Asian-Pacific Security 9781685855666

Table of contents :
Contents
Illustrations
Acronyms
Preface
1 New Security Realities in the Asian Pacific.- Perspectives, Purpose, and Approach
Part 1 Great Powers as Regional Actors
2 The United States: Coping with the Soviet Buildup and Alliance Dilemmas
3 The Soviet Union: Meshing Strategic and Revolutionary Objectives in Asia
4 The Great Powers' Security Role in Southeast Asia: Diplomacy and Force
Part 2 Northeast Asia
5 China: Coping with the Evolving Strategic Environment
6 Japan: Security Role and Continuing Policy Debates
7 The Two Koreas: Security, Diplomacy, and Peace
Part 3 Southeast Asia and Oceania
8 Vietnam/Indochina: Hanoi's Challenge to Southeast Asian Regional Order
9 ASEAN: Patterns of National and Regional Resilience
10 ANZUS: The Alliance Transformed
Part 4 Future Prospects
11 Emerging Trends and Policy Implications for the Asian-Pacific Region and the United States
Appendices
Select Bibliography
Contributors
Index

Citation preview

Asian-Pacific Security

A d a p t e d f r o m " T h e N a t i o n s of t h e P a c i f i c , " C u r r e n t H i s t o r y n o . 474 : 1 93 . U s e d w i t h p e r m i s s i o n of t h e p u b l i s h e r .

81,

Asian-Pacific Security

Emerging Challenges and Responses edited by

Young Whan Kihl and

Lawrence E. Grinter

Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. • Boulder, Colorado

All of t h e c h a p t e r s in this book are o r i g i n a l and w e r e w r i t t e n e s p e c i a l l y f o r i n c l u s i o n in the p r e s e n t volume. T w o chapters, however, have also appeared elsew h e r e as j o u r n a l a r t i c l e s u n d e r s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t titles. These are: C h a p t e r 4, by S h e l d o n S i m o n , u n d e r the t i t l e "The G r e a t P o w e r s and S o u t h e a s t A s i a : C a u t i o u s M i n u e t or D a n g e r o u s T a n g o ? " As ian S u r v e y 25, no. 9 ( S e p t e m b e r 1985):918-942 . C h a p t e r 7, by Young W h a n K i h l , u n d e r the t i t l e "Evolving Inter-Korean R e l a t i o n s : S e c u r i t y , D i p l o m a c y , and P e a c e , " K o r e a ^ W o r l d Af^aj.rs 9 , no. 3 ( F a l l 1985):441-468.

Published in the United States of America in 1986 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 948 North Street, Boulder, Colorado 80302 ©

1986 by Lynne Rienner Publishers,

Inc.

All rights

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Main entry under Asian-Pacific

reserved

Data

title:

security

Bibliography: p. Includc.'i index. 1. Pacific Area--Strategic aspects--Addresses, essays, lectures. I. Kihl, Young W., 1 932II. Grinter, Lawrence E. UA830.A84 1986 355'03305 85-25631 ISBN 0-931477-51-4 Distributed outside of North and South America and Japan by Frances Pinter (Publishers) Ltd, 25 Floral Street, London WC2E 9DS England. UK ISBN 0-86187-85-256 31 Printed and bound in the United States of America

To a s a f e r world f o r t h i s and f u t u r e g e n e r a t i o n s .

Contents

List of Illustrations

ix

List of Acronyms

xi xiii

Preface Chapter 1.

Part 1. Chapter 2.

Chapter 3.

Chapter 4.

New Security Realities in "the Asian Pacific: Perspectives, Purpose, and Approach Young Whan Kihl Lawrence E. Grinter

1

Great Powers as Regional Actors The United States: Coping with the Soviet Buildup and Alliance Dilemmas Lawrence E. Grinter

19

The Soviet Union: Meshing Strategic and Revolutionary Objectives in Asia Marian Leighton Leif Rosenberger

51

The Great Powers' Security Role in Southeast Asia: Diplomacy and Force Sheldon W. Simon

79

vii

viii

Part 2. Chapter 5.

Chapter 6.

Chapter 7.

Part 3. Chapter 8.

Northeast Asia China: Coping with the Evolving Strategic Environment Robert Sutter

105

Japan: Security Role and Continuing Policy Debates William T. Tow

125

The Two Koreas: Security, Diplomacy, and Peace Young Whan Kihl

151

Southeast Asia and Oceania Vietnam/Indochina: Hanoi's Challenge to Southeast Asian Regional Order William S. Turley

177

ASEAN: Patterns of National and Regional Resilience Donald E. Weatherbee

201

Chapter 10. ANZUS: The Alliance Transformed Michael McKinley

225

Chapter 9.

Part 4.

Future Prospects

Chapter 11. Emerging Trends and Policy Implications for the Asian-Pacific Region and the United States Lawrence E. Grinter Young Whan Kihl

2 53

Appendices

263

Select Bibliography

267

Contributors

273

Index

27 5

Illustrations

Map

The Asian-Pacific Region

Tables

1.1

U.S.-Soviet Military Balance in East Asia and the Pacific, January 1, 1983

8

4.1

U.S. Military Deployments in Asia

6.1

Japan's Regional Security: Selected Nuclear Capability Indices

130

6.2

Japanese Public Opinion of Security Threats

141

7.1

Comparison of North and South Korean Military Postures, 1984

158

Figures

87

4.1

Strategic Straits and U.S. Military Bases in the Southeast Asian Region

83

4.2

U.S. Military Assistance to the ASEAN Countries

84

APPENDICES A.

U.S. PACOM Area Military Personnel, December 31, 1984

263

B.

Selected General Purpose Forces in Asia-Pacific, Part 1

264

Selected General Purpose Forces in Asia-Pacific, Part 2

265

ix

Acronyms

ABRI AFP ALP ALRI ANZUS ASDF ASEAN ASW AURI

A n g k a t a n B e r s e n j a t a Republik Indonesia (Indonesian Armed Forces) Armed Forces of the Philippines Australian Labour party Angkatan Laut Republik Indonesia (Navy) Australia-New Zealand-United States Air Self-Defense Force Association of Southeast Asian Nations antisubmarine warfare Angkatan Udora Republik Indonesia (Indonesian Air Force)

BAM

Baikal-Amur

Mainline

CAR CENTCOM CINCPAC CITUU CMEA COIN COMECON CPP

closer ANZAC relations U.S. Central Command Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Committee for International Trade Union Unity Council for Mutual Economic Assistance counterinsurgency Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Communist party of the Philippines

DCRK DEFCON DPRK DSP

Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo defense readiness condition Democratic People's Republic of Korea Democratic Socialist party

EEZ

exclusive economic

FIP

Force Improvement

GATT GDP GNP GSDF

general agreement on trade and tariff gross domestic product gross national product Ground Self-Defense Force

HF= DF

high frequency direction finding

IADS ICP

Integrated Air Defense System Indochina Communist party

J DA JSP

Japan Defense Agency Japanese Socialist party

zone Plan

xii KODAL

KWP

K o m a n d o D a e r a h A n g k a t a n Laut (Navy A r e a Command) Komando Daerah Militer (Military Area Command) Komando Strategic Angkatan Darat (Indonesian Army Strategic Command) Komando Wilayah Pertahanan (Defense Regional Command) Korean Workers party

LDP

Liberal Democratic party

MAF MDB MSDF

Malaysian Armed Forces Mutual Defense Board Maritime Self-Defense Force

NATO NIC NOIC NOSIC NPA

North Atlantic Treaty Organization newly industrialized country Naval Operational Intelligence Center Naval Ocean Surveillance Center New People's Army

OECD

Organization Development

PKP PLA PTUF

Philippine Communist party People's Liberation Army Pacific Trade Union Forum

RAAF RBAF RIMPAC RNZAF RNZN ROK RTA

Royal Australian Air Force Royal Brunei Air Force Rim of the Pacific Royal New Zealand Air Force Royal New Zealand Navy Republic of Korea Royal Thai Army

SAF SDF SDI SEATO SIGINT SLOC SPNFZ STOL

Singapore Armed Forces Self-Defense Forces Strategic Defense Initiative Southeast Asia Treaty Organization signals intelligence sea-lanes of communication South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone short-takeoff-and-landing

USFJ

U.S. Forces, Japan

VCP

Vietnam Communist party

WFTU WPC WTO

World Federation of Trade Unions World Peace Council Warsaw Treaty Organization

ZOPFAN

Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality

KODAM KOSTRAD KOWILHAN

of

Economic

Cooperation

and

Preface

T h e Pacific Ocean is no longer as much a p h y s i c a l barrier as it was once; t o d a y , travel and c o m m u n i c a t i o n a m o n g the nations and p e o p l e w h o share and border the o c e a n are easier to a c c o m p l i s h . The Pacific Ocean has b e c o m e , in fact, the c o m m o n lake for the P a c i f i c - r i m countries in this age of intercontinental air travel and instantaneous satellite communications. The Asian-Pacific region, the focus of this book, is an arena in which the foreign and security policies of the Great Powers and their allies compete constantly. It is a region that is not only conflict ridden politically and heavily armed m i l i t a r i l y , but also d y n a m i c economically. Moreover, it is in East Asia in the midtwentieth century that a major ideological confrontation between two different socioeconomic systems, socialism and c a p i t a l i s m , has o c c u r r e d , and its o u t c o m e is far from clear. B e c a u s e security is one of the u t m o s t concerns of the region's nations and p e o p l e , it is natural and fitting that w e have initiated this book on AsianPacific security affairs. The book a s s e m b l e s s o m e of the leading analysts and s p e c i a l i s t s of East A s i a n affairs to identify the emerging security trends and challenges in the region. They have been asked to identify current and future trends and to g i v e their v i e w s regarding the implications of these trends and the policy m e a s u r e s n e c e s s a r y to c o p e w i t h t h e s e emerging challenges. The origin of the volume stems from the two-tiered panel on Asian Security held during the 26th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association in W a s h i n g t o n , D.C., March 5-9, 1985. The p a n e l i s t s , including Davis Bobrow, Lawrence Grinter, Richard Higgot, Sheldon Simon, William Tow, William Turley, and Donald Weatherbee, agreed to assemble their respective papers into a book format. Lynne Rienner v a s approached to publish the book. The g r o u p elected L a w r e n c e G r i n t e r as one coeditor of the book. Young W h a n Kihl w a s xiii

xiv s u b s e q u e n t l y r e c r u i t e d as t h e o t h e r c o e d i t o r . In a d d i t i o n t o t h e p a n e l p a r t i c i p a n t s mentioned above, s e v e r a l a d d i t i o n a l c o n t r i b u t o r s were s o l i c i t e d : L e i f R o s e n b e r g e r and M a r i a n L e i g h t o n , Robert S u t t e r , and M i c h a e l McKinley. The two c o e d i t o r s have g i v e n equal t i m e and e f f o r t t o t h e book. The s e l e c t b i b l i o g r a p h y i s t h e work o f Young Whan K i h l and i s b a s e d on h i s own r e s e a r c h a s w e l l as r e f e r e n c e s c i t e d i n i n d i v i d u a l c h a p t e r s . The e d i t o r s w i s h t o t h a n k Lynne R i e n n e r f o r h e r p r o f e s s i o n a l g u i d a n c e and members o f h e r editorial s t a f f , e s p e c i a l l y Dianne Ewing and J a n i c e M u r r a y , f o r t h e i r d e d i c a t i o n and s k i l l . Young Whan Kihl a l s o w i s h e s t o acknowledge t h e r e c e i p t of a f a c u l t y improvement l e a v e g r a n t from Iowa S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y d u r i n g t h e f a l l 1 9 8 5 s e m e s t e r t h a t e n a b l e d him t o s p e n d t i m e a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a , B e r k e l e y , I n s t i t u t e of E a s t Asian S t u d i e s , t o i n i t i a t e new r e s e a r c h on P a c i f i c B a s i n i s s u e s i n c l u d i n g t h e c o m p l e t i o n of t h i s book. Lawrence G r i n t e r wishes t o thank many of h i s f a c u l t y c o l l e a g u e s and s t u d e n t s a t Maxwell A i r F o r c e s B a s e , whose v a l u a b l e comments o v e r t h e y e a r s have sharpened h i s own a p p r e c i a t i o n of A s i a n - P a c i f i c s e c u r i t y p r o b l e m s . F i n a l l y , both e d i t o r s wish t o thank t h e a s s o c i a t e s and c o l l e a g u e s who c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h i s volume f o r t h e i r c o o p e r a t i o n , s u p p o r t , and a n a l y t i c a l s k i l l s , as w e l l as t h e i r s u p e r b ins i g h t s . The c o e d i t o r s and c o n t r i b u t o r s hope t h a t t h i s v o l ume w i l l make a s u b s t a n t i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n t o u n d e r s t a n d ing on both s i d e s of t h e P a c i f i c of E a s t A s i a ' s emerging s e c u r i t y c h a l l e n g e s and t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r p o l i c y .

1 New Security Realities in the Asian Pacific.Perspectives, Purpose, and Approach Young Whan Kihl Lawrence E. Grinter

T h e A s i a n - P a c i f i c a r e a is o n e of the m o s t d y n a m i c r e gions in the world. It is a conflict-ridden region both politically and m i l i t a r i l y w h e r e the interests of four m a j o r world p o w e r s - - t h e United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan--intersect. It is also the site of the United States' last three m i l i t a r y conflicts (World W a r II, the Korean W a r , and the Vietnam War). Yet the Asian P a c i f i c is g r o w i n g r a p i d l y e c o n o m i c a l l y and in w o r l d t r a d e , and it h a s g r o w n in t h e 1970s and 198 0s at r a t e s not e x p e r i e n c e d e l s e w h e r e in t h e w o r l d . The AsianPacific region could b e c o m e the world's m o s t viable economic center in the not-too-distant future. 1 The Pacific Basin region, defined broadly, includes the c o u n t r i e s bordering on the Pacific: A u s t r a l i a , N e w Z e a l a n d , the U n i t e d S t a t e s , C a n a d a , t h e m i n i s t a t e s of t h e S o u t h P a c i f i c , t h e L a t i n A m e r i c a n s t a t e s , and t h e East A s i a n and S o u t h e a s t A s i a n n a t i o n s . A s u b a r e a of t h e P a c i f i c B a s i n is t h e A s i a n P a c i f i c , w h i c h f o r t h e p u r p o s e of the p r e s e n t s t u d y c o n s i s t s of t h r e e m a i n a r e a s - - N o r t h e a s t A s i a , S o u t h e a s t A s i a , and O c e a n i a - i n c l u d i n g A u s t r a l i a , N e w Z e a l a n d , J a p a n , t h e People's Republic of China (PRC), South and North Korea, Taiwan, Hong K o n g , the t h r e e I n d o c h i n e s e s t a t e s of V i e t n a m , L a o s , and C a m b o d i a , and t h e six A s s o c i a t i o n of S o u t h East A s i a n N a t i o n s ( A S E A N ) of I n d o n e s i a , M a l a y s i a , t h e Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Brunei (the latter j o i n i n g the o r g a n i z a t i o n in 1 9 8 4 ) . 2 The United States and the Soviet Union, which possess considerable regional ties and interests, are also included in the scope of the present study.

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT A N D THE SHIFTING POWER

BALANCE

T h e A s i a n - P a c i f i c a r e a is o n e of t h e m o s t h e a v i l y a r m e d reg ions in t h e w o r l d , and r e g i o n a l p e a c e and s e c u r i t y a r e s t i l l m a r r e d by c o n t i n u i n g p o l i t i c a l and military conflicts. S i n c e 1 9 4 5 , E a s t A s i a (or t h e F a r 1

2 East) has been a c e n t e r of the w o r l d s t r u g g l e b e t w e e n the dominant adversarial systems of capitalism and socialism, and the Asian-Pacific region today continues to be a p r i m e locus of c o n t e n t i o n for the m a i n actors in the g l o b a l b a l a n c e of power. 3 East Asia has w i t n e s s e d not only c o m m u n i s t r e v o l u t i o n s after World W a r II in China, North Korea, and Indochina, following prolonged civil and international wars, but conversely also some of the m o s t i m p r e s s i v e c a p i t a l i s t a c h i e v e m e n t s in the p o s t w a r era in J a p a n , South K o r e a , T a i w a n , Hong Kong, and S i n g a p o r e . The e c o n o m i c " m i r a c l e s " of the latter c a t e g o r y h a v e been credited to the d y n a m i c forces of market-oriented capitalist economies. The A s i a n P a c i f i c is a r e g i o n in s e a r c h of p e a c e and s t a b i l i t y . The K o r e a n P e n i n s u l a is an a r m e d c a m p w h e r e a c o m b i n e d total of 1.5 m i l l i o n t r o o p s are s t a tioned face to face across the 155-mile long Demilitarized Zone that s e p a r a t e s the land into the c o m m u n i s t North and the n o n c o m m u n i s t South. In the t h r e e IndoChinese countries of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, some 1.3 m i l l i o n m e n are now u n d e r a r m s , and V i e t n a m e s e forces are face to face with C h i n e s e forces across the S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e b o r d e r at the s a m e t i m e as V i e t n a m e s e forces also occupy Cambodia and deploy along the border of T h a i l a n d . About o n e - t h i r d of the 4 m i l l i o n m e n in uniform in China confront Soviet troops across the SinoSoviet f r o n t i e r , and a p p r o x i m a t e l y o n e - t h i r d of the Soviet ground f o r c e s — s o m e 52 d iv is i o n s — a r e garrisoned in the Soviet Far East. 4 The steady increase in Soviet theater forces in the Far East s i n c e the U.S. w i t h d r a w a l from I n d o c h i n a and Thailand in 1974 and 1975 has been the m a j o r s o u r c e of threat perception shared by most of the region's actors. T h e Soviet P a c i f i c Fleet is now at its largest and Soviet airpower, both tactical and strategic, continues to g r o w . A b o u t o n e - t h i r d of the Soviet S S - 2 0 intermediate-range ballistic missile battalions now threaten much of the Asian-Pacific region. 5 This concentration of m i l i t a r y f o r c e is a s o u r c e of c o n s i d e r a b l e c o n c e r n given the demonstrated willingness of the Soviet Union and its a l l i e s - - i n A f g h a n i s t a n , C a m b o d i a , and on the Korean P e n i n s u l a — t o use their military power for political ends. Fortunately, the Soviet Union has not yet been able to translate this growing military power into equivalent political influence. Its i d e o l o g i c a l a p p e a l in the Asian Pacific remains negligible, and its economic leverage l i m i t e d . T e r r i t o r i a l d i s p u t e s w i t h J a p a n and China also limit prospects for accommodation with these most important Asian neighbors, and Soviet support for Vietnam fuels the suspicion with which all ASEAN states regard M o s c o w . As the Soviet f a c i l i t i e s in V i e t n a m c o n t i n u e to e x p a n d , so the "reach" of Soviet n a v a l f o r c e s e x t e n d s beyond the W e s t Pacific to t h e I n d i a n Ocean.

3 REGIONAL DIVERSITY AND COMMONALITY t

The A s i a n P a c i f i c is a r e g i o n c h a r a c t e r i z e d by great diversity of population size, economic wealth, and cultural tradition. Populations range from the world's largest, China, with over 1 billion people and almost 4 million square miles, to the world's smallest independent s t a t e , N a u r u , in the South P a c i f i c , w i t h a p o p u l a tion of 8,000 in 8 s q u a r e m i l e s . E c o n o m i c s i z e and influence also range from oil-rich Brunei, which gained i n d e p e n d e n c e in 1984, w i t h a per c a p i t a G N P of nearly $18,000, to some of the island nations, with per capita GNPs of less than $180. Cultural, religious, and philos o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n s c o v e r the s p e c t r u m of t h e world's g r e a t h e r i t a g e s , ranging from C o n f u c i a n i s m , B u d d h i s m , and Islam to Christianity. The Asian-Pacific region is also noted for several shared a s p i r a t i o n s and a t t r i b u t e s . M o s t of the c o u n t r i e s in the r e g i o n d e s i r e p e a c e and s t a b i l i t y , e s p e cially for economic growth and development. Human res o u r c e s in the r e g i o n are a b u n d a n t and, g i v e n p r o p e r education and training, can be a productive force. The c o u n t r i e s in the r e g i o n w i t h m a r k e t - o r i e n t e d s y s t e m s h a v e e x h i b i t e d d y n a m i c e c o n o m i c g r o w t h , aided by t h e The A s i a n - P a c i f i c U.S. e c o n o m i c r e c o v e r y in 1983-84. economies have displayed the greatest resilience and the world's h i g h e s t rates of g r o w t h . U.S. t r a d e w i t h the r e g i o n is g r o w i n g , w i t h U.S. e x p o r t s to the A s i a n Pacific c o u n t r i e s v a l u e d at $54.6 b i l l i o n in 1984 and U.S. imports from these countries at $114 billion. U.S. investments in the Asian-Pacific countries are conservatively valued at over $30 billion. 6 NEW REALITIES: THREE DIMENSIONS Three dimensions of the changing reality and emerging pattern in the Asian-Pacific region are particularly noteworthy. T h e s e are (1) Soviet and S o v i e t c l i e n t p o w e r p r o j e c t i o n , (2) r e l a t i v e U.S. m i l i t a r y d i s a d v a n tage, and (3) noncommunist Asia's economic growth. The Soviet Union, for example, is projecting military forces and i n f r a s t r u c t u r e i n t o t h e a r e a at a r a p i d p a c e . China, an adversary of the Soviet Union, is introducing a m a r k e t e c o n o m y into its c o u n t r y s i d e as w e l l as into its cities and also is shopping for U.S. military equipment. J a p a n , t o t a l l y d e f e a t e d in W o r l d W a r II, h a s risen to possess the world's second largest GNP and has b e c o m e East Asia's e c o n o m i c p o w e r h o u s e . O t h e r U.S. f r i e n d s , such as South K o r e a , T a i w a n , and S i n g a p o r e , have vibrant economies and are running trade surpluses with the United States. Overall U.S. two-way trade with East A s i a and the P a c i f i c s u r p a s s e s U.S. t r a d e w i t h W e s t e r n Europe. But t h e United States s t a t i o n s f e w e r c o m b a t t r o o p s in the A s i a n - P a c i f i c area t o d a y - - o n l y about 160,000 on s h o r e and a f l o a t - - t h a n in the last

4 forty years with the exception of the low point (about 140,000 under the Carter administration). The Soviets have deployed another 100,000 troops in the region since the United States exited Indochina in 1974 and 1975. These developments create a rapidly changing security environment, one increasingly independent of any single country's control. Dimension One: Soviet and Soviet Client Power Projection The Soviet Union since 1965 has steadily and conspicuously increased its military capabilities and logistical infrastructure in the Asian-Pacific region. Moscow's Far Eastern forces in 1985 are second in size and quality only to the forces Moscow positions opposite NATO. In 1985, the USSR positioned about 480,000 troops on China's northern frontier and 110,000 troops on China's western flank in Afghanistan. The Soviets' largest fleet operates out of Vladivostock and Petropavlovsk to China's northeast. To the south, a squadron of 20 to 26 Russian warships and auxiliaries operates out of Vietnam's Cam Rahn Bay. The Soviet Union also deploys in its eastern territories about two-fifths of its ICBMs and ballistic missile firing submarines, one-third of its SS-20 missiles, one-quarter of its tactical fighter aircraft, more than one-third of its strategic bombers, and one-third of its general purpose forces. This enormous catalogue of modern military forces makes the Soviet Union Asia's predominant military power in sheer numbers alone, although equipment quality and g e o s t r a t e g i c d i s a d v a n t a g e s m a y reduce the force's effectiveness. 7 In geopolitical terms, it is perhaps not surprising that the Soviets have chosen to heavily arm their Asian territories. History and warfare have left a deep imprint on the Russian view of East Asia. The Soviet Union is an Asian as well as a European state: threequarters of Soviet territory lies east of the Ural Mountains, and 80 percent of Soviet energy is produced east of the Urals. Siberia holds up to one-fifth of the world's coal, a virtually untapped storehouse of lumber, and a huge stockpile of strategic minerals. However, Siberia, as distinct from Central Asia, is a population vacuum: only about 20 million Soviet citizens live in Western Siberia, Eastern Siberia, and the Far Eastern territories. In short, the USSR due east of the Urals has a security problem: it pushes up against 1 billion Chinese. For a variety of reasons, therefore, Moscow approaches Asia and the Pacific from a position of psychological insecurity compensated by territorial expansion. More than ever, Asia occupies a central position in Moscow's geopolitical priorities.8 The growth of Soviet military power on the SinoSoviet border has been steady. Since 1965, the number

5 of Far East f o r c e s h a s m o r e then t r i p l e d , from 15 to 50 divisions. The Chinese oppose them with approximately 100 d i v i s i o n s that are m u c h less w e l l e q u i p p e d . Over 2,400 S o v i e t c o m b a t a i r c r a f t are in t h e Far East, inc l u d i n g 1,700 s t r i k e a i r c r a f t and 400 b o m b e r s , m o s t of them highly modern. Of approximately 370 Soviet SS-20 mobile intermediate-range ballistic missiles, more than o n e - t h i r d are now d e p l o y e d east of the Ural M o u n t a i n s . By late 1981, s e e k i n g to head off m o r e t e n s i o n , the Chinese and the Russians sought ways of improving their strained relationship. In 1982, a limited rapprochement began, which resulted in an increase in bilateral trade to about $2.5 b i l l i o n (in U.S. d o l l a r s ) in 1984. A slowly improving, more stable, and less polemical relationship between Moscow and Beijing may be in the offing, but pervasive distrust and negativism between the two are not likely to dissipate. 9 In c o n t r a s t to the b o r d e r b u i l d u p o p p o s i t e C h i n a and its related n e g o t i a t i o n s , t h e S o v i e t s are involved in a hot w a r on China's w e s t e r n flank in A f g h a n i s t a n . One hundred ten thousand Soviet troops plus about 30,000 Kabul soldiers are fighting 80,000 to 100,000 Mujahideen - - t o d a t e to a s t a l e m a t e . The R u s s i a n s test a v a r i e t y of weapons in Afghanistan, some quite gruesome, against rebel p e r s o n n e l , e n c a m p m e n t s , and l i v e s t o c k . 1 0 More than 3 m i l l i o n A f g h a n s (one-fifth of the p o p u l a t i o n ) h a v e left t h e i r c o u n t r y , m o s t of them c r a m m e d into d i s m a l r e f u g e e c a m p s in w e s t e r n Pakistan. As the Russians d e n u d e the A f g h a n c o u n t r y s i d e and g a r r i s o n the t o w n s , they do not s e e m likely to quit A f g h a n i s t a n in the near future. It is a v i c i o u s w a r , but o n e w h o s e costs to d a t e are t o l e r a b l e to both M o s c o w and t h e Mu j ah ideen. In Northeast Asia, the Soviet Pacific Fleet is the largest of the USSR's four f l e e t s , e x h i b i t i n g about 90 m a j o r s u r f a c e c o m b a t a n t s and 120 s u b m a r i n e s . Overall Soviet naval t o n n a g e in the Pacific is t w i c e the U.S. tonnage. One of the principal objects of this enormous naval buildup has been Japan, Washington's m a i n ally in the Asian-Pacific region and an historic Russian enemy. Prevented by U.S. policy from occupying Hokkaido at the end of W o r l d W a r II, t h e R u s s i a n s s e t t l e d for taking all of S a k h a l i n Island, o c c u p y i n g the n o r t h e r n half of Korea, and taking the southern Kuriles immediately adjacent to H o k k a i d o — w h a t Japan calls the Northern Territories and has steadfastly claimed as its own. In order to d e f l e c t a t t e n t i o n from the 100,000 S o v i e t troops on these islands, Moscow has kept up an endless barrage of p r o p a g a n d a about the alleged " r e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n " of Japan. 1 1 On the K o r e a n P e n i n s u l a , North K o r e a , allied with the Soviet Union and equipped l a r g e l y by the latter, s h o w s no c h a n g e in its f u n d a m e n t a l o b j e c t i v e of reunifying the divided land, by force if necessary. In S o u t h e a s t A s i a , the S o v i e t s o p e r a t e a s o u t h e r n naval s q u a d r o n out of V i e t n a m ' s Cam Rahn B a y , p a r t of a large n a v a l - a i r - i n t e l 1 i g e n c e c o m p l e x 800 m i l e s a c r o s s

6

the South China Sea from U.S. assets in the P h i l i p p i n e bases at Subic Bay and Clark Air Base. At last count t w e n t y to t w e n t y - s i x Soviet s u r f a c e s h i p s and four to six s u b m a r i n e s u s e Cam Ranh Bay. Bear and B a d g e r aircraft also deploy out of Vietnam. 1 2 Vietnam's dependency on the Soviet Union is now striking—Hanoi's reliance on t h e 1978 treaty w i t h M o s c o w and m e m b e r s h i p in the S o v i e t - b l o c C o u n c i l for M u t u a l E c o n o m i c A s s i s t a n c e (COMECON) continues. All gasoline, oil, major weapons, l o g i s t i c s , and high t e c h n o l o g y in I n d o c h i n a are of Soviet or East E u r o p e a n origin. Inside I n d o c h i n a , the Soviets m a y be s p e n d i n g $4 b i l l i o n a y e a r to p r o p up the Howlocal economies and to fuel Vietnam's militarism. e v e r , the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n Hanoi and M o s c o w s h o w s evidence of strain. 1 3 Vietnamese/Soviet militarism in turn has produced a reaction among the ASEAN countries, w h i c h t o g e t h e r w i t h the United N a t i o n s , the United S t a t e s , and China are a t t e m p t i n g to p r e s s V i e t n a m to leave Kampuchea. Although it appears true that Soviet military power projection has not translated into equivalent political influence in the Asian-Pacific region and indeed tends to engender backlashes, Russian behavior has not modified n o t a b l y as a result. Indeed, the S o v i e t s s h o w no desire to reduce their growing military presence in the region. As the invasion of Afghanistan and the shooting down of KAL flight 007 vividly demonstrate, the Soviets w i l l e m p l o y t h e i r forces w h e r e and w h e n they p l e a s e . The effect has been to fundamentally challenge the peace and s t a b i l i t y of the A s i a n - P a c i f i c r e g i o n and t h e assumptions behind U.S. policy. Dimension Two: Relative U.S. Military

Decline

The second c r i t i c a l d i m e n s i o n of c h a n g e i n v o l v e s U.S. military force levels in the Asian-Pacific region: they c o n t i n u e at one of their l o w e r p o i n t s s i n c e 1945. W i t h about 160,000 U.S. c o m b a t forces on s h o r e and afloat in the r e g i o n , only Brunei, S i n g a p o r e , Laos, K a m p u c h e a , M a l a y s i a , N e w Z e a l a n d , and A u s t r a l i a h a v e fewer forces in East Asia. 14 However, under the Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t h e r e has b e e n an effort to m o d e r n i z e U.S. P a c i f i c forces. These i n i t i a t i v e s i n c l u d e i n t r o d u c i n g F - 1 6 s into J a p a n and r e p l a c i n g F-4s a s s i g n e d to O k i n a w a and South Korea w i t h F - 1 5 s and F-16s. T h e 7th Fleet has also received m o r e F - 1 4 s , and the a i r c r a f t carrier Carl Vinson and the battleship Missouri are now w i t h the fleet. B - 5 2 s on Guam are being u p g r a d e d w i t h air-launched cruise missiles.15 Nevertheless, the United States is a m i l i t a r y l i g h t w e i g h t in t e r m s of m a n p o w e r , and it is d i f f i c u l t to speak of the United States maintaining a "balance of power" in East Asia and the P a c i f i c - - u n l e s s U.S. a b i l i t y to c o u n t e r m a n p o w e r with firepower, or rapidly deploy m o r e troops into the area, or see its a l l i e s u n d e r t a k e s u b s t a n t i a l l y in-

7 creased efforts can m a k e a difference. As we shall see, all of these contingencies are problematic. The baseline for U.S. forward-deployed manpower in t h e A s i a n - P a c i f i c area has tended to be about 180,000 personnel. That f i g u r e is 20,000 m o r e than the 1985 levels. At the t i m e of the J a p a n e s e attack on Pearl H a r b o r , the United States had a p p r o x i m a t e l y 160,000 t r o o p s in East Asia. By the end of W o r l d W a r II, the figure was more than 3 million (not counting the ChinaBurma-India theatre). After demobilization, force levels q u i c k l y fell only to rise by the end of the K o r e a n War to 650,000. At the start of the Kennedy administration's V i e t n a m i n v o l v e m e n t , total U.S. f o r c e s in .sia w e r e back at about 185,000. Then w i t h e s c a l a t i o n in V i e t n a m , U.S. f o r c e l e v e l s rose to m o r e t h a n 855,000, peaking just after the 1968 Tet Offensive. By mid-1975, t h e total U.S. f o r c e f i g u r e had d r o p p e d to 175,000. Additional withdrawals from Thailand, Korea, and Taiwan, and some cutbacks in 7th Fleet personnel, reduced these f o r c e s by early 1979 to less than 140 ,000. 16 As indicated, the Reagan administration is attempting to overcome these disadvantages. The f l u c t u a t i n g U.S. force p r e s e n c e in the A s i a n Pacific area contrasts sharply with Soviet force deploym e n t s s i n c e the m i d - 1 9 6 0 s . They h a v e b e e n m o v i n g in only one direction: up. The numbers, an important measure of strength, are impressive. As of 1983 (see Table 1.1), the Soviets had m o r e than 2,000 a i r c r a f t , including approximately 1,600 tactical aircraft and more than 400 bombers in the area, but the United States had less than o n e - f o u r t h this a m o u n t - - a b o u t 500. The Soviet s u r f a c e navy o u t n u m b e r e d the U.S. s u r f a c e navy in East A s i a by a figure of 84 to 39. Soviet s u b m a r i n e s w e r e 122 c o m p a r e d to 13 for the United States. Since 1983, t h e s e Soviet a d v a n t a g e s h a v e increased. F i n a l l y , in a d d i t i o n to the m a s s i v e Soviet f o r c e a d v a n t a g e s in the region, there are the huge armed forces that North Korea and Vietnam bring to b e a r — 7 8 5 , 0 0 0 and 1,227,000 active duty t r o o p s , r e s p e c t i v e l y . A c c o r d i n g l y , to try and rebalance the scales, the United States must rely on the contributions of Asian allies and friends, in particular Japan's forces of 245,000, South Korea's 620,000 troops, and in S o u t h e a s t A s i a , Thailand's a r m e d forces of 235',000.17 To m a i n t a i n its f o r w a r d p r e s e n c e in the A s i a n Pacific region even at these reduced f o r c e l e v e l s , the United States c o n t i n u e s to depend on c r i t i c a l bases in N o r t h e a s t A s i a , S o u t h e a s t A s i a , ?nd in s p e c i a l areas such as Australia. Back-up and support bases and facilities are located in G u a m , H a w a i i , A l a s k a , and the western states of the United States. In mainland Japan these facilities include the U.S. 7th Fleet headquarters at the Y o k o s u k a - Y o k o h a m a naval c o m p l e x . U.S. 5th air force h e a d q u a r t e r s are at Yokota Air Base. On O k i n a w a the United States relies p r i n c i p a l l y on air bases and f a c i l i t i e s at K a d e n a and F u t e n m a . In the R e p u b l i c of

8 TABLE 1.1 U.S.-Soviet Military Balance in East Asia and the pacific, January 1, 1983

United States Western Eastern Pacific pacific Divisions Tanks Bombers Tactical aircraft Naval aircraft Naval ships Aircraft carriers Attack Helicopter Cruisers Destroyers Frigates Total surface ships Submarines Strategic Attack Total submarines Amphibious

1-2/3 189 14 449 36

2-1/3 136 0 301 72

Total

Soviet

Union

4 325 14 750 108

35 9,000 435 1,565 50

3 1 5 13 17 39

3 5 9 18 24 59

6 6 14 31 41 98

0 1 13 20 50 84

0 13 13 7

1 33 34 24

1 46 47 31

31 91 122 12

S o u r c e : C o n g r e s s i o n a l R e s e a r c h S e r v i c e , R e p o r t N. 8 3 - 1 5 3 S , U.S./ Soviet Military Balance, August 1, 1983, pp. 127-128. Reprinted in S t e p h e n J. S o l a r z , "The S o v i e t C h a l l e n g e in Asia," A s i a P a c i f i c Community 24 (Summer 1984), p. 15.

Korea (ROK) the U.S. 2nd infantry d i v i s i o n is h e a d q u a r tered at C a m p C a s e y , and the U.S.-ROK Joint C o m m a n d is h e a d q u a r t e r e d in Seoul. In the P h i l i p p i n e s t h e United States relies p r i n c i p a l l y on Subic Bay N a v a l B a s e and Clark Air Base, the 13th air force headquarters. 1 8 The bases in the P h i l i p p i n e s h a v e b e c o m e the s u b j e c t of d r a w n out and sharp n e g o t i a t i o n s in recent y e a r s , although a successful renegotiation in 1983 allows the two governments a reprieve until 1987-88. In a d d i t i o n to t h e s e basing a r r a n g e m e n t s , the United States also maintains defense treaties with the countries in which it utilizes military facilities. The United States originally signed bilateral defense pacts with the Philippines, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the R e p u b l i c of China on T a i w a n (ROC). The A u s t r a l i a N e w Z e a l a n d - U n i t e d States (ANZUS) Pact w a s s i g n e d in S e p t e m b e r 1951. The M a n i l a P a c t , by w h i c h T h a i l a n d c o m e s u n d e r U.S. p r o t e c t i o n , w a s signed in S e p t e m b e r 1954 and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was established shortly thereafter. SEATO has since been disbanded, and the U.S.-ROC treaty was unilaterally abrogated in January 1979 by the Carter administration.

9 Each o f t h e r e m a i n i n g b i l a t e r a l and m u l t i l a t e r a l t r e a t i e s s t i p u l a t e s t h a t an armed a t t a c k on any o f the p a r t i e s w o u l d e n d a n g e r U.S. p e a c e and s a f e t y and t h a t e a c h p a r t y i s o b l i g a t e d t o " a c t t o m e e t t h e common danger in a c c o r d a n c e with its constitutional p r o c e s s e s . "19 In s p i t e of a l l t h e changes in t h e m i l i t a r y e q u a t i o n i n E a s t A s i a and t h e P a c i f i c t h a t o c c u r r e d b e f o r e S a i g o n f e l l in A p r i l 1 9 7 5 — t h e huge S o v i e t b u i l d u p , t h e l o w l e v e l s of U.S. f o r c e s , and t h e p r e s s of U.S. c o m m i t m e n t s i n d i s t a n t a r e a s such as t h e P e r s i a n G u l f - - U . S . p o l i c y m a k e r s s t i l l a r g u e t h a t U.S. c o m m i t m e n t s r e m a i n e s s e n t i a l l y unchanged. 2 0 Nevertheless, when S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e George S h u l t z r e c e n t l y a d d r e s s e d t h e changing f o r c e b a l a n c e i n t h e A s i a - P a c i f i c , h i s t o n e was r a t h e r s omber: The Asian and p a c i f i c r e g i o n i s one of enormous concent r a t i o n s of m i l i t a r y power i n the hands of regimes t h a t h a v e shown l i t t l e h e s i t a t i o n t o use f o r c e , e i t h e r d i r e c t l y o r as a means of i n t i m i d a t i o n when provided with an opening. Vietnam has one m i l l i o n men under arms, a s t a g g e r i n g number f o r a c o u n t r y o f t h a t s i z e . North Korea i s one of the most h e a v i l y m i l i t a r i z e d nations i n t h e w o r l d , and i t has shown no s c r u p l e s a b o u t p u t t i n g f o r c e to use. Beyond t h e s t r a t e g i c m i s s i l e s on land and s e a t h a t t h r e a t e n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i t s e l f , t h e S o v i e t Union has d r a m a t i c a l l y i n c r e a s e d i t s f o r c e s i n the p a c i f i c r e g i o n t o i n c l u d e over 50 d i v i s i o n s , 3,000 modern combat a i r c r a f t , i t s l a r g e s t f l e e t , and 135 i n t e r m e d i a t e - r a n g e nuclear m i s s i l e s , poised a g a i n s t the nations of the P a c i f i c a r e a , i n c l u d i n g o u r s e l v e s . 2 1

Dimension T h r e e : Noncommunist A s i a ' s Economic Growth I n c o n t r a s t t o t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y b u i l d u p of S o v i e t , V i e t n a m e s e , and North Korean m i l i t a r y power i n East A s i a and t h e d e c l i n e of t h e U.S. f o r c e p r e s e n c e in t h e r e g i o n i s t h e stunning economic g r o w t h of A s i a ' s noncommunist societies. For e x a m p l e , t h e P a c i f i c B a s i n , l e d by t h e "Gang o f F i v e " c o u n t r i e s ( J a p a n , South K o r e a , T a i w a n , Hong Kong, and S i n g a p o r e ) i s now t h e f a s t e s t g r o w i n g and most r e s i l i e n t t r a d e r e g i o n i n t h e w o r l d . It is also the f a s t e s t growing investment area. Add i n t h e impact of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , and t h e A s i a n - P a c i f i c r e g i o n a l s o becomes t h e high t e c h n o l o g y c e n t e r of t h e w o r l d , bounded by S i l i c o n V a l l e y on t h e U.S. W e s t C o a s t , by J a p a n , T a i w a n , and Hong Kong i n N o r t h e a s t A s i a , and by S i n g a pore in Southeast A s i a . T o t a l U.S. t w o - w a y t r a d e w i t h E a s t A s i a and t h e P a c i f i c i n 1984 was e s t i m a t e d t o be i n t h e v i c i n i t y o f $165 b i 1 1 i o n - - g r e a t e r t h a n U.S. t r a d e w i t h t h e European Common Market and a l m o s t o n e - t h i r d o f t o t a l U.S. t r a d e . 2 2 U.S. i n v e s t m e n t i n t h e a r e a i s c o n s e r v a t i v e l y v a l u e d a t m o r e t h a n $30 b i l l i o n . 2 3 But

10

the United States is also running a serious trade deficit with the a r e a — m o r e than $60 billion. U.S.-Japanese t w o - w a y trade alone was m o r e than $75 b i l l i o n in 1984. Japan now has the world's second l a r g e s t G N P at $1.5 t r i l l i o n in 1984. T o g e t h e r the United States and Japan account for almost one-third of all global economic productivity. Their combined share of world trade is about 22 percent. In Southeast Asia, the ASEAN countries also are generally showing remarkable progress. Their combined exports w e r e m o r e than $75 billion in 1984, and their per capita income growth has been very impressive. F o r e x a m p l e , c o m p a r e d to Vietnam's meager $180 annual per capita income, Thailand's is $800, Singapore's is over $5,000, and oil-rich Brunei's is nearly $18,000. ASEAN's combined population is almost five times Vietnam's. The association's c o m bined Gross National Product (GNP) is over $210 billion, m o r e than fifteen times Vietnam's.24 F i n a l l y , as a g r o u p , the ASEAN countries now form the United States' f i f t h l a r g e s t t r a d e p a r t n e r , and n e w r e c i p r o c a l t r a d e arrangements are under consideration. U.S. m a r k e t s have o p e n e d l i b e r a l l y t o A S E A N p r o d u c t s in t h e p a s t t w o y e a r s , and U.S. b u s i n e s s i n v e s t m e n t in t h e s e c o u n t r i e s was valued at $8 billion in 1984. 2 5 T h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t s add u p t o s o m e t h i n g q u i t e p r o found for the Asian-Pacific region's future: economically and politically the n o n c o m m u n i s t countries (whether democratic or authoritarian) are d r a m a t i c a l l y outstripping the c o m m u n i s t countries. By c o n t r a s t , t h e e c o n o m i e s of B e i j i n g , P y o n g y a n g , H a n o i , P h n o m P e n h , and V i e n t i a n e p a l e in c o m p a r i s o n to t h e rest of East Asia. The region's t w o harshest regimes, Pyongyang and Hanoi, cannot hope to effectively develop as long as they rely on the Soviet Union, m a k e w a r on their neighbors, spread t e r r o r i s m , and d i v e r t 20 p e r c e n t o r m o r e of t h e i r G N P to arms. F o r t u n a t e l y , B e i j i n g no l o n g e r b e l o n g s to t h a t m o l d and is r a p i d l y m o d e r n i z i n g its e c o n o m y t h r o u g h programs of d r a m a t i c economic reform, free m a r k e t incent i v e s , and e x t e r n a l t r a d e and t e c h n o l o g y a c q u i s i t i o n s . U.S. t r a d e w i t h t h e PRC w e n t f r o m $1.1 b i l l i o n in 1 9 7 8 to $4.4 b i l l i o n in 1 9 8 3 and m a y h a v e r e a c h e d $5.5 b i l lion in 1984. 2 6 Having engaged with the W e s t , China now has the chance to c o m p l e t e a new Long M a r c h — t h i s t i m e to e c o n o m i c m a t u r i t y - - i f it c a n c o n t r o l its p r e v i o u s tendency toward political instability. In short, nonc o m m u n i s t A s i a , p l u s t h e P R C , is m a k i n g e x t r a o r d i n a r y economic progress.

THE SOVIET MILITARY CHALLENGE

IN

PERSPECTIVE

T h e rapid S o v i e t m i l i t a r y b u i l d u p in t h e p o s t V i e t n a m W a r e r a is y e t to be t r a n s l a t e d i n t o a s t r a t e g i c environment in the region that is decidedly favorable to the Soviet Union. S e v e r a l f a c t o r s are r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the failure of the Soviet Union thus far to take advan-

11

t a g e of t h e s i t u a t i o n by c o n s o l i d a t i n g its p o s i t i o n of political influence in the Asian-Pacific region. These i n c l u d e , a c c o r d i n g to a n o t e d s c h o l a r , t h e f o l l o w i n g seven regional d e v e l o p m e n t s in the early 1980s: (1) the n e w cold w a r b e t w e e n t h e c o m m u n i s t s t a t e s ; (2) China's d r a m a t i c t u r n to t h e W e s t ; (3) t h e g r a d u a l r e a s s e r t i o n of J a p a n ; (4) t h e end of t h e p e r i o d of U.S. d r i f t ; (5) t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of A S E A N ; (6) t h e K o r e a n s t a n d o f f ; and (7) the d y n a m i c economic g r o w t h in the region that could eventually lead to a new Asian-Pacific trading c o m m u n i ty. 2 7 T h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r a S o v i e t c o m e b a c k in t h e A s i a n - P a c i f i c a r e a in t h e i m m e d i a t e f u t u r e , h o w e v e r , c a n n o t and m u s t not be r u l e d out. The five possible scenarios for the Soviet comeback in the region, according to the s a m e scholar, are: (1) instability in the region; (2) further shifts in the m i l i t a r y balance in M o s cow's f a v o r ; (3) t h e u n r a v e l i n g of U.S. r e l a t i o n s w i t h C h i n a , J a p a n , o r A S E A N ; (4) a S o v i e t b r e a k t h r o u g h w i t h J a p a n ; and (5) a s u c c e s s f u l S o v i e t r e c o n c i l i a t i o n w i t h China.28 U l t i m a t e l y , it is the interplay of the forces within each c o u n t r y and b e t w e e n t h e m a j o r r e g i o n a l a c t o r s that will provide the s t i m u l u s for change and stability in t h e r e g i o n . D o m e s t i c p o l i t i c a l t r e n d s and f o r e i g n policy directions of each regional actor will thus need to be s u r v e y e d w i t h a v i e w to d e t e r m i n i n g t h e s h a p e of t h e e m e r g i n g p a t t e r n of r e g i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t s in t h e Asian Pacific. T h e p o l i c y m a k e r s ' p e r c e p t i o n s of t h e external environment are particularly important in determining the pattern of policy response by individual countries in the region. It is l i k e l y t h a t t h e S o v i e t U n i o n w i l l not r e a d i l y disengage or disassociate itself from its regional ties in the' i m m e d i a t e future because of its heavy infrastructure, investment, and m i l i t a r y buildup there. In fact, it is m o r e l i k e l y t h a t t h e S o v i e t s a r e h e r e to s t a y in the A s i a n - P a c i f i c region for the f o r e s e e a b l e future. After all, the Soviet Union has longer coastlines along t h e P a c i f i c O c e a n t h a n any A S E A N s t a t e . The implicat i o n s of t h e S o v i e t p r e s e n c e and e n t r e n c h m e n t in t h e r e g i o n , in t e r m s of i m p a c t o n i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t r i e s and t h e r e g i o n as a w h o l e , r e c e i v e s f u r t h e r a n a l y s i s and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n in i n d i v i d u a l c h a p t e r s of t h i s v o l u m e . T h e m e a n i n g and s i g n i f i c a n c e of U.S. m i l i t a r y d e c l i n e vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in the Asian-Pacific region, although the trend has been reversed u n d e r the Reagan administration, also is analyzed. Also necessary is the d i s c u s s i o n of t h e i m p o r t a n c e and f u t u r e p r o s p e c t s of noncommunist Asia's e c o n o m i c g r o w t h in t e r m s of regional stability and the p o w e r balance. POLICY RESPONSES A N D NEW U.S. ASIAN-PACIFIC

POLICY

The Asian-Pacific area is a region of challenge and diversity that requires broadly gauged policy pronouncem e n t s and e l i c i t s c r e a t i v e p o l i c y r e s p o n s e s by t h e

12

r e g i o n a l a c t o r s w i t h r e g a r d to r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y and welfare. The United States, for instance, was responsible for the shift in policy emphasis and attention in t h e 1 9 7 0 s , w h i c h a f t e r V i e t n a m w a s r e i n f o r c e d by t h e C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s i n i t i a l d e c i s i o n to w i t h d r a w U.S. ground combat forces from South Korea, thus generating confusion and concern among U.S. Asian allies and friends, including Japan. 2 9 President Reagan's u n s w e r v ing support and shared o p t i m i s m for the future of AsianPacific cooperation, h o w e v e r , is manifested in a series of u n a m b i g u o u s p o l i c y s t a t e m e n t s and a c t s r e g a r d i n g future U.S. intentions toward the region. These include President Reagan's addresses in November 1983 before the J a p a n e s e Diet in T o k y o and t h e S o u t h K o r e a n N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y in S e o u l , r e s p e c t i v e l y , and h i s t a l k s w i t h C h i n e s e l e a d e r s d u r i n g h i s v i s i t to B e i j i n g in A p r i l 1984. The policy agenda for promoting "a Pacific era," notwithstanding the concern of European allies, was also put into effect in September 1984 w h e n President Reagan, during W h i t e House c e r e m o n i e s , demonstrated his c o m m i t m e n t to the future of Pacific cooperation by inaugurating t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s N a t i o n a l C o m m i t t e e f o r P a c i f i c Economic Cooperation. O n e U.S. g o v e r n m e n t o f f i c i a l , at t h e o u t s e t of President Reagan's second term in office, perceived that c h a n g e s in t h e A s i a n - P a c i f i c s e c u r i t y e n v i r o n m e n t and regional development would offer the United States both o p p o r t u n i t i e s and r i s k s in t h e f u t u r e . He d e f i n e d U.S. o p p o r t u n i t i e s in t h e r e g i o n as f o l l o w s : (1) e x p a n d i n g c o m m e r c i a l and investment opportunities; (2) associating J a p a n e v e n m o r e c l o s e l y w i t h t h e W e s t ; (3) p r o p e l l i n g China toward closer cooperation with the United States; (4) w o r k i n g c o n s t r u c t i v e l y w i t h r e g i o n a l g r o u p i n g s in the area, particularly ASEAN; and (5) fostering a NorthSouth dialogue on the Korean Peninsula. Included in the list of potential risks are: (1) burgeoning trade d e f i cits that will s t i m u l a t e increased protectionist s e n t i m e n t and p r o t e c t i o n i s t t r a d e m e a s u r e s in t h e U.S. C o n g r e s s ; (2) s u c c e s s i o n c r i s e s in s e v e r a l A s i a n - P a c i f i c countries that could lead to political instability adversely affecting U.S. financial flows, economic d e v e l opment, and strategic interests; (3) antinuclear s e n t i m e n t t h a t c o u l d c h e c k U.S. n a v a l a c c e s s to N e w Z e a l a n d and v i t i a t e a k e y a l l i a n c e ; (4) f a i l u r e to a d d r e s s t h e i m b a l a n c e w i t h i n the C a m b o d i a n r e s i s t a n c e that w o u l d u n d e r m i n e future possibilities for a political solution; and (5) a S o v i e t p o l i c y t h a t w i l l c o n t i n u e to b u i l d its m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h in A s i a and p l a y f o r any d i p l o m a t i c and political breaks that m a y c o m e along. 3 0

ORGANIZATION OF THE VOLUME The present v o l u m e reflects varying v i e w s of Asian security expressed in terms of each country's or s u b r e gion's perception of and response to the emerging s e c u -

13

rity environment in the remainder of the 1980s. Policy i m p l i c a t i o n s for the r e g i o n , and e s p e c i a l l y for t h e United S t a t e s , are then d i s c u s s e d in t e r m s of past commitments, alliances, and treaties as contrasted with the current security realities and relationships. Each of the contributors has organized his (or their) chapter a c c o r d i n g to t h r e e c o n c e r n s : (1) t h e country's (or s u b region's) perceived security threats or challenges; (2) t h e country's (or s u b r e g i o n ' s ) e m e r g i n g s e c u r i t y response for the remainder of the 1980s; and (3) implicat i o n s of (1) and (2) for t h e r e g i o n and e s p e c i a l l y for the U.S. national interests. A l t h o u g h not all c o u n t r i e s in the region (e.g., T a i w a n ) are i n c l u d e d , m o s t of the i m p o r t a n t r e g i o n a l actors are represented. The introductory chapter (Kihl and Grinter) presents an overview of regional security realities and emerging patterns as well as a framework for the subsequent individual analyses. Under the rubric of "the Great P o w e r s as r e g i o n a l actors" in p a r t 1, t h r e e s e p a r a t e c h a p t e r s are included. T h e t w o s u p e r p o w e r s , the United States and the Soviet Union, are e x a m i n e d s e p a r a t e l y in c h a p t e r s 2 (Grinter) and 3 (Leighton and Rosenberger). The Great Powers' security role and their d i p l o m a t i c and m i l i t a r y i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s in the S o u t h e a s t A s i a s u b r e g i o n are e x a m i n e d in chapter 4 (Simon). In part 2, the N o r t h e a s t A s i a s u b r e g i o n , w h o s e m a j o r regional actors are C h i n a , J a p a n , and the t w o Koreas, is examined in terms of each country's security role and d e f e n s e p o l i c i e s . China's p e r c e p t i o n of the s t r a t e g i c e n v i r o n m e n t and its d i p l o m a t i c p o l i c y are discussed in chapter 5 (Sutter). Japan's security role and continuing policy debates are examined in chapter 6 (Tow).' North and South Korea's threat p e r c e p t i o n s , diplomatic maneuvering, and prospects for inter-Korean negotiations are examined in chapter 7 (Kihl). In part 3, the S o u t h e a s t A s i a and O c e a n i a s u b r e gions, whose main regional actors are Vietnam, ASEAN and A N Z U S , are e x a m i n e d . Vietnam's c h a l l e n g e to S o u t h e a s t Asia's regional o r d e r , in t e r m s of Hanoi's p e r c e p t i o n and ideological s t a n d s , is e x a m i n e d in c h a p t e r 8 (Turley). The military and security policies of each ASEAN m e m b e r s t a t e are e x a m i n e d in c h a p t e r 9 (Weatherbee). The p r o s p e c t s for A N Z U S are e x a m i n e d in c h a p t e r 10 (McKinley). In part 4, the c o n c l u d i n g c h a p t e r (Grinter and Kihl) d i s c u s s e s the f u t u r e p r o s p e c t s of A s i a n - P a c i f i c security. The emerging regional trends are highlighted, and the policy implications are discussed for the region and for the United States. Both s h o r t - t e r m and l o n g range p r o s p e c t s are introduced as p r o b a b l e future trends, and policy o p t i o n s are e x a m i n e d . The c h a p t e r closes with recommendations for U.S. policy.

14

NOTES 1. Recent studies on the economic prospect of the Asianpacific region include: Roger Benjamin and Robert T. Kudrle, eds.. The Industrial Future of the Pacific Basin (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1984); Roy Hofheinz, Jr. and Kent Calder, Eastasia Edge (New York: Basic Books, 1982); Lawrence B. Krause and Sueo Sekiguchi, eds.. Economic Interaction in the Pacific Basin (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1980). 2. Excluded from the scope of the present study are Mongolia, Burma, Papua-New Guinea, and some island countries in the Pacific, such as Western Samoa, Tonga, and Fuji, and a large number of dependencies of the United States, France, and New Zealand in Oceania. 3. Jon Halliday, "Capitalism and Socialism in East Asia," New Left Review 124 (November-December 1980): 3-24. 4. In April 1985, China announced its intention of reducing troop size by as much as 1 million. 5. Department of Defense, Soviet Miitary Power 1984 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1984). 6. Michael H. Armacost, The Asia-Pacific Region: A Forward Look, U.S. Department of State, Current policy, no. 653, 29 January 1985. 7. Details are in Paul F. Langer, "Soviet Military Power in Asia," in Donald S. Zagoria, ed., Soviet Po 1 icy in East Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 269-271; Patrick J. Garrity, "Soviet policy in the Far East," Asia-Pacific Defense Forum (Summer, 1983):14-20; and Peter Polomka, "The Security of the Western Pacific: The Price of Burden Sharing," Survival (JanuaryFebruary 1984) :4. 8. An insightful presentation is in John J. Stephen, "Asia in the Soviet Conception," in Zagoria, Soviet Policy, pp. 29-56. 9. See Chi Su, "China and the Soviet Union: 'Principled, Salutary, and Tempered' Management of Conflict," in Samuel S. Kim, ed., China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy in the Post-Mao Era (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1984), pp. 155-156. 10. Details are in Claude Malhuret, "Report from Afghanistan," Foreign Affiars (Winter 1983-84) :426-443. 11. Examples are shown in Langer, "Soviet Military Power in Asia," in Zagoria, Soviet Policy, pp. 261-262. 12. Donald S. Zagoria, "The USSR and Asia in 1984," Asian Survey (January 1985):27. 13. Donald S. Zagoria and Sheldon W. Simon, "Soviet Policy in Southeast Asia," in Zagoria, Soviet Policy, pp. 164-166. 14. "The Military Balance 1984-1985," as reprinted in Pacific Defense Reporter, 1985 Annual Reference Edition (December 1984january 1985): 137-147. The 160,000 U.S. combat, or combat support, troops in the Asian-Pacific are composed mainly of army divisions in Korea and Hawaii, a marine division and brigade in Okinawa and Hawaii, 7th Fleet assets, and U.S. Air Force strategic and tactical fighter squadrons. See Caspar W. Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1986 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 4 February 1985), pp. 237-240. 15. Jonathan D. Pollack, "East Asia: A Positive Example for U.S. Interest," in Barry M. Blechman and Edward N. Luttwak, Inter-

15

national Security Yearbook 1984/85 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1985), pp. 172-173. 16. Details are in Lawrence E. Grinter, The Philippine Bases: Continuing Utility in a Changing Strategic Context, National Security Affairs Monograph 80-2 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1980), p. 4. 17. Armed forces numbers are from "The Military Balance 1984-1985," pp. 139-147. 18. Details of all U.S. basing arrangements in East Asia and both the Western and Eastern pacific are in William R. Feeney, "The Pacific Basing System and U.S. Security," in William T. Tow and William R. Feeney, eds., U.S. Foreign Policy and Asian-pacific Security: A Transregional Approach (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1982), pp. 174-187. 19. A protocol of the Manila Pact defines "aggression by means of armed attack" as limited "only to Communist aggression." Article II of the 1954 ROC-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty stipulated that the two "will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and Communist subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability." The U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty of 1951 stipulated the United States would help defend Japan from both external attack and "large-scale internal riots and disturbances." The subsequent U.S.-Japanese Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty of 1960 refers only to an "armed attack" against territory. Neither of the Japanese treaties nor the Korean or Philippine treaties specified communist aggression. Nor does the ANZUS treaty. See U.S. Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, vol. 6, part 1 , 1955, pp. 8189, 322-343; vol. 3, part 3, 1952, pp. 3329-3340; vol. 2, part 2, pp. 1632-1635; vol. 5, part 3, 1954, pp. 2368-2376; vol. 3, part 3, 1952, pp. 3947-3951 and 3421-3425, published respectively in 1956, 1953, 1960, 1955, and 1953 by the GPO, Washington, D.C. 20. Ronald Reagan, in Shultz, Asia-Pacific and the Future, U.S. Department of State, Current Policy, no. 598, 18 July 1984. 21. Ibid. 22. George p. Shultz, Economic Cooperation in the pacific Basin, U.S. Department of State, Current Policy, no. 658, 21 February 1985. 23. Armacost, Asia-Pacific, and Paul H. Kreisberg, "The United States and Asia in 1984," Asian Survey (January 1985) :2. 24. population and GNP figures are taken from "The Military Balance 1984-198 5." 25. George P. Shultz, Challenge Facing the U.S. and ASEAN, U.S. Department of State, Current Policy, no. 597, 13 July 1984; and shultz, Asia-pacific and the Future. 26- Paul D. Wolfowitz, The U.S.-China Trade Relationship, U.S. Department of State, Current Policy, no. 594, 31 May 1984. 27. Zagoria, Soviet Policy, p. 5. 28. Ibid., p. 13. 29. See, for instance. Franklin B. Weinstein and Fujin Kamiya, eds., Itie Security of Korea: U.S. and Japanese Perspectives on the 1980s (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980). 30. Armacost, Asia-Pacific.

Part 1

Great Powers as Regional Actors

2 The United States: Coping with the Soviet Buildup and Alliance Dilemmas Lawrence E. Grinter

The Reagan administration perceives two fundamental trends in t h e A s i a n - P a c i f i c r e g i o n : (1) t h e v i b r a n t whose e c o n o m i c g r o w t h of t h e n o n c o m m u n i s t c o u n t r i e s l e a d e r , J a p a n , n e v e r t h e l e s s is s e r i o u s l y c o m p l i c a t i n g t h e U.S. t r a d e b a l a n c e w i t h t h e a r e a ; a n d (2) t h e g r o w i n g S o v i e t and S o v i e t c l i e n t m i l i t a r y b u i l d u p in t h e region. In F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 5 , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e G e o r g e S h u l t z a f f i r m e d both p e r c e p t i o n s w h e n h e c o m m e n t e d : In economic development, in the growth of free institutions, and in growing global influence, the Pacific region has rapidly emerged as a leading force on the world stage. Its economic dynamism has become a model for the developing world and offers a unique and attractive vision of the future. Shultz

continued:

While the prospects for the nations and people of the pacific Basin are bright, politically and economically, w e must bear in mind that this is one of the most heavily armed regions in the world, and Asian peace is still marred by continuing and tragic conflicts. In Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, some 1.1 million m e n are now under arms, while on the Korean Peninsula there is a combined total of 1.5 million troops. In addition to 4.4 million men in uniform in China, approximately onethird to one-half of the USSR's ground forces—some 52 divisions—are garrisoned in the Soviet Far East. Soviet air power, both tactical and strategic, continues to grow; the Soviet Pacific Fleet is now their largest;

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. government agency. 19

20

and about one-third of the Soviet SS-20 intermediate range ballistic missile battalions overshadow much of the population of the region. This concentration of military forces is of considerable concern given the demonstrated willingness of the Soviet Union and its proxies--in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and K o r e a — t o use their military power for their political ends.1 These perceptions and concerns have been evident in R e a g a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n v i e w s of A s i a and t h e P a c i f i c s i n c e Mr. R e a g a n t o o k o f f i c e in 1981. However, since 1 9 8 4 , as t h e J a p a n e s e t r a d e s u r p l u s w i t h t h e U n i t e d States has escalated, economic c o m p e t i t i o n b e t w e e n the U n i t e d S t a t e s and its a l l i e s as w e l l as o t h e r a l l i a n c e difficulties have attracted m o r e official c o m m e n t than the Soviet threat. The Reagan administration's first m a j o r policy s t a t e m e n t o n East A s i a and t h e P a c i f i c c a m e in A p r i l 1981. In t h a t s t a t e m e n t , U n d e r S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r P o l i t i c a l A f f a i r s W a l t e r S t o e s s e l c o n c e n t r a t e d o n U.S. allies — assuring South Korea the new U.S. administration w o u l d not r e i n i t i a t e t h e C a r t e r w i t h d r a w a l p l a n ; e x pressing confidence that U.S.-Japanese trade p r o b l e m s c o u l d be h a n d l e d ; b a c k i n g t h e a t t e m p t s of t h e A s s o c i a tion of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to get Vietnam out of K a m p u c h e a . T h e S o v i e t Union's m i l i t a r y b u i l d u p w a s mentioned in passing. 2 In June 1982, Stoessel gave S o v i e t a c t i v i t i e s in E a s t A s i a m o r e a t t e n t i o n . He a r gued that the Soviet Union and its friends in Asia w e r e seeking "positions of m a x i m u m geopolitical strength from w h i c h t o p r o j e c t p o w e r and i n f l u e n c e . . . . [They] p u t a p r e m i u m on m i l i t a r y force as an instrument of geopolitic a l s t r e n g t h . . . and t h e i r f o r c e b u i l d u p f a r e x c e e d s any legitimate defense requirements. 3 To c o u n t e r t h e s e S o v i e t a c t i o n s , Mr. S t o e s s e l a r g u e d that U.S. p o l i c y s h o u l d u r g e J a p a n to d o m o r e in defense (especially in "air defense, antisubmarine w a r fare, logistics, and communications"); continue to rely on Australia's and New Zealand's role in standing "guard over a secure, if lengthy, line of c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n the Pacific and Indian Oceans"; continue U.S. assistance to South Korea, w h o s e defense efforts "figure p r o m i n e n t ly in our broader objectives vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in East A s i a " ; and be e n c o u r a g e d by China's " c o m m o n perception [with the United States] of threatening Sov i e t a m b i t i o n s w o r l d w i d e . . . . China's o p p o s i t i o n t o Soviet and Soviet proxy aggression is an important fact o r in m a i n t a i n i n g r e g i o n a l a n d g l o b a l p e a c e a n d stability." 4 Stoessel concluded by acknowledging the heavy A s i a n d e f e n s e b u r d e n t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c a r r i e s in A s i a , and h e indicated the apparent burden-sharing rearrangem e n t s under way: In summary, while our defense burdens are heavy and we continue by necessity to make the largest single con-

21

t r i b u t i o n o f any c o u n t r y , o u r a l l i e s and f r i e n d s a r e c o n t i n u i n g t o a s s u m e an e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g s h a r e o f t h e burden. Given t h e i n c r e a s i n g S o v i e t t h r e a t t o our common i n t e r e s t s , i t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t we, our a l l i e s , and our f r i e n d s t r a n s m i t an u n r e m i t t i n g s i g n a l of r e s o l v e t o p r o t e c t t h e s e i n t e r e s t s f o r s o long as t h e y c o n t i n u e t o be t h r e a t e n e d . ^

T h u s , e i g h t e e n months i n t o t h e Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s f i r s t term in o f f i c e , f o u r p r i o r i t i e s in Asian p o l i c y had e m e r g e d : p u s h i n g J a p a n t o w a r d an i n c r e a s e d s e c u r i t y r o l e , r e l y i n g on A u s t r a l i a ' s and New Z e a l a n d ' s s e c u r i t y c o n t r i b u t i o n s , depending on South K o r e a ' s c r i t i c a l m i l i t a r y r o l e , and r e l y i n g on t h e P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c o f China (PRC) as a " f r i e n d l y , n o n a l i g n e d c o u n t r y " w i t h parallel strategic interests. By 1 9 8 4 , t h e s e f o u r p r i o r i t i e s had e n l a r g e d t o t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t ASEAN's a n t i c o m m u n i s t s t a n c e i n S o u t h e a s t A s i a and U.S. p r o b l e m s w i t h t h e P h i l i p p i n e s and New Zealand. For e x a m p l e , i n J u l y 1 9 8 4 , S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e S h u l t z t o l d t h e ASEAN f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s : ASEAN's r e c o r d o f p r o g r e s s o v e r t h e p a s t d e c a d e h a s b e e n p h e n o m e n a l . . . . U.S. i n v e s t m e n t i n ASEAN, c u r r e n t l y a l m o s t $8 b i l l i o n . . . c o n t i n u e s t o i n c r e a s e , as American b u s i n e s s s e e s new o p p o r t u n i t i e s i n ASEAN's expanding f r e e - m a r k e t e c o n o m i e s . . . . ASEAN i s now t h e f i f t h l a r g e s t t r a d i n g p a r t n e r of the United S t a t e s - with t o t a l t r a d e exceeding $23 b i l l i o n . 6

However, i n A p r i l 1 9 8 5 , A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r E a s t A s i a n A f f a i r s Paul W o l f o w i t z a d d r e s s e d t h e p r o b l e m s i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s and commented t h a t t h e United S t a t e s f a v o r e d " f r e e and f a i r l o c a l e l e c t i o n s i n 1 9 8 6 and P r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s in 1987," backed " e f f o r t s to r e s t o r e a f r e e - m a r k e t o r i e n t a t i o n i n t h e economy," and would p r o v i d e "enhanced m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e i n t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t r e f o r m s a l r e a d y begun w i l l c o n t i n u e and expand. "7 In F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 5 , P r e s i d e n t Ronald Reagan spoke of Zealand-United the s t r a i n s within the Australia-New S t a t e s (ANZUS) a l l i a n c e : We d e e p l y r e g r e t t h e d e c i s i o n by t h e New Z e a l a n d Gove r n m e n t t o deny p o r t a c c e s s t o our s h i p s . . . . I t ' s o u r d e e p e s t h o p e t h a t New Z e a l a n d w i l l r e s t o r e t h e t r a d i t i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n t h a t has e x i s t e d between our two c o u n t r i e s . ®

Thus, as 1985 b e g a n , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s had s u b s t a n t i a l p r o b l e m s with key a l l i e s . In e a r l y 1 9 8 5 , S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n s e C a s p e r W e i n b e r g e r s i g n e d an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d "The F i v e P i l l a r s o f o u r D e f e n s e P o l i c y i n E a s t A s i a and t h e P a c i f i c " i n which he seemed t o s u m m a r i z e t h e v a r i o u s c h a l l e n g e s in t h e Asian P a c i f i c . In i t W e i n b e r g e r c i t e d f i v e " f o u n d a t i o n s t o n e s " u n d e r l y i n g U.S. p o l i c y i n A s i a :

22

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

The key i m p o r t a n c e of the U.S. s e c u r i t y relationship with Japan The U.S. commitment to stability on the Korean peninsula U.S. efforts to build an enduring relationship with China U.S. support for ASEAN The l o n g - s t a n d i n g U.S. p a r t n e r s h i p w i t h Australia and New Zealand 9

By m a k i n g t h e s e five r e l a t i o n s h i p s the f o u n d a t i o n s of U.S. policy toward the Asian-Pacific region, the Reagan administration has acknowledged Washington's dependence on c o u n t r i e s in the area to h e l p p r o d u c e the c o m b i n e d economic-military-diplomatic strength necessary to contain and d e t e r the S o v i e t s and their c l i e n t s . Little c o m m e n t a r y can be found on U.S. m i l i t a r y f o r c e s a l o n e m a k i n g the d i f f e r e n c e , any l o n g e r , in m a i n t a i n i n g a balance of power in the region. U.S. military assets in the region are being modernized, although, as indicated e a r l i e r in this b o o k , they are at low l e v e l s . Thus, m o r e than ever b e f o r e , the United States h a s b e c o m e dependent on its Asian-Pacific partners, rather than the o t h e r way a r o u n d , to m a i n t a i n s e c u r i t y in East Asia. The remainder of this chapter examines these five relat i o n s h i p s , the c h a l l e n g e they p r e s e n t , and the R e a g a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s r e s p o n s e , as it c o n d u c t s its A s i a n Pacific policies.

U.S.-JAPANESE

RELATIONS

By 1984, U.S.-Japanese r e l a t i o n s , t r o u b l e d by t h e g r o w i n g trade i m b a l a n c e b e t w e e n the t w o p a r t n e r s (the U.S. d e f i c i t w a s $37 b i l l i o n in 1984 and a p p r o a c h e d $50 b i l l i o n in 1985), b e c a m e the s i n g l e m o s t c o m m e n t e d o n aspect of U.S. relations with East Asia. Things did not start out this way. In October 1981, nine months after the R e a g a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n c a m e to o f f i c e , t h e n e w l y appointed A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of State for East A s i a n and Pacific A f f a i r s , J o h n H o l d r i d g e , c o n c l u d e d that despite the burgeoning trade imbalance (about $15 billion in 1981) a c o n t i n u i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p of m u t u a l c o n f i d e n c e and c r e d i b i l i t y b e t w e e n j a p a n and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s is essential to the maintenance of peace in East Asia. A solid foundation exists to sustain such a relationship. To ensure that the relationship will continue to serve the national interests of each, we must be a w a r e of our mutual dependence; w e must be considerate and patient: we must be willing to hear each other out. I think our r e c o r d to d a t e in s u s t a i n i n g a n d e x p a n d i n g t h i s v i t a l relationship holds solid p r o m i s e for the f u t u r e . 1 0

23

Compare t h e s e a s s u r a n c e s w i t h t h e comments o f t h e n e x t E a s t A s i a n A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , Paul W o l f o w i t z , t h r e e and o n e - h a l f y e a r s l a t e r i n A p r i l 1 9 8 5 : The s t r i k i n g i n c r e a s e i n o u r b i l a t e r a l t r a d e d e f i c i t w i t h j a p a n l a s t y e a r h a s provoked s t r o n g c o n c e r n i n t h e C o n g r e s s , o u r b u s i n e s s c o m m u n i t y , and t h e p o p u l a r press, p r e s s u r e s f o r p r o t e c t i o n i s t a c t i o n , which c o u l d h a v e a m a j o r d e t r i m e n t a l i m p a c t on t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p as w e l l as on t h e g l o b a l t r a d i n g s y s t e m , have mounted on a dangerous l e v e l . Our r e l a t i o n s w i t h J a p a n a r e t o o v i t a l s t r a t e g i c a l l y , p o l i t i c a l l y , and e c o n o m i c a l l y f o r us not t o r e s o l v e c u r r e n t and u n d e r l y i n g d i f f i c u l t i e s on an u r g e n t b a s i s . 11

What happened t o J a p a n e s e - U . S . r e l a t i o n s — " t h e c o r e e l e m e n t of our Asia p o l i c y " — in t h o s e f o u r y e a r s ? The a n s w e r i s t h a t U.S. c o n s u m e r s and i n d u s t r y bought about $ 1 2 0 b i l l i o n more o f J a p a n e s e goods t h a n U.S. b u s i n e s s e s and p r o d u c e r s s o l d t o J a p a n , and a p o l i t i c a l b a c k l a s h b r o k e l o o s e in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . T h r e e f a c t o r s were a t work: (1) t h e r e l a t i v e d i s a d v a n t a g e o f U.S. m a n u f a c t u r ing t o J a p a n e s e m a n u f a c t u r i n g ; (2) t h e h i s t o r i c p r o t e c t i o n i s t s e n t i m e n t in J a p a n ; and ( 3 ) t h e f r e e t r a d e p h i l o s o p h y o f t h e Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n v e r s u s a p r o t e c t i o n i s t Congress. By 1 9 8 4 , i t was a l m o s t as though t h e e x e c u t i v e branch o f t h e U.S. government was a c t i n g as a r e f e r e e b e t w e e n Tokyo and t h e U.S. C o n g r e s s . The p r o b l e m i n i t i a l l y began t o mount in 1 9 8 2 : "The movement o f J a p a n e s e i n d u s t r y i n t o i n d u s t r i a l a r e a s , long c o n s i d e r e d t h e [United S t a t e s ' ] p r e s e r v e has . . . c a u s e d a s u b s t a n t i a l i n c r e a s e i n e c o n o m i c f r i c t i o n . " 12 By t h e f a l l o f 1 9 8 3 , R e a g a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n p r e s s u r e on J a p a n t o r e d u c e t r a d e b a r r i e r s was made p u b l i c : R e c e n t l y , t h e J a p a n e s e Government h a s taken s e v e r a l i m portant steps t o reduce t r a d e b a r r i e r s in order t o i n c r e a s e a c c e s s and g i v e more e q u a l t r e a t m e n t f o r f o r e i g n goods i n j a p a n . We welcome t h e s e s t e p s . We e n c o u r a g e j a p a n n o t o n l y t o p u t them i n t o e f f e c t e x p e d i t i o u s l y b u t a l s o t o pursue o t h e r measures f o r opening m a r k e t s , f o r t h i s w i l l r e d u c e s e r i o u s s t r e s s e s i n our r e l a t i o n ship. *3

I n e a r l y 1 9 8 4 , t h e s e r i o u s U.S. b a c k l a s h acknowledged by t h e e x e c u t i v e b r a n c h :

finally

In t h e view of many A m e r i c a n s , t h e U.S.-Japan r e l a t i o n s h i p i s not c h a r a c t e r i z e d by g l o b a l p a r t n e r s h i p and pot e n t i a l but by d i v i s i v e p r o b l e m s , e s p e c i a l l y i n t r a d e and s e c u r i t y . . . . A Gallup p o l l i n September 1983 f o u n d t h a t f u l l y 73% o f t h e A m e r i c a n p u b l i c b e l i e v e d t h a t J a p a n e s e i m p o r t s p o s e a " s e r i o u s t h r e a t now t o t h e j o b s of American workers." 1 1 *

was

24

In June 1984, t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s o u g h t t o convey a c o n c i l i a t o r y and o p t i m i s t i c a t t i t u d e . Assistant Secret a r y Wolfowitz argued: When many p e o p l e l o o k a t U . S . - J a p a n r e l a t i o n s , the f o c u s i s on t h e p r o b l e m s i n o u r r e l a t i o n s h i p and n o t on i t s successes. But I b e l i e v e t h a t i f we s t e p b a c k and t a k e a l o o k a t o u r o v e r a l l r e l a t i o n s h i p , we w o u l d d e t e r m i n e t h a t i t i s t h e b e s t t h a t i t h a s e v e r b e e n and t h a t t h e p r o b l e m s t h a t we h a v e a r e t h e e x c e p t i o n s a n d not the rule. F i r s t of a l l . . . o u r d e f e n s e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h has never been b e t t e r . Second, diverse country between

Japan

we h a v e w i t h J a p a n one of t h e b r o a d e s t and m o s t s c i e n t i f i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t we h a v e w i t h any i n t h e w o r l d - - b o t h i n t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r and our governments.

Our e d u c a t i o n a l and c u l t u r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h J a p a n i s a n o t h e r a s p e c t of o u r r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t we h e a r l i t t l e a b o u t - - a g a i n , because everything i s going so smoothly. A l t h o u g h t h e common p e r c e p t i o n i s of a c l o s e d m a r k e t , Japan a c t u a l l y i s our l a r g e s t overseas market. ^

H o w e v e r , by A p r i l 1 9 8 5 , t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n c o n c e d e d t h a t p r e s s u r e s w i t h i n t h e U.S. C o n g r e s s a n d p u b l i c f o r p r o t e c t i o n i s t a c t i o n had mounted t o "a d a n g e r o u s l e v e l . " 1 6 To c o p e w i t h i t , t h e R e a g a n and t h e N a k a s o n e g o v e r n m e n t s singled out four t r a d e s e c t o r s f o r s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n : t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , e l e c t r o n i c s , f o r e s t p r o d u c t s , and medical/pharmaceutical products. The J a p a n e s e p r i m e m i n i s t e r pledged to take "dramatic steps" to open J a p a n ' s m a r k e t s , but s t i l l t h e J a p a n e s e s u r p l u s mounted and as 1985 c l o s e d was e s t i m a t e d t o be $50 b i l l i o n f o r 1985.17 On t h e d e f e n s e i s s u e , a n e q u a l l y c r i t i c a l i f l e s s p u b l i c i z e d p r o b l e m i n U. S . - J a p a n e s e r e l a t i o n s was J a p a n ' s v e r y l o w l e v e l of d e f e n s e s p e n d i n g and c a p a b i l i t i e s c o m p a r e d t o i t s e n o r m o u s GNP. J a p a n , a d j a c e n t t o t h e S o v i e t Union's l a r g e s t f l e e t , would have consigned t h e S e a of J a p a n t o S o v i e t d o m i n a t i o n i f i t w e r e n o t f o r U.S. n a v a l and a i r p r o t e c t i o n . S u c c e s s i v e U.S. a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s have t r i e d to prod Japan i n t o s u b s t a n t i a l i n c r e a s e s in i t s d e f e n s e s p e n d i n g , i t s c a p a b i l i t i e s , or both. U n d e r P r e s i d e n t s Ford and C a r t e r , d e f e n s e s p e n d ing was p u s h e d . Under P r e s i d e n t Reagan, t h e e m p h a s i s h a s b e e n on " r o l e s and m i s s i o n s . " U.S. u r g i n g s e e m s t o h a v e h a d l i t t l e e f f e c t on J a p a n p r i m a r i l y b e c a u s e t h e L i b e r a l D e m o c r a t i c p a r t y (LDP), w h i c h r u l e s by way of i n t e r n a l p a r t y f a c t i o n s and p e r i o d i c c o a l i t i o n s w i t h o t h e r p a r t i e s , s i m p l y has not g i v e n d e f e n s e r e a l p r i o r i ty. There are a l s o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o h i b i t i o n s .

25

Japanese P r i m e M i n i s t e r Y a s u h i r o Nakasone has r h e t o r i c a l l y pushed f o r a s t r o n g d e f e n s e , a l t h o u g h l i k e a l l p r i m e m i n i s t e r s , he i s hemmed i n by p a r t y p o l i t i c s . At h i s f i r s t news c o n f e r e n c e a f t e r h i s November 1982 e l e c t i o n , Nakasone s a i d : " I b e l i e v e t h a t our c o u n t r y ' s d e f e n s e e f f o r t s h a v e not been a d e q u a t e . And I u n d e r s t a n d t h e a r g u m e n t p u t f o r w a r d by t h e U.S. and i t s E u r o p e a n a l l i e s t h a t Japan s h o u l d i n c r e a s e i t s m i l i t a r y s p e n d i n g now t h a t i t has become a g r e a t economic p o w e r . " 1 8 Duri n g h i s J a n u a r y 1983 v i s i t t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , N a k a sone t a l k e d about c o n t r o l of " t h e f o u r s t r a i t s t h a t go through t h e Japanese i s l a n d s s o t h a t t h e r e should be no p a s s a g e o f S o v i e t s u b m a r i n e s , " and h e i t e m i z e d J a p a n ' s r o l e i n d e f e n d i n g t h e s e a - l a n e s out t o 1000 m i l e s . 1 9 U.S. o f f i c i a l s , i n t u r n , h a v e b e e n c a n d i d a b o u t Japan's m i n i m a l d e f e n s e e f f o r t . In November 1982, C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f , P a c i f i c A d m i r a l R o b e r t Long s t a t e d : "The J a p a n e s e a r e i n d i v i d u a l l y w e l l - t r a i n e d , welld i s c i p l i n e d and t e c h n i c a l l y v e r y c o m p e t e n t . The m a j o r problem i s t h a t t h e y l a c k adequate s u p p l i e s of f u e l , ammunition and m i s s i l e s . In my j u d g m e n t , t h e y l a c k t h e a b i l i t y t o h a n d l e even a m i n o r c o n t i n g e n c y . " 2 0 In March of 1982, F r a n c i s W e s t , an a s s i s t a n t s e c r e t a r y of d e f e n s e in the f i r s t Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , testified to Congress: By i t s own p u b l i c a n a l y s e s , [ j a p a n ' s ] S e l f - D e f e n s e F o r c e s (SDF) c a n n o t s u s t a i n i t s army d i v i s i o n s , d e s t r o y e r s , and t a c t i c a l a i r c r a f t c o m b a t due t o v e r y l i m i t e d s u p p l i e s o f a m m u n i t i o n , t o r p e d o e s , and m i s siles. The s i z e and m o d e r n i z a t i o n o f Japan's a i r and naval f o r c e s are not adequate to defend i t s a i r space and s e a l a n e s t o 1000 m i l e s a g a i n s t t h e S o v i e t f o r c e l e v e l s o f t h e 1 9 8 0 ' s , w h i c h e v e n t h e G o v e r n m e n t now i d e n t i f i e s as p o t e n t i a l l y t h r e a t e n i n g . 2 1

A l l t h i s c o n t r o v e r s y and t h e push t o a d e q u a t e l y arm Japan s t e m i n p a r t f r o m t h e s t u n n i n g e n l a r g e m e n t o f Soviet m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s in Asia. The Japan D e f e n s e Agency's (JDA) a n a l y s i s of t h e S o v i e t Union's c a p a b i l i t i e s is sobering. East o f Lake B a i k a l , t h e USSR d e p l o y s about 370,000 t r o o p s i n 40 d i v i s i o n s compared t o Japan's 160,000 t r o o p s i n 13 d i v i s i o n s . Of t h e 2,400 S o v i e t c o m b a t a i r c r a f t i n A s i a , t h e JDA i n d i c a t e s t h a t m o r e than o n e - h a l f a r e second o r t h i r d g e n e r a t i o n , including MIG-2 3/27 F l o g g e r s and SU-24 F e n c e r s . On w a t e r , t h e S o v i e t P a c i f i c F l e e t ' s 825 s h i p s , w i t h t o t a l d i s p l a c e ment o f 1.7 m i l l i o n t o n s , o u t c l a s s J a p a n ' s 132 s h i p s a t 400,000 t o n s . A l l t h r e e m a j o r Japanese s t r a i t s , T s u s h i ma, T s u g a r u , and S o y a , e x p e r i e n c e a l a r g e v o l u m e o f S o v i e t m i l i t a r y a i r c r a f t movements and v e s s e l p a s s a g e . 2 2 Japan's c u r r e n t Mid-Term D e f e n s e Program (1983-1987) has not been a b l e t o a c c o m p l i s h i t s g o a l s . 2 3 Various i n i t i a t i v e s c o n t i n u e t o be d i s c u s s e d i n U.S.-Japan d e f e n s e circles. These i n c l u d e : 2 4

26

Doubling J a p a n ' s

Defense

Budget

Doubling Tokyo's d e f e n s e e x p e n d i t u r e s from 1 p e r c e n t t o 2 p e r c e n t o f GNP w o u l d r a i s e t h e a m o u n t s p e n t i n 1 9 8 5 t o a b o u t $26 b i l l i o n i n 1985 d o l l a r s . T h i s would a l l o w japan to begin a competent d e f e n s e of the Sea of j a pan's e a s t e r n r e a c h e s i n c l u d i n g c o o r d i n a t e d m i n i n g and blockade a c t i v i t y with t h e United S t a t e s . Replacing Obsolete

Equipment

D e s p i t e c u r r e n t m o d e r n i z a t i o n e f f o r t s , much o f t h e SDF equipment i s s t i l l o b s o l e t e . I n t h e ground f o r c e s , it has been e s t i m a t e d t h a t 60 p e r c e n t a r e out of d a t e . In t h e m a r i t i m e and a i r f o r c e s , t h e e s t i m a t e s r u n e v e n higher. Improving

Training

T r a i n i n g e x e r c i s e a r e a s and t r a i n i n g f u n d i n g f o r j a pan's armed s e r v i c e s a r e e x t r e m e l y l i m i t e d . Because of terrain, population density, environmental r e s t r i c t i o n s , and p u b l i c m o o d s , t h e g r o u n d f o r c e s h a v e no f a c i l i t i e s f o r l a r g e u n i t maneuvers or f o r p r a c t i c e f i r i n g s o f l o n g r a n g e a r t i l l e r y and m i s s i l e s . Naval and a i r f o r c e s a r e a l s o l i m i t e d . Increasing

SDF Manpower

W i t h an a u t h o r i z e d m a n p o w e r s t r e n g t h o f s o m e 2 7 2 , 0 0 0 men, t h e SDF i s a r e l a t i v e l y m o d e s t f o r c e , and i t s f o r c e s a r e a c t u a l l y manned b e l o w t h i s l e v e l . Ground f o r c e s a r e p r e s e n t l y manned a t o n l y 8 6 p e r c e n t o f t h e authorized 180,000-man l e v e l . The a i r and n a v a l f o r c e s a r e a t a b o u t 95 p e r c e n t manning. Increasing

flmmunition

S u p p l i e s and L o g i s t i c

Support

U.S. e s t i m a t e s a r e t h a t t h e S e l f - D e f e n s e F o r c e s h a v e a b o u t t h r e e t o f i v e d a y s o f a m m u n i t i o n and l o g i s t i c s s t o c k s i n t h e event of combat. D e v e l o p i n g an I n t e g r a t e d S t r a t e g y and Concept f o r O p e r a t i o n s E v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e s t h a t j a p a n ' s armed f o r c e s h a v e s e r i ous p r o b l e m s w i t h a u n i f i e d command s y s t e m and a c o n cept for integrated operations. Expanding T r a n s p o r t a t i o n

Capabilities

j a p a n ' s t r a n s p o r t c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r t r o o p s and s u p p l y movements a r e e x t r e m e l y l i m i t e d . Even l i m i t e d e n g a g e ments would b e d i f f i c u l t t o h a n d l e under t h e s e c i r c u m stances .

27

D e a l i n g w i t h t h e e c o n o m i c and s e c u r i t y a s p e c t s o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between J a p a n and t h e United S t a t e s h a s not been e a s y f o r e i t h e r W a s h i n g t o n o r Tokyo. The r e l a t i o n s h i p c o n s t i t u t e s the s i n g l e most c r i t i c a l b i l a t e r a l a l l i a n c e f o r both c o u n t r i e s . The c o n s p i c u o u s i m b a l a n c e in J a p a n ' s s t r e n g t h s - - J a p a n i s a g l o b a l e c o nomic c o m p e t i t o r b u t , in t h e f a c e of t h e g r o w i n g S o v i e t threat, it is a military weakling—produces continual f r u s t r a t i o n in the United S t a t e s . This w i l l continue u n t i l and u n l e s s t h e i m b a l a n c e s a r e r e s o l v e d . However t h e i m b a l a n c e s a r e r e c t i f i e d - - t h r o u g h r e d u c t i o n of J a p a n ' s t r a d e s u r p l u s with t h e United S t a t e s , or i n c r e a s e s in J a p a n ' s d e f e n s e c a p a b i l i t i e s , or b o t h - - i t w i l l p r o b a b l y p r o v e t o be t h e m o s t d e l i c a t e c h a l l e n g e ahead f o r U.S. p o l i c y in t h e A s i a n - P a c i f i c r e g i o n . U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS A l e x a n d e r H a i g , when he was t h e Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s f i r s t S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , c o n s i d e r e d C h i n a c r u c i a l t o U.S. s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s . 2 5 The p e r c e p t i o n was not s h a r e d by P r e s i d e n t R e a g a n , a t l e a s t not i n i t i a l l y , and i t t o o k a l m o s t a y e a r f o r a c o n s i s t e n t and s t r a t e g i c China p o l i c y t o emerge from t h e Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Ronald Reagan came t o o f f i c e i n t e n d i n g t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s would not "abandon" T a i w a n . 2 6 However, in J u n e 1 9 8 2 , i n a s p e e c h on S i n o - U . S . r e l a t i o n s , Under S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e W a l t e r S t o e s s e l i n d i c a t e d new p r i o r i t i e s in U.S.-PRC r e l a t i o n s : A s t r o n g U . S . - C h i n a r e l a t i o n s h i p i s one of t h e h i g h e s t g o a l s of p r e s i d e n t Reagan's f o r e i g n p o l i c y . S t r o n g U.S.-China r e l a t i o n s a r e not o n l y c r i t i c a l f o r our l o n g - t e r m s e c u r i t y but a l s o c o n t r i b u t e to Asian s t a b i l i t y and g l o b a l harmony. We v i e w China a s a f r i e n d l y c o u n t r y with which we a r e not a l l i e d b u t with which we s h a r e many common i n t e r e s t s . S t r a t e g i c a l l y , we h a v e no f u n d a m e n t a l c o n f l i c t s of i n t e r e s t , and we f a c e a common c h a l l e n g e from t h e S o v i e t Union. 2 7

These p r i o r i t i e s s u g g e s t t h a t i n t h e p e r i o d between t h e 1980 c a m p a i g n and 1982, t h e p r e s i d e n t came around t o t h e view t h a t China s h o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d t h e e q u i v a l e n t of a s t r a t e g i c p a r t n e r of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . S e c r e t a r y Haig d i d not l a s t long enough t o s e e t h e f u l l f r u i t i o n of h i s (and o t h e r s ' ) e f f o r t s i n t h i s r e g a r d a s h e r e s i g n e d i n J u l y 1 9 8 2 , b u t he d i d r e m a r k i n h i s m e m o i r s t h a t more than any o t h e r t h i n g t h a t happened i n t h e e i g h t e e n m o n t h s t h a t I was S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , the China q u e s t i o n c o n v i n c e d me t h a t R e a g a n ' s w o r l d v i e w was

28

i n d e e d d i f f e r e n t f r o m my own, and t h a t I c o u l d s e r v e him and my c o n v i c t i o n s a t the same t i m e . 2®

not

I t was t h e q u e s t i o n of Taiwan t h a t most c o m p l i c a t e d U.S.-China p o l i c y . A f t e r much d e b a t e w i t h i n t h e admini s t r a t i o n and f r u s t r a t i n g d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h t h e Chinese ( " a n e s p e c i a l l y d i f f i c u l t and s e n s i t i v e t i m e f o r both s i d e s " 2 9 ) , W a s h i n g t o n and B e i j i n g i s s u e d t h e J o i n t Communique of August 17, 1982. The document r e f l e c t e d t h e c o n t i n u i n g and u n r e s o l v e d d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e t w o c o u n t r i e s — t h e o n g o i n g U.S. " s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p " ( i n c l u d i n g arms s a l e s ) w i t h t h e g o v e r n m e n t on T a i w a n , and t h e PRC's d e n i a l o f l e g i t i m a c y t o t h a t g o v e r n m e n t . Those d i f f e r e n c e s were f u r t h e r e l a b o r a t e d in a s t a t e department a p p r a i s a l : Aware of our c o n s i s t e n t and f i r m o p p o s i t i o n to the use of f o r c e a g a i n s t Taiwan, the Chinese d u r i n g t h e s e d i s c u s s i o n s agreed to s t a t e i n v e r y s t r o n g terms t h e i r p o l i c y of pursuing a p e a c e f u l r e s o l u t i o n of the Taiwan The i s s u e and d e s c r i b e d t h i s p o l i c y as "fundamental." C h i n e s e i n s i s t e d , h o w e v e r , t h a t we a g r e e t o t h e u l t i m a t e t e r m i n a t i o n of arms s a l e s [ t o T a i w a n ] . We

refused. 30 this

As f i n a l l y hammered U.S. p o s i t i o n :

out,

the

communique

reflected

•The U n i t e d S t a t e s " h a s no i n t e n t i o n of i n f r i n g i n g on Chinese s o v e r e i g n t y . " •The U n i t e d s t a t e s " u n d e r s t a n d s and a p p r e c i a t e s the Chinese p o l i c y of s t r i v i n g f o r a p e a c e f u l r e s o l u t i o n of the Taiwan q u e s t i o n . " • The U n i t e d S t a t e s " d o e s n o t s e e k to c a r r y o u t a l o n g term p o l i c y o f arms s a l e s t o T a i w a n . . . . I t s arms s a l e s to Taiwan w i l l not exceed, e i t h e r i n q u a l i t a t i v e or i n q u a n t i t a t i v e terms, the l e v e l of those s u p p l i e d i n r e c e n t years s i n c e the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and C h i n a , and t h a t i t intends to reduce g r a d u a l l y i t s s a l e s of arms t o T a i w a n , l e a d i n g o v e r a p e r i o d of t i m e t o a f i n a l resolution." ^

T h i s p o s i t i o n on Taiwan c o n t i n u e s t o be Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n p o l i c y , but U.S. p o l i c y i s now f u r t h e r c o m p l i c a t e d by t h e q u e s t i o n o f arms s a l e s t_o B e i j i n g . In s h o r t , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s has d e c i d e d t o s e l l arms t o both Chinas and s t i l l e n c o u r a g e a p e a c e f u l r e s o l u t i o n of their d i f f i c u l t i e s . For o v e r a d e c a d e , U.S. s e c u r i t y t h i n k i n g has c o n s i d e r e d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of e n l i s t i n g t h e P e o p l e ' s Republ i c of China as an a n t i - S o v i e t s u r r o g a t e . Statesmen and a n a l y s t s have seen advantages t o a Sino-U.S. "de f a c t o s t r a t e g i c p a r t n e r s h i p in t h e i r p a r a l l e l competition

29

a g a i n s t the Soviet Union."32 Zbigniew Brezezinski, President Carter's national security advisor, expressed t h e i d e a d u r i n g a May 1 9 7 8 t r i p t o t h e PRC: "We s e e o u r r e l a t i o n s w i t h C h i n a a s a c e n t r a l f a c e t o f U.S. g l o b a l policy. The U n i t e d S t a t e s and C h i n a s h a r e c e r t a i n c o m mon i n t e r e s t s and we h a v e p a r a l l e l , l o n g - t e r m s t r a t e g i c concerns. The m o s t i m p o r t a n t of t h e s e i s o u r common o p p o s i t i o n t o g l o b a l o r r e g i o n a l h e g e m o n y by any s i n g l e power."33 The t h e n V i c e P r e s i d e n t W a l t e r M o n d a l e , i n B e i j i n g in August 1979, e x p r e s s e d s i m i l a r i d e a s . H o w e v e r , d u r i n g t h e 1980 e l e c t i o n c a m p a i g n , R o n a l d R e a g a n i m p l i e d t h a t h e f a v o r e d r e t u r n t o a Two C h i n a s p o l i c y ( g i v i n g T a i w a n an " o f f i c i a l " s t a t u s ) , and h e i n c l u d e d s e v e r a l p r o - T a i w a n s p e c i a l i s t s among h i s a d visors. The C h i n e s e , a l w a y s t o u c h y a b o u t T a i w a n , f o u n d t h e i n i t i a l Reagan p o s i t i o n d i s a p p o i n t i n g , a n d U.S. o f f i c i a l s revealed that the United States faced "the t h r e a t of c o l l a p s e of t h e e n t i r e s t r u c t u r e of S i n o - U . S . relations."311 PRC r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s cooled. The S o v i e t m i l i t a r y t h r e a t on C h i n a ' s b o r d e r p r o v e d an added c o m p l i c a t i o n f o r C h i n e s e f o r e i g n p o l i c y , and i n l a t e 1981 B e i j i n g s i g n a l e d a m o r e f l e x i b l e a t t i tude toward the Soviet Union. Reconciliation talks b e t w e e n Moscow and B e i j i n g b e g a n i n e a r l y 1982 w i t h t h e o b j e c t i v e of r e c o m p o s i n g t h e i r r e l a t i o n s , d e f u s i n g t h e b o r d e r p r o b l e m , and r e b u i l d i n g t r a d e and c u l t u r a l e x changes.35 China e v i d e n t l y had c o n c l u d e d t h e r e was " g r e a t e r advantage f o r h e r s e l f in maneuvering between t h e two superpowers."36 Although B e i j i n g c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e c o o l r e l a t i o n s w i t h W a s h i n g t o n a s a f u n c t i o n of U.S. t i e s t o Taiwan ( " i n t e r f e r e n c e in China's i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s " ) , i t i s l i k e l y t h a t t h e need t o d e f u s e t h e S o v i e t t h r e a t w a s e q u a l l y a c u t e i n PRC t h i n k i n g . The C h i n e s e r e m a i n t o u c h y on a l l t h e s e s u b j e c t s . 3 7 At a l l e v e n t s , S i n o - U . S . r e l a t i o n s h i t a l o w i n 1982 and e a r l y 1983. T r i p s i n 1 9 8 3 by S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e S h u l t z and S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n s e W e i n b e r g e r h e l p e d t o r e l a x b o t h s i d e s ' r h e t o r i c on T a i w a n . The n o t i o n of s t r a t e g i c c o o p e r a t i o n had n e v e r r e a l l y d i e d , as c o n c u r rent events revealed: • The l a t e 1979 C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t t o e s t a b l i s h a j o i n t U.S.-PRC l a n d s a t m i s s i l e m o n i t o r i n g s t a t i o n i n X i n j i a n g ( r u n by C h i n e s e t e c h n i c i a n s ) • S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n s e H a r o l d B r o w n ' s J a n u a r y 1980 t o t h e PRC a n d t h e s u b s e q u e n t U.S. a g r e e m e n t t o China " n o n l e t h a l " m i l i t a r y equipment

trip sell

• S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e H a i g ' s J u n e 1 9 8 1 v i s i t t o t h e PRC and i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w o u l d i n c r e a s e t e c h n o l o g y s a l e s t o C h i n a and c o n s i d e r d e f e n s i v e w e a p o n s s a l e s on a " c a s e - b y - c a s e " b a s i s • T h e D e c e m b e r 1 9 8 1 U.S. t i o n s s a l e s t o t h e PRC

lifting

of

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on

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•

The F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 2 v i s i t t o C h i n a by S e c r e t a r y S h u l t z i n which he s o u g h t t o put S i n o - U . S . r e l a t i o n s "back on stable, realistic footing"38

• S e c r e t a r y o f Commerce M a l c o l m v i s i t to Beijing granting the dual-use technology access

B a l d r i d g e ' s May 1 9 8 3 Chinese l i b e r a l i z e d

With S e c r e t a r y W e i n b e r g e r ' s S e p t e m b e r 1983 v i s i t , t h e n o t i o n of s e c u r i t y c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e two c o u n t r i e s was b a c k on t r a c k . W e i n b e r g e r ' s v i s i t o p e n e d up new a r e a s o f t e c h n o l o g y t r a n s f e r as w e l l as m i l i t a r y equipment s a l e s t o C h i n a . In November 1 9 8 3 , new g u i d e l i n e s on t e c h n o l o g y t r a n s f e r a l l o w e d t h e C h i n e s e a c c e s s t o c o m p u t e r s , s c i e n t i f i c i n s t r u m e n t s , and m i c r o e l e c t r o n ic manufacturing equipment. In J a n u a r y 1 9 8 4 , C h i n e s e P r e m i e r Zhao Ziyang s i g n e d a s e r i e s o f s c i e n c e , t e c h n o l o g y , and t r a d e a g r e e m e n t s i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . In A p r i l 1984 came P r e s i d e n t Reagan's l a v i s h l y publicized t r i p t o t h e PRC t h a t a l s o r e s u l t e d i n t h e s i g n i n g o f a nuclear cooperation accord. In h i s A p r i l 27 a d d r e s s t o C h i n e s e l e a d e r s , t h e P r e s i d e n t acknowledged t h e two c o u n t r i e s ' m u t u a l i n t e r e s t s : " A m e r i c a and C h i n a b o t h condemn m i l i t a r y e x p a n s i o n s , t h e b r u t a l o c c u p a t i o n o f A f g h a n i s t a n , t h e c r u s h i n g o f K a m p u c h e a ; and we s h a r e a s t a k e i n p r e s e r v i n g p e a c e on t h e Korean p e n i n s u l a . " 3 9 C h i n e s e D e f e n s e M i n i s t e r Zhang A i p i n g came t o t h e United S t a t e s in June 1984; h i s t r i p c o i n c i d e d with p r e s s i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t t h e C h i n e s e had r e c e i v e d compute r s and r a d a r s f o r m i l i t a r y u s e and t h a t e x p o r t l i c e n s e s f o r a n t i t a n k and a n t i a i r c r a f t weapons had been g r a n t e d t o U.S. f i r m s d e a l i n g w i t h C h i n a . Two m o n t h s l a t e r , i n A u g u s t 1 9 8 4 , S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Navy J o h n Lehman t o u r e d C h i n a amid i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t U.S. s h i p s m i g h t make p o r t c a l l s i n t h e f u t u r e , and i n J a n u a r y 1 9 8 5 , C h a i r m a n o f t h e J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f J o h n V e s s e y made a w i d e l y p u b l i c i z e d m i l i t a r y t o u r of China. Seven months l a t e r , C h i n e s e P r e s i d e n t Li X i a n n i a n t o u r e d t h e United S t a t e s . In s h o r t , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and t h e P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c o f China have become de f a c t o s e c u r i t y a l l i e s in t h e p o l i t i c a l - m i l i t a r y c o n t a i n m e n t o f t h e S o v i e t Union i n t h e Asian-Pacific region. An a n t i - S o v i e t network of s e c u r i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p s among B e i j i n g , W a s h i n g t o n , and Tokyo, backed by t h e m i l i t a r y - t e c h n o l o g i c a l - e c o n o m i c might o f t h e United S t a t e s , i s i n p l a c e . 4 0 T h e i s s u e now i s a r m s s a l e s : how much and w h a t types? B e i j i n g , W a s h i n g t o n , and o t h e r c a p i t a l s are moving t o s e l e c t i v e l y m o d e r n i z e t h e PRC's huge and o u t d a t e d g r o u n d , a i r , and n a v a l f o r c e s w i t h a v a r i e t y o f p r e c i s i o n - g u i d e d weapons, m i s s i l e s , r a d a r s y s t e m s , and training aids.41 The C h i n e s e r e q u i r e a quantum b o o s t i n l e t h a l i t y and m o b i l i t y i f t h e y a r e t o t r y and c o u n t e r t h e S o v i e t ' s c l e a r l y b e t t e r equipped f o r c e s on t h e S i n o S o v i e t b o r d e r . S o v i e t f o r c e s on t h e b o r d e r d i s p l a y n e a r l y t h r e e t i m e s as many t a n k s and t e n t i m e s t h e a r m o r e d

31 f i g h t i n g v e h i c l e s that China h a s , and they also h a v e a s s u r e d air s u p e r i o r i t y g i v e n that t h e i r a i r p o w e r is nearly twenty-five years ahead of China's.112 In t h e last few y e a r s , the C h i n e s e h a v e c o n d u c t e d combined arms military exercises in northern China inv o l v i n g a r m y , a i r b o r n e , and air f o r c e u n i t s . T h e r e is also s o m e evidence that Beijing may be developing tactical nuclear weapons in support of their conventional forces.43 But d e f e n s e s t i l l r e m a i n s o n e of the l o w e s t priorities in China's national programs. Thus, for the foreseeable future, it seems unlikely that the present m i l i t a r y i m b a l a n c e on the S i n o - S o v i e t b o r d e r can b e dramatically altered. It is from that perspective, and continuing United S t a t e s ties to T a i w a n , that U.S. a r m s s a l e s p o l i c y toward China is being implemented. Selective U.S. arming of C h i n a should t a k e p l a c e w i t h i n the r e a l i z a t i o n that it is not g o i n g to m a k e a g r e a t d e a l of d i f f e r e n c e until the Chinese themselves upgrade their own defense commitment. M o r e o v e r , should the h o s t i l i t y b e t w e e n M o s c o w and Beijing d i m i n i s h , U.S. w e a p o n s t r a n s f e r s to China would occur within an altered strategic climate. That possibility, though remote at this time, provides a second constraint on U.S. arms sales to China. There is also a third c o n s t r a i n t : the c o n c e r n s of o t h e r A s i a n governments. 1( ' t B e c a u s e air and naval forces w o u l d b e the m o s t likely C h i n e s e i n s t r u m e n t s for u s e a g a i n s t Taiwan, it is prudent to place restrictions on equipment that could e n h a n c e a C h i n e s e a m p h i b i o u s or a i r b o r n e invasion of Taiwan. Thus ground force modernization is the most logical emphasis. Hawk ground-to-air missiles, TOW antitank weapons, air defense systems, anti-cruise missile defenses, attack helicopters, and armor piercing ammunition, already mentioned in press reports,1*5 constitute the most logical kinds of defensive weaponry the United States could sell to China. C h i n a is n o w a d e f a c t o U.S. p a r t n e r in t h e political-military containment of the Soviet Union. But c o m m u n i s t d i c t a t o r s h i p s can c h a n g e p o l i c y o v e r n i g h t . Such r e a l i t i e s m u s t p r o d u c e c a u t i o n in U.S. a r m s s a l e s policy t o w a r d both C h i n a and T a i w a n . An a r m s r a c e b e t w e e n the t w o C h i n a s , fueled by the United S t a t e s , would not be in U.S. n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s nor w o u l d it contribute to Asian-Pacific stability. STABILITY IN KOREA The contrast between Carter and Reagan administration p e r c e p t i o n s of the i m p o r t a n c e of South K o r e a , and h o w to e n s u r e s t a b i l i t y on t h e p e n i n s u l a , is s t r i k i n g . Four m o n t h s into his a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , J i m m y C a r t e r announced he would withdraw all U.S. ground combat forces from South Korea. He did this against t h e p r i v a t e and public advice of every senior U.S. commander involved in Asian-Pacific security.46 The a n n o u n c e m e n t hit East

32 A s i a and t h e U.S. n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y c o m m u n i t y l i k e a bombshell. A year later, following much debate in which leading congressional m e m b e r s of Mr. Carter's o w n Democ r a t i c p a r t y w o r k e d to s t o p t h e p r e s i d e n t ' s p l a n , t h e president changed his mind. Eighteen months after his May 1977 announcement, the w i t h d r a w a l p l a n was shelved. The Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , on the other hand, from its f i r s t w e e k s in o f f i c e , s o u g h t t o r e a s s u r e South K o r e a t h a t it w o u l d n e v e r r e i n i t i a t e t h e C a r t e r w i t h d r a w a l plan. For e x a m p l e , in A p r i l 1 9 8 1 , U n d e r S e c r e tary of State W a l t e r Stoessel said: This Administration's approach to our relations with South Korea offers a solid demonstration of our intention to be a reliable friend and ally there, as elsewhere in Asia. In this regard we have moved quickly to affirm our security commitment to the Republic of Korea and to lay to rest any notion that this Administration will contemplate withdrawing U.S. forces from South Korea in the foreseeable future. 4 7 H i g h - l e v e l v i s i t s to S o u t h K o r e a , i n c l u d i n g t h e P r e s i dent's and M r s . R e a g a n ' s o w n w e l l - p u b l i c i z e d t r i p in November 1983, underscored the continuing importance to U.S. i n t e r e s t s of S o u t h Korea's s e c u r i t y and s t a b i l i t y . T h u s , w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of t h e 1 9 7 7 - 1 9 7 8 p e r i o d , U.S. p o l i c y t o w a r d S o u t h K o r e a s i n c e t h e end of the K o r e a n W a r h a s e m p h a s i z e d t h e need f o r U.S. c o m b a t f o r c e s s t a t i o n e d b e t w e e n S e o u l and t h e p r o b a b l e N o r t h K o r e a n invasion routes. The Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) remains one of the most heavily armed places in the world. Behind it, o n both s i d e s , s t a n d a t o t a l of 1.5 m i l l i o n a r m e d m e n w h o , u n l i k e t h o s e in 1 9 5 0 , a r e n o w e q u i p p e d w i t h t h e most modern conventional military weapons. In 1985, N o r t h K o r e a is s t i l l led by K i m I l - S u n g , and t h e D e m o c r a t i c People's R e p u b l i c of K o r e a ( D P R K ) d e v o t e s m o r e than 20 percent of its m e a g e r GNP to the military. Its 7 8 4 , 0 0 0 - m a n s t a n d i n g a r m y c o n t a i n s 13 p e r c e n t of all N o r t h K o r e a n m a l e s of m i l i t a r y age (17 to 49 ). 4 8 This force includes 100,000 c o m m a n d o s , the largest c o m m a n d o f o r c e in t h e w o r l d . T h e D P R K f i e l d s o v e r 2,600 t a n k s and 4,000 to 5,000 artillery guns and h o w i t z e r s , perhaps three-fourths as m a n y as the U.S. Army has worldwide. 9 Russian-made Frog 5 and Frog 7 m i s s i l e s close to the DMZ c o u l d h i t S e o u l , j u s t 35 k i l o m e t e r s a w a y , in a m a t t e r of s econds. U n m i s t a k a b l e evidence of North Korea's hostility to peace on the peninsula continues: In October 1983, North K o r e a n o f f i c e r s a t t e m p t e d t o k i l l S o u t h Korea's p r e s i d e n t and c a b i n e t and in t h e p r o c e s s d e s t r o y e d R a n g o o n , Burma's m o s t sacred historical m o n u m e n t . President Chun Doo H w a n e s c a p e d , but 17 R e p u b l i c of K o r e a (ROK) o f f i cials, including 4 cabinet m e m b e r s , died. A few weeks later, North Korean agents resumed infiltration attempts 5 against South Korea. ® North Korea in 1985 is governed

33

by what is perhaps the harshest Stalinist regime in the world; most power in North Korea remains concentrated in t h e h a n d s of o n e m a n , Kim I l - S u n g , w h o is l a v i s h l y p r a i s e d in North Korean m e d i a and o f f i c i a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n s as t h e "Great Leader," " S u p r e m e Leader," "The Sun of t h e Nation," etc. 5 1 In the mid-1980s, President Kim's son, Kim Jong-Il, h a s e m e r g e d as his father's s u c c e s s o r w i t h his o w n personality cult. North Korea's e c o n o m y has m a d e remarkable progress since the Korean War's destruction. A l t h o u g h m o s t of the peninsula's h e a v y industry and mineral resources are concentrated in the North, North K o r e a s u f f e r s from a s e v e r e labor d e f i c i e n c y d u e to u n d e r p o p u 1 at ion and r e f u g e e f l o w s to the South. The DPRK's e c o n o m y has had to rely on m a s s i v e f o r e i g n ass i s t a n c e d e s p i t e the regime's p o l i c y of s e l f - r e l i a n c e (or juche). 5 2 In the 1970s, the DPRK s o u g h t to m o d ernize its economy with a sharp turn outward to Western m a r k e t s , but a s e r i o u s hard c u r r e n c y debt resulted. A new t e c h n o c r a t i c elite is g r a d u a l l y e m e r g i n g in North Korea and is now attempting to encourage limited foreign investment in the DPRK. 5 3 South Korea, in turn, has experienced major political and e c o n o m i c changes. The a s s a s s i n a t i o n of ROK P r e s i d e n t Park Chung Hee in N o v e m b e r 1979 t e m p o r a r i l y halted stability and growth, but in 1981 and 1982 Park's successor, General Chun Doo Hwan, solidified his power through a substantial political and military housecleaning. South Korea's extraordinary economic performance was renewed. Three venerable political competitors in South Korea — Kim Chong Pil, Kim Young S a m , and Kim Dae Jung (who r e t u r n e d from e x i l e in F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 5 ) - - h a v e been a c t i v e in the last f e w y e a r s , but none has been able to seriously challenge Chun's power so far. President Chun h a s indicated h e w i l l not run for r e e l e c t i o n in 1987 if security conditions are conducive to what he d e s c r i b e s as a "stable" e l e c t i o n e n v i r o n m e n t . South Korea's G N P , now at a l m o s t $80 b i l l i o n , reflects the country's enormous productivity, hard work, concentration of industrial capital, and technical ingenuity, in s p i t e of a f o r e i g n debt of m o r e than $40 b i l l i o n in 1985--perhaps the fourth largest in the world. 5 4 The q u e s t i o n of K o r e a n u n i f i c a t i o n is a p o w e r f u l issue in both South and North Korea, and it i m p a c t s on the rest of N o r t h e a s t Asia. North Korea s u b s c r i b e s to three principles for Korean unification: (1) independent Korean efforts "without being subject to external impos i t i o n or i n t e r f e r e n c e " ; (2) p e a c e f u l m e a n s , that is, "not through t h e u s e of f o r c e against each other"; and (3) a g r e a t e r n a t i o n a l u n i t y " t r a n s c e n d i n g d i f f e r e n c e s in ideas, ideologies, and systems." 5 5 Debunking gradualist approaches to reunification as ways of perpetuating the peninsula's d i v i s i o n , DPRK s p o k e s m e n p r o p o s e rapid reunification aided by the elimination of "external forces" (i.e., the U.S. 2nd infantry d i v i s i o n , t h e U.S. 5th A i r Force e l e m e n t s , and the United N a t i o n s

34 Command), the easing of tensions and the "democratization" (i.e., radicalization) of South Korean society. A f a v o r e d p r o p o s a l of Pyongyang's is a "peace treaty" b e t w e e n the DPRK and the United S t a t e s — t h u s d e a l i n g over Seoul's head. 5 6 By contrast, South Korea favors an incremental, step-by-step unification strategy designed to a l l o w p s y c h o l o g i c a l a d j u s t m e n t by p e o p l e on both s i d e s p r i o r to e x p l i c i t r e u n i f i c a t i o n actions. This b a s i c ROK p o s i t i o n of " u n i f i c a t i o n p r e c e d e d by peace" understandably reflects caution over the tragic war of 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 5 3 that w a s s t a r t e d by North K o r e a as "the fatherland unification war."57 As of late 1985, Red C r o s s , e c o n o m i c , and i n t e r p a r l i a m e n t a r y talks had occurred between the two Koreas. T h u s , in the late 1980s, U.S. p o l i c y t o w a r d the Korean Peninsula encounters major changes on both sides of the DM Z. T h e r e w a s s o m e p r o g r e s s in 1985 on the diplomatic front between Seoul and Pyongyang. However, t h e a r m s race on the p e n i n s u l a c o n t i n u e s . Increased DPRK forward positioning near the DMZ, ROK purchases of U.S. F-16s, and DPRK receipt of MIG 23s are three of the most critical military developments. Can the K o r e a n s i t u a t i o n be guided t o w a r d m o r e s t a b i l i t y ? Should an international conference on Korea be convened? Previous e x t e r n a l p r o p o s a l s , such as S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e Henry Kissinger's 1975 f o u r - p o w e r c o n f e r e n c e p r o p o s a l , or Marshal Tito's 1978 three-power conference proposal, met w i t h l u k e w a r m responses. B r o a d e n i n g the a t t e n d e e s to the six prime parties could prove unwieldy. U.S. policy continues to emphasize direct North-South discussions, a l t h o u g h the R e a g a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n has i n d i c a t e d it would consider a Chinese role useful. 58 Conventional arms reductions in the two Koreas seem like a m o r e logical and c o n c r e t e p r o b l e m to w o r k on. T h e r e is l i t t l e s e n s e in the t w o Koreas c o n t i n u i n g to p i l e up a r m s in w h a t is a l r e a d y the m o s t h e a v i l y a r m e d 155-mile strip of land in the world. In the late 1970s, in anticipation of U.S. ground combat force withdrawals, South Korea's g o v e r n m e n t m a d e strong e f f o r t s to strengthen its defenses in order to catch up with North Korea. T h e s e e f f o r t s in turn m a y h a v e t r i g g e r e d new d e f e n s e s p e n d i n g by P y o n g y a n g . Thus, the C a r t e r w i t h d r a w a l p l a n m a y h a v e a c t u a l l y c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e a r m s race in the p e n i n s u l a . T h e r e could c o m e a p o i n t w h e r e t h e K o r e a n a r m s race s i m p l y reaches t h e s a t u r a t i o n p o i n t ; it m a y already have. Both the ROK and t h e DPRK are receiving the m o s t advanced U.S. and S o v i e t e x p o r t fighters. As chief weapons suppliers to the two Koreas, should Washington and Moscow work to restrain, and then reduce, arms deliveries to their Korean clients? T h e r e is also the issue of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s on the Korean Peninsula. With the three most powerful nuclear s t a t e s o p e r a t i n g at c l o s e p r o x i m i t y in and around t h e K o r e a n P e n i n s u l a — w h i c h a l r e a d y c o n t a i n s t h e m o s t intense concentration of conventional armaments a n y w h e r e — t h e r e are c l e a r risks to p e a c e . The S o v i e t U n i o n , t h e

35

P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c of C h i n a , a n d N o r t h K o r e a h a v e a l l a s s e r t e d t h a t the United States s t a t i o n s t a c t i c a l nuc l e a r weapons in South Korea. F o r m e r S e c r e t a r y of Def e n s e J a m e s S c h l e s i n g e r , when i n o f f i c e , o n c e c o n f i r m e d t h i s in public. In t h e p a s t , W a s h i n g t o n e v i d e n t l y has h a d t o p r e s s t h e S o u t h K o r e a n g o v e r n m e n t away f r o m w h a t a p p e a r e d t o be p u r s u i t of n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t i e s . Does t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s p a y a p r i c e f o r n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n by S e o u l , g i v e n P y o n g y a n g ' s m i l i t a r y a d v a n t a g e s on t h e peninsula? The a n s w e r t o t h a t q u e s t i o n m i g h t c l a r i f y t h e d e g r e e t o which t h e United S t a t e s , t h e S o v i e t Union, and C h i n a c o u l d p o s s i b l y c o l l a b o r a t e on a n u c l e a r - f r e e z o n e i n and a r o u n d K o r e a . But t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l a r m s s i t u a t i o n and t h e o n g o i n g p o l i t i c a l h o s t i l i t y b e t w e e n P y o n g y a n g and S e o u l w i l l c o n t i n u e t o b e a r c l o s e l y o n t h e n u c l e a r - f r e e zone q u e s t i o n . F i n a l l y , t h e r e i s t h e q u e s t i o n of U n i t e d N a t i o n s a d m i s s i o n of t h e t w o K o r e a s . Pyongyang c o n t i n u e s t o r e j e c t any p r o p o s a l s t h a t w o u l d l e g a l l y a c k n o w l e d g e w h a t in f a c t is c o m p l e t e l y o b v i o u s : t h e r e a r e two i n d e p e n d e n t , s o v e r e i g n K o r e a n s t a t e s r u n by s e p a r a t e , r e c o g n i z e d governments. P y o n g y a n g ' s t r a d i t i o n a l "Koryo" c o n f e d e r a l r e p u b l i c p r o p o s a l s h a v e n o t m e t w i t h much s y m p a t h y f r o m a n y c o r n e r ; t h i s i n c l u d e s t h e R u s s i a n s who s p e a k o f " b o t h Korean s t a t e s " and i n v i t e S o u t h K o r e a n a t h l e t i c t e a m s t o Moscow, as do t h e C h i n e s e t o B e i j i n g . At t h e United Nations, both s t a t e s remain in a d i p l o m a t i c l i m bo. B u t t h e y a r e r e c o g n i z e d by a t o t a l o f a b o u t n i n e t y s t a t e s , and c l o s e t o s e v e n t y of t h e s e h a v e r e c o g n i z e d b o t h S o u t h K o r e a and N o r t h K o r e a . U l t i m a t e l y t h e key t o p e a c e in Korea r e s t s w i t h t h e two Koreas, not the o u t s i d e powers. The r e c e n t r o u n d s of d i a l o g u e b e t w e e n S e o u l and P y o n g y a n g a r e e n c o u r a g i n g . B u t , a s a l w a y s , t h e r e a l m o t i v e s of N o r t h K o r e a ' s r u l i n g e l i t e a r e unknown. Whether Pyongyang i s s e r i o u s l y int e r e s t e d i n r e a c h i n g an a c c o m m o d a t i o n w i t h S e o u l o r i s s i m p l y w o r k i n g t o o v e r c o m e t h e s t i g m a of t h e R a n g o o n t e r r o r i s t a t t a c k is not known. As a r e s u l t , S e o u l a n d W a s h i n g t o n h a v e no c h o i c e b u t t o r e m a i n v i g i l a n t . U.S.-ASEAN RELATIONS U.S. p o l i c y i n S o u t h e a s t A s i a e n c o u n t e r s three c r i t i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t s : (1) ASEAN's e m e r g e n c e a s a n e c o nomically dynamic, anticommunist regional association; (2) V i e t n a m ' s m i l i t a r y o c c u p a t i o n of K a m p u c h e a and L a o s , and c o n c u r r e n t S o v i e t p o w e r p r o j e c t i o n f r o m V i e t n a m e s e b a s e s ; and (3) t h e d i f f i c u l t p o l i t i c a l t r a n s i t i o n i n t h e Philippines. The A s s o c i a t i o n of S o u t h e a s t A s i a n N a t i o n s h a s b e e n o n e of t h e m o s t e n c o u r a g i n g r e g . i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t s among A s i a n - P a c i f i c c o u n t r i e s s i n c e t h e m i d - 1 9 6 0 s . Currently with six members—Thailand, Malaysia, Singap o r e , I n d o n e s i a , B r u n e i , a n d t h e P h i l i p p i n e s — ASEAN's g r o w t h and s t r e n g t h e n i n g h a v e t a k e n t i m e , and a s s o c i a t i o n c o u n t r i e s have had t h e i r p r o b l e m s . However, t h e

36 d i s p u t e s w i t h i n A S E A N , s u c h as I n d o n e s i a n - M a l a y s i a n Philippine territorial squabbles or ethnic and religious differences b e t w e e n Malaysia and Singapore, have moderated. The unstable leaders of the past, like Soekarno, are gone. Each ASEAN country has strong or experienced l e a d e r s h i p , and V i e t n a m ' s D e c e m b e r 1 9 7 8 i n v a s i o n of K a m p u c h e a accelerated ASEAN's strengthening. The assoc i a t i o n h a s m u c h to p r o t e c t : w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of the Philippines, all ASEAN economies have experienced real G N P g r o w t h of b e t w e e n 6 and 9 p e r c e n t s i n c e 1 9 7 0 . 5 9 Their combined GNPs are fifteen times Vietnam's. S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e G e o r g e S h u l t z a s s e s s e d ASEAN's r e m a r k a b l e progress in July 1984: The accomplishments of all the ASEAN countries, individually and as a group, have captured worldwide attention and admiration. . . . Through disciplined and creative economic management your real growth rate has averaged over 7% a year for the last decade. Through realism and courage you have forced the world to address the threat to regional and world peace by Vietnamese aggression in Kampuchea.60 In July 1985, Shultz further noted that U.S. investment in A S E A N c o u n t r i e s w a s a l m o s t $10 b i l l i o n and that the association had become the fifth largest trading partner of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h e b i l a t e r a l t r a d e l e v e l h a v i n g reached $26 billion. ASEAN's d r a m a t i c e c o n o m i c g r o w t h h a s o c c u r r e d , h o w e v e r , at a time w h e n threats to the region's stability have also increased. These threats include: •

The e s t a b l i s h m e n t and e x p a n s i o n of a l a r g e , c o n f i d e n t , S o v i e t m i l i t a r y p r e s e n c e on t h e S o u t h C h i n a S e a — b a s e d out of Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang--and diplom a t i c a l l y anchored in a twenty-five-year treaty with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Will Soviet ships and a i r c r a f t m o v e out into m a r i t i m e and a i r p o w e r p r o j e c t i o n r o l e s in i n s u l a r S o u t h e a s t A s i a , p e r h a p s pressuring A S E A N or t h r e a t e n i n g other countries' commerce?

•

T h e p o s s i b i l i t y of e x p a n d e d V i e t n a m e s e m i l i t a r y agg r e s s i o n beyond the 230,000 c o m b a t troops already operating outside Vietnam's borders. Will the Vietnamese pursue C a m b o d i a n rebel remnants deep inside Thailand or grab pieces of Thai territory as bargaining c h i p s a g a i n s t B a n g k o k ' s s u p p o r t of t h e K h m e r res istance?

•

The g r o w i n g m a r i t i m e security problems in the region. O f f s h o r e t e r r i t o r i a l c l a i m s and m i n e r a l d e p o s i t s in the South China Sea, p a r t i c u l a r l y among the Spratly Islands, w h e r e Vietnam, Malaysia, China, T a i w a n , and t h e P h i l i p p i n e s h a v e all s t a k e d c l a i m s , h a v e a l r e a d y produced m i l i t a r y skirmishes.

37 •

The c o n t i n u i n g , though s t i l l low l e v e l , p a t t e r n s of i n s u r g e n c y a n d / o r communal t h r e a t s a g a i n s t e x i s t i n g ASEAN g o v e r n m e n t s . T h e s e i n c l u d e t h e Moro/New P e o p l e ' s Army v i o l e n c e in t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , t h e communist/ s e p a r a t i s t i n s u r g e n c i e s in T h a i l a n d , the p e r i o d i c appearance of communist c e l l a c t i v i t i e s i n I n d o n e s i a , and c o m m u n a l / r e l i g i o u s a g i t a t i o n i n M a l a y s i a and Indones i a .

The combined e f f e c t s of t h e s e t h r e a t s p r o v i d e i n c e n t i v e s f o r t h e ASEAN g o v e r n m e n t s t o t a k e i n c r e a s e d s e c u r i t y measu r e s • ASEAN's r e s p o n s e s to these m u l t i p l e , emerging t h r e a t s g e n e r a l l y have been e n c o u r a g i n g , a l t h o u g h g r a d u a l and somewhat u n f o c u s e d . As Donald W e a t h e r b e e documents in h i s c h a p t e r in t h i s book, b e g i n n i n g in t h e l a t e 1970s ASEAN armed f o r c e s h a v e b e e n c h a n g i n g f r o m an i n t e r n a l , c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y emphasis t o c o n v e n t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t i e s f o c u s e d on e x t e r n a l t h r e a t s . Substantial i n c r e a s e s in d e f e n s e e x p e n d i t u r e s have r e s u l t e d . In 1980, ASEAN d e f e n s e spending t o t a l e d about $5.5 b i l l i o n , a 45 p e r c e n t i n c r e a s e o v e r 1979 and t w i c e t h a t o f 1975. In 1983, spending reached $8 b i l l i o n , and in 1984 i t was e s t i m a t e d t o have s u r p a s s e d $8.25 b i l l i o n . 6 2 Standardiz a t i o n of equipment a l s o has o c c u r r e d , and b i l a t e r a l and t r i l a t e r a l m i l i t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n o c c u r among ASEAN count r i e s on a r e g u l a r b a s i s . 6 3 T h e r e i s c l e a r l y room t o broaden t h e e x e r c i s e s t o i n c l u d e a l l s i x members. R e g a r d i n g Kampuchea, ASEAN g o v e r n m e n t s n o t e t h a t V i e t n a m ' s army i s one o f t h e m o s t f o r m i d a b l e m i l i t a r y machines in t h e A s i a n - P a c i f i c r e g i o n and i s now r i g h t on Thailand's doorstep. In J u l y 1981, at t h e UN-sponsored I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n f e r e n c e on Kampuchea, t h e s e p r o p o s a l s f o r a s e t t l e m e n t in Kampuchea w e r e made: ( 1 ) a c e a s e f i r e by a l l p a r t i e s and w i t h d r a w a l o f a l l f o r e i g n f o r c e s under t h e UN's p e a c e k e e p i n g f o r c e / o b s e r v e r s u p e r v i s i o n and v e r i f i c a t i o n ; ( 2 ) t h e h o l d i n g of f r e e elections under UN s u p e r v i s i o n ; ( 3 ) p r e v e n t i o n of i n t i m i d a t i o n by any Kampuchean f a c t i o n d u r i n g t h e e l e c t i o n p r o c e s s ; and (4) measures t o m a i n t a i n law and o r d e r b e f o r e t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a new g o v e r n m e n t r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h o s e e l e c tions.64 A g r e e i n g w i t h t h e UN c o n f e r e n c e p r o p o s a l , ASEAN s o u g h t t o d e v e l o p a f r a m e w o r k f o r a p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t t h a t would p r e s e r v e t h e l e g i t i m a t e s e c u r i t y c o n c e r n s of K a m p u c h e a ' s n e i g h b o r s , i n c l u d i n g V i e t n a m . However, Vietnam has r e j e c t e d both t h e p r o p o s a l s of t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n f e r e n c e on Kampuchea and ASEAN's p r o p o s a l s f o r phased t e r r i t o r i a l w i t h d r a w a l s , i n s e r t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e a c e k e e p i n g f o r c e s and r e c o n s t r u c t i o n a i d , and commitments t o e l e c t i o n s . The U.S. Department of S t a t e p o s i t i o n i s t h a t "supp o r t f o r ASEAN and i t s approach t o t h e Kampuchean p r o b lem i s t h e c o r n e r s t o n e o f U.S. p o l i c y i n S o u t h e a s t Asia." The U.S. Department of S t a t e c o n t i n u e d : The ASEAN members — t h e c o u n t r i e s i n t h e r e g i o n

most

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threatened by Vietnamese aggression in Kampuchea—seek a political settlement to the problem of Kampuchea based on the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and the establishment of a neutral, independent Kampuchea through internationally supervised elections. . . . ASEAN's strategy includes applying political, diplomatic, and economic pressures on Vietnam to persuade Hanoi that a political settlement is in its own interests.65 In July 1 9 8 4 , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e S h u l t z t o l d t h e A S E A N foreign ministers in Jakarta: You have offered Vietnam a realistic proposal for a negotiated political solution, one based on the restoration of Kampuchea's sovereignty and the rights of its people to choose their own government. Such a solution safeguards the interests of the Khmer people and all Kampuchea's neighbors. 6 6 However, to date, no V i e t n a m e s e response has clearly addressed the underlying issue of w i t h d r a w a l of Vietn a m e s e f o r c e s f r o m K a m p u c h e a o r c r e a t i o n of a f r e e , elected government in Phnom Penh. As W i l l i a m Turley's chapter s h o w s , the m e n w h o rule the Socialist Republic of Vietnam evaluate their country's security interests very differently than does ASEAN. The c a s e for using t h e c a r r o t r a t h e r t h a n t h e s t i c k , t h a t is, n o r m a l i z i n g U.S. or ASEAN relations with Vietnam before it w i t h d r a w s f r o m K a m p u c h e a , in h o p e s of " h a v i n g p o s i t i v e i m p a c t o n Hanoi's p o l i c y t o w a r d t h e w i t h d r a w a l of its m i l i t a r y f o r c e s f r o m K a m p u c h e a , its w i l l i n g n e s s t o n e g o t i a t e a s o l u t i o n to t h e c o n f l i c t t h e r e , and its g e n e r a l i n t e n tions with respect to Thailand and the rest of Southeast A s i a " 6 7 is not c o n v i n c i n g . W e s i m p l y h a v e no e v i d e n c e that this will m a k e any difference to Hanoi. The ability of the United States to m a i n t a i n m i l i t a r y f o r c e s in t h e s u b r e g i o n and to p r o j e c t p o w e r f r o m S o u t h e a s t A s i a i n t o t h e I n d i a n O c e a n is r e l a t e d to ASEAN's s e c u r i t y and S o u t h e a s t Asia's d e v e l o p m e n t as a whole. Of particular significance is the special situat i o n in t h e P h i l i p p i n e s and c o n t i n u e d U.S. u s e of S u b i c Bay N a v a l B a s e and C l a r k A i r Base. It is f r o m t h e s e p r i m e p i e c e s of A s i a n m i l i t a r y real e s t a t e that U.S. p o w e r p r o t e c t s t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and the Philippines and u n d e r w r i t e s the strategic balance in Southeast Asia. E i g h t h u n d r e d m i l e s w e s t of S u b i c B a y , t h e S o v i e t n a v a l , a i r , and i n t e l l i g e n c e c o m p l e x c o n t i n u e s to e x pand. Critics at h o m e of U.S. policy in the Philippines h a v e b e e n c u r i o u s l y s i l e n t a b o u t t h e S o v i e t s and C a m Ranh Bay. But A S E A N , as w e h a v e s e e n , h a s b e e n b e e f i n g up its d e f e n s e s . Although President Marcos's m a r t i a l law rule in the Philippines has had u n f o r t u n a t e results, d o e s it t h e r e f o r e m a k e s e n s e to " r e m o v e t h e b a s e s f r o m the Philippines" as s o m e critics a d v o c a t e ? 6 8 Subic Bay

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and C l a r k F i e l d c a n n o t s i m p l y be p a c k e d up and r e a s s e m b l e d i n l e s s o b j e c t i o n a b l e p a r t s of A s i a and t h e Pacific. Strategic r e a l i t i e s dictate otherwise. S u b i c Bay i s t h e f i n e s t d e e p w a t e r p o r t i n t h e e n With more t h a n t i r e A s i a n / P a c i f i c / I n d i a n Ocean r e g i o n . 6 0 , 0 0 0 a c r e s of l a n d and w a t e r , S u b i c i s t h e m a j o r n a v a l b a s e , s h i p r e p a i r , and s t o r a g e f a c i l i t y w e s t of H a w a i i . Guam, P a l a u , and S i n g a p o r e a r e s o m e t i m e s m e n t i o n e d as a l t e r n a t i v e s , b u t n e i t h e r t h e s m a l l A p r a h a r b o r a t Guam, nor t h e p r i m i t i v e Malakal or Babelthuap h a r b o r s in t h e Palau Republic, nor S i n g a p o r e ' s commercial h a r b o r are v i a b l e as m i l i t a r y s u b s t i t u t e s f o r S u b i c Bay. Clark Air Base is t h e l a r g e s t a i r f i e l d in t h e A s i a n - P a c i f i c r e gion. W i t h 1 3 0 , 0 0 0 a c r e s of l a n d , a l l - w e a t h e r r u n w a y s , a n d s a t e l l i t e d e l e c t r o n i c w a r f a r e and g u n n e r y t r a i n i n g r a n g e s , 13th a i r f o r c e h e a d q u a r t e r s is t h e m a j o r m i l i t a r y c o m m u n i c a t i o n s c e n t e r , a i r t r a i n i n g , and t r a n s i t h u b w e s t of H a w a i i . Are t h e r e a l t e r n a t i v e s ? Tinian I s l a n d , in t h e n o r t h e r n M a r i a n n a s , has some t r a i n i n g a r e a s and s e v e r a l p r i m i t i v e r u n w a y s . But t h e p r i c e t a g t o m o d e r n i z e T i n i a n b e g i n s a t $1 b i l l i o n . Andersen Air F o r c e B a s e o n Guam i s m o r e p r o m i s i n g . Andersen could a b s o r b some t r a f f i c coming o f f C l a r k . The r e s t w o u l d h a v e t o r e l o c a t e t o o t h e r p a r t s of t h e r e g i o n . In a w o r d , S u b i c and C l a r k r e m a i n e x t r e m e l y v a l u a b l e . 6 9 Hopefully, it is from t h i s s t r a t e g i c p e r s p e c t i v e t h a t U.S. p o l i c y t o w a r d t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , and t h e M a r c o s administration, is being implemented. The P h i l i p p i n e s is changing from one-man a u t h o r i t a r i a n r u l e t o a more open, l e s s c e n t r a l i z e d system. But t h e r e i s no f o r m u l a for this process. T h e s e r i o u s n e s s of t h e s i t u a t i o n i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s e b b s and f l o w s . T h e c h i e f of s t a f f of t h e P h i l i p p i n e a r m e d f o r c e s , G e n e r a l F a b i a n V e r , and o t h e r s e n i o r o f f i c e r s h a v e b e e n on t r i a l f o r a c o n s p i r a cy t o k i l l B e n i g n o A q u i n o . Meanwhile P r e s i d e n t Marcos, who h a s g o v e r n e d i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s f o r t w e n t y y e a r s , h a s been a b l e t o t o u g h i t o u t as a n t i - a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a c t i v i s m weakened d u r i n g t h e long t r i a l proceedings. The p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n i s b a d l y s p l i n t e r e d and u n a b l e to exploit the continuing popular resentment toward Marcos. I n t h e c o u n t r y s i d e , t h e New P e o p l e s Army commun i s t i n s u r g e n t s h a d g r o w n , by 1 9 8 4 U.S. e s t i m a t e s , to about 10,000 a c t i v e g u e r r i l l a s , a c t i v e t o v a r y i n g d e g r e e s i n n e a r l y a l l a r e a s of t h e c o u n t r y . 7 0 J u l y 1985 e s t i m a t e s p l a c e d t h e f i g u r e a t 12,000 t o 1 5 , 0 0 0 . 71 The P h i l i p p i n e economy c o n t i n u e s i t s l a c k l u s t e r p e r f o r m a n c e . U.S. b u s i n e s s i n v e s t m e n t - - o n t e r m s f a v o r a b l e t o b o t h s i d e s — c o n t i n u e s t o p r o p up t h e P h i l i p p i n e e c o n o m y . 7 2 Encouraging c o n s t r u c t i v e change in t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e W o l f o w i t z , i n an A p r i l 1985 s t a t e m e n t c a r e f u l l y c o o r d i n a t e d with t h e White House, i n d i c a t e d t h a t f u t u r e U.S. e f f o r t s w o u l d f o c u s on b a c k i n g f r e e and f a i r l o c a l e l e c t i o n s i n t h e 1986 and 1987 elections; encouraging e f f o r t s to r e s t o r e a free-market, o r i e n t a t i o n t o t h e e c o n o m y ; and p r o v i d i n g e n h a n c e d m i l i tary a s s i s t a n c e "in the expectation that reforms already

40 begun will continue and expand." 73 Wolfowitz indicated that Philippine d e f e n s e e x p e n d i t u r e s , at only 1.1 percent of Gross National Product (GNP), despite the communist insurgency, were the lowest in Southeast Asia. He also mentioned shortages in logistics, transport, maintenance, communications, and training. His conclusion was a thoughtful appraisal of the insurgency problem in the Philippines: At the s a m e time, w e have made it clear that the Philippine m i l i t a r y w i l l not be able to stop the insurgency without basic changes. This aid proposal is premised on the full expectation that the incipient reforms we have seen will continue and expand. First and foremost, this requires an end to m i l i t a r y abuse a g a i n s t c i v i l i a n s , p e r h a p s the m o s t fundamental explanation for the alarming growth of the insurgency. Nor can the insurgency be combatted effectively without addressing the political and economic problems that the communists exploit. The best antidote to communism is democracy. S h o u l d c o m m u n i s t s s u c c e e d i n t a k i n g o v e r the Philippines, however, there would be no alternative for 50 million Filipinos. The problems we see there today, serious though they are, pale in c o m p a r i s o n to those that every communist regime in history has inflicted on i ts people.

By late fall 1985, the Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was also pressing the Marcos government for reform on a wide range of political and economic issues--broadening the political p o w e r s t r u c t u r e and reintroducing m a r k e t forces into the collapsing economy. 7 5 Thus, U.S. policy in the Philippines must take into account both the changing strategic environment of Southeast Asia and the responses of the Filipino g o v e r n m e n t to its internal problems. Much of Southeast Asia's continued progress depends on the outcome in the Philippines. THE ANZUS ALLIANCE Australia's and New Zealand's i m p o r t a n c e to U.S. Asian-Pacific policies derives from shared d e m o c r a t i c traditions, c o m m o n ancestral roots, and the critical geographic positions of New Zealand and Australia in the South Pacific. T h e s e t w o m i d d l e - to s m a l l - s i z e d countries (in terms of population) are located on the periphery of the Asian-Pacific region. Protected by the U.S. nuclear g u a r a n t e e , Australia and New Zealand, in turn, have permitted the United States access to important facilities, air fields, and ports. This access h a s e n a b l e d U.S. m i l i t a r y p r o j e c t i o n and s e c u r e

41 c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a c r o s s t h e s o u t h e r n zones of t h e P a c i f i c and I n d i a n Oceans. The ANZUS a l l i a n c e ( s e c u r i t y t r e a t y b e t w e e n A u s t r a l i a , New Z e a l a n d , and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ) was founded i n 1951. O r i g i n a l l y sought by A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand t o p r e v e n t a r e p e a t of c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t l e d t o W o r l d War I I , ANZUS has s u b s t a n t i a l l y e v o l v e d i n t o an i n t e g r a l p a r t of t h e W e s t e r n s e c u r i t y s y s t e m . The a l l i a n c e p r o v i d e s b e n e f i t s t o each m e m b e r . There are, however, g i v e n t h e v a s t d i f f e r e n c e s i n s i z e and p o w e r among t h e t h r e e c o u n t r i e s , i n e v i t a b l e p r o b l e m s of " p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y " in the t r i a n g u l a r r e l a t i o n s h i p . Neither the o b l i g a t i o n s nor t h e i n t e r d e p e n d e n c i e s have e v e r been e q u a l l y distributed. S e n s i t i v i t y t o t h e s e p o i n t s of d i f f e r e n c e , and p o l i c y s h i f t s , has p e r i o d i c a l l y d i s t u r b e d t h e g e n e r a l l y h i g h q u a l i t y of t h e a l l i a n c e ' s p a r t n e r s h i p . The m o s t r e c e n t e x a m p l e i s t h e New Z e a l a n d L a b o r g o v e r n r m e r i t ' s p o l i c y o f b a n n i n g U.S. (and UK) n u c l e a r - a r m e d o r - p o w e r e d v e s s e l s f r o m New Z e a l a n d ' s p o r t s d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t a l l o w i n g U.S. s h i p s t o dock i n New Z e a l a n d i s o n e o f t h e v e r y f e w o b l i g a t i o n s W e l l i n g t o n has as a p a r t o f ANZUS. A l t h o u g h t h e g o v e r n m e n t s of a l l t h r e e c o u n t r i e s h a v e had l e a d e r s h i p c h a n g e s s i n c e 1970 t h a t h a v e p r o duced p o l i c i e s at t i m e s out of s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n w i t h each o t h e r ( t h e C a r t e r , W h i t l a m , and L a n g e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s a r e t h e most o b v i o u s e x a m p l e s ) , n e v e r t h e l e s s o v e r t h e y e a r s shared p e r c e p t i o n s of g l o b a l and r e g i o n a l d e v e l o p ments and t h e p o l i c i e s n e c e s s a r y t o meet them have been t h e norm. " T h i s i n c l u d e s , " w r i t e s Henry A l b i n s k i : v i e w s about the I n t e r r e g i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of r i v a l r y b e t w e e n g r e a t p o w e r s , t h e a s c r i p t i o n of m i s c h i e v o u s m o t i v e s t o t h e USSR, and t h e need t o a p p r e c i a t e t h e v a r i e t i e s and s e n s i b i l i t i e s of i n d i v i d u a l and r e g i o n a l l y a s s o c i a t e d s t a t e s t h a t a r e not i n d i r e c t l i n e o f F i r s t and Second World c o n f l i c t s , as w i t h i n the ASEAN community and i n the South p a c i f i c . Both A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand p l a c e a h i g h premium on an e f f e c t i v e and c r e d i b l e American p r e s e n c e i n the r e g i o n . Both f e e l t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d be e n c o u r a g e d and s u p ported. 76

These v i e w s , of c o u r s e , tend t o r e p r e s e n t t h e p o s i t i o n s o f t h e m o r e c o n s e r v a t i v e g o v e r n m e n t s among t h e three. Such v i e w s a r e l e s s f i r m l y h e l d among t h e t w o L a b o r p a r t i e s and t h e D e m o c r a t i c p a r t y i n t h e U n i t e d States. I n d e e d , t h e L a b o r p a r t y i n New Z e a l a n d has a d v o c a t e d b a r r i n g v i s i t s by U.S. n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d v e s s e l s f o r many y e a r s . T h e r e a r e d i f f e r e n c e s as w e l l b e t w e e n New Z e a l a n d ' s and A u s t r a l i a ' s L a b o r p a r t i e s - - t h e New Z e a l a n d e r s r e g a r d t h e m s e l v e s "as l e s s c e n t r a l l y p l a c e d , l e s s v u l n e r a b l e , and l e s s t h r e a t e n e d by g r e a t o r i n t e r m e d i a t e powers than A u s t r a l i a n s do. New Z e a l a n d e r s a l s o f e e l t h a t t h e y can do l e s s a b o u t what h a p p e n s o v e r s e a s

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w i t h t h e s p e c i a l e x c e p t i o n o f t h e n e i g h b o r i n g South P a c i f i c Community." 7 7 New Zealand's minor r o l e i n t h e a l l i a n c e , compared t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and A u s t r a l i a , i s f r e q u e n t l y ment i o n e d , p a r t i c u l a r l y by A u s t r a l i a n c o m m e n t a t o r s . 7 8 Of c o u r s e , as M i c h a e l McKinley a p t l y d e m o n s t r a t e s in chapt e r 10 o f t h i s v o l u m e , i t i s t r u e t h a t b i l a t e r a l a r rangements b e t w e e n A u s t r a l i a and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s f o r j o i n t l y managed d e f e n s e f a c i l i t i e s in A u s t r a l i a — p a r t i c u l a r l y P i n e Gap, N u r r u n g a r , and N o r t h West C a p e - - m a k e very v a l u a b l e c o n t r i b u t i o n s to a l l i e d communications, n a v i g a t i o n , s a t e l l i t e t r a c k i n g , and i n t e l l i g e n c e a c q u i sition. P r i m e M i n i s t e r D a v i d L a n g e ' s p o s i t i o n on nuc l e a r ship v i s i t s is g e n e r a l l y p o p u l a r in the p a s t o r a l s o u t h e r n P a c i f i c c o u n t r y of New Z e a l a n d , but Lange, who has been under c r i t i c i s m f r o m both Washington and Canb e r r a , a l s o admits t h a t he comes f r o m a g e n e r a t i o n t h a t d i d n o t f i g h t s i d e by s i d e w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and A u s t r a l i a i n W o r l d War I I . W i t h l i t t l e l e e w a y t o move on t h e i s s u e , L a n g e a p p e a r s t o h a v e had t h e p o l i c y d i c t a t e d t o him by h a r d l i n e r s w i t h i n New Zealand's l e f t . Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , Lange m i s s e s no o p p o r t u n i t y t o emphas i z e t h a t he b e l i e v e s t h e ban on s h i p v i s i t s d o e s not c o n f l i c t w i t h m e m b e r s h i p i n ANZUS, c a l l i n g i t " a n t i n u c l e a r not ant i - A m e r i can o r ant i - A N Z U S . " 7 9 U.S. and A u s t r a l i a n a u t h o r i t i e s do not a g r e e w i t h New Zealand's prime m i n i s t e r . A l l i a n c e s , t o be s u c c e s s f u l , r e q u i r e s e n s i t i v i t y t o member i n t e r e s t s , p e r c e p t i o n s , and d i f f e r e n c e s . So i t i s w i t h ANZUS, and t h e c u r r e n t U.S. D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e p h r a s e f o r s m o o t h i n g o p e r a t i o n of t h e s e c u r i t y t r e a t y i s "managing ANZUS." In a speech in June 1984 ( j u s t b e f o r e t h e J u l y e l e c t i o n o f t h e L a n g e g o v e r n m e n t i n New Z e a l a n d ) , A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e W o l f o w i t z argued that f o r a l l i a n c e managers, the e s s e n t i a l t a s k , whether i n Washington, C a n b e r r a , or W e l l i n g t o n , i s to maximise c o o p e r a t i o n to mutual advantage when we are on common ground and to c o n t a i n d i f f e r e n c e s — l e g i t i m a t e though they may b e — t h r o u g h the kinds of compromises necessary i n an e f f e c t i v e w o r k i n g p a r t n e r s h i p . By s o d o i n g , we can a s s u r e t h a t c o m p e t i t i o n i n commerce and d i f f e r e n c e s i n o t h e r a r e a s do n o t t h r e a t e n c o o p e r a t i o n l i n k e d t o our most fundamental shared i n t e r e s t — m u t u a l n a t i o n a l survival.

By t h e s p r i n g o f 1985, w i t h t h e e f f e c t s o f t h e Lange g o v e r n m e n t ' s n u c l e a r ban in f u l l v i e w , Washington and C a n b e r r a w e r e t a k i n g a s t r o n g e r s t a n d . The Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n d i c a t e d t o W e l l i n g t o n that the United S t a t e s has o n l y one n a v y - - n o t one c o n v e n t i o n a l navy and one n u c l e a r navy; not one navy t o accommodate one count r y ' s p o l i c y and a n o t h e r n a v y f o r t h e r e s t o f the world.81 Furthermore the United States indicated it would not weaken i t s d e t e r r e n t p o s t u r e by a d v e r t i s i n g t o

43 p o t e n t i a l a d v e r s a r i e s which U.S. s h i p s a r e , and a r e n o t , c a r r y i n g nuclear weapons. As A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e W o l f o w i t z t e s t i f i e d t o Congress in March 1985: In sum, we b e l i e v e t h a t New Zealand's p o l i c y , whatever i t s i n t e n t i o n s , i s not good f o r the a l l i a n c e or f o r the cause of peace. W h i l e we do not e x a g g e r a t e the e f f e c t of t h a t p o l i c y , we cannot i g n o r e i t . W i t h w o r d s New Z e a l a n d a s s u r e s us t h a t i t r e m a i n s c o m m i t t e d t o ANZUS; b u t by i t s d e e d s New Z e a l a n d has e f f e c t i v e l y c u r t a i l e d i t s o p e r a t i o n a l r o l e i n ANZUS. A m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e has l i t t l e meaning w i t h o u t m i l i t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n — w i t h o u t some e q u i t y i n s h a r i n g b o t h t h e b u r d e n s and t h e r e w a r d s . New Z e a l a n d c a n ' t h a v e i t both ways. In l i g h t of New Z e a l a n d ' s d i m u n i t i o n of c o o p e r a t i o n with us, we have reduced our own m i l i t a r y and s e c u r i t y c o o p e r a t i o n with New Zealand. We have made these r e ductions with r e g r e t g i v e n New Zealand's h i s t o r y as an a l l y - - o n e t h a t has f o u g h t with us i n f o u r wars i n t h i s century. But u n l e s s our a l l i a n c e p a r t n e r s b e a r a comm e n s u r a t e s h a r e of m i l i t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n e s s e n t i a l t o the a l l i a n c e , our p a r t n e r s h i p cannot be s u s t a i n e d p r a c t i c a l l y or p o l i t i c a l l y . 8 2

I t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t New Z e a l a n d ' s c u r r e n t n u c l e a r a l l e r g y w i l l s p r e a d t o A u s t r a l i a o r a f f e c t o t h e r U.S. a l l i e s in A s i a and t h e P a c i f i c t h a t have more t h r e a t e n ing s e c u r i t y environments. But i t i s a l s o l i k e l y t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and A u s t r a l i a w i l l i n s i s t on r e d u c e d s e c u r i t y c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e government of New Zealand u n t i l , and u n l e s s , W e l l i n g t o n s e e k s t o r e t u r n t o i t s p r e v i o u s d e g r e e o f d e f e n s e c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h i n ANZUS, w h i c h , as M i c h a e l M c K i n l e y argues l a t e r in t h i s v o l u m e , is unlikely to occur.

CONCLUSION What i s s t r i k i n g a b o u t t h e U.S. p o s i t i o n i n t h e A s i a n - P a c i f i c r e g i o n i n t h e l a t e 1980s i s t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s has b e c o m e d e p e n d e n t on c o u n t r i e s in t h e area t o a s s i s t in m a i n t a i n i n g t h e r e g i o n ' s s e c u r i t y and p r o s p e r i t y . The U n i t e d S t a t e s i s no l o n g e r a b l e t o a s s e r t i t s e l f as t h e most i n f l u e n t i a l e n t i t y i n t h e r e g i o n as i t d i d i n t h e 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. As i s t r u e at t h e g l o b a l l e v e l , power and i n f l u e n c e in A s i a and t h e P a c i f i c h a v e d i f f u s e d and r e d i s t r i b u t e d . Alliance c a p a b i l i t i e s h a v e changed. R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s are shifting. The S o v i e t Union i s now t h e s i n g l e s t r o n g e s t m i l i t a r y power in East A s i a . As i n E u r o p e , t h e USSR i s p i l i n g up armaments i n A s i a i n redundant q u a n t i t i e s . It has surrounded China w i t h m i l i t a r y f o r c e s — s o m e of them

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i n combat. However, Moscow h a s not been a b l e t o t r a n s l a t e t h i s determined m i l i t a r y growth into e q u i v a l e n t p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e , and i n d e e d , t h e R u s s i a n s behave in ways t h a t g u a r a n t e e o t h e r c o u n t r i e s ' o p p o s i t i o n . Japan, t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t U.S. a l l y i n A s i a and t h e P a c i f i c , h a s grown t o d o m i n a t e t h e r e g i o n ' s t r a d e and i n v e s t m e n t and runs a s t e a d i l y mounting and t r o u b l e s o m e t r a d e d e f i c i t with the United S t a t e s . China, in t u r n , i s opening r a p i d l y t o Western economic and t e c h n i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t , but, u n l i k e J a p a n , China's continued p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y cannot be p r e d i c t e d . R e c e n t c h a n g e s and c o m p l i c a t i o n s i n t h e a l l i e d s e c u r i t y s y s t e m i n A s i a and t h e P a c i f i c , f i r s t s e t up in t h e 1 9 5 0 s , h a v e c o n t r i b u t e d t o r e d u c e d U.S. d o m i n a n c e w i t h o u t , s o f a r , h a v i n g a l t e r e d t h e m a i n g o a l of t h e s y s t e m — c o n t a i ni ng and d e t e r r i n g t h e S o v i e t Union and its allies. B u t , t h e n , with 8 5 5 , 0 0 0 U.S. t r o o p s in E a s t A s i a i n t h e l a t e 1 9 6 0 s and a $ 2 0 0 b i l l i o n p l u s c o m b a t e x p e n d i t u r e o v e r t e n y e a r s , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s was not a b l e t o u l t i m a t e l y c h a n g e t h e o u t c o m e i n one p a r t of Southeast Asia. So p e r h a p s , i n e v i t a b l y , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w i l l find that having to use i t s ingenuity, r a t h e r than i t s p o w e r , i s f o r t u n a t e . Among U.S. a l l i e s i n t h e r e g i o n , t h e J a p a n e s e e c o nomic c h a l l e n g e and t h e P h i l i p p i n e p o l i t i c a l t r a n s i t i o n a r e l i k e l y t o c a r r y t h e most s e r i o u s c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r U.S. i n t e r e s t s . A poor h a n d l i n g of e i t h e r problem w i l l do s u b s t a n t i a l d a m a g e t o U.S. i n t e r e s t s and t o t h e entire region's security system. On t h e Korean P e n i n s u l a , c r i t i c a l p o l i t i c a l t r a n s i t i o n s a r e under way i n both t h e S o u t h and t h e N o r t h . In S o u t h K o r e a , w h e t h e r a c i v i l i a n o r a m i l i t a r y g o v e r n m e n t i s in p o w e r , t h e t h r e a t f r o m North K o r e a i s s o w e l l f e l t t h a t i t i s u n l i k e l y a weak government w i l l come t o o f f i c e in S e o u l . Regarding U.S. p o l i c y t o w a r d t h e two C h i n a s , U.S. s e c u r i t y a r r a n g e m e n t s with and a s s i s t a n c e t o both China and Taiwan w i l l r e q u i r e d e l i c a t e maneuvering in t h e y e a r s ahead. In S o u t h e a s t A s i a , a s s i s t i n g ASEAN as t h e p r i n c i p a l s t a b i l i z e r i n t h i s s u b r e g i o n w i l l c o n t i n u e t o be both a n e c e s s a r y and an i n t e l l i g e n t U.S. p o l i c y . Finall y , i n t h e S o u t h P a c i f i c , A u s t r a l i a and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w i l l have t o a d j u s t t o New Z e a l a n d ' s w i t h d r a w a l from o p e r a t i o n a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n in ANZUS. As t h e S o v i e t Union and i t s A s i a n a s s o c i a t e s expand t h e i r p o w e r and t h r e a t e n t h e i r n e i g h b o r s , t h e a l l i e d s e c u r i t y s y s t e m must a d j u s t . Even as i t r e d i s t r i b u t e s i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and r o l e s , t h e s y s t e m h a s no c h o i c e but to m a i n t a i n d e t e r r e n c e . No l o n g e r t h e d o m i n a n t a r b i t e r of t h e A s i a n - P a c i f i c t r e n d s , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s n e v e r t h e l e s s — when t h e new p a r t n e r s h i p w i t h C h i n a i s f a c t o r e d i n — h a s more f r i e n d l y c o u n t r i e s and more u s a b l e c a p a b i l t i i e s t o work w i t h t h a n e v e r b e f o r e . These f a c t s , and t h e w i s d o m g a i n e d f r o m t h e d i f f i c u l t U . S . e x p e r i e n c e in I n d o c h i n a , s h o u l d bode w e l l f o r f u t u r e U.S. p o l i c i e s i n A s i a and t h e P a c i f i c .

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NOTES 1. G e o r g e P. S h u l t z , E c o n o m i c C o o p e r a t i o n i n t h e P a c i f i c B a s i n , U.S. D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , C u r r e n t p o l i c y , no. 658, 21 Febr u a r y 1985. 2. W a l t e r T. S t o e s s e l , j r . , F o r e i g n p o l i c y p r i o r i t i e s i n Asi a , U.S. D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , C u r r e n t P o l i c y , no. 274, 24 A p r i l 1981 . 3. W a l t e r T. S t o e s s e l , J r . , A l l i e d Responses t o t h e S o v i e t C h a l l e n g e i n E a s t A s i a and t h e p a c i f i c , U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e , Current p o l i c y , no. 403, 10 June 1982. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. G e o r g e P. S h u l t z , C h a l l e n g e s F a c i n g t h e U.S. and ASEAN, U.S. D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , C u r r e n t p o l i c y , no. 597, 13 J u l y 1984. A l s o s e e s h u l t z , " p a c i f i c T i d e s Are R i s i n g , " address t o the World A f f a i r s Council of Northern C a l i f o r n i a i n San Francisco on 5 March 1 983 . 7. From a s p e e c h by A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r E a s t A s i a and t h e P a c i f i c , P a u l D. W o l f o w i t z , as r e p r i n t e d i n W a l l S t r e e t J o u r n a l , 15 A p r i l 1985, p. 29. 8. p r e s i d e n t Reagan i s c i t e d by Paul D. W o l f o w i t z , The ANZUS A I l i a n c e , U.S. D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , C u r r e n t p o l i c y , no. 674, 18 March 1985. 9 . Caspar W. W e i n b e r g e r , " T h e F i v e P i l l a r s o f Our D e f e n s e P o l i c y i n East Asia and the p a c i f i c , " i n A s i a - p a c i f i c Defense Forum ( W i n t e r 1984-1985):2-8. 10. John H. H o l d r i d g e , Japan and the United S t a t e s : A Durable R e l a t i o n s h i p , U.S. Department of S t a t e , Current P o l i c y , no. 337, 28 O c t o b e r 1 981. 11. P a u l D. W o l f o w i t z , p r o t e c t i o n i s m and t h e U.S.-Japan T r a d e , U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e , C u r r e n t p o l i c y , no. 689, 17 A p r i l 1985. 12. John H. H o l d r i d g e , Japan and the United S t a t e s : A Coopera t i v e R e l a t i o n s h i p , U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e , C u r r e n t P o l i c y , no. 374, 1 "March i982. 13. George p. Shultz, Japan and America: I n t e r n a t i o n a l P a r t n e r s h i p f o r t h e 1980s, U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e , C u r r e n t P o l i c y , no. 506, 2 September 1983. 14. Kenneth W. Dam, U.S.-japan R e l a t i o n s i n p e r s p e c t i v e , U.S. Department of S t a t e , Current p o l i c y , no. 547, 6 February 1984. 15. Paul D. W o l f o w i t z , Taking Stock of U.S.-japan R e l a t i o n s , U.S. Department of S t a t e , Current p o l i c y , no. 593, 12 June 1984. 16. Paul D. W o l f o w i t z , P r o t e c t i o n i s m and U . S . - j a p a n T r a d e , U.S. Department of S t a t e , Current p o l i c y , no. 689, 17 A p r i l 1985. 17. A l l e n W a l l i s , The R e l a t i o n of j a p a n ' s Economic I n e f f i c i e n c i e s t o I t s Balance of Trade, U.S. Department of S t a t e , Current p o l i c y , no. 763, 18 O c t o b e r 1985. 18. Nakasone c i t e d i n Steve Lohr, "Japanese premier Urges an I n c r e a s e i n Armed S t r e n g t h , " New York T i m e s , 28 November 1982, p. 1. 19. Nakasone's i n t e r v i e w with the Washington post i s summari z e d i n t h e Far E a s t e r n Economic R e v i e w , 15 December 1 983, p. 3031. R e c a l l t h a t i t was p r i m e M i n i s t e r Suzuki who f i r s t p r o p o s e d the sea-lanes m i s s i o n i n May 1981.

46 20. Long i n t e r v i e w e d i n N i e l Ulman and U r b a n C. L e h n e r , "Tokyo's B u i l d u p , " W a l l s t r e e t J o u r n a l , 22 November 1 9 8 2 , p. 1. 21. U . S . , C o n g r e s s , H o u s e , C o m m i t t e e on F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , Francis J . West, j r . , U . S . - J a p a n D e f e n s e C o o p e r a t i o n and U . S . p o l i c y , March 1 9 8 2 , pp. 7 - 8 . 22. J a p a n e s e Defense Agency, Defense of j a p a n , 1984 (Tokyo: j a p a n T i m e s , 1 9 8 4 ) , p p . 3 1 - 3 7 ; and The M i l i t a r y B a l a n c e 1 9 8 4 - 1 9 8 5 (London: I I S S , 1 9 8 4 ) , p. 1 4 2 . 23. Frank Langdon, " j a p a n and North A m e r i c a , " R o b e r t S. Ozaki and W a l t e r Arnold, e d s . , j a p a n ' s F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s ( B o u l d e r , C o l o . : W e s t v i e w , 1 9 8 5 ) , p. 2 9 . 24. The a u t h o r i s g r a t e f u l t o M a j o r J o h n E b i n g e r , USAF, f o r i d e a s concerning t h e i s s u e s t h a t appear below. Major Ebinger c o m p l e t e d a y e a r i n r e s i d e n c e a t t h e A i r Command and S t a f f C o l l e g e i n J u n e 1 9 8 5 and i s t h e a u t h o r o f " S h a r i n g t h e D e f e n s e B u r d e n i n E a s t A s i a : J a p a n e s e D e f e n s e C a p a b i l i t i e s i n t h e 1 9 9 0 s , " ACSC S t u d e n t j*epoirt 8 5 - 0 7 3 5 , A p r i l 1 9 8 5 . A l s o s e e A n t h o n y H. C o r d e s m a n , "The M i l i t a r y B a l a n c e i n N o r t h e a s t A s i a — T h e C h a l l e n g e t o j a p a n and K o r e a , " Armed F o r c e s J o u r n a l I n t e r n a t i o n a l (November-December 1 9 8 3 ) : 2 7 - 3 7 , 8 0 - 1 0 9 ; and A d m i r a l R o b e r t L. J . L o n g , USN ( R e t . ) i n t e s t i m o n y b e f o r e t h e S u b c o m m i t t e e on Asian and p a c i f i c A f f a i r s o f t h e C o m m i t t e e on F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , 98th c o n g . , 2nd s e s s . , 2 May 1 9 8 4 , p . 8 9 . 25. A l e x a n d e r M. H a i g , J r . , C a v e a t : R e a l i s m , R e a g a n , and F o r e i g n p o l i c y (New York: M a c m i l l a n , 1 9 8 4 ) , pp. 1 9 4 - 2 1 7 . 26. Haig: "Taiwan was a d i f f i c u l t q u e s t i o n f o r Ronald Reagan. He i s an a n t i - C o m m u n i s t . Reagan's e m o t i o n s were d e e p l y engaged i n t h i s q u e s t i o n , and s o was h i s s e n s e o f honor" ( i b i d , p. 1 9 8 ) . Haig c o n t i n u e d : "As l a t e a s March 1 9 8 2 , t h e p r e s i d e n t t o o k t h e s t a n c e t h a t we were g o i n g t o s e l l s p a r e p a r t s t o Taiwan w h e t h e r t h e C h i n e s e l i k e d i t o r n o t ; i f t n e y wanted t o t a l k , t h e n we would a c c o m m o d a t e t h e m , and i f t h e y d i d n o t , t h e n t h e r e was n o t h i n g t o t a l k a b o u t " ( i b i d . , p. 2 1 3 ) . 27. Walter J . S t o e s s e l , j r . , Developing Lasting U.S.-China R e l a t i o n s , U.S. D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , C u r r e n t p o l i c y , n o . 3 9 8 , 1 J u n e 1982. 28. Haig, C a v e a t , p. 1 9 5 . H o w e v e r , when I d i s c u s s e d H a i g ' s p o s i t i o n , and o t h e r a s p e c t s o f Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n China p o l i c y , w i t h s e n i o r U.S. o f f i c i a l s i n B e i j i n g i n J u n e 1 9 8 4 , I f o u n d a g e n u i n e b e l i e f t h a t i t was H a i g , m o r e t h a n a n y o n e e l s e , who h a d u l t i m a t e l y t u r n e d t h e P r e s i d e n t around on t h i s i s s u e . 29. J o h n H. H o l d r i d g e , A s s e s s m e n t o f U.S. R e l a t i o n s w i t h C h i n a , U.S. Department o f S t a t e , C u r r e n t p o l i c y , no. 4 4 4 , 13 December 1982. 30. J o h n H. H o l d r i d g e , U . S . - C h i na J o i n t C o m m u n i q u e , U.S. D e p a r t m e n t o f s t a t e , C u r r e n t p o l i c y , no. 4 1 3 , 18 August 1 9 8 2 . 31. Ibid. 32. S t e v e n I . L e v i n e , " C h i n a and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s : The L i m i t s o f I n t e r a c t i o n , " i n Samuel S. Kim, e d . , China and t h e W o r l d : C h i n e s e F o r e i g n P o l i c y i n t h e P o s t - M a o Era ( B o u l d e r , C o l o . : Westv i e w , 1 9 8 4 ) , p. 1 1 3 . A l s o s e e Henry B. Gass, S i n o - A m e r i c a n S e c u r i t y R e l a t i o n s : E x p e c t a t i o n s and R e a l i t i e s ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: Nat i o n a l D e f e n s e u n i v e r s i t y E s s a y 8 4 - 2 , 1 9 8 4 ) , pp. 1 - 1 1 . 33. B r e z e z i n s k i c i t e d by L e v i n e i n Kim, China and t h e World p. 1 1 3 . 34. Holdridge, "Assessment of U . S . R e l a t i o n s with C h i n a . "

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35. The d e t a i l s a r e t r a c k e d i n Chi Su, " C h i n a and t h e S o v i e t U n i o n : ' p r i n c i p l e d , S a l u t o r y , and T e m p e r e d ' M a n a g e m e n t of C o n f l i c t , " i n Kim, C h i n a and t h e W o r l d , p p . 1 3 6 - 1 4 1 . 36. p e t e r p o l o m k a , "The S e c u r i t y of t h e W e s t e r n p a c i f i c : T h e p r i c e of B u r d e n s n a r i n g , " S u r v i v a l ( J a n u a r y - F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 4 ) : 5 . 37. S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e a r g u m e n t i n Zhang J i a - L i n , "The New R o m a n t i c i s m i n t h e Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s Asian p o l i c y : Illusion and R e a l i t y , " A s i a n S u r v e y ( O c t o b e r 1984) : 1 0 0 7 - 1 0 0 9 . 38. Paul W o l f o w i t z , D e v e l o p i n g an Enduring R e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h C h i n a , U . S . D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , C u r r e n t p o l i c y , n o . 4 6 0 , 28 F e b r u a r y 1983. 39. R o n a l d R e a g a n , "A H i s t o r i c O p p o r t u n i t y f o r t h e U . S . a n d C h i n a , " U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e , C u r r e n t p o l i c y , n o . 5 7 4 , 27 A p r i l 1984. 40. See a p p r a i s a l s b y P a u l F. L a n g e r , " S o v i e t M i l i t a r y p o w e r i n A s i a , " i n D o n a l d S. Z a g o r i a , e d . , S o v i e t p o l i c y i n E a s t A s i a , p. 258; and by J o h n J . S t e p h a n , " A s i a i n t h e S o v i e t C o n c e p t i o n , " a l s o i n Z a g o r i a , i b i d . , pp. 46-47. 41. E v i d e n t l y , I s r a e l i a d v i s o r s and w e a p o n s s y s t e m s h a v e e n t e r e d t h e PRC t h r o u g h Hong K o n g . I s r a e l a l s o s u p p l i e s T a i p e i a v a r i e t y of m i l i t a r y i t e m s . W a s h i n g t o n T i m e s , 24 J a n u a r y 1 9 8 5 , p . 1 . 42. A. J a m e s G r e g o r , "The M i l i t a r y P o t e n t i a l of t h e p e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c of C h i n a and W e s t e r n S e c u r i t y I n t e r e s t s , " A s i a n A f f a i r s ( S p r i n g 1984): 1 - 2 4 . E s t i m a t e s of t h e c o s t t o m o d e r n i z e C h i n a ' s 300 d i v i s i o n s r a n g e f r o m u . S . $ 2 0 0 t o 300 b i l l i o n . purchases abroad c o u l d r e q u i r e a n o t h e r $60 b i l l i o n b e f o r e a c o n f i d e n t d e f e n s e against the Soviets e x i s t e d . G a s s , Si n o - A m e r i c a n S e c u r i t y R e l a t i o n s , p. 31. 43. R o b e r t S. Wang, " C h i n a ' s E v o l v i n g S t r a t e g i c D o c t r i n e , " Asian Survey (October 1984): 1 0 4 4 - 1 0 4 5 . 44. As a n A s i a n d i p l o m a t t o l d S e c r e t a r y H a i g : " R i f l e s a r e o k a y , b u t n o t F - 1 5 s . A s i a n s a r e c o u n t i n g o n U.S. c a u t i o n i n m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s w i t h China." As c i t e d i n G a s s , Si n o - A m e r i c a n S e c u r i t y R e l a t i o n s , p. 23. 45. See, f o r e x a m p l e , Far E a s t e r n Economic Review, 8 March 1 9 8 4 , p p . 1 2 , 1 3 , a n d 28 J u n e , p p . 1 2 - 1 3 ; a n d C h r i s t i a n S c i e n c e M o n i t o r , 14 J a n u a r y 1 9 8 5 , p p . 9 - 1 0 . 46. F o r e x a m p l e , o n 8 J a n u a r y 1 9 7 7 , G e n e r a l J o h n W. v e s s e y , J r . , c o m m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f of UN, U.S., and ROK f o r c e s i n S o u t h K o r e a , s t a t e d t h a t r e m o v a l of t h e r e m a i n i n g U.S. c o m b a t f o r c e s f r o m S o u t h K o r e a w o u l d " i n c r e a s e c o n s i d e r a b l y " t h e r i s k of w a r . Citing the 2nd i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n ' s v a l u e , v e s s e y s t a t e d : " I t ' s t h e o n e c l e a r s i g n a l t o Kim I I S u n g t h a t i f h e s t a r t s a w a r , h e f i g h t s b o t h t h e U . S . a n d t h e ROK a r m i e s . " W a s h i n g t o n p o s t , 9 J a n u a r y 1 9 7 7 , p . A20. I n May, G e n e r a l v e s s e y t o l d r e p o r t e r s , on r e c o r d , " I h a v e t o l d my s u p e r i o r s t h a t n o o n e h e r e w h o i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n i n K o r e a i s i n f a v o r o f U.S. t r o o p w i t h d r a w a l . " Far E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c R e v i e w , 20 May 1 9 7 7 , p . 2 8 . On 18 May 1 9 7 7 , M a j o r G e n e r a l J o h n S i n g l a u b s a i d t h a t a U.S. f o r c e w i t h d r a w a l " w o u l d l e a d t o w a r " — a s t a t e m e n t t h a t l e d P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r t o r e l i e v e h i m of c o m m a n d . W a s h i n g t o n p o s t , 19 May 1 9 7 7 , p p . A - 1 . Many m o r e e x amples could b e c i t e d . 47. W a l t e r T. S t o e s s e l , j r . , F o r e i g n p o l i c y p r i o r i t i e s i n A s i a , U.S. D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , C u r r e n t p o l i c y , n o . 2 7 4 , 2 4 A p r i l 1981 .

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48. Tai Sung An, North Korea i n T r a n s i t i o n : From D i c t a t o r s h i p t o Dynasty (London: Greenwood, 1983), p. 81. 49. C. I . Eugene Kim, " C i v i 1 - M i l i t a r y R e l a t i o n s i n t h e Two K o r e a s , " Armed F o r c e s and S o c i e t y ( F a l l 19 8 4 ) : 1 2; and Paul D. W o l f o w i t z , The U.S. and K o r e a : A u s p i c i o u s p r o s p e c t s , U.S. D e p a r t ment of s t a t e , Current p o l i c y , no. 543, 31 January 1984. 50. See Young Whan K i h l , " N o r t h Korea i n 1 983: T r a n s f o r m i n g the 'Hermit Kingdom'?" Asian Survey (January 1 984) : 1 00-11 1 . 51. See B. C. Koh, " T h e C u l t o f P e r s o n a l i t y and t h e S u c c e s s i o n I d e a , " i n C. I . Eugene Kim and B. C. Koh, e d s . , Journey t o North Korea: Personal P e r c e p t i o n s ( B e r k e l e y : U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a p r e s s , 1984), pp. 25-41; and T a i Sung An, N o r t h K o r e a i n T r a n s i t i o n , pp. 129-148. 52. For d a t a on m i n e r a l , i n d u s t r i a l , and h y d r o e l e c t r i c r e s o u r c e s , s e e U.S. D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e Army, Area Handbook f o r North K o r e a ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C., GPO, 1969), pp. 11-28", 286-289, ~2957 368. During t h e 1970s and 1980s, N o r t h Korea s t i l l r e l i e d on the USSR and the PRC as i t s number one and two trade p a r t n e r s . 53. Young Whan K i h l , "North Korea i n 1984: "Ihe Hermit Kingdom' Turns Outward," Asian Survey (January 1985):67-70. 54. C h a e - J i n L e e , "South K o r e a i n 1984: S e e k i n g p e a c e and S t a b i l i t y , " A s i a n Survey (January 1985):83. 55. Young Whan K i h l , "The Issue of Korean U n i f i c a t i o n : North Korea's p o l i c y and p e r c e p t i o n , " i n Kim, Journey t o North Korea, p. 99. 56. K i h l , "Korean U n i f i c a t i o n , " pp. 103-104; and K i h l , p o l i t i c s and p o l i c i e s i n Dividend Korea: Regimes i n Contest (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1984), pp. 209-21 2. 57. K i h l , p o l i t i c s and P o l i c i e s , p . 207 . 58. W o l f o w i t z , " T h e U.S. and K o r e a : A u s p i c i o u s P r o s p e c t s " ; a l s o see Paul D. W o l f o w i t z , Recent S e c u r i t y Development i n Korea, U.S. Department of S t a t e , Current p o l i c y , no. 731, 12 August 1985. 59. ASEAN, Department of S t a t e Background Note, Washington, D.C., November 1983, r e l y i n g on I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund data. 60. G e o r g e P. S h u l t z , C h a l l e n g e s F a c i n g t h e U.S. and ASEAN, U.S. Department of S t a t e , Current p o l i c y , no. 597, 1 3 July 1984. 61 . G e o r g e P. S h u l t z , The U.S. and ASEAN: p a r t n e r s f o r peac e and Development, U.S. Department of S t a t e , Current p o l i c y , no. 722, 12 J u l y 1 985. 62. S h e l d o n W. Simon, "U.S. S e c u r i t y I n t e r e s t s i n S o u t h e a s t A s i a , " i n W i l l i a m T. Tow and W i l l i a m R. F e e n e y , e d s . , U.S. F o r e i g n P o l i c y and A s i a n - p a c i f i c S e c u r i t y : A Trans r e g i o n a l Approach ( B o u l d e r , C o l o . : Wes t v i ew, 1982), p. 125; A s i a 1 984 Y e a r b o o k ( Hong Kong: Far E a s t e r n Economic R e v i e w , 30 November 1984), p. 20; and The M i l i t a r y Balance, 1984-1985. 63. R o b e r t L. Rau, " S o u t h e a s t A s i a S e c u r i t y i n t h e 1980s: An I n t r a r e g i o n a l p e r s p e c t i v e , " i n Tow, U.S. Foreign p o l i c y and Asianp a c i f i c S e c u r i t y , pp. 97-98. 64. Paul D. W o l f o w i t z , Cambodia: The S e a r c h f o r p e a c e , U.S. Department of S t a t e , Current p o l i c y , no. 613, 11 September 1984. 65. John C. Monjo, Kampuchea A f t e r F i v e Years of Vietnamese O c c u p a t i o n , U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e , C u r r e n t p o l i c y , no. 514, 15 September 1984. 66. S h u l t z , Challenges Facing the U.S. and ASEAN. 67. A l l e n E. Goodman, " T h e Case f o r E s t a b l i s h i n g R e l a t i o n s with Vietnam," i n W i l l i a m A. Buckingham, j r . , ed., Defense planning

49 f o r t h e 1990s and t h e C h a n g i n g I n t e r n a t i o n a l E n v i r o n m e n t (Washi n g t o n , D.C.: N a t i o n a l D e f e n s e u n i v e r s i t y p r e s s , 1 9 8 4 ) , p . 6 1 . Dr. Goodman t h e n r e e x a m i n e s h i s a r g u m e n t w i t h t h i s o b s e r v a t i o n : " T h e r e i s , of c o u r s e , no a c t u a l e v i d e n c e t h a t [ t h i s ] p e r s p e c t i v e i s r i g h t . And t h e r e i s a g o o d d e a l of e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e c u r r e n t a n d p r o j e c t e d l e a d e r s h i p i n Hanoi h a v e a w o r l d v i e w s h a p e d l a r g e l y b y t h e e x i g e n c i e s of m a i n t a i n i n g t h e i r h o l d o n p o w e r a n d n o t on t h e b e h a v i o r a n d p o l i c i e s of s u p e r p o w e r s , f r i e n d o r f o e " ( p p . 6 1 - 6 2 ) . 68. S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , G e o r g e McT. K a h i n , " R e m o v e t h e B a s e s f r o m t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , " New York T i m e s , 12 O c t o b e r 1 9 8 3 . 69. A d e t a i l e d case for retaining these c r i t i c a l bases is L a w r e n c e E. G r i n t e r , The P h i l i p p i n e B a s e s : C o n t i n u i n g U t i l i t y i n a C h a n g i n g S t r a t e g i c C o n t e x t , N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A f f a i r s Monograph 8 0 2 ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: N a t i o n a l D e f e n s e U n i v e r s i t y , 1 9 8 0 ) . Also r e l e v a n t i s F r a n c i s c o S. T a d a d , " K e e p i n g P h i l i p p i n e B a s e s , " W a s h i n g t o n Q u a r t e r l y ( W i n t e r 1 9 8 4 ) ; W i l l i a m H. S u l l i v a n , " R e l o c a t i n g Bases i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , " W a s h i n g t o n Q u a r t e r l y ( S p r i n g 1984); and L a w r e n c e E. G r i n t e r , " p a c i f i c M i l i t a r y I n s t a l l a t i o n s v i t a l t o U.S. D e f e n s e , " Human E v e n t s (4 A u g u s t 1 9 8 4 ) . 70. 1 9 8 3 c o n g r e s s i o n a l t e s t i m o n y b y J a m e s A. K e l l y o f U . S . D e p a r t m e n t of D e f e n s e a s c i t e d i n D a v i d A. R o s e n b e r g , "Communism i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , " P r o b l e m s of Communism ( S e p t e m b e r - O c t o b e r 1 9 8 4 ) : 39-40. 71. S t e v e L o h r , " F i l i p i n o I n s u r g e n c y : Out of R i c e P a d d i e s a n d I n t o t h e C i t i e s , " New York l i m e s , 2 J u l y 1 9 8 5 , p p . 1 , 7 . 72. A. J a m e s G r e g o r , " S o m e P o l i c y C o n s i d e r a t i o n s " i n G r e g o r , e d . , T h e U.S. a n d t h e P h i l i p p i n e s : A C h a l l e n g e t o a S p e c i a l R e l a t i o n s h i p ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: H e r i t a g e F o u n d a t i o n , 1 9 8 3 ) , p p . 6 7 , 7 0 73. 73. P a u l D. W o l f o w i t z , " U . S . E n c o u r a g e s C o n s t r u c t i v e C h a n g e i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , " as a d a p t e d f r o m a s p e e c h a p p e a r i n g i n W a l l S t r e e t j o u r n a l , 15 A p r i 1 1985, p. 29. 74. Ibid. 75. P a u l D. W o l f o w i t z , D e v e l o p m e n t s i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , U.S. D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , C u r r e n t P o l i c y , n o . 7 6 0 , 30 O c t o b e r 1 9 8 5 . 76. H e n r y S. A l b i n s k i , " T h e U.S. P o s i t i o n i n A s i a a n d t h e p a c i f i c : T h e R e l e v a n c e o f A u s t r a l i a a n d New Z e a l a n d , " i n R a m o n H. M y e r s , e d . , A U.S. F o r e i g n P o l i c y f o r A s i a : T h e 1 9 8 0 s a n d B e y o n d ( S t a n f o r d , C a l i f . : Hoover i n s t i t u t i o n p r e s s , 1982), p . 290. 77. Ibid. 78. S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , F . A. M e d i a n s k y , "ANZUS: An A l l i a n c e Beyond t h e T r e a t y , " A u s t r a l i a n O u t l o o k ( D e c e m b e r 1984) : 1 7 8 - 1 8 3 ; a n d Desmond B a l l , The ANZUS C o n n e c t i o n : The S e c u r i t y R e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n A u s t r a l i a , New Z e a l a n d a n d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , SDSC R e f e r e n c e P a p e r , n o . 105 ( C a n b e r r a : A u s t r a l i a n N a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t y , 1 9 8 3 ) , p . 2. 79. D a v i d L a n g e , "New Z e a l a n d ' s S e c u r i t y p o l i c y , " F o r e i g n A f f a i r s (Summer 1 9 8 5 ) : 1 0 0 9 - 1 01 9 . 80. P a u l D. W o l f o w i t z , The ANZUS R e l a t i o n s h i p : A l l i a n c e Mana g e m e n t , U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e , C u r r e n t p o l i c y , n o . 5 9 2 , 24 J u n e 1984. 81 . A u s t r a l i a ' s L a b o r p r i m e M i n i s t e r R o b e r t Hawke a l s o t o l d P r i m e M i n i s t e r L a n g e , "We c o u l d n o t a c c e p t . . . t h a t t h e ANZUS a l l i a n c e had a d i f f e r e n t m e a n i n g and e n t a i l e d d i f f e r e n t o b l i g a t i o n s f o r d i f f e r e n t members." Wall S t r e e t J o u r n a l , 6 F e b r u a r y 1985, p. 26.

50 82. Paul D. Wolfowitz, The ANZUS Alliance, U.S. Department of State, Current policy, no. 674, 18 March 1985.

3 The Soviet Union: Meshing Strategic and Revolutionary Objectives in Asia Marian Leighton Leif R. Rosenberger

W i t h t w o - t h i r d s o f i t s l a n d m a s s and t h e b u l k o f its m i n e r a l and e n e r g y r e s o u r c e s in A s i a , t h e USSR i s f o c u s ing i n c r e a s i n g l y on t h e s e c u r i t y e n v i r o n m e n t beyond i t s eastern borders. I t r e g a r d s many of t h e t r e n d s t h e r e as adverse. I t s p e s s i m i s m i s c o n d i t i o n e d p a r t l y by d e e p r o o t e d i d e o l o g i c a l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l f a c t o r s : a f e a r of c a p i t a l i s t e n c i r c l e m e n t , a c o n v i c t i o n that c a p i t a l i s t h o s t i l i t y and " i m p e r i a l i s t " - i n c i t e d war a r e i n e v i t a b l e , and a p a r a n o i d a t t i t u d e a b o u t t h e " y e l l o w p e r i l . " The f a c t t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union l a c k s a g l a c i s of f r i e n d l y and a l l i e d s t a t e s along i t s A s i a n p e r i p h e r y c o n t r i b u t e s h e a v i l y t o i t s s e n s e of i n s e c u r i t y and v u l n e r a b i l i t y . Asia's s p a t i a l i n t e r p é n é t r a t i o n w i t h t h e S o v i e t Union i s s y m b o l i z e d by trie v a s t E u r a s i a n p l a i n , which s t r e t c h e s from the Urals t o M o n g o l i a . In the absence o f m a j o r b a r r i e r s , waves o f m i g r a t i o n s h a v e moved across the p l a i n f o r c e n t u r i e s , d i s p l a c i n g or absorbing e a r l i e r i n h a b i t a n t s . . . . An a w a r e n e s s o f t h e p l a i n ' s p e r m e a b i l i t y and e t h n i c e v a n e s c e n c e l e a v e s many Russians with a h a l f - f o r m e d sense of t e r r i t o r i a l i n s e c u r i ty t h a t m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f not only i n the p r e d i l e c t i o n f o r s t r o n g c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y b u t i n what amounts t o a n a t i o n a l f i x a t i o n on f r o n t i e r d e f e n s e . 1

The K r e m l i n ' s p a r a n o i a about s e c u r i t y i s e s p e c i a l l y pronounced in A s i a because of t h e p e c u l i a r g e o p o l i t i c a l and demographic v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s t h a t shape S o v i e t t h r e a t perceptions there. In sharp c o n t r a s t w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , which l o o k s out on v a s t expanses of ocean on i t s e a s t e r n and w e s t e r n f l a n k s and f r i e n d l y c o u n t r i e s t o t h e n o r t h and s o u t h o f i t s b o r d e r s , t h e S o v i e t e m p i r e i s

This a r t i c l e r e f l e c t s the v i e w s of those of the U.S. government.

51

the authors and not

necessarily

52 surrounded in most directions by hostile neighbors. In Asia, China lies to the south of the USSR, Japan lies to the east, and U.S. theater air and naval power cover the Pacific region. L o g i s t i c a l p r o b l e m s p l a g u e the Soviet m i l i t a r y position in the East Asia-Pacific arena. Enormous distances separate the resource-rich but sparsely populated Soviet Far East from the major industrial and population centers of European Russia. The Trans-Siberian Railway c o n s t i t u t e d v i r t u a l l y the only link b e t w e e n the t w o areas u n t i l the recent c o m p l e t i o n of s e c t i o n s of the B a i k a l - A m u r M a i n l i n e (BAM). The BAM runs p a r a l l e l to and a few hundred miles south of the Trans-Sib and would be almost equally vulnerable to Chinese sabotage during a Sino-Soviet war. S o v i e t l o g i s t i c v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s p e r t a i n on sea as well as land. Siberian ports are limited in number and are very congested. A new port at Nakhodka is designed to h a n d l e c i v i l i a n c a r g o so that V l a d i v o s t o k can be reserved strictly for military use. Although icebreakers ( s o m e of them n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d ) h a v e h e l p e d to keep open the Arctic sea-lanes to the Soviet Far East, use of that r o u t e to s u p p l y coastal v i l l a g e s (not to m e n t i o n such v i t a l m i l i t a r y i n s t a l l a t i o n s as V l a d i v o s t o k ) remains time-consuming, extremely expensive, and ultimately unreliable. Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk, the two principal bases for the Soviet Pacific Fleet, both suffer from h i g h l y u n f a v o r a b l e w e a t h e r c o n d i t i o n s . Even m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , V l a d i v o s t o k has no d i r e c t access to the open ocean. Naval vessels based there must transit one of the t h r e e n a r r o w c h o k e p o i n t s — t h e s t r a i t s of T s u s h i m a , T s u g a r u , or S o y a — t h a t p r o v i d e ingress into and egress from the Sea of Japan. Petropavlovsk, situated at the s o u t h e r n tip of the K a m c h a t k a P e n i n s u l a , faces the open sea but is too far north to be s u p p l i e d by land from Soviet territory. In summing up the USSR's logistical difficulties as they r e l a t e to p o t e n t i a l m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s in A s i a , one scholar has pointed out that t h e s e l o g i s t i c a l p r o b l e m s do not [pose] m a j o r c o n straints on Soviet military power in East Asia, so long as any future conflict is geographically limited and of short duration. . . . Thus, a quick o f f e n s i v e action a g a i n s t a r e g i o n a l East A s i a n c o u n t r y in p u r s u i t of a limited military objective along the Soviet periphery is p o s s i b l e . But S o v i e t l o g i s t i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s m e a n that Moscow would experience extreme difficulty in any large-scale military involvement over a longer period of t i m e outside the immediate Soviet periphery. 2

This p r o b l e m is c o m p o u n d e d for the Soviet U n i o n by t h e fact that its Pacific Fleet is d e f i c i e n t in a f l o a t replenishment and supply capabilities and in sea-based tactical airpower. The fleet would h a v e to rely o n

53

s h o r e - b a s e d a i r c o v e r in o r d e r t o s u s t a i n a c o n v e n t i o n a l c o n f l i c t w i t h U.S. n a v a l f o r c e s in t h e P a c i f i c . Soviet a c q u i s i t i o n s of a n a v a l b a s e in V i e t n a m a n d t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a i r c r a f t and h e l i c o p t e r c a r r i e r s are h e l p i n g t o r e m e d y t h e s e d e f i c i e n c i e s , as is a r e c e n t S o v i e t f o c u s o n a m p h i b i o u s l a n d i n g c a p a b i l i t y in t h e P a c i f i c naval a r e a — r e f 1 e c t e d in t h e j o i n t S o v i e t - V i e t n a m e s e i n f a n t r y l a n d i n g e x e r c i s e o f f t h e V i e t n a m e s e c o a s t in 1984. 3 A l t h o u g h V i e t n a m h a s e m e r g e d as a c l o s e S o v i e t a l l y in A s i a , M o s c o w a p p e a r s t o r e g a r d o v e r a l l politicalmilitary trends in t h e r e g i o n a s a d v e r s e . The SinoJapanese peace treaty of 1978, including an "antih e g e m o n y " c l a u s e d i r e c t e d at t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , w a s o f particular concern to the Kremlin. Soviet concern m o u n t e d s t i l l f u r t h e r w i t h China's d e c i s i o n not to r e n e w t h e S i n o - S o v i e t t r e a t y of t h i r t y - y e a r s s t a n d i n g w h e n it lapsed in 1 9 8 0 . Moscow regularly denounces alleged " c o l l u s i o n " a m o n g the U n i t e d S t a t e s , C h i n a , and J a p a n a n d , i n c r e a s i n g l y , a m o n g t h e m e m b e r s of t h e A s s o c i a t i o n of S o u t h e a s t Asian Nations (ASEAN). "Washington is t o d a y s e e n as p u s h i n g C h i n a t o w a r d [confrontation with] t h e U S S R in t h e s a m e w a y t h a t B r i t a i n a n d F r a n c e t r i e d to p u s h H i t l e r t o w a r d t h e S o v i e t U n i o n in t h e 1930's." Moreover, r e g a r d i n g C h i n a ' s a n d J a p a n ' s a l l e g e d r o l e in the anti-Soviet conspiracy: Images of the Mongol conquest (the most traumatic historical experience of the Russian people) are triggered by s h r e w d l y w o r d e d p r o p a g a n d a a b o u t the t e r r i t o r i a l appetites of "Great Han chauvinism." Japanese claims [to] the K u r i l e Islands are p o r t r a y e d as f o l l o w i n g a tradition of predatory designs on the Russian Far East from the Siberian Intervention (1918-22) to the miniwars around the Manchurian perimeter in 1937-39. Ominous motives are ascribed to the 19th-century American c o m m e r c i a l i n t e r e s t s in the A m u r r e g i o n , to A m e r i c a n involvement in the Siberian Intervention, and to Washington's wartime plans to occupy the Kurile Islands. 4 I n r e s p o n d i n g t o w h a t it a p p a r e n t l y p e r c e i v e s as t h r e a t s to its s e c u r i t y in A s i a a n d t h e P a c i f i c , the S o v i e t U n i o n i t s e l f h a s e m e r g e d as t h e g r e a t e s t m i l i t a r y threat to this v a s t r e g i o n . In v i e w of t h e general u n a t t r a c t i v e n e s s of c o m m u n i s t i d e o l o g y a n d o f t h e S o v i e t e c o n o m i c m o d e l to m o s t Asian c o u n t r i e s , the o v e r w h e l m i n g thrust of the Kremlin's policy in A s i a has been military.

SOVIET STRATEGY T h e S o v i e t f e a r of a t w o - f r o n t w a r h a s led t h e to u n d e r t a k e m i l i t a r y p r e p a r a t i o n s that reflect a front strategy. Having engaged since the m i d - 1 9 6 0 s

USSR twoin a

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m a s s i v e m i l i t a r y buildup aimed l a r g e l y a t E u r o p e , t h e S o v i e t s h a v e e m b a r k e d on an u n p r e c e i d e n t e d b u i l d u p o f t h e i r f o r c e s in N o r t h e a s t Asia. Unlike the 500,000 S o v i e t t r o o p s s t a t i o n e d along t h e S i n o - S o v i e t f r o n t i e r — t r o o p s equipped t o wage a land war w i t h C h i n a — t h e new deployments in the Soviet Far East s u g g e s t acquisition o f a c a p a b i l i t y t o t a k e on U.S. f o r c e s i n t h e P a c i f i c , n e u t r a l i z i n g Japan in t h e p r o c e s s . E l e m e n t s of Moscow's A s i a n - P a c i f i c b u i l d u p i n c l u d e t h e e m p l a c e m e n t of t h e l a t e s t g e n e r a t i o n of ground and a i r equipment ( n o t a b l y t h e n u c l e a r - c a p a b l e B a c k f i r e b o m b e r ) , c r e a t i o n of a new t h e a t e r high command, s i t i n g of some 140 S S - 2 0 m i s s i l e s , and t h e e x p a n s i o n and m o d e r n i z a t i o n o f t h e Pacific Fleet. A Soviet s t r a t e g i c b a s t i o n is developing north of J a p a n on t h e Sea of Okhotsk and t h e Kamchatka P e n i n sula. The Sea of Okhotsk, which i s v i r t u a l l y e n c i r c l e d by S o v i e t t e r r i t o r y , makes a n a t u r a l s t r a t e g i c s a n c t u a r y and p r o t e c t i v e b a r r i e r f o r t h e USSR's A s i a n l a n d m a s s . B l a n k e t e d w i t h an a i r d e f e n s e n e t w o r k c o n s i s t i n g o f r a d a r s , m i s s i l e s , g u n s , and i n t e r c e p t o r a i r c r a f t , t h e a r e a has become s o s t r a t e g i c a l l y s e n s i t i v e t h a t i n 1 9 8 3 t h e S o v i e t s s h o t down a S o u t h K o r e a n c i v i l i a n j e t l i n e r w i t h 269 p a s s e n g e r s when i t s t r a y e d o f f c o u r s e t h e r e en r o u t e from A l a s k a t o J a p a n . The S o v i e t r i n g around t h e Sea of Okhotsk h a s been c l o s e d w i t h t h e f o r t i f i c a t i o n of t h e s o u t h e r n K u r i l e I s l a n d s , which c o n t r o l p a s s a g e from t h e P a c i f i c t o t h e Sea of Okhotsk. These i s l a n d s , which J a p a n c l a i m s as i t s N o r t h e r n T e r r i t o r i e s , w e r e s e i z e d by t h e USSR a t t h e end o f W o r l d War XI and h a v e b e e n a m a j o r b o n e o f c o n t e n t i o n in S o v i e t - J a p a n e s e r e l a t i o n s ever s i n c e . In 1 9 8 3 , Moscow d e p l o y e d a s q u a d r o n o f s u p e r s o n i c M I G - 2 3 f i g h t e r - b o m b e r s on E t o r o f u , o n e o f t h e i s l a n d s - - a d e ployment t h a t r e p r e s e n t e d a s i g n i f i c a n t u p g r a d i n g of S o v i e t m i l i t a r y p o w e r i n t h e a r e a and a s t r o n g s i g n a l t h a t t h e S o v i e t s intend t o occupy t h e Northern T e r r i t o r i e s permanently. In a d d i t i o n t o t h e m i l i t a r y buildup around t h e S o v i e t Union's Far E a s t e r n p e r i p h e r y , the Kremlin has moved t o t r a n s f o r m t h e U . S . - b u i l t n a v a l b a s e a t Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, i n t o t h e l a r g e s t S o v i e t m i l i t a r y i n s t a l l a t i o n o u t s i d e t h e USSR. Cam Ranh Bay i s s t e e p e d in historical significance. I t was t h e s t a g i n g a r e a f o r t h e J a p a n e s e F l e e t d u r i n g t h e R u s s o - J a p a n e s e War. The Japanese Fleet decimated the Russian B a l t i c Fleet in the Tsushima S t r a i t in 1905 in t h e m a j o r n a v a l b a t t l e of t h a t war. This f a c t has led t o s p e c u l a t i o n t h a t S o v i e t n a v a l s t r a t e g i s t s may b e c o n t e m p l a t i n g a T s u s h i m a - i n r e v e r s e during a f u t u r e c o n f l i c t . Cam Ranh Bay h a s y e t another h i s t o r i c a l connotation. I t was t h e J a p a n e s e move i n t o Cam Ranh Bay t h a t l e d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o i m p o s e o i l s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t J a p a n — a c a t a l y s t f o r World War I I i n t h e P a c i f i c . In 1 9 8 5 , M o s c o w ' s u s e o f t h e b a s e a t Cam Ranh Bay e n a b l e s i t t o p r o j e c t p o w e r f a r s o u t h o f J a p a n and t o

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p o s e a t h r e a t t o t h e v i t a l s e a - l a n e s and c h o k e p o i n t s l i n k i n g t h e P a c i f i c and I n d i a n o c e a n s . The S o v i e t s a l s o m a k e u s e o f t h e V i e t n a m e s e a i r b a s e a t Da Nang and t h e C a m b o d i a n p o r t o f Kompong Som, which l i e s on t h e G u l f o f Thailand. B e a r - D l o n g - r a n g e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e a i r c r a f t and B e a r - F a n t i s u b m a r i n e w a r f a r e p l a n e s o p e r a t e out of V i e t namese b a s e s ; they s e r v e t o enhance S o v i e t operational and i n t e l l i g e n c e - g a t h e r i n g a c t i v i t i e s and t o i n t i m i d a t e t h e noncommunist s t a t e s of Southeast Asia. In t h e s p r i n g o f 1 9 8 4 , S o v i e t and V i e t n a m e s e n a v a l infantry f o r c e s s t a g e d an u n p r e c e d e n t e d j o i n t a m p h i b i o u s e x e r c i s e o f f t h e c o a s t of n o r t h e r n Vietnam in t h e Gulf of Tonkin.5 T h i s e p i s o d e p r e s u m a b l y had a s o b e r i n g e f f e c t on C h i n a , which had t h r e a t e n e d t o t e a c h V i e t n a m a " s e c o n d l e s s o n " as p u n i s h m e n t f o r i t s i n v a s i o n of Cambodia. (The " f i r s t l e s s o n " c o n s i s t e d of a l i m i t e d Chinese c r o s s - b o r d e r a t t a c k i n t o V i e t n a m i n F e b r u a r y 1979 and a s i x - w e e k - l o n g o c c u p a t i o n of some n o r t h e r n V i e t n a m e s e areas . ) Moscow h a s u s e d i t s m i l i t a r y p r e s e n c e i n S o u t h e a s t A s i a f o r i n t i m i d a t i o n on o t h e r o c c a s i o n s a s w e l l . In 1 9 8 0 , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r M^nsk l e d a f o u r - s h i p f l o t i l l a on a p r e c e d e n t - s h a t t e r i n g cruise through t h e Gulf of T h a i l a n d . In F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 3 , t h e M i n s k , c a r r y i n g v e r t i c a l t a k e o f f YAK-36 f i g h t e r p l a n e s , s a i l e d v i r t u a l l y w i t h i n view of S i n g a p o r e ' s waterfront business d i s t r i c t . During h i s t e n u r e as U.S. a m b a s s a d o r t o t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , Michael Armacost t o l d r e p o r t e r s t h a t S o v i e t a i r c r a f t c a r r i e d out "hundreds of v i o l a t i o n s of Philippine airspace."5 Moscow's d e p l o y m e n t o f a p e r m a nent naval c o n t i n g e n t in t h e South China Sea at a t i m e when t h e U . S . a b i l i t y t o r e t a i n u s e o f b a s e s i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s is in j e o p a r d y c o n s t i t u t e s s t i l l another ominous p o r t e n t f o r t h e r e g i o n . The S o v i e t s stand p o i s e d t o a s s e r t r e g i o n a l hegemony i n t h i s s t r a t e g i c a l l y v i t a l area. M e a n w h i l e , t h e USSR s t a t i o n e d t w o a i r c r a f t carriers in t h e w e s t e r n P a c i f i c — f o r m e r l y a U.S. " 1 ak e " - - d u r i n g a p e r i o d when t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s was f o r c e d t o denude i t s naval power t h e r e in o r d e r to t r a n s f e r c a r r i e r s t o t h e I n d i a n O c e a n and P e r s i a n G u l f i n r e s p o n s e t o t h e c r i s e s i n A f g h a n i s t a n and I r a n . As n o t e d a b o v e , t h e S o v i e t U n i o n ' s s t r a t e g i c n i g h t m a r e e n v i s a g e s t h e f o r m a t i o n o f an a l l i a n c e among t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , C h i n a , and J a p a n . However, t h e t h r u s t of t h e Kremlin's p o l i c y toward i t s f o e s has t h e e f f e c t of a s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g prophecy. Its intransigence toward J a p a n on t h e N o r t h e r n T e r r i t o r i e s i s s u e and v i s - à - v i s C h i n a on c o n c e s s i o n s t o b r i n g a b o u t a S i n o - S o v i e t r e c o n c i l i a t i o n l e a v e s t h o s e c o u n t r i e s v i r t u a l l y no a l t e r n a t i v e b u t t o r e c o i l f r o m t h e USSR and s e e k c l o s e r l i n k s w i t h each o t h e r , w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , and w i t h ASEAN. In s h o r t , t h e S o v i e t Union h a s c r e a t e d a s i t u a t i o n i n which i t s p r o v o c a t i v e b e h a v i o r i s t h e c a t a l y s t f o r t h e m o v e s t o w a r d " c o l l u s i o n " among i t s f o e s t h a t i t p r o f e s s e s t o r e c o g n i z e and d e p l o r e .

56 NORTHEAST ASIA: SOVIET RELATIONS W I T H CHINA, JAPAN, A N D KOREA

U . S . - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s l i e b e y o n d t h e s c o p e of t h i s chapter. S u f f i c e i t t o s a y t h a t t h e USSR r e g a r d s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a s i t s m a i n e n e m y ( g l a v n i y p r o t i v n i k) i n Asia—and worldwide. The U n i t e d S t a t e s i s v i e w e d a s a n a c t u a l , even i m m i n e n t , t h r e a t as compared w i t h t h e p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t f r o m C h i n a and J a p a n . Moscow's c h i e f concern, t h e r e f o r e , is that closer m i l i t a r y links bet w e e n J a p a n , C h i n a , and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w i l l h a s t e n t h e day when t h o s e p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t s a r e t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o actual ones. As o n e s c h o l a r a p t l y p o i n t e d o u t : What t h e S o v i e t s f e a r i s a C h i n a i n d u s t r i a l i z e d and g i v e n m i l i t a r y t e c h n o l o g y and a s s i s t a n c e by Tokyo and W a s h i n g t o n . . . . The S o v i e t s a r e c o n s c i o u s of t h e h i g h l e v e l of J a p a n e s e t e c h n o l o g y and of t h e d a n g e r t h a t i t m i g h t b e a p p l i e d t o m i l i t a r y e n d s . . . . Even i f J a p a n ese technological cooperation should remain o u t s i d e the m i l i t a r y s e c t o r , i t could produce a quantum jump i n Chinese i n d u s t r i a l - m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s . ^

As n o t e d a b o v e , C h i n a , l i k e J a p a n , s e e m s t o b e r e g a r d e d by t h e USSR a s a p o t e n t i a l s e c u r i t y t h r e a t . As t h e J a p a n e s e m i g h t move d u r i n g an i n t e r n a t i o n a l crisis t o mine t h e t h r e e s t r a i t s t h r o u g h which t h e S o v i e t P a c i f i c F l e e t w o u l d h a v e t o e x i t t h e S e a of J a p a n i n t o t h e open ocean, t h e C h i n e s e might a l i g n t h e m s e l v e s act i v e l y o n t h e s i d e of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d J a p a n i n a superpower c o n f l i c t . M o r e o v e r , as one s c h o l a r h a s p o i n t e d o u t , " A l t h o u g h C h i n a i s no m a t c h f o r t h e S o v i e t s in a f r o n t a l , one-on-one c o n f l i c t , i t s r e l a t i v e l y obsol e t e weapons could t u r n i n t o a f o r m i d a b l e f a c t o r if t h e S o v i e t Union w e r e t o e x h a u s t i t s e l f i n a m a j o r c o n f l i c t with t h e United S t a t e s in East Asia."8 Moscow's c o n c e r n s s h o u l d be v i e w e d a g a i n s t the b a c k d r o p of t h e S i n o - S o v i e t d i s p u t e , w h i c h , i n t u r n , e v o l v e d o u t of a l o n g h i s t o r i c a l l e g a c y : The S o v i e t s e c u r i t y p e r s p e c t i v e i n A s i a and w o r l d w i d e . . . b e a r s t h e i m p r i n t o f y e a r s of c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h t h e w o r l d ' s m o s t p o p u l o u s , and A s i a ' s l a r g e s t , n a t i o n . The t w o c o u n t r i e s s h a r e a b o r d e r t h a t s t r e t c h e s f o r more t h a n 4,000 m i l e s a c r o s s A s i a . Bitter ideologicalp o l i t i c a l and t e r r i t o r i a l c o n f l i c t s r o o t e d i n h i s t o r y going back t o C z a r i s t t i m e s have envenomed t h e . . . r e l a t i o n s h i p . . . . C h i n e s e m i l i t a r y i n f e r i o r i t y and t e c h n o l o g i c a l b a c k w a r d n e s s a r e t o some e x t e n t compens a t e d f o r by C h i n a ' s e n o r m o u s m a n p o w e r r e s o u r c e s , its p r o v e d t e n a c i t y i n r e s i s t i n g f o r e i g n i n v a d e r s , and t h e v a s t n e s s of t h e c o u n t r y , w h e r e i n v a d i n g a r m i e s t e n d t o bog d o w n , a s d i d t h o s e of t h e J a p a n e s e i n t h e 1 9 3 0 ' s and e a r l y 1 9 4 0 ' s . 9

Moscow's p u b l i c

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t i o n s h i p a p p e a r s t o be somewhat s c h i z o p h r e n i c . Soviet p r o p a g a n d a l a m b a s t s B e i j i n g and W a s h i n g t o n f o r a l l e g e d c o l l u s i o n a g a i n s t Moscow, but a t t h e same t i m e S o v i e t s p o k e s m e n p r o f e s s t o be u n c o n c e r n e d a b o u t a S i n o - U . S . r a p p r o c h e m e n t b e c a u s e t h e i d e o l o g i c a l gap b e t w e e n t h e t w o n a t i o n s seems u n b r i d g e a b l e . D e s p i t e C h i n a ' s a s s e r t i o n s t h a t i t i s p u r s u i n g an "evenhanded" p o l i c y e q u a l l y c r i t i c a l of both superp o w e r s , a S o v i e t D e f e n s e M i n i s t r y p u b l i c a t i o n of l a t e December 1 9 8 3 — t h e e v e o f C h i n e s e P r e m i e r Zhao Z i y a n g ' s v i s i t t o t h e United St a t e s - - a c c u s e d B e i j i n g of a p r o U.S. b i a s . The p u b l i c a t i o n a r g u e d t h a t China was g u i l t y o f c o m p l i c i t y w i t h U.S. " i m p e r i a l i s m . " It also chided the Chinese for " f o r g e t t i n g " that "the e n t i r e Asian c o n t i n e n t i s s u r r o u n d e d by U.S. m i l i t a r y b a s e s . " 1 0 One c o u l d s p o t t r a c e s of S o v i e t c o n c e r n about Sino-U.S. s e c u r i t y t i e s i n t h e w a k e o f Z h a o ' s U.S. v i s i t i n J a n u ary 1984. Nevertheless, Soviet statements, although e x h i b i t i n g some u n e a s e about t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of S i n o U.S. l i n k s , e x p r e s s e d r e l a t i v e o p t i m i s m a b o u t t h e g e n e r a l c o u r s e o f C h i n e s e f o r e i g n p o l i c y and t h e p r o s p e c t s for Sino-Soviet relations. A c c o r d i n g t o Moscow's a s s e s s m e n t , underlying d i f f e r e n c e s between the United S t a t e s and China would p r e c l u d e " a c o m p r e h e n s i v e S i n o U.S. s t r a t e g i c agreement."11 A s h o r t t i m e l a t e r , Moscow's o p t i m i s m g a v e way t o a m o r e p e s s i m i s t i c o u t l o o k as a r e s u l t o f P r e s i d e n t Ronald Reagan's o f f i c i a l v i s i t t o China in A p r i l 1 9 8 4 . The S o v i e t news agency T a s s , f o r e x a m p l e , denounced C h i n e s e l e a d e r Deng X i a o p i n g f o r r e p o r t e d l y s t a t i n g t h a t " C h i n a i s not o p p o s e d " t o a U.S. arms b u i l d u p . 1 2 Soviet p o l i c y m a k e r s and a c a d e m i c s a l i k e h a v e p e r i o d i c a l l y accused B e i j i n g of " t i l t i n g " t o w a r d Wash i n g t o n - - C h i n e s e claims of " e v e n h a n d e d n e s s " n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g . The y e a r 1 9 8 4 was n o t a b l e f o r t h e n u m b e r o f h i g h l e v e l Sino-U.S. exchanges.13 In J a n u a r y , as a l r e a d y n o t e d , P r e m i e r Zhao v i s i t e d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , and i n March a g r o u p of C h i n e s e d e f e n s e i n d u s t r y s p e c i a l i s t s - r e p o r t e d l y i n c l u d i n g D e f e n s e M i n i s t e r Zhang A i p i n g ' s son--paid a visit. The f o l l o w i n g m o n t h , President Reagan j o u r n e y e d t o B e i j i n g — a j o u r n e y t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union v i e w e d as a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f o r t t o u p g r a d e S i n o U.S. r e l a t i o n s i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r R e a g a n ' s reelection campaign.11* The S o v i e t s u n d o u b t e d l y w e r e r e l i e v e d by B e i j i n g ' s r e j e c t i o n d u r i n g Reagan's v i s i t of S i n o - U . S . s t r a t e g i c c o o p e r a t i o n , but t h e y r e m a i n e d c o n c e r n e d about the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t s e c r e t accords were signed at the t ime of t h e v i s i t . Although Reagan r e c e i v e d a warm w e l c o m e , t h e C h i nese media d e l e t e d some of h i s s t r o n g e s t anti-Soviet statements.15 The c e n s o r s h i p p r e s u m a b l y r e f l e c t e d C h i n a ' s d e s i r e t o a v o i d o f f e n d i n g t h e K r e m l i n on t h e eve of a p l a n n e d v i s i t by F i r s t D e p u t y P r i m e M i n i s t e r I v a n A r k h i p o v , who s e r v e d as Moscow's c h i e f e c o n o m i c a d v i s e r i n China d u r i n g t h e S i n o - S o v i e t honeymoon of t h e 1 9 5 0 s . However, t h e S o v i e t s p o s t p o n e d Arkhipov's v i s i t in t h e

58 w a k e o f e s c a l a t i n g b o r d e r c l a s h e s b e t w e e n C h i n e s e and V i e t n a m e s e armed f o r c e s . Moscow w a r n e d B e i j i n g a g a i n s t attempting to "teach Vietnam a second lesson" f o r i t s i n v a s i o n of Cambodia, w h i l e B e i j i n g r e i t e r a t e d i t s t h r e e p r e c o n d i t i o n s f o r a n o r m a l i z a t i o n of S i n o - S o v i e t relat i o n s : a S o v i e t d r a w d o w n o f t r o o p s on t h e S i n o - S o v i e t b o r d e r and i n M o n g o l i a ; S o v i e t w i t h d r a w a l f r o m A f g h a n i s t a n ; and c e s s a t i o n o f S o v i e t s u p p o r t f o r V i e t n a m ' s war in Cambodia. China t r i e d t o r e a s s u r e t h e Kremlin t h a t " C h i n a i s n o t e n t e r i n g and w i l l n e v e r e n t e r i n t o any against the USSR. alliance with the United S t a t e s Never."16 The S o v i e t and C h i n e s e f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s c o n f e r r e d a t l e n g t h d u r i n g t h e UN G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y s e s s i o n i n New York i n t h e autumn o f 1 9 8 4 , and s e m i a n n u a l t a l k s b e t w e e n S o v i e t and C h i n e s e o f f i c i a l s on n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f relations proceeded on s c h e d u l e — a l b e i t perfunctorily. Arkhipov f i n a l l y v i s i t e d B e i j i n g i n December 1984. The h i g h e s t r a n k i n g S o v i e t o f f i c i a l t o come t o China i n f i f t e e n y e a r s , he n e g o t i a t e d a f i v e - y e a r t r a d e a c c o r d and an a g r e e m e n t p r o v i d i n g f o r S o v i e t a s s i s t a n c e i n t h e m o d e r n i z a t i o n of S o v i e t - f i n a n c e d i n d u s t r i a l projects d a t i n g from t h e 1 9 5 0 s . Arkhipov's v i s i t notwithstanding, Sino-Soviet s t a t e - t o - s t a t e r e l a t i o n s have remained r e l a t i v e l y chill y , and p a r t y - t o - p a r t y r e l a t i o n s a r e n o n e x i s t e n t . Chin e s e p a r t y o f f i c i a l s demand S o v i e t c o n c e s s i o n s on m a j o r issues (troop l e v e l s , Cambodia, Afghanistan) before " f r a t e r n a l " t i e s can be r e s t o r e d . The K r e m l i n i s u n l i k e l y t o o f f e r any c o n c e s s i o n s t o B e i j i n g s o l o n g a s S i n o - U . S . t i e s become c l o s e r , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e m i l i tary field. As a U . S . s c h o l a r h a s e m p h a s i z e d : " M o s c o w h a s f e a r e d t h a t A m e r i c a n a d v a n c e d weapons t e c h n o l o g y and weapons s y s t e m s m i g h t make t h e i r a p p e a r a n c e i n C h i n a , [thus] transforming a p o t e n t i a l Chinese t h r e a t to Soviet s e c u r i t y i n t o an a c t u a l i t y . " 1 7 The U n i t e d S t a t e s r e p o r t e d l y a l r e a d y h a s a g r e e d t o s e l l t h e C h i n e s e TOW a n t i t a n k and Hawk a n t i a i r c r a f t m i s s i l e s . 1 8 The K r e m l i n c a n be e x p e c t e d t o p l a y upon t h e c o n c e r n s o f t h o s e i n C h i n e s e o f f i c i a l d o m who o p p o s e t h e U . S . c o n n e c t i o n and w h o , f o r i d e o l o g i c a l o r o t h e r r e a s o n s , h a r b o r n o s t a l g i a f o r t h e S i n o - S o v i e t amity of earlier times. Moscow's a t t e m p t t o c u l t i v a t e k i n d r e d s p i r i t s i n B e i j i i n g , h o w e v e r , w i l l b e a c c o m p a n i e d by c o n t i n u i n g m i l i t a r y p r e s s u r e in t h e form of a t i g h t e r e n c i r c l e m e n t of China from M o n g o l i a , V i e t n a m , Cambodia, A f g h a n i s t a n , and p e r h a p s , e v e n t u a l l y , North K o r e a . Although t h e r e i n s t a t e m e n t of China i n t o t h e Sovietc o n t r o l l e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i s t movement would c o n s t i t u t e a t r e m e n d o u s v i c t o r y f o r t h e USSR, t h e S o v i e t s a r e u n l i k e l y t o pay a p r i c e in t h e form of c o n c e s s i o n s on what t h e y v i e w as i m p o r t a n t s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s e l s e where in Asia. Moscow r e g a r d s J a p a n , l i k e C h i n a , as a p o t e n t i a l l y serious threat to its security. As S o v i e t c o m m e n t a r y s t a t e d r e c e n t l y , " I t i s w e l l known t h a t i t i s p r i m a r i l y

59 a country's industrial b a s e and . . . s k i l l e d m a n p o w e r w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e the f o u n d a t i o n of m i l i t a r y industry. Both t h e s e factors are p r e s e n t in J a p a n . " 1 9 As J a p a n , under Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, has continued to i n c r e a s e its m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e s , the K r e m l i n has displayed concern that Tokyo will harness its economic and technological prowess militarily to undermine Soviet security interests in Asia. The uneasy relationship between the USSR and Japan, like that between Russia and China, has deep historical roots: The t w o p o w e r s have faced each other on the Korean peninsula, on Chinese territory, and in areas traditionally included in the Chinese zone of influence. They have clashed repeatedly in enormously costly and bloody land and sea battles: in the Russo-Japanese War, in confrontations triggered by the spread of the Bolshevik Revolution into the Far East and leading to the Japanese armies' attempted occupation of Siberia, in the large-scale Soviet-Japanese tank battles of the 1930's, and in the sudden thrust of the Soviet armed forces into Japanese-occupied Manchuria during the closing days of World War II, a military operation that led to the capture and abduction of hundreds of thousands of Japanese into Siberian labor camps. . . . History has left in both nations a residue of psychological attitudes that can be described only as dark suspicions of the neighbor's

intentions.

?n

A l t h o u g h Japan r e p r e s e n t s an a t t r a c t i v e trade and economic partner for the USSR, the Soviets seem to focus primarily on the military threat that they perceive in the U.S. s e c u r i t y treaty and the U.S. n u c l e a r u m b r e l l a over J a p a n . 2 1 In recent y e a r s , M o s c o w h a s e x p r e s s e d p a r t i c u l a r alarm over the i n c r e a s i n g l y c l o s e d e f e n s e c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n Tokyo and W a s h i n g t o n and over Japan's willingness to assume greater burdens for its o w n def ense. In May 1981, Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki paid an o f f i c i a l v i s i t to W a s h i n g t o n . He a n n o u n c e d t h e r e that Japan w o u l d defend the seas and s k i e s around the h o m e islands and also c o n t r i b u t e to the d e f e n s e of the s e a lanes up to a d i s t a n c e of 1,000 m i l e s . U.S.-Japanese m i l i t a r y c o l l a b o r a t i o n s u b s e q u e n t l y i n t e n s i f i e d and included, during 1982, a joint naval exercise in the Sea of Japan and a joint command post exercise on Hokkaido. In a n o t h e r recent d e v e l o p m e n t , U.S. and J a p a n e s e m i l i tary s t a f f s have been joint p l a n n i n g to p r o v i d e for contingencies in the event of a Soviet attack on Japan. Tokyo also has agreed to export advanced military technology to the United States and to i n c r e a s e its f i n a n cial s u p p o r t for the m a i n t e n a n c e of the 45,000 U.S. troops stationed in Japan. P r i m e M i n i s t e r Nakasone's j o u r n e y to the United States in 1983 reaffirmed Suzuki's pledge of helping in

60 d e f e n d i n g t h e s e a - l a n e s up to 1,000 m i l e s from Japan. He also told a Washington Post interviewer on 18 January that J a p a n should b e c o m e "an u n s i n k a b l e aircraft carrier" against Soviet Backfire bombers and should control the s t r a i t s around the Sea of J a p a n to p r e v e n t Soviet warships from crossing between Vladivostok and the open Pacific. The following day, Tass declared: Is it not c l e a r t h a t in t h e p r e s e n t n u c l e a r a g e t h e r e c a n be no " u n s i n k a b l e a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r " and t h a t by deploying "onboard the carrier" arsenals of armaments, i n c l u d i n g A m e r i c a n [ a r m s ] , t h e a u t h o r s of s u c h p l a n s m a k e japan a likely target for a response strike? And for such a densely populated, insular country as japan, this could spell a national disaster more serious than the one that befell it 37 years ago.

oo

Moscow's propaganda offensive against Japanese military policies intensified markedly after the arriv a l , on 22 March 1983, of the U.S. n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r E n t e r p r i s e at the port of Sasebo. On 25 March, a Radio Moscow commentator warned that "Japan w i l l be the first v i c t i m in all d i s p u t e s that arise in the Far East." On 5 April, Tass t h u n d e r e d that Japan's increasing military cooperation with the United States " t h r e a t e n s to t r a n s f o r m Japan into an arena of n u c l e a r c o m b a t and, in the final a n a l y s i s , to bring about t h e country's destruction." 2 3 Soviet Foreign Minister A n d r e i G r o m y k o even charged that Japan w a s a l r e a d y "bristling with nuclear missiles." 2 4 On 3 August 198 3, Pravda s u m m e d up the p r e v a i l i n g Kremlin view of Tokyo's growing defense cooperation with Washington by contending that "after being an accomplice in the U.S. anti-Soviet strategy, Japan is increasingly becoming a co-participant." 2 5 Even more disturbing from Moscow's v i e w p o i n t , h o w e v e r , is the belief that J a p a n w i l l b e c o m e a de facto m e m b e r of the North A t l a n t i c Treaty Organization (NATO). According to an article on 11 March 1983 in Le M o n d e : T h r o u g h v a r i o u s c h a n n e l s , w i t h the a c t i v e s u p p o r t of their A m e r i c a n allies, the Japanese sounded out the m e m b e r s of the Atlantic Alliance early this year with a v i e w to o b t a i n i n g t h e s t a t u s of " e x t e r n a l a s s o c i a t e , " w h i c h w o u l d h a v e e n a b l e d t h e m to p a r t i c i p a t e . . . in the operations and discussions of the regional organiz a t i o n w h i c h r e l a t e to E a s t - W e s t e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s . . . . T h e F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t . . . cut s h o r t t h e i n i t i a tive, vetoing in principle any expansion or globalizat i o n of N A T O . 2 6

The _La M o n d e a r t i c l e m a y h a v e been r e f e r r i n g to a t o u r in January of West European capitals by Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe, who reportedly also suggested the creation of a mechanism for informal consultations between Japan and NATO on political and security issues. 2 7

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In J u n e 1 9 8 3 , J a p a n s i g n e d t h e d e c l a r a t i o n issued at t h e s u m m i t c o n f e r e n c e of t h e w o r l d ' s l e a d i n g i n d u s The dectrial p o w e r s held at W i l l i a m s b u r g , Virginia. laration dealt with both economic and political-military issues. It w a s t h e f i r s t t i m e t h a t J a p a n a s s o c i a t e d itself formally with NATO m e m b e r s on a d o c u m e n t expressing s u p p o r t f o r a s t r o n g c o m m o n d e f e n s e . M o s c o w reacted, predictably, by proclaiming that "Tokyo is beginning to play increasingly clearly the role of NATO's Far Eastern flank." 2 8 In seeking to further c o m p l i c a t e Japan's relations w i t h t h e W e s t , S o v i e t p r o p a g a n d a c o n t i n u e s to e x p l o i t Japan's "nuclear allergy" to the hilt. Tokyo adheres to a s e l f - r e s t r a i n i n g p o l i c y in t h e f o r m of t h e " t h r e e nonnuclear p r i n c i p l e s " — n o m a n u f a c t u r e , possession, or " i n t r o d u c t i o n " of a t o m i c w e a p o n s i n t o t h e c o u n t r y . In 1 9 8 4 , w h e n P r i m e M i n i s t e r David L a n g e of N e w Z e a l a n d p r o h i b i t e d t h e e n t r y of U.S. n u c l e a r - a r m e d s h i p s into his country's w a t e r s , t h e r e v e r b e r a t i o n s w e r e felt throughout Asia. The United States has a standing policy of n e i t h e r a f f i r m i n g nor d e n y i n g t h e p r e s e n c e of nuclear arms aboard its naval vessels, and the Japanese g o v e r n m e n t to d a t e h a s not c h a l l e n g e d t h e c o m i n g s and goings of U.S. warships in Japan's waters. Moscow presumably would w e l c o m e a U.S.-Japanese crisis over this d e l i c a t e i s s u e and h a s s p a r e d no e f f o r t in p r a i s i n g Wellington's antinuclear stance. The Soviets have not confined themselves to propag a n d a in a t t e m p t i n g to w a r d off w h a t t h e y v i e w as a potential m i l i t a r y challenge from Japan. Russian m i l i t a r y f o r c e s in N o r t h e a s t A s i a h a v e a d o p t e d an i n c r e a s ingly o f f e n s i v e and a g g r e s s i v e p o s t u r e , and e s p i o n a g e and s u b v e r s i v e a c t i v i t i e s , as r e v e a l e d in g r e a t d e t a i l by K G B d e f e c t o r S t a n i s l a v L e v c h e n k o and o t h e r s , h a v e proceeded apace. Soviet surface combatants and s u b m a r i n e s sail along the v e r y e d g e s of J a p a n e s e t e r r i t o r i a l w a t e r s . Soviet m i n i s u b m a r i n e s of the t y p e that h a v e p e n e t r a t e d d e e p into S w e d i s h w a t e r s n o w h a v e a p p e a r e d off Japan's coasts. T h e s e s u b s a r e c a p a b l e of c r a w l i n g a l o n g the s e a b e d , w h e r e t h e y l e a v e t r a c k - l i k e m a r k i n g s , and returning to their motherships after dropping off spies or other agents or engaging in sabotage operations. Soviet i n t e l l i g e n c e - g a t h e r i n g v e s s e l s (AGIs) ply c o n s t a n t l y along J a p a n e s e s h o r e s . Soviet reconnaissance planes f r e q u e n t l y a p p e a r s i m u l t a n e o u s l y on b o t h s i d e s of t h e a r c h i p e l a g o and a p p r o a c h so c l o s e to J a p a n ' s a i r s p a c e that the self-defense forces and flights by reconnaissance and a n t i s u b m a r i n e aircraft around Japan have bec o m e almost routine. The regular flights of Bear reconn a i s s a n c e p l a n e s n e a r J a p a n en r o u t e f r o m t h e U S S R to Vietnam have c o m e to be dubbed the "Tokyo Express." 2 9 In 1 9 8 0 , a S o v i e t T U - 1 6 B a d g e r l o n g - r a n g e b o m b e r , w h i c h is c a p a b l e of d e l i v e r i n g n u c l e a r - t i p p e d a i r - t o s u r f a c e King Fish m i s s i l e s , b u z z e d a J a p a n e s e n a v a l v e s s e l t h a t w a s e x e r c i s i n g in t h e S e a of J a p a n . Since

62 t h a t t i m e , t h e S o v i e t s h a v e a d o p t e d an i n c r e a s i n g l y a g g r e s s i v e p o s t u r e v i s - a - v i s U.S. as w e l l as J a p a n e s e vessels in the area. The Soviet intention evidently is to d e m o n s t r a t e to J a p a n the v u l n e r a b i l i t y of t h e U.S. forces on which it depends for protection. D u r i n g an i n t e r v i e w o n 21 A p r i l 1981 w i t h t h e J a p a n e s e d a i l y M a i n i c h i Sh i m b u n , A l e k s a n d r B o v i n , a political c o m m e n t a t o r for the Soviet newspaper Izvestia, was asked about the continuing problem of the Northern Territories. "Is it for military reasons that the Soviet Union cannot return the 'northern territories'?" the questioner asked. Bovin's reply was as follows: This involves an important issue. It is a principled position of the Soviet Union that it will reject any proposal aimed at readjusting territorial delineations reached as a result of the Second World War. It took us 30 years to make Europe understand this position, which was at last recognized at the Helsinki Conference. . . . Our position of preserving political and geographical borders delineated after the Second World War is also applicable to Asia. Perhaps the chief underlying factor in Moscow's adamant r e f u s a l e v e n to d i s c u s s the r e t u r n of the N o r t h e r n T e r r i t o r i e s , h o w e v e r , is its f e a r of c r e a t i n g a p r e c e d e n t for c o n c e s s i o n s o n o t h e r s i g n i f i c a n t t e r r i t o r i a l issues, particularly those involving the huge tracts of land that China claims were seized illegally by czarist R u s s i a u n d e r the " u n e q u a l t r e a t i e s " of the n i n e t e e n t h century. At the height of the Sino-Soviet dispute, this question led to charges of "cartographic aggression." As Moscow turns its attention to the Korean Peninsula, the Kremlin seems to have m a d e considerable progress in wooing North Korea away from the Chinese orbit. H a v i n g long m a i n t a i n e d a p o s i t i o n of e q u i d i s t a n c e bet w e e n M o s c o w and B e i j i n g , P y o n g y a n g a p p e a r s to h a v e s t r e n g t h e n e d its c o n t a c t s w i t h t h e USSR. In M a y 1984, Kim Il-Sung paid his first official visit to the Soviet U n i o n in t w e n t y - t h r e e y e a r s . He w a s a c c o m p a n i e d by a high-ranking party and state delegation. From M o s c o w , he traveled to a number of East European bloc countries. S o v i e t s t a t e m e n t s and a c t i o n s d u r i n g Kim's v i s i t s u g gested an effort to draw the Asian c o m m u n i s t countries (notably North Korea and Vietnam) closer to the USSR and t h e East E u r o p e a n b l o c as p a r t of a c a m p a i g n to r e i n v i g orate the international c o m m u n i s t m o v e m e n t and to gain support for Soviet security objectives in Asia. Pyongy a n g r e p o r t e d l y is r e l u c t a n t to s t r a i n its f r i e n d s h i p with Beijing, however. North K o r e a h a s t r e a t i e s of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance with both the USSR and China dating from 1961. Kim's m o r e forthcoming attitude toward M o s c o w was foreshadowed during an interview he gave to a visiting d e l e g a t i o n f r o m T a s s in M a r c h 1984. In a r a r e l y u s e d f o r m u l a t i o n , he referred to the USSR and North Korea as

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" c o m r a d e s - i n - a r m s " and c a l l e d t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p an " a l l i a n c e " (a s t a r t l i n g t e r m in v i e w o f N o r t h K o r e a ' s r e g u larly self-proc 1a imed nonalignment). He a l s o lauded Moscow's support for Third World "liberation struggles," in c o n t r a s t w i t h p r e v i o u s N o r t h K o r e a n a l l e g a t i o n s t h a t b o t h t h e S o v i e t U n i o n and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a t t e m p t to d o m i n a t e the Third World. K i m ' s s o j o u r n in M o s c o w w a s m a r k e d by e x p r e s s i o n s of d e s i r e f o r c l o s e r b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s and c o o p e r a t i o n in t h e g l o b a l a r e n a . D u r i n g a K r e m l i n b a n q u e t in h i s h o n o r , K i m e v i n c e d a w i s h t o l e a r n f r o m t h e s u c c e s s and a d v a n c e d e x p e r i e n c e of t h e S o v i e t p e o p l e and to e x t e n d c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n the t w o c o u n t r i e s . In a d d i t i o n , h e invoked " p r o l e t a r i a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m " (the code word f o r j o i n t a c t i o n b y c o m m u n i s t n a t i o n s in s u p p o r t o f " f r a t e r n a l " s t a t e s and r e v o l u t i o n a r y m o v e m e n t s w o r l d wide). In t h e l a t t e r c o n t e x t , N o r t h K o r e a , a l t h o u g h not interests a Soviet proxy, "objectively" serves Moscow's by r e n d e r i n g m i l i t a r y and p r o p a g a n d a a s s i s t a n c e to t h e S a n d i n i s t a s in N i c a r a g u a , t h e T a m i l r e b e l s in Sri L a n k a , and v a r i o u s a n t i - W e s t e r n g r o u p s in t h e M i d d l e East and Africa. North Korea also m a i n t a i n s friendly relations w i t h A f g h a n i s t a n , d e s p i t e its i n i t i a l c r i t i c i s m of t h e Soviet invasion. Chernenko's banquet s p e e c h e m p h a s i z e d that Sovietbeyond the North K o r e a n c o o p e r a t i o n can be e x p a n d e d economic field. He u r g e d e x c h a n g e s a m o n g p a r t y and s t a t e w o r k e r s and i n t e r a c t i o n in t h e s p h e r e of i n t e r n a tional activities. Kim toasted the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u nist m o v e m e n t t o w a r d w h i c h N o r t h K o r e a h a s b e e n a l o o f in recent years. K i m h e l d t h r e e r o u n d s of t a l k s w i t h C h e r n e n k o , and North K o r e a ' s d e f e n s e and f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s m e t with their Soviet counterparts. Soviet officials in c h a r g e of f o r e i g n e c o n o m i c a s s i s t a n c e a l s o m e t t h e N o r t h K o r e ans. A c c o r d i n g to r e p o r t s f o l l o w i n g Kim's v i s i t , s p e c i a l e m p h a s i s w a s p l a c e d o n q u e s t i o n s of strengthening s e c u r i t y in t h e Far East and P a c i f i c . This f o r m u l a t i o n s u g g e s t s t h a t m o d e r n i z a t i o n of t h e N o r t h K o r e a n a r m e d forces m a y h a v e been on the agenda. Persistent rumors raise the p o s s i b i l i t y that the USSR w i l l p r o v i d e M I G - 2 3 w a r p l a n e s to N o r t h K o r e a , t h u s r e v e r s i n g a d e c a d e - o l d p o l i c y of w i t h h o l d i n g o f f e n s i v e a i r c r a f t from Kim's militant regime. In N o v e m b e r 1 9 8 4 , S o v i e t D e p u t y F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r As w a s t h e c a s e Mikhail Kapitsa visited Pyongyang. a f t e r Kim's M o s c o w v i s i t , no f o r m a l m i l i t a r y o r e c o n o m i c a g r e e m e n t s w e r e a n n o u n c e d , but t h e e x i s t e n c e of s e c r e t accords cannot be precluded. S t i l l a n o t h e r s i g n of t h e gathering momentum in S o v i e t - N o r t h K o r e a n relations e m e r g e d with the a n n o u n c e m e n t that Soviet F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r G r o m y k o w o u l d j o u r n e y t o P y o n g y a n g in A u g u s t 1 9 8 5 , p r e s u m a b l y in o r d e r to r e c i p r o c a t e f o r a r e c e n t Moscow v i s i t by N o r t h K o r e a n F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r K i m Y o u n g N a m . Before the visit could take place, h o w e v e r , G r o m y k o was r e p l a c e d by E d u a r d S h e v a r d n a d z e . In t h e m e a n t i m e , a

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S o v i e t s h i p m e n t of MIG-23 war p l a n e s a r r i v e d i n North Korea f o r the f i r s t t i m e , r a i s i n g the q u e s t i o n whether t h e S o v i e t s had g a i n e d a c c e s s t o North Korean n a v a l and a i r b a s e s in r e t u r n . Such b a s e s would e n a b l e t h e USSR t o t h w a r t U . S . - J a p a n e s e c o n t r o l of t h e S e a of J a p a n i n a crisis situation.31 Moscow seems t o h a v e abandoned i t s s t r o n g r e s i s t a n c e t o t h e t r a n s f e r of p o w e r f r o m Kim I l - S u n g t o h i s s o n , Kim J o n g - I l - - a d y n a s t i c s u c c e s s i o n a t o d d s w i t h Marxist-Leninist precepts. B e f r i e n d i n g t h e younger Kim w i l l smooth S o v i e t p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s with North Korea b u t i s u n l i k e l y t o t e m p e r t h e new l e a d e r ' s a g g r e s s i v e and i n d e p e n d e n t n a t u r e . Kim J o n g - I l , who i s s a i d t o h a v e m a s t e r m i n d e d t h e Rangoon b o m b i n g i n c i d e n t t h a t k i l l e d s e v e r a l S o u t h K o r e a n g o v e r n m e n t o f f i c i a l s and narrowly missed the p r e s i d e n t , r e p o r t e d l y i s committed t o t h e r e u n i f i c a t i o n of K o r e a — t h r o u g h m i l i t a r y a c t i o n i f n e c e s s a r y . A new K o r e a n war w o u l d p l u n g e A s i a i n t o a c r i s i s and a l m o s t c e r t a i n l y would l e a d t o a d i r e c t U.S.Soviet military confrontation. T h u s , a l t h o u g h Moscow w o u l d l i k e t o i n c o r p o r a t e N o r t h K o r e a i n t o a g l a c i s of f r i e n d l y c o m m u n i s t s t a t e s on t h e USSR's A s i a n b o r d e r s , i t would be l o a t h e t o e n d o r s e a new m i l i t a n t f o r e i g n p o l i c y of t h e Pyongyang r e g i m e . A M I G s - f o r - b a s e s a g r e e ment c o u l d be t h e i n i t i a l s t e p i n d e s t a b i l i z i n g N o r t h e a s t A s i a , which h a s e n j o y e d r e l a t i v e t r a n q u i l i t y - d e s p i t e severe underlying t e n s i o n s - - i n recent years. S o v i e t p o l i c i e s in N o r t h e a s t A s i a have been d e s i g n e d p r i m a r i l y t o b o l s t e r t h e s e c u r i t y of t h e USSR a g a i n s t t h e r e a l and p o t e n t i a l c h a l l e n g e s t h a t t h e Kreml i n h i e r a r c h y p e r c e i v e s from the United S t a t e s , J a p a n , and C h i n a . In S o u t h e a s t A s i a , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e S o v i e t s view t h e s e c u r i t y environment more in t e r m s of o p p o r t u n i t i e s than of c h a l l e n g e s . SOVIET OPPORTUNITIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA The U.S. w i t h d r a w a l f r o m V i e t n a m l e f t t h e S o v i e t U n i o n w i t h an i r r e s i s t i b l e o p p o r t u n i t y t o a c q u i r e t h e f o r m e r U.S. b a s e a t Cam Ranh Bay. Although both Moscow and Hanoi d e n i e d v e h e m e n t l y t h a t t h e S o v i e t s e n j o y e d u n r e s t r i c t e d u s e of t h e b a s e , t h i s f i c t i o n b e c a m e i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t t o s u s t a i n i n t h e wake of t h e s i g n i n g of t h e S o v i e t - V i e t n a m e s e f r i e n d s h i p t r e a t y of November 1978, f o l l o w e d by t h e S o v i e t - b a c k e d V i e t n a m e s e i n v a s i o n of Cambodia. The q u a n t i t y and q u a l i t y of S o v i e t arms and equipment a t Cam Ranh Bay h a v e r i s e n s t e a d i ly. A s q u a d r o n of TU-16 B a d g e r bombers and a c o n t i n g e n t of MIG-23 f i g h t e r bombers a r e among t h e weapons s y s t e m s r e c e n t l y d e p l o y e d t h e r e - - e v i d e n t l y on a permanent b a s i s . Cam Ranh Bay s e r v e s t h e USSR a d m i r a b l y b o t h a s a means of p r o j e c t i n g S o v i e t power i n t o S o u t h e a s t A s i a f o r p u r p o s e s of i n f l u e n c i n g and i n t i m i d a t i n g r e g i o n a l s t a t e s and a s a c o m p o n e n t of a w o r l d w i d e n e t w o r k of s t a g i n g areas for wartime use. S o u t h e a s t A s i a may be r e g a r d e d

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as a m i s s i n g l i n k i n t h e c h a i n o f m i l i t a r y s t r o n g p o i n t s w i t h w h i c h t h e S o v i e t Union a s p i r e s t o g i r d t h e g l o b e . S o v i e t c o n t r o l of access t o the S t r a i t of Malacca, below the Malayan P e n i n s u l a , in p a r t i c u l a r would round o f f an arc of m i l i t a r y f a c i l i t i e s s t r e t c h i n g from Murmansk t o V l a d i v o s t o k ( a c r o s s t h e n o r t h e r n s e a r o u t e , which i s k e p t open by i c e b r e a k e r s ) t o I n d o c h i n a and s o u t h w a r d through the P a c i f i c i n t o the Indian Ocean toward S o v i e t f a c i l i t i e s in South Yemen and E t h i o p i a . P o i n t i n g t o S o u t h e a s t A s i a as a v i t a l a r e n a i n M o s c o w ' s q u e s t f o r g l o b a l h e g e m o n y , an a r t i c l e in t h e Chinese Communist p a r t y ' s t h e o r e t i c a l j o u r n a l Red Flag contended t h a t the S o v i e t s seek t o c r e a t e a "bow-shaped n a v i g a t i o n l i n e " c o n n e c t i n g the M e d i t e r r a n e a n , the Red Sea, t h e I n d i a n Ocean, the southwest P a c i f i c , the Sea of J a p a n , and t h e c o n t i n e n t s o f E u r o p e , A s i a , and A f r i c a . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e C h i n e s e , such a n a v i g a t i o n l i n e w o u l d e n a b l e t h e S o v i e t P a c i f i c and Black Sea f l e e t s t o c o n duct mutual support o p e r a t i o n s , would p e r m i t the S o v i e t s t o i m p e d e t h e U.S. 7th F l e e t ' s e n t r y i n t o t h e I n d i a n Ocean, w o u l d t h r e a t e n China f r o m t h e s e a s , and w o u l d l e a v e t h e S o v i e t Navy p o i s e d t o c u t o f f m a r i t i m e t i e s b e t w e e n t h e Far East and A u s t r a l i a and b e t w e e n t h e Far East and E u r o p e , thus c h o k i n g o f f J a p a n ' s c o m m e r c i a l l i f e l i n e (and w a r t i m e r e s u p p l y r o u t e ) . 3 2 A s i d e from p o s i t i o n i n g i t s e l f f o r a number of w a r t i m e s c e n a r i o s , the USSR i s e x p l o i t i n g i t s g r o w i n g m i l i t a r y prowess in A s i a f o r p e a c e t i m e advantage. The Wall St r e e t Jou r n a l a p t l y summed up t h i s phenomenon i n an e d i t o r i a l e n t i t l e d "Ivan Knocking." Commenting on a r e c e n t S o v i e t o f f e r t o t h e ASEAN c o u n t r i e s t o a c t as a " g u a r a n t o r " o f p e a c e i n S o u t h e a s t A s i a , t h e Jou rna1 w r o t e : " T h e s t r a t e g y i s t o b u i l d up armed s t r e n g t h , d e p l o y t h o s e arms in t h r e a t e n i n g numbers, and then make an o f f e r y o u r ' p a r t n e r s ' a r e a f r a i d t o r e f u s e . In t h e gangster world, this is c a l l e d a p r o t e c t i o n racket."33 I n s o f a r as Vietnam remains a p i v o t a l p l a y e r in the S o v i e t Union's response t o p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t s and o p p o r t u n i t i e s in Southeast A s i a , the n a t u r e of the S o v i e t V i e t n a m e s e a l l i a n c e must be e x a m i n e d and i t s f u t u r e prospects assessed. The r a i s o n d ' e t r e of the a l l i a n c e , which d a t e s o f f i c i a l l y from the sTgnTng of the T r e a t y of F r i e n d s h i p and C o o p e r a t i o n on 3 November 1978, i s mutual h o s t i l i t y t o w a r d China. W i t h i n weeks of t h e t r e a t y ' s s i g n i n g , V i e t n a m , b a n k r o l l e d and s u p p o r t e d m a t e r i a l l y and l o g i s t i c a l l y by t h e K r e m l i n , i n v a d e d Cambodia and i n s t a l l e d a puppet r e g i m e under Heng Samrin. In Februa r y 1979, C h i n e s e f o r c e s l a u n c h e d an a t t a c k a c r o s s t h e S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e b o r d e r — a n a t t a c k f o r w h i c h Moscow c l a i m e d B e i j i n g g o t t h e g r e e n l i g h t d u r i n g Deng X i a o p i n g ' s v i s i t t o W a s h i n g t o n a t t h e end o f 1978. In t h e a f t e r m a t h of the i n v a s i o n , which China c l a i m e d was d e s i g n e d t o " t e a c h V i e t n a m a l e s s o n " on p o l i c y t o w a r d Cambodia, t h e S o v i e t Union sent m i l i t a r y equipment t h a t enabled Hanoi t o b o l s t e r s u b s t a n t i a l l y t h e q u a n t i t y and q u a l i t y of i t s t r o o p s a l o n g t h e S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e f r o n -

66 tier. Moscow a l s o w a r n e d B e i j i n g a g a i n s t any a t t e m p t to a d m i n i s t e r a second l e s s o n t o Vietnam. The V i e t n a m e s e h a v e s o u g h t t o s t r a d d l e t h e f e n c e i n t h e S i n o - S o v i e t d i s p u t e in o r d e r to enjoy the g r e a t e s t p o t e n t i a l f o r f o r e i g n p o l i c y maneuvering. Thus, Hanoi p r e s u m a b l y a p p l a u d e d when t h e S i n o - S o v i e t t r e a t y e x p i r e d i n 1 9 8 0 a t C h i n a ' s i n i t i a t i v e , b u t by t h e s a m e t o k e n t h e i n i t i a t i o n o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n t a l k s b e t w e e n t h e USSR and C h i n a i n O c t o b e r 1 9 8 2 was c a u s e f o r V i e t n a m e s e c o n c e r n . During t h e f i r s t round of t a l k s , h e l d in B e i j i n g , the C h i n e s e d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union would have t o meet t h r e e p r e c o n d i t i o n s b e f o r e a s u b s t a n t i a l improvement i n b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s c o u l d o c c u r : a r e d u c t i o n o f S o v i e t t r o o p s a l o n g t h e S i n o - S o v i e t b o r d e r and i n Mongolia; a w i t h d r a w a l of S o v i e t f o r c e s from A f g h a n i s t a n ; and a c e s s a t i o n o f S o v i e t s u p p o r t t o t h e V i e t n a m e s e war e f f o r t in Cambodia. China a s s e r t e d t h a t t h e l a s t of t h e s e p r e c o n d i t i o n s was t h e m o s t u r g e n t . Although t h e S o v i e t s to date have i n d i c a t e d l i t t l e r e c e p t i v i t y to a s e t t l e m e n t o f t h e Cambodian i s s u e on t e r m s a c c e p t a b l e t o C h i n a and h a v e r e i t e r a t e d t h a t i m p r o v e m e n t i n S i n o S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s would n o t come a t t h e e x p e n s e o f t h i r d c o u n t r i e s , Hanoi r e c a l l s p a s t o c c a s i o n s on w h i c h Moscow s a c r i f i c e d i t s i n t e r e s t s on t h e a l t a r o f superpower politics. Vietnam thus f e a r s t h a t Soviet support f o r i t s p o l i c i e s would b e a m a j o r c a s u a l t y o f a S i n o - S o v i e t detente. As an i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y , V i e t n a m h a s t r i e d on a n u m b e r o f o c c a s i o n s t o mend i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h C h i n a . In t u r n , Moscow's c o n c e r n t h a t Hanoi m i g h t s e e k a d e a l with the Chinese behind i t s back e v i d e n t l y has induced t h e S o v i e t Union t o r e m a i n i n f l e x i b l e on t h e Cambodian i s s u e and n o t d e v i a t e f r o m t h e V i e t n a m e s e p o s i t i o n . To r e a s s u r e Vietnam of c o n t i n u i n g S o v i e t s u p p o r t , a d e l e g a t i o n l e d by P o l i t b u r o m e m b e r G e i d a r A l i y e v a r r i v e d i n H a n o i i n O c t o b e r 1 9 8 3 t o s i g n a new a g r e e m e n t u p d a t i n g the Soviet-Vietnamese friendship treaty. The new d e c l a r a t i o n ( s i g n e d on 4 N o v e m b e r 1 9 8 3 and p u b l i s h e d in Pravd a t h e f o l l o w i n g day) r e s t a t e d S o v i e t s u p p o r t f o r t h e Vietnamese communist regime. It s t r e s s e d "the unc h a n g e d p r i n c i p l e d l i n e o f t h e USSR t o p r o v i d e s u p p o r t and a s s i s t a n c e t o f r a t e r n a l V i e t n a m . " In a d d i t i o n , i t a s s e r t e d t h a t t h e Communist p a r t y o f V i e t n a m " c o m p l e t e l y s u p p o r t s t h e p r i n c i p l e d l i n e of t h e S o v i e t Union t o normalize relations with the People's Republic of China." However, t h i s a s s e r t i o n was a c c o m p a n i e d by t h e c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e e x i s t i n g g o v e r n m e n t in Kampuchea ( C a m b o d i a ) i s t h e o n l y l e g a l o n e and t h a t " t h e b a s i c c a u s e of t h e s t i l l e x i s t i n g t e n s i o n s in t h e r e g i o n i s t h e h o s t i l e p o l i c y o f t h e f o r c e s o f h e g e m o n i s m and i m p e r i a l i s m w h i c h t h r e a t e n t h e s o v e r e i g n t y and t h e t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y o f V i e t n a m , L a o s , and K a m p u c h e a . " Hegemonism i s a S o v i e t c o d e word f o r C h i n e s e p o l i c y , s o t h a t when t h e d e c l a r a t i o n s t a t e s t h e n e c e s s i t y " f i r s t o f a l l to stop foreign intervention into the internal a f f a i r s o f t h e s t a t e s o f t h e r e g i o n , " i t i s c l e a r a t whom

67 the remark is aimed. Although the gradual withdrawal of t h e V i e t n a m e s e o c c u p a t i o n forces from K a m p u c h e a w a s e n v i s a g e d ("over a period of years"), the d e c l a r a t i o n backed Hanoi's call for "the unity of the V i e t n a m e s e , Laotian, and Kampuchean nations."31* Although the declaration seemed to reflect SovietVietnamese harmony, the speeches delivered by Aliyev and Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong on the occasion of its signing indicated that friction between the two allies persisted. Aliyev downplayed the Chinese threat and p r e s e n t e d the United States as the g r e a t e s t threat to world peace. He called on Vietnam to coordinate its p o l i c i e s w i t h M o s c o w in facing the U.S. c h a l l e n g e . Dong, on the other hand, emphasized the Chinese peril. 3 5 S o v i e t - V i e t n a m e s e t e n s i o n s on the e c o n o m i c front w e r e alleviated with the signing, during Aliyev's visit, of a long-term agreement on economic development and scientific c o o p e r a t i o n , w h i c h p r o v i d e d for m e c h a n i z i n g a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n , i n c r e a s i n g energy and fuel production, expanding transportation and communication facilities, stepping up production of chemical fertilizer, and increasing overall Vietnamese exports to the Soviet Union. Yuri Andropov's death in February 1984 and Konstantin C h e r n e n k o ' s a c c e s s i o n to the top Soviet l e a d e r s h i p p o s t led to changes in the Kremlin's p o s t u r e t o w a r d V i e t n a m and China. Unlike Andropov, Chernenko seemed strongly in favor of strengthening Moscow's relationship with Hanoi and using that r e l a t i o n s h i p as a s t r a t e g i c asset a g a i n s t w h a t the S o v i e t s regarded as Sino-U.S. military collusion. Chernenko was particularly vehement in accusing China of aggressive activities in Afghanistan and elsewhere in Asia. In the spring of 1984, w o r s e n i n g S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e border tensions, increasing Soviet-Vietnamese military and naval cooperation, and Chinese naval maneuvers cons t i t u t e d both a cause and a s y m b o l of d e t e r i o r a t i n g relations between Moscow and Beijing. (In an uneguivocal g e s t u r e of m i l i t a n t s o l i d a r i t y , the Soviets and Vietnamese staged an amphibious exercise highlighted by the landing of s o m e 400 Soviet naval i n f a n t r y m e n [ m a rines] at H a i p h o n g . 3 6 ) In M a y , the C h i n e s e c o u n t e r e d with t h e i r o w n naval e x e r c i s e s in the South China Sea. Beijing's a p p a r e n t p u r p o s e w a s to s t r a i n the S o v i e t V i e t n a m e s e a l l i a n c e by d e p i c t i n g the USSR as a p a p e r tiger that w o u l d not p r o t e c t V i e t n a m ' s s e c u r i t y on the high seas. Moscow cancelled Arkhipov's May visit to China, and the following month Vietnamese Defense Minister Van Tien Deng traveled to the USSR to meet with his counterpart, Dmitri U s t i n o v . Deng s o u g h t m o r e Soviet m i l i t a r y assistance to cope with mounting Chinese pressure on the S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e b o r d e r and to c o u n t e r C h i n e s e s u p p o r t for the K h m e r Rouge in K a m p u c h e a . The fact that Deng went to M o s c o w again six w e e k s later w i t h the s a m e agenda i n d i c a t e s that the results of the J u n e m e e t i n g

68 were u n s a t i s f a c t o r y to the Vietnamese. Thus, Hanoi p r e s u m a b l y r e a l i z e d t h a t a l t h o u g h Moscow was c o o l i n g i t s a t t i t u d e toward B e i j i n g , i t intended to avoid m i l i t a r y e n c o u n t e r s w i t h t h e C h i n e s e on V i e t n a m ' s b e h a l f . The S o v i e t Union, i n d e e d , seemed t o be a c t i n g l i k e a p a p e r tiger. By t h e a u t u m n of 1 9 8 4 , C h e r n e n k o ' s h e a l t h was f a i l ing. T h u s , h e may h a v e b e e n a b l e n o l o n g e r t o m o b i l i z e the a n t i - C h i n e s e f o r c e s in the Kremlin against other o f f i c i a l s who f a v o r e d a m o r e a n t i - V i e t n a m e s e , proChinese policy. At a n y r a t e , a n t i - C h i n e s e p o l e m i c s i n t h e S o v i e t m e d i a s u b s i d e d m a r k e d l y , and t h e A r k h i p o v v i s i t was r e s c h e d u l e d f o r l a t e D e c e m b e r . Before the v i s i t took p l a c e , however, the Soviets sent Vladimir D o l g i k h , a c a n d i d a t e m e m b e r of t h e P o l i t b u r o , t o H a n o i t o r e a s s u r e t h e V i e t n a m e s e t h a t Moscow was n o t a b o u t t o betray their interests. The y e a r 1985 w i t n e s s e d a n o t i c e a b l e i m p r o v e m e n t i n Sino-Soviet relations. Vietnamese President Truong C h i n h , r e p u t e d d u r i n g t h e V i e t n a m War t o h a v e b e e n t h e l e a d e r of t h e p r o - C h i n e s e f a c t i o n i n H a n o i , j o u r n e y e d t o M o s c o w i n M a r c h f o r t a l k s w i t h new S o v i e t p a r t y c h i e f Mikhail Gorbachev. A R a d i o Moscow b r o a d c a s t of 14 March lauded the "unshakeable cohesion" between the Soviet U n i o n and V i e t n a m . The t w o c o u n t r i e s w e r e s a i d t o s h a r e a " c o m p l e t e i d e n t i t y of v i e w s , " a f o r m u l a t i o n g e n e r a l l y r e s e r v e d o n l y t o d e s c r i b e r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e USSR and i t s Warsaw P a c t a l l i e s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , s t r a i n s p e r s i s t in the SovietV i e t n a m e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p , and C h i n a a p p e a r s p o i s e d t o e x p l o i t them. I n May 1 9 8 5 , Deng X i a o p i n g a v e r r e d t h a t B e i j i n g w o u l d t o l e r a t e a c o n t i n u a t i o n of t h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y p r e s e n c e a t Cam Ranh Bay i f Moscow w o u l d h a l t i t s s u p p o r t f o r t h e V i e t n a m e s e war e f f o r t in Cambodia. Deng s e e m e d t o b e o f f e r i n g t h e K r e m l i n an o p p o r t u n i t y t o a c c e d e t o o n e of C h i n a ' s p r i n c i p a l c o n d i t i o n s f o r a n o r m a l i z a t i o n of S i n o - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s ( a n end t o S o v i e t s u p p o r t f o r t h e c o n f l i c t i n C a m b o d i a ) and m a i n t a i n t h e s t r a t e g i c p r e s e n c e i n V i e t n a m t h a t e n h a n c e s t h e USSR's c a p a b i l i t i e s in i t s global m i l i t a r y competition with the United S t a t e s . At t h e s a m e t i m e , Deng's s t a t e m e n t p r o v i d e d t h e S o v i e t s w i t h an o p p o r t u n i t y t o c u r r y f a v o r w i t h t h e ASEAN s t a t e s , w h i c h s t r o n g l y d e m a n d a V i e t n a m ese w i t h d r a w a l from Cambodia. The USSR's i m p r e s s i v e n a v a l and a i r p r e s e n c e i n Southeast Asia, i t s power-projection c a p a b i l i t i e s , and i t s a l l i a n c e with Vietnam have c r e a t e d t h e p r e c o n d i t i o n s f o r s u b s t a n t i a l l o g i s t i c a l and o t h e r f o r m s of " f r a t e r nal" a s s i s t a n c e t o communist i n s u r r e c t i o n s in t h e a r e a . A l t h o u g h Moscow's o b j e c t i v e s i n S o u t h e a s t A s i a do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y e n t a i l t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of c o m m u n i s t r e g i m e s , t h e d e s t a b i 1 i z a t i o n of p r o - W e s t e r n g o v e r n m e n t s w o u l d add i m m e a s u r e a b l y t o S o v i e t s e c u r i t y g o a l s i n t h e region. D u r i n g a 1983 v i s i t t o S i n g a p o r e , Deputy F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Mikhail K a p i t s a warned t h a t Vietnam would arm i n s u r g e n t s a g a i n s t S o u t h e a s t A s i a n g o v e r n m e n t s t h a t

69 c o n t i n u e to s u p p o r t the C a m b o d i a n r e s i s t a n c e . 3 7 The implication was that Moscow would back Hanoi in such a policy. Evidence already is accumulating that the Soviets and Vietnamese are supporting a breakaway faction of the Thai Communist party and training Thai guerrillas in Laos . Soviet support for the communist insurgency in the Phi 1ippines--a subject that has been virtually ignored by scholars and journalists a l i k e — e n a b l e s the Kremlin to promote two of its principal security objectives in Asia. 3 8 One is to fuel the campaign for the removal of U.S. m i l i t a r y f a c i l i t i e s from the P h i l i p p i n e s , thus allowing the Soviets, through their Vietnamese bases, to a c q u i r e h e g e m o n y in t h e South China Sea and a d j a c e n t s t r a t e g i c areas. T h e o t h e r is to r e c a p t u r e t h e alleg i a n c e of S o u t h e a s t A s i a n c o m m u n i s t p a r t i e s and m o v e m e n t s that fell u n d e r China's s w a y during t h e S i n o Soviet schism. If the P h i l i p p i n e C o m m u n i s t s w i n a m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y or a d o m i n a n t p l a c e in a c o a l i t i o n government, both the U.S.-Philippine alliance and ASEAN w i l l be d a m a g e d i r r e p a r a b l y , and the " c o r r e l a t i o n of forces" in A s i a w i l l t a k e a radical s w i n g in f a v o r of t h e Soviet Union. Soviet s t r a t e g y in the P h i l i p p i n e s , and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, combines minimal risks with the possibility of dramatic gains. Such gains, in t u r n , would h a v e i m m e d i a t e and g r a v e r e p e r c u s s i o n s t h r o u g h o u t A s i a and w o u l d u n d o w h a t e v e r p r o g r e s s the United States has m a d e in the r e s t o r a t i o n of its p r e s tige and influence since the debacle of the Vietnam War. All too frequently, the Kremlin faces a d i l e m m a in foreign policy decisionmaking. It must choose between furthering the national security interests of the USSR and enhancing Moscow's leadership role in the international communist m o v e m e n t . In the P h i l i p p i n e s , the Soviets c o n f r o n t no such c o n f l i c t i n g g o a l s . Soviet s e c u r i t y o b j e c t i v e s w o u l d be advanced s t r o n g l y by the end of U.S. m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y in the Pacific. Supp o r t i n g the c o m m u n i s t i n s u r g e n t s , w h o s e chief f o r e i g n p o l i c y goal is the e x p u l s i o n of the U.S. m i l i t a r y p r e s ence in the country, is an excellent means of promoting Soviet security objectives as well as bolstering Soviet ideological influence. The C o m m u n i s t p a r t y of the P h i l i p p i n e s (CPP) and its m i l i t a r y a r m , the N e w People's A r m y (NPA), h a v e forged i n c r e a s i n g l y c l o s e links with t h e Soviet Union. M o s c o w f o r m e r l y p r o v i d e d s u p p o r t e x c l u s i v e l y to t h e P h i l i p p i n e C o m m u n i s t p a r t y (PKP), from w h i c h the CPP broke away in 1969 to e s p o u s e M a o i s t p r i n c i p l e s . A major issue in the Sino-Soviet dispute involved Soviet willingness to foster communist revolution in the Third World. Moscow argued that revolutions could not succeed unless the o b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s w e r e f a v o r a b l e . The Philippines was not judged ripe for revolution in Moscow's eyes. T h u s , t h e Soviet Union and the PKP p u r s u e d a strategy of avoiding armed struggle and concentrating on p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s .

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The CPP and t h e NPA l o o k e d t o B e i j i n g , which a r g u e s t h a t armed s t r u g g l e i t s e l f c o u l d c r e a t e t h e n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s f o r communist v i c t o r y in the P h i l i p p i n e s . The C h i n e s e a c c u s e d t h e S o v i e t s of s e l l i n g o u t c o m m u n i s t p a r t i e s i n A s i a and e l s e w h e r e u n d e r a p r e t e x t of s h u n ning " l e f t - w i n g dev i at i o n i s m " and " a d v e n t u r i s m . " D u r i n g t h e l a t t e r h a l f of t h e 1 9 7 0 s , C h i n e s e s u p p o r t f o r t h e CPP/NPA e v a p o r a t e d s t e a d i l y . China, d e t e r mined t o c o u n t e r S o v i e t - b a c k e d V i e t n a m e s e e x p a n s i o n i n t o C a m b o d i a , c u l t i v a t e d c l o s e t i e s w i t h T h a i l a n d and t h e r e s t of ASEAN, China a l s o was o b l i g e d t o improve r e l a t i o n s with the United S t a t e s in o r d e r to c o u n t e r the S o v i e t b u i l d u p in Vietnam. B e i j i n g , for example, supp o r t e d t h e p r e s e n c e o f U.S. m i l i t a r y b a s e s i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s — a p o s i t i o n t h a t i n f u r i a t e d t h e CPP. By t h e e a r l y 1 9 8 0 s , t h e CPP a p p e a r e d r e c e p t i v e t o S o v i e t s u g g e s t i o n s t h a t i t f o l l o w a u n i t e d f r o n t s t r a t e g y with t h e PKP and v a r i o u s f r o n t g r o u p s a g a i n s t t h e r e g i m e of P r e s i d e n t Ferdinand M a r c o s . With t h e a c t i v e s u p p o r t and encouragement of t h e S o v i e t - c o n t r o l l e d World F e d e r a t i o n of Trade U n i o n s , l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s of t h e CPP and PKP s t e p p e d up t h e i r c o o p e r a t i o n b i l a t e r a l l y and with v a r i ous o s t e n s i b l y i n d e p e n d e n t t r a d e union g r o u p s . In 1982, S t a n i s l a v L e v c h e n k o , a f o r m e r o f f i c i a l of t h e T o k y o r e z i d e n t u r a of t h e KGB, t e s t i f i e d b e f o r e t h e H o u s e S e l e c t Committee on I n t e l l i g e n c e t h a t S o v i e t i n t e l l i g e n c e o f f i c e r s w e r e f u n d i n g t h e CPP on a f a i r l y regular bas i s . 3 9 The p o l i t i c a l t u r m o i l t h a t shook t h e P h i l i p p i n e s in t h e a f t e r m a t h of t h e a s s a s s i n a t i o n of p o p u l a r o p p o s i t i o n l e a d e r B e n i g n o A q u i n o i n A u g u s t 1983 l e d Moscow t o c o n c l u d e t h a t r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o n d i t i o n s in t h e c o u n t r y were becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y f a v o r a b l e . The S o v i e t s s t e p p e d up p o l i t i c a l and m a t e r i a l s u p p o r t t o t h e CPP and t h e NPA, which i n t e n s i f i e d t h e i r i n s u r g e n c y and s p r e a d t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s i n t o t h e c i t i e s as w e l l as r u r a l a r e a s . In t h e s p r i n g of 1 9 8 4 , t h e K r e m l i n a s s i g n e d KGB d i s i n f o r m a t i o n e x p e r t B o r i s Smirnov t o t h e S o v i e t Embassy i n M a n i l a . H i s t a s k was t o f a n a n t i - U . S . s e n t i m e n t i n t h e Philippines.1*0 A few weeks a f t e r S m i r n o v ' s a r r i v a l at h i s p o s t , a bogus q u e s t i o n n a i r e " f r o m the U.S. I n f o r m a t i o n S e r v i c e " was d i s t r i b u t e d among l e a d i n g F i l i p i n o s t h a t s o u g h t s e n s i t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n on s u b j e c t s s u c h a s t h e i r p o l i t i c a l l e a n i n g s and m i l i t a r y e x p e r i e n c e . Many of t h e r e c i p i e n t s r e p o r t e d l y were o u t r a g e d by t h e "American impertinence."1* Moscow c o n c e a l s many of i t s s e n s i t i v e c o v e r t a c t i v i t i e s in the P h i l i p p i n e s under c u l t u r a l , s p o r t s , or economic c o v e r . There h a s been a marked i n c r e a s e i n t h e number of v i s i t o r s f r o m t h e USSR and t h e E a s t E u r o p e a n bloc c o u n t r i e s , according to a P h i l i p p i n e government official.hl Meanwhile, t h e N a t i o n a l D e m o c r a t i c F r o n t , an u m b r e l l a g r o u p of a n t i - M a r c o s o p p o s i t i o n e l e m e n t s , has d r a m a t i c a l l y s t e p p e d up i t s p o l i t i c a l and p r o p a g a n d a activities. The PKP and CPP work w i t h i n t h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n , a s w e l l a s i n d e p e n d e n t l y , and h a v e d e v o t e d g r e a t

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e f f o r t s t o winning o v e r f i g u r e s in the moderate o p p o s i t i o n t o communist p o s i t i o n s on m a j o r p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s . S o v i e t involvement in arms t r a n s f e r s t o the NPA a r e more d i f f i c u l t t o d e t e c t . The f a c t t h a t the P h i l i p p i n e s i s an a r c h i p e l a g o c o n s i s t i n g of some 7,000 i s l a n d s r e n d e r s i t v i r t u a l l y i m p o s s i b l e f o r the government t o m o n i t o r e f f e c t i v e l y any arms d e l i v e r i e s to the Communists. However, the S o v i e t s e v i d e n t l y were i n v o l v e d in at l e a s t one recent shipment of arms from E a s t e r n Europe t h a t was made v i a South Yemen, a S o v i e t s u r r o g a t e , t o the NPA. 43 From 30 November t o 4 December 1984, t h e S o v i e t c o n t r o l l e d World Peace C o u n c i l (WPC) and i t s P h i l i p p i n e a f f i l i a t e , the P h i l i p p i n e Peace and S o l i d a r i t y C o u n c i l , c o - s p o n s o r e d the f i r s t I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n f e r e n c e on Peace and S e c u r i t y in East A s i a and the P a c i f i c . The c o n f e r ence took p l a c e at the U n i v e r s i t y of the P h i l i p p i n e s , a f o c a l p o i n t of N a t i o n a l Democratic Front a c t i v i t y . The p a r l e y c o i n c i d e d with a wave of p r o t e s t s and d e m o n s t r a t i o n s throughout the P h i l i p p i n e s t h a t f e a t u r e d a common o p p o s i t i o n to "American i m p e r i a l i s m " and U.S. f a c i l i t i e s in the c o u n t r y . Pravda quoted an a l l e g e d p a r t i c i p a n t at one of the r a l l i e s as s a y i n g : There were more than 5,000 p e o p l e . We gathered i n f r o n t of the American base at Clark Field, the largest in t h i s r e g i o n of the w o r l d . From h e r e , the bombers f l e w t o Vietnam. The Americans c a l l the entrance to the base the "Gate of Friendship" but we c a l l them the "Gates of Hell," since nuclear death lurks behind them. We demanded the removal from our land of a l l 23 U.S. bases, including Clark Field and Subic Bay. THE SOUTH PACIFIC:

FISHING

IN TROUBLED WATERS

Moscow has c a r r i e d i t s p o l i t i c a l o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t t h e U.S. p r e s e n c e i n A s i a and t h e P a c i f i c s o u t h w a r d t o A u s t r a l i a and New Z e a l a n d and t o t h e n e w l y i n d e p e n d e n t South P a c i f i c i s l a n d s . A U.S. o b s e r v e r o f t h e USSR h a s w r i t t e n t h a t " t h e P a c i f i c i s now an a r e n a f o r S o v i e t military-political i n t r u s i o n and s u b v e r s i o n [ w i t h ] the w h o l e b u n d l e o f i s l a n d m i n i s t a t e s . . . up f o r g r a b s . " 1 4 5 A u s t r a l i a and New Z e a l a n d h a v e t r a d i t i o n a l l y harb o r e d v o c a l p r o - S o v i e t m i n o r i t i e s i n communist and o t h e r l e f t i s t (notably labor) organizations. However, the announcement by New Z e a l a n d P r i m e M i n i s t e r David L a n g e , head of one of t h e c o u n t r y ' s l e a d i n g p o l i t i c a l parties, t h a t U.S. n u c l e a r - a r m e d and n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d s h i p s would be banned f r o m New Z e a l a n d ' s p o r t s o f f e r e d t h e S o v i e t U n i o n a b o o n t h a t i t w a s t e d no t i m e i n e x p l o i t i n g . A S o v i e t m e d i a b l i t z l a u d e d New Z e a l a n d ' s newfound n u c l e a r a l l e r g y and u r g e d o t h e r P a c i f i c n a t i o n s t o f o l l o w s u i t by b a n n i n g U.S. n u c l e a r arms i n t h e i r w a t e r s o r a i r s p a c e , d i s m a n t l i n g e x i s t i n g U.S. m i l i t a r y installations on t h e i r t e r r i t o r y , and p r e v e n t i n g t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of new o n e s . Moscow, h o w e v e r , has not been a v e r s e to

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e x p a n d i n g its o w n n a v a l p r e s e n c e in t h e S o u t h P a c i f i c through such innocent-sounding proposals as treaties on fishing rights. Nor has the K r e m l i n offered to abandon its air and naval bases in Vietnam. The Soviets evidently regard New Zealand's antinuclear policy as the opening w e d g e in the undermining of the A u s t r a l i a - N e w Zealand-United States (ANZUS) treat y , w h i c h l i n k s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , A u s t r a l i a , and N e w Z e a l a n d in t h e d e f e n s e of t h e S o u t h P a c i f i c . Soviet s p o k e s m e n are p r e s s i n g f o r a n u c l e a r - f r e e z o n e in t h e P a c i f i c - - a topic on which they can d r a w s u p p o r t from a m e l a n g e of nations that o t h e r w i s e have little affinity for the USSR. T h e S o v i e t c a m p a i g n is b e i n g w a g e d not o n l y in t h e m e d i a but a l s o t h r o u g h v a r i o u s Sovietdominated front groups. Perhaps the o l d e s t of t h e s e groups is the Pacific Conference of Churches, founded in t h e 1 9 6 0 s a n d s u b s i d i z e d by t h e W o r l d C o u n c i l of Churches. It p r o p a g a n d i z e s a g a i n s t U.S. m i l i t a r y ins t a l l a t i o n s and e x e r c i s e s in t h e A s i a n - P a c i f i c r e g i o n and s p o n s o r s p r o g r a m s of " p e a c e e d u c a t i o n . " Another important front group is the C o m m i t t e e for International Trade Union Unity (CITUU), spawned in Sydney, Australia, by delegates to the 9th Congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) that took place in Czechoslovakia in 1978. According to a report in the W a s h i n g t o n Times: CITUU has been organizing conferences and study programs in the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia, and the pacific regions, pacific islanders have been sent to the Soviet Union, while Soviet and Vietnamese Communist officials have been the leading speakers at various area conferences.'1'' In 1 9 8 0 , t h r e e m e m b e r s of t h e C o m m u n i s t p a r t y of Australia attended the Third Nuclear-Free Pacific Conference in H a w a i i , which brought together trade unionists f r o m a n u m b e r of P a c i f i c n a t i o n s and c r e a t e d an organization called the Pacific Trade Union Forum (PTUF). In 1 9 8 1 , t h e C I T U U and P T U F h e l d a j o i n t c o n ference in Vanuatu (formerly the New Hebrides) to which the Soviet Union sent observers. The following year the P T U F s p o n s o r e d a P a c i f i c - w i d e c o n f e r e n c e in N o u m e a at which peace and d i s a r m a m e n t w e r e the m a i n issues. The S o v i e t s and t h e i r n e w f r i e n d s in t h e P a c i f i c a r e a h a v e announced support for the NPA-led "liberation m o v e m e n t " in the Philippines and the anti-French Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front in New Caledonia and, for good m e a s u r e , have r e c o m m e n d e d that Hawaii be returned to its "indigenous" p e o p l e s . 4 7 Moscow's "peace offensive" in the Pacific can claim at least partial credit for New Zealand's action against U.S. naval vessels, for a s i m i l a r ban by Vanuatu and the S o l o m o n I s l a n d s on U.S. nu c 1 e a r - a r m e d and nuclearp o w e r e d s h i p s , f o r P a p u a - N e w G u i n e a ' s r e j e c t i o n of a U.S. request to permit Philippine-based B-52s to overfly the country, and for a m o v e m e n t by politicians in Palau

73 to deny the United States a m i l i t a r y base. 4 8 The "peace o f f e n s i v e " is o c c u r r i n g a g a i n s t a b a c k d r o p of g r o w i n g Soviet m i l i t a r y p o w e r in the Pacific, large portions of w h i c h u s e d to be a U.S. lake. CONCLUSION Soviet concerns about a threat from the United S t a t e s and a p o t e n t i a l c h a l l e n g e f r o m C h i n a and J a p a n n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , in o u r o p i n i o n t h e e m e r g i n g s e c u r i t y environment in the Asian-Pacific region contains a host of opportunities for the USSR. Furthermore, the access i o n of M i k h a i l G o r b a c h e v , a r e l a t i v e l y f r e s h , y o u n g leader with an aura of d y n a m i s m , puts M o s c o w in its best p o s i t i o n in m a n y y e a r s to e x p l o i t t h o s e o p p o r t u n i t i e s . T h e r e p l a c e m e n t of v e t e r a n S o v i e t F o r e i g n Minister Andrei G r o m y k o with Eduard Shevardnadze, w h o has little experience in international affairs, not only suggests G o r b a c h e v ' s d e s i r e to t a k e t h e lead in t h i s r e a l m but also s y m b o l i z e s a penchant for fresh initiatives abroad. G r o m y k o , r i g h t l y or w r o n g l y , w a s p e r c e i v e d w i d e l y as obsessed with Soviet-U.S. relations and perhaps as advocating a s u p e r p o w e r duopoly in world affairs. Gorbachev m a y plan to d e e m p h a s i z e the relationship b e t w e e n the Big T w o and to seek improved ties with other m a j o r actors in the global arena. China seems to be one of the primary targets of his attention. In July 1985, Chinese Deputy Premier Yao Yilin visited Moscow for talks w i t h , among others, First Deputy Prime Minister Arkhipov. The t w o m e n initiated a five-year pact on barter trade that was estimated at $14 b i l l i o n . 4 9 The accord also stipulated that the Soviet Union would build seven new industrial plants in China and would help to m o d e r n i z e a number of enterprises that it financed during the heyday of SinoSoviet friendship in the 1950s. Arkhipov played a m a j o r role as an economic adviser to China at that time. The trade agreement was particularly significant because it represented the first time in m a n y years that bilateral t r a d e w a s p l a c e d o n a l o n g - t e r m r a t h e r t h a n an a n n u a l bas is. A c c o r d i n g to t h e j o i n t c o m m u n i q u é issued a f t e r Yao's visit, the t w o sides discussed not only trade and e c o n o m i c q u e s t i o n s but a l s o " s o m e o t h e r p r o b l e m s of mutual interest."50 In v i e w of Deng X i a o p i n g ' s r e m a r k that China would tolerate a Soviet military presence at Cam R a h n Bay if t h e S o v i e t s w o u l d h a l t t h e i r s u p p o r t f o r V i e t n a m ' s w a r e f f o r t in C a m b o d i a , I n d o c h i n a m a y h a v e a p p e a r e d o n Yao's a g e n d a in M o s c o w . The Kremlin undoubtedly has been feeling the pressure from the United States (which was moving toward the provision of m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e to t h e n o n c o m m u n i s t e l e m e n t s of t h e Cambodian resistance) and ASEAN on the C a m b o d i a n issue. It u n d o u b t e d l y felt s t i l l g r e a t e r p r e s s u r e f o l l o w i n g U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz's s u m m e r 1985 tour of Southeast Asia and meeting with ASEAN's foreign m i n -

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isters. V i e t n a m , f o r i t s p a r t , e v i d e n t l y hoped t o head o f f a S i n o - S o v i e t r a p p r o c h e m e n t a t i t s e x p e n s e by p r o p o s i n g h i g h - l e v e l d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s on t h e u n r e s o l v e d i s s u e of U.S. s o l d i e r s m i s s i n g i n a c t i o n d u r i n g t h e V i e t n a m War. H a n o i ' s c a u t i o u s o v e r t u r e s f o r t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s with Washington have been spurned w i t h t h e a d m o n i t i o n t h a t s u c h a move was i m p o s s i b l e b e f o r e t h e w i t h d r a w a l of V i e t n a m e s e t r o o p s f r o m Cambodia. H o w e v e r , t h e g r e a t e r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a S i n o Soviet r e c o n c i l i a t i o n appears to the Vietnamese leaders, t h e more l i k e l y they are t o p e r s i s t in t h e i r campaign to b r i n g a l l of I n d o c h i n a u n d e r t h e i r c o n t r o l — e v e n i f Moscow w i t h d r a w s m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e f o r t h e C a m b o d i a n war. To a l l o w C a m b o d i a t o d r i f t i n t o t h e S o v i e t o r C h i n e s e o r b i t w o u l d be an u n a c c e p t a b l e t h r e a t t o V i e t nam's s e c u r i t y interests. R e g a r d l e s s of t h e o u t c o m e of t h e C a m b o d i a n c o n f l i c t , M o s c o w ' s p o s i t i o n a t Cam Ranh Bay a p p e a r s s e c u r e f o r at l e a s t the s h o r t - t e r m f u t u r e . T h u s , M o s c o w may w e l l b e a b l e t o h a v e i t s c a k e a n d e a t i t t o o by d i m i n i s h i n g t h e t h r e a t f r o m C h i n a t h r o u g h p o l i t i c a l and e c o n o m i c g e s t u r e s and r e t a i n i n g S o v i e t m i l i t a r y i n v e s t m e n t i n S o u t h e a s t A s i a by m e a n s of i t s V i e t n a m e s e b a s e s . G o r b a c h e v s e e m s no m o r e p r e d i s p o s e d t h a n h i s p r e d e c e s s o r s t o making c o n c e s s i o n s aimed at improving S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s with Japan. Sticks appear l i k e l y to prevail o v e r c a r r o t s i n Moscow's p o l i c y t o w a r d T o k y o . Japanese spokesmen, however, have r e i t e r a t e d t h a t t h e i r country w i l l n o t e n t e r i n t o a n y t y p e of f o r m a l a l l i a n c e o r o t h e r s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h W a s h i n g t o n and B e i j i n g . T h u s , t h e USSR's s t r a t e g i c n i g h t m a r e of a S i n o - U . S . Japanese t r i a n g l e is unlikely to m a t e r i a l i z e . Moreover, Moscow p r o b a b l y c a n t a k e c o m f o r t i n t h e t h o u g h t t h a t Prime M i n i s t e r Nakasone's commitment to a s u b s t a n t i a l b o l s t e r i n g of J a p a n e s e m i l i t a r y p r o w e s s may w e l l b e e r o d e d by h i s s u c c e s s o r s . E l s e w h e r e i n A s i a t h e S o v i e t s may w o r r y a b o u t r e g i o n a l a r m s r a c e s , b u t t h e y d i s p l a y no r e l u c t a n c e t o participate. I t was S o v i e t d e p l o y m e n t of TU-16 B a d g e r a i r c r a f t and MIG-23 f i g h t e r - b o m b e r s i n V i e t n a m t h a t b r o u g h t a b o u t a U.S. d e c i s i o n t o s e l l a n u p g r a d e d v e r s i o n of t h e F - 1 6 w a r p l a n e t o T h a i l a n d a n d S i n g a p o r e . 5 1 O t h e r ASEAN m e m b e r s may s e e k s i m i l a r p u r c h a s e s . On t h e Korean P e n i n s u l a , t e n s i o n a l m o s t c e r t a i n l y w i l l mount a s Moscow y i e l d s t o P y o n g y a n g ' s r e p e a t e d r e q u e s t s f o r MIG23s. The S o v i e t s w i l l j u s t i f y s u c h d e l i v e r i e s by c i t i n g S o u t h K o r e a ' s a c q u i s i t i o n of F - 1 6 s . In s u r v e y i n g t h e o v e r a l l m i l i t a r y balance in t h e A s i a n - P a c i f i c region, i t i s h i g h l y s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t t h e USSR a n d i t s allies p o s s e s s an o v e r w h e l m i n g s u p e r i o r i t y i n m a n p o w e r . The S o v i e t s t h e m s e l v e s d e p l o y more t h a n 500,000 t r o o p s on t h e S i n o - S o v i e t b o r d e r a l o n e and h a v e t h e c a p a b i l i t y t o t r a n s f e r f o r c e s r e l a t i v e l y q u i c k l y from o t h e r t h e a t e r s i n any e m e r g e n c y s i t u a t i o n s h o r t of an E a s t - W e s t w a r i n

Europe. V i e t n a m ' s armed f o r c e s , t o t a l i n g some 1.2 mill i o n , a r e l a r g e r t h a n t h o s e o f t h e s i x ASEAN c o u n t r i e s combined. North Korea, l i k e V i e t n a m , has one of the world's largest military establishments. One n e e d not p o s t u l a t e c o m b i n e d a c t i o n by S o v i e t , V i e t n a m e s e , and North Korean a r m i e s t o a p p r e c i a t e t h e p o t e n t i a l threat t h e s e f o r c e s pose t o p r o - W e s t e r n n a t i o n s in t h e A s i a n Pacific region. If S i n o - S o v i e t relations take a dramat i c turn for the better, China's m a s s i v e armed forces would be e f f e c t i v e l y n e u t r a l i z e d from t h r e a t e n i n g Soviet security in Asia. Much a s t h e K r e m l i n w o u l d l i k e t o a c q u i r e reliable allies in A s i a , i t w i l l c o n t i n u e t o r e l y upon i t s own s t r e n g t h f o r expanding Soviet i n f l u e n c e t h e r e . In v i e w o f t h e u n a t t r a c t i v e n e s s o f c o m m u n i s t i d e o l o g y and o f t h e S o v i e t e c o n o m i c model, t h e o v e r w h e l m i n g t h r u s t of t h e K r e m l i n ' s p o l i c y in A s i a h a s b e e n and w i l l c o n t i n u e to be m i l i t a r y . A l o n g - t i m e o b s e r v e r of S o v i e t a f f a i r s has a p t l y s u m m e d u p t h i s p h e n o m e n o n by n o t i n g t h a t a s u c c e s s f u l c u l t u r a l d i p l o m a c y , an i m p o r t a n t means o f p o l i c y , is v i r t u a l l y nonexistent in the Soviet case. M o r e o v e r , S o v i e t e c o n o m i c p o l i c y toward A s i a i s h i g h l y u n s u c c e s s f u l . . . . Most A s i a n s t a t e s f i n d S o v i e t goods u n a t t r a c t i v e , Soviet terms of a s s i s t a n c e o b j e c t i o n a b l e , and S o v i e t t e c h n o l o g y s e c o n d - r a t e . . . . In t e r m s of d i p l o m a t i c s t y l e , Moscow's m o t i v e s have b e e n p a t e n t l y t r a n s p a r e n t , i t s manner heavy-handed and m a n i p u l a t i v e , and i t s a p p e a l g e n e r a l l y u n s u c c e s s f u l . . . . S o v i e t p e r f i d y h a s c o m e t o b e w e l l known i n A s i a . . . . E f f e c t i v e S o v i e t p o l i c y i n s t r u m e n t s h a v e b e e n reduced t o t h e m i l i t a r y / c o n s p i r a t o r i a l t o o l , t h e o n l y one i n which i t e x c e l s and t o which i t c o n t i n u e s t o d e v o t e most o f i t s energies . 5 2

NOTES 1. John j . Stephan, "Asia in the S o v i e t Conception," i n Donald S. Z a g o r i a , e d . , S o v i e t P o l i c y i n E a s t Asia (New Haven: Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y p r e s s , 1 9 8 2 ) , p. 3 1 . 2. P a u l F. L a n g e r , " S o v i e t M i l i t a r y Power i n A s i a , " i b i d . , p. 2 7 2 . 3. Far E a s t e r n Economic Review, 8 November 1 9 8 4 . 4. Stephan, " A s i a , " p. 3 2 . 5. Far E a s t e r n Economic Review, 8 November 1 9 8 4 . 6. See M a r i a n L e i g h t o n , " S o v i e t s S t i l l p l a y Dominoes i n A s i a , " W a l l S t r e e t J o u r n a l , Op Ed p a g e , 14 O c t o b e r 1 9 8 3 . 7. Langer, " S o v i e t M i l i t a r y Power," p . 2 6 6 . 8. Tetsuya Kataoka, "Japan's Northern T h r e a t , " problems of Communism ( M a r c h - A p r i l 1984) : 6 . 9. Langer, " S o v i e t M i l i t a r y power," p. 2 5 9 . 10. K r a s n a y a Zvezda, 31 December 1 9 8 3 . 11. S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e a r t i c l e by I . A l e k s e y e v and F . N i k o l a y e v i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s (Moscow, A p r i l 1 9 8 4 ) .

76 12. T a s s , 3 May 1 9 8 5 . 13. T h e s e e x c h a n g e s a c t u a l l y w e r e k i c k e d o f f b y t h e v i s i t of U.S. S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n s e C a s p a r W e i n b e r g e r i n t h e a u t u m n of 1 9 8 3 . 14. See Thomas p. B e r n s t e i n , " C h i n a i n 1984," A s i a n S u r v e y (January 1985):46. 15. Ibid., p. 45. 16. A c c o r d i n g t o an i n t e r v i e w t h a t Chinese Communist p a r t y c h i e f Hu Yaobang g a v e t o t h e I t a l i a n C o m m u n i s t n e w s p a p e r L ' U n i t a , t h i s a s s u r a n c e was p a s s e d by a h i g h C h i n e s e o f f i c i a l t o R u m a n i a n p r e s i d e n t N i c o l a e C e a u c e s c u , who w a s a s k e d t o p a s s i t o n t o Moscow. See B e r n s t e i n , i b i d . , p. 47. 17. L a n g e r , " S o v i e t M i l i t a r y p o w e r , " p . 265 . 18. Bernstein, "China i n 1984," p. 46. 19. Quoted i n L a n g e r , " S o v i e t M i l i t a r y p o w e r , " p . 2 6 4 . 20. I b i d . , p . 261 . 21 . Interestingly, t h e t r e a t y r e q u i r e s the United S t a t e s to i n t e r v e n e m i l i t a r i l y i f j a p a n comes u n d e r S o v i e t a t t a c k b u t does n o t i m p o s e a p a r a l l e l r e q u i r e m e n t on j a p a n . T h u s , t h e USSR w o u l d b e v i t a l l y c o n c e r n e d t o p r e v e n t j a p a n f r o m e n t e r i n g a NATO-Warsaw p a c t war. 22. T a s s , 19 J a n u a r y 1 9 8 3 . 23. Tass, 5 April 1983. 24. A s i a w e e k , 29 A p r i l 1 9 8 3 , p . 1 7 . 25. pravda, 3 August 1983. 26. Le Monde, 11 March 1 9 8 3 . 27. The W a s h i n g t o n T i m e s , 21 A p r i l 1983 . 28. I z v e s t i a , 10 J u n e 1 9 8 3 . 29. Marian Leighton, "De-Coupling the A l l i e s : Soviet S t r a t e g y T o w a r d N o r t h e r n E u r o p e and J a p a n , " S u r v e y ( A u t u m n - W i n t e r 1983) :1 3 4 . 30. M a i n i c h i S h i m b u n , 21 A p r i l 1 9 8 4 . 31 . See Far E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c R e v i e w , 6 J u n e 1985, p. 13; and W a s h i n g t o n p o s t , 18 J u l y 1 9 8 5 . 32. Ibid. 33. W a l l S t r e e t J o u r n a l , 25 A p r i l 1 9 8 5 . 34. As c i t e d i n L e i f R o s e n b e r g e r , " T h e S o v i e t - V i e t n a m e s e A l l i a n c e and K a m p u c h e a , " S u r v e y ( A u t u m n - W i n t e r , 1983):230. 35. F a r E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c R e v i e w , 1984 A s i a Y e a r b o o k , p . 285 . 36. F a r E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c R e v i e w , 8 November 1 9 8 4 . 37. L e i g h t o n , " S o v i e t s S t i l l p l a y Dominoes." 38. F o r a d e t a i l e d s t u d y of t h i s t o p i c , s e e L e i f R o s e n b e r g e r , " p h i l i p p i n e Communism and t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , " S u r v e y ( S p r i n g 1 9 8 5 ) . 39. U.S., C o n g r e s s , H o u s e , S e l e c t C o m m i t t e e on i n t e l l i g e n c e , S o v i e t A c t i v e M e a s u r e s , 9 7 t h c o n g . , 2nd s e s s . , 1 3 - 1 4 J u l y 1 9 8 2 , p p . 166-167. 40. B u s i n e s s Times ( K u a l a L u m p u r ) , 5 D e c e m b e r 1 9 8 4 . 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. R o s s H. M u n r o , " D a t e l i n e M a n i l a : M o s c o w ' s N e x t W i n ? " Foreign Policy ( F a l l 1984):186. 44. P r a v d a , 4 December 1 9 8 4 . 45. Arnold Beichman, " T r o u b l e i n P a r a d i s e , " Washington Times, 19 J u n e 1 9 8 5 . 46. Ibid. Ibid. 47 . 48. Ibid. 49. W a s h i n g t o n p o s t , 11 J u l y 1 9 8 5 .

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50. Ibid. 5 1 . R e u t e r , 8 J u l y 1 9 8 5 , p r e v i o u s U.S. p o l i c y h a d b e e n t o s e l l o n l y t h e e x p o r t v e r s i o n s of t h e F - 1 6 . 5 2 . T h o m a s W. R o b i n s o n , "On S o v i e t A s i a n p o l i c y : A Comment a r y , " i n R o b e r t H. D o n a l d s o n , e d . , S o v i e t U n i o n i n t h e T f r i r d W o r l d : S u c c e s s and F a i l u r e s ( B o u l d e r , C o l o . : W e s t v i e w , 1 9 8 0 ) , p p . 298-299.

4 The Great Powers' Security Role in Southeast Asia: Diplomacy and Force Sheldon W. Simon

Although Great Power r e l a t i o n s a r e f r e q u e n t l y d e s c r i b e d in g e o m e t r i c t e r m s , s u g g e s t i n g s t r u c t u r a l b a l a n c e s in t r i a n g l e s and q u a d r a n g l e s , a n o t h e r p e r s p e c t i v e - - a t l e a s t i n S o u t h e a s t A s i a — m a y be drawn f r o m dance. Rather than v i e w i n g s t a t e s c o n f r o n t i n g one a n o t h e r in a l i n e a r mann e r i n t e s t s o f " p o w e r , " i t may be u s e f u l t o t h i n k o f them as engaged in a s e r i e s of movements, some of which may be harmonious and g r a c e f u l j u s t as o t h e r s c o u l d l e a d to serious c o l l i s i o n s . A p r i m a r y s t r a t e g i c g o a l of G r e a t P o w e r s ( t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , and China) i s t o a v o i d d i r e c t m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s w i t h e i t h e r of t h e o t h e r s . However, secondary i n t e r e s t s , f o r example, the p r o t e c t i o n of s e a - l a n e s (the United S t a t e s ) o r t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f new m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n s (the USSR), r e q u i r e t i e s w i t h r e g i o n a l members who may a l ready be a r r a i g n e d as a n t a g o n i s t s . By a s s i s t i n g r e g i o n al a l l i e s in a t t a i n i n g t h e i r s e c u r i t y requirements, t h e n , t h e Great Powers e n t e r i n t o r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t may m o v e them t o w a r d c o n f r o n t a t i o n . S t r a t e g y d e p e n d s on managing t h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h s u f f i c i e n t s k i l l t h a t war i s a v o i d e d and t h e i n t e r e s t s of a l l i e s a r e advanced. This c h a p t e r a s s e s s e s Great Power p o l i c i e s in S o u t h e a s t A s i a , f o c u s i n g on t h e i r s e c u r i t y t i e s w i t h t h e r e g i o n ' s m a j o r a d v e r s a r i a l g r o u p s : t h e A s s o c i a t i o n of S o u t h e a s t A s i a n N a t i o n s (ASEAN) and I n d o c h i n a . As i n a l l a l l i a n c e s , each member hopes t o a c q u i r e a measure of

T h i s c h a p t e r was o r i g i n a l l y p r e p a r e d f o r t h e N a t i o n a l S t r a t e g y I n f o r m a t i o n Center Conference on " S t a b i l i t y , Development, and Secur i t y i n S o u t h e a s t A s i a , " p o r t D i c k s o n , M a l a y s i a , November 12-14, 1984. R e s e a r c h f o r t h i s p a p e r was p a r t i a l l y s u p p o r t e d t h r o u g h t r a v e l g r a n t s f r o m the U.S. I n f o r m a t i o n Agency and t h e E a r h a r t Foundation (Ann Arbor, M i c h i g a n ) . A s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t v e r s i o n of t h i s a r t i c l e was f i r s t p u b l i s h e d i n A s i a n S u r v e y , v o l . 25, no. 9, S e p t e m b e r 1985, pp. 9 1 8 - 9 4 2 , c o p y r i g h t 1985 by The R e g e n t s of t h e U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a . 79

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p o l i c y s u p p o r t it c o u l d not a f f o r d to o b t a i n by itself and m i n i m i z e d i r e c t c o s t s . In m o s t i n s t a n c e s of G r e a t P o w e r r e l a t i o n s w i t h s m a l l e r r e g i o n a l p a r t n e r s , the f o r m e r finances the latter's military g r o w t h in exchange for strategic location (bases) and an understanding that the latter w i l l provide neither facilities nor political s u p p o r t to t h e f o r m e r ' s a d v e r s a r i e s . Thus, alliances tend to polarize political relations, providing stability without resolving conflicts. THE U N I T E D STATES: RELIABLE OR DECLINING POWER?

PARTNER

There are numerous claims that U.S. foreign policy has been erratic and reactive since the Second Indochina W a r (1965-1975), torn by conflicts b e t w e e n Congress and t h e e x e c u t i v e b r a n c h , and f l a w e d by a p r o c e s s t h a t divides responsibility and lacks coherence. 1 Although it is t r u e t h a t U.S. f o r e i g n p o l i c y h a s b e e n e r r a t i c o n d e t a i l s and r h e t o r i c , m o r e r e m a r k a b l e h a s b e e n that policy's overall consistency. As Kenneth W a l t z recently observed: Who would have thought when the war ended in 1945 that 40 years later we would still be carrying West Germany and much of Western Europe on our backs at a cost recently estimated by Senator Sam Nunn at $90 billion a year? Who would have thought we would be proportionately outspending japan for defense by about five to one, in considerable part to protect its vital interests? Seldom have a country's cost commitments abroad been sustained with the constancy or vigor that America has shown.^ T h i s " c o n s t a n c y " is b o t h a s t r e n g t h and a w e a k n e s s - - a s t r e n g t h in t h a t it u n d e r s c o r e s U.S. r e l i a b i l i t y , a w e a k n e s s b e c a u s e it m a y r e f l e c t a k i n d of s t r a t e g i c i m m o b i l i t y o r i n a b i l i t y to a d a p t to c h a n g e s in t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l e n v i r o n m e n t , to s h a r e b u r d e n s and p o w e r w i t h i n the international system as the relative capacit i e s of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s d i m i n i s h . Put a n o t h e r w a y , the m a i n t e n a n c e of U.S. m i l i t a r y h e g e m o n y m a y be accelerating its economic decline. U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia is d e r i v a t i v e of l a r g e r i n t e r e s t s in t h e A s i a n r e g i o n as a w h o l e . Although the United States historically looked toward the Atlantic and Europe for its cultural h e r i t a g e and social institutions, a political and economic reorientation to the Pacific began as early as World W a r II. Since 1945, Asia has been the locus of the United States' t w o m a j o r m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s ( K o r e a and I n d o c h i n a ) . More s i g n i f i c a n t l y , it has b e c o m e the world region with which t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a s c a r r i e d o n t h e p l u r a l i t y of its i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e s i n c e 1978. In 1 9 8 2 , U.S. t r a d e w i t h t h e P a c i f i c e x c e e d e d its A t l a n t i c c o u n t e r p a r t by

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some $15 b i l l i o n . In 1 9 8 3 , P a c i f i c t r a d e a c c o u n t e d f o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y 30 p e r c e n t o f t o t a l U.S. t r a d e . At t h e s a m e t i m e , U.S. i n v e s t m e n t i n A s i a h a s a l s o g r o w n a t a f a s t e r r a t e t h a n i n v e s t m e n t i n any o t h e r w o r l d r e g i o n . P a c i f i c B a s i n c o u n t r i e s c u r r e n t l y produce 60 p e r c e n t o f t h e w o r l d ' s G r o s s N a t i o n a l P r o d u c t (GNP). For 1984, U.S. e x p o r t s t o t h e A s i a n - P a c i f i c r e g i o n were v a l u e d a t $ 5 4 . 6 b i l l i o n and i m p o r t s a t $114 b i l l i o n . U.S. i n v e s t ments in t h e P a c i f i c a r e c u r r e n t l y valued at over $30 b i l l i o n , and A s i a now a c c o u n t s f o r more t h a n 50 p e r c e n t o f t h e U.S. g l o b a l d e f i c i t . Asia i s of prime i m p o r t a n c e , t h e n , t o U.S. p r o s p e r i t y , and U.S. A s i a n p o l i c y may i n l a r g e p a r t be e x p l a i n e d by t h e d e s i r e t o n u r t u r e t h e s e important economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . The p r i m a r y c o m p o n e n t s o f W a s h i n g t o n ' s E a s t A s i a p o l i c y a p p e a r t o be an e m p h a s i s on c l o s e r e l a t i o n s w i t h m a r k e t - o r i e n t e d e c o n o m i e s i n A s i a c o n g e n i a l t o U.S. t r a d e and i n v e s t m e n t and t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s t o p r o t e c t t h e s e a - l a n e s of international commerce. The m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s r e q u i r e d t o a c h i e v e t h e s e e n d s a r e p r i m a r i l y a i r and n a v a l , w h i c h i n t u r n n e c e s s i t a t e r e g i o n a l base f a c i l i t i e s through f o r m a l alliances. Although most U.S. a l l i a n c e commitments made i n t h e 1950s ( J a p a n , South K o r e a , t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , A u s t r a l i a New Z e a l a n d , and, t o a s m a l l e r e x t e n t , T h a i l a n d ) r e m a i n in f o r c e , t h e n a t u r e of t h e s e commitments has been somewhat degraded s i n c e t h e end of t h e Second I n d o c h i n a War i n 1 9 7 5 . T h a t i s , i t i s h i g h l y i m p r o b a b l e t h a t t h e United S t a t e s w i l l commit ground f o r c e s i n f u t u r e A s i a n c o n f l i c t s ( w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of t h e Korean P e n i n s u l a , which i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by an uneasy armed t r u c e of more than t h i r t y years' d u r a t i o n ) . As e a r l y as 1 9 6 9 , t h e n p r e s i d e n t Nixon e n u n c i a t e d a p o l i c y t h a t h o l d s t o t h i s d a y : t h a t U.S. ground f o r c e s w i l l not i n t e r v e n e i n Asian d o m e s t i c h o s t i l i t i e s t o p r o t e c t incumbent governments from i n t e r n a l t u r m o i l , even i f t h a t t u r m o i l i s e x t e r n a l ly backed. The s i n g l e e x c e p t i o n t o t h i s p r i n c i p l e - Korea--is a special case. The 4 1 , 0 0 0 m o s t l y f o r w a r d d e p l o y e d U.S. f o r c e s t h e r e a r e n o t a s i g n i f i c a n t m i l i t a r y f a c t o r but s e r v e r a t h e r as a p o l i t i c a l d e t e r r e n t o r t r i p w i r e c o m p a r a b l e , s a y , t o U.S. f o r c e s i n B e r l i n . They c o n s t i t u t e a g u a r a n t e e t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s would be i n v o l v e d i n t h e e a r l y s t a g e s o f a w a r on t h e p e n i n s u l a i f North K o r e a ( D e m o c r a t i c P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c o f Kor e a , o r DPRK) l a u n c h e d an a t t a c k . One o t h e r h y p o t h e t i c a l c a s e i n w h i c h U.S. g r o u n d f o r c e s m i g h t be deployed s h o u l d be m e n t i o n e d : t o p r o t e c t U.S. f a c i l i t i e s i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s . Given t h e i n s t a b i l i t y of P h i l i p p i n e p o l i t i c s , t h e c o u n t r y ' s economic c r i s i s , and t h e growing u n p o p u l a r i t y of t h e Marcos r e g i m e , U.S. m i l i t a r y f a c i l i t i e s i n t h a t c o u n t r y may p o t e n t i a l l y be a t r i s k i n t h e e v e n t o f an i n t e r n a l u p r i s i n g . It is n o t e w o r t h y i n t h i s r e g a r d t h a t t h e P h i l i p p i n e - U . S . mutua l s e c u r i t y agreement s p e c i f i c a l l y p r o h i b i t s t h e use of U.S. f o r c e s f o r a c t i o n i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s i t s e l f and

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t h a t p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e b a s e s i s t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of t h e P h i l i p p i n e government because the bases a r e , under law, Philippine bases. In a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , if t h e P h i l i p p i n e b a s e s become a p r i m e t a r g e t f o r a p o p u l a r u p r i s ing a g a i n s t Marcos or a l t e r n a t i v e l y if Marcos h i m s e l f t u r n e d a g a i n s t t h e b a s e s and a s k e d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o v a c a t e as a n a t i o n a l i s t p l o y , U.S. f o r c e s w o u l d b e withdrawn. It is inconceivable t h a t the United S t a t e s w o u l d f i g h t F i l i p i n o s t o m a i n t a i n c o n t r o l of t h e b a s e s . In f a c t , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i s a l r e a d y e x a m i n i n g p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s to the Philippine bases for the twentyf i r s t century (see d i s c u s s i o n below). Two m a j o r U.S. f o r e i g n p o l i c y c o n c e r n s i n S o u t h e a s t ASEAN's A s i a c e n t e r on t h e ASEAN s t a t e s and I n d o c h i n a . importance is m u l t i f a c e t e d , comprising economic, s t r a t e g i c , and p o l i t i c a l d i m e n s i o n s . The ASEAN s t a t e s c o n s t i t u t e p r e c i s e l y t h e k i n d of m a r k e t - o r i e n t e d , modernizing p o l i t i c o e c o n o m i c systems t h a t the United S t a t e s hopes w i l l c o m e t o c h a r a c t e r i z e m o s t of t h e T h i r d W o r l d . An e c o n o m i c a l l y s u c c e s s f u l ASEAN i s s e e n by W a s h i n g t o n a s b o t h an e x a m p l a r of t h e a d v a n t a g e s i n f o l l o w i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e and i n v e s t m e n t - o r i e n t e d d e v e l o p m e n t polic i e s and an a n t i d o t e t o t h e f a i l u r e s of m o r e r a d i c a l a u t a r k i c a l s y s t e m s s u c h as V i e t n a m and N o r t h K o r e a . ASEAN a s a g r o u p i s A m e r i c a ' s f i f t h l a r g e s t trading partner. I n 1 9 8 1 , U.S. d i r e c t i n v e s t m e n t i n ASEAN t o t a l e d $ 4 . 5 b i l l i o n , a 48 p e r c e n t i n c r e a s e o v e r t h e l e v e l o f U.S. i n v e s t m e n t i n 1 9 7 7 . 3 On t h e s t r a t e g i c l e v e l , t h e ASEAN s t a t e s a r e s i t u ated a s t r i d e Japan's most i m p o r t a n t t r a d e r o u t e to the Persian Gulf. I n t h e w a k e of t h e S o v i e t o c c u p a t i o n of A f g h a n i s t a n and t h e s t r o n g l y a n t i - U . S . S h i i t e r e v o l u t i o n i n I r a n , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a s d e v e l o p e d a new a p p r o a c h t o s e c u r i t y in t h e I n d i a n Ocean a r e a . By a c t i v e l y seeking to enhance i t s access to area-wide naval, a i r , and c o m m u n i c a t i o n s f a c i l i t i e s , i m p r o v i n g t h e n a v a l and a i r o p e r a t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t i e s of D i e g o G a r c i a , i n c r e a s i n g t h e l e v e l of I n d i a n Ocean d e p l o y m e n t s f r o m t h e U.S. 7 t h F l e e t t o b e t w e e n o n e and t w o c a r r i e r t a s k g r o u p s , and c r e a t i n g t h e R a p i d D e p l o y m e n t F o r c e (now known a s t h e C e n t r a l Command), t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a s s u b s t a n t i a l l y improved i t s c a p a c i t y to p r o j e c t i t s f o r c e s i n t o t h i s reg ion. The ASEAN s t a t e s a r e a n i n t e g r a l c o m p o n e n t of t h i s new s t r a t e g y . The I n d o n e s i a n a r c h i p e l a g o , stretching f o r s o m e 3 , 0 0 0 m i l e s , and M a l a y s i a s i t a s t r i d e a s e r i e s of r e l a t i v e l y n a r r o w s t r a i t s , t h e c o n t r o l of w h i c h c o u l d be u s e d t o b o t h m o n i t o r and i n t e r d i c t s h i p s m o v i n g b e t w e e n t h e W e s t e r n P a c i f i c and I n d i a n o c e a n s . Only a f e w of t h e c h a n n e l s t h r o u g h t h e I n d o n e s i a a r c h i p e l a g o a r e w i d e and d e e p enough t o p e r m i t t h e s a f e p a s s a g e of submerged s u b m a r i n e s (see F i g u r e 4.1). These are the S u n d a S t r a i t w i t h a g o v e r n i n g d e p t h of 120 f e e t and a m i n i m u m w i d t h of 12 n a u t i c a l m i l e s , Lombok S t r a i t w i t h a d e p t h o f 6 0 0 f e e t a n d w i d t h o f 11 n a u t i c a l m i l e s , t h e O m b a i S t r a i t w i t h a d e p t h o f 6 0 0 f e e t a n d w i d t h o f 12

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F i g u r e 4.1. Strategic Southeast Asian Region.

Straits

and

U.S.

Military

Bases

in

the

n a u t i c a l m i l e s , and t h e S t r a i t s of M a l a c c a w i t h a depth of 75 f e e t and minimum w i d t h of 8 n a u t i c a l m i l e s . 1 * I t i s a s s u m e d t h a t U.S. SSBNs (NATO c o d e f o r s u b m a r i n e s c a r r y i n g n u c l e a r - b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s ) from Guam s o m e t i m e s t r a n s i t t h e s e s t r a i t s on t h e i r way t o t h e I n d i a n Ocean. Because the S o v i e t Union l a g s behind t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s in a n t i s u b m a r i n e w a r f a r e (ASW) c a p a b i l i t y , t h e s e s t r a i t s c o u l d be i m p o r t a n t c h o k e p o i n t s where t h e S o v i e t s would have some chance to l o c a t e U.S. s u b m a r i n e s through a c o u s t i c d e v i c e s . N o t e w o r t h y in t h i s r e g a r d was t h e 1982 a r r e s t and e x p u l s i o n of a S o v i e t espionage agent in I n d o n e s i a who was a t t e m p t i n g t o o b t a i n e x a c t l y t h e k i n d of h y d r o g r a p h i c d a t a on t h e M a k a s s a r S t r a i t n e c e s s a r y t o p o s i t i o n h u n t e r - k i l l e r s u b m a r i n e s i n an i n t e r d i c t i o n mode. I n a d d i t i o n t o ASEAN's s t r a t e g i c g e o g r a p h y , the United States is a l s o i n t e r e s t e d in i t s m i l i t a r y growth. U.S. f o r e i g n m i l i t a r y s a l e s and c r e d i t s t o ASEAN i n t h e e a r l y 1980s a r e around $4 b i l l i o n f o r t h e a c g u i s i t i o n of U.S. h a r d w a r e , and U.S. m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e i s a r o u n d The U n i t e d S t a t e s a l s o $300 m i l l i o n ( s e e F i g u r e 4 . 2 ) . p l a y s a l e a d i n g r o l e i n s t a g i n g j o i n t e x e r c i s e s as i t i s the dominant t h i r d c o u n t r y in t h e m i l i t a r y maneuvers of ASEAN s t a t e s .

84

300 250 U.S. dollars (millions)

200 -

150-

100

,

1975 1976

Figure

4.2

U.S.

1

1977

Military

,

1978

,

1979

Assistance

,

1

1980 1981 to

the

.

1982 ASEAN

,—

1983

Countries.

U.S. m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e h a s b e e n i n s t r u m e n t a l i n providing Thailand with the firepower to r e s i s t Vietnamese encroachments along the Thai f r o n t i e r . Whereas p r i o r to 1983, Thai a r t i l l e r y lacked the range to supp r e s s V i e t n a m e s e f i r e from a c r o s s t h e b o r d e r , t h e U.S. s u p p l y of 155-mm h o w i t z e r s in A p r i l 1 9 8 3 e n a b l e d T h a i forces to repel Vietnamese incursions that spring.5 There is a growing c o n t r o v e r s y , however, over w h e t h e r t h e ASEAN a c q u i s i t i o n o f s o m e a d v a n c e d U . S . s y s t e m s c o u l d f u e l a r e g i o n a l arms r a c e a n d / o r skew g o v e r n m e n t b u d g e t s i n o r d i n a t e l y t o w a r d t h e m i l i t a r y and away f r o m d e v e l o p m e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s . Both I n d o n e s i a and T h a i l a n d h a v e a s k e d t o p u r c h a s e a t o p - l i n e U.S. f i g h t e r bomber, General Dynamic's F-16A. As a g e n e r a l p o l i c y , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a s d i s c o u r a g e d T h i r d World c o u n t r i e s from buying t h e t o p - l i n e F - 1 6 , u r g i n g i n s t e a d t h a t they c o n s i d e r t w o new i n t e r m e d i a t e f i g h t e r s d e v e l o p e d s p e c i f i c a l l y f o r T h i r d World a i r f o r c e s : N o r t h r o p ' s F - 2 0 and General Dynamic's F - 1 6 / 7 9 . N e i t h e r of t h e s e f i g h t e r s has y e t t o f i n d a buyer, however. Proponents of F-16A s a l e s t o T h a i l a n d c l a i m t h a t t h e f i g h t e r i s n e c e s s a r y t o b a l a n c e t h e l a r g e number o f V i e t n a m e s e c o m b a t a i r c r a f t — 4 8 5 i n c l u d i n g 180 M I G - 2 1 S , v e r s u s 179 f o r t h e T h a i s , t h e t o p f i g h t e r b e i n g t h e F - 5 , of which t h e Thais have 50. B e c a u s e t h e USSR h a s r e c e n t l y deployed MIG-23s in V i e t n a m , t h e argument g o e s , t h e n T h a i l a n d w i l l need F - 1 6 s t o be a b l e t o c h a l l e n g e t h e V i e t n a m e s e i n t h e a i r and p o s s i b l y e v e n t o p r e e m p t them on t h e g r o u n d . 6 I t should be n o t e d , h o w e v e r , t h a t s o f a r t h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e S o v i e t s h a v e g i v e n MIG-23s to t h e V i e t n a m e s e Air Force. The a i r c r a f t a t Cam Ranh Bay r e m a i n i n S o v i e t h a n d s . Moreover, should Thailand a c q u i r e t h e F-16A, in a l l p r o b a b i l i t y Indonesia would not be f a r b e h i n d . The p u r c h a s e o f t h e F - 1 6 A would e n h a n c e ASEAN's a b i l i t y t o d e v e l o p a r e g i o n a l air defense. AWACs s y s t e m s i n S i n g a p o r e c o u l d p e r f o r m a r e g i o n a l C 3 i n t h i s c o n t e x t and m o v e ASEAN t o w a r d a n integrated air defense system.7 S i n g a p o r e has r e c e n t l y purchased s e v e r a l E-2Cs.

85

Opponents of t h e F-16A p u r c h a s e b e l i e v e t h a t T h a i l a n d ' s F - 5 E s a r e more t h a n s u f f i c i e n t t o o u t m a n e u v e r H a n o i ' s M I G - 2 1 s and t h a t a s q u a d r o n o f F - 1 6 s , i n any e v e n t , would h a v e o n l y a m a r g i n a l e f f e c t on V i e t n a m ' s o v e r a l l a i r s u p e r i o r i t y w i t h t h e i r 207 MIG-17 and 21 f i g h t e r s and SU-17 b o m b e r s . The enormous c o s t o f an F16A s q u a d r o n — w i t h s p a r e s and t r a i n i n g — w o u l d be m o r e t h a n $ 5 0 0 m i l l i o n , money s o m e s a y b e t t e r s p e n t on e c o nomic d e v e l o p m e n t . Furthermore, Thailand could acquire Neverthet h e F - 2 0 at o n e - t h i r d of t h e F - 1 6 ' s c o s t . 8 l e s s , i n J u l y 1 9 8 5 , T h a i l a n d announced p l a n s t o p u r c h a s e 12 F - 1 6 A s a t an i n i t i a l c o s t o f m o r e t h a n $ 3 0 0 m i l l i o n over a five-year period. To do t h i s , t h e a i r f o r c e agreed to cut the r e s t of i t s o p e r a t ions — c u r t a i 1 i n g t r a i n i n g , r e t i r i n g o l d e r a i r c r a f t , and d e f e r r i n g d e v e l o p i n g o f b a d l y needed a i r l i f t c a p a c i t y . Deliveries are s c h e d u l e d t o begin in 1988. As ASEAN d e f e n s e b u d g e t s g r o w , t h e problem o f t r a d e - o f f s i n o t h e r a r e a s o f p u b l i c p o l i c y become i n c r e a s i n g l y s a l i e n t . Is national s e c u r i t y b e t t e r s e r v e d by a c q u i r i n g b i g - t i c k e t s y s t e m s with a r e g i o n a l p o t e n t i a l o r by a l l e v i a t i n g d o m e s t i c , social, and e c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n s upon which i n s u r g e n c y t h r i v e s ? Or a l t e r n a t i v e l y , i s s e c u r i t y e n h a n c e d by a d d i n g l e s s e x p a n s i v e m i l i t a r y s y s t e m s t h a t would improve a i r - g r o u n d c o o r d i n a t i o n as i n t h e Thai c a s e ? The p r i m a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e p o w e r s i n S o u t h e a s t A s i a f o r t h e p a s t f i v e y e a r s has been c e n t e r e d in Indochina. U.S. p o l i c y m a k e r s s e e s e v e r a l l i n k a g e s b e t w e e n I n d o c h i n a and ASEAN s e c u r i t y . These i n c l u d e : 1. 2. 3. 4.

t h e t h r e a t p o s e d by S o v i e t u s e o f n a v a l f a c i l i t i e s a t Cam Ranh Bay; t h e t h r e a t t o T h a i l a n d posed by t h e V i e t n a m e s e o c c u p a t i o n of Kampuchea; t h e danger of p o s s i b l e V i e t n a m e s e a n d / o r S o v i e t s u p p o r t f o r communist i n s u r g e n c i e s i n ASEAN s t a t e s ; and t h e d e s t a b i l i z i n g i m p a c t o f l a r g e number o f r e f u g e e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y in T h a i l a n d ' s e a s t e r n p r o v i n c e s .

T h a i l a n d and t h e o t h e r ASEAN s t a t e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned t h a t a c c e p t a n c e of Vietnam's domination of Kampuchea w o u l d r e m o v e t h e t r a d i t i o n a l b u f f e r b e t w e e n t h e r e g i o n ' s h i s t o r i c r i v a l s , in e f f e c t t u r n i n g Thailand i t s e l f i n t o a b u f f e r between a p o s s i b l y e x p a n s i o n i s t Hanoi and M a l a y s i a . 9 Although t h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e t h a t Vietnam is c u r r e n t l y a t t e m p t i n g to s u b v e r t the Thai g o v e r n m e n t , i f Hanoi d e c i d e d t o do s o , i t s d o m i n a t i o n o f Kampuchea and p a s t r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e T h a i C o m m u n i s t party could provide i t with t h a t c a p a b i l i t y . ASEAN i s p a r t i c u l a r l y s u p p o r t i v e o f t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f U.S. m i l i t a r y f o r c e s i n E a s t A s i a . Reversing its i n i t i a l d e c i s i o n i n 1978 t o draw down U.S. f o r c e s i n t h e a f t e r m a t h of t h e Second I n d o c h i n a War, t h e C a r t e r adm i n i s t r a t i o n , and t h e n P r e s i d e n t R e a g a n , e x p a n d e d U.S. n a v a l and a i r c a p a b i l i t i e s . In e f f e c t , t h e U.S.

86 p r e s e n c e h a s p r e v e n t e d t h e p o l a r i z a t i o n of S o u t h e a s t A s i a into p r o - S o v i e t and p r o - C h i n e s e b l o c s . Instead, the United States is expanding the 7th Fleet, encouraging J a p a n e s e r e a r m a m e n t , and i n c r e a s i n g a r m s s a l e s to ASEAN. A l t h o u g h t h e U.S. p r e s e n c e p r o v i d e s A S E A N w i t h greater d i p l o m a t i c m a n e u v e r a b i l i t y , A S E A N m e m b e r s a r e u n c o m f o r t a b l e with the de facto joint Sino-U.S. security guarantee to Thailand. From ASEAN's perspective, Thailand's r e l i a n c e o n a c o m b i n a t i o n of C h i n e s e m i l i t a r y pressure on Vietnam's northern border and U.S. arms aid to Bangkok has led W a s h i n g t o n to adopt the intransigent p o s t u r e of t h e People's R e p u b l i c of C h i n a (PRC) t o w a r d any negotiated settlement to the Cambodian issue short of a c o m p l e t e V i e t n a m e s e m i l i t a r y withdrawal. The prospect of greater U.S. aid to the noncommunist segments of the C a m b o d i a n resistance, h o w e v e r , is particularly welc o m e d by A S E A N (the S o l a r z p r o p o s a l ) b e c a u s e it increases the viability of a non-Khmer Rouge alternative to Vietnam's occupation. T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a p p e a r s to be less concerned about the future welfare of the K h m e r people than it is with consolidating Sino-U.S. cooperation against the Soviet Union. (One c o u l d s p e c u l a t e a b o u t w h e t h e r U.S. s u p p o r t f o r China's h a r d l i n e o n C a m b o d i a m i g h t change if Washington's security interests b e g a n to d i v e r g e f r o m B e i j i n g ' s as C h i n a a d o p t s a less belligerent posture toward the Soviet Union.) At least o n e U.S. o b s e r v e r d u r i n g a r e c e n t v i s i t to H a n o i f o u n d s o m e V i e t n a m e s e receptivity to the idea of negotiations with the n o n c o m m u n i s t elements of the Cambodian resistance if the K h m e r Rouge were removed from the coalition. According to f o r m e r U.S. diplomat Anthony Lake, although a K h m e r Rouge exodus might lead to a marginal reduction in military effectiveness, [t]he diplomatic advantages would be large, both in removing a stated Vietnamese objection to compromise, and a major Vietnamese propaganda issue, and in strengthening the ASEAN and American position before public opinion and at the United Nations, where current successes may not last forever. *" U.S. Force Deployments

in Southeast

Asia

The United States retains a considerable strategic advantage in its relations with Southeast Asian states ( T a b l e 4.1). W i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of I n d o c h i n a , all states in the region are either tied into W e s t e r n alliances, friendly to the W e s t because of m a r k e t - o r i e n t e d economies, or at least suspicious of Soviet intentions. F o r t h e f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w i l l be a b l e to d e p l o y m o r e f o r c e s t h r o u g h o u t the r e g i o n and k e e p t h e m o n s t a t i o n f o r l o n g e r p e r i o d s f r o m b a s e s in t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , G u a m , O k i n a w a , and c o n t i n g e n t l y f r o m Australia than can the USSR.

87 TABLE 4.1

U.S. Military Deployments in Asia

Army 1 Infantry Division 1 Infantry Division

(Korea) (Hawaii

Marines 1 Division (Okinawa) 31 Air Squadrons (pacific) 2 attack helicopter 13 lift helicopter 8 attack 7 fighter attack 1 photo reconnaissance

Navy 75 Air Squadrons 21 attack 10 tactical early-warning 7 early-warning 14 fighter 13 patrol 2 fleet air reconnaissance 2 fleet logistic support 6 antisubmarine warfare

Air Force 1 strategic bomber wing Navy Seventh Fleet 1 air reinforcement wing 15 Air Squadrons 7 aircraft carriers 86 surface combatants 10 tactical fighter 32 amphibious ships 2 tactical air support 38 attack submarines 1 tactical reconnaissance 2 ballistic missile submarines 2 tactical airlift marine amphibious units Source :

New York Times, 26 October

1983.

The c e n t e r p i e c e for U.S. force d e p l o y m e n t s in Southeast Asia is, of course, the air and naval bases at Clark and Subic Bay--the largest and most complete U.S. m i l i t a r y f a c i l i t i e s o u t s i d e the United States. These bases c o n s t i t u t e a s o u r c e of c o n s i d e r a b l e p o l i t i c a l controversy given the instability of the Marcos government and demands from some Philippines opposition quarters that the bases agreement not be renewed in 1991. 1 Briefly, the bases are positioned to provide maxim u m f l e x i b i l i t y in r e s p o n d i n g to c r i s e s a n y w h e r e from the Indian O c e a n to the Sea of Japan. C l a r k , for exa m p l e , is h o m e base for a t a c t i c a l a i r l i f t s q u a d r o n of C-130s that can move men and supplies through the Indian and Pacific oceans. It is also an important C 3 1 center for the Pacific. Subic's major wharves can service all ship types in the U.S. Navy, including its largest carriers--the basic component of U.S. m a r i t i m e deploym e n t s in Asia. The A S E A N s t a t e s o p e n l y (and China p r i v a t e l y ) h a v e urged the United States to r e t a i n the 12 Philippine bases. On the other hand, Philippine opponents of the bases c l a i m they are t h e r e s o l e l y to buttress U.S. g l o b a l c o m p e t i t i o n with the S o v i e t s , they contribute nothing to Philippine security. Because the Philippines face no external threat and in the event of a g l o b a l w a r P h i l i p p i n e bases would b e c o m e a Soviet nuclear target, the bases place the Philippines at risk and should be t e r m i n a t e d . 1 3 This a r g u m e n t i g n o r e s , of course, U.S. overseas military facilities as a deterrent to a Soviet-U.S. c o n f r o n t a t i o n , but it d o e s reflect the

88 c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n a G r e a t P o w e r w i t h g l o b a l c o n c e r n s and t h e m o r e p a r o c h i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of s m a l l e r s t a t e s . The s a m e p r i n c i p l e was m a n i f e s t e d i n New Z e a l a n d ' s o b j e c t i o n s t o U.S. Navy n u c l e a r s h i p p o r t c a l l s . At b o t t o m , c r i t i c i s m o f U.S. f a c i l i t i e s i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s may b e e x p l a i n e d m o r e a c c u r a t e l y i n t e r m s of domestic Philippine p o l i t i c s than external security concerns. M a r c o s ' o p p o n e n t s a r g u e t h a t $900 m i l l i o n i n a i d p r o v i d e d u n d e r t h e 1983 b a s e s a g r e e m e n t a l l o w s t h e regime to s u b s t i t u t e r e p r e s s i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r responsive capabilities. U.S. a i d h a s s u p p l i e d t h e w h e r e w i t h a l f o r t h e P h i l i p p i n e armed f o r c e s t o increase t h r e e f o l d i n s i z e and t e n f o l d i n b u d g e t s i n c e t h e d e c l a r a t i o n of m a r t i a l l a w i n 1 9 7 2 . 1 4 A l t h o u g h t h e b a s e s may b e i m p o r t a n t f o r t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of U.S. f o r c e s i n t h e Western P a c i f i c , they are harmful to b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , f o r t h e y a r e s e e n as t h e means whereby a r e p r e s s i v e regime is maintained in power. H e r e i n l i e s t h e d i l e m m a f o r U.S. p o l i c y . Should Washi n g t o n r i s k t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of b e i n g precipitously f o r c e d o u t of t h e b a s e s by a p o s t - M a r c o s r e g i m e , or s h o u l d i t p l a n now f o r other alternatives--the latter r e q u i r i n g new p o l i t i c a l n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h A u s t r a l i a , Japan, Thailand, Singapore, and/or the costly expansion of f a c i l i t i e s on Guam and t h e M a r i a n a s ? 1 5 In 1985, w i t h t h e P h i l i p p i n e b a s e s , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s d o m i n a t e s t h e w a t e r s of t h e S o u t h C h i n a S e a a n d An a v e r a g e of s e v e n t o e i g h t 7 t h e a s t e r n I n d i a n Ocean. F l e e t v e s s e l s t r a n s i t e d t h e S t r a i t of M a l a c c a e a c h m o n t h of 1 9 8 1 - 8 2 c o m p a r e d w i t h t h r e e S o v i e t s h i p s . Some e l e v en f i x e d - w i n g a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s c r u i s e d t h e r e g i o n f o r t h e United S t a t e s compared t o none f o r t h e R u s s i a n s . F i n a l l y , t h e R u s s i a n s d e p l o y e d f o u r d e s t r o y e r s and t w o f r i g a t e s c o m p a r e d w i t h t e n U.S. d e s t r o y e r s and t h i r t e e n f r i g a t e s over the two-year period.16 I f U.S. n a v a l s u p r e m a c y i s t o b e m a i n t a i n e d in S o u t h and S o u t h e a s t A s i a n w a t e r s , p r u d e n c e r e q u i r e s t h a t a l t e r n a t i v e s t o t h e P h i l i p p i n e b a s e s be i n v e s t i g a t e d . The P e n t a g o n e s t i m a t e s t h a t t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a l t e r n a t i v e f a c i l i t i e s on P a l a u , Guam, a n d / o r T i n i a n t o t h e e a s t of t h e P h i l i p p i n e s w o u l d r e a l i s t i c a l l y r e q u i r e t e n y e a r s l e a d t i m e and c o s t a n y w h e r e f r o m $ 3 - 4 b i l l i o n . M o r e o v e r , r e l o c a t i o n of P h i l i p p i n e b a s e f a c i l i t i e s t o t h e w e s t e r n P a c i f i c w o u l d p l a c e U.S. f o r c e s f a r t h e r f r o m t h e c r u c i a l P e r s i a n Gulf r e g i o n o r r e q u i r e t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a d d i t i o n a l s h i p s t o m a i n t a i n t h e s a m e l e v e l of d eployment.17 On t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h o s e s u c h a s A d m i r a l G e n e La R o c q u e , ( R e t . ) USN, and A i r F o r c e C o l o n e l W i l l i a m B e r r y , who a d v i s e t h e p h a s i n g - o u t of U.S. f a c i l i t i e s i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s by 1 9 9 1 , b e l i e v e t h a t U.S. f a c i l i t i e s in O k i n a w a and t h e m i d - P a c i f i c a r e s u f f i c i e n t t o s u s t a i n a U.S. n a v a l p r e s e n c e t h r o u g h o u t t h e r e g i o n . Any l o s s i n b a s e s s u p p o r t c o u l d b e c o m p e n s a t e d by g r e a t e r reliance on a t - s e a l o g i s t i c s ( t h e p r i m a r y r e s u p p l y m o d e of t h e

89 S o v i e t P a c i f i c F l e e t in the Indian Ocean). Major r e p a i r s c o u l d be u n d e r t a k e n a t Yukosuka, J a p a n , though l a b o r c o s t s would be c o n s i d e r a b l y h i g h e r t h a n i n t h e Philippines. S h i p r e p a i r f a c i l i t i e s a t Sembawang S h i p y a r d i n S i n g a p o r e , a l r e a d y a v a i l a b l e t o t h e U.S. Navy, c o u l d a l s o be e n l a r g e d . Tengah A i r F i e l d , from which U.S. P 3 C - 0 r i o n s f l y t o m o n i t o r S o v i e t s u b m a r i n e a c t i v i t y in t h e I n d i a n Ocean, could accommodate o t h e r a i r c r a f t in t h e U.S. i n v e n t o r y as w e l l . Moreover, Singapore is 1,300 m i l e s c l o s e r to t h e Indian Ocean. A i r and n a v a l b a s e s i n n o r t h e r n and w e s t e r n A u s t r a l i a , i n c l u d i n g D a r w i n , L e a r m o t h , T i n d a l , T o w n s v i l l e , and P e r t h , c o u l d a l s o be used f o r deployment i n t o t h e I n d i a n Ocean.18 W i t h m o r e modern a i r c r a f t , s u c h a s F - 1 5 s , t h e c o m m a n d e r o f t h e 1 3 t h a i r f o r c e was r e p o r t e d a s s t a t i n g t h a t t h e a i r f o r c e c o u l d o p e r a t e as e f f e c t i v e l y i n t h e I n d i a n O c e a n / P e r s i a n Gulf from Guam—with one i n f l i g h t r e f u e l l i n g — as i t c u r r e n t l y d o e s w i t h o l d e r p l a n e s f r o m Clark F i e l d . 1 9 M o r e o v e r , b o t h t h e d r y d o c k and a i r s t r i p f a c i l i t i e s i n Guam c a n h a n d l e t h e l a r g e s t U.S. s h i p s and planes. As l o n g - r a n g e T o m a h a w k c r u i s e m i s s i l e s are added t o t h e 7 t h F l e e t , U.S. s h i p s c a n s t e a m f a r t h e r t o t h e e a s t w i t h o u t l o s i n g t h e c a p a b i l i t y of s t r i k i n g East Asian t a r g e t s . In sum, a l t h o u g h m o s t s p e c i a l i s t s a g r e e t h a t t h e l o s s of U.S. f a c i l i t i e s i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s c o u l d not be f u l l y r e p l a c e d at a r e a s o n a b l e p r i c e through base d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n i n t h e I n d i a n O c e a n , S o u t h w e s t P a c i f i c , and S o u t h e a s t A s i a , o p i n i o n s d i f f e r about whether such d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n would d e g r a d e t h e U.S. p r e s e n c e and r e n d e r i t l e s s c r e d i b l e t o b o t h f r i e n d and f o e . T h o s e who s u p p o r t t h e s t a t u s quo i n s i s t t h a t t h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f a s u p e r b i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , l o w - c o s t l a b o r , and g e o p o l i t i c a l l o c a t i o n a s t r i d e t h e m a j o r Asian s e a - l a n e s c a n n o t be replicated. C r i t i c s of t h i s p o s i t i o n b e l i e v e , however, t h a t t h e U.S. p r e s e n c e i n t h e r e g i o n can be m a i n t a i n e d f r o m o t h e r l o c a t i o n s and t h a t t h e p o l i t i c a l r i s k o f b e i n g a s k e d t o l e a v e t h e P h i l i p p i n e s p r e c i p i t o u s l y by a post-Marcos nationalist regime requires the United S t a t e s t o e m b a r k upon a s y s t e m a t i c p h a s i n g o u t o f t h e bases during t h e next s e v e r a l y e a r s . O t h e r a v e n u e s t h a t m i g h t be e x p l o r e d as an a l t e r n a t i v e t o a c o m p l e t e w i t h d r a w a l from t n e b a s e s i n c l u d e a change in t h e l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p whereby t h e United S t a t e s l e a s e s some of t h e b a s e f a c i l i t i e s in c o n c e r t with t h e d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n p l a n d i s c u s s e d above. Another p o s s i b i l i t y would be t h e m u 1 1 i 1 a t e r a l i z a t i o n of the b a s e s w h e r e b y ASEAN f o r c e s would be i n v i t e d t o u s e s o m e of the f a c i l i t i e s . Such a p o l i c y would r e d u c e p o l i t i c a l a l l e g a t i o n s t h a t t h e b a s e s s e r v e o n l y U.S. interests. M o r e o v e r , a m u l t i l a t e r a l ASEAN p r e s e n c e i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s c o u l d be an i n i t i a l s t e p t o w a r d a g r e a t e r c a p a c i t y f o r l o c a l s t a t e s t o u n d e r t a k e more r e s p o n s i b i l i t y in t h e i r own r e g i o n a l d e f e n s e .

90 THE SOVIET UNION: SUPERPOWER

ENTANGLED

Like the United States, the USSR, too, views Southe a s t Asia's i m p o r t a n c e as p a r t of b r o a d e r A s i a n c o n cerns. Overall, the Soviet political position is decide d l y i n f e r i o r b e c a u s e of (a) t h e USSR's i n t r a c t a b l e c o n f l i c t w i t h C h i n a ; (b) M o s c o w ' s p o o r r e l a t i o n s w i t h Asia's m o s t p o w e r f u l e c o n o m y , J a p a n ; (c) a r e l a t i v e s t a b i l i t y t h r o u g h o u t East A s i a , e x c e p t for I n d o c h i n a , that provides few o p p o r t u n i t i e s for Soviet influence; and (d) t h e lack of a p p e a l in t h e S o v i e t m o d e l f o r either development strategies or revolutionaries. Nevertheless, Soviet c o m p e t i t i v e involvement a g a i n s t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , e n c i r c l e m e n t of C h i n a , and the establishment of an important client with base fac i l i t i e s f o r its g r o w i n g n a v a l f o r c e s e e m w o r t h t h e d i s a d v a n t a g e s t h a t h a v e a c c r u e d to S o v i e t p o l i c y . Although perceived as the p a t r o n of a state (Vietnam) that has violated the independence of its neighbor, the Soviets seem prepared, nevertheless, to write off relations w i t h t h e rest of t h e r e g i o n f o r t h e t i m e b e i n g . The gains Moscow sees in Southeast Asia are the increase of S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e in I n d o c h i n a and t h e f a c i l i t a t i o n of Soviet naval passage. M o s c o w views these gains as stepp i n g s t o n e s t o w a r d t h e e n h a n c e m e n t of its t o t a l A s i a n presence. A l t h o u g h t h e S o v i e t s are p r e p a r e d to a c c e p t n e g a tive relations with ASEAN and China, they are concerned that sustained high levels of tension could bring about a g r a n d c o a l i t i o n a m o n g C h i n a , J a p a n , A S E A N , and t h e United States that opposes Soviet buildup in the region. B e g i n n i n g in 1981 u n d e r B r e z h n e v and c o n t i n u i n g w i t h Andropov and to a s m a l l e r extent Chernenko, Moscow has essayed a peace offensive, the primary goal of which is to r e l a x S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s w i t h its a d v e r s a r i e s s u f f i ciently to w e a k e n incentives toward security collaboration. N e v e r t h e l e s s , it is d i f f i c u l t to p u r s u e a p e a c e policy convincingly and simultaneously continue a m i l i t a r y b u i l d u p , o c c u p y o n e n a t i o n w i t h a r m e d f o r c e , and support the military suppression of another. The Asian states are not convinced. F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e r e is m i n i m a l l i k e l i h o o d that S o v i e t - U . S . r e l a t i o n s w i l l m o d e r a t e in A s i a d u r i n g a second Reagan term. S e n s i n g in t h e i n c u m b e n t U.S. adm i n i s t r a t i o n a coherent policy to u n d e r m i n e Soviet pol i t i c a l l e g i t i m a c y at h o m e and a b r o a d and to r e s t o r e U.S. m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y in v i o l a t i o n of t h e R u s s i a n v i e w of d e t e n t e , t h e S o v i e t s h a v e l i t t l e i n c e n t i v e t o n e g o t i a t e s u p e r p o w e r d i f f e r e n c e s in A s i a , m u c h l e s s other global regions. I n s t e a d , t y p i c a l l y , t h e S o v i e t s rely on a s i n g l e e l e m e n t of i n f l u e n c e - - t h e d e p l o y m e n t of f o r c e . The Southeast Asia/Indian Ocean nexus falls within the p u r view of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, currently the largest in t h e S o v i e t N a v y , w i t h o v e r 720 s h i p s , i n c l u d i n g 2 0 0 combatants, 65 of which are nuclear-powered s u b m a r i n e s .

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Many o f t h e s e a r e a t t a c k v e s s e l s t a s k e d w i t h h u n t i n g t h e U.S. 7 t h F l e e t and p o s s i b l y i n t e r d i c t i n g S o u t h e a s t A s i a n s t r a i t s in t h e e v e n t of a c r i s i s . The P a c i f i c Fleet p o s s e s s e s a modest amphibious a s s a u l t c a p a b i l i t y in t h e I v a n Rogov, t h e l a r g e s t such c r a f t in t h e S o v i e t Navy, c a p a b l e o f c a r r y i n g 5 0 0 t r o o p s , 30 APCs , and 10 t a n k s . According to Commander-in-Chief, P a c i f i c (CINCPAC), if p r o v i d e d w i t h s u f f i c i e n t a i r c o v e r and a n t i s u b m a r i n e w a r f a r e (ASW) p r o t e c t i o n ( t h e f o r m e r p a r t i c u l a r l y d e f i c i e n t i n t h e P a c i f i c F l e e t ) t h e I^v^n Rogov w o u l d be a s i g n i f i c a n t means of p r o j e c t i n g S o v i e t o r c l i e n t state forces into local conflicts.20 In A p r i l 1 9 8 4 , S o v i e t amphibious f o r c e s staged l a n d i n g s on t h e V i e t n a m c o a s t i n v o l v i n g b o t h t h e I v a n Rogov and t h e Mjjisk. T h i s was t h e f i r s t t i m e S o v i e t MarTnes o p e r a t e d o u t s i d e S o v i e t c o a s t a l w a t e r s . Pentagon o f f i c i a l s s t r e s s e d t h e t i m i n g , n o t i n g t h a t a m e s s a g e was b e i n g s e n t t o both ASEAN and C h i n a - - t o B e i j i n g a t a t i m e when i t s P e o p l e ' s L i b e r a t i o n Army (PLA) f o r c e s w e r e probing t h e Vietnamese border. S o v i e t n a v a l f o r c e s a r e s u p p l e m e n t e d by some 2 , 0 0 0 l a n d - b a s e d combat a i r c r a f t , i n c l u d i n g 70 T u p o l e v B a c k f i r e s w i t h an o p e r a t i o n a l r a d i u s o f 3 , 4 0 0 m i l e s . In both 1981 and 1 9 8 2 i n S o u t h e a s t A s i a and n o r t h e r n P a c i f i c w a t e r s , B a c k f i r e s s t a g e d s i m u l a t e d a t t a c k s on U . S . carriers, t h e f i r s t d e m o n s t r a t i o n of a S o v i e t anticarr i e r w a r f a r e c a p a b i l i t y in A s i a . 2 1 In a d d i t i o n , M o s c o w ' s t h e a t e r n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t y h a s b e e n e n h a n c e d by t h e d e p l o y m e n t of o v e r 130 S S - 2 0 m o b i l e , MIRVed ( 3 warhead) IRBMs i n S o v i e t A s i a . Their range could encomp a s s T h a i l a n d and t h e P h i l i p p i n e s . A l t h o u g h S o v i e t b a s i n g f a c i l i t i e s a t Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang p r o v i d e l o g i s t i c s s u f f i c i e n t f o r P a c i f i c F l e e t v e s s e l s t o r e m a i n on s t a t i o n i n t h e I n d i a n O c e a n double the time they could p r i o r to 1980, t h e s e bases c a n n o t r e p a i r m a j o r b a t t l e d a m a g e ; n o r do t h e y p r o v i d e a i r c o v e r for Southeast Asian o p e r a t i o n s . Indeed, the f l e e t ' s g r e a t e s t d e f i c i e n c y i s t h e a b s e n c e of f i x e d - w i n g aircraft carriers. T h e M_insk, w h i c h h a s o p e r a t e d o u t of Cam Ranh B a y , and a newly c o m m i s s i o n e d s h o r t - t a k e o f f a n d - l a n d i n g (STOL) c a r r i e r , t h e N o v o r o s s i s k , b e i n g d e ployed in t h e P a c i f i c , are primarlly ASW v e s s e l s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , by 1 9 8 4 , t h e S o v i e t l e v e l of n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s out of Cam Ranh Bay had r e a c h e d t w e n t y t o t w e n t y five ships d a i l y . 2 2 P e r h a p s as i m p o r t a n t as S o v i e t f a c i l i t i e s f o r n a v a l c r a f t i s t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n a t Cam Ranh Bay o f o n e o f t h e l a r g e s t c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and e l e c t r o n i c s u r v e i l l a n c e s t a tions outside Soviet t e r r i t o r y . I t is used t o m o n i t o r C h i n e s e and U.S. m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s and t o c o m m u n i c a t e with f l e e t h e a d g u a r t e r s a t V l a d i v o s t o k . 2 3 Soviet reconn a i s s a n c e a i r c r a f t and e l e c t r o n i c e a v e s d r o p p i n g s h i p s from V i e t n a m p e n e t r a t e d t h e Gulf of T h a i l a n d t o o b s e r v e t h e summer 1 9 8 4 T h a i - U . S . C o b r a Gold e x e r c i s e . 2 4 A navy h a s t h r e e r o l e s i n a w a r t i m e e n v i r o n m e n t : f i r s t , t o d e n y t h e enemy f r e e a c c e s s t o and u s e o f a

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p a r t i c u l a r sea area; s e c o n d , to c o n t r o l a sea a r e a so that its o w n s h i p s h a v e s a f e p a s s a g e ; and t h i r d , to use naval assets either to invade or devastate a particular o n s h o r e area. The U.S. 7th Fleet d e p l o y s s y s t e m s for all t h r e e roles, but so far the Soviets are a b l e to u n d e r t a k e only the first on a r e g u l a r basis. This capability should not be underestimated, however. For the first t i m e , the Soviets could interdict at s e a U.S. and o t h e r c o u n t r i e s ' e f f o r t s , s a y , to supply friendly states under attack. Moreover, the Soviets could impede 7th Fleet access to the Indian O c e a n via the S t r a i t of M a l a c c a , t h r e a t e n China from the s o u t h , and cut off m a r i t i m e a r t e r i e s to J a p a n from both A u s t r a l i a and Europe. In February 1983, the M i n s k , carrying Yak-36 V S T O L f i g h t e r s , sailed v i r t u a l l y w i t h i n v i e w of the waterfront business district of Singapore. 2 5 D e s p i t e t h e i r g r o w t h in n u m b e r s , Soviet naval forces in South and Southeast Asia e x p e r i e n c e s e r i o u s deficiencies. R e i n f o r c e m e n t s from Europe could be blocked at such c h o k e p o i n t s as Bab a l - m a n - d e b and Suez in the Middle East and from Vladivostok at the Japanese s t r a i t s of Soya, T s u s h i m a , and Tsugaru. M o r e o v e r , the B a d g e r and Bear aircraft d e p l o y e d at Cam Ranh are old and slow, useful for peacetime reconnaissance but clearly ineffective in combat situations. Similarly, Soviet P a c i f i c Fleet ships g e n e r a l l y d e p l o y e d in the Indian O c e a n are among the least s o p h i s t i c a t e d in the navy. They p o s s e s s p r i m a r i l y "day-sailing" c a p a b i l i t y with minimal electronics. The best ships are kept instead near Soviet h o m e w a t e r s w h e r e they can be p r o t e c t e d by l a n d - b a s e d aircraft and are able, in turn, to p r o t e c t the homeland and their own SSBNs. 26 B e c a u s e n e i t h e r the size nor f i r e p o w e r of the forward-deployed elements of the Pacific Fleet are sufficient to i n t e r f e r e with the m a j o r Asian s h i p p i n g lanes, there m u s t be other roles for the Soviet fleet. A p e r s u a s i v e c a s e can be m a d e that the fleet's u t i l i t y for Soviet policy lies m o r e in the p o l i t i c o e c o n o m i c r e a l m , including the p r o t e c t i o n of its o w n e x t e n s i v e commercial fleet that supplies Soviet Asia via a Black Sea-Mediterranean-Indian Ocean route. The presence of the fleet also p r o v i d e s the USSR with a p r e s u m p t i v e c l a i m to p a r t i c i p a t e in any n e g o t i a t i o n s leading to regional p e a c e or c o n t r o l zones. Indeed, the S o v i e t s h a v e m o r e interest in u p h o l d i n g f r e e d o m of n a v i g a t i o n through all s t r a i t s than in any act of i n t e r d i c t i o n . (Both the USSR and the United States argued successfully for a free p a s s a g e p r o v i s i o n in the 198 2 Law of the Sea d r a f t treaty.) In s u m , t h e r e is no need to be a l a r m i s t about the Soviet naval presence in Southeast Asia. Its effectiveness d e p e n d s on the m a i n t e n a n c e of m a r i t i m e p e a c e . In the event of w a r , U.S. 7th Fleet s u r v e i l l a n c e and f i r e p o w e r w o u l d be s u f f i c i e n t to d e s t r o y Soviet s u r f a c e ships and ultimately interdict most of their submarines at Japanese chokepoints. In the event of war, according

93 t o U.S. m i l i t a r y a n a l y s t s , t h e S o v i e t s w o u l d p r o b a b l y not e v e n a t t e m p t to r e i n f o r c e t h e i r p r e s e n c e in V i e t n a m . R a t h e r t h e y w o u l d c o n c e n t r a t e t h e i r f l e e t in t h e S e a of O k h o t s k , t h e N o r t h P a c i f i c , and t h e n o r t h e r n p a r t of t h e S e a of J a p a n . 2 7 In V i e t n a m , t h e U S S R h a s a c q u i r e d its f i r s t m a j o r Southeast Asian client. A l t h o u g h H a n o i and M o s c o w w i l l probably share parallel strategic interests against China for s o m e t i m e , there are longer term p r o s p e c t s for divergence b a s e d o n a n u m b e r of p a s t , current, and incipient conflicts and d i f f e r e n c e s . J u s t as Hanoi a r g u e d t h a t B e i j i n g ' s r e c o r d of s u p p o r t f o r V i e t M i n h v i c t o r y in t h e F i r s t a n d S e c o n d I n d o c h i n a w a r s is t a r n i s h e d , a c o m p a r a b l e a l l e g a t i o n could be m a d e against the Soviets. The Soviets, for e x a m p l e , proposed the a d m i s s i o n of b o t h V i e t n a m s to t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s in 1 9 5 5 , a p r o p o s a l , w h i c h h a d it b e e n i m p l e m e n t e d , w o u l d h a v e d e s t r o y e d any p r o s p e c t f o r r e u n i f y i n g t h e c o u n t r y under the terms of t h e 1954 Geneva Agreements.2® N i x o n ' s w a r m w e l c o m e by B r e z h n e v d u r i n g t h e M a y 1 9 7 2 m i n i n g of H a i p h o n g H a r b o r a l s o d e m o n s t r a t e d to Hanoi's l e a d e r s h i p w h e r e Moscow's p r i o r i t i e s lay. Even after t h e S o v i e t - V i e t n a m F r i e n d s h i p T r e a t y w a s s i g n e d in 1 9 7 8 , t h e S o v i e t s i n i t i a t e d s h a r p c u t b a c k s in e c o n o m i c aid to V i e t n a m a n d r a i s e d t h e p r i c e of p e t r o l e u m in 1 9 8 0 f r o m $4 t o $ 1 6 p e r b a r r e l . T h e s u b s e q u e n t d e c r e a s e in S o v i e t oil s h i p m e n t s c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e s e r i o u s V i e t n a m e s e food s i t u a t i o n as v e h i c l e s w e r e w i t h o u t f u e l t o t r a n s p o r t rice f r o m t h e s u r p l u s S o u t h t o t h e d e f i c i t N o r t h . Vietn a m e s e t r a c t o r s a l s o w e r e i d l e f o r lack of f u e l . 2 9 The Soviets h a v e p r e s s e d the V i e t n a m e s e for d o m e s t i c e c o n o m i c / a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e f o r m s that m a k e m o r e e f f i c i e n t u s e of a i d a n d a l l o w t h e p r e s e n c e of l a r g e n u m b e r s of S o v i e t a d v i s e r s ( s o m e 7 , 0 0 0 w e r e e s t i m a t e d t o b e in c o u n t r y by 1 9 8 3 ) . The Soviets h a v e used their aid, t h e n , as a f o r m of p o l i t i c a l l e v e r a g e t o e x p l o i t V i e t n a m e s e v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s and i s o l a t i o n . They have used the debt issue to a c q u i r e a l o n g - t e r m m o r t g a g e on the Vietnamese economy, thereby bargaining their financial aid in r e t u r n f o r r e c e i p t of c o a l and e v e n s c a r c e g r a i n , w h i c h c o u l d h a v e b e e n u s e d to m e e t i n t e r n a l reconstruction needs. In 1 9 8 2 , t h e U S S R s t i l l s u p p l i e d 200,000 t o n s o f g r a i n , a l l of V i e t n a m ' s o i l , a n d 9 0 p e r c e n t o f Vietnam's other imports. Hanoi's o p t i o n s w e r e f e w . 3 0 M o r e o v e r , t h e U S S R h a s r e f u s e d to g o t h r o u g h V i e t nam in d e a l i n g w i t h L a o s and K a m p u c h e a . O p p o s e d to t h e c r e a t i o n of b l o c s n o t u n d e r i t s c o n t r o l , t h e Soviet Union has sent advisers to the o t h e r c o m p o n e n t s of I n d o c h i n a as w e l l . The Soviets have signed a long-term e c o n o m i c aid a g r e e m e n t w i t h L a o s ( 1 9 8 1 - 1 9 8 5 ) , providing V i e n t i a n e w i t h s o m e $ 6 0 0 m i l l i o n in g o o d s and s e r v i c e s . T h e r e a r e 1,000 S o v i e t a d v i s e r s in L a o s ; and t h e L a o t i a n Air F o r c e h a s a c q u i r e d 20 M I G - 2 1 f i g h t e r s , infantry w e a p o n s , and n e w r a d a r and S A M s i t e s n e a r V i e n t i a n e and the S i n o - L a o b o r d e r . Soviet military instructors are a l s o in K a m p u c h e a . 3 1 Japanese sources claim that the

94 S o v i e t s a r e c o n v e r t i n g P h s a r R e a m in K a m p u c h e a i n t o a new naval base.32 Although the Soviets may have ambivalent feelings a b o u t V i e t n a m ' s h e g e m o n i a l p o s i t i o n in L a o s and C a m b o d i a , t h e y c o n t i n u e to add to Hanoi's m i l i t a r y c a p a c i t y In 1 9 8 4 , a c c o r d i n g t o U.S. A s s i s t a n t for domination. S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n s e R i c h a r d A r m i t a g e , M o s c o w s u p p l i e d H a n o i w i t h M I - 2 4 c o m b a t h e l i c o p t e r s (the s a m e kind t h e S o v i e t s u s e in A f g h a n i s t a n ) , S U - 2 2 s w i n g - w i n g fighters, m i s s i l e c o a s t a l a t t a c k b o a t s , S A M s , and t a n k s . 3 3 Nevert h e l e s s , t h e r e is e v i d e n c e t h e R u s s i a n s a r e a l s o p r e s s ing V i e t n a m t o r e a c h a s e t t l e m e n t of t h e A S E A N - I n d o c h i n a confrontation over Kampuchea. V i e t n a m is c o n s t a n t l y a w a r e of a p o s s i b l e S i n o - S o v i e t d e a l at H a n o i ' s e x p e n s e ; t h e r e f o r e , b o t h M o s c o w and H a n o i a r e s e n s i t i v e t o the p o s s i b i l i t y of e a c h p l a y i n g a " C h i n a c a r d " in t h e i r p o l i t i c a l m a n e u v e r s c o n c e r n i n g t h e f u t u r e of C a m b o d i a . (This i s s u e is d i s c u s s e d b e l o w . ) T h e S o v i e t s h a v e h i n t e d to A S E A N i n d e p e n d e n t l y that t h e y c o u l d s u p p o r t a n e u t r a l C a m b o d i a s o long as S o v i e t bases were undisturbed. Indonesia has argued that a r e t u r n to t h e 1 9 5 4 G e n e v a A g r e e m e n t s s t a t u s of n e u t r a l i ty and n o n a l i g n m e n t for C a m b o d i a s h o u l d s a t i s f y the d e f e n s i v e s e c u r i t y n e e d s of b o t h C h i n a and Vietnam. Nevertheless, Foreign Minister Andrei G r o m y k o apparently concluded discussions with Indonesian Foreign Minister M o c h t a r in A p r i l 1 9 8 4 by r e l u c t a n t l y d e m u r r i n g : "The c l o c k c a n n o t b e t u r n e d b a c k in C a m b o d i a . The society . . . is e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h e o n e in w h i c h p e o p l e of t h e l i k e of S i h a n o u k u s e d to f u n c t i o n . " 3 4 It is n o t e w o r t h y t h a t t h e S o v i e t s h a v e n o t c o n d e m n e d A S E A N d i r e c t l y f o r r e s i s t i n g V i e t n a m ' s c o n t r o l of I n d o c h i n a but r a t h e r c l a i m that t h e a s s o c i a t i o n is a c t ing a g a i n s t i t s o w n i n t e r e s t s u n d e r C h i n e s e a n d U.S. pressure. Instead, the Soviets insist that ASEAN's f u t u r e s e c u r i t y lies in a c c e p t i n g Hanoi's f a i t a c c o m p l i and c r e a t i n g a p e a c e f u l r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h a S o v i e t backed Indochina. From Moscow's p e r s p e c t i v e , this d e v e l o p m e n t w o u l d m o v e its l o n g - h e l d " c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y " plan a giant step forward. T h e r e a r e s t r a t e g i c d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n M o s c o w and H a n o i w i t h r e s p e c t to A S E A N . The K r e m l i n probably favors a m o r e conciliatory attitude. Hanoi's u s e of f o r c e relationship. s e r v e s o n l y to c e m e n t t h e A S E A N - C h i n a - U . S . M o s c o w s e e m s p r e p a r e d to s e e t h e w a r of a t t r i t i o n c o n t i n u e at a l o w l e v e l , h o w e v e r , b e c a u s e t h i s s e e m s t o m a x i m i z e Soviet influence, though Moscow would prefer a s e t t l e m e n t that leaves Russia on good t e r m s with both V i e t n a m and A S E A N . Thus, the USSR has s h o w n p a r t i c u l a r favor to the p a r t i a l troop w i t h d r a w a l p r o p o s a l first b r o a c h e d by H a n o i in J u l y 1982. The USSR also v i e w s the c r e a t i o n of a s a f e t y z o n e o n t h e T h a i - K a m p u c h e a n b o r d e r as a n i n i t i a l s t e p t o w a r d a s o l u t i o n o f t h e K a m p u c h e a n issue. Asia

D e s p i t e t h e s e e f f o r t s , t h e S o v i e t r o l e in S o u t h e a s t is t r e a t e d w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e h o s t i l i t y b y A S E A N .

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Not o n l y do S o v i e t a c t i o n s o b s t r u c t t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f t h e Zone o f P e a c e , F r e e d o m , and N e u t r a l i t y (ZOPFAN), b u t t h e y have p r o b a b l y a c c e l e r a t e d t h e development of s e c u r i t y c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n ASEAN s t a t e s and o u t s i d e r s . The S o v i e t P a c i f i c F l e e t p r e s e n c e , f o r e x a m p l e , led M a l a y s i a to agree to the basing of A u s t r a l i a n P3-C reconnaissance a i r c r a f t that follow the Soviet fleet t h r o u g h t h e S o u t h C h i n a S e a and I n d i a n O c e a n . ASEAN l e a d e r s a l s o f e a r t h a t t h e l a r g e r t h e S o v i e t p r e s e n c e becomes t h e more a c t i v e w i l l be China's e f f o r t s to subvert it. Malaysian Foreign Minister Ghazali S h a f i e b e l i e v e s t h a t S o v i e t moves t o d e v e l o p an i n d e p e n d e n t S o v i e t p o s i t i o n i n Laos and Kampuchea w i l l e n c o u r age China t o a c c e l e r a t e a i d t o t h e r e s i s t a n c e movements i n b o t h c o u n t r i e s , t h u s e n s u r i n g c o n s t a n t t u r m o i l and i n v o l v i n g b o t h t h e C h i n e s e and R u s s i a n s i n t e r r i t o r y adjacent to Thailand.35 Ominous, g i v e n t h i s l i n e of r e a s o n i n g , a r e r e p o r t s from T h a i l a n d t h a t f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e , t h e S o v i e t s a r e b a c k i n g a b r e a k a w a y movement (Phak M a i ) o f t h e f a c t i o n a l i z ed T h a i C o m m u n i s t p a r t y . This g r o u p h a s r e p o r t e d l y s e t up t h r e e o p e r a t i o n a l z o n e s i n T h a i l a n d ' s n o r t h and n o r t h e a s t t h a t b o r d e r L a o s w i t h training centers located i n Lao m i l i t a r y garrisons across the border. 36 CHINA: THE INTRACTABLE PARTNER/ADVERSARY A l t h o u g h t h e USSR and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s v i e w S o u t h e a s t A s i a as a r e g i o n i n t o which t h e y p r o j e c t m i l i t a r y p o w e r and p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e f r o m a f a r , t h e C h i n e s e solution is q u i t e d i f f e r e n t . For C h i n a , S o u t h e a s t A s i a i s a v i t a l n e i g h b o r i n g a r e a t h a t must n o t b e c o n t r o l l e d by r e g i m e s h o s t i l e t o B e i j i n g . C h i n a would p r e f e r t h a t S o u t h e a s t A s i a b e r u l e d by s t a t e s t h a t acknowledge C h i n a ' s h i s t o r i c a l and c u r r e n t e m i n e n c e . Traditionally, China's d y n a s t i e s essayed t r i b u t a r y relations with s o u t h e r n n e i g h b o r s , e x c h a n g i n g C o n f u c i a n c u l t u r a l and p o l i t i c a l forms f o r acquiescence. At t i m e s , C h i n a i n t e r v e n e d d i r e c t l y in r e g i o n a l a f f a i r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y in w h a t i s t o d a y I n d o c h i n a , and s u p p o r t e d o n e c o n t e n d i n g kingdom a g a i n s t a n o t h e r . R e a c t i n g t o t h i s h i s t o r y of C h i n e s e i n t e r v e n t i o n and i n d i r e c t c o n t r o l b e c a m e a b a s i s f o r S o u t h e a s t Asian n a t i o n a l i s m , which in t h e n i n e t e e n t h and t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s c e n t e r e d a r o u n d b o t h antiE u r o p e a n and a n t i - C h i n e s e s e n t i m e n t s . Even t o d a y , the r e g i o n ' s f e a r of China e x t e n d s t o t h e o v e r s e a s C h i n e s e communities born out of n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y m i g r a t i o n s . T h e s e c o m m u n i t i e s number a p p r o x i m a t e l y 17 m i l l i o n , their members p l a y a c e n t r a l r o l e in a l m o s t a l l of t h e r e g i o n ' s e c o n o m i e s and h a v e e n g e n d e r e d an a b i d i n g c o n c e r n among S o u t h e a s t A s i a n g o v e r n m e n t s t h a t B e i j i n g m i g h t seek t o i n f l u e n c e i t s e t h n i c kinsmen's b e h a v i o r t o p o l i tical ends. C e n t r a l to China's f o r e i g n p o l i c y c a l c u l a t i o n s in Southeast Asia is the b e l i e f t h a t Vietnam has become a

96 surrogate for the USSR through Hanoi's membership in the C o u n c i l for M u t u a l E c o n o m i c A s s i s t a n c e ( C O M E C O M ) and through the 1978 Treaty of F r i e n d s h i p and C o o p e r a t i o n that confirmed Vietnam's client status. Vietnam's political and economic dependence on the Soviet Union combined with the former's depredations against Vietnam's Chinese community precipitated China's limited military i n t e r v e n t i o n into V i e t n a m in F e b r u a r y 1979 and s u b s e quent pressure in the border region. China e m p l o y s c o e r c i v e d i p l o m a c y a g a i n s t V i e t n a m (with i n d i f f e r e n t results so far). This s t r a t e g y uses military force in "an exemplary, demonstrative manner, in d i s c r e t e and c o n t r o l l e d i n c r e m e n t s , to induce the o p p o n e n t to r e v i e w his c a l c u l a t i o n s and agree to a m u t u a l l y a c c e p t a b l e t e r m i n a t i o n of the c o n f l i c t . " 3 7 Beijing's e a r l i e r invasion and c u r r e n t p r o b e s are des i g n e d to restore China's c r e d e n t i a l s as a regional military power after they had been diminished in light of the d e f e a t of China's K h m e r Rouge client. China believed it had to d e m o n s t r a t e that Soviet forces deployed along its n o r t h e r n b o r d e r had not rendered the People's L i b e r a t i o n A r m y (PLA) m i l i t a r i l y i m p o t e n t . 3 8 N e v e r t h e l e s s , from the c o e r c i v e d i l o m a c y p e r s p e c t i v e , China's efforts have not been successful. The Vietnamese h a v e n e i t h e r w i t h d r a w n from C a m b o d i a nor severed their ties to the USSR. China derived s o m e b e n e f i t s from its u s e of m i l i tary f o r c e , h o w e v e r . The m y t h of V i e t n a m ' s m i l i t a r y invincibility was exploded as PLA forces leveled parts of the country's six n o r t h e r n p r o v i n c e s . Hanoi also learned that a treaty with the USSR would not necessarily d e t e r a l i m i t e d but costly C h i n e s e m i l i t a r y attack. To this end, C h i n a d e m o n s t r a t e d it w a s prepared to sacrifice lives and treasure in order to restore Chinese c r e d i b i l i t y to both friend (Thailand and the United S t a t e s ) and foe (Vietnam and the USSR). Nevertheless, on b a l a n c e , China's c o e r c i v e d i p l o m a c y m a y be judged a failure. V i e t n a m h a s been d r i v e n d e e p e r into a Soviet embrace, thus distorting Chinese political priorities-the o b j e c t of the e x e r c i s e had been to c o u n t e r Soviet i n f l u e n c e , not to p r o m o t e it. 3 9 M o r e o v e r , in 1985, China's m i l i t a r y c r e d i b i l i t y w a s f u r t h e r eroded w h e n China refrained from reacting to the Vietnamese destruction of Kampuchean resistance base camps and temporary occupation of Thai territory in several locations along the Thai-Cambodian border. To b a l a n c e the S o v i e t - V i e t n a m alliance, China turned to the United States and ASEAN. By 1982, s e n s i tive to Soviet and Vietnamese allegations that Beijing had become too dependent on Washington for its security and that its c o m m i t m e n t to the Third W o r l d had b e e n e r o d e d , China b e g a n to b a l a n c e its d i p l o m a c y . China sought to reduce the level of tension with the USSR and to distance itself somewhat from the United States polit i c a l l y , but s t i l l r e t a i n its actual d e p e n d e n c e on U.S. t r a d e and i n v e s t m e n t for e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t and t h e

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d e p l o y m e n t of U.S. f o r c e s r e g i o n a l l y f o r s e c u r i t y . Although China's d e c l a r a t o r y p o l i c y became more c r i t i c a l o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h e r e was no e v i d e n c e t h a t B e i j i n g w i s h e d t o reduce economic t i e s o r ask t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o draw down i t s naval and a i r f o r c e s i n t h e r e g i o n . It i s i m p o r t a n t t o note t h a t S o v i e t hegemony directly t h r e a t e n s C h i n a ' s s e c u r i t y ; U.S. h e g e m o n y o n l y o f f e n d s i t s moral s e n s i b i l i t i e s . As Jonathan P o l l a c k n o t e s , China's more evenhanded approach t o the superpowers is best e x p l a i n e d through l o n g - t e r m m o d e r n i z a t i o n c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t i n c l u d e (1) d i m i n i s h i n g d i r e c t S o v i e t p r e s s u r e a g a i n s t China, t h e r e by making d e f e n s e needs l e s s i m p e r a t i v e ; ( 2 ) d e v i s i n g a c r e d i b l e , c o n s i s t e n t b a s i s f o r h e i g h t e n e d economic and t e c h n o l o g i c a l exchanges w i t h t h e W e s t ; and ( 3 ) c r e a t i n g a s t a b l e and p e a c e f u l i n t e r n a t i o n a l e n v i r o n m e n t t h a t would be congruent w i t h o r d e r l y economic d e v e l o p m e n t . 4 0 Thus, China d e f i n e s i t s s e c u r i t y r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e United S t a t e s in terms of a c o a l i t i o n or a l o o s e l y f a s h i o n e d u n i t e d f r o n t , not an a l l i a n c e . The two s t a t e s may u n d e r t a k e p a r a l l e l , m u t u a l l y s u p p o r t i v e a c t i o n s w i t h o u t more f o r m a l kinds of s e c u r i t y c o l l a b o r a t i o n . In t h i s way C h i n a a v o i d s b e i n g l i n k e d d i r e c t l y t o a s u p e r p o w e r ' s g l o b a l s t r a t e g y and t o t h e Soviet-U.S. conf r o n t at i o n . A t t h e same t i m e , h o w e v e r , C h i n a u n d e r s t a n d s t h a t East A s i a i s no l o n g e r a p e r i p h e r a l m i l i t a r y f r o n t f o r t h e USSR, a f a c t f o r m a l i z e d by t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t by t h e S o v i e t Union of an independent t h e a t e r command f o r t h e r e g i o n i n l a t e 1978. The S o v i e t p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y p r e s e n c e t o t h e n o r t h ( M o n g o l i a and t h e S i n o - S o v i e t b o r d e r ) , the e a s t ( t h e S o v i e t P a c i f i c F l e e t ) , t h e south ( i n V i e t n a m ) , and t o t h e w e s t ( i n A f g h a n i s t a n ) r e f l e c t an u n d e r l y i n g s t r a t e g y o f c o n t a i n i n g C h i n a . Beijing's problem i s t o d e v i s e a means of managing t h i s l o n g - t e r m geopolitical threat.41 The U n i t e d S t a t e s i s a u s e f u l p a r t n e r in t h i s endeavor b e c a u s e , a c c o r d i n g t o Xinhua Deputy E d i t o r - i n c h i e f Mu Guangren, t h e U.S. w i l l c o n t i n u e t o need C h i n a t o t i e down t h e m i l l i o n S o v i e t s o l d i e r s on t h e n o r t h , and t h e s e v e r a l hundred thousand Vietnamese s o l d i e r s on the south. And i t w i l l need t o c o o r d i n a t e w i t h C h i n a on A f g h a n i s t a n and Kampuchea i n s u p p o r t of those people's r e s i s t a n c e and of ASEAN's e f f o r t a g a i n s t the S o v i e t and Vietnamese threat. The U.S. w i l l a l s o need t o c o o r d i n a t e w i t h C h i n a on any and a l l s t e p s t h a t may b e a r on g l o b a l strategic

situations.

lx ?

In s h o r t , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s now needs China's s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n as much as China r e q u i r e s U.S. economic a s s i s t ance and a l s o b e n e f i t s f r o m U.S. r e g i o n a l m i l i t a r y p r e s ence. T h u s , China i s o n c e a g a i n a b l e t o d e c l a r e a p o l i c y of nonalignment t o w a r d both t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and the S o v i e t Union, thereby improving i t s diplomatic

98 c r e d e n t i a l s w i t h t h e T h i r d World but knowing t h a t , in f a c t , the United S t a t e s w i l l s t i l l maintain a c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h China b e c a u s e o f i t s own A s i a n s e c u r i ty c o n c e r n s . 4 3 The m o s t a r t f u l i s s u e i n C h i n a ' s d i p l o m a c y i s u n d o u b t e d l y t h e Kampuchean c o n f l i c t . ASEAN m e m b e r s , m o s t p a r t i c u l a r l y I n d o n e s i a and M a l a y s i a , a r e s k e p t i c a l o f C h i n a ' s l o n g - t e r m o b j e c t i v e s i n t h e r e g i o n and a r e n o t c o n v i n c e d t h a t Vietnam is a g r e a t e r t h r e a t than China. I f t h i s v i e w p e r s i s t s , ASEAN s o l i d a r i t y c o u l d be s o r e l y s t r a i n e d o v e r t i m e and m i g h t even u n r a v e l o v e r t h e i s s u e o f r e a c h i n g an a c c o m m o d a t i o n w i t h V i e t n a m . The ASEAN s t a t e s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned t h a t t h e United S t a t e s in i t s z e a l t o c o n t a i n t h e S o v i e t - V i e t n a m e s e a l l i a n c e not h e l p l a y t h e b a s i s f o r C h i n e s e p r e d o m i n a n c e in Southeast Asia. ASEAN and PRC o b j e c t i v e s d i f f e r o v e r C a m b o d i a . Although t h e f o r m e r s e e k s a Vietnamese w i t h d r a w a l , i t i s o p p o s e d t o a Khmer R o u g e r e t u r n t o p o w e r — h e n c e , the b e l i e f t h a t t r u l y f r e e U N - s u p e r v i s e d e l e c t i o n s i n Kamp u c h e a a f t e r a V i e t n a m e s e e x i t would e l i m i n a t e any r o l e f o r t h e Khmer R o u g e i n a p o p u l a r l y e l e c t e d g o v e r n m e n t . I n d e f i n i t e m i l i t a r y f o r a y s from t h e T h a i b o r d e r a r e a s , a c c o r d i n g t o t h i s l i n e o f r e a s o n i n g , w i t h no d i p l o m a t i c p r o g r e s s w i l l o n l y i n c r e a s e S i n o - S o v i e t r i v a l r y and i n f l u e n c e in S o u t h e a s t A s i a t o t h e d e t r i m e n t o f t h e r e g i o n ' s independence. V i e t n a m , of c o u r s e , a t t e m p t s t o r e i n f o r c e t h e s e u n d e r l y i n g A S E A N - C h i n a d i f f e r e n c e s by i n s i s t i n g t h a t i t i s w i l l i n g t o w i t h d r a w i t s f o r c e s from Kampuchea as s o o n as " t h e c e s s a t i o n of t h e Chinese t h r e a t and t h e u s e o f T h a i t e r r i t o r y by g u e r r i l l a s h o s t i l e t o t h e Government in Phnom Penh [ o c c u r s ] . " V i e t n a m ' s p r i m a r y f e a r is the p o s s i b i l i t y of a S o v i e t s e l l o u t in a n e g o t i a t e d S i n o - S o v i e t d e t e n t e . If t h e f i n a n c i a l c o s t s of u n d e r w r i t i n g Hanoi's I n d o c h i n a hegemony seem t o e x c e e d t h e s t r a t e g i c b e n e f i t s o f a c c e s s t o Vietnamese b a s e s , the Russians might c o n s i d e r a w i t h d r a w a l o f s u p p o r t f r o m V i e t n a m j u s t a s Moscow h a s b e t r a y e d i t s i n t e r e s t s in t h e p a s t . The V i e t n a m e s e a r e u n d o u b t e d l y a p p r e h e n s i v e e v e r y t i m e C h i n e s e and S o v i e t delegations meet to d i s c u s s their full range of relat ions. C h i n a ' s p o l i c y i s b e s t i n t e r p r e t e d as a l o n g - t e r m undertaking. Its g e o p o l i t i c a l position enables it to a p p l y p e r s i s t e n t p r e s s u r e on V i e t n a m and Laos d i r e c t l y a s w e l l a s on C a m b o d i a v i a t h e Khmer R o u g e t h r o u g h Thailand. China's o b j e c t i v e s a r e t o prevent t h e c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f t h e Heng S a m r i n g o v e r n m e n t and t h e V i e t n a m i z a t i o n o f Kampuchea v i a t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n o f V i e t n a m e s e a d v i s o r s and t h e e m i g r a t i o n o f V i e t n a m e s e f a r m e r s , fishe r m e n , and t r a d e s p e o p l e t o C a m b o d i a . A l t h o u g h t h e PRC has not a c h i e v e d t h e s e g o a l s t o d a t e , i t has f o r c e d V i e t n a m t o pay an e x c e e d i n g l y h e a v y p r i c e (by w a g i n g t h e b o r d e r war i n 1 9 7 9 ) in l a g g i n g c o n s t r u c t i o n , staggering d e b t , and d e p e n d e n c e upon t h e USSR, f r o m which g r o w s , in p a r t , t h e genuine p o s s i b i l i t y of economic c o l l a p s e .

99 In e f f e c t , C h i n a r e f u s e s to c o n t e m p l a t e a p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e m e n t that d o e s not e n t a i l a V i e t n a m e s e w i t h d r a w a l f r o m K a m p u c h e a and s o m e k i n d of a c k n o w l e d g m e n t that C h i n a p o s s e s s e s l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t s in h e l p i n g to d e termine regional order in s t a t e s c o n t i g u o u s to its southern boundaries. A l t h o u g h t h e PRC's a r m e d f o r c e s a r e q u a l i t a t i v e l y inferior to the S o v i e t - s u p p l i e d Vietn a m e s e m i l i t a r y , its s u p e r i o r i t y in n u m b e r s and g r o w i n g r e g i o n a l n a v y m a k e it m o r e t h a n a s u f f i c i e n t m a t c h . A t h o r o u g h e v a l u a t i o n of t h e F a l k l a n d I s l a n d s W a r in w h i c h s e v e r a l B r i t i s h n a v a l v e s s e l s w e r e s u n k by A r g e n t i n a ' s e l e c t r o n i c a l l y g u i d e d m i s s i l e s l e d C h i n a in 1 9 8 2 t o acquire advanced naval equipment i n c l u d i n g Sea Dart S A M s , s o n a r s f o r A S W , and n a v i g a t i o n a l and f i r e c o n t r o l r a d a r s f o r its L u d a c l a s s d e s t r o y e r s . The South Sea F l e e t h a s b e e n r e i n f o r c e d by a d d i t i o n a l d e s t r o y e r s and landing craft. China maintains regular sea patrols a r o u n d b o t h t h e P a r a c e l s , w h i c h it o c c u p i e s , a n d t h e S p r a t l y I s l a n d s , w h i c h it c l a i m s in c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h V i e t n a m (and o t h e r s ) . 4 5 China's d i s p u t e s w i t h V i e t n a m o v e r r e g i o n a l s t a t u s o n t h e m a i n l a n d a n d t e r r i t o r i a l c o n t r o l in t h e S o u t h C h i n a Sea a p p e a r b o t h i n t r a c t a b l e and d a n g e r o u s . Int r a c t a b l e b e c a u s e t h e y d e a l w i t h h i s t o r i c a l q u e s t i o n s of n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e on V i e t n a m ' s p a r t and regional s u p e r i o r i t y on C h i n a ' s . D a n g e r o u s b e c a u s e C h i n a h a s not shrunk from military confrontation with a m o r e powerful n e i g h b o r , the U S S R , and c a n h a r d l y be e x p e c t e d to ret r e a t f r o m a r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l n a t i o n s u c h as V i e t n a m , w h i c h C h i n a a l s o s e e s as a n u n g r a t e f u l a n d arrogant tributary. For its p a r t , V i e t n a m s e e m s e q u a l l y i n t r a n sigent. If H a n o i w a s p r e p a r e d t o c h a l l e n g e China's c l a i m s in t h e S o u t h C h i n a S e a e v e n b e f o r e t h e e n d o f t h e Vietnam W a r and risk Beijing's e n m i t y in t h e war's a f t e r m a t h by e x p e l l i n g t e n s of t h o u s a n d s of e t h n i c C h i n e s e at a t i m e w h e n it w a s e c o n o m i c a l l y d e s t i t u t e a n d politically overburdened, t h e r e is l i t t l e r e a s o n t o believe Hanoi will m a k e concessions now w h e n the country is p o l i t i c a l l y u n i f i e d , e n j o y s t h e s t r o n g b a c k i n g of t h e U S S R , and is c o n s o l i d a t i n g c o n t r o l o v e r I n d o c h i n a . 4 6 For C h i n a , t h e d i s p u t e w i t h H a n o i a b o u t t h e f u t u r e g o v e r n a n c e of K a m p u c h e a and c o n t r o l of t h e S o u t h C h i n a S e a i s l a n d s and s u r r o u n d i n g w a t e r s is a q u e s t i o n o f w h i c h s t a t e w i l l be p r e e m i n e n t in t h e r e g i o n . Although u n a b l e t o r e g a i n c o n t r o l of t h e P a r a c e l s , s o v e r e i g n t y o v e r the Spratlies has b e c o m e Vietnam's m i n i m u m d e m a n d , b a c k e d u p by t h e f o r t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e s i x i s l a n d s it occupies. If t h e S o v i e t s a r e w i l l i n g to b a c k V i e t n a m e s e c l a i m s w i t h s u p p o r t f r o m its P a c i f i c F l e e t at t h e s a m e t i m e t h a t C h i n a is i n c r e a s i n g its o w n n a v a l s t r e n g t h in the s a m e region, the p o t e n t i a l for a r m e d c o n f l i c t w i l l l o o m l a r g e r t o w a r d t h e e n d of t h e d e c a d e . C h i n a is d e v e l o p i n g t h e P a r a c e l s as a n a v a l b a s e . The precipitating i s s u e c o u l d w e l l be p e t r o l e u m e x p l o r a t i o n and d e v e l o p m e n t in a r e a s of o v e r l a p p i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n . Notew o r t h y in t h i s r e g a r d is U.S. c a u t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o

100 naval p r o t e c t i o n f o r U.S. o i l company o p e r a t i o n s . Washi n g t o n h a s made i t c l e a r t o both t h e o i l c o m p a n i e s and C h i n a t h a t i t h a s no i n t e n t i o n of i n t e r v e n i n g i n d i s puted a r e a s . 4 7 But i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o r e a l i z e t h a t a f u t u r e a r e a of G r e a t P o w e r c o n f r o n t a t i o n in S o u t h e a s t Asia may be on t h e w a t e r s r a t h e r than t h e land. NOTES 1. An e x c e l l e n t e x a m p l e o f t h i s a r g u m e n t i s I . M. D e s t l e r , L e s l i e H. G e l b , and Anthony L a k e , Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking o f American F o r e i g n P o l i c y (New York: Simon & S c h u s t e r , 1 9 8 4 ) . 2. K e n n e t h W a l t z , "How F o r e i g n p o l i c y W e n t O f f t h e R a i l s , " Hew York Times Book Review, 9 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 4 , p. 7 . 3. These f i g u r e s and o t h e r m e a s u r e s o f t h e p r o f i t a b i l i t y o f U . S . i n v e s t m e n t i n ASEAN a r e c i t e d i n J o h n W. G a r v e r , " T h e R e a g a n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s S o u t h e a s t Asian p o l i c y , " i n James Hsiung, ed., U . S » - A s i an R e l a t i o n s : The N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y p a r a d o x (New Y o r k : p r a e g e r , 1 9 8 3 ) , pp. 8 6 - 8 8 . 4. I b i d . , p. 8 9 . 5. U . S . , C o n g r e s s , H o u s e , C o m m i t t e e on Armed S e r v i c e s , R e p o r t o f t h e D e l e g a t i o n t o E a s t A s i a , 9 8 t h c o n g . , 1 s t s e s s . , 16 N o v e m b e r 1 9 8 3 , p. 1 3 . 6. J e f f r e y Gayner and G r e g o r y Hung, "New O p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r U.S«-Thai R e l a t i o n s , " Asian S t u d i e s C e n t e r Backgrounder ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: H e r i t a g e F o u n d a t i o n , 9 A p r i l 1 9 8 4 ) , p . 5 . 7. I h i s p r o s p e c t i s d i s c u s s e d i n Merdeka ( J a k a r t a ) , 1 March 1 9 8 4 ; and i n F B I S , D a i l y R e p o r t : A s i a / P a c i f i c , 12 March 1 9 8 4 , N1 . 8. Nayan Chanda, "Countdown on F - 1 6 S , " Far E a s t e r n Economic R e v i e w , 5 A p r i l 1 9 8 4 , pp. 4 2 - 4 3 . 9. T h i s c o n c e r n was e x p r e s s e d t o t h e a u t h o r b y M a l a y s i a n s p e c i a l i s t s i n a 1981 v i s i t t o K u a l a Lumpur. 10. A n t h o n y L a k e , " D e a l i n g w i t h H a n o i : What W a s h i n g t o n Can Do," I n d o c h i n a I s s u e s 49 (August 1 9 8 4 ) : 6 . 11. T h i s p o s i t i o n was a r t i c u l a t e d by e x i l e d o p p o s i t i o n l e a d e r S e n a t o r J o v i t a S a l o n g a i n an a d d r e s s i n p h o e n i x , A r i z o n a , F e b r u a r y 24, 1984. I t i s a l s o r e p o r t e d l y h e l d by S e n a t o r J o s e D i o k n o , t h e l e a d e r o f t h e A n t i - B a s e s Movement i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s . On t h e o t h e r hand, i n an i n t e r v i e w by t h e a u t h o r w i t h t h e n n e w l y e l e c t e d o p p o s i t i o n member o f t h e B a t a s a n K a b a n g s a n , A q u i l i n o p i m e n t e l , May 2 0 , 1 9 8 4 , i n Cagayon de Oro, t h e v i e w was e x p r e s s e d t h a t an o p p o s i t i o n l e d g o v e r n m e n t would p r o b a b l y r e n e g o t i a t e t h e b a s e s a g r e e m e n t b e c a u s e of i t s economic importance t o t h e country. 12. S t a t e m e n t by A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y o f D e f e n s e R i c h a r d A r m i t a g e i n U . S . , C o n g r e s s , H o u s e , S u b c o m i t t e e on A s i a n and P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , H e a r i n g s : U n i t e d s t a t e s - P h i l i p p i n e R e l a t i o n s and t h e New B a s e and Aid A g r e e m e n t , 9 8 t h c o n g . , 1 s t s e s s . , 1 7 , 2 3 , and 28 J u n e 1 9 8 3 , p p . 33 ( h e r e a f t e r c i t e d a s H e a r i n g s ) . See a l s o W i l l i a m F e e n e y , "The U n i t e d S t a t e s and t h e P h i l i p p i n e s : The B a s e s Dilemma," Asian A f f a i r s 10, no. 4 ( W i n t e r 1 9 8 4 ) : 6 3 - 8 5 . 13. Salonga takes this p o s i t i o n ( s e e f n 1 1 ) . I t may a l s o b e found i n the t e s t i m o n y of t h e l a t e Benigno Aquino, J r . , i n Heari n g s , pp. 8 7 , 8 9 . See a l s o Waiden B e l l o , "U.S. M i l i t a r y B a s e s i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , " S o u t h e a s t A s i a C h r o n i c l e 89 ( A p r i l 1 9 8 3 ) : 3 - 1 9 . 14. T e s t i m o n y o f p r o f e s s o r L e l a Noble i n H e a r i n g s , p . 1 3 7 .

101

15. The most d e t a i l e d c a s e f o r a l t e r n a t i v e s t o C l a r k and S u b i c Bay i s made by Rear A d m i r a l Gene R. L a R o c q u e , USN ( R e t . ) i n H e a r i n g s , pp. 174-188. See a l s o G e o r g e McT. K a h i n , "Remove t h e Bases Crom the P h i l i p p i n e s , " New York Times, 12 October 1983. 16. A M a l a y s i a n m i l i t a r y s u r v e i l l a n c e r e p o r t as c a r r i e d i n The New S t r a i t s Times (Kuala Lumpur), October 1983. 17. See Admiral Robert Long's t e s t i m o n y i n Hearings, pp. 16, 18, 19, 39, 40. 18. I b i d . , pp. 178, 183, 184, 205. 19. I b i d . , p . 226. 20. A May 1983 CINCPAC r e p o r t c i t e d i n F. A. M e d i a n s k y and Dianne Court. The S o v i e t Union i n Southeast A s i a , Canberra papers on S t r a t e g y and D e f e n s e , no. 29 ( C a n b e r r a : A u s t r a l i a n N a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t y , 1984), p. 25. 21. Ibid. 22. The C h r i s t i a n Science Monitor, 14 February 1984. 23. Mediansky, The S o v i e t Union, p . 28. 24. " I n t e l l i g e n c e , " Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 September 1984, p. 11. 25. Joseph G. Whelan, The S o v i e t s i n A s i a : An Expanding p r e s e n c e ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: C o n g r e s s i o n a l R e s e a r c h S e r v i c e , 27 March 1984), p . 111. 26. For analyses t h a t d e p r e c a t e S o v i e t naval c a p a b i l i t i e s in the Indian Ocean, see Richard Remnak, " S o v i e t S t r a t e g i c I n t e r e s t s i n A f r i c a " and Howard H a n s e l , " S o v i e t I n t e r e s t s i n t h e I n d i a n Ocean," both papers p r e s e n t e d a t the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Studies A s s o c i a t i o n annual m e e t i n g , A t l a n t a , 28 March 1984. 27. Author's d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h U.S. Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency a n a l y s t s , Washington, D.C., 2 May 1984. 28. C a r l y l e Thayer, Hie O r i g i n s o f the N a t i o n a l Front f o r the L i b e r a t i o n o f South V i e t n a m ( U n p u b l i s h e d Ph.D. d i s s . , A u s t r a l i a n National U n i v e r s i t y , 1977), p. 561. 29. L e i f R o s e n b e r g e r , "The S o v i e t - V i e t n a m e s e A l l i a n c e and Kampuchea," Survey 27, nos. 118/119 (Autumn-Winter 1983) :214-215. 30. I b i d . , p . 218; and Paul K e l e m a n , " S o v i e t S t r a t e g y i n Southeast A s i a : The Vietnam F a c t o r , " 24, no. 3 (March 1984):342. 31. Rosenberger, " S o v i e t - V i e t n a m e s e A l l i a n c e , " pp. 224, 225. 32. Research I n s t i t u t e f o r peace and S e c u r i t y , Asian S e c u r i t y , 1982 ( T o k y o : R I P S , 1983), p . 66. 33. Nayan Chanda, "The Uneasy A l l i a n c e , " Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 September 1984, p. 40. 34. Robert Trumbull, "Indonesian Says S o v i e t Supports Cambodian Plan," New York Times, 23 A p r i l 1984; and Far Eastern Economic R e v i e w , 19 A p r i l 1984, p . 30. 35. Nayan Chanda, " U n i t e d We S t a n d , " Far E a s t e r n Economic Review, 11 August 1983, pp. 24-25. 36. The Nation Review (Bangkok), 8 November 1983, p . 5. 37. A l e x a n d e r G e o r g e , D a v i d K. H a l l , and W i l l i a m E. Simon, The L i m i t s o f C o e r c i v e Diplomacy (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown, 1971), p. 118. 38. For a d i s c u s s i o n o f C h i n a ' s use o f c o e r c i v e d i p l o m a c y , see Paul H. B. Godwin, " S o l d i e r s and Statesmen i n C o n f l i c t : Chinese D e f e n s e and F o r e i g n p o l i c i e s i n t h e 1980s," i n Samuel Kim, e d . , C h i n e s e F o r e i g n p o l i c y i n t h e 1980s ( B o u l d e r , C o l o . : W e s t v i e w , 1984) . 39. For an e x c e l l e n t a n a l y s i s o f t h e c o s t s and g a i n s o f

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China's Southeast Asian policy, see Michael Leifer, "Conflict and Regional Order in Southeast Asia," in Robert O'Neill, ed., Security in East Asia (New York: St. Martin's, 1984), pp. 139-142. 40. Jonathan D. Pollack, Olina and the Global Strategic Balance (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, P-6952, January 1984), p. 13. 41. Ibid., pp. 19, 21. 42. Mu Guangren, "The Current U.S. Policy Toward China," Ban Yue Tan (Tab Biweekly) 16 ( 1981):53. 43. For a typical statement on China's independent foreign policy, see Foreign Minister Wu xueqian's address to the 39th UN General Assembly, Xinhua, 26 September 1984, as reported in FBIS, Daily Report/China, 29 September 1984, A2-A3. For a U.S. statement to Thai prime Minister Prem that the United States believes China's continued opposition to Vietnam is an important component of IndoChinese diplomacy, see Nayan Chanda, "Take-off for F-16s," Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 April 1984, pp. 17-18. 44. SRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach's statement to the Press Trust of India cited by Agence France Presse, 1 September 1984, in FBIS, Daily Report Asia/Pacific, 13 September 1984, K2. 45. Donald McMillen, "Chinese perspectives on International Security," in Donald McMillen, ed., Asian Perspectives on International Security (London: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 186-188. See also June Dreyer, "China's Military in the 1980's," Current History (September 1984) :276-278. 46. For an insightful discussion, see Chang pao-min, "The Sino-vietnamese Territorial Dispute," Asia pacific Community 24 (Spring 1984), especially pp. 43-48. 47. Mark Valencia, "Oil Under the Troubled Waters," Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 March 1984, pp. 30-33.

Part 2

Northeast Asia

5 China: Coping with the Evolving Strategic Environment Robert Sutter

T h e r e i s no c o n s e n s u s among s p e c i a l i s t s as t o w h i c h f a c t o r s — i n t e r n a l o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l — a r e more i m p o r t a n t a t any g i v e n t i m e i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e c o u r s e o f C h i n e s e f o r e i g n and s e c u r i t y p o l i c y . T h u s , t h e r e i s no a g r e e ment as t o w h e t h e r o r n o t C h i n e s e p o l i c y t e n d s t o be more r e a c t i v e t o o u t s i d e e v e n t s o r tends t o e v o l v e as a r e s u l t of f o r c e s i n s i d e China. Some a n a l y s t s have t r i e d t o b r i d g e t h e gap b e t w e e n t h o s e s p e c i a l i s t s who s t r e s s f o r e i g n and t h o s e who s t r e s s d o m e s t i c d e t e r m i n a n t s i n C h i n e s e f o r e i g n and s e c u r i t y p o l i c y . Some p o i n t t o " p o l i c y p a c k a g e s " of m u t u a l l y r e i n f o r c i n g and c o m p a t i b l e f o r e i g n and d o m e s t i c p o l i c i e s a d v o c a t e d by a p a r t i c u l a r g r o u p of l e a d e r s and n o t e how t h e s e l e a d e r s f a r e i n p r o m o t i n g t h e i r a p p r o a c h e s in t h e f a c e of o p p o s i t i o n from other l e a d e r s with competing f o r e i g n - d o m e s t i c p o l i cy a r r a n g e m e n t s . Others have t r i e d t o i s o l a t e those a s p e c t s o f C h i n e s e f o r e i g n and s e c u r i t y p o l i c y (e.g., c e r t a i n a s p e c t s of s e c u r i t y p o l i c y ) t h a t a r e more l i k e l y t o be r e a c t i v e t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e s f r o m t h o s e f o r e i g n p o l i c y concerns (opening Chinese s o c i e t y to W e s t e r n e c o n o m i c c o n t a c t ) t h a t a r e m o r e l i k e l y t o be a f f e c t e d by Chinese d o m e s t i c d e t e r m i n a n t s . 1 The r e c o r d o f C h i n e s e f o r e i g n and s e c u r i t y p o l i c y s i n c e t h e l a t e 1960s has shown a f a i r l y consistent Chinese e f f o r t t o d e a l with o f t e n d i f f i c u l t changes in t h e s t r a t e g i c e n v i r o n m e n t s u r r o u n d i n g China. It depicts China emerging from a p e r i o d of s e r i o u s d i s l o c a t i o n and i d e o l o g i c a l e x c e s s d u r i n g t h e v i o l e n t s t a g e of t h e C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n and i t s a t t e n d a n t Red Guard " d i p l o m a cy." Faced w i t h dangerous i n t e r n a t i o n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s , B e i j i n g f e l t c o m p e l l e d t o b e g i n a more c o n v e n t i o n a l and r a t i o n a l b a l a n c e - o f - p o w e r approach t o f o r e i g n a f f a i r s t h a t w o u l d s h o r e up i t s n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y and f o r e i g n

The v i e w s expressed i n t h i s chapter are the author's and not necess a r i l y t h o s e of t h e C o n g r e s s i o n a l R e s e a r c h S e r v i c e , L i b r a r y o f Congress .

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policy interests and ensure a more favorable environment for restoring disrupted political order inside China and pursuing the development of national wealth and power. Key aspects of this balance-of-power approach involved the perceived power and policies of the Soviet Union and the United States. 2 Moscow's persisting military buildup and search for g r e a t e r p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e around China's p e r i p h e r y h a v e r e p r e s e n t e d the s t r a t e g i c c e n t e r of g r a v i t y for Chinese foreign and defense policy since the late 1960s. Top level C h i n e s e leaders of w h a t e v e r b a c k g r o u n d or ideological inclination were forced by Soviet actions to focus their foreign policy on the fundamental question of how to deal effectively with Soviet military threat and political intimidation without compromising Chinese security and sovereignty or mortgaging Chinese aspirat i o n s for i n d e p e n d e n c e and d e v e l o p m e n t . Initially, C h i n e s e leaders c a m e up w i t h s t r i k i n g l y d i f f e r e n t approaches, leading in the late 1960s to the most serious leadership dispute over foreign and security policy in the history of the People's Republic of China (PRC).3 The death of D e f e n s e M i n i s t e r Lin Biao and p u r g e of a large segment of the Chinese military high command in 1971 markedly reduced the political importance of Chinese leadership differences over how to handle the Soviet Union. From that t i m e on, China d e v e l o p e d a fairly c o n s i s t e n t s t r a t e g y , at first u n d e r the l e a d e r s h i p of P r e m i e r Zhou Enlai and C h a i r m a n Mao Z e d o n g , and later u n d e r Deng X i a o p i n g . It a t t e m p t e d to u s e E a s t - W e s t d i f f e r e n c e s p r a g m a t i c a l l y to China's a d v a n t a g e . The Chinese leaders recognized that China--only at tremend o u s cost and great r i s k — c o u l d c o n f r o n t , t h e Soviet Union on its o w n . It relied h e a v i l y on i n t e r n a t i o n a l counterweights to Soviet power, provided mainly by the United S t a t e s , its a l l i e s , and a s s o c i a t e s . As the U.S. r e e v a l u a t e d its f o r m e r c o n t a i n m e n t p o l i c y d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t C h i n a , and no l o n g e r posed a s e r i o u s m i l i t a r y threat to C h i n e s e s e c u r i t y , Beijing m a i n t a i n e d a collaborative relationship with the United States and the W e s t as a key link in C h i n e s e s e c u r i t y p o l i c y a g a i n s t the USSR. M e a n w h i l e , C h i n e s e internal policy i n c r e a s i n g l y focused on economic development and modernization. Chinese l e a d e r s , e s p e c i a l l y in the p o s t - M a o p e r i o d , s a w that t h e s e g o a l s would be best achieved through c l o s e r e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s with the W e s t . The United S t a t e s , Japan, and other noncommunist dev.eloped states had the markets, technology, managerial expertise, and financial r e s o u r c e s that w e r e seen as crucial in s p e e d i n g and s t r e a m l i n i n g China's h e r e t o f o r e troubled modernization efforts so as to i n c r e a s e m a t e r i a l b e n e f i t to the C h i nese people and thereby sustain their political loyalty and support. This simple outline of a framework for recent Chinese foreign and defense policy clearly portrays China as o f t e n r e a c t i v e to the actions of f o r e i g n p o w e r s ,

1 07 e s p e c i a l l y t h e S o v i e t U n i o n and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . It shows t h a t Chinese l e a d e r s were w e l l aware of China's i n t e r n a l w e a k n e s s e s and w i s h e d t o r e m e d y t h o s e f l a w s through a prolonged e f f o r t at economic m o d e r n i z a t i o n . In t h e m e a n t i m e , t h e s e l e a d e r s r e c o g n i z e d t h a t China needs t o s e c u r e i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l environment in o r d e r t o f o c u s e n e r g i e s i n t e r n a l l y , and t h a t a l t h o u g h C h i n a i n f l u e n c e s t h e s i t u a t i o n around i t in t h e A s i a n - P a c i f i c r e g i o n t o s o m e d e g r e e , t h e USSR, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , and t h e i r f r i e n d s and a l l i e s e x e r t f a r g r e a t e r influence there. As a r e s u l t , C h i n a was f o r c e d r e p e a t e d l y to a d j u s t t o p e r c e i v e d changes in t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l situat i o n around i t . I n d e e d , t h e r e c o r d s h o w s t h a t many o f t h e c h a n g e s in Chinese p o l i c y during t h i s p e r i o d were caused c h i e f l y by C h i n e s e r e a c t i o n s t o p e r c e i v e d s h i f t s i n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l b a l a n c e o f f o r c e s and i n f l u e n c e a f f e c t i n g C h i n e s e s e c u r i t y and d e v e l o p m e n t . S a l i e n t examples include:1* • August 1 9 6 8 The S o v i e t i n v a s i o n o f C z e c h o s l o v a k i a and Moscow's s u b s e q u e n t announcement of t h e so-called Brezhnev d o c t r i n e of l i m i t e d s o v e r e i g n t y caused China t o view t h e r e c e n t l y expanded S o v i e t m i l i t a r y p r e s e n c e along t h e S i n o - S o v i e t b o r d e r in a more ominous l i g h t . I t p r o m p t e d a t l e a s t some C h i n e s e l e a d e r s t o a d v o c a t e a more a c t i v i s t , c o n v e n t i o n a l Chinese approach to f o r e i g n a f f a i r s in o r d e r t o enhance C h i n e s e i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e r a g e in t h e f a c e of S o v i e t power. • Augus t 19 69 S i x months of S i n o - S o v i e t m i l i t a r y c o n flict a l o n g t h e f r o n t i e r r e a c h e d a c l i m a x as t h e l a r g e s t S i n o - S o v i e t b o r d e r c l a s h on r e c o r d r e s u l t e d i n a s e r i o u s C h i n e s e m i l i t a r y d e f e a t and was f o l l o w e d by S o v i e t warnings about p o s s i b l e m i l i t a r y " p r e v e n t i v e s t r i k e s " against China. This pressure tipped the s c a l e s in t h e o n g o i n g p o l i c y d e b a t e i n B e i j i n g a g a i n s t t h o s e , l e d by L i n B i a o , who h e l d o u t f o r u n c o m p r o m i s ing o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e S o v i e t U n i o n . China e v e n t u a l l y f a v o r e d a t a c t i c a l l y more f l e x i b l e p o s t u r e a d v o c a t e d by P r e m i e r Z h o u . The f r u i t s of Zhou's e f f o r t s w e r e s e e n i n t h e u s e o f S i n o - S o v i e t t a l k s and Chinese d i p l o m a t i c maneuvers, along with Chinese d e f e n s e prepa r a t i o n s , t o deal with S o v i e t p r e s s u r e . Zhou's s t r a t egy i n c l u d e d t h e s t a r t o f S i n o - U . S . d i p l o m a t i c c o n t a c t s f o c u s e d on t h e t w o s i d e s ' common o p p o s i t i o n t o S o v i e t a t t e m p t s at dominance in A s i a — c o n t a c t s t h a t led d i r e c t l y to P r e s i d e n t Nixon's landmark v i s i t to Ch i n a . • 197 5 The r a p i d c o l l a p s e o f U . S . - s u p p o r t e d g o v e r n m e n t s T ñ I n d o c h i n a p r o m p t e d C h i n a t o a d o p t a much m o r e a c t i v e approach throughout East Asia in o r d e r t o s h o r e up a u n i t e d f r o n t a g a i n s t t h e p e r c e i v e d d a n g e r o f Soviet expansion around China's p e r i p h e r y as the United S t a t e s withdrew. C o n c u r r e n t s i g n s o f U.S. w e a k n e s s in t h e f a c e o f

108 g r o w i n g Soviet m i l i t a r y p o w e r and b r e a k t h r o u g h s by both countries in negotiating East-West accords over a r m s c o n t r o l and E u r o p e a n s e c u r i t y caused C h i n a to raise v o c a l o p p o s i t i o n to U.S.-Soviet d e t e n t e to unprecedented heights. In the process China underlined its k e e n s u s p i c i o n that W e s t e r n a c c o m m o d a t i o n with M o s c o w w o u l d a l l o w the Soviets a free hand to deal with China. •

1978 Soviet gains in the Third World, especially the areas of d i r e c t i m p o r t a n c e to China (i.e., V i e t n a m ) , enhanced Chinese interest in fostering a c o m m o n front w i t h the United S t a t e s , J a p a n , and o t h e r W e s t e r n states against the USSR. Prospects for such cooperation increased as opinion in the U.S. government gradually shifted from the view advocated by Secretary of State Cyrus V a n c e that g a v e p r i o r i t y to U.S.-Soviet arms control to the view favored by National Security Adviser Zbignew Brzezinski that advocated confronting Soviet expansion in sensitive Third World areas.

• April 1979 China's efforts to confront Soviet expans i o n focused on V i e t n a m and led to d i r e c t C h i n e s e m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n ; that i n t e r v e n t i o n p r o d u c e d mixed results for Chinese interests and left Beijing d a n g e r o u s l y exposed in the face of i n c r e a s i n g Soviet military pressure. Chinese leaders were compelled to change tactics, moderate their anti-Soviet stance, and o p e n a p o l i t i c a l d i a l o g u e with M o s c o w in o r d e r to manage the danger of Soviet military power. •

19 8 0 The Soviet invasion of A f g h a n i s t a n and s t i f f e n e d W e s t e r n o p p o s i t i o n to Soviet expansion p r o m p t e d China to c h a n g e d i r e c t i o n a g a i n : China reverted to a firmly anti-Soviet posture and suspended talks with the USSR.

• 1981-1982 A C h i n e s e p e r c e i v e d shift in the international balance of power against the Soviet Union, and a revival of U.S. power and determination against the USSR under the Reagan administration, gave China more freedom to maneuver. These changes allowed China to d i s t a n c e itself from the R e a g a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o v e r T a i w a n , Third W o r l d and o t h e r issues, r e o p e n talks w i t h the Soviet Union, and adopt an o s t e n s i b l y m o r e independent posture in foreign affairs. Beijing's growing concern over a projected • 1983-1984 long-term downturn in Sino-U.S. relations at a time of increasing Soviet pressure on China prompted China's leaders to compromise for a time. They modified their hard line on s e n s i t i v e b i l a t e r a l d i s p u t e s with the United States in order to solidify relations with the Reagan administration in preparation for a period of difficult relations with the USSR.

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• 1984-1985 F o l l o w i n g c o n s o l i d a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s with t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , B e i j i n g was i n a g o o d p o s i t i o n t o r e s p o n d i n a f o r t h c o m i n g way t o t h e r i s e o f p o w e r o f t h e G o r b a c h e v l e a d e r s h i p i n t h e USSR, t h e r e b y att e m p t i n g t o e n c o u r a g e Moscow t o c u r b i t s military b u i l d u p i n A s i a and i t s p r e s s u r e a g a i n s t C h i n a . D e s p i t e such r e p e a t e d examples of r e a c t i v e C h i n e s e f o r e i g n and s e c u r i t y p o l i c y , e s p e c i a l l y with regard t o p e r c e i v e d changes in t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l b a l a n c e of power a f f e c t i n g Chinese i n t e r e s t s in Asia, t h e r e are i n s t a n c e s t h a t v i v i d l y d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t w e l l s p r i n g s of p a r t i c u l a r Chinese p o l i c i e s a l s o l i e w i t h i n China. For one t h i n g , C h i n e s e v i e w s o f t h e i r s u r r o u n d i n g s and t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l b a l a n c e of power a r e f i l t e r e d through l e n s e s c o l o r e d by C h i n e s e h i s t o r y , c u l t u r e , and i d e o l o g y . The s t r e n g t h and u n i t y o f C h i n a ' s p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p h a s had a p r o f o u n d e f f e c t on s e c u r i t y w h e t h e r o r n o t C h i n a c a n t a k e t h e i n i t i a t i v e in i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y a f f a i r s o r merely respond p a s s i v e l y t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s . D o m e s t i c demands f o r e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t , military m o d e r n i z a t i o n , and p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l o f t e n h a v e h a d a v i t a l i m p a c t on t h e c o u r s e o f s u c h C h i n e s e d e c i s i o n m a k ing. Meanwhile, Chinese l e a d e r s have demonstrated a d e s i r e t o m a n i p u l a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l e v e n t s and t o m a n e u v e r m o r e f r e e l y among c o m p e t i n g o u t s i d e p r e s s u r e s i n order to enhance t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n China, e s p e c i a l l y t h e i r l e a d e r s h i p s t a n d i n g . Key e x a m p l e s o f s u c h d o m e s t i c d e t e r m i n a n t s influe n c i n g t h e c o u r s e of C h i n e s e f o r e i g n p o l i c y s i n c e t h e l a t e 1960s i n c l u d e : 5 • F e b r u a r y - A u g u s t 1969 Intense competition for p o l i t i c a l power in China led t o d e b a t e o v e r c o m p e t i n g approaches to i n t e r n a t i o n a l developments, especially c o n c e r n i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and t h e S o v i e t Union. L i n B i a o and o t h e r s a d v o c a t i n g a t o u g h l i n e toward both powers were a b l e t o r e v e r s e the o p e n i n g t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n i t i a t e d by Zhou E n l a i and o t h e r l e a d e r s a f e w m o n t h s e a r l i e r , which had c a l l e d for revived p o l i t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n s with the United S t a t e s . They s u c c e e d e d i n f o l l o w i n g their h a r d - l i n e p o s t u r e f o r seven months. • 1973-1974 Leadership c o n f l i c t over i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l and d e v e l o p m e n t q u e s t i o n s r o s e d u r i n g t h e intense p o l i t i c a l c a m p a i g n a g a i n s t C o n f u c i u s and L i n B i a o . The c a m p a i g n s p i l l e d o v e r i n t o f o r e i g n p o l i c y , r e s u l t i n g i n an a c r o s s - t h e - b o a r d t o u g h e n i n g o f C h i n a ' s a p p r o a c h t o t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , and t h e i r a l l i e s and a s s o c i a t e s and a c u t b a c k i n C h i n a ' s i n t e r e s t i n g r e a t e r e c o n o m i c and c u l t u r a l contacts with t h e West. • 1976-1977

Beijing's

preoccupation

with

post-Mao

110 leadership transition and m a j o r e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m s resulted in a much less active Chinese approach to most foreign issues, even those having a direct bearing on China's security, such as increasing SovietVietnamese collaboration. • 1979 Some Chinese leaders questioned China's previous emphasis on establishing close ties with the West in order to better confront the USSR. They stressed China's need for "breathing space" in competition with the USSR, emphasized that defense modernization would have to be prolonged for the sake of speeding higher priority e c o n o m i c m o d e r n i z a t i o n , and wished to reestablish China's flagging ties with the developing countries and the international c o m m u n i s t m o v e m e n t . They w e r e successful for a t i m e in advocating an easing of Chinese c o n f r o n t a t i o n with the USSR and a cutback in China's developing strategic alignment with the United States and the West. 6 • 1981-198 2 These same leadership decisions helped push China to reassert its policy independence of the United States, adopting in the process a more balanced stance b e t w e e n the s u p e r p o w e r s and adhering m o r e closely to Chinese nationalistic principles on sensitive issues like Taiwan.

DETERMINANTS OF RECENT CHINESE FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY In assessing the relative importance of the strategic environment and domestic developments in the recent Chinese approach to international security affairs, the scales appear to tip decidedly in favor of strategic factors. In effect, the t w o sets of factors appear to interact in the following manner. The objectives of Chinese foreign and security policy have been d e t e r m i n e d by a s m a l l g r o u p of toplevel Chinese leaders w h o h a v e reflected the broad interests of the Chinese state as well as their own parochial concerns. In the past, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and other senior leaders exerted overriding control over foreign policy. In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of officials involved in advising about Chinese foreign policy, but key decisions remain the p r e s e r v e of a small group of leaders, especially Deng Xiaoping. 7 The primary concerns of these leaders have been to guarantee Chinese national security, maintain internal o r d e r , and p u r s u e e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t . Especially since the death of Mao in 1976, the top p r i o r i t y of Chinese leaders has been to promote successful economic modernization. This development represents the linchpin determining the success or failure of their leadership.

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T h u s , C h i n e s e o f f i c i a l s h a v e g e a r e d C h i n a ' s f o r e i g n and s e c u r i t y policy to help the modernization effort.8 But i n o r d e r t o a c c o m p l i s h e c o n o m i c m o d e r n i z a t i o n as w e l l as t o m a i n t a i n n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y and i n t e r n a l o r d e r , Chinese leaders recognize the fundamental p r e r e q u i s i t e of e s t a b l i s h i n g a r e l a t i v e l y s t a b l e s t r a t e g i c environment, e s p e c i a l l y around China's p e r i p h e r y in Asia. The a l t e r n a t i v e w o u l d be a h i g h l y disruptive s i t u a t i o n r e q u i r i n g much g r e a t e r C h i n e s e e x p e n d i t u r e s on n a t i o n a l d e f e n s e and p o s i n g g r e a t e r d a n g e r t o C h i n e s e d o m e s t i c o r d e r and t r a n q u i l i t y . Unfortunately f o r ChiD e s p i t e some na, i t does not c o n t r o l t h i s e n v i r o n m e n t . Chinese influence, the environment remains controlled m o r e by o t h e r s , e s p e c i a l l y t h e s u p e r p o w e r s and t h e i r a l l i e s and a s s o c i a t e s . As a r e s u l t , C h i n a ' s leaders have been r e q u i r e d r e p e a t e d l y t o a s s e s s t h e i r s u r r o u n d i n g s f o r c h a n g e s t h a t c o u l d a f f e c t C h i n e s e s e c u r i t y and development i n t e r e s t s . They h a v e been c o m p e l l e d r e p e a t e d l y t o a d j u s t C h i n e s e p o l i c y t o t a k e a c c o u n t of s u c h changes . At t h e s a m e t i m e , C h i n e s e l e a d e r s a l s o h a v e n a t i o n a l i s t i c and i d e o l o g i c a l o b j e c t i v e s r e g a r d i n g i r r e d e n t i s t claims (e.g., Taiwan). They h a v e a d e s i r e t o s t a n d i n d e p e n d e n t l y as a l e a d i n g f o r c e among " p r o g r e s s i v e " n a t i o n s of t h e T h i r d W o r l d . These goals have s t r u c k a r e s p o n s i v e chord p o l i t i c a l l y i n s i d e China. Occasional l e a d e r s h i p d i s c u s s i o n and d e b a t e o v e r t h e s e and o t h e r q u e s t i o n s r e g a r d i n g f o r e i g n and d e f e n s e p o l i c y h a v e s o m e t i m e s h a d a n e f f e c t on t h e c o u r s e of C h i n e s e p o l i c y . S i n c e t h e e a r l y 1970s, t h e d e b a t e s have become p r o g r e s s i v e l y l e s s s e r i o u s , and t h e p o l i c y d i f f e r e n c e s r a i s e d i n t h e s e d e b a t e s h a v e b e c o m e m o r e m o d e r a t e and l e s s of a c h a l l e n g e t o t h e r e c e n t d o m i n a n t o b j e c t i v e s of n a t i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t and s e c u r i t y . T h u s , C h i n a ' s t o p f o r e i g n and d e f e n s e p o l i c y p r i o r ity has remained the p r a g m a t i c quest f o r the s t a b l e e n v i r o n m e n t n e e d e d f o r e f f e c t i v e m o d e r n i z a t i o n and d e velopment. Chinese l e a d e r s in the f i f t e e n years p r i o r t o 1985 h a v e s e e n t h e m a i n s o u r c e of n e g a t i v e c h a n g e i n At t h e s u r r o u n d i n g e n v i r o n m e n t as t h e S o v i e t Union. f i r s t , C h i n a s a w S o v i e t p o w e r a s an i m m e d i a t e t h r e a t t o its national security. Over t i m e , i t came t o s e e t h e USSR p r o g r e s s i v e l y a s m o r e of a l o n g - t e r m t h r e a t , d e t e r m i n e d t o u s e i t s g r o w i n g m i l i t a r y p o w e r and other s o u r c e s of i n f l u e n c e t o e n c i r c l e and p r e s s u r e C h i n a i n t o a c c e p t i n g a b a l a n c e of p o w e r i n A s i a d o m i n a t e d b y t h e USSR and c o n t r a r y t o PRC i n t e r e s t s . 9 China's s t r a t e g y a g a i n s t the Soviet t h r e a t has been b o t h b i l a t e r a l and g l o b a l . B i l a t e r a l l y , China has used a m i x of m i l i t a r y p r e p a r a t i o n s and t a c t i c a l p o l i t i c a l moves t o keep t h e S o v i e t s f r o m a t t a c k i n g C h i n a , but without compromising China's b a s i c s e c u r i t y interests. G l o b a l l y , C h i n a ' s s t r a t e g y h a s f o c u s e d on d e v e l o p i n g - e i t h e r i m p l i c i t l y or e x p l i c i t l y — a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l united f r o n t d e s i g n e d t o h a l t S o v i e t e x p a n s i o n and p r e v e n t t h e c o n s o l i d a t i o n of S o v i e t d o m i n a n c e a b r o a d .

112 As the most important international counterweight to Soviet p o w e r , the United States has loomed large in Chinese calculations. Once the United S t a t e s , u n d e r t e r m s of the Nixon D o c t r i n e announced in 1969, s e e m e d determined to withdraw from its past containment policy in Asia and t h e r e b y end its threat to China's n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , the PRC w a s p r e p a r e d to s t a r t the p r o c e s s of Sino-U.S. normalization. The process has been complem e n t e d in recent years by China's enhanced interest in pragmatic economic modernization, which has emphasized the importance of Western markets. Closer Chinese ties with the United States continue to be complicated by Chinese nationalistic and ideological concerns about such issues as Taiwan and Third World questions as well as by fundamental differences between the social-political and economic systems of the United States and the PRC. Most n o t a b l y , U.S. s u p p o r t for T a i w a n is s e e n as a c o n t i n u e d affront to China's s e n s e of national sovereignty. But Chinese leaders have differentiated between substantive threats to their security, posed by the USSR, and threats to their ideological sense of national sovereignty, posed by U.S. support for Taiwan. 1 0 C h i n a sees the Soviet s t r a t e g y as an e x p a n s i o n i s t one in w h i c h m i l i t a r y p o w e r is used r e l e n t l e s s l y but cautiously in order to achieve political influence and d o m i n a n c e t h r o u g h o u t the p e r i p h e r y of the USSR. China h a s long held that the focus of Soviet a t t e n t i o n is in E u r o p e , but that the North A t l a n t i c T r e a t y O r g a n i z a tion's (NATO) strength requires Moscow to work in other areas, notably the Middle East, Southwest Asia, Africa, and East Asia, in o r d e r to o u t f l a n k the W e s t e r n defenses. China is s e e n as r e l a t i v e l y low on M o s c o w ' s list of m i l i t a r y p r i o r i t i e s , a l t h o u g h C h i n e s e leaders c l e a r l y a p p r e c i a t e the d i r e c o n s e q u e n c e s for the PRC should the USSR be able to c o n s o l i d a t e its p o s i t i o n e l s e w h e r e and then focus its s t r e n g t h to i n t i m i d a t e China. 1 1 China's strategy of deterrence and defense, therefore, aims basically to exacerbate Soviet expansion in g e n e r a l and to raise the p o s s i b i l i t y of a m u l t i f r o n t c o n f l i c t in the event the Soviet Union a t t e m p t e d to attack or intimidate China in particular. Chinese leaders s e e China's c o o p e r a t i o n with the United S t a t e s as especially important in strengthening deterrence of the Soviet Union and in aggravating Soviet strategic vulnerabilities. Beijing also encourages anti-Soviet efforts by so-called Second World, developed c o u n t r i e s — m o s t of w h o m are f o r m a l allies of the United S t a t e s — and by d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s of the Third W o r l d . At t h e s a m e t i m e , Beijing u s e s a m i x of p o l i t i c a l t a l k s , b i l a t e r a l e x c h a n g e s , and o t h e r f o r m s of d i a l o g u e to h e l p m a n a g e the danger posed by the USSR. Meanwhile, within this overall strategy to establish a stable environment in Asia, Chinese leaders have e m p l o y e d v a r y i n g t a c t i c s to s e c u r e t h e i r i n t e r e s t s ,

1 1 3 d e p e n d i n g o n i n t e r n a t i o n a l v a r i a b l e s , s u c h as t h e p e r ceived strength and intentions of the s u p e r p o w e r s , and C h i n e s e d o m e s t i c variables, such as the status of leadership cohesion. For example, w h e n Chinese leaders have judged that their strategic surroundings w e r e at least t e m p o r a r i l y stable, they have seen less i m m e d i a t e need f o r c l o s e t i e s w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and t h u s h a v e felt f r e e r to a d o p t s t r i d e n t p o l i c i e s o n T a i w a n and o t h e r nationalistic issues that appeal to d o m e s t i c constituenc i e s but o f f e n d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . (This t y p e of l o g i c w a s in p a r t r e s p o n s i b l e f o r China's t o u g h e r a p p r o a c h toward the United States about T a i w a n and other issues in 1981-1983.) But w h e n the Chinese leaders have judged that such tactics could s e r i o u s l y a l i e n a t e the United S t a t e s and t h e r e b y e n d a n g e r t h e s t a b i l i t y of China's e n v i r o n m e n t , they h a v e p u t t h e m a s i d e in t h e i n t e r e s t s of p r e s e r v i n g p e a c e f u l s u r r o u n d i n g s . (This kind of l o g i c w a s in p a r t r e s p o n s i b l e f o r China's m o d e r a t e a p proach toward the United States in 1983-1984.) 1 2 At b o t t o m , t h e r e f o r e , B e i j i n g l e a d e r s h a v e p l a c e d first priority in foreign and security affairs on securing a stable environment in Asia that will allow internal reform and m o d e r n i z a t i o n to proceed smoothly. The recent record shows that other factors influencing Chinese policy (domestic politics, ideology, and nationalistic goals, for example) have not been allowed to upset seriously China's continued efforts to deal p r a g m a t i c a l ly with the Asian balance, and especially the s u p e r p o w ers' i n f l u e n c e in A s i a , f r o m w h a t is c l e a r l y s e e n as a position of relative weakness. The result is a Chinese p o l i c y in A s i a q u i t e r e s p o n s i v e to and d e p e n d e n t u p o n Soviet and U.S. actions in the region.

CHINA'S RECENT CALCULUS IN THE GREAT POWER TRIANGLE IN ASIA C h i n a ' s c h a n g i n g r e s p o n s e to t h e G r e a t Power relations has been amply illustrated by the adjustments in China's " i n d e p e n d e n t " s t a n c e in f o r e i g n a f f a i r s in 198 3 and 1984. 1 3 At t h a t t i m e , B e i j i n g m o v e d to h a l t t h e decline in S i n o - U . S . relations and a t t e m p t e d to consolidate relations with the Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n on an anti-Soviet basis. The changes in Chinese policy w e r e based largely on p e r c e p t i o n s of s h i f t s in t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l b a l a n c e of p o w e r affecting China. Chinese leaders b e c a m e increasingly c o n c e r n e d a b o u t t h e s t a b i l i t y of t h e nation's surroundings in Asia at a t i m e of unrelenting buildup of S o v i e t m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e a l o n g China's periphery. They also w e r e concerned about what they c o n s i d e r e d a s e r i o u s and p e r h a p s p r o l o n g e d d e c l i n e in China's relations with the United States. Chinese leaders d e c i d e d that t h e f o r e i g n p o l i c y t a c t i c s of t h e previous t w o years, designed to d i s t a n c e China from the p o l i c i e s of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and to m o d e r a t e and

114 improve r e l a t i o n s with t h e S o v i e t Union, were l e s s l i k e l y t o s a f e g u a r d t h e i m p o r t a n t C h i n e s e s e c u r i t y and d e v e l o p m e n t c o n c e r n s a f f e c t e d by t h e s t a b i l i t y o f the Asian environment. They r e c o g n i z e d i n p a r t i c u l a r that B e i j i n g would h a v e t o s t o p i t s p u l l b a c k f r o m t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s f o r f e a r of j e o p a r d i z i n g t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of C h i n a ' s s e c u r i t y and d e v e l o p m e n t i n t e r e s t s i n t h e f a c e of p e r s i s t e n t S o v i e t p r e s s u r e in A s i a . Thus, in 1983, B e i j i n g began t o r e t r e a t from some of t h e p r e v i o u s t a c t i c a l c h a n g e s made u n d e r t h e r u b r i c o f an i n d e p e n d e n t a p p r o a c h t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l and s e c u r i t y a f f a i r s . The r e s u l t was a s u b s t a n t i a l r e d u c t i o n i n C h i n e s e p r e s s u r e on t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c o n c e r n i n g T a i w a n and o t h e r i s s u e s ; i n c r e a s e d C h i n e s e i n t e r e s t and f l e x i b i l i t y i n d e a l i n g w i t h t h e Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and o t h e r W e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s a c r o s s a b r o a d r a n g e o f e c o n o m i c , p o l i t i c a l , and s e c u r i t y i s s u e s ; and h e i g h t e n e d S i n o - S o v i e t antipathy. By e m p l o y i n g s u c h f o r e i g n p o l i c y t a c t i c s effectivel y , B e i j i n g was a b l e t o s e c u r e i t s c o n c e r n s without s u b s t a n t i a l l y disrupting e f f o r t s to modernize i n t e r n a l ly. Thus, economic reforms continued to r e c e i v e high p r i o r i t y as m i l i t a r y m o d e r n i z a t i o n r e c e i v e d relatively low p r i o r i t y . P l a n s t o s t r e a m l i n e and r e d u c e t h e s i z e of t h e C h i n e s e army c o u l d move a h e a d ; t h e s e p l a n s h e l d out t h e hope t h a t o v e r a l l d e f e n s e spending c o u l d be h e l d down, and s e l e c t i v e m o d e r n i z a t i o n o f m i l i t a r y e q u i p m e n t and o r g a n i z a t i o n c o u l d be f u n d e d by s a v i n g s g e n e r a t e d by a c u t b a c k i n p e r s o n n e l and o t h e r r e l a t e d e x p e n s e s . 1 4 The key e l e m e n t i n C h i n a ' s d e c i s i o n t o move t o w a r d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s was an a l t e r e d C h i n e s e v i e w o f t h e l i k e l y c o u r s e of S i n o - U . S . - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s o v e r t h e next s e v e r a l y e a r s . When C h i n a b e g a n i t s m o r e i n d e p e n d e n t a p p r o a c h t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l e v e n t s and i t s c o n c u r r e n t h a r d e r l i n e t o w a r d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n 1 9 8 1 and 1 9 8 2 , i t had hoped t o e l i c i t a m o r e f o r t h c o m i n g U.S. a t t i t u d e toward issues s e n s i t i v e to Chinese i n t e r e s t s , notably Taiwan. B e i j i n g a l m o s t c e r t a i n l y knew t h a t t h e r e w e r e s e r i o u s r i s k s t o b e i n c u r r e d by a l i e n a t i n g t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , w h i c h h a d p r o v i d e d an i m p l i c i t b u t v i t a l c o u n t e r w e i g h t a g a i n s t t h e USSR f o r m o r e t h a n a d e c a d e and had a s s i s t e d more r e c e n t C h i n e s e e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t concerns. But t h e C h i n e s e s e e m e d t o h a v e a s s e s s e d t h a t t h e i r room t o m a n e u v e r had i n c r e a s e d b e c a u s e t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s had r e a s s e r t e d a b a l a n c e o f E a s t - W e s t relations l i k e l y t o l e a d t o a c o n t i n u e d m a j o r c h e c k on p o s s i b l e Soviet expansion. In a d d i t i o n , t h e S o v i e t a b i l i t y t o p r e s s u r e C h i n a had a p p e a r e d t o be a t l e a s t t e m p o r a r i l y b l o c k e d by U . S . p o w e r a s w e l l a s by S o v i e t d o m e s t i c and i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r o b l e m s , and a t l e a s t s o m e i m p o r t a n t U.S. l e a d e r s c o n t i n u e d t o p l a c e a h i g h s t r a t e g i c v a l u e on p r e s e r v i n g g o o d U . S . r e l a t i o n s w i t h C h i n a a s an i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t i n U . S . e f f o r t s t o c o n f r o n t and c o n t a i n Soviet expansion. By m i d - 1 9 8 3 , C h i n a s a w t h e s e c a l c u l a t i o n s u p s e t . I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a d o p t e d a new p o s t u r e t h a t p u b l i c l y downgraded C h i n a ' s s t r a t e g i c i m p o r t a n c e t o

11 5

the United States.15 U.S. p l a n n e r s now a p p e a r e d t o c o n s i d e r improved r e l a t i o n s with China l e s s i m p o r t a n t t h a n in the recent p a s t because: • China seemed u n l i k e l y to c o o p e r a t e f u r t h e r with t h e United States (through m i l i t a r y s a l e s , s e c u r i t y cons u l t a t i o n s , e t c . ) a g a i n s t t h e S o v i e t Union at a t i m e w h e n t h e PRC h a d p u b l i c l y d i s t a n c e d i t s e l f f r o m t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and h a d r e o p e n e d t a l k s on n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e USSR. • At t h e s a m e t i m e , C h i n a ' s c o n t i n u e d p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h p r a g m a t i c e c o n o m i c m o d e r n i z a t i o n and i n t e r n a l d e v e l o p m e n t made i t a p p e a r u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e PRC w o u l d r e v e r t t o a h i g h l y d i s r u p t i v e p o s i t i o n in East Asia t h a t w o u l d a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t U.S. i n t e r e s t s i n t h e s t a b i l i t y of t h e r e g i o n . • C h i n a ' s d e m a n d s r e g a r d i n g T a i w a n and o t h e r d i s p u t e s , and B e i j i n g ' s a c c o m p a n y i n g t h r e a t s g r a d e U.S.-China r e l a t i o n s if i t s demands m e t , a p p e a r e d o p e n e n d e d and e x c e s s i v e .

bilateral t o downwere not

• U.S. a b i l i t y t o d e a l m i l i t a r i l y and p o l i t i c a l l y w i t h t h e USSR h a d i m p r o v e d , p a r t i c u l a r l y a s a r e s u l t of t h e l a r g e - s c a l e Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n m i l i t a r y budget i n c r e a s e s and t h e s e r i o u s i n t e r n a l and international d i f f i c u l t i e s of t h e USSR. • U.S. a l l i e s , f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e i n y e a r s , w e r e w o r k i n g more c l o s e l y with Washington in d e a l i n g with t h e S o v i et m i l i t a r y threat. T h i s was p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e i n Asia where Prime M i n i s t e r Yasuhiro Nakasone took p o s i t i o n s and i n i t i a t i v e u n d e r l i n i n g common J a p a n e s e - U . S . concerns against the Soviet danger. • J a p a n a n d U.S. a l l i e s a n d f r i e n d s i n S o u t h e a s t As i a — u n l i k e China—appeared more i m m e d i a t e l y i m p o r t a n t t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n p r o t e c t i n g a g a i n s t w h a t was s e e n a s t h e p r i m a r y U.S. s t r a t e g i c c o n c e r n i n t h e r e g i o n : s a f e g u a r d i n g a i r and s e a a c c e s s t o E a s t A s i a , the I n d i a n O c e a n , and t h e P e r s i a n G u l f f r o m S o v i e t a t t a c k . By c o n t r a s t , C h i n a d i d n o t a p p e a r a s i m p o r t a n t in dealing with t h i s perceived Soviet danger. I n e f f e c t , t h e U.S. s h i f t m e a n t t h a t C h i n e s e a b i l i t y t o e x p l o i t U.S. i n t e r e s t i n s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h China, in o r d e r t o compel the United S t a t e s to meet C h i n e s e d e m a n d s on T a i w a n and o t h e r q u e s t i o n s , h a d b e e n sharply reduced. U n d e r l i n i n g t h i s t r e n d was t h e c o n t i n u e d u n w i l l i n g n e s s of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t h r o u g h o u t this p e r i o d t o a c c o m m o d a t e h i g h - l e v e l PRC p r e s s u r e o v e r T a i w a n , t h e a s y l u m c a s e o f Hu N a , t h e C h i n e s e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s s u e i n t h e A s i a n D e v e l o p m e n t Bank, and o t h e r quest ions. Moreover, B e i j i n g p e r c e i v e d i t s p o l i t i c a l leverage

116 in the United States to be small. Chinese press reports noted the strong revival in the U.S. economy in 1983 and the positive political implications this had for President Reagan's reelection campaign. 1 6 China also had to be aware through contacts with leading Democrats, notably S p e a k e r O'Neill, that Beijing could expect l i t t l e c h a n g e in U.S. p o l i c y t o w a r d T a i w a n u n d e r a D e m o c r a t i c administration. 1 7 Meanwhile, although Sino-Soviet trade, cultural, and t e c h n i c a l c o n t a c t s w e r e i n c r e a s i n g , Beijing s a w l i t t l e s i g n of Soviet w i l l i n g n e s s to c o m p r o m i s e b a s i c p o l i t i c a l and s e c u r i t y issues during the v i c e f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r i a l talks b e g u n in O c t o b e r 1982. The Soviet m i l i t a r y b u i l d u p in As i a - - i n c l u d i n g the d e p l o y m e n t of h i g h l y a c c u r a t e SS-20 i n t e r m e d i a t e - r a n g e m i s s i l e s - continued unabated. In short, Beijing faced the prospect of a period of p r o l o n g e d d e c l i n e in Sino-U.S. r e l a t i o n s , w h i c h could last until the end of Reagan's second presidential term, if it continued to follow the hard line of the previous t w o y e a r s in r e l a t i o n s w i t h the United States. This d e c l i n e ran the risk of cutting off the i m p l i c i t but vitally important Chinese strategic understanding with the United States in the face of a p r o l o n g e d d a n g e r posed by the USSR. China's incentive to accommodate the United States was reinforced by Beijing's somber view of Sino-Soviet relations. Disappointed with China's inability to elicit substantial Soviet c o n c e s s i o n s — o r even a slackening in the pace of Soviet military expansion in A s i a — d u r i n g the Andropov administration, Beijing saw the Chernenko g o v e r n m e n t as even m o r e rigid and u n c o m p r o m i s i n g . In response, China hardened its line and highlighted public complaints against Soviet pressure and i n t i m i d a t i o n — a n approach that had the added benefit of broadening c o m m o n ground between China and the West, especially the Reagan administration. The Sino-Soviet vice foreign ministerial talks, 1 8 revived in October 1982, met semi-annually, alternating between Beijing and Moscow. Although some progress was m a d e on s e c o n d a r y issues, t h e s e talks w e r e u n a b l e to b r i d g e a m a j o r gap b e t w e e n the p o s i t i o n s of the t w o sides on b a s i c s e c u r i t y and p o l i t i c a l issues. Thus, Beijing stuck to its p r e c o n d i t i o n s for i m p r o v e d S i n o Soviet relations: withdrawal of Soviet forces from the Sino-Soviet border and Mongolia (later China added specific r e f e r e n c e to Soviet SS-20 m i s s i l e s targeted a g a i n s t China); end of Soviet s u p p o r t for V i e t n a m ' s occupation of Kampuchea; and withdrawal of Soviet forces from A f g h a n i s t a n . Beijing s o m e t i m e s said that S o v i e t movement on only one of these guestions would substantially open the way to improved Sino-Soviet relations. But M o s c o w r e m a i n e d u n w i l l i n g to c o m p r o m i s e , s t a t i n g that the USSR would not discuss matters affecting third countries.

1 17 In p a r t t o g e t around t h i s r o a d b l o c k , a s e c o n d c h a n n e l o f v i c e f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r i a l d i s c u s s i o n s was begun i n S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 3 . P r o g r e s s i n both s e t s o f t a l k s came o n l y i n s e c o n d a r y a r e a s o f t r a d e , t e c h n i c a l t r a n s f e r s , and e d u c a t i o n a l and c u l t u r a l e x c h a n g e s . Both s i d e s a t t e m p t e d t o g i v e added i m p e t u s t o p r o g r e s s i n t h e s e a r e a s c o i n c i d e n t with t h e e x c h a n g e o f h i g h - l e v e l Sino-U.S. v i s i t s in e a r l y 1984. I n p a r t i c u l a r , Moscow p r o p o s e d and B e i j i n g a c c e p t e d a v i s i t t o China of S o v i e t F i r s t Deputy P r i m e M i n i s t e r A r k h i p o v , r e p o r t e d l y t o d i s c u s s l o n g e r term economic and t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e t o China. 19 N e v e r t h e l e s s , both s i d e s proved w i l l i n g t o d i s r u p t t h e s e c o n t a c t s when more i m p o r t a n t s t r a t e g i c and p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s were at s t a k e . B e i j i n g i n p a r t i c u l a r was d i s a p p o i n t e d with t h e new Chernenko r e g i m e . China had s e n t i t s r a n k i n g V i c e P r e m i e r Wan Li as i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o t h e f u n e r a l o f Andropov i n F e b r u a r y 1984-marking a s u b s t a n t i a l u p g r a d i n g from B e i j i n g ' s d i s p a t c h o f F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Huang Hua t o B r e z h n e v ' s f u n e r a l i n 1982. But Wan r e c e i v e d o n l y a c o o l w e l c o m e i n Moscow. M o r e o v e r , t h e S o v i e t s t h e n a p p e a r e d t o go o u t o f t h e i r way t o p u b l i c i z e s t r o n g s u p p o r t f o r Mongolia and Vietnam a g a i n s t C h i n a , and t h e y u n d e r l i n e d S o v i e t u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o make c o m p r o m i s e s with China a t t h e e x p e n s e of t h i r d countries. B e i j i n g a l s o saw Moscow r e s o r t i n g t o s t r o n g e r m i l i t a r y means i n b o t h E u r o p e and A s i a i n o r d e r t o a s s e r t S o v i e t power and d e t e r m i n a t i o n a t a t i m e o f l e a d e r s h i p t r a n s i t i o n in the Kremlin. Chinese media p o r t r a y e d Moscow as on t h e d e f e n s i v e on a whole r a n g e of i n t e r n a tional issues, p a r t i c u l a r l y its f a i l u r e to halt the deployment of U.S. P e r s h i n g and c r u i s e m i s s i l e s i n W e s t e r n E u r o p e , o r t o e x p l o i t t h e p e a c e movement i n E u r o p e as a way t o d i s r u p t t h e W e s t e r n a l l i a n c e o v e r t h e d e p l o y m e n t s and o t h e r i s s u e s . They now saw Moscow—faced w i t h e v e r - g r o w i n g W e s t e r n m i l i t a r y p o w e r and g r e a t e r s o l i d a r i t y i n t h e f a c e of t h e S o v i e t t h r e a t — l a s h i n g out In w i t h new d e m o n s t r a t i o n s of S o v i e t m i l i t a r y p o w e r . 2 " Asia t h i s p e r c e i v e d S o v i e t approach d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d C h i n e s e s e c u r i t y and u l t i m a t e l y a p p e a r e d d e s i g n e d t o bring China t o h e e l . T h u s , i n F e b r u a r y and M a r c h , t h e S o v i e t Union deployed two of i t s t h r e e a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s t o t h e W e s t e r n P a c i f i c ; one t r a n s i t e d n e a r China i n l a t e F e b r u a r y on i t s - w a y t o V l a d i v o s t o k . 2 1 In March, t h e USSR used an a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r t a s k f o r c e t o s u p p o r t i t s f i r s t j o i n t amphibious e x e r c i s e with V i e t n a m , which was c o n d u c t e d f a i r l y c l o s e t o China and n e a r t h e V i e t n a m e s e p o r t c i t y . o f Haiphong. This followed the reported s t a t i o n i n g of s e v e r a l S o v i e t medium bombers a t Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam in l a t e 1 9 8 3 - - t h e f i r s t t i m e such S o v i e t f o r c e s were r e p o r t e d s t a t i o n e d o u t s i d e a r e a s c o n t i g u o u s w i t h t h e USSR. 2 2 Meanwhile, pressure against

the Chinese e s c a l a t e d the Vietnamese—taking

their their

military strongest

118 a c t i o n p r e c i s e l y a t t h e t i m e of P r e s i d e n t Reagan's v i s i t t o C h i n a i n l a t e A p r i l and e a r l y May 1 9 8 4 . The r e s u l t was t h e most s e r i o u s downturn i n S i n o - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s s i n c e t h e S o v i e t i n v a s i o n of A f g h a n i s t a n in l a t e 1979. B o t h Moscow and B e i j i n g r e v i v e d p o l e m i c a l e x c h a n g e s , t r a d i n g p a r t i c u l a r c h a r g e s about i s s u e s i n v o l v i n g s e n s i t i v e s e c u r i t y m a t t e r s i n A s i a , E a s t - W e s t arms c o n t r o l i n Europe, and t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l communist movement. Their b i l a t e r a l d i p l o m a t i c d i a l o g u e was d i s r u p t e d f o r a t i m e , as t h e USSR—presumably c o n c e r n e d and i r r i t a t e d by C h i na's c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s with t h e United S t a t e s and t o u g h e r p o s t u r e toward V i e t n a m — p o s t p o n e d f o r an i n d e f i n i t e t i m e t h e v i s i t o f F i r s t Deputy P r i m e M i n i s t e r A r k h i p o v t o China. S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n along t h e i r common b o r d e r c o n t i n u e d i n t o t h e summer of 1 9 8 4 , w e l l beyond t h e u s u a l p e r i o d of f i g h t i n g c o i n c i d e n t w i t h t h e annual V i e t n a m e s e dry s e a s o n campaign against C h i n e s e - s u p p o r t e d r e s i s t a n c e f o r c e s i n Kampuchea. SinoS o v i e t p o l i t i c a l c o m p e t i t i o n h e a t e d up i n Korea as both s i d e s maneuvered t o improve r e l a t i o n s w i t h Kim I l - S u n g and h i s s u c c e s s o r s . In p a r t i c u l a r , Moscow welcomed Kim I l - S u n g in M a y - - t h e Korean l e a d e r ' s f i r s t v i s i t t o t h e USSR s i n c e 1 9 6 1 . At t h e same t i m e , B e i j i n g c o n t i n u e d t o move ahead i n e s t a b l i s h i n g c l o s e r e c o n o m i c and m i l i t a r y t i e s with t h e United S t a t e s d e s p i t e t h e absence of o s t e n s i b l y b a l a n c i n g p r o g r e s s in S i n o - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s . China was s t i l l a n x i o u s t o manage t h e S o v i e t t h r e a t without r e c o u r s e to f o r c e , however. I t h e l d out t h e o p t i o n of resumed S i n o - S o v i e t b o r d e r t a l k s : Hu Yaobang reportedly t o l d v i s i t o r s t h a t a border s e t t l e m e n t could be r e a c h e d w i t h r e l a t i v e e a s e . 2 3 China a g r e e d t o remark f r o n t i e r l i n e s w i t h t h e S o v i e t s a t e l l i t e , M o n g o l i a , and a g r e e d t o s e t up j o i n t e c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n s t o d i s c u s s e c o n o m i c e x c h a n g e s w i t h Moscow's c l o s e E a s t European allies. Moscow o f c o u r s e had l o n g p r o p o s e d r e n e w e d b o r d e r d e l i n e a t i o n a g r e e m e n t s and t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f Beijing s i m i l a r j o i n t economic commissions with China. a l s o s a i d t h a t i t was w i l l i n g t o r e c e i v e Arkhipov whene v e r t h e USSR would s e n d h i m , and i t was a l s o w i l l i n g t o conduct f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r i a l c o n s u l t a t i o n s with t h e S o v i e t s d u r i n g t h e UN G e n e r a l Assembly i n S e p t e m b e r . Moscow moved t o respond t o t h e C h i n e s e g e s t u r e s and t o r e s u m e f o r w a r d movement i n l e s s s e n s i t i v e e c o n o m i c and t e c h n i c a l a r e a s . The S o v i e t s s e n t Arkhipov t o China in l a t e December. He was w a r m l y r e c e i v e d and s i g n e d t h r e e e c o n o m i c a g r e e m e n t s t h a t would p r o v i d e f o r a broad a r r a y of economic c o o p e r a t i o n , including t h e exchange of p r o d u c t i o n t e c h n o l o g y , t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n and revamping o f i n d u s t r i a l e n t e r p r i s e s , and t e c h n i c a l t r a i n i n g and e x c h a n g e s of e x p e r t s and s c i e n t i f i c d a t a under t h e s u p e r v i s i o n of a new S i n o - S o v i e t e c o n o m i c t r a d e , scientific, and t e c h n o l o g i c a l c o o p e r a t i o n c o m m i t t e e . I t was a n n o u n c e d t h a t t h e t w o c o u n t r i e s would s i g n a f i v e - y e a r t r a d e a g r e e m e n t and t h a t t h e i r t r a d e l e v e l i n 1985 would be 60 p e r c e n t g r e a t e r t h a n t h e i r t r a d e i n 1 9 8 4 .

1 1 9

PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ASIA A N D THE

PACIFIC

The advent of the Gorbachev a d m i n i s t r a t i o n has led t o f u r t h e r S i n o - S o v i e t e f f o r t s to i m p r o v e e x c h a n g e s , reduce acrimony, and o t h e r w i s e m a n a g e bilateral tensions in a m o r e m o d e r a t e f a s h i o n . But B e i j i n g s t i l l g r o u n d s its p o l i c y t o w a r d t h e U S S R and its d e m a n d s f o r S o v i e t c o m p r o m i s e on the "obstacles" in the relationship--all of which involve Soviet m i l i t a r y actions around China's periphery. T h i s t e s t i f i e s to t h e l i k e l i h o o d t h a t B e i jing will remain fundamentally concerned with this perceived Soviet pressure in Asia and the Pacific. Even though the Soviet Union, along with China, has m a d e r e c e n t e f f o r t s to i m p r o v e t h e a t m o s p h e r e and inc r e a s e e x c h a n g e s in S i n o - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s , it h a s t h u s f a r not r e d u c e d its m i l i t a r y p r e s s u r e a r o u n d China's periphery. Indeed, the USSR has used a continued m i l i tary buildup and support for such key allies as Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Mongolia as the critical m e a n s to help secure its interests in the region. This has been done in part because Moscow has been unable to build substantial economic or political influence in the area. As a result, it is highly likely that China will continue to perceive a growing danger of Soviet m i l i t a r y d o m i n a n c e and a strong need to work with the United States, Japan, and o t h e r c o u n t r i e s to p r o v i d e a c o u n t e r w e i g h t that w o u l d k e e p t h e S o v i e t p o w e r in c h e c k and p r e s e r v e a b a l a n c e of i n f l u e n c e in A s i a f a v o r a b l e to B e i j i n g ' s security and development concerns. In fact, prospects for widening Sino-Soviet differe n c e s to i n c l u d e K o r e a h a v e i n c r e a s e d as M o s c o w h a s f e t e d Kim I l - S u n g in 1 9 8 4 and s e n t a d v a n c e d f i g h t e r Beijing has been a i r c r a f t to N o r t h K o r e a in 1 9 8 5 . 2 4 trying hard — in conjunction with North K o r e a — t o foster a N o r t h - S o u t h K o r e a d i a l o g u e and an e a s i n g of m i l i t a r y tensions on the peninsula. Nevertheless, apparent differences b e t w e e n Beijing and Pyongyang have emerged as the North Koreans have repositioned t h e m s e l v e s between Moscow and Beijing. The implications of this change for China's p a s t f a v o r a b l e i n f l u e n c e o n N o r t h K o r e a r e m a i n u n c l e a r , but it m a y o p e n t h e w a y f o r g r e a t e r S o v i e t influence in Pyongyang. O n b a l a n c e , h o w e v e r , C h i n a is l i k e l y to r e m a i n preoccupied internally with m a j o r leadership and economic c h a n g e s f o r t h e r e m a i n d e r of t h e 1 9 8 0 s . These prop o s e d c h a n g e s h a v e b e e n s e t f o r t h in r e c e n t C h i n e s e pronouncements promising m a j o r shifts in the urban economy, in Chinese party ranks, and in the Chinese m i l i t a ry. It s e e m s l o g i c a l t h a t u n d e r t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s C h i n a w o u l d not be i n c l i n e d to u p s e t t h e p r e v a i l i n g acceptable balance in Asia or o t h e r w i s e exacerbate tens i o n s a l o n g its p e r i p h e r y in w a y s that w o u l d u p s e t t h e m o d e r n i z a t i o n and reform process. China would probably p r e f e r , if p o s s i b l e , to e n c o u r a g e S o v i e t m o d e r a t i o n in Asia and a curb in Moscow's military buildup there.

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China's i n c e n t i v e t o c o n t i n u e t h i s balanced, relat i v e l y moderate approach to s e c u r i t y p o l i c y issues in A s i a w i l l l i k e l y b e u n d e r l i n e d by t h e a n t i c i p a t e d c o n t i n u a t i o n of m i l i t a r y r e f o r m s , i n c l u d i n g t h e m a j o r c u t b a c k i n t h e s i z e of t h e C h i n e s e a r m e d f o r c e s p r o j e c t e d f o r 1985 and 1986. The r e s u l t i n g s a v i n g s p r e s u m a b l y w i l l b e u s e d t o m o d e r n i z e C h i n e s e m i l i t a r y e q u i p m e n t and t h e r e b y make t h e C h i n e s e a r m e d f o r c e s m o r e s t r e a m l i n e d and e f f e c t i v e i n t h e l o n g e r r u n . But t h e s h o r t - t e r m e f f e c t of s u c h c h a n g e s w i l l l i k e l y b e a r e d u c t i o n i n Beijing's inclination to confront its adversaries milit a r i l y and a s t r e n g t h e n i n g of C h i n a ' s r e l i a n c e on e f f e c t i v e diplomacy t o meet n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y p r o b l e m s . B e i j i n g , of c o u r s e , r e t a i n s t h e o p t i o n of a t t e m p t i n g t o r e a c h , on i t s own, a s e r i o u s a c c o m m o d a t i o n w i t h Soviet power in Asia. This path could help China's m o d e r n i z a t i o n and r e f o r m by r e d u c i n g t h e need f o r e x t e n sive defense expenditures to deter Soviet power, thus a l l o w i n g g r e a t e r C h i n e s e r e s o u r c e s t o be a p p l i e d to economic development. But t h e C h i n e s e l e a d e r s h i p i s d o u b t l e s s a w a r e t h a t any s e r i o u s C h i n e s e e f f o r t t o a c c o m m o d a t e t h e USSR i n A s i a w o u l d c a u s e t h e United S t a t e s , J a p a n , and t h e i r a l l i e s and f r i e n d s i n A s i a t o r e a s s e s s t h e i r p o l i c i e s t o w a r d C h i n a and w o u l d r u n t h e r i s k of l e a v i n g C h i n a i s o l a t e d a s i t d e a l t w i t h t h e USSR. U n d e r t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , C h i n a a l m o s t c e r t a i n l y w o u l d r i s k m o r t g a g i n g i t s l o n g e r t e r m d e v e l o p m e n t and i n d e p e n d e n c e t o t h e d i c t a t e s of S o v i e t p o w e r a n d i nflu ence. China t h e r e f o r e is u n l i k e l y t o p u r s u e such a r i s k y c o u r s e u n l e s s i t p e r c e i v e s t h a t S o v i e t l e a d e r s a r e no l o n g e r i n t e r e s t e d in using m i l i t a r y power to e x e r t dominating i n f l u e n c e over China. T h e p r o o f of s u c h i n t e n t would be s e e n i n S o v i e t e f f o r t s t o c u r b m i l i t a r y p o w e r in the region. Whether o r not t h e Gorbachev a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w i l l a d o p t s u c h p o l i c i e s i s d o u b t l e s s a key d e t e r m i n a n t i n t h e f u t u r e c o u r s e of S i n o - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s and China's r e s p o n s e t o i t s p e r c e i v e d s e c u r i t y t h r e a t in t h e Asian-Pacific region. Although some C h i n e s e o f f i c i a l s may h o p e f o r s u c h a r e d u c t i o n i n S o v i e t p o w e r , s o b e r a n a l y s i s would s u g g e s t such p r o s p e c t s a r e r e m o t e . A Soviet m i l i t a r y p u l l b a c k from Asia at t h i s t i m e would s e r i o u s l y j e o p a r d i z e Moscow's a b i l i t y t o p r o t e c t S o v i e t t e r r i t o r y a n d t h e i n t e r e s t s of S o v i e t a l l i e s and f r i e n d s , not only a g a i n s t p o s s i b l e t h r e a t from China, b u t a g a i n s t t h e c o n t i n u i n g m i l i t a r y b u i l d u p of the U n i t e d S t a t e s , J a p a n , and t h e i r a s s o c i a t e s . IMPLICATIONS AND OPTIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES The o v e r a l l r e s u l t of C h i n a ' s e f f o r t s t o d e a l w i t h i t s s t r a t e g i c e n v i r o n m e n t i n t h e A s i a n - P a c i f i c a r e a and i t s c o n c e r n w i t h d o m e s t i c p o l i t i c a l and e c o n o m i c r e f o r m i s t h a t C h i n e s e f o r e i g n and d e f e n s e p o l i c y i s l i k e l y t o

121

remain aligned with t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e United S t a t e s , at l e a s t d u r i n g t h e n e x t few y e a r s . In f a c t , i t s e e m s f a i r t o say t h a t Chinese p o l i c y w i l l c o n t i n u e in a d i r e c t i o n more f a v o r a b l e t o U.S. i n t e r e s t s t h a n a t any time in the p a s t . C h i n a p r o b a b l y w i l l c o n t i n u e t o work, c o o p e r a t i v e l y and i n p a r a l l e l w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and i t s allies and f r i e n d s i n t h e A s i a n - P a c i f i c r e g i o n t o c h e c k t h e e x p a n s i o n o f S o v i e t p o w e r and i n f l u e n c e i n t h e r e g i o n . B e i j i n g w i l l p l a y , a s i t h a s i n t h e p a s t , an i m p o r t a n t r o l e a l o n g t h e S i n o - S o v i e t and S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e b o r d e r s , and an i n d i r e c t r o l e i n I n d o c h i n a , and t o a l e s s e r d e g r e e in A f g h a n i s t a n . At t h e s a m e t i m e , C h i n a w i l l probably continue to use b i l a t e r a l p o l i t i c a l , economic, and o t h e r c o n t a c t s w i t h t h e U S S R — i n p a r t t o i n s u r e t h a t S i n o - S o v i e t t e n s i o n s do n o t g e t o u t o f hand and e n d a n g e r C h i n a and t h e s t a b i l i t y o f t h e r e g i o n . Although t h e r e remains a danger that the recent S i n o - S o v i e t c o n t a c t s may d e v e l o p t o a p o i n t w h e r e t h e y c o u l d u n d e r m i n e C h i n a ' s u t i l i t y a s an a n t i - S o v i e t c o u n t e r w e i g h t i n A s i a , t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f t h a t h a p p e n i n g a p p e a r s r e m o t e as l o n g as t h e USSR c o n t i n u e s t o u s e i n c r e a s i n g m i l i t a r y p o w e r to a s s e r t i t s i n f l u e n c e in Asia. China a l s o appears l i k e l y to s u s t a i n a moderate a p p r o a c h t o w a r d i t s n o n c o m m u n i s t A s i a n n e i g h b o r s and t o s e e k c l o s e r e c o n o m i c and p o l i t i c a l t i e s w i t h t h e m . Many of t h e s e s t a t e s a r e a l l i e s o r c l o s e a s s o c i a t e s of t h e United S t a t e s t h a t in the p a s t r e q u i r e d d i r e c t U.S. m i l i t a r y support a g a i n s t the "China threat"--notable e x a m p l e s a r e T h a i l a n d and S o u t h K o r e a . In p a r t i c u l a r , B e i j i n g s e e m s d e t e r m i n e d t o c o m p l e m e n t i t s avowed p e a c e f u l approach toward Taiwan with r e c e n t unprecedented e f f o r t s t o work w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o e a s e t e n s i o n s b e t w e e n N o r t h and S o u t h K o r e a , s o m e t h i n g t h a t until r e c e n t l y C h i n a h a s b e e n l o a t h e t o do f o r f e a r o f a l i e n a t i n g North K o r e a . In g e n e r a l , China can be e x p e c t e d t o f o l l o w a path toward becoming a g r e a t e r s o u r c e of s t a b i l i t y in Asia and an i m p o r t a n t s o u r c e o f e c o n o m i c e x p a n s i o n t h e r e . T h u s , C h i n e s e e c o n o m i c g r o w t h and r a p i d l y expanding f o r e i g n economic exchanges have promoted opportunities f o r U . S . e n t r e p r e n e u r s and t h o s e o f i t s f r i e n d s i n A s i a and e l s e w h e r e t o i n v e s t and t r a d e w i t h t h e PRC. U.S. p o l i c y m a k e r s may b e i n c l i n e d u n d e r t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s t o f o l l o w p o l i c i e s more in a c c o r d w i t h C h i nese i n t e r e s t s . They c o u l d • R e d u c e a r m s s a l e s and s e n s i t i v e p o l i t i c a l contacts with Taiwan in o r d e r t o h e l p e a s e t h i s l o n g - s t a n d i n g s o u r c e of i r r i t a t i o n in Sino-U.S. relations; • Be m o r e f o r t h c o m i n g w i t h e c o n o m i c and t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e and s u p p l i e s and w i t h m i l i t a r y supplies. This could include i n c r e a s e d w i l l i n g n e s s to train Chinese in t h e United S t a t e s ( t h e r e a r e o v e r 12,000 a t

i 22

p r e s e n t ) and w i l l i n g n e s s t o f o l l o w t h e example of path b r e a k i n g U.S. management s c h o o l s i n China ( e . g . , t h e D a l i e n I n s t i t u t e ) w i t h more such i n s t i t u t i o n s ; • A v o i d p o l i c i e s t o w a r d t h e USSR t h a t c o u l d be s e e n by C h i n a as e n d a n g e r i n g t h e b a l a n c e o f p o w e r i n A s i a s o e s s e n t i a l t o C h i n a ' s a b i l i t y t o f o c u s on i n t e r n a l economic m o d e r n i z a t i o n ; •

E n c o u r a g e a m o r e f o r t h c o m i n g a t t i t u d e on t h e p a r t o f o t h e r c a p i t a l i s t p o w e r s and i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g economic interchange with China. T h i s w o u l d i n v o l v e a v o i d i n g r e s t r i c t i o n s on Chinese i m p o r t s .

But each of t h e s e o p t i o n s has i m p o r t a n t , p o t e n t i a l l y n e g a t i v e t r a d e - o f f s f o r U.S. i n t e r e s t s . Thus, f o r e x a m p l e , a s h a r p r e d u c t i o n i n arms s a l e s and c o n t a c t s w i t h T a i w a n c o u l d be s e e n as c o n t r a r y t o t h e T a i w a n R e l a t i o n s A c t , u p s e t t i n g t o t h e s t a b i l i t y of T a i w a n , and damaging t o t h e U.S. r e p u t a t i o n as a r e l i a b l e s u p p o r t e r o f a l l i e s and f r i e n d s . U.S. m i l i t a r y e x c h a n g e s w i t h China c o u l d u n n e r v e T a i w a n and o t h e r noncommunist f r i e n d s i n A s i a and m i g h t c o m p l i c a t e U.S. e f f o r t s t o r e a c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g s w i t h t h e USSR on arms c o n t r o l . More e x t e n s i v e economic exchanges w i t h China c o u l d come at t h e expense of U.S. m a n u f a c t u r e r s o r economic s u p p o r t e l s e w h e r e in the d e v e l o p i n g w o r l d . U.S. e n c o u r a g e m e n t of g r e a t e r W e s t e r n and UN i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h China m i g h t r e q u i r e g r e a t e r o u t l a y o f U.S. a i d f u n d s f o r such e n d e a v o r s , a p o t e n t i a l l y unpopular t r e n d at a t i m e of U.S. budget c o n s t r a i n t . As a r e s u l t , u n l e s s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s s e e s a g r e a t er need f o r accommodating C h i n e s e i n t e r e s t s than i t has r e c e n t l y , i t i s u n l i k e l y t o make r a p i d p o l i c y c h a n g e s more f a v o r a b l e t o B e i j i n g . A more e v o l u t i o n a r y approach, c o n s i s t e n t with r e c e n t p o l i c y , appears more l i k e l y as t h e Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and t h e U.S. C o n g r e s s c o n t i n u e t o v a l u e good r e l a t i o n s w i t h China but do not p l a c e t h e heavy emphasis on t h e i m p o r t a n c e of t h o s e t i e s , as was done in t h e l a t e 1970s and e a r l y 1980s. NOTES 1. This c h a p t e r r e l i e s h e a v i l y on t h e r e s e a r c h conducted by the author f o r h i s book, Chinese F o r e i g n p o l i c y Developments A f t e r Mao (New Y o r k : P r a e g e r , 1 9 8 5 ) . On t h e c o n c e p t o f " p o l i c y p a c k a g e s , " s e e C a r o l H a m r i n , " E m e r g e n c e o f an ' I n d e p e n d e n t ' C h i n e s e F o r e i g n p o l i c y and S h i f t s i n Sino-U.S. R e l a t i o n s , " i n James Hsiung, e d . , U . S . - A s i a R e l a t i o n s (New Y o r k : P r a e g e r , 1 9 8 3 ) . On d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g b e t w e e n a s p e c t s of Chinese f o r e i g n and s e c u r i t y p o l i c y , s e e M i c h a e l Yahuda, T o w a r d s t h e End o f I s o l a t i o n i s m : C h i n a ' s F o r e i g n p o l i c y A f t e r Mao (New York: S t . M a r t i n ' s , 1983). "" 2. For a f u l l d i s c u s s i o n of e v e n t s i n t h e p e r i o d , s e e S u t t e r , Chinese F o r e i g n P o l i c y . For a d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e on C h i -

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nese f o r e i g n p o l i c y a t t h i s t i m e , see Harry Harding, ed., Chinese F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s i n t h e 1 9 8 0 s (New H a v e n : Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y p r e s s , 1984). 3. For b a c k g r o u n d , s e e Thomas G o t t l i e b , C h i n e s e F o r e i g n p o l i c y F a c t i o n a l i s m and t h e O r i g i n s of t h e S t r a t e g i c Triangle ( S a n t a M o n i c a , C a l i f . : Rand C o r p o r a t i o n , 1977). 4. Assessments p a r t i c u l a r l y useful in charting these ins t a n c e s i n C h i n e s e f o r e i g n a n d s e c u r i t y p o l i c y a r e : A. D o a k B a r n e t t , C h i n a a n d t h e M a j o r P o w e r s i n E a s t A s i a ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: Brookings I n s t i t u t e , 1977); Joseph C a m m i l l e r i , Chinese Foreign P o l i c y : The M a o i s t E r a a n d I t s A f t e r m a t h ( S e a t t l e , W a s h . : U n i v e r s i t y of W a s h i n g t o n P r e s s , 1 9 8 0 ) ; H a r r y G e l m a n , The S o v i e t F a r E a s t B u i l d u p and S o v i e t R i s k - T a k i n g A g a i n s t C h i n a ( S a n t a M o n i c a , C a l i f . : Rand C o r p o r a t i o n , 1 9 8 2 ) ; R i c h a r d S o l o m o n , e d . , A s i a n S e c u r i t y i n t h e 1 9 8 0 s ( S a n t a M o n i c a , C a l i f . : Rand C o r p o r a t i o n , 1 9 8 2 ) . See a l s o Robert Sutter, Chinese Foreign Policy After the Cultural Revolution ( B o u l d e r , C o l o . : W e s t v i e w , 1 9 7 8 ) ; a n d R o b e r t S u t t e r , " R e a l i t i e s of I n t e r n a t i o n a l p o w e r and C h i n a ' s 'Independence' i n Foreign A f f a i r s , 1 9 8 1 - 1 9 8 4 , " j o u r n a l of N o r t h e a s t A s i a n S t u d i e s ( W i n t e r 1984). 5. For b a c k g r o u n d , s e e s o u r c e s c i t e d i n n o t e s 3 and 4, as w e l l a s J o n a t h a n p o l l a c k , The S i n o - S o v i e t R i v a l r y a n d C h i n e s e S e c u r i t y D e b a t e ( S a n t a M o n i c a , C a l i f . : Rand C o r p o r a t i o n , 1 9 8 2 ) . 6. See H a m r i n , "Emergence." See a l s o Kenneth L i e b e r t h a l ' s a r t i c l e in Harding, Chinese Foreign R e l a t i o n s . 7. S e e , i n p a r t i c u l a r , A. D o a k B a r n e t t , T h e M a k i n g o f F o r e i g n p o l i c y i n China (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1985). 8. F o r b a c k g r o u n d on t h i s c h a n g e i n p r i o r i t i e s , s e e U.S. C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e A g e n c y , C h i n a : The C o n t i n u i n g S e a r c h f o r a M o d e r n i z a t i o n S t r a t e g y ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: C I A , R e p o r t N o . E R - 8 0 70248, April, 1980). 9. For a c l e a r a r t i c u l a t i o n of t h i s v i e w , s e e B a n n i n g G a r r e t t a n d B o n n i e G l a s e r , War a n d p e a c e : T h e v i e w s f r o m M o s c o w a n d B e i j i n g ( B e r k e l e y : U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a p r e s s , 1984). 10. F o r b a c k g r o u n d , s e e J o n a t h a n p o l l a c k , Th_e L e s s o n s o f C o a l i t i o n p o l i t i c s : Sino-American S e c u r i t y R e l a t i o n s ( S a n t a Monica, C a l i f . : Rand C o r p o r a t i o n , 1984). 11. These themes have o c c u r r e d r e p e a t e d l y i n t h e a u t h o r ' s conversations with Chinese o f f i c i a l s over the p a s t e i g h t years. 12. See S u t t e r , C h i n e s e F o r e i g n P o l i c y . See a l s o S u t t e r , " R e a l i t i e s of I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o w e r . " 13. For b a c k g r o u n d on t h i s p e r i o d , s e e S u t t e r , C h i n e s e F o r e i g n p o l i c y , c h a p t e r 9. S e e a l s o J o n a t h a n p o l l a c k , H i e L e s s o n s of Coalition Politics. 14. T h i s c a l c u l u s w a s c l e a r l y e v i d e n t i n s t a t e m e n t s b y Deng X i a o p i n g and o t h e r C h i n e s e l e a d e r s l e a d i n g u p t o t h e C h i n e s e Commun i s t p a r t y c o n f e r e n c e of S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 5 . 15. For b a c k g r o u n d , s e e R o b e r t Manning, "Reagan's Chance H i t , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y ( W i n t e r 1984); and R i c h a r d N a t i o n s , " P r e s i d e n t R o n a l d R e a g a n C h a r t s a New C o u r s e i n A s i a , " F a r E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c R e v i e w , 21 A p r i l 1 9 8 3 . 16. S e e C h i n e s e c o v e r a g e o f U.S. d e v e l o p m e n t s r e p l a y e d i n t h e U.S. F o r e i g n B r o a d c a s t I n f o r m a t i o n S e r v i c e , D a i l y R e p o r t , C h i n a ( A p r i l - J u n e 1983). 17. S e e S p e a k e r O ' N e i l l ' s o f f i c i a l r e p o r t i n t h e U.S. C o n g r e s s , H o u s e of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , The U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d C h i n a ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: G o v e r n m e n t p r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1 9 8 3 ) .

124 18. For b a c k g r o u n d , s e e a r t i c l e by Chi Su i n Sarauel Kim, ed., Chinese Foreign p o l i c y i n the 1980s (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1984). 19. S e e n o t e 18 and a l s o s e e Chi S u , " C h i n a and t h e S o v i e t Union," C u r r e n t H i s t o r y ( S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 4 ) . 20. T h e s e themes were common i n C h i n e s e m e d i a c o v e r a g e d u r i n g March-May 1 9 8 4 . 21 . T h e s e s h i p movements w e r e d i s c l o s e d i n t h e J a p a n e s e p r e s s and r e p l a y e d i n U.S. F o r e i g n B r o a d c a s t I n f o r m a t i o n S e r v i c e , D a i l y R e p o r t , A s i a and t h e P a c i f i c (March 1 9 8 4 ) . 22. B e i j i n g p u b l i s h e d U.S. and J a p a n e s e r e f e r e n c e s t o t h e s e S o v i e t a c t i v i t i e s i n March, A p r i l , and May 198423. Washington P o s t , 22 J u n e 1 9 8 5 . 24. On t h e l a t t e r s u b j e c t , s e e S a n k e i Shimbun, 28 J u n e 1 9 8 5 .

6 Japan: Security Role and Continuing Policy Debates William T. Tow

S i n c e t h e S i n o - U . S . r a p p r o c h e m e n t i n 1 9 7 2 and t h e r e t r a c t i o n o f U.S. m i l i t a r y f o r c e s f r o m V i e t n a m b e g i n n i n g in 1969, East A s i a ' s s t r a t e g i c environment has become increasingly multidimensional. Elements of t h e United S t a t e s ' t r a d i t i o n a l p o s t w a r c o n t a i n m e n t network as r e p r e s e n t e d by i t s a l l i a n c e s w i t h v a r i o u s Asian-Pacific regional actors are s t i l l intact. But significant f o r c e s o f s t r a t e g i c c h a n g e a r e a l s o a t work i n t h e region; the Sino-U.S. rapprochement and t h e Soviet Union's d e v e l o p m e n t of a f o r m i d a b l e m i l i t a r y power p r o j e c t i o n c a p a b i l i t y in t h e Far E a s t a r e two r e c e n t i l l u s t r a t i o n s o f how c r u c i a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l s y s t e m i c c h a n g e s may o r i g i n a t e f r o m A s i a n s o u r c e s . How e f f e c t i v e l y t h e p e o p l e o f A s i a and t h e P a c i f i c a d j u s t t o r e g i o n a l p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l c h a n g e s e n g e n d e r e d by r a p i d e c o n o m i c g r o w t h and n a t i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t t r e n d s w i l l be o f p a r t i c u l a r s t r a t e g i c s i g n i f i c a n c e in t h e coming y e a r s . From a U . S . p e r s p e c t i v e , E a s t A s i a — even more t h a n E u r o p e - - h a s f u n c t i o n e d as t h e p r i m a r y c a t a l y s t . . i n c e 1945 f o r c h a n g e s i n t h e U.S. s t r a t e g i c d o c t r i n e s and o u t l o o k s . The Korean War, f o r e x a m p l e , p r e c i p i t a t e d t h e North A t l a n t i c T r e a t y O r g a n i z a t i o n ' s (NATO) L i s b o n D e c l a r a t i o n ; t h e 1 9 5 4 Geneva c o n f e r e n c e on t h e s t a t u s of Indochina f o r e o r d a i n e d l a t e r r i f t s between NATO m e m b e r s c o n c e r n i n g a l l o c a t i o n o f l a n d f o r c e s i n c e n t r a l E u r o p e ; and t h e f a i l u r e o f U.S. m i l i t a r y e f f o r t s i n V i e t n a m even more t h a n os t p o l i t i k e v e n t u a l l y c o m p e l l e d W a s h i n g t o n t o s e e k d e t e n t e w i t h Moscow on b o t h E u r o p e a n and e x t r a - E u r o p e a n g e o p o l i t i c a l q u e s t i o n s . As h a s b e e n t h e c a s e t h r o u g h o u t m o s t o f t h e p o s t w a r era, however, it is Japan that c o n s t i t u t e s the c e n t r a l f o c u s o f W a s h i n g t o n ' s s t r a t e g i c o u t l o o k on t h e P a c i f i c . T h i s i s t r u e d e s p i t e J a p a n ' s c o n s t a n t t e n d e n c y t o downp l a y i t s own i n v o l v e m e n t i n W e s t e r n c o l l e c t i v e d e f e n s e and t o p r o j e c t a s e c u r i t y i m a g e o f w a r a v o i d a n c e u n d e r t h e g u i s e of " o m n i d i r e c t i o n a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y " of "comprehensive s e c u r i t y . " 1 From t h e J a p a n e s e v a n t a g e p o i n t , A s i a n s e c u r i t y c a n be b e s t a t t a i n e d t h r o u g h Tokyo's 125

126 p r o j e c t i o n o f an e c o n o m i c r a t h e r t h a n a s t r a t e g i c i m a g e toward the o u t s i d e world. This approach i s the product o f a c o n s c i o u s d e c i s i o n r e a c h e d e a r l y on by t h e c o u n t r y ' s postwar leadership to pursue n a t i o n a l survival t h r o u g h c o n c e n t r a t e d e c o n o m i c r e c o n s t r u c t i o n and t h r o u g h t h e b u i l d i n g o f t r a d e r e l a t i o n s h i p s on a g l o b a l s c a l e . J a p a n ' s e x p e c t a t i o n was t h a t by p u r s u i n g t h i s p o l i c y , i t s w a r t i m e e n e m i e s would e v e n t u a l l y f e e l c o m f o r t a b l e i n p e r m i t t i n g Japan a l e g i t i m a t e reentry i n t o the i n t e r n a tional system. T o k y o ' s l o w s t r a t e g i c p r o f i l e was a l s o embodied in A r t i c l e 9 of i t s n a t i o n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n ( r a t i f i e d i n 1 9 4 7 ) , w h i c h c l e a r l y s t a t e s t h a t no l a n d , s e a , o r a i r f o r c e s as w e l l as o t h e r war p o t e n t i a l would be m a i n t a i n e d — a s e e m i n g l y e x p l i c i t "no w a r " c l a u s e . But t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f A r t i c l e 9 o v e r t h e y e a r s by s u c c e s s i v e J a p a n e s e g o v e r n m e n t s a s w e l l a s by t h e g e n e r a l p o p u l a c e has been s u b j e c t t o i n c r e a s e d ambival e n c e and d e b a t e . T h i s t r e n d h a s l e d many o b s e r v e r s t o a s k why J a p a n h a s r e f u s e d t o amend A r t i c l e 9 a t t h e s a m e t i m e i t h a s s t r e n g t h e n e d i t s S e l f - D e f e n s e F o r c e s (SDF) t o meet p e r c e i v e d o u t s i d e s e c u r i t y t h r e a t s . Most J a p a n ese, according to public opinion polls recently cond u c t e d by t h e news d a i l y As ah i Sh imbun, t h e J i j i Press, and o t h e r s o u r c e s i n d i c a t e t h e J a p a n e s e e l e c t o r a t e t e n d s t o s u p p o r t SDF b u i l d u p s o n l y i f W a s h i n g t o n initially moves t o d e f i n e t h e t h r e a t a g a i n s t which J a p a n must p r e p a r e and o n l y i f s u b s e q u e n t SDF r e i n f o r c e m e n t is a c c o m p l i s h e d under t h e s t r i c t a u s p i c e s of t h e Mutual S e c u r i t y Treaty with i t s various p r o v i s i o n s f o r shared protect ion.2 The J a p a n e s e t a c t i c o f m a i n t a i n i n g a b e n i g n s e c u r i ty i d e n t i t y , couched w i t h i n t h e o v e r a l l r u b r i c of t h e U.S. d e f e n s e p o s t u r e , r e m a i n e d e f f e c t i v e a s l o n g as t h e w o r l d was s t r a t e g i c a l l y b i p o l a r . As t h e g l o b a l and E a s t A s i a n m i l i t a r y b a l a n c e s h i f t e d i n Moscow's f a v o r , howe v e r , d u r i n g t h e mid t o l a t e 1 9 7 0 s , t h e J a p a n e s e p r e f e r e n c e f o r r e l y i n g on s i g n a l s f r o m W a s h i n g t o n t o d e t e r m i n e i t s d e f e n s e e f f o r t s b e c a m e m o r e c o n s p i c u o u s and l e s s c r e d i b l e w i t h i n t h e framework of o v e r a l l Western a l l i ance p o l i t i c s . J a p a n has t h u s come u n d e r increasing c r i t i c i s m f r o m t h o s e i n t h e W e s t who c o n t e n d t h a t Tokyo c a n n o t r e m a i n immune much l o n g e r f r o m a c h a n g e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l environment. I n d e e d , W a s h i n g t o n now a s s e r t s t h a t J a p a n e s e s t r a t e g i c r e c i p r o c i t y in Asia must e v o l v e in t h e f o r m o f g r e a t e r d e f e n s e e x p e n d i t u r e s and m o r e f o r m i d a b l e m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s as t h e S o v i e t , Vietnamese, and o t h e r p o t e n t i a l s e c u r i t y t h r e a t s c o n f r o n t i n g noncommunist A s i a n - P a c i f i c s t a t e s grow. The Nunn R e s o l u t i o n , w h i c h was c o n s i d e r e d by t h e U . S . C o n g r e s s d u r i n g 1 9 8 4 and c a l l e d u p o n NATO t o u p g r a d e i t s d e f e n s e s i n an e r a of r i s i n g t r a d e i m b a l a n c e s , has r e f l e c t e d what i s c e r t a i n t o be s i m i l a r U.S. i m p a t i e n c e o v e r T o k y o ' s r e l u c t a n c e t o p l a y a s e c u r i t y r o l e more in k e e p i n g with i t s economic i n f l u e n c e throughout the w o r l d . 3 U.S.

The i m p o r t a n c e o f e v a l u a t i n g d i v e r g e n t J a p a n e s e s e c u r i t y a p p r o a c h e s i s r e l a t e d t o t h e need

and for

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u n d e r s t a n d i n g h o w any u p g r a d i n g of Japan's s e c u r i t y posture will affect overall p o w e r balances in Asia and beyond. In essence, what Japan does in terms of developing a m i l i t a r y outlook to regional security threats on its o w n as o p p o s e d to w h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c o n t i n u e s to do in terms of underwriting Japanese security must be weighed seriously. T h o s e d e c r y i n g U.S. p r e s s u r e s o n Japan to accelerate its defense efforts assert that not only will the Japanese continue to resist a militaristic future but that neither the United States nor its other Asian-Pacific allies would really want a remilitarized Japanese state acting independently. 4 Y e t , u l t i m a t e l y , J a p a n m u s t be v i e w e d as an increasingly critical factor within the Asian-Pacific's politicostrategic f r a m e w o r k . How successful the United S t a t e s and J a p a n w i l l r e a l l y be in a d j u s t i n g t h e i r s e c u r i t y relations w i t h o u t seriously disrupting the underlying premises of their m i l i t a r y cooperation is the m a j o r c o n c e r n of t h i s c h a p t e r . More specifically, the q u e s t i o n of w h a t J a p a n r e a l l y p e r c e i v e s as s e c u r i t y t h r e a t s to itself is c o n s i d e r e d . A l s o of c o n c e r n is w h a t m e a n s of d e f e n s e t h e J a p a n e s e a r e n o w p u r s u i n g in r e s p o n s e to any s u c h p e r c e i v e d t h r e a t s . Finally, the i m p l i c a t i o n s of an u p g r a d e d J a p a n e s e s e c u r i t y r o l e in the overall Asian-Pacific security environment is discussed in r e l a t i o n to that region's o v e r a l l power balance.

J A P A N E S E G O V E R N M E N T THREAT PERCEPTIONS A N D THE STRATEGIC BALANCE IN THE ASIAN-PACIFIC REGION U.S. t h r e a t a s s e s s m e n t s b a s e d o n t r a d i t i o n a l b a l a n c e of p o w e r c a l c u l a t i o n s and J a p a n e s e t e n d e n c i e s t o d o w n p l a y t h r e a t s p o s i t e d by m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s in favor of diplomatic h a r m o n y remain inherently contradictory. Current Japanese public perceptions of a "Soviet threat" emanate primarily from sociocu1tural factors r e l a t e d to Japan's p o s t w a r d e t e r m i n a t i o n to a v o i d w a r . I n d e e d , m a n y in J a p a n f e e l t h a t S o v i e t m i l i t a r y e x p a n sion is a natural historical d e v e l o p m e n t s t e m m i n g from the USSR's sense of cultural and geopolitical inferiority. Japanese conciliatory tactics toward Moscow t h r o u g h o u t t h e p o s t w a r e r a o f t e n s e e m e d to be t h e m o s t expedient m e a n s of pursuing strategic survival against Soviet m i l i t a r y power. The abhorrent legacy of Japan's o w n i m p e r i a l i s m p r e c e d i n g W o r l d W a r II, m o r e o v e r , h a s reinforced in the minds of m a n y Japanese the futility of t h e S o v i e t s (or a n y o n e e l s e ) u s i n g m i l i t a r y m e a n s to coerce others into long-term c o m p l i a n c e with their o w n geopolitical objectives. 5 Recent Japanese foreign policy doctrines have therefore emphasized d i p l o m a t i c and e c o n o m i c m e a n s for interacting with all other states. This trend reflects a f u n d a m e n t a l p o s t w a r J a p a n e s e i n t e r e s t in r e j e c t i n g " p o l i t i c o p h o b i a " and in k e e p i n g t h e n a t i o n ' s o v e r a l l

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approach to i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s "value f r e e . " 6 If J a p a n a c t u a l l y d o e s c o n d u c t i t s p o l i c i e s b a s e d on s u c h r e a s o n i n g , U.S a r g u m e n t s t h a t J a p a n s h o u l d b e m o r e r e s p o n s i v e m i l i t a r i l y t o c l o s i n g t h e power gap between t h e USSR and t h e West t h r o u g h o u t t h e A s i a n - P a c i f i c and e l s e w h e r e would be l a r g e l y i r r e l e v a n t . The e x t e n t t o w h i c h J a p a n ' s g l o b a l and r e g i o n a l s t r a t e g i c p e r c e p t i o n s move c l o s e r t o t h o s e of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w i l l d e p e n d i n l a r g e p a r t on t h e f u t u r e c o u r s e of Soviet-Japanese relations. Notwithstanding Japan's publ i c l y s t a t e d o b j e c t i v e of c o n d u c t i n g g o o d r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e USSR a s w e l l a s w i t h a l l o t h e r s t a t e s , T o k y o h a s l i t t l e r e a l i n t e r e s t in p l a c a t i n g S o v i e t needs f o r e c o nomic d e v e l o p m e n t o r d i p l o m a t i c i n r o a d s as long as t h e The p r o s p e c t United S t a t e s r e m a i n s Tokyo's m a j o r a l l y . of l o n g - t e r m S i b e r i a n d e v e l o p m e n t p r o j e c t s o r of a l a r g e r Russian market is a t t r a c t i v e to Japan but is more t h a n c o u n t e r b a l a n c e d by T o k y o ' s f e a r s t h a t Moscow's p o l i t i c a l p r i c e f o r a t t a i n i n g t h e s e would be t o o h i g h . T h e q u e s t i o n of s o v e r e i g n c o n t r o l o v e r t h e N o r t h e r n T e r r i t o r i e s , f o r example, remains unsolved because the S o v i e t s f e a r t h a t any move t o r e t u r n t h e f o u r c o n t e s t e d i s l a n d s of t h e s o u t h e r n K u r i l e s t o J a p a n w o u l d o p e n u p a p l e t h o r a of o t h e r A s i a n c l a i m s a g a i n s t t e r r i t o r y now h e l d by t h e USSR, e s p e c i a l l y b e c a u s e J a p a n c o n t i n u e s t o r e g a r d t h e i s l a n d s a s a s y m b o l of S o v i e t hegemonic d e s i g n s a g a i n s t J a p a n and t h e e n t i r e E a s t A s i a n a r e a . 7 T e r r i t o r i a l d i s p u t e s , h o w e v e r , a r e only one d i m e n s i o n of S o v i e t - J a p a n e s e t e n s i o n s . S i n c e t h e m i d d l e of the nineteenth c e n t u r y , Japanese s t r a t e g i s t s have viewed t h e i r l a r g e n o r t h e r n n e i g h b o r as p o t e n t i a l l y t h e i r most troublesome threat. Such f e e l i n g s a r e r e c i p r o c a l in Moscow: t h e R u s s i a n s r e g a r d t h e J a p a n e s e as p o t e n t i a l 8 m i l i t a r i s t s of t h e f i r s t o r d e r . P a s t w a r s and o c c u p a t i o n s between t h e two n a t i o n s have c r e a t e d a d i f f i c u l t l e g a c y of r e l a t i o n s t h a t e x a c e r b a t e c u r r e n t d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n Tokyo and Moscow. Soviet m i l i t a r y expansion in E a s t A s i a h a s b e e n c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n t h e 1984 J a p a n e s e D e f e n s e Wh i t e P a p e r a s an " u n r e l e n t i n g b u i l d u p , " and t h e 198 4 J a p a n e s e f o r e i g n m i n i s t r y D i p l o m a t i c B l u e b o o k d e s c r i b e s S o v i e t m i l i t a r y p o w e r i n A s i a a s t h e " c a u s e of t h e harsh c l i m a t e around Japan."9 A s i d e f r o m i n c r e a s i n g t h e i r m i l i t a r y d e p l o y m e n t s on t h e Northern T e r r i t o r i e s t o d i v i s i o n l e v e l (16,000 men), the Soviets are believed to have developed higher level a t t a c k c a p a b i l i t i e s a g a i n s t J a p a n ' s a i r and s e a - l a n e approaches out t o s e v e r a l hundred m i l e s . Although Japan m a i n t a i n s f o u r m i l i t a r y d i v i s i o n s of i t s o w n w i t h a i r s u p p o r t on H o k k a i d o , t h e l e v e l of J a p a n e s e r e s i s t a n c e p o s s i b l e w i t h o u t U.S. h e l p i n t h e e v e n t o f a c o n c e r t e d Soviet amphibious o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t Hokkaido remains largely uncertain. J a p a n ' s f o r m e r s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l of the Defense Council a s s e r t s that Japan's air defense c o u l d b e e l i m i n a t e d by a n y c o m b i n a t i o n of o v e r 2 , 2 0 0 S o v i e t m i l i t a r y a i r c r a f t s i t u a t e d i n t h e F a r E a s t and t h a t J a p a n e s e f o r c e s would be d e f e a t e d i n two t o t h r e e

129 days by elements of the Soviet Pacific Fleet (40 MIG-23 Floggers are stationed on the contested Northern Territ o r i e s a l o n e , and recent reports assert that even the l a t e s t Soviet f i g h t e r m o d e l — t h e M I G - 3 1 F o x h o u n d — h a s been emplaced there). 1 0 T h e Russian's m i l i t a r y d e p l o y m e n t p a t t e r n s and military assistance programs to North Korea and Vietnam a r e also c o n s i d e r e d h i g h l y t h r e a t e n i n g by Tokyo. Kim Il-Sung's North K o r e a n r e g i m e still intermittently threatens to invade South Korea; if carried out, a North Korean takeover of the South could deprive Japan of its o n l y g e o g r a p h i c b u f f e r zone in N o r t h e a s t Asia. The h e i g h t e n e d p r e s e n c e of Soviet naval and a i r p o w e r in V i e t n a m ' s Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang a i r f i e l d , m o r e o v e r , could (in t i m e s of w a r or high c r i s i s ) s e v e r c o n t i n u e d Japanese access to Southeast Asian markets, Persian Gulf oil s u p p l i e s , or to the o t h e r c r i t i c a l s e a - l a n e s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s (SLOCs) both in the Indian and Pacific oceans. The Soviet p r e s e n c e at Cam Ranh has b e c o m e p a r t i c u l a r l y w o r r i s o m e to J a p a n e s e d e f e n s e p l a n n e r s because for the first time the USSR's Pacific Fleet sits astride the South China Sea oil conduits. These conduits, w i t h p e r m a n e n t port f a c i l i t i e s , s e r v i c e , on t h e a v e r a g e , a d o z e n Soviet w a r s h i p s and s u b m a r i n e s and s e v e n a u x i l i a r y v e s s e l s with m a i n t e n a n c e , m u n i t i o n s , communications, and intelligence-gathering facilities on Vietnam's s h o r e s . 1 1 Accelerated Soviet military power concentrations in N o r t h e a s t Asia and in the East and South China Sea areas, moreover, are complemented by the deployment of s o m e 80 s u p e r s o n i c B a c k f i r e b o m b e r s (with a range of 4,000 kilometers), 120 SS-20 intermediate range ballistic missiles (with a maximum range of 5,000 kilometers), and s o m e 24 b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s u b m a r i n e s with b a c k u p cruise missile subs all east of Lake Baikal. These are s e e n by both U.S. and J a p a n e s e d e f e n s e p l a n n e r s as part of an a c c e l e r a t e d Soviet effort to split the United States from Japan and from other pro-Western states in East A s i a through i n t i m i d a t i o n . The U.S. A s s i s t a n t Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Richard P e r l e , u n d e r l i n e d this point in an early 1985 i n t e r v i e w , and the J a p a n D e f e n s e Agency (JDA) s p e c i f i cally applied the "Soviet divide and rule" hypothesis to its o w n reading of h o w f u t u r e J a p a n e s e d e f e n s e p o l i c y should be forced. 1 2 (Appendix B, w h i c h s u m m a r i z e s and contrasts the general purpose force deployments in and a r o u n d J a p a n , s e e m s to v a l i d a t e J a p a n e s e and U.S. concerns.) At the n u c l e a r level, Japan's s u r v i v a l c e r t a i n l y would be dependent on the mutual restraint of the USSR, the United S t a t e s , a n d / o r C h i n a in i n t r o d u c i n g n u c l e a r weapons on or near Japanese territory in the event of a Such restraint, major war in the Asian-Pacific region. however, would by no means be guaranteed; bases in Japan c o n s t i t u t e a p r i m a r y m e a n s by which W a s h i n g t o n w o u l d project its o w n m i l i t a r y p o w e r t h r o u g h o u t East Asia.

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TABLE 6.1

Japan's Regional Security: Selected Nuclear Capability Indices

Soviet Union • A number of iCBMs capable of hitting Japanese/East Asian targets • 135 SS-20 IRBM launches in Far East • 80 nuclear-capable Backfire bombers • Assorted TU-16 Badgers and TU-22 Blinder mid-range bombers (latter directed toward naval aviation role) • Assorted nuclearcapable surface-toground missile launchers • Assorted cruisemissile submarines carrying SS-N-7, SS-N-9, and SS-N-12 number cruise missile warheads

China • Limited number of East Wind DF-4 and DF-5 ICBMs (range: 10,000-13,000 km) • 60 DF-3 and 50 DF-2 ICBMs (range: 1 ,800-5,500 km) • 1 Daqingyu (xia) SSBN with 12 CSSNX- 3s with 4 more Daqingyu SSBNs on order (range: 2,800 km) • 120 H-6 medium range bombers • 500 H-5 light bombers • Assorted atomic demolition munitions on Si noSoviet border

United States • 2 Trident SSBNs • 2 attack carrier task forces with assorted nuclearcapable firing systems, fighterbomber aircraft, etc. (backed by 4 other task forces in the central and eastern pacific) • Battlefield nuclear weapons deployed with South Korean land-force division • 2-3 refurbished battleships with nuclear cruise missile delivery sys tems • B-52 squadron on Guam with nuclearcapable short-range attack missiles • Tomahawk nuclearcontrolled cruise missiles coming on line for development on U.S. air and naval elements in late 1980s • 59 marine air fighter and attack aircraft, at least some deploying nuclear-capable attack systems (backed by 1 27 marine air fighters and attack aircraft in California, Hawaii, and Arizona)

Sources: International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, Military Balance, 1984-1985, and Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo, Asian Security, 1984

T h e q u i d p r o q u o f o r s u c h U.S. a c c e s s is t h e e x t e n s i o n o f t h e U.S. n u c l e a r d e t e r r e n t t o J a p a n . Yet t h i s e x t e n d e d d e t e r r e n t o n l y c o n f i r m s , in M o s c o w ' s e s t i m a t e ,

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Japan's tacit a c c e p t a n c e of U.S. n u c l e a r s t r a t e g i c o p e r a t i o n s in t h e r e g i o n as p r e c e d e n t a l o v e r a m o r e s t r i c t c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t J a p a n e s e a d h e r e n c e t o A r t i c l e 9 of its "peace constitution." ( T a b l e 6.1 d e t a i l s t h e n u c l e a r f o r c e s s u r r o u n d i n g Japan.)

JAPANESE PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS A N D F O R C E S T R U C T U R E S IN T R A N S I T I O N Japanese public opinion, however, still remains l u k e w a r m to any a r g u m e n t that t h e M u t u a l S e c u r i t y T r e a t y n e e d s t o b e r e s h a p e d s o as t o a l l o w f o r m o r e U.S.An J a p a n e s e r e c i p r o c i t y in m i l i t a r y b u r d e n - s h a r i n g . O c t o b e r 1984 p o l l c o n d u c t e d by t h e Y o m i u r i Sh i m b u n noted that o n l y 2 p e r c e n t of t h o s e p o l l e d r e s p o n d e d that J a p a n n e e d s t o s h o u l d e r a b i g g e r s h a r e of e x p e n s e s f o r t h e s t a t i o n i n g of U.S. f o r c e s in J a p a n , and o n l y 5.4 p e r c e n t a g r e e d t h a t T o k y o s h o u l d a c c e p t U.S. a r g u m e n t s about s t r e n g t h e n i n g Japan's d e f e n s e p o w e r . F u l l y 38.9 p e r c e n t a d v o c a t e d s u s t a i n i n g o n l y c u r r e n t l e v e l s of J a p a n e s e c o s t s u p p o r t s f o r U.S. f o r c e s s t a t i o n e d in J a p a n (29.8 p e r c e n t w a n t e d d e c r e a s e s in s u c h s u p p o r t ) , a n d a c o m b i n e d 51.9 p e r c e n t s a i d J a p a n s h o u l d n o t a c c e p t U.S. a r g u m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r J a p a n to a c c e l e r a t e its o w n d e f e n s e b u i l d u p . 1 3 T h e s e p o l l r e s u l t s , in k e e p i n g w i t h a w i d e r a n g e of p r e v i o u s o n e s , indicate that t h e J a p a n e s e p u b l i c c o n t i n u e s to r e s i s t extensive r e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n in t h e f o r m of i n c r e a s i n g n a t i o n a l " w a r p o t e n t i a l " (and r e s p e c t e d U.S. a n a l y s t s s t i l l f i n d it i m p o s s i b l e to e n t e r t a i n i n - d e p t h d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h t h e i r J a p a n e s e c o u n t e r p a r t s about any p o s s i b l e s c e n a r i o for a c t u a l w a r f i g h t i n g by J a p a n e s e f o r c e s ) . 1 4 U n d e r such c i r c u m s t a n c e s , e v e n P r i m e M i n i s t e r Y a s u h i r o N a k a s o n e is r e q u i r e d to t e m p e r his n o r m a l l y e n t h u s i a s t i c s u p p o r t of U.S. d e f e n s e p o l i c i e s in A s i a ( w h e n h e v i s i t s W a s h i n g t o n ) w i t h an a c u t e s e n s i t i v i t y t o J a panese domestic political concerns. In g e n e r a l , Nakasone has upheld Japanese international trade policies i n s t i t u t e d by p r e v i o u s g o v e r n m e n t s that tend to w o r k f o r J a p a n e s e b u s i n e s s m e n , f a r m e r s , a n d e x p o r t e r s , e v e n at t h e e x p e n s e of t h e i r U.S. c o u n t e r p a r t s . He h a s a l s o m a i n t a i n e d f a i r l y s u b t l e , if not a m b i g u o u s , p o s i t i o n s o n p a r t i c u l a r l y d i v i s i v e d e f e n s e i s s u e s : e.g., w h e t h e r t o o p p o s e s u p e r p o w e r a r m s c o n t r o l d e a l s that m i g h t d i s c o u n t A s i a n or J a p a n e s e i n t e r e s t s in t h e p r o c e s s of s t a b i l i z ing t h e n u c l e a r b a l a n c e in E u r o p e , or w h e t h e r to s u p p o r t the R e a g a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s S t r a t e g i c D e f e n s e I n i t i a t i v e (SDI), w h i c h m a n y J a p a n e s e w o r r y c o u l d e v e n t u a l l y u n d e r cut W a s h i n g t o n ' s e x t e n d e d d e t e r r e n c e c o m m i t m e n t s to its allies . 1 5 T h e p r e s e n c e of a g r o w i n g a n t i n u c l e a r m o v e m e n t in East A s i a a l s o a f f e c t s J a p a n ' s d e f e n s e o u t l o o k . In A u g u s t 1984, for e x a m p l e , d u r i n g t h e c e r e m o n i e s h e l d to h o n o r t h e m e m o r y of t h o s e w h o d i e d as a r e s u l t of t h e a t o m i c b o m b i n g of H i r o s h i m a and N a g a s a k i , P r i m e M i n i s t e r

1 32 N a k a s o n e p l e d g e d t h a t J a p a n w o u l d r e f u s e t o a l l o w U.S. w a r s h i p s c a r r y i n g Tomahawk n u c l e a r c r u i s e m i s s i l e s t o enter its ports.16 S i x m o n t h s a f t e r t h e Tomahawk s t a t e ments, a n d p e r h a p s s e n s i t i v e t o U.S. uncertainties, N a k a s o n e s e e m e d t o make a c o n c e p t u a l a b o u t f a c e when h e a n n o u n c e d t h a t Tokyo wouId a l l o w t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o u s e n u c l e a r weapons i n j o i n t U.S.-Japanese d e f e n s e o p e r a t i o n s if J a p a n ' s a c t u a l s u r v i v a l w e r e a t s t a k e . The M u t u a l S e c u r i t y T r e a t y was a g a i n c i t e d a s t h e r a t i o n a l e f o r a p p l y i n g w h a t , i n t h i s c a s e , was r e g a r d e d a s an e x t r e m e l y f l e x i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of J a p a n ' s n o n - n u c l e a r p r i n c i p l e s , i . e . , not t o allow p r o d u c t i o n , introduction, o r s t o r a g e of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s o n J a p a n e s e s o i l . 1 7 On t h e o t h e r h a n d , J a p a n r e c e i v e d t h e c r i s i s i n t h e A u s t r a l i a - N e w Z e a l a n d - U . S . (ANZUS) a l l i a n c e , w h i c h i n v o l v e d New Z e a l a n d ' s r e f u s a l t o a d m i t i n t o i t s p o r t s B r i t i s h o r U.S. w a r s h i p s t h a t c o u l d b e c a r r y i n g n u c l e a r weapons, with what one A u s t r a l i a n newspaper has l a b e l e d "deeply considered silence."18 The J a p a n e s e a r e e s p e c i a l l y concerned t h a t if t h e United S t a t e s c o n t i n u e s t o e x e r c i s e a h a r d l i n e a g a i n s t New Z e a l a n d ' s a n t i n u c l e a r s t a n d , t h e c o h e s i o n and c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e W e s t ' s s t r a tegic planning throughout the Asian-Pacific region will d e c l i n e i n l i g h t of i n c r e a s e d S o v i e t m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s i n I n d o c h i n a and a l o n g t h e I n d i a n Ocean l i t t o r a l s . Conv e r s e l y , any U.S. c o n c e s s i o n s t o New Z e a l a n d o r t o o t h e r A s i a n - P a c i f i c n u c l e a r - f r e e - z o n e f a c t i o n s would be q u i c k l y s e i z e d u p o n by J a p a n e s e p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s t o p r e s s u r e t h e United S t a t e s i n t o a more l i t e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of J a p a n ' s n o n - n u c l e a r p r i n c i p l e s t h a n i s now the case. At p r e s e n t , b o t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d J a p a n h a v e o p t e d t o t r e a t t h e s e n s i t i v e i s s u e of U.S. n a v a l p o r t c a l l s w i t h p u b l i c s i l e n c e b e c a u s e , a s n o t e d by J a p a n ' s R e s e a r c h I n s t i t u t e f o r P e a c e and S e c u r i t y , " [ i f ] the United S t a t e s were ever prepared to d i s c l o s e t h e e x i s t e n c e of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s i t w o u l d p r e s u m a b l y n o t c o n s u l t [ t h e J a p a n e s e ] e i t h e r , s i n c e J a p a n is [ p u b l i c l y ] bound t o r e j e c t any r e q u e s t . " 1 9 Intense debate did m a t e r i a l i z e i n t h e J a p a n e s e D i e t d u r i n g F e b r u a r y and March 1984 a b o u t t h e p e n d i n g d o c k i n g of t h e n u c l e a r - c a p a b l e U.S.S. New J e r s e y a n d t h e r i g h t of J a p a n t o e n j o y " p r i o r c o n s u l t a t i o n ® r e g a r d i n g U.S. n u c l e a r - a r m e d c r u i s e m i s s i l e s f l y i n g through Japanese airspace. To d a t e , h o w e v e r , b o t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and J a p a n h a v e f o u n d i t m u t u a l l y advantageous t o avoid d i r e c t l y f o r c i n g the i s s u e . How l o n g t h i s " a g r e e m e n t t o d i s a g r e e " w i l l c o n t i n u e i s o p e n t o s e r i o u s q u e s t i o n when t h e g r o w i n g momentum of t h e A s i a n - P a c i f i c f r e e - z o n e movement i s c o n s i d e r e d . In A u g u s t 1 9 8 4 , t h e f o u r t e e n n a t i o n s of t h e S o u t h P a c i f i c Forum u n a n i m o u s l y a p p r o v e d a r e s o l u t i o n c a l l i n g f o r a n u c l e a r - f r e e - z o n e t r e a t y t h a t would p r o h i b i t t h e manuf a c t u r e , u s e , s t o r a g e , o r a c q u i s i t i o n of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s i n t h e i r r e g i o n a s w e l l a s t h e d u m p i n g of n u c l e a r w a s t e there.20 New Z e a l a n d and A u s t r a l i a w e r e among t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h i s g r o u p , and t h e A s s o c i a t i o n of S o u t h -

133 e a s t A s i a n N a t i o n s (ASEAN) l a t e r went on r e c o r d s u p p o r t i n g t h e e x t e n s i o n of t h i s n u c l e a r - f r e e - z o n e c r i t e r i a t o i t s own r e g i o n . 2 1 Doubts o v e r Japan's c o n t i n u e d w i l l i n g n e s s t o a s s i s t U . S . f o r c e s w i l l o n l y i n c r e a s e i f , as a r e s u l t o f s u c h antinuclear initiatives, t h e J a p a n e s e p u b l i c becomes more r e s i s t a n t t o t h e SDF's " o f f e n s i v e p o t e n t i a l " i n i t s relation t o U.S. nuclear-capable military elements. Even p r o - d e f e n s e f a c t i o n s of t h e L i b e r a l Democratic p a r t y (LDP) d u r i n g p a s t c r i s e s i n v o l v i n g t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of M u t u a l S e c u r i t y T r e a t y w e r e p r o n e t o u s e t i m e h o n o r e d t e c h n i q u e s f o r h u m o r i n g W a s h i n g t o n w i t h o u t demo n s t r a t i n g a c t u a l d o c t r i n a l c o m p a t a b i l i t y b e t w e e n U.S. and J a p a n e s e d e f e n s e p o l i c i e s . As a June 1980 U.S. Arms C o n t r o l and D i s a r m a m e n t A g e n c y r e p o r t t o t h e C o n g r e s s concluded: The s e c u r i t y p o l i c y t h a t i s e n v i s i o n e d by most of t h e Japanese p o p u l a c e i s t h e r e f o r e an e c l e c t i c one which seeks t o assure continued access t o resources and energy as w e l l as i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l and economic s t a b i l i t y , l a r g e l y by a v o i d i n g any a b r u p t changes i n Japan's f o r e i g n or m i l i t a r y p o s t u r e . . . . The p u b l i c v i e w seems t o e n d o r s e t h e s t a t u s quo, r e q u i r i n g t h a t t h e f u t u r e g r o w t h of t h e JSDF, p o t e n t i a l i n c r e a s e s i n d e f e n s e spending, and p o s s i b l e changes i n japan's o v e r a l l m i l i t a r y posture be incremental and u n o b t r u s i v e . 2 2 T h i s same J a p a n e s e t e n d e n c y t o r e s i s t s i g n i f i c a n t milit a r y d o c t r i n a l c h a n g e , h o w e v e r , a l s o t e n d s t o work in f a v o r of u p g r a d e d U . S . - J a p a n e s e d e f e n s e t i e s . Indeed, any e x p l i c i t a d o p t i o n of a "no f i r s t u s e " n u c l e a r p o s t u r e by J a p a n w o u l d d e n y i t t h e f u l l p r o t e c t i o n o f U . S . m i l i t a r y p o w e r and d e p r i v e i t of t h e b e n e f i t s c u r r e n t l y a v a i l a b l e t h r o u g h t h e U.S. " n u c l e a r u m b r e l l a . " No r e s p o n s i b l e Japanese l e a d e r s h i p would s e r i o u s l y consider r i s k i n g such d e t e r r e n c e g u a r a n t e e s . M o r e o v e r , M o s c o w ' s c r u d e u s e of m i l i t a r y p o w e r f o r p u r p o s e s of r e g i o n a l i n t i m i d a t i o n s e e m s t o h a v e had a largely counterbalancing e f f e c t . The J a p a n e s e p u b l i c seems i n c r e a s i n g l y w i l l i n g t o m o d i f y p o s t w a r w a r - a v o i d a n c e s e n t i m e n t s i n f a v o r of g r e a t e r r e s i s t a n c e t o a c c o m modation with the S o v i e t Union. S i x t y p e r c e n t of t h o s e q u e s t i o n e d i n a 1984 JDA p o l l , f o r e x a m p l e , f e e l J a p a n i s i n d a n g e r o f b e i n g a t t a c k e d by t h e USSR, and 80 p e r c e n t of t h e J a p a n e s e p u b l i c s u p p o r t t h e S e l f - D e f e n s e F o r c e s ; o n l y 12 p e r c e n t r e s i s t SDF o u t r i g h t . 2 3 Although a t t i t u d e s have y e t t o be t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o s u p p o r t f o r g r e a t e r J a p a n e s e d e f e n s e b u r d e n - s h a r i n g , i t d o e s seem t h a t h i g h l e v e l s o f p u b l i c s u p p o r t o f SDF w o u l d a l l o w f o r its incremental strengthening against Soviet military intimidation. I n f a c t , marked i m p r o v e m e n t i n J a p a n ' s d e f e n s e s has been r e f l e c t e d in the N a t i o n a l D e f e n s e Program Outline and t h e S t a n d a r d D e f e n s e F o r c e C o n c e p t , b o t h i n e f f e c t s i n c e O c t o b e r 1976. Under the o u t l i n e ' s directives,

134 J a p a n h a s e x t e n d e d i t s p a r a m e t e r s of d e f e n s e f r o m i t s own s h o r e l i n e s t o s e v e r a l h u n d r e d m i l e s o u t t o s e a and h a s i n i t i a t e d t h e u p g r a d i n g of i t s w a r n i n g , surveill a n c e , and i n t e l l i g e n c e - g a t h e r i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s s o a s t o be a b l e t o ward o f f s m a l l - s c a l e , l i m i t e d c o n v e n t i o n a l a t t a c k s w i t h o u t t h e a s s i s t a n c e of U.S. F o r c e s , Japan (USFJ). Q u a l i t a t i v e i m p r o v e m e n t s w i t h i n t h e SDF, m o r e o v e r , have been emphasized over q u a n t i t a t i v e expansion i n o r d e r t o p r e c l u d e t h e t y p e of i n c r e a s e s i n s u c c e s s i v e annual J a p a n e s e d e f e n s e budgets t h a t would i n e v i t a b l y c a t a p u l t t h e i r measurable annual level to considerably m o r e t h a n 1 p e r c e n t of J a p a n ' s G r o s s N a t i o n a l P r o d u c t (GNP). But t h e o u t l i n e h a s a l s o r e f l e c t e d Tokyo's b e l i e f t h a t o t h e r r e g i o n a l powers, including the Soviet Union, are s t i l l s u f f i c i e n t l y nonthreatening. If s u c h w e r e t h e c a s e , t h e r e would be l i t t l e n e c e s s i t y f o r J a p a n t o i n c r e a s e i t s own m i l i t a r y p o w e r b a s e d s t r i c t l y on w h a t force levels other m i l i t a r y powers a c t i v e throughout E a s t A s i a m i g h t d e p l o y . 2k Accordingly, defense procurement patterns have r e f l e c t e d m o r e a b s t r a c t c o n c e p t s of g e n e r a l m a r i t i m e and a i r c o r r i d o r defense commensurate with Japan's unique g e o g r a p h i c i d e n t i f y : an i s l a n d - a r c h i p e l a g o d e p e n d e n t o n i m p o r t s and r a w m a t e r i a l s f r o m many s o u r c e s f o r i t s own survival. For e x a m p l e , t h e M a r i t i m e S e l f - D e f e n s e F o r c e (MSDF) i s i n v e s t e d w i t h s e c u r i n g a n d s u s t a i n i n g two m a j o r SLOCs: ( 1 ) a n e a s t e r n s e a - l a n e e x t e n d i n g 1 , 0 0 0 n a u t i c a l m i l e s southward from Tokyo/Osaka bays toward ( b u t n o t r e a c h i n g t o ) Guam; and (2) a w e s t e r n s e a - l a n e s t r e t c h i n g 1,000 n a u t i c a l m i l e s t o t h e s o u t h w e s t as f a r as t h e B a s h i C h a n n e l b e t w e e n T a i w a n and t h e P h i l i p pines.25 I n t h e e v e n t of s p e c i f i c S o v i e t a g g r e s s i o n , t h e MSDF w o u l d a l s o a s s i s t e l e m e n t s o f t h e U.S. 7 t h F l e e t i n b l o c k a d i n g t h e S o y a , T s u s h i m a , and T s u g a r u straits. T h e MSDF, h o w e v e r , w o u l d n o t b e e x p e c t e d t o sustain long-term missions related to either sea-lanes of c o m m u n i c a t i o n (SLOC) c o n t r o l o r s t r a i t s closure. Most W e s t e r n d e f e n s e a n a l y s t s s e r i o u s l y d o u b t t h a t J a p a n e s e n a v a l c a p a b i l i t i e s , a s t h e y a r e now c o n s t i t u t e d , w o u l d come c l o s e t o a c t u a l l y d e f e n d i n g a 1 , 0 0 0 - m i l e SLOC r a d i u s e v e n t h o u g h J a p a n ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o do s o w o u l d r e m a i n an i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r i n t h e W e s t ' s o v e r a l l d e f e n s e s t r a t e g y as i t a p p l i e s t o A s i a n - P a c i f i c c o n t i n g e n c i e s . T h e J DA h a s d e t e r m i n e d t h a t a t l e a s t 4 e s c o r t f l o t i l l a must be m a i n t a i n e d as m o b i l e o p e r a t i n g s h i p u n i t s , c o m p r i s e d of s o m e 60 a n t i s u b m a r i n e s u r f a c e v e s s e l s ( t h e MSDF now o n l y h a s 34 d e s t r o y e r s a n d 18 f r i g a t e s ) , 16 s u b m a r i n e s ( o n l y 14 a r e c u r r e n t l y on p a t r o l ) , a s e p a r a t e m i n e - s w e e p i n g naval component o p e r a t i n g o f f b o t h t h e e a s t e r n a n d w e s t e r n s h o r e s of J a p a n , a n d 2 2 0 c o m b a t a i r c r a f t f o c u s i n g on a n t i s u b m a r i n e w a r f a r e (ASW) operations.26 M o r e o v e r , i n o r d e r f o r MSDF t o o p e r a t e e f f e c t i v e l y o f f s h o r e up t o 200 n a u t i c a l m i l e s , a s W a s h i n g t o n w o u l d l i k e , p r e s e n t i n v e n t o r i e s of s u b m a r i n e s , d e s t r o y e r s , and l a r g e f r i g a t e s w o u l d h a v e t o be i n -

135 c r e a s e d by 50 p e r c e n t , and an array of f i x e d - w i n g A S W a i r c r a f t - - e s t i m a t e s run as high as 125--needs to be added to the 13 P - 3 C s and 90 o b s o l e s c e n t P - 2 0 m a r i t i m e p a t r o l a i r c r a f t now in s e r v i c e . 2 7 J a p a n also r e m a i n s s o m e w h a t o v e r d e p e n d e n t on U.S. e l e c t r o n i c s and C 3 I related systems for the manning of its o w n naval communications systems. However, Japan is beginning to produce indigenous shipborne electronics and sonar systems (the NOLQ-1 ESM/ECM threat analysis system, NOLR-6, OLR-9 ESM, and OLT-9 ESM) at a more credible pace. 28 Japanese naval aviation capabilities beyond purely ASW components are w e l l regarded with s o m e 81 c o m b a t aircraft and 63 combat helicopters divided into 6 air wings. 29 A major emphasis in Japan's Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) procurement is to build sufficient inventories of fighter aircraft (eventually 13 full-strength squadrons as opposed to the 10 now deployed) to block seaborne and a i r b o r n e landing i n v a s i o n s and to s u p p o r t J a p a n e s e ground defenses with adequate cover critical to achieving such m i s s i o n s . 3 0 Also d e e m e d c r i t i c a l is the u p grading of air refueling capabilities. Consideration is now being given to purchasing the Boeing KCE-3J refueling tankers to supply the MSDF's F-4EJ Phantom and ASDF F-15J Eagle a l l - p u r p o s e jet f i g h t e r s q u a d r o n s . 3 1 A countervailing factor, however, is the Japanese wish to ensure that any air refueling or air transport moderniz a t i o n u n d e r t a k e n w i l l not be p e r c e i v e d as a threat by Japan's Southeast A s i a n n e i g h b o r s . Such c o n s i d e r a t i o n has r e s t r a i n e d the Diet, to d a t e , from approving the building of an M S D F - p r o p o s e d "invincible" c l a s s - t y p e aircraft carrier. In March 1985, P r i m e M i n i s t e r N a k a s o n e a n n o u n c e d that a new JDA p r o g r a m for i m p r o v i n g the Ground S e l f Defense Force (GSDF) would be incorporated into Japan's forthcoming 1986-1990 defense plan. 32 The GSDF would be given stronger defense systems designed for coping with amphibious operations or with similar attacks where it would be required to fight back an enemy "at the water's edge." The four GSDF divisions now stationed at Hokkaido (out of t w e l v e d e p l o y e d in the c o u n t r y ) w o u l d be armed with heavier weapons--i.e., more main battle tanks with advanced 220-mm guns and greater survivability than the c u r r e n t Type 74s anad T y p e 61s already d e p l o y e d , more AH-15 antitank helicopters, and greater ammunition stocks--and backed with greater air mobility. The objective of this b u i l d u p on H o k k a i d o and of the o v e r a l l strengthening of GSDF components is "to maintain a quick and e f f e c t i v e s y s t e m c a p a b l e of launching s y s t e m a t i c d e f e n s e o p e r a t i o n s from the start of a g g r e s s i o n in any section of Japan." 33 In s u m m a r i z i n g the o v e r a l l p a c e and s c o p e of Japan's current force structure and programs, it is clear that the Japanese have acquiesced to U.S. pressures for doing m o r e in the s e c u r i t y r e a l m . They h a v e q u a l i f i e d their c o m p l i a n c e , h o w e v e r , by d e l i c a t e l y c a l i b r a t i n g defense budget increases at relatively small levels and

136 subtly timing public declarations reaffirming the basic r a t i o n a l e s of t h e M u t u a l S e c u r i t y T r e a t y . Japanese s e c u r i t y p o l i c y , t h e r e f o r e , s e e m s to be o n e of c o p i n g w i t h and p a r r y i n g a g a i n s t U.S. p r e s s u r e s to c h a n g e Japan's p o s t w a r s e c u r i t y i d e n t i t y and r e c o n c i l i n g U.S. p r e s s u r e s w i t h t h e g e n e r a l l y a n t i - d e f e n s e o u t l o o k of Japan's o w n population. U.S. BURDEN-SHARING PRESSURES: THE JAPANESE RESPONSE Both t h e C a r t e r and R e a g a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s h a v e c o n t e s t e d t h e r e t i c e n t J a p a n e s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of and response to external security threats. In 1978, President Carter secured c o m m i t m e n t s from the NATO allies to increase their defense budgets by 3 percent annually (in real t e r m s a f t e r i n f l a t i o n ) , and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y implored Tokyo to u n d e r w r i t e even greater defense expenditures, considering the favorable state of its e c o n o m y in r e l a t i o n t o m o s t W e s t E u r o p e a n s t a t e s . T h e U.S. and J a p a n e s e m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t s s u b s e quently moved to adopt the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation that authorized b i l a t e r a l m i l i t a r y p l a n n i n g studies geared to larger J a p a n e s e d e f e n s e outlays. By l a t e 1 9 8 0 , h o w e v e r , m o s t p r o m i n e n t U.S. o f f i c i a l s w e r e criticizing the Suzuki government's disclaimers that an overall national budget deficit in Japan would not allow t h a t c o u n t r y to a t t a i n an o r i g i n a l l y (and a d m i t t e d l y overoptimistic) 9.7 percent increase in defense spending for fiscal year 1981. 3 4 T h e R e a g a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a s a t t e m p t e d to avoid t h e t r a p of m e a s u r i n g t h e r e l a t i v e m e r i t of U.S.Japanese defense ties on the basis of such narrow criteria as i n c r e m e n t a l f i s c a l c o m m i t m e n t s . Although they have pushed the Japanese to spend "substantially greater a m o u n t s " on its d e f e n s e f o r c e s , S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n s e C a s p a r W e i n b e r g e r and o t h e r U.S. o f f i c i a l s h a v e p r e f e r r e d to e m p h a s i z e Japan's g r a d u a l a s s u m p t i o n s of g r e a t e r d e f e n s e m i s s i o n s w i t h i n t h e p a r a m e t e r s of t h e 1976 N a t i o n a l D e f e n s e P r o g r a m O u t l i n e . The United States has continued to insist, h o w e v e r , that Japan m o v e gradually to incorporate a w i d e r geographic area in its overall military responsibilities. This would ideally be a c c o m p l i s h e d s o J a p a n c o u l d s u p p l e m e n t o r e v e n replace the United States in fulfilling selected defense missions throughout the Pacific.35 Although such a policy approach has helped to address past J a p a n e s e c r i t i c i s m s that W a s h i n g t o n h a s f a i l e d to s p e c i f y w h a t m o r e it a c t u a l l y w a n t e d J a p a n to d o in t h e d e f e n s e s e c t o r , p o l i c y c r i t i c s in b o t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and J a p a n a r g u e t h a t by p u s h i n g t h e J a p a n e s e to a s s u m e greater responsibilities, the United States is destabilizing East Asia's overall security environment. Presently, h o w e v e r , U.S. officials have toned d o w n t h e i r b u r d e n - s h a r i n g r h e t o r i c by n o t i n g t h a t all t h e y are r e a l l y d e m a n d i n g f r o m J a p a n is a g r e a t e r e f f o r t t o

1 37 d e f e n d i t s e l f and t h a t t h e J a p a n e s e s h o u l d u l t i m a t e l y d e t e r m i n e what m i l i t a r y r o l e s t h e i r c o u n t r y w i l l f u l fill. Y e t , at t h e same t i m e , t h e s e spokesmen have i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e United S t a t e s s h o u l d b e n e f i t from w h a t e v e r i n c r e a s e d d e f e n s e e f f o r t s J a p a n does make b e c a u s e Tokyo would i n e v i t a b l y f o c u s on s e a - l a n e c o v e r a g e and " c r e a t e room f o r t h e U.S. t o be a b l e t o [ b e t t e r ] c o p e w i t h S o v i e t m i l i t a r y power i n t h e Far E a s t . " 3 6 For i t s p a r t , J a p a n has become more s e n s i t i v e t o W e s t e r n a c c u s a t i o n s t h a t Tokyo s t i l l e n j o y s a " f r e e r i d e " from t h e United S t a t e s by c o n t i n u i n g t o e x e r c i s e a low m i l i t a r y p r o f i l e . But Tokyo a l s o f a c e s t h e dilemma t h a t i f i t does i n v e s t more h e a v i l y in weapons, i t r i s k s provoking f e a r s throughout East Asia. Even w i t h i n J a p a n s u c h c o n c e r n s a r e s t i l l h e l d by t h e n a t i o n ' s major p o l i t i c a l opposition group--the Japanese S o c i a l i s t party (JSP). T h i s r e m a i n s t r u e d e s p i t e a r e c e n t e f f o r t by P a r t y C h a i r m a n M a s a s h i I s h i b a s h i ( i n 1 9 8 3 and 1 9 8 4 ) t o s h i f t t h e J S P f r o m i t s t r a d i t i o n a l p o s i t i o n t h a t SDF f o r c e s a r e " u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and i l l e g a l " t o a new l i n e of " u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l but l a w f u l . " Y e t I s h i b a s h i ' s t a c t i c s w e r e a t t a c k e d n o t o n l y by h i s own p a r t y ' s t h e o r e t i c i a n s b u t by K o m e i t o ( C l e a n G o v e r n m e n t ) , J a p a n ' s o t h e r m a j o r o p p o s i t i o n p a r t y , as i m p l i c i t l y e n d o r s i n g an " u n c h e c k e d e x p a n s i o n " o f t h e SDF. 3 7 Komeito i t s e l f , h o w e v e r , a c t u a l l y s u p p o r t s t h e M u t u a l S e c u r i t y T r e a t y on t h e b a s i s t h a t t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n w i l l e v e n t u a l l y e l i m i n a t e t h e need f o r both t h e Mutual S e c u r i t y T r e a t y and t h e SDF. W i t h i n t h e current domestic p o l i t i c a l s c e n e , only the Democratic S o c i a l i s t p a r t y (DSP), along with t h e L i b e r a l D e m o c r a t s , s u p p o r t s t h e need f o r J a p a n e s e n a t i o n a l d e f e n s e i n unambiguous t e r m s . The LDP s t i l l p r e f e r s t o s t e e r a m i d d l e c o u r s e between i n t e r m i t t e n t U.S. b u r d e n - s h a r i n g demands and t h e J a p a n e s e p u b l i c ' s o v e r a l l p a c i f i s t s e n t i m e n t s . In r e a l i t y , both t h o s e U.S. o f f i c i a l s who i n s i s t on imposing s e t q u a n t i t a t i v e c r i t e r i a f o r J a p a n ' s d e f e n s e e f f o r t s and t h o s e J a p a n e s e p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n groups t h a t c r i t i c i z e what t h e y s e e as s u b m i s s i o n t o U.S. demands a r e b a c k i n g arguments of o n l y t e n t a t i v e c r e d i bility. Most U.S. and J a p a n e s e d e c i s i o n m a k e r s r e c o g n i z e t h e c h a l l e n g e s o f c u l t u r a l and h i s t o r i c a l diversity w i t h i n t h e a l l i a n c e and t e n d t o f i n d ways t o d e a l w i t h those challenges. For e x a m p l e , i n e a r l y 1 9 8 0 , J a p a n e s e F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r S a b u r o O k i t a t o l d t h e D i e t t h a t J a p a n would a l l o w t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o u s e b a s e s i n J a p a n f o r t h e movement o f U.S. t r o o p s t o t r o u b l e s p o t s i n t h e M i d d l e E a s t and I n d i a n Ocean based on t h e i r " t r a n s i t s t a t u s , " which did not t e c h n i c a l l y v i o l a t e J a p a n ' s p e a c e c o n s t i t u t i o n . 3 8 The Nakasone government has b r o a d l y i n t e r p r e t e d A r t i c l e 6 of t h e U . S . - J a p a n Mutual S e c u r i t y T r e a t y , which s t i p u l a t e s t h a t t h e m i s s i o n of U n i t e d S t a t e s F o r c e s , J a p a n ( U S F J ) i s t o c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e s e c u r i t y o f J a p a n and m a i n t a i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e a c e and s e c u r i t y i n t h e F a r East. T h r e a t s t o J a p a n ' s s u r v i v a l may emanate not o n l y

138 f r o m S o v i e t a c t i v i t i e s i n N o r t h e a s t A s i a but a l s o f r o m t h e f u t u r e c l o s u r e of o i l r o u t e s i n Southeast A s i a , t h e I n d i a n O c e a n , a n d / o r t h e P e r s i a n G u l f by u n d e s i g n a t e d combatants.39 I n S e p t e m b e r 1984, t h e r e f o r e , a m o d e s t d e t a c h m e n t o f U.S. S p e c i a l F o r c e s was a l l o w e d t o be d e p l o y e d a t O k i n a w a t o augment t h e 3rd m a r i n e d i v i sion.40 Japan a l s o c o n t i n u e d i t s i n d i r e c t p a r t i c i p a t i o n as an " o b s e r v e r " i n t h e Rim o f t h e P a c i f i c (RIMPAC) e x e r c i s e s h e l d i n t h e c e n t r a l P a c i f i c i n May and June 1984, w h i c h i n v o l v e d 80 s h i p s , 250 a i r c r a f t , and m o r e t h a n 50,000 p e r s o n n e l f r o m , i n a d d i t i o n t o J a p a n , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , A u s t r a l i a , New Z e a l a n d , and Canada.1*1 U.S. and NATO o p t i m i s m c o n c e r n i n g Japan's i n c r e a s e d r e a d i n e s s t o become a c t i v e l y i n v o l v e d i n P e r s i a n G u l f / M i d d l e East d e f e n s e e f f o r t s must be t e m p e r e d , h o w e v e r , by t h e r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t Tokyo remains e x t r e m e l y s e n s i t i v e t o t h e use of USFJ components beyond Japan's immed i a t e p e r i m e t e r of d e f e n s e . One W e s t e r n s k e p t i c o f Japan's b u r d e n - s h a r i n g i n t e n t i o n s v i e w e d t h e 1980 O k i t a s t a t e m e n t c i t e d above as t h e Japanese d o i n g n o t h i n g more t h a t " d e c i d [ i n g ] not t o d e c i d e . " By a l l o w i n g USFJ t o use Japanese s t a g i n g p o s t s at W a s h i n g t o n ' s discretion, T o k y o , a c c o r d i n g t o t h i s v i e w p o i n t , was s h i f t i n g t h e d e c i s i o n m a k i n g f o r M i d d l e E a s t e r n o i l s u p p l i e s t o U.S. s h o u l d e r s and not r e a l l y c o m m i t t i n g Japan t o t h e s u p p o r t of such basing u s e . 4 2 A Japanese a n a l y s t f u r t h e r n o t e s t h a t a l i t e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l res t r a i n t s embodied in t h e l a n g u a g e of A r t i c l e 9 would r e s t r i c t h i s countrymen f r o m even c o o p e r a t i n g w i t h U.S. Rapid Deployment F o r c e / C e n t r a l Command (CENTCOM) u n i t s i n f e r r y i n g t r o o p s o r m a t e r i a l f r o m Japan i n t o t h e P e r s i a n Gulf o r I n d i a n O c e a n . 4 3 j t appears t h a t o v e r a l l consensus on any Japanese d e f e n s e b u r d e n - s h a r i n g r o l e i n t h e d e f e n s e of P e r s i a n Gulf o i l s u p p l i e s w i l l have t o a w a i t a more d e f i n i t i v e a t m o s p h e r e . A second a r e a of expanded U.S.-Japan d e f e n s e r e l a t i o n s e m e r g i n g as a b u r d e n - s h a r i n g f a c t o r i s a d v a n c e d w e a p o n s - r e l a t e d t e c h n o l o g y t r a n s f e r from Japan's i n d u s In t r i a l c o n c e r n s t o t h e U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of D e f e n s e . S e p t e m b e r 1980, t h e J a p a n - U . S . S y s t e m s and T e c h n o l o g y Forum was c r e a t e d t o a l l o w f o r r e g u l a r d i s c u s s i o n s on mutual t e c h n o l o g y t r a n s f e r a r r a n g e m e n t s . Within three y e a r s ( J a n u a r y 1 9 8 3 ) , i n r e s p o n s e t o a number o f U.S. r e q u e s t s f o r a c c e s s t o Japanese h i g h - t e c h e l e m e n t s , t h e Japanese government determined that a two-way d e f e n s e t e c h n o l o g y f l o w under t h e a u s p i c e s of t h e Mutual S e c u r i t y T r e a t y has p r i o r i t y o v e r o t h e r kinds of r e s t r i c t i o n s on t e c h n o l o g y t r a n s f e r s . 4 1 * On November 8, 1983, a Mutua l D e f e n s e A s s i s t a n c e Agreement was s i g n e d b e t w e e n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and Japan, t o implement mutual t e c h n o l o g y t r a n s f e r and r e g u l a r c o n s u l t a t i o n s b e t w e e n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s c o n s t i t u t i n g a J o i n t M i l i t a r y T e c h n o l o g y Commiss i o n t h a t was f o r m e d as p a r t o f t h e a g r e e m e n t . The l o n g - t e r m p o l i c y i m p l i c a t i o n s of U.S.-Japan m i l i t a r y t e c h n o l o g y t r a n s f e r s have been a s s e s s e d by t h i s w r i t e r I t should be n o t e d , howmore e x t e n s i v e l y elsewhere. 1 * 5

139 ever, that by m i d - 1 9 8 5 , Japan had gradually acquiesced to U.S. Department of Defense requests to transfer between thirty-six and thirty-eight military-related high technology items to U.S. recipients over the next few years. 4 6 ASSURING JAPAN'S SECURITY THROUGH NONMILITARY MEANS Although in e c o n o m i c terms Japan now stands as a global power, its geopolitical identity remains limited to a regional context. If Japan can follow an effective strategy along ideal lines, its leadership can exercise creative policy innovations with developing countries, in international p o l i t i c a l - e c o n o m i c q u e s t i o n s , and in regional cultural developments and eventually forge the nation's identity in harmony with an increasingly interdependent world. Consensus is now building in Japan to address the country's energy and g e o g r a p h i c v u l n e r abilities and simultaneously use the country's economic wealth and cultural homogeneity to fashion a more benign international strategic environment. 4 7 In East Asia, the Japanese have recently adopted a new, more politically oriented vision of Pacific Cooperation, e m p h a s i z i n g Tokyo's w i l l i n g n e s s to realize a "balanced" interaction between Asian-Pacific and extraregional actors. This s o m e w h a t fluid, a l l - i n c l u s i v e outlook supplanted the former Pacific Community concept that tended to e m p h a s i z e a specifically reg ional and strictly economic leadership role for J a p a n . A c c o r d ingly, Japanese leaders in government and business now endorsing the Pacific Cooperation approach have opted to avoid unqualified e n d o r s e m e n t of various ASEAN p r o p o sals, noting that Southeast Asian capitals not be too eager to appropriate Japan's postwar development experience in lieu of other W e s t e r n d e v e l o p m e n t m o d e l s that may be more applicable to their own unique situations. 49 But Japan also remains sensitive to the chronic problem of i m b a l a n c e in J a p a n e s e - A S E A N trade and investment. During the 1980s, Japan's e c o n o m i c assistance p r o f i l e toward the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)--dramatically labeled "heart to heart relations" by former Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fakuda--has been maintained, although with a lower profile as the visits of P r i m e Minister Suzuki (1981) and Nakasone (1983) produced only small-scale Japanese commitments to ASEAN economic assistance. 50 Notwithstanding increased Japanese sensitivities to ASEAN's economic development problems, Malaysian Prime Minister M a h a t h i r has forcefully argued that in its efforts to emulate Japanese industrialization, Malaysia, and other ASEAN states, often has become more, not less, dependent on Japanese heavy industry and h igh technology to broaden its own manufacturing and commercial infrastructures. Future Japanese access to Southeast Asia's

140 n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s may w e l l depend on Tokyo's a b i l i t y t o d e m o n s t r a t e more a f f i n i t y t o w a r d ASEAN economic p r o b l e m s than has been t h e c a s e t o d a t e . 5 1 To s o m e e x t e n t , r e s i d u a l e c o n o m i c t e n s i o n w i t h o t h e r East A s i a n n a t i o n s has overshadowed Japanese e f f o r t s t o p l a y a m o r e v i s i b l e r o l e i n b a c k i n g ASEAN's s e c u r i t y concerns. In July 1984, Japanese F o r e i g n Mini s t e r S h i n t a r o Abe t o l d h i s ASEAN d i p l o m a t i c c o u n t e r p a r t s t h a t Japan was d e t e r m i n e d t o s e e k a p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n t o t h e Cambodian c r i s i s , consistent with T o k y o ' s and ASEAN's m u t u a l a s p i r a t i o n s f o r a l a s t i n g In O c t o b e r , Japan h o s t e d V i e t n a m e s e peace in Indochina. F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Nguyen Co Thach and u r g e d a p r o m p t V i e t n a m e s e m i l i t a r y w i t h d r a w a l f r o m Cambodia as w e l l as i m m e d i a t e V i e t n a m e s e n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h ASEAN s t a t e s t o f i n d a common b a s i s f o r s e t t l e m e n t . 5 2 The J a p a n e s e , h o w e v e r , a l s o had o t h e r m o t i v e s in b r i n g i n g Hanoi t o t h e n e g o t i a t i n g t a b l e t h a n m e r e l y t o d e r i v e a Cambodian s e t t l e m e n t f o r ASEAN's b e n e f i t . These i n c l u d e d enhanced s t a b i l i t y f o r T h a i l a n d , which i s a g u a r d i a n of key SLOCs t h a t s t r e t c h t o t h e e a s t e r n m o s t p a r t s of t h e I n d i a n Ocean ( v i a t h e Andaman S e a ) , l e s s p r o b a b i l i t y of a l o n g term arms r a c e b e t w e e n t h e V i e t n a m e s e and ASEAN s t a t e s spanning t h e S t r a i t of Malacca as w e l l as o t h e r key o i l r o u t e s , and t h e e n c o u r a g e m e n t o f g r e a t e r V i e t n a m e s e s t r a t e g i c independence f r o m t h e USSR through t h e l e s s e n i n g of o v e r a l l r e g i o n a l t e n s i o n s . The a m e l i o r a t i o n o f I n d o c h i n e s e t e n s i o n s c o u l d a l s o reduce U.S. p r e s s u r e s on Japan t o s u s t a i n o r i n c r e a s e i t s own m a r i t i m e d e f e n s e s . S i m i l a r r a t i o n a l e s l a y behind Japan's e f f o r t s t o d e f u s e t e n s i o n s on t h e K o r e a n P e n i n s u l a . A May 1984 v i s i t t o Moscow by North Korean P r e s i d e n t Kim I l - S u n g t o seek a d d i t i o n a l m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e from t h e USSR c u l m i n a t e d i n S o v i e t l e a d e r K o n s t a n t i n U. Chernenko's s t a t e m e n t t h a t such a s s i s t a n c e would be e x t e n d e d by t h e USSR t o s t e m " t h e r i s e o f m i l i t a r i s t i c m o v e s " by t h e U.S. and Japan i n N o r t h e a s t A s i a . 5 3 The J a p a n e s e p u b l i c ' s c o n t i n u e d a n i m o s i t y t o w a r d t h e S o v i e t Union has r e m a i n e d m o r e c o n s t a n t ( s e e T a b l e 6.2) t h a n t h e a t t i tudes of Japan's s u c c e s s i v e g o v e r n m e n t s . The government has tended i n t e r m i t t e n t l y - - a n d u n s u c c e s s f u l l y - - t o i n i t i a t e n e g o t i a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t e r r i t o r i a l and p o l i t i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s as a means t o break i n t o t h e S o v i e t m a r k e t place. Continued t e n s i o n s on t h e Korean P e n i n s u l a w i l l , h o w e v e r , o n l y r e i n f o r c e Japan's o v e r a l l v i e w t h a t a h i g h l e v e l o f s t r a t e g i c d e p e n d e n c e on U.S. m i l i t a r y p o w e r s t a t i o n e d i n o r a d j a c e n t t o Japan i s n e c e s s a r y . Japan w i l l be l e s s a b l e t o f a c i l i t a t e a more i n d e p e n d e n t s t r a t e g i c image as might be c o n s t r u e d from t h e somewhat o b f u s c a t e d p r o j e c t i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e July 1980 Comp r e h e n s i v e N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y Task F o r c e report's recommendations. Beyond t h e A s i a n - P a c i f i c r e g i o n , Japan i s a s s e r t i n g i t s e l f more i n M i d d l e East d i p l o m a c y . E c o n o m i c and s t r a t e g i c i n c e n t i v e s have r e i n f o r c e d t h i s p o l i c y . In 1983, Japan s u r p a s s e d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s as t h e l e a d i n g

1 4 1

TABLE 6 . 2

Japanese P u b l i c Opinion of

Security

Threats

Inquiry: i s t h e r e any c o u n t r y which you e s p e c i a l l y t h i n k of as a t h r e a t to japan's s e c u r i t y recently? From among t h e f o l l o w i n g , l i s t as many as you l i k e . Country

percentage of

United States South Korea North Korea China USSR Others

Responses

7.8 2 .9 5.4 2.3 53.5

0.1

T h r e a t , but no s p e c i f i c threat No t h r e a t No answer Source: Yomuri Shi mbun, 8 O c t o b e r 1984, O c t o b e r 1 984, p. 1 3 - 1 4 .

16.0 1 3.5 10.5 reprinted

i n DJSP,

19

s u p p l i e r of goods t o Saudi A r a b i a n m a r k e t s (U.S.$7.7 b i l l i o n t o $7.6 b i l l i o n ) , and t h e b u l k o f J a p a n e s e o i l s u p p l i e s c o n t i n u e t o o r i g i n a t e from t h e P e r s i a n Gulf area. In June 1984, Nakasone r e p o r t e d l y had d r a f t e d h i s country's f i r s t postwar d i p l o m a t i c i n i t i a t i v e independent of U.S. encouragement. T h i s was a t h r e e - s t e p p e a c e p l a n f o r e n d i n g t h e I r a n - I r a q war t o be p r e s e n t e d a t t h e annual economic summit of s e v e n i n d u s t r i a l i z e d c o u n t r i e s i n London. 5 1 4 Reports a l s o s u r f a c e d that the Japanese might even c o n s i d e r u s i n g SDF u n i t s in a UN p e a c e k e e p i n g r o l e as a p r e f e r r e d a l t e r n a t i v e t o t h e s c e n a r i o o f J a p a n e s e n a v a l c o n v o y s e s c o r t i n g U.S. n a v a l u n i t s through A s i a n - P a c i f i c w a t e r s en r o u t e t o a P e r s i a n Gulf defense operation. The I r a n - I r a q w a r ' s n e g l i g i b l e e f f e c t on g l o b a l o i l s u p p l i e s , h o w e v e r , has r e m o v e d s o m e s e n s e of urgency f o r t h e Japanese in f i n d i n g a d i p l o m a t i c s o l u t i o n t o t h a t c o n f l i c t s i n g 1 eh a n d e d l y . In t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s annual f o r e i g n p o l i c y address d e l i v e r e d at t h e D i e t ' s opening s e s s i o n on January 25, 1985, F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Abe concluded t h a t "our c o u n t r y i s i n no p o s i t i o n t o m e d i a t e o r a r b i t r a t e t h e c o n f l i c t " but t h a t Japan would work through t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s t o r e a l i z e a p e a c e f u l s e t t l e m e n t t o Middle Eastern d i s p u t e s . 5 5

THE JAPANESE DEFENSE TRANSITION: I M P L I C A T I O N S FOR T H E R E G I O N A N D T H E U N I T E D

STATES

U.S.-Japan m i l i t a r y b u r d e n - s h a r i n g t r e n d s w i l l be f o l l o w e d c l o s e l y i n t h e ASEAN r e g i o n . Assuredly, the Soviet Union c o n t i n u e s t o p r o v i d e the communist

142 I n d o c h i n e s e s t a t e s w i t h g e n e r o u s levels of m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e and has d i s p a t c h e d t h o u s a n d s of m i l i t a r y a d v i s e r s to V i e t n a m , C a m b o d i a , and Laos. Yet any significant increase of Japanese military power in East or Southeast Asia would be regarded by most ASEAN nations with trepidation. S p e c i f i c a l l y , U.S. p r e s s u r e s for g r e a t e r naval p a t r o l l i n g by J a p a n to its s o u t h w e s t w o u l d c o m p l i c a t e ASEAN's e f f o r t s to i m p l e m e n t a Zone of P e a c e , F r e e d o m , and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) by introducing yet another sign i f i c a n t naval p o w e r into t h e i r region. Of a d d i t i o n a l concern is the possibility that Japan could establish an independent strategic foothold along Southeast Asian oil routes in the event of f u r t h e r d e c l i n e in U.S. o f f s h o r e power in the region. Finally, the prospect of Japanese d e f e n s e f i r m s reaching out to c u l t i v a t e new m a r k e t s raises fears that regional ethnic or t e r r i t o r i a l disputes and confrontations in Southeast Asia could become more exacerbated. As Francis Lai Fung-wai observed in assessing Nakasone's J a n u a r y 1983 trip t h r o u g h A S E A N c o u n t r i e s to a l l a y f e a r s a b o u t J a p a n e s e m i l i t a r y i ntent ions: The diplomatic language of support [for Japan's defense buildup] . . . [has] seemed to be expressions of certain reservations rather than of enthusiastic endorsement. Most of the ASEAN leaders made it clear that they were only endorsing Japan building u p its selfdefense force, but definitely not an active m i l i t a r y role in the region. . . . The ASEAN leaders seemed to agree that . . . it is not desirable for Japan to involve its military forces directly, either in protecting sea lanes or patrolling the region.5®

If this interpretation is valid, the United States' continued willingness to deploy a strong military presence on or p r o x i m a t e to the A S E A N n e i g h b o r h o o d m a y remain the best hope for noncommunist Southeast Asia to e v e n t u a l l y r e a l i z e its l o n g - t e r m s e c u r i t y goal of regional neutrality. Washington would have great difficulty in justifying to ASEAN the need for Japan to take over sea-lane patrols in various parts of the region. 5 7 Japan's security policy toward the Korean Peninsula is thus also relevant to any u p g r a d e d d e f e n s e role it m i g h t u n d e r t a k e in p a r t n e r s h i p with W a s h i n g t o n . In S e p t e m b e r 1984, South Korea P r e s i d e n t C h u n Doo H w a n journeyed to Japan as his country's first head of state to ever formally visit that country. Economic problems and the issue of Japanese wartime atonement toward the Korean people highlighted Chun's trip (although a Japanese loan of $4 billion to Seoul was extended earlier in the year). In addition, a joint statement was issued by Chun and Nakasone, urging direct talks between North and South Korea. The c h a i r m a n of the South K o r e a n Joint C h i e f s of Staff also a c c o m p a n i e d P r e s i d e n t C h u n to Japan, and his SDF counterpart, General Keitaro Watanabe,

143 announced t h a t h e would r e t u r n t h i s " c o u r t e s y v i s i t " by t o u r i n g Seoul in t h e f a l l of 1 9 8 5 . Yet both s i d e s were e m p h a t i c i n t h e i r d e n i a l s t h a t any J a p a n e s e - S o u t h Korean m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e was f o r m i n g . 5 8 A l t h o u g h J a p a n had s i g n e d a j o i n t m i l i t a r y p l a n w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n December 1 9 8 4 t h a t i s t h o u g h t t o have some r e l e v a n c e t o t h e d e f e n s e of South K o r e a , Tokyo and S e o u l seem c o n t e n t a t p r e s e n t t o work t h r o u g h t h e i r m u t u a l U.S. s e c u r i t y p a r t n e r i n a c h i e v i n g common d e f e n s e o b j e c t i v e s r a t h e r t h a n t h r o u g h more d i r e c t s e c u r i t y t i e s with one a n o t h e r . 5 9 Some b a s i s f o r S o u t h Korean-Japanese defense c o o r d i n a t i o n could m a t e r i a l i z e , h o w e v e r , i f S o v i e t a i r p o w e r c o n t i n u e s t o be d e p l o y e d i n g r e a t q u a n t i t i e s in t h e N o r t h e a s t Asian p e r i m e t e r . Any B a c k f i r e bomber s t r i k e s d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t J a p a n e s e o r U.S. n a v a l e l e m e n t s i n t h e a r e a w o u l d h a v e t o f l y p a s t South K o r e a n t e r r i t o r y t o r e a c h t h e Sea of J a p a n , O k i n a w a , and t h e P h i l i p p i n e s . South Korean a i r defenses c o u l d c o o r d i n a t e a f o r w a r d a i r d e f e n s e l i n e of F - 1 6 i n t e r c e p t o r s s t a t i o n e d a t Cheju Do o r o t h e r a p p r o p r i a t e b a s e s i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h U.S. and J a p a n e s e f o r c e s o p e r a t i n g f r o m M i s a w a A i r B a s e , O k i n a w a , and o t h e r s i t e s . T h i s m u l t i l a y e r e d a i r d e f e n s e s c r e e n would be even m o r e e f f e c t i v e i f and when J a p a n d e p l o y s a t r u l y f o r m i d a b l e e a r l y w a r n i n g a i r d e f e n s e s y s t e m f o r i t s home i s l a n d s . The S o u t h K o r e a n s c o u l d a l s o u p g r a d e t h e i r m i n e l a y i n g a i r c r a f t and n a v a l v e s s e l s w i t h t h e i n t e n t o f c l o s i n g o f f t h e Korean S t r a i t t o S o v i e t s u r f a c e s h i p s , t h e r e b y f r e e i n g J a p a n and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o c o n c e n t r a t e on t h e T s u g a r u and S o y a s t r a i t s t o t h e n o r t h . 6 0 As i s t h e c a s e i n S o u t h e a s t A s i a , h o w e v e r , t h e U.S. m i l i t a r y p r e s ence in N o r t h e a s t A s i a r e m a i n s t h e paramount i n s t r u m e n t of d e t e r r e n c e a g a i n s t a g g r e s s i o n d i r e c t e d a t t h e Korean Peninsula. I t s e e m s c l e a r t h a t t h e Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and, most p r o b a b l y , i t s s u c c e s s o r s w i l l c o n t i n u e t o p r e s s u r e the Japanese into accepting g r e a t e r defense responsibili t i e s r a t h e r t h a n m e r e l y demand i n c r e a s e s i n J a p a n e s e f i s c a l c o m m i t m e n t s t h a t may o r may n o t b e r e l a t e d t o a w e l l - i n t e g r a t e d r e g i o n a l d e f e n s e e f f o r t by both a l l i e s . U.S. p r o p o s a l s w i l l f o c u s on a c h i e v i n g g r e a t e r J a p a n e s e s e a c o n t r o l c a p a b i l i t i e s i n S o u t h e a s t A s i a and t h e P a c i f i c i s l a n d - s t a t e s ; a c h i e v i n g s t r a i t s c o n t r o l by c r e d i b l y m i n i n g and b l o c k a d i n g t h e T s u s h i m a , T s u g a r u , and S o y a s t r a i t s t h r o u g h which t h e S o v i e t P a c i f i c F l e e t must p a s s d u r i n g w a r t i m e t o r e a c h o p e n w a t e r s ; and s t r u c t u r i n g more s o p h i s t i c a t e d a i r d e f e n s e s t h a t could i n f l i c t s i g n i f i c a n t l o s s e s on S o v i e t a t t a c k a i r c r a f t o p e r a t i n g f r o m t h e USSR's F a r E a s t e r n Command. Japan's recent w i l l i n g ness t o a c c e p t g r e a t e r d e f e n s e b u r d e n - s h a r i n g during P r i m e M i n i s t e r Nakasone's t e n u r e of o f f i c e has been e n c o u r a g i n g , but W a s h i n g t o n must h a v e m o r e p e r m a n e n t i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t f u t u r e J a p a n e s e l e a d e r s w i l l be a s committed to a c c e p t i n g a broadened Japanese d e f e n s e role.

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CONCLUSION J a p a n ' s a p p r o a c h to s e c u r i t y p r o b l e m s m a y be p e r c e i v e d as p a r t of a s t r a t e g y to m o v e t h r o u g h a d i f f i c u l t transition period in which an almost exclusive emphasis on economics under the protection of U.S. deterrence is widening to include independent Japanese diplomatic and security efforts. Extended politicostrategic activities, w h e t h e r carried out on a global or regional level, h o w e v e r , m u s t still be justified by Japanese leaders to t h e i r e l e c t o r a t e in l a r g e l y n o n m i l i t a r y t e r m s ; t h e s e activities must be seen as facilitating positive economic, s o c i a l , and c u l t u r a l d e v e l o p m e n t . In t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s , both t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and J a p a n s t i l l h o l d largely the s a m e broad o b j e c t i v e s for ensuring their national well-beings: to stabilize the Third World so as to g u a r a n t e e t h e i r m u t u a l a c c e s s to c r i t i c a l n a t i o n a l resources and markets; to preclude radical forces such as t h e S o v i e t U n i o n o r f u n d a m e n t a l I s l a m i c m o v e m e n t s from undercutting such W e s t e r n access; and to m i n i m i z e t h e p o l a r i z a t i o n of A S E A N o r M i d d l e E a s t e r n s o c i e t i e s into p r o - W e s t e r n and a n t i - W e s t e r n f a c t i o n s . The key question is to what extent W a s h i n g t o n and Tokyo will be able to pursue their collaboration in m i l i t a r y planning, t e c h n o l o g i c a l s u p p o r t , and o t h e r a v e n u e s of s t r a t e g i c cooperation given the shift of economic and even politic a l i n f l u e n c e in East A s i a f r o m W a s h i n g t o n to T o k y o during the past decade. Although Japan will most likely b e c o m e neither neutralist nor nonaligned--at least in the short term — it is c l e a r t h a t t h e J a p a n e s e w i l l be l e s s p r o n e to support tight bipolar security coalitions or other blocs f a s h i o n e d by t h e s u p e r p o w e r s . Certainly, the Mutual S e c u r i t y T r e a t y w i l l u n d e r g o at l e a s t s o m e s h i f t s and changes in the years ahead because collective security, as t h e J a p a n e s e n o w i n t e r p r e t it, "is not . . . c o n f i n e d t o [ c o n c e r n a b o u t ] t h e d e f e n s e of f r o n t i e r s . . . [and] . . t h e p u r e l y m i l i t a r y d i m e n s i o n [is] s e e n as of limited importance." 6 1 Continued relaxation of regional and g l o b a l t e n s i o n s t h r o u g h p r o m o t i o n of e c o n o m i c and d i p l o m a t i c h a r m o n y w i l l r e m a i n t h e e s s e n c e of Japan's overall national security policy, and this reality m u s t be considered in future U.S. strategic policy deliberations. In t u r n , t h e a c c e p t a b i l i t y of U.S. s t r a t e g i c deterrence in Japan will r e m a i n credible only so long as Tokyo remains confident that M o s c o w cannot be diverted by any o t h e r m e a n s f r o m p r e s s u r i n g J a p a n i n t o s u b m i s sion. T h i s a c c e p t a n c e is a m o s t d i f f i c u l t c o m p r o m i s e for Japan to m a k e in both cultural and historical terms. It also, h o w e v e r , stands as a reluctant a c k n o w l e d g m e n t by the Japanese people that the West's traditional strat e g i c g e o m e t r y is s t i l l a b e t t e r g u a r a n t e e of Tokyo's s e c u r i t y a s p i r a t i o n s t h a n is t h e m o r e i d e a l i s t i c yet amorphous politics of interdependency.

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NOTES 1. Joachim G l a u b i t z has c h a r a c t e r i z e d the o m n i d i r e c t i o n a l a p p r o a c h a d o p t e d by j a p a n t h r o u g h o u t t h e 1970s as a " p o l i c y o f p e a c e t o a l l s i d e s " ( z e n h o i - h e i w a - g a i k o ) o r , as c r i t i c s would term i t , a "be n i c e t o everybody p o l i c y . " The d i p l o m a t i c s t r a t e g e m was t o compensate f o r japan's s t r a t e g i c v u l n e r a b i l i t y by c u l t i v a t ing the best p o s s i b l e r e l a t i o n s with every country i n the world. See G l a u b i t z , "Japanese F o r e i g n and S e c u r i t y p o l i c y , " A u s s e n p o l i t i k (English e d i t i o n ) 2 (1984):176. For i n - d e p t h a s s e s s m e n t s o f t h e more r e c e n t comprehensive s e c u r i t y approach found i n the July 1980 s p e c i a l task f o r c e r e p o r t presented t o the Japanese government and e n t i t l e d "Report on Comprehensive N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y , " s e e Robert W. B a r n e t t , Beyond War: Japan's Concept o f C o m p r e h e n s i v e N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y (New York: pergamon-Brassey's, 1984), pp. 1 - 6 . 2. See t h e d a t a i n c o r p o r a t e d by S h i n k i c h i E t o , " J a p a n e s e P e r c e p t i o n s o f N a t i o n a l T h r e a t s , " i n C h a r l e s E. M o r r i s o n , e d . , Threats t o S e c u r i t y i n East A s i a - p a c i f i c ( L e x i n g t o n , Mass.: Heath, 1983), pp. 5 3 - 6 4 . 3. See, f o r example, "Japan-U.S. Defense R e l a t i o n s Entering a New Stage," yomuri Shimbun, 29 June 1984, p. 3 as t r a n s l a t e d and r e p r i n t e d i n Daily Summary of the Japanese press ( h e r e a f t e r c i t e d as DSJP), U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, p o l i t i c a l S e c t i o n — O f f i c e of Transl a t i o n S e r v i c e s , 6 July 1984, pp. 3-4; " S e c u r i t y C o n s u l t a t i o n s : No B a s i c Change i n U.S. Reques t s , " S a n k e i , 29 June 1984, p. 13, t r a n s l a t e d and r e p r i n t e d i n DSJP, 7-9 July 1984, p. 1; "Japan-U.S. j o i n t Defense and S e l f - d e f e n s e power," Mainichi Shimbun, 29 June 1984, p. 2, t r a n s l a t e d and r e p r i n t e d i n i b i d . , p. 2; " J a p a n - U . S . D e f e n s e C o o p e r a t i o n Reaches L i m i t , " Tokyo Shimbun, 29 June 1984, p. 5, t r a n s l a t e d and r e p r i n t e d i n i b i d . , p. 3. A l s o s e e Mike T h a r p , " S o f t l y Does I t , " Far Eastern Economic Review, 31 May 1984, pp. 42, 43. The e n t i r e U . S . - j a p a n b u r d e n - s h a r i n g h i s t o r y i n a 1980s c o n t e x t i s w e l l covered by p e t e r polemka, "the S e c u r i t y of the Western p a c i f i c : The p r i c e of Burden-Sharing," S u r v i v a l 26, no. 1 (JanuaryF e b r u a r y 1 9 8 4 ) , e s p e c i a l l y pp. 11-12; and by R o b e r t F. Reed, The U . S . - j a p a n A l l i a n c e : S h a r i n g t h e Burden o f D e f e n s e ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: N a t i o n a l Defense u n i v e r s i t y press, 1983), e s p e c i a l l y pp. 5859. 4 . A r e p r e s e n t a t i v e c r i t i c i s m along such l i n e s i s t h a t of R. B. Byers and S t a n l e y C. M. I n g , " S h a r i n g t h e Burden on t h e Far S i d e of the A l l i a n c e : Japanese S e c u r i t y i n the 1980's," Journal of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s 37, no. 1 (Summer 1983) :163-175. 5 . Taketsugu Tsurutani, Japanese p o l i c y and East Asian Secur i t y (New York: P r a e g e r , 1981), pp. 89-90. 6. I b i d . , pp. 118-125; and F u j i K a m i y a , " J a p a n ' s S e c u r i t y and t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l E n v i r o n m e n t i n t h e 1 9 8 0 ' s , " i n Donald Hugh M c M i l l a n , e d . , A s i a n p e r s p e c t i v e s on i n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y (New Y o r k : S t . M a r t i n ' s , 1 9 8 4 ) , e s p e c i a l l y p. 29. 7 . R e c i p r o c a l S o v i e t - J a p a n e s e tensions along such l i n e s are w e l l d e s c r i b e d by Edward A. O l s e n , U . S . - j a p a n R e c i p r o c i t y ( S t a n f o r d , C a l i f . : Hoover I n s t i t u t i o n p r e s s , 1985), pp. 46-47. 8. See a n a l y s i s of Paul F. Langer, " S o v i e t M i l i t a r y power i n A s i a , " i n Donald S. Z a g o r i a , e d . , S o v i e t p o l i c y i n E a s t A s i a (New Haven: Yale U n i v e r s i t y press, 1982), pp. 260-261. 9 . Japan D e f e n s e A g e n c y , D e f e n s e o f j a p a n 1984 [ B o e i Hakus h o ~ E n g l i s h e d i t i o n ] (Tokyo: JDA, 1984), p. 30; Japanese M i n i s t r y

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of F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , D i p l o m a t i c B l u e b o o k 1984 E d i t i o n [ i n E n g l i s h ] ( T o k y o : F o r e i g n p r e s s C e n t e r , 1 9 8 4 ) , p . 1 2 ; a n d R o b e r t Y. H o r i g u c h i , " v i g o r o u s S o v i e t B u i l d u p , " p a c i f i c D e f e n s e R e p o r t e r 11, n o s . 6 / 7 (December 1 9 8 4 - J a n u a r y 1985):33-37. 10. H o r i g u c h i , " V i g o r o u s S o v i e t B u i l d u p , " p . 3 4 ; L a r r y A. Miksch, "Japanese Defense policy: issues f o r the United S t a t e s , " B a c k g r o u n d p a p e r , C o n g r e s s i o n a l R e s e a r c h S e r v i c e , L i b r a r y of C o n g r e s s , 15 D e c e m b e r 1 9 8 4 , p p . 3 - 4 ; L a n g e r , " S o v i e t M i l i t a r y p o w e r , " p p . 2 6 8 - 2 6 9 ; a n d G. J a c o b s , " N o r t h A s i a n N a v a l F o r c e s , " A s i a n Defense Journal (January 1985):65. 1 1 . " C a m r a n h - - A T h r e a t t o J a p a n , " M a i n i c h i D a l y News, 1 March 1 9 8 5 , p . 1, d i s c u s s e s U.S. p a c i f i c Command I n t e l l i g e n c e e s t i m a t e s p l a c e d b e f o r e t h e s e a p o w e r s u b c o m m i t t e e of t h e U.S. S e n a t e Armed Services Committee. A l s o s e e The I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e f o r S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s , S t r a t e g i c Survey 1984-1985 (London: IISS, Spring 1985), p. 87. 12. The P e r l e i n t e r v i e w i s r e p r i n t e d as "Moscow Out t o D i v i d e t h e W e s t e r n A l l i a n c e , " p a c i f i c D e f e n s e R e p o r t e r 1 1 , n o . 11 ( M a y 1 9 8 5 ) : 3 5 - 3 6 ; t h e JDA a f f i r m a t i o n i s i n D e f e n s e o f J a p a n 1 9 8 4 , p . 54. 13. " R e s u l t s of Y o m i u r i S h i m b u n ' s P u b l i c O p i n i o n S u r v e y on j a p a n - U . S . D e f e n s e R e l a t i o n s ( e x t r a c t e d f r o m 29 O c t o b e r 1 9 8 4 e d i t i o n ) , " DSJP, 7 N o v e m b e r 1 9 8 4 , p p . 1 1 - 1 2 . 14. B a r n e t t , Beyond War, p . 1 2 6 . 15. In l a t e A p r i l 1985, Nakasone i n d i c a t e d t h a t h e would t a k e a " c a u t i o u s s t a n d " o v e r t h e SDI i s s u e w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f j a p a n ' s n o - w a r c o n s t i t u t i o n a n d , as s u c h , n o t n e c e s s a r i l y c o m p l y w i t h p r e s i d e n t R e a g a n ' s r e q u e s t f o r J a p a n e s e f u n d i n g and t e c h n o l o g ical support for that project. S e e " N a k a s o n e C o m m e n t s on Bonn S u m m i t , SDI P r o j e c t " a s r e p o r t e d b y K y o d o , 27 A p r i l 1 9 8 5 , a n d reprinted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter cited a s F B I S ) , 29 A p r i l 1 9 8 5 , p . C - 1 . In a March 25, 1984, press c o n f e r e n c e i n B e i j i n g b e t w e e n p r i m e M i n i s t e r N a k a s o n e and C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s t A d v i s o r y C o m m i t t e e C h a i r m a n Deng X i a o p i n g , b o t h l e a d e r s s t a t e d t h a t j a p a n and C h i n a w a n t e d t o p r o m o t e " n u c l e a r d i s a r m a m e n t o n a g l o b a l s c a l e " a n d t h a t t h e i n c r e a s i n g S o v i e t d e p l o y m e n t on S S 20s i s a m a j o r p r o b l e m f a c i n g b o t h C h i n a and j a p a n . A s a h i S h i m b u n , 26 March 1 9 8 4 , p . 2, a s t r a n s l a t e d a n d r e p r i n t e d i n DSJP, March 3 1 A p r i l 2, 1 9 8 4 , p . 1 1 . J a p a n and C h i n a a l s o a n n o u n c e d an a g r e e m e n t " t o t r a d e t h e i r own i n f o r m a t i o n " o n S S - 2 0 d e p l o y m e n t . 16. " J a p a n Ban I n c l u d e s U.S. W a r s h i p , " The T i m e s ( L o n d o n ) , 10 A u g u s t 1 9 8 4 , p . 5; and " N a k a s o n e t o Deny N u c l e a r - A r m e d S h i p s P r o t o c o l s , " F B I S , A s i a S^ P a c i f i c ( D a i l y R e p o r t ) , 9 Aug u s t 19 8 4 , p . C - 1 . 17. R o b e r t Whymant, "Tokyo S e t s Out C o n d i t i o n s f o r N u c l e a r D e f e n s e , " The G u a r d i a n , 20 F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 5 , p . 4; a n d " N a k a s o n e A p p r o v e s U.S. N u c l e a r D e f e n s e of j a p a n , " F B I S , A s i a Pacific ( D a i l y R e p o r t ) , 19 F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 5 , p . C - 1 . 18. " J a p a n K e e n f o r N . Z . , U . S . t o S t a y o n E v e n K e e l , " Th e A u s t r a l i a n F i n a n c i a l R e v i e w , 12 F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 5 , p . 1 4 . 19. R e s e a r c h I n s t i t u t e f o r p e a c e and S e c u r i t y , A s i a n S e c u r i t y 1984, (Tokyo: RIPS, 1984), p. 205. Also s e e comments by Masamichi i n o k i , c h a i r m a n of t h e B o a r d of D i r e c t o r s , RIPS, i n an i n t e r v i e w c o n d u c t e d by t h e J a p a n e s e M a g a z i n e J i t s u g y o k a i [ d a t e , p l a c e , and i d e n t i t y o f i n t e r v i e w e r n o t s p e c i f i e d ] (1 F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 3 ) , p p . 2 4 27, as r e p r i n t e d i n j o i n t p u b l i c a t i o n s R e s e a r c h s e r v i c e (JPRS), J A R - 8 4 - 0 0 6 , J a p a n R e p o r t , 23 March 1 9 8 4 , e s p e c i a l l y p p . 2 6 - 2 8 .

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20. "14 C o u n t r i e s i n A r e a Back N u c l e a r - F r e e p a c i f i c Z o n e , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l H e r a l d T r i b u n e , 28 August 1984, p. 5; and " N u c l e a r F r e e Zone To Be S e t up i n P a c i f i c , " D a i l y T e l e g r a p h ( L o n d o n ) , 29 A u g u s t 1984, p. 6. 21 . "ASEAN M i n i s t e r s Communique," FBIS, Asia & P a c i f i c ( D a i l y R e p o r t ) , 12 J u l y 1984, p. A - 7 . 22. U.S., C o n g r e s s , S e n a t e , S u b c o m m i t t e e on E a s t A s i a n and p a c i f i c A f f a i r s o f t h e C o m m i t t e e on F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s , Japan's C o n t r i b u t i o n t o M i l i t a r y S t a b i l i t y i n Northeast A s i a , 96th cong., 2nd s e s s . , June 1980, pp. 4 3 - 4 4 . 23. As c i t e d by Denis W a r n e r , " J a p a n ' s G l o b a l and R e g i o n a l S t r a t e g i c p e r c e p t i o n s , " p a c i f i c D e f e n s e R e p o r t e r 11, no. 11 (May 1985):31• 24. The N a t i o n a l D e f e n s e program O u t l i n e i s s u m m a r i z e d i n comprehensive terms by N i s h i h a r a , "Expanding japan's C r e d i b l e Def e n s e R o l e , " i n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y 8, no. 3 ( W i n t e r 1 9 8 3 - 1 9 8 4 ) , e s p e c i a l l y pp. 180-185. 25. See J a c o b s , " N o r t h A s i a n N a v a l F o r c e s , " p. 66, f o r a comprehensive map-graph of the proposed Sea-Lane Defense Concept. A l s o see Niksch, "Japanese Defense p o l i c y : Suzuki's Shrinking Opt i o n s , " j o u r n a l of Northeast Asian Studies 1, no. 2 (June 1982):84; and D e f e n s e o f Japan 1984, p. 56. 26. Defense of japan 1984, p . 6 7 . 27. Jacobs, "North Asian Naval F o r c e s , " p . 66. 28. Ibid. 29. I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e f o r S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s , The M i l i t a r y Balance, 1984-1985 (London, I I S S , 1984), p. 101. 30. As o u t l i n e d by Def ense of Japan 1 984, p . 67 . 31. Kensuke E b a t a , "Japan C o n s i d e r s C o n t e n d e r s f o r A i r R e f u e l i n g T a n k e r , " Jane's D e f e n s e W e e k l y , 23 F e b r u a r y 1985, pp. 31 3-318. 32. "Nakasone C a l l s f o r SDF Buildup," Japan Times Weekly 25, no. 14 (6 A p r i l 1 9 8 5 ) : 3 ; and " N a k a s o n e , K a t o D i s c u s s New D e f e n s e program," FBIS, Asia S p a c i f i c ( D a i l y R e p o r t ) , 15 A p r i l 1985, p. C4. 33. Defense of japan 1984, p . 66. 34. The p r o g r e s s i v e a t t a c k s o f t h e C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a g a i n s t t h e q u a n t i t a t i v e d e f i c i e n c i e s o f Japan's 1980 and 1981 d e f e n s e budgets are b e s t surveyed by Cliae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, U.S. p o l i c y Toward Japan and Korea: JV Changing I n f l u e n c e R e l a t i o n s h i p (New York: p r a e g e r , 1982), pp. 134-135. 35. perhaps the most d e f i n i t i v e s t a t e m e n t of the Reagan adm i n i s t r a t i o n ' s approach was o f f e r e d by then A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of Defense f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y A f f a i r s , Frances J. West, j r . , t e s t i f y i n g i n Hearings b e f o r e the Committee on F o r e i g n A f f a i r s and i t s subcommittees on I n t e r n a t i o n a l Economic p o l i c y and Trade and on Asian p a c i f i c A f f a i r s , United S t a t e s - J a p a n R e l a t i o n s , 97th c o n g . , 2nd s e s s . , 1 March 1982, p. 26: The Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n [has] adopted a p o l i c y of not c r i t i c i z i n g i t s a l l i e s i n p u b l i c and o f d i s c u s s i n g d e f e n s e c o o p e r a t i o n on t h e b a s i s of r o l e s and m i s s i o n s r a t h e r than on a r b i t r a r y s t a t i s t i c a l i n d i c e s such as percentages of GNP, which by themselves are not n e c e s s a r i l y meaningful.

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3 6 . " I n t e r v i e w w i t h U.S. D e p u t y A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of Def e n s e [ j a m e s B l a k e r ] ; E x p e c t a t i o n s p l a c e d on ' E a s i n g of T e n s i o n on K o r e a n P e n i n s u l a ' ; S o v i e t N u c l e a r Weapons E x c e s s i v e ; j a p a n s h o u l d C o m p l e m e n t S t r a t e g y T o w a r d USSR," M a i n i c h i s h i m b u n , 22 N o v e m b e r 1984 and t r a n s l a t e d i n DSJP, 4 December 1984, p. 1. 3 7 . Background on t h e d o m e s t i c J a p a n e s e p o l i t i c a l d e b a t e i s p r o v i d e d by O l s e n , U . S . - J a p a n R e c i p r o c i t y , pp. 9 8 - 1 0 1 ; and i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t e f o r S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s , S t r a t e g i c S u r v e y , 1984-1985 (London: I I S S , 1985), p . 9 4 . On o v e r a l l J a p a n e s e p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n p a r t y s t r e n g t h s , s e e Fukuoka M a s a y u k i , "The A i l i n g O p p o s i t i o n , " j a p a n E c h o 1 2 , n o . 1 ( S p r i ng 1 9 8 5 ) : 4 5 - 5 0 . On t h e s p e c i f i c i s s u e , c o n s u l t r e m a r k s o f JDA D i r e c t o r - G e n e r a l Yuko K u r i h a r a i n Tokyo Shimbun, 3 J a n u a r y 1984, as t r a n s l a t e d and r e p r i n t e d i n DSJP, 12 J a n u a r y 1 9 8 4 , p p . 3 - 4 . 3 8 . S e e " T r o u b l e S p o t s : J a p a n ' s Yes t o U.S. T r o o p s , " New S t r a i t s T i m e s , 2 F e b r u a r y 1980, p. 32. 39. N i s h i h a r a , " C r e d i b l e D e f e n s e , " p . 196. 4 0 . R o b e r t Whymant, "Green B e r e t s S t r e t c h D e f e n s e p a c t w i t h J a p a n , " The G u a r d i a n , 3 A u g u s t 1984, p . 5 . 4 1 . D e f e n s e of J a p a n 1984, p . 1 7 9 . 42. Olsen, U.S.-Japan Reciprocity, pp. 16-17. 4 3 . Y a t s u h i r o Nakagawa, "The WEPTO O p t i o n : J a p a n ' s New R o l e i n E a s t A s i a / p a c i f i c C o l l e c t i v e S e c u r i t y , " Asian Survey 24, no. 8 (August 1 9 8 4 ) : 8 3 7 . 4 4 . D e f e n s e of J a p a n 1 9 8 4 , p p . 1 7 1 - 1 7 2 ; and W i l l i a m T. Tow, "U.S.-Japan M i l i t a r y T e c h n o l o g y T r a n s f e r s : C o l l a b o r a t i o n or Conf l i c t ? " j o u r n a l of N o r t h e a s t A s i a n S t u d i e s 2, n o . 4 ( D e c e m b e r 1983):10-14. 4 5 . See Tow, i b i d . , p p . 3 - 2 3 . 4 6 . "U.S. I n t e r e s t e d i n J a p a n ' s M i l i t a r y T e c h n o l o g y , " The J a p a n Economic J o u r n a l ( I n t e r n a t i o n a l Weekly of Nihon K e i z a i Shimb u n ) , 23, n o . 1162 (4 J u n e 1 9 8 5 ) : 1 , 19; and W i l l i a m J . H o l s t e i n e t a l . , "The p e n t a g o n Heads f o r a S h o p p i n g S p r e e i n J a p a n , " B u s i n e s s Week (8 J u l y 1 9 8 5 ) : 4 0 - 4 1 . 4 7 . B a r n e t t , Beyond W a r , p p . 1 - 1 4 , p r o v i d e s u s e f u l a n a l y s i s on t h i s p o i n t . 4 8 . B r u c e R o s c o e , "A New New O r d e r , " F a r E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c R e v i e w , 31 J a n u a r y 1 9 8 5 , p p . 2 8 - 3 0 , p r o v i d e s b a c k g r o u n d o n t h i s revised Japanese r e g i o n a l approach. 4 9 . As n o t e d i n Lim Hua S i n g ' s " J a p a n e s e p e r s p e c t i v e s o n M a l a y s i a ' s 'Look E a s t ' p o l i c y , " S o u t h e a s t Asian A f f a i r s , 1984, e s p e c i a l l y pp. 244-245. 50. For b a c k g r o u n d on J a p a n e s e e c o n o m i c i n i t a t i v e s t o ASEAN d u r i n g r e c e n t y e a r s , s e e C h a r l e s E. M o r r i s o n , J a p a n , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and ^ Changing S o u t h e a s t A s i a (London: U n i v e r s i t y p r e s s of A m e r i c a w i t h The A s i a S o c i e t y , 1 9 8 5 ) , p p . 3 5 - 3 8 . A l s o s e e C h r i s S h e r w i l l , "ASEAN C r o s s e s S w o r d s w i t h J a p a n , " F i n a n c i a l T i m e s , 3 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 3 , p . 3. 51 . For a s s e s s m e n t s on M a h a t h i r ' s o v e r a l l o u t l o o k s e e j u r e k M a r t i n , " j a p a n and i t s N e i g h b o r s , " F i n a n c i a l Times, 31 A u g u s t 1984, p . 1 1 ; and Ahmad R e j a l A r b e e , " p r o s a n d Cons of T i e s w i t h j a p a n , " j a p a n T i m e s , 30 O c t o b e r 1984, p. 18. 5 2 . " T h a c h , Abe A g r e e H a n o i S h o u l d M e e t w i t h ASEAN," J a p a n T i m e s , 4 O c t o b e r 1 9 8 4 , p . 1; a n d W h y m a n t , " j a p a n a n d H a n o i p o l e s A p a r t , " The G u a r d i a n , 4 O c t o b e r 1 9 8 4 , p . 7 .

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53. Sam J a m e s o n , " F e a r s Grow i n S e o u l of New N o r t h K o r e a B u i l d u p b y S o v i e t s , " Los Angeles T i m e s , 9 J u n e 1984, p. 2. 5 4 . G e o f f r e y Murray, " J a p a n T r i e s Out More A c t i v e D i p l o m a t i c R o l e i n P e r s i a n Gulf War," The C h r i s t i a n S c i e n c e M o n i t o r , 13 J u n e 1984, p. 13; J u r e k M a r t i n , " j a p a n May P l a y More A c t i v e R o l e i n Bid t o End I r a n - I r a q W a r , " F i n a n c i a l T i m e s , 5 J u n e 1 9 8 4 , p . 1 1 ; a n d S t u a r t A u e r b a c h , " J a p a n S u r p a s s e s U.S. as S a u d i ' s Chief S u p p l i e r , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l H e r a l d T r i b u n e , 11 F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 4 , p . 2 . F o r b a c k g r o u n d on e m e r g i n g J a p a n e s e p o l i c i e s i n t h e G u l f , c o n s u l t M. Y o s h i t s u , Caught i n t h e Middle E a s t : Japan's Diplomacy i n T r a n s i t i o n ( L e x i n g t o n , Mass.: L e x i n g t o n Books, 1984). 5 5 . "Abe O u t l i n e s F o r e i g n p o l i c y a t a D i e t S e s s i o n , " F B I S , Asia p a c i f i c ( D a i l y R e p o r t ) , 30 J a n u a r y 1985, p. C - 1 3 . 56. F r a n c e s Lai F u n g - w a i , " J a p a n ' s D e f e n s e P o l i c y and I t s I m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e ASEAN C o u n t r i e s , " i n I n s t i t u t e o f S o u t h e a s t A s i a n S t u d i e s , S o u t h e a s t A s i a n A f f a i r s , 1 9 8 4 ( S i n g a p o r e : ISAS, 1984), p. 60. 57. S o u t h e a s t A s i a n f e a r s of J a p a n e s e n a v a l e x p a n s i o n a r e d i s c u s s e d by T a k a s h i Oka, " S o u t h e a s t A s i a Wary of C h a n g i n g R o l e s of J a p a n and U.S. i n p a c i f i c , " The C h r i s t i a n S c i e n c e M o n i t o r , 10 J u l y 1984, p. 10. A more o p t i m i s t i c a s s e s s m e n t i s a r e p o r t a s s e r t i n g t h a t " j a p a n Sea Lane D e f e n s e D o e s n ' t Worry M a h a t h i r , " j a p a n Times, 26 J a n u a r y 1 9 8 3 , p . 1 . D u r i n g h i s J a n u a r y 1 9 8 3 t o u r of t h e ASEAN R e g i o n , N a k a s o n e d i s c u s s e d p r o s p e c t s of l i m i t e d J a p a n e s e n a v a l expansion with a l l h i s Southeast Asian c o u n t e r p a r t s w i t h o u t r a i s i n g v i s i b i l y s h a r p o p p o s i t i o n i n t h e c o n t e x t of J a p a n ' s l i m i t e d p a t r o l ling objectives capabilities. 5 8 . A J a p a n e s e a c c o u n t of t h e l i m i t e d n a t u r e of t a c i t J a p a n South Korea s e c u r i t y r e l a t i o n s i s " F o r w a r d Looking A t t i t u d e Toward S e t t l e m e n t of P e n d i n g M a t t e r s : New Era Marked b y P r e s i d e n t Chun's V i s i t t o J a p a n , " S a n k e i , 9 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 4 , a s t r a n s l a t e d and r e p r i n t e d i n P S J P , 21 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 4 , p . 5 . Also see Horuguchi, " V i g o r o u s S o v i e t B u i l d u p , " p . 3 5 ; and A s i a n S e c u r i t y 1 9 8 4 , p . 180 f o r more g e n e r a l s u m m a r i e s . 59. See " U . S . - J a p a n i n J o i n t M i l i t a r y p l a n , " A s i a n D e f e n s e Journal (February 1985):88. 6 0 . N i k s c h , "South Korea i n B r o a d e r p a c i f i c D e f e n s e , " j o u r n a l of N o r t h e a s t A s i a n S t u d i e s 2, n o . 1 ( S p r i n g 1 9 8 3 ) : 9 4 - 9 5 ; and " S t r e n g t h e n i n g o f S o v i e t M i l i t a r y P o w e r and D e p l o y m e t of F - 1 6 s , " M a i n i c h i Shimbun, 5 A p r i l 1985, p. 5 as t r a n s l a t e d and r e p r i n t e d i n DSJP, 11 A p r i l 1 9 8 5 , p p . 2 - 3 . 61 . Wolf M e n d l , Wes t e r n E u r o p e &_ J a p a n B e t w e e n t h e S u p e r p o w e r s (New Y o r k : S t . M a r t i n ' s , 1 9 8 4 ) , p . 1 5 3 .

7 The Two Koreas: Security, Diplomacy, and Peace Young Whan Kihl

The p r e c a r i o u s m i l i t a r y b a l a n c e on t h e Korean P e n i n s u l a i s c o m p l i c a t e d by r e c e n t d i p l o m a t i c a c t i v i t i e s c o n c e r n ing Korea. With t h e i n t e r - K o r e a n arms r a c e i n t e n s i f i e d , any move t o w a r d r e d u c t i o n o f t e n s i o n s on t h e K o r e a n P e n i n s u l a would be welcomed and r e g a r d e d as e n c o u r a g i n g . H o w e v e r , any a t t e m p t t o b r e a k t h e s t a l e m a t e i n i n t e r Korean r e l a t i o n s through d i p l o m a t i c maneuvering w i l l a l s o i n t r o d u c e new e l e m e n t s of u n c e r t a i n t y and r i s k - - a s w e l l as r e s i s t a n c e t o c h a n g e by v e s t e d and e n t r e n c h e d i n t e r e s t s - - t h e r e b y i n c r e a s i n g t h e d a n g e r of u n s t a b i l i t y and p o t e n t i a l war b e t w e e n t h e t w o h a l v e s o f d i v i d e d Korea. 1 The a r m s r a c e i n K o r e a h a s r e a c h e d t h e p o i n t o f no r e t u r n - - t h e Korean P e n i n s u l a in t h e 1980s has t u r n e d i n t o an armed c a m p . As o n e o f t h e m o s t h e a v i l y m i l i t a r i z e d and f o r t i f i e d s p o t s i n t h e w o r l d , d i v i d e d K o r e a n h a s become a dangerous powder keg where s l i g h t p r o v o c a t i o n might i g n i t e and i n v o l v e t h e o u t s i d e p o w e r s . 2 The r e l a t i v e l y e v e n l y m a t c h e d m i l i t a r y and p o w e r b a l a n c e between t h e two Koreas i n t h e 1980s may s h i f t and f a v o r o n e s i d e o v e r t h e o t h e r as a r e s u l t o f t h e d y n a m i c i n t e r p l a y of s e v e r a l f a c t o r s : i n c r e a s e d S o v i e t m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s and p r e s e n c e i n t h e r e g i o n ; C h i n e s e d i p l o m a t i c p r e s s u r e s on North Korea t o improve i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h S o u t h K o r e a and a l s o w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ; and t h e d y n a m i c s o f i n t e r - K o r e a n d i a l o g u e and c o m p e t i t i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e f u t u r e of K o r e a . 3 KOREA AND THE CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT The s h i f t i n g m a j o r p o w e r r e l a t i o n s i n t h e r e g i o n h a v e had a g r e a t i m p a c t on K o r e a and e s p e c i a l l y on t h e d i p l o m a t i c a l i g n m e n t o f t h e r e s p e c t i v e Korean r e g i m e s . T h i s a r t i c l e a p p e a r s as " E v o l v i n g I n t e r - K o r e a n R e l a t i o n s : S e c u r i t y , D i p l o m a c y , and p e a c e , " K o r e a & W o r l d A f f a i r s , v o l . 9 , n o . 3 ( F a l l 1 9 8 5 ) , pp. 4 4 1 - 4 6 8 .

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1 52 T h e t w o K o r e a s ' s e c u r i t y e n v i r o n m e n t , l i k e t h a t of a n y o t h e r c o u n t r y , i s s h a p e d by a h o s t of f a c t o r s , s o m e o f w h i c h a r e f i x e d , s u c h a s g e o g r a p h y , and o t h e r s t h a t a r e c o n s t a n t l y c h a n g i n g , s u c h as p o l i t i c s , e c o n o m i c s , and military capabilities.4 Changes in Korea's s e c u r i t y e n v i r o n m e n t , m o r e o v e r , a r e a l s o a f f e c t e d by d e v e l o p m e n t s w i t h i n e a c h K o r e a n s t a t e and b e t w e e n t h e t w o K o r e a s . G e o p o l i t i c a l l y , t h e Korean P e n i n s u l a i s t h e s t r a t e g i c f u l c r u m of E a s t A s i a w h e r e t h e i n t e r e s t s of f o u r m a j o r p o w e r s — t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , C h i n a , J a p a n , and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s — c o n v e r g e and c r i s s c r o s s . I t is not s u r p r i s i n g , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t in t h e one hundred y e a r s p r i o r t o 1985 t h r e e m a j o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l w a r s h a v e b e e n waged o v e r t h e c o n t r o l of t h e K o r e a n P e n i n s u l a : t h e S i n o J a p a n e s e War of 1 8 9 4 - 1 8 9 5 , t h e R u s s o - J a p a n e s e War of 1 9 0 4 - 1 9 0 5 , and t h e K o r e a n War of 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 5 3 , t h e l a s t o n e i n v o l v i n g t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and C h i n a , among o t h e r s , a s major belligerents. As a p e n i n s u l a , K o r e a i s n o t o n l y v u l n e r a b l e t o a t t a c k by s e a b u t a l s o i s d e e p l y a f f e c t e d by t h e l a t e s t d e v e l o p m e n t s i n n a v a l w a r f a r e as s u p p o r t f r o m any a l l y n o t o n t h e A s i a n m a i n l a n d m u s t a r r i v e by s e a o r a i r . Because t h e Korean P e n i n s u l a is poor in n a t u r a l res o u r c e s , i t s e c o n o m i c w e l l - b e i n g d e p e n d s on w o r l d t r a d e : i t s i m p o r t and e x p o r t a c t i v i t i e s d e p e n d on t h e s u p p l y l i n e from the sea. The f a c t t h a t S o u t h K o r e a c o n t r o l s o n e s i d e of t h e i m p o r t a n t S t r a i t of K o r e a ( T s u s h i m a ) , w h i c h i s o n e of t h e f o u r m a i n c h o k e p o i n t s f o r e n t r a n c e i n t o t h e S e a of J a p a n f r o m t h e P a c i f i c , a l s o e n h a n c e s South Korea's s t r a t e g i c v a l u e . 5 In t h e 1 9 8 0 s , t h e s t r a t e g i c e n v i r o n m e n t i n N o r t h e a s t A s i a s u r r o u n d i n g t h e K o r e a n P e n i n s u l a i s f l u i d and u n c e r t a i n due t o t h e h e i g h t e n e d t e n s i o n in U.S.-Soviet r e l a t i o n s , t h e c o n t i n u e d S i n o - S o v i e t c o n f l i c t , and t h e i m p r o v e m e n t i n U . S . - S i n o and Si n o - J a p a n e s e r e l a t i o n s . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e s e c u r i t y e n v i r o n m e n t on t h e K o r e an P e n i n s u l a i s r a p i d l y c h a n g i n g b e c a u s e of i n c r e a s e d Soviet m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s in the r e g i o n , a heightened S o v i e t c o n c e r n a b o u t d e v e l o p m e n t s i n N o r t h K o r e a , and an e v o l v i n g d e f a c t o t r i p l e e n t e n t e b e t w e e n t h e U.S., C h i na, and J a p a n ( t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t s u c h m a j o r p o w e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s p r o d u c e a n e g a t i v e i m p a c t on K o r e a ) . Soviet

and U . S .

Force

Deployment

Both N o r t h and S o u t h K o r e a a r e c o n s i d e r e d s t r a t e g i c a s s e t s by t h e m a j o r p o w e r s a n d by t h e c o u n t r i e s t h a t b o r d e r t h e t w o K o r e a s : i n t h e c a s e of a m a j o r w a r , b o t h Korean s t a t e s could p r o v i d e e x c e l l e n t naval s u p p o r t f a c i l i t i e s and a i r b a s e s t o o u t s i d e p o w e r s i n the reg ion. The S o v i e t U n i o n p r e s e n t l y m a i n t a i n s no n a v a l s u p p o r t f a c i l i t i e s , ground f o r c e s , or a i r bases in North Korea. However, t h e S o v i e t P a c i f i c F l e e t h e a d q u a r t e r e d in Vladivostok (across from t h e S o v i e t - N o r t h Korean

153 b o r d e r ) c o u l d e a s i l y u s e s e v e r a l o f North K o r e a ' s e x c e l l e n t p o r t f a c i l i t i e s in t h e Sea of J a p a n . North K o r e a ' s p o r t c i t i e s , s u c h a s C h o g j i n , U n g g i , and N a j i n , c o u l d v e r y w e l l s e r v e as s u b s i d i a r y l o a d i n g p o i n t s f o r c a r g o destined for the Soviet maritime province. The r e c e n t l y n e g o t i a t e d North K o r e a - S o v i e t border t r e a t y , s i g n e d i n 1 9 8 4 and p u t i n t o e f f e c t i n 1 9 8 5 , may g i v e both c o u n t r i e s b e t t e r a c c e s s t o each o t h e r ' s t e r r i t o r y , e c o n o m i c a l l y and m i l i t a r i l y . A l t h o u g h t h e common b o r d e r s h a r e d by b o t h c o u n t r i e s r u n s o n l y f o r f i f t e e n m i l e s a l o n g t h e Tumen R i v e r i n t h e n o r t h e a s t e r n c o r n e r of t h e Korean P e n i n s u l a , s e v e r a l c r o s s i n g p o i n t s a c t as v i t a l c o n n e c t i n g t r a n s p o r t a t i o n l i n k s , b o t h r a i l w a y and h i g h w a y , b e t w e e n t h e two c o u n t r i e s . With S o v i e t t e c h n i c a l s u p p o r t , t h e p o r t f a c i l i t i e s of N a j i n have been e x p a n d e d and m o d e r n i z e d . An o i l r e f i n e r y w a s b u i l t i n U n g g i , h a l f w a y b e t w e e n N a j i n and t h e S o v i e t b o r d e r . 6 R e c e n t l y , J a p a n ' s S a n k e i Sh imbun r e p o r t e d a S o v i e t test-flight a c r o s s t h e narrow neck of North K o r e a ' s e a s t - w e s t c o r r i d o r a l o n g t h e DMZ, a f l i g h t t h a t may h a v e p o l i t i c a l a s w e l l as s t r a t e g i c s i g n i f i c a n c e . 7 T h i s may h a v e b e e n o n e o f t h e r e s u l t s o f Kim I l - S u n g ' s 1984 Moscow v i s i t and t h e s u b s e q u e n t b o r d e r t r e a t y n e g o t i a t e d in 1984. P o l i t i c a l l y , N o r t h K o r e a h a s now a g r e e d t o s u p p o r t S o v i e t a c c e s s t o North K o r e a , as i t d i d w i t h C h i n a i n 198 3. In t h a t i n s t a n c e , North K o r e a made t h e p o r t c i t y of Chongjin a v a i l a b l e f o r cargo t r a n s s h i p m e n t f o r Japan-China t r a d e in order to s e r v e the i n t e r i o r of China's n o r t h e a s t province.8 Strategically, S o v i e t a c c e s s t o North K o r e a ' s a i r space also is important because i t provides the Soviets w i t h an a l t e r n a t i v e r o u t e and c h a n n e l f o r t h e t r a n s a i r l i n k b e t w e e n t h e S o v i e t F a r E a s t and S o v i e t s t a t i o n s in t h e Cam Ranh a i r b a s e s i n V i e t n a m . Prior to this acc e s s , t h e S o v i e t a i r r o u t e had been o v e r t h e n a r r o w S t r a i t o f T s u s h i m a b e t w e e n t h e S e a o f J a p a n and t h e South China Sea. Now w i t h t h e c o o p e r a t i o n o f N o r t h Korea, t h e S o v i e t Air F o r c e can proceed from t h e Sea of J a p a n t o t h e Y e l l o w S e a v i a North K o r e a , t h e r e b y b y p a s s i n g and a v o i d i n g t h e d a n g e r o u s c o r r i d o r b e t w e e n J a p a n and S o u t h K o r e a . The S o v i e t i n t e r e s t i n K o r e a i s c l o s e l y t i e d w i t h its overall global strategic designs.9 Although t h e S o v i e t f o r c e deployment in the r e g i o n — b o t h c o n v e n t i o n a l and n u c l e a r — i s a i m e d p r i m a r i l y a t t h e c o u n t r i e s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , s u c h a s C h i n a and J a p a n , i t has r e c e n t l y e x t e n d e d beyond t h e t r a d i t i o n a l l i n e of d e f e n s e t o i n c l u d e c o u n t r i e s l i k e V i e t n a m and p o s s i b l y North K o r e a . Intermediate-range nuclear delivery syst e m s m a i n t a i n e d by t h e S o v i e t Union i n A s i a i n c l u d e t h e 5,000 S S - 2 0 , a m o b i l e m i s s i l e with a range of about k i l o m e t e r s , and t h e TU-22M B a c k f i r e , a h i g h - p e r f o r m a n c e bomber c a p a b l e o f p e n e t r a t i n g a i r s p a c e a t low a l t i t u d e s and h i g h s p e e d s . Of t h e 3 5 1 S S - 2 0 s ( c a r r y i n g three MIRVed w a r h e a d s ) d e p l o y e d s i n c e 1 9 7 7 , a b o u t 1 4 4 a r e d e p l o y e d i n t h e F a r E a s t , and 8 0 o f t h e m o r e t h a n 2 0 0

1 54

B a c k f i r e bombers a r e in A s i a , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e 1983 w h i t e p a p e r on d e f e n s e p u b l i s h e d by t h e J a p a n D e f e n s e Agency.10 The S o v i e t Union a l s o has deployed c o n s i d e r a b l e c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s i n t h e r e g i o n e a s t of Lake B a i k a l , with a p p r o x i m a t e l y 3 7 0 , 0 0 0 t r o o p s , 820 v e s s e l s d i s p l a c i n g o v e r 1 . 6 m i l l i o n t o n s , and 2 , 1 0 0 a i r c r a f t . The main components o f t h e S o v i e t weaponry i n c l u d e MIG2 3 s , l o n g - r a n g e 130-mm c a n n o n s , and M I - 2 4 Hind g r o u n d a t t a c k gunship h e l i c o p t e r s . 1 1 By c o m p a r i s o n , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s m a i n t a i n s no n a v a l s u p p o r t f a c i l i t i e s in South K o r e a , perhaps b e c a u s e t h e United S t a t e s h a s a c c e s s t o J a p a n ' s nearby n a v a l f a c i l i t i e s i n S a s e b o and Yokosuka. But t h e United S t a t e s h a s e x t e n s i v e u s e of a i r b a s e s i n South Korea i n f o u r l o c a t i o n s : K u n s a n , O s a n , Suwon, and T a e g u . Together with o t h e r a i r b a s e s i n J a p a n and O k i n a w a , s u c h as I w a k u n i , A t s u g i , Y o k o t a , Misawa, Futenma, and Kadena, U.S. p l a n e s on Korean a i r b a s e s p r o v i d e t a c t i c a l s u p p o r t not o n l y t o U.S. g r o u n d f o r c e s i n Y o n g s a n and a l o n g t h e DMZ i n Camp C a s e y b u t a l s o t o R e p u b l i c o f K o r e a (ROK) d e f e n s e forces. T o t a l U.S. f o r c e s i n K o r e a c u r r e n t l y number a b o u t 40,462. Of t h e s e , about 2 9 , 2 3 2 a r e a s s i g n e d t o t h e U.S. 8 t h Army, which i n c l u d e s t h e 2nd i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n , t h e 19th s u p p o r t command, s u p p o r t i n g a v i a t i o n and e n g i n e e r g r o u p s , and v a r i o u s s m a l l e r s u p p o r t u n i t s . The o t h e r component o f U.S. f o r c e s i s t h e 3 1 4 t h a i r d i v i s i o n , w i t h t a c t i c a l f i g h t e r w i n g s and s q u a d r o n s l o c a t e d i n f o u r s e p a r a t e a i r bases already mentioned.12 The U.S. d e p l o y m e n t o f f o r c e s i n t h e r e g i o n i s c o n s i d e r a b l y l e s s i n number t h a n t h a t of t h e S o v i e t s . 1 3 The m a i n s t a y o f t h e U.S. f o r c e i n E a s t A s i a a r e U.S. f o r c e s i n K o r e a , w i t h 4 0 , 0 0 0 t r o o p s and a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1 0 0 a i r c r a f t , and t h e U.S. 7 t h F l e e t , w i t h 2 3 0 a i r c r a f t and 65 v e s s e l s amounting t o some 6 7 0 , 0 0 0 t o n n a g e s . Also about 3 3 , 0 0 0 U.S. M a r i n e s a r e on Okinawa a s s i g n e d t o t h e 7th F l e e t . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c a n r e l y on J a p a n S e l f - D e f e n s e F o r c e s (SDF) c o n s i s t i n g o f 1 5 6 , 0 0 0 t r o o p s , 350 a i r c r a f t , and 166 v e s s e l s amounting t o some 232,000 tons.114 The U n i t e d S t a t e s c a n a l s o r e l y on Taiwan and p o s s i b l y China f o r s u p p o r t a g a i n s t t h e S o v i e t t h r e a t in t h e region. Whereas Taiwan m a i n t a i n s s i z e a b l e m i l i t a r y f o r c e s c o n s i s t i n g o f 3 3 0 , 0 0 0 t r o o p s , 547 a i r c r a f t , and 170 v e s s e l s amounting t o a t o n n a g e o f 8 6 , 0 0 0 , China i s A s i a ' s l a r g e s t m i l i t a r y power with 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 r e g u l a r t r o o p s , 6 , 1 0 0 combat a i r c r a f t , and 2 , 6 5 0 v e s s e l s amounting t o a t o n n a g e of 6 6 5 , 0 0 0 . 1 5 No known deployment o f n u c l e a r warheads e x i s t s i n North K o r e a . However, t h e United S t a t e s reportedly m a i n t a i n s a n u c l e a r weapons s y s t e m i n South Korea c o n s i s t i n g of more t h a n 1 , 0 0 0 w a r h e a d s . Establishing a n u c l e a r - f r e e zone f o r t h e Korean P e n i n s u l a , p r o p o s e d s o f a r by v a r i o u s p e a c e movement g r o u p s , may be a v i a b l e o p t i o n i n t h e f u t u r e , but now i t i s an i d e a l p l a n r a t h e r than a p r a c t i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e .

155

The Major P o w e r s '

Policies

Toward

Korea

The m a j o r p o w e r s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e Korean P e n i n s u l a g e n e r a l l y m a i n t a i n an a c t i v e i n t e r e s t i n t h e o v e r a l l s i t u a t i o n and s p e c i f i c d e v e l o p m e n t s in each Korean s t a t e , and t h e y a c t i v e l y p u r s u e a p u b l i c l y s t a t e d p o l i c y o f p r o m o t i n g p e a c e and s t a b i l i t y on t h e peninsula. S e c u r i t y t i e s t h a t b o t h N o r t h and S o u t h K o r e a m a i n t a i n w i t h t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e a l l i e s a r e an i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e s t r a t e g i c v a l u e s and i m p o r t a n c e t h a t t h e m a j o r p o w e r s a t t a c h t o t h e Korean P e n i n s u l a . North K o r e a , f o r i n s t a n c e , is the only communist country t h a t is a l l i e d w i t h b o t h t h e S o v i e t U n i o n and C h i n a , by v i r t u e o f a T r e a t y o f F r i e n d s h i p , C o o p e r a t i o n , and Mutual A s s i s t a n c e s i g n e d w i t h each c o u n t r y i n 1 9 6 1 . South K o r e a l i k e w i s e i s an i m p o r t a n t U . S . a l l y i n E a s t A s i a , w i t h t h e M u t u a l S e c u r i t y Treaty signed in 1954. The U.S.-ROK J o i n t Combined F o r c e s ( w h i c h r e p l a c e d t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s Command) a s w e l l a s a n n u a l U.S.-ROK s e c u r i t y c o n s u l t a t i v e m e e t i n g s a r e i n s t i t u t i o n a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of t h e c l o s e s e c u r i t y t i e s e s t a b l i s h e d between t h e two c o u n t r i e s . 16 N e i t h e r North Korea nor South K o r e a , h o w e v e r , i s p a r t y t o m u l t i l a t e r a l d e f e n s e a g r e e m e n t s , s u c h as t h e North A t l a n t i c T r e a t y O r g a n i z a t i o n (NATO) o r t h e Warsaw T r e a t y O r g a n i z a t i o n (WTO). The U n i t e d S t a t e s U.S. p o l i c y t o w a r d K o r e a f o c u s e s on m a i n t a i n i n g a s t a b l e s t r a t e g i c and p o l i t i c a l e n v i r o n m e n t t h r o u g h t h e p r e v e n t i o n of armed c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n t h e two h o s t i l e K o r e a n s t a t e s and t h e a v o i d a n c e o f hegemony on t h e p e n i n s u l a by any o u t s i d e p o w e r . Renewal o f armed c o n f l i c t in K o r e a would p o s e a p o t e n t i a l l y g r a v e t h r e a t t o t h e s e c u r i t y o f J a p a n , t o r e g i o n a l s t a b i l i t y , and t o U . S . i n t e r e s t s . 1 7 The p r e s e n c e o f U . S . c o m b a t f o r c e s i n S o u t h K o r e a i s t h u s an i m p o r t a n t means o f p r e s e r v i n g s t a b i l i t y on t h e Korean P e n i n s u l a . In t h e wake of r a p i d c h a n g e i n t h e A s i a n s t r a t e g i c environment f o l l o w i n g Sino-U.S. rapprochement in the e a r l y 1 9 7 0 s , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a s not a l w a y s f o l l o w e d a c o n s i s t e n t p o l i c y t o w a r d K o r e a , as t h e r e v e r s a l o f t h e i l l - f a t e d C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n p o l i c y on ground t r o o p s w i t h d r a w a l from K o r e a i l l u s t r a t e s . 1 8 Nevertheless, the b a s i c U.S. p o l i c y g o a l of m a i n t a i n i n g a s e c u r i t y a l l i a n c e w i t h S o u t h K o r e a h a s r e m a i n e d c o n s i s t e n t , and t h e Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s t r e s s e s t h e c o n t i n u i n g i m p o r t a n c e of c l o s e U.S.-ROK c o o p e r a t i o n f o r r e g i o n a l s t a b i l i t y and for b i l a t e r a l trade. Japan J a p a n s h a r e s a common i n t e r e s t w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n p r e s e r v i n g r e g i o n a l s t a b i l i t y and r e d u c i n g t e n s i o n on t h e K o r e a n P e n i n s u l a as a means o f p r o m o t i n g J a p a n e s e s e c u r i t y and e c o n o m i c i n t e r e s t s . B e c a u s e of i t s c o n s t i tutional restrictions, and t h e a b s e n c e o f defense

1 56 arrangements with either of the t w o Korean states, h o w ever, Japan depends heavily upon the United States to preserve security and stability on the Korean Peninsula. In fact, the Japanese leadership was quite reluctant to s e e t h e w i t h d r a w a l of U.S. f o r c e s u n d e r C a r t e r , f r o m South Korea. 2 0 The Soviet Union Soviet policy toward the Korean Peninsula was governed less by its bilateral relationship with North Korea than by its c o n c e r n a b o u t S i n o - S o v i e t c o n f l i c t and S o v i e t rivalry with the United States and Japan. 2 1 The USSR's s t r a t e g i c - m i l i t a r y offensive in the Asian-Pacific since t h e V i e t n a m W a r , h o w e v e r , s e e m s t o h a v e led to t h e reversal of its usual posture from one of limited logistic and military support to a m o r e active and aggressive m i l i t a r y assistance to North Korea. As a result of this changed Soviet policy toward North Korea under Gorbac h e v , in M a y and J u n e 1985 t h e S o v i e t U n i o n m o d i f i e d its h i t h e r t o r e s t r a i n i n g p o s t u r e by s u p p l y i n g North K o r e a with its latest weaponry s y s t e m , including MIG-23s. M o s c o w , at s o m e point, m a y also encourage and supp o r t a P y o n g y a n g h a r d l i n e p o l i c y t o w a r d t h e S o u t h , in t h e h o p e t h a t a m a j o r m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n in K o r e a could split the Sino-U.S. detente and the implicit SinoU.S.-Japanese coalition. Furthermore, as s o m e analysts point out, if strategic circumstances seem favorable, as w a s t h e c a s e in V i e t n a m in t h e 1 9 7 0 s , t h e S o v i e t s m a y attempt to help create one large Korea dominated by proSoviet C o m m u n i s t s in order to reinforce dramatically the Soviet position in the W e s t e r n Pacific. 22 S t r a t e g i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s m a y t h e r e f o r e be m o r e i m p o r t a n t in t h e S o v i e t c a l c u l u s of t h e K o r e a p o l i c y . C o n f l i c t in K o r e a f o s t e r e d by S o v i e t m i l i t a r y and e c o nomic support, h o w e v e r , would accelerate pressures for Japanese remilitarization, cause anti-Soviet collaborat i o n a m o n g t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , J a p a n , and C h i n a , and thereby exacerbating Sino-Soviet relations. In f a c t , S o v i e t p e r c e p t i o n of such an e v e n t u a l i t y m a y u n d e r l i e t h e S o v i e t (and N o r t h K o r e a n ) c r i t i c i s m of an e v o l v i n g " A s i a n NATO" o r " U . S . - J a p a n - R O K t r i a n g u l a r military alliance." Ch ina The People's Republic of China (PRC) appears m o m e n t a r i ly s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e s t a t u s q u o and s t a b i l i t y o n t h e Korean Peninsula. North Korea, as China sees it, serves as an i m p o r t a n t b u f f e r b e t w e e n t h e PRC and W e s t e r n p o w e r s , and the U.S. forces in South Korea may also help to counter Soviet expansionism. Military confrontation in K o r e a w o u l d p l a c e C h i n a in t h e s t r a t e g i c d i l e m m a of e i t h e r s u p p o r t i n g t h e D e m o c r a t i c P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c of Korea (DPRK) and thereby jeopardizing U.S.-PRC relations or abandoning North Korea totally to Soviet influence. Beijing, therefore, has consistently discouraged Pyongyang's b e l l i g e r e n c e . 2 3

1 57 In r e c e n t y e a r s , t h e C h i n e s e h a v e g r a d u a l l y i n c r e a s e d t h e i r m i l i t a r y and economic a i d t o North K o r e a , i n c l u d i n g A - 5 a i r c r a f t and o i l s u p p l i e s , and t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e t w o c o u n t r i e s has improved s i g n i f i c a n t l y , as shown by t h e mutual exchange of s t a t e v i s i t s by t h e r e s p e c t i v e l e a d e r s . B e t w e e n D e c e m b e r 1981 and May 1985, a t o t a l o f s e v e n m u t u a l v i s i t s by h i g h - l e v e l l e a d e r s t o o k p l a c e b e t w e e n t h e t w o c o u n t r i e s and i n v o l v e d Kim I l - S u n g and Kim J o n g - I l ( f o r North Korea) and Deng X i a o p i n g , Hu Y a o b a n g , and Zhao Z i y a n g ( f o r C h i n a ) . A l t h o u g h C h i n e s e e f f o r t s a r e aimed at p r e v e n t i n g near t o t a l North Korean dependence on t h e S o v i e t Union, i t i s u n c e r t a i n w h e t h e r such a p o l i c y w i l l c o n t i n u e t o be successful. Due t o l i m i t e d Chinese i n d u s t r i a l and m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s , C h i n e s e s u p p o r t has not s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t e d t h e s e c u r i t y b a l a n c e on t h e K o r e a n P e n i n s u l a . I f C h i n a ' s K o r e a p o l i c y f a i l s , i t w i l l no d o u b t u n d e r mine t h e Chinese e f f o r t s at c o u n t e r i n g S o v i e t e n c i r c l e ment of t h e PRC. Korea's

Shifting

B a l a n c e of

Power

N o r t h and South K o r e a , as a l l i e s o f t h e S o v i e t Union and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , r e s p e c t i v e l y , a r e v a l u a b l e s t r a t e g i c a s s e t s because t h e y would most l i k e l y p r o v i d e s u p p o r t t o t h e war e f f o r t s in a f u t u r e h y p o t h e t i c a l war b e t w e e n t h e two s u p e r p o w e r s in t h e r e g i o n . Therefore, t h e s h i f t i n g power b a l a n c e between t h e two h o s t i l e K o r e an s t a t e s w i l l have b r o a d e r s e c u r i t y and s t r a t e g i c i m p l i c a t i o n s , n o t o n l y f o r t h e K o r e a n P e n i n s u l a but a l s o f o r t h e c o n t i n g e n c y p l a n n i n g of t h e s u p e r p o w e r s . The M i l i t a r y B a l a n c e The m i l i t a r y b a l a n c e b e t w e e n communist North Korea and noncommunist South Korea in t h e 1980s, a c c o r d i n g t o many a n a l y s t s , f a v o r s North Korea o v e r South Korea. However, t h e s u c c e s s f u l c o m p l e t i o n of t h e ongoing F o r c e I m p r o v e ment P l a n ( F I P ) I I (1982-1987) in t h e ROK may e v e n t u a l l y l e a d t o a s i t u a t i o n w h e r e b y t h e South w i l l come t o surpass t h e N o r t h . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the m i l i t a r y balance b e t w e e n t h e t w o Koreas w i l l remain r e l a t i v e l y c o n s t a n t and e v e n l y matched f o r t h e r e m a i n d e r of t h e 1980s. 2 4 Both Korean r e g i m e s m a i n t a i n a huge m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t t h a t i s u n d o u b t e d l y beyond t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l means o f s u p p o r t . In 1984, N o r t h K o r e a , f o r i n s t a n c e , m a i n t a i n e d a l a r g e m i l i t a r y f o r c e c o n s i s t i n g of a t o t a l of 784,000 t r o o p s , 740 a i r c r a f t s , and 490 vessels a m o u n t i n g t o 6 6 , 0 0 0 t o n n a g e s , and South K o r e a had a m i l i t a r y f o r c e c o n s i s t i n g o f 6 2 2 , 0 0 0 t r o o p s , 440 a i r c r a f t s , and 110 v e s s e l s a m o u n t i n g t o 8 9 , 0 0 0 t o n n a g e s (see Table 7.1).25 At t h e t i m e o f t h i s w r i t i n g , N o r t h K o r e a i s s a i d t o p o s s e s s a s u b s t a n t i a l a d v a n t a g e o v e r t h e South in o v e r a l l q u a n t i t y o f m i l i t a r y e q u i p m e n t as a r e s u l t o f i t s i n t e n s i v e d e f e n s e b u i l d u p d u r i n g t h e 1970s. North K o r e a ,

158

TABLE 7.1

Comparison of North and South Korean M i l i t a r y p o s t u r e s , 1984

North Korea p o p u l a t i o n , 1984 T o t a l A c t i v e Forces T o t a l Reserve Forces paramilitary Forcesa M i l i t a r y Expenditures as % of GNP 1980 e s t i m a t e 1982 e s t i m a t e Army Armored D i v i s i o n s ' 3 Mechanized D i v i s i o n s ^ Infantry Divisions'3 Navy Submarines Destroyers ( F r i g a t e s ) Naval Bases A i r Force Combat A i r c r a f t incl.

19,600 ,000 784 ,500 300 ,000 4,1 38 ,000 18.9 21 .6 700 ,000 2 3 34 33 ,500 21 0(4) 9 51 ,000 740 290 MIG-15/17 100 MIG-19 160 MIG-21

South Korea 41,600 ,000 622 ,000 1 ,540 ,000 4,400 ,000 6.6 6.9 540 ,000 0 2 20 49 ,000 0 11(8 8 33 ,000 440 i n c l . 260 F-5A 70 F-86F 72 F-4D/E

Sources: The I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e f o r S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s , The M i l i t a r y B a l a n c e , 1984-85 ( L o n d o n : I I S S , 1984), pp. 102-104; U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, World M i l i t a r y Expenditures & Arms T r a n s f e r s , 1972-1982 (Washington, D.C.: Arms C o n t r o l and Disarmament Agency, A p r i l 1984), p. 33. aparamilitary

f o r c e s i n c l u d e s e c u r i t y f o r c e s , border guards, m i l i tia, etc. N o r t h K o r e a n d i v i s i o n s a r e m o d e l e d a f t e r USSR/PRC d i v i s i o n s and number about 10,000 men, a b o u t 65 p e r c e n t o f t h e s t r e n g t h of a South Korean d i v i s i o n . Hie l a t t e r f o l l o w s U.S. d i v i s i o n o r g a n i z a tion. Most o f t h e manpower d i f f e r e n c e s l i e , h o w e v e r , i n combat s u p p o r t and l o g i s t i c s t r o o p s , and t h e N o r t h Korean d i v i s i o n s a r e roughly e q u i v a l e n t t o t h e combat s t r e n g t h of South Korean divisions.

f o r i n s t a n c e , h a s a l l o c a t e d s o m e 20 t o 25 p e r c e n t o f its G r o s s N a t i o n a l P r o d u c t (GNP) t o m i l i t a r y s p e n d i n g . In 1984, North K o r e a ' s 784,000-man armed f o r c e ( o u t of a p o p u l a t i o n o f 19.6 m i l l i o n ) was h i g h l y d i s c i p l i n e d . The s t o c k p i l e of North Korean m i l i t a r y equipment in m a j o r categories—armor, artillery, ships, and aircraft—was a l s o e s t i m a t e d t o be more than t w i c e t h a t of t h e South. T h e N o r t h was j u d g e d by m i l i t a r y analysts to hold a clear m i l i t a r y advantage, with o f f e n s i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s fashioned precisely to the b a t t l e f i e l d ' s tactical contours. North Korea is also b e l i e v e d to m a i n t a i n a l a r g e commando f o r c e o f approximately 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 men (the

1 59 8th s p e c i a l c o r p s ) whose p r i m a r y m i s s i o n i s t o c r e a t e a s e c o n d f r o n t i n r e a r a r e a s of t h e S o u t h . South Korea has been expanding i t s m i l i t a r y moderni z a t i o n p r o g r a m s i n c e t h e l a t e 1970s u n d e r FIP I ( 1 9 7 6 1982) and FIP I I ( 1 9 8 2 - 1 9 8 7 ) , i n a d e l a y e d r e s p o n s e t o the North's m i l i t a r y buildup. South Korea's m i l i t a r y b u d g e t h a s b e e n i n c r e a s e d s u b s t a n t i a l l y and i s a l m o s t 6 p e r c e n t of t h e GNP. South Korea's 622,000-man armed f o r c e i n 1984 ( o u t of a p o p u l a t i o n of 4 1 . 6 m i l l i o n ) was w e l l t r a i n e d , and t h e S o u t h m i g h t r e t a i n a q u a l i t a t i v e a d v a n t a g e i n m i l i t a r y e q u i p m e n t , i n c l u d i n g a i r c r a f t and ground weapons. These are not s u f f i c i e n t , however, according to m i l i t a r y analysts, to o f f s e t the quant i t a t i v e d i s a d v a n t a g e s of S o u t h K o r e a ' s military establishment. T h e a r m s r a c e and e x i s t i n g m i l i t a r y i m b a l a n c e b e t w e e n t h e two Korean s t a t e s w i l l c o n t i n u e , h o w e v e r , as e a c h K o r e a n r e g i m e o u t s p e n d s i t s o p p o n e n t i n d e f e n s e and also a c q u i r e s the l a t e s t advanced equipment from the respective allies. T h e s e i n c l u d e t h e p r o m i s e d s a l e of 36 F - 1 6 s a n d 1 , 0 0 0 M 5 5 - 1 l i g h t t a n k s t o t h e S o u t h a n d the t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f MI G - 2 3 s a n d T - 7 2 t a n k s f o r North.2' The E c o n o m i c R a c e South Korea g e n e r a l l y e n j o y s f a r more advanced economic and i n d u s t r i a l c a p a b i l i t i e s t h a n t h e N o r t h . 2 8 In 1982, t h e S o u t h K o r e a n GNP ( U . S . $ 7 0 . 8 b i l l i o n ) w a s m o r e t h a n f o u r t o f i v e t i m e s t h a t of t h e N o r t h ( U . S . $ 1 3 . 6 b i l l i o n ) , and t h e t o t a l v o l u m e of t h e S o u t h ' s f o r e i g n t r a d e w a s m o r e t h a n t e n t i m e s t h a t of t h e N o r t h . 2 9 South K o r e a n t e c h n o l o g y i s a l s o f a r s u p e r i o r t o t h a t of t h e North in a l m o s t every c a t e g o r y . B o t h K o r e a n e c o n o m i e s s u f f e r e d i n t h e w a k e of w o r l d w i d e economic r e c e s s i o n in t h e e a r l y 1980s. High i n f l a t i o n , w o r l d w i d e o i l s h o c k s , and u n c e r t a i n s u p p l i e s of o t h e r key raw m a t e r i a l s a l l a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d S o u t h K o r e a n e c o n o m i c g r o w t h and s t a b i l i t y . Due t o t h e r i s i n g p r e s s u r e s of p r o t e c t i o n i s m i n w o r l d t r a d e , S o u t h K o r e a ' s e x p o r t of m a n u f a c t u r e d p r o d u c t s d i d n o t i n c r e a s e a s r a p i d l y as in t h e 1970s. North Korea's economic p r o b l e m s a p p e a r t o b e e v e n m o r e s e r i o u s a s a r e s u l t of h e a v y defense expenditures, increasing foreign debts (approxim a t e l y $ 3 . 5 b i l l i o n ) , and l a g g i n g t e c h n o l o g y . 3 0 S o v i e t and C h i n e s e e c o n o m i c a i d t o N o r t h K o r e a i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o e n a b l e t h e N o r t h t o c a t c h up w i t h S o u t h K o r e a ' s e c o n o m i c and i n d u s t r i a l a d v a n c e s . Under s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e N o r t h s e e m s t o h a v e no a l t e r n a t i v e but to turn outward economically, p a t t e r n i n g i t s e l f a f t e r C h i n a ' s s u c c e s s f u l p r o g r a m of e c o n o m i c r e f o r m m e a s u r e s and t h e f o u r m o d e r n i z a t i o n s . T h e new j o i n t v e n t u r e l a w e n a c t e d on S e p t e m b e r 8, 1984, t o g e t h e r w i t h " t h e t r a d e d e v e l o p m e n t r e s o l u t i o n " a d o p t e d on J a n u a r y 2 6 , 1 9 8 4 , by t h e 3 r d S e s s i o n of t h e 7 t h S u p r e m e P e o p l e ' s A s s e m b l y i s an e x p r e s s i o n of N o r t h K o r e a ' s a l t e r e d e c o nomic d e v e l o p m e n t s t r a t e g y . 3 1

1 60

THREAT PERCEPTION AND DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERS The c h a n g i n g s e c u r i t y e n v i r o n m e n t i n E a s t A s i a i s p e r c e i v e d by t h e r e s p e c t i v e K o r e a n l e a d e r s h i p s t o be p o t e n t i a l l y d e s t a b i l i z i n g and t h r e a t e n i n g t o t h e v i a b i l i t y of t h e i r s y s t e m . To overcome t h e p e r c e i v e d t h r e a t , t h e two Korean s t a t e s took m e a s u r e s t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e i r s e c u r i t y and s e c u r i t y t i e s w i t h t h e i r a l l i e s and a l s o i n i t i a t e d a s e r i e s of d i p l o m a t i c maneuvers v i s - à - v i s t h e m a j o r powers in t h e r e g i o n . L e g i t i m a c y , s e c u r i t y , and d e v e l o p m e n t a r e t h e s t r a t e g i c g o a l s p u r s u e d by b o t h Korean r e g i m e s e v e r s i n c e t h e i r e s t a b l i s h m e n t i n 1 9 4 8 . The a b n o r m a l p a r t i t i o n o f t h e Land o f t h e M o r n i n g Calm i n t o two h o s t i l e and a n t a g o n i s t i c p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m s h a s a c c e n t u a t e d t h e s e c u r i t y c o n c e r n s of t h e r u l i n g e l i t e s o f North and South Korea. Both Korean s t a t e s and t h e i r c i t i z e n s h a v e been g r i p p e d by a " s i e g e m e n t a l i t y " — d e e p s e a t e d a n x i e t y and f e a r p r e v a i l i n both North and South Korea. D i p l o m a t i c moves and i n i t i a t i v e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e r e c e n t l y r e v i v e d i n t e r - K o r e a d i a l o g u e and n e g o t i a t i o n i n 1 9 8 4 , a r e a t t e m p t s , both p s y c h o l o g i c a l and p o l i t i c a l , by t h e l e a d e r s h i p in each s t a t e t o cope with t h e r a p i d l y changing e n v i r o n m e n t s u r r o u n d i n g t h e Korean P e n i n s u l a . 3 3 North Korea V i s - á - v i s

t h e Major Powers

T h r e a t P e r c e p t i o n and S e c u r i t y P o l i c y From Kim I l - S u n g ' s p e r s p e c t i v e , " U . S . i m p e r i a l i s m " i s North K o r e a ' s number o n e enemy and t h e m a i n s t u m b l i n g block to Korea's r e u n i f i c a t i o n . 3 4 I t i s no w o n d e r , t h e n , t h a t U.S. t r o o p w i t h d r a w a l f r o m S o u t h K o r e a i s North K o r e a ' s f i r s t f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e . North Korea's s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s v i s - á - v i s South Korea, c o n s i s t e n t l y upheld t h r o u g h o u t t h e 1970s and 1 9 8 0 s , a r e : ( 1 ) w i t h d r a w a l o f U.S. t r o o p s f r o m t h e S o u t h ; ( 2 ) " d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n " of South Korea, i . e . , v i a a c o m m u n i s t s p o n s o r e d r e v o l u t i o n , i f n e c e s s a r y ; and (3) b u i l d i n g t h e " r e v o l u t i o n a r y " b a s e o f o p e r a t i o n i n t h e North t h r o u g h t h e " s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n and c o n s t r u c t i o n " u n d e r t h e Korean Workers p a r t y (KWP) a u s p i c e s . 3 5 North K o r e a ' s c h a j u ( i n d e p e n d e n c e ) and j u c h e ( s e l f r e l i a n c e ) p o s t u r e on t h e S i n o - S o v i e t r i v a l r y i s g r e a t l y s t r a i n e d b e c a u s e of t h e d i p l o m a t i c moves t h a t grew from t h e S i n o - U . S . r a p p r o c h e m e n t i n 1971 and n o r m a l i z a t i o n of d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s between W a s h i n g t o n and B e i j i n g i n 1979. P y o n g y a n g ' s d e l i c a t e r e l a t i o n s w i t h B e i j i n g and Moscow, n e i t h e r of which a p p e a r s t o be p e r c e i v e d by t h e N o r t h K o r e a n s as a t r u l y r e l i a b l e a l l y , have been s t r a i n e d in the 1980s. I n an a t t e m p t t o a s s e r t N o r t h K o r e a ' s i n d e p e n d e n c e and t o e x e r c i s e d i p l o m a t i c l e v e r a g e , Kim I l - S u n g i n i t i a t e d a s e r i e s of d i p l o m a t i c moves t o e n h a n c e h i s p e r s o n a l p r e s t i g e and s t a t u s t h a t i n c l u d e d t h e e x c h a n g e of mutual v i s i t s with China i n 1 9 8 3 , 1 9 8 4 , and 1985 and t h e v i s i t by Kim t o Moscow and E a s t e r n Europe i n May-June 1 9 8 4 .

16 1

One of t h e t a n g i b l e outcomes of Kim's Moscow v i s i t , although no j o i n t communique was i s s u e d at t h e t i m e , was t h e S o v i e t a s s u r a n c e o f a s s i s t a n c e t o North K o r e a i n upgrading m i l i t a r y h a r d w a r e and e q u i p m e n t . As a r e s u l t o f t h e s u b s e q u e n t t h i r t e e n - d a y v i s i t by S o v i e t Deputy F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r M i k h a i l K a p i t s a t o Pyongyang i n Novemb e r 1 9 8 4 , t h e S o v i e t Union r e p o r t e d l y a g r e e d t o s u p p l y North K o r e a w i t h a d v a n c e d M I G - 2 3 j e t f i g h t e r s and T - 7 2 tanks . 3 6 North K o r e a ' s t h r e a t p e r c e p t i o n i n t h e 1 9 8 0 s was a c c e n t u a t e d by a s e r i e s of m i l i t a r y e x e r c i s e s i n v o l v i n g both ROK and U.S. t r o o p s i n S o u t h K o r e a . North K o r e a s p e c i f i c a l l y c r i t i c i z e d t h e annual U.S.-ROK j o i n t m i l i t a r y e x e r c i s e s c a l l e d Team S p i r i t , o b j e c t i n g t o what i t c a l l s t h e p o l i c y o f r e v i v i n g " J a p a n e s e m i l i t a r i s m " as w e l l as t h e f o r m i n g o f a U . S . - J a p a n - S o u t h Korea " t r i a n gular m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e . " 3 7 North K o r e a ' s r e s p o n s e t o i t s p e r c e i v e d s e c u r i t y t h r e a t was t o b e e f up i t s own d e f e n s e p o s t u r e and t o i n i t i a t e d i p l o m a t i c moves t o c o u n t e r t h e p e r c e i v e d s e c u rity threat. Thus, in a m a j o r o p e r a t i o n during t h e t h r e e - y e a r p e r i o d b e t w e e n 1983 and 1 9 8 5 , North Korea has r e p o r t e d l y r e d e p l o y e d l a r g e numbers of t r o o p s i n t o a p p r o x i m a t e l y one hundred underground bunkers c l o s e t o t h e D e m i l i t a r i z e d Zone (DMZ). 3 8 T h r e e underground b u n k e r s , r e p o r t e d l y l o c a t e d t w e l v e t o e i g h t e e n m i l e s from t h e DMZ, a l s o c a n a c c o m m o d a t e l a r g e n u m b e r s o f men and supplies. T h e s e new t r o o p movements w i l l g r e a t l y r e d u c e t h e l e n g t h o f t i m e i t would t a k e t h e North K o r e a n s t o launch a l a r g e - s c a l e i n v a s i o n , i f they so d e s i r e . The t r o o p m o v e m e n t s , h o w e v e r , do n o t seem t o r e p r e s e n t an i n c r e a s e i n o v e r a l l North K o r e a n m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h , a c c o r d i n g t o U.S. o f f i c i a l s ; i n s t e a d , i t r e p r e s e n t s a r e d e p l o y m e n t o f r e a r - e c h e l o n t r o o p s t o new p o s i t i o n s near t h e DMZ. 39 D i p l o m a t i c I n i t i a t i v e s and Maneuvers Pyongyang's t r i p a r t i t e t a l k s p r o p o s a l , i n v o l v i n g S o u t h Korea i n what b a s i c a l l y a p p e a r s t o be a two-way d i s c u s s i o n b e t w e e n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and North K o r e a , was o f f i c i a l l y made p u b l i c on J a n u a r y 1 0 , 1 9 8 4 , and c l e a r l y r e p r e s e n t s i t s l a t e s t e f f o r t t o n e g o t i a t e a U.S. t r o o p w i t h d r a w a l from t h e S o u t h . North K o r e a ' s p r i m a r y o b j e c t i v e i s a l s o t o r e p l a c e t h e e x i s t i n g a r m i s t i c e agreement with a p e a c e t r e a t y . The t r i p a r t i t e t a l k s p r o p o s a l was i n t e r p r e t e d by many W e s t e r n o b s e r v e r s as a t a c t i c a l m o ' e , e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r t h e O c t o b e r 1983 Rangoon bombing, t o a c h i e v e one of Pyongyang's t r i p l e s t r a t e g i c g o a l s . Pyongyang f i r s t moved d i p l o m a t i c a l l y t o improve i t s s e c u r i t y and d i p l o m a t i c t i e s with both B e i j i n g and Moscov. Kim I l - S u n g p a i d a n i n e - d a y s t a t e v i s i t t o C h i n a i n S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 2 , f o l l o w e d by an u n o f f i c i a l v i s i t t o China by h i s s o n , Kim J o n g - I l , i n J u n e 1 9 8 3 . 1 , 0 The Chinese p a r t y l e a d e r Hu Yaobang p a i d an e i g h t - d a y o f f i c i a l v i s i t t o N o r t h K o r e a i n May 1 9 8 4 and was g r e e t e d by "the g r e a t e s t welcome in Korean h i s t o r y , " a c c o r d i n g t o

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t h e North K o r e a n m e d i a . 4 1 In a d d i t i o n , t h e l e a d e r s of t h e two c o u n t r i e s exchanged numerous " i n f o r m a l " mutual v i s i t s f o r c o n t i n u o u s p o l i c y c o n s u l t a t i o n , such as Kim Il-Sung's " u n o f f i c i a l " four-day v i s i t to B e i j i n g (Octob e r 2 3 - 2 7 ) i n 1984 and Hu Yaobang's t h r e e - d a y u n o f f i c i a l v i s i t (May 4 - 6 ) t o S h i n u i j u , North K o r e a ' s b o r d e r town, in 1985. The agenda and a g r e e m e n t s o f t h e s e and o t h e r s i m i l a r m e e t i n g s a r e n o t known t o o u t s i d e r s . One S o u t h K o r e a n s o u r c e s p e c u l a t e d , h o w e v e r , r e g a r d i n g t h e May 1 9 8 5 Hu-Kim m e e t i n g , t h a t North K o r e a had s t r e n u o u s l y o b j e c t e d t o China's r e l a x e d p o s t u r e toward South Korea as e v i d e n c e d by South K o r e a ' s n e g o t i a t i o n with China i n March 198 5 o v e r t h e r e t u r n o f t h e l a t t e r ' s PT b o a t and i t s crew. North K o r e a a l s o p r e s s u r e d C h i n a , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e same s o u r c e , t o r e v e r s e China's c o n t e m p l a t e d a p p r o v a l o f U.S. f l e e t v e s s e l s ' v i s i t t o Shanghai on May 1 8 , 1 9 8 5 , a d e c i s i o n t h a t was s u b s e q u e n t l y r e s c i n d e d by C h i n a on t h e g r o u n d s o f d i s a g r e e m e n t o v e r t h e n u c l e a r disclosure issue.42 I f t h i s s p e c u l a t i o n about Pyongyang's r o l e i n p r e s s u r i n g China t o r e v e r s e i t s d e c i s i o n it r e g a r d i n g t h e U.S. v i s i t t o S h a n g h a i i s c o r r e c t , means t h a t North Korea s t i l l e x e r c i s e s l e v e r a g e in m a j o r power r e l a t i o n s . F i v e days a f t e r Hu Yaobang l e f t North Korea i n May 1 9 8 4 , Kim I l - S u n g embarked upon an a m b i t i o u s f o r t y - f i v e day t r i p abroad t h a t took him t o Moscow and t o t h e E a s t European c o u n t r i e s . A l t h o u g h no j o i n t c o m m u n i q u é was i s s u e d f o l l o w i n g a t h r e e - d a y s t a y i n Moscow and m e e t i n g s between Kim I l - S u n g and t h e S o v i e t P r e s i d e n t K o n s t a n t i n Chernenko, Kim's 1984 Moscow v i s i t was i m p o r t a n t as i t was h i s f i r s t v i s i t t o Moscow i n t w e n t y - t h r e e y e a r s . It s i g n i f i e d h i s w i l l i n g n e s s t o improve c l o s e t i e s with t h e Soviets. S o v i e t Deputy F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r M i k h a i l K a p i t s a was a l s o i n North K o r e a on November 1 1 - 2 7 , 1 9 8 4 , t o n e g o t i a t e a new b o r d e r t r e a t y , w h i c h was s i g n e d i n Moscow by North Korean F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Kim Young Nam in A p r i l 1985. S o v i e t F i r s t Deputy P r e m i e r G e i d a r A l i y e v l e d a t w e n t y - t h r e e - m e m b e r government d e l e g a t i o n t o Pyongyang i n August 1985 t o a t t e n d t h e c e l e b r a t i o n of t h e f o r t i e t h a n n i v e r s a r y o f K o r e a ' s l i b e r a t i o n f r o m J a p a n on A u g u s t 15, 1945. He was a c c o m p a n i e d by F i r s t Deputy M i n i s t e r of D e f e n s e M a r s h a l l V a s i l y P e t r o v , who r e p o r t e d l y a g r e e d t o o f f e r "around 40" MIG-23s and f u t u r e d e l i v e r y of SAMs t o North K o r e a . 4 3 To u n d e r s c o r e t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e new S o v i e t - N o r t h Korea m i l i t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n , t h r e e S o v i e t w a r s h i p s a r r i v e d on A u g u s t 13 i n Wonsan on t h e S e a o f J a p a n , t h e f i r s t S o v i e t n a v a l v i s i t t o a North Korean port. Noteworthy in t h i s regard is t h e f a c t t h a t China did not r e c e i v e an i n v i t a t i o n from North Korea t o a t t e n d t h e ceremony commemorating K o r e a ' s l i b e r a t i o n . China's a b s e n c e d u r i n g t h e c e l e b r a t i o n was c l e a r l y an e x p r e s s i o n o f North K o r e a ' s d i p l o m a t i c d i s f a v o r of t h e PRC. I f and when North K o r e a p e r m i t s a s i m i l a r v i s i t o f S o v i e t

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w a r s h i p s t o i t s p o r t i n t h e Y e l l o w S e a , s u c h a move w i l l c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e a p r o - S o v i e t s t a n c e by North K o r e a b e c a u s e North K o r e a ' s n e a r e s t p o r t l i e s l e s s t h a n 2 0 0 m i l e s from t h e home p o r t of t h e C h i n e s e N o r t h e r n F l e e t i n Q i n g d a o . A l l o f t h e s e d i p l o m a t i c m a n e u v e r s by North Korea v i s - ä - v i s i t s a l l i e s a r e an ominous s i g n of North K o r e a ' s c o n t i n u e d s t r a t e g i c r o l e as t h e b a l a n c e r between B e i j i n g and Moscow, and of North Korea's e f f o r t t o remain independent in t h e S i n o - S o v i e t hegemonic conf1ict. South Korea V i s - a - v i s

t h e Major Powers

T h r e a t P e r c e p t i o n and S e c u r i t y P o l i c y To South Korea's F i f t h R e p u b l i c , t h e s e c u r i t y g o a l a l s o o v e r r i d e s a l l o t h e r s , i n c l u d i n g l e g i t i m a c y and d e v e l o p ment. Once t h e q u e s t i o n of l e g i t i m a c y had b e e n t e m p o r a r i l y s e t a s i d e , with t h e founding in 1981 of t h e F i f t h R e p u b l i c , t h e q u e s t i o n of South Korea's n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y v i s - a - v i s North Korea reemerged as t h e f o r e m o s t p r i o r i t y f o r South Korea's p o l i c y . In h i s i n a u g u r a l speech on March 3 , 1 9 8 1 , P r e s i d e n t Chun Doo Hwan a f f i r m e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y when h e s a i d t h a t "no m a t t e r how f i n e our g o a l s , they a r e m e a n i n g l e s s u n l e s s our n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y is u n f l i n c h i n g l y p r e s e r v e d . We must not r e l a x o u r g u a r d f o r e v e n t h e m o s t f l e e t i n g moment; in l i g h t of our unique g e o p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n , we must keep an unblinking watch on t h e v o l a t i l e s i t u a t i o n s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e K o r e a n P e n i n s u l a , as w e l l as on t h e u n p r e d i c t a b l e g l o b a l s c e n e in t h e 1 9 8 0 s . " ' t 5 The s o u r c e of South K o r e a ' s t h r e a t p e r c e p t i o n i s , of c o u r s e , t h e a l l e g e d " a g g r e s s i v e " i n t e n t i o n s of North Korea. "We l i v e under c o n s t a n t t h r e a t of m i l i t a r y i n v a s i o n from t h e n o r t h " b e c a u s e , as Chun p u t i t , " d u r i n g t h e p a s t 10 y e a r s , North Korea has a g g r e s s i v e l y b u i l t up a r m s , dug i n f i l t r a t i o n t u n n e l s , and s e t g u e r r i l l a s and provocateurs into the south."1,6 The U n i t e d S t a t e s i s c o n s i d e r e d an a l l y t h a t could h e l p South Korea overcome t h e p e r c e i v e d s e c u r i t y t h r e a t from t h e North. From South Korea's p e r s p e c t i v e two m a t t e r s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y w o r r i s o m e : i n c r e a s e d S o v i e t m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e t o North K o r e a and p o s s i b l e r e d u c t i o n i n t h e l e v e l of U.S. s e c u r i t y commitment t o South Korea. South K o r e a h a s come t o be l e s s f e a r f u l of C h i n a ever s i n c e t h e U.S.-China d i p l o m a t i c n o r m a l i z a t i o n of 1 9 7 9 , but i t i s i n c r e a s i n g l y more f e a r f u l of t h e S o v i e t Union. A s e r i e s of d r a m a t i c e v e n t s l e d t o S e o u l ' s d i f f e r i n g p e r c e p t i o n s o f t h e USSR and t h e PRC. The s h o o t i n g down of KAL f l i g h t 0 0 7 on S e p t e m b e r 1 , 1 9 8 3 , o v e r t h e Sea of J a p a n o f f S a k h a l i n I s l a n d , r e i n f o r c e d South K o r e a ' s f e a r of t h e S o v i e t Union and r e i n f o r c e d i t s i m a g e o f t h e USSR as a " m i l i t a n t " and " d a n g e r o u s " c o u n t r y h o s t i l e t o South Korea. The n e g o t i a t i o n on t h e r e l e a s e of China's c i v i l a i r l i n e r and i t s c r e w s in 1 9 8 3 , a f t e r i t was h i j a c k e d and f o r c i b l y l a n d e d on South

164 Korea's soil, gave South Korea an invaluable diplomatic o p e n i n g for o f f i c i a l c o n t a c t s w i t h B e i j i n g . This w a s followed in March 1985 by another successful negotiation of the r e t u r n to China of China's PT boat and its c r e w a f t e r the boat had been t a k e n into South Korea's port city of Kunsan. South Korea's i m a g e of the Soviet U n i o n as a h o s t i l e p o w e r is of long s t a n d i n g . The U.S. m i l i t a r y p r e s e n c e in Korea is d e f e n d e d on the g r o u n d s that it p l a y s a "strategic role" in the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. K o r e a , a c c o r d i n g to Chun Doo H w a n , "is after all a bulwark of defense for the Free World, especially Japan and the United States in the Pacific Basin. So, working t o g e t h e r , w e and the U.S. f o r c e s s e r v e to r e s t r a i n , serve the stay of hands of Soviet expansionism in Northeast Asia, and particularly to diminish the possibility of Soviet Russia using North Korea as a proxy and creating m a j o r s t r i f e in that c r i t i c a l l y i m p o r t a n t region. That is the role, that is the s t r a t e g i c role, that the United States forces are playing." 4 7 Diplomatic Initiatives and Maneuvers Two important diplomatic trips were initiated by Presid e n t Chun Doo H w a n in 1984 and 1985: a t h r e e - d a y s t a t e v i s i t to Japan in early S e p t e m b e r 1984 and a w o r k i n g level v i s i t to the United S t a t e s in l a t e April 1985. These trips were ostensibly to strengthen South Korea's r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Japan and s e c u r i t y ties with the United States. Earlier in 1983, Japan's Prime Minister Y a s u h i r o N a k a s o n e paid a s t a t e v i s i t to Seoul in J a n u ary; U.S. President Ronald Reagan came to South Korea in November 1983. Chun's Japan visit, his first foreign travel since the October 1983 Rangoon incident that killed seventeen South Korean officials and narrowly missed him, was the first s t a t e v i s i t to Japan ever m a d e by a K o r e a n head of state. Although Chun was able to extract the Emperor's e x p r e s s i o n of "regrets" and P r i m e M i n i s t e r Nakasone's "apology" for Japan's thirty-five-year colonial rule of Korea (1910-1945), h e failed to o b t a i n Japan's c o n c e s sion on the trade imbalance between the two countries, an i m b a l a n c e that a m o u n t e d in 1983 to $2.8 b i l l i o n in Japan's favor. Nevertheless, Chun received the Japanese p r i m e m i n i s t e r ' s pledges not only to h e l p p r o m o t e Seoul's overtures toward China and the Soviet Union but also to support Chun's proposal for direct talks between North and South Korea.1+8 President Chun's 1985 Washington visit, the second such v i s i t in four y e a r s , w a s low key and m e a n t to institutionalize political consultations between the t w o countries. Included on the agenda of consultations was Seoul's desire to receive extra military credits and to extract trade concessions from the United States. President Reagan, in his welcoming remarks, reiterated U.S. support for "Chun's commitment to a peaceful transfer of p o w e r at the end of his term in 1988" and also r e a f -

165 f i r m e d t h e " s t r o n g and m u l t i f a c e t e d t i e s " w i t h S e o u l t h a t "remain t h e l i n c h p i n of p e a c e in N o r t h e a s t A s i a . " 4 9 At a s u b s e q u e n t news c o n f e r e n c e on b o a r d a s p e c i a l p l a n e r e t u r n i n g t o K o r e a , Chun c l a i m e d t h a t P r e s i d e n t Reagan a g r e e d t o h i s view t h a t t h e coming t h r e e t o f o u r y e a r s w o u l d be " m o s t c r u c i a l t o t h e s e c u r i t y o f t h e K o r e a n peninsula."50 Chun's m e e t i n g w i t h Reagan was f o l l o w e d by a r e g u l a r , a n n u a l s e c u r i t y c o n f e r e n c e i n W a s h i n g t o n , D.C., on May 7 - 8 , 1 9 8 5 , b e t w e e n t h e d e f e n s e m i n i s t e r s of t h e t w o countries. I n c l u d e d on t h e a g e n d a w e r e p o s s i b l e c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s t o be t a k e n a g a i n s t North K o r e a ' s r e c e n t a c q u i s i t i o n o f e i g h t y - s e v e n Hughes h e l i c o p t e r s , transm i t t e d by a t h i r d c o u n t r y i n v i o l a t i o n o f U.S. l a w . S e o u l r e p o r t e d l y m e n t i o n e d AWACS and new e l e c t r o n i c i d e n t i f i c a t i o n g e a r as a way of p r e v e n t i n g North Korean h e l i c o p t e r s f r o m s n e a k i n g i n t o t h e S o u t h , which a l s o i s e q u i p p e d w i t h t h e Hughes h e l i c o p t e r s . On t h e t r a d e f r o n t , S o u t h K o r e a ' s c o m p l a i n t a b o u t g r o w i n g U.S. p r o t e c t i o n i s m was not w e l l r e c e i v e d i n W a s h i n g t o n , which i n t u r n r e m i n d e d South K o r e a of i t s t r a d e s u r p l u s w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , w h i c h r o s e 39 p e r c e n t i n 1 9 8 4 , and i t s " c l o s e d m a r k e t " t o c e r t a i n U.S. p r o d u c t s . 5 1 In s p i t e o f t h e s e t r a d e d i s p u t e s , S e o u l was a b l e t o r e a f f i r m its s t r o n g s e c u r i t y t i e s with t h e United S t a t e s . Inter-Korean

D i a l o g u e and

Negotiation

N o r t h - S o u t h K o r e a n Red C r o s s t a l k s t o b r i n g a b o u t t h e p o s s i b l e r e u n i o n o f 10 m i l l i o n d i s p e r s e d f a m i l i e s w e r e resumed a f t e r a t w e l v e - y e a r l a p s e as t h e t w o s i d e s a g r e e d t o h o l d t h e e i g h t h r e g u l a r m e e t i n g i n S e o u l on May 2 8 - 2 9 , and t h e n i n t h m e e t i n g i n Pyongyang on August 2 6 - 2 7 , 1985. I n t e r - K o r e a n economic t a l k s were a l s o held i n Panmunjom on May 1 6 , 1985, a f t e r a l a p s e of s i x months s i n c e t h e f i r s t h i s t o r i c m e e t i n g . 5 2 T h i s was f o l l o w e d by t h e t h i r d e c o n o m i c t a l k s i n J u l y and a p r e l i m i n a r y meeting of t h e i n t e r p a r l i a m e n t a r y t a l k s in Panmunjom i n J u l y 1 9 8 5 . These developments r e p r e s e n t e f f o r t s by b o t h K o r e a n r e g i m e s t o move a h e a d on t h e f r o n t of i n t e r - K o r e a n d i a l o g u e and n e g o t i a t i o n s . The N o r t h - S o u t h K o r e a n d i a l o g u e , i n i t i a t e d i n 1 9 7 1 , r e m a i n e d d e a d l o c k e d and s t a l e m a t e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e p r e 1 9 8 4 p e r i o d b e c a u s e of c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s and e x p e c tations. The S o u t h K o r e a n p o l i c y , f o r i n s t a n c e , was b a s e d on a p o s t u r e o f i n c r e m e n t a l i s m , a " s t e p - b y - s t e p " a p p r o a c h t o w a r d g r a d u a l i n t e g r a t i o n o f North and South K o r e a t h r o u g h c u l t u r a l and e c o n o m i c e x c h a n g e s d u r i n g t h e initial stage and p o l i t i c a l negotiations at later stages. The North K o r e a n p o l i c y , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , was b a s e d on a p o s t u r e o f s i m u l t a n e o u s problemsolving— d r a m a t i c s t e p s t a k e n on s e v e r a l f r o n t s t h a t a r e aimed a t a c h i e v i n g i m m e d i a t e u n i f i c a t i o n , such as t h e f o u n d i n g o f t h e D e m o c r a t i c C o n f e d e r a l R e p u b l i c of Koryo (DCRK). 5 3 Underlying the divergent unification policy

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p o s i t i o n s i s a d i f f e r e n c e i n s t r a t e g i c c a l c u l a t i o n and e s t i m a t i o n s h a r e d by " t w o r e g i m e s i n c o n t e s t . " The p o s i t i o n o u t l i n e d by t h e S o u t h , f o r i n s t a n c e , e m p h a s i z e s g r e a t e r s e c u r i t y and t h e g u a r a n t e e of s t a b i l i t y a s p r e c o n d i t i o n s in the u n i f i c a t i o n p r o c e s s . The N o r t h , i n turn, declares that the prerequisites for unification i n c l u d e t h e w i t h d r a w a l of U.S. f o r c e s f r o m S o u t h K o r e a , t h e s c r a p p i n g of S o u t h and N o r t h K o r e a n d e f e n s e t r e a t i e s w i t h t h i r d c o u n t r i e s , and t h e r e p l a c e m e n t of t h e a r m i s t i c e a g r e e m e n t of 1953 w i t h a p e a c e t r e a t y . 5 4 South Korea's "peace f i r s t , unification later" p o s i t i o n i s c l o s e l y t i e d w i t h and r e f l e c t e d i n its m i l i t a r y - s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y toward North Korea. South K o r e a ' s p o s t u r e b a s i c a l l y i s d e f e n s i v e and r e a c t i v e , stressing deterrence, i . e . , p r e v e n t i o n of a n y a r m e d c o n f l i c t on t h e K o r e a n P e n i n s u l a . North Korea's " u n i f i c a t i o n f i r s t , p e a c e l a t e r " p o s i t i o n , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , i s b a s e d o n i t s a s s e s s m e n t t h a t t h e U.S. m i l i t a r y p r e s ence in Korea i s t h e main o b s t a c l e t o Korean u n i f i c a t i o n and p o s e s t h e p r i m a r y t h r e a t t o N o r t h K o r e a n s e c u r i t y . F o r t h i s r e a s o n N o r t h K o r e a , i n 1 9 7 3 , a d o p t e d a new s t r a t e g y by b o y c o t t i n g t h e N o r t h - S o u t h n e g o t i a t i o n p r o c e s s and s e e k i n g , i n s t e a d , d i r e c t b i l a t e r a l t a l k s w i t h W a s h i n g t o n i n 1974 a n d , s i n c e 1 9 8 4 , t r i p a r t i t e talks t h a t i n v o l v e South Korea in t h e p r o c e s s . The d i v e r g e n t p e r c e p t i o n s and e x p e c t a t i o n s u n d e r l y ing t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s t r a t e g i e s are c l e a r l y p r e s e n t in t h e c u r r e n t r o u n d of i n t e r - K o r e a n d i a l o g u e i n 1 9 8 4 . An important breakthrough suddenly occurred in September 1 9 8 4 w h e n t h e S o u t h K o r e a n Red C r o s s S o c i e t y a n n o u n c e d t h a t i t w o u l d a c c e p t t h e N o r t h K o r e a n Red C r o s s S o c i e t y ' s o f f e r t o send r e l i e f goods t o f l o o d v i c t i m s in t h e South. As a r e s u l t , o n S e p t e m b e r 2 9 - 3 0 , 1 9 8 4 , N o r t h K o r e a d e l i v e r e d 5 0 , 0 0 0 s u k ( 1 4 , 3 0 0 t o n s ) of rice, 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 t o n s of c e m e n t , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 s q u a r e m e t e r s of t e x t i l e s , and m e d i c a l s u p p l i e s by t r u c k v i a t h e l a n d r o u t e t h r o u g h P a n m u n j o m a n d by c a r g o v e s s e l s d o c k i n g a t t h e p o r t c i t i e s of I n c h o n on t h e w e s t c o a s t and P u k p y o n g o n t h e e a s t c o a s t . 55 I n c l u d e d i n t h e l i s t of N o r t h K o r e a ' s l a t e s t p e a c e i n i t i a t i v e s i s t h e p r o p o s a l of A p r i l 9 , 1 9 8 5 , t o h o l d t a l k s b e t w e e n t h e t w o l e g i s l a t i v e b o d i e s of N o r t h and S o u t h K o r e a t o d e l i b e r a t e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of i s s u i n g a N o r t h - S o u t h j o i n t d e c l a r a t i o n of n o n a g g r e s s i o n . South K o r e a r e s p o n d e d p o s i t i v e l y on J u n e 4, p r o p o s i n g t h a t p r e l i m i n a r y c o n t a c t b e t w e e n t h e two s i d e s be e s t a b l i s h e d i n J u l y i n P a n m u n j o m t o d e l i b e r a t e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of d r a f t i n g a u n i t e d c o n s t i t u t i o n f o r N o r t h and S o u t h Korea. T h e e c o n o m i c t a l k s i n P a n m u n j o m a n d t h e Red C r o s s t a l k s i n S e o u l and P y o n g y a n g a r e w e l c o m e d e v e l o p m e n t s i n t h e s e r v i c e of l e s s e n i n g t e n s i o n s o n t h e K o r e a n Peninsula. T h e s e i n i t i a t i v e s a r e a l s o p o s i t i v e news f o r t h e p r o s p e c t of n o r m a l i z i n g i n t e r - K o r e a n r e l a t i o n s and f o r promoting p e a c e and e v e n t u a l r e u n i f i c a t i o n of d i v i d e d Korea. However, t h e s e s t e p s , l i k e t h e e a r l i e r t r i p a r -

167 t i t e t a l k s p r o p o s a l of J a n u a r y 1984, may not b e a r t h e i n t e n d e d f r u i t u n l e s s they a r e p o s i t i v e l y r e i n f o r c e d by both s i d e s and a r e s e e n as g e n u i n e measures f o r p r o m o t ing p e a c e and u n i f i c a t i o n r a t h e r than s m o k e s c r e e n s for disguising aggressive intentions.56 The s t r a t e g i c e n v i r o n m e n t i n N o r t h e a s t A s i a h a s i m p r o v e d c o n s i d e r a b l y i n 1985 f o r t h e p r o s p e c t of a b r e a k t h r o u g h in i n t e r - K o r e a n r e l a t i o n s . The two Korean r e g i m e s h a v e c a r r i e d out i n t e n s i v e p o l i c y consultation w i t h t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e a l l i e s i n r e c e n t y e a r s , and t h e y a l s o a p p e a r t o b e r e a d y t o f a c e each o t h e r i n a s e r i e s of s e r i o u s i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l n e g o t i a t i o n s and i n b a r g a i n i n g on t h e i s s u e s of p e a c e and u n i f i c a t i o n . Presid e n t Kim I l - S u n g of t h e DPRK, as n o t e d , p a i d n u m e r o u s v i s i t s t o C h i n a , both o f f i c i a l and unannounced, i n 1983 and 1985, as w e l l as t h e l o n g - a w a i t e d o f f i c i a l v i s i t t o Moscow i n May 1984. P r e s i d e n t Chun Doo Hwan of the ROK a l s o p a i d an o f f i c i a l v i s i t t o J a p a n i n S e p t e m b e r 1984 and a w o r k i n g - l e v e l v i s i t t o the U n i t e d S t a t e s i n A p r i l 1985. The r e c e n t s e r i e s of moves t o a l l o w South Korean d i p l o m a t s t o v i s i t C h i n a , and North Korean j o u r n a l i s t s and a t h l e t e s t o v i s i t J a p a n , a r e f u r t h e r e v i d e n c e of r e a d i n e s s on the p a r t of t h e m a j o r p o w e r s t o accommodate t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e r e s p e c t i v e K o r e a n r e g i m e s f o r t h e s a k e of i m p r o v i n g p e a c e and s t a b i l i t y on t h e K o r e a n Peni nsu1 a .

PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS What a r e t h e f u t u r e p r o s p e c t s f o r p e a c e in d i v i d e d Korea? What a r e the p o s s i b l e s c e n a r i o s and c o n t e n d i n g issues? What p o l i c y i m p l i c a t i o n s f o l l o w f r o m r e c e n t d i p l o m a t i c a c t i v i t i e s t h a t d i r e c t l y and i n d i r e c t l y c o n c e r n the Korean P e n i n s u l a ? Prospects B r o a d l y s p e a k i n g , e i t h e r war o r p e a c e i s t h e o p t i o n f a c i n g t h e Korean P e n i n s u l a . Between t h e s e two t h e o r e t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s a r e a number of p r o b a b l e i n t e r m e d i ary s i t u a t i o n s i n c l u d i n g ( 1 ) c o n f r o n t a t i o n ; (2) c o e x i s tence; (3) c o o p e r a t i o n , e i t h e r l i m i t e d or a c t i v e ; (4) i n t e g r a t i o n , e i t h e r s e c t o r a l o r b r o a d ; and (5) u n i f i c a tion. The s i t u a t i o n t h a t p r e v a i l s i n t h e m i d - 1 9 8 0 s i s one of c o n f r o n t a t i o n , which i f the c u r r e n t inter-Korean n e g o t i a t i o n i s s u c c e s s f u l , may l e a d t o c o e x i s t e n c e o r even t o l i m i t e d c o o p e r a t i o n . The p o l i c y i s s u e s c o n f r o n t i n g t h e r e s p e c t i v e Korean regimes in the f u t u r e are a l s o p o l i t i c a l , economic, s o c i a l , and c u l t u r a l in n a t u r e , and they a l s o h a v e t i m e d i m e n s i o n s t h a t a r e e i t h e r s h o r t term or long term. From a s h o r t - t e r m p e r s p e c t i v e , both Korean r e g i m e s a r e l i k e l y t o f a c e t h e c h a l l e n g e of a s s u r i n g t h e p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y and c o n t i n u i t y of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l systems.

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Both N o r t h and S o u t h K o r e a m u s t r e s o l v e t h e i s s u e of how t o a l l o w a s m o o t h t r a n s i t i o n of p o w e r by e n a b l i n g a n o r d e r l y a n d p r e d i c t a b l e p o l i t i c a l s u c c e s s i o n of the leadership. Kim I l - S u n g h a s a l r e a d y d e s i g n a t e d h i s s o n , Kim J o n g - I l , t o s u c c e e d h i m i n a m a n n e r r e s e m b l i n g t h e h e r e d i t a r y , o r d y n a s t i c , s u c c e s s i o n of t h e o l d r e g i m e s . W h e t h e r s u c h an a r r a n g e m e n t i s a c c e p t a b l e t o t h e p e o p l e of N o r t h K o r e a , a s s u m i n g t h a t " t h e m a s s e s a r e m a s t e r s of t h e i r o w n d e s t i n y " a s Kim I l - S u n g ' s p r e a c h i n g o f m a s s l i n e p o l i t i c s would l e a d us t o b e l i e v e , w i l l be known Chun Doo Hwan a l s o o n l y a f t e r t h e d e a t h of Kim I l - S u n g . announced t h a t he would not seek a second p r e s i d e n t i a l t e r m a f t e r c o m p l e t i n g h i s f i r s t s e v e n - y e a r t e r m in 1988. T h e n e x t p r e s i d e n t of e a c h K o r e a , a n d t h e s e g m e n t s o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n h e o r s h e r e p r e s e n t s , i s an i m p o r t a n t p o l i t i c a l i s s u e f o r t h e f u t u r e s u r v i v a l of b o t h K o r e a s . Other s h o r t - t e r m i s s u e s t h a t South Korea f a c e s i n c l u d e r e c o n c i l i a t i o n on t h e i s s u e of t h e 1980 K w a n g j u U p r i s i n g , f o r w h i c h P r e s i d e n t Chun Doo Hwan's g o v e r n m e n t was c h a r g e d by t h e o p p o s i t i o n a s r e s p o n s i b l e ; s u c c e s s f u l c o m p l e t i o n of t h e 1988 Summer O l y m p i c s i n S e o u l , w h i c h N o r t h K o r e a a n n o u n c e d i t w o u l d b o y c o t t and o p p o s e , a l though i t l a t e l y proposed t o "cohost" t h e Olympics with S o u t h K o r e a ; t a m i n g of t h e h a r d - l i n e m i l i t a r y f a c t i o n t h a t may n o t g o a l o n g w i t h m a n y of t h e C h u n Doo Hwan policies; finding a solution to the student activism, which has r e s u l t e d in c o n t i n u o u s a n t i - g o v e r n m e n t campus d e m o n s t r a t i o n s ; and s u s t a i n i n g t h e momentum of e c o n o m i c g r o w t h by e x p a n d i n g t h e e x p o r t s e c t o r of t h e e c o n o m y and h o l d i n g i n f l a t i o n a r y p r e s s u r e s down. N o r t h K o r e a l i k e w i s e f a c e s a n u m b e r of s h o r t - t e r m p o l i c y i s s u e s : i n v i g o r a t i n g t h e s t a g n a n t e c o n o m y by o b t a i n i n g new t e c h n o l o g y and e n t i c i n g i n v e s t m e n t c a p i t a l f r o m a b r o a d ; r e c o n c i l i n g t h e o l d i d e o l o g y of selfr e l i a n c e a s s y m b o l i z e d by t h e j u c h e i d e a w i t h a new p o l i c y of p r o m o t i n g j o i n t v e n t u r e s w i t h f o r e i g n c a p i t a l ; a n d t r a n s i t i o n f r o m t h e o l d t o t h e new g e n e r a t i o n of l e a d e r s h i p i n t h e p a r t y , a r m y , and b u r e a u c r a c y . The l a t t e r c o n c e r n was m a n i f e s t i n t h e T h r e e R e v o l u t i o n Team m o v e m e n t , a c a m p a i g n o r g a n i z e d and l e d by Kim J o n g - I l . 5 7 In t h e l o n g r u n , o n l y t i m e w i l l t e l l w h e t h e r any o r m o s t of t h e s e s h o r t - t e r m i s s u e s w i l l b e r e s o l v e d s m o o t h l y and s u c c e s s f u l l y and t h e r e b y l e a d t o t h e s u r v i v a l and v i a b i l i t y of t h e r e s p e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m s b e y o n d t h e l i f e s p a n of t h e i r i n c u m b e n t l e a d e r s . A s s u m i n g t h a t no second Korean war w i l l o c c u r i n t h e f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e , and t h a t i n t e r - K o r e a n c o e x i s t e n c e and l i m i t e d c o o p e r a t i o n w i l l c o n t i n u e , t h e r e s p e c t i v e Korean s t a t e s w i l l e m e r g e as e c o n o m i c a l l y d e v e l o p i n g and i n d u s t r i a l i z i n g countries. S o u t h K o r e a ' s e m e r g e n c e i n t o a NIC ( n e w l y i n d u s t r i a l i z i n g country) s t a t u s will enable it to j o i n t h e r a n k s of t h e m a t u r e a n d d e v e l o p e d industrialized c o u n t r i e s , s o t h a t S o u t h K o r e a now w i l l b e e l i g i b l e f o r m e m b e r s h i p i n t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n of E c o n o m i c C o o p e r a t i o n a n d D e v e l o p m e n t (OECD). North Korea's t u r n outward e c o n o m i c a l l y , w h i c h e m u l a t e s C h i n a ' s new e c o n o m i c p o l i -

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c y , m a y a l s o p r o v i d e a new s t i m u l u s t o t h e c e n t r a l l y p l a n n e d and s t a g n a n t e c o n o m y by i n j e c t i n g new t e c h n o l o g y and c a p i t a l f r o m t h e o u t s i d e w o r l d u n d e r t h e j o i n t v e n t u r e laws r e c e n t l y enacted. The l o n g - t e r m p r o s p e c t s f o r a u n i f i e d K o r e a t h r o u g h e c o n o m i c i n t e g r a t i o n o r p o l i t i c a l u n i o n seem l e s s s a n g u i n e and l i k e l y f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of 1 9 8 5 . The e x i s t i n g a r m s r a c e and h e i g h t e n e d t e n s i o n o n t h e K o r e a n P e n i n s u l a , u n l e s s d i s a r m a m e n t and a r m s c o n t r o l m e a s u r e s a r e t a k e n i m m e d i a t e l y , w i l l c o n t i n u e t o p e r s i s t and m a k e K o r e a o n e of t h e m o s t s e n s i t i v e a n d d a n g e r o u s s e c u r i t y f l a s h p o i n t s in the world. It is hard to b e l i e v e t h a t t h e Korean c o n f l i c t has been p r o l o n g e d f o r so long. It is more t h a n f o r t y y e a r s s i n c e t h e i n i t i a l partitioning of t h e p e n i n s u l a i n 1945 and m o r e t h a n t h r e e d e c a d e s s i n c e t h e K o r e a n War e n d e d i n 1 9 5 3 . The K o r e a n a r m i s t i c e a g r e e m e n t i s o n e of t h e o l d e s t t r u c e r e g i m e s i n e f f e c t and s t i l l o b s e r v e d , s o t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r c o n c l u d ing a p e a c e t r e a t y t o r e p l a c e t h e a r m i s t i c e a g r e e m e n t , when and i f c i r c u m s t a n c e s a r e r i g h t , h a s n o t d i m i n i s h e d . I n t h e a b s e n c e of a b r e a k t h r o u g h i n t h e c u r r e n t i n t e r - K o r e a n d i a l o g u e and n e g o t i a t i o n on u n i f i c a t i o n , h o w e v e r , t h e r e i s no c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n t o a s s u m e t h e e x i s t i n g a r m i s t i c e regime w i l l cease t o f u n c t i o n or the c u r r e n t t e n s i o n s w i l l end i n t h e n e a r f u t u r e . Without f i r s t a b a n d o n i n g m u t u a l s u s p i c i o n and d i s t r u s t and r e s t o r i n g p o l i t i c a l w i l l and m u t u a l c o n f i d e n c e , no p o s i t i v e and m e a n i n g f u l i n t e r - K o r e a n i n t e r a c t i o n i s l i k e l y t o occur in t h e f o r s e e a b l e f u t u r e . B e c a u s e of the d e l i c a t e b a l a n c e b e t w e e n d o m e s t i c p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s and f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s , e s p e c i a l l y in r e l a t i o n to d i p l o macy and n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i n t h e S o u t h , t h e f u t u r e p r o b l e m s of K o r e a n p o l i t i c s w i l l b e c o m e m o r e c o m p l e x and d i f f i c u l t to resolve. Given t h e g e o p o l i t i c a l r o l e and s i g n i f i c a n c e t h a t t h e Korean P e n i n s u l a o c c u p i e s in g l o b a l a n d r e g i o n a l p o l i t i c s , no m a j o r p o w e r s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e K o r e a n P e n i n s u l a s e e m t o f a v o r a d r a s t i c and a b r u p t c h a n g e i n t h e s t a t u s g u o p r e v a i l i n g on t h e K o r e a n P e n i n sula. The m o r e i t c h a n g e s , t h e m o r e i t s e e m s t h a t t h e K o r e a n s i t u a t i o n s y m b o l i z e d by t h e c u r r e n t " r e g i m e s i n c o n t e s t " w i l l r e m a i n t h e s a m e , i n s o f a r as t h e l o n g - t e r m p r o s p e c t of K o r e a i s c o n c e r n e d . 5 8 Implicat ions What i m p l i c a t i o n s a r i s e f r o m t h e p r e c e d i n g a n a l y s i s , e s p e c i a l l y i n t e r m s of t h e p o s s i b l e i m p a c t of a d i v i d e d K o r e a o n r e g i o n a l a n d U.S. p o l i c i e s ? If t h e s c e n a r i o of " c o n t i n u e d c o n f r o n t a t i o n " b e t w e e n t h e t w o Korean r e g i m e s p r o v e s t o be v a l i d , t h e s i t u a t i o n in t h e K o r e a n P e n i n s u l a f o r t h e r e s t of t h e c e n t u r y w i l l r e m a i n s i m i l a r t o what has t r a n s p i r e d s i n c e 1945, i . e . , h e i g h t ened t e n s i o n and i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of t h e w a r s y s t e m . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , i f t h e s c e n a r i o of "limited c o o p e r a t i o n " and e v e n a c t i v e i n t e r - K o r e a n i n t e r a c t i o n

170 r e s u l t f r o m s u c c e s s f u l N o r t h - S o u t h K o r e a n d i a l o g u e and n e g o t i a t i o n on u n i f i c a t i o n , t h e p r o s p e c t f o r p e a c e i n Korea w i l l improve m e a s u r a b l y , although t h e s i t u a t i o n may a l s o b e c o m e i n c r e a s i n g l y c o m p l e x and v o l a t i l e . More c o n f l i c t issues w i l l prove d i f f i c u l t to resolve because of a g r e a t e r t e n d e n c y i n b o t h K o r e a s t o l i n k d o m e s t i c p o l i t i c s and s e c u r i t y - d i p l o m a t i c p o l i c y i s s u e s . The t w o K o r e a n s o c i e t i e s w i l l b e c o m e m o r e i n t e g r a t e d i n t o a s y s t e m of m u t u a l d e p e n d e n c e p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y and c u l t u r a l l y , s o t h a t e a c h w i l l be i n c r e a s i n g l y s u b j e c t to p r e s s u r e s emanating from the opposite s i d e . Although both s y s t e m s w i l l grow more s e n s i t i v e t o each o t h e r ' s s t r e n g t h and w e a k n e s s , p l u r a l i s t i c S o u t h K o r e a w i l l be more v u l n e r a b l e t o o u t s i d e p r e s s u r e s , a t l e a s t i n t h e s h o r t r u n , t h a n m o n o l i t h i c North Korea. F u t u r e d e v e l o p m e n t on t h e K o r e a n P e n i n s u l a w i l l a l s o i n f l u e n c e t h e m a j o r p o w e r s ' p o l i c i e s and a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d t h e r e s p e c t i v e Korean s t a t e s . Because t h e United S t a t e s i s an a r c h i t e c t and a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t i n t h e c u r r e n t s y s t e m of d i v i d e d K o r e a , t h e f u t u r e d i r e c t i o n of U . S . - K o r e a r e l a t i o n s w i l l a f f e c t t h e s i t u a t i o n on t h e Korean P e n i n s u l a . From a b r o a d e r h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e , U . S . - K o r e a r e l a t i o n s h a v e h a d many u p s and d o w n s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by b o t h i n i t i a l a l o o f c o n t a c t and s u b s e q u e n t i n t i m a c y , o r w h a t B r u c e C u m i n g s i n 1980 c a l l e d "a c e n t u r y of c o n t a c t and t h i r t y - f i v e y e a r s of i n t i m a c y . " 5 9 T h e c u r r e n t a c t i v e p h a s e of U . S . - K o r e a p o l i c y , o n e of " i n v o l v e m e n t and i n t e r v e n t i o n , " i s m o t i v a t e d l a r g e l y by U.S. p e r c e p t i o n of K o r e a ' s g e o p o l i t i c a l r o l e and i m p o r t a n c e a s p a r t of t h e p o s t - W o r l d War I I " i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t p o l i c y " of t h e c o l d w a r e r a . 6 0 During t h e p o s t W o r l d War I I e r a " n o A s i a n n a t i o n h a s b e e n i n m o r e intense, sustained, and c o n f l i c t u a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t h a n Korea," as one n o t e d s t u d e n t r e m i n d s 61 us. From t h e m a c r o s c o p i c a n d s t r u c t u r a l p e r s p e c t i v e , h o w e v e r , no n a t i o n ' s p o l i c i e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e U.S.-Korea p o l i c y , may b e c o n s i d e r e d " e n d u r i n g , " i n t h e s e n s e t h a t d i p l o m a t i c p o l i c i e s are never permanent but are more l i k e l y a r e f l e c t i o n a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r s e t s of i n t e r e s t s . From t h i s r e a l i s t i c perspective, t h e n , U.S.-Korea p o l i c y i s bound t o c h a n g e as i t h a s in the past. I n f a c t , " K o r e a h a s n e v e r m a t t e r e d much t o Americans f o r i t s i n t r i n s i c i n t e r e s t or c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , b u t o n l y as i t r e l a t e s t o s o m e b r o a d e r c o n c e r n , " C u m i n g s observed. " I n d e e d , one can q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r i t i s p r o p e r t o s p e a k of m u t u a l i t y i n t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p a t a l l , s i n c e t h e i n f l u e n c e has been so s t r o n g l y one-way."62 How l o n g t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w i l l c o n t i n u e a s t h e s i n g l e m o s t i n f l u e n t i a l g l o b a l p o w e r , e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e f a c e of U.S. r e s p o n s e t o S o v i e t e x p a n s i o n i n t h e P a c i f i c , r e m a i n s t o be s e e n . As l o n g a s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s r e m a i n s t h e p r i n c i p a l global power, however, the i n t r i n s i c v a l u e of t h e K o r e a n P e n i n s u l a w i l l c o n t i n u e t o b e o b v i o u s and s o K o r e a w i l l c o n t i n u e t o be an i m p o r t a n t p i e c e on t h e c h e s s b o a r d of U.S. g e o p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g y .

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CONCLUSION Both Korean s t a t e s s h a r e s i m i l a r , although d i a m e t r i c a l l y o p p o s e d , p e r c e p t i o n s o f s e c u r i t y c o n c e r n s and S o v i e t expansion in the P a c i t h r e a t s from the o u t s i d e . f i c i s n a t u r a l l y a m a t t e r o f s e r i o u s c o n c e r n and a s e c u r i t y t h r e a t t o South Korea. But South Korea s h a r e s such a c o n c e r n w i t h o t h e r m a j o r p o w e r s i n t h e r e g i o n , such as t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , J a p a n , and C h i n a . The c o n t i n u e d U.S. m i l i t a r y p r e s e n c e i n South K o r e a i s t h e dominant s e c u r i t y c o n c e r n of North K o r e a , which g e n u i n e ly f e e l s threatened. It also f e e l s increasingly isol a t e d b e c a u s e C h i n a , i t s f o r e m o s t a l l y , has t u r n e d t o ward t h e West and j o i n e d a de f a c t o a n t i - S o v i e t e n t e n t e w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and J a p a n . N o r t h K o r e a has sought S o v i e t s u p p o r t in i t s d e n u n c i a t i o n of t h e U.S.ROK m i l i t a r y e x e r c i s e s (Team S p i r i t ) , t h e r e v i v a l o f "Japanese m i l i t a r i s m , " and t h e emerging " t r i p l e m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e " of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , Japan, and t h e ROK.63 The p r i m a r y s o u r c e o f e x t e r n a l t h r e a t s t o each Korea i s , of c o u r s e , t h e p r e s e n c e of an a n t a g o n i s t i c and r i v a l r e g i m e on t h e o p p o s i t e s i d e o f t h e DMZ t h a t d i v i d e s t h e p e n i n s u l a i n t o t h e two " r e g i m e s i n c o n t e s t . " 6 1 * But both Korean r e g i m e s a r e b a s i c a l l y c a u t i o u s and s u s p i c i o u s of o u t s i d e f o r c e s , l e s t t h e Great Power "scheme and m a c h i n a t i o n " w o u l d be d o n e , o n c e a g a i n , at t h e expense of t h e f u t u r e w e l f a r e and i n t e r e s t of t h e Korean people. T h i s i s why b o t h K o r e a n s t a t e s h a v e a g r e e d to pursue i n t e r - K o r e a n d i a l o g u e and n e g o t i a t i o n on u n i f i c a tion. S i n c e t e r r i t o r i a l p a r t i t i o n i n g of K o r e a by t h e G r e a t P o w e r s a t t h e end of W o r l d War I I i n 1945 was i m p o s e d upon t h e K o r e a n p e o p l e as a f a i t accompli, w i t h o u t p a r t i c i p a t i o n of t h e Korean p e o p l e I~n t h e d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , t h e n a t i o n a l i s t - m i n d e d Korean p e o p l e d e s i r e r e u n i f i c a t i o n of t h e i r d i v i d e d land as a m a t t e r of r i g h t and j u s t i c e . The t h r e e f o l d p r i n c i p l e of n a t i o n a l u n i f i c a t i o n , as c o n t a i n e d i n t h e July 4, 1972, J o i n t Communique of North-South D i a l o g u e t o which both Korean r e g i m e s s u b s c r i b e , r e p r e s e n t s t h e broad consensus of t h e Korean people. These p r i n c i p l e s s t i p u l a t e t h a t Korean u n i f i c a t i o n w i l l be a c h i e v e d by ( 1 ) independent e f f o r t s , w i t h o u t i n t e r f e r e n c e by and r e s o r t t o e x t e r n a l f o r c e s , ( 2 ) p e a c e f u l means, w i t h o u t r e s o r t t o war or t h e use of f o r c e , and ( 3 ) t h r o u g h a g r e a t e r n a t i o n a l u n i t y t h a t t r a n s c e n d s i d e a s , i d e o l o g y , and s y s t e m s . The r e a l i t y o f K o r e a ' s s t r a t e g i c v a l u e and i m p o r tance w i l l , n e v e r t h e l e s s , continue t o dominate the d e c i s i o n m a k e r ' s p e r s p e c t i v e and p e r c e p t i o n of Korea's p l a c e in the r e g i o n . Korea's g e o p o l i t i c s w i l l continue to e n s n a r e b o t h K o r e a n r e g i m e s i n a web o f c o m p l e x and complicated a l l i a n c e systems. As l o n g as m a j o r p o w e r r e l a t i o n s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e K o r e a n P e n i n s u l a , i . e . , U.S.S o v i e t , S i n o - S o v i e t , and J a p a n - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s , do not i m p r o v e , but remain b a s i c a l l y h o s t i l e and a n t a g o n i s t i c , t h e r e s p e c t i v e Korean s t a t e s w i l l be u n a b l e t o d e c o u p l e

172 themselves from the entangled a l l i a n c e network. Korea, u n d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , w i l l r e m a i n more of a d e p e n d e n t t h a n an i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e i n t h e e q u a t i o n and on t h e a l t a r of p o w e r p o l i t i c s .

NOTES 1. R e c e n t s t u d i e s on Korean s e c u r i t y , i n E n g l i s h , i n c l u d e : Sang-Woo Rhee, S e c u r i t y and U n i f i c a t i o n of Korea ( S e o u l : Sogang U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1984); Young C h o i , "The N o r t h Korean M i l i t a r y Buildup and I t s Impacts on N o r t h Korean M i l i t a r y S t r a t e g y i n t h e 1980s," Asian Survey 25, no. 3 (March 1985): 341-355; Young-Ho Lee, " M i l i t a r y Balance and Peace in the Korean Peninsula," Asian Survey 21, no. 8 (August 1 981 ) : 85 2-864 ; Edward N. L u t t w a k and S t e v e n L. Canby, "The D e f e n s e of K o r e a , " i n R o b e r t L. Downen, ed., N o r t h e a s t As i a i n t h e 1980s : C h a l l e n g e and O p p o r t u n i t y ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: CSIS, 1983); W i l l i a m S c u l l y , "The Korean P e n i n s u l a M i l i t a r y B a l a n c e , " Backgrounder No. 2 of A s i a n S t u d i e s C e n t e r ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: H e r i t a g e F o u n d a t i o n s , 1983); F r a n k l i n B. W e i n s t e i n and F u j i Kamiya, eds., The Security of Korea: U.S. and Japanese P e r s p e c t i v e s on t h e 1980s ( B o u l d e r , C o l o . : W e s t v i e w , 1980); Joseph A. Y a g e r , "The S e c u r i t y E n v i r o n m e n t of t h e Korean P e n i n s u l a i n t h e 1980s," Asian P e r s p e c t i v e (Seoul) 8, no. 1 (Spring-Summer 1984) :85-105. 2. Young Whan K i h l , P o l i t i c s and P o l i c i e s in Divided Korea: Regimes i n C o n t e s t ( B o u l d e r , C o l o . : W e s t v i e w , 1984), pp. x i - x i i , 145-150. 3. M i l i t a r y a n a l y s t s d i s a g r e e as t o w h e t h e r t h e m i l i t a r y b a l a n c e b e t w e e n N o r t h and South Korea i s e v e n l y matched or i s i n f a v o r of the North. The trend, however, seems t o be toward an arms equilibrium between the two Koreas. 4. Yager, " S e c u r i t y Environment," p. 85. Ibid. 5. 6. Young Whan K i h l , "North K o r e a : A R é é v a l u a t i o n , " C u r r e n t His t o r y 81 , no. 474 ( A p r i l 1982):181. 7. Sankei Shim bun, 18 A p r i l 1985, as c i t e d in Korea Herald, 18 A p r i l 1985. 8. Young Whan K i h l , "North Korea in 1983: Transforming 'The Hermit Kingdom'?" Asian Survey 24, no. 2 (January 1984):105. 9. Donald S. Z a g o r i a , ed., S o v i e t P o l i c y i n Eas t As i a (New Haven: Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1982); s e e , e s p e c i a l l y , Ralph N. C l o u g h , "The S o v i e t Union and t h e Two K o r e a s , " i n Z a g o r i a , S o v i e t P o l i c y , pp. 175-200. 10. Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1983, as c i t e d in Japan Economic I n s t i t u t e R e p o r t , no. 8A ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C., J E I , 1985), p. 8. 11 . Ibid . 12. S c u l l y , " K o r e a n M i l i t a r y B a l a n c e , " p. 14; a l s o , s e e App e n d i x B. 13. For d e t a i l s , see chapters 2 and 3 of t h i s book. 14. Defense of Japan, 1983. 15. Far Eastern Economic Review, As i a 1985 Yearbook, 20 November 1984, pp. 26-27, 30; a l s o see Appendix B. 16. Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, U.S. P o l i c y Toward Japan and Korea (New York: P r a e g e r , 1982).

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17. N a t h a n N. W h i t e , U.S. P o l i c y T o w a r d K o r e a : A n a l y s i s , A l t e r n a t i v e s , and R e c o m m e n d a t i o n ( B o u l d e r , C o l o . : W e s t v i e w , 1979). 18. L a r r y N i k s c h , "U.S. T r o o p W i t h d r a w a l f r o m S o u t h K o r e a : P a s t S h o r t c o m i n g s and F u t u r e P r o s p e c t s , " A s i a n S u r v e y 21, no. 3 ( M a r c h 1 9 8 1 ) : 325-341» 19. P a u l D. W o l f o w i t z , R e c e n t S e c u r i t y D e v e l o p m e n t s i n K o r e a , U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e , C u r r e n t P o l i c y , no. 7 3 1 , 12 A u g u s t 1 9 8 5 . 20. W e i n s t e i n , S e c u r i t y of K o r e a . 21. Young Whan K i h l , " S o r e n n o K a n h a n t o S e i s a k u " [ S o v i e t P o l i cy Toward t h e Korean P e n i n s u l a ] , K o r i a Hyoron 270 ( N o v e m b e r D e c e m b e r 1 9 8 4 ) : 3 - 1 5 ; C l o u g h , "The S o v i e t U n i o n , " p p . 1 7 5 - 1 7 6 . 22. W h i t e , U . S . P o l i c y Toward K o r e a . 23. Young Whan K i h l , " N o r t h K o r e a i n 1 9 8 4 : The ' H e r m i t K i n g dom" T u r n s O u t w a r d ! " A s i a n S u r v e y 2 5 , no. 1 ( J a n u a r y 1 9 8 5 ) : 6 5 - 7 9 . 24. S c u l l y , "Korean M i l i t a r y Balance." 25. D e f e n s e of J a p a n , 1 9 8 3 ; The I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e f o r S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s , The M i l i t a r y B a l a n c e 1 9 8 4 - 8 5 (London: I I S S , 1984). 26. C h o i , " N o r t h K o r e a n M i l i t a r y B u i l d u p , " ; U.S., C o n g r e s s , S e n a t e , C o m m i t t e e on F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s , U.S. T r o o p W i t h d r a w a l f r o m t h e R e p u b l i c of K o r e a , A R e p o r t t o t h e C o m m i t t e e by S e n a t o r s H u b e r t H. H u m p h r e y a n d J o h n G l e n n , 9 5 t h c o n g . , 2d s e s s . , 9 J a n u a r y 1 9 7 9 . 27. S c u l l y , "Korean M i l i t a r y B a l a n c e , " p . 14. 28. U.S. C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e A g e n c y , K o r e a : T h e E c o n o m i c Race B e t w e e n t h e N o r t h and t h e S o u t h : A R e s e a r c h P a p e r ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: N a t i o n a l A s s e s s m e n t C e n t e r a n d t h e L i b r a r y of C o n g r e s s , 1978). 29. N a t i o n a l U n i f i c a t i o n B o a r d , A C o m p a r a t i v e S t u d y of t h e S o u t h and N o r t h K o r e a n E c o n o m i e s ( S e o u l : ROK N a t i o n a l U n n i f i c a t i o n B o a r d , 1 9 8 4 ) , p . 32. 30. K i h l , P o l i t i c s and P o l i c i e s , p p . 1 5 5 - 1 5 7 . 31. K i h l , North Korea i n 1984, p p . 6 9 - 7 0 . 32. B y u n g C h u l K o h , T h e F o r i e g n P o l i c y S y s t e m s of N o r t h a n d S o u t h K o r e a ( B e r k e l e y : U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1 9 8 4 ) , p p . 8-14. 33. On i n t e r - K o r e a n d i a l o g u e a n d n e g o t i a t i o n i n t h e 1 9 7 0 s , s e e Y o u n g Whan K i h l , " K o r e a n R e s p o n s e t o M a j o r P o w e r R a p p r o c h e m e n t , " i n Young C. Kim, e d . , Maj o r P o w e r s and K o r e a ( S i l v e r S p r i n g , Md.: R e s e a r c h I n s t i t u t e o n K o r e a n A f f a i r s , 1 9 7 3 ) , p p . 1 3 9 - 1 6 4 ; Young Whan K i h l , " K o r e a ' s F u t u r e : S e o u l ' s P e r s p e c t i v e , " A s i a n S u r v e y 17, n o . 11 ( N o v e m b e r 1 9 7 7 ) : 1 0 6 4 - 1 0 7 6 . 34. K o h , F o r e i g n P o l i c y S y s t e r n s , p . 8 8 ; a l s o s e e Y o u n g C. Kim, " N o r t h K o r e a n F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " P r o b l e m s of Communism ( J a n u a r y F e b r u a r y 1985): 1-17. 35. Young Whan K i h l , "The I s s u e of K o r e a n U n i f i c a t i o n : N o r t h K o r e a ' s P o l i c y a n d P e r c e p t i o n , " i n C. I . E u g e n e Kim a n d B. C. K o h , eds., Journey t o North Korea: P e r s o n a l P e r c e p t i o n s (Berkeley: Univ e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a I n s t i t u t e of E a s t A s i a n S t u d i e s , 1 9 8 3 ) , p p . 99-117. 36. I I S S R e p o r t o n May 3 , 1 9 8 5 , a s c i t e d i n K o r e a H e r a l d , 5 May 1985. 37. On Kim I l - S u n g ' s c r i t i c i s m of J a p a n , s e e t h e t e x t of h i s b a n q u e t s p e e c h i n M o s c o w , P y o n g y a n g T i m e s , 26 May 1 9 8 4 ; a l s o s e e New York T i m e s , 26 May 1984. 38. Washington Times, 2 May 1 9 8 5 , q u o t i n g a U.S. State Department o f f i c i a l .

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39. Ibid. 40. K i h l , N o r t h Korea i n 1983, p p . 7 0 - 7 1 . 41. P y o n g y a n g T i m e s , 9 May 1 9 8 4 ; B e i j i n g R e v i e w 2 7 , n o . 20 ( 1 4 May 1 9 8 4 ) . 42. Naewoe P r e s s , 4 3 5 ( 1 7 May 1 9 8 5 ) . 43. F a r E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c R e v i e w , 29 A u g u s t 1 9 8 5 , p p . 2 2 . 44. Ibid. 45. C h u n Doo H w a n , 3 M a r c h 1 9 8 1 , a s c i t e d i n K o h , F o r e i g n P o l i c y S y s t e m s , p . 104. 46. Chun Doo Hwan, s p e a k i n g b e f o r e t h e N a t i o n a l P r e s s C l u b i n W a s h i n g t o n , D.C. , on F e b r u a r y 2, 1 9 8 1 , eis c i t e d i n i b i d . 47. I b i d . , p . 106. 48. C h a e - J i n L e e , " S o u t h K o r e a i n 1984: S e e k i n g P e a c e and P r o s p e r i t y , " A s i a n S u r v e y 25, no. 1 ( J a n u a r y 1 9 8 5 ) : 8 0 - 8 9 . 49. F a r E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c R e v i e w , 16 May 1 9 8 5 , p . 4 6 . 50. K o r e a H e r a l d , 30 A p r i l 1 9 8 5 . 51. F a r E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c R e v i e w , 16 May 1 9 8 5 , p p . 4 6 - 4 9 . 52. K i h l , North Korea i n 1984, p p . 7 7 - 7 8 . 53. For d e t a i l s , s e e K i h l , P o l i t i c s and P o l i c i e s , pp. 20621 2. 54. I b i d . , pp. 228-230. 55. K i h l , Noth Korea i n 1984, p p . 7 6 - 7 7 . 56. The t r i p a r t i t e t a l k s p r o p o s a l was n o t s u c c e s s f u l b e c a u s e t h e t i m i n g , among o t h e r f a c t o r s , w a s n o t r i g h t f o l l o w i n g t h e O c t o b e r 1983 R a n g o o n b o m b i n g e p i s o d e . See i b i d . , pp. 66-67. 57. K i h l , P o l i t i c s and P o l i c i e s , p . 243. 58. I b i d . , pp. 242-245. 59. B r u c e C u m i n g s , " K o r e a n - A m e r i c a n R e l a t i o n s : A C e n t u r y of C o n t a c t a n d T h i r t y - F i v e Y e a r s of I n t i m a c y , " i n W a r r e n L. C o h e n , e d . . New F r o n t i e r s i n A m e r i c a n - E a s t As i a n R e l a t i o n s (New Y o r k : Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1983), pp. 237-282. 60. B r u c e C u m i n g s , The O r i g i n s of t h e K o r e a n War: L i b e r a t i o n a n d t h e E m e r g e n c e of S e p a r a t e R e g i m e s , 1945-1947 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981). 61. Cumings, "Korean-American R e l a t i o n s , " p . 136. 62. I b i d . , p . 277. 63. "Team S p i r i t , T h r e e - W a y War G a m e , " P y o n g y a n g T i m e s , 9 March 1 9 8 5 . 64. See K i h l , P o l i t i c s and P o l i c i e s , e s p e c i a l l y c h a p t e r 9 .

Part 3

Southeast Asia and Oceania

8 Vietnam/Indochina: Hanoi's Challenge to Southeast Asian Regional Order

William S. Turley

I n an e r a o f p o w e r d i f f u s i o n and w a n i n g G r e a t P o w e r hegemony, l o c a l a c t o r s have g r e a t e r o p p o r t u n i t y than p r e v i o u s l y t o shape p o l i t i c a l and s e c u r i t y arrangements f o r their regions. Such i s t h e c a s e i n S o u t h e a s t A s i a , t h e o t h e r s t r a t e g i c f u l c r u m of A s i a where t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h e S o v i e t Union, China, and Japan now c o n v e r g e , i f l e s s d i r e c t l y t h a n i n t h e n o r t h e a s t . L o c a l r i v a l r i e s have reemerged a f t e r a c e n t u r y of c o l o n i a l r u l e , and d e s p i t e an o v e r l a y of Great Power competition, i n i t i a t i v e b e l o n g s t o s t a t e s of t h e r e g i o n . Vietnam in p a r t i c u l a r has responded t o i t s own n a t i o n a l r e u n i f i c a t i o n , t h e U.S. r e t r e a t f r o m t h e m a i n l a n d , and a r e a s s e r t i v e China by s e e k i n g t o c o n s o l i d a t e a new p a t t e r n of r e l a t i o n s w i t h i t s n e i g h b o r s and w i t h e x t r a r e g i o n a l powers. T h i s s t r i v i n g a l r e a d y has a f f e c t e d s e c u r i t y i n S o u t h e a s t A s i a and t h e s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n s o f Great Powers in t h e W e s t e r n P a c i f i c . Significant longterm p o l i c y i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r a v a r i e t y of a f f e c t e d count r i e s h i n g e on t h e g o a l s , p e r c e p t i o n s , d e t e r m i n a t i o n , and c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h e V i e t n a m e s e . In t h i s c h a p t e r , " V i e t - c e n t r i c " v i e w s of s t r a t e g i c s e c u r i t y and r e g i o n a l o r d e r a r e e x a m i n e d i n o r d e r t o d e t e r m i n e w h a t some o f t h e s e i m p l i c a t i o n s might be. A t t e n t i o n n e c e s s a r i l y f o c u s e s on t h e c o n f l i c t t h a t c e n t e r s on Cambodia. T h e r e , i t w i l l be remembered, P o l P o t ' s Khmer Rouge b r o k e away f r o m V i e t n a m e s e t u t e l a g e e v e n b e f o r e t h e Second I n d o c h i n a War e n d e d . As H a n o i t i l t e d t o w a r d M o s c o w , China s u p p o r t e d t h e Khmer Rouge R e s e a r c h f o r t h i s p a p e r , i n c l u d i n g t w o t r i p s t o H a n o i , was c o n ducted when I was v i s i t i n g p r o f e s s o r i n American S t u d i e s , Chulalongkorn U n i v e r s i t y , Bangkok, under the a u s p i c e s of the F u l b r i g h t Hayes p r o g r a m and t h e John F. Kennedy F o u n d a t i o n o f T h a i l a n d . I a l s o w i s h t o a c k n o w l e d g e t h e s u p p o r t g i v e n t o me by t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s I n s t i t u t e , H a n o i , d u r i n g my v i s i t t o V i e t n a m i n

1984. 177

178 against the V i e t n a m e s e . F i n a l l y , in 1978, Hanoi obtained reassurance from Moscow and intervened in December of that y e a r to s u p p r e s s a C a m b o d i a n r e g i m e it judged to be s u b s e r v i e n t to China. 1 That i n t e r v e n t i o n provoked attack by China and opposition from the noncomm u n i s t A s s o c i a t i o n of S o u t h e a s t A s i a n N a t i o n s (ASEAN) s u p p o r t e d by the United States and Japan. T h e ensuing c o n f l i c t f a c i l i t a t e d Soviet e f f o r t s to c o n s o l i d a t e a closer relationship with Vietnam, as it deepened Vietn a m e s e d e p e n d e n c e on the Soviet Union. O b v i o u s l y , the conflict was entangled from the beginning in the SinoSoviet d i s p u t e and h a s p o t e n t i a l to c r e a t e a d e e p reg i o n a l c l e a v a g e s u b o r d i n a t e to the rivalry of Beijing and Moscow. H o w e v e r , the t r i l a t e r a l G r e a t P o w e r c o m p e t i t i o n permits regional actors a greater degree of flexibility than they had during the period of U.S. hegemony. Great P o w e r s s u p p l y local c o n t e s t a n t s and thus s u s t a i n the latters' conflicts, but they obtain little leverage over them in return. Vietnam's d e p e n d e n c y on the Soviet Union, for example, is matched by the Soviet dependency on V i e t n a m to extend the range of its largest fleet into w a t e r s h i t h e r t o a p r e s e r v e of the United S t a t e s and to g a i n a foothold on China's s o u t h e r n flank. The Soviet Union has no other viable way besides cooperation with V i e t n a m to be a m a j o r p l a y e r in this part of the w o r l d . H o w e v e r d e p e n d e n t V i e t n a m m a y be on the Soviet U n i o n , Soviet d e p e n d e n c y on V i e t n a m a s s u r e s Hanoi of s t a b l e support for its own goals in Indochina. Those goals are i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the Thai p e r c e p t i o n that Thailand's security is threatened by a Vietnamese military presence in the Mekong Basin; protracted conflict disturbs other ASEAN states because it provides opportunities for Great Powers, principally China and the Soviet Union, to gain i n f l u e n c e in the region. For the p o l i c y m a k e r or the analyst to respond e f f e c t i v e l y , it is n e c e s s a r y to u n d e r s t a n d Hanoi's g o a l s in s o m e d e t a i l and to g a u g e its commitment to attaining them.

THE SETTING Without implying geopolitical determinism, certain environmental features of Southeast Asia must be given t h e i r due. Though V i e t n a m e s e c o m m u n i s t l e a d e r s hold conceptions that distinguish them from other elites that have governed Vietnam, geography and history shape their views and provide continuity. These continuities help to e x p l a i n the local and m o s t e n d u r i n g f e a t u r e s of t h e current conflicts. The dominant geopolitical feature of Southeast Asia is the region's p o l i t i c a l f r a g m e n t a t i o n c o m b i n e d w i t h its l o c a t i o n on China's p e r i p h e r y . China historically h a s s o u g h t to keep r e g i o n a l p o w e r s w e a k , d i v i d e d , o r deferential and to exclude competitors in order to mini-

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m i z e t h r e a t from t h i s q u a r t e r . Except i n t h e u l t i m a t e l y u n s u c c e s s f u l a t t e m p t t o c o n q u e r V i e t n a m , China pursued t h i s s t r a t e g y b e f o r e t h e c o l o n i a l p e r i o d by m a n i p u l a t i n g trade p r i v i l e g e s , mediating disputes, inviting t r i b u t e , and engaging i n l i m i t e d m i l i t a r y f o r a y s . China pursued t h i s s t r a t e g y through t h e l a t e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y (even t h o u g h d i r e c t l y c h a l l e n g e d on i t s own t e r r i t o r y ) i n an a t t e m p t t o a v e r t t h e u n i f i c a t i o n o f I n d o c h i n a by F r a n c e . F o l l o w i n g t h e C h i n e s e R e v o l u t i o n , f o r lack, of a l t e r n a t i v e s as long as t h e W e s t e r n p r e s e n c e was s t i l l s t r o n g , C h i n e s e t a c t i c s emphasized s u p p o r t of i n s u r g e n c i e s , but t h e i r s t r a t e g y was t h e s a m e . I r o n i c a l l y , the Vietnamese w e r e t h e f i r s t t o b e n e f i t as C h i n a s o u g h t t o t e r m i n a t e t h e F r e n c h p r e s e n c e on i t s s o u t h e r n f l a n k and t h e n t o p r e v e n t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s from o b t a i n i n g a s e c o n d f o o t h o l d on t h e Asian m a i n l a n d . Over t h e y e a r s , China has s u p p o r t e d i n s u r g e n c i e s i n v i r t u a l l y every S o u t h e a s t Asian c o u n t r y . I t has g i v e n t h i s s u p p o r t s o m e t i m e s t o weaken r e g i m e s and s o m e t i m e s t o s e c u r e l e v e r a g e o v e r them, e . g . , t o e n f o r c e Burma's neutrality. In 1 9 7 9 , China suspended s u p p o r t of i n s u r g e n c i e s i n t h e ASEAN c o u n t r i e s i n e x c h a n g e f o r improved s t a t e - t o - s t a t e r e l a t i o n s but s i n c e t h e n has s p o n s o r e d o r s u p p o r t e d i n s u r g e n c i e s i n L a o s , Cambodia, and Vietnam i n an e f f o r t t o b r e a k up any p r o - S o v i e t e m e r g e n t b l o c and t o d e t e r a l l i a n c e b e t w e e n t h a t b l o c and t h e S o v i e t Union. C h i n a i s t h e o n l y G r e a t Power s u p p l y i n g d i r e c t m i l i t a r y support t o i n s u r g e n c i e s in Southeast Asia t o day. Only i n t e r n a l u p h e a v a l and e x t e r n a l c h a l l e n g e have ever stayed China's s t r i v i n g f o r predominance w i t h i n t h e region. Of a l l S o u t h e a s t A s i a n c o u n t r i e s , V i e t n a m h a s most o f t e n f a l l e n w i t h i n t h e s c o p e of C h i n a ' s s t r a t e g i c c o n c e r n — w h e t h e r as b e n e f i c i a r y o r v i c t i m . A second important g e o p o l i t i c a l f e a t u r e is t h e p r o c e s s of s t a t e c o n s o l i d a t i o n t h a t has taken p l a c e in S o u t h e a s t A s i a o y e r a p e r i o d of 2 , 0 0 0 y e a r s . For t h e V i e t n a m e s e , t h i s p r o c e s s o c c u r r e d in t h e c o n t e x t of r e p e a t e d a t t e m p t s by C h i n a t o s u b j u g a t e t h e m . China's attempted s u b j u g a t i o n s have implanted in t h e Vietnamese a d e e p a n t i p a t h y t o C h i n a and may h a v e b o t h p r o p e l l e d and s t e e l e d t h e V i e t n a m e s e f o r s o u t h w a r d e x p a n s i o n a t t h e e x p e n s e of weaker n e i g h b o r s . The T h a i l i k e w i s e e x p a n d e d s o u t h w a r d , and w i t h t h e s a m e r e s u l t . By t h e s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y , Vietnam and T h a i l a n d had emerged as t h e l e a d i n g c o n t e n d e r s f o r power on t h e S o u t h e a s t A s i a n m a i n l a n d and commenced a r i v a l r y f o r i n f l u e n c e i n t h e b u f f e r s between them. The r o o t o f c o n f l i c t was t h e s h a r e d p e r c e p t i o n t h a t t h e Mekong B a s i n c o m p r i s i n g l o w land Laos and most of Cambodia was a l i n e o f u n i t y , not d i v i s i o n , t h a t n e i t h e r power c o u l d l e t f a l l t o t h e o t h e r without t h r e a t t o s e c u r i t y . 2 S p o r a d i c a l l y , d u r i n g two c e n t u r i e s b e g i n n i n g i n 1 6 2 3 , t h e two c o u n t r i e s s u p p o r t e d r i v a l c l a i m a n t s t o t h e Cambodian t h r o n e and a t t e m p t e d t o enforce exclusive claims to suzerainty. These i n t e r v e n t i o n s i n v o l v e d armed a c t i o n i n s i d e Cambodia, s u p p l y of

180 arms and t r o o p s t o t h e Khmer c o n t e s t a n t s , o n e o u t r i g h t m i l i t a r y o c c u p a t i o n (by V i e t n a m ) , t h e a n n e x a t i o n of C a m b o d i a n t e r r i t o r y (by b o t h ) , and g e n e r a l warfare. C o l o n i a l r u l e suspended Asian i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . I t a l s o u n i f i e d I n d o c h i n a under a s i n g l e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e in h i s t o r y , t o t h e T h a i s ' advantage o f h a v i n g e s c a p e d d i r e c t r u l e as V i e t n a m w e n t t h r o u g h two d e v a s t a t i n g w a r s . R i v a l r y r e s u m e d as t h e T h a i s s e i z e d t h i s o p p o r t u n i t y t o work f o r t h e f r a g m e n t a t i o n of I n d o c h i n a and w e a k e n i n g o f V i e t n a m . B e t w e e n 1 9 5 9 and 1973, t h e Thais s e n t t w e n t y - f i v e b a t t a l i o n s of " v o l u n t e e r s " i n t o Laos and f a c i l i t a t e d t h e U.S. bombardment of Vietnam from Thai t e r r i t o r y . Vietnam responded by a i d ing an ongoing i n s u r g e n t movement i n T h a i l a n d . L a s t i s V i e t n a m ' s c o n s t r u c t i o n as a t h i n s l i v e r of l a n d on t h e e d g e o f t h e A s i a n l a n d m a s s . Open d e l t a s a t e i t h e r end of t h i s s l i v e r s u p p o r t d e n s e p o p u l a t i o n s , but t h e s e a r e f l a t , v u l n e r a b l e , and s e p a r a t e d by more t h a n a thousand k i l o m e t e r s of c r o s s - r u n n i n g r i d g e s . Between t h e s e r i d g e s l i e s m a l l c o m p a r t m e n t s of human s e t t l e m e n t and c o a s t a l e n c l a v e s . The t e r r a i n i s h o s t i l e t o i n t e r n a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n and t r a d i t i o n a l l y h a s made V i e t n a m d i f f i c u l t t o g o v e r n and d e f e n d . Whereas T h a i l a n d i s h e l d t o g e t h e r by i t s t o p o g r a p h y , V i e t n a m i s d i v i d e d by it; Thailand has f l o u r i s h e d under i n c o h e s i v e s t a t e s t r u c t u r e s , b u t V i e t n a m h a s r e l i e d on b u r e a u c r a c y t o hold the country t o g e t h e r . 3 The s e a c a n be a l i n k , b u t t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n of p e o p l e a l o n g t h e c o a s t l i n e a l s o p l a c e s t h e bulk of r e s o u r c e s w i t h i n e a s y r a n g e of s e a borne a t t a c k . The V i e t n a m e s e c o n s e q u e n t l y have f e l t i t n e c e s s a r y t o c o n t r o l t h e mountainous h i n t e r l a n d s h a r e d w i t h Laos and C a m b o d i a i n o r d e r t o h a v e a s e c u r e r e a r and l i n k a g e b e t w e e n r e g i o n s . This requirement has seemed t o t h e V i e t n a m e s e t o grow i n i m p o r t a n c e b e c a u s e i n modern t i m e s t h r e e G r e a t P o w e r s , t w o o f them w i t h Thai c o n n i v a n c e , h a v e i n t e r v e n e d i n Laos and Cambodia t o o b s t r u c t a s t r u g g l e f o r n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e and u n i t y in Vietnam. T h e s e c o n t e x t s e n c o u r a g e V i e t n a m e s e communist l e a d e r s , as t h e y did t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s , t o view Vietnam as t h e p r i n c i p a l r e p o s i t o r y of advanced u n i v e r s a l v a l u e s ( C h i n e s e i n t h e p a s t , Marx i s t - L e n i n i s t i n t h e p r e s e n t ) i n S o u t h e a s t A s i a and t h e r e g i o n ' s bulwark a g a i n s t C h i n a ' s p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y p o w e r . They a l s o make i t e a s y f o r t h e V i e t n a m e s e , as long as t h e r e i s no r e v o l u t i o n i n T h a i l a n d , t o i n t e r p r e t T h a i p o l i c y p a r t l y as a t r a d i t i o n a l p u r s u i t of power and e x p a n s i o n , now aided by a h o s t i l e U n i t e d S t a t e s and C h i n a . Lastly, Vietnam's g e o g r a p h y makes t h e V i e t n a m e s e e x t r e m e l y s e n s i t i v e t o t h r e a t s a g a i n s t t h e i r i n t e r n a l l i n e s of communication; t h e r e f o r e , t h e y i n s i s t on unimpeded a c c e s s t o t h e t e r r i t o r y o f L a o s and C a m b o d i a . Such p e r c e p t i o n s , h o w e v e r , a r e o n l y a s u b s t r a t u m as c o m p a r e d w i t h o t h e r s that r e f l e c t the current Vietnamese l e a d e r s h i p ' s e x p e r i e n c e on t h e road t o p o w e r , s t r a t e g i c a i m s , and i d e o l o g y .

181 INDOCHINA IN VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST STRATEGY The most common a s s u m p t i o n about V i e t n a m e s e s t r a t e gy i s t h a t i t a i m s t o e s t a b l i s h H a n o i ' s d o m i n i o n o v e r a l l of I n d o c h i n a , p e r h a p s i n a f e d e r a l s t r u c t u r e . Evid e n c e f o r t h i s view i s found i n p r e c o l o n i a l V i e t n a m e s e r e l a t i o n s w i t h Laos and Cambodia, i n t h e Communist p a r t y ' s claim t o r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r r e v o l u t i o n in a l l t h r e e c o u n t r i e s up t o 1 9 5 1 , and i n r e f e r e n c e s t o an I n d o c h i n a Federation in e a r l y party documents. It is reinforced by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e F r e n c h c o l o n i a l r e g i m e r e l i e d , i n p a r t , on V i e t n a m e s e t o a d m i n i s t e r L a o s and C a m b o d i a , t h a t l i b e r a t i o n movements w o r l d w i d e h a v e s o u g h t t o f i l l out t h e b o u n d a r i e s o f t h e i r c o l o n i a l p r e d e c e s s o r s , t h a t t h e V i e t n a m e s e h a v e t u t o r e d Lao and Khmer C o m m u n i s t s down t o t h e p r e s e n t , and t h a t Le Due Tho b o a s t e d i n s e c r e t t a l k s with Henry K i s s i n g e r , a c c o r d i n g t o K i s s i n g e r , of " h i s p e o p l e ' s d e s t i n y not m e r e l y t o t a k e o v e r South Vietnam but t o d o m i n a t e t h e whole of I n d o c h i n a . " 4 The c o n v e n t i o n a l v i e w , h o w e v e r , r e s t s on s i m p l i s t i c h i s t o r i c i s t premises. I t a l s o assumes a u n i f o r m i t y o f e x p e r i e n c e among V i e t n a m e s e e l i t e s t h a t d i d not e x i s t . The t r u e i n h e r i t o r s of t h e French m a n d a t e , i t s h o u l d be p o i n t e d o u t , were V i e t n a m e s e employees of t h e French c o l o n i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and t h e s e wound up i n S a i g o n For t h e s e r e a s o n s t h e e v o l u t i o n of n o t Hanoi i n 1 9 5 4 . communist s t r a t e g y as r e g a r d s I n d o c h i n a , though f a m i l i a r i n broad o u t l i n e , d e s e r v e s c l o s e a t t e n t i o n . That e v o l u t i o n began with a d i s p u t e o v e r t h e p a r t y ' s name a t t h e t i m e o f i t s f o u n d i n g . In F e b r u a r y 1930, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of f o u r V i e t n a m e s e communist groups met a t a " m e r g e r c o n f e r e n c e " a t t h e b e h e s t of Ho Chi Minh t o f o u n d t h e V i e t n a m C o m m u n i s t p a r t y ( V C P ) . The name r e f l e c t e d a w i s h t o c o n c e n t r a t e on a c h i e v i n g independence f o r Vietnam j u s t as i t r e f l e c t e d low e s t e e m f o r t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y p o t e n t i a l o f L a o s and C a m b o d i a . D e l e g a t e s from n o r t h e r n Vietnam a l s o a s s e r t e d t h a t " i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h L e n i n i s t s e l f - d e t e r m i n i s m t h e y c o u l d not make t h e Cambodian and Lao p r o l e t a r i a t s e n t e r t h e p a r t y w i t h t h e m . " 5 The i d e a o f a s s u m i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r r e v o l u t i o n i n a l l o f I n d o c h i n a seems t o h a v e had l i t t l e support. That r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was assumed l a t e r t o b r i n g VCP p o l i c y i n t o l i n e w i t h t h e C o m i n t e r n p r i n c i p l e o f matching p a r t i e s in the c o l o n i a l world with c o l o n i a l (not e t h n i c ) j u r i s d i c t i o n s . A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e 1 s t Plenum of t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e , h e l d in O c t o b e r 1930 p r i n c i p a l l y t o c o r r e c t t h e " e r r o r s " of t h e m e r g e r c o n f e r e n c e , gave c o n s i d e r a b l e a t t e n t i o n t o t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e p a r t y ' s name. The plenum r e s o l u t i o n s t a t e d t h a t " i n s t r u c t i o n s from t h e C o m i n t e r n " were t o "drop t h e name ' V i e t nam C o m m u n i s t P a r t y ' and t a k e t h e name ' I n d o c h i n a Communist Party (ICP).'"6 An i n t e n s i v e campaign had t o be mounted w i t h i n t h e p a r t y t o e x p l a i n t h i s c h a n g e , as t h e r e a s o n s f o r i t w e r e by no means o b v i o u s t o t h e membership. The e x p l a n a t i o n

182 was t h a t d e s p i t e d i f f e r e n c e s o f c u s t o m , l a n g u a g e , and " r a c e , " t h e V i e t n a m e s e , C a m b o d i a n , and Lao " p r o l e t a r i a t s " had formed a c l o s e p o l i t i c a l and e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s h i p due t o t h e i r j o i n t s u b j u g a t i o n by French c o l o n i a l ism. B e c a u s e t h e c o l o n i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was a " u n i f i e d c o n c e n t r a t e d f o r c e , " i t was n e c e s s a r y t o "have a s i n g l e Communist P a r t y t o c o n c e n t r a t e t h e f o r c e o f t h e p r o l e t a r i a t i n a l l of t h e c o u n t r i e s o f I n d o c h i n a . " 7 A letter from t h e C e n t r a l Committee t o p a r t y branch c o m m i t t e e s f u r t h e r e x p l a i n e d t h a t b e c a u s e t h e t h r e e c o u n t r i e s had grown i n t e r d e p e n d e n t under c o l o n i a l r u l e , each r e q u i r e d t h e s u p p o r t o f t h e o t h e r two t o o v e r t h r o w c o l o n i a l r u l e and " i f s e p a r a t e d each would l a c k s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s f o r economic a c t i v i t y . E r r o n e o u s r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s , " t h e l e t t e r s t e r n l y c o n c l u d e d , "has r e s u l t e d i n many dangerous i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f t h e p a r t y ' s i d e o l o g y . The ' n a m e ' p r o b l e m may s e e m o n l y a m a t t e r o f f o r m , a s m a l l m a t t e r , but i n r e a l i t y i t has i m p o r t a n c e b e c a u s e i t can i n f l u e n c e t h e t h o u g h t and a c t i o n s o f t h e P a r t y . " 8 Though t h i s a f f a i r t o o k p l a c e when t h e p a r t y had o n l y 2 0 0 t o 300 m e m b e r s , i t had l a s t i n g importance b e c a u s e t h e s e f o u n d e r s , who were t o l e a d t h e p a r t y down t o t h e p r e s e n t , p a s s e d on v i e w s f o r m e d i n t h i s p e r i o d t o t h e membership as a w h o l e . The i n c i d e n t r e v e a l e d i m p o r t a n t f o r m a t i v e e l e m e n t s i n V i e t n a m e s e communist o r i e n t a t i o n s toward I n d o c h i n a . F i r s t , t h e p e r c e p t i o n of I n d o c h i n a as a u n i t y did not come n a t u r a l l y t o t h e a p p a r e n t m a j o r i t y o f p a r t y m e m b e r s who t e n d e d t o d i s m i s s t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y p o t e n t i a l o f Laos and Cambodia. Whether n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n o r p r o l e t a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n was t h e p r i m a r y o b j e c t i v e , t h e need t o i n v o l v e Laos and Cambodia was not e v i d e n t . The r e q u i r e m e n t s o f i d e o l o g i c a l o r t h o d o x y and s u b s e r v i e n c e t o Moscow, h o w e v e r , a s s u r e d a s p l i t w i t h i n t h e p a r t y on t h i s i s s u e . 9 Second, in 1930, V i e t n a m e s e Communists p e r c e i v e d l i t t l e t h r e a t e m a n a t i n g from Laos and Cambodia, a p a r t from t h a t which " i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t s " a s s o c i a t e d with French colonial rule. T h i r d , i d e o l o g y r e s h a p e d i f i t did not c o m p l e t e l y s u p p l a n t t r a d i t i o n a l V i e t n a m e s e a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d t h e Lao and Khmer. A l t h o u g h low e s t e e m f o r t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y p o t e n t i a l o f t h e s e p e o p l e s r e s o n a t e d w i t h an o l d e r V i e t n a m e s e b e l i e f i n Lao and Khmer c u l t u r a l b a c k w a r d n e s s , t h e e v i d e n c e g i v e n t o s u p p o r t t h i s v i e w was t h a t t h e y lacked the r e q u i s i t e c l a s s s t r u c t u r e to s u s t a i n a p r o l e t a r i a t party. Such r e a s o n i n g i m p l i e d poor p r o s p e c t s f o r a M a r x i s t m i s s ion c i v i l i s a t r i c e and r u l e d a g a i n s t o r g a n i z i n g p r o l e t a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n s i n Laos and Cambodia c o n temporaneous w i t h t h a t o f V i e t n a m . Fourth, the concept o f t r i n a t i o n a l u n i t y e m b o d i e d i n t h e name I n d o c h i n e s e Communist p a r t y grew out of g e n e r a l g u i d e l i n e s on o r g a n izing against colonial rule. T h e s e g u i d e l i n e s were drawn up by C o m i n t e r n o f f i c i a l s ( a f e w o f whom w e r e V i e t n a m e s e ) and i m p o s e d on t h o s e who a t t e n d e d t h e " m e r g e r c o n f e r e n c e " i n 1 9 3 0 . T h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e c o n c e p t was c a m o u f l a g e f o r

183 a n a n c i e n t a m b i t i o n of t h e V i e t n a m e s e t o d o m i n a t e a l l of Indochina. Last, the assertion that the three countries had become e c o n o m i c a l l y i n t e r d e p e n d e n t i m p l i e d t h a t t h e i r t i e s s h o u l d be p r e s e r v e d i n s o m e f o r m p a s t t h e end of c o l o n i a l r u l e . With l i t t l e f o u n d a t i o n in f a c t , t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s a s s e r t i o n was u n c l e a r e x c e p t a s a n e c h o of a C o m i n t e r n t h e m e , t h o u g h t h e a s s e r t i o n w a s t o be made a g a i n i n t h e p o s t r e v o l u t i o n a r y e r a . F o r t h e r e s t of t h e 1 9 3 0 s , t h e ICP d i d l i t t l e t o l i v e up t o i t s name. Very l i t t l e e f f o r t was made t o r e c r u i t m e m b e r s i n Laos and C a m b o d i a , and v i r t u a l l y a l l of t h o s e who j o i n e d w e r e V i e t n a m e s e r e s i d e n t s of t h o s e countries, n o t Lao and K h m e r . D i r e c t i v e s from the C o m i n t e r n t o e x t e n d o r g a n i z i n g work among n o n - V i e t n a m e s e went l a r g e l y i g n o r e d as members f o c u s e d on p e o p l e whose l a n g u a g e and p a t r i o t i c a s p i r a t i o n s t h e y s h a r e d . Federa t i n g I n d o c h i n a a f t e r i n d e p e n d e n c e a p p e a r e d among t h e g o a l s l a i d down a t t h e 1 s t P a r t y C o n g r e s s i n 1935 and a g a i n i n t h e r e s o l u t i o n of t h e 8 t h P l e n u m i n 1 9 4 1 , b u t t h i s g o a l was o t h e r w i s e d i s r e g a r d e d . P a r t y members were t o o c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e i r own s u r v i v a l t o t a k e i n t e r e s t i n t h e p r a c t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of w h a t s o m e s a y was a v a g u e e x p r e s s i o n of s o l i d a r i t y , not a c o n c r e t e obj ect ive. The f i r s t s e r i o u s a t t e m p t t o b r o a d e n t h e r e v o l u t i o n c r o s s - n a t i o n a l l y f l o w e d f r o m s u p p o r t f o r Lao r e s i d i n g i n V i e t n a m who w e r e s w e p t up i n t h e a n t i - F r e n c h f e r v o r of 1945. The e v e n t t h a t d i d m o s t t o a w a k e n V i e t n a m e s e C o m m u n i s t s t o t h e u n i t y of I n d o c h i n a was t h e o p e n i n g of a t t a c k s by F r a n c e f r o m b a s e s i n t h e s e c o u n t r i e s a g a i n s t t h e V i e t Minh's m o u n t a i n r e d o u b t s i n 1947. This e x p e r i e n c e f o r c e d t h e V i e t n a m e s e t o s e e r e v o l u t i o n s in Laos and C a m b o d i a as means t o t i e down t h e F r e n c h f r o m t h e rear. The C o m i n t e r n ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s , i n r e t r o s p e c t , m u s t have seemed e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y p r e s c i e n t . T h e v i e w s of " i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t s " in t h e p a r t y were v i n d i c a t e d . Indoc h i n a h e n c e f o r w a r d was t o b e c o n s i d e r e d a " s i n g l e s t r a t e g i c u n i t , " though p r i n c i p a l l y f o r m i l i t a r y reasons. As Vo Nguyen G i a p p u t i t i n 1 9 5 0 : Indochina is a single s t r a t e g i c unit, a s i n g l e b a t t l e f i e l d , a n d h e r e we h a v e t h e m i s s i o n o f h e l p i n g t h e m o v e m e n t t o l i b e r a t e a l l of I n d o c h i n a . Trtiis i s b e c a u s e m i l i t a r i l y , Indochina i s one b l o c , one u n i t , i n both t h e i n v a s i o n and d e f e n s e p l a n s of t h e e n e m y . For t h i s r e a s o n , and e s p e c i a l l y b e c a u s e of t h e s t r a t e g i c t e r r a i n , we c a n n o t c o n s i d e r V i e t n a m t o b e i n d e p e n d e n t s o l o n g a s Cambodia and Laos a r e u n d e r i m p e r i a l i s t d o m i n a t i o n , j u s t a s we c a n n o t c o n s i d e r C a m b o d i a a n d L a o s t o be i n d e p e n d e n t s o long as Vietnam i s u n d e r i m p e r i a l i s t rule. The c o l o n i a l i s t s u s e d C a m b o d i a t o a t t a c k V i e t n a m . and Cambodia t e m p o r a r i l y h a v e become t h e s e c u r e a r e a s of t h e enemy and s i m u l t a n e o u s l y t h e i r

Laos rear most

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vulnerable area in the entire Indochina theatre. Therefore, we need to open the Laos-Cambodia battlefield resolutely and energetically.10 It was against this background that the ICP decided In 1951, the to push revolutions in Laos and Cambodia. p a r t y i n v i t e d a n u m b e r of Lao and C a m b o d i a n l e a d e r s to attend its 2nd congress, which p r o c l a i m e d the f o r m a t i o n of t h e V i e t n a m W o r k e r ' s p a r t y to r e p l a c e t h e ICP and unveiled a Viet-Lao-Khmer alliance. R e f e r e n c e s to an Indochina Federation disappeared from party texts, and s e p a r a t e Lao and C a m b o d i a n C o m m u n i s t p a r t i e s a p p e a r e d shortly thereafter. T h e p u r p o s e w a s to c a p i t a l i z e o n n a t i o n a l i s t s e n t i m e n t in all t h r e e c o u n t r i e s and to m o b i l i z e joint struggle against French colonialism and U.S. i n t e r v e n t i o n i s m . 1 1 By t h e end of t h e w a r , as t h e Viet Minh strove to link up their far-flung base areas, t h e y a l s o n o t e d t h a t t h e c e n t r a l h i g h l a n d s w e r e of "extreme strategic importance." "Only by d e v e l o p i n g into the Central Highlands," observed the Political Bureau's m i l i t a r y c o m m i t t e e in N o v e m b e r 1 9 5 3 , "is it p o s s i b l e to obtain the m o s t important strategic position in t h e S o u t h . If the e n e m y c o n t r o l s t h a t s t r a t e g i c zone, it will be very difficult to improve the situation in t h e South." 1 2 T h e v a l i d i t y of p e r c e i v i n g I n d o c h i n e s e u n i t y as a f u n c t i o n of o t h e r s ' s t r a t e g i e s s e e m e d , to t h e V i e t n a m e s e , c o n f i r m e d by s u b s e q u e n t e v e n t s . Even before the Second Indochina W a r got u n d e r w a y , the United States w i t h T h a i c o n n i v a n c e took a d v a n t a g e of i n s t a b i l i t y in Laos to secure a foothold in the s a m e lowland from which the French had attacked the Viet Minh. The United S t a t e s and T h a i l a n d s y s t e m a t i c a l l y u n d e r m i n e d L a o t i a n n e u t r a l i t y and e q u i p p e d t h e R o y a l Lao A r m y and h i l l t r i b e s to a t t a c k t h e Ho Chi M i n h T r a i l . The United States also c a p i t a l i z e d on P r i n c e Noradom Sihanouk's o v e r t h r o w in 1 9 7 0 to a t t a c k V i e t n a m e s e s a n c t u a r i e s in Cambodia. Although the V i e t n a m e s e w e r e hardly innocent of provocation, the implications for Vietnam's security and u n i t y s e e m e d c l e a r . By 1 9 7 7 , as r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n B e i j i n g and H a n o i d e t e r i o r a t e d , t h e V i e t n a m e s e c o u l d not but view Chinese support for the Khmer Rouge as the t h i r d a t t e m p t by a G r e a t P o w e r in m o d e r n t i m e s to e n circle and attack Vietnam from the west. The V i e t n a m e s e t h u s w e r e s a t i s f i e d in t h e i r o w n m i n d s t h a t t h e i r r e s p o n s e s w e r e , f i r s t , d e f e n s i v e , and t h e n , in D e c e m b e r 1978, preemptive. Hanoi's Indochina strategy g r o w s principally out of the p e r c e p t i o n that the three countries are s e c u r i t y interdependent. This perception is expressed both priv a t e l y and p u b l i c l y by H a n o i o f f i c i a l s as a " l a w " : because adversaries must gain a foothold in at least one of t h e s t a t e s in o r d e r to a t t a c k a n o t h e r , t h e t h r e e states m u s t be joined in alliance to guarantee the peace and independence of each. In the words of the c o m m a n d e r of V i e t n a m e s e forces in C a m b o d i a , "Experience over m o r e

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t h a n half a c e n t u r y on the I n d o c h i n e s e p e n i n s u l a s h o w s t h a t t h e a g g r e s s i v e p l o t s of t h e J a p a n e s e f a s c i s t s , F r e n c h c o l o n i a l i s t s , and U.S. i m p e r i a l i s t s as w e l l as t h e C h i n e s e e x p a n s i o n i s t s and h e g e m o n i s t s d o w n to t h e p r e s e n t h a v e a l w a y s t r e a t e d I n d o c h i n a as a t a r g e t of a g g r e s s i o n and a u n i f i e d b a t t l e g r o u n d . . . . In t h e i r plots to annex Indochina and expand into Southeast Asia, t h e B e i j i n g r e a c t i o n a r i e s c a n n o t h e l p but f o l l o w t h i s law." 1 3 Moreover, the record suggests to the V i e t n a m e s e that just as aggressors must treat Indochina as a "unified b a t t l e g r o u n d , " s o a r e t h e t h r e e c o u n t r i e s a b l e to repel any aggression, including a nuclear s u p e r p o w e r , if t h e y are u n i t e d . B e c a u s e Hanoi officials b e l i e v e that c o n s c i o u s n e s s of a s h a r e d f a t e a m o n g t h e t h r e e p e o p l e s is strengthened in dialectical reaction to each threat, they firmly believe Indochinese unity is not only "irrev e r s i b l e " but is f u r t h e r c o n s o l i d a t e d by e x t e r n a l l y mounted efforts to destroy it. I m p l i c i t in t h e f o r e g o i n g is a r e l a t i v e l y c o m p l a cent attitude toward protracted tensions with neighbors, as long as t h e c o s t s c a n b e c o n t r o l l e d . It is c l e a r , t o o , t h a t the m e n n o w in p o w e r in H a n o i c a n n o t a c c e p t t h e r e c o n s t i t u t i o n of Laos and C a m b o d i a as " n e u t r a l buffers" if that means having governments in Vientiane and Phnom Penh that are weak, divided, and vulnerable to penetration by powers besides Vietnam. Because schemes f o r c o a l i t i o n g o v e r n m e n t s l i k e that p r o p o s e d by A S E A N f o r C a m b o d i a c o u l d h a v e t h i s r e s u l t , such s c h e m e s a r e unacceptable to the Vietnamese. So would be any lesser f o r m s of real p o w e r s h a r i n g . 1 4 Vietnamese diplomats a c k n o w l e d g e T h a i c o n c e r n s but n o t e t h a t r e l a t i v e to T h a i l a n d ' s U.S. and C h i n e s e g u a r a n t e e s t h e y c a n rely t o t a l l y o n l y o n t h e i r o w n n a t i o n a l s t r e n g t h and p a r a mount position in Laos and Cambodia. This has become so basic in V i e t n a m e s e thinking that leaders in Hanoi hardly distinguish b e t w e e n consolidating friendly regimes in Laos and C a m b o d i a and d e f e n d i n g t h e i r o w n c o u n t r y . Hanoi's ties with Moscow are almost certainly subordiRelations with the Soviet nate to its aim in Indochina. Union are of course enormously important as a source of economic and m i l i t a r y assistance and as a counterweight to the Chinese, but in the absence of unstinting Soviet s u p p o r t f o r t h e V i e t n a m e s e a r m y in C a m b o d i a as w e l l , Hanoi would face m o r e risk than benefit in facilitating the S o v i e t Union's a t t e m p t to e n c i r c l e C h i n a . It is thus quite unrealistic to expect Moscow to force a C a m bodian settlement on Vietnam that dilutes Hanoi's influe n c e in P h n o m P e n h , e x c e p t in t h e u n l i k e l y e v e n t t h a t t h e Soviet Union sacrificed important interests in Vietnam.

IDEOLOGICAL

PERCEPTIONS

N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h a t in i n t e r n a t i o n a l politics realist views prevail over ideological ones, it would be an e r r o r to o v e r l o o k t h e i n f l u e n c e of t h e l a t t e r in

186 V i e t n a m e s e p e r c e p t i o n s and s t r a t e g y . 1 5 The V i e t n a m e s e a r e in t h e e a r l y s t a g e s of c o n s o l i d a t i n g t h e i r r e v o l u t i o n , whose s u c c e s s t h e y a t t r i b u t e t o c o r r e c t a p p l i c a t i o n of d o c t r i n e . Though t h i s d o c t r i n e may seem a mere a b s t r a c t i o n t o some, t h i s i s a b s t r a c t i o n t h e Vietnamese take seriously. P a r t i c u l a r l y in a s s e s s i n g l o n g - t e r m t r e n d s and i n a t t e m p t i n g t o p r e d i c t i n t e r n a l s h i f t s i n c o u n t r i e s of c o n c e r n t o them, t h e V i e t n a m e s e r e l y h e a v i l y on i d e o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t s . S i n c e the l a t e 1960s, they have j o i n e d t h e S o v i e t s i n m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t t h e " c e n t r a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n " in the present era places "three revolut i o n a r y c u r r e n t s " i n o p p o s i t i o n t o c a p i t a l i s m and i m p e rialism. T h e s e c u r r e n t s a r e t h e s o c i a l i s t camp headed by t h e S o v i e t Union, t h e n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n movement i n t h e T h i r d W o r l d , and t h e w o r k e r s ' movement i n t h e c a p i talist countries. As t h e s e c u r r e n t s g a i n s t r e n g t h , s o w i l l the n a t i o n s t h a t c o o r d i n a t e t h e i r p o l i c i e s with them, t h e t h e o r y p r e d i c t s . T h i s t h e o r y combined with a d o c t r i n e o f h i s t o r i c a l i n e v i t a b i l i t y r e d u c e s d i p l o m a c y and s t r a t e g y t o m a t t e r s of a d j u s t m e n t t o t h e winning t r e n d s . As a d e p u t y f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r put i t : " I n a s s e s s i n g t h e s i t u a t i o n f o r p u r p o s e s of making p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s , i t i s n e c e s s a r y above a l l e l s e t o look at t h e t r e n d s . Certain trends are i n e v i t a b l e . T h o s e who s e e t h e s e t r e n d s and f o l l o w them s u c c e e d , t h o s e who o p p o s e them f a i l . . . . V i e t n a m h a s b e e n s u c c e s s f u l b e c a u s e i t i s on t h e s i d e o f t h e g r o w i n g number o f c o u n t r i e s t h a t h a v e won t h e i r i n d e pendence. Though t h e s e c o u n t r i e s h a v e e c o n o m i c p r o b lems, they are developing while peace is being c o n s o l i dated."16 I t f o l l o w s t h a t i f s t a t e s m e n have a s s e s s e d t h e t r e n d s c o r r e c t l y and d e v i s e d p o l i c i e s t h a t c o n f o r m t o t h e winning t r e n d s , t h e n a t i o n w i l l b e n e f i t from change over t h e long run, r e g a r d l e s s of t r i a l s in t h e short term. To t h e n o s t r u m t h a t p a t i e n c e a s s u r e s s u c c e s s , i d e o l o g y adds c o n f i d e n c e t h a t t h e t r e n d s have been assessed c o r r e c t l y . Marxism-Leninism a l s o d i r e c t s a t t e n t i o n to i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e s of c l a s s and power when a s s e s s i n g o t h e r s o c i e t i e s ' c o h e s i o n , c a p a b i l i t i e s , and e x t e r n a l b e h a v i o r . A p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e s e i d e a s by t h e V i e t n a m e s e r e f l e c t s t h e i r own e x p e r i e n c e , h o w e v e r . Convinced t h a t they a c h i e v e d power by m a n i p u l a t i n g i n e q u a l i t i e s i n t h e i r own s o c i e t y , and c o n f i d e n t t h a t e q u a l i t y i s t h e f o u n d a t i o n o f t h e i r n a t i o n a l s o l i d a r i t y and s t r e n g t h , V i e t n a m e s e s t r a t e g i s t s a r e n o t much i m p r e s s e d by t h e a g g r e g a t e wealth of t h e i r neighbors. What c a p t u r e s t h e i r a t t e n t i o n is the unequal wealth d i s t r i b u t i o n s in t h e s e count r i e s , w h i c h t h e y r e g a r d as a c a u s e o f g r a v e w e a k n e s s . Moreover, ideology p r e d i c t s t h a t t h e s e i n e q u a l i t i e s w i l l grow w o r s e u n d e r c a p i t a l i s t - d r i v e n , export-oriented development s t r a t e g i e s . A l t h o u g h t h e y do n o t e x p e c t r e v o l u t i o n s i d e n t i c a l t o t h e i r own t o o c c u r , t h e V i e t namese a r e c o n f i d e n t t h a t r i s i n g s o c i a l t e n s i o n s w i l l p r e o c c u p y ASEAN e l i t e s i n t h e f u t u r e and make them e a g e r t o remove s o u r c e s of f r i c t i o n from t h e r e g i o n . 1 7

187 One of the main practical uses of Marxist-Leninist ideology is to s u s t a i n c o n f i d e n c e d e s p i t e s e t b a c k s . I n d e e d , i d e o l o g y d e f i n e s s e t b a c k s as a b n o r m a l events that r e q u i r e only t a c t i c a l a d j u s t m e n t ; t h e s e s e t b a c k s c a n n o t be c o n s i d e r e d c u m u l a t i v e . T h e h o p e that Hanoi w i l l s e e the d i r e n e s s of its s t r a i t s as o t h e r s s e e it founders on this confidence. Ideology also encourages the V i e t n a m e s e to a n t i c i p a t e the e m e r g e n c e of antii m p e r i a l i s t , a n t i c a p i t a l i s t forces in the A S E A N c o u n tries that w i l l d i v i d e t h e s e c o u n t r i e s i n t e r n a l l y and p r o v i d e i n c e n t i v e for A S E A N to s e t t l e its d i f f e r e n c e s with the socialist bloc (and Vietnam). This expectation reduces c o n c e r n about ASEAN's c o n c e r t e d s u p p o r t for T h a i l a n d o v e r the long t e r m . But this does not imply that Hanoi w i s h e s to d i v i d e A S E A N itself to the p o i n t of collapse. For w h o but C h i n a w o u l d pick up t h e p i e c e s ? The Vietnamese moreover are ideologically predisposed to v i e w the A S E A N nations as part of t h e Third W o r l d s t r i v ing to perfect their independence and therefore potentially w i t h i n the "current" on w h o s e a s c e n d a n c y t h e Vietnamese count for their own safety. As for g l o b a l s t r a t e g y , the V i e t n a m e s e h a v e b e e n remarkably consistent in seeing their own struggles as a l t e r n a t i v e l y c e n t r a l or p e r i p h e r a l to t h o s e of a soc i a l i s t c a m p h e a d e d by the Soviet U n i o n . 1 8 In this conception, it is the "internationalist duty" of communist s t a t e s to s u p p o r t the c a m p m e m b e r that at a g i v e n time finds itself at the focal point of conflict between socialism and imperialism. Soviet leadership is assumed by the V i e t n a m e s e not only for reasons of h i s t o r y and capability, but because China broke with the camp at the very moment Vietnam most needed the support of a united bloc in its w a r with the United States. T h u s , an ideological i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a l l i a n c e o b l i g a t i o n s influenced Hanoi's decision to align with Moscow in the SinoSoviet dispute. Obviously, the Vietnamese interpretation also has been self-serving, as all interpretations of alliance obligations tend to be, but the ideological c o n t e x t e n c o u r a g e s the V i e t n a m e s e , as long as they are a c t i v e l y engaged in c o n f l i c t w i t h bloc e n e m i e s , to expect support as a moral right.

REALIST PERCEPTIONS The i n f l u e n c e of r e a l p o l i t ik is r e a d i l y a p p a r e n t , however. Forced to choose between competitive patrons in the last w a r , Hanoi leaned t o w a r d the o n e that had m o s t to g i v e , p a r t i c u l a r l y for a e r i a l d e f e n s e of the North and the equipping of m a i n f o r c e d i v i s i o n s , and away from the one that was turbulent and inward-looking. T h e Soviet Union was a r e l i a b l e s u p p l i e r of c r u c i a l military hardware; China during the s a m e period refused to c o o r d i n a t e w i t h the S o v i e t s a g a i n s t the United S t a t e s , w a s d i s t r a c t e d by t h e C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n , and m o u n t e d a c h a l l e n g e t o S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p of t h e

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Communist b l o c . China, t o t h e V i e t n a m e s e , a l s o seemed more w i l l i n g t h a n t h e S o v i e t s t o improve r e l a t i o n s with t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a t V i e t n a m ' s e x p e n s e as t h e war n e a r e d its end.19 S i n c e t h a t w a r , t h e S o v i e t Union h a s been V i e w e d as t h e o n l y p o s s i b l e c o u n t e r w e i g h t t o a h o s t i l e China. I d e o l o g y was c e r t a i n l y t h e l a s t t h i n g on t h e m i n d of t h e H a n o i d i p l o m a t who t o l d me " I n a l l of h i s t o r y , we h a v e b e e n s e c u r e f r o m C h i n a i n o n l y t w o c o n d i tions. One i s w h e n C h i n a i s w e a k a n d i n t e r n a l l y d i vided. T h e o t h e r i s w h e n s h e h a s b e e n t h r e a t e n e d by barbarians from the north. In t h e p r e s e n t e r a , the Russians are our b a r b a r i a n s . " 2 0 Ideological concepts shape responses, perhaps s i g n i f i c a n t l y t h r o u g h t h e a n a l y s i s of t r e n d s , b u t e x p e r i ence has imparted to t h e Vietnamese a f i n e a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r t h e r e a l i t i e s of p o w e r , w h i c h i s t h e i r p r i n c i p a l b a s i s f o r a s s e s s i n g p r e s e n t t h r e a t and p l a n n i n g s t r a t e gic security. Thus, the Vietnamese regard the United S t a t e s as i m p e r i a l i s t , an enemy by d e f i n i t i o n , b u t t h e y no l o n g e r c o n s i d e r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a s i g n i f i c a n t d i r e c t t h r e a t : U . S . l e a d e r s h a v e t h e " l e s s o n " of V i e t n a m b e f o r e t h e m and d o m e s t i c o p p o s i t i o n t o i n t e r v e n t i o n i s m . The I n d o c h i n a f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s ' m e e t i n g i n J a n u a r y 1985 urged t h e United S t a t e s t o "assume a r e s p o n s i b l e r o l e in c o n t r i b u t i n g t o l o n g - t e r m p e a c e and s t a b i l i t y i n S o u t h e a s t A s i a , " w h i c h b a r e l y d i s g u i s e d t h e h o p e t h a t U.S. a v e r s i o n t o Pol Pot would d e v e l o p i n t o s u p p o r t f o r t h e s u p p r e s s i o n of t h e Khmer Rouge and r e s t r a i n t i n s u p p o r t i n g t h e n o n c o m m u n i s t Khmer r e s i s t a n c e . 2 1 The V i e t n a m e s e m o r e o v e r v a s t l y p r e f e r U.S. t o C h i n e s e i n f l u e n c e i n T h a i l a n d b e c a u s e U.S. a i m s a r e l i m i t e d a n d i t s p o w e r d e c l i n i n g i n S o u t h e a s t A s i a by c o m p a r i s o n w i t h C h i n a . Japan i s more p r o b l e m a t i c . On t h e o n e h a n d , J a p a n i s a n a t u r a l m a r k e t f o r V i e t n a m ' s raw m a t e r i a l s and p o t e n t i a l l y i t s m a j o r s o u r c e of h a r d c u r r e n c y e a r n i n g s and n o n c o m m u n i s t i n v e s t m e n t and a s s i s t a n c e . The V i e t n a m e s e h a v e r e a l i s t i c e x p e c t a t i o n s of g a i n i n g s i g n i f i c a n t l y from economic t i e s with Japan in the f u t u r e . D e s p i t e t h e s u s p e n s i o n of J a p a n e s e g o v e r n m e n t c r e d i t s s i n c e 1979, two-way t r a d e b e t w e e n t h e two c o u n t r i e s h a s c o n t i n u e d a t l e v e l s i n e x c e s s of $100 m i l l i o n p e r y e a r (down f r o m a p o s t w a r p e a k of $270 m i l l i o n i n 1 9 7 8 ) , and J a p a n i s t h e s o u r c e of r o u g h l y h a l f of a l l private c r e d i t d i s b u r s e d t o Vietnam from t h e c o n v e r t i b l e a r e a . 2 2 On t h e o t h e r h a n d , J a p a n i s t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t f o r w a r d b a s e of U.S. p o w e r i n t h e P a c i f i c , a d i r e c t t h r e a t t o t h e s e a l i n k w i t h V l a d i v o s t o k on w h i c h V i e t n a m i n c r e a s ingly depends. J a p a n ' s l o c a t i o n g i v e s i t and i t s a l l i e s t h e p o t e n t i a l t o cut off Soviet a s s i s t a n c e t o Vietnam in t h e e v e n t of h o s t i l i t i e s . S e a - l a n e s t h a t ASEAN, U . S . , J a p a n e s e , and C h i n e s e s t r a t e g i s t s s e e b r i s t l i n g w i t h Soviet s h i p s look l i k e e x t r e m e l y v u l n e r a b l e supply l i n e s to the Vietnamese.23 The i n e s c a p a b l e c o n c l u s i o n f o r Hanoi is t h a t J a p a n ' s d e f e n s e c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s o r C h i n a , o r i t s r e a r m a m e n t as l o n g as

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J a p a n i s s t i l l c a p i t a l i s t and a n t i p a t h e t i c t o t h e S o v i e t Union, p o s e s a t h r e a t t o V i e t n a m . J a p a n ' s s u p p o r t o f ASEAN on t h e Cambodian q u e s t i o n i s s a i d by Hanoi t o d i s g u i s e a c y n i c a l a t t e m p t to s t r e n g t h e n i t s e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n among t h e ASEAN s t a t e s and, i n c o o p e r a t i o n with t h e United S t a t e s , t o p l a y t h e r o l e of " r e g i o n a l gendarme" in S o u t h e a s t A s i a . 2 4 Any t e n d e n c y on t h e p a r t of J a p a n t o r e a r m , d e f e n d i t s s e a l a n e s , o r t o j o i n w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , C h i n a , and South Korea i n c o n t a i n i n g t h e S o v i e t Union i s v i e w e d with deep m i s g i v i n g s in Hanoi. The n e w s p a p e r Quan d o i nh an dan ( P e o p l e ' s A r m y ) , f o r e x a m p l e , d e s c r i b e d t h e s p a t e o f m o v e s by P r i m e M i n i s t e r Y a s u h i r o N a k a s o n e i n 1983 t o b o l s t e r J a p a n ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n in t h e W e s t e r n P a c i f i c as a "new p h a s e i n J a p a n ' s s e r v i c e t o A m e r i c a n global strategy."25 Though p r i n c i p a l l y c o n c e r n e d a t p r e s e n t w i t h what t h e y p e r c e i v e as J a p a n ' s s u b s e r v i e n c e t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , i n p r o j e c t i n g f u t u r e power s h i f t s t h e V i e t n a m e s e r e g a r d J a p a n as t h e o n l y c o u n t r y b e s i d e s China c a p a b l e of expanding in t h e r e g i o n . Thus o n e f o r e i g n m i n i s t r y o f f i c i a l s p e c u l a t e d t h a t China's " f o u r m o d e r n i z a t i o n s " and p u r s u i t o f a h e g e m o n i s t i c f o r e i g n p o l i c y might produce a d e f e n s i v e r e a c t i o n in Japan in t h e form of a m i l i t a r y b u i l d u p and r e s u r g e n t m i l i t a r i s m ; such a c t i v i t i e s would p r e s e n t Vietnam w i t h a dual t h r e a t f r o m t h e n o r t h t h a t V i e t n a m c o u l d o f f s e t o n l y by c o o p e r a t i n g s t i l l more c l o s e l y with t h e S o v i e t Union. Inc r e a s e d S o v i e t a c c e s s t o n a v a l and a i r f a c i l i t i e s , h e i n d i c a t e d , c o u l d not be r u l e d out i n t h a t e v e n t . 2 6 Hanoi i s s i m i l a r l y a m b i v a l e n t w i t h r e g a r d t o ASEAN f o r a m i x t u r e o f h i s t o r i c a l , i d e o l o g i c a l , and p r a g m a t i c reasons. The o r g a n i z a t i o n was f o u n d e d by t h e r e g i o n ' s anticommunist regimes p a r t l y in r e a c t i o n t o i n s t a b i l i t y i n I n d o c h i n a , and two o f i t s m e m b e r s , T h a i l a n d and t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , a s s i s t e d U.S. e f f o r t s t o d e s t r o y t h e commun i s t r e v o l u t i o n in Vietnam. F o l l o w i n g t h e w a r ' s end i n 1 9 7 5 , Hanoi e x p r e s s e d h o s t i l i t y t o w a r d ASEAN as an i n s t r u m e n t o f U.S. i m p e r i a l i s m , an e m e r g e n t s u c c e s s o r t o t h e S o u t h e a s t A s i a T r e a t y O r g a n i z a t i o n (SEATO), and a group o f n a t i o n s whose i n d e p e n d e n c e was s t i l l i n t h r a l l to Western c a p i t a l . I n V i e t n a m e s e e y e s , ASEAN e l i t e s w e r e a m i x e d bag o f m i l i t a r i s t s , "feudalists," and s t o o g e s of a n e o c o l o n i a l world o r d e r . The ASEAN c o n c e p t of a Zone of P e a c e , Freedom, and N e u t r a l i t y (ZOPFAN) was found w a n t i n g f o r not i n c l u d i n g " i n d e p e n d e n c e , " i . e . , an end t o m i l i t a r y t i e s w i t h t h e United S t a t e s and dependency on W e s t e r n c a p i t a l . B u t Hanoi s o f t e n e d t h e s e v i e w s i n 1 9 7 8 as i t s o u g h t t o preempt o p p o s i t i o n t o i t s p l a n n e d move i n t o Cambodia. I t has c o n t i n u e d t o speak in t o n e s of r e l a t i v e moderation. Though t h e S o v i e t s may h a v e nudged Hanoi t o s t r i k e a l e s s s t r i d e n t note, the Vietnamese recognized i t was i n t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s t o a d o p t a r h e t o r i c a l l y c o n c i l i a t o r y p o s t u r e and t o draw t h e ASEAN s t a t e s i n t o dialogue.27 Without y i e l d i n g anything t o Cambodia,

190 H a n o i n e e d e d t o p l a c a t e f e a r s t h a t h a d u n i t e d ASEAN b e h i n d T h a i l a n d and t h a t c o u l d f a c i l i t a t e C h i n a ' s p e n e t r a t i o n of t h e r e g i o n . Hanoi a l s o w i s h e d t o c a p i t a l i z e on t h e f a c t t h a t ASEAN's n a t u r a l l e a d e r , Indonesia, s h a r e d t h e V i e t n a m e s e v i e w of C h i n a as t h e p r i n c i p a l long-term threat. Thus, Vietnam's s t r a t e g i c s e c u r i t y concerns o v e r rode i t s i d e o l o g i c a l d i s t a s t e . The o b j e c t i v e s w e r e t o o b t a i n a c c e p t a n c e o f V i e t n a m ' s p o s i t i o n i n Cambodia and t o p r e e m p t t e n d e n c i e s i n ASEAN t o s e e k r e a s s u r a n c e f r o m G r e a t Powers h o s t i l e t o V i e t n a m . These o b j e c t i v e s req u i r e d V i e t n a m t o i m p r o v e r e l a t i o n s w i t h ASEAN s t a t e s , p r e f e r a b l y on a b i l a t e r a l b a s i s b u t on a m u l t i l a t e r a l one as w e l l . Hanoi t h e r e f o r e h a s s u b s c r i b e d t o t h e Malaysian proposal "to turn Southeast Asia into a n u c l e a r - f r e e z o n e and t o m a t e r i a l i z e t h e ZOPFAN c o n c e p t [ w i t h o u t i n s i s t i n g on i n c l u s i o n o f ' i n d e p e n d e n c e ' ] p e n d ing a s o l u t i o n t o t h e Cambodian p r o b l e m . " 28 The m a n i f e s t hope of t h e s e moves, a s i d e from o f f e r i n g b a i t f o r ASEAN t o move t o w a r d a Cambodian s e t t l e m e n t on V i e t n a m ' s t e r m s , i s t o e n c o u r a g e t h o s e i n ASEAN who w i s h t o m i n i m i z e G r e a t P o w e r i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e r e g o n and t o d i s c o u r a g e ASEAN's t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i n t o a m i l i t a r y alliance. 29 A v i c t o r y f o r t h e P h i l i p p i n e New P e o p l e ' s Army o r f o r a n t i - M a r c o s p o l i t i c i a n s r e s p o n s i v e t o demands f o r c l o s i n g U.S. m i l i t a r y f a c i l i t i e s in t h e Philippines would be h i g h l y f a v o r a b l e t o V i e t n a m . Ideally, in Hanoi's view, t h e s e developments could lay foundations f o r a S o u t h e a s t Asian u n i t e d f r o n t a g a i n s t China in t a c i t c o o p e r a t i o n with t h e S o v i e t Union. N e v e r t h e l e s s , f o r t h e p r e s e n t and f o r e s e e a b l e f u ture, Vietnamese leaders perceive t h e i r country, in t h e i r w o r d s , a s " s u r r o u n d e d by e n e m i e s . " This percept i o n c o m b i n e d w i t h t r u s t o n l y i n t h e i r own d e t e r m i n a t i o n and a b i l i t y t o d e f e n d t h e m s e l v e s h a s c a u s e d H a n o i t o maintain the world's fourth l a r g e s t m i l i t a r y establishment. Of t o t a l a r m e d f o r c e s n u m b e r i n g 1 , 2 2 7 , 0 0 0 in 1 9 8 4 , t h e P e o p l e ' s Army n u m b e r e d 1 m i l l i o n . I n a l m o s t c o n t i n u o u s c o m b a t s i n c e i t s f o u n d i n g i n 1 9 4 4 , and w i t h s o m e t a c t i c a l as w e l l as s t r a t e g i c v i c t o r i e s o v e r t h r e e G r e a t P o w e r s t o i t s c r e d i t , t h e P e o p l e ' s Army i s t h e most e x p e r i e n c e d , b a t t l e - h a r d e n e d armed f o r c e in A s i a today. A 15,000-man a i r f o r c e , a 12,000-man navy, a 6 0 , 0 0 0 - m a n a i r d e f e n s e f o r c e , and a s s o r t e d b o r d e r d e f e n s e f o r c e s and a u x i l i a r i e s r o u n d o u t t h e f i g u r e f o r standing regulars. T h e s e a r e s u p p o r t e d by a 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 - m a n quick reinforcement reserves, a 2.5 million-strong " s t r a t e g i c r e a r " r e s e r v e , and m i l i t i a t h a t number s o m e w h e r e b e t w e e n 1 and 3 m i l l i o n . 3 0 The o v e r w h e l m i n g e m p h a s i s g i v e n t o ground combat f o r c e s ( 5 6 i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s a v e r a g i n g 1 0 , 5 0 0 men e a c h ) and p o p u l a r t e r r i t o r i a l d e f e n s e i s t h e l e g a c y o f t w o long r e v o l u t i o n a r y wars a g a i n s t t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y s u p e r i o r foes. It is also a response to the post-1975 threat environment. P r o f e s s i o n a l e l e m e n t s in t h e m i l i t a r y p r o p o s e d a t t h e end o f t h e l a s t war t h a t t h i s s t r u c t u r e

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be s t r e a m l i n e d i n e x c h a n g e f o r t e c h n i c a l m o d e r n i z a t i o n , b u t t h i s a r g u m e n t was o v e r r i d e n by a n e e d t o u s e t h e m i l i t a r y i n e c o n o m i c c o n s t r u c t i o n ( t h e P e o p l e ' s Army h a s , i n a d d i t i o n , 7 e n g i n e e r i n g and 15 e c o n o m i c c o n s t r u c t i o n d i v i s i o n s of a b o u t 3 , 0 0 0 men e a c h ) and t h e n by t h e l o o m i n g c o n f l i c t w i t h C a m b o d i a and C h i n a . Since 1 9 7 9 , when t h e C h i n e s e a t t a c k on t h e n o r t h e r n b o r d e r was m e t p r i m a r i l y by l o c a l m i l i t i a , r e g i o n a l f o r c e s , and a t r a i n e e d i v i s i o n , t h e P e o p l e ' s Army h a s d e p l o y e d f r o m 20 t o 25 i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s ( r o u g h l y o n e - h a l f o f a l l a s s e t s i n c l u d i n g s u p p o r t u n i t s ) n o r t h of Hanoi. Obviously, t h a t i s t h e d i r e c t i o n from which t h e m a j o r s h o r t - t e r m t h r e a t is s e e n t o come. Another 3 d i v i s i o n s have been s t a t i o n e d c o n t i n u o u s l y i n Laos s i n c e 1 9 6 5 , and about 12 remain in Cambodia. The s m a l l n a v y ' s 6 f r i g a t e s and assorted large p a t r o l c r a f t are adequate for c o a s t a l p a t r o l and s u r v e i l l a n c e . The a i r f o r c e , w i t h 290 c o m b a t a i r c r a f t c o n s i s t i n g p r i m a r i l y of MIG-21s (and MIG-23s a v i r t u a l c e r t a i n t y if Thailand obtains the F-16A), is i n e x p e r i e n c e d i n s u p p o r t o f g r o u n d c o m b a t and weak i n t r a n s p o r t but o v e r s h a d o w s i t s n e i g h b o r s i n a e r i a l i n t e r c e p t i o n ; i t a l s o is a c q u i r i n g l a r g e model h e l i c o p t e r s u s e f u l in c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y . Although t h e s e f o r c e s g i v e t h e V i e t n a m e s e c o n f i d e n c e t h a t t h e y c a n c o p e w i t h any t h r e a t on t h e h o r i z o n , i n c l u d i n g a " s e c o n d l e s s o n " f r o m China, t h e c o s t i s d e a r ( m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e as a p r o p o r t i o n of G r o s s N a t i o n a l P r o d u c t must rank among t h e h i g h e s t i n t h e w o r l d ; t h e army t a k e s a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n of t e c h n i c a l s c h o o l g r a d u a t e s , e t c . ) . That c o s t comb i n e d w i t h an i n a b i l i t y t o m a n u f a c t u r e any b u t the s i m p l e s t e q u i p m e n t and a m m u n i t i o n f o r c e s V i e t n a m t o o b t a i n an e s t i m a t e d $1 b i l l i o n a n n u a l l y i n f o r e i g n m i l i tary assistance, o v e r w h e l m i n g l y from t h e S o v i e t Union. Though V i e t n a m e s e m i l i t a r y s p o k e s m e n f l a t l y d e n y t h a t any i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h S o v i e t s t r a t e g i c p l a n n i n g h a s t a k e n p l a c e , 3 1 S o v i e t m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t of Vietnam i s a r e l a t i v e l y c h e a p way f o r Moscow t o s e e t h a t m o r e t h a n 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 t r o o p s h o s t i l e t o C h i n a a r e s t a t i o n e d on t h e l a t t e r ' s s o u t h e r n b o r d e r and t o s e c u r e V i e t n a m ' s p a r t i c i p a t i o n in s u r v e i l l a n c e of t h e South China Sea. It a l s o a s s u r e s t h a t Vietnam w i l l h a v e t h e means not o n l y t o d e f e n d i t s n o r t h e r n b o r d e r but t o p u r s u e i t s g o a l s i n o t h e r p a r t s of I n d o c h i n a . SECURITY RESPONSES: CONSOLIDATING INDOCHINESE UNITY Meanwhile, the Vietnamese b e l i e v e t h e i r s e c u r i t y r e q u i r e s them t o s t r e n g t h e n s o l i d a r i t y among t h e t h r e e I n d o c h i n e s e c o u n t r i e s a t a l m o s t any p r i c e . How d o e s Hanoi i n t e n d t o do t h i s ? For t h e p r e s e n t i t can s h o r e up c l i e n t r e g i m e s w i t h i t s own army and a d v i s o r y a s s i s t a n c e , which i s not d i f f i c u l t i n Laos w h e r e t h e g o v e r n ment o r i g i n a t e d i n d e c a d e s of r e v o l u t i o n a r y warfare under V i e t n a m e s e t u t e l a g e . But t h i s i s c o s t l y i n Cambod i a w h e r e t h e V i e t n a m e s e h a v e had t o c o n s t r u c t a

1 92

g o v e r n m e n t f r o m s c r a t c h i n t h e t e e t h o f d o m e s t i c and international opposition. The i d e a o f f e d e r a t i o n was a b a n d o n e d l o n g a g o , and t h e V i e t n a m e s e s e e m g e n u i n e l y a w a r e t h a t s u c h a m o v e now w o u l d o n l y p l a y i n t o t h e h a n d s of t h e i r a d v e r s a r i e s . P e r i o d i c summits, semiannual foreign ministers' meetings, exchanges of t e c h n i c a l t e a m s , and a V i e t n a m e s e a d v i s o r y p r e s e n c e a r e s a t i s f a c tory to coordinate policy. If t h e Vietnamese have a m o d e l , i t c o u l d be t h e S o v i e t r o l e i n E a s t e r n E u r o p e ; t h o u g h t h e y do n o t t h e m s e l v e s d r a w t h i s p a r a l l e l , t h e y do not o b j e c t when i t i s made. B u t t h e V i e t n a m e s e do i n t e n d t o p r o m o t e " e c o n o m i c i n t e g r a t i o n , " i n t h e words of a s e n i o r f o r e i g n m i n i s t r y official. N a t i o n a l c o m m i t t e e s f o r c u l t u r a l and e c o n o m i c c o o p e r a t i o n were formed in a l l t h r e e c o u n t r i e s in e a r l y 1 9 8 3 and h e l d t h e i r f i r s t j o i n t m e e t i n g i n J u l y . The a p p o i n t m e n t o f f a i r l y p o w e r f u l C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e members t o head e a c h n a t i o n a l c o m m i t t e e i n d i c a t e s t h e i m p o r t a n c e attached to this goal. But t h e c o m m i t t e e s h a v e o n l y c o n s u l t a t i v e p o w e r s , and t h e i r g o a l i s a v e r y d i s t a n t one. I t c o u l d h a r d l y be o t h e r w i s e , g i v e n t h e e x t r e m e l y l o w l e v e l o f e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t i n e a c h c o u n t r y and t h e f a c t t h a t although t h e y have " c o o p e r a t e d " in m i l i t a r y m a t t e r s f o r y e a r s , as t h e V i e t n a m c o m m i t t e e ' s d e p u t y d i r e c t o r p u t i t , e c o n o m i c c o o p e r a t i o n i s " a new p r o b l e m for us."32 " C o o p e r a t i o n " in f a c t c o n s i s t s a l m o s t e n t i r e l y o f V i e t n a m e s e a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e o t h e r two c o u n tries, and p r i o r i t y i s g i v e n t o d e v e l o p m e n t o f f o o d self-sufficiency. No p r o p o s a l s f o r c o m p l e m e n t a r y d e v e l opment o r f o r i n d u s t r i a l c o p r o d u c t i o n w e r e on t h e a g e n d a as of s p r i n g 1 9 8 4 . Nor h a d l i n k i n g intra-Indochina c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h C o u n c i l f o r Mutual E c o n o m i c A s s i s t a n c e (CMEA) a c t i v i t i e s been m e n t i o n e d i n any o f t h e c o m m i t tees' joint meetings. C o o p e r a t i o n on t r u l y m a j o r p r o j e c t s such as Mekong B a s i n d e v e l o p m e n t h a s b e e n r u l e d o u t f o r l a c k of c a p i t a l . The m a i n p h y s i c a l l i n k s b u i l t up t o t h e p r e s e n t a r e i m p r o v e m e n t s t o p o r t i o n s o f t h e Ho Chi Minh T r a i l c o m p l e x a s t r i d e t h e A n n a m i t e C o r d i l l e r a , a 286-km p e t r o l e u m p i p e l i n e from Vinh i n V i e t n a m ' s Nghe T i n h p r o v i n c e t o R o u t e 13 i n L a o s , w h i c h e a c h c o u n t r y s e p a r a t e l y m a n a g e s on i t s r e s p e c t i v e t e r r i t o r y , 3 3 and t h e e x t e n s i o n of R o u t e 9 t o c o n n e c t S a v a n n a k h e t w i t h Da Nang,3l( which t h e V i e t n a m e s e acknowledge w i l l never p r o v i d e Laos a c c e s s t o t h e s e a t h a t i s as c o s t - e f f i c i e n t as t h e r a i l l i n k a c r o s s T h a i l a n d . 3 5 Transnational institutions, not t o mention economic i n t e g r a t i o n in t h e a c c e p t e d s e n s e o f t h e t e r m , h a r d l y seem l i k e l y t o e m e r g e in the f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e . More i n t e r e s t i n g f o r what i t r e v e a l s a b o u t t h e Vietnamese o r i e n t a t i o n t o " c o o p e r a t i o n " is the s p i r i t in which Hanoi g i v e s a s s i s t a n c e . V i e t n a m e s e Communists i n t h e p a s t admired t h e r e l a t i v e e g a l i t a r i a n i s m of t h e i r n e i g h b o r ' s t r a d i t i o n a l s o c i e t i e s , and " c o o p e r a t i o n " i s c o n d u c t e d among p u t a t i v e e q u a l s . The p a r t y m o r e o v e r h a s attempted for decades to i n d o c t r i n a t e i t s cadres in r e s p e c t f o r e t h n i c m i n o r i t i e s and o t h e r p e o p l e of I n d o -

193 china, as t h e c o o p e r a t i o n of t h e s e g r o u p s has been c r u c i a l t o t h e a t t a i n m e n t of p a r t y o b j e c t i v e s . But t h e V i e t n a m e s e t a k e n a t u r a l l y t o t h e r o l e of s e n i o r p a r t n e r and p a t r o n i z e o t h e r g r o u p s . ( " M a t r o n i z e " m i g h t be a b e t t e r w o r d — s e e below.) The h i s t o r i a n A l e x a n d e r Woods i d e has suggested t h a t t h i s a t t i t u d e r e s o n a t e s with C o n f u c i a n " c u l t u r a l e v a n g e l i s m " and " h i e r a r c h i c a l v i s i o n of i n t e r - s t a t e r e l a t i o n s , " r e i n f o r c e d by a " p s y c h o l o g i cally defensive i m i t a t i o n " o f t h e way V i e t n a m was t r e a t e d by W e s t e r n c o l o n i a l p o w e r s . 3 6 Whatever the s o u r c e , the tone is c e r t a i n l y p r e s e n t , p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h r e g a r d t o Cambodia, as in a t r i p t y c h of p o e m s , one of which i s e n t i t l e d "Orphaned Younger S i s t e r , " w r i t t e n by Le Due Tho d u r i n g a v i s i t t o Cambodia.37 In s p r i n g 1 9 8 4 , F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Nguyen Co Thach d e s c r i b e d t h e Phnom Penh r e g i m e as a " c h i l d " t h a t V i e t nam h a d t o p u t o n i t s f e e t a n d e n c o u r a g e t o w a l k alone.38 Though T h a c h ' s p u r p o s e was t o emphasize H a n o i ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n not t o l e t Phnom Penh become p e r m a n e n t l y d e p e n d e n t on V i e t n a m ' s d e f e n s i v e s h i e l d , t h e l a n g u a g e was s t r i k i n g l y s i m i l a r t o t h a t of Emperor Gia Long ( 1 8 0 2 - 1 8 1 9 ) , who s a i d : " C a m b o d i a i s a s m a l l c o u n t r y . . . . And we s h o u l d m a i n t a i n i t a s a c h i l d . We w i l l be i t s m o t h e r , i t s f a t h e r w i l l b e S i a m . When a c h i l d has t r o u b l e with i t s f a t h e r , i t can g e t r i d of s u f f e r i n g by e m b r a c i n g i t s m o t h e r . When t h e c h i l d i s unhappy w i t h i t s m o t h e r , i t can run t o i t s f a t h e r f o r s u p p o r t . " 39 G i v e n t h a t t h e Khmer R o u g e c o u l d n o t s u r v i v e w i t h o u t Thai c o n n i v a n c e in China's s u p p o r t , the V i e t n a m e s e m i g h t w e l l s e e t h e c h i l d as unhappy w i t h i t s f a t h e r , t h e r e f o r e running t o i t s mother. Though t h e y h a v e d o n e m o r e t h a n any o t h e r V i e t n a m e s e e l i t e t o e x punge t r a d i t i o n a l n e g a t i v e s t e r e o t y p e s t o w a r d n e i g h b o r ing p e o p l e s , t h e V i e t n a m e s e Communists draw t r e m e n d o u s p r i d e f r o m p r o t e c t i n g and d e v e l o p i n g o t h e r s o c i e t i e s . In f u l f i l l m e n t of t h e i r " i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t d u t y , " not t o m e n t i o n t h e i r own s e c u r i t y r e q u i r e m e n t s , t h e V i e t n a m e s e f i n d c o n f i r m a t i o n o f V i e t n a m ' s f u l l s o v e r e i g n t y and m e m b e r s h i p i n t h e modern w o r l d c o m m u n i t y . These t r e m e n d o u s l y i m p o r t a n t p s y c h i c s a t i s f a c t i o n s a r e made a l l t h e m o r e i n t e n s e by t h e c o n s i d e r a b l e s a c r i f i c e a t w h i c h a s s i s t a n c e i s given.*t0 A l a s t o p t i o n f o r c o n s o l i d a t i n g V i e t n a m e s e hegemony o v e r I n d o c h i n a c o u l d be V i e t n a m i z a t i o n i n t h e f o r m o f s e t t l e m e n t and e v e n t u a l a b s o r p t i o n of Laos and Cambodia. T h i s s p e c t r e h a s b e e n r a i s e d p r i n c i p a l l y by Khmer r e s i s t a n c e g r o u p s and t h e i r ASEAN s u p p o r t e r s , who c h a r g e t h a t V i e t n a m e s e in t h e h u n d r e d s of t h o u s a n d s already h a v e s e t t l e d i n Cambodia w i t h H a n o i ' s e n c o u r a g e m e n t and assistance. But e v i d e n c e of s e t t l e m e n t o f t h i s m a g n i tude is thin. Hanoi's p r i n c i p a l c o n c e r n s regarding s e t t l e m e n t h a v e been t o c u r b t h e movement o f s m u g g l e r s , b l a c k m a r k e t e e r s , d r a f t d o d g e r s , and p o l i t i c a l d i s s i d e n t s s e e k i n g r e f u g e o r o p p o r t u n i t y in Cambodia's p o s t 1 9 7 9 d i s a r r a y , y e t t o p e r m i t some s e t t l e m e n t t h a t m i g h t help economic recovery. I t i s d o u b t f u l t h a t t h e aim i s

194 assimilation. P o l i c y documents t h a t have come t o l i g h t s u g g e s t an aim o f r e g u l a t i n g an o n g o i n g movement s o as t o g u a r a n t e e t h a t V i e t n a m e s e i n Cambodia w i l l c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e economy, not t o t u r b u l e n c e . 4 1 The V i e t n a m Cambodia b o r d e r i s c l o s e l y p a t r o l l e d t o s t o p u n a u t h o r ized c r o s s i n g s , 4 2 and a p l a n t o s c r e e n s e t t l e r s a l r e a d y i n C a m b o d i a was b e i n g d i s c u s s e d i n s p r i n g 1 9 8 4 . 4 3 As f o r numbers of s e t t l e r s , t h e y a r e u n d o u b t e d l y h i g h e r t h a n t h e 5 6 , 0 0 0 V i e t n a m e s e (and o v e r 6 0 , 0 0 0 Sino-Khmer) c i t e d by Phnom Penh i n m i d - 1 9 8 3 , t h e l a s t t i m e e s t i m a t e s were g i v e n . 4 4 But m i g r a t i o n i s s a i d t o have t a p e r e d o f f due t o t i g h t e r c o n t r o l s and, on t h e p a r t of law—abiding V i e t n a m e s e , t o memory of e a r l i e r t r e a t m e n t at t h e hands of t h e K h m e r . 4 5 Hanoi f o r e i g n m i n i s t r y a n a l y s t s add t h a t an o f f i c i a l l y s p o n s o r e d program of m a s s i v e s e t t l e ment of t h e kind a l l e g e d would p r o v o k e Cambodian, ASEAN, and world o p p o s i t i o n and be s e l f - d e f e a t i n g . 4 6 However, Hanoi s o u r c e s r e f e r t o t h e 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 V i e t n a m e s e who l i v e d i n C a m b o d i a up t o 1 9 7 0 as p r e c e d e n t f o r a s i z e a b l e community t h a t might be t o l e r a t e d a g a i n , which r e v e a l s s t r i k i n g o b t u s e n e s s g i v e n t h e r e a s o n s t h a t t h i s communit y s u b s e q u e n t l y was r e d u c e d n e a r l y t o z e r o . 4 7 It is p o s s i b l e t h a t o p i n i o n i n Hanoi i s d i v i d e d on t h i s i s s u e , w i t h some o f f i c i a l s w i l l i n g t o c o n s i d e r i m p l a n t a t i o n o f Vietnamese communities in c e r t a i n areas f o r s e c u r i t y r e a s o n s ( a l a I s r a e l ' s W e s t Bank) i f o t h e r m e a n s a r e s een t o f a i l . Hanoi does not seem t o have p e r c e i v e d any s i g n i f i c a n t f a i l u r e s i n i t s s t r a t e g y toward Cambodia t h u s f a r , however. B u i l d i n g a new C a m b o d i a n p a r t y , s t a t e , and army has proved more d i f f i c u l t t h a n t h e V i e t n a m e s e i n i t i a l l y a n t i c i p a t e d but i s e x p l a i n e d by t h e f a c t t h a t few e d u c a t e d Khmer s u r v i v e d t h e P o l Pot y e a r s . Khmer r e s i s t a n c e f o r c e s made m i n o r g a i n s r a t h e r t h a n f a d i n g away d u r i n g 1983 and 1 9 8 4 , but t h i s was a t t r i b u t e d t o e x t e r n a l s u p p o r t and d i p l o m a t i c c o n s t r a i n t s on u s e o f f o r c e along t h e Thai b o r d e r . China p e r s i s t s i n a p p l y i n g p r e s s u r e on V i e t n a m ' s n o r t h e r n b o r d e r , b u t no " s e c o n d l e s son" has m a t e r i a l i z e d , and B e i j i n g ' s s e a r c h f o r b a l a n c e b e t w e e n Moscow and W a s h i n g t o n , t h e V i e t n a m e s e b e l i e v e , c o n s t r a i n s C h i n e s e a c t i o n a g a i n s t Hanoi. The m a i n f e a r o f t h e V i e t n a m e s e h a s b e e n t h a t t h e Phnom Penh government and t h e Khmer p e o p l e might become d e p e n d e n t on t h e P e o p l e ' s Army f o r p r o t e c t i o n and grow a p a t h e t i c about t h e Khmer Rouge t h r e a t . Two " t r a p s " a r e e v i d e n t : one i s Khmer dependency l e a d i n g t o an i n t e r m i n able Vietnamese m i l i t a r y involvement; the other is p r e m a t u r e V i e t n a m e s e w i t h d r a w a l t h a t would p e r m i t t h e Khmer R o u g e — a n d b e h i n d them t h e C h i n e s e — t o r e t u r n . 4 8 The u n p r e c e d e n t e d a t t a c k s by t h e V i e t n a m e s e on a l l m a j o r b o r d e r encampments of t h e r e s i s t a n c e i n t h e 1 9 8 4 - 8 5 dry s e a s o n w e r e p a r t o f an a t t e m p t t o a v o i d b o t h o f t h e s e t r a p s through more v i g o r o u s m i l i t a r y a c t i o n . The immed i a t e o b j e c t i v e was t o d i s p r o v e c l a i m s t h a t t h e r e s i s t a n c e f o r c e s had g r o w n s t r o n g e r a n d , o f c o u r s e , t o r o l l back t h e i r p r o g r e s s , which t h e a t t a c k s d i d . But t h e

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s t r a t e g y can be j u s t i f i e d o n l y i f i t h e l p s t o s h i f t t h e burden t o Phnom Penh. In t h e r e s p i t e , t h e r e f o r e , t h e m o s t u r g e n t o b j e c t i v e h a s been t o c o n s o l i d a t e t h e Phnom Penh a p p a r a t u s a t a l l l e v e l s in t h e d e n s e l y p o p u l a t e d b a s i n around t h e G r e a t Lake. I t was c a l c u l a t e d t h a t i f Phnom Penh c o u l d m o b i l i z e t h e r e s o u r c e s of t h i s , t h e " i n l a n d f r o n t , " i t would be a b l e t o h a n d l e t h e s k i r m i s h i n g at t h e " b o r d e r f r o n t " with r e d u c e d V i e t n a m e s e a s s i s t a n c e . The V i e t n a m e s e a l s o h a v e f o r m e d j o i n t command s t r u c t u r e s f o r V i e t n a m e s e and C a m b o d i a n u n i t s i n t h e f i e l d t o s t i f f e n t h e l a t t e r as n o n e s s e n t i a l Vietnamese t r o o p s a r e w i t h drawn. 4 9 Though a t t e n t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y from t h e United S t a t e s , ASEAN, and C h i n a , h a s f o c u s e d on t h e p r e s u m e d p u r p o s e of a n n u a l w i t h d r a w a l s t o a p p e a s e f o r e i g n o p i n ion, the w i t h d r a w a l s a l s o are c o n s i s t e n t with Hanoi's d e s i r e t o p u t t h e Khmer on n o t i c e t h a t t h e y m u s t do m o r e to defend themselves. From t h e s e a d j u s t m e n t s of s t r a t e g y , i t c a n b e c o n c l u d e d t h a t i f C h i n a and T h a i l a n d ( o r o t h e r s i n c l u d i n g t h e United S t a t e s ) c o n t i n u e t o s u p p l y a v i a b l e Khmer r e s i s t a n c e , t h e Cambodian c o n f l i c t i s l i k e l y t o e v o l v e i n t o a c i v i l war b e t w e e n e x t e r n a l l y s u p p o r t e d Khmer p a r t i e s . Although Thai m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s have s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e p a r t i t i o n of Cambodian t e r r i t o r y m i g h t be an a c c e p t a b l e outcome of such a c o n f l i c t , 5 0 t h e Vietnamese c a t e g o r i c a l l y r u l e t h i s out. THE CHALLENGE AND THE RESPONSES Vietnam h a s t h e means and d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o p e r s i s t in i t s p r e s e n t c o u r s e i n d e f i n i t e l y , a l b e i t a t g r e a t c o s t to i t s e l f . Success in that course i m p l i e s the c o n s o l i d a t i o n of an I n d o c h i n a b l o c u n d e r H a n o i ' s p r e d o m i n a n t influence, easy access f o r the Vietnamese m i l i t a r y to t h e Mekong B a s i n , p r o t r a c t e d t e n s i o n between Vietnam and China, and s t r e n g t h e n i n g of s e c u r i t y t i e s between V i e t nam and t h e S o v i e t Union. These outcomes i n t u r n would r e d i s t r i b u t e power on t h e m a i n l a n d t o T h a i l a n d ' s d i s a d v a n t a g e and m i g h t l e a d t o f u r t h e r e n t r e n c h m e n t of t h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y p r e s e n c e i n Vietnam. In r e s p o n s e , T h a i l a n d a l r e a d y h a s s o u g h t r e a s s u r a n c e f r o m C h i n a and t h e United S t a t e s at the same t i m e i t has d i v e r t e d c a p i t a l from economic t o m i l i t a r y d e v e l o p m e n t . These t r e n d s i n Thai p o l i c y t e n d t o d i v i d e ASEAN, as members not d i r e c t l y t h r e a t e n e d by V i e t n a m g r o w i m p a t i e n t t o end a c o n f r o n t a t i o n t h a t i n v i t e s i n t r u s i o n by t h e l e a s t t r u s t e d of t h e G r e a t P o w e r s . Though u n l i k e l y , an ASEAN s p l i t over t h e s e i s s u e s could d r i v e Thailand t o go i t alone in a l l i a n c e with China, t h e United S t a t e s , o r b o t h . Altern a t i v e l y , T h a i l a n d would h a v e t h e o p t i o n of accommodat i o n and n e u t r a l i t y , l e a d i n g toward t h e B u r m a n i z a t i o n of mainland Southeast A s i a . O v e r t h e n e a r t e r m , h o w e v e r , no r a d i c a l c h a n g e i n t h e broad c o n t o u r s of c o n f l i c t o r a l i g n m e n t seems l i k e ly. Though V i e t n a m c l e a r l y h a s t h e u p p e r hand i n

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Cambodia and c a n m a i n t a i n i t f o r as l o n g as i t i s w i l l ing t o s t a t i o n s i z e a b l e f o r c e s t h e r e , i t i s not e v i d e n t a t t h i s w r i t i n g t h a t i t can u n i l a t e r a l l y impose a s t a b l e o u t c o m e b a s e d e x c l u s i v e l y on i t s own s e c u r i t y interests without mortgaging its future welfare. Perhaps more o b v i o u s l y , n e i t h e r c a n T h a i l a n d , ASEAN, and t h e i r s u p p o r t e r s i m p o s e t h e i r p r e f e r r e d o u t c o m e by p r e s s u r i n g V i e t n a m a s t h e y h a v e up t o now. H o w e v e r , ASEAN h a s a powerful i n c e n t i v e t o continue backing Thailand: if T h a i l a n d l o s t ASEAN's s u p p o r t , Bangkok m i g h t f e e l c o n s t r a i n e d t o a d o p t an even l e s s p l e a s a n t o p t i o n t h a n i t s p r e s e n t one. The o n e a i m s h a r e d by t h e r e g i o n a l c o n t e s t a n t s — a balanced r e l a t i o n s h i p between Southeast A s i a n c o u n t r i e s and G r e a t Powers t o m i n i m i z e o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r t h e l a t t e r t o i n t e r f e r e i n n a t i o n a l and r e g i o n a l a f f a i r s — t h u s f a r h a s b e e n h e l d h o s t a g e by b o t h V i e t n a m and ASEAN i n t h e i r demands f o r c o n c e s s i o n s o v e r Cambodia. D i p l o m a t i c d e a d l o c k , low i n t e n s i t y c o n f l i c t , and m i l i t a r y b u i l d u p s by a l l t h e m a j o r p l a y e r s t h e r e f o r e seem l i k e l y t o c o n t i n u e . T h i s p r o s p e c t p o s e s much t h e s a m e p r o b l e m s f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s as i t h a s s i n c e 1 9 7 8 . W a s h i n g t o n must s e e k a r e s o l u t i o n of t h e Cambodian q u e s t i o n in such a manner as t o r e d u c e S o v i e t o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r e x p a n d e d i n f l u e n c e and m a i n t a i n ASEAN u n i t y and sound U.S.-ASEAN and U . S . - C h i n a r e l a t i o n s . At f i r s t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s d i d t h i s by a c q u i e s c i n g i n C h i n a ' s s t r a t e g y o f " b l e e d i n g " V i e t n a m t h r o u g h d i p l o m a t i c i s o l a t i o n and s u p p o r t f o r t h e Khmer Rouge. Washington a l s o helped t o s u s t a i n ASEAN r e s o l v e t o e x t r a c t c o n c e s s i o n s f r o m H a n o i . Although t h e s e p o l i c i e s w e r e u s e f u l i n d e m o n s t r a t i n g U.S. s o l i d a r i t y w i t h China and T h a i l a n d , t h e y d i d n o t h i n g t o e v i c t V i e t n a m e s e t r o o p s from Cambodia, added i n c e n t i v e f o r Hanoi t o expand S o v i e t m i l i t a r y a c c e s s t o V i e t n a m e s e f a c i l i t i e s , and a s s o c i a t e d U.S. p o l i c y , i f o n l y i n d i r e c t l y , w i t h s u p p o r t f o r t h e Khmer R o u g e . They a l s o a b d i c a t e d i n f l u e n c e t o China. U.S. p o l i c y t h u s h e l p e d t o c o n f i r m t h e b e l i e f in Hanoi t h a t V i e t n a m c o u l d r e l y o n l y on i t s e l f t o e x t i n g u i s h t h e t h r e a t p o s e d by a C h i n a - b a c k e d Khmer R o u g e and on c l o s e t i e s w i t h t h e S o v i e t Union t o o f f s e t C h i n e s e p r e s s u r e . I t was a f t e r s e v e r a l y e a r s of what Hanoi c o n s i d e r e d d i p l o m a t i c p a t i e n c e t h a t i n 1 9 8 4 i t o r d e r e d i t s army t o a t t a c k i n m a j o r f o r c e on t h e b o r d e r o f T h a i l a n d . Vietnamese f o r c e s in r e g i m e n t a l s t r e n g t h c r o s s e d t h a t border s e v e r al times. With t h e Khmer r e s i s t a n c e camps removed as a b u f f e r , t h e s c e n e was s e t f o r a c o n f r o n t a t i o n t h a t c o u l d f o r c e t h e United S t a t e s t o choose between a p o l i t i c a l l y u n p a l a t a b l e i n v o l v e m e n t o r abandonment of a t r e a t y a l l y . I t i s i n t h e U.S. i n t e r e s t t o a v o i d h a v i n g t o m a k e that choice. T h i s c a n b e d o n e by f a c i l i t a t i n g e f f o r t s t o l i q u i d a t e t h e Khmer Rouge, which may r e q u i r e a l a r g e r s e c u r i t y c o m m i t m e n t t o T h a i l a n d t o r e a s s u r e Bangkok f o r t h e l o s s o f t h i s " b u f f e r " and t o m i t i g a t e r e p e r c u s s i o n s in T h a i l a n d ' s r e l a t i o n s with China. Sustaining the noncommunist Khmer r e s i s t a n c e w i t h " h u m a n i t a r i a n a s s i s t -

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a n c e " i s u s e f u l as a s h o w o f s o l i d a r i t y w i t h ASEAN b u t s h o u l d not b e g i v e n w i t h any e x p e c t a t i o n s of o b t a i n i n g a s h a r e of r e a l p o w e r f o r noncommunists i n t h e Phnom Penh government. Because there is l i t t l e the United States r e a l i s t i c a l l y c a n do t o m o d i f y V i e t n a m ' s r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , i t i s i n t h e U.S. i n t e r e s t t o s u p p o r t ASEAN e f f o r t s t o f i n d common g r o u n d w i t h H a n o i on r e g i o n a l o r d e r over the long term. For t h e o r d e r d e s i r e d by A S E A N , s h a r e d i n l a r g e m e a s u r e by H a n o i , is more c o m p a t i b l e w i t h U.S. i n t e r e s t s t h a n t h e r e g i o n a l polariz a t i o n and e n c r o a c h m e n t of C h i n e s e and S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e t h a t t h e p o l i c i e s of a l l t h e G r e a t P o w e r s , including t h o s e of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h u s f a r h a v e e x a c e r b a t e d .

NOTES 1. For background and a n a l y s i s , s e e David W. P. E l l i o t t , ed., The I h i r d Indochina C o n f l i c t (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1981); and W i l l i a m S. Turley and J e f f r e y Race, "The Third Indochina War," Foreign P o l i c y 38 (Spring 1980):92-116. See Sukhumbhand P a r i b a t r a , " S t r a t e g i c I m p l i c a t i o n s of the 2. Indochina C o n f l i c t : Thai P e r s p e c t i v e s , " Asian A f f a i r s : An American R e v i e w 11, no. 3 ( F a l l 1 9 8 4 ) : 3 0 - 3 5 . 3. For f u t h e r c o m p a r i s o n , s e e R. B. S m i t h , " T h a i l a n d and Viet-Nam: Some Thoughts Toward a Comparative H i s t o r i c a l A n a l y s i s , " The Journal of the Siam Society 60, p a r t 2 (July 1972): 1 -21. 4. Henry K i s s i n g e r , W h i t e Hous e Y e a r s ( B o s t o n : Little, Brown, 1979), p. 433. 5. "Tho cua Trung uong g u i cho cac cap Dang b o , " 3 December 1930, i n Dang Cong San V i e t Nam, Ban chanh hanh Trung uong, Van Kien Dang, 1930-1945 (Party Documents, 1930-1945) (Hanoi: Central Committee Commission f o r the Study of Party H i s t o r y , 1972), p. 190. This volume, marked "Luu hanh noi bo" ( f o r i n t e r n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n ) , is an unexpurgated documentary record. 6. "An nghi q u y e t cua Trung uong t o a n t h e h o i nghi n o i v e tinh hinh h i e n t a i o Dong duong va nhiem vu can k i p cua Dang," (101930)," Van K i e n Dang, p. 87. 7. " T r u y e n don g i a i t h i c h v i e c d o i t e n Dang," ( n . d . ) , Van Kien Dang, p. 188. 8. "Tho cua Trung uong gui cho cac cap Dang b o , " p. 191. 9. For a d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of t h i s s p l i t , s e e Huynh Kim Khanh, Vietnamese Communism 1925-1945 ( I t h a c a , N.Y.: C o r n e l l Univ e r s i t y Press, 1982), pp. 99-119. 10. Vo Nguyen G i a p , Nhiem vu quan su t r u o c m a t chuyen s ang Tong phan cong (The M i l i t a r y Mission in T r a n s i t i o n t o the General O f f e n s i v e and U p r i s i n g ) (Ha Dong C o m m i t t e e f o r R e s i s t a n c e and A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 1950), p. 14, i n L i b r a r y of C o n g r e s s , O r i e n t a l i a / South A s i a 4 m i c r o f i l m c o l l e c t i o n , P. T. Chau, ed., Vietnam es e Communist P u b l i c a t i o n s , item 40. 11. Joseph J. Z a s l o f f , The Pathet Lao: Leadership and Organiz a t i o n ( L e x i n g t o n , Mass.: Heath, 1973), p. 13. 12. C i r c u l a r d a t e d 27 November 1953, q u o t e d i n War E x p e r i ences R e c a p i t u l a t i o n Committee, Vietnam: Hie Anti-U.S. Resistance f o r N a t i o n a l S a l v a t i o n 1954-1975: M i l i t a r y Events (Hanoi: people's

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Army P u b l i s h i n g H o u s e , 1 9 8 0 ) , t r a n s . J o i n t P u b l i c a t i o n s R e s e a r c h S e r v i c e n o 8 0 9 6 8 ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C., 3 J u n e 1 9 8 2 ) , p . 6 2 . 13. Gen. Le Due Anh, "Quan d o i n h a n d a n v a n h i e m vu q u o c t e c a o c a t r e n d a t b a n C a m - P u - C h i a " (The P e o p l e ' s Army a n d i t s L o f t y I n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t M i s s i o n i n F r i e n d l y K a m p u c h e a ) , Tap c h i Quan d o i n h a n d a n ( P e o p l e ' s Army J o u r n a l ) ( D e c e m b e r 1 9 8 4 ) , p . 32. 14. Phnom P e n h s p o k e s m e n h a v e r u l e d o u t a n y d i l u t i o n of t h e p o w e r m o n o p o l y h e l d by t h e C o m m u n i s t p a r t y . See comment t h a t " i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y s u p e r v i s e d e l e c t i o n s " must be i n accord w i t h t h e PRK c o n s t i t u t i o n b y PRK F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Hun S e n o n P h n o m P e n h R a d i o , 11 D e c e m b e r 1 9 8 4 , i n F o r e i g n B r o a d c a s t I n f o r m a t i o n S e r v i c e , D a i l y R e p o r t : As i a & P a c i f i c (h e r e i n a f t e r FBIS—APA), 14 D e c e m b e r 1 9 8 4 ; a n d Hun S e n ' s s t a t e m e n t t h a t " t h e l e a d i n g r o l e of t h e KPRP c a n n o t b e q u e s t i o n e d " i n i n t e r v i e w o n B u d a p e s t R a d i o , 30 May 1 9 8 5 , FBIS-APA, 31 May 1 9 8 5 . 15. For an a n a l y s i s t h a t e m p h a s i z e s i d e o l o g i c a l i n f l u e n c e s i n Vietnamese v i e w s , s e e Gareth P o r t e r , "Hanoi's S t r a t e g i c P e r s p e c t i v e and t h e S i n o - V i e t n a m e s e C o n f l i c t , " P a c i f i c A f f a i r s 57, no. 1 (Spring 1984):7-25. 16. I n t e r v i e w w i t h Vo D o n g G i a n g , 31 M a r c h 1 9 8 3 . Giang s u b s e q u e n t l y b e c a m e m i n i s t e r of s t a t e f o r F o r e i g n A f f a i r s . 17. Such v i e w s w e r e e x p r e s s e d t o t h e a u t h o r by s e v e r a l s o u r c e s i n H a n o i ' s M i n i s t r y of F o r e i g n A f f a i r s . 18. See G a r e t h P o r t e r , " V i e t n a m and t h e S o c i a l i s t Camp," i n W i l l a m S. T u r l e y , e d . , V i e t n a m e s e Communism i n C o m p a r a t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e ( B o u l d e r , Colo., W e s t v i e w , 1980), pp. 225-264. 19. The V i e t n a m e s e r e t r o s p e c t i v e on t h i s b r e a k i s t h e M i n i s t r y of F o r e i g n A f f a i r s " w h i t e b o o k , " The T r u t h a b o u t V i e t n a m - C h i n a R e l a t i o n s o v e r t h e L a s t T h i r t y Y e a r s ( H a n o i : F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y of t h e S o c i a l i s t R e p u b l i c of V i e t n a m , 1 9 7 9 ) . 20. P r i v a t e communications with the a u t h o r . 21. Communique of t h e 1 0 t h I n d o c h i n a F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s ' C o n f e r e n c e , R a d i o H a n o i , 18 J a n u a r y 1 9 8 5 , F B I S - A P A , 2 3 J a n u a r y 1985. 22. J a p a n T r a d e O r g a n i z a t i o n , Bangkok, and International M o n e t a r y Fund, " S o c i a l i s t R e p u b l i c of V i e t - N a m — S t a f f R e p o r t f o r 1 9 8 4 , " 18 May 1 9 8 4 , a p p e n d i x I , p . 2 0 . 23. A map i n Quan d o i n h a n d a n ( P e o p l e ' s A r m y ) , 1 O c t o b e r 1 9 8 3 , e m p h a s i z e s t h e U.S. e m p l a c e m e n t i n t h e W e s t e r n P a c i f i c a s v i r t u a l l y e n c i r c l i n g Vietnam and t h r e a t e n i n g s e a c o m m u n i c a t i o n s t o the north. 24. Quan d o i n h a n d a n , 1 J u l y 1 9 8 3 . 25. Q u a n d o i n h a n d a n , 26 J a n u a r y 1 9 8 3 ; a l s o Q u a n d o i n h a n d a n , 7 M a r c h , 4 a n d 24 A p r i l , a n d 25 a n d 28 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 3 . 26. Pham B i n h , d i r e c t o r of t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s I n s t i t u t e , M i n i s t r y of F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , 21 A p r i l 1 9 8 4 . Also s e e Binh's p a p e r , " p r o s p e c t s f o r S o l u t i o n s t o P r o b l e m s R e l a t e d t o P e a c e and S t a b i l i t y i n S o u t h e a s t Asia," p r e s e n t e d a t t h e CSIS-IRS m e e t i n g i n H a n o i , F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 4 , Th e I n d o n e s i a n Q u a r t e r l y 1 2 , n o . 2 (1984):221-222. 27. One F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y o f f i c i a l t o l d t h i s w r i t e r i n 1 9 8 3 t h a t H a n o i h a d d r o p p e d i t s i n s i s t e n c e o n i n c l u s i o n of " i n d e p e n d e n c e " i n t h e ZOPFAN c o n c e p t o n d i s c o v e r i n g i t w a s " o f f e n s i v e " t o ASEAN c o u n t r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y I n d o n e s i a , t h o u g h t h e ASEAN c o u n t r i e s , h e w e n t on, " s t i l l d e p e n d on o t h e r s and n e e d t o c o m p l e t e

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their i n d e p e n d e n c e i n t h e s e n s e of r e d u c i n g t h i s d e g r e e of dependence." 28. C o m m u n i q u e , R a d i o H a n o i , 18 J a n u a r y 1 9 8 5 . 29. V i e t n a m News A g e n c y , H a n o i , 2 F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 5 , FBIS-APA, 4 F e b r u a r y 1985. 30. The I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e f o r S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s , The M i l i t a r y B a l a n c e 1984-1985 (London: I I S S , 1984), pp. 110-112. 31 . I n t e r v i e w w i t h C o l . Nghiem T u c , d e p u t y e d i t o r of Quan d p i n h a n d a n , 23 A p r i l 1 9 8 4 . 32. I n t e r v i e w w i t h Pham B a o , 24 A p r i l 1 9 8 4 . 33. V i e n t i a n e R a d i o , 9 March 1 9 8 5 ; FBIS-APA, 3 A p r i l 1 9 8 5 . 34. V i e n t i a n e KPL, 5 D e c e m b e r 1 9 8 4 ; F B I S - A P A , 7 D e c e m b e r 1984. 35. Pham Bao i n t e r v i e w . 36. A l e x a n d e r W o o d s i d e , " V i e t n a m and L a o s : The C o n t i n u i n g C r i s i s , " p a p e r p r e s e n t e d a t t h e m e e t i n g of t h e A m e r i c a n H i s t o r i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n , W a s h i n g t o n , D.C., D e c e m b e r 1969. 37. Nhan d a n ( T h e P e o p l e ) , 18 J a n u a r y 1 9 8 4 . 38. I n t e r v i e w w i t h N g u y e n Co T h a c h , 25 A p r i l 1 9 8 4 . 39. M a n u s c r i p t c h r o n i c l e q u o t e d i n D a v i d P. C h a n d l e r , _A His t o r y of C a m b o d i a ( B o u l d e r , C o l o . : W e s t v i e w , 1 9 8 3 ) , p . 116. 40. Pham B a o , i n t h e i n t e r v i e w c i t e d a b o v e , s a i d : " V i e t n a m d e s p i t e i t s own d i f f i c u l t i e s h a s g i v e n C a m b o d i a a n a v e r a g e of $30 m i l l i o n w o r t h of a s s i s t a n c e e v e r y y e a r s i n c e 1 9 7 8 . T h i s was m o s t l y f o o d a t f i r s t , b u t now i t i n c l u d e s c o n s u m e r g o o d s a n d c a p i t a l goods. The S o v i e t s g i v e m o r e — o v e r $50 m i l l i o n w o r t h a n n u a l l y - - a n d a d d i t i o n a l aid is received from i n t e r n a t i o n a l organizations. Vietn a m ' s $30 m i l l i o n i s l a r g e i n r e l a t i o n t o i t s c a p a c i t y . " 41. C i r c u l a r n o . 3 8 , PRK C o u n c i l of M i n i s t e r s , 9 O c t o b e r 1 9 8 2 ; a n d C i r c u l a r n o . 2 4 0 , P e o p l e ' s R e v o l u t i o n a r y P a r t y of K a m p u c h e a C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e , 13 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 2 . For d i s c u s s i o n , s e e W i l l i a m S. T u r l e y , " I s H a n o i T r y i n g t o V i e t n a m i z e K a m p u c h e a ? " A s i a n W a l l S t r e e t J o u r n a l , 2 0 - 2 1 May 1 9 8 3 . 42. T h i s was a f f i r m e d t o t h e a u t h o r by " l a n d p e o p l e " r e f u g e e s , i n c l u d i n g r e c e n t l y a r r i v e d d r a f t - a g e m a l e s , i n Dongrak camp on t h e T h a i - C a m b o d i a n b o r d e r , 25 March 1984. 43. I n t e r v i e w w i t h PRK D e p u t y F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Kong Korm, 3 April 1984. 44. P r e s s D e p a r t m e n t , M i n i s t r y of F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , " P o l i c y of t h e P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c of K a m p u c h e a w i t h R e g a r d t o V i e t n a m e s e R e s i d e n t s " (Phnom P e n h , S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 3 ) , p p . 7, 8. 45. Thach i n t e r v i e w . F o l l o w i n g t h e o v e r t h r o w of Prince S i h a n o u k i n 1970, t h e m i l i t a r y government i n s t i g a t e d or t o l e r a t e d a t t a c k s on V i e t n a m e s e c i v i l i a n r e s i d e n t s i n C a m b o d i a . Thousands d i e d , and o t h e r s s o u g h t r e f u g e i n V i e t n a m . Under Pol P o t , t h e remainder e i t h e r f l e d or were k i l l e d . 46. These p o i n t s w e r e made i n c o l l e c t i v e d i s c u s s i o n w i t h m e m b e r s of t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s I n s t i t u t e , 24 M a r c h 1 9 8 3 ; a l s o s e e T u r l e y , " I s Hanoi T r y i n g t o V i e t n a m i z e Kampuchea?" 47. The f i g u r e i s w i d e l y a c c e p t e d as a r e a s o n a b l y a c c u r a t e estimate. A s e n i o r o f f i c i a l , i n t e r v i e w e d 31 March 1 9 8 3 , m a d e t h e u n a t t r i b u t a b l e comment t h a t " i t i s n o r m a l f o r V i e t n a m e s e t o l i v e i n C a m b o d i a , b u t t r e a t m e n t of t h e m h a s n o t a l w a y s b e e n g o o d . " Lengthy c o m m e n t a r y i n Quan d o i n h a n d a n , 27 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 3 , p o r t r a y e d t h e 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 V i e t n a m e s e who l i v e d i n C a m b o d i a b e f o r e 1970 as m o s t l y

200 working f o l k who s h a r e d t h e Khmer's s u f f e r i n g under c o l o n i a l r u l e . In r a r e comments on t h e s u b j e c t , Khmer a n t i p a t h y t o t h e V i e t n a m e s e u n d e r Lon Nol and P o l P o t i s e i t h e r g l o s s e d o v e r o r a s c r i b e d t o i n s t i g a t i o n by U.S. and C h i n e s e a n t i - V i e t n a m p o l i c i e s . 4 8 . This was t h e p o i n t of Thach's r e f e r e n c e above t o Cambodia as a " c h i l d " needing t o stand alone t o s t i m u l a t e f u r t h e r growth. 4 9 . Anh, "Quan d o i nhan dan v a nhiem vu quoc t e . " 5 0 . The i d e a h a s c i r c u l a t e d among R o y a l T h a i Army o f f i c e r s f o r s o m e t i m e . Gen. p i c h i t K u l l a w a n i c h , c o m m a n d e r o f t h e F i r s t Army R e g i o n , i s a p o w e r f u l p r o p o n e n t : " M a i n t a i n i n g t h a t t h e n a t i o n a l i s t s w o u l d n o t b e a b l e t o d r i v e o u t t h e V i e t n a m e s e f r o m Kamp u c h e a , L t . Gen. p i c h i t s a i d t h e f u t u r e o f K a m p u c h e a i s t h a t t h e c o u n t r y w i l l b e d i v i d e d i n zones c o n t r o l l e d by t h e V i e t n a m e s e and the r e s i s t a n c e . " B a n g k o k P o s t , 24 A p r i l 1 9 8 5 ; F B I S - A P A , 26 A p r i l 1985.

9 ASEAN: Patterns of National and Regional Resilience Donald E. Weatherbee

I n D e c e m b e r 1 9 7 8 , a u n i f i e d V i e t n a m , l e d by a s k i l l e d , c o h e s i v e communist e l i t e t h a t disposed of t h e l a r g e s t and most b a t t l e - t e s t e d m i l i t a r y f o r c e i n t h e r e g i o n s e n t i t s m i l i t a r y machine i n t o a c t i o n across i n t e r n a t i o n a l b o u n d a r i e s , t u r n i n g t h e A s s o c i a t i o n of S o u t h e a s t A s i a n N a t i o n s ' (ASEAN) b o r d e r r e g i o n s i n t o a zone of c o n f l i c t and in e f f e c t making t h e Thai-Kampuchean b o r d e r ASEAN's s t r a t e g i c border with Vietnam. The v a g u e f o r e b o d i n g s and looming menaces t h a t had plagued t h e ASEAN s e c u r i t y managers s i n c e t h e communist v i c t o r i e s i n I n d o c h i n a i n 1975 took on c o n c r e t e form with t h i s d r a m a t i c example o f a p o t e n t i a l a d v e r s a r y ' s w i l l i n g n e s s t o use f o r c e in p u r s u i t of e x t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s . No m a t t e r how c o m p l e x t h e f a c t o r s may h a v e b e e n i n H a n o i ' s d e c i s i o n making with r e s p e c t t o t h e i n v a s i o n of Kampuchea, f o r a w o r r i e d ASEAN, t h e f i r s t S o u t h e a s t A s i a n " d o m i n o " had f a l l e n to aggressive Vietnamese expansionism. ASEAN's c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h V i e t n a m o c c u r r e d i n a w i d e r r e g i o n a l s t r a t e g i c e n v i r o n m e n t t h a t had s i n c e 1975 been made more d a n g e r o u s f o r ASEAN by t h e s e e m i n g w i t h d r a w a l o f t h e U.S. p o w e r p r e s e n c e and t h e a p p a r e n t p o l i t i c a l d e t a c h m e n t of t h e United S t a t e s from l o c a l security interests. The r e l a t i v e d i m u n i t i o n o f U.S. G r e a t Power i n t h e r e g i o n was a c c o m p a n i e d by a h i g h e r p r o f i l e f o r t h e USSR i n i t s v i r t u a l a l l i a n c e with V i e t nam and t h e i n t r u s i o n of C h i n e s e power i n d i r e c t s u p p o r t of Kampuchea. The c h a n g e d r e g i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p o w e r d i r e c t l y i m p i n g e d on m i l i t a r y f o r c e p l a n n i n g i n t h e ASEAN s t a t e s ( B r u n e i , I n d o n e s i a , M a l a y s i a , t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , S i n g a p o r e , and T h a i l a n d ) . A l t h o u g h t h e ASEAN s t a t e s c o u l d not m i l i t a r i l y i n f l u e n c e t h e G r e a t Power b a l a n c e , t h e y d i d f e e l t h e need t o r e d r e s s t h e l o c a l b a l a n c e o f r e g i o n a l m i l i t a r y power i n o r d e r t o d e t e r and i f n e c e s s a r y r e p e l any V i e t n a m e s e t h r u s t a c r o s s ASEAN strategic frontiers. These f r o n t i e r s i n c l u d e not o n l y t h e b l e e d i n g Thai-Kampuchean b o r d e r but t h e p o t e n t i a l c o n f l i c t zone in t h e South China Sea where u n r e s o l v e d 201

202 b o u n d a r i e s pit f i v e of ASEAN'S six m e m b e r s against Vietnam and the People's Republic of China (PRC). The intensity of the V i e t n a m e s e threat w a s shaped by a Vietnamese order of battle that was quantitatively and q u a l i t a t i v e l y s u p e r i o r to any the A S E A N s t a t e s had available. 1 As Goh Keng S w e e , then S i n g a p o r e M i n i s t e r of Defense, put it in mid-1979: "The dominant feature in the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n the I n d o c h i n e s e and A S E A N s t a t e s is the s u p e r i o r i t y of the a r m e d f o r c e s of the DRV [ D e m o c r a t i c R e p u b l i c of V i e t n a m ] over t h o s e of A S E A N s i n g l y or c o l l e c t i v e l y . . . . In any m i l i t a r y contest between the two s i d e s — a s s u m i n g there is no third power i n t e r v e n t i o n — t h e outcome would be quick and decisive." 2 The r e a l i s t i c v i e w in A S E A N s e c u r i t y c i r c l e s held that as long as ASEAN major power asymmetries marked ASEANVietnamese relations, Vietnam's putative hegemonic ambitions might remain unchecked. The policy response was an u n p a r a l l e l e d p e r i o d of A S E A N m i l i t a r i z a t i o n . It is this we consider here. In a s e m i - i d e o l o g i c a l s e n s e , ASEAN's efforts to increase its indigenous security capabilities has been encapsulated in the (originally Indonesian) concept of " n a t i o n a l resilience." In the a b s t r a c t , "national resilience" means the total mobilization and utilization of all of a nation's t a n g i b l e and i n t a n g i b l e r e s o u r c e s in defense of its interests. Construed more instrumentally, "national resilience" has become a euphemism for beefed up military establishments. As Indonesia's President S u h a r t o w a r n e d in his 1981 I n d e p e n d e n c e Day address: "In this turmoil filled world, whoever wishes to preserve his independence must be ready to take up arms to d e f e n d it." 3 A c l o s e r e x a m i n a t i o n of the A S E A N states' actual defense p l a n n i n g — t h e way in which scarce resources are d e p l o y e d - - i s p e r h a p s a b e t t e r g u i d e to real c o n c e r n s about security than the nuanced and diplomatic rhetoric of the conference halls where the ASEAN elites are ever alert to the impact of their words on extra-ASEAN powers and to the self-conscious requirement of a generalized, if s i m p l i f i e d , l o w e s t c o m m o n d e n o m i n a t o r c o n s e n s u a l posture. The i n f o r m i n g v a l u e of d e f e n s e p l a n n i n g for the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n s e c u r i t y p o l i c y and threat perception is particularly relevant when we realize that planning for enhanced military capabilities in the face of t h r e a t r e q u i r e s m e n t a l p r o j e c t i o n of the threat beyond an immediate crisis. The way in which investment is made in military development may be a more objective, longer term measure of threat perceptions than the verbalizations of the moment because "the needs to acquire arms and increase military spending is closely related to the country's perception of its security s ituat ion."1* G i v e n the fact that there is a long lead t i m e b e t w e e n d e c i s i o n m a k i n g and m a n i f e s t a t i o n w h e n it c o m e s to new defense capabilities, it is obvious that ASEAN's acquisition of new capabilities is directed to security goals

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beyond t h e demands f o r t h e i m m e d i a t e c r i s i s over Kampuchea. Preparing f o r d e f e n s e is expensive. Faced with a changed s e c u r i t y e n v i r o n m e n t in t h e l a t e 1 9 7 0 s , the ASEAN s t a t e s i n d i c a t e d what t h e i r new s e c u r i t y p r i o r i t i e s w e r e i n t h e r e a l l o c a t i o n of s c a r c e s t a t e b u d g e t a r y resources. The p e r i o d 1 9 7 9 - 1 9 8 2 saw a s h a r p upward jump in d e f e n s e e x p e n d i t u r e s . ASEAN's r i s i n g d e f e n s e b u d g e t s were meant t o f i n a n c e i n c r e a s e s in m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l , i n f r a s t r u c t u r e development, a c q u i s i t i o n of modern w e a pons s y s t e m s , and t r a i n i n g . Historically i n ASEAN S o u t h e a s t A s i a , d e f e n s e p l a n n i n g , f o r c e s t r u c t u r e , and t a c t i c s h a v e been r e s p o n s e s t o t h r e a t s o r i g i n a t i n g f r o m internal insurgencies. ASEAN m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t s w e r e b u i l t a r o u n d c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y (COIN) w a r f a r e . The p o s t - 1 9 7 8 m i l i t a r i z a t i o n p r o g r a m s i n t h e ASEAN s t a t e s h a v e f o c u s e d on t h e c r e a t i o n o f a c o n v e n t i o n a l w a r f a r e capability, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e s t r e n g t h e n i n g of n a v a l and a i r a r m s , t h e p o o r r e l a t i o n s i n COIN. I f d e f e n s e p o l i c y i s t o be r a t i o n a l s o a s t o m a x i mize i n v e s t m e n t , t h e p r i o r i t i e s adopted have t o r e f l e c t an a p p r e c i a t i o n o f t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s o f p o t e n t i a l e n e mies. A l t h o u g h t h e p o t e n t i a l enemy may not be e x p l i c i t l y named, t h e i d e n t i t y i s i m p l i c i t in p l a n n i n g . It is o b v i o u s t h a t t h e new c o n v e n t i o n a l w a r f a r e c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h e ASEAN s t a t e s a r e n o t g e a r e d t o G r e a t P o w e r i n t e r v e n t i o n o r n u c l e a r t h r e a t s b u t t o a s t r a t e g i c and t a c t i c a l a s s e s s m e n t of t h r e a t i n which s e l f - d e f e n s e c a p a b i l i t i e s do p r o v i d e a m e a s u r e o f s e c u r i t y i n d e t e r r i n g or r e p e l l i n g a g g r e s s i v e f o r c e from a r e g i o n a l enemy. R e a l i s t i c a l l y - - i f not d ip lomat i c a l l y - - t h e t h r e a t s c o n t r o l l i n g ASEAN's m i l i t a r y p o l i c y seem t o be b a s e d on t h e p e r c e i v e d l i n k a g e between Vietnam's p o s s i b l e i n t e n t i o n s and i t s r e a l capabilities. THE MILITARY PROGRAMS OF THE ASEAN STATES Malaysia N o w h e r e i n t h e r e g i o n h a s t h e s h i f t f r o m COIN t o c o n v e n t i o n a l p r e p a r e d n e s s been more d r a m a t i c t h a n i n Malaysia. A c l o s e r look at t h e M a l a y s i a n m i l i t a r y r e s p o n s e t o t h e new s e c u r i t y e n v i r o n m e n t i s i n s t r u c t i v e f o r ASEAN as a g r o u p . The M a l a y s i a n Armed F o r c e s (MAF) h a v e been t u r n e d around a t g r e a t f i n a n c i a l c o s t t o f a c e a potential external threat. B e t w e e n 1 9 7 9 and 1 9 8 2 , t h e t o t a l d e f e n s e and s e c u r i t y b u d g e t i n c r e a s e d by n e a r l y 200 p e r c e n t . Despite l a t e r e f f o r t s at savings in s t r a i t e n e d economic c i r c u m s t a n c e s , in 1983 d e f e n s e s t i l l a t e 5.8 p e r c e n t of M a l a y s i a ' s Gross N a t i o n a l P r o d u c t (GNP) , m o r e t h a n any o t h e r ASEAN c o u n t r y . 5 The F o u r t h M a l a y s i a P l a n ( 198 1 - 1 9 8 5 ) had b u i l t i n t o i t a m i l i t a r y e x p a n s i o n p r o g r a m t h a t had as i t s g o a l t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f t h e m e a n s t o d e t e r o r r e p e l any a t t a c k by a r e g i o n a l

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aggressor. A s u s t a i n e d d e v e l o p m e n t a l e m p h a s i s was g i v e n t o n a t i o n a l d e f e n s e : "A s u b s t a n t i a l p r o g r a m m e f o r n a t i o n a l d e f e n c e w i l l be c a r r i e d o u t t o i n c r e a s e the c a p a b i l i t y and e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h e a r m e d f o r c e s t o m e e t 6 any e x t e r n a l c o n t i n g e n c y " ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . When i n 1 9 8 0 , t h e t h e n P r i m e M i n i s t e r H u s s e i n Onn a n n o u n c e d t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s i n t e n t i o n t o e m b a r k on a massive m i l i t a r i z a t i o n program, he s t r e s s e d t h a t Malays i a "was i n a p o l i t i c a l l y d i s t u r b e d r e g i o n and t h i s r e q u i r e s us t o s t r e n g t h e n o u r d e f e n c e s . " 7 More d i r e c t l y t o t h e p o i n t , t h e MAF c h i e f of s t a f f s t a t e d t h a t e x p a n s i o n of t h e a r m e d f o r c e s was n e c e s s a r y , " t o m e e t e x t e r n a l t h r e a t s p o s e d by d e v e l o p m e n t s i n I n d o c h i n a . " 8 The m i l i t a r y d e v e l o p m e n t p r o g r a m i s p l a c e d i n t h e c o n t e x t of "comprehensive d e f e n s e , " which means, " t o put i t b l u n t l y , " i n D e p u t y P r i m e M i n i s t e r Musa H i t a m ' s w o r d s , " I f y o u d a r e a t t a c k u s , we w i l l g i v e y o u a b l o o d y n o s e . T h e n we w i l l b l e e d y o u t o d e a t h . " 9 R e a l i s t i c a l l y , of c o u r s e , t h i s can only apply t o r e g i o n a l c o n v e n t i o n a l power. The 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 - m a n M a l a y s i a n Army h a s i n i t s t r a i n i n g a n d e x e r c i s e s m o v e d s u b s t a n t i a l l y a w a y f r o m COIN t o conventional warfare preparation.1" The d i r e c t i v e f r o m t h e top to the b r i g a d e commanders is "to p r e p a r e the a r m y i n t h e e v e n t of a p o w e r f u l e x t e r n a l a g g r e s s i o n . " 1 1 When t h e f u l l p l a n n e d f o r c e o f 1 2 0 , 0 0 0 i s r e a c h e d , t h e a r m y w i l l b e d o u b l e t h e s i z e of t h e 1979 e s t a b l i s h m e n t . The army i s s t i l l e s s e n t i a l l y a l i g h t i n f a n t r y f o r c e r e l y i n g on t h e M-16. It is d e f i c i e n t in artillery, a n t i t a n k w e a p o n s , and a i r d e f e n s e . I n 198 3 , a s p a r t o f t h e e f f o r t t o b u i l d up i t s c o n v e n t i o n a l w a r f a r e c a p a b i l i t i e s , t h e army c r e a t e d a c a v a l r y c o r p s and b e g a n t o a c c e p t t h e d e l i v e r y of t w e n t y - f i v e new B r i t i s h S t o r m e r ATPCs a l o n g w i t h t w e n t y - s i x new S c o r p i o n AC90 l i g h t tanks. The MAF's new m i s s i o n i s r e p r e s e n t e d i n t a c t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c p l a n n i n g and e x e r c i s e s i n w h i c h t h e " o p p o s i n g " f o r c e s e e m s t o h a v e t h e command s t r u c t u r e , d i s p o s i t i o n , a n d t a c t i c s of t h e V i e t n a m e s e . T h i s can be s e e n i n t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l w a r f a r e d e f e n s e e x e r c i s e s of t h e G o n z a l e s s e r i e s h e l d i n 1 9 8 0 , 1 9 8 1 , and 1 9 8 2 . The l o n g - t e r m c o m b a t d e v e l o p m e n t p r o g r a m f o r t h e M a l a y s i a n A i r F o r c e i s d e s i g n e d t o g i v e i t a new i m a g e and r o l e i n t h e c o u n t r y ' s d e f e n s e s t r a t e g y . Historicall y , t h e MAF h a s o p e r a t e d i n s u p p o r t of i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y and c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n t w a r f a r e . T h e new e m p h a s i s i s t o e n h a n c e t h e MAF's c o n v e n t i o n a l w a r f a r e c a p a b i l i t i e s . At t h e end of 1 9 8 2 , an i n t e r n a l d e b a t e on M a l a y s i a n d e f e n s e d o c t r i n e b e c a m e p u b l i c , and p r o t a g o n i s t s of t h e a i r f o r c e and n a v y c a l l e d f o r g r e a t e r r e s o u r c e s t o d e f e n d a c o u n t r y s p l i t i n t o t w o h a l v e s by w a t e r a s w e l l a s t o p r o t e c t the important m a r i t i m e r e s o u r c e s in Malaysia's e x c l u s i v e e c o n o m i c z o n e (EEZ, i . e . , a c o a s t a l a r e a b e yond t h e t w e l v e - m i l e t e r r i t o r i a l l i m i t o v e r which a s t a t e c l a i m s an e x c l u s i v e r i g h t t o u s e f o r e c o n o m i c purposes). Some a r g u e d t h a t t h e a i r f o r c e n e e d e d a m i n i m u m of 2 0 0 c o m b a t a i r c r a f t t o d o t h e j o b . 1 2 For t h e

205 t i m e b e i n g , h o w e v e r , it w i l l r e m a i n a s m a l l air f o r c e with a planned three squadron (fifty-nine aircraft) f i g h t e r / g r o u n d attack f o r c e ; o n e s q u a d r o n of F - 5 E / F Tigers armed with AIM-9P Supersidewinders and two with the forty A - 4 S k y h a w k s that are being r e c o n d i t i o n e d by the Grumman Corporation from the eighty-eight mothballed S k y h a w k s p u r c h a s e d by M a l a y s i a in 1982. At the end of 1983, t w o RF-5E armed r e c o n n a i s s a n c e aircraft w e r e delivered. Malaysia's s t i l l e x p a n d i n g navy h a s on order t w o G e r m a n - b u i l t c o r v e t t e s that w i l l be a r m e d w i t h Exocet missiles, four Italian minehunters, and additional offs h o r e p a t r o l boats and fast attack c r a f t . It a l r e a d y d e p l o y s eight E x o c e t - a r m e d g u i d e d m i s s i l e fast attack craft. Reflecting more extensive m a r i t i m e surveillance r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , a naval air w i n g is p l a n n e d . The u p g r a d i n g of the air base at L a b u a n in East M a l a y s i a , which in 1984 became Federal Territory, and the planned new base at Miri in Sarawak will provide facilities for an air umbrella over Malaysia's South China Sea claims. Realistically, in terms of Malaysia's m a r i t i m e interests and d e f e n s e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , the navy's c a p a b i l i t i e s must be addressed in terms of joint operation or coalition warfare with other friendly navies in the region. Budgetary constraints have forced a severe cutback and rephasing of some infrastructure projects and procurement programs. By m i d - 1 9 8 2 , r e v e n u e s h o r t f a l l s caused the government to review its development budgets. The major casualty was the Gong Kedak air base at Pasir Puteh, Kelantan that accounted for more than half of the air force's e x p a n s i o n budget in the Fourth M a l a y s i a Plan. Relative austerity--compared with the expansion budgets of 1979-1982--prevails today. Defense developm e n t in the 1985 budget is pegged at $ 1 8 3 m i l l i o n - - 2 3 p e r c e n t less than in 1984, w h i c h itself represented a cut of 15 percent from 1983. 13 The goals of military modernization and expansion r e m a i n intact d e s p i t e the s l o w d o w n in the p a c e of achievement. The p a u s e in the s w i f t e x p a n s i o n is p e r h a p s m a n a g e r i a l l y d e s i r a b l e in that it now a l l o w s for attention to consolidation and absorption. The slowdown also a l l o w s t i m e for a r e a s s e s s m e n t of s t r a t e g i c requirements. This seems implied in the emerging defense p o s i t i o n of the M a h a t h i r g o v e r n m e n t , w h i c h r e c o g n i z e s that M a l a y s i a can only ward off the first w a v e s of any external aggression after which it will have to depend on friends to come to its military assistance. 14 Malaysia's geostrategic problems were considerably c o m p l i c a t e d w h e n it m i l i t a r i l y o c c u p i e d the T e r e m b u Layang-Layang atoll in the South China Sea in the s u m m e r of 1983 (although the d e c i s i o n w a s a p p a r e n t l y taken in 1981). This brought Malaysia into bilateral territorial c o n f l i c t w i t h V i e t n a m in the S p r a t l y g r o u p of i s l a n d s , islets, and reefs. G e n e r a l Tan Sri Zain H a s h i m w a r n e d that Malaysia would use whatever force was necessary to repel an a t t e m p t to expel M a l a y s i a n f o r c e s from the

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i s l a n d . 1 5 The o c c u p a t i o n took p l a c e in t h e framework of E x e r c i s e P a h l a w a n , t h e f i r s t f u l l - s c a l e combined f o r c e s e x e r c i s e in M a l a y s i a ' s m a r i t i m e zone. The t w o - m o n t h e x e r c i s e was s e e n a s a d e m o n s t r a t i o n t h a t M a l a y s i a was s e r i o u s about defending i t s c l a i m s . Malaysia also c l a i m s Amboyna Key, s i x t y - f o u r k i l o m e t e r s n o r t h w e s t of Terumbu L a y a n g - L a y a n g , which h a s been o c c u p i e d by V i e t nam s i n c e 1978. M a l a y s i a ' s i n j e c t i o n of i t s power p r e s ence i n t o the d i s p u t e d South China Sea a r e a has g i v e n new s t r a t e g i c i m p o r t a n c e t o t h e i s l a n d of Labuan where the Malaysian m i l i t a r y presence i s being strengthened. Singapore On h i s f i r s t o f f i c i a l v i s i t t o S i n g a p o r e i n l a t e 1 9 8 1 , M a l a y s i a ' s P r i m e M i n i s t e r Mohamad M a h a t h i r r e m a r k e d t h a t he c o u l d not " s e e why S i n g a p o r e h a s t o b o l s t e r i t s d e f e n s e s except to complement the d e f e n s e c a p a b i l i t y and g r e a t e r r e s i l i e n c e of t h i s r e g i o n a g a i n s t any e x t e r n a l t h r e a t t o t h e s e c u r i t y of t h e a r e a . " 1 6 T h i s was r h e t o r i c a l l y i n t e r p r e t e d by S i n g a p o r e ' s Prime M i n i s t e r Lee Kuan Yew t o mean t h a t t h e S i n g a p o r e Armed F o r c e s (SAF) " s h o u l d be t h e r e t o a u g m e n t M a l a y s i a ' s a r m e d f o r c e s t o m e e t any t h r e a t of e x t e r n a l a g g r e s sion."17 T h i s i l l u s t r a t e s t h e p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g y behind t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e SAF: not o n l y i s t h e s t r a t e g y f o r t h e d e f e n s e of S i n g a p o r e , but i t i s a l s o t o p r o v e t o i t s n e i g h b o r s t h a t S i n g a p o r e w o u l d be a u s e f u l a l l y i n any c o l l e c t i v e e f f o r t t o m a i n t a i n r e g i o n a l p e a c e and security. S i n g a p o r e ' s d e f e n s e p o l i c y i s b a s e d on t h e p r e m i s e t h a t " i f you want p e a c e you s h o u l d p r e p a r e f o r w a r . C o u n t r i e s which h a v e , in t h e p a s t , not t a k e n t h e t r o u b l e t o p r e p a r e t h e m s e l v e s f o r d e f e n s e , h a v e been o v e r r u n by foreign countries."18 But how d o e s a s m a l l i s l a n d n a t i o n of 2.5 m i l l i o n , s e a - and a i r - l o c k e d in the embrace of l a r g e r n e i g h b o r s , d e f e n d i t s e l f ? The S i n g a p o r e s t r a t e g y h a s b e e n c a l l e d t h a t of t h e " p o i s o n s h r i m p " o r " p o r c u p i n e " — b o t h s m a l l but d a n g e r o u s a n i m a l s t o p r e d a tors. B r i g a d i e r G e n e r a l L e e H s i e n Loong ( s o n of t h e p r i m e m i n i s t e r and f a s t e s t r i s i n g s t a r in t h e S i n g a p o r e p o l i t i c a l c o n s t e l l a t i o n ) has noted t h a t a s m a l l s t a t e must f i g h t t o win. C o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s must be b u i l t up t h a t a r e " b e t t e r e q u i p p e d and b e t t e r o r g a n i s e d t h a n t h e i r o p p o n e n t s , which means e x p l o i t i n g t e c h n o l o g y and human t a l e n t t o t h e f u l l . " 1 9 S t a r t i n g from s c r a t c h a f t e r s e p a r a t i o n from Malays i a in 1965, S i n g a p o r e has b u i l t a s m a l l ( 5 5 , 5 0 0 ) c o n s c r i p t - b a s e d m i l i t a r y f o r c e that is probably the best e q u i p p e d and t r a i n e d i n t h e r e g i o n . The SAF i s m o r e than j u s t a "poison shrimp."20 At t h e h e a r t of t h e SAF i s i t s a i r f o r c e , p r o b a b l y the most advanced a i r f o r c e in the r e g i o n . The c o n c e n t r a t i o n of c a p i t a l r e s o u r c e s on a i r d e f e n s e m a x i m i z e s S i n g a p o r e ' s modern t e c h n o l o g i -

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c a l b a s e w i t h t h e a b i l i t y t o o p e r a t e and m a i n t a i n s o p h i s t i c a t e d weaponry. I t h a s an i n v e n t o r y of m o r e t h a n 160 combat a i r c r a f t w i t h , a t i t s c o r e , one s q u a d r o n of t w e n t y - f o u r F-5ES and two s q u a d r o n s of r e c o n d i t i o n e d A-4s. An a d d i t i o n a l s i x F-5Es a r e s c h e d u l e d f o r d e l i v ery. T h e r e a r e a l s o t w o s q u a d r o n s of o l d e r Hawker Hunters. A i r d e f e n s e i s b a s e d on f o u r SAM s q u a d r o n s armed with o l d B l o o d h o u n d s , R a p i e r , Swedish RBS-70, and, i t s newest a d d i t i o n , t h e improved Hawk m i s s i l e s y s t e m . As S i n g a p o r e c o n t i n u e s i t s p l a n n e d , c o n s t a n t m o d e r n i z a t i o n and u p g r a d i n g , t h e a i r d e f e n s e w i l l be augmented by t h e p u r c h a s e of f o u r Grummons E2C Hawkeyes with s o p h i s t i c a t e d a i r b o r n e r a d a r s u r v e i l l a n c e s y s t e m s at a c o s t of $450 m i l l i o n . The f i r s t i s t o be d e l i v e r e d i n 1987. In j u s t i f y i n g t h e d e a l , M i n i s t e r of D e f e n s e Goh Chok Tong s t a t e d t h a t "we m u s t c o n t i n u a l l y m a i n t a i n o u r a i r d e f e n s e c a p a b i l i t y t o e n s u r e S i n g a p o r e ' s s e c u r i t y in a world of c o n s t a n t t u r m o i l . " 2 1 In 1 9 8 4 , S i n g a p o r e c h o s e t h e F r e n c h company A e r o s p a t i a l e ' s Super Puma t r a n s p o r t h e l i c o p t e r o v e r S i k o r s k y ' s UH-60 and B r i t i s h W e s t l a n d ' s Sea King. The buy i s f o r t w e n t y - t w o with o p t i o n s f o r t w e l v e a d d i t i o n a l . At l e a s t s e v e n t e e n of t h e s e h e l i c o p t e r s w i l l be a s s e m b l e d by S a m a e r o i n S i n g a p o r e , a j o i n t v e n t u r e company of A e r o s p a t i a l e and S i n g a p o r e A e r o s p a c e M a i n t e n a n c e Comp a n y . The S u p e r Puma i s a w e a p o n s p l a t f o r m a s w e l l a s a transport. In t h e r e g i o n a l g e o s t r a t e g i c c o n t e x t we n o t e t h a t t h e a i r c r a f t c a n be o u t f i t t e d f o r a n t i s u b m a r i n e w a r f a r e as w e l l as e q u i p p e d with a n t i s h i p m i s s i l e s . The S i n g a p o r e N a v y ' s c o m b a t f o r c e c o n s i s t s of s i x L u e r s s o n m i s s i l e g u n b o a t s armed w i t h G a b r i e l I I S S M s . T h e s e , t o g e t h e r w i t h a v a r i e t y of p a t r o l c r a f t , a r e deemed s u f f i c i e n t f o r a m i s s i o n t h a t i s g e o s t r a t e g i c a l l y limited. The g o v e r n m e n t d e c i d e d not t o make a m a j o r i n v e s t m e n t in high c o s t naval s y s t e m s , p r e f e r r i n g t o b u i l d up t h e a i r f o r c e . The army i s a c o n s c r i p t f o r c e of 4 5 , 0 0 0 b a s e d on a twenty-four-month national service. This is the only n o n v o l u n t a r y f o r c e i n ASEAN. I t s c o m b a t s t r e n g t h c o n s i s t s of t h r e e i n f a n t r y b r i g a d e s and an armored b r i g a d e . The SA'F i s e q u i p p e d with 350 AMX-13 l i g h t t a n k s . It has been d e s c r i b e d as a " w e l l o r g a n i z e d , reasonably e q u i p p e d , and c o h e s i v e f o r c e c a p a b l e of home d e f e n c e and some power p r o j e c t i o n abroad in a c o a l i t i o n c o n t e x t . " 2 2 S i n c e 1 9 8 3 , SAF h a s o c c u p i e d a p e r m a n e n t camp c o m p l e x f o r i t s j u n g l e t r a i n i n g in B r u n e i ' s Temburong d i s t r i c t , n o r t h of B r u n e i B a y . T h e r e i t h a s a t r a i n i n g p a r t y of one h u n d r e d r e g u l a r s . National servicemen rotate through on a s i x - m o n t h b a s i s . In 1983, a S i n g a p o r e i n f a n t r y company p a r t i c i p a t e d in j o i n t e x e r c i s e s with t h e B r u n e i - b a s e d B r i t i s h Ghurka r e g i m e n t a t Tutong i n w e s t ern B r u n e i . The army a l s o j o i n t l y e x e r c i s e s a t company s t r e n g t h with t h e A u s t r a l i a n Army in A u s t r a l i a . Ties to t h e F i v e Power D e f e n s e Arrangement a r e s y m b o l i z e d by t h e c o n t i n u e d p r e s e n c e of New Zealand f o r c e s i n S i n g a p o r e .

208 Brunei When t h e U.S. C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f , P a c i f i c (CINCPAC) A d m i r a l W i l l i a m C r o w e made t h e f i r s t o f f i c i a l CINCPAC v i s i t t o ASEAN's newest member s t a t e in O c t o b e r 1984, he remarked t h a t he was " e x t r e m e l y encouraged by t h e Royal Brunei Armed F o r c e s ' r a p i d d e v e l o p m e n t " and b e l i e v e d i t was c a p a b l e o f p r o t e c t i n g t h e c o u n t r y ' s s o v e r e i g n t y . 2 3 Given a p o p u l a t i o n of j u s t o v e r 200,000 and t h e e x p e n d i t u r e s on d e f e n s e , Brunei may be t h e " g a r r i s o n s t a t e " of the region. In 1984, d e f e n s e was a l l o c a t e d more than 12 p e r c e n t of t h e B r u n e i b u d g e t . I n t h e run up f r o m 1978 t o i n d e p e n d e n c e on 1 J a n u a r y 1984, s u b s t a n t i a l l y m o r e t h a n U.S.$1 b i l l i o n was s p e n t on weapons a c q u i s i t i o n s f o r t h e 4,000-man f o r c e . These include t h r e e Exocetarmed f a s t a t t a c k c r a f t , s i x Bolkow 105 h e l i c o p t e r guns h i p s , s i x t e e n S c o r p i o n l i g h t t a n k s , and a R a p i e r a i r d e f e n s e b a t t e r y . 24 The R o y a l B r u n e i A i r F o r c e (RBAF) e s s e n t i a l l y has two m i s s i o n s . The f i r s t i s i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y i n a r a p i d l y changing p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l e n v i r o n m e n t h i s t o r i c a l l y d o m i n a t e d by t h e r e b e l l i o n o f 1962. The s e c o n d i s p r o t e c t i o n o f B r u n e i ' s s o u r c e s o f w e a l t h , t h e o n - and offshore oil fields. In t h i s r e s p e c t Bruneian m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s are linked t o the i n d e f i n i t e l y continuing p r e s e n c e of t h e B r i t i s h Ghurka b a t t a l i o n based at S e r i a . We have a l r e a d y noted t h e S i n g a p o r e a n m i l i t a r y p r e s e n c e in Temburong. When t h e B r u n e i 3rd i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n i s f o r m e d , i t i s e x p e c t e d t h a t i t w i l l be b a s e d i n Temburong. Brunei's e x t e r n a l environment is strategically dominated by M a l a y s i a . M a l a y s i a ' s new l e g a l r e g i m e f o r Labuan and t h e m i l i t a r y b u i l d u p t h e r e make common s e c u r i t y u n d e r s t a n d i n g s b e t w e e n M a l a y s i a and Brunei p r e s s i n g with respect to t h e i r b i l a t e r a l overlapping maritime j u r i s d i c t i o n s and t h e w i d e r p r o b l e m o f V i e t n a m e s e and PRC c l a i m s i n t h e South China Sea ASEAN EEZs. Naval c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h S i n g a p o r e began b e f o r e independence and i n c l u d e s annual j o i n t e x e r c i s e s c a l l e d P e l i c a n . Indonesia I n d o n e s i a ' s Second S t r a t e g i c Development Plan (1979-1983) p r o v i d e d t h e f r a m e w o r k f o r a m a j o r e f f o r t at r e b u i l d i n g and r e o r i e n t i n g t h e I n d o n e s i a n Armed F o r c e s (Angkatan B e r s e n j a t a R e p u b l i k Indones i a, o r ABRI). From a t e r r i t o r i a l l y based i n t e r n a l w a r f a r e f o r c e , ABRI was t o be g i v e n t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s t o meet conventional t h r e a t s along i t s b o r d e r s as w e l l as assume t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of s u r v e i l l a n c e o v e r I n d o n e s i a ' s e x t e n s i v e a r c h i p e l a g i c m a r i t i m e j u r i s d i c t i o n s and EEZ. 25 Although not abandoning i t s t e r r i t o r i a l w a r f a r e d o c t r i n e , Indon e s i a ' s m i l i t a r y program s i n c e 1979 r e f l e c t s a g e o s t r a t e g i c a p p r e c i a t i o n t h a t t h e b o r d e r s of t h e n a t i o n a r e i n i t s m a r i t i m e z o n e s , and h e n c e , ABRI must be p r e p a r e d t o

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m e e t t h e enemy a t t h a t b o r d e r . The m a g n i t u d e of I n d o n e s i a ' s m a r i t i m e d e f e n s e and s u r v e i l l a n c e t a s k s cannot be o v e r e s t i m a t e d . Within i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n s a r e some 2.5 m i l l i o n s q u a r e m i l e s . ABRI's commander, G e n e r a l Mohamad Andi J u s u f , took o v e r i n 1978 a m i l i t a r y f o r c e t h a t was i l l - t r a i n e d , i l l e q u i p p e d , and u n d e r - s t r e n g t h f o r t h e c h a n g i n g r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y needs ( a l l w e a k n e s s e s t h a t had been demons t r a t e d by t h e E a s t T i m o r c a m p a i g n t o s u p p r e s s t h e s e c e s s i o n i s t r e v o l t by E a s t Timor r e s i d e n t s ) . To b u i l d up n a t i o n a l r e s i l i e n c e i n ASEAN's s o u t h e r n f l a n k r e q u i r e d a s u b s t a n t i a l i n v e s t m e n t of new r e s o u r c e s . The d e f e n s e and s e c u r i t y d e v e l o p m e n t budget ( a s opposed t o t h e r o u t i n e o r o p e r a t i o n a l b u d g e t ) j u m p e d 500 p e r c e n t b e t w e e n 1978 and 1 9 8 3 . T h i s was made p o s s i b l e by t h e f l o w of w e a l t h from I n d o n e s i a ' s p e t r o l e u m e x p o r t s . Although I n d o n e s i a ' s d e f e n s e e x p e n d i t u r e s were i n a b s o l u t e t e r m s t h e l a r g e s t i n ASEAN, t h e y s t i l l r e m a i n e d o n l y a b o u t 7 p e r c e n t of t h e t o t a l d e v e l o p m e n t b u d g e t . 2 6 If G e n e r a l J u s u f ' s 1 9 7 8 - 1 9 8 2 p e r i o d was c h a r a c t e r i z e d by m i l i t a r y e x p a n s i o n f u e l e d by o i l r e v e n u e s , h i s 1983 s u c c e s s o r G e n e r a l Benny Moerdani's program f o r ABRI i s one of c o n s o l i d a t i o n and r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n i n a b u d g e t a r y framework of a u s t e r i t y (a r e s p o n s e t o t h e s h a r p drop i n Indonesian o i l revenues). ABRI's c u r r e n t f o r c e l e v e l i s about 280,000 men of whom 2 1 0 , 0 0 0 a r e i n t h e a r m y . It is claimed that the army was expanded t o one hundred combat b a t t a l i o n s under J u s u f , many of which were not up t o a u t h o r i z e d s t r e n g t h . G e n e r a l Moerda ni h a s a d m i t t e d t h a t " f r o m t h e v e r y b e g i n n i n g we h a v e c o u n t e d t h a t of t h e 100 b a t t a l i o n s o n l y a b o u t 20 b a t t a l i o n s a r e r e a l l y t h e c o m b a t t r o o p s . " 2 7 The a r m y ' s c o n v e n t i o n a l w a r f a r e c a p a b i l i t i e s a r e c e n t e r e d on i t s Army S t r a t e g i c Command (Komando S t r a t e g i c Angkatan D a r a t , o r KOSTRAD) under t h e d i r e c t c o n t r o l of t h e ABRI commander. KOSTRAD i s made up of t h r e e i n f a n t r y b r i g a d e s ( n i n e b a t t a l i o n s ) , an armored b r i g a d e ( t e n b a t t a l i o n s ) , and an a r t i l l e r y r e g i m e n t ( t h r e e b a t t a l ions). Two of t h e i n f a n t r y b r i g a d e s a r e a i r b o r n e . With e x i s t i n g l i f t c a p a c i t y and t h e r e d e p l o y m e n t of e l e m e n t s of KOSTRAD f r o m J a v a t o Ujung P a n j a n g i n S u l a w e s i , t h e army can be q u i c k l y d e p l o y e d anywhere i n I n d o n e s i a . It i s f r o m KOSTRAD t h a t any f o r w a r d s t r a t e g i c p r o j e c t i o n w o u l d be p o s s i b l e . There i s a s e p a r a t e s p e c i a l f o r c e s e l i t e command of 4 , 0 0 0 p a r a c o m m a n d o s a l s o u n d e r t h e d i r e c t c o n t r o l of t h e ABRI commander. The KOSTRAD u n i t s a r e t h e f i r s t r e c i p i e n t s of u p g r a d e d w e a p o n s . The KOSTRAD armored b a t t a l i o n s h a v e adopted t h e AMX-13 l i g h t tank as t h e i r b a t t l e a r m o r ; t h e r e a r e about one hundred i n t h e i n v e n t o r y w i t h a n o t h e r o n e h u n d r e d on o r d e r . A heavy v e h i c l e r e p a i r c e n t e r i n Bandung k e e p s a mixed i n v e n t o r y on S a l a d i n s , S a r a c e n s , and F e r r e t s o p e r a t i o n a l . O u t s i d e of KOSTRAD, d u r i n g 1984 and 1985, t h e t e r r i t o r i a l command s t r u c t u r e of ABRI h a s been r e o r g a n i z e d t o s i m p l i f y and s h o r t e n t h e l i n e s of command. The f o u r T h e a t e r Commands (KOWILHAN) i n t o w h i c h I n d o n e s i a was

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divided are being abolished. Under them t h e s e v e n t e e n Area Commands (KODAM) a r e b e i n g reduced t o e i g h t and t h e J a k a r t a command. P a r a l l e l t e r r i t o r i a l command s t r u c t u r e s by t h e o t h e r s e r v i c e s a r e b e i n g e l m i n a t e d . The e i g h t N a v a l A r e a Commands (KODAL) a r e b e i n g c h a n g e d t o E a s t e r n and W e s t e r n F l e e t b a s e s a t S u r a b a y a a n d , when c o n s t r u c t e d , t h e new b a s e a t T e l u k R a t a i i n W e s t Sumatra. The b a s e o r i g i n a l l y e s t i m a t e d t o c o s t U . S . $ 5 b i l l i o n i s an e l e m e n t of I n d o n e s i a ' s new s t r a t e g i c o r i e n t a t i o n s t o t h e S o u t h C h i n a S e a and s t r a i t s a p p r o a c h e s t o the archipelago. Although modest i n s i z e , t h e I n d o n e s i a n Navy (ALRI) i s becoming a t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y advanced f o r c e and a l r e a d y p o s s e s s e s some i n t e r d i c t i o n c a p a b i l i t y . At t h e h e a r t of t h e new navy a r e t h r e e Dutch b u i l t 1 , 5 0 0 - t o n c o r v e t t e s armed with f o u r E x o c e t MM-38 SSMs. P l a n s f o r two more have been d e l a y e d b e c a u s e of budgetary shortfalls. There are four K o r e a n - b u i l t Exocet-armed f a s t a t t a c k craft. Two G e r m a n - b u i l t t y p e 209 s u b m a r i n e s ( w i t h a t h i r d on o r d e r ) a l s o h a v e a s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e r o l e and g i v e a n t i s u b m a r i n e w a r f a r e (ASW) t r a i n i n g . Four e x - U . S . J o n e s c l a s s f r i g a t e s and two e x - S o v i e t R i g a c l a s s f r i g a t e s a r e s t i l l in s e r v i c e along with numerous o t h e r attack, patrol, and a u x i l i a r y v e s s e l s . Indonesia's l a t e s t m a j o r n a v a l a c q u i s i t i o n i s t h e p u r c h a s e of t h r e e e x - R o y a l Navy T r i b a l c l a s s f r i g a t e s , t h r e e o f s e v e n b u i l t between 1962 and 1964 and d e s i g n e d o r i g i n a l l y f o r s e r v i c e i n t h e P e r s i a n Gulf and Red S e a . The p o s t - 1 9 6 5 I n d o n e s i a n A i r F o r c e (Angkatan Udora R e p u b l i k I n d o n e s i a , o r AURI) i n h e r i t e d n o t o n l y t h e t a i n t o f c o m p l i c i t y i n l e f t i s t a d v e n t u r i s m but an i n v e n t o r y of o b s o l e s c e n t and u n s e r v i c e a b l e R u s s i a n a i r c r a f t . The r e b u i l d i n g o f AURI h a s f o c u s e d on c r e a t i n g a r e a c t i o n f o r c e c a p a b l e of s u p p o r t i n g ground and n a v a l o p e r a tions. A c c o r d i n g t o G e n e r a l Moerdani i t i s overmanned and i s a m a j o r t a r g e t f o r r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . The ABRI commander has u n f a v o r a b l y compared AURI's 2 7 , 0 0 0 men and 1 0 0 a i r c r a f t t o S i n g a p o r e ' s 7 , 0 0 0 men and 1 5 0 - 1 6 0 a i r craft.28 T h e r e i s a combat f o r c e c o n s i s t i n g of a s q u a d ron of F - 5 E s , two s q u a d r o n s of e x - I s r a e l i A-4 Skyhawks, and a COIN squadron of OV-IOF B r o n c o s . The a c q u i s i t i o n o f t h r e e Boeing 737s f i t t e d with s i d e - l o o k i n g r a d a r t h a t g i v e 1 0 0 - m i l e c o v e r a g e from each s i d e of t h e a i r c r a f t w i l l a l l o w t h e f u l l w i d t h o f I n d o n e s i a ' s EEZ t o b e m o n i t o r e d on a m i s s i o n r a n g e of 3 , 0 0 0 m i l e s . A v e r y i m p o r t a n t component of AURI i s i t s t r a n s p o r t fleet. Given t h e g e o s t r a t e g i c r e q u i r e m e n t s , l i f t is v i t a l to Indonesia's security. Twenty-one C-130 Herc u l e s a r e a t t h e c o r e of t h e t r a n s p o r t s q u a d r o n s , which a l s o f l y an a s s o r t m e n t of l i g h t e r t r a n s p o r t s i n c l u d i n g t h e I n d o n e s i a n - a s s e m b l e d CN-212 and e v e n t u a l l y t h e m i l i t a r y v e r s i o n o f I n d o n e s i a ' s CN-235. The p l a n e s a r e t h e p r o d u c t s o f t h e a e r o s p a c e company PT N u r t a n i o , t h e c e n t e r p i e c e of I n d o n e s i a ' s n a s c e n t d e f e n s e i n d u s t r i a l complex. I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e f i x e d - w i n g a i r c r a f t , PT N u r t a n i o " p r o d u c e s " [ a s s e m b l e s ] a v a r i e t y of r o t a r y wing

211 a i r c r a f t i n c l u d i n g t h e German BO-105 g u n s h i p , t h e French S u p e r Puma, and t h e B e l l 4 1 2 . In 1 9 8 6 , i t w i l l b e g i n t o assemble the BK-117. N u r t a n i o ' s d i r e c t o r of t e c h n o l o g y has i n d i c a t e d t h a t a f i x e d - w i n g combat a i r c r a f t is planned f o r the f u t u r e . 2 9 G e n e r a l Moerdani has shown g r e a t c o n c e r n f o r I n d o nesia's a i r defense c a p a b i l i t i e s . AURI a c c e p t e d d e l i v e r y o f t h e f i r s t two F r e n c h Thomson r a d a r u n i t s i n September 1983. T h e s e w i l l be u s e d t o c o n t r o l F-5 intercepts. In a d d i t i o n t o i t s combat a i r c r a f t I n d o n e s i a has deployed s i n c e 1982 t h e Swedish B o f o r s RBS-70 G i r a f f e SAMs. G e n e r a l M o e r d a n i was v e r y i m p r e s s e d by V i e t n a m ' s a i r d e f e n s e s y s t e m when h e v i s i t e d t h e r e i n February 1984. I t may have been c o i n c i d e n t a l , but w i t h i n days a f t e r h i s r e t u r n , he t o l d t h e I n d o n e s i a n P a r l i a m e n t t h a t an a d v a n c e d SAM s y s t e m was n e c e s s a r y f o r Indonesia.30 A f t e r l o o k i n g a t a number o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n c l u d i n g t h e U.S. V u l c a n and C h a p p a r a l , Indonesia p l a c e d in December a £100 m i l l i o n o r d e r with B r i t i s h Aero S p a c e f o r t h e R a p i e r s y s t e m , one of t h e l a r g e s t r e c e n t d e f e n s e o r d e r s p l a c e d by I n d o n e s i a . The t e s t i n g o f A B R I ' s n e w l y a c q u i r e d c o n v e n t i o n a l w a r f a r e c a p a b i l i t i e s h a s f o c u s e d on t h e n o r t h e r n a p proaches to Indonesia. I n d o n e s i a ' s 21 March 1980 d e c l a r a t i o n of i t s EEZ was i m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w e d by t h e l a r g e s t c o m b i n e d f o r c e s e x e r c i s e e v e r h e l d by I n d o n e s i a , which deployed t h i r t y - f i v e b a t t a l i o n s o v e r 1 5 , 0 0 0 s q u a r e m i l e s of West I n d o n e s i a w i t h t h e " f r o n t " e s t a b l i s h e d n o r t h of t h e Natunas i s l a n d group. Special attention h a s b e e n g i v e n t o t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a f o r w a r d b a s e on Natuna B e s a r from which I n d o n e s i a can p r o j e c t power i n t o t h e South China Sea. I n 1 9 8 1 , a new runway was o p e n e d a t R a n a i A i r F o r c e B a s e t h a t c a n t a k e any a i r c r a f t i n AURI's i n v e n t o r y . I t i s known t h a t o t h e r ASEAN a i r f o r c e s have o p e r a t e d through R a n a i . The s p e c i a l m a r i n e u n i t formed in 1982 d e d i c a t e d t o t h e p r o t e c t i o n from s e i z u r e of o f f s h o r e p l a t f o r m s can o p e r a t e from t h e r e . R e g u l a r n a v a l d e p l o y m e n t s a r e now made i n t o t h e S o u t h China S e a zone as w e l l as combat a i r p a t r o l s . The

Philippines

Of t h e m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t s of t h e ASEAN s t a t e s , t h e Armed F o r c e s o f t h e P h i l i p p i n e s (AFP) h a s p r o b a b l y b e e n t h e l e a s t a f f e c t e d by p e r c e p t i o n s o f new e x t e r n a l threats. T h i s does not mean t h a t m i l i t a r y e x p a n s i o n and m o d e r n i z a t i o n t o some d e g r e e h a v e n o t o c c u r r e d . Such c h a n g e s have been s t i m u l a t e d , h o w e v e r , by i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y developments; e x t e r n a l s e c u r i t y is l a r g e l y conc e i v e d o f as c o m i n g u n d e r t h e U.S. s e c u r i t y u m b r e l l a . The U n i t e d S t a t e s and t h e P h i l i p p i n e s h a v e a j o i n t d e f e n s e p l a n f o r t h e P h i l i p p i n e s i n c a s e of an e x t e r n a l a t t a c k worked out t h r o u g h t h e P h i l i p p i n e - U . S . Mutual D e f e n s e Board (MDB). The P h i l i p p i n e a l l i a n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i s u n i q u e i n ASEAN and w i t h

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t h e U.S. b a s e f a c i l i t i e s i s s e e n as c r u c i a l t o U.S. e f f o r t s t o c o u n t e r b a l a n c e g r o w i n g S o v i e t m i l i t a r y power in the region. The AFP was t h e bulwark of t h e m a r t i a l law a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and r e m a i n s t h e e f f e c t i v e g u a r a n t o r o f r e g i m e stability.31 I t s s i z e has b a l l o o n e d f r o m l e s s t h a n 6 0 , 0 0 0 i n 1971 t o 150,000 t o d a y . The d e f e n s e b u d g e t l e a p t f r o m $82 m i l l i o n i n 1972 t o $1 b i l l i o n i n 1980 t o m o r e t h a n $2 b i l l i o n i n 1984. The AFP'S e x p a n s i o n i n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e was l a r g e l y c a u s e d by t h e m i l i t a r y r e q u i r e m e n t s o f t h e Moro i n s u r g e n c y i n t h e s o u t h . The r a p i d l y e x p a n d e d i n t a k e , t r a i n i n g , and d e p l o y m e n t o f o f f i c e r s and men t o t h e b i t t e r war i n t h e s o u t h had a c o r r o s i v e e f f e c t on t r a d i t i o n a l m i l i t a r y v a l u e s , and a b r e a k d o w n i n c i v i l - m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s p e r s i s t s and i n f a c t was e x a c e r b a t e d u n d e r t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f m a r t i a l law. Now i t i s t h e g r o w i n g p o t e n t i a l o f t h e New P e o p l e ' s Army ( NPA) t h a t t e s t s t h e AFP's i n t e r n a l s e c u rity role. The NPA has t a k e n t h e i n i t i a t i v e a c r o s s t h e l e n g t h and b r e a d t h of t h e a r c h i p e l a g o , not i n f r e q u e n t l y c o n f r o n t i n g t h e AFP i n b a t t a l i o n s t r e n g t h . 3 2 The AFP r e m a i n s g e a r e d e s s e n t i a l l y t o COIN o p e r a t i o n s . The c h a l l e n g e , h o w e v e r , i s as much p o l i t i c a l and economic as i t is m i l i t a r y . The P h i l i p p i n e s i s an a r c h i p e l a g i c s t a t e w i t h a l a r g e m a r i t i m e zone. The navy i s e s s e n t i a l l y a c o a s t g u a r d , and t h e a i r f o r c e has a b a s i c g r o u n d s u p p o r t mission. I t i s U.S. f o r c e s i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s t h a t f a c e any p o s s i b l e s t r a t e g i c c h a l l e n g e — w i t h o n e m a j o r and important exception. The U n i t e d S t a t e s i s not c o m m i t t e d t o the d e f e n s e of claimed P h i l i p p i n e s o v e r e i g n t y in the S p r a t l y s i n t h e mid-South China Sea where t h e g e o p o l i t i c s of p e t r o l e u m i s at p l a y . There the P h i l i p p i n e s militarily confronts Vietnam. The P h i l i p p i n e s has sought t o u p g r a d e i t s c a p a b i l i t i e s t o d e f e n d i t s g a r r i s o n s i n t h e S p r a t l y s and has s t r e n g t h e n e d i t s s u p p o r t base on Palawan. C o n t i n u i n g b u d g e t a r y c o n s t r a i n t s have p r e v e n t e d t h e A F P , i n t h e w o r d s o f t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e U.S. s e c u r i t y a s s i s t a n c e program t o the P h i l i p p i n e s , "from s u s t a i n i n g and m o d e r n i z i n g f o r c e s and e q u i p m e n t . " 3 3 T h e s e b u d g e t a r y p r o b l e m s h a v e b e e n e x a c e r b a t e d by t h e i n c r e a s i n g r e l u c t a n c e of t h e U.S. Congress t o a s s e n t t o the requested m i l i t a r y assistance appropriation f o r the Philippines. C o n g r e s s has p r e f e r r e d t o c h a n g e t h e m i x of t h e a i d p a c k a g e p r o m i s e d t h e P h i l i p p i n e s i n t h e c o n t e x t o f U.S. b a s e r i g h t s . Thailand S u s t a i n i n g and m o d e r n i z i n g f o r c e s and e q u i p m e n t h a v e not been t h e p r o b l e m f o r T h a i l a n d . Thailand's f r o n t l i n e s t a t u s has j u s t i f i e d l a r g e c l a i m s on i t s b u d g e t a r y r e s o u r c e s by t h e m i l i t a r y . The R o y a l T h a i Armed F o r c e s d e f e n s e m i s s i o n h a s b e e n r e o r i e n t e d f r o m

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t h e i n t e r n a l w a r a g a i n s t t h e armed g u e r r i l l a s o f t h e Communist p a r t y of T h a i l a n d t o a more i m m e d i a t e t h r e a t posed by t h e l a r g e , h o s t i l e V i e t n a m e s e armed p r e s e n c e i n t h e Th a i - K a m p u c h e a n b o r d e r a r e a and t h e l o n g e r r a n g e s e c u r i t y c o n c e r n s p o s e d by u n c e r t a i n t y i n e s t i m a t i n g Vietnam's f u r t h e r ambitions. Given t h a t T h a i l a n d has h i s t o r i c a l l y c o n s i d e r e d t h e t r a n s - M e k o n g a r e a of c r u c i a l s t r a t e g i c i m p o r t a n c e , T h a i s e c u r i t y i s s e e n as menaced by t h e p r o j e c t i o n o f V i e t n a m e s e power t h e r e e s p e c i a l l y when t h a t p o w e r i s s u p p o r t e d by an e x t e r n a l a c t o r t h a t i s p e r c e i v e d as a p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t — t h e USSR. 3 4 The T h a i - U . S . c o n n e c t i o n has been a m a j o r f a c t o r i n In both t h e C a r t e r enhancing Thai m i l i t a r y r e a d i n e s s . and Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a s p u b l i c l y r e i t e r a t e d t h e U.S. commitment t o T h a i l a n d u n d e r t h e Manila T r e a t y with p l e d g e s of support in t h e event of e x t e r n a l a g g r e s s i o n . As a d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f U.S. s u p p o r t , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a c c e l e r a t e d d e l i v e r y of m i l i t a r y h a r d w a r e i n t h e p i p e l i n e and s u b s t a n t i a l l y upped i t s l e v e l of m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e . P r e s i d e n t Ronald Reagan h a s e x p r e s s e d h i s " f u l l s u p p o r t " t o P r i m e M i n i s t e r Prem T i n s u l a - N o n d f o r t h e m o d e r n i z a t i o n o f T h a i land's defense.35 S i n c e 1982, t h e United S t a t e s has a l s o engaged in e x t e n s i v e annual j o i n t combined Cobra Gold m i l i t a r y e x e r c i s e s w i t h T h a i l a n d . In t h e framework of t h e c o n c e p t of t o t a l d e f e n s e , Former T h a i Supreme Commander Saiyud Kerdphol h a s s t a t e d that the present m i l i t a r y preparations are s u f f i c i e n t to m e e t t h e e x t e r n a l t h r e a t by i t s e l f . 3 6 In t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l war p l a n n i n g , t h e r e e q u i p p i n g and r e s t r u c t u r i n g o f t h e armed f o r c e s and t h e r e s e r v e s a r e d i r e c t e d t o i n c r e a s i n g Thai c a p a b i l i t y to block a Vietnamese land t h r u s t f r o m C a m b o d i a and t h r o u g h t h e L a o t i a n t a i l . 3 7 The t h r e a t would be a g g r a v a t e d i n t h e e v e n t t h e i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n d e t e r i o r a t e d and t h e e x t e r n a l enemy was a b l e t o l i n k up w i t h i n t e r n a l f o r c e s . Much o f t h e g r o w i n g T h a i army p o l i t i c a l / m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e s e e m s designed t o j u s t i f y t h e army's p r e e m i n e n t p o s i t i o n i n the p o l i t i c a l system. National defense s t i l l claims n e a r l y 20 p e r c e n t o f t h e b u d g e t , a f i g u r e t h a t h a s b e e n f a i r l y c o n s t a n t s i n c e 1 9 7 9 . Although i n some p a r l i a m e n t a r y c i r c l e s t h e r e may b e c r i t i c i s m s o f t h e d r a i n on s c a r c e r e s o u r c e s by m i l i t a r y s p e n d i n g , t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l dominance o f t h e m i l i t a r y b u t t r e s s e d by t h e f a c t of t h e b l e e d i n g b o r d e r has a l l o w e d t h e government t o r e s i s t t h e kind of s h a r p d e f e n s e c u t b a c k s f e l t e l s e w h e r e in t h e region. The f o r c e improvement program o f t h e 1 6 0 , 0 0 0 - s t r o n g R o y a l T h a i Army (RTA) h a s c o n c e n t r a t e d on c r e a t i n g a more c r e d i b l e d e t e r r e n t t o c o n v e n t i o n a l t h r e a t s from Soviet-supported Vietnam.38 This has meant u p g r a d i n g i t s armor t o i n c l u d e e v e n t u a l l y 200 M-48 medium b a t t l e t a n k s as w e l l as i t s a n t i t a n k r o c k e t and m i s s i l e i n v e n tory. The RTA r e c e i v e s t h e l i o n ' s s h a r e o f t h e d e f e n s e funds — i n 1984 more t h a n h a l f . A c t u a l l y , in t e r m s of t h e wider s e c u r i t y environment t h e continued c o n c e n t r a -

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t i o n o f r e s o u r c e s on t h e a r m y may r e f l e c t traditional p a t t e r n s of i n t r a m i l i t a r y i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s more than s t r a t e g i c orientation. The navy h a s a c q u i r e d m i s s i l e c a p a b i l i t y . I t has in commission t h r e e f a s t a t t a c k c r a f t each equipped with f o u r E x o c e t SSM a s w e l l a s t h r e e w i t h G a b r i e l SSM. Four a d d i t i o n a l Exocet-armed a t t a c k c r a f t are under c o n s t r u c t i o n in I t a l i a n yards. Larger ships include six older frigates. A new f r i g a t e and t w o c o r v e t t e s a r e on o r d e r . A l t h o u g h T h a i l a n d h a s an I n d i a n O c e a n c o a s t , t h e f l e e t o p e r a t e s b a s i c a l l y in t h e Gulf of T h a i l a n d . One o f t h e navy's m a j o r d e f i c i e n c i e s has been t h e absence of s o p h i s t i c a t e d airborne radar systems for surveillance. I n t e l l i g e n c e - s h a r i n g a r r a n g e m e n t s may h a v e m a d e t h e radar unnecessary. I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t at l e a s t two s u b m a r i n e s may b e a d d e d t o t h e f l e e t a l t h o u g h no o r d e r h a s b e e n made. The m i s s i o n of t h e T h a i A i r F o r c e h a s been e s s e n t i a l l y COIN. T h e r e a r e two a i r d e f e n s e s q u a d r o n s f l y i n g F - 5 E s and an a t t a c k s q u a d r o n o f F - 5 A s . T h a i l a n d ' s new c o n c e r n s about a i r d e f e n s e has thrown i n t o sharp r e l i e f t h e g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e of a c c e s s t o U.S. h i g h - t e c h n o l o g y w e a p o n s s y s t e m s and e l e c t r o n i c s . There is sometimes, h o w e v e r , a q u e s t i o n of a b s o r p t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s . The h a s t y d e l i v e r y by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f t h e R e d e y e SAM t o T h a i l a n d — t h e f i r s t t o A s i a — i s an e x a m p l e . The weapon a p p a r e n t l y h a s n o t b e e n i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e RTA's a i r defense. In m i d - 1 9 8 4 , t h e U.S. D e p a r t m e n t of D e f e n s e informed Congress t h a t i t planned t o s e l l $207 m i l l i o n o f u p g r a d e d command, c o n t r o l , and c o m m u n i c a t i o n e q u i p m e n t t o T h a i l a n d t o " s t r e n g t h e n T h a i a i r d e f e n s e s and t h e r e b y r e d u c e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of armed aggression against Thailand." 39 This s h o u l d p r o b a b l y be p l a c e d i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e p r o p o s e d F - 1 6 p u r c h a s e and t h e d e s i r e t o c r e a t e a modern t a c t i c a l a i r d e f e n s e f o r c e . ASEAN and t h e F - 1 6 I s s u e The most c r i t i c a l c u r r e n t d e f e n s e q u e s t i o n f o r T h a i l a n d has been t h e i s s u e of t h e p u r c h a s e of two s q u a d r o n s o f F-16As. I t h a s b e e n T h a i l a n d ' s i n s i s t e n c e s i n c e 1 9 8 3 on a c q u i r i n g t h e F-16A t h a t has posed t h e i s s u e of the e x p o r t o f F - 1 6 A s t o ASEAN and i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e r e g i o n a l b a l a n c e of power. C u r r e n t l y , t h e most advanced c o m b a t a i r c r a f t i n ASEAN a i r f o r c e i n v e n t o r i e s i s t h e F 5E ( T h a i l a n d , 3 4 ; S i n g a p o r e , 2 4 ; M a l a y s i a , 1 3 ; I n d o n e s i a , 11).1+0 T h e s e 82 p l a n e s t h r o u g h f o u r n a t i o n s b a l a n c e t h e 180 MIG-21s t h a t a r e t h e c o m b a t b a c k b o n e o f Vietnam's air force. T h a i l a n d has argued t h e need t o d e v e l o p an o f f e n s i v e c o u n t e r s t r i k e a i r c a p a b i l i t y that can o p e r a t e in t h e e x p e c t e d MIG-23 e n v i r o n m e n t . The a c q u i s i t i o n o f a m o r e a d v a n c e d p l a n e now w i l l e n a b l e t h e Thai Air F o r c e t o keep a b r e a s t of modern weapons t e c h n o l o g y and m a i n t e n a n c e and p r e v e n t a n y l a g f r o m developing. for

A l t h o u g h w i l l i n g t o p r o v i d e an e x p o r t replacement the F - 5 E s , t h e United S t a t e s has been r e l u c t a n t t o

215 p r o v i d e an e x p o r t l i c e n s e f o r t h e t o p - o f - t h e - 1 i n e F-16A, p r e f e r r i n g t o promote e i t h e r t h e l e s s e r - p o w e r e d F-16/79 o r the N o r t h r o p F - 2 0 , both e s p e c i a l l y d e s i g n e d f o r e x port. T h a i l a n d , h o w e v e r , h a s i n s i s t e d on t h e F - 1 6 A , m a k i n g t h e i s s u e a p o l i t i c a l t e s t of t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e c l a i m e d U.S. commitment. The g u e s t i o n was h i g h on Prime M i n i s t e r Prem's agenda f o r h i s A p r i l 1984 m e e t i n g w i t h P r e s i d e n t Reagan. In t h e wake of t h e 1984-1985 V i e t n a m ese "dry season" o f f e n s i v e along the Thai-Kampuchean b o r d e r , Congress was o f f i c i a l l y n o t i f i e d of t h e i n t e n t i o n t o g r a n t the e x p o r t l i c e n s e f o r t h e F-16A t o T h a i l a n d and d i d not move t o b l o c k t h e s a l e . T h e r e a r e s t r o n g a r g u m e n t s t o b e made a g a i n s t t h e s a l e , not the l e a s t of which i s the c o s t . For T h a i l a n d , t h e p r o p o s e d s i x t e e n - p l a n e p a c k a g e would c o s t $500 m i l lion. One p l a n e and i t s l o g i s t i c t a i l c o s t a b o u t as much as r a i s i n g and e q u i p p i n g an army d i v i s i o n . 4 1 It is a l s o a r g u e d t h a t t h e s c e n a r i o s i n which t h e F-16A would r e a l l y come i n t o p l a y a r e t h e l e a s t l i k e l y i n T h a i Vietnamese r e l a t i o n s . F i n a l l y , i t can be s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of the F-16A i n t o a S o u t h e a s t A s i a n a i r f o r c e w o u l d be e s c a l a t o r y ; i t w o u l d g u a r a n t e e S o v i e t t r a n s f e r s of MIG-23s t o Vietnam, force budgetarily s t r a i n i n g F-16A p u r c h a s e s on o t h e r ASEAN c o u n t r i e s , and r e s u l t i n t h e i n t e r n a l r e a l l o c a t i o n of d e f e n s e f u n d s from i n s t r u m e n t a l l y more u t i l i t a r i a n p u r p o s e s . In I n d o n e s i a , f o r e x a m p l e , a l t h o u g h a m b i g u i t y about the r o l e of t h e a i r f o r c e c o n t i n u e s t o abound in I n d o n e s i a ' s d e f e n s e d o c t r i n e , G e n e r a l Moerdani i s committed in p r i n c i p l e t o keeping the a i r f o r c e at t h e t e c h n o l o g i c a l edge w i t h the F-16A as t h e r e p l a c e m e n t f o r t h e F-5Es i f a U.S. e x p o r t l i c e n s e c o u l d b e o b t a i n e d . 4 2 Indonesia's m i l i t a r y d e v e l o p m e n t budget has s u f f e r e d s e v e r e e n t r e n c h m e n t s , and any buy w i l l h a v e t o b e d e l a y e d . On t h e o t h e r hand, the o p p o r t u n i t y c o s t s may be a c c e p t a b l e i f o n l y not t o f a l l b e h i n d S i n g a p o r e i n t e r m s of air combat c a p a b i l i t i e s . S i n g a p o r e had t a k e n an o p t i o n on e i g h t F - 1 6 / 7 9 S , but i t i s e x p e c t e d t h a t t h i s would be m o d i f i e d t o t h e F - 1 6 A i f a p o l i c y e x c e p t i o n w e r e made f o r ASEAN c o u n t r i e s . ' » 3 Confirmation that Singapore w o u l d b e f i r s t i n l i n e a f t e r T h a i l a n d came w i t h its s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the P r a t t and Whitney F100 e n g i n e t h a t p o w e r s the F-16A.'*''

ASEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION The concept of n a t i o n a l r e s i l i e n c e i s complemented by the n o t i o n of r e g i o n a l r e s i l i e n c e . In d e f e n s e terms t h i s means t h a t as each ASEAN member i n c r e a s e s its c a p a b i l i t i e s to defend i t s e l f t h e r e g i o n as a w h o l e b e c o m e s m o r e c a p a b l e of w i t h s t a n d i n g e x t e r n a l a g g r e s s i o n , e s p e c i a l l y from V i e t n a m . The q u e s t i o n i s how w i l l t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s of t h e ASEAN members r e l a t e t o o n e another m i l i t a r i l y f o r r e g i o n a l r e s i l i e n c e . We h a v e sketched the n a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y responses to the p o s t -

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1978 r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y e n v i r o n m e n t . How do t h e s e r e s p o n s e s b e c o m e a s s o c i a t e d i n any m e a n i n g f u l f a s h i o n ? The T h a i s u s e t h e p h r a s e " c o l l e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l d e f e n s e " t o c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e i r common e f f o r t s t o e l i m i n a t e from the region "adverse external interference."145 But a t what p o i n t , i f any, w i l l " c o l l e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l d e f e n s e " g i v e way t o c o l l e c t i v e m i l i t a r y d e f e n s e ? Although ASEAN l e a d e r s h i p s r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e memb e r s o f t h e g r o u p i n g h a v e s t r e n g t h e n e d t h e i r armed f o r c e s and have f o r g e d c o n s e n s u a l d i p l o m a t i c and p o l i t i c a l ASEAN p o s i t i o n s on c r u c i a l s e c u r i t y i s s u e s , t h e y c o n t i n u e t o deny t h a t t h e p a t t e r n of s e c u r i t y c o o p e r a t i o n t h a t h a s e v o l v e d a t an e v e r a c c e l e r a t i n g p a c e i s leading to a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e . Foreswearing a l l i a n c e , h o w e v e r , d o e s n o t mean t h a t i n t e n s i f i e d cooperative d e f e n s e - r e l a t e d a c t i v i t i e s cannot t a k e p l a c e . Perhaps t h e most v i s i b l e e l e m e n t o f i n c r e a s e d d e f e n s e c o o p e r a t i o n has been t h e p a t t e r n o f ASEAN j o i n t m i l i t a r y e x e r c i s e s on a b i l a t e r a l b a s i s . A p a r t i a l l i s t i n g of 1 9 8 4 ' s e x e r c i s e s s u g g e s t s t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e e v o l v i n g network of m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p s . (The Roman numeral f o l l o w i n g t h e c o d e name i n d i c a t e s t h e number i n t h e s e r i e s o f s i m i l a r e x e r c i s e s in previous years.) S i n g - S i am IV: M a r c h / A p r i l , S i n g a p o r e - T h a i l a n d n a v a l exercises. A_i£ ThamajL I I I : A p r i l , Th a i 1 a nd - M a 1 ay s i a a i r exercise. E l a n g I n d o p u r a I l l s May, I n d o n e s i a - S i n g a p o r e a i r exercise. M a 1 i nd o J a y a X I : May, I n d o n e s i a - M a l a y s i a n a v a l exercise. K a r i p u r a Maii ndo I I I : F a l l , M a l a y s i a - I n d o n e s i a army exercise. Elang Maiindo I X : S e p t e m b e r , M a l a y s i a - I n d o n e s i a a i r exercise. Sea Garuda V: S e p t e m b e r , I n d o n e s i a - T h a i l a n d n a v a l exercise. Eng1ek V I I : O c t o b e r , Indonesia-Singapore naval exercise. Malapura I : The f i r s t j o i n t naval e x e r c i s e b e t w e e n t h e M a l a y s i a n and S i n g a p o r e n a v i e s was h e l d i n t h e South China S e a a t t h e end of J u l y 1 9 8 4 . APEX: The ADEX e x e r c i s e s a r e j o i n t a i r d e f e n s e e x e r c i s e s t e s t i n g t h e I n t e g r a t e d A i r D e f e n s e System (IADS) f o r M a l a y s i a and S i n g a p o r e u n d e r t h e 1 9 7 0 F i v e Power D e f e n s e A r r a n g e m e n t . The p a t t e r n h a s been f o r A u s t r a l i a n a i r u n i t s based a t B u t t e r w o r t h t o e x e r c i s e s e p a r a t e l y w i t h M a l a y s i a and S i n g a p o r e . ADEX 8 4 - 3 , h e l d i n J u n e 1 9 8 4 , was a b r e a k t h r o u g h . For t h e f i r s t t i m e , M a l a y s i a n f i g h t e r s o p e r a t e d out of a S i n g a p o r e b a s e . S e v e r a l p o i n t s s h o u l d b e made a b o u t t h i s l i s t and t h e many p r i o r e x e r c i s e s . W i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f ADEX, they are a l l b i l a t e r a l . O t h e r ASEAN b i l a t e r a l e x e r c i s e s

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a r e c a r r i e d out w i t h f r i e n d l y non-ASEAN powers such as A u s t r a l i a , New Z e a l a n d , and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . The e m p h a s i s i s on n a v a l and a i r e x e r c i s e s . In p a r t t h i s i s b e c a u s e t h e y a r e a r e e a s i e r t o o r g a n i z e and e x e c u t e . The s c e n a r i o s a r e f o r t h e d e f e n s e o f m a r i t i m e and a i r s p a c e and do n o t i n v o l v e " g a m e s " o f p r o j e c t i n g ASEAN power t o t h e Kampuchean-Cambodian b o r d e r . The f u l c r u m f o r ASEANizing of m i l i t a r y e x e r c i s e s seems t o be I n d o n e sia. The P h i l i p p i n e s ' r o l e i n t h i s k i n d o f r e g i o n a l r e s i l i e n c e seems t o be t h a t o f h o s t i n g t h e U.S. b a s e s . W i t h r e s p e c t t o ADEX, A u s t r a l i a w i l l r e m a i n an a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t i n t h e IADS even though i t w i l l h a v e w i t h d r a w n from i t s b a s e a t B u t t e r w o r t h i n M a l a y s i a i t s r e m a i n i n g M i r a g e s q u a d r o n by 1 9 8 8 . I t has agreed to r o t a t e through t h e new F-18As f o r a minimum o f s i x t e e n weeks a y e a r b e g i n n i n g i n m i d - 1 9 8 8 . B o t h M a l a y s i a and Singapore endorse c o n t i n u i t y in at l e a s t a symbolic A u s t r a l i a n p r e s e n c e and s e e m i n g c o n t r i b u t i o n t o r e g i o n a l d e f e n s e and s t a b i l i t y . Existing air-warning c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r IADS w i l l be a u g m e n t e d by M a l a y s i a ' s a c q u i s i t i o n o f a $ 1 8 0 m i l l i o n Hughes A i r c r a f t HADR s y s t e m . M o r e o v e r , a l t h o u g h i t i s h i g h l y i m p r o b a b l e t h a t t h e new E2Cs w i l l f l y o n l y i n S i n g a p o r e ' s v e r y l i m i t e d a i r s p a c e , t h i s a c q u i s i t i o n t o o s h o u l d be viewed i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e IADS. Singapore's s t r a t e g i c m i l i t a r y planning problem r e s t s on a f u n d a m e n t a l p o l i t i c a l p r o b l e m : f i n d i n g a r e g i o n a l r o l e f o r t h e S i n g a p o r e Armed F o r c e s a c c e p t a b l e to its neighbors. S i n g a p o r e o f f i c i a l s have been t h e most i n s i s t e n t l y outspoken in f a v o r of expanding t h e p a t t e r n of m i l i t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n beyond t h e b i l a t e r a l . A f t e r h i s S e p t e m b e r 1982 summit with P r e s i d e n t S u h a r t o , L e e Kuan Yew p u b l i c l y c a l l e d f o r r a i s i n g t h e l e v e l o f j o i n t e x e r c i s e s from b i l a t e r a l t o t r i l a t e r a l and e v e n t u a l l y a l 1 - ASEAN e x e r c i s e s . 1 * 6 This would, he argued, enhance t h e d e t e r r e n t c a p a b i l i t y o f t h e member s t a t e s ' new m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h . His c a l l f e l l l a r g e l y on d e a f ears. In a s u r p r i s i n g , p e r h a p s even g a d f l y i s h i n i t i a t i v e , I n d o n e s i a ' s l a t e e x - V i c e - P r e s i d e n t and F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Adam Malik i n s p r i n g 1984 r e t u r n e d t o t h e i d e a but i n an even more d i r e c t f a s h i o n . Malik c a l l e d f o r a j o i n t all-ASEAN m i l i t a r y e x e r c i s e t o be h e l d i n T h a i l a n d as a c l e a r d e m o n s t r a t i o n t o Vietnam of ASEAN s o l i d a r i t y and d e t e r m i n a t i o n . 4 7 Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , M a l i k ' s b o l d p r o p o s a l was w a r m l y r e c e i v e d o n l y by S i n g a p o r e . The t h e n C o l o n e l L e e H s i e n L o o n g , SAF c h i e f - o f - s t a f f , d e s c r i b e d t h e n o t i o n o f an ASEAN j o i n t m i l i t a r y e x e r c i s e i n T h a i l a n d as " v i a b l e . " His comment was made i n Kuala Lumpur where h e was on an o f f i c i a l v i s i t — h i s f i r s t — t o f u r t h e r s t r e n g t h e n t h e good r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e armed f o r c e s o f t h e two c o u n t r i e s . 1 1 8 S i n g a p o r e ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d be i n c r e a s e d m i l i t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h i n ASEAN was t a k e n up a g a i n i n J u l y 1 9 8 4 when S i n g a p o r e S e c o n d M i n i s t e r f o r D e f e n s e Yeo Ning Hong, c i t i n g t h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y b u i l d u p , s t a t e d t h a t "we m u s t l e a v e no s t o n e u n t u r n e d t o

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e n s u r e c o n t i n u e d p e a c e and s t a b i l i t y . The m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s of t h e ASEAN c o u n t r i e s s h o u l d be enhanced t o t h e l e v e l n e c e s s a r y t o m e e t e x t e r n a l t h r e a t s and d e t e r aggression."1*9 T h i s was q u i c k l y r e j e c t e d by P h i l i p p i n e F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r T h i n s u 1 i n o n d a T o l e n t i n o who s a i d , "I don't t h i n k t h e t i m e s r e q u i r e a change in t h e p o l i c y and p u r p o s e of ASEAN," a d d i n g , " I d o n ' t t h i n k t h e i d e a o f m i l i t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n i s even d e v e l o p i n g . " 5 0 Ind o n e s i a a l s o r e a c t e d c o o l l y , t u r n i n g down S i n g a p o r e ' s c a l l f o r an ASEAN " m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e " t o f a c e e x t e r n a l threats. I t d i d n o t , h o w e v e r , r u l e out t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of i n t e n s i f y i n g m i l i t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n in t h e e x i s t i n g b i l t e r a l framework. One a r e a t h a t has o f t e n been m e n t i o n e d as r i p e f o r g r e a t e r ASEAN c o o p e r a t i o n i s t h e s t a n d a r d i z i n g o f weapons s y s t e m s and j o i n t p u r c h a s i n g o f c o m p o n e n t s . Proposa l s f o r p r o c u r e m e n t c o o p e r a t i o n and ASEAN d e f e n s e i n d u s t r i a l c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y s t u m b l e , h o w e v e r , on t h e f a c t t h a t S i n g a p o r e ' s e x i s t i n g t e c h n o l o g i c a l and i n d u s t r i a l b a s e would t h r e a t e n t h e i n f a n t d e f e n s e i n d u s t r i e s in o t h e r ASEAN c o u n t r i e s . Singapore's defense industries a r e world c l a s s i n t e r m s of c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s . 5 1 Malays i a , f o r e x a m p l e , t a l k s o f s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n of weaponry as i t p l a n s t o m a n u f a c t u r e i t s own a s s a u l t r i f l e on a j o i n t v e n t u r e b a s i s with a European arms m a n u f a c t u r e r . I n d o n e s i a i s r e p l a c i n g t h e M-16 as t h e s t a n d a r d i n f a n t r y weapon w i t h t h e B e l g i a n FNC 5 . 5 6 r i f l e m a n u f a c t u r e d under l i c e n s e i n Bandung. Meanwhile S i n g a p o r e i s t r y i n g t o s e l l i t s own a s s a u l t r i f l e on t h e g l o b a l m a r k e t . T h e r e i s g r e a t r e s i s t a n c e i n M a l a y s i a and I n d o n e s i a t o defense interdependence with Singapore. Indonesia's G e n e r a l M o e r d a n i h a s p u t i t b l u n t l y : u n d e r no c i r c u m s t a n c e s , he has t o l d t h e P a r l i a m e n t , w i l l I n d o n e s i a buy armaments from S i n g a p o r e . 5 2 At t h e c o r e of r e g i o n a l r e s i l i e n c e i s t h e i m p l i c i t s t r a t e g i c a l l i a n c e t h a t has d e v e l o p e d b e t w e e n I n d o n e s i a and M a l a y s i a . 5 3 For I n d o n e s i a , M a l a y s i a i s i t s s t r a t e g i c f r o n t l i n e as w e l l as b u f f e r . For M a l a y s i a , I n d o n e s i a is a r e l i a b l e s t r a t e g i c p a r t n e r in t h e g e o g r a p h i c l o c k t h e y h o l d on t h e v i t a l s e a - and a i r - l a n e s o f commun i c a t i o n in t h e Malaccan S t r a i t r e g i o n . T h e r e i s an a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e i r common s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s i n t h e South China Sea zone. A 1982 t r e a t y d e f i n e s Malaysian r i g h t s w i t h i n t h e I n d o n e s i a n a r c h i p e l a g i c m a r i t i m e zone and p r e s e r v e s M a l a y s i a ' s c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a c c e s s between P e n i n s u l a M a l a y s i a and S a b a h and S a r a w a k . The a c c o r d a l s o p r o v i d e s f o r M a l a y s i a n r i g h t s of n a v a l maneuver and e x e r c i s e as w e l l as j o i n t s e c u r i t y o p e r a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e two c o u n t r i e s . The two c o u n t r i e s j o i n t l y e x e r c i s e t h e i r n a v i e s and a i r f o r c e s i n I n d o n e s i a ' s m a r i t i m e and a i r s p a c e n o r t h of t h e Natuna I s l a n d . At t h e end o f t h e S e p t e m b e r 1984 Elang Malindo a i r e x e r c i s e , Malaysian M a j o r G e n e r a l Mohammad Ngah s t a t e d t h a t t h e t w o c o u n t r i e s would p r e s e n t a u n i t e d f r o n t a g a i n s t c h a l l e n g e s o r t h r e a t s from o t h e r c o u n t r i e s . 5 1 4 For h i s p a r t , G e n e r a l M o e r d a n i h a s s a i d t h a t I n d o n e s i a was p r e p a r e d t o h e l p

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Malaysia defend i t s t e r r i t o r i a l claim to the disputed Layang-Layang a t o l l . 5 5 In 1 9 8 4 , t h e s c o p e of the twelve-year-o1d M a l a y s i a n - I n d o n e s i a n B o r d e r A g r e e m e n t was r e v i s e d and broadened. The new a g r e e m e n t e x t e n d s t h e e x i s t i n g p a t t e r n of m i l i t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n t o a l l b o r d e r s — i n c l u d i n g m a r i t i m e b o r d e r s - - b e t w e e n t h e two n a t i o n s and c o v e r s t h e j o i n t u s e o f n a v a l and a i r f o r c e s . According to r e p o r t s , I n d o n e s i a n s o u r c e s s a i d t h a t t h e new a g r e e m e n t was t h e "most c o m p r e h e n s i v e s e c u r i t y a r r a n g e m e n t I n d o n e s i a had w i t h a n e i g h b o u r , " b u t t h a t s i m i l a r a r r a n g e ments c o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d with o t h e r ASEAN c o u n t r i e s . 5 6 Even m o r e i n t e r e s t i n g i s t h e f a c t t h a t a t t h e s i g n i n g o f t h e new a g r e e m e n t , M a l a y s i a ' s Deputy Prime M i n i s t e r Musa Hitam s e e m e d t o p l a c e i t w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e i n c r e a s i n g S o v i e t n a v a l p r e s e n c e i n S o u t h e a s t A s i a by s t a t i n g : "Maybe w e h a v e t o a r r a n g e a new s t r a t e g y on how t o t a k e m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e m e t h o d s t o p r o t e c t o u r own i n t e r e s t s in t h i s s t r a t e g i c area." 57 I t must be n o t e d , h o w e v e r , t h a t S i n g a p o r e o c c u p i e s Its a s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n i n t h e s a m e a r e a as w e l l . c a p a b i l i t i e s , t o g e t h e r with B r u n e i ' s , i f p l a c e d in a r e g i o n a l m a r i t i m e and a i r d e f e n s e c o n t e x t would add s u b s t a n t i a l l y to d e t e r r e n c e or i n t e r d i c t i o n . The number of S S M - c a p a b l e v e s s e l s o p e r a t e d by t h e f o u r n a v i e s , f o r e x a m p l e , i s not i n s i g n i f i c a n t . Nor i s t h e i r a i r p o w e r a t t h e e x i s t i n g F - 5 l e v e l t o be d i s m i s s e d as l o n g as a p o t e n t i a l a d v e r s a r y i s o p e r a t i n g at a MIG-21 l e v e l . The p o l i t i c a l p r o b l e m i s how t o e n h a n c e what i s i n f a c t an I n d o n e s i a n - M a l a y s i a n (je f a c t o a l l i a n c e with t h e g r e a t e r c o o p e r a t i o n with S i n g a p o r e i n o r d e r t o c r e a t e an e f f e c tively integrated defense system. Recent events in Malaysian-Singapore defense r e l a t i o n s point in the d i r e c t i o n of g r e a t e r c o o p e r a t i o n through t h e f i r s t joint e x e r c i s i n g b e t w e e n t h e two c o u n t r i e s . I t w i l l not be a l l i a n c e , h o w e v e r ; i t w i l l be a b r o a d e n i n g o f t h e d e v e l oping ASEAN s e c u r i t y e n t e n t e . THE EXTRAREGIONAL CONTEXT M a l a y s i a has c o n s i s t e n t l y r e j e c t e d moves t o change t h e " i n f o r m a l " and b i l a t e r a l b a s i s of s e c u r i t y c o o p e r a t i o n i n ASEAN. In r e i t e r a t i n g t h e M a l a y s i a n o p p o s i t i o n t o c o n v e r t i n g ASEAN i n t o a " d e f e n s e n e t w o r k , " Deputy F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Abdul K a d i r S h e i k h F a d z i r e x p r e s s e d n o n a l i g n e d M a l a y s i a ' s c o n c e r n about t h e w i d e r p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of such a move. He emphasized t h a t " M a l a y s i a ' s p o l i c y was t o a v o i d s u c h b l o c f o r m a t i o n m o v e s " b e c a u s e ASEAN's members " a r e not p r e p a r e d t o be m i l i t a r y o u t p o s t s in t h e f o r w a r d d e f e n c e l i n e of f o r e i g n powe r s . " 5 8 The f e a r t h a t t i g h t e r m i l i t a r y a s s o c i a t i o n might lead t o g r e a t e r a l i g n m e n t i s of p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e r n a t a t i m e when M a l a y s i a and I n d o n e s i a a r e c o n s c i o u s l y s e e k i n g a more e q u i d i s t a n t p o s t u r e b e t w e e n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and the S o v i e t Union. Moreover, t h e r e is concern t h a t the

220 c o n v e r s i o n of A S E A N into an overt d e f e n s e i n s t r u m e n t would m a k e it even less likely that political structures could be d e v i s e d to b r i d g e the gap b e t w e e n A S E A N and Indochina. T h e f o r m a l m i l i t a r i z a t i o n of ASEAN runs c o u n t e r to the n e w l y r e i n v i g o r a t e d goal of a S o u t h e a s t Asian Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). V i e t n a m h a s s i n g l e d out Singapore's " w a r m a c h i n e " for bitter attack as a major source of regional tension. In commenting on Singapore's efforts to turn ASEAN into a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e and its p l a n s to build "a u n i f i e d weapons depot to prepare for war against the Indochinese countries," Hanoi a t t r i b u t e s this to Singapore's "one s o l e o b j e c t i v e w h i c h is to s e r v e the a g g r e s s i v e and expansionist policy of the American imperialists and the Chinese hegemonists." 5 9 Deep suspicion of ASEAN military c o o p e r a t i o n also colors Soviet j u d g m e n t of the grouping. A S E A N is d e p i c t e d by the Soviets as u n d e r constant pressure by the capitalist powers interested in turning ASEAN into a military alliance directed against the regional forces of "social r e n o v a t i o n and p r o g r e s s , " 6 0 i.e., t h e I n d o c h i n e s e c o u n t r i e s and the USSR. In the Soviet a n a l y s i s of I n d o n e s i a n p o l i c y o n e of the p o s i t i v e e l e m e n t s o f f s e t t i n g the policy's " r i g h t - w i n g tendencies" is that Indonesia actively resists the militarization of ASEAN. The Soviets see this resistance as based on Indonesia's c o r r e c t u n d e r s t a n d i n g that the real threat to r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y does not arise from Indoch i na. 61 The Soviet comment guoted above points up the political f r a c t u r e line in ASEAN that m i l i t a t e s against a c o m m o n s e c u r i t y s t r a t e g y at the m o s t m i n i m u m level of s e l f - d e f e n s e against a d i r e c t a g g r e s s i o n . As the fear of a Vietnamese blitzkrieg has receded, singularly different long-term threat perceptions in the ASEAN region have become manifest.62 I n d o n e s i a and M a l a y s i a feel that the years of confrontation with Vietnam over Kampuchea have m a d e the region vulnerable to Chinese political ambitions and strategic designs. There is concern that the d e f acto T h a i - C h i n e s e a l l i a n c e could h a v e a destabilizing impact in the long run. In this respect, although the continued U.S. political-military presence in the r e g i o n is w e l c o m e d as a necessary i n g r e d i e n t in the Great P o w e r r e g i o n a l b a l a n c e of p o w e r , e s p e c i a l l y g i v e n the S o v i e t - V i e t n a m es e link, it does not r e q u i r e Jakarta or Kuala Lumpur to mortgage their future options v i s - a - v i s the p l a y i n g out of S i n o - S o v i e t r i v a l r i e s to U.S. global security interests.

CONCLUSION: THE COSTS OF MILITARIZATION Trends e m e r g i n g from t h e p r o l o n g e d c r i s i s over K a m p u c h e a s e e m to be leading to a p e r m a n e n t hard d i v i sion of Southeast Asia into two conflicting blocs facing one another militarily across the Thai frontlines and in the South China Sea. If this proves to be the case, the

221 c o s t s of t h i s d i v i s i o n s h o u l d be c a l c u l a t e d . They a r e b o t h d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t , p o l i t i c a l and e c o n o m i c . Let t h e f u t u r e a c c o u n t a n t s simply t a k e note of t h e opportunity costs of a high l e v e l of c o n v e n t i o n a l military p r e p a r e d n e s s i n ASEAN w i t h t h e r e a l l o c a t i o n o f s c a r c e r e s o u r c e s t o weapons s y s t e m s such as t h e F - 1 6 A . We a l s o s h o u l d be a w a r e of t h e h e i g h t e n e d s t r e s s e s on t h e f r a g i l e d o m e s t i c p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s o f t h e ASEAN s t a t e s as demands f o r more d e f e n s e in an a t m o s p h e r e o f c h r o n i c i n s e c u r i t y enhance o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n a l c l a i m s of the military. M o r e o v e r , a s i n t h e c a s e o f S i n g a p o r e and i t s neighbors, the creeping m i l i t a r i z a t i o n o f ASEAN h a s reinforced old antagonisms and s u s p i c i o n s as newly d e veloping military capabilities are measured against possible future intentions. W i l l t h e b a l a n c e s h e e t show t h a t t h e i n v e s t m e n t of h a l f a decade in a t t e m p t i n g to r e d r e s s t h e l o c a l b a l a n c e of power c o n t r i b u t e d t o nat i o n a l and r e g i o n a l r e s i l i e n c e a s b r o a d l y conceived?

NOTES 1. The s t a n d a r d s o u r c e f o r o r d e r o f b a t t l e c o m p a r i s o n s i s The M i l i t a r y B a l a n c e p u b l i s h e d a n n u a l l y by t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e o f S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s , London; s e e a l s o , G. J a c o b s , " V i e t n a m ' s T h r e a t P o t e n t i a l t o ASEAN," Asian D e f e n s e J o u r n a l (May 1 9 8 2 ) : 1 6 - 2 7 ; Douglas P i k e , " V i e t n a m , a Modern S p a r t a , " p a c i f i c D e f e n s e R e p o r t e r (April 1 9 8 3 ) : 3 3 - 3 9 . 2. Goh Keng Swee, " V i e t n a m and B i g - P o w e r R i v a l r y , " i n R i c h ard S o l o m a n , e d . , Asian S e c u r i t y i n t h e 1 9 8 0 ' s : p r o b l e m s and p o l i c i e s f o r a Time o f T r a n s i t i o n ( S a n t a M o n i c a , C a l i f . : Rand C o r p o r a t i o n R - 2 4 0 2 - I S A , ^November 1 9 8 0 ) , p. 1 1 3 . 3. S u h a r t o , 17 A u g u s t 1 9 8 1 , t e x t as r e p o r t e d i n F o r e i g n B r o a d c a s t I n f o r m a t i o n S e r v i c e , D a i l y R e p o r t : Asi a & p a c i f i c , 21 August 1 9 8 1 , p. N-7. 4. Khaw G u a t Hoon, " W e a p o n s p r o l i f e r a t i o n and S e c u r i t y i n S o u t h e a s t A s i a , " i n R o b e r t O ' N e i l l , e d . , I n s e c u r i t y : The Spread o f Weapons i n t h e I n d i a n and p a c i f i c O c e a n s ( C a n b e r r a : A u s t r a l i a n N a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t y p r e s s , 1 9 7 8 ) , p. 1 5 3 . 5. T h i s a c c o r d i n g t o Deputy D e f e n s e M i n i s t e r Abang Abu B a k a r , S t r a i t s T i m e s , 3 March 1 9 8 3 . 6. F o u r t h M a l a y s i a P l a n , 1981 - 1 9 8 5 ( K u a l a Lumpur: N a t i o n a l p r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1 9 8 1 ) , p. 1 8 5 . 7. Speech t o UMNO's 3 1 s t G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y , t e x t as g i v e n by Ihe Star [penang], 5 J u l y 1980. 8. G e n e r a l Tan S r i Sany j a f f a r , q u o t e d by t h e S t r a i t s T i m e s , 12 March 1 9 7 9 . 9. Deputy p r i m e M i n i s t e r Musa Hitam, " M a l a y s i a ' s D o c t r i n e o f C o m p r e h e n s i v e S e c u r i t y , " F o r e i g n A f f a i r s M a l a y s i a , 1 7 , no. 1 (March 1 9 8 4 ) : 97 . 10. In a d d i t i o n t o t h e M i l i t a r y B a l a n c e , i n g e n e r a l f o r M a l a y s i a n f o r c e s t r u c t u r e , s e e Harold C r o u c h , "A S t r i c t D i v i s i o n , " F a r E a s t e r n Economic R e v i e w , 20 O c t o b e r 1 9 8 3 , pp. 4 6 - 5 1 ; C o l . J o h n M. F i t z g e r a l d , " M a l a y s i a : D e f e n s e i n T r a n s i t i o n , " p a c i f i c D e f e n c e R e p o r t e r (March 1 9 8 4 ) : 2 3 - 2 8 .

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11. B r i g . G e n . M u s t a f a A w a n g , q u o t e d b y t h e New S t r a i t s T i m e s , 6 A p r i l 1981. 12. S t r a i t s T i m e s , , 4 J a n u a r y 1983. 13. A s i a n W a l l S t r e e t J o u r n a l W e e k l y , 29 O c t o b e r 1 9 8 4 , p . 2 2 ; F a r E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c R e v i e w , 1 N o v e m b e r 1 9 8 4 , p . 42. 14. S t r a i t s T i m e s , 22 O c t o b e r 1 9 8 4 . 15. S t r a i t s T i m e s , 20 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 3 . 16. S t r a i t s T i m e s , 18 D e c e m b e r 1 9 8 1 . 17. S t r a i t s T i m e s , 19 D e c e m b e r 1 9 8 1 . 18. Goh, " V i e t n a m a n d B i g - P o w e r R i v a l r y . " 19. B r i g . Gen. Lee H s i e n Loong, " S e c u r i t y O p t i o n s f o r S m a l l S t a t e s , " s p e e c h t o t h e S i n g a p o r e I n s t i t u t e of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 16 O c t o b e r 1 9 8 4 . 20. I n a d d i t i o n t o The M i l i t a r y B a l a n c e , i n g e n e r a l f o r S i n g a p o r e ' s f o r c e s t r u c t u r e , s e e K i r p a Wong b i n R a h i m , "The S i n g a p o r e Armed F o r c e s , " P a c i f i c D e f e n s e R e p o r t e r ( N o v e m b e r 1 9 8 0 1 : 5 6 - 5 8 ; P a t r i c k S m i t h and P h i l i p B o w e r i n g , "The C i t i z e n S o l d i e r , " Far E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c R e v i e w , 13 J a n u a r y 1 9 8 3 , p p . 2 6 - 3 2 . 21. S t r a i t s Times, 1 J a n u a r y 1984. 22. S p e c i a l c o r r e s p o n d e n t , " S i n g a p o r e : The R e s e r v e s P r o v i d e t h e Teeth," P a c i f i c Defense Reporter (October 1983):20. 23. S t r a i t s T i m e s , 12 O c t o b e r 1 9 8 4 . 24. I n a d d i t i o n t o The M i l i t a r y B a l a n c e , i n g e n e r a l f o r B r u n e i ' s f o r c e s t r u c t u r e , s e e Hans I n d o r f , " B r u n e i — T h e V u l n e r a b i l ities of a M i n i - s t a t e , " P a c i f i c Def e n s e R e p o r t e r (September 1984):46-49. 25. I n a d d i t i o n t o The M i l i t a r y B a l a n c e , i n g e n e r a l f o r I n d o n e s i a ' s f o r c e s t r u c t u r e , s e e D o n a l d E. W e a t h e r b e e , "Indonesia: A Waking G i a n t , " i n Rodney J o n e s , ed., T h i r d World R e g i o n a l Powers a n d t h e F u t u r e of C o n f l i c t (New Y o r k : P r a e g e r , i n p r e s s ) . 26. Indonesian budgetary data are contained in the annual M i n i s t r y of F i n a n c e r e p o r t , H o t a K e u a n g a n d a n R a n c a n g a n A n g g a r a n I t s h o u l d be n o t e d , h o w e v e r , t h a t a Pendapatan dan Belanj a Negara. s u b s t a n t i a l p r o p o r t i o n of I n d o n e s i a ' s d e f e n s e e x p e n d i t u r e s h a s b e e n b a s e d on o f f - b u d g e t r e v e n u e s o u r c e s . T h e s e t o o h a v e c o n t r a c t e d as Indonesia is forced to adjust to a p o s t - o i l era. 27. I n t e r v i e w i n Tempo, 15 O c t o b e r 1 9 8 3 . 28. Tempo, 15 O c t o b e r 1 9 8 3 . 29. H a r m o n o P u s p o n e g a r a as q u o t e d i n t h e I n d o n e s i a T i m e s , 14 March 1 9 8 4 . F o r a g e n e r a l d i s c u s s i o n of I n d o n e s i a ' s d e f e n s e i n d u s t r i e s , s e e D o n a l d E. W e a t h e r b e e , " I n d o n e s i a ' s D e f e n s e - I n d u s t r i a l C o m p l e x , " i n J a m e s K a t z , e d . , S o w i n g t h e S e r p e n t ' s T e e t h : The I m p l i c a t i o n s of T h i r d W o r l d M i l i t a r i z a t i o n ( L e x i n g t o n , Mass.: Heath, 1986). 30. S t r a i t s T i m e s , 21 F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 4 . 31. I n a d d i t i o n t o The M i l i t a r y B a l a n c e , i n g e n e r a l f o r t h e P h i l i p p i n e ' s f o r c e s t r u c t u r e , s e e K h a l i d A b d u l l a h , "The Armed F o r c e s of t h e P h i l i p p i n e s : S e c u r i t y T h r o u g h D e v e l o p m e n t i n t h e 1 9 8 0 s , " As i a D e f e n s e J o u r n a l ( J u n e 1 9 8 2 ) : 2 0 - 3 5 ; L a r r y A. N i k s c h , '"Bie P h i l i p p i n e s : U n c e r t a i n t i e s a f t e r t h e A q u i n o A s s a s s i n a t i o n , " P a c i f i c Def e n s e R e p o r t e r ( F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 4 ) : 2 1 - 2 9 . 32. U.S., C o n g r e s s , S e n a t e , C o m m i t t e e on F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s , T h e S i t u a t i o n i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , s t a f f r e p o r t ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: GPO, 1 9 8 4 ) . 33. C o n g r e s s i o n a l P r e s e n t a t i o n , S e c u r i t y Ass i s t a n c e P r o g r a m s FY 1 9 8 5 , p . 8 9 .

223 34. S u k h u m b h a n d p a r i b a t r a , " S t r a t e g i c I m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e I n d o c h i n a C o n f l i c t : Thai p e r s p e c t i v e s , " A s i a n A f f a i r s 11, no. 3 ( F a l l 1 984): 32. ~ 3 5 . " T a k e - o f f f o r F - 1 6 s , " F a r E a s t e r n E c o n o m i c R e v i e w , 26 A p r i l 1984, p. 17. 3 6 . G e n e r a l S a i y u d K e r d p h o l , "The Meaning of N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y . , " I S I S B u l l e t i n 1, n o . 2 ( O c t o b e r 1 9 8 2 ) î 1 3 . 3 7 . For a g e n e r a l a s s e s s m e n t of T h a i l a n d ' s s e c u r i t y o p t i o n s , s e e Hans I n d o r f , " T h a i l a n d , t h e F r o n t - l i n e S t a t e , " p a c i f i c D e f e n s e R e p o r t e r ( A p r i l 1982):36-44. 38. I n a d d i t i o n t o The M i l i t a r y B a l a n c e , i n g e n e r a l f o r T h a i l a n d ' s f o r c e s t r u c t u r e , s e e Hans I n d o r f , " T h a i l a n d : A C a s e o f M u l t i p l e U n c e r t a i n t i e s , " P a c i f i c Defense Reporter (September 1983): 23-35. 39. S t r a i t s Times, 27 J u n e 1 9 8 4 . 4 0 . The f i g u r e s a r e as g i v e n i n The M i l i t a r y B a l a n c e , 1 9 8 4 . 41 . "F-16 C o u n t e r - a t t a c k e d , " F a r E a s t e r n Economic Review, 25 O c t o b e r 1984, p. 50. 4 2 . J a k a r t a P o s t , 19 December 1 9 8 4 . 43. S t r a i t s Times, 18 March 1 9 8 5 . 4 4 . A v i a t i o n Week and Space T e c h n o l o g y , 27 May 1985, p . 1 5 . 4 5 . A i r Chief M a r s h a l S i d d h i S a v e t s i l a , m i n i s t e r of F o r e i g n A f f a i r s of T h a i l a n d , "ASEAN's C o n t r i b u t i o n t o A s i a n S e c u r i t y , " I S I S B u l l e t i n 2, no. 4 (October 1983):30. 46. "A New C a l l f o r U n i t y , " A s i a w e e k , 22 O c t o b e r 1982, p . 2 4 . 4 7 . Kompas, 8 May 1 9 8 4 . 48. S t r a i t s Times, 10 May 1 9 8 4 . 49. S t r a i t s Times, 23 J u l y 1 9 8 4 . 50. S t r a i t s Times, 25 J u l y 1984 51. For S i n g a p o r e ' s d e f e n s e - i n d u s t r i a l complex, see Michael Richardson, "Singapore's Defense Industry," p a c i f i c Defense Reporte r (May 1 9 8 3 1 : 6 9 - 7 5 . 52. S t r a i t s Times, 21 F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 4 . 53. In g e n e r a l f o r t h e I n d o n e s i a n - M a l a y s i a n r e l a t i o n s h i p , s e e J a m e s C l a d , " A l i k e But D i f f e r e n t , " F a r E a s t e r n Economic Review, 18 A p r i l 1985, pp. 2 3 - 3 0 , e s p e c i a l l y pp. 2 5 - 2 7 . 5 4 . A n t a r a , 29 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 4 . 55. S t r a i t s Times, 4 December 1 9 8 4 . 56. Ibid. 57. M a l a y s i a n D i g e s t , 31 J u l y 1 9 8 4 . 58. Ibid. 59. Quan d p i nhan d a h n , 5 March 1 9 8 4 . 60. S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , A. G r e b e n s c h i k o v , "ASEAN i n t h e S t r a t e g y of W a s h i n g t o n and Tokyo," F a r E a s t e r n A f f a i r s ( J a n u a r y 1 9 8 4 ) : 3 8 4 7 ; Y. P l e k h a n o v , "ASEAN i n W a s h i n g t o n ' s p l a n s , " International Af f a i r s (Moscow) ( J u n e 1 9 8 4 ) : 8 1 - 8 5 . 6 1 . V. A n d r e y e v , " I n d o n e s i a : G r o w i n g p a i n s of D e v e l o p m e n t , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s (Moscow) (May 1 9 8 4 ) : 5 9 - 6 6 . 6 2 . A g o o d o v e r v i e w of ASEAN's d i f f e r e n t i a l t h r e a t p e r c e p t i o n s i s R o b e r t 0 . T i l m a n , The Enemy B e y o n d : E x t e r n a l T h r e a t P e r c e p t i o n s i n t h e ASEAN R e g i o n ( S i n g a p o r e : I n s t i t u t e o f S o u t h e a s t A s i a n S t u d i e s , 1984); f o r I n d o n e s i a , M a l a y s i a , and S i n g a p o r e , s e e D o n a l d E. W e a t h e r b e e , " T h e v i e w f r o m ASEAN's S o u t h e r n F l a n k , " S t r a t e g i c Review 11, no. 2 ( S p r i n g 1 9 8 3 ) : 5 4 - 6 1 .

10 ANZUS: The Alliance Transformed Michael McKinley

A N Z U S is a treaty that e m b o d i e s anxiety. W h e n the negotiations that led to its establishment commenced in early 1951, there was anxiety about the sort of arrangem e n t that would g u a r a n t e e A u s t r a l i a n and New Zealand security in an age of British incapability. This worry w a s m o r e keenly felt in A u s t r a l i a t h a n in New Zealand, but both countries had perceived, during several years, a need for the United States to s u c c e e d B r i t a i n in g u a r a n t e e i n g their v i t a l interests. The p r e s s u r e , therefore, for this arrangement, ultimately called the ANZUS treaty, came from Australia and New Z e a l a n d — n o t from the United States. The United States had s t e a d fastly t a k e n the p o s i t i o n that no f o r m a l treaty w a s necess ary. However, g r a d u a l l y the U.S. p o s i t i o n changed. First, U.S. solidarity and appreciation grew as Australia and New Zealand sent ground forces to Korea. Second, all t h r e e nations w e r e s i m i l a r l y c o n c e r n e d about t h e entry of the People's Republic of China into the Korean W a r and the threat China's action posed to Asian security. T h i r d , the United S t a t e s , p a r t l y in r e s p o n s e to C h i n e s e m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y , d e s i r e d a "soft" p e a c e with J a p a n and h e n c e needed to o b t a i n t h e s u p p o r t of U.S. allies w h o still feared a revival of J a p a n , a p r i m e reason for the ANZUS treaty. Fourth, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand shared a concern for communist imperialism in general and regional communist expansionism based on the Asian mainland. Without doubt, also, t h e r e w a s at that t i m e a s e n s e of shared v a l u e s , s i m i l a r h i s t o r y , and c o m m o n p u r p o s e s that m a d e a h i g h level of close cooperation possible and natural. Nevertheless, Australia and New Zealand differed as to the purpose and importance of the treaty. Australia wanted a formal arrangement m o r e than New Zealand did, but the n a t u r e of the a r r a n g e m e n t each s o u g h t also admitted differences between them. New Zealand, for its p a r t , w a n t e d a u n i l a t e r a l d e c l a r a t i o n by the United States that it w o u l d p r o t e c t New Z e a l a n d , like that 225

226 g i v e n to Canada in 1938. This had an obvious attraction to W e l l i n g t o n because, if effected, it would not require t h a t N e w Z e a l a n d g i v e m u c h , if a n y t h i n g , in r e t u r n . Australia's preferences for a formal trilateral treaty, with provision for consultation, w o n out, however. Alt h o u g h N e w Z e a l a n d had t o a c c e p t a f o r m a l t r e a t y w i t h reciprocal obligations, the d i p l o m a t i c liaison b e t w e e n t h e t h r e e c o u n t r i e s w a s s e e n as an i n t i m a t e and e f f e c t i v e o n e , both r e a s s u r i n g and c o m f o r t i n g . I n d e e d , acc o r d i n g to Frank C o r n e r , f o r m e r s e c r e t a r y of t h e N e w Zealand Department of Foreign Affairs, the easy access t h a t A u s t r a l i a n and N e w Z e a l a n d o f f i c i a l s had to t h e i r counterparts during various U.S. administrations was a c a u s e f o r e n v y a m o n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s in W a s h i n g t o n of o t h e r c o u n t r i e s and to m a n y of t h e i r g o v e r n m e n t s . 1 In s h o r t , t h e e x p e r i e n c e of t h e l e s s e r p o w e r s in A N Z U S c o n f i r m e d f i n d i n g s m a d e by s c h o l a r s t h a t s m a l l p o w e r s can have disproportionate influence over their larger ally. 2 I n s o f a r as A u s t r a l i a n and N e w Z e a l a n d d e f e n s e w a s c o n c e r n e d , t h e b e n e f i t s a t t r i b u t e d to A N Z U S s e e m e d t o e x p a n d w i t h t h e p a s s a g e of t i m e . As t h e 1978 N e w Z e a land Defence Review stated: "ANZUS has been accepted by s u c c e s s i v e New Zealand G o v e r n m e n t s as the u l t i m a t e guara n t e e of s e c u r i t y in t h e r e g i o n . " 3 Others, however, held (and still do) a much m o r e skeptical assessment of A N Z U S : t h a t it is in r e a l i t y a u s e l e s s p i e c e of p a p e r b e c a u s e each p a r t y is b o u n d o n l y to " c o n s u l t " and o n l y t o "act to m e e t t h e c o m m o n d a n g e r a c c o r d i n g to its constitutional processes." I n d e e d , as D e s m o n d B a l l w r o t e in 1983: The ANZUS Treaty itself, however, is neither an absolute nor watertight guarantee, and nor is it the primary determinant of United States military assistance to Australia and New Zealand. Whether or not the United States would come to the assistance, and the conditions on which it would be forthcoming, would depend essentially on the calculation of interests made by the United States Government at the time.4 B a l l w a s a l l u d i n g , in t h i s p a s s a g e , t o t h e e s s e n t i a l l y e q u i v o c a l n a t u r e of t h e U.S. g u a r a n t e e u n d e r He was able to cite not ANZUS in certain circumstances. o n l y t w o h i s t o r i c a l e x a m p l e s of U.S. e q u i v o c a t i o n b u t a l s o c e r t a i n s c e n a r i o s in w h i c h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , its willingness notwithstanding, would be unable to provide other than incidental help. 5 Implicit in ANZUS, theref o r e , is a c o n t i n u i n g e l e m e n t of u n c e r t a i n t y c a u s e d by the potential differences b e t w e e n what Australia and/or N e w Zealand might hope for, and h o w much any particular U.S. president and the Congress can or will deliver. Nevertheless, as the aforementioned Defence Review s t a t e m e n t i n d i c a t e s , t h i s did not p r e v e n t t h e N e w Z e a land g o v e r n m e n t f r o m w e a v i n g f o r itself c o n s i d e r a b l e f a i t h ( s u p p o r t e d by h o p e and i n f e r e n c e ) in w h a t it

227 called the "ultimate guarantee" of ANZUS. For New Zealand, the p r i c e of this g u a r a n t e e s e e m s s e l d o m to h a v e b e e n in e v i d e n c e . T h e b e n e f i t s of a l l i a n c e w e r e s t r e s s e d w h i l e its costs w e r e s e e n e i t h e r as inevita b l e — in which case they were beyond a r g u m e n t — o r hidden, in which case they were also beyond argument. New Zealand defense came to be viewed, almost as reflex, in an ANZUS framework. In Australia, where perceptions of d e f e n s el essness w e r e m o r e a c u t e , the t r e a t y also w a s invested w i t h faith. E n c o u r a g e d by L i b e r a l - C o u n t r y party (coalition) governments who were in power for most of the time, a strong populist sentiment emerged there, as w e l l , in f a v o r of t h e a l l i a n c e . In an i n t e r v i e w in M a r c h 1985, t h e M i n i s t e r of D e f e n s e , Kim B e a z l e y , outlined five areas of defense and foreign policy where the c o o p e r a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p u n d e r the A N Z U S rubric w a s important: (1) intelligence exchange, (2) direct influence w i t h t h e U.S. g o v e r n m e n t , (3) s p e c i a l access to U.S. e q u i p m e n t , (4) s p e c i a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s for m i l i t a r y e x e r c i s e s , and (5) d e f e n s e s c i e n c e cooperation. 6 New Zealand d o c u m e n t s also c o n f i r m t h e s e a d v a n t a g e s . 7 In short, Australian and New Zealand views mutually reinforce the proposition that ANZUS represents a vital defense asset against threats to the South Pacific and its environs. 8

SECURITY THREATS TO OCEANIA AND THE NEW CHALLENGE TO ANZUS Although ANZUS originally was assumed to cover the area north of A u s t r a l i a and N e w Z e a l a n d , it has o v e r t i m e d e v e l o p e d a c e r t a i n e l a s t i c i t y of s c o p e . Consequently, it now very definitely includes the South Pacific and, with somewhat less emphasis, the Indian Ocean. The r e g i o n north of A u s t r a l i a has a l w a y s e x e r c i s e d t h e m i n d s of A u s t r a l i a n s e c u r i t y p l a n n e r s , and a n u m b e r of c h a p t e r s in this v o l u m e attest to w h y this has b e e n , and should be, t h e case. B e c a u s e the Indian O c e a n is not w i t h i n t h e focus of this w o r k , it is e x c l u d e d from further consideration; however, the expansion of ANZUS coverage to that area reflects some of Australia's more enduring defense preoccupations during recent years. O c e a n i a , by c o m p a r i s o n , does not c o m m a n d the s a m e attention. Indeed, the South Pacific must currently be one of the very few areas of t h e w o r l d in w h i c h local p o w e r s can p r o d u c e t h r e a t a s s e s s m e n t s that are both brief in c o n t e n t and m i l d in nature. "Fortunate" or "benign" are terms that have been used by both Australian and N e w Zealand m i n i s t e r s to d e s c r i b e t h e i r local security environments. Nevertheless, there are certain disturbances in Oceania's tranquility. Those disturbances fall under three c a t e g o r i e s — t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a South P a c i f i c N u c l e a r - F r e e Zone (SPNFZ), t u n a f i s h i n g , and French c o l o n i a l i s m . 9 As regards the f i r s t , a S P N F Z t r e a t y w a s e n d o r s e d at t h e

228

16th South P a c i f i c Forum i n R a r o t o n g a ( t h e Cook I s l a n d s ) i n August 1985 by e i g h t of t h e t h i r t e e n e l i g i b l e s t a t e s present. As an A u s t r a l i a n i n i t i a t i v e , i t was, however, a compromise between t h e g l o b a l i n t e r e s t s of t h e United S t a t e s and t h e r e g i o n a l a i m s o f t h e P a c i f i c island states. Thus, i t banned t h e a c q u i s i t i o n and t e s t i n g of n u c l e a r e x p l o s i v e d e v i c e s , t h e s t o r a g e and dumping o f n u c l e a r w a s t e s , and t h e s t a t i o n i n g o f n u c l e a r weapons i n t h e South P a c i f i c . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , h o w e v e r , i t d i d not p r e v e n t t h e t e s t i n g of d e l i v e r y s y s t e m s , t h e t r a n s i t i n g o f t h e z o n e by n u c l e a r - c a p a b l e v e s s e l s , nor did i t p r e v e n t a c c e s s t o such v e s s e l s (member g o v e r n m e n t s were l e f t to decide t h e i r respective p o l i c i e s ) . Tuna f i s h i n g r i g h t s a l s o h a v e t h e p o t e n t i a l o f d i s t a n c i n g t h e s m a l l r e g i o n a l s t a t e s from t h e United States. What s t a t e s such as K i r i b a t i s e e k i s a r e g i o n a l management o r l i c e n s i n g s y s t e m t h a t g o e s some way toward national self-sufficiency. Yet i n r e c e n t t i m e s , t h e o n l y c o u n t r y w i l l i n g t o p r o v i d e t a n g i b l e r e c o g n i t i o n of t h i s o b j e c t i v e has been t h e S o v i e t Union. Furthermore, Moscow's o f f e r of U . S . $ 1 . 0 5 m i l l i o n in a c c e s s f e e s t o K i r i b a t i , and i t s s u b s e q u e n t a c c e p t a n c e , has been viewed w i t h s o m e t r e p i d a t i o n by t h e s t a t e s o f t h e S o u t h P a c i fic. For t h e a l l i a n c e , t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e proposed S o v i e t v e n t u r e l i e s i n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t i t m i g h t be c o r r u p t e d i n t o s o m e t h i n g more t h a n f i s h i n g a c c e s s r a t h e r t h a n i n any s u g g e s t i o n t h a t K i r i b a t i h a s u n d e r g o n e a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n t o communism. But f o r K i r i b a t i , t h e R u s s i a n o f f e r e q u a l s 10 p e r c e n t o f t h e r e p u b l i c ' s n a t i o n a l budget.10 Where i d e o l o g i c a l c o n v i c t i o n does p l a y a damaging r o l e i s i n t h e p o p u l a r , r e g i o n a l demands f o r New C a l e d o n i a n i n d e p e n d e n c e by t h e n a t i v e Kanaks o f t h e F r e n c h island possession. E s s e n t i a l l y , t h i s b r i n g s French c o l o n i a l i s m and M e l a n e s i a n n a t i o n a l i s m i n t o c o n f l i c t , and w i t h i t , t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f f u r t h e r e x t e r n a l i n t e r v e n t i o n beyond t h e a l r e a d y m i n o r i n v o l v e m e n t of L i b y a ( f o r p r o v i s i o n of t r a i n i n g t o a s m a l l number o f K a n a k s ) . In t h i s c i r c u m s t a n c e , a l l t h e n a t i o n s of t h e South P a c i f i c Forum i n s i s t t h a t F r a n c e e x p e d i t e i n d e p e n d e n c e and p r e v e n t f u r t h e r e x p r e s s i o n s o f extraregional interests. The ANZUS a l l i a n c e w i l l a l s o h a v e t o t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e a r e some p r o b l e m s r i v e t i n g t h e r e g i o n - - i n d e p e n d e n c e and n u c l e a r - f r e e z o n e s - - f o r which a i d i s an i n a p p r o p r i a t e and i r r e l e v a n t " s o l u t i o n . " I n t u r n , t h i s i m p l i e s t h a t A u s t r a l i a (and New Z e a l a n d , a r g u a b l y ) w i l l need t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h e i r P a c i f i c c h a r a c t e r toward t h e p o p u l a r a s p i r a t i o n s of t h e South P a c i f i c . N e v e r t h e l e s s , a l t h o u g h some of t h e s e demands, such as a c o m p r e h e n s i v e SPNFZ, a r e p r o b a b l y n o t i n t h e r e a l m o f a c h i e v e m e n t , o t h e r s , s u c h as a t u n a f i s h i n g r e g i m e o r New C a l e d o n i a n i n d e p e n d e n c e , v e r y d e f i n i t e l y a r e . Both are manageable. Because of t h i s , f u t u r e a s s e s s m e n t s of t h e l e v e l of t h r e a t i n t h e South P a c i f i c and t h e l e v e l s o f c r e d i b i l i t y and c o n f i d e n c e i n ANZUS w i l l b e d e t e r -

229 m i n e d by t h e a l l i a n c e p a r t n e r s ' r e s p o n s e s t o w h a t a r e , c o m p a r a t i v e l y s p e a k i n g , s t i l l mere d i s t u r b a n c e s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e i r o n y of t h e s i t u a t i o n o u t l i n e d in the foregoing is t h a t i t c l e a r l y presents the l e s s e r c h a l l e n g e t o ANZUS i n O c e a n i a . The r e a l c h a l l e n g e now, if not s t r i c t l y a s e c u r i t y t h r e a t , o r i g i n a t e s with a member s t a t e . I t t a k e s t h e f o r m , c u r i o u s l y , not of a g g r e s s i o n b u t o f a m o d e o f b e h a v i o r and p o l i c y i m p l e m e n t a t i o n t h a t t h r e a t e n t h e f u n d a m e n t a l c o h e s i o n b o t h of ANZUS and of o t h e r t r e a t i e s and a r r a n g e m e n t s u n d e r w r i t t e n by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . That s t a t e i s , of c o u r s e , New Z e a l a n d , and t h e p o l i c y , t h a t o f b a n n i n g v e s s e l s d e s c r i b e d as n u c l e a r f r o m i t s t e r r i t o r y and w a t e r s . NEW

ZEALAND'S NON-NUCLEAR POLICY VIS-A-VIS

ANZUS

New Z e a l a n d ' s n o n - n u c l e a r p o l i c y can be i n t e r p r e t e d i n t h r e e w a y s : f i r s t , as a r e v u l s i o n a g a i n s t n u c l e a r a r m s i n g e n e r a l ; s e c o n d , a s a d e s i r e t o i n s u l a t e New Zealand's immediate r e g i o n — t h e South P a c i f i c - - f r o m both n u c l e a r w e a p o n s and s u p e r p o w e r c o m p e t i t i o n and c o n f r o n t a t i o n ; and t h i r d , a s a m o v e t o e f f e c t New Z e a l a n d ' s s e c u r i t y by d i s t a n c i n g New Z e a l a n d , as f a r as p o s s i b l e , f r o m any a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h n u c l e a r w e a p o n s t h a t m i g h t c a u s e i t t o be a t a r g e t s h o u l d war break o u t . 1 1 As w i t h New Z e a l a n d ' s o r i g i n a l i m p e t u s t o w a r d t h e ANZUS t r e a t y , t h e c u r r e n t p o l i c y s t r o n g l y s u g g e s t s an a n x i e t y a b o u t t h e s t a t e of t h e w o r l d ; i t i s , m o r e o v e r , a c o n d i t i o n t h a t found o f f i c i a l e x p r e s s i o n more than two d e c a d e s ago. As l o n g ago as 1 9 6 3 , a New Z e a l a n d g o v e r n m e n t t o o k the formal d e c i s i o n never to permit the s t o r a g e , t e s t i n g , o r m a n u f a c t u r e o f n u c l e a r w e a p o n s o n New Z e a l a n d soil. B e c a u s e t h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e t h a t any o f t h e s e were real p r o s p e c t s , t h i s d e c i s i o n s e r v e s j u s t to date o f f i c i a l New Z e a l a n d o p p o s i t i o n t o n u c l e a r d e f e n s e , h o w e v e r t h a t m i g h t be d e f i n e d . S u b s e q u e n t l y , t h e Labour p a r t y a f t e r 1966 and t h e Labour g o v e r n m e n t of 1 9 7 2 - 1 9 7 5 came t o o p p o s e v i s i t s by n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d c r a f t , h o w e v e r a r m e d , a s w e l l a s v i s i t s by a n y c r a f t t h a t m i g h t b e carrying nuclear weapons. A m e a s u r e of t h e c h a n g e d c o n d i t i o n s i n w h i c h t h e a l l i a n c e o n c e o p e r a t e d i s t o be had f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t t h e l a t t e r ' s r e q u e s t of its a l l i e s t o r e f r a i n f r o m b r i n g i n g n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d and n u c l e a r - a r m e d c r a f t t o New Z e a l a n d was h o n o r e d — a s was the succeeding (National party) government's wish to h o s t such v e s s e l s . The g o v e r n m e n t e l e c t e d i n J u l y 1 9 8 4 h a s f o l l o w e d t h e o l d Labour p o l i c y . Accordingly, i t s o f f i c i a l policy i s t h a t t h e c r a f t of a l l a l l i e d f o r c e s t h a t w o u l d o t h e r w i s e be p e r m i t t e d t o v i s i t New Z e a l a n d must c o n f o r m , i n p o s i t i v e t e r m s , t o t w o c r i t e r i a : n o t o n l y m u s t t h e y be c o n v e n t i o n a l l y p o w e r e d , but a l s o " d e m o n s t r a b l y c o n v e n t i o n a l l y armed" ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . In i m p l e m e n t a t i o n , h o w e v e r , t h i s p o l i c y h a s not b e e n a p p l i e d c o m p r e -

230 hensively. F o r e x a m p l e , U.S. c o m b a t a i r c r a f t , F - 1 6 s , c a p a b l e of c a r r y i n g n u c l e a r weapons v i s i t e d New Zealand i n O c t o b e r 1984 f o r E x e r c i s e T r i a d 84. Yet in February 1985, t h e New Zealand government r e j e c t e d a U.S. r e q u e s t t o a l l o w t h e v i s i t o f t h e U.S.S. Buchanan, a t w e n t y t h r e e - y e a r - o l d Adam c l a s s g u i d e d m i s s i l e destroyer, c o n f i g u r e d w i t h t h e ASROC s y s t e m — a n a n t i s u b m a r i n e r o c k e t c a p a b l e o f b e i n g armed w i t h e i t h e r c o n v e n t i o n a l o r n u c l e a r warheads. Under P r i m e M i n i s t e r David Lange, t h e n o m i n a l l y b i n d i n g p o s i t i o n on a l l c r a f t admits o t h e r a m b i g u i t i e s as w e l l . U n t i l the United States canceled the e x e r c i s e s s c h e d u l e d f o r ANZUS ( t r i l a t e r a l ) p a r t i c i p a t i o n , t h e New Zealand government adopted a c u r i o u s s t a n c e on what was and was not p e r m i t t e d f o r i t s own f o r c e s . By e x t e n d i n g i t s n o n - n u c l e a r p o l i c y t o such e x e r c i s e s , t h e New Z e a l a n d s e r v i c e s w e r e p r e c l u d e d f r o m any i n v o l v e m e n t i n m i l i t a r y e x e r c i s e s d e s i g n a t e d as n u c l e a r . As P r i m e M i n i s t e r Lange has r e p e a t e d on numerous o c c a s i o n s , his government i s d e t e r m i n e d t o s t a t e u n e q u i v o c a l l y t h a t New Zealand wants no p a r t of n u c l e a r weapons. In p o i n t of f a c t , h o w e v e r , t h e New Zealand g o v e r n m e n t ' s p o l i c y was j u s t t h e o p p o s i t e — e q u i v o c a l . On 21 F e b r u a r y 1985, M i n i s t e r o f D e f e n s e Frank O ' F l y n n a n nounced t o P a r l i a m e n t t h a t , d e s p i t e t h e above p r o h i b i t i o n s , t h e R o y a l New Z e a l a n d Navy (RNZN) w o u l d be a l lowed t o e x e r c i s e w i t h n u c l e a r - c a p a b l e v e s s e l s o u t s i d e New Zealand t e r r i t o r i a l w a t e r s . The m i n i s t e r j u s t i f i e d t h i s p r o v i s i o n on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t New Z e a l a n d r e c o g n i z e d t h e r i g h t o f p a s s a g e o f a l l v e s s e l s on t h e h i g h s e a s — w h i c h was, and r e m a i n s , t r u e — b u t t h e d i f f i c u l t y a r i s e s i n a t t e m p t i n g t o p o s i t t h i s as a b a s i s f o r e x e m p t i n g t h e RNZN f r o m g o v e r n m e n t p o l i c y . 1 3 The RNZN, a f t e r a l l , i s no m o r e c o m p e l l e d t o e x e r c i s e w i t h s h i p s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l w a t e r s t h a n i t i s w i t h s h i p s i n New Zealand w a t e r s . But beyond t h e s e i n a d e q u a c i e s in l o g i c l i e s a more s a l i e n t f e a t u r e of t h e n o n - n u c l e a r p o l i c y : t o d a t e t h e Labour government has chosen t o implement i t s e l e c t i v e l y and i n t h e p r o c e s s has b o t h u n d e r m i n e d t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f New Z e a l a n d ' s a v o w e d o p p o s i t i o n t o nuc l e a r weapons and c r a f t and sown t h e seeds f o r m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of i t s p o s i t i o n . R e g a r d i n g ANZUS, a c c o r d i n g t o o f f i c i a l s t a t e m e n t s , t h e New Z e a l a n d g o v e r n m e n t r e m a i n s c o m m i t t e d t o t h e ANZUS a l l i a n c e . But t h e r e a r e t w o f a c e t s o f t h i s c o m mitment t h a t d e s e r v e s p e c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n . The f i r s t i s t h a t ANZUS i s o n l y w h a t t h e New Z e a l a n d g o v e r n m e n t d e f i n e s i t t o b e ; t h e s e c o n d i s t h a t New Z e a l a n d ' s commitment i s t o ANZUS as a c o n v e n t i o n a l a l l i a n c e . Thus t h e p r i m e m i n i s t e r d e n i e d t h a t ANZUS o b l i g e s New Zealand t o a c c e p t n u c l e a r w e a p o n s and s t a t e d t h a t h i s c o u n t r y has no w i s h t o be d e f e n d e d by n u c l e a r w e a p o n s . 1 4 He d e f i n e d t h e v a l u e of ANZUS as f o l l o w s : New Z e a l a n d i s

a member of

ANZUS b e c a u s e we s e e

its

231 usefulness as a conventional alliance to us and to our region. It is a useful means of interaction among the conventional forces of three countries of broadly similar outlook and interests in the region.^"*

Elsewhere it is also clear that Lange's government c o n t i n u e s to s u b s c r i b e to the " u l t i m a t e g u a r a n t e e " int e r p r e t a t i o n of ANZUS. In C a n b e r r a , in A p r i l 1985, h e f o r e s a w the " i n e v i t a b i l i t y " of an A N Z U S r e s p o n s e , des p i t e his g o v e r n m e n t ' s c u r r e n t e q u i v o c a t i o n , if one of the three partners were attacked. By so determining the p a r a m e t e r s and c o n t i n g e n t e x p e c t a t i o n s of A N Z U S , i.e., maintaining a non-nuclear policy while expecting a U.S. r e s p o n s e in c a s e of i n v a s i o n or a t t a c k , the N e w Zealand policy on ANZUS might be summarized as a qualified commitment to general alignment. The above assessment, of course, begs the question "aligned to what?" ANZUS, clearly, is not what it used to be; indeed, after F e b r u a r y 1985, the i m p a s s e caused by New Zealand has b r o u g h t into e x t e n s i v e c u r r e n c y the t e r m "inoperative." But this term is t a k e n to apply only to the level and n a t u r e of d e f e n s e c o o p e r a t i o n in conditions short of war within the treaty framework. As a result, the core obligations of ANZUS--to consult and act to m e e t the c o m m o n d a n g e r , in a c c o r d a n c e with constitutional p r o c e s s e s — r e m a i n e d intact, at least until late S e p t e m b e r 1985, and w e r e r e a f f i r m e d by both Australia and the United States as well as by New Zealand. But this situation, in which the lowest c o m m o n denominator prevailed, was far from ideal because it emphasized the changed character of the tripartite relationship and u n d e r l i n e d the p o t e n t i a l for f u r t h e r d e t e r i o r a t i o n of the a l l i a n c e as it had been k n o w n . As the New Zealand g o v e r n m e n t m o v e d c l o s e r t o w a r d e n t r e n c h i n g its nonn u c l e a r policy in l e g i s l a t i o n , and as d i p l o m a t i c attempts in September 1985 failed to resolve the essential d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n it and the United S t a t e s , this pot e n t i a l w a s realized. In t h e w a k e of Deputy P r i m e M i n i s t e r G e o f f r e y Palmer's v i s i t to W a s h i n g t o n in the fall of 1985, U.S. s t a t e m e n t s indicated the extent to w h i c h N e w Zealand had f a l l e n from g r a c e w i t h i n the alliance. In this m a t t e r , the p r o s p e c t s for r e h a b i l i t a t i n g New Zealand-U.S. relations, and the treaty as a tripartite a l l i a n c e , are less t h a n f a v o r a b l e . Public o p i n i o n in New Zealand, although solid in its support of ANZUS, has also consistently arrayed itself behind the Labour government's non-nuclear policies. If a n y t h i n g , the trend is toward increased support for Labour on both its weapons and craft proscriptions. The Labour party as a whole, moreover, is further to the left than its subsidiary Parliamentary party and has established constraints o n w h a t w i l l and w i l l not be t o l e r a t e d in the g o v e r n m e n t . Both, h o w e v e r , regard the n u c l e a r ban as o n e of "principle" and c e r t a i n l y o n e that is " nonnegotiable."

232 As Deputy P r i m e M i n i s t e r P a l m e r p h r a s e d i t , no amount of p e r s u a s i o n , f r i e n d l y o r o t h e r w i s e , w i l l " c a u s e us t o d e v i a t e from our p o l i c y . " 1 7 Palmer's d e c l a r a t i o n does, however, contain e l e ments of e x a g g e r a t i o n ; survey d a t a have r e v e a l e d the e x i s t e n c e o f a body o f o p i n i o n t h a t m i g h t d e s e r t t h e Labour government i f i t s n o n - n u c l e a r p o l i c i e s resulted i n d a m a g e t o New Z e a l a n d ' s e x p o r t t r a d e a n d / o r New Z e a l a n d ' s e x c l u s i o n from ANZUS. In e f f e c t , t h e s e c o s t s , even imposed s e p a r a t e l y , would r e d u c e t h e a b s o l u t e maj o r i t y s u p p o r t t h e New Zealand government now e n j o y s t o If a l e v e l below 40 p e r c e n t ( b a s e d on e a r l y 1985 d a t a ) . t h e Labour government i s i n t e r e s t e d i n s u r v i v a l beyond t h e n e x t e l e c t i o n , s c h e d u l e d f o r 1 9 8 7 , such r e s e r v a t i o n s w i l l have t o be b o r n e i n mind. S i m i l a r l y , in a r a d i c a l l y changed i n t e r n a t i o n a l t h r e a t e n v i r o n m e n t , Labour c o u l d be d e f l e c t e d f r o m i t s c u r r e n t p o l i c i e s . But d e f l e c t i o n , o r s l i g h t m o d i f i c a t i o n , i s a l l t h a t m i g h t be c o n t e m p l a t e d : given t h e s t r e n g t h of Labour's commitment, i t m u s t be r e g a r d e d as h i g h l y u n l i k e l y t h a t p r e s s u r e s from any of t h e s o u r c e s o u t l i n e d above c o u l d produce t h e abandonment o f t h e n o n - n u c l e a r p o l i c y . 1 8 I n t h i s m a t t e r i t s h o u l d be a p p r e c i a t e d t h a t t h e New Z e a l a n d L a b o u r p a r t y d u r i n g t h e l a s t f e w y e a r s h a s r e s o l v e d t o w i t h d r a w on a f a i r l y r e g u l a r b a s i s . More r e c e n t l y , a t t h e p a r t y ' s 1985 c o n f e r e n c e , i t r e s o l v e d t o w i t h d r a w a l s o from t h e F i v e Power D e f e n s e Arrangement w i t h A u s t r a l i a , B r i t a i n , M a l a y s i a , and S i n g a p o r e . It a l s o a d o p t e d r e s o l u t i o n s i n f a v o r o f n o n a l i g n m e n t and n e u t r a l i t y and urged t h e government t o g r a n t p e r m i s s i o n f o r the Soviet a i r l i n e A e r o f l o t to use Christchurch Airport f o r deploying Soviet f i s h i n g crews. At t h e same c o n f e r e n c e , m o t i o n s w e r e a l s o p u t (and l o s t ) t o c l o s e down t h e U.S. m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t o p e r a t i o n f o r A n t a r c t i c a and c u t d e f e n s e e x p e n d i t u r e s . The p o s s i b l e e l e c t i o n of t h e m a j o r o p p o s i t i o n p a r t y , t h e New Z e a l a n d N a t i o n a l p a r t y , t o g o v e r n m e n t i s n o t , however, guaranteed t o h e r a l d a s u b s t a n t i a l change. N a t i o n a l h a s b e e n o b l i g e d t o r e e x a m i n e i t s p o s i t i o n on n u m e r o u s i s s u e s , and t h e i n d i c a t i o n s a r e t h a t i t i s somewhat l e s s c o m m i t t e d t o r e t a i n i n g a l l of i t s t r a d i t i o n a l o p e n - d o o r p o l i c i e s r e g a r d i n g v i s i t s by a l l i e d nuclear-capable vessels. Even i f N a t i o n a l s h o u l d resume t h e s e p o l i c i e s , i t i s a moot p o i n t w h e t h e r a r e s u m p t i o n would make any d i f f e r e n c e t o t h e a l l i a n c e . The p r e s e n t i m b r o g l i o has o b v i o u s l y h u r t t h e c o n f i d e n c e t h a t e x i s t e d b e t w e e n New Zealand and i t s two ANZUS p a r t n e r s . Confid e n c e w i l l n o t be r e s t o r e d m e r e l y by a c h a n g e o f g o v e r n ment i n W e l l i n g t o n ; i t w i l l t a k e t i m e . Even t h e n , such r e s t o r a t i o n is not, perhaps, a r e a l i s t i c expectation. I f a f u t u r e N a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d be i n p o w e r and opposed by a Labour p a r t y whose p o l i c i e s were s u b s t a n t i a l l y t h e s a m e as t h e y w e r e i n 1 9 8 5 , t h e n ANZUS i n g e n e r a l would h a v e o n l y s u c c e e d e d i n b e c o m i n g p a r t l y p o l i t i c a l ( t h i s presumes no c h a n g e i n t h e a t t i t u d e s and p r a c t i c e s o f A u s t r a l i a and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ) . Little

233 c o n f i d e n c e , t h e r e f o r e , c o u l d be e x p e c t e d t o emerge f r o m a s i t u a t i o n i n which t h e o p e r a b i l i t y of t h e t r e a t y on a d a y - b y - d a y b a s i s was b e i n g c h a l l e n g e d i n a f u n d a m e n t a l way e v e r y t h r e e y e a r s o r l e s s . In t u r n , t h i s s u g g e s t s t h a t a c r i t i c a l j u n c t u r e was r e a c h e d , and p a s s e d , i n ANZUS i n e a r l y 1985. But u n l i k e many c r i t i c a l junct u r e s , t h i s o n e a d m i t s no r a t i o n a l o r e v e n f o r e s e e a b l e r e t u r n t o t h e f o r m e r s t a t u s quo.

THE

ANZUS

RESPONSE

I n t e r m s of t h e s e c u r i t y d i s t u r b a n c e s i n t h e South P a c i f i c , as an a l l i a n c e ANZUS i s v i r t u a l l y s i l e n t , a l though t h e p a r t n e r s t o i t h a v e been a c t i v e in v a r y i n g degrees. I t was on A u s t r a l i a ' s i n i t i a t i v e t h a t t h e SPNFZ was p r o p o s e d and on a U.S. i n i t i a t i v e t h a t a b e l a t e d a t t e m p t was made t o r e v i v e t h e i d e a of a r e g i o n a l tuna f i s h i n g management r e g i m e . Both m e a s u r e s , howe v e r , are i m p e r f e c t — t h e f o r m e r because i t is h a r d l y c o m p r e h e n s i v e and t h e l a t t e r b e c a u s e i t comes s o l a t e and was v i r t u a l l y f o r c e d on t h e U.S. g o v e r n m e n t by t h e S o v i e t Union's i n t e r v e n t i o n . Expediency h a s , t h e r e f o r e , been t h e d e t e r m i n a n t i n each of t h e s e c a s e s , and i t has prompted s k e p t i c i s m w i t h t h e r e g i o n a l a t t e n t i o n span of A u s t r a l i a and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and t h e a f f i n i t y t h e y c l a i m w i t h t h e c o u n t r i e s of Oceania. D i s s a t i s f a c t i o n is a l s o a f a c t o r in two other s e t s o f b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s , n o t a b l y b e t w e e n A u s t r a l i a and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and b e t w e e n A u s t r a l i a and F r a n c e . In t h e f o r m e r c a s e , Canberra's d i s c o n t e n t o r i g i n a t e d in what i t saw as W a s h i n g t o n ' s u n b e c o m i n g s i l e n c e i n t h e f a c e of French a r r o g a n c e in t h e P a c i f i c , p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o c o n t i n u e d n u c l e a r t e s t i n g at Nururoa A t o l l and t h e s i n k i n g o f t h e G r e e n p e a c e p r o t e s t v e s s e l Rainbow W a r r i o r i n Auckland h a r b o r by French agents i n J u l y 1985. A c c o r d i n g l y , i n t h e c o u r s e o f an a d d r e s s i n l a t e S e p t e m b e r 1985, t h e A u s t r a l i a n a m b a s s a d o r t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , Rawdon D a l r y m p l e , d e l i v e r e d a f i r m d i p l o m a t i c warning t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t h a t i t s t a r d i n e s s i n t h i s regard did nothing f o r the c o n f i d e n c e that the South P a c i f i c n a t i o n s p l a c e d i n t h e good o f f i c e s of t h e alliance partners. N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h i s was d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n b e t w e e n c l o s e a l l i e s and e x p r e s s e d w i t h o u t r a n c o r or i n t e n s i t y . As r e g a r d s French d e c o l o n i z a t i o n , i t was both Aust r a l i a ' s and New Z e a l a n d ' s v i e w t h a t France s h o u l d e x p e d i t e t h e p e a c e f u l t r a n s i t i o n of New C a l e d o n i a t o an independent, m u l t i r a c i a l s o c i e t y . At t h e same t i m e , b o t h c o u n t r i e s h a v e condemned t h e s o l i c i t i n g o f any o u t s i d e s u p p o r t t h a t might e n t a i l t h e u s e , o r t h r e a t of u s e , o f v i o l e n c e and t e r r o r i s m t o a c h i e v e l e g i t i m a t e political objectives. Whether such e x p r e s s i o n s of s u p p o r t and c a u t i o n f o r t h e Kanak p e o p l e w i l l h a v e any e f f e c t is q u e s t i o n a b l e . F r a n c e i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n has shown l i t t l e w i l l i n g n e s s t o a c c e p t o u t s i d e c o u n s e l ; on

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t h e c o n t r a r y , i t has f o r t h e most p a r t s h a r p l y r e s i s t e d A u s t r a l i a n and New Z e a l a n d o v e r t u r e s and p r o c e e d e d a t a p a c e d i c t a t e d a l m o s t e n t i r e l y by s e l f - r e l i a n c e . The m o s t v i s i b l e c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e F r e n c h a t t i t u d e w a s a b i t t e r r e s p o n s e by A u s t r a l i a n F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r B i l l Hayden d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of h i s a d d r e s s b e f o r e t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n ' s G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y on 1 O c t o b e r 1 9 8 5 . In r e s p o n s e t o a n e x t e n d e d p e r i o d of o f f i c i a l o b f u s c a t i o n by t h e F r e n c h , t h e n i t s g r u d g i n g a d m i s s i o n t h a t F r e n c h a g e n t s w e r e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e s a b o t a g e of R a i n b o w W a r r i o r , Hayden a t t a c k e d F r a n c e not o n l y f o r c o n t i n u i n g t o c o n d u c t i t s n u c l e a r t e s t i n g p r o g r a m w i t h i n t h e new SPNFZ, b u t by i m p l i c a t i o n b e r a t e d i t f o r i n g r a t i t u d e — h i s c h a r g e w a s b a s e d on t h e f a c t t h a t no c o u n t r i e s s a c r i f i c e d m o r e l i v e s i n d e f e n s e of F r a n c e i n W o r l d War I t h a n A u s t r a l i a a n d New Z e a l a n d . His r e m a r k s w e r e an attempt to r e c t i f y the "softness" or compromises t h a t many o b s e r v e r s s a w i n t h e SPNFZ t r e a t y and a r e a s s e r t i o n of Australia's identification with the Pacific community. A c c o r d i n g t o t h e s e r e s p o n s e s , ANZUS w a s i n e f f e c t f o l l o w i n g t h e p r a c t i c e i n w h i c h A u s t r a l i a and New Z e a l a n d o v e r s e e t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n of r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y i n t h e South P a c i f i c ( e v e n when i t i n v o l v e d a c e r t a i n a m o u n t o f c h i d i n g of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ) . T h u s , New Z e a l a n d ' s n o n - n u c l e a r p o l i c y c h a l l e n g e t o ANZUS w a s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s p r a c t i c e , a s was t h e U.S. r e s p o n s e to it. I n i t i a l l y , t h e U.S. g o v e r n m e n t e n g a g e d i n a t i m e - b i d i n g e x e r c i s e i n t h e h o p e t h a t New Z e a l a n d w o u l d soften its position. F o r s o m e s e v e n m o n t h s , no r e q u e s t w a s m a d e of t h e new g o v e r n m e n t i n W e l l i n g t o n t o h o s t U.S. Navy v e s s e l s of a n y d e s c r i p t i o n . Australia also m a d e n o a t t e m p t t o i n f l u e n c e New Z e a l a n d , b u t this n o n i n t e r v e n t i o n grew from t h e more n e g a t i v e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t e x t e r n a l a t t e m p t s t o i n f l u e n c e m a t t e r s would be u n w e l c o m e and c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e . The e v e n t t h a t moved t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s away f r o m i t s i n i t i a l s t a n c e w a s t h e r e j e c t i o n by New Z e a l a n d o f t h e U . S . S . Buch a n a n . In i t s a f t e r m a t h , t h e i r r e c o n c i l a b l e n a t u r e o f U.S. c o n v e n t i o n s a n d New Z e a l a n d p o l i c y became a p p a r e n t . With t h e f o r m e r r e f u s i n g t o o f f e r v e s s e l s t h a t conformed t o t h e Labour g o v e r n m e n t ' s r e q u i r e m e n t s , or t o c o n f i r m or deny w h e t h e r i t s v e s s e l s were c a r r y i n g nuclear weapons, the l a t t e r ' s r e f u s a l t o g r a n t p o r t a c c e s s was a s s u r e d . In t u r n , s o was U.S. r e a c t i o n and r e t r i b u t i o n , w h i c h i n v o l v e d d r a s t i c r e d u c t i o n s i n t h e l e v e l s of d e f e n s e and i n t e l l i g e n c e c o o p e r a tion. I n e f f e c t , ANZUS was r e n d e r e d " i n o p e r a t i v e " a s a t r i l a t e r a l s e c u r i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p , and New Z e a l a n d u n d e r went a change in c l a s s i f i c a t i o n — f r o m a l l y t o f r i e n d . J u s t a s New Z e a l a n d s i g n i f i e d i t s i n t e n t i o n to p r o v i d e a b a s i s in l e g i s l a t i o n f o r i t s p o l i c y , pronouncements f r o m t h e Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n became p r o g r e s s i v e l y s t r o n g e r and m o r e p u n i t i v e . In a n t i c i p a t i o n of t h e e v e n t , U . S . U n d e r S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r P o l i t i c a l A f f a i r s Michael Armacost gave n o t i c e t h a t t h e United

235 States could "renegotiate a new treaty arrangement, or p e r h a p s t h e r e are o t h e r w a y s the legal eagles in our r e s p e c t i v e g o v e r n m e n t s can d e f i n e for t r a n s m u t i n g a trilateral alliance into a bilateral alliance." 1 9 Notwithstanding U.S. willingness to negotiate a new treaty, there is, and is likely to be for some considerable time, a marked disinclination in Australia to move a w a y from ANZUS. For a s t a r t , a new t r e a t y could include provisions that are more restrictive in terms of U.S. c o m m i t m e n t to ANZUS. In an age w h e n C o n g r e s s h a s become increasingly jealous of its constitutional role in the U.S. foreign policy process, this restrictiveness must be seen as a distinct possibility and one that the To W h i t e H o u s e could p r o v e p o w e r l e s s to c i r c u m v e n t . labor the obvious: ANZUS is the embodiment of views that p r e v a i l e d in 1951; to say that its p r o v i s i o n s w o u l d a u t o m a t i c a l l y be t r a n s f e r r e d , u n d i m i n i s h e d , to a new treaty would involve a gamble. On these grounds alone, no Australian government could welcome moves leading to the dissolution of ANZUS. In Australia, too, there are cautions against such a decision. In this r e g a r d , t h e r e is p r o b a b l y no m o r e e l o g u e n t t e s t i m o n y t h a n P r i m e M i n i s t e r Robert Hawke's d e c i s i o n not to p r o v i d e A u s t r a l i a n s u p p o r t for the MX missile-testing program. He has argued that such support would put not only ANZUS, but the joint facilities and the v i s i t s by U.S. Navy ships to A u s t r a l i a n p o r t s , at "potential risk" in t h e event of w a r . Lange's p o s i tion w a s s e e n as o r i g i n a t i n g from t h o s e o p p o s e d to the original MX decision, in association with the left wing of the A u s t r a l i a n L a b o u r p a r t y (ALP), w h o it w a s felt w o u l d be able to m u s t e r s u f f i c i e n t n u m b e r s for the calling of a s p e c i a l L a b o u r p a r t y c o n f e r e n c e to d e b a t e the whole alliance structure. Hawke felt strongly about the issue: "I won't be a p r i m e m i n i s t e r of this country where those issues of central and continuing importance to our security are at risk." 20 In this light, it would appear that a treaty renegotiation could not be undertaken without considerable d i s r u p t i o n to p r e v a i l i n g v i e w s in the g o v e r n i n g (ALP) party in Australia. In all probability, the outcome in Australia would be as uncertain as in the United States, and h e n c e the c a u t i o n on Australia's p a r t against ever entering renegotiation in the first place. C a n b e r r a could also a r g u e a g a i n s t a r e n e g o t i a t e d treaty b e c a u s e of its p o t e n t i a l e f f e c t on a f u t u r e New Zealand government that wanted to resume the full range of alliance activities as they were understood prior to July 1984. Although this argument and its implications might be regarded as unlikely (in itself) to restore New Zealand to its prior status in ANZUS, such a restoration would nevertheless be that much more unlikely if, in the meantime, Australia and the United States had formalized their separatism. Overarching these considerations, however, is the popular support for ANZUS within the Australian elector-

236 a t e as a d e f e n s e a s s e t . So f i r m l y i s t h i s support r o o t e d t h a t m o v e s t o r e p l a c e ANZUS w o u l d i n v a r i a b l y b e t h o u g h t by t h e e l e c t o r a t e t o h e r a l d a d i m u n i t i o n i n t h e U.S. c o m m i t m e n t t o A u s t r a l i a . T h u s , i n t h e f a c e o f New Z e a l a n d ' s i n i t i a t i v e , Hawke's c o n c e r n was t o m i n i m i z e t h e d o m e s t i c r i s k s t o h i s g o v e r n m e n t t h a t c o u l d be c a u s e d b y New Z e a l a n d ' s e x a m p l e a n d t o m a i n t a i n t h e v i t a l i t y of A u s t r a l i a ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e U n i t e d States. In o r d e r t o d i f f u s e any p o t e n t i a l d o m e s t i c r i s k s , Canberra pursued the indirect approach. First, it w a i t e d , o b s e r v i n g t h a t any s u c c e s s f u l p r e s s u r e o n D a v i d Lange t o change h i s g o v e r n m e n t ' s p o s i t i o n c o u l d r e s u l t i n t h e u n d e r m i n i n g of h i s l e a d e r s h i p a n d New Z e a l a n d ' s a s s e r t i o n of a n e v e n h a r d e r l i n e p o l i c y . Second, Canb e r r a d e c l a r e d i t s e l f t o be n e u t r a l in t h e d i s p u t e . F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Hayden t h u s g a v e p u b l i c assurances t h r o u g h o u t l a t e 1984 t h a t A u s t r a l i a w o u l d n e i t h e r a c t a s " m e s s e n g e r boy" f o r t h e R e a g a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n n o r e n g a g e in "heavying" t h e Lange government o v e r i t s stand. Somewhat f o r t u i t o u s l y , A u s t r a l i a ' s s t a n c e i n t h i s p e r i o d was f a c i l i t a t e d by t h e l a c k of o p p o r t u n i t y New Z e a l a n d had t o e x c l u d e v e s s e l s banned u n d e r i t s p o l i c y . I n J a n u a r y 1 9 8 5 , h o w e v e r , t h e p o l i c y of l i m i t i n g domestic risks c o n f l i c t e d with a l l i a n c e maintenance, or a t l e a s t was r e g a r d e d as t o o p a s s i v e a s t r a t e g y to guarantee it. The B u c h a n a n r e j e c t i o n d e m a n d e d m o r e , and m o r e was f o r t h c o m i n g o n t h r e e f r o n t s — r e b u k e , i s o l a t i o n , and d e n i a l — f r o m A u s t r a l i a ( w h i c h r e a c t e d i n o b v i o u s concert with the United States). The r e b u k e t o o k t h e f o r m of a s t r o n g l y w o r d e d l e t t e r , r e p o r t e d l y s e n t w i t h o u t c a b i n e t c o n c u r r e n c e , f r o m Hawke t o L a n g e . In i t , t h e f o r m e r w r o t e t h a t A u s t r a l i a " c o u l d not a c c e p t as a p e r m a n e n t a r r a n g e m e n t t h a t t h e ANZUS a l l i a n c e h a d a d i f f e r e n t meaning, and e n t a i l e d d i f f e r e n t obligations, f o r d i f f e r e n t members."21 W i t h i n w e e k s , i s o l a t i o n and d e n i a l w e r e a c h i e v e d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y u s i n g a n u m b e r of m e a s u r e s — i n c l u d i n g t h e c a n c e l l a t i o n of s c h e d u l e d tril a t e r a l m i l i t a r y e x e r c i s e s , t h e c u t t i n g o f f of intelligence, and, p e r h a p s most i m p o r t a n t l y , t h e postponement by A u s t r a l i a ( a s h o s t n a t i o n ) of t h e J u l y 1 9 8 5 ANZUS council meeting. Yet, c o n c u r r e n t l y , C a n b e r r a a l s o a t t e m p t e d t o amel i o r a t e New Z e a l a n d ' s s i t u a t i o n . T h u s , a s a r e s u l t of a j o i n t defense m i n i s t e r s meeting in Wellington in April 1 9 8 5 , new w o r d s w e r e f o u n d t o e x p r e s s w h a t c o n s e n s u s t h e r e was r a t h e r t h a n w h a t i s s u e s d i v i d e d t h e m : " d e m o n s t r a b l e and i m p o r t a n t s h a r e d d e f e n c e i n t e r e s t s and a c l e a r need t o c o l l a b o r a t e on r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y issues."22 By t h i s f o r m u l a , b a s i c d i f f e r e n c e s o n t h e a l l i a n c e w e r e s u b o r d i n a t e d t o an a g r e e m e n t on m o r e A u s t r a l i a - N e w Z e a l a n d (ANZAC) e x e r c i s e s a n d p l a n s f o r c l o s e r d e f e n s e i n d u s t r i a l c o o p e r a t i o n and c o p r o d u c t i o n . In a d d i t i o n , A u s t r a l i a a g r e e d n o t o n l y t o h e l p New Z e a l a n d o v e r c o m e i t s e x t e r n a l i n t e l l i g e n c e d e f i c i t by e s t a b l i s h i n g and m a i n t a i n i n g d i s c r e t e ANZAC c e l l s that

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would h a n d l e i n f o r m a t i o n not U . S . - s o u r e e d , but a l s o t o meet t h e a s s o c i a t e d c o s t t h e s e m e a s u r e s e n t a i l e d . Aust r a l i a t h e r e b y imposed a d d i t i o n a l burden on an a l r e a d y s t r e t c h e d d e f e n s e b u d g e t , and w i t h i t , e l i c i t e d c r i t i c i s m s from t h e A u s t r a l i a n r i g h t t h a t t h e government was e i t h e r s u b s i d i z i n g o r c o n d o n i n g a New Z e a l a n d p o l i c y t h a t was i n i m i c a l t o i t s own i n t e r e s t s as a l r e a d y d e f i n e d by Hawke. Although c r i t i c i s m s were r e f u t e d , i t i s more d i f f i c u l t t o c h a l l e n g e t h e i l l o g i c o f C l o s e r ANZAC R e l a t i o n s (CAR) t h a t t h e A p r i l a g r e e m e n t s e f f e c t i v e l y entail. C o n v e r s e l y , t o e m b a r k on CAR now w o u l d s e e m t o i n v o l v e New Z e a l a n d i n an a s s o c i a t i o n t h a t w i l l be a l m o s t as d i s a g r e e a b l e f o r i t s p o l i c y m a k e r s as t h e n u c l e a r d i m e n s i o n s of t h e a l l i a n c e with t h e United S t a t e s . The p o i n t , t h o u g h , i s l e s s t h a t t h e New Z e a l a n d g o v e r n m e n t h a s f a i l e d t h e t e s t o f r a t i o n a l p u b l i c p o l i c y , but t h a t t h e A u s t r a l i a n government a p p e a r s c o m m i t t e d t o a compounded i l l o g i c a l i t y . WELLINGTON AND CANBERRA: DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS AND CAPABILITIES In t e r m s of s h e e r d e f e n s e m u s c l e , i t i s easy t o s e e why a new m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y of c l o s e n e s s t o A u s t r a l i a seems i m p e r a t i v e t o New Z e a l a n d . Defense spending f i g u r e s are r e v e a l i n g in t h i s r e g a r d . 2 3 New Z e a l a n d ' s d e f e n s e budget i s about o n e - h a l f A u s t r a l i a ' s i n t e r m s r e l a t i v e t o Gross N a t i o n a l P r o d u c t and has been steadily shrinking. In 1 9 8 5 - 8 6 , New Zealand w i l l spend a b o u t $ 5 0 4 m i l l i o n ( i n U.S. d o l l a r s ) on d e f e n s e ( b a r e l y 5 p e r c e n t of t o t a l government s p e n d i n g ) compared with A u s t r a l i a ' s more than $4.6 b i l l i o n ( 9 . 5 p e r c e n t of t h e total). F o r t h i s r e a s o n , any c o m p a r i s o n o f t h e f o r c e l e v e l s and weapons s y s t e m s o f New Zealand w i t h A u s t r a l i a , o r any o t h e r r e g i o n a l power, can o n l y be i n a p p r o p r i ate. To be s u r e , i n A u s t r a l i a ' s c a s e , t h e d i s c r e p a n c y r e f l e c t s Australia's proximity to Asia, the vulnerablity o f i t s n o r t h e r n s h o r e s , and i t s immense n a t u r a l w e a l t h . New Z e a l a n d , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , b e c a u s e o f i t s r e m o t e n e s s , t h e v a s t o c e a n t h a t s u r r o u n d s i t , and i t s r e l a t i v e p a u c i t y o f n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s , p e r c e i v e s no e x t e r n a l th r e a t . New Z e a l a n d I n 1 9 8 3 - 8 4 , t h e c o s t o f New Z e a l a n d ' s d e f e n s e t o t a l e d $470 m i l l i o n . This r e p r e s e n t e d 2.3 p e r c e n t of Gross D o m e s t i c P r o d u c t (GDP) and 4.2 p e r c e n t o f g o v e r n ment e x p e n d i t u r e . A u s t r a l i a s p e n t more t h a n $ 4 . 9 5 b i l l i o n , a c c o u n t i n g f o r 9 p e r c e n t of i t s t o t a l budget. By 1 9 8 5 - 8 6 , t h e d i s p a r i t y was even more s t r i k i n g . In J u n e 1 9 8 5 , New Zealand a l l o c a t e d $504 m i l l i o n t o d e f e n s e — a f i g u r e t h a t r e p r e s e n t e d an 18 p e r c e n t b o o s t o v e r 1 9 8 4 - 8 5

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levels. T o t a l e x p e n d i t u r e s f o r e c a s t t h u s r o s e t o $4.6 billion. To p l a c e t h e s e f i g u r e s i n p e r s p e c t i v e — t h e t o t a l New Z e a l a n d d e f e n s e b u d g e t i s j u s t $ 2 . 1 m i l l i o n more t h a n t h e i n c r e a s e a l l o c a t e d t o d e f e n s e i n A u s t r a l i a f o r 1985-86. One o t h e r c o m p a r i s o n i s a l s o r e v e a l i n g . Among t h e Western i n d u s t r i a l i z e d n a t i o n s , only A u s t r i a , F i n l a n d , and L u x e m b o u r g s p e n d a l e s s e r p r o p o r t i o n on defense. A p p r o x i m a t e l y o n e - h a l f of t h e New Zealand t o t a l i s a c c o u n t e d f o r by e x p e n d i t u r e on p e r s o n n e l , 17 p e r c e n t by c a p i t a l e q u i p m e n t , and a p p r o x i m a t e l y 6 p e r c e n t by f o r c e s o v e r s e a s , m a i n l y t h e New Zealand p r e s e n c e in S i n g a p o r e ( w h i c h i n c l u d e s o n e of t h e c o u n t r y ' s two i n f a n t r y b a t talions). Although d e f e n s e e x p e n d i t u r e s have i n c r e a s e d i n r e a l t e r m s s i n c e t h e l a t e 1 9 7 0 s , New Z e a l a n d ' s m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s a r e , t o s a y t h e l e a s t , modest even f o r a c o u n t r y of 3.3 m i l l i o n p e o p l e . In p r a c t i c a l t e r m s , New Z e a l a n d ' s 1 3 , 0 0 0 m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l and a s s o c i a t e d equipment r e p r e s e n t a working m u s e u m , a m e m o r i a l t o t h e b y g o n e e r a of t h e F o r w a r d D e f e n s e S t r a t e g y when New Zealand and A u s t r a l i a e n v i s aged h o l d i n g a t bay w h a t e v e r t h r e a t was e x t a n t i n S o u t h e a s t A s i a with t h e c o n s i d e r a b l e h e l p of t h e i r dominant alliance partners. The s t r i k e f o r c e e l e m e n t s w i t h o u t e x c e p t i o n a r e a r t i f a c t s b e l o n g i n g t o modes of t h i n k i n g t h a t d i d not s u r v i v e i n t a c t beyond t h e 1 9 6 0 s ; m o r e o v e r , t h e i r o b s o l e s c e n c e i s s o consummate as t o r e n d e r them of q u e s t i o n a b l e u t i l i t y i n a c o n f l i c t i n v o l v i n g any r e g i o n a l p o w e r . 2 4 The Royal New Zealand Air F o r c e (RNZAF) , f o r e x a m p l e , must be one of t h e few a i r f o r c e s in t h e w o r l d t h a t p o s s e s s e s f i g h t e r - t y p e a i r c r a f t (which d o n ' t even have a i r - t o - a i r radar) s l o w e r than i t s t r a n s p o r t a i r craft. In t h i s l i g h t , ANZUS's r e s o u r c e s , i n a s t r i c t l y m i l i t a r y s e n s e , w e r e not i m p r o v e d by New Z e a l a n d ' s a c t i v e m e m b e r s h i p , n o r , by t h e same c r i t e r i o n , s h o u l d they be d i s a d v a n t a g e d by i t s r e m o v a l . The p r o s p e c t s f o r a c h a n g e i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n a r e not b r i g h t b e c a u s e New Zealand h a s s u f f e r e d from c e r t a i n economic d i s a d v a n t a g e s , which a r e l i k e l y t o p e r s i s t . New Zealand h a s had t o f a c e t h e d i f f i c u l t t a s k of c r e a t i n g and m a i n t a i n i n g a v i a b l e d e f e n c e f o r c e i n a s o c i e t y whose w e a l t h i s s t i l l l a r g e l y a g r i c u l t u r a l , w i t h a s m a l l p o p u l a t i o n and r e l i a n t e n t i r e l y f o r i t s a r m e d f o r c e s on a v o l u n t e e r s y s t e m i n a r e l a t i v e l y prosperous s o c i e t y . The t a s k h a s been f u r t h e r c o m p l i c a t e d by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e d e f e n c e environment i s p r i n c i p a l l y m a r i t i m e , and t h e r e f o r e r e q u i r e s a d e f e n c e p r o f i l e which i n c l u d e s a v i a b l e s e a and a i r c a p a b i l i t y . T h e s e a r e a s of d e f e n c e h o w e v e r , a r e a t t h e s a m e t i m e t h e most c a p i t a l i n t e n s i v e and t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y s o p h i s ticated. However, t h e c h a n g e s t h a t have t a k e n p l a c e i n New Z e a l a n d ' s d e f e n c e s i t u a t i o n o v e r t h e l a s t d e c a d e h a v e b e e n a c c o m p a n i e d by s p i r a l l i n g e q u i p m e n t and t r a i n i n g c o s t s , i n an e c o n o m i c c l i m a t e w h i c h h a s brought i n c r e a s i n g f i n a n c i a l c o n s t r a i n t s .

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The m a g n i t u d e of such c o n s t r a i n t s can be gauged by r e f e r e n c e t o j u s t a few economic i n d i c a t o r s . Up u n t i l t h e l a s t t w o y e a r s o f t h e Muldoon ( N a t i o n a l p a r t y ) g o v e r n m e n t ( 1 9 8 2 - 1 9 8 4 ) , i n f l a t i o n was o f t h e d o u b l e d i g i t v a r i e t y - - 1 5 . 8 p e r c e n t in 1 9 8 2 , 12.6 p e r c e n t in 1 9 8 3 , and c u r r e n t l y 15 p e r c e n t . Growth i n t h e G r o s s N a t i o n a l Product (GNP) h a s a l s o been u n s p e c t a c u l a r — 3 . 2 At t h e s a m e t i m e , p e r c e n t in 1982; 0 p e r c e n t in 1983. b u r d e n s on t h e economy h a v e b e e n a i d e d and a b e t t e d by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e e x c h a n g e r a t e was f i x e d t o o h i g h . But o t h e r f a c t o r s a l s o had t h e i r i n f l u e n c e , i n c l u d i n g a budget d e f i c i t , in 1 9 8 3 - 8 4 , equal t o 9 p e r c e n t of t h e GDP--and a f o r e i g n d e b t , in 1 9 8 2 , of $ 1 0 . 2 billion ( a g a i n s t a 1 9 8 2 GDP o f o n l y $ 2 2 . 8 b i l l i o n ) . Together, t h e s e f i s c a l p r a c t i c e s had t h e e f f e c t o f dumping New Z e a l a n d i n t o a h i g h e r f o r e i g n d e b t p e r d o l l a r o f GNP t h a n even B r a z i l has i n c u r r e d . I t a l s o l o s t New Zealand t h e t o p c r e d i t r a t i n g i t had p r e v i o u s l y e n j o y e d among t h e banks of New York. Some h o p e i s h e l d f o r t h e l o n g - t e r m f u t u r e o f New Z e a l a n d ' s o v e r a l l economy b e c a u s e t h e s t r a t e g y of t h e Lange Labour g o v e r n m e n t c u r r e n t l y i s i n t h e c o n t r o l of what c a n o n l y be d e s c r i b e d as " f r e e m a r k e t e e r s . " Not o n l y have a l l e x c h a n g e c o n t r o l s been t e r m i n a t e d and t h e e x c h a n g e r a t e f l o a t e d ( e f f e c t i v e l y d e v a l u i n g t h e New Zealand d o l l a r c o n s i d e r a b l y ) , but t h e g o v e r n m e n t has a b o l i s h e d a l l t h e p r i c e c o n t r o l s , wage c o n t r o l s , intere s t r a t e c o n t r o l s , most of t h e i n d u s t r i a l s u b s i d i e s , a g r i c u l t u r a l s u b s i d i e s , e x p o r t s u b s i d i e s , and s t a t e c o r p o r a t i o n s u b s i d i e s i n t r o d u c e d o r i n t e n s i f i e d by t h e previous conservat ive government. It intends to i n t r o d u c e a g o o d s and s e r v i c e t a x on e v e r y t h i n g , i n c l u d i n g f o o d , and h o p e s t o u s e t h e t a x r e v e n u e s o g a i n e d t o o b t a i n a c r o s s - t h e - b o a r d r e d u c t i o n s i n income t a x . Just as s u r p r i s i n g , i t i s a l s o d i s m a n t l i n g much o f i t s w e l f a r e s t a t e — s o m e t h i n g t h a t , i r o n i c a l l y , o n c e p l a c e d New Zealand i n t h e f o r e f r o n t of " p r o g r e s s i v e " n a t i o n s . 2 6 I t i s p o s s i b l e , h o w e v e r , t h a t f o r a l l of t h e Labour g o v e r n m e n t ' s e n d e a v o r s , t h e c o u n t r y w i l be u n f o r g i v i n g of i t s impoverishment in r e a l terms in t h e immediate f u t u r e and w i l l remove Labour from o f f i c e i n 1 9 8 7 . This c o u l d v e r y w e l l r e t u r n a N a t i o n a l government whose e c o nomic p o l i c i e s would be b a s i c a l l y r e a c t i o n s (and r e a c t i o n a r y ) t o t h o s e of Labour. But i n l a r g e p a r t , t h e s u c c e s s o r f a i l u r e of t h e e c o n o m i c e x p e r i m e n t w i l l d e pend on how t h e r e s t o f t h e t r a d i n g w o r l d t r e a t s New Zealand. T h e r e a r e grounds f o r p e s s i m i s m h e r e b e c a u s e New Z e a l a n d ' s f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e f a c e s c o m p e t i t i o n on a l l s i d e s f r o m g r o s s l y s u b s i d i z e d p r o d u c t i o n s u c h as t h a t from t h e Common M a r k e t . E c o n o m i c s a s i d e , New Z e a l a n d h a s , h o w e v e r , made c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e ANZUS s e c u r i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p . But t h e y a r e o f an o r d e r much l e s s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a n , f o r e x a m p l e , some of t h e U.S. i n s t a l l a t i o n s i n A u s t r a l i a . 2 7 I n a w a r - f i g h t i n g s e n s e , t h e most i m p o r t a n t New Zealand i n s t a l l a t i o n is the Defense Communications Unit,

240 Tangimoana, north of W e l l i n g t o n , a s i g n a l s intelligence ( S I G I N T ) o p e r a t i o n under t h e n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l of t h e Government Communications S e c u r i t y Bureau. Its particul a r f u n c t i o n is to p r o v i d e high frequency direction f i n d i n g (HF-DF) d a t a t o a g l o b a l n e t w o r k d i r e c t e d t o what was f o r m e r l y known as t h e Naval Ocean S u r v e i l l a n c e I n f o r m a t i o n C e n t e r (NOSIC) at S u i t l a n d , M a r y l a n d , but i s now known as t h e Naval O p e r a t i o n a l I n t e l l i g e n c e C e n t e r ( N O I C ) . The end p r o d u c t o f t h i s i n t e l l i g e n c e i s t h e l o c a t i o n of a l l n a v a l v e s s e l s , e s p e c i a l l y S o v i e t n a v a l v e s s e l s ( i n c l u d i n g s u b m a r i n e s ) , on a w o r l d w i d e b a s i s . On i t s own, Tangimoana i s of e x t r e m e l y l i m i t e d s t r a t e g i c value. I f T a n g i m o a n a w e r e t o be l o s t t o t h e s y s t e m , a r e p l a c e m e n t c o u l d be l o c a t e d e l s e w h e r e i n t h e South P a c i f i c w i t h o u t t h e a l l i a n c e s u f f e r i n g any s e r i o u s i n t e l l i g e n c e degradation. I n sum, New Z e a l a n d ' s a l l i a n c e - r e l e v a n t d e f e n s e i n s t a l l a t i o n s a r e not r e a l l y c o m p a r a b l e t o A u s t r a l i a ' s or the United S t a t e s ' . Under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s , ins t a l l a t i o n s in A u s t r a l i a would i n v i t e a p r i o r i t y n u c l e a r s t r i k e ; such i s p r o b a b l y n o t t h e c a s e i n New Z e a l a n d . 2 8 But even i f t h i s crude l i t m u s i s d i s r e g a r d e d , t h e n a t u r e of New Z e a l a n d ' s m i l i t a r y and s t r a t e g i c c o n t r i b u t i o n t o ANZUS had more t o do w i t h t h e f a c t t h a t i t e x i s t e d than w i t h any a c t u a l f u n c t i o n a l a t t r i b u t e . Australia For A u s t r a l i a , h i s t o r y , t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l e n v i r o n ment, and d o m e s t i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s cause t h e c o u n t r y t o s e e t h e w o r l d i n much l e s s s a n g u i n e t e r m s t h a n New Zealand does. I n W o r l d War I I , t h e J a p a n e s e bombed Darwin and then p e n e t r a t e d t h e d e f e n s e s of Sydney h a r b o r with midget submarines. These a r e r e m i n d e r s t o A u s t r a l i a t h a t t h e r e was p e r i l o u t o f t h e n o r t h , and t h e v i e w s t i l l has c u r r e n c y even i f t h e o r i g i n s of t h e p e r i l h a v e chang e d . F o r some t i m e now, A u s t r a l i a ' s s u s p i c i o u s g l a n c e has b e e n i n t h e d i r e c t i o n o f I n d o n e s i a and i t s o p e r a t i o n s i n E a s t T i m o r and p a r t i c u l a r l y a l o n g t h e b o r d e r w i t h Papua New G u i n e a . It is here, f o r example, that t h e o l d E u r o c e n t r i c n o t i o n o f t h e Far E a s t b e c o m e s a distortion. For p o l i c y m a k e r s in C a n b e r r a , t h i s i s t h e n e a r n o r t h , and t h e c l o s e n e s s i s w o r r y i n g . Despite f r e q u e n t and r e a s o n a b l y c o r d i a l d i p l o m a t i c e x c h a n g e s b e t w e e n A u s t r a l i a and I n d o n e s i a , t h e r e has a l s o been an a t t e m p t by C a n b e r r a t o " s i g n a l " J a k a r t a t h a t t h e r e a r e l i m i t s t o what w i l l be t o l e r a t e d . To t h i s e n d , i t was announced, i n August 1984, t h a t t h e Royal A u s t r a l i a n A i r F o r c e (RAAF) w o u l d be l o c a t i n g i t s 75th s q u a d r o n , w i t h t h e new FA/18 t a c t i c a l f i g h t e r , at T i n d a l , near K a t h e r ine, in the Northern T e r r i t o r y . This expensive (in e x c e s s of $168 m i l l i o n o v e r t h e f i r s t f i v e y e a r s ) p r o j e c t i s p a r t of t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of n o r t h e r n d e f e n s e f r o m L e a r m o n t h i n t h e n o r t h w e s t t h r o u g h D e r b y , D a r w i n , and

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T o w n s v i l l e i n t h e n o r t h e a s t , and i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e Jindalee over-the-horizon radar system. When t h e s e deployments are coupled with the planned rotational d e p l o y m e n t of o t h e r F A / 1 8 s t o t h e B u t t e r w o r t h A i r B a s e in Malaysia, t h e r e is a c l e a r message t o the Indonesians (and o t h e r s a d m i t t e d l y ) t h a t A u s t r a l i a i s p r e p a r e d t o defend i t s regional i n t e r e s t s . On p a p e r a n y w a y . As E x e r c i s e Kangaroo 83 p r o v e d , even a l l o w i n g f o r i t s a r t i ficial nature, the A u s t r a l i a n Defense Forces were s t r e t c h e d t o t h e l i m i t by t h e i n s e r t i o n o f o n l y 2 0 0 " i n v a d e r s " s u p p o r t e d by l i m i t e d a i r s t r i k e s i n t h e P i l b a r a r e g i o n of n o r t h w e s t A u s t r a l i a . At t h e r i s k of a p p e a r i n g t o o v e r e m p h a s i z e A u s t r a l i a ' s n e a r n o r t h , two I n d o n e s i a n s t r a t e g i c a s s e t s s h a r p e n Australia's concern. The f i r s t is the quite longs t a n d i n g a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n I n d o n e s i a and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s governing t h e use of v a r i o u s s t r a t e g i c waterways ( e . g . , O m b i a - W e t a r S t r a i t s ) t h a t U.S. Navy v e s s e l s u s e t o t r a n s i t from t h e P a c i f i c t o t h e Indian Ocean. The a g r e e m e n t i m p l i e s t h a t I n d o n e s i a e n j o y s U.S. c o n f i d e n c e . The s e c o n d i s t h e r e c e n t a p p o i n t m e n t of A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r E a s t A s i a n and P a c i f i c A f f a i r s P a u l W o l f o w i t z as U.S. a m b a s s a d o r t o I n d o n e s i a . As a "hawk" who h a s e a s y and d i r e c t a c c e s s t o t h e W h i t e H o u s e , and as t h e m a i n o r c h e s t r a t o r of U.S. p o l i c y on ANZUS, W o l f o w i t z ' s appointment i n d i c a t e s t h a t Washington is paying increased attention to Indonesia. I n t h e l i g h t o f Dep a r t m e n t o f S t a t e and P e n t a g o n a n x i e t y o v e r t h e f u t u r e of t h e P h i l i p p i n e b a s e s , W o l f o w i t z ' s appointment has been s e e n as s i g n i f i c a n t in A u s t r a l i a . The f a c t t h a t , i n 1 9 8 4 , h e s p a r k e d a m i n o r d i p l o m a t i c row by m a k i n g e x t r e m e l y t r e n c h a n t comments a b o u t M i n i s t e r f o r F o r e i g n A f f a i r s B i l l Hayden and A u s t r a l i a ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y u n d e r h i m , m u s t s e r v e t o i n d i c a t e l i k e l y U.S. a s s i s t a n c e i n t h e event of A u s t r a l i a n d i f f i c u l t i e s with I n d o n e s i a . Notwithstanding the worrisome p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of I n d o n e s i a , A u s t r a l i a i s d e t e r m i n e d on a c l o s e l y s u p p o r t i v e r o l e i n U.S. g l o b a l s t r a t e g y . I n no a r e a i s t h i s more abundantly c l e a r than in t h e a r e a of n u c l e a r s t r a t e g y and t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e Aus t r a l i a n - U . S . j o i n t f a c i l i t i e s a t P i n e Gap, N u r r u n g a r , and North West C a p e . 2 9 From t h e l i m i t e d p u b l i c d e b a t e and g o v e r n m e n t a l d i s c l o s u r e s t h a t h a v e o c c u r r e d , i t i s a p p a r e n t t h a t P i n e Gap and N u r r u n g a r p l a y t w o i n t e r t w i n e d r o l e s . The f i r s t i s a s t a b i l i z i n g , v e r i f i c a t i o n r o l e as r e g a r d s arms c o n t r o l a g r e e m e n t s and an e a r l y w a r n i n g r o l e i n r e s p e c t of m i s s i l e launches. The s e c o n d i s a d e s t a b i l i z i n g n u c l e a r war-fighting role that f a c i l i t a t e s counterforce targeting of S o v i e t m i s s i l e s i l o s . In a d d i t i o n , P i n e Gap p r o v i d e s t h e United S t a t e s with a v i t a l c o v e r t e l e c t r o n i c s u r v e i l l a n c e c a p a b i l i t y t h a t c a n n o t be l o c a t e d i n any o t h e r p a r t of t h e w o r l d . A c c o r d i n g t o Desmond B a l l , t h e s t r a t e g i c i n t e l l i g e n c e f u n c t i o n of P i n e Gap h a s a l w a y s o v e r s h a d o w e d i t s arms c o n t r o l f u n c t i o n s t o t h e p o i n t t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s is a b l e , with the i n f o r m a t i o n i t o b t a i n s , to

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c o n c e a l c e r t a i n n u c l e a r s t r a t e g i c a c t i v i t i e s from S o v i e t scrutiny.30 Under t h e r u b r i c of s t r a t e g i c i n t e l l i g e n c e , f a c i l i t i e s a t P i n e Gap a l s o a r e a b l e t o m o n i t o r C h i n e s e , S o v i e t , and A u s t r a l i a n c o m m u n i c a t i o n s — o f f i c i a l as w e l l as p r i v a t e . T h e t h i r d f a c i l i t y , as c o n t e n t i o u s as t h e o t h e r t w o , i s t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s s t a t i o n a t N o r t h W e s t Cape t h a t p r o v i d e s (among i t s f u n c t i o n s ) v e r y low f r e q u e n c y s i g n a l s t o t h e U.S. f l e e t o f n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e submarines. In t h e c u r r e n t s t a t e of s u b m a r i n e b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e and a s s o c i a t e d t e c h n o l o g i e s , this f a c i l i t y is extremely important. Such i s t h e m a r k e d s u p e r i o r i t y of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o v e r t h e S o v i e t Union t h a t many U.S. c o m m e n t a t o r s w i t h a working knowledge of t h e v a r i o u s t e c h n o l o g i e s c r e d i t t h e U.S. Navy w i t h a move t o w a r d a c q u i r i n g a f i r s t s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t y . 3 1 More c o n s e r v a t i v e o b s e r v e r s , h o w e v e r , deny t h a t t h i s s i t u a t i o n is l i k e l y in t h e f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e , yet they a l s o point t o p o l i c i e s t h a t , taken t o g e t h e r , are s t r a t e g i c a l ly d e s t a b i l i z i n g . 3 2 ( T h i s i s , o f c o u r s e , d e n i e d by A u s t r a l i a n and U.S. government o f f i c i a l s who c l a i m t h a t , even i f t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s a r e of a f i r s t s t r i k e n a t u r e , and some r e s i s t t h i s s u g g e s t i o n , t h e United S t a t e s does not a d h e r e t o a f i r s t s t r i k e s t r a t e g y . ) O v e r a l l , then, t h e s e f a c i l i t i e s f a l l in f u n c t i o n somewhere b e t w e e n s u p p o r t f o r a d o c t r i n e o f d e t e r r e n c e t h a t i s i n a s t a t e o f e r o s i o n and a n u c l e a r w a r - f i g h t i n g resource. By t h e s e c o n d c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , t h e y a r e a l l p r i o r i t y n u c l e a r t a r g e t s , and t h i s has been c o n f i r m e d by b o t h U.S. and A u s t r a l i a n g o v e r n m e n t t e s t i m o n y . Nevert h e l e s s , t h e p o s s i b l e c o s t t o A u s t r a l i a of h o s t i n g t h e l a t t e r i s t h o u g h t by s u c c e s s i v e g o v e r n m e n t s t o be worth t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of t h e f o r m e r . Neither under a c o a l i t i o n government nor an ALP government i s t h i s l i k e l y t o change. I n d e e d , P r i m e M i n i s t e r Hawke has put h i s f u t u r e on t h e l i n e i n s o f a r as t h e i r s e c u r i t y o f t e n u r e i s concerned. I n March 1 9 8 5 , h e went as f a r as t o s a y h e would not be p r i m e m i n i s t e r i f t h e h o s t i n g a r r a n g e m e n t s for the j o i n t f a c i l i t i e s were r e p u d i a t e d . 3 3 Thus, whether a benign or malign view is taken of t h e s e i n s t a l l a t i o n s , t h e y a r e r e g a r d e d by t h e two l a r g e s t ANZUS p a r t n e r s as v i t a l . The j o i n t i n s t a l l a t i o n s a r e a l s o nonnegotiable i n s t r u m e n t s o f U.S. p o l i c y . P r i m e M i n i s t e r Hawke c o n c u r s in t h i s , but i t i s W a s h i n g t o n ' s a t t i t u d e toward W h e r e a s a number o f them t h a t i s m o r e i n t e r e s t i n g . A u s t r a l i a n commentators have a s c r i b e d d i p l o m a t i c l e v e r age t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e b a s e s e x i s t on A u s t r a l i a n s o i l , t h i s c l a i m i s r e j e c t e d o u t o f hand by s e n i o r U.S. o f f i cials. A c c o r d i n g t o David Emery, deputy d i r e c t o r o f t h e U.S. Arms C o n t r o l and Disarmament Agency, t h e b a s e s a r e on A u s t r a l i a n s o i l b e c a u s e t h e A u s t r a l i a n g o v e r n m e n t r e c o g n i z e s t h e very important r o l e they p l a y in p r o m o t i n g p e a c e and i n n e g o t i a t i o n : t h e y a r e , t h e r e f o r e , n o t bargaining chips in i n t r a - a l l i a n c e r e l a t i o n s . 3 4 A s s e r t i o n s of t h i s n a t u r e h a v e been common t h r o u g h -

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out t h e h i s t o r y of t h e j o i n t i n s t a l l a t i o n s . Probably the most frequent denies t h a t they a r e , operationally s p e a k i n g , U.S. i n s t a l l a t i o n s o v e r which A u s t r a l i a h a s even l i m i t e d c o n t r o l . Yet t h e p u b l i c r e c o r d is q u i t e c l e a r on t h e h i s t o r i c a l u n i l a t e r a l i s m o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s : i n 1 9 7 3 , f o r e x a m p l e , d u r i n g t h e Yom Kippur W a r , t h e f a c i l i t i e s a t North West Cape, P i n e Gap, and N u r r u n g a r w e r e p l a c e d on f u l l a l e r t , w i t h N o r t h W e s t C a p e b e i n g u s e d t o c o m m u n i c a t e t h e g e n e r a l U.S. a l e r t t o both c o n v e n t i o n a l and n u c l e a r f o r c e s i n t h e r e g i o n t o a s s u m e D e f e n s e R e a d i n e s s C o n d i t i o n 3 (DEFCON 3 ) . 3 5 At no s t a g e i n t h e p r o c e e d i n g s was t h e A u s t r a l i a n g o v e r n m e n t i n formed. 6 In 1 9 8 4 , i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e G u l f War b e t w e e n I r a n and I r a q , a c a b i n e t p a p e r w a r n e d t h a t t h e c u r r e n t l a c k o f A u s t r a l i a n c o n t r o l was s u c h t h a t t h e U.S. i n s t a l l a t i o n s c o u l d be u s e d w i t h o u t Australian k n o w l e d g e t o i n i t i a t e and s u p p o r t a c t i o n t o p r o t e c t U.S. i n t e r e s t s in the Middle E a s t . 3 7 H e n c e , by a n y s t a n d a r d s , A u s t r a l i a h a s been p r e p a r e d t o s a c r i f i c e c o n s i d e r a b l e a u t o n o m y w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e t h r e e m a i n U.S. b a s e s in t h e c o u n t r y . I t h o s t s , and w i l l c o n t i n u e t o h o s t , U.S. f a c i l i t i e s t h a t by t h e i r v e r y n a t u r e i n v o l v e a s u r r e n d e r o f s o v e r e i g n t y i n t h e a r e a of war f i g h t i n g and p o s s i b l y n u c l e a r war f i g h t i n g . In o t h e r , r e l a t e d a r e a s a s i m i l a r p a t t e r n h a s been f o l l o w e d — A u s t r a l i a i s h o s t t o a number of h i g h f r e q u e n c y d i r e c t i o n - f i n d i n g f a c i l i t i e s and an OMEGA n a v i g a t i o n s t a t i o n with unique m i l i t a r y f u n c t i o n s . The g o v ernment has a l s o agreed t o allow r e s e a r c h in A u s t r a l i a n e s t a b l i s h m e n t s t o be u n d e r t a k e n on a weapons s y s t e m t h a t is d i r e c t l y r e l e v a n t t o t h e S t r a t e g i c Defense I n i t i a t i v e ( S t a r W a r s ) of t h e Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 3 8 (The o p e r a t i o n o f a p l e t h o r a o f o t h e r U.S. i n s t a l l a t i o n s with v a r y i n g d e g r e e s of s t r a t e g i c r e l e v a n c e i s not e x a m i n e d here.) N e v e r t h e l e s s , from t h e above b r i e f c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , t h e r e c a n be no doubt about A u s t r a l i a ' s e x t e n s i v e i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e U.S. s t r a t e g i c p o s t u r e . There is a l s o no d o u b t t h a t New Z e a l a n d ' s o b j e c t i v e o f a c l o s e r ANZAC r e l a t i o n s h i p must be t e m p e r e d by t h e f a c t t h a t i t w i l l i n v o l v e a c l o s e a l l i a n c e with t h e country t h a t i s , e f f e c t i v e l y , a U.S. s t r a t e g i c s a t r a p . F o r New Z e a l a n d p o l i c y m a k e r s , t h e r e i s u n l i k e l y t o be any r e l i e f f r o m t h i s f u n d a m e n t a l o r i e n t a t i o n , u n d e r any A u s t r a l i a n g o v ernment, in the f o r s e e a b l e f u t u r e . New Z e a l a n d p l e a s f o r a n u c l e a r - d i s a r m e d w o r l d , o r a t l e a s t a n u c l e a r - f r e e P a c i f i c Ocean a r e , g i v e n t h e f o r e g o i n g , u n l i k e l y t o be a c c o m m o d a t e d . C e r t a i n l y , New Z e a l a n d m i g h t e x p e c t some s u p p o r t from A u s t r a l i a i n t h e d i s a r m a m e n t / a r m s c o n t r o l s p h e r e , and much i s l i k e l y t o be made by A u s t r a l i a of i t s m e m b e r s h i p i n v a r i o u s U n i t e d N a t i o n s o r g a n s , i t s m e m b e r s h i p i n t h e C o n f e r e n c e on D i s a r m a m e n t , and i t s a p p o i n t m e n t o f an a m b a s s a d o r f o r disarmament. But none o f t h e s e i s l i k e l y t o s a t i s f y New Z e a l a n d i n t h e l o n g r u n b e c a u s e w h a t New Z e a l a n d w a n t s i s what A u s t r a l i a c a n n o t p o s s i b l y p r o v i d e — t h e a b o l i t i o n of t h e c u r r e n t n u c l e a r w o r l d , not i t s r e f o r m .

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CAR, t h e r e f o r e , i s a m a s s i v e i r o n y . I t would a c t u a l l y s u b v e r t a n d m a k e l e s s c r e d i b l e New Z e a l a n d ' s p o l i cies. W h e r e a s t h o s e p o l i c i e s now c a n b e c h a r a c t e r i z e d as p r o g r e s s i v e , p e r h a p s r e v o l u t i o n a r y , because they i n v o l v e a f u n d a m e n t a l r e a r r a n g e m e n t of l o n g - e s t a b l i s h e d p r a c t i c e s and u n d e r s t a n d i n g s , A u s t r a l i a n s e c u r i t y p o l i c i e s p o i n t t o w a r d a c l o s e r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and integrat i o n w i t h U.S. n u c l e a r s t r a t e g y . In o t h e r w o r d s , the ANZAC c o n n e c t i o n w i l l m o r e c l o s e l y i n v o l v e New Z e a l a n d w i t h a c o u n t r y t h a t h a s a c q u i r e d m a n y of t h e s a m e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t c a u s e d New Z e a l a n d t o d i s t a n c e itself f r o m a n o t h e r c o u n t r y — t h e U.S.— i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e . In t u r n , t h i s w o u l d m e a n t h a t New Z e a l a n d , i n t h e g u i s e of g r e a t e r s e c u r i t y and i n d e p e n d e n c e , had o n l y " J a p a n i z e d " i t s e l f - - s e e k i n g n e i t h e r t o h e a r , speak, nor s e e t h e e v i l it purports to abhor.39 In r e t u r n , A u s t r a l i a might p r o v i d e a n d e n c o u r a g e a s e n s e of c l o s e n e s s , b u t i t w i l l d o s o o n i t s own t e r m s a n d w i t h a q u a l i f i e d g e n e r o s i t y , much l i k e t h e s h e l t e r g r a n t e d t o a d i f f i c u l t c h i l d by a previous marriage.

A TREATY IN LIMBO I n s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s , i t m i g h t b e t h o u g h t t h a t New Z e a l a n d w o u l d , i n d e e d s h o u l d , w i t h d r a w f r o m ANZUS. Ins t e a d , t h e s i t u a t i o n a d m i t t e d an i r o n y i n t h a t , until S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 5 , New Z e a l a n d s t e a d f a s t l y m a i n t a i n e d a n o n p o s i t i o n o n w i t h d r a w a l f r o m ANZUS. On t h e c o n t r a r y , i t h a d , a c c o r d i n g t o P r i m e M i n i s t e r David Lange's s t a t e ments, a c o n t i n u i n g , s t r o n g commitment t o the a l l i a n c e . One e x t e n s i o n of t h i s p o s i t i o n w a s t h a t t h e o n u s of a n y a t t e m p t t o d i s e s t a b l i s h ANZUS o r t o i s o l a t e New Z e a l a n d w i t h i n i t w o u l d be on A u s t r a l i a and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . A n o t h e r e x t e n s i o n of New Z e a l a n d ' s p o s i t i o n was t h a t a n y a t t e m p t by A u s t r a l i a a n d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o n e g o t i a t e a s e p a r a t e t r e a t y w o u l d s i g n i f y t h e d e m i s e o f ANZUS b y unilateral withdrawal. E x p u l s i o n o f New Z e a l a n d f r o m ANZUS w a s e v e n l e s s of a l i k e l i h o o d , a g a i n f o r a s i m p l e r e a s o n : t h e t r e a t y c o n t a i n s no p r o v i s i o n s f o r e x p u l s i o n of a m e m b e r s t a t e — o n l y w i t h d r a w a l f r o m t h e C o u n c i l a s s p e c i f i e d by A r t i c l e X, w h i c h r e q u i r e s t h a t o n e y e a r ' s n o t i c e b e g i v e n t o t h e g o v e r n m e n t of A u s t r a l i a . Nevertheless, it is s i g n i f i c a n t that since withd r a w a l ( a l b e i t f r o m t h e C o u n c i l ) was a t l e a s t c o n t e m p l a t e d when t h e t r e a t y was e s t a b l i s h e d , and g i v e n a l s o t h a t New Z e a l a n d w a s t h e l e a s t o f t h e t h r e e p o w e r s t o s i g n i t , t h e p o s s i b i l i t y e x i s t s t h a t ANZUS r e m a i n s v i a b l e a t t h e c u r r e n t l e v e l of o p e r a b i l i t y b e t w e e n A u s t r a l i a and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . T h i s i s an i n t e l l e c t u a l and n o t a p o l i t i c a l j u d g m e n t ; t h e v a r i o u s political dimensions t o t h e p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n could persuade t h e s e t w o c o u n t r i e s t o m o v e t o w a r d a new f o r m a l a l l i a n c e . The same p o l i t i c a l dimensions a l s o could d e t e r both from

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s u c h an i n i t i a t i v e i n v i e w o f t h e u n c e r t a i n t i e s t h a t must a t t e n d i t . Even m o r e i r o n i c t h a n New Z e a l a n d ' s p o s i t i o n on w i t h d r a w a l was i t s p r o p o s a l o f a P a c i f i c Regional D e f e n s e A r r a n g e m e n t ; i t was i r o n i c b e c a u s e David Lange ( i n R a r a t o n g a d u r i n g t h e August 1985 South P a c i f i c F o r um), t h e p r i m e m i n i s t e r o f t h e m i l i t a r i l y w e a k e s t s t a t e i n ANZUS, proposed t h e a r r a n g e m e n t y e t made no m e n t i o n o f a r o l e f o r A u s t r a l i a , upon whom New Z e a l a n d i s i n c r e a s i n g l y d e p e n d e n t , both m i l i t a r i l y and e c o n o m i c a l l y . I t i s i m p o s s i b l e , t h e r e f o r e , t o c o n c e i v e how New Z e a l a n d , which l a c k s t h e m i l i t a r y and s u r v e i l l a n c e c a p a b i l i t i e s t o c o o r d i n a t e a r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y a r r a n g e m e n t , can be t a k e n s e r i o u s l y i n s t r a t e g i c t e r m s . W i t h i n a month o f L a n g e ' s p r o p o s a l , h o w e v e r , t h e c e n t r a l q u e s t i o n of New Z e a l a n d ' s c o n t i n u e d membership i n ANZUS was r e a d d r e s s e d and t h i s t i m e i n more r e a l i s t i c terms. In t h e wake of t h e deputy p r i m e m i n i s t e r ' s v i s i t t o W a s h i n g t o n and t h e e v i d e n t f a i l u r e o f t h e U.S. and New Z e a l a n d g o v e r n m e n t s t o r e a c h a c o m p r o m i s e , L a n g e d e n i e d t h a t t h e r e was " a n y p o s s i b i l i t y " o f a r e t u r n t o t h e t r a d i t i o n a l d e f e n s e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e two countries. He t h e r e f o r e s t a t e d h i s p r e p a r e d n e s s t o s c r a p ANZUS " i n t h e i n t e r e s t s o f h a r m o n i o u s r e l a t i o n s w i t h A u s t r a l i a and t h e U . S . " In doing s o , he p r o v i d e d one of t h e more t e l l i n g i n d i c a t o r s of t h e m o r b i d i t y of ANZUS as i t h a s been known. I n g e o s t r a t e g i c t e r m s , t o b e i n New Z e a l a n d i s t o be l o n e l y . So many n e g a t i v e i n d i c a t o r s c a n b e a d d u c e d in s u p p o r t of t h i s f a c t t h a t i t i s perhaps more u s e f u l t o c o n c e n t r a t e on t h e few p o s i t i v e i n d i c a t o r s t h a t make t h e same p o i n t . Surrounded by v a s t o c e a n s , New Z e a l a n d , q u i t e s i m p l y , i s r e m o t e from anywhere e x c e p t P o l y n e s i a , A u s t r a l i a , and t h e s o u t h e r n p o l a r i c e - - s o much s o t h a t one i s tempted t o borrow Henry K i s s i n g e r ' s famous d e p r e c i a t i o n o f L a t i n A m e r i c a and apply i t : " a d a g g e r p o i n t ing a t t h e h e a r t of A n t a r c t i c a . " Whereas some A u s t r a l i a n s f e a r t h a t t h e i r c o u n t r y ' s endowment o f n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s c o u l d p r o v o k e some form of a t t a c k o r i n c u r s i o n , New Z e a l a n d ' s main bounty i s a g r i c u l t u r e , and t h e n o t i o n t h a t s o m e o n e m i g h t want t o i n v a d e f o r t h i s i s simply f a n t a s t i c . Whereas A u s t r a l i a i s p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h t h e n e a r n o r t h o f i t s s t r a t e g i c e n v i r o n m e n t , t h e New Zealand p r i m e m i n i s t e r i n 1 9 6 9 , K e i t h H o l y o a k e , met with c o n s i d e r a b l e d e r i s i o n when he a t t e m p t e d t o e x p l a i n h i s c o u n t r y ' s m i n i m a l commitment t o t h e Vietnam War i n t e r m s of t h e " l o g i c " of g e o g r a p h y . As was q u i c k l y p o i n t e d o u t t o him by David M c l n t y r e , New Z e a l a n d ' s f r o n t l i n e c o u l d be p l a c e d i n S o u t h e a s t A s i a o n l y w i t h t h e a i d o f a s p u r i o u s " l o g i c " : " I t i s h e l p f u l t o remember t h a t London i s c l o s e r t o Hanoi t h a n C h r i s t c h u r c h i s . Even D i s r a e l i , who s a i d t h e ' k e y o f I n d i a ' was C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , n e v e r c l a i m e d t h a t t h e o u t e r d e f e n c e s of t h e S t r a i t s o f Dover s t r e t c h e d t o t h e Gulf o f T o n k i n . " 4 0 A g a i n s t t h i s b a c k g r o u n d , New Z e a l a n d i s v e r y much

246 c a s t i n t o s h a d o w - - a s m a l l g r o u p of i s l a n d s b e h i n d an i s l a n d c o n t i n e n t t h a t does not even p o s s e s s t h e g e o s t r a t e g i c i m p o r t a n c e t h a t , s a y , G i b r a l t a r e n j o y e d in previous t i m e s , or that A u s t r a l i a , in r e l a t i v e terms, has had t h r u s t upon i t now. In s h o r t , i n g e o s t r a t e g i c t e r m s , i f New Z e a l a n d d i d n o t e x i s t , i t w o u l d n o t h a v e t o be i n v e n t e d . The r e a d i n e s s w i t h w h i c h t h e Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n has been p r e p a r e d t o cut o f f intelligence t o W e l l i n g t o n i n t h e c u r r e n t impasse s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e U.S. g o v e r n m e n t i s w e l l a p p r a i s e d o f t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n c o n v e n i e n c e and n e c e s s i t y w i t h r e g a r d not o n l y t o t h e v a l u e o f f a c i l i t i e s i n New Z e a l a n d but a l s o t h e country's s t r a t e g i c assets. CONCLUSION

A g a i n s t t h e d e t a c h m e n t o f New Z e a l a n d f r o m ANZUS, t h e s e c u r i t y c h a l l e n g e s f a c e d by A u s t r a l i a and t h e United States remain manageable. Although A u s t n a l i a w o u l d o b v i o u s l y w e l c o m e U.S. s u p p o r t f o r i t s c o n c e r n s a b o u t F r a n c e ' s a c t i v i t i e s and t u n a f i s h i n g r i g h t s , t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of ANZUS f r o m a t r i l a t e r a l t o a b i l a t e r a l arrangement i s t h e s i n g l e most i m p o r t a n t s e c u r i t y e v e n t i n t h e South P a c i f i c and o n e t h a t t h e r e m a i n i n g t w o p a r t n e r s w i l l need t o accommodate. New Z e a l a n d ' s n o n - n u c l e a r i n i t i a t i v e u n d o u b t e d l y w i l l h a v e an extended e f f e c t , but t o what end i s i m p o s s i b l e t o say. In W e s t e r n Europe, t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n , and N o r t h e a s t A s i a , t h e r e a r e c o u n t r i e s t h a t w i l l not o n l y g i v e New Z e a l a n d ' s p o l i c i e s c l o s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n but w i l l t a k e e n c o u r a g e m e n t f r o m them as w e l l . Thus, f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f ANZUS i s l e s s i m p o r t a n t i n i t s e l f than i s i t s p o t e n t i a l consequences i n a r e a s of g r e a t e r s t r a t e g i c s i g n i f i c a n c e . For a l l t h e p o t e n t i a l d i s t u r b a n c e t h i s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i m p l i e s , i t i s n e v e r t h e l e s s p o s s i b l e t o v i e w New Zealand's detachment in p o s i t i v e terms. Outside the f o r m a l t r e a t y a r r a n g e m e n t , t h e r i p p l e e f f e c t may be o b v i a t e d t o a m a r k e d d e g r e e b e c a u s e t h e New Z e a l a n d example p r e s e n t s o t h e r c o u n t r i e s w i t h s t a r k d e c i s i o n s . Moreover, because nearly every other country in the w o r l d r e s i d e s i n a more t h r e a t e n i n g e n v i r o n m e n t than t h e South P a c i f i c , t h e i r o n y of t h e New Zealand s t a n c e c o u l d be t h a t s t a t e s w i l l s t a y w i t h i n t h e bounds of t r a d i t i o n a l a l l i a n c e b e h a v i o r f o r f e a r o f t h e c o s t s and u n c e r t a i n t i e s t h a t o c c u r o u t s i d e them. I n New Z e a l a n d ' s c a s e , e x c o m m u n i c a t i o n i s not c o m p l e t e . There i s a c l e a r d e s i r e , a l b e i t i l l o g i c a l on t h e b a s i s o f t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d , t h a t C l o s e r ANZAC R e l a t i o n s w i l l develop b e t w e e n A u s t r a l i a and New Z e a l a n d and t h a t t h e l a t t e r wants t o r e e s t a b l i s h t h e c l o s e b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p i n nonsecurity areas with the United States that e x i s t e d p r i o r t o 1985. What m i g h t e m e r g e , t h e r e f o r e , is a r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n New Zealand and ANZUS ( o r i t s s u c c e s s o r ) s i m i l a r t o the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the n e u t r a l

247 R e p u b l i c of I r e l a n d and NATO. I t p r o b a b l y s a t i s f i e s no one c o m p l e t e l y , but n e i t h e r d o e s i t u p s e t anyone mightily. I n t h e p r e v a i l i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s , A u s t r a l i a and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w i l l be o b l i g e d t o t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t a f u n d a m e n t a l d i s a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n them and New Zealand. To use an a n a l o g y , New Zealand i s p l a y i n g L u t h e r t o t h e A l l i a n c e ' s C o u n c i l of T r e n t . New Zealand s e e s i t s e l f as t h e R e f o r m a t i o n c h a r a c t e r and i s e n e r g i z e d by i t s c r i t i q u e o f t h e e x i s t i n g w o r l d s t r a t e g i c o r d e r and i t s d e p a r t u r e f r o m t h e g o s p e l of i n t e r n a t i o n a l cooperation. I f A u s t r a l i a and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s respond f a v o r a b l y t o L a n g e ' s d e m a r c h e , t h e y w i l l o n l y be c o n c e d i n g t h e f a c t t h a t , as w i t h t h e C o u n c i l o f T r e n t , t h e r e was a need t o admit c e r t a i n i m p e r f e c t i o n s — a n o c c a s i o n a l g r e e d y f r i a r o r l e c h e r o u s nun—the modern e q u i v a l e n t b e i n g t h e w i d e s p r e a d d i s p e r s a l of n u c l e a r weapons t o i n n o c e n t p l a c e s l i k e the Southwest P a c i f i c . But what t h e C o u n c i l o f T r e n t u n d e r s t o o d and what A u s t r a l i a and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w i l l need t o c o m p r e h e n d i s t h a t t h e r e a l t a r g e t i s not t h e a b u s e s i n o r d e r s but t h e o r d e r s t h e m s e l v e s . L u t h e r d i d not want monks t o be more c h a s t e . He wanted no more monks. At i s s u e a r e t h e c o n f l i c t i n g v i e w s o f t h e w o r l d h e l d by New Z e a l a n d , A u s t r a l i a , and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . The f o r m e r has d e c i d e d t h a t r e m o t e n e s s w i l l c o n t i n u e t o ensure i t s i n v u l n e r a b i l i t y . I t make no s e n s e , t h e n , t o c r i t i c i z e New Z e a l a n d p o l i c i e s m e r e l y b e c a u s e t h e y do not c o n f o r m t o a n o t h e r r e a l i t y , f o r r e a l i t y i s j u s t a darkness t h a t i s s o m e t i m e s p e n e t r a t e d by l i g h t n i n g t h a t And t h e g o o d u s e d e p e n d s on can be put t o g o o d u s e . what i s s e e n . C l e a r l y , t h e Labour government i s a c t i n g on t h e b a s i s of i t s own p e r c e p t i o n s and s h o w s e v e r y i n d i c a t i o n of c o n t i n u i n g t o do s o . For A u s t r a l i a and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h e v i e w o f t h e w o r l d i s , t o p e r s i s t in t h e m e t a p h o r , i l l u m i n a t e d by t h e l i g h t n i n g of a n x i e t y and t h r e a t e n i n g c o n s t e l l a t i o n s of f o r c e s . A g a i n , i t i s o f no m a t t e r w h e t h e r t h e v i e w a f f o r d e d is a c c u r a t e — t h e b e l i e f d e r i v e d from i t e x i s t s It is accordand t h a t , a t t h e b o t t o m , i s what c o u n t s . i n g t o t h i s b e l i e f t h a t t h e c u r r e n t s t a t e o f ANZUS has d e v e l o p e d and i t s f u t u r e w i l l be d e t e r m i n e d . Logic, political a c c o u n t a b i l i t y , and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y demand nothing l e s s . NOTES 1. See an a r t i c l e entitled "ANZUS E x p e r t S e t s Record S t r a i g h t , " i n t h e E v e n i n g P o s t ( W e l l i n g t o n ) , 14 F e b r u a r y 1985. Frank Corner, i n a d d i t i o n to b e i n g the f o r m e r s e c r e t a r y of the New Zealand Department of Foreign A f f a i r s , was a l s o a t v a r i o u s s t a g e s i n h i s c a r e e r New Zealand's ambassador to Washington and h i s count r y ' s permanent r e p r e s e n t a t i v e to the United N a t i o n s . He took p a r t i n the ANZUS n e g o t i a t i o n s and was p r e s e n t a t the t r e a t y ' s s i g n i n g . 2. Ole R. H o l s t i , p. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. S u l l i v a n ,

248 U n i t y and P i s i n t e g r a t i o n i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l A l l i a n c e s : C o m p a r a t i v e S t u d i e s (New York: W i l e y , 1 9 8 3 ) . 3. New Z e a l a n d D e p a r t m e n t o f D e f e n s e , D e f e n c e R e v i e w 1 9 7 8 ( W e l l i n g t o n : Government P r i n t e r , 1 9 7 8 ) . 4. Desmond B a l l , " T h e ANZUS C o n n e c t i o n : The Security R e l a t i o n s h i p Between A u s t r a l i a , New Zealand and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a , " A r m s , D i s a r m a m e n t and New Z e a l a n d : T h e P a p e r s and P r o c e e d i n g s o f t h e E i g h t e e n t h F o r e i g n P o l i c y S c h o o l 1982 (Dunedin: D e p a r t m e n t of U n i v e r s i t y E x t e n s i o n , U n i v e r s i t y of O t a g o , 1 9 8 3 ) , p. 79. 5. I b i d . , pp. 7 9 - 8 2 . 6. N a t i o n a l Times ( S y d n e y ) , 8 - 1 4 March 1 9 8 5 . 7. F o r a d e t a i l e d a c c o u n t o f New Z e a l a n d ' s b e n e f i t s , s e e B r i e f i n g P a p e r s P r e p a r e d f o r t h e M i n i s t e r of D e f e n c e , a s e r i e s of p a p e r s s u p p l i e d t o t h e M i n i s t e r of D e f e n c e , t h e Hon. F. D. O'Flynn, on t a k i n g up h i s a p p o i n t m e n t and r e l e a s e d b y h i m on 19 O c t o b e r 1984. I n p a r t i c u l a r , s e e B r i e f Two. 8. S e e Andrew M a c k , " T h e P r o s and Cons o f ANZUS," p a p e r p r e s e n t e d t o t h e F a b i a n ANZUS C o n f e r e n c e , L o r n e , v i c t o r i a , 4 - 5 May 1985. 9. On t h e s e m a t t e r s I am p a r t i c u l a r l y i n d e b t e d t o Dr. R i c h a r d Herr of t h e D e p a r t m e n t of P o l i t i c s , U n i v e r s i t y o f T a s m a n i a , f o r m a k i n g a v a i l a b l e h i s p a p e r on t h e 1 6 t h S o u t h P a c i f i c Forum e n t i t l e d , "What's Happening t o t h e Neighbourhood? A u s t r a l i a ' s South P a c i f i c Relations." 10. I b i d . , p. 6 . 11. F o r e x p o s i t i o n s and e x p l a n a t i o n s o f New Z e a l a n d ' s n o n n u c l e a r p o l i c y , s e e New Zealand F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Review 35 ( J a n u a r y March 1 9 8 5 ) , f o r t h r e e a d d r e s s e s by P r i m e M i n i s t e r David Lange (pp. 3 - 1 7 ) , and o n e a d d r e s s by t h e High C o m m i s s i o n e r t o A u s t r a l i a , Mr. Graham A n s e l l (pp. 4 7 - 5 1 ) , h e r e a f t e r c i t e d as NZFAR 35. 12. I b i d . , p. 3. 13. M i n i s t e r o f D e f e n s e F r a n k O ' F l y n n h a s s a i d t h a t RNZN v e s s e l s would be a l l o w e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n j o i n t e x e r c i s e s p r o v i d e d t h e y d i d n o t i n v o l v e any u s e , o r s i m u l a t e d u s e , of n u c l e a r weapons o r maneuvers n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e i r u s e . Source: Evening Post (Well i n g t o n ) , 22 F e b r u a r y 1985. 14. NZFAR 3 5 , p . 5 . 15. I b i d . , p . 13 ( D a v i d L a n g e , A d d r e s s t o t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s C o n f e r e n c e on D i s a r m a m e n t , Geneva, 5 March 1 9 8 5 ) . 16. A u s t r a l i a n ( S y d n e y ) , 18 A p r i l 1 9 8 5 . 17. Dominion ( W e l l i n g t o n ) , 26 J a n u a r y 1 9 8 5 . 18. F o r an e x t e n d e d d i s c u s s i o n o f i s s u e s r a i s e d i n t h i s s e c t i o n , s e e M i c h a e l M c K i n l e y , ANZUS, New Zealand and t h e Meaning o f L i f e : An A s s e s s m e n t o f t h e L a b o u r G o v e r n m e n t ' s N o n - N u c l e a r P o l i c y and i t s I m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e A l l i a n c e ( C a n b e r r a : L e g i s l a t i v e R e s e a r c h S e r v i c e , P a r l i a m e n t of t h e Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a , forthcoming). 19. Age ( M e l b o u r n e ) , 31 J u l y 1 9 8 5 . 20. A u s t r a l i a n ( S y d n e y ) , 6 March 1 9 8 5 . 21. N a t i o n a l Times ( S y d n e y ) , 2 5 - 3 1 J a n u a r y 1 9 8 5 . 22. Australian (Sydney), 4 April 1985. 23. D a t a u s e d i n t h i s s e c t i o n i s t a k e n i n p a r t f r o m The M i l i t a r y B a l a n c e 1 9 8 4 - 1 9 8 5 (London: I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e f o r S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s , 1 9 8 4 ) , p p . 9 6 - 9 7 , 1 0 6 , h e r e a f t e r c i t e d as T h e M i l i t a r y Balance.

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24. F u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s s u b j e c t w i l l b e found i n J . H. B e a g l e h o l e , "New Z e a l a n d : H i g h l y p r o f e s s i o n a l , But Upgrading a Slow p r o c e s s , " P a c i f i c Defence Reporter ( J u l y 1 9 8 4 ) : 1 5 - 1 9 ; Robert M i l e s , " W i l l God D e f e n d New Z e a l a n d ? " New O u t l o o k ( N o v e m b e r - D e c e m b e r 1 9 8 4 ) : 3 6 - 3 8 ; and D a l t o n W e s t , "The 1983 D e f e n c e R e v i e w : prospects and I m p l i c a t i o n s , " New Z e a l a n d I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e v i e w 9 ( M a y - J u n e 1984):2-6. 25. J . H. B e a g l e h o l e , "New Z e a l a n d : H i g h l y p r o f e s s i o n a l . But Upgrading a Slow p r o c e s s , " p . 2 0 . 26. S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , "New Z e a l a n d L a b o u r I s G e t t i n g It R i g h t , " Weekend A u s t r a l i a n (Sydney), 8 - 9 J u n e 1 9 8 5 . 27. Desmond B a l l , " T h e ANZUS C o n n e c t i o n , " p p . 7 1 - 7 5 , 8 6 ; s e e a l s o p e t e r W i l l s , "Spy v s . Spy," New Outlook ( M a r c h - A p r i l 1 9 8 5 ) : 2 7 30. 28. B a l l , "The ANZUS C o n n e c t i o n , " p p . 8 8 - 9 3 . 29. The c o m p l e t e l i s t o f U.S. i n s t a l l a t i o n s i n A u s t r a l i a i s v e r y much l o n g e r t h a n t h e s e t h r e e . For a f u l l a n a l y s i s , s e e Desmond B a l l , A S u i t a b l e p i e c e of R e a l E s t a t e : American I n s t a l l a t i o n s i n A u s t r a l i a (Sydney: Hale and I r e m o n g e r , 1 9 8 0 ) . 30. " U . S . B a s e s - - W h a t Hawke D i d n ' t S a y , " Weekend A u s t r a l i a n (Sydney), 9 - 1 0 J u n e 1984. 31 . S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , J o u r n a l of t h e F e d e r a t i o n of A m e r i c a n S c i e n t i s t s 33 (December 1 9 8 0 ) : 3 - 8 . 32. S e e World Armaments and Disarmament S I P R I Yearbook 1979 ( L o n d o n : T a y l o r and F r a n c i s , 1 9 7 9 ) , p p . 4 2 7 - 4 5 2 ; " A n t i S u b m a r i n e W a r f a r e , " S t r a t e g i c Survey 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 1 (London: I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e f o r S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s , 1 9 8 1 ) , p p . 3 1 - 3 6 ; and J o e l S. W i t , "Advances i n A n t i - S u b m a r i n e W a r f a r e , " S c i e n t i f i c A m e r i c a n ( F e b r u a r y 1981):31-41 . 33. A u s t r a l i a n ( S y d n e y ) , 6 March 1 9 8 5 . 34. A u s t r a l i a n ( S y d n e y ) , 10 December 1 9 8 4 . 35. Defense Readiness Conditions--DEFCONS f o r short--range from 5 t o 1, w i t h 5 b e i n g a n o r m a l p e a c e t i m e c o n d i t i o n and 1 b e i n g t h e u l t i m a t e s t a t e of e m e r g e n c y o r "maximum f o r c e r e a d i n e s s . " 36. B a l l , A S u i t a b l e p i e c e of R e a l E s t a t e , p . 1 6 . 37. N a t i o n a l Times ( S y d n e y ) ~ 2 5 - 3 1 May 1 9 8 4 . 38. T h i s r e f e r s t o A u s t r a l i a n r e s e a r c h c o n d u c t e d a t t h e Aust r a l i a n N a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t y i n C a n b e r r a and t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f Defense M a t e r i a l s R e s e a r c h L a b o r a t o r i e s i n v i c t o r i a on t h e d e v e l o p ment o f a " r a i l g u n " - - k i n e t i c e n e r g y w e a p o n s s y s t e m c a p a b l e o f l a u n c h i n g p r o j e c t i l e s a t v e l o c i t i e s a p p r o a c h i n g t h e s p e e d of l i g h t . Its conventional a p p l i c a t i o n s are obvious—point defense f o r naval vessels against anti-ship m i s s i l e s — b u t i t s s t r a t e g i c applications a r e e v e n m o r e s i g n i f i c a n t - - e a r t h - b a s e d and s p a c e - b a s e d b a l l i s t i c missile defense. 39. The a l l u s i o n h e r e i s t o t h e J a p a n e s e n o n - n u c l e a r p o l i c y t h a t i s s u b v e r t e d by t h e i r p r a c t i c e of c o m p l e t e l y r e s p e c t i n g U.S. n o n d i s c l o s u r e p o l i c y and a l l o w i n g c l e a r l y n u c l e a r - c a p a b l e v e s s e l s t o be b a s e d i n , or v i s i t , J a p a n e s e p o r t s , e t c . 40. David M c l n t y r e , "The F u t u r e of t h e New Z e a l a n d System of A l l i a n c e s , " Landf a l l 84 (December 1 9 6 7 ) : 3 4 2 . A l s o s e e W. D a v i d M c l n t y r e , B r i t a i n , New Z e a l a n d and t h e S e c u r i t y of South E a s t As i a in t h e 1970s ( W e l l i n g t o n : New Z e a l a n d I n s t i t u t e o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 1 9 6 9 ) , pp. 1 9 - 3 2 .

Part 4

Future Prospects

11 Emerging Trends and Policy Implications for the Asian-Pacific Region and the United States Lawrence E. Grinter Young Whan Kihl

The A s i a n - P a c i f i c r e g i o n i n t h e m i d - 1 9 8 0 s h a s b e c o m e s e c o n d o n l y t o E u r o p e a s a c e n t e r of g l o b a l s t r a t e g i c trends with important policy i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the e n t i r e world. The p o l i t i c a l - m i l i t a r y - e c o n o m i c e n v i r o n m e n t of A s i a and t h e P a c i f i c h a s r a d i c a l l y c h a n g e d d u r i n g t h e d e c a d e s i n c e t h e 1975 c o m m u n i s t v i c t o r i e s i n I n d o c h i n a . T h e s e c h a n g e s h a v e b e e n p r o d u c e d p r i m a r i l y by t h r e e c r i t i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t s : (1) S o v i e t and S o v i e t client m i l i t a r y e x p a n s i o n , w h i c h b e n e f i t e d f r o m (2) t h e p o w e r v a c u u m c r e a t e d by U.S. m i l i t a r y w i t h d r a w a l s , w h i c h i n t u r n h a s b e e n p a r t i a l l y c o m p e n s a t e d f o r by ( 3 ) the i m p r e s s i v e e c o n o m i c g r o w t h of t h e n o n c o m m u n i s t A s i a n countries. T h e U.S. p o l i c y of d i s e n g a g e m e n t a n d w i t h d r a w a l from Asia has been r e v e r s e d . This r e v e r s a l began l a t e i n t h e C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n when P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r w a s f o r c e d t o r e s p o n d t o t h e S o v i e t i n v a s i o n of A f g h a n i s t a n i n December 1979. The p o l i c y h a s c o n t i n u e d s i n c e 1981 w i t h t h e Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s more a c t i v i s t p o l i c y i n E a s t A s i a , i . e . , b e e f i n g u p t h e U.S. f o r c e p r e s e n c e and s u p p o r t i n g r e g i o n a l f o r c e s and s e c u r i t y initiatives. In l o o k i n g a h e a d , t h e A s i a n - P a c i f i c r e g i o n p r o m i s e s t o be b o t h d y n a m i c and v o l a t i l e i n t h e l a t e 1 9 8 0 s . The e m e r g e n t t r e n d s and p a t t e r n s i n t h e r e g i o n w i l l c o n t i n u e to involve the major powers including t h e United S t a t e s and t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , a s w e l l a s o t h e r r e g i o n a l p o w e r s . D i p l o m a t i c and p o w e r r e a l i g n m e n t s s i n c e t h e 1970s among the major powers in t h e r e g i o n have been f a r - r e a c h i n g : p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e U.S. e x i t f r o m I n d o c h i n a , Vietnam's i n v a s i o n of K a m p u c h e a , t h e 1978 S i n o - J a p a n e s e f r i e n d s h i p t r e a t y , t h e 1979 U . S . - C h i n e s e n o r m a l i z a t i o n , t h e a b r o g a t i o n of t h e S i n o - S o v i e t a l l i a n c e i n 1 9 8 0 , and t h e e m e r g e n c e of t h e A s s o c i a t i o n of S o u t h e a s t A s i a n N a t i o n s (ASEAN) a s a g r o w i n g c o u n t e r w e i g h t t o V i e t n a m . T o d a y C h i n a , J a p a n , ASEAN, and a h o s t of s m a l l e r c o u n t r i e s a n d e n t i t i e s i n t h e r e g i o n s t a n d a g a i n s t t h e USSR, V i e t n a m , 253

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and North Korea. In s h o r t , a l t h o u g h t h e r e g i o n ' s power has d i f f u s e d , i t s a n t i c o m m u n i s t s t a n c e h a s grown more e v i d e n t and s t r o n g e r . In t h i s c o n c l u d i n g c h a p t e r some of t h e f u t u r e p r o s p e c t s i n t h e r e g i o n — b o t h s h o r t term and long r a n g e — a r e explored. The c h a p t e r c o n c l u d e s w i t h p o l i c y i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e r e g i o n and r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s f o r t h e United States. THREE REGIONAL

1.

TRENDS

The S o v i e t m i l i t a r y b u i l d u p w i l l

continue.

The R u s s i a n s h a v e e v e r y r i g h t t o a G r e a t Power r o l e i n A s i a and t h e P a c i f i c . T h r e e - q u a r t e r s of t h e i r t e r r i t o r y and most of t h e i r energy and m i n e r a l r e s o u r c e s a r e l o c a t e d in the r e g i o n . But t h e y v i e w E a s t A s i a a s an i n s e c u r e , o f t e n t h r e a t e n i n g zone, and as a r e s u l t , t h e i r A s i a n p o l i c i e s h a v e been a t t i m e s h e a v y - h a n d e d , long on t h r e a t and m i l i t a r y p o w e r , b u t s h o r t on c o n s t r u c t i v e p o l i t i c a l and economic p r o p o s a l s . In r e s p o n d i n g t o what t h e USSR s e e s a s t h r e a t s t o i t s s e c u r i t y , i t h a s emerged as the g r e a t e s t m i l i t a r y t h r e a t to the r e g i o n . Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , Moscow and t h e c o m m u n i s t g o v e r n m e n t s i t b a c k s i n P y o n g y a n g and Hanoi h a v e c r e a t e d e x a c t l y t h e s i t u a t i o n t h a t i s most h a r m f u l t o them s h o r t of w a r : t h e n e a r u n a n i m o u s d i s t r u s t and o p p o s i t i o n of m o s t o t h e r s t a t e s i n A s i a and t h e P a c i f i c i n c l u d i n g C h i n a and t h e c r e a t i o n of a jde f a c t o s e c u r i t y s y s t e m o p p o s i n g them l e d by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , C h i n a , J a p a n , and ASEAN. F o r i t s a c h i e v e m e n t of m i l i t a r y p r e d o m i n a n c e i n E a s t A s i a , and i t s e n c i r c l e m e n t of C h i n a , t h e USSR p a y s a h e a v y p r i c e i n d i p l o m a t i c i s o l a t i o n and r e g i o n a l o p p o s i t i o n . The R u s s i a n s , v i c t i m s of t h e i r own p a r a n o i a , h a v e c r e a t e d a s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g prophecy. G i v e n t h e s t e a d i n e s s and h a r s h n e s s of S o v i e t p o l i c y i n A s i a and t h e P a c i f i c i n t h e l a s t few y e a r s — c o n s i s t e n t through f o u r S o v i e t h e a d s of s t a t e — i t i s s a f e t o p r e d i c t t h a t t h e R u s s i a n s w i l l c o n t i n u e both t h e i r p o l i c y of p o l i t i c a l - m i l i t a r y e x p a n s i o n and t h e i r s u p p o r t of H a n o i ' s and P y o n g y a n g ' s b e l ligerent activities. 2.

The United S t a t e s w i l l c o n t i n u e t o s l o w l y the m i l i t a r y s c a l e s in East A s i a .

rebalance

R e j e c t i n g t h e e a r l i e r p o l i c i e s of w i t h d r a w a l and r e t r e n c h m e n t by t h e C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , t h e R e a g a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a s r e v e r s e d t h e U.S. m i l i t a r y d e c l i n e in A s i a and t h e P a c i f i c by g r a d u a l l y m o d e r n i z i n g and e x p a n d i n g U.S. and a l l i e d combat power. But t h i s r e v e r s a l i s n o t , i n and of i t s e l f , g o i n g t o r e g a i n U.S. m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y in the region. The R u s s i a n s h a v e t o o much momentum. To r e v e r s e t h e S o v i e t d o m i n a n t s i t u a t i o n would r e q u i r e d r a s t i c m e a s u r e s such as a m a j o r J a p a n e s e m i l i t a r y e x p a n s i o n i n N o r t h e a s t A s i a and p o s s i b l y t h e

255 c o n v e r s i o n of ASEAN i n t o a f o r m a l m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e i n Southeast Asia. Neither development is l i k e l y to occur in the next few y e a r s . T h u s , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and i t s A s i a n - P a c i f i c a l l i e s m u s t r e l y on i n c r e m e n t a l improvem e n t s of t h e i r c o m b a t p o w e r and c o n t i n u i n g r e a d j u s t m e n t s in t h e i r defense burden-sharing. 3.

East A s i a w i l l c o n t i n u e t o be t h e d y n a m i c t r a d e and i n v e s t m e n t a r e a .

world's

most

T h i s f a c t m a k e s i t p o s s i b l e f o r t h e As i a n - P a c i f i c c o u n t r i e s t o b u i l d up t h e i r d e f e n s e s g r a d u a l l y without undue s t r a i n . Of c o u r s e , J a p a n - - E a s t A s i a ' s richest major country—could double or t r i p l e i t s defense spendi n g w i t h o u t any a p p r e c i a b l e e f f e c t on i t s economy. Inc r e a s i n g i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e a n d c r o s s - p e n e t r a t i o n by A s i a n P a c i f i c c o u n t r i e s of e a c h o t h e r ' s e c o n o m i e s w i l l o c c u r a s t h e "Gang of F i v e " c o u n t r i e s ( J a p a n , S o u t h Korea, T a i w a n , Hong K o n g , and S i n g a p o r e ) c o n t i n u e t o a c t a s t h e region's economic engine. The n e w l y industrialized c o u n t r i e s of t h e r e g i o n — S o u t h K o r e a , T a i w a n , Hong Kong, and S i n g a p o r e — a r e f o l l o w i n g J a p a n ' s e x a m p l e . Relying o n e x p o r t - l e d s t r a t e g i e s of e c o n o m i c g r o w t h , t h e y h a v e become e x p o r t e r s t o North A m e r i c a , W e s t e r n Europe, and T h i r d World c o u n t r i e s and a r e a l s o a s s i s t i n g t h e l e s s developed countries. These i n d u s t r i a l i z i n g countries w i l l b e f o l l o w e d by o t h e r ASEAN c o u n t r i e s l e d by B r u n e i , T h a i l a n d , a n d M a l a y s i a , p e r h a p s l e s s by I n d o n e s i a a n d the Philippines. With East Asian economies a v e r a g i n g 6 t o 9 p e r c e n t G r o s s N a t i o n a l P r o d u c t (GNP) g r o w t h r a t e s in r e c e n t y e a r s , t h e i r a b i l i t y t o pay f o r arms is a l s o becoming e a s i e r . Thus t h e n e e d e d r e o r i e n t a t i o n i n s e c u r i t y b u r d e n - s h a r i n g i n East Asia is made e c o n o m i c a l l y s i m p l e r , a l t h o u g h f o r p o l i t i c a l r e a s o n s , many A s i a n s t a t e s a r e f l u c t u a t i n g on t h e q u e s t i o n of r e l i a n c e on the United S t a t e s . F i n a l l y , among t h e c o m m u n i s t c o u n t r i e s , C h i n a , a d e f a c t o U.S. a l l y , and N o r t h Korea, s t i l l an a d v e r s a r y , h a v e made some e c o n o m i c p r o g r e s s . The C h i n e s e " r e s p o n s i b i l i t y s y s t e m " m i x e s c a p i t a l i s m and s o c i a l i s m in e f f e c t i v e ways. North Korea, which f i r s t t u r n e d o u t w a r d i n t h e e a r l y 1970s o n l y t o f a i l , h a s now, g i v e n C h i n a ' s e x a m p l e , t u r n e d o u t w a r d a g a i n and begun t o a t t r a c t very l i m i t e d f o r e i g n investment. Vietnam, howe v e r , s e e m s c a u g h t i n t h e r e s u l t of i t s militarism, political repression, and e c o n o m i c m i s m a n a g e m e n t as i t s t r i v e s to dominate Indochina.

REGIONAL

IMPLICATIONS

The t h r e e r e g i o n a l t r e n d s d e p i c t e d above w i l l be a c c o m p a n i e d by a f u r t h e r d i f f u s i o n of p o w e r i n the r e g i o n and c o n s i d e r a b l e f l u x i n i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e s ' s e c u rity policies. A h o s t of c r o s s - c u t t i n g d i l e m m a s h a v e e m e r g e d t h a t a f f e c t b o t h t h e c a p i t a l i s t and c o m m u n i s t c o u n t r i e s of t h e r e g i o n .

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Alliance

Dilemmas

Among t h e a l l i e d c o u n t r i e s , S o u t h K o r e a ( t h e R e p u b l i c of K o r e a , o r ROK) w i l l b e c o m e i n c r e a s i n g l y s e l f s u f f i c i e n t m i l i t a r i l y as an e x p a n d i n g economy a l l o w s S o u t h K o r e a t o p r o d u c e m o r e of i t s own d e f e n s e c a p a b i l i ties. M o r e o v e r t h e ROK i s o n t h e t h r e s h o l d of b e c o m i n g an e c o n o m i c c o m p e t i t o r of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n c e r t a i n trade areas. S t i l l d e p e n d e n t on t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s f o r i t s s t r a t e g i c p r o t e c t i o n , S o u t h K o r e a may move i n t o t h e a r m s t r a d e f i e l d , s u p p l y i n g ASEAN and o t h e r T h i r d W o r l d c o u n t r i e s with weapons, t e c h n o l o g y , and, p o s s i b l y , advisers. Japan's external security policies also are changing but in s u b t l e r — a l t h o u g h perhaps more compreh e n s i v e — w a y s t h a n South Korea's. J a p a n , i n f a c t , i s on t h e t h r e s h o l d of b e i n g a n i m p o r t a n t s u p p l i e r of m i l i t a r i l y u s a b l e h i g h t e c h n o l o g y , and i t a l r e a d y h a s t h e s e k i n d s of a r r a n g e m e n t s w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and C h i n a . M o r e o v e r , J a p a n may move i n t o a c c e l e r a t e d e c o n o m i c a i d a r r a n g e m e n t s w i t h s o m e ASEAN c o u n t r i e s t h a t c o u l d h a v e indirect military ramifications. J a p a n ' s v i e w of i t s s e c u r i t y r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i s b r o a d e n i n g and m a t u r i n g b o t h r e g i o n a l l y and g l o b a l l y , although Japanese public o p i n i o n s t i l l s u p p o r t s a b e n i g n and p a s s i v e s e c u r i t y r o l e f o r J a p a n ' s armed f o r c e s . However, J a p a n ' s r e a l d e f e n s e p r o b l e m l i e s c l o s e t o home in t h e security s i t u a t i o n of t h e s e a named f o r J a p a n . It is here t h a t a d o u b l i n g o r t r i p l i n g of J a p a n ' s d e f e n s e e x p e n d i t u r e s , in c l o s e c o o r d i n a t i o n w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and p o s s i b l y S o u t h K o r e a , c o u l d h a v e a s e r i o u s i m p a c t on t h e S o v i e t P a c i f i c F l e e t ' s m o b i l i t y and w a r p l a n s . How much l o n g e r Japan can a f f o r d t o proceed in a p a s s i v e d e f e n s e d i r e c t i o n , as t h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y e x p a n s i o n c o n t i n u e s , i s a m a t t e r of s e r i o u s c o n c e r n f o r J a p a n ' s a l l i e s . In S o u t h e a s t A s i a , t h e most b e n e f i c i a l s e c u r i t y r e l a t e d d e v e l o p m e n t t h a t e a c h of t h e ASEAN c o u n t r i e s c o u l d e x p e r i e n c e i s o r d e r l y e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t and stable political transitions. If r a d i c a l f o r c e s , f o r e x a m p l e , t o o k o v e r t h e g o v e r n m e n t s of e i t h e r t h e P h i l i p pines, Indonesia, or Thailand, the ripple effects t h r o u g h o u t ASEAN w o u l d b e e x t r e m e l y s e r i o u s . One h a s only t o r e c a l l t h e chaos t h a t Indonesia's f o r m e r P r e s i dent Soekarno reaped. Moreover, i n t h e e v e n t of a radical t a k e o v e r of any c o u n t r y , ASEAN's position a g a i n s t V i e t n a m a l s o w o u l d b e s e r i o u s l y j e o p a r d i z e d , and H a n o i and Moscow w o u l d s u r e l y move t o e x p l o i t the s ituation. I n t h e S o u t h P a c i f i c , New Z e a l a n d ' s c u r r e n t p o s t u r e of " n u c l e a r a l l e r g y " a p p e a r s t o b e no l o n g e r r e s o l v a b l e w i t h i n t h e A u s t r a l i a - N e w Z e a l a n d - U n i t e d S t a t e s (ANZUS) alliance. A l t h o u g h New Z e a l a n d h a s e s s e n t i a l l y d r o p p e d o u t of ANZUS a s a n o p e r a t i o n a l f a c t o r , U . S . - A u s t r a l i a n s e c u r i t y c o o p e r a t i o n , t h e h e a r t of t h e a l l i a n c e , r e m a i n s f irm. F o r t h e a l l i e d c o u n t r i e s of E a s t A s i a , t h e n , t h e d i l e m m a i s how t o b a l a n c e t h r e a t e n i n g e x t e r n a l e n v i r o n -

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m e n t s a g a i n s t t h e d e m a n d s of r i s i n g l o c a l e c o n o m i e s and emerging p o l i t i c a l t r a n s i t i o n s and a l s o m a k e e f f e c t i v e and i n c r e a s i n g c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o a r e v a m p e d a l l i e d s e c u r i t y system. Communist C o u n t r y

Problems

Among t h e A s i a n c o m m u n i s t c o u n t r i e s s e r i o u s s c h i s m s are well evident. C h i n a , h o s t i l e t o t h e USSR, i s a r m i n g i t s e l f a g a i n s t t h e R u s s i a n s and t h e V i e t n a m e s e w i t h t h e a i d of W e s t e r n t e c h n o l o g y . V i e t n a m , d e p e n d e n t on t h e USSR f o r e x t e n s i v e m i l i t a r y a n d e c o n o m i c a s s i s t a n c e , d i s p l a y s t e n s i o n w i t h i t s R u s s i a n a d v i s e r s and u n d o u b t In edly d e s i r e s a more independent f o r e i g n p o l i c y . I n d o c h i n a , h i s t o r i c e t h n i c f r i c t i o n s among t h e K h m e r s , L a o s , and V i e t n a m e s e h a v e c o m p l i c a t e d H a n o i ' s d r i v e t o dominate the area. North Korea s e e k s t o b a l a n c e i t s r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n Moscow and B e i j i n g w i t h r e n e w e d S o v i e t m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t b u t i s now a l s o s e e k i n g - - a l o n g the l i n e s of t h e C h i n e s e m o d e l — t o a t t r a c t W e s t e r n i n v e s t ment. These r e a l i t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y China's hostility t o w a r d t h e S o v i e t s and t h e V i e t n a m e s e , t h a t Beijing s e l e c t i v e l y employs as p r e s s u r e p o i n t s a r o u n d i t s p e r i phery, complicate Soviet expansion in the area. Likely C o n f l i c t Zones, P r o b l e m s , and T r a n s i t i o n s The S e a of J a p a n ' s S e c u r i t y C o n t r o l of t h i s s e a m a y b e t h e s i n g l e m o s t critical p o l i t i c a l - m i l i t a r y q u e s t i o n in East Asia because it i m p a c t s on a l l t h e m a j o r p o w e r s as w e l l as t h e t w o Koreas. I n s p i t e of J a p a n ' s b e n i g n , r e t i c e n t p e r c e p t i o n of t h e S o v i e t a n d N o r t h K o r e a n t h r e a t a n d T o k y o ' s c o n t i n u i n g e f f o r t s t o c o n c i l i a t e Moscow, w i l l t h e e n l a r g i n g S o v i e t p r e s e n c e a n d p a t t e r n of i n t i m i d a t i o n p u s h J a p a n i n t o new s e c u r i t y m e a s u r e s ? Will trilateral s e c u r i t y cooperation inevitably follow between the U n i t e d S t a t e s , J a p a n , and S o u t h K o r e a ? Isn't this a s t r a t e g i c n e c e s s i t y a n y w a y , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n a i r and s e a d e f e n s e c o o r d i n a t i o n , as t h e S o v i e t t h r e a t mounts i n Northeast Asia? The S i n o - S o v i e t B o r d e r The b o r d e r c o n t i n u e s t o be h e a v i l y a r m e d and t h e r e a r e no l i k e l y p r o s p e c t s f o r f o r c e r e d u c t i o n s i n t h e a r e a . U.S., E u r o p e a n , and I s r a e l i t e c h n o l o g y and w e a p o n s a r e now g o i n g i n t o C h i n a t o h e l p b o l s t e r C h i n a ' s d e f e n s e s a g a i n s t t h e USSR. How f a r s h o u l d W e s t e r n m i l i t a r y a i d proceed in t h i s regard? Does i t i n t e n s i f y t h e o n g o i n g a r m s r a c e on t h e S i n o - S o v i e t b o r d e r ? Does i t f u r t h e r c o m p l i c a t e r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c of C h i n a (PRC) and T a i w a n ?

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The K o r e a n Arms R a c e The K o r e a n D e m i l i t a r i z e d Zone (DMZ) i s t h e m o s t h e a v i l y armed 1 5 5 - m i l e s t r i p in t h e w o r l d . How much f a r t h e r w i l l t h e K o r e a n arms r a c e p r o c e e d b e f o r e e i t h e r a s a t u r a t i o n p o i n t i s r e a c h e d o r an a c c i d e n t a l w a r o c c u r s ? Should t h e r e be a d e l i b e r a t e p o l i c y of r e s t r a i n t on arms s a l e s and t e c h n o l o g y by t h e e x t e r n a l s u p p l i e r s t o t h e two Koreas? P e r h a p s such r e s t r a i n t a l r e a d y e x i s t s — t h e United S t a t e s took s e v e n y e a r s a f t e r a g r e e i n g " i n p r i n c i p l e " t o s e l l F - 1 6 s t o South Korea b e f o r e t h e f i r s t d e l i v e r i e s w e r e made, and R u s s i a n MIG-23s w e r e not s u p p l i e d t o North Korea ( t h e D e m o c r a t i c P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c o f K o r e a , o r DPRK) u n t i l J u n e 1 9 8 5 . What a b o u t c r e a t i n g a n u c l e a r - f r e e z o n e on t h e K o r e a n p e n i n s u l a ? What c o n v e n t i o n a l arms r e s t r a i n t s and p o l i t i c a l accommodations, r e s u l t i n g from i n t e r - K o r e a n d i a l o g u e s a n d / o r f o u r - p o w e r c o n f e r e n c e s on K o r e a , w o u l d h a v e t o a c c o m p a n y s u c h a development? The South China S e a and t h e S p r a t l y I s l a n d s The c o m b i n a t i o n of p o t e n t i a l o i l r e s e r v e s and t e r r i t o r i a l a m b i t i o n s by t h e l i t t o r a l s t a t e s w i l l p r o d u c e c o n t i n u i n g f r i c t i o n in t h e South China Sea. For e x a m p l e , V i e t n a m , M a l a y s i a , C h i n a , T a i w a n , and t h e P h i l i p p i n e s h a v e a l r e a d y s t a k e d c l a i m s , and m i l i t a r y s k i r m i s h e s h a v e resulted. Some of t h e s e c o u n t r i e s a r e r e o r i e n t i n g t h e i r d e f e n s e c a p a b i l i t i e s from i n t e r n a l d e f e n s e t o e x t e r n a l p r e p a r e d n e s s b e c a u s e o f b o t h t h e o f f s h o r e p r o b l e m and Vietnamese/Soviet a c t i v i t i e s . No e v i d e n t s u p r a n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y s e e m s l i k e l y t o be c r e a t e d t h a t w i l l h e l p resolve these conflicts. W i t h i n ASEAN, cooperative d e v i c e s and p o l i c i e s t o m o d e r a t e t h e s e p r o b l e m s , which e x i s t in p r o t o t y p e form in t e r m s of j o i n t military e x e r c i s e s and c o o p e r a t i o n , c o u l d be a c c e l e r a t e d . Indoch i n a W h e t h e r Hanoi i s m o t i v a t e d by i d e o l o g y , c h a u v i n i s m , or l e g i t i m a t e s e c u r i t y c o n c e r n s as t h e V i e t n a m e s e p o l i t b u r o i n t e r p r e t s t h e m , t h e S o c i a l i s t R e p u b l i c of V i e t n a m , w i t h f u l l S o v i e t b a c k i n g and a g r o w i n g c o n v e n t i o n a l m i l i t a r y a r s e n a l , shows no c l e a r s i g n s of r e l i n q u i s h i n g i t s m i l i t a r y o c c u p a t i o n and t u t e l a g e o f K a m p u c h e a and L a o s . C o m p l i c a t e d by S i n o - S o v i e t r i v a l r y i n t h e a r e a and i n c r e a s i n g S o v i e t , C h i n e s e , and some U.S. arms t r a n s f e r s , t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s T h i r d I n d o c h i n a War a r e v e r y s e r i o u s f o r T h a i l a n d , t h e r e s t of ASEAN, and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . Should t h e war widen, could T h a i l a n d d e f e n d against a concerted Vietnamese attack without outside support? Would t h a t s u p p o r t i n t u r n f u r t h e r divide S o u t h e a s t A s i a and i n c r e a s e S i n o - S o v i e t t e n s i o n s ? Would the United S t a t e s i n e v i t a b l y be d r a g g e d i n t o these events? The P h i l i p p i n e S i t u a t i o n Next t o t h e w a r f a r e in V i e t n a m e s e - o c c u p i e d Kampuchea, t h e i n s t a b i l i t y in t h e P h i l i p p i n e s is t h e most c r i t i c a l

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i n t e r n a l v i o l e n c e problem in East Asia. T h e New P e o p l e ' s Army (NPA) e v i d e n t l y h a s a t l e a s t 1 2 , 0 0 0 a c t i v e s in t h e f i e l d t h a t a r e s u p p l i e d in p a r t from abroad, i n c l u d i n g , r e p o r t e d l y , t h e S o v i e t Union. The s t a k e s a r e h i g h b e c a u s e o f U.S. m i l i t a r y d e p e n d e n c e on S u b i c Bay N a v a l B a s e and C l a r k A i r B a s e and ASEAN's b e n e f i t f r o m t h e U.S. p r e s e n c e . ASEAN i s s t i l l f r a g i l e enough t h a t i t c o u l d be t r a u m a t i z e d i f a c r i t i c a l member government f e l l . N o t h i n g , o f c o u r s e , would p l e a s e Moscow and Hanoi m o r e as t h e y would be s u r e t o a c c e l e r a t e e f f o r t s to exploit the s i t u a t i o n . Are t h e r e p o s s i b l e ASEAN i n i t i a t i v e s , p o l i t i c a l , e c o n o m i c , o r m i l i t a r y , t h a t could help defuse t h e s i t u a t i o n in t h e P h i l i p p i n e s ? S i n c e U.S. m i l i t a r y p r o j e c t i o n o u t o f S u b i c and C l a r k b e n e f i t s ASEAN, p e r h a p s t h e a n t i - U . S . s e n t i m e n t i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s c o u l d be reduced by a m u l t i l a t e r a l i z a t i o n o f t h e b a s e s w i t h ASEAN f o r c e s . Or p e r h a p s ASEAN d i p l o m a t s c o u l d o f f e r t o m e d i a t e b e t w e e n M a n i l a and t h e NPA. Could ASEAN m a r k e t s be opened more t o P h i l i p p i n e p r o d ucts? I n s h o r t , c a n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s i t u a t i o n be r e gionalized to the a l l i e s ' benefit? Critical P o l i t i c a l Transitions S i x Asian c o u n t r i e s are l i k e l y t o e x p e r i e n c e c r i t i c a l p o l i t i c a l t r a n s i t i o n s i n t h e n e x t few y e a r s t h a t b e a r on the region's s t a b i l i t y . T h e s e a r e : North K o r e a , where Kim I l - S u n g ' s s o n , Kim J o n g - I l , w i l l t a k e o v e r ; S o u t h K o r e a , where Chun Doo Hwan may t u r n o v e r t h e government t o a c i v i l i a n ; C h i n a , where Deng X i a o p i n g , i n h i s e i g h t i e s , wishes to ensure a s t a b l e t r a n s i t i o n ; the P h i l i p pines, where a d i f f i c u l t p o l i t i c a l transition has created considerable i n s t a b i l i t y ; and I n d o n e s i a and S i n g a p o r e , where both P r e s i d e n t S u h a r t o and P r i m e M i n i s t e r Lee Kwan Yew a r e e x p e c t e d t o r e t i r e . RESPONSES T h e s e p r o m i n e n t p r o b l e m s and c h a l l e n g e s w i l l make f o r both a dynamic and dangerous A s i a n - P a c i f i c r e g i o n i n t h e l a s t h a l f of t h e 1 9 8 0 s . For t h e a l l i e d c o u n t r i e s of E a s t A s i a b o t h m u l t i l a t e r a l and i n d i v i d u a l p o l i c y r e sponses are required. The t h r e e most c r i t i c a l s e c u r i t y p r o b l e m s , where m u l t i l a t e r a l r e s p o n s e s seem most a p p r o p r i a t e and n e c e s s a r y , a r e i n t h e S e a of J a p a n , S o u t h e a s t A s i a , and on C h i n a ' s n o r t h e r n b o r d e r . Growing S o v i e t i n t i m i d a t i o n of J a p a n and South Korea i s v e r y l i k e l y t o push t h e two c o u n t r i e s i n t o some kind o f c l o s e r s e c u r i t y cooperation. The l o g i c i s on t h e s i d e o f such c o o p e r a t i o n b e c a u s e t h e h i s t o r i c a l p r o b l e m s b e t w e e n J a p a n and Korea a r e no d e e p e r t h a n t h o s e between Germany, F r a n c e , and E n g l a n d , f o r e x a m p l e , c o u n t r i e s t h a t f o u g h t e a c h o t h e r t o t o t a l e x h a u s t i o n t w i c e in t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , but a l s o have j o i n e d t h e w o r l d ' s most v i a b l e a l l i a n c e s i n c e 1947. I n S o u t h e a s t A s i a , ASEAN i s on t h e v e r g e o f b r o a d -

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e n i n g i t s m u l t i l a t e r a l d i p l o m a t i c and economic p o s i t i o n a g a i n s t Vietnam's S o v i e t - s u p p o r t e d aggression to include a s e c u r i t y d i m e n s i o n as w e l l . If t h i s c o o p e r a t i o n could a l s o r e s u l t i n a d e c r e a s e o f t e r r i t o r i a l s q u a b b l e s among ASEAN c o u n t r i e s — e s p e c i a l l y r e g a r d i n g o f f s h o r e and j u r i s d i c t i o n a l q u e s t i o n s - - i t w o u l d be d o u b l y b e n e f i c i a l . I t i s i m p o r t a n t t h a t ASEAN n o t j e o p a r d i z e i t s own r e gional resilience. Regarding t e n s i o n on t h e S i n o - S o v i e t b o r d e r , a l l o f East Asia has a s t a k e in t h e outcome t h e r e . In t h e a b s e n c e of a S i n o - S o v i e t n o r m a l i z a t i o n , China's t u r n t o t h e West f o r m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e in d e f e n d i n g a g a i n s t t h e USSR i s d r a w i n g a s y m p a t h e t i c , m u l t i l a t e r a l response. There are r i s k s , however, to Western i n v o l v e ment h e r e . Too e x t e n s i v e a C h i n e s e m i l i t a r y b u i l d u p , f o r i n s t a n c e , could t r i g g e r Russian o v e r r e a c t ions or f r i g h t e n China's noncommunist n e i g h b o r s o r b o t h . There i s a l s o t h e c h a n c e t h a t China m i g h t u s e W e s t e r n weapons a g a i n s t c o u n t r i e s o t h e r t h a n t h e USSR. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES The United S t a t e s can e n c o u n t e r t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y ' s f i n a l f i f t e e n y e a r s i n E a s t A s i a from a p o s i t i o n o f s o m e c o n f i d e n c e and e q u a n i m i t y a b o u t t h e o v e r a l l d i r e c t i o n o f and t r e n d s w i t h i n t h e r e g i o n . As a l w a y s , t h e S o v i e t Union and i t s c l i e n t s s e e k t o u p s e t t h e r e g i o n ' s s t a b i l i t y and e c o n o m i c and p o l i t i c a l p r o g r e s s t h r o u g h m i l i t a r y i n t i m i d a t i o n ( s u c h as v i o l a t i o n o f J a p a n e s e and P h i l i p p i n e a i r and s e a s p a c e ) , states p o n s o r e d t e r r o r i s m ( t h e Rangoon bombing), and s u b v e r s i v e m e a s u r e s ( s u c h as S o v i e t E m b a s s y a c t i v i t i e s in Manila). These a r e not i n c o n s i d e r a b l e f a c t s . They p r o d u c e an i n s e c u r e e x t e r n a l e n v i r o n m e n t f o r many c o u n t r i e s in t h e r e g i o n . But i n c o n t r a s t t o S o v i e t p o l i c i e s and b e h a v i o r i s t h e s t u n n i n g economic growth o f t h e noncommunist A s i a n and P a c i f i c c o u n t r i e s and t h e b e n e f i t s t h i s growth p r o vides. In s h o r t , U.S. a l l i e s and f r i e n d s h a v e m o r e t o g a i n , and m o r e t o l o s e , t h a n e v e r b e f o r e . Thus, a l t h o u g h t h e U.S. a b i l i t y t o u n d e r t a k e u n i l a t e r a l d i p l o m a t i c and m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s i n t h e a r e a i s r e d u c e d , t h e A s i a n c o u n t r i e s a r e m o r e a b l e t o i n c r e a s e t h e i r own s h a r e of the r e g i o n ' s s e c u r i t y burdens. Therefore i t is i m p e r a t i v e that the United S t a t e s develop a long-term s t r a t e g y and p o l i c y f o r A s i a and t h e P a c i f i c b a s e d on two f u n d a m e n t a l p r e m i s e s : (1) t h e c o n t i n u e d d e t e r r e n c e o f t h e USSR and i t s f r i e n d s t h r o u g h i n c r e a s i n g l y m u l t i l a t e r a l s e c u r i t y a c t i o n s among t h e United S t a t e s and i t s A s i a n p a r t n e r s ; and ( 2 ) t h e c o n t i n u e d a d v a n c e o f t h e p r o s p e r i t y o f E a s t A s i a and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t h r o u g h reciprocal and m o r e e q u i t a b l e t r a d e and tariff arrangements. Recommendations f o r U.S. p o l i c y p r o c e e d from t h e s e two s t r a t e g i c p r i n c i p l e s and a r e as f o l l o w s :

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6.

R e a f f i r m t h e U.S. c o m m i t m e n t and d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o h e l p defend t h e r e g i o n s o as t o p r o v i d e t h e s e c u r i t y e n v i r o n m e n t f o r c o n t i n u o u s e c o n o m i c growth and p o l i tical stability. Support i n c r e a s e d e f f o r t s to mu11i1 a t e r a l i z e the d e f e n s e o f t h e S e a o f J a p a n , and i t s t h r e e c r i t i c a l straits, thereby seeking to bring Japan, South K o r e a , and t h e United S t a t e s t o g e t h e r i n a c c e l e r a t e d m i l i t a r y p l a n n i n g and o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e a r e a . S u p p o r t t h e e m e r g e n c e o f ASEAN as a de f a c t o m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e and back ASEAN's p o l i c y o f k e e p i n g t h e p r e s s u r e on Hanoi u n t i l Vietnam w i t h d r a w s i t s combat f o r c e s from Kampuchea. Support t h e s e l e c t i v e arming of communist China a g a i n s t t h e USSR, p r o v i d e d g u a r a n t e e s c a n be o b t a i n e d t h a t C h i n a w i l l n o t u s e t h e s e arms a g a i n s t any o t h e r c o u n t r y t h a n t h e USSR. Expand t h e Rim o f t h e P a c i f i c (RIMPAC) n a v a l e x e r c i s e s t o i n c l u d e ASEAN m e m b e r s and S o u t h K o r e a , i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e c u r r e n t U . S . , C a n a d i a n , and ANZUS f o r c e s and J a p a n e s e o b s e r v e r s . S u p p o r t m o r e l i b e r a l i z e d t r a d e i n t h e a r e a among A s i a n - P a c i f i c c o u n t r i e s , based on G e n e r a l Agreement on T r a d e and T a r i f f (GATT) p r i n c i p l e s o f m u t u a l b e n e f i t and n o n d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s o as t o open m a r k e t s t o a l l A s i a n - P a c i f i c c o u n t r i e s t h a t promote o r d e r l y e c o m o n i c and p o l i t i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t .

CONCLUSION The management of A s i a n - P a c i f i c s e c u r i t y in t h e f u t u r e must r e a c h beyond p r e v i o u s l y m e c h a n i s t i c a p p l i c a t i o n s o f g e o s t r a t e g i c t a c t i c s and i n s t e a d s h o u l d a c t i v e l y p l a n t h e d e s i r e d f u t u r e p o l i t i c a l , e c o n o m i c , and m i l i t a r y c o n t o u r s of t h e r e g i o n . The k e y c r i t e r i a f o r a l l i e d p o l i c y p l a n n i n g must be c o n t i n u e d d e t e r r e n c e o f t h e USSR and p r o m o t i o n o f e q u i t a b l e e c o n o m i c p r o g r e s s among f r i e n d s . S e c u r i t y r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and m i l i t a r y b u r d e n - s h a r i n g need t o be made m o r e r e f l e c t i v e o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l A s i a n - P a c i f i c n a t i o n ' s a c t u a l and e m e r g i n g capabilities. In t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s , t h e A s i a n - P a c i f i c r e g i o n p r o b a b l y h a s t h e m o s t p r o m i s i n g f u t u r e o f any a r e a in t h e world. C r e a t i v e d i p l o m a c y , m a r k e t economi c s , l i b e r a l i z e d p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m s , and r e a l i s m i n s e c u r i t y m a t t e r s w i l l be t h e e s s e n t i a l i n g r e d i e n t s i n f u l f i l l i n g t h i s p r o m i s e i n t h e y e a r s ahead.

Appendices

APPENDIX A.

U.S. PACOM Area Military Personnel, December 31, 1984

Location Alaska American Samoa Australia Bangladesh Burma China Diego Garcia Guam/TTPI Hawaii (incl. afloat) Hong Kong India Indonesia Japan Johnston Island Korea Malaysia Midway Island Nepal New Zealand Philippines Singapore Sri Lanka Thailand Afloat/Embarked 7th Fleet 3rd Fleet USPACOM Conus Forces Ashore Conus Total

USA 21 2 22 2 3 5 91 19,,268 12 5 13 2,,633 147 29,,232 6 2 2 56 3 62

51,,587

USN

USAF

USMC

Total

850

3

159

401

297

8 6 6 11

1,,033 2 728 8 11 22 1,,334 9,,036 57,,512 43 33 51 45,,646 152 40,,462 17 13 8 68 14,,910 29 9 113

3 1,,321 4,,621 22,,907 14 3 14 7,,850 362 1 13 50 5,,034 14 3 9

2 3 13 3 ,947 , 6,,614 6 5 13 14,,597 5 10,,806 2 10 9,,193 3 29

377 8,,723 11 20 11 20,,566 62 8 6 6 627 9 6 13

16,,880 79,,185

2,,775

19,,655 79,,185

38,,035

41,,935

79,,970

75 ,345

350,,050

177,,570

45,,548

Source: DOD Report "Worldwide Manpower Distribution by Geographic Area," USPACOM AREA DOD Personnel, assigned as of 31 December 1984, Source: J13, Unclassified, p. 23. 263

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Contributors

L a w r e n c e E. G r i n t e r i s p r o f e s s o r o f n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y a f f a i r s , A i r Command and S t a f f C o l l e g e a t Maxwell Air Force Base. He h a s p u b l i s h e d w i d e l y i n h i s f i e l d and u n d e r t a k e n numerous s t u d i e s f o r t h e N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , t h e o f f i c e of t h e S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n s e , and t h e J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f . Young Whan K i h 1 i s p r o f e s s o r of p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e a t Iowa S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y . He h a s w r i t t e n and c o a u t h o r e d s e v e r a l books i n c l u d i n g World T r a d e I s s u e s : Reg i m e , S t r u c t u r e and Pol i c y . M a r i a n L e i g h t o n i s an a n a l y s t w i t h t h e D e f e n s e I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency. S h e h a s worked as a f r e e l a n c e S o v i e t s p e c i a l i s t f o r R a d i o L i b e r t y and h a s p u b l i s h e d w i d e l y on S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y and international relat ions. M i c h a e l McKi n l e y i s a l e c t u r e r i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s and s t r a t e g i c s t u d i e s i n t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f P o l i t i c s at t h e U n i v e r s i t y of Western A u s t r a l i a . L e i f R. R o s e n b e r g e r i s a S o v i e t f o r e i g n a f f a i r s s p e c i a l i s t with t h e D e f e n s e I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency. From 1979 t o 1980 he was a s p e c i a l l e c t u r e r i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s at Providence C o l l e g e . S h e l d o n W. S i m o n i s p r o f e s s o r of p o l i t i c a l and d i r e c t o r of t h e C e n t e r f o r A s i a n S t u d i e s a t S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y i n Tempe, A r i z o n a .

science Arizona

R o b e r t S u t t e r i s a s p e c i a l i s t in Asian a f f a i r s with t h e C o n g r e s s i o n a l Research S e r v i c e of t h e L i b r a r y of Congress. He h a s h e l d a s s i g n m e n t s with t h e Department o f S t a t e , t h e S e n a t e F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e , and t h e C e n t r a l I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency. 273

274

W i l l i am T. Tow i s an a s s i s t a n t p r o f e s s o r of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s at the U n i v e r s i t y of Southern C a l i fornia. He h a s w r i t t e n w i d e l y on E a s t A s i a n s e c u r i t y and U.S. f o r e i g n and s t r a t e g i c a p p r o a c h e s t o t h e A s i a n Pacif i c . W i l l i am S . Tu r 1 e y i s an a s s o c i a t e p r o f e s s o r o f p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e at Southern I l l i n o i s U n i v e r s i t y , Carbondale. He was a Ford F o u n d a t i o n R e s e a r c h A s s o c i a t e i n Vietnam from 1972 t o 1 9 7 3 , and a K e n n e d y - F u l b r i g h t P r o f e s s o r a t C h u l a l o n g k o r n U n i v e r s i t y , Bangkok, from 1982 to 1984. D o n a l d E. W e a t h e r b e e i s t h e Donald S. R u s s e l l P r o f e s s o r of Contemporary F o r e i g n P o l i c y a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y of South C a r o l i n a . He was a F u l b r i g h t F e l l o w a t t h e I n s t i t u t e of S o u t h e a s t Asian S t u d i e s , S i n g a p o r e , from 1 9 8 1 t o 1 9 8 2 , and h a s p u b l i s h e d w i d e l y on S o u t h e a s t Asian a f f a i r s .

Index

A b d u l K a d i r S h e i k h F a d z i r , 219 A b e , S h i n t a r o , 60, 140, 141 ADEX exercises, 216-217 A f g h a n i s t a n , 58, 6 3 , 67, 121 i n v a s i o n o f , 6, 1 0 8 , 118 m i l i t a r y p o w e r , 2, 20 S o v i e t t r o o p s in, 4 , 5, 6 6 , 82, 116, 253 A i r S e l f - D e f e n s e F o r c e (ASDF) (Japan), 135 Albinski, Henry, 41 A l i y e v , G e i d a r , 66, 67, 162 A n d a m a n Sea, 1 4 0 A n d e r s e n A i r F o r c e B a s e , 39 A n d r o p o v , Y u r i , 6 7 , 90, 116, 117 A p r a h a r b o r , 39 A q u i n o , B e n i g n o , 39, 70 A r k h i p o v , Ivan, 5 7 - 5 8 , 68, 7 3 , 117, 118 A r m a c o s t , M i c h a e l , 55, 2 3 4 - 2 3 5 Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), 2 1 1 - 2 1 2 A r m i t a g e , R i c h a r d , 94 A s s o c i a t i o n of South East A s i a n N a t i o n s (ASEAN), 1, 20, 21, 68, 69, 1 3 3 , 1 3 9 - 1 4 1 , 1 4 4 , 1 7 8 , 185, 1 8 7 - 1 9 0 , 193, 1 9 5 197, 1 9 8 ( n 2 7 ) , 2 0 1 - 2 2 1 , 2 5 3 , 259, 261 C h i n e s e p o l i c y , 98 d e f e n s e , 3 7 , 74, 2 0 2 - 2 0 3 e c o n o m y , 10, 36 Great Power relations, 79 military relationships, 216217 Soviet policy,

94-95

275

t r a d e w i t h U n i t e d S t a t e s , 10, 21, 36 United States military assistance, 83-84 U n i t e d States policy, 35-40, 828 6 , 201 A s i a n D e v e l o p m e n t B a n k , 115 A t s u g i , U . S . a i r b a s e a t , 154 A u s t r a l i a , 1, 217 A N Z U S t r e a t y , 2 2 5 - 2 4 7 , 256 defense, 237-238, 240-244 A u s t r a l i a n L a b o u r p a r t y (ALP), 235, 2 3 9 , 242 Australia-New Zealand-United S t a t e s (ANZUS) t r e a t y , 8, 1 5 ( n l 9 ) , 21, 4 0 - 4 3 , 72, 81, 132, 2 2 5 - 2 4 7 , 256 B a b e l t h u a p h a r b o r , 39 B a i k a l - A m u r M a i n l i n e (BAM), 52 B a l d r i d g e , M a l c o l m , 30 B a l l , D e s m o n d , 2 2 6 , 241 B a s h i C h a n n e l , 134 B e a z l e y , K i m , 227 B e r r y , C o l . W i l l i a m , 88 B o v i n , A l e k s a n d r , 62 B r e z h n e v , L e o n i d I l y i c h , 90, 9 3 , 117 Brezhnev d o c t r i n e of limited s o v e r e i g n t y , 107 B r z e z i n s k i , Z b i g n i e w , 29, 108 B r o w n , H a r o l d , 29 B r u n e i , 1, 3, 10, 35, 2 0 1 , 207, 208, 2 1 9 , 2 5 5 C a m R a n h B a y , 4 - 6 , 36, 5 4 - 5 5 , 64, 6 8 , 7 3 , 7 4 , 8 4 , 8 5 , 91, 92, 117, 1 2 9 , 153

276 C a m b o d i a , 1, 58, 140, 1 7 9 - 1 8 0 m i l i t a r i z a t i o n o f , 2, 19, 20 V i e t n a m e s e i n v a s i o n , 64, 6 5 , 180 V i e t n a m e s e w a r e f f o r t , 66, 68, 73-74 V i e t n a m e s e w i t h d r a w a l , 68 C a m p C a s e y , 8, 154 C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 4 , 8, 20, 253, 254 A S E A N p o l i c y , 85, 213 C h i n a p o l i c y , 29 J a p a n p o l i c y , 136, 1 4 7 ( n 3 4 ) K o r e a p o l i c y , 12, 3 1 - 3 2 , 1 5 5 Ceausescu, Nicolae, 76(nl6) C e n t r a l C o m m a n d , U . S . , 138 C h e j u Do, 143 C h e r n e n k o , K o n s t a n t i n , 63, 6 7 6 8 , 90, 116, 117, 140, 162 C h i n a , 3, 259 A S E A N p o l i c y , 70, 1 7 9 C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n , 2, 105, 1 7 9 , 187 e c o n o m y , 10, 255 foreign policy, 105-115 m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h , 2, 96, 154 North Korea policy, 156-157 Northern Fleet, 163 s e c u r i t y p o l i c y , 1 0 5 - 1 1 3 , 120 Southeast Asia policy, 95-100, 179 Soviet policy, 96-98, 106-109, 112, 115, 118, 257 Thailand policy, 70 United States policy, 27-31, 96-98, 108-109, 113-115, 120122 C h u n D o o H w a n , 32, 33, 142, 1 6 3 - 1 6 4 , 1 6 7 - 1 6 8 , 259 Clark Air Base, 6, 8, 38-39, 71, 87, 89, 259 C l o s e r A N Z A C R e l a t i o n s (CAR), 237, 243-244 C o m i n t e r n , 181, 1 8 2 , 183 Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), 91, 208 C o m m i t t e e for I n t e r n a t i o n a l T r a d e U n i o n U n i t y (CITUU), 72 Communism, in Indochina, 1811 8 3 , 187, 1 8 9 , 193 in the P h i l i p p i n e s , 6 9 - 7 0 C o m m u n i s t m o v e m e n t , 118 C o m m u n i s t p a r t y o f the

Corner, Frank 226 C o u n c i l for M u t u a l E c o n o m i c A s s i s t a n c e , 6 , 96, 192 C r o w e , W i l l i a m , 208 C u m i n g s , B r u c e , 170 Czechoslovakia, Soviet invasion, 107 D a l r y m p l e , R a w d o n , 233 Da Nang, Soviet military p r e s e n c e , 36, 55, 9 1 , 1 2 9 Defense Communications Unit, New Zealand, 239-240 D e f e n s e W h i t e P a p e r (Japan), 128 D e m i l i t a r i z e d Z o n e (DMZ) (Korea), 2, 32, 1 5 3 , 1 5 4 , 161, 1 7 1 , 258 Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo, 165 Democratic People's Republic of K o r e a (DPRK), 3 2 - 3 3 , 156 See also North Korea D e m o c r a t i c S o c i a l i s t p a r t y (DSP) (Japan), 137 D e n g V a n T i e n , 67 D e n g X i a o p i n g , 57, 65, 6 8 , 73, 106, 110, 1 2 3 ( n l 4 ) , 1 4 6 ( n l 5 ) , 157, 259 D i e g o G a r c i a , 82 Diokno, Jose, 100(nil) D i p l o m a t i c B l u e b o o k (Japan), 128 D o n g P h a m V a n , 67 D o l g i k h , V l a d i m i r , 68 8 t h a r m y , U . S . , 154 E m e r y , D a v i d , 242 E t o r o f u , 54 Exclusive Economic Zone 2 0 4 , 2 0 8 , 2 1 0 , 211

(EEZ),

Fakuda, Takeo, 139 F a l k l a n d I s l a n d s W a r , 99 F a r E a s t e r n C o m m a n d , U S S R , 143 5 t h a i r f o r c e (U.S.), 7, 33 F i r s t I n d o c h i n a W a r , 93 Five Power Defense Arrangement, 2 0 7 , 2 1 6 , 232 F o r c e I m p r o v e m e n t P l a n (FIP) I (1976-1982) (ROK), 1 5 9 F o r c e I m p r o v e m e n t P l a n (FIP) II (1982-1987) (ROK), 1 5 7 , 159 F o r w a r d D e f e n s e S t r a t e g y , 238 F o u r t h M a l a y s i a n P l a n (19811985), 203, 205 F r a n c e , 1 8 3 , 1 8 4 , 228, 2 3 3 , P h i l i p p i n e s (CPP), 6 9 - 7 0 2 3 4 , 246 Comprehensive National Security c o l o n i a l r u l e in I n d o c h i n a , T a s k F o r c e (1980) (Japan), 1 4 0 181-182, 184-185

277 colonial rule in New Caledonia, See also Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam 227, 228, 246 Indochina Communist Party (ICP), Fung-wai, Francis Lai, 142 181-184 Futenma, U.S. air base, 7, 154 Indonesia, 1, 35, 82-83, 201, 208212, 218-219, 240, 241, 255, 259 "Gang of Five," 9, 255 Area Commands (KODAM), 210 General Agreement on Trade and Army Strategic Command (KOSTRAD), Tariff (GATT), 261 209 Geneva Agreements (1954), 93 Naval Area Commands (KODAL), 210 Goh Chok Tong, 207 Theater Commands (KOWILHAN), 209 Goh Keng Swee, 202 Indonesian Air Force (AURI), 210Gorbachev, Mikhail, 68, 73, 74, 211 109, 119, 156 Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI), Great Powers, 79-100, 178, 254208-211 255 Indonesian Navy (ALRI), 210 See also China, Soviet Union, Integrated Air Defense System United States (IADS), 216-217 Gromyko, Andrei, 60, 63, 73, 94 International Conference on Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) Kampuchea (UN), 37 (Japan), 135 International Conference on Peace Guam, 6, 7, 39, 86-87, 88, 89 and Security in East Asia and Guidelines for Defense the Pacific, 71 Cooperation, 136 Iran-Iraq war, 141, 243 Gulf of Thailand, 55, 91, 214 Ishibashi, Masashi, 137 Gulf of Tonkin, 55 Israel, arms supply to PRC, 47(n41) Iwakuni, U.S. air base, 154 Haig, Alexander M., Jr., 27, 29, 46 (n26), 46(n28) Japan, 1, 125-144, 188-189, 256 Haiphong Harbor, mining of, 93 defense, 24-25, 126, 133-136, 255 Hawke, Robert, 235, 236, 242 economy, 2, 3, 10, 255, 256 Hayden, Bill, 234, 241 Korea policy, 142-143, 155-156 Heng Samrin, 65 non-nuclear policy, 131-132 Hiroshima, 131 security, 20-21, 125-144 Hitam, Musa, 204, 219 Self-Defense Forces (SDF), 25, Ho Chi Minh, 181 126, 133, 137, 141, 154 Ho Chi Minh Trail, 184, 192 Soviet policy, 128-130, 140 Hokkaido, 5, 128, 135 Soviet troops in, 5 Holdridge, John, 22 U.S. bilateral defense pact, 8 Holyoake, Keith, 245 U.S. military forces in, 6, 137 Hu Na, 115 U.S. policy, 22-27, 126-144 Hu Yaobang, 76(nl6), 118, 157, U.S. trade, 20, 22-24 161-162 Vietnam policy, 188-189 Huang Hua, 117 Japan Defense Agency (JDA), 25, Hussein Onn, 204 129, 133, 154 Japanese Diet, 12, 132, 137 Indian Ocean, 82-83, 88, 91, Japanese Socialist party (JSP), 115, 129, 137, 140 137 Indochina, 2, 181-185, 201, 258 Japan-U.S. Systems and Technology collapse of governments, 107 Forum, 138 communist revolutions, 2, 201 Joint Communique (U.S.-China), 28 Great Power relations, 79, 177- Joint Communique of North-South 197 Dialogue (Korea), 171 Soviet aid to, 6 Joint Military Technology U.S. foreign policy, 82-86 Commission, 138 U.S. withdrawal from, 2, 253 Jusuf, Mohamad Andi, 209

278 K a d e n a , U . S . a i r b a s e , 7, 154 K a m p u c h e a , 6, 30, 6 6 - 6 7 , 94, 2 2 0 , 258 military occupation by Vietnam, 6, 20, 3 5 - 3 8 , 85, 96, 1 1 6 , 2 5 3 , 258 Kanak Socialist National L i b e r a t i o n F r o n t , 72 K a p i t s a , M i k h a i l , 63, 68, 161, 162 K e r d p h o l , S a i y u d , 213 K h m e r R o u g e , 36, 67, 8 6 , 96, 98, 1 7 7 - 1 7 8 , 184, 188, 1 9 3 1 9 6 , 257 K i m C h o n g Pil, 33 K i m D a e J u n g , 33 K i m I l - S u n g , 32, 33, 6 2 - 6 4 , 1 1 8 , 119, 1 2 9 , 140, 1 5 3 , 157, 160-162, 167-168, 259 K i m J o n g - I l , 33, 64, 157, 1 6 1 , 168, 259 K i m Y o u n g N a m , 63, 162 K i m Y o u n g Sam, 33 K i r i b a t i , 228 K i s s i n g e r , H e n r y , 34, 1 8 1 Komeito, 137 K o m p o n g Som, 55 K o r e a n P e n i n s u l a , 2, 5, 3 1 - 3 5 , 151-172 m i l i t a r y p o w e r , 2, 34, 1 5 7 - 1 5 9 nuclear weapons on, 34-35 unification, 167-170, 171-172 See a l s o D e m o c r a t i c P e o p l e ' s Republic of Korea, North Korea, Republic of Korea, South Korea K o r e a n W a r ( 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 5 3 ) , 1, 7, 80, 1 2 5 , 152, 169, 225 K o r e a n W o r k e r s p a r t y (KWP), 160 K u n s a n , 154 K u r i l e I s l a n d s , 5 3 - 5 4 , 128 K w a n g j u U p r i s i n g (1980), 168 Lake, Anthony, 86 L a k e B a i k a l , 2 5 , 129, 154 L a n g e , D a v i d , 4 2 , 61, 71, 2 3 0 2 3 1 , 235, 236, 244, 2 4 5 L a o s , 1, 6 6 - 6 7 , 1 7 9 , 2 5 7 , 258 m i l i t a r i z a t i o n o f , 2, 19, 35 L a R o c q u e , A d m . G e n e , 88 Le D u e Tho, 181, 193 Lee H s i e n L o o n g , 206, 217 Lee K u a n Y e w , 206, 2 1 7 , 259 Lehman, John, 30 L e v c h e n k o , S t a n i s l a v , 61, 7 0 Li X i a n n i a n , 30

L i b e r a l D e m o c r a t i c p a r t y (LDP) (Japan), 24, 1 3 3 , 137 L i n B i a o , 106, 107, 109 L i s b o n D e c l a r a t i o n (NATO), 1 2 5 Lombok Strait, 82-83 L o n g , A d m . R o b e r t , 25 L o n g , G i a , 193 M c l n t y r e , D a v i d , 245 M a h a t h i r , M o h a m a d , 139, 206 M a k a s s a r S t r a i t , 83 M a l a k a l h a r b o r , 39 M a l a y s i a , 1, 35, 1 3 9 , 2 0 1 , 2 0 3 2 0 6 , 2 1 8 - 2 1 9 , 232, 255 M a l a y s i a n A r m e d F o r c e s (MAF), 203-204 Malaysian-Indonesian Border A g r e e m e n t , 219 M a l i k , A d a m , 217 M a n i l a P a c t , 8, 1 5 ( n l 9 ) , 2 1 3 M a o Z e d o n g , 106, 110 M a r c o s , F e r d i n a n d , 39, 70, 8 1 - 8 2 M a r i t i m e S e l f - D e f e n s e F o r c e (MSDF) (Japan), 1 3 4 - 1 3 5 M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t i d e o l o g y , 180, 186-187 M e k o n g B a s i n , 1 7 8 , 179, 1 9 2 , 195 M i d - T e r m D e f e n s e P r o g r a m (Japan), 25 M i s a w a A i r B a s e , 143, 154 Moerdani, Gen. Benny, 209, 2102 1 1 , 215, 218 M o n g o l i a , 58, 66, 1 1 6 , 1 1 7 , 118 M u G u a n g r e n , 97 N a g a s a k i , 131 N a j i n , 153 N a k a s o n e , Y a s u h i r o , 25, 5 9 - 6 0 , 7 4 , 115, 1 3 1 - 1 3 2 , 135, 139, 1 4 1 - 1 4 3 , 1 4 6 ( n l 5 ) , 1 4 9 ( n 5 7 ) , 1 6 4 , 189 National Defense Program Outline (Japan), 133, 136 N a t i o n a l D e m o c r a t i c F r o n t , 70, 71 Naval Ocean Surveillance I n f o r m a t i o n C e n t e r (NOSIC), 240 Naval Operational Intelligence C e n t e r (NOIC), 240 N e w C a l e d o n i a , 2 2 7 , 228, 2 4 6 N e w P e o p l e ' s A r m y (NPA) (the P h i l i p p i n e s ) , 39, 6 9 - 7 0 , 1 9 0 , 2 1 2 , 259 N e w Z e a l a n d , 1, 217 A N Z U S t r e a t y , 2 2 5 - 2 4 7 , 256 defense, 237-240 n o n - n u c l e a r p o l i c y , 4 2 , 4 3 , 72, 1 3 2 , 2 2 9 - 2 3 4 , 2 4 3 , 246

279 New Zealand Labour party, 229232, 234 Ngah, Mohammad, 218 Nicaragua, 63 19th support command, U.S., 154 Ning Hong, Yeo, 217-218 Nixon, Richard M., 81, 93, 107 Nixon Doctrine, 112 Non-nuclear policy Japan, 131-132 New Zealand, 42-43, 72, 132, 229-234, 243, 246 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 60-61, 112, 125, 126, 138, 155 North Korea, 1, 259 Communist revolutions, 2 economy, 159, 255 military power, 157-159, 161162, 172 (n3) security concerns, 160-163, 257 South Korea policy, 165-167 See also Democratic People's Republic of Korea North West Cape, 42, 241-243 Northern Territories (Japan), 5, 54, 62, 128, 129 Nuclear-free zone Korean Peninsula, 35, 154 South Pacific, 72, 132-133, 227-233 Nuclear weapons, 129-132 on Korean Peninsula, 34-35 Nunn, Sam, 80 Nunn Resolution, 126 Nurrungar, 42, 241, 243 Oceania, 1, 227-229 O'Flynn, Frank, 230, 248 (nl3) Okinawa, U.S. bases, 6, 86-87, 88, 143, 154 Okita, Saburo, 137, 138 Olympics, 1988 Summer, 168 Ombai Strait, 82-83 O'Neill, Thomas, 116 Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 168 Osan, 154 Pacific Conference of Churches, 72 Pacific Fleet. See Soviet Pacific Fleet

Pacific Trade Union Forum (PTUF), 72 Palau, 39, 88 Palmer, Geoffrey, 231-232 Papua New Guinea, 240 Paracels, the, 99 Park Chung Hee, 33 People's Liberation Army (PLA), 91, 96 People's Republic of China (PRC), 1, 106, 156, 225 See also China Perle, Richard, 129 Persian Gulf, 9, 115, 129 Petropavlovsk, 4, 52 Petrov, Vasily, 162 Phak Mai, 95 Philippines, the, 1, 35, 201, 211212, 258-259 U.S. bases in, 69-70, 71, 86-88, 190, 217 See also Clark Air Base, Subic Bay Naval Base U.S. bilateral defense pact, 8 Philippine Communist party (PKP), 69 Philippine Peace and Solidarity Council, 71 Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Board (MDB), 211 Philippine-U.S. mutual security agreement, 81-82 Pimentel, Aquilino, 100 (nil) Pine Gap, 42, 241-242, 243 Pol Pot, 188, 194, 199 (n45) See also Khmer Rouge Pollack, Jonathan, 97 Prem Tinsula-Nond, 213, 215 Rainbow Warrior, sinking, 233, 234 Ranai Air Force Base, 211 Rangoon, 32, 35, 64, 161, 164, 174(n56), 260 Rapid Deployment Force, 82, 138 See also Central Command Reagan, Ronald, 12, 21, 164-165, 213, 215 visit to China, 30, 57, 118 Reagan administration ANZUS policy, 234-235, 246 ASEAN policy, 85, 213 Asian-Pacific policy, 19-22, 253, 254 China policy, 27, 29, 113-114, 116

280 Japan policy, 131, 136, 143, 147(n35) Korea policy, 31-32, 155 Soviet policy, 108, 115 Strategic Defense Initiative, 243 Red Cross, 165, 166 Red Guard (China), 105 Republic of Korea (ROK) defense forces, 154 U.S. bilateral defense pact, 8 See also South Korea Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), 138, 261 ROC-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, 8, 15(nl9) Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), 240 Royal Brunei Air Force (RBAF), 208 Royal Lao Army, 184 Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF), 238 Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN), 230, 248(nl3) Royal Thai Armed Forces, 212-214 Royal Thai Army (RTA), 213 Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), 54, 59, 152 Saigon, fall of, 9 Sakhalin Island, 5, 163 Salonga, Jovita, 100(nil,13) Sasebo, 60, 154 Saudi Arabia, 141 Schlesinger, James, 35 Sea of Japan, 52, 64, 153, 257, 259, 261 Sea of Okhotsk, 54 Second Indochina War, 80, 81, 85, 93, 177, 184 2nd infantry, U.S., 8, 33, 154 Second Strategic Development Plan (Indonesia), 208 Self-Defense Forces (SDF) (Japan), 25, 126, 133, 137, 141, 154 Sembawang Shipyard, 89 7th Fleet, U.S., 6, 7, 65, 82, 88, 89, 90, 92, 134, 154 Shafie, Ghazali, 95 Shanghai, 162 Shevardnadze, Eduard, 63, 73 Shiite revolution in Iran, 82 Shultz, George, 9, 19, 21, 29, 30, 36, 38, 73-74

Siberian Intervention, 53 Sihanouk, Noradom, 184, 199(n45) Singapore, 1, 35, 39, 74, 201, 206-208, 215, 219, 232, 259 economy, 2, 10 military assistance to, 84, 215 Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), 206-207 Sino-Japanese peace treaty (1978), 53, 253 Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), 152 Sino-Soviet dispute, 56, 163, 178, 187, 257, 258, 260 Sino-Soviet trade agreement, 118 Sino-Soviet treaty, expiration, 66, 253 Smirnov, Boris, 70 Soekarno, Achmad, 36, 256 Solarz proposal, 86 Solomon Islands, 72 South China Sea, 36, 88, 95, 129, 191, 201, 205-206, 210-212, 218, 258 South Korea, 1, 20, 259 economy, 2, 33, 159, 256 military power, 157-159, 172(n3), 256 North Korea policy, 165-167 security concerns, 160, 163-165 U.S. military force in, 6 U.S. withdrawal, 12, 31-32, 47 (n46), 160, 161, 163, 166 See also Republic of Korea South Sea Fleet, 99 South Pacific Forum, 132, 228 South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone (SPNFZ), 227-228, 233, 234 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 8, 189 Soviet Pacific Fleet, 2, 5, 19, 25, 52, 54, 89, 90-92, 95, 99, 129, 143, 152-153, 256 Soviet Union Australia policy, 71-73 bases in Vietnam, 54-55, 58, 72 China policy, 56-57, 67-68, 73, 106, 112, 116, 118 economic aid agreement with Laos, 93 Japan policy, 56, 58-62, 128-130 militarization of, 2, 53-55, 74 military forces in Asian-Pacific region, 3, 4, 6-8, 10-11, 25, 4344, 90-95, 116, 119, 128-129, 140 military forces on Sino-Soviet border, 30-31, 107, 116, 119

281 New Zealand policy, 71-73 North Korea policy, 62-64, 152-156, 160-162 Philippines policy, 69-71 transportation routes, 52-53 Vietnam policy, 64-69 Soviet-Vietnam Friendship Treaty (1978), 64-67, 93, 96 Soya Strait, 25, 52, 134, 143 Spratly Islands, 36, 99, 205, 212, 258 Sri Lanka, 63 Standard Defense Force Concept (Japan), 133 Stoessel, Walter, 20, 27, 32 Strait of Malacca, 65, 82-83, 88, 92, 140, 218 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 131, 243 Subic Bay Naval Base, 6, 8, 3839, 71, 87, 259 Suharto, Gen., 202, 217, 259 Sunda Strait, 82-83 Suwon, 154 Suzuki, Zenko, 45(nl9), 59, 136, 139

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (1978), 64, 65, 66-67, 93, 96 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, 155 Truong Chinh, 68 Tsugaru Strait, 25, 52, 134, 143 Tsushima Strait, 25, 52, 54, 134, 143, 152, 153 Tumen River, 153 Tuna fishing rights. South Pacific, 227, 228, 233, 246

Unggi, 153 United Nations Command, 33, 155 United States ANZUS treaty, 225-247, 256 arms sales to China, 28 ASEAN policy, 35-40, 82-86, 261 Asian-Pacific policy, 3, 43-44, 260-261 China policy, 27-31, 120-122, 261 Indochina policy, 82-86 Indonesia policy, 241 Japan policy, 22-27, 115, 126144, 225 Korea policy, 170 Taegu, 154 military forces in Asian-Pacific Tan Sri Zain Hashim, 205 region, 3-4, 6-9, 14(nl4), 86Tengah Air Field, 89 89, 129, 154 Tet Offensive, 7 military forces in Korea, 154-155 Thach, Nguyen Co, 140, 193 Philippines policy, 38-40, 212 Thai Air Force, 214 South Korea policy, 154-155 Thai Communist party, 69 Southeast Asia policy, 80-81 Thailand, 1, 8, 35, 36, 74, 180, Soviet policy, 108, 115-116 195-196, 201, 212-215, 255 Thailand policy, 213 China policy, 70 trade relations, 3, 22-24, 36, economy, 10 80-81, 82 United States Forces, Japan U.S. military assistance to, (USFJ), 137-138 84-85, 214 U.S.-Japan alliance, 81 U.S. withdrawal from, 2 U.S.-Japan military collaboration, 3rd marine division, U.S., 138 59 Third Nuclear-Free Pacific U.S.-Japanese Mutual Assistance Conference, 72 Agreement (1983), 138 Third World, 63, 82, 84, 96, 98, 108, 111, 112, 144, 186, 187, U.S.-Japenese Mutual Cooperation and Security treaty, 15(nl9), 255, 256 126, 131-133, 136-138, 144 13th air force, U.S., 8, 89 U.S. National Committee for 314th air division, U.S., 154 Three Revolution Team (North Pacific Economic Cooperation, 12 Korea), 168 U.S.-Philippines alliance, 69, 81 Tinian Island, 39, 88 U.S.-ROK Joint Combined Forces, Tito, Marshal, 34 8, 155 Tolentino, Thinsulinonda, 218 U.S.-South Korea alliance, Trans-Siberian Railway, 52 81

282

U.S.-South Korea Mutual S e c u r i t y T r e a t y (1954), 1 5 5 U.S .-Thailand alliance, 81 U . S . S . B u c h a n a n , 230, 2 3 4 , 236 U s t i n o v , D m i t r i , 67 Vance, Cyrus, 108 Vanuatu, ban on nuclear v e s s e l s , 72 V e r , G e n . F a b i a n , 39 V e s s e y , G e n . J o h n W. , 30, 47(n46) V i e t M i n h , 183, 184 V i e t n a m , 1, 58, 140, 1 7 7 - 1 9 7 , 202, 220 e c o n o m y , 10 m i l i t a r i z a t i o n , 2, 19, 96, 190-191 S o v i e t a i d to, 2, 6 , 8 4 - 8 5 , 93, 94, 96, 257 S o v i e t b a s e s in, 5 4 - 5 5 , 58, 72 See a l s o C a m R a n h B a y , D a N a n g U . S . w i t h d r a w a l f r o m , 64 V i e t n a m C o m m u n i s t p a r t y (VCP), 181 V i e t n a m W a r , 1, 7, 6 9 , 245 V i e t n a m W o r k e r ' s p a r t y , 184 V l a d i v o s t o k , 4, 52, 91, 92, 117, 152, 188 V o N g u y e n G i a p , 183

W a l t z , K e n n e t h , 80 W a n Li, 117 W a r s a w T r e a t y O r g a n i z a t i o n (WTO), 155 Watanabe, Keitaro, 142-143 W e i n b e r g e r , C a s p a r , 2 1 - 2 2 , 29, 30, 7 5 ( n l 3 ) , 136 W e s t , F r a n c i s J., J r . , 25, 1 4 7 ( n 3 5 ) " W h i t e p a p e r " 1 9 8 3 (Japan), 154 W o l f o w i t z , P a u l , 21, 23, 2 4 , 3 9 4 0 , 4 2 - 4 3 , 241 W o o d s i d e , A l e x a n d e r , 193 W o r l d C o u n c i l of C h u r c h e s , 72 W o r l d F e d e r a t i o n of T r a d e U n i o n s (WFTU), 70, 72 W o r l d P e a c e C o u n c i l (WPC), 71 W o r l d W a r II, 1, 7, 4 1 , 54, 59, 1 2 7 , 171, 240 Yao Yilin, 73 Y o k o s u k a , J a p a n , 89, 154 Yokosuka-Yokohama naval complex, Y o k o t a A i r B a s e , 7, 154 Y o m K i p p u r W a r , 243 Z h a n g A i p i n g , 30 Z h a o Z i y a n g , 30, 57, 157 Z h o u E n l a i , 106, 107, 109, 110 Zone of Peace, Freedom, a n d N e u t r a l i t y (ZOPFAN), 9 5 , 1 4 2 , 1 8 9 , 1 9 8 ( n 2 7 ) , 220

7