanges Memorandum of Cooperation between the Indian Coast Guard and Japan Coast Guard MOU on cooperation between the Indian Coast Guard and Korean Coast Guard Indo-US Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation Exercise Habu Nag (IN-USN Expeditionary Operation Table-top Exercise; annual joint amphibious operations training including HADR) Anti-piracy and SAR exercise in the Indian Ocean and Malacca Straits Trilateral Exercise (TRILATEX) Expanded Naval Exercise Malabar

1991 1992

USA Russian Federation USA USA Russian Federation Russian Federation Japan Russian Federation Japan Russian Federation Russian Federation USA USA South Korea and USA USA USA Russian Federation Japan USA Japan Japan South Korea South Korea USA USA USA USA Australia Japan Japan South Korea USA USA

Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea Japan and USA Australia, Japan, Singapore and USA

1992 1994 1994 1995 1996 1998 1999 1999 2000 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2002 2002 2003 2004 2004 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2006 2006 2006 2006 2007 2007

2007 2007 2007

Sino-Indian maritime security dilemma   165 Partner state

Initiative

Year promulgated

Japan

Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India Australia–India Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation Japan–India Maritime Security Dialogue Action Plan to Advance India–Japan Security Cooperation Administrative Vice-Ministerial 2 + 2 Dialogue MOU on defence cooperation and exchanges US–India Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative (CCI) Joint Exercise India (JEI table-top HADR exercise; between Indian Integrated Defence Staff and USAPACOM) Joint statement on enhancing cooperation in maritime security activities in the Indian Ocean MOU on coastguard anti-piracy and maritime search-and-rescue cooperation Agreement to enhance naval cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region Agreement to continue consultation and exchange on maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region Indo-US Coast Guard Joint Training Workshop on Maritime/Port Security Trilateral director-general talks on Asia-Pacific affairs (including maritime security issues) Japan–India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX) Agreement to accelerate cooperation in maritime security, including anti-piracy and establishment of foreign ministerial-level maritime consultative framework by end of 2012 Bilateral group for discussing security in the South China Sea Agreement to further enhance IN-JMSDF cooperation Joint naval anti-piracy exercise INDIAEX (submarine rescue exercise) Coordinated anti-piracy naval patrols for the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) in the Gulf of Aden Agreement to expand defence and maritime security cooperation including regularising of joint naval exercises (JIMEX) Agreement on cooperation in disaster management Protocol on further development of military and technical cooperation Agreement to hold military staff talks on regional and global security issues US–India Joint Declaration on Defense Cooperation Tokyo Declaration for India–Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership Memorandum of Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Defence National Security Advisors Dialogue Proposal to establish institutionalised defence and security information and intelligence exchanges Multinational Exercise Fortune Guard under the auspices of US-led Proliferation Security Initiative Rim of the Pacific Exercise

2008

Australia Japan Japan Japan South Korea USA USA Japan South Korea Russian Federation USA USA Japan and USA Japan Japan

Japan Japan Russian Federation USA China, Japan and South Korea Japan Russian Federation Russian Federation Russian Federation USA Japan Japan Japan USA International International

Source: Author’s database relying on various sources.

2009 2009 2009 2010 2010 2010 2010 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2012 2012

2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014

166   C.S.L. Koh Table 8A.3 India’s maritime security-related CSBMs with other Indian Ocean littoral states Partner state

Initiative

Year promulgated

Mauritius

Agreement on deputation of Indian defence officials to the Mauritian National Coast Guard and the Mauritian Police Force for joint EEZ security cooperation Maritime Security Exercise DOSTI-X Naval Exercise Naseem Al Bahr Thailand–India naval exercise in the Andaman Sea Exercise Sadakah Naval Exercise Milan

1974

Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) Discussion on long-term naval cooperation under framework of mutual security in the Indian Ocean Rim Mauritius, Sri Lanka and Italy Maritime Search-and-Rescue Exercise Suraksha (SAREX between navies of India, Sri Lanka and Italy as well as Mauritian Coast Guard) Indian Ocean littoral states Naval Exercise Milan West South Africa India–South Africa Defence Cooperation Agreement Indian Ocean littoral states Draft Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for Co-operation on the Response to Marine Oil and Chemical Spills in the South Asia Region Indonesia Bilateral Agreement on Cooperative Activities in the Field of Defence Indonesia India-Indonesia Coordinated Patrol (INDINDOCORPAT) Maldives Hydrographic survey cooperation Iran Naval Exercise Mauritius MOU allowing the Indian Navy to engage in patrols within the Mauritian EEZ Myanmar Naval Exercise United Arab Emirates Agreement on defence cooperation Bangladesh Agreement to enhance naval cooperation Indonesia MOU on Combating International Terrorism Sri Lanka Naval Exercise (Operations Ek Sath) Thailand Indo-Thai Joint Working Group Meeting for Establishment of Good Order at Sea Oman MOU on Defence Cooperation Mauritius MOU on assistance to Mauritius in hydrographic surveys and associated training for the Mauritian Coast Guard Sri Lanka Sri Lanka-India Naval Exercise (SLINEX) Thailand Indo-Thai Coordinated Patrols (Indo-Thai CORPAT) Bangladesh Joint coastguard training exercise Mozambique MOU on Defence Cooperation (including allowing the Indian Navy to engage in regular patrols off the Mozambique coast) Oman Joint Military Cooperation Committee South Africa Agreement on counter-terrorism intelligencesharing cooperation Thailand India–Thailand Joint Working Group on Security Cooperation Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Observer to GCC military exercise Madagascar Basing arrangement for Indian Navy’s radar surveillance station Nigeria MOU on Military Cooperation Maldives Agreement on EEZ surveillance cooperation Qatar Defence Cooperation Agreement Qatar DIMEX Brazil and South Africa India–Brazil–South Africa Maritime Exercise (IBSAMAR) Indian Ocean littoral states South Asia Regional Port Security Cooperative (SARPSCO) initiative

1995

Mauritius Oman Thailand United Arab Emirates Indian Ocean littoral states and international partners Indian Ocean littoral states and international partners South Africa

1991 1993 1995 1995 1995

1998 1998 1999 2000 2000 2001 2002 2002 2003 2003 2003 2003 2004 2004 2004 2004 2005 2005 2005 2005 2006 2006 2006 2006 2006 2007 2007 2007 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008

Sino-Indian maritime security dilemma   167 Partner state

Initiative

Year promulgated

Indian Ocean littoral states and international partners Maldives

Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)

2008

Maritime security agreement (against terrorism and piracy, including framework to encompass Maldives within Indian coastal security grid) CADEX (ICG-IN-SLN exercise) EEZ surveillance and hydrographic survey cooperation Agreement to enhance naval cooperation MOU on cooperation in defence, security and maritime sectors Agreement on anti-piracy cooperation Seychelles Comprehensive Maritime Security Plan of Action (SCMSPA) Cooperation on combating piracy, maritime terrorism and drug trafficking Memorandum of Understanding on Combating International Terrorism, Trans-national Crime, Illicit Drug Trafficking and Enhancing Bilateral Cooperation in Capacity Building, Disaster Management and Coastal Security Agreement on maritime security cooperation Agreement to conduct joint naval exercise Joint naval staff-level meeting on maritime security in Palk Bay and Palk Straits Intensification of coordinated patrols in Malacca Straits Agreement on Security Cooperation Trilateral Meeting on Maritime Security Cooperation Pledge to jointly combat piracy in the Indian Ocean through info-sharing and technical assistance Joint naval exercise Biennial defence dialogue Agreement to enhance cooperation in CT, antipiracy and maritime security in the Indian Ocean India-Saudi Arabia Joint Committee on Defence Cooperation Annual Defence Dialogue High Level Coastguard Meeting Agreement to enhance anti-piracy cooperation MOU on Defence Cooperation National Security Advisor-level Meeting on Trilateral Cooperation on Maritime Security Expanded Maritime Security Exercise DOSTI-X Trilateral arrangement in strengthening SLOC security in the Indian Ocean Agreement to step up defence ties, including Indian transfer of military equipment Agreement to jointly tackle marine oil spillage in the Arabian Sea Memorandum of Understanding for the Deputation of Indian Naval Personnel for Operational Training and Basic Maintenance of the Seychelles Peoples Defence Forces (SPDF) Dornier Agreement on combating international terrorism and illicit drug trafficking Agreement on cooperation against piracy and terrorism in the Indian Ocean Agreement to commit to decrease in fishing incidents along the IMBL and refrain from the use of force MOU on trilateral maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean Trilateral Tabletop Exercise (TTEX) (trilateral coastguard exercise) Agreement to elevate INDINDOCORPAT to regular bilateral naval exercise

2009

Sri Lanka Seychelles Oman Qatar Seychelles Indian Ocean littoral states and international partners Iran Maldives

Mozambique South Africa Sri Lanka Thailand United Arab Emirates Maldives and Sri Lanka IOR-ARC partners Egypt Indonesia Maldives Saudi Arabia Sri Lanka Sri Lanka Seychelles Thailand Maldives and Sri Lanka Maldives and Sri Lanka Sri Lanka and the USA Maldives Oman Seychelles

Sri Lanka Sri Lanka Sri Lanka Maldives and Sri Lanka Maldives and Sri Lanka Indonesia

2009 2009 2010 2010 2010 2010 2011 2011

2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2012 2013 2013 2013

2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2014 continued

168   C.S.L. Koh Table 8A.3 Continued Partner state

Initiative

Year promulgated

Maldives

Agreement to assist Maldives National Defence Force capacity-building and to enhance joint maritime security initiatives MOU for defence cooperation Joint naval exercise Joint hydrographic survey Agreement to enhance Indian Ocean maritime security cooperation, during the Third IndiaAfrica Forum Summit (IAFS) Expansion of Trilateral Meeting on Maritime Security Cooperation Joint system for maritime domain awareness in the Indian Ocean

2014

Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia Tanzania African partners Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles and Sri Lanka Maldives and Sri Lanka

2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014

Source: Author’s database relying on various sources.

Table 8A.4 China’s maritime security-related CSBMs with Indian Ocean littoral states other than India Partner state

Initiative

Year promulgated

Iran

10-year agreement on scientific cooperation and transfer of military technology Protocol on institutionalising foreign ministry official consultations MOU on military cooperation Consultation mechanism Agreement on regular bilateral political consultations China–South Africa Bi-National Commission China–South Africa Defence Committee meeting China–Iran Consultative Commission Meeting China–Pakistan Defence and Security Talks Agreement to enhance and establish long-term naval cooperation especially in the non-traditional security fields and joint training Sino-Seychelles military cooperation agreement Framework Agreement on Cooperation Between the Ministry of National Defence of the People’s Republic of China and the Ministry of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan China–Pakistan Strategic Dialogue China–South Africa Strategic Dialogue MOU on Strategic Dialogue between the People’s Republic of China and the Member States of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf Agreement to enhance military cooperation China–Myanmar Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation Partnership Renewal of military cooperation agreement MOU on counter-piracy cooperation in the Indian Ocean Agreement to strengthen defence cooperation including provision of training for Maldives National Defence Forces Agreement on mutual military cooperation and to strengthen maritime security cooperation Joint oceanographic exploration and research mission Joint Action Plan on China–Myanmar Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation Partnership Strategic Security Consultation China–Pakistan Defence and Security Consultations Mechanism MOU on Maritime Cooperation Agreement on Border Ports and Management System Common Vision for Deepening China–Pakistan Strategic Cooperative Partnership in the New Era Agreement to establish strategic partnership including defence and maritime security cooperation Strategic Dialogue Action Plan 2014–2017 Agreement to enhance defence cooperation Regular naval exercise Agreement to institute Joint Commission mechanism Agreement to initiate annual defence dialogue

1990

Bangladesh Kuwait GCC Mauritius South Africa South Africa Iran Pakistan Pakistan Seychelles Pakistan Pakistan South Africa GCC Sri Lanka Myanmar Seychelles Seychelles Maldives Pakistan Nigeria Myanmar Myanmar Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Sri Lanka GCC Myanmar Pakistan Sri Lanka Sri Lanka

Source: Author’s database relying on various sources.

1990 1995 1996 1999 2001 2003 2003 2004 2004 2004 2006 2008 2008 2010 2010 2011 2011 2011 2012 2012 2012 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2014 2014 2014 2014

Sino-Indian maritime security dilemma   169

Notes    1 Robert D. Kaplan, ‘Center Stage for the Twenty-­first Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean’, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2009, p. 17.    2 This chapter adopts the definition used by then Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa: ‘an important triangular spanning two oceans, the Pacific and Indian Oceans, bounded by Japan in the north, Australia in the southeast and India in the southwest, notably with Indonesia at its center’. Marty Natalegawa, ‘An Indonesian Perspective on the Indo-­Pacific’, Jakarta Post, 20 May 2013.    3 Mainstream thinking holds that the use of naval power for the attainment of foreign policy objectives is often fraught with ambiguity, although it is less risky and unpredictable compared to other forms of force. Read for instance: D.P. O’Connell, The Influence of Law on Sea Power (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1975); Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy (London: Croom Helm/New York: Crane, Russak, 1977); and Harold J. Kearsley, Maritime Power and the Twenty-­First Century (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1992).    4 Read for instance: John Herz, The Nation-­State and the Crisis of World Politics (New York: David McKay, 1976); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Nicholas Wheeler and Ken Booth, ‘The Security Dilemma’, in John Baylis and N.J. Rengger (eds), Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); and Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008).    5 Read for instance: S. Singh (ed.), India and China: Mutual Relations (New Delhi: Anmol Publications Pvt. Ltd, 2006); Amardeep Athwal, China–India Relations: Contemporary Dynamics (London and New York: Routledge, 2008); Geoffrey Kemp, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010); and Jeff M. Smith, Cold Peace: China–India Rivalry in the Twenty-­First Century (New York: Lexington Books, 2013).    6 Gaurav C. Sawant, ‘Pakistan Still Poses Biggest Threat to National Security Says Ministry of Defence’, Mail Online, 16 October 2013.    7 ‘Foresight into Common Dreams with India’, China Daily, 12 February 2014 [Remarks by Chinese State Councillor Yang Jiechi at the launch ceremony of the Year of China–India Friendly Exchanges, New Delhi, 11 February 2014]; ‘China, India Must Practise “Mutual Sensitivity” – Indian Vice-­president’, BBC Monitoring South Asia, 21 November 2009.    8 ‘India’s Relationship with China Is “More Complex”: Menon’, Press Trust of India, 15 October 2013.    9 ‘China for New Security Concept to Improve Ties with India’, Press Trust of India, 11 June 2014.   10 ‘India, China Discuss Ways to Address, Resolve Border Dispute’, Asian News International, 15 July 2014.   11 ‘PM’s China Mantra: Inch towards Miles’, The Times of India – Bangalore Edition, 17 September 2014.   12 ‘China, India Should Be Partners for Peace, Development: Xi’, Xinhua News Agency, 19 September 2014.   13 ‘UPDATE 1-Ahead of Xi’s Trip, China Says Not Seeking to Contain India’, Reuters News, 9 September 2014.   14 ‘Full Text of China–India Joint Statement on Closer Development Partnership’, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 22 September 2014 [PRC–Republic of India Joint Statement on Building Closer Partnership for Development, signed in New Delhi on 19 September 2014].

170   C.S.L. Koh   15 In the aftermath of the nuclear tests, the Chinese president Jiang Zemin said that Beijing was ‘really surprised by the attempt of India to target China with these tests’. ‘Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s Interview with AFP’, Agence France Presse, 3 June 1998 [Unofficial translation of a 45-minute interview with Chinese President Jiang Zemin by AFP Chairman Jean Miot].   16 ‘Two Chinese Choppers Entered Uttarakhand in April, June’, Press Trust of India, 15 July 2014; ‘Chinese Troops Violated Border Pact in June: Jaitley’, Press Trust of India, 1 August 2014.   17 ‘Government Insists Chinese Border Incursions Are “Nothing Alarming” ’, Mail Online, 1 July 2014.   18 ‘India Strongly Reacts to Reported Chinese Claim on Arunachal’, Press Trust of India, 28 June 2014.   19 ‘Adhere to One India Policy, Sushma Tells China’, UNI (United News of India), 8 September 2014.   20 ‘Chinese Incursion in Ladakh: A Little Toothache Can Paralyze Entire Body, Modi Tells Xi Jinping’, The Times of India, 21 September 2014.   21 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on 23 September 2014, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China.   22 ‘China, India Have Smooth Communication on Boundary Issue’, Xinhua News Agency, 25 September 2014.   23 ‘No Compromise with China on India’s Territorial Sovereignty: AjitDoval’, Asian News International, 21 October 2014.   24 ‘Matching Military Infrastructure Being Created on Indian Side: Jaitley’, Press Trust of India, 7 November 2014.   25 ‘China Urges India Not to Complicate Border Situation’, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 31 October 2014.   26 ‘ “Nobody Can Warn India”, Rajnath Tells China’, Hindustan Times, 16 October 2014.   27 Rohinee Singh, ‘Japan Gets Contract to Build Strategic Roads on Indo-­China Border’, Daily News & Analysis, 3 November 2014.   28 ‘China’s International Security Cooperation: Q&A’, Shangri-­La Dialogue 2011 Fourth Plenary Session Q&A with General Liang Guanglie, Minister of National Defence, China, 5 June 2011.   29 China’s annual population growth declined from nearly 2.75 per cent in 1971 to less than 0.5 per cent by 2012, and during the same period its electricity consumption soared from lower than 250 kWh per capita to over 3000 kWh per capita. Yet its energy import dependence has continued to rise steadily since 2009. Data from the World Bank database, http://data.worldbank.org/.   30 Ibid.   31 BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2014, British Petroleum, p. 18: online available www.bp.com/statisticalreview. Exporting country statistics can be found in the official China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) website (in Chinese language), www.cnpc.com.cn/.   32 Read for instance: Du Chaoping, ‘Dao lian dui zhongguohaijun de yingxiang you duo da (The Impact of Island Chains on China’s Navy)’, Jian Zai Wu Qi (Shipborne Weapons), 12 May 2004, pp. 37–40; Jiang Yu, ‘Dao lianyizhongguohaijunxiang yuan yang de fa zhan (Island Chain and Chinese Navy’s Going to the High Seas)’, Jian Zai Wu Qi (Shipborne Weapons), 12 December 2008, pp. 26–31; Shi Chunlin and Li Xiuying, ‘Mei guodaolianfengshuoji qi dui wo guohaishang an quan de yingxiang (The Impact of the US Island Chain Blockage on China’s Access to the Sea)’, Shi Jie Di Li Yan Jiu (World Regional Studies), Vol. 22, No. 2, June 2013, pp. 1–10.   33 ‘Zhongguohaijunxiandaihuayineng yuan an quan (Energy Safety and PLA-­Navy Modernisation)’, Jian zaiwu qi (Shipborne Weapons), 11 November 2007, pp. 13–20.

Sino-Indian maritime security dilemma   171   34 ‘Chinese Naval Officials on Building Powerful Navy’, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 27 July 2007; ‘China PLA Navy Urged to Beef up Muscle for National Security’, Xinhua News Agency, 25 April 2009.   35 ‘China Says Somali Mission Signals No Change in Military Policy’, Agence France Presse, 16 January 2009.   36 The three-­ship flotilla sailed through the Lombok Strait – marking the first time the PLAN charted a new route as an alternative to the Malacca Strait. ‘Chinese Warships Hold Rare Exercises in Indian Ocean’, Press Trust of India, 3 February 2014.   37 ‘3Cs’ refer to cooperative security, common security and comprehensive security. Beijing stressed that emerging economies will not become free-­riders. Tang Zhiqiang, ‘Emerging Economies Not Free Riders: Chinese Vice FM’, Xinhua News Agency, 2 February 2013; Wang Lei, ‘China to Firmly Fulfill Due Int’l Responsibilities, Obligations: FM’, Xinhua News Agency, 28 September 2013; see also an editorial by Liu Zhenmin, vice-­minister of foreign affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Chopsticks Together Hard to Break’, China Daily, 5 December 2013.   38 ‘China Advocates Building, Maintenance of Harmonious Maritime Order: UN Envoy’, Xinhua News Agency, 12 December 2012.   39 ‘Chinese Navy to “Actively Maintain” Peace in Indian Ocean’, Press Trust of India, 16 December 2012.   40 ‘China Willing to Provide More “Public Goods” to World: Xi’, Xinhua News Agency, 9 November 2014.   41 ‘China’s Aircraft Carrier Docks in Sanya’, Xinhua News Agency, 29 November 2013.   42 Liu Qin, ‘ “Zhen zhulianzhanlue” zhishuobian xi (Analysis of the “String of Pearls Strategy”)’, Xian Dai GuoJi Guan Xi (Modern International Relations), No. 3, 2010, pp. 8–14; Gurpreet S. Khurana, ‘China’s Maritime-­strategic Presence in IOR: Geopolitical, Geoeconomic and Security Import’, Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India, 2014, pp. 1–15.   43 Vishwa Mohan, ‘Green Nod for Defence Radar at Andamans’, The Times of India – Mumbai Edition, 12 June 2014.   44 ‘China to Set Up Military Base to Fight Somali Piracy’, BBC Monitoring Africa, 4 January 2010; Cui Xiaohuo, ‘Navy Has No Plan for Overseas Bases’, China Daily, 11 March 2010.   45 ‘China Mulling Naval Base in Gulf of Aden: Admiral’, Agence France Presse, 30 December 2009.   46 It is difficult to discount the possibility that such port deals may carry political-­ security overtones. For example, the US$10 billion Chinese-­Tanzanian joint development project for the port of Bagamoyo was signed around the same time when both governments strengthened maritime security cooperation. ‘China’s Defense Ministry Refutes Military Purpose of Tanzania Port’, Xinhua News Agency, 28 March 2013.   47 Meera Srinivasan, ‘India Conveys Concern at China Presence in Sri Lanka’, The Hindu, 26 October 2014.   48 Li Xiaokun and Zhang Yunbi, ‘China, Pakistan Ink Transport Pact’, China Daily – Hong Kong Edition, 6 July 2013. The 1500-kilometre-­long overland energy route through the corridor is supposedly more cost-­efficient compared to overall expenses of having to first ship energy supplies to Chinese coastal provinces before transporting them 3500 kilometres overland to Kashgar. Zeng Xiangyu, ‘Ba jisi tan gua da er gang dui guojianquan tai shi de yingxiang (The Gwadar Port: Implications for International Security)’, Nan Ya Yan Jiu Ji Kan (South Asian Studies Quarterly), No. 2, 2009, pp. 31–44.   49 ‘UPDATE 1-China Says Unaware of Pakistan Naval Port Proposal’, Reuters News, 24 May 2011.

172   C.S.L. Koh   50 ‘China Funding Development of Gwadar Port in Pakistan: Antony’, Press Trust of India, 7 August 2013.   51 ‘Road Through PoK Not Directed at India’, Hindustan Times, 21 February 2014; ‘India All Set to Oppose China’s Role in PoK’, Deccan Herald, 22 August 2014; Sutirtho Patranobis, ‘NSA AjitDoval Warns China over Pakistan Occupied Kashmir Projects’, Deccan Chronicle, 10 September 2014.   52 ‘Navy to Commission Security Outpost in Sagar Island’, The Statesman, 3 December 2013.   53 Li Fan, Beijing Naval Institute, ‘An da man nikeba – in du de dong jintiao ban (Andaman and Nicobar Islands – Springboard for India’s “Look East”)’, World Outlook, February, year unknown, p. 9; Hu Qingliang, ‘Yin du hai yang zhanlueji dui zhongguoneng yuan an quan de yingxiang (India’s Marine Strategy and Its Effect on China’s Energy Security)’, Nan Ya Yan Jiu Ji Kan (South Asian Studies Quarterly), No. 1, 2008, pp. 21–25, 83.   54 Only home bases for the strike assets of both the Indian Navy and Air Force, which may be tasked for anti-­shipping missions, are included even though such highly mobile forces may be readily re-­deployed in other Indian military airfields as expedient and logistically possible. This also implies that the coverage indicated in Figure 8.2 is potentially wider if other airbases are included.   55 ‘Indian Presence in Indian Ocean a Weak Area for China: Mehta’, The Press Trust of India Limited, 13 August 2009.   56 ‘Dr M: China Interested in Reviving Oil Pipeline Plan’, New Sunday Times, 6 October 2013.   57 ‘Prayuth Says No to Proposal to Dig Kra Isthmus Canal in PrachuapKhiri Khan’, Real Estate Monitor Worldwide, 13 June 2014.   58 Official website of ONGC Videsh Ltd, www.ongcvidesh.com/Assets.aspx? tab=0.   59 OVL was said to have been active in the SCS since 1988, and New Delhi insists that its SCS energy interests are purely commercial. ‘Don’t Ascribe Political Angularity to Indian Oil Scouting: President’, Indo-­Asian News Service, 17 September 2014.   60 ‘India for Peaceful Resolution of South China Sea Dispute’, Press Trust of India, 6 July 2012.   61 ‘ASEAN Wants India’s Help in China Disputes’, Agence France Presse, 20 December 2012.   62 ‘Beijing Hopes India Does Not Get Involved in South China Sea Dispute – Official’, BBC Monitoring South Asia, 26 March 2012.   63 U.S.–India Joint Statement, United States White House Documents – Press Release/Statement, 1 October 2014.   64 ‘Ties with Vietnam, Not Against China: Prez’, Deccan Herald, 18 September 2014.   65 ‘Time for “Act East Policy” and Not Just “Look East”: Swaraj’, Press Trust of India, 24 August 2014; ‘Vietnam Important in India’s Look East Policy: President’, Indo-­Asian News Service, 13 September 2014.   66 Read more in, for example, Koh Swee Lean Collin, ‘ASEAN Perspectives on Naval Cooperation with India: Singapore and Vietnam’, India Review, Vol. 12, Issue 3, 2013, pp. 186–206; Yang Qiaoguang and Wang Xiaonian, ‘Shi xi xinshijiyue nan yi yin du junshi he zhuo de jucuo he yuan yin (A Study on the Measures and Reasons for Military Cooperation between Vietnam and India in the New Century)’, Dong Nan Ya Yan Jiu (Southeast Asian Studies), Issue 3, 2012, pp. 53–57.   67 Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy, Integrated Headquarters Ministry of Defence (Navy), May 2007, pp. 59–60.

Sino-Indian maritime security dilemma   173   68 ‘Indian Navy Bracing for South China Sea: Admiral Joshi’, UNI (United News of India), 3 December 2012.   69 Both Chinese and Indian authorities sought either to deny or downplay this incident. Ben Bland and Girija Shivakumar, ‘China Confronts Indian Vessel in Sth China Sea’, Financial Times (FT.com), 31 August 2011; ‘No Face-­off with Chinese Navy in South China Sea: Govt’, United News of India, 1 September 2011; ‘China Dismisses Report of Confronting Indian Naval Ship’, Political & Business Daily, 5 September 2011.   70 ‘Indian Navy Chief Says New Chinese Ballistic Missile Poses “Threat” ’, BBC Monitoring South Asia, 3 December 2011.   71 This is an operational concern since the Indian Navy’s SCS deployments typically comprise organic aviation elements. ‘Navy Closely Watching China Claims’, New Indian Express, 6 December 2013.   72 ‘India Backs Japan on Maritime Security to Fend Off China’, The Times of India, 29 March 2013.   73 ‘Japan, India to Hold Naval Drills as Early as Summer’, Asia Pulse, 29 February 2012.   74 ‘China Hopes India–Japan Ties Would Be Conducive to Regional Peace’, Press Trust of India, 2 December 2013.   75 In February 2014, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russell pointed that given her strategic position in the Indo-­ Pacific region, India ‘has an important role to play, an important contribution to make’. ‘India Has Important Contribution to Make in Asia Pacific’, Press Trust of India, 6 February 2014.   76 ‘India to Host Five-­nation Exercise in Bay of Bengal; China Apprehensive’, BBC Monitoring South Asia, 14 July 2007.   77 ‘US Rules Out Trilateral Military Partnership with India, Japan’, Press Trust of India, 3 October 2014.   78 Sutirtho Patranobis, ‘Ties with China Looming over Indo-­Japan Naval Relations’, Hindustan Times, 23 April 2014.   79 ‘Indian Official Says No Chinese Military Bases in Indian Ocean’, BBC Monitoring South Asia, 12 September 2009.   80 ‘China Wants India in Maritime Plan’, Hindustan Times, 15 February 2014; ‘China Eyes Consensus with India on Construction of New Silk Road’, Xinhua News Agency, 18 September 2014.   81 ‘Beijing Assures New Delhi on Silk Road Security Concerns’, New Indian Express, 24 October 2014.   82 ‘India OK with BCIM, Wants Details on China Maritime Silk Road’, Press Trust of India, 30 June 2014.   83 Sachin Parashar, ‘Narendra Modi’s “Mausam” Manoeuvre to Check China’s Maritime Might’, The Times of India, 16 September 2014.   84 ‘Stopover in Male, Eye on Beijing’, The Telegraph, 1 November 2014.   85 ‘India Seeks Deeper Engagement with ASEAN on Maritime Security’, Press Trust of India, 6 March 2014.   86 Text of address by Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao at the 3rd MEA-­ IISS Seminar on ‘Perspectives on Foreign Policy for a 21st Century India’, London, 22 February 2010. See also, ‘India Has to Accept China’s Presence in “Exclusive” Areas: Khurshid’, Indo-­Asian News Service, 10 December 2012.   87 Then Indian Defence Minister A.K. Antony urged the Indian Navy to ‘maintain – and even increase the momentum’ of naval linkages with IOR littoral states, in apparent response to Chinese moves. ‘With China Making Forays, Antony Asks Navy to Assert in IOR’, The Press Trust of India Limited, 27 October 2010.   88 ‘India to Cooperate with Mauritius to Safeguard Indian Ocean’, Press Trust of India, 2 November 2014.

174   C.S.L. Koh   89 Sandeep Dikshit, ‘Seychelles, Mauritius Join Indian Ocean Maritime Group’, The Hindu, 7 March 2014.   90 ‘India Mulls Joint Military Exercises with China’, Press Trust of India, 20 June 2012.   91 ‘China’s PLA Seeks “New Type” Relations with Indian Military’, Press Trust of India, 15 January 2013.   92 ‘India–China Maritime Rivalry Not Inevitable: NSA’, Press Trust of India, 4 March 2013.   93 ‘India, China Plan to Hold Navy, Air Force Exercises’, Press Trust of India, 11 July 2013.   94 The proposed rear admirals-­level dialogue is tipped as the first high-­level Sino-­Indian naval contact. Sandeep Unnithan, ‘China Moots Maritime Dialogue with India, Panchsheel Diamond Jubilee’, India Today, 15 February 2014.   95 ‘Chinese Army Chief Visits Indian Navy’s Western Naval Command’, Hindustan Times, 28 May 2005.   96 Dinesh Kumar, ‘Naval Flotilla’s Visit to China Put Off ’, The Times of India, 9 July 1998.   97 ‘China Not to Participate in International Fleet Review’, Press Trust of India, 24 December 2000.   98 ‘China Turns Down Indian Request to View Warship Combat Information Centre’, BBC Monitoring South Asia, 17 November 2003.   99 Ananth Krishnan, ‘An Unusual Request from China’s Navy Chief ’, The Hindu, 25 April 2014. 100 ‘India Won’t Allow China’s Warships near Andamans’, The Times of India – Chennai Edition, 21 March 2014. 101 PLAN had requested to join IONS since 2009 but New Delhi rebuffed the move on grounds that there was no strategic rationale to involve China since IONS was strictly restricted to IOR states. But it is puzzling that non-­IOR states Cambodia and the Philippines were invited. Pranab Dhal Samanta, ‘China Wants to Join Navy Initiative on Indian Ocean, MEA Says No Need’, Indian Express, 21 April 2009; ‘Biennial Naval Exercise Concludes’, Press Trust of India, 9 February 2014. 102 Rahul Singh, ‘India to Tackle China–Pakistan Naval Exercises’, Hindustan Times, 9 October 2013; ‘Pak China Bilateral Naval Exercise Concludes at Arabian Sea’, The Balochistan Times, 2 October 2014. 103 The opportunity for China’s future participation in IONS appears optimistic. In February 2014, then Chief of Naval Staff Admiral D.K. Joshi remarked that IONS will in future open up in phases to include more members and accord observer status to some others. S. Anandan, ‘Indian Ocean Naval Forum to Take in More Members’, The Hindu, 6 February 2014.

9 Looming over the horizon Japan’s naval engagement with India Tomoko Kiyota

Introduction In most of the postwar period, the geographic scope of ‘Asia’ has been limited from the Japanese archipelago to the straits of Malacca for the majority of people in Japan. Although there are huge strategic resources beyond the straits, the Indian Ocean seems invisible to Japan. India and Japan have mutually admired each other but India did not figure prominently in Japanese strategic and foreign policy thinking. It was only after 2000 that Tokyo established closer relations with New Delhi and concluded many security agreements and treaties, including the ‘Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India’ (2008). As Shinzo Abe mentioned during his first visit to India as a Prime Minister of Japan in 2007, ‘the Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity’, and ‘broke away geographical boundaries’.1 It is often considered that the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have played important roles in driving India–Japan security ties. However, although those two countries explain why the India–Japan relations suddenly became ‘natural allies’2 they do not explain what New Delhi and Tokyo will and can do in the domain of security. Most of the existing literature on India–Japan relations overlooks two important aspects.3 First, the change in Japan’s India policy is an extension of the reform of Japanese national security policy. Tokyo has conducted security reform since the Persian Gulf War in the early 1990s, and allowed the Japan Self-­Defence Force (JSDF ) to participate in a number of overseas operations.4 Without expansion of the JSDF ’s sphere of activities, the security cooperation between Tokyo and New Delhi could not have been substantive. In other words, what the JSDF can do determines the extent of security cooperation between India and Japan. Second, differing perceptions of the term ‘alliance’ could be a potential obstacle for mutual trust and understanding. While Japanese people have relied on Japan’s current ally, the United States, Indian people have generally adhered to the strategic autonomy, except the Indo-­Soviet Treaty

176   T. Kiyota of Friendship and Cooperation which was signed in August 1971. New Delhi often doubts Japanese reliability when Tokyo emphasises the security cooperation with India based on the alliance.5 This chapter attempts to explain Japan’s India policy through the prism of ‘military realism’ first propounded by Mike Mochizuki.6 Mochizuki explained Japanese domestic politics by four schools of strategic thought: unarmed neutralism, Japanese Gaullism, political realism and military realism. Unarmed neutralism is traditional pacifism and Japanese Gaullism seeks a more independent Japan and to build up a strong military force. The political realism is concerned with the political and diplomatic implications of Japan’s security policy, so it stresses that Japan’s contribution to international security should be commensurate with its economic strength. On the other hand, the military realism promotes a strategy that would address the most likely military threat and advocate closer military cooperation between Japan and the United States. As Mochizuki predicted in the 1980s, military realists gradually gain support due to the changes in Japan’s security environment in the post-­Cold War era. The author assumes that current security reforms in Japan and security cooperation with India are both led by military realists, as represented by Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe. The important point is that although military realists came to the centre of Japanese politics, the political realists still dominate Japanese political thought. It follows then that if political realists return to power after Abe, it is possible that the momentum of security reform and cooperation with India will stall. In addition, even if military realists remain in power it is important to bear in mind that they seek security reforms and security cooperation with other countries within the framework of alliance. India, however, for a variety of reasons is uncomfortable with alliances thereby creating reliability issues. Therefore, Japan’s policy towards India could depend on how long military realists remain in political power and how they can gain New Delhi’s trust in their reliability, while simultaneously strengthening the US–Japan alliance. In this context, this chapter first explains how Japanese decision makers, especially military realists, shaped Japan’s policy towards India, which was influenced by the India–US relations and China’s rise. Next, the chapter examines the reform of the Japanese security policy and activism of the JSDF. As is well known, naval cooperation has been an important driver of this relationship and accordingly it focuses on how the Japan Maritime Self-­Defence Force (JMSDF ) expanded security cooperation with other countries and later describes defence ties with the Indian Navy. Finally, it analyses Tokyo’s perception of the Japan–US alliance and how it affects relations with India. From those analyses, this chapter concludes with a discussion on the future challenges for the India–Japan relations.

Japan’s naval engagement with India   177

Triggers and drivers for Japan’s security cooperation with India7 Before the end of the 1950s, Tokyo and New Delhi had maintained comfortable relations. There were some memorable occasions between India and Japan during this period. The first Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s supportive attitude towards Japan after the Second World War was welcomed by the Japanese people. Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi chose India as the second country to visit during his first Asian tour in 1957. Nonetheless, the two countries soon drifted away with the escalations of the Cold War. While Tokyo prioritised relations with the United States, New Delhi led the Non Alignment Movement and gradually enhanced relations with the Soviet Union. The ‘estranged’8 relations during the Cold War are evident from the fact that until 2000 only three Japanese prime ministers visited New Delhi after Kishi’s initial visit in 1957.9 In addition, the India–Japan relations hit a new low after the 1998 Indian nuclear tests which were followed by economic sanctions imposed by Japan. When Tokyo sought a chance to lift the sanction and to have rapprochement with New Delhi, Washington played an important role. In March 2000, Bill Clinton became the first American President to visit India in over 20 years. Immediately after his visit, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori also visited India in August 2000 and inked ‘Global Partnership in the 21st Century’ with the Indian Prime Minister Atal B. Vajpayee. Since then, five Japanese Prime Ministers and over 40 other ministers have visited India over the last 14 years.10 During the same period, the two governments also signed a number of agreements and treaties including ‘Indo-­Japan Partnership in New Asian Era: Strategic Orientation of Japan–India Global Partnership’ (2005), ‘Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India’ (2008) and ‘Joint Declaration on the Japan–India Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement’ (2011). The improvement in India–Japan bilateral ties was welcomed and even quietly encouraged by the United States. The American diplomatic cable from New Delhi on 5 May 2006, which was quoted by The Hindu, urged Washington to use ‘blossoming’ India–Japan relations to fulfill its goals for the Asian region. It argued that ‘times have changed, and the time is right for the world’s oldest democracy, the world’s largest democracy, and Asia’s most stable and prosperous democracy to become strategic partners’. It also mentioned that ‘the opportunity for the United States to secure closer trilateral relations with the world’s largest democracy and one of our greatest allies is dazzling’.11 Washington’s support became one of the drivers for Tokyo to change the relations with New Delhi. It should be pointed out that, however, the Japanese policy-­makers did not have to cooperate with India in the domain of security, in which Japan

178   T. Kiyota has many restrictions. Primarily, Tokyo was attracted by India’s growing market. Since the 1990s, India has pushed drastic economic reforms and has been growing as an economic power. Thus, mere economic cooperation between Japan and India should have satisfied Tokyo and Washington. As mentioned earlier, security cooperation with India was led by Japanese military realists. According to Mochizuki, military realists begin their analysis by assessing the military environment, unlike political realists who prioritise economic development.12 He developed this argument after Japan adopted the National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO) for the first time in 1976, due to the Soviet military buildup. Facing the dramatic change in security environment in the post-­Cold War period, military realism has gained greater prominence today, as he predicted. For military realists, the rise of China provides a strong rationale to conduct security reform and strengthen the defence ties with other countries. They are also aware of the fact that Japan will not be able to sustain or increase the Japanese defence budget nor develop its own military capability to counter new security challenges on its own, and therefore, try to maximise Japan’s international relevance. Under these circumstances, India is a very attractive strategic partner for military realists. India is located in the centre of the Indian Ocean, overseeing important sea lanes of communication, and is in the region where the JMSDF conducted several operations, such as the refuelling mission for Operation Enduring Freedom after the 9/11 terrorist attack. While other East Asian countries are concerned about Japanese military development, India accepts JMSDF entry into the Indian Ocean without demur.13 Moreover, New Delhi also has territorial disputes with Beijing and faces Chinese military assertiveness. Toru Ito, for example, emphasised the rise of the ‘China Threat Theory’ in Japan especially after the spring of 2005 and explained that the Japanese people have evaluated India as a ‘card’ to be played against China.14 Harsh V. Pant also wrote that [b]oth Tokyo and New Delhi seek to hedge against Chinese influence by trying to create stronger relations with other democracies in Asia. Both consider China a potential military threat that would have to be faced and countered in the coming years.15 Swaran Singh, one of India’s leading experts on China, also mentioned ‘[n]o doubt this [the rise of China] has partly triggered Japan–India rapprochement’.16 Shinzo Abe and Taro Aso are the key players driving relationships between India and Japan. During the first visit as a Prime Minister of Japan in 2007, Abe delivered a speech entitled the ‘Confluence of the Two Seas’, at the Indian Parliament, and said that ‘a strong India is in the best

Japan’s naval engagement with India   179 interest of Japan, and a strong Japan is in the best interest of India’.17 During the first Abe–Aso period,18 the so-­called ‘Quadrilateral Initiative’ which was seen as encirclement of China by four democratic countries – India, Japan, Australia and the United States – was also launched. Although this initiative was later discontinued mainly to assuage Chinese concerns, bilateral cooperation between Japan and India continued. During the Aso era, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Tokyo in 2008 resulting in the ‘Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India’. India became the third country to conclude such an agreement with Japan. When Abe came back to power in December 2012, he again mentioned that he sought to expand the Japan–US security partnership to India and Australia.19 When new Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Tokyo and Kyoto from 30 August to 1 September 2014, Abe emphasised a ‘special relationship’ between India and Japan.20 Security cooperation between India and Japan now includes the Subcabinet/Senior Officials – level 2 plus 2 dialogues, bi- and tri-­lateral maritime exercises, and arms sales. The Subcabinet/Senior Officials – level 2 plus 2 dialogues were agreed when Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama visited New Delhi in December 200921 and were subsequently held in July 2010 and October 2012. In the maritime field, the annual exercises and exchange visits of Director-­Generals between two coast guards began in 2000 after the Alondra Rainbow incident in 1999. The JMSDF has been participating in several trilateral exercises with the Indian Navy since 2007, including ‘Malabar 07–2’ which was held with India, the United States, Australia and Singapore in 2007, and ‘Malabar 09’ held with India and the United States in 2009. In July 2012, the first India–Japan naval exercise ‘JIMEX 12’ was held at the bay of Sagami, followed by the second JIMEX in the Bay of Bengal in December 2013. JMSDF participated in the Malabar series again, in July 2014. Moreover, the Japanese government is now negotiating with the Indian government on the sale of the ShinMaywa US-­2 Search and Rescue Amphibian aircraft. Although the Japanese government has also expanded similar cooperation with other countries, security cooperation with India was activated faster than others. This becomes evident when examining Defence of Japan, the annual publication of the Japanese Ministry of Defence (Defence Agency22). Before 2006, India was included with ‘others’ when discussing bilateral cooperation, while South Korea, Russia, China, Australia, the United Kingdom and South East Asia were separately explained. A separate section describing bilateral relations with India first appeared in the Defence of Japan 2006, and in 2010 it became the third position after Australia and South Korea, and before China.23 The Japanese Ministry of Defence (MoD) finally decided to increase the number of defence attaché in India from one to three by 2015 to deal with the rapidly expanding security ties.24

180   T. Kiyota Nevertheless, there are some who point out that there are limits to India–Japan relations. Takenori Horimoto, one of the most eminent Japanese scholars on India points out that the bilateral relations can be described as a ‘marriage of convenience’.25 Indeed, there is neither real love nor a real treaty which forms an alliance between New Delhi and Tokyo. One of the obstacles for further defence cooperation is Japan’s restricted security policy. As following chapters discuss, Japan’s security reform is yet to be adequate for cooperation with other countries. Another obstacle is the misperception over alliances. Whereas Tokyo tends to stress the importance of the US–Japan alliance, Indian leaders still hesitate to trust the alliance system. These misperceptions and limitations also impact the actual cooperation between Indian armed forces and the JSDF, especially between the two maritime forces.

Japanese security reform and activism of the JSDF Since the end of the Second World War Japan had adhered to the Yoshida Doctrine, which relied upon the American security guarantee, permitting the country to have a minimal defence capability and to concentrate on economic development.26 Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which was written under the American occupation, denies the right of belligerency and possession of any force. During the 1980s, the Japanese government gradually accepted the reality that the other countries, especially the United States, expected more contribution commensurate with the size of the Japanese economy, but produced only a minor change in its security policy.27 The trigger for the drastic change of Japanese security policy was the Persian Gulf War in January 1991, when Tokyo was shocked that even the government of Kuwait did not appreciate Japan’s contribution, although total amount of Japanese economic assistance reached US$13 billion.28 Soon after that, the minesweepers of the JMSDF were dispatched to the Persian Gulf in April 1991. This became the first overseas operation of the JSDF. Under the Kiichi Miyazawa cabinet, the Act on Cooperation in the UN Peace Keeping Operations (PKO Law) was enacted successfully in the Diet in June 1992. This law enables the JSDF to join the UNPKO’s humanitarian missions. In addition, deterioration of Japanese security environment during the 1990s also impacted public perception. The most important events were the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996 and the North Korean Tepodong-­1 missile test in 1998. The latter especially shocked the people of Japan as part of the Tepodong-­1 missile fell in Japanese waters. Indicating this shift in perceptions in 2000, when the Cabinet Office conducted a survey asking a question whether there were possibilities that Japan may be involved in war, 65 per cent replied yes, whereas only 48 per cent did the same in 1994.29

Japan’s naval engagement with India   181 When the 9/11 terrorist attacks occurred in the United States in 2001, the Japanese Diet under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi took only two months to pass the Anti-­Terrorism Special Measures Law. Based on this law, the JMSDF supplied fuel and water for military vessels and helicopters which participated in the Operation Enduring Freedom–Maritime Interdiction Operations (OEF–MIO). From December 2001 until 2010, approximately 511,200 KL of fuel and 11,000 tons of water were provided.30 Japan also decided to contribute ground troops in Iraq from 2003 to 2009. The Japan Ground Self-­Defence Force (JGSDF ) assisted in recovery of Samawah’s infrastructure and other humanitarian activities in Iraq. The JMSDF has also been dispatched to the seas off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden for anti-­piracy operations since 2009. In the wake of rapid increase in the piracy epidemic, the Japanese government decided to use an existing legal framework, the Maritime Security Operation, to justify the JMSDF ’s operation overseas in March 2009. In June, the Aso cabinet enacted the Anti-­Piracy Measures Law.31 According to the MoD, more than three thousand ships were escorted by two JMSDF destroyers as of 30 April 2013. Moreover, the JMSDF opened a naval base in Djibouti for logistics in July 2011.32 While at the same time, those overseas operations also let the Japanese policy-­makers realise the importance of bilateral and multi-­lateral joint exercises in peace time and security agreements such as the Acquisition and Cross-­Servicing Agreement (ACSA).33 As of February 2014, the JSDF has participated in 30 overseas operations and a number of naval exercises with other countries including India.34 This trend remained even after Japan experienced changes of government. In December 2012, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) came back to power after over three years in opposition. The leader of the LDP, Abe won the general election even as he publicly stated his commitment to amend article 9. Although his initiative to amend the Constitution has not succeeded as of the end of 2014, Abe established the National Security Council (NSC) in December 201335 and reinterpreted Japan’s Constitution to allow Japan to exercise the right of collective self-­ defence.36 These measures appear to be vindicated by the fact that the people of Japan are now increasingly open to changes in security policy.37 However, as mentioned above, the current constitutional and legal framework has not been enough for the JMSDF to operate overseas.38 Basically, the overseas deployment of the JSDF to exercise force is still against the Constitution of Japan. Nevertheless, the Japanese policy-­ makers have interpreted the deployment of the JSDF for PKO and military drills as constitutional and introduced new laws on a case-­by-case basis. Due to this inadequate legal reform, the JSDF is still facing a number of obstacles for operations abroad. For example, in the case of refuelling operation in the Indian Ocean, the Japanese government and MoD were criticised because the fuels which the JMSDF supplied to the American

182   T. Kiyota troops were also used for the Iraq War, not only OEF–MIO. According to those criticisms, it is violation of the Japanese Constitution to support the Iraq War which is not approved by the UN Security Council so it is a breach of international law.39 In the case of anti-­piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden, the issue was use of weapons by the JMSDF. Under the Maritime Security Operation, JMSDF destroyers could protect only Japanese related vessels and could not open fire until pirates attacked them. The Anti-­Piracy Measures Law relaxed the rule as the Japan Coast Guard and the JMSDF can now fire in case pirates beleaguer or obstruct their ships.40 This law was also criticised as being against the Constitution and as an exclusively defence-­oriented policy.41 Although its equipment has been evaluated the same as other navies, the JSDF has lots of limitation to operate overseas.

Interaction between the JMSDF and the Indian Navy Considering the JSDF ’s limitations, the Indian Navy and the JMSDF have achieved fairly substantial security cooperation in a relatively short time. In the 1990s, the cooperation between two forces began in the same way as other relations – ‘exchange’.42 The Indian Navy visited a Japanese port in 1995 on a goodwill mission, following the JMSDF ’s return visit to Mumbai port in 1996. Indian Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat visited Japan in 1997 and Japanese Chief of Maritime Staff of the JMSDF, Admiral Yasumasa Yamamoto visited New Delhi in February 1998 in return. During Admiral Yamamoto’s visit, Admiral Bhagwat suggested exchange of officers and conduct of joint rescue mission for a disaster relief operation between the two forces. When India conducted nuclear tests in 1998, other navies halted exchanges with the Indian Navy, while the JMSDF continued to accept Indian naval officers. Prakash Panneerselvam, one of the Indian officers who worked at JMSDF Staff College as a guest researcher, points out that this positive response from the JMSDF facilitated a deepening of trust in the bilateral relationship.43 The ‘expanding and deepening period’ between the Indian Navy and the JMSDF began in the mid-­2000s.44 The first major joint drill between the JMSDF, the Indian Navy along with the American Navy was TRILATEX-­07 which was conducted in the Pacific Ocean off the Boso peninsula, Japan, in April 2007. During this event, the three navies performed basic drill of communicating among each other through radio transmissions and flag signalling.45 In September 2007, the JMSDF was also invited to the Malabar exercise for the first time along with the Australian and Singaporean Navy. The Malabar 07–2 was held in the Bay of Bengal with more than 20,000 personnel from five countries. According to the United States Navy, this was designed to increase ability to operate among maritime forces to develop common understanding and procedures for maritime operations. It enhanced interoperability among them for a more

Japan’s naval engagement with India   183 effective capability to respond to maritime threats such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and transnational challenges such as pandemic disease and natural disaster.46 Daiki Sakazaki, one of the JMSDF officers who participated in the Malabar 07–2, admitted the exercise was a valuable experience for operations abroad. He also wrote that the JMSDF could show its presence in East Asia as well as enhance interoperability with the United States, Indian, Singaporean and Australian navies during the exercise.47 The JMSDF participated in the US–India bilateral exercise Malabar once again from 26 April to 3 May in 2009. Malabar 09 was held off the coast of Okinawa, in the waters of Japan. From Japan, JMSDF destroyers Kurama and Asayuki were involved in this event. An Indian officer, Lt Cmdr Hamanth Gopal admitted that a greater number of ships were involved with the JMSDF, increasing the complexity of the exercise.48 Moreover, India and Japan agreed to hold a bilateral naval exercise during Indian Defence Minister A.K. Anthony’s visit to Tokyo in 2011.49 This occurred when four Indian naval vessels paid a goodwill visit to Japan in June 2012. These vessels from the Indian Navy and two destroyers Hatakaze and Oonami and one aircraft US-­2 from the JMSDF conducted the first bilateral naval exercise JIMEX 12. According to the JMSDF, the contents of JIMEX 12 included basic training such as tactical exercises, communication training and search and rescue training. Especially the search and rescue training which was newly conducted between the two forces was expected to improve tactical skills and strengthen collaboration.50 The second round of the bilateral JIMEX was conducted in Indian waters, the Bay of Bengal from December 19–22, 2013. Japan dispatched two JMSDF guided missile destroyers, Ariake and Setogiri, while the Indian Navy was represented by the stealth frigate INS Satpura, the guided missile destroyer INS Ranvijay and missile corvette INS Kuthar. According to the Indian Navy, the four-­day exercise comprised a harbour and sea phase of two days each. During the harbour phase, the ship crews exchanged experiences through professional interactions, and undertook planning for joint operations for the sea phase. During the sea phase, practical exercises were conducted including Visit, Board, Search and Seize (VBSS) drills, and operations in anti-­surface, anti-­submarine and anti-­air threat scenarios to enhance interoperability between the Indian Navy and the JMSDF.51 These exercises have been deepening mutual understanding and trust between the two forces. As Panneerselvam wrote, the naval cooperation between the Indian Navy and the JMSDF is not a mere diplomatic venture or symbolic gesture for a goodwill relationship. Rather, it is a good opportunity for them to derive tangible operational experience from such exercises.52 Both governments have also been exchanging the Anti-­Piracy escort schedule of the JMSDF and the Indian Navy in the Gulf of Aden.53

184   T. Kiyota In addition to these naval exercises, it should be noted once again about the negotiation of the US-­2 Search and Rescue Amphibian. The major supplier, ShinMaywa Industries Ltd, stresses the US-­2 is ‘the best amphibian aircraft in the world’. ‘The world’s only amphibian equipped with a Boundary Layer Control (BLC) powered high-­lift device, the US-­2 can cruise at extremely low speeds (approx. 90 km/h) and take off and land on water within a very short distance.’54 The negotiation over the US-­2 started between two governments after the Indian Navy’s Request for Information (RfI) was issued in the late 2010. The negotiation has accelerated especially after the Susumu Noda cabinet relaxed the Three Principles on Arms Exports which had banned export of virtually every weapon to other nations except the United States since the 1960s. The principles were further eased by the Abe cabinet which is more active in selling the amphibian aircraft to India.55 The negotiation of US-­2 will require time but it is a positive in enhancing the logistical and technological cooperation between the two nations. Satoru Nagao suggests two possible cooperation fields – submarine rescue vehicle and minesweeper. According to him, Japanese technologies for those two areas are the best in the world.56 The minesweeping skill of the Japanese Navy was passed to the JMSDF and contributed after the Gulf War in the early 1990s.57 The Indian government has been procuring eight minesweepers from South Korea. New Delhi is seeking to build six of them at the Goa Shipyard.58 The Indian Navy also wants to acquire a submarine rescue vehicle in case of an accident. Since 2013, the Indian Navy has experienced several accidents including the blast and subsequent sinking of INS Sindhurakshak which killed 18 crew members. Again in February 2014, two more sailors died due to the fire in another submarine INS Sindhuratna.59 The Indian Navy, however, does not have a single Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle (DSRV) after the one which was acquired in 1971 and was decommissioned in 1989. According to the Times of India, the Indian MoD cleared the proposal for procuring two DSRV at a cost of Rs.1500 crore.60 There must be a possibility for Japan to cooperate in such a technological field. Prime Minister Abe also expressed the technology cooperation between India and Japan during his visit to New Delhi in 2014.61 Again, considering the JMSDF ’s limitation, the two countries’ security cooperation has been expanding rapidly and steadily. It is a tendency in Japan that once the Japanese government, bureaucrats and people accept a policy, they try to maintain the same direction regardless who leads the government. India–Japan security cooperation will not terminate even if prime ministers change. However, it is also true that Japan’s legal and constitutional constraints will remain an obstacle for further security cooperation with India. Therefore, the bilateral defence ties will depend on how long military realists maintain their power at the centre of Japanese politics and how they can reform security policy.

Japan’s naval engagement with India   185

Japanese perception of alliances Even though military realists could maintain power in Japanese politics, we must not forget that the Japan–US alliance will be at the centre of Japanese security reform and defence ties with other countries. As this chapter has already mentioned, military realists highly appreciate American presence in Japan, as well as political realists. While New Delhi is cautious about forming an alliance, Tokyo has reaped lots of benefit from allies. These differences of experience often create disappointments between the two countries. In the course of its modern history, according to Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, Japan has formed alliances on 12 different occasions.62 He defines alliance as a treaty, which includes written promise of mutual military assistance and is formed between two or more sovereign states. Japan’s first alliance agreement was the Anglo-­Japanese Alliance which was signed in 1902 with the United Kingdom. This alliance was renewed twice, in 1905 and 1911 respectively, and survived for 20 years. Kawasaki also included the Japan– Korea Treaty in 1904, the Russo-­Japan Treaty in 1916, and the military agreement with the Republic of China in 1917 with the list of alliances. Before and during the Second World War, Tokyo signed six treaties for military cooperation including the Anti-­Comintern Pact of 1936 (Germany), Tripartite Pact of 1940 (Germany and Italy), Matsuoka–Henry Pact of 1940 (France) and the Treaty between Thailand and Japan in 1940. Finally, the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan was signed in 1950 in San Francisco, and was subsequently revised in 1960 and called the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan. Why Japan forms alliances is still open to debate. While Kawasaki concluded that seven treaties out of 12 were signed when Japan faced a threat,63 Jitsuo Tsuchiyama pointed out that the leaders in Tokyo signed treaties to increase their profit and expand Japanese power in the world.64 According to Tsuchiyama, Japanese people see the world as a hierarchical society, therefore when they form alliances, they tend to bandwagon with stronger powers (or with an intention to control weaker nations). The US–Japan alliance could be the most obvious case of bandwagoning for profit, which Kawasaki concluded was for balancing against the Soviet Union. Regardless of motivation Japan has benefited from its numerous alliances. For instance, in the case of the UK–Japan alliance and the Tripartite Pact, Japan was geographically removed from the primary theatre of conflict and was able to expand its power in East Asia while the main battle was fought elsewhere.65 Currently, Tokyo enjoys considerable political and economic benefits, including the security umbrella, from the Japan–US alliance. However, due to the dynamism of the security environment, the nature of the Japan–US alliance has been changing. Although in the beginning it

186   T. Kiyota looked like bandwagoning with Washington or balancing against Moscow, today’s Japan–US alliance seems more like a balancing act against Beijing. Thus, unless the threat from China disappears it is unlikely that Tokyo will terminate the Japan–US alliance. In addition, the JSDF has developed its equipment and strategies along the lines of American strategy for more than 60 years. Especially the JMSDF has maintained the strongest relations with its United States counterpart and has conducted military exercises with the United States and other navies even before the 1990s, and even beyond its territorial waters.66 Thus, it seems that there are more advocates who insist on the importance of the Japan–US alliance inside the JMSDF than in the Japanese political circle. For instance, soon after the 9/11 terror incident, the leadership of the JMSDF urged the cabinet to support the War on Terror by the American forces.67 They consider the security cooperation with other navies as a supplement of the alliance. This Japanese tendency to create alliances and work within them is in contrast with India’s perception of non-­alignment or strategic autonomy. These differing attitudinal prisms have the potential to create disappointments. India doubts Japan’s reliability because of its alliance with the United States and therefore wants Japan to be a more independent player. On the other hand, Japan is mistrustful, and often confused, about India’s non-­alignment policy. For instance, Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano, Chief of Staff of the JMSDF, admitted that Indian politics is very complicated to understand for Japanese people, although the Indian Navy is keen and willing.68 Moreover, during Modi’s visit to Japan in 2014, the two countries failed to upgrade the current 2 plus 2 dialogue to a ministerial level. It was reported that the Modi government hesitated to do so because it wanted to avoid provoking Beijing before the India–China summit later in the month.69 However, Japanese concerns about India are assuaged to a significant extent when US–India ties are well. While the US–India bilateral ties are discussed by Timothy Hoyt in Chapter 7 of this book, it is crucial to note that the swings in the bilateral relationship affect Japan’s perception of India. Nevertheless, as of now, US–India relations seem to have improved thanks to Prime Minister Modi’s visit to the United States in September 2014 and President Obama’s successful return visit to attend the Republic Day parade in New Delhi in January 2015. These developments are viewed very positively in Tokyo and could add momentum to India–Japan relations too. Significantly, the joint statement made during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Washington specifically mentioned India– Japan–US trilateral relations.70 Japan therefore stands to gain from improved US–India relations.

Japan’s naval engagement with India   187

Conclusion: future trajectory of India–Japan security cooperation The future of India–Japan relations appears to be bright and is a result of the efforts made by the two countries over the last decade and a half. As argued in this chapter one of the principal reasons why the bilateral relationship between India and Japan has developed so rapidly is due to Japanese security policy reforms and the expanded role of the JSDF. As long as both these factors persist cooperation between India and Japan is also expected to be on the upswing. India has reportedly expressed an interest to engage in defence trade and this could form an additional pillar for cooperation. At the same time, both countries have differing perspectives on alliances. New Delhi is uncomfortable with the idea of alliances whereas Tokyo would prefer India to be closer, if not a part, of the US–Japan alliance. These perceptual differences, arising from historical factors, are an issue that needs to be carefully dealt with. The United States unsurprisingly is the metaphorical ‘elephant in the room’ for both countries, more so India than Japan. The bilateral relationship between India and Japan therefore is shaped to a significant extent by India–US relations. For the moment it appears there are no clouds looming over the horizon for the future of India–Japan relations. Shinzo Abe and Narendra Modi, who are keen to enhance India–Japan relations, enjoy considerable domestic political stability. Prime Minister Abe’s continuation in office will be significant since he is also a key player both for Japanese security policy reforms and the expanded role of the JSDF. Fortunately, it does not appear that India under Prime Minister Modi will fundamentally disagree with the United States on regional developments in the Asia-­Pacific in the foreseeable future. Indeed, the interests and diplomatic positions of these three countries are in more congruence than ever before. These developments augur well for the India–Japan relationship.

Notes   1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA of Japan), ‘Confluence of the Two Seas’, Speech by H.E. Mr Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India, 22 August 2007, www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-­ paci/pmv0708/speech-­2.html.   2 Brahma Chellaney, ‘Japan, India: Natural Allies’, Japan Times, 16 August 2007.   3 Takenori Horimoto and Lalima Varma (eds), India–Japan Relations in Emerging Asia (New Delhi: Manohar, 2013); Harsh V. Pant, ‘India–Japan Relations: A Slow, but Steady, Transformation’, in Sumit Gangly (ed.), India’s Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 207–225; Madhuchanda Ghosh, ‘India and Japan’s Growing Synergy’, Asian Survey, Vol. 48, No. 2, March/April 2008, pp. 282–302; Victoria Tuke, ‘Japan’s Foreign Policy Towards India: A Neoclassical Realist Analysis of the Policymaking

188   T. Kiyota Process’, Dissertation submitted to the University of Warwick (September 2011).   4 Hiromi Fujishige, ‘Reisengoniokeru Jieitai no Yakuwari to Sono Henyo: Kihan no Sokoku to Shiyo, soshite “Sekkyoku Shugiheno Tenkan” [The Changing Role of Japan’s Self-­Defence Forces after the Cold War: The Norm-­Shift and the Rise of “Activism”]’, Kokusai Seiji [International Relations], Vol. 154, December 2008, p. 95.   5 This is the view that has been impressed upon the author after a number of interviews and interactions with Indian scholars and retired officers in New Delhi from October 2008 to January 2010 and in Karnataka from March 2012 to March 2014.   6 Mike M. Mochizuki, ‘Japan’s Search for Strategy’, International Security, Vol.  8, No. 3, Winter 1983–84, pp. 152–179.   7 For more on India–Japan relations, see for example, Official Website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, www.mofa.go.jp/; Official Website of Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, www.mea.gov.in/index.htm; Horimoto and Varma, India–Japan Relations in Emerging Asia; Pant, ‘India–Japan Relations’, pp. 207–225; Ghosh, ‘India and Japan’s Growing Synergy’, pp. 282–302; Tuke, ‘Japan’s Foreign Policy Towards India’.   8 Toru Ito, ‘ “China Threat” Theory in Indo-­Japan Relations’, in Horimoto and Varma, India–Japan Relations in Emerging Asia, p. 114.   9 The three Prime Ministers are Hayato Ikeda (1961), Yasuhiro Nakasone (1984) and Toshiki Kaifu (1990). 10 Official Website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 11 ‘88132: Time for India–U.S.–Japan Tri-­lateral Relationship’, The Hindu, 23 April 2011. Also see Sarah Hiddleston, ‘How the “Stars Aligned” for Closer Trilateral Relations’, The Hindu, 23 April 2011. 12 Mochizuki, ‘Japan’s Search for Strategy’, pp. 152–179. 13 Tomoko Kiyota, ‘Shinzo Abe’s Struggle in the Indian Ocean Region’, Asia Pacific Bulletin, No.  290, 18 November 2014, www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/ default/files/private/apb290.pdf. 14 Ito, ‘ “China Threat” Theory in Indo-­Japan Relations’, p. 116. 15 Pant, ‘India–Japan Relations’, p. 212. 16 Swaran Singh, ‘US–Japan–India Trilogue: The China Factor’, in Horimoto and Varma, India–Japan Relations in Emerging Asia, p. 134. 17 ‘Confluence of the Two Seas’, Speech by H.E. Mr Shinzo Abe. 18 Taro Aso was a Foreign Minister in Abe’s cabinet during September 2006 to August 2007 and has been a Deputy Prime Minister and a Minister of Finance of Abe’s second term from December 2012. 19 ‘Japan’s PM Shinzo Abe Seeks Security Ties with India, Australia: Report’, The Economic Times, 29 December 2012, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes. com/2012–12–29/news/36051044_1_senkaku-­islands-japan-­s-pm-­shinzo-abe-­ east-china-­sea. 20 MOFA of Japan, ‘Tokyo Declaration for Japan–India Special Strategic and Global Partnership’, September 1, 2014, www.mofa.go.jp/files/000050532.pdf. 21 MOFA of Japan, ‘Joint Statement by Prime Minister Dr. Yukio Hatoyama and Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh: New Stage of Japan–India Strategic and Global Partnership’, 29 December 2009, www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-­paci/ india/pmv0912/joint.html. 22 Japan upgraded the Defence Agency to a ministry in January 2007. 23 Japan Ministry of Defence (Japan MoD/Defence Agency), BoueiHakusho [Defence of Japan] (Japanese version), various years, www.clearing.mod.go.jp/ hakusho_web/. English versions of Defence of Japan are also available at www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/ but they are not always the same as the

Japan’s naval engagement with India   189 Japanese versions. The Japan–US alliance is separately explained in the Defence of Japan. 24 Nikkei Shimbun, 30 December 2013, www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASGM 29005_Z21C13A2MM8000/. 25 Author’s interaction with Prof. Horimoto via e-­mail on 9 February 2014. 26 Mochizuki, ‘Japan’s Search for Strategy’, p. 152. 27 For the detail of Japanese security environment, see Mochizuki, ‘Japan’s Search for Strategy’, pp.  152–179; Tadashi Nishihara, ‘Expanding Japan’s Credible Defense Policy’, International Security, Vol.  8, No.  3, Winter 1983–84, pp. 180–205. 28 For example, Fujishige, ‘Reisengoniokeru Jieitai no Yakuwari to Sono Henyo: Kihan no Sokoku to Shiyo, soshite “Sekkyoku Shugiheno Tenkan” [The Changing Role of Japan’s Self-­Defence Forces after the Cold War: The Norm-­Shift and the Rise of “Activism”]’, p. 101. 29 Ibid., p. 106. 30 JMSDF Official Website, ‘International Counter-­Terrorism Operations’, www. mod.go.jp/msdf/formal/english/about/operation/kokusaitero.html. 31 MOFA of Japan, ‘Somalia Oki Aden Wan no Kaizokutou Jian no Genjyo to Torikumi [Current Status and Efforts of Anti-­Piracy Operation in the Seas off the Coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden]’, www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/ pirate/africa.html. 32 Joint Staff, MoD, ‘Somalia Oki Aden Wan ni Okeru Kaizoku Taisho [Anti-­Piracy Operation in the Seas off the Coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden]’, www. mod.go.jp/js/Activity/Anti-­piracy/anti-­piracy.htm. 33 As of April 2014, the Japanese government has signed ACSA with the American and Australian governments. Japan is also negotiating the same agreement with Canada, and the United Kingdom. MOFA of Japan, ‘Signing of Agreement Amending Acquisition and Cross-­serving Agreement’, 27 February 2004, www. mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2004/2/0227.html; Prime Minister of Canada, ‘PM Strengthens Defence Relations with Japan’, News Releases, 24 September 2013, www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2013/09/24/pm-­strengthensdefence-­relations-japan; ‘Ei to Boei Kyoryoku no Kyoka de Goui he . . . Shusho, Homonji [Agreed to Strengthen the Defence Cooperation with the UK. . . . During Prime Minister’s Visit]’, Yomiuri Online, 29 April 2014, www.yomiuri. co.jp/politics/20140427-OYT1T50279.html. 34 Japan MOD, ‘Two Decades of International Cooperation: A Look Back on 20 Years of SDF Activities Abroad’, www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/no24/specialfeature01. html. 35 Japan MoD, Defence of Japan 2013 (English version), pp.  105–106, www.mod. go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2013/24_Part2_Chapter1_Sec4.pdf. 36 For further detail of Japan’s Collective Self-­Defence, see Michael Green and Jeffrey W. Hornung, ‘Ten Myths about Japan’s Collective Self-­Defense Change’, The Diplomat, 10 July 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/ten-­myths-about-­ japans-collective-­self-defense-­change/. 37 Mochizuki, ‘Japan’s Search for Strategy’, pp. 152–179. 38 For constitutional and legal problems of Japanese national security, see, for example, Yasuhiro Takeda and Matake Kamiya (eds), Anzen Hosho Gaku Nyumon [Introduction of Security Studies] (Tokyo: Aki Shobo, 2003), pp.  331–368: Shigenobu Tamura (ed.), Nihon no Bouei Seisaku [Japanese Security Policy] (Tokyo: Naigai Shuppan, 2012). 39 For example, see Peace Forum, ‘Jieitai Indo You Haken no Mondaiten [Problems of JSDF Deployment to the Indian Ocean]’, www.peace-­forum.com/ mnforce/tokusohou-­hantai/00kaisetu/02.htm. 40 ‘Kaizoku Koui no Shobatsuoyobi Kaizoku Kouiheno Taisho ni Kansuru Horitsu

190   T. Kiyota (Law on Punishment of and Measures against Acts of Piracy)’, http://law.e-­gov. go.jp/htmldata/H21/H21HO055.html; English version is available at www.un. org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/JPN_anti_piracy.pdf. 41 For example, Live in Peace 9 + 25, ‘Kaizoku Taisho Ho no Shuin Saikaketsu Seiritsuni Kougi Suru [Against Enacting the Anti-­Piracy Law]’, 20 June 2009, www. liveinpeace925.com/index.html. Also see Kazuya Matsuo, ‘Jieitai to Kaijyo Hoancho no Kokusai Katsudouwomeguru Ronten [Points over the International Operations of Japan Self-­Defence Force and Japan Coast Guard]’, Reference, January 2010, www.ndl.go.jp/jp/data/publication/refer/pdf/070802.pdf. 42 This term is used by the MoD. Japan MoD, Defence of Japan (English version), various years. 43 Prakash Panneerselvam, ‘India–Japan Maritime Security Cooperation (1999–2009): A Report’, JMSDF Staff College Review, Vol. 2, May 2013, pp. 90–92. 44 Japan MoD, Defence of Japan (English version), various years. 45 Ibid., pp. 95–96; Bharat Rakshak, ‘TRILATEX ’07’, 25 April 2007, www.bharat-­ rakshak.com/NAVY/Galleries/Bridges/2007/Trilatex+07/. 46 America’s Navy, ‘Exercise Malabar 07–2 Kicks Off ’, Navy News Service, 7 September 2007, www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=31691. 47 Daiki Sakazaki, ‘(VOICE) Takokukan Kaijyou Kyoudou Kunren (Malabar) ni Sanka Shita Taiin no Koe [Voice of an Officer who Participated in Malabar]’, Bouei Hakusho [Defence of Japan] 2008, www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_ data/2008/2008/html/kc337000.html. 48 America’s Navy, ‘India, Japan, U.S. Foster Relationships During Malabar’, Navy News Service, 5 May 2009, www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=45022. 49 Press Information Bureau (PIB), Government of India (GoI), Ministry of Defence (MOD), ‘Maritime Security Issues Dominate India–Japan Defence Talks, India and Japan to Step Up Bilateral Military Exercises, India–Japan Defence Cooperation “Geared” towards Peace and Prosperity – Antony’, 3 November 2011, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=76976. 50 Japan Defence Focus, MoD, ‘Japan–India Joint Training’, No.  30, July 2012, www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/no30/activities.html; Panneerselvam, ‘India–Japan Maritime Security Cooperation (1999–2009): A Report’, p. 97. 51 Indian Navy Press Release, ‘Japan–India Maritime Exercise: First Round in Indian Waters’, 18 December 2013, http://indiannavy.nic.in/press-­release/ japan-­india-maritime-­exercise-first-­round-indian-­waters. 52 Panneerselvam, ‘India–Japan Maritime Security Cooperation (1999–2009): A Report’, p. 97. 53 ‘Joint Statement Vision for Japan–India Strategic and Global Partnership in the Next Decade’, Speeches and Statements by Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 25 October 2010, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/kan/statement/201010/ 25seimei_india_e.html. 54 ShinMaywa Industries, Ltd, Aircraft Website, ‘Development Story: Performance of the State-­of-the-­Art US-­2’, www.shinmaywa.co.jp/aircraft/english/us2/us2_ capability.html. 55 For example, Chico Harlan, ‘Japan Relaxes Longtime Weapons Export Ban’, Washington Post, 27 December 2011; Mizuho Aoki, ‘Abe Eases Weapons Export Rules’, Japan Times, 1 April 2014; and Kosuke Takahashi, ‘Japan, India Agree to Push for US-­2 Amphibian Deal’, HIS Jane’s Navy International, 6 January 2014, www.janes.com/article/32120/japan-­india-agree-­to-push-­for-us-­2-amphibian-­ deal. 56 Satoru Nagao, ‘Sensuikan Kyunan to Sokai de Nichiin Anpo Kyoryoku [Submarine Rescue and Minesweeping for India–Japan Security Cooperation]’, Nikkei Business, 14 November 2013, http://business.nikkeibp.co.jp/article/ topics/20131111/255691/?P=1.

Japan’s naval engagement with India   191 57 Funada, ‘Sea Power to Nichibei Bouei Kyoryoku [Sea Power and the US–Japan Defense Cooperation]’, p. 283. 58 The acquisition process is pending as of May 2014 due to the complaints raised from numerous sources; see N.C. Bipindra, ‘Depleting Minesweepers Fleet Worries Indian Navy’, The Sunday Standard, 9 June 2013; Vinay Kumar, ‘Navy’s Wait for Minesweepers Continues as Govt. is Yet to Ink the Deal’, The Hindu, 14 September 2013 and Rajat Pandit, ‘India Red-­Faced as South Korea Raises Long-­Pending “Minesweeper” Contract’, The Times of India, 16 January 2014. 59 ‘Fire in Cables Led to Accident in Submarine INS Sindhuratna, Navy Says’, The Times of India, 3 March 2014; also see ‘Indian Navy: 11 Accidents, 22 Deaths in Seven Months’, DNA, 7 March 2014, www.dnaindia.com/india/report-­indiannavy-­11-accidents-­22-deaths-­in-seven-­months-1967635. 60 Jatinder Kaur Tur, ‘Navy Lacks Rescue Vehicle to Save Submarine Crew’, The Times of India, 11 March 2014. 61 MOFA Japan, ‘Nichiin Kagaku Gijyutsu Seminar (Gaiyo) [India–Japan Science and Technology Seminar]’, 25 January 2014, www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/ page3_000635.html. 62 Kawasaki counted one treaty as one alliance, thus the US–Japan alliance counted two since it signed two treaties. Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, ‘Doumei Teiketsu Riron to Kindai Gaiko [Theory for Alliance Formation and Mordern Japanese Diplomacy]’, Kokusai Seiji, No. 154, 2008, pp. 115–128. 63 Ibid., pp. 115–128. 64 Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, Anzen Hosho no Kokusai Seiji Gaku [International Politics of Security: Anxiety and Hubris] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2004), pp. 297–310. 65 Ibid., pp. 297–310. 66 Narushige Michishita, ‘Jieitai no Sea Power no Hatten to Igi [Development and Meaning of SDF ’s Sea Power]’ and Eiichi Funada, ‘Sea Power to Nichibei Bouei Kyoryoku [Sea Power and the US–Japan Defence Cooperation]’, Kyoichi Tachikawa, Tomoyuki Ishida, Narushige Michishita and Katsuya Tsukamoto (eds), Sea Power: Sono Riron to Jissen [Sea Power: Theory and Practice (Tokyo: Fuyoshobo 2008); Sado, Sengo Nihon no Bouei to Seiji [Japanese National Defence and Politics after the War], pp. 26–30; Tomohisa Takei, ‘Kaiyo Shinjidainiokeru Kaijyo Jieitai [JMSDF in the New Maritime Era]’, Hatou, Vol.  199, November 2008, pp. 2–29. The English version is also available at www.mod.go.jp/msdf/navcol/ SSG/topics-­column/images/c-­030/c-­030_eng.pdf, for history of MSDF. 67 Asahi Shimbun Jieitai 50 Nen Shuzaihan, Jieitai: Shirarezaru Henyo [Self-­Defence Force: Unknown Transformation] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Sha, 2005), pp. 24–31. 68 ‘Japan Wary of India–China Relations’, Hindustan Times, 24 April 2014. 69 Miho Suzuki and Kei Sato, ‘Nichiin Shuno 2 Plus 2 Sakiokuri [Postponement of 2 Plus 2 between India and Japan’, Mainichi Shimbun, 1 September 2014, http://mainichi.jp/select/news/20140902k0000m010095000c.html. 70 The White House, ‘U.S.–India Joint Statement’, 30 September 2014, www. whitehouse.gov/the-­press-office/2014/09/30/us-­india-joint-­statement.

10 A sea of opportunities South East Asia’s growing naval cooperation with India Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto1

This chapter explores the growth of naval cooperation between India and South East Asia from the perspective of the latter. As South East Asia is neither singular nor uniform as a geopolitical entity, the chapter will analyse the views of each country.2 While doing so, it seeks to answer the following questions: why do South East Asian countries engage in naval cooperation with India? How will future naval cooperation develop? How can naval cooperation with India contribute to greater stability in the South China Sea? This chapter argues that despite growth of naval cooperation with India, the depth and scope of that cooperation depends on the political motivations, geographical imperative and capabilities of individual South East Asian countries. The chapter begins by explaining why and how India’s ‘Look East’ policy has led to increased naval cooperation with South East Asia. Next, it examines the perspectives of individual South East Asian countries toward naval cooperation. Then it discusses how South East Asian countries view naval cooperation with India in the context of the South China Sea disputes. Finally, it examines South East Asia’s reception of naval cooperation with India by explaining the reasons behind the variance in the depth and scope of cooperation.

The Indian Navy and the ‘Look East’ policy 2.0 Examinations of India’s ties with South East Asia usually begin with historical and cultural contexts. India’s historical and cultural footprints in the region are left through inter-­regional linkages in trade and religious beliefs, as well as conflicts, such as the Chola naval expeditions in the eleventh century ce.3 C. Raja Mohan noted that ‘even a cursory examination of recent history would point to the strategic bonds that endure between India and East Asia’.4 Despite its historical and cultural legacies, India was arguably seen as separate and distinct from South East Asia and detached from the Western Pacific.5 The separation of India from South East Asia and the Pacific should be seen as an artificial construct called the ‘mental map’. A mental

South East Asia’s naval cooperation with India   193 map is articulated through ‘an ordered but continually adapting structure of the mind’ about the surrounding geographical environment.6 David Brewster argues that mental maps ‘are used to divide the world up into chunks that we are better able to understand and deal with’.7 In C. Raja Mohan’s words, mental maps are described as ‘imagined communities’ such as the perception that South and East Asia are two very different geopolitical entities.8 As it is constructed, the pre-­existing mental map about India and the Indian Ocean as a separate entity from Asia and the Pacific Ocean can therefore be re-­constructed anew. While India’s historical and cultural influences are arguably strong, the economic and security relationships are relatively underemphasised and underappreciated. The ‘Look East’ Policy, which was officially launched and articulated by India’s Prime Minister P.V. Rao in September 1994, was meant to highlight those economic and security relationships further. Yet, notwithstanding rhetorical reiterations of the Look East Policy by India’s prime ministers, foreign ministers and senior officials,9 the policy has been criticised for not ‘being actively pursued’ in its implementation. Despite its shortcomings, the Look East Policy is still diplomatically and symbolically significant in conveying India’s desire to re-­connect with South East Asia and the larger Asia-­Pacific region in economic and security terms.10 At the turn of the twenty-­first century, the Look East Policy progressed into its second phase, known as the ‘Look East Policy 2.0’. Speaking in 2003, India’s former External Affairs Minister, Yashwant Sinha said: The first phase of India’s ‘Look East’ policy was ASEAN-­centred and focused primarily on trade and investment linkages. The new phase of this policy is characterised by an expanded definition of ‘East’, extending from Australia to East Asia, with ASEAN at its core. The new phase also marks a shift from trade to wider economic and security issues, including joint efforts to protect the sea-­lanes and coordinate counter­terrorism activities.11 Not only did Yashwant Sinha’s speech reflect the expanded geographical scope of Look East Policy 2.0, it also emphasised maritime security issues, particularly the security of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC). A geographically maritime region straddling both the Indian and Pacific Oceans, South East Asia occupies a central place in India’s naval thoughts. The Indian Maritime Doctrine has identified the South East Asian Straits of Malacca and Singapore, Sunda and Lombok as ‘primary areas of interest’.12 In pursuing India’s interest in these areas, the Doctrine emphasises the pivotal role of the Indian Navy ‘as a highly visible and cost-­ effective arm of the Indian government’, aiming to become a blue-­water navy by 2022 with 160-plus ship navy, including three aircraft carriers, 60 major combatants, including submarines, and close to 400 aircraft of ­different types.13

194   R. Atriandi Supriyanto The Look East Policy was reiterated once more by India’s Prime Minister Narenda Modi during the 12th East Asia Summit (EAS) in November 2014 under a new brand name – the ‘Act East Policy’. While it is as yet unclear on how they are going to be substantially different, it has none the less conveyed an impression that India will be more engaged in East Asia, particularly in South East Asia. Underlining this claim, Modi highly commended the EAS initiatives in disaster preparedness and response, and conveyed India’s hopes ‘for the goal of creating an ASEAN community in 2015’, which, if successful, can become ‘an inspiration for broader integration in the Asia-­Pacific region’. Although Modi did not explicitly mention it in his speech, the Indian Navy would remain a pivotal pillar in the Act East Policy implementation.

The depth and scope of naval cooperation Albeit a clear-­cut distinction is impossible, naval cooperation between India and each South East Asia country can be distinguished based on the depth and scope, as summarised in Table 10.1. Divided into probing, developmental and advanced, the depth of India’s naval cooperation can vary across individual countries. The ‘probing stage’ is where bilateral naval cooperation is yet to exist in a formal and institutionalised basis. Instead, both parties of cooperation are still considering the potential benefits accrued from closer defence cooperation. The ‘developmental stage’ suggests that naval cooperation is already ongoing, but it remains on an ad hoc and functional basis (only when and where the need arises), such as counter-­piracy, while refraining from engaging more deeply in an institutionalised manner, such as in regular exercises and/or defence industrial and technological collaboration. As the name suggests, the ‘advanced stage’ is where naval cooperation is more solid than the probing and developmental stages. This stage is identified by formalised/institutionalised bilateral naval cooperation activities, such as regular joint exercises with more complex and demanding scenarios, arms transfers, and/or defence industrial/naval technological collaboration. The scope of naval cooperation can be described in three kinds of activities. The first is naval dialogue and information sharing. Naval dialogues try to develop mutual understanding and confidence in the absence of formal bilateral cooperation treaty or agreement. The most common example of this cooperation is navy-­to-navy talks held bilaterally or multilaterally (such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus or ADMM-­Plus). Naval dialogues can be held in a formal meeting ashore or conducted during goodwill visits and passage exercises (PASSEX). Another example is information sharing where Indian and South East Asian naval personnel can interact within a multilateral cooperative framework, such as in the Singapore-­based Information Fusion Centre (IFC) where information sharing on the maritime security of the region is conducted.14

Regular and formal as per bilateral MoU/defence agreement, e.g. bilateral joint defence committee)

Advanced

Held regularly and include complex Already occurring scenarios and activities, e.g. antisubmarine warfare

Intentions are displayed, but concrete action is yet to be taken

Regular and formal as per bilateral MoU/defence agreement, e.g. bilateral joint defence committee

Developmental

Mostly functional and ad hoc, e.g. counter-piracy

Irregular and incidental, e.g. passage Non-existent Very limited, usually taken under a multilateral framework, e.g. sidelines exercises (PASSEX) during goodwill meeting visits

Defence/naval industrial cooperation and arms transfers

Probing

Training, exercises and patrols

Naval dialogues and info-sharing

Depth/scope

Table 10.1  The depth and scope of naval cooperation

196   R. Atriandi Supriyanto The second kind of activities is joint or coordinated patrols, training and exercises taken bilaterally or multilaterally. Anchored in a formal Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), or binding defence cooperation agreements, such naval activities are usually held regularly. For example, naval joint or coordinated patrols can be held several times annually as per bilateral agreements. However, these activities can also be conducted irregularly or incidentally during a ship’s goodwill visit and port call, such as in a PASSEX. Finally, defence/naval industrial and technological cooperation forms the third kind of cooperation highlighting the fullest extent of mutual confidence and trust, as evidenced by the transfers or joint development of material and technology between India and South East Asian countries. While the three kinds of naval activities can proceed simultaneously, they usually begin in subsequent stages. For example, a defence agreement often precedes, and forms the basis of, institutionalised naval cooperation, such as regular joint naval exercises. In turn, a defence agreement is usually the outcome of many series of informal/formal defence dialogues and consultations to foster mutual trust and understanding.

Naval cooperation with South East Asian countries South East Asia’s naval cooperation with India can vary on a country-­bycountry basis. The countries under discussion here are ASEAN members minus Laos but including Timor Leste. Laos is excluded since it is a land-­ locked country, which only maintains a riverine navy. Despite not being a member of ASEAN, Timor Leste with its markedly maritime geography certainly belongs to the South East Asian security environment. As summarised in Table 10.2, the different qualities of relationships with India can lead some South East Asian countries to forge formal defence and naval cooperation (such as Vietnam and Singapore), while others may regard India as no more than a defence or naval dialogue partner (such as Cambodia and Timor Leste). Brunei Darussalam At the time of writing, India and Brunei continue to work towards a defence cooperation agreement, thus rendering their naval cooperation to a probing stage. Following the Sultan of Brunei’s visit to New Delhi in May 2008, there are signs the two countries are likely to enhance bilateral defence cooperation. Naval dialogues and information sharing already exist between them. At the multilateral level, both the Indian Navy and Royal Brunei Navy assign their International Liaison Officers (ILOs) to the Singapore-­based IFC, which can be an opportunity for mutual interaction and discussion. Indian Navy ships have made several port calls to Bandar Seri Begawan, while the RBN participated in the Indian Navy-­hosted

Defence/naval cooperation MoU/ agreement (signed)

No Yes (2007) Yes (2001) Yes (1993) No Yes (2006) Yes (2003) Yes (2012) No Yes (2007)

Countries

Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Timor Leste Vietnam

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes

Naval dialogues and info-sharing Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes

No No No No Yes No Yes No No No

Probing Probing Developmental Developmental Probing Probing Advanced Developmental Probing Developmental

Training, exercises and Defence/naval Depth of cooperation patrols industrial collaboration and arms transfers

Table 10.2  Bilateral naval cooperation between India and South East Asian countries

198   R. Atriandi Supriyanto ‘MILAN 2012’ multilateral naval exercise in the Andaman Sea. This exercise was noteworthy since it was the first RBN international exercise beyond the Pacific. A defence agreement can formalise and regularise practical cooperation between the Indian Navy and the Royal Brunei Navy. Although the Royal Brunei Navy remains focused on coastal ‘brown-­water’ defence, recent acquisitions of offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) and corvettes could allow more practical cooperation with the Indian Navy, including greater participation in future series of MILAN exercises.15 The Royal Brunei Navy’s profile has increased considerably in recent years with the latest being its inaugural participation at the United States Navy-­hosted RIMPAC 2014 Exercise. While Brunei’s lack of naval manpower could limit its commitment to participate in large-­scale exercises with India, closer economic and energy cooperation could support the case for greater naval cooperation, such as the exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Brunei.16 India–Brunei trade has risen from US$453.08 million in 2009–2010 to US$796.56 million in 2013–2014, with oil accounting for around 80 per cent of Brunei’s exports to India.17 Brunei is a claimant country in the South China Sea disputes, where its hydrocarbon-­rich continental shelf and 200 nautical miles claimed exclusive economic zone (EEZ) overlaps with China’s ‘U-­shape’ or ‘9-dash line’ claim. While Brunei wishes to avoid direct confrontation with China, it could certainly deepen naval cooperation with India to complement the cooperation with other partners (such as the United Kingdom and the United States), such as in training courses or technological assistance, in order to build its capacity in defending offshore energy interests. Cambodia Although the India–Cambodia Defence Cooperation Agreement theoretically puts bilateral naval cooperation at a developmental stage, a lack of funding and equipment substantially limits any meaningful practical cooperation between the Royal Cambodian Navy and the Indian Navy. Signed in December 2007, the agreement provides the framework for bilateral defence cooperation covering such areas as military education and training, exchange visits of naval vessels, military aircraft and armed forces units, exchange of intelligence and information, maintenance and repair, supply of military equipment, and defence industry and research.18 While Indian warships have periodically visited Cambodia and engaged in professional exchanges with the Royal Cambodian Navy since 2008, bilateral cooperation largely takes the form of dialogues and information sharing, such as between their naval representatives at the IFC. Entirely consisting of fast attack craft and patrol boats, the Royal Cambodian Navy requires further foreign assistance to build its capacity. Some of this assistance has been given by China, including the sales of four Type-­062 patrol

South East Asia’s naval cooperation with India   199 craft in 2007, as well as MA-­60 transport aircraft and portable anti-­aircraft missiles in 2008 and 2012, respectively.19 Notwithstanding, the Indian Navy could offer an alternative for the Royal Cambodia Navy to diversify the latter’s security cooperation partners. For example, following the Cambodia– Vietnam defence cooperation agreement in March 2013, the Royal Cambodia Navy could benefit from the Vietnam People’s Navy’s close links with the Indian Navy, possibly creating a trilateral defence or naval cooperation arrangement.20 Indonesia As maritime neighbours, India–Indonesia naval cooperation is a natural progression of their geographical proximity. While geography might compel Indonesia to cooperate with India, Jakarta is equally motivated by India’s growing potential as an arms supplier, as underlined by the India– Indonesia Defence Cooperation Framework Agreement signed in 2001, which Indonesia ratified in December 2006. Following the India–Indonesia Strategic Partnership Agreement signed in 2005, naval cooperation is proceeding at the developmental stage with activities ranging from information sharing to coordinated patrols. Alongside their mutual interaction at the IFC, the Indonesian Navy (TNI-­AL) is a member of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) – a discussion forum among naval representatives from 35 Indian Ocean littoral countries. Started in 2002, the India–Indonesia ‘IndIndo Corpat’ coordinated patrols are conducted twice a year for two or three weeks along the International Maritime Boundary Line in the Great Channel (or Six-­Degree Channel), located between India’s Great Nicobar Island and Indonesia’s Weh Island.21 Nevertheless, while these patrols are significant to counter maritime piracy and prevent smuggling, they are actually ‘token in practical terms’.22 In addition to participating at MILAN exercises since its inception in 1995, Indonesia and India conduct the ‘Indopura SAREX’ search and rescue exercise, which has been converted into a multilateral maritime exercise since 1997 that includes irregular participations of Malaysia and Singapore.23 Both countries are gearing towards expanding their current naval cooperation. India’s former Defence Minister A.K. Antony’s offer to establish ‘formal maritime domain information sharing arrangement between the two navies’ could potentially become the next step in practical naval cooperation.24 This initiative could improve maritime domain awareness in the northern part of the Malacca Strait, which was notorious for a host of transnational crimes, particularly piracy. Motivated by India’s growing potential as an arms supplier, defence industrial and technological cooperation can become an additional pillar of cooperation. Despite Indonesia’s failed bid to acquire the Brahmos supersonic anti-­ship cruise missiles due to Russia’s objection, Jakarta remains confident in forging closer

200   R. Atriandi Supriyanto cooperation with New Delhi. In October 2013, India’s former Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, agreed to explore collaboration with Indonesia ‘in sale and co-­production of defence equipment, mutually agreed defence-­related research activities’ as well as ‘capacity building in the fields of hydrography, joint surveys, and maritime domain awareness’, which Indonesia thoroughly endorsed.25 Such talks were reflective of Jakarta’s past ‘interest in importing batteries for torpedoes, engines for [TNI-­AL’s] Parchim-­class corvettes, and repair facilities for its Type 209 submarines’.26 Considering India’s success in August 2013 to launch its first defence-­ dedicated spacecraft for maritime surveillance, the GSAT-­7, future collaborations can include intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems, such as maritime radars and space-­based military communications.27 As India and Indonesia have already signed a civilian space technology partnership agreement, it would be a logical step if both countries decided to convert that agreement into a defence/military one. That cooperation could possibly include the launch of Indonesian micro satellites into space using Indian launch vehicles.28 Despite greater opportunities for cooperation, some challenges continue to stymie bilateral naval cooperation beyond the developmental stage at present. While still necessary, the IndIndo Corpat appears to be losing steam after the Aceh civil war ended in 2005, and Jakarta was notably anxious about India’s intentions in the security of the Malacca Strait.29 Prospects of Indonesia’s closer defence cooperation with Pakistan and China could become a source of concern in New Delhi. While the prospect of air force cooperation with Pakistan remains dim,30 Sino-­ Indonesian defence and security cooperation appears to be gaining greater traction. Apart from joint research on naval missiles, China and Indonesia recently signed a cooperation agreement on maritime remote-­ sensing and surveillance.31 Moreover, Jakarta has not subscribed into India’s concerns over China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean.32 Instead, Jakarta saw the Chinese ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’ Project, which includes the Indian Ocean, as an opportunity to promote the concept of ‘World Maritime Axis’ under Indonesia’s President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo.33 In the past, India had also been hesitant to provide training for Indonesia’s Su-­30 aircraft, fearing the risk of disclosure to third parties of operational information of its frontline strike fighters.34 This problem can be compounded by Indonesia’s modest, albeit growing, defence procurement budget and India’s cumbersome defence bureaucracy.35 Malaysia Malaysia’s naval cooperation with India is at its developmental stage. While the 1993 defence cooperation MoU only formalised pre-­existing India– Malaysia military technical cooperation, it broadens the scope to include

South East Asia’s naval cooperation with India   201 joint venture, joint research and development projects, procurement, logistical and maintenance support.36 Having assisted Malaysian pilots with their Russian MiG-­29 aircraft in the 1990s, India provided similar technical and training support for Malaysia’s Su-­30MKM aircraft in 2008. Such support could be reciprocated by Indian Navy submariners being trained in Malaysia’s future submarine simulator facilities.37 Having had India repair and refit the Royal Malaysian Navy vessels before, Malaysia had also ‘evinced interest in the procurement of BrahMos missile’ from India.38 On defence industrial and technological cooperation, Malaysia invited the Indian defence industry to invest in the Malaysia Defence and Security Technological Park.39 Closer cooperation is beset with challenges, however, which limits its prospects beyond the current stage. Malaysia echoed Indonesia’s concerns over India’s ambitions in maintaining the security of the Malacca Strait. Asked about the possibility of India joining the Indonesia–Singapore– Malaysia–Thailand Eye in the Sky (EiS) aerial patrols over the Malacca Strait, Malaysian PM Najib Tun Razak emphasised that ‘the primary responsibility for the security and safety aspects of Malacca lie with the littoral states’.40 In what seems to be a double standard, Malaysia invited the non-­Malacca littoral state of Myanmar in February 2015 to join the Malacca Strait Patrol as an observer.41 While having participated in a few series of MILAN exercises before, Malaysia does not intend to make its participation regular nor is it willing to conduct ‘coordinated patrols’ with the Indian Navy in the Andaman Sea. Additionally, concerns arise in Kuala Lumpur over India’s potential interference in defence of allegedly ill-­ treated ethnic Indian-­Malaysians, while New Delhi can be equally concerned over Malaysia’s growing security cooperation with Islamabad.42 At the same time, territorial disputes in the South China Sea have not led Malaysia to underplay the ‘close economic, political and ethnic links with China’.43 For these reasons, Malaysia is unlikely to see India as a promising partner in naval cooperation compared to the more established alternatives, such as the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA), which remains fundamental in Malaysia’s international defence commitments. Myanmar Despite the current positive trends, India–Myanmar naval cooperation remains at its probing stage. The visit of former Indian PM Manmohan Singh to Naypyidaw in April 2012 was followed by then Defence Minister A.K. Antony’s visit in January 2013, a meeting between their naval chiefs in July 2013, and the signing of an MoU on border cooperation in May 2014 which includes an initiative on coordinated patrols between the Indian Navy and Myanmar Navy.44 However, the MoU is only the first of many steps towards a formal cooperation to be sealed under an ‘agreement’ or other legally binding documents of an equal stature.

202   R. Atriandi Supriyanto The Indian Navy was among the first navies entrusted by Naypyidaw to deliver aid in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in 2008.45 In addition to participating in IONS meetings since 2008 and MILAN exercises since 2003, the Myanmar Navy was a chairman of the ADMM-­Plus forum in 2014, which enabled it to engage the Indian defence establishment at the multilateral level. Although Myanmar is no stranger to using Indian arms, such as the British Islander maritime surveillance aircraft, T-­55 tanks, artillery guns, radar, small arms and light weapons, a defence cooperation agreement would be even more necessary if the Myanmar Navy wished to obtain them in greater quantities.46 In July 2013, for instance, the Myanmar Navy was interested to procure Indian-­built OPVs, fast attack craft, and naval sensors and radars, including for its Aung Zeya-­class frigates.47 Through a defence agreement, the Indian Navy could even provide the Myanmar Navy with consultative assistance on organising a large multilateral similar to MILAN. Such engagements could over time develop greater mutual trust between the two navies, which can lead to regular Indian Navy–Myanmar Navy coordinated patrols and joint exercises. Greater naval cooperation between India and Myanmar can as well dispel concerns both nations might have harboured towards each other.48 During their inaugural joint naval exercise and coordinated patrol in March 2013, Myanmar Navy ships called on the Indian Navy’s Visakhapatnam port and undertook a coordinated patrol with two Indian Navy ships in the vicinity of Cocos Islands, previously thought to be hosting Chinese surveillance facilities. Given their proximity to India’s Andaman Islands, concerns were raised over the possibility of Cocos Islands becoming a Chinese military foothold. But Naypyidaw dispelled India’s concerns by inviting Indian officials to visit the Islands and see for themselves the inaccuracy of the reports.49 Nevertheless, it would be in India’s best interest to prevent Myanmar from being engulfed deeper into China’s geopolitical influence. Not only is Myanmar important due to its geographical proximity to India, but also for its location facing the Bay of Bengal and northern entrance of the Malacca Strait. China is already constructing a deep-­water port at Myanmar’s Kyaukphyu, where a Chinese natural gas pipeline provides China’s landlocked region of Kunming access to the Indian Ocean.50 Meanwhile, to the north of Kyaukphyu, India is also building a US$120 million deep-­ water port in Sittwe for cargo vessels from India’s landlocked Mizoram state to access the Indian Ocean through the Kaladan River.51 Philippines Greater naval cooperation between India and the Philippines seems likely, notwithstanding the present probing stage. The growing interest of the Philippines for naval cooperation with India was attested by the signing of the India–Philippines Defence Cooperation Agreement in February 2006.

South East Asia’s naval cooperation with India   203 The agreement called for enhanced level of interaction between defence personnel of the two countries, exchange of information on the air force planes and naval ships, as well as access to Indian military training.52 Maritime security issues have gained traction in bilateral cooperation, with India–Philippines naval dialogues being held since 2004, in addition to their interaction at the IFC in Singapore.53 Visits by Indian Navy ships were made since 1998 and regularised since 2001, which were complemented by joint exercises held since 1999, including the inaugural participation of the Philippines Navy in the 2012 MILAN Exercise.54 In January 2012, the inaugural Joint Defence Cooperation Committee (JDCC) was held to discuss the possibility of Manila’s defence procurement from New Delhi.55 Defence industrial and technological cooperation with India has been mooted, including in satellite communication, ship-­building and repairs, aircraft design, manufacturing and maintenance.56 As an alternative to other potential arms suppliers, Manila had considered purchasing two Indian-­built frigates.57 In facing Chinese growing maritime assertiveness in the South China Sea, Manila seems eager to forge partnerships with like-­minded nations beyond its alliance with the United States. India appears to be one of those nations. In a veiled support for the Philippines’ defiance of China, India supported Manila’s bid to seek international arbitration in its dispute.58 Meanwhile, Manila has welcomed India to play a greater role in the South China Sea disputes to balance China’s growing influence. Cognisant of India’s reluctance to directly antagonise its relationship with Beijing, Manila might invite Indian energy companies to explore offshore resources within the Philippines’ EEZ or continental shelf as a counterweight against Chinese claims. While it is gathering pace, bilateral naval cooperation should not be overstated. Despite their similar concerns in the South China Sea, India– Philippines cooperation would likely be low-­key and mostly revolve around non-­traditional security, such as Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR). After all, both countries wish to avoid military cooperation from being overtly perceived as threatening China. Moreover, Philippines still cannot purchase Indian arms at discounted friendly prices, while very few slots are available for Philippines military personnel training in India. Singapore Being a small state means Singapore must forge as many partnerships as it can within and outside ASEAN. Arguably India’s closest defence cooperation partner in South East Asia, naval cooperation with Singapore has entered into the advanced stage. While a defence cooperation agreement was only signed in 2003, India–Singapore defence engagements had been frequent prior to that. Singapore’s close naval cooperation with India could allow the former to compensate for its lack of strategic weight. It makes the cooperation

204   R. Atriandi Supriyanto between the Indian Navy and the Republic of Singapore Navy relatively more complex than with other South East Asian partners. The Republic of Singapore Navy hosts the multinational IFC maritime security information­sharing centre at its Changi base, where India has posted a naval liaison officer, thus greatly enhancing Indian Navy–Republic of Singapore Navy mutual interaction at the operational-­tactical level. This information-­ sharing component is complemented with regular joint exercises. Started with a PASSEX in 1993, joint naval exercises were regularised into Exercise Lion King in 1994 focusing on anti-­submarine warfare in the Indian Ocean, and in 2005, became the Singapore–India Maritime Bilateral Exercise (SIMBEX) to reflect its expanded geographical and functional nature into the South China Sea.59 Additionally, cooperation has looked into the defence industrial and technological realm. In the 1970s, India tranferred to Singapore second-­ hand AMX-­13/75 and Centurion-­3 tanks and in turn, Singapore transferred six new patrol craft for the Indian Coast Guard in the 1980s.60 In October 2006, both countries discussed ways to intensify defence technological cooperation, such as in artillery systems. Despite the alleged corruption involving a Singaporean defence company, cooperation still looks promising in unmanned systems, remote-­sensing and space-­based technologies.61 It would also be unsurprising if both countries decided to venture into the naval technological cooperation with India collaborating with Singapore’s relatively advanced naval systems and shipbuilding sector.62 Thailand Naval cooperation between India and the Kingdom of Thailand is pacing at the developmental stage. Buttressed by their close historical and cultural links, India and Thailand signed a defence cooperation agreement in January 2012 covering regular joint maritime exercises/patrols, counter­terrorism, piracy, smuggling, exchange and training of officers at their military institutions, and participation as observers in military exercises. Apart from their interaction at the IFC, the Royal Thai Navy has been attending the IONS meetings regularly since 2008. Started in 2006, the ‘Indo-­Thai Corpat’ coordinated patrols between the Indian Navy and the Royal Thai Navy are quintessential to ensure security in the northern approach of the Malacca Strait, which was subsequently improved with the MoU on joint naval Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) in 2007.63 In addition, the Royal Thai Navy has been consistently participating in the MILAN exercises since 1995. Although both countries have conducted information sharing as well as joint patrols and exercises, they are still working towards collaboration in the defence industrial and technological sector. In June 2013, Indian Defence Minister Antony invited a Thai delegation to visit Indian defence production facilities as a prelude to defence industrial collaboration.64

South East Asia’s naval cooperation with India   205 While bounded in an alliance treaty with the United States, closer naval cooperation with India could add value to Thailand as it aspires to increase naval presence in the Andaman Sea (Thailand is the only Southeast Asian country operating an aircraft carrier, the HTMS Chakri Naruebet).65 In addition, India can be one of many partners Thailand can train with in undersea warfare, as the latter aspires to acquire submarines in keeping up with its neighbours.66 Timor Leste Being among the world’s youngest countries, Timor Leste struggles to maintain its own armed forces (F-­FDTL) operational. Understandably, India–Timor Leste naval cooperation is still at the probing stage. In 2013, Timor’s defence budget stands at around US$64 million with 1330 personnel, including 80 from the naval element – a proto-­navy of the F-­FTDL.67 While Australia and Indonesia remain Dili’s immediate cooperation partners, Timor Leste’s foreign policy aims to seek cooperation with ASEAN and external parties, such as Portugal, China, South Korea and the United States. While India–Timor Leste economic ties are still nascent, Timor’s oil and gas reserve potentials are relevant to India’s energy security goals, with Indian energy companies already exploring two oil blocs off Timor-­ Leste.68 Notwithstanding the requirements to protect offshore marine resources, the naval component of the F-­FDTL is only a patchwork of small and lightly armed platforms, including two Portugal-­built Albatros-­ class patrol boats donated from Portugal, two Chinese Type 62 Shanghai-­ class boats, and three South Korean Chamsuri-­class boats. However, Timor’s Force 2020 document outlines plans to establish a ‘Light Naval Force’ to ‘carry out EEZ surveillance, patrol the SLOCs, escort and assure the safe passage of oil tankers and guarantee the security of oil platforms’.69 The document also cited India as ‘a high technology country without interests in the strategic orbit of Timor-­Leste’.70 This can allow India to donate patrol boats and offer training assistance for naval personnel similar to its assistance to Indian Ocean island countries, such as Mauritius and Seychelles. Vietnam Despite the close political relationship with India, naval cooperation with Vietnam is still at the developmental stage. Regarded as India’s ‘most trusted friend and ally’, Vietnam’s post-­Cold War Doi Moi (Renewal) foreign policy to seek multiple partnerships bode well with India’s Look East Policy, which aims to cultivate greater cooperation with South East Asian partners.71 Having sought India’s aviation technology assistance in 1994, defence ties were upgraded by a strategic agreement in 2007 to

206   R. Atriandi Supriyanto intensify cooperation in defence supplies, joint projects, training and intelligence, as well as to enhance interaction between their respective defence and security establishments.72 Being a claimant in the South China Sea disputes means Vietnam shares a ‘common interest and convergence in security perceptions’ with India over Chinese growing assertive behaviour.73 This shared perception has permeated into the naval dimension, whereby both navies seek to maintain bilateral dialogues on regional maritime security, aside from their participation at the IFC. Since 2008, the Vietnam People’s Navy has made tailored participation in the MILAN exercises, while India has started training Vietnam People’s Navy submariners to operate their newly acquired Russian-­built Kilo-­class, and is considering selling Hanoi the Brahmos missiles.74 While seemingly modest, India’s reiterated pledge of US$100 million credits for Vietnam to purchase naval vessels could be highly symbolic, given the former had been granted Vietnamese oil concession blocks located inside China’s U-­shape line in the South China Sea, which can position India ‘much closer to the heart of China’s naval power in the South China Sea’.75 Naval cooperation can even expand to the defence industrial and technological field as Vietnam seeks ‘to develop its defence industrial base and reduce dependency on foreign military imports’, including in missile development, communications, radar systems, and naval shipbuilding seems to be quite promising.76 India’s defence and naval cooperation with Vietnam is not all smooth-­ sailing, however. Given Moscow’s aversion to risk ties with Beijing and to risk its own sales pitch of Yakhont/Onyx missiles on whose airframe the Brahmos is based, Russia might object to India’s Brahmos sale to Vietnam.77 Concerned about violating its Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) commitment, India failed to sell the Prithvi missiles to Vietnam, while Vietnam is alleged to consider India as ‘a less than reliable weapons procurement partner’.78

South East Asia and India’s role in the South China Sea Geopolitical analyst Robert Kaplan describes the South China Sea as ‘the future of conflict’ not only due to its strategic location at the Indo-­Pacific maritime crossroads and the marine resources (particularly oil and gas) beneath, but most importantly, ‘the coldblooded territorial disputes that have long surrounded these waters’.79 Four South East Asian countries have contested claims with China and Taiwan and among themselves on certain areas of the South China Sea. Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines have sought to use diplomacy as their primary means to resolve the disputes, including through the implementation of the 2002 Declaration of Conduct and the formulation of the Code of Conduct. Although China’s assertion of claims is conducted mainly through non-­ military means, such as coast guard vessels, the power asymmetry seen

South East Asia’s naval cooperation with India   207 vis-­à-vis the South East Asian claimants is wide enough to make the latter feel bullied.80 Viewing prospects of escalation, India views China’s assertive behaviour as tantamount to interference in the freedom of navigation.81 Indeed, the South China Sea forms India’s ‘secondary areas of maritime interest’ as described by the Indian Maritime Doctrine.82 Viewed as a potential strategic counterweight against China’s behaviour in the South China Sea, South East Asia seeks to welcome growing naval cooperation with India. First, leveraging on India’s security interests in the South China Sea, Vietnam and the Philippines can voice their defiance more strongly against China. With India being given concessions in energy Blocks 127 and 128, Vietnam can shield behind India’s diplomatic and naval protection against repeated Chinese protests, notwithstanding the July 2011 incident when the INS Airavat was allegedly contacted by  the ‘Chinese Navy’ to leave ‘Chinese waters’ while cruising within Vietnam’s EEZ.83 Second, unlike China, India can be perceived as a benign power with neither territorial ambitions nor designs in South East Asia, notwithstanding reservations from Malaysia and Indonesia over India’s potential security presence in the Malacca Strait. Despite the challenges to greater cooperation, South East Asian allies or close partners of the United States, such as Thailand, Philippines and Singapore, may share Washington’s view that India can be a ‘net security provider’ because it is ‘a benign maritime power’.84 This perception could enhance South East Asia’s appreciation of India’s naval presence in the region. Third, India can offer an alternative to regional countries that wish to neither align too closely with China nor the United States. India’s non-­ alignment stance can attract like-­minded South East Asian countries, such as Indonesia with its non-­aligned ‘free and active’ foreign policy. Apart from being the two founding members of the Non-­Alignment Movement (NAM), India and Indonesia co-­hosted the first Asia-­Africa Conference in 1955 to discuss views among the then new independent nations in Asia and Africa against the backdrop of the Cold War.85 Recently, Indonesia has embraced the notion of ‘Indo-­Pacific’ (although unofficially), acknowledged India as a major power, and welcomed India’s inclusion into East Asian architecture.86 An India–Indonesia axis in the Indo-­Pacific can become a force of stability in the South China Sea by collectively calling for the early formulation of the Code of Conduct and peaceful resolution of the disputes in accordance with international law. Finally, India’s inclusion into ASEAN multilateral frameworks provides South East Asian countries a leeway to cooperate more broadly on maritime security. Becoming ASEAN’s full dialogue partner in 1996, India has now fully joined key ASEAN fora, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF ), East Asia Summit (EAS) and ADMM-­Plus. Maritime security cooperation has become a key focus cooperation area as commemorated during the 20th anniversary of India–ASEAN summit in 2012.87 Apart from

208   R. Atriandi Supriyanto engaging India to support ASEAN’s views on the South China Sea disputes, India’s inclusion into the ASEAN multilateral architecture can open up greater opportunity for naval cooperation with individual ASEAN countries. While still being under considerations, the biennial ASEAN Navy Chiefs’ Meeting (ANCM) ‘Plus process’ could include the Indian Navy alongside other navies of ASEAN dialogue partners.88

Reception of naval cooperation with India Based on the observations above, it can be argued that cooperation with the Indian Navy only supplements, rather than supplants, South East Asia’s pre-­existing networks of cooperation. Different stages of cooperation can be attributed to political reception towards India’s greater security role in South East Asia, geographical imperatives, the individual capacities to develop defence industrial/technological cooperation further and enhance the complexity of joint exercises and patrols, as well as bureaucratic impediments in effectively implementing defence/naval cooperation agreements. Out of the ten South East Asian countries, only naval cooperation with Singapore can qualify as belonging to the ‘advanced stage’, while the rest are still in their developmental or probing stage. While South East Asia’s naval cooperation with India is generally growing, it has taken various forms. Singapore’s and, to a lesser extent, Vietnam’s, naval cooperation with India has entered into a relatively higher stage than the rest of South East Asian countries. Already at the advanced stage, Singapore’s naval cooperation with India is much more complex in terms of activities partly due to the city-­state’s advanced military capabilities relative to its South East Asian neighbours. A joint naval technological R&D project can be developed should both countries consider deepening existing naval cooperation. While remaining at the developmental stage, naval cooperation with Vietnam can arguably be considered the second closest after Singapore. A move toward the advanced stage of naval cooperation could be taken if India’s sale of patrol vessels and Brahmos missiles materialised, and if Hanoi started engaging Delhi in substantive defence industrial and technological cooperation. Indian Navy’s cooperation with the navies of Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Myanmar remains at the developmental stage, since these countries are unclear as to where India would fit into their existing networks of international naval cooperation. The prospects of cooperation with Indonesia and Thailand look more promising than with Malaysia and Myanmar. Maritime domain awareness (MDA) cooperation with India could be a logical next step for naval cooperation with Indonesia and Thailand. While naval cooperation with Malaysia and Myanmar is growing, its progress can be partly stymied by India’s potential reaction to their domestic political environments. Viewing India first as a benign major

South East Asia’s naval cooperation with India   209 power would be necessary if Malaysia and Myanmar were genuinely willing to expand naval cooperation. Notwithstanding the absence of a defence cooperation agreement, India’s naval cooperation with Brunei might progress more effectively than with Cambodia and Philippines. Not only can Brunei financially afford more complex naval cooperation with India, Brunei can also focus cooperation on meeting external security challenges in the South China Sea, with offshore energy security interests providing greater importance to cooperation. With limited financial means, Cambodia and the Philippines can align naval cooperation toward more capacity-­building, including by inducing India to sell naval armaments at discounted friendly prices, which can eventually enable them to engage in more complex joint naval activities. While the Indian embassy is yet to be established in Dili, Timor Leste can still proceed with naval and maritime security cooperation with New Delhi. With a significantly less naval capacity compared to the rest of South East Asia, Dili can be in a more desperate situation to secure its offshore interests. In securing these interests, Dili can specifically ask India to join other countries in providing maritime security assistance, including the gifting of patrol boats and training of its proto-­navy.

Conclusion: a sea of opportunities While South East Asian naval cooperation with India has generally grown, it is varied across individual countries. Singapore is arguably the only South East Asian country to have entered into the advanced stage of naval cooperation with India, followed by Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam at the developmental stage. Meanwhile, the navies of Brunei, Cambodia, Myanmar, Philippines and Timor Leste are still at their probing stage to explore the prospects of deeper cooperation with the Indian Navy. The variance in depth and scope of naval cooperation with India can be explained by the political, geographical and capacity factors of individual South East Asian countries. Political sensitivities and reservations over the prospects of India’s greater security presence in the Malacca Strait continue to stymie closer naval cooperation with Malaysia and Indonesia. However, geographical imperatives prod Indonesia to cooperate with India along the shared maritime boundary. Largely in the name of geographical proximity too, Myanmar and Thailand appear keen to cultivate stronger naval cooperation with New Delhi. Despite their appetites for cooperation, the navies of Brunei, Cambodia, Philippines and Timor Leste are hampered by their lack of capabilities to do much cooperation beyond naval dialogues and information sharing. In contrast, grounded in political alignments and sufficient capabilities, the naval cooperation of Singapore and Vietnam with India has progressed relatively better than their South East Asian neighbours.

210   R. Atriandi Supriyanto While Singapore is the only country that has ever entered into the advanced stage, other South East Asian countries are catching up. With enhanced naval capabilities and, as in the case of the Philippines, a looming threat from China’s assertive maritime behaviours, South East Asia’s naval cooperation with India can potentially gain greater pace. But it is also noteworthy to understand that ‘it takes two to tango’: South East Asia is not the only party interested in doing cooperation. Given the possibility of low political enthusiasm and a lack of capacity on their part, India can do a lot more to enthusiastically engage South East Asian countries in naval cooperation beyond the rhetoric of the Act East Policy.

Notes   1 The author thanks Prof. Rajesh Basrur, Prof. C. Raja Mohan, Dr Anit Mukherjee and the anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier versions of this chapter.   2 Euan Graham and Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, ‘Waves of Expectation: Naval Co-­operation in Southeast Asia’, Jane’s Navy International, Vol.  119, Issue  1, January/February 2014, p. 19.   3 See Hermann Kulke, ‘The Naval Expeditions of the Cholas in the Context of Asian History’, in Hermann Kulke, K. Kesavapany and Vijay Sakhuja (eds), Nagapattinam to Suvarnadwipa: Reflections on the Chola Naval Expeditions to Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 1–14.   4 C. Raja Mohan, Samudra Manthan: Sino-­Indian Rivalry in the Indian Ocean (Massachusetts: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012), p. 90.   5 A.N. Ram, ‘India-­ASEAN Relations: Evolving Convergences’, in T. Nirmala Devi and Adluri Subramanyam Raju (eds), India and Southeast Asia: Strategic Convergence in the Twenty-­first Century (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), pp. 51–52.   6 Alan Hendrikson, ‘The Geographical “Mental Maps” of American Foreign Policy Makers’, International Political Science Review, Vol. 1, No. 4, 2000, p. 498.   7 David Brewster, ‘Evolving “Mental Maps”: India as an Asia-­Pacific Power’, Future Directions International, 30 November 2011, www.futuredirections.org.au/publications/indian-­ocean/29-indian-­ocean-swa/321-evolving-­mental-maps-­india-as-­ an-asia-­pacific-power.html.   8 Raja Mohan, Samudra Manthan, p. 90.   9 S.D. Muni, ‘India’s “Look East” Policy: The Strategic Dimension’, ISAS Working Paper, No. 121, February 2011, p. 12. 10 Sandy Gordon, Strategic Insights: India’s Rise as an Asia-­Pacific Power: Rhetoric and Reality (Canberra: The Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2012), pp. 18–19. 11 Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Speech by External Affairs Minister Shri Yashwant Sinha at Harvard University’, 29 September 2003, www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-­ Statements.htm?dtl/4744/Speech+by+External+Affairs+Minister+Shri+Yashwa nt+Sinha+at+Harvard+University. 12 Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), Indian Maritime Doctrine, 2009, pp. 65–68. 13 David Scott, ‘India’s “Extended Neighbourhood” Concept: Power Projection for a Rising Power’, India Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, April–June 2009, p. 122; ‘Indian Navy Fleet to Grow to 160-plus by 2022’, Thaindian, 9 August 2008, www.thaindian.com/newsportal/business/indian-­navy-fleet-­to-grow-­to-160-plus-­by-2022_1 0081924.html.

South East Asia’s naval cooperation with India   211 14 For details, see www.infofusioncentre.gov.sg. 15 Dzirhan Mahadzir, ‘Making Waves: Southeast Asia’s Navies Strive to Expand and Modernise’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol. 50, Issue 18, May 2013, p. 31. 16 Sally Piri, ‘India Eyes Stronger Defence, Energy Ties with Brunei’, The Brunei Times, 14 February 2012. 17 Ministry of External Affairs, ‘India–Brunei Relations’, July 2014, www.mea.gov. in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Brunei_July_2014.pdf; Pranav Kumar, ‘Brunei in India’s Foreign Policy’, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 19 May 2008, www. ipcs.org/article_details.php?articleNo=2569. 18 Embassy of India (Phnom Penh, Cambodia), ‘Defence Cooperation’, www. indembassyphnompenh.org/bilateral-­relations/defence-­cooperation.html. 19 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), ‘Arms Exports from China to South East Asia, 1990–2012’, www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers. 20 ‘Cambodia, Vietnam Ink Defence Cooperation Plan’, The Voice of Vietnam¸ 30 March 2013, http://english.vov.vn/Politics/Cambodia-­Vietnam-ink-­defencecooperation-­plan/256835.vov. 21 ‘India, Indonesia to Boost Anti-­piracy Cooperation’, Deccan Herald¸ 10 January 2011. 22 David Brewster, India as an Asia Pacific Power (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2012), p. 117. 23 Bilveer Singh, ‘Southeast Asia-­India Defence Relations in the Changing Regional Security Landscape’, IDSA Monograph Series, No. 4, May 2011, p. 24. 24 Ministry of Defence, ‘India and Indonesia Agree to Significantly Step Up Defence Cooperation; It’s a Turning Point: Antony’, Press Information Bureau, 16 October 2012, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=88424; Brewster, India as an Asia Pacific Power, p. 118. 25 Prime Minister’s Office, ‘Joint Statement on Five Initiatives for Strengthening the India–Indonesia Strategic Partnership’, Press Information Bureau, Government of India¸ 11 October 2013 http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid= 100004; Defence Media Center, ‘Wamenhan Terima Dubes India Bahas Implementasi Peningkatan Kerjasama Pertahanan’ [Deputy Defence Minister Met the Indian Ambassador to Discuss about Enhancing Implementation of Defence Cooperation], Kementerian Pertahanan RI, 17 April 2013, http:// dmc.kemhan.go.id/post-­wamenhan-terima-­dubes-india-­bahas-implementasi-­ peningkatan-kerjasama-­pertahanan.html. 26 Vibhanshu Shekhar, ‘India–Indonesia Relations: An Overview’, IPCS Special Report, No. 38, March 2007, p. 2, www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/477138183IPCSSpecial-­Report-38.pdf. 27 ‘India’s First Defence Satellite All Set for Launch’, The Hindu, 30 August 2013. 28 Prime Minister’s Office, ‘Joint Statement on Five Initiatives for Strengthening the India–Indonesia Strategic Partnership’. 29 Amit Baruah, ‘Only “Escort Duties” in Malacca Straits’, The Hindu, 23 April 2002. 30 Markus Junianto Sihaloho, ‘Indonesia, Pakistan to Share Defense Expertise’, The Jakarta Globe, 22 July 2010 http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/archive/ indonesia-­pakistan-to-­share-defense-­expertise/. 31 ‘Indonesia, China Discuss C-­705 Missile Technology Transfer’, Antara, 20 August 2013, www.antaranews.com/en/news/90341/indonesia-­china-discuss-­c705-missile-­technology-transfer; Jon Grevatt, ‘China–Indonesia Sign Remote-­ sensing MoU’, IHS Jane’s Defence Industry, 13 October 2014, www.janes.com/ article/44434/china-­indonesia-sign-­remote-sensing-­mou. 32 David Brewster, ‘An Indian Sphere of Influence in the Indian Ocean?’, Security Challenges, Vol. 6, No. 3, Spring 2010, pp. 5–7. 33 Zakir Hussain, ‘Indonesia “Key in China’s Vision of Maritime Silk Road” ’, The Straits Times, 4 November 2014.

212   R. Atriandi Supriyanto 34 David Brewster, ‘The Relationship between India and Indonesia’, Asian Survey Vol. 51, No. 2, March/April 2011, p. 233. 35 Benjamin Schreer, ASPI Strategy: Moving beyond Ambitions? Indonesia’s Military Modernisation (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2013), pp. 16–18; James Hardy, ‘India’s Defence Procurement Bungles’, The Diplomat, 27 October 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/indias-­defense-procurement-­bungles/. 36 Singh, ‘Southeast Asia–India Defence Relations in the Changing Regional Security Landscape’, pp. 25–26. 37 ‘Sabah Navy Base to be “World’s First” Scorpene Training Centre’, The Malaysian Insider, 15 October 2012. 38 Vivek Raghuvanshi, ‘India, Malaysia Seek Closer Military Ties’, Defense News, 30 January 2012, www.defensenews.com/article/20120130/DEFREG03/30130 0012/; Walter C. Ladwig III, ‘Delhi’s Pacific Ambition: Naval Power, “Look East”, and India’s Emerging Influence in the Asia-­Pacific’, Asian Security, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2009, p. 97. 39 Press Information Bureau, ‘Joint Statement on the Framework for the India– Malaysia Strategic Partnership’, Prime Minister’s Office – Government of India, 27 October 2010, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=66596. 40 P.S. Suryanarayana, ‘India, Malaysia to Step Up Defence Ties’, The Hindu, 8 January 2008. 41 ‘Malaysia Invites Myanmar to be MSP Observer to Combat Piracy in Malacca Strait’, The Sun Daily, 26 February 2015. 42 Yogendra Singh, ‘India Malaysia Relations: It is Time to Get Going’, IPCS Special Report¸ No. 42, June 2007; Akhtar Jamal, ‘Pak–Malaysia to Boost Defence Coop’, Pakistan Observer, 23 July 2012, http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id= 166134. 43 David Brewster, ‘India as an Asia Pacific Power: Naval Power, “Look East”, and India’s Emerging Influence in the Asia-­Pacific’, Asian Security, Vol.  5, No.  2, 2009, p. 112. 44 ‘India and Myanmar Sign Memorandum of Understanding on Border Cooperation’, 10 May 2014, www.mea.gov.in/press-­releases.htm?dtl/23315/Ind ia+and+Myanmar+sign+Memorandum+of+Understanding+on+Border+Cooper ation; ‘Myanmar Navy Chief Visits India’, Indian Navy¸ 29 July 2013, http://indiannavy.nic.in/news-­events/myanmar-­navy-chief-­visits-india. 45 Ministry of Defence, ‘Indian Armed Forces Launch Operation Sahayata; IAF, Navy Rush Relief to Myanmar’, Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 7 May 2008, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=38604. 46 Rahul Bedi, ‘Myanmar Gets India’s Maritime Aircraft’, Hindustan Times, 12 May 2007. 47 N.C. Bipindra, ‘Myanmar Navy Seeks Arms from India’, The New Indian Express, 30 July 2013; Saurav Jha, ‘India’s ASEAN Defense Sales Effort’, The Diplomat, 20 November 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/indias-­asean-defense-­saleseffort/?allpages=yes. 48 Bipindra, ‘Myanmar Navy Seeks Arms from India’, and Kalyan Ray, ‘1st India– Myanmar Naval Exercise’, 8 March 2013, www.deccanherald.com/content/ 317533/1st-india-­myanmar-naval-­exercise.html. 49 C. Raja Mohan, ‘India’s Security Cooperation with Myanmar: Prospect and Retrospect’, ISAS Working Paper, No. 166, February 2013, p. 8. 50 Du Juan, ‘Myanmar–China Gas Pipeline Completed’, China Daily, 10 October 2013, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2013–10/20/content_17046790. htm. 51 ‘India Seeks to Deepen Economic Ties with Myanmar’, The Times of India, 14 October 2011; Press Trust of India, ‘Kaladan Corridor Project Likely to Be Completed by 2016: Singh’, Business Standard, 14 August 2014.

South East Asia’s naval cooperation with India   213 52 Vibhanshu Shekhar, ‘India–Philippines Relations: An Overview’, IPCS Special Report, No.  43, June 2007, www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/1297330211IPCSSpecial-­Report-43.pdf. 53 Chester B. Cabalza, ‘Philippines-­India: Making Impressive Strides in Strengthening Ties’, NDCP Policy Brief, No. 7, 16 May 2013, p. 4, www.ndcp.edu.ph/publications/7%20CABALZA%20on%20PH-India.pdf. 54 Ibid., p. 2. 55 ‘PH Convenes Joint Defense Committee with India’, Department of National Defense, Republic of the Philippines, www.dndph.org/2012-press-­releases/ph-­ convenes-joint-­defense-committee-­with-india. 56 Renato Cruz De Castro, ‘Harnessing the Quad Dialogue against an Emergent Power: The Case of the Philippines’ Balancing Policy against the China Challenge in the South China Sea’, paper presented at Quad Track Two Dialogue, Canberra, Australia, 10 December 2014, p. 24. 57 ‘Phl Eyes Frigates from India’, The Philippine Star, 23 October 2013, www. philstar.com/headlines/2013/10/23/1248390/phl-­eyes-frigates-­india. 58 Zachary Keck, ‘India Wades into South China Sea Dispute’, The Diplomat, 12 March 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/india-­wades-into-­south-china-­ sea-dispute/. 59 Koh Swee Lean Collin, ‘ASEAN Perspectives on Naval Cooperation with India: Singapore and Vietnam’, India Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2013, p. 193. 60 SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers. 61 N.C. Bipindra, ‘Modi Eases Graft-­Linked Curbs to Spur Arms Deals in India’, Bloomberg News, 16 September 2014, www.businessweek.com/news/2014–09–15/ modi-­eases-graft-­linked-curbs-­to-spur-­arms-deals-­in-india. 62 Koh Swee Lean Collin, ‘ASEAN Perspectives on Naval Cooperation with India’, p. 195. 63 ‘Thailand–India Relations’, Thai Embassy, India, www.thaiemb.org.in/en/ information/index.php. 64 N.C. Bipindra, ‘Ready to Cement Military Ties with Thailand: Antony’, The New Indian Express, 7 June 2013, www.newindianexpress.com/nation/Ready-­tocement-­military-ties-­with-Thailand-­Antony/2013/06/07/article1623396.ece; Sitanshu Kar, ‘India Offers Thailand Collaboration in Defence Production’, Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 6 June 2013, http://pib.nic.in/ newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=96449. 65 ‘Royal Thai Navy’, Global Security, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/thailand/navy-­intro.htm. 66 Prashant Parameswaran, ‘Thailand Eyes Submarine Fleet’, The Diplomat, 4 January 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/thailand-­eyes-submarine-­fleet/. 67 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2013 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2013), p. 341. 68 Nitin Pai, ‘For an Indian Touch in Timor-­Leste’, Takashila Institution, Policy Brief April 2011, http://takshashila.org.in/wp-­content/uploads/2010/03/TPB-­ IndianTouchTimorLeste-NNP-­1.pdf. 69 Force 2020, p. 89, www.locjkt.or.id/Timor_E/pdf/Forca202007.pdf. 70 Force 2020, p. 101, www.locjkt.or.id/Timor_E/pdf/Forca202007.pdf. 71 ‘India Must Not Ignore S. E. Asia: Fernandes’, The Hindu, 27 March 2000; C. Raja Mohan, ‘Pranab Mukherjee in Vietnam: Modi’s Asian Power Play’, The Indian Express, 14 September 2014. 72 Ajaya Kumar Das, ‘India’s Defense-­Related Agreements With ASEAN States: A Timeline’, India Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2013, p. 131. 73 ‘Transcript of Joint Media Interaction by External Affairs Minister and Foreign Minister of Vietnam (11 July 2013)’, Ministry of External Affairs¸ 11 July 2013 http://mea.gov.in/media-­briefings.htm?dtl/21938/Transcript+of+Joint+Media

214   R. Atriandi Supriyanto +Interaction+by+External+Affairs+Minister+and+Foreign+Minister+of+Vietnam +July+11+2013. 74 Rajat Pandit, ‘India Kicks Off Sub Training for Vietnamese Navy’, The Times of India, 22 November 2013, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ 2013–11–22/india/44363694_1_south-­china-sea-­indian-navy-­submarines; Frank Jack Daniel, ‘India Tightens Vietnam Defence, Oil Ties ahead of China’s Xi’s Visit’, Reuters, 15 September 2014, http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/09/15/ india-­vietnam-pranab-­mukherjee-visit-­xi-idINKBN0HA1X520140915. 75 ‘Prime Minister of Vietnam H.E. Mr Nguyen Tan Dung’s State Visit to India’, Embassy of India (Hanoi, Vietnam), 9 October 2014, http://indembassy.com.vn/ media-­center/press-­release/213-media-­statements.html; ‘India’s Modi Pledges to Modernise Vietnam’s Defences’, Channel News Asia¸ 28 October 2014, www. channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/india-­s-modi-­pledges-to/1439786.html; Koh Swee Lean Collin, ‘ASEAN Perspectives on Naval Cooperation with India’, pp. 197–198. 76 Jon Grevatt, ‘Vietnam’s Defence Industrial Development Enshrined in New Constitution’, IHS Jane’s Defence Industry, 9 December 2013. 77 Jha, ‘India’s ASEAN Defense Sales Effort’. 78 Brewster, India as an Asia Pacific Power, p. 95. 79 Robert D. Kaplan, ‘South China Sea is the Future of Conflict’, Foreign Policy¸ 15 August 2011, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/the_south_ china_sea_is_the_future_of_conflict. 80 James Hardy, ‘Analysis: ASEAN Finds Voice over South China Sea Dispute’, IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, 14 August 2014, www.janes.com/article/42006/analysis-­ asean-finds-­voice-over-­south-china-­sea-dispute. 81 Aman Sharma, ‘India, Vietnam Call for Freedom of Navigation in South China Sea’, The Economic Times, 16 September 2014, http://articles.economictimes. indiatimes.com/2014–09–16/news/53983323_1_vietnam-­coast-guard-­presidentpranab-­mukherjee-wadhwa. 82 Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), Indian Maritime Doctrine, 2009, p. 68. 83 Ananth Krishnan, ‘Measured Chinese Response to India–Vietnam Deals’, The Hindu, 22 November 2013; ‘Chinese Warship Warns Indian Navy Vessel in South China Sea?’, The Economic Times, 1 September 2011. 84 ‘India Stepping Up Role as Net Security Provider in Indian Ocean’, Business Standard, 19 September 2013. 85 Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, ‘India and Indonesia: Towards a Convergent Mandala’, India Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2013, p. 215. 86 Marty Natalegawa, ‘An Indonesian Perspective on the Indo-­Pacific’, speech delivered at the Center for International and Strategic Studies (CSIS) Conference on Indonesia, Washington, DC, 16 May, 2013, http://csis.org/files/attachments/130516_MartyNatalegawa_Speech.pdf. 87 ‘Vision Statement ASEAN India Commemorative Summit’, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 21 December 2012, www.asean.org/news/asean-­statementcommuniques/item/vision-­statement-asean-­india-commemorative-­summit; Anjana Pasricha, Voice of America, 21 December 2012,www.voanews.com/ content/india-­asean-upgrade-­strategic-partnership/1569655.html. 88 ‘The 7th ASEAN Navy Chiefs Meeting’, Ministry of Defence Brunei Darussalam, 11 September 2013, www2.mindef.gov.bn/MOD_Brunei/index.php/news-­archivesmainmenu-­70/2059-the-­7th-asean-­navy-chiefs-­meeting.

11 India and regional maritime security Sam Bateman

Introduction This chapter addresses the emerging multilateral security architecture in the Indo-­Pacific, and evaluates India’s contributions to the regional institutions concerned with maritime security. It assesses the strengths and weaknesses of these contributions. While the chapter considers the situation in what is now described as the Indo-­Pacific spanning both the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and East Asia, it pays particular attention to the likelihood of a stable cooperative maritime security regime in the IOR and considers the implications for India’s maritime strategy. India’s preparedness to participate in regional institutions has waxed and waned over the years. As a founding member of the Non-­Aligned Movement, India steered clear of multilateralism, particularly anything with a security agenda unless under the auspices of the United Nations. During the Cold War, India was wary of multilateral initiatives unless they were explicitly dealing with economic and trade issues.1 With the end of the Cold War, India has been more prepared to engage in regional initiatives although as this chapter will conclude, it still has a marked preference for bilateral defence arrangements rather than participating actively in regional institutions with a security agenda. An Indo-­Pacific system It has become popular to talk about the ‘Indo-­Pacific’ as a strategic system stretching across the Indian Ocean from the nearer Middle East and the Gulf to East Asia and across the Pacific even to the West coast of North America. This replaces the Asia-­Pacific construct which is seen as a strategic system more narrowly focused on the Pacific Ocean. The Indo-­Pacific is an attractive system for some key stakeholders in maritime security but less attractive to others. It accords with India’s ‘Looking East’ policies with its strategic interests stretching from the Middle East to East Asia, affirming recognition of the inclusion of the Western Pacific within the range of India’s security interests.2 It is attractive

216   S. Bateman to the United States because it establishes the two key strategic regions of East and South West Asia as a common strategic whole bringing together India, Australia, Indonesia, Japan and other states with concerns about China’s expanding influence. The concept fits with Japanese Prime Minister’s Abe’s notion of ‘broader Asia’ under a ‘strategic global partnership’ between India and Japan.3 It also appeals to Australia where strategic perspectives have been torn between a traditional focus on the Pacific and East Asia on the one hand, and ‘looking West’ to the Indian Ocean on the other.4 The Indo-­Pacific system is less attractive, however, to China which can view the system as part of efforts to encircle it strategically. It also has little appeal to African countries in the IOR that are more concerned about local issues of governance, poverty, disease and internal security rather than the broader strategic issues implicit in an Indo-­Pacific view. While the Indo-­Pacific may appeal at the higher strategic level, institutionalising the construct will prove difficult. The region, encompassing as it does well over half the globe, may be too large to find common interests on which to base regional institutions, other than perhaps a common desire to encircle China although that is certainly not a universal position across the region. At present, there is no institution of any nature that covers the entire Indo-­Pacific. The institutions established by the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) include South Asian members, but ASEAN itself has not shown much interest in the IOR. The Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies (HACGA) forum and the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) both have a footprint in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. India participates in both these arrangements. Maritime security Maritime security is a major concern in the Indo-­Pacific. Related issues appear regularly on the agenda of regional institutions, but the focus of discussion is largely on non-­traditional security issues, such as environmental threats, climate and human security issues, including piracy and maritime terrorism. Much of the academic discussion concerned with regionalism in the IOR and regional institution-­building has tended to focus on these non-­traditional security issues.5 Existing institutions tend to avoid the more sensitive sources of interstate tension and conflict in the maritime domain, such as sovereignty disputes, different interpretations of the law of the sea and the possibility of ‘naval arms races’. These issues have been characterised as the ‘wicked problems’ of maritime security.6 Wicked problems are those that involve fundamental differences between stakeholders, who typically have deeply held convictions about the correctness of their own position. As a consequence, regional institutions tend to focus on non-­traditional security issues where common interests can more easily be identified.

India and regional maritime security   217 Regional institutions There are numerous institutions in East Asia, or more widely, the Asia Pacific, concerned with maritime security – these include forums established under ASEAN, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF ) and the East Asian Summit (EAS); and the ones established outside of ASEAN, such as Asia-­Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS). China is a participant in all these forums while India participates in the ASEAN-­related forums, but is not a member of the other institutions. The IOR is less institutionalised compared with the Asia Pacific. The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) both address maritime security issues, but it is early days for both and no effective regime-­wide security regime exists at present. India played the leading role in establishing both these institutions. In comparison, institutions at a sub-­regional level, notably the Indian Ocean Commission in the south-­west, the Gulf Cooperation Council in the north-­ west and, of course, ASEAN in the north-­east, have done reasonably well. Institutions in South Asia have been less successful although the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-­Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) has potential for dealing with maritime security issues in its part of the Indian Ocean. This chapter considers the institutions that do or should address maritime security, including piracy, maritime terrorism and the risks of interstate conflict. Due to the lack of institutions covering the wider Indo-­Pacific, it deals with the IOR and East Asia separately before putting it altogether with observations applicable to the wider Indo-­Pacific. The chapter does not address the regional institutions established to address aspects of non-­traditional maritime security, such as illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing and the threat of natural disasters. Examples of these include the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response and the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission.

Indian Ocean Strategic overview The IOR is characterised by strategic uncertainty, and the Indian Ocean itself has been described as a ‘sea of troubles’.7 Its troubles are extensive and diverse. They comprise traditional maritime security concerns, including the risks of interstate or intrastate conflict; threats to good order at sea, such as maritime terrorism, piracy and IUU fishing; and non‑traditional security concerns, including climate change, marine natural hazards, energy security and human security (the risks of crime, poverty

218   S. Bateman and disease). Most threats have a significant maritime dimension. Illegal trafficking in arms, drugs and people are all evident to some extent in the IOR, and this largely occurs by sea. IUU fishing is rife in the IOR mainly because no effective fisheries management regime has been established. China, India and the United States are major players in the IOR. Most strategic uncertainty in the region flows from questions about how relations between these three countries will evolve. Each has its own national interests and these do not necessarily coincide. Many Indian strategists are concerned about China’s alleged ‘string of pearls’ strategy in the IOR,8 and seem reluctant to concede that China has legitimate interests in the region. While China has direct interests in energy, resources and Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) in the IOR, it also faces challenges in its Western regions, Tibet and South West Asia more generally.9 Separate interests of these key players are often misread or misinterpreted to the advantage of a particular party, especially elements of the naval and strategic communities in Beijing, Delhi and Washington. These seek to promote the idea of serious threats in the region necessitating a strategic response, as well as increased defence budgets. China and India both have fears of encirclement or containment by the other, and there is uncertainty about whether the United States will be able to remain the dominant extra-­regional presence. As one United States-­based commentator has observed, the Indian Ocean may prove to be ‘an ocean too far’ for the United States with substantial impediments to the exercise of high-­ end combat power in the region that will only grow over time.10 Strategic distrust is widespread, particularly between India and China, China and the United States, India and Pakistan, and also elsewhere in the region, including in the Gulf region and around the Bay of Bengal. Other extra-­regional countries, notably Japan and Russia, are also increasing or re-­asserting their regional military presence, while France continues to see itself as having an important strategic role in the region. Institution-­building Building an effective regional institution covering the IOR has proven difficult. The Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR–ARC) is the one regional institution that emerged from the institution-­building efforts in the mid-­1990s, but it has had a chequered career.11 Largely at the behest of India with its (then) restrictive view of multilateralism, it was established as an exclusive forum limited to economic and trade issues. It made little progress initially and participating states tended to lose interest. Its subsidiary forums (the Working Group on Trade and Investment, the Indian Ocean Rim Business Forum and the Indian Ocean Rim Academic Group) have produced few results. However, it has been through a process of rejuvenation since India took over as chair in 2011.

India and regional maritime security   219 Many factors explain the lack of success with institution-­building in the IOR.12 First, regional countries are very diverse in their political systems, stability, economic development and maritime interests and capabilities. They lack common interests, other than the ocean and its resources. Second, the IOR is large and it is expensive to move around the region. Third, political sensitivities have limited the scope of cooperation. This was evident in the mid‑1990s, when there were different views about how far cooperation should extend and whether it should be inclusive or exclusive. Until recently, India has prevented the inclusion of security issues on the agenda of the IOR–ARC.13 Fourth, most regional countries lack the political, legal and administrative capacity to participate in cooperative forums. When they participate, they are invariably dependent on support and assistance from larger regional countries, but at the same time, are concerned about domination by larger powers and some loss of independence. Another problem concerns the part non-­regional countries might play in regional institutions. Several non‑littoral countries or international entities are stakeholders in the IOR. France sees itself as a regional country due to its island territories in the south-­west and sub-­Antarctic, but so far has not succeeded in becoming a full member of the IOR– ARC.14 The United Kingdom also has an island territory in the ocean, but has no significant military presence except in the Gulf region. The more prominent extra-­regional stakeholders include the United States as a global power, China as a rising great power and the European Union (EU) and Japan because of extensive trade and shipping interests. There are indications also that Russia is re-­asserting an interest in the IOR,15 and there are good reasons now for ASEAN to become more involved in the IOR.16 This large number of stakeholders with their different interests makes it difficult to find the common ground needed for building cooperation. Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) The IOR–ARC was renamed the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) in 2013. Apart from the name change, the meeting of the association in Perth in November 2013 agreed to some organisational reforms, especially more efficient meeting structures (including associated academic and business forums).17 Australia took over chair of IORA for 2013–2015 with Indonesia as vice-­chair. The charter of the organisation establishes a ‘Troika’ comprising the Chair, the Vice Chair and the previous Chair associated with the Council of Ministers (COM) and the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) to deal with important matters in the period between meetings of the COM and CSO.18 With the three influential members (Australia, Indonesia and India) forming the Troika, this might be a good opportunity to move the organisation forward.

220   S. Bateman The IORA consists of 20 member states. They reflect the considerable diversity of the IOR, although there are still some IO littoral states that, due mainly to lack of capacity, are not members – Djibouti, Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan, Somalia and Timor-­Leste. There is also an issue as to whether states of the Red Sea and the Gulf, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, should be eligible for membership. Dialogue partners include China, Egypt, France, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. France has applied for full membership but this has been rejected because only sovereign states are eligible for membership.19 The United States was only admitted as a dialogue partner in 2012 after some concerns that Iran might oppose this step. The 2010 IORA Charter states that the association’s primary objective is to promote the sustained growth and balanced development of the region and of member states, and to create common ground for regional economic cooperation. While maritime safety and security have been identified as priorities for the IORA, specific reference is made to piracy, sustainable fisheries management, and the need for preparations to deal with the natural disasters to which the region is prone.20 The Perth Communique from the meeting of the COM in 2013 had much to say about maritime safety and security and oceans issues more generally.21 It calls upon member states to implement fully their obligations under the Safety of Life at Sea Convention and the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code through domestic implementation of these instruments; support the work of the IONS, including in preparations for disaster management; information-­sharing and other activities with both civilian and non-­civilian dimensions; address needs in fisheries management and aquaculture and artisanal fishing, and underscore the need to combat illegal fishing; and foster collaboration and build capacity in areas of oceanic research. While India played a leading role in the establishment of the IOR–ARC, it has not been particularly active in developing the role of the association, even while it was Chair between 2011 and 2013 despite expectations that it would do so. The involvement of IOR countries in sub-­regional institutions may be a reason for the lacklustre performance of the IOR–ARC.22 With the exception of ASEAN, the more effective and involved sub-­regional organisations are in the West Indian Ocean rather than in the east or the north. These include the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which has an active standing maritime committee;23 the Gulf Cooperation Council whose activities include military and maritime cooperation among the GCC states;24 the African Union;25 and the Indian Ocean Commission which addresses non-­traditional maritime security issues in the south-­west IOR.26 The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is dedicated to economic, technological, social and cultural development of South Asian countries, but has not been particularly effective.27

India and regional maritime security   221 Indian Ocean Naval Symposium India held the inaugural IONS in 2008 to foster cooperation between regional navies and coast guards. IONS has 35 member countries, including all 20 members of the IORA, as well as three IORA dialogue partners (France, Egypt and Japan). Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, while members of IONS, are not members of IORA. IORA dialogue partners, China, United Kingdom and the United States are not members of IONS. IONS may be expanded with some new members.28 In between the main meetings of IONS (the ‘Concave of Chiefs’), various seminars and workshops are held each year, addressing operational issues, such as Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), anti-­piracy operations, and other non-­ sensitive matters. IONS may evolve as a useful forum, provided it is an inclusive gathering and develops a clear sense of purpose. However, the lack of common interests and threat perceptions, the wide disparities in the capabilities of maritime security forces and the costs associated with holding meetings may all work against its success. A lot of drive and resources will be necessary to sustain its momentum. When the second meeting in Abu Dhabi in 2010 considered developing a common maritime strategic perspective, there was no appetite even for preliminary work, and even India appeared to adopt a conservative and low-­key approach to the future agenda.29 Bay of Bengal The Bay of Bengal has become ‘a new focus of strategic competition in Asia’.30 It has been described as ‘a complex and important geostrategic, geopolitical and geo-­economic context implicating ASEAN with other IOR countries in profound ways’.31 India is concerned about China developing links, including of a military nature, with Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar. It has boosted its own military activities in the Bay, especially in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and has forged security arrangements with Sri Lanka and the Maldives that may be expanded to include other countries in the Bay.32 The MILAN naval gatherings at Port Blair in the Andamans are an important element of India’s naval diplomacy in the region with the 2014 event being the largest ever. The Bay of Bengal could play a key part in India assuming a greater strategic role in South East Asia and the Indo-­Pacific more generally. BIMSTEC could be a vehicle to assist in this regard. This organisation has had some involvement in maritime security issues, including terrorism, natural disaster mitigation and drug trafficking, but its main focus is on economic and social development, as well as climate change and natural hazards.33 Initiatives include a Weather and Climate Centre established in India and a Convention on Cooperation in Combating International Terrorism, Organised Crime and Illicit Drug Trafficking. The inclusion of

222   S. Bateman Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore as members would enhance the utility of BIMSTEC as a sub-­regional institution dealing with maritime security. Future prospects India holds the key to institution-­building in the IOR. Much will depend on the extent to which India is prepared to step back from any grand strategic vision of dominating the region, largely through the efforts of a powerful Indian Navy. This vision has been prominent in much commentary both by Indian authors and overseas observers.34 K.M. Panikkar expounded the idea that the Indian Ocean should remain truly Indian following the Second World War, but it has become the ‘holy grail’ of many Indian writers since then, particularly ones of a naval ilk, who continue to see that the Indian Ocean is, or should be ‘India’s Ocean’.35 However, this grand vision has encountered ‘stumbling blocks’ in the contemporary globalised world. The interests of extra-­regional countries must be considered, particularly while so much of the world’s energy is sourced from the Gulf and the Red Sea. As Raja Mohan has noted in respect to China, ‘it is absolutely important . . . for India to be realistic in the appreciation of China’s interests and signal its sensitivity toward them’.36 Historically India has opposed the presence of the United States in the Indian Ocean with generations of Indian strategists against any great power presence in the IOR.37 To some extent, there is still ambivalence in Delhi on the current relationship with the United States, particularly with concerns over the impact of the relationship upon India’s residual desire for strategic autonomy. There are elements of short-­term opportunism in the bilateral relationship and difficulties surface from time-­to-time, including the diplomatic stand-­off in December 2013 over criminal charges levelled against an Indian diplomat.38 Differences over policies towards Iran have been a basic difficulty, as well as languishing nuclear cooperation arrangements, and then it is not clear in the final analysis how far India will be prepared to jeopardise its bilateral relationship with China and play the role of balancer against China, as may be sought by Washington. Perhaps coincidentally, the Malabar bilateral naval exercise between India and the United States in 2013 was a smaller version of previous exercises in the series.39 Then there is the attitude of the other littoral and island countries. Lesser powers, such as Myanmar, Sri Lanka and the Seychelles, have become adept at cultivating rivalry between larger powers in order to gain economic advantage or strategic benefit. This is particularly so with competition between India and China.40 A contrast is evident though in the approaches of India and China – while India has tended to focus on security assistance through maritime patrol and surveillance capacity-­ building, China has mainly provided civil assistance and ‘soft aid’ with infrastructure development.

India and regional maritime security   223 IOR countries may be uncomfortable with India’s leading role, particularly if there is an under-­current that India is only willing to work with them as long as they are prepared to concede that role to India. As one eminent South East Asia commentator suggested, India’s neighbours may ‘attempt to balance against India and increase their political and security relationships with other smaller states on India’s periphery’.41 Brewster made a similar point when he observed that ‘India’s security partners in the Indian Ocean (with the possible exception of the Maldives) will likely maintain other important security relationships and will not easily grant an exclusive security role for India’.42 A region-­wide framework for security management in the IOR seems unlikely. Rather there is an emphasis on stronger bilateral, rather than multilateral, security relationships.43 As one observer has noted, ‘Current mechanisms are at best fragmented and incomplete’.44 Some maritime cooperation might be possible through IONS, but overall the prospects for security cooperation in the region as a whole are not good.45 There is a strongly held view in some regional countries, particularly India, that the primary responsibility for IOR maritime security should rest primarily with them.46 However, it is increasingly apparent that the legitimate interests of extra-­regional countries must also be considered. Paradoxically, the promotion of an Indo-­Pacific strategic construct is in effect a recognition of this reality. Major barriers to effective security cooperation include political sensitivities, both between pairs of regional countries and to the involvement of extra-­regional players; the lack of common interests; the lack of capacity of many regional countries; and the lack of resources. Thus it may be necessary to look for more focused frameworks. Kaplan recognised this when he suggested that, rather than an IOR‑wide effort, a better approach would be to rely on ‘multiple regional and ideological alliances in different parts of the Indian Ocean’.47 With the extensive common maritime interests of countries in the eastern Indian Ocean, a regional institution might be possible in that part of the ocean focused mainly on maritime issues.48 While enhanced maritime security cooperation in the IOR is desirable, basic questions remain about its feasibility. Resourcing the IORA secretariat has been a long-­running concern within the association and remains a major drawback.49 China, as a guest member, committed several million dollars towards its operations – much more than Australia committed to the grouping while it was the deputy chair.50 Doing more to re-­invigorate the IORA will cost money and there is little indication that even the current members of the Troika are prepared to commit the necessary resources. In addition to China, the Gulf States may be prepared to participate more actively in regional institution-­building, including through the contribution of resources.

224   S. Bateman

Looking East Unlike the IOR, the East Asian region is replete with institutions addressing regional maritime security, although few have had any marked success. The development of an effective regional security architecture has preoccupied governments, academics and other commentators for many years. Most current institutions have been established under ASEAN although the United States and North East Asian countries have not always been comfortable with ASEAN leadership. There are real doubts about the ability of ASEAN to handle serious security challenges, including the disputes in the South China Sea.51 Apart from institutions developed under ASEAN, Japan, due to its concern for the security of regional sea lanes, has taken the lead with establishing regional institutions, notably ReCAAP and the HACGA, dealing specifically with maritime security. Just as in the IOR, the involvement of extra-­regional countries in regional institutions has occasionally been a vexed issue. This has impacted on the United States although Washington is now accorded regional status by virtue of its territories in Guam and the Northern Marianas. However, there is concern about the ability of the United States to sustain its re-­balancing towards the region despite the regional desire that it should do so in the face of a more assertive China. There are also regional concerns about the more assertive aspects of Washington’s rebalancing, such as the AirSea Battle Concept,52 and the risks of a spiralling cycle of instability.53 Regional forums under ASEAN ASEAN was established in 1967 and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) was adopted in 1976. China, Japan, India, Australia, New Zealand and the United States have all acceded to the TAC. Security cooperation in East Asia has been driven largely by ASEAN which has actively led a process of defence regionalism, particularly over the past decade.54 ASEAN in turn has spawned other forums, particularly the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF ), the East Asian Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF ) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-­Plus). All these forums address maritime security issues. After some initial hiccups, India now participates in the ARF, the EAS, the AMF and the ADMM-­Plus. India was not admitted to the ARF until 1997 after its initial application had been rejected.55 It joined the EAS as an inaugural member despite the reservations from China.56 India has also formed a direct relationship with ASEAN.57 While these links have helped India’s ‘Look East’ policies, Brewster has still perceived that ‘in some cases there is still a feeling that India lies outside the core of these groupings’.58 Meanwhile the United States holds expectations that India may play a greater role in strengthening these groupings.59

India and regional maritime security   225 Maritime security There are now three separate forums under the umbrella of ASEAN that address maritime security specifically: the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF ); the ARF Inter-­Sessional Meeting (ISM) on Maritime Security; and the Maritime Security Expert Working Group (MSEWG) established by the ADMM-­Plus. ASEAN itself has significant security-­ related institutions, such as the ASEAN Chiefs of Defence Forces meetings. The ARF ISM on Maritime Security was established to provide an annual platform for discussion of maritime security issues, including increasing cooperation and capacity-­building, as well as specific concerns, such as piracy and armed robbery against ships and the smuggling of goods and persons. Its agenda items fall mainly within the category of ‘soft’ issues of common interest, such as cooperation in civil law enforcement, the ISPS Code and marine environmental protection – types of issue that are also covered, and possibly more appropriately, by the EAMF. Various other activities under the ARF framework relate to maritime security. These include regional meetings on the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and workshops on aspects of capacity-­ building for maritime security. These more focused meetings offer potential for achieving some real outcomes with maritime security cooperation. India has conducted one of these workshops – the ARF Workshop on ‘Training for Cooperative Maritime Security’ held in Kochi in October 2005. The AMF was first mooted at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Jakarta in June 2004, and was eventually launched at its first meeting in Surabaya in July 2010. The AMF has also sponsored the creation of a larger forum, the EAMF, that includes all members of the EAS.60 This meets back to back with meetings of the AMF with the first EAMF held in Manila in October 2012. It appears as though the EAS will be the parent body for the EAMF. A particular role of the AMF and EAMF may be to have oversight of sectoral bodies under ASEAN or the EAS concerned with issues, such as the marine environment, eco-­tourism and fisheries, and to provide some coordination of the regional approach to maritime affairs, particularly the inter-­sectoral aspects. The ADMM-­Plus has established several expert working groups on key regional security issues, including maritime security. The MSEWG was initially co-­chaired by Australia and Malaysia, and Australia hosted a field training exercise off Sydney in October 2013 followed by a meeting of the MSEWG.61 The various working groups formed under the ADMM-­Plus have proven to be useful forums in which to bring the militaries of the region into dialogue with each other, as well as exercises. India has recently agreed to co-­chair a new working group on humanitarian mine clearance.

226   S. Bateman The HACGA is an important regional forum at the Track 1.5 level.62 It was established in 2004 to provide a combined regional response to piracy but has since widened its scope to include other maritime security issues.63 Its meetings are useful, but it is an under-­appreciated forum for regional maritime security cooperation and confidence-­building. The HACGA has agreed that coast guards should work together on areas of urgent and common interest: search and rescue, environmental protection, preparedness to address natural disasters, preventing and controlling unlawful acts at sea, as well as the necessary capacity-­building.64 Its meetings are held annually with the last in Japan in October 2014. India hosted the 2012 meeting. The WPNS was the model for IONS. It provides a major forum for naval dialogue and cooperation bringing together leaders from the navies of the Western Pacific to discuss issues of common concern, including law of the sea and SLOC security. Its twenty members comprise the navies of eight ASEAN countries (Laos and Myanmar are the ASEAN non-­members), Australia, Canada, Chile, China, France, Japan, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Russia, Tonga and the United States. Bangladesh, India, Mexico and Peru have observer status. Approval has been granted for Pakistan to have observer status.65 In between biennial meetings of the WPNS, workshops are held on details of its initiatives and operational issues, such as mine counter-­ measures, HADR and exercise planning. The last meeting of the WPNS in Qingdao, China, in April 2014 agreed the voluntary and non-­binding Code for Unplanned Encounters between Ships (CUES).66 CUES sets out safety and communications procedures to be used between naval ships and naval aircraft during unplanned encounters at sea. By only being an observer at WPNS, India misses out on major opportunities to develop dialogue and cooperation with Pacific navies. Availability of funding remains a key issue with the WPNS with concerns about whether members can afford to host workshops and symposia, and attend seminars and exercises.67 This demonstrates a basic limitation on institutions set up to facilitate maritime security cooperation – there are many great ideas for cooperation but finding the necessary wherewithal to implement them can be difficult. This limitation is also applicable to the IOR where in comparison with the Pacific region, regional countries are much less well-­off. Risks of overlap There is no shortage of regional institutions in East Asia dealing with maritime security. While ASEAN has been in the ‘driver’s seat’ for many of these forums, defence regionalism remains largely an exercise in informal confidence-­building, with an occasional limited and incidental foray into preventive diplomacy.68 As Tan See Seng has noted,

India and regional maritime security   227 What is somewhat unusual and refreshing about the regional enterprise in Southeast Asian defence collaboration is an apparent quiet determination among its architects and stakeholders to eschew talk of grand designs and visions and to focus on small, even prosaic, forms of functional cooperation.69 Leaving aside ‘Track Two’ forums and the more specialised institutions, such as ReCAAP, the WPNS and the HACGA, the risk of overlap and duplication is evident between the three major ‘Track One’ activities focused on maritime security: the ARF ISM, the ADMM-­Plus, MSEWG and the EAMF. However, it would seem from consideration of the main participants and work plans of the three institutions that they are finding their own particular niche – the ARF ISM is attended mainly by defence and foreign affairs officials and is concerned with broader strategic and policy issues, including confidence-­building, despite an occasional foray into non-­traditional security issues; the MSEWG is attended mainly by defence officials and naval officers, focusing mainly on military cooperation, operational issues and confidence-­building; and the EAMF brings into play national maritime administrations, as well as naval and coast guard officers and diplomats, to look at a full range of maritime issues. While both the ARF ISM and MSEWG address confidence-­building measures, it should still be possible to define areas of responsibility with the former covering measures at the strategic and political level, while the latter focuses on measures more at the operational level.

Putting it together India and regional institutions India is keen to establish itself as a player of some relevance in East Asia and the Pacific. India has joined various Asian multilateral institutions, but perhaps due to its tradition of non-­alignment, its participation in these forums has been ‘quiet and low-­key’.70 This may also suggest that drawing on the experience from the IOR, Delhi is more comfortable in multilateral institutions set up under its leadership rather than playing as ‘a member of the team’ in institutions where the agenda and direction are set by others. Several paradoxes can be identified in India’s approach to regional institutions. India wishes to be a key player in East Asia, but has given most attention to its bilateral relationships and has been relatively inactive in regional institutions and with multilateral cooperation. As Raja Mohan has pointed out, ‘While India is party to many regional multilateral organizations that deal with security issues overlapping the member states of ASEAN, its participation in them has been somewhat lacklustre.’71 The situation is different in the IOR where India has fostered both multilateral

228   S. Bateman institutions and its bilateral relations. However, even in the IOR, India seems to be giving increased priority to its bilateral relations rather than regional institutions. India appears to have a ‘hubs and spokes’ approach to regional engagement with India as the centre of a web of bilateral relationships. It seems opposed to multilateral security cooperation unless it is in the ‘driver’s seat’, and appears more comfortable in bilateral relationships, including with the United States, except under the clear banner of the United Nations.72 While India’s perspectives on security cooperation may be evolving, they are changing slowly, and there continues to be significant political sensitivity about participating in United States-­led coalitions, such as the counter-­piracy operations off Somalia. India also remains concerned about being ‘played’ by the United States into a partnership geared towards balancing China.73 India’s regional security engagement, including its efforts to participate in and develop regional maritime institutions, can seem rather haphazard – or a bit ‘all over the place’. This might be what Raja Mohan has referred to as ‘political and strategic ambiguities’ in its military diplomacy.74 These ambiguities include India’s relationship with the United States which, as was noted above, is handicapped by India’s notions of ‘strategic autonomy’ coupled with entrenched suspicions of American motives. Ambiguities are also evident in India’s relations with China that make it difficult to see a regional security institution spanning the wider Indo-­ Pacific. It is hard for India to complain about China’s activities in the IOR when India is building close security relations in East Asia. While Delhi has been making a clear effort to build a better relationship with Beijing, there are still views from the Indian side that see China as an imminent threat. Both sides have a fear of encirclement or containment.75 India fears containment by China with an increased Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean, including China’s bilateral security links with India’s neighbours, containing it between the ocean and its long land boundary with China in the north. Similarly, Beijing views with concern closer links between India and the United States and Japan. India’s bilateral relationships India has sought a web of bilateral relations with countries throughout the IOR and East Asia. Prime Minister Narendra Modi since taking office has attached considerable importance to enhancing New Delhi’s security and strategic ties with China, Japan and the United States, as well as with Australia and key ASEAN countries such as Singapore and Vietnam.76 Security cooperation between India and Japan has been a priority for both countries. Japan is the only country with which India has a 2 + 2 dialogue involving the Foreign and Defence secretaries of the two countries.77 India ranks high in Japan’s Prime Minister’s Abe’s priorities to help

India and regional maritime security   229 balance an aggressive China, but ‘stumbling blocks’ remain, including Tokyo’s reluctance to sign a civilian nuclear arrangement with India.78 India may also prefer a cooperative security framework that involves China rather than a realist balance of power one that Abe may be seeking.79 India and South Korea are also pursuing closer security cooperation with the exchange of high level visits and the expectation that a closer relationship could help to offset the prevailing antipathy between China and Japan and China and the United States.80 India is also building stronger ties with Taiwan,81 but needs to exercise caution, particularly with statements on the South China Sea while Taiwan’s sovereignty claims to the features of that sea are identical to those of China. Along with a general region-­wide trend towards bilateral security relationships, India has established a web of bilateral relations with South East Asian nations.82 These include India’s more proximate neighbours (Indonesia,83 Malaysia, Myanmar84 and Thailand) where cooperative activities reflect a common interest in good order at sea and often involve coordinated naval patrols; its strategically significant and primary regional partner, Singapore, where India has access arrangements for its naval vessels;85 and more distant Vietnam86 and the Philippines which have both been vocal in their disputes with China over claims in the South China Sea. There is a possible downside, however, with India’s focus on bilateral relations rather than regional institutions – it risks being misconstrued as an attempt to build alliances against China, and hence conflicts with India’s attempts to improve China–India relations. This is particularly the case when greater attention seems to be given to the countries that are known to be more overtly opposed to China: Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Implications for India’s maritime strategy This review of regional institutions and the part played by India leads to three main implications for India’s maritime strategy. First, there is the issue of naval or military diplomacy and India’s regional defence engagement. This should be a clearly articulated part of the maritime strategy, but as Raja Mohan has noted, relatively little attention has been given in academic writings to India’s military diplomacy.87 The Indian Navy has been at the forefront of India’s military diplomacy, except on the sub-­continent itself, with its assistance to island and East African countries, and also in South East Asia with its cooperative arrangements with regional navies. With these diplomatic initiatives, the navy might be running ahead of foreign policy rather than having naval activities guided by foreign policy. Naval cooperation figures prominently in the diplomatic role of the Indian Navy, but it has limitations. India’s military and defence establishment places a premium on security.88 Exercising or operating closely with

230   S. Bateman another navy provides excellent opportunities to gain intelligence on the capabilities and performance of the other navy, but it can also reveal information on one’s own capabilities. This may be an explanation as to why India has not joined one of the multinational anti-­piracy task forces off Somalia. It also seems evident in the nature of the forces that India commits to international naval exercises. Exercise Malabar, the annual exercise between the United States Navy and the Indian Navy, is promoted as India’s major international naval exercise, but the Indian participants have only rarely included a submarine and then it has been one of the smaller and less capable Shishumar-­class vessels, the Indian variant of the German Type-­209, the characteristics of which are well-­known. It may present a better foundation for cooperation if India was less overtly sensitive about its own security and capabilities. Excessive secrecy inhibits maritime cooperation and information-­sharing. This limitation may explain why enhanced naval multilateralism on the part of India and China, including participation in regional multilateral forums, has not necessarily brought these two countries closer together or reduced their mutual misperceptions.89 The second consideration for India’s maritime strategy is that of the role India plays in regional institutions. Maritime defence engagement means much more than naval operational cooperation, coordinated patrols, joint exercises, port visits and so on. It should also include personnel exchanges, training and capacity-­building. India engages in these activities, but they should be a specific priority in maritime strategy. Where India might be falling short in this regard is with the greater use it could make of the multilateral regional maritime institutions and the framework they provide for cooperation and regional engagement. As far as can be ascertained, India has never offered to co-­chair any of the groups established under ASEAN to address maritime security, and has not been particularly active in any of these groups. It might help if India articulated a more comprehensive policy for its regional engagement, including capacity-­building assistance to the less well-­ equipped countries of the IOR that went beyond being just a naval policy. Regional security engagement might become more formalised, including relevant priorities. The sub-­continent itself and India’s closest neighbours would seem to have the highest priority, but what is the priority of engagement in South East Asia over say the Middle East, the Gulf, East Africa or the more remote parts of the Indian Ocean? India cannot be engaged in all parts of the IOR. And what is the priority generally of regional engagement over force development? India has been through a period of relatively rapid economic growth, but as the rate of economic growth slows and domestic pressures of education, health and social welfare become more acute, the need for priorities in defence spending will become more pressing. The third issue is a matter of ‘hard’ power and ‘soft’ power. Regional naval engagement tends to be a demonstration of ‘hard’ power whereas

India and regional maritime security   231 cooperation by coast guards is an exercise of ‘soft’ power. India’s regional maritime engagement seems not to have recognised the major expansion of regional coast guards in South East Asia and the use, for example, that China has been making of its ‘white ships’ in the South and East China Seas.90 And in the IOR, many regional countries only have coast guards. Surprisingly, unlike Japan and China, India seems to have made little use of its coast guard for cooperation and capacity-­ building overseas with, for example, the Indian Navy providing most of the assistance to island countries of the IOR rather than the Indian Coast Guard. The benefits of ‘soft’ power might be recognised in maritime strategy, including active participation in the HACGA and other regional institutions. Looking to the future India might play a more active role in the ASEAN-­based forums in persuading them to take a more active interest in the IOR, including the moves to rejuvenate the IORA, but an Indo-­Pacific-wide security institution is unlikely. However, India appears reluctant to become too heavily involved in multilateral security institutions. An Indian colleague once told me the proverb that ‘India is like an elephant – big and clumsy, but if you invite an elephant into your house, you don’t tell it where to sit’. India is certainly big and the political and strategic ambiguities in its regional engagement activities, as well as an apparent lack of coordination between naval and foreign policies, suggests some clumsiness – and India also appears to have some aversion to being told ‘where to sit’ in regional institutions! In this regard, India is not unlike the other major powers of the region – China and the United States. Within the IOR, expectations remain low for the IORA, and the IONS may have difficulty maintaining momentum. This is not to say that the IONS and IORA are not worthwhile. The IORA in particular will contribute in addressing issues of region-­wide interest, mainly ocean-­related. The practical experience of ASEAN in achieving cooperation among its member states might provide practical lessons for the IORA.91 It is vital for the future of both the IORA and IONS that India continues to play an active role as a lead facilitator of these institutions even though it might not be a current office-­holder. Similarly, India might promote BIMSTEC as a key sub-­regional institution in the IOR concerned with maritime security. The ADMM-­Plus may offer the best prospects for taking naval cooperation forward including by providing a forum for dialogue between the defence agencies of India, China and the United States.92 The EAMF offers potential for dealing with the ‘softer’ issues of maritime security. Much will depend on whether these forums can move beyond being ‘talk-­ shops’, and whether mindsets can be changed with regard to how countries

232   S. Bateman view the maritime domain. A more cooperative mindset is required and this will only be achieved through greater efforts on the part of the regional institutions. India, however, by focusing on its bilateral relationships, has done little so far to foster that cooperative mindset. There is scope now for India to bring its considerable maritime expertise and ‘soft power’ to play in fostering maritime cooperation throughout the Indo-­ Pacific. The bottom line of institution-­building in the Indo-­Pacific is that it all costs money and human resources. Countries will only be forthcoming if they perceive that the benefits of participating in a multilateral institution outweigh the costs. It would seem that India may have done that benefit-­ cost analysis and reached a conclusion that participation in regional institutions is often not worthwhile. It goes along to participate but is not going to take a more costly proactive stance, preferring instead to work on its bilateral relationships. A more proactive but nuanced stance by India would now seem both appropriate and necessary for the ongoing maritime security of the region.

Notes   1 G.V. Naidu, ‘Prospects for IOR–ARC Regionalism: An Indian Perspective’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 8, No. 1, June 2012, p. 30.   2 Dennis Rumley (ed.), The Indian Ocean Region: Security, Stability and Sustainability in the 21st Century, Australia India Institute Task Force on Indian Ocean Security, March 2013, p. 95.   3 Tetsuo Kotani, ‘Lifeline at Sea: Japan’s Policy toward the Indian Ocean Region’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol.  7, No.  2, December 2011, p. 220.   4 Sam Bateman and Anthony Bergin, Our Western Front: Australia and the Indian Ocean, Strategy Paper (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, March 2010).   5 Most recommendations, for example, in Rumley, The Indian Ocean Region, were about non-­traditional security issues rather than traditional security.   6 Sam Bateman, ‘Solving the “Wicked Problems” of Maritime Security – Are Regional Forums up to the Task?’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.  33, No.  1, 2011, pp. 1–28.   7 Bateman and Bergin, Our Western Front, Chapter 3.   8 David Brewster, ‘An Indian Sphere of Influence in the Indian Ocean’, Security Challenges, Vol. 6, No. 3, Spring 2010, p. 6.   9 C. Raja Mohan, Samudra Manthan – Sino-­Indian Rivalry in the Indo-­Pacific (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2012), p. 11. 10 Toshi Yoshihara, ‘The US Navy’s Indo-­Pacific Challenge’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 9, No. 1, June 2013, p. 90. 11 A comprehensive history and critical appraisal of the IOR–ARC may be found in Commonwealth of Australia, The Importance of the Indian Ocean Rim for Australia’s Foreign, Trade and Defence Policy, Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Canberra, June 2013, Chapters 3 and 4, www.aph.gov.au/ Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_ Trade/ Completed_inquiries/2010–13/indianocean/report/index 12 Bateman and Bergin, Our Western Front, p. 14.

India and regional maritime security   233 13 C. Raja Mohan, ‘Contemporary Strategic Environment of the Indian Ocean Region: An Overview’, in Sam Bateman, Jane Chan and Euan Graham (eds), ASEAN and the Indian Ocean – A Policy Paper (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2011), p. 21. 14 Christian Bouchard and William Crumplin, ‘Two Faces of France: “France of the Indian Ocean”/“France in the Indian Ocean” ’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 9, No. 1, December 2013, pp. 161–182; and Isabelle Saint-­Mezard, ‘The French Strategic Vision of the Indian Ocean’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 9, No. 1, June 2013, pp. 53–68. 15 Alexey D. Muraviev, ‘Shadow of the Northern Giant: Russia’s Current and Future Engagement with the Indian Ocean Region’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 9, No. 1, December 2011, pp. 200–219. 16 Bateman, Chan and Graham, ASEAN and the Indian Ocean. 17 Anthony Bergin, ‘Regional Architecture: IORA’, The Strategist, The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Blog, 8 November 2013, www.aspistrategist.org.au/ regional-­architecture-iora/. 18 www.iora.net/charter.aspx. 19 Christian Wagner, ‘The Indian Ocean Rim – Association for Regional Co-­ operation (IOR–ARC): The Futile Quest for Regionalism’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 9, No. 1, June 2013, p. 11. 20 Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) Joint Op-­Ed, 2 November 2013, www. iora.net/iora-­joint-op-­ed.aspx. 21 Available at www.dfat.gov.au/geo/indian-­ocean/iora.html. 22 Naidu, ‘Prospects for IOR–ARC Regionalism’, pp. 24–25. 23 A discussion of the role of the SADC in Indian Ocean maritime security may be found in Francis A. Korneygay Jr, ‘South Africa and SADC in the Indian Ocean Maritime Security Equation’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol.  8, No.  1, June 2012, pp. 71–89. 24 A.K. Pasha, ‘The Gulf Cooperation Council: A Regional Approach to Peace, Security and Development’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol.  8, No.  1, June 2012, pp. 90–98. 25 The African Union has 53 member states across the African continent. 26 Members of the Commission are Comoros, France (for Reunion), Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles. The Maldives is an observer. 27 P.V. Rao, ‘South Asia’s Retarded Regionalism’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 8, No. 1, June 2012, pp. 37–53. 28 S. Anandan, ‘Indian Ocean Naval Forum to Take in More Members’, The Hindu, 5 February 2014, www.thehindu.com/news/national/indian-­oceannaval-­forum-to-­take-in-­more-members/article5656853.ece. 29 Lee Cordner, ‘Progressing Maritime Security Cooperation in the Indian Ocean’, Naval War College Review, Vol. 64, No. 4, Autumn 2011, pp. 80–81. 30 David Brewster, ‘The Bay of Bengal: A New Focus for Strategic Competition in Asia’, Asia-­Pacific Bulletin, Vol. 263, 15 May 2014. 31 Shaun Lin and Carl Grundy-­Warr, ‘ASEAN and Interconnecting Regional Spheres: Lessons for the Indian Ocean Region’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 8, No. 1, June 2012, pp. 54–70. 32 David Brewster, ‘Dividing Lines: Evolving Mental Maps of the Bay of Bengal’, Asian Security, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2014, pp. 151–167. 33 Members of BIMSTEC are Bangladesh, India, the Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand. 34 David Scott, ‘India’s “Grand Strategy” for the Indian Ocean: Mahanian Visions’, Asia-­Pacific Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2006, pp. 97–127. 35 Brewster, ‘An Indian Sphere of Influence’, p. 2. 36 Mohan, Samudra Manthan, p. 206.

234   S. Bateman 37 Ashley Townshend, ‘Sino-­Indian Maritime Relations: Managing Mistrust in the Indian Ocean’, Strategic Snapshots Snapshot 6 (Sydney: Macarthur Foundation and Lowy Institute, December 2010), p.  2, www.lowyinstitute.org/files/pubfiles/Townshend,_Sino-­Indian_maritime_relations_web.pdf. 38 Harshita Kohli, ‘US–India Strategic Partnership: Diplomatic Standoff Strains Ties’, RSIS Commentaries 237/2013, 30 December 2013. 39 S. Anandan, ‘Exercise Malabar Scaled Down’, The Hindu, 10 November 2013, www.thehindu.com/news/national/kerala/exercise-­malabar-scaled-­down/article 5333301.ece. 40 See the discussion of this competition in Chapter 8 of Mohan, Samudra Manthan. 41 Barry Desker, ‘As Asia Rises, New Challenges Emerge’, RSIS Commentaries No. 120/2013, 1 July 2013. 42 Brewster, ‘An Indian Sphere of Influence’, p. 17. 43 Rumley, The Indian Ocean Region, p. 12. 44 Cordner, ‘Progressing Maritime Security Cooperation’, p. 81. 45 Peter Lehr, ‘Prospects for Multilateral Security Cooperation in the Indian Ocean: A Skeptical View’, Indian Ocean Survey – A Journal of the Indian Ocean Research Group, Vol. 1, No. 1, January–June 2005, pp. 1–18. 46 Cordner, ‘Progressing Maritime Security Cooperation’, p. 78. 47 Robert Kaplan, ‘Center Stage for the Twenty‑first Century’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 2, March/April, 2009, p. 2. 48 Bateman and Bergin, Our Western Front, pp. 47–48. 49 Commonwealth of Australia, The Importance of the Indian Ocean Rim, p. 40, para 4.27. 50 Ibid., p. 40, para 4.31. 51 Joshua Kurlantzick, ‘ASEAN’s Future and Asian Integration’, Working Paper (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, November 2012), p. 1. 52 Amitai Etzioni, ‘Who Authorized Preparations for War with China?’, Yale Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 8, 2013, pp. 37–51. 53 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, ‘An Indonesian Perspective on the U.S. Rebalancing Effort toward Asia’, Comment, National Bureau of Asian Research, 26 February 2013. 54 For a comprehensive discussion of the process, see See Seng Tan, ‘ “Talking Their Walk”? The Evolution of Defence Regionalism in Southeast Asia’, Asian Security, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2012, pp. 232–250. 55 Mohan, Samudra Manthan, p. 94. 56 Ibid., p. 222. 57 Details are discussed in Ted Osius and Raja C. Mohan, Enhancing India–ASEAN Connectivity (Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2013). 58 Brewster, ‘Dividing Lines’, p. 161. 59 National Institute for Defence Studies, East Asian Strategic Review 2014 (Tokyo: The Japan Times, 2014), p. 273. 60 Membership of the EAS and the EAMF comprises the ten ASEAN countries, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the United States and Russia. 61 Australian Government. Minister for Defence, Stephen Smith MP, ‘Transcript: Interview with Linda Mottram, Radio Australia’, 13 October 2010. www. minister.defence.gov.au/SmithTranscripttpl.cfm?CurrentId=10938. 62 Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan, Philippine, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam, Hong Kong (China) and ReCAAP participate in HACGA meetings.

India and regional maritime security   235 63 Rajeev Sharma, ‘Policing the High Seas – The Coast Guard Agencies of 17 Asian Nations Meet in India’, The Diplomat, 3 October 2013, http://thediplomat. com/2012/10/policing-­the-high-­seas/. 64 ‘Sri Lanka Represented at the Heads of Asian Coast Guard Meeting’, Asian Tribune, 11 November 2013, www.asiantribune.com/node/66773. 65 Ministry of Defence Brunei Darussalam, ‘Royal Brunei Navy Attends the Western Pacific Naval Symposium Workshop 2014’, 16 January 2014, www. mindef.gov.bn/MOD2/index.php/news-­archives-mainmenu-­70/2216-royal-­ brunei-navy-­attends-western-­pacific-naval-­symposium-workshop-­wpns-2014. 66 James Goldrick, ‘Cue co-­operation? Pacific Naval Code Aims to Improve Collaboration at Sea’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 21 May 2014, pp. 24–25. 67 Sea Power Centre Australia, ‘The Western Pacific Naval Symposium’, Semaphore, July 2006, www.navy.gov.au/media-­room/publications/semaphore-­july-2006. 68 Tan, ‘ “Talking Their Walk” ’, p. 244. 69 Ibid., p. 245. 70 C. Raja Mohan, ‘From Isolation to Partnership: The Evolution of India’s Military Diplomacy’, ISAS Working Paper No. 144 (Singapore: Institute of South Asian Studies, 20 February 2012), pp. 10–11. 71 Mohan, ‘Contemporary Strategic Environment’, p. 23. 72 Rumley, The Indian Ocean Region, p. 92. 73 Mohan, Samudra Manthan, p. 255. 74 Mohan, ‘From Isolation to Partnership’, p. 12. 75 Trefor Moss, ‘Power Struggle’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 23 December 2009, p. 22. 76 Rahul Bedi, ‘Modi’s Power Play’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 1 October 2014, p. 21. 77 ‘India Japan Defence Cooperation’, Security Risks Monitor, 25 January 2014, www.security-­risks.com/security-­trends-south-­asia/india-­defence/india-­japandefence-­cooperation-2411.html. 78 Rupakiyoti Berah, ‘Abe’s India Visit: Raising the Bar’, RSIS Commentary No. 015/2014, 23 January 2014. 79 Rahul Bhonsie, ‘Talk Asian Cooperative Security and Not Just Balancing China’, Security Risks Monitor, 25 January 2014, www.security-­risks.com/security-­ trends-south-­asia/indian-­ocean/talk-­asian-cooperative-­security-and-­not-just-­ balancing-china-­2412.html. 80 Sukjoon Yoon, ‘Middle-­Power Cooperation between South Korea and India: Hedging the Dominance of the Great Powers’, PacNet #10, 28 January 2014, https://csis.org/publication/pacnet-­10-middle-­power-cooperation-­betweensouth-­korea-and-­india-hedging-­dominance-great. 81 Arvind Gupta, ‘Strong Ties with Taiwan’, The New Indian Express, 30 January 2014, www.newindianexpress.com/opinion/article1441318.ece#.UwEnHh PNvIU. 82 C. Raja Mohan, ‘Indo-­Pacific Balancing Act: In Search of a Middle Power Coalition’, Speech to the Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 9 October 2013, www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/indo-­pacific-balancing-­act-search-­middlepower-­coalition. 83 Jennifer McArdle, ‘Wading out to Sea: The Evolution of India and Indonesia’s Naval Mindset towards Multilateralism’, ORF Occasional Paper No.  34 (New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, June 2012). 84 Vijay Sakhuja, ‘Myanmar: Expanding Naval Ties with India’, Article No. 3876, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 8 April 2013, www.ipcs.org/article/ peace-­and-conflict-­database/myanmar-­expanding-naval-­ties-with-­india-3876. html. 85 Brewster, ‘An Indian Sphere of Influence’, pp. 12–13. 86 Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘India-­Vietnam Consolidating Bilateral Ties’, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist, January 2014, pp. 51–52.

236   S. Bateman 87 Raja Mohan, ‘From Isolation to Partnership’. 88 Josy Joseph, ‘Secretive Nation’, Times of India, 23 March 2014. 89 Mohan, Samudra Manthan, p. 221. 90 Sam Bateman, ‘Regional Navies and Coastguards: Striking a Balance between “Lawships” and “Warships” ’, in Geoffrey Till and Jane Chan (eds), Naval Modernisation in Southeast Asia: Nature, Causes and Consequences (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), pp. 245–262. 91 Ralf Emmers and Sam Bateman, ‘ASEAN’s Model of Conflict Management: Lessons for the Indian Ocean Region’, in Bateman, Chan and Graham, ASEAN and the Indian Ocean – A Policy Paper, p. 27. 92 Townshend, ‘Sino-­Indian Maritime Relations’, p. 3.

12 India’s naval moment Anit Mukherjee and C. Raja Mohan

As we noted in the introduction, undivided India and its military power contributed significantly to the outcomes of the two great wars in the first half of the twentieth century. At the heart of the Indian military contribution was its Army, which became the largest all-­volunteer force in human history during the Second World War. For nearly a century and a half before that, the Indian Army was at the centre of the British imperial defence system conducting expeditionary operations and providing stability which in turn allowed the modernisation and economic globalisation of Asia. These external functions of the Army were of course in addition to the duties within the Subcontinent for territorial defence as well as internal security. This expansive role for the Army was matched by little effort to build a naval capability. There was no need for one since the Royal Navy dominated the Indian Ocean and provided complete freedom of action for the armies of the Subcontinent after the Napoleonic wars. This happy circumstance, however, strengthened the continentalist orientation of the Indian security establishment. Despite the fact that India was won by invaders who came from the sea and was controlled by one of the greatest maritime powers in history, Delhi seemed to return to continentalism. Having established dominance over the Subcontinent, the British Raj was focused on defending the North Western frontier that had so obsessed the previous great empires of the Subcontinent. Preventing rival European powers from the overland approaches to the Subcontinent, or the Great Game, became a major strategic preoccupation for the Raj. On the eve of independence, Indian navalists like K.M. Panikkar saw India inheriting both the role of the Army as a security provider as well as building a strong blue water Navy of its own.1 Another naval thinker, Keshav Vaidya laid out an ambitious naval vision for India, which called for the development of an an invincible Navy . . . to defend not only her coast but her distant oceanic frontiers with her own Navy . . . the points which must be within India’s control are not merely coastal, but oceanic, and far from the coast itself . . . our ocean frontiers are stretched far and wide in all directions.2

238   A. Mukherjee and C. Raja Mohan A number of factors, as we noted in the introduction, prevented this vision from becoming the policy for independent India. These included the Partition of the Subcontinent, the unification of China which gained control of Tibet, India’s increasing alienation from the Anglo-­American powers, and India’s inward economic orientation. In combination these factors significantly limited the possibilities for the Indian Navy, despite the expansive maritime aspirations unveiled by the likes of Panikkar and Vaidya. It was only after the end of the Cold War which opened renewed possibilities for normal relations with the West and an outward economic orientation that the Indian Navy comes into its own. In the intervening period the Navy seemed to have little role in India’s preoccupations with the contested frontiers and a diminishing interdependence with the region and the world. Amidst independent India’s military isolationism, the Navy had little or no engagement with the other major powers or key regional actors. The Navy became increasingly diminished along with India’s own relative decline during the 1960s and 1970s. Despite limited budgetary outlays the Indian Navy did plan on building a balanced force that could operate in all three dimensions. This foundation, including the development of domestic design and development capabilities, helped the Navy to emerge as a force to reckon with in the twenty-­first century both in India’s own national security calculus and in shaping the regional balance of power. The introduction of nuclear weapons into the Subcontinent produced an interesting new dynamic on India’s contested borders with Pakistan. While the disputes seemed to sharpen over Kashmir, nuclear weapons limited the possibilities of a full scale conventional war between India and Pakistan. Pakistan exploited the window that the shadow of nuclear deterrence opened up for sub-­conventional and hybrid warfare in Kashmir. The international community became increasingly concerned about escalation from the sub-­conventional to the conventional and the nuclear levels. The frequent military crises with Pakistan tested the doctrines of the Army and the Air Force towards the Western neighbour; but it was not easy to find a solution to the problem of escalation. Although the idea of a ‘limited war’ or ‘Cold Start’ generated much concern, especially in the United States and Pakistan, there was no real breakthrough in finding ways in which to punish the Pakistan Army for its support to terrorism within India. The Navy, however, from being generally irrelevant to this problem found a new niche for itself. During the Kargil war as well as the 2001–2002 crisis following the terror attack on the Indian Parliament, the entire Navy was deployed in full force into the Arabian Sea as part of the art of coercive diplomacy that India was beginning to learn. The Indian Navy has also begun to figure in interesting ways in the debate on the security threats from China. The period of relative tranquillity on the border with China that was established after Rajiv Gandhi’s visit

India’s naval moment   239 to Beijing in 1988 seemed to break down two decades later. Amidst the improvement in Chinese infrastructure in Tibet the PLA adopted more aggressive patrolling along the disputed frontier. Recognising the dangers of the military balance shifting on the frontier, India chose to modernise its own infrastructure, adapt a more vigilant posture on the border and raise new divisions for deployment along the Chinese border as well as reopen a number of dormant airfields. As the security establishment began to accept the logic of the Army and the Air Force, the Navy found a way of intervening in the China security debate for the first time. A number of analysts, especially from the Navy, began to challenge the argument that additional deployments on the China border would address India’s security concerns. They argued instead for strengthening the Navy’s ability to interdict Chinese commerce through the Malacca Straits.3 Whether such an option is feasible or not, the question of securing the land frontier with China has begun to acquire a maritime dimension. The idea that India needs to think asymmetrically and play to its advantages rather than merely increase the size of the military presence on the land borders has gained some traction within Delhi. That the Navy could be an important component of the China strategy has been strengthened by the fact that China’s presence in the Indian Ocean has begun to grow. China’s outreach to the island states like Sri Lanka, Maldives, Seychelles and Mauritius that Delhi had long seen as part of its sphere of influence has increasingly put the Navy at the centre of India’s security calculus vis-­à-vis China. The Navy’s importance in Delhi’s world view has grown not merely because of its potential role in dealing with the traditional security threats emanating from Pakistan and China. It has also come from the broadening of India’s definition of its security interests. As the Indian economy became global and increasingly interdependent with the world, Delhi had to necessarily look beyond the requirements of territorial defence and imagine its interests more broadly. As the political establishment began to articulate the proposition that India’s interests stretched from Aden to Malacca, the framing had been set for a much wider arc in which the Indian Navy had to operate. This involved more expansive naval diplomacy, greater interest in multilateral and plurilateral cooperation and undertaking new missions such as non-­combatant evacuation, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, anti-­piracy and securing the sea lanes of communication. The Navy was the natural and flexible instrument to cope with the new and emerging interests of India. Many problems, however, remain before the Navy emerges as an effective instrument. First, the Navy requires continued budgetary support for its modernisation programme. Despite the sense of India’s new strategic opportunities in the maritime domain, the political mindset in Delhi remains stubbornly continentalist. As India’s former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran pointed out,

240   A. Mukherjee and C. Raja Mohan it is through the maritime space that India will be able to re-­connect with its neighbours to the east and to the west. The implication of this geographical reality is that India must reorient its resource allocations to enable it to emerge as the key maritime power in the region.4 Delhi, however, is nowhere near making that fundamental shift in its resource allocation. Second, the threat of sea-­borne terrorism has forced the Navy to alter its acquisition, training, intelligence and operations. The Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008 led to a renewed emphasis on coastal security and have led the Navy to work more closely with state governments, coastal police and local communities. This has its own challenges and distracts from the conventional war fighting role for the Indian Navy. Unfortunately this threat cannot be ignored or wished away. Third, the Indian Navy has to face the reality of insufficient civilian maritime infrastructure and domestic industrial base. Although unrelated sectors, deficiencies in both ultimately limit India’s opportunities. Notwithstanding its significant new dependence of its economy on the seas, India’s civilian maritime infrastructure remains weak and the talk of massive investments in ports and shipping has not been translated into action. Similarly, while the Navy has done a lot better than the other services in the indigenisation of weapons production and the government led by Narendra Modi has put a special emphasis on reducing arms imports and promoting defence production at home, a variety of policy constraints on domestic naval production remain. An additional problem, discussed in the volume, relates to India’s near lack of awareness of the strategic importance of its island territories to the east and the west of the peninsula. While China has rapidly developed the Hainan Island into a potent economic and strategic asset and is building artificial islands in the South China Sea, India has focused little on developing the Andaman Island chain, so strategically located at the junction of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. On the contrary it has neglected the military potential of these islands. Hence, for instance, the islands play host to the Andaman and Nicobar Command, India’s first joint Command, which was created with an aim to forge an integrated, tri-­services capability. However, this command suffers from institutional apathy and a woeful lack of resources. Finally, there are significant institutional problems in inter-­services cooperation and higher defence management. As discussed by many of the authors in this book, jointness in the Indian military remains problematic and requires urgent attention. Equally important is the issue of higher defence management and civil-­military relations which, under the previous United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition government, were said to be ‘in crisis’.5 Tensions between civilians and the military led to the unprecedented resignation in February 2014 of Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral D.K. Joshi.6 While these tensions have since dissipated structural problems in India’s higher defence management remain.7

India’s naval moment   241 As the Indian Navy began to acquire a critical mass by the first decade of the twentieth century, the security environment in Asia and the Indo-­Pacific began to take a dramatic turn. The rise of China, its assertiveness in the maritime territorial disputes with the Asian neighbours, the uncertainties in its relations with Japan and the United States has ended an extended period of great power harmony and regional stability in East Asia. Amidst the unfolding redistribution of power in Asia and the Pacific, there has been a growing regional interest in India’s contribution to stability in Asia. This broad idea was at the back of the American mind when the Bush Administration gambled on transforming relations with India. The idea that India could contribute positively to the regional balance of power had nudged the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) into inviting India to become a founding member of the East Asia Summit in 2005. But the developments since then – Japan’s rethink of its national security policies and the US pivot to Asia –have increased the interest in Tokyo, Washington and Canberra for greater strategic cooperation and coordination with India. With ASEAN unable to develop a united response to the China challenge, individual countries like Myanmar, Vietnam and Indonesia have eagerly sought to develop deeper strategic ties with India. This new dynamic, of course, is playing out in the maritime domain giving the Indian Navy an important future role in the regional balance of power. The Indian Navy seemed to be in a very unique position: to improve its capabilities and reach in collaboration with other powers and regional actors and use its growing capacity to acquire a powerful influence on the maritime environment in the Indo-­Pacific. But the lingering foreign policy of non-­alignment and residual military isolationism tended to prevent Delhi from responding to India’s new strategic possibilities under the UPA government. Delhi was hesitant to embrace the United States for the fear of offending China. It was also reluctant to carve out a larger role for itself in the Pacific by citing the risks of being drawn into the conflict between China and its neighbours. For many, the UPA government’s ambivalent response to the new possibilities with the United States and in Asia was a reminder that strategic autonomy is deeply wired into the Indian mindset and unlikely to change any time soon. Yet within no time after taking charge the Narendra Modi government was quick to discard the ambivalence towards the United States and embarked on an expansive strategic, especially naval cooperation. Neither the BJP’s manifesto during the elections nor the articulation of the Modi government’s world view during the first year of its tenure have given any salience to terms like ‘strategic autonomy’ and ‘non-­alignment’ that figured prominently during the Congress years. Whether this shift is enduring or not, Modi has injected a new way of thinking about India and its role in the world. Quite clearly Delhi has ceased to be a political monolith when imagining the possibilities for strategic partnership with the United States in securing a stable balance of power in Asia.

242   A. Mukherjee and C. Raja Mohan Instead of non-­alignment, Modi’s emphasis has been on reinventing India as a ‘leading power’. Although the idea has not been fleshed out in detail, its essence is to see India as a power in its own right that is ready to engage all other powers on a pragmatic basis. It also involves taking leadership on regional and global issues. Modi has also been unafraid of innovating and experimenting with foreign policy and discarding the long-­standing reluctance in Delhi to take risks in pursuit of strategic rewards. Modi ended the drift in India’s relations with the United States by resolving the dispute over nuclear liability and renewing the ten year defence framework agreement. During the visit of Barack Obama to India in January 2015, Modi outlined a joint vision with the US President for the Indian Ocean and the Asia-­Pacific region that called for comprehensive economic, political and security cooperation between the two nations. It also emphasised the importance of working with other regional partners to promote peace and prosperity in the Indo-­Pacific littoral.8 This is the first time ever that Delhi and Washington have given a specific regional frame for their strategic partnership. The importance of India agreeing to work with the United States in its extended neighbourhood after decades of viewing its presence in the region has not gone unnoticed. India’s former national security adviser M.K. Narayanan noted that there were ‘implicit references in the Joint Strategic Vision Document to China’s growing economic and military strength and assertiveness’. He added that this has lent weight to the perception that ‘India and the US now see each other as a crucial partner in offsetting China’s increasingly assertive role in Asia – marking a significant departure from India’s past unwillingness to forge a common front against China’.9 Narayanan’s successor as national security adviser, Shivshankar Menon, had a more nuanced view. He suggested defining a regional framework for India–US strategic cooperation was an important step forward. At the same time, he added that this need not be interpreted as a move to counter China. For me, the strategic congruence with the US is a big step. . . . Our interests are not identical. We are not allies, we are not clients. We are not claiming that our interests are identical but there is this congruence. But there is congruence with Chinese as well. . . . So it does not mean necessarily that every time you assert a common interest with the US, it is somehow going to offend the Chinese.10 As he warmed up to America, Modi has also made an extra effort to reach out to the Chinese and remove many obstacles in Delhi for an expanded economic and political engagement with China. Beijing on its part has found Modi a potentially attractive partner and is ready to explore possibilities for finding common ground. Modi’s self-­assured engagement with both the United States and China is at odds with the defensive and

India’s naval moment   243 passive interpretation of non-­alignment under the Manmohan Singh government. It is also more in tune with the original vision of Panikkar who envisaged India’s expansive naval cooperation with the Anglo-­American powers while fully respecting China’s legitimate interests. Writing just after the Second World War and before independence, Panikkar argued that ‘the alliance between a free and independent India and Britain is . . . not only of the utmost importance to the two countries but also to the entire Rimland of the Eurasian continent’.11 He called for a comprehensive defence partnership between Britain and India and the integration of the defence of India with that of the Indian Ocean. He laid out a clear framework for burden sharing between Britain and India – that put India in the lead in the region with Britain assisting in India’s defence modernisation and sharing its regional military bases. Replace Britain with the United States in this framework and one gets a general sense of where Delhi and Washington could head in the early twenty-­first century. In emphasising a strong relationship with the West, Panikkar was not trying to isolate China. Unlike those in Delhi today who imagine keeping China out of the Indian Ocean, Panikkar recognised the critical interests of China in the region and the need for a cooperative approach with Beijing of which he was certain was going to be a first rate power after the Second World War.12 Modi’s sure-­footed engagement with the United States, China and other powers offers a rare prospect for significantly improving India’s naval capabilities in a shorter time frame. The United States, which has supplied significant equipment for the Indian Navy since 2005 – the USS Trenton landing platform docks and the P8I maritime reconnaissance aircraft – entered discussions in 2015 on assisting India with aircraft carrier design and development.13 Japan is in talks with India on the sale and local assembly of the amphibious aircraft US-­2. India has also signalled interest in acquiring Japan’s Soryu class submarine. Put another way, the range and quality of advanced weapons systems that India can acquire from the United States and its allies has significantly increased. The United States, Japan and Australia are also eager to develop better interoperability with the naval forces of India. If Delhi discards the entrenched opposition to interoperability, the effectiveness of its Navy in the Indo-­Pacific could dramatically expand. At the strategic level, the Modi Administration appears to have recognised that collaboration with the United States is the key to reducing the growing strategic gap with China and consolidating India’s strategic advantages in the Indian Ocean and gaining a foothold in the Pacific. During the visit to the Indian Ocean island states in March 2015, Modi articulated a comprehensive framework for a more active Indian Ocean policy.14 This involved deepening security cooperation with maritime neighbours and friends. India has long had close security partnerships with both Seychelles and Mauritius; Modi has elevated it to a higher level. In Seychelles, Modi announced the gift of a second Dornier aircraft for

244   A. Mukherjee and C. Raja Mohan maritime monitoring of the island’s vast exclusive economic zone and signed an agreement for conducting a hydrographic survey of its waters. Modi also launched a coastal surveillance radar project in Seychelles.15 The radar project is part of Delhi’s ambitious project to build a network of radars across the island states in the Indian Ocean to promote maritime domain awareness in the littoral. It calls for the establishment of eight surveillance radars in Mauritius, eight in Seychelles, six in Sri Lanka and ten in Maldives. They are to be connected to 50 odd sites on the Indian coast and, in turn, will be linked to an integrated analysis centre near Delhi.16 In Mauritius, the commissioning of the MCGS Barracuda, an Offshore Patrol Vessel built by Garden Reach Shipbuilders in Kolkata, marked India’s commitment to maritime capacity-­building to the small island republics. During his visit to the islands Modi announced important agreements to develop infrastructure for connectivity in the Assumption Island (Seychelles) and Aga Lega (Mauritius). These agreements are likely to strengthen the defence capabilities of the two republics and give India a valuable foothold at critical locations in the South Western Indian Ocean.17 Modi also discarded the long-­standing Indian self-­perception as a ‘lone ranger’ in the Indian Ocean. For decades India made no secret of its reluctance to cooperate with other major powers in the Indian Ocean. Delhi constantly sought to differentiate between its legitimate role as a ‘native’ power and the intrusive presence of ‘extra-­regional’ powers. Political opposition to the presence of extra-­regional powers was central to India’s articulation of Indian Ocean policy during the 1970s and 1980s and has lingered on since the 1990s. This opposition that was once focused on the Western powers, whose presence is seen as a residual legacy of the colonial era, has easily been extended to China in the Indian strategic discourse on the Indian Ocean in recent years. Modi, however, broke from this tradition to present a new and more sophisticated approach. While insisting that ‘those who live in the region have the primary responsibility for peace, stability and prosperity in the Indian Ocean’, Modi recognised that ‘there are other nations around the world, with strong interests and stakes in the region’. Modi declared that ‘India is deeply engaged with other powers’. ‘We do this through dialogue, visits, exercises, capacity building and economic partnership’.18 One should be cautious however in assuming that there will be a significant Indian role in the Pacific Ocean. Instead, in all likelihood, India’s priority will be to consolidate its position in the Indian Ocean region. As discussed in this volume, the institutional consensus within the Indian Navy views the Indian Ocean as its primary theatre of operation and the Pacific Ocean as a secondary theatre. In part this is because the Navy believes that it neither has the operational mandate or the assets to be effective in the Pacific theatre. Therefore, its impact on the operational environment in the Pacific will be mainly through taking on larger

India’s naval moment   245 responsibilities in the Indian Ocean Region leaving the United States – its partner of choice, free to do more in the Pacific. In addition, rather than being an autonomous player it will necessarily have to work with its partners in the South China Sea. All this will require international diplomacy and extensive discussions on priorities, partnerships and burden sharing. Apart from a dynamic foreign policy the Modi government has also distinguished itself from its predecessor by focusing on issues relating to the internal management of defence. Perceptually, it was significant that Prime Minister Modi’s first visit outside Delhi since he assumed office was for the dedication of India’s largest aircraft carrier, INS Vikramaditya. Onboard the ship the prime minister articulated a vision for the Navy and its role in safeguarding maritime security. More substantially the new government has distinguished itself with the speed with which it moved on clearing long-­pending defence acquisition deals. There is also a significant emphasis on galvanising the domestic defence industrial sector under the ‘Make in India’ campaign.19 In a bid to encourage private sector participation in the defence industry it has raised the cap on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from 26 per cent to 49 per cent. The Modi government has shown greater decisiveness and a willingness to engage with the military thereby relieving some strain on civil-­military relations. In the end, there is no doubt that India has begun a consequential drift towards a more ambitious naval policy in the Indo-­Pacific. It has shed many ideas and principles that were widely considered sacrosanct in India’s world view. India appears well positioned to consolidate its natural geographic advantages in the littoral by effectively negotiating the changing dynamic among the other powers. It is no longer hesitant about taking a larger responsibility for securing the Indian Ocean and promoting regional mechanisms for collective security and economic integration. India is confident enough to collaborate with the United States in self-­ interest and engage China on maritime issues with greater self-­assurance. Yet it is important to note that some of the new naval thinking that has begun to emerge in the Modi era is only the first step towards rejuvenating Delhi’s Indo-­Pacific strategy. The new approaches will face the familiar tests of implementation and internal political contestation where Delhi has had multiple problems in the past.

Notes   1 K.M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea Power on Indian History (New York: Macmillan, 1945).   2 Keshav Vaidya, The Naval Defence of India (Bombay: Thacker, 1949), pp. 9 and 29, cited in David Scott, ‘India’s Drive for a Blue Water Navy’, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, Winter 2007–2008.   3 For instance see Raja Menon, ‘A Mountain Strike Corps is not the Only Option’, The Hindu, 29 July 2013; for more on this debate see Shashank Joshi, ‘Can India Blockade China?’, The Diplomat, 12 August 2013.

246   A. Mukherjee and C. Raja Mohan   4 Shyam Saran, ‘India and East Asia: Moving from the Margins to the Centre’, Third Annual Lecture of the Indian Association of Foreign Affairs Correspondents, India International Centre, New Delhi, 14 February 2015.   5 Anit Mukherjee, ‘Civil-­Military Relations in Crisis’, India in Transition (Philadelphia: Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania, September 2012), also see Admiral Arun Prakash, ‘Civil–Military Dissonance: The Bane of India’s National Security’, Maritime Affairs, Vol.  10, No.  1, Summer 2014, pp. 1–19.   6 See remarks made by Admiral D.K. Joshi in an interview with journalist Nitin Gokhale, ‘ “Vested Interests Have Stalled Reforms”, Former Navy Chief Admiral D.K. Joshi Tells NDTV: Full Transcript’, NDTV, 15 October 2014, http:// web.archive.org/web/20141016023422/www.ndtv.com/article/india/vested-­ interests-have-­stalled-reforms-­former-navy-­chief-admiral-­dk-joshi-­tells-ndtv-­fulltranscript-­607103.   7 See Anit Mukherjee, ‘Cleaning the Augean Stables’, Seminar, No. 658, June 2014.   8 ‘US–India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-­Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region’, issued by President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, New Delhi, 25 January 2015, www.whitehouse.gov/the-­press-office/2015/01/25/ us-­india-joint-­strategic-vision-­asia-pacific-­and-indian-­ocean-region.   9 M.K. Narayanan, ‘Tangibles and Imponderables of a Visit’, The Hindu, 6 February 2015. 10 ‘Ex-­NSA Shivshankar Menon Lauds PM Narendra Modi Foreign Policy’, The Indian Express, 17 March 2015. 11 K.M. Panikkar, The Basis of an Indo-­British Treaty (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1946). 12 K.M. Panikkar, The Future of South East Asia: An Indian View (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1943), p. 104. 13 For a discussion see Ashley J. Tellis, Making Waves: Aiding India’s Next-­Generation Aircraft Carrier (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015). 14 ‘Prime Minister’s Remarks at the Commissioning of Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) Barracuda in Mauritius’, 12 March 2015, www.mea.gov.in/ SpeechesStatements.htm?dtl/24912/Prime+Ministers+Remarks+at+the+Comm issioning+of+Offshore+Patrol+Vessel+OPV+Barracuda+in+Mauritius+Marc h+12+2015. 15 ‘Prime Minister’s Media Statement During his Visit to Seychelles’, 11 March 2015, www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-­Statements.htm?dtl/24895/Prime+Ministers+ media+statement+during+his+visit+to+Seychelles+March+11+2015. 16 Manoj Joshi, ‘Modi’s Faultless Foreign Policy’, Mid-­Day, 17 March 2015. 17 ‘India to Develop Two Islands in the Indian Ocean’, Times of India, 11 March 2015. 18 For a discussion of the implications of Modi’s Indian Ocean visit, see C. Raja Mohan, ‘Modi and the Indian Ocean: Restoring India’s Sphere of Influence’, ISAS Insight, No.  277 (Singapore: Institute of South Asian Studies, March 2015). 19 For such plans see Manu Pubby, ‘Indian Navy’s Submarines to be Made Locally; Rs.60,000-cr P75 I Will be Last Order from Abroad’, Economic Times, 24 April 2015.

Index

Page numbers in italics denote tables, those in bold denote figures. Abe, Prime Minister Shinzo 175–6, 178–9, 181, 184, 187, 216, 228–9 Act East Policy 3, 7, 194, 210; see also Look East Policy Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) 26–7 Aeronautical Development Agency (ADE) 52 Afghanistan 67, 110, 117, 127–8, 139 Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) 92–3, 157 Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) systems 22, 43; MESMA 59n31 air threat 15; anti-air threat 183 airborne early warning (AEW) 52 aircraft carriers 14, 16–17, 23–6, 32, 39, 43, 49–52, 78–9, 149, 193, 245; Admiral Gorshkov 25; based aircraft 52, 65, 76, 82n36; battle groups 50–1; carrier-centric force 4, 38, 40, 57; Chinese battle groups 62n78; construction 142n20; deployment 150; design and development 243; from Russia 37; strike force 44; Thailand operated 205; underwater 54; unsinkable 56; wings 39, 52 Al Qaeda 21, 128, 143n24 Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) 48, 61n69, 86, 90, 93, 98–9, 102, 102n16, 103n18, 103n37, 104n50, 104n62, 104n65, 240; field Headquarters 73; force accretion 100; functional Commands (+ANC) 101; Headquarters 94; Joint Command 92, 100; military assets 95, 97; organisational chart 96; theatre

command 56, 71; tri-services 5, 87, 91, 240 Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) 4, 38–9, 43, 138; anti-access (A2) strategies 57n5; bubble 4, 42, 49; capabilities 157; counter anti-access campaign 55; umbrella 45, 48 anti-piracy 71–3, 165; activity 117; cooperation 76, 167; efforts 29, 47, 50; escort schedule 183; Law 181–2; missions 5, 239; naval exercise 164–5; operations 3, 61n64, 130, 221; patrols 83n52, 139; task forces 230 Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) 42, 49, 52, 54–6 anti-submarine 183; long-range capabilities 16; Warfare (ASW) 23, 27, 42, 78, 195, 204 Anti–Submarine Warfare (ASW) 23, 42, 54–5, 57; capabilities 27; operations 63n79; ships and helicopters 78; sonar detection 53 Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW) 42–3, 54 Arabian Sea 17, 40, 48–9, 57, 112, 117, 137–8, 140, 153, 164, 167, 238; Northern 4, 40, 42 armed forces 1, 90, 198; American 84n69, 109; assistance in national disasters 73; Bangladeshi 110; Indian 49, 75, 84n69, 104n65, 107, 109, 113, 117, 119, 180; Lanka 111; Timor Leste 205 arms 110, 134–5, 179; acquisition 132; chemical 150; dumped into the sea 73; exports 122, 184; imports 240; Indian 142n19, 202; races 216;

248   Index arms continued smuggling 21, 66; suppliers 199, 203; test of 18; transfers 7, 118, 194, 195, 197; trafficking 218; ASEAN 8, 76, 106, 113, 137, 193, 208, 216, 219–21, 226, 228, 230, 234n60; Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response 217; APEC 217; ARF 106, 112, 207, 217, 224–5; ARF ISM 225, 227; community 194; EAMF 225; East Asia Summit 241; forums 231; Indian partnership 2, 4, 7, 159, 207; leaders 156; Maritime Forum (AMF) 224–5; maritime security 230; members 196; Singapore partnerships 203; Timor Leste cooperation 205 ASEAN meetings 106, 225; Chiefs of Defence Forces 225; Defence Ministers meeting 106, 112, 194, 224; Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) 106, 112, 194, 202, 207, 224–5, 227, 231; Foreign Ministers 225; Navy Chiefs (ANCM) 208; Asian security 1, 9n1; India Centre 109; South East environment 196 AURA system 52 Australia 2, 9n11, 106, 109–10, 113, 121–2, 136, 139, 142n21, 158, 164–5, 169n2, 179, 193, 205, 216, 228, 243; acceded to the TAC 224; chair of IORA 219; co-chair of MSEWG 225; deputy chair of IORA 223; membership of EAS and EAMF 234n60; observer status 226 balance of power 1–2, 8, 77, 115, 229; in Asia 8, 241; favourable 77; in the Indo-Pacific 115; regional 238, 241 Bansal, Vice-Admiral O.P. 98, 161 Bay of Bengal 8, 15–16, 28, 49, 55, 137, 182, 202, 221; deepbed sonar arrays 63n79; gas fields 62n75; India–Japan naval exercise JIMEX 179, 183; islands security 74, 153; maritime security cooperation 112; naval operations 82n45, 138; nuclear submarine trials 71; strategic distrust 218; US transit route 140 Bay of Bengal Initiative for MultiSectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) 217, 221–2, 231, 233n33

bilateral relations 136, 146, 162, 180; China–India 222; forward-looking 146; India–Japan 182, 187; Indian 2, 8, 131, 179, 227–9, 232; with South East Asian nations 229; US–India 7, 186, 222 BJP Manifesto 13, 241; led government 122 blue water 70; capabilities 159; fleet 49; force 45, 67, 205; navy 18, 28, 44, 117, 193, 237; operations 47, 78; training 150 borders 140; contested with Pakistan 238; defence 116; India’s western 127; land 1, 48, 107, 114, 239; new 1, 116; threats 141 British Raj 1, 8, 107–9, 114, 237 Brunei Darussalam 8; contested claims with China 206; exports of liquefied natural gas 198; HACGA meetings 234n62; lack of naval manpower 198; naval cooperation with India 197, 209; Royal Brunei Navy 196, 198, 209; trade with India 198 budget 100; defence 218; India’s defence 2, 22–3, 84n80; India’s naval 4, 15, 17, 22–3, 78; Indonesian defence 200; Japanese defence 178; Timor defence 205 budgetary considerations 15; outlays 100, 238; support 239 Cambodia 8, 174n101, 196; bilateral naval cooperation with India 197; Defence Cooperation Agreement with India 198, 209; defence cooperation agreement with Vietnam 199; HACGA meetings 234n62; Royal Cambodian Navy 198–9 capability 7, 25, 32, 52, 65–6, 67–9, 70–3, 76–7, 79, 81, 88, 90, 93, 117, 121, 183, 230, 237; A2/AD 43, 138, 157; accretion 86–7; acquisition 23; AIP 22; amphibious 80n5; Andaman and Nicobar Command 61; building 6, 17; combat 51; defence 244; distance operations 68, 82n24; enhancement 118; expeditionary 81n15; far seas 5, 74, 78, 81n23; force projection 150; forward defence 84n77; IONS maritime security forces 221; IOR maritime 219; lack of 209; maritime 81n16; military 2, 178, 208; minimal defence 180; mix 19; to

Index   249 obstruct progress 133; optical and infrared 54; out-of-area operational 149; plans 100; power projection 4, 140; precision-strike 38; ship-to-shore 83n54; strategic 80, 116; surveillance 55; technological 136; tri-services 240; uranium enrichment 142n15; warship building 15 Chatterjee, Admiral A.K. 98 Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) 37, 69, 155, 156, 174n103, 240; former 81n23; Indian 46, 182; Pakistani 42 China 1–2, 4, 7–8, 27; aggressive 6, 71, 128, 133, 137–8, 140–1, 229, 239; anti-piracy operations 47, 61n64; assertive behaviours 206–7, 210, 242; energy 48, 60n50, 148, 153; expanding footprint 158–9; imports 22, 45; interests 147, 222, 243; IOR 147, 152, 155, 159; kill chain 54–5; Malacca Dilemma 49, 86, 88, 149–50, 153, 155; maritime security-related CSBMs 168; Maritime Silk Road 88, 121, 159, 200; military strength 242; naval capacity 14, 45; naval presence 29, 206; naval strategy 148–9; relations 8; sea lanes of communication 48; strategic counterweight 8, 203, 207; string of pearls 46–7, 60n53, 152, 159, 200, 218; submarines 27, 47, 49, 62n76, 138–9; threats 7, 15, 17, 22, 28, 35n65, 178, 186, 210, 228, 238–9 Chinese 29, 49, 147, 239; assertiveness 2, 178, 203, 206, 241–2; carrier battle groups 62n78; interest 120; landbased airpower 157, 158; missiles 54; natural gas pipeline 155, 202; occupation 145; President 86, 146, 150, 170n15; shipping 138; Special Operation Forces 49; state-owned enterprises 46; strategists 39, 48; in Tibet 1, 108–9, 116, 218, 238; waters 139, 207 Chinese capability 28; anti-access and area denial 157; naval 15, 121, 139; PLA 157; PLAN blue water 159; SinoIndian naval 144, 162 Chinese military 49–50; assertiveness 178, 242; assets 50; challenge 157; helicopters 146; installations 156; land forces 62n73; modern 128; surveillance 161, 202; theorists 58n9; troops 146–7

Chinese naval force 48, 153; expansion 22; foray into Bay of Bengal 28; naval 15, 121, 139; power projection 4, 40, 137; presence in the Indian Ocean 14, 120, 228; task forces 47, 49 Chinese Navy 17, 22, 26, 149, 157, 207 Chinese submarines 49, 138; deployment in the Indian Ocean 27, 47; launched cruise strikes 62n76; nuclear 47, 139 Coast Guard 93, 94–5, 96, 164–5, 179, 221, 226; cooperation 231; Indian 16, 164, 204, 231; Japan 164, 182, 190n41; Mauritian 118, 166; officers 227; vessels 206; see also Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies (HACGA) Cold War 3, 46–7, 108–9, 111–12, 128, 133, 137, 145, 207; divisions 107; end of 6, 50, 113, 120, 127, 136, 215, 238; escalations 177; institutional memory 132; period 108, 110; politics 1, 136; superpower rivalry 16; see also postCold War collective security 6, 119; arrangement 69; mechanism 120, 245; proposals 112 Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) 79; networks 63n91 Commander in Chief Andaman and Nicobar Command (CINCAN) 92–3, 96–7, 98, 102n16 Communications, Interoperability and Security Agreement (CISMOA) 75 confidence and security-building measure (CSBM) 146; maritimerelated 160; security-related 158, 160, 164, 166, 168; Sino-Indian 146, 163 continentalist 237, 239; mindset 9; tradition 114 corridors 30; air 56; Bangladesh– China–India–Myanmar economic 159; China–Pakistan Economic 153; Internationally Recommended Transit 165; overland energy route 171n48 counter-piracy 162, 194, 195; cooperation 168; cooperation in the Indian Ocean 168; deployment of Somalia 72, 228; Gulf of Aden deployments 150, 152, 162

250   Index counter-terrorism 161; coordination 193; defence cooperation agreement 204; Dialogue 163; Indo-Japanese Joint Working Group 164; intelligence-sharing cooperation 166; partner 143; US–India Cooperation Initiative 165 cruise missiles 44; anti-ship (ASCMs) 42, 54, 83n48; Babur 44, 59n36; BrahMos supersonic 64n97, 199; DH-10 49; Nirbhay 54, 64n94; nuclear capable 27, 44; saturation attack 51 defence 2–3, 7, 52; coastal 16, 78; reforms 100; reforms post-Kargil 91, 103n20; research 22, 52, 99, 133, 135; trade 130, 132, 134, 187 defence budgets 218; Indian 2, 15, 17, 22–3, 84n80; Japanese 178; Timor 205 Directors General of Military Operations (DGMO) hotline 163 drivers 6, 139; China’s Indian Ocean policy 29, 60n49; India–Japan relations 7, 177; Indian maritime and naval strategy 4, 14, 19, 22, 80n5; Indian Navy far-seas presence 80 drug trafficking 21, 167, 218, 221 East Asia 1, 111, 193, 215–16, 227; alternative route for energy supplies 155; consumers of energy 13; Japanese expansion of power 185; JMSDF presence 183; maritime security institutions 217, 226; relations with India 192, 228; relations with Japan and the United States 241; Summit (EAS) 106, 112, 194, 207, 217, 224–5, 234n60, 241 Eastern Naval Command (ENC) 55, 71, 96–7, 100, 161 economic growth 3; Chinese 148; Indian 19­–20, 30, 140, 230 economic reforms 2–­3, 113, 120, 178 electromagnetic aircraft system (EMALS) 52 energy 150; East Asian consumers 13; routes 155, 171n48; security 3, 13, 30, 148, 205, 209, 217; Vietnam cooperation with India 156 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 3, 16, 30, 32, 87, 92–3, 198; Philippines 203; protection 3, 16; surveillance 205;

surveillance cooperation 166–7; Vietnam 207 Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) 225, 227, 231, 234n60 Eye in the Sky (EiS) aerial patrols 201 Far Eastern Naval Command (FENC) 97 Fast Attack Crafts (FAC) 42, 53, 95 First World War 107 fisheries management and aquaculture 218; sustainable 220 fishing 21; artisanal 220; illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) 217–18; Sri Lanka 167; vessels 42, 53 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 21, 135, 245 foreign policies 109, 231 forums 112; cooperative 219; established under ASEAN 217, 224–6, 231; multilateral 6, 113, 230; subsidiary 218; Track Two 227 forward deployment 39, 47 forward operations 65, 68, 79; operating bases (FOBs) 5, 70, 73–5, 78, 84n65 Freedom to Use the Seas 3, 57n3, 81n15, 82n36, 119 Gandhi, R. 1, 238 governments 224, 240; Australian 189n33; Chinese 147, 160, 163, 171n46; Japanese 177, 179–81, 183–4, 189n33; Kuwait 180; Pakistani officials 42; Russian 164; Tamil Nadu 111; Tanzanian 171n46; US 133, 141, 189n33; see also Indian government green water operations 39, 53; see also blue water Gulf of Aden 3, 29, 47; anti-piracy operations 61n64, 72, 117, 139, 149–50, 152, 162, 165, 181–3; PLAN warships 153; surveillance radar station 152 Hatoyama, Prime Minister Dr. Yukio 179 Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies (HACGA) 216, 224, 226–7, 231, 234n62 Hiranandani, Admiral 15 Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW) 17–­18, 25 Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) 41, 51, 69, 203, 221,

Index   251 226; exercise 165; operations 71, 93, 164; security 80 human smuggling 225; trafficking 21 Ikeda, Prime Minister Hayato 188n9 illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) 217–18 Independent India 1–2, 107, 109, 238, 243; defence cooperation agreements 110; political leadership 14 India 3; maritime infrastructure 13, 19, 73, 240; military energies 1, 114; Ministry of Shipping 34n43; naval ships 60n47, 70, 72–3; naval strategy 4, 6, 15, 17, 22, 28, 116 India–Indonesia 199; Coordinated Patrol (INDINDOCORPAT) 166; Indo-Pacific axis 207; Task Force on Defence 91–2, 99 India–Japan 175; drivers 7; economic sanctions 177; naval exercise 179; relations 176, 180, 186–7; security cooperation 184, 187; Tokyo Declaration 165 India–Japan–US trilateral relations 177, 186 India–Pakistan 21; War 15–­16 India–US Joint Services Committees 164; Maritime Cooperation Framework (MCF) 76; relationship 142n10, 176, 187; strategic cooperation 242 Indian: foreign policy 91, 114–15; Shipping Ministry 3; Special Operation Force 54, 63n91 Indian Army 1–2, 64n101, 67, 237; Chief 146; forces 75 Indian capability 1, 4, 30, 142n14; defence engineers 52; maritime 14, 24, 31, 40; Military 86; naval 18, 24, 28, 65, 70, 106, 137, 238, 241, 243; plans 100; sea-lift 71; Sino-Indian 144, 162 Indian government 3, 8, 19, 147, 160, 163, 179; agreement on submarine fleet 28; Anti-Piracy escort schedule 183; capability plans 71, 100; central 121; central and state 14; coalition 132, 240; Commission on Military Technical Cooperation 164; costeffective arm 193; goals 32; incentivising private sector participation 21; Indo–Japan

Partnership 177; Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) 83n56, 99, 165; maritime modernisation 30; Modi 122, 135, 145–6, 159, 186, 241, 245, 249; negotiation over US-2 184; officials 46; overseas cargo 34n43; review of defence requirements 15; Singh 116, 243; subsidy plans 20; total exports 155; UPA 240–1 Indian Navy 1, 4, 6, 9, 13, 15, 18–19, 39, 42, 47, 49, 56, 79, 84n77, 84n79, 92, 118, 121, 173n87, 196, 204, 239, 241, 244; aggressive manoeuvres 17; airpower capability 52; ASEAN Navy Chiefs’ Meeting 208; assistance to IOR island countries 231; benign hegemon 80n5; combat-capability 51; communication links 163; CSBMs 164; defence budget cut 84n80; doctrine 69; equipment supplied by US 243; expanding 111; expansion 23, 37, 81n23, 82n40; force structure 57; former chief Admiral 29; forward bases 74; future cyber warfare specialists 55; goals and objectives 41, 119; Indo-Pacific profile 106, 117; institution-building in the IOR 222; JMSDF defence ties 176, 182–3, 186; limited possibilities 238; lobbying 100; localised sea control 53; logistics agreements 75; missions and strategy 31; outward orientation 114; patrols within the Mauritian EEZ 166; portcall to China 161; port visits to Vietnam 156; procurement 34n33; under the Raj 2; regional force 137; Request for Information (RfI) 184; strategic moment 8; strike assets 172n54; surveillance 153; top brass 67–8 Indian Navy aircraft carriers 25; loss 43; carrier-centric force design 38, 40 Indian Navy capability: airpower 52; combat 51; long-range deployment 71 Indian Navy cooperation: Japan 158; with Royal Brunei Navy 198; Royal Cambodian Navy 199; Singapore 7; South East Asia 209 Indian Navy deployment: capital acquisitions 96; long-range capability 71; SCS 156, 173n71; Indian Navy exercises 130; off Andamans 104n42; Malabar 230;

252   Index Indian Navy exercises continued off Trincomalee 108; trilateral exercises 179 Indian Navy far-seas operations 77; acquisitions 84n73; long-range deployment capability 71; presence 80; power-projection 66–7 Indian Navy maritime operations 76; Capabilities Perspective Plan 24; Military Strategy (MMS) 67, 81n15, 81n16; Strategy 28, 41, 45–6, 53, 67, 81n15, 82n25 Indian Navy military 3; Chinese challenge 157; diplomacy 229; external engagement 113; Indian Navy role 68, 82n36, 124n45, 193–4; conventional war fighting 240; security provider 124n45 Indian Navy operational outlook 65; lack of readiness 14; new orientation 16; objectives 45; plans 70 Indian Navy operations 76; anti-piracy 3; Directorates of Plans & Operations 69; far-seas 77; forward mindset 5; philosophy 68; relief and rescue 73 Indian Navy power-projection 66–7; platforms 44 Indian Navy presence 72, 77, 79–80, 117, 139; littoral 106, 112; Malacca Strait 88; new normal 145, 147; SLOCs 158; strategic balance 115–16; US Navy presence 149 Indian Navy ships and vessels 202–3; surface fleet 50; investment in lowsignature surface vessels 54; modernisation drive 72; replacing ageing ships and vessels 24 Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) 8, 106, 112–13, 120, 142n13, 161–2, 167, 174n101, 174n103, 199, 202, 204, 217, 220–1, 223, 226, 231 Indian Ocean Region (IOR) 4–5, 7–8, 22, 24, 29, 40, 45–7, 49–50, 56, 61n58, 66, 68–9, 71–2, 76, 86, 106, 120, 128, 130–1, 140, 144, 147–9, 154, 156, 158, 165, 215–24, 226–8, 230–1, 232n5, 245; Chinese 155, 159; external powers 29, 116; initiatives 161; littoral states 160, 173n87; naval presence 150; ports 152–3, 159; states 174n101 Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) 8, 106, 112–13, 142n13, 166, 217–19, 231; Charter 220; members 221; secretariat 223

Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR–­ARC) 166, 218–20; partners 167 Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZP) 120 Indian security 1, 30–1; burden 116; concerns 239; cooperation 112; dilemma 18; interests 207, 215; partners 223 Indian Subcontinent 2, 6, 114, 237; American presence 127; Partition 1, 108–9, 116, 238; nuclear weapons 238; sanctions imposed 127; strategic relevance of the Indian Navy 40–1; undivided 1, 118 Indian submarines 15, 18, 43, 57, 138; AIP capability 22; exercise 230; fleet 57, 78; force 26–7, 32, 138–9; manufacturing 31–2; nuclear attack 51; submariners 201 Indo-Japanese Joint Working Group on Counter Terrorism 164; Partnership 177; strategic convergences 158 Indo-Pacific 1–2, 4–5, 8, 66, 138, 144, 207, 216; connectivity project 159; freedom of navigation 158; green water operations 39; Indian navy 243, 245; India’s strategic position 173n75, 221; littoral 106, 112, 242; maritime cooperation 232; maritime crossroads 206; multilateral security architecture 215; new normal 162; security environment 241; security institution 231; strategic construct 223; wider 72, 80, 217, 228 Indo-US Coast Guard Joint Training 165; cooperation 127, 136; defence industrial cooperation 142n20; Disaster Response Initiative 164; joint statement 156; maritime operations 76; military cooperation 138, 140, 164; naval exercise Malabar 158; relationship 129, 139, 141 Indonesia 1–2, 8, 87, 93, 108, 111, 169n2, 197, 200, 216; BIMSTEC 222; CSBMs 166–7; cooperation with India 197, 208–9; cooperation partners 205; Eye in the Sky (EiS) aerial patrols 201; IORA 219; Indopura SAREX 199; non-aligned foreign policy 207 Indonesian 200; Foreign Minister 169n2; Navy 199; Sino-Indonesian defence and security cooperation 200

Index   253 Information Fusion Centre (IFC) 194, 196, 198–9, 203–4, 206 information sharing 7, 194, 196, 198–9, 204, 209, 220, 230; Request for Information (RfI) 184 initiatives 8, 73, 158, 160, 163–8, 174n101, 199, 201, 221, 226; BIMSTEC 217; Border Defence Cooperation Agreement 146; capacity-building 118; civil nuclear 116; Constitution amendment 181; Defense Trade and Technology 136; diplomatic 229; EAS 194; existing 162; Indian Navy 79; IONS 106, 113, 120, 161; Maritime Silk Road 88, 121, 159; multilateral 112, 215; nonmilitary 68; Quadrilateral 179 institutionalised 112–13; defence 165; less 8, 217; naval cooperation 161, 194, 196 institutions 133, 228, 231; ASEAN established 216, 224–5; Asian multilateral 112, 227; basic limitation 226; maritime 217, 230; military 112, 204 intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) 50, 54, 79, 200 Inter-Sessional Meeting (ISM) 225, 227 International Liaison Officers (ILOs) 196 international security 141, 150; Japanese contribution 176; navy commitments 153 International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code 220, 225 international trade 3; India’s 19, 30, 32 Islamabad 42–4, 110, 153, 201 Islamic militants 59n34; Republic of Pakistan 168 Islamist extremism 128 Japan Maritime Self-Defence Forces (JMSDF) 76, 176, 178–84, 186; IN-JMSDF cooperation 165 Japan Self-Defence Force (JSDF) 7, 175–6, 180–2, 186–7 Japan–India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX) 158, 165, 179, 183 Japan–US alliance 176, 185–6, 188n23; security partnership 179 Japanese 7, 176–7, 180, 184–5; Constitution 181–2; diesel submarine

142n21; government 179, 189n33; India policy 175, 186; military realists 178; naval presence in the IOR 158; political circle 186; submarine 243; Yoshida Doctrine 180 Japanese Prime Ministers 176–7, 181, 216, 228; see also Abe; Hatoyama; Ikeda; Kaifu; Kishi; Koizumi; Mori; Nakasone Japanese security 176, 180; cooperation with India 177; environment 189n27;  policy 176, 187, 241; reform 175, 185 Japanese submarines 139, 243; diesel 142n21 joint naval Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 204 Joshi, Admiral D.K. 37, 61n68, 81n23, 98, 156, 174n103, 240 Kaifu, Prime Minister Toshiki 188n9 Kargil war 17, 40, 91, 117, 238 Koizumi, Prime Minister Junichiro 181 Korea 2; Japan–­Korea Treaty 185; North 180; Republic of 128, 136, 226, 234n60, 234n62; South 110, 158, 164–5, 179, 184, 191n58, 205, 229, 235n80 Landing Platform Docks (LPD) 41, 71, 110 legitimate interest 223; of China 8, 218, 243 Line of Actual Control (LAC) 145–7, 153, 159, 162, 163; Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity (AMPTLAC) 163 littoral 39, 46, 50, 53–4, 58n12, 66, 79, 82n36, 106, 111–12; ASW 57; congested areas 43; countries 222; distant 74, 77, 80; Indian Ocean 108–9, 118, 131; Indo-Pacific 8, 242; IO states 166–8, 199, 220; IOR states 69, 160, 173n87; key countries 121; maritime domain awareness 244; natural advantages 245; operations 5, 21, 81n13; Pakistan 42; states 120, 201; strike network 51; surveillance capabilities 55; vital 81n10 Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) 75, 84n69 Look East Policy 1, 3, 7, 111, 137, 156, 192–4, 205

254   Index Malaysia 8, 20, 97, 108, 111, 201, 206–7, 222, 229; Airlines flight missing 161; Anti-piracy exercise 164; HACGA meetings 234n62; maritime exercises 199; MSEWG 225; naval cooperation with India 197, 200, 208–9; TransPeninsula (Kedah-Kelantan) Pipeline 155 Maldives 1, 21, 111–12, 118, 220, 223; CSBMs 166–8; maritime security cooperation 160; Maritime Silk Road Initiative 159; PLAN’s IOR port calls 151; security arrangements 221 man-portable air defence (MANPAD) systems 42, 53 Marine Commando Force (MARCOS) 54, 63n90 maritime reach 65, 71, 76, 78 maritime security 7, 30, 45, 76, 110, 121, 159, 207, 215–17, 220, 230, 232; agreement 167; assistance 209; broader 17, 32; CSBMs 158, 160, 164, 166, 168; emerging challenges 70; Exercise 166–7; Expert Working Group (MSEWG) 225, 227; Indian Navy 77, 84n77; information-sharing centre 194, 204; IOR 223, 231; issues 193, 203, 221; Japan–India Dialogue 165; Operation 181–­2; peacetime 131; regional 65, 69, 206, 224, 226; safeguarding 245; sub-regional institution 222; Wicked Problems 216 maritime security cooperation 159, 209, 225; agreement 165, 167–8; deepening 111–12; enhanced in the IOR 223; Indo-US Framework 164; key focus area 207; regional 226; strengthened 171n46; trilateral meeting 160, 167–8 Maritime Silk Road 88, 121, 159, 200 maritime trade 3, 29–30, 48, 163 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 76, 161, 163, 166–7, 196; bilateral 195; border cooperation 201; defence cooperation 197, 200; joint naval Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 204 Menon, Shivshankar 69, 145, 159 military cooperation 1, 6, 108, 110–11, 119, 121, 203, 227; Indo-US 138, 140, 164; Japanese treaties 185; Japanese– US 176; military-to-military 127; MoU 166, 168; Oman Joint Committee 166; Russian Federation agreement

164; Sino-Indian 161; Sino-Seychelles agreement 168; Sri Lanka agreement 168 military engagement 108, 110, 113; renewed 6, 109 military equipment 198; Indian transfer 167; US 132 military realists 7, 176, 178, 184–5 military strategy Chinese Navy 22; India’s Maritime 31, 38, 57n3, 81n15, 81n16, 130; Indian Navy 3, 119 military support 6, 110 missile 42, 49, 51–4, 59n34, 62n78, 183; anti-aircraft 199; ASCMs 55–6; attacks 57; Babur 44; ballistic 78, 138, 157; boats 15, 34n36, 39–40; bombardment 50, 62n74; competitions 63n86; Exocet 43; Kamorta corvettes 79; land attack 82n36, 83n48; naval 200; Naval Strike 63n89; ships and vessels 23; strikes 48; Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 27, 206; test 180; see also cruise missiles missile submarines 26–7, 44; BrahMos supersonic 64n97, 72, 201, 206, 208; cruise 42, 49, 51, 83n48, 199; Nirbhay 54, 64n94; nuclear 37 modernisation 19; of Asia 237; India’s defence 243; military 1–2; naval 4, 15–18, 22–4, 27, 30, 37, 56, 72, 84n80, 144, 239 Modi, Prime Minister Narendra 3, 6, 116, 187, 228; government 8, 122, 145, 240–1; visit to Tokyo and Kyoto 179 multilateral 106, 113, 202; ASEAN frameworks 207–8; context 109; cooperation 227, 239; cooperative framework 194, 195; exercises 196; forums 6, 230; Indian security-related CSBMs 158; initiatives 112, 215; maritime exercise 199; military exercises 132; naval exercise 198 multilateral institutions 228, 232; Asian 112, 227; regional maritime 230 multilateral security 112; architecture 215; cooperation 8, 228; institutions 231; relationships 223 multilateralism 145, 215, 218; naval 230; security 112–13 Myanmar 8, 155, 220, 222, 226, 229; Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar economic corridor 159; bilateral

Index   255 naval cooperation with India 197; BIMSTEC 233n33; China Strategic Cooperation Partnership 168; Chinese port development 46, 202; Chinese military links 221; Coco Islands 87, 152; Indian maritime security cooperation 112; Indian Navy surveillance 153; HACGA meetings 234n62; Malacca Strait Patrol 201; naval cooperation with India 208–9; Naval Exercise 166; Navy 202; PLAN’s IOR port calls 151; strategic ties with India 241; western land border 96 Nakasone, Prime Minister Yasuhiro national security 117; apex 119; calculus 8, 238–9; consciousness 9; cooperation 134; Council (NSC) 181; ensuring 19; Indian Advisor 46, 145, 147, 159, 242; instrument of 81; Japanese 189n38; Japanese Advisor 165; Maldives and Sri Lanka Advisor meeting 167; threats to 67; US concern 127, 133 national security policies 140; cooperative 138; Indian 134; Japanese 7, 175, 241 natural gas 62n75, 206; Chinese pipeline 202; exports 198; market 20; Timor reserve potentials 205 naval capability 15, 137, 144, 162, 237; Chinese 121, 139; Indian 18, 24, 28, 65, 70, 106, 137, 238, 241, 243; Pakistani 22; Sino-Indian 144, 162; South East Asian 210 naval cooperation with India 8, 9n11, 192; Brunei 209; deepening 198; Malaysia 200; Philippines 202; Singapore 203, 208; South East Asia 196, 207–10; Thailand 205; Vietnam 208 naval diplomacy 17, 19, 50, 239; Indian 6, 107, 111, 116, 122, 221; virtues 121 naval technological cooperation 7, 204 naval threat 4, 15; regional 1, 19, 21 Nehru, J. 1, 107; Nehruvian roots 135; Nehruvian tradition 8; period 14; supportive attitude towards Japan 177; Years 108 non-alignment 6, 107, 113, 115–16, 121–2, 127, 136, 242–3; Movement 130, 177, 207; Nehruvian tradition 8; policy 1, 108, 186, 241; tradition 227

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 127 nuclear submarines 23–4, 26–7, 49, 54, 78, 138–9; attack (SSNs) 18, 26–7, 62n78; Chinese 47, 139; Indian indigenous 71; initiative 116; missile (SSBN) 26–7, 37; PLAN 143n22, 153; Soviet 17–18; US 63n79 nuclear ambiguity 40; apartheid 134; armament 145; capable missiles 27, 44; civilian deal 131–2, 136, 229; coercive escalation 39, 59n39; commercial activity 131; cooperation 22; deterrent 19, 28, 238; Indo– Pakistani interaction 44; investment 132; Iranian developments 128; liability 242; proliferation 136; shadow 44–5; strategic programme 26, 31; tests 16, 127, 146, 161, 170n15, 177, 182; threshold 41; triad 26–7, 37; weapons 4, 16, 27, 44, 51, 58n13, 238 nuclearisation/nuclearization 39, 118; India 27, 32; Pakistan 4, 40, 43 Obama, President B. 186, 242; Administration 2; Modi–­Obama summit 156 ocean-floor Chinese surveillance network 63n79 oil 172n59; consumption 148; exports 198; fleet replenishment oilers 149, 150, 152; importer 29; imports 16, 22, 30; market 20; from Middle East and Africa 45; needs 61n70; offshore fields 62n75; producing Persian Gulf states 128; refinery 89; shock 15; Sino-Vietnamese rig standoff 156; spills 166–7; Timor Leste reserves 205; traffic 88; Vietnamese concession blocks 206 ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL) 156, 172n58 Operation Ek Sath 166 Operation Enduring Freedom 164, 178 Operation Enduring Freedom–­Maritime Interdiction Operations (OEF–­MIO) 181–2 Operation Parakram 17, 40 Operation Talwar 40, 67 Operational Manoeuvre from the Sea 81n13 Operational Training 167 Out of Area Operations 65, 149

256   Index Overseas Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Operations 83n54, 83n56 Pakistan 15, 18, 39, 44–6, 110–11, 120, 137, 155, 220; arms embargo 134; army 108; blockade 42; China Economic Corridor agreement 153; Chinese CSBMs 168; contested borders 107, 238; defeating 4, 28; HACGA meetings 234n62; Indian military crises 117; Indonesian defence cooperation 200; IORA dialogue partner 221; missile-armed FACs 53; naval confrontation 38; naval variant of the Babur 59n36; Navy 21–2, 40–3; observer status 226; occupied Kashmir 145, 153; Orion maritime patrol aircraft 59n34; PLAN’s IOR port calls 151; signals intelligence facilities 49; strategic distrust 218; submarines 22; terrorists 29, 128; traditional security threats 239; Transport Pact 171n48; US engagement 127, 129, 132–3, 139, 143n24 Pakistani 16, 44; Air Force (PAF) 43; coasts 29, 153; Marines 42, 53; military thinking 59n39; political leadership 22; port of Gwadar 139; reconnaissance strike complex 49; Special Operation Forces 59n34; vessels 60n47; see also Sino-Pakistani Pakistani Navy 21–2, 40–1, 143n24; Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) 42; commanders 44; fleet concentration 137; installations in Mehran 143n24; Naval Air Defence Arm (PNAD) 42; nuclearised 4, 40, 43; Special Service Group (SSG(N)) 43 Pakistani submarines 22; midget 53–4; Navy 4, 41–3; threat 55 Partition 1, 108, 116, 238; India–Pakistan 15 partnership 2, 8, 81n16, 113, 129, 131, 136, 138, 203, 245; agreement with the Maldives 111; Britain–India defence 243; civilian space technology agreement 200; defence 122; for development 146, 163; economic 244; global 216; India– Indonesia Strategic Agreement 199; India–Soviet Union 1, 108; India–US 158, 228; Indo-Japan 177; Indo-Pacific littoral 106; informal 130; Japan–US

security 179; military 107, 116, 128; multiple 205; strategic 110, 121, 139, 165, 168, 241–2 patrols 137, 139, 195, 197, 198, 204; aggressive 239; aircraft (maritime patrol) 44, 59n34, 71, 132; anti-piracy 83n52, 165; boats 51, 205, 209; Chinese nuclear submarine 47, 143n22; coordinated 166–7, 196, 199, 201, 229–30; joint 7, 76, 164; maritime 222; offshore vessels (OPVs) 95, 104n50, 202, 244; vessels 94–5, 208 People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 45, 47, 49, 62n78, 71, 77, 128, 143n22, 149, 150, 152, 163, 171n36, 174n101; blue water capabilities 159; IOR port calls 151; warships 153, 161 Philippines 8, 84n65, 136, 174n101, 197, 206–7, 209; Chinese threat 210; dispute with China 229; India– Philippines cooperation 203; India–Philippines Defence Cooperation Agreement 202 piracy 21, 29, 128, 164, 167, 204, 217, 220, 225–6; epidemic 181; maritime 199; ReCAAP 216; threats 149; see also anti-piracy; counter-piracy post-Cold War era 176, 178; Vietnam Doi Moi (Renewal) 205 power projection 77, 82n24, 116–17; capability 4, 71–2, 79; Chinese naval 4, 40, 48; Indian Navy 4, 6, 44, 65–6, 69–72, 78; soft 19, 50, 77; US 57n5 Prakash, Admiral Arun 5, 29, 46, 69, 81n13, 90–2, 97, 98, 100–1 Prime Ministers 193, 245; of China and India 163; Deputy 14, 188n18; former 200; India’s 193–4; Japanese 175–9, 181, 184, 187, 216, 228; Office 27; Vietnam 214n75; visit to Washington 186; see also Modi; Nehru; Rao; Singh Rao, Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama 69, 82n33 Rao, Prime Minister P.V. 193 Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia 216, 224, 227, 234n62 regional engagement 228; comprehensive policy 8, 230; political and strategic ambiguities 231 regional institutions 216, 219, 227–32;

Index   257 in the Asia-Pacific 8; East Asian 2, 217, 226; establishing 224; maritime 4, 228, 230; maritime security 215; sub-regional 220 regional security 2, 117; effective architecture 224; engagement 228, 230; environment 37; key issues 225; strategy 72; sustainable 69 Royal Navy 2, 114, 237 Russia 19, 27, 77, 110, 164, 179, 206; aircraft carrier 25, 37; Cold War with US 109; economic ties with India 129; entry into Indian Ocean 120, 219; membership of EAS and EAMF; military presence 218; naval partner 106; observer status 226; submarine 17–18, 23, 78 Russian Federation 158, 164–5; aircraft 52, 201; aircraft carrier 32; Chief of Navy 77; Far East 156; submarine 27, 206 Saudi Arabia 129, 167–8, 220–1; PLAN’s IOR port calls 151 Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) 5, 13, 49, 78, 92, 148, 153, 193, 218; Chinese access 149; energy 150; Indian access 155; Indo-Pacific 158; monitoring 92; patrol 205; piracy threats 149; protection 17, 22, 30, 50, 119, 149; security 80n5, 153, 160–2, 167, 193, 226; Western-Pacific 156 Second World War 1, 9n1, 15, 177, 180, 185, 222, 237, 243 security 1, 3, 9, 70; American guarantee 180; Asian 9n1, 109; challenges 29, 35n65, 178, 209, 224; coastal 167, 240; concerns 30, 116, 118, 217, 239; cooperative framework 229; India’s 14, 17; management 28, 223; South East Asian 196; strategy 72 security cooperation 110, 113, 182, 223, 229, 242; agreement 167; deepening 2, 243; in East Asia 224; Group 164; increased 7; India–Japan 165, 176–9, 184, 187; India’s 112; Japan–US 186; joint declarations 165–6, 175, 177, 179; Malaysia–Islamabad 201; multilateral 8, 228; national 134; opportunities 130; partners 199; Sino–Indonesian 200 security dilemma 7; India’s 18; SinoIndian 7, 144–5, 147, 158–60, 162 security policy Indian 91, 114–15;

Japanese national 7, 175–6, 180–1, 184, 241; Japanese reforms 187; national 134, 138, 140 security role 1–2, 77; Indian Navy 79; India’s 208, 223; international 150 security threats 91; from China 238; emerging 19, 29; India’s 114; naval 15; non-traditional 21; from Pakistan and China 239; PLA handling 149 Shankar, Vice Admiral Vijay 98 signals intelligence (SIGINT) facilities 49 Sing, Arun 91–2, 99 Singapore 20, 74, 193, 196, 199, 203, 228; anti-piracy and SAR exercise 164; BIMSTEC 222; defence cooperation with India 111; Eye in the Sky (EiS) aerial patrols 201; HACGA meetings 234n62; Indian access arrangements for naval vessels 229; Indian Navy cooperation 7; Indo-US naval exercise Malabar 158; Information Fusion Centre (IFC) 194; military cooperation with India 108; MoU with India 76; naval cooperation 197, 208–10; Navy 93; partners of the United States 207; port 88–9; Shangri La Conference 124n44, 124n46; SIMBEX 204; trilateral exercises 179 Singh, Prime Minister Manmohan 69, 110, 116, 179, 200–1, 243 Singh, Vice Admiral A.K. 98 Sino-Indian 144–7, 158, 160–2; CSBMs 163; land border 54; military cooperation 161; military exchanges 110; military tensions 108; naval contact 174n94; naval conflict 4, 40, 47; relations 6; rivalry 45, 141n5; security dilemma 7, 159; tensions 109 Sino-Pakistani 38; corridor 153; naval exercises 161 smuggling 204, 225; anti-smuggling efforts 50; arms 21; prevention 95, 199 solidarity 1, 107 South China Sea (SCS) 14, 29, 71, 106, 117, 138, 150, 160–1, 165, 204, 207, 229, 245; artificial islands 240; Chinese land-based maritime air strike coverage 157, 158; disputes 8, 111, 119, 149, 192, 198, 201, 203, 206, 208, 224; external security challenges 209; Indian Navy deployments 156, 173n71; OVL 172n59

258   Index South East Asia 1, 6, 87, 109, 117, 179, 206–7, 209, 223, 230; Chinese aggression 140; defensive and offensive operations 74; mainland 155; Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) 224; Treaty Organisation (SEATO) 112, 137 South East Asia links with India 208, 221; defence diplomacy 111; economic cooperation 140; maritime 159, 193–4, 231; naval cooperation 69, 192, 196, 203, 210, 229; naval presence 207 South East Asian 106, 196, 205, 209; capability 192, 210; countries 7–8, 111–12, 192, 197, 206–8, 210; Nations (ASEAN) 137, 216, 229, 241; naval personnel 194; partners 204, 207; seas 140; states 128; Straits of Malacca 193 Southern African Development Community (SADC) 220, 233n23 Soviet Union 1, 15–18, 34n36, 107–9, 111–12, 120, 133, 138, 177, 185; see also Russia; Russian Federation; USSR Sri Lanka 1, 166–8, 222, 239; BIMSTEC 233n33; capacity-building initiatives 118; Chinese military links 221; Chinese port development activity 46; Chinese submarines 139; civil war 111; Galle Dialogue 150; HACGA meetings 234n62; Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace (IOZP) 120; maritime security cooperation 160; Maritime Silk Road Initiative 159; naval cooperation 112; PLAN port visits 151, 153; surveillance radar 244 strikes: air and missile 48, 54; precision 22, 49, 57; standoff 55; submarinelaunched cruise 62n76; tactical nuclear weapon 51 string of pearls 46–7, 60n53, 152, 159, 200, 218 submariners Indian Navy 201; nuclear missile 27; Vietnam People’s Navy 206 submarines 25, 38, 44, 51, 59n31, 72, 193, 200; conventional 139; dieselelectric 39, 49, 53–5, 78; fleet 16, 28; Foxtrot class 17–­18; Hunter-Killer (SSK) 23, 42; exercise 230; midget 43, 59n32; nuclear 24, 26–7, 37, 47, 71, 78, 153; nuclear-powered attack

(SSN) 62n78; rescue exercise 165; rescue vehicle 184; simulator facilities 201; see also Indian submarines; Japanese submarines; Pakistani submarines; Russian submarines; Thailand submarines submarine construction 79; Construction Plan 26; Indian manufacturing 31–2; indigenous 18 surveillance 22, 79; airborne 65; airborne maritime 95, 110, 202; capacity-building 222; coastal radar 244; coverage 52; EEZ 92, 166–7, 205; littoral 55; maritime 200; ocean-floor 63n79; outpost 153; potential outposts 70; radar station 152, 166 Taiwan 229 Taiwan Strait 150; Crisis 180; tensions 146, 149 Task Force for the Management of Defence 91; Chairman Arun Singh 91–2, 99 territorial disputes 8, 119, 128, 144, 159, 178, 201, 206, 241 terrorism 128, 238; Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law 181; international 129, 164, 166–7, 221; maritime 21, 216–17, 221; sea-borne 30, 32, 240; threat of 29, 183 terrorists 21, 29; 9/11 attack 178, 181; Mumbai attacks 3, 41, 117, 238, 240; threat 117 Thailand 8, 93, 111, 229; bilateral relationships 136; CSBMs 166–7; Eye in the Sky (EiS) aerial patrols 201; HACGA meetings 234n62; naval cooperation with India 197, 204–5, 208–9; PLAN’s IOR port calls 151; submarines 205; Treaty with Japan 185; US partners 207 threat 1, 4, 7, 15, 19, 21–3, 28, 37–9, 45, 53, 67–8, 79, 90–2, 128, 145, 149, 178, 238–9; anti-air 193; China 2, 17, 35n65, 186, 210, 228; to China 203; Communist 107, 111; environmental 216–17; hierarchy 115; to India 49, 141; Iranian midget submarines 59n32; to Japan 185; maritime 50, 218; military 176; non-traditional 66, 148; nuclear 44, 58n13; Pakistan perceptions 121, 139, 221; Pakistani 55, 60n47; proliferation 131; retaliation 18; seaward 16; security

Index   259 114, 138; terrorist 29, 32, 117, 183, 240 Tibet 1, 218; Autonomous Region 147; Chinese control 109, 238; improvement in Chinese infrastructure 239; occupation by China 108, 116 Tibetan plateau 49; Indo-Tibetan border 108; Tibetan railway infrastructure 55 Timor Leste 8, 196, 205, 209, 220; bilateral naval cooperation with India 197 Tokyo 7, 76, 147, 158; benefit from allies 185; civilian nuclear arrangement with India 229; Declaration for India–Japan Partnership 165; Indian market 178; Indian State visits 179, 183; national security 189n38, 241; relations with New Delhi 175, 177, 180, 186–7; security cooperation with India 176; US relations 177, 186 trafficking 21; arms 218; drugs 167, 218, 221; human 66, 225 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) 224 tri-services 91; capability 240; commands 5, 87; Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) 68 trilateral 160; defence or naval cooperation 199; director-general talks 165; framework for naval cooperation 112; maritime exercise 164, 179; Maritime Security Cooperation 167–8; military nexus 158; relations 177, 186 tsunami relief operations (Indian Ocean) 5, 67, 69, 73, 93, 113, 117 TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan) 59n34 United Kingdom 15, 179, 189n33, 198, 219–21; Britain–India defence 243; UK–Japan Alliance 185 United Nations 8, 118, 215, 228; coalitions not sanctioned 113, 130 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 119, 225 United Nations peacekeeping 6; forces 108; international 118; Operations 180–1 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 108, 113, 149, 182, 215, 228; Security Council–Organisation for

the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 150 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) 50, 65, 67; base 71; vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) 54 US 142n14, 241; alliances 112, 176, 185–6, 188n23; armed forces 109; Assistant Secretary of State 173n75; Central Command (CENTCOM) 127, 136; commitment 137; containment strategy 158; CSBMs 164–5, 167; defence industrial expertise 142n20; Defense Intelligence Agency 47; defense secretary 124n36, 124n44; Department of Defense 133; economic costs for defence cooperation 135; equipment 110, 132, 136; leadership 129, 131; military commitments 128; President 242; reliability 134 US Navy (American Navy) 44, 67, 182; access to Indian port facilities 140; access to Singapore naval facilities 149; Chief of Naval Operations 39, 133; forces 128, 137; Naval War College Professors 62n73; Pacific Fleet 164; policy 130–1, 136; Soviet rivalry 47; strategy 141; super carrier 52; Task Force 74 16, 33n21; trilateral relations with India and Japan 186 US-2 Search and Rescue Amphibian 23, 35n70, 179, 183–4, 243 US–India 128, 164–5; bilateral exercise Malabar 183; Cold War relationship 141n2; Defense Relationship 129; Joint Strategic Vision for the AsiaPacific and the Indian Ocean Region 246n8; naval cooperation 127; relations 6–7, 130, 132, 139, 142n10, 142n15, 186; understanding 137 USSR 15, 19, 127, 164 Vajpayee, Prime Minister Atal B. 116, 124n40, 177 Verma, Admiral Nirmal 33n8, 64n83 vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) 54 Vietnam 2, 8, 205; defiance against China 207; HACGA meetings 234n62; Indian Navy access 229; MoU with India 76; People’s Navy 199, 206; Petro 156; Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung 214n75; War 137

260   Index Vietnam cooperation with India 76; defence 111, 172n66; energy 156; naval 197, 208–9; strategic ties 228, 241 Vietnam defence cooperation with Cambodia 199; with India 111, 172n66; with South East Asia 196 Vietnamese coast 157; hydrocarbons 111; Indian Navy port calls 156; oil concession blocks 206; SinoVietnamese oil rig standoff 156 Visit and Board Search and Seize (VBSS) procedures 73, 83n52, 183 warfare 42–3; amphibious 68, 71; Anti-Submarine (ASW) 23, 27, 62n76, 78, 195, 204; Anti-Surface 54; cyber 55, 57; electronic 39, 52, 58n9; land 16; maritime 4, 38; maritime strike 56; naval 40, 76; net-centric 67; sub-conventional and hybrid 238; undersea 26, 205

warships 17, 38, 84n69; ageing fleet 25; amphibious 77; ANC 97; building capability 15; Chinese 171n36; deployed off Karachi 67; ENC 96; foreign 75; frontline 24; Indian 72, 81n16, 157, 198; Pakistani 60n47; PLAN 153, 161 War on Terror 164, 186; see also terrorism; terrorists weapons 4; advanced systems 243; Chinese supply programs 46; indigenisation of production 240; of mass destruction 183; nuclear 16, 27, 44, 58n13, 238; platform 110; procurement 202, 206; sought from Soviet Union 108; UN prohibition of chemical weapons 150; use by JMSDF 182 Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) 107, 162, 217, 226–7